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INTELLIGENCE SHARING, TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME AND MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

Diane E. Chido

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This book is dedicated to my son, Zachary, who suffered neglect while it was composed. Thank you for your patience, support, and love.

Foreword

Transnational organized crime (TOC) is the elephant in the United Nations (UN) peace operations room. Lasting peace is achieved through political solutions not military action and TOC prevents reaching those political solutions.

The 2015 *Report of the High-level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* identifies criminal activities as a mission-wide concern. The International Forum for Challenges of Peace Operations 2014 report, *Designing Mandates and Capabilities for Future Peace Operations,* concludes that TOC poses an existential threat to UN peace operations, yet the strategy for combatting this threat is not well developed. It goes on to identify the need for tools to analyze and develop comprehensive strategies.

Dr. Mike Dziedzic, based on his extensive studies, concludes that the international community has suffered from a persistent blind spot concerning criminal enterprises and their effect on achieving lasting peace and stability. The nexus of criminal activity providing illicit wealth to political power undermines the hope of achieving lasting political solutions. This nexus must be broken for long-term progress to be made. The longer it takes for the international community to deal with the problem, the more entrenched it becomes, and soon these activities take on the patina of normality. There are many examples, from Kosovo to Afghanistan.

What is needed is an easy assessment tool that can highlight the problem in unambiguous terms that can lead to a regional strategy. The 2014 UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) *Integrated Assessment and Planning Handbook* acknowledges that "there is no agreed

United Nations system-wide methodology for comprehensively assessing risks to the United Nations in post-conflict and conflict settings."[1]

There is a need to sharpen pre-mission assessment to determine potential spoilers and identify spoiler activity so these spoilers can be addressed at the onset of a mission. For missions that have been in place for several years, these assessments can begin to identify why peace processes may be stalled and what a path ahead might look like. It can lead to an integrated international approach to a problem that needs to be addressed. Key and simple assessment tools can identify the relationships between terrorism, extremism, and transnational criminal activity. Once established, this can be the basis for action.

This study by Diane Chido is key and essential for presenting such an assessment tool. She reviews the critical organizations and structures that have been put in place over the last few years to deal with these issues and address their advantages and short comings. What seems to be needed is a method and a way ahead that these structures can use to focus their efforts. The clear and simple tool that is described in this study may be the answer.

Developing effective strategies to address fragile states requires an understanding of the underlying structural grievances and the drivers of conflict. Planners and executers must appreciate what factors strengthen illicit actors and power structures. Political and security efforts must be united in a comprehensive approach to achieve sustainable outcomes. Understanding and identifying the issue may be a way to maintain and sustain the will of international partners and key host-nation reformers to transform the state.

Readers of this study will find a proposed starting point to achieve that understanding.

Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute William Flavin,
Carlisle, PA, USA

Note

1. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Integrated Assessment and Planning Handbook* (New York: January, 2014), 32.

Preface

The purpose of this study was to impress upon the peacekeeping, stabilization, and countering-violent-extremism communities the fact that violent actors cannot function without criminal organizations to fund and facilitate their activities. It was also intended to assist the UN in understanding how to share information and apply traditional criminal intelligence methods to halt observable activities that cause missions to go on for decades or occur repeatedly.

This research was generously funded and guided by the US Army Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), without which it would not exist. All of the brilliant scholars who assisted in refining and better addressing the topics have been too patient and kind to be implicated in the final product. Special thanks go to PKSOI's Dr. Karen Finkenbinder, COL Brian Foster, Mr. Scott Braderman, and German Army LTC Andreas Heselschwerdt. Thanks also are in order to Mr. Marty Bartram, who reviewed and improved the section on BAIT, and to Dr. Jibecke Joenssen of the Folke Bernadotte Academy and the UN Challenges Forum, who was kind enough to review a draft and correct UN-related inconsistencies.

Dr. Paul Kan took the time to review Chap. 1 and Dr. Evan Ellis of the US Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute went far out of his way to provide a very thorough review with proofing and restructuring recommendations, as well as discuss inputs for the criminal and Latin American sections, for which I am eternally grateful.

Ms. Kayley Morrison, PKSOI's hardest working intern ever, deserves my most heartfelt thanks for all the hours and brainpower she put into

helping develop BAIT and researching the various multinational crime prevention organizations and activities included in the study. I hope it was at least half as much fun for her as it was for me.

Carlisle, PA Diane E. Chido

Contents

Glossary of Acronyms

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AQ	al Qaeda
AQIM	al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
ASG-I	Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence
ASG-I&S	Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Security
ASIFU	All Sources Information Fusion Unit
ATM	Automated Teller Machine
AU	African Union
AUBP	African Union Border Programme [sic]
CCIRM	Collection, Coordination, and Intelligence Requirements Management
CCOMC	Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Center
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CICIG	United Nations' International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (Spanish)
COESPU	Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units, Italy
DFS	Department of Field Support (UN)
DoD	U.S. Department of Defense
DPA	Department of Public Affairs (UN)
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DSG	Deputy Secretary General (UN)
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ELN	National Liberation Army (Spanish)
ERCAIAD	Regional School for Anti-drug Intelligence of the American Community (Spanish)

ESC	Emerging Security Challenges
EU	European Union
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Spanish)
FHQ	Force Headquarters
FPU	Formed Police Units
GITOC	Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime
HIPPO	High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IAPTCs	International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ILP	Intelligence-Led Policing
IMS INT	International Military Staff – Intelligence
INCB	International Narcotics Control Board
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organisation [sic]
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
IU	Intelligence Unit
JAITF	Joint Airport Interdiction Task Forces
JMAC	Joint Mission Analysis Centre
JOC	Joint Operations Centre
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MAOC-N	Maritime Analysis and Operations Center-Narcotics
MC	Military Committee
MEDEVAC	Medical Evacuation
MINUSMA	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MNLA	Azawad National Liberation Movement
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDI	National Director of Intelligence
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NIFC	National Intelligence Fusion Center
OAS	Organization of American States
OE	Operational Environment
OROLSI	Rule of Law and Security Institutions (Italian)
PCC	Police Contributing Country
PIR	Priority Intelligence Requirement
PKSOI	U.S. Army Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute
PN	Partner Nation

PSOTEW	Peace and Stability Operations Training and Education Workshop
REC	Regional Economic Communities
SAC	Strategic Analysis Capability
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SALUTE	Size, Activity, Location, Unit/Uniform, Time and Equipment
SARPCCO	Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SITCEN	Situation Center
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
TCC	Troop Contributing Country
TCU	Transnational Crime Unit
TOC	Transnational Organized Crime
TTIU	Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit
U2	Unified Military Intelligence Directorate
UAS	Unmanned Aerial System
UN	United Nations
UNGASS	UN General Assembly Special Session
UNOWA	United Nations Office for West Africa
UNOWAS	United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel
USMOG	U.S. Military Observer Group
WACI	West African Coast Initiative
WCO	World Customs Organization

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Abstract Transnational organized crime (TOC) is usually treated as separate from corruption and terrorism, but in complex peacekeeping missions the three are intertwined. Recent research strongly correlates the often symbiotic relationship among transnational crime, corruption, and terrorism commonly found in the environments where peacekeeping is required. This study presents the intelligence-sharing limitations and mission challenges with recommendations on how to enhance the use of intelligence analysis to mitigate TOC in the mission environment.

Keywords Transnational organized crime • United Nations • Peacekeeping • Intelligence • Analysis

As the international community continues to throw its moral weight and its financial and technical resources behind well-intentioned peacekeeping missions to protect civilians and reduce the societal ravages of conflict, it unwittingly gets in the way of unimaginably profitable illicit business interests that prefer instability and conflict over peace. This lack of understanding of the operational environment causes United Nations (UN) missions to last interminably long and to be repeated, often resulting in peacekeepers and other stabilization actors themselves turning to lucrative criminal activities,[1] due to long stays, dangerous and unpleasant living conditions, and low income and opportunity.

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The deleterious effect of crime on peace and stability operations can be easily understood when criminal activities clearly affect specific operations, such as critical materiel disappearing on the eve of an offensive, but the underlying role of organized crime is not always as simple to identify or to convince policymakers of its seriousness.

In the wake of the March 2016 airport and metro bombings in Brussels, Belgium, the complex and disjointed security and intelligence configuration of not only the European Union (EU), but the Belgian and even the Brussels security apparatus became starkly apparent. Belgian Justice Minister Koen Greens was internationally lampooned for his public comment, "At that moment, he was not known for terrorism, but as a criminal," meant to explain why Belgium did not monitor Ibrahim el-Bakraoui, one of the Brussels bombers, because he was not known to Belgium as a terrorist but [only] as a criminal.[2] Despite el-Bakraoui's record of violent crime and despite a warning from Turkish authorities who had earlier deported him to the Netherlands after he tried to enter Syria to join an Islamic extremist group, Belgian authorities failed to monitor him. This unambiguously showed the rest of the world the clear link between violent criminals and violent extremists. These individuals know each other, these groups work together to obtain resources, these groups co-opt the same corrupt facilitators, and these groups share the routes that convey their illicit goods, associates, and services. Even when their ideologies and motivations are widely divergent, they also often share essential motives, especially when gaining economic or political influence or causing disruption or destabilization is of benefit to all such groups.

In 2000, the UN General Assembly adopted the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) but it failed to provide a precise definition. Article 2(a) of the Convention offers four key identification criteria of a TOC group:

1. Three or more persons not randomly formed
2. Existing for a period of [unspecified] time
3. Acting in concert with the aim of committing at least one crime punishable by at least four years' incarceration [does not specify by what legal code].
4. In order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.[3]

In 2011, the US National Security Council published its "Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime" defining TOC as "self-perpetuating associations of individuals operating across borders to obtain power, influence, monetary and/or commercial gains, wholly or in part by illegal means."[4] Despite these indications that TOC is recognized as a global problem, it is addressed only to a small degree in a few UN mandates and only sometimes finds its way into the planning process in New York.

These groups protect their activities through corruption, violence, and by implementing a cross-border structure that both expands their activities and reduces their risks. Criminality in peacekeeping mission areas is generally dealt with in a fragmentary manner, if at all, and the response is incongruous with the importance of integrated planning and execution at the mission level. Mission success, however, is predicated upon a multidimensional/multidisciplinary approach toward UN missions and a clear division of labor between military and police in the planning stages, as well as finding or establishing complementarity among the various players, particularly when deployed to complex environments.

TOC mitigation, when considered, is usually treated as separate from corruption and terrorism, but in reality, the three are intertwined. Recent research strongly correlates the often symbiotic relationship among transnational crime, corruption, and terrorism commonly found in the environments where peacekeeping is required.

As a number of noted scholars, economists, and journalists have illustrated repeatedly, the extreme economic dislocation and inequality that emerged with the fall of the Soviet Union and the birth of capitalism across the formerly communist Eurasian landmass, caused a large number of people to turn to aspects of criminality for their livelihoods in this "new economy." Even groups that were once motivated by political, religious, ethnic, or other ideological concerns were forced to turn to criminal sources of funding, however reluctantly, as their US and Russian backers no longer found their causes and their targeted furtherance of instability valuable.

Post-conflict states typically have an economy in disarray and a traumatized population whose livelihoods and educations have been interrupted, resulting in a need for retraining, but once they receive such training, there must be jobs available to employ them. What is forgotten in the fighting is that many combatants have families, sometimes large, extended families, and a common desire or obligation to provide for them during

both war and peace. Lack of such economic opportunity, even in stable states, such as the United States and the Scandinavian countries, still drives young people from some disenfranchised parts of society toward the upward mobility offered by criminal gangs.

This is of great concern today in Colombia as the euphoria over the late 2016 peace deal ending 50 years of civil war dies down. Yes, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN) have agreed to lay down their arms and the violent clashes among the Cali and Medellin cartels have abated, but there is still plenty of profit to be made in the cocaine trade and there are plenty of young men who have known nothing but war and who have only the skills and tools of violence with which to make a living.

Recent historical examples abound of the end of war leading to the beginning of an unstable peace and the rise of criminal syndicates that often take advantage of the fragile peace to recruit associates, co-opt corrupt officials and develop markets in both licit and illicit goods and services that legitimate governments are unable or unwilling to provide to certain geographic or demographic elements of its sovereign territory. The general lack of rule of law that abounds post-conflict incubates crime as host nations and domestic and international partners scramble to establish transitional public security as a foundation for the other elements of stabilization, such as governance and a sustainable economy.

In post-conflict or fragile states, the most destabilizing element is society's young men who lack skills adaptable to the legal economy and have been permitted and often encouraged to use brutality to further profit or ideological aims and have been provided the training and resources to do so effectively. Once the conflict ends, they are expected to settle down and become productive members of society with civic outlook and civilized manners. If there are no economic opportunities for these testosterone-driven, battle-hardened beings, stability is a pipedream.

Although in most former Soviet and Communist countries, the demise of the empire did not result in widespread violence, with the exceptions of Armenia and Azerbaijan and parts of Georgia and southern Russia (i.e., Chechnya and Daghestan), the void created by the loss of that power structure across the 15 constituent republics as well as in Eastern Europe into the Balkans led directly to the genocidal Balkan Wars of the early 1990s.

Very briefly, the crisis began brewing in the late 1980s in Yugoslavia, as the Serbs had been the Balkan darlings of the Soviets, due to their shared language and culture. Serbs tended to run the civil service and the military

and had key Communist Party positions in all of the ethnically based republics of the country. As the Soviet Union breathed its last, Serbs began to be perceived as those colluding with the Soviet system to keep others in Yugoslavia enslaved. Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milosevič, a Serbian nationalist demagogue, began to turn that language around, hearkening back to allusions of anti-Turk sentiment prevalent in World War I and language from the Crusades to sow tensions among the Croats, Bosnians, and other ethnic groups that comprised the tenuous country that was Yugoslavia.

Milosevič's famous battle cry, "Only unity will save the Serbs!" meant that the Serbian people must take control of the other areas of the fragile country, such as Bosnia and Croatia, to ensure protection of the Serbian minorities there as things fell apart. Croatia declaring independence was the starting gun for mass atrocities that resulted in a complex war and genocide that ostensibly ended with the Dayton Peace Accords in 1994 but continued unabated in Kosovo, a restive ethnic Albanian province of Serbia, until a 1999 peace accord quelled the violence.

In the decade of viciousness unimaginable in Europe at the time, crime became a form of art. There were virtually no Balkan leaders not involved in the organized crime game in some form, as active puppet masters, as participants, as facilitators, or simply as part of the many who looked away and still profited from passivity. As nationalism ignited Yugoslavia into a conflagration of atrocity, organized crime was right there, fueling the fires and enabling all sides. As the violent political battles raged, killing thousands, business partners continued selling arms and provisions and smuggling violent actors among the warring factions even to the detriment of their own ethnic group.[5]

As the more distant outposts of the Soviet empire, the Balkans enjoyed relative independence, and the hard currencies they brought in through limited trade with the West had aided in sustaining the entire Soviet sphere. When the Empire fell, the special privilege Yugoslavia had as a link between the communist and capitalist worlds was lost, and it was seen by the East as a bit wild and traitorous and by the West as a shabby backward country.

Bulgaria was another odd Balkan case with an entirely totalitarian and paranoid leadership, but its access to the Black Sea beaches gave it a bit of a cache as an Eastern Riviera and the ability to move goods over land and sea. The first modern Bulgarian-origin TOC syndicates were essentially created by the Bulgarian KGB (DS) in the 1960s, smuggling drugs, arms, and technology.

Eastern Europe has, for decades, been known as the "heart of cybercrime" with Bulgarian hackers having been tasked in the Soviet period with developing the first computer viruses for Cold War cyber warfare and continuing to thrive in that arena.

Enterprising Bulgarians who, like the Tuaregs in Mali, see themselves as storied historical traders over rough, remote terrain are now trading in bits and bytes.

Most of the global superstars of the computer industry today started out at Stanford University, whose longtime partnerships enabled them to establish working and funding partnerships in Silicon Valley that would not have been possible almost anywhere else. Had there been the legitimate capital, financial and economic instruments, regulations, and accrediting bodies in Sophia in 1985, the Googles and Apples might have emerged there.

Unfortunately, the twin ills of instability and lack of governance instead led to a dearth of gainful employment for these technical superstars, who were led by circumstances to the "dark side" for economic opportunity and the chance to increase their skill level and their status among their shadowy peers. This story of lack of legitimate economic opportunity leading to crime or revolution is ubiquitous around the world and across human history.

When powerful central authority collapses or erodes and is not organically replaced by something broadly perceived as legitimate by those living in its claimed territory, alternative governance takes over to first provide physical security, then other needed elements for human security, whether through coercion, service provision, or shared ethnic or other identity.

In the case of criminal gangs emerging in the post-Soviet period, many of them had been black marketeers who realized there was "a killing" now to be made in more activities than selling counterfeit jeans and videotapes. Some were paramilitary organizations formed by comrades in the Soviet Army who fought together in Afghanistan or Chechnya. Many others arose from ethnic groups banding together, such as the long-established Georgian mafia or other disenfranchised peoples in the ethnocentric Russian Soviet sphere, who were pushed into the fringes to make a living through illegal trade or other illicit means. In fact, in 2014, Russian investigators reported that no fewer than 883 ethnic gangs had been identified around the country, many of whom, but not all, engaged only in muggings and low-level non-violent crimes.[6]

Seasoned paramilitary groups eagerly fought again in the Balkan wars and the profits they brought home served as ready capital for establishing larger and larger syndicates, the leaders of which quickly became very rich, very powerful, and very savvy at maintaining control over corrupt officials and ensuring the environment in which they operated continued to sustain their activities. Like the United States, the European Union (EU) is one of the largest consumers of illicit goods, from untaxed cigarettes to drugs to prostitutes; thus, this access to the Western European market proved the adage "location, location, location," when it came to moving these goods into consumers' hands from the developing world.[7]

Once these disparate criminal enterprises realized the power of "unionizing," across destabilized Eurasia, the iron will of the Soviet state was replaced by a free-for-all. This contiguous region essentially began with the Baltics, through the Russian heartland into the Caucasus down to the Balkans and across Central Asia, creating a new "Silk Road" that once again became a vibrant trading route for much more than silk and spice and which connected the illicit goods markets in Europe with those as far away as in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and China, and eventually in the United States.

As Misha Glenny describes, criminals, "organized and disorganized, were also good capitalists and entrepreneurs" who saw opportunities in the "dazzling mixture of upheaval, hope and uncertainty" following the collapse of the Soviet system. They respected the laws of supply and demand, economies of scale and sought local and international partners and markets to develop modern industries of various types.[8]

As in the early trading period, various groups began to develop brands—a particular reputation for a single product, or for the quality of their goods and services, or for the efficiency or discretion with which they were able to provide preferred items to various types of customers. "Clients" could include unsuspecting civilians using off-brand automatic teller machines (ATMs) unwittingly participating in money laundering, or multinational movers and shakers with specialized tastes.

While these criminal groups organized, there was a chaotic period of consolidation where violent turf wars raged for exclusive use of routes, methods, and corrupt facilitators across the region to build clout and brand recognition, which eventually led to developing partnerships with ethnic and other organized groups in different countries and regions.

Competition was dangerous, with a lot of small bands fighting for market space, as was seen in Colombia, where many small players jockeyed for control of disparate aspects of the cocaine market after the Cali and Medellin cartels' market strangleholds were broken. In Czechoslovakia, when the government was one of the world's largest arms dealers, there was relative stability in the market, but when it opened up to free market competition across the region, small arms flooded into developing countries without consideration of the widespread violence they would engender.

Freewheeling capitalism in the style of the US Wild West seized Eurasia, filling the pockets of these new entrepreneurs and the corrupt officials that enabled the goods and money to flow undeterred. Not only did the Soviet and East European "iron curtain" dissipate, but as official maps were redrawn with hundreds of new borders, actual border control all but disappeared.

As transnational crime became more "organized," partnering to ensure shipments got to distant markets with the trust that they would be in the same condition and of the same relative quantity as when they were shipped required a degree of trust, or even legitimacy, which again was achieved through threat or use of force, reputation or shared kinship, and ethnic, religious, or other identity.

The traits exhibited by criminal leaders are common to all entrepreneurs and it is not impossible to imagine the edges of the law occasionally skirted by young mavericks willing to get even legal enterprises off the ground. The difference is often the environment in which these young minds grow. Every good criminal group needs crimes to commit and security forces to protect goods, leaders, activity locations, and routes, but it also needs good accountants, logisticians, lawyers, planners, sales staff, facilitators, and networks of corruptible officials in various locations and positions to ensure their businesses can run smoothly. Highly skilled staff are easy to hire in unstable climates when professional positions are scarce in the legitimate world, and often the criminal world pays much better.

The environment determines whether young people are taught the rule of law and the paramount importance of education to success and are nurtured in an innovative environment laden with capital for new entrepreneurs with a good idea and some connections to get a start, or whether they are directed to seek employment in a life of crime because of their unstable, seemingly lawless environment of violence and poverty.

This is similar to recently exposed Islamic State efforts in which the group managed to recruit at least one Tunisian with a chemistry and physics background to come to Syria to work in a university laboratory, rather than drive a taxi or run a fruit stand due to little licit economic opportunity.[9] So, this man will end up making bombs instead of curing cancer, but this is the result of the highest bidder understanding the true drivers and results of instability.

With the Soviet threat gone, leading to the perceived approach of the "end of history," the foreign policy field of Sovietology was no longer needed, so those who had spent their lives in this profession searched for the new threat to which to apply their expertise, often, unfortunately also applying the same familiar paradigm. First, there was nuclear nonproliferation and then, the War on Drugs presented itself.

Although the rise in cocaine use in the United States and Europe in the late 1980s and the violence across Latin America, due to criminal battles similar to those described above, were unfortunate, they were not threats on the scale of nuclear annihilation as was that posed by a peer-adversary during the Cold War. However, as the same policy analysts and planners were looking at these threats, everything since has been treated in the same manner.

This resulted in the United States identifying a mainly military solution in Colombia and now, again in Mexico, with the veneer of police involvement, but mainly consisting of identifying targets for army elements of both countries and their partners to kill or occasionally capture for prosecution. A holistic development approach to reduce supply in Colombia and a public health approach to reduce the demand for drugs in the United States were tiny shares of the budget for this larger "war."

Aside from the efforts to reduce TOC in Latin America, things were just settling down in Europe and the United States with the *Pax Americana* beginning to bear fruit, at least in the coffers of the US Treasury, which had managed a surplus simplistically attributed to the post-Soviet peace dividend. On the international security front, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was expanding and Europe uniting again into a big happy family until September 2001, when everything changed.

As the study of Islamic terrorism became the paramount foreign policy exercise from that time, with questions about "why they hate us" and "what makes them do that" abounding, the identical factors that attract marginalized young men to crime provide adherents to violent extremist organizations.

Some were Bosnian veterans with experience and resources, some former *mujahidin* that gained their skills battling the Russians in Afghanistan, as well as former Russian and Eastern European soldiers with Afghan, Balkan, and Chechen war tutelage. Many were criminal entrepreneurs eager to take advantage of the instability caused by the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Those opportunities continue, as does the instability that has spread to Syria and Libya and across the Maghreb to Mali and into Africa with the continued advance of al Qaeda and the rise of the Islamic State, Boko Haram, and others.

Crime by the Numbers

Not only has the instability in the wake of the end of the Cold War contributed to the rise of TOC, it has had both a contributing role in globalization and has benefitted from it, enhancing partnerships and diversifying products, markets, and routes. Technological innovations have also given TOC the capability to extend its reach into new areas of crime in the cyber realm and allowed more and more secure money transfers and communications among groups and associates.

Havascope, an organization devoted to the transparent tracking of the value of the global black market, lists 50 crimes that cumulatively are worth $1.6 trillion[10] or 2.2% of the 2016 gross world product of $75.5 trillion.[11] That is equivalent to the entire 2016 gross domestic product of the Republic of Korea or the Russian Federation. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates that 2% of the world economy consists of money laundering, or $800 billion, which is almost one-fourth of the entire US economy.

While all of this crime does not necessarily represent the share of TOC, it does provide some sense of the economic scale of global crime.[12] The physical and emotional toll of those affected by TOC, from the victims themselves to their loved ones and associates, is even more difficult to estimate.

What to Do?

Due to the complex nature of TOC and its intricate connections with extremism and local corruption, criminal and intelligence analysts are often undertrained or ill-equipped with the necessary tools to recognize and assess TOC groups. The majority of analysts, analyst educators, and

other professionals examining the issue of violent actors, including US military doctrine developers and civil affairs officers, believe it is important to differentiate between TOC and terrorist groups because criminals are only conducting "business" and can be reasoned with, but the fanatical nature of extremists precludes their having practical motivations.

This erroneous approach is perpetuated by the full force of US law enforcement, homeland security, and the defense establishment being misorganized with all structures and funding mechanisms focused on eradicating terrorism and not on the criminal activities that enable terrorist activities. International partners are also forced into this posture if they desire to work with or obtain support from the US defense and security community. Until the true magnitude and effect of TOC on terrorist funding and capabilities as well as its intersection with the everyday lives of civilians is recognized, efforts to thwart terrorist acts will be misguided and ineffectual and destabilizing criminal activity will continue to exacerbate violence around the globe.

Notes

1. See "UN: Tackle Wrongdoing by Peacekeepers: Letter to Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon." Human Rights Watch. Open letter to UN General Secretary released on April 30, 2008, urging the organization to investigate allegations of Indian and Pakistani peacekeepers involved in gold and weapons smuggling in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Available from https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/04/30/un-tackle-wrongdoing-peacekeepers-0 accessed on July 19, 2017. Many other instances of peacekeeper criminal activity have since been reported, mainly around the sex trade and human trafficking.
2. Faiola, Anthony, Souad Mekhennet, and James McAuley. "Bomb attacks show how Belgium became an incubator of terror," March 23, 2015. *Washington Post*. Available from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/bomb-attacks-show-how-belgium-became-an-incubator-of-terror/2016/03/23/79539218-f14b-11e5-89c3-a647fcce95e0_story.html?wpisrc=nl_rainbow-gift, accessed on March 27, 2016.
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4. See "Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime." July 25, 2011, U.S. National Security Council. Available from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/administration/eop/nsc/transnational-crime accessed on April 27, 2017.

5. Misha Glenny provides a concise but clear picture of the murky world of organized crime traversing the Balkan nations, describing the forces that fueled then fed the fire of the Yugoslav dissolution; see McMafia: A Journey through the Global Criminal Underworld. 2008. Alfred A. Knopf: New York, NY. pp. 27–44.
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CHAPTER 2

Why Worry About Organized Crime?

Abstract In the current age of endless conflict, it is apparent to most observers that the primary challenge to global stability is violent extremism. Policymakers believe the biggest threat to our personal and national security is ideologically motivated violence; thus our bureaucracy, funding streams, and security services at all levels are structured to identify and mitigate this threat. However, the role of transnational organized crime in conflict and instability worldwide has been well documented by many scholars and practitioners, and was acknowledged in 2011 by the US National Security Council, yet has not become universally recognized as a much more rampant destabilizer. Thus, strategies to counter it are generally piecemeal and ineffective.

Keywords Stability • Transnational organized crime • Violent extremism • Ideology

In the current age of endless conflict, it is apparent to most observers that the primary challenge to global stability is violent extremism. That premise is simply incorrect and prevents policy and strategic planning from beginning at any other point. Since 2001, "terrorism" has been the driving force of US military operations around the world and the way so much fear has been cultivated among average citizens, who imagine terrorists lurking around every corner.

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The shocking impact of acts of terror have driven global media to focus on horrific attacks to the point that most people believe this threat is pervasive, common, and likely to affect them personally. Aside from the nearly 3,000 killed in the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which woke most of the world up to the bogeyman of violent extremism, in the United States alone, from 2004 to 2014, the best data currently available, fewer than 100 Americans have been killed domestically in acts of violence in which the perpetrators affirmed their allegiance to an extremist ideology, most commonly radical Islam.

Yet most people, including policymakers, still believe the biggest threat to our personal and national security to be ideologically motivated violence; thus our bureaucracy, funding streams, and security services at all levels are structured to identify and mitigate this threat, as opposed to those that are truly existential. For example, in that same 2004–2014 time period, nearly 300,000 Americans have been killed by gunshots alone, never mind from other weapons and never mind the injuries and loss of property and well-being associated with common crime and non-ideological violence. That is 100 times the number killed on 9/11, but no "war on guns" has been declared or implemented.[1]

The intention here is not to debate US laws or gun use but to point out the undeserved emphasis that has been placed on protection of civilians against violent extremism in the post-9/11 age. The role of transnational organized crime (TOC) in conflict and instability worldwide has been well documented by many scholars and practitioners,[2] and has even been enshrined in the US National Security Council, "Strategy to Combat

Transnational Organized Crime" referenced above, yet has not become universally recognized as a much more rampant destabilizer.

A key issue is that the US-driven focus on terrorism since 2001 has created funding streams and bureaucratic structures far beyond the US and is affecting partner nations and multinational organizations supporting US anti-terror efforts to the point where nothing can be accomplished in mitigating conflict or state fragility without labeling the problem "terrorism." As many of these programs are classified, it is impossible to know the volume of this funding.

At the same time, unlike terrorism, TOC invades the life of every American. This can range from criminally stocked no-name automated teller machines (ATMs), to illicit automobile dealerships selling stolen cars, to high school kids buying marijuana originating in the Hindu Kush, much of which actually funds terrorist activity. As a US national guardsman and civilian police detective recently told the author,

> How can people not see the obvious connection between TOC and conflict? Here we are with thousands of suburban Americans now addicted to heroin because the dealers realized they had a new market in those addicted to prescription opioids here in the US. So, now we have Americans-turned-junkies directly funding the people our military is fighting in Afghanistan.

Differentiating Between Violent Extremists and Criminals

A working group of analysts and crime experts at the April 2016 Peace and Stability Operations Training and Education Workshop (PSOTEW) using a case study of Mali in the year 2012, spent two days discussing optimal approaches to defining whether violent groups active at that time were terrorist or criminal in motivation. This Working Group on *Analyzing and Mitigating Transnational Organized Crime* ultimately determined that this is not the most important question.

This is borne out by a statement by unnamed Afghans quoted in a May 2016 *New York Times* story on the Taliban:

> There is no security concern for a single laborer being checked or robbed by the police. The entire district is under Taliban control and the bulk of the harvesters are Taliban. Actually, this is the Taliban regime—you can take your narcotics anywhere or anytime you want to sell them.

The author's assessment underscores the lack of understanding of the nexus, noting, "The war in Afghanistan is not a war of ideology, it is a war of financial benefits."[3]

One member of the PSOTEW 2016 Working Group, US Army Colonel William Mandrake, PhD, pointed out that "terrorist and insurgent networks benefit from deviant globalization by connecting with [transnational criminal organizations] in order to employ their capabilities and generate funds to continue operations."[4] This statement is supported by Dr. Tamara Makarenko's 2004 article on the "crime-terror continuum," which explains:

> [I]t is in the interest of criminal and terrorist groups—invariably within unstable regions—to form alliances to ensure that an environment conducive to both their needs is sustained. Instability is in the interest of terrorists because it diminishes the legitimacy of governments in the eyes of the mass populations—the very people terrorists seek to gain support from; and it is in the interest of criminal groups seeking to maximise [sic] criminal operations.[5]

While it is popular and fascinating to discuss methods of changing "hearts and minds" and identifying cultural and neurological markers for attraction to extremist ideologies as well as devising strategies to wean adherents from their wayward beliefs, it is more efficacious to ***identify observable criminal activities*** and ***apply tested methods*** to halt and prevent them, rather than attack intangible and unobservable thoughts and ideas. Former US President Jimmy Carter may have committed adultery "in my heart many times," but nobody, not even his wife Rosalyn, could prosecute him for it without observable evidence of activity.[6]

Once critical activities are identified, other methodologies, such as financial, geospatial, and social network analyses, can be applied to identify resources, transit routes, and actors needed to carry out activities and locations and routes where they take place. This allows development of a roadmap for interruption by isolating or eliminating key people, insulating or blocking transit or halting specific activities, as well as developing violence prevention strategies. These practical and measurable activities, when fully informed by analysis, are more likely to lead to well-planned, well-orchestrated, and well-implemented mitigation efforts that successfully stem violence-related resources in the operational environment.

Unfortunately, as this approach is trumped by the hunt for terrorists, analysts are not generally trained or equipped to recognize organized crime or the corrupt environment that nurtures it; yet failing to do so diminishes effective forecasting and mitigation of violent crime and insurgencies, which are often the only target of intelligence requirements. Also, violence mitigation strategies are often developed at the policy level, but effective policy formulation and implementation require full information from various sources and a complete picture of the environment through robust analytic estimates. ***The flow of organized crime products and services is transnational; however, control of the flow is local.***

Analytic Approaches

It is difficult to identify any specific organization within the US Department of Defense (DoD) focused globally on assessing and mitigating TOC. There is also no apparent methodological approach to standardizing data collection on TOCs, nor a common repository for integrating strategic intelligence with criminal intelligence discussed in the open source (unclassified) environment to generate a more robust network analysis estimate.

To test this hypothesis, through funding from the US Army Peace and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), the author developed and

distributed a survey in March 2016 to gain a clearer understanding of analysts' experience at the operational and tactical levels. The survey also considered how training and education currently prepare analysts to effectively assess such complex environments using the most appropriate analytic tools. Although the survey response rate was too low to provide a significant sample, the responses received did anecdotally confirm PKSOI's assumptions:

1. Analysts identify, analyze, and investigate many kinds of TOC networks, but lack formal training and generally do not apply proven analytic tools or techniques in the process.
2. Educators report providing training at a more significant level than analysts report having received training.
3. Training on specific types of crime mirrors the types of crime analysts are required to identify and have witnessed in the field, but there is likely a much higher magnitude of training needed than currently provided on many types of TOC.
4. Analysts and educators tend to differentiate between TOCs and terrorist groups based on identified motive, that is, greed versus ideology; if they share characteristics, terrorist ties trump TOC interests for mitigation strategy development.
5. There is little interest in identifying corrupt officials and others who may facilitate TOC, unless there is a terrorist connection.

The survey suggested that 80% of analyst educators who responded to the question of how they differentiate between TOC and terrorist groups pointed to *motive of the organization* as the primary identifier, but one astute respondent noted that either type could possess both ideological and profit motivations; another respondent suggested that the level of state support of these activities was the determining factor.

In terms of classifying facilitators who operate along Makarenko's "crime-terror continuum," spanning or conjoining both types of networks, analyst educators surveyed agreed that these networks share characteristics of both groups, but that there is little value in studying them past motive identification, as involvement in terrorist activities becomes the only implicating factor of interest. There were no clear responses to the survey questions on integrating criminal and tactical or strategic intelligence products for more robust network analysis or on identifying corrupt officials facilitating TOC (Fig. 2.1).



Fig. 2.1 Crime types trained and analyzed as reported by educators and analysts to PKSOI March 2016 survey

Analyst survey respondents received training on the following types of TOC in rank order: money laundering, cybercrime, drug smuggling, human trafficking and corruption. None were trained to assess antiquities, arms or wildlife trafficking, or environmental crime or piracy.

Despite this lack of training, respondents identified, analyzed, or investigated ALL of these crimes except wildlife smuggling. This results in a clear knowledge and skills deficit for those tasked to analyze and investigate all types of transnational crimes that undermine stability.

While it is highly likely that the analyst and educator groups do not overlap, they both report the same trend in types of crimes that have been analyzed, but the amounts of training claimed to have been provided by trainers and received by analysts is rather different. Only counterfeit goods trafficking and cybercrime are reported at the same volume by both groups.

All respondents acknowledged having witnessed most types of transnational crime included in the survey, whether or not they had worked in the field. However, the instances of first-hand observation far outweighed the



Fig. 2.2 Crime types trained and witnessed as reported by educators and analysts responding to PKSOI March 2016 survey

instances of training on each type of crime, illustrating the dearth of analytic training in comparison to the volume of criminality, as noted in Fig. 2.2. Twenty-five percent of responding educators self-reported being "experts" in TOC and one-third of analysts did the same.

In line with the lack of general training on TOC, analysts reported low use of specific tools for identifying and analyzing it; only one analyst claimed to use tools such as Access, Excel, and SSPS, and only one educator claimed to use a combination of online proprietary data extraction tools. As illustrated in Fig. 2.3, both analysts and educators expressed familiarity with a variety of intelligence "products."

Two analysts used them in combination to respectively build cases and to alert investigators to financial crimes. However, many of these are collection reports, not finished intelligence products for decision-makers, including those starred in Fig. 2.3.

The reporting analysts stated that the consumers for their products are unspecified US government agencies and anti-money laundering



Fig. 2.3 Types of intelligence products used or taught as reported to PSKOI March 2016 survey

investigators, respectively. Thus, a simple, easy-to-train method that tracks observable activities associated with TOC using basic tools would fill a very real gap in knowledge and capability to improve efforts to tackle this pervasive destabilizing force.

In order to ensure that mission planning, operations, and tactical actions are coordinated for common, appropriate purposes, the destabilizing effect of TOC must be recognized, assessed, and accounted for in the mission outcome determination and resource allocation process at the **strategic** mission planning level.

While the strategy defines the end state or mission success metrics, any deviation to the overall mission plan should take place at the operational planning level, not at the strategic level. Using a simple analytic model, the mission team and its leaders can maintain **operational** agility and more effectively plan tactical activities that will feed into overall mission success metrics, however they are devised.

Such a model should be applied at the **tactical** mission level, again along with current social network and geospatial information, to identify optimal patrol areas or objectives and to provide metrics of tactical success.

Mali Case: Manifestation of the Crime–Terror Nexus

One example of the intricate relationship between violent criminal and extremist groups manifested itself in northern Mali in 2012 and is related to the Muslim nomadic Tuareg peoples inhabiting that area and their complex relationship with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Ansar al Dine groups operating there at the time.

Mali Conflict Background and Evolution

Since independence in 1960, the West considered Mali a "democratic success story." From the 1970s, the Malian government began to decentralize control over the north and began to give security contracts to local groups, essentially defined by ethnic group, to those who had historically supported government initiatives or were corrupt partners of certain officials in Bamako, the national capital, located in southern Mali. This resulted in increasing restiveness among the Tuaregs, whose tribes in the north were progressively marginalized and alienated.

For millennia, the Tuaregs had been respected throughout the region for their tracking and trading skills with extensive networks across the Maghreb region, many based on clan or kinship and, thus, ensuring a monopoly over the routes. Although today's collective memory invokes Timbuktu to designate the most "middle of nowhere" location on Earth, Mali's ancient city is still remembered at all due to its status as an honored and wealthy trading center that served as a key transit route to the Mediterranean and on to Europe centuries ago. As transportation changed in the era of globalization with cargo increasingly traveling by ship and air, these historic routes through rugged and "lawless" desert became inefficient. Today's most lucrative cargo traveling these routes are cocaine and human migrants.

Adding to the Tuaregs' troubles, the southern Malian government instituted agricultural quotas, forcing the Tuaregs to grow crops, such as cotton, in untenable amounts that were inappropriate to the arid climate and sandy soil. This increased desertification and led to depressed economic conditions in the region, forcing the Tuaregs to return to their traditional livelihoods but now not as legal traders, but as smugglers of illicit goods, such as untaxed cigarettes and counterfeit goods. This led to the convergence of trafficking in the north with corrupt military, police, and political officials and agencies eager to share in the burgeoning profits.[7]

For decades, young Tuaregs have also found employment in neighboring Libya. In the 1960s, as a locally respected African head of state who had always courted favor to gain influence in the region, late Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi often brokered peace deals between the Tuaregs and the constituent governments in the five states in which they reside in a contiguous territory the Tuaregs call Azawad, comprising the northern half of Mali bordering Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, and Niger.

In the 1970s, Gaddafi formed the "Islamic Legion" to create a unified Islamic state in northern Africa. During times of severe drought, the Legion offered cash for service, which enticed disenfranchised Tuaregs throughout the region. In 1987, the Legion disbanded, causing an influx of unemployed mercenaries to head back to Mali, while some joined the Libyan armed forces. As the Arab Spring unfolded in March 2011, Malian Tuaregs began to head to Libya in support of pro-Gaddafi forces due to an offer of a $10,000 signing bonus and a $1000 monthly wage.

With the fall of Gaddafi in late 2011, hundreds of such armed and battle-tested Tuaregs returned from Libya ready to form the Azawad National Liberation Movement (MNLA), which took control of several northern Malian towns by December 2011. While the Tuaregs are united in their desire to carve out a contiguous homeland as national borders hamper their traditional nomadic farming and trading activities, they are by no means monolithic and have enjoyed centuries of rivalry and infighting.

When a leading Tuareg, Iyad Ag Ghaly, was not selected to head the MNLA, he formed a rival separatist group, called Ansar al Dine, meaning "Defenders of the Faith," which had a more violent and radical Islamic agenda. Once well respected as a hostage negotiator and known to be fond of "whiskey and music," Ag Ghaly had served in the Malian consulate in Jedda, Saudi Arabia, from 2007 until 2010, and was known for his skill in hostage negotiation. It is believed Ag Ghaly became radicalized during this time. His extreme views and stated intention to unite the area of Azawad under a sharia structure was anathema to the Tuareg traditional brand of Islam and lost him the leadership of MNLA. In much of Tuareg culture, for instance, women make the majority of household decisions and the men are veiled.[8] Incidentally, a US diplomatic cable released by *Wikileaks* referred to Ag Ghaly as turning up "like the proverbial bad penny" whenever there was the prospect of "a cash transaction" between the Tuaregs and a foreign government.[9]

Ansar al Dine pledged allegiance to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the regional AQ affiliate, which is largely known as a kidnapping-for-ransom syndicate, much like Abu Sayyaf, the AQ affiliate in the

southern Philippines. AQIM is believed to have netted over $100 million from ransoms but is also funded through trafficking in arms, vehicles, cigarettes, persons, and narcotics, via its close links to South American cocaine cartels.[10] AQIM leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the mastermind of the 2013 attack on the In Amenas gas facility in Algeria that killed nearly 40 people, is known as the "one-eyed Marlboro Man" for his control of the illicit cigarette market.[11]

MNLA and Ansar al Dine already had close ties through Ag Ghaly and local kinship among members and worked together to attack government facilities in a bid to secede the northern parts of Mali, mainly around the cities of Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu. Incidentally, to underscore the complex nature of identifying a person or group as "terrorist," members of Ansar al Dine did not directly fight MNLA, due to their many close tribal and kinship ties, which in such harsh environments as the Maghreb and Somalia, are paramount to survival. Ansar al Dine leaves any fighting to be done with MNLA to the "foreign" members of AQIM.[12]

Unfortunately, this brief association with Ansar al Dine allowed the Malian government to label MNLA a "terrorist" organization implying Islamic radicalism, when they were actually national separatists with a secular agenda that did not attack civilians, only government facilities and police stations. This label ensured international funding and assistance for the government, which was fighting Ansar al Dine and AQIM; however, MNLA was also lumped in as an international threat when their original objective was only to carve out northern Mali as an independent Tuareg homeland.[13]



Fig. 2.4 Tuareg rebellion timeline from October 2011

In contrast to Mali's experience, Niger, which has also had a history of Tuareg rebellion, dealt with their heavily armed returnees from Libya through a proven post-conflict disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) strategy. The Niger government disarmed Tuareg groups as they entered the country and integrated their leaders into the government, including the new Tuareg prime minister appointed in April 2011 and the majority of local officials in Agadez, the Tuareg-majority region. The United States is assisting Niger in its stability efforts through its Pan-Sahelian Counter Terrorism Initiative by conducting aerial surveillance of the region.[14]

The imposition of modern borders, poor governance in Mali, changing logistical and environmental conditions, and the proliferation of arms have turned Mali into a battleground for competing ideologies, but also a turf war zone for control of historical trading routes now used for illicit trafficking. This was drastically exacerbated as the US "War on Drugs" drove Colombian cocaine dealers to begin to use West Africa as a transit route and cocaine entered Mali in 2002 (Fig. 2.4).

The huge cocaine profits led to an increase in arms trafficking and a breakdown in traditional power and security structures as young transporters became flush with profits and lost respect for traditional leaders and mores, creating intergroup tensions and increasing violence to protect drug runners' routes.[15] Eventually, the conflict in Mali drove the UN Security Council to recommend a peacekeeping mission deployment in April 2013.

Mali Mission Intelligence Assessment

The UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was deployed in July 2013 to bring peace to the restive area of northern Mali, mainly targeting al-Qaeda-linked group, Ansar al Dine. MINUSMA has been the most dangerous peacekeeping mission in UN history with the mission death toll at 128 (excluding accidents and illness) as of June 30, 2017.[16]

As described above, Mali is not a unique example of Islamic radicalism working with and vying for position with TOC. It is, however, unique in two ways: first, it is home to the first UN peacekeeping mission to include TOC mitigation in its mandate:

> *Expressing its continued concern* over the serious threats posed by transnational organized crime in the Sahel region, and its increasing links, in some cases, with terrorism, and strongly condemning the incidents of kidnapping and hostage-taking with the aim of raising funds or gaining political concessions, noting the increase in such kidnappings in the Sahel region, and underscoring the urgent need to address these issues…[17]

The second unique attribute of MINUSMA is as the first UN mission to incorporate intelligence analysis at the mission level, through its All Sources Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU). Despite the improvements in information sharing brought by ASIFU's implementation, missions still have no effective infrastructure for sharing intelligence. The structure in Mali is such that the challenge is to operationalize the overall stabilization mandate, which is complicated by the need to determine what everyone has to do to support the mandate within a framework that lacks harmony among the civilian, military, and police components.

Much has been written and studied about the Mali ASIFU, but a key assessment completed by John Karlsrud and Adam C. Smith in November 2015, based mainly on interviews with members of European troop contributing countries (TCCs) and UN staff involved in MINUSMA, discovered an intelligence capability with a disjointed **command, control, and logistics** structure and confusion about whether the role of the ASIFU is to be strategic, operational, or tactical, and whom it serves and interfaces with in the intelligence collection and analysis cells across the mission. Further, MINUSMA's lack of a secure communications network within the mission and between the field and New York hinders transmission of critical information. In addition, NATO members prefer to share information and equipment with some TCCs more than others, which created discord within mission teams and hampered collaboration.

Some of this was likely due to the fact that the 70-person Bamako-based unit was staffed with personnel mainly from Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Germany, Finland, and Estonia, not indigenous or regional analysts, and that none of the African nations involved in the mission were ASIFU contributors. This is unfortunate, as there is no local African perspective within the MINUSMA ASIFU, which automatically causes the European contributors to fail to see the degrees to which each of the

armed groups holding territory in Mali are supported by the population and why. While they may speak English and French, the official languages of Mali, these Europeans and most of the contributed troops are not fluent in the local languages actually used in the mission area. This drastically reduces the mission's credibility as well as its capability to truly understand the operational environment and drivers of conflict and hampers its ability to devise permanent conflict mitigation strategies.

The authors also discovered that on the positive side, the Open Source Section in Bamako that monitors local and regional newspapers, television, web-based news, and social media is manned by linguists trained in analysis who provide the mission with good information about the complexity of the situation and longitudinal analysis of the players, considering it is poorly resourced. Also, the Collection, Coordination, and Intelligence Requirements Management (CCIRM) is a valuable element of ASIFU with "well-structured organization, archives, databases, and communications."

Karlsrud and Smith also found that in Gao and Timbuktu, the ASIFU has intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) units with sensor and analysis capacity with human intelligence and unmanned aerial system (UAS) capabilities, plus some use of helicopter reconnaissance, special forces, police officers, as well as the troops and civilians on the ground; but in other mission areas, there were far fewer such assets and the government placed restrictions on UAS use that reduced situational understanding. Finally, there were strong signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities, but limited human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities, which in combination, provide a better understanding of key actors and conflict drivers, the local political economy, and perceptions of key constituencies.[18]

In assessing the overall effectiveness of the ASIFU in Mali, the US Military Observer Group (USMOG) deployed to Mali concluded that MINUSMA had taken too long to develop an integrated strategy for mission success, resulting in uncoordinated activity among the mission elements. There is also a feeling that the Special Representative of the Secretary General SRSG, or chief of mission, leadership is lacking, with the Force Commander having to provide any cohesion of effort. This results in few clear decisions and a dearth of priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) connected to decision support,[19] leading to reactive actions instead of careful planning on how to create and sustain stability in Mali.[20] USMOG further noted that as a result of these shortcomings, "MINUSMA

is seen as disorganized and wasteful. Due to this perception, the government of Mali's reliance on MINUSMA is interpreted as weakness by the population."[21]

This assessment was underscored by a July 2017 PKSOI Peace Operations Estimate on MINUSMA that noted the difficult position of this UN mission to remain "impartial," a primary UN principle intended to maintain credibility with all sides, as well as the consent and cooperation of the host nation. MINUSMA is caught between trying to protect civilians and support the government when it is the government that is targeting its own citizens,[22] leaving the majority of the mission's resources, personnel as well as material, devoted to protecting its own force, instead of implementing the mandate.[23]

A plan to merge the ASIFU in early 2017 with the Force Headquarters' (FHQ) unified intelligence management unit (U2), which is under the Force Commander's control, may help enhance coordination and alleviate some of these information sharing and requirement setting challenges, especially regarding the use of the UASs, that have plagued the mission thus far.[24]

Finally, USMOG noted that the "[K]ey resource in Northern Mali is trafficking routes; livelihood, and therefore nearly all of the conflict, is centered on the control of these routes."[25] As noted in the Mali conflict deconstruction above, the Tuareg historical value to the region is establishment and maintenance of trade routes. While once used to transport licit goods, and still critically important for moving some needed commodities throughout the region and helping willing migrants escape war-torn areas and head to perceived safety in Europe, they are increasingly used to transport narcotics and arms, as well as personnel involved in exacerbating regional conflict and exporting it to other regions. Therefore, this hotbed of TOC will remain in conflict until these activities are recognized as crucial contributors to conflict and mitigation strategies focused on them are devised and implemented.

Notes

1. These figures are difficult to pinpoint as the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) is restricted in using its Congressional funding on this research, due to the 1996 legislation initiated by the late Congressman Jay Dickey, who later expressed regret for the legislation. A bill (H.R. 2612) was introduced in June 2015 to "authorize the appropriation of funds to the Centers for

Disease Control and Prevention for conducting or supporting research on firearms safety or gun violence prevention." This bill has languished since its introduction to the House on June 2, 2015, when it was immediately referred to the Subcommittee on Health under the Committee on Commerce and Energy, with no action taken since. Bill text available from www.congress.gov/114/bills/hr2612/BILLS-114hr2612ih.pdf, accessed on July 18, 2016. Bill activity available from https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2612, accessed on July 30, 2017;

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CHAPTER 3

United Nations Intelligence and Transnational Organized Crime Initiatives: Evolution and Lessons Learned

Abstract The UN has been slow to recognize transnational organized crime as a destabilizer but in 2013, included its mitigation in the mission area as part of its stabilization mission in Mali. This mission was also the first to include an All Sources Intelligence Fusion Unit (ASIFU) to attempt to more effectively collect, process, and share information at the mission level for direct mission action. While this recognition of the need to share intelligence and to consider crime are leaps forward, there are still improvements to be made. This chapter explores information sharing by other multinational organizations in Africa, Europe, and Latin America to glean lessons to be applied to overcome intelligence limitations in UN missions.

Keywords United Nations • All Sources Intelligence Fusion Unit (ASIFU) • Mali • Transnational organized crime • Information sharing • Intelligence analysis

To understand the basic evolution of UN policymakers' recognition of the need for intelligence and the role of organized crime as it relates to conflict, a brief historical tour is in order. While the UN began its first peacekeeping operation soon after its creation in 1948, Secretary-General Boutros

D.E. Chido, *Intelligence Sharing, Transnational Organized Crime and Multinational Peacekeeping*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71183-6_3

Boutros-Ghali formally established the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) only in 1992, indicating a basic UN trait of reacting slowly to changing conditions.[1]

UN Intelligence and Transnational Organized Crime Initiatives

In November 2000, the Security Council received recommendations presented in the report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations, also known as the "Brahimi Report," after Lakhdar Brahimi, the Panel Chair. These recommendations were intended to refine the peacekeeping mission and processes, specifically expressing that despite the "impartiality" emphasis, the UN cannot be neutral and must have the capability and the knowledge to carry out its mandate and missions as formulated.

Two critical recommendations included creating an "Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat" within the Office of the Secretary-General to provide "a professional system for accumulating knowledge about conflict situations, distributing that knowledge efficiently to a wide user base, generating policy analyses and formulating long-term strategies." The second key proposal was to create a new information management and strategic analysis section at the headquarters level to enhance forecasting and change the current reactive culture, recommending it be staffed by "a small team of military experts and experts in international criminal networks."[2]

While these are useful recommendations for strategic decision-making at the headquarters level, the 2000 report does not discuss information sharing at the mission level for more effective operational and tactical efforts either to support the overall mandate, to protect civilians, or to improve security for mission teams.

Not until the creation of Joint Mission Analysis Centres [sic] (JMACs) within missions in 2005 did the first recommendation gain traction. JMACs support a mission's strategic mandate and include civilian, police, and military analysts who provide integrated analysis to the mission's chief, or Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). They do not provide real-time information to be operationalized within the mission environment and are not focused on transnational organized crime (TOC), even when it is included in the mission mandate.

On October 31, 2014, the then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon convened a High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO)

tasked "to undertake a thorough review of UN peace operations today and the emerging needs of the future." The HIPPO report was released in June 2015 and included recommendations to enhance the use of intelligence in missions and to recognize the detrimental effect of TOC on peace, strongly supporting many of the assertions made by the Brahimi report, noting that

> The Panel firmly believes that the United Nations Secretariat needs to overhaul the functioning of information and analysis structures and systems within missions in order to deliver significantly streamlined reporting, more effective information management and significantly enhanced analytical capacities. This can be complemented by low-cost but effective tools to support situational awareness and analysis within the mission area. The Panel calls upon all Member States, including host Governments, to share any information that may relate to the security of United Nations personnel.[3]

Until recently, the term "intelligence" was taboo in the UN environment and "information sharing" was, and often still is, preferred. This created a challenge for UN partners, specifically due to the current US focus on targeting, which requires a specific intelligence infrastructure. To this end, the 2000 Brahimi Report only used the word "intelligence" twice, once in a historical context and once to emphasize the force protection objective, rather than mandate achievement.[4] By the time the 2015 HIPPO report was issued, the UN had become much more accustomed to the word and more directly addressed the need to integrate it into the mission structure. Thus, the UN had finally come to terms with this critical capability gap, nearly 70 years after the first peacekeeping mission was deployed.

A key driver of the development of policies on intelligence since the 2000 report was force protection, made increasingly difficult by all types of violent actors in the operational environment, as a lack of intelligence analysis precludes effective identification of threats and in tandem, the ability to predict or prevent them. Since the issuance of both reports, the UN has recognized that at one time, peacekeepers were deployed to keep the peace, after both sides had signed an agreement, and were working toward shared goals. Today, the UN is increasingly deploying missions into environments where there may be no peace to be kept, such as in Mali.

When peacekeepers are deployed into hot combat with a lack of clarity of who the "good guys" are, especially when the host-State's own military even targets civilians, making their protection within the conflict zone an additional element of the mission mandate, it becomes most appealing for the peacekeepers to first protect themselves. As the improvised explosive device (IED) threat has increased, 70–80% of combat power has shifted to protecting forces, not on conducting peacekeeping tasks. This leads to an almost total focus on logistics and security.[5]

A robust intelligence capability is needed to understand the complexities of such an unstable operational environment, protect civilians that may be victims, not only of insurgents, but of both petty and organized criminals, or of their own government, and to protect the forces and assets the UN deploys to conduct peace and stabilization operations.

Now, with force and civilian protection as the critical mission tasking, in addition to the primary peacekeeping or stabilization mandate, the former Secretary-General, Security Council members, and the Senior Police Advisor to the Department of Peacekeeping have all noted the significant negative impact TOC has on the capability of missions to address all of these issues.

Similarly, the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GITOC), a network of law enforcement, governance, and development practitioners serving as a platform to create a global strategy to counter organized crime, published an input paper to HIPPO in February 2015 stating that the UN system appears to "lack the ability and determination to respond to organized crime." The paper further noted that countering organized crime requires a focus on corruption as well, and recommended that the UN "[b]uild analytical capabilities that include conflict threat assessment and other tools that allow for proactive and preventative approaches to organized crime and its impact upon governance, development, and the state."

A Challenges 20th Anniversary Series article by Dr. Jibecke Joensson stresses the recommendation that "missions should acquire expertise in [transnational organized crime] when requested and in partnership with others to support national police capacity," adding,

> This is an implicit recommendation, not drawn out into a bolded/numbered list but important nonetheless. A nascent peace in many zones of conflict is threatened by organized criminal entities trafficking in drugs, guns, timber, minerals and people, sometimes in league with corrupt

> officials. UN Police must have the ability to collect and use police intelligence, and as necessary interdict such criminal conspiracies, not only to execute their mandates effectively but for purposes of self-protection.[6]

As of 2013, the UN has begun to include addressing TOC in mission mandates, starting with Mali.[7]

In 2016 and 2017, the UNDPKO issued two important documents that concern the conduct of intelligence in the field and combating TOC: the January 2016 *Guidelines for Police Operations in UN Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions* and the April 2017 *Policy on Peacekeeping Intelligence.*

Guidelines for Police Operations in UN Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions, January 2016

Five pages of this nearly 30-page document are devoted to the concept of "intelligence-led policing," which is described as "working in tandem with community-led policing." These models intend to coordinate with local communities to enhance the perception of police as protectors and defenders, rather than potentially dangerous external forces. Community-led policing enhances the capability of intelligence-led policing as it enables information to flow more readily from trusting community members to the elements of the mission force that need to understand their operating environment in order to carry out their mandate. This mandate often includes a responsibility to protect these very community members; so the idea is to develop a symbiotic relationship between the local community and police and the UN peacekeepers, whether they are police or military, as the indigenous population rarely sees a difference.

The *UN Guidelines* describe intelligence-led policing (ILP) as

> [D]ata analysis and criminal intelligence…the fundamental basis for an objective, decision-making framework that facilitates crime prevention, reduction, disruption and dismantling through both strategic management and effective enforcement strategies…Intelligence informs and influences the police by helping them more effectively decide on priorities, the allocation of resources and strategies to reduce crime.[8]

In addition to using data for the above-noted benefits, the *Guidelines* also state that data-driven criminal intelligence is important for helping

the host-State to develop and install a "standardized crime report and data collection system." This will not only assist in developing metrics for capacity building and police success, but more importantly will enable the collection of standardized information that can be easily shared among jurisdictions and analyzed over time, space and across criminal groups of concern to the host-State.

As discussed above, within the mission team itself, geographic sectors are often managed by various troop- and police-contributing countries (TCC/PCC) which do not use a common information sharing system with a consistent lexicon or collection method. This severely hampers the conduct of analysis across sectors within a single UN mission team. It is impossible to build the host-State capacity if mission teams are not even effectively sharing information among themselves. Critically, the *Guidelines* also state that

> [a]ll United Nations police officers, including those deployed out in the regions/sectors/sub-sectors, shall be responsible for collecting and reporting information…shall target active and prolific offenders or specific activities or locations in an effort to predict emerging areas of criminality and insecurity or to obtain assistance in dismantling groups or networks involved in serious or organized crime.

This data analysis approach is critical to ensuring organized crime is not only halted, but *prevented* in the mission environment by enabling effective prioritization of assets in locations where criminal activity is most likely to occur *before* large-scale crime or atrocities can be committed, not just prosecuted after the fact.

The *Guidelines* state that, in addition to protecting mission and community members and resources in the short term, "strategic criminal intelligence forms the basis for policy and mission plans to enable effective and efficient mandate implementation."[9] Finally recognizing but not resolving the thorny issue of over-classification and impediments to information sharing, the *Guidelines* admit, "Criminal intelligence files shall be classified as 'confidential,' 'strictly confidential' or 'unclassified.' The classification, handover and purging of criminal intelligence files will be addressed in future specialized guidance."[10]

Policy on Peacekeeping Intelligence, April 2017

On April 1, 2017, the UN DPKO and Department of Field Support (DFS) issued the first ever *Policy on Peacekeeping Intelligence*, which describes the "overarching principles, processes and parameters to manage the intelligence needs of UN peacekeeping operations" and defines peacekeeping intelligence as

> [t]he non-clandestine acquisition and processing of information by a mission within a directed mission intelligence cycle to meet requirements for decision-making and to inform operations related to the safe and effective implementation of the Security Council mandate.[11]

The *Policy* is intended to serve as guidance to missions on these aspects of intelligence and leaves primary discretion on requirements generation, collection methods and analysis to the Mission Commanders under each mission's SRSG.[12] Much of this document has undoubtedly been left in vague terms with mission-by-mission flexibility in hopes that the *Policy* can one day be adopted by all Member States without objection, a challenge that results in glacially slow reform.

While the focus of intelligence-led policing in the peacekeeping context is appropriately on identifying, mitigating, and preventing crime in the mission environment and across the mission at all levels, the *Policy on Peacekeeping Intelligence* describes its fundamental purpose as enabling "missions to take decisions on appropriate actions to fulfill mandates effectively and safely" with three primary intentions: (1) support a common operational picture; (2) provide early warning of imminent threats; and (3) identify risks and opportunities.[13]

These are essential uses for intelligence that can be applied at the strategic, operational and tactical levels that focus on the mission's ability to fulfill its mandate. One of the key caveats governing the use of intelligence for peacekeeping is a dramatic departure from the common understanding of the use of intelligence by nation-states.

> Clandestine activities, defined as the acquisition of intelligence conducted in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment of the activities because they are illicit and/or are inconsistent with the legal framework, principles, policies and mandates of United Nations peacekeeping operations, are outside the boundaries of peacekeeping intelligence and shall not be undertaken by participating mission entities.[14]

This is not a surprise, as this admonition is intended to allay fears of international partners that T/PCCs will be "spying" on each other within the mission and concerns of the domestic population that "secret" collection activities will be undertaken in their communities, potentially compromising those citizens and others, such as non-governmental organization (NGO) staff and humanitarian aid workers who do provide information that assists the mission's efforts. To emphasize this, the *Policy* further stresses that intelligence activities must be "fully autonomous from and independent in all aspects of any national intelligence systems or other operations and will maintain their exclusively international character."[15]

In terms of process, the conduct of intelligence activities, including information gathering and sharing, is to be planned and implemented at the mission level by the Head of Mission or a delegate in accordance with standard operating procedures (SOPs), which are to be developed writ large and by each mission, and Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) agreed among mission T/PCCs, the host-State, and other relevant actors. These may include international aid groups and other critical actors within the mission environment, which are to be identified at the mission level in a process still to be determined. This gives a more operational flavor to the process. The current common view of intelligence in conflict-affected areas is that it is primarily conducted to identify kinetic targets (usually labeled "terrorists"), rather than being than a more robust effort to achieve mission objectives.

The mission intelligence coordination structure provided in the *Policy* as Annex B, and illustrated here in Fig. 3.1, shows the SRSG serving as the primary intelligence requirements generator through a delegated civilian Chair of mission intelligence coordination, which can be the JMAC Chair. In any case, the JMAC will be responsible for information collection plans and the Joint Operations Centre (JOC) will be responsible for information management and flow up to the SRSG and down to the Force and Police Commanders and their intelligence cells, mainly through the Unified Military Intelligence Directorate (U2) and Police equivalent.[16]

The *Policy's* Appendix A describes long-term development into implementation including the development of SOPs, doctrine, handbooks, and training. The plan for this process is illustrated in Fig. 3.2 and will likely take several years, particularly considering the competing interests and varied sensitivities of UN members. Another critical area not addressed by the charts provided in either Appendix A or Appendix B, is the division of labor between the U2 and the Police component within the intelligence



Fig. 3.1 Mission intelligence coordination structure

cycle when the mandate includes a requirement to address TOC as a threat to the mission. In addition to protecting civilians, the mission has responsibility to protect mission personnel and assets. Some lessons for informing these issues may be gleaned from other multinational organizations mandated to address TOC.

Other Multinational Organizations' Intelligence Sharing and TOC Efforts

While the UN DPKO and DFS continue to refine their peacekeeping intelligence *Policy* and develop the associated "principles, processes and parameters," an overview of the experiences and constructs of some UN



Fig. 3.2 Peacekeeping intelligence policy framework

partners and other regional and state entities focused on using intelligence analysis to mitigate TOC are likely to present some useful considerations.

Organization of American States Permanent Committee on Hemispheric Security Special Committee on TOC

The Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted the Hemispheric Plan of Action against TOC in October 2006 outlining key lines of action, including information sharing and cooperation. The Secretariat for Multidimensional Security is responsible for implementing the Plan and has three sections intended to combat TOC: Executive Secretariat of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, Executive Secretariat of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism, and the Department of Public Security.[17]

These work together with constituent states to develop sub-regional and crime-specific activities and coordination methods, as well as assisting individual countries to develop national anti-TOC strategies. The majority of evaluation information provided, however, is about training efforts, rather than actual intelligence sharing that results in effective assessment and mitigation strategies.

The latest report on Plan implementation from February 2015 notes the use of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) organized by the Group of Experts for the Control of Money Laundering, which provides training and expertise to financial analysts in the region. The Regional School for Anti-drug Intelligence of the American Community (ERCAIAD), led by the Colombian National Police trains multinational participants in strategic and operational police intelligence. In 2014, ERCAIAD helped Trinidad and Tobago establish a similar counterdrug intelligence training school for the Caribbean.

Latin American States' Individual Efforts to Control TOC

Individual Latin American states have made greater strides in recent years in combatting the violence and negative effects on governance and economic development posed by TOC and its relationship with local corruption. This is due in part to cooperation with the UN and to a greater extent with US Special Forces assistance as well as ongoing efforts at training and education through US Army South. This degree of US involvement in mitigating transnational drug trafficking beginning in the 1980s

with the "War on Drugs" is unlikely to be replicated in any other combatant command region, due to obvious interest in hemispheric security. Some such cases include Argentina, Colombia, El Salvador, and Guatemala.

In Argentina, the judicial branch has led the fight against TOC by publicizing the problem and the Argentine Supreme Court and other judicial bodies plan to create open databases on organized crime cases including one that will name individuals charged with corruption and another that will cross-reference drug trafficking charges for current and closed cases. The Court admitted that most cases are brought against individual dealers, rather than the leaders of cartels, and stressed that this must change. In addition, the Executive branch under President Mauricio Macri, elected in January 2016, has granted the military broader ability to control narcotics transit and consumption.[18]

Colombia is the most studied case of the quintessential narco-terror state turning itself around with the help of its neighbors, including intensive efforts by US defense and judiciary agencies. The rampant violence of the 1980s initiated by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), National Liberation Army (ELN) and Cali and Medellin drug cartels has greatly diminished with ceasefires and efforts to finalize a peace treaty with the FARC, which was signed on August 24, 2016, but was subsequently rejected in a referendum on October 2, 2016.[19] Both sides are still discussing future options but there are widespread fears that new militant drug gangs will quickly fill the space vacated by the insurgent groups and cartels, due to the profits to be made.

As Michael Shifter of the Council on Foreign Relations noted in April 2012,

> To a certain extent, Central America's predicament is one of geography—it is sandwiched between some of the world's largest drug producers in South America and the world's largest consumer of illegal drugs, the United States. The region is awash in weapons and gunmen, and high rates of poverty ensure substantial numbers of willing recruits for organized crime syndicates.[20]

In El Salvador, the fight against TOC has mainly been conducted by the military, which is still recovering from the 1979–92 civil war, which left as many as 75,000 dead. El Salvador has generally followed the US 1980s model and has imprisoned violent gang members, which has

resulted in creation of overcrowded recruitment centers for gangs as violence continues to escalate.

Growth of organized crime followed the Central American civil wars, thanks to a demobilization program that typically ignored the disarmament and reintegration process, leaving masses of unemployed armed men, especially in El Salvador. The government is coordinating its efforts with US Army South to enhance security cooperation to counter the increasing violence related to TOC to assist the government in reasserting control in rural areas.[21]

Guatemala, for example, is also still in recovery from its much longer civil war, which lasted from 1960 until 1996 and killed an estimated 200,000 civilians. Despite the cessation of the war, armed groups that arose from deposed state intelligence and military forces still threaten stability. Strides have been made, however, as former general and President Pérez Molina was forced to resign and was immediately arrested on fraud and corruption charges in September 2015. These events were the result of efforts of local prosecutors and investigators working with the UN International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) since 2007 with the goal of uncovering networks of criminals and corrupt officials.[22]

Despite these charges of personal corruption, Dr. Evan Ellis of the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute noted in November 2016 that

> while the small amount of news about Guatemala in the mainstream U.S. media concentrates on the CICIG and its fight against public corruption, the nation's progress in the struggle against transnational organized crime continues to be a good-news story that deserves greater attention… Although not prominent in the news, there are arguably few countries in the region that demonstrate the level of commitment to working with the U.S. that Guatemala does.[23]

The US typically deals with violence in Central America through financial and technical assistance to law enforcement, rule of law, and counternarcotics and anti-gang agencies and programs, as well as through addressing other contributing issues, including lack of economic opportunity and poverty.[24] This is a big step forward in establishing sustained conflict reduction measures and implementing long-awaited reintegration and economic development efforts that were needed in the immediate postwar period across the region.

African Union

The African Union is behind its constituent regional cooperation organizations in identifying and addressing TOC as a regional destabilizer. Its Peace and Security Committee does not have a framework dedicated to TOC, but only one on counter-terrorism. The AU's Border Programme [sic] (AUBP) does note that addressing "cross-border criminal activities through pragmatic border management" as one justification of its formation, but it remains unclear what this entails or the significance of the effort.[25]

African Regional Economic (and Security) Communities

In 2009, DPKO, UNODC, UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) Department of Public Affairs (DPA), and INTERPOL launched the West African Coast Initiative (WACI) in 2009, which creates Transnational Crime Units (TCU), meant to "enhance national and international coordination, as well as to enable intelligence-based investigations." As of 2016, these "elite inter-agency units, trained and equipped to fight TOC and to coordinate their activities in an international framework" are operational in Guinea Bissau, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, and one is preparing to stand up in Côte d'Ivoire.

WACI was developed in order to support the implementation of the **Economic Community of West African States (*ECOWAS*)** *Regional Action Plan to Address the Growing Problem of Illicit Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime, and Drug Abuse in West Africa*,[26] which grew out of the Regional Action Plan against drugs and crime, clearly recognizing TOC as a driver of conflict and an obstacle to legitimate governance and sustainable economic development.

The **Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)** in Eastern Africa is comprised of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda[27] and was expanded in 1996 to replace a similarly composed organization dedicated to overcoming the consequences of frequent and severe drought. Logically, IGAD is focused mainly on food security and protecting the environment as well as peace and security, humanitarian affairs, and economic integration and cooperation in the region.

As the region has been as affected by conflict as by drought since IGAD's inception, it established a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) in 2002, which is a data collection and analysis tool using geographic and thematic information clusters to forecast potential conflict and identify mitigation responses. CEWARN was updated as of June 2016 to integrate 21 representatives of civil society networks to create an Information Collection Network (ICN) based in Uganda to give top decision-makers analytic estimates on regional conflict using its web-based Reporter tool. Initially focused on cross-border pastoral conflict in specified areas, the upgraded tool combines diverse online sources, including crowd sourcing via text messaging to produce graphical and geographical data representations.

The innovative concept of CEWARN is its joining of government and civil society to share information and skills in order to "unlock the power of collective intelligence and ownership." The emphasis on open source information is also encouraging, as this is the kind of information that is most critical to effective UN peacekeeping and should be easy to share without source and method protection issues that classification creates. Effective use of popularly generated information would require UN missions to be more willing to leave their bases in order to gain the confidence of the population they are mandated to protect and serve. However, without effective vetting methods, violent extremist or criminal networks could take advantage of the system for their own ends, especially on the crowdsourcing and other social media collection side.

As the majority of information about CEWARN is IGAD-derived, such as the assertion that its operations have resulted in a "significant reduction of violent conflict particularly along Kenya-Uganda as well as Ethiopia-Kenya-Somalia borders," there have been no public assessments of its use or effectiveness. One can see easily that violence in South Sudan has increased steadily since independence in 2011 and while improving through 2012, Somalia has also become increasingly violent as al-Shabaab erodes the early gains made by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Uganda has also not succeeded in halting Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) rampaging throughout its border region, despite the US deployment of special forces and UASs since 2013.

In addition to its information collection, analysis, and sharing capability, CEWARN also intends to enact development projects to disincentivize

violent conflict participation and reduce crime, but it is not clear what kind of projects are envisioned, where or when they might begin, or how these relatively poor countries intend to pay for them.

The **Southern African Development Community (SADC)** was established in 1980 as the SAD Coordinating Conference, changing to the current name in 1992. The Specific Objectives of the organization in addition to "Peace-making and Peacekeeping Enforcement," include Crime Prevention focused on cross-border crime and intelligence expressed as "close cooperation" and "develop democratic institutions and practices."

SADC's Police Organization sees the following as the primary challenges to effective policing in the region of southern Africa, all activities that fund or otherwise support violent conflict:

- Terrorism
- Motor vehicle thefts
- Drugs and counterfeit pharmaceuticals
- Economic and commercial crimes
- Firearms and explosives
- Trafficking in gold, diamonds and other precious stones and metals
- Crimes against women and children
- Illegal immigrants and stolen and lost travel documents
- Wildlife crime and endangered species
- Trafficking in human beings

The Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation [sic] (SARPCCO) is the primary force in Southern Africa for the prevention and fighting of cross-border crime. It was founded in 1995 in Zimbabwe, is supported by the Sub-Regional Bureau of INTERPOL in Harare, which coordinates its activities and programs and has enacted a number of agreements that give it the mandate to combat transnational crime within the SADC territory.[28]

Subject to approval by constituent countries, SARPCCO has enacted a number of regional protocols and coordinates with INTERPOL to develop and implement joint strategies to combat regional crime, share information on criminal groups and activities, and ensure cross-jurisdictional access to pursue criminals across shared borders. The SARPCCO *Multilateral Cooperation Agreement on Combating Crime within the Region* was signed on October 1, 1997, by Member States and

came into effect on July 29, 1999, outlining the commitments, objectives, and conditions for cooperation among police agencies. The SARPCCO *Agreement in Respect of Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in the Field of Crime Combating* enables police officers to cross borders in the region to investigate or interdict crime and to question witnesses with the local police force retaining authority within each jurisdiction or nation.

Priority crimes SARPCCO targets include terrorism, trafficking in illegal and counterfeit drugs, arms, and explosives, humans and wildlife, as well as gold and other precious metals and gems. Unfortunately, there is currently no information available on the effectiveness of these programs, but it is useful to note that these regions recognize the contribution TOC makes to ongoing conflict and to undermining governance.

European-Led Initiatives

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) website itself states that "there is an over-reliance by the Alliance as a whole on the United States for the provision of essential capabilities, including…intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; air-to-air refuelling [sic]; ballistic missile defence [sic]; and airborne electronic warfare."[29]

US Army Colonel Brian Foster argued in his 2013 Strategy Research Project for the US Army War College that NATO should create an Assistant Secretary-General for Intelligence (ASG-I) to bridge the gap between competing civilian and military intelligence structures. Colonel Foster explained that leadership of the NATO intelligence effort is currently the responsibility of the Deputy Secretary-General (DSG) and that other duties stretch this position too thinly to allow for a comprehensive focus on intelligence, adding that the person in this position is unlikely to be an intelligence professional.

At the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO called for increased information sharing and established the Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit (TTIU), which became the foundation in 2003 for creation of the Intelligence Unit (IU) in 2011 to focus on intelligence issues broader than terrorism. Contributors to the intelligence process at NATO include the International Military Staff – Intelligence (IMS INT), which has about 500 members and which the NATO website claims that IMS INT products are widely used across NATO but, in reality, its primary client is limited to the Military Committee (MC) and therefore lacks access to a wider audience.

The strength of the IMS lies in exchanging information and views with the staffs of the Military Representatives, the civilian International Staff (IS), the Strategic Commanders, multinational Working Groups, and NATO agencies. The IU gets much of its intelligence from national civilian intelligence services which, until recently, mainly focused on counter intelligence and counter espionage concerns in a bilateral manner rather than sharing the information widely among the allies. In 2010, the Emerging Security Challenges (ESC) Division was established as a civilian department to investigate terrorism, WMD proliferation, cyber defense, and energy security. The ESC includes a small analytic cell, the Strategic Analysis Capability (SAC).

The Situation Center (SITCEN), controlled by the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), is, according to Foster, "responsible for receiving, exchanging and disseminating political, economic and military intelligence and information…24 hours a day, seven days a week." Due to its full-time nature, SITCEN is known to often disseminate non-vetted products that are not fully analyzed.

NATO also has an Intelligence Fusion Center (NIFC), created in 2007 and comprised of over 200 multinational military and civilian intelligence and support professionals. The Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Center (CCOMC), established in 2012, is designed to be NATO's military eye on the world by analyzing developing crisis situations. One European analyst at NATO HQ estimated IMS INT, IU, and SAC work on 75% of the same topics and these units all have different leadership, which only enhances the existing redundancy and lack of coordinated tasking.

Colonel Foster further noted that a highly desirable candidate for the ASG-I position would be an individual who has been in charge of a NATO nation's civilian or military intelligence organization and who would be able to work with member nations' foreign services. Foster added that rank and prestige are important because without proper credentials, an ASG-I could quickly become marginalized and ineffective.[30]

On July 7, 2016, the US National Director of Intelligence (NDI) James Clapper penned a public memo to express his support for a new intelligence post at NATO Headquarters, the Assistant Secretary-General for Intelligence and Security (ASG-I&S), announced at the July 8–9, 2016, NATO Summit in Warsaw, stating,

> We envision the ASG-I&S as a strong, empowered, strategic-minded leader who will better enable the Alliance's intelligence enterprise to anticipate and respond to myriad complex intelligence and security challenges. In addition to designing the new ASG-I&S, the NATO intelligence community over the past six months developed a new intelligence doctrine known as the Overarching Intelligence Policy (OIP).[31]

On December 1, 2016, Dr. Arndt Freytag von Loringhoven, former vice president of the German Federal Intelligence Service and Ambassador to the Czech Republic, assumed the post and officials indicate that the new ASG will work to improve intelligence sharing with a focus on Russia and on "addressing duplication in civilian and military intelligence efforts" with a view to improving counter-terrorism efforts. In addition, when it comes to the Islamic State terrorist (criminal) group, the new ASG will emphasize sharing information on operations and strategy, rather than tactical-level information about specific individuals active in Europe.[32]

Interestingly, the Columbia School of International and Public Affairs Group's 2013 thesis on NATO intelligence sharing in the twenty-first century recommends a standardized approach that assesses six key factors that influence a country's willingness to share intelligence: strategic priorities, security environment/deployed forces, established partnerships, governance models, capabilities, and culture/history. Based on these factors, the paper ranks Italy as most likely to share intelligence with Turkey second, then Germany and finally France, as least likely to share.[33]

Just before the NATO Summit, in June 2016, the UN Security Council authorized the EU to stop and inspect ships carrying migrants from the Libyan coast that might be smuggling arms in violation of a UN embargo. The interesting thing about this British-drafted resolution is that while it is focused on prohibiting the expansion of "terrorist" threats posed by Libyan groups allied with the Islamic State and al Qaeda, it acknowledges the TOC-terror nexus and a law enforcement approach to mitigating the perceived threat.[34]

While examining "A Decade of EU Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence," Javier Argomaniz et al. note that there are no accepted methods for measuring effectiveness of counter-terrorism efforts. Therefore, it is difficult to determine with certainty lessons to be learned. This is yet another reason to treat "terrorism" as a crime problem and use tested and measurable law enforcement methods for assessing and mitigating it.[35]

In 2009, UNODC and INTERPOL began developing the *Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessments (SOCTA) Handbook* with the stated aim of providing "guidance to make organized crime threat assessments… [to help] practitioners identify the risk factors, crime types, perpetrators and their collaborators. The methodology is designed to generate the information and analysis needed for intelligence-led policing and evidence-based policy."[36]

The *Handbook* describes a number of analytical approaches that can be used to assess TOC including criminal business analysis, market analysis, crime pattern analysis, network analysis, and demographic and social-trend analysis. While all of these are tested methods that can be appropriately applied to TOC, they are likely too complex and require expensive tools to be effectively applied in the mission environment, due to analytic capability and resource constraints noted above.

During the UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on the World Drug Problem in November 2015, INTERPOL stressed that "law enforcement, military and peacekeeping communities need to better interact and make it easier to help each other and understand their limitations in addressing drug trafficking." INTERPOL also stated that its replicable model for this purpose applied to counter-terrorism intelligence gathering in Iraq and Afghanistan.[37]

INTERPOL's criminal intelligence analysis efforts tend to be focused on using post-seizure data from member countries to identify new trafficking methods and trends through which it drafts analytical narrative reports to propagate knowledge about criminal methods and connections. It does not appear to develop or use specific techniques to conduct in-depth analysis.

Its efforts are, as expected, law enforcement attuned and aimed at interdiction and prosecution, not large-scale mitigation through stabilization efforts, specifically in conflict-affected or fragile environments. The organization ranks the following transnational crimes as the primary threats in the twenty-first century, aside from drug trafficking and currency counterfeiting: terrorism, cybercrime, and illicit trade in wildlife and forest products.

INTERPOL works extensively with many international and multinational organizations including EUROPOL, International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Maritime Analysis and Operations Center-Narcotics (MAOC-N) UNODC, World Customs Organization (WCO) and regional efforts, such as in Africa with Joint Airport Interdiction Task

Forces (JAITF), UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA) and West African Coast Initiative (WACI). A September 2015 INTERPOL study noted:

> Research into the linkages between drug trafficking and terrorism has become more robust in recent years, but this has not yet been translated into operational outcomes. Greater emphasis is needed on identifying and targeting drug trafficking organizations engaged in helping to finance terrorism and support terrorist groups from an intelligence exchange and evidentiary standpoint, not just a knowledge one. This should be given a priority within the law enforcement community.[38]

INTERPOL urges a focus on tracking and monitoring primary trafficking routes, hubs, and points of entry to reduce TOC's ability to function and serve as a supporter of terrorism and conflict. This is an intelligence function that could be overlaid onto major conflict areas through geospatial analysis to determine likely lingering or increasing violence and the funding and activities that fuel it to devise crime mitigation strategies that are already tried and true, rather than constantly inventing new approaches to countering "ideologies," which only give violent extremists actors a veneer of demigods, which make them more difficult to defeat than recognizing them as the basic criminals they are.

The 2015 report sagely noted that effective TOC mitigation results from using intelligence to disrupt operations from a supply chain perspective that will require things that the UN currently does not do well in its basic peacekeeping preparation: long-term, targeted training and mentoring with monitoring and evaluation.

Finally, the report stated that keys are "[l]earning from past experience, building up operational capacity and providing assistance to law enforcement on the ground…consciously and over the long-term." While highly likely to be a success multiplier in reducing the funding and activities that underpin conflict, such an approach is unlikely to be applied at the UN mission level.

Joint UN Initiatives

In March 2011, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and DPKO signed a joint plan of action to further strengthen their cooperation in the battle against drugs and organized crime in conflict and post-conflict zones and to proactively address threats to stability and security.

Part of the plan is to collaborate in offering training, including through e-learning where appropriate, using toolkits developed by UNODC in areas such as criminal justice training for law enforcement personnel including police officers, investigators, prosecutors and judges, intelligence analysts, and customs officials.

UNODC also works with Partner Nation (PN) governments directly as advisors and provides training for identifying narcotics trafficking and international crime to PN police. UNODC operates in PNs without regard to whether there is a concomitant peacekeeping mission underway. During UN peacekeeping missions, UNDPKO provides peacekeeping forces and Formed Police Units (FPUs) to maintain stability, until their own forces and police can assume that role.

As of January 1, 2016, UNDPKO *Guidelines* came into effect, which emphasize increased use of UNODC criminal intelligence manuals in peacekeeping missions, although intelligence sharing between DPKO and UNODC is not specifically discussed.

The *Guidelines* noted that the role of police in peacekeeping has evolved over time to include "addressing such threats as serious and organized crime, terrorism and corruption" and police personnel selected for a mission's newly created "Criminal Intelligence Unit shall undergo rigorous in-mission and refresher training on the basis of UNODC's *Criminal Intelligence Manuals* (2011) and their associated training materials."[39] Therefore, the UN is working through both DPKO and UNODC to prepare its mission staff to address TOC, suggesting that its mitigation will likely increasingly become part of future peacekeeping mandates and that it is aware of the shortcomings of pre-deployment-only training.

The UN Police Division works with many multinational organizations to identify TOC and mitigate its effect on conflict and violence including UNODC and the International Criminal Police Organisation [sic] (INTERPOL). In specific regions, it also coordinates with the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the European Union (EU) and individual member states.[40]

Former UN Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) for Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) Dmitry Titov, responsible for FPU training, deployment, and mission oversight, visited the Italian Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU) in Vicenza in June 2016[41] and stressed that FPUs are capable of identifying TOC and reporting what they have found.

ASG Titov also advised that FPUs provide indigenous or reach-back capability to intelligence personnel for passing TOC and criminal intelligence, as well as properly collect and catalogue forensic evidence to criminal intelligence units (CIUs). This is not the same as passing the information directly to the host-State for action, whose officials may be part of the local crime–terror–corruption nexus. ASG Titov's remarks emphasized integrating all types of intelligence for mitigating TOC at the mission level, noting that UNODC provides "advice on policy, assessment and gap analysis, and criminal analysis training (including specialized software)," and has recently published criminal intelligence training manuals to share.[42]

In this context, UNODC has published a series of criminal intelligence guides for managers, analysts and frontline law enforcement respectively, to serve as reference tools for law enforcement officials performing their respective roles, or to accompany and reinforce training courses in the discipline. Capacity building initiatives are supported by training that emphasizes the importance of international cooperation in the investigation of TOC.[43]

Intelligence Limitations: Challenges and Recommendations

Jurisdictional Limitations

Managing information at the mission level on TOC is impossible within the current structure and capability level. The need to coordinate information is gradually becoming understood, but no mechanism to do so has yet been devised or implemented. One challenge to developing uniform approaches and requirements to peacekeeping intelligence is that missions are divided into sectors in which individual troop- and police-contributing countries (T/PCCs) have responsibility for various geographic sectors and tasks within a single mission.

As a result, the combination of participating countries places little, if any, effort on collaborative collection and much less on debriefing in the field and there is little to no effort to process and produce at the headquarters level. They may also speak different languages, have varied cultural views of crime, have different levels of commitment to the mission itself and its leaders may have better or worse relationships with the SRSG,

Force Commander, or Police Commissioner. It also depends upon the Force Commander and the Police Commissioner how and whether any new methods or tools are adopted and even rudimentarily trained, and that it is entirely mission-dependent and personality-driven how much interaction takes place between the military and police components at any level.

Private discussions with returning USMOG personnel confirmed that an antiquated MS Excel spreadsheet is the only analytic "tool" available at the mission level and the contents, construction, and maintenance of which tended to depend upon the skill and commitment of the user, with no efforts at consistency in content. The speaker agreed that a standardized database would be most valuable but again, with the current lack of training, that value would depend upon the individual user. Information management has been a widely discussed shortcoming of the UN as a whole; so implementation would depend upon the mission.

The conversation also confirmed that there was also no criminal-intelligence capability under the Police Commissioner and that it would be useful to have this skill set in the JMAC to establish information sharing between the police and military components in the mission area and combine these datasets from the various military and police mission sectors.

In this particular mission, Country A was the most competent and agile force with enormous willingness and enthusiasm to conduct patrols. Country B was the largest TCC and most capable force but had no will to engage, remaining in a Chapter VI mindset (which prohibits offensive efforts), although this was a Chapter VII mission (mission mandate language requires only local forces to conduct targeted offensive operations). Country C's special forces were the most competent assets available for the force, operating nearly on par with US special forces in the field. In contrast, Country D's special forces were the least capable, the least trained and the least equipped. This left the NATO forces as the most effective overall performers who were heavily relied upon for planning and mission leadership execution, and for obvious reasons more inclined to share information with some partner nations more than others.

The population's perception of the mission currently is that it is a deterrent to its own armed services' often heavy-handed approach to threats and to the population. In some regions, the mission has become the main source of (licit and illicit) revenue for the local population. This economic boom is expected to collapse soon after the mission leaves, which could cause noncombatants to support armed groups with the intention of

maintaining instability and extending the economic support the mission provides.

Anticipated resource cuts to missions are expected to be based on troop performance, which happily has resulted in the development of new performance metrics for mission success at the headquarters level, but is a bit shocking that this was not considered before the mission was planned or deployed and that such metrics are not applied universally when mission objectives are formulated. Despite the apparent new understanding of the value of an analytic approach, remaining resources are unlikely to be allocated for analyst tools and training.[44]

As has been confirmed by a number of returning members from several current missions, there are constant leaks of operational intentions both to armed groups with the host-State's armed forces personnel often the origin of such leaks, leading to a greater reluctance to share information with host-Nation entities, further complicating coordination and thus, mission success.

Despite this concern, the UN analyst function must recognize the **criticality of effective information sharing and not be influenced by Western tendencies**, led by the United States, to adhere to generic protocols on intelligence coordination and to over-classify information. Peacekeeping mission information sharing needs and capabilities are not the same as those needed for or employed by individual country's national security structures. Much has been written and discussed about the handling and sharing of classified information, even among the United States' own intelligence and law enforcement agencies, as well as among the closest Western allies, known as the "five eyes."[45]

Broadening intelligence sharing to those outside this close circle is difficult enough, but what about "allies of expediency" in certain complex environments? Host-State military forces may say this is the reason for leakage of information, as some armed groups may enter into short-term détentes that enable achievement of short-term goals or shared objectives.

James Jeffrey, US Ambassador to Iraq from 2010 to 2012, indicated that "filtering and firewalling information was common, even with U.S. allies, when it came to intelligence sharing." Jeffrey believed that in the context of Iraq, there was "no harm" in sharing information with the Russians or Iranians.[46] It is important to recognize when the circumstances warrant information sharing to achieve individual mission success,

especially in cases that would have no effect on long-term individual national security. Unfortunately, such mission-critical infomation sharing does not take place due to mutual and long-standing suspicion.

As was noted in the ASIFU example in Mali, what Dr. Adam Svendsen calls ineffective "regionalization of intelligence" results from heavy reliance on Western partnerships and a failure to consult those with local expertise. This can be due to a simple lack of consideration of the value of this expertise, language barriers or a lack of trust or initiative in forging such relationships with those outside the usual circle among whom various nations or analyst teams have established information sharing agreements and practices.

Intelligence agencies are reluctantly acknowledging that the ubiquity and reliability of **open source information** relieves the need for protection of most "sources and methods." When everyone literate can collect useful data from the *New York Times*, there is no need to then classify it. In addition, the types of sources to be relied upon must be expanded to include vettable information even from adversaries in certain circumstances. As noted by Ambassador Jeffrey, NGOs and others operating in the mission environment can provide valuable information without becoming "sources," although their protection must always be a paramount consideration.

Just as US Special Forces use publicly available Google Maps and Google Earth when interacting with local forces,[47] the intelligence briefing for US presidential candidates upon receiving their party's nomination could serve as a model for sharing once-classified information. This process limits what information candidates are provided with briefings classified as Top Secret but only including the top-level intelligence community's analytic judgments and their confidence level based on available evidence. They are not given details about methods used to reach analytic conclusions nor information about sources or how the information was collected, nor are they given any operational-level information about ongoing activities.[48]

Commitment Limitations

UN mission leaders have their hands full herding this multicultural cattery trying to enforce the basic peacekeeping or stabilization mandate, ensuring the protection of their own force in increasingly hostile environments, managing the new "responsibility to protect"[49] civilians in such challenging mission environments, and now must also deal with a "new" mandate

element of TOC as a threat. In addition, as the UN does not target individuals or groups, a number of common mitigation approaches are immediately taken out of play. Chapters VI[50] and VII[51] missions under the UN Charter are focused on protecting peace, which is anathema to the UN force becoming an offensive army or gendarmerie.[52]

One US observer has noted that the lack of the T/PCCs' commitment to the mission is another impediment to effective use of intelligence for TOC mitigation. While most TCCs are developing countries that participate in peacekeeping for various reasons, including the desire for peace and the prestige of supporting the UN, some are also in it for the money. In at least one case, this observer noted that troops may be directed by the mission to go on patrol but are instructed by their own government not to use any of the equipment they have been issued, from weapons to vehicles, to ensure they remain pristine when they go home so the materiel can be added to the TCC's arsenal.[53] In such cases, peace is not protected and information is not collected to assist in achieving any aspect of the mission, mandated or not.

Along with the extreme violence against the UN presence in Mali by the insurgents as well as civilian protests, there is often a lack of medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) for injured peacekeepers. If they are injured, they often die because helicopters are not under the control of the mission Force Commander but are under the logistics chain, which is reluctant to allow flights under any dangerous conditions.[54] In such circumstances, it is little wonder the mission troops are loathe to leave their compounds. In fact, the UN base in Kidal is referred to as a "supercamp," due to its size and especially its massive and complex fortifications. These all contribute to a negative view of UN peacekeeping that is unlikely to result in lasting security or development.

Training Limitations

The challenge for dealing with all of these issues in the peacekeeping and stabilization mission context today is that the mission has limited intelligence capability. There is generally no criminal intelligence capability under the Police Commissioner but it would be useful to have this skill set in the JMAC to establish information sharing between the police and military components in the mission area with the caveats noted above addressed and combine these datasets from the various military and police mission sectors.

Thus far, the policy for peacekeeping intelligence has only been developed but not yet adopted, there is no training yet by the UN, and most of the personnel selected to participate in missions lack training, experience, or tools to conduct the analysis process. According to one US observer, there is often a "bait and switch" played by the T/PCCs as they send their best people for any training that is provided, then actually deploy troublemakers or low performers, retaining the better trained personnel within their own ranks.[55] While this is certainly not the case for all T/PCCs, its occurrence lowers the overall capability within such mission environments.

The training provided is not via the UN per se, but by other national or multinational organizations assisting with the mission, such as European entities and members of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (IAPTCs), which do not operate under a common rubric or other standards. Unfortunately, this often results in "training fratricide," meaning there is no training plan, no metrics, it is repetitive and contradictory. Often there are last minute requirement changes after troops and police are selected for deployment and are already trained, which causes them to also be "traded" for other soldiers being sent to the mission without training.

Although the 2016 police *Guidelines* specifically state that "where possible" the collection and analysis processes "should be accomplished by trained analysts," underscoring the current dearth of such assets, recognizing the problems discussed with pre-deployment assignment and training, it further states, "Personnel selected to lead and/or work in the police component's Criminal Intelligence Unit shall undergo rigorous in-mission and refresher training on the basis of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime's (UNODC's) Criminal Intelligence Manuals (2011) and their associated training materials." This also addresses the point that in the past, there has not been unified cooperation between UNDPKO and UNODC personnel operating in the same environment, but if DPKO missions continue to include TOC in their mandates, such enhanced cooperation will be imperative for the success of both UN agencies and the missions themselves.

Due to resource constraints, robust tools and training are unlikely to be given to those actually on the mission team needed for social network, geospatial, timeline, financial, and supply chain analysis to be used in concert to identify criminal activities underpinning the actions of violent actors. These must be provided as reach-back capabilities at the JMACs. Developing and standardizing training on very basic analytic techniques at

the mission level can also overcome "proprietariness" problems in sharing estimates as "methods" become common and no longer need to be protected.

Information Infrastructure Limitations

When peacekeepers do conduct patrols, if no clear intelligence requirements have been provided by the mission leadership, they will all be looking for and identifying different things, almost at random. When they do collect information, it will not be in a standardized format that can easily be combined, synthesized, and analyzed along with information collected in other sectors; so even skilled analysts, who are not necessarily to be found at the mission level at all, would be working under the "garbage in, garbage out" standard and not producing valuable actionable intelligence at all.

Chief among UN intelligence challenges in all mission environments is varying levels of concern among UN entities and participating Member States about secure communications and information protection as well as technical and interoperability issues, all of which hamper information sharing at the mission level. Some examples include the difficulty of combining collection databases and technical feeds from UAS and SIGINT sources, that is, sharing data from fifth-generation [fighter] jets to their fourth-generation cousins. In addition, lack of a common mission language hinders collectors from standardizing information and analysts from comparing like datasets.

While most countries go to great lengths to protect their intelligence sources and methods and rightly so, in the mission environment, there are many valuable open source information assets and an embracing of this type of information would drastically reduce the interoperability issues and avoid the need for complex compartmentalizing of valuable mission-oriented information. Of course, local sources should be carefully protected to ensure their safety, but local media, village meetings, and members of the non-governmental organization (NGO) community can provide critical situational awareness in open fora that do not need to be classified and stove-piped.

While JMACs have been in use to a greater degree since 2009, the Mali mission is the first UN mission to deploy an ASIFU, which is not focused on improving information at the headquarters level but at the mission level. It provides a test bed to determine how well such information

sharing can be conducted *once effective infrastructure is in place*, highlighting again the need for well-trained, experienced information collectors, analysts, and users, as well as effective tools for producing useful information.

As one Challenges Forum *20th Anniversary Background Paper* noted in April 2016,

> Significant challenges and obstacles exist to effectively make use of intelligence units, including, but not limited to, a lack of: adequate United Nations intelligence policy and guidance as well as tactics, techniques and procedures; linkage of the intelligence process to operational planning and coordination; access clearance procedures; and secure information management systems. It is critical that the Organization works closely with Member States to overcome these challenges and develops and deploys these types of intelligence units.[56]

As the Challenges paper also noted, if these obstacles are not overcome, deploying such units into UN mission environments "is like sending a modern 16-cycle washing machine to an organization used to an antique hand wringer washer."[57]

New protocols must be examined to ensure information is shared in each mission environment with those needing to possess it for effective function. This also means the development of data sharing platforms that can be used by all mission analysis team members without complex "filtering and firewalling." Once an actor is labeled a "violent extremist," individual or group, all subsequent mentions tend to be classified, which prohibits open discussion and clear understanding of the actor. This is a cultural change that needs to take place in the UN, the United States, and most other defense and intelligence establishments. Additional technical protocol changes are for cyber and data experts to identify and are outside the scope of this study, but the above recommendations on peacekeeping mission-specific requirements and the value of open sources must be key considerations as such solutions are identified and implemented. The end-users' needs and skill levels must not be ignored in this planning process.

Such protocols must ensure source reliability across multinational, multi-platform, and multi-source systems and teams. In addition to identifying the correct tools, a unified source vetting process must be developed as well as a timeliness function, as old information can create mission failure if targets move or other conditions change before information can

be acted upon. New systems must also ensure that single collection sources or types must not be overly relied upon, as a combination of sources provide a more holistic and thorough understanding of the operational environment.

Universality of Analysis Limitations

These intelligence limitations are universal, not just a challenge for the UN. Even in the United States, a very small number of police departments have a criminal analyst at all, only the very largest or those with a particularly high level of narcotics trafficking or high-profile transnational crime. This means that even when data on arrests for various crimes are provided by individual police departments, they are entered into the system by people unconcerned with how the information will be used.

This issue was clearly illustrated for the author when approached by a large retail chain attempting to determine the most likely crimes to be committed within proximity to its stores. It was extremely difficult to identify appropriate stores to sample for data collection. Intending to look at a five-mile radius around each store in several locations nationwide, it soon became apparent that, similar to the UN mission environment, as many as six local jurisdictions existed within that area, sometimes even State police. This meant extremely varied information would be available from each department, which resulted in the additional challenges described below.

Once the participating jurisdictions were identified, a number of problems with the initial data collection were discovered, particularly shocking was the largest impediment to effective analysis: lack of cooperation from individual police departments to provide crime incident reports for the requested period.

The reasons for this difficulty reside within the individual police departments and are part of the police culture as a whole, to which an entire research project can be devoted. Critical challenges identified included

- Online availability of reports
- Clarity of point of contact information
- Cooperativeness of police department
- Periodicity of data available
- Cost incurred for obtaining data, if any (yes, some police departments charged for hard copies even of public, digitally recorded

information as there was an inability or unwillingness to share their electronic files)

The next issue related to the quality of data when it was made available, including:

- Completeness of information obtained
- Hand-written vs. computer generated
- Format of incident reporting information, that is, database format, electronic or paper
- Other, case-specific problems identified throughout the collection process

Finally, usability of the data was the most time and labor intensive problem to resolve for the data that were actually collected. None of the departments willing to cooperate provided data in a standardized form that could be applied consistently across jurisdictions. A customized database had to be developed to normalize the data with analysts and the database designer attempting to determine appropriate uniform names for crimes for starters.

The data problems are endless, but here are a few examples. Some departments (and individuals within departments) listed first and last names of suspects as separate fields, some in a single field. The address information was far more complex with haphazard use of fields, abbreviations, and punctuation, while accurate location information was critical for the analysis to include all the data for the five-mile radius. For example, one field "offense address" had the value "123 W MAINST," while the same address was recorded in three separate fields corresponding to the Block: "123," the Direction: "W," and the Street: "MAINST." For geospatial analysis, Google Maps will probably recognize "MAINST" as "Main Street" but this is not likely to be the case for less common amalgamations. These and other challenges are only exacerbated in a multinational, multilinguistic environment where both collectors and analysts have low skill level and few tools and questionable commitment to anything but force protection.

Policy Direction Limitations

Much of the lack of effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions is the lack of appropriate analysis, mission mandate development, and direction given by the policymakers at the top. It is understood that there are sensitive issues surrounding all mission mandates and that they must be written in such a way to achieve support from a large number of members with competing interests and mission objectives, but if mandates continue to include mitigation of TOC, missions must be given clarity in the expectations of what they are to achieve and the capacity and capabilities to effectively apply intelligence methods to them.

One way to increase mission information sharing capability is to develop TOC mitigation strategies for specific missions through close coordination with the UNODC, which was created specifically for the purpose of countering illicit economic activities and organized crime and has a range of instruments to apply. Such strategies might include adding aerial surveillance of transit routes into training missions and sharing information with mission and other partners with mandates emphasizing interdiction, not the usual "kill on sight" expectations. This would save on training costs as well as provide "real world" training to mission teams actually in place, avoiding the pre-mission "bait-and-switch" of personnel that leads to untrained personnel ending up in the mission environment.

Peace expert Dr. Jibecke Joensson has recommended that to achieve stabilization, a "more strategic approach" is needed in fragile states during peace operations to halt the expansion of crime networks, which undermine both peace and stability. Such an approach should be based on "a deeper understanding of the various linkages and interfaces between organized crime and peace operations."[58]

Chloë Gotterson recently recommended in a *Small Wars Journal* article "a multi-pronged approach" in which national, regional, and international entities' civil society and private sector-led local initiatives prevent transnational crime and create alternative opportunities "to promote social and economic resilience to organised [sic] crime."

In order to develop a STRATEGIC mission plan for long-term TOC mitigation and conflict resolution, analysis is critical for following the steps below:

Step 1: Identify the types of TOC present in the region of interest
Step 2: Complete a standardized basic activities matrix for each type of TOC
Step 3. Follow activities and apply geospatial, social network, timeline, financial and supply chain analysis as needed to identify linkages and specific mitigation strategies
Step 4: Identify groups controlling each aspect of each TOC supply chain and assess alternative governance and services provided by each group
Step 5: Identify geographic boundaries of each group's territorial control and the demographic, ethnic, or religious composition of those under this control
Step 6: Identify key players in each group to determine network structure and with profiles, determine whom to isolate and with whom to negotiate for assisting the state in reasserting control
Step 7: Identify partners that can assist the state in reasserting control and satisfying grievances, that is. civil society, religious or ethnic leaders, other NGOs, and international partners
Step 8: Identify why legitimate authority is not providing effective governance and how the state could reassert control
Step 9: Develop a roadmap for reasserting control with socio-cultural-politico-economic considerations likely to ensure lasting control and service provision including legitimate economic opportunity and participation in local governance
Step 10: Establish rule of law and social well-being mechanisms for long-term social stability and effective governance in concert with local needs and aspirations.

In tandem with the strategic planning steps above, analysis could be used to great effect in order to follow the OPERATIONAL process to be led by the state, assisted by international actors:

Step 1: Present mission-derived analytic results to the host-State and other partners (INTERPOL, NATO, USA, AU, OAS, etc.)
Step 2: UN Role: Clarify to the host-State that for normal economic development and an end to conflict to be achieved, its overarching role is to:

Step A: Establish effective interdiction methods for ALL TOC activities within the state's jurisdiction and not pit one group against another

Step B: Develop a nonthreatening method for identifying grievances that keep people within the TOC group's territorial control marginalized from state authority

Step C: Participate in negotiations with a credible third party to address all parties' grievances and identify a peaceful path forward with assurances that the host-State will provide security and economic development opportunities

Step D: Develop a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program that provides some institutional role for rehabilitatable members of the violent group and a method for educating and re-integrating members of the entire region into a unified state

Step 3: Develop and implement an effective strategic communication plan to isolate, discredit, and recruit members of TOCs, and encourage the population under threat to turn away from criminal activities and toward state-sponsored protection and training and education for economic opportunity with the assurance that the state will strive to earn the right to be the protector and governor of the population.

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CHAPTER 4

BAIT: Analytic Model for Catching Bad Guys and Addressing Intelligence Limitations

Abstract The proposed BAIT (Basic Activities Indicators Template) analytic model was developed with an emphasis on simplicity and flexibility to overcome many of the intelligence limitations endemic to UN missions, especially when confronted with transnational organized crime in the mission environment. The model can be applied at the strategic level for mission planning and at the operational and tactical mission levels with only minimal training and minor MS Excel skill and access.

Mission training must clearly express that the more complete the knowledge about the operational environment, the more effective the mission team will be in securing that environment and maneuvering within it. Such knowledge can only be obtained through coordinated intelligence collection and analysis by that team.

Keywords Analytic model • Peacekeeping • Intelligence sharing • Training • BAIT (Basic Activities Indicators Template)

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Model Development

While supply chain analysis is often used by law enforcement to determine the activities and processes used by transnational criminals in an effort to identify the series of steps and operations that are characteristic of a particular transnational organized crime (TOC) group in order to disrupt operations, but without expensive software and highly skilled analysts with a business or mathematics background, it would be impossible to effectively apply this complex analytic method to TOC.

While loosely based on elements of supply chain, the simplicity and flexibility of the proposed BAIT (Basic Activities Indicators Template) model can overcome many of the limitations listed above and be usable at the strategic level for mission planning and at the operational and tactical mission levels with only minor MS Excel skill and access required.

The model uses inputs from several other methods to capture key information about each group of interest. The categories identified for each group include elements such as headquarter location, objectives, methods, use of violence, criminality, and production. Each category has an associated group of indicators and yes/no questions to further assess each violent target group. It was determined to be critical that entries into the template be possible only through standardized terms provided in drop-down menus to ensure the integrity and comparability of groups and activities.

In order to make the template more usable, the matrix is presented in a report card format, which results in a highly readable and even printable or digitally shareable profile snapshot of each group on its own Excel tab. The categories used in the template are objectives and activities, use of violence, and locations and associations, each of which is further described with pertinent sub-items.

To add a further layer of usability for United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions, the template includes a simple scoring system that can weigh particular indicators. Instead of using complex macros, these can be quantified using simple Excel "IF" statements in basic formulas and can be manipulated by the analyst to resolve a given set of questions about a group.

For instance, to provide a simple binary determination of whether a target group is *criminal* or *ideological* in nature, the analyst can add an "IF" statement to assign a value to certain responses for an aggregated score. If a target-group analysis results in a score of zero, the group is

purely ideological and this term automatically appears in the cell representing "Type," although extensive research has not uncovered any violent extremist groups that rate a zero, as several dozen assessed all engage in some form of criminality for funding. This reduced analyst bias in making the common assumption that a known extremist group is only that and allows the focus to remain not on prejudged impressions but on observable activities. As shown in Fig. 4.1, the fictitious group illustrated has "Criminal" as its type accordingly.

Group	Bad Guys Gang
Type	**Criminal**
Objectives and Activities	
Stated Objective(s)	Influence politics
Observable Objective(s)	Engage in alternative governance
Methods of Recruitment	Incentives
Sources of Funding	Charities/ Donations/ Remittances, Criminality
Engage in Criminal Acts	Yes
Types of Crime	Extortion, Robbery/Theft, Smuggling, Trafficking
Types of Illicit Products	Art/Antiquities, Counterfeit goods, Narcotics
Type(s) of Narcotics	Opiates, Synthetic Narcotics
Natural Resource Product(s)	Oil
Use of Violence	
Forms of Violence	Bombing, Hostage-taking
Tools of Violence	Arms, Explosives, Vehicle/Vessel
Purpose of Violence	Crime commission, Operational security, Subversion
Targets of Violence	Financial, Political
Engage in Suicidal Violence	Yes
Locations and Associations	
HQ Location	Bad Guy City
Operate Trans- nationally?	Yes
Operate Trans- continentally?	Yes
Transnationality Purpose	Expand logistical options, Safe haven
Key Local Alliance(s)	Other Bad Guys Gang (OBGG)
Purpose of Alliance	Logistics, Recruitment

Fig. 4.1 BAIT profile with hypothetical content

If the analyst encounters a new group, it is a simple matter of adding standard information based on reliable sourcing to a new report template. When a different requirement is issued, the "IF" statements can be easily adjusted to result in another aggregated score with the necessary meaning.

In addition, the analyst can compare groups using a matrix that aggregates information from the individual group profiles. The aggregated matrix includes a drop-down functionality that allows the mission analyst to easily select groups to compare side by side. The drop-down list automatically updates when new groups are added to the database and allows the matrix to remain current regarding group activities in the operational environment (OE).

The analyst can then apply conditional formatting to the aggregated sheet to indicate which groups engage in a specific set of activities. If, for instance, there is an increase in bombings targeting police stations, the mission analyst can identify across all the groups in the OE which have used bombing in the past and which have targeted police stations in the OE. If these key terms are present for a given group, those cells will turn pink with red font.

The entire matrix can then be easily filtered, leaving only these criteria to easily identify the relevant groups as in Fig. 4.2, which is important if there are dozens of groups operating in the mission area. This then enables analyst managers more efficient allocation of resources to begin to narrow down the set of likely suspects and apply additional collection and analytic methods including social network, geospatial and timeline analysis.

While there are some methods already in use for organizing collection of information such as the Army's SALUTE (Size, Activity, Location, Unit/Uniform, Time, and Equipment) report, these additional elements are not included in the BAIT analytical model as they are too tactical and too specific to be of universal value. The objective of the BAIT model is to be a ***basic*** template for untrained analysts to focus on observable ***activities***, which as noted, can then be combined with other factors to develop

Group	MNLA	Boko Haram	FARC	Hamas	Los Zetas	Taliban	Aum Shinrikyo
Forms of Violence	Assassination, Hostage-taking	**Bombing**, Hostage-taking, Mass Murder, Rape, Torture, Beating	**Bombing**, Assassination, Hostage-taking	**Bombing**, Rocket/Missile Attack	Assassination	Assassination, Mass Murder, Rocket/Missile Attack, **Bombing**, Hostage-taking	**Bombing**, Mass Murder, Assassination
Types of Violence	**Police**/Military, Political	**Police**/Military, Political, Ethnic/Religious, Prisons, Soft Targets	**Police**/Military, Political	Societal Influence, **Police**/Military, Soft Targets	Other Criminals, Financial, **Police**/Military, Political, Prisons	**Police**/Military, Political, Soft Targets, Prisons	Ethnic/Religious, Soft Targets

Fig. 4.2 Sorted and filtered BAIT profile

unique mitigation strategies based on mission conditions for police investigators to narrow down equipment suppliers, operating times, frequency of violent or criminal incidents, and other elements.

Alternative Governance Evaluation Matrix

When violent or criminal groups control territory, they are typically filling a power vacuum in an area vacated by the state and do govern the area under their control, even if not in the Western sense of "good" governance, as they would be unable to hold this land area without some form of legitimacy, however it is achieved. This results in the group creating some form of alternative governance structure. It is a structure because it has achieved more legitimacy and more effect on the local population's daily lives than the sovereign government authority, making it an alternative to the state, which has enabled the group to take control by ceding power for some reason. This can be due to weak state institutions, a corrupt or incapable local government, or the inability or unwillingness of the state to maintain control, resulting in disenfranchisement of a segment of the population to the point where state institutions no longer serve them.

For those groups whose activities are assessed in the primary matrix to the extent that their "observable objective(s)" includes "engage in alternative governance," the collector would automatically complete this section of BAIT, identifying the group's alternative governance characteristics. This information helps greatly with mitigation strategy development, as it clarifies whom its adherents and associates might be and how entrenched it is in governing, perhaps more effectively than the host nation the mission endeavors to support.

Legitimacy can be attained by an alternative governance structure, even a violent insurgency or criminal group in various ways, including provision of services, threat of violence, use of violence or other coercion methods, social group identification, or a combination.

Services provided by alternative governance structures vary greatly but can include security, food, water, shelter, land, electricity or other resources, employment or market access, dispute resolution, health care, and education. Chief among these services is security. Even the use of violence can provide effective control, as long as it is applied consistently enough to give inhabitants the ability to function throughout their daily lives to even a minimum degree, knowing the general rules of the game. Types of social connection can include ethnic, cultural, linguistic, or religious identity as well as economic class or caste. These elements are captured in the bottom

Alternative Governance	
Sources of Legitimacy	Service Provision
Type of Group	Economic class/caste
Specific Group	Badguyinese
Services Provided	Security, Prestige, Land

Fig. 4.3 Alternative governance elements captured in the BAIT profile

section of the matrix, as displayed in Fig. 4.3, and the drop-down menu contents can also be found in Appendix.

In order to devise effective mitigation strategies to counter the destabilizing effects of TOC in peacekeeping missions, instances of alternative governance must be recognized and understood as critical aspects of the operational environment. Otherwise, efforts to displace these groups can cause an unintended backlash as the people have come to rely on them in some cases as the only functioning governing authority.[1]

As the primary challenge to effectively implementing robust intelligence analysis capabilities in the mission environment, information management and sharing has been clearly described by many experts. On the **information collection** side, shortcomings relate to lack of adequate data gathering by mission teams that fail to conduct patrols due to safety considerations or prohibitions on using equipment, which results in a shortage of useful information. Conversely, issues of **data overload** can also be experienced, especially when there is no effective information processing or management system implemented at the mission level.[2]

Force protection has become one of the key drivers of enhancing information operations in mission environments as has been seen in the Mali case, which, now that the *Policy* has been issued by DPKO and DFS, can be correctly called "intelligence." Mission training must clearly express that the more complete the knowledge about the operational environment, the more able the mission team will be in securing that environment and its ability to maneuver within it. Such knowledge can only be obtained through coordinated intelligence collection and analysis by that team.

Such holistic approaches are likely to result in sustainable stability and reduction in the length and repetition of peace and stabilization missions once the commitment to see such approaches through to their completion is made by all parties involved and TOC is universally recognized as a key driver of conflict.

Notes

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Appendix

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Objectives and Activities

Stated objective(s)	*Observable objective(s)*	*Methods of recruitment*	*Sources of funding*	*Engage in criminal acts*	*Types of crime*	*Types of illicit products*	*Type(s) of narcotics*	*Natural resource product(s)*
Engage in alternative governance	Engage in alternative governance	Incentives	Charities/ Donations/ Remittances	Yes	Corruption	Art/Antiquities	Cocaine	Agriculture
Influence politics	Influence politics	Ideological	Criminality	No	Digital/ Information technology-enabled crime	Arms	Counterfeit Drugs	Gas
Profit	Profit	Prestige	Licit activities		Environmental crime	Counterfeit goods	Hashish	Gems
Promote ideology	Promote ideology	Threat or coercion	State sponsorship		Extortion	Humans	Heroin	Minerals
Territorial independence	Territorial independence	Use of violence			Kidnapping	Money for laundering	Marijuana	Oil
Vengeance	Vengeance				Money laundering	Narcotics	Opiates	Timber
					Piracy	National security Information	Pharmaceuticals	Water
					Prostitution	Natural resources	Synthetic Narcotics	N/A

Robbery/ Theft Smuggling Trafficking N/A	Identifying Information Pharmaceuticals Ships/Cargo (Piracy) Slaves Technology Toxic Waste for Disposal Wildlife (Plant/ Animal) N/A	N/A

Use of Violence

Forms of violence	*Tools of violence*	*Purpose of violence*	*Targets of violence*	*Engage in suicidal violence*
Assassination	Arms	Crime commission	Civic Facilities	Yes
Beating	Blunt objects	Operational security	Ethnic/Religious	No
Bombing	CBRN	Political influence	Financial	
Hostage-taking	Explosives	Security	Other Criminals	
Mass Murder	Rockets/Missiles	Societal Influence	Police/Military	
Rape	Vehicle/Vessel	Subversion	Political	
Rocket/ Missile Attack		Territorial security	Prisons	
Torture		Vengeance	Soft Targets	

Locations and Associations

Operate trans-nationally?	*Operate trans-continentally?*	*Purpose of transnational operation*	*Purpose of alliance*
Yes	Yes	Expand activity types	Access to facilitators
No	No	Expand logistical options	Destabilize operational environment
		Expand market	Expert knowledge/skills
		Expand product input sourcing	Funding
		Outsource to reduce risk	Logistics
		Recruitment	Other
		Safe haven	Recruitment
		Other	Reduce competition
		N/A	Security
			N/A

Alternative Governance

Sources of legitimacy	*Type of group*	*Services provided*
Coercion	Economic class/caste	Education
Service provision	Ethnic	Electricity or other power sources
Group identification	Ideological	Employment or market access
Threat of violence	Linguistic/Cultural	Food
N/A	Religious	Health care
	Social	Land
	N/A	Prestige
		Security
		Shelter
		Water
		N/A

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