Contributions to
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT,
PEACE ECONOMICS
AND DEVELOPMENT

VOLUME 2

MILITARY MISSIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS RECONSIDERED: THE AFTERMATH OF SEPTEMBER 11TH

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GIUSEPPE CAFORIO AND GERHARD KÜMMEL

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SERIES EDITOR

MANAS CHATTERJI

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FOREWORD

The definition of a nation-state has changed markedly over the last 50 years. In developing nations, the process of state formation is following a similar pattern as Europe, where several long and brutal wars preceded the creation of the modern nation-states. In particular, the dissolution of Pakistan (formerly East and West Pakistan) in 1971, is an example of this volatile process, which is being repeated in many Asian, African, and even some European countries like Yugoslavia and the former Soviet republics. After the disintegration of Pakistan, the evolution of civilian–military relations in that nation presents an excellent case study about the civilian–military balance and directed democracy. The question that arises is whether this scenario, which started initially in some Southeast Asian countries such as Taiwan and Korea, will continue in the emerging countries in other parts of Asia and Africa. Only time will tell whether the institutional development of these fragile new nations will someday achieve the same stability as the developed world.

At the center of this inquiry is the role of the military. It was an important factor in the process of political consolidation in Europe. It played a crucial role in the First and Second World Wars and in subsequent conflicts. Today, the relationship between military and civilians in developed countries has reached a matured state. With advances in military technology, the modern war is not fought in the same way as its predecessors. As the world has become more globalized, there are fewer international wars and most violent confrontations are now fought inside the countries. Furthermore, diversity and ethnic differences in militaries themselves are more common. This trend is affecting the composition of armed forces and the motivation of the members to fight in internal wars. More and more women are also joining the military, and this creates new challenges. Thus, the culture of the military and the relationship between military and civilian families are rapidly changing.

In developed countries such as in the United States, we continue to see some problems with a volunteer army. Critics argue that a volunteer army relies heavily on the poor and the minorities. Some are now calling for the reintroduction of a draft. Alternatively, others are recommending a hired army to reduce the pressure on civilian leaders deciding to go to war.

In both, the developed and poor countries, military spending is an important factor for national and regional economy. There are serious disagreements among researchers whether military spending is helping or hindering socio-economic development. This is particularly true for the poor and developing countries, which are spending vast amounts of money on their militaries when their own people are starving. In the present era of nuclear and biochemical weaponry, the possibility of accidents and terrorism is also alarming the civilian population. Terrorism has changed the role of the military in man-made and natural disaster management and it poses a challenge to civil liberties. Before the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC, military spending was declining in the U.S. At that time, we faced the vexing problem of conversion from the military to civilian. At this time however, it is the reverse.

After the end of the cold war, humanitarian nongovernmental organizations were working with armed forces (under the command of the United Nations) in peacekeeping and initially there was some confusion about the role of the military in peacekeeping. In recent years, we see more coordination between humanitarian organizations and international armed forces and both the players are viewed as partners in conflict management and nation building.

The articles in this volume of our series address all of these fascinating questions and reflect the contributions of an outstanding group of international scholars. Taken together, they represent a new perspective on the future of the military and peace.

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Series Editor

PART I: INTRODUCTION

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INTRODUCTION

Giuseppe Caforio and Gerhard Kümmel

Since the suicide terrorist attacks of September Eleven, security issues have become more prominent again. There is also an increased interest in the military since the military was and still is seen as a major instrument in the so-called 'war on terror'. The current international situation has thus increased the importance, significance and urgency of a correct, broad-based research effort on the part of the social sciences to study the emergence and development of conflicts with an eye on the means of conflict resolution. In this context, it is also appropriate and necessary to analyse one, albeit ambivalent, instrument of conflict resolution, the armed forces. Today, the military is said to face new and broader tasks than in the past.

We, the Research Committee 01 on Armed Forces & Conflict Resolution (RC 01) within the International Sociological Association (ISA), felt and continue to feel both the duty and the opportunity to provide a body of high-profile studies and projects to the scientific community and to operators in the sector and have organised a large international meeting which took place in Ankara, Turkey, in July 2004. The meeting was attended by 75 speakers from 21 different countries, who dealt with various themes linked to the topic of this book in depth and in a dialectical exchange between different schools of thought.[1]

The contributions to this anthology represent the most important and pertinent contributions of that meeting which have been revised during the second half of 2004. They focus on the most recent developments in the military sphere and try to assess the impact of September Eleven and the

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new military missions' on the armed forces in terms of, inter alia, conflict management capabilities, social and psychological developments inside military units, recruitment and civil–military relations.

The book is composed of seven chapters, each devoted to a specific research topic. First comes a chapter on conflict resolution because the general trend and mood in developed countries is towards a prevention of war rather than towards its conduct and management. The next chapter is devoted to civil–military relations and presents the first results of an empirical, cross-national research project on the divide between the armed forces and their parent societies and on the cultural dimensions of this civil–military gap: it is a research study that involved, at that time,[2] 12 countries and its results show both some general trends, and some interesting national ones. Families and women are the subject of the following chapter, dealing with the integration of women in national armed forces and with the impact of war on women. This is followed by a chapter on various aspects of the transformation processes going on in militaries all over the world and a related chapter focussing on the motivation of soldiers in peace support operations. The next chapter deals with the question of the representation of the interests of military personnel and presents steps taken by different countries.

Last but not least, we present the most significant contributions from colleagues of our hosting country, Turkey. The importance of this chapter on the Turkish army in transition is twofold: first of all it represents a meaningful example of a transition process that is at work in many countries today. Second, it represents in some way the reason why we have chosen Turkey as the host country of our meeting. In fact, as it was pointed out by RC 01 President Giuseppe Caforio in his introductory speech, Turkey constitutes a bridge – geographic but also cultural – between Europe and Asia, and we wanted to make the best possible use of this bridge. An association like RC 01 has a distinctive nature, with respect to similar international organisations in the field, in its vocation for taking in and linking scholars of the military from every part of the world and promoting research on the military also in areas where it is somewhat less developed. Our membership data tell us that the countries of Asia, as well as those of Africa, are underrepresented in our RC. Holding a conference in a country that is certainly part of Europe but which at the same time is part of Asia, means laying the ground for a broadening of participation in RC 01. But there was a second reason for our enthusiastic acceptance of the Turkish authorities' offer to host the conference in Ankara because Turkey is about to become an integral part of the European Union. Therefore, we felt it was important

to increase the ties, which already exist, with the scholars of the military of this country. Integration of countries works if it does not stop at the formal level but extends to the cultural one, which may possibly precede formal integration.

In summary, the book represents a radiography of the state of the art in several research domains of the sociology of the military and covers current trends and developments. This endeavour would not have been possible without the help of many hands. First of all, we would like to thank the authors for investing their time and expertise in writing and revising their contributions. Next, we are grateful to Professor Manas Chatterji, Editor of the Elsevier Series Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development, for including our anthology in his series. Last, but not least, we are indebted to Jörn Thießen, Director and Professor of the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Research (SOWI), whose support was essential in bringing this book about, and to Antje Gust, Project Assistant at the SOWI, who diligently prepared the manuscript. May all their work find a large readership.

NOTES

1. As part of the International Sociological Association, RC 01 unites social science scholars interested in the military from all over the world. Our objectives are chiefly that of facilitating and maintaining contacts among specialists in this subject worldwide, stimulating research, especially cross-national one, and favouring the exchange of information, data, models and research methodologies. To achieve these goals, RC 01 carries out cross-national researches and publishes the results, issues a newsletter every 6 months to keep its members informed, participates in the World Congresses of the ISA and, every 4 years, organises its own international conferences like the one that was organised in Ankara.
2. Other countries joined the research project afterwards.

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PART II:
CONFLICT RESOLUTION

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MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND DEVELOPMENT

Manas Chatterji

1. INTRODUCTION

Although political conflict and war are as old as humanity itself, in the twentieth century, it peaked. In recent years, most of the conflicts were intrastate conflict rather than interstate conflict. A new element of terrorism has been associated with the conflict. These conflicts are not only resulting from internal political disturbances, it is also intermingled with ethnicity, resources, migration, and above all extreme poverty.

Although these low intensity conflicts are located in the developing countries, it has great potential damage to developed world. It is true that for these conflicts small arms are used. Proliferation of small arms, however, can lead to more terrorist attacks. Further some of these countries possess nuclear weapons. It makes more sense to attempt to anticipate these conflicts and prevent it. It usually leads to civil war and genocide as in the case of Rwanda and Barundi.

Conflict management and peace have always been of great interest to mankind since the earliest days of civilisation. Seeds of thought on these concepts are rooted in great religions. Applications of conflict management were initially investigated in a religious and ethical dimension and continued

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to be developed in theological literature. From time immemorial religious leaders and social transformers have persistently spread the gospel of peace and tranquility.

In modern times, the issues of peace and war have come to entail more than ethical or religious questions; they are interwoven in the social, economic, and political fabric of the global community. Therefore, it is vital that we develop a theoretical basis for conflict management and peace analysis and indicate how the techniques used in the social sciences can be applied to solve practical, real-life conflict problems; planning problems such as housing, transportation, and so forth; and of course, international relations.

There are many social scientists working in this area. Development of this concept has taken place in a number of directions. In the academic area, in recent years, the greatest contribution has come from peace studies, where learned societies were formed, books have been written, and international issues of peace and conflict are discussed at conferences. An overt expression of this interest culminated in peace movements that have been quite prominent in the second half of the twentieth century. Another area is Peace Economics and Peace Science.

Isard and Smith (1982) have developed some practical procedures to solve (or at least contain) conflicts. Some of them involving action, options, values, etc. are:

1. Procedures for Managing Conflicts over Outcomes Regarding Utility and/or Achievement of Objectives.
2. A SMALL Number of Options, Participants Can RANK Outcomes in Order of Preference, Need to Focus on IMPROVEMENTS, Can Focus Only on Actions.
3. A SMALL Number of Options, Participants Can RANK Outcomes in Order of Preference, Need to Focus on IMPROVEMENTS, Can Focus on OUTCOMES.
4. A SMALL Number of Options, Participants Can RANK Outcomes in Order of Preferences, Need to Focus on CONCESSIONS, Can Focus Only on Actions.
5. A SMALL Number of Options, Participants, Can RANK Outcomes in Order of Preference, Need to Focus on CONCESSIONS, Can Focus on OUTCOMES.
6. A SMALL Number of Options, Participants Can Assign RELATIVE VALUES to Outcomes, Need to Focus on IMPROVEMENTS, Can Focus on OUTCOMES.

7. A SMALL Number of Options, Participants Can Assign RELATIVE; VALUES to Outcomes, Need to Focus on IMPROVEMENTS, Can Focus on OUTCOMES.
8. A SMALL Number of Options, Participants Can Assign RELATIVE VALUES to Outcomes, Need to Focus on CONCESSIONS, Can Focus Only on ACTIONS.
9. A SMALL Number of Options, Participants Can Assign PRECISE VALUES to Outcomes, Need to Focus on IMPROVEMENTS, Can Focus Only on Actions.

The basis for their research is on the concept of indifference curve developed in economics. Interested persons are referred to the source mentioned above. Readers are also referred to Chatterji (1992) for some techniques that can be used for conflict management purposes. Some of them are:

- Descriptive Statistics
- Probability Theory and Probability Distribution
- Statistical Inference
- Analysis of Variance
- Nonparametric Testing of Hypothesis and Chi Square Test
- Multivariate Distributions

Differential Equations, Arms Race, and Related Models

- Differential and Integral Calculus
- Catastrophe Theory
- Chaos Theory

Gaming, Coalition Theory, and Simulation

- Decision Science and Game Theory
- Coalition Theory
- Simulation

Factor Analysis and Related Methods

- Factor Analysis
- Discriminant Analysis
- Cluster Analysis
- Content Analysis

Graph Theory and Markov Chain

- Graph Theory
- Markov Chain

Participation and Information Models

- Decentralisation Process
- Learning Theory
- Artificial Intelligence and Expert Systems
- Asymmetric Information Theory
- Fuzzy Set Theory
- Delphi Method

Arms spending is one of the main causes for conflict. Other sources of conflict are poverty, frustration, aggression, relative deprivation, income inequality, demographic pressure, dictatorial political system, lack of values, etc.

A question is often asked about the causal relationship between weapons and conflict, whether weapons an independent/dependent/intervening variable. But one thing which is very clear is that excessive spending on weapons does not necessarily bring more security. But it decreases the sources for development, education, health, etc. That perpetuates poverty and income inequality. According to some, military spending leads to development. For others this is not true. This paper address that question.

One of the most important problems facing humanity today is the immense disparity in the level of income and, consequently, in the standard of living among the people in different parts of the world. What is more disheartening is that the growth rate of income of the poor countries is consistently far below the rate of economically advanced countries. Based on the resulting difference of income, countries are generally divided into two groups: developed and underdeveloped.

The term underdeveloped has been used with different connotations in the literature of economic development. Sometimes it means a low ratio of population to area, sometimes a scarcity of capital as indicated by the prevalence of high interest rates, and sometimes a low ratio of industrial output to total output. A reasonably satisfactory definition of an underdeveloped country seems to be a country that has good potential prospects for using more capital and labour and/or more available natural resources to support its present population at a higher level of living; or, if its per capita income level is already fairly high, to support a larger population at a level of living not lower than at present. The reasons for underdevelopment include poor natural environments, severe climate conditions, niggardly endowment of resources, past social and cultural development, and restrictive religious practices. All these factors confine production far within the maximum possible frontier, leading to low output. Frequently, the result is a

vicious circle of low output, high propensity to consume and low levels of savings and capital accumulation.

Another dimension of the problem of economic development is regional or spatial. Unfortunately, insufficient attention was paid to this area until recently. Considerable theoretical and empirical work has been done on the problem of allocation of resources over time, but not over space. Clearly, the spatial aspect is also important. This is particularly true for a country like India, which is striving for economic growth despite extreme regional variations within a framework of a federal democratic system of government. The situation is basically the same in all the so-called poor countries, especially those that were under foreign rule for a long time. Examples are Indonesia (Java versus the other islands), Burma and Thailand (capital cities and rice growing areas versus up-country), and Brazil (Northeast versus Central-South area).

The formation of Bangladesh from former East Pakistan is a classic example of regional divisiveness. The general pattern is one of economic disparity between the capital or port city and the rest of the country. Look at the economic history of any of these countries. Typically, industrialisation has started at a few focal points, mostly port cities. These were points deemed convenient to the rulers, not necessarily optimum locations. In addition to economic development, these points got an earlier start with respect to education, health care facilities, and all the other benefits and drawbacks of Western civilisation. The cases of Kolkata, Mumbai, and Chennai in India are good illustrations.

This regional variation can also be observed in developed countries, such as in the United States, the United Kingdom, Western Europe, the former USSR, and the like. In the United States, for example, the central cities, Appalachia, the northern Michigan and Minnesota regions, and other areas provide clear examples of poverty and underdevelopment in the midst of affluence and prosperity. Although on the absolute level there is no comparison between this underdevelopment and that of the developing countries, in relative terms it is nevertheless very striking.

There are many reasons for the growth and decay of a region: economic, social, and political. One factor that has become prominent in recent years is the availability of resources, particularly water and energy. Scarcity of energy, its high price, and the development of new resources will have a profound impact on regional growth and decline. For example, the northeastern United States is in decline and is in need of reindustrialisation, whereas the South and Southwest are growing and need management of this growth.

The spatial dimension is also highlighted by the continuous confrontation between developing and developed countries (North versus South); between ethnic, racial, linguistic, and religious groups; and, more recently, between ecological and development goals. Historically, this phenomenon of conflict and its resolution has not been integrated into social science theory. Consequently, the solutions obtained from such an analysis, though optimal, in an economic perspective, have not been found to be practical in terms of policy.

Due to the existence of internal and international conflict poor countries are spending considerable amounts of scarce resources on military spending. Tables A.1–A.13 in the appendix give some information about the magnitude of production and transfer of arms and military spending. It is clear from these figures that although superpowers are cooperating in reducing their military spending, there is no such change visible in the case of the developing countries. In fact, the scene has moved to regional conflict away from superpower confrontation (particularly after the disintegration of the U.S.S.R.).

This unabated trend in military spending has implications for economic development. Some scholars such as Benoti (1973) found a positive relationship between defence spending and economic development while others have severely criticised his findings. Paul Dunne (1996) has excellent discussion of this material. The bibliographies in that reference and in this paper serve as an excellent source of the subject matter.

In this paper, I shall summarise the analytical techniques which have been used by some scholars in this context and indicate how their techniques can be used for testing and estimating the relationship between military spending and development.

There are usually two types of analytical tools used in this area, namely:

1. Regression and econometric analysis
2. Input–output type analysis

Due to the limitation of space, I shall only discuss the application of the first technique.

2. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF MILITARY SPENDING AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

Economic growth can be defined in various ways. One way is to measure the rate of growth of real gross domestic product (GDP). However, economic growth is not the same thing as economic development, since it avoids the

question of income distribution. Economic growth can take place when total savings leads to capital accumulation which in turn helps to product more goods. Increased production leads to industrialisation and urbanisation with all their positive and negative externalities; efforts on the part of the governments to achieve the targets may reduce income inequality and lead to social justice. The question then, is to decide the amount of optimum savings and how to allocate. Some say that military spending does not contribute to economic growth; it produces goods which in themselves are not capital goods since they do not lead to further production. In that context, growth itself is not the end, but is a means to an end. As Amartya Sen (1983) puts it:

> I believe the real limitations of traditional development economics arose not from the choice of means to the end of economic growth, but is the insufficient recognition that economic growth was no more than a means to some other objectives. The point is not the same as saying that growth does not matter. It may matter a great deal, if it does, this is because of some associated benefits that are realised in the process of economic growth. Entitlement refers to the set of alternative commodity bundles that a person can command in a society using the totality of rights and opportunities that he or she faces. On the basis of this entitlement, a person can acquire some capabilities, i.e., the ability to do this or that (e.g., be well nourished), and fail to acquire some other capabilities. The process of economic development can be seen as a process of expanding the capabilities or people. Given the functional relation between entitlements of persons over goods and their capabilities, a useful – if derivative – characterisation of economic development is in terms of expansion of entitlements.

A considerable amount of material on growth theory is available. Growth theory, including studies of such topics as growth models starting from the Harrod–Domar theory, the Turnpike theorems, and others. However, in these multisector, multiperiod models, military spending traditionally has not been treated as a separate variable. In some instances investment funds have been divided into two parts as consumption and investment goods. Maholanobis's (1963) model is based on that principle. And when the growth models have been linked with the macroeconomic models, military expenditure as an explicit variable in a macroeconomic theory has not been taken into consideration. One such exception is by Smith (1980b).

The welfare function is dependent on security variable (S) and output of civilian sector (C):

$$W = W(SC) \tag{1}$$

Although it may not be appropriate to assume, we can set

$$S = S(ME) \tag{2}$$

i.e., security is a function of military expenditure M and strategic environment E. E may be determined from the Richardsonian equation of arms race, where one country's military spending depends on the strength of its adversary. Total output is made up to civilian and military expenditure, i.e.

$$Y = pC + qM \tag{3}$$

where p and q are prices relative to the price of total output.

The objective will be to maximise (1) subject to (2) and (3). The first-order condition for that is

$$W_S S_M = (q/p) W_C \tag{4}$$

W_S is the partial derivative of the welfare function with respect to S and the same is true for S_M and W_C. If the form of the welfare function and the production function are respectively

$$\text{CES}: \quad W = A[dC^{-a} + (1-d)S^{-a}]^{-1/a} \tag{5}$$

$$\text{Cobb-Douglas}: \quad S = BM^b E^c \tag{6}$$

The first-order condition in logarithm becomes

$$\log m = A_0 + A_1 \log C + A_2 \log(q/p) + A_3 \log E \tag{7}$$

where

$$A_0 = \{log[(1-d)/d] + log\, b - a\, log\, B\}/(a + ab)$$
$$A_1 = (1+a)/(1+ab)$$
$$A_2 = -1/(1+ab)$$
$$A_3 = -ac/(1+ab)$$

Thus the elasticity of substitution between security and civilian output and the parameters for the security and production function can be estimated empirically. Although the estimation of this equation was made for England, similar formulations can be made for other countries provided we can make a realistic security production function and the strategic environment E.

Of course, the strategic environment can be defined in terms of alternative formulations. Others try to relate military expenditure for a country such as the U.S. to the structural instability of capitalist economy, monopoly power, under-consumption, unemployment, income concentration, union power, and political variables. Griffin, Wallace, and Devine (1982) conclude, by analysing empirical observation, that military expenditure in the U.S. is related to cyclical stagnation and that geo-political influences and secondary.

Smith (1980a) tested the hypothesis that reduced investment has been a major opportunity cost of military expenditure. He made a regression relation of potential output with the share of military expenditure, growth rate, and demand pressure. He found a significant regression coefficient of -1 between spending and investment.

Working with national accounting identity

$$Q - W = Y = C + I + M + B \tag{8}$$

where Q is the potential output, W the gap between actual and potential output, C the consumption (private + public), I the investment (private + public), M the military expenditure, and B the current account balance of payments.

And using lower-case symbols denoting shares (8) can be written as

$$i = 1 - w - c - m - b \tag{9}$$

The share of consumption can be postulated as

$$c = \alpha_0 - \alpha_1 u - \alpha_2 g \tag{10}$$

where u is the unemployment rate and g growth in actual output. Assuming $(w + b) = \beta u$, he reformulates (9) and estimates

$$i = (1 - \alpha_0) - (\beta - \alpha_1)u + \alpha_2 g - m \tag{11}$$

It is often suggested that, to be most effective, the theoretical models must include social, political, and other non-economic variables (in addition to economic variables). Notwithstanding the problem of measurement, social scientists are increasingly employing such techniques as factor analysis. However, some of these data-oriented approaches ignore a prior tested hypotheses about socio-economic determinants of growth. Scholing and Timmermann (1988) propose a path analysis to correct this deficiency. In this path model they use latent variables (like socio-economic status, political participation, human capital, technical progress, international competitiveness, etc.). This model with latent variables is defined by two linear equation systems, i.e., the inner model and the outer model. The inner model describes the core theory containing the theoretical relationship of latent variables. The structural relations are

$$Y = BY + \Gamma X + \delta \tag{12}$$

where $Y = (Y_1, Y_2, \ldots, Y_n)$ denotes the vector endogenous inner variables, $X = (X_1, \ldots, X_m)$ denotes the vector of exogenous variables, $\delta = (\delta_1, \ldots, \delta_n)$ denote the residual vector, and $B_{n \times n}$ and $\Gamma_{\upsilon\xi\mu}$ are matrices of parameters.

The outer model describes the relationship between the observable (manifest) variables and the latent variables they measure.

The structional equation of the outer model is

$$Z = \pi^1 X + \varepsilon_1 \quad (13)$$

$$R = \pi^2 Y + \varepsilon_2 \quad (14)$$

where $Z = (Z_1, \ldots, Z_p)$ is the vector of outer variables associated with exogenous inner variables (X) and $R = (R_1, \ldots, R_q)$ is the vector of outer variables associated with the endogenous inner variables (Y). $\pi^1_{p\times m}$ and $\pi^2_{q\times n}$ are the regression matrices with loading factors at the diagonals and zeros in off-diagonals.

The authors, using Wold's method of partial least squares (PLS), estimate the above equations taking 19 inner variables, and 118 associated outer variables, for 70 developing countries. They found that non-economic factors such as climate, ethnic homogeneity, intensity of government control, infrastructure, etc. have significant direct and indirect relationships. There are some scholars, such as Neuman (1978), who believe that too much emphasis should not be placed on macrostatistical analysis:

> Apparently, secondary manipulation of macrostatistical indicators, by academic and policymaking centres thousands of miles from the areas being studied, misses the essence of what is actually going on in the countries under study. There may be no substitute for field research on this issue, at least until we have discovered which are the relevant variables and have collected sufficient information about them

Palma (1978) for example, proposes Dependency Theory as a formal theory of underdevelopment. In his estimation, such approaches as stages of growth, modern-traditional sociological typologies, dualism, functionalism, etc., do not integrate into their analysis the socio-political context in which development takes place. The mechanical formal nature renders them both static and unhistorical. Some radical analysts such as Sunkel (1973) blame the neo-mercantilist system of domination by transnational conglomerates (TRANCO) for hindering the growth potential of developing countries emanating from the demand side as against foreign aid and investment. The relationship of military spending to economic growth is a part of a broader consideration of causal link between GDP (income) and government (public) expenditure. Some argue that the causal flow runs from the level of economic development to government expenditure. Others treat government expenditure as exogenous which determine the economic growth. Ram (1986) uses the Granger–Sargent procedure to determine the direction of the flow.

It is given by

$$Y_t = \sum_{j=1}^{m} a_j Y_{t-j} + \sum_{j=1}^{m} b_j X_{t-j} + \alpha + \beta T + U \tag{15}$$

where Y and X are variables for which the direction of the causality flow needs to be determined, T is trend, and U is random disturbance.

The Granger–Causality rests on the proposition that X causes Y, if and only if Y is better predicted by using the past history of X than by not doing so with past of Y being used in either case. Thus, testing for the absence of Granger-casual flow from X to Y is equivalent to testing the hypothesis $b_j = 0$ for all j. In this case, Y denotes income and X denotes government expenditure. Ram (1986) selected 63 countries from 1950 to 1980 and used a dummy variable (1973 energy shock) and different lags ($m = 2, 3, 4$) and found no significant causality between GDP and government expenditure.

Lotz (1970) discussed the same relationship of 37 developing countries through a factor analysis study. His variables are:

Yp	per capita income (in U.S. dollars)
U	per cent of population living in urban areas.
MO	exports of minerals and oil as a per cent of total exports.
X/Y	exports as a per cent of gross national product (GNP).
Li	literacy rate of adults.
Qp	notes and coins per capita (in US$).
W/Y	expenditures on social welfare as a per cent of GNP.
$(E+H)/Y$	expenditures on education and health as a per cent of GNP.
D/Y	expenditures on defence as a per cent of GNP.
ES/Y	expenditures on economic services as a per cent of GNP.
EXP/Y	total government expenditures as a per cent of GNP.

His conclusion is that government spending is related to not only the level, but also the character of economic development. Where development has penetrated all sectors of the economy, welfare spending appears to have increased. Further defence and economic services are not closely related to the stages of economic development.

Landau (1983) investigated the relationship between total government expenditure and the rate of growth of per capita output based on 96 non-communist countries. His conclusion is that the effect of an increase in government spending reduces the growth rate of income, for the full sample of countries, weighted or unweighted by population for all six time periods covered excluding or including the major oil producers.

Landau (1986) extended the analysis by disaggregating the government expenditure variably (including national, state, and local governments). The classifications are: (1) consumption other than defence or education; (2) education; (3) defence; (4) transfer; and (5) capital expenditures. The revenue source are current revenue, the deficit, and foreign aid. To measure regulatory impact, he took the rate of change of money supply, inflation rate, an index of real exchange rate, and the real interest rate. He also took many variables to measure international economic conditions; human and physical capital; population, industrial shares in GDP; and historical–political factor including conflict variables. He found a strong negative relation between the level of per capita expenditure and the growth rate. The military did not have an impact on economic growth, government expenditure as such has no relation with growth and foreign aid showed no impact on growth.

It is to be emphasised again the growth in GDP does not necessarily imply a development since the distribution of income (say as measured by GINI coefficients) can be quite asymmetric; and besides, income inequality may not decrease as a consequence of economic growth. Rubinson (1976) showed through a cross-section regression analysis that it is the economic influence and dominance of a State in the relation to the world economy which influences inequality of income within that state. His regression measures the effect of kilowatts-hour; per capita, government reserve exports; and the value of and index of social security insurance. Deger (1981) has shown that for 50 developing countries over the period 1965–1973 there was a statistically negative relation between share of military expenditure in GDP and the share of public education expenditure in GNP. The same was true between military expenditure and average propensity to save.

Maizels and Nissanke (1986) investigated, through regression analysis using dummy and qualitative variables, the determinants of military spending. They found the following statistically significant factors: (1) war/tensions with neighbouring countries; (2) domestic factors, namely repressing internal opposition groups; and (3) global power block and most important share of central government budget in GDP. Investment in developing countries by transnational corporations was not a determinant of military expenditure.

Frederikson and Looney (1983) divided Benoti's list of countries into two groups. Group I consisted of 24 countries characterised by a relative abundance of financial resource. Group II consisted of nine countries which were relatively resource-constrained. Using Benoti's methodology, data and time frame, the same regression equation (as follows) was recomputed:

$$\mathrm{DIVGDP} = f(\mathrm{INV}, \mathrm{AID}, \mathrm{DEFN}) \tag{16}$$

where

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{GIVGDP} & \text{realgrowthinGDPminusrealgrowthindefenseexpenditure} \\ \text{INV} & \text{grosscapitalformulationasapercentageofGDP} \\ \text{AID} & \text{receiptsofbilateralaidasapercentageofGDP} \\ \text{DEFN} & \text{defenseexpenditureasapercentageofGDP} \end{array} \tag{17}$$

The authors found that the coefficients of defence in the resource abundant group is significantly positive, whereas in the resource constraint group, it is negative. It means that in poor countries, defence spending retards growth, whereas in resource-constrained countries defence expenditures contributes to growth. Specifically, the equations are:

For resource poor group:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{CIVGDP} = 1.77 + 16\underset{(6.11)}{\text{INVEST}} + 12\underset{(3.070)}{\text{AID}} \\ + 0.22\underset{(3.77)}{\text{DEFN}}, \quad R^2 = 0.89 \end{aligned} \tag{18}$$

For the resource abundant group:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{CIVGDP} = 4.72 + 0.15\underset{(1.92)}{\text{INVEST}} + 0.19\underset{(1.46)}{\text{AID}} \\ - 1.22\underset{(3.52)}{\text{DEFN}}, \quad R^2 = 0.76(19) \end{aligned} \tag{19}$$

The regression equation of Benoti's 44 countries is

$$\begin{aligned} \text{CIVGDP} = 1.14 + 0.2\underset{(5.57)}{\text{INVEST}} + 0.13\underset{(2.30)}{\text{AID}} \\ + 0.23\underset{(1.34)}{\text{DEFN}}, \quad R^2 = 0.61 \end{aligned} \tag{20}$$

Ball (1985), however, thinks that Frederiksen and Looney have obscured more than they have explained regarding the true nature of the growth-military expenditure. According to her, they have presented an unrealistically simplified view of the relationship since other factors such as civilian expenses, term of trade, etc. are more important. According to her, this complex relationship cannot be expressed by a few equations estimated by weak data. Also, their suggestion of a positive relation for resource-rich country can be illusory. Again, the difficulty in inferring causality on the basis of statistical analysis remains.

Consistent with the hypothesis, he found that the signs of the path coefficients are correct in showing that (a) DEF has a positive relation with both GDP-manufacturing and social development factor (SDF); (b) SDF

has a positive relation with GDP-manufacturing; and (c) military expenditure has negative relation with both GDP and SDF rejecting Benoti's hypothesis.

Adamas, Jere, and Michael (1989) addressed Benoti's hypothesis for 95 countries for the period 1974–1986. They divided these countries into "low income," "middle income," and "industrial market economies." Their initial conclusion, based on the extension of Feder's (1982) analysis, is that there is a positive correlation between government spending (and even military spending) and economic growth once the other growth-determining factors have been taken into account if we exclude "warring" countries. Including the warring countries, however, the relationship is negative.

Biswas and Ram (1986) used the augmented Feder model

$$Y = \alpha(I/Y) + \beta(\acute{L})[\delta/1 + \delta + C_M]M/(M/Y) \tag{21}$$

$$Y = \alpha(I/Y) + \beta(L) + [\delta/(1+\delta) - \theta][M/(M/Y) + \theta M] \tag{22}$$

where Y is the annual rate of growth of total output (GDP), I/Y the investment-output ratio, L the annual rate of growth of labour force, and M the annual growth of military expenditure.

$$\theta = C_M[M/Y - M]$$

and C_M represent the externality effect of military output of the civilian sector (obtained from the production function of C, the civilian output). If $C_M > 0$ and $\theta > 0$, increase military output will imply a higher rate of growth of total output Y.

Deger and Sen (1983) reputed Benoti's econometric evidence for India indicating that the positive effect of military expenditure on economic growth is exaggerated. Their intertemporal discounted welfare function to maximise is

$$W = \int_0^{\alpha} \mathrm{e}^{-pt} u(1 - m, s, \theta)\, \mathrm{d}t \tag{23}$$

$$\text{subject to :} \quad s = m - (\delta + \beta)s = m - \alpha s \tag{24}$$

where p is the rate of time preference, m and s are average coefficients M/Y and S/Y, respectively, and θ is a threat perception variable. Based on this optimisation of the specification, the authors prove that a stable steady-state equilibrium will hold which can be brought to a higher level by an increased perception of threat θ. They justify the validity of the model on the basis of India–Pakistan relations. Their point of contention is that defence is related to non-economic factors such as security and counteracting threat rather

than economic variables. To test whether there is spinoff or economic impact they estimate the following equation:

$$X_{it} = \alpha_{0i} + \alpha_{1i} M_{1i} + \alpha_{2i} V_i + k_{it} \tag{25}$$

where V_i is the value added in ith industry whose output is X_{it} and M the military expenditure. Based on the estimated equations for the sectors (i) basic metals, (ii) metal products, (iii) machinery not electrical, (iv) electrical machinery, and (v) transport equipment, they find that increases in military expenditure have insignificant effects of industry output.

To examine the interaction between growth, investment, and military expenditure, they specify the following model and estimate it with 1965–1973 time-series averages of cross-section of 50 LDCs. (Here, g is average annual growth rate of GDP, i the investment share in GDP, m the defence burden, y the income, n the growth rate of population, a the net foreign capital transfer, y the change in national income, D the difference between per capita incomes measured at purchasing power parity at official exchange rates, N the total population, $D1$ the dummy variable for oil-producing countries with balance of payments surplus, and $D2$ the same for war economy.)

The three stage least-squares estimates are (t values in parentheses)

$$G = -\underset{(-1.50)}{9.63} + \underset{(1.84)}{0.83i} + \underset{(0.98)}{0.20m} - \underset{(-0.76)}{0.13y} + \underset{(0.63)}{0.39n} - \underset{(-2.09)}{0.28a} \tag{26}$$

$$i = \underset{(10.8)}{14.17} + \underset{(2.75)}{0.54g} + \underset{(4.42)}{0.03y} - \underset{(-2.75)}{0.35m} + \underset{(3.83)}{0.33a}$$

$$m = \underset{(5.59)}{3.69} + \underset{(3.25)}{0.18y} - \underset{(-2.82)}{0.30D} + \underset{(0.37)}{0.001N} + \underset{(4.19)}{4.99D1} + \underset{(15.63)}{13.33D2}$$

The multiplier of military burden on growth can be easily calculated as

$$\delta g/\delta m = (\alpha_2 + \alpha_1\beta_3)(1 - \alpha_1\beta_1) = -0.1633$$

Clearly, when taking *all* interdependent effects together, the effect of an increased military burden is to reduce the growth rate.

Deger and Smith (1983) based their results on cross-sectional data of 50 LDCs and found that military expenditure has a small positive effect on growth through modernisation and a larger negative effect through savings. But the net effect of the growth was negative. These equations estimated by three stage least-square are

$$g = -\underset{(-2.43)}{8.93} + \underset{(3.78)}{0.92s} + \underset{(2.77)}{0.35m} - \underset{(-1.08)}{0.49p} + \underset{(2.89)}{0.59a} - \underset{(-2.44)}{0.26y} + \underset{(1.42)}{0.16r}, \quad R^2 = 0.2260$$

$$s = \underset{(9.70)}{14.54} - \underset{(-3.16)}{0.43m} + \underset{(1.92)}{0.48g} + \underset{(4.55)}{0.37gy} - \underset{(-7.63)}{0.67a} - \underset{(-0.03)}{0.75p}, \quad R^2 = 0.8651 \quad (27)$$

$$m = \underset{(4.53)}{3.98} + \underset{(2.61)}{0.19y} - \underset{(-2.09)}{0.30(q-y)} - \underset{(-4.29)}{0.02N} + \underset{(3.65)}{4.67D1} + \underset{(10.83)}{11.31D2}, \quad R^2 = 0.7808$$

The variables are:

g average annual growth rate of real GDP
s national savings ratio
a net external capital flows as a percentage of GDP
m Share of military expenditure in GDP
p rate of growth of population
y 1970 per capita income at official exchange rates
r average annual growth rate of agricultural product
p rate of change of aggregate price level per annum
q 1970 per capita income at purchasing power parity
N total populations
$D2$dummy for Israel, Jordan, South Vietnam, Egypt, Syria, India, Pakistan
$D1$dummy for Iran, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia

Chan (1985) sums up the research already done and its potential avenues:

> "We have probably reached a point of diminishing returns in relying on aggregate cross-national studies to inform us about the economic impact of defence spending. Instead, it appears that future research will profit more from discriminating diachronic studies of individual countries. As some analysts have already noted, the search for universal pattern applicable to all places and times is likely to be disappointing. The claims to generality based on the results of such searches tend to entail substantial costs in empirical sensitivity and specificity. Moreover, the discrepancies in these results are not easily reconciled, as they are often based on different measures and samples. An alternative and perhaps more fruitful approach would be to eschew claims of generality at the present, while recognising the complexity of the problem."

There are a number of basic criticisms made by contributors to this subject matter. The first is the question of the use of cross-sectional data. Regression equation can be estimated on the basis of cross-sectional data. The data refer to a particular time period, say 1960, for all countries.

Alternatively, we can have a particular country, say India, for which we may have data for the time period 1950–1990. It will be a time-series data. A pooled time-series cross-sectional data exists when we have information for a number of countries for a number of years. Benoti used pooled data, except that he took the *average* for a number of years for the countries. He also conducted time-series analysis for some countries as India. The major difficulty in the time-series analysis is that there is a frequent occurrence of

co-linearity which is, however, not so serious in the case of cross-sectional data. The use of cross-sectional data is appealing since micro information is quite important and many macro hypotheses are nothing but the aggregate of micro behaviour. If ε_{jt} denotes the error term of jth country for tth period, it is composed of two parts, i.e.,

$$\varepsilon_{jt} = \gamma_j + \gamma_{jt}$$

where γ_j represents individual firm effect and γ_{jt} is the residual random variable for jth country at time period 't'. If the data for some country for every observation period is available, we can compute the average residual for a particular country over the years. If we wish to compare the time-series regression coefficient with that of the cross-section, we have to first average the regression coefficients of a firm over time and average the time-series coefficients over countries. Obviously the two regression coefficients will not be equal. The cross-sectional will show long-run adjustments, whereas times series will reflect short-term fluctuations. So cross-sectional coefficients will show adjusted long-run coefficients. Thus, "cross section cannot be used successfully to make time series predictions unless a systematic relationship between the cross section and time series estimates has been firmly established" (Kuh, 1959). For this purpose, a pooled or rectangular data structure is necessary; otherwise the analysis will be structurally incomplete.

The second point which is directed against Benoti's analysis is that his arms race equation is not based on action–response Richardsonian (1960) type analysis. A third argument is the absence of any separate equation of international trade, separate manufacturing sector and technical and educational infrastructure sector. Also, it requires an appropriate lag in time. We have been working on a model to include all the above considerations for India during the period 1950–1986 and estimating it by three stage least square. The following is an outline of the progress report.

3. TOWARD A SOCIO-ECONOMETRIC MODEL OF ARMS RACE IN THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT

There has been considerable development in econometrics as models have been developed on the international, national and regional levels. However in such models, social and political factors are seldom taken into account. Without these considerations, such models in the area of military spending will be of limited value. It will be worthwhile to integrate some conflict models with econometric models. We shall outline such an attempt. Let me

first present Richardsonian equations of action and reaction models for India and Pakistan.

There has been recently a great increase in the literature of conflict resolution models (Chatterji, 1968). More and more often, realities of the world are being taken into account and restrictive assumptions are being relaxed. Testing these models is becoming easier because of the development of new concepts and methods to measure qualitative variables. The scope of these models, however, can be enlarged in at least two respects. First of all, spatial relations of the contesting parties, i.e., geopolitical aspects of the conflict, can be considered. For example, when we look at the map of the Indian subcontinent, we find that the geographical boundaries of two other major powers, namely China and Russia, meet the boundaries of India and Pakistan. In considering political relations between India and Pakistan, this factor is of crucial importance. The second factor is the diverse forces that are acting *within* the contesting parties. The rate of economic growth, population rates, and internal peace and stability are a few of many factors which greatly influence the foreign relations of a country. This is particularly true in Indo-Pakistani relations.

The case of India and Pakistan offers an excellent field of study to which we can apply the modern game theoretical approaches for analysing a mutual relationship. Here, we have two countries which are dependent from geographic, economic, political, and social points of view. They can gain much by cooperating or lose much by quarreling, while the great powers, through coercion, can act as moderating influences. This study casts some light on these aspects and is intended as a beginning toward a more generalized study to be undertaken in the future.

The emergency of India and Pakistan as two nations in the Indian subcontinent has ushered in a new phenomenon in Asia. Before 1947, they were a single country whose people struggled together for freedom from British rule. When the British decided to leave, the Moslem minority, apprehensive of the Hindu majority, demanded a separate state, which they obtained after a bloodbath, the consequence of religious riots (East Pakistan, a former part of Pakistan, is now Bangladesh). The division of the country resulted in a complete breakdown in the social, economic, and political systems of the country.

India now has about 1100 million people, of which 10% are Moslem. Of Pakistan's 180 million people, there are very few Hindus. The enmity between Hindus and Moslems in India has not ended as a result of the division of the country. These two groups have now become arch-enemies, spending millions of rupees in defence preparation. Already they have fought significant wars resulting in loss of lives and resources over Kashmir Valley.

The very existence of these two countries depends on their mutual cooperation and friendship. There are many ways through which this friendship can be built. This has to be brought about on a government level, on personal levels, and also through the auspices of other countries. One significant step in the right direction would be in the field of disarmament. The following discussion will shed some light on this aspect. It is not intended to provide an easy solution, since conflict between nations is too complicated a matter to be solved easily. This is just a simple approach to conflict resolution taking into consideration the realities as far as possible.

Following Richardson (1960), we assume that there are three factors related to the arms race: namely, mutual suspicion and mistrust, cost of military expenditures, and grievances. Let us consider these factors for India and Pakistan in the context of their relationship and other internal and external variables.

4. INDIA

As far as India is concerned, there are two fronts to guard, namely, her borders with Pakistan and China. India is suspicious of both these countries. Thus, it can be assumed that the rate of change if its military expenditure will depend upon the military expenditure of Pakistan and China in the previous period. The lag in time period is appropriate since responses are never instantaneous and there is always a time lag in intelligence reports. A time lag of 1 year is assumed. So we have the following relations:

$$(\mathrm{d}M_{1t})/\mathrm{d}t = kM_{2(t-1)} + nM_{3(t-1)} \tag{28}$$

where M_{1t} is the military expenditure (rupees in millions) of India for the time period t, $M_{2(t-1)}$ the military expenditure (rupees in millions) of Pakistan in the time period $(t-1)$, and $M_{3(t-1)}$ the military expenditure (rupees in millions or an index number) of Communist China in the period $(t-1)$.

The L.H.S. of (28) denotes the rate of change of Indian military expenditure, k and n are positive constants which, following Richardson's terminology, can be called "defence coefficients." It is difficult to obtain data for China's defence expenditure; when not available we can try to employ some index numbers or use some proxy variables. This Eq. (28) represents the mistrust and suspicion on the part of India against Pakistan and China. It is true that mistrust is a qualitative aspect of a state of mind. However, we assume that military expenditure is a satisfactory yardstick for measuring it.

The second factor involved in the arms race is the cost of keeping up defences. It can be assumed that a significant portion of resources devoted to

military efforts is a complete waste, while other military expenditures, such as road building, etc., may have some economic value. It is not the purpose of this paper to identify those items as useful and useless, nor do we want to make any estimate of them at this stage. Secondly, since the investment resources of India are limited, military expenditure implies sacrificing economic development (in terms of increase in the GNP) that would have been achieved if the resources were used for national economic development.

The third factor is the amount of benefit that would have accrued to India if these two countries become friendly and cooperated in the field of international trade. In regard to many commodities, such as jute, tea, textiles, etc., the foreign exchange income of both countries could increase appreciably if they cooperated in production and distribution. These three factors have been combined in the following equation:

$$O_{it} = a_1 M_{1t} + b_1 Y_{1t} + c_1 T_{1t} \tag{29}$$

where O_{1t} represents the cost of defence, Y_{1t} is the GNP of India at the time t, T_{1t} the foreign exchange income of India at the time period t, and a_1 the constant showing what percentage of the military expenditure can be treated as waste, b_1 is the percentage of Indian GNP that could have increased if there were a friendly relationship between the two countries. In the extreme case, b_1 may be taken as the percentage of Indian GNP that could have increased if there is no military spending. Since such an utopian situation is nowhere in sight in the near future, we shall take b_1 as the percentage of GNP that could be increased if the defence expenditure is kept at "normal" level. We shall not attempt a comprehensive definition of the term "normal" and shall assume that such a figure has been agreed upon. c_1 is a constant which shows the percentage of foreign exchange income that could be added with mutual cooperation between these countries.

The third factor related to conflict is grievances. For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that India's grievances against Pakistan consist of two parts (1) alleged collusion with China, and (2) alleged Pakistani inspired rebellions in Kashmir and tribal areas of northeastern India. Again, we do not want to verify whether these allegations are true or not. These two sources of grievances are assumed to be measurable in monetary terms. Some portion of them – say, military help from China and Pakistan – is measurable. The following equation then represents the third factor:

$$Q_{1t} = d_1 A_{2t}^{c} + e_1 I_{2t} \tag{30}$$

where Q_{1t} is the grievance of India against Pakistan at time period t, A_{2t} the military help from China to Pakistan in the time period "t" (rupees in

millions), and I_{2t} the "Help" (assumed to be expressed in terms of monetary value) by Pakistan to inaugurate in Kashmir and the tribal rebels in north-eastern India (rupees in millions). d_1 and e_1 are respective weights given by the Indian government to match these threats. These constants can also show what amount of money has to be spent by India to face these dual fronts. The grievance equation involves some qualitative aspects which are assumed to be expressed in quantitative terms. It is easy to identify other "cost" and "grienvances," but for the sake of simplicity we assume that all these items can be expressed through the variables we have considered.

Combining the three factors together, we have

$$(\mathrm{d}m_{jt})/\mathrm{d}t = km_{2(t-1)} + nm_{3(t-1)} - O_{1(t-1)} - Q_{1(t-1)} \tag{31}$$

Based on Eqs. (28)–(31), we may develop a time path of equilibrium military expenditure of the two countries (Chatterji, 1968).

It is possible to extend the above approach for a panel data of a larger group of developing countries using some socio-economic and political variables and appropriate lags. The data for the political variables can be obtained from the conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB). This data bank gives information about political, economic, military, cultural, demographic, and ethnic factors. These variables and the index of conflict situation for each country can be used as independent variables with military expenditure as independent variables. What we are suggesting is to combine advanced econometric studies of military expenditures with Richardsonian model. We hope such a model will be available in the future.

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APPENDIX A

Tables A.1 to A.13 give some information about the magnitude of production and transfer of arms and military spending.

Table A.1. Military Spending for Some Developing Countries.

	1973	1975	1978	1980	1983	1985	1988	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002
Middle East														
Egypt	34.1	35.4	10.2	—	6.7	5.8	4.8	4.6	3.8	3.3	3.1	2.9	2.5	2.7
Iran	7.3	13.0	11.2	[5.4]	[2.6]	3.0	—	—	2.2	3.1	2.4	2.6	3.8	4.0
Iraq	12.2	11.7		[6.3]	[24.4]	[27.5]	23	20	—	—	—	—		—
Israel	33.9	26.7	19.8	25.0	23.8	17.7	9.1	8.4	10.5	8.8	8.7	8.6	8.2	9.2
Saudi Arabia	6.9	(9.7)	[16.3]	(16.6)	(20.3)	(21.8)	19.8	—	11.7	10.6	9.8	8.5	10.6	9.8
Syria	0.7	0.8	0.7	17.3	15.4	15.6	9.2	13	9.0	7.4	6.2	5.9	5.5	6.1
South Asia														
India	3.0	3.3	3.1	3.0	3.1	3.3	3.5	3.3	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.3	2.3
Pakistan	6.1	6.1	5.3	(5.7)	(6.9)	(6.8)	6.7	6.6	6.7	6.2	5.8	4.8	4.5	4.7
Sri Lanka	0.7	0.8	0.7	1.5	1.5	2.6	4.3	4.8	3.0	3.4	5.0	4.2		3.1
Far East														
Indonesia	[3.7]	[4.1]	4.3	[3.8]	[3.9]	[3.0]	2.3	1.6	1.4	1.3	1.3			
South Korea	3.7	4.3	5.7	5.9	5.6	5.2	4.6	4.0	3.6	3.3	3.2			

Africa														
Algeria	(1.7)	1.8		2.1	1.9	1.7	1.5	—	1.9	3.1	3.1	4.0	3.5	3.7
Angola				12.8	16.5	28.4	21.5	—	12.0	19.8	19.5	11.3	4.8	3.7
Ethiopia	1.9	4.5	6.5	8.5	9.0	(8.9)	12.2	—	3.2	2.4	1.8	6.7	9.6	5.2
Ghana	1.4	1.7	—	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.8	1.0	0.6
Libya	(4.9)	(5.7)	(12.1)	[10.0]	[14.5]	—	8.6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Mozambique				5.6	10.07	11.7	—	—	8.3	5.7	2.2	2.2	2.5	2.4
Nigeria		3.7	5.4	2.5	1.9	1.3	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.5	0.9		1.1
South Africa	2.2	3.3	4.7	3.9	3.7	3.7	4.6	4.3	2.8	2.6	1.8	1.5	1.5	1.6
Tanzania	3.0	3.8	(6.1)	3.7	3.5	3.3	5.2	—	—	1.2	1.4	—	1.3	1.5
Central America														
Costa Rica	0.5	0.6	(0.6)	0.8	(0.8)	(0.7)	0.4	0.5	0.3	0	0.	0	0	0
Mexico	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.5	(0.7)	0.5	—	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5
South America														
Argentina	1.2	(1.7)	2.1	6.4	(4.6)	3.5	3.5	—	1.4	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.2
Brazil	1.4	1.1	1.1	(0.7)	(0.8)	(0.8)	1.4	1.7	1.1	1.2	1.3			1.6
Chile	3.5	3.9	5.8	6.7	8.0	7.6	7.8	5.0	2.2	3.1	3.1	3.4	3.7	3.9
Venezuala	1.7	1.9	1.5	2.7	(2.9)	(2.0)	1.9	2.0	1.3	1.5	1.0		1.5	1.4

The values in ( ) are the uncertain data; The values in [ ] are the very uncertain data.

$\frac{\text{Military Exp}}{\text{GDP}} \times 100$

Source: SIPRI (1992).

Table A.2. Socio-Economic Information about Some Developing Countries.

	Population Thousand 1985	Agriculture Index (1980 = 100.0) 1985	Industry Index (1980 = 100.0) 1985
Middle East			
Egypt	48,503	193.6	117.5
Iran	43,000	—	—
Iraq	15,000	—	—
Israel	4,233		
Saudi Arabia	11,508	152.2	93.9
Syria	10,458	171.7	138.2
South Asia			
India (pop. in mil.)	765	145.6	149.7
Pakistan	96,180	149.0	143.6
Sri Lanka	15,837	192.0	117.6
Far East			
Indonesia	163	153.1	156.8
South Korea	41,056	130.1	128.5
Philippines	55,819	237.4	238.6
Thailand	51,683	87.5	133.1
Africa			
Algeria	27,718	165.8	127.8
Angola			
Ethiopia	42,271	126.5	105.7
Ghana	12,737	655.7	1,428.0
Kenya	20,353	164.7	150.7
Libya	3,764		
Mozambique	13,791	241.0	241.0
Nigeria	99,669	209.9	132.1
South Africa	31,593	163.2	172.0
Sudan	21,931	382.0	382.0
Tanzania	22,242	317.1	201.0

Table A.3. World and Regional Military Expenditure Estimates, 1994–2003.

Region[a]	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	% change 1994–2003
Africa[b]	(9.2)	(8.7)	(8.4)	8.6	9.2	9.9	10.3	10.5	11.3	11.4	(+*24*)
North[b]	(4.1)	(3.9)	(4.0)	4.2	4.4	4.3	4.7	4.8	5.4	5.5	(+*35*)
Sub-Saharan	5.1	4.8	4.4	4.4	4.8	5.6	5.7	(5.8)	5.9	(5.9)	(+*15*)
Americas	365	347	328	329	321	323	334	339	376	451	+*24*
North	344	324	306	304	298	299	310	313	350	426	+*24*
Central	3.5	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.2	3.4	3.5	3.6	3.4	3.3	*−5*
South	17.6	20.2	18.4	21.2	20.2	20.1	20.7	22.6	22.9	21.8	+*24*
Asia & Oceania	120	123	127	127	126	128	133	140	146	151	+*25*
Central	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	(0.4)	0.5	—	(0.5)	—	—	—
East	101	103	107	107	105	105	110	115	121	125	+*24*
South	12.0	12.6	12.8	13.4	13.5	14.6	15.2	15.8	15.9	16.9	+*41*
Oceania	7.3	7.0	7.0	7.1	7.4	7.7	7.7	8.0	8.3	8.5	+*17*
Europe	200	187	186	186	184	188	191	191	194	195	*−2*
Central & Eastern	26.4	20.6	19.3	20.1	17.5	18.3	20.0	21.5	22.2	24.5	*−8*
Western	174	166	166	166	167	170	171	170	172	171	*−2*
Middle East	47.1	43.8	43.8	48.1	51.9	50.3	58.0	63.1	63.8	70.0	+*48*
World	742	709	693	699	693	699	727	743	792	879	+*18*
Change (%)		*−4.4*	*−2.2*	*0.9*	*−0.8*	*0.8*	*4.0*	*2.3*	*6.5*	*11.0*	

Note: Figures are in US$b, at constant (2000) prices and exchange rates. Figures in italics are percentages. Figures do not always add up to totals because of the conventions of rounding.
Source: SIPRI.
[a]For the country coverage of the regions, see SIPRI. Some countries are excluded because of lack of consistent time-series data. Africa excludes Angola, Benin, Congo (Republic of), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Liberia and Somalia; Asia excludes Afghanistan; and the Middle East excludes Iraq. World totals exclude all these countries.
[b]The series for North Africa and Africa have an increased coverage compared to that in *SIPRI Yearbook 2003*, because, figures for Libya are available for the first time. However, these cover only the period 1997–2003, so the regional totals for 1994–1996 are rough estimates.

Table A.4. Military Expenditure, Official Development Assistance and Foreign Debt, by Income Group, 2001.

Income Group[a]	GNI/Capita 2000 ($)	Number of Countries	Population 2001 (m)	Military Expenditure		Official Development Assistance Given 2001 ($b)	Foreign Debt 2001 ($b)
				2001 ($b)	2003 ($b)		
Low	⩽755	58	2,505	(33)	(36)	0.0	533
Lower middle	756–2,995	41	2,164	76	91	0.0	918
Upper middle	2,996–9,265	27	504	80	80	0.6	882
High	⩾9,266	32	957	555	672	52.9	—[b]
Total		158	6,130	743	879	53.5	—[b]

Note: Figures are in US$b. Figures for GNI/capita, development assistance and foreign debt are in current dollars, while figures for military expenditure are at constant (2000) prices and exchange rates. Figures do not always add up to totals due to the convention of rounding.
Source: Population: World Bank, *World Development Indicators 2003* (World Bank: Washington, DC, 2003), Table 2.1: 'Population dynamics', p. 40; official development assistance: Table 6.9: 'Aid flows from Development Assistance Committee members', p. 336; and Table 6.9a: 'Official development assistance from selected non-DAC donors, 1997–2001', p. 337; foreign debt: Table 4.16: 'External debt', p. 248; and military expenditure: Appendix 10A, Table 10A.1, in this volume.
[a]The countries included in each income group are listed in the notes to Table 10A.1, Appendix 10A, in this volume. GNI = gross national income.
[b]Comparable data for foreign debt are not available for the high-income countries.

Table A.5. Countries with the Highest and Lowest Military Burden in 2002: Social and Military Expenditure as a Share of Gross Domestic Product, 2000–2002[a].

High-Income Countries[b]				Low- and Middle-Income Countries[b]			
Country[c]	Education[d]	Health[e]	Military[f]	Country[c]	Education[d]	Health[e]	Military[f]
Countries with the highest military burden in 2002							
Kuwait	—	2.6	10.4	Eritrea	4.8[d]	2.8	23.5
Israel	7.3	8.3	9.2	Oman	3.9[d]	2.3	[12.3]
Brunei	4.8	2.5	7.0	Saudi Arabia	9.5[d]	4.2	9.8
Singapore	3.7[d]	1.2	5.2	Jordan	5.0	4.2	8.4
Greece	3.8	4.6	4.3	Burundi	3.4	1.6	7.6
UAE	1.9[d]	2.5	3.7	Liberia	—	—	(7.5)
USA	4.8	5.8	3.4	Yemen	10.0	—	7.1
France	5.8	7.2	2.5	Syria	4.1	1.6	[6.1]
UK	4.5[d]	5.9	2.4	Ethiopia	4.8	1.8	5.2
Taiwan	—	—	2.3	Turkey	3.5	3.6	4.9
Average[g]	4.6	4.8	4.7		4.9	2.8	9.7
Countries with the lowest military burden in 2002							
Iceland	5.9	7.5	0.0	Costa Rica	4.4	4.4	0.0
Ireland	4.4	5.1	0.7	Mauritius	3.7	1.9	0.2
Austria	5.8	5.6	0.8	Moldova	4.0[d]	2.9	0.4
Luxembourg	3.7d	5.3	0.9	Mexico	4.4[d]	2.5	0.5
Japan	3.5	6.0	1.0	Ghana	4.1[d]	2.2	0.6
New Zealand	6.1	6.2	1.1	Guatemala	1.7	2.3	0.6
Switzerland	5.5[d]	5.9	1.1	Cape Verde	4.4[d]	1.8	0.7
Finland	6.1[d]	5.0	1.2	Honduras	4.0[d]	4.3	0.8
Spain	4.5[d]	5.4	1.2	El Salvador	2.3[d]	3.8	0.8
Slovenia	—	6.8	1.5	Georgia	—	0.7	0.9
Average[g]	5.1	5.8	0.9		3.7	2.9	0.5

Note: Figures are percentages. The values in [ ] are the SIPRI estimates.
Source: Education expenditure as a share of GDP for 2000/2001: UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Institute for Statistics Database Access Statistics, table on 'Public expenditure on education as percentage of GDP', URL <http://stats.uis.unesco.org/eng/TableViewer/wdsview/dispviewp.asp>; education shares for 1998–2000 and health shares: UN Development Programme (UNDP), *Human Development Report 2003* (Oxford University Press: New York, 2003), annex Table 17, 'Priorities in public spending', and military expenditure shares: Appendix 10A, Table 10A.4, in this volume. *Budgeting for the Military Sector in African Countries: The Process and Mechanisms of Control* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, forthcoming).
[a]Top/bottom 10 countries with a known military expenditure share of GDP in 2002.
[b]For the definition and coverage of the respective income groups, see Appendix 10A.
[c]Countries are ranked by their share of military expenditure in GDP in 2002.
[d]The figures for public expenditure on education as a share of GDP are for 2000/2001, except figures marked with footnote d, which are for 1998–2000.
[e]The figures for public expenditure on health as a share of GDP are for 2000.
[f]The figures for military expenditure as a share of GDP are for 2002.
[g]The figures for average share include only the countries for which data are available for all three variables (education, health and military) so as to achieve comparability between the shares.

Table A.6. The 15 Major Spender Countries in 2003.

Military Expenditure: in MER Dollar Terms					in PPP Dollar Terms[a]		
Rank	Country	Level ($b)	Per capita ($)	World share (%)	Rank[b]	Country	Level ($b)
1	USA	417.4	1,419	*47*	1	USA	417.4
2	Japan	46.9	367	*5*	2	China	[151.0]
3	UK	37.1	627	*4*	3	India	64.0
4	France	35.0	583	*4*	4	Russia	[63.2]
5	China	[32.8]	25	*4*	5	France	38.4
Sub-total top 5		569.1		*64*	Sub-total top 5		734.0
6	Germany	27.2	329	*3*	6	UK	35.0
7	Italy	20.8	362	*2*	7	Japan	32.8
8	Iran[c]	[19.2]	279	*[2]*	8	Germany	30.4
9	Saudi Arabia	19.1	789	*[2]*	9	Italy	26.4
10	South Korea	13.9	292	*2*	10	Saudi Arabia[c]	25.6
Sub-total top 10		669.3		*76*	Sub-total top 10		884.2
11	Russia	[13.0]	91	*1*	11	South Korea	25.0
12	India	12.4	12	*1*	12	Iran[c]	[23.7]
13	Israel	10.0	1,551	*1*	13	Turkey	22.5
14	Turkey	9.9	139	*1*	14	Brazil	[21.0]
15	Brazil	9.2	51	*1*	15	Pakistan	15.0
Sub-total top 15		723.8		*82*	Sub-total top 15		991.4
World		879		*100*	World		—

Note: Figures are in US$b, at constant (2000) prices and exchange rates. Figures in italics are percentages.
The values in [ ] are the SIPRI estimates.
MER, market exchange rate; PPP, purchasing power parity.
Source: Military expenditure: appendix 10A; PPP rates: World Bank, *World Development Indicators 2002* (World Bank: Washington, DC, 2002), Table 5.6, Relative prices and exchange rates.
[a]The figures in PPP dollar terms are converted at PPP rates (for 2000), calculated by the World Bank, based on comparisons of gross national product (GNP).
[b]The top 15 list in PPP terms would probably include Myanmar, if data were available.
[c]Data for Iran includes expenditure for public order and safety and is a slight overestimate.

Table A.7. US Military Expenditure, FY 1999–2008.

	Actual				Enacted 2003[a]	Requested 2004[b]	Projected			
	1999	2000	2001	2002			2005	2006	2007	2008
Department of Defense										
Budget authority, current dollars	278.6	290.5	319.5	345.0	374.0	379.6	399.6	419.6	440.3	461.6
Budget authority, constant dollars	315.5	320.8	343.0	360.6	382.7	379.6	390.5	400.5	410.4	420.1
Annual change, in real terms (%)	—	*1.7*	*6.9*	*5.1*	*6.1*	*−0.8*	*2.9*	*2.6*	*2.5*	*2.4*
Outlays, current dollars	261.4	281.2	291.0	332.0	358.2	370.7	389.6	402.7	416.3	441.1
Outlays, constant dollars	296.9	310.7	311.9	346.1	366.5	370.7	380.8	375.5	379.0	392.1
Annual change, in real terms (%)	—	*4.7*	*0.4*	*11.0*	*5.9*	*1.1*	*2.7*	*−1.4*	*0.9*	*3.5*
National Defense										
Budget authority, current dollars	292.3	304.1	335.5	362.1	392.7	399.7	420.0	440.0	460.3	480.7
Budget authority, constant dollars	331.1	335.8	360.1	378.5	401.8	399.7	410.4	420.0	429.0	437.5
Annual change, in real terms (%)	—	*1.4*	*7.2*	*5.1*	*6.2*	*−0.5*	*2.7*	*2.3*	*2.1*	*2.0*
Outlays, current dollars	274.9	294.5	305.5	348.6	376.3 (438.9)	390.4 (456.0)	410.1	423.2	436.4	460.5
Outlays, constant dollars	312.2	325.3	327.4	363.4	385.1 (448.9)	390.4 (456.0)	400.9	394.6	397.3	409.3
Annual change, in real terms (%)	—	*4.2*	*0.6*	*11.0*	*6.0 (23.5)*	*1.4 (1.6)*	*2.7*	*−1.6*	*0.7*	*3.0*
Outlays as a share of GDP (%)	*3.0*	*3.0*	*3.0*	*3.4*	*3.5*	*3.5*	*3.5*	*3.4*	*3.3*	*3.3*

Note: Figures are in US$b, at current prices and constant (FY 2004) prices. Figures in italics are percentages.

Budget authority is the authority to incur legally binding obligations of the government, which will result in immediate or future outlays. Most authority is provided by Congress in the form of enacted appropriations. *National Defense* allocations include the allocations for the Department of Defence and allocations for military purposes funded by non-DOD departments.

Source: Belasco, A. and Daggett, S., 'Authorization and appropriations for FY2004: Defense', CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, updated 26 Sep. 2003, Table 3, p. 18. Outlays as a share of GDP: *Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2004* (US Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 2003), Table 6.1: 'Composition of outlays: 1940–2008', p. 115, URL <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget>.

[a]The figures for FY 2003 do not include the DOD part ($62.6 billion) of the emergency supplemental appropriations approved by Congress in April 2003 for the war in Iraq and other military operations. If this is included, outlays for national defence in FY 2003 in $438.9 billion (shown in brackets).

[b]The figures for FY 2004 do not include the DOD part ($65.6 billion) of the supplemental appropriations requested by the administration in September 2003. If this is included, the outlay for national defence in FY 2004 in $456.0 billion (shown in brackets).

Table A.8. The FY 2004 Supplemental Appropriation for the War on Terrorism.

Category		Requested Sum
Department of defense and Classified operations		
Operation Iraqi Freedom		51,000
Operation Enduring Freedom, in Afghanistan		11,000
Coalition partners and mobilization support		3,600
Total military		65,600
Coalition Provision Authority (CPA) and Department of State for reconstruction		
The Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (for use by the CPA):		20,300
To enhance security (army, police and border enforcement)	5,100	
To provide basic electricity services	5,700	
To provide basic water and sewer services	3,700	
To rehabilitate the oil infrastructure	2,100	
Other	3,700	
Security and reconstruction in Afghanistan (incl. Funds for building the Afghan National Army)		800
State Department operations (to provide secure State Department facilities in Iraq and to pay rewards in the war on terrorism		140
Other		160
Total reconstruction		21,400
Total supplement appropriation		87,000

Note: Figures are in US$m, at current prices.
Source: Office of Management of Budget (OMB), Executive Office of the President, 'President submits request for funding war on terrorism – provides resources for the war on terror, including military and intelligence operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the relief and reconstruction of those countries', Press release, Washington, DC, 17 Sep. 2003. For details, see 'Transmittal Letter from the Director of OMB to the President', 17 Sep. 2003, URL <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/amendments/supplemental_9_17_03.pdf>.

Table A.9. Seven of the 15 major spenders, military expenditure, 1999–2003.

Rank 2003			Military Expenditure					Share of GDP 2002 (%)
Country	MER	PPP	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	
Japan	2	7	45.5	45.8	46.3	46.8	46.9	*1.0*
UK	3	6	35.2	35.7	36.4	36.7	37.1	*2.4*
France	4	5	34.2	33.8	33.7	34.4	35.0	*2.5*
China	5	2	[20.0]	[22.0]	[25.9]	[30.3]	[32.8]	[*2.5*]
Russia	11	4	[8.3]	[9.7]	[11.2]	[11.4]	[13.0]	[*4.0*]
India	12	3	10.5	10.9	11.4	11.4	12.4	*2.3*
Brazil	14	13	7.2	7.6	8.9	9.9	[9.2]	*1.6*
For comparison: USA	1	1	290.5	301.7	304.1	341.5	417.4	*3.4*

The values in [ ] are the SIPRI estimates.
MER, market exchange rate; PPP, purchasing power parity; GDP, gross domestic product.
Note: Figures are in US$b, at constant (2000) prices and market exchange rates. Figures in italics are percentages.
Source: Appendix 10A, Tables 10A.3 and 10A.4. See also Table 10.4.

Table A.10. Regional/National Shares of Arms Sales for the Top 100 Arms-producing Companies in the World Excluding China, 2002 compared to 2001.

Number of Companies	Region/ Country	Arms Sales[a] (US$b)		Change (%)[b] 2001–2002	Share of Total Arms Sales (%) 2002
		2001	2002		
42	North America	*[98.4]*	*120.8*	*[23]*	*62.8*
2	Canada	0.7	0.7	−4	0.3
40	USA	[97.7]	120.1	[23]	62.5
38	Europe	*52.2*	*57.9*	*11*	*30.2*
11	UK	23.1	23.8	[3]	12.4
8	France[c]	[11.3]	13.9	[24]	7.2
1	Trans-European[d]	5.5	5.6	2	2.9
3	Italy	3.7	4.9	34	2.5
5	Germany	3.6	4.1	14	2.1
6	Russia[e]	[2.3]	2.8	[21]	1.5
1	Sweden	1.1	1.3	24	0.7
2	Spain	0.6	0.8	29	0.4
1	Switzerland	0.5	0.5	4	0.2
1	Norway	0.3	0.3	32	0.2
10	Other OECD	*[7.2]*	*[7.4]*	*[3]*	*[3.9]*
7	Japan	5.9	5.9	−1	3.1
2	South Korea[e]	[1.0]	[1.2]	[13]	[0.6]
1	Australia	0.3	0.4	25	0.2
10	Other non-OECD	*6.3*	*6.0*	*−4*	*3.1*
4	Israel	3.2	3.2	2	1.7
3	India	1.9	1.6	−17	0.8
1	Singapore	0.8	0.8	4	0.4
1	South Africa	0.4	0.3	−9	0.2
100	Total	[164.1]	192.1	[17]	100.0

The values in [ ] are the totals that include estimates for one or more companies; OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Note: Figures do not always add up because of the conventions of rounding.
Source: Appendix 11A, Table 11A.1.
[a]Arms sales include both sales for domestic procurement and export sales.
[b]The percentage changes are based on figures for arms sales that are not rounded.
[c]The total for France in 2001 includes an estimate of the arms production value for DCN.
[d]The company classified as trans-European is the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS), which is based in three countries – France, Germany and Spain – and registered in the Netherlands.
[e]Data for Russian and South Korean companies are uncertain, and data for Russian arms sales in 2001 are estimated on the basis of the trend in their total sales.

Table A.11. The Recipients of Major Conventional Weapons, 1999–2003.
The list includes all countries/non-state actors with imports of major conventional weapons in the period 1999–2003. Ranking is according to the 1999–2003 aggregate imports. Figures are SIPRI trend-indicator values expressed in US $m. at constant (1990) prices. Figures may not add up because of the conventions of rounding.

Rank Order		Recipient	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	1999–2003
1999–2003	1998–2002[a]							
1	1	China	1,539	1,822	3,049	2,842	2,548	11,800
2	3	India	1,043	580	908	1,691	3,621	7,843
3	6	Greece	556	682	697	517	1,957	4,409
4	4	Turkey	1,125	692	372	804	504	3,497
5	10	UK	98	834	1,202	567	555	3,256
6	8	Egypt	490	820	775	646	504	3,235
7	2	Taiwan	1,670	536	411	293	179	3,084
8	7	South Korea	1,162	719	375	300	299	3,855
9	12	Pakistan	788	135	391	600	611	2,525
10	5	Saudi Arabia	1,215	68	74	576	487	2,420
11	13	Australia	331	326	636	616	485	2,394
12	9	Israel	1,202	320	88	267	318	2,195

Table A.11. (*Continued*)

Rank Order		Recipient	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	1999–2003
1999–2003	1998–2002[a]							
13	14	UAE	413	243	186	356	922	2,120
14	17	Algeria	459	372	523	228	513	2,095
15	11	Japan	1,028	197	206	154	210	1,795
16	18	Iran	242	294	410	371	323	1,640
17	15	Finland	797	513	10	31	125	1,476
18	19	Canada	47	424	466	351	94	1,382
19	27	USA	103	133	167	364	515	1,282
20	16	Singapore	219	548	167	227	121	1,282
21	26	Italy	8	236	355	323	348	1,270
22	25	Malaysia	787	40	26	110	242	1,205
23	20	Brazil	272	91	539	150	87	1,139
24	24	Spain	314	264	176	215	97	1,066
25	21	Netherlands	294	131	142	255	132	954
26	41	Poland	1	136	68	300	420	925
27	23	Angola	379	118	313	29	—	839
28	29	Yemen	54	158	92	487	30	821
29	39	Indonesia	181	164	38	53	333	769
30	30	Jordan	70	129	174	121	258	752
31	28	Norway	193	269	150	82	—	694
32	31	Argentina	199	184	77	107	127	694

Table A.12. China's Arms Exports, 1981–1988. Index: 1981 = 100.

Year	SIPRI	CRS	ACDA
1981	100	100	100
1982	240	291	305
1983	298	352	362
1984	368	445	436
1985	308	141	143
1986	400	255	247
1987	667	491	200
1988	613	592	—

Source: Index constructed from constant price in **SIPRI Yearbook* 1989: *World Armaments and Disarmament* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1989), Table 6A.2; Grimmelt, R., *CRS Report Supplier Trends in Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World by Major Supplier, 1980–1988* (Library of Congress: Washington, DC, 1989); US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfer 1988* (ACDA: Washington, DC, 1989).

Table A.13. Official Chinese Defence Spending, 1975–1990.

Year	Milex, Current (b. yuan)	Share of CGE[a] (%)	Share of NI[b] (%)	Milex, Constant (b. 1988 yuan)
1975	14.25	17.4	6.7	27.88
1976	13.45	16.7	5.5	25.92
1977	14.90	17.7	5.6	28.33
1978	16.78	15.1	5.6	31.65
1979	22.27	17.5	6.7	41.17
1980	19.38	16.0	5.3	33.37
1981	16.80	15.1	4.3	28.20
1982	17.64	15.3	4.1	29.02
1983	17.71	13.7	3.7	28.60
1984	18.08	11.7	3.2	28.41
1985	19.15	10.4	2.7	26.91
1986	20.13	8.6	2.6	26.43
1987	20.98	8.6	2.3	25.32
1988	21.80	8.1	1.9	21.80
1989	24.55[c]	8.4	1.9	20.46
1990	28.90[c]	11.5	—	23.10

Source: SIPRI (1992).
[a]CGE, central government expenditure.
[b]NI, national income.
[c]Planned figure.

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TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: BASIC LINES

Jaime García Covarrubias

BACKGROUND

Since their independence from the European colonial powers, most of the countries of the American region have been unable to build solid, stable democracies. Only a few countries in the region today have solid and effective democratic processes, and some of them are even involved in unpredictable situations, such as Bolivia or Venezuela. As a result, the historical march of our democracies has been one of advances and retreats, all of them interrupted at some time in the 20th century.

In fact, in the last century all of the countries from Mexico to the southern cone have suspended their democratic processes at one time or another and given in to military governments of various types that finally ended up in processes of transition to democracy.[1]

Transition processes are not simple and have not happened in the same way in all the countries. At both ends of the spectrum, we have different cases. In some cases it was in favour of a clean break (Argentina), and in others it was more institutionalised and scheduled (Chile). In other countries such as Paraguay, it was the final result of another coup d'état. Brazil, Uruguay, and Bolivia also have their own features.

Transitions are not single-step processes; they have phases and may vary from case to case. For example, for some, transition is simply the process

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that goes from the end of a de facto government to a democratic one. In my personal case, I believe that there are cases, in which transitions can begin during the military regime itself and do not necessarily end up with the advent of democratic government. However, but as we will see in this paper it is a broader process.

In this paper, I will identify what I consider to be the lines that are essential to studying and understanding the transition from military governments to democracies in the countries of the southern cone of Latin America. These countries are Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. I think that all these cases have similarities and characteristics that help better clarify these lines along which transition occurs. I intend only to use these countries as general examples, without going into great detail, in order to avoid an excessively long article. Each country is a subject for separate study, and for comparative studies of two or more of them. However, the purpose of this work is not an in-depth study of the cases, but for the time being only to identify the lines that support the process.

In order to clarify concepts, these "lines" are the central or basic aspects that distinguish the processes of transition to democracy and may be given a greater or lesser degree of emphasis. In my point of view, these basic lines in Latin America are *acknowledgment of latent and manifest roles, stages of the transitional process, the difference between military and political logic, and steps to improve the civilian–military relationship*. The fact that I give priority to these points does not mean that I do not realise that there are also other aspects that impact transitional processes.



LATENT AND MANIFEST ROLES

It is an historical fact that the full, democratic insertion of the armed forces in Latin America in a democratic system is difficult, and that it is their historical origin and the way their own inhabitants see them that complicates this integration. This circumstance is also an important line in the transitional process.

As is known, the armed forces (particularly armies) are foundational, meaning that they precede the independent state or are at least born along with it, and for that reason they are part of its history and symbolism. However, this situation does not occur by spontaneous generation but has been developing since colonial times, when the royal army took care of military, political, educational, and developmental tasks. When independence came, a vacuum was created in society and the patriot armies continued to play these roles.[2]

Certain roles, which I have called latent and manifest, have resulted from the above foundational nature of the armed forces.[3] The manifest role is the constitutional mission of the armed forces as legally expressed in the founding charter and the laws. This point is very important in the region since there is not always a deeply rooted concept of respect for the law and there is often a tendency of laws to become ineffective and rarely enforced. This manifest role that is expressed in the laws has been the subject of extensive discussion during transitions. For example, in Chile there are certain sectors that want to change Article 90 et seq. of the Political Constitution because it gives the armed forces certain prerogatives that would exceed the democratic framework, such as the inability to remove the commanders-in-chief for 4 years, participation in the national security council, and a role as guarantors of the institutions. In addition, in other countries there are discussions about the need to eliminate the law stating that the minister of defence must be an active or retired member of the armed forces. In my opinion, all these constitutional definitions aimed at extending the armed forces beyond their natural role of defence are doing nothing more than trying to make the latent role a "manifest" one.

The latent role is the one that is in the "collective unconsciousness" of society and is derived from the political, military, educational, and developmental role played first by the colonial army and then by the patriot army. This very early role of the military benefited society and made an indelible mark on it and has been handed down from generation to generation. So societies begin to see the armed forces as having a certain obligation to them

beyond what is written in the founding charter. The same thing is true in the realm of moral issues and the Catholic Church. Generally, there is no constitution in the Americas that regulates the role of the Catholic Church[4], but no one can deny the real role it has and plays in the societies of the region.

From my point of view, over time, the latent role has become a heavy burden for the armed forces themselves, who are often overworked by their own societies, calling on them to assume roles beyond their constitutional ones in times of political, social, or natural crises. In the countries mentioned in this paper, we have cases of permanent participation of the armed forces in all types of events that are not part of the defence sector. In Bolivia, there is extensive participation of the armed forces in community assistance. In Uruguay, they have even been used as guards in jails. In Brazil, they are used in domestic security. In addition, in all cases they are the first institutions that work with the community in case of disasters, vaccination campaigns, road construction, etc.

The integration and consequences of these four features (political, military, developmental, and educational) have contributed to strengthening the latent role and making it the central point of study and research on the relationship between the armed forces and society. In my opinion, it is impossible to understand the civilian–military relationship in Latin America without addressing this variable.[5]

THE TRANSITIONAL PROCESS

In my opinion, transitions from a military government or dictatorship to democracy are not a single linear processes but include three distinct transitions, each with its own dynamic. In addition, and this is of prime importance, we have to add the country's own unique situation, the wounds left by military governments, the political, economic, and social conditions, etc.

All these situations can produce a multiplier effect or else some modification along any of the basic lines along which transition is built. For example, in the case of Argentina, unlike the other countries of the southern cone, the result of the Falklands War precipitated and marked that country's transition, damaging the prestige of the armed forces. In Paraguay, General Rodriguez's coup d'état led the country to transition and partly restored the credibility of the military sector. In Peru and Bolivia, there were military governments of opposing political persuasion, which is certainly a differentiating factor.

The first phase is the transition of the formal turnover of "power". This occurs when the armed forces turn over power to a civilian authority and

withdraw to perform the activities provided in the founding charter. One example or model of this transition is General Pinochet's turnover of power to President Patricio Aylwin on March 11, 1989 in Chile. The second step is that of "constitutional law", meaning the transition from a constitution and legal system with authoritarian (or praetorian) features to one giving priority to the authority of civilian institutions based on popular sovereignty. As explained above, in the case of Chile it would be during the reform of Article 90 on the armed forces, and in other cases discussion of whether or not there is a need to keep military defence ministers. The proper legal insertion of the armed forces into the new social framework is one of the most important points in making a constitution really democratic. However, there are other central aspects such as the consolidation of the citizens' individual freedoms.

Finally the slower and longer transition, the "cultural" transition, meaning the period when people, and especially young people, begin to believe in democracy and intensely value it, without accepting it as a lesser evil or feeling nostalgic about an authoritarian regime. This transition is still in progress in many of our countries and still has a long way to go because many young people are not registering to vote, marginalising themselves from democratic decision making by simple apathy or distrust. This situation is particularly serious in Latin American countries because young people are not participating and expressing their demands. This results in weak democracies in which large emerging masses are out of the electoral game, victimised, and impoverished. In desperation, they begin to long for an authoritarian government to solve their problems even it if does restrict their liberties. From this situation emerge neo-military leaders such as Commander Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Colonel Lino Gutiérrez in Ecuador, or General Lino Oviedo in Paraguay.



To this is added another type of transition, the one that occurs within military governments before the turnover of power takes place. Such as the case of Chile between 1988 and 1990. This type of transition or "pre-transition" is what I call "endogenous".[6] I agree that this type of transition does not always occur and is more characteristic of agreed or scheduled transitions.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MILITARY LOGIC AND POLITICAL LOGIC

During a transitional process, both the military and civilians have to understand one another. Knowing and providing for ways that the two differing opinions can use to approach problems is fundamental to this. As we know, the two sectors have different logics for approaching problems. We see the most obvious features are: the political mind will take the global view, while the military mind takes a specific view, centring on defence. The military mind has a more long-term view since it is centred on institutions; the political mind a more short-term view since it normally involves a period of government. The political mind aims at creating consensus, while the military mind looks to providing solutions and executing them. The politician sees horizontal organisations, the military man vertical ones. Political success depends on the general will, while military success depends on the recognition of leaders and subordinates.[7]

DIFFERENCES IN MILITARY AND POLITICAL LOGIC

Political:	Military:
- Tendency to negotiate and create consensus between factions	- Tendency to solve and execute
- Horizontal power structure	- Vertical power structures
- Success depends on public approval	- Success dependant on acknowledgement by superiors and subordinates
- Global View of phenomena	- Focused sector view (defence)

However, more than different logics, what delays a transition the most are the prejudices that exist on both sides. I refer to crossed, radical, and biased views held in both sectors that are detrimental to a better political–military relationship. For some members of the armed forces, politicians are loose, corrupt, demagogical enemies of the armed forces and the forces of order, and just want power. In a similar vein, there are politicians who see the members of the armed forces as rough illiterates with no present raison d'être, receiving excessive benefits. I stress that these are extreme and radicalised points of view that fortunately are clearly shrinking. In addition, there are two types of problems between civilians and the military, "Cyclical" problems and "Philosophical–Ideological Structural" problems.

"Cyclical" refers to the rejection felt toward the armed forces by citizens who were against the military regime (or dictatorship) or suffered its effects. "Philosophical–Ideological Structural" refers to conscientious objectors, members of religions that do not accept military service due to philosophical or life principles, or militants from parties that reject the model of society and all its institutions. Cyclical problems can be overcome with time, but in my opinion the second type of problem has no solution.

In addition, there is another situation that is detrimental to transition and has long-term repercussions. This situation is the result both of the sociological characteristics of the military institution and of its actions as authoritarian or dictatorial governments that still makes them the subject of criticism. Whenever this occurs, the norm is for the institution to react collectively and characterise anyone who criticises it as an enemy of the armed forces. The problem lies in the fact that today's second lieutenant will be a colonel in 2028, and by then will certainly have expanded his negative view of his critics. This occurs because a member of the armed forces has a high "historical sensitivity" and feels he is the heir, for better or for worse, of past glories, disagreements, or other historical moments, so it is very difficult for him to be absolutely detached from the past. On the other hand, in many cases the politician legislating today is someone who entered politics under military governments and has been marked by those events. The problem is that at times he legislates with a view to a political–military conflict dating from 30 years ago. By this I mean to say that the situation of conflict between politicians and the military can be up to 60 years out of phase (backward or forward) between the two extremes. I am simply stating a fact here.

STEPS TO IMPROVE THE CIVILIAN–MILITARY RELATIONSHIP: KNOWLEDGE, TRUST, COORDINATION, AND INTEGRATION (UNDERSTANDING)



Looking toward the future and with the idea of improving the civilian–military relationship in general and the political–military relationship in particular, it is necessary to follow and observe certain steps, which involve knowledge, trust, coordination, and integration. This means that in order to achieve a good political or civilian–military relationship, between institutions as well as between people, the first requirement is to create opportunities for knowledge. The second is to forge bonds of trust through meetings to exchange ideas, subsequently to begin to work together while maintaining an environment of independence. Last, and as a consequence of the preceding, will come the possibility of working together in an integrated manner. These steps are sequential because recoils occur between civilians and the military when this order is not adhered to. For example, if people try to gain trust without knowing each other they will inevitably have to step back, and the same will be true if they try to work together without having trust. These steps are lived out in daily life, and this is exactly where relationships should be created.[8]

Today, it is very important to remember the aforementioned steps because many of these groups live together in society and have either a close or a conflicted relationship with the armed forces. Some even form non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to address their issues with the military. For example, some groups take up certain human rights causes against military governments and by extension their rejection extends to the present-day armed forces. This often occurs in Chile and Argentina. There are others, such as the case of conscientious objectors who reject military service, or women seeking to claim their right to enter the armed services. And lastly, various groups that want the armed forces to have some ability to have their own positions and demands heard. In addition, the armed forces' relationship with the press is another type of interesting relationship that has been the subject of a lot of work in recent years.

The fact is that much progress has been made in the civilian–military relationship and in general the foundations are in place for the future normality in all the countries. For example, in Chile there have been discussions with the Evangelical churches requesting equal standing with the Catholic Church in the armed forces. Furthermore, a woman can now be a fighter pilot and the police (*Carabineros*) have a female general and the army has several female colonels. The same is happening in Brazil and Argentina. Recently, in March 2003 in Chile a bill was introduced in the house of deputies that permits women to access the rank of general in the armed forces and to earn promotions without sex discrimination for officers, NCOs, and civilian employees. For its part, in 2002 Argentina graduated the first class of

officers with women in combat positions. In Venezuela, for example, the first class of women that entered the air force officers' academy was in 1973.

In *practical* terms, subordination of the military to civilian power is a fact in the region. There is a de facto and de jure constitutional, symbolic, and administrative subordination, that is that the armed forces are subordinate to civilian power, are paid the appropriate respect, and the political authority approves or disapproves the armed forces' administrative proposals. However, as far as strategy goes, there has traditionally been some degree of autonomy for the armed forces since often the deployment or the idea of using the armed forces has not come from a political idea but from their own institutions. At the root of the issue there has been a sort of political subordination on the subject of strategy since the political echelon has taken on preexisting planning. There is no doubt that the latest advances such as the defence books in Chile (I and II), Argentina, Ecuador, and Guatemala will help correct this anomaly.

CONCLUSIONS

I think that general terms of the transition to democracy are settled, at least the transitions of the turnover of power and, in most cases, that of the laws. However, in many countries the cultural transitions are still pending.

It is indispensable that in transitional processes the following aspects are monitored and managed, since they are basic lines of transition:

- Accept the latent role as a real sociological fact. However, the necessary limitations must be put in place so that the scope of action of the armed forces does not hinder the democratic system.
- Understand that transition is not a single stage; it is at least three different stages that are necessarily interdependent.
- The political and military minds have different logic for understanding problems, so it is necessary to achieve the proper synchronisation between their points of view. In addition, prejudicial views between the two must be eliminated or set aside.
- In order to transition to a democracy in which the armed forces are properly inserted, it is necessary to follow the sequential steps of knowledge, trust, coordination, and integration (understanding).

With respect to the permanent insertion of the armed forces in democratic processes, I think that there are situations that could possibly make it difficult: in the first place, the difficulties inherent to the processes of cultural

transition in each of the countries. In the second place, the emergence of former military leaders as populist "bosses" with some degree of charismatic control over all or part of the armed forces. In the third place, tensions left over from military governments, such as human rights problems.[9]

NOTES

1. Transitions to democracy began in Ecuador (1979), Peru (1980), Honduras and Bolivia (1982), Argentina (1983), El Salvador and Uruguay (1984), Brazil (1985), Guatemala (1986), Chile (1990), and Paraguay (1993).
2. During colonial times, political authority was at the same time military authority (Quartermaster General and Commander in Chief). Wherever a military fort or barracks was built, a city was born. The educational role – by State imperative – was in effect well into the 20th century. I have written more extensively on this subject in the case of Chile, in *"Algunos fundmentos de las relaciones civiles miitares en Chile"* by Jaime García Covarrubias, in *Boletín de la Asociacion de Ciencia Política*, Vol. 2, January–March 1992.
3. In the definition of these concepts, though, I take the latent and manifest functions of Robert Merton with another interpretation. More information in R. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (1957).
4. The Mexican Constitution does have some articles and amendments limiting the power of the Catholic Church, legacy of the "*Leyes de Reforma*" of Benito Juarez.
5. The political–military relationship is the relationship between political sectors and the armed forces. The civilian–military relationship, on the other hand, is the relationship between the armed forces and society as a whole or with specific sectors of society, be they organised or not. For example, the armed forces and young people on the subject of military service, the armed forces and women for the inclusion of women in military institutions, etc.
6. This period, which I have called "endogenous transition", is not widely written about by political scientists in the case of Chile. I wrote about it in my article *"Relación Politico Militar en Chile"* to be published in a book edited by the Spanish Universidad Nacional de la Defensa (UNED), whose editor is José Antonio Olmeda. During the period in question, the management of Minister of the Interior Carlos Cáceres was decisive from late 1989 to March 1990. See "Que Pasa" magazine (Santiago, Chile) from January–July 1989.
7. See the Postmodern Military in Latin America in Security and Defence, the online magazine of the CHDS, Washington, DC, January 2002.
8. Various interviews and articles have discussed this proposition, which I pointed out in 1992 in a meeting on civilian and military relations in the Centro de Estudios de Desarrollo (CED).
9. In my opinion, the appropriate way of ensuring good civilian political control of defence is to have the National Defence Ministry in the line of command. This is true in most of the countries, even though there are others such as Nicaragua or Paraguay where the NDM is not in the chain of command.

‘THROUGH LITTLE STEPS …’: INFORMAL NETWORKS IN PEACEFUL CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Bandana Purkayastha

1. INTRODUCTION

Two trends mark the contemporary international scholarship on conflict and resolution. The scholarship on conflict has begun to look systematically at intra-state conflicts and track the role of non-state actors, along with the more established trend of analysing inter-state conflict. Conflict resolution has also moved beyond looking at states and national and global-level NGOs to the role of local, non-state actors in preventing and/or minimising conflict. While the “mainstream” scholarly work emphasises a linear process of reaching resolutions in the aftermath of a conflict (e.g. Burton, 1990; Galtung, 1965), a range of “related” scholarship has begun to focus on factors that prevent conflict and their rapid diffusion over wider areas, as well as factors that contribute to longer term, peaceful, resolution (e.g. Das, Kleinman, Lock, Ramphele, & Reynolds, 2001; Sabet, 1998; Varshney, 2001). These related literature look beyond political solutions such as conflict management, boundary adjustments, and treaties, and the role of international and national formal bodies to resolve and manage conflict; their

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emphasis is on conflict prevention, the healing of conflict victims, and building and sustaining peace. With the recognition, in the 21st century, of the escalating production and spread of weaponry, the power of non-state actors to generate significant conflict, as well as the rapidly growing proportion of people who suffer from and cope with the aftermath of such conflict, the expanded frames for understanding conflict and resolution, requires further attention.

The present discussion focuses on one aspect of the emerging scholarship: the role of informal networks in conflict resolution, i.e. the ''little steps'' that help prevent, minimise, or resolve conflicts and seek long-term solutions. The discussion on informal networks is grounded in the recent literature that indicates more complex notions of conflict resolution. A focus on informal networks which complement the more formal networks, organisations, and institutions that are engaged in the same process, reveal several less visible factors that help to create long-term solutions. It also makes us aware of less visible actors who facilitate the resolution process. This emphasis greatly expands our knowledge about socially effective and locally meaningful conflict resolution techniques. This paper begins with a description of some of the key assumptions of the more established literature on conflict and resolution. This is followed by a discussion of the related literature – on ethnic conflicts, trauma and social suffering, human rights perspectives on conflict – which indicate more complex ways of thinking about resolution. The next section introduces the notion of informal networks, and, with reference to selected cases, of the processes through which informal networks contribute to conflict resolution. The concluding section discusses the importance of considering informal networks in thinking about the complex process of conflict resolution in the contemporary world.

2. CONFLICTS: TRENDS AND TERMS

Gleditsch, Wallerstein, Erikkson, Sollenberg, and Strand (2002) presented a new database on ''Armed Conflict 1946–2001'' that documents conflicts that kill at least 25 people annually remain a serious issue during the Post Cold War period. Importantly, they have identified that intra-state conflict has become the dominant form after World War II. Other scholars such as Keegan (1994) and Watkin (2004) point out that as the mass production of weapons increased dramatically, these increased the range and costs of ordinary people's warfare. The numbers of people around the world who are directly and indirectly affected by such armed conflicts have been growing

rapidly: scholars have begun to point out how many people around the world are negatively affected even if they are not injured or killed through such conflict (e.g. Sen, 2002). Thinking about conflict resolution to address this new reality, therefore, requires that we move beyond the linear frame of conflict and its resolution, towards a framework which identifies mechanisms that address and ameliorate diverse kinds of conflict.

Much of the literature on conflict resolution has focused on conflict that involves a state government and another state or an intra-state entity; the corresponding emphasis on resolution has been on political responses to such conflict. Most scholars follow the definition of Johan Galtung (1965, quotations, 348, 351), who defined conflict as an expression of a system wherein "the system has two or more incompatible goal states", and resolution as "a process that leads (...) to a state (...) where the system (...) no longer [has] two or more incompatible goals". Galtung pointed out there are many ways in which this goal compatibility can be brought about: resolutions that range from complete annihilation of one party to complete agreement among the parties. Moreover resolution can consist of external conformity (agreement) or by internalisation (acceptance) of the solution.

Recent examples illustrate that this version of conflict resolution is widely used. In a survey of the various modes of conflict resolution, Heraclides (1989) points to a range of policy options adopted by states to deny or accept the rights of other parties in the conflict based on his assessment of the Israel–Palestinian conflict. Examining a range of Arab–Israeli conflicts, Bar-Sman-Tov (1994, quotations, 75, 81) points out that conflict management refers to "controlling, limiting, and containing conflict (...) [or] suppression, regulation, institutionalization", while resolution "occurs when the incompatibility between the preferences of the various parties to a conflict disappears or when sources of conflict are removed". Resolution should mean "not only the absence of violence but also the removal of the sources of the conflict situation, the changing attitude, and the emergence of readiness to give up some of the sources of conflict in order to accomplish others". Similarly, in their study of conflict resolution in Northern Ireland, Boyle and Hadden (1995) describe the ceasefire as the beginning of the political solution. They caution, however, that when the groups in conflict have led very distinctive ways of life entrenched in a long history of separation, such political negotiations are fragile at best. Overcoming primordial loyalties to ensure long-lasting peace requires both external conformity and internalisation of the proposed solutions.

Thus, the emphasis in the literature has mostly been on a linear process, of resolution after conflict, and the types of activities – conflict management,

resolution etc. – needed to control the spread of such conflict. While the effect of such conflict on individuals (especially trauma) has attracted scholarly attention, less work has been conducted on group cultures, folkways, the role of informal networks and how these influence the prevention of conflict or its rapid spread or the coping mechanisms fostered through such networks to heal communal rifts in the aftermath of the conflict.

3. LOOKING BEYOND RESOLUTION: FROM CONFLICT PREVENTION TO SUSTAINED HEALING AND PEACE

Three sets of emerging literature, which touch on themes of conflict and resolution, together indicate a more complex model for understanding conflict resolution. Instead of looking at conflict followed by resolution, this scholarship focuses on what prevents conflict, what minimises or dissipates it. It also extends the meaning of resolution beyond people's conformity with or acceptance of a resolution (i.e. a top-down process) to what constitutes healing and a reclaiming of conditions that allow people to recreate everyday routines and promote, at least to some degree, healing. This expanded frame emphasises the role of hitherto invisible agents involved in minimising, preventing, and healing after conflict, just as it emphasises a higher standard of "resolution" to confront the nature of conflict and its effects.

The first set of literature, which has examined intra-state conflict, does not assume that deeply entrenched primordial identities incite conflict between groups. For instance, in the conflict prevention and healing literature that has emerged over the last two decades, many scholars are beginning to identify the constructed nature of "primordial hatreds". Ivana Milojevic (2002) has described this complex process of constructing antagonistic collective identities within one generation among the people in the Balkans; a similar process seemed to have been underway in the genocidal violence of Hutus against Tutsis in Rwanda (Dallaire, 1998). The work by Nandy, Trivedy, Mayaram, and Yagnik (1997) on Hindu–Muslim conflict in Ayodhya points to the role of outsiders in hardening social boundaries of the two groups. These scholars point to the process of nation-building with its bureaucratic need to demarcate clear group identities based on race, religion, and its effect on "freezing" social identities. The other factor Nandy et al. (1997) identify is the profit motive: the active interest of some groups to

profit from the sale of arms as well as the production and sale of "new cultural identities," their symbols and artifacts such as attire, adornment, books, music etc. These two intersecting factors promote the hardening of social boundaries in ways that prepare the ground for the more proximate causes that trigger conflict.

The rejection of the primordial identity thesis and a search for causes of conflict is best addressed in the work of Ashutosh Varshney who compared all the Hindu–Muslim riots in India between 1950 and 1995.[1] Varshney examined why in some cities riots broke out while in others, even if conflict was generated, it quickly dissipated without turning into a riot (Varshney, 1997, 2001). Varshney concluded that inter-ethnic connections in urban areas are the best predictors of the absence or minimisation of violence. While in rural areas, shared everyday routines or face-to-face relationships work, in urban areas, ties through civic associations worked to diffuse and dissipate conflict. Civic organisations where individuals of a variety of backgrounds can freely mingle tend to prevent the outbreak of ethnic conflicts because they are relatively more resistant to being manipulated by the rhetoric of politicians. He also pointed out that everyday engagement further sustains lasting peace.

The second set of literature, the human rights perspective on conflict and resolution, emphasises that varieties of groups rely on global communications and technological advancement to use a range of tools to organise intra-state and transnational forms of violence. Watkin (2004), among others, has argued that the established humanitarian regime, where victims of conflict are rescued or protected, and perpetrators held "accountable" for crimes is often not sufficient to deal with many forms of contemporary violence. Instead, human rights laws are increasingly used to "protect" the lives and liberties of a range of individuals affected by conflict. More germane to this paper, however, is the effect on victims of conflict: the fundamental rights of human beings against bodily harm, even when their government may perpetrate such violence, as well as the right to survival (Lauren, 1998; Falk, 2000). These human rights literature move beyond the language of inter-state conflict and resolution to focusing on a wider set of people who are victimised by violence and their claims as human being, not to be victimised by violence.

The third set of literature focuses on conflict resolution among peaceful societies (Bonta, 1996) and on trauma, social suffering and healing (Das et al., 2001). Using his study of 24 peaceful societies, Bonta argues that the institutionalisation of two cultural beliefs – that violent conflict is inevitable and that armed intervention and punishment prevent internal and external

violence – in Western societies impede the spread of lasting peace. Bonta describes a series of norms about resolving conflicts which veer away from punishment and retribution. He argues there is an urgent need to follow the lead of peaceful societies and build cultures that are firmly committed to peace. Examples of such shifts in collective thinking so that violence (inciting violence or controlling conflict through violent means) is not considered inevitable are available from different parts of the world, such as the Gandhian movements in pre- and post-independence India to post-apartheid South Africa Purkayastha (2002).

Das et al. (2001) illustrate how communities attempt to regain their worlds after violent conflict in different parts of the world. They emphasise that attempts to recreate "normalcy" engage survivors of collective tragedies in creating public spaces where their experiences of victimisation can be articulated, and their involvement in repairing relationships in families, neighbourhoods, and communities cumulatively help them cope. In general, the arguments of these scholars suggest that "resuming the task of living (and not only surviving), [with a] renewed capability to address the future" (Das et al., 2001, p. 4) constitutes a better measure of conflict resolution.

Overall, these three sets of literature suggest more complex ways of thinking about conflict and resolution. Conflict is not "resolved" or even "managed" solely through political solutions; nor is it a utilitarian solution. Just as conflict reflects multiple interacting causes, the "resolution", from the perspective of these scholars, centrally emphasises the need to understand the structures and cultures that promote peace. The solutions suggested for preventing and addressing conflicts are political, social, and cultural, engaging local groups and formal organisations at all social levels, in an active engagement with a culture of peace. The following discussion on informal networks is grounded in this "related" perspective that I will henceforth refer to as the conflict prevention and healing perspective. While informal networks interact centrally with the more visible formal organisations that "resolve" conflict, the role of such networks remains an understudied aspect of the complex process through which deeper and lasting "resolution" of conflict, i.e. prevention and healing, is achieved.

4. INFORMAL NETWORKS AND THE PROCESS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

The world of humanitarian aid, negotiations over boundaries, setting up commissions, the means of managing and containing conflict fall mostly

within the realm of formal groups and institutions. The role of formal groups which engage in such activity including the humanitarian role of international NGOs such as the Red Cross is well documented (Weissbrodt, 1987). Little attention has been paid to ongoing "little steps" that people use to deal with the precursors and aftermath of armed conflict. Yet the second view of conflict prevention and healing points to distinctive arenas in which informal networks are likely to play a crucial role: such networks are important in both preventing violence and in the healing process.

Informal networks, which link individuals and groups, are flexible in form and unobtrusive in character. These networks do not always manifest as organisations seeking change, or as described in international and transnational movement scholarship as "issue-based" networks, or "advocacy networks" (such as those described by Stinestra, 2000; Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Such networks are often dependent on bonds of empathy, obligation, or even a conscious need to present a united front against "others". They may be kin based or non-kin based, localised (village or town) or may involve connections beyond the local community (see Purkayastha & Subramaniam, 2004). They all generate some resources for the people involved in them, and they all contribute to social change either by meeting the sheer need for survival and obtaining the power to do so. At other times, they help to garner the collective ability to talk about suffering and they can aid the processes of social recovery. Examples drawn from different parts of the world illustrate the role of such informal networks.

Varshney's work emphasises that in peaceful cities, associational networks often prevented the outbreak of conflict (or if conflict erupts, helps to mitigate it), but the inclusion in such associations of people of various social identities is contingent upon everyday interactions and some degree of mutual respect of the different groups. Examples from the US and South Asia illustrate how informal networks are likely to help in sustaining this process and help to prevent or, at least, minimise violence.

McComiskey's (2001) study on members of the American Friends Committee, Catholic Workers, North East Connecticut Coalition for Peace and Justice, Peace Action, Prince of Plowshares, Veterans for Peace, War Resisters League, and Women Strike for Peace provides a way of looking at what groups attempt to achieve within a situation where violence and conflict are widely seen as an inevitable part of life. All of these formal groups focus on non-violence as a way of protesting injustices, resisting war, efforts, creating and enhancing consciousness about nuclear and other weapons of war, and related issues. At the same time, many of the members use a series of other "peace-building" activities that are dependent on informal

networks. There are ongoing everyday attempts to reach out to and create a growing number of people who believe in and respond to the "alternative cultures". As one of McComiskey's participants explained:

> "One of the things I really like (…) is the synthesis of lifestyle, of charitable work, peace work, of justice work – how all that comes together. How we have met so many, many people because of our hospitality and the works of mercy, so they have gotten to know us and like us at a personal level and that relationship has enabled us to bring up issues that maybe they wouldn't have been initially open to but because of the foundational relationship we have, they are interested in listening to us and hearing our opinion and joining us at these vigils."
>
> (McComiskey, 2001, p. 60)

This constant effort to build up a culture of peace and draw more people into the network need not automatically imply victory of such methods. But it suggests that people work constructively to create arenas of society where violence need not be the inevitable response to conflict. This point may be further illustrated with reference to two examples from South Asia. Deitrich (2001) features Rajani Rajasingham's account of the role of women in social reconstruction of the Tamil community in Jaffna, Sri Lanka. She illustrates how, amidst the growing violence in Sri Lanka, these informal networks offered alternatives to violence, provided a collective means to challenge violence, and attempted to rebuild some of the pre-existing relationships in the locale. A similar pattern is evident in studies of the Self Employed Women's Association (SEWA), a group of poor women who set up a union of informal and home-based workers. These marginalised women worked relentlessly to build a collective shantipath (way of peace), as violence spiraled during the 2001 Hindu–Muslim conflicts in Ahmedabad, Gujarat (SEWA, 2001). Here, too, the belief in the power of a peaceful culture, and their ability to galvanise women to help victims was contingent upon a range of informal networks with others outside the union.

The second point raised by the literature on social suffering and healing is how do people come to resolve the effects of violence and conflict. What processes do groups adopt, beyond accepting conflict management solutions, to reclaim a degree of normalcy in their lives? Regaining normalcy does not minimise the devastation wrought in people's lives by violent conflicts; on the contrary, reclaiming normalcy implies piecing together an everyday routine in ways that allows individuals and groups to carry on the task of living and surviving.

Four accounts drawn from Naomi Adelson (on the attempts to reassert indigenous people's identity among the Cree in Canada), Maya Todeschini (on women in the aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan), Sasanka

Perera (on the use of spirit mediums to cope with trauma in Sri Lanka in the aftermath of conflict between the Janata Vimukti Preramuna and the state), and Deepak Mehta and Roma Chatterjee (on dealing with displacement and dehumanisation among the Muslims in the Dharavi slums in Mumbai, India) illustrate some of the strategies used for survival and healing and the crucial role of informal networks in this process (Das et al., 2001). These authors argue that looking to international and state agencies as the main entities initiating resolution of conflict is a limited view. Often, these formal groups or institutions have inhibited long-term resolution of conflict by impeding the power of groups to fashion their own healing by rigidly insisting on techniques that are neither culturally appropriate, nor sufficiently accessible. For instance, Perera argues that it may not even be sufficient to depend on formal psychotherapy alone to promote recovery and healing. The use of spirit stories, ideas of spirit possessions, tributes to bodhi trees allow Sri Lankan groups to collectively remember trauma while relegating it to the past, to confront its awesome dimensions, but to assert their agency in defining it. This collective process of selected cultural and religious rituals aids in healing suffering communities. Similarly, in Todeschini's account of the hibakusha, the Japanese women who were the victims of the atomic bombs, were also able to create and sustain cultural symbols embodying the memory of the destruction but also transcending it.

> "Women's dangerous bodies emerged as potent signifiers of atomic suffering and the bomb's threat to this and future generations, no matter how much effort was applied to silence these bodies through medico-legal discourse or glorified representation of mothers."
>
> (Todeschini, 2001, p. 149)

Accounts of the Cree (Adelson) and the Muslims (Mehta and Chatterjee) show a similar process of collective attempts to move beyond the meanings imposed by groups which have a stake in the violence and devastation of these victims. The informal kin- and non-kin-based networks are critical to all the stages of rebuilding relationships, articulating their suffering, and finding social spaces to rebuild a peaceful culture in order to promote a reconstruction of normal lives.

A large volume of literature has pointed out that a key precursor to conflict is the hardening of social boundaries. In their seminal work on creating a nationality Sheth and Nandy (1996) describe the sustained political attempt to fragment social relationship and harden boundaries. Later 'pure' identities are mobilised to incite violence. This was a key ingredient in defining and hardening the boundaries between Hindus and Muslims in

Ayodhya, India. The task of keeping social boundaries permeable is based on the ability of individuals and groups to maintain inter-group informal networks along with the formal inter group networks through civic organisations. Little steps create and sustain the cultural links that affirm interdependency rather than exclusivity. Individuals and groups which are committed towards building peace, consciously and constantly disseminate their ideas about conflict resolution through how they raise their children, how they interact with other family members. This is apparent among the sample studied by McComiskey (2001, p. 108):

> "Yah its tough and we are never going to accomplish it but we have to keep trying. How could you stop? As someone said recently, We could get rid of every nuclear weapon in the world tomorrow and we will not have created a culture of peace because we would still have the same assholes, the same oppressive orthodox capitalism, the same views about what human life is and how to walk this planet and what nature is. Yah know the changes have to be deeper than that. So that's always an issue with me, how to really live in a way that has to do with expressing freedom and creating peace. I mean (…) there's no way you can do it except in little moments. So you keep finding your moments. You know it is hard in this culture".

A similar sentiment was expressed by the members of SEWA in the aftermath of the Gujarat violence in 2001. In a position paper entitled "Shanthipath", they wrote:

> "The real task for tomorrow is the rehabilitation of 'hearts and minds' of getting people to live and work together in the same occupations and to study together in the same schools. We have to organise and join hands in the same organisation. That is the India to which we belong. That is our tomorrow (…) In an environment where peace making was impossible – especially in the initial weeks, could we have done more? We chose to work quietly among all affected communities. We saw that our first priority was to heal wounds and keep people together."
>
> (SEWA, 2004, 28f.)

The mode of operation here too was for members of SEWA to use their informal networks and attempt to bring back some normalcy to life while working for the larger purpose of "keeping people together" on the path of peace.

Third, the human rights literature has emphasised a range of rights that human beings can now claim, including the right to survival and the right not to be harmed bodily. While the symbolic power of this right to hold governments accountable for violence or in failing to protect people, is supposed to work through a range of formal institutions, on the ground, frequently, informal networks carry out the task of ensuring such survival. Once again, the description of the SEWA members is illustrative.

"SEWA leaders and especially Elaben, understood the tremendous expectations of us from all quarters. We felt the need to find the middle ground, serving the poorest and pressing for their needs and rehabilitation with the government which had lost credibility in the eyes of many people. Our experience pointed to the centrality of employment and livelihoods in all work with the poor, especially those in the informal economy (...) [collectively we will] help them rebuild their lives. We are convinced that it is this approach which will lead to real and lasting peace. We need to use economic activities as the first and essential building block for constructive development. And this as well as all peace efforts must be led by women of all communities (...) What is significant is the fact that SEWA kept on providing services to the victims in spite of the violence and curfew. This was possible because of the decentralised way that SEWA works: though Bank Sathis, childcare and health workers, union organisers, trade representatives, board members and aagewans. Eighty-Seven per cent of our staff is from the working class and live in the affected areas. They already were acceptable in their areas. With concrete support from SEWA's Main Office, they could work effectively. They were like small lamps that spread the light of hope during those dark days and nights."

Marginalised women, many of whom had been severally affected by the genocidal violence, held together, across religious divides, fighting for survival through economic rehabilitation. As the formal mechanisms of aid failed or were delayed, the small tasks of rehabilitation supported attempts of victims to survive. Using their informal networks within the affected communities, SEWA members saw these tasks of building economic survival techniques, as an intrinsic step towards building lasting peace.

5. RELEVANCE OF INFORMAL NETWORKS FOR UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT RESOLUTION

The discussion on informal networks raises several issues in thinking about conflict resolution. Adopting the broader theoretical perspective on conflict resolution moves the contemporary discussion from thinking about resolution in the aftermath of conflict to thinking about a continuum beginning with ways to prevent conflict to ways promoting healing among victims of conflict. The established scholarly tradition has focused on policies and activities of organised groups and formal bodies charged with managing and resolving conflicts. These formal activities remain critically important. Nonetheless, this paper suggests that there is a need to look beyond these formal entities to what happens in the interstices of formal arenas of engagement, consider the role of the other, less-visible agents who are involved in the process, as well as other knowledge structures that contribute to the same ends.

Johan Galtung's work suggests that within the system of conflict resolution people come to accept solutions handed down to them. Varshney's work suggests that the presence of integrated associations in civic society act as a mediating factor when politicians attempt to sway public opinion toward conflict. In both instances, informal networks can act as the link through which encouragement to accept the handed-down solution, or messages to desist from violence are dispersed among individuals. Similarly, cultures of peace, including support mechanisms for healing of victims grow and develop in the interstices of the activity spheres of formal entities. A key commonality among the examples in the previous section is the everyday work of keeping alive repressed histories (the atomic bomb victims), fostering inter-group harmony while working to foster peace (SEWA), and ongoing attempts to convince larger sections of the people about the value of peace (McComiskey's groups). These are tasks that fall outside the purview of the formal activities of many of these groups. Locally nuanced efforts undertaken by informal networks are important because they do not represent top-down bureaucratic solutions that often leave a section of the victims silenced and invisible.

Second, this discussion helps us to see new agents in the conflict resolution process. The Japanese women, the Sri Lankan women, the Indian women, the Cree, and the Kui are not typically visible in the literature on conflict resolution. Neither their formal organisations, nor their informal networks are regularly featured for their role in conflict resolution. The tasks they are engaged in are often unobtrusive, their activities rarely fit into classifications of associations or management activities. Yet, their efforts contribute to the process of resolution and building peace. Small successes and little steps that alter the dynamics in the recesses of families, neighbourhoods, and local communities, mark their cumulative contribution to their role in fostering the process of peaceful resolutions to conflicts.

Third, this discussion raises a related question about knowledge structures. Perera's example of spirit healing, SEWA's emphasis on the link between economic survival and peace, or the tasks identified by McComiskey's groups are based on knowledge structures that are very different from the more rationalised bureaucratised mechanisms advocated by larger organisations. The ability of these groups to act upon alternative knowledge structures, sometimes complementing and at other times replacing ways advocated by experts, points to the need for systematically documenting the varied ways in which nuanced local folkways may serve the larger cause of resolving conflicts. A focus on these relatively invisible efforts to build peace points to other cultural norms that provides some degree of resilience to

people. While groups that initiate violence often speak in terms of civilisation clashes and victors – states or non-state actors – restrict the access of victims to public spaces of discourse, these alternative ways keep alive victims' stories. The power to keep these alternative knowledge and structures alive is often contingent upon the informal networks as well.

In sum, given the nature of conflict in contemporary times, which draw in vast swaths of people within the ambit of violence, paying attention to the interstitial areas, the less visible agents, and the alternative knowledge structures may be fruitful for the scholarly literature on conflict resolution and mechanisms for building and sustaining peace.

NOTES

1. Varshney reports that rural areas, where the majority of India's population resides, shared 3.6% of the casualties, while 8 cities (two of which appear on the list because of their share in pre-1970 riots) have been the scene of 46% of the deaths. Since these cities contain 18% of India's urban population (and 5% of the rural and urban population combined), 82% of the urban population has not been prone to riots (Varshney, 2001, p. 373).

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PART III:
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

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INTRODUCTION

Giuseppe Caforio

The Research Committee (RC) 01 of the International Sociological Association is carrying out a broad cross-national research on civil–military relations in democratic countries and, particularly, on the cultural dimensions of this relationship. In this chapter several country papers on that theme are presented, but before giving the floor to the reports of the findings from the national researches, let me introduce the research itself. The issue of a cultural gap between the armed forces and the parent society is an old one and on this theme we can say that two main positions are present in the literature; one is that there is a necessary cultural gap between the military and the civilian, and that a particular gap is not negative. Another side also accepts the idea that the military has a culture different from civilian society, but argues that traditional military culture now serves a less essential purpose: according to them the military has no functional imperative to retain a culture contrary to the prevailing civilian values. On this subject, we can cite what John Hillen (1999, pp. 43, 58), for instance, writes for the US:

> "To many observers, the values and social mores of 1990s America – narcissistic, morally relativist, self-indulgent, hedonistic, consumerist, individualistic, victim-centered, nihilistic, and soft – seem hopelessly at odds with those of traditional military culture." Despite that, "Whether politically motivated by the agenda pushers or not, there is now [in the US] an inexorable momentum to 'close the gap' between the military and society without clearly identifying the nature of the gap, the extent to which it might in fact be healthy and desirable."

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A similar opinion is expressed by Hew Strachan (2003) and by several other authors.

Given this our RC decided to set up a broad cross-national empirical research on the subject, taking its cue from the research performed by Feaver and Kohn in the US (Feaver & Kohn, 2001), but completely revising both the theoretical framework and the empirical methodology of the research. To do that, we created and discussed first of all a new theoretical framework for the research, through an acceptable definition of culture, of the military specificity, and of the military relationships with civilian society. To synthesise, we accepted the following definition of culture. Culture: (1) is belonging to a group of people and, particularly, to an organised group; (2) it constitutes a pattern of basic assumptions that become a collective programming of the mind; (3) as such, it has to be learned by newcomers; (4) it indicates a particular way to cope with problems of internal integration and external adaptation; and (5) this particular way must have worked well enough in the past to be considered valid.

Following that we dealt with the military subculture, conceived of as a specific occupational culture, which is relatively isolated from society. Following the analysis by Don Snider (1999), we considered that four basic elements characterise the military culture, i.e.: (1) discipline, whose purpose is "to minimize the confusion and disintegrative consequences of battle by imposing order on it with a repertoire of patterned actions" (Burk, 1999); (2) the professional ethos, i.e. a set of normative self-understandings which for the members define the profession's corporate identity, its code of conduct and, for the officers in particular, their professional work; (3) rituals as an important element because they guide individual conduct and provide a semblance of order to the harsh reality of death and destruction that often threatens to be overwhelming; and (4) cohesion and esprit de corps.

However, the military is not something unique and homogeneous inside. If you go down from the macro to the micro level, little by little you shall discover that armed forces themselves are a mosaic of subcultures. Thus, we find structural as well as geographical internal subdivisions. In our study the particular subculture of officers is considered, because it appears to be predominant inside the military. It shapes the relationship among the military and its parent society, it is the only one that belongs to a professional group. But we cannot consider the military culture as something constant and identical over time, on the contrary change is characteristic of military culture because of the many influences that constantly affect the values, behaviour, and beliefs that together define it: especially the present change of that culture seems to be deeper and quicker than in the past. In fact,

nowadays we seem to be seeing the return to a Hobbesian world (Mearsheimer, 1990) in which ethnic, religious, national and/or regional antagonisms, kept in check for over 40 years by the balance of power between the superpowers, are being unleashed. This set of changes brought about several important developments inside the military culture of many countries. Therefore it becomes prominent to investigate not only the present situation of civil–military relations, but also particularly the trends that these relations reveal. And, in fact, researches already carried out show not only that a cultural gap between the military and its parent society exists in democratic countries, but "suggest that, with the waning of the citizen-soldier ideal, democratic civil–military relations become more difficult to sustain" (Burk, 2002).

Having created this theoretical framework, we decided the guidelines for our research project. Definitely, we started from one basic assumption and some working hypotheses. The basic assumption is that several indicators show the existence, in democratic countries, of a gap between the military culture and that of its parent society, generally speaking. We have several indicators of this fact presented in the literature. The first working hypothesis is that we can consider officers as opinion-leaders/opinion-makers in the armed forces, and we can consider civilian professionals (in a broad sense) among the most significant opinion-leaders in civil society. Therefore it seems convenient to carry out an elite research among these categories. The second working hypothesis is that of some kind of uniqueness of the military profession (Boene, 1990) with respect to the other professions. Therefore, it makes sense to compare the professional culture of officers with the culture of other civilian professions. The third working hypothesis is that there are several common features of the cultural civil–military gap in democratic countries, so it makes sense to do a cross-national research.

Therefore, according to the idea of the research group, the empirical phase of the research investigated political culture of future and present (civil and military) elites, according to the following programme: (1) Investigate the political culture of future (civilian and military) elites, simultaneously surveying cadets and university students on three levels: (a) cognitive – beliefs, attitudes, and opinions; (b) evaluative – values, norms, and moral judgements; and (c) expressive or affective – emotions (identity, loyalty) or feelings (affinity, aversion, and indifference). In every participating country we investigated through a common questionnaire a sample of at least 30 cadets in the military academies (15 in their first year of study and 15 in their fourth year) and compared them with a sample of at least 30 university students in at least three key faculties (economics, law, and

political science, assuming that a good part of national opinion leaders arise from these categories). (2) Simultaneously with the surveying of cadets and students, several top leaders in different fields (experts) have been interviewed in order to assess changes in civil–military relations. The interviews allow us to get a grasp on the time dimension, changes over time. (3) At the Ankara Conference co-workers from every participating country presented the findings of his/her own country. (4) A cross-national comparison of the research results will be published in a final report of the very research project. Having said that, I think that readers can read and better understand the country papers presented in this chapter. Most of these papers belong to the project itself, some others have been added since they deal with similar issues.

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CIVIL-MILITARY GAP ISSUES AND DILEMMAS: A SHORT REVIEW

Maja Garb

1. INTRODUCTION

The world of military uniforms has always attracted attention by the rest of society. The film and literary image of the military in the history lays stress on power, honour, discipline, privileges, high social position of warriors and also dependence of the social welfare on military power and military campaigns. Those images impose to our minds that the military was an important institution and also that it was something really special. How does the society see the military today? And how does the military regard itself and its functions? Since the development of military sociology in the middle of the 20th century, there have been two opposing views on civil-military relations: one that strictly differentiates the military and society and the other that seeks the similarities between them. The recent military-sociological debate in the United States has also been devoted to the issue of the relationship between the military and its parent society. The experts found important differences between the US military and US society (including cultural ones) and some are very concerned about a growing gap between them. The classical antagonism between Huntington's uniqueness of the military and Janowitz's convergence of the military and civil society is renewed in debates about a so-called civil-military gap (e.g., Ricks, 1997;

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Holsti, 1998; Cohn, 1999; Snider, 1999; Hillen, 1999; Feaver, Kohn, & Cohn, 2001).

The evolution of the American civil-military gap debate and its main issues have been reviewed a few years ago by Cohn (1999). The author leads us through three periods of literature on civil-military gap: (1) from World War II to the establishment of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) in 1973; (2) the period of the AVF till the end of the Cold War and (3) the post-Cold War period. The first period is characterised by differing concepts of Huntington and Janowitz, the second by the compositional change to the AVF and its consequences for convergence/divergence of military and society and the third is characterised by downsizing and discussions about new missions of the military. The typical civil-military gap issues in that perceived period refers to questions of traditional military culture and the lack of contact and understanding between military and society. In this paper, some features of the relationship between the military and its civilian surrounding in the US in the post-Cold War period will be highlighted. The debate on that issue had intensified particularly after the publication of an article by Thomas E. Ricks (1997). It seems that this kind of debate in the US culminated and almost ended by a comprehensive empirical and theoretical study by Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn (2001).

2. ISSUES IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL-MILITARY GAP DEBATE

Following some sources that discuss the military culture and civil-military gap in the US, it can be noticed that there are several issues in that debate. Some of them are regularly mentioned and some not; some of them are directly connected to the cultural aspect and some of them only indirectly touch the question of military and political culture. The reviewed debate[1] centres on the following issues: military recruitment (draft/AVF, military families, self-selection, etc.); the social composition of the military; the role of civilian experts in the military; the interest for military issues among politicians and the general public; the question of knowledge about the society within the military and about the military within society (the level of ignorance); the lack of military experiences among politicians and the rest of society (veterans' impact); the question of mutual understanding of military and its civilian counterparts; questionable military obedience vs. civil control over the military; (in)visibility of the military; the system of benefits and

soldier's social network; what the military can offer to society (courses, camps, etc.); historical events (such as the Vietnam War); comparison of 'social deviations' (alcoholism, drug abuse, racial discrimination, etc.) in the military and its parent society; the question of who the enemy is; the factors shaping the gap; the elite-masses issue; the politicisation of the military; the comparison between military and civilian values; the militarisation of society vs. the civilianisation of the military; the social isolation of the military and self-sufficiency vs. contracting.

The categories mentioned above are not separated from each other. Quite to the contrary, they are often interchangeable and interdependent (for example, the level of knowledge about the military is connected to the percentage of military veterans in society). However, it is illustrative to mention them without systematic categorisation to show the variety of the topic. But, since those categories are not analysed in the debate with equal frequency, only some of them will be briefly presented.

2.1. Ignorance about the Military

One of the concerns that deserved attention in the debate regards the notion that the public and the politicians in the US know too little about the military. The main reason for such ignorance may be the lack of military experiences in the American society due to the AVF format. The most problematic social group in this respect is the political elite; especially the members of the Congress, who have to take important decisions about the military. Ricks (1997, p. 76) writes, that "during the Vietnam War two thirds of the members of Congress were veterans. Today almost two thirds are not. What most congressmen know of the military is what they saw on television during the Gulf War. They learned two lessons: high-tech weaponry works, and the United States needs missile defences." The more general problem for some authors in the debate is that in the US, military issues are excluded from high school programmes, which may lead to an alienation of military and social elites. On the other hand, the ignorance of the military personnel about the civilian society may be equally dangerous. Foster (2000) explains:

> "When the military becomes alienated from society; when its members talk of moral superiority but fail, in incidents after incident, to walk the walk; when they evince a civil illiteracy no less pronounced and troubling than the military illiteracy they decry in their civilian political masters, the stage is set for a crisis in civil-military relations."

2.2. Lack of Interest for the Military

The lack of interest for the military is noticed in public and in Congress. The American public was found to show interest for the military just in case of scandals (sex scandals in the military, for example). Also in the 1990s, the military had become a less important political tool. It had been sent to humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, which are far less interesting for the public than actual warfighting. The lack of interest for the military is evident in Congress also and this is even more problematic than the ignorance and illiteracy of Congress about the military. Ricks (1997, p. 76) noted, that Armed Services Committees were declining in prestige, and defence was an unpleasant issue for Congress' members – mainly because of the post-Cold War reduction in the military budget.

2.3. Military Benefits

The system of benefits in the American military is very well developed. It encompasses numerous benefits – from family care to consulting in the case of drug abuse, education and medical care. But the authors warn that we should be aware that such a system brings a lot of costs and as a consequence, ideas on reducing these benefits emerge. On the other hand, such reductions could increase recruitment problems. Maintaining these benefits, however, may have negative effects in the rest of society as they separate the military and civilian society because the military personnel can fulfill almost all its needs inside the military organisation (military apartments, military health system, etc.) and need not make contacts with the people outside the military in their everyday life. Furthermore, it can be assumed, that the people in civilian society feel some envy towards the military personnel for the benefits they have. And this also increases the separation between the military and society.

2.4. Physical Separation and Invisibility of the Military

Accommodation of military personnel in military bases with all infrastructure limits social bonds – the social network of military personnel. The military is physically isolated from the rest of the society, and that diminishes the visibility of the military within the society. This could be problematic due to the fact that an invisible military may receive relatively little

support in society. Additionally, the financial and personnel needs of an invisible military would not be fully understood in society.

2.5. Military Logistics

At the end of the Cold War, the US military had met personnel reduction needs. In order to retain the soldiers for combat roles, the military began with the privatisation of support services. For example, the technical maintenance is no longer in the hands of the military technical services but rests with civilian companies. In reflection of the civil-military gap theory, such a situation bears two aspects. On the one hand, civilian institutions (civilian contractors) enter the military, which erase the boundaries between the military and society, but on the other, that kind of taking over non-combat jobs contributes to the militarisation of the military. The military personnel execute combat tasks only, they are pure classical warriors and do not perform any non-combat jobs in the military.

2.6. Political Orientation of Soldiers

As Ricks (1997, p. 70) points out, the military has always had a conservative streak, but he suspects ''that today's officers are both more conservative and more politically active than their predecessors.'' It is evident that the ''open identification with the Republican Party is becoming the norm'' (Ricks, 1997, p. 72). But why should the question of a politicisation of the military be important for the debate on the civil-military gap? The answer lays in the conclusion that the American military is clearly no longer representative of society with regard to political orientation.

2.7. Military Culture

Americans share the opinion that their society has become more fragmented, more individualistic and less disciplined, and that institutions like church, family and school have become less influential within the last few decades. In comparison with changes in society, the military keeps the classic military values of sacrifice, unity, self-discipline and considering the interests of the group before those of the individual (see Ricks, 1997, p. 74). Some authors in the debate see this cultural or value discrepancy as the most

critical point of the gap between the military and society. The debate also touches the military academies. They still educate cadets in the manner of traditional military values regardless of the values in the broader society. So graduates of the academies further contribute to the gap in values between military and society (Hammill, Segal & Segal, 1995). To diminish the differences, even the idea of abolishing the military academies has emerged (despite the fact that it would be very difficult to realise) i.e., the military officers would attend civilian educational institutions. However, it can be doubted if such action would really prevent the officers from allegiance to traditional values like honour, courage, sacrifice, subordination, etc.

The problem of military culture also relates to the issue of women in the military. According to the opinions of advocates of differences between military and society, the integration of women into the military undermines the traditional military culture, but diminishes the differences between the military and society. The cultural gap is fed also by specific attitudes of military members. Some of them not only believe that they are not like civilian people but perceive themselves as better than the rest of the society they serve. If the observation is correct, then the mutual respect of military and society, which can be a strong bond between them despite other differences, is in deep crisis, too. Under the issue of culture, the debate on some bad habits and race tensions in the society and military could be mentioned as well. As Ricks (1997, p. 74) points out, "the military has effectively addressed the two great plagues of American society, drug abuse and racial tension, but civilian society has not. In addition, the military is doing a better job in other areas where society is faltering, including education." The public probably envies the military because of these successes. And finally, such success is an argument of the opponents of a congruity of the military and society in values. They ask: why should the military be like the rest of the society with all its destructive habits and differentiations?

2.8. Military Recruitment

With regard to recruitment, the incorporation of women and homosexuals into the military, issues of race relations and issues of manning the armed forces with people from lower social strata are usually discussed. In addition, there is another aspect of military recruitment – self-recruitment. As the authors in the civil-military gap debate and also military sociologists in general state, the US armed forces much more comprises children from so-called military families than children from a non-military family

environment. Being aware of that, some of the authors express the fear that a specific military caste is emerging, which, expectedly, enlarges the gap between the military and society.

3. QUESTIONS AND DILEMMAS REGARDING THE DEBATE

Having revisited some written sources on the civil-military gap, it could be established that there are empirical surveys on the issue (see Ricks, 1997; Holsti, 1998; CSIS, 2000; Feaver & Kohn, 2001) and that there are different classifications and conclusions (Cohn, 1999; Feaver et al., 2001) but we can also see that many questions and dilemmas have remained open in the debate. Let us see some of them.

- Does the civil-military gap correspond to the abolishment of the draft/conscription? Is there a significant influence of recruitment difficulties on the debate? A wish to popularise the military and to attract more young people into the armed services through making it more society-like or civilianising it could be one of the reasons that the changes for the military were proposed. However, the effects on recruitment are twofold: some young people are more, but some – more pro-military-oriented ones – are less interested to join a civilianised military.
- Are there any special historical circumstances that influence the debate? The 'no enemy' situation encourages society to exert more pressure on the military and traditional military culture. This is actually what happened after the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the third phase of the debate on the civil-military gap.
- Is there an influence of actual political circumstances on the debate? Remembering that some discussants in the debate mention the Democratic President Clinton leads us to the assumption that some authors connect the problems in relationship between the military and civilian society to the politics of a particular President. But the debate itself also proves somewhat that the politics was very liberal in that time to allow various discussants, also military ones, to participate in the debate.
- Uniqueness or analogy? What is better: military uniqueness and differences between the military and society or similarity, unity between the military and its parent society? The advocates of analogy – those who consider the cultural gap between the military and society as a negative phenomenon – demand the diminishing of the gap. The main argument

they cite is that only a military that shares the values of society is capable to execute the tasks the society wants them to. To the contrary, the advocates of military uniqueness warn that with a closing of the gap, the military would lose some of its specialties that help to fulfill the military tasks. Even more, the question of the very nature of military professionalism is raised here. So, does the special military culture correspond to professionalism? If so, some may ask whether we can expect the public to support a de-professionalised military (see Snider, 1999, p. 13).

- Is there a danger of diminished civilian control or, to the contrary, is there a danger of the military becoming too civilianised? The fear of weakening civilian control over a socially alienated military is mentioned in the debate several times. This is the attitude of the advocates of the analogy between the military and its parent society. The opposite opinions are that the society is not endangered by the military but the military is endangered to lose its military ethos (military culture, military values, military way of work, etc) and also its functional abilities due to civilianisation.
- What is the role of modern technology in the civil–military gap issue? Is there any truth in the hypothesis that the technological development of the military shapes the relationship between the military and the society? The review of some sources imposes the notion that the existence of a civil–military gap has not been the main troubling issue. The trouble spot for both, the advocates of military uniqueness and the advocates of a military–civilian analogy, is the trend in civil–military relations. Is there a growing gap that can make a mutual understanding and civilian control questionable in the future? Or does the military become more and more like rest of the society that may compromise the functional effectiveness of military?

Finally, the debate about the civil–military gap in the US is dealing with possible remedies. To narrow, to bridge the gap the following three approaches can be identified (Holsti, 1998, p. 40): (1) restoration of conscription; (2) curtailment of the costly infrastructure of on-post facilities that enable military personnel to meet almost all of their needs without much contact with civilians and (3) changes in the education of the officer corps. These are the solutions suggested by the advocates of a military–civilian analogy. The advocates of military uniqueness talk about the need of managing the gap. They propose some steps to help manage the gap, like: (1) increase the participation in the military without upsetting the effectiveness of a professional force; (2) recruit and reward elites for serving in the military, and (3) invest heavily in active public relations (Hillen, Owens, 1999).

4. THE FOURTH PERIOD?

It seems that the publication of the TISS project's results in Feaver and Kohn (2001) and in a special issue of *Armed Forces & Society* in Winter 2001 has closed the debate on the civil-military gap. The question thus arises, whether this is an evidence of goal fulfillment (to expose, explore and elaborate all the issues and dilemmas) or a result of other social and political circumstances. One of the new circumstances has been the change in American presidency, second the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. A glance on today's contents of news and articles in the US shows us that today we can hardly talk of a fourth period in the debate about the military and society. It is evident that the present war in Iraq poses a challenge to civil-military relations. The questions of military obedience (a case of order refusal), military responsibilities (the case of Abu Ghraib), the recruitment and deployment problems, etc. are not merely military but also problems of the broader society.

Balancing the arguments for military cultural uniqueness and warnings about a civil-military gap and its consequences turned out as a source of frustration. There are more than 50 years of alternative argumentations on relations between the military and society. In the period 1997–2001, the debate has re-emerged and even escalated. Since in that particular period the US experienced 30 years of the AVF which, according to the debate, has brought many challenges, we can put the following question: Can we expect that the post-Cold War abolishment of conscription and the adoption of AVFs in many European countries will bring a similar debate to Europe, too? One of the answers can be yes, but the nature and the actual contents of the debate about civil-military relations will be influenced by the specific circumstances in society.

NOTES

1. See CSIS (2000), Cohn (1999), Donnelly (2000), Feaver and Kohn (2001), Feaver, Kohn and Cohn (2001), Foster (2000), Hillen (1999), Holsti (1998), Lister (2000), Manthrope (2000), Moniz (1999), Morgan (2001), Murray (1999), Online NewsHour Forum, November 10, (1999), Ricks (1997), Sicherman (1999), Snider (1999).

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CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY: THE CASE OF BULGARIA

Yantsislav Yanakiev

1. INTRODUCTION

The Bulgarian sample of the international civil–military gap project comprised 30 cadets in the National Defence University (I and III course) and 91 students from the University of Sofia (law and political science department), the New Bulgarian University (psychology department), and the University for National and World Economy (economy of defence and security department). According to the gender of the respondents, the sample is divided as follows: cadets – 67% male, 33% females; students – 38% males, 62% females. Data was collected in the period March–June 2004.

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2. THE FINDINGS

2.1. Personal Values and Attitudes

The rating of the personal values for the two sub-samples of cadets and students is presented in Tables 1 and 2 respectively. The comparison between the two groups shows that on the whole, the respondents evaluate all 19 values as "important" and "rather important" for both the education of the children and for the military. The structure of the attached importance is close for both cadets and students.

Both cadets and students demonstrate comparatively weak religious affiliation and irregular religious practice (Fig. 1). About half of the students (49%) and (43%) of the cadets declare that they "attend religious services

Table 1. Importance of Some Basic Qualities for the Education of One's Own Children and for the Military (Cadets).

Basic Personal Values	Importance for the Education of One's Own Children	Importance for the Military
Honour	1.03	1.03
Responsibility	1.10	1.00
Honesty	1.13	1.03
Comradeship	1.17	1.18
Self-control	1.21	1.10
Discipline	1.30	1.03
Determination	1.30	1.03
Initiative	1.33	1.21
Open-mindedness	1.33	1.30
Tolerance	1.45	1.50
Orderliness	1.62	1.43
Loyalty	1.62	1.39
Team spirit	1.70	1.34
Patriotism	1.77	1.20
Generosity	1.77	1.70
Spirit of equality	1.83	1.76
Traditionalism	1.90	1.73
Creativity	1.96	1.72
Obedience	2.03	1.80

Note: Arithmetic mean, scale: "very important" = 1, "rather important" = 2, "rather unimportant" = 3, "very unimportant" = 4.

Table 2. Importance of Some Basic Qualities for the Education of One's Own Children and for the Military (Students).

Basic Personal Values	Importance for the Education of One's Own Children	Importance for the Military
Responsibility	1.12	1.03
Determination	1.21	1.17
Honour	1.22	1.17
Self-control	1.26	1.21
Initiative	1.35	1.99
Honesty	1.35	1.33
Open-mindedness	1.41	1.77
Discipline	1.47	1.04
Comradeship	1.51	1.74
Tolerance	1.55	1.62
Loyalty	1.56	1.43
Orderliness	1.73	1.42
Team spirit	1.74	1.55
Patriotism	1.82	1.26
Spirit of equality	1.84	1.92
Generosity	1.99	2.21
Creativity	2.23	1.90
Traditionalism	2.47	2.33
Obedience	2.51	1.78

Note: Arithmetic mean, scale: "very important" = 1, "rather important" = 2, "rather unimportant" = 3, "very unimportant" = 4.

only for the biggest fests". In addition, about one-fifth (22%) of the students and 20% of the cadets say they are "not religious".

At the same time, the majority of the respondents (69% of cadets and 72% of students) declare to adhere to Christian orthodox religion. Atheists are correspondingly 7% and 8% and 14% and 16%, respectively, do not give an answer. The rest is Roman Catholic, Protestant or Muslim. Regarding the political position, both cadets and students declare to be centre-right. The statistics confirm this conclusion. The arithmetic mean for cadets is 5.25 (SD = 2.01) and for students 5.55 (SD = 2.10). The most important goal of the government in domestic politics for the next 10 years according to both cadets and students is "Maintaining order in the nation" (43% and 38%). The next important goal is "Giving the people more say in important government decisions" (27% and 37%) and the third goal is "Fighting rising prices" (30% and 15%). It is important to say that the goal "Protecting



Fig. 1. If you are Religious, how Regularly do you Attend Religious Services (in per cent)?

Table 3. Degree of Agreement With Some Statements About the Social Life in General.

Statements	Cadets	Students
An insult to your personal honour should not be forgotten	1.90	1.89
Most people who don't get ahead just don't have enough will power	2.07	1.88
A few strong leaders could make this country better than all the laws and talk	2.14	1.98
What young people need most of all is firm discipline by their parents	2.30	2.24

Note: Arithmetic mean, scale: ''agree strongly'' = 1, ''agree somewhat'' = 2, ''disagree somewhat'' = 3, ''disagree strongly'' = 4.

freedom of speech'' is chosen by no single cadet, whereas 10% of students rate it at fourth place. There are no significant differences among cadets and students on some basic attitudes towards society (see also Table 3).

2.2. Sources of Information on Military Matters

The data illustrating the main sources of information regarding military matters for cadets and students is presented in Table 4.

Table 4. Importance of the Main Sources of Information on Military Matters.

Main Sources of Information	Cadets	Students
Television network news	1.47	1.70
Special military newspapers or magazines	1.62	1.62
Internet	1.64	1.82
Radio news	2.23	2.10
Newspapers	2.30	2.27
Military trade/professional publications	2.43	1.63
Other	2.56	2.55
Political newspapers or magazines	2.63	2.06
General newspapers	2.73	2.83
General news magazines	3.04	2.87
Movies	3.10	2.53

Note: Arithmetic mean, scale: "very important" = 1, "rather important" = 2, "rather unimportant" = 3, "very unimportant" = 4.



Fig. 2. How Much Interested are you in Defence Related Security Issues (in per cent)?

For both categories of respondents, the most important sources of information regarding military matters are television network news, followed by special military newspapers or magazines and the internet. All other information channels are evaluated between "rather unimportant" and "very unimportant". Regarding military matters, both groups demonstrate comparatively high levels of interest (Fig. 2). About half of the students (49%) and two-thirds of the cadets (63%) are "very much interested in security issues". In addition, about one-third (33% cadets and 38% students) declare they are "somewhat interested in security issues".

Both cadets and students demonstrate full consent regarding the rating of main state institutions according to the level of confidence they attach to each institution (Table 5).

The most trusted institutions are the president, the universities, the military, banks, the police and the church. The least trusted ones are political parties, parliament and government. The military institution is traditionally highly trusted. The differences among the students and the cadets are in the declared trust in the church and the police. The analysis of data from nation-wide opinion polls in the last decade shows that the Bulgarian Army attracts traditionally high public confidence both before and after the democratic changes in 1989. Public opinion polls found confidence in the Army as an institution to have varied between 63% and 70% for the first few years after 1989, and lack of confidence, between 10% and 12% (Yanakiev, 1999). This high level of confidence has been sustained until today. In 2001, 61% of the Bulgarians are confident in the Army; the Army is the state institution with the highest declared confidence of the public. At the same time, it is the state institution with the lowest level of expressed mistrust (14%).

This is probably due to several factors: first, in the period of transformation, the Army was regarded as a truly national institution and a guarantee

Table 5. Level of Knowledge and Confidence in the Main Institutions in the Country.

Institutions	Cadets		Students	
	Confidence	Knowledge	Confidence	Knowledge
Military	6.17	8.00	6.25	6.43
Universities	5.77	6.66	6.65	8.62
President	5.73	5.72	7.41	7.18
Church	5.63	5.03	4.45	5.36
Banks	5.07	5.21	5.79	6.30
Police	4.97	6.71	5.16	7.10
Media	4.91	5.96	4.10	6.68
Companies	3.90	4.76	3.97	5.12
Justice	3.57	4.90	2.82	5.42
Voluntary organisations	3.55	3.52	4.62	4.48
Trade unions	3.41	3.76	3.28	4.13
Government	3.20	4.90	2.95	6.15
Parliament	2.83	4.55	2.41	6.25
Organised political parties	2.50	4.28	2.62	5.63

Note: Arithmetic means, scale: 1 = no confidence/knowledge at all; 10 = complete confidence/knowledge.

Table 6. Degree of Attachment to Some Persons and Groups.

Persons and Groups	Cadets	Students
Your family	3.23	2.78
Yourself	3.27	2.88
Your friends	3.47	3.04
Bulgaria	3.47	3.35
Natural environment	4.20	3.43
Your profession, your colleagues	3.40	3.74
Your native city	4.50	4.13
Europe	5.87	4.77
World community	6.47	5.47
Your religious community	5.55	6.04

Note: Arithmetic means, scale: 1 = strongest attachment; 10 = weakest attachment.

for the ongoing process of democratisation of the country because it remained aloof from politics. At the same time, it is unanimously acknowledged to have functions vital to the nation. Second, the ongoing process of differentiation of political and professional ranks in the top echelon of the military administration and the establishment of a system of civilian control over the armed forces has raised the Army's prestige as a democratic institution. Third, the Army accomplishes new tasks such as participation in international peacekeeping and humanitarian missions under the United Nations (UN) aegis and joint exercises within NATO's Partnership for Peace initiative. The Army is thus perceived as an institution helping to accelerate the integration into Euro-Atlantic defence and security structures and promote the international prestige of Bulgaria.

On the globalism–localism scale, both groups demonstrate similar attitudes (Table 6). On the whole both students and cadets are more locally than globally oriented.

3. ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY OF THE COUNTRY

There exists full consent between students and cadets on the country's foreign policy goals (Table 7). Among the priority goals are maintaining Bulgarian external security, preserving world peace, fighting terrorism and preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The second group of important Bulgaria's foreign policy goals includes worldwide arms control,

Table 7. Importance of Foreign Policy Goals.

Foreign Policy Goals of the Country	Cadets	Students
Maintaining the external security of your country	1.07	1.20
Preserving world peace	1.10	1.29
Fighting terrorism	1.27	1.42
Preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction	1.34	1.42
Worldwide arms control	1.70	1.70
Combating world hunger	1.79	1.67
Strengthening regional security alliances or agreements (NATO, for example)	1.80	1.83
Fostering international co-operation to solve common problems, such as food, inflation and energy	1.83	1.51
Promoting and defending human rights in other countries	2.00	1.87
Strengthening the UN	2.07	2.11
Helping to improve the standard of living in less developed countries	2.29	2.15
Helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations	2.60	2.37

Note: Arithmetic mean, scale: "very important" = 1, "rather important" = 2, "rather unimportant" = 3, "very unimportant" = 4.

combating world hunger, strengthening regional security alliances and agreements such as NATO and fostering international co-operation to solve common problems, such as food, inflation and energy.

Among the foreign policy goals that the respondents evaluate as "rather unimportant" are promoting and defending human rights in other countries, strengthening the UN, helping to improve the standard of living in less developed countries and helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations. One probable explanation of this result is that the respondents perceive the last group of foreign policy goals as possible goals of a big country, which could not be implemented by a small country like Bulgaria. The analysis of the data in Table 8 shows that there is also full consensus between students and cadets on the evaluation of some elements of Bulgaria's security policy. In addition, the data confirms the above-mentioned attitude to give priority to resolving national security problems. At the same time, the young Bulgarians believe that it is "vital to enlist the cooperation of the UN in settling international disputes". The respondents definitely stress the political primacy when a decision to use military force has to be taken. At the same time both groups are unanimous regarding the role of the military in preserving the country's national security. Last but not the least, in the context of more expeditionary-oriented armed forces, it deserves attention that both groups think that

Table 8. Attitudes Towards the Security Policy of Bulgaria.

What is Your Opinion on the Following Statements?	Cadets	Students
Public opinion will not tolerate large numbers of casualties in military operations	1.42	1.33
We should not think so much in international terms but concentrate more on our own national problems	1.90	1.78
It is vital to enlist the co-operation of the UN in settling international disputes	1.92	1.72
The national security of my country depends more on international trade and a strong domestic economy than on our military strength	2.31	1.80
When force is used, military rather than political goals should determine its application	2.55	2.67

Note: Arithmetic mean, scale: ''agree strongly'' = 1, ''agree somewhat'' = 2, ''disagree somewhat'' = 3, ''disagree strongly'' = 4.

''public opinion in the country will not tolerate large numbers of casualties in military operations''.

When comparing the evaluations of students and cadets regarding the likelihood of some threats to Bulgaria's national security, one can find general consent again. The threats primarily named are organised crime, international drug trafficking and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and an accidental nuclear war. Most belong to the group of the so-called non-traditional security risks (Table 9). Both groups tend to evaluate the traditional security threat from the Cold War period (military attack by a foreign state) as ''rather unlikely''. The only difference between the two groups is that the students rate as ''rather likely'' two possible threats: environmental problems like air pollution and water contamination and an armed conflict over the control of vital resources.

Despite the fact that the traditional military threat has considerably diminished in public perception, the respondents give priority to the traditional role of the armed forces – defence of the national territory (Table 10). In addition, both cadets and students highly approve a mission, which was traditional during the Cold War period such as providing disaster relief. According to the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the respondents would also approve participation of the armed forces in missions to prevent such a threat. It is important to underline that both groups of the respondents would approve participation of the armed forces in missions, which could be defined as police missions: to deal with domestic disorder within our country, to combat drug trafficking and to fight terrorism.

Table 9. Evaluation of the Likelihood of Some Potential Threats to National Security.

Security Threats	Cadets	Students
Organised crime	1.59	1.49
International drug trafficking	1.63	1.44
Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	1.86	1.95
Terrorism	1.93	1.89
Accidental nuclear war	1.97	2.19
Armed conflict in the Middle East	2.19	2.61
Nuclear war between Third World countries with global consequences	2.20	2.32
Indirect involvement in civil war	2.27	2.24
Military attack by foreign state	2.28	2.12
Environmental problems like air pollution and water contamination	2.45	1.81
Armed conflict over the control of vital resources	2.46	1.97
Mass immigration from foreign countries	2.59	2.51
Nuclear blackmail by Third World countries	2.64	2.46
Armed conflict between Asian countries	2.65	2.74
Attacks on computer networks	2.71	2.31
Armed conflict between African countries with which we have co-operation relations	3.03	3.11

Note: Arithmetic mean, scale: "very likely" = 1, "rather likely" = 2, "rather unlikely" = 3, "not likely at all" = 4.

Table 10. Approval of Some Possible Missions for the Military.

Missions of the Military	Cadets	Students
Defend our country	1.07	1.19
Provide disaster relief	1.13	1.24
Deal with domestic disorder within our country	1.30	1.49
Prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	1.33	1.55
Combat drug trafficking	1.50	1.43
Fight terrorism	1.50	1.41
Participate in peacekeeping missions	1.63	1.76
Contribute to the protection of the environment	1.64	1.72
Provide humanitarian relief abroad	1.80	1.45
Control mass immigration from foreign countries	2.29	2.18
Participate in combat missions	2.69	2.66
Participate in peace-enforcement missions	2.70	2.70

Note: Arithmetic mean, scale: "approve very strongly" = 1, "rather approve" = 2, "rather disapprove" = 3, "strongly disapprove" = 4.

Last but not the least, cadets as well as students would ''rather approve'' participation of the military in peacekeeping missions, to contribute to the protection of the environment and to provide humanitarian relief abroad.

Among the military missions that both groups would ''rather disapprove'' are to control mass immigration from foreign countries, to participate in combat and to participate in peace enforcement. Probably, the respondents perceive these missions as risky and therefore tend to oppose the potential involvement of the Bulgarian military. This conclusion is in concordance with the statement that ''public opinion in the country will not tolerate large numbers of casualties in military operations''. These results are in concordance with the results received in nation-wide opinion polls in the last years in Bulgaria. In summary, Bulgarian citizens tend to support: the traditional mission of the Bulgarian Armed Forces (BAF) – the protection and the defence of the national territory; the participation of the BAF in missions associated with helping civilians; the participation of the BAF in international missions accompanied with low risk for the military personnel, which are associated with the ''traditional peacekeeping missions''. Bulgarian citizens do not support missions accompanied with high risk for the military personnel. (Yanakiev & Domozetov, 2000; Yanakiev, 2001, 2003).

The analysis of data presented in Table 11 shows that both students and cadets tend to agree with the need to make the UN stronger and to give it more power when multinational military missions are being planned and implemented. At the same time they would ''disagree somewhat'' with the idea of the UN having more control of the armed forces of the troopcontributing nations. Last but not the least, both groups of respondents do not

Table 11. Approval of International Military Operations and the Use of Military Force in International Relations.

Statements	Cadets	Students
The increasing multinational character of military missions shows the need for a stronger UN	2.00	1.86
The UN should have more control of the armed forces of all members	2.26	2.23
The UN Security Council should be the only body to verify military actions against sovereign states	2.42	2.22
NATO should have the freedom to intervene on its own initiative	2.64	3.08
The EU should have the freedom to intervene on its own initiative	2.93	2.96
The USA should have the freedom to intervene on its own initiative	3.59	3.47

Note: Arithmetic mean, scale: ''agree strongly'' = 1, ''agree somewhat'' = 2, ''disagree somewhat'' = 3, ''disagree strongly'' = 4.

agree with unilateral interventions by either the US or by multinational coalitions led by NATO or the EU.

4. ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY

4.1. Democratic Control of the Military

The analysis of the data presented in Table 12 shows that on the whole, both students and cadets support the departisation of the military. Even cadets demonstrate a clear attitude towards following the rule of political primacy and the principles of democratic civil–military relations and the civilian control over the military. The only significant difference between the two groups is that the students tend to support the statement "It is proper for the military to advocate publicly the military policies it believes are in the best interest of the country". One probable explanation is that they perceive the military as the experts in the field and for that reason tend to support such an action.

At the same time, the majority of cadets (44%) and students (44%) think that political leaders are "somewhat ignorant" about the modern military. In addition, more than one-fourth (27%) of the cadets and 16.5% of the students declare they are "very ignorant" (Fig. 3).

Table 12. Opinions on the Military's Role in Society.

Statements	Cadets	Students
Members of the military should not publicly criticise members of the government	2.04	2.45
Members of the military should not publicly criticise their parent civil society	2.04	2.12
It is proper for the military to advocate publicly the military policies it believes are in the best interest of the country	2.15	1.54
Members of the military should be allowed to publicly express their political views just like any other citizen	2.61	2.25
It is proper for the military to have direct political influence in society	2.63	3.13
It is proper for the military to explain and defend in public the policies of the government	3.16	2.25

Note: Arithmetic mean, scale: "agree strongly" = 1, "agree somewhat" = 2, "disagree somewhat" = 3, "disagree strongly" = 4.



Fig. 3. How Knowledgeable do you Think Our Political Leaders are About the Modern Military (in per cent)?

The data presented in Table 13 give an opportunity to analyse and to compare the attitudes of the young Bulgarians towards some basic democratic principles. On the whole, there exists consensus and the respondents tend to evaluate most of them as "very important". The only principle that both groups of students and cadets tend to rate as "rather unimportant" is subordination of the military to the political leadership. The obvious explanation is the understanding of the respondents that this principle has already been implemented in Bulgaria (Table 14).

The second basic principle in the democratic society that both groups consider as realised is the development of peaceful relations with the other societies in the world.

4.2. Tasks of the Military

Both groups of cadets and student demonstrate full approval regarding the main tasks of the military – to defend the country and its interests (Table 15). In addition, they express patriotic attitudes highly supporting such statements as: "primary allegiance of the Bulgarians is to his/her own country", "we should strive for loyalty to our country before we can afford to consider world brotherhood" and "the promotion of patriotism should be an important aim of citizenship education". At the same time, there exist

Table 13. Importance of Some Basic Democratic Principles.

Basic Democratic Principles	Cadets	Students
Respect for individuals	1.37	1.24
Respect for the constitution	1.40	1.31
Integration of the military in parent society	1.41	1.85
Safeguarding individual opportunities and responsibilities	1.50	1.32
Peaceful relations with the other societies in the world	1.50	1.34
Equality of people, regardless of gender, race, religion, etc.	1.63	1.62
Defence of the societal system and the way of life of the country	1.70	1.48
Basic freedoms of the individuals (freedoms of assembly, ideas, speech, press, etc.)	1.76	1.55
Subordination of the military to the political leadership	2.54	2.28

Note: Arithmetic mean, scale: "very important" = 1, "rather important" = 2, "rather unimportant" = 3, "very unimportant" = 4.

Table 14. Perception of the Degree to Which Some Basic Democratic Principles are Realised in the Country.

Basic Democratic Principles	Cadets	Students
Subordination of the military to the political leadership	1.81	1.99
Peaceful relations with the other societies in the world	1.86	1.88
Safeguarding individual opportunities and responsibilities	2.52	2.87
Basic freedoms of the individuals (freedoms of assembly, ideas, speech, press, etc.)	2.57	2.38
Respect for the constitution	2.76	2.84
Defence of the societal system and the way of life of the country	2.87	3.00
Integration of the military in parent society	2.92	2.77
Respect for individuals	2.93	2.86
Equality of people, regardless of gender, race, religion, etc.	3.00	2.77

Note: Arithmetic mean, scale: "completely realised" = 1, "rather realised" = 2, "rather unrealised" = 3, "unrealised at all" = 4.

significant differences with respect to the readiness to fight for the country. Cadets tend to express support for the statement "all Bulgarians should be willing to fight for our country", while the students tend to disagree. Other significant differences occur regarding the statement "the strongest indicator of good citizenship is performance of military service in defence of our country". Both students and cadets tend to disagree with the statements "the military job implies to guarantee peaceful and free trade in the international arena" and "the military should represent the parent civil society with regard to social and ethnic groups and classes".

Table 15. Degree of Agreement With Some Statements About the Tasks of Military.

Tasks of the Military	Cadets	Students
The military exists for the defence of the country and its interests	1.10	1.36
The Bulgarians should always feel that his or her primary allegiance is to his/her own country	1.33	1.65
All Bulgarians should be willing to fight for our country	1.53	2.29
We should strive for loyalty to our country before we can afford to consider world brotherhood	1.59	1.60
The military should be prepared to cover the whole spectrum of possible missions (from war to aid to civilians)	1.59	1.84
The promotion of patriotism should be an important aim of citizenship education	1.76	1.84
The strongest indicator of good citizenship is performance of military service in defence of our country	1.87	2.64
Strong armed forces improve our image throughout world	1.93	2.14
The most important role of the military is preparation for and conduct of war	1.97	1.99
Civilians and military must share the same basic values	2.03	1.93
Today, peacekeeping and other non-combat activities should be central military functions	2.07	1.95
The military job implies to guarantee peaceful and free trade in the international arena	2.50	2.26
The military should represent the parent civil society with regard to social and ethnic groups and classes	2.54	2.55

Note: Arithmetic mean, scale: "agree strongly" = 1, "agree somewhat" = 2, "disagree somewhat" = 3, "disagree strongly" = 4.

4.3. Public Image of the Military and Mass Media

Half of the cadets (50%) and more than half of the students (57%) consider the level of information that Bulgarian media give on military issues as "not good". In addition, about half of the cadets (47%) and one-third of the students (33%) consider the level of information as "somewhat good". What is the attitude of the media towards the military according to the perceptions of the respondents (Fig. 4)?

According to the data presented in Fig. 4 the media is perceived as "somewhat supportive" or "neutral" towards the military. About half of the students (48%) and cadets (47%) consider the public image of the military in Bulgaria as "not very good" (Fig. 5). In addition, almost one-fifth (23% cadets and 18% students) perceives the image of the military as "not good at all". These figures need additional research and analysis because of some



Fig. 4. Attitudes of the Media Towards the Military (in per cent).



Fig. 5. Public Image of the Military in Bulgaria (in per cent).

divergence with the data presented in Table 5 regarding the confidence in the main institutions in the country. The military institution attracts comparatively high levels of confidence and at the same time the respondents evaluate the public image as predominantly not good.

What could be the reason for this divergence? One possible answer of the question is in the comparison between the confidence in the military institution and the rating of the military profession among the other professions and occupations in the country (Table 16).

Table 16. Prestige of Some Professions and Occupations in Bulgaria.

Professions/Occupations	Cadets	Students
Military officer	3.50	5.61 (6)
Medical doctor	3.60	2.49 (1)
Lawyer	4.67	4.97 (4)
Diplomat	4.83	4.30 (2)
Police inspector	5.03	6.48 (7)
Civil airline pilot	6.17	5.24 (5)
University professor	6.83	4.46 (3)
Engineer	7.52	7.18 (8)
Civil servant	7.67	8.13 (12)
Entrepreneur	8.73	7.73 (10)
Pharmacist	8.80	7.55 (9)
Journalist	9.43	8.36 (13)
Teacher at secondary school	9.47	8.78 (14)
Priest, clergy man	9.57	9.68 (15)
Manager of a company	9.93	7.95 (11)
Artist	12.23	9.84 (16)

Note: Arithmetic means, scale: 1 = the most prestigious profession; 10 = the least prestigious profession.

The analysis of data presented in Table 16 shows that in general the perceptions of the students and the cadets regarding the prestige of different professions and occupations in Bulgaria converge to a great extent. At the same time, the analysis reveals some differences in perceptions regarding the prestige of the profession of the military officer. According to the students the position and the professions of medical doctor, diplomat, university professor, lawyer and civil airline pilot are more prestigious than those of the military officer. When comparing these data with the data from recent nation-wide opinion polls, one can find significant similarities (Fig. 6). For example, the general public in Bulgaria in 2001 rates the military profession in the "golden middle" or at 10th place out of 20 most common professions and occupations in Bulgaria. More prestigious professions are those of university professor, owner of a big firm, manager of a big firm, banker, medical doctor, journalist, lawyer, public prosecutor and judge. Less prestigious than the profession of the military are those of engineer, police officer, teacher, member of the parliament, owner of a small firm, qualified industrial worker, customs officer, shop keeper, agricultural worker and non-qualified industrial worker (Yanakiev, 2003).



Fig. 6. Rating of the Public Prestige of the Main Professions and Occupations in Bulgaria.

4.4. Gender Roles and the Military

Despite the fact that females applied for cadets in the army academy for the first time in 1988 and many positions have been opened for women in the armed forces, the issue of female integration in the military is still disputed particularly regarding the access of females to combat positions. The data received illustrate this public debate (Figs. 7 and 8). Most Bulgarians are in favour of the integration of females into the all-volunteer military including



Fig. 7. Views Regarding the Integration of Women into the All-Volunteer Bulgarian Armed Forces (in per cent).



Fig. 8. Views Regarding the Integration of Women into the Conscript Bulgarian Armed Forces (in per cent).

Table 17. Agreement With Some Statements About the Conscript and All-Volunteer Military Service (AVF).

Statements	Cadets	Students
An AVF fits the requirements of new missions better than conscription	1.90	1.41
Looking at the whole national economy, conscription causes more costs then an AVF, because of the waste of human resources	1.92	1.71
The BAF are attracting high-quality, motivated recruits	2.34	2.40
The draft guarantees a steady exchange of values, opinions and perceptions between society and armed forces	2.38	2.79
There is a natural link between democracy and conscription	2.67	2.89
The general military draft should include women too	3.34	3.19

Note: Arithmetic mean, scale: "agree strongly" = 1, "agree somewhat" = 2, "disagree somewhat" = 3, "disagree strongly" = 4.

combat positions and do not approve their integration in the conscript armed forces.

4.5. Conscript versus All-Volunteer Force

The decision of the Bulgarian Parliament to end conscription by 2010 and the requirements of the new missions the Bulgarian armed forces face are probably one explanation of the full consent between the cadets and students in favour of the all-volunteer force (AVF) (Table 17).

5. CONCLUSIONS

The comparative analysis of the data from the survey among Bulgarian cadets and students shows that there exists broad consensus on the perceptions of the main security risks, understanding of the missions of the armed forces and attitudes towards the main components of Bulgarian foreign security and defence policy. In addition, the visions of the two surveyed groups of young people regarding the role of the military in society and the need of democratic civilian control over the military converge to a great extent. Moreover, both cadets and civilian students share close personal values and support basic democratic principles. With respect to the size and the format of the BAF, again both groups of respondents support the abolishment of conscription and the establishment of AVF in Bulgaria. In this context the two groups also broadly support the full integration of

females in the BAF. Regarding the knowledge and confidence in the institution, there exist slight differences among the cadets and student but on the whole they rate the military institution high and declare lack of confidence in political parties, parliament and government. Slight differences between the two groups exist also when they rate the main professions and occupations in the country regarding the prestige of the military profession. Briefly, the analysis of the data clearly shows that there is no cultural gap between cadets and civilian students.

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THE CULTURAL GAP BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND THE PARENT SOCIETY: THE GERMAN CASE

Sabine Collmer

1. INTRODUCTION

Since more than one decade, the German armed forces are undergoing massive modifications in structure, size and mission, which can be traced back to the transformation of the international security environment and globalisation effects after the end of the Cold War (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, & Perraton, 1999). As the threat scenarios changed from mutual deterrence to a multitude of risks and dangers, including violent internal conflict, international terrorism and global ecological crisis, the threat perceptions within wider society underwent simultaneous changes. Today, 'security' and 'insecurity' are terms with totally different connotation than only 20 years ago. Clearly, these alterations also initiated a new era of civil–military relations in Germany after 1990. Besides the rather obvious transnational effects described by the changing security context as well as the trend towards globalisation and to new security regimes, perpetual societal changes within West European societies evenly took place during the last thirty years. These societies are therefore becoming 'post-traditional societies' (Giddens, 1994)[1] or – as far as the armed forces are concerned – 'post-military' societies (Shaw, 2000). This study aims at examining the current

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state of civil–military relations and deals with the question of the existence of a civil–military gap in Germany. Therefore, empirical data stemming from an international project will be examined. After a sketch of the patterns of civil–military relations in Germany, a brief description of the methodology of the German part within the Civil–Military-Gap-project is given. Afterwards, some key findings of the project data, concerning a set of questions relating to security, war and peace issues, are presented and discussed.

2. BACKGROUND: CHANGING CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS IN GERMANY

In the age of bipolarity, the complexity of the relationship between the civilian and the military sphere can be described in terms of the prevalent security doctrine: During the Cold War, German society focussed on military power and mutual deterrence via the threat of a nuclear war, which was escorted by a deadlock situation in the Security Council of the UN. Western Europe – and especially Germany – by then belonged to the few geographical areas with the most massive aggregation of weapons and military personnel in the world. The situation mutated, when during the rearmament round of the late 1970s and 1980s a security sensitive public was on the rise and became quite a strong societal factor (Bredow, 1995, p. 39). Growing numbers of Germans, just similar to people in other West European countries, articulated scepticism towards the notion that an ever-growing arsenal of deadly weapons would increase their security. Mass protests against further rearmament all over Germany and a significant rise of the numbers of conscientious objectors were the consequence. As the doctrine of mutual annihilation gradually lost its ideological power, the Bundeswehr was less subject to positive appraisal among the German public in terms of the 'production of security', as one of the slogans of the times suggested. Rather, the German armed forces and their weapons evoked ambivalent feelings of hazardousness and imminent danger. This finally contributed to the promotion of policy change towards arms reduction. Additionally, non-military dangers, such as the poison gas accident in Bhopal/India or the super-accident in the nuclear power plant of Chernobyl/Ukraine raised the consciousness of a formerly technology believing population inasmuch as these events promoted the idea of a global "risk society" (Beck, 1992). This concept takes into account that not only

traditional social divisions, but also political borders are crossed by new sources of danger and that not all of these 'risks' represent military problems, nor may they be properly addressed by the military (Shaw, 2000).

After the end of the Cold War, the situation changed once more: The early euphoric assessment that the "end of history" (Fukuyama, 1992) would bring about an era of long-lasting peace on earth, quickly gave way to the disenchantment created by the violent ethnic conflicts on the edges of Europe. Whereas the East–West conflict constituted a unique system of global power relations, "which, paradoxically, both divided the globe into rival camps and yet unified it within a strategically interconnected world military order" (Held et al., 1999, p. 99), the post-bipolar world brought a decentralisation of the international security system, a regionalisation of interests and a fragmentation of power. Meanwhile, the German army took its first steps towards a long-term transformation process from a predominantly homeland defence force towards an internationally engaged peacekeeping and peace-enforcement army. But the average German citizen was preoccupied with other issues. Since German reunification, public opinion polls revealed a perpetual trend towards a decline of interest in security issues. The focus of attention among the population regularly was preoccupied with domestic problems, such as economic stagnation, high unemployment rates, corroding social security, or the like. Despite the occurrence of major events in the history of the Bundeswehr, such as the beginning of out of area missions or the promotion of unlimited access for female soldiers even to combat units, the German populace reacted more or less indifferently towards these changes. Strikingly, after the Berlin Wall fell, public opinion in Germany towards military and security issues has been characterised as an "ongoing non-debate" as Lutz Unterseher, a German political analyst, once remarked (Koch, 1997, p. 22).

These estimations are epitomised by public opinion polls, which regularly reveal an apparently paradoxical situation: on the one hand the data exhibit continually increasing consent with the new missions of the Bundeswehr and on the other hand they disclose widespread disinterest in all things military, which, especially among the younger generation, is connected with a profound refusal to get personally engaged in any kind of civil service whatsoever (Collmer, 2002, 2003). The assessment of Klein and Kuhlmann (2000) points in corresponding directions: In their analysis of the outcomes of a "peace dividend" in Germany, they argue that despite the fact, that the average citizen displays a significant detachment from activities demanding personal commitment to defence and the military establishment, armed forces may still be seen as a kind of "insurance" that protects people from

hazards "from the outside". It is because of this perception of insurance that the public prestige of the Bundeswehr is still comparatively high. It is, though, a research question if and how traces of detachment and alienation from the military among civilians can be observed in current empirical survey data. Furthermore, it will be examined if there are significant findings that underscore the assumption of a civil–military gap in Germany.

3. METHODOLOGY

This study forms part of the European Research Group on Military and Society (ERGOMAS) research project called "Cultural Dimensions of Civil–Military Relations in Democratic Societies". Within this project, a common questionnaire was distributed in 13 countries, which included a set of questions relating to personal and military values, foreign and defence policy issues, and democratic principles. The study was set up to inquire whether civilian and military respondents show significant differences in their opinions on these issues. Therefore, students – as members of future elites – of the participating countries were questioned.

The German sample consisted of two groups: first, young officers, who currently study at one of the universities of the German Armed Forces (hereafter 'studying officers') and second, civilian students who currently study at the university of Potsdam (hereafter 'students'). The military officers responding to the questionnaire were either in their first year of study, or in their third year of study. They were students at the academic departments of either social sciences, economics or computer sciences. The civilian respondents were students of the departments of either social sciences/political sciences, economics or computer sciences/software technology. The questionnaires were distributed to respondents during the period January 2004 to May 2004. All respondents were volunteers. After checks for completeness a total of 368 questionnaires were processed. Concerning the demographic profile of the sample, 320 respondents were male (256 studying officers, 64 students) and 42 were female (6 studying officers, 36 students). Six persons did not indicate their gender. The age of respondents of the university of the Armed Forces varied from 20 to 32 years, the age of respondents of Potsdam university varied from 19 to 35 years. The mean age was 26. The data analysis was carried out with the statistical package SPSS, Version 12.0.1 G for Windows. For statistical purposes, responses were often grouped to reflect either a positive, negative or neutral position. According to scale level, a chi-square test of significance or a two-tailed *t*-test

was conducted in order to test statistically significant differences between the two groups. A 5% level of significance was used.

4. INITIAL FINDINGS

In the following, initial findings are presented concerning three selected topics: (1) threat perceptions; (2) attitudes towards war, peace and possible roles of the military; and (3) trends in the construction of collective identities.

4.1. Threat Perceptions

The response pattern of the participants echoes the fact that the security situation in Europe and Germany has notably increased since the end of the Cold War. Traditional military threats such as a ‘‘conventional’’ or ‘‘nuclear war’’ seem not to be the main concern of those interviewed. Instead, they score high on the following items: ‘‘attacks on computer networks’’ (74% of all respondents), ‘‘organised crime’’ (72%) and ‘‘proliferation of WMD’’ (71%). These items are followed by the apprehension of a ‘‘war over the control of vital raw materials’’ (68% of all respondents), ‘‘terrorism in our country’’ (58%) and ‘‘international drug trafficking’’ (56% of all). With most of these items there are no statistically significant differences to be observed between the two groups. There are, however three items which bear statistical relevance:

As can be seen from Table 1, studying officers are more apprehensive towards information technology-oriented attacks and towards mass immigration. On the contrary, students are significantly more anxious about an

Table 1. Likelihood of Each of the Following Threats to National Security (in per cent).

Most likely Threats	Civilian Students	Studying Officers
Attacks on computer networks	62	78
Mass immigration from foreign countries	18	55
An accidental nuclear war	23	10

Note: $N = 368$, $p < 0.05$.
*‘‘Likely’’/‘‘very likely’’.

accidental nuclear war. These differences may indicate an 'alertness' on contrary ends of the possible danger spectrum.

4.2. Attitudes towards War, Peace and Possible Roles of the Military

Since more than one decade, the Bundeswehr has shifted priority to rapid deployment forces and performs the Petersberg tasks. Here, the respondents were asked to show their degree of approval to possible roles of the military (Table 2). Both groups do show high consent with the "defence of our country", the provision of "disaster relief", the participation of German armed forces in "peacekeeping missions", and the provision of "humanitarian relief abroad" to which more than 90% of all respondents unequivocally agreed. Furthermore, no significant differences can be reported concerning the "fight against terrorism" and the prevention of the "proliferation of WMD", which is approved of by 76% resp. 66% of all surveyed. Interestingly, a majority in both groups rejects the notions that the army should care for the control of "mass immigration into Germany" (82% against) or be held responsible for combating "drug trafficking" (75% against). There are, however items, where statistically significant variations surface:

Obviously, when it comes to tasks where combat elements are included, such as peace-enforcement and combat missions, the level of approval of these roles by civilian students is diminishing: only one out of three (31%) civilian students approves of a German participation in peace-enforcement missions, and even less respondents of this group, only one out of four (26%), is convinced that the Bundeswehr should participate in combat missions. This finding not only echoes the results of studies, by other countries e.g. South Africa (see Heineken & Gueli, 2004), but also reflects results

Table 2. Significant* Differences in the Agreement to Roles of the Military (in per cent**).

Possible Roles of the Military	Civilian Students	Studying Officers
Peace-enforcement missions	31	67
Combat missions	26	65
Protection of the environment	63	32

*($p < 0.001$).
**"Approve very strongly"/"rather approve".

stemming from current opinion polls among average German citizens (Collmer, 2004).

In addition, respondents were asked how they feel about peace and war issues and corresponding tasks of the military. The majority of respondents (78%) agrees that nowadays ''peacekeeping and other non-combat activities should be a central military function'', but the consent among studying officers (88%) is notably higher than the consent among students (74%) ($p<0.005$). Also, the split in opinions towards the statement that ''the most important role of the military is the preparation for and conduct of war'' is striking: whereas 23% of studying officers agree, only 11% of students do so ($p< 0.05$). This fits into a kind of pacifist attitude of the students: Most of them (79%) reject the idea that ''sometimes war is necessary to protect the national interest'' (studying officers: 42%) ($p<0.000$) and they are less pessimistic about human nature: ''Human nature being what it is, there will always be war'': 64% of students agree with this statement, whereas 83% of studying officers do so ($p<0.000$).

In current years, a debate about new security regimes and reorganised structures for global governance has surfaced. A majority in both groups agrees that ''the increasing multinational character of military missions shows the need for a stronger UN'' (86%) and a vast majority of respondents rejects the idea that ''the USA should have freedom to intervene on its own initiative'' (93%). Different perspectives occur when asked about NATO and the EU international actors: while every second studying officer (49%) wants to give ''NATO the freedom to intervene on its own initiative'', only a minority of students (32%) wants to do that too ($p<0.005$). Likewise, the idea that ''EU should have the freedom to intervene on its own initiative'' is more rejected by students (84%) than studying officers (69%) ($p<0.005$).

4.3. Trends in the Construction of Collective Identities

In the context of modernisation of societies and by means of globalisation and increased mobility, a tendency towards new forms of collective identities in a transnational or 'post-national' manner (Albrow, 1997; King, 2000) has been reported, which focus more on a global/local scale and less on the national level. To investigate this topic, participants were asked to indicate their attachment to a list of items: Table 3 shows the results for the feeling of strong attachment.

Table 3. Degree of Strong Attachment on the Global/Local Scale (in per cent).

	Civilian Students	Studying Officers	*p*
World community	13	7	0.003**
Europe	21	18	0.581
Germany	28	49	0.000***
Natural environment	27	17	0.002**
Your profession/your colleagues	26	49	0.000***
Your friends	84	82	0.170
Your family	87	89	0.208
Your religious community	16	7	0.036*
Your native city	30	27	0.357
Yourself	70	71	0.532

Note: *$p<0.05$, **$p<0.01$, ***$p<0.001$.

As is indicated by the results, there is a group of items where significant differences can be observed: Civilian students feel more attached to the world community, whereas studying officers are more patriotic. Interestingly, there are no significant differences towards Europe. Further on, students indicate more attachment to the natural environment; studying officers on the contrary feel notably more attached to their profession and colleagues, which can be considered rather typical with soldiers. Relatively high levels of attachment are indicated for friends and family, but no substantial differences between the groups can be found. This also holds true for the native city and oneself. Finally, a significant contrast shows up with the item "religious community", where students feel more attached than studying officers. All in all, the strongest attachment can be verified with friends and family, as well as oneself, which may represent the 'local' end of the scale, whereas attachment towards items of the 'global' end, e.g. world community, Europe or the environment is weaker, but still more pronounced with students than with studying officers. The stronger attachment to their own country among officers has to be seen in correspondence with their professional self-concept, in which serving one's country plays a substantial role.

As part of the German survey an additional question was posed, which investigates the occurrence of composed forms of collective identities and is commonly used within the Eurobarometer survey in the Euro zone. This way, it is possible to compare both data. Here, respondents were urged to indicate, which one of four alternative statements fitted best for them. The statements were: "I feel as a German" (Ge), "I feel as a German and as

Table 4. Occurrence of Composed Forms of Collective Identities among Future Elites in Comparison with Eurobarometer Survey (EB 60.1) (in per cent).

Sample	Ge	Ge + EU	EU + Ge	EU
Civilian Students	13	45	29	14
Studying Officers	36	53	9	2
EB 60.1 (2003)	38	45	10	4

European'' (Ge + EU), ''I feel as an European and as German'' (EU + Ge) or ''I feel as European'' (EU). The results are shown in Table 4.

There are a variety of possible interpretations of the results. If we first focus on the comparison of the future elites, then we see at first glance that purely nationally constructed identities are not chosen (any more) by the majority of respondents. Only 13% of the civilian students and 36% of the studying officers feel attachment to Germany only. The vast majority of students (74%) and a sound majority of studying officers (62%) feel attached to some composed form of identity, and a minority of 14% resp. 2% feels European only. Whereas this result bears significant differences ($p < 0.05$), the overall picture is modified when comparing the results with the Eurobarometer survey (Eurobarometer 60.1, 2003), which is conducted among a representative sample of the German population. Here we notice far-reaching correspondence between the samples of the studying officers and German citizens. Most striking is the common tendency towards composed forms of identities with 55% among average German citizens and 62% among the officer's sample, as well as the minorities who opt for a purely German identity (38% resp. 36%) and the evenly small minority for a purely European identity (4% resp. 2%).

5. CONCLUSIONS: CIVIL–MILITARY GAP OR SUB-CULTURAL VARIATION?

The data presented of the future elite survey among officers and civilian students offer a multitude of possible interpretations. Although the findings have to be classified as preliminary because they cover only a fraction of the survey topics, they shed considerable light on the outline of a possible civil–military gap in Germany. However, for the interpretation of the survey data, the current state of civil–military relations in Germany has to be taken into

consideration. The apparent paradox is that there is a high level of institutional confidence in the armed forces which is accompanied by a trend, which can best be characterised as indifference (more than alienation) towards the military. However, this has been identified as typical for the ''postmodern'' state of civil–military relations (Moskos, Williams, & Segal, 2000). Taking this into account, it is not only surprising, but even more consolidating, that there are quite a lot of hints for converging opinions among the sample groups. Most conspicuous are the corresponding views of current dangers and risks, which focus mainly on 'new' risks such as computer crime, weapons proliferation and organised crime than on traditional military risks. Although some differences in views emerged due to diverging patterns of alertness, they seem to be of minor significance. Also to be mentioned here are the similar views towards global governance structures.

The most striking contrast, however, surfaced, over the question of how to use the military. Here, fundamentally different views towards war and peace were observed. Civilian students reveal a basic belief in non-violent ways of conducting world politics and reject to a higher degree the idea of the basic necessity of war than do their military counterparts. In many ways they offer a pacifist or 'dovish' picture, which supports multilateral approaches under the leadership of the UN and rejects unilateral acts. Central to this position is the refusal of combat-oriented missions for the Bundeswehr. Studying officers on the other hand show a set of attitudes which can rather be called 'pragmatic': In accordance with their professional ethos, officers were more in favour of peace-enforcement and combat missions than students. They also see mass immigration more often as a problem than students. A presumed link between war and human nature is more commonly perceived as reality among officers than students. Nevertheless, the studying officers' attitudes seem to be fully in line with the current defence paradigm of the German armed forces, which holds that non-combat missions are at the core of possible missions of the Bundeswehr. Only a minority of them therefore sees the preparation and conduct of war as the primary mission of the armed forces.

As far as globalism/localism is concerned, civilian students score higher on the 'global' end of the scale with more attachment to world community and the natural environment. Studying officers on the contrary expose higher levels of attachment to their home country and their profession/colleagues. However, both groups feel more attached to friends and family than to all other items offered. The analysis of the construction of composed forms of identities clearly shows the relativity of group differences. Whereas significant differences could be observed between students and officers, these

differences shrink when figures from the officers' sample are compared with those of average German citizens.

This brings about the question whether these results do actually reveal a precarious civil–military gap, or if they simply disclose sub-cultural variations? As has been argued before, the real question is whether the gap as it is now gives reason for concern and requires action to be taken (Collmer & Kümmel, 2003). Similarly, Holsti (2001) holds that group differences between professional groups are a rather 'normal' social fact, which can be traced back to the development of certain group cultures. Of course, the famous remark of Morris Janowitz points in the same direction, when he says "The military is more than an organization, it's a way of living!" Having said this, it seems to be clear, that only more detailed analysis and systematic investigation can bring about clarification about the differences and similarities between civilians and those serving in the military and about a possible gap between them.

NOTES

1. For a more comprehensive overview on the societal changes, see Collmer and Kümmel (2003).

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THE CULTURAL GAP BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND ITS PARENT SOCIETY IN ITALY

Giuseppe Caforio

1. INTRODUCTION

The state of the relations between the armed forces and society in Italy displays some general features that should be described before going on to the analysis of the research data. The first is the presence of a very broad-based pacifism that has two different origins which, although quite different from each other, often end up by uniting or allying. These two traditions are a Marxist-anarchic, or a more generically leftist one, and a Catholic one that is still very strong in our country. Since the end of the Second World War, the extent of this pacifism, often with a good dose of antimilitarism, has always made relations between the country and its armed forces difficult. This situation has shown some rather significant changes in the last decade, however. Italy's ever-increasing participation in peace support operations (PSOs), which is very extensive in proportion to the commitments of other comparable countries, has given new popularity to the armed forces, both because of their use in functions more easily reconciled with pacifist ideals and because, finally put to the test,[1] they have demonstrated capabilities and skills that for many have been a revelation. The transition from conscription to voluntary service, although certainly heralding other problems in the

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relationship with public opinion, has also allowed the armed forces to shed the unpopularity due to the sacrifices required of male citizens. Added to these aspects is the rapid change of the international situation which, with the materialising of a significant threat from Islamic fundamentalism, has brought the problem of security[2] to the attention of everyone. All of the surveys conducted in the last decade, therefore, have recorded an increased level of social acceptance of the armed forces in Italy.

This research has been carried out on two levels of empirical investigation: the first is constituted by future elites, here represented by young people preparing themselves for leadership roles in civilian life and in the military. This context was identified in the educational institutions that provide the professional training, that is, civilian universities and military academies. Owing to its size, this context was investigated by administering a joint questionnaire. The second level of investigation is constituted by a sample of current elites, people who currently occupy leadership positions in the most important sectors of life. For this level of research a qualitative investigation procedure was chosen, conducting an expert survey on a smaller sample of persons with whom semistructured interviews were conducted.

2. ATTITUDES OF FUTURE ELITES

2.1. General Features

The survey of future Italian elites was conducted on a sample of cadets at the academies of the three armed services and students at three state-run universities. The sample was made up as shown in Table 1. The universities chosen were those of Turin for economics students, Pisa for political science students and Salerno for law students. The choice of the sites was dictated by the desire to include students from different parts of Italy: North, Centre and South.

The questionnaires were administered by researchers in the period November 2003–February 2004. Before going on to a comparison of the values, attitudes and opinions of the cadets with those of their university peers, let us take a look at the validity of one of our research hypotheses, namely that the military profession has a kind of uniqueness (Boene, 1990) with respect to other professions. For the sake of clarity, we made the hypothesis that the officer's profession is culturally more distant from the average mindset of the civilian professions than individual civilian professions are from each

Table 1. Sample Composition.

	Military Academy	Economy	Law	Political Science
Number of valid questionnaires	124	41	23	29
Percentages	55.9	18.5	10.2	12.8
Male (%)	75.0	51.2	39.1	64.3
Female (%)	25.0	48.8	60.9	35.7
Year of study				
1st and 2nd (%)	45.2	37.5	52.2	34.5
3rd and more (%)	54.8	62.5	47.8	65.5

other. To evaluate the veracity of this hypothesis, the one-way analysis of variance was applied to the four groups into which the variable "studies programme attended" is divided with Scheffé's test with respect to some significant variables. This procedure evidenced, first of all, a significant level of probability of variance (always below 0.5), and even more that the difference between group 1 (cadets) and each of the other three groups (political science, law and economics) was always greater than the differences that the remaining three groups displayed between them.

2.2. Data Analysis

2.2.1. Personal Values and Attitudes

The university students and the cadets at the military academies display significant basic differences,[3] irrespective of their opinions and attitudes on security issues, which deserve to be looked at first because they help us to understand better some of the reasons for the differences in opinion. As pointed out in previous studies (Caforio, 1998), these basic differences are likely the result of a different anticipatory socialisation of the two groups examined here. Beginning with character traits, we note that despite the good basic homogeneity of the sample as a whole, the future officers exhibit greater determination than their university peers; almost none of them (less than 1%) admit having uncertain opinions about something, compared to a sizeable percentage of university students (12.4%) who say their opinions are uncertain. And again, where 26% of university students recognise that it is not infrequent for them to change their mind about something, only 12% of the cadets take this position. The cadets' determination is also shown in less fear of being in disagreement with the group they belong to than their university peers. Education shapes character; so it appears significant to

investigate, as second item, what traits the respondents consider to be important in bringing up children. The most general datum is that in almost all of the 19 character traits on which the respondents were asked to express themselves, the cadets give greater importance than their university peers to the education of children. Two groups of qualities stand out in this panorama for the significant percentage differences between the two categories. The first group, which we can call traditional qualities, includes patriotism, honour and respect for tradition; the second, which regards qualities of character, includes self-control, determination and initiative, and sounds like confirmation of the character traits already evidenced previously for the cadets. On these two groups of traits, the mean positive percentage gradient of the cadets exceeds 10%. The cadets seem less religious than their university colleagues, as shown by Table 2 below. The breakdown by religious faith, which for the great majority is Roman Catholic, is not affected by membership in one category or the other.

The differences are more sizeable when the Inglehart index (Inglehart, 1977) is applied to the two groups. As shown in Table 3, post-materialists are nearly absent among the cadets, while they reach nearly a quarter of the total among university students. Conversely, the cadets display a percentage of materialistic positions 15 points higher than the university students.

Rather expected and already abundantly pointed out in the literature is the cadets' more politically conservative stance compared to society at large, in our case to their university peers. The difference in their positions is given in Fig. 1. This view, as well as the percentage figures, makes the difference in positions appear truly significant: whether this is a national characteristic or

Table 2. Attitudes towards Religion.

Religiosity and Attendance at Religious Service	Cadets (%)	University Students (%)
Religious and regularly (every week) attend religious service	18.5	22.7
Religious and attend religious service once per month	15.3	19.6
Religious but attend religious service only for the biggest feasts	42.7	37.1
Can't tell if religious or not	8.1	10.3
Not religious	13.7	4.1
No answer	1.6	6.2

Pearson: 0.07.

Table 3. Application of the Inglehart Index.

	Cadets (%)	University Students (%)
Materialist	38.7	23.5
Post-materialist	4.0	25.5
Mixed	57.3	51.0

Pearson: 0.00005.



Fig. 1. Cadets and University Students: Political Positions Compared (Pearson: 0.00005).

inherent to the world of military ideas and values can be evaluated only through an international comparison.

On average the cadets display more confidence in national institutions than their university fellows, except for the media, Parliament, trade unions and political parties; in short, their level of confidence is lower for everything that concerns national politics. The cadets' strong positive gradient of confidence in the military establishment and the police is hardly a surprise; however, it must be pointed out that the young elites' confidence in these two institutions is high for all respondents.

The sources of information on issues and aspects of national defence are used in different ways by the two groups. While the cadets favour special military newspapers or magazines, their university peers give precedence to national newspapers and television network news. All non-military sources of information (radio news, general news magazines, political newspapers, etc.) are more used by university students than cadets with the exception of the internet, where the attention given by the two groups appears equivalent. To finish up the analysis on personal values and attitudes, it must be noted

that the cadets display greater attachment to their points of reference than do the university students, while the ranking of these points appears common to the two groups, both of which put the family, Italy, themselves, friends and colleagues on top. With regard to family and colleagues especially, the cadets show significantly higher levels of attachment than the comparison group.

2.2.2. Security Policy

Military policy choices are obviously functional to the perception of the external threat, which thus seem appropriate to examine first. Among the cadets and the university students the perception of the most important threats, such as terrorism, mass immigration from foreign countries, organised crime and international drug trafficking, largely coincide. A diversity of positions is discernible as to potential threats that we might term second-level threats. In particular, the future civilian elites are more sensitive to danger stemming from events like an ecological disaster, involvement in a civil war in another country, a conflict over the control of raw materials and the nuclear threat in its various aspects (nuclear blackmail, nuclear war between third-world countries with global consequences and accidental nuclear conflict). The interviewees' attitudes towards the missions assigned to the national armed forces are obviously related to the perceived threat, but they display differences between the two groups that seem more influenced by value choices. As expected, the two groups show agreement, albeit with some percentage differences, as to the most obvious missions (see Table 4). Significantly, the university group shows much lower levels of approval for those missions that involve more typically military activities: participation in peace-enforcement and combat missions. This attitude may be influenced by the strong ideological grip of pacifism.

This seems to be confirmed by the sizeable percentage of university students who feel factors other than military force are more important for guaranteeing the country's national security (57.1% versus 29% for the cadets).

One important element of security policy is the defence budget. On this issue, although with strongly differentiated attitudes between the two groups, a shared general opinion emerges that is more in favour of increasing, rather than reducing, military expenditures (see Table 5). This is probably a new development with respect to attitudes in the past, one that we can hypothesise to derive from both an increased visibility of military functions and an acquired awareness of a larger budget commitment in countries comparable to Italy.

Table 4. Approval of the Use of the Military.

To	Cadets (%)	University Students (%)	Pearson
Defend our country	100	90.7	0.0024
Participate in peacekeeping missions	97.6	83.3	0.0007
Participate in peace-enforcing missions	82.3	48.5	0.0000
Participate in combat missions	66.7	29.9	0.0000
Provide disaster relief	97.6	87.6	0.0129
Provide humanitarian help abroad	82.3	74.7	0.2483
Deal with domestic disorder in our country	86.3	87.5	0.7925
Combat drug trafficking	74.2	81.4	0.2011
Prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	93.5	84.5	0.0294
Control mass immigration from foreign countries	77.4	70.1	0.2837
Fight terrorism	93.5	85.6	0.1091
Contribute to the protection of the environment	61.3	73.2	0.0744

Table 5. Opinions on Defence Budget.

It should....	Cadets (%)	University Students (%)
Raise considerably	71.9	20.8
Raise somewhat	24.0	27.1
Remain as it is	4.1	37.5
Be lowered somewhat	—	6.3
Be lowered considerably	—	8.3

Pearson: 0.0000.

On more general foreign policy topics, when asked about the priorities to give to the country's objectives, the two groups exhibit a certain amount of basic homogeneity, but with some differences in the rankings assigned. For the cadets, the priorities are in the following order: combating terrorism (94.4%), preserving world peace (93.5%), guaranteeing the country's external security (90.3%) and preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction (90.3%). For the students, first place goes to fighting hunger in the world (94.7%), followed by preserving world peace (92.9%) and, third, the fight against terrorism (92.8%). There is common appreciation for the role and importance of the UN on the part of all interviewees, with different nuances between the two groups on the ways how this role should be carried out. For the great majority (86.1%) of Italian cadets, the expansion of

multinational military missions requires strengthening the UN and giving it a more decisive role; when this role involves greater control over the armed forces of the member countries, however, the national spirit re-emerges and the level of agreement drops significantly (55.4%) although still retaining a majority. A more coherent position appears to be that of the university students, who agree with both statements with very similar percentages (70.8% and 63.9% respectively). Also interesting is the comparison between the two groups on whether the United States and the European Union should engage in unilateral interventions. The interviewees are against this hypothesis on the whole, but while opposition among the cadets is nearly unanimous (94.3% and 84.4% in the two cases), among their university peers, opinion appears to be considerably more nuanced (72.2% and 62.5% respectively).

2.2.3. The Military

2.2.3.1. Democratic Control. Fundamental democratic principles appear to be embraced fully (percentages ranging from 89% to 100%) by the young people in both groups examined, but in judging their concrete realisation in Italy the cadets appear more optimistic on average than their university peers. This takes on special importance where it is a question of the subordination of the armed forces to the political power: nearly all (84%) of the cadets believe that this subordination is effectively achieved, while the university students, although agreeing in majority (65%), appear more cautious. Another significant difference is found on the importance of military personnel being fully integrated in the parent society: this is a position embraced by 92% of cadets, while their university peers give it only 66% agreement. The cadets' aspiration to such integration is evidenced even more by the fact that only 52% of them feel that it is effectively achieved. The common ground of democratic principles between the two groups appears to be further confirmed by their responses to a question aimed at checking for an inclination towards somewhat authoritarian attitudes, in and out of politics:[4] cadets and university students show quite close percentages both in disapproving and approving such solutions (see Table 6).

In addition, the view that the armed forces are subordinate to the political power are identical between the two groups and there is also general agreement (69% and 60%) that politicians must give professional autonomy to the military. On the public use of this autonomy the cadets appear more cautious than their university peers, however. The data show that the cadets are much more cautious as to the advisability of making public statements, either in general or on specific security topics, while the future civilian elites

Table 6. Agreement and Disagreement towards Authoritarian Attitudes.

	Cadets (%)	University Students (%)
Approve	43.4	40.6
Disapprove	50.0	55.2

Table 7. Opinions about the Role of the Military.

I Approve	Cadets (%)	University Students (%)
Members of the military should be allowed to publicly express their political views just like any other citizen	33.1	72.4
It is proper for the military to explain and defend in public the policies of the government	27.4	47.4
It is proper for the military to advocate publicly the military policies it believes are in the best interest of the country	66.9	76.5
It is proper for the military to have direct political influence in the society	28.2	30.6

Table 8. Opinion on Political Leaders' Knowledge of Military Problems.

Level of Knowledge	Cadets (%)	University Students (%)
Very knowledgeable	7.3	12.4
Somewhat knowledgeable	42.7	37.1
Somewhat ignorant	37.1	38.1
Very ignorant	6.9	8.2
No opinion	3.2	4.1

appear oriented towards considering the military like any other professional sector (Table 7).

Part of the capacity for political control of the armed forces is the level of knowledge that political leaders have of the military aspects of national policy. The interviewees' opinions on this knowledge are not especially comforting, since nearly half of the sample credits the political world with modest or no knowledge of these aspects (see Table 8), without significant differences between the two groups.

Whether political leaders share citizens' values instead concerns the country's level of democracy. The interviewees' responses are not particularly comforting here either, since only a small majority gives a positive response, while, albeit with some differences between the two groups (45.2% for the cadets and 38.8% for the university students), a relative majority declares that they are not sure if these values are shared.

2.2.3.2. Tasks of the Military. The survey does not show any sizeable gap between the two groups for what concerns the purpose and function of the armed forces: with very large majorities, both groups agree that the armed forces exist to defend the country and its national interests and that their principal task is preparing for and conducting war. However, a good one-fifth of the university students feel that the military should be abolished and 43% deem it a necessary evil, positions obviously not shared by the cadets. For the university students, moreover, it is not true (at least for a 60% majority) that the existence of a strong military has positive effects on the country's international image: they believe (58%) that national security is better assured by a strong economy than by a military force. This is a point that clearly divides the two groups: with even larger majorities (73% and 71%, respectively) the cadets hold the opposing views. In any case, although with different majorities, the two groups concur that at times war is necessary to defend the national interests (75% for cadets, 52% for university students) and human nature is such that there will always be wars (73% versus 59%). The level of patriotism in its various forms and consequences is obviously greater in the military group than in the civilian one, with percentage differences ranging between 20% and 30% depending on the questions. However, the significance of these percentages would only emerge in a cross-national comparison or, possibly, a longitudinal survey.

2.2.3.3. Public Image of the Military. Interestingly, the cadets' view on the public image of the armed forces in Italy is more pessimistic than the one held by their university peers (see Table 9): if we sum "very good" and "rather good" we get 58.1% for the cadets and 68.3% for the university students.

The positions are reversed when the interviewees are asked about the image of the military profession. This question finds that a medium level of appreciation prevails among university students, concentrated in the positions 4 to 6, while the officer's profession is significantly more appreciated by those who have embarked on a military career. It is interesting to note, however, that these positions are repeated and even accentuated when it is

the officer's educational level that is being judged, as clearly shown by plotting of the research data. A large gap seems to exist here between cadets' awareness of receiving a good level of education and a (likely) dearth of knowledge as to the content of this educational process on the part of their university peers (Figs. 2 and 3).

Table 9. Public Image of the Armed Forces.

	Cadets	University Students
Very good	12.9	22.4
Rather good	45.2	45.9
Not very good	37.1	24.5
Not good at all	4.0	2.0
No opinion	—	5.1

Pearson: 0.0192.



Fig. 2. Military Officer Image (Pearson: 0.2299).



Fig. 3. Military Officer Education (Pearson: 0.0001).

These positions are confirmed by a ranking of the professions made according to prestige, where the university students place officers in a middle position, eighth on a list of 16, while, rather obviously, for the cadets officers rank at the top. Another interesting indicator of the perception of the military in Italian public opinion is represented by the sharing of citizens' values attributed to military leaders by the interviewed sample. The two groups' views are strongly split on this point: while the majority of the cadets (52.4%) say they are sure these values are shared, a much lower percentage of university students embrace this position (35.7%), while a good 39.8% of them say they are not sure about these shared values. In addition, as mentioned earlier, sizeable percentages of the future civilian elites feel either that the military should be abolished (19.6%) or that it is a necessary evil (43.3%).

As expected, the distrust towards the world of the media characteristic of members of the military is manifested also among the cadets, albeit not in a particularly important way, in comparison with their university peers. The available indicators provide us with a set of coherent data in this regard. First, the level of confidence that the cadets have in the media, in general, is lower on average by two-tenths of a percentage point (5.5484 versus 5.7629), but the difference in prestige that the two groups assign to the profession of journalist is much more sizeable: the difference here is one percentage point and six-tenths (average of the values 10.2035 for the military, 8.5714 for the civilians, where the lowest scores indicate a better position in the ranking of the professions). As to the assessment of the level of information provided by the media on national security, a common critical attitude prevails among all the young people interviewed, but while a majority of cadets (56.9%) judge it not good, the university students are split nearly down the middle in judging it good or poor (49.5% versus 47.5%): substantially, for those who judge the average information given on the topic insufficient, there is a difference of almost 10 percentage points when we compare the military group with the university group (56.9 against 47.4). Lastly, the attitude of the media is deemed hostile by one cadet out of three (29%), while only 7.1% of students share this judgement. These data confirm that a different attitude of the two cultures towards the world of information, already evidenced in the past,[5] tends to project itself towards the future as well.

2.2.3.4. Gender Roles and the Military. Voluntary military service for women was introduced very recently in Italy, so it seems particularly meaningful to assess the opinions of the future elites in this regard. There is an initial

common position of the two groups, which are in agreement that service should be voluntary. The majority are against instituting compulsory military service for women. Women's entry into the armed forces being accepted, at least by the majority, there remains the question (currently under discussion within the military and in public opinion) of the appropriate roles with which they should be entrusted. On this point the two groups' opinions diverge significantly. While a majority of university students (51.5%) feel that women should have access to all roles, including combat, a relative majority of cadets (48.3%) feel they should be excluded from such roles and only 36.1% are in favour of full integration. What are the reasons for exclusion? For 82% of cadets who are against full integration, the presence of women in combat units impacts men's operational abilities negatively; for 75% they do not ensure the same availability as men for reasons connected with maternity; for 64% the death of female soldiers can demoralise both men and public opinion; for 54% the presence of women undermines the cohesiveness of small units. Curiously, for university students who oppose the use of female soldiers in combat roles, the reasons are quite different. Their chief concern is the fear that women taken prisoner might be raped (60.5%: this hypothesis instead preoccupies only 27.9% of the cadets opposed to full integration), and secondly (53%) that their availability is reduced by maternity-related matters.

The conception of women as something different from men remains in both groups in Italy; however, when interviewees are asked if all citizens should be called to perform some sort of national service (whether civil or military), there is general agreement that this is right for male citizens (although with different percentages) but the two groups are united in rejecting this hypothesis for women, with very similar percentages (63.9% for cadets, 60.0% for university students).

2.2.3.5. Format and Size of the Military. On the armed forces' recruitment system, general agreement emerges on the passage from conscription to a volunteer system, with special regard to the new missions assigned to them, but with a significant positive gradient (over 20 percentage points, 92.6% versus 69.1%) for the cadets. As is known, the abolition of conscription has led many to hypothesise that those who do not perform military service should do some sort of civilian service of public utility. On this point the two groups' views differ significantly: the cadets are generally favourable (61.5%) to civilian service for male citizens only (35.2% for women as well), but a majority, although a very slim one (50.5%), of their university peers are against such a requirement.

3. CHANGES OVER TIME

3.1. General Features

As mentioned above, the second phase of the research focussed on current elites, who were surveyed by semistructured interviews. The interviews were conducted in February, March and April 2004 by three interviewers. The examined sample comprises: two Members of Parliament on the Chamber of Deputies' Defence Committee, one from the majority (the Committee Chairman) and one from the opposition (Committee Vice Chairman); two serving army generals, a brigade commander (Parachutists Brigade) and the commander of an officer training institute; two university professors, one in political science (University of Pisa), the other in economics (University of Turin); two journalists from independent newspapers, one with a conservative orientation, one leaning to the left; two industrial executives, one in Pisa (medium-sized enterprise), the other in Milan (large corporation); and one public manager, adviser to the Court of Auditors, former three stars general. The interviews varied in duration from 40 minutes to an hour and a half. They were recorded with the consent of the interviewees. Only the two political leaders requested (and received) the transcripts of the interviews for checking and possible rectifications.

3.2. Relationship between the Military and Society

All the interviewed experts pointed out that following the Second World War, for a long period extending at least to the 1980s, there was a strong disconnect between the country and its armed forces. To use the words of the political science professor interviewed, "The basic disagreement was the preconceived notion that civil society had of the thoughts and attitudes of the military hierarchy. This hierarchy was considered to be viscerally hostile to the political left in general and markedly pro-American in its attitudes. The military was perceived as one of the elements that maintained what has been termed *democrazia incompiuta*, incomplete democracy not open to all parties." Conversely, in civil society, as other interviewees pointed out, widespread pacifist and antimilitarist attitudes were taking root, partly instrumental to ideological positions, partly due to religious positions (the Catholic world). All this in the context of a low-profile Italian foreign policy in that period, one that certainly did not exalt the role of the armed forces.

Until very recently, according to the interviewees, this resulted in a lack of awareness of the armed forces on the part of public opinion, of their tasks, their problems. In such a framework, only striking episodes were brought to the fore in the media. Given that the activity of the Italian military was limited to training, at least until the intervention in Lebanon in 1982, these episodes were mostly negative, such as instances of hazing, training accidents and scandals. The interviewees point out that the changing international situation and Italy's shift to an active foreign policy, with the resulting deployment in many countries, even distant ones, of military contingents who have given a good accounting of themselves, radically altered, in the course of the 1990s and the early years of this millennium, the public's views on the national armed forces. In addition, feeling more appreciated and understood, military leaders opened themselves more to dialogue, to public debate of their problems. As the leftist journalist declared in her interview, with the recent, positive interventions in PSOs, "the armed forces can consider themselves fully back within the civil society."

This does not mean that the situation today is idyllic. As most of the interviewees point out, one substantial reason remains for tension between the military and, especially, the political world: the paucity of resources allocated to national security, both in relation to the missions assigned and in comparison with countries comparable to Italy. The causes of these tensions are essentially twofold, according to the interviewees, one of a cognitive nature, the other ideological. The first derives from the scant knowledge that the public in general, but politicians in particular, have of the aspects and issues of national security. The ideological cause derives from the continuing stronghold of pacifist and antimilitarist ideologies on the country. According to these groups, military action is to be proscribed and, as a result, having a strong military is not advisable, as it would produce interventionist temptations.

Partially differing from this position are two interviewees (the opposition MP and the political science professor) according to whom the dissension between the military and politicians on the allocation of resources is structural and does not characterise the Italian situation particularly. All interviewees (with the sole exception of the right-wing journalist) have full confidence in Italian military leaders, to whom they attribute a good or medium level of professionalism. But they are divided in evaluating whether this professionalism is greater today than in the past: the interviewed generals contend that it has always been high, while the other interviewees see a cultural growth in recent years that, according to the leftist journalist, nevertheless does not yet reach the level of the best European armies.

3.3. The Military and Public Opinion

The possibility of influencing public opinion is chiefly through relations with the media. According to most of the interviewees, military leaders have little or no possibility of expressing their views in the media, and even the only two (a general and the right-wing MP) who think they do have this possibility say that in fact it is rarely exercised, partly due to disinclination on the part of the media themselves. On the advisability of military leaders bringing national security issues to the public's attention directly, the sample is divided: both journalists are favourable, both MPs are against, and the two officers say little on this topic, limiting themselves to observing that the interventions of the military leadership in the media are generally piloted by the Ministry Cabinet. In particular, some of the interviewees (the opposition MP, the leftist journalist and the two generals) report cases in which affirmations made by the military in the media have caused tension between public opinion and the armed forces. However, the cause of these tensions must be seen differently: for the generals it was a question of instrumentalisation by the media, for the MP and the journalist the poor ability of the military leaders to express themselves in a politically correct fashion. In any event it seems clear that the relationship between the media and the military has been, and perhaps still is, rather problematic in Italy.

The interviewees are unanimous in judging the level of information that the Italian citizens have on national security issues as meagre and insufficient, while they are split as to the causes: for many the cause lies in the modest level of information given by the media. The Defence Committee Chairman affirms that "We do not have a class of journalists expert in military issues comparable to the English or French, for example." (…) "The attention of the media is more referred to episodes than to the complexity of the defence issues." This is a position shared by several other interviewees, albeit with different nuances (the other MP, a journalist, a university professor, the public manager, a general). For others, the cause lies upstream from the media and must be sought in the pacifist and antimilitarist ideologies that pervade large swaths of public opinion, not just on the left as there is also a Catholic strain. The media do not talk about military issues because public opinion is not very interested in them: "War and everything related to it is to be refused in any case," says one interviewee in this regard.

Nevertheless, for all of the interviewees, this framework of insufficient knowledge has undergone positive change in the last 10 years (modest according to some, significant according to others). The cause of this change is

also the cause that the same period produced substantial improvement in Italians' attitudes towards the military. As already mentioned, this is due to the participation of Italian soldiers in numerous complex international PSOs and in the chance to acquit themselves positively that these operations have provided. The judgement on this point is unanimous. One of the industrial executives says in this regard, for example: "The Italian armed forces are seen as a positive component of social life now. This attitude has changed with respect to the past, when the armed forces were detached from society, people did not really know what they were about. The Iron Curtain made it so they were always kept in reserve and it wasn't easy to understand their function. Their use in peacekeeping missions in recent years has demonstrated their capabilities and made their function clearer to everyone." The media have followed, more than brought about, this change in attitude, according to most of the interviewees, and in many cases remain poorly prepared on security issues and still exhibit a propensity for privileging sensational episodes rather than the real problems of national defence. However, the level of information has improved with respect to the past, also because it is the armed forces themselves who, through press offices, have better equipped themselves for communicating with the public. One of the generals observed that film and novel production centred on positive military figures that is so widespread, for example, in the USA, is nearly nonexistent in Italy.

3.4. Main Security Issues

The prevalent threat recognised as imminent for Italy by all of the interviewees is, obviously, terrorism. However, the specifications that many of them make regarding this type of threat are interesting. First of all, terrorism is correlated with and included within a more detailed set of forms of action, such as mass immigration, the missile threat and politically unstable countries, to report a few of the examples cited. Not only that, but also the economic and social threat constituted by behaviours on the part of the population resulting from the insecurity produced by terrorism is raised. In particular, one general considers it a threat to the country's security that effective control over the foreign policy of the European countries is in the hands of a non-European power 6,000 km away that does not suffer the immediate consequences on its own territory of the decisions it takes in the Mediterranean area, a sea that unites much more than it divides.

For most of the interviewees, the mission of the armed forces principally remains the country's defence. For them, this mission can only be carried

out in an international dimension and through international cooperation, whether it be the EU, NATO or the UN. The military interviewees affirm that, in any case, the readiness of the armed forces must be for traditional warfare, since it is the basis for all the other types of operations. There is a widely shared view, however, that the prevalent operations should be PSOs, with an adequate development of intelligence activities.

The necessary tool for putting the armed forces in the conditions to fulfil the mission entrusted to them is essentially the defence budget: the great majority of the interviewees offers a completely negative assessment on this point. For example, one of the journalists interviewed, using her experience in the Balkans as reference, responds concerning the Italian defence budget: "It's ridiculous, completely inadequate for the country and its role in the world. The comparison with the other countries of our level is completely negative: the result is a shortage of vehicles and equipment with respect to other countries." The only discordant voice is that of the opposition MP, who feels that the defence budget might even be adequate but is poorly structured and not targeted at results, spending needs are not clearly specified, and clarity as to objectives is lacking. He concludes by saying: "I have the impression that for many years the budget was determined chiefly by the desire to maintain the existing structure." The public manager interviewed raised a more general problem in this regard, observing that, in addition to the Italian defence budget not being on a par with the other European countries, the budgets of the latter are far from what would be needed to put the EU on a level with the US.

3.5. The Military and Politics

In Italy, political control over the military is entrusted to Parliament and Government. It is felt by most of the interviewees to be effective, but for some it is exercised in a non-optimal manner: they complain of a prevalence of governmental control, on the one hand, with a certain shunting aside of Parliament, and on the other they feel that this control often lacks decisiveness due to the general unpreparedness of politicians on security issues. With various nuances, this position is shared by both MPs, the public manager, one journalist, one university professor, and one industrial executive. For the majority of the interviewees, the significant politico-military decisions suffer from this sort of marginalisation of Parliament, which is often presented with decisions that have already been made, to be ratified or rejected, without being able to carry out an effective role of debate and

contribution in forming the hypotheses underlying the decisions. In the relationship between politicians and the top military, the most widely shared view is that it is the politicians who make the choices, without a substantial role of military leaders in determining these choices. This position is shared by both MPs, one general, the public manager and one journalist. The decision-making processes for military policy choices are considered to be correct by most, with a healthy balance between the needs of industry, those of the armed forces, and foreign policy requirements. Both journalists and the public manager dissent from this position. They feel the military leadership should be more involved, in a collegiality, especially with political leaders, that does not exist.

4. DISCUSSION

4.1. Comparison of Future Elites

The survey conducted on the future elites made it possible to identify a number of similarities and differences between the two groups, cadets and university students, which deserve to be briefly summarised. A first, substantial set of differences proved to be in what we have called personal values and attitudes here and appear to be chiefly the product of differing anticipatory socialisation (Caforio, 1998). The cadets showed themselves to be more determined in their choices, more attentive to traditional qualities in education, less religious than their university colleagues, and more materialist according to the Inglehart index. These basic characteristics presumably result in their more conservative political leanings, their greater confidence in the country's institutions, and also their closer ties to the primary reference groups: family, colleagues, friends. The views on the country's security policy do not present any substantial dissimilarities in the two groups, either for what concerns objectives or for methods. The cadets naturally put more emphasis on military tools and actions, while their generational peers, generally speaking, favour political instruments. In both groups, a general awareness is present of the inadequacy of the Italian military budget, and this is obviously stronger and more widespread among the cadets.

On democratic control of the armed forces there is substantial sharing of the basic conceptions between the two groups, but a few significant divergences emerge on the use of some tools. One important example is the conception that the university students have of public comments by military leaders: according to most of the students, military figures should be able to

discuss security problems publicly like any other institution or professional group. The cadets appear to be much more cautious and reserved on this point. This may also be due to the general distrust that the future military elites have towards the media, an attitude that is not at all shared by their university peers. Present among the university students is a strong pacifist and/or antimilitarist fringe, part of which would even like to abolish the armed forces, while a large minority (43%) considers the military a necessary evil. But even beyond this fringe, the university students give more weight, for the country's military security, to political and economic aspects than to strictly military ones. The cadets take a diametrically different stance.

The assessment of the public image of both the armed forces and the military profession is quite positive for all of the interviewees and improves over previous surveys (Caforio, 1994, 1998), obviously with different intensities between the two groups. The assessment that the two groups make of the media is very split, however, with cadets confirming the distrust already revealed in previous surveys on the military (Caforio, 1994). On forms of recruitment there is substantial agreement between the two groups for what regards the passage from conscription to voluntary service, also for women. Views diverge on the utilisation of women, which the university students would like to see extended to all roles while a majority of the cadets is against putting women in combat roles. There is also disagreement on establishing obligatory civilian service for all male citizens: the cadets are favourable, the students opposed.

From this summary of the positions expressed by the two surveyed groups we can point to a cultural gap that seems to exist principally in relation to the following aspects: (1) personal values and attitudes (especially ideological positions); (2) relationship with public opinion (freedom of speech, relations with the media); (3) existence and use of the military; and (4) some aspects of recruitment (women, civilian service). It should be borne in mind that this comparison makes reference to the majority opinions and attitudes expressed by the two investigated universities. Caution is particularly advisable in relation to the data regarding the university students, where a sizeable minority (about a fifth of the total) expresses much more extremist and antimilitarist positions than the average.

4.2. Opinions of Current Elites

The survey conducted on the current elites allows a twofold comparison: one with the future elites and another on changes over time. For what

concerns the first aspect, it must be said, first of all, that in the current elites there seems to be less disagreement between the interviewed military leaders and the civilian ones. One sees that the divisions on the various issues occur irrespective of the individual interviewees' membership in one group or the other. In reality, the assessments of the two groups differ on two topics only. The first regards cases where statements by officers in the media have produced tension between public opinion and the armed forces: for the generals this was a question of instrumentalisation by journalists in search of a scoop, for the civilian experts interviewed the cause is seen as ineptness by officers in relating with the media. The second issue regards the growth of professionalism of Italian military leaders in the last decade: it exists and is noticeable, according to all the civilian leaders interviewed, while the generals in the sample insist that professionalism was high in the past as well. But this appears to be more flag-waving than a real difference of opinion. It must be borne in mind, of course, that a small sample like the one examined here with the expert survey can only provide general indications.

There is instead a widely shared view among the top leaders interviewed that a gap of values, attitudes and behaviours exists between the two cultures and always has. The differences, therefore, in the personal values and attitudes encountered in analysing the data on the future elites sample appear to be something to be expected, and considered as having existed also in the past by the interviewed experts. Taking as a whole the opinions expressed at the two levels, future elites and current elites, we see the disappearance of certain extreme aspects in the latter that were proper to a sizeable minority of the university students. None of the interviewed experts cast doubt, for example, on the necessity of national armed forces, their professionalism (albeit with different accents), or the need for adequate budget appropriations. Interesting in this regard is the affirmation of one interviewee, politically positioned on the left, who declared: "I, who was an antimilitarist in the past, saw in Bosnia what it means for a country not to have an army and I think my country has to have armed forces and I want it to have them."

The change that has occurred in civil–military relations in Italy in the last 10 years, as it emerges from the expert survey, is that of a gradual rapprochement and of increased prestige for the military. We have seen in this decade, for the causes already mentioned, what one interviewee efficaciously called "a reappropriation of its armed forces by Italian society."

This is something different from a rapprochement between the two cultures; however, it appears to have occurred for some aspects and not for others. For the aspects where this has occurred, it must be pointed out first

of all that this ‘‘reappropriation’’ has, at a minimum, involved recognition by most citizens of a military culture’s right to exist, and this is no small thing. On a more contingent level one can observe that the expert survey shows greater ideological similarity between members of the military and a majority of the Italian public; military leaders are no longer viewed, for example, as one of the pillars of ‘‘incomplete democracy’’. On the part of the citizens, there is greater knowledge and understanding of military activities (also because objectively more comprehensible today). This greater comprehension by the public has also been accompanied by a lowering (not a disappearance) of the barriers of mutual distrust between the media and military leaders: the latter have begun to equip themselves to facilitate relations with journalists and have overcome a considerable amount of prejudice. The assessments made by the two cultures of the international scenario and of the threats to national security are much closer today than in the past.

The two cultures remain distant primarily for what concerns the set of values and attitudes proper to their members. In the face of hedonistic, self-referential, egoistic values, prevalent in civilian culture, military culture preserves the traditional values of personal sacrifice for the community. Also different are the results of the respective educational processes, especially from a cognitive point of view: the interviewees share the view that the public and those who should be their most qualified expression, elected political leaders, are largely ignorant of the problems and aspects of national security. Resulting tensions remain between these two worlds on a number of concrete issues, especially, as emerges from the expert survey, the allocation of resources. There is still a lack of collegiality in military policy choices, which would include in a single process political leaders, military leaders and, at least in part, the public. According to the results of the survey, finally, political control over the armed forces still appears out of balance and imperfect in Italy:[6] Parliament is hardly involved at all and the whole issue appears to be entrusted exclusively to the Government, on the one hand, and the professionalism of the military on the other, a professionalism that excludes any interference in the political arena by members of the armed forces, according to Huntington’s model (Huntington, 1957). What emerges from this analysis, therefore, is the impression that some aspects of the cultural gap regard a necessary peculiarity of military culture with respect to civilian culture (Boene, 1990), while others, at least in the dimension they have in Italy, constitute a national specificity. Without pretending to be exhaustive, I would include among the latter the marked ignorance on the part of all the non-military actors (citizenry,

media, politicians) on national security issues, the imperfect dynamics of the decision-making processes for military policy choices, and the lack of balance in political control over the armed forces.

NOTES

1. One of the problems of the Italian military during the 45 years of the Cold War was never having been able to be put to the test in some way, not only because of the Cold War situation but also due to the low-profile foreign policy pursued by the Italian government during the First Republic.
2. The theme of security has always been given a short shrift in republican Italy, whose governments, under the Cold War guarantee of the American nuclear umbrella, limited themselves to maintaining a military instrument that was sufficient for carrying out (at a minimum) the requests of the American ally.
3. By basic differences I mean to refer here to aspects of character, value attitudes and conceptions of life.
4. The reference here is to a few questions aimed at determining the interviewee's inclination to follow a strong leader, demand greater rigidity in the education given to young people, etc.
5. See the numerous researches already carried out on this topic, in particular those published by me (Caforio, 1994, 1998, 2001).
6. Even if this has never led to problems of an internal political nature, as Italian military leaders have a long tradition of non-interference in the country's political affairs.

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THE CULTURAL GAP BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND THE PARENT SOCIETY IN ROMANIA

Marian Zulean

1. INTRODUCTION

Romania has experienced a dramatic transition, after 1989, starting from one of the fiercest communist regimes and trying to build a democratic regime and to join the Western institutions, such as NATO and EU. The issue of democratisation of civil–military relations ranked high on the reform agenda of both Romanian policymakers and international donors that offered assistance for transition. The main reason was – for the Romanian public – the concern that the military could seize the power and institute dictatorship, while – for the Western countries – it was the perception that the military was a pillar of a socialist state and the neo-Kantian assumption that democracies do not fight each other, so a civilian control over the military is desirable to be instituted in Eastern Europe. However, the relations between the Romanian military and its parent society present some particular features that should be acknowledged before the presentation of research results.

First of all, Romania has no tradition of militarism. Except for a short period, during the Second World War, the modern army was always under some sort of civilian control. During the Middle Ages, the Romanian

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territories were under Ottoman, Austro–Hungarian or Tsarist suzerainty, so, the militaries were the occupation armies. In 1859, a former colonel, Alexandru Ioan Cuza, was elected Domn (Principe). He was the one who established the institutions of the modern state and a standing army. After the establishment of the modern state, the army and the Orthodox Church were the two institutions considered the main pillars of the state. That might explain the trust into these institutions until today. The Constitution of 1923 introduced the incipient norms of civilian control and Romania experienced its golden age of unity and development. However, the democratic system was destroyed, starting with 1938, and continued during the Cold War. Even then, between 1945 and 1989, the military experienced some kind of civilian control, but one of the subjective type, in Huntington's terms. While in the early 1950s the Romanian military was under both Russian commissaries' control and local communists' control, after 1964 it became more independent from Moscow but under the national communists' control. On the ideological level, the army was considered to belong to the people, the recruitment of the officers targeted mostly the working class and military service was mandatory. So, we do not have clear evidence about a gap between the military and society during communism. Moreover, at the rhetorical level it was not expected to have a gap since both the soldiers and militaries were recruited from the working class and many militaries were used in non-military economic tasks, such as picking potatoes (Zulean, 2003a: 40–51).

After the end of the Cold War, both the revolutionaries in the streets, in December 1989 and, later, the Western institutions were very fond of building a civilian oversight over the Armed Forces. They were afraid of a growing gap between the Armed Forces and their parent society. The establishment of mechanisms of democratic control over the Armed Forces was a primary concern for such institutions as OSCE, NATO/PfP and the European Union. Now that Romania has become a NATO member and has been evaluated on the norms and mechanisms of civilian control it is interesting to find out if there is any gap between the Armed Forces and its parent society. Since the technical criteria for joining NATO required a professional army, it is expected to be in process to develop a specific military culture, different from the parent society. Is that gap increasing?

This research is part of a cross-national European study that investigates the existence of a cultural difference between the culture of the military organisation and the culture of the parent society. The research is carried out as a combination of both quantitative and qualitative methods. The first part of the investigation is a result of a quantitative research, applied on a

sample of both military cadets and civilian students from the relevant universities for the leadership roles of society. After a brief presentation of the demographic features of the sample, the study will investigate the existence of a relevant difference between the military and civilian students at the level of their values and attitudes. The following section will investigate the existence of a difference related to the attitudes towards the foreign and defence policy, while the third section will investigate the issues of democratic control, missions for the military, public image, gender and the military and size of the military. The second part of the study is on the results of the qualitative investigation, based on semi-structured interviews, realised with some current elites.

2. THE STUDENT SURVEY

2.1. Values and Attitudes of the Future Elites

The investigation of the Romanian future elites' attitudes and values was carried out between September and December 2003 on a total sample of 180 students, consisting of 89 military cadets from three military academies (Land-Sibiu, Air-Brasov and Navy-Constanta) and 91 civilian students from three universities (economics, law and political science) based in Bucharest. The detailed demographic description of the sample can be found in Table 1.

Since the basic hypothesis of this study is the existence of a uniqueness of the military profession (Boene, 1990: 3–59) and its culture, the gap should be studied by investigating the declared opinions on values and attitudes towards different issues. On the importance of the values for the education of their children, the military cadets considered that "determination", "open

Table 1. Sample Composition.

	Military Academy	Economy	Law	Political Science
Number of questionnaires (%)	89 (49.4)	32 (17.8)	28 (15.6)	31 (17.2)
Male %	87.6	23.3	32.1	29.0
Female %	22.4	76.7	67.9	71.0
Year of course %				
1st year	49.4	53.1	53.6	60.0
4th and 5th year	50.6	46.9	46.4	40.0

mindness'', ''initiative'' and ''patriotism'' are very important while their civilian peers considered ''tolerance'' as very important, and ''initiative'' and ''determination'' as rather important. On the other hand civilian students considered ''traditionalism'', ''patriotism'' and ''obedience'' as very unimportant. The χ^2 value ($p < 0.05$) shows an important difference between these groups. On the question of what values are necessary for the military the picture looks more or less the same. The cadets consider that the military needs ''open mindness'', ''determination'', ''initiative'', ''comradeship'' and ''loyalty'' while their civilian peers think that ''obedience'', ''comradeship'' and ''determination'' should be characteristic to the military. The issue of determination seems to be pretty common to both civilian and military students. There is a slight difference in the sense that the military students look more determined and civilian students have more uncertain opinions but the difference is not relevant. However, when the issues of discipline, honour and determination are put differently we noticed a relevant difference. The most evident difference is about the necessity of disciplining the youngsters by their parents and condition of success where the military strongly agreed with the statement while the civilian strongly did not. Also, there is a strong evidence of difference, since the military students have a predisposition to favour group consensus and listen to the leaders' orders while the civilian peers strongly disagree with that. Going back to the personal attitudes, the data do not show significant differences between the cadets and civilian peers on the issue of religiosity (see Table 2).

Another issue in finding a gap between civilian and military students is that of political orientation, measured on a left–right scale. The measure does not seem too relevant for two reasons: firstly, the left–right orientation on a macro-level in post-communist Romania is not so relevant and, secondly, chi-square shows no relevant differences between the groups (almost

Table 2. Attitude towards Religion (in per cent).

Religiosity and Attendance of Religious Service	Civilian Students	Cadets
Religious and regularly (every week) attend religious service	9.9	5.6
Religious and attend once per month religious service	18.7	16.9
Religious, but attend religious service only for the biggest fests	46.2	55.1
Cannot tell if religious or not	8.8	12.4
Not religious	13.2	7.9
No answer	3.3	2.2

Pearson: 0.58.



Fig. 1. Political orientation (in percent). Pearson coefficient: 0.059.

Table 3. Materialism – Post-Materialism (in per cent).

	Civilian Students	Cadets	Total
Materialist	17.8	34.8	26.3
Post-materialist	18.9	5.6	12.3
Mixed-type	63.3	59.6	61.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Inglehart index ($p < 0.01$).

0.06). However, it is to be noticed that the civilian students are more right-oriented than their military peers (see Fig. 1).

The differences between the civilian and military students on world values were measured by using the Inglehart index. The students were asked to indicate their choice on the most important and second most important goals of the Romanian government for the next 10 years (Inglehart, 1977). As shown in Table 3, the military students are more materialistic while their civilian peers are rather post-materialistic. This means that military students favour maintaining order and fighting rising prices as domestic goals, while their civilian peers favour liberty and political participation.

On the question of the importance of sources of information, there are some relevant differences between civilian and military students. While newspapers, political newspapers, journals and movies are very important for the civilian students in constructing a view about military problems they are considered rather unimportant for the military students, who favour special military newspapers and journals and professional publications. It is obvious that the civilian students base their judgment on non-military and non-professional newspapers and journals so we have to be careful about differences. Therefore, the next part will focus on studying the interest in security issues and the knowledge of some institutions, including the military

Table 4. Confidence in and Knowledge of Institutions (Means) (in per cent).

	Confidence in the Main Institutions		Knowledge of Institutions	
Institutions	Cadets	Civilian Students	Cadets	Civilian students
The church	7.71 (2)	6.82	8.49 (2)	8.44 (2)
President	5.96	5.08	7.61 (3)	7.90 (3)
Media	6.43	6.66	8.02	7.66
Justice	5.57	5.66	5.68	6.54
Parliament	4.91	4.81	6.91	6.82
Government	5.49	5.02	7.40	7.47
Banks	6.96	6.89	5.75	5.76
Companies	6.29	8.12 (1)	6.92	6.65
Trade unions	5.96	5.77	6.69	6.42
Universities	7.04	7.27	8.39	8.56 (1)
Political parties	4.60	4.57	7.15	7.20
The military	8.55 (1)	6.69	8.58 (1)	6.29
The police	6.44	5.37	7.60	6.47
Voluntary organisations	7.06	7.13 (2)	5.35	4.59

one, when asked about the confidence in institutions. As expected, the cadets are very much interested in defence issues (40%) and somewhat interested (51%) while their civilian peers expressed little interest (almost 50%).

Regarding the confidence of the students in governmental and non-governmental institutions, measured on a 10-point scale from 1 (no confidence) to 10 (complete confidence), with a mean of 8.55, the cadets have the greatest confidence in the military, while the civilian students placed it close to the middle-bottom and rank the private companies as the most trustable institutions. Military students have strong confidence also in the church, universities and voluntary organisations, almost similar with their civilian peers. The lowest confidence expressed by the cadets is in the political parties, parliament and government, almost similar with their civilian peers. When it comes to the problem of informed decision/evaluation, measured on a similar scale, the most visible difference between the cadets and their civilian peers is related to the knowledge about the military and the police. Basically the knowledge about the institutions correlates with the confidence in the institution. However, for the media, parliament, government, political parties and the police more knowledge correlates with less confidence. By contrast, less knowledge about NGOs means to have more confidence in them (see Table 4).

Table 5. Localism/Globalism (Means) (in per cent).

Attachment to	Civilian Students	Cadets
World community	5.11	5.54
Europe	6.30	6.54
Your country	7.70	8.69
Natural environment	7.63	7.88
Your colleagues	7.71	8.08
Your friends	8.71	8.53
Your family	9.53	9.38
Your religious community	5.91	6.42
Your native city	6.92	6.66
Yourself	8.99	8.66

On a scale ranging from 1 (weak attachment) to 10 (strong attachment) students were asked to indicate their attachment to different local or global groups. Roughly speaking there were no big differences between the cadets and their civilian peers, except for "their country", where the cadets felt more attached (mean 8.69) while the civilian students expressed a high but much lower attachment (7.70). The strongest attachment of both civilian and military students are expressed towards their primary groups (family) and themselves, while the weakest attachment is to the world community and religious communities (see Table 5).

3. FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

The foreign and security policy of Romania has undergone dramatic changes. During the Cold War, Romania was a maverick country within the Warsaw Pact, with a military doctrine of total war and territorial defence. The efforts to join NATO brought a new philosophy that led to power projection for stability and peace within the PfP framework (Zulean, 2002). Therefore, the national/international orientation of both civilian–military students is an interesting issue of investigation. There was a relevant difference in opinions on a $p<0.05$ level, related with the goal of "helping to improve standard of living in LDC" (68% of civilians and 83% of military agree and strongly agree), "preserve world peace" (90.2% civilians vs. 98.9% military) and "fight against terrorism" (84.6% civilian vs. 97.7% military). This finding is somehow strange bearing in mind that, earlier, the Inglehart index showed a materialistic and domestic goals orientation for

the military. On the use of the military there were no significant differences between the civilian and military students except to "We shouldn't think so much in international terms but concentrate more on our own national problems", where the cadets showed agreement with the statement while the civilians disagreed ($p < 0.05$). On the likelihood of 16 threats to the national security of Romania there were no statistically significant differences between the two groups, except for the likelihood of an armed conflict between the Asian countries, where the civilian students perceived it as rather likely while their military peers saw this as rather unlikely ($p < 0.05$). The most likely threats to national security (very likely and rather likely) are those of drug trafficking (97% cadets and 91% civilians), military attack from a foreign country (90% both), terrorism (around 88%) and organised crime (97% cadets and 91% civilians).

On the possible missions of the military there were significant differences between civilian and military students (see Table 6). A very strong support from the military students, at the level $p < 0.01$, goes to the missions of "defending the country" (100% vs. 98% civilians), "sending troops abroad" (91% vs. 70%) and "participation in peace-keeping operations" (71% vs. 40% civilians). Military students also favoured peace-enforcement missions, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, control of immigration and fighting against terrorism. The fight against terrorism seems to be a very topical issue: although the difference was statistically significant the support of both civilian and military students is very high (over 90%).

Table 6. Military Missions (Very Strong and Rather Strong Approval; in per cent).

Military Missions	χ^2	Cadets	Civilian Students
To defend our country	0.005	100	98
To be sent in missions abroad	0.001	91	70
To participate in peace-keeping missions	0.000	71	40
To participate in peace-enforcing missions	0.037	55.1	37.5
To provide disaster relief	0.35	87.2	87.7
To provide humanitarian relief abroad	0.89	84.1	81.2
To deal with domestic disorder within our country	0.09	76.4	59.4
To combat drug trafficking	0.78	79.5	81.3
To prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	0.049	95.5	87.7
To control mass immigration from foreign countries	0.025	46.1	41
To fight terrorism	0.038	97.7	92.2
To contribute to the protection of the environment	0.2	62.5	51.7

An important aspect of security policy is the resource allocation. Do civilian students support an increase of the defence budget? While military students support a considerable rise of the actual budget (2.38% GDP), the civilian students want it to rise somewhat (38.3%) or remain as it is (18.7%), with Pearson 0.00. Although there was no difference in the perceptions of the role of international organisations in foreign operations, it is significant that both civilian and military students agreed with the need for a stronger UN (78% military and 76% civilian students) and with the statement that "The Security Council of the UN should be the only power to verify actions against sovereign states" (51% civilian and 63% military students). There is a very low support among the military students for an American intervention abroad (10% agree and 84% disagree) and relatively low support from the civilian students (18.8% agreement and 74% disagreement). The EU's freedom to intervene alone is perceived similarly (32% civilian and 33.7% military students agree).

4. THE MILITARY IN A DEMOCRACY

The democratic principles and norms of civilian control over the armed forces were introduced very early in Romania as a request of domestic forces and international organisations (OSCE, NATO, EU). Therefore, it is of interest to reveal the civil and military students' opinion on how knowledgeable they consider the political leaders are in military matters. The study shows that there is a relevant difference between the cadets and their civilian peers ($p<0.05$). While the majority of the civilian students consider the political leaders as somewhat ignorant in military matters (58%), the cadets consider them somewhat knowledgeable (40%). Going further, on the question if the politicians share the same values as the rest of the population, although the difference was not statistically significant some information of interest could be drawn. Only 16% of the cadets and 8% of civilians consider that politicians share the same values as the population, while the majority of both categories consider that they do not share them (68% and 54% for cadets) or are not sure about it (see Fig. 2).

On two points related to the role of the military in society, the military and civilian students views differ significantly. Firstly, on the question if the military should be allowed to publicly criticise the government, the military students agree that the military should not criticise the government ($p<0.05$). Secondly, on the issue of the military's influence in society, more



Fig. 2. Do Political Leaders Share the Same Values? (in per cent).

than 50% of the cadets consider that is proper for the military to have influence in society (only 30% of civilian students agree with that).

When examining the democratic principles we notice a strong support of both civilian and military students for basic individual rights. However, there is a significant difference between them concerning the principles of: equality of the people (civilians consider it very important while militaries rather important; Pearson: 0.014), basic freedoms of individuals (similar; Pearson: 0.017) and integration of the military in the parent society (military students consider it very important, while civilians consider it rather important, Pearson: 0.000). As for the practical integration of the military in the parent society, there is a slight difference, with the military students considering it as rather unrealised (39%) and 16.5% of the civilian students did not answer. The problem of subordination of the military to the political leadership is considered very important and important by 58% of the civilian students and 48% of military cadets. However, most of the military students think that the subordination of the military is realised in Romania (61%) compared to only 47% of the civilian students. On the statement that the military profession is subordinated to the political leadership there was no significant difference between civilian and military students (70% of the civilian students agreed with the statement and 72% of the military). However, a significant difference emerged on the statement that the politicians must give professional autonomy to the military ($p<0.05$), with a very strong agreement from the military side (50%).

The survey did not reveal any gap concerning the tasks of the military. There was a very strong support to the statement that the military's main task is to defend the country (94% civilian and 97% military students).

A slight difference in agreement is related to the statement that the military's task is to guarantee a free trade and that the military should represent the parent civil society with regard to social and ethnic groups and classes. The gap is widening on the statement that the civilians and the military must share the same basic values (78% civilian vs. 88% military students). However, there was an increasing gap when civilian and military students were asked about the role of the military in peacemaking, war and their direct relations with the military or the role of patriotism. As shown in the Table 7, the military students are strongly inclined to agree with the statements that: "a Romanian should feel that his/her primary allegiance is to his/her country", "military service is the strongest indicator of good citizenship", "patriotism should be a goal for citizenship education", "all Romanians should

Table 7. Opinion on War, Peace and Patriotism (Strongly Agree – Rather Agree; in per cent).

Statement	χ^2	Civilian Students	Cadets
The Romanian should always feel that his or her primary allegiance is to his/her own country	0.00	63.8	95.0
The strongest indicator of good citizenship is performance of military service in defence of our country	0.00	26.4	63.2
The promotion of the patriotism should be an important aim of citizenship education	0.00	64.8	91.0
All Romanians should be willing to fight for our country	0.00	43.9	88.7
We should strive for loyalty to our country before we can afford to consider world brotherhood	0.00	55.0	86.6
Today, peacekeeping and other non-combat activities should be central military function	0.084	95.7	89.8
The military should be prepared to cover the whole spectrum of possible missions	0.083	91.2	96.6
The most important role of the military is preparation for and conduct of war	0.00	50.6	82.0
Sometimes war is necessary to protect the national interest	0.616	60.5	71.6
Human nature being what it is, there will always be war	0.146	62.5	76.4
Strong armed forces improve our image throughout world	0.009	63.8	85.4

fight for their country'', ''the loyalty to the country should prevail before the world brotherhood'' and ''the most important role of the military is to prepare for a war'' (Pearson: 0.000). A significant difference is revealed on the statement that ''strong armed forces improve the image abroad'' ($p<0.01$). The only aspects where both civilian and military students expressed very high support are related to the view that ''peacekeeping should be a central military function today'' (95.7% civilian and 89.8% military students) or that ''the military should be prepared for the whole spectrum of missions (91.2% civilian and 96.6% military).

The information on military matters by the national media is perceived differently (Pearson: 0.007). While civilian students consider the level of information as very good, the military students only consider it as somewhat good. The media depiction of the military in Romania is considered as somewhat supportive by the military students (60.7%), while the civilian students consider it as somewhat hostile (40%), at the level of $p<0.01$.

An important indicator of the public image of the military in Romania is represented by the question if the military leaders share the same values as civilians (see Fig. 3). While the military students consider that their leaders share civilian society values (33.7%), only 14.3 of civilians do so, while 56% of them think the opposite (Pearson: 0.011). Moreover, when directly asked about the public image of the armed forces in society, most of the civilian students consider it as not very good (42.9%) while the military students consider it as rather good (62.9%), on a level $p = 0.00$.

The same difference on the prestige and image of the military profession is supported by the data on ranking some professions, ranging from 1 – the most positive image – to 16 – the most negative one. As expected from the



Fig. 3. Do Military Leaders Share the Same Values as the Society? (in per cent).

previous data, the military students rate their profession first followed by medical doctor, while the civilian students rate the medical profession and a university career first. The difference between civilian and military students is more pronounced on the military profession, which is placed on a medium rank by the civilian students.

Gender integration is a very interesting subject. The data does not show a significant difference between the civilian and military students. Both support the integration of women into armed forces on an optional basis (57% and 49%). In addition, a slight difference regarding the integration of the women into the armed forces but not in combat roles is expected, since only 27.5% of civilian students agree while 37% of the military students agree. The slight but not statistically significant difference looks pretty similar when asked about compulsory service. The military students were more inclined to support the compulsory integration of the women in non-combat roles (34.1% compared to 27%).

Romania has faced a huge transformation of its armed forces, restructuring the conscript socialist military and aiming to build a modern and flexible NATO force. Its active strength was reduced from 230,000 in 1989 to 90,000 in 2004 and will be fully professional by 2007. On the requirement of some national service, there is one of the deepest gaps between the civil and military students ($p<0.01$). While the majority of military students favour national service (70%), only 34% of the civilian students agree to that. Military service is perceived as lost time by the civilian students and they would like to postpone their military duties as long as they can until the new provisions of the Constitution will permit them to avoid it. The difference is still evident on the statement that all citizens, including women should be required to do some national service, only 5.5% of civilians support that and 21% of the military students. On the question of conscription vs. all volunteer force a strong difference between the civilian and military students is evident (see Table 8). While the military students think that the draft "guarantees an exchange of values and perceptions with the society" (65.1%) only 28.6% of civilians do so ($p<0.001$). The difference is also evident on the estimate that the Romanian AF attract high-quality people, 64.1% of military students being very supportive. Although there is no significant difference, a very high percentage of both groups thinks that AVF fits the new missions better (86.9% civilians and 92.1% military).

Summarising the findings of the first part, the outcome of future elites survey, some conclusions on civil–military cultural gap could be drawn. First of all, there were many similarities and agreements. Among the issues

Table 8. Conscription vs. AVF (in per cent).

	χ^2	Civilian Students	Cadets
All male citizens should be required to do some national service	0.001	34	70.7
All (male and female) citizens should be required to do some national service	0.024	5.5	21.4
There is a natural link between democracy and conscription	0.016	35.2	48.3
The general military draft should include women too	0.039	14.3	7.8
The draft guarantees a steady exchange of values, opinions and perceptions between society and armed forces	0.000	28.6	65.1
An AVF fits better than conscription the need of new missions	0.10	86.9	92.1
Looking at the whole national economy, conscription causes more costs than an AVF, because of the waste of human resources	0.016	69.3	85.4
I am proud of women and men who serve in the military	0.039	69.3	89.7
The Romanian Armed Forces are attracting high-quality, motivated recruits	0.000	33	64.1

on which no differences were found and where the area of agreement between the civilian and military students overlaps are: basic values, religiosity, threat perceptions, the role of international organisations, tasks of the military and integration of the women in the military. Slight differences emerged on the role of discipline in education, political orientation, confidence in institutions, sources of information, attachment to the primary groups, values shared by the politicians and military, democratic principles of subordination of the military to the political leadership, role of the military in peacemaking. An increasing gap is revealed on issues such as: subordination of the military (the cadets favour group consensus and listening to orders), materialism/post-materialist orientation (Inglehart), foreign and security policy goals, missions of the military, attitude towards defence spending, military's role in the society, public image of the military and media's attitude towards the military. The most evident gap is related with the possible missions of the military, attachment to their country, national service and conscription.

5. EXPERT SURVEY

The next part will present the changes in civil-military relations in Romania over time, the relations of the military with the public and politicians and some aspects of civil–military relations as perceived by elites will be presented. It will also be used to check the findings from the students' survey. The data were drawn from semi-structured interviews of 10 people: Two Members of Parliament (Defence Committee), one from the governing party (Social Democrat), one from the opposition; two generals, one still employed as senior civilian researcher, one retired but working actively for an NGO; two academics, one teacher and the other a teacher and leader of a think-tank; two journalists from independent national newspapers; one senior civilian within the MoD; and one manager of a think-tank and independent research institute. The majority of the interviews were recorded. I would like to point out the difficulty to get an interview from active duty generals and from the journalists.

On past and present tensions and their causes and the trust in the military, the main questions were on the evolution of tensions, past and present, the explanation of the causes of these tensions and confidence in the military. There was a relatively strong agreement that in the case of Romania we can hardly talk about civil–military tensions. They are rather differences of culture, visions, approaches or understandings of problem solving and reflect individual experiences. The main problems in the past are related with: recruitment (conscription vs. AVF); confidential vs. public information; rigour of military discipline; discrimination of payment for civilians within the MoD; conditions of living and training; implication of militaries in politics; legislative vacuum related with contractual soldiers; downsizing the military; and budgetary constraints. Today's areas of tensions include: rejection of association rights of active officers by politicians; unfair pensions and retribution system between civilians and militaries, between the militaries in Romania and those in peace-keeping missions abroad; compulsory/ conscript service, mentioned by the majority of interviewees; and budgetary allocation.

Some of the main causes of the tensions are: inter-agencies' different visions about the conscription-AVF issue; different perceptions of some military and political leaders about the role of the military, budgetary priorities, involvement of the military in politics; attitudes of the young generation about the mandatory service; communication; lack of military training and security culture for civilians; and discretionary promotion

policy by political leaders. The most interesting explanation was delivered by a civilian expert who stated that the old generation of officers lack the understanding of the international environment and relies too much on a national approach. Not many interviewees mentioned the confidence in the military but all touched upon that and viewed the military as one of the most trustful institution in Romania.

With regard to the opportunity of the military to express its opinion in the media, consequences of expressed opinions, citizens' knowledge about the military and citizens' attitudes towards the military, there is a general agreement that the military expresses its opinion in the media very seldom. They were more active in the public debates during the early 1990s, particularly in debates related to the military's participation in the Revolution of 1989. Also, communication norms and PR mechanism were put into place so that now they have to follow the procedures. The situation is very clearly expressed by a parliamentarian:

> "my belief is that they (officers) didn't lack the opportunity to express publicly their opinion. The fact that they are relatively seldom present in the media is due to their reluctance in expressing publicly (...) That reluctance could be attributed to their education and training in a closed hierarchical system".

This statement was similar with one journalist, who underlined the role of internal regulations. As far as the consequences of expressing one's opinion most of the interviewees did not remember one single case. However, the retired generals, a journalist and a parliamentarian mentioned the situation in 2000 when the Chief of the General Staff expressed some opinions that led to his early retirement. The problem was that not expressing the opinion was the cause of his retirement but rather expressing some opinions about some conspiracies without bringing proves. Also he supported the participation of the military in the elections and in politics that was against the Constitution.

Concerning the citizens' attitude towards the military all interviewees agreed that the population had a positive attitude towards the army, which is rated among of the more trusted institutions. One scientist was more nuanced and mentioned that the attitudes vary due to age and residence: youngsters support the professionalisation and an AVF, while elders and countryside people favour conscription and national service. As far as the media's attitude is concerned the views are very diverse. The majority of the interviewees agreed that the media has, in general, a positive attitude towards the military, is balanced, co-operative and could help the communication between the military and civil society. The civilians within the MoD

perceived a more and more professional approach of the media to military matters and underlined their contribution to combating corruption within the MoD. A retired general identified three kinds of journalists: the serious one that does analysis, the neutral one and the tabloid one that looks for more quarrels.

On military missions, defence budget and major threats to national security there were many points of view about the military missions but generally speaking, the most common task considered by both civilians and militaries is defending the territory. However, many experts see different approaches between civilians and militaries. A former general considers that there is a gap perception about the military missions:

> "For the politicians the main military missions should be: peacekeeping, contribution to integration into NATO and EU, civil emergencies, defending the country in a collective defence framework such as NATO's article 5 missions. For militaries, the main missions should be: defending the country, participation to collective defence, non-article 5 missions and civil emergencies".

Similarly, an academic stated that politicians rely on the army to preserve political order, as a tool of negotiation while the military sees its missions as a voucher for independence and territorial integrity and, as NATO member, as projector of national interests abroad. Also, the manager and former civilian official sees differences between the politicians and military perception of the military missions. While the politicians think the main task is defending the territorial integrity, obligations as NATO member, fight against terrorism, the military considers its main tasks to be professionalisation according to NATO standards, responding to political requirements, and training. Not many experts expressed their views on the military budget, but the one who did so stated that the tensions created around the budgetary allocations are quite normal within a democracy. A parliamentarian, member of the Defence Committee, commented: "the Romanian society endured bravely the military expenses".

Next is to investigate the existence and extent of the political control of armed forces, how political–military decisions are made and what decision-making process is related to sending troops abroad. All the experts expressed their view that the legal norms and mechanisms of political control are in place in Romania. The political control is exercised by Parliament, the President as commander in chief, and the Government. However, there are dividing lines and views on the functionality of those mechanisms reached and proposed measures to perfect them.

A retired general considers that the Government controls the armed forces but the General Staff has its own mechanisms of controlling its programmes, and training; he proposes the improvement of legislation and measures to professionalise the civilians in charge with military matters; the other general also proposed a change of mentality of politicians in the sense of training and professionalising them. The civilian general manager mentioned the role of foreign assistance in the implementation of civilian political control and proposes the professionalisation of civilians. Many experts proposed the professionalisation of defence committees and staffing them with experts. One of the important shortcomings, mentioned by the senior civilian expert, was that the mechanisms of control are superficially exercised if the ruling party controls the Defence Committee and proposed a sort of de-politicisation and more professionalism approach. Another academic proposed the development of a security community for civilians working with and thinking of military matters. An opposition parliamentarian mentioned a less functioning mechanism over the defence acquisitions and proposed a clarification.

Concerning the mechanism of political–military decisions the majority of the interviewees think that even though the initiative of the military is not discouraged, politics has the final word in political–military decisions, such as the defence budget, operations abroad or reform issues. The retired general did not agree to the terms "shared responsibility" or "civilian supremacy" in decision-making, he rather proposed the term "well-established responsibilities". For example, when a request to send troops abroad is addressed to the Government, the MoD evaluates the opportunities and costs, proposes the mission to the Supreme Council for Defending the Country that, under the President's supervision agrees or not. If agreed the proposal is addressed to Parliament for approval.

Summarising the findings it can be said that the actual elites' views were more "convergent" on civil–military tensions, critical but basically did not contradict the future elites' opinions. The majority noticed that we could not speak of tensions and conflict but rather of difference of views, approaches and some problematic situations. The recruitment system, income differences, lack of some association right for the active military, discipline and budget allocation are issues of tensions already mentioned by the students. However, the militaries have the right to express their opinions but they do not use it very often due to education and training. The majority of the interviewees agree that the military has a positive image in the media and in public. All are very critical of politicians as managers of defence issues. There are many points of view related to the presumptive gap between the

politicians and militaries and different perceptions of missions and tasks. As far as the democratic civilian control is concerned, the common view was that all norms and mechanisms of control are in place but that there were some diverging points about how the mechanism works and how to improve it.

6. CONCLUSIONS

This study investigated the existence of a cultural gap between the military culture and that of its parent society. While the first part investigated, though a questionnaire, the values, attitudes, opinions, norms, emotions and feelings of the cadets compared to their civilian peers, the second part was a qualitative analysis of the actual elites and was done in order to get a grip of the evolution of the civil–military culture over time and to use similar indicators as control variables. The study revealed the existence of many similar views, opinions, beliefs, emotions but also the existence of smaller or higher variance between civilian and military students' views. Although the difference between civilian and military students' confidence in institutions was very slight, besides their own institutions, favouring the church, and voluntary organisations, a reason for concern is the lowest score obtained by the political institutions (parties, parliament or government). The concern becomes more evident when we consider that the political and military leaders do not share the same values as society in the eyes of those surveyed. A slight difference is also revealed on the issues of attachment to the country, patriotism as a personal value and the role of discipline in educating kids. The most evident differences between civilian and military students views that can illustrate an increasing gap are:

While the military students are predominantly materialists (in Inglehart's terms), favouring domestic issues and a national orientation, the civilian peers are predominantly post-materialists, favouring liberalism and the political participation of the public in decision-making. Military students are stronger supporters of helping LDCs, preserving the world peace and fighting terrorism than their civilian peers; they also advocate a rise of defence spending and request a greater role for the military in society. Another important gap is revealed on the issue of the public image of the military: while the military students consider it as rather good and they rate it first among 16 professions, the civilian students consider it as not very good, place it in the middle of the list of professions and would like to see the military abolished. The attitudes towards conscription and the AVF take the shape of a deep gap. The military students favour a national service,

consider that the draft ''guarantees an exchange of values'' and recommend to all citizens some kind of national service, the civilians consider the conscription a loss of time, favour an AVF and do not show esteem for the military profession. However, both civilian and military students consider that an AVF fits better to the new missions of the military. A deep gap is shown also on possible military missions, where the military students favour ''defence of the country'', ''sending troops abroad'', peacekeeping'', ''peace-enforcement'' more than the civilian students; the findings on the difference related to possible missions are also confirmed by the interviews with the present elites.

The final conclusion is a certain difference between the civilian and military culture that exists in Romania, particularly on such issues as the role of patriotism and discipline in education, foreign and security goals, image of the military profession and conscription/national service. However, the gap does not seem to become wider, or to represent a fear of a militarisation of society. On the contrary, the institution of democratic civilian control norms and mechanisms, restructuration and professionalisation of the Army to be compatible with NATO forces was considered by some military elites as a risk of civilianisation. A high concern should be placed on the risk of politicians to become considered as not knowledgeable about military matters and not to share the same values as their parent society.

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THE CULTURAL GAP BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND THE PARENT SOCIETY IN SLOVENIA

Maja Garb and Ljubica Jelušič

1. INTRODUCTION

Slovenian society was historically very ambivalent towards the military. In former Yugoslavia many people understood the military as the socialising agent, the organisation that would help their sons to grow up, and as provider of help in cases of natural catastrophes. The role of defence of the homeland was perceived as a legitimate task of the military, but the expectation of a foreign military threat was gradually decreasing. The Yugoslav policy of active participation in the non-alignment movement helped people to believe that they lived in a neutral country, in a country without foreign enemies. The perception of a low military threat in the public clashed with the very tough enemy-searching of the former Yugoslav military. This caused tensions between Slovenian civil society and Yugoslav military elites. The associations of civil society asked for recognition of conscientious objection, which was not permitted in former Yugoslavia until the mid-1980s. Even then, the status of conscientious objectors was given to religious believers only, and they had to serve within the military without arms. In 1991, the Slovenian public verified its decades-old hypothesis that there is no enemy outside the country, but the biggest enemy is its own military. The

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war in Slovenia, although the decision to form an independent state was encouraged by Serb nationalism and the totalitarian perception of the Yugoslav Federation, was clearly a war between the Slovenian people, military, and police against the Yugoslav Peoples' Army and not against other nations or republics of former Yugoslavia.

When the new military was formed on the basis of former territorial defence militia units in 1991, the Slovenian public regarded it as the victorious army and was very supportive towards it for a few years. In 2003, when the draft was suspended, the military gained even more support and in public opinion polls it was listed among the three top country institutions, together with the president and the "tolar" (the Slovenian currency). In October 2003, the last conscripts left the Slovenian military and it became an all-volunteer force (AVF). The options that the Slovenian military had in 2003 are described in a comparative analysis of countries that continued with the draft and countries that abolished it after 1992 (Malešič, 2003). The future of civil–military relations is now stemming from a new set of values. The military is becoming some kind of an enterprise; for those who need some adventures or a short-term job a contract of at least 5 years is offered. In the first year of AVF, volunteering for military jobs was very high. The military has attracted a high number of women, who despite known patriarchalism of the military, entered the AVF files very enthusiastically. According to critics and suspicious attitudes of males, the integration of women will be one of the testing points of military culture. Is it able to adapt to the new social group or is it going to change the standards in order to stop the female influx?

2. THE SURVEY ON CONVERGENCE/DIVERGENCE OF CIVILIAN AND MILITARY VALUES IN SLOVENIA

The researchers of the Defence Research Centre at the University of Ljubljana participated in the international survey on the "Cultural Dimensions of Civil–Military Relations in Democratic Society", led by Giuseppe Caforio, in order to find out if there are evidences of convergence or divergence between the military culture and the values of Slovenian civil society. Slovenian researchers carried out the opinion poll among military and civilian students between January and June 2004, and interviews among representatives of the elites in May and June 2004. The Slovenian opinion poll's sample was 164 respondents ($N = 164$). There are 48.8% male respondents

and 51.2% female ones in the sample. According to the university course there are 19.5% students of economics, 40.2% of law, 18.9% of political science, and 21.3% officers' candidates in the Military Officers School. The military respondents are a specific group of respondents, because they hold a university degree before entering the Officers School. Slovenia does not have a military academy; therefore the military must recruit its future officers among graduates of civilian universities. The candidates for military officers are employed by the Slovenian Army and sent to a 1-year course that is provided by the Military Officers School, which means that the Slovenian military sample consists of the officers' candidates.

The demographic characteristics of the military respondents are the following: We had to interview one complete generation of candidates at the Officer School (35). They are not from different courses or years of studies, because it is a 1-year course only. Freshmen usually enter the school in September every year, and we included into the survey, the generation that started in September 2003; in January 2004, when we interviewed them, they were in the middle of their officer education. The generation consists of mostly men (88% male, 11.4% female respondents). All respondents have completed a college or university degree of different sciences and studies. The majority of respondents (84.8%) has previous military experiences, which are twofold: they served their 7-month military duty in the Slovenian Army as draftees, or 12–15 months in the former Yugoslav People's Army, and/or they worked in the military before coming to the Officer School (80% of respondents; on average more than 6 years). They are born in the years 1962–1979. The average age of the whole Slovenian sample was 24 years (the average of military respondents was 33, and of civilian students 22). The military respondents were a homogenous group in the sense of their military education, but in terms of their civilian degrees, they were very heterogeneous. Among the university respondents we had 40.2% in their first year of studies, 11% in their third year, and 27.4% in their fourth year. The military respondents represented 21.3% of the whole sample. Regarding previous military experiences, besides the military respondents, only two more respondents had some military training; they served as conscripts in the military.

3. PERSONAL VALUES AND ATTITUDES

The indicators of group feelings and/or personal self-confidence show that an average Slovenian respondent possesses moderate personality power;

he/she does not necessarily follow the leaders, and despite the personal opinions – respects the power of group. The comparison between military and civilian opinions did not show significant differences on personality characteristics. The analysis of political values shows that Slovenian respondents tend to be slightly more left- than right-wing.

3.1. Education Goals

The respondents were asked to evaluate how important they rate certain values for their children's education and how important they rate the same values for the military. When summing up the answers "very important" and "rather important", the rank of the values important for the respondents' children's education, is the following: responsibility, honesty, determination, tolerance and open-mindedness, discipline, creativity and self-control. In comparison to the respondents' image of the importance of the same values for the military, we found quite some differences. The rank of the qualities, which are the most important for the military, according to the opinion of all respondents are the following: discipline, determination, responsibility, self-control, obedience, team spirit, comradeship, and honour.

The comparison between military respondents and civilian students shows some differences on values that are important for the children's education (for military respondents, patriotism, comradeship, traditionalism, and honour are much more important than for civilian students; see Graph 1). There were significant differences in perception of military qualities. Regarding the image of the military it can be seen that the military respondents see the military as much more tolerant, traditional, creative, generous, initiative, honest, open-minded, and with much more spirit of equality than the civilian students (see Graph 2). It can be concluded that the military respondents see the military much more civilianised than the civilian students. The people from inside the military observe the convergence of military and civilian qualities more broadly than the university students. Our conclusion is supported by the fact that the military respondents had passed quite some time in the military before coming to the officer's school, whereas among university students only two had some military experience. The lack of knowledge on how the military really looks may cause several stereotypes of it, positive and negative, and it may influence the perception of a gap between the military and civil society as more deep and wide, than it is perceived from the military side.



Graph 1. Values Important for the Children's Education (in per cent). In Order to Keep the Comparison with Other Surveys in the Framework of Giuseppe Caforio's Project "Cultural Dimensions of Civil–Military Relation in Democratic Society" we used in all Graphs the Expression "Military Cadets". These are in Slovenian Terms, Military Respondents in the Survey.



Graph 2. Qualities of the Military (in per cent).

3.2. Globalism/Localism

We asked the respondents how much attachment they felt to the world community, Europe, Slovenia, natural environment, profession and colleagues, friends, family, religious community, native city, and themselves. On average, the family ranked first (see Table 1). The item family is also the only one that caused significant differences between military and civilian respondents. The military respondents were, expectedly, more attached to the family than the civilian students (military respondents $M = 9.88$; students $M = 9.10$; Sig. $= 0.003$), because they were older and probably had already formed their own families, but we did not check this demographic characteristic in the survey. The respondents in general ranked as, higher the attachment to the social network around him/her personally (family, oneself, friends, colleagues), the attachment to the country, the city, and Europe was somewhere in the middle, and the lowest was attachment to abstract communities, like the world and religious community. Although 52% of the respondents answered that they were religious, the religious community does not seem to be an important identification point of Slovenian respondents. The prevailing religion of Slovenian respondents is Roman catholic (58%), but 23% of respondents declared themselves as atheists. They are moderately religious (they mostly attend religious service only for the biggest fests – 28%). There are no differences on religion and religiosity between military respondents and civilian students.

Table 1. Personal Attachment to Persons and Groups.

Rank		*M*	St. Dev.
1.	Family	9.24	1.698
2.	Oneself	9.06	1.558
3.	Friends	9.02	1.493
4.	Profession. colleagues	8.14	1.582
5.	Natural environment	8.12	1.957
6.	Country (Slovenia)	7.99	2.299
7.	Native city	6.77	2.494
8.	Europe	6.11	2.238
9.	World community	4.34	2.209
10.	Religious community	3.70	3.006

3.3. *Patriotism*

The attitude towards the country (Slovenia) is positive (7.99 on average on a 10-point scale). The comparison between the military and civilian respondents shows no statistically significant differences. But some other questions related to being a Slovene left a slightly different impression. There was a set of questions in the questionnaire, where our analysis of attachment to the country was more indirect. Indicators on what should be the primary allegiance of the Slovenian people, on military service as an indicator of good citizenship, on patriotism as an aim of citizenship education, and on loyalty to Slovenia, have generated statistically significant differences between military and civilian respondents. On all mentioned indicators, more than 70% of the military respondents expressed their strong agreement. Civilian respondents were more ambivalent on these indicators and even ignorant on the question of military service as an expression of patriotism. The general conclusion is that the military respondents expressed much more agreement with the statements on allegiance and loyalty to the nation and the country than the civilian students (see Graph 3).

3.4. *Postmaterialism*

The respondents had to prioritise four goals of government activities (the Inglehart scale). The respondents thought that the government should "fight rising prices" and "give people more say in important government decisions". There are very small statistical differences between military and civilian respondents. Relatively more military respondents saw the goals like "fighting rising prices" and "protecting freedom of speech" as the most important governmental goal than civilian students.

3.5. *Interest for Defence-Related Issues*

Regarding interest and information on defence-related issues we found significant differences between military and civilian respondents. As expected, military respondents are much more interested in defence related security issues, and they give more importance to military professional publications, special military newspapers or magazines as the main sources of knowledge on defence issues than civilian students. They mentioned the internet as a very important source of information, which confirmed one of the findings



Graph 3. Patriotism (in per cent; Sum of "Agree Strongly" and "Agree Somewhat").

from the survey "The Opinions of Slovenian Youth on Military Occupations" (Defence Research Centre, 2003), that those young people, who are interested in military matters, more often use the internet as a source of information on military issues than the others. Military respondents use political newspapers or magazines less than civilian respondents.

4. SECURITY POLICY, FOREIGN POLICY

4.1. Foreign Policy Goals

The Slovenian respondents generally thought that the most important foreign policy goals concern the preservation of world peace, maintaining the external security of the country, and the prevention of weapons of mass destruction. The lowest importance was given to promoting and defending

human rights in other countries and to bringing a democratic form of government to other nations. To a large extent, the respondents are critical of exporting democracy and human rights. We found differences in opinions: on strengthening the United Nations; preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction; strengthening the regional security alliances or agreements; maintaining the external security of the country, and fighting terrorism. Military respondents gave more importance to maintaining the external security of the country. They are stronger supporters of the United Nations than civilian students. They are more pessimistic about the public tolerance of casualties in military operations and, surprisingly more optimistic about the importance of international trade and domestic economy than civilians.

4.2. International Organisations

The importance of the UN for the military respondents is evident also in opinions on the authority of international organisations. The UN finds relatively strong support among all respondents, but the military respondents support the authority of this international organisation even more than the civilian students (Graph 4). Respondents disagreed with the opinion that NATO or the US should have the freedom to intervene on its own initiative, but they have shown more tolerance towards EU and its freedom to intervene on its own initiative.

4.3. Likelihood of Threats to National Security

The Slovenian respondents in general have evaluated threats such as organised crime, environmental problems, international drug trafficking, mass immigration, and attacks on computer networks as the most likely threats to Slovenia. Armed conflicts among distanced countries (in Asia, Africa, Third World) and a military attack on Slovenia were perceived as the least possible. We expected differences in military and civilian threat perception. The issue of threat perceptions among the military personnel is – in some literature on military sociology (see Abrahamsson, 1972) – connected to the concepts of pessimism and alarmism. Could we say that the military respondents in the civil–military gap survey in Slovenia also express more concern about the national security threats than the civilian students? The results show some more pessimistic and alarmist attitudes in comparison to



Graph 4. International Organisations (in per cent; Sum of ‘‘Agree Strongly’’ and ‘‘Agree Somewhat’’).

civilian students, but not very significant ones. There are some differences in the perception of non-military threats (mass immigration, drug trafficking, environmental problems, and attacks on computer networks), which are perceived by military respondents as more dangerous than by the civilian students. The civilian students are more alarmed about the military threats (nuclear war between Third World countries with global consequences, an accidental nuclear war, and military attack by foreign state). They are also more concerned about a possible indirect involvement in civil wars (see Graph 5).

4.4. Defence Budget

The majority of respondents (43.6%) agreed with the statement that the percentage of GDP spent for defence should remain as it is. The percentage



Graph 5. Threat Perceptions (in per cent; Sum of "Very Likely" and "Rather Likely").

of those who would raise it somewhat or considerably is higher (39.3%) than of those who would lower it somewhat or considerably (17.2%). It seems that the political repetition of the standpoint on the need to increase the defence costs due to NATO membership has become a part of public attitudes. Opinions on the Slovenian defence budget differ between the military respondents and civilian students. While the majority of the military sample supports the statement that the defence budget should be raised somewhat (68.6%), the majority of the students support the statement, that the budget should remain as it is (50.8% of the students).

5. THE PERCEPTION OF THE MILITARY

5.1. Media Depiction of the Military

According to the majority of respondents, the media depiction of the military in Slovenia is neutral (36%). The ratio between those who thought, that the media is supportive towards the military (25.7%), and those, who thought that it is hostile (26.2%), is balanced. The civil–military comparison shows that military respondents' opinions are much more determined on that issue. Namely, while 15.5% of the civilian students do not have an opinion on the question of the media depiction of the military, no military respondents choose that answer. It is also evident, that the military respondents judge the media depiction of military as slightly more hostile than civilian students.

5.2. Trust to Institutions

The respondents also viewed the political leaders as more ignorant towards the military (53%) than knowledgeable (40.3%). One out of four respondents (24.4%) thought that military leaders share the same values as the society. Lower numbers of respondents (18.3%) agreed that political leaders share the same values as the people. The respondents also perceived the public image of the armed forces as very low. Nearly 66% of them thought that the public image of the armed forces is not good in comparison to 30.5% of those who thought otherwise. There certainly is a gap between the young generation (the country's future intelligentsia) and general public opinion. A Politbarometer survey of spring 2004 has shown very high public trust to the Slovenian Armed Forces (Politbarometer 4/2004). Our

Table 2. Confidence and Knowledge of the Institutions in Slovenia.

Rank According to Confidence	Institutions in Slovenia	Confidence		Knowledge	
		M	St. Dev.	*M*	St. Dev.
1.	Universities	7.38	1.830	8.14	1.517
2.	Banks	6.34	2.104	6.75	1.881
3.	President	6.03	2.143	7.81	1.888
4.	Military	5.87	2.314	6.66	2.156
5.	Justice	5.82	2.433	6.85	2.003
6.	Voluntary organisations	5.69	2.363	5.95	2.388
7.	Companies	5.59	1.853	6.27	1.952
8.	Police	5.37	2.358	7.30	1.735
9.	Government	5.09	2.153	7.27	1.807
10.	Media	5.01	2.112	7.83	1.636
11.	Parliament	4.86	1.921	7.16	1.797
12.	Trade unions	4.86	2.051	5.41	2.054
13.	Church	4.14	2.829	7.31	2.314
14.	Organised political parties	3.74	1.978	6.43	2.262

respondents' perception was that the public is not very happy with the military, but on the other hand, they personally reported high confidence in the military as an institution, although their knowledge of it was not that high (see Table 2).

Table 2 shows universities to be the most trusted and most known institutions in Slovenia. The Standard Deviation figures show very firm attitudes. Their knowledge of the police is quite high, but trust is much lower; that goes to another state institution, the military. High confidence of the universities can be explained by the fact that students study on them and expect to achieve a better social status by getting a university degree. As it is also the first trusted institution for the military respondents, the explanation may be found in the fact that military respondents had to achieve university degree before going to the Military Officers School. In this regard, they may perceive university as the basic institution for their military career.

5.3. The Military in Public Affairs?

The relation between the military and civil society was evaluated with different indicators. The majority of respondents disagreed with the statement that the military should not publicly criticise the members of the

government, or civil society, or that the military should have direct political influence in society. On the contrary, they agreed with the statements that the military should advocate its policies publicly if it believes they are in the best interests of the country. Additionally, respondents supported the idea that the military should be allowed to publicly express their political views just like any other citizen. Regarding the opinions on the democratic control of armed forces, we can conclude that the civilian students have more moderate opinions than the military respondents. While the military respondents generally oppose the public statements of the military, the students would allow some public appearance of the military.

5.4. Military Missions

The respondents overwhelmingly supported four tasks of the military: defence of the homeland, providing disaster relief, providing humanitarian relief abroad, and participation in peacekeeping missions. The congruity between military respondents and civilian students on these tasks was unique (Graph 6). The highest disagreement between the military respondents and civilian students is in evaluating robust military tasks. While the military respondents strongly approve traditional military tasks (like defence of the country, peacekeeping, peace-enforcing and combat missions), the civilian students are more prone to humanitarian and police assistance tasks of the military (disaster and humanitarian relief, domestic disorder, combat drug trafficking, control mass immigration, and prevention of weapons of mass destruction proliferation). We may additionally verify this thesis by data that more civilian students than military respondents agree with the statements "Today, peacekeeping and other non-combat activities should be central military functions" and "The military should be prepared to cover the whole spectrum of possible missions (from war to aid to the civil power)" and more military respondents agree with the statement "The most important role of the military is preparation for and conduct of war".

6. CHANGES OVER TIME: RESULTS FROM THE EXPERTS' INTERVIEWS

In May and June 2004, we successfully finished four interviews with two top military officials (Chief of General Staff and Deputy Chief of Staff), one high defence ministry official (State Secretary), and one member of



Graph 6. Possible Tasks of the Military (in per cent; Sum of "Approve Very Strongly" and "Rather Approve").

parliament (Head of the Defence Committee). The interviewed respondents were authoritative enough to regard the sample of governmental, military, and parliamentary respondents as fulfilled, therefore we are not going to make additional interviews with defence, military, and parliamentary elites. The Head of the Defence Committee belonged to the parliament in the 2000–2004 term. Due to the parliamentary elections in October 2004, Slovenia has, since the end of 2004, a new parliamentary composition, but members are not very expertised yet in control of the military and their opinions would not represent the influential standpoints of the politicians

regarding the military yet. The researchers are planning to finish the qualitative analysis by interviewing two journalists, two scientists and two company managers in the near future.

6.1. Military–Society Relationship

The respondents evaluated the relationship between the military and society as positive over the past 4 years. The military respondents thought that the military would not like to have a gap with the society for it is more in the interest of civil society to make the borders. The military would like to present its activities in public, because it must compete in the civil market for labour force and moral support.

6.2. Military and Public Opinion

Public appearances of military persons in the media are limited to those who are responsible for public relations. In the past 4 years, a broader process of decentralisation of appearances in the media has taken place, mainly reinforced by the new defence minister and supported by the chief of the General Staff. There are still some tensions between some parts of public opinion and the military, because people hold old views of the military, they still think of it as of the former Yugoslav Peoples' Army and do not accept the tremendous changes since. Some media are helpful in civil–military relations, and some not, because they try to find some incidents in order to make more attractive articles. Public opinion on the military has changed to very supportive in the past 4 years. The main civilian points of control over the military were the Defence Committee and some other Parliamentary Committees, the media and the University Defence Studies surveys, expert studies and analyses.

6.3. Main Security Issues

The military respondents said that the main military task is not only defence of the homeland, which is still perceived by some people or even politicians as the only relevant military task. Some politicians think that there are such opinions present in the military, too. After becoming EU and NATO member, Slovenia must understand that the military engages in NATO activities,

in peace operations, and in many different international military activities. The military people are aware that to get support from the public they have to help in disaster relief, and whenever it is possible, military people are present. Even more, when something happens, they do not wait for a call of the Civil Emergency Agency, they immediately offer all help possible, but due to the tensions with experts from the civilian part of the Defence Ministry who cares of disaster management, the military is not present in catastrophes to the extent that soldiers would like to see. The Head of the Defence Committee was critical towards some politicians and said, that some politicians think homeland defence is the only important task for the military, in fact, for him, it is peace operations and collective defence.

6.4. Military and Politics

All respondents thought there are no tensions, or at least not so big ones as in the past between the military and politics. The main difference is less abuses and interventions from politics. Nowadays, the tensions between the military and the civilian part of the Ministry of Defence are more prevailing. Civil servants think they are supposed to control the military. The Defence Committee of the Parliament in the past 4 years supported the military, which was given many opportunities to explain its problems in parliament. Although the Defence Committee was led by the opposition leader, the military and defence sector in general had a lot of support from their side. The Defence Ministry and the military itself invited members of parliament to visit the troops, the Defence Committee members even visited soldiers during their peace mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Such visits were important messages for soldiers and for politicians. The high official from the Ministry of Defence reported on the dualism of some functions between the military and the defence ministry. There are some misunderstandings on military missions. The importance of NATO and EU membership has been seen through some decisions. The Head of the Defence Committee said that, in the past, the military found higher support and understanding from the opposition than from the ruling parties.

7. CONCLUSION

The results of the survey among students of three faculties within the University of Ljubljana in Slovenia and among officers candidates of the

Officers School of the Slovenian Armed Forces, conducted in 2004, has shown that there are some topics on which a certain civil–military gap exists (see Fig. 1). Usually the differences are due to the different levels of knowledge of military issues. Military respondents are much more knowledgeable on the military characteristics and topics, because they are former graduates of different university studies and have some military experience from military service and also from additional years of employment in the military. Civilian students have more stereotypical perceptions of the military and their perception of the gap between the military and society is broader than of the military respondents. The gap does not exist when students and military respondents had to evaluate the public image of the armed forces, when they described their confidence in public institutions, threat perceptions, and perceptions of foreign policy goals. The biggest differences in the opinion of both samples were on those topics that need some basic experience and knowledge of the military, like qualities of the military, interest in defence-related issues, importance of the UN, and democratic control of the military. The difference in the level of patriotism between military and civilian respondents can be explained by the difference in the demographic structure of both samples (military respondents were older, more experienced and employed by the military, whereas students are still very confused on what they are going to do in their future.

The qualitative analysis of the changes in civil–military relations in Slovenia over the past decade has shown that the most important changes were the liberalisation of military service in 1994 and the introduction of the all volunteer force and the abolishment of compulsory military service in 2003. The Slovenian Armed Forces entered this historical period in 1991 with a very positive image of the military that successfully met the challenge of war with the superior former Yugoslav military and had gained victory over it. In the years to come, that famous Territorial Defence military gradually lost its positive image, due to the political abuses of the military in the defence sector. Public opinion was not able to differentiate between the defence ministry incidents and narrow military mistakes, and accused the military for everything negative that was coming from the defence ministry.

The military was loosing its professional autonomy on very basic military questions like, e.g., conscientious objection. In 1994, the rights of conscientious objectors were prolonged, from the time before calling into the military service to the time during military service and after in reserve service. The decision was made without considering military expertise on how this regulation might affect military training efficiency. In the years to come, between 1995 and 2002, the liberalisation of civil service led to disproportionately



Fig. 1. The Civil–Military Gap in Slovenia.

more recruits doing civil service rather than military service. In that period, the Slovenian Armed Forces began to participate in peacekeeping missions (in 1997) and in order to establish appropriate forces for such missions, the Slovenian Armed Forces informally divided the units into two-tier units – the best professional soldiers were commissioned to AVF units for missions abroad, and less prepared ones had work with lowly motivated military conscripts. In April 2003, the Government decided to stop the training of conscripts by mid-2004. The remaining conscripts tried to escape the bad image of being the last recruits to serve by not responding to the calls to the military, and the military alone was forced to ask the Government to shorten the period of transition into the AVF. The last conscript left the military in October 2003, and the last conscientious objector left the civil service in December 2003.

Public opinion fully supported the political decision to abolish conscription, and the military regained its high position among the most trusted institutions in Slovenia. High confidence in the military was also verified in our survey, although we had in our sample a traditionally more critical public, the students of social sciences, like law, economy, and political sciences. In 2004, the Slovenian Armed Forces still have many requests for jobs within the military. There are still two to three candidates for each working position, and despite the fact, that secondary school degree is a precondition to enter the military, there are even some people with university and college degrees that would like to enter its files as enlisted soldiers. This makes the military comparatively more educated than are the similar files of the militaries with which Slovenian soldiers are supposed to co-operate in peace operations. The trend to study and get non-commissioned officer's or even officer's ranks is highly popular among enlisted soldiers.

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THE CULTURAL GAP BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND THE PARENT SOCIETY IN SOUTH AFRICA

Lindy Heinecken and Richard Gueli

1. BACKGROUND

The South African armed forces have undergone profound changes over the past decade in almost every aspect of organisation and structure. With the end of the Cold War and the subsequent demise of Apartheid, the South African armed forces moved away from a defence posture focused on national security, to one focused on regional and non-military threats. In terms of force structure, all-white male conscription was replaced with a volunteer system and for the first time the military became representative of a broader society. However, unlike the previous era, where there was a clearly defined threat, the armed forces were obliged to operate under strict budgetary constraints, in an environment where security became subservient to other more pressing socio-economic priorities. (For a historic overview see Cilliers & Heinecken, 1999.) After the first democratic election in 1994 and the acceptance of the new Constitution and Bill of Rights, everything from the country's foreign, domestic and defence policies were revised. In terms of the tasks of the newly formed South African National Defence Force (SANDF), the final Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Article

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200 (2), described these as "to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force". The first and primary role of the SANDF is "defence against external aggression", but it was for its secondary function, "to defend and protect its people in accordance with the Constitution and principles of international law", that the SANDF has been most operational, both internally in law and order functions, and more recently, in peace support operations in the region.

For South Africa, the advent of democracy meant more than just a shift in mission focus. The country also entered a new era of civil–military relations. Prior to 1995, there was little real civilian oversight of the armed forces and no civilian outside the cabinet had any influence over the military since 1967. In many respects, South Africa was a highly militarised society, given the fact that it was a society at war (see Cock & Nathan, 1989). This was to change radically in post-1994. In the new Constitution, Section 204, the Minister of Defence was mandated to exercise control over the SANDF and to be accountable for the entire defence function. A civilian Defence Secretariat was established to formulate the policies, programmes and budgets, and to control the execution of the mandate of the Defence Force. The Secretary of Defence assumed the role of administrative head and accounting officer, as well as being the principal departmental adviser to the Minister with regard to defence policy matters within the Department of Defence (DoD). The Chief of the SANDF, previously effectively in command of the DoD, became chiefly responsible for the efficient management, command and administration of the SANDF and its operations.

At the same time, the DoD came under increasing pressure to bring its policies in line with the Bill of Rights enshrined in the Constitution. Striking the balance between equality of rights and military effectiveness has not been easy, as the military became compelled to implement affirmative action policies and often by court judgements, to revise its policies and practices. In this regard, less due respect was given to the uniqueness of the military, and the impact this was to have on military effectiveness. The stresses and strains felt within the military emanating from these systemic forces – that is, "the transition away from the Cold War era, changes in the demographic composition of the forces and need to adapt to a new political, social and even moral reality" – is not unique to South Africa (Feaver, 2003, p. 4). Some believe that these changes have evoked renewed tension in civil–military relations, brought about by what has been termed the emergence of a civil–military gap. This study sets out to determine whether such a gap exits in South Africa by examining the responses of an elite group of young military

officers and civilian students on a range of security-related issues, and comparing this with contemporary debates in civil–military relations.

2. METHODOLOGY

This study forms a part of the larger European Research Group on Military and Society (Ergomas) project on the "Cultural Dimensions of Civil–military Relations in a Democratic Society". The study was conducted in three phases, the first comprising a literature review of relevant material in the field, the second in-depth interviews with specific target groups and third, the distribution of the Ergomas questionnaire to civilian students and military officers of comparable age and educational background.

2.1. Interviews

In-depth interviews were conducted with two senior SANDF military officers, one responsible for Corporate Communications and the other for external military operations; two journalists, one from a daily Afrikaans newspaper, the other from a weekly English newspaper; two politicians, a representative from the ruling African National Congress (ANC), the other from the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA); two anti-war/peace campaigners; and two military analysts, one working at a civilian university, the other employed by a leading non-governmental organisation involved in security research and capacity building in Africa. The interviewers were sensitive to the political, cultural and military backgrounds of the respective interviewees, as well as race and gender.

2.2. Questionnaires

The questionnaires were distributed to respondents during the period from July 2003 to March 2004. The military officers (hereafter officers) responding to the questionnaire were either in their first year of commission or final undergraduate or postgraduate year of study at the South African Military Academy. The civilian respondents were civilian students (hereafter students) attending the University of Stellenbosch, the University of the Western Cape, and the University of Cape Town[1] in the following academic departments, political science, law, economics and engineering. Only

persons who volunteered to take part in the study completed the questionnaires. A total of 226 questionnaires were handed out of which 36 questionnaires were incomplete and were discarded. A total of 190 questionnaires were processed.

2.3. Demographic Profile

The demographic profile of the sample is as follows. Of the 190 respondents, 127 were male (51 officers, 76 students) and 63 were female (10 officers, 53 students). Of these, 60 were black, 94 white, 29 coloured, and 3 Asian respondents, while 4 participants did not report their race group. The age of the respondents varied between 19 and 38 years. The mean age of respondents was 24 years. Of the respondents, 38.4% indicated that their father had served in the military, while 1.6% revealed that their mother had.

2.4. Data Analysis

The aim of this study was to determine if there were any differences in the opinions of students and officers on a range of civil–military relation issues. Most of the data were recorded on a 5-point scale. The fifth category 'don't know/not applicable' was discarded to enable the analysis of the data on an ordinal scale by means of a χ^2 test of significance. For statistical purposes, responses were often grouped to reflect either a positive, negative or neutral position, to enhance the validity of the test or interpretation of the frequencies. A two-tailed *t*-test was conducted with data recorded on a 10-point scale. A 5% level of significance was used. In the final interpretation of the data, the findings were discussed with reference to information obtained from the interviews and other secondary sources. The ultimate aim was to determine if there is a convergence in attitudes, values, perceptions, opinions and experiences of officers and students on the range of issues discussed, and whether with reference to the qualitative information obtained from the interviews and literature in the field if these "gaps" can be confirmed, and if so, what this means for civil–military relations and military effectiveness in South Africa.

2.5. Limitations

This study does not attempt to determine the impact of race, gender, age, year of study, whether the parents of the members had served in the military

or political disposition on civil–military relations. The survey deliberately focused on an elite group of military officers and civilian students and the results may not be indicative of the opinions of the rank and file of the military, or the broader population. In terms of race, a higher percentage of whites responded to this survey than represented in the broader population. The fact that most of the white respondents' parents served in the military could mean that the civil–military gap is wider than recorded.

3. FINDINGS

3.1. Personal Values and Attitudes

For any state, loyalty and selfless service are considered the most desirable qualities in individuals recruited into the military. The military profession requires all members to demonstrate high standards of patriotism, discipline, courage, and self-sacrifice in the course of their duties, and to demonstrate a responsibility to use their skill in the interests of society (Heinecken, 2001, p. 133). These values are influenced by a range of factors, such as the importance the individual attaches to these values, willingness to compromise and accept authority, religious and political inclinations and sense of identity.

The first set of questions dealt with the importance of certain qualities: discipline, responsibility, tolerance, patriotism, comradeship, orderliness, traditionalism, obedience, creativity, loyalty, spirit of equality, generosity, initiative, self-control, determination, open-mindedness and team spirit and so forth, in children's education. Of the 19 qualities listed, significant differences in opinion emerged between students and officers on eight characteristics. Officers felt far stronger that discipline ($p<0.05$), patriotism ($p<0.01$), comradeship ($p<0.01$), orderliness ($p<0.05$), traditionalism ($p<0.05$), obedience ($p<0.01$), initiative ($p<0.01$) and determination ($p<0.005$) are important in their children's education. Although not statistically significant, other characteristics such as loyalty, team spirit and honour were of greater importance to military officers than students. When the question was asked how important the above-mentioned qualities are for the military, there was very little difference between officers and students. Over 90% regarded discipline, responsibility, honesty and team spirit as very important for the military and over 80% obedience, loyalty, orderliness, honour, self-control, comradeship, orderliness and determination. Only on the value of obedience ($p<0.05$) and traditionalism ($p<0.05$) and

on the aspect of self-control by the military ($p < 0.05$) was there some variance in opinion. These findings concur with related questions. For example, 75% of officers compared to only 55.5% students ($p < 0.05$), held that "young people need firm discipline by their parents". As with the response to the value of "determination" in a child's education, officers felt more strongly that "people who don't get ahead just don't have enough willpower" ($p < 0.05$).

On issues that touch on individualism and willingness to make compromises, little differences in opinion emerged, students being a little less "willing to give into arguments" and "to change their minds when in an argument". However, more than three-quarters stated that they do not easily give into arguments or change their opinions. Most favoured consensus decision-making, but did not hesitate to disagree with the group or challenge the system. However, there was one marked, but obvious difference between officers and students, namely, that officers were significantly more ($p < 0.01$) prepared (42.6% versus 16%) to "always listen to their leaders".

On the whole, officers and students felt very similar on matters of religion. Most were religious, attending church regularly or at least once a month. In terms of religions denomination, most were of Christian faith and the only marked difference was that a greater percentage of officers listed some "other"[2] denomination as their religion. Similarly, there did not appear to be a mismatch in terms of political inclination, with only slightly more students indicating that their political inclination was centre to left than officers.

On the question of sources of information on the military, significant differences were observed. Television and newspapers were the main sources of information for everyone although significantly more officers obtained their information on the military from special military newspapers ($p < 0.00$), professional publications ($p < 0.00$) and other sources (such as information briefs/bulletins) ($p < 0.05$).

The fact that few students consulted these sources, could relate to the fact that significantly less ($p < 0.00$) students expressed an interest in security matters. Only 36.4% compared to 75.4% officers demonstrated a keen interest in security issues, with almost a fifth of students indicating little or no interest.

When asked how much confidence they had in various institutions on a scale from 1 to 10, officers held institutions of the state in high esteem, compared to students. The *t*-test results showed significantly higher levels of confidence in the President ($p < 0.01$) and the military's ability ($p < 0.001$)

than students and while not statistically significant, also in government and parliament. In terms of all the other institutions, the media, trade unions and political parties, the mean score for both were comparable.

When respondents were asked to rank their attachment to various persons or groups, no difference was found between officers and students. The factors that rated the highest in both instances were those closest to the individual themselves, namely family, oneself, friends and only thereafter, South Africa, professional colleagues, religious community, native city and far more removed, the world community and Europe.

3.2. Foreign and Security Policy

South Africa's foreign policy rests on four pillars: a commitment to human rights and democracy; respect for international law; a devotion to peace and arms control initiatives and regimes; and an emphasis on African concerns as well as regional and international economic co-operation. In accordance, the government is committed to uphold the United Nations' efforts towards general and complete disarmament, the reformation of the United Nations, and to a collective non-militaristic approach to security in the Southern African region. (Henwood, 1997) The emphasis from warfighting to sustaining peace, coupled with a general acceptance of new security thinking (i.e. the emergence of economic, political and environmental aspects of security) has also made the SANDF more prepared to participate in international peace missions and to negotiate and settle international disputes.

On South Africa's foreign policy objectives, when the responses to the following questions were combined into two categories, those who agree versus those who disagree, all concurred that preserving world peace (92.6%), the need to maintain the external security of the country (89.9%), combating world hunger (87.4%), improving the standard of living of other countries (86%) and fighting world terrorism (83.3%) are the most important foreign policy objectives. The only significant difference between students and officers was on the aspect of promoting and defending human rights. Officers regarded this as a far more important foreign policy objective than students ($p < 0.05$). On a range of other foreign policy issues, some variance of opinion was found, but none of the results were statistically significant. Once more, when the positive and negative responses were combined, more officers (71.9%) than students (60%) felt that "when force is used, military force rather than political goals should determine its application". On the question of whether "public opinion would not tolerate

large numbers of casualties in military operations'' all supported this contention. Officers were slightly less inclined to support the view that ''the country should not think so much in international terms, but concentrate more on our own national problems''. Both students and officers supported the view ''that national security depends more on international trade and a strong domestic economy than on military strength''. However, students were more inclined to agree that ''it is vital to enlist the cooperation of the UN in settling international disputes''.

When it came to identifying the most likely threats to South Africa's national security and the results were combined reflecting the most likely and most unlikely threats, the impact of organised crime (89.3%), international drug trafficking (88.8%), threat of mass immigration from foreign countries (88.0%), environmental problems like water contamination or air pollution (69.5%) and the threat of terrorism in the country (68.4%), armed conflict over the control of vital raw materials (61.6%) and the possibility of armed conflict between African countries (61.4%) were top priority. Despite the consensus on the level of importance of these threats, officers differed on their evaluation of some threats. For example, officers felt significantly stronger ($p < 0.01$) that mass immigration posed a threat and differed from students in terms of the likely threat of attack on computer networks ($p < 0.05$). Although neither officers nor students thought nuclear blackmail from developing countries a possibility, officers thought this more likely ($p < 0.05$) than students.

When asked, ''how much do you approve of the military being used for the following missions'', marked differences emerged between officers and students. All agreed that the military should defend the country and most approved of the military being used for peacekeeping, disaster relief and to fight terrorism. However, when it came to the missions that could entail the use of force, significant differences emerged. Officers were far more in favour of their involvement in peace enforcement ($p < 0.00$), combat missions ($p < 0.00$) and the need to combat mass immigration from foreign countries ($p < 0.01$).

The fact that there was strong support for the military being involved in a wide spectrum of missions, could explain why most supported an increase in the defence budget. Although officers felt significantly stronger that this was needed ($p < 0.001$), only 10.1% of students thought it should be lowered.

On the role of external involvement and control of international security organisations in foreign operations, all supported the need for a stronger UN and there was agreement that the UN should have more control over all member states. However, opinion was divided on the question of ''whether

the Security Council of the United Nations should be the only power to verify military actions against sovereign states" and if "NATO should have the freedom to intervene on its own initiative". The feeling was strongly against "the USA being allowed the freedom to intervene on its own initiative", and the same held true with respect to "the European Union's freedom to intervene on its own initiative".

3.3. The Military in Democracy

The White Paper on Defence, titled "Defence in Democracy" states that, "the SANDF shall conduct itself with honour and dignity, and shall abide by the provisions of the Bill of Fundamental Rights in its interaction with civil society". The following set of questions focused on civil control over the armed forces, the military's role in civil society, the importance of certain democratic principles, and whether these principles have been realised.

In South Africa, civil control over the armed forces is exercised through parliamentary defence committees, Minister of Defence and Defence Secretariat. Therefore, it is of interest to note the responses of officers and students to the question of "how knowledgeable they thought political leaders were about the modern military". Even though there was no significant difference between officers and students, the majority felt that politicians were only "somewhat knowledgeable" (35.9%), but mainly "somewhat ignorant" (44.2%) on military matters. Of interest, is that most (53.1%) felt that "political leaders do not share the same values as society".

On a number of salient points, officers differed significantly from students in terms of the military's involvement in politics. For example, 59.3% of officers compared to only 37.7% students ($p < 0.05$), felt strongly that "military members should not criticise the government" and also "not criticise parent society" ($p < 0.01$). Officers and students held almost opposite views on the issue of whether "military members should be allowed to express their political views like normal citizens". Most officers disagreed strongly (40.7%) with this statement, while 46.9% of students supported this view ($p < 0.001$). On the issue of whether "it is proper for the military to explain and defend in public the policies of government" the feelings were divided. There was greater support for the view (47.7%) that "the military should advocate military policies that it believes are in the best interest of the country". However, everyone supported the contention that the "military should not have any direct political influence in the society".

On the topic of individual rights, a number of interesting findings emerged. Although students (76.4%) felt slightly stronger than officers (66.1%), all supported the view that "respect for equality of rights, regarding gender, race and religion" and also basic "freedoms of individuals, such as the freedom of assembly, ideas, speech, press etc." (officers 72.9% versus students 84.6%) were very important. All agreed that "the need exists to safeguard individual opportunities and responsibilities" and that it is important to have "peaceful relationships with other societies around the world".

Both officers and students were synonymous in their view that the "subordination of the military to the political leadership" was important. Although there was general consensus on most principles, there were some salient differences. Officers felt far stronger that there is the need to "respect national laws, such as the Constitution" ($p<0.05$) and "to defend the societal system and the way of life of the country" ($p<0.00$). They also considered it very important that "the military should be integrated into parent society" ($p<0.01$). Most officers and students believed that these principles have been realised in South African society. Although not statistically significant, many felt that "respect for the basic national laws of the country" (60.8%) and "safeguarding of individual opportunities and responsibilities" (45.9%) could be better. The only aspect where there was marked difference in opinion was on the importance to "defend the societal system and way of life in the country" ($p<0.05$). Although all felt that this had been "rather realised" officers felt that it had, and students that it had not. On the question of whether "the military profession is subordinate to the political leadership" officers (52.7%) felt much stronger than students (32.5%) that this is the case. Yet, officers felt remarkably stronger (42.6% versus 25.2%) that "politicians need to give professional autonomy to the military". A considerable number of students disagreed with this statement.

Marked differences in opinion emerged on questions relating to the armed forces and societal values. Although there was consensus that "civilians and the military should share the same basic values", they differed significantly on the need for "the military should be representative of society in terms of social, ethnic groups and classes" ($p<0.05$). While officers felt strongly (46.3%) that this is necessary, only 26.1% of students held this view. On the statement "the military exists for the defence of the country and its interests" considerably more officers (87.7% versus 65%) strongly agreed with this ($p<0.01$). While not statistically significant, more officers than students (46.4% versus 29.5%) felt strongly that "the military job implies to guarantee a peaceful and free-trade international arena".

Concerning the status of the military and patriotic values, officers were more inclined to agree that "South Africans should always feel that his or her primary allegiance is to his/her own country" ($p<0.05$), that "the strongest indicator of good citizenship is performance of military service in defence of South Africa" ($p<0.001$) and that "the promotion of patriotism should be an important aim of citizenship education" ($p<0.01$). On the question of loyalty to the country, officers felt stronger than students that "all South Africans should be willing to fight for the country" ($p<0.001$) and that "loyalty for South Africa precedes loyalty to the rest of the world" ($p<0.01$). Understandably, officers were steadfast that "the most important role for the military is to conduct war" ($p<0.001$) and that "war is necessary to protect the national interest" ($p<0.001$). While not statistically significant, officers were also more supportive of the view (56.6% versus 23.5%) that "war is part of human nature". The only aspects where there was some agreement was on the softer issues, namely that "peacekeeping and other non-combat activities should be central to the military function" and even though officers felt more strongly (66% versus 46.6%), both agreed that "the military should be prepared to cover a wide spectrum of possible missions".

All agreed that "the level of information the media provides on military issues" is only somewhat good (37.3%), but mostly not very good (54.6%). Considerably, more officers felt the media depicted the military negatively ($p<0.01$). Both officers and students felt that the public opinion of the military was not very good. This concurs with the findings on "what image do you think the military profession has in the public eye in our country?". Most agreed that the professional image was neutral to somewhat negative. This possibly relates to the value the civilian students attached to the military as an institution. Although students did not think "the military should be abolished" or that "it is a necessary evil", they differed quite sharply from officers that the military is a very important part of public life ($p<0.001$).

Significant differences in opinion emerged on gender integration, specifically with regard to combat roles. Students (59.5%) were far more supportive than officers (39.2%) that women should be permitted to serve in combat roles on a voluntary basis ($p<0.05$). However, significantly more ($p<0.05$) students opposed women being compelled to serve in combat (47.1%) than officers (27.7%). Officers were more inclined to support the compulsory integration of women in non-combat roles (51.1%). In general, everyone supported women serving in the military, even in combat, although officers had some reservations. Officers felt significantly stronger

that pregnancy impacts negatively on the deployability of women ($p<0.05$). Although not statistically significant, they were also more concerned about the impact of women on small unit cohesion, abuse if taken prisoner, the impact of their death on male soldiers and the public, on privacy and also, but to a lesser extent on combat effectiveness. In no way did they perceive women to be a threat to their career in terms of them taking jobs away from men.

On the issue of national service, students were considerably less supportive of the statement that "all men should do some national service" ($p<0.001$). However, there was consensus that "women should not be compelled to do national service". Yet, when the question was asked whether "all women should do some national service" most disagreed that they should. The questions on conscription versus an all-volunteer force evoked diverse responses between officers and students. Significantly more officers thought, "the draft guarantees an exchange of values, opinions and perceptions between society and the military" ($p<0.001$). Contrary to students, officers disagreed somewhat that "an all-volunteer force fits the requirement for new missions better than conscription" ($p<0.01$). On the whole, both officers and students were "proud of the men and women who serve in the South African armed forces", although there was disagreement over whether the "SANDF was attracting high-quality motivated recruits" among students ($p<0.01$).

4. DISCUSSION

When an analysis is made of the findings on the three themes presented and compared with the qualitative data obtained from the interviews and available literature in the field, there are some areas where little variance occurs, and others where evidence points towards an evolving civil–military gap. In terms of personal values and attitudes, the DoD established a Workgroup on Organisational Culture to formulate a value system for military personnel that was acceptable to all and in line with national values as defined in the Constitution. The seven values identified in the Strategic Business Plan as guiding principles were patriotism, loyalty, human dignity, professionalism, integrity, leadership and accountability. Together with the Code of Conduct, these values serve as the guiding principles for members of the SANDF. This largely explains why officers placed considerably more emphasis on discipline, patriotism, comradeship, orderliness, traditionalism, obedience, initiative and determination in their children's education. Of

interest, is that students also valued these principles and agreed on their importance for the military, which points to a general acceptance of these values by society at large. Nonetheless, officers displayed a higher sense of commitment to traditional military values, as well as state institutions. Across the board, officers had more confidence in the abilities of the President the military's ability and also government and parliament.

The commitment to altruistic values is despite the evidence of growing individualism among the youth. Although officers were far more "prepared to listen to their leaders", than students, they are equally assertive in terms of their opinion. This implies that members want to be valued and respected as individuals and unqualified obedience to authority is on the wane. Given the diversity within the ranks of the SANDF, personnel are more likely to view events from different perspectives. Rationales such as "this is the way it is done" or the "colonel says" are less accepted in an environment where egalitarianism has become the norm. The fact that officers placed a much higher premium on the value of initiative supports the contention that they want more freedom in terms of decision-making.

Since the advent of democracy, South Africa's foreign, domestic and defence policies have been geared towards the commitment to peace and development in the Southern African region (Landsberg, 2000, p. 77f.). For the SANDF, the need to strengthen regional agreements and participation in peace missions is an extension of South Africa's foreign policy. In this regard, general consensus exists on generic goals, such as the need to preserve world peace, maintain the external security of the country, combating world hunger, improving the standard of living of other countries and fighting world terrorism. The only significant difference between students and officers was on the aspect of promoting and defending human rights. Officers regarded this a far more important foreign policy objective than students, possibly due to the fact that they have been made more aware of such violations in their education and training. As regards the most likely threats to South Africa, the main concerns were with non-military threats, namely the impact of organised crime, drug trafficking and the threat of mass immigration from foreign countries and to a lesser extent environmental concerns, terrorism, armed conflict over the control of vital raw materials and the possibility of armed conflict between African countries. Although there was general consensus on the level of importance of these threats, officers regarded mass immigration from foreign countries a higher priority. The fact that illegal immigration is a major concern and that the SANDF is extensively involved in borderline control could explain this. The first real divergence in views emerged on the use of the armed forces for

various missions. Students were far more in favour of the military being used in missions that did not involve the use of force, such as peacekeeping, disaster relief and to fight terrorism. In accordance with their profession, officers were significantly more in favour of peace-enforcement, combat missions and the need to control mass immigration. Although they were explicit that the military's role is to conduct war, this did not imply that they did not support the military's involvement in operations other than war, but that warfighting is the core business.

For students and for many of those interviewed, the concern was less with external security, and more with internal security threats such as crime, drug trafficking and disaster relief. Many hold the view that South Africa's security is best served by preventing internal conflict caused by high unemployment, poverty as well as ethnic and racial tensions, than by keeping peace in Africa.[3] However, government has taken a definite decision to remove the armed forces from these internal roles, and channel the available resources to external deployments in line with its foreign policy objectives. While the SANDF is capable of fulfilling these roles, it is overstretched in terms of manpower, equipment and resources to meet all these requirements (South African Institute of Race Relations, 2003, p. 458). Since 1990, South Africa's defence expenditure has declined by 57% in real terms. Most felt that the defence budget should be increased. A survey commissioned by the DoD among the broader populace confirmed this sentiment, but in the same breath, respondents stated that these funds are better spent on education, housing, health and job creation (South African Institute of Race Relations, 2003, p. 460). Thus, civil society wants the military to perform an array of tasks, but is not prepared to fund this at the expense of other national priorities.

Who decides on the defence priorities? In South Africa, civil control over the armed forces is exercised through parliamentary defence committees, the Minister of Defence and the Defence Secretariat. This process is entrenched in the Constitution and outlined in the Defence Act, 42 of 2002. As members of the SANDF pledge to respect the democratic political process and civil control of the SANDF, it is not surprising that they felt significantly stronger than students that "the military profession must be subordinate to the political leadership". Yet at the same time, they felt that "politicians need to give professional autonomy to the military". This reflects the tension that exists between the functions of the Secretary of Defence and that of the Chief of the Defence Force. According to the DA representative in Parliament, there is "tension between the Minister of Defence and Chief of the SANDF, specifically over the power, duties and areas of responsibility of

the Secretary of Defence and the Chief of the SANDF'' (Schmidt, 2003). The tension is not because officers do not accept civil supremacy, but due to the perception (among officers and civilians alike) that ''political leaders are not all that knowledgeable on military matters''. Across the spectrum, military officers, journalists, academics and politicians stated that politicians do not understand the challenges the SANDF has faced since 1994. Statements include, ''there are too much expectations and this is placing the military in an unfair position. The politicians think that when the military says it needs more time, they are stalling or unwilling. Politicians speak out before the military has been consulted and this is a source of great tension for commanders'' (Senior Military Officer, 2003). ''Politicians promise things that the military cannot deliver. They are over-enthusiastic about the abilities of the military'' (Malan, 2003). ''Politicians have no idea of the role of the military'' and show a ''lack of real interest in finding out what is going on'' (Journalist, 2003).

While the DoD holds regular information briefings with the Parliamentary Portfolio committees, to inform, advise and direct operations, there is an apparent lack of credible information to make informed decisions on military matters. Many express the view that the military should be more involved in constructive dialogue with civil society (Liebenberg, 2003). Although officers did not support the right of members ''to criticise government'', they supported the view that ''the military should advocate military policies that it believes are in the best interest of the country''. Restrictions on commanders to advocate the military in the media, clearly inhibits this.

For many in civil society the SANDF is a faceless organisation and it is apparent that the public needs more information on how the SANDF operates, on the challenges of transformation, the problems the SANDF faces, how the defence budget is spent and the operations the SANDF is involved in. According to Kent and Malan, the SANDF does not have a proactive public information strategy and has chosen to suppress information, rather than providing open and timely information on military matters (Kent & Malan, 2003, p. 9). Academics confirm that, ''there is not enough information on explaining the role and function of the military. People sit with snippets of information and there is no informed or mature debate on military issues'' (Liebenberg, 2003). Journalists and politicians support this. A military journalist, who chose to remain anonymous, felt that the military had become ''isolated from society and that in order to bridge the gap, the military should raise its profile, be accountable, be transparent and increase communication with the media''. Mr David Dlali, member of the ruling

ANC, claims that "the military is not well understood by civil-society and this should be blamed on both the public representatives (members of parliament) and the communications sections of the military" (Dlali, 2003). Erica Gibson (2003) is of the opinion that the restrictions placed on the SANDF by the Minister of Defence on communication with the media, has "hampered the flow of information to the press".[4] The fact that the SANDF has no proactive public information strategy, has meant that media attention has focused on sensational issues, sex scandals, racial tensions, the conflict with the trade unions and disciplinary problems, rather than the positive contribution the SANDF is making. Therefore, it is not surprising that officers considered the media critical of the military, that public opinion of the military was not very good and that the public viewed their profession negatively. This invariably affects morale, recruitment and retention.

With the emphasis placed on the respect for the law and equality of rights it is not surprising that officers felt significantly stronger that the military should represent all members of society irrespective of ethnic, social groups or class. To some extent this is also reflected in their attitude towards gender integration. Although there was consensus that women should be permitted to serve in the military, there was some tension over their impact on military effectiveness. There is no doubt a degree of tension over the need to accommodate individual freedoms (Heinecken, 1998) as reflected in the responses of officers to full gender integration, freedom of expression, equality before the law and freedom of association. This tension is sure to increase with the rise in individualism and lower tolerance for frustration, within the context of a growing rights-based culture. Many believe the "correct balance between these democratic rights and the need to maintain the effectiveness of the forces has still not been reached" (Senior Military Officer, 2003).

In conclusion, it is apparent that students do not attach the same value to military service as officers. They were nowhere near as patriotic, loyal to the country or prepared to serve in the military out of national security concerns. Few students "felt that good citizenship means serving in the military" and these views are supported in terms of their attitude towards conscription. Nonetheless, most were proud of those who serve in the South African armed forces, although they did not think the SANDF was attracting the best recruits. These attitudes are symptomatic of a growing apathy towards the military, brought about by the absence of any direct threat, contact and information on the military. The wider the civil–military gap, the more problematic this becomes for civil–military relations in a democracy.

5. CONCLUSIONS

What does this mean in terms of the civil–military gap in South Africa? In terms of personal values and attitudes, the gap that exists in terms of the value placed on certain principles is both healthy and respected by broader society. This implies that recruits can more readily be socialised into accepting military norms and practices. However, the fact that officers placed a higher value on initiative, but were equally assertive in their views, indicates a desire to be respected as individuals in terms of their opinions. To some extent this is antithetical to traditional military norms and may pose a challenge to the highly structured authority relations in time to come.

The first gap exists in terms of what the military is trained for, what civil society wants from the military and what the politicians regard as national and foreign policy priorities. With fewer people having any direct contact with the military, this could place a strain on civil–military relations. The military is unlikely to gain public support for resources, if its needs are unknown and where the service it renders to society is not valued and supported by broader society.

Where insufficient credible information is available to the public, it places an even greater obligation on those responsible to communicate this. Restrictions on freedom of speech, media relations and academic freedom undermines this, and could lead to a situation of distrust and mis-understanding between the military, political leaders and society. Bland asks the question "how are ministers to control the armed forces when they (usually) lack the necessary knowledge and experience to do so effectively?" (Bland, 1999, p. 13). In this regard, definite tension exists between politicians and commanders (Malan, 2003) and this could increase if the level of understanding of the military declines.

In South Africa, the civil–military gap is predominantly a knowledge gap, rather than a cultural gap, based on a lack of critical debate and growing apathy towards the military. The wider this gap, the more strain this will place on civil supremacy and on the military to conform to civilian values. Faced with a growing right-based culture, it is up to the military to make known its unique institutional requirements and "need to be different", but without the support and understanding of politicians, this is unlikely. Whether the current civil–military gap is dysfunctional, or cause for concern, is subject to further research and debate. Some unease certainly exists.

NOTES

1. The three universities were chosen for different historic reasons. While all the universities are now fully racially integrated, the University of Cape Town is a historically white English university. The University of Stellenbosch is historically white Afrikaans and also houses the Faculty of Military Science of the South African Military Academy. The University of the Western Cape is historically black. All three universities are located in the Western Cape.

2. When religion was correlated by race, up to 40% of black officers indicated their religions denomination as other. Many belong to the African Indigenous churches, which is a conglomerate of all churches that were started by indigenous people, integrating Christian faith with traditional beliefs.

3. Interviews with a range of opinion makers indicate that while most acknowledge the importance of peace operations in Africa, that the scarce resources should rather be spent on dealing with domestic security concerns.

4. Military journalists, military officers and military scientists all stated that the tensions with the media are worse now than ever before and that the military there is a dire need for a more open, critical debate on military issues which can only occur with a more free flow of information. The fact that there has been no media briefings for almost 2 years has added to this growing "information gap" on military affairs.

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SPAIN: AN EQUATION WITH DIFFICULT SOLUTIONS

Rafael Martínez and Antonio M. Díaz

1. INTRODUCTION

Contemporary relations between the military and society in Spain can be traced back to the civil war period. Following 3 years of cruel, fratricidal combat, the victory of the insurgent troops led to the Spanish republic being converted into a totalitarian regime headed by Franco. The dictatorship of Franco was not a military dictatorship, but rather the dictatorship of a military man who built up a triangular structure of power at the apex of which he felt protected and from which he controlled society from all angles: the army, the church and the single fascist party FET-JONS.[1] Throughout almost 40 years of a totalitarian regime, millions of Spanish men spent a period of their lives as conscripts in military service under the orders of a fascist military and under the influence of an oppressive political power. The death of the dictator, in 1975, marked the start of the transition to democracy that represented a break with the stigmas of the past and, for the first time in Spanish history, ushered in a period of peaceful coexistence for the entire population. In the military domain, the reforms initiated by General Gutiérrez Mellado – the first Vice-President of the Government of Adolfo Suárez – are worthy of mention. It was through these that efforts were made to modernise the Armed Forces (hereafter AF) in Spain by distancing them

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from political power, transforming them into a military force administered to serve political structures, and reducing their size to a more coherent one in relation to the needs and threats of a democratic state surrounded by its partners in the same economic community. However, among the military, a small but still powerful nucleus existed, whose rejection of democracy and whose nostalgia for the Franco dictatorship led to a failed attempt at a coup d'état in 1981.

Following the consolidation of the democratic process and having been accepted as full members of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1986, Spanish democracy faced multiple challenges, one of which, due to the nature of past relations between the AF and civil society, was that of constructing fruitful and fluid relations between civil society and the military. The social status of Spanish military personnel was not well considered. As a profession, it had lost a great deal of prestige. Anti-military sentiment was increasingly present in the minds of many citizens and made itself felt with greater force and less fear. The very large presence of North American bases and troops on Spanish soil, and the accompanying feeling that national sovereignty had been violated, did nothing to appease that tendency. Civilian society identified the army with the Franco era and to move beyond that perception would require a great deal of very patient activity. The extraordinary extent to which conscientious objection gained ground in Spain is of great relevance to what has been said. Faced with the exponential increase in conscientious objectors, the political classes were unable to come up with a satisfactory consensus and embarked upon a hasty electoral race to reduce the length of military service right up until its eradication at the end of the last century. However, that measure, far from oiling the relations between civil society and the military, led to a dramatic cooling-off period and a new problem for the government: the extreme difficulty of finding volunteer soldiers. Since the end of the 1990s, successive Spanish governments, quite logically, have not failed to define their own defence policy within which figure objectives imposed by military policy: to participate actively in the decision-making of international defence organisations, as well as in the international peace missions they sponsor. Furthermore, given the rift between the AF and society at large, there is a perceived need to promote awareness of defence-related issues among citizens.

Two events were to be crucial in the normalisation of civilian attitudes towards security and defence policies. On the one hand, the electoral victory of the socialists during the 1980s, which as one of the central planks of its campaign had the aim of withdrawing from NATO. However, following Spain's entry into the EEC in 1986, the government called a referendum in

which the government's position was the defence of a 'Yes to continued membership'. The government spokesperson in those days, Javier Solana Madariaga, subsequently Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1995, was later named Secretary General of NATO. Once his mandate came to an end, the European Union (EU), wishing to benefit further from his experience as well as his talents at achieving general consensus among Spain's European partners, appointed him EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, a post that he still holds to this day. On the other hand, the Spanish AF were increasingly deployed on peacekeeping missions in Latin America, Africa, the Balkans, Afghanistan, etc. They also collaborated in disaster relief missions at an international and national level. The presence of a Spanish politician in a key post for European and world security has meant defence policy is more readily perceived as a democratic reality that is necessary and far removed from fascist overtones. For its part, the new missions upon which the army has embarked have given them a great deal of social prestige (Table 1). However, that substantial improvement in public opinion polls contrasts with the pejorative opinion that the military believes society harbours towards it (Table 2).

Today, the officers of the future are citizens with impeccable democratic credentials and an undeniable acceptance of the supremacy of political power. The Spanish AF have modernised and are comparable with those of their European partners, as shown by their faultless incorporation into successive EU projects and military missions. Moreover, society is increasingly aware of the need for a solid defence policy. However, there is still a lot

Table 1. The Professionalism of Military Training as Rated by Public Opinion (in per cent).

	1986	1987[a]	1989	1997	1998	1999	2000
Very professional	4		6.2	4.1	5.6	5.3	8.6
Quite professional	33	37[b]	45.3	40.4	41.3	45.1	48.1
Somewhat professional	38	47[c]	25.5	32.0	28.0	25.0	19.6
Not at all professional	9		3.3	5.0	3.9	3.3	2.9
Don't know/no response	16	16	19.7	18.5	21.2	21.3	20.9

Source: Studies 1518, 1784, 2234, 2277, 2317 and 2379 of the Centre for Sociological Research (CIS)[2] (authors' own presentation).

[a]"Report "The social image of defence for young people". Research Unit of the Technical Secretary of Spanish Ministry of Defence".

[b]Percentage corresponding to 'very and quite professional'.

[c]Percentage corresponding to 'somewhat or not at all professional'.

Table 2. Thinking of the Future Role of the Army – which of the following Opinions seem to you to be held by the Majority in Society? (in per cent).

Future Possibilities	Public Opinion 1997[a]	Public Opinion 1998[b]	Public Opinion 1999[c]	Public Opinion Media	Officer Cadets' Public Opinion 2001[d]
Will continue to be necessary for defence	46.3	50.0	47.8	48.0	26.1
Will disappear in the short- or medium term	9.2	7.5	7.3	8.0	9.9
Will be committed to intervening solely in humanitarian disasters	24.6	21.7	24.9	23.7	49.2
Will form part of an international police force	9.7	9.7	10.2	9.9	12.1
Don't know/no response	10.3	11.2	9.7	10.4	2.7

[a]CIS Study 2234.
[b]CIS Study 2277.
[c]CIS Study 2317.
[d]CIS Study 98/14 IUGGM.[3]

of ground to be covered in Spain before a relationship built on mutual trust between civil society and the military is reached.

All that has gone before justifies the cryptic title of this article. Before analysing the data in the surveys, our starting point is the hypothesis that the future elites will reveal two different faces, like the Roman God of Spanish culture, Janus. We think that this brief historical outline describes citizens who undoubtedly perceive the threats to security. They therefore understand the need to articulate security and defence policies and to do so within the framework of the EU, as part of a common European security and defence policy. However, at the same time, the dying embers of the Franco era smoulder on which leaves the Spanish more inclined to consider the abolishment of the military as a strategy by no means utopian. But, to complete the square of the circle, the Spanish value more highly than ever the latest missions upon which Spanish troops have embarked: the modern concept of the AF's peacekeeping role. It is out of this paradox that our

perhaps unsolvable equation arises:



As regards the design of the ‘cultural gap’ research in which we are not participating due to our late incorporation, the situation in Spain presented methodological problems which were thought necessary to solve by looking carefully at the make up of the agreed sample. Therefore, as regards the students, given the supposedly deep-seated bias within the so-called ‘historic’ autonomous communities (Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia) it was thought convenient to increase the number of universities to be surveyed and not to limit ourselves to the analysis of data from the University of Barcelona, as had initially been foreseen. Alongside its economic landscape, substantially better off than that of many other Spanish regions, we suspected that for many Catalan university students the questions on the Spanish army might in some cases be taken as questions referring to an army of occupation. What is more, at the time Spain was governed by the Partido Popular, the sense of confrontation between that party and the other political forces in the Catalan parliament was intense. It was feared that along with the traditional rejection of the army the idea of centrally held power might result in a bias that would undermine the scientific nature of the results. For that reason, it was decided to conduct surveys, of an identical size and on identical university courses, among students at the University of Granada, the University of Burgos and the Rey Juan Carlos University of Madrid. The first university gave us access to students from Andalucia, densely populated with a low per capita income, in which the left has always governed although the presence of conservatives in the provincial capitals is high. Its belonging to Spain is not a contentious issue and it has a significant presence of barracks and military academies. Burgos fits the profile of an autonomous community, Castile and Leon, proud of being Spanish, with a strong conservative and military tradition. Madrid marks an ideologically balanced area between the left and the right, the paradigm of centralism and in which the nerve centres of defence are located.

It was decided to create a common database with the results from the two Universities of Barcelona and Granada, on the understanding that merging the data from the two groups would balance the bias that might arise in each individual case. Data from Burgos and Madrid would be used as a control mechanism, fundamentally for the – few – cases where a great discrepancy might arise between Granada and Barcelona. The final results demonstrated that our suspicions were, to an extent, unfounded, since in their responses to the majority of the questions, the opinions of students from all four universities differed in intensity, but not insofar as their tendencies were concerned. Moreover, in the course of a study recently carried out by the authors in all of the Spanish military academies, important differences were shown to exist on particular topics between the Army, Navy, or Air Force officer cadets at their respective academies. For that reason, it was decided that the questionnaire should be sent to the three principal academies for future officers: the Academia General Militar del Ejército de Tierra for the army in Zaragoza, the Academia General Naval en Marín for the Navy in Pontevedra, and the Academia General del Aire for the Air Force in San Javier (Murcia). It was also thought useful to breakdown responses under the particular branch of the AF to assess any nuances and/or relevant differences.

As for the rest, the survey in Spain followed the methodology adopted for the research. Students studying Law, Economics and Political Science[4] were interviewed, of whom approximately half were students in the first cycle of their studies (43% of the total were in their first year of a 5-year Licenciatura) and the other half in the second cycle[5] (37% of the total were students in their fifth year). As regards the officer cadets, interviews were held with identical numbers from the three branches of the AF, exactly half were in their first year and the other half in their fifth year. On a further point, the initial demographic profile shows up the gender imbalance in the military: 92% men and 8% women. However, this imbalance is all the more relevant because for many years now women have made up the majority of students in Spanish universities as is shown by our data: 40% men, 60% women.

2. VALUES AND PERSONAL ATTITUDES

2.1. Personal Values, Religion, Inglehart Scale

The first question that arises on examining the data is the enormous coincidence in the choice of values between university students and officer

Table 3. Top 10 Values for Children and for the Military.

Values for the Education of our Children		Values for the Military	
Students' opinion[a]	Officer cadets' opinion[a]	Students' opinion[a]	Officer cadets' opinion[a]
Responsibility	Responsibility	Discipline	Discipline
Tolerance	Honesty	Loyalty	Patriotism
Honesty	Comradeship	Responsibility	Honour
Open-mindedness	Tolerance	Orderliness	Comradeship
Spirit of equality	Honour	Obedience	Loyalty
Comradeship	Loyalty	Patriotism	Responsibility
Generosity	Open-mindedness	Honour	Obedience
Initiative	Spirit of equality	Team spirit	Team spirit
Team spirit	Team spirit	Comradeship	Self-control
Creativity	Creativity	Self-control	Orderliness

[a]The table has been drawn up by calculating only those responses that rank the value as very important.

cadets that they hope to instil in their children (Table 3). They are also in close agreement when specifying the qualities that they believe to be the most important in the military. These two coinciding results also imply that both groups believe that the values of civilian society and the military, in line with theories advanced by Huntington, are and should remain different. In relation to their children, only a subtle difference may be seen in the importance given by some interviewees to tolerance and to comradeship. The former is of great importance to university students and it is ranked in fifth place by the cadet officers, in the list of values they would wish their children to have. The opposite occurs in relation to comradeship as this is given greater importance by the cadet officers. In this case, it is also accorded great importance as a quality by the military themselves.

There are three values that university students and cadets wish to instil in their children and which they also understand to be important in the military: responsibility, honesty and comradeship. On the other hand, honour and loyalty are two values that only the officer cadets wish to instil in their children while believing at the same time that they are vital for their profession. Generosity and initiative only appear among the top 10 values that university students wish to pass on to their children. However, we cannot analyse them in terms of a difference between civilians and the military because the cadet officers rank them in 11th and 12th place with percentages similar to creativity, which they rank in 10th place.

As has been pointed out, the relation between the 10 qualities that the civilian students and military trainees consider as the principal values for military personnel is identical. Officer cadets and university students make reference to the same values and only slight differences are found with regard to the importance of their place in ranking. Thus, the cadets place patriotism, honour and comradeship as the second, third and fourth of their values and the university students let those values drop to sixth, seventh and ninth place. On the contrary, the university students expect that responsibility – which is the first quality they wish their children to have – and honesty will be crucial for military personnel (they place them in third and fourth place), whereas, the military, even though they place those among the top 10, do not attribute so much relevance to them (sixth and tenth place). There again, open-mindedness, creativity, tolerance and a spirit of equality are values that the civilian students and the military believe to be fundamental in the education of their children, but which they do not consider to be important as military values. Among the future civilian elites the same thing occurs with generosity. On the contrary, both groups are in agreement that discipline, patriotism, honesty, obedience and traditionalism – in both cases, 11th in the ranking at hardly any distance from 10th place – are important values in military personnel and are irrelevant for the education of their siblings.

Clearly, there is an enormous coincidence of views between military and civilian students as regards what they understand are the principal values they wish their children to have and the values they expect to find in military personnel and, more subtly, the military attributes five values to both themselves and their children. This coincidence is also present in the divergence of values and qualities that define, according to their criteria, both worlds. In contrast, however, 65% of university students think that civilians and the military should share the same basic values and half of them think that the military should be representative of the parent society with regard to social and ethnic groups and classes. That is to say, the future civilian elites describe a reality that is close to both different worlds – the civilian and military ones – and necessarily different to that related by Huntington, while they make evident their desire, in line with Janowitz, that both worlds converge to the benefit of the political system. The response of the officer cadets is identical; eight out of ten believe that civilians and the military should share the same basic values; but half do not believe that the path to understanding in civil–military relations implies that the AF be turned into a mirror of ethnic and cultural diversity. This paradox or social hypocrisy is plain. Some, when asked in general terms about the convenience or

otherwise of sharing values, are undoubtedly inclined towards a convergence of both worlds. Everybody is a citizen of the same society and has, therefore, to share social values. However, when pushing them to move from broader to more specific premises – far from following Janowitz's proposals – the future Spanish elites do not wish the two worlds to share the same values. This amounts to saying that, in theory, they follow Janowitz; and they put the theories of Huntington into practice.

As regards religion, the processes of secularisation and laicisation that have been developing in Spain over the last 30 years are very clearly laid bare among the university students, in such a way that 41% declare themselves to be non-religious and, even if half of those interviewed declare themselves to be Catholic, 32% of the total affirm that: "I am religious, but I attend religious services only for the biggest religious festivals". Among the officer cadets, the process is not as visible since 80% of them state that they are Catholic, even though half of these – 40% of the total number of officer cadets – only attend church on important religious festivals and 26% attend the Sunday service, and 18% declare that they are not religious. The secular dynamic experienced by the officer cadets is a very similar process to that experienced by the Spanish who coincide ideologically with them; they retain their identity as Catholics, but with limited liturgical involvement. It is almost certainly necessary to distinguish between the religiosity of military personnel and the religiosity of the military as an institution. The reason is that while the officer cadets display a progressive and intense process of secularisation, the institution continues to keep particular liturgical rites alive in ceremonies that are part of military life. It is probable that a wish not to stand out in the crowd is behind the high number of non-practicing Catholics in the AF.

As regards ranking one's own ideological orientation, it should be noted that, as shown in Graph 1, the two curves reflecting the answers of the university students and the officer cadets are very different. The officer cadets' curve is unimodal with mode values of 6 and 7 and a mean value of 6.6; 40% place themselves in the centre and 52% define themselves as centre-right, which is to say that nine out of ten position themselves between 5 and 8.

Also of note is the significant descent in the extreme right that has fallen from 12% to 1%, in only 5 years. The university students' curve is bimodal, with one principal mode in position three and its second significant peak lies at a value of 7.50% of the respondents position themselves left-of-centre, while more or less 20% place themselves in the centre and as many others, right-of-centre. This is to say that the mean of 4.37[6] very faithfully reflects the traditional ideological position of Spanish society; but the existence of



Graph 1. Ideological Orientation (in Per cent).

two modes also explicitly reflects the importance the centre right has had and continues to have in Spain.

Faced with the exchange of different points of view, essential in any democratic society, some define themselves as moderates, convinced of their ideas and ready to enter into dialogue. In fact, only 20% declare that they have firm positions whereas, seven out of ten respondents believe their opinions to be moderate. The strength of their convictions is revealed by the difficulty they say they have in changing their opinion. Eighty-eight per cent of cadet officers and 77% of university students affirm that it is difficult to make them change their point of view. There again, they do not have any problems, in the context of a discussion, in accepting other points of view (48% of officer cadets and 56% of university students). This tolerant attitude in a dialogue is a little more pronounced among university students (30% of them say they have difficulties in accepting other points of view, compared to 42% among cadets). Some are in favour of consensus (nine out of ten), but that does not stop them, should the need arise, contradicting the group feeling (six out of 10), without going so far as to attack the system because of it. Nevertheless, the officer cadet shows a greater commitment to institutions since 83% are against the possibility of attacking the system, while 60% of university students (20% less) affirm that they do not find that possibility an appealing one. In line with this support for institutions, 83%

of officer cadets affirm that they always listen to their leaders, against 43% of university students who also do, and 42% who do not.

In relation to the Inglehart scale, of the four possibilities on offer, both the university students as well as the officer cadets show a clear majority tendency in favour of one area (Table 4). Thus, whereas the university students opt for a more participative society, an 'inclusive society', as proposed by Dahl, the officer cadets, with similar intensity, believe that in the next 10 years the government should centre its efforts on maintaining order.

Given the priorities established by each collective, it is not surprising that 61% of the officer cadets believe that what young people need most of all is firm discipline from their parents, whereas only 31% of the university students agree with this idea. But that belief coupled with the affirmation that they always listen to their leaders does not mean that 'a few strong leaders could make this country better than all the laws and talk' since 67% of officer cadets reject that statement. Evidently, the university students who have claimed that public participation is an objective reject it in greater force, by a total of 83%. Intervention in the economy, referred to as the fight against increasing prices was not considered a relevant government objective by either the university students or the officer cadets. Although the response is identical, there is a basic underlying difference; the officer cadets believe that the secret of success lies in personal effort, because of which they (63%) state, "most people who don't get ahead just don't have enough will power". The university students are split almost down the middle by this idea (43%

Table 4. Most Important Goal of our Government in Domestic Policy (in per cent).

	First Choice	Second Choice	Mean
University students			
Giving the people more say in important government decisions	58	24	41
Maintaining order in the nation	19	26	22
Protecting freedom of speech	10	34	22
Fighting rising Prices	11	17	14
Officer Cadets			
Maintaining order in the nation	64	17	40
Giving the people more say in important government decisions	14	33	23
Fighting rising prices	9	29	19
Protecting freedom of speech	11	19	15

in favour and 52% against). Equally, both groups considered the protection of fundamental civil rights, such as liberty of expression, as being of little importance in the immediate future. We believe that this is because it has been fully consolidated as an objective in Spain. However, as regards the right to protect your honour and your image and the way that this might impact on liberty of expression, a notable unwillingness to enter the fray is revealed by three quarters of all the university students when they state that "an insult to your personal honour should be forgotten". By contrast, half of the officer cadets believe that it should not be forgotten. It should be remembered that this greater need to protect their honour is closely linked to the fact that honour is one of the principal qualities that they desire for themselves as well as for their children.

2.2. Sources of Information

Both groups surveyed concur that their main sources of information on security matters are the traditional sources: the press, and the news on the television as well as the radio (Table 5). It is also of note that new tools such as the internet are not so well assimilated in the context of military training.

2.3. Interest in Security Problems

University students display a keen interest in matters relating to security. Fourteen per cent consider they are very interested and 45% quite interested; that is, 59% of the sample group. Due to the fieldwork having been carried out after the terrorist attacks of 11 March (11-M) in Madrid when, in addition to the news on what had happened the media also carried out an exhaustive follow up of arrests and details of the terrorists' plans, it is possible that the students' responses were not only prompted by their interest in security matters from a more general point of view, but also by their concern for security. As regards those interviewed in the military academies, as might be expected, they affirm their interest in these matters (80%).

2.4. Confidence in Institutions

The assessment of institutions made by officer cadets and university students is substantially different (Table 6). Both of them coincide, nevertheless, in

Table 5. How Important are the following Sources of Information on Military Matters to You? (in per cent).

	University Students		Military	
	Important	Position	Important	Position
Newspapers	80	1	79	1
Television network news	74	2	71	2
Radio news	64	3	62	3
General news newspapers	64	4	61	4
General news magazines	33	7	39	7
Special military newspapers or magazines	29	8	54	8
Movies	38	6	20	9
Military trade/professional publications	21	10	58	5
Internet	28	9	55	6
Other	53	5	24	10

expressing a high level of confidence in universities, NGOs and the police. From this threesome, the officer cadets' assessment of NGOs and the university students' of the police appear a little clichéd. Both institutions are positively evaluated by them and, at the same time, they recognise their lack of knowledge of that institution that they have nevertheless rated so highly. This profound ignorance linked to a high level of confidence smacks of being a little too 'politically correct'. One diametrically opposed supposition is the rating given by the university students to the AF or the officer cadets' rating of trade unions. In both cases, they state their lack of knowledge of the institutions; but that is no obstacle to their being among the ones, which inspire least confidence. Prior judgement has not acted here in the institution's favour but rather to its prejudice. One possible explanation of why, despite such unawareness of the agencies responsible for security (the Ministry of the Interior, the Police, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the AF), some of them generate a great deal of confidence and others do not, could well be that the perceived threat to internal security is felt much more keenly and that creates a feeling of being closer to those responsible for fighting it. Another reason, more to do with Spanish internal affairs, is that the university students' response might be because they perceive and therefore evaluate the security forces' role in the transition to democracy in a more positive light than that of the AF.

When the institutions rated are grouped by sector, it is clear that the officer cadets and the university students each express their confidence in a different way. The officer cadet has confidence first and foremost in the

Table 6. How Much Confidence and Knowledge do you have in each of these Institutions?

Confidence				Knowledge			
Officer cadets	Mean[a]		University students	Officer cadets	Mean[a]		University students
The military	6.29	6.49	Universities	Universities	7.11	7.61	Universities
The police	6.16	6.46	Voluntary organisations	The church	6.97	7.29	Media
Universities	6.00	6.31	Parliament	The military	6.83	6.49	Government
Voluntary organisations	5.78	5.56	The police	Media	6.53	6.46	President
Justice	5.63	5.55	President	The police	6.40	6.45	Political parties
Parliament	5.58	5.50	Government	Political parties	6.30	6.38	The church
Government	4.80	5.48	Justice	Government	6.22	6.28	Parliament
Banks	4.70	5.06	Trade unions	President	6.09	6.10	Justice
President	4.67	4.99	Political parties	Justice	5.94	5.97	Voluntary organisations
The church	4.52	4.70	Media	Parliament	5.90	5.82	Trade unions
Companies	4.42	4.65	The military	Voluntary organisations	5.68	5.82	The police
Media	3.99	4.46	Banks	Trade unions	5.13	5.28	Banks
Trade unions	3.92	4.27	Companies	Companies	5.11	5.12	Companies
Political parties	3.83	3.12	The church	Banks	4.94	4.80	The military

[a]A scale from 1 to 10 is used, in which 1 means no confidence/knowledge at all and 10 means complete confidence/knowledge.

security and defence institutions; in second place in the organisations that are closest to society (universities and NGOs; but not the Church); in third place the basic institutions that are representative of the three powers of the state; penultimately, in those related to the economy together with the Church; and, finally, the basic actors within the political system, those that have to put society in contact with the Eastern European 'black box' (political parties, trade unions and the media). It is equally noteworthy that the government and its president, as well as the Church, economic agents and politicians all fail to reach the grade as regards their marks for confidence. The lack of knowledge, already pointed out, regarding trade unions and NGOs is comparable to that of the economic agents and parliament, the government, its president and the judicial system. Institutional as well as economic agents are assessed, insofar as confidence is concerned, with a logic that is very close to their level of knowledge. On the other hand, two of the main political actors in the Spanish political system, the mass media and political parties, are well known; but that is not enough in itself for them to inspire confidence. The university students display a very different ranking for confidence from that of the officer cadets, in which the position of the AF may be highlighted towards the bottom of the scale with less than five points, political agents are given a better ranking, in third place, although also on a scale less than five points and the last positions are conferred to the Church and the economic institutions. It implies that the university students have much more confidence in the university and NGOs and institutions that represent legislative and judicial power. The degree of knowledge, with the exception of the police that has already been mentioned, is in line with the degree of knowledge of each institution. Those related to security and the economy are the least familiar. Finally, the paucity of confidence in the Church merits comment despite it being one of the institutions that the university students admit to knowing.

2.5. Global or Local

Both groups have placed, as is usually the case, their closest and most intimate social circle in first place: the family, friends and oneself. Equally, the world community has been relegated to the penultimate position accompanied in the queue by your religious community. The most relevant information appears in the intermediary values, above all regarding the position and the assessment of Spain and of their autonomous community. For the officer cadets, after the intimate social circle comes identification

with the country, before that of their region or their city, a fact that reveals the high degree of institutional commitment. Even their autonomous community, in a state in which multinationality is a constant subject of political debate, comes behind Europe. In contrast, the university students place the autonomous community and their city ahead of Spain; a fact that, on the contrary, implies a great indifference towards their country.

It is to be mentioned that in Spain there exist among the autonomous communities, those termed the historic communities, such as Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia, in which a significant number of citizens with a subjective national identity that is separate to the Spanish national identity live; they feel specially or exclusively Catalan, Galician or Basque. By the same token, citizens of Castile usually identify subjectively in a special way with Spain as a nation. Finally, citizens from the rest of the country; that is to say, the majority of the Spanish has developed a dual subjective national identity: they feel as much attached to their autonomous community (Aragón, Andalucía, etc.) as to Spain. For this reason, the question was modified in relation to the questionnaire used across Europe. In view of the fact that the final result for the university students could be very biased due to the Catalan students it was decided to extract their results separately.

The final result of the disaggregated results shows that identification with Spain, as was expected, grows among the students from Granada and even more so in the case of the students from Castile and Leon and from Madrid (6.28 for Catalan students, 7.32 for those from Granada and 7.98 for those from Burgos, roughly similar to those from Madrid). On the contrary, identification with their autonomous community follows an identical but decreasing pattern (7.24 for Catalan students, 6.68 for students from Granada and 6.31 for those from Burgos as well as from the capital, Madrid). In short, the idea reflected in Table 7, that the university students identify very strongly with their autonomous community and that Spain is much less relevant for them is a bias controlled by the subjective identification with Catalonia as a nation. With the aim of finding a happy medium that corresponds to the average profile of the Spanish university students and that is not severely biased by Catalan nationalists or Spanish nationalists from Burgos or Madrid, we have chosen as valid the data corresponding to the final average for the students from the four universities that were analysed. In this way, identification with Spain stands at 7.19 which repositions it at a very similar point to that of the officer cadets although at a much lesser degree of intensity; that is to say, the university student does identify with Spain, but is a long way off from feeling the same sort of patriotism as the officer cadet. Overall, identification with Spain stands at 6.74, which is a

Table 7. How much Attachment do you feel to each of these Persons and Groups?

Attachment to...			
Officer Cadets	Mean		University Students
Your family	9.00	8.95	Your family
Yourself	8.74	8.58	Your friends
Your friends	8.68	8.49	Yourself
Spain	8.67	7.43	Your profession, your colleagues
Your profession, your colleagues	8.07	7.03	Natural environment
Natural environment	6.82	6.96	My region
Your native city	6.63	6.85	Your native city
Europe	6.31	6.80	Spain
My region	6.29	6.76	Europe
Your religious community	4.90	5.77	World community
World community	4.69	3.38	Your religious community

value that leaves identification with the country behind that of the respondents' city of origin, comparable to Europe and above the officer cadets' identification with their regions. The immense majority of cadets come from autonomous communities in which the Spanish (INS)[7] predominates.

3. FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY

As we have seen, the future Spanish elites keep up a keen interest in security and defence policies. What is more, though, the university students as well as the officer cadets, accord greater importance to international than national policy. In fact, 67% are against the statement ''We shouldn't think so much in international terms but concentrate more on our own national problems''. This coincidence of views is maintained (Table 8) when defining the most probable threats to security: terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), conflicts over oil, organised crime, drug trafficking and conflict in the Middle East. In all of these cases, over half of those interviewed consider those threats as likely. However, these similarities are divided by two significant issues. For the officer cadets, mass immigration is a very important issue (seven out of 10 see it that way) while for the university students, it is relegated to the last positions. Certainly the university students do experience immigration as a social problem, but not as a security problem. The same happens, in the opposite sense, with the environment, the

Table 8. Ranking of the Likelihood of Threats to National Security (in per cent).

Officer Cadets		University Students	
Terrorism in our countries	99	Terrorism in our countries	91
Mass immigration from foreign countries	70	An armed conflict over the control of vital raw materials (water, oil, etc.)	63
Proliferation of WMD	62	Proliferation of WMD	61
An armed conflict over the control of vital raw materials (water, oil, etc.)	61	Environmental problems like air pollution and water contamination	61
Organised crime	58	Organised crime	61
International drug trafficking	51	International drug trafficking	57
An armed conflict in the Middle East	49	An armed conflict in the Middle East	55
Military attack by foreign state	49	An accidental nuclear war	49
Environmental problems like air pollution and water contamination	44	Nuclear war between Third World countries with global consequences	47
An accidental nuclear war	42	A possible indirect involvement in a civil war	47
Nuclear war between Third World countries with global consequences	34	Military attack by foreign state	44
An armed conflict between African countries with which we have co-operation relations	32	Mass immigration from foreign countries	43
An armed conflict between Asian countries	31	Attacks on computer networks	40
Attacks on computer networks	30	Nuclear blackmail by Third World countries	36
A possible indirect involvement in a civil war	23	An armed conflict between Asian countries	35
Nuclear blackmail by Third World countries	23	An armed conflict between African countries with which we have co-operation relations	26

fourth most important threat for the university students and the ninth for the officer cadets; for the university students it is a serious problem and for the officer cadets, it might be one, but it is not a security problem. Without a doubt, this is but another element that serves to warn us that while the Spanish youth progresses towards a dynamic post-materialist culture and perception, Spanish military personnel are more concerned about questions related to order. It could also be the case that the university students were

displaying profound ignorance or ingenuity regarding the threats that might befall Europe.

Terrorism is not only one of the main threats to Spanish security, fighting it is also considered by university students and officer cadets (Table 9) alike, as one of the main objectives of Spanish foreign policy. However, it is not the only foreign policy objective linked to security matters, as preserving world peace also appears in the list of possible objectives. The officer cadets continue with the same logic and give preferential attention to preventing the spread of WMD, as well as the traditional military function of maintaining the external security of Spain. On the contrary, the university students, along with the two foreign policy objectives closely related to security, put forward two that are in principle, unrelated: combating world hunger and promoting and defending human rights in other countries. By doing so, the students place objectives with a greater humanitarian component in a preferential position. However, despite the differences it is clear that defence policy is very much on the agenda of priorities for the future civil and military elites. On the other hand, the university students placing the fight

Table 9. Approval of Foreign Policy Goals (in per cent).

Officer Cadets		University Students	
Fighting terrorism	89	Preserve world peace	68
Maintaining the external security of our country	77	Fighting terrorism	65
Preserve world peace	67	Combating world hunger	58
Preventing the spread of WMD	63	Promoting and defending human rights in other countries	53
Promoting and defending human rights in other countries	38	Fostering international co-operation to solve common problems, such as food, inflation and energy	48
Worldwide arms control	37	Helping to improve the standard of living in less developed countries	47
Strengthening regional security alliances or agreements (NATO)	30	Preventing the spread of WMD	46
Fostering international co-operation to solve common problems, such as food, inflation and energy	29	Maintaining the external security of our country	46
Strengthening the United Nations	27	Worldwide arms control	42
Combating world hunger	26	Strengthening the United Nations	34
Helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations	19	Helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations	30
Helping to improve the standard of living in less developed countries	17	Strengthening regional security alliances or agreements (NATO)	20

against terrorism second shows the influence that the terrorist attack of 11 March in Madrid had on their answers. It is not in vain that terrorism has consistently appeared as one of the three principal concerns of the Spanish, but up until present, it has always been considered as a domestic, internal problem, and not one of international politics.

What undoubtedly might appear as incongruencies on the part of both future elites is the limited relevance that they give to the foreign policy objective of 'strengthening the United Nations' since, on the other hand, seven out of ten consider the increasing multinational character of military missions to show the need for a stronger United Nations and to give the UN more control of the members' AF. Sixty per cent even consider that the Security Council should be the only power to verify military actions against sovereign states. Following the same logic, they believe that neither NATO, nor the USA, nor the EU should have the freedom to intervene on its own initiative. That is to say, the officer cadets and university students believe it essential to revitalise the authority of the UN, to adapt them to an international landscape with multinational military missions and they reject the intervention of any country or organisation without the backing of the UN. Nine out of 10 respondents affirm that 'It is vital to enlist the co-operation of the UN in settling international disputes'. Concern over security requires an agency capable of taking on those priorities and responding to those threats. When the future elites were asked about the training that the military has to undergo, agreement between officer cadets and university students was absolute (Table 10). In both cases, more than half believe the AF to be perfectly adapted to their traditional role of defending the national territory; a mission for which, out of all those proposed, the officer cadets feel themselves to be best trained. Terrorism is an internal threat in Spain, and has now appeared as an international threat. The fight against terrorism, a basic objective of Spanish foreign policy, is considered by more than half as a role for which the army is very well trained. Something that is certainly directly opposed to the policy of refusing to involve the army in the response to terrorism at a national level which has been upheld and supported by successive Spanish governments (ETA, GRAPO, EGPGC, Terra Lluire, Triple A, Batallón Vasco Español…).[8]

Certainly, the apparent decrease, related to the perception of terrorism as a threat and as a foreign policy priority, is in response to the long-standing Spanish tradition of rejecting the AF intervention when dealing with terrorism within the country. For that reason, the high percentage obtained must be due to another motive. It might indicate that the military interventions in Afghanistan and the post-invasion period in Iraq are behind this

Table 10. Approval Rates for Military Involvement in Hypothetical Missions (in per cent)[a].

Officer Cadets		University Students	
To defend our country	77	To provide disaster relief	79
To provide disaster relief	73	To provide humanitarian relief abroad	72
To participate in peacekeeping missions	70	To defend our country	59
To provide humanitarian relief abroad	64	To participate in peacekeeping missions	58
To fight terrorism	54	To fight terrorism	53
To prevent the proliferation of WMD	47	To prevent the proliferation of WMD	42
To deal with domestic disorder within our country	44	To contribute to the protection of the environment	41
To participate in combat missions	41	To deal with domestic disorder within our country	28
To participate in peace-enforcing missions	33	To combat drug trafficking	26
To combat drug trafficking	23	To participate in peace-enforcing missions	13
To control mass immigration from foreign countries	22	To control mass immigration from foreign countries	13
To contribute to the protection of the environment	19	To participate in combat missions	10

[a]Only the values of the response 'approve very strongly' are reflected in the table.

answer. Both missions were considered a collaboration in the international fight against Islamic terrorism by the Spanish government, acceptable in the first case, but highly questionable in the second. The angry popular reaction against the invasion and the government's opinion that the participation of the Spanish troops was a humanitarian peace mission, might be behind the second to last place and last place occupied by 'to participate in peace enforcing missions' and 'to participate in combat missions'. The other three missions which were considered by the majority as appropriate for the army correspond to the new functions that are replacing the traditional defensive function: to provide disaster relief, to provide humanitarian relief abroad and to participate in peacekeeping missions. The fact that the officer cadets support the use of military force in peacekeeping and disaster relief missions indicates that they have taken on board, with less resistance than their superiors, the redefinition of their functions in response to the challenge

posed by the new threats, which will be compatible with their most basic mission.

Whether or not the Spanish AF are fully trained for these hypothetical roles, the officer cadets and university students are quite clear that Spanish public opinion will not tolerate large numbers of casualties in military operations. Moreover, for the university students, when force is used, political rather than military goals should determine its application. Whereas two-thirds of the officer cadets believe that military objectives should be the determining factors. Lastly, a new discrepancy emerges when analysing the relationship between security and the economy. For more than half of the university students, national security depends more on international trade and a strong domestic economy' than 'on our military strength'; a proposition largely rejected among the officer cadets. It is precisely the economy that leads us to a final and basic aspect of defence: the budget. Prevention is the principal defensive measure and this is expensive, not very attractive and quick to expire. Perhaps this is why the university students (Table 11) declare themselves to be in favour of maintaining or slightly increasing the budget, but it should not be forgotten that 35% argue for its reduction – 44% in the case of the Catalan students. As is logical, the officer cadets (76%) are inclined to favour a rise in its budgetary allocation.

Since the earliest days of its democracy, Spain has been characterised by its rejection of military spending. To the extent that, in 1986, a study by the CIS[9] showed that 35% of citizens believed that defence expenditure was excessive. A decade later, in the four surveys on the professionalisation of the AF, also carried out by the CIS,[10] in which an average of 24% of all Spaniards continue to consider it excessive, this opinion persists. On the contrary, from the military's point of view, they are considered insufficient (Table 12). This bone of contention between society and military professionals has never ceased to attract attention; above all, between 1982 and 1992, when both the Defence budget dropped from 2.09 of gross national product (GNP) to 1.34 and, expenditure, from 2.38 of GNP to 1.20, between

Table 11. Opinion about Defence Budget (in per cent).

	Raise considerably	Raise somewhat	Remain as it is	Lower somewhat	Lower considerably
Students	8	28.4	28.4	18.2	17
Officer cadets	46.7	28.9	7.8	6.7	10

Table 12. Opinions on the Defence Budget and the Principal Shortfalls (in per cent).

Budget	Army		Navy		Air Force	
	Officers	NCO	Officers	NCO	Officers	NCO
Excessive	0.3	1.2	1.0	2.3	0.0	1.2
Satisfactory	3.2	5.6	6.6	8.5	12.2	12.4
Insufficient	96.5	93.3	92.3	89.3	87.8	86.4
Principal shortfalls						
Salaries	43.8	77.2	46.9	82.9	75.9	79.9
Installations	7.4	6.8	24.3	7.6	5.1	9.6
Army	40.8	11.7	6.2	1.9	2.5	0.5
Navy	2.0	0.8	13.0	3.2	2.5	0.0
Air Force	1.1	1.0	2.3	0.6	12.7	4.3
Training	5.0	2.5	7.3	3.8	1.3	5.7

Source: Study 98/14 IUGGM. Author's presentation.

1982 and 2002. It is not our intention to put forward an apology of military expenditures, but if as it seems, the current trend is towards transforming the AF into peacekeeping armies, we would fully endorse the words of Javier Solana in the Universal Forums of Culture 2004.[11]

> "The United States will only go to war, whereas the European Union will move from Peace Enforcement to Peacekeeping. This requires a budget. (…) It is hypocritical to criticise not intervening in certain conflicts and at the same time not to make resources available, and that includes economic resources, to help in its resolution."

4. MILITARY PERSONNEL

4.1. Democratic Control

A recurrent theme among military personnel is a feeling of being forgotten, relegated in importance and looked down upon by politicians; but, on the other hand, to see that those leaders are in fact close to their country people. Our data ratifies the first part of that axiom since the officer cadets believe that their political leaders are not knowledgeable about the modern military (52%); whereas, the university students do believe that they are (59%). However, officer cadets and university students do not believe that political

leaders, in general, share the same values as their country people (50% and 35%, respectively; a further 31% and 39%, respectively, are not sure whether it really holds true). That unawareness does nothing to discredit the idea of the supremacy of civilian power with respect to the military. Sixty-three per cent of officer cadets believe it is an important value, 68% believe that it is a principle which Spain honours and 64% agree that the military profession is subordinate to the political leadership – 29% do not! On another note, without renouncing the supremacy of civilian society, they demand (57%) that politicians must give professional autonomy to the military. On the contrary, the university students are content with the idea of the military being subordinate (65%); but neither do they see it as an important question (yes 49% set against no 39%), neither do they believe that it is a principle that is carried out in practice (yes 44% as against no 43%), although, on the other hand, neither do they believe that the military should be invested with professional autonomy (47%).

The political role that they think a member of the military should assume includes neither criticising members of the government, nor the parent society, in public (Table 13). Neither should the military have direct political influence in society, although the university students do believe that they should enjoy the freedom of expression in relation to political issues just as any other citizen. The officer cadets who rule out this option are quite simply making it clear that they are aware of the Reales Ordenanzas Militares, a regulatory text on the rights of military personnel approved at the same time as the 1978 Constitution. Whereas the university students' acceptance of it is no doubt motivated by the idealism of transparency and democratic equality, they have yet to take account of the necessary limitations placed on the fundamental rights of certain citizens if the state is to function correctly. This implies that the cadet has already developed a sense of what the state represents which the university student might not have. Finally, they should not explain and defend in public the policies of the government, although they should publicly advocate the military policies they (the AF) believe to be in the best interest of the country.

Finally, with respect to the personal importance that they attribute to basic democratic principles, it is evident that 'liberté, égalité, fraternité' enjoy enthusiastic support among officer cadets and university students; and to a lesser degree the safeguarding of individual opportunities and responsibilities (Table 14). In much the same way, both groups attribute less importance to principles of defending our societal system, the subordination of the military to the political leadership and the integration of the military in the parent society. It is indeed a worrying symptom that for future civilian

Table 13. The Military's Role in Civil Society (in per cent).

Statements	University Students	Officer Cadets
Members of the military should not publicly criticise members of the government	55	78
Members of the military should not publicly criticise their parent society	66	82
Members of the military should be allowed to publicly express their views just like any other citizen	63	38
It is proper for the military to explain and defend in public the policies of the government	38	13
It is proper for the military to advocate publicly the military policies it believes are in the best interest of the country	71	63
It is proper for the military to have direct political influence in the society	11	28

elites, questions of subordination to civil authority and the social integration of the military are not, in the global calculations, considered important (49% and 38%, respectively).

There are two principles that are considered very important in one social grouping and not so very much in the other. The officer cadets display a strong attachment to the Spanish Constitution and the Statutes on the Autonomy of the regions, something that is not appreciated among the Catalan and Andalusian students; however, this same principle among students from Madrid and Castile and Leon is afforded great importance by 53% of the respondents, even more than among the officer cadets. Without a doubt, the question of pluri-nationality, inadequately resolved in the Constitution of 1978, as well as the promise of the current Spanish government to reform the Constitution, as regards the Senate and the statutes on the autonomy of quite a number of communities, underlies the answers of more than a few respondents. The other principle that points to a certain discrepancy is maintaining peaceful relations with other societies across the world, something which is 'very important' for the students and totally coherent with their considering it as the main objective of Spanish foreign policy.

With regard to principles realised, two principles show a significant discrepancy when assessed by officer cadets and by university students. The future civilian elites believe that the degree to which the principle of a peaceful relationship with the other societies in the world has been achieved is 26 percentage points below that of the officer cadets. Without a doubt, the backdrop of the invasion of Iraq is seen to be present. The subordination of

Table 14. Importance of Democratic Principles and their Realisation in Society (in per cent).

Democratic Principles	How Important are … for you		How well are … realised in my Country	
	Very important[a]		Realised[b]	
	Students	Officer cadets	Students	Officer cadets
Equality of people, regardless of gender, race, religion, etc.	84	71	40	52
Respect for individuals	86	78	51	59
Basic freedoms of individuals (freedoms of assembly, ideas, speech, press, …)	80	69	73	82
Respect for the basic national law (constitution and the like)	37	50	69	59
Safeguarding of individual opportunities and responsibilities	43	37	49	49
Defence of the societal system and the way of life of the country	16	15	62	76
Peaceful relationship with the other societies in the world	54	44	51	77
Subordination of the military to the political leadership	18	19	44	68
Integration of the military in the parent society	9	40	33	40

[a]Given that the aggregation of responses attributing importance almost always throws up very high figures, only percentages from those whose response was 'very important' are counted, but whenever the two responses 'very important' and 'rather important' are added together and amount to less than 50% the percentages are underlined.
[b]The data on 'rather realised' and 'completed realised' are added together. Those cases in which non-realisation is greater than realisation are underlined.

the military to the political leadership is the other principle that leaves a significant 24-percentage-points gap between them – there is almost an equal balance between realisation and non-realisation, given that 43% of the university students believe that this democratic principle is not upheld. Nevertheless, the most discouraging aspect is the concurring viewpoint that the social integration of the AF has not been achieved; five out of ten, in both groups, believe that it is a principle that is yet to be realised. For the future politicians charged with managing the Ministry of Defence, neither does it appear to be an important principle, nor do they believe that it has been achieved in Spain. The officer cadets do believe it to be important – only 28% do not, but the majority view is that the objective has not been achieved.

4.2. Public Image in the Media

In accordance with the lack of integration just singled out, which for the university students neither seems relevant, nor do they believe it has been achieved, it is surprising that they understand that military leaders, in general, do not share the same values as their country people (45% and 39% are not sure). For their part, the future military elite, as has been observed, believe that the social integration of the military is relevant; but, just as the university students, neither do they believe that it is the case, nor do they think that the military leaders share the same values as their country people (41% and 27% are not sure). This vision of relations between society and the AF is reflected in the opinion of the AF that each collective attributes to civil society (Table 15). It has been shown elsewhere that the impression the students have of public opinion of the AF is substantially more negative than that expressed by society. The officer cadets have a distorted impression and feel slightly victimised by what society thinks of them. Whereas 51% of university students believe that the public profile of the AF is bad, the officer cadets make that proportion rise to 73%.

What might also be happening is that the cadet identifies professional prestige with public image. This is certainly thinly spread and both collectives see it as such. In other words, the image of the AF is not a bad one in itself; but the military profession is greatly devalued (Table 16). Only priest, civil servant, artist and secondary school teacher rank lower than military officer on the scale of prestige. A scale, moreover, on which the preferences of both the civil and military worlds coincide: the liberal professions first, businessmen and women and the service sector second. The poor social

Table 15. What is the Public image of the AF in our Society? (in per cent).

	Very Good	Rather Good	Not Very Good	Not Good at all	No Opinion
Officer cadets	0	20	56	17	7
Students	3	32	41	10	13

Table 16. Ranking of Professional Prestige.

Professions	Officer Cadets[a]	Students[a]	Professions
Medical doctor	3.95	3.05	Medical doctor
Engineer	5.17	5.00	Diplomat
Diplomat	5.43	5.30	Engineer
Manager of a company	5.96	5.68	Manager of a company
University professor	6.36	5.78	Lawyer
Lawyer	6.60	6.23	University professor
Entrepreneur	6.90	6.59	Entrepreneur
Civil airline pilot	7.33	8.20	Civil airline pilot
Pharmacist	8.54	8.25	Journalist
Journalist	9.48	8.49	Pharmacist
Police inspector	10.18	9.87	Police inspector
Military officer	10.58	10.78	Military officer
Artist	10.86	10.81	Artist
Teacher at secondary school	11.51	10.95	Civil servant
Civil servant	12.06	11.01	Teacher at secondary school
Priest, clergyman	12.68	13.28	Priest, clergyman

[a]The possible placements went from 1 to 16 (first to 16). The data displayed represent the mean average of all of the answers.

prestige suffered by the military profession does nothing to stop 90% of the officer cadets stating that they are proud of women and men who serve in the military as well as half of the students.[12]

The image projected through the media once again reproduces the differences between society and the military. The university students think that the level of information the Spanish media give on military issues is not good (48%), as do 70% of the officer cadets. Whereas the officer cadets believe that the mass media depictions of the military are hostile, half of the university students believe them to be 'supportive'. This may be one of the elements that explain why the military, when assessing the image that society has of the AF, forms a more negative picture than the university student.

Table 17. Considerations about Military (in per cent).

	Officer Cadets		Students	
	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
The military should be abolished	16	82	22	78
The military is a necessary evil	23	71	37	48
The military is the most important part of public life	16	71	8	81

Despite the paucity of information that the mass media disseminates on the AF, the military's lack of social integration and the discrepancy in values with the civilian world, the future military elites do not argue for the abolition of the army; although, neither do they consider it the most important part of the public life. However, the majority (48%) thinks it to be a necessary evil (Table 17). Clearly, the officer cadets reject the three arguments: abolition, principal part of public life and a necessary evil.

4.3. Military Functions

To be highlighted in both groups (Table 18) is the idea that the AF have to be prepared for any contingency: "The military should be prepared to cover the whole spectrum of possible missions (from war to aid to the civil power)". Equally, both groups rank the preparation for and waging of war last. The university students even reject that it should be the most important mission of the military. Those officer cadets, who agree with all of the proposed functions, are inclined to favour the most traditional and the new missions such as peacekeeping. Although they are taking them on board, these new missions remain very much at the bottom of the table. The university students for their part want armies for peacekeeping, aid and other non-combat activities in first place. Article 30.1 of the Spanish Constitution establishes that: "Citizens have the right and the duty to defend Spain". However, the university students (Table 19) do not want to know anything of loyalty, defence, patriotism, etc. The officer cadets, in contrast, affirm without hesitation their loyalty towards the country and the need to share the patriotic spirit in society at large; yet, they do not believe that the strongest indicator of good citizenship is performance of military service. In accordance with that, they disagree with the idea that 'all Spanish citizens should be willing to fight for our country'.

Table 18. Military Functions (in per cent).

	Officer Cadets		Students	
	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
The military exists for the defence of the country and its interests	87	11	72	28
The military job implies guaranteeing the necessary conditions for peaceful and free international trade	73	21	54	35
Today, peacekeeping and other non-combat activities should be central military functions	66	31	78	13
The military should be prepared to cover the whole spectrum of possible missions (from war to aid to the civil power)	87	12	77	15
The most important role of the military is to prepare for and to wage war	63	34	24	66

Table 19. Spanish Patriotism (in per cent).

	Officer Cadets		Students	
	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
A Spanish citizen should always feel that his or her primary allegiance is to his/her own country	77	21	36[a]	57
The strongest indicator of good citizenship is the performance of military service in defence of our country	36	60	11	82
The promotion of patriotism should be an important aim of citizenship education	62	34	13	78
All Spanish citizens should be willing to fight for our country	52	47	13	79
We should strive for loyalty to our country before we can afford to consider world brotherhood	59	38	27	65

[a]Students from Burgos and Madrid respond in quite the opposite way to those from Barcelona and Granada (agree 58% and disagree 31%).

Both groups adopt a very Hobbesian approach and believe that, given the character of human beings, war is inevitable (68% officer cadets and 51% university students). The difference lies in that for the officer cadets (64%) sometimes war is necessary to protect the national interest and even that strong AF improve our image throughout world (68%). By contrast for the

university students, in spite of believing war to be a necessary evil given the human condition, neither do they believe that this may one day be necessary (62%) nor that it improves our image abroad (58%).

4.4. Gender Roles

The first observation is that the number of women is immensely lower than the number of men. However, although the female presence is lower, in February 2004 the percentage of women has reached 10.3%. Whereas there are only 1.9% among the commanding officers, amongst the rank and file of the army and the navy they reach 16.1%. A high figure in comparison with the rest of Spain's partners in NATO and the WEU and one that above all is very close to the figure of 17%, below which it is believed that their group identity is lost and they are obliged to reproduce the behavioural patterns of the masculine majority and which is a figure that none of our European partners' armies reach.

As to the incorporation of women in the AF as conscripts or by forced conscription the response given by officer cadets and university students is almost identical (Table 20): if they want to do military service let them do it, and let them do everything. The university response is a little more categorical and does not vary significantly according to sex. You might call the type of integration that the respondents profess as hardly that of a gentleman since on the contrary, when it is a matter of obligatory military service, the percentage that accepts the full integration of women, although a majority response, is cut by half. Half of the university students – more than half if only male respondents are selected – and two thirds of the officer cadets support the statement that "the general military draft should include women too". Women university students, unlike their male counterparts, are against the recruitment of women (45%), however 42% are in favour; but of the latter, only half are in favour of carrying out all of the roles,[13] which suggests a degree of 'feminine machismo'. The strength of the university students' response that opposes men (84%) or women (86%) having to do obligatory military or community service, as recognised in Article 30.3 of the Constitution, destroys that idea of the errand knight generously thinking that if a woman wants to, he for one will not get in her way, but if they try to make her do it, he is against it. The answer of the Spanish university student is more in line with the liberty of decision-making. They think that nobody should be obliged to do military service, but if a woman wants to enlist, then she should be able to do so. However, if it is a matter of

Table 20. Do you Support the Full Integration of Women into the AF? (in per cent).

On an Optional Basis?			On a Compulsory Basis?		
Officer Cadets		Students	Officer Cadets		Students
79	Yes, in all (also combat) roles	87	49	Yes, in all (also combat) roles	43
11	Yes, but not in combat roles	4	14	Yes, but not in combat roles	8
7	No	2	32	No	32

an obligation, the response goes against obliging anybody, whether male or female, to perform a defensive role. On the other hand, the officer cadets do seem to respond to the profile of a knight in shining armour, since 55% believe that a woman should not be obliged to join the ranks; but 56% do believe that men can be obliged. Military service is a man's world. For that reason, if a woman wants to enlist voluntarily they are not opposed to the idea and they think that a woman can perform all of the roles; but if it is a matter of trying to oblige her, the resistance towards her enlistment grows.

The analysis of the reasons for rejecting women (Table 21) shows us that for the university student the rejection of women is, basically, an ethical and a moral question, based on personal, subjective convictions, and secondly, alludes to a recent problem among men: they will not fight as effectively with women present in combat units. The officer cadets argue in a more practical vein, and although they also point to the loss of effectiveness as a reason, their principal point is that the presence of women disrupts small unit cohesion.

4.5. Format and Size of the Military

From the diverse data that has been presented, it can be seen that the process of across-the-board professionalisation that began at the end of the 1990s and culminated in 2002, has been taken to heart by the future Spanish elites; the best possible army is a voluntary one (73% and 68% of the university students and officer cadets, respectively). Furthermore, two thirds of the officer cadets and university students believe that the revolutionary idea of a nation in arms lacks any sense. Nevertheless, whereas the officer cadets (79%) believe that the draft guarantees a steady exchange of values,

Table 21. Factors Behind the Rejection of Females Joining the AF (in per cent).

Factors	Officer Cadets	Students	Factors
The presence of women disrupts small unit cohesion	58	42	Religious/moral convictions
Men will not fight as effectively with women present in combat units	46	36	Men will not fight as effectively with women present in combat units
The deaths of female soldiers will demoralise male soldiers and the public	42	31	Women could be taken prisoner and abused
Women are not fully deployable as men because of pregnancy	38	27	The presence of women disrupts small unit cohesion
There is too little privacy for men and women in military jobs	33	23	The deaths of female soldiers will demoralise male soldiers and public
Women could be taken prisoner and abused	33	18	Women in the military take jobs away from men
Religious/moral convictions	21	14	Women are not fully deployable as men because of pregnancy
Women in the military take jobs away from men	8	14	There is too little privacy for men and women in military jobs

opinions and perceptions between society and AF, the university students (59%) do not believe it to be so. Moreover, from an economic perspective, for the university students an all-volunteer force is less costly than conscription because it does not waste human resources (52%). Military personnel are very proud of women and men who serve in the military (90%), whereas the university students do not share such a favourable opinion (44% are proud and 42% are not). They also concur, even though the intensity of the military environment is greater, that the Spanish AF are not attracting high-quality, motivated recruits (47% and 82% university students and officer cadets, respectively).

5. CHANGES OVER TIME

The great affirmation that all of the respondents express very deeply, whatever their work and their ideological bent may be, is the immense progress

that has been made in relations between society and the military in Spain. They continue believing that it is a matter of two different worlds but the frontier that separates them is increasingly less foreboding. Equally, everybody coincides in affirming how intense and satisfactory the democratisation process implemented by the Spanish AF has been, and how fully they have accepted the supremacy of political power with many fewer problems than foreseen. The acceptance has been such that today Spanish military personnel do not want to know anything about politics. The attitude they adopt is totally resistant to involvement in such matters. On the other hand, as reflected in the data that is shown here, the Spanish elites who were interviewed made clear their conviction that the differences between society and the AF were very scarce. They were convinced almost in unison that opinions on security matters for civilians and military personnel were not going to differ. On the other hand, it is to be highlighted that all the respondents are in profound agreement over the progressively closer relationship that society and the military are experiencing in Spain. The future elites have not only perceived and continue to be aware of this issue, but also when defining the essential values of those two worlds they express a desire that those two worlds be worlds with different values. Frankly, speaking there is still a long way to go in the search for fluid relations between society and the military in Spain!

The respondents constantly cite terrorism as the main threat in the future for Spain. On the contrary, there was not so much unanimity when defining the roles to which the AF will commit themselves in the future. On this point, one can clearly see how military personnel are very obviously inclined towards the traditional roles of the military, whereas for progressive politically and intellectually minded students, as is shown by the surveys, the fundamental tasks of the AF are defined as the new missions. Without a doubt, democracy is the only political system in which the equilibrium between security and liberty is possible. The events of 11 September, as we have just seen in the recent presidential elections in the US, have drastically shifted the balance towards security. Europe has traditionally tried to ensure that the balance was tipped in favour of civil liberties. Whether or not that will continue to be possible is yet to be seen; but the terrorist attacks of 11 March might put an end to that political tendency in the EU. Analysis of the survey in Spain reveals how the preferences of the officer cadets clearly favour security, whereas the university students, even though they perceive the relevance of security and defence, continue to support civil liberties and see within the AF the curtailment of those same rights.

NOTES

1. FET-JONS Falange Española Tradicionalista y Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista: The two organisations which represented the single Fascist Party (FET) and its accompanying Trade Union committees (JONS).
2. Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas – a Spanish government agency responsible for studying Spanish society primarily through the use of public opinion polls and surveys.
3. IUGGM – Instituto Universitario General Gutiérrez Mellado: an institute concerned with security issues belonging to Spain's national distance learning university.
4. In some universities, political science is only taught in the second cycle and the diploma in Public Management and Administration corresponds to the study programme for the first cycle.
5. A licenciatura at a Spanish university is normally a 4-year course of studies divided up into two cycles, each of a 2-year duration.
6. The mean average is 4.81 for economists, 4.31 for barristers, 4.53 for public sector managers and 3.81 for political scientists.
7. INS – Identidad Nacional Subjetiva/National Subjective Identity – a Spanish sociological term that refers to the degree to which citizens identify primarily with their country or their region.
8. ETA – Euskadi ta Askatasuna/Basque Homeland and Liberty – Basque separatist terrorists; GRAPO – Grupo Revolucionario Antifascista Primero de Octubre/Revolutionary Antifascist Group First of October – Terrorists formed from a Communist Party splinter group; EGPGC – Exército Guerrilheiro do Povo Galego Ceive/Guerrilla Army of the Free Galician People – Galician separatist terrorists; Terra Lluire/Free Land – Catalan separatist terrorists; Batallón Vasco Español/Spanish Basque Batallion; and Triple A or Alianza Anticomunista Americana/American Anti-communist Alliance – both rightwing paramilitary groups.
9. CIS Study 1518.
10. CIS Studies 2234, 2277, 2317 and 2379.
11. Words spoken by the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, on formally accepting the document "A Human Security Doctrine for Europe. The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Security Capabilities in Europe".
12. In this case, the difference between officer cadets and university students is not only one of meaning, but also of intensity. As 56% of the officer cadets are "very" proud and 23% of the students "not at all" proud.
13. Whereas 75% of male university students who think that a woman should be conscripted in the ranks are in favour of her assuming all roles including combat roles.

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IS THERE A CULTURAL GAP IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN SWEDEN?

Alise Weibull

1. INTRODUCTION

The past ten to fifteen years have been a turbulent period for the Swedish military. The collapse of the Soviet Union, which was the primary potential enemy, the end of the Cold War, the establishment of the independent Baltic States and Swedish membership in the European Union all combined to render the Swedish defence forces hopelessly outdated. However, although the need for change has been obvious for many years, now many think the progress has been very slow. Some say we should have changed the defence forces dramatically back in the early 1990s. Instead, we chose to implement a series of reorganisations, closing down piece after piece of the old invasion-oriented defence force, while trying to retain as much as possible. What we have today is an eroded conscription system, where military service has become more a question of choice. Despite all this, the public is still quite supportive, thinking that we might need a defence "just in case", especially as new threats arise. A new trend is that quite many, according to public opinion polls, now think that those who actually do serve as conscripts should get extra compensated with money for this service to society.

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In searching for new functions, the defence forces have been focusing more on participation in international missions and alliances, but it has proven increasingly difficult to recruit for these units. The budget has also been repeatedly cut during the 1990s, with concomitant regiment closings. A new reorganisation, with more regiments closed and about 1,000 officers discharged, just now appears to be a fact. From interviews made with journalists and other experts, another trend seems to be a decline of public and media interest in military issues, except for various scandals. Our defence minister is also concerned about how little the public seems to understand of the content of discussions about the new military.

All in all, there are many reasons for watching the possibility of a widening gap between the military and the rest of the society. Below are presented some of the main Swedish results in the Ergomas' questionnaire on civil-military relations. The qualitative part of this study, based on interviews with politicians, journalists and military authorities, is not included here but will be presented in a coming publication.

2. THE SWEDISH SAMPLE

To examine the cultural gap between the military and the rest of Swedish society, 295 students (75% men and 25% women) in two groups were given standardised questionnaires between February and April 2004. One group consisted of 186 military students (170 men and 16 women) attending their first year of officers' training at two military academies, one in northern Sweden (MHS-Ö) and one in southern Sweden (MHS-H). The second group were 107 civilian students consisting of 74 students of economics (29 men and 45 women) at the University College in Östersund, and 33 political science students (20 men and 13 women) at the Swedish National Defence College in Stockholm, but formally belonging to the University of Uppsala.

On average, the civilian students are 28 years of age compared to about 23 for the military group. Most of the civilian students had studied for 2 or 3 years, and had also studied other subjects before their present ones, while for most of the military students this was their first year of academic studies. Most of the students had previous experience of the military as conscripts. All the military students had completed military service, which is a requirement for acceptance to officer training. Most of the civilian students (71% of the men and 5% of the women), as well, had done their military service. A majority of those who had served, both men and women, saw military service as a good experience. 92% of the military students and 71% of the

civilian students characterised their time in the service as positive (very or somewhat).

3. MAIN FINDINGS

3.1. Security and Foreign Policy

Almost all military students (91%) say that they are (very or somewhat) interested in defence-related security issues, with considerably fewer amongst the civilian students (61%) expressing the same opinion. However, the civilian students are divided here. Amongst political science students, all the men and 92% of the women say that they are (very or somewhat) interested, compared to the economics students amongst whom only 55% of the men and 38% of the woman are interested in these issues. Concerning civilian and military student opinions on the importance of possible foreign policy objectives for Sweden, there are both similarities and differences. The results for the 12 listed objectives in the questionnaire are presented in Table 1, separately for military men and women and civilian men and woman.

As seen in Table 1, more than 90% in all groups find that the most important objectives in Swedish foreign security policy are to preserve world peace, to maintain the external security of our country, to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and to fight terrorism. They are also rather agreed on what objectives on the list are least important. These include the strengthening of defence alliances such as NATO, engaging in worldwide arms control and helping to bring democracy to other nations. The significant differences between the military and civilian groups, taken as a whole, become clearer as they regard objectives that concern different forms of international co-operation, here exemplified by helping to improve the standard of living in less developed countries, combating world hunger and increasing the food and energy supply. However, except for the strengthening of NATO, where especially men are prone to find this less important (64% of military men and 50% of civilian men), the figures are quite high for all the objectives and above 70% of the students in both groups find them important. It is interesting to note that women generally find foreign security objectives more important than do men.

The relatively high willingness for international co-operation is also seen in answers to other questions. About 70% in both student groups are against the idea of concentrating more on our own national problems rather

Table 1. Possible Future Foreign Policy Goals (very or rather important).

	Military Students (%)		Civilian Students (%)	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
Preserve world peace	97	100	94	100
Fighting terrorism	96	100	90	97
Maintaining the external security of our country	94	100	96	96
Preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction	94	100	94	100
Defending human rights in other countries	94	100	87	98
Strengthening the UN	84	88	81	93
Helping to improve the standard of living in less developed countries**	83	94	94	100
Combating world hunger*	81	94	90	95
Fostering international co-operation to solve common problems (food, energy, etc.)**	79	81	96	96
Helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations	76	88	71	84
Worldwide arms control	72	81	72	91
Strengthening regional security alliances or agreements (for instance NATO)	64	71	50	66

*Significant difference between all civilian and all military students at the 0.05 significance level.
**Significant difference at the 0.01 significance level.

than thinking in international terms. Almost everyone (96% in both groups) sees co-operation with the UN as very important and about 90% in both groups also see the need for a stronger UN. The contention that the UN should have more control over the armed forces of all its members was somewhat less supported by both groups (63% of the military and 71% of the civilian students). We got about the same results about the UN being the only power that should be allowed to order actions against sovereign states. Both groups are very much against (about 90%) allowing US the freedom to intervene on its own initiative or granting NATO the same right.

3.2. Likelihood of Threats to Swedish National Security

The students were asked to evaluate the likelihood of 16 threats to Swedish national security. (The most likely threats according to both the military and the civilian students were found to be organised crime, drug trafficking and

attacks on computer networks). Between 72% and 90% see these threats as likely. On the other hand, the groups diverge greatly concerning the role of the economy with regard to Swedish national security. 88% of the civilian students agree that our security depends more on international trends and a strong domestic economy than on military strength. This view is also shared by a majority (64%) of the military students, and the difference is significant at the 1% significance level. The reverse group order is found concerning the level of the threat from conflicts in distant areas, such as Africa, Asia and the Middle East and from conflicts concerning the control of vital raw materials and mass immigration. The military students are much more concerned about all of these issues than are the civilians. However, the threat of Sweden being attacked by a foreign power, which we have long focused on, is for both groups among the least worrisome threats (second from the bottom for the military group (20%). The least concern among the military students is for an indirect involvement in a civil war (13%), a threat that the civilians look upon as more likely (34%).

To sum up, when it comes to perception of threats towards Sweden, the picture has changed dramatically from what people in Sweden have believed in for centuries, namely the possibility to be attacked by a foreign state, or to be more precise by Russia. Today none of the student groups believes in this possibility. Actually this is the least important threat for the civilian students and the next least for the military students. (The kind of threats that concern both groups is organised crime, drug trafficking and an attack on computer networks). A majority in both groups also think that Swedish security depends more on international trade and the economy than on military strength. This result might show a deepening identity crisis and loss of meaning for young military men and women. On the other hand, they see their tasks increasingly on the international scene and much more broadly than before.

3.3. Future Functions for the Swedish Defence Forces

As might be expected, the approval of Swedish military functions shows both differences and similarities between the student groups. The degree of approval of 12 possible functions is shown in Table 2. The differences between the sexes are often very small and not shown in the table. However a couple of these differences are more significant and are commented on further down.

As can be seen, the students respond more or less alike on most possible military functions. However, there are some interesting differences. The military group approves of functions with more muscles such as peace-enforcement and

Table 2. Approval of Possible Military Functions (Strongly or Rather Approve) in percent.

	Military Students (%)	Civilian Students (%)
To defend our country	100	98
To participate in peacekeeping	99	97
To participate in peace-enforcement**	96	74
To provide disaster relief	95	95
To provide humanitarian relief abroad	89	91
To deal with domestic disorder**	88	76
To prevent proliferation of mass destruction	87	83
To fight terrorism	82	90
To participate in combat missions**	81	46
To contribute to the protection of the environment	58	56
To combat drug trafficking	53	49
To control mass immigration**	48	29

**Significant difference between military and civilian students at the 0.01 significance level.

combat functions. They are also more willing than the civilian students to approve of the military dealing with what in Sweden traditionally have been strictly police tasks, such as handling domestic disorder and guarding the borders in case of mass immigration, a situation that is more often talked about than experienced. Compared to military men, the sixteen military women in the sample are more reluctant about the military's participating in combat functions (57% of the women approve, compared to 82% of the men). For the control of mass immigration function, the comparable figures are 33% and 50%. Something of the reverse is found in the civilian sample. Here the women favour military involvement to a greater extent than the men. These functions concern dealing with domestic disorder, 79% of the women and 70% of the men are in favour and a similar result is found concerning the prevention of the spread of weapons of mass destruction. 89% of the women approve of this type of function for the Swedish defence compared to 76% of the civilian men.

So what are the possible future objectives for the Swedish military as viewed by military and civilian students? The students agree on many of the possible future objectives for the military. Even if the threat from Russia is no more, the military must – just in case – be able to defend our country, engage in international functions and disaster relief, fighting terrorism, etc. They also agree on that softer tasks as protecting the environment, combating drug trafficking or controlling mass immigration are not really

things that the military should be that much involved with. On the whole, the military students favour more muscular tasks and seem to be in favour of all kinds of participation in this context, even in tasks where we have no tradition, such as combat missions abroad. They even support having the military take over police tasks to control domestic conflicts, a task that Sweden has forbidden the military from getting involved in, ever since 1931 when the military was sent in to stop striking workers and ended up killing five of them. However, the military is now moving closer to the police but the demarcation of roles and tasks is still under debate. The same goes for the task "fighting terrorism", a task very much approved here by both military and civilian students. However, at time of writing (May 2005) the security police has officially announced that there is no need for a military involvement in these type of tasks.

3.4. Personal Values and Attitudes

3.4.1. Virtues in Children's Education

Looking at personal values, the students were asked to indicate the importance of 19 different virtues in the education of children. The main impression is that the answers are very similar for the military and the civilian students. For example, those virtues that the groups found "most" respectively "least" important in children's education were the same. Both groups gave the highest ratings to the virtues of "comradeship", "honesty", and "responsibility"; 98% or more of the group members judged these as "very" or "rather" important. Of almost the same importance to both groups were the virtues of "initiative", "open-mindedness", "creativity" and "tolerance". About 95% of the students chose these as important. At the bottom of the preference list were, for both groups, "discipline", "obedience", traditionalism" and "patriotism". However, these similarities do not mean that there are no differences. For example in this last virtue group, the quality of "traditionalism" was judged important much more often by the military students (about 50%) than by the civilian students (18%). Significant differences in the same direction and in the order of 10–20% are also found for the virtues of "discipline", "obedience", "loyalty" and "team-spirit". To sum up, the differences between military and civilian students regarding virtues in children's education are not very distinct. However there is a tendency that the military students stress conservative values and qualities in children's education more than the civilian students do. This tendency is also supported by the answers to the statement that what young

people need most of all is strict discipline from their parents. 80% of the military students, as opposed to 58% of the civilian students, agree with this statement.

3.4.2. Virtues for the Military

The students were asked to indicate the importance of the same 19 virtues for the military. The results show that 90% or more of the military students judged almost all of the virtues important (“rather” or “very”) for the military. The exceptions are “patriotism” and “generosity” which was considered important by about 80%. The civilian students’ views of which qualities are important for the military show a more differentiated picture. On the one hand, they seem to see the military as an organisation with unique needs compared to what is needed in the domestic educational sphere. Virtues that they found more dubious in children’s education, such as “obedience”, “discipline”, “orderliness” and “team-spirit” were judged important for the military by almost every one of the civilian students. On the other, there were some virtues that many civilian students judged less important for the military than for the education of children. This is true of the virtues of “equality”, “creativity”, “open-mindedness” and “generosity”, which were judged by almost everyone as very important for children, but which between 22% and 36% found unimportant for the military. Most of all, and in some agreement with the military students, many civilian students considered “traditionalism”(41%) and “patriotism” (30%) unimportant for the military.

In summary, the results show that the military students demonstrate greater consistency in their assessment of important virtues for the military and the private sectors. A clear majority judged discipline, obedience, loyalty and self-control as important in both areas, though a little less so than other virtues. Although they also stress virtues related to personality development, their attitudes and values on the whole are more conservative. The civilian’s picture of important virtues for the military is also somewhat problematic as it seems to follow a common stereotype of the military as a place where there is little need for initiative, open-mindedness and creativity, a picture which is very much contradicted by the military group. One question raised in the analysis of military virtues was the impact of former military experience within the civilian group, where those who had done military service were compared to those who had not. The picture is roughly the same in both groups, with the exception of “traditionalism”, which was a much more valued virtue by those who had military experience.

3.4.3. Confidence in Institutions

On a scale of 1 (no confidence) to 10 (complete confidence), students were asked to indicate their confidence in 14 different institutions. The mean results for the military and the civilian students are shown in Table 3.

Four very distinct and significant differences are found between military and civilian students' confidence in different institutions. Military students have the greatest confidence (mean 8.2) in the military in contrast to the civilian students who show a mean of 5.9. In relative terms, this may not be as big a gap as it might seem statistically, as this mean represents the civilian students' fourth-highest level of confidence shown, only universities, the police, and the justice have higher confidence means. Other significant differences are the military students' greater confidence in the king, the police, and the trade unions and their lower confidence in the media. The military students trust the media least, followed closely by the church, political parties and the government.

To some extent, at least, the degree of confidence in an institution appears to be related to the extent of knowledge about that institution. One of the questions focussed on how much knowledge the students had about the institutions listed above. For the military students, this hypothesis seems to be relevant. The military students judge their knowledge of the police, the military, the king and voluntary organisations as being more than the level claimed by the civilian students, and they also generally place more trust in these institutions.

Table 3. Confidence in Institutions (mean).

Institutions	Military Students	Civilian Students
The military**	8.2	5.9
The police**	7.5	6.4
The king**	7.0	4.6
Universities	6.7	7.0
Justice	6.6	6.5
Banks	6.2	5.9
Parliament	5.8	5.8
Companies	5.7	5.5
Trade unions**	5.7	4.8
Voluntary organisations	5.6	5.6
Government	5.3	5.2
Organised political parties	4.8	5.1
The church	4.5	4.7
The media**	3.8	4.6

Note: 1 = no confidence; 10 = complete confidence.

**Significant differences between military and civilian students on 0.01 significance level.

The civilian students judge their knowledge of universities, companies, banks and political parties as being greater than that claimed by military students. Except for the somewhat greater trust in universities reported by the civilian group, the correlation between confidence in an institution and knowledge about the same institution is quite blurred for this group.

To sum up, the military shows stronger confidence in the uniformed organisations than the civilian students do. This applies to the king, the police and the military. They also judge their knowledge in these institutions as being greater than the civilian students do. (The institution the military has least confidence in is the media). The negative attitude towards the media is also shown in other questions, and will be dealt with further below.

3.4.4. Attachment to Global and Local Entities

The students were asked to indicate their degree of attachment to 10 global and local entities on a ten-point scale from 1 (weakest attachment) to 10 (strongest attachment). The alternatives included small and local entities such as the family, friends, colleagues, hometown and region to bigger entities such as Sweden, Europe and the world. Some of the results are completely in line with expectations and more or less confirm common knowledge. For both groups, the attachment to the small world (family, friends, etc.) is the strongest, with less attachment to the larger world and more distant communities. Very small attachment and lowest of all concerns the religious community, with a mean value about 3. The commitment to the world and to Europe is not that high either, with a mean round 5 and 6, but both groups are significantly more attached to Europe than to the world. Comparisons between the military and the civilian students show two significant differences. The military students are more nationalistic, here expressed as attachment to Sweden, and also more attached to the own profession and colleagues.

3.5. Contact with Media and Public

3.5.1. The Media

Several of the questions asked in this study relate to the opinion the officers and the civilian students have of how the public and the media have portrayed the military. The answers here are important, as they reflect, more clearly than do other questions, the main subject of the study – the existence of a value gap between defence and the rest of society, from the perspective of the groups questioned. One area in which a gap is apparent is the image of

the armed forces in news reporting. Both the quality and good will of the media reporting are challenged. The evaluation was done on a three-level scale (''very good'', ''somewhat good'' and ''not good''). A majority of the military students (64%) are negative to the media's coverage, and deem this to be ''not good''. Only 1% sees it as ''good'', while the remaining 35% characterise it as ''somewhat good''. The civilian students characterise the defence reporting more favourably. More than two-thirds of them (69%) see the information as ''somewhat good'' while a bit under one-third (30%) characterise it as ''not good''. Here, as well, only 1%, however, deem it to be ''very good''. The difference between the groups reflects significantly more dissatisfaction among the military students regarding the quality of media reporting of the armed forces. Although the civilian students are more positive in this context, there are nevertheless fairly many in this group who feel that the reporting about the armed forces lacks quality.

One question also dealt with the tone (supportive, neutral or hostile) of the reporting about the defence forces. Only 2% of the military students see the media as ''supportive'' while 20% felt they were neutral and a whole 77% saw media as hostile (somewhat or very). As in the case of the previous question, the civilian students were more nuanced in their appraisal, with 18% finding the media to be supportive and 37%, neutral. But even here, the majority felt that the media was ''hostile'' (somewhat or very). To sum up, there is a prevailing opinion amongst the military students that the Swedish military are treated unkindly by the media, and to an extent, the civilian students agree. These responses might be related to the increase in alarming reports in the media over the last year or two before the study, some of the most recent relating to sexual abuse and criminal behaviour among military personnel.

3.5.2. The Public and the Military

When the students were asked to characterise the public image of the military on a 1–10 scale, the results summarised in Fig. 1 were obtained. The answers have been divided into three categories: ''positive'' (1–3), ''medium'' (4–6) and ''negative'' (7–10).

These results show that both groups are basically in agreement in their appraisal of the public image of the military. Fairly few (16% and 13%, respectively) believe that the public has an image that is clearly ''positive'', about one-half (48% and 53%, respectively) feel the image to be ''medium'', and about one-third (36% and 34%, respectively) feel that the image is ''negative''. The last fact that more than one of every three military or civilian students feel that the public has a negative image of the military



Fig. 1. The Public Image of the Military (in Percent).

must be a devastating blow to the sense of ''meaning'' felt by many of those becoming officers. That even the civilian students show just about the same figures adds to the impression of the answers here as an alarm signal that somehow must be dealt with by the authorities.

3.5.3. The Military Profession in Comparison with Other Professions

When the students were asked to rank 16 professions according to social prestige, the results differed between military and civilian students. The military students ranked the prestige of a military officer position significantly higher than the civilian students do. Military students gave ''Military officer'' a mean rank of 5.6, meaning that they placed this job among the top third in prestige. The civilian students, however, do not attribute such high prestige to this profession. They placed ''Military officer'' significantly lower with a mean rank of 8.4. The most prestigious professions for both groups are ''Medical doctor'', ''Diplomat'', ''University professor'' and ''Lawyer''. Professions connected in some way to economics and political science, such as ''Company manager'' and ''Entrepreneur'' were ranked higher among the civilian students. Table 4 below shows professions where significant differences between military and civilian students were found. The figures represent mean of ranks.

3.5.4. Military Integration in Civilian Society

One expression of civil–military integration is the existence of shared values between military and political leaders and the public. About half of the

Table 4. Prestige of different Professions (mean of ranks). Significant Differences Between Military and Civilian Students.

Profession	Military Students	Civilian Students
Military officer**	5.59	8.36
Company manager**	7.90	6.06
Entrepreneur**	11.11	9.25
Engineer**	8.63	7.48
Artist*	11.44	12.60

Note: 1 = Most prestigious; 16 = Least prestigious.
*Significant difference at the 0.05 significance level.
**Significant difference at the 0.01significance level.

military students (45%) believe that the opinions of the military leaders in Sweden correspond to the values of the public and 20% say they do not. The civilian students are even more doubtful about this correlation in values. Only one-fourth (25%) of the civilian group thinks that military leaders and the public share the same values, while 40% are sure they do not. However, in both groups there are quite many (35%) who chose "don't know". When the same question is used, but with reference to political leaders, the two student groups seem to agree that common values between politicians and the public are quite rare. Only 29% of the military group and 26% of the civilians agree on their existence and about one-third (35%) in both groups are sure that a common basis of values between political leaders and the public does not exist. As was the case for military leaders, even here quite many, 37% of the military students and 35% of the civilians, say that they cannot answer this question. In summary, both military and civilian students agree that there is a value gap between military and political leaders, on the one hand, and the public on the other. Even if the military students think this gap is less extreme for their own leaders, the civilian students certainly do not hold this opinion. However, about one-third in both groups report being undecided on these questions.

3.6. Opinions on Conscription

Although Sweden still has conscription, this system is increasingly eroding. From having had about 60,000 draftees per year, with a great majority of those actually serving, the estimated future need is between 8,000 and 12,000 persons. All positions have been open for women since 1989, yet very few

women actually serve, and their attrition rate is quite high. In this study, the results for questions concerning conscription show a quite blurred picture, especially for the military students. Even if these students, on the whole, support conscription much more than the civilian students do, this support is not unambiguous and there are significant differences between the groups.

These differences might depend on the higher proportion of women in the civilian group, and the fact that only a few of these have had any personal experience of military service. However, further examination shows that these factors have only a marginal effect on the group differences and are therefore disregarded here. Almost every one of the military students (90%) feels proud of the men and women who serve in the military, compared to a smaller majority (63%) in the civilian group. A majority of the military students (79%) also thinks that conscription means a better exchange of values with the civil society and represents a natural link (70%) to democracy. Among the civilian students only 35–45% agree with this reasoning. Another question on which opinions diverge is whether the military attracts motivated and qualified people. A majority, 63%, of the military students think that the military is able to do this, as opposed to 40% of the civilian students. However, what quite many within both groups seem to agree on is the need for a changing format for the military. A change to an all-voluntary force to meet the requirements of new missions is something that 61% of the military students and 51% of the civilian believe in.

4. CONCLUSIONS

How do the differences we have seen in the Swedish results indicate the existence of a "gap" between military and civilian society? The results do not seem to give a clear answer. In quite a few questions the groups answer more or less alike. Both the military and the civilian group favour an international commitment by the military, and they agree on the whole range of major threats, even if the military students seem to be more "alarmist" and more in favour of "muscular" tasks. The military group is also prepared to engage in tasks that hereto have been strictly reserved for the police. An example here is the military students' desire to also handle domestic disorder. Many questions also hint on the reasons behind this, such as a loss of meaning in the military job and, as compensation, a willingness to become a "Mädchen für alles", a development that the civilian students are much more against.

However, the most serious answers in this study, which are also very much in line with the civil-military gap discussion, seem to be the military students' low confidence in the media and politicians and also their impression of rather low public support. The results also indicate that quite many of both military and civilian students perceive the image of the military among the public as a negative one. If this is true, the results here hint at the possibility that the military employees will have less professional identity, motivation and legitimacy than they used to have in Sweden. It goes without saying that it is very important to watch and follow up if these gap tendencies found in this study are representative of changing relations between the military and society on the whole and something that political and military authorities must either try to change actively or adjust to for the future.

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IS THERE A CULTURAL GAP BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND THE PARENT SOCIETY? AN ANALYSIS OF SWITZERLAND

Tibor Szvircsev Tresch, Dominik Allenspach, Michael Born and Karl W. Haltiner

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper serves to present the Swiss data in the framework of the international project "Civil–Military Gap" of ERGOMAS Working Group "Military Profession". Its theoretical basis has been developed in a common working paper (Jelusic, Caforio, Haltiner, Moelker, & Szvircsev Tresch, 2003) and will be presented in a more detailed way in a forthcoming common cross-national analysis. The main research hypothesis and its implied research questions refer to the existence of a growing cultural gap between the military and its parent democratic society: Is there such a gap between the armed forces, mainly its professional bodies and democratic society? If yes, what is the nature of that gap? According to the planning of the research project, the following research steps are carried on in the participating countries: (1) investigate the political culture of future (civilian and military) elites by simultaneously surveying cadets at military academies and students at civilian universities; (2) carry out semi-structured interviews with

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present elites (an expert survey) in order to assess changes in civil–military relations over time; and (3) elaborate and compare results at cross-national level and compare and contrast them with data from the American (Feaver, Kohn, & Cohn, 2001) research. This paper first outlines some peculiarities of the Swiss military system, considering them as somewhat important for the question of the nature of a possible civil–military gap. It then presents the methodological procedure and the main findings of Switzerland.

2. SOME THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS

2.1. Reasons for a Growing Gap in Europe

Most evidence shows that the existence of a civil–military gap and mainly its alleged growth is due to the recent strategical and societal changes. It mainly can be traced back to the end of the Cold War and the end of conscription which had three major implications:

(1) There was a new security environment in the post-Cold War era which missed a unifying threat that the Soviet Union had posed. It follows that military organisations were constrained to justify the maintenance of their large establishment during peacetime vis-à-vis its parent society (Holsti, 2001, p. 18; Ricks, 1997).
(2) With the end of the mass armies in many West-European Countries followed an onward termination of conscription (Haltiner, 2003a, p. 381). A de-militarisation of the society and a decrease of people with military experience was the cause. The relationship between the military and its parent society diminished and the military became more isolated and disintegrated within the society (Ricks, 1997; Venesson, 2003, p. 234). This led to a rising civilian ignorance on military affairs (Gronke & Feaver, 2001, p. 131; Ricks, 1997; Moskos, 2000, p. 20).
(3) With the downsizing of the mass armies followed a rebuilding and re-militarisation of the military. That consisted of the professionalisation, traditionalisation, and politicisation of the military and of the privatisation of many functions of logistic and maintenance. By that cultural changes in the military and a growing alienation from the values of the civilian society occurred (Ricks, 1997; Holsti, 2001, p. 18; Gronke & Feaver, 2001, p. 150).

2.2. Switzerland – A Special Case with Regard to its Political and its Military Culture

The Swiss Military Culture differs quite strongly from the European standard military format based on standing forces and manned by conscripted citizen soldiers and a body of professional carrier and contract soldiers, a fact which influences the civil–military relations in the Alpine Republic in a considerable manner. Moreover, contrary to the European trends, Switzerland has not (yet) given up neither conscription nor its militia-based military system. The Swiss constitution states in Art. 58 (1) that Switzerland has an army which is organised as a militia system. The state is prohibited to establish a professional army and to have standing troops. According to Art. 59 (1) of the constitution, every Swiss male has to serve in the army for which reason the conscription is a duty of the citizens. By this, Switzerland represents a historic special case because it is except from Israel one of the last countries, which relies upon conscription and a militia system and does not keep standing troops. (Williams, 2000, p. 267; Haltiner & Hirt, 2000, 205f.). According to Klein, a militia system does not have permanent serving soldiers in the army (Klein, 1999, p. 13). On the contrary, it contains all men in an age liable for military service who have to undergo a short military education. After that they will be organised in units where they have to participate in periodical courses over a long time to enhance and refresh their skills and knowledge.

All officers have an identical militia status, and therefore only a very small corps of a professional elite exists. These officers are primarily instructors and only secondarily leaders of the military organisation (Haltiner, 1988, p. 257; Haltiner & Hirt, 2000, p. 213). However, the education is carried out by the militia itself. Therefore, most of the teachers are no professionals. The training reform for professional officers in 1991 might have changed this situation. The officers will be educated more scientifically and will approach a status of a soldier-statesman (Haltiner & Hirt, 2000, p. 214). The primary tasks of these professional officers are to teach, to lead, and to make a statement not only on military issues but also on political, social, economic, and ecological issues (Rettore, 2003, p. 269). This force structure should guarantee a small military presence and secures the civil control of the military organisation (Haltiner, 2000, p. 141). By that there is no threat that the militia is used by the state for aggressive purposes (Klein, 1999, 13f.).

Until 1990 the policy of neutrality and the defence of its territory was the major mission of the Swiss army. These policies are deeply rooted in the society for which reason it took a long time till Switzerland joined the

United Nations (UN) in 2002. Furthermore, Switzerland is not a member of the European Union and is very reluctant towards military alliances like the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). After the end of the Cold War, the increasing interdependence in the state community caused a reorientation of the military missions. Importance is laid rather on international co-operation which contains promotion of peace, prevention of war and defence of the Swiss territory, and assistance as a contribution to generally safeguarding our means of existence (Haltiner & Hirt, 2000, pp. 211–213).

To explain the relationship between the military and its society one has to look at its tradition which consists of the following three elements: "(…) compulsory military service for several hundred years, the absence of the utilization of the military as a tool of the ruling class and an army order unchanged for more than a century (…)" (Haltiner & Meyer, 1978, p. 9). In a state with a militia system no male person can avoid the contact with the army and becomes therefore aware of military issues (Haltiner & Hirt, 2000, p. 205, 211). This leads to a strong link between the military organisation and the society. Foot describes this relationship in the following way: "As the whole community is engaged in the task of self-Defence, no gulf can open between the armed forces and the nation: the two are virtually one." (Foot, 1961, 60f.). Furthermore, due to the militia system a militia career should enjoy a high degree of acceptance and even social prestige (Haltiner, 2000, p. 141). However, as stated in the theory of social change the attitude towards the military is becoming more indifferent also by Swiss society. On the one side, the military is accepted by the society and perceived as a necessary evil; on the other, the society is not ready to participate within the military (Haltiner, 2003b, p. 6). May be this is a reason why more and more people favour a professional army in Switzerland (Haltiner & Hirt, 2000, p. 215; Haltiner, Wenger, Bennett, & Szvircsev Tresch, 2003, p. 145). Taking the peculiarities of Swiss military culture into consideration, we expect a somewhat milder nature of a gap between the military and its parent society in comparison to the European average situation.

3. RESEARCH PROCEDURE AND METHODS IN THE SWISS STUDY

3.1. Common Research Plan

According to the research plan, each participating country is to survey a sample of at least 30 cadets at the military academies (15 in their first year

and 15 in their fourth year) and compare them with samples of at least 30 university students in each of the following faculties: economics, law, and political science. The research among university students is limited to three faculties in order to make an empirical examination manageable. The choice of the economics, law, and political science faculties was based on the assumption that they are major producers of civilian elites. This step of our research will be called "student survey". Simultaneously with the cadet and student surveys, each participating country is to interview experts in order to assess changes in both civilian and military culture, from the past to the present. These interviews serve as a methodological tool to handle the longitudinal dimension of the research issue. The idea is to select at least 10 experts on civil–military relations in every country. These are: two top military experts; two journalists on military affairs (from different nation-wide newspapers, television channels or other media); two members of parliament specialised in political–military decision-making (different political affiliations: preferably one from the right and one from the left); two scholars (from such fields as political science, history, international relations, etc.); and two managers.

3.2. Procedures and Surveys in Switzerland

To examine the cultural gap between the military and the Swiss society 300 students (83 women and 217 men) were questioned in their class rooms with a standardised questionnaire between mid-October and mid-December 2003 (the so-called "student survey"). The survey took place at the universities of Bern, Fribourg, Lausanne, St. Gallen, and Zurich. Of these 300 students, 211 are German speaking, 85 French, and 4 English. 109 students study at the military academy at the ETH Zurich, 39 are students of economy, 84 study law, 59 political science, and 9 something else. While the whole population of students at the Military Academy was surveyed, the civilian sample was selected randomly. Thirty-four per cent of the students are in their first year, 23% in their second and third year, 16% in their fourth year, and 2% of the students in their fifth year of studies. Twenty-three per cent of the 300 students are privates or non-commissioned officers (NCO) and 39% are officers (i.e., 109 professional officers at the military academy and 7 militia officers); 39% do not serve in the military. Only two women have any military experience. These two women study at the military academy and are professional military women. This is mentioned because apart from the

civil–military gap one has to distinguish a gender gap. In order to pay attention to this fact, we use the data in an appropriate way.

The statistical calculations are usually made for male military students (107 persons, 36% of the questioned students), male civilian students (110 persons, 37%), and female civilian students (81 persons, 27%). Male and female civilian students are examined as a single group for correlations, which showed no gender differences. The two questioned female military students are excluded from the statistical calculations because of a lack of representativeness. Between December 2003 and March 2004, additional qualitative interviews were held with 11 military experts representing different backgrounds. Two interviewees are military officers of high rank, three are members of the national assembly, two are journalists, another two are scientists, one interviewee represents the private economy and another participant represents the political, economic, and military side in unison. All of them are leading personalities in their specific professional field. The investigation is subdivided into four different parts: (1) civil–military relationship; (2) military and public opinion; (3) main security issues; and (4) military and politics. The main goal of these interviews is to analyse different aspects of the development of the civil–military relationship across time.

4. MAIN FINDINGS

4.1. Students Survey

4.1.1. Personal Values and Attitudes

On a left-to-right scale students had to indicate their political view. Thirty-eight per cent of the students are positioned on the right side of the scale, 36% on the left, and 26% in the centre. The subgroups for the military students, the male civilian students, and the female civilian students show the following political views: 67% of the military students are positioned on the right side, 28% in the centre, and 5% on the left side of the scale. Twenty-five per cent of the male civilian students are rightists, 29% are positioned in the centre, and 46% are leftists. Only 17% of the female civilian students are rightists, 20% are positioned in the centre, and 63% are leftists (Graph 1). This shows that the future military elite in Switzerland prefers rightist politics. Compared with the entire population, one can state that the military students are significantly more rightist. Conversely, the civilian students, and to a much higher degree the female civilian students,



Graph 1. Political Position (in per cent).



Graph 2. Interest in Security Issues (in per cent).

are more leftist compared to the entire population of the Swiss people above 18 years of age (Haltiner et al., 2003, p. 145).

Eighty-one per cent of all students are very or somewhat interested in security policy issues. This applies also to 96% of the military students and 82% of the male civilian students, whereas only 57% of the female civilian students show such an interest (Graph 2). However, the differences between the three subgroups are significant. The security policy interest of the students is very high compared to that of the entire Swiss population. In general, only 50% of the latter are interested in security policy issues.

Table 1. Confidence in Institutions (means).

Institutions	All Students	Military Students	Civil Students
Legal system*	7.43	7.72	7.26
Universities*	7.39	7.73	7.20
Government	6.73	7.03	6.55
Police*	6.64	7.78	5.99
Parliament	6.48	6.52	6.47
President*	5.85	6.30	5.60
Military*	5.66	8.16	4.24
Voluntary organisations*	5.41	4.83	5.73
Banks*	5.39	6.07	5.02
Companies*	5.02	5.64	4.67
Media	4.99	4.79	5.11
Trade unions*	4.94	4.38	5.26
Organised political parties	4.78	4.92	4.71
Church	4.43	4.52	4.38

Note: 1 = no confidence at all; 10 = complete confidence.
*Significant difference between military and civil students at the 0.05 level.

Confidence in Institutions. On a scale reaching from 1 (no confidence) to 10 (complete confidence) students had to indicate their confidence in 14 different institutions (Table 1). Significant differences between military and civilian students exist with regard to nine institutions and is greatest concerning the confidence in the military. With a mean of 8.16 military students have the greatest confidence in the military in contrast to the civilian students who have the lowest confidence in this institution with a mean of 4.24. Military students have also great confidence in the police, the universities, and the legal system. Except for the police, the civilian students have approximately the same level of confidence in these institutions as the military students. With a mean of 7.26 the civilian students have most confidence in the legal system followed by confidence in the universities with a mean of 7.20. Furthermore, military students show more confidence in the government, the president, the banks, and the companies than civilian students. On the other hand, voluntary organisations, the media, and trade unions are seen as more trustworthy by the civilian students than by the military students. With a mean of 4.38 military students have the lowest confidence in trade unions, whereas civilian students show a mid-level confidence in this institution with a mean of 5.26. It is obvious that military students have greater confidence in state authorities, especially the military, the government, and the president, than civilian students. The latter have

greater trust in institutions which are independent from the government and which observe it critically, such as the media and the trade unions. Although confidence in institutions differs between the two student groups, the general assessment of the 14 institutions is quite similar for both groups. Large deviations can be ascertained only for the military and the police.

The students also had to indicate their knowledge about the same institutions on a scale from 1 (completely ignorant) to 10 (perfect knowledge). A significant difference between military and civilian students is visible only for six of the 14 institutions. Military students' level of knowledge is lowest with regard to trade unions (mean 4.1), but it is not much higher for civilian students (mean 5). With a mean of 9, the military students have almost complete knowledge about the military whereas the mean is 6 for civilian students. Taking a closer look at the civilian students, one can see that the male students have a significant greater knowledge about the military (mean 6.8) than the female students (mean 4.7). It is remarkable to note that the knowledge about and the confidence in an institution correlates strongly. The greater the knowledge about an institution the more confidence the students have in it, and vice versa. Only in the case of organised political parties and the media this does not apply, because the knowledge about these two institutions is great while confidence in them is low.

Attachment to Global and Local Entities. On a scale from 1 (weakest attachment) to 10 (strongest attachment) students had to indicate their degree of attachment to 10 different global or local entities. Military as well as civilian students are most strongly attached to their families, friends, and themselves (mean for both groups is 9). Significant differences between military and civilian students exist concerning the attachment to Switzerland as well as to their profession and their colleagues. Military students feel more attached to these entities than civilian students. The military factor of cohesion is well visible in that the sense of belonging to a group is more distinct for military students. Further, significant differences between the two groups exist with regard to the commitment to Europe (mean for military students 5.3; mean for civilian students 6.4) and the world community (mean for military students 4.2; mean for civilian students 6) to which the civilian students feel more attached. All students show the weakest attachment to their religious community (mean 3). Apart from the strong attachment of all students to themselves and to persons of their closer environment one can say that civilian students feel more attached to global entities. Conversely, military students are more locally oriented and feel more attached with the immediate surroundings.

Virtues in Children's Education. The students were asked to indicate the importance of 19 virtues in the education of their children. In 13 virtues there is a significant difference between the military and the civilian students. All military students perceive the virtues as important. The most important virtues to them are comradeship, tolerance, and discipline. These values are very or rather important for at least 98% of the military students. Furthermore, values such as patriotism, tradition, and generosity are seen by more than 70% of the military students as important in children's education. Other virtues which are also weighted strongly by military students are orderliness, obedience, and honour. A significantly different opinion is held by civilian students. Only 15% of them consider the virtue patriotism and 39% the virtue tradition as important for the education of children. On the other hand, 96% of the civilian students see the virtues open-mindedness, tolerance, and sense of equality as very or rather important for the education of their children. Especially for male civil students, obedience is not as important for the education of their children. The differences between military and civilian students regarding the virtues in children's education are not very distinct. Nevertheless, one can say that military students assess conservative virtues as more important than civilian students. Moreover, these different attitudes between the military and the civilian students become clearer with regard to the statement that young people need a strict discipline from their parents. Ninety-one per cent of the military students as opposed to 39% of the civilian students agree with this statement. Above all, civilian students consider those virtues important which contribute to personality development.

Virtues for the Military. The students had to indicate the importance of the same virtues for the military. Again, there are significant differences between military and civilian students in 13 virtues. Military students consider all virtues important for the military with the exception of generosity. Ninety-seven per cent of the military students see the virtues responsibility, comradeship, team spirit, loyalty, orderliness, honesty, and initiative as important for the military (Graph 3). Furthermore, 89% of the military students assess the virtues tolerance and open-mindedness, and roughly 73% of the military students consider the virtues sense of equality and creativity as important for the military. Ninety-four per cent of the civilian students perceive the qualities orderliness, comradeship, and team spirit as very or rather important for the military. On the other hand, the virtues initiative, sense of equality, open-mindedness, creativity, and generosity are seen as very or rather unimportant by the civilian students. When examining only the male civilian students, one can see that they assess the qualities



Graph 3. Importance of Different Virtues for the Military (means).

responsibility and tolerance as less important for the military than the other two student groups.

To sum up, civilian students consider conservative virtues and virtues which contribute to the community as important for the military. Virtues which are connected to the personal fulfilment and individualism are seen by them as unimportant for the military. This is contrary to the military students who see these virtues as appropriate for the military. Furthermore, for military students, there exists no big difference between the importance of virtues for the education of their children and military virtues. In this respect, greater differences can be observed for civilian students. Male civilian students, especially see the virtues tolerance, creativity, sense of equality, generosity, initiative, and open-mindedness as important for the education of children but as unimportant for the military. On the other hand, for civilian students, the virtues of patriotism and tradition are unimportant for the education of children but important for the military.

Materialism – Post-Materialism Indicator (Inglehart-scale). Students had to indicate their choice of the most important and second most important goal of the Swiss government in domestic policy for the next 10 years. In so doing, a materialism – post-materialism indicator (Inglehart-scale) could be

created. The Inglehart-scale tries to explain the change in values from material qualities such as silence, order, prosperity, and security to post-material qualities such as self-realisation, ideas, environment, and direct democratic rights. The analysis shows that 23% of students are materialists, 14% are post-materialists, 35% are mixed materialists, and 24% mixed post-materialists. Examining the three subgroups military students, male civilian students, and female civilian students, it becomes clear that with 41% and 43%, respectively, the military students make up the largest share of materialists and mixed materialists. On the other hand, only 2% among them are post-materialists (Graph 4). An equal share of male civilian students are materialists (19%) and post-materialists (18%) as well as mixed materialists (32%) and mixed post-materialists (31%). Most of the female civilian students are mixed post-materialists (33%), followed by mixed materialists (32%) and post-materialists (26%). Hence, it follows that military students favour domestic goals to maintain order in the nation and to fight rising prices.

Conversely, female civilian students uphold the domestic goals to give the people more say in important government decisions and to protect freedom of speech. The male civilian students are spread across these four goals and form large mixed types.



Graph 4. Inglehart-Scale (in per cent).

The whole chapter and the personal values and views of the military and civilian students can be best summarised with adjectives. Military students can be characterised as rightist, conservative, economy and military friendly, loyal to the government, materialistic, very interested in security policy, and focused on Switzerland. Conversely, civilian students, especially female civilian students, are mostly leftist. Furthermore, civilian students are more individualistic, critical of the military, and less interested in security politics. These views are more distinct for the male civilian students. Female civilian students are post-materialistic, whereas male civilian students are either materialistic and post-materialistic. Finally, civilian students are internationally orientated, as well as critical of the government and the economy.

4.1.2. Security and Foreign Policy Issues

A significant difference in opinion between civilian and military students exists concerning the importance of eight of twelve foreign policy goals of Switzerland (Table 2). The most approved foreign policy goal of Switzerland

Table 2. Very and Rather Important Possible Foreign Policy Goals (in per cent).

Foreign Policy Goals	All Students	Military Students	Civilian Students
Preserve world peace*	91	88	93
Preventing and defending human rights in other countries	87	82	90
Fostering international co-operation to solve common problems, such as food shortages, inflation, and energy supplies*	87	83	89
Preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction	85	82	87
Combating world hunger*	82	63	92
Helping to improve the standard of living in less developed countries*	78	62	87
Worldwide arms control	75	69	78
Fighting terrorism*	75	89	67
Maintaining the external security of our country*	74	92	64
Strengthening the UN*	73	67	77
Helping to bring democratic form of government to other nations	65	60	68
Strengthening regional security alliances or agreements*	48	59	42

*Significant difference between military and civilian students at the 0.05 level.

is the preservation of world peace. For 93% of the civilian students and 88% of the military students this goal is very or rather important. The significant difference between the two student groups becomes clearer regarding the foreign policy goal of combating world hunger. This goal is important for 92% of the civilian students but only for 63% of the military students. Other foreign policy goals which are more important to civilian students than to military students are the fostering of international co-operation to solve common problems, helping improve the standard of living in less developed countries, and the strengthening of the UN. Consequently, civilian students support more soft goals. The most important foreign policy goal of Switzerland for military students is the maintaining of external security. For 92% of the military students this goal is very or rather important. Fighting terrorism is a further important foreign policy goal.

It becomes clear that civilian students approve of a strong co-operation in foreign policy issues, whereas the military students are more sceptical. Eighty-five per cent of the civilian students doubt that Switzerland should concentrate only on national problems and neglect the international perspective as opposed to 63% of the military students. Moreover, 91% of the civilian students agree that the national security of Switzerland depends more on international trade and a strong domestic economy than on military strength. This view is shared by only 60% of the military students. A large significant difference between civilian and military students exists also concerning the opinion on the UN. Military students are critical of the UN in contrast to civilian students who are in favour of them. Eighty-six per cent of the civilian students and 71% of the military students approve of a stronger UN because of the increasing multinational character of military missions. Furthermore, civilian students approve more strongly of UN co-operation in settling international disputes than military students. Civilian students are also in favour of a stricter UN control of all members' armed forces and consider the UN Security Council as the only power authorised to decide on military action against sovereign states. Moreover, both student groups strongly refuse military interventions against states or defence alliances. Eighty-six per cent of the military students and 84% of the civilian students disagree that the US should have the freedom to intervene in a state on its own initiative. The same applies to NATO. Finally, 57% of the military students and 68% of the civilian students disagree that military rather than political goals should determine when force is used.

Likelihood of Threats to the National Security of Switzerland. The students were asked to evaluate the likelihood of 16 threats to the national security of

Switzerland. With regard to eight threats, a significant difference between military and civilian students can be observed. For civilian students, environmental problems such as air pollution and water contamination are the most likely threats to the national security of Switzerland. Seventy per cent of the civilian students and 59% of the military students see this threat as very or rather likely. Conversely, 90% of the military students see international drug trafficking and attacks on computer networks as the most likely threats. Further, significant differences between military and civilian students exist with regard to mass immigration and organised crime. Eighty-nine per cent of the military students see the former threat as very or rather likely, whereas only a minority of the civilian students perceives mass immigration as a threat. Organised crime is a very or rather likely threat for 80% of the military students and 62% of the civilian students. Only a minority of the entire student sample perceives terrorism as a threat for Switzerland. All students agree that an accidental nuclear war or a military attack by a foreign state on Switzerland is not at all likely.

Possible Military Missions. The approval of military missions varies between civilian and military students (Table 3). Ninety-nine per cent of the military students approve missions to defend the country. Although this opinion is shared by 86% of the civilian students they differ significantly

Table 3. Very Strong and Rather Strong Approval of Possible Military Mission (in per cent).

Military Missions	All Students	Military Students	Civilian Students
Disaster relief	97	97	98
Humanitarian relief abroad	93	88	96
National defence*	89	99	86
Peacekeeping missions*	87	95	83
Environmental conservation*	69	52	82
Prevention of domestic disorder*	63	74	57
Fighting terrorism*	58	66	56
Preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction*	55	61	53
Control of mass immigration*	50	79	33
Peace-enforcing missions	40	50	36
Fighting drug trafficking	40	37	43
Combat missions*	22	45	10

*Significant difference between military and civilian students at the 0.05 level.

from military students. The participation in peacekeeping missions is approved by 95% of the military students and 83% of the civilian students. Further, military missions that are approved more strongly by military students than by civilian students are missions to control mass immigration and missions dealing with domestic unrest. On the other hand, civilian students support more strongly than military students' military missions to provide disaster and humanitarian relief abroad. A significant difference between the two groups exists concerning the support of a military mission to protect the environment. Eighty-two per cent of the civilian students and 52% of the military students approve of such a mission.

Summary. The results of this chapter can be summarised as follows: Regarding foreign policy issues, intensified international co-operation of Switzerland is a higher priority for civilian students than for military students. According to civilian students, Switzerland should deal with foreign policy issues which contribute to a better environment and humanity. These missions should take place under the auspices of the UN. Conversely, military students follow a more unilateral course. They prefer issues which have direct implications on Switzerland and which can be reached without a close co-operation with the international system. A similar picture can be drawn for Switzerland's security policy. Civilian students believe that a secure international environment has positive implications on Switzerland, too. This is why they approve military missions which contribute to such an environment. Military students connect security policy with national defence and therefore take a more traditional view. Thus, they prefer military missions which contribute in a unilateral way to the security of Switzerland. These different opinions appear again concerning the defence budget. The military students' unilateral focus on Switzerland and the measures connected with it, demand an increase of the budget. Conversely, the civilian students support an international co-operation of Switzerland which is possible by other funds than those of the defence budget.

4.1.3. Military Issues

A significant difference between military and civilian students exists regarding the perception of the democratic control of the military. Only 35% of the military students believe that in Switzerland the political leaders and average citizens share the same values and 36% of military students even deny any such correlation (Graph 5). On the other hand, 45% of the military students think that the values of military leaders and those of the average citizen are congruent. Obviously, military students consider the



Graph 5. Do Political/Military Leaders Share the Same Values as Our Citizens? (in per cent).

differences in values between the political leaders and the citizenship as greater than the ones between military leaders and citizens. It seems as though military students had only limited confidence in the political leadership. On the other hand, civilian students consider the difference in values between military leaders and average citizens as greater than differences between politicians' and citizens' values. Forty per cent of the civilian students think that the political leaders of Switzerland hold the same values as average citizens. On the other hand, only 12% of the civilian students see a convergence between the values of the military leaders and those of the citizens.

Furthermore, only 46% of the military students credit political leaders with having good knowledge of the modern military, whereas 65% of the civilian students think that the leaders are knowledgeable in this matter. Although military students are critical of the political leaders, they do not call into question democratic control and the loyalty to the government. The majority of the military and the civilian students agree that the military is subordinate to the political leadership (98% versus 91%) and should not have direct political influence on society (73% of the military students versus 94% of the civilian students). More military students (54%) than civilian students (41%) agree that members of the military should not criticise members of the government publicly. The military should publicly advocate the military policies it believes are in the best interests of the country (91% of the military students versus 69% of the civilian students).

Democratic Basic Rights. When examining the issue of democratic basic rights only a small difference between military and civilian students is visible. For more than 95% of all students, the respect for individuals and the basic freedoms of the individual, such as the freedom of assembly, freedom of speech and press, are important principles. However, the individual is more important to civilian students than to military students. Civilian students approve somewhat more strongly of equality as well as of the safeguarding of individual opportunities and responsibilities. For 95% of the civilian students as opposed to 85% of the military students the peaceful relationship with other societies in the world is very or rather important. The subordination of the military to the political leadership is also an important principle for 83% of the civilian students and 74% of the military students. This stands in opposition to the results reported above where it was shown that military students consider this principle as more important. The integration of the military into Swiss society is seen by 91% of the military students as very or rather important, whereas for 60% of the civilian students this democratic principle is very or rather unimportant. This is a direct indicator for the existence of a civil–military gap. The military wants to integrate itself into society but the society does not seem to be interested in that.

According to the whole sample of students, all basic rights are realised in Switzerland. More than three quarters of all questioned students agree with all mentioned principles. The principle considered most sceptical is the integration of the military in society. For 68% of the military and 58% of the civilian students this principle is realised. Eighty-eight per cent of the military students and only 63% of the civilian students agree with the statement that with human nature being as it is, there will always be war. This negative view of the military students could be a reason why 61% of them believe that the most important role of the military is the preparation for and conduct of war. Only 25% of the male civilian students agree with this statement as do only 8% of the female civilian students. Furthermore, 87% of the civilian students and only 42% of the military students agree that peacekeeping and other non-combat activities should be central military functions. For 97% of the military students the main task of the military is the defence of Switzerland and its interests. Although a majority (59%) of the civilian students share this opinion, a great discrepancy exists regarding this task of the military.

The Military as an Institution. The military as an institution is questioned much more by civilian students than by military students. While none of the

student groups wants to abolish the military, there are great differences of opinion between military and civilian students. Ninety-nine per cent of the military students are clearly against an abolition of the military, whereas 45% of the civilian students are in favour of an abolition. Furthermore, 51% of the civilian students and only 22% of the military students consider the military a necessary evil. Seventy-seven per cent of the civilian students and 30% of the military students disagree strongly with the statement that the military is the most important part of public life (Graph 6).

Image of the Military Profession. Interestingly, the image of the military profession in the public eye in Switzerland is valued more or less similarly by military (mean 5.17) and civilian students (mean 6.04). This means that on a



Graph 6. Opinions about the Military (in per cent).

scale from 1 (very positive image) to 10 (very negative image) military students value the image of the military profession slightly more positive than civilian students. This tendency is supported by the fact that military students (94%) are more proud of women and men who served in the military than civilian students (22%). This difference between military and civilian students is manifested by asking for the prestige of certain professions, whereby the most prestigious profession received the value 1, the second most prestigious the value 2, and so on. The prestige of the military officers is valued as 8 by the military students and as 12.4 by the civilian students. This shows that there exists a significant difference between the military and the civilian students in judging the prestige of the military officer. For civilian students, the profession of a military officer has the lowest prestige. Interestingly, military officers judge their own prestige as only average. This confirms the results reported above for the image of the military profession in the public eye, which was also judged as average by military students. A further significant difference between the two groups exists for the prestige of journalists, which are considered more prestigious by civilian than by military students. This is an indicator that military students consider media reports about the military more negative than civilian students, which will be confirmed in the following section.

The Mass Media and the Military. The mass media depictions of the military in Switzerland are seen as supportive by only 7% and as neutral by 34% of the military students. Thirty-four per cent of the civilian students consider the mass media depictions of the military as supportive and 45% as neutral. These results correspond with the statement that "only Switzerland seems to be a partial exception to the general tendency of the military to court the media" (Williams, 2000, p. 269). Furthermore, civilian as well as military students perceive the public image of the armed forces in the Swiss society as negative but the correlation is not significant. However, this trend and the results mentioned above for the image and the prestige of the military profession and the military as an institution, support the thesis that the media reflect the views of the public with regard to the military.

Conscription Versus All-Volunteer Force. Military students continue to support conscription as opposed to civilian students who approve a change of the format and size of the military. A significant difference between these two groups exists only concerning the question whether there exists a natural link between democracies and conscription. Eighty-five per cent of the military students as compared to only 29% of the civilian students agree

that there is such a link. Furthermore, 62% of the civilian students are of the opinion that an all-volunteer force (AVF) fits the requirements of new missions better than conscription does. This is supported by only 34% of the military students. Seventy-five per cent of the civilian students are of the opinion that an AVF is less expensive than conscription due to the lower waste of human resources. This opinion is accepted by only 29% of the military students. The critical view of the militia system by civilian students and its support from the military students becomes clearer when looking at the statement that all citizens should be required to do some military or civilian service. Only 59% of the civilian students in contrast to 97% of the military students agree that male citizens should be required to do such a service. Looking at the statement that all female citizens should be required to do some military service, one can distinguish a male–female gap. This statement is approved more strongly by male students than by female students. Eighty-three per cent of the female civilian students, 67% of the male civilian students, and 63% of the military students are against a complete and compulsory integration of women into the armed forces.

That there is a civil–military gap, as proposed in the theoretical part of this work, becomes clear with regard to the following statement: The draft guarantees a steady exchange of values, opinions, and perceptions between the civil society and the armed forces. Ninety-three per cent of the military students agree with this statement as opposed to only 41% of the civilian students.

In summarising this chapter, we can emphasise that civilian students see a difference in values between the military and the society because according to them no steady exchange of values between these two cultures exits. This is made especially clear by the negative image that civilian students have of the military in society. Furthermore, civilian students uphold the rights and freedoms of the individual and support peacekeeping and non-combat missions for the military. Moreover, they are critical of the militia system and conscription and favour an AVF.

Although the military students are aware of the critical view that society takes of the military, they see a strong interconnection between the military and society and perceive the military as well integrated in society. Therefore, in their view, a difference in values between these two cultures does not exist. According to the military students, a gap is avoided by a steady exchange of values between the military and society. Thereby, the democratic control and the loyalty to the government is secured. Moreover, for military students, the central task of the military is to safeguard the independence and security of Switzerland as it is stated in the Swiss constitution. These reasons

contribute to the fact that military students want to maintain conscription. In conclusion, we can distinguish five different areas of civil–military relations in Switzerland with different sizes of the civil–military gap (Graph 7).

4.2. Elite Survey

4.2.1. Civil–military Relationship

In this section, past and present civil–military tensions as well as their causes are examined. There is a strong agreement among the interviewees that civil–military tensions used to be much stronger in the past than today.[1] The main tensions of the past mentioned are (1) conflicts between military and political leaders before and during times of war;[2] (2) the "Mirage" (war plane) affair in the 1960s; (3) the referendum on the abolishment of the army in 1989; and (4) the reform of the Armed Forces ("Army XXI"). Some of the interviewees find that there are no tensions at all today or prefer to speak about differences of opinion or transitional problems because they find that today's civil–military conflicts are too minor to use the word "tensions". One interviewee says that there are no civil–military tensions whatsoever but that the tensions within the military establishment and among the political elite are much greater than the tensions between the average military officer and the average politician.

Today's areas of tensions which are mentioned include (1) the military budget (especially the representatives of the army put a lot of emphasis on this point); (2) the debate about the army's missions; (3) a lack of support of the army by the private economy; (4) the intelligence service; (5) unprofessional behaviour of military officers during the reform of the army; and (6) the new professionalism in the army (in contrast to the conscript army and the militia concept). The military budget and the debate about the missions of the army are by far the areas of tensions that are most frequently mentioned.

Some of the main causes that are mentioned for these tensions include (1) the growing budget deficit of the Federation; (2) an insufficient cost management of the army (ratio of running costs and investments that must be improved); (3) the global competition that has become so fierce that SMEs (Small and Medium Enterprises) have more and more difficulties to support the army with personnel resources (militia system); (4) different personalities and perspectives of military and political leaders; and (5) a lack of civil understanding for some of the army's missions, as well as (6) the negative attitude of the citizens towards the army as a result of bad experiences



Graph 7. Value Differences between Civilian and Military Students are Especially Large Concerning.

during military service. It is remarkable that despite their different political and functional backgrounds, most interviewees assess the civil–military relationship quite similarly. The conscription is considered to be a minimising factor for the tensions between the society and the military. But the militia system – which is connected with conscription – is considered by some to induce the militarisation of civil society.

4.2.2. The Military and Public Opinion

This section include questions concerning (1) the opportunity of military officers to express their opinion in public and the consequences there from; (2) the citizens' attitude towards the Armed Forces; and (3) the press coverage on the army. There is a consent that military officers have the right to speak to the press today, as long as a certain political and situational sensitivity is kept in mind.[3] However, there are two interviewees who highlight that under a former defence minister public statements by military officers were practically banned. A politician and a representative of the media say that it would be even desirable if military officers expressed their opinion more often, because professional and fact-oriented statements are valuable for the formation of public opinion and are also a useful information channel. Some of the interviewees mention the potential loss of reputation resulting from public military statements that are unobjective or kept in a tone that is different from what the public is used to. An interviewee from the political side is appalled that military officers who got involved too much in public discussions have been laid off. All in all freedom of expression is looking as a positive factor because the critical faculty of the military can be improved by this way.

Concerning the citizens' attitude towards the Armed Forces almost all interviewees agree that there is still a strong public support of the army, but that the military is not as well anchored in the public as it used to be.[4] While the public image of the army has improved,[5] the general attitude towards the army has also become more indifferent. According to representatives of the scientific side, there is a decreasing understanding of the sense of the army's missions. Also, it is questionable if people will agree that the army carries out police tasks any longer.

Concerning the media attitude towards the Armed Forces, the assessments vary. Representatives of the military and the private economy perceive the media output as positive and look at it as a controlling body. They see the media as a partner who is sometimes rather critical but who is responsible for a valuable contribution to the public civil–military dialogue. The media and science representatives agree that the quality of the articles is

often insufficient, and that there are few competent journalists. The tabloids are criticised, because their stories about scandals and personal failures do not contribute to a constructive discussion about issues of real relevance for the civil–military relationship. A scientist says that over time, there are three stages in the medial–military relation: During the Cold War (stage 1), the army was hardly ever criticised because investigative journalism was a taboo and inopportune. In the 1980s (stage 2), the reporting was very critical in the course of peace movements. Today (stage 3), the media are very much fact-oriented and objective.

4.2.3. Main Security Issues

This sections contains questions about the military missions and about the military budget. Concerning the military missions there is a remarkable diversity of different views and observations. The military representatives are very clear about the army's missions and basically refer to the missions defined by the Swiss constitution. The politicians are very much discordant and see the national defence either as most important or least important mission. Most of the interviewees, however, agree that the political environment has changed dramatically after the end of the Cold War, and that in reality national defence has lost some of its importance, while other missions such as peace support and support of the police have become more relevant. There are very different views on why the parliament (that is competent to change and redefine military laws and the army's missions) has not stayed abreast of changes of the political environment:

- A scientist says that the politicians as well as the military officers have understood the decreasing importance of national defence long ago. However, both groups must be considerate of the fact that people are more conservative, he says. They don't necessarily understand that the concept of armed neutrality which has worked for centuries will not be useful anymore in the future. That's why the parliament and the Federal Council prefer an army that can carry out very different tasks. A journalist has a similar opinion. He says that politicians are afraid to admit that national defence has lost its importance. Politicians and representatives of the private economy say that especially the Federal Council should take a path-breaking decision because the politicians are discordant, but that the Federal Council does not have the courage to redefine the missions of the army.
- Another journalist states that politicians have still not realised that the Cold War is over, whereas military officers have much better understood

the importance of international co-operation. However they don't express their opinion on a political level.

- A politician says that not the politicians, but some military officers have still not realised that the Cold War is over.
- A scientist says that depending on each of the army's missions, politicians as well as military officers are discordant among themselves: Concerning the question whether an autonomous national defence is feasible and reasonable, there are very different views among the military officers as well as among the politicians. The peace support function is mainly supported by the military officers due to its importance for the military lessons learned process, whereas the politicians are generally more critical because many of them see this mission from the perspective of neutrality. The only military task supported by all is emergency aid.

According to almost all interviewees, the military budget is a major civil–military area of tension. According to the military officers and a parliamentarian, the main problem is that the army cannot fulfill all the different missions defined by the parliament if the parliament is not willing to grant the required funds. This has negative effects on the army's professionalism, credibility and military vigour. Other parliamentarians say that the citizens would support further reductions of the military budget.[6] The military officers insist that the political side has to take strategic decisions: Since military investments (for example, new weapons) are long-term investments, the political side must be clear about the army's missions. This is the only way to prevent that useless but expensive long-term investments are made. The military officers also mention two improvement opportunities: First, there is a strong need for a global budget, which would be more efficient because the military leaders know best what they need to fulfill the missions defined by the political side. Statements of politicians seem to approve this view: They say that politicians normally don't have the needed knowledge to assess the military purchases properly. Second, the army's internal controlling and the ratio of running costs and investments have to be improved and international benchmark methods must be implemented.

4.2.4. Military and Politics

The purpose of this section is to investigate (1) to what extent there is a political control over the Armed Forces and (2) to describe the interaction between the political and the military side during the political process. All interviewees agree that theoretically, there is not only a strong political control over the army,[7] but also a clear task-sharing: The politicians define

the missions of the army and take strategic decisions, whereas the military officers bear the operational responsibility. However, as far as the reality is concerned, the opinions were divided into two main groups:

– Five interviewees say in one way or the other that the political influence on the military is less distinctive than the legal situation would suggest.[8] Because of the militia system, the political, economic, and military elites are sometimes mingled so that it is not always clear who influences whom. There is a strong agreement that the military knowledge of parliamentarians is generally very low and that politicians are often completely swamped when they should assess military questions of detail. A parliamentarian says that politicians rely very much on information provided by military officers and that, therefore, a strong military influence on politicians concerning military questions is exerted. Two interviewees also mention the visits of the troops by parliamentary delegations, which were meant to be a part of parliamentary control over the army but in reality is at best an advanced training course for the parliamentarians.
– The other interviewees say that there is a strong and sufficient political control of the army: The military representatives perceive the political control as very strict and say they would welcome a larger scope of action. Especially, as far as the military budget is concerned, a global budget would be far more efficient, they say. Other interviewees from the political, economic, scientific, and medial side underline the far-reaching control competences of the parliament and the Federal council as well as the militia concept, and the direct democracy as very powerful means of political control (no gap between the professional military leaders and the non-professional political representatives).

According to one interviewee, the political influence on the army has become stronger over the last few decades, as opposed to the 19th and the first half of the 20th century when the political environment was very unsafe and the control of the army by the civilian population was weaker than today. As far as improvement opportunities are concerned, there is a strong agreement that the role of the political and military leadership should be divided better: The political side should focus more on strategic decisions which have a large financial and political impact. The military side on the other hand should be given more operational scope of action, since only military officers have the required know-how to run the army efficiently. The creation of the position of a chief commander of the army is considered as a first step in the right direction.

5. CONCLUSION

The civil–military tension used to be much stronger in the past than today. Today, it seems the tensions between the average military officer and the average politician are much greater.

- New tensions emerge on the question of the military budget and the debate about the army's missions. All in all the interviewees assess the civil–military relationship quite similarly. Concerning the citizens' attitude towards the Armed Forces almost all interviewees agree that there is still a strong public support of the army, but that the military is not as well anchored in the public as it used to be. The relationship to the media is more and more fact-oriented and objective.
- The military representatives are very clear about the army's missions and basically refer to the missions defined by the Swiss constitution. Contrary to that, the statements about the army's missions and the military budget by the politicians seem to be more influenced by the party line than by objective considerations. For the military there is a strong need for a global budget, which would be more efficient because the military leaders know best what they need to fulfil the missions defined by the political side.
- Theoretically, there is not only a strong political control over the army, but also a clear task sharing: The politicians define the missions of the army and take strategic decisions, whereas the military officers bear the operational responsibility. In one way or the other, it seems that the political influence on the military is less distinctive than the legal situation would suggest. Because of the militia system, the political, economic, and military elites are sometimes mingled so that it is not always clear who influences whom.

The civil–military gap and the value distinctions between civilian students and military students which exist today are not equal for all issues:

- The gap is strongest regarding military issues. These issues comprise tasks and functions of the military system, values of the military organisation, and the defence capability of the military.
- Also a deep civil–military gap and great value distinctions between civilian and military students can be seen with security and foreign issues. There are differences for the interest in security policy, the image of the UN, the willingness of international co-operation, and the attachment to the world.

– For the comprehension of the state and for aspects of citizenship a somewhat strong civil–military gap exists. Value distinction can be seen for trusts and beliefs in authorities and institutions, political attitudes, the attachment to the country, the materialism-post-materialism index, and global–local matters.
– A small civil–military gap exists for the threat perception. Civilian students focus more on the environment, military students are more aware of organised crime, mass migration, and drugs.
– A very small civil–military gap can be seen for basic attitudes on the nature of the human being. This comprises issues like the use of force and the violence for conflict solution.
– No differences between civilian and military students exist for basics in socialisation and values, the attachment to the family and peer groups, the self-attachment, religion, democratic basic rights, and the way of looking at the society.

All in all in Switzerland there is not a fear for a widening of the civil–military gap. Rather one can say that the existing gap has been reduced since the end of the Cold War insofar as the relationship between society and military is on a more objective basis, and the myth of the militia system has vanished.

NOTES

1. Only one parliamentarian and the military side have a somewhat different views: The parliamentarian says that civil–military tensions have increased over the last 14 years. However, the areas of tensions mentioned by this individual do not vary much from the statements of the other interviewees. The representatives of the military say that there have always been some tensions but that they are not bigger than they used to be.

2. These were mostly conflicts between the general of the army (which exists only at times of war) and the Federal Council, when the general's focus was on the defence of the country, and the Federal Council's focus was influenced by a multitude of different interests.

3. It is said that it must either be clearly visible that a personal opinion is expressed (if the officer speaks as a citizen) or that fact-oriented and professional information must be provided (if the officer speaks as an official member of the army).

4. One interviewee has a somewhat different view: He says that on the one hand, there are citizens who support the army very strongly and who are not critical at all towards the army. On the other, there are citizens who are very much opposed to the army which becomes a burden for the military, he said.

5. The army's image has mainly improved due to their clean-up efforts after natural disasters and because there is less chicanery during military service.

6. It is remarkable that statements about the army's missions and the military budget seem to be more influenced by the party line than by objective considerations.

7. The parliament and the Federal Council pass military laws and even military standing orders. A major means of control is the parliamentary authority concerning the military budget. There are also parliamentary delegations that visit the troops. In the new military law 2002 there is a political controlling mechanism (article 149b). Periodically, the MoD has to write up an evaluation report about the achievement of objectives. Finally, the militia system and direct democracy ensure a control of the army by the civil population.

8. Comment of the authors: These statements generally seemed far more sophisticated than the statements of the other group that highlighted the strong political control over the army.

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PART IV:
WOMEN, CONFLICT AND THE MILITARY

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WOMEN IN AN INSECURE WORLD

Marie Vlachová

Gender-based violence is directed against a woman because she is a woman or affects women disproportionately. It includes acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty.

Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 11th Session, 1992

1. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: SCOPE, MAGNITUDE AND ROOTS

In the past, the attendees to Research Committee 01 (RC 01) workshops and conferences had several opportunities to get acquainted with results of the members' research on the integration of servicewomen into armed forces. In Ankara, for the first time gender issues were presented in a broad framework of the combat against gender-based violence to which women are exposed both in peace time and during wars and armed conflicts. The panel[1] met with attentive interest of the conference participants, which might justify this rather experimental enlargement of RC 01 traditional interests. In the following introduction to the panel's papers I would like to indicate why gender-based violence should be included into future activities of the ISA RC 01. Let us start with some facts which have been randomly selected during the course of 25 November 2003, on the so-called International Day

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for the Elimination of Violence against Women, from online media (Vlachová & Biason, 2005):

– According to the World Bank, about 113 million women are missing as a result of female infanticide (female foetuses being aborted or newborn girls being killed) and neglect of young girls, which has led to a severe gap in the demographic composition of the population of China, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia and the Philippines.
– In the year 2000, an estimate of 700,000–2 million women and children throughout the world were subjected to trafficking across international borders. Moreover, trafficking in women is not restricted to the developing world alone. For instance, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, an estimated 750–1,000 women are trafficked for exploitation in local brothels each year.
– According to the 1998 United Nations Study on the Status of Women, one woman is raped every 26 s in South Africa. Throughout Africa, women and girls have to live with the fear of becoming the victims of crimes of sexual violence; crimes which might result in many women contracting HIV/AIDS in a region where millions of them have already died because of violence and unprotected sexual relations. Women and girls in other developing countries such as South Asia and Southeast Asia, the Caribbean and Central America are equally vulnerable, as the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS continues.
– The World Health Organisation (WHO) estimates that 6,000 girls are genitally mutilated every day. More than 130 million girls and women worldwide have been subjected to female genital cutting, and a further 2 million girls are at risk. Girls and women are subjected to genital mutilation in at least 28 – mostly African – countries.
– The most crucial and widespread form of female suffering is domestic violence as experienced by women in their homes and at the hands of their 'intimate' partners and/or family members. In 2002, the Council of Europe announced that violence against women was the major source of death and disability for women aged between 16 and 44 years. Studies which were conducted in 2003 demonstrate that all women, no matter what their condition is, are vulnerable and this includes pregnant women who may suffer the same plight. For instance, a current assessment in a hospital in the UK indicated that 3% of the 500 pregnant women who took part in the survey had experienced some form of violence during their pregnancy; in Namibia this figure is in the order of 6% of the 1,500 women surveyed. These figures are mere assessments of the actual range of

violence as domestic violence is a delicate and complex problem and some studies record that 6 out of 10 women fail to report their victimisation. Furthermore, those who do report their ill-treatment to the authorities, only do so after having been subjected to an average of 35 assaults.

All of these cases are evidence of violence committed against women, for the reason that they are women, i.e. because the status that society accords to their gender permits men (for the most part) to behave violently against women (for the most part). It is obvious that other groups of the population may be affected in a similar manner, but female victims of gender-based violence deserve special attention, not only because they represent the majority of victims, but also because, as opposed to children or the elderly, women can fight the violence both actively and effectively.[2] Gender-based violence is both of a physical and psychological nature and cuts through all cultures and societies. It is committed within the family (battering, sexual abuse of female children, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital circumcision, and other traditional practices that have proven to be harmful to women; non-spousal violence, and violence that accompanies various forms of female exploitation), in communities (sexual abuse, harassment, and intimidation in the workplace and educational institutions, trafficking in women, and forced prostitution), as well as in society at large (see Table 1).

Violence afflicts all demographic groups of the female population, although to some extent its scope and forms reflect the stage of economic, political and social development. While traditional forms of gender-based violence centred on religion and customary law dominate in developing countries, in developed countries domestic violence with women's partners as perpetrators is the most frequent type of violent behaviour. Although all women are potential victims, certain groups are more exposed to the violence, such as indigenous women, women from ethnic minority groups, female refugees and internally displaced women, migrant women, women living in rural and remote communities, destitute women, female children and elderly women, and last but not least, women and girls in situations of armed conflicts. Some types of violent behaviour are restricted to certain religious groups, others are ubiquitous. Perpetrators may be both individuals and communities, both non-state institutions, such as paramilitary forces, or state institutions that are not able to protect vulnerable groups of citizens.

Gender-based violence is a part of complex social, political and economic phenomena of a global character, and therefore any measures for its

Table 1. Gender Violence Throughout the Life Cycle.

Gender Violence Throughout the Life Cycle
Prenatal phase
Battering during pregnancy (emotional and physical effects on the woman; effects on birth); coerced pregnancy; deprivation of food and liquids; sex-selective abortion
Infancy
Female infanticide; emotional and physical abuse; differential access to food and medical care for girl infants
Childhood
Child marriage; genital mutilation; sexual abuse by family members and strangers; differential access to food and medical care; child prostitution
Adolescence
Rape and marital rape; sexual assault; forced prostitution; trafficking in women; courtship violence; economically coerced sex; sexual abuse at the workplace
Reproductive age
Abuse of women by intimate partners; marital rape; dowry abuse and murders; partner homicide; psychological abuse; sexual abuse at the workplace; sexual harassment; rape; abuse of women with disabilities; legal discrimination
Old-age
Abuse and exploitation of widows

Source: UNDP (1998).

elimination that are straightforward or too simplistic usually fail in a long-term perspective. Recent changes in the global labour market, enabling women from developing countries to migrate in order to find jobs, lie against the background of trafficking in women, one of the worst forms of violence against women. According to some estimates, women represent one half of the 120 million legal and illegal migrants presently working abroad. Moreover, in some countries, for instance in Sri Lanka, it is primarily the women who leave their homes to search for better job opportunities abroad. The increase in the number of women migrating from Third World countries represents a response to the demand for services connected with the traditional roles of women namely child care, domestic housekeeping and sex services. This demand for traditional female work was strengthened as women from the West began to take on professional careers and to compete with men in the workplace, and therefore having much less time to perform traditional domestic duties. Thus, the piteous destiny of a Moldovan girl working in some of Kosovo's brothels is part of an invisible, yet powerful change in the global market. Any solutions for eliminating trafficking in women that do not take into consideration these varied and complex factors have no chance of success.

The most theorising and holistic concept of roots of gender-based violence is offered by feminism according to which the roots of this ancient

phenomenon must be sought in the patriarchal character of gender relations present in almost all existing cultures and societies. The inequalities are encoded in gender roles and forged into our attitudes, values and behaviour in the process of socialisation. In some Islamic countries women's lives are believed to be of less value than that of men. This belief is even translated in the penal code wherein a female homicide is compensated by only half as much as a male homicide is, and marital rape is not considered to be a crime in the civil code as women traditionally have a duty to be subservient to their husband, including to their sexual demands. In the environmental stream of feminism it is western society that is understood as a typical patriarchy, and western modern science and development as male, patriarchal projects, threatening to annihilate nature and the entire human species. For instance, the Indian physician, environmentalist and activist Vandana Shiva argues that the whole process of exploitation of nature for profit maximisation can be understood as new patterns of domination over women who bear the brunt of impoverishment of rural areas in the developing world (Shiva, 2002, pp. 2–5). Not only does the access to basic resources such as food, clean water, health care, education, land, seeds and agricultural tools, but also the possibility to participate in decision-making about societal priorities appear to be problematic areas of gender equality. Poverty, underdevelopment and a lack of economic resources are other causes of persistent gender inequalities, and consequently, of violence used in order to keep women in their subordinated status.

But again, the situation is not so simple that we could make an unambiguous correlation between poverty and gender-based violence. The economic boom of Asian countries in the 1970s and 1980s has not changed deeply rooted gender relations, which have been in existence for centuries. It resulted in an unprecedented heyday of regional sex industries satisfying the needs of both tourists and local men. As introduced by Louise Brown in her book on the Asian sex industry, 'there is a beautifully neat symmetry: strict sexual codes and rigorously male-dominated societies are mirrored by widespread systems of sexual slavery and regular supply of trafficked women to the sex trade' (Brown, 2000, p. 25).

The existence of two different spheres of life – the public and the private one – with different powers for men and women is another cause of the persistent reproduction of violence against women. Most of the violence is perpetrated in the privacy of households, in order to maintain the traditional structure of gender relations. Here the legal protection of individuals established in the public sphere of work, public institutions and social interactions has been substituted by men's rights to control women's behaviour and,

when viewed as necessary, to discipline those who disobey. Violence in families is omnipresent and immense in magnitude whether it takes a form of battering, sexual abuse or female genital mutilation, acid attacks, dowry related or honour killing. It is supported by common laws and religious beliefs shared by whole communities. The legal protection of women exposed to domestic violence is not customary, especially in countries with weak, ineffective or corrupt state institutions. These prevailingly male-dominated institutions tend to view violence against women as being less weighty and protection worthy than crimes against men. The traditional social attitudes towards violence against women have resulted in an unusually high frequency of violent acts against women and girls in Latin America, the Caribbean, the Middle East and in the Western regions of Asia. Yet, these 'macho' standards also appear in western countries – for instance the statistics on violence against women in the United States do not make pleasant reading either. According to reports made by the US Department of Justice in 1998, approximately 4.8 million intimate partner rapes and physical assaults are perpetrated against American women annually.

Armed conflicts, coup d'états and regime changes are a breeding ground for atrocities against women. The protection of civilians, represented for the most part by women and children, which is guaranteed by international humanitarian law, has failed in the armed conflicts and wars of the past decade. Moreover, wars and conflicts are prone to exacerbate existing inequalities and patterns of discrimination. Therefore, women who are exposed to discrimination in peacetime are victimised to an even greater extent during wartime. Not only that they bear the brunt of the responsibility for caring for the family in situations where there is a general lack of survival commodities such as food, water and medication, but – as evidenced during the recent wars in Africa, Asia and Europe – women and girls were also exposed to sexual violence and exploitation; they were forced to follow the camps of the armed forces and to provide domestic and sexual services for the soldiers of belligerent parties. In ethnic conflicts in particular, sexual violence against women has been employed as a weapon of war, a method which is deliberately used in order to humiliate and unnerve the enemy by violating the adversary's most private sanctuary – be it his house, or his wife or daughter – and spread terror in order to trigger a wave of refugees, thus facilitating 'ethnic cleansing'.

Violence against women in war situations has been relatively widely reported by the media, but there is a surprising lack of exact statistics documenting its scope and, of course, as time passes the chance of gaining more precise data diminishes. Nevertheless, the existing numbers are shocking

enough: in Africa alone, the number of 'war rapes' is estimated to be hundreds of thousands of cases, and the number of rapes committed during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina has been estimated up to 60,000 cases (see Table 2). Moreover, in the countries with high frequency of HIV/AIDS, systematic mass raping results in the further spread of the disease. A massive flight of civilians from any country affected by an armed conflict is another inevitable consequence of war, and women and children represent the most numerous group among war refugees and internally displaced persons. Even in refugee camps, which should provide protection for the defenceless, again it is the women who suffer various forms of violent behaviour.

Violence against women is not only immoral and illegal, but also costly. Considering the increased investments necessary for its alleviation and remedy; it is more and more often addressed as a grave obstacle to development. Although the quantification of human suffering might be rather problematic and uneasy from the point of methods used, some recent studies show that the costs of violence represent quite a significant burden not only for developing economies but even for western countries (SIDA, 2004; WHO, 2003). For instance, in Canada, annual gender-related costs are estimated to reach 3 billions of US $, which represents about 1% of the Canadian GDP. In certain situations women have fled to refuge shelters, a phenomenon which has reached record levels in Switzerland, with 55,459 nights being spent in women's shelters in 2002. In Switzerland, the cost of protecting women and children who are suffering domestic violence is evaluated at over 400 million Swiss Francs per year. In the US alone, the health costs of violence against women including intimate partner assaults, rape and murders amount to US $ 5.8 billion a year (See Table 3).

Some consequences of gender-based violence cannot be expressed in financial terms although they affect societies and even regions very gravely. Female infanticides have misbalanced the demographic structure of populations of whole regions as happened recently in Northern India where the

Table 2. Estimated Incidents of War-Related Violence Against Women.

Country	Period	Estimations
Sierra Leone	1991–2001	50,000–64,000 women
Rwanda	1990–1994	250,000–500,000 women
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina	1992–1995	10,000–60,000 women
Darfur (Sudan)	2004–2005	Thousands of women at the minimum

Table 3. Estimated Costs of Domestic Violence in Some Western Countries[3].

Country	Year	Costs in US dollars
United States	2003	6 billion
Canada	1995	3 billion
Switzerland	1998	290 million
Netherlands	1997	80 million
Finland	1998	53 million

Source: UNIFEM (2003, p. 69).

lack of young women caused a massive increase in the trafficking in women in order to substitute for the 'missing brides'.

2. COMBATING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

Although combating violence against women has a long history, only recently has it been recognised as a political issue and as a grave obstacle to economic and social development. Albeit being repeatedly included in the program of all world conferences of women, the international binding document on violence against women – the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women – declaring its unacceptability regardless it occurs in private or publicly, whether committed by state or non-state institutions was only adopted in 1993. But it was the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security agreed to in 2000 that enabled all actors to take actions within their responsibility and capability and to lay a solid legal basis for women's protection against systemic violence worldwide. During the 60th session of the UN Human Rights Commission held in Geneva in April–May 2004, the integration of the gender perspective into human rights discourse and practice became one of the most vital issues and various cases of violence against women have been described as flagrant breaches of human rights.

In the last 50 years profound and positive changes in the status and role of women occurred. In great numbers, women have entered the labour market gaining unprecedented economic decision-making power. Women have been major actors in the rise of civil society through the world, stimulating pressure for inclusion of gender-sensitive approaches to the resolution of all major economic, political and social processes. There is a relatively

well-developed legal framework delineating standards and norms of unacceptable behaviour that has contributed to practical steps in bringing to justice and punishing perpetrators of the most flagrant acts of violence against female victims, as evidenced by the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and former Yugoslavia. Public awareness of the gravity of violence against women and other vulnerable groups of citizens has increased significantly due to numerous media campaigns.[4] Most of the internationally renowned NGOs operating in the field of human rights as well as high-level international political institutions have created a monitoring gender agenda reporting numerous cases of breaching women's rights. Due to such a broad and diversified monitoring, the amount of public awareness of the scope, magnitude and forms of gender-based violence has significantly increased during the last decades. Within expert circles and academia, violence against women has been recognised as a systemic and structural principle of existing gender relations, and within the international community, it has been declared as one of the main obstacles in development and progress.

The year 2005 is expected to be a very active year in combating violence against women. The achievements of women's movements in practice and theory will be critically evaluated. A review of the implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action and the outcome documents of the 23rd special session of the General Assembly (Beijing + 5) is being prepared for the 49th session of the UN General Assembly to be held in March 2005.[5] The attention of the international community turns to the sphere of private life, to families and local communities, where all too often physical, sexual and psychological violence occurs, including battering, sexual abuse, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female infanticide, female genital mutilation and crimes committed against women in the name of honour. There is a broad debate about the principle of universality of human/women's rights which some experts consider as an outcome of the highly individualistic Western culture neglecting the weight of community-oriented standards of non-Western societies. The issues of how to include all the existing diversity of cultures and races in this universality of human rights will inevitably be put to new scrutiny. Such a fresh perspective is necessary to interpret the motives behind many national governments' resistance to international conventions, to understand the depth of culturally embedded norms of behaviour and to find remedies that would treat the economic and social roots of the violence perpetrated in the name of customary laws, religious practices or traditional ceremonies. The spread of HIV/AIDS, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa and its devastating consequences to women, maternal mortality, feminisation of poverty, poor access of girls to education and

trafficking in women represent other topics that certainly will remain on the agenda for the years to come.

Amidst women's organisations and feminist groups there is a growing concern about the tendency towards geopolitics that can negatively influence chances for peace and downplay all non-violent approaches and solutions to security problems of the present world. Militarism, as understood by feminists, reinforces patriarchal discriminative features of gender relations and consequently the re-emergence of gender-based violence. All too frequently it is the malfunctioning of state institutions, responsible for protection of all citizens, that worsens the incidence of gender-based violence. Blindness of the law, unwillingness of governmental and parliamentarian authorities to implement international law into national legislation, low accountability of state institutions in crimes against women and marginalisation of violence all reduce the odds of bringing the perpetrators to justice.

During the last 20 years, the international community began to fully recognise the value and strength of women's organisations devoted to the eradication of violence against women. These NGOs including charitable associations and feminist academic institutions, are now seen as actors capable of enriching the activities of the international community, bringing in critical views and standpoints, and being able to shed light on numerous problems that otherwise would have been left unnoticed. Those were the grass-root organisations that gave a true estimation of success of the implementation of relevant international laws and recommendations at both the regional and national level. The impetus to apply a gender-sensitive approach to many of the crucial problems that the international community has been trying to solve – such as poverty, illiteracy, post-war reconstruction, HIV/AIDS, peace support operations – came from the non-governmental level.

In spite of all this success there seems to be a strong need to re-evaluate the progress of the NGOs from the point of original goals of women's movements and to restore the questions whether the inclusion of women's NGOs has really resulted in making them equal partners to policy makers and what their real impact on international politics is. Those are gender relations (or, using feminist vocabulary, regimes) that are at the bottom of structural violence against women. The years ahead should re-establish a discourse on transformation of these regimes in all agendas dealing with violence against women. At the same time they hold the promise to become an important period, if not even a watershed in the fight against gender-based violence.

3. ISA RC 01'S PANEL ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AT THE ANKARA INTERIM CONFERENCE

The issues of violence against women are covered by several different political agendas (women's world movement, gender studies, feminism, development, human rights, international relations), including peace and conflict resolution. Women's inclusion is based upon experience that women represent most of war and armed conflicts victims and that their interventions on the community level can be very profitable in all peace-building and peace-maintaining process. Women's achievements in these areas have already gained respect by the international community (Annan, 2002). At the same time women's 'selective inclusion' into post-conflict processes have raised severe criticism of feminists and activists who pointed out that in most of recent conflict resolutions women were prevailingly excluded from peace-negotiating processes on the macro-political levels. In many cases social policies and programmes of international and national agencies dealing with post-conflict reconstruction featured women only rhetorically or used/misused women's issues for the political interests of donors that control post-conflict aid and development programmes and decide about the true role of target groups and actors to be included. It is also necessary to point out that this is a male-dominated arena, part of International Relations studies as well as of international politics on which women only recently started to exert pressure in order to include gender issues and gender-sensitive solutions into the agenda. Newly and rather shyly the role of the security sector has been introduced to this agenda. Since there is a lot of evidence that the perpetration of violence in the home is facilitated by state institutions that refuse to treat the problem as a serious crime the question how gender sensitive strategies, policies, and visions could work on the level of 'an obscure, confusing and hierarchical decision-making structures', whether national or supranational, seems to be justifiable (Ruppert, 2002, pp. 155). The logical question would thus be who is advocating for women and women's rights and who are the actors having the power to implement global gender policies and international law on the national level. Last but not least is the issue whether the concept of security sector should deal with personal security at all and what the obstacles are that hamper vulnerable groups of population in 'consuming' security.

The following papers can be considered as an introduction into looking for answers to these and many other questions. The panel, divided into two sessions, encompassed eight papers/presentations covering a wide scope of

issues from the integration of women into armed forces (Heidi L. Smith and Christopher J. Luedtke, Helena Carreiras and Gerhard Kümmel) to public opinion on domestic violence in Switzerland (Ruth Meyer-Schweizer) and to war rapes (June Willenz) and its treatment in psychotherapist practice (Pamela Bell). Since the Middle East Technical University (METU) hosting the ISA RC 01 conference is alma mater of Professor Yakin Ertürk, the incumbent Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights on violence against women, the auditorium had an opportunity to hear her fresh experience from the visits to the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Guatemala and El Salvador where grave violations of women's rights are committed on a daily basis.

For this volume four panelists volunteered with their papers. June Willenz's contribution is devoted to sexual abuse of women during wars giving a brief historical overview of the problem and indicating consequences of rape for the victims as well as different legal and human rights measures that protect women against rape. She concludes her paper with an overview of various actors that take part in the struggle to curb sexual violence. Pamela Bell's paper goes deeper into the effects of trauma female civilians suffer when exposed to the cruelties of war, and critically evaluates present psychological and psychotherapeutic methods which, according to her, run the risk of increasing, rather than reducing the suffering and distress of victims. Two contributions cover the issues of the integration of women into regular armed forces. Gerhard Kümmel presents an interesting look at how men and women within the Bundeswehr accept that women previously confined to non-combat roles in medical service and military bands are now eligible to all jobs and positions in the German Armed Forces. His paper, based upon empirical research, suggests that albeit the opening of the traditionally male institution to women runs more or less in harmony with emancipating trends in German larger society, there is a lot of reservation within the armed forces to the integration process that could cause trouble to the armed forces leadership in future. Heidi L. Smith and Christopher J. Luedtke investigate to what extent sexual violence against women limits their true integration into the US Armed Forces. Again based upon extensive empirical research, their contribution examines the extent of sexual assaults against women cadets and concentrates upon the structural and cultural factors that enforce attitudes incompatible with true gender integration, such as a purely masculine construction of the warrior. The paper suggests that the new Officer Development system introduced at the US Air Force Academy in 2004 might bring a more gender-reflective model of officer's profession.

NOTES

1. The realisation of this panel has been enabled by financial aid of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).

2. The fact that women are exposed to systemic and structural violence worldwide does not mean that women differ from men in their capacity to commit violent acts. Gender roles are results of social conditioning and female gender roles and characteristics connected with these roles such as submissiveness, obedience and solicitude can be changed under the pressure of extreme conditions. This has been evidenced many times by the active participation of women in combat during armed conflicts in Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Columbia, Palestine and Chechnya.

3. Estimated costs for health and medical care, legal and criminal justice, social services and assistance, child care, housing/shelters, refuge, lost productivity, lost life earnings.

4. Such as the yearly celebrations for St. Valentine's Day accompanied by the so-called 'V-Day', a campaign initiated by NGOs to end the violence against women and girls; or the long-lasting campaign launched in 2003 by Amnesty International 'Stop Violence Against Women!'.

5. The 23rd special session of the GA on 'Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the 21st century' took place at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 5 to 9 June 2000 and adopted a Political Declaration and outcome documents (further actions and initiatives to implement the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action). This briefing note summarises the steps leading up to the special session and immediate implications of its outcome for the work of the Commission on the Status on Women, one of the main functional commissions of ECOSOC and the main intergovernmental body tasked with the responsibility of promoting the advancement of women and gender equality.

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RAPE IN WAR: REALITIES AND REMEDIES

June A. Willenz

1. REALITIES

Sexual abuse of women during armed conflict has always been taken for granted; in modern times, it is still viewed as a regrettable part of war. History books have brought forward vivid images of women in chains in or behind chariots as spoils of war. Rape was not considered a crime, but an inevitable 'collateral damage' to part of the population solely because of their gender. Since women were considered property, they were automatically viewed as the prize of victory. Historians have traced attempts to regulate rape in war in earlier centuries, but even if such an initiative was taken, it had little impact upon actions. Only recently with emphasis on human rights and progress in equating women's rights with men's human rights have there been serious efforts to come to grips with bringing to justice those who committed mass rape during armed conflicts. Though there was evidence of widespread rape during World War II, there were no efforts to find or prosecute the perpetrators during the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan has observed that "gender based harms including rape during conflict have historically been viewed as less serious transgressions than their non-gender equivalents."

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1.1. World War II: 'The Comfort Women'

A gripping example of mass rape in recent history is the story of the 'comfort women' of World War II – the hundreds of thousands of young women and girls from Asian countries who were kidnapped or enticed under false pretences for sexual exploitation by the marauding Japanese army as it swept across Asia during the 1930s and 1940s. It has been estimated that over 350,000 women and girls, some as young as 13 or 14, were either recruited under false pretenses, or forcibly taken from their homes in this massive enslavement which lasted the duration of the war as the Japanese army moved from battle to battle with their 'comfort women' in tow. To compound the horror of this occurrence was the finding that these crimes against humanity were officially sanctioned and even organised by the Japanese government. Yet this atrocity remained unknown for almost half a century. The women who survived (thousands were killed by their fleeing abductors when they committed suicide, or died from injury or disease) did not speak of what they had endured during the war. It was not until the early 1990s that historians found records that described these happenings. When one of the women spoke to the press, others began to recount their experiences alerting the world of this hidden human rights tragedy.

The cause of the 'comfort women' was taken up by human rights groups from several different countries, including Japan; several testified before the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations. Under pressure from these groups as well as from activists and the governments of the invaded countries, the Secretary General of the United Nations despatched a Special Rapporteur to investigate and report what happened in several of those countries from which the 'comfort women' were taken. The findings were startling, even worse than what had been thought. After on-site visits to the relevant countries and numerous interviews and study of documents, UN Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, concluded:

> "From documents (…) it is evident that a strict system of control over the 'comfort women stations' was maintained on the basis of instructions from the Ministry of the Army (…) Not only do they reveal beyond doubt the extent to which the Japanese forces took direct responsibility for the comfort stations and were intimately connected with all aspects of their organisation, but they clearly indicate how legitimised and established an institution the stations had become (…) This only serves to highlight the extraordinary inhumanity of a system of military sexual slavery, in which large numbers of women were forced to submit to prolonged prostitution under conditions which were frequently indescribably traumatic (…)"
>
> (Coomaraswamy, 1996)

Most of the 'comfort women' who survived were too ashamed to return home or too beaten down to rebuild their shattered lives, retreating into obscurity, poverty, and isolation. Without family or friends, the comfort women barely eked out a living at menial work. As the comfort women's stories became public, women's and human rights groups gathered around them as they came out of seclusion and gave testimony as to what happened to them. That such an atrocity experienced by so many women was hidden for so many years was amazing. With the encouragement of their advocates, the 'comfort women' sought an official apology and modest reparations. Though the Japanese government set up a private fund, it never officially apologised or offered government funds for the elderly women. The lawyers representing them also appealed to the Japanese courts, but to date, even though they won in some lower courts, those verdicts were overturned by higher courts. Strong advocacy from many different NGOs is continuing for the 'comfort women' within and outside the United Nations system. So far, the Japanese government has expressed sympathy but has taken no action to meet the requests of the women.

1.2. Recent Events and Responses: The Balkans

After World War II, it was hoped that the world would be free of armed conflicts forever. The San Francisco Conference saw the creation of the United Nations in 1945 and adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, which recognised 'the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family.' Despite these important developments and the expressed dedication of the international community to equality, development, and human rights, dozens of mostly internal armed conflicts erupted in many parts of the post-World War II world causing more casualties than those of that massive upheaval. This bloody period is replete with horror tales of sexual violence against women and children. In the early 1990s, when Yugoslavia broke up and the Balkans exploded into sectarian conflict, reports of systematic mass rapes on all sides began to trickle out of the region. The UN sent a Special Rapporteur from the UN Commission on Human Rights with medical experts to investigate and document the reports. The team of experts found that rape of women occurred on a large scale, and concluded that rape had been used as an instrument of ethnic cleansing.

1.3. Other Conflicts and Consequences

The former Yugoslavia is not the only armed conflict where women have been assaulted and raped during the last few decades. With most of these armed conflicts being internal ones within a nation's borders, the battlefields are close to home. Women and children fleeing their homes to avoid the fighting are fair game for rape and violence. In such internal conflicts, there is no effective government to provide protection for the civilian population, or international protection from UN agencies; humanitarian aid itself is difficult or impossible to deliver in such turbulence. Whether it is Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, the Great Lakes Region, Sudan, Ivory Coast, East Timor, El Salvador, Columbia, Rwanda, Somalia, or Haiti, or other conflict areas, women are extremely vulnerable to rape and violence as they seek safety in other parts of their country, or across borders in another possibly hostile country.

As refugees and internally displaced, women are further victimised by those who are supposed to help them, whether they be officials in refugee camps or legal authorities, national or international, with whom they must deal with while in flight. Too often, they sell their bodies just to survive. In the 1980s, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) finally took actions to mitigate the victimisation of refugee women, both in flight and in the camps. Detailed guidelines and training programs were initiated in 'gender sensitivity' for field personnel to provide needed 'protection' for vulnerable women and children. While some progress has been made, there are still reports of abuse and exploitation of this fragile population. Even when peacekeepers are present, protection is uneven; sometimes peacekeepers themselves are guilty of molestation.

1.4. Trafficking

Both during and after conflict, trafficking of women and girls for sexual use is a major industry in long-term conflict areas. Armed conflict breeds poverty and devastation, lack of opportunities for employment, loss of family support, and the social and economic environment that allows a community to function. This provides the soil for criminal rings to flourish from the traffic in human beings. Young girls and women are enticed, bribed, sold, or kidnapped into sexual slavery in foreign lands. Like trafficking in drugs, diamonds and other precious metals, and small arms, trafficking in 'sex workers' has become a billion dollar industry. As governments in affected nations seek to control this blight, the UN finally has passed protocols

condemning such practices and calling for more drastic actions to prevent this marketing of human beings.

1.5. Rape as a Weapon of War

Many psychiatrists, sociologists, and historians who have studied rape conclude that it is an act of aggression, and an acceptable weapon of war. Turkish psychiatrist Dr. Aysel Eksi (1993) found from her study of Bosnian women who had suffered rape during the breakup of Yugoslavia, that rape is an act of violence and humiliation by sexual means, a way of demoralising an enemy, used to express power and anger and to relieve pent-up aggression and fear. The perpetrators dehumanise the women, seeing them as property or chattel, a belief that still remains dominant in many cultures. In wartime, it is taken for granted that rape, while regrettable, is an acceptable form of spoils as well as revenge. Losing as well as winning armies have used rape as a weapon of terror and hate.

1.6. Denial of Women's Human Rights

Would rape have been used as a weapon of war if women had not been denied their human rights throughout all areas of life? When women have a second-class status in the family and in society, they are easy targets of abuse and exploitation especially during a war-time situation. With denial of women's human rights goes a lack of respect for women's humanity. Up to recently, rape and sexual abuse in armed conflicts had no penalties. The creation of the United Nations and the adoption of the Universal Bill of Human Rights led to new developments and institutions in international laws and treaties that have taken away the persistent impunity that existed for centuries for those who committed rape in war and opened the way for prosecution of perpetrators guilty of crimes against humanity.

1.7. Consequences for the Victims

Among the consequences of rape are severe health problems for the victims. Besides pregnancy, venereal infections, physical injury, and psychological trauma, the rape victims' futures are totally compromised. Women have been devastated by the scourge of HIV-AIDS transmitted during armed

conflicts by rape. The extent of the pandemic of AIDS has decimated many countries in Africa as the disease spreads rapidly through the population. In areas where peacekeeping forces and foreign militias are present, the likelihood of sexual violence and abuse of girls and women further opens them up to the disease. There is evidence that military forces have greater rates of sexually transmitted infections than in civilian populations. When the main form of transmission of AIDS is sexual, it has been found that women are infected in greater numbers than men and at younger ages. In Rwanda, infected men were known to deliberately infect Tutsi women as a strategy of war. The spread of AIDS has been one of the most heartrending consequences of armed conflicts in Africa.

Another consequence for victims of rape in some societies is the rejection by their families and communities for cultural or religious reasons. The rape victims are considered unclean and are isolated from their homes by their families. Deserted by husbands and fathers, the raped women cannot hope for marriage or a normal life in their communities. The victim herself is blamed for the violence against her person. Especially pitiful are the women and girls impregnated by the aggressors, who must bear the babies of their violators, and then care for them, without support from their own families and communities.

Another modern phenomenon is the proliferation of the use of children of soldiers in war-torn countries which has had dire consequences for girls who are caught and conscripted by armed militias or government forces. Girls forced or enticed to be soldiers are totally at the mercy of their captors who use and punish them at will. Most of the girls suffer sexual abuse, many are forced to be 'slaves' or 'wives' to a military master. With more than 2 million children killed and 6 million wounded, the UN commissioned Mrs. Graca Machel to investigate what was happening to children in conflict areas. She found that "rape is not incidental to conflict (...) Rape poses a continual threat to women and girls during armed conflict, as do other forms of gender-based violence, including prostitution, sexual humiliation, trafficking and domestic violence." (Machel, 1996)

1.8. Treatment of Rape Victims

After an armed conflict, women and girls who have suffered sexual violence rarely are given the services or health care that they need. Though it is generally accepted that civilians are the largest category of casualties and

victims, women are not included in the kinds of assistance – medical, monetary, rehabilitative – that former combatants receive from their governments. Often governments are eviscerated or non-functioning after extended armed conflicts and cannot provide any kind of assistance to anyone. But even if the government is functioning, the needs of civilian victims of war, including those raped, are rarely considered. Even UN-sponsored post-conflict reconstruction strategies rarely address the needs of women and girls who are victims of armed conflicts, even rape victims.

When treatment is available for rape victims, sometimes other problems arise. From interviews with rape victims, members of the health, mental health, and humanitarian aid workers, we have learned that there is often a conflict as to when and how to treat the rape victims. Medical and health personnel usually from a UN agency or humanitarian organisation want to give aid and counselling as soon as possible, but they are also anxious to protect rape victims from intrusive questioning or even identifying themselves, concerned that they will be further traumatised. Often, the women themselves will not admit to being raped, but talk as though it happened to someone else, fearing the shame and social ostracism that those who have admitted to being raped suffer. In such cases, entirely different techniques are needed to bring relief to those who have suffered sexual abuse.

On the other hand, with new human rights institutions in place for prosecution of rapists, legal advocates want to document sexual crimes. Since the creation of the ad hoc UN Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and the emergence of the International Criminal Court, it is important to have first-hand timely evidence to bring before the appropriate international legal body for purposes of prosecution. Therefore, such advocates will want to interview the victims as soon as possible to obtain evidence. In the field, there have been reports of disagreement as to how to deal with the victims. Often it is not easy to find a balance between the medical and legal points of view.

A Norwegian psychiatrist, Dr. Lars Weisaeth, after the end for the first Gulf War studied the civilian population that had lived in Kuwait during that war. Although there was not much publicity given to it (possibly because that country did not want to acknowledge the scope of this atrocity), there was a large incidence of rapes, sometimes of whole families, that took place in Kuwait. Dr. Weisaeth has urged that rape be defined as a "war injury." He claims that when it is understood that way, it promotes the healing process for the victim. "Defined as a war injury, the individual family or woman will be in a much better position to work through the experience than if the rape is seen as private personal tragic event." (Weisaeth, 1997)

This year being the 10th anniversary of the Rwanda Genocide in which 800,000 Rwandans were killed in a 3-month period recalls the inaction of the international community, while the slaughter was taking place. Along with the killing was the raping. As one social worker who survived the Rwandan genocide reported, every woman who survived had been raped. Today, with the terrible mayhem in the Darfur region of Sudan taking place, with thousands dying every day, as well as brutal rapes, one cannot but wonder if a similar genocidal atrocity is occurring, while once again the United Nations and the governments of the world do nothing.

Other current conflicts in Africa seem to resist solution as new ones emerge, whether it is the Ivory Coast or Burundi or others. Human rights organisations report evidence of numerous rapes whenever armed conflicts erupt. An example of the extent of sexual violence occurring is the story of the terrible conflict in Sierra Leone which was documented by Human Rights Watch (HRW). The media had emphasised the horrible amputations committed during that outbreak, especially those by child soldiers. Yet the Report from HRW suggested that

> "sexual violence was committed on a much larger scale than the highly visible amputations for which Sierra Leone became notorious (…) sexual violence has remained Sierra Leone's silent war crime (…) These crimes of sexual violence were generally characterized by extraordinary brutality (…) The lack of attention to conflict-related sexual violence means that few assistance programs have been established for women and girls (…) Survivors not only live with the severe physical and mental consequences of the abuses suffered, but also fear ongoing non-conflict related sexual violence, largely perpetrated with impunity (…)"

Similar conclusions were reported by other human rights groups investigating the Sierra Leone situation including Physicians for Human Rights, Human Rights Watch, and in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) (Human Rights Watch, 2002; Physicians for Human Rights, 2002).

2. REMEDIES

2.1. Laws of War and International Law

No serious attempts to govern how war is conducted were made until after the founding of the Red Cross in 1865, when a series of protocols and treaties including the Hague Conventions and Laws of Naval Warfare of 1907 were promulgated. The most important restrictions which set limits on

what armies could do were set forth by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its Optional Protocols of 1977, known as International Humanitarian Law (IHL), which were "founded on the idea of respect for the individual and his dignity." Also, persons not directly taking part in hostilities, or those put out of action including prisoners of war, disabled or sick, must be respected and protected. The Fourth Convention explicitly sets forth the treatment of civilians who are not involved in hostilities, defining them as 'protected persons' and prohibiting harmful treatment against them as well as "outrages upon personal dignity in particular humiliating and degrading treatment." Women as a protected class are singled out in this Fourth Convention: "Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honor, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault." (Article 27)

Despite the good intentions of the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols, they have not had the impact that was hoped for to minimise the suffering of persons during armed conflict, especially civilians. With no enforcement provisions except the limited oversight of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the effectiveness of the Geneva Conventions restricting the activities of states or non-state warring parties has been much less than expected. Despite the protections offered to women, they have not eliminated the brutality and excesses that have been described, and are still occurring. As women have found out, unfortunately, IHL has not prevented rape being used as a weapon of war.

Alarmed at the escalation of violence against civilians as well as the ill treatment of armed participants in dozens of conflict areas around the globe, including the implosion in the Balkans, governments heeded the Swiss Government's convening of an international conference in 1993 to deplore the mayhem against civilian populations, mostly women and children. The Conference issued many pious statements but events on the ground did not change. Ten years later, another international conference was convened by the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies to find ways to develop respect for the principles of IHL. Once more, the gap in the principles of IHL and its enforcement was noted and protested. But the lack of enforcement, especially for civilians, of IHL, meant that innocent civilian women and children continue to be molested and raped with impunity. In its Final Declaration the 1993 Conference noted:

> "We refuse to accept that civilian populations should become more and more frequently the principal victims of hostilities and acts of violence perpetrated in the course of armed conflicts (…) We are alarmed by the marked increase in acts of sexual violence directed

notably against women and children and we reiterate that such acts constitute grave breaches of international humanitarian law."

2.2. The Role of the UN in Expansion of Women's Human Rights

A number of events and developments coalesced in the last few decades to change the way rape in war is viewed by the international community. The creation of the United Nations and its Charter after the end of World War II, plus the adoption of the International Bill of Human Rights which included the Universal Declaration of Human Rights propelled a fruitful avenue for human rights law which proclaimed the equal rights of men and women. Recognition in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of "the inherent dignity and of the equal inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world" gave impetus to legitimising women's quest for justice and autonomy in their lives. Following the emergence of the United Nations as the voice and conscience of the international community for human rights, a series of new conventions and protocols were enacted over the past 50 years spelling out the universality of human rights for all populations. An important one for women is the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which enunciates the equal rights of women. States which are parties to the Convention report periodically on their actions to meet the goals of that treaty. In recent years, 'shadow reports' by non-government organisations (NGOs) bringing in a non-governmental perspective have become important parts of the reporting process. The UN Commission on Human Rights also hears reports on human rights abuses of women, often sending Special Rapporteurs to investigate the situation.

Another development that has enhanced the drive for the human rights of women has been the convening by the UN of unique conferences on women beginning with the first women's conference in Mexico City in 1975, gaining momentum and support until the 1995 Conference in Beijing which brought in over 30,000 government delegates and NGOs. Other UN Conferences on Sustainable Development, Environment, Population, The Habitat – dealing with issues of great concern to women, also gave women's voices an international venue to pursue their goals, enhancing their empowerment along the way. The platform for action adopted by the delegates to the Beijing Conference delineated the goals of women worldwide for full human rights in all areas of domestic and national life. For the first time, the Beijing Platform for Action identified the population of 'women in armed conflict'

as one of the 12 critical areas of concern that required urgent attention by the international community.

Another major breakthrough was the UN Human Rights Conference of 1993 in Vienna which clearly and unequivocally enunciated the universality and equality of human rights for all individuals, in all countries in all cultures. The Vienna Conference helped bring women's issues to prominence and promoted the equality of women's participation in all human endeavours. The Vienna Declaration addressed the terrible situation of women who suffer rape and other sexual violence during war: "violations of the human rights of women in situations of armed conflicts are violations of the fundamental principles of international human rights and humanitarian law." The Vienna Conference on Human Rights broadened the scope and depth of women's empowerment as equal partners with men in identifying and meeting the challenges that beset peoples of all races and nationalities.

2.3. Growth of Civil Society

With the United Nations has come a tremendous surge in the number of local voluntary organisations at the grass roots level which have increased women's political and social participation, both locally and in the international community. Accredited by the UN, these organisations (NGOs), known as the 'civil society', is considered a vital partner in the United Nations family, often asked to the 'table' as an equal, contributing a fresh or alternative viewpoint from that of official government delegates. More and more frequently, NGOs serve on official delegations and are invited to present their ideas and perspectives on key issues under consideration at the UN, becoming a potent force in shaping the agenda at the United Nations. UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan has acknowledged the importance of NGOs: "Non-governmental organizations and other civil society actors are now perceived not only as disseminators of information or providers of services but also as shapers of policy, be it in peace and security matters, in development or in humanitarian affairs." (Annan 1997) Since women in most countries throughout the world are either totally powerless or with limited influence to affect policies within their own countries, the NGOs at the United Nations provide an opportunity for women to make known their views and aspirations. It is also a training ground for leadership, especially for women in societies which exclude women in most areas of national life.

2.4. UN Strengthens International Law

The imploding of Yugoslavia in 1992 turning the Balkans into killing fields prompted the United Nations to take giant steps in prosecuting gender crimes under international law by creating the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). With the Geneva Conventions seeming impotent in the face of rape and sexual abuse during armed conflicts, the UN broke new ground with this action which led to the Foca guilty verdict in 2001 against eight Serbs accused of mass rape and sexual slavery of women. When an apparent genocide took place in Rwanda, and there was strong evidence that there was widespread rape of the female Tutsi population, the UN set up a separate Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). In a landmark decision, Jean-Paul Akayesu was convicted on many counts, including rape as an instrument of genocide and a crime against humanity. The Foca verdict and the Akayesu judgement broke new ground in international law by successfully prosecuting rape in armed conflicts as war crimes and crimes against humanity. Such gender crimes can no longer be committed against women and girls with impunity as a result of these verdicts from international tribunals.

Another giant step in deterring sexual abuse and rape during war is the creation of the International Criminal Court by the UN which came into force in 2002, and is now operational. The Rome Statute of the Court has defined rape and sexual violence as serious crimes against humanity and war crimes when they are committed as part of a widespread attack against a civilian population. The Statute also sets forth the terms and elements of jurisdiction that include persecution on the basis of gender, including rape, forced prostitution or sterilisation, forced pregnancy, and other forms of sexual violence, as crimes against humanity and/or war crimes. The case law of the International Tribunals and the existence of a permanent International Criminal Court, which will be in a position to prosecute crimes of rape and sexual violence in a timely manner, will serve as a deterrent to future gender-related crimes. Through these actions, the international community has sent a strong message that rape will not be tolerated as a weapon of war for genocide or revenge.

2.5. Another UN Initiative: Security Council Resolution 1325

Besides these crucial actions by the United Nations which advanced international law as an instrument of justice for women in gender-related crimes,

the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1325 in 2000, in which it "called upon all actors involved in negotiating and implementing peace agreements to adopt a gender perspective that included the special needs of women and girls during negotiation and resettlement, rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction." This followed a ringing statement of principle, the Windhhoek Declaration and a Plan of Action which came out of a Seminar hosted by the government of Namibia. They set forth minimum principles to insure women's full participation in all aspects of peacemaking and peacekeeping, including formulation of peace treaties which spell out conditions for post-war reconstruction.

Resolution 1325 culminated years of initiatives of women's groups, UN agencies, and some governments to increase women's official participation in the peacekeeping and peace-making processes of the UN, from which they have been excluded even though unofficially women on numerous occasions have been actively and successfully involved in such activities. The Resolution 1325 called for women to be an integral part of the peacekeeping and negotiating processes, setting up a gender affairs unit in all peace support missions, and gender mainstreaming in all related activities. At the UN, a working group of various NGOs devotes itself to closely monitoring the implementation of Resolution 1325 and co-ordinating efforts with interested governments to move it forward. It had became clear that in countries who were currently or recently embroiled in armed conflicts, women's interests and priorities were largely ignored. We have seen how post-war rehabilitation and reintegration strategies rarely address the needs of women victims. When women are present at peace tables, they are usually the only ones speaking out for women's interests. If they are not there, no one represents the women's concerns or point of view. Yet in Northern Ireland, Guatemala, South Africa, Burundi, Liberia, Cambodia, and other countries, women have made unique contributions to the negotiations and peace processes.

2.6. UN Drive for Gender Equality

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan addressed the Security Council on Resolution 1325:

> "The theme you have chosen is crucial, for it brings together two vital parts of the United Nations mission. The Charter tells us that the Organization was created to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. It also proclaims the equal rights of men and women. We must live up to both challenges, or we shall not succeed fully in either

(…) But women, who know the price of conflict so well, are also often better equipped than men to prevent or resolve it. For generations, women have served as peace educators, both in their families and in their societies. They have proved instrumental in building bridges rather than walls. They have been crucial in preserving social order when communities have collapsed (…) And yet the potential contribution of women to peace and security remains severely undervalued. Women are still grossly under-represented at the decision-making level, from conflict prevention to conflict resolution to post-conflict reconciliation (…) You recognized that peace is inextricably linked to equality between women and men. And you declared that maintaining and promoting peace and security requires women's equal participation in decision-making (…)."

(Annan, 2000)

Mandated by Resolution 1325, the Secretary General commissioned a study on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, and the role of women in peace building and the gender dimension of peace processes and conflict resolution. That study by Rehn and Sirleaf under the auspices of UNIFEM concluded that

"gender equality (…) means enabling women as full citizens, as voters, as candidates, as decision-makers. It means supporting women's centrality to reconstruction. Without women's representation – without half the population – no country can truly claim to be engaged in democratic development and participatory governance."

(Rehn & Johnson Sirleaf, 2002)

From on-site interviews and investigations in many conflict areas, from East Timor to Sierra Leone, the authors build a strong case that the violence that women suffer during armed conflicts is not different or isolated from the endemic violence that they suffer in civilian settings, i.e. the family, the community, the workplace, or through the inequitable political, legal, economic, and social institutions that determine their fate. It is the lack of equality and the denial of human rights, which put women in such a vulnerable and destructive situation. Though the UN Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna in 1993 proclaimed the complete universality of human rights, and many nations vowed to live up to that principle, it is still an uphill battle to make equal rights a reality, and hence, to eliminate violence against women, in peace and in war.

2.7. 2004 Meeting of the UN Commission on the Status of Women

At its 2004 meeting in March, the UN Commission on the Status of Women took Resolution 1325 as one of its themes: "Women's equal participation in conflict prevention, management and conflict resolution and in post conflict peace-building." The Secretary General's report noted that

> "the understanding of, as well as attention to, women's role in the realization and maintenance of peace, and of the linkages between gender equality and peace have increased significantly in recent years. Given their central role and broad relevance to all stages of peace processes, the present report focuses on peace agreements as a tool for enhancing the participation of women and promoting gender equality."
>
> (Annan, 2004)

The background reports for the Commission's meeting also emphasised the critical role that women need to play during the peace process, beginning with the peace agreements.

> "Peace agreements are crucial components of the peace process as they not only signify the formal cessation of armed conflict but also provide the framework for the reconstruction of political, legal, economic and social structures. As such, peace agreements are the basis for the ensuing institutional arrangements of a State or community. Their content will have a direct bearing on women's participation – as a reflection of women's inclusion in formal peace negotiations and as a determinant of their involvement in post-conflict peace-building."
>
> (UN Division for the Advancement of Women, 2003)

The Secretary General suggested

> "gender equality is an important social goal in itself, and a crucial factor for achieving sustainable peace. If gender equality is omitted from the peace agreement, a window of opportunity is lost. Silence in a peace agreement about the position of women perpetuates and institutionalizes the marginalization of women in the political process after the conflict and allows those implementing the peace process, including international agencies, to commence their mandates without reference to how their operations impact differentially upon women and men. Explicit language in a peace agreement to promote gender equality and women's participation can facilitate proactive implementation and ensure that the gender-specific consequences of armed conflict and the rights, needs and priorities of women and girls in the aftermath of conflict are fully addressed."
>
> (Annan, 2000)

Unless women's voices are heard early in the peace process, their interests will not be included as new or revised legal structures emerge from the chaos of war-torn societies. History teaches us that from the ashes of war, rebuilt societies emerge that may or may not improve the status of women. Indeed, they even diminish the status of women and their human rights. The political, legal and economic landscape may change, but unless there is careful planning, old inequalities restricting women's rights may persist or even increase. Women are harmed because peace agreements do not address social, economic and cultural rights, which are especially relevant to women. Peace agreements provide an opportunity to change the status quo, and promote new roles for women. Having women participating in the peace

negotiations and in the writing of a peace agreement from the beginning will ensure that women's interests will not be overlooked or diminished.

An example of how important the early involvement of women in the peace process became very clear when the new constitution of Afghanistan was being written recently. The convening of a Loya Jirga to write such a crucial document meant that input from women and their advocates was essential if women's rights were to be affirmed. Those rights which had been written into previous Afghan constitutions had been abrogated by the Taliban. There are still extremist elements in Afghan society that want to undermine efforts to institutionalise those rights. An Afghan woman leader reported that Afghan women supported by some men, finally persuaded a majority of the delegates to enshrine women's rights once more into the Constitution. If those rights had not been included from the outset, women's future roles and rights in Afghanistan would have been circumscribed automatically. This does not mean that all is right for women in that country. Time will tell whether those rights become a reality, but at least for now, there is no legal bloc to stand in the way of full rights for women.

3. IMPLICATIONS FOR WOMEN'S STATUS

The realities of the likelihood of sexual slavery, mass rape and trafficking of women during armed conflict still continue to occur in modern conflicts. What has changed in the last decade is the viewpoint that such sexual violence is an inevitable consequence of war. Women's second-class status and lack of human rights which perpetuates this violence is no longer accepted as inevitable by the international community, and certainly not by women. Major social and political developments, including the women's movement, the creation of the United Nations, the emergence of the civil society and the human rights community have nourished the possibility that women's dignity and humanity will not be violated during armed conflict. Slowly, an international consensus has gelled into the conviction that peace and justice cannot be achieved without human rights and gender equality. Advances in international law beginning with the Geneva Conventions and continuing through the setting up of the ICTY and ICTR and the International Criminal Court have put teeth into this conviction, ending automatic impunity for perpetrators of rape in war.

It has been a long hard road with many roadblocks and pitfalls for women to achieve equal status in the family and all aspects of social, economic and political life, which are essential if they are to achieve their full

human rights. And it has a long way to go. Cultural and religious practices which denigrate the status of women continue even though the international community has over and over again committed itself to support the equality and universality of the human rights of women. Despite the legal advances, de facto, few convictions have been obtained with the international instruments available even when irrefutable evidence is available that women and girls are being raped in war. The declarations of the UN Secretary General, the resolutions and initiatives of the UN Security Council, the Conventions, Protocols, treaties, statements, and the many declarations and plans of action of international conferences and the NGO community, have committed nations to upgrade women's status in society and to decry violence against them. The words and legal frameworks are in place; nations have signed protocols and treaties; but the implementation is still a work in progress. Every day, new atrocities are reported, as armed conflicts continue to desecrate the world's landscapes.

Perhaps it is not surprising that there has been so much resistance to changing the status of women. It will mean that the gender that has held total power over the centuries will have to share that enormous power in all fields and areas of human endeavour with the other gender. Equality for women and acceptance of their human rights raises the spectre that decision-making will no longer be men's sole province. It will mean that the interests and wishes of over half of humanity will have to be heard directly from them. Power sharing is not an easy thing to contemplate when it has hardly been tried. It is seen as a loss, rather than a plus. From the brief experiences of women sitting at the peace table, or taking active roles in developing reconstruction plans, it is clear that their input enriches the mix of ideas and experiences to draw from. With an international consensus to expand women's roles, there is hope that exploitation and sexual violence will abate and eventually disappear. The goal is for women and girls to live in a less and less 'insecure world' as the concept of universal human rights becomes more and more a reality.

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CHALLENGING PSYCHOSOCIAL RESPONSES TO FEMALE CIVILIANS IN ARMED CONFLICT

Pamela Bell

1. INTRODUCTION

Trauma has become a buzz term, and the responses to trauma are slick and swift. Teams of mental health professionals can now be dispatched within hours of a catastrophe, and psychological intervention is fast becoming an industry. A more penetrating look at the state of trauma intervention reveals a less impressive picture. In spite of the heightened interest in the effects of trauma, mental health professionals are in fact a long way from fully understanding the impact of such trauma, and from providing responses to victims that are effective. Not only do we lack a psychotherapeutic *antidote* that can be distributed to the hundreds of thousands of victims of conflict across the globe, but to date we have failed to provide scientifically evaluated, evidence-based treatment guidelines for the psychological rehabilitation of victims.

I would like to draw attention to the inadequacies and dilemmas of psychosocial responses to women in conflict. I will examine some of the underlying assumptions of the international community that are not conducive to successful interventions, and the particular difficulties of women traumatised by conflict that thwart effective responses – and prevent a return to

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normalcy. Both avenues of consideration challenge the idea that recovery from psychological trauma is a responsibility that rests with mental health professionals alone.

2. SEXUAL VIOLENCE

Few situations illustrate more articulately the dilemmas of psychological response than that of sexual violence in conflict. First, how much basic research has gone into exploring the impact of trauma and successful therapeutic intervention with female victims of such violence? Given the magnitude of the aid industry and the appeal of psychosocial programmes, one would think a great deal. This is unfortunately not the case. Yes, there has been a surge of interest in trauma, and an increasingly large body of research available, yet a serious imbalance exists as to which populations receive attention. Most research has been performed in North America and North Western Europe, yet the vast proportion of stress-related events, such as wars and natural disasters, where entire communities or populations are traumatised, occur in countries outside Western Europe and North America. All but two of the 127 wars since World War II have occurred in developing countries (Brett, 1996), and an average of 117 million people living in developing countries are affected by disaster each year compared to approximately 700,000 in developed countries (McFarlane & De Girolamo, 1996).

Thus, if the problems of traumatised populations are being tackled at all, they are addressed by Western European and North American researchers, and largely outside the geographical, social and psychological context of their trauma. The implications are particularly grim concerning female civilians. Little, if any, structured research exists on female civilians who have been forced to remain in the war environment – either in their own towns or displaced to refugee settlements. There are a number of negative implications to this, significantly that much less research is available on the effects and responses to prolonged, multiple trauma (Bell, Oruc, & Spratt, 2001).

3. CONTEXT

This in turn leads to the crucial concept of context being neglected. The fundamentally different context of war is often ignored. One cannot

generalise from isolated single traumatic episodes to massive, enduring trauma. A trauma caused by common, unfortunate incidents (for example, traffic accidents) cannot be explained and treated in the same way as colossal atrocities such as the Holocaust. It is not about the extent or impact of trauma, or comparing how tragic one incident is to the other – but rather the context within which that occurs. Even considering the immense human tragedy of 9/11 and the phenomenal impact it had on the nation and the rest of the world – New York was not a war zone. The path to recovery in a resourced and intact society will be different (and we cannot afford to generalise from this situation) to a developing world war zone. Below are some aspects of traumatic experiences suffered by people in non-western cultures that are not adequately encompassed by the mainstream western trauma constructs. Note that this is far less a function of different culture, but rather because of the nature and extent of trauma.

- Prolonged and repeated trauma. In many non-western countries this is the rule rather than the exception, so that even the Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) criteria of experiencing 'an event outside the normal range of experience' (DSM-IV, 1994) is rendered somewhat ridiculous.
- Acute traumatic episodes that can only be understood in a socio-political or multigenerational context. There are certainly differences in responses noted when comparing genocidal rape in war with rape following a date with someone well known to the victim. Do they however generate a unique psychological expression? Much has been written on the latter, but very little on the former.
- Collective trauma as experienced by a whole community in the context of political repression, war or a natural disaster. The strong sense of community evidenced in non-western societies, compared to the often individualistic and subjective focus in western cultures must create significant differences in the psychological impact and expression of such traumas. Collective and individual trauma are not, however, mutually exclusive, and will most likely be experienced on communal as well as individual levels.
- Cumulative exposure to life events. Most studies focus on the relationship between a single life event and a subsequent psychological outcome. This unfortunately does not bear resemblance to real life experiences of many populations whose daily existence is characterised by unrelenting stress, if not trauma.
- Multiple refugee trauma. In addition to traumas experienced in home countries that include torture, starvation and witnessing killings, refugees

must overcome problems of acculturation, racism, language, employment, housing and health. The process of rebuilding lives can prove to be as traumatic as the dislocation process from which they sought refuge (Marsella, Friedman, Gerrity, & Scurfield, 1994).

4. WAR RAPE

War rape is a pertinent example of trauma deeply entrenched in a particular context. In order to understand the consequences of war rape, it is essential to recognise that the victim's response is not to a single, isolated act of violation, occurring in a relatively stable society, with at least some access to medical, legal, communal and familial support. It is an act that is engulfed by social, cultural, domestic, physical and psychological repercussions. Violent social upheaval, genocide and ethnic cleansing form an all-encompassing environment that irrefutably shapes the response. While this does not undermine the utterly destructive nature of rape in a civilian setting, it does imply that merely exporting models of therapy and support can be a waste of human and financial resources at best, and at worst iatrogenic and damaging to the victim. Exploration that occurs exclusively in North America and Europe concerning events embedded in a vastly different context, cannot offer effective, enduring solutions.

From a range of inimitable difficulties facing victims of sexual violence in conflict, two aspects are particularly important; first the core perceptions linked to the rape experience, and second the wide ranging accompanying trauma and post-conflict environment. Not only does the victim's core perceptions of the rape have far-reaching consequences, but such perceptions or beliefs can be significantly linked to the objectives of those who orchestrate, and those who commit the rape (not necessarily one and the same). The intentions of the perpetrators play an ominously predictive role. This demands an insight into the reasons for war rape that go beyond morale boosting and 'the spoils of war'. While certainly not the only explanation for war rape, using it as a tool of ethnic cleansing is particularly significant in conflicts such as Bosnia, Rwanda and Sudan (Swiss & Giller, 1993).

The aim in ethnic cleansing is the destruction of a culture, or eradication of a people, rather than the conquest of an army. Women are particularly vulnerable as an important tactical objective. Their significance in the structure of the family and the cultural role they play make them prime targets for such violence. The pattern of rape is fairly consistent, with rape

occurring both before fighting breaks out in a region involving small groups of soldiers or militia and in conjunction with invasion of towns or villages. In rape camps, estimates from Bosnia suggest as many as 2,000 women were held, some enduring forced pregnancies. Certain elements of rape are common, with a motive to humiliate and ensure a level of powerlessness and fear that will remain entrenched in the victim. The following are typical patterns:

- *Gang rapes*. These include the element of spectacle, with non-voluntary (family, other victims, local population) and voluntary spectators (military and militia).
- *Sexual torture*. Including rituals, mutilation and filming for pornography.
- *Psychological torture*. In the Bosnian context, for example, women were forced to sing Serbian songs or say Christian prayers while being raped.
- *Expressed motive of rape*. Rape occurring particularly in the phases of expulsion, was accompanied by the expressed motive of expulsion. Women were told if they did not leave, the soldiers would return the next day to rape again, to rape the family, to kill (Niarchos, 1995).

The aim to humiliate the victim is achieved as the victim feels isolated, fearing ostracism and stigmatisation. As a result, one is not only looking at multiple, severe and prolonged personal trauma, but trauma that impacts on the individuals' relationship to their community. Their own sanctity has been compromised by belonging to the group. Thus, all avenues to recovery – self-esteem, a grounded sense of identity, family support, community help – all are to some degree damaged, and for some, irrevocably destroyed. Too often mainstream psychotherapy neglects the context of violence and medicalises the consequences of war and organised violence. Mental health care professionals have a responsibility to explore and understand the socio-political environment. Acknowledging and condemning human rights abuse should be an integral part of the response, not merely a token gesture.

5. COEXISTING TRAUMA

In addition to the heinous experience of war rape, comes a daunting range of coexisting trauma that must also be endured in the context of violent social upheaval. Increasingly, conflicts are not played out on the battlefields, but in the heart of civil life: schools, hospitals, market places and bread lines.

- Women are often the sole providers of food and shelter for extended families.

- They have experienced death (often multiple) of family members.
- Other family members are missing, some in concentration camps.
- Victims themselves have experienced torture, death threats, deprivation and severe physical injury.
- Medical facilities range from non-existent to vastly inadequate.
- They have also witnessed atrocities. An increasing number of studies link witnessing atrocity to the highest incidence of pathology (Bell, 2002; Silove, 1999).
- Often they must survive in an entirely unfamiliar environment, having lost all material possessions, their homes and birthplaces.
- Communities have been shattered, and families are torn apart by distance or death.
- In an ironic twist of fate, victims of the Bosnian conflict had the additional burden of appearing as breaking news to the international community. The plight of tens of thousands of Bosnian women was splashed across newspapers and filled television screens. While such coverage did little to stem the tide of ethnic cleansing, it did bring an army of journalists, eager for stories and photographs. Their war rape became the most documented and investigated in history.
- Equally disturbing is the rising account of women who are raped by peacekeeping forces. Reports cite incidents ranging from harassment to beatings, rape and sexual exploitation against local women and children. In many conflicts, the arrival of peacekeepers is concurrent with a sharp rise in prostitution, including child prostitution (Lindsey, 2000; Rehn & Sierleaf, 2002). The impact of being betrayed by those assigned to protect cannot be underestimated.
- Finally, there are many who must deal with forced pregnancy. This widespread practice has been reported in conflicts including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Rwanda, Bangladesh, Uganda, Sudan and Liberia (Kozaric-Kovacic, Folnegovic-Smalc, & Skrinjaric, 1993).

6. RECOVERY ENVIRONMENT

With respect to the post-conflict situation, or ‘recovery’ environment, a pervading misconception is that it is post-traumatic. In the context of war rape, the milieu is in fact the very antithesis of a recovery environment. Recent conflicts may give an erroneous message that warfare is automatically

accompanied by a well-planned (or not) scheme for humanitarian amelioration. Most wars are of a long genesis and a low intensity. They are accompanied by the chronic malfunction of state institutions and unremitting hardship for the vast majority of the population. It is thus a further misconception that displacement is of a temporary nature. Some three-quarters of refugees are in asylum for more than 5 years (Muecke, 1992)

- Many of the traumatic circumstances that are experienced at the time of rape, continue for months and often years after the trauma. Women remain the sole providers, family members remain missing and medical facilities are scarcely improved.
- In addition, there are the highly stressful aspects of refugee status to reckon with. These include the unfamiliar, often hostile environment, unemployment and acculturation.
- For displaced persons, the potential for human rights abuses is greater. The central role of tradition, community and a sense of continuity are disrupted or irreparably damaged.
- In recent years there has been a growing awareness and concern about the increase of family violence in post-conflict areas. Few post-conflict areas have a co-ordinated and comprehensive approach to the problem of family violence. The vast proportion of violence remains hidden and no communal support is available to victims (Kapetanovic & Oruc, 2000).
- Finally in many instances, the post-conflict period is characterised by chronic insecurity for the victims. In Bosnia, the number of individuals with questionable war records have assumed positions of authority. For those returning home, the risk of coming face to face with their attackers is a realistic fear. Attacks and reprisals to returning refugees are common in many areas, and can occur with impunity (Report Office of the High Representative, 2000, 05/02) Scenes such as attacks and rioting are often televised and victims elsewhere are confronted by the most explicit and potent of reactivation stressors.

Once again, the nature of these stressors remains so severe, as to render the chances for recovery extremely grim, and attempts at intervention challenging to say the least. The notion that conventional individual centred therapies can be effective under these circumstances is simplistic to say the least. For example, the three main factors associated with successful therapy outcomes are patient perception of therapy as credible, high and regular attendance of therapy sessions, and most importantly, the absence of ongoing stress (Foa, 2000). Mainstream treatments such as cognitive-behavioural therapy are considered to be effective, given the appropriate, supportive environment.

Anyone familiar with a conflict or post-conflict environment will recognise that few, if any of the necessary elements are present. All factors associated with successful therapy outcomes are challenged:

- Choice of medication is often very limited, and supply not necessarily consistent.
- The likelihood of a therapeutic setting being sufficiently staffed to attend to the numbers of PTSD patients individually and on a weekly basis is slim – particularly when rates in some populations are exceptionally high.
- Difficulties and expense in transport and familial responsibility (such as being the sole provider) may well confound the possibility of attending on a regular basis.
- Many patients, particularly from rural areas, are unfamiliar and suspicious of seeking help in a therapeutic setting, and may well not perceive it as credible.
- Undoubtedly, the absence of ongoing stress is a therapeutic demand that is virtually out of the question.

The nature and extent of therapy will thus depend largely on the resources available. Unfortunately under circumstances of social upheaval, the staff is usually faced with a clinical overload, and the systematic documentation of therapeutic results does not take place. There is rarely the opportunity of publishing clinical findings that are so crucial to the improved understanding of trauma and its consequences. Although there is to date no well-established, successful response to PTSD that can be implemented within the restraints of all conflict zones, there certainly are practices that should be avoided and those that should be encouraged. Certain aspects are important to bear in mind (notably most are pertinent to experiences of sexual abuse).

- Most women who have experienced sexual abuse refuse treatment. When women do seek help it is more often for physical ailments. A report from a psychiatric hospital in Croatia describes 18 victims of sexual torture. All were diagnosed with PTSD, some suicidal, but came to seek assistance for (forced) pregnancy. All of the women refused any form of psychotherapy. This response is fairly consistent with reports from other psychosocial programmes (Folnegovic-Smalc, 1994; Giller, Bracken, & Kabaganda, 1991; Hauser, 1995).
- Many displaced women have a rural background. Even aside from the aversion to therapy associated with rape victims, the social and cultural background thwarts participation in psychosocial programmes. Problems have always been solved within the extended family. In sharp contrast to

the custom of particularly North Americans, the idea of expressing personal distress to a complete stranger is anathema to the majority of victims needing assistance.

- A number of harmful outcomes have been reported after rape victims were interviewed by medical personnel, including psychotic episodes and even suicide (Ivezic, Oruc, & Bell, 1999). In addition, some initiatives serve to drive the wedge even further between rape victims and their community by only offering assistance to rape victims.
- Many psychosocial programmes employ western models and staff – certainly in the initial phases. At the core of most therapy interventions is the understanding that rape must be acknowledged and discussed. Given how fearful women are to speak about this, how many other traumas they need to deal with, and how little we know about the effects of war rape, one should seriously question whether this assumption can be made at all. Is giving voice to that experience therapeutic or harmful? With increasing experience, more and more professionals in conflict zones are urging greater caution over encouraging victims to talk about rape if they are reluctant (Arcel, 2000; Felice & Vincent, 1994).
- There is a growing interest in the use of narrative techniques, and testimony methods. It is interesting to note that with the use of narratives, women freely describe experiencing other forms of violence, but frequently refer to their sexual trauma as if it had happened to someone else. Such storytelling can voice the 'unspeakable' without facing the consequences. However, considerable skill and care is required with regard to the implications of recounting such traumatic events. Regrettably such skilled staff is not always available.
- Survivors require an environment that feels safe and contains adequate social support. They must have a sense of control over when, where and if they talk about their traumatic experiences. Numerous occasions have been noted where women specifically asked for support in other areas, refusing support groups, individual and group psychotherapy focusing on rape.
- Programmes, often in the form of crisis intervention (whose efficacy has yet to be proven), employ voluntary workers who are not trained mental health professionals. Their brief training cannot fully prepare them for the intensity of the torture experiences suffered by many women – consequently they are overwhelmed and unable to be of assistance.
- Funds that are forthcoming in an initial phase (crisis intervention, emergency rehabilitation) often dry up, resulting in the premature termination of programmes. Reliable, long-term projects often cannot illicit sufficient financial support. Programmes folding under financial strain create

more problems than they solve, and interventions are more likely to succeed if there is no excessive dependence on imported expertise and support.

- Much of the language describing raped women, and the associations surrounding this issue, are far from helpful to the women themselves. There are constant references to them having 'lost their dignity', assumptions that these acts have completely destroyed them. Even the term 'victim' can have a negative association, and some prefer to use the term 'survivor'. It is true indeed that there are many who have overcome these multiple atrocities. There are many who have shown tremendous dignity and courage. They are deeply offended by the assumption that they are 'sick' and in need of outside help. They are offered pity, when in fact many deserve admiration. Indeed, the most exceptional stories are by no means those recounting the spectacular destruction of communities and individuals through such evil. Rather, they are accounts of women who continue to display an indomitable spirit and courage under such circumstances.

If the tools and understanding we have are inadequate, what direction should the mental health worker take? Firstly to recognise that basic, systematic research must take place. Rapid crisis intervention may be appealing, but is has not offered results in the realm of psychosocial response. Research is far less spectacular a response, but is *not* a luxury. It is an essential element to long-term solutions. Secondly we must challenge mainstream – and novel – psychosocial programmes as to their efficacy, both in short and long term. This requires independent assessment. Thirdly we must recognise that a person's ability to regain equilibrium depends crucially on their capacity to rebuild their social world and cultural meaning systems. This challenges mainstream or traditional western notions of psychotherapy as exploring traumatic events as a prerequisite to resolving problems. Disclosure is difficult and in some circumstances unwise. Alternative avenues of consideration would be to focus on rebuilding destroyed community infrastructures, developing a greater sense of agency and control over their situation, rather than entering into emotionally invasive therapy, exclusively focusing on the rape experience. This however does implicate a broader, more multidisciplined approach.

7. CONCLUSION

Given the wide domain of areas affected by multiple and prolonged trauma, the healing process should not only be dominated by psychologists. In the

absence of security, a home, family and community, which clinical interventions can begin to heal the destructive effects of war rape or torture? These limitations must be recognised; the responsibility of healing this group in the community lies far more broadly than with mental health professionals alone.

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INTEGRATING THE 'OTHER': THE BUNDESWEHR AND WOMEN SOLDIERS

Gerhard Kümmel

1. THE BEGINNINGS

When the German armed forces came into being in the mid-1950s, as a result of the international tensions due to the Cold War, few considered female soldiers. It took another decade until this issue began to be discussed in society and in politics. This discussion of the 1960s was shaped by a wide-ranging democratisation and significant socio- and politico-cultural changes. Starting with the so-called student movement, various parts of German society became important social movements that called for political and societal participation. Among these were various women's movement groups that criticised the patriarchically structured German society and sought emancipation and gender equality as laid out in various UN documents. Of course, during this endeavour, some parts of them also demanded equal access and participation to professions that had hitherto been male-exclusive domains. Shortly thereafter, the male-dominated soldierly profession and the Bundeswehr viewed pressure from society, which soon translated into the political sphere and put the issue of women in the military on the agenda (Kraake, 1992; Albrecht-Heide & Bujewski-Crawford, 1991; Fischer, 1997).

In late 1973, the German government, a coalition of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and the Liberal Party (FDP) responded to

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these societal concerns by establishing the enquête-commission Women and Society. As a result, Defence Minister Georg Leber (SPD) implemented the opening of the Bundeswehr for women. Thus, in autumn 1975, the year the UN had declared Year of the Woman, women entered the Bundeswehr.[1] This participation, however, was constrained to the medical service, which in the early 1970s had substantial recruitment problems, when there was a gap of 1,300 longer service volunteers in the career of officers (Seidler, 1998, pp. 223, 225). After some time, the access to classifications and trades was extended to military bands because in case of an emergency, the soldiers of the military bands had to be transferred to the medical service. In the early 1980s, the discussion about extending female participation to new classifications gained new momentum. In 1981, an independent long-term Commission had analysed the shifts and the trends in the demographic composition of the society with an eye towards satisfying the Bundeswehr personnels' needs. One year later, the Commission submitted its report, which in one paragraph recommended considering extending voluntary service of women to non-combat functions. However, throughout the 1980s, no such political move was initiated. Nevertheless, the issue remained on the agenda of societal and political debate.

As a result, further steps were taken to enlarge the representation of women in the armed forces. Since the beginning of 1991, all the careers of the medical and military musical service were made accessible to women (see also the findings of Anker, Lippert & Welcker, 1993; Klein & Kriesel, 1993; Schaffer, 1994) and, in 1994, Verena von Weymarn became Surgeon General, the first female general in German military history (Seidler, 1998, p. 227). In the late 1990s, female soldiers made up for about 1.2% of all the German soldiers. The number of women came close to 60 in the military bands and to 4,350 in the medical service (approximately 400 medical officers, 700 medical officer candidates, 2,300 non-commissioned officers, 200 non-commissioned officer candidates and 100 in private ranks) (German Ministry of Defence, 1999). In addition, close to 50,000 women worked as civilian employees either in the armed forces or in the Federal Armed Forces Administration.

2. THE CASE OF TANJA KREIL AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Towards the end of the millennium, women in the Bundeswehr were still confined to non-combat roles, i.e., to the medical service and to military

bands, whereas in other countries, the integration of women had progressed, sometimes substantially.[2] Although the women soldiers were trained in the use of weapons, their utilisation – except for cases of self-defence – was forbidden according to the then interpretation of Article 12a of the Basic Law. This situation changed fundamentally at the turn of the century in no small extent due to a woman named Tanja Kreil who has been described by the media as embodying the – foremost male – "nightmare of a woman with a gun in her hand" (Kipphoff, 2000, p. 39) and as indicating the end of the rule of men (Zielke, 2000, p. 14).

In 1996, the 19-year-old trained electrician Tanja Kreil applied for voluntary service in the area of maintenance, i.e., in a combat support function. Her application, however, was declined. The Bundeswehr argued that women serving in combat functions and with weapons in their hands was forbidden by law. Tanja Kreil did not accept this decision and went to the courts. Part of her charge was that her application was illegally rejected because the Bundeswehr resorted to her sex and used a gender-specific argument by saying that men were allowed to enter positions involving the use of arms while women were not. The argument ran counter to a February 1976 European Union (EU) directive (Council Directive 76/207/EEC) that demands member states follow the principle of equality of treatment in the workplace, i.e., prohibits discrimination in the workplace for reasons of gender. The Administrative Court in Hanover found it necessary to have this checked and, in mid-1998, decided to suspend the court proceedings and to ask the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Luxemburg for an interpretation. Eventually in January of 2000, the ECJ ruled that the EU directive applied to the specific workplace of the armed forces, that it overrode the provisions of the German Law on Soldiers and the German Regulations on Soldiers' Careers and that Community law governed matters of defence (European Court of Justice, 2000). Hence, the ECJ overruled the arguments of national sovereignty put forward by the German government.

This means that the recent steps to open the Bundeswehr to women do not stem from genuinely political initiatives as one may have thought, but from a court ruling that required the political sphere to take some action (see also Stelzenmüller, 2000, p. 6). As a consequence, for the German armed forces, the new millennium began with a dramatic change, the prospect of including women in the military on a much larger scale. To be sure, this departure from the status quo is part of a larger picture of reform, restructuring and profound changes, either already under way or impending. Its main objective is for the Bundeswehr to develop a "new profile of capabilities", as laid down by the then Defence Minister, Rudolf

Scharping, in his so-called Cornerstones-Memorandum (German Minister of Defence, 2000). Following the ruling of the ECJ, there was a lively and controversial debate on the topic of women's inclusion in the military not only within the armed forces themselves, but also within the larger German society and in academia. And one of the issues discussed was the depth or the degree of the integration and thus the question whether, taking into account the text of the ECJ ruling whether certain areas, classifications or trades should be denied to women or whether the Bundeswehr should be completely open.

The Ministry of Defence eventually chose the latter option, an option which an expert opinion by the Bundeswehr Institute for Social Research (SOWI) had already advocated in mid-February 2000 (Kümmel, Klein & Lohmann, 2000). Thus, the organization and implementation of this political decision began. Starting in January 2001, women became eligible to enter all the classifications and trades, i.e. beyond the trades hitherto already open for women (medical service and military bands). Two premises guided the further steps to include women in the armed forces: (1) Integration incorporated the principle of voluntariness. Accordingly, women would enter the military services voluntarily, women would not be subject to conscription as is still the case for men. (2) The integration was to be based not on policies of affirmative action, but on the principle of equality of treatment. Thus, there was to be a gender-free or gender-neutral assessment of those who applied for military service, i.e., everyone would have to pass the criteria for the position they requested irrespective of their sex.

In the summer of 2000, the first job interviews and aptitude tests were conducted with female applicants. Simultaneously, steps which most of the people involved deemed necessary were taken to revise the German constitution. At the end of October and in early December, respectively, the German parliamentary bodies, the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, with two-thirds majorities, voted for the revision of Article 12a of the Basic Law. Starting with January 2001, women entered the Bundeswehr in trades hitherto precluded for females in several, usually bi-monthly incoming, cohorts. Overall, about 2,740 servicewomen were counted in 2001; as of May 2003, some 8,760 women serve in the German military amounting to about 4.7% of all German shorter- and longer-service volunteers and career soldiers.[3] In the long run, the percentage of women will increase to something between 7 and 10 percent (around 14,000 and 15,000 total) according to estimates of the Defence Ministry. This expectation is in line with the experiences of Germany's partner countries in NATO.

3. PART A: MALE SOLDIERS' ATTITUDES AND PERCEPTIONS[4]

The quite moderate numbers of female applicants so far may lead to the assumption that the further integration of women into the Bundeswehr will not cause major frictions and that the 'noise' around this issue is too much. However, this view seems to be somewhat rash. When taking into consideration the history of the inclusion of women in the military in several other countries, it can be seen that the whole process is by no means smooth, but faces substantial opposition, especially when it comes to women in combat roles. This resonates with the findings to be found in the field of gender studies, in feminist writings and in military-sociological research. According to them, once the images and perceptions of the roles of women in society start to change, the gender system as a whole cannot be left untouched by this. Instead, the change in role images for women also means a change in role images for men and for the gender system as a whole (Zulehner & Volz, 1999; Meuser, 1998; Connell, 1999). In addition, the integration of women and, in particular, the unrestricted and complete opening of the armed forces for women, including combat functions, severely touches the commonly held and cultivated image of the soldier as a male warrior (Seifert, 1996; see also Johnen, 1992). However, it may be questioned, if not doubted, whether, in the case of Germany, this will assume such dramatic manifestations as sensed in parts of the German media. In the end, this issue boils down to the question whether the military has been affected by the trends of shifting gender roles and perceptions to be observed in society at large or whether the armed forces have managed to 'insularise' themselves from these socio-cultural processes and to attract only or mostly those men who resist the change in the gender system. In such a vein, it may be helpful to describe and analyse male soldiers' opinions and images surrounding the issue of women in the military. How do male soldiers perceive and judge the integration of women into the Bundeswehr? What problems do they anticipate? And what do they expect or even fear?

3.1. The Research Project

The research project was commissioned to the SOWI during the implementation stage of the further integration of women. Its main objectives were to get information on the attitudes and perceptions of male soldiers

towards the inclusion of women into the military; to find out whether the soldiers have reservations against women soldiers; to single out in which areas, classifications and trades these reservations are more pronounced than in others; and to identify soldiers or groups of soldiers who display more reservations than others. For this purpose, we administered a questionnaire which contained items related to the scope or the degree to which the Bundeswehr should be opened; to the effects anticipated for the military itself following the extension of women's integration; to the external implications of such a move; and to the gender images of the soldiers. The soldiers surveyed in April 2000 (i.e., before the political decision was taken to open the Bundeswehr without restrictions!) were asked to place their agreement or disagreement to each item on a six-point scale ranging from Agree Completely to Thoroughly Disagree. Later on, the responses were binarised in Agree and Disagree. To manage the problem of acquiescence, i.e., the tendency of the respondents to agree to positively formulated items which may lead to significant distortions in the responses, some items were formulated positively, others negatively (Bortz & Döring, 1995, p. 215f.).

Concerning the data, it is to be mentioned that we received close to 2,650 responses of about 3,300 questionnaires mailed which were analysed by using SPSS, version 8. The sample does not precisely meet the criteria for an optimum, representative sample (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, 1999, p. 16). This implies that certain caveats are necessary regarding the transfer of our findings to the Bundeswehr at large. When looking at the rank structure of our sample, an over-representation of officers is to be noted, which means that our sample carries a higher level of education compared to the Bundeswehr at large. This may result in a more positive attitude of our sample towards the integration process all the more so since there may be a sponsorship bias at work: officers because of their rank, their career orientations and their relative closeness to the military and political leadership of the Bundeswehr may tend to respond by social desirability and political correctness (Bortz & Döring, 1995, p. 229; Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, 1999, p. 32). Furthermore, when looking at the services, our sample is characterised by an under-representation of the army. Taking into consideration the findings of research done on the present topic in other countries, one may assume that this may lead to a more positive attitude of our sample towards the inclusion of women when compared to the Bundeswehr at large. Nevertheless, with these caveats in mind, our findings may be taken as a rough and imperfect indicator. Lastly, to put the following data into a larger context and to assess whether and to what extent the

opinions of the soldiers vary from German public opinion, it should be mentioned that several general population surveys from 2000 to 2003 reveal a constant and consistent majority of close to 75% of the respondents who are positive about the German government's decision to make the Bundeswehr completely accessible for females.

3.2. The Findings

As has already been mentioned, in an initial attempt to structure the research field, the various items we developed were grouped into four different categories. These categories are: (1) external effects: items dealing with the extra-organisational implications; (2) scope: items related to the degree to which the Bundeswehr should be opened; (3) gender images: items covering the soldiers' views of how women and men should be; and (4) internal effects: items asking for the internal, military consequences of the extension of military roles for women. According to our data presented in Table 1, the integration of women seems to be basically welcomed. In terms of its external effects, almost 70% of the male soldiers think that integrating women will buy the armed forces prestige and legitimacy within German society, thus improving civil–military relations in Germany. But the military is not the only one to profit from this move because benefits regarding the process of women's emancipation in German society are expected by a similar percentage of soldiers. Welcoming attitudes also come to the fore when it comes to the scope of female integration. Almost nine out of 10 soldiers are in

Table 1. Male Soldiers' Attitudes Towards the External Effects and the Scope of Integration of Women into the Bundeswehr (in per cent).

External Effects	Agree	*N*
The integration of women has a positive effect on the image of the Bundeswehr within society	69	2627
The integration process furthers the emancipation of women	72	2622
If the integration of women is to proceed, conscription should be introduced for women	67	2617
Scope of integration		
Women should not be allowed to serve in the military	15	2623
Women should only serve in the trades currently open to them	27	2631
Women should be allowed to serve in all trades except for combat roles	40	2627
There should be no restricted classifications and trades for women	51	2625

favour of having women in the military and three-fourths support an integration of women that transcends the long-practiced restriction of women to the medical service and military bands. A thorough inclusion, without any restrictions in terms of classifications and trades closed for women, is still supported by a slight majority of those surveyed.

At the same time, however, the data show that there are soldiers who view women in the military as a matter of principle and are strictly opposed to any measures and policies taken to include women in the military (15%). Twenty seven percent of the respondents prefer to stay with the status quo. That the opening of the Bundeswehr may be seen in equivocal terms is also indicated by the two-thirds of the soldiers who expect German society and German politics to introduce conscription for women too. This finding of ambivalence is corroborated when looking at the two item categories left (Table 2).

As regards to gender images, the soldiers' responses indicate the persistence of traditional images concerning the role of women in society and vis-à-vis the men. In this vein, in some segments of the sample, biologically based perceptions and stereotypes come to the fore. Close to one-third of the

Table 2. Gender Images of the Soldiers and Internal Effects Following from Female Integration as Anticipated by them (in per cent).

Gender Images	Agree	*N*
Women are to be protected	25	2624
Women are not suited for the difficult life in the fields	31	2624
Women are not suited for trades requiring a high level of physical fitness	43	2626
Women are not suited for positions as superiors	23	2617
Women can very well be used in missions abroad which require negotiation skills	66	2616
I can easily imagine being defended by a woman with a gun in her hand	56	2626
Internal effects		
It is easy to imagine working with women in my own unit	76	2628
Women are a disruptive factor in the military	24	2625
Armed forces with women soldiers do not loose in combat power	62	2626
With women the Bundeswehr will not be able to accomplish its military missions	30	2628
With the further integration of women there will be more problems in military every-day life	65	2623
Women soldiers will change the tone in the armed forces	75	2619
The extension of women's integration will lead to an increase of problems related to sexuality	84	2623
There should be no preferential treatment for women in the armed forces	86	2625
Women in the Bundeswehr take away the jobs from the male soldiers	23	2620

soldiers deem women not to be suited for the challenging life in the fields and more than two-fifths think that women are not suited for slots that demand high levels of physical fitness. Socio-culturally based arguments can be detected also. Almost 45% cannot imagine to be defended by a female soldier with a gun in her hand and one-fourth perceive women as the ones to be protected. Obviously, the classical gender-role ascriptions – the man as the protector and the woman as the protected – are still adhered to by a significant number of soldiers. However, traditional gender images also leave women a place in which they are thought to have a comparative advantage over men. Thus, two-thirds of the respondents hold the communicative (and thus de-escalating) skills ascribed to women in high esteem, in particular when it comes to military operations other than war.[5]

Moreover, there are areas in which an erosion of traditional gender images can be observed. No less than 77% of those surveyed take women to be suited for positions as military superiors. This can be seen when analysing the responses in the category of internal effects, as well. A similar number, more than three-fourths of the respondents claim to have no problems in thinking of women in their own unit. In addition, about 70% of the respondents do not expect any disadvantages or damage to the realisation of military missions due to the integration of females. In a similar vein, more than 60% do not anticipate any losses in combat power due to female soldiers. About 75% expect the tone, the way of speaking in the German armed forces, to change following the increase in the number of female soldiers.

The other side of the coin, however, is that negative internal effects on every-day life in the military are anticipated as a consequence of the integration process. More than 65% firmly believe that, in general, there will be more problems in their specific workplace once women will be there. When it comes to a particular dimension, to all the problems revolving around the issue of sexuality, this number is even higher. In this respect, roughly 84% anticipate an increase in the number of problems related to sexuality. Furthermore, the data show a certain uneasiness, if not fear, among the male soldiers not only about an increasing competition in the workplace as a result of the inclusion of women, but also about the possibility that male soldiers will be put at a disadvantage (reverse discrimination). More than one-fifth of the men are open in arguing that the women in the Bundeswehr will take away the jobs from the men. Thus, they explicitly stress the necessity of equality of treatment. An overwhelming majority of 86% demands that there will not be any preferential treatment given to women just because they are women.

Taken together, then, the pattern of responses given by the male soldiers outlined above is proof of mixed feelings on their side. This ambivalence in attitudes consists of a mixture of (1) scepticism/reservations concerning change and curiosity about the future; (2) classical/traditional prejudices against women and understanding combined with sympathy for the new or modern role of women in society; and (3) fears of a rising competition of women in the workplace and respect for the capabilities and the performance of women.

3.3. The Roots of the Men's Reservations

In a further step of the analysis, we ran a factorial analysis of all the items to find out whether the four categories (scope of integration, external effects, internal effects and gender images) can neatly be distinguished in reality. Yet, the analysis produced a one-factorial solution. At this point, we decided to take the items falling into this one predominant factor and construct an Attitudes Towards the Integration of Women into the Bundeswehr Likert Scale ranging from 16 (pro-integration) to 96 (contra-integration). Further on we analysed several segments within the military to find out whether certain groups of soldiers are more opposed to integrating women than others. The most interesting results have been put together in Table 3.

Based on these data, an attempt was made to develop a sufficiently coherent framework of interpretation. According to this endeavour, the male soldiers cultivating reservations against the integration of women into the armed forces may be grouped on the basis of the different sources that structure their thinking and nourish their reservations. Here, two categories may be distinguished: the first type or group consists of what we call the traditionalists. Their images of the military, the soldier, of men and women and of the division of labour among the sexes within society are the classical and traditional ones. The preference for denying access of women to the military and for confining them to certain classifications and trades is thus based on the binary construction of men and women which, inter alia, ascribes to males the roles of fighting, killing and protecting and to females the roles of caring, being protected and of giving birth to and bringing up children; male aggressiveness is juxtaposed with female peacefulness (Mitscherlich, 1985; Elshtain, 1987; Batscheider, 1993; Dunivin, 1994; Seifert, 1996; Meuser, 1998). In this sense, it might be inferred that the military in general (and the Bundeswehr also) may be particularly attractive to men who deem the military as a place where the world is still in balance,

Table 3. Bundeswehr Segments and their Attitude towards the Integration of Women into the Bundeswehr (range: 16 (pro-integration) to 96 (contra-integration); mean = 44.59; standard deviance = 17.99).

Military Segment	Mean	*N*
Age group up to 29	46.4	1594
Age group from 30 onwards	40.0	742
Army	46.9	1083
Navy	43.6	655
Air Force	41.7	650
Officers	39.6	750
Non-Commissioned Officers	47.6	658
Rank and File	46.1	926
Shorter/Longer Service Volunteers	47.6	775
Career Servicemembers	40.4	764
Combat Forces	45.0	969
Combat Support Forces	43.7	468
Command and Control Forces	44.7	947
Medical Service	54.0	188
Non-Medical Services	43.9	2196

i.e., where the traditional gender system is still valid. We base this notion of traditionalism on the response behaviour of the army. Soldiers of the army show more reservations against the integration of female soldiers than the soldiers of the navy and the air force. Also, the combat forces display a somewhat higher mean. However, it is interesting to note that the differences between combat forces, combat support forces and command & control forces are quite small and surely much smaller that one could have expected. This might indicate that traditionalist thinking does not constitute the primary source of reservations or that it is still predominant, but has been put to latency.

The second type or group, in turn, entails those whom we call the statusinconsistents. First, they perceive women as a socio-economic threat because of the increasing competition in the workplace due to the presence of female soldiers. This perception is based on the grounds that their socio-economic and professional situation and hence their future is insecure. Second, they fear that they themselves will be discriminated against and that women will be given preferential treatment. In their view, it is they who are put at a disadvantage and not the women. The status inconsistents can

rather be found among the younger and the contract soldiers, i.e., the shorter- and longer-service volunteers. Here, indeed, the socio-economic, workplace-related competition for women is much more real than for career service members. In addition, we found markedly strong reservations among the male soldiers in the medical service. At first glance surprisingly, it is therefore the male soldiers already working with women in their specific workplace who display significant reservations. It could have been assumed that gender relations in the medical service, i.e., in an area where the integration of women into the military has a substantial history, were or in the meantime have become smooth. Yet, once the fact that women in the medical service had been exempt from guard duty in the past is taken into account – a task which then had to be done by the male soldiers in the medical service, it becomes clear that the reservations of men have some real substance and that there is a subjective feeling of having not been treated equally and a sense that justice in gender relations (cf. Bierhoff, Cohen & Greenberg, 1986) is not given in the workplace. Because of this suspicion of or belief in reverse discrimination, they explicitly point to the necessity of equality of treatment of men and women in the armed forces.

In the empirical reality, these two types overlap without any doubt. Nevertheless, distinguishing them analytically is important because underlying them are two different sources motivating negative attitudes towards the ongoing inclusion of women into the armed forces which in turn necessitates a broader approach in managing this issue and therefore different routes in dealing with these attitudes. The two types we have identified, the traditionalist and the status inconsistent, resonate with the findings of recent social-psychological research on stereotypes. Negative attitudes towards women – just like those to ethnic or racial minorites – may be seen as stereotypes and prejudices following the classical definition by Gordon Allport (1954). In the past, some decades ago, stereotypes and prejudices against women were openly expressed. This situation has changed remarkably because of the observed significant shifts in the socio-economic, socio-cultural and politico-cultural spheres (Inglehart, 1989; Schäfers & Zapf, 1998). In general, living conditions, education and job opportunities for women have improved substantially in recent decades; also, socio- and politico-culturally, women are increasingly considered as equal to men. This points to the formation of perceptions in society that are based on images of egalitarianism (Spence & Hahn, 1997; Twenge, 1997). Nevertheless, it is hardly possible to argue that gender-based discrimination in the workplace and in society at large has been completely eliminated in modern societies. Rather, discrimination against women can be observed when examining the

division of labour in the families and the ratio of women working in the top echelons of business, politics and academia.[6]

However, in the recent past, the phenomenology of these discriminating attitudes towards women has changed. Open, manifest expressions of prejudices against women have become less visible whereas subtle forms have increasingly shaped the gender landscape. In the literature on sexism at least two forms of sexism are distinguished: (1) traditional sexism characterised by an emphasis on differences between the sexes, a belief in the inferiority of women compared to men, an adherence to classical gender roles, and a strong opposition towards women assuming non-traditional roles; and (2) modern sexism consisting of denying the persistence of discrimination against women, criticising the economic and political demands of women and strongly opposing any affirmative action measures on behalf of women (cf. Tougas et al., 1995; Swim & Cohen, 1997; Eckes & Six-Materna, 1998; Schmermund, 1998).

3.4. The Recommendations and Their Implementation

Based on our empirical findings, we recommended the introduction of what was called gender or integration training into military education and socialisation, all the more so since not only the German police and the German Border Guard, but also the armed forces from Scandinavian countries, from Austria, Canada and the United States have devised and implemented similar programmes in the past and have positively reported upon them. The response to our advice was affirmative and the Zentrum Innere Führung in Koblenz was tasked to devise some sort of a curriculum for such a program. A first, initial curriculum which had to be framed within a very short period of time in the summer of 2000 came into practice in November 2000, namely in courses for military leaders and trainers coming from those military units in which the military education and training of the servicewomen was to start in the following year. This curriculum was based on the assumption that the military context was to change substantially as a consequence of the integration of women: men who hitherto overwhelmingly commanded men and/or were commanded by men were going to face women both as subordinates and superiors in the near future; and this very fact was to be brought to the knowledge of the incoming servicewomen.

The objectives of the curriculum were defined as (a) improving the men's acceptance of women; (b) developing an atmosphere of mutual trust, tolerance and comradeship between men and women; (c) bringing to the men's knowledge relevant legal provisions; and (d) building and strengthening the

men's security in behaviour towards women. This was thought to be achieved by following the principle of multiplication, i.e., these courses were organised centrally for a core group of soldiers that were deemed multiplicators, who would pass their newly gained knowledge on to the various subordinate military levels and soldiers. In other words, the integration training operated with the notion of a trickle-down or cascade effect. The concrete material contents of the curriculum centred on five different issue areas. One dimension was the legal one in which the participants were made familiar with the legal provisions valid from then on. Here, particular attention was given to the sensibilisation for the issues of sexual harassment and sexual violence. The next dimension focussed on general or average physiological differences between men and women pointing to a special need for focussed physical training programmes for females. The third one addressed general psychological differences between the sexes, in particular different response and coping strategies of the sexes towards stress, and discussed prevailing, traditional gender images. In the fourth dimension, differences in communicative behaviour (directive versus non-directive style of communication) were taught to the participants. And the last dimension revolved around motivational aspects (Zentrum Innere Führung, 2000a, b). With an eye both on the contents and the principles of this curriculum and with regard to schemes like those of the Florida-based Defence Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI) of the American armed forces, there soon emerged some criticism of this curriculum (Kümmel, 2003b) and, meanwhile, this curriculum has been changed substantially, the integration/gender training is no longer a separate section in military education, but has become one basic ferment in any section of military education and follows principles of gender mainstreaming.

4. PART B: FEMALE SOLDIERS' ATTITUDES AND PERCEPTIONS – THE CLASS OF 2001[7]

4.1. The Research Project

The findings of our research so far and the widespread assumption in the Bundeswehr and the German Ministry of Defence that the German armed forces were going to change quite dramatically due to the full-scale and thorough integration of women persuaded the Defence Ministry to commission an evaluative research project to the SOWI. Here, we proceed in two steps:

in first step, we surveyed the group of women that entered the Bundeswehr in 2001 in the first few weeks of their military career in order to have something like an initial, early picture of their attitudes and perceptions. This, summary of the findings of our research on the class of 2001 will be presented in what follows. And the second step, currently in its preparatory stage and scheduled for 2005, will consist of surveying both male and female soldiers for their experiences, attitudes and perceptions of some 2–3 year experience of practical integration. The survey of the class of 2001 basically aims at sketching a profile of the 'typical' female soldier and at identifying – potential, perceived or real – problems within the process of integration. Our questionnaire was sent to some 2,740 women in the first few weeks of their basic training and more than 40% responded. Again, SPSS version 8, was used to analyse the incoming data. In addition, we conducted 33 interviews of female soldiers at a somewhat later stage (usually after about 3–4 months) and we distributed nearly 80 'diaries', of which seven were returned to us.

4.2. The Findings

Profiling the 'typical' female soldiers reveals that, on average, the women are 21 years old and about seven out of 10 come from villages and little towns. Women coming from the new Bundesländer are clearly over-represented in the armed forces when compared to their percentage in the general population. Indeed, 44% have been raised on the territory of the former GDR. Although only 11% were unemployed prior to their military career, this may be explained by pointing to the more intense economic problems of these areas when compared to the old Bundesländer and to a much greater societal experience of working females. This disproportionally high number of women coming from the East is also reflected in religious – or rather non-religious – affiliations because, in the meantime, the group of those who do not adhere to any religion has become the biggest one. More than 60% have a Secondary School diploma and another 25% have a High School diploma. Close to half of the women have a lasting relation with a boyfriend or are married, but only 4% already have children. Almost all servicewomen have a positive role model since their mothers have worked in the past or are still working.

More than 60% are non-commissioned officers while about 28% have chosen the officers' career. In most cases, the servicewomen, both officers and non-commissioned officers, have opted for quite 'traditional' occupational slots in administrative, logistical and maintenance functions. Nevertheless, some 17% and 19%, respectively, have joined the combat and

combat support forces. The army receives the bulk of the incoming servicewomen. Their motivations to join the military are basically circumscribed by three dimensions: (a) comradeship, i.e., some longing for community; (b) general occupational characteristics like job security, good payment and reasonable career prospects; and (c) specific characteristics of the soldierly profession like adventurism and the testing of one's physical and mental limits.

Our analysis revealed two areas which are or may be problematic in the future course of integration. The first problem refers to the social or interactionist side of integration that is to be distinguished from the technical side of integration. When it comes to military, soldierly life, in everyday situations as well as in the context of concrete missions, we found considerable difference and variation in the attitudes and perceptions between the sexes, as is illustrated by the responses of both men and women to the military effectiveness items, the gender images items and the daily military routine items in Table 4. Whereas overwhelming majorities of both men and women can easily imagine to co-operate well with the women in their own unit, about double the number of men than of women anticipate an increase of problems in military everday life. Life in the military is expected to become more complex and difficult in the future. Moreover, every fifth male soldier has some reservations when it comes to women in leadership functions. Not surprisingly, the percentage of women who argue that way is five times smaller than that. In a similar vein, with integration much more men than women expect increasing difficulties related to sexuality. Here, only half of the women agree to this item while more than four out of five men do so.

With regard to military effectiveness, there are 43% of the male soldiers who deem women not suited for physically demanding classifications and trades; this percentage is more than double as that for women. This skepticism points to a rather widespread understanding that combat, actual fighting, is a male business. Similarly, almost 40% of the men anticipate some damaging effects of female integration on military combat capabilities and 30% state that following female integration, the Bundeswehr will no longer be able to fulfill its military tasks. By contrast, nine out of 10 women do not expect this to happen and are thus confident in the military capabilities of women. The same percentage of women also thinks that women are perfectly suited for military missions other than war, i.e., aiming at the de-escalation of conflict situations due to their presumed better developed social skills.[8] These data not only show that fighting is still predominantly considered a male business, but they also evidence that soldierly interaction is perceived to become more difficult and strenuous once men do not have to deal with other men only, but have to include women into the equation.

Table 4. Daily Military Routine, Gender Images and Military Effectiveness Male as Judged by Male and Female Soldiers (in per cent).

Gender Images	Women Agree	Men Agree
Women are not suited for the difficult life in the fields	12	31
Women are not suited for trades requiring a high level of physical fitness	21	43
Women are not suited for positions as superiors	6	23
I can easily imagine being defended by a woman with a gun in her hand	83	56
The extension of women's integration will lead to an increase of problems related to sexuality	52	84
Women in the Bundeswehr take away the jobs from the male soldiers	5	23
Daily military routine		
It is easy to imagine working with women in my own unit	88	76
With the further integration of women there will be more problems in military every-day life	36	65
Women soldiers will change the tone in the armed forces	57	75
Military effectiveness		
Armed forces with women soldiers do not loose in combat power	90	62
With women the Bundeswehr will not be able to accomplish its military missions	10	30
Women can very well be used in missions abroad which require negotiation skills	90	66

The second field where problems are either already existing or are to be expected is circumscribed by the notion of 'greedy institutions' (Mady Wechsler Segal). This term denotes both the family/the partner on the one hand and the military on the other as forces that both pull the individual soldier but in opposite directions; he or she is so to speak torn between these two demanding institutions. Harmonising them, making them compatible is perceived as a sincere problem (see also Kümmel, 2005). We found one indicator of this compatibility problem in the much less pronounced enthusiasm or approval for the decision of the females to join the military on the side of the servicewomen's male partners. Whereas 80% of the fathers and 74% of the mothers and the sisters and brothers of the servicewomen are reported to have greeted the decision of their daughters/sisters to voluntarily join the armed forces, only 47% of the partners are reported as equally positive or enthusiastic. Another indicator that corroborates the centrality of this problem is mentioned in Table 5. Speaking of perceived difficulties and problems in their military career, the demanding criteria of physical fitness were followed by partnership problems and difficulties in harmonising one's family life with one's occupational life.

Table 5. Anticipated Difficulties and Problems by Female Soldiers (in per cent).

	Agree
Handling of weapons	7
Housing	7
Pregnancy	10
Equipment	11
Sanitary installations	13
Mental demands	17
Uniform/Clothes	22
Job–Family–Compatibility	25
Partnership	29
Physical demands	35

A third, and last, indicator is to be found in the coincidence of (a) the notable majority of about 60% that even in this early stage is determined to stay in the military much longer than their contract runs; (b) the preference and desire for long-term working; and (c) the 75% majority that wants to have children later on in their life. Interestingly, and also quite surprisingly, the topic of sexual harassment/sexual violence ranks comparatively low when it comes to difficulties, but also to doubts, fears and apprehensions. Sexist talk and sexual harassment is named by just 8% of the female soldiers when they are asked about some apprehensions that they might have with regard to their being a female in a previously predominantly male environment. Indeed, the perception of the servicewomen at the beginning of their military career is that the Bundeswehr provides a rather secure occupational context in this regard. What worries them more is unfair behaviour by their male and female comrades and superiors each ranging between 13% and 18%, and it is unfair behaviour by their female comrades which is named by 18% that ranks at the top of the list.

These data from the quantitative pillar of the analysis are proof of the fact that the incoming servicewomen are highly motivated to prevail in this hitherto male-exclusive occupational field and do not cultivate unrealistic expectations as to their life in the military. They enter the social space of the military well-informed. Nevertheless, some doubts do remain on their side, but generally speaking on a relatively low intensity level. Yet, the analysis reveals some substantial potential for future trouble. Here, it is the harmonisation of occupational and family demands on the one hand and the notable differences and gaps in attitudes that may translate into material behaviour in the social interaction of men and women in the Bundeswehr on the other that have to be named.

The qualitative pillar of our research, the analysis of semi-structured interviews and rather unstructured 'diaries', corroborates these findings and details them. They provide a glimpse into integration at work, because this step of the analysis was conducted at a time when the servicewomen had already stayed in the Bundeswehr for at least 2–3 months. What is of special importance here is that with regard to the dimension of soldierly interaction, both the interviews and the 'diaries' are vivid documents of tokenism (Rosabeth Moss Kanter) at work. They show that equality of treatment and equal opportunity in practice are quite difficult to implement and to achieve. To illustrate this, the female soldiers report that they feel privileged and under-privileged at the same time. On the one hand, they feel to be positively discriminated against because of a type of male behaviour that may be called benign or benevolent sexism and male chivalry; they report that they get too much attention and sometimes excessive, 'mothering' care. On the other hand, they say that their performance, in particular when it comes to physical exercises, marches, sports, etc., is exposed to overly meticulous and fastidious scrutiny. According to them, they have to perform at 150% in order to be accepted and respected. In addition, they report that sex and sexuality are subtly used to undermine their social integration, i.e., they are the object of gossip and dirty talking which are employed as a means of exclusion. Their own reaction to this seems to be either polarisation or isolation, assertive rebuffing or disillusioned retreat. This situation obviously changes in military exercises and manouvres. Here, the servicewomen say that they felt and feel fully accepted and respected. Life in the (military) fields, in a concrete operation so to speak, levels differences and models existing stereotypes.

The main strategy female soldiers employ when entering the military as a social space seems to be assimilation. They are highly motivated to prevail in the military and to meet all the occupational and military requirements. They are determined to do a good job and are willing to pay a substantial price for this, i.e., to accept restraints in their private life. With the male soldiers, it is to be noted that obviously the presence of women in the armed forces has an effect and triggers a reaction. The preliminary evidence of these male responses leads to the equally preliminary conclusion that there is, among them, something that may be called a polarisation effect based on a re-affirmation of classical maleness (see also Faludi, 1995; Zulehner & Volz, 1999, p. 288; Meuser, 1998, p. 303) which, however, does not come openly to the fore as the organisation has made it quite consistently clear so far that its sanctioning power in cases of misbehaviour will actually be used. This interpretation is strengthened by notable changes in the attitudes of

Table 6. Male Soldiers' Attitudes, 2000–2002 (agree; in per cent).

Gender Images	Men 2000	Men 2002
Women are to be protected	24	25
Women are not suited for trades requiring a high level of physical fitness	43	61
Women are not suited for positions as superiors	23	36
I can easily imagine being defended by a woman with a gun in her hand	56	75
Women in the Bundeswehr take away the jobs from the male soldiers	23	18
There should be no preferential treatment for women in the armed forces	86	91
Daily military routine		
Women soldiers will change the tone in the armed forces	75	64
With the further integration of women there will be more problems in military every-day life	65	68
Military effectiveness		
Women can very well be used in missions abroad which require negotiation skills	66	64
In combat women may become a burden	—	54
With women in small combat units group cohesion will suffer	—	51

male soldiers between 2000 and 2002. Indeed, our data from the survey of male soldiers in 2000 compared to those of the SOWI's general armed forces survey of 2002 show that the skepticism with regard to the leadership, physical and military capabilities of women and to military effectiveness has become more pronounced in the meantime (see Table 6).

Thus, the very problems will probably emerge only on the middle- and long-term scale, paradoxically in the course of a 'normalisation process'. This points at the necessity of continued efforts in managing the gender relations in the Bundeswehr, of structurally and persistently establishing gender mainstreaming training programmes within the organisation. The social integration of female soldiers is by no means a mission accomplished, but a permanent effort. Establishing, maintaining and promoting the social integration of servicewomen is a permanent challenge requiring persistent attention.

4.3. The Recommendations and Their Implementation

Given these findings from social research, our advice was to pay increasing attention to the social side of integration as well as to somehow accommodate both 'greedy institutions', i.e., the family and the military. In this

regard, our plea was to think of steps so far unthought of, namely (1) the introduction of part-time working schemes and child care policies; (2) the creation of a surplus pool of personnel that compensates for maternity and family leave; and (3) the 'permanentisation' and intensification of gender mainstreaming programmes. The Ministry of Defence did indeed take up our recommendations. In this vein, it has been decided to establish, in a pilot project, 12 so-called family care centres all over Germany, which include various types of child care ranging from child care through the Bundeswehr itself to child care in co-operation with local institutions and companies. The later numerical and geographical expansion (into mission areas abroad) of these family centres is currently debated and will be decided once the pilot project will have been evaluated. Also, the Bundeswehr has just introduced flexible working hours and a gender mainstreaming program in co-operation with the Family Ministry.

5. CONCLUSION

The gender system in Germany as well as in modern societies in general is subject to change. In the analysis of Norbert Elias (1989, pp. 33–37), this is part of what he calls an 'emancipatory trend'. Hence, the overall direction seems to point to full-scale equality of women vis-à-vis the men both in formal and in real terms. Nevertheless, this process might neither be one-dimensional nor smooth thus constituting the need for more and more comprehensive research. Although quite a few men have changed their gender images in the meantime or are used to modern conceptions of a man's and a woman's role, the very fact of the perceptible changes in the gender system may provoke resistance and a renewed emphasis on the traditional images. Hence, focussing on men, one may distinguish four different types: the traditional man, the insecure men, the pragmatic man, and the new men which reminds us of the necessity to speak of masculinity in terms of masculinities (Zulehner & Volz, 1999; Connell, 1999; Steffen, 2002; Higate, 2003).

The question then is whether and in how far the German armed forces are involved and affected by these processes. The proceeding analysis points to an affirmative answer, i.e., the Bundeswehr cannot distance itself from developments going on in the larger society, but it would be too far-fetched to hypothesise or assume civil-military congruence (cf. also Schaffer, 1992). As a consequence, the further examination of gender images in the military, among male and female soldiers and the analysis of soldierly interaction is

required. This being said, it seems safe to conclude, that, even at this early stage, there are shifts in the gender system and they may impact on the armed forces. What has become evident is that there is unrest, fear and opposition among a considerable number of male soldiers of the Bundeswehr. These reservations can indeed make a difference in the further path of integration. They may translate into manifest behaviour when male soldiers meet female soldiers in their workplace. It will be these opinions, attitudes, expectations and reservations based on traditionalism and/or on status inconsistency that the German armed forces and their political and military leadership will have to accommodate and manage. Gender training programs are one means to accomplish this objective. Of crucial importance will be the unmistakable signal of the political and military leadership that integration is wanted, not the least because the recruitment of women alleviates the military's personnel problems which, in turn, requires the organisation to pay more attention to the issues of family/child care and working hour flexibilisation. Further on, the successful integration of women will be contingent on the soldiers' feeling, both male and female, that the Bundeswehr is dealing with their concerns in a sincere and authentic way.

NOTES

1. This was not the first time that women entered German armed forces. During World War I, women worked in the German armaments' industries and were recruited for medical, secretaries', administrative and combat support functions. Towards the end of the war, 500 of them were trained for communication roles. In World War II, the inclusion of females in the war effort went even further. About 450,000 were recruited for the Wehrmacht Assistance Corps (Wehrmachthelferinnenkorps) and tens of thousands of them were assigned combat functions. However, this was not officially recognised since their roles were interpreted in terms of assistance only (Seidler, 1998).

2. The literature on women in the military has meanwhile become legion and it is still growing, most likely even on an accelerated level due to the steps taken in a number of countries to further open the military to women. For an overview and apart from the literature cited in other parts of this article, see the following selected references: Quester (1977), Lippert and Rössler (1980), Goldman (1982), Isaksson (1988), Hurni et al. (1992), Howes and Stevenson (1993), Vickers (1993), Segal (1994), Dandeker and Segal (1996), Herek, Jobe and Carney (1996), Stiehm (1996), Micewski (1997), Heinecken (1998), Trompette, Saglio and Dufouton (1998), Benard and Schlaffer (1999), Segal (1999), Soeters and Meulen (1999), Klein (2000) and Kümmel (2002).

3. Since women join the military on a voluntary basis, this calculation does not include conscripts.

4. This section draws heavily on Kümmel and Biehl (2001).

5. On the changing roles of the military, cf. Kümmel (2003a). In this context, it is interesting to observe that the British military has tried to recruit women precisely on the basis of their specific 'female' competences (cf. Reng, 2000, p. 13).

6. Again the literature is legion, cf., e.g., Wetterer (1992), Helwig and Nickel (1993), Barkhausen and Niemann-Geiger (1994), Hoecker (1995), Schmermund (1998), Reynolds (1999), Bauer (2000) and Menzel (2000).

7. This section draws heavily on Kümmel and Werkner (2003).

8. Beside differences in opinion, there are also similarities: Attitudinal congruence, e.g., emerges when it comes to the basic principle that should guide the integration process. Overwhelming majorities of more than 80% for both sexes want integration to be based on the principle of equality of treatment and equal opportunity. Much the same can be said, although on a somewhat lower percentage level, for the presumption that female integration in the military advances the cause of women and furthers emancipation.

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FACTORS THAT LIMIT THE TRUE INTEGRATION OF WOMEN AT MILITARY ACADEMIES

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1. INTRODUCTION

The United States military, like most militaries, has traditionally been a male-dominated organisation. Contemporary military historians argue that wars and the militaries that fight them are "an entirely masculine activity" (Keegan, 1993, p. 76) and "[b]efore it was anything else, war was an assertion of masculinity. When everything else is said and done, an assertion of masculinity is what it remains" (Van Creveld, 2001, p. 161). Because the military's "core activity" is combat (...), a task viewed primarily in masculine terms because it has generally been defined as "men's work", a "deeply entrenched cult of masculinity pervades US military culture" (Dunivin, 1997, p. 2). Language has codified the long history of the masculine warrior paradigm. Van Creveld notes that the Old Testament utilises the same term for "adult man" and "warrior" while medieval Germans used "becoming a man" and "carrying a sword" interchangeably (Van Creveld, 2001, p. 164). James Webb, former Secretary of the Navy in the late 1980s, called combat the "quintessentially male obligation in any society" (Webb,

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1997, p. 4). If societies have obligated men to combat, they have rewarded them by connecting combat to the achievement of manhood. Men bestow manhood on one another: men are made, not born (Goldstein, 2001). According to Kimmel (2000a, p. 214), "What men need is men's approval (...) we test ourselves, perform heroic feats, take enormous risks, all because we want other men to grant us our manhood."

The masculine nature of the warrior concept is transmitted through the use of targeted language meant to motivate men in the military by labelling their poor performance in gendered (feminine) terms. Miller's research on gender harassment in the army suggests that "men who fail to live up to the 'masculine ideal' by showing insecurity or hesitation during maneuvres may be called 'girls' by their comrades" (Miller, 1997, p. 35). Denigration of women to increase men's motivation has been described by a number of scholars (e.g., Francke, 1997; Goldstein, 2001). Snyder described incidents where recruits were told "they run like a bunch of women" and their weapons were compared to male genitalia through the slogan "this is my rifle, this is my gun; one is for fighting, the other's for fun." Such gendered language suggests women are the "epitome of all that is cowardly, passive, untrustworthy, and undisciplined" (Snyder, 2003, pp. 192f.).

Because the warrior role is one way that men achieve manhood in society, the exclusion of women from this role becomes a priority (Stiehm, 1989). Thus, masculinity is a defining characteristic of military culture maintained by exclusivity and cohesion. Titunik points out that the "most important element in military organization (...) is the cultivation of a feeling of mutual attachment or camaraderie among soldiers. [B]ecause war requires such a high degree of cohesiveness among members of the military unit, this most violent and aggressive of enterprises ironically requires qualities of submissiveness, obedience, and fidelity to one's fellow comrades in arms" (Titunik, 2000, p. 236f.). Arguments against women in the military have focused on the threat posed by women whose presence may disrupt the cohesion among men (Gutmann, 2000).

Dunivin (1994, 1997) describes the current tension between the traditional masculine warrior paradigm and the evolving model of what it means to be a soldier in the postmodern military. The traditional model of military culture is socially conservative and homogeneous, with masculine values and norms enforced by exclusionary policies and practices hostile to those other than the male majority. However, the evolving model of military culture, characterised by many of the same socially conservative and masculine values, is imbued with social egalitarianism towards a heterogeneous force with inclusive policies and practices.

The dissonance between the evolving model and the traditional paradigm reflects the deeply felt cultural struggles regarding gender in the military. As Dunivin explains,

> Proponents of the traditional paradigm assume a universal male model of combatant and filter out women from their prism because women do not conform to their image of a combat, masculine warrior (…). This paradigm can engender prejudice as women are viewed as second-class citizens who do not share full responsibilities of soldiering (…) women are viewed as a gender class, not as warriors, peers, or even as individuals. It is a small leap from myopic cultural assumptions about women as not 'real' warriors to prejudice through stereotypic attitudes, discrimination through sexual harassment, and violence (…) as long as the military narrowly defines the soldiering as a masculine role, integrating women will remain problematic because the traditional model excludes women from its cultural core.
>
> (Dunivin, 1997, p. 18)

Despite the masculine-warrior tradition, the US military has steadily increased the number of women in the armed forces, but the road has not been easy. Recognising women's contributions during World War II, the US Congress enacted the Women's Armed Services Act in 1948. Although it limited women to selected support roles, it provided the first active duty opportunities for women in the peacetime military. The end of the conscription and movement to an all-volunteer force in 1973 also increased military opportunities for women (Segal, 1989). Congress lifted the ban on women at the military academies in 1975, paving the way for women to enter the United States Air Force Academy (USAFA), United States Military Academy (USMA), and United States Naval Academy (USNA) in 1976. While public policy changed to open the academies to women, "surveys and interviews with top cadets and military leaders at the academies reflected a clear message (…) women were not wanted at these academies, which train officers to be combatants" (D'Amico & Campbell, 1999, p. 69). Then Air Force Academy Superintendent Lieutenant General A. P. Clark stated "[i]t is my considered judgment that the introduction of female cadets will inevitably erode th[e] vital atmosphere" at USAFA and the academies "would inevitably find it necessary to create a modified program to accommodate the female cadet, or, God forbid, be required to water down the entire program" (Mitchell, 1998, p. 29). Clark suggested that despite formal policies calling for integration, creating an institution in which women would be accepted by their male peers at USAFA would be difficult.

Whereas women were admitted to the military to fill support roles that would free-up men for combat, in the 1990s legislation opened many combat roles, such as piloting of combat aircraft and serving aboard naval combat

vessels, to women. While congress legally opened many combat roles to women, they relied on the military and civilian leadership within each of the services to enact the policy. It is here that the struggle for true acceptance of women in combat and the larger warrior culture became most evident. Testimony of senior military leaders prior to the removal of combat exclusions against women reiterated deeply held masculine views of combat and the intense "informal" resistance that was bound to occur (Holm, 1992).

In his testimony before congress, the former Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Robert Barrow, initiated a frontal assault against women in combat, making it clear that women were unfit. To do so, he attempted to redefine combat harkening back to a time when combat was limited to hand-to-hand encounters. In a sense, his words appeared to define true combat in the most limited terms requiring the most brute examples of physical strength and endurance. Barrow argued that war waged from a distance, such as from fighter aircraft or naval vessels, was not true combat. By doing so, he attempted to preserve combat as an enterprise reserved solely for men. Even if women were allowed into selected "combat" positions, their contributions would be marginalised as not befitting of "true combat" and the manhood conferred on those who engage in true combat would be protected (Holm, 1992, p. 483).

General Merrill McPeak, the Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, was more positive about opening combat positions to women, acknowledging that "[t]here are some women who can do this combat as well as any man" (Holm, 1992, p. 483). While this portion of his formal testimony supported the formal lifting of the ban on women in combat aircraft, it is what McPeak said next that foretold the marginalisation women would continue to face. When asked whether he would choose a highly qualified woman fighter pilot or a less qualified male fighter pilot to fly with him in combat, he said he would choose the man (Holm, 1992, p. 483). The then highest ranking military officer in the Air Force had just indicated that he would discriminate against a more qualified pilot based solely on gender.

2. WHAT DOES INTEGRATION MEAN?

There are a variety of ways to conceptualise the incorporation of women and military academies have employed several strategies to do so. Early studies identify assimilation as the primary goal of military academies (Dornbusch, 1955) and long before women were enrolled, assimilation was used to instill a

common set of experiences and values in those seeking commission in the profession of arms. "Assimilation is the process through which an individual forsakes his or her own cultural tradition to become part of a different culture." Assimilation "can be described as a pattern in which $A+B+C \rightarrow A$. The majority, A, dominates in such a way that members of minorities B and C imitate it and attempt to become indistinguishable from it" (Schaefer, 2005, p. 263). Even beyond the military, assimilation has been used to "separate the men from the boys" (Goldstein, 2001). While the particular forms of these rites of passage vary across cultures, they consistently reflect the idea that to be a "real man" requires one to face life-threatening, harsh experiences with bravery (Gilmore, 1990).

Diamond and Kimmel (2002) explain how the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) sought to incorporate women using an assimilation approach that encourages young women to "take on male attitudes and to perform in physical competition in a manner and at a standard that is more typical of male cadets" to demonstrate their status as "honorary men" (Australian Defence Force Academy, 1998, p. xiv). This strategy rests on the foundational principle of meritocracy: that those who work hard and succeed will rise to the top. Unfortunately, assimilation confuses equality with sameness. One strategy women adopt in such environments is an emphatic sameness in which they avoid contact with other women and "do gender" by downplaying feminine characteristics so that they do not stand out from their male peers (Kimmel, 2000b). Indeed, their emphatic sameness can be so strong that women assimilated into the masculine military academy culture sometimes argue that gender harassment in the form of sexist jokes and comments is desirable. These women argue they should endure harassment from their male peers with the stoicism expected of warriors in combat, as it leads to mental toughness.

According to Diamond and Kimmel (2002) integration, by contrast, is designed to bring diverse people together, to unite them. Whereas assimilation requires women to meet the same standards as their male peers, integration may include "gender norming" for performance standards, as in the case of the differing physical fitness standards for men and women at the US Military Academy (USMA) and USAFA. In our view, the strategy adopted by USMA and USAFA might be better labelled the accommodation approach, as institutional changes focus on adapting institutional standards and practices to incorporate individuals who are different (women) from the prototypical member of the organisation (men). "Accommodation is the process whereby a group changes its beliefs and actions to fit those of a person who has joined the group." (ADFA, 1998, p. 1–1). For

instance, military technology has been adapted to accommodate women as military occupational specialities previously reserved for men have been opened to women. Pilot training systems and ejection seat technology have been adapted to allow pilots with smaller, lighter frames to operate the technology. While these changes have benefited both women and men and increased the marketability of this technology to other countries with populations of smaller average stature, "the issue of cockpit accommodation was framed by its opponents as a women's issue." (Richman-Loo & Weber, 1996, p. 150).

Although Diamond and Kimmel describe integration (i.e., accommodation) as the preferable approach, their data suggest that USMA may have adapted to include women, but they have not achieved the true integration of women. That is, accommodation strategies have not resulted in the acceptance of women as equal members of the Corps of Cadets. Unfortunately, efforts to integrate women that rely on accommodation are inadequate. For instance, different physical fitness requirements for men and women, based on physiological differences between the sexes, make it obvious to cadets that women are not like men. While some women will achieve or exceed the male standard, like Rebecca Marier who combined a 3.95 academic average and 70 push-ups, 100 sit ups, and a 6-min-mile run to graduate at the top of USMA's Class of 1995 (Francke, 1997), on average they will not. Most will not surpass their male peers on physical tasks requiring upper-body strength due to anatomical differences between the sexes. Thus female cadets find that "[i]t doesn't matter how good you are; you will get the credit for being able to keep up with them. But because you do not have the credentials of being a male, you are still not fully accepted." (Burke, 1996, p. 64 cited in ADFA, 1998, pp. 1–4).

When faced with the legal requirement to incorporate women into traditionally male institutions, men may find themselves unable to voice their resistance. They may believe that the presence of women makes the warrior identity less meaningful, and that women will receive special privileges from commanders who want to successfully carry out the integration order by ignoring protests of male members of the organisation. As a result, men in the military may resort to using "weapons of the weak" against female colleagues to voice their disapproval of women in the military (Miller, 1997). According to Miller's studies of US Army personnel, gender harassment such as resistance to women in authority, constant scrutiny, gossip, rumours and jokes, sabotage, and indirect threats may reflect a form of protest against the accommodation of women that softens the traditional masculine warrior paradigm.

3. SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND ASSAULT AT THE USAFA AND THE ADFA

Based on an email sent from a former cadet to the Secretary of the Air Force in January 2003 alleging a sexual assault problem that existed at the USAFA, the Air Force General Counsel and the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD/IG) conducted investigations to determine if Academy policies, programs, and practices effectively deterred sexual misconduct. The DoD/IG administered a survey to 579 female cadets at USAFA in May 2003, 88% of the female cadet population. Results indicated that 7.4% of female cadets experienced a rape or attempted rape since they arrived at USAFA – this percentage was as high as 11.7% for the most senior class of female cadets. Under the broader definition of sexual assault, 18.8% of female cadets indicated that they were victims in their time at USAFA. Of the 177 total sexual assault incidents reported on the survey, respondents indicated only 18.6% were reported to authorities. Female cadets indicated that fear of ostracism by peers, fear of reprisal, fear of punishment, belief that nothing would be done, and embarrassment were the largest impediments to reporting. Female cadets indicated male cadets were the alleged perpetrator in 86% of cases (Department of Defense Inspector General, 2003).

The General Counsel's report focused on reported allegations of sexual assault involving cadets either as victims or as alleged perpetrators from 1993 through 2003. The report indicated a tendency existed for cadets to place loyalty to peers above loyalty to values, leading them to tolerate behaviour that could lead to sexual assault. Additionally, indicators suggested cadets tolerated inappropriate, gender-based comments, demeaning sexual jokes, and harassment. Over the 10-year period reviewed, 142 allegations of sexual assault were officially reported to investigators. Male cadets were suspects in 73% of the incidents and 65% of the incidents involved a cadet victim and cadet suspect. The review also concluded that 55% of alleged cadet-on-cadet incidents occurred in the dormitories and 40% involved alcohol.

Concerns were also raised about the cadet authority structure where upper-class cadets could potentially abuse their authority. One allegation indicated that a new female cadet recruit was directed to meet with an upper-class male cadet in the middle of the night for additional training. Based on her followership training, she thought she had to comply; she alleged that she was subsequently raped by the upper-class cadet. Upper-class cadets can also potentially abuse their authority through quid pro quo relationships. Alleged cases exist where upper-class males have coerced sexual relations with women in subordinate classes by storing contraband items that

lower-class cadets are not yet authorised (civilian clothing, stereos, etc.). Upper-class cadets can leverage their position through the contraband relationship to demand sexual favours in return. (Department of the Air Force General Counsel Report, 2003, p. 91)

The crisis at USAFA was similar to the crisis at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) in 1997. In the ADFA review, 48% of female cadets reported experiences of unwanted gender- or sexually-related behaviours. Crude and offensive sexual behaviours were reported by 98% of female cadets and they experienced them more often than male cadets. The perpetrators of these behaviours were cadets from the immediate social group and most incidents occurred in cadet-living areas. Only 15% of cadets made formal complaints. Alcohol appeared to be a factor in 53% of inappropriate sexual behaviours. Other cadets were identified as the perpetrators in 86% of the cases. The ADFA review also discovered that 14% of the female cadets indicated they were victims of sexual assault or attempted sexual assault (ADFA, 1998, pp. 3–4).

4. CULTURAL AND STRUCTURAL INFLUENCES ON GENDER CLIMATE AT THE USAFA AND ADFA

A comparison of the "Report of the review into policies and practices to deal with sexual harassment and sexual offences" at the ADFA (1998) and findings of investigations at USAFA suggest the problems of harassment and sexual assault at military academies result from common structural and cultural factors. The structure of the cadet chain of command at both USAFA and ADFA equated seniority with rank. At USAFA, the "fourth class system" was a two-tiered power structure. In general, USAFA upper classmen were afforded more privileges due only to their seniority and were given power over fourth classmen or doolies, who they "trained." In this type of system, power comes with rank, and there is an increased possibility that power is abused when inexperienced upper-class men have unsupervised access to newer recruits (ADFA, 1998).

Leadership development programs and human relations education programs failed to provide developmental opportunities for cadets at different stages of development. At USAFA, cadets finished their fourth class year as followers, then transitioned to an upper-class status with little preparation. If a cadet made it through the first year at USAFA, it was assumed that he or she could serve as a leader and role model for cadets in the lower classes. Leadership development at ADFA followed a similar approach. The first year

was dedicated to followership, after which upper-class cadets were thought to have the skills to lead the newest class of cadets. Human relations educational programs did not help cadets develop interpersonal skills needed to deal with important harassment and discrimination issues. Rather, cadets at both institutions received canned briefings on human relations in large group settings and the briefings were repeated each year of a cadet's time at the academy as an annual human relations training event. The focus was on ensuring that cadets received material, not on educational effectiveness.

Structural features of the officer chain of command and relations between organisational units and civilian authorities caused difficulties as well. At ADFA, local civilian law enforcement had jurisdiction over all reports of sexual misconduct. As a result, ADFA commanders had no authority over, or ability to punish, alleged perpetrators. At USAFA, a confidential reporting system was available to victims. The confidential system allowed victims to obtain support without reporting the alleged incident to commanders or military law enforcement. As a result, commanders were often unaware of sexual assault incidents and thus could not pursue legal action against alleged perpetrators.

Cultural factors embedded in the structures and processes at USAFA and ADFA likely exacerbated harassment and assault. First, the acculturation processes used to assimilate new recruits at these institutions rely on behaviourist principles that were central to the discipline of psychology in the 1950s and 1960s. In these adversative approaches, cadets are subjected to extreme stress and are punished for failing to meet impossibly high standards (Kimmel, 2000b). While a behaviourist might argue that recruits will habituate to heightened stress and learn to perform well, it appears that the use of punishment as a primary tool for behaviour modification has more liabilities than advantages. In behaviourist-oriented approaches, discipline practices prescribe a standardised sanction for each offense. For instance, under the Cadet Disciplinary System used at USAFA until 2004, a cadet who went "Over the Fence" (left the base without a pass) received a standard punishment including marching tours, demerits, and being restricted from leaving the base for a number of months. Both the USAFA and ADFA reviews noted this approach leads cadets to "play the game" rather than internalise core values desired by the institution. The ADFA report noted "the induction process rapidly injects a new and problematic identity, convincing cadets that dishonesty is normal and acceptable; placing appearances, especially conformity, above reality; inculcating attitudes toward authority and leadership that are inappropriate for the wider ADF" (ADFA, 1998, pp. 1–30). Of course, this transactional approach (Bass,

1985) to training is limited because cadets learn to behave appropriately only as long as the threat of punishment is present.

In and beyond basic training, both military academies share a host of cultural traditions emphasising masculinity and solidarity with other cadets. Prior to the sexual harassment and assault problems, basic training at both USAFA and ADFA focused heavily on physical training. Traditionally, masculine characteristics were raised in status and feminine characteristics were disparaged. For instance, female cadets are required to cut their hair short, like their male counterparts, although the same is not required of female airmen in basic training at Officer Training School. Physically, tasks included in basic training overemphasised upper body strength. During "rifle runs" at the Air Force Academy, cadets carried the M-14, a Vietnam era weapon weighing 11 lb for long periods of time. By the end of the run, several women in the flight were likely to fall out, requiring their male peers to carry their weapons. This practice highlighted women's comparative weakness and is inconsistent with what cadets will be asked to do as Air Force officers. (The Air Force issues M-16 rifles weighing approximately 8 lb to its personnel. However, officers carry side arms rather than rifles.) At times, women were humiliated when they were required to wear ill-fitting uniforms or were demeaned when they chose to wear the skirts they were issued. These practices highlight the extent to which female cadets were not like their male counterparts and yet not like real 'real women' either.

Finally, although the hypermasculine culture and traditions likely fostered gender and sexual harassment, the intensive emphasis on teamwork and solidarity in these institutions made it difficult for women to report harassment or discrimination. The camaraderie developed between cadets who endure adversative training together creates a fraternal cadet organisation, where cadets rarely hold one another accountable for violations of standards. Rather cadet culture discourages cadets from reporting harassment or assault to officers in their chain of command because they fear ostracism from their peers. These forces were so deeply embedded in ADFA cadet culture that cadets developed a language to describe them: "don't jack your mates' even if they do the wrong thing" and "don't cross the road" to report problems to military staff (ADFA, 1998, pp. 1–13).

5. ATTITUDINAL AND BEHAVIOURAL FACTORS AT USAFA

As the Air Force Academy responded to the immediate sexual assault crisis, a number of additional concerns arose related to the broader institutional

culture. Some 11 years earlier, the Secretary of the Navy recognised that his service had larger cultural issues which had allowed demeaning behaviour and attitudes towards women to exist. The Air Force Academy was now recognising the same concern. Cadet attitudes and behaviours associated with gender, alcohol, violations of standards, and the cadet honour code clearly suggested that larger cultural dynamics led to a climate where incidents of sexual assault were more likely to occur. It became clear to USAFA leaders that expanded climate assessment was necessary. Senior Air Force and Air Force Academy leaders asked the authors to develop, administer, and analyse a comprehensive cadet social climate survey. The authors administered a large-scale cadet climate survey in August 2003 that provided a baseline measure of cadet attitudes and behaviours on a variety of items related to gender, sexual harassment, sexual assault, toleration of harassment, and discrimination.

The population of interest in the fall 2003 survey was the cadet wing consisting of 4,132 cadets (712 women, 3,420 men). The 2003 survey had a participation rate of 86% (3,554 cadets). Men represented 82% (2,910) and women represented 18% (630) of the respondents. Results indicated USAFA faced cultural challenges regarding the true integration and acceptance of women (Table 1). Attitudinal items indicated statistically significant differences existed between men and women. When asked whether "women belong at USAFA," almost all of the women agreed (98.4%), while 78.4% of the men agreed – a gap of 20% between the genders. When asked whether "some women get leadership positions because of gender," over 67% of the men agreed. Surprisingly, over 39% of the women also agreed – indicating that even women at USAFA had some belief that women were only getting leadership positions because of their gender. Men were also more likely to agree (42.7%) that female cadets were less likely to be held accountable for poor performance – only 11.5% of women agreed. When asked whether sexual slurs, comments, and jokes were used by cadets, 79% of men and 83% of women said these 'weapons of the weak' were used in the cadet wing. Cadet responses on behavioural items indicated that both men and women reported hearing sexual jokes and comments occasionally to frequently, with women reporting slightly higher frequency.

Items measuring fear of reprisal also indicated gaps between men and women, with women more fearful of reprisal than men. When asked about confronting and reporting discrimination and harassment, 20–30% of the women consistently reported that they would not confront or report harassment or discrimination. This compared to 9–10% men who would not confront or report discrimination or harassment. Additionally, 21.4% of the

Table 1. Results of the Fall 2003 and Fall 2004 Cadet Climate Surveys (Agree; in percent).

Survey Item	Men	Women
	2003 Survey 2004 Survey (Difference)	2003 Survey 2004 Survey (Difference)
Women belong at USAFA	78.4 84.0 (+5.6)	98.4 96.5 (−1.9)
It is difficult for a woman to be feminine and professional	42.5 49.2 (+6.7)	42.6 44.8 (+2.2)
Natural differences make complete acceptance of women impossible	45.9 43.9 (−2.0)	40.9 37.7 (−3.2)
Sexual slurs, comments, and jokes are used by cadets	79.0 60.1 (−18.9)	83.0 59.8 (−23.2)
Sexual harassment occurs in the cadet wing	37.0 21.2 (−15.8)	59.0 34.4 (−24.6)
Sexually explicit pictures are seen in the common areas of my squadron	10.0 13.4 (+3.4)	12.0 16.1 (+4.1)
Some women get leadership positions because of gender	67.2 58.2 (−9.0)	39.2 29.6 (−9.6)
I question the criteria when a woman gets the job (leadership position)	48.7 39.9 (−8.8)	21.5 17.1 (−4.4)
Would not report harassment or discrimination due to negative treatment	10.0 9.4 (−0.6)	24.0 18.4 (−5.6)
More important to be accepted than to report	17.0 15.3 (−1.7)	21.4 18.2 (−3.2)
Would not confront due to fear of ostracism	9.6 8.8 (−0.8)	19.6 15.6 (−4.0)
Would not report due to fear of ostracism	11.1 11.8 (+0.7)	27.8 22.9 (−4.9)

women and 17% of the men agreed that it was more important to be accepted by squadron mates than to report harassment or discrimination.

The Air Force Academy quickly recognised that the initial focus on cadet attitudes and behaviour needed to be expanded to include the institution's faculty and staff – the primary role models for cadets. In the spring of 2004, a similar survey was administered to the faculty and staff. One of the primary objectives was to identify faculty/staff attitudes and behaviours associated with the institutional culture. The Culture Survey of Faculty and Staff included items similar to those contained in the cadet climate surveys to enable direct comparisons on reported attitudes and behaviours between the two populations (teacher-role models and students).

The population of interest (faculty and staff of military officers, enlisted personnel, and civilian employees) consisted of 3,182 personnel. The web-based survey was administered over a 2-week period resulting in a 58% participation rate (1,846 personnel). Men represented 67% (1,192) and women represented 33% (579) of the respondents. Results on gender-related items indicated statistically significant differences between men and women, with men indicating a more positive culture related to gender equality and sexual harassment. When asked if sexual slurs, inappropriate sexual comments, or sexually explicit jokes were used, 16.4% of men and 23.3% of women agreed. When asked if sexual harassment was tolerated, 6.5% of men and 11.9% of women agreed. When asked if gender discrimination was tolerated, 7.8% of men and 18.3% of women agreed. Finally, 90.6% of men and 79% of women agreed individuals are provided equal opportunity regardless of gender.

Responses on items related to "women's effectiveness" showed more agreement between men and women. When asked if female officers are as effective as male officers, 94.3% of men and 96.2% of women agreed. When asked if women are an asset to the Academy's effectiveness, 96.1% of men and 97.9% of women agreed. Written comments on the faculty and staff survey indicated that challenges remain regarding gender. One male staff member indicated that his commander had a framed photo in his office with the letters "LCWB" for all to see. The letters stand for "Last Class with Balls," a designator for military officers from the USAFA Class of 1979, the last all-male class. One male staff member highlighted the assignment of a female Major General as the reserve officer representative to the Superintendent as an example of women receiving senior leadership positions solely based on gender.

Comparing the results of similar items, faculty and staff report more positive attitudes and behaviours associated with the gender climate than cadets. Group difference existed between men and women on both the faculty/staff survey and the cadet surveys. In both cases, women indicated more favourable attitudes than men. When asked if male and female cadets are equally effective leaders, 91.7% of female cadets and 94.8% of female faculty/staff agreed. Male faculty and staff reported 92.1% agreement while male cadets' agreement lagged behind all of the other groups at 75.4%. When asked if female officers were as effective as male officers, 96.7% of female cadets, 96% of female faculty/staff, and 94% of male faculty and staff agreed. Again, male cadet agreement lagged behind the other groups at 82%. Most evident in the above results was that male cadets had a less favourable outlook on the gender-attitude items than female cadets, and both male and female faculty and staff.

6. COGNITIVE CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE WARRIOR CONCEPT

Attitudes towards women at military academies are certainly one barrier to the acceptance of women. When men refer to women as "chicks," explain that female cadets are "not real girls," and bemoan the "double standard" that affords women special status, it is not surprising that true integration does not occur (Burgess, 1993). However, a more deeply rooted impediment to the true integration of women at military academies lies in the masculine-warrior concept itself. In order to capture cadets' constructions of the warrior concept, the first author conducted a class exercise with her students. As part of a lesson on the effect of language on thinking, 34 freshman cadets (27 males, 7 females) were asked to create cognitive maps depicting their thoughts about the word "warrior." Cadets used a free association mapping technique in which they wrote down attributes, exemplars, and images that came to mind as they thought about what it means to be a warrior, drawing links between related ideas and images. This technique allows students to appreciate the complexity of the topic, exposes mental models, and helps students understand how their mental models may influence their feelings and actions.

Qualitative analysis of cadets' cognitive maps of the warrior concept identified four general categories of responses: exemplars, physical traits, emotional characteristics, and character traits/moral values. Exemplars cadets identified were largely reflective of Hollywood influence on the warrior concept and included Rambo, GI Joe, Hercules, Braveheart, Samurai, and the Green Berets (an elite special forces unit). These exemplars offer larger-than-life, heavily muscled, hyper-masculine images of what it means to be a warrior. In only one case did a cadet identify a female exemplar for the warrior concept (i.e., Xena, a warrior-princess created in a Hollywood studio herself).

The physical traits cadets identified in cadets' cognitive maps emphasise physical prowess and destruction. For instance, cadets describe a warrior as someone who has "huge muscles," is "very strong," "uses weapons (guns, swords, knives)," and "blows things up." Less frequently, cadets describe the warrior in terms of emotional characteristics. However, these emotional qualities suggest the same hyper-masculinity and toughness as the previous two categories of responses. Emotional descriptions of the warrior concept emphasise emotional control. Cadets indicate a warrior is "brave, calm under stress and danger," "cold," "stoic," and "holds in emotions most of

the time." One instance in which it is apparently acceptable for warriors to experience emotion is when they "[feel] rage when loved things are lost."

7. STRUCTURAL INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND ASSAULT AT USAFA AND ADFA

Both USAFA and the ADFA responded similarly to the sexual assault crises each institution faced. Similarities included recognition of broader cultural challenges, need for improved education in leadership development and human relations, and movement to integrate academic and military missions. Differences existed in response to reports of sexual assault. Both academies recognised the need to assess and improve broader culture and climate issues that contributed to an environment where gender harassment, sexual harassment, and sexual assault were more likely to occur. Culture change efforts focused on negative cultural artifacts such as condoning of standards violations, toleration of honour code violations, tendency to illegally/inappropriately consume alcohol, gender relations (sexual harassment/assault and unacceptable attitudes), and loyalty to peers above institutional values. Both USAFA and ADFA revamped their human relations education programs. Developmental education was tailored to the different follower or leadership roles of respective cadet classes. Instead of large mass briefings, lessons were designed around small group discussions utilising realistic case studies.

In 2004, USAFA adopted a mandatory reporting policy for sexual assault in an effort to balance supporting victims with pursuing justice to enforce good order and discipline. Any cadet, faculty, or staff member who has knowledge of an alleged sexual assault is now required to contact military law enforcement. The initial call activates the Academy Response Team (ART), which provides multi-disciplinary support ranging from immediate victim care (medical, spiritual, investigative, and legal) and extended survivor support. The ART ensures continuity of care to victims and can refer victims to chaplains, who continue to have confidentiality on issues of sexual assault. The ART also alerts commanders of reported sexual assaults, enabling them to ensure sufficient victim support while pursuing investigative and disciplinary action against perpetrators. Currently, commanders have various judicial and non-judicial tools they can use to hold perpetrators

accountable. If evidence warrants, a commander can send a case through the military court system. If evidence is lacking to pursue criminal prosecution, commanders can utilise non-judicial (administrative) action to hold alleged offenders accountable for their actions.

At ADFA, sexual assault investigations are kept out of the hands of military commanders, instead incidents are reported to and investigated by civilian authorities. This policy presents a challenge to commanders who are prevented from holding cadets accountable for misconduct. Commanders are at the mercy of civilian law enforcement to pursue investigations and punishment. In many cases, civilian law enforcement may not pursue or would only lightly punish alleged perpetrators. As a result, a dysfunctional system exists in which commanders have few tools to enforce discipline in cases of sexual misconduct.

Data regarding the cultural, attitudinal, and cognitive factors present at USAFA and ADFA suggest true integration of women at military academies requires accommodation that goes well beyond placing locks on dorm room doors and construction of separate bathroom facilities. It requires reconstruction of the warrior concept to include characteristics that are considered stereotypically feminine. As noted by the team that reviewed policies and practices at the ADFA,

> "masculine and feminine attributes are not alternatives. Rather, a person (or a cultural context) may possess a substantial array of attributes of either group (…) neither group (…) or both groups (…) [t]he instrumental goals of the academy which rest on developing various 'masculine' characteristics should remain as they are now, but should be broadened to include feminine characteristics as well. The Academy cannot achieve optimum training of future leaders by retaining this overemphasis on masculinity alone".
> (ADFA, 1998, pp. 2.13–2.14)

Reconstructing the warrior paradigm need not mean.

> "that one would replace the need for discipline and commitment to military values with some hazy, warm and fuzzy approach to duty. Rather (…) it means seeking an expansion of skills and attributes to a proper appreciation for the capacities of empathy, communication, and emotional expression and personnel management that are thought to be 'feminine'"
> (ADFA, 1998, pp. 2.14–2.15)

At USAFA, a team of military and civilian faculty and staff from across all elements of the institution collaborated to develop a new, expanded model of officership to guide cadets' leadership development – the Officer Development System (ODS). The developmental framework introduced in this document allows cadets to direct their own intellectual, physical, social, and spiritual development and enables them to guide others' development – a critical

leadership skill. We published the ODS in January 2004 and introduced it to cadets through a series of lectures and workshops. To demonstrate our shared commitment to this developmental model, we selected 300+ faculty and staff members from across the Academy and trained them to teach the model to cadets using a carefully crafted small-group discussion technique.

We believe the time is right for the paradigm shift reflected in the ODS. Indeed, contemporary models of leadership have evolved to include a wider range of personal and interpersonal characteristics than ever before. Contemporary theories describe leadership in terms of the interpersonal relationship between leaders and followers rather than defining leadership solely by the position power a leader holds. This shift from a focus on instrumental towards relational bases of power in leadership reflects increased inclusion of stereotypically feminine interpersonal styles. One such theory describes transformational leadership as a process in which leaders engage with others and create a connection that raises the level of motivation, performance, and morality of both the leader and followers. Transformational leaders are attentive to the needs of their followers and try to help followers achieve their fullest potential (Bass, 1985; Burns, 1978; Northouse, 1997).

The Leadership Growth Model (LGM) described in the ODS captures the interpersonal, transformational process desired between cadets at USAFA. In this model, the core of the relationship between leader and follower is a mutual focus on follower development. According to LGM, growth occurs as a result of an iterative process involving four steps: (1) establishing expectations and offering inspiration, (2) providing instruction, (3) feedback regarding performance, and (4) reflection on lessons learned. Clearly, leaders and followers must develop a number of interpersonal skills to successfully apply the LGM. In order to inspire the follower, the leader must be keenly attuned to the emotions and goals of the follower, and must be able to communicate in a way that is inspiring to the individual follower (a combination of Inspirational Motivation and Individualised Consideration in transformational leadership theory). Providing instruction and feedback will require leaders to nurture and counsel followers, interpersonal skills difference feminists identify as women's strengths (Goldstein, 2001). This prescription for leadership stands in marked contrast to the adversative training methods common to assimilation approaches (Kimmel, 2000b).

This focus on leadership development should not suggest that the warrior concept is no longer a part of cadet development at USAFA. One of the four overlapping attributes of officership identified in the ODS is the warrior spirit. The ODS definition of warrior spirit focuses on motivational and

cognitive characteristics required to fight and win the nation's wars. The ODS definition says

> "[r]egardless of duty location or occupational speciality, all officers must embody the warrior spirit; tough-mindedness, tireless motivation, unceasing vigilance, and a willingness to sacrifice their own lives for the country if necessary. While always preferring peace to war, officers hone their skills to ensure the Air Force is ready to 'fly, fight, and win.' Air Force officers are committed to being the world's premier air and space force. This is the warrior spirit"
>
> (United States Air Force Academy, 2004, p. 9)

The challenge, of course, is to find ways to inculcate the warrior spirit in cadets without retreating to outdated models that may flow from the traditional masculine warrior paradigm. This is particularly difficult given cadets' Hollywood-created cognitive constructions of what it means to be a warrior.

8. EVIDENCE OF IMPROVEMENT

After a year of focused interventions designed to improve the institutional culture, the authors re-administered the Cadet Climate Survey in August 2004. This enabled us to assess change in cadet attitudes and behaviours 1 year into this concerted institutional effort. The population of interest in the Fall 2004 survey was the cadet wing consisting of 4,251 cadets (766 women, 3,485 men). The survey had a participation rate of 83% (3,529 cadets). Men represented 81% (2,858) and women represented 19% (671) of respondents. The 2004 results suggest efforts to improve attitudes and behaviours which are having an impact (Table 1).

While many of the attitudinal items showed movement towards more egalitarian gender attitudes, more promising were the results of behaviour items showing reduced frequency of observed sexual harassment, sexually explicit comments, and sexually explicit jokes. Both men and women reported hearing sexual jokes and comments less frequently in 2004, from the previous year's response mean of occasionally to frequently to a mean in the range of once to occasionally. Additionally, while women reported a higher frequency of jokes and comments than men in the 2003 survey, men and women reported reduced frequencies at the same level in 2004. The combined frequency of men and women reporting that they heard sexually explicit jokes occasionally to frequently dropped by 31% from 90% in 2003 to 59% in 2004. While the reduced frequency of jokes was welcomed, the raw rate of 59% in 2004 continues to suggest we have room for improvement.

The combined frequency of men and women reporting that they heard sexually explicit comments occasionally to frequently dropped by 32% from 86% in 2003 to 54% in 2004. While reduced, the raw rate of sexually explicit comments in 2004 is still too high.

Cadets also reported positive change on the 2004 survey through a reduced frequency of observed sexual harassment. The combined frequency of men and women reporting that they observed sexual harassment occasionally to frequently dropped by 11.2% from 20.2% in 2003 to 9% in 2004. Consequently, 81.4% of men and women reported they never observed sexual harassment, up from 69.6% in 2003. The positive results identified in the fall 2004 cadet survey were encouraging to institutional leaders. Recognising that improving institutional culture is a long-term process, leaders continue consistent messages aimed at professional values and conduct. Further integration of leadership development into all facets of the cadet experience continues.

9. CONCLUSION

The masculine warrior paradigm is embedded in the structures, practices, and processes that define military academies around the world. It influences institutions and the individuals within them in myriad ways. A systematic comparison of the structural, cultural, attitudinal, and cognitive factors identified at USAFA and ADFA in the wake of sexual assault crises at each institution suggests that common causes can be identified. In both cases, the institutions involved significantly altered their philosophies of leadership development and the programs and practices affecting leader development. At USAFA, recent survey data suggest attitudes regarding the acceptance of women in the cadet wing are improving and gender and sexual harassment are decreasing. While it will take a number of years to assess these trends reliably, we are heartened by the changes seen so far.

An expanded definition of leadership offers enormous benefits in the postmodern era (Moskos, 2000). Given the focus on peacekeeping and humanitarian operations other than war, the repertoire of skills needed in the force has expanded. No longer are brute strength and a willingness to kill enough to sustain the "warrior." As we move toward paradigms like the soldier–scholar, soldier–statesman, and soldier–humanitarian, the interpersonal attributes stereotypically ascribed to women will become increasingly valuable, and increasingly necessary (Moskos, 2000). The military "must adopt an identity that encompasses warfighting, peacekeeping, and disaster

relief roles'' (Dunivin, 1994, p. 540). Such an identity need not excise the warrior concept from models of officer development but will require a reconstruction of what it means to be a warrior paramount to a paradigm shift. We believe such a paradigm shift will allow women and men who serve as officers in the armed forces to transform the young airmen, soldiers, sailors, and marines we entrust to their care in ways we have not yet imagined.

NOTES

1. The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the United States Air Force Academy, the Department of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other government office or agency.

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PART V: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE MILITARY

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CARING LEADERSHIP: PREPARING LEADERS TO CARE FOR SOLDIERS AND FAMILIES

Todd Woodruff

1. INTRODUCTION

The need to care for families has been a command focus within the United States military for a number of years. Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the resulting risk and family separation, have made the care of families and their satisfaction with military life enormously important due to their impact on retention, morale, and readiness. The US Army has taken a two-pronged approach to caring for families: (1) family friendly leadership; and (2) family friendly programs and policies. Like many other organisations, the Army has invested heavily in family friendly policies and programs, such as family support groups, affordable childcare, medical care, and systems so spouses can communicate during periods of separation. Over the last 15 years, the Army's focus on families has produced a much improved system of support, resulting in almost two-thirds of spouses rating the Army's family support as excellent or good during the war in Iraq.[1] (Ricks, 2004, p. 9) While family friendly policies and programs are important in reducing work–family conflict and developing commitment, they are only part of the solution, and are much more effective when combined with supportive leadership. By themselves, policies and programs offer an incomplete

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solution that would achieve only partial success at best, particularly as the level of demands made by the organisation increase.

As part of the Army's focus on supportive, family friendly leadership, unit commanders are encouraged to develop families that are capable of coping with the absence of the soldier/spouse during deployments and supporting the soldier's professional needs while at home station. Because the spouse is highly influential in most retention decisions, they must also ensure their unit's families remain satisfied with military life. It is the junior level, front-line leaders who, because they have the most frequent and intimate contact with soldiers and their families, are likely to be the most influential in this process, yet they are also the group that is the least likely to have any family experience of their own or to understand how to care for or support the needs of military families. It is the argument of this paper that: (1) the combination of the US Army's current operational tempo and societal trends make addressing the needs of families increasingly important; (2) many young leaders (lieutenants and junior noncommissioned officers (NCO)), due to a lack of family experience, resulting from the demographic characteristics of this group, and limited training and education, are ill prepared to care for the well-being of their soldiers and their families; and (3) that other things being equal, leaders who are effective in caring for soldiers and families are more successful, as reflected in having units with higher morale, readiness, and retention.

2. SOCIETAL AND MILITARY FAMILY TRENDS

By any measure, there are large numbers of families in the US Army, with most facing a collection of pressures that are unique to military families. Over 50% of the Army is married, over 60% are either married or have dependent children, and family members outnumber soldiers by a ratio of 3:2. In the typical platoon one-third of the junior enlisted soldiers and over half of the NCOs will have families. (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence Military Community and Family Policy, 2000) Unlike most other organisations, the military creates significant demands for the family. Most notably, these include risk of injury or death to the soldier and separation of the soldier from the family. The US military has lost over 1,300 soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan as of November 2004, and most soldiers can measure the time spent away from their families in years rather than months or weeks. Other demands include geographic mobility, overseas living, and normative pressures on family members to volunteer and behave

(Segal, 1986, 1989; Stanley, Segal, & Laughton, 1990). These characteristics result in a cascade of other difficulties that include: unpredictable short- and long-term schedules, financial management problems, housing concerns, detriments to spousal employment, increased need for childcare, lessened support/access to extended families and long-term friends, increased tensions between spouses, the absence of the soldier from critical family events, and disruptions in friendships and education for children and often the spouse (Wolpert et al., 2000; Segal, 1986, 1989; Stanley et al., 1990).

The importance of these demands are compounded by dramatic societal changes that have transpired in American work and family institutions over the last few decades (Orthner, Bowen, & Beare, 1990; Stanley et al., 1990). Societal work–family changes that have impacted the military–family interface include: an increase in the work force by married women, to include those with small children; a drop in the proportion of households headed by married couples and a corresponding increase in single parent families; a substantial increase in dual-income, dual-career, and dual-service couples; more egalitarian gender roles in the family; a shift in values that reduces the willingness of families to subordinate the needs of the family to the needs of the military/workplace; and increasing demands by working parents for the military/employers to develop family friendly policies that are supportive of family responsibilities. (Orthner et al., 1990; Stanley et al., 1990) The operational demands of the war on terrorism and Iraq, and the broader post-Cold War trend towards increased involvement in peacekeeping has only exacerbated these issues for military families.

3. THE LACK OF EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATION

Given the powerful influence of the family, it is crucial that leaders develop a situation, where families and soldiers believe that Army and family life are compatible. Unfortunately, lieutenants and junior NCOs often lack the skills to care for soldiers with families. There are a number of reasons for this. Perhaps most obvious is that many junior leaders are unmarried or only recently married, with even fewer having children. For example, a second lieutenant commissioned through the US Military Academy is prohibited from marrying or having children as a cadet, meaning they will either arrive at their first unit unmarried or married less than a year. They are even less likely to have children. Additionally, differences in socio-economic status and education make it likely that even those lieutenants with families experience different issues than enlisted soldiers with families.

In short, many junior leaders, particularly lieutenants without enlisted service, lack a first-hand understanding of the needs of their soldiers and their families. Compounding the problem is the absence of training and education on how to care for the well-being of families received by cadets, newly commissioned officers, and junior NCOs before being placed in charge of soldiers. In fact, after interviewing dozens of US Military Academy cadets who were within a half year of commissioning in the Winter of 2003, not one had any type of training or exposure to the unique needs of military families and how best to support them.

4. THE CASE FOR CARING FOR FAMILIES

This lack of experience and training is significant, because it can lead to continuing or increased conflict between the military and its families, which can then result in increased absenteeism, reduced performance, decreased retention likelihood, lessened commitment, and diminished job satisfaction for the soldiers. Families may experience reduced marital and family satisfaction, cohesion, and stability; child developmental problems; family conflict; and lessened individual well-being (Voydanoff, 2002). The benefits of preventing these problems by effectively caring for families and reducing military–family conflict is supported by ample evidence.

Like the larger American population, military families are becoming less willing to subordinate their needs to the needs of the military. Research on soldier and family identity salience of infantrymen tend to support this, finding that married soldiers and soldiers with children are almost seven times more likely to consider their family identity more important and self-defining than their soldier identity (Woodruff & Kolditz, forthcoming). For leaders, this means that soldiers with families, when given the freedom to choose, are more likely to behave in a way that is consistent with expectations, values, and norms of their family rather than the Army. This is surprising because soldiers experience significant socialisation to their units and the Army and tend to develop close, caring relationships with other soldiers. In short, the finding of high family identity salience relative to the soldier identity is likely to require the military to align the behaviour, values, and norms it requires of soldiers with the behaviour, values, and norms desired by families. This alignment requires considerable family and organisational knowledge and skill on the part of the leader. Other studies further support the importance of leaders who are supportive and caring of families. Multiple studies have found that (1) the perception of leader support for

families and (2) satisfaction with military life are the two key ways that the leaders can influence readiness, retention, and morale by caring for families (Segal & Harris, 1993).

- *The Perception of Support*: Two Human Resources Research Organisation (HumRRO) reports (both are part of the Army Family Research Program) found the single greatest family-related factor that contributed to unit and individual readiness was the level of perceived support provided by unit leaders to their soldiers and their families (Sadacca, McCloy, & DiFazio, 1992; Sadacca, Stawarski, & DiFazio, 1991). In fact, the first report argues that, "as long as there is the perception of support between the Army and the family, and the perception of the Army's willingness to share in time and family need, family variables do not contribute or detract from individual readiness." (Sadacca et al., 1991, p. 81). The second report makes the same point arguing that the importance of leader support for families and soldiers on a unit's readiness cannot be overemphasised (Sadacca et al., 1992, p. 57). Reports by RAND and Segal and Harris echoed these arguments and found a strong relationship between perceptions of positive leadership and readiness (Burnam et al., 1992; Segal & Harris, 1993). Retention is similarly impacted, with the perception that unit leaders care about families having a direct positive effect on soldiers' and their spouses' commitment to continued service (Segal & Segal, 1999).
- *Satisfaction with military life*: Leaders have enormous control over the day to day lives of their soldiers and their families. Consequently, leaders play a critical role in affecting the satisfaction soldiers and families have with military life, with the level of satisfaction then impacting on readiness, retention, and motivation. Family satisfaction with military life also may reduce military–family conflict from the perspective of family impacts on military readiness. Burke argues that, "there is a positive relationship between families who are satisfied with the military way of life and their readiness level" (Burke, 1999). Both HumRRO reports on the impact of family factors on individual and unit readiness make the same argument saying that soldier and spouse satisfaction levels significantly impact motivation and both individual and unit readiness (Sadacca et al., 1992; Sadacca et al., 1991). Retention is affected in a similar way. Families who are not satisfied with military life are likely to leave the service, reducing readiness by leaving positions unfilled and increasing personnel turnover, and requiring the recruiting, training, and retention of replacements (Segal & Segal, 1999).

The spouse's satisfaction and perceptions are critical in this equation. Spousal satisfaction influences soldier job satisfaction and retention decisions. Segal and Harris (1993) found that spouses' level of satisfaction is positively related to their perception of the military's support for families, and that spouses' satisfaction with military life tends to increase adaptation to military life. Soldiers with families that are poorly adapted to the military are likely to suffer poor morale, poor performance, and will be unlikely to reenlist (Orthner & Bowen, 1999; Russo, 1999). Pittman (1994) found that the soldiers' perceptions of military-family fit were predicted not only by their own attitudes about work time and job satisfaction, but also by their wives' opinion of military-family fit. A study by Orthner and Pittman (1989) ties together many of these arguments, finding that among Air Force personnel job commitment was best explained by a product of satisfaction, the perception of organisational responsiveness to families, spousal support for the airman's career, and the quality of the military as a child rearing environment. Cumulatively, the evidence strongly suggests the following relationship.



5. LEADER ACTIONS

Through the study of units and military families, we know there are a number of specific actions that leaders can take to establish the perception of support for families and increase the satisfaction of families with military life. Generally, junior leaders must be trained in the impact their leadership and decisions have on families and their unit's readiness. Leaders should be held accountable for the level of support provided to families, and the plan and support for families should be nested at all levels of leadership so that

each unit is working together and augmenting the support provided by higher and subordinate commands (Woodruff & Kolditz, forthcoming). Specific leader actions that contribute to improved readiness, retention, and family adaptation to the military include (Segal & Harris, 1993):

- Leaders should allow families as much control over their family situation as possible. Allow time off for family emergencies and non-emergency family activities. (Time spent preventing family problems reduces readiness issues in the future.) Provide a sense of freedom to soldiers and control over personal time by avoiding call-backs, providing predictable work hours, not wasting soldiers' time, compensating soldiers with time off after they return from deployment or routine training that occurs over a weekend.
- Treat soldiers and families with respect.
- Communicate with spouses, provide avenues for spouses to communicate with unit leaders, and act as an advocate and information source for families. (Spouses may be reluctant to approach you. Make a point of introducing yourself and getting to know your soldiers' families. Do not count on soldiers to bring home information to their spouses!)
- Listen to families' problems; show real interest in the well-being of families.
- Provide unit activities that include families, inform soldiers/spouses about family programs in the unit and elsewhere and what they provide. (Unit social events provide a great opportunity to both meet the families of your soldiers and communicate information such as schedules and phone roster directly.)
- Have an effective family readiness group that encourages communication, volunteers, and avoids hierarchy. Provide family support programs in the unit and facilitate/encourage use of family programs. (As a lieutenant or platoon level NCO, know all the spouses in your unit and seek out opportunities to interact and communicate with them. In doing so, identify the spouses that are willing to participate in the company family readiness group and platoon family activities.)
- Minimise family separation when possible and when it does not degrade training. (Deployments and weekend training directed from higher will already create hardships for families; make every effort possible to conduct your own training during the work week.)
- Take steps to reduce the stress of family separation with predeployment information, quality rear detachment plans and commanders, and updated information. (As a lieutenant or platoon level NCO, you should ensure

that all of your unit's families have the predeployment information, especially if they did not attend the battalion or company briefings, and have your platoon or company rear detachment representative, if there is one, contact each family before and during deployments.)

- Train subordinate leaders in family care, model these practices in your own leadership, and evaluate partly on the basis of the success in meeting soldier/family needs.
- Seek to identify new ways to increase spousal satisfaction with military life. To do this, you must know your unit's families and their issues and concerns. Consider families to be part of your organisation and not some distraction to buffer your unit from.
- Encourage/promote soldier financial responsibility; encourage families to use on-post housing when available. (Soldiers living on-post will typically have fewer financial challenges and a greater network of support from other military families. This results in fewer problems and increased ability to cope with problems.)
- Provide quality sponsorship to new soldiers and allow new soldiers time to get families settled. Try to have a sponsor that has a similar family situation (if the incoming soldier has a spouse and kids the sponsor should have a spouse and kids). When a spouse is involved, try to arrange a sponsor who's own spouse is willing to sponsor the incoming spouse. (A family that is welcomed, allowed sufficient time to get settled, and then made to feel they are a part of the organisation will typically be better adapted and create fewer problems.)
- Target at-risk families for help (young families, single parents, and families new to the military). This high-risk group requires special attention. Time spent preventing problems within this group is time well spent.

6. CONCLUSION

The military continues to increase its emphasis on families. Post-September 11th operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the broader post-Cold War deployment and operation tempo trends have made institutional support or families and family readiness programs a leader's business like never before. First, the need for leaders to care for families is made clear, but it is not enough to be genuinely concerned. Second, leaders must know how to care for families, how their actions impact on the lives of soldiers and families, and how families influence the effectiveness of the unit. Simply stated, just as a leader must be technically and tactically competent, so must he or she be

competent in ensuring the well-being of their soldiers and their families. Last, there are some resources that remain finite for the soldier. The soldier/family member only has so much time and may not be able to satisfy the demands of both the military and the family simultaneously. With the current level of demands (risk and family separation) placed on the military, particularly the US Army (both active duty and reserves), it is unclear if any level of leader support or family adaptation will be sufficient to maintain families' satisfaction with military life. Is there a threshold for risk and repeated, long-term family separation beyond which the family and the military roles are simply incompatible?

NOTES

1. These findings were based on a poll conducted by the Washington Post, Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, and Harvard University, plus dozens of supplemental interviews. The poll was the first nongovernmental survey of military spouses since the terrorist attacks September 11, 2001. The survey included more than 1,000 spouses living on or near the 10 most deployed Army posts.

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MULTINATIONALITY AS A CHALLENGE FOR ARMED FORCES

Paul Klein and Karl W. Haltiner

1. INTRODUCTION

With the French Revolution that brought the formation of mass armies based upon conscription of all male citizens, it became inconceivable in Europe that armies were composed otherwise than by subjects of the own country. Service in the armed forces became a national duty to comply with, either voluntarily or compelled, since loyalty to the country or its sovereign did require so. Soldiers were submitted to a purely national power of command, they tendered an oath on their country and, during several wars, even risked their lives for it. This narrow link between the nation-state on the one hand and the armed forces on the other had been lasting until World War II, and only then did it successively become looser and looser. It even obscured the fact that there had also been times when armies comprised soldiers from different countries.

There are various examples. The armed forces of the Roman Empire were exclusively recruiting Romans only in the very beginning. After the Second Carthaginian War, two so-called socii (Gilliver, 2003, p. 33) were counted for every soldier possessing the Roman civil rights. During the imperial monarchy and with the legion system emerging, 'barbarians' (i.e. foreigners) had been recruited to an even larger extent; they finally constituted the majority within the Roman armed forces and sometimes rose up to the

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highest ranks – what even led to their enthronement as emperor. In the Middle Ages, most of the armed forces consisted of mercenaries recruited from all quarters of the globe. Particularly sought after, though, were the Swiss pikeniers and halberdiers who, after the Morgarten battle of 1315 and for more than two centuries, were reputed to be nearly unbeatable (Montgomery of Alamain, n.d., p. 195). The German lansquenets had a similar reputation. The protection of the sovereign often was not assigned to natives but to a Swiss guard. A last relict of those times is the Swiss guard of the pope.

The period of conscript mass armies, over the 19th and 20th centuries, also had formations with international make-up. On the one hand, this was due to the multinationality of the respective state, such as the Habsburg Empire or the Russian czardom (and later on the Soviet Union). On the other hand, these armies were colonial troops with an officers corps purely consisting of Europeans and with natives serving as rank and file or as NCOs. Relicts are to be found nowadays in the Gurkha formations of the British army. Moreover, the so-called foreign legions of international mixture did emerge in the 19th century, in France and in Spain they have been existing up to the present.

In the 19th century, and in the 20th as well, it happened again and again that foreign volunteer formations brought help to one or the other party in wars between nation-states. Thus, Italians fought under Garibaldi on the French side during the Prussian–French war of 1870/1871, and Sweden supported Finland during the winter war of 1940 against the Soviet Union. In each of the cited cases, though, these were nationally closed formation which cannot be subsumed under the heading of multinationality. In the Spanish civil war and in World War II, however, matters changed. The International Brigades of the Spanish Republic showed an international mixture, in parts down to the battalion level and even lower. The 9th battalion of the XIVth International Brigade consisted of citizens of nine nations, and the battalion 'Tchapaiev' of the XIIIth Brigade united volunteers from even 21 countries (Delperrié de Bayac, 1968, p. 426). During World War II volunteers from many countries fought on the German side in the Waffen SS. Partly did they form 'outlandish' national divisions or brigades, but partly also mixed formations such as the division 'Wiking' where Netherlanders, Flemings, Danish, Norwegians, Finns, Swedes and Estonians fought side by side with Germans (Neulen, 1980, p. 203). The allies, and particularly the British army, integrated either as individual soldiers or as national corps, citizens from countries defeated and occupied by the German Wehrmacht.

A large step towards an internationalisation of the armed forces was made after World War II, and this for several reasons. On the one hand, during the Cold War period, many states joined one of the alliance systems, thus transferring parts of their own sovereignty to these alliances. Within NATO, this state of affairs has been lasting until today. Further impulses for mixing armed forces came from UN missions. These were nearly exclusively led by a motley conglomerate of national contingents commanded by mixed headquarters. The growing coalescence of the European states did not leave the armed forces of the countries concerned unaffected. A very significant proof of growing internationalisation of the military is the build-up of major units showing a binational or even multinational mixture. This phenomenon began in Europe in 1988 with the creation of the German–French Brigade, to be continued with the build-up of multinational mixed divisions and corps.

2. MULTINATIONAL MAJOR UNITS NOWADAYS

Besides the German–French Brigade, we find today at the same level an Italian–Slovenian–Hungarian Brigade, the latter not operating as a standing formation, though (Gasperini, 2004). The German-Netherlands Corps consisting of the 1st Netherlands Division and the 1st (German) Armored Division with headquarters in Münster/Westphalia is operational since 1995 (Moelker & Soeters, 2004). The Eurocorps at Strasbourg, with the participation of France, Germany, Belgium, Spain and Luxembourg, went into service in 1993. The German–French Brigade is the only standing major unit that is permanently subordinate to the Eurocorps (Martin, 1996). The Multinational Corps Northeast in Szczecin/Poland does not dispose of permanently subordinate standing units. This corps emerged from the German–Danish Corps 'Landjut' and unites German, Danish and Polish soldiers (Gareis & Hagen, 2004). Further major multinational units in Central Europe are the German–American Corps (II. GE/US Corps) with headquarters in Ulm, and the American–German Corps (V. US/GE Corps) in Heidelberg, as well as the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC).

France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain have decided on common reaction forces (Eurofor). The headquarters are in Florence, and up to 10,000 soldiers can be mobilised. These reaction forces proved their operational readiness by common exercises in 1998 which lead to the operational readiness report. 'Eurofor' will thus be ready to take over tasks under the roof of UN, NATO or WEU.

The Navy maintains standing task forces in the Atlantic, the Channel and the Mediterranean covering battleships from different NATO member states. The same applies to the multinational navy forces 'Task Force 150' assigned to the operation Enduring Freedom. As for the Air Force, NATO has instituted integrated operational planning and command headquarters for air defence, and in the AWACS scout planes for reconnaissance and airspace control of the NAEW component (NATO Airborne Early Warning E-3A Component) stationed at Geilenkirchen/Germany the crews are mixed. Moreover, tasks of air traffic and transport and staff training are fulfilled on a multinational level. In addition, most European armies are co-operating in UN missions or under NATO or EU command with soldiers from other nations which partly did not adhere to any alliance. This happened recently rather often within the Partnership for Peace programme where German servicemen held exercises together with, among others, Austrian, Polish, Slovak, Czech and Lithuanian soldiers.

3. FORMS OF MULTINATIONAL INTERACTION

Interaction within multinational military contingents reaches from simple co-operation between purely national units to mixing soldiers from different countries within even the smallest unit, the latter form actually being common only in the brigade headquarters unit and in the main support battalion of the German–French Brigade. The first way, i.e. lining up individual national units within a formation or even the co-operation of corps or army groups from different countries, represents the traditional form of interaction joining allied armed forces, and it is also surnamed 'horizontal multinationality'. Here, direct contacts between soldiers from the participating nations occur regularly only on the level of headquarters, liaison teams or logistics if there is a centralised supply and support. As a rule, the soldiers of the participating nations stay apart from each other in the troops. There are only scarce contacts to the partners, or even none at all. National systems and particularities remain untouched, thus needing no co-ordination at all. Even in the multilingual armed forces of Switzerland and Belgium, the units at the lower level are usually formed according to the language spoken.

During missions, however, soldiers from different nations are often stationed in one common camp; they meet each other in leisure facilities or take over common control tasks. They go on patrol in mixed groups or guard facilities together with comrades from other nations (Haltiner, Bennet & Boesch, 2004). This kind of interaction might trigger difficulties on the

social-psychological level in the form of national prejudices, e.g. if soldiers of a certain nationality are traditionally regarded as not belligerent or if experience led to the feeling that the armed forces from this or that country would be unreliable, thus representing a risk for one's own security. War history cites such examples, but they are also reported from international UN missions today (Mortensen, 1996, 9f). Such attitudes and apprehensions, however, should not touch the individual soldier living in his own national unit and relying there first of all upon his known comrades. As for the integrated headquarters, specialists coming from different nations meet there. They have been specially trained for these tasks, are scarcely restricted by linguistic difficulties, and learn very soon that multinational teamwork can only be work when everybody contributes to it. Even here, frictions and difficulties arise, e.g. if different supply regulations do one-sidedly grant privileges to the soldiers of one nationality, or if there are uneven work loads due to national supplementary tasks. On the whole, however, these difficulties are not more significant than those found in purely national headquarters where rivalry, jealousy and uneven work load also cannot be excluded.

But what if one intends to encourage the dialogue between soldiers of different nationality, to increase direct contacts between these soldiers, to ameliorate their understanding for each other and to diminish mutual prejudices? The only way to reach these aims consists in vertical multinationality, i.e. establishing contingents which are mixed, binationally or multinationally, already on the battalion or even company level (Steinaecker, 2001; Bredow, 2001). At a first glance, it seems to be easy to organise such a project. The difficulties, however, are that nowadays armed forces are nationally characterised, and no country will willingly give up national particularities. As far as Europe and the European armed forces are concerned, soldiers will meet here enjoying nearly even standards of living, having the same cultural background and knowing similar manners and customs. If this is not the case, e.g. in UN missions where soldiers with absolutely different attitudes and descents meet on the inferior command level, these problems will become more significant (Horvath, 2004). The cultural differences, then, will not only often constitute the source of misunderstandings and communication problems between the different contingents, but they are often also the cause for deviating behaviour and crime (Kernic, 1996, p. 227).

As for structure and organisation of the major units cited above, the German–American Corps and the American–German Corps are established following the 'lead nation principle'. One nation concerned takes the command and provides the corresponding ratio of command and control

troops and support troops. Major officers of the corresponding partner nation are integrated into the corps headquarters of the 'lead nation'. The divisions subordinate to the corps keep their purely national structure and organisation. All the other major units cited here follow the pattern of deepened integration. It has to be underlined, though, that as a rule only the headquarters (and partly their support troops) show a binational or multinational mixture. Thus, the deep integration in the German–Netherlands Corps covers just the corps headquarters in Münster and the headquarters of the support brigade in Eibergen, as well as one support and one signal battalion (Hagen, 2004). Also in the Eurocorps, only the headquarters and the support battalion show a multinational mixture. In the German–French Brigade subordinate to the Eurocorps, however, the binational mixture goes down to the company level and even through the soldiers' quarters. As for the Multinational Corps Northeast, mixed personnel are to be found only in the corps headquarters in Szczecin. Among these corps cited here, the German–Netherlands Corps and the Eurocorps (with the German–French Brigade) are the only ones to dispose of standing units under common supreme command.

In peacetime, all the other binational and multinational joint forces only consist of integrated headquarters and their immediately subordinate units. Due to national decisions, the units designated to join them in mission get under their command solely to fulfil the mission concerned (Transfer of Authority, TOA). Apart from this, these units stay in their national or NATO assignments (Schnell, 1993, p. 419). For multinational out-of-area missions, the different national contingents get their orders normally from headquarters of a multinational mixture. However, the contingents are mostly under national command. Thus, all the international missions of German soldiers are planned and controlled by the Bundeswehr Operations Command (*Einsatzführungskommando*) at Geltow near Potsdam, giving national instructions and orders to the leaders of German contingents on the theatre concerned.

4. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF MULTINATIONAL MILITARY CO-OPERATION AND INTERACTION

According to Wilfried von Bredow, there are "three reasons to strive for military multilateralism as the future pattern for the armed forces of the

European countries in their integration process towards a political union: savings, efficiency, and political legitimacy'' (Bredow, 2001, p. 55). As for the savings, most of the European states have dramatically reduced their armed forces and face the fact that the shrunken defence budgets do not allow to train and equip their troops in a way that they can be used for any imaginable kind of mission. Within the framework of multinational co-operation, it is possible to concentrate on focal points, training capacities can be pooled, and it is possible to produce military goods in higher quantities with lower costs. The establishment of common headquarters saves national ones of the same dimension, thus contributing to reduce high personnel costs.

Regarding their efficiency, multinational armed forces have long been in dispute. Meanwhile opinions have changed, particularly because multinational units have succeeded in a series of out-of-area missions. With regard to the Eurocorps, Hartmut Bühl wrote in 1996 already: ''The Eurocorps performances hitherto and the proof of its various capabilities, which correspond to the large wing of its task spectre, have already made this corps a model case'' (Bühl, 1996, p. 174). It is possible to substantiate the necessity of multinational corps in a simple and sober manner. General Willman, at that time corps commander of the Eurocorps, wrote:

> ''From Skagen in Jutland down to Gibraltar, there are only two nations disposing in future of more than one mechanised division. The Danes, the Dutch, the Belgians and the Spanish dispose of just one mechanised division. Only France and Germany have more of them. That means, these divisions will have to be integrated anyway in a crisis or an operational case. Let's better do it in peacetime, before it will be too late (…)''
> (Willmann, 1996, p. 288)

When the question of difficulties and disadvantages of multinational formations arises, it is often pointed at aggravated communication due to the existence of two or more languages. Certainly, this phenomenon constitutes a problem in the armed forces of bilingual or multilingual countries, such as Switzerland, Belgium or Canada (Vogler, 2004; Manigart, 2004), but it constitutes an obstacle thwarting interaction even more particularly in those units consisting of soldiers from nations with different native languages. Thus, two or several languages are recognised officially, as is the case in the Eurocorps, the German–French Brigade and the Swiss militia. A conditio sine qua non for interaction in mixed-lingual units for every side is to understand at least the language of the others, even though not speaking it fluently. Another option is to select a language as the official one which is not native for any of the participating countries. This way was chosen for the German–Netherlands Corps, the Multinational Corps Northeast and

the Italian–Slovenian–Hungarian Brigade. For all the three major units, English is agreed upon as the official language.

Both solutions do not go along without any problems. Maintaining several languages will always lead to more administrative expenditures and limits recruitment to those soldiers also understanding the other language(s) concerned. Furthermore, it is "impossible during military operations on the theatre to command by using more than two languages, the minor units (platoon, company, squadron, battery) – and if possible even the battalion – have to be unilingual anyway" (Briquemont, 1996, p. 318). The choice of one only language that is not the native one of any of the participating nations involves the danger that a specific language could gradually develop which is peculiar to the major unit concerned and understood only there.

Further difficulties in multinational major units consist in the fact that the participating armed forces not only show characteristics in common, but rather often quite a series of differences clashing in situ. They express, on the one hand, different organisational cultures (Keller, 1999, 301ff.), on the other hand this concerns different conceptions of tactics and mission planning, not always identical semantics of military key terms, and different habits of instruction/training and command. Moreover, the corresponding national regulations normally exist further on to their full extent. This applies to the disciplinary codes which partly show significant deviations, the soldiers' rights of complaint, the right of political activities and the possibility to join associations and syndicates. Furthermore, the corresponding national attachment and subordinate relations fully exist further on. A certain exception here is given by the German–Netherlands Corps. A binational agreement of 1998 authorises the Commanding General with integrated command and control powers for all soldiers "with regard to planning, preparation and execution of the Corps' tasks or missions, including training, exercises and logistical needs" (Wieland, 1999). In the troops' everyday life of the other multinational units, they manage with the regulation – not undisputed on the legal field (Wieland, 1999, p. 138) – to instruct the soldiers to respect mutual co-operation and, in this context, also to obey the orders given by superiors of the other nation(s) concerned.

According to their national adherence, soldiers receive different payment for the same work. This fact is particularly significant in the Multinational Corps Northeast where German and Danish soldiers earn much more than their Polish comrades. There are different regulations across the nations regarding overtime work compensation, and in France such a compensation does not even exist. Other differences are to be found on the administrative sector. On this field, the German Bundeswehr is unique in that it falls into

the armed forces on the one hand and the civil Bundeswehr administration on the other, the latter being competent of the management of expenditures. This is rather difficult to understand for the soldiers of the other armies since their leaders have a far-reaching financial autonomy within the frame of allocated means.

In addition to all these differences there are particular national mentalities showing up. These concern different attitudes towards the working rhythm and towards military discipline, as well as deviating preferences with regard to food, lunch-time breaks or the question of equality of meals throughout ranks and grades. As a rule, such tensions are even to be found within armed forces of one multicultural nation. Furthermore, there are distinctions between the armed forces participating in multinational major units with regard to superior–subordinate relations. Here, the German 'Innere Führung' and the principle of 'citizen in uniform', together with similar liberal attitudes on the Dutch and Danish side, are confronted with a very pronounced hierarchy and a patriarchal command style in the armed forces of France, Spain and Poland (Klein, 1997).

Last but not least it has to be mentioned that the soldiers from the different nations joining a major multinational unit rather often dispose of different equipment and armament. To reach at least interoperability on this field often constitutes a process that lasts over years and, as a prerequisite, requires the possibility of adjusting and tuning the information and communication systems to each other. According to statements by General Willmann, this has been ensured in the Eurocorps for years already .

> "At the Eurocorps, for the large-scale exercise *Pegasus '95*, the headquarter, the Belgian division, the German division and the Spanish brigade did use the same command and control system, namely the German *Heros* system. That means we do emit the data by means of the same system as the subordinate major units. Only the French division do use their own system, but *Siemens* and *Thomson* have succeeded in making both systems interoperable"
>
> (Willmann, 1996, p. 284)

5. IS THERE A FUTURE FOR MILITARY MULTINATIONALITY?

In Europe, but also during missions under the NATO or UN auspices, military multinationality has become an integral component that cannot be neglected. This is underlined not only by the reality of the missions, but also by numerous statements and documents which increasingly speak of

multinationality of the armed forces and of multinational corps. Thus, it reads in the London Declaration of the alliance's heads of states and of governments dated 6 July 1990: "The Alliance will rely increasingly on multinational corps" (Martin, 1996, p. 548). With regard to multinationality, the NATO Handbook comments as follows:

> "Multinational forces demonstrate the Alliance's resolve to maintain a credible collective defence; enhance Alliance cohesion; reinforce the transatlantic partnership and strengthen the European pillar. Multinational forces, and in particular reaction forces, reinforce solidarity. They can also provide a way of deploying more capable formations than might be available purely nationally, thus helping to make more efficient use of scarce defence resources. This may include a highly integrated, multinational approach to specific tasks and functions"
>
> (NATO-Handbuch, 1995, p. 266)

It reads in the Petersberg Declaration of the WEU Foreign Ministers dated 19 June 1992: "The military formations will consist of armed forces of the WEU member states, including armed forces charged with NATO tasks (in this case, after consultation with NATO). They will be organised on a multinational level and comprise units from all services (…)" (Bühl, 1994, p. 611). Finally, the 'Explanatory Notes to the Defense Policy Guidelines' edited by the Federal Government in 2003 read:

> "The multinational involvement of Germany and the Bundeswehr has become a constitutive characteristic of German security policy. That means actually, deployments of Bundeswehr armed forces – except for non-combatant evacuation operations – take place jointly with allies and partners under the auspices of UN, NATO and EU"
>
> (BMVg, 2003, p. 9)

Such a multinational orientation also becomes obvious in structure and involvement of many national armed forces. Thus, the Netherlands have assigned nearly all of its Army to the command of the German–Netherlands Corps; Belgium has integrated the major part of its Army into the Eurocorps and also takes an active part in the ARRC, and Germany has no corps at all under purely national command. Even in neutral Switzerland, the decision to participate at least in the program 'Partnership for Peace' led to the phenomenon that English has become an important military language, and the term 'interoperability' meanwhile belongs to the military's basic vocabulary. Thus, the question whether or not there is a future for military multinationality can only be answered by a clear 'Yes'. It is also rather definite to foresee how this international involvement will develop in the near future.

According to the statements of high-ranking military people (Willmann, 1996, p. 289; Clerc, 1996, p. 303), deepened integration will only have a

chance on the headquarters level. The – either permanently or only in operational cases – subordinate units certainly will remain purely national for a longer period. Thus, it is possible to avoid many of the problems shown here, while the individual countries keep a rather high degree of national influence without losing the advantages already mentioned. But one aim is to be dropped out: to contribute over the armed forces, namely by changing the nationally coined attitudes of soldiers, to a growing together of the different countries. An indispensable prerequisite for reaching this are permanent contacts and the feeling of being unable to get along without each other, as it is given only in minor units.

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TOTAL FORCE IN IRAQ: A FAILURE OF POLICY OR IMPLEMENTATION?

Roger Thompson

"You hear about this 'Army of One'. Well, there isn't one Army. It's an Army of them (the regulars) and us." – US reservist in Iraq

(Josar, 2003)

1. INTRODUCTION

In 1992 and 1993, I published several articles on the "Total Force" armies of Canada and the US in an attempt to evaluate the worthiness of the concept (see Thompson, 1993). Ideally, a Total Force Army is one in which both regular and reserve units are supposed to be equals, well-integrated, harmonious, synergistic, functional, and interdependent. To achieve this, the two components must work together, train together, respect each other, and function seamlessly with identical equipment, training, and procedure. Since most reserve units in the US, Canada, and the UK, for example, train mostly on weekends, and typically have older equipment, this would necessarily involve the improvement and maintenance of reserve force training, retention, and equipment. It also really means that reserve forces will need time to reach these standards, but for some reason, some governments do not think about this basic fact. This is true not only for the US, but for the Canadian, UK, and other allied forces, as well.

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At the time, I was skeptical about these plans, and 10 years later, I am even more skeptical. Both the US and the UK have sent large numbers of reservists to fight in Iraq, in accordance with the general precepts of the Total Force "One Army," and by all accounts, the results have been much less than stellar. This article will explore what is going on in the US and UK armies in Iraq, with special emphasis on the reserve units that were called to join their regular counterparts. The tough lessons these two military powers are learning now (or, more likely, failing to learn) have implications for other NATO countries, and we would be wise to heed them.

Arguably, no NATO country can claim to support its reserve forces more than the US does. American reservists have job protection,[1] contractual terms of service, and lots of hardware. Yet, in spite of this relatively high status, political protection, and expenditure, the US National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers in Iraq have very serious problems, many of which can be fairly blamed on the regular Army. Interestingly, many of the same problems affect the British Territorial Army troops in Iraq as well. As of September 2004, approximately 135,000 US troops were serving in Iraq, and of those about 40% were reservists. Approximately 400,000 reservists from all branches have been mobilised since 2001, and this extensive use of part-time soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines has been problematic in a number of areas. There have been many conflicts between the regulars and reservists of late, and this Intra-army friction has spilled into the pages of newspapers all over the US and Britain.

2. DEPLOYMENT TO IRAQ

> "We're at war, this is a hard war and we, frankly, inside the Army Reserve have not been properly prepared for it." – Lieutenant General James Helmly, Chief, US Army Reserve (Burns, 2004b)

US reserve forces in Iraq (specifically, the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve) and their British comrades have serious complaints about the way they have been trained, equipped, deployed, treated, and finally just plain ignored by their respective regular armies. Their grievances are both profound and prolific, and the first came to the surface in October 2003. At the time, it was reported that the American regular troops in country would serve for up to 12 months, but according to Josar (2003), the US reserves were told that their tours would actually be up to 2 years. Thus, the two organisations were initially not in synch, and feelings of resentment grew and festered for

months. Not only was such a policy patently unfair, it was particularly harmful to reservists who had full-time civilian jobs. As Colonel David Hackworth (2003) correctly observed, “More than one-third of the 200,000 reservists already called to active duty are missing civilian promotions and losing money by serving” (see also Vanderpool, 2004; Eisman, 2003).

Fortunately, this matter was apparently resolved, as virtually all US forces in Iraq, regular and reserve, were rotated in early 2004 (of course, some of the units were not rotated on schedule due to the upsurge in the resistance). As we shall see below, however, this length of tour issue and other discriminatory practices have taken a huge toll on the morale of deployed National Guard and Reserve personnel. And since there is very strong correlation between morale and combat readiness, this loss of morale can have very serious consequences on the battlefield.

Another problem is the differential between regular and reserve training programs. The main reason for this is that, during peacetime, reservists usually have much less training than do regulars. It is a real problem for reservists to maintain the same standards of performance as the regulars because they have so little time to train. One might have hoped that the reserve forces would have had lots of time to prepare for deployment to Iraq, but sadly that was not the case. Many US and UK reservists have complained that they have not been properly trained, and are being used as a cheap labor pool to beef up their respective under-staffed armies.[2] Regulars deride the reserves as “weekend warriors” but history has shown that with proper equipment and enough time, reserve forces can fight on the same level as the regulars. For example, Canadian Lieutenant General Sir Arthur Currie, Commander of the Canadian Corps that destroyed 47 German divisions in the last 100 days of World War I, was a reservist.[3] Unfortunately, however, the whole concept of the “Total Force” is to save money by creating the illusion that reserves can be deployed at the same time, or even before, the regular forces go. Most military analysts would agree that the “ready-to-go-in-a-flash” Total Force Army is a dangerous illusion.

In 2003, the British sent over 5,000 Territorial Army (TA) troops to Iraq (about 25% of their total force in country), and they too have complaints about their training. One Territorial Army officer was quoted in the UK House of Commons that he only received a paltry 5-day pre-training course before deployment, and that he only got to fire 10 practice rounds. The anonymous officer added, “I was concerned that so many young reservists were being so poorly prepared” (BBC News, 2003; see also Chamberlain, 2003). In addition, many US reservists told Star and Stripes newspaper that

their units simply were not ready to fight. For instance, reserve specialist Chris Wallace said publicly that his unit's training was "Well below readiness standards" (cited in Josar, 2003).

Poor training undermines morale and combat effectiveness, but so do other less tangible factors. Army regulars also tend to have a low opinion of the reserve forces, and that does not help matters. Regular army indifference to the reserves is indicated in the following passage: "National Guard units say at times during the recent deployment to Iraq they had been relegated to different bathrooms and medical care. One unit was so poorly supplied it asked hospitals in the United States to donate medical supplies. Other units said they were asked to get by on two bottles of water a day so regular Army units could have more bottles" (Josar, 2003). In addition, it was reported in the British press that one regular US Army trainer actually called the reservists he trained for duty in Iraq "bullet magnets" (Goldenberg, 2004).

British reservists report similar treatment by their regular Army also. "They call us Stabs (stupid TA bastards) and, while you try to dismiss it, it does get to you, especially when you are supposed to be working in one team. As some of the patrols leave, they aim their guns at the TA soldiers on the main gate and shout: "Kill the Stabs." They treat us like outcasts and they wonder why morale is low and most of us cannot wait to get home and leave the TA. We are made to eat at separate tables, live in TA-only tents and, when it comes to flying home, the TA are often held back with priority being given to regulars. It is very frustrating. The atmosphere was terrible. I wish I had never gone" (Smith, 2004a; Ricks, 2004b).

It gets worse. As elsewhere, even in the mess tent, US regulars get better treatment than reservists. Consider this: "When National Guard troops were attached to the 1st Armored Division (AD) (...) they had to eat breakfast meals for dinner while 1st AD troops had evening meals of beef steak and pork chops" (Josar, 2003). Napoleon once said that "An Army travels on its stomach," and he was right, so it would seem that some US reservists in Iraq might be less than completely motivated to travel, or fight. It is a reasonable assumption that these poorly treated troops will not have strong motivation. Indeed, it is possible that if forced to endure such injustice for a sustained period of time, the same sort of disciplinary problems that undermined the US Army in Vietnam may begin to appear in Iraq.

The US reserve members also have an inferior health insurance program,[4] and in some cases, very old equipment that has long been discarded by the regular force. One US reservist told The Guardian that his unit's equipment was fit "for the trash pile" (Goldenberg, 2003). The end result is that there are a lot of demoralised reservists serving in Iraq these days. Staff Sergeant

Richard Thompson told Star and Stripes what many reservists truly feel these days: "We are second-class soldiers (...). We are assigned to jobs we're not trained to do. Our equipment is lacking" (Josar, 2003). Another reservist quipped, "Vietnam-era flack vests held together by dental floss and a prayer would keep us safe. It was like pulling teeth to get the things we needed. As 'dirty reservists' we didn't deserve the same respect, even though we're supposed to watch the active duty's backs" (Goldenberg, 2003).

Rushed and inadequate training, discrimination, and unfair treatment by regular force units, old equipment, and for the US reserves, the initial discrepancies in rotation dates, are definitely undercutting morale in both armies. A survey by Star and Stripes came up with some rather shocking findings, and the statistics are most compelling. Soon after the historic toppling of Saddam Hussein's statues and his filthy regime, which ironically was installed and supported for many years by the US, morale plunged to lows not seen since Vietnam. The newspaper surveyed 2000 US troops from all branches (regular and reserve) in Iraq in October 2003.

> The purpose of the survey was to find out how the soldiers feel about the war, and the surveyors got an "earful." Nearly one in three indicated that they thought this war was of little or no value. About 40% said that they were performing jobs that they had not been trained to do. The reservists, however, were "the most troubled," according to The Washington Post (Graham & Milbank, 2003). It should come as no surprise that the abuse of Iraqi detainees in US military facilities was allegedly committed by members of a reserve unit with little or no training in prison management.
>
> (International Herald Tribune 27 July 2004)

The survey conveyed that nearly half the reservists said morale in their units was low or very low, and more than half said they are unlikely or very unlikely to reenlist in the reserves (Hider, 2003). Of course, the Pentagon instituted a Stop Loss program to prevent soldiers from quitting, but if anything this action will cause even more serious damage to morale (Hockstader , 2003).[5] These findings were confirmed in a subsequent survey by military sociologist Charles Moskos, and they carry very serious manpower and morale implications for the US military (Ricks, 2004; Loeb, 2004). The Army National Guard is now having trouble meeting its recruiting goals, and the Pentagon has decided to implement a compulsory call-up of approximately 5,600 Individual Ready Reserve members, who are former soldiers who are not assigned to the National Guard or the Reserve (Jelinek, 2004; see Pfaff, 2004; Scarborough, 2004).[6] This call-up of ex-soldiers is a clear and unambiguous indication of a manpower crisis, and regrettably, there is still more bad news. In early July 2004, it was announced that the National Guard will play an even "more prominent

role" in Iraq after the next troop rotation. "Over all, National Guard and Reserve forces will make up 42 percent or 43 percent of the total force in Iraq, the Director of Operations for the Joint Staff, Lt. Gen. Norton Schwartz, told Congress." Under the adverse conditions in Iraq, where reservists accounted for 50% of US combat deaths in June 2004 (Burns, 2004a; see also Rieckhoff & Hochman, 2004), we can expect, even predict, an even more serious degradation of morale and combat effectiveness.

3. CONCLUSION

The issues facing the US and British armies in Iraq are not unique, and they will be encountered by any allied army that seeks to deploy reserve forces to save money. What is happening in Iraq to US and British reserve units should be a warning to other countries. And let us not forget that unlike the Americans, Canadian reservists have no job protection rights, and much worse equipment (and very little of it). But like their British and Americans allies, Canadian regular soldiers do not respect the Militia. All of these problems and shortcomings suggest that an overhaul of the Total Force Army will soon be necessary.

If we can accept this Total Force Army deployment as a failure, as many defence analysts do, it begs the question as to whether this was a failure of policy or just implementation. It seems clear that the US and UK governments did not give their Total Force armies the support, resources or co-ordination necessary for this concept to succeed. Perhaps, with greater co-ordination, integration, and synchronisation, future Total Force deployments can avoid some of the problems now besetting our American and British allies. But even with better planning, co-ordination, and resources for reserve forces, there remain two potentially fatal flaws in the policy itself. The two flaws are related, and probably intractable. Firstly, it is naive and reckless to perpetuate the myth that a reservist, who trains for perhaps 39–45 days a year, can quickly stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the professional regular army soldier. Reservists need time to get trained up and prepared for deployment, but sadly, this policy was created to pinch pennies, and therefore that time is often denied. This was evident in the report that some British reservists were deployed to Iraq with less than 1 week of training (BBC News, 22 October 2003). Secondly, and correspondingly, the reality is that professional soldiers are often intensely insular, parochial, and filled with the most arrogant species of hubris about their unit and their battle reputation. In other words, they frequently distrust and often dislike "outsiders" and

"amateurs," and reservists are the perfect target for their barbs, put-downs, and discrimination. Professional soldiers are, by and large, conservative and not especially sensitive to newcomers. In the initial stages of war, reservists and regulars are not equals, but this policy conveniently ignores that fact as much as possible. Unless governments begin to understand military culture and accept that war is costly, ugly, and unfair, the Total Force Army policy should be considered a failure in its very conception.

NOTES

1. Although US reservists have job protection, there have been approximately 3,000 complaints filed by reservists since September 2001, concerning job loss, denial of benefits, or denial of promotion (see Margasak, 2004; Crawley, 2004).

2. Interestingly, the same has often been said of Israeli reservists, but thankfully this is about to change. In July 2004, an Israeli general declared that the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) had finally learned not to treat reservists as "a manpower company" (see Gilbert, 2004). Furthermore, starting in 2005, the IDF will no longer utilise reservists for security duties, such as guarding detention facilities, nor will it issue call-outs to members over the age of 40. Hopefully such enlightened thinking will find its way into other western armies in the near future (see Alon, 2004).

3. General Currie, a Canadian reservist and former school teacher, is widely considered to be the most effective allied general of World War I. In the final 100 days of the War, his men took more ground, and captured more weapons and prisoners than any other allied formation (see Schreiber, 1997; Dancocks, 1987).

4. Reservists also face discrimination when they are hospitalised. Unlike regular troops, reservists are usually not hospitalised near their hometowns (see Kramer, 2004). Furthermore, in a transparent attempt to boost retention and recruitment, in July 2004, the Pentagon let it be known in the media that all uniformed service members and their immediate families are eligible for various plastic surgery procedures, free of charge. But according to the US Army's Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, reservists, of course, are *not* eligible for the more expensive procedures (see Schaler, 2004).

5. Reuters reported on August 17, 2004 that a National Guard member has filed a lawsuit to challenge the Army's Stop Loss policy (Tanner, 2004).

6. The British are now finally considering mandatory call-ups of Territorial Army soldiers, as many have indicated little interest in serving in Iraq voluntarily (Smith, 2004; Sapsted, 2004).

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KOREAN RESERVE FORCES: THEIR MISSION RECONSIDERED

Doo-Seung Hong

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper examines Korean reserve forces with respect to their missions, roles and utilisation. Korea has a huge standing army of 686,000 and reserve forces of 3,040,000. The Korean peninsular is the last spot of the cold war. In spite of mutual efforts by South and North Korea to keep peace in this region these days, there has been no sign yet to downsize military manpower and equipments by either side. It is generally believed that in the future, as the international security environment and inter-Korea relations change, the size of the standing army will be downsized and the role of reserve forces will increase instead. The Korea Institute of Defence Analyses (KIDA) estimated that the appropriate military strength of Korea be around 500,000 in the year of 2015, 200,000 less than the present size. In particular, the number of draftees will be reduced, while the number of officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) will be kept at the present level (Lim, 2001). The reduction of the standing army, as has been observed in other nations, may require proper utilisation of reserves.

In its "Army Vision 2025", the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army (2003, p. 32) declares that "because the future defence of the nation ought to depend on reserves to a considerable extent, the system of mobilisation shall be critical to the enhancement of combat readiness." (ROKA Headquarters,

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2003, p. 32). In a speech delivered at the National Defence University in July 2003, Army Chief of Staff General Nam Jae Joon proposed three points for the development of ground forces: first, to build military power focusing on reserve strength; second, to proceed to a military system with emphasis on civil–military co-ordination; and third, to maximise the transferability of civil and military manpower.

The points General Nam made seem to highlight the military structure of the ROK Army in the future. However, much less attention has been paid so far to the reserve forces than to the standing army, and, in fact, the military positions in charge of reserve affairs are less preferred by military professionals. Since Moskos (1976, p. 64) mentioned sociological analyses on reserve and supplementary military forces as ''terra incognita'' in the mid-1970s, little research has been conducted on this topic. Generally speaking, reservists refer to those who hold civilian status in peacetime but are mobilised to active service in wartime.

2. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Reserve forces in Korea came into being along with the establishment of the ROK armed forces in 1948: for instance, *hogukgun* (National Guard Forces (NGF)) and *kugminbangwigun* (National Defence Forces (NDF)) were created before and during the Korean War (1950–1953). Although these reserve units were believed to play a very important role to supplement the standing forces, they were unfortunately disbanded due to ''political'' reasons after a short duration. We can learn from the experiences of the NGF introduced at the early stage of nation-building. At the time of its foundation, military service was not compulsory, but military manpower was recruited on a voluntary basis. Furthermore, since the ceiling of military manpower was set at 100,000, the expansion of standing forces was constrained. The NDF, reserve units organised in late 1950, recruited men aged 17–40 years who were not in active service. But as a result of the scandal of embezzlement by top NDF commanders, the NDF was dissolved after 6 months.

In 1955, the Army established 10 reserve infantry divisions to retrain reservists. Reservists discharged from active service were divided into two categories; in-service reservists and standby reservists. During the first 3 years after discharge they were designated as in-service reservists, who served as key personnel for reserve divisions and during the next 2 years as standby reservists. During the whole period of service as reservist they had

to serve five times and each time for 30 days. Later, the duration of obligatory service was reduced.

It was not until 1968 that full-fledged reserve forces were organised. But the start of the reserve forces was politically quite controversial. The opposition party, the New Democratic Party, objected to arm the reserve with weapons because they believed that arming the reserve might turn the nation into a totalitarian state. They were afraid of President Park Chung-Hee revising the constitution to enable him to run for presidency a third time. At the time of the Homeland Defence Forces Act promulgated in 1961, the mission of reserve forces was defined rather broadly so as to defend the homeland, to guard logistics line and to manage crisis in the rear areas. In 1968 after a North Korean armed commando had infiltrated the Demilitarised Zone and had reached the capital, counterattack to armed guerrillas was explicitly added to its mission. The act was once again revised to enable reserve forces to be mobilised to quell armed riots after the Kwangju Uprising of 1980, when police forces could not control them. In other words, reservists were permitted to use weapons to suppress armed riots as well as to counterattack armed guerrillas. At the time of its revision, the National Assembly was in a state of dissolution and there was no opposition to the proposed revision. Nevertheless, the act contained quite controversial issues.

3. ORGANISATION AND TRAINING OF RESERVE FORCES

As of 31 December 2000, the total number of reserve forces is 3,040,000. About one half is the mobilised reserve and the other half is the homeland defence reserve. Of these, the area reserve constitutes 75%, while the workplace reserve is 25%. Reservists are obliged to serve for 8 years after discharge from active duty, but the first and eighth year of duty are exempt from training. During the first 4 years, they have to serve as the mobilised reserve while during another 4-year period as the homeland defence reserve. As to hours of training for reserve forces, enlisted personnel is obliged to receive a total of 100 h of training for the first 4-year period after discharge from active service, and 68 h for the next 4 years. Officers and NCOs have to serve for longer hours. From the year 2004, the training period of the mobilised reserve was reduced to 3 from 4 days. This reduction was induced not by military strategic decisions, but by political considerations to alleviate people's burden.

4. MAJOR ISSUES

Above all, the status of reservists and reserve units is in question. As mentioned above, policy priority has been always given to regular forces regarding reserves as only supplementary. Reserve units keep no more than 30–50% of the equipment and resources that are needed for maintaining the units properly. Furthermore, weapons and equipment allocated to reservists are quite outdated and thus, new reservists who were trained with new and fancy weapons and equipment during active duty tend to be easily frustrated.

Laws related to mobilisation and the reserve forces are diverse and redundant; for example, the Homeland Defence Act, the Civil Defence Act, the Combined Defence Act, the Emergency Resource Control Act, etc. Manpower and material mobilisation and the mobilisation during peacetime and wartime are defined by different laws. The Combined Defence Act was enacted for the defence against aggression, in total capacity unifying armed forces, police, marine police, reserve forces, civil defence units and central and local government agencies. The duplication of missions and functions is a real problem.

The primary mission of the homeland defence reserve units is to defend their local areas and therefore the units should have closer connections with local governments. However, chief officials of local governments tend to regard the duty of reserve forces as military proper. When mobilised, local governments are responsible for combat support functions to provide basic logistics, but they do not secure budgets appropriate for this purpose.

Equity of service in the reserve forces has been raised. In the case of area reserves, self-employed workers and the employees of small firms are more frequently mobilised. In 1996 when North Korean armed guerrillas infiltrated by sea to Kangneung, an east coast city, 60% of those mobilised were salaried and waged workers while the other 40% were self-employed workers. These people had to give up daily wages or their work to serve in reserve units during the period of mobilisation. The majority of mobilised salaried workers belonged to small-scale firms, whereas those of large firms who were organised into the workplace reserve were exempt from mobilisation.

Defence budgets allocated to reserve forces are very limited. In the case of the army, the budget related to reserve forces in 2003 was no more than 1.3% of the total expenditure. If we exclude costs for training full-time reservists and public service personnel (they serve in public organisations instead of military units), the portion is further down to 0.6% of the total annual army budget. Moreover, monetary compensation for mobilisation is

nominal. Civilians who are called up for training have to make sacrifices in their ordinary work including pay cuts or the loss of job during this period without being compensated by the military properly.

There is a great demand for modernised training facilities. Military units in charge of reserve forces are dependent on local governments for maintaining the facilities. But local governments do not pay much attention to reserve forces. Nowadays, it becomes more difficult to establish military installations and facilities than it used to be because complaints and grievances from local residents grow as time goes by. Furthermore, the activities of NGOs have become more aggressive and anti-military mood has been more conspicuous. The construction of military installations such as training grounds and firing ranges have been often resisted by local people.

The status of commanding officers in low-level reserve units is unstable. For example, commanding officers in the workplace reserve are hired either as special-commissioned, contract based or temporary employed. It is suggested that the reserve system become a part of regular military structure. In other words, the necessity of core "professionalised" reservists is proposed, rather than of the simple aggregate of civilian-turned soldiers.

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The role of reserves is important not only from a military point of view but from a sociological perspective. Service in reserves should be integrated with the service in regulars. Reservists keep civilian status but play a military role when mobilised. Presently, since military service in Korea is obligatory, male youngsters should serve in the armed forces as enlisted for 24 months or as an officer or NCO for longer periods depending on the type of service. Sometime in the future, it is anticipated that the size of regulars is kept to a minimum, maintaining only core members who operate units daily while reservists with civilian status are called to active duty to encounter emergencies. The reserve system in Korea is still in its primitive stage. More systematic approach has to be made for its improvement.

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APPENDIX

Statistics of standing and reserve forces are shown in Table A.1.

Table A.1. Standing and Reserve Forces by Country.

Country	Population (in 1,000)	Standing Forces	Reserve Forces	Ratio of Reserve
United States	281,404	1,414,000	1,259,300	0.89
Canada	31,750	52,300	35,400	0.68
China	1,293,239	2,270,000	600,000	0.26
Japan	127,014	239,900	47,000	0.20
Israel	6,336	161,500	425,000	2.63
Taiwan	22,124	370,000	1,657,500	4.48
Russia	146,720	988,100	20,000,000	20.24
Great Britain	58,938	210,450	256,750	1.22
France	59,271	260,400	100,000	0.38
Germany	82,442	296,000	390,300	1.32
Italy	57,184	216,800	65,200	0.30
Switzerland	7,453	3,500	351,000	100.29
North Korea	24,500	1,082,000	4,700,000	4.34
South Korea	47,295	686,000	3,040,000	4.43

Source: IISS (2002); Kwak, Dokgo, and Lee (2003).

DEFENCE TRANSFORMATION AS A LATIN AMERICAN PHENOMENON

Jaime Garcia Covarrubias

BACKGROUND

After September 11th the defence community of the United States of America has been trying to adapt to the threats of the 21st century. Since 2001, many specialists have devoted themselves to explaining the concept of security, while the Federal government in Washington has organised a Transformation Office attached to the Defence Department. There has been much progress in the intervening years, and two wars plus a cunning terrorist attack have helped to definitively shape the concept.

In an almost natural process of transfer of ideas, this concept has been transmitted to the Latin American region, where military leadership is trying to absorb it and to find an application for it in situations where the armed forces are often discussed in terms of shortages.

For this last reason, the transfer of the concept to Latin America is not so simple, since the design of the military apparatus depends on the selected strategic modality and that, in turn, depends on the challenges and threats facing the State. In this sense, the situation of the US is not symmetrical with that of the countries of the region, so the application of this concept to Latin America must be analysed with care.

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This article is an attempt to explain the concept of defence transformation, emphasising on the aspects I think are pertinent to countries like those of the Latin American region. These are my personal opinions and do not involve any agency or country in which I am working in a professional capacity.

DEFENCE: THE INSTRUMENTAL VIEW

After the end of the Cold War the nations of the world faced new challenges classified as "new threats" (e.g., drug trafficking, non-state violence, money laundering, etc.). From then on, this concept began to appear strongly, positing the need for countries to reform their defence sectors in order to develop the necessary capabilities to meet these threats.

Since the first ministerial meetings of the American continent, these threats have been posed globally without specifying which would be resolved with the instruments of defence and public safety, i.e., with the military and/or political apparatus, or through agencies of another kind.

In fact, the Declaration of San Carlos de Bariloche states the concern about the impact of economic phenomena on a country's security.[1] This circumstance gradually gave rise to an expansion of risk management, since problems of a political, economic, and social nature were also included as possible threats to States.

Accordingly, the work groups in the aforesaid meeting agreed that the new threats were: growing unemployment, social marginality, uncontrolled migrations, drug trafficking, terrorism in all its forms, organised crime, violations of human rights, the deterioration of the environment, various forms of discrimination, and others. As can be seen, it is a matter of a combination of different risks whose only common trait is the fact that they cannot be resolved with a single instrument or a single government.

The impact that conventional economic crises in the region have on the security of the states can thus be deduced. I tended to "globalise" the threats, attributing all of them to the defence sector, among other reasons because of the equivocal assimilation made between the two concepts (security and defence). What complicates things even more is the fact that some identify the concept of national security with public safety.

For that reason, the need has intensified throughout these years to define what will be meant by defence and security. What is the scope of one, and what is the scope of the other? This is no doubt an interesting discussion, more academic than political, that ends up "boring" decision makers, since

beyond definitions the concepts need to be concretely materialised. There is no doubt that the defence ministers are much more concerned with the "management" of defence than with the conceptual definition of its terms. However, it is necessary to emphasise that this concern about defining the scopes of security and defence has been recurrent in the four ministerial meetings. My position is that I adhere to an instrumental view of defence, and see security only as an "effect". As for public safety, which is confused with the security "effect", it is one of the instruments the state has, like defence, health, education, and treasury, to solve its problems, in this case people's safety.

Now what does instrumental defence mean? This means that if in view of the magnitude and quality of the threat or problem, the state decides or needs to use the armed forces or the police[2] to resolve it, the threat is a matter of defence. On the other hand, if the problem (such as AIDS) requires the health system for its resolution, it is simply a problem for the health sector. In sum, the instrument that is ultimately used will define whether the threat is the domain of the defence sector or a problem inherent to another sector. Obviously, there are threats that so clearly have a certain nature that it takes a highly precise instrument to resolve them. For example, if a country is militarily invaded there is no doubt that this circumstance (or threat) is in the domain of defence, and requires a military apparatus to resolve it. In this case the "nature" of the threat is clearly within the domain of defence.

Another point of conflict is that some think that poverty is a threat to security. In my opinion, poverty in itself is not a threat. What can happen is that it can be the cause or driver of some threat or have a multiplying effect on some threat, such as terrorism or drug trafficking, for example. In this case, the armed forces will not act against hunger, but directly against the threat that requires the military instrument.[3]

For their part, the armed forces (as instruments) have a nature (they were created to fulfil a mission), have been given capabilities (in order to fulfil the mission efficiently and effectively), and have a constitutional framework that directs them (Fig. 1). The logical thing is to use them within those limits. In turn, the state itself will have to develop the specific capabilities for resolving the various types of problems or threats, for example, developing a good health system that controls AIDS, an adequate educational structure, initiatives that solve poverty, etc.

It is important to remember that there has been agreement among the ministers of the region that the primary role of the countries' armed forces continues to be the defence of national sovereignty, which explicitly



Fig. 1.

acknowledges that each country is free to define its own range of specific threats. This gives the countries freedom of action to their own threat scenarios (normally local) that must be resolved or mitigated by the countries through bilateral ties.

The basic reality is to be clear that in today's world there will be three scenarios that can exist simultaneously. The first is peace, to which I would add the word ''relative'' since the so-called new threats are a phenomenon seen in a scenario of peace. The second is crisis, in which the armed forces must shape and refine concrete, real, and credible measures of deterrence. The third scenario will be that of war or conflict with the military use of the means of defence. These three events may cross and combine because currently wars are not declared; they coexist with peace and/or crisis. And the bigger the country, the greater the risk of simultaneity of events. In addition, at any time there can be part of a crisis or high tension anywhere.

In sum, the so-called ''new'' threats affect everything from the state down to the individual citizen and today are essentially a peacetime phenomenon. If we look with a keen historical eye we will see that most of them have been occurring for a long time throughout the world, but before they mainly made their appearance in times of war. This is confirmed by acts of terrorism in war, massive migrations after bombardments, deterioration of the environment due to the use of conventional, chemical, or nuclear weapons, or post-war economic crises. In synthesis, it would appear that the only really new (or, rather, renewed) threat is the interaction of the drug trafficking–subversion–terrorism triad as we observe it in Colombia, which is now 40 years old.

From my point of view, what is happening is that there are three central points:

- It is not that there are "new" threats; what is happening is that there is a different perception of them.
- These threats essentially affect countries in peacetime.
- There is a social interest in having the armed forces do more for less money, a requirement very characteristic of a market economy. This leads to designing new missions, including their debated role in the development of countries. To this is added the natural political interest in materialising the effective subordination of the armed forces by centering them on their specific tasks. In order to do that it is necessary to redefine their missions.

For the time being, the defence sectors will have to fulfill four major missions. The first is to resolve the traditional threats, or possible military attack (deterrence).[4] Second, is to resolve the so-called new threats. Third, is to fulfil the country's strategic commitments, in this case peacekeeping and other operations, and lastly, to play a role in national development playing a role subsidiary to the state, if it is a market economy. In this context, and as a fifth task, the functions of public safety can be added when the police are a part of the defence sector. Each country will prioritise these missions independently based on its own situation. For example, the case of Colombia is emblematic when speaking of new threats, due to the drug-trafficking guerilla warfare. On the other hand, in Bolivia the armed forces are playing an important role in the country's development, collaborating with the population, and Uruguay is unique due to the preeminence it gives to participating in international operations.

ADAPTATION, MODERNISATION, AND TRANSFORMATION?

There are three main concepts that define the armed services. The first is their nature, since they were created to perform a task that society has assigned them since their creation. In the second place, the state has given them a regulatory and judicial framework, and in the third place, the state gives them certain capabilities in order to carry out their natural tasks within that legal framework. Up to this point, things are seen from a theoretical perspective. Now these three basic concepts interact, and if one is changed it impacts the others. For example, in Paraguay the decision was made to state

in the political constitution that the country renounces war and that its armed forces are defensive. This change in the legal framework impacts to some extent the operational nature of the armed forces and obviously their capabilities, since they will have to be defensive. In the case of the major powers, the changes are not in the legal framework, but instead directly involve capabilities, which is of the essence of military transformation in the US. I would add that history is the discipline that teaches us about the nature of men and institutions. Looking at history, then, we can see the various changes in the nature of the armed forces that could have occurred, and the specific cases. So in essence, in Latin America, any modification to any of these three basic concepts implies that we are "transforming" the armed forces. This means that transforming the armed forces in Latin America is a more deep-rooted process because it covers political aspects, value aspects, and the relationship with society. All these aspects recur frequently in the countries' defence agendas. In Latin America, transforming the armed forces is necessarily synonymous with a radical change in their nature, the laws that govern them, and their capabilities.

Ultimately, all the political decisions made in defence end up impacting the structure and organisation of the armed forces, in what is called "force design". That is, new missions require a new design of military forces. If we add missions or tasks to the armed forces, consideration must be made to give them the necessary capabilities. So this is the point on which military leadership must place the emphasis and give their professional opinion.

Today, three concepts are managed simultaneously. In the United States, there is a definition of these, in which adaptation, modernisation, and transformation are stages of a single process that is basically divided into short, medium, and long term.[5] In the case of Latin America, it seems to me that the most appropriate interpretations would be as follows. Adaptation consists of enabling existing structures to continue carrying out their assigned tasks. Modernisation is optimizing capabilities in order to better perform the assigned missions, and transformation is developing new capabilities to carry out new missions or play new roles in combat (see Fig. 2).

On this subject, it must be emphasised that this is not a matter of applying foreign recipes, much less copying models, it means considering trends and selecting the aspects that could be applicable, while keeping things in proportion and respecting specificities.

Based on this statement, it would be particularly interesting in the region's next military meetings to have a thorough discussion of this idea of military transformation (or polyvalence) in order to draw conclusions for Latin America.[6] This is because it is possible that modernisation processes will



Fig. 2.

lose their validity sooner or later and it will become necessary to conduct a more integral transformation in the armed forces.

On this point, it occurs to me that in future processes of military transformation, at least the following aspects should be taken into consideration:

- First, clearly define the strategic model, assuming that the force design will be derived from it. In addition, determine the priority of modern-day missions, i.e., (1) conventional threats scenarios, (2) new or unconventional threats, (3) strategic commitments, and (4) the military role in national development. For example, for Uruguay, strategic commitments (3) are the first priority. For Chile, conventional threats (1) are probably their priority. But for Colombia it will be unconventional threats (2) (see Fig. 3).
- Develop joint capabilities with possibilities of international interoperability.
- Define more clearly what role the armed forces will have in national development, taking care not to denature their primary function. In addition, develop the capabilities that are indispensable for handling "new missions", since although the missions may be new, the threats are not.
- Streamlining polyvalent organisations equipped with mobile reserves. In parallel, preparing forces for efficient performance in multinational operations.



Fig. 3.

- Armed forces conceived of as an instrument of foreign policy and not in the service of local hypotheses, detached from the interests and opportunities of the states. This definition produces a change in consideration because it undermines the foundation many armed forces had throughout the last century.
- Provide for effective military-police coordination in the "gray area" in which police forces are used in clearly combat tasks due to the country's needs. For example, this can be seen in Colombia, and it is important to note that many countries have the police under the defence ministry.

Our discussion in Latin America will be to define whether we must modernize or transform, or whether ultimately, due to lack of resources or to the needs of the country, there is no remedy other than adaptation. The fact of assigning new missions to the armed forces makes a transformation mandatory, since new missions require new capabilities that must be acquired.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Defence transformation does not only apply to the US, but to the entire hemisphere. It is a trend that has already begun. However, it is not imperative in Latin America if conditions do not warrant it. It must be determined whether adaptation, modernisation, or transformation is required. As for modernisation, it will be a permanent part of transformation.

Before deciding whether to transform defence, the problem must be identified and diagnosed, and then a long-term plan must be prepared. Obviously, each situation has a different starting point. The US transformation does not have the same starting point as Bolivia or Brazil. Also, transformation is not only technology (modernisation), it is also a change in the forces' doctrines and structures and it is not just improving combat methods; it is also developing new forms of combat. In addition, it is not a matter of replacing the entire military structure, just combining the emerging structure with the existing one.

Finally, in Latin America, the transformation process is global because it involves restructuring the three basic parameters of the military: nature, legal framework, and capabilities. Conversely, in the United States the modernisation process of the armed forces only requires a change in capabilities.

NOTES

1. Declaration of San Carlos de Bariloche, October 1996.
2. In some countries such as Chile, Colombia, Venezuela, and others, the police are part of the Defence Ministry.
3. I think that threats are situations in which the will of an adversary or enemy is involved. Things such as unemployment, hunger, illiteracy, poverty, etc. are problems, structural failures of society, or shortages.
4. See Jaime Garcia Covarrubias. "The Significance of Conventional Deterrence in Latin America," Military Review, March–April 2004, p. 36.
5. The adaptation concepts are explained by Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler in *Managing Change: Capability, Adaptability, and Transformation,* Defence Horizons, June 2001.
6. An alternative to transformation, which is a more generalised process, is achieving greater polyvalence in the military instrument. However, polyvalence does not always ensure efficiency in all the areas it purports to include.

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PART VI:
MOTIVATION IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

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‘WHO WANTS TO GO AGAIN?’ MOTIVATION OF GERMAN SOLDIERS FOR AND DURING PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

Maren Tomforde and Jörg Keller

1. INTRODUCTION

Reports from the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences (SOWI) (Biehl, Keller, Kozielski, Reinholz, & Tomforde, 2004; Biehl, vom Hagen, & Mackewitsch, 2001) about the motivation of German soldiers in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo have already clarified that no longer only patriotism, political ideas, the identification with an ideology or charismatic leaders count as motivating factors for soldiers to risk their lives in combat or in peacekeeping missions abroad (see also Moskos, 1968). Also, it is not – as long proclaimed within military sociology – only cohesion between comrades, which will motivate soldiers to fight (see Segal & Kestnbaum, 2001). Instead, factors which concern the soldier as an individual, such as family support and the soldier’s social environment influence greatly whether or not a soldier is willing to risk his or her life, or less drastically speaking, whether or not, he or she is willing to endure the hardships of peacekeeping missions.

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Soldiers' tasks and roles are no longer solely perceived as related to 'pure' combat and conflict between states, nations or ideas (Kümmel, 2003). Rather, peacekeeping missions call for soldiers with a new self-image to fulfil the multiple, complex and intellectually often challenging tasks in foreign countries of deployment. Due to this change in soldiers' tasks and roles, an approach to motives and notions of soldiers who are explicitly studied as individuals – and not as one member of a large organisation – becomes more and more important (Battistelli, 1997, 468f.; Keegan, 1976).

Paul Klein and Ekkehard Lippert have already emphasised in 1986 that a soldier's social, non-military environment cannot be neglected because it strongly influences the attitudes and actions within the German Army. German concepts such as the 'Innere Führung' (leadership and civic education) and 'Staatsbürger in Uniform' (citizen in uniform) are increasingly questioned due to the new tasks of the Bundeswehr after the end of the Cold War. It is questioned whether soldiers can be motivated to risk their lives in battle and be fully integrated into civil society as politically mature citizens at the same time. The peacekeeping missions even give rise to the question whether soldiers are even faced with a dilemma when, during deployment, it is expected of them that they act as peacekeepers and combatants at the same time. Are soldiers at all able to fulfil both roles at the same time or are they confronted with the dilemma that they cannot maintain both roles at the same time as the events in Kosovo in March 2004 might suggest?[1] Research on the self-perceptions of German peacekeepers reveals that they identify most prominently with the image of 'supporters in uniform'. However, what are the consequences for the soldiers' self-image and motivation when they are deployed, over and over again? How can they be motivated to volunteer again and to conscientiously fulfil their responsibilities during the missions? Are German soldiers motivated during and for other deployments by financial rewards only? Or, can a priority of military aspects such as confidence in their task, training and equipment be stated? Or, is the fact that soldiers can act as citizens in uniform and as 'supporters' be an important stimulus during employment in low-intensity conflicts? Or, are the missions' objectives and the belief in its success evenly motivating factors? These questions are answered in the course of the paper by combining results from quantitative and qualitative research on the motivation of German soldiers for and during deployment with results from data obtained about the self-perceptions of Bundeswehr soldiers during peacekeeping missions.

Data were assessed by questionnaire and qualitative methods during two research phases in Bosnia-Herzegovina in October 2003 and January 2004, two further questionnaires were distributed in March and August 2004

(after returning home) without our presence in the field. Next to the application of qualitative methods such as participant observation and semi-structured interviews, questionnaires were distributed to all German SFOR soldiers (about 1,200 people) four times. Between 39 and 53% of the written questionnaires were returned to us (approximately 2,000 responses in total). Return rates were lower (39%) when we did not distribute and explain the purpose of the study to the soldiers ourselves than when we went to all the companies in person (53%).

In the first section of this paper it is underscored that the Bundeswehr has changed from an army trained for combat solely to an army whose main task is to participate in multinational peacekeeping endeavours. Explanations of important changes within the Bundeswehr are central to an understanding of German soldier's self-images and perceptions of their new roles and tasks as well as for an understanding of their deployment motivation. The second section of this paper focuses on questionnaire results about the motivation of German soldiers in Bosnia during the mission and for further missions. In the third and last section, self-images of German peacekeepers are subsumed into five categories, which aim at drawing a general picture of soldiers' self-perception and their main motivation during and for deployment.

2. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BUNDESWEHR FROM A COMBAT TO A PEACEKEEPING ARMY

Only in the year 1992, with its deployment to Cambodia, the Bundeswehr has started to become actively involved in peace-support, humanitarian and disaster-relief operations. Thus, the German military is less experienced in such operations than neighbouring countries such as France or Great Britain that already have a long history of involvement and experience in foreign countries. A great majority of German soldiers assess the missions as a great challenge for the Bundeswehr since it is a field where the German Army can work alongside with other armies of NATO and the United Nations (Johansson, 2001).

Germany still drafts its soldiers (a 9-month-long compulsory military service); participation in peacekeeping missions is officially based on voluntariness, practically, however, compulsory as well. Once a soldier is ordered to participate in a mission, he or she cannot easily refuse to go unless he or she is willing to cope with possible negative consequences for his/her future career. Peer pressure also plays an essential role, forming consensus to participate when a whole company is deployed. The great majority of

soldiers was deployed for a period of 6 months in the past, but this is currently reduced to a 4-month-stay.

Peacekeepers do not face a clear enemy; instead they have to deal and get engaged with the local population exhibiting different behaviour and norms. Therefore, these missions demand skills other than combat for which Bundeswehr soldiers have been traditionally trained for. Humanitarian missions require skills that are not comparable to military skills. Liora Sion (to be published) hypothesises that "the further soldiers are from core combat expertise, the more likely that they will adopt a humanitarian attitude". How have German soldiers been affected by the change in their tasks and roles as soldiers?

Peacekeeping missions do not fit into the traditional picture of classical soldier's assignments and roles, which once had been characterised by training for combat, masculinity, physical and technical expertise. Missions demand more social skills such as de-escalation, peace-enforcement, persuasiveness, diplomacy, sensitiveness and intercultural competence. Military sociologists describe soldiers' roles in UN missions as that of constabularies. German soldiers' self-perception is even less combat-like than that. Due to the strict enactment of the Rules of Engagement on the German side and very limited opportunities to practise law enforcement, many soldiers see their roles during deployment rather as extension workers and 'supporters in uniform' than as constabularies.

New tasks and roles of soldiers during peacekeeping missions contradict with the traditional soldiers' tasks of combat and the exertion of physical violence in wars. These contradictions can account for tensions between soldiers of the 'old school' and soldiers who have only recently entered the German Army knowing that participation in foreign peacekeeping missions is one of the major tasks of a soldier. The acceptance of women into combat forces since 2001 and the consequential deployment of women infantry soldiers into missions enhance confusion and tensions, as well as begin a new orientation within the Bundeswehr. In other words, German soldiers have generally adapted well to their new roles and missions. They have even adapted to such a degree that they rather understand themselves as 'supporters in uniform' than as pure combatants. Nonetheless, especially older soldiers view the drastic changes within the German Army critically more often than not and call for the conscious maintenance of a 'fighter's morale' among the troops. Especially older NCOs and officers have a problem in abandoning a combat-oriented self-image and giving up the combat-model of the Army. For them combat, not peacekeeping, is what makes an army relevant and legitimate.

Military training of the Bundeswehr has also been adapted to the new tasks of peace-enforcement abroad to prepare soldiers for their diversified jobs inside and outside the camps. Training designed for peacekeeping missions predominantly takes the shape of exercises in deescalation and diplomacy. Combat exercises are part of this training that is generally directed towards preventing open (armed) conflict at all costs. However, mission trainings, for the purpose of the exercise, draw a generally hostile picture of the host societies in the Balkan or the Hindukush so that some soldiers deploy with rather negative views of the people abroad as well as with wrong perceptions of their tasks. As a result, these soldiers, once deployed, have to adapt to the fact that work inside and outside the camps is not dominated by fighting hostile enemies but by a sometimes ever-repeating working routine instead, especially for those working within the camps.

The unintended effect of the Bundeswehr's training for peacekeeping is that soldiers can be disappointed of their tasks during deployment due to the fact that they have actually been prepared for encounters and negotiations with aggressive locals who are potential enemies but not for monotonous, less demanding day-to-day tasks within the camps, which, in addition can be rarely left by the majority of the soldiers. The greatest problem during deployment is not the mission itself but more the challenge of keeping all soldiers busy and alert during their everyday tasks while preventing boredom with everyday routine. "My men are mostly busy with simple, not exciting everyday tasks. Therefore, it is sometimes difficult to keep up the motivation of my men during deployment and to prevent that they get bored when they actually need to stay alert at all times" explained one NCO in Bosnia. Especially lower ranking soldiers are trained for action and are thus eager to look for excitement and adventure. It goes without saying that it is difficult for them to keep up their motivation during deployment when confronted with daily routine and ever-repeating tasks rather than exciting missions. Interestingly enough, only about 20% of the soldiers in Bosnia-Herzegovina have official missions to follow outside the camps and are therefore allowed to leave the fenced sites permanently; in Afghanistan these numbers are even lower.

3. THE MOTIVATION OF GERMAN SOLDIERS DURING AND FOR PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

In military sociology as well as among military practitioners, there is an agreed understanding that the motivation of soldiers – in combination with

the quality of training, equipment and military leadership – influences military efficiency. Soldiers' motivation must be understood as an amalgam of possible actions, behaviours and attitudes, which has a decisive bearing on soldiers' actions (Biehl & Mackewitsch, 2002; Battistelli, 1997). When speaking about the long-term motivation of soldiers and a fundamental bond towards an army, one can even speak of a commitment to the military organisation (see Moser, 1969). Commitment of individuals to organisations happens on a long-term basis and is generally resistant to short-term impacts (Manning, 1991, p. 458). It is the hypothesis of this paper that the level and course of motivation during peacekeeping missions are mainly connected to specific matters and developments of the deployment whereas motivation for participation in further missions is rather connected to a soldier's commitment. Motivation for further deployments can be seen, in other words, as mostly unrelated to events of a current mission but rather expresses the basic relationship of a soldier to the military organisation.

Facets of motivation of German soldiers during and for further deployment was assessed in the camps by way of in-depth interviews with individuals and focus groups, participant observation and written questionnaires. Questionnaires included items that allowed soldiers to assess their own motivation during a mission as well as items, which were intended to indirectly measure the attitudes of soldiers. The 7th German SFOR contingent was surveyed by questionnaire once in the middle of the assignment in Bosnia, while the 8th contingent was surveyed three times: in the beginning, in the middle and after the assignment. About a total of 2,000 questionnaires were returned to us. Survey samples are representative and allow conclusions regarding the whole contingents (see Fig. 1).

The motivation of German SFOR soldiers in the 7th and 8th contingent is high with 13.7% of the soldiers being highly motivated and almost half of the two contingents (47.7%) being relatively highly motivated. Yet, overall motivation during a mission is still lower than motivation for another deployment because of several reasons: motivation during a deployment successively decreases in the course of the deployment while it increases only after the return home, yet without ever reaching the high level it had before deployment (see also Biehl & Mackewitsch, 2002). Motivation during the mission decreases since it is influenced by several factors: (1) Many soldiers generate false expectations of mission tasks and situations in the country of deployment. This is partly due to prior deployment training, which mainly concentrates on combat training and de-escalation aimed at a violent and hostile local population. This kind of peacekeeping training conveys the image that missions abroad include adventure, combat-like situations and



Fig. 1. Motivation During Deployment (in Per cent). *Source*: SOWI questionnaires, 7th contingent SFOR October 2003 ($N = 429$) and 8th contingent SFOR March 2004 ($N = 491$).

challenges the soldiers will never encounter at their home bases. Disappointment during missions is especially high for those soldiers charged with maintenance tasks within the camps. For the majority, the camp does not offer anything but daily routine, lacking privacy, and, to a certain degree, boredom. (2) Motivation also decreases during deployment because strains connected to missions such as being physically separated from ones own family and friends, extreme climate, difficult working environment, lacking privacy, being 'entrapped' within the camp, latent dangers or foreign cultures to cope with, can diminish a euphoria which soldiers might have had initially. (3) Problems with superiors and comrades can be seen as another factor that can affect statements about motivation on-site. That these oscillations do not have an immediate effect on the overall motivation and self-image of soldiers is emphasised by the fact that motivation for another deployment is considerably higher than motivation during deployment.

The great majority of the soldiers deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2003 and 2004 would volunteer to participate in another mission (see Fig. 2). Interestingly enough, surveys among KFOR soldiers in the year 2000 show similar results (Biehl & Mackewitsch, 2002). This congruity supports the hypotheses that motivation during deployment is strongly influenced by 'phases of deployment' that mostly repeat themselves in similar stages of 'euphoria' at the beginning, of coping with tasks and problems in the middle of the term and of excitement about the expected return home at the end of



Fig. 2. Motivation for Another Mission (in Per cent). *Source*: SOWI questionnaires, 7th contingent SFOR October 2003 ($N = 429$) and 8th contingent SFOR March 2004 ($N = 491$).

the mission (see also Bennett, Boesch, & Haltiner, 2003). The motivation during deployment, however, even if individual experiences are not positive, do not markedly affect the overall motivation of soldiers for further deployments as it is closely connected to the soldier's commitment to the military organisation. However, which are the most important factors that motivate the soldiers to deploy again or, asked the other way round, not to be willing to participate in another mission?

The most important reasons for soldiers to 'go again' are (1) the meaningful tasks of peacekeeping missions, (2) good comradeship, (3) endurable duration of the deployment, and (4) the good extra pay that the soldiers receive tax-free. The result underlines once again that soldiers, as they are mostly motivated by meaningful tasks of the mission, are influenced primarily by civilian society and its values instead of factors such as good pay (Klein & Lippert, 1998, p. 29). In other words, the motivation of German troops can no longer be seen as solely related to comradeship, as done in the past, but also, and most importantly, needs to incorporate factors related to the individual as well. In this regard it is also interesting to look at the reasons given by the soldiers who are not willing to volunteer for another mission.

In the past, the majority of German soldiers had been deployed for a duration of 6 months, which most soldiers complained about as being too long. Deployment lasting a period of 6 months was only considered to be bearable if it was followed by a stay at the home base for a period of 18

months, as many soldiers proclaimed. In practice, however, this was not the case. Especially soldiers with special qualifications were sent abroad at least once a year. At present, deployments are being reduced to 4 months (or even shorter). Fig. 3 also shows that the compatibility of deployment with family life is another important reason for soldiers to be motivated for another mission. Fig. 4 confirms that peacekeeping missions need to be compatible with the individual soldier's family life since problems with the partner or the family are cited as the main reasons against the willingness to participate in another deployment. Most soldiers who either return voluntarily or are sent home in the midst of a mission need to return to Germany due to problems with their partners or family. Surprisingly, especially young soldiers at the age of 18–25 have difficulties in coping with being separated



Fig. 3. Motivational Factors (in Per cent). *Source*: SOWI questionnaires, 7th contingent SFOR October 2003 and 8th contingent SFOR March 2004.



Fig. 4. Reasons against Another Deployment (in Per cent). *Source*: SOWI questionnaires, 7th contingent SFOR October 2003 and 8th contingent SFOR March 2003.

from their partners or their parents for a couple of months, as it is primarily this age group that spends large sums of money for endless daily mobile phone calls while their older comrades, who are mostly married or in stable relationships, have adopted coping strategies by way of frequently writing letters next to the eventual phone call or by setting fixed times for their partners to call them from Germany in Bosnia or Afghanistan, which is considerably cheaper than vice versa. Further interrogations among soldiers deployed have shown that the motivation for further deployments does not decrease when people have been deployed for two or more times already. On

the contrary, soldiers who are willing to participate in peacekeeping missions more than once are convinced of their tasks and fulfil them highly motivated.

One important factor, which motivates soldiers to partake in peacekeeping missions but which is not shown in the figures above, has become clear during personal interviews. According to one infantry soldier, "it is important to have participated in a peacekeeping mission at least once to have made the experience abroad and to be able to join talks about the German involvement in peacekeeping missions." In other words, participation in deployments can be seen, to a certain extent, as a 'rite de passage' for the 'modern soldier' who needs to have experienced deployment at least once during the time of his military service. Soldiers who have already served for three decades or longer do not necessarily share this view since they have trained and worked under different circumstances during the Cold War. However, younger soldiers define their role more in connection to the new tasks of peacekeeping missions and therefore share the view that 'a real soldier' needs to have peacekeeping experience. Soldiers even rank the different deployments, SFOR being the least desired one, but which is seen as being suitable for a first deployment. Following deployments should preferably go to KFOR, or if possible, to ISAF to experience missions which are more challenging than the "calm one in SFOR which sometimes resembles more a holiday than a deployment" as a parachutist stated.

4. SELF-IMAGE OF GERMAN PEACEKEEPERS

Peacekeeping missions abroad and their special, diversified tasks result in different self-images of German soldiers than tasks of infantry, artillery or airborne companies at home bases in Germany. It is interesting to see that self-images of German peacekeepers are not only different from images of comrades at home, but also from those of their British, Italian, French or American peacekeeping comrades who still appear to mostly define themselves as combat soldiers with valued symbols of power and masculinity. Among German peacekeepers, five main (stylised) types of soldiers with certain, differing self-images could be found: (1) the 'supporter in uniform' whose mentality suits peace more than combat; (2) the 'leader and educator' whose self-image is more oriented towards the military organisation and 'traditional military tasks' of training for combat than to civil society; (3) the 'careerist' who sees the Bundeswehr in general and the peacekeeping missions in particular as a chance to advance quickly in career and material



Fig. 5. Categories of German SFOR-Soldiers. *Source*: SOWI questionnaires, 7th contingent SFOR October 2003 ($N = 429$) and 8th contingent SFOR March 2004 ($N = 491$).

well-being; (4) the 'martial adventurer' whose main desire is for adventure as well as new and meaningful personal experiences, and last, but not least; (5) the 'male warrior' who is mainly combat-oriented with a strong masculine image. It goes without saying that these five types of German peacekeeping soldiers have to be seen as stylised categories enabling only a generalised view of soldiers' differing self-conceptions (see Fig. 5). Of course, soldiers might see themselves as belonging to more than only one category, might define themselves differently according to specific situations and circumstances, or might not concur with any of these categories at all. For example, a soldier who defines himself as 'supporter in uniform' can also partly identify with characteristics of the 'male adventurer' when, inter alia, being also attracted by the foreignness and latent danger of deployments such as the one in Afghanistan. Or a 'careerist' can also, yet not most importantly, be driven by a wish to contribute personally to the socio-economic development in the countries of deployment.

5. CONCLUSION

Soldiers who mainly define themselves during peacekeeping missions as 'supporters in uniform' are foremost determined by social and familial influences and are socially integrated into their home society. The results of our study confirm the trend in military sociology that soldiers are not solely

motivated by comradeship and their combatant status alone. Instead, they are motivated by their own social environment and their personal ideological convictions. Therefore, soldiers have to be conceptualised as part of their social background as well as military actors with a certain political orientation. In conclusion, actions by soldiers during deployment can only be understood when societal and political influences affecting them and the army are considered as well.

NOTES

1. 1 SOWI study among KFOR-soldiers returning from the 8th contingent is currently underway to help answer the question whether German soldiers are still able to react as warriors in combat-like situations (as the violent upheaval in Prisren would have required to some extent) or if they have been trained too much to be 'helpers in uniform' that they have lost their ability to fight.

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MOTIVATION AND JOB SATISFACTION OF SLOVENIAN SOLDIERS AND POLICEMEN IN PEACE OPERATIONS

Ljubica Jelušič and Maja Garb[1]

1. INTRODUCTION

Slovenia has joined the club of peacekeepers in 1997. The decision was made under pressure of foreign expectations that a country which strives for NATO membership should prove its willingness to co-operate in common defence efforts. First military units, sent to UN-led peacekeeping operations, comprised volunteers on an ad hoc basis and were very small (platoon level). There were also a few policemen who joined missions abroad, first under WEU leadership in Albania. The governmental need 'to show the flag' in many operations increased the number of soldiers needed for peace operations and the number of policemen. Currently, there are around 200 soldiers and 30 policemen in different operations abroad. In the period 1997–2001 all soldiers and policemen entered the missions on a voluntary basis. In 2002, there was the first contingent of Slovenian SFOR soldiers that used its home military structure (infantry motorised company) in a peace mission. It marked the end of ad hoc units, comprised to serve the goals of the mission only, and the start of more organised, and also more

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ordered co-operation of soldiers in missions. They could still refuse participation in the mission, but that would have led to risks of losing unit cohesion. In the transition from voluntary peacekeepers to peacekeepers on duty, or by order, the Slovenian Army realised the need to understand what helps soldiers to fully accept the terms of operations abroad.

The question of why soldiers, policemen, civil servants, or members of civil society are motivated to participate in efforts dedicated to keeping, enforcing, building, or making peace is as old as the peacekeeping efforts of the global community, and at least occasionally connected with the phenomenon of the 'willingness to fight' in classical military operations (Caforio, 2002). The term should be, within the scope of peace endeavours, redefined into 'willing to pacify, but without fighting' because, in the majority of peace operations that have taken place after the Second World War, the given mandates were very limited in terms of allowing the use of weapons. In most cases, participants had light armament only. If morale, motivation, and cohesion are the core concepts that guide the actions of military combatants, can we use them to explain the behaviour of the peacekeepers as well? The dilemma derives from a tendency to understand soldiers as schizophrenic employees, who have to possess highly-tuned combat readiness if the peace mission turns into war-fighting, (which happens, although very rarely), and, at the same time, they have to achieve the goals of their missions with the minimal use of force, if not completely without the resort to arms.

The theatre for peace operations differs in important ways from the classical military front. Although soldiers are deployed in military formations, their mandate is fully different (with some exceptions, as in UN peace enforcement operations from what they have learned during their basic military training. Their police-like activities push them into the role of negotiator, intelligence gatherer, mediator, observer, listener, humanitarian worker, helper, and social worker (Kümmel, 2003). It is questionable to what extent they still need the heroism, fighting morale, or developed will to fight that basic military training strives to inculcate. Gabriel argued that modern war-fighting activities put soldiers into stressful situations, with a resulting high number of psychological losses, which is evidence of the "no more heroes" tenor of the current mode of combat (Gabriel, 1991, p. 149f.). In peace operations, there is even greater doubt about the necessity for heroes; moderate and neutral soldiers are more in demand. Therefore if, in combat missions, soldiers have to maintain a high level of morale, which helps them to fight eagerly in order to win the battle, in peace operations they have to be motivated to act with the minimal use of force, but with

substantial mental and psychological strength. "Heroes without the power of arms" would be the most appropriate description of the soldiers regarded as traditional peacekeepers or peacekeepers. (Johansson, 2001, p. 61). The famous peace activist and researcher Anatol Rapoport once said that, if we take the arms from the soldier, he is nothing. In peace operations, the soldiers (and policemen) have to fulfill their entire mandates without the extensive use of force. However, in many post-Cold War peace operations, the peacekeepers have adopted the "warrior for peace" (Kernic & Haas, 1999) mentality, derived from their deployment under extremely tense circumstances, especially in times of a tenuous peace in the wake of civil war.

2. DAILY EXPERIENCES, STRESS, AND MOTIVATION

There are many different motives that shape the decision of peacekeepers to join peacekeeping missions. In contemporary all-volunteer forces, some soldiers join the military specifically because they would like to serve in support of peace operations. This motivation was noticed among Slovenian volunteers, who entered the Slovenian Army in 2003, having been attracted by the media's presentation of the military's peacekeeping activities. The official Slovenian military campaign to attract young boys and girls to become soldiers, activated in 2004, is essentially based on propagating the peacekeeping tasks of the Slovenian Army. Participation in different peace operations constitutes an important part of the military career. Some militaries deploy peacekeepers on a voluntary basis, which means that active soldiers – and reserve soldiers, too – may voluntarily apply for peacekeeping missions outside the country, whereas in some other armies soldiers are ordered to join peacekeeping units. In both cases, the soldiers need some intrinsic and extrinsic driving forces to help them make the decision to join the peacekeeping force, or to convince him/her of the positive outcomes of such a mission.

Once deployed in the field, the soldiers – and, similarly, policemen – have to develop other motives in order to maintain their readiness to complete their mission. Usually, after the first month – which is always very busy, filled with learning new jobs and new social networks – the sobering effect of peace missions takes place. Immersed in the reality of a peacekeeping operation, soldiers are forced to realise the difference between their personal image of the mission and the practice of the task at hand. In the Slovenian

survey among peacekeepers we recognised that even veterans in peacekeeping, those who joined missions two or more times, are still subject to disappointment, while passing the initial stage of the mission.

In comparison with military peacekeeping, the practice of police peacekeeping differs in some ways. The term of deployment is longer, usually one year, with the possible prolongation of half a year. In addition, these servicemen live among the local population and must learn a great deal about the habits and attitudes of the locals. Their motivation must be sufficient and consistent enough to survive the long absence from family and home. The stressors are similar to those in the military framework, but with a higher impact of the local population's attitudes and behaviour than in the military.

Researchers who have surveyed the stress factors in peace operations distinguish between pre-deployment, early deployment, and late deployment stressors (Bartone et al., 1998, p. 590). Why do we have to elaborate on stressors, given that our focus here is on motivation? The explanation would be that the same factors that serve as generators of high levels of motivation among peacekeepers might serve as stressors as well. For example, if a soldier's family has supportive attitudes towards the mission, this may motivate the soldier to join and expect positive outcomes of the mission. On the other hand, family concerns may push the soldier into isolation and other typical occupational stresses. Ulrich von Hagen has written that peacekeeping deployment and duty could be considered an important part of the modern concept of occupational stress in the military (Hagen, 2003, p. 258). The peacekeepers experience separation from home, family, and garrison life; they feel isolated due to the remote locations, obstacles to communication, newly configured units, cross-attached individuals, and family concerns. A high degree of ambiguity growing out of unclear mission goals and confusion in command structures, roles, and identity has been detected as the second important dimension of stress. It often results in feelings of powerlessness, boredom, and the sense of threat and danger (Bartone et al., 1998, p. 591). Segal and Segal (1993, p. 37) have explained this boredom as the consequence of contradictory tasks; soldiers who have been trained to close with, engage, and defeat an enemy often have difficulty in adapting to a mission of observing, verifying, and reporting. Slovenian soldiers, deployed in SFOR, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, used to complain that they were trained for combat missions – that they were combatants – but that nothing in the mission looked like a combat theatre (Jelušič et al., 2004). The cognitive inconsistency between the soldiers' perception of the peace mission and understanding of the mandate on the one hand, and the reality of daily

work on the other, leads to identity crisis and tensions (Franke, 1999, p. 129).

3. FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE MOTIVATION

Fabrizio Battistelli has elaborated a typology of soldiers' motivation to join missions, employing empirical data and utilising current social science terminology, using the adjectives pre-modern, modern, and post-modern. He argues that some soldiers join peacekeeping missions due to their primarily pre-modern motives, such as "to be useful to others" or "to strengthen the country's image at the international level." Another group of soldiers espouses modern motives, like "to earn some extra money, to learn things that could be useful to one's career or on one's return to civilian life." The third group is driven by postmodern motives, such as "to satisfy a desire for adventure" or "to have a meaningful personal experience" (Battistelli, 1997, pp. 467–484). In most empirical surveys among peacekeepers, we would find all the above-mentioned motives, but the importance of them would vary from soldier to soldier. Giuseppe Caforio made a survey among 100 Italian peacekeepers in UNOSOM (United Nations Mission in Somalia), which was among the first empirical tests of post-Cold War peacekeeping operations' motivation (conducted in May 1993). His findings on motivation in the pre-deployment phase have shown the overwhelming spirit of adventure, escape from home routine, and expectations of something new as basic motives to join. Additionally, the soldiers displayed some aspects of an altruistic military culture, i.e., to help and do something important in their life. The economic reward was the third most important motive for participating in the mission (Caforio, 1996).

Among the current attempts in the field of military sociology to define the components of the motivation for peace missions there are at least three different research projects under way in Europe, conducted among Swiss (Bennett et al., 2003), German (Biehl & Mackewitsch, 2002; Tomforde & Keller, 2004) and Slovenian (Jelušič et al., 2004) soldiers, deployed in the SFOR and KFOR peace missions in the Balkans. Although the surveys are not based on a common research model and methodology, and the researchers were driven by their own countries' interests in gaining knowledge about the soldiers' motivation, they have had very similar ideas on how to measure the motivation of peacekeepers. They have deduced numerous similar factors of peacekeepers' motivation from the answers given by the respondents. The main differences are in the relative importance of

motivating factors in different units. Moreover, the researchers who surveyed the dimensions of psychological stress in peacekeeping (Bartone et al., 1998) or stress in the daily experiences of peacekeepers (Johansson, 2001) have conducted their surveys using similar variables and indicators.

4. SLOVENIAN PEACEKEEPERS AND THEIR MOTIVATION

Researchers at the defence Research Centre of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Ljubljana are conducting a survey among Slovenian contingents deployed with SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The survey began in 2002, and will end in 2005. The Slovenian contingents (SICON) of the Multinational Battle Group (MNBG) are deployed in the area of Doboj. The Slovenian contingents in the Multinational Specialised Unit (SICON MSU) are stationed in Sarajevo, but are deployed on tasks throughout the entire country. The surveys are three-point measurements: before assignment, during assignment, and after assignment. The measurements before and during assignment are conducted using a semi-standardised questionnaire (self-administered), and the last measurement after assignment is conducted by face-to-face semi-structured interviews. The survey is a trend survey in contingents SICON MNBG I, II, III, IV (deployed with SFOR between January 2003 and December 2004) and SICON MSU IX, X, XI (deployed with SFOR between April 2003 and October 2004). The results of the survey should help Slovenian military officials to recognise problems of soldiers' motivation, identify potential actions that can be taken by the military to change the level of motivation, and sources of increasing job satisfaction among the Slovenian all-volunteer forces. The military needs these answers urgently because of the expected problems in recruiting peacekeepers in the near future. In the period between 1997 and 2003, there were approximately 1,200 individual missions fulfilled by soldiers of the Slovenian Army as part of peacekeeping operations. That means that more than every sixth soldier (in a military of 6,500 servicemen and servicewomen) has already been deployed in peacekeeping missions abroad.

The researchers of the defence Research Centre measure the influences of different factors (the soldiers' home environment, mission external environment, mission internal environment, and personal cognitive identity with the mission) on his or her assignment motivation. The variables that shape the peacekeepers' home environment are support from the family and

friends, support of public opinion, media, and politicians. The variables that define the mission external environment are threats and dangers in the area of the mission, local population, and multinational military units. The mission internal environment is defined by the vertical and horizontal cohesion in the deployed military unit, its quality of preparation for the mission, equipment, logistics, infrastructure, and organisation of free time. The personal cognitive identity with the mission deals with the level of trust the peacekeepers have in the aims and success prospects of the mission, material advantages, and usefulness of the experience for their future military career. The survey in two Slovenian military contingents, deployed in SFOR between January and July 2003 (SICON MNBG I) and between April and October 2003 (SICON MSU IX), has shown some differences between the servicemen in MSU – who are military policemen, on average in their mid-30s – and the servicemen in MNBG, who are on average 27 years old. Although they are members of the same army, their personal expectations of and motives for participating in a peacekeeping mission vary. In the pre-deployment stage, the younger and mostly unmarried MNBG participants (in order of importance) expected an attractive job with many new military experiences, to contribute to the image of Slovenia in the world, to be able to put their military knowledge to good use, to achieve some economic reward, to provide help to the local population, and to gain knowledge of the people and culture of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the late deployment phase, the order of these motives changed. The soldiers confirmed the gaining of new knowledge about the country and culture, contributing to the image of Slovenia, earning additional money, gaining new military experiences, helping the local population, and – far down at the end – usefully deploying their military knowledge. The results show the difference between expectations and the fulfillment of them. The anticipated combat-like situation did not happen, but they have learned some new military skills, and they have gained insight into the country's changes in the past decade.

The MSU contingent of older and mostly married servicemen with children had more rational expectations. First of all, they were motivated by the economic reward, contributing to the image of Slovenia, and by gaining new military knowledge. They did not expect to be of particular help to the local population. They confirmed these expectations in the late-deployment phase, with the exception of gaining new military knowledge, which they reported as not having been achieved (see Jelušič et al., 2004). The mission's external environment was more important to higher self-respect on the part of the Slovenian soldiers in the late-deployment phase than in the beginning. The expected threats to be coped with were civilian threats and the remnants of

past military activities, such as mine fields. The life in the multinational unit was interesting, and relations with other participants of the mission were good. The servicemen expected and enjoyed respect from other servicemen; some reported encountering more professional and respectful behaviour from other officers than from their own. Although they did not expect troubles in communication with the local citizens (Slovenian soldiers still speak some Serbo-Croatian), they were surprised by the warm acceptance and openness of the citizens. The local citizens seemed to be more pleasant when they realised that the troops in their midst were from the 'former Yugoslavia.' The level of importance of these factors was high, and stayed stable over the duration of mission. The 'home front' of the peacekeepers contained some contradictions for the motivation to serve in the mission. While family and friends supported the peacekeepers before and during the mission, the Slovenian media and the political elite were perceived as being not fully supportive of the mission, and of the peacekeeping task of the Slovenian Army in general. The soldiers are convinced that the media generate negative images of the armed forces in Slovenian society. During their long absence from home, this conviction was reinforced. The pre-deployment stereotype gained strength with every small critical media observation.

The mission's internal military environment was the social microcosm of the peacekeepers. Life with comrades changed from eight-hour daily shifts at work at home to living together around the clock. In the late deployment phase, people perceived this close relation as a heavy emotional strain, one for which they were not prepared. The trust they placed in their leaders was high in the pre-deployment phase, but decreased significantly during the mission. They also criticised the preparation for the mission, saying that they received enough (too much, according to some) military training, but lacked specific education on the political and social situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as anthropological knowledge, English refresher courses, and skills in managing the stress of separation from their families.

Three basic environments have a high influence on the motivation of the peacekeepers and their personal identity, but the discrepancy between their expectations to be deployed in traditional military tasks and the reality of the police-like mission seems to have the highest impact. Therefore, the unfulfilled attractiveness of the peacekeeping job (although it pays well) and the lack of proper training for mission tasks have a significant influence on decreasing motivation, which seems to continue in the post-deployment phase for Slovenian soldiers. Disappointment does not seem to have a substantial influence on soldiers' preparedness to join another mission. Soldiers with whom we had a group discussion on the survey findings after four months of home

rehabilitation have said that they would like to go again – to every mission, except SFOR. It seems that military adventurism (a postmodern motive) increases in importance in attracting soldiers for the second (or more) term(s).

5. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we may observe that the pre-deployment motivation of all surveyed peacekeepers has one variable in common: the perceived attractiveness of the expected job, offering adventure and new military experiences. The reality of the mission lowers these post-modern expectations and replaces them with the objectives of economic reward. If application for peacekeeping missions were based on a volunteer basis for all personnel, it would be possible to conclude that different operations with different mandates attract different kind of personalities to apply. Stable, not dangerous, low-intensity missions are attractive for soldiers' first deployments, while more risky, long-distance missions attract peacekeeping veterans. When deployed, the support from the home environment, external mission environment, and internal mission environment must help servicemen to keep a stable level of motivation to work efficiently over the whole period of the term. The impact of different motivating factors varies from country to country, and usually represents the special social circumstances of the peacekeepers' donor country. The factors that motivate the soldiers and policemen may also help create stressful conditions. If we turn back to Battistelli's typology of motivations to join these missions, we should, on the basis of current surveys, conclude that, in the pre-deployment phase, peacekeepers are guided by pre-modern motives (help those who need us, contribute to the country's image) and postmodern motives (attractiveness of the job). Over the course of the mission, the postmodern motives diminish in influence, and modern motives (economic reward, military experience) become more influential. The Slovenian policemen – veterans of peacekeeping missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and East Timor – have a specific philosophy in this regard: usually they say that the economic rewards are important driving forces, but to survive a year or more in the mission, peacekeepers must develop some other, mostly postmodern motives.

NOTES

1. The data in this paper come from the research projects Slovenian Military in Peace Operations and Slovenian Police in Peace Operations, conducted by the

Defence Research Centre, Institute of Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, 2002–2005.

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MOTIVATION AND MISSION SATISFACTION IN THE 5TH SWISSCOY CONTINGENT

Jonathan Bennett, Rolf P. Boesch and Karl W. Haltiner

1. INTRODUCTION

In June 1999, the Swiss government made its decision to support the Austrian contingent (AUCON) – serving in the German KFOR Brigade – with the so-called "Swiss Company" (SWISSCOY). This overview offers insight into Swiss soldiers' motivation during their deployment to Kosovo from October 2001 to April 2002. SWISSCOY is a predominantly unarmed logistical unit integrated into the Austrian KFOR Battalion (AUCON). It supports AUCON primarily in the domains of transportation, water preparation, fuel, and civil-military co-operation. The primary goal of this research project was to monitor the motivation of 130 Swiss soldiers. How motivated were they at the beginning, at half-time, and shortly before the end of their mission? In addition to this descriptive approach, we also aimed at examining crucial independent variables supposedly related to motivation (such as perceived quality of infrastructure, perceived quality of training, financial incentives, social support at home, attractiveness of daily activities, perceived benefit of the mission, etc.).

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2. RESEARCH DESIGN

Instead of simply questioning the 130 men and women of SWISSCOY once during their mission it was decided to perform a panel study using the same standardised paper and pencil questionnaire three times. The SWISSCOY was therefore questioned during the last week of October 2001, in mid-December 2001, and at the end of February 2002. All members of SWISSCOY were surveyed at the same time in a central classroom. The questionnaire used is to a large extent similar to the one used by the Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr (SOWI) in its surveys on motivation of German KFOR troops in Kosovo (Biehl & Mackewitsch 2001). However, certain adjustments to the Swiss case were necessary. The questionnaire comprises questions relating to motivation (cf. Table 4), and to several aspects and potential predictors of motivation. The latter are aspects of infrastructure, leisure activities, financial gain, work strain, quality of equipment and training, quality of and trust in psychological care, cohesion between officers and the rank and file (vertical cohesion), cohesion in the rank and file itself (horizontal cohesion), social support at home, apparent benefit of mission, attractiveness of one's own tasks, public interest and support, soldiers' attitudes towards the political goals of the mission, and communication facilities. The items of the scales that proved to be important predictors of motivation as well as their reliabilities (Cronbach's Alpha) are listed in the appendix. Most scales use a five-point Likert format, ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree".

Since SWISSCOY's size of 130 soldiers is comparatively small, it was our aim to question all of SWISSCOY's members. Response rates were 91.5% (October 2001), 74.6% (December 2001), and 71.5% (February 2002). Table 1 provides an overview of the age structure of the 5th SWISSCOY contingent.

Table 1. Age Structure of the 5th SWISSCOY Contingent.

	Frequency	Percent
18–24 years	27	22.7
25–30 years	44	37.0
31–40 years	34	28.6
41–50 years	8	6.7
Older than 50	1	0.8
Total answers	114	95.8
No answer	5	4.2
Total	119	100.0

Table 2. Ranks of SWISSCOY members.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Private	51	42.9	47.7	47.7
NCO	37	31.1	34.6	82.2
Senior NCO	9	7.6	8.4	90.7
Officer	10	8.4	9.3	100.0
Total answers	107	89.9	100.0	
No answer	12	10.1		
Total	119	100.0		

Table 3. Allocations of SWISSCOY members.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Transportation	18	15.1	16.4	16.4
Pioneers	20	16.8	18.2	34.5
Support	24	20.2	21.8	56.4
NCC staff	21	17.6	19.1	75.5
Other	27	22.7	24.5	100.0
Total answers	110	92.4	100.0	
No answer	9	7.6		
Total	119	100.0		

The largest age group is the one ranging from 25 to 30 years. Only nine members of SWISSCOY were older than 40. As Table 2 makes clear, the rank groups of privates and NCOs are almost equally large, completed by a clearly smaller group of officers.

SWISSCOY is divided into a transportation, a pioneer, and a support platoon. Furthermore, the National Contingent Commander is provided with a staff (Table 3).

3. RESULTS

A seven-item scale of motivation shows the lowest mean value for the half-time measurement in December and the highest mean value for the first measurement in October ($m_{t1} = 3.45$; $m_{t2} = 3.38$; $m_{t3} = 3.42$). Overall motivation dropped between October and December, rising again between December and February to almost its original level. However, these mean differences are not statistically significant. When the single-item measures of

Table 4. Percentages "Strongly and Rather Agree" for Seven Motivational Indicators.

	1st Survey ($n = 115$)	2nd Survey ($n = 97$)	3rd Survey ($n = 93$)
I am making an important contribution to the fulfillment of SWISSCOY's assignment	80	70*	75
I can identify with my tasks	78	74	78
I am proud to be a member of the SWISSCOY contingent	68	50*	65
I fully support SWISSCOY's mission	71	65	62
I could recommend my colleagues to volunteer for a SWISSCOY stint	53	43	49
If it were possible I'd go home immediately	2	11*	9*
SWISSCOY's mission in Kosovo makes sense	76	67*	71

*Significant mean difference at the 0.05 level in comparison to the first measurement.

motivation are examined, however, significant differences can be found (see Table 4). The statements "I am proud to be a member of the SWISSCOY contingent", "SWISSCOY's assignment makes sense" and "I am making an important contribution to the fulfillment of SWISSCOY's assignment" all draw significantly less support in the second measurement than in the first one. The item "If it were possible, I'd go home immediately" is agreed on by almost five times as many persons in the second and third survey than in the first one, rising from 2% to 11% and then decreasing back to 9%.

Multiple regression analysis was performed in order to single out important predictive variables for the motivational scale. The same independent variables as in the German survey were examined first concerning their bivariate relationship with motivation (cf. Table 5). Those independent variables correlating significantly with motivation were then further analyzed in multiple regression analysis (see Table 6).

The variable with the greatest predictive weight is the perceived attractiveness of the mission task, a factor consisting of five items ($\beta = 0.38$). Perceived public interest and the apparent benefit are also of significance, albeit somewhat lower, predictive weight ($\beta = 0.25$; $\beta = 0.28$). Table 7 provides an overview of the potential predictors of motivation at the second

Table 5. Spearman Correlations Between Overall Motivation and Potential Predictive Variables at the Beginning of the Mission.

	Overall Motivation	Quality of Equipment	Social Support	Attractiveness of Mission Task	Public Interest	Apparent Benefit of Mission
Overall motivation	1.00	0.22*	0.26**	0.41***	0.24*	0.40***
Quality of equipment	0.22*	1.00	0.20*	−0.07 n.s.	−0.07 n.s.	0.29**
Social support	0.26**	0.20*	1.00	0.10 n.s.	−0.08 n.s.	0.53***
Attractiveness of mission task	0.41***	0.03 n.s.	0.10 n.s.	1.00	0.02 n.s.	0.07 n.s.
Public interest	0.24*	−0.07 n.s.	−0.08 n.s.	0.02 n.s.	1.00	0.02 n.s.
Apparent benefit of mission	0.40***	0.29**	0.53***	0.07 n.s.	0.02 n.s.	1.00

*$p < 0.05$;
**$p < 0.01$;
***$p < 0.001$; $n = 115$.

Table 6. Multiple Regression of Overall Motivation on Selected Independent Variables at the Beginning of the Mission.

Variables	*B*	*β*	sr	*p*
Attractiveness of mission task	0.339	0.397	0.389	0.000
Public interest	0.151	0.252	0.246	0.003
Apparent benefit of mission	0.164	0.275	0.224	0.006
Quality of equipment	0.032	0.108	0.095	0.239
Social support at home	0.094	0.106	0.091	0.263
Quality of training	0.015	0.032	0.030	0.709
(Constant)	0.643			0.104

$R^2 = 0.38$; $n = 115$.

measurement point in December 2001. On a general level, it can be observed that there are more independent variables correlating significantly with overall motivation than at the first measurement point. New variables standing in relation to motivation are infrastructure, training, public support, vertical cohesion, and attitudes towards political goals of the mission.

As Table 8 makes clear, the most important predictive role by far is now played by the apparent benefit of the mission ($\beta = 0.46$); the attractiveness of the mission task has lost some of its importance at mid-term ($\beta = 0.17$) while a new predictor, perceived quality of training, enters the equation ($\beta = 0.21$).

Shortly before the end of the 5th contingent's mission, a third survey was taken. Following the same procedure outlined above, we again tried to single out predictive variables for the overall motivation at this point. Table 9 lists the bivariate relationships between overall motivation and potential predictors. As can be seen, apparent benefit of mission, attractiveness of mission task, quality of equipment, and public support are still among the potential predictors of motivation.

However, the independent variables have much less predictive value for the overall motivation than at the two earlier measurement points, explaining only 12% of the variance of overall motivation. Merely one independent variable, attractiveness of mission task, contributes significantly to the prediction of overall motivation (see Table 10).

4. SUMMARY

The SWISSCOY volunteers are truly interested in their mission and identify with its objectives. They do not seek an escape from their lives at home and

Table 7. Spearman Correlations between Overall Motivation and Potential Predictors at Mid-term.

	Overall Motivation	Apparent Benefit of Mission	Infra-structure	Quality of Equipment	Training	Social Support	Attractiveness of Mission Task	Public Support	Vertical Cohesion	Attitudes towards Political Goals of the Mission
Overall motivation	1.00	0.43***	0.22*	0.45***	0.34**	0.33**	0.37***	0.34**	0.24*	0.23*
Apparent benefit of mission	0.43***	1.00	0.35***	0.31**	0.17 n.s.	0.43***	0.17 n.s.	0.17 n.s.	−0.05 n.s.	0.26*
Infrastructure	0.22*	0.35***	1.00	0.33**	0.32*	0.25*	−0.02 n.s.	0.29**	0.06 n.s.	0.27**
Equipment	0.45***	0.31**	0.33**	1.00	0.36***	0.40***	0.21*	0.35**	0.20 n.s.	0.32**
Training	0.34**	0.17 n.s.	0.32*	0.36***	1.00	0.10 n.s.	−0.01	0.06 n.s.	0.42***	0.21*
Social support	0.33**	0.43***	0.25*	0.40***	0.10 n.s.	1.00	0.15 n.s.	0.44***	−0.01 n.s.	0.24*
Attractiveness of mission task	0.37***	0.17 n.s.	−0.02 n.s.	0.21*	−0.01	0.15 n.s.	1.00	0.08 n.s.	0.19 n.s.	0.29**
Public support	0.34**	0.17 n.s.	0.29**	0.35**	0.06 n.s.	0.44***	0.08 n.s.	1.00	0.08 n.s.	0.32**
Vertical cohesion	0.24*	−0.05 n.s.	0.06 n.s.	0.20 n.s.	0.42***	−0.01 n.s.	0.19 n.s.	0.08 n.s.	1.00	0.12 n.s.
Attitude towards political goals of the mission	0.23*	0.26*	0.27**	0.32**	0.21*	0.24*	0.29**	0.32**	0.12 n.s.	1.00

*$p < 0.05$;
**$p < 0.01$;
***$p < 0.001$; $n = 97$.

Table 8. Results of the Multiple Regression Analysis of Overall Motivation on Potential Predictive Variables at Mid-term.

Variables	B	β	sr	p
Apparent benefit of the mission	0.302	0.465	0.386	0.000
Quality of training	0.104	0.212	0.174	0.050
Attractiveness of mission task	0.158	0.174	0.153	0.083
Public support	0.137	0.135	0.116	0.187
Vertical cohesion	0.077	0.114	0.097	0.270
Social support at home	0.094	0.086	0.073	0.404
Quality of Infrastructure	−0.045	−0.060	−0.052	0.551
Quality of equipment	0.033	0.044	0.038	0.665
Attitudes towards the political goals of the mission	−0.009	−0.009	−0.008	0.927
(Constant)	0.675			0.149

$n = 93$; $R^2 = 0.42$.

Table 9. Spearman Correlations between Overall Motivation and Potential Predictive Variables Shortly Before the End of the Mission.

	Overall Motivation	Apparent Benefit of Mission	Quality of Equipment	Attractiveness of Mission Task	Public Support
Overall motivation	1.00	0.22*	0.31**	0.31**	0.28**
Apparent benefit of mission	0.22*	1.00	0.24*	0.19 n.s.	0.28**
Equipment	0.31**	0.24*	1.00	0.14 n.s.	0.28**
Attractiveness of mission task	0.31**	0.19 n.s.	0.14 n.s.	1.00	0.32**
Public support	0.28**	0.28**	0.28**	0.32**	1.00

*$p < 0.05$;
**$p < 0.01$.

are not juvenile adventurers. The belief in the meaningfulness of tasks and the usefulness of one's own job are the main motives for volunteering. It can hardly surprise, then, that the "apparent benefits of the mission" – both for the soldiers themselves as well as for the local population – and the "attractiveness of mission tasks" – that is, the inherent meaningfulness and variation of assignments – are the most important predictors of the level of

Table 10. Results of the Multiple Regression Analysis of the Overall Motivation on Selected Independent Variables Shortly Before the End of the Mission.

Variables	*B*	*β*	sr	*p*
Attractiveness of mission task	0.179	0.215	0.232	0.041
Quality of equipment	0.103	0.162	0.169	0.122
Public support	0.104	0.116	0.127	0.266
Apparent benefit of mission	4.639E−02	0.071	0.075	0.496
(Constant)	1.946			0.000

$n = 95$; $R^2 = 0.12$.

motivation. The social support from spouses, parents, and friends – while not having a direct effect on motivation – is also very important, since it seems to facilitate the perception of the mission benefits. These aspects need to be considered in the process of recruitment. Other motivators (quality of training and equipment, infrastructure) unfold their influence on motivation and mission satisfaction only gradually. On the whole, SWISSCOY shows a development of mission satisfaction similar to that found in other surveys of military motivation. At the outset, motivation tends to be at a peak level but will then decline steadily until mid-term before recovering again without, however, reaching the original peak level. Knowledge of a predictable motivational low at mid-term should be used by commanders to point out to the members of SWISSCOY, at that very moment, the importance and benefits of the mission, which can be obscured by daily hassles. Taking the time to do so, is a rewarding investment.

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APPENDIX

Table A. Most Important Scales, Their Items, Mean Values, Cronbach's Alpha and Frequencies at All Three Measurement Points (in percent).

	1st Survey ($n = 115$)	2nd Survey ($n = 97$)	3rd Survey ($n = 93$)
Overall motivation	*Mean value = 3.45; Cronbach's Alpha = 0.80*	*Mean value = 3.38; Cronbach's Alpha = 0.86*	*Mean value = 3.42; Cronbach's Alpha = 0.81*
I am making an important contribution to the fulfillment of SWISSCOY's assignment	80	70*	75
I can identify with my tasks	78	74	78
I am proud to be a member of the SWISSCOY contingent	68	50*	65
I fully support SWISSCOY's mission	71	65	62
I could recommend my colleagues to volunteer for a SWISSCOY stint	53	43	49
If it were possible I'd go home immediately	2	11*	9*
SWISSCOY's mission in Kosovo makes sense	76	67*	71
Scale: Attractiveness of mission task	*Mean value = 3.31 Cronbach's Alpha = 0.54*	*Mean value = 3.25; Cronbach's Alpha = 0.52*	*Mean value = 3.27; Cronbach's Alpha = 0.54*
My everyday task makes sense to me	72	59	63
My task is varied	68	61	74
I mainly do routine business	24	23	25

I can integrate my own views into the service	60	59	66
I cannot leave camp when carrying out my assignments	27	22	24
Scale: Public interest	*Mean value = 3.36; Cronbach's Alpha = 0.46*	*Mean value = 3.40; Cronbach's Alpha = 0.72*	*Mean value = 3.40; Cronbach's Alpha = 0.70*
The Swiss citizens take too little interest in SWISSCOY's mission	50	41	41
On the whole, the Swiss media report too little and too rarely about the Swiss mission in Kosovo	42	53	53
Scale: Apparent benefit of mission	*Mean value = 3.42; Cronbach's Alpha = 0.60*	*Mean value = 3.29; Cronbach's Alpha = 0.65*	*Mean value = 3.34; Cronbach's Alpha = 0.51*
I can help other people	57	50	43
My vocational qualifications will improve	37	39	36
During this mission I can prove I am able to meet special challenges	60	50	54
Scale: Quality of training	*Mean value = 3.32; Cronbach's Alpha = 0.82*	*Mean value = 3.27; Cronbach's Alpha = 0.89*	*Mean value = 3.24; Cronbach's Alpha = 0.83*
On the whole, my platoon was well prepared for the mission tasks	41	43	37
The training on the working tools is good	50	53	49

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PART VII:
MILITARY UNIONISM

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INDEPENDENT REPRESENTATION IN THE BRITISH ARMY: HAS THE TIME FINALLY ARRIVED?

Richard Bartle

1. INTRODUCTION

Britain is now one of the few EC countries without some form of military representative body. Yet, probably the first military trade union was formed in the British Armed Forces in 1919. At the outset, the organisation grew rapidly with the formation of 49 branches and an estimated membership of 10,000 (Englander, 1989, p. 10). But the efforts of the Soldiers', Sailors' and Airmens' Union (SSAU) to organise the armed forces and secure a right of representation were short-lived. The authorities were quick to react to the perceived socialist threat by demobilising and discharging "men who [were] largely imbued with unionism tinged with socialism" (Englander, 1989, p. 11) and, following a raid by the intelligence services on the SSAU headquarters, the union rapidly disappeared.

Although there were some isolated incidents of unrest towards the end of World War II such as the mutinies by RAF servicemen enraged by delays in demobilisation and repatriation (Judd, 1996, p. 335) it was not until the late 1970s that renewed attempts were made to organise a trade union. This arose from the considerable unease among all ranks as pay parity with other comparable workers was seen to be eroding (Hollingworth, 1977; Richey,

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1978). Revelations that pay was so bad that married soldiers with children were eligible for state benefits caused uproar (Chalfont, 1978). Some middle ranking officers disobeyed regulations and made their voices heard in the news media (Richey, 1978) and, apparently, some soldiers contacted trade unions to represent them in their fight for better terms and conditions of service (Cortwright & Watts, 1991). Appeals to represent soldiers were made by the Transport and General Workers Union and the Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs to the Labour government of the time, but they fell on deaf ears (Cortwright & Watts, 1991). However, the election of a Conservative government in May 1978 calmed things down. One of the very first acts of Margaret Thatcher's new government was to give a substantial pay increase to both the Armed Forces and the Police Service (Thatcher, 1993). As a result, the subject of trade unions ceased to be of burning interest and debate until the mid-1990s.

The British military is uncomfortable with the term 'trade union' with its connotation of industrial relations and strike action. The more neutral phrase 'independent representation' seems to be more acceptable. It was first coined by Sir Michael Bett in 1995 in his "Independent Review of the Armed Forces' Manpower, Career and Remuneration Structures" (Bett, 1995). Although not quite a euphemism for trade union, the intention is clear in that it refers to some form of collective bargaining and representation outside the chain of military command. It is immensely significant that this concept should have been re-introduced to the debating arena in an official government document. It is, arguably, even more significant that this same document revealed that 66% of servicemen and women were in favour of some form of independent representation outside the chain of command. At the time it was an extraordinary revelation in an official report. Furthermore, Bett even went so far as to call for servicemen and women to argue the case for "an organisation to represent their collective concerns" (Bett, 1995, p. 66).

It is now nearly 10 years since Sir Michael Bett called for servicemen to argue the case for independent representation. He suggested that the issue should be "freely debated within the Services" but since then very little has happened (Bett, 1995, p. 66). There has been a limited debate in academic military circles. Yet the evidence of Bett's report and various pieces of research both published and unpublished is that there is substantial support for independent representation throughout a large proportion of the Armed Forces (see, for example, Bartle, 1998a, 1999a, b; Hill, 2000; Jenkins, 1998; Young, 1996). So, the question must be asked – why has there not been a much larger discussion on this issue or even an official response?

This paper will analyse the present situation and identify some of the recent changes that have led to increasing criticism of the chain of command as a means of representing the collective concerns of members of the Army. Thought is given as to whether the time has finally come for a new form of representation independent of the chain of command. The paper will conclude with a brief consideration of the latest position following the end of the Iraq War, the subsequent report of the House of Commons Defence Committee (HSDC) on the lessons of the Iraq campaign (2003–2004) and the new draft European Constitution (CONV 850/03, 2003).

2. THE CASE FOR A MILITARY FEDERATION

The British Armed Forces is a unique organisation that is particularly reliant upon a set of values that have been described as a total open-ended commitment, subordination of the self to the group and the idea of sacrifice of selfish interest, even a willingness to risk losing ones life (Turner, 1997). British military law (Queens Regulations for the Army, 1995) prevents service personnel from striking or negotiating over working conditions. In return for this open-ended commitment is the expectation of a paternalistic system in which pay, terms and conditions of service, accommodation and even food and clothing are guaranteed and protected by senior officers. This arrangement is unwritten and subjective, based upon the expectations of both parties and founded upon the mutual trust that each will honour their commitment – in other words, a psychological contract. Glaister (1978) argues that any change in the psychological contract on the part of the organisation will lead to a re-evaluation by each employee of his or her position within the organisation. Indeed, if the psychological contract is broken by either side a redefinition of roles is likely to occur.

Evidence of the breakdown of this relationship has been well documented (Bartle, 1999b; Joyce, 1997). Joyce gave his interpretation of the reasons for changes in the psychological contract in his controversial paper for the Fabian Society. The main thrust of his argument was that changes in the military budgetary system have placed senior military officers in a new position. Whereas before they could be expected to represent the views of the rank and file to the Ministry of Defence (MoD), now they are budget holders with responsibility for local decisions on such matters as accommodation, working life and food. So, instead of standard conditions of service for all service personnel, it is now possible for there to be significant differences depending upon decisions made by local budget managers. But,

it does not seem feasible for soldiers to rely on senior officers to represent their views to the budget holders when these same officers are the budget holders themselves. This, says Joyce (1997), has seriously damaged trust in senior officers to represent the concerns of service personnel.

However, it seems unlikely that these changes alone could have created substantial support for independent representation. Arguably, a much more serious turn of events undermined servicemen and women's already shaky trust in their senior officers. In 1990, the government introduced major reductions in the size of the Armed Forces (King, 1990). These cutbacks in manpower (34,600 redundancies across the three services) were an enormous shock to the Armed Forces who had never had to face the prospect of redundancy before. The general impression had been that a serviceman's psychological contract assumed unlimited liability, up to and including the readiness to sacrifice himself, and in return he/she had the guarantee of job security. As one Colonel admitted, this round of redundancies hit morale and trust very hard (Welch, 1997).

Any residual trust and morale has been seriously tried by further changes in the relationship between the expectations of the employees and the offerings of the employer. The creation of 'Next Steps Agencies', half-way houses between public and private sector, has led to servicemen and women working alongside civilians and doing the same or comparable work but with different terms and conditions of service. This is probably far from the expectations of most service personnel who could have found similar work without having to join the Armed Forces. In addition, the MoD has "a poor record in the field of employment welfare" (Strachan, 2000). Examples such as the problems over Gulf War Syndrome, compensation for injuries in Bosnia (*The Daily Telegraph*, 1999a) and, more recently, the debacle over equipment in Iraq (Rayment, 2003) have strengthened the perception that senior officers can no longer be trusted to represent servicemen/women. The conclusion, according to Joyce (1997), is that independent representation outside the chain of command is needed to redress the balance. Recent research (see, for example, Bartle, 1998b; Hill, 2000; Jenkins, 1998; Young, 1996) shows that Armed Forces personnel want to have more say on terms and conditions of service and that they favour some form of independent representation to achieve this. The overwhelming consensus is that this can best be achieved through an organisation similar to the Police Federation.

However, as events have shown, a consensus does not necessarily lead to action. In 1977, Harries-Jenkins suggested that there are four factors that can lead to a demand for the creation of trade unions in armed forces: (1) The motive to unionise; (2) the mood to unionise; (3) the opportunity to

unionise; and (4) the level of national political culture. In 1999, Harries-Jenkins' factors were used to examine the demand for independent representation in the British Army (Bartle, 2001). At that time it appeared that the requirements of Harries-Jenkins' model were not being met and so the chances of independent representation being realised were slight. Much has changed in the intervening 5 years and it may be useful to re-examine each of the factors to determine the present demand for representation outside the chain of command.

2.1. The Motive to Unionise

The motive to unionise can take many forms of which Harries-Jenkins (1977, p. 61) identifies two major factors. The first is the attempt by the military to regain control over professional matters such as recruitment, training, the size of the service, terms and conditions of service and so on. This factor implies a problem in the relationship between the military and an external body. The second factor is a motive of sectional interest in which one or more groups form associations in which they aim to protect the rights of one group against those of another group. On the one hand, it could be argued that both aspects appear to be relevant to the present situation, though on the other, it is possible to argue that neither is truly representative. It has already been established (see Hall, 2002; Hill, 2000; Jenkins, 1998; Young, 1996) that servicemen and women want to have more say in policies on such matters as pay, allowances, career development, single soldiers accommodation, married quarters and postings. In some respects these areas fall under the first category in that they are matters that are decided in consultation between the military and some external body – in this case, the MoD. However, Eric Joyce (1997) would argue that it is more of a problem of sectional interests in which the junior and middle ranks no longer trust their senior officers to represent them as they have traditionally done.

Representation in the Armed Forces is based upon the chain of command. It relies upon officers passing information upwards and representing the needs of their subordinates. This is only half of the picture, though. Officers are the main channel of organisational communication and as well as communicating their subordinates' requirements upwards, also have the responsibility of communicating the policies of the government down to the servicemen and women. Even when the policy seems unfair or unreasonable an officer is required to represent the government's policy to his/her men and women with complete loyalty (Glaister, 1978). It could be, therefore, that the officer's concern for the welfare and morale of service

personnel may well conflict with loyalty to the overall policy of the Armed Forces. Further strain exists in this situation in that the pressures to conform are also intimately connected to the system of promotion. Although not quite reliant upon patronage, the confidential report system and through it the promotion system, are based upon the perceptions of an officer's superior of his subordinate's suitability for promotion. An officer who disturbs the status quo by representing more than the usual number of grievances may well jeopardise his/her chances of promotion. Thus, at an individual level, the system has within it in-built strains that work against effective representation upwards while still ensuring reliable downward communication of government policies. Representation at national level also has its problems.

There is only one official organisation involved in representing the interests of servicemen and women – The Armed Forces Pay Review Body (AFPRB). This is an independent voluntary body that was established in 1972 to give advice on pay and allowances for all three services. Of its eight members only one is serving in the Armed Forces (presently Vice Admiral Sir Peter Woodhead) (AFPRB, 2004). Their remit is to ensure comparability between service and civilian pay while balancing the need to recruit and retain the right calibre of people against government expenditure limits. To that end they take evidence each year from the MoD, the services and other interested parties. As part of their research they visit servicemen and women to talk to them directly about pay and conditions. Last year they consulted 3,000 service personnel and their spouses (AFPRB, 2004). This is less than 1.5% (MoD Defence Statistics, 2003) of the service population – hardly a representative sample. While each service has some form of continuous attitude survey, there is no evidence in the public domain to show that they have any influence on the Pay Review Body or that they do any more than to register trends in attitudes. So, as far as the rank and file is concerned, there is no official mechanism for their collective views to be represented to the Pay Review Body or for that matter, to the Government.

It could be argued, therefore, that there are elements of both of Harries-Jenkins' motivational features within the present situation. There is the motive to gain control over matters to do with pay and conditions that are negotiated with an external body. But there is also the motive to replace the senior officers as negotiators on behalf of the lower ranks in dealing with these same areas. Perhaps the categorisation of these motives is less relevant than to record that there appears to be a strong motive for independent representation and thus the first of the four factors appears to be in place.

2.2. The Mood to Unionise

One of the main reasons given by Harries-Jenkins (1977, p. 63) for the mood to unionise is "a heightened awareness of the extent to which individual interests (…) can only be guaranteed through some form of collective action". As well as the evidence in the Bett Report (Bett, 1995), other, more recent examples of this 'heightened awareness' have appeared in recent research and in the media.

Various pieces of research carried out at by Cranfield University at the Royal Military College of Science (RMCS) provided the first evidence, outside the Bett Report, of both the loss of trust in the senior management and the support within the Army for some kind of independent representation (Young, 1996; Bartle, 1999a,b). Results from this work confirm that a large percentage of Army personnel (approximately 70%) want to have more say in policies on such matters as pay, allowances, career development, single soldiers accommodation, married quarters and postings and that they favour some form of independent representation to achieve this. Further evidence from work carried out since the Cranfield/RMCS studies underlines these results and shows that the mood to unionise is not confined to the army but is just as strong in all three services and at all levels up to and including Lieutenant Colonel and equivalent (Jenkins, 1998; Hill, 2000; Hall, 2002). More support for these views has also appeared in various forms of communication ranging from newspaper reports to internet bulletin boards.

In 1997, an article in the Sunday Times (McManners & Leppard, 1997) claimed to have uncovered a "secret trade union" in the army called "The Colours" that had 2,500 members with representatives in "most infantry and many armoured corps regiments". Military pilots have also expressed their views on this subject. During early 2000, a discussion on the desirability of trade unions began in the military section of the Professional Pilots Rumour Network (PPRuNe, 2004) Bulletin Board. Although some doubt was expressed by a few of the contributors about the format of a representative body, the overwhelming view of those involved was that some kind of independent representative organisation was needed. More recently, another article has appeared in the Sunday Times (Clark, 2002) this time announcing that the Army (and presumably the other two services) will be forced to allow service personnel to form and join trade unions under European human rights law. Quoted in this article is a piece from Soldier magazine by Corporal D. Fox of the Royal Signals who says that: "The Police Federation represents every officer in England and Wales without

membership fees. It provides a means of bringing the officers' views on welfare and efficiency to the notice of the government. Such an organisation for military personnel would provide a much-needed independent and professional support network'' (Clark, 2002).

Additionally, the Sunday Times article mentions again The Colours, describing it as a loose, unofficial federation that is ''essentially a secret society'' and also states that ''recent internal army surveys show that as many as 77% now want representation'' (Clark, 2002). The most recent evidence of continuing support for independent representation can be found on the, relatively new, unofficial Army Rumour Service Bulletin Board (ARRSE). In a recent poll conducted by them, only 28% of respondents were against the idea of an Army Federation (ARRSE, 2004) while 44% were in favour and 27% expressed an interest but wanted more information.

These surveys cover a significant cross section of the Armed Forces and highlight a sense of collective deprivation amongst those questioned. They also demonstrate that there is a ''mood to take action (...) through some form of collective representation'' (Harries-Jenkins, 1977, p. 63). While many servicemen and women recognised that such a change could radically affect the culture and ethos of the Armed Forces (Young, 1996; Bartle, 1998b) there no longer seems to be an acceptance that the chain of command is best suited to represent their rights and career interests. Indeed, there is now a significant body of evidence to show that servicemen/women have lost trust in the present system for dealing with pay and conditions of service. The mood to unionise appears to be very strong.

2.3. The Opportunity to Unionise

Generally, the opportunity to unionise is dependent upon the government of a country deciding to extend to members of the armed forces those economic, political and social rights enjoyed by the other members of a society (Harries-Jenkins, 1997, p. 65). Some would argue that this is a human right that is enshrined in international law (Adams, 1999). But many governments, including the British government, have yet to extend these 'human rights' to the armed forces. There were suggestions in the Labour Party manifesto before their first term in office that some employment rights such as minimum wages and working time regulations would be extended to the service personnel but servicemen/women have subsequently been exempted either wholly or partly from this legislation (McManners & Prescott, 1998). This was despite Dr. John Reid (erstwhile Minister of State for the Armed

Forces) announcing that "wherever practical and sensible, military law and liberties should reflect the values of contemporary society" (Reid, 1997).

Until very recently, the mood within the MoD did not appear to be in favour of "reflecting the values of contemporary society". Indeed, in 1998 it was reported that the Army was concerned about Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which gives people the freedom to join trade unions (McManners & Prescott, 1998). This article was seen by some to be a direct attack on the Army's traditional authority and discipline. In the report General Sir Michael Rose (a retired officer) was quoted as saying "These laws are designed to improve civilian employment practices and are entirely inappropriate for soldiers on the battlefield" (McManners & Prescott, 1998). Unsurprisingly, there seemed to be little difference between his views on 'civilian employment practices' and those of serving senior officers. In a speech to the Royal United Services Institute in 1999, General Sir Roger Wheeler, Chief of the General Staff and head of the Army, reaffirmed Sir Michael's views by stressing that "the efficient running of an organisation such as the Army occasionally requires the subjugation of individual rights for the greater good" (*The Daily Telegraph*, 18 February 1999b). He went on to say that European legislation on workers' rights had to be dealt with differently in the armed forces. Such an important statement by the most senior Army officer must have had government clearance and must, therefore, have reflected government policy at that time.

However, such a stance was, arguably, at odds with EC legislation. The armed forces have a poor record in relation to the observance of EC employment law and the Army especially has, in the past, fallen foul of EC legislation, notably in the unlawful sacking of pregnant servicewomen and homosexuals (Rubin, 2002). However, in March 2002, an extraordinary report appeared in the Sunday Times announcing a cave in by the MoD. It said that lawyers to the MoD had warned that under European Human Rights law it would be illegal to continue to prevent service personnel from joining trade unions (Clark, 2002). A "senior ministry source" was quoted as saying that it would be impossible to prevent soldiers from forming some kind of federation to represent their interests. Apparently there will still need to be a test case to establish the precedence of the Convention of Human Rights over Queen's Regulations but the report seems confident that some kind of federation similar to the Police Federation will eventually be formed.

Therefore, while there appeared to be little opportunity for the armed forces to unionise at the beginning of the 21st century, there now seems to be every possibility that things are changing. However, this was a single report in one newspaper and at the time of writing (2 years later) nothing more has

been mentioned in the press on this matter. Nevertheless, it seems safe to assume that government opinion is changing and that the opportunity to unionise, the third of Harries-Jenkins' factors, is now more likely than it was only a few years ago.

2.4. The Level of Political Culture

According to Harries-Jenkins there are two types of political culture with regard to military unionisation. The first is the continental model in which unionisation is seen as a right of all citizens, irrespective of their occupation. The second, the insular culture epitomised by Great Britain in which the armed forces seek "to preserve a conservative value system, traditionally identified with a feudal or chivalric legacy, by stressing the importance not of rights but of the accepted social and public obligations of the military" (Harries-Jenkins, 1977, p. 68). The continental model is most identified with Germany, Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands. It is based upon the philosophy that military service is an integral part of citizenship and that "the development of individual rights (...) has been a consistent feature of such citizenship (...) [which] is inextricably associated with the emergence of the mass army" (Harries-Jenkins, 1977, pp. 67–69). In this kind of society, members of the military will naturally seek rights such as the right to unionise and this will be acceptable both to the government and to most spheres of society. One can see direct parallels here with Article 11 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (CETS No. 005, 1950, p. 10) which, among other things, gives people the freedom to join trade unions and the expectation in the continental cultures that these rights should be extended to the armed forces.

In the insular model this has not been the general expectation. "Rights are seen to be part of the distinctive sphere of the civil domain, and armed forces assume that they will be 'looked after' by the civil power" (Harries-Jenkins, 1977, p. 69). But expectations change. Traditionally, the British Armed Forces have lagged behind social change and, until recently, it has been acceptable for them to filter out what they have perceived to be the least desirable changes in order to defend core military principles and traditions (Dandeker & Paton, 1997). However, in today's "post-deferential society" (Dandeker & Paton, 1997, p. 1) servicemen and women are more aware of their rights and, if necessary, are now quite prepared to resort to the law to

assert them. Boyd-Carpenter (1995) summed it up when he said that there has been:

> "a growth in the individual's sense of their [sic] own autonomy, an ambition to make judgements for themselves, to pursue their own interest and advancement and to be less willing to take accepted norms at face value or even to conform in pursuit of some perceived benefit to society as a whole".

Furthermore, it is apparent that the trust that resided in the senior officers to "look after" the interests of their men and women has all but disappeared. The demand for independent representation witnessed in the research quoted above is proof of that. Thus, there are forces at large that have resulted in changes in the attitudes of servicemen and women towards their occupational role which means that in the absence of anyone else to look after their interests they feel the need to take matters into their own hands and look after themselves.

In this they have been assisted by what Dandeker and Paton (1997, p. 4) call "the intrusion of civilian law and the scrutiny of civilian courts into the affairs of the armed forces". They claim that in recent times both the EC and the European Court of Human Rights have been instrumental in influencing the day-to-day running of the British Armed Forces. As far back as 1997 nearly 40 EC directives had been incorporated into UK law (Dandeker & Paton, 1997). However, while these have been accepted by other EC states as being applicable to all members of society including the armed forces, in the UK this has not been the case. A few, relating to health and safety at work have been universally applied, some others, such as the rights of pregnant women and homosexuals, have been enforced by law. But, the armed forces have been exempted from many, including minimum wage legislation (McManners & Prescott, 1998) and, of course, the right to form trade unions. However, recent events in both Britain and the EC may have a major impact on this situation.

The end of conventional fighting in Iraq resulted in substantial media criticism of the government over shortages and deficiencies in soldiers' personal equipment (see Wilson, 2003; Norton-Taylor, 2003; Rayment, 2004a). As part of their investigation into the lessons to be learnt from the war, the HSDC examined the provision of desert clothing, boots, body armour and NBC protection. It censured the MoD for not recognising that there was a problem "which had a detrimental impact on service personnel" (HSDC, 2004, p. 18). But, more significantly, it went on to say: "Robust arrangements should now be introduced to gauge the views of more junior ranks and specialists whose widespread concerns do not seem to be properly

understood, reflected and acted upon by more senior commanders and officials further up the chain'' (HSDC, 2004, p. 18.64). This was a clear indictment of the chain of command as a means of communicating upwards the concerns of lower-ranking servicemen and women and perhaps a suggestion that it is now time for some form of independent representation.

Potentially, the new Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (CONV 850/03, 2003) can have an even greater impact on the foundation of trade unions in the British Army. While the original Article 11 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (CETS No. 005, 1950, p. 10) gave everyone the right ''to form and to join trade unions'' it qualified this with the proviso that this should not ''prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State''. However, in the new Constitution for Europe, Article 11–12 on the Freedom of Assembly and Association is worth quoting in full, as it does not contain any qualifications regarding armed forces: ''Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association at all levels, in particular in political, trade union and civic matters, which implies the right of everyone to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his or her interests'' (CONV 850/03, 2003). In addition, it also states that it is necessary to ''adopt measures to ensure coordination of employment policies of the Member States'' (CONV 850/03, 2003, Article 14.3).

So, it would seem that significant changes in the political culture of the UK and, in particular, the armed forces are in the offing and that servicemen and women may well be viewed more like their continental brethren as 'citizens in uniform', with all the associated rights. In the future, pressing matters such as the provision of vital personal equipment, compensation for injuries, Gulf War syndrome, the standard of accommodation, military discipline and poor pay could well be addressed on behalf of the rank and file by some kind of federation.

3. CONCLUSIONS

In contrast to 1999 (Bartle, 1999a), the application of the Harries-Jenkins model now shows that there is strong evidence to indicate that all four of the factors are finally in place. Not only is there a motivation, a mood and an opportunity to unionise, there are also significant changes in the UK and the EC to suggest that the level of political culture has now moved in favour of independent representation. However, even though all factors are now in

evidence, it does not mean that there will be any change in the status quo. In 1995, Bett called for a debate on independent representation and it was met with a limited response. Nearly 10 years later the HSDC has called for "robust arrangements (…) to gauge the views of more junior ranks and specialists" (HSDC, 2004, p. 18.64) yet this also seems to have fallen on deaf ears. It remains to be seen what effect the new Constitution for Europe will have. The opinion in the MoD seems to be that it will take a test case to establish whether the human rights convention can be applied to the British Army (Clark, 2002). What seems to be needed is a catalyst to spark off more insistent demands for the introduction of independent representation. Maybe it will take an accumulation of events like the death of Sgt. Roberts (who was ordered to give his body armour to someone else and was then shot) (Elliott & Sengupta, 2004); a pay cut for soldiers while senior officers keep their right to first-class rail travel (Rayment, 2004b) and the large redundancies in the armed forces said to be in the pipeline despite record deployments around the world (Evans, 2004). Perhaps the mysterious unofficial federation The Colours (Clark, 2002) will use these events to provide a new impetus. However, unless someone takes the initiative, the foundation of an Army union will remain just as elusive as ever.

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FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE CANADIAN FORCES: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE TRENDS

Kelly Farley, Rick Walker, Harry Bondy and Dan Mendoza[1]

1. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE CANADIAN FORCES: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE TRENDS

Unlike many militaries in Europe, the Canadian Forces (CF) have no union or representative association. Although two separate studies have shown that more than one-third of military members think positively about forming a union (Bradley & Charbonneau, 2004; Deneumoustier, 1971), there has traditionally been little movement towards any form of associationism within Canada's military. While there is no formal 'contract' between the CF and the government of Canada, an informal social contract has appeared to be successful in maintaining the status quo. Critics of the social contract argue the agreement is one-sided; that is, the responsibilities of the member to Canada are well defined in the National Defence Act and Queen's Regulations and Orders but there is "no such articulation of the

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responsibilities of the Government of Canada to the men and women of the CF" (Milner, 1998, p. 10).

On the other hand, those in favour of the social contract argue that the nature of such an agreement is necessary in that it reinforces the philosophy of civilian control of the military in a liberal democracy such as Canada. While not contractual, there exists "a set of reciprocal expectations between the profession and society (…) in essence a moral commitment" (Canadian Forces, 2003, p. 44) that is based on principles including: fair and equitable compensation, access to suitable accommodation, care and compensation to injured veterans, and the provision of appropriate equipment commensurate with their tasking. Further, those in favour of the status quo point to constitutional safeguards such as the Canadian Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms that protect the rights of all citizens. In fact, the Charter sits prominently in the description of the Canadian military ethos (Canadian Forces, 2003). But this begs the question, if such expectations and safeguards are sufficient to protect the rights of individual members, why does a significant proportion of members continue to believe some form of military association is a good idea? Clearly, the absence of a representative association or union in the CF is not due to any single policy of the government or military. Rather, the current status quo has resulted from a constellation of historical, cultural, legal and social psychological influences that continue to construct our view of the CF and their role in Canadian society.

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the history and current status of the CF with respect to associationism. To this end, a short review of military associationism will help put the CF's case in context and set the stage for a fuller discussion of civil–military relations in Canada. With this broader understanding as backdrop, the current status of mechanisms of voice and the attitudes of soldiers towards unionisation will be examined. Organisational views towards unionisation will also be considered in light of recent member activity. Finally, the chapter will conclude with a discussion of potential future trends.

2. MILITARY ASSOCIATIONISM

Militaries with unions or representative associations are not new. Since, Norway established its association for military members in 1847, many other countries, mostly European, have followed this lead. In fact, the European Organisation for Military Associations (EUROMIL) now counts 29 military associations from 19 countries as members. Since the end of the

Cold War, EUROMIL membership has expanded to include military associations from the former Soviet Bloc such as the Russian Federation and the Czech Republic. In general, and for associations that formed in Europe during the 19th and first half of the 20th centuries in particular, the pressure to unionise "derived from conscription and the fear that those drafted into national service would be mistreated by a conservative and hierarchical military system" (Milner, 1998, p. 30). But this was not true in all cases. In Sweden for example, initial pressure for unions came from the senior NCO corps and eventually led to unions for all rank categories including officers. In Belgium, the origin of the modern union for officers was a result of the failure of the government of the day to act in support of the army during the difficult period of decolonisation in the late 1950s and 1960s. According to Milner (1998), Belgium is the only example of unionisation that approximates the current situation in Canada. An examination of Canadian civil–military relations is necessary for a more fulsome appreciation of the current situation in the CF.

3. THE CASE OF CANADA: DEFINING THE CANADIAN MILITARY CONDITION

The noted French historian Andre Corvisier once observed: "Les Canadiens, ils sont très combatif, n'est-ce pas?" Canadian Forces (2001) (Douglas, 1974–75, p. 259). Similarly, Canadian military history tends to be defined, in a European perspective, by either the Canadian Corps in the Great War of 1914–1918 or the Canadian contribution to the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945. Though both examples were great national contributions in blood and treasure, they mask a paradox, which makes the contemporary Canadian military condition unique among Anglo-western militaries. The aim of this short review is to define the Canadian military condition as a product of its civil–military history, and to show how the present CF conflict over the concepts of management and leadership could conceivably make the CF membership more receptive to the ideals of representative association today than ever before.

Canadians have shown themselves to be an unmilitary people burdened by a warlike history. As the historian George Stanley observed: "Canada is an unmilitary community. Warlike her people have often been forced to be, military they have never been" (Newman, 1983, p. 1). Where images such as the Canadian victory at Vimy Ridge in 1917 are often used as defining

symbols of Canadian nationalism, the reality is that war planning, standing armies, entangling alliances and going to war as a nation in arms has always been viewed as an anomaly or political aberration by the majority of Canadians. Her honourable war record notwithstanding, Canada never developed an indigenous military culture. Unlike her traditional British and American allies, the Canadian state is not a product of either civil war or a war of independence. Correspondingly, the Canadian military condition evolved along different lines and in response to different political imperatives. The origin and survival of the Canadian state was inextricably linked to the suasion of her foreign and defence policy. Correspondingly, the varying degrees of conflicted civil–military tension within the emergent Canadian state became the critical determinant in defining the contemporary Canadian military condition.

It was the threat of American expansion after the Civil War in 1865 that forced the two founding cultures, English and French Canada, to confederate in 1867. This was a pragmatic marriage of necessity for an antithetical cultural duality. English Canadian culture was articulated as being English speaking, protestant, politically Conservative, and imperialist in loyalty to the British Empire. English Canadians desired the 'Senior Dominion' to play a leading role in Imperial Defence and to be a major contributor to an Old World focus in the British Imperial vision. In contrast, French Canada was French speaking, catholic, politically Liberal, and continentalist in rejecting loyalty to the British Empire in favour of a 'maitre chez-nous or master in our own house' vision of Canada's place in the New World. As their history shows, French Canadians were prepared to defend Canada from invasion or a threat to sovereignty, but they were disinclined to support Imperial defence or 'British wars'. The conundrum, which underpinned confederation, was how to hold this union together when faced with the divisive passions generated by the major wars of the 20th century. National unity became, therefore, the critical imperative in the survival of the state.

The political management of civil–military friction, with its potential to shred the fabric of national unity, became the defining dynamic in the evolution of the Canadian military condition. Since the 'direct' defence of Canada was secured by the Royal Navy prior to 1823 and has been protected by the American Monroe Doctrine since, there has never existed a direct threat of Canada threat. Though a citizen militia maintained 'peace order and good government' from 1867 onward, the Militia Department was intentionally structured to serve more as a government conduit of political patronage than to maintain any notion of a credible land defence of Canada. Defence against whom was the rhetorical question and therefore

any designs on military organisation or expenditure in a European model or mindset was an anathema to the Liberal administration of Sir Wilfrid Laurier (1896–1911). The threat to national unity came from the English Canadian camp and their perspective that the 'indirect' defence of Canada and the responsibilities of imperial citizenship necessitated a national commitment to provide an expeditionary force to a fully integrated Imperial Defence structure or 'kriegsverein'. Correspondingly, a series of British General Officers, who commanded the Canadian Militia, in concert with their Conservative Party sympathisers, worked continuously to transform the Militia into a 'Canadian National Army', available for service as an Imperial expeditionary force. Their weapon of choice was for military officers to directly intervene in national politics and subvert government policy through a direct appeal to the public. This divisive strategy stoked the imperial loyalty of English Canadians while subsequently vilifying the apparent disloyalty of French Canadians and their Liberal defenders.

In the first such test of wills, the Laurier government was coerced to partially concede, through an Order in Council, to the creation of a Canadian contingent of 'volunteers' for service in the Boer War (1899–1902). This quasi-official contingent was provided by Canada for service with the Imperial Forces in South Africa but paid for by the British Army. It was a cunning 'Order in Council' ruse by the government to ensure that the Boer War question never reached Parliament. Though the strategy of direct military intervention in politics appeared to work, it was at best a pyrrhic victory; there would be no standing government commitment to imperial defence and each British General, who pursued that aim was dismissed summarily. The nature of this discordant civil–military friction can be found in both Laurier's subtle admonition to Lord Dundonald: "You must not take the Militia seriously, for though it is useful for suppressing internal disturbances, it will not be required for the defence of the country, as the Monroe Doctrine protects us against any enemy aggression" (The Earl of Dundonald, 1926, p. 294) and in the overt public warning to Dundonald provided by The Montreal Gazette of 4 September 1902:

> "Lord Dundonald seems to think that the people of Canada are concerned about being in readiness for war, or if they are not they are to blame and should be stirred up. Any man who thinks that way – and all European soldiers do – fails to grasp the essential distinction between Europe and North America. With Europe war is a condition. With us it is a theory"
>
> (cited in Page, 1972, p. 104)

The precedent for direct military intervention in politics was therefore well established prior to the First World War. The divisive passions inherent in

what was now the Achilles' heel of the Canadian confederation were dramatically exacerbated by the social and political crisis generated by Sir Robert Borden's Conservative administration policy of wartime conscription. The past and future spectre of conscription became, for a divided Canada, the defining symbol of the imperialist-military threat to national unity. Correspondingly, the political cleavage, riots and loss of life generated by the conscription crisis of 1917 reshaped the political landscape whereby a Liberal ideology of anti-military, anti-British and continentalist sentiment contrasted starkly with the Conservative ideology of a pro-British military and conscriptionist imperialism. Canadian military elites were correspondingly tarred as Conservatives. Though the political demographic of Canada was diversified by the massive wave of immigration during the interwar years, this political and military dichotomy remained dominant throughout Mackenzie King's interwar and wartime Liberal administration (1935–1948). Though resistant to military expenditure and overtly anti-military in peacetime, Liberals, by ideology are not pacifists and they will fight when roused over principles of human rights and natural justice. Though King was prepared to do whatever it took to win the war, including conscription if necessary, he was not prepared to endanger national unity and belatedly impose conscription in any vainglorious attempt to advance the Army's wartime agenda or in support of its postwar corporate ambitions.

The Army was the most prominent of the military elites that by 1944 had reached the apogee of its political power and influence. The Army was by its nature politically conservative and like the rest of the services had been fully harmonised, in organisation and culture, to the needs of the Imperial General Staff. As General Maurice Pope noted in his memoirs: "our Army was indeed British through and through with only minor differences imposed by local conditions" (Pope, 1962, p. 53). The Army also desired that Canada should build on its wartime accomplishments and therefore planned secretly that Canada extend its leadership role within the British Empire through the maintenance of a postwar standing Army of over 55,000 men, fed by a continuous system of 48,000 peacetime conscripts, and buttressed by an effective Militia strength of 178,000 (Walker, 2003).

Knowing of the Liberal government's intention to cut the existent Army structure by 90% and in a professionally motivated gamble to save both their wartime and postwar armies, the Army Council threatened mass resignation in a 'revolt of the generals' on 22 November 1944. The Army ultimatum on conscription for overseas service was timed to coincide with the opening of Parliament, where Conservative Party sympathisers

were primed to defeat the government. This failed effort in civil–military blackmail was the ultimate manifestation of a direct military challenge to civil and constitutional authority. It not only imperilled national unity but it also threatened to destroy Canada's wartime record in what civil authority interpreted as a portent to civil war. In deflecting this military threat, Prime Minister Mackenzie King would neither forgive nor forget and he put into progress a sequence of policies structured to assert an unprecedented degree of civil control in an overt attempt to destroy military corporatism.

As Amos Perlmutter affirmed, military corporatism is the key to modern civil–military relations. The dilemma is that while the degree of corporatism determines whether the military will intervene in politics, it is that same corporatism, which preserves an Army, for example, as a fighting force (Perlmutter, 1980). Since the timeless Canadian challenge – defence against whom – remained unanswered, the Canadian military condition was not retained throughout the postwar and Cold War period as a fighting force, but as a government expression of other non-military imperatives. This unique Canadian worldview and penchant for quasi-military innovation, was examined by James Eayrs in his critique, "Canada Pioneering the Single Service" in The Round Table in 1969.

> "When armed forces are maintained, as Canada's are maintained, not for defending the homeland but for some other reason – prestige, diplomatic influence, law and order at home – certain liberties may be taken with their organization, which might be rather too risky to take with forces meant for fighting. For others, armed forces are a necessity. For us, they are a kind of luxury. Armed forces kept for luxury may be designed differently from armed forces kept for necessity."
>
> (Eayrs, 1969, p. 157)

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, remnants of the wartime military service elites continued to resist the government dilution of their professional responsibility for the security of the state, in what was termed the consignment of military men to the status of second-class citizen in time of peace. This emasculation and erosion of military professionalism was relentless, or as John Gellner observed, "There is no other country where the political masters are so unreasonably masterful towards the military as they are in Canada" (Gellner, 1961, p. 5). In order to subvert this perceived pernicious civilian influence, military officers exploited Cold War rearmament and shifted their 'imperial' loyalties from the bankrupt British Empire to the American Empire and its burgeoning military-industrial complex. Through a series of sub rosa, classified, and need to know only military to military agreements, Canadian general officers keenly put themselves, unbeknownst

to civil authority, under American operational command within a variety of entangling NATO alliance commitments.

This subterfuge was the essence of the confused government response to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and of the military being implicated in the subsequent fall of the John Diefenbaker government over the nuclear weapons issue in 1963. The replacement Liberal government under Lester B. Pearson, learned from this civil–military discontinuity and armed with his Nobel Peace Prize, realigned Canada's role within NATO to that of a non-fighting 'helpful fixer'. By inventing peacekeeping, Lester B. Pearson created a cost-effective alternate source of international legitimacy, put in process a future exit strategy for a CF withdrawal from Europe, and regained civil control over a Canadian–American military agenda tittering on the brink of a black hole of NATO military expenditures. Unlike other NATO allies revitalised by the Marshall Plan and whose militaries were being bankrolled by American money, Canada paid her full share. Unrestrained militarisation and social programmes were incompatible and domestically, defence policy became a 'guns and butter' dilemma.

Similarly, at this height of civil–military distrust, the Minister of National Defence, Paul Hellyer, was convinced that civilians within the defence establishment were disadvantaged and that civilian control of the military was endangered by the influence of the Cold War generals. The rhetoric of his 1964 White Paper on Defence emphasised fiscal management in support of a programme of capital spending which never occurred. His real purpose was aimed at integrating the Armed Forces under a single Chief of the Defence Staff that "would permit an effective exercise of civilian control and, equally important, civilian direction in the carrying out of defence policy as laid down by the government" (Byers, 1972, p. 200). In rapid succession, the reassertion of civil authority escalated as Hellyer firstly introduced Bill C-90, which created the Office of the Chief of the Defence Staff and formalised the unified chain of command in the Armed Forces. He quickly followed with Bill C-242 on 7 December 1966, for the unification of the three separate services into a single service. It was this document, The Canadian Forces Reorganisation Act, which was passed by the imposition of closure in Parliament, which led to the 'Admirals revolt'. This highly public and acrimonious protest against government policy served to reaffirm Departmental contentions on the need to bridle the military profession in Canada and confirmed to many the maxim 'that civil control of the military gives the civilian the right to be wrong'. Correspondingly, the logic of this unique Canadian civil–military innovation was never fully understood or completely accepted by those senior officers, who chose not to resign.

Consequently, the foundations and supporting structure of 'Unification' were unsteady, prone to shifting organisational crises, and did not achieve the desired end of civil primacy.

The degree of civilian control, which Hellyer failed to achieve through legislation, was instituted secretarially by the 1970 Management Review Group (MRG), which launched a

> "fundamental and comprehensive reorganisation of the higher management of defence (…) [and a] reconstituted deputy minister who would assume complete control of formulating defence policy, providing policy advice to government, and managing the department that was henceforth to include the Canadian Armed Forces"
>
> (Bland, 1998, p. xviii)

Notwithstanding the fact that the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces are distinctive and legally separate entities under the National Defence Act, a hostile takeover merger, in the guise of a staged reorganisation, was executed as a "public service coup (…) to entrench the deputy minister in areas and with responsibilities that had hitherto been the preserve of military officers" (Bland, 1998, p. xviii).

Supporting Departmental initiatives, such as the Task Force on the Review of Unification of the Canadian Forces, served to reinforce civilian constraint of military authority in what some senior military officers saw as a capricious appetite for the 'civilianisation' of the Armed Forces. The final erosion of military authority was manifest in the insertion of civilians and civilian management practices directly into the military's corporate command and control structure. Resistance to civilianisation faded as senior military leadership was co-opted into accepting career 'comparability' within a civil-service executive category. With careerism a dominant theme within this new public service management culture, senior military officers rationalised their new management status, abrogated their leadership and advocacy responsibilities to their subordinates, and aligned their senior management functions with the controlling interests of the Department of National Defence. Unification, the empowerment of the Deputy Minister under the Management Review Group, and the civilianisation of senior leadership led to the absorption of the CF into the sphere of unchallenged civilian administrative 'command'. Such is the present nature of the contemporary Canadian military condition.

This non-military control of the CF is the evolutionary result of a conflicted civil–military history whereby the statesmen felt compelled to hobble the political power of the soldier through the destruction of military corporateness – as defined by a shared sense of organic unity and a consciousness of

themselves as a group apart from Canadian lay society. This military road to perdition was executed through two sequential processes that Samuel Huntington described as extirpation and transmutation (Huntington, 1967). In the process of extirpation, the military was stripped of its political voice and in a sustained policy against military values, military leadership was marginalised to the point where it existed as a Conservative caste on the periphery of a dominantly Liberal Canadian society. An unprecedented assertion of civilian control over the CF and a progressive transmutation of traditional command and control functions, refashioned along Liberal lines, coalesced so that these now 'civilianised' functions lost their military character and military leadership transmuted into military management. The result is the marked primacy of the civilian bureaucrat over the denigrated military professional. The innovative Canadian approach to the traditional Anglo-western balance of civil–military friction was to eliminate it. This apparent lack of military corporatism, responsibility and expertise, as defined by Huntington's model of military professionalism, challenges the notion that there is any existent military profession or military elite in Canada (Huntington, 1967).

In this dearth of leadership, responsibility and advocacy, the question of who speaks for the soldier dates back, coincidentally, to March 1967, when the Liberal government of Lester B. Pearson approved passage of the Public Service Staff Relations Act. Of the 130,000 white-collar workers subsequently unionised under the Public Service Alliance of Canada (PSAC), the government exempted the CF and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). By March 1971, PSAC mounted a strong public campaign "to win a legislative amendment permitting collective bargaining for the Canadian Armed Forces" (Deneumoustier, 1971, p. 2). The formal PSAC overture to amend the Public Service Staff Relations Act was put to the government on 7 May 1971. In response to this union challenge and aware that CF members felt underpaid, Treasury Board (TB) established the concept of civil–military 'comparability' in pay and benefits. Though comparability was approved by TB in October of 1966, it was instituted in a lengthy, faltering and belated manner, which saw annual military pay increases lag well behind the Public Service from 1961 to 1970 by a cumulative difference of 12.6% (Bondy, 1999). Yet, notwithstanding this lack of genuine comparability, and the fact that compensation was considered second to promotions as the major cause of dissatisfaction in the CF, the comparability process, in concert with an inherent military distrust of unions, was sufficient to defuse the PSAC challenge to Departmental control of the Canadian military condition.

The persistent question of who speaks on behalf of the welfare of the CF membership remains to be answered and the lack of any representative voice

on behalf of the military as an institutional culture within government has yet to be addressed. Therefore, the lack of any demonstrable military leadership, empowered with both the authority and the responsibility to challenge Departmental or government policy, in concert with the members' growing self-realisation that they are bereft of representation, may yet foster a rekindled interest in and receptiveness to the concept of associationism. The lack of coherent mechanisms of voice is clearly the most pressing, topical and emergent issue facing the CF membership today.

4. STATUS OF CRITICISM, REFORM AND MECHANISMS OF VOICE WITHIN THE CANADIAN FORCES

In the absence of a formal union or representative association, the CF have typically taken an unsystematic and episodic approach to reform and mechanisms of voice. An examination of the status of criticism and reform within the CF will provide important background for our consideration of mechanisms of voice. Criticism of CF personnel policies has increased in tempo since the end of the Cold War, but its tenor has been consistent for decades. The literature review by English (2001) describes a long series of high profile, internal DND studies of personnel strategy that include the Mainguy Report, 1949; the Belzille Report, 1972; the Vance Report, 1980; the Officer Corps Study, 1989; and the Croatia Board of Inquiry, 1999. These reports consistently describe an erosion of the military ethos and a continuing crisis in leadership. English concludes that because there is no top-down strategic guidance, the CF has accomplished little change of enduring worth. Although many in Canada's National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) have called for a Human Resource strategy to guide the CF of today and tomorrow, there is still no overall plan or philosophy for cultural reform.

Government review agencies external to the Department of National Defence (DND) make many of the same criticisms. The Office of the Auditor General (OAG, 1990) in their 1990 Report recommended that the CF develop a coordinated HR management system to link conditions of service with the military ethos. The OAG provided several examples of unconnected, ad hoc changes to conditions of service. Parliament's Standing Committee On National Defence and Veteran Affairs added similar criticisms in their report of October 1998 (SCONDVA, 1998). When researchers sought

the purpose of various allowances and benefits, the Report notes that they only "found a patchwork put in place to deal with the exigencies of the moment. Long-range planning and a clear sense of purpose do not seem to underlie the current system" (SCONDVA, 1998, II, pp. 1–2).

Fraser's committee "to monitor (...) change initiatives, the process for implementation of these changes, and to evaluate their effectiveness (...)" was established October 14, 1997. Their final report, released in February 2000, was sufficiently concise and to the point, that the following passages have been copied verbatim:

> As the Minister and others have noted, this program involves profound cultural change. And that means finding ways of embedding within the institution and constantly re-inforcing such new or re-discovered values as accountability, self-examination and self-improvement, fairness and openness, alongside the existing values of professionalism, loyalty, courage, and service to country. To do this, changes in structure, procedures, regulations and education arrangements (like those already made or under way) are necessary. But these measures by themselves will not be sufficient to ensure that the new values will become internalized to the point of being as instinctive as, say, loyalty or service to country. And until this degree of cultural shift is attained, there remains a risk that the achievements of the change program will be diminished, or that the substance of the changes will lack staying power. In spite of these positive changes, the Committee has observed some deficiencies in how the Department and the CF have tackled reform. We attribute this to what we perceive as the absence of an overall strategic agenda to ensure the cohesive implementation of a very broad-ranging set of changes. In our view, the reform program, to achieve its goals, requires an overarching philosophical shift in the way business is done. The Committee has identified this pattern as a case of putting the activity 'cart' before the conceptual 'horse', which has led to implementation of a good many recommendations, but has not produced a clear vision of what the reform program is to achieve.
>
> (Committee's final Report, 2000)

Why has this happened? The Department's approach to reform seems to have resulted from the way in which change was directed by the Government. The Department and the CF were given the task of implementing hundreds of recommendations deriving from various sources, which appeared over a span of 2 years. The implementation of individual recommendations was accepted as a series of tactical jobs. NDHQ dealt with each as a specific objective, developing an action plan, schedule and an achievable goal: to implement the recommendation and 'tick the box'. Public communication of the reform program in various DND/CF publications reflects that approach: charts, percentages and bar graphs represent the completion status of recommendations; the percentage recorded as complete therefore has become the gauge of reform. Taken as a whole, however, the many ministerial decisions represented an opportunity and a challenge to

identify and describe the strategic vision behind them and to formulate a coherent implementation plan to realise that intention. Put simply, the defence team has applied tactical solutions to what it considers to be tactical problems. What the Committee has stressed over its tenure is that the reform program is a strategic challenge that requires strategic solutions:

> "With that in mind, the Monitoring Committee suggests that the CF and DND should sharpen the strategic focus and increase the sense of commitment and urgency about the institutional reform program by: Developing as soon as possible a clear vision of the desired institutional culture and of the qualities and characteristics of officers who will serve in it. This should be seen as a cultural dimension to the kind of strategic thinking in A Strategy for 2020".

The tactical, 'tick the box' reforms in response to SCONDVA alone, are worth noting because it sought to address many issues related to conditions of service and potential dissatisfiers called 'Quality of Life' (QOL) issues. The tactical campaign was organised into six 'pillars' of multiple initiatives as follows: each colour coded green, yellow, orange and red according to its stage of completion for monthly progress reports (QOL Report, 1999): (1) Compensation and Benefits Pillars: 35 initiatives; (2) Accommodation Pillar: 9 initiatives; (3) Care of Injured/Retired Pillar: 31 initiatives; (4) Family Support Pillar: 28 initiatives; (5) Transitions/Work Expectations Pillar: 26 initiatives; (6) Miscellaneous Pillar: 8 initiatives (Total initiatives: 137). A more recent series of scorecards provided on the DND intranet breaks out 314 recommendations by office of primary interest, by the investigation or scandal that prompted reforms, and by the percentage by which they have been implemented (VCDS Report, 2002).

Let us now focus on the mechanisms of voice available to members of the CF, many of which were created in response to the wave of reform initiatives of the 1990s. There is a complex web of complaint mechanisms now, some with no relationship to one another, many with intricately limited mandates, and most with no deadlines for the highest authorities to respond. The DND Ombudsman (2004) attempts to decipher this smorgasbord for common CF members, who are often on their own while the authorities have the resources of lawyers, career managers, other departmental staff, and an impressive budget at their disposal. The Ombudsman (2004) lists 23 general areas of possible complaint and recommends that CF members contact or consult 50 different persons, offices, hotlines, websites, regulations, acts of Parliament and other sources. These include: Director Accounts Processing; Pay and Pensions; Reserve Pay Hot Line; unit orderly rooms; the chain of command; commanding officers; Chief of Defence Staff; Director General Military Careers; padres and social workers; assisting

officers; Centre for the Support of Injured and Retired Members and their Families and their hotline; Canadian Forces Member Assistance Program; Defence Counsel Services hotline; Summary Trial Review Authorities; Court Martial Appeals Court; Supreme Court of Canada; Canadian Forces Provost Marshal; Military Police Complaints Commission; The streamlined Redress of Grievance process; Director Canadian Forces Grievance Administration; Canadian Forces Grievance Board; local, district and national offices and inspectors for the Canadian Forces Housing Authority; Harassment/Sexual Assault Hotline; Members of Parliament; civil court system; local, district and national offices of Veteran Affairs Canada; Veteran Review and Appeals Board; Bureau of Pension Advocates; local Post-Deployment Clinics (for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder); Director Quality of Life and their website; Maritime Life Assurance company; President of the Service Income Security Insurance Plan; Public Service Health Care Plan Trust; Ombudsman's Office; The Ombudsman's Mandate; "The Code of Service Discipline and Me"; Canadian Forces Grievance Manual; Canadian Forces Administrative Orders; Defence Administrative Orders and Directives; and, The Queen's Regulations & Orders.

The Ombudsman's Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) page refers members no less than 25 times to the Queen's Regulation & Orders. It stipulates that members can only contact the Ombudsman if the "circumstances are compelling" 10 times, and warns or infers that the Ombudsman cannot help at all at least 11 times. The hotlink to the word "compelling" leads to another site that lists 18 Ministerial Directives and two appendices with a difficult to find and brief explanation appearing under a section entitled Existing Mechanisms, article 13, sub-para 2, sub-sub-para a to c. The Ombudsman's extensive FAQ site does not completely describe the mechanisms of voice. There are also local and national offices, meetings and processes related to Alternate Dispute Resolution, the Defence Ethics Program, Personal Married Quarter community councils, and Military Family Resource Centres. There may be others unknown to the authors.

The emphasis for complaints still seems to be the highly adversarial Redress of Grievance system, in which members find themselves more or less alone facing the largest government department in Canada. The Ombudsman can only review and comment on the process, not any findings. The Ombudsman (2001) reported immediate problems and delays with the new Streamlined System implemented June 15, 2000. Problems continue to the present (Ombudsman, 2003). After delays at various stages of the process, the complainant finds that there is no time limit for the CDS to reply; it is

really the Judge Advocate General who drafts the reply. Despite favourable recommendations by the CF Grievance Board, and after a very long wait, members still find that their grievance is often denied with limited reasons given and that their real issues of concern have not been addressed (Ombudsman, 2003). Thus, one might expect that new and revised mechanisms of voice available to CF membership have not satisfied the long standing dissatisfaction with senior officials and the institution. Put another way, the fact that senior officials often preside over intense reform activity may be an important contributor to persistent disillusionment among the rank and file. But what is the extent of member dissatisfaction with senior leadership? And what effect, if any, have these issues had on the attitudes of members towards some form of associationism?

5. CANADIAN FORCES MEMBERS DISSATISFACTION WITH SENIOR LEADERSHIP AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS UNIONISATION

Several recent CF attrition studies (e.g., Jenkins, 2003a, b) point to a profound dissatisfaction with senior leadership among voluntary leavers. Over a 2-year period (2001–2003) leaving members (1,109) were asked to reflect on the reasons that prompted them to voluntarily exit the CF. Of those reasons cited most often, almost two-thirds (73%) responded that they were "tired of poor decision making and the associated misuse of limited CF resources". A similar number (70%) of members responded that they had "lost faith in the CF leadership". Other reasons included dissatisfaction with postings (67%), too much time away from home (62%), no credit for job well done (59%) and inadequate compensation (55%). Given these findings, it appears that attempts by the CF to reform internal systems including mechanisms of voice have been hampered by a general and persistent dissatisfaction with senior leadership. Moreover, it is perhaps not surprising that a significant proportion of CF members has favourable attitudes toward some form of association or union. Interestingly, attitudes within the CF have remained impressively consistent since the early 1970s. For example, a survey study of 200 members across the CF found that, overall, one in three (35%) supported the idea of a union for military members (Deneumoustier, 1971). When broken down by rank, however, important trends appeared. Specifically, slightly more than one in five officers (22%) supported the idea while about one in four (25%) senior

non-commissioned officers agreed with the same statement. Support among junior non-commissioned members was highest with over half (52%) supporting the idea of unionisation.

In a more recent survey that focused specifically on Army members, researchers found similar results (Bradley & Charbonneau, 2003). Consistent with the previous CF research, about one third (32%) of all Army members agreed or strongly agreed that "a civilian-style union or some other type of professional organisation outside the chain-of-command" was a good idea. Although the overall differences between ranks were less striking as compared to the earlier research, the trends were the same. For example, officers expressed the least support for the idea of a union (18%) compared to senior non-commissioned officers (30%) and junior non-commissioned members (33%). On the face of it, support for unionisation appears to have declined among junior non-commissioned members. However, the more recent research included a "neither agree nor disagree" option that was not available in the previous study (the 1971 study forced respondents to simply agree or disagree). 23% of junior non-commissioned members responded in this neutral category, which, if considered with the positive responses would bring the total "non-negative" responses to 56% – similar but slightly higher than the previous study (52%).

In summary, while not a majority across ranks, a significant proportion of members continues to express support for the idea of some kind of professional association or union. As might be expected, support tends to be highest among junior personnel compared to senior non-commissioned officers and officers. Given the plethora of reform activities and mechanisms of voice outlined earlier, one might expect that the desire for some form of unionisation would have diminished over the same period. Clearly, this is not the case. One possible explanation is that members feel overwhelmed with the complexity of options presented to them and are discouraged with delays and a perceived lack of positive outcomes for many of their friends who have engaged the system. Another explanation is more fundamental; there continues to exist a general dissatisfaction with, and lack of confidence in, the senior leadership and management of the CF.

Perhaps in response to these issues, there have been at least two recent unsuccessful attempts by members to stimulate action towards some form of association. As these activities occurred about the same time as a Supreme Court of Canada ruling on a related issue for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the CF undertook a review of its policies towards associationism. Included in this review are five possible options for the CF regarding the question of freedom of association.

6. ORGANISATIONAL VIEWS TOWARDS UNIONISATION IN THE CF

The Supreme Court of Canada decision in the case of Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] S. C. J. No. 43, although related to the RCMP, is important in that it has informed the thinking of policy makers within the CF. Briefly, the Delisle case concerned the collective bargaining rights in the RCMP. The Public Service Staff Relations Act (PSSRA) and the Canada Labour Code (CLC) exclude the RCMP from the collective bargaining process available to federal public servants. Delisle, an RCMP officer challenged this as a violation of freedom of association rights under section 2 (d) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The essence of the Delisle decision is that freedom of association, as guaranteed by the Charter, does not provide a right to form a specific type of labour association endowed with particular statutory powers. Therefore, the exclusion of the RCMP from the provisions of the PSSRA is not a violation of the right of association. However, the Court ruled that the Charter guarantees the right to associate freely in independent organisations for the collective exercise of lawful individual rights.

As the CF are also excluded from the PSSRA and CLC, the Director Military Gender Integration and Employment Equity (DMGIEE) was tasked to determine the implications of the decision for the CF. Extrapolating the decision to the specific context of the CF, DMGIEE concluded that: CF members clearly do not have the right to form a union as such in the sense of a certified entity having the right to bargain collectively, CF members do not have a right to strike or withhold services, and CF can likely not prevent its members from associating together to exercise their lawful individual rights in a collective fashion. The right to associate appears to encompass. CF member associations for legal purposes, independent of the chain of command and exercising a representative function. Any rules that prohibit or restrict the formation of CF associations, or that impose sanctions on those who participate therein, would be suspect and would have to be justified under s. 1 of the Charter. To the extent that CF members are free to associate, this requires no more on the part of the CF other than non-interference. There is no obligation or requirement on the CF to help establish, promote, facilitate, or affirmatively recognise member associations.

DMGIEE went further to provide a range of five options for consideration by senior leadership: (1) Prohibited – Prohibit representative associations within the CF; (2) Regulatory – Allow formation of representative

associations under regulations and guidelines specified by the CF; (3) Facilitative – Proactive approach whereby CF would take initiative and develop a framework that allows CF member input on conditions of service and compensation; (4) Permissive – Hands-off, non-interference in the formation of representative associations, with any recognition at managerial discretion; and (5) Unionisation – Legislative approach that amends exception of the CF under the PSSRA (Canadian Forces, 2001).

In summary, the CF has recently considered the current legal status and potential options surrounding the freedom of association issue. DMGIEE concluded that unionisation of military members under the current legal framework is not a right that can be claimed under the Charter. DMGIEE adds, however, that the "CF can likely not prevent its members from associating together to exercise their lawful individual rights in a collective fashion." DMGIEE's consideration of options includes a range of organisational policies that include prohibition to unionisation. Although neither of these two extremes appear reasonable in the current context of the CF, any chosen option or combination of options will need to be considered and endorsed by Armed Forces Council (AFC). At the time of writing, AFC has yet to review the DMGIEE report.

7. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

In this chapter, we have argued that the current status of freedom of association in the CF is a result of a constellation of historical, cultural, legal and social psychological influences. Moreover, these forces have continued to construct our views of the CF and their role in Canadian society. We have argued that, unlike other Anglo-Western countries, Canada has never seen itself as an important military power. Although Canadians have answered the call to war many times, the existence of a military elite in Canadian society, if it ever existed, was permanently exorcised with the 'civilianisation' process of the CF beginning early in the 1960s. Surprising then, in the absence of a military elite in Canadian society that some form of military union or representative association has never emerged. Rather, an informal social contract between the CF, the government and Canadian society continues to define the roles for each.

Although generally more respectful of authority than Canadian society at large, CF members reflect fairly closely the values and attitudes of the dominant culture. Perhaps this characteristic more than any other explains

the current status quo. Respect for authority in a society that tends to minimise the importance of the military in the state's affairs has created a military that values compliance over confrontation. The fact that CF members have not taken serious action towards any form of associationism supports this observation. This is especially telling in light of a consistent and profound dissatisfaction with senior leadership. The range of options for some form of representative association were outlined. These options have been examined by staff at NDHQ but have yet to be considered by the Armed Forces Council. Given the present CF context described in this chapter, it is unlikely formal trade unionisation will be embraced by the senior leadership or even a majority of CF members across ranks. That said, continued dissatisfaction with leadership and the disjointed nature of mechanisms of voice will likely shape the military discourse towards some form of increased representation in the future. Whether this discourse will lead to a new social contract between CF members and those they serve remains to be seen.

NOTES

1. The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Canadian Forces, the Department of National Defence or the Government of Canada.

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MILITARY REPRESENTATION IN THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES IN THE TURN FROM CONSCRIPTION TO PROFESSIONAL FORMAT

Eraldo Olivetta

1. INTRODUCTION

According to Kümmel, the military is a highly complex social phenomenon touching several different contexts and is thus subject to multiple processes of interpretation (Kümmel, 2003). For this reason, the military is studied from a trans- or interdisciplinary perspective. Historically, the military function could be synthesised in the protection of the entire nation from external invasion and the ruling regime from domestic unrest as well as the conduct of wars for foreign policy objectives. This function raises a basic peculiarity of the military that makes it a special institution: the legitimate management of violence. Such as every organisation, the military changed over time and the changes ask for a revision of the management modalities of many aspects of its operations. From here the idea of a research about the collective representation of military personnel in Italy started. This article is intended to present the planned research. The survey is divided into three parts. To begin, I will analyse some aspects of the military changes, in order to know the context in which the need for an empirical research about this

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matter is placed. Next, I will examine the structure of the Italian collective representation of the military, pointing out some of the problems of the actual system. To conclude, I will briefly present the research.

2. THE CHANGES IN THE MILITARY: A MORE AND MORE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER

By the end of the 18th century, the armies of Europe changed from an aristocratic model officered by members of the nobility, a dynastic institution under the control of the crown in which there was an integration of political and military élites, to the mass army model raised by the conscription of all male citizens. Without detailing this change in size, homogeneity and mobilisation, synthesised by Van Doorn (1975), the idea was that "all men who belonged to a community were citizens who were obligated to perform military service when called on by the State" (Paret, 1992). The mass army model remained the standard model for military mobilisation until the end of the second World War and thereafter, in the period called modern. After the Second World War and at the beginning of the Cold War, some other changes affected military organisations:

- The technological development "has led to the substitution of brainpower for brawn in the warrior sale" (Segal, 1995). Technology involved a specialisation of military roles with increased emphasis on technical skills and their assimilation to civilian occupations. Some of the consequences of technological development are: the increase in the need of information and a higher education.
- In parallel with the historic evolution from the mass army to the all-volunteer one, there is also a change of the performance required from military personnel, including the most demanding among all: war. There is a trend from total war and from trinitarian war to small wars or wars of a third kind, which basically are civil wars or intrastate conflicts in which only one side officially represents a state or a government while the other warring side consists of 'irregular' troops (Kümmel, 2003).
- Since the end of the Cold War, the number of military operations other than war has increased. These peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and peace-support operations and humanitarian interventions, further shift the military role set.
- In the end, "women's entry in the armed forces goes along the transition from conscript-based and large armies to the smaller and technologically

advanced all-volunteer force'' (Nuciari, 2003). If it is true that the transition to a professional and voluntary military makes the entry easier to women, it is as well true that their entry changes the military organisation.

But the most important change, from the point of view of this research, is the turn from conscription to the professional format. After the end of the Cold War, mobilisation for mass armed forces has given way to mobilisation for an all-volunteer professional force. This change is one of the most important ones because it is connected to the new status of the soldiers. They are professionals, but they work in a particular context that has, according to Segal and Kramer, a unique social function: the legitimate management of violence. ''The military requires of its personnel a degree of commitment that differs from that required by other modern organizations'' (Segal & Kramer, 1977). In Italy, there is a pseudo-conscript military, now. But, in a few years, it will become an all-volunteer professional military. It is well-founded to expect an increase in the demand of unionism.

3. MILITARY REPRESENTATION IN THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES

In Italy, the first example of associations with the aim to protect the interests of military personnel dates back to the 1950s, but it concerned only retired personnel. At the end of the 1960s, some of these associations founded the first real trade-union, open also to non-retired personnel: the ANAM. Its activity lay principally in the publication of some reviews (Il corriere dell'aviatore, L'aiutante ufficiale since 1972 Il giornale dei militari, Il nuovo pensiero militare). In 1969, Admiral Marengo asked for authorisation to found a real trade-union, but it was not allowed. Nevertheless, this was the beginning of an inflamed debate about this matter, a lot of questions were submitted and some bills were brought before parliament. The law about the collective representation of military personnel passed on 11 July, 1978 (Law n. 382). It went into effect with the regulations of the Military Representation Act (RARM) on 4 November, 1979 (DPR n. 691). The first elections took place in 1980. The RARM has been amended with two important amendments: on 30 October, 1984 (DPR n. 912) and on 28 March, 1986 (DPR n. 136). In 1986, conscripts entered in Central Representative Council (COCER) with a term of office of 6 months (DPR n. 958, 24 December, 1986). In the end, the Internal Regulation (RIRM) for the organisation and

the operation of military union organisations was published on 9 October, 1985.

How is the Italian union representation of the military personnel organised? In Italy there is an institutionalised internal representation system of the military professional interest. There is a partition in relation to the armed forces or the armed corps (Army, Navy, Air Force, Carabinieri, Customs and Inland Revenue Service) and also in relation to the classes of personnel (A: regular officers; B: non-commissioned officers (NCOs); C: long-term volunteer and military cadets; D: reserve officers in draft service; E: rank and file draftees). The representative bodies are divided into three levels (basic, intermediate and central): COBARs (Basic Representative Councils); COIR (Intermediate Representative Councils); and COCER (Central Representative Council).

COCER is the only superior body who forms the central level. Its members are chosen among themselves by the delegates of COIRs. It is also composed of some committees. It expresses opinions, proposals and requests about the questions of law, economy, social security, health, cultural and moral tutelage. COIRs are the collegiate boards of the intermediate level. They are composed of all the five classes of personnel. There is a COIR for each regional area or equivalent extent (Military Districts, Naval, Air Districts, but also Divisions and Inspectorates). COBARs are the collegiate boards of the basic level and there is one of them for each military unit (battalion level) or equivalent body. They are composed of the representatives of the five classes of personnel. Their composition changes in accordance with the armed forces. There are special rules to fix the number of members. Only COCER has a real trade-union type proposal power. COIRs and COBARs have a proposing and stimulating function. No level has bargaining power. Their jurisdiction is, among other things, to request from the competent hierarchical authority information about, for example, professional qualifying; indemnity for accidents suffered during work; cultural, amusing and welfare activities; cook-house organisation; sanitary conditions; housing, etc. The terms of office are different for the five classes: longer for officers and NCOs; shorter for reserve officers, volunteers, rank and file draftees.

In addition to the institutionalised internal representation system, there are also some professional associations, freely founded and managed generally by retired soldiers. These associations finance themselves by members' fees. They do not depend on state funding and they do not join with any party. Their competence is about all the matters not pertaining to the active service, the discipline and the use of the staff. To summarise, the Italian

model of collective interest representation of military personnel has the following characteristics: (1) Representative bodies are elective. (2) It is an internal system of representation. (3) They are set as mandatory institutional bodies: they only have the right of the representative function. (4) Representation bodies are divided into three levels: basic, intermediate and central. The first and the second are local and regional; the third is national. (5) Members can immediately be re-elected. (6) Some limits of the matters on which they have competence are fixed. They are competent about the service, the discipline and the use of the personnel. (7) The right to strike is not acknowledged.

A research done in the 1980s (Caforio & Nuciari, 1990) showed some problems with collective representation. At first, the research pointed out a notable difference between the interest and the procedure of their defence for the armed forces and the army-corps (Carabinieri and Customs and Inland Revenue Service). Moreover, in the armed forces, the ideal type of officers and NCOs is very different. A second problem pointed out by this research, is the nature of COCER, that is an internal organ and its preferential interlocutor is the top of the hierarchy. From another point of view, it could represent the top of the hierarchy too, and it could have outward, direct and autonomous relations with the political world, with the press, etc. A third problem noticed by the research is the trouble for representatives to store up on adequate patrimony of experiences in order to perform their duties. In other words, the tenure of the office is too short.

If these are some of the most important problems pointed out by Caforio and Nuciari in the 1980s, during the last 20 years a heated debate about the operation of military representatives confirmed their issues and lay stress on some aspects to which the currently considered reform of the military representation ought to consider including, e.g.: (1) Military representative bodies have to be an efficacious instrument of tutelage. An internal instrument of the military structure is more difficult to work with the indispensable qualifications of democracy, autonomy and independence. (2) Military representative bodies claim more power in order to play a more participating role; military leadership considers this to be in conflict with the nature of military activities that are characterised by order and obedience.[1] (3) About classes of personnel, there may be the problem of the prevalence of the more numerous over the less numerous ones. Military representative bodies suggest dividing NCOs into two classes: warrant officers and sergeants. (4) It is suggested to found a studying committee who takes care of women's problems inside the military. These are only some of the aspects of the problems of Italian military collective representation system. As

mentioned above, proposals are still under consideration by the 4th Defence Committee.

4. MILITARY REPRESENTATION IN THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES IN THE TURN FROM CONSCRIPTION TO PROFESSIONAL FORMAT: THE RESEARCH

The current change in the military, particularly the shift to a volunteer force, but also the project of reform, requires wider and more updated analysis and data about this topic, in order to provide the indispensable information for those who are called to decide on it. It seems to be the task of social scientists to provide this. Since the 1980s there has been a lack of studies on the topic. More than 10 years after the study of Caforio and Nuciari, we need to study again the Italian military representatives bodies. From here the idea of this research emerged. Its goals are: (1) to outline the Italian military representative bodies at the beginning of the third millennium; (2) (because they are part of the wider society to which they belong) to study them in the wider, social, political and trade-union context in which they operate; (3) because the military is a sub-society with one's own sub-cultures (Kümmel, 2003), it would be useful to study: the elected members, what they think about their role and how satisfied they are; and the electors, their behaviour and their expectations. In order to obtain these aims, it seems necessary to study: (a) the course of the elections since 1980; (b) how CO-CER is composed, how it works and what it takes care of; (c) public opinion, politics and civil trade-unions attitude about military representative bodies; and (d) (for the last two goals) the military personnel opinion, either the electors or the elected members.

NOTES

1. According to Taylor and Arango. With regard to the US they pointed out that those who take the negative position, for example, state that unionisation would bring about an erosion of discipline, a threat to the hierarchic chain and, above all, would undermine the capacity of the military to carry out its entrusted mission. Among the disadvantages are: danger of internal division of the unit due to new inter-rank conflict, and an increase in the cost of personnel (Taylor & Arango, 1977; Caforio, 1994).

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SOUTH AFRICA: TEN YEARS OF MILITARY UNIONISM

Lindy Heinecken

1. INTRODUCTION

Up until 1993, the South African armed forces were an essentially all-white conscript force, fighting a war 'in proxy' in neighbouring states and within the country, against a perceived communist onslaught. During this period, the former South African Defence Force (SADF) was central to state functioning and funding. With the end of the Cold War and the subsequent demise of Apartheid, the armed forces were forced to adapt not only to the new security environment, but to the imperatives spelt out in the newly forged Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. This was to be a traumatic time for the newly established South African National Defence Force (SANDF), which came into being in April 1994. The challenge of having to integrate seven former enemies into one cohesive force has been no mean task, and the legacies of past loyalties continue to divide the forces. The challenges stretched beyond just the need to integrate, thereby swelling the size of the SANDF, but to downscale the forces to affordable levels in years to come. As Seegers (1996, p. 280) states, "the SANDF encountered two big problems simultaneously, integration and a desperate popular need for employment". Therefore, rationalisation would inevitably be met with some collective resistance. Adapting to the principles enshrined in the Constitution also meant that the SANDF had to adapt its policies and practices

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to meet the democratic imperatives spelt out in the Bill of Rights. Without doubt, one of the most contentious issues was the pressure exerted on the SANDF, even before 1994, to amend its labour relations mechanisms for uniformed personnel. The Constitution provided the legal sanction for military unions and despite vehement resistance, the SANDF eventually had to concede to this right when it lost the case in the Constitutional Court in 1998. Even so, the shock of having to deal with trade unions within its ranks and to bargain with the unions over "all matters of mutual interest" has been no mean feat.

This paper discusses the evolution of military trade unions over the past decade and the different phases, both the union and military leadership have gone through. A chronological account is given of how events unfolded and the reaction of the various parties to the challenges they faced during this era of transformation. Hereby, I do not profess to give a complete overview of every single event, but merely to highlight how the SANDF's unitarist approach to labour relations has led it into conflict with the unions, who have adopted a pluralist stance. This has locked the parties in a phase of confrontational pluralism, where both labour (the military trade unions) and the employer (Department of Defence (DoD)) are unable to reach agreement amicably through the process of collective bargaining. The concern raised is that this stance is detrimental to the efficient functioning of the SANDF and will continue to disrupt employee relations in the DoD, unless both parties adopt a more consultative or corporatist philosophy, aimed at solving problems through collective bargaining, rather than bargaining on the courts to settle disputes.

2. THE CHALLENGE OF TRANSFORMATION

In order to place the discussion on the evolution of military unions in South Africa into context, it is necessary to briefly outline some of the challenges the SANDF faced since the end of the Cold War. Since 1989, the South African armed forces have sought to adjust not only to the new security climate, but pressures from the broader social and political arena. This prompted radical transformation of both the nature and structure of the armed forces, but also of military employment. First was the need to downscale the forces and to replace all-white conscription with a volunteer force representative of broader society. This marked the beginning of a new era for the South African armed forces, as it was not merely a shift to a

volunteer system, but a new Defence Force consisting of seven different armed forces from diverse ethnic, political and military origins.[1]

2.1. Restructuring, Integration and Downsizing

With the formation of the SANDF, a new three-tier contract service system was introduced whereby persons were employed on a long-, medium- and short-term contract. While in theory this system would afford the SANDF greater flexibility and affordability, in practice the reverse emerged largely due to the political imperatives of integration. Many of the newly integrated members were employed on a short-term contract system and protest action, leading to shoot-out over non-renewal of contracts, alerted everyone to the volatile potential this posed. As a solution many were moved over to the medium-term system, or their contracts were renewed. The downside was the evolution of an aging, unaffordable force structure, rank stagnation and ill-discipline, all of which impacted negatively on the SANDF's operational capacity (Department of Defence, 2003a, p. 2). With personnel costs now consuming up to 52% of the defence budget, it was imperative not only to revise the force structure, but to downsize the forces from a peak strength of 101,353 in 1996 to 65,000 (Department of Defence, 2003, p. 11). Up till now, rationalisation has taken place through natural attrition, retirements, non-renewal of contracts, voluntary severance packages (VSPs) and more recently, employer initiated packages (EIPs). This has been a relatively painless process, but has become more tenuous as talks to downsize the forces from around the present force strength of around 77,000–65,000, continue. The SANDF plans to cut existing personnel to free funds for equipment and to reach the ideal budget ratio of 30% operating costs, 30% personnel and 40% capital expenditure. This may mean retrenchments for an estimated 12,000 soldiers (Honey, 2002, p. 28).

To address some of these challenges, HR Strategy 2010 proposed the implementation of a new force design and force structure consisting of the Military Skills Development System, the Core Service Systems and Senior Career System, all of which are contract based. This new HR Strategy is set to down and rightsize the forces, rejuvenate the ageing profile of the forces, and rectify the deteriorating health status of the SANDF (Department of Defence, 2003). The rightsizing process, involved not only force, but also organisational restructuring. Even before the formation of the SANDF, a process was underway to demobilise and disband those units no longer required and to align all operational and support processes to reduce

duplication of defence activities. This process has focused on inter-service co-operation and jointness in terms of management, logistics, command, support, training and deployment, as well as the civilianisation of certain posts and outsourcing (Department of Defence, 2002: 6). All these changes impact on military employment, in terms of available posts, career paths and promotion possibilities. For the past decade, personnel have experienced a seemingly incessant transformation process. This has created much uncertainty with respect to security of tenure, threatened base closures, retrenchment and decline in operational capacity. Inadequate remuneration, allowances, benefits and the continued pressure for the down-scaling of operational capabilities continue to affect morale and the loss of operational and functional expertise (Department of Defence, 2003b, p. 11). This, together with pressures from the broader socio-political environment, provided the impetus for military unionism.

2.2. Factors Facilitating Unionism

When the debate on military unions emerged in Western Europe in the 1970s, Harries-Jenkins (1977) pointed out that "there must not only be a motive/need or unionise, but also the mood to unionise, the opportunity to unionise and a national political culture receptive to military unions". Manley, McNichols, and Young (1977), also identified certain forces that either restrain or advance the development of military unions. These included a belief that the union can be effective, if the rest of the public sector had labour rights, if there was public antipathy towards unions, societal forces such as growing rights-based culture and the DoD's own labour relations policies. When analysing these factors in South Africa, everything pointed to the inevitable emergence of unions within the military. In terms of the classic motive for unionisation, declining service conditions, insecurity over tenure of employment, changing conditions of employment and declining career prospects, provided clear motives (Heinecken, 1995). Added to this was the perception that the chain of command could not be relied upon to address these needs, primarily because the grievance mechanisms were not functioning and there were no forums where uniformed members could articulate, or bargain for their own institutional needs. Members experienced a decline in service benefits with respect to duty buses, housing subsidies, study incentive schemes, military accommodation tariffs and sport allowances (Heinecken, 1997a, p. 50). Therefore, it is not surprising that a survey conducted among officers of all rank groups as early as 1995,

revealed that only 11% agreed that "their interests were well looked after by the respective headquarters and staff divisions". A significant 86% supported "the need to have some representation on pay and promotion issues directly at the highest level". The overwhelming majority, 72%, stated that "as long as it does not harm discipline an independent representative association (not a trade union) is a good idea". However, almost 50% supported the idea that "the SANDF needs a more effective collective bargaining structure (such as a military trade union) to protect the interests of uniform members" (Heinecken, 1997a, p. 48).

This mood to have a union for soldiers gained momentum as both civilians in the DoD, members of the Correctional/Prisons and Police started to belong to unions. Prior to 1993, civilians could only legally belong to personnel associations. As these associations only had consultative and not collective bargaining rights, their effectiveness was limited. Rising labour unrest and growing support for trade unions eventually led to their acceptance. The Public Service Labour Relations Act 102 of 1993, initially excluding the police, was eventually extended to everyone, except uniformed members of the SANDF. Following the decree of the International Labour Organisation Convention No 87 of 1948, on freedom of association and protection of the right to organise, the SANDF was left to create its own labour relations regulations. This it did, with an amendment to the Defence Act, 44 of 1956 on 24 September 1993 and in terms of Section 126B which read as follows:

> "Section 126 B (1) A member of the Permanent Force shall not be or become a member of any trade union as defined in section 1 of the Labour Relations Act, 1956: Provided that this provision shall not preclude any member of such a Force from being or becoming a member of any professional or vocational institute, society, association or like body approved by the Minister." Section 126 B (2) furthermore states that "a member of the SADF who is subject to the said Military Discipline code, shall not strike or perform any act of public protest or participate in any strike or act of public protest or conspire with or incite or encourage, instigate or command any other person (whether or not such person is a member of the SADF or an officer or employee referred to in section 83 A (2) serving in the SADF or a member of any auxiliary or nursing service established under this Act) to strike or to perform such an act or to participate in a strike or such an act." Section 126 C goes on to specify that "any member of the permanent force shall exercise his rights with respect to labour matters in terms of the regulations, and that the State as his employer shall handle and administer all such matters, including the resolution of disputes in accordance with the regulations."

The effect of the above provisions were clear, no person in uniform could belong to any trade union, strike or participate in the activities of a union and all labour matters would be regulated according to internal defence

regulations (Heinecken, 1995, p. 12). This legally barred members from joining unions, but did not distract from the mood to unionise. Following this, the new Labour Relations Act (LRA) 66 of 1995 was passed, granting labour rights to every sector of the labour market including civilians employed in the DoD and the police. Only members of the SANDF, the National Intelligence Agency and the South African Secret Service were excluded from the ambit of the LRA. The spillover effect to members of the SANDF was inevitable, especially as many of the members now serving in the SANDF came from underprivileged backgrounds, had experienced the benefits of trade unionism and joined the military for the pay and service conditions. The SANDF's exclusion from the LRA, also meant that they were excluded from the ambit of the Public Service Co-ordinating Bargaining Council (PSCBC). This was to become an issue in years to come. Besides this, the political climate was receptive to military unionism. The new South Africa came into power on the back of the labour movement and the public was not altogether opposed to these rights being extended to the military. A survey carried out by the Human Sciences Research Council and Institute for Defence Policy in June 1995, showed that 45% of all respondents supported the contention that members of the SANDF should be allowed to belong to trade unions. The greatest support came from black African respondents (52%), the least support from whites (73%). However, most rejected the idea that soldiers should have the right to strike (Schutte and Sass, 1995, p. 52f).

The opportunity to transform this motive and mood to unionise into reality came with the acceptance of the new Constitution for the Republic of South Africa. Both the Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1994 and the final Constitution Act 108 of 1996, stated that: Freedom of association: Sec 18

> "everyone has the freedom of association". Labour relations: Sec 23 (1) that "everyone has the right to fair labour practices, (2) Every worker has the right (a) to form and join a trade union, (b) to participate in the activities and programmes of a trade union; and (c) to strike." Limitation of rights: "These rights may be limited by limited Sec 36 (1) in terms of a law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors including (a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose."

The onus was now on the military to justify that any restriction on trade union rights, such as those imposed in Section 126 of the amended Defence

Act, meet the above-mentioned criteria if it was to withstand a challenge in the Constitutional Court (CC). With this, a group of South African Air Force personnel officers who had attended a labour relations course at the University of Pretoria, began to moot the idea of a union for military personnel. While initially they thought military leadership was receptive to the idea, it became clear when some of the founding members were threatened with prosecution in terms of the Defence Act ''that someone needed to start the union from the outside'' (Van Niekerk, 2004).

3. THE EVOLUTION OF MILITARY UNIONISM: 1994–2004

Subsequently, Maj Cornelius van Niekerk, a personnel officer in the South African Air Force resigned and with his pension fund payment, starred the union. On 26 August 1994, the South African National Defence Union (SANDU) announced its existence in the media – ''a union from the soldiers for the soldiers''. Their mission statement reads: ''To establish the most representative apolitical trade union for workers of the South African National Defence Force which by means of an active and collective power base, represents and promotes the rights and interests of the members in a professional manner, for the benefit of the members and the community''. The issues it planned to take up with military leadership included, equal opportunities for women with respect to housing subsidies, pensions, medical aid and tax, the retrenchment of about 30,000 members due to integration, one-sided decisions which resulted in the erosion of numerous service benefits and decisions to couple market-related prices to state-owned housing (Friedman, 1994, p. 3).

3.1. The Era of Resistance and Repression

On 29 August 1994, a letter with a list of demands from SANDU was addressed to the Minister of Defence and Chief of the Defence Force. Among the demands included, the right to be recognised as a union for soldiers in terms of the Constitution, the right to recruit members during working hours, stop-order facilities, and the right to negotiate on all matters of mutual concern (Botha, 1994). In response, the SANDF requested the following information, SANDU's registration certificate, a namelist of the union's management committee and how the persons were elected (Chief of

the National Defence Force, 1994). Before this information was even provided, the SANDF sent out a notice to all units that trade union activities were in contravention of Section 126 B of the Defence Act, 1957 and constituted a criminal offence (Department of Defence, 1994: 1). This marked the beginning of a long struggle for recognition for SANDU. Although they were registered with the Department of Labour on 26 September 1994, Section 126 B of the Defence Act prohibited their activities in terms of recruiting uniformed personnel. The DoD was under no legal obligation, given the exclusion of the Defence Force from the ambit of the Public Service Labour Relations Act, 1993 and later the Labour Relations Act, 1995, to recognise SANDU as a union representing the interests of members in uniform (Meiring, 1994).

In 1994, the SANDF in an attempt to preempt the need for unions, announced that a 'Forum' structure would be implemented for uniformed members, through which they could channel individual and collective grievances, complaints or suggestions to higher authorities. These Forums for respective rank groups came into affect in 1995, after an increase in labour unrest among soldiers, but did little to parry the union challenge.[2] Surveys conducted in 1995 by Section Effect Analysis throughout the SANDF confirmed that over 50% would join a union if such a union existed (or was legal) (Chief of the SANDF, 1996, p. 3). The fact that civilian employees could legally belong to trade unions and were being actively recruited by these unions increased the demand by SANDU to be treated likewise.[3] Nonetheless, the SANDF was resolute not to recognise any union for uniformed military personnel. During this early period, SANDU's members reported that they were victimised for promoting the union and that union application forms were being destroyed at unit level (De Wet, 1994, p. 6). The SANDF's stance is reflected in the statement by Lt Genl Reg Otto, then Chief of the Army

> "the SANDF and by implication the SA Army, does not recognise any trade union or person claiming to represent leaders of any trade union. The SA Army has very clear command channels to handle grievances. No alternative channel exists. We will not be dictated too by any labour union, or any of its officials. Peace and stability are our concern and it cannot be achieved with bad discipline or the interference of outside institutions".
>
> (Weekend Argus Correspondent, 1995, p. 11)

Similar sentiments were reiterated by Lt Genl Johan Pretorious, a previous Chief of the SA Army, "because of the nature of the trust put in members of the armed forces, it is proper for them to subjugate their personnel interests

to the great task of protecting the sovereignty of the RSA. If they fail to do so, they cannot claim to be military professionals'' (Pretorious, 1995, p. 21).

The main concerns were that trade unions would politicise the military,[4] create division within the ranks along racial lines and would undermine operational effectiveness (Heinecken, 1997b). Military leadership also felt that the wrong perception was being created, namely, that military leadership was not looking after the interests of soldiers. The feeling was that SANDU was exploiting soldiers' vulnerabilities at a time when the SANDF faced enormous challenges. The SANDF's sentiment was, that if it is true that the existing grievances channels are inadequate, that alternatives would be looked into, hence the creation of the Forum structure (Die Soldaat en Arbeidsverhoudinge, 1994). SANDU thought their final break had come when an invitation was received from President Nelson Mandela on 6 April 1995, to discuss their case and the plight of soldiers from the Lenz Military[5] base who had protested (with SANDU's support) against the termination of their short-term contracts. These members were later charged with mutiny (Anon, 1995, p. 5). However, shortly after this meeting President Mandela addressed a letter to SANDU, claiming that he could not repeal Section 126 B of the Defence Act because ''the Defence Force is a critically important institution in our country, on whose shoulders the stability and security to the transition to a democracy rests. Unlike other employees, the uniformed soldier has access to arms and even sophisticated weapons of mass destruction'' (Mandela, 1995). However, the mere fact that President Mandela met with this ''unrecognised'' union, afforded SANDU tremendous legitimacy (Van Niekerk, 2002a, p. 6).

3.2. The Fight for Recognition

Having exhausted all viable alternatives, SANDU turned to the Constitutional Court (CC). On 13 August 1995, the case was presented to the CC and the legal battle to declare Section 126 B inconsistent with the Constitution in terms of the provisions pertaining to freedom of association and labour rights commenced. However, in this application the union made the mistake of referring the matter directly to the CC, instead of the Supreme Court (now High Court), which had the jurisdiction to overturn Section 126 B of the Defence Act, before being referred to the CC for ruling. The case was dismissed with costs and the SANDF was granted reprieve to prepare their case and to promulgate regulations pertaining to the resolution of disputes in terms of Section 126 C of the Defence Act. The Defence Force argued that it needed more time, given the challenges of integration, to

examine international precedents on trade unionism, to establish regulations for the conduct of labour relations in the National Defence Force and to redraft the Defence Act in terms of its collective bargaining system within the Public Service (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 1995).

In the years that followed, no regulations to regulate labour relations for military personnel in terms of Section 126 C were ever promulgated. In the meantime, four public service trade unions representing civilian employees in the DoD were recognised. With growing impatience, SANDU whose membership was increasing at a rate of 250–400 members per month, became increasingly assertive, even threatening industrial action. This came after members at 4 SAI Battalion were forced to sign documents waiving their constitutional right of freedom of association and after special orders were issued that members would be prosecuted if they continued with union activities (Perkins, 1997, p. 10). Of interest, is that no member was ever charged in terms of Section 126 B. This would have lent urgency to SANDU's case and given it untold publicity.

In the meantime SANDU was fighting other Court battles. An urgent court application was brought to the Supreme Court on 5 February 1997 to prohibit the Defence Force from detaining members without the right to a fair trial. This was regarded as unconstitutional. SANDU also continued to challenge SANDF leadership's ability to defend the interests of military personnel in terms of pay and allowances. As uniformed members were excluded under the provisions of the Labour Relations Act and by implication from the Public Service Coordinating Bargaining Council, there was no forum where their interests could be articulated. SANDU argued that this led to insufficient representation and budgeting for special allowances such as danger pay (SANDU News, 7 May 1997). All these events received widespread media attention, enhancing SANDU's legitimacy among its constituency. In a letter addressed to the Minister of Defence on 1 August 1997, SANDU requested the Minister to comment on the progress made with respect to the promulgation of labour regulations in terms of Section 126 C of the Defence Act. The Minister was reminded that should the proposals exclude the recognition of military unions, that a court application would be made to have the matter served before the CC (Van Niekerk, 1997). Having received no response, the case was referred to the Pretoria High Court, where Justice Hartzenburg in the landmark case ruled on 25 November 1998, that Sections 126 B of the Defence Act prohibiting permanent force members from joining trade unions and partaking in protest action were unconstitutional, and the ruling was forwarded to the CC for confirmation.

On 26 May 1999, the CC ruled in favour of members being allowed the freedom of association to join a trade unions and the right to participate in public protest as a fundamental right of freedom of expression (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 1998). The SANDF contested the case on the basis that members of the Permanent Force did not constitute workers under Section 23 of the Constitution. While the CC acknowledged that members of the Permanent Force do not enter a contract of employment, but enrol in the Permanent Force, it nonetheless ruled that this does not preclude them from being excluded under the definition of 'worker' as the International Labour Organisation's interpretation of the term 'worker' extended to the armed forces. All 10 CC judges unanimously agreed that the prohibition on trade union membership for uniformed members of the SANDF infringed the constitutional right of "every worker to form and join a trade union". Secondly, since the Constitution guarantees the freedom of association and fair labour practices, that soldiers are entitled to join unions. Therefore, it was unnecessary to decide whether soldiers qualified as workers. Furthermore, Judge O'Regan ruled that the restrictions on public protest in Section 126 B (2) was in conflict with the principle of freedom of expression. He argued that "a blindly obedient soldier represented a greater threat to the constitutional order than a constitutionally conscientious one who regarded him/herself as a citizen in uniform". In conclusion, the CC ruled that the limitations placed on the rights of uniformed personnel in the Defence Act, went beyond what was reasonable and justifiable to achieve the legitimate state objective of a disciplined military force. As the provision on strike action was not challenged, the CC upheld the prohibition against strike action and the incitement to strike (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 1999). Finally, the CC ordered that the Minister of Defence to promulgate labour regulations that would be consistent with the constitutional rights of members of the Defence Force within 3 months.

3.3. Recognition, Conflict and Co-operation?

The outcome of the Constitutional Court case led to the promulgation of Chapter XX of the General Regulations for the SANDF in the Government Gazette of 20 August 1999 (hereafter General Regulations). These General Regulations provided among others, for the organisational rights of military trade unions (MTUs), rights of trade union representatives, deduction of subscriptions and levies, access to department of defence premises, registration of MTUs, the establishment of a Military Bargaining Council

(MBC), Military Arbitration Board (MAB) and the procedures to refer matters to the High Court in case of disputes (RSA, 1999). However, SANDU was not presented on the drafting committee, nor was their submission prior to the promulgation of the regulations, taken into consideration (Van Niekerk, 1999, 2002b, High Court of South Africa, 2002a). As some of the provisions in the final version of the regulations were even more restrictive than the provisions in the draft, it was inevitable that they would be challenged. Nonetheless, for the time being the General Regulations opened the door for the union to be legally registered and recognised by the DoD.[6]

SANDU met both the threshold requirement for registration of 5,000 members and recognition, 15,000 members to serve on the MBC. SANDU was formally registered on 30 June 2000, but other unions that emerged shortly after the General Regulations were promulgated, namely the Military Trade Union of South Africa (MTUSA), the South African National Union of Soldiers (SANUS) and the South African Security Forces Union (SASFU), also applied. Of the three, only SASFU met the registration criteria of 5,000, but was soon thrown into disrepute after it was found to have received financial support from the Police Prisons and Civil Rights Union (POPCRU), a militant police union, affiliated to the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and politically aligned to the African National Congress.[7] This was precisely the concern the SANDF raised against unions. From the onset, it was clear that SASFU was recruiting along racial lines and had a strong following among members of the former non-statutory forces. The link with POPCRU was in violation of the General Regulations that prohibit any military trade union from affiliating or associating with (a) "any labour organisation, labour association, trade union or labour federation that is not recognised and registered: and (b) any political party or organisation". SASFU was notified that their registration would be withdrawn, should these links not be severed.

Being the only union to have met the threshold requirement of 15,000, SANDU met for the first time with the SANDF as 'employer' on the MBC in October 2000. This, and subsequent MBC meetings were tense, especially when it came to the new staffing policy which SANDU believed led to grosly unfair labour practices. Other heated issues included the deduction of sports and regimental fees from members' salaries, voluntary service packages, non-statutory force pensions, the merit award system, problems with the grievance procedure, court martials, notch increases and some of the provisions in the General Regulations. Some issues were resolved, such as unit deductions for sport and regimental funds, but in many cases the

SANDF implemented changes unilaterally resulting in growing hostility between the parties. In the subsequent meetings of the MBC in 2001, the minutes reflected a reserved willingness by the SANDF to involve SANDU in respective workgroups and discussions to address matters of mutual concern. As more issues were tabled, growing tension emerged between the parties and SANDU became increasingly frustrated with the delays in terms of the implementation and resolution of disputes. Judging from the minutes, it is clear that the bargaining process was not only hampered by power relations between the parties themselves, but the impact of decision-makers outside the MBC, namely the Secretary of Defence which was seen by the union as 'interfering with the responsibilities and obligations of the Chief of the SANDF' and Minister of Defence, in terms of ratifying certain decisions and the functioning of the MAB.

On 29 August 2001, the Joint Standing Committee on Defence received a briefing on the military trade unions, aimed at reviewing the relationship between the DoD and SANDU. At this meeting, the SANDF sketched some of the problems it was experiencing with respect to the issues raised by SANDU, for example, the "insistence of SANDU to be involved in managerial matters, the militant spirit of the union 'typical of trade unions', the flood of administrative complaints brought to the MDC, the use of the media to discredit individuals and the tabling of issues, such as pensions, which 'is not a matter for negotiations'". The meeting portrayed the sentiment that the military unions were potentially dangerous (Joint Standing Committee on Defence, 2001). With this, the Minister of Defence suspended the activities of the Military Bargaining Council during September 2001, effectively ending the collective bargaining process as it pertained to uniformed members. With negotiations impasse, approximately 1,000 SANDU members took part in a protest march on 31 January 2002, expressing their dissatisfaction with the DoD's disregard for the General Regulations and the "unfair human resource policies and procedures" (Van Niekerk, 2002, p. 6). A dispute was declared over the unilateral amendments and implementation of exiting personnel-related policies/issues affecting the rights and interests of its members. SANDU had insisted that a moratorium be placed on the staffing process, failing which the process would be contested. This appeal was based on the claim that the union had received 456 staffing complaints over alleged irregularities in the appointment procedures. The same applied to the revision of the merit award bonus system, and the replacement of the Voluntary Severance Package (VSP) with the new Employer Initiated Severance Package (EIP), and NSF pensions (Van Niekerk, 2001).

During this period, some of the issues were referred to the MAB (which came into effect on 3 July, 2002)[8] such as NSF pension payouts, the staffing process, amendments to the General Regulations, Transformation and Restructuring of the Public Service, the mediation agreement and maternity leave. Of interest, is that at one of the MAB meetings, the legal standing of Mr van Niekerk as General Secretary of SANDU was questioned. A so-called Steering Committee called for his suspension.[9] Although the MAB found Mr van Niekerk's appointment legitimate, the DoD continued to direct correspondence to both "leaders", SANDU and the Steering Committee. An interdict was later brought against the Steering Committee by the High Court and shortly after this SANDU held its first National Conference (SANDU, 2002). With tensions between the parties reaching a peak, numerous attempts were made to mediate between the parties with the aim of resolving the 129 issues still outstanding on the MBC. The matters referred to the MAB were also still pending. According to the DoD, the reasons why the issues were not resolved were because of the

> "different pending court cases, the anomalies of certain sections of the General Regulations, SANDU's insistence to be involved in managerial matters and the denial of the managerial prerogative and responsibilities as provided for in all recognised labour practice and the perceived calculated confrontational stance of SANDU, possibly linked to their quest for membership".
>
> (Department of Defence, 2003)

3.4. Bargaining 'on' the Courts

Against the background of growing tensions between SANDU, the Employer and the Minister of Defence, SANDU turned to the Pretoria High Court to intervene against the Minister's authority to suspend negotiations in the MBC and the DoD's unilateral implementation of policies. In two separate High Court applications in July 2002, SANDU sought to declare that the Minister of Defence has firstly, an obligation to negotiate on all matters of mutual interests and secondly, that the provisions in the General Regulations that are an infringement of the Bill of Rights in Chapter 2 of the Constitution, be corrected or set aside. In terms of the first issue, Justice van der Westhuizen ruled that there was no constitutional imperative that imposed a duty on the DoD to participate in collective bargaining. He went on to state that "the Constitution properly interpreted permits a right to engage in collective bargaining and that such right is in the nature of a freedom. Consequently the employer has a choice rather than a duty to negotiate with

the employee trade unions" (High Court of South Africa, 2002a). Without ado, this judgement was challenged by SANDU, but as the wheels of justice turned the DoD continued with the Restructuring and Transformation Process (TRP) as agreed by the Government for the wider public service, known as Resolution 7/2002. Both SANDU, by now representing approximately 30% and SASFU, 18% of uniformed SANDF members in the SANDF, took exception to this (High Court of South Africa, 2002b). A dispute was referred to the MAB on 6 August 2002, but while still pending, the DoD continued implementation of Resolution 7/2000 as this process was due to be completed on 30 June 2003.

During this period, numerous meetings were held with the MTUs to ensure that the process was fair and justifiable, but this did not subdue the unions' persistence that Resolution 7/2002 did not apply to members of the SANDF. As a result of the TRP members faced being matched and placed, redeployed, transferred within the DoD, redeployed and transferred to other public service departments, forced to resign or be retrenched, without being consulted. According to SANDU, "the future careers, families, social and economic well-being, morale, discipline, loyalty, levels of motivation and fundamental rights could be affected by these unilateral and unlawful actions of the DoD" (Van Niekerk, 2003). This lent some urgency to the appeal against the ruling of Judge van der Westhuizen and the Minister of Defence's suspension of the MBC.

In July 2003, the Pretoria High Court overruled Judge van der Westhuizen's ruling and ordered that the SANDF had the duty to negotiate with military trade unions about matters that affect the working conditions of soldiers. The SANDF was ordered to stop the TRP process pending the outcome of arbitration. This implied that the SANDF could not go ahead with the redeployment of almost 8,000 soldiers who were mostly earmarked to go to other government departments (Pretoria News, 2003, p. 1). Furthermore, that the DoD was to stop the implementation of any matter that forms the subject of collective bargaining that has already been referred to the MAB. According to Judge Bertelsmann, the Regulations in CH XX impose a duty on the DoD to negotiate on all matters that effect the rights and interests of members of the SANDF. He stated that "in the absence of a right to strike, the denial of the right of collective bargaining would emasculate the labour rights protected by the Constitution, and trade unions would be left to the whim of employers, with no other recourse" (Lange, 2003, p. 4). This favourable judgement followed on a number of other victories for SANDU in terms of the Regulations. As previously mentioned, the General Regulations were promulgated without any input from

SANDU and the appeals to amend certain provisions came to no avail. The regulations to be challenged included:

- *Regulation 8 (b)*–Limitation on the right to protest action in respect of any matter concerning their employment relationship in the DoD. The Court ruled that it is inconsistent with the Constitution and is to be severed from the regulations.
- *Regulation 13 (a)*–Prohibiting MTUs from associating of affiliating to trade unions and federations not registered in terms of Chapter XX (i.e., any private sector union or organisation or professional body). The Court declared this restriction to be inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid and as such, to be severed from the Regulations.
- *Regulation 19*–Prohibition to negotiate a closed shop or agency shop agreement. The Court declared this to be inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid and to be severed from the Regulations.
- *Regulation 25 (a–b) and 27*–Prohibitions preventing the union from representing its members with respect to grievances and disciplinary proceedings. The aspects limiting the right of MTUs to represent their members to be removed from the Regulations.
- *Regulation 3 (c) and 36*–Restrictions on the right to negotiate over all matters of mutual interest between the Employer and the MTUs. The word 'certain' to be severed from the Regulations and that Section 36 be declared inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid to the extent that it purports to limit the right of military trade unions to engage in collective bargaining.
- *Regulation 37*–The complete ban on the union's contact with members while undergoing military training and operations. This Regulation is declared to be inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid and to be severed from the Regulations.
- *Regulation 73*–The extent to which the Minister of Defence has the power to appoint the members of the Military Arbitration Board. This regulation is declared to be inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid to the extent that it empowers the first respondent to appoint the members of the MBA. The Judge ordered that for this regulation to be amended 6 weeks after the date of the court case.

The outcomes of the various court judgements implied that the TRP had to be suspended and that any matter that formed the subject of collective bargaining or had been referred to the MAB, be placed on hold until it could be resolved on either the MBC or MAB. A number of disputes remained unresolved before the MAB, such as the new performance appraisal

system for members of the SANDF, which was not negotiated with SANDU and the new working hours policy affecting fire and rescue services personnel and NSF pensions. A duty was imposed on the DoD to negotiate on all matters that effect the rights and interests of members of the SANDF in the workplace.

Whereas, before SANDU was not permitted in terms of the General Regulations to represent its members in grievance, disciplinary and court proceedings, the Court now afforded them this right. This will strengthen the MTU's influence at grassroots level and pose a challenge to commanders who have resisted the unions. The prohibition on members of the SANDF to partake in the activities and programmes of SANDU during military operations, military exercises and military training (including international obligations) was also overruled. This implies that the MTUs have the right to liase or consult with their members during these periods, a right formerly denied. Another important victory was the right to negotiate a closed-shop or agency fee agreement. The courts did not grant SANDU the right to a closed-shop or agency fee agreement, but argued that this could not be excluded from being a point for negotiation. Should this be granted, it may well boost union membership. A recent survey within the DoD indicated that personnel felt,

> "that management is not concerned with the interest of all members/personnel and does not understand their problems and needs. The way rationalisation, affirmative action and personnel development are managed is perceived negatively and many expressed low levels of satisfaction with the DoD as employer, especially with respect to efficiency in meeting personal development needs and the flow of information".
>
> (Defence Inspectorate, 2003)

The Minister of Defence's right to appoint the registrar for Military Trade Unions was also curtailed. As it stood, the present incumbent Mr Joy Rathebe is the legal advisor to the office of the Secretary of Defence and could therefore not be seen as an independent registrar. This in effect evicts him from the post. Similarly, the Minister of Defence no longer has the power to appoint the five members of the MAB. Whether the DoD will appeal against any of these rulings, is yet to be seen.

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Besides the unique challenges the transformation process posed for the South African armed forces many of the same social forces that led to military unionism elsewhere were evident in South Africa – a sense of

frustration among military personnel as they witnessed a decline in their service conditions, rising occupationalism within the ranks, a dominant trade union culture receptive to unionism, a growing rights-based culture and most important, the legal opportunity to organise (Caforio, 2003). Like Europe, trade unions rights for military personnel were not secured through collective bargaining, but by government initiated legislation that guaranteed certain inalienable rights to individuals irrespective of employment. In terms of the gains made by SANDU, the victories have not been a result of collective bargaining, but rested on certain inalienable rights guaranteed in the Constitution. The MTUs in South Africa "bargained on the courts" to gain "collective bargaining rights". Based on these legal imperatives, the SANDF has been compelled to align its command and managerial attitudes to manage this reality. This has led to a clash in culture, as military leadership conforms to classic unitarist principles, while the legislative framework supports a pluralist approach to labour relations (Nel, 2002, p. 5). The two approaches to labour relations have placed labour relations in the DoD in a permanent state of dynamic tension.

In theory, the unitarist approach to labour relations is based on the principle of mutual co-operation and harmony. From this perspective, trade unions are seen as detrimental to the loyalty and commitment of employees and to the goals of the organisation. Conflict is believed to be primarily frictional, due to incompatible personalities,[10] misunderstandings ascribed to faulty communication, a lack of understanding, or the cause of agitators inciting the majority. The response to collective employee dissatisfaction is to improve internal communication mechanisms, coupled with appeals for loyalty and where this fails, increased legal intervention by threatening legal sanction (Salamon, 1987, p. 27). Typical tactics in dealing with unions include dismissal of union activists, delaying recognition, postponing meetings, treating union representatives with disrespect and following an excessively legalistic approach. Should they be compelled to negotiate with trade unions, they continue along unitary lines, limiting the issues they are prepared to bargain over (Farnham & Pimlott, 1995, p. 46). In this regard, the preceding discussion on the evolution of labour relations in the DoD over the past 10 years is a classic example of the implications the adherence to a unitarist perspective holds for armed forces in an environment where the legal dispensation favours a more pluralist approach.

In South Africa, this has resulted in an impasse in terms of the management of employee relations in the armed forces. The problem in this particular case is not only in terms of power relations, diverging values and personality issues, but because the legislative framework that regulates the

relationship is fundamentally flawed. As the state is the guardian of public interest, the obligation rests upon it to provide a legislative framework that can balance the needs of the military as employer, versus the needs of the union as a legitimate voice of the soldiers. The acceptance of fundamental rights of soldiers negates the possibility of turning back to unitarist practices, but neither can the military function within a framework of confrontational pluralism that proves incompatible with its functional needs. All three parties, the state (as legislator), the DoD (as employer) and the unions (as employees) need to move towards consensus-building based on mutual respect for each other's needs and rights within a democracy. This is commonly accepted in South Africa, but implies the right to be consulted on matters regulating employee relations. The question raised by the DoD is how far does the right to collective bargaining stretch, without it undermining management prerogative? (Shoke, 2003). Once the right to negotiate has been conceded, it grants the union ipso facto significant powers. The question is what action if any, can be taken against a highly unionised military force, that irrespective of any legal prohibition against striking exerts pressure upon the military leadership or government in power to concede to its demands?

Most European armed forces tend to follow a consultative or corporatist approach to employee relations. Freedom of association is recognised and where unions exist, their legal standing and right to be consulted on a wide range of issues is recognised by the state and military leadership alike. Of interest, is that where these rights have been granted, the unions have not acted in self-interest, but along corporatist lines. Their aims according to Caforio (2003, p. 319) have been among others, to defend the moral and professional interests of members, to enhance the profession in the eyes of the public, to inform commanders on personnel problems, to collaborate in solving personnel problems, to inform members on personnel issues, to defend the interests of retired personnel and to participate in bodies for social and cultural promotion. The cardinal difference between the European associations/unions and the South African military unions is that the former is corporatist and professional, based on the principles of joint consultation and joint decision making, rather than on an us–them relationship based on collective bargaining. In terms of South Africa, military unionism is caught in the wrath of confrontational pluralism and it will take some time before an amicable middle ground is found. Unlike Europe, the only role models have been other unions in the public service, which are notoriously militant. Slowly, there is the reluctant acceptance that the 'collective labour voice of soldiers' cannot be ignored (Ministerial Committee of Inquiry, 2001). The

challenge for all, is to move away from the present confrontational stance towards a form of consultative pluralism, or corporatism that embraces a value system acceptable to all concerned.

NOTES

1. The forces which formed the new South African National Defence Force in 1994 and consisted of the five statutory defence forces, namely the South African Defence Force (SADF), the four homeland defence forces: the Transkei Defence Force, the Boputhaswana Defence Force, the Venda Defence Force and the Ciskei Defence Force (collectively known as the TBVC forces) and the two non-statutory forces, the African National Congress' political wing Umkhonto we Sizwe, the Pan African Congress' political wing the Azanian Peoples' Liberation Army and later also the KwaZulu Self Protection Force.

2. Labour unrest surfaced among the predominantly Black uniformed members during the integration phase at the Wallmannstal assembly point in 1994. In 1994, in another incident, a group of short-term service members from the former APLA, MK and SADF marched up to the Union Buildings in September 1995 against the termination of their contracts and also to bring their grievances to the attention of the President. These soldiers were later charged with mutiny.

3. The DoD recognised the National Education Health and Allied Workers Union on 10 August 1995, granting them access to units, recruiting rights, permission to make use of unit notice boards and access to information as per conditions agreed upon in the recognition agreement.

4. All the seven forces integrated into the new SANDF had their own political alliances. The concern was that unions would develop along these lines, thereby undermining the integration process and the SANDF's attempt to create unity among the different sectors.

5. SANDU had taken up the case of the soldiers who were being held in detention without trail and was successful in securing their release on bail on the grounds that the Constitution made provision for everyone to be heard before a court or where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum.

6. In an interview with Mr Cornelius van Niekerk, he claimed that SANDU was given 1 week to comment on the regulations prior to their promulgation. Despite a lengthy submission, none of their recommendations were taken into consideration in the formulation of the regulations, June 2004.

7. This was confirmed in SASFU's Secretariat Report, presented at the National Executive Committee, Orchidea Hotel, Pretoria, October 2000.

8. The Regulations made provision for the Minister to appoint five independent arbitrators. After much negotiation, it was agreed that the union could nominate two persons, the Employer (DoD) the other two and the Chair would be agreed upon by both parties. SANDU, nevertheless insisted, that the regulations be amended to reflect this agreement.

9. The Steering Committee was concerned with the collapse of the MBC, compliance with the General Regulations and various other problems facing SANDU.

The Steering Committee also requested that all correspondence between the SANDF and SANDU be directed to them to enable them (the Steering committee) to protect the interests of the members. SANDU filed an urgent application to the High Court.

10. Mention needs to be made of the fact that many in the DoD regard Mr van Niekerk of SANDU as being a major stumbling block in the smooth running of labour relations in the Department because of his aggressive and confrontational attitude during proceedings. This opinion was expressed in numerous interviews with persons in the Directorate Labour and Service Relations as well as in the Confirmatory Affidavits of Dr Mary Lebwaba and Col Gysbert J. du Plessis, Case No. 29868/2001.

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PART VIII: THE TURKISH MILITARY IN TRANSITION

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INTRODUCTION

A. Kadir Varoğlu

Besides the main theme of interim conference of RC01 in Ankara which was "Military Missions and Their Implications Reconsidered: The Aftermath of September 11th" and its implications for the Turkish Armed Forces, the Research Committee encouraged the hosts of the meeting to arrange two separate sessions for discussing the tremendous transition process of the Turkish Army which is characterised by the following developments:

(1) *Environment*. Both the international and the task environment are changing for the Turkish Armed Forces. Even though the perceived internal threats – like ethnic separatism and fundamentalism – and external threats continue to some extent, peace support operations, humanitarian aid and disaster relief have started to gain priority. Also, the Turkish Armed Forces have started to contribute to the restructuring process of some Caucasian and Balkan Armed Forces. While the environmental uncertainty has been decreasing in terms of traditional threats, new mission areas have been coming up. Since the needs of the Armed Forces have changed, a structural transformation has become necessary.
(2) *Size*. The size of the conscription Armed Forces in Turkey has continually been reduced since the 1990s. In fact, it was an outcome of the intent to professionalise and also of the changing nature of threats and missions. Both downsizing numbers and delayering (abolishing the levels of regiments and divisions) are major trends in the restructuring of the Armed Forces. As a result, more responsive, flexible, organic and flatly structured units and headquarters are expected.

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(3) *Technology*. The modernisation projects have generated a demand for technologically competent personnel in the Turkish Armed Forces. These projects do not only cover weapons, equipment and material systems, but also information and service technologies at the headquarters.
(4) *Strategy*. There are many changes in the strategic choices of the functional areas of the Armed Forces. For human resources management policies, the use of rational performance measurement tools, the recruitment of females into combat branches and as non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and total quality management applications are some examples. In training and education, preferring modern leadership training processes, having accreditation for officer and NCO education or promoting post-graduate studies among personnel are some indicators of policy changes.
(5) *Culture*. Apparently, the cultural changes in the parent society trigger some changes in values, attitudes, expectations and beliefs within the Turkish Armed Forces. Even though the corporate culture of the Turkish Armed Forces is very strong and has pioneered most of the modernisation trends in Turkey, as a very integrated part of society, its culture is showing more egalitarian values (creating empowerment) and is becoming more open to public evaluations.

As a result of these exemplified changes, the Turkish Army is transforming from the institutional to the occupational model. Because of the changing nature of it, it was the aim to present the Turkish military as a research subject for national and international scholars in these special sessions. Turkey and the Turkish Armed Forces have not yet been analysed from the perspective of military sociology. Even though there are some research attempts by political science with respect to civil–military relations and military interventions between 1960 and 1980, the Turkish Armed Forces were not, for example, evaluated from a postmodern perspective in detail and peculiarities of this very old and dynamic organisation have not been the topic of sociological research *per se*. In some efforts to analyse the Turkish military, very few post-graduate students have tried to incorporate the postmodern framework into their studies that can also be used to illustrate the wealth of potential research areas in the Turkish military.

A few of the variables of the postmodern framework that we have used are the definition of major mission and public attitudes towards the military. Defining the mission of the Turkish Armed Forces can broadly be compared to that of many other countries. In addition to preparing its forces for in-country counter-terrorism operations, gendarmerie missions and

peacekeeping operations abroad, it also acts as a 'finishing school' for young Turkish males. This includes a wide range of areas such as literacy skills and sex education. As regards the public attitudes towards the military which offer another possible research area it may be said that the Turkish military is seen as a rite of passage for young men. This can be witnessed at any bus terminal when young soldiers are sent-away for service. The commotion created by this is unparalleled to any other social event in Turkey. These are only a few of the variables of the postmodern framework, but they show the abundance of research questions related to the Turkish Armed Forces. It is believed that the Turkish Armed Forces present a ripe and unique opportunity for military sociological research.

In addition to such macro-level evaluations of the Turkish Armed Forces, the following are some possible research questions that show the uniqueness of Turkey in sociological and psychological terms: (1) In the Dardanelles campaign, the Turkish soldiers carried wounded enemy soldiers to a safe zone even under intense exchange of fire. They also shared their food and water when the fighting came to a standstill. What aspects of that culture are still present in today's Turkish Armed Forces? (2) What factors can account for the unbroken chain of command among Turkish military personnel captured in the Korean War despite all the interrogation techniques used by the Chinese? (3) In Turkey, comradeship or brotherhood in arms are deemed to be beyond kinship and ranks and posts during the service, and are kept in use in daily life even years after military service has been completed. How can sociology explain this social structure? (4) According to some public opinion polls, the Turkish military is one of the most reliable and trusted institutions of the country. What effect does this have on civil–military relations? (5) In peacekeeping operations, the Turkish Army had no frictions with troops from other nations or with local people. What kind of training and culture brings about this kind of interaction?

In two consecutive special sessions on "The Turkish Army in Transition", 10 papers were presented and four of them were found eligible for publication. They can be found in this section. These papers are encouraging steps for comprehending the Turkish Armed Forces. There is a need to convince both civilian academics and military personnel with academic background to utilise the methodologies and perspectives of military sociologists.

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THE TURKISH MILITARY ETHOS AND ITS COMPATIBILITY WITH THE NATIONAL TURKISH CULTURE

A. Kadir Varoğlu, Ünsal Sığrı and Erbil Işın

1. INTRODUCTION

In this paper we present the findings of a study on the differences or the harmony of Turkish military vs. Turkish national culture. We approached this issue by using work-related value orientations. Hofstede's research provided an organisation-based look into national cultural differences and we used his work to evaluate the Turkish national culture and its compatibility with the Turkish military culture. The data about the characteristics of the Turkish military culture are based on observations.

2. MILITARY AND NATIONAL CULTURE

The Turkish Armed Forces are an organisation that has a unique culture. It is influenced by the cultures of small groups and individuals that come together to form the organisation. An organisation itself is not a closed system. It interacts with its environment. Sectoral cultures like NATO and

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the UN as elements of this environment, impact on organisational culture. The last century increased the importance of the sectoral culture because of the globalisation in civilian life and internationalisation in military life. International organisations like NATO and the UN play important roles in conflicts all around the world. Multinational operations as in Kosovo, Bosnia–Herzegovina, and Afghanistan are conducted by these international organisations. This process of internationalisation affects the armies that take part in these operations and it becomes even more complicated with the expansion of NATO. Above these cultural levels (individual, group and sectoral level), mostly national culture influences shape the organisational culture. Understanding these interactions will provide us some better solutions and some new ways of solving culture-related problems.

To understand the interactions deeply, one must be aware of cultural differences or harmony. Many social scientists developed frameworks for examining cultures. In this study, like so many researchers, we used Hofstede's dimensions. Hofstede (1991) has identified work-related dimensions along which national cultures vary: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, masculinity, and long-term orientation. Hofstede's empirical results have been replicated at the national level. To compare the Turkish military ethos with national culture, we used these empirical results. But in our study only four dimensions are included. The fifth dimension, long-term orientation, has been excluded because there are no empirical results for Turkey in Hofstede's research. The term 'ethos' refers to the fundamental character or spirit of a culture. It is the underlying sentiment that informs the beliefs, customs or practices of a society. In this study we mostly tried to emphasise the specific characteristics of the Turkish military culture. The data were collected based on observations and some recent empirical researches will be mentioned in the following parts to support these observations.

3. TURKISH MILITARY AND NATIONAL CULTURE COMPARED

3.1. Individualism – Collectivism

Individualism–collectivism reflects the extent to which people prefer to take care of themselves and their immediate families, remaining emotionally independent from groups, organisations, and other collectivities (Schneider & Barsoux, 1997). Individualism exists when people define themselves as

individuals. It implies loosely knit social frameworks in which people are supposed to care for themselves and their immediate families. Collectivism is characterised by tight social frameworks in which people distinguish between their own groups (in-groups such as relatives, clans, and organisations) and other groups. In Hofstede's research (1980) Turkey scored 37 points; that accounts for a collectivist culture. Similar to the national culture, military culture is also collectivist. Collectivism in the Turkish national culture positively affects the identification with the troops and the uniform. Also, loyalty to the in-group and shared targets are the major contributions of collective culture. In this culture, saying 'we' rather than 'I', self-sacrifice for the group is taught. People prefer to be managed as a group rather than as an individual. Professional life is seen as a part of individual life and interference into family life by the military is accepted as normal. Military life style and norms could easily invade private life. If there is an important task to finish, leisure time can be used easily. There is a common saying that "being a soldier is not an occupation, it is a life style". Officers and non-commissioned officers see the military life as a life-long career and most of them stay in the military during their whole working life.

Loyalty to the leader is not based on the mutual exchange of interests; rather it is the outcome of an ethical process because of the acceptance and intermediary effects of the peers. Disobedience leads to shame and loss of face for oneself and the group. This relationship between the individual and group creates the right for the control of the individual by the group. The emphasis on harmony and consensus helps the military leader to establish the team spirit easily. Since the purpose of education is learning how to do something and collectivism does not allow for learning how to learn, this cultural characteristic sometimes creates a hurdle to creativity. The emphasis of groupthink has almost the same influence on individual creativity and competition. The other disadvantage of a collectivist culture could be the prevalence of relationship over task.

3.2. Power Distance

Power distance is the extent to which people believe that power and status are distributed unequally and accept an unequal distribution of power as the proper way for social systems to be organised. In organisations, power distance influences the amount of formal hierarchy, the degree of centralisation, and the amount of participation in decision-making (Hofstede, 1991). Power distance ranges from small to large. A small power distance

society is less comfortable with power differences such as social class distinctions or organisational ranking, while in a large power distance culture, differences among people with different ranks are accepted, and an individual's societal or organisational position influences how he acts and how others treat him (Adler, 1991).

In Hofstede's research Turkish national culture is seen as an example of a high power distance. Similar to the national culture, military culture is also an example of a high power distance. This is supported by a recent empirical study by Colonel Basım (2000) who found that Turkish military leaders show high power distance tendencies. In the Turkish Army there is a high level of hierarchy that supports obedience and rule compliance. This characteristic supports military leaders in the acceptance of the decisions by the subordinates because obedience is taught by the parents. Hierarchical structure and inequalities between the leader and followers are somewhat given. As a result, age and seniority are valued. The leaders are expected to show benevolent–autocratic behaviour which is, under combat circumstances, unavoidable. It is easy to gain the trust of subordinates because of high power distance and former experience in the family and school. In other words, the military leader is expected to be treated with respect as the father of a family or the teacher of a class who knows and protects the others.

In rural areas of the country, the conscripts with ranks of sergeant are called with their ranks by their friends in their civilian life and they are respected till they die. Above all, power distance creates a kind of charisma and heroic figure in the eyes of subordinates. In the Turkish military, this legitimacy is emphasised to balance the power sources of leaders. Considering the disadvantages of a high power distance, centralisation is popular; subordinates expect to be told what to do which results in the leader carrying all the responsibilities of decisions. This high power distance results in more top–down communication. The most dangerous case for the military leader is to lose the trust and to create a feeling that he could not protect the followers.

3.3. Uncertainty Avoidance

Uncertainty avoidance refers to a society's discomfort with uncertainty, preferring predictability and stability (Trompenaars, 1993). Uncertainty avoidance measures the extent to which people in a society feel threatened by ambiguous situations and the extent to which they try to avoid these situations by providing greater career stability, establishing more formal

rules, rejecting deviant ideas and behaviour, and accepting the possibility of absolute truths and the attainment of expertise. Turkish national and military cultures are examples of strong uncertainty avoidance. In the same research by Colonel Basım (2000) that was mentioned above, Turkish military leaders showed strong uncertainty avoidance. The emotional need to be busy and the inner urge to work hard are advantages for military leaders in the Turkish culture. This characteristic provides cultural support for the tight rules, precision, punctuality, formalisation, and management of uncertainty requirements of military environments. As an example, the commanding system continues until two soldiers are left in any military environment to reduce the uncertainty and because the seniority specified even with the days would provide the right to command the other.

Obedience includes absoluteness and even to have the right to order the death as was the case during the Dardanelles campaign exemplified by Kemal Atatürk. The founder of the Turkish republic, Atatürk was colonel at that time and he ordered the troops without any weapon because "I do not order you to attack but to die." Here we must emphasise that obedience is not a barrier to initiative, which is an important trait for soldiers, because obedience is based on knowledge, training, patience, and fortitude. The military leader is expected to be strong, problem-solving, and reducing risky situations. In terms of the followers, it is possible to motivate by security, a sense of belonging and esteem rather than achievement needs. Being patriotic is a basic attitude and the leaders emphasise this as a significant value. Sending male citizens of the country to conscription is a reason for widespread celebrations and informal ceremonies within the family and among close friends.

Completing military service is seen as an indicator of adulthood, otherwise the males would not be allowed to marry especially in rural areas, since they are perceived as lacking military experience. This experience is seen as a basic input to the rest of the life in terms of learning discipline, responsibility, sharing, and courage. As a disadvantage the cultural trait of strong uncertainty avoidance creates resistance to change. In this culture people believe that the current situation is better because it is known. Change will bring uncertainties and risks. To avoid this uncertainty, resistance to change occurs.

3.4. Masculinity and Femininity

The masculinity/femininity dimension reveals the bias towards either 'masculine' values of assertiveness, competitiveness, and materialism, or towards

'feminine' values of nurturing, and the quality of life and relationships (Hall & Hall, 1997). Masculinity is the extent to which the dominant values in society emphasise assertiveness and the acquisition of money and things (materialism), while not particularly emphasising concern for people. Femininity is the extent to which the dominant values in society emphasise relationships among people, concern for others and the overall quality of life. Turkey is slightly feminine in national culture. The military culture does not differ from the national culture. As having the characteristics of feminine culture, in the Turkish military culture, dominant values of caring for others and sympathy for the weak guide leaders to influence the subordinates for the military mission. This cultural characteristic emphasises people and warm relationships to exhibit the benevolent behaviour of the leader. Immaterialism makes it easier to emphasise concepts like country, flag and honour. The use of intuition and strive for consensus help leaders to make better decisions. Relative gender equality leads to sharing the task of defending the country. Because of this feminine culture female officers have not encountered big problems in the Turkish Armed Forces. The acceptance of average as a norm, small and slow change process, and the denial of material success and progress are some hurdles for the leader.

4. CONCLUSIONS

In the Turkish Army, values like loyalty to the nation and country, obedience, determination and endurance, courage and bravery, self-sacrifice, getting along with peers, ethical behaviour, altruism, love of profession (professionalism), responsibility for duty, honesty, and competence are written and adopted. These values are socially constructed through long years of experience going back to 209 BC. The source of this military culture is national culture. The national culture of Turkey is much correlated with the values of the military culture of the army. We think that the reason for this is that the Turkish Armed Forces are a good sample of the overall nation because of conscription. The dimensions of uncertainty avoidance and power distance are related not only to the national culture but also to the formal and centralised structure of the Turkish Armed Forces. Officer training, written rules, and social norms support the reasons for observing these cultural characteristics clearly. In this sense one important point is that the models that are developed in different cultures cannot always be applied to every nation without examining the cultural differences. For example, terms like total quality management, being a learning organisation and

being creative were developed in the cultures of low power distance and uncertainty avoidance. Applying these titles to the cultures of high power distance and uncertainty avoidance will create problems.

In this situation we have four alternatives to choose. First is to give up implementing the model. Second is to behave as if you are implementing. Third is to adapt these models to the characteristics of nations or organisational culture; and, finally, the fourth is to lower power distance and uncertainty avoidance. In the end, we must emphasise that every national culture is transient in its characteristics because of the impact of universal values, economic trends, and technological developments. For example, the research results show that Turkish culture has become more individualist over the last 20 years. However, globalisation is not reducing the local impact of the national culture. The armies of the 21st century should find global solutions to the leadership as a force multiplier.

The workforce is becoming more diverse; increasing diversity is forcing organisations to recognise the cultural backgrounds of their members. Those organisations which can adapt to 'culturally different' members will have the opportunity to attract and retain the most qualified people in these groups and to elicit the best performance from them (Abbasi & Hollman, 1991). It happens almost the same way in the Armed Forces due to the increasing numbers of international operations. Therefore 'managing diversity' also remains an important issue in the Turkish military system.

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OPINIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS ON DEMOCRACY AND INTERVENTIONS OF THE MILITARY IN TURKEY

Bahattin Aksit[1], Ayse Serdar[2] and Bahar Tabakoglu[2]

1. INTRODUCTION

In this paper we will focus on the perceptions of the relations between civil society and the armed forces in Turkey. This is a bundle of complex relationships and it has many direct and indirect effects on the development of civil society in Turkey. The Constitution of 1961 that followed the 1960 military intervention brought a very suitable political environment for the development of organisational life in Turkey. Particularly unions, as semi-public organisations, developed and became the pioneers of civil society. However, this period was characterised by ideological polarisation that divided these so-called 'democratic mass organisations' into opposite political camps. The 1980 military coup stopped this process, constrained the rights of organisations and closed many democratic mass organisations. Due to the strict controlling mechanisms of the post-coup period, democratic mass organisations, mainly unions and chambers, such as the Turkish Union of Chambers of Engineers & Architects and Confederation of Revolutionary Labour Unions, lost their power. The labour union was closed and many of its leaders were imprisoned after the coup. On the other hand, during the

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post-1980 era, the central cleavage of left-right politics and ideologies was transformed into more diffused and fragmented cleavages.

Both the Constitution of 1982 and the sociopolitical conditions that followed drastically changed the atmosphere upon which a new form of civil society was established. Especially towards the end of the 1980s, new civil society organisations (CSOs) began to be established, and after the mid-1990s this process accelerated. Although these CSOs had some mild ideological orientations, many of them constructed their identities in more apolitical terms. Moreover, they covered a broader range of issues compared to the democratic mass organisations, from environmentalism to feminism. In other words, the essential characteristics of the new CSOs were not their class or occupational basis, as was the case with democratic mass organisations, rather they were tapping new antagonisms and problems faced in the public sphere. For example, the Kurdish problem that reached its climax towards the mid-1990s, and the rise of political Islam that gradually entered the political agenda were two important dynamics that led to the formation of new identities and CSOs during the last two decades.

Despite the wide spectrum of working areas, CSOs after the 1980s have continued to report complaints about restrictive legal regulations, perhaps more than the democratic mass organisations in the period before the 1980 intervention. Since 1999, during the last 5 years, this restrictive legal framework has been radically transformed due to the upsurge of CSOs after the 1999 earthquake and the constitutional amendments and legislation to meet the European Union criteria for membership. Therefore, for most of the interviewees and survey respondents, the 1980 intervention marks a point in time after which the whole sociopolitical fabric of civil society has radically changed. Paradoxically, this change meant stricter control of associational life as well as the development of more agonistic civil societal recognition and thereby proliferation of CSOs (Mouffe, 1999). However, CSOs do not see this change as a direct outcome of military intervention. For the present time, we can say that state, civil society and military relations have been in a state of transformation for the last few decades and that the present paper is an attempt to shed some light on the perceptions of this relationship by the members of CSOs in Turkey.

2. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH SAMPLE

This paper is based on a small part of a large-scale research project on CSOs in Turkey in the aftermath of the 1999 Marmara earthquake.[3] The study

was primarily based on field research that consisted of both in-depth interviews and a survey. The samples were administrators and members of leading CSOs in Turkey that have become prominent after the 1999 Earthquake. We carried out 146 in-depth interviews: 136 were conducted with the administrators of 79 CSOs in 10 cities (İstanbul, Ankara, Adana, İzmir, Mersin, Yalova, Kocaeli, Adapazarı, Düzce and Bolu) and 10 were conducted with bureaucrats and public administrators from state institutions in Ankara, Istanbul, Duzce and Yalova. A research company, Veri Arastırma, carried out the survey with a total of 896 members of 39 different CSOs in four cities (Istanbul, Ankara, Adana and Kocaeli). The in-depth interviews were completed between February 2001 and October 2001, whereas the survey was conducted from August 2001 to the beginning of November 2001. In this paper, we will use a small part of the data in order to analyse the opinions of members and administrators of leading CSOs in Turkey about the role of the armed forces in Turkish politics and civil society. We must underline that this research did not focus particularly on this issue. Therefore, in this paper, we will use only a subset of research findings. Other parts of the research were reported elsewhere (Aksit, Serdar, & Tabakoglu, 2004; Aksit, Tabakoglu, & Serdar, 2002a, b, 2003).

3. THE CONTEXT OF THE RESEARCH: CSO INVOLVEMENT IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE 1999 MARMARA EARTHQUAKE AND THE UPSURGE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

An earthquake with a magnitude of 7.4, the epicenter of which was Golcuk, struck the urban Marmara region a few hours before dawn on 17 August 1999. Another earthquake, on 12 November 1999, with a slightly smaller magnitude of 7.2 and whose epicentre was Duzce, affected the same region. More than 18,000 people were left dead, and approximately 49,000 people were wounded. Another indicator of the devastation was that more than 93,000 residential units and more than 15,000 work places were totally destroyed. When medium and lightly damaged units were added the number reached 358,000 (Aksit & Karancý, 1999; Kasapoglu & Ecevit, 2003; Kasapoglu, Ecevit & Ecevit, 2004). The Marmara region has traditionally been the most industrialised and urbanised region in Turkey. The earthquake struck Izmit, Yalova, Adapazari, Duzce and Bolu. These are the city centres of these provinces. There are other smaller cities in all these

provinces. A relatively small area of Istanbul (with more than 9 million urban population) was also struck by these two earthquakes. Excluding Istanbul, the urban population of the provinces affected was around 1.5 million which is 4% of the urban population in Turkey. If you add Istanbul to this, the percentage goes up to 24%.

Starting from the early hours of 17 August 1999, the media coverage of the earthquake was enormous. Television and newspaper reporters reached the region before the state agencies. There was also a massive influx of NGOs who rushed to the regions for search and rescue, relief and reconstruction purposes. Something very curious happened in the context of live media coverage as well as in the newspapers: NGOs became representatives of civil society rising from the ashes of disaster against the strong and paternalistic image of the state and they turned into CSOs. In all of the previous earthquakes state agencies such as the search and rescue teams of the General Directorate of Civil Defence, the technical teams of the General Directorate of Disaster Affairs and Red Crescent were on the scene and national and international search and rescue and relief organisations would have been in an auxiliary position to the state. However, this time the disaster was so massive that the state agencies could not be everywhere at the same time and hence there was absence as well as relative slowness. Public telecommunication networks collapsed and the prime minister of the time used one of a private television's mobile transmitters to address the nation. The state resources were not enough to meet all the needs of the earthquake survivors. Since the state's professional search and rescue teams were not enough, army units were called into the disaster areas as security forces as well as search and rescue teams. Miners also worked in the region as search and rescue teams. There were also NGO-type national as well as international search and rescue teams. However, televisions and newspapers focussed on NGO-type search and rescue teams and constructed a rising image of civil society and CSOs in opposition to state agencies (Aksit et al., 2003).

4. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE STATE AND CSOs IN TURKEY

Before focussing on the perception of the army by the members and administrators of CSOs, it would be helpful to analyse what they think about the role of the state in the development of civil society and what kinds of

problems occur between CSOs and the state. With the purpose of questioning the mode of the relationship between the state and CSOs, they were asked whether they have ever experienced a confrontation with the state during their activities. Sixty-six per cent of the 132 interviewees (who were executive committee members of CSOs) and 37% of the 896 survey respondents (who were just ordinary members of CSOs) responded by saying that they had confrontations with state agencies. Almost all of the CSOs complain about the restrictive and negative attitude of state authorities against them. Many of these problems are caused by certain legal regulations that do not allow a free environment for the activities of CSOs. Problems reported include: the closure of branches of CSOs, trials of executive committee members on some supposed violations of rules, restrictions on meetings, demonstrations, press releases, organising conferences and campaigns. In other words, the interviewees and survey respondents complained mainly about the repressive attitude of the state against CSOs, the power of the police forces on CSOs and the restrictiveness of existing laws. It was emphasised that police practices in everyday affairs had usually been worse than the restrictiveness of the existing laws. However, it has to be pointed out that the present research was carried out before the democratic reforms that have been enacted as part of the process of the transition to European Union membership.

It is also to be noted that conflicts with the state have been differentially experienced by CSOs. Names of some organisations whose members reported little conflict with the state were, inter alia, the Chambers of Commerce and Industry (2%), the Lions' Club (5%), the Philanthropists' Association (5%), Kemalist Thought Association (7%), the Confederation of Traders and Artisans (10%), the Red Crescent (17%), the Rotary Club (18%), the Federation of Employers (20%), the Chamber of Physicians (24%), the Environment Protection Foundation (24%) and the Nationalist Association (27%). By contrast, CSOs reporting many conflicts with state agencies include, inter alia, an earthquake survivors' association (92%), a human rights association (86%), a modern jurists' association (79%), a state employees' union (69%), a revolutionary labour union (68%), an association to help the oppressed (67%) and an Islamist employers' association (58%). As it can be seen from these examples, the more the CSOs were pro-establishment, the less the members reported confrontation; the more oppositional they were the more the members reported conflict. It has to be immediately added that the survey was conducted in the year 2001 before the 2002 elections from which the present Islamist leaning political party emerged as the winner and formed the government.

5. OPINIONS ABOUT INTERVENTIONS OF THE MILITARY AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN TURKEY

In the questionnaire on CSOs there were only two relevant questions about the role of the armed forces in the development of civil society in Turkey. The first question that was related to this subject aimed to find out what the members of CSOs thought about the interventions of the military into politics. The second question referred to perceived obstacles in the development of civil society in Turkey.

5.1. Opinions about Interventions of the Military

Out of 24 Likert-type statements in the questionnaire there was one statement formulated to elicit opinions about military interventions (''I am against the intervention of the army into politics''.). There were five options from 1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree. Seventy-five per cent of the interviewees and 72% of the survey respondents either agreed or agreed strongly. This means that the majority of the people in CSOs were against military interventions. However, when the variation of this percentage across the CSOs was examined it was observed that the highest figure was 97% while the lowest was 27%. The highest percentages were to be found among human rights associations, the lowest percentages were to be found among educationist, environmentalist and search-rescue associations.

A good way to examine this variation is by doing a cluster analysis. Five clusters emerged from the analysis. In order to see the exact location of each cluster, the average for each cluster was calculated. The variation of the cluster averages were between 1.27 (closer to ''strongly agree'') and 3.0 (closer to the middle, ''undecided''). In the first group with 1.27 average, there were the CSO that were strongly against military interventions into politics: These were some human rights associations, some opposition leftist and Islamist associations, such as a jurists' association, an earthquake survivors' association, Islamist leaning businessmen's association, a recently established civil servants' union, a historical research association and so on. These can be called opposition CSOs. The second cluster, with an average of 1.89 (closer to ''agree''), included two labour unions, one civil servants' union, a physicians' association, one Islamist leaning youth association and one Islamist leaning women's association. This cluster consists of what can be considered as mild opposition CSOs. The third cluster, with an average of

2.22, included the following CSOs: two CSOs from industry and commerce, one chamber from traders and artisans, one labour union, one chamber of engineers and architects, one nationalist association and one of the branches of the Lions' Club. These CSOs can be considered as representatives of mainstream CSOs. The fourth cluster, with an average of 2.53 (in the middle of "agree" and "undecided") included an environmentalist association, a search and rescue association, a branch of the Rotary Club, a branch of Red Crescent, an earthquake survivors' association and an association supporting modern society. The last cluster had an average score of 3.00, which in terms of a Likert Scale item means being neither for nor against military interventions. This cluster included a Kemalist association, an environmentalist association and an education volunteers association. This group was the least critical cluster on military interventions.

The general conclusion that can be inferred from these data is that there was no CSO in Turkey which supported military interventions. The five clusters that emerged were differing in terms of degrees of being against military interventions. Those CSOs that were strongly against military interventions were inclined towards solving all political problems within civil society without the intervention of the military or a centrally strong state. Those CSOs that were least against military interventions were so because of their fear of an Islamist takeover of the political system and they believed that army interventions might turn out to be the only viable force preventing such a takeover.

5.2. Opinions about the Obstacles to the Formation of Civil Society in Turkey

Out of 54 open and closed-ended questions in the questionnaire, there was one question which was asked as follows: "According to you, what are the obstacles to the formation of a strong and effective civil society in Turkey? Please rank the three most important factors in three separate columns using the eight alternatives listed". The options listed and the percentages of responses in terms of the three most important obstacles to the development of civil society were as follows: Presence of repressive central state (42%; 8%; 8%);[4] low educational level (12%; 15%; 21%); absence of historical tradition of civil society (11%; 12%; 9%); cultural and social obstacles (9%; 13%; 13%); economic problems (9%; 20%; 15%); underdevelopment of culture of individualism (8%; 11%; 14%); military interventions into politics (6%; 16%; 9%); other answers and no answer (3%; 6%; 11%). The

members of the CSOs in Turkey, in the first-order responses, ranked military interventions seventh in the list of obstacles to the development of civil society. However, as the second-order responses were taken in the second column of the question, the responses ranking military interventions as the most important obstacle went up to 15%, second to economic problems only. As the third-order responses were taken in the third column, the responses ranking military interventions as the most important obstacle went down to 9% and became the fifth important obstacle. These are the results when members of all CSOs in the sample were considered. When individual CSOs were examined there were some opposition CSOs that consider military interventions as the most important obstacle in the formation of civil society in Turkey. It has also to be pointed out that the mainstream and apolitical CSOs did not at all consider the army to be an obstacle to the formation of civil society.

6. CONCLUSION

This is a short paper on the opinions of a sample of members of some selected CSOs on the role of the military in the development of civil society in Turkey. As it has been reported in detail above two questions were asked in the questionnaire. To the first one on interventions of the military, the overwhelming majority of the sample reported that they were against military interventions. Only the degree of being against such interventions varied. However, it has to be noted that when asked about obstacles to the development of civil society military interventions were not identified as the main obstacle to the formation of civil society in Turkey.

NOTES

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2. Ayse Serdar and Bahar Tabakoglu are graduate students, presently, the former is in Binghamton, SUNY, department of sociology, the later METU department of sociology.

3. The research was carried out in the years 2001 and 2002 and was financially supported by the Higher Education Council, the Turkish Academy of Sciences and the Scientific and Technical Research Council of Turkey, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Support and the Middle East Technical University Research Projects Fund.

4. The first percentage indicates that 42% of respondents thought that the repressive central state was the most important obstacle to the development of civil society in Turkey; the second percentage indicates that percentage of respondents ranking the repressive central state in the second column drop to 8%; while the third percentage indicates that when the third most important obstacle was ranked in the third column the repressive central state was marked by 8% of respondents again.

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THE TURKISH MILITARY ACADEMY FROM A GENDER PERSPECTIVE

Ceyda Kuloglu

1. INTRODUCTION

When we look at the theories about the integration process and the roles of women in the military both in Turkey and worldwide, this issue comes forth as controversial and problematic. Although Turkey is the first country which accepted women to military academies, the process of women integration has never been prolonged and there has not been a consensus on women's positions in the military. The implications have always been changeable. The army is the mirror of society and, in Turkey, officers and soldiers come from all over the country and all socio-economic statuses. It is important to investigate the representation and position of women in the military because they will affect the government's policies towards all women in society. This issue is not only important for women's rights but also for citizenship rights of women.

Weber (cited in Nagel, 2000, p. 66) describes the nation as a community of people with the same roots which need not be kinship relations. According to Nagel (2000, 67f.), this description of nationality has two aspects. First one is to have a nation and the second is to have the same beliefs. To have an independent nation, people have to struggle with other nations. This

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means nationalism and militarism go hand in hand. The ones that have traditionally been tasked to protect the nation are the men. Women are always the protected ones caring for the children. According to Saigol (2000, p. 226), because of the different socialisation processes of men and women, both of them accept the roles that are ascribed to them. Women accept to be the protected group and they also believe that their role was to bring up heroes for the nation.

As Yuval-Davis (2003, p. 169) mentions, citizenship is described as the right to kill or to die for the nation that is protected. According to Altınay (2000, 265f.), the relationship between militarism and nationalism can be analysed by using the 'conscription' concept. By conscription half of the population, the men, enter the military and gain the right to be 'real man'[1] and 'full citizen'. Turkey introduced (male) conscription in 1927 and this implies the second-rate status of women in society. Nothing else distinguishes men and women more profoundly. Like the right to vote and the right to become elected, conscription is included into the citizenship concept.

According to Yuval-Davis and Anthias (cited in Walby, 2000, p. 32), women are included into society in various ways: (1) As the biological reproducers of the nation or ethnic group; (2) as the nation's or ethnic group's borderline reproducers; (3) as the ideological reproducers of the nation or ethnic group; (4) as the symbols of the changes in the nation or ethnic group (passive symbol); and (5) as participants in national, economic, political and military struggles (active symbols). These five ways explain the relationship between nationalism and women. Opposite to men, women are involved in citizenship in indirect ways only. According to some feminists, like NOW (National Organisation of Women), women have to share the task of 'dying for the nation' with the men to gain the same citizenship rights and to become full members of society. So, they always argue for equal positions of the women in military (Yuval-Davis, 2003, p. 169). According to Nagel (2000, p. 83) the reason for the exclusion of women from the military is not only that they are not as strong as men and that they are the ones who should be protected, but also because of the masculine 'self-concept'. The culture that is closed to women is not only the 'military culture', it is also 'masculine culture'.

I argue that, like liberal feminists, as more women participate in main institutions they will also begin to participate in the decision-making process and they will gain the same rights as men. The most important right is 'citizenship', which means to become a full member of the society. In Turkey, the military can reach all male citizens by universally conscripting them

into military service. Because women are excluded from military service, they are also excluded from full citizenship rights. So, it is important for women to participate in the military as officers.

Women's position and participation rate are still unresolved issues for the Turkish Military. At the time of the War of Independence women worked on the frontline as non-combat supporters for the military. There are a lot of uncredited woman heros in this war. Also Mustafa Kemal Atatürk encouraged women to join the military. Atatürk was the first person to grant women a place in the military. He gave the rank of a 'corporal' to Halide Edip Adıvar in 1921 and Adıvar became the first woman officer in Turkey. He also encouraged Sabiha Gökçen to become the first female military pilot. In 1938, he asserted that women should be commissioned as officers in the military but this decision did not come into effect until 1955.

A woman named İnci Arcan applied for being a cadet at the Turkish Military Academy (TMA) and gained the right to be the first female cadet at the TMA. With İnci Arcan, three women for the TMA, six for the Air Force Academy and two for the Navy Academy were accepted. After their graduation, these women worked in combat ranks. But in 1961, the acceptance of women to all military academies was stopped and female officers like them had to work as non-combat officers. The argument offered for this decision was that women could not work efficiently as combatants because of their low physical strength and motherhood. Besides these, the fact that both sexes shared the same place for education was seen as culturally inappropriate. In 1992, the acceptance of women in military academies was resumed, "Because it is speculated that is 1990s NATO was pressuring its member states to accept woman into the military." The first graduates of this generation started to serve in 1996 and worked in combatant ranks. But because of the problems women faced during their service as combat officers, the military leaders decided in 2001 that women would only work as non-combatants with the exception of the Gendarmerie and Aviation ranks.

The aim of this research is to demonstrate positive and negative situations that female military officers nowadays face during their student and occupational life in the Turkish Military and to investigate this process historically. The study investigates the experiences and attitudes of both male and female cadets and officers. Currently, there are 57 female cadets in the TMA. The military ranks of the cadets are defined in the third year. In the third and fourth years of the academy four of the women cadets are chosen for combat ranks as Gendarmerie and Aviation officers. The remaining 29 cadets are trained and educated to serve in non-combat ranks in supply, ordinance, finance, etc. I interviewed 33 female and 33 male cadets and 11

female and 10 male officers. The data collected from these interviews were structured along the following lines: (1) Personal Information; (2) Thoughts about the Turkish Military Academy and its Education; (3) Gender-Related Problems; (4) Women Officer Perceptions; (5) Solidarity; and (6) Discrimination.

2. THE FINDINGS

2.1. Personal Information

The female cadets are between 19 and 24 years of age. Generally, their fathers are officers and their mothers are housewives. Socio-economically the families of female cadets are from the middle class.

2.2. Thoughts about the Turkish Military Academy and its Education

The female cadets gave three reasons for joining the TMA: First of all, they mentioned that they were impressed by their father's or relative's occupation. The second reason was that they were impressed by the high social status of the military job and the uniform. Finally, the third reason was the job guarantee after graduation. Generally, we can say that the families greeted their daughter's choice for the same reasons. Families that did not approve of their daughter's choice thought that the job was inappropriate for women. Female cadets mentioned that they had no prior information about the education and life in TMA. They even did not know about the low percentage of female cadets and the low-level positions of women working in the military. They said that they do not have any problems about obeying the rules and the discipline of the TMA, but they feel under pressure because of the strict control of the male/female relationship. In the TMA, there is too much control over male/female friendship, for example, a female and a male cadet cannot even sit together in the cafeteria.

2.3. Gender-Related Problems

The first gender-related problem is about the physical structure of the academy. Female cadets' classrooms and dormitories are located in different places. This situation causes some problems for them, because they cannot

be in the place they should be on time. They always have to run from one place to another. Another problem is the number and the place of the toilets. There is only one women's toilet and this toilet is far from the classes of the female cadets; this also causes time-management problems for them. These problems are tried to be fixed immediately according to the female cadet's needs by the Regiment Command. Female cadets also have private rooms to change their clothes and to place their personal belongings when they are in their classrooms.

Female cadets and officers mentioned that they sometimes felt they were the "things shown in a shop window", implying that they have only been accepted to the TMA because Turkey wants to show the world that there are women officers in the Turkish Military, too. In this context, female cadets are pushed to enter most of the social clubs and sport teams. They also work as hosts in all organisations. The major problem mentioned by female cadets is about the training camp in Menteş, İzmir. Both female and male cadets have similar troubles with the physical strength training programme, which means this is not a specific problem for female cadets. But unlike male cadets, female cadets have more difficulties about the living conditions on the field. The biggest problem is the toilet. Because of the difficult physical strength programme and non-hygienic conditions on the field, they develop health problems, particularly gynaecological complications.

2.4. Woman Officer Perception

If we look at the perception of female officers among both female and male cadets and female and male officers, a 'woman officer' is defined as tidy, disciplined and more matured than her civilian peers. Male cadets mentioned that female cadets and officers had developed masculine behaviours because education in the TMA was different and living side by side for a long time became strained. Male cadets and officers also mentioned that they did not feel uncomfortable with taking orders from female officers, which means rank is important but not sex. Besides, they said they would never marry a female officer because a female's first role should be that of a mother and a female officer could not perform this role successfully because of difficult working conditions. Unlike the male cadets, female cadets and officers expressed that they would only marry a male officer because only an officer could understand their working conditions.

According to female cadets and officers, female officers are better at administrative jobs than male officers and they believe they can work better at

headquarters than detachments. This means, they have rationalised the occupational gender segregation structure in which they operate. They also expressed that they were insufficient in physical strength and military knowledge. Regarding military leadership, some of the female cadets and officers mentioned that they could not give orders like their male counterparts, because they believed females were naturally more sensitive than men. However, other female cadets and officers believed that leadership was not a gender-related issue, it was about personality. On the other hand, male officers and cadets mentioned that women could be a leader in a civilian job, but military leadership was a difficult issue. According to them, women could not be appropriate military leaders because soldiers would not listen to their orders, especially under stress. The respect towards the military in our society reflects upon society's attitudes towards female officers. Their service is appreciated by society, therefore, evoking a sense of pride among the female officers.

2.5. Solidarity

According to Goldstein (2001, p. 194), the solidarity of a group can only happen by eliminating the differences in that group. From this point of view, solidarity occurs in a group only by making behaviours and values similar. Goldstein (2001, p. 199) mentions that there are two kinds of solidarity. One of them is "social solidarity", which is used to define the interconnection of the members in a group. Social solidarity decreases with the increase of differences between members' values and behaviours. The other type of solidarity is "task solidarity", which means the reasons that members get along with one another are discipline and leadership. The members in this kind of solidarity are together just because of the task at hand.

If we look at the relationship between male and female cadets in the TMA, it becomes clear that the solidarity between male and female cadets is task solidarity. Again, we can say that the male cadets develop a stronger and more reliable solidarity among themselves because most of the male cadets graduate from Military High School. After 4 years of education in the TMA, they know each other for 8 years. That is why they see their generation as a 'chosen brotherhood' making the 'brothers in arms' concept very strong. In this context, it is mentioned that the male cadets that talk and create relationships with female cadets are considered to have betrayed the whole group. The ones that want to build friendship with female cadets cannot do so because of the collective behaviour and fear of ostracism. Male

cadets mentioned that there were mainly two groups among them. The first ones were the male cadets that accompanied female cadets, and the second group consisted of the male cadets who did not. They believe that the solidarity among male cadets and the notion of 'brothers in arms' is being ruined by female cadets. This is one of the main reasons why male cadets do not want females in the academy.

If we look at the solidarity among female cadets, female cadets and officers and also male cadets mentioned that although females were the minority group in the TMA, they did not get along with each other. They expressed that upper-class female cadets did not help lower-class female cadets. Also, it is mentioned that unlike male cadets, the hierarchy among women was stronger than among men. The reason for this is explained as the women's demand to integrate into the system completely. That is why "they act like men even more than men". Also, female cadets mentioned that they preferred a "male team commander" instead of a female, because females did not help each other, but male team commanders always helped female cadets.

2.6. Discrimination

When we look at the discrimination concept we see that it is divided into two categories. Positive discrimination explains the policies in favour of a group (like ethnic groups and women) in fields like work and education (Marshall, 1999, 597f.). If we consider the policies for female cadets in the TMA we can see some positive discrimination implications such as female cadets do not go outside their dormitory after 10:00 p.m. Also female cadets do not train for 3 days and do not swim for 5 days during their menstruation period. Also, female cadets combat training standards are lower than males. Positive discrimination implications for female cadets are considered as unfair by male cadets and this prevents the social solidarity among them. Female cadet's problems are listened by Regiment Command systematically and this can also be considered as positive discrimination for female cadets.

Negative discrimination generally means implications that are unfair. In gender studies, this term is used as sexist discrimination towards women (Marshall, 1999, p. 101). The attitudes of male cadets against female cadets can be considered as negative discrimination, because, as mentioned by both female and male cadets and female officers, male cadets act like female cadets do not exist. They think only men can be soldiers and that the military is not an occupation for women. Also, they think it is unfair that

they become officers in 8 years, while women can reach the same status in 4 years.

Occupational gender segregation, which is one of the most evident indicators of negative discrimination, occurs in the Turkish Land Forces Command. As I have already mentioned, women work in non-combat ranks. Some female and male cadets and officers think that this situation is logical because the detachment structure is not ready, the privates' education level is low and Turkish society has a patriarchal point of view. By contrast, some of the female cadets and officers said that if a woman was physically and psychologically suited for combat positions she should be able to get there. They mentioned that this combat – non-combat distinction was the main reason for the male–female dichotomy. Also, some of the female and male cadets and female and male officers think that it is unnecessary for women to study at the TMA because the TMA's first task is to bring up infantry team commanders but women do not work in this position. Nevertheless they argue that a modern military should have women officers also. The others think that women should study at the TMA because the TMA infuses the notion of being an officer.

NOTES

1. Gilmore (1990, as cited in Nagel, 2000, 63f.) mentions that there is not a universal definition of masculinity but he argues that, in every culture a 'real man' is defined as one who can make a woman pregnant, who can protect the ones that are dependent on him and who can be the breadwinner of his family.

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A UN TYPE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: DILEMMAS OF MILITARY OBSERVER MISSIONS IN THE EXAMPLE OF UNOMIG

Mesut Uyar

1. INTRODUCTION

Peace support operations and the role of the United Nations is getting important in changing the global power system. But generally peace support missions are creating new problems while trying to solve the original ones. In this presentation I will try to examine the relative effectiveness of the UN in the military observer missions, which is the most common type of UN peace support operations. The UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) is used to show their relative effectiveness in the current world system by means of differentiating the problems they are facing. After showing the common problems, I will give special emphasis to the genuine problems of UNOMIG. First of all we have to take a brief look at the origins of military observer missions. During the long Cold War, the UN had to engage in conflict resolution/management in a world widely divided between two superpowers. The Security Council (SC) suffered lots of problems to handle conflicts without jeopardising the interests of the superpowers. So in most of the cases (except Korea and Congo) the SC did not

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authorise the necessary military forces to the conflict areas. Instead the SC preferred to send interpositional forces with light arms or military observers without arms after getting the consent of the conflicting parties. Currently we are calling this approach traditional peacekeeping. By experiences gained on the ground and in the SC it was understood that the best and easiest reaction is establishing a UN military observer mission (UNMOM) (Mackinlay, 1996, pp. 9–11; British Army, 1995, pp. 1–2/2–7). According to this limited and conservative logic this process must follow standard steps: First an armed conflict between two states; second a stalemate that nobody is able to defeat the other side completely; third conflicting states ask the UN to enforce a ceasefire; fourth the SC authorises neutral military observers to monitor a ceasefire and to achieve some other limited objectives, according their mandate; fifth conflicting states try to reach a peaceful solution by diplomatic negotiations with the help of the UN; sixth agreement is reached and end of UNMOM. In short, the duty of the military observers is to monitor the ceasefire and the restrictions agreed to by both parties in a geographically limited area for a limited time. But in reality, diplomatic negotiations often do not provide fast and lasting solutions. UNMOMs have remained and temporary missions turned into permanent ones. The answer to the question why is that they are economically cheap operations and politically easier to maintain than to remove. Most of the UNMOMs that were established in different continents are still going on without an end in sight (Brahimi et al., 2000, p. 3).

2. THE FOUNDATION OF UNOMIG

The disintegration of the Soviet Union was painful and bloody, particularly in newly independent Georgia. The legacy of history, Soviet ethnic policies and conflicting interests created a suitable atmosphere for civil wars in Georgia. Initial troubles began in South Ossetia and later in Abkhazia. Numerous attempts to solve the real and imaginary problems failed. The actual fighting was begun after the entrance of the Georgian National Guard in Abkhazia on 14 August 1992. Georgian forces easily captured the capital city Sukhumi and most of Abkhazia. Abkhazs managed to stop the Georgian advance further north. The fighting between ill-trained and hastily formed units was immediately turned to ruthless inter-communal fighting. The SC members were reluctant to deal with the issue as Georgia was seen as an area of Russian influence. Russia took the lead and brokered an agreement between Georgians and Abkhazs on 3 September 1992. But both

sides violated this agreement and others that followed. Abkhaz forces reinforced with alleged volunteers from Russia and heavy weapons from Russian stocks launched a major offensive to Sukhumi and managed to capture the city on 27 September 1993 (MacFarlane, 1997). At the end of December 1993 all Georgian troops withdrew from Abkhazia except some remaining units in the Kodori valley. The intense communal fighting left 10,000–15,000 dead and forced more than 200,000 people (most of them Georgians) to flee from Abkhazia.

UN reactions to the conflict were too little and came too late. The UN Secretary General tried to use diplomatic means by appointing a special envoy on 11 May 1993. When the initial diplomatic negotiations did not succeed, the SC approved the deployment of a limited number of military observers on 9 July 1993 (UNSCR 849). The advance team arrived in Abkhazia on 8 August 1993. UNOMIG was formally founded on 24 August 1993 (UNSCR 858) to monitor the 27 July 1993 Ceasefire Agreement. UNOMIG's deployment did not help to stop the conflict; it suspended all operational activities after the breakdown of the agreement. With the mediation of Russia the Georgian and Abkhaz sides signed the ''Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces'' in Moscow on 17 May 1994. Both sides agreed to the deployment of a peacekeeping force from the Commonwealth of Independent States (ClS) to act as an interpositional force between the two sides and to give consent to UNOMIG for monitoring the implementation and observing of the conduct of the CIS peacekeeping force (CISPKF). On 21 July 1994 (UNSCR 937) the SC expanded UNOMIG's mandate and increased the strength to 136 military observers. The new mandate gave three main objectives to the mission: (a) monitoring and verification of the Moscow Agreement by conducting regular patrols; (b) observing the operation of CISPKF; and (c) maintaining close contacts with all sides to safeguard an orderly return of the refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).

Over the years, the UN has continued its diplomatic activities to promote a peaceful and lasting solution to the problem and the return of refugees and IDPs. Despite all efforts too little results have been achieved. The peace process has come to an impasse. The SC is renewing the mandate every 6 months without attempting to solve the impasse by using other types of peace support operations. The general situation in the conflict area remained mostly calm but unstable. Unexpected factors came to the surface like widespread criminality and lawlessness. UNOMIG continued to carry out its mandate by means of daily ground patrols from its headquarters in Sukhumi and the two sector headquarters at Gali and Zugdidi, as well as

through regular helicopter patrols. But repeated incidents showed that military observers are not able to handle sporadic crises and ill-equipped to deal with criminality. And occasionally the observers themselves fell victim to the assaults and had to stop all operational activities for some time (Solomon, 2001; UN Agency–UNDPI, 1996, pp. 571–588).

3. DIFFERENTIATION OF THE PROBLEMS

Currently, everybody on the ground is accusing UNOMIG for everything that is going wrong. Authorities of both sides are blaming UNOMIG more than they blame each other. The local population is asking everything ranging from medical help to the erasers for the students from military observers who have no means to meet the requests. Personnel of NGOs and all other aid organisations are frequently writing reports that UNOMIG is not providing necessary security to their convoys and officials on the ground. The CIS peacekeepers are not happy with UNOMIG and see it as a burden. Even the individual military observers are voicing their frustration with UNOMIG. International and national media are highlighting the achievements of the OSCE Mission in South Ossetia and give much attention to the alleged blunders of UNOMIG. In short, UNOMIG turned out to be an ideal scapegoat for every interested party.

Is it possible and proper to blame UNOMIG for not doing enough in Abkhazia? As far as we are concerned the answer is absolutely No! Without differentiating the problems and seeing them from new perspectives we cannot blame UNOMIG or any other UNMOMs. And of course we cannot find ways to solve problems like Abkhazia and improve the ways to deal with it. The problems that UNOMIG is facing are mostly not unique and they do not fall into one simple category. In fact, UNOMIG is facing three different categories of problems. And two categories of problems are common issues for all UNMOMs. I will mention the basics of the first two categories and will focus on the third category, which is unique to UNOMIG.

3.1. Nature of UNMOMs

The first category of problems is related to the nature of observer missions. As I have already mentioned observer missions are traditional type of peacekeeping operations. They are temporary missions with limited objectives. That means if you want a successful UNMOM operation you

have to formulate a clear, credible, achievable and adequately resourced mandate. You also need to have a time table, good organisation (military and civilian) and strategic planning. UNMOMs are effective in inter-state conflicts when both sides give up actual fighting and give consent to the UN. So you need responsive governments who could maintain control on their troops and security forces and who at the same time, are reasonable and rational enough for every sort of dialogues. But after 1990 most of the conflicts are intra-state conflicts between a state and groups trying to establish their own spheres of sovereignty. In most of the cases conflicting sides have difficulty to control their so-called military units and their leadership is widely divided with divergent aims. Additionally they have neighbours who are willing to use the conflicts for their own benefits. Traditional UN sanctions are not effective against these types of loose political groups who can act irrationally and find illegal economic means to support them.

The Georgian–Abkhaz conflict is a very good example in this sense. It is an intra-state conflict between a newly founded state and an ethnically distinct minority group trying to establish its own state. And they have a neighbour – the Russian Federation – hoping to reestablish an effective political and economical control of the former Soviet territory. Both sides have difficulty to control their military and security forces. Their leaders and societies are divided on several issues. Widespread criminality, illicit goods trafficking and human rights violations are also part of the scene. In terms of mandate, UNOMIG is again a good example of what not to do. Except monitoring ceasefire agreements, it is not a clear and achievable mandate. UNOMIG has limited means to observe the CISPKF operations and absolutely no means to help a safe and orderly return of refugees and IDPs. It is interesting to note that UNOMIG is the only UNMOM operation, which is charged with the duty of safe and orderly return of refugees and IDPs. According to both sides the mandate is far from credible. There is no time table and strategic planning. And of course there is no exit strategy. (Solomon, 2001, 218f, 222f).

3.2. Operational Conditions

The second category of problems is related to operational conditions. By saying operational conditions I am not only including geography, topography, demography and infrastructure, but also political, historical, economical and socio-cultural settings. Operational conditions are the most important barriers for the success of any peace support operation. And of

course we have limited means to control them. In this sense the Georgian–Abkhaz conflict shows all the trademarks of an ideal conflict. Abkhazia is a strategically located region between Russia and Trans-Caucasia. The importance of the region's oil resources is widely acknowledged and is reflected in growing American geopolitical interest in the region. With its suitable climate and terrain, Abkhazia was a touristic attraction of the former Soviet Union and at the same time an ideal place for agriculture. It has a multiethnic population. According to the 1989 Soviet census ethnic Georgians constituted 45.7%, Abkhazs 17.8%, Armenians and Russians 14.6% and 16.8% respectively of the population. But historically Abkhazs see the region as a distinctly Abkhaz entity. Past Russian and Soviet politics made the ethnical claims more disputable. Even though Soviet economic policies created multinational cities like Sukhumi and Tkvarcheli with frequent interethnic interactions, it also created nationally compact populations at the level of villages. Force relocations, using ethnic groups against each other, trying to separate the community in every respect, frequent policy changes and the like provided fertile ground for future conflicts. Whether the actual fighting started intentionally or not ethnic cleaning was the major visible outcome. Initially Abkhaz civilians fled during the Georgian advance and later Georgian civilians ran away when the tide had turned (Dale, 1997). Widespread human rights violations inflamed the already existing ethnic suspicions. The volatile atmosphere of the neighbouring region and the availability of large numbers of mercenary type volunteers and stocks of weapons were the other factors that affected the outcome. In short, Abkhazia had all the ingredients for an ethnic conflict and all the complexities and difficulties as barriers for a lasting solution.

3.3. Problems Unique to UNOMIG

The last category of problems is unique to UNOMIG. It is the reluctance of the SC members to handle a conflict in a Russian area of interest and the relative reluctance of the UN to organise a peacekeeping mission after failures like UNOSOM and UNPROFOR. So from the very beginning an observer mission was the only suitable alternative.

3.3.1. CISPKF

When the SC refused to send interpositional peacekeepers, Russia used the opportunity to send peacekeepers under its control. Russia got the authorisation of the conflicting parties in the Moscow Agreement and from

the CIS in June 1994. Although nominally a CISPKF, it was and still is an entirely Russian force. The CISPKF was deployed in July 1994 and took over the responsibility from Russian troops that separated the two sides since November 1993 (Danilov, 1999). From the very beginning CISPKF became a problem for UNOMIG. The conflict parties do not see it as a peacekeeping but a Russian force trying to protect Russian interests in the region (Finch, 1996). Criticism of the operations of the CISPKF increased sharply after its evident failure to enforce its mandate to return the IDPs. First of all the quality and quantity of Russian troops are limited. The size of the force remained around 1,500, which is far from enough. In terms of quality their command, communication, intelligence and logistics are very poor. Officers and soldiers are very young and without proper peacekeeping training. Secondly their strategic and tactical attitude to peacekeeping is also problematic. Instead of conducting aggressive patrols, observation and providing security they prefer to establish platoon sized checkpoints and remain indoors except for logistical activities. The outcomes of poor training, leadership and logistics are widespread corruption, looting, illicit goods trafficking and bullying the civilians (MacFarlane, 1997, pp. 517–520; Danilov, 1999; Fuller, 2002, 2003). Thirdly joint operation with UNOMIG is very limited and sometimes counterproductive. Several UNOMIG patrols were targeted after being seen with CISPKF vehicles. And most of the time civilians are reluctant to talk in front of CISPKF officials. At the same time UNOMIG is seen as playing a secondary role in peacekeeping because of the presence of CISPKF. Even though CISPKF is creating lots of problems its presence is still needed because its presence is deterring both sides from large scale armed hostilities. But the ideal solution is replacing CISPKF with a more effective multinational force. Even traditional type UN interpositional peacekeepers will help to improve the situation drastically (MacFarlane, 1999).

3.3.2. IDPs

The second problem is managing the safe and orderly return of the IDPs. After the end of hostilities more than 2,00,000 ethnic Georgians from Abkhazia remained as IDPs. After the enforcement and monitoring of the ceasefire agreement the IDP problem turned out to be the main problem to be solved in order to reach a peaceful solution. Until now all the efforts to organise the return of the IDPs have failed. The Abkhaz side is evidently reluctant to surrender the demographic advantage gained after the escape of the Georgians from Abkhazia. So everybody is expecting UNOMIG to find a peaceful way to force Abkhazs to accept the IDPs. But this is not easy. The

ruthless conflict, abuses and crimes against each other, high levels of casualties, extensive damage to the infrastructure and the like have already created a big barrier for reconciliation, which is absolutely necessary for peaceful coexistence and a lasting solution. (Greenberg Research, 1999; The International Peace Academy and Best Practices Units of UNDPKO, 2002, pp. 34, 37). All the indicators show that both sides are far from reconciliation. Without the necessary preparations and without providing their physical security the return of the IDPs is a recipe for a renewal of hostilities.

The May 1998 Gali clashes are a good example of the outcome of an uncontrolled return. The Gali district is at the ceasefire line and nearly 96% of the pre-conflict population were Georgians. More than 40,000 IDPs returned back to Gali permanently or temporarily after the end of hostilities. UNHCR and other International Organisations (IOs) and NGOs rendered humanitarian aid to these people. However Georgian partisan and militia groups tried to use the spontaneous return of the IDPs to recapture the Gali district. After sudden militia attacks Abkhaz forces launched a sweeping operation against them. Many homes and schools that were rebuilt after the ceasefire were destroyed and more than 35,000 people were displaced once again. UNOMIG and CISPKF were unable to do anything to protect civilians and keep both sides apart. At the end the prestige of UNOMIG was damaged beyond repair (Fuller, 1998a,b; Hansen, 1999; Dale, 1997; MacFarlane, 1997). After the May 1998 clashes UNHCR and most IOs and NGOs stopped humanitarian aid and began to wait for the improvement of the situation. But the IDPs once again began to return back home spontaneously. The only organisation available on the ground was UNOMIG, which had no means to meet these demands. It was and still is a frequent occurrence to see IDPs voicing their frustration to military observers because military observers are the only persons, who would not harm them and listen to their complaints patiently. UNOMIG managed to launch quick-impact projects to help improve the conditions of IDPs in 2001 only. At the same time UNOMIG encouraged NGOs to cover immediate humanitarian concerns. In this way UNOMIG began to take on the responsibilities of UNHCR in Abkhazia (Annan, 2004a, pp. 7–8; Beau, 2004). In short, the mandate to assist the return of the IDPs is a mission impossible. UNOMIG is trying to do everything in its power but is always falling victim to biased criticism.

3.4. Criminality

The political and diplomatic deadlock and both sides' failure to enforce public order and security created a power vacuum. Criminal groups immediately

seized the opportunity. Unfortunately some of the alleged militia and partisan groups also turned to criminal activities to finance their operations. Extortion, kidnapping, robbery, looting, illicit goods trafficking, killings and the like become daily events especially in the lower Gali district. So currently crime is the biggest danger for the fragile ceasefire.

In the beginning UNOMIG showed no interest in crime except reporting the available information about criminal incidents. But after 1998 crime became the main concern for everybody. UNOMIG had to deal with criminal incidents, but, as a military observer group, lacks the means to do so. When military observers tried to get information about the incidents and gangs they became targets. Gangs attacked UNOMIG patrols to force them not to get into their lucrative business as the example of the June 2000 ambush of Hotel Team in lower Gali shows (Global IDP Georgia, 2000, pp. 10–13). After much discussion the SC decided to strengthen the capacity of UNOMIG by adding a civilian police component to the mission. The first 10 officers were deployed in November 2003. But the deployment of the remaining members has been delayed because of Abkhaz refusal to accept them. The main duty of the civilian police is to help local security departments to conduct their duties effectively and professionally by means of giving training and equipment. Some Georgian police officers have already been chosen to participate in the OSCE Kosovo Police School. The impact of this new policy will become clear in a few years (Annan, 2004b, pp. 5–6).

3.5. Military Observers

The strength of every organisation depends upon the values of its members. This is also true for UNOMIG. Even though the UN gained much experience from many peacekeeping operations, it still needs an overall approach to training, evaluating and controlling the military personnel assigned to diverse missions. The UN's manual on selection and training of UNMOs has clearly stated the necessary qualities and standards. But it is not easy to apply the rules in the field. UNOMIG is lucky mission by means of countries contributing military observers. Nearly all the contributing countries have a professional army above world average. The current composition of UNOMIG is 116 military observers from 23 countries, 15 European, 5 Asian, 2 American and 1 North African. Most other UN missions are heavily dependent on third world countries' military personnel. There is already a discussion going on about this cheap mercenary trend. UNOMIG

is also suffering from several problems with observers. I will only list some of my observations without accusing any country but the general system:

(1) More than half of the military observers do not have previous peacekeeping experience or training. A 1 week long orientation training is not enough to overcome this deficiency. That means at least 1 month is needed to train novice observers before getting any contribution from them.
(2) For some observers serving in the mission is just about getting additional wage.
(3) It is nearly impossible to send back observers who do not have the necessary standards or have violated important rules or regulations. The evaluation system is just not working.
(4) The mission language, English, is a big problem. Nearly a quarter of the observers does not speak English sufficiently. This problem gets worse during operational patrols and in emergency cases.
(5) An important percentage of observers has difficulty to perform operational patrols because they lack some basic military qualities like driving off-road military vehicles, using maps and navigating, guiding helicopters, emergency rescue etc.
(6) Communication with local people is also creating problems. Most of the observers do not speak local languages and depend on locally hired interpreters. In the OSCE Mission to Georgia which is operating in South Ossetia its is obligatory for observers to speak Russian. That is one of the important factors for the relative success of the OSCE.
(7) Some observers are coming from very poor countries. Even the conditions of the IDPs are better than the conditions of some people in their home countries. So they are suffering problems to understand the complaints of the locals and to evaluate the humanitarian needs of the respective population.
(8) Observers from some countries are not welcome by different local authorities. For example Georgians do not like Russian observers and Abkhazs do not like US observers.
(9) Some countries are sending observers for a 6 months term only. So observers have just barely learnt their trade when they return back home.

There are also some problems related to UNOMIG's organisation and general policy:

(1) The main problem is the frequent rotation of observers. The average time of serving in one operational team is 3 months. Only some individuals manage to serve more than 4 months in the same team. So most

of the observers never learn more than the basics about the teams' area of responsibilities (AORs).

(2) There are one main HQ, two sector HQs and one liaison HQ, which means there are more staff positions than operational team duties. Observers with talents and able to speak English fluently are picked for staff duties, leaving the operational value of the teams problematic.

(3) The contributing countries are reluctant to take risks for their observers. That means that in any life threatening situation all operations would be discontinued for the time being.

(4) After a decade the local population and sometimes the media still do not understand why UNOMIG is in Georgia. The mission needs reliable channels for information. By this way UNOMIG could explain its mission, capabilities and would be able to mobilise NGOs, the media and the local population.

(5) UNOMIG does not have a satisfactory de-briefing and lessons-learned system. So the valuable experiences of the observers are remaining with themselves. It is sometimes impossible to learn what had happen even a year ago. Local mayors, directors and people are tired of answering the same questions again and again after every rotation.

(6) The sectors have difficulty to follow and understand what is happening on the other side and gaining access to events.

4. CONCLUSION

As a conclusion even though UNOMIG proved itself a learning organisation and military observers are trying to do their best, UNOMIG is not a successful peacekeeping mission like other UNMOMs. It has many problems and limited means to overcome them. As we have already discussed most of the problems are beyond the power of UNOMIG. But even under these conditions some of the problems can be solved without waiting for a concrete change in Abkhazia or the UN peace support operational system. To improve the relative effectiveness of UNMOMs we need to differentiate the problems and to focus on the ones that a respective mission has the means to overcome. By this way UNMOMs will be more successful and will not waste their limited means on impossible issues.

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