CHINA in
TRANSFORMATION

IDENTITY, POLICY, AND PROSPERITY

BORDER NATIONALITY OF THE KOREAN DIASPORA AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN NORTHEAST CHINA

JEONGWON BOURDAIS PARK

China in Transformation

Series editors
Lin Chun
Department of Government
London School of Economics
London, UK

Carl Riskin
Queens College
City University of New York, Flushing
NY, USA

Rebecca Karl
AL, USA

China in Transformation publishes outstanding works of original research on, as well as translations and analyses of, the debates about China today. Critical and interdisciplinary in its outlook, the series seeks to situate China in its historical, regional, and international contexts, and to locate global trends with reference to China. As a flexible endeavor to identify longer-term problems and issues, the series is not constrained by discipline, perspective, or method. It launches a new perspective on China and the world in transformation that contributes to a growing and multifaceted scholarship.

More information about this series at
http://www.springer.com/series/14890

Jeongwon Bourdais Park

Identity, Policy, and Prosperity

Border Nationality of the Korean Diaspora and Regional Development in Northeast China

palgrave
macmillan

Jeongwon Bourdais Park
Lingnan University
Hong Kong SAR
Hong Kong

China in Transformation
ISBN 978-981-10-4848-7 ISBN 978-981-10-4849-4 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-4849-4

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017940379

Cover illustration: © Mattia Dantonio/Alamy Stock Photo

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature
The registered company is Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.
The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

For my grandfather, Park Byeong Seong (朴炳星)

Preface

This book tells the story of the people who live 'on the border,' both physically and psychologically. The core theme is how the Korean diaspora in Northeast China, formerly called Manchuria, has survived, passing through turbulent historical periods of modern China while keeping a relatively peaceful relationship with the host society. This project is partly based on my doctoral dissertation, which I completed in 2005. The idea first occurred to me while I was taking a graduate course on International Politics of Africa, for my master's degree at the London School of Economics and Political Science in the late 1990s. I was fascinated by the survival of the people's national identity in Eritrea and their relationship with Ethiopia in the context of dynamic regional politics of Africa. The subject concurrently reminded me of a fiction entitled *Bukgando* (north Jiandao, Jilin China) by a well-known Korean novelist, Ahn Soo-gil, that I had just finished reading in Korea before I left for London. I was inspired by the stories and historical backgrounds of the novel that zoom in on the lives of marginalized people living back and forth between the Qing and Joseon dynasties under severe oppressions by both in the border regions. The core similarity that connected my two separate incidences of inspiration that came from two completely different places, Africa and East Asia, was the peoples' struggle to preserve their collective identity and the patterns of compromising for survival as they faced various political tumults. Another reason this

region piqued my interest concerns the intriguing life story of my grandfather, a Waseda University law student turned anti-colonial activist. Much of his life he was on the run all over Japan, the Korean peninsula and Manchuria, often in and out of jails and tarred with various labels by different authorities throughout the colonial and de-colonialization periods: first as an anti-imperialist rebel, later as a communist activist, and finally as revisionist partisan. To my regret, I never met him. For my Ph.D., as I was advised that the scope of the case of the diaspora in China was not broad enough for a dissertation, I added two more case studies, the Korean diasporas in Japan and Uzbekistan. After completion of this longer project in 2005, it took me a decade or so to again develop this project, this time focusing only on my initial interest, the Korean diaspora in Northeast China. For helping me to regain my courage, I would like to thank Prof. Chun Lin and Prof. Dominic Lieven, who have constantly inspired me and supported me to continue fulfilling my academic tasks. Also, my thanks go to Lingnan University Hong Kong, for generously offering me the opportunity to carry out this project over the past few years. However, I acknowledge that any faults that might be found in this book are of course solely mine. My primary intention to publish this book is to share what I so far have learned through this research with anyone who may have similar academic interests and serious concerns about how the historically accumulated community in China or elsewhere could peacefully preserve a distinctive but stable collective identity and share a mutually prosperous community life for the wider region. My special thanks go to the publisher, Palgrave Macmillan, for accepting my manuscript and providing me patient support. Lastly, my family, both in Korea and in France, has been my most important supporter. I particularly thank my dearest friend, Frédéric Bourdais, who offered me a great deal of support during my research, while remaining full of good humor, constantly giving me confidence to carry out what I believed to be best.

Hong Kong SAR, Hong Kong — Jeongwon Bourdais Park

Contents

About the Author

Dr Jeongwon Bourdais Park is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science at Lingnan University Hong Kong where the author has been a faculty member since 2013. The author's current research focuses on international politics of Northeast Asia, environmental politics, and international organizations.

List of Figures

List of Tables

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Studying the *Joseonjok/Chaoxianzu* in the Context of the State–Community Relationship

The world has become increasingly globalized and interconnected, and migration, the highly dynamic phenomenon of people's movement, has drawn a great deal of attention from the broader epistemic community. The number of people who live outside their country of birth in 2015 was 244 million—3.3% of the world's population (OECD 2016, p. 23)—up from 173 million in 2000; "officially classified" refugees accounted for 7% of this total. In addition, armed conflict and the threat of violence have driven millions of people from their homes and across international borders in search of safety. At the end of 2015, there were 16.12 million refugees and 3.21 million asylum seekers worldwide (The United Nations Refugee Agency 2016).[1] This modern exodus occurs continuously as people seek higher incomes, improved individual and family welfare, cultural comfort, fundamental safety, and better opportunities for their offsprings. Migration generates both positive and negative consequences for the societies involved in terms of the mobility of human resources—for example, brain gains and brain drains from the receiving and sending countries' perspectives. Other associated issues include social cohesion, welfare burdens and the rise of welfare chauvinism, labor market restructuring due to competition over certain jobs, ethnostratification, security concerns, chain migration, and ethnic hatred. Migration studies linked with security or social

J.B. Park, *Identity, Policy, and Prosperity*, China in Transformation,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-4849-4_1

and economic development have increased because of people's greater mobility and the interconnectivity of labor markets in the globalizing world. Therefore, the control and integration of migrant populations (both internal and external) has become a high national priority for many countries, both developing and developed. China (The People's Republic of China [PRC]) has preserved a particular form of modern multiethnic state with an ethnically diverse population. China has experienced rapid internal migration and has gradually become a receiving country while remaining the fourth largest sending country, with 9.5 million people in overseas Chinese communities across the globe. By 2015, the number of internal rural–urban migrants in China reached 150 million (IOM 2016, p. 5). For these reasons, China has been a focus of academic research in the fields of Chinese diasporas, both enduring and new ethnic tensions and conflicts, and internal Chinese migration. Since China has become the preeminent world economy and is undergoing multifaceted full-scale transformation, migration analysis should be expanded accordingly to fully understand the state–community relationship in this rapidly developing and transitory period. Reflecting these changes, China's previously territorially confined ethnic minority communities have also been at the edge of disintegration, with a variety of political (security), socioeconomic (development), and cultural (identity) problems in different regions in China.

Against this backdrop, this project, a case study taking an interdisciplinary academic field of ethnic relations, investigates the formation of the *Joseonjok* (*Chaoxianzu*, the ethnonym of the pre-modern Korean diaspora) identity,[2] the PRC's policy toward minority regions, and the prosperity ("thriving" in an inclusive sense beyond short economic well-being) of northeast China, focusing on the communities of the *Joseonjok*, the 13th largest ethnic group in China, concentrated in a region generally known as *Dongbei* (formerly Manchuria), which comprises the three provinces of Jilin, Heilongjiang, and Liaoning (Table 1.1). The project presents the process and nature of the formation of *Joseonjok* identity and changes in their community in contemporary China, dividing it into the three distinctive historical periods: the period surrounding Deng Xiaoping's Open Door policy, the period of rapid economic reform, and the post-Deng era. A multiple-level analysis is made in each period, including general theoretical discussions on the relationship between communism and ethnonationalism; explanations of the Chinese particularities of the conflicts and synergies of seemingly contradictory human

Table 1.1 Total and minority populations in minority regions (2013) (unit: 10,000)

	Total population	*Minority population*	*Ratio (national total ratio): 49.23%*
Jilin	331.28	176.18	53.18%
Liaoning	326.42	112.75	34.54%
Heilongjiang	24.81	5.16	20.80%
Tibet	312.00	304.04	97.45%
Xinjiang	2264.00	1406.57	62.13%

Adapted from the NBS 2014

Note The official figures do not reflect the re-adjustment and decreasing numbers of the previously designated "minority" administrative prefectures, counties, and cities nor the floating population who maintain their *hukou* but actually live outside the region

groupings in the Chinese context; and applications of the two levels of discussion to the *Joseonjok* case. The theoretical propositions inform the comparative analysis. Given the significance of regionally confined ethnicity and ethnonationalism in a modern multinational state due to their linkages with national security, stability, and prosperity, studying the state–community (social group) relationship is an essential part of political science, public policy studies, and international relations. This case study also contributes to the literature on ethnic relations in the context of Northeast Asia.

By focusing on the question of how minority ethnic groups have built a distinctive collective identity and survived political turmoil throughout China's modern history, this project disentangles the contradictions and synergies between nationality, locality, and development in China. The pre-modern Korean diaspora population is concentrated in the region of *Dongbei*, which surrounds the *Yanbian/Yeonbyeon Joseonjok* autonomous prefecture (*yanbianzizhizhou*) and *Changbai/Jangbaek* autonomous county (*changbaizizhixian*). Nationwide, China has eight officially recognized ethnic minority provinces (*shaoshuminzuquyu*): Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang. China also has five minority ethnic autonomous regions: the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (*neimengguzizhiqu*), the Xinjiang Uyghurs Autonomous Region (*xinjiangweiwuerzizhiqu*), the Guangxi Zhuang Ethnicity Autonomous Region (*guangxizhuangzuzizhiqu*), the Ningxia Hui Ethnicity Autonomous Region (*ningxiahuizuzizhiqu*),

Table 1.2 *Joseonjok* population change

	1964	*1990*	*2000*	*2010*	*2012*
Yanbian		861,572	842,549	736,900	796,524
Jilin	867,000	1184,000	1146,000	1040,100	–
Liaoning	–	230,378	230,000	239,537	–
Heilongjiang	–	452,398	388,500	327,806	–
Total	1339,569	1920,507	1923,842	1830,929	–

Adapted from the Yanbian Yearbook and the NBS 2014

Table 1.3 *Joseonjok* population (%) in *Yanbian* (per non-*Joseonjok)*

Year	*1949*	*1960*	*1970*	*1980*	*1990*	*2000*	*2012*
Rate	63.36	51.82	44.76	40.41	40.54	38.55	35.66

Adapted from the Yanbian Yearbook and the National Statistics Bureau 2014

and the Tibet Autonomous Region (*xizangzizhiqu*). In *Dongbei*'s three provinces and the rest of northern China, there are, in addition to the Han Chinese, five main ethnic groups: Mongols (2200,000), *Joseonjok* (1923,842), *Ewenkezu* (30,505), *Hèzhézú* (10,000), and *Orogenzu* (8196). However, the *Joseonjok* are the only ethnic group who reside in all three provinces of *Dongbei*, which is adjacent to the Korean peninsula. The populations of *Hèzhézú* and *Orogenzu* are concentrated in Heilongjiang only. Mongols are spread more widely, residing mostly in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region but also in Xinjiang and other parts of *Dongbei* (NBS 2012). As of 2000, approximately 92% of the *Joseonjok* lived in *Dongbei*, of which about 60% lived in Jilin Province, 20% in Heilongjiang, 12% in Liaoning, and 7.7% outside *Dongbei*, with 1% in Beijing (Kim 2010, p. 97) Tables 1.2 and 1.3.

The administrative divisions of China's ethnic minority regions are as follows: 77 ethnic autonomous groups at the prefecture level (*dijiminzuzizhidifang*), 31 cities at the prefecture level (*dijishi*), 30 autonomous prefectures (*zizhizhou*), 705 ethnic autonomous regions at the county level (*xianjiminzuzizhidifang*), 72 cities at the county level (*xianjishi*), and 120 autonomous counties (*zizhixian*). *Yanbian* Autonomous Prefecture is one of the 30 autonomous prefectures (*zizhizhou*), whereas *Changbai Joseonjok* autonomous *xian* (*hyun* in Korean) in Jilin is one of the 120 autonomous counties (*zizhixian*). In addition, although

not categorized as "autonomous" (*zizhi*), there are an additional 11 *Joseonjok* counties (*hyang* in Korean) in Jilin, 13 in Liaoning, and 19 in Heilongjiang (NBS 2013). The *Joseonjok* community is one of the 36 ethnic minority groups that reside near China's borders (NBS 2012). The majority of Yanbian's residents were *Joseonjok* before the implementation of the PRC's market reforms.

Dongbei was well protected by the government before the PRC's reform policies, to the point that half of the state's total investment was allocated for industrial development. In recent years, however, in the wake of Beijing's reform policy, China's northeast has become an industrial rust belt, with the dismantling of traditional state-owned factories and the dispersal of their labor force (Mackerras 2003, pp. 56–57). The region has become a centerpiece of the state's reform policy failure in managing state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The estimated proportion of output values of SOEs in manufacturing sector recorded 77.6% in 1978, but it was dropped as low as 26.6% in 2010 (NBS 2010). It is lagging behind China's overall rapid economic and social development and is consequently becoming isolated and relatively disadvantaged because of the decline of productivity and efficiency and a lack of investment (Yang and Guo 2006; Wang and Lu 2005; Wang 2005; HERI 2014). The process of rapid industrialization, deindustrialization, and reindustrialization in *Dongbei* occurred in parallel with the increased urbanization that accompanied the de-collectivization of ethnic groups in rural areas; this has gradually resulted in the disintegration of ethnic communities. This process was also precipitated by a variety of other political and social factors.

The changing circumstances in this region gave local people misgivings about the gradual disintegration of the community and the dispersal of population in both rural and urban minority-concentrated areas in *Dongbei* (Jeong 1997; Kim 1999; Lee 2008; Piao 2014). The *Joseonjok* community has also undergone de-ethnicization pressure and become re-diasporized while facing implicit barriers of non-inclusion and non-acceptance in the societies in which they are currently settled in China, South Korea, and the West. These problems are attributed to a lack of attention from the central government and the relatively sluggish development of the traditional *Joseonjok* region compared with other rapidly developing coastal cities in China. "By any measure, China's cities have enjoyed several decades of explosive growth. According to the official data, the country passed the 50% urbanization threshold in

2010, and the urbanization rate had already exceeded 54% by 2014" (OECD 2015a, p. 14). However, China's urban–rural nominal income gap increased from zero in 1978 to approximately 17,000 CNY in 2012 (NBS 2013). "Living standards in rural China remain far below those in urban areas. Average rural disposable income per capita is around 1/3 of that in urban areas" (OECD 2015b, p. 46). Because the majority of ethnic minorities reside in the country's rural areas, 11 of the 14 extreme-poverty areas in China are located within minority ethnicity–concentrated regions. By the end of 2014, in the eight major official minority ethnicity–concentrated regions and provinces, the population below the poverty line at the national level had reached 2.205 million. The overall poverty rate of those eight regions and provinces reached 14.7%, which was double the national average of 7.5%. Of China's 22,000-km border, 19,000 km are located in minority ethnicity regions. At the end of 2013, 99 counties in those border areas were short of basic infrastructure such as highways; 6,000 counties had no paved roads; and 2.47 million people had no access to fresh drinking water (Liu et al. 2016). Nationwide, Chinese society has faced increasing social inequality, recording a 0.473 GINI coefficient in 2015, which is much higher than those of other rapidly developing countries (OECD 2017, p. 8).

With the development of the market economy and Open Door policy, the *Joseonjok* community has been to a great extent integrated into the South Korean market more than the mainland China market, especially in terms of the labor supply but as marginalized low-skilled labor (Piao 2016). This suggests a question relating to the *Joseonjok*'s more than half century of integration into Chinese society: Why is ethnostratification within Chinese territory transnationally transferrable outside China? Most of the *Joseonjok* population outside *Dongbei* has been employed in low-skill and low-paying jobs such as basic level construction work, domestic and restaurant work, temporary clerk positions in small enterprises regardless of their social status in *Dongbei*. It is not uncommon to meet *Joseonjok* people with tertiary education who used to be employees in the PRC's public sector in *Dongbei* who are now engaged in low-level unskilled jobs outside China. This phenomenon marks a wider gap between the *Joseonjok* and the socially rising Han Chinese diasporas. Under these circumstances, as Chinese citizens, are the *Joseonjok* still as proud of China's economic growth as the Han Chinese and as much as they should be, or are they more frustrated than before? As minority nationals, how much do the *Joseonjok* share the country's prosperous

vision compared to before? In reality, the *Joseonjok* in China have a growing fear of gradually but surely losing their agricultural land and basis for their communities (Jeon 1999). Similar to other rural populations, Han Chinese and minority nationals alike, the *Joseonjok* face growing pressure to become highly capitalist-minded and self-sufficient. They are indirectly encouraged to become connected with the two motherlands as brokers, traders, and remittance senders while being mindful of the changing diplomatic relationships among the PRC, the DPRK, and the ROK. Nevertheless, they are pressured not to become closely connected to the people of the DPRK, notably defectors, and are even encouraged to report them to the Chinese police. The local governments, in line with Beijing's policy, are extremely alert to any potential tensions arising from the relationship between the *Joseonjok* and the DPRK. For example, a murder case committed by a North Korean defector in Nanping, a town on the border between China and North Korea, had provided a ground for the government's increasing concerns about the flow of defectors in this region.[3]

More recently, because of the DPRK's nuclear tests near *Dongbei*, earthquakes have been reported, and directly and indirectly related natural disasters have become more prominent. None of the governments of the DPRK's neighboring countries, including the ROK, have hardly spoken out enthusiastically about resolving the problems associated with DPRK defectors in China. A number of overseas Korean individuals in the region, being accused of a variety of different official reasons, have been imprisoned or executed for engaging in human rights activities to assist North Korean defectors through Christian churches or non-governmental organizations. Contrarily, Han Chinese enterprises involved in trade that have site operations in the DPRK are well protected and fully supported by the Chinese government; thus, their globally monopolized businesses in the DPRK have grown rapidly. Meanwhile, *Joseonjok* communities are on the brink of exclusion in this rapidly growing transregional production network and are only engaged in small-scale businesses or "illegal" (according to the DPRK if not state-supported) trade with people of the DPRK. As far as the political relationship is concerned, there has been rising concern that autonomy is in name only. Moreover, the *Joseonjok*'s population ratio in *Dongbei* has decreased, partly because they have the lowest fertility rate in China among all ethnic groups. Yet *Joseonjok* communities in South Korea have grown, and mistrust and "ethnic" tensions have been nurtured between

the ROK and Yanbian society more than with the Han Chinese or the Chinese government. Although the *Joseonjok* contribute substantially to the ROK's economy by complementing the country's shrinking labor force, ROK society has also absorbed adverse social consequences from organized and transnational crimes, such as human and drug trafficking, massive voice phishing networks, and illegal online gambling businesses, also of course involving other nationalities including South Koreans and other Asian immigrants. Crimes are committed in the ROK, and the perpetrators send the money back to China to feed their families and contribute to the local economy. It is questionable whether the widely accepted view of peaceful ethnic coexistence in *Dongbei* can truly be regarded as problem-free. In the past, the *Joseonjok* were recognized as a paragon minority populated by well-trained communist comrades and able farmers, but these virtues are much less valued in the modern era of rapid marketization and urbanization.

Matters concerning China's ethnic minorities have mostly been examined in terms of the conflict or non-conflict framework, ignoring the further aspirations of ethnic groups, which are much more complicated than the question of physical security and have wider implications for the development of the region as a whole. In this regard, this project aims to answer the following questions. How has the *Joseonjok* community and its ethnonationalism survived the Chinese modern nation-building process? Why, how, and when was it modified, and by what forces? To what extent is the preservation of ethnonationalism and collectivity positively associated with the prosperity of Northeast China under the dynamic geopolitical conditions of the region? What theoretical and policy implications can be drawn from this association for the contemporary transformation of a communist multinational state like China?

In a nutshell, the dynamism of the interaction between the PRC's policy and the *Joseonjok* represents a transition from ethnicization (with collectivization), de-ethnicization (disintegration), and nationalizing ethnicity (politicization of ethnicity combined with diaspora national identity) as both top-down and bottom-up processes.

Background of Diasporization and Spatial Particularity

Collective forms of migration started in the 1910s, when the Korean peninsula was under Japanese occupation, primarily as mobilized labor forces for agricultural cultivation, infrastructure construction, and the

munitions industry. As its munitions industry flourished, Japan became increasingly dependent on Manchurian lumber, coal, iron, and steel (Doenecke 1981, p. 7). As a model of colonial exploitative economy, large amounts of resources and produced goods were used to serve the Japanese people and to modernize Japan rather than to develop Manchuria or other colonies, including the Korean peninsula. The history of Koreans moving up to China's border area dates to the eighteenth century and possibly earlier. Historical records are not entirely accurate about exactly when and how many Koreans migrated to Northeast China. If we consider individual or household migration, the history goes back more than 1,000 years, but most of these were assimilated or returned to Korea (Han 2013, pp. 66–67). The history of the Korean diaspora in China is naturally intertwined with the history of Korea and can be broadly divided into four periods: the early years of migration during the *Yi Joseon* Dynasty (1860–1909); migration to Manchuria during the first half of the colonial period (1910–1931); the second period of colonization (1931–1945); and the decolonization period (1945–1953). This periodization is somewhat arbitrary, however, as chain migration has continued ever since individual and household-level migration began. Historians are continuing to discover new evidence on the interactions between different groups of peoples in the region in pre-modern era. Focusing on the modern era, the first period of migration began with the diasporization of the Korean population under Korea's Joseon and China's Qing dynasties, primarily because of economic destitution. To escape the famine in the northern Hamgyeongdo region, which is adjacent to the Tumen (Duman) River, a number of Korean households crossed the border from Joseon into Qing China, mostly via the Yalu (Amnok) and Tumen Rivers, risking severe punishment by both governments (Lee 1997; Lee 2011, pp. 86–87). However, Koreans during the *Joseonjok* era moved back and forth freely and had already cultivated large portions of the agricultural land in the region. They settled not only in the southern part of Manchuria (mostly Gando) but as far as Primorsky Krai (known as the Russian Far East and Yeonhaeju in Korean), which borders Hunchun, China, and Rajin and Seonbong in the DPRK and which became Russian territory according to the 1860 Beijing Treaty. During the aforementioned second period, the volume of Korean migration to both China and Japan increased considerably. Border-crossing was no longer limited to farmers with primarily economic goals: A number of political activists began

to move around Manchuria to avoid surveillance and suppression by the colonial government in Korea (Lee 1978, p. 16). After 1911, an increasing number of nationalist activists moved north, reaching as far as the Urals, forming a number of different factions. Ethnic tensions increased. The Manchurian Koreans were seen by many Chinese as the "'running dogs' of Japanese imperialism" (Scalapino and Lee 1972 Part I, p. 149). From the mid-1920s, anti-colonial nationalism combined with communism grew rapidly within the Korean communities in the region, ethnic tension reached a peak, and suspicions and hostility against Koreans grew among the Japanese, Chinese, and Russian people and their governments. By 1931, Manchuria was fully under Japanese control, and laborers from mainland Korea volunteered (mostly because of increasingly harsh economic exploitation in Korea) or were forced to settle in the region, mainly to support its industrial development (Park 1985, pp. 23–25). Greenhill called it "a deliberately manipulated coercive engineered migration" (Greenhill 2011, p. 13). Even with the overall increase in agricultural and industrial production and the development of infrastructure and construction in the region, "poverty was widespread among the Koreans living in Manchuria. The Communists did not overlook this opportunity" (Scalapino and Lee 1972 Part I, p. 140). The severe oppression of the decades-long colonization of the Korean peninsula led to burgeoning anti-colonial nationalism outside Korea, including Shanghai, Siberia, and most of Manchuria. The Marxist-oriented Korean Labor-Farmer Federation had emerged in 1924 with 110,000 members along with another 80 labor and farmers' unions with 21,000 members. By the end of 1926, 1,092 Korean youth movement organizations had been established (Scalapino and Lee 1972 Part I, pp. 69–70). At the end of the Second World War, nationalist activists, equipped with a variety of foreign ideas, modern political ideologies, and connections with foreign powers, overwhelmed Korea's domestic activists, and Korea again experienced relentless political turmoil. Some members of the diaspora returned to Korea, but most remained in Manchuria, actively engaging in China's new state building and integrating into Chinese society.

Considering the multiple reasons for diasporization until the end of the Second World War, the Korean diaspora in China can be described as a hybrid economic/labor diaspora, colonial/imperial diaspora, and political diaspora according to the Cohen's typology (Cohen 1997). Some may view the political and ideological orientations of these people as determined by their origins on the Korean peninsula (either liberal

US-influenced South or communist North), assuming that ideological stance and national identity are congruent with geographical origin. However, many Koreans moved to Manchuria before the division of the Korean nation, and after 50 years of rigid Chinese communism that included extensive efforts by the CCP to identify loyalists and potential traitors, the community became uniformly collectivized and socialized. Moreover, a complicated multilayered collective identity, such as the national identity of a diaspora represents many complicated factors that lead to the formation of the current nature of national identity beyond the simple hometown-loyalty link.

Until recently, *Dongbei* is populated by around 107 million, 8.9% of China's total population, who produce 11.3% of the total national GDP. At the beginning of the PRC era, 58 of the Soviet Union's total 156 development aid projects were concentrated in this region, which also experienced an influx of skilled industrial and construction laborers. *Dongbei* contains China's largest chemical and heavy industry zones, and the region is also rich in natural resources. Its industries include steel, energy (including natural gas and oil), chemicals and machinery, car manufacturing, shipment, aircraft, and military goods. Until 2010, the region produced 25% of China's steel and iron, 60% of the world's magnesite, and 25% of China's car production (Cho 2012, Chap. 4). In major cities in *Dongbei*, marketization and globalization entered into *Joseonjok* communities via the South Korean motherland. In the early years of the Open Door policy, Yanbian underwent rapid changes in its industrial structure, particularly between the late 1980s and mid-2000s. In the 1980s and 1990s, the growth rate of the region's primary and secondary industries dropped sharply, from 23.6 to 16.8% and from 51.2 to 41.6%, respectively. In contrast, the growth rate of Yanbian's tertiary sector increased markedly during this period, rising from 25.2% in 1980 to 41.6% in 1997. The subsequent inflow of capital from *Joseonjok* laborers working abroad contributed substantially to *Dongbei*'s increased gross domestic product (GDP). In Heilongjiang Province alone, the currency flow from *Joseonjok* workers in foreign countries reached approximately USD 12 million in 1996 (Yanbian Yearbook 1998, p. 18, quoted in Park 2017, pp. 56–57). In the same year, the city of Yanji/Yeongil recorded the highest savings per capita (at the national level), expenditures (at the province level), and use of forms of transport and communication such as postal services, cars, and telephones (Yanbian Yearbook 1998, p. 18, quoted in Park 2017, p. 57). In 2011, Yanbian's GDP reached USD 56.6 million, with an average annual growth rate of 15.1%. The region's total income

from tourism reached USD 8.5 million in 2011, with an average increase of 29.5% per year. Yanbian experienced more growth than any other region in Jilin (Gilim). The inflow of wages from *Joseonjok* working in South Korea amounts to USD 1 billion per year, accounting for 33% of Yanbian's total GDP. Thus, Yanbian has become the richest of China's minority regions.[4] However, Jilin experienced 6.5% growth in 2015 and 6.2% growth in 2016, below the national average (6.9% and 6.7%, respectively) and recorded a decrease in production in the manufacturing sector during the second quarter of 2015. Liaoning province performed worse, consistently recording negative growth rates between 2013 and 2016 (KOTRA 2016, quoted in Park 2017, p. 62).[5] Since 2016, the central government has focused on development plans for Hunchun, where the *Joseonjok* comprise 45% of the population. The PRC government renegotiated with the Russian government to revamp previously launched development projects in this region that link major cities in China, Rajin, and Seonbong in the DPRK, and Vladivostok in the Russian Far East. These projects include rebuilding 12 export-oriented industries (construction materials, steel and iron, machinery, shipment, chemicals, textiles, cement, information technology, energy refinery), mutual tax relief, administrative support, and attracting investment (KOTRA 2016).

Does Ethnic Minority Still Matter in China?

Considering the dynamic transformation of China and changing nature of ethnic relationship in China, what would be the significance of the *Joseonjok* community in China? More fundamentally, is it still worthwhile to pay attention to ethnic minority groups in China? Has strong collective identity among minority nationals in China aided their survival? In fact, the significance of the region and the *Joseonjok* community to Beijing is manifold. As discussed, *Dongbei* should be of particular interest to China for security and economic reasons as it borders both Russia and DPRK, countries with which Beijing's diplomatic relationships have not always been amicable. It is an important stretch of border because of the volatile situation between the DPRK and the ROK. Moreover, the region's economic potential has been underutilized and understudied.

The significance of studying China's ethnic minorities including *Dongbei* is related to dealing with challenges that minority communities face, including population decrease, disintegration, isolation

and stagnation, dwindling instrumental values and demise in roles, and assimilation and disappearance. Ethnicity-related issues under the One China policy remain one of Beijing's top political priorities. China's minority population accounts for 7% of its total. In official ethnicity discourse in China during the era of rigid communism (excluding the Cultural Revolution), the *Joseonjok* community was a model minority (Liu 2001), demonstrating the state's successful management in the preservation of ethnicity and the implementation of developmentalism. Since the 2000s, the preservation of Yanbian with Korean characteristics has included a mixture of anxiety and caution (Zhang 2009; Hu and Chen 2011; Yan 2005), a sense of harmlessness (Piao and Zheng 2000), and opportunity or advantage (Shu 2007; Wang 2008), as has been the case since the diaspora's incorporation into the PRC.

Even if the communist instrumental approach to the changing values of ethnic minorities represents a "Kill the dogs after the hunt is over" mindset, hunting continues with different targets. In this regard, it is necessary to shift the analytical angle to better understand the dynamic changes in ethnic relations that reflect the political and economic reforms and consequent social changes. Economic development initiated by the *Joseonjok* via trade (both legal and illegal) with the two Koreas contributes significantly to the local economy. In addition, linking with China's One Belt, One Road agenda and revamping the Greater Tumen Initiative as a subregional growth polygon linking Hunchun,[6] the historical starting point of the Silk Road in Northeast Asia with Russia, Japan, the ROK, the DPRK, and Mongolia, could provide the *Joseonjok* communities with greater opportunities to rebuild their communities by reabsorbing the one million members of the floating *Joseonjok* population and to stabilize their collective identity. Nevertheless, despite a historically accumulated mutual trust backed by decades of the positive construction of ethnic relations and the central government's good intentions, *Dongbei* suffers from a lack of updated policy coordination and coherent vision on regional development.

If conflict-prone ethnic communities are more worthy of study than others, it can also be asked whether conflict exists in the first place only because an ethnic minority group has strong ethnic nationalism. Would it be undesirable if ethnic minority communities with strong ethnonationalism in China did not demand further autonomy or self-determination, thus making them less meaningful to investigate? Non-conflicting minorities may also suffer from their negotiations with the host country over

preservation of their collective national identity and deeper integration issues (not separation) with reflections on their changing instrumental values. Whether a minority group is driven to the dilemma of "assimilation and disappearance" or "multiculturalism and integration," both entail significant theoretical and policy implications.

The important questions to ask in studies of conflict-prone ethnic nationalism include whether China is destined to be or should be restructured similar with the case of former Soviet Union and why. Contrarily, a study of a group like the *Joseonjok* requires answers to how far China's official multiculturalism with territorial ethnic engineering is implemented, and what it means to the community and the people's collective identity. For the former body of scholarship, a case study of the *Joseonjok* (non-conflict) is less significant than a study of a more volatile ethnic community. This is one reason why the literature on China's minorities (at least in English) is over-concentrated on conflict-prone cases.

Over-concentration on volatile separatism in China may miss the core academic and prescriptive research objectives of migration studies, such as integration policy, the state's management of multiculturality, and the conditions for stabilizing plural nationalities among various minorities, and often misses the latent pressure that grows among ethnic groups. The process of diasporization and ethnicization throughout the modern history of the *Joseonjok* in China, similar to those of other ethnic groups with strong national identity, represents a vigorous psychological struggle and continuous negotiation with central and local authorities and ordinary Han Chinese over collective identity and interests within the given geopolitical and historical structural setting.

Methodology and Data Collection

This study is based on a qualitative empirical analysis of various primary sources. Several rounds of fieldwork were conducted in the three provinces of *Dongbei* and in Beijing, China, and Seoul, South Korea, between 1999 and 2000. Another round of fieldwork was conducted in Yanji City, Yanbian, Jilin, in June 2015 and in various cities in South Korea in 2016. The timing of the fieldwork in the late 1990s is particularly significant because the end of the twenty-first century was an important turning point for the community and for China. At this time, communication with the South Korean motherland increased dramatically, which allowed

me to observe the rapid changes in society. The more recent fieldwork provided me with a clearer picture of the vicissitudes that this society has undergone since 2000. The empirical data used for this project include interviews, local newspapers (both local and South Korean), television programs, films, books written by local people (essays, fiction, and academic writing), and statistical data released by the Korean and Chinese governmental agencies. Excluding the numerous informal contacts and discussions with local people, I conducted around 50 formal in-depth face-to-face interviews with intellectuals and ordinary citizens of diverse backgrounds, particularly public opinion leaders such as university professors, local government officials, journalists at local newspapers, businessmen, writers, graduate students, artists, historians, and leaders of civil associations.[7] I used several different approaches within the interviews—structured, semi-structured with categories, unstructured, and informal friendly conversations—depending on the circumstances and interviewees. "[Interviewing] is a basic mode of inquiry. Recounting narratives of experience has been the major way throughout recorded history that humans have made sense of their experience … and (interviewing) is a powerful way to gain insight into educational and other important social issues through understanding the experience of the individuals whose lives reflect those issues" (Seidman 2013, pp. 8–13). The interviewees inevitably answered the questions within their social context. Purposive cluster sampling was used to select the respondents to enable an in-depth exploration of specific issues. The interviews usually took longer than one hour, and some took up to several hours. Each interview was individually crafted through prior research on the interviewees and their organizations. The time allotted for each question varied depending on the interviewee's social and professional background. The interviews were supplemented by a questionnaire sent out via mail to *Joseonjok* settled in Beijing and by observations of group discussions among the local people without the interviewer's intervention. The primary data sources are contextualized into the relevant chapters. In addition, I arranged two informal workshops in 2015: one attended by seven local scholars, writers, and journalists and the other attended by six graduate students. The field notes compiled during the interviews and workshops included detailed observations of nonverbal clues and implicit messages and the circumstances during and after the events. I also observed local people and social processes during my visits to major local organizations and institutions, such as the Yanbian Research Institute for Social Sciences, the Yanbian

Association of Writers, the Yanbian Business and Trade Association, the Yanbian Daily newspaper, a broadcasting company based in Yanbian, the Yanbian Institute of Science and Technology, *Joseonjok* schools, the National Museum of Yanbian, as well as major tourists spots. These visits provided opportunities for informal discussion with a wide range of local people. In particular, academic essays and books written in Korean by local people offered valuable insights into the societal discourses of the *Joseonjok* community.

To reduce the data gap between the first and last rounds of field research, I closely examined the changes in the community since the late 1990s by including retrospective questions in the interviews and by collecting other sources that adequately cover previous decades. Ethnographic inquiries through formal and informal discussions with ordinary local people were also conducted in parallel with the targeted interviews. Before 2000, outsiders had limited information about the region, but since the mid-2000s, because of developments in information technology and the *Joseonjok*'s rapid adaptation to the Internet, online resources with historical data have been well documented, including all major local newspapers. In addition, with the influence of globalization, the *Joseonjok* people and communities can now be found in many countries other than South Korea, including countries in Europe and North America. My observations of the *Joseonjok* people re-settled outside China and their re-diasporized communities in France, the UK, and the USA provided another valuable source of information, allowing both spatial and temporal extensions of the research.

In reality, empirical methods and close ethnographical research on a community and identity do not neatly satisfy all of the highly abstract theories on ethnic relationships and the scientific analytical frameworks suggested by nationalism theorists. The psychological and social aspects are complex and change continuously. Because of their plural identities and frequent contacts with the outside world, the local people are well trained to control several collective identities and have learned how to formulate their responses to different parties. In the 2000s, the locals were much more curious about the fact that their community and people were the subjects of research by outsiders. Although *Joseonjok* have a better understanding of their motherlands today, their trust level has decreased, and the local people have become much more cautious. Many asked where and how the interviews would be used with self-editing in their responses. This is partly because of their experiences with many

outside media notably South Korean that sensationalized ethnic ties and tensions and emphasized South Korean transnational ultra-nationalism, which may put the community in a more difficult position regarding the Han Chinese and the PRC authorities. Interviewees have become more informed and were better acquainted with similar types of surveys and research queries; some thought they knew what to say to satisfy outside researchers. In this context, a strict content analysis or textualization of interviews may be less meaningful compared with in 1999/2000. Nonetheless, this society has become much more mature in articulating its ideas on the core elements of this field of study, such as national identity, relationships with motherlands, the community's vision as an ethnic minority group in China, the re-unification of the Korean peninsula, and regional development.

It may be asked whether the contents of the interviews, as personal views, are representative of the whole population. Because the interviewees are members of the community, their expressed views on the community, nation, and state are unavoidably contextual and social. Because this study uses a qualitative research method, I do not deny that author's subjectivity is also involved in the determination of what texts are relevant to explaining the phenomenon. In-depth verbatim conversations with individuals are completed with ontological data. In this field, given the dynamic changes in geopolitics and in the migrant group, this is a process of evolution; this research contributes to that process, and different research outcomes have their own significance.

Finally, several sections in the following chapters are extracted from the author's doctoral dissertation, which was completed in 2005. However, the research focus has been shifted exclusively to China, whereas the dissertation also considered Korean diasporas in Japan and Uzbekistan. I had concluded that China's policy encouraged the *Joseonjok* to develop their own distinguishable identity and to establish a stable third type of national identity relatively speaking in comparison with the other two cases. This community once featured a balanced diasporic national identity accompanied by both patriotic loyalty to the state and strong ethnonational solidarity. By problematizing its collectively inflicted past and expressing its identities, the diaspora has become a new category of human collectivity (in that concepts and perceptions of outsiders have changed) or has become newly highlighted in both academia and real life. Whether their identity is constructed or not and whether they should be regarded as a group or individuals, the members of the diaspora have

undeniably suffered collectively as a specific group of people, and this suffering (by misrecognition and coercion) has affected their individual and family lives. As part of a "citizen or citizen-like" dichotomy constructed during China's early nation-building period and later fostered as part of the political agenda in multinational states, the diaspora has been alienated and its identity has been concealed. "Much of diaspora experience is unwritten" (Butler 2001, p. 212). By expressing and representing their identity and aspirations by both insiders and outsiders as a group and as individuals, a new space has been created in which diaspora members can comfortably represent and articulate their identity.

Organization of the Book

Following this introductory chapter (chap. 1), Chap. 2 establishes a conceptual and analytical framework based on ethnic relations and nationalism studies. The framework sets a tool to explain the interactions among the three factors: *Joseonjok*'s national identity, the nature of the PRC's multiculturalism, and regional development. Chapter 3 focuses on the interaction between the PRC's minority and regional policy and the formation of *Joseonjok* society. The process is explained as an "ethnicization" engineered by the state and the Party, particularly during the Mao and Deng eras. Although the PRC's minority policy has continuously shaped the *Joseonjok*'s identity, society, and the region, powerful external forces—globalization and renewed communication with the South Korean motherland—began to influence the region in the mid-1990s. Chapter 4 investigates in detail how *Joseonjok* society has reacted to these external forces, achieving fast economic development and enhanced well-being, and how these forces have affected the "de-ethnicization" of the group, which has developed a third sphere of national identity, diasporic identity. Chapter 5 discusses the PRC's policy failures, the two Koreas' limitations in dealing with the region and the people, and the consequences of the *Joseonjok*'s frustration in trying to build a stabilized nested national identity in *Dongbei*, which has resulted in their re-dispersal (re-diasporization) and loss of the ability and opportunity to contribute to regional development. Chapter 6 concludes the project with a discussion of the findings and theoretical and policy implications.

Notes

1. UNHCR statistics, http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview#_ga=1.118578953.127734789.1487250122. Accessed January 31, 2017.
2. As both the Chinese and Korean languages are used as official languages in the Korean autonomous prefecture, counties and towns in *Dongbei*, both *Joseonjok* and *Chaoxianju* are commonly used in *Dongbei* where the *Joseonjok* population is concentrated. For convenience, "*Joseonjok*" is used throughout the book except direct quotes that use the ethnonym in Chinese. Depending on the vicissitudes in their official nationality while being incorporated into a particular nation-building process, such ethnonyms were followed by public perceptions of poverty-stricken and powerless peoples. The ethnonyms are at times used pejoratively depending on outsiders' perceptions of the people. *Joseon* refers to unified Korea from 1392 until 1910.
3. "The Chinese village living in fear of North Korean intruders: Nanping has seen a wave of murders as desperate soldiers cross border to carry out robberies" (*The South China Morning Post*, September 29, 2015).
4. "Facing the era of 1% *Joseonjok*: the shaking society in Yanbian Autonomous Prefecture" [*Joseonjok ilpeuro sidae: heundeulineun yeonbyeon jachiju*] (*Yeonhap News*, July 8, 2011).
5. KOTRA (Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency) Beijing Office Report 2016. Available at http://chn-shenyang.mofa.go.kr/korean/as/chn-shenyang/news/major/index.jsp. Accessed December 10, 2016.
6. "Actively participate in the 'One Belt One Road' strategy to achieve Jilin's rapid development" [*Zhudon grongru 'yidaiyilu' zhanlve, shixian jilin kuaishu fazhang*] (*Jilin Daily*, January 28, 2015); The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) (2015) "Vision and actions on jointly building Silk Road economic belt and twenty-first century maritime Silk Road"; "How will Hunchun play an active role in constructing the nation's 'One Belt One Road'?" [*Kan Hunchun ruhe jiji rongru guojia"YidaiYilu"jianshe*] (*Xinhua Net*, March 13, 2015). Available at http://www.jl.xinhuanet.com/2015-03-13/c_1114629369.htm. Accessed July 11, 2015.
7. The interviewees' personal details and professional backgrounds are kept confidential at their request. Locals are cautious about discussing any issues related to ethnic tensions or Yanbian's political involvement in diplomatic issues concerning ROK and DPRK. Although outsiders are much freer to discuss these issues, the locals believe that if they released any information related to potentially sensitive issues, the community would experience serious trouble with the Chinese authorities.

References

Butler, Kim D. 2001. Defining diaspora, redefining a discourse. *Diaspora* 10 (2): 189–220.

Cho, Hyun Tae. 2012. Jungguk dongbuk samseong-ui jeolryakjeok jungyoseong [Strategic importance of China's northeast]. In *Three northeast provinces in China and the future of the Korean peninsula*, ed. Lee Tae Hwan. Seoul: Oreum Publishing House.

Cohen, Robin. 1997. *Global diaspora: An introduction*. London: UCL Press.

Doenecke, Justus D. 1981. *The diplomacy of frustration: The Manchurian crisis of 1931–1933 as revealed in the papers of Stanley K. Hornbeck*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press.

Greenhill, Kelly M. 2011. *Weapons of mass migration: Forced displacement, coercion, and foreign policy*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Han, Enze. 2013. *Contestation and adaptation: The politics of national identity in China*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hall, Stuart. 1992. The question of cultural identity. In *Modernity and its futures, ed. Stuart Hall*, David Held, and Anthony McGrew. Cambridge; Oxford: Polity Press.

Hu, Hengfu and Keqing Chen. 2011. Minzu zhuyi dui zhongyang yu minzu diqu guangxi de yingxiang he duice [The impacts of nationalism on the relationship between central government and ethnicity areas and strategies]. *Thinking* 3: 139–140.

Hyundai Economic Research Institute (HERI). 2014. *Samcha dongbuk hyeonsangui teukjingqua sisajeom* [The feature and implications of the third *Dongbei* crisis] HERI Report 556.

International Organization for Migration (IOM). 2016. *Global migration trends factsheet*.

Jeon, Shin Cheol. 1999. *Joseonjok sahoeui byeonhuawa jeonmang* [The changes and prospect of Joseonjok society]. Liaoning: Yonyeong Minjokchulpansa.

Jeong, Pan Ryong. 1997. Gohyangtteona osipnyeon [Fifty years, after leaving hometown]. Heilyongjiang: Heukryonggang Minjokchulpansa.

Kim, Jong Guk. 1999. Ishipil saegiui Joseonjok [Joseonjok in the 21st centrury]. Yanbian: Yeonbyeon Minjokchulpansa.

Kim, Hyejin. 2010. *International ethnic networks and intra-ethnic conflict: Koreans in China*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kim, Jong Guk. 1999. *Ishipil saegiui Joseonjok* [Joseonjok in the 21st centrury]. Yanbian: Yeonbyeon Minjokchulpansa.

KOTRA (Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency). 2016. *KOTRA Report 2016*. Beijing Office.

Lee, Chong Shik. 1978. *The Korean workers' party: A short history*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press.

Lee, Kenneth B. 1997. *Korea and Aast Asia: The story of a phoenix*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publications.

Le Monde. (2016, 7 January). Yeonbyeon, prosperity of the little Korea in China: in spite of its geographical proximity with North Korea, Beijing is cold-hearted a toward their alliance" [*Yanbian, la petite Corée chinoise prospère: Malgré sa proximité géographique et politique avec la Corée du Nord, Pékin est en froid avec son allié*] http://www.lemonde.fr/asie-pacifique/article/2016/01/07/yanbian-la-petite-coree-chinoiseprospere_4843231_3216.html?xtmc=yanbian&xtcr=2. Accessed January 8, 2016.

Lee, Ok Hee. 2011. *Buk-jung jeopgyeongjiyeok: Jeonhwangi bukjung jeopgyeongjiyeokui dosi-network* [The Sino-North Korean border: City network of Sino-North Korean border areas in the era of transition]. Seoul: Pureungil.

Lee, Soo San. 2008. *Dorawayo Yeonbyeoneuro* [Please come back to Yanbian]. Yanbian: Yeonbyeon Inminchulpansa.

Liu, Yansui, Yang Zhou, and Jilai Liu. 2016. Jingzhun fupin zhongda zhanlve yu zhence yanjiu [Major strategy and policy research on poverty alleviation]. Policy Report of the State Council's Policy Evaluation Project, 'Shishi jingzhun fupin, jingzhun tuopin' [Implementing Poverty Alleviation and Relief] March: 269–278.

Liu, Zhiwen. 2001. Zhongguo dongbei Chaoxianzu zizhi difang minzu hemu de chengyin chutan. [A preliminary study of the reasons for ethnic harmony of Korean autonomous region in Northeast China]. *Heilongjiang National Series* 2: 23–28.

Mackerras, Colin. 2003. *China's ethnic minorities and globalisation*. London: Routledge.

National Bureau of Yanbian Autonomous Prefecture, Yanbian Statistical Yearbook 1998 (Yanbian: Government of China, 1998).

NBS (National Bureau of Statistics). 2010, 2012, 2013. *China statistical yearbook*. Beijing: China Statistics Press.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 2016. *Perspectives on global development 2017: International migration in a shifting world*. Paris: OECD.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 2015a. *Urban policy reviews: China*. Paris: OECD.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 2015b. *Economic survey: China*. Paris: OECD.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 2017. *Economic surveys: China*. Paris: OECD

Park, Jeongwon Bourdais. 2017. Ethnic relations in Northeast China: ethnic revival or de-ethnicization in the Korean diaspora?. *European Journal of East Asian Studies* 16: 36–66.

Park, Young Seok. 1985. *Manbosan sageon yeongu* [Study of Manbosan incident]. Seoul: Aseamunhuasa.

Piao, Guangxing. 2016. Kuaguo dagongzhe – jingji quanqiuhua shidai 'zhongxin yu bianyuan' de lianjiezhe [Transnational migrant workers: The

link between “center and edge” in the era of economic globalization]. *Journal of Minzu University of China* 43(1): 22–28.

Piao, Guangxing. 2014. Yasuoxing chengshihua xia de minzu gongtongti ‘Lisan Weiji’ yu ‘Chonggou Yundong’—jiyu dui Chaoxianzu chengshihua jingchen de kaocha [Disperse crisis and reconstructing movement of ethnic communities in compressed urbanization-based on a survey of urbanization process of Korean ethnic group]. *Journal of Minzu University of China* 41(3): 88–97.

Piao, Jin-hai and Xin-zhe Zheng. 2000. Lvelun zhongguo Chaoxianzu de aiguozhuyi qingjie [A brief account of the patriotism complex of China’s Korean people]. *Journal of The Central University for Nationalities* 4: 6–12.

Scalapino, Robert A., and Chong-Sik Lee. 1972. *Communism in Korea, Part I: The movement*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Seidman, Irving (ed.). 2013. *Interviewing as qualitative research: A guide for researchers in education and the social sciences*. New York: Teachers College of Columbia University Press.

Shu, Zhan. 2007. Zhongguo Chaoxianzu de xingcheng yu gongxian [The forming and the contribution of Korean nationality in China]. *Journal of the Central University for Nationalities* 3: 5–11.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2016). Populations Statistics UNHCR statistics, http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview#_ga=1.118578953.127734789.1487250122. Accessed January 31, 2017.

Wang, Hongyu and Xinhua Lu. 2005. Lun suoyouquan de peizhi yu dongbei laogongye jidi guoyou qiye zhenxing [Ownership distribution and rejuvenating the state-owned enterprises in the Northeast]. *Northeast Asia Forum* 5: 54–57.

Wang, Jimang. 2008. Quanqiuhua shidai zhongguo Chaoxianzu de minzu rentong yu guojia rentong – yi zhongguo Chaoxianzu weili [Chinese Korean’s national identification and state identification in the era of globalization]. *Journal of Hubei University for Nationalities* [Philosophy and Social Sciences] 4: 15–20.

Wang, Xiaoguang. 2005. Chongfen liyong minying qiye zhenxing dongbei laogongye jidi [Rejuvenate northeast old industrial base through private enterprises]. *Agriculture & Technology* 4: 151–154.

Yan, Wenhu. 2005. Kuajie minzu wenti yu zhongguo de heping huangjing [Cross-border ethnicity issues and peaceful environments of China]. *Contemporary International Relations* 5: 24–31.

Yang, Chunfeng and Hailou Guo. 2006. Dui dongbei laogongye jidi guoyou qiye zhidu chuangxin de fenxi [Analysis on creating new system of state-owned enterprise in the northeast industrial base]. *Journal of Changchun University of Science and Technology* 1: 35–37.

Zhang, Ming. 2009. Woguo kuojie minzu de zhengzhi xinli fenxi [Analysis on the political psychology of cross-border ethnicities in China]. *Legal System and Society* 16: 190–191.

CHAPTER 2

Diaspora, National Identity, and Reciprocal Prosperity

Understanding Ethnic Relations

This chapter establishes a conceptual and analytical framework for exploring the formation of a diaspora's national identity from ethnicization and de-ethnicization to build a third type of stabilized national identity in relation to host society, and the dynamic interplay between ethnonationalism and regional development. In this regard, the first task would be to clarify the term "ethnic relations." Studying ethnic relations requires an interdisciplinary approach. Debates and disagreements among scholars in the field of national identity and nationalism studies relate closely to the question of academic discipline, and researchers' own ethnic and/or national backgrounds inevitably influence their perspectives on ethnic relations, particularly in this field of study. "[T]he 'I' who write and speak from a particular place and time, from a history and culture which is specific. What we say is always 'in context,' *positioned*" (Hall in Braziel and Mannur 2003, p. 234). In any case, academic writers' personal experiences and cultural backgrounds should be valuable seeds for their inspiration of authorship. The primary focus of this research is on the diaspora group's national identity and the community's development. However, the diaspora group under investigation does not have an independent political entity (a state). Thus, this group's identity formation and community development cannot be discussed in isolation from its host country and its dominant ethnic group, Han Chinese, which is the legitimate center of official nationalism as opposed to local or minority

J.B. Park, *Identity, Policy, and Prosperity*, China in Transformation,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-4849-4_2

nationalisms. Diasporas and other ethnic minorities with nested collective identities in the state comprise a tiny fraction of the population, and they are labeled "minority," "local," or "ethnic" groups. Thus, a practical issue for researchers is what and whom exactly to investigate, as "ethnic relations" could mean relationships between individual members of the ethnic groups concerned, between individuals of the dominant group and the diaspora community, between the central government and the community, or between different minority groups. In this research, which is conducted in a subfield of political science, I consider the state–community relationship, which is shaped primarily through the interactions between government policy and the reactions from the community to this policy. If only size (e.g., population size) is considered, minority groups' aspirations for equality, mutual respect, or interdependency may sound idealistic, particularly in China where the Han Chinese population overwhelmingly dominates the vast multiethnic country. Conversely, from the statist point of view, such a seemingly trivial issue may still be important to justify why a protective approach to ethnic minorities is often necessary given the huge asymmetric power relationship. Governments' policy in action can easily lead to the suffering of minority groups, which may believe they will eventually disappear or be assimilated. A general tendency is that unless a minority group seriously threatens the security of the host society, such a group may be considered unworthy of attention by policymakers or scholars of ethnic relations.

Approaches to understand ethnic relations in the context of nationalism and migration studies can be grouped into three 'broad' categories: socioeconomic (material relationships), politico-cultural, and politics-centered explanations. Diverse research views and focuses exist within these three categories and vary according to what aspects of ethnic relations are highlighted and examined. I do not intent to review the extensive body of research on ethnic relations and related academic discourses, which is beyond the scope of this project. Rather the categorization below is only an attempt to clarify where the case of the *Joseonjok* in China should be situated within academic approaches that directly and indirectly address the asymmetric reality of ethnic relations. Scholarship using socioeconomic approaches particularly offers insights on material relationships such as disparity and asymmetry in the level of development or minorities' economic contributions in ethnically divided states as the most important causes and consequences of ethnic disturbance and conflicts. Studies under this category have contributed to understanding

neocolonialism, internal material exploitation, conflicts over resources (e.g., Goodman 2012), uneven development (Gellner 1983; Nairn 1981), and competition between ethnic groups in labor markets (Barth 1989; Olzak 1992; Hechter 1975). In this context, it is argued that competition worsens during economic recessions and consequently ethnic conflict is highest when both immigration and unemployment rates are high (Olzak 1992, pp. 32–37). Consequently, the rise of various levels of nationalisms and causes of secessions are explored primarily in the context of competition over scarce resources and economic achievements between ethnic groups, which persistently reshape the uneven or exploitative relationships.

More recently, studies focusing on economic aspects of ethnic relationship much highlight the contributions of migrant labor and their specific ethnic ties to a host country's overall economic development. This group of scholars mostly comprises political economists and scholars of international labor markets and migration studies. These studies reflect the academic trend of merging studies of old and new migration, including colonial diasporas, ethnic groups, and global migration, in view of integrating these groups into their host society. Their research focuses on migrant groups' economic self-sufficiency or instrumental value to mainstream society in cases where integration is the groups' final goal. Those topics include the diaspora's contributions or disturbing factors to broader aspects of development and at times involving immigrants' homelands as a valuable source of economic networking (e.g., Kuznetsov 2006; Bergsten and Choi 2003; Luova 2009; Kokot et al. 2013; Shin et al. 2015).

One of the main arguments underpinning this project is that the instrumental value approach is limited in its ability to explain complicated state–community relationships involving various types of settlers and integrationists from longer-term perspectives. Minority groups' instrumental (mostly economic) contributions to a host society may only explain short-term stability in ethnic relations. Such view may justify the state's strategies of assigning perpetual guest worker status to the groups, the categorization according to their usefulness to the host society, and the creation of a hierarchy between different ethnic minority groups. One of the limits of such an approach is that society's perceptions of "usefulness" as a group change but historical recognition may not.

Studies of politico-cultural ethnic relations vary widely based on different perspectives. Authors of such studies include anthropologists and

sociologists of ethnicity and nationalism (e.g., Armstrong 1976; Smith 1986, 1999) and political theorists who have engaged in controversial debates on the ethics and rationality of nationality and multiculturalism in a liberal democracy (Barry 2001; Miller 1995; Habermas 1992; Parekh 2000; Favell 1998). Their primary concern has been the question of whether the recognition of minorities' identity by a political system that supports positive discrimination can be ethically justified in a liberal democracy and whether it is congruent with the fundamental liberalist value of individual freedom. Fundamentally, the divergent perspectives stem from differing views of the notion of justice as fairness—whether such a view takes into account only generic (neutral and abstract) human interests (primary goods) or emphasizes the liberal state's obligation to focus on different conceptions of good, including culture and identity (immersion rather than abstraction) (Carens 2000, p. 8).

Such debates are not yet appropriate for the Chinese context, but they provide useful references for establishing a China-specific analytical framework. A number of multiculturalist theorists have noted that multiculturalism theory research has centered on developments in Western democracies (Taylor 1994; Kymlicka 1995; Tamir 1993; Young 2000; Gutmann 2003), even though ethnonationalism is universal regardless of political system (Connor 1984) and East–West (communitarian vs. liberal or ethnic vs. civic) over-generalization (Kohn 1994, pp. 162–165) has become a problematic academic trend (Kymlicka 2005, p. 38; Anderson 2001). A notable point is that debates and controversies over multiculturalism theories have enabled researchers and practitioners to pay greater attention to different types of minorities and their aspirations for group rights. In this project, I do not necessarily endorse the moralization of cultural rights of any ethnic minorities' nationalism in favor of unconditional protection by the host state. I only note that the debates between multiculturalism sympathizers and anti-multiculturalists have provided a constructive space in which to seriously discuss the minorities and related political issues. Multiculturalism is better used as a transitory policy tool than as the ultimate goal of a society; thus, it should be useful until the world is achieved in which there remains no hierarchy with implicit discrimination embedded in any ethnic relations. Rationalist anti-multiculturalists do not offer any space in which to reveal the reality (which may be either beneficial for or detrimental to minorities) of deep-seated discrimination and rights abuses, silent suffering, or reverse discrimination. As Taylor illuminates, common misunderstanding is that

reverse discrimination in the West is caused by the widespread multiculturalism discourse that gives weight to the protection of the rights of marginalized populations at the expense of established groups. On the contrary, reverse discrimination is the result of failed policy (mis-implementation) rather than the motivation to implement multiculturalism. European attacks on multiculturalism often blame certain phenomena of ghettoization and alienation of immigrants on a foreign ideology, instead of recognizing the home-grown failures to promote integration and combat discrimination (Taylor et al. 2012). Without endorsing a theory that offers room for openly reflecting on minorities' rights, discussions of official nationalism inevitably reveal limits, as any policy that is justified in the name of universal patriotism and that has purpose, means, and goals as evasive and diverse as those of nationalism often represent only the powerful.

This category also includes discussions on the connection between minority identity and politics relating to the origin/rise of nations viewed through the postmodernist prism and the formation of collective identity and modern citizenship (e.g., Bhabha 1990; Taylor 1994; Soysal 1994). Cultural identity is "not a mere trick of the imagination. It has its histories—and histories have their real, material, and symbolic effects" (Hall 2003, p. 237). Such theories have focused on the multifaceted citizenship and de-territorialized characteristics of national identity and transnationalism in the postmodern world. By dint of globalization, various collective identities are highly interconnected, and the most meaningful interconnectivity involves the inevitable linkage between the memories of the colonizers and those of the colonized. These studies provide an insightful guide for understanding global diasporas in the present world, particularly those that aspire to greater integration into their host societies with sufficient recognition of their cultural and historical diversity.

The final literature group focuses on the political engineering and management of ethnic division and its relationship with political arrangement as reflected in certain state systems, notably federalism (O'Leary 2004, 1997; Adeney 2006) and consociationalism (Finlay 2011), and in the design of state policy for integration (Zolberg 2008), or comprehensive analysis on conflicts and secession (e.g., Horowitz 1985; Lehning 1998; Rata and Openshaw 2009). Discussions have focused on political arrangements directed by state policy to accommodate ethnic diversity through changes in the political system and administrative reforms

for power sharing. This approach informs scholars in this field of the significance of policy design and the state's functional role. An important assumption is that minorities' rights and cultural diversity should be discussed in mainstream politics and in the public policy domain. This goes beyond the notion that minority groups' political rights originate from their cultural and historical particularities, which are "private," rather than from a "public" and "official" source.

A subfield under this category of nationality and nationalism studies conducted by scholars of international relations and international law (Mayall and Simpson 1992; Jacquin-Berdal 2000; Taras and Ganguly 2010; Lobell and Mauceri 2004) emphasizes the external ties or recognition of minority groups by the international community. This group of scholars has focused on secessionist ethnic groups that aspire to self-determination and to build their own independent states—their ultimate collective goal. This group has shown that ethnic groups' choices and actions are not self-perpetuating but exogenous in the sense of the reconsideration of foreign policy, changing international perceptions on minority groups as (potential) independent actors in international relations and ethnic network across the globe, and international human rights efforts to protect group rights. Some insights were derived from this group to analyze the case under this project, Yanbian in China, that is often called "the third Korea" (*Le Monde* 2016; Han 2013),[1] although this community has been as-understudied.

Ethnic Relations in the Chinese Context

The cultural and ideological particularities of ethnic relations in the Chinese context require greater attention, as the discourse on nationalism is essentially different from that on liberal political systems. As a modern multinational state, one of China's major aims is to effectively manage the ethnic divisions within and between its multinational communities. The government seeks to acknowledge the intrinsic value of cultural diversity while ensuring equitable regional prosperity through material affluence. In this regard, valuable research includes the historical and anthropological studies such as Lee (1931), Scalapino and Lee (1972), and Suh and Shultz (1990), who focus on the early history of the integration of Korean minorities into modern China and Chinese state building. Studies of ethnonationalism in China include various views on China's ethnic relations (Harrell 1995; Dreyer 1976; Dwyer 1998;

Mackerras 1994). Focusing on class and ethnicity, theories on the interface between communism and nationalism explore the links between government policy, ethnicity, and equitable development in China (Szporluk 1988; Berberoglu 2000; Lin 2006, 2015; Mevius 2009; Cartier 2011; Saich 2011). Wide variety can be found within these discussions (e.g., developmentalism, essentialism, and reformism), although they are not mutually exclusive. Scholars often compare the Soviet experience of failed federalism and the de-federalization process with China's quasi-federalism (e.g., Tanrisever 2009). Legal approaches to minority rights explain the current disparity between China's legislation and the degree of its implementation and urge greater conformity to international laws that protect minorities' cultural rights (e.g., Wu 2014; Bosely 2007). Such studies are beneficial for understanding the political and legal background of China's handling of ethnic minority issues. The most familiar and frequently cited research on ethnic relations in China includes Mackerras (1994), Gladeny (1991), and Dittmeret et al. (1993). More recent directly relevant research on the state–community relationship includes Han (2013), who compares ethnic relations in contemporary China, including the Korean community, to the Uyghurs, Mongols, Dai, and Tibetans. Using a common denominator (the kin relationship), these comparative studies offer valuable insights into why some groups are more rebellious than others under the same regime. Gladeny (1991) questions what determines a certain type of ethnic relation in China in the particular case of the Hui. Making broader comparisons, Mackerras presents a comprehensive picture of China's major minorities (i.e., the Manchus, Tibetans, Zhang, Mongolians, Uyghurs) using a comparative analytical tool of economic development, history, foreign relations, and population to identify the generalizable elements that determine China's particular ethnic relationships. He thus discusses China's state policy on minority groups and the formation of ethnic communities there as a consequence rather than an interaction, which may mean that to some degree ethnic groups can be portrayed as passive and dependent. In contrast, Gladeny's analyses suggest a more interactive relationship, "a dialogical interpretation" (1991, p. 77). Previous well-received case studies (e.g., Mackerras 1994; Herberer 1989) have shown the complexity of the historical roots between the Han Chinese and the groups in question. The shared connotation of previous research seems that how to "manage" ethnic groups with diverse historical and cultural roots may be more relevant than the dichotomized theoretical "liberalism versus Marxism" framework

in explaining ethnic relationships in China. Regardless of the political system, dominant ethnic groups are fundamentally fearful of implementing full multiculturalism, in contrast to the liberal multiculturalist argument that would defend minority groups' self-determination depending on various conditions and circumstances.

A goal of the current project is to provide a deeper understanding of the Korean community in *Dongbei* to offer a fuller analysis of various dimensions of ethnic relations (e.g., causes, descriptions of the current relationship, dynamics, mutual goals, and focuses on various groups within the community). Regardless of the theoretical contradictions associated with the class struggle and ethnic divisions under communist regimes (Szporluk 1988), the CCP was relatively successful in preserving a certain level of ethnic diversity. In this sense, its policy bears a great deal of resemblance between China's multiculturalism policy and those of multinational and multiethnic societies elsewhere. However, multiculturalism has scarcely been discussed explicitly in the context of non-liberal, non-Western democracy. Contrarily, South Korea, as one of the motherlands of the diaspora in this study, has explicitly and officially promulgated multiculturalism as a policy and social vision since the mid-2000s, and the *Joseonjok* comprise the largest majority among the South Korean migrant groups. This promotion of multiculturalism has attracted increasing numbers of *Joseonjok* people to the South Korean labor market and to South Korean society.

Multiculturalism in liberal democracy spreads authority across multiple levels and agencies of government, which encourages direct public participation from a wide cross section of society. Freedom of choice is at the heart of liberal multiculturalism, and the government provides the necessary legal protections and political conditions to realize this freedom of choice. Participation can be analyzed by stage and level. In China, citizen participation is limited to learning and obeying state policies (Woodman 2016, p. 344); thus, multiculturalism in the liberal sense does not serve as a standard framework for analyzing ethnic relations in China. The terms used to define ethnic relations include fusion, amalgamation, assimilation, "additive assimilation" (Barry 2001), communication, autonomy, integration (Dreyer 1976, 2005), interculturalism, acculturation, as well as multiculturalism (as recognition of diversity and guarantee of non-assimilation). All of these terms are used to describe changes due to contact between different cultures. Some tend to be used in a negative sense, such as the use of "acculturation" to refer to political invasion and forced

assimilation. Some express process, policy, or results and interaction. "Assimilation" refers to the process through which individuals and groups of differing heritages acquire the basic habits, attitudes, and mode of life of a culture. "Amalgamation" is a milder term used to mean a blending of cultures (closer to the Chinese term *ronghe*) rather than one group eliminating another (acculturation) or one group mixing itself into another (assimilation) (Merriam-Webster). Although any of these words universally defines ethnic relations, at the policy level, within China's historical context, most of these processes have occurred, and more or less coexist.

The term "cultural diversity" (*wenhua duoyangxing* in Chinese) is widely used in China, but little reference has been made to the Western concept of multiculturalism as a political vision and policy. However, as Zhao (2011) explains, "Chinese intellectuals keenly use the theoretical lens of multiculturalism to analyze the situation of ethnic minorities in China's educational system, referring to the series of preferential policies" (pp. 48–49). The term multiculturalism can be used in daily life (particularly in official propaganda and media) and in academia. Chinese people are hearing this term more often from news reports on national television. Students may learn this term in their civil/moral education classes or geography classes in primary school, where multiethnic compositions of Chinese population and the government's related policies are introduced. Chinese people may use "-isms" in both casual and academic ways. The suffix "-ism" can be translated into two different terms in Chinese according to the context: *xing* (meaning "nature") or *zhuyi* (meaning "doctrine"). In the case of multiculturalism, the "-ism" is usually translated into *xing*, which contains a neutral meaning of "nature" (Interview). However, ethnic relations are explained in terms of *ronghe* (intermingling, amalgamation, fusion) or *tonghua* (assimilation), with the former preferred by Beijing. Thus, both liberal multiculturalists and Chinese ethnic policymakers officially emphasize non-assimilation. However, non-assimilation is often limited to political rhetoric, and the Chinese setting creates many barriers to implementing *ronghe* in practice. The recognition of a third hybrid identity (Bhabha 1996) as opposed to a single hegemonic identity is an outcome of amalgamation rather than assimilation. "Nevertheless, considering the immense asymmetries between China's Han Chinese majority and ethnic minority groups in both population size and actual power relations, minority groups may interpret intermingling as a euphemism for assimilation" (Park 2017, p. 42).

The ethnic relations observed between the Han Chinese and minority groups in both the region under study and elsewhere in China suggest that the Chinese government has endeavored to find an effective way to manage multiethnicity and multiculturality (effectively rooting out multiethnic tensions in Manchuria before the end of the Second World War) that encourages cultural diversity and a self-governing system, a method that has been reinforced by the regionalized and territorialized ethnic engineering seen since the Mao era. This approach arguably provides a different model that accommodates the China-specific characteristics of ethnic relations. Regardless of the political system of the host country, there are at least four universally transferrable assumptions in multiculturalist discourse that serve as explanatory variables in a non-liberal context. First and foremost, all modern states are more or less "multinational" and thus naturally "multicultural" in composition, although this multiculturality does not automatically connote the existence of multiculturalism as a social ideology and political program. Second, cultural historicism is not exclusively applicable to liberal democracies. Public culture is often used as an important motif in instigating national solidarity (by explicitly calling it "nationalism/national identity" or "patriotism") (Callahan 2006) and culture (applicable to both dominant and minority national groups) and is thus seen as an intrinsic value worthy of preservation. Precisely because of such culture-based solidarity, modern states and societies, whether liberal or non-liberal, have a fundamental fear of the rise of local ethnonationalism and secessionism, while culturally based ethnic groups are increasingly likely to become political. Third, a dominant ethnic group is in a better position to promote and protect its own culture, which minority nationals may also aspire to, particularly when public fields implicitly but exclusively function in favor of the dominant ethnic group. Few liberal democracies have the confidence to explicitly accommodate multiculturality in the public domain, whereas China's multicultural ethnic engineering has been a top-down procedure accommodating ethnic aspirations. In this respect, Beijing has been reluctant to recognize China as "multinational," preferring the term "multicultural" to decouple culture from the political arena. Finally, regardless of its political system, a host country's options for dealing with ethnic groups are limited—broadly speaking, either assimilation or autonomy—although many derivations and forms of political rhetoric exist between those two options. China's model of multiculturalism to date can be understood as a centralized government-dominated,

non-participatory, top-down (and thus authoritarian) approach to dealing with the historically evolved multinational composition (multiculturality) of its people.

Limited participation in ethnic policymaking is an important aspect of China's authoritarian multiculturalism, which is provisionally defined as a model that concentrates authority in a few executive agencies to improve ethnic relations. This tradition has changed from ethnicization (the promotion of diversity within preset boundaries in terms of geography and content) to de-ethnicization. These processes are opaquely governed by powerful officials within the central government with limited and nominal participation by local community.

National Identity, Diaspora, and Geopolitics

Ethnic Relations Concerning a Diaspora

In light of the preceding, what is the national identity of a diaspora? How does the collective identity of a diaspora, which is attached to more than one nation or state, differ from the identity of non-diaspora citizens? Answering these questions through an empirical case study is somewhat complicated. The term "diaspora," which originates from the Greek word for "dispersion," has certain features distinct from other types of migrant. A dictionary definition of the ancient prototypical diaspora is "the settling of scattered colonies of Jews outside Palestine after the Babylonian exile." The word also refers to "Jews living outside Palestine or modern Israel" (Merriam-Webster). Today, "diaspora" is a generalized term for cases similar to that of the exiled Jews. It may refer to the breaking up and scattering of populations, scattered people who have settled far from their ancestral homelands, or the places in which these scattered people settle. Combining these three elements (spatial particularity), people (part of a certain group), and phenomenon (dispersed), a diaspora can be understood as a group of people with shared cultural characteristics whose dispersal has resulted in long- or short-term geographical re-settlement.

Diasporas are often regarded as groups in transition whose members' identities are inevitably determined by their loyalty to two or more states. For example, considering conventional nationalism theorists' views on minority nationalism (as opposed to official nationalisms), according to Gellner's typology of nationalisms, diaspora nationalism is abnormal

and thus doomed to disappear (O'Leary 1997). Armstrong (1976) observes, "Much of the literature on contemporary diasporas appears to consider them to be anomalies or at least very transitory" (Armstrong 1976, p. 393). In addition, as diasporas usually retain close ties to their motherlands, they are often regarded with suspicion in their host countries, particularly when diplomatic relations between the sending and receiving countries are antagonistic. Once re-settled in the host country, a diasporic group is categorized as an ethnic minority or subnational group and is generally assumed to have migrated less voluntarily than other migrant groups.

A diaspora may form part of an ethnic group, and national historical continuity may be central to an understanding of national identity (Smith 1986, 1999). In discussing national identity and the rise of nationalism, modernists have paid more attention to exogenous phenomena, while ethnosymbolists and perennialists have highlighted the origins and cultural attributes of national identity. For example, Smith emphasizes the distinctive pre-modern cultural and historical bases of the national identity of a political group and defines an ethnic group as "a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories and one or more common elements of culture, including an association with a homeland, and some degree of solidarity" (Smith 1999, p. 13). The Korean diaspora can be seen both as part of the Korean nation (with a Korean national identity) and as ethnically Korean in the Chinese context. In essence, they are part of the national group, but only in relation to the host nation, and categorized as minority members of a nation external to the host nation. "[E]thno-national diasporism and diasporas do not constitute a recent, modern phenomenon … Their identities are intricate combinations of primordial, psychological/mythical, and instrumental elements" (Sheffer 2003, p. 7). This explains the coexistence of "ethnic" and "national" identities in a diaspora population, although their selective exposure is neither accurately measurable nor sufficiently describable. The duality of a diaspora's national identity is vexing to the host state. The multiple ethnic and national identities of diasporas are often problematized and demoralized by mainstream social expectations and behavior in the receiving nations.

Diasporas commonly aspire to recognition and integration at the same time, which complicates ethnic relations when involving a diaspora group. Taylor et al. (2012) suggest two definitions of multiculturalism in accommodating minority identities: "as a generic term for the ensemble

of policies introduced with the combined goals of recognizing diversity, fostering integration and producing/maintaining equality; and then as a word designating a subspecies of such policies, to be contrasted with another subspecies, called 'intercultural'." Diasporas seek prosperity, both material and spiritual stability, and security, for both their individuals and their communities. Within this context, minority communities in China have sought to secure opportunities in parallel with the state's developmental agenda to reposition them in mainstream society and to avoid marginalization and ghettoization, in the terms used by Taylor et al. (2012), due to the regionally clustered nature of China's geographically designated multiculturalism.

China's policy toward minorities (both in general and toward the *Joseonjok*) interacts with ethnic minorities until they form a firm and stable collective identity and prosperous community. A collective ethnic boundary (both physical and spiritual collectivity) is an outcome of historical evolution with continuous identity formation. As such a boundary is relational and circumstantial, following the postmodern view on de-territorialized identity, there should be no distinction between the "nationality of a diaspora" and the "ethnicity of diaspora," as nationality is attached to people rather than to territories. The common understanding of ethnic boundaries is that they are cultural as opposed to racial or national, with "national" meaning something relational *vis-à-vis* official nationalism and nations with states. In this study, rather than discussing those cultural attributes, given that a great deal of research has been produced by South Korean sociologists and anthropologists and by the *Joseonjok* themselves, I focus more on the nexus among policy (top-down), nationality (reaction to policy), and development/prosperity (developmental vision). Here, "national and collective identity" is related to state policy more than anthropological dispositions or general cultural markers of ethnicity, although their interconnectivity is not ignored.

The National Identity of a Diaspora

National identity can be understood as an interpretation of oneself in relation to the nation and is reflected in various forms of communication. There are abundant theories on and terminology for the conditions and elements of national identity. Kymlicka (1995), for example, takes national identity ("societal culture" in his term) as a collective identity formed around language, territory, land ownership, and sometimes

religion. Miller (1995) equates national identity with national character or public culture and explains it as a collective political identity built on common history and national myth. Tamir (1993) discusses the boundary of a nation as a public sphere, but does not specify whether it is identical to Habermas's (1992) conception of the public sphere as an amalgamated culture linked by the civic notion of national identity. For sociologists such as Smith (1986, 1999), the qualifications of a nation are not only public features but also the ethnic bases of a group, which include a comprehensive range of culture, both private and public. The first step toward multiculturalism in a modern multinational society is the recognition of these "national" identities. This project particularly concerns the difference between a national or ethnic group and the dominant Han Chinese. An essentialist interpretation defines an identity as "the attribution of behavior or thinking to the intrinsic, fundamental nature of a person, collective, or state" (Suny 2001, pp. 868–869). Identity is the condition of being the same as something described or asserted. It is also defined as the sameness of essential or generic character in different instances, sameness that constitutes the objective reality of a thing (oneness), or an equation that is satisfied for all of the values of the symbols. When these abstract definitions are extended to the collective level, definitions of identity become more intangible. Psychologists tend to emphasize the inside mechanism of "identity" as a categorization of the human self, whereas sociologists and political scientists focus on the objective conditions and visible qualifications by which various identities are categorized. Sigel succinctly summarizes the common views on identity among social scientists, mostly social psychologists (Sigel 2001, p. 112). First, all consider it a social construct and thus not immutable. Second, it implies a social relation—in other words, it encompasses notions of the self and of the groups in which the self is embedded or identifies with. Third, by group identification, one defines oneself and differentiates oneself from (or at least compares oneself to) groups believed to be different from one's own. A person's sense of self thus includes the *I*, the *we*, and the *not-we*. Fourth, individuals tend to have multiple group identities, but their priorities depend on the salience of the groups to which they attach themselves. Finally, social identities and their manifestations reflect the social structure and culture of which they are a part.

Social identity refers to both the self and the social group, and it provides the link between the two. Although being aware of individual identity entails discovering/knowing oneself in relation to others, awareness

of collective identity means perceiving oneself as a member of a larger group and having the consciousness of this group within the context of (or in opposition to) larger groups. This identification and differentiation process is inevitably accompanied by some degree of understanding of the conditions of the group to which one supposedly belongs. In this sense, "identity … bridges the gap between the 'inside and the outside'—between the personal and the public worlds" (Hall 1992, p. 276). The strength of collective identity, however, does not have to do with how many members belong to a group. The discussion has gone further, as the falsity–reality debate has provided little help in understanding problematic ethnic relationships in real political life. Regardless of whether it is an outcome of imagination (Anderson 1983), national identity eventually has become almost real and material in most contemporary societies.

When one is aware of the identity attached to, for instance, family, community, or society, one tends to behave as expected within these boundaries. Some people may behave coherently in opposition to cultural norms, but it is hard to imagine that such people are unaware of their collective identity and live completely in personhood. "Being aware of identity attached to something" is inseparable from how one understands something to which his or her identity is attached. Unless one knows what family, community, or society means to oneself, one can hardly be aware of collective identities. Identity is both intrinsic and extrinsic; it is subjective only in the context of objectivity.

Identity is continuously shaped and constructed. For instance, how people understand the objective conditions of the nation to which they belong explains how they perceive themselves as a part of such a nation regardless of whether they are satisfied with their identity. It can be argued that even people who do not have a strong sense of belonging to the community or nation or who wish to deny their obligation to larger groups still have a shared national identity as long as outsiders categorize and perceive certain groups of people differently. Thus, national identity can be explained and discovered by outsiders even if insiders are unaware of what the nation is or whether it means nothing in particular to them in their daily lives.

National identity coexists with other kinds of identities, and it is neither an essential nor the primary kind of collective identity (Suny 2001).[2] There are numerous kinds of collective identity that coexist simultaneously in complex layers. Reflecting this diverse understanding of human

categorization, many liberal sociologists have created theoretical frameworks along the lines of "primordialist, modernist, or postmodernist." Marxist sociologists view the issue of nationalism as class versus nation or as the interaction between the two. "[N]ationalism and national movements are a product of the interests of a particular class or classes (…) who are the direct beneficiaries of this ideology which represents the position of these classes" (Berberoglu 2000, p. 228).[3]

Whether the culture-based categorization of human beings is useful in understanding the real world is a separate issue from whether such a categorization is normative. Universalistic observers have suggested using citizenship to group people in politics because it implies a culture-free legal individual as the basis of a political entity. Liberal republicans have suggested a more nationalized concept of citizenship, whereas Marxists view class as a fundamental divider of human beings. Culturalists tend to hold that human beings are fundamentally divided by racial, ethnic, and cultural differences. Feminists may view society and politics as being seriously divided by gender. All of these ways of categorizing people are useful as long as they provide a sound framework for understanding the problems of societies in view of resolving those problems. These categorizations are all political, as they provide different views on worldwide problems that can and should be "politically" adjusted.

A diaspora's national identity is attached to both the nation it has left behind and its new host country, and a diaspora could also identify itself in terms of both nations at the same time. Thus, when I speak of a diaspora's national identity, I mean its identity as related to both nations regardless of the order or form of the two nations' coexistence. The history of a diaspora is formed through the collective memory separated from the host society and imagined ancestral homelands and the collective life stories of its members. The process by which diaspora members understand and write the meaning of shared history is also the process of self-justification and of searching for legitimate political membership in host countries. In this process, various visible and invisible cultures (depending on the ethnic groups) are used as means of cognition and recognition. Claims on historical land, vernacular language, customs, values, and religions are only a few examples.

Identity entails people's understanding of who they are and of their fundamental defining characteristics as human beings, whereas the demand

for recognition is given urgency by the supposed links between recognition and identity. Taylor (1994, p. 29) writes, "The thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion … Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being."[4] A diaspora's identity is based on an accumulation of collective memories of recognition, under-recognition, misrecognition, or non-recognition.

The Geopolitics of a Diaspora

In the wake of the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Beijing was concerned about worsening ethnic disturbances due to the increasing openness of society, marketization, social stratification, and changing values. The rise of state-led Chinese patriotism with nationalist elements was the official reaction to the changing ethnic relationship. China's official nationalism is the mixture of communism (itself a mixture of Marxism and Leninism), multiculturalism, developmentalism, and authoritarianism. How several strong ethnonationalisms survived in this milieu remains a perplexing question. The diaspora case adds one more critical element, geopolitics, which have contributed to the current ethnic relations of *Joseonjok* communities in *Dongbei*. Geopolitics has been used by both agencies and agents, and it is historically rooted in China's general policy of a "territorialized ethnicization" process which later switched to a selective shift between region and ethnicity criteria.

As Mackerras' analysis informs us, ethnic identity may become stronger when border nationalities are instigated by countries of origin in border areas, which leads to ethnic resurgence caused by frequent communication and interaction (particularly trade) with the countries of origin or the same ethnic group. This is especially true in the case of the Muslims, who also exhibit better economic performance than the Han Chinese in the minority regions partly thanks to increased trade volume with their kin country. However, the case seems opposite for the *Joseonjok*-concentrated areas than for the Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang because of the unpredictable patterns of interaction between the two motherlands and the *Joseonjok*. Ethnicity (Korean-ness) as an imagined nation waned gradually while resentment increased. Korean-ness

intensified with frequent communication and traveling and actual integration into the market; ethnic identity waned, but national identity was strengthened.[5] In this regard, while "interaction," "relationship," and "reciprocal" could be key terms according to Gladney's category of approaches (1991), "Stalinist," "culturalist," and "circumstantialist" do not sufficiently explain diverse China's ethnic relationships. The "dialogical relationship" is emphasized as a continuous interaction with the understanding that policy in the Chinese context (a circumstantial factor) plays a greater role. Thus, rather than using a top-down (identity determined by policy) or bottom-up (identity determined by ethnic characters and nature) approach, this research intends not to underestimate the continuous micro-level negotiation over the defense of collective identity and community prosperity. Concurrently, unlike other migrant cases, the "foreign policy" variable is insufficient in this case, and macro-analysis of the dynamic geopolitical conditions and historical setting over the last half century is important because of the community's historical link with regional particularities such as the colonial history of Manchuria, intense multiethnic tensions, the communist revolution, and geopolitical proximity to a divided motherland.

Ethnic Relationships and Implications for Regional Development

Developmentalism and the Value of Ethnic Communities

China's historical model of regional development with ethnic characteristics appears to changing, partly because of the PRC's shift to a market economy and the associated changes in regional policies and partly because of the government's sensitivity to ethnicity-related problems that may lead to political uprisings based on territorial claims. Some experts hold that de-ethnicization and elimination of minority nationality status provide a mechanism for rebalancing regional disparities and rooting out problems related to ethnically divided geopolitics (Ma 2007), in favor of a model of ethnic assimilation. However, as Lin argues, de-ethnicization that involves the dismantling of an existing setting does not guarantee the equality of groups or regions (Lin 2015, p. 67), and the cost of doing so would be very high; thus, status quo may be preferred for the sake of equity, stability, and cost avoidance. Ma argues the adoption of the Soviet model as the root of present problems in China, "but

criticized for praising the norms of Western liberal pluralism and failing to mention debates over 'multiculturalism' and other issues that continue to provoke widespread concern (…) (Elliott 2015, p. 187)." While "development" is an ongoing phenomenon and is thus hard to grasp clearly, "developmentalism" has been adopted as a clear national agenda in China—it began with Deng's pragmatism but was implemented more aggressively by Jang Zemin. China has continued to prioritize its developmentalism agenda. In this sense, it is relevant to consider how developmentalism has affected ethnic relationships. The *Joseonjok* community in *Dongbei* has maintained peaceful ethnic coexistence in spite of many potential ethnic conflicts and has a high potential for regional development. Insomuch that China's influence is increasing in many aspects, this potential may contribute not only to the development of the *Joseonjok* society and the *Dongbei* region but also to Northeast Asia. The factors that indicate the development level often include interactions between social and political factors that may be visible or invisible and long or short term. These include infrastructure, education, social equality, the global network, the environment, employment, population, and political freedom.[6] In reality, a gap often occurs between developmentalism and actual development. As a socioeconomic ideology and political agenda, developmentalism provides direction for society to devote its collective energy to the pursuit of prosperity and justifies development at all costs. In China, many conditions must be met, including shifts in the discussion of perspectives on ethnic minorities and in the fundamental perceptions on security and development toward more emphasis on the quality of comprehensive long-term regional development and human-centered security. Considering the current rural–urban disparities and subsequent negative economic and social consequences, revitalizing ethnic communities in rural areas itself is an imminent part of the state's development agenda.

The *Joseonjok* community is a marginalized case. This ethnic group has received relatively little attention, and it is located in "Far" East Asia, which is often examined by "regional studies" rather than the conventional political science discipline. Moreover, China is in transition from socialist modernization to marketized re-modernization, under which every aspect of society exhibits a complicated mixture of conflicting ideas and values and contradictory practices with policy experiments. One reason for choosing the *Joseonjok* case in this project is to build on current studies of migration and integration (rather than ethnic conflict) in China.

It is insufficient using the theoretical prism of communism to analyze modern China. Class struggles in China did not blur the ethnic divisions of the country, even under the most rigid communism of the Cultural Revolution. On the contrary, because of oppression, the sense of ethnicity in all minority regions was strengthened. Liberal theorists have argued that modernization with capitalism and democratization may lead to the increased pursuit of minority rights. Thus, revival of the sense of ethnicity has more to do with the rise of democracy triggered by a marketized economy, in which individuals have greater rights as citizens. Due to China's hybrid system, marketization has not yet been accompanied by individuals' increased awareness of rights-based citizenship.[7]

An Analytical Framework to Understand the PRC–Yanbian, Center–Local Ethnic Relations

In contrast to economic and instrumental approaches to migration, in the global era ethnic diversity, plural cultural affiliations, and multiple nationalities provide value to society and contribute to the progress and development of the community, region, and host society. This should particularly be the case in contemporary China's current ethnic setting. A common misunderstanding on behalf of universal impartial anti-multiculturalists (categorized under the first type of national identity explained in Chap. 4) is that diasporas belong to nowhere and are therefore less committed to their community, less loyal to either state (patriotism by universalists), and less likely to have a special national attachment (nationalized citizenship by particularists). However, "nationalized" diasporas (as opposed to "depoliticized" ethnic groups) can have attachments to multiple nations with appropriate external recognition by states. Being pluralistic in policy design and managing ethnic relations requires approaches tailored to different groups of migrants. Such approaches are likely to be disdained by universalists. Particularists would argue that particularism per se should be universalized due to the interconnectivity of moral and political interests (Parekh 2003). In the real world, human life seems much more complicated and irregular than is portrayed in neat and sophisticated theories on ethnicity and nationalism. No single theoretical approach can adequately explain the complexity of the historical evolution of ethnic relations in China. This is because the period researched, severe

irregularities in external drivers and forces, and the mixture of intended policy and unintended outcomes all heavily and constantly affect the dynamism of ethnic relations.

Several stages of stabilizing diaspora identity are proposed as a framework for analysis. An ideal stage may be where both integration and recognition are satisfactorily achieved. Necessary conditions include the quality of communications between parties, sound knowledge of multiple cultures, and diaspora ethics. This final stage is an effort to achieve a nationalized identity, which is appropriate for nationalism debates in the globalization context and should improve the morale of ethnic minorities including diasporas. An important implication for modern China is that these minority groups are likely to cooperate with shifting state agendas, notably developmentalism. In this regard, a nationality group under this category is a critical asset for long-term development in the region.[8] Desirable ethnic relations would result in a society in which minority groups and individuals are officially recognized. Accordingly, ethnic minorities would be given equal opportunities in the public domain, while the choice of whether to embrace the national identity (together with entry into and exit from their own minority community) would be left to the individual. Under such circumstances, minority groups highly likely pursue reciprocal prosperity both for the host nation and for their own community. In addition, a minority group's fuller integration into mainstream society should be non-hierarchical at both the public and cultural levels. Such conditions would be nurtured and reinforced by a stable third type of national identity that is strong and prominent yet not antagonistic and that motivates community development and loyalty to their host country. In this regard, there is a substantial gap between multiculturality as a phenomenon and the implementation of multiculturalism as a vision and an actual state policy. As the following chapters discuss in detail, within the spectrum of multiculturality and the implementation of multiculturalism, state policy and minority reactions vary for a multitude of ontological and epistemological reasons inside and outside the community. Each chapter describes such changes from both sides.

In a nutshell, this project's core concern is to disentangle the policy–identity–prosperity nexus (Fig. 2.1). China's multiculturalist approach has a state-imposed authoritarian character ever since the integration of Korean communist activists into the CCP in the 1920s, and "policy" has thus had a stronger connection to the evolution of ethnicized collective identity than in cases in liberal democracies. As mentioned in Introduction,



Fig. 2.1 'Identity–policy–prosperity' nexus

the following primary research questions underpin this book. How has the *Joseonjok* national identity evolved? To what extent has the host country's policy shaped this path, and how is it different from those of other ethnic minorities in China? How does it relate to the community's long-term prosperity? What are the implications of the formation of ethnic relations for broader regional politics? I answer these questions by demonstrating and elaborating on the outcomes of the interaction between the PRC's (implicit and explicit) policy and *Joseonjok*'s reactions.

The analysis is conducted within the triad of policy, identity, and prosperity. These three elements explaining *Joseonjok* society are explored in conjunction with the changing patterns and outcomes of ethnic relations in terms of ethnicization (Chap. 3), de-ethnicization (Chap. 4), and the struggle to form a stable third (national) identity to re-politicize ethnicity (Chap. 5). A brief analytical framework is summarized in Table 2.1.

Conclusion

In the case of the *Joseonjok*, constructing a third type of national identity equates to a transition from viewing oneself as a guest worker (a status imposed by external forces) to one of the principal actors in regional development. This connotes a collective desire to possess a de-territorialized national identity, which is combined with ethnic minority groups' yearning to refuse the "minority" label. However, its consequence would also mean gradually giving up territorially confined welfare favoritism in

Table 2.1 Analytical framework: ethnic relations in China and the ethnicity–territory–prosperity nexus

	Ethnicization	*De-ethnicization*	*Re-politicization of ethnicity*
Recognition	Positive and active recognition	Weakening state intervention	Non-active recognition
Integration	Territorially confined isolation	Re-dispersal and disintegration	Demands of a fuller degree of citizenship
National identity	Formation of ethnicized identity	Destabilized identity formation	Struggle to forming a third type of national identity
Ethnic equality	Hardly tested due to territorial isolation	Growing disparities in seizing opportunity	Growing awareness of collective consciousness
Development and prosperity	State protected stability and community development	De-stabilizing ethnic communities	Increasing potential but losing opportunities

China, resisting government-led multiculturalism-oriented policy measures and the present form of self-governance.

During the era of the planned communist economy, territorialized ethnic management was somewhat efficient, as centralized plans for the allocation and use of resources (e.g., employment, job allocation, development) were easily implementable. However, the dynamic re-modernization of the country as a whole has generated a number of conditions that have steadily worsened social equity. The developmentalist agenda has created and reinforced social (urban–rural; rich–poor) and ethnic (modernity–ethnicity) divisions. Previously isolated ethnic groups have faced the destruction of the historically accumulated collectivity of their community and ethnicity. Due to the overall nationwide increase in social and physical mobility, the influx of the Han Chinese population to previously minority-dominated regions can be considered an overwhelming and uncontrollable phenomenon/threat to minorities given the size of the Han Chinese population and its rapidly increasing overall competitiveness (language ability, education and skills quality, social networks, etc.). Moreover, minority groups with geopolitical advantages (or disadvantages) that are adjacent to their motherlands or former allies face greater pressure and greater opportunities at the same time. As an overlooked missed decolonization case, the *Joseonjok* minority group in *Dongbei* has been continuously involved in and confined to the triangular

host–motherland–diaspora structure with confrontations and tensions over culture (e.g., contradicting interpretations over historical memories), economic instrumentalism (e.g., its role as a trade agency and the accumulation of capital using ethnic networks), and security (inevitable involvement in unresolved disputes and foreign affairs).

Policy failure and the mismanagement of geopolitics by the ROK, the DPRK, and China have resulted in missed opportunities for development potential, which has destabilized the community and hampered the establishment of a stable third type of national identity. In the following chapters, I further elaborate on what this national identity signifies as well as on the generalizable conditions for forming and maintaining such an identity. This intends to contribute to the development of a tool for understanding diasporas and minorities in the globalized world, as how to manage ethnic relations and how to integrate diverse migrant populations into host societies have become common challenges. Mainly due to China's aggressive developmentalist agendas followed by rapid urbanization and re-modernization, traditional communities gradually disintegrate. Besides, due to the ethnicization of the rural–urban division in China, the disruption of rural livelihood is directly linked with the disintegration of ethnic communities. For this reason, ethnic issues in China increasingly resemble those of other multinational states, as the core of any ethnic relation is the intrinsic human relationship. A common theme in migration studies is the question of selection and integration, and China is no exception. Thus, ethnic/national theories implying Chinese exceptionalism could gradually become less persuasive in this field.

Notes

1. "Yeonbyeon, prosperity of the little Korea in China: in spite of its geographical proximity with North Korea, Beijing is cold-hearted a toward their alliance" [*Yanbian, la petite Corée chinoise prospère: Malgré sa proximité géographique et politique avec la Corée du Nord, Pékin est en froid avec son allié*] (Le Monde, January 7, 2016) http://www.lemonde.fr/asie-pacifique/article/2016/01/07/yanbian-la-petite-coree-chinoise-prospere_4843231_3216.html?xtmc=yanbian&xtcr=2. Accessed January 8, 2016.
2. "Essentialism may be defined as the attribution of behavior or thinking to the intrinsic, fundamental nature of a person, collectivity, or state.

Identity theory proposes an alternative to essentialist models of people or social groups by claiming that rather than having a single, given, relatively stable identity, persons and groups have multiple, fluid, situational identities that are produced in intersubjective understandings" (Suny 2001, pp. 868–869).

3. Berberoglu's grouping of academic camps in this field is a useful guide to refer. Nationalism and national movements are products of class relations and class struggles at the national and international levels. In his theoretical article on nationalism, he divides nationalism theorists into the liberal bourgeois camp and the Marxist rationalist camp rather than using the conventional primordialist-versus-modernist framework. The liberal nationalism theorists are followers of Ernest Renan and Max Weber, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Johann Herder, Johann Fichte, Giuseppi Mazzini, Hans Kohn, Carlton Hayes, Louis Snyder, ElieKedourie, Ernest Gellner, Walker Connor, Karl Deutsch, John Breuilly, Charles Tilly, Anthony Giddens, and Anthony D. Smith. Berberoglu argues that liberal mainstream nationalism scholars commonly stress the subjective and idealist abstraction emerging from the collective imagination of nation and nationalism and over-emphasize ethnic and cultural phenomena when explaining their origins and development, overlooking the class struggle as the fundamental force of historical development. The academic camp of Marxist nationalism theorists includes Tom Nairn, Benedict Anderson, Earnesto Laclau, Ephraim Nimni, Horace B. Davis, Eric Hobsbawm, Berberoglu, and Berch (Berberoglu 2000, p. 228).
4. Patrick (2000) noted that "conviction that political recognition is accomplished through the extension and completion of the Enlightenment project of toleration is shared by some of the most influential political theorists of our time" such as Charles Taylor (1994), and Will Kymlicka (1995), "all formulate the issue of recognition as if it were a corollary of the principle of toleration based in equal liberty or dignity." (Patrick 2000, p. 29).
5. An important difference in the Joseonjok case relates to China's agenda to "enlighten and modernize" minority nationalities while emphasizing regional development, the purpose of which is to mitigate any possible ethnic tensions to reduce the economic gap between Han Chinese and the regions of ethnic minorities. However, this process is less applicable to establishing ethnic relations in the Korean case. This may mean that modernity and modernization are not crucial to explaining the rise (or consolidation) of ethnic consciousness in the Korean minority case. This diaspora's national background is mainly based on the Korean peninsula as an independent state that underwent modernization and industrialization before the diasporization.

6. However, Mackerras (1994) suggests that the rural economy, industry, infrastructure, health delivery, labor, gender equality, and other additional problems are economic indicators of the development of minority regions (pp. 198–232).
7. See, for example, the discussion of "rights consciousness" in China by Lorentzen and Scoggins (2015).
8. Balanced rural and urban development in Quebec is an example of the political accommodation of the francophone group with a strong national identity apart from the one attached to Canada.

References

Adeney, Katharine. 2006. *Federalism and ethnic conflict regulation in India and Pakistan*. London: Macmillan.

Anderson, Benedict. 1983. *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origins and spread of nationalism*. London: Verso.

Anderson, Benedict. 2001. Western nationalism and eastern nationalism: Is there a difference that matters? *New Left Review* 21 (9): 31–42.

Armstrong, John A. 1976. Mobilized and proletarian diasporas. *American Political Science Review* 70 (2): 393–408.

Barry, Brian. 2001. *Culture and equality: An egalitarian critique of multiculturalism*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Barth, Fredrik. 1989. The analysis of culture in complex societies. *Ethnos* 54 (3–4): 120–142.

Berberoglu, Berch. 2000. Nationalism, ethnic conflict and class struggle: A critical analysis of mainstream and Marxist theories of nationalism and national movements. *Critical Sociology* 26 (3): 205–231.

Bergsten, Fred C. and Inbom Choi (eds.). 2003. *The Korean diaspora in the world economy*. Peterson Institute for International Economics, Special Report No. 15.

Bhabha, Homi. 1990. DissemiNation: Time, narrative and the margins of the modern nation. In *Nation and narration*, ed. Homi Bhabha. London: Routledge.

Bhabha, Homi. 1996. Culture's in-between. In *Questions of cultural identity*, ed. Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay. London: Sage.

Bosely, Corey. 2007. The ethnic minority policies of the People's Republic of China: Patronage and prejudice. *Rutgers Race and Law Review* 8 (2): 291–319.

Braziel, Jana Evans, and Anita Mannur (eds.). 2003. *Theorizing diaspora*. London: Blackwell.

Callahan, William A. 2006. History, identity, and security: Producing and consuming nationalism in China. *Critical Asian Studies* 38 (2): 179–208.

Carens, Joseph H. 2000. *Culture, citizenship, and community: A contextual exploration of justice as evenhandedness.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cartier, Michael. 2011. Thirty years of economic reform and workforce transformation in China. *China Perspectives* 2: 27–33.
Connor, Walker. 1984. *The national question in Marxist-Leninist theory and strategy.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Dittmer, Lowell, and Samuel S. Kim (eds.). 1993. *China's quest for national identity.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Dreyer, June Teufel. 1976. *China's forty millions.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Dreyer, June Teufel. 2005. China's vulnerability to minority separatism. *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 32: 69–86.
Dwyer, Arienne M. 1998. The texture of tongues: Languages and power in China. In *Nationalism and ethnoregional identities in China*, ed. William Safran. London: Frank Cass.
Elliott, Mark. 2015. The case of the missing indigene: Debate over a "second-generation" ethnic policy. *The China Journal* 73: 186–213.
Favell, Adrian. 1998. *Philosophies of integration: Immigration and the idea of citizenship in France and Britain.* London: Macmillan Press.
Finlay, Andrew. 2011. *Governing ethnic conflict: Consociation, identity and the price of peace.* London: Routledge.
Gellner, Ernest. 1983. *Nations and nationalism.* Oxford: Blackwell.
Gladney, Dru C. 1991. *Muslim Chinese: Ethnic nationalism in the People's Republic of China.* Cambridge, MA: Havard University Press.
Goodman, Bryna. 2012. Colonialism and China. In *Twentieth-century colonialism and China*, ed. Bryna Goodman and David Goodman. London: Routledge.
Gutmann, Amy. 2003. *Identity in democracy.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Habermas, Jurgen. 1992. Citizenship and national identity: Some reflections on the future of Europe. In *The condition of citizenship*, ed. Bart van Steenbergen. New York: Sage.
Hall, Stuart. 1992. The question of cultural identity. In *Modernity and itsfutures, ed. Stuart Hall,* David Held, and Anthony McGrew. Cambridge; Oxford: Polity Press.
Hall, Stuart. 2003. Cultural identity and diaspora. In *Theorizing diaspora*, ed. Jana Evans Braziel and Anita Mannur. London: Blackwell.
Han, Enze. 2013. *Contestation and adaptation: The politics of national identity in China.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Harrell, Stevan (ed.). 1995. *Cultural encounters on China's ethnic frontiers.* Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Herberer, Thomas. 1989. *China and its national minorities: Autonomy or assimilation?* New York: M.E.Sharpe.

Hechter, Michael. 1975. *Internal colonialism: The Celtic fringe in British national development*. New Brunswick: Transaction.

Horowitz, Donald L. (ed.). 1985. *Ethnic groups in conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Jacquin-Berdal, Dominique. 2000. State and war in the formation of Eritrean national identity. In *The state and identity construction in international relations*, ed. Sarah Owen Vandersluis. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press.

Kohn, Hans. 1994. Western and eastern nationalism. In *Nationalism*, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D.Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kokot, Waltraud, Christian Giordano, and Mijal Gandelsman-Trier. 2013. *Diaspora as a resource: Comparative studies in strategies, networks and urban space*. Berlin: Verlag.

Kymlicka, Will. 1995. *The rights of minority cultures*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kymlicka, Will. 2005. Liberal multiculturalism: Western models, global trends, and Asian debates. In *Multiculturalism in Asia*, ed. Will Kymlicka and He Baogang. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kuznetsov, Yevgeny, ed. 2006. *Diaspora networks and the international migration of skills: How countries can draw on their talent abroad*. World Bank Development Studies.

Lehning, Percy B. (ed.). 1998. *Theories of secession*. London: Routledge.

Lee, Hoon Koo. 1931. *Korean immigrants in Manchuria*. Pyeongyang: College of Pyeongyang Sungsil, previously Union Christian College Press.

Le Monde. (2016, 7 January). Yeonbyeon, prosperity of the little Korea in China: in spite of its geographical proximity with North Korea, Beijing is cold-hearted a toward their alliance" [*Yanbian, la petite Corée chinoise prospère: Malgré sa proximité géographique et politique avec la Corée du Nord, Pékin est en froid avec son allié*] http://www.lemonde.fr/asie-pacifique/article/2016/01/07/yanbian-la-petite-coree-chinoiseprospere_4843231_3216.html?xtmc=yanbian&xtcr=2 Accessed January 8, 2016.

Lin, Chun. 2006. *The transformation of Chinese socialism*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Lin, Chun. 2015. Modernity and the violence of global accumulation: The case of ethnic question in China. In *Global modernity and social contestation*, ed. Breno Bringel and Jose Mauricio Domingues. London: Sage Publication.

Lobell, Steven E., and Philip Mauceri. 2004. *Ethnic conflict and international politics: Explaining diffusion and escalation*. London: Macmillan.

Lorentzen, Peter and Suzanne Scoggins. 2015. Understanding China's rising rights consciousness. *The China Quarterly* 223: 638–657.

Luova, Outi. 2009. Transnational linkages and development initiatives in ethnic Korean Yanbian, northeast China: "Sweet and Sour" capital transfers. *Pacific Affairs* 82 (3): 427–446.

Ma, Rong. 2007. A new perspective in guiding ethnic relations in the 21st century: 'De-politicization' of ethnicity in China. *Asian Ethnicity* 8 (3): 199–217.

Mackerras, Colin. 1994. *China's minorities: Integration and modernization in the twentieth century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mayall, James, and Mark Simpson. 1992. Ethnicity is not enough: Reflections on protracted secessionism in the third world. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 33 (1–2): 5–25.

Mevius, Martin. 2009. Reappraising communism and nationalism. *Nationalities Papers* 37 (4): 377–400.

Miller, David. 1995. *On nationality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nairn, Tom. 1981. *Break-up of Britain: Crisis and neo-nationalism*. London: Verso.

O'Leary, Brendan. 1997. On the nature of nationalism: An appraisal of Ernest Gellner's writings on nationalism. *British Journal of Political Science* 27: 191–222.

O'Leary, Brendan. 2004. *The Northern Ireland conflict: Consociational engagements*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Olzak, Susan. 1992. *The dynamics of ethnic competition and conflict*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Patrick, Morag. 2000. Liberalism, rights and recognition. *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 26 (5): 28–46.

Parekh, Bhikhu. 2000. *Rethinking multiculturalism: Cultural diversity and political theory*. London: Macmillan Press.

Parekh, Bhikhu. 2003. Cosmopolitanism and global citizenship. *Review of International Studies* 29: 3–17.

Park, Jeongwon Bourdais. 2017. Ethnic relations in Northeast China: ethnic revival or de-ethnicization in the Korean diaspora?. *European Journal of East Asian Studies* 16: 36–66.

Rata, Elizabeth, and Roger Openshaw. 2009. *The politics of conformity in New Zealand*. Auckland: Pearson.

Rawls, John. 1996. *Political liberalism*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Saich, Tony (ed.). 2011. *Governance and politics of China*. London: Macmillan.

Scalapino, Robert A., and Chong-Sik Lee. 1972. *Communism in Korea, Part I: The movement*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Sheffer, Gabriel. 2003. *Diaspora politics: At home abroad*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Shin, Gi-Wook, Joon Choi, and Joon-Nak Cho. 2015. *Global talent: Skilled labor as social capital in Korea*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Sigel, Roberta. 2001. An introduction to the symposium on social identity. *Political Psychology* 22 (1): 112.

Smith, Anthony D. 1986. *The ethnic origins of nations*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Smith, Anthony D. 1999. *Myths and memories of the nation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Soysal, Yasmin. 1994. *Limits of citizenship: Migrants and post-national membership in Europe*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Suh, D.S., and Edward J. Shultz (eds.). 1990. *Koreans in China*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Suny, Ronald Grigor. 2001. Constructing primordialism: Old histories for new nations. *The Journal of Modern History* 73 (4): 862–896.

Szporluk, Roman. 1988. *Communism and nationalism; Karl Mark versus Friedrich List*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tamir, Yael. 1993. *Liberal nationalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Tanrisever, Oktay F. 2009. Why are federal arrangements not a panacea for containing ethnic nationalism? Lessons from the post-Soviet Russian experience. *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 10 (3): 333–352.

Taras, Raymond C., and Rajat Ganguly. 2010. *Understanding ethnic conflict*. London: Routledge.

Taylor, Charles, Alessandro Ferrara, Volker Kaul, and David Rasmussen. 2012. Interculturalism or multiculturalism? *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 38 (405): 413–423.

Taylor, Charles. 1994. *Multiculturalism: Examining the politics of recognition*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Woodman, Sophia. 2016. Local politics, local citizenship? Socialized governance in contemporary China. *The China Quarterly* 226: 342–362.

Wu, Xiaohui. 2014. From assimilation to autonomy: Realizing ethnic minority rights in China's national autonomous regions. *Chinese Journal of International Law* 13 (1): 55–90.

Young, Iris Marion. 2000. *Inclusion and democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Zhao, Zhenzhou. 2011. Multiculturalism in China: Conflicting discourses in universities. In *Minority students in East Asia*, ed. JoAnn Phillion, Ming Tak Hue, and Yuxiang Wang. New York: Routledge.

Zolberg, Aristide R. 2008. *A nation by design: Immigration policy in the fashioning of America*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

CHAPTER 3

Communist Nation Building and Territorialized Ethnicization

This chapter explores the *Joseonjok*'s survival as a distinctive community thanks to their loyal submission to the CCP from the years following the PRC's establishment until the Cultural Revolution. The CCP's policy toward minorities, which included the bestowal of Chinese citizenship and the provision of basic needs for minority-concentrated communities, enabled various groups to survive and flourish. As a diaspora group, the *Joseonjok* also underwent the ethnicization of their national identity. The PRC's policy was also designed to manage competition for resources in the public domain among different national groups to ensure certain level of equality among those groups. State's strong interventionism was necessary considering the massive imbalance in capacity between the Han Chinese and ethnic minorities, which would have otherwise produced procedural inequality.

As I argue in this chapter, although studies of ethnic relations suggest a useful list of the causes of conflicts, reductionism is often found. Many of the factors that are explained as causes of conflicts may also serve as causes of reconciliation. Although there presently seems to be peaceful ethnic coexistence in this region, brutal ethnic conflicts (involving various ethnic groups) occurred at the time of the *Joseonjok*'s settlement during the Qing dynasty, when they were discriminated as economic outcasts from poverty-stricken *Joseon*. They were also persecuted for being either pro-Japanese colonial subjects or pro-Soviet communists in the 1920s and 1930s, as colonial remnants at the end of WWII, and as revisionist North Korean spies during the Cultural Revolution.

J.B. Park, *Identity, Policy, and Prosperity*, China in Transformation,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-4849-4_3

The *Joseonjok* community was progressively marginalized and isolated, with limited communications with mainstream Han Chinese society; this was one of the factors to explain the *Joseonjok*'s present quasi-integration with the Korean society. In this case study, I demonstrate that the constant careful management of the ethnic relations has been the key to the stable state–community relationship, as all strong group identities have the potential to be volatile to some degree. Yet, although policy heavily influenced the first stage of the formation of ethnicized national identity and community, this chapter sheds light also on the reciprocal and interactive nature (a combination of the CCP's flexible minority policy and the "active" submission of the *Joseonjok*) of the ethnicization process.

Principles of China's Policy Toward Ethnic Minorities

Citizenship, Communism, and Ethnicization

With Mao Zedong's rise to power in 1935, China's policy changed from one of self-determination to one of self-governing, in departure from the Soviet model. At first, China supported Lenin's policy, as seen from Outer Mongolia's independence. Shortly after, the CCP abandoned and rejected both national self-determination and federalism, adopting a weaker system of regional autonomy and the Chinese unitary system. Mao was "critical of the nationality policy prior to his coming to power and reversed the Party's stand on the right of national minorities to secession and independence" (He 2005, p. 73). Mao envisaged "a unified state with a population composed of many nationalities which were equal and had the right to self-government" and to maintain their own cultures, languages, and customs (Wu 2014, p. 63). In such a way, China's totalitarian form of multiculturalism approach embraced people of different ethnic backgrounds. Wu (2014, p. 89) states, "The contradiction inherent in the current set of policies and laws that promotes both integration and autonomy was a dilemma." This contradiction has been a core feature of Beijing's minority policy. Under the condition of territorial integration and absolute centralized state power, minority policy has been carefully designed and directed by the state and the Party throughout China's modern history. Compared with federalism, autonomy can be much less legally articulated in terms of power sharing, the role of the central government, and the decision-making and coordination system. Autonomy, especially in the communist state, can mean a

flexible approach but leaving more room to be ambiguous, lacking clear direction from the central government and various levels of local administration. State-imposed authoritarian multiculturalism in China entails top-down procedural and official recognition, especially in terms of procedural matters in the evolution of ethnic relationship, and often lacks transparency (in communication) and public participation. At the beginning of the PRC's state building, ethnicization and ethnicized regional design are followed by an institutionalization based on official cultural labels that combines Leninist, Marxist, and Soviet approaches.

In the context of nationalism in Manchuria during and immediately after Japanese colonization, the term "nationality" reflects the complicated ethnic relationships in the region. At the beginning of communist mobilization, unlike Mao, Sun Yat-sen-led *Kuomintang*'s (KMT) use of *minzu* followed a more Japanese sense of exclusive and ethnicized *minzoku* ("nationality" in Japanese), showing an explicitly assimilationist approach. Initially, five prominent *minzu* were recognized (the Han, Manchu, Mongolians, Tibetans, and Hui (all Muslims)), but the goal was to eventually assimilate all races into Han Chinese (Gladney 1991, p. 83; Cohen 1997, pp. 88–89). The term *minzu* was introduced to China in 1903 by a Swiss-German political theorist and legal scholar, Johannes Kasper Bluntschli (…) based on the "Nationality" volume of the Chinese Complete Encyclopedia (Gladney 1991, p. 85). The use and meaning of the term in the Chinese context, even among leaders, was not consistently clear, as it related to various groups of people and to a particular time (the transition from pre-modern to modern) and space (colonialism and geopolitics). For Koreans, nationalism *(minjokjuui)* in the 1930s evolved into a full-fledged anti-colonial nationalism that was mobilized for collective action. By this time, Korean nationalist movements had become widespread in all areas of Manchuria, Shanghai, Siberia, Japan, and Korea, and these movements conducted myriad forms of organized protests, marches, and acts of terrorisms. In this sense, the Korean case can be regarded as one of the mostly highly mobilized (politicized) diasporas in Armstrong's (1976, p. 393) categorization. During this period, *minzu* acquired two levels of meaning: ethnic and national. In the Chinese context, the ethnic meaning signified the state's categorization of people for integration into the unified state. The term has since been used in the national sense to refer to China's minority groups. China's minorities have been stereotyped as "traditional backward-looking pre-modern" people, in contrast to

the "modernized future-oriented" Han Chinese (Anderson 2001, p. 39). Today, Chinese "nationalism" is commonly linked to Han Chinese nationalism or patriotism, while minority groups have to some degree shed such descriptions as "poor," "rural," "less civilized," "traditional," and "stagnant." Although the Han are only one of China's 56 officially recognized ethnic groups, they are more numerous than the other 55 groups combined. Thus, the Han have come to be considered "national," whereas the rest are considered "ethnic." In this context, the process by which the PRC has separated and highlighted the non-dynamic cultural dimension of nationalism among minority groups can be called "ethnicization." The PRC's efforts have depoliticized minority nationalism, which has resulted in a gradual loss of "nationality" for minority groups while making "ethnicity" part of their identity.

To categorize nationality (*minzu*), the State Commission for Nationality Affairs (SCNA) used the Stalinist approach in the mid-1950s, which included a common language, a common territory, a common economic life, and a common psychological makeup (national culture) (Gladney 1991, p. 67; Harrell 1995, p. 23). However, not all ethnic minorities were officially recognized, and the Chinese Jews, Sherpas, Khmer, Ku Cong, and Boat People continued to seek nationality status (Gladney 1991, p. 83). Once the PRC was established, controlling Han chauvinism and local nationalisms (*difangminzuzhuyi*) became an important task for the CCP. With the exception of supporting Outer Mongolia's self-determination, China has adhered to its "One China" policy, although it has allowed various administrative arrangements and degrees of regional autonomy. Article 4 of the PRC's Constitution states China's policy on autonomy and unity.[1] According to Article 4, "The state protects the lawful rights and interests of the minority nationalities and upholds and develops a relationship of equality, unity and mutual assistance among all of China's nationalities." Unity is re-emphasized: "Discrimination against and oppression of any nationality is prohibited; any act which undermines the unity of the nationalities or instigates division is prohibited." The Constitution also stipulates that autonomy must be given to any region in which the concentration of a minority nationality is "sufficiently high," although it does not define this criterion. Autonomy with a guarantee of self-governance for minorities has provided a clear framework for the *Joseonjok* to identify themselves as Chinese *gongmin* (literally "public person") while remaining "ethnically" Korean. To a large extent, the Chinese notion of socialist citizenship

has allowed for the accommodation of minority nationalities. "Although there are limits to applying the concept of citizenship in its strict sense, the Chinese term *gongmin* has connotations equivalent to the Western concept of a citizen" (Park 2017, p. 48). However, the term "citizen" may refer to a politicized individual who is actively participating in state-building projects (see, e.g., Barabantseva 2009). This definition is used most often by Chinese officials. The CCP has expressed its appreciation for the support of minorities as follows: "Unity and cooperation among the various ethnic groups have helped to safeguard China as a united multi-ethnic state," and "In modern times, when China became a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society and the Chinese nation suffered from imperialist invasion, oppression and humiliation and was reduced to the status of an oppressed nation […] all the ethnic groups united and fought unyieldingly together against foreign invaders and ethnic separatists" (State Council of Information Office of the PRC 2000). This statement was reconfirmed in the 2009 White Paper ("China's Ethnic Policy and Common Prosperity and Development of All Ethnic Groups") with a few changes of wording:

> For over a century from the first Opium War in 1840, China suffered repeated invasions and bullying by Western powers. On the verge of national subjugation and genocide, the destiny of all ethnic groups in China was linked more closely than ever before. At the critical moment when China faced the danger of being carved up, and when the nation was on the verge of being subjugated, the Chinese people of all ethnic groups united as one, and put up the most arduous and bitter struggles against foreign invaders in order to save the country.

The discourse on victimization and humiliation became a powerful tool for evoking the solidarity of people from different backgrounds. *New York Times* journalist Thomas L. Friedman writes, "The single most under-appreciated force in international relations is humiliation" (quoted also in Payne 2013, p. 93),[2] yet it is rarely considered an important factor in international relations. During China's Civil War, the Korean population's anti-Japanese sentiment was readily amalgamated with the CCP's humiliation discourse, leading to its active cooperation with the CCP against the KMT.

Various positive discrimination measures benefiting minority nationals have been implemented, and the PRC's Constitution and Regional

Ethnic Autonomy Law includes preferential welfare policy stressing minorities' rights to autonomy and self-governance. In addition, a series of legislative measures such as the Law on the Regional Autonomy of Ethnic Minorities (1984, 2001), Regulations on the Administrative Work of Ethnic Townships, Regulations on Ethnic Work in Urban Areas (1993), and the Intangible Cultural Heritage Law of the PRC (2011) have included provisions to protect minorities' rights. Decisions on ethnic affairs are made by four central governmental bodies: the State Ethnic Affairs Commission (SEAC), the Ethnic Commission of the National People's Congress, the Ethnic and Religious Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, and the State Administration for Religious Affairs (Park 2017, p. 49).

However, some scholars (e.g., Yahuda 2000) have viewed China's autonomy policy as socialist rhetoric, arguing that the country's policy has been consistently assimilationist throughout its history. Yahuda goes back to ancient China to argue that Chinese attitudes toward minorities are rooted in Han chauvinism and racial nationalism and that there is a clear distinction between outsiders, who are uncivilized barbarians, and insiders, who understand and share in the great Confucian civilization. The present relationship between Han and non-Han Chinese has been in place since the establishment of communist China in 1949. China's anthropologists view amalgamation (*ronghe*) rather than assimilation (*tonghua*) as an ideal final goal of relations between different ethnic and national groups. However, it can be difficult to distinguish between these terms. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, assimilation involves one group's incorporation into the other's sphere and the elimination of differences. In contrast, amalgamation involves more natural communication over a longer period and aims to form a third type of identity through mutual influence. Accommodation implies allowance for cultural autonomy in terms of language, customs, and religion in China's case. During the accommodation stage, various cultural features coexist with the dominant one, but no forced assimilation is attempted unless political independence violates the One China policy. As much of ethnic pluralism in liberal states is political rhetoric, amalgamation could also be socialist rhetoric. This is because most states would wish political and cultural boundaries as congruent for the fear of any ethnic surges and attempts at secession. Reflecting this, starting from 1990 Beijing has published 29 White Papers that are directly and indirectly addressing ethnic minority issues in China among which 11 exclusively concerning Tibet and

Xinjiang. The common themes of the White Paper are largely to confirm that there are no issues of Tibet's political status as it has always been part of China, and Tibet has been in the peaceful process of modernization and development being liberated from feudal serfdom, guided by the PRC government. In the 2000s, the government of PRC also issued three White Papers that are directly concerning ethnic minorities in general, which include "National Minorities Policy and Its Practice in China" (June 2000), "Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities in China" (February 2005), and "China's Ethnic Policy and Common Prosperity and Development of All Ethnic Groups" (September 2009). If including White Papers that include any chapters concerning ethnic minority issues, there are at least seven more White Papers, mostly explaining current situations, issues and official policy on human rights protection including freedom of speech and building political democracy in China.

The First Survival of Ethno-nationalism Under Communist Nation Building

The process of unifying the highly scattered and fractured Korean communist activists within the Han Chinese-led communist camp was complicated (Park 2005, 2015; Sclapino and Lee 1972). After integration, the *Joseonjok* generally benefited from the Chinese government's treatment of minorities in the sense that not all ethnically distinctive groups in China in the 1940s were entitled as a national group, particularly in comparison with the Manchus, who were opted out of the same region. In particular, the CCP's land reforms, accompanied by the granting of Chinese citizenship, helped to re-collectivize the dispersed *Joseonjok* communities in the vast territory of Manchuria and enabled their members to continue to cultivate agricultural lands even after the end of the Second World War. However, land reforms in the Han regions were not the same as those in minority-concentrated regions (Son 2001). The land distribution and collectivized land-sharing policy was in line with the CCP's territorialized ethnicization of minority nationals (Han 2013). During and after the colonial period, Yanbian, the colonial administrative center under Japanese rule experienced harsh political turmoil and social chaos with sharp ideological divisions. Ethnic tensions and hatred instigated by Japan's colonial vision of establishing a rigid ethnic hierarchy among the "yellow races" comprised a critical part of this division (Park 2000, pp. 206–209). Under these circumstances, being afforded both

ongoing ownership of agricultural lands and securing Chinese citizenship (as a precondition of land ownership) constituted significant material gains for the *Joseonjok*, particularly in light of the tense political situation in their motherland, the Korean peninsula.

The *Joseonjok*'s own interpretations of their collective memory repeatedly highlight their participation in an anti-colonial war against Japan (Choi 2006), the Communist Revolution, and an anti-imperial war to guarantee that the Korean peninsula was not colonized by the USA, also being encouraged by Chinese authorities in terms of the selection of such historical memories. Their own recorded history represents self-justification for being Chinese citizens, their awareness of not being full members of the nation, and efforts to prove their value to the host society. It illustrates a guided (surveillance and control by the government) and (partially) spontaneous selection of historical memories leading to the development of a distinctive identity from that of the dominant nation. This process of differentiation was not necessarily antagonistic to the host society and has more or less demonstrated optimistic constructivism (e.g., Park 2009).

The Diaspora's Reaction to Policy: Maximizing Ethnic Markers/Boundaries

The Yanbian prefectural government is a good model of minority self-government. However, it is a lower-level administrative government than the Jilin provincial government, which is categorized as a "regional" rather than an "ethnic" self-governance body, although several Korean minority counties are under its administrative rule. Yanbian was designated an autonomous region in 1949 but was later downgraded to a prefecture because of Chinese gerrymandering that excluded the largely *Joseonjok Mudanjiang (Mokdangang)* area (Park 2015, p. 155). Minority populations voluntarily moved into the counties, towns, and regions where their own groups already comprised majorities. A lack of accurate data on population groups at that time made the categorization of an ethnic group challenging, and determining "sufficient" majorities to fulfill the condition of a recognized minority was difficult. Nevertheless, I emphasize throughout this project that ethnic relations between China and Yanbian have been more interactive than unilateral although China's policymaking itself can be understood as a top-down unilateral approach. The early period of communist state building witnessed the creation of

Table 3.1 *Joseonjok* ethnic markers/boundaries

Generic factors	*Joseonjok-specific factors*
Selecting and reproducing historical memories (Cohen 1997; Cairns and Roe 2003)	Collective political action (e.g., nationalist movements), including anti-colonial nationalist movements; memories of colonial oppression; experiences of ethnic tension and conflict
Participating in the host country's (PRC) modern nation-building process to pursue both material and symbolic values	Integration into the CCP; fighting against the KMT; fighting against Western colonization of the Korean motherland
Establishing the group's own distinctive institutional boundaries	Establishment of the Yanbian Autonomous Prefecture; collectivization of agricultural land; official recognition as an ethnic group with an ethnonym; establishment of Yanbian University
Nurturing ethnic/national consciousness (Harrell 1995, p. 28) through collective enthusiasm for fundamental security and prosperity	Emphasis on education for children; preservation of the Korean language; belief in/hope for Korean re-unification; Christian movements
Experiencing implicit or explicit discrimination or threats ("a troubled relationship with the host society") (Cohen 1997, p. 186)	Awareness of being a minority and barriers to entering mainstream society; ethnic tensions in daily life; experience of being oppressed during the Cultural Revolution; implicit de-ethnicization pressure; security warnings

Author

clear ethnic boundaries (ethnic markers) between ethnic groups, including the Han Chinese. The following five factors listed in Table 3.1 were the most significant in the early stage of community building and remain so in the collective identification of the *Joseonjok*. The *Joseonjok*-specific markers explain the interactive ethnic relationship. Policy intervention does not sufficiently explain why the reactions of ethnic groups to the state's policy vary under the same political regime.

Chinese communism has to some extent embraced national and ethnic groups over the last half century. The history of shaping minority groups' collectivity by consolidating their essential elements demonstrates that ethnicity (with a clear distinction from official nationality) coexists with class division under communism. More important is the government's ability to flexibly manage multiethnicity taking into account the various historical contexts of the geopolitics of ethnic minorities. Marxist

sociologists somehow tended to view nationalism as bourgeois rationalization and national identity as an irrational, invented, forged, imagined, or constructed ideology involving an imaginary allegiance to a nation and independent of any direct links to class or social processes. The Leninist approach accepts the self-determination of minority national groups and even secession. It also assumes that class divisions will eventually blur ethnic segmentation, but the Chinese case has not aligned with these assumptions. I largely agree with the modernist approach (whether liberal or Marxist) to understanding nationalism as a product of construction via exogenous forces rather than as inherently endowed as an extension of kinship. In China, ethnic boundaries are somehow arbitrarily engineered; thus, minority groups' identities are constructed within the structure created by the CCP. This process involves the determination of elements that mark ethnicity. The CCP did not strictly adopt Stalin's four qualifications for nationality; instead, qualifications were later set by local governments through communication with minority communities (through negotiation, guidelines, monitoring, censorship, etc.). Markers naturally developed based on the preexisting core features of each ethnic group. Generic but essential (in terms of facilitating the development of group solidarity) boundary marker features may include (based on findings from the *Joseonjok* case) the experience of collective nationalist movements (including memories of conflicts), shared memory of collective oppression, the means of the group's visionary salvation (commonly religion or, in the *Joseonjok* case, education), distinctive language, and participation in modern nation building. These markers are not completely static; some have been preserved and others modified.

When the markers entail more affinity (overlap) with the host society and dominant ethnic group, antagonism and conflict less likely occur. Religious faith is often considered a crucial element in the politicization of ethnicity based on an exclusive national solidarity and separatism with political autonomy. The *Joseonjok* share with other Koreans the ethnic feature of being religiously heterogeneous, and they typically do not explicitly preserve physical ethnic culture (traditional, custom, rituals) as a bargaining tool to negotiate material gains or greater autonomy. The *Joseonjok* have had no conflicts with Beijing over any issues relating to physical or visible traditions or religious rituals. Like those of other ethnicized groups in China, *Joseonjok* customs and lifestyles are often portrayed on CCTV, when presenting China's folklore multiculturalism as government propaganda to inform the public its benign support for celebrating

diversity. In terms of shared historical memory, certain affinity has been kept between Han Chinese and *Joseonjok* community. Discourses on such shared historical memories have been reproduced, that is rooted in the shared historical memory of anti-colonialism in *Dongbei*. The CCP's recognition of the *Joseonjok*'s contributions was followed with the provision of tangible benefits to the community (land, citizenship, security). The *Joseonjok* have since maintained highly visible ethnic features, including language, customs (lifestyle, food, folklore), Korean schools and universities, writing their own history, and the production of various publications in Korean (Nam 1995). In their private daily lives, the *Joseonjok* have undoubtedly maintained their traditional ways of eating, cooking, cultivating land, educating their children, and doing business. However, their lifestyle and private culture have been infused with both Han Chinese and South Korean influences, leading to a state of indigenous heterogeneity distinct from both China and the two Koreas. The remaining sections explore the above-presented five factors more in detail.

Constructing and Reproducing Historical Memories of Political Action

Constructivism may include both backward-looking pessimistic skepticism (a firm belief in historical constructivism) and forward-looking proactive optimistic constructivism (hopeful about constructing something different from the past). Constructing relational memories among different nations requires subtlety and may take a great deal of time. What matters more in building non-antagonistic ethno-nationalism in China is not shared religious belief but reciprocal construction of historical memories. Constructing memories inevitably entails selection, omissions, interpretation, and reproduction, and narratives on historical facts, events, and incidences can be manipulated and modified (Morris-Suzuki 2005). In this process, continuous negotiation and reciprocity involve between relevant parties until an official nationalism is built. "This form of nationalism arose historically as a reactionary response to popular nationalisms from below, directed against rulers, aristocrats and imperial centres," with the prominent example of the Imperial Russia, "where the Tsars ruled over hundreds of ethnic groups and many religious communities." The similar kinds of contradictions between popular nationalism and official nationalism continue today and "so strikingly evident on the mainland today" (Anderson 2001, pp. 35–37).

The *Joseonjok* tend not to fight for the ethnic features that are categorized as pertaining to the "private" lifestyle of a minority group. Instead, they usually use what they have contributed to mainstream society to achieve recognition as a political citizen. However, this does not mean that there were no conflicts or tensions before the establishment of the PRC. Within this context, the communist notion of citizenship can be understood as an interaction with the diaspora's perpetual guest-fighter/worker mind-set, although in a way this mind-set is also an outcome of China's particular notion of citizenship, which stresses the instrumental value of minorities, thus assigning them guest worker status even several generations after their settlement. China views the *Joseonjok* as being fundamentally adaptive to the dominant political system and willing to respect Beijing's agenda of territorial integrity. In response to government policy, the *Joseonjok* highlighted their contributions to the PRC's modern state building, and recording the history in their own language was an important means of maintaining national pride and differentiating themselves from outsiders. Hutchinson writes, "Central to ethnicity is the question of origins, the recovery of memory and of a 'usable past' by which to negotiate the problems of the present" (Hutchinson 2000, p. 653). Historians and other writers typically emphasize the historical memories shared by the *Joseonjok* and Han Chinese rather than memories specific to the *Joseonjok* community.

The residents of Manchuria suffered during Japan's colonization of the region under the *Manchuguo* government after the Manchu Crisis of 1931. Although the Manchu had already been excluded as uncivilized aliens by both Sun Yat-sen's KMT and the CCP (Cohen 1997, pp. 88–89; Rigger 1995, pp. 209–213), the Koreans were seen as useful because they were able farmers and because they were already full of anti-colonial spirit with being readily mobilized for revolution. The *Joseonjok* believed that China could not retake Manchuria without their cooperation. *Joseonjok* historians frequently highlight the *Joseonjok* participants in the anti-colonial war against Japan in Manchuria in the 1930s, such as by emphasizing the number of participants killed (Table 3.2). *Joseonjok* historians record that there were 64 social and political organizations involved in nationalist movements against Japan in the region and that over 90% of the 2,000 members of the Communist Party in 1931 were *Joseonjok*. These data are inaccurate but provide insight into how importantly the *Joseonjok* view their historical contributions. For example, the newly restored Yanbian

Table 3.2 Number of participants killed during the Sino-Japanese war

City	*Total*	*Han Chinese*	*Joseonjok*	*Other nationalities*
Yanji (Yeongil)	517	5	512	–
Tumen (Domun)	188	3	185	–
Longjin (Ryongjeong)	817	3	814	–
Helung (Hwaryong)	287	4	283	–
Antu (Ando)	83	4	78	1 (Manchurian)
Wangqing (Wangchung)	566	34	531	1 (Manchurian
Hunchun (Hunchun)	358	4	352	1 (Manchurian)
Tunwha (Donwha)	25	6	18	1 (Manchurian)

Unpublished booklet written by local historians and data from exhibitions at the Yanbian National Museum

National Museum is plentiful of similar data and stories about *Joseonjok*'s contributions to anti-colonial battles against Japan.

The number of independent activists in Manchuria was less than the number of ordinary previously settled immigrants, but they were those who experienced severe colonial oppression and were more educated. Those activists could successfully mobilize ordinary Korean settlers, most of whom were farmers. The motivations to participate in nationalist movements might have varied depending on social classes, but memories of the fight against colonialism were widely shared and passed down to the current generations in the region. The following passage demonstrates the competition over authenticity and legitimacy of nationalism vis-à-vis the people from the ROK:

> It is absurd that South Koreans look down on us *Joseonjok*. We have same ancestors. Our nation, especially in Manchuria, fought fiercely against the Japanese colonial powers until the country's independence, but South Korea was rebuilt by pro-Japanese traitors. Those national enemies took high positions in the government after emancipation. Now, South Koreans think that they are the only legitimate people of the Korean nation. Recognized nationalists and their family members are well-honored by the ROK government, and South Koreans firmly believe that anti-colonial nationalism is their own heritage, but those independent movement activists could have been *Joseonjok* today if they had decided to resettle in *Dongbei* rather than going back to Korea proper at the end of the Second World War. (Interview 2015 Yanbian)

This part of history had been emphasized and reproduced via various media, such as local writings on history, museums, and tourist attractions to visualize history. One of many examples of modernizing ethnic roots is the community's effort of constructing the various traces of Yun Dong Ju (1917–1945), a poet of resistance and national hero, as tourist place in Ryongjeong (Longjing) in Jilin (Choi and Kim 1996). They also served different purposes, such as to educate younger generation *Joseonjok*, to seek recognition from the CCP, and more recently to appeal to their common ethnic qualifications with South Koreans. A notable trend since the 2000s is local historians' endeavors to realign their community's collective history with South Koreans' historical perspectives, which has been accompanied by increased cooperation with South Korean historians.

As an agrarian community, the *Joseonjok*'s attachment to its ancestral agricultural land goes beyond practical interests. This was evident in every political upheaval throughout history. During the Qing dynasty, the *Joseonjok* endured humiliation and discriminations under Manchurian rule in the region and were left with land considered infertile. The *Joseonjok* were later forced to move when it was discovered they were skilled at agriculture. In the early 1930s, the *Joseonjok* population comprised only 3% of Manchuria's population but produced over 90% of its agricultural yield (Jeon 1999, p. 10; Park 1998). During this period, the *Joseonjok*'s attachment to the land led them to develop a community more easily. Under Japanese occupation, the *Joseonjok* fought for the land, and ethnic conflicts among the Han Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese erupted over the surrounding agricultural lands, particularly over irrigation rights. Reflecting this, ethnic tensions were escalated during the *Wanpaoshan [Manbosan]* Incident.

This incident is little known to the public, but it ignited the 1931 Manchurian Crisis directly caused by the bombing of the South Manchurian Railway near *Liutiaohu* Lake in Shenyang (September 18, 1931). The *Wanpaoshan* Incident resulted from harsh confrontations between different national groups and complicated the political situation in Manchuria before the crisis. The region had been left infertile before the *Joseonjok* arrived and began to cultivate the discarded land. As the region became increasingly cultivated, Manchurians moved in and claimed land ownership. As the region had long been left under a near power vacuum, there were no clear fixed regulations on land property and migration before the Japanese occupation. By 1931, "China

had been casting a wary eye on some 800,000 Korean residents in Manchuria" (Doenecke 1981, p. 9). After Japan annexed Korea, China viewed Japan as taking a "protective interest" in Koreans who had previously been considered, what Chinese believed, semi-colonized Chinese subjects. Japan made territorial claims on all parts of the region with large Korean populations. "For some time, the Japanese had demanded the right to establish a subconsulate at *Wanpaoshan* on the Chinese side of the Yalu [Amrok] River, a district like Chientao [Jiandao; Gando], heavily settled by ethnic Koreans" (Matsusaka 2001, p. 326). Japan used the initially minor dispute between Korean residents and local Chinese at *Wanpaoshan* as an opportunity to foment anti-Chinese sentiment among Korean farmers. In July 1931, Korean tenants and Chinese farmers fought over irrigation concessions at *Wanpaoshan*, a small village about 20 km north of Jangchun, that were initiated by Korean farmers under contract with Chinese landowners. When construction was nearly completed, Chinese farmers protested against the irrigation system on the grounds of the protection of their own farms. "[A] group of Chinese attacked the Korean farmers. The Chinese farmers were backed by Chinese police and the Koreans by Japanese consular police"; this incident "highlighted long-standing issues relating to Japan's right to lease land and engage in commercial activity in Manchuria" (Wilson 2002, p. 18). The Chinese government ordered the Korean farmers to cease the construction and evacuate the region. The Koreans protested. At the beginning, the conflict was between Korean farmers and Chinese residents; later, however, the Japanese became involved (or had designed the conflict in the first place as it was belived), and it escalated into a political confrontation between China and Japan. Although there were no actual casualties at the beginning, false reports were spread out reporting that several hundreds of Korean farmers were attacked and killed by 800 Chinese farmers. Being instigated by a series of similar false reports, anti-Chinese riots were spread major cities in Korean peninsula in the following days. It was reported that 142 Chinese were killed, 546 were injured, and 91 went missing (*Joongang Daily*, 15 March 2017).[3]

As the territorial occupation of South Manchuria had been largely completed through the Manchurian Crisis, the colonial government sought to locate Koreans who had legally become Japanese. By 1931, Japanese from Japan formed only 0.7% of the population but were equipped with arms and modenized colonial institutions. The Korean and Manchu populations were estimated to comprise, respectively, 2.7% (800,000) and 15%

of the total population (Lee 1931, p. 89). However, these figures are inaccurate for various reasons. First, some Koreans in other parts of Manchuria were not included, and some others were reluctant to register with the colonial authorities. Second, some Koreans became already naturalized Chinese citizens before the official population census was conducted. The hometowns from which the Koreans in Manchuria originated became more varied; previously, most Koreans had come from northern Hamgyeongdo; later, others came from other areas of southern Korea. Korean migration from other parts of the Korean territory preceded this period. The Joseon regime encouraged the immigration of southern Koreans (the old province of Shila) north into Hamgyeong Province near the Manchurian border whenever the Qing threatened them. The region experienced continuous military and political turmoil, and with Chinese, Japanese, and Russian involvement, the ethnic relationships in Manchuria had already become complicated.

Today, the interpretation of the *Wangbaoshan* Incident demonstrates the *Joseonjok*'s construction of their historical memory as a justification of *raison d'être* in the foreign soil with harmony than confrontation with Han Chinese while making Japan as a common enemy. Historians explain the case as the exposure of severe deep-seated ethnic tensions among the Han Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese that had accumulated for a decade leading up to the Manchurian Crisis (Park 1985). *Joseonjok* and Han Chinese historians interpret it as a Japanese conspiracy to use the Korean population, conveniently utilizing them as ethnic Koreans or Japanese colonial subjects depending on the situation (Park 2000).

Participating in China's Modern Nation-Building Process

The self-evaluation of contributions to state building is a crucial element for forming the collective identity of a diaspora group through integrating their stories of survival and existence to the state-building process. Maoism, which is based on inclusive pragmatism rather than principles, successfully mobilized the local non-Han populace to struggle against foreign imperialism and against the KMT. Mao's strategy was reinforced during the Long March, during which the CCP successfully communicated with minority groups, even in remote locations on the border. During the Communist Revolution, each non-Han Chinese group had a different motivation for cooperating with the CCP. The *Joseonjok*'s motivations were multifaceted. First, many of the highly organized and

mobilized communist activists already shared a strong ideological affinity with the CCP. Anti-colonial nationalism against Japan had increased, and many leaned toward Marxism as a counter-ideology to Japanese capitalist colonialism and pro-Japanese Korean landlords in their motherlands. Many activists in Manchuria who allied with Chinese and Russian communist organizations were diasporized Koreans who moved from Japan in the 1920–1930s to escape from Japanese control. Many of these Koreans were educated and influenced by Marxist ideology. Later, they became leaders in rebuilding the community. Second, the Han Chinese selective integration of *Joseonjok* communist factions into unified Chinese communism was accompanied by the purge of suspected pro-Japanese members and the disintegration of various organizations (Yeom 2013). Park states that socialist internationalism advocated by the CCP was in fact the Hanification of Chinese communism: "As the communists espoused nationalism, socialist internationalism in Manchuria became an aggregation of national politics rather than a global politics capable of challenging the capitalist relations of production and exchange" (Park 2005, p. 199). Consequently, the *Joseonjok* were recognized as one of the most loyal minority national groups in China.

Third, from the peasants and laborers' point of view, the CCP's land reform and redistribution policy in favor of non-Han Chinese minorities was crucial because Koreans had not been allowed to own land without naturalizing. The chaotic situation in the motherland during that period made people reluctant to return home considering the practical difficulties of re-settlement. Fourth, as a minority group, the KMT's liberal assimilationist approach to national minority groups was much less appealing. Among minority national groups, liberalism was regarded as a tool for suppression and discrimination with the goal of exclusive nation-state building, which stood in sharp contrast to communism's ethnicity-neutral class-first political agenda that recognized farmers as valued members of the Communist Revolution. Had the KMT been in power, it would have been expelled from the country. Considering its five-decade history of settlement in Manchuria, its attachment to the region was sufficiently strong for it to fight to protect its livelihood. Thus, for the sake of both their interests and identity, many *Joseonjok* actively participated in crucial events that led to the modern (re)building of China's communist state. The *Joseonjok*'s enthusiastic cooperation with the CCP was praised and appreciated by the CCP, and they were given a relatively higher degree of autonomy in many aspects.

The *Joseonjok*'s participation in the Korean Civil War against the USA was another significant point of shared history with the CCP. The *Joseonjok* were effectively mobilized under communism. Locals in *Dongbei*, most of them members of the Korean diaspora, were mobilized to join the war against the southern part of Korea in support of the alliance between China and the Soviet Union during the Korean War of 1950–1953. These shared historical memories have been told and written by local and Chinese historians and educators throughout the diaspora's settled history. The *Joseonjok* successfully seized the opportunity afforded by the CCP's policy of autonomy for ethnic minority regions (Shin 1988). The group has built that identity in geographical isolation, which has facilitated the development of a culturally and territorially confined subnational community. Although the self-celebration of a distinctive history varies by case, groups' common motivation for such self-celebration is to justify their existence in their host society.

A mass education system unavoidably imposes nationalistic views on history; in contrast, first- or second-generation diasporas that have been outside such a mass education system provide their children with different perspectives and interpretations of major historical events. The larger the gap, the more likely the younger generation is to have different experiences with issues of nationality. Although the *Joseonjok*'s collective memory of warfare against Japanese colonization is not distinctively their own or separate from that of the Han Chinese, their interpretation of participation in the war differs. The *Joseonjok* still perceive their role in the war as guest fighters contributing to the foreign lands, whereas the Han Chinese regard the war as a victory of the Chinese nation with the cooperation with national and ethnic minorities. Neither of the two interpretations reflects the view that the *Joseonjok* and Han Chinese are included in a single nation. The *Joseonjok*'s historical memory of warfare justifies their existence (unofficial certificate for integration with citizenship) in the Chinese territory. For this reason, the question of who (which ethnic group in comparison with other minority groups in Manchuria, including the Han Chinese) fought most fiercely against the Japanese troops and against the KMT has been of utmost importance to the *Joseonjok*. However, due to China's nationalistic interpretation of history, younger *Joseonjok* who have been taught in the present central education system have a feeling of collective shame over the history of their ancestral motherland:

> We have learned only negative facts about Korea. Because of a Sino-centric historical view, we have learned that Korea had always been a Chinese colony until the Japanese occupation and that Koreans were highly divisive fighting against each other. Until recently, I felt antagonistic toward South Korea. But after communication with South Korean people, I've been learning about Korean history and I found a lot of things to re-learn. (Interview 1999 Changbai).

Interviewees revealed that numerous anecdotes about individual-level tensions between the Han Chinese and *Joseonjok* in daily or social life are caused by cultural differences or arguments over historical facts and interpretations (e.g., in classrooms, university student unions, dormitories, work units, intermarriage). However, regardless of their educational backgrounds, many concluded that their degree of individual-level uneasiness in daily life was usually trivial and understood that those are something that could occur in any multinational society elsewhere. In addition, the government has tended to efficiently and promptly intervene to root out any tensions between the Han Chinese and other groups.

State-Led Institutions for Ethnicization

Yanbian Autonomous Prefecture was officially established in 1952 along with 30 other autonomous prefectures. Ju Deok Hae, a revered *Joseonjok* community leader, one of the major founders, and the first head of the prefecture, played a crucial role in negotiating with the CCP to secure ethnic-specific welfare provisions for the Korean community (Han 1990; Jeong 1997). In a 1949 meeting for national affairs at the province level (Jilin), Ju insisted on the implementation of a national autonomous governing system in Yanbian. Yanbian was the place where the *Joseonjok* population was concentrated and which had served as a colonial administrative center during the Japanese occupation. *Joseonjok* leaders had conflicting opinions on the community's future. Some, such as Im Min Ho, insisted on collective action to establish an independent republic of *Joseonjok*, while others, such as Im Chun Ho, wanted to incorporate Yanbian into the Korean peninsula. In contrast, Ju argued that it had been over 100 years since the *Joseonjok* had settled in China and, having cultivated the barren land and fought against Japanese colonization with the Han Chinese, the *Joseonjok* had already become a minority national group in China. National autonomous governance under the Chinese party was the only

way the *Joseonjok* society could flourish. Ju considered the other suggestions impractical because of the political trends and reality of China at that time (Choi 2012; Han 1990, p. 512; Kang et al. 1992, p. 160). Ju believed that becoming a minority national autonomous region was the best way to fully enjoy political equality, and achieve economic development while preserving national culture. He believed that a multinational society would eventually decrease the differences between various national groups, and his view was officially supported by the Chinese government. An alternative view is that Ju was the only *Joseonjok* communist who was ready to compromise with the CCP and was therefore strongly supported by CCP leaders, whereas hardline integrationists (those claiming North *Gando* as Korea proper) would not have survived. It is known that Ju had an amicable relationship with influential people in the CCP at that time and was considered a capable leader who could mediate effectively between *Joseonjok* society and the PRC despite over-leaning to the Chinese side. Today, local people recall that Ju was the last real head who represented *Joseonjok*'s collective interests in negotiation with Beijing. As a "prefecture" rather than a "region," Yanbian's administrative status was "one level below the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, [and] the substance of [the] autonomous rights enjoyed by the Koreans in Yanbian was essentially no different from that of the Mongols in Inner Mongolia" (Wu 2014, p. 66). Wu explains that the CCP intended to allow various levels of autonomous administrative arrangements. The PRC's official policy adheres to the principle that "ethnic autonomous areas effectively exercise the right of self-government."

The 2009 White Paper of the PRC, "China's ethnic policy and common prosperity and development of all ethnic groups," clarifies what it officially means by regional ethnic autonomy:

> The organs of self-government in ethnic autonomous areas perform the functions of local state organs as prescribed in Section Five, Chapter Three of the Constitution. They also exercise the right of self-government provided for in the Constitution, the Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy and other laws, and of carrying out and implementing state laws and policies in the light of specific local conditions.

Under this principal, this chapter of the White Paper details the policy framework with the seven categories, namely, "independently managing

the ethnic group's internal affairs in its autonomous area," "ethnic autonomous areas enjoy the right to formulate self-government regulations and separate regulations," "using and developing the spoken and written languages of the ethnic groups," "respecting and guaranteeing the freedom of religious belief of ethnic minorities," "retaining or altering the folkways and customs of ethnic groups," "independently arranging, managing and developing economic construction," and "independently developing educational, scientific, technological and cultural undertakings." During the early period of ethnicization, the *Joseonjok*'s interpretation of the PRC's policy in line with the government direction was as follows:

> In socialist China the solution to the issues of nationalities took the form of national autonomous governance. This system allows unifying universality and particularity; combining the Party and State's policy guidance with ethnic minority region's particular advantages; respect and guaranteeing minorities' own internal administration and management; and seeking equality between ethnic groups and realizing the principle of reciprocal prosperity. (Nam 1995, p. 73)

Ethnic communities' political activities are allowed through China's official political process. Each autonomous minority region has representatives at all levels of the People's Assemblies. The *Joseonjok* being equipped with an autonomous prefecture and several autonomous counties and towns, there is no discrimination against the set quantity of representation. In 1952, *Joseonjok* accounted for 74% of the population in Yanbian (including five *hyun* and one city) and *Joseonjok* cadre comprised 78% of the cadres. On August 21, 1952, during the First Yanbian National People's Congress, 209 of the 300 representatives were *Joseonjok*, compared with 79 Han Chinese. In 1962, the population ratio dropped to 50.04%, and the *Joseonjok* cadre accounted for 64% of the cadres, further dropping to 40% in 1995 (Overview of *Joseonjok* Autonomous Prefecture 1989, pp. 151–159; Nam 1995, p. 5).[4] Meanwhile, nationwide, government official statistics show that the ratio of ethnic minority representatives to the National People's Congress has been constant with very little fluctuation between 9.4% at the lowest (in 1975) and 18.60% at the highest in 1993 (Table 3.3).

Among the previous leaders of the prefecture, eight continued serving as provincial-level leaders: Cho Nam Gi, Kim Myeong Han, Choi

Table 3.3 Ratio of ethnic minority representatives to the National People's Congress

	1954	*1959*	*1964*	*1975*	*1978*	*1983*	*1988*	*1993*	*1998*	*2003*	*2008*	*2013*
Number	178	179	372	20	381	403	445	554	428	415	411	409
ratio(%)	14.50	14.60	12.20	9.40	10.90	13.60	14.90	18.60	14.47	13.90	13.76	13.69

Adapted from the NBS, 2013

Rim, Lee Deok Su, Jeon Cheol Su, Jeong Ryong Cheol, Nam Sang Bok, and Kim Jin Gil. Those who became political leaders in the central government after their terms as prefectural heads included Cho Nam Gi (Party Committee Secretary, PRC Liberation Army General Logistics Department, Member of Central Military Commission, Director of Military Academy of Liberation Army, Committee Vice-President of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference), Lee DeokSu (Chief of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission), and Jeon Cheol Su (National Industrial and Commercial Alliance Vice-Party Secretary, First Secretary to the Department of Commerce).[5]

Once the administrative arrangement of autonomous governance was settled, the ethnicization of the *Joseonjok* began naturally through collective farming and subsequent state policy arrangements. "[T]he socialist transformation … began in rural areas during 1953–1956, encouraging peasant households to form 'mutual aid teams' and other collective farming organizations" (Guo 2013, p. 76). Agricultural land was evenly distributed to local people, a community was established from newly built farming units, and the community's cultural autonomy was secured. In *Joseonjok* writings up to the 1990s, writers (historians and essayists) constantly appreciated the CCP's policy, especially as it related to land ownership and the maintenance of ethnicity. *Joseonjok* identity relating to rice and agriculture is reflected in the attachment of the older generations to the land, their loyalty to Chairman Mao, and their memories of Ju Deok Hae. As Miller (1995) or Parekh's ethical justification of cultural nationality implies, needs are accurately understood in concrete terms only when it is defined for a certain group of people in a culturally distinctive context. Cultural choice that allows an ethnic niche is often considered a non-political lifestyle issue, but for the Koreans, rice farming was a life-or-death matter insomuch as it is associated with their lands and the community's survival as a group. The discussion of cultural choice for a particular group is inevitably a political subject. Ordinary *Joseonjok*

remember at least one act of Ju Deok Hae and highly praise him for it: During the Communist Revolution in the late 1940s, Ju swiftly negotiated with Communist Party leaders to ration rice instead of wheat for the *Joseonjok*. Cultural preferences and national dispositions in the political sphere should not be trivialized. "People necessarily and properly consider public issues in terms influenced by their situated experience and perception of social relations" (Young 1998, p. 270). With regard to questions related to their official nationality as Chinese citizens, older generations say, "We should not betray China. We should carry on the historically accumulated trust between China and the *Joseonjok*. This is because China allowed us to keep our national features so well along with our lands" (Interview 1999 Yanbian). The first and second generations still show strong loyalty to Chairman Mao, and this nostalgic loyalty is shared by the Han Chinese, recently resurged as a nostalgic neo-Maoist sentiment.[6] The older generations are aware that they live as outsiders, but they remember that it was communist China and Mao that saved them: "Japan took our territory. We wouldn't have been allowed to preserve our lands without comrade Mao and the Party" (Interview 1999 Yanbian).

It is true that China has allowed a great deal of preferential policy under the constitutional arrangement (Li and Xu 2014; Tian 1999; Bao 1999), although the consequences are not always adequate to satisfy all ethnic minorities in China. Sautman (1998) articulates China's preferential policy in the context of family planning, educational preferences, hiring and promotion of minorities, and representation bodies. He also puts emphasis on the importance of revenue sharing and tax exemption measures in certain regions such as Xinjiang which is rich in oil and has other profitable industries such as its chemical industry. Sautman neatly explains that because of the diasporas' common dilemmas, each category of indicators has both advantages and disadvantages for ethnic minorities. Policy outcomes usually reflect both intentional and unintentional consequences for different groups of affected people, as further explained in Chap. 4. Yet the important point must be how the system and decision makers rectify unintentional adverse consequences. Not all well-intentioned policies result in desirable outcomes depending on the agencies that implement them and on who the final beneficiaries are. Thus, autonomy and isolation are two sides of the same coin. An example is the consequence of the One Child Policy for minority regions. It is unclear whether this policy targets minority groups, yet

the large number of Han Chinese who move to minority regions are the final beneficiaries. Whether intended or otherwise, ethnic composition changes in previously "ethnic" regions. In this regard, strictly speaking, the exemption measure of the One Child Policy results in discrimination against ethnic minorities in favor of the rural majority population, although the benefits to the ethnic majority in the rural areas are accidental rather than by policy design.

The household registration system (*hukou*) is another of many examples, as it supported collectivization by consolidating the linkage between territory and ethnicity (territorialized ethnicization). "Chinese internal migration is unique because it is occurring in the shadow of a household registration system that is an institutional mechanism for regulating population movement. The *hukou* system is responsible for two migration streams to cities: temporary migrants who move without approval and permanent migrants whose move is approved by the state" (Wang et al. 2013, p. 50). The system "was designed to control migration by linking individuals to households that are issued residence permits to live in particular places" and "classifies every Chinese citizen according to the place of registration and the status of registration" (the *de jure* residence of an individual) (Chan and Zhang 1999, pp. 821–822). Thus, the *Joseonjok* would never comfortably identify with the Han Chinese, although they have no problem identifying as Chinese citizens. All of the *Joseonjok* people I met clarified that they were *Joseonjok* in China—Chinese citizens, but not Chinese. The *Joseonjok* were clear in distinguishing their civic identity from their collective identity. Minority nationality is inscribed on all Chinese identification cards and passports. Although collectivization has undoubtedly been beneficial for agrarian communities, it has isolated these communities from the center of mainstream China. Likewise, socialist amalgamation rhetoric has resulted in isolation from the rest of the world. The *Joseonjok* have formed a distinctive identity, but this was not necessarily the goal of amalgamation, as no other groups in China would share the *Joseonjok* identity, even those under *Joseonjok* autonomous governance.

As I discuss in the following chapters, policy became blurred between preferential treatment for ethnic minorities and for regions that remained only nominally under minority autonomy. Furthermore, the consequences of policies applied to minorities often resulted in further isolation and segregation from mainstream society. In this sense, although the debate requires an understanding of the China-specific context,

Table 3.4 University degree holder (%)

	1982	*1990*	*2000*
Joseonjok	2.18	4.8	8.6
Han Chinese	0.94	1.9	4.8
Manchu	0.80	1.8	4.1
Huízú	0.14	0.5	1.4
Miao zu	0.39	1.1	2.7
Uygur	0.95	2.2	5.2
Mongols	0.24	0.5	1.3
Tibetans	0.69	1.6	3.9
China	0.68	1.6	3.8

Adapted from the Yanbian Yearbook and NBS 2002

minorities' dilemma between preserving their ethnic traits and further integrating into mainstream society seems to be applicable to other multinational society, thus reflecting the crux of multiculturalism debates elsewhere. Some host countries manipulate this dilemma, while others seek reconciliation based on the state's desire to implement higher degree of multiculturalism including cultural, economic, and political aspects.

Education as a Tool for National Salvation

The *Joseonjok* maintained visible ethnic features, including language, customs (lifestyle, food, folklore), Korean schools and universities, and their own written history. Also, many publications produced in the Korean language. By 2000, there were around 12 different *Joseonjok* newspapers and 21 magazines and periodicals published in the Korean language, which was above the average of other ethnic or national minority groups.

Yanbian *Ilbo* reported based on a source provided by the Xinhua News Agency: "multi-level ethnic education has been successfully established in Yanbian, [whose residents have] consequently achieved the best educational results among [China's] 55 ethnic-minority nationalities." In addition, "303 of every 10,000 people [in Yanbian] hold university degrees, which is 2.13 times higher and that of high school graduates is 3.8 times higher than the national average and."[7] (Table 3.4). The *Joseonjok*'s educational achievements are relative to those of the 55 other officially recognized nationalities in China. Until the late 1990s, the *Joseonjok*'s rate of illiteracy, among the *Joseonjok* population aged

above 15 years, was the lowest (7%) among minority national and ethnic groups (average 31%) and lower than China's overall average (22%). About 82% of the total *Joseonjok* population has more than an elementary education, compared with China's national average of around 70% and the Han Chinese at 71% (Jeong 1997, p. 67). Such educational performance among the *Joseonjok* was achieved in not only Yanbian but also other areas, such as the Heilongjiang region, where the multinational mixture is greater.

During my first field trip to Yanji in 1999, the first interviewee I encountered on the second day of my arrival in Yanbian was a professor of history from Yanbian University. At the end of the interview, she invited me to her apartment for tea and asked me if I can give private Korean lessons to her 12-year-old son. She told me about her plan to go to South Korea for her Ph.D. and how she wanted to send her son to a university in South Korea. I accepted and visited her apartment once a week for a few hours while I stayed in Yanbian. This provided me with a good opportunity to observe how the *Joseonjok* lived, and it facilitated my snowball method of interviewing local people, particularly local intellectuals. The Korean dream reached its peak in 1999. Everywhere I went, I heard people discussing how to enter the ROK however, at that time, the ROK government strictly controlled the *Joseonjok*'s influx. Regardless of their educational levels, *Joseonjok* parents' most important value was providing good education for their children with few exceptions. This meant sending their children abroad, as they believed Yanbian had become stagnant, although they also talked about their loyalty to China. The late Jeong Pan Ryong, a mentor of the *Joseonjok* intellectual community, wrote, according to 1990 statistics, although the percentage of students studying at Han Chinese schools increased, it was still only 15%. The total number of *Joseonjok* students at *Joseonjok* schools was about 355,000, including 1,363 *Joseonjok* primary schools and 288 *Joseonjok* junior high schools. In the case of Yanbian, only 9.2% of *Joseonjok* elementary school students studied at Han Chinese schools, compared with 30% in Liaoning and 22% in the Heilongjiang region; 85% of *Joseonjok* elementary school students were still in *Joseonjok* schools (Jeong 1997, p. 284). While there was already a deep public concern about diminishing *Joseonjok* exclusive national education, the community's enthusiasm for enhancing quality of education in general has increased partly due to their growing feelings of insecurity at all levels (individual, community, and political). It is believed that increasing *Joseonjok* individuals' capacity is the only way to overcome the crises

Table 3.5 Number of students at *Joseonjok* elementary and middle/high schools in Yanbian

	Middle/high school				*Elementary school*			
	Number of schools	*Current students*	*Graduated students*	*New students*	*Number of schools*	*Current students*	*Graduated students*	*New students*
1990	122	40,789	12,857	14,267	386	80,762	10,500	13,755
1999	75	49,597	13,693	18,518	195	63,631	14,759	6819
2009	37	20,217	8,864	5,745	31	15,124	3,088	2305

Adapted from the Yanbian Yearbook and NBS 2012

that *Joseonjok* society faces today, as the government is considered less reliable than in the past. Ironically, today *Joseonjok* society's growing insecurity stems from decreases in the population, the number of *Joseonjok* exclusive schools (Table 3.5), and land ownership, which are closely linked with their re-dispersal primarily in order to finance children's education.

This level of enthusiasm for education has endured throughout the history of the *Joseonjok*'s settlement in Manchuria despite severe political turmoil. Early in the ethnicization period, educationalism was strongly linked to the *Joseonjok*'s will to preserve the community, as maintaining the Korean language and keeping their own history were critical to the establishment of their own educational institutions. Ethnic identity is commonly preserved and reproduced by "cultural nationalist intellectuals, such as historical scholars, artists, philologists, educationalists, journalists, religious and social reformers" (Hutchinson 2000, p. 655). Important *Joseonjok* literature written in their own language that deals with national identity reflects their will to maintain language as an important feature of the community. Popular literature is more than part of the arts in a society in which direct expressions of intellectuals' social discontent are not welcome. As censorship develops during oppressive periods, writers' reflections on reality through their literature become subtler. "[F]iction—especially those works that enjoy mass popularity over time—taps into a deeper, sometimes truer understanding about a subject than that allowed by the constraints of social science" (Ling 2000, p. 132). Apart from the well-known fictional works on the historical background of Koreans in the Manchurian era, such as *Seolya* and *Bukgando*, there are numerous works of fiction and poems dealing with the community's experience and sentiments in the early years of

settlement. This identity is part of the community's active quest for recognition through negotiation with China. In this regard, the language itself is not a determining factor of an ethnic boundary but a powerful tool the *Joseonjok* can use to achieve their aspirations. "Students are members of their ethnic and cultural communities, citizens of their political community, and also human beings. A good educational system needs to attend to all three" (Parekh 2003, p. 227). At the beginning of their integration into the PRC, minority national groups' education was not guaranteed; thus, learning their own language and national history were vital to their survival as a Korean community. "The Korean language (*Joseon-eomun*) itself is the very content of national culture and fundamental tool to learn other national culture" (Nam 1995, p. 62). Jeong focused on the demise of Korean language usage among younger generations, finding that between 1989 and 1995 Korean language usage decreased in countryside *Joseonjok* middle schools by 68.42%, in elementary schools in Yanbian by 59.4%, and by 44% and 33% in Heilongjiang (Jeong 1997, p. 333). In the past, more than 90% of the students attending schools in *Joseonjok*-concentrated regions were *Joseonjok*; thus, these schools naturally played an important role in maintaining a sense of *Joseonjok* ethnicity. It is commonly assumed that a higher level of education results in a higher degree of nationalism (Kolstø 2008), but this is difficult to generalize, and the content and quality of education count more. Modernization, economic development, and communication are all dynamically related to the rise of nationalism. Moreover, all education has nationalized characteristics; thus, education level must have a certain co-relationship with the rise of nationalism. Wu argues, "As the living standards and education levels of minorities improve, the minorities may aspire to greater autonomy and accountability in public life, better preservation of their culture, languages, a spiritual life free from interference and more control over the use of natural resources in their autonomous regions" (2014, p. 84). However, in the *Joseonjok* case, the causal link between education level and the rise of strong collective ethno-nationalism is unclear. Some cases demonstrate that intelligentsia may instigate strong antagonistic ethno-nationalism against central authorities. Interestingly, the reason why overseas Koreans are enthusiastic about education is not because they seek to mobilize people for collective action against the host society, but because they seek to achieve secure individual and family security and prosperity. These highly family-centered aspirations for quality of life do not extend to the collectivization of ethnic consciousness against the host society unless they strongly perceive they are systematically disadvantaged by intention.

Yanbian University represents the *Joseonjok*'s collective will on education. As soon as his idea was accepted, Ju turned his efforts to founding a *Joseonjok* university with the participation of nationalist-minded *Joseonjok* leaders. Young educated *Joseonjok* who had left the region during Japanese colonization for inner China or Japan for further study to participate in the independence movement returned to Yanbian to devote themselves to the building of a *Joseonjok* university immediately after emancipation of Korea from Japan. It was strongly believed that this was one way to fulfill a vision for the community using collective national spirit (Kang et al. 1992, pp. 161–163). Since this time, the *Joseonjok* have viewed education as a form of national salvation. The earlier form of Yanbian University was founded in 1949 in Yanji City even before the Communist Revolution during which the community gained credential from the Chinese authorities. In Ryongjeong city, meanwhile, the first college of agriculture, Saebyeok Nongmin University, was established in 1958, which was an outcome of the *Joseonjok*'s compromise with the Chinese government. *Joseonjok* writer Hyeon Lyong Sun writes, "The attempt to found a *Joseonjok* college of education was canceled in the Soviet Union, and Korean minority universities in Tokyo are not officially recognized educational institutions. Only the *Joseonjok* in China could develop a national university with government support. This is the obvious result of the superiority of China's policy toward national minorities" (Hyeon 1994, p. 496). Similarly, a *Joseonjok* professor from the Department of Language at Yanbian University contrasted this achievement with the Japanese occupation, during which the Korean language was strictly banned and Korean schools were forcibly shut ("History of Yanbian University," Yanbian *Television*, October 28, 1999).[8] Ultimately, Ju's compromise with the Chinese government secured further *Joseonjok* autonomy through the establishment of the Yanbian autonomous government. Once administrative autonomy was institutionalized, Yanbian University has been an essential center for *Joseonjok* cultural maintenance. Intellectual activities have been organized there, and the university has supported the *Joseonjok* identity in the sense that it has been a relatively independent sphere in which the *Joseonjok*'s own issues and collective vision are nurtured through public discussions and publications (Jeong 1997, pp. 216–217; Hao and Guo 2016).

A necessary condition for developing a stable third type of national identity is the knowledge of both societies, and the *Joseonjok* may have

fewer problems in accessing knowledge of both their own collective history and culture and that of the host society. These elements are closely aligned with the objectives of the PRC's policy of cultural autonomy as delineated in Article 119 of the constitution. The PRC government issued 2009 White Paper, "The associated language policy is representative of the government's approach to ethnic and national minority groups," clarified that "In the political activities of the state, such as important meetings held by the NPC and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), documents in Mongolia, Tibetan, Uyghur, Kazak, Korean, Yi, Zhuang and other ethnic minority languages are available, and language interpretation between Han Chinese and these languages is provided." The language policy has been viewed as beneficial to China's preferential cultural policies. China's minority ethnic and national groups speak over 80 languages,[9] 30 of which have written forms (Zhou 2000). Zhou examines minority languages in China using three categorizations: those with writing systems of historically broad usage, those with writing systems of historically limited usage, and those without functional systems (Zhou 2000, p. 129). State language policy is one of the most sensitive issues in a multiethnic country, as it often determines the educational and professional opportunities, cultural attachment, and generational relationships of minority groups, among other outcomes (Réaume 2000, pp. 247–248).

How the state's ethnicization was imposed through linguistic boundaries across ethnic minorities in China is reflected in the construction of perceptions of non-recognized minorities as less civilized groups. Gladney (1991) explains this complexity by juxtaposing the Chinese Jews, who have a strong but unrecognized identity, with the Manchus, a designated minority group stigmatized by their officially categorized ethnic identity, especially when they were "singled out as being feudal remnants of the oppressive Qing Empire" (pp. 316–317). This demonstrates that recognition as an ethnic minority group per se is not sufficient to preserve ethnic boundaries. The extent to which and why a certain group is officially recognized as such may explain more clearly the selective process of territorialized ethnicization, which may facilitate either collective protection or targeted assimilation. Language is one of the most important components of collectivity and is widely acknowledged as a barometer by which the strength of a collective identity can be judged. Nevertheless, the inability to command the Korean language among diasporas does not safely lead to the conclusion that they are losing their

own identity or that they have been culturally assimilated. There are a number of fifth- or sixth-generation *Joseonjok* who speak the Korean language fluently but confidently say that they are Chinese.

The public discourse among highly educated *Joseonjok* reflects the dilemma of the minority's choices between the "ethnic (language) trap" (Birch 1989, p. 55) and the acquisition of bilingual "skill" (Armstrong 1976, p. 396) and between national maintenance and the adoption of "high culture" (Gellner 1983). Increasing numbers of *Joseonjok* children are being sent to Han Chinese schools. "Speaking two languages perfectly is not always feasible for ordinary people. *Joseonjok* who went to *Joseonjok* schools are not able to speak Chinese as fluently as those who were educated in Han Chinese schools. They naturally face difficulties, when competing with Han Chinese outside this region" (Interview 2015 Yanbian). Such resistance to and fear of cultural assimilation are not necessarily caused by state policy but by other external drivers, such as globalization, industrialization, and urbanization. Bilik observes that they face a double challenge of westernization and Sinicization. Many minority national groups in China have deep concerns about the dilemma between maintaining their own cultural identity and adopting high culture (Bilik 1998, pp. 48–51). However, around 60–70% of *Joseonjok* are estimated to be able to communicate in the Korean language in the late 2000s. Regardless of the generation, this rate does not decrease overall because of increased interactions with the South Korean motherland. *Joseonjok*'s educationalism is also reflected in their changing views on the leaders of the community.

Answers to the question of who the *Joseonjok* respect most among their leaders also reflect the changing views and vision of the community. In the 1940s and 1950s, Ju Deok Hae was highly respected as a community leader, and he continues to be respected for having been a successful and reasonable negotiator between the CCP and *Joseonjok*. The ethnic features that Ju used for political autonomy and material gains were the community's contributions to the national economy (land/agriculture and cheap labor for industrial development) and its shared collective goals with the CCP of anti-colonialism and anti-capitalism. Using all of these features, the community secured continuous agricultural activity with stable land ownership and re-settlement with legal citizenship, and it enjoyed educational autonomy. Its efforts were considered a promise of active integration into the national economy under communism and of proactive cooperation for other national goals. From the 1960s to the

1990s, Jeong Pan Ryong was considered one of the most influential community leaders. While he emphasized the importance of maintaining an ethnic identity, he also warned the people against being indiscriminately assimilated by South Korea (calling this phenomenon "new colonialism") or becoming involved in the political activism that was creating tensions between the two motherlands. Many people have gradually come to disbelieve that the official leaders of the prefectural government will properly protect the Joseonjok's collective welfare. Since the late 2000s, a number of Koreans from outside the region have won respect for caring about the welfare and future of the community. These include Kim Jin Kyeong (the founder of Yanbian University of Science and Technology, the first joint China–foreign university in *Dongbei*) and Choi Eun Taek and Park Tae Ha (the coaches of the regional Yanbian *Odong* soccer team), who are regarded as having unselfishly sacrificed themselves for the development of the community. They are regarded as knowing what is urgently needed in the region and for the *Joseonjok* people: Kim for improving education quality for future generations and Choi and Park for being catalysts of *Joseonjok* enthusiasm, pride, and solidarity. Many Christian humanitarian workers are also respected for devoting their lives to the North Korean people and national re-unification.

The Cultural Revolution, De-ethnicization, and the Second Survival of National Identity

This section discusses the last factor (Table 3.1) of the ethnic markers explained in the previous section. The period of the Cultural Revolution (1967–1976) was one of socialist assimilation under the slogan of class struggle, during which minorities experienced the most assimilative period in the history of the PRC, which instigated explicit ethnic tensions and violence. As this factor is explicitly against the CCP's previously promulgated ethnicization, I explain it separately from the other four elements. The de-ethnicization attempt through communization reinforced rather than diluted a separate collective identity in minority-concentrated regions. It is believed that promulgating class struggle was merely rhetoric used to uncover ethnic tensions, and it was to some extent successful toward the end of the Cultural Revolution. Thus, I explain this period of oppression as the second survival of the *Joseonjok* identity.

Although the period can be considered anomalous in China's history, the *Joseonjok* remember it as one of harsh ethnic oppression (Lee 2011;

Ryu 2008), with many *Joseonjok* intellectuals suffering due to the government's effort to mobilize the masses in the "class struggle against… 'capitalist roaders'" (Guo 2013, p. 79). For the *Joseonjok*, this event would have been reminiscent of the *Minsaengdan* Incident in the 1920s, during which hundreds of *Joseonjok* were purged and involved in conspiracy and killings. The Chinese government encouraged minorities to abandon their old customs and traditions. "Many of those who asserted their ethnic identity were purged in the Anti-Rightists Movement for the sin of 'local nationalism'" (Wu 2014, p. 67). The goal of the Cultural Revolution was to transform China into a purely communist society by eliminating political opponents, but for most of the ethnic minorities in China, the period is remembered as a time of ethnic oppression that dramatically reshaped ethnic relationships everywhere in China, and Yanbian was no exception. During this period, conflicts between ethnicity and class brutally removed any ethnic trace from the community. Although the community's ethnic characteristics were gradually restored after the revolution, mistrust of the CCP endured. Ironically, the reinforcement of communism in a de-ethnicizing way in minority regions resulted in minorities developing clearer ethnic identities rather than blurring their collectively distinctive identity. As the *Joseonjok* had had a sufficiently long experience of being oppressed as a part of the Korean nation during the Japanese occupation, their ethno-nationalism had been already full-fledged. The destruction of their visible ethnic boundaries during the Cultural Revolution was not enough to eliminate their collective identity as a separate national group. Whether such a collective identity develops into collective action and movements is another matter, as identity is only a triggering and contributing factor to the antagonistic mobilization of an ethnic group.

Although this oppression was not exclusive to the *Joseonjok* community, the *Joseonjok* believed that they were more severely oppressed, being regarded as one of the enemies of the revolutionaries because of their higher ratio of intellectuals and the geopolitical proximity with two Koreas particularly with the DPRK. The ROK—land considered by the *Joseonjok* to be lost—was still colonized by the USA, whereas the DPRK was more accessible. Before the revolution, DPRK government-level intervention with the people and community was rare, as the DPRK and China had maintained a close and freely moving relationship between their people, travel, and trade (with the exception of defectors). China, South Korea, and North Korea were all rebuilding modern states with strong official

nationalist agendas and hard and distinctive ideological lines. The DPRK appreciated China's support for communization against the US-led liberal alliances during the Korean Civil War (Shen and Dong 2011). Kim Il Sung was honored in China as he was an activist of the main anti-Japanese and anti-KMT guerilla force in Manchuria called Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army. The *Joseonjok* labor force was mobilized (with the encouragement of the central government) to help the DPRK modernize its building and construction work in the 1950. The *Joseonjok* were allowed to re-settle permanently in DPRK, and many did because of famine during the Great Leap and political oppression during the Cultural Revolution. The DPRK's economy under Kim Il Sung's premiership in the 1960s was better than that of China, as Kim had already built a stable communist state.

> From the ashes of wartime destruction has emerged an industrial complex whose productivity and rate of growth are surpassed only by those of Japan in all of Asia. Through a series of economic plans, the latest being the Seven Year Plan of 1961–1967, North Korea claims not only to have recovered from the devastating impact of the Korean War but to have become a nearly self-sufficient industrial-agricultural nation. According to its optimistic forecast, by the end of the Seven Year Plan North Korea will have become not merely a self-reliant but an affluent country. Total industrial output, growing at the annual rate of 18 per cent, will have increased 3.2 times that of 1960. This would mean that North Korea's total industrial output will have increased 20 times that of its pre-war level. (Koh 1965/1966 reprinted in 2014, p. 768)

Beijing did not allow double DPRK and Chinese nationalities despite the two countries' amicable relationship before the Cultural Revolution. During the Cultural Revolution, the CCP harshly criticized the DPRK for "revisionist" communism and the *Joseonjok* communities were under severe surveillance, which made the *Joseonjok* suffer more severely, not because of their class but because of their nationality. Jeon recalls that many *Joseonjok* were sentenced to death, erroneously accused of being foreign spies, especially during the so-called class arrangement: at least 175 *Joseonjok* cadres, local officials, and policemen were accused of being foreign spies. This amounted to 70% of the total *Joseonjok* who were engaged in the major higher level public positions in the community at that time. During this period, minority national education, language, and customs were severely oppressed. All local national minority schools had to be closed, and the *Joseonjok* schools rapidly became mixed with those of the Han Chinese

(Jeon 1999, p. 43). Eliminating *Joseonjok*'s national characteristics from Yanbian University was a traumatic memory for the community. In this historical context, the *Joseonjok*'s stronger attachment to and solidarity around the university are mainly for the following reasons. Respected early Korean nationalist activists such as Ju Deok Hae, Im Min Ho, Park Kyu Chan, Bae Guk, Lim Yu Hun, Park Yui Hoon, Kim Mun Bo, and Jeong Hak founded the institution. As the university symbolized the national survival of the *Joseonjok* people, its closure signified their suppression. During this period, Im Min Ho was beaten to death and Ju Deok Hae died from illness caused by severe torture. These are only a few of the massive number of cases. As Jeong (1997) recalls as a tragic event, during the Cultural Revolution, the name of the *Joseonjok* university, Yanbian University, was severely criticized by the Red Army because the revolutionaries believed it was named after the particular region and that this automatically reflected national separatism. Teaching in the Korean language was banned and Han Chinese staff joined the university. More and more Han Chinese students were encouraged to enter the university; consequently, *Joseonjok* staff who were not as fluent in Chinese as the Han Chinese had to leave. In the midst of the revolution, *Joseonjok* professors were accused of promoting revisionist academic ideas by the Committee of the Revolution. Professor Choi Yun Gap had, in his Korean language class, explained the origins of the vernacular language created by King Se-jong with scholars' support, after which certain students accused him on the grounds that only the people could create a language and history, not by a king that is a symbol of anti-revolutionary feudalism. The committee's argument was that as with Chinese, language is an outcome formed by ordinary people following the process of historical development. If the Korean language is a typical symbol of a feudal ruler like King Se-jong, using such a language reflects a trite form of traditionalism and is destined to be abolished (Jeong 1997, pp. 252–269).

Unlike other historical memories, the Cultural Revolution is less remembered for evoking nationality issues among *Joseonjok* writers because Deng's regime encouraged the people to remember the Cultural Revolution as a political error made by a few corrupt and incapable political leaders. At the national level, minorities' discontent received public attention for the first time from the mass media at the third session of the National People's Congress in 1980, where criticisms and suggestions from minority representatives were openly heard. It is explained that afterward, "an effective implementation and expansion of national

autonomy in all dimensions" was attentively discussed. This resulted in the 1982 Constitution, which covered a wider range of national minority issues (Wu 2014, pp. 69–71). Throughout Deng's regime, the CCP successfully made ordinary Chinese believe that the political clique was the people's common enemy. At the same time, symbolic compensation was given to the oppressed. For decades under Deng, local newspapers were full of criticisms of the clique, the Gang of Four, and reports on government compensation for victims through the construction of memorial towers or the offering of special honors.

It is not a straightforward question to answer generally whether ethnic oppression or autonomy nurtures a stronger collective identity. The answer is dependent on the particular situation of ethnic relations and must take into account the various factors associated with. They include not only historical facts but also how such history affects people's lives and how it was handled afterward considering all factors such as denial of historical facts, psychological humiliation, material loss, physical harassment, and political defamation. Allowing greater autonomy to minority regions after such a period of severe ethnic tensions would have been risky for the Chinese government. However, legislation and policies were rewritten. Thus, "the past three decades have seen substantial governmental efforts to replace assimilation policies with pluralistic laws and policies for ethnic minority areas and individuals" (Wu 2014, p. 84). Beijing does not actively look to remove barriers to more fully implementing the pluralistic constitution. Thus, there seems to be a limit to the argument that the PRC's 1984 pluralistic multicultural constitution that redefined the state–minority relationship has actually resulted in greater autonomy. Procedural bureaucracy and administrative hierarchy are often identified as barriers, yet the real barrier is lack of political rather than constitutional will to remove such barriers. Consequently, despite ethnic minority communities' restoration of identity, they have clashed with the state's de-ethnicization process, which was accelerated by Deng's Open Door policy, and have been affected by modernization and globalization forces.

Conclusion: Blood or Loyalty Beyond the Dichotomy?

The construction of *Joseonjok* identity was the work of the community in collaboration with the Chinese state. I argued that although the state's ethnicized self-government rule and subsequent policies are largely outcomes of the top-down process, the results of its implementation can

be described as an ethnicization process that is reciprocal to some extent given that not all ethnic minority groups within the government-set boundaries have the same form of ethnic relations in China. The consequences of territorialized ethnicization can be described as "[l]ocalizing ethnic minorities in a given territory and in a fixed set of traditions and cultures" that may hamper them from becoming modern citizens and "from fully participating in the economic transformations" (Barabantseva 2009, pp. 227–228). My answer to the question of whether an agency or an agent shapes the current ethnic relationship in China would be a mixture of the state's top-down ethnicization including all levels of agents in the governing structure, and minority nationals' bottom-up aspiration and compromise on state-initiated institutional arrangements. This explains why the consequences of the state's policy measures are considerably different in each ethnic group in modern China.

Conversely, contrary to assumptions of a non-volatile *Dongbei*, struggles over historical memories, interpretations, interests, and identity continuously evolve. This also shows the nature of the dynamic interactions of ethnic relations. Peaceful coexistence may occur because tensions and antagonistic memories are politically controlled, and negative memories are effectively reinterpreted or omitted. In this regard, constructivism may triumph to some extent, as such collective relational memories are a mixture of fact, imagination, fabrication, and interpretation. An important factor is who directs the selection process. If the answer is the government and the Party, the question remains as to why this kind of positive constructivism did not function in the same way in other minority regions of contemporary China. This confirms the significance of analyzing mutual interactions and reciprocity.

In terms of policy implementation, all positive discrimination entails both intentional and unintentional outcomes, and the particularist multiculturalism approach involves duality and contradictions. This seems a universal dilemma that any multinational societies notably China is expected to re-address.

Notes

1. It was adopted at the Fifth Session of the Fifth National People's Congress and promulgated for implementation by the National People's Congress on December 4, 1982 (and amended in 1988, 1993, 1999, and 2004).

2. Friedman, Thomas L. (2003) "The Humiliation Factor" (*The New York Times*, November 9, 2003). http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/09/opinion/the-humiliation-factor.html?_r=0. Accessed September 29, 2016.
3. "Lessons from Wanpaoshan" (*Joongang Daily*, March 15, 2017). http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3030962&cloc=joongangdaily|home|online. Accessed March 15, 2017.
4. An Overview of *Joseonjok* Autonomous Prefecture [*Joseonjok jachiju gaehwang*], Yanbian Minjokchulpansa, 1989.
5. 'Who are the former governors of the *Joseonjok* Autonomous Prefecture? [*Junggguk Yanbian Joseonjok jachiju yeokdae jujangdeuleun nugu?*]' (*Dongbuka (DBA) News*, September 4, 2012). http://www.dbanews.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=16382. Accessed December 1, 2014.
6. "Culture official in northern China fired after calling Mao 'a devil'" (Reuters, January 17, 2017). http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201701170014.html. Accessed January 20, 2017.
7. "Yanbian's educational performance, best among China's ethnic minority regions" [*Yeonbyeon minjok gyoyuksujun, jeonguk sosuminjok gaunde cheotjari*] (*Yanbian Ilbo*, July 3, 2015).
8. In 1998, the total number of registered at Yanbian University was 8461, with 1503 teaching staff (Jeong 1997, p. 351).
9. This number shows that not all ethnic groups with their own vernacular languages are officially recognized. See also J. Dreyer (1998, 71) and Enze Han (2013) for detailed discussions of the classification of linguistic groups of minorities.

References

Anderson, Benedict. 2001. Western nationalism and eastern nationalism: Is there a difference that matters? *New Left Review* 21 (9): 31–42.

Armstrong, John A. 1976. Mobilized and proletarian diasporas.*American Political Science Review* 70 (2): 393–408.

Bao, Meirong. 1999. Minzu youhui zhengce yu minzu diqu de fazhang [Preferential policy toward ethnic minority and the development of ethnic minority regions]. *Qianyan* 3: 40–43.

Barabantseva, Elena V. 2009. Development as localization: Ethnic minorities in China's official discourse on the Western Development Project. *Critical Asian Studies* 41 (2): 225–254.

Bilik, Naran. 1998. Language education, intellectuals and symbolic representation: Being an urban Mongolian in a new configuration of social evolution. In *Nationalism and ethnoregional identities in China,* ed. William Safran. London: Frank Cass.

Birch, Anthony H. 1989. *Nationalism and National Integration*. London: Unwin Hyman.

Chan, Kam Wing, and Li Zhang. 1999. The Hukou system and rural-urban migration: Processes and changes. *The China Quarterly* 160: 818–855.

Choi, Jang San (ed.). 2006. *Haerangang daehaksalsageon* [The Haeran river massacre]. Yanbian: Yeonbyond Inminchulpansa.

Choi, Guk Cheol. 2012. *Ju Deok Hae pyeongjeon* [A critical biography of Ju Deok Hae]. Yanbian: Yeonbyeon Inminchulpansa.

Choi, Mun Shik, and Dong-Hun Kim (eds.). 1996. *Yun Dong Ju ginyeomjip* [Yun, Dong Ju Memorial Collection]. Yanji: Yanbian University Press.

Cohen, Robin. 1997. *Global diaspora: An introduction*. London: UCL Press.

Doenecke, Justus D. 1981. *The diplomacy of frustration: The Manchurian Crisis of 1931–1933 as revealed in the papers of Stanley K. Hornbeck*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press.

Gellner, Ernest. 1983. *Nations and nationalism*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Gladney, Dru C. 1991. *Muslim Chinese: Ethnic nationalism in the People's Republic of China*. Cambridge, MA: Havard University Press.

Guo, Sujian. 2013. *Chinese politics and government: Power, ideology, and organization*. London: Routledge.

Han, Enze. 2013. *Contestation and adaptation: The politics of national identity in China*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Han, Jun Kwang. 1990. *Junggguk Joseonjok inmulsa* [Biographies of Joseonjok in China]. Yanji, China: Yeonbyeon Inminchulpansa.

Hao, Zhidong, and Zhengyang Guo. 2016. Professors as intellectuals in China: Political identities and roles in a provincial university. *The China Quarterly* 228: 1–22.

Harrell, Stevan (ed.). 1995. *Cultural encounters on China's ethnic frontiers*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

He, Baogang. 2005. Minority rights with Chinese characteristics. In *Multiculturalism in Asia*, ed. Will Kymlicka and Baogang He. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hutchinson, John. 2000. Ethnicity and modern nations. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 23 (4): 651–669.

Hyeon, Lyong Sun. 1994. *Yeonbyeon daehakgyo* [Yanbian University] *Changeop*. Yanji, China: Minjokchulpansa.

Information Office of the State Council of the PRC. 2000. White paper on National Minorities Policy and its practice in China September 1999. *China Report* 36 (1). London: Sage.

Jeon, Shin Cheol. 1999. *Joseonjok sahoeui byeonhuawa jeonmang* [The changes and prospect of Joseonjok society]. Liaoning: Yonyeong Minjokchulpansa.

Jeong, Pan Ryong. 1997. *Gohyangtteona osipnyeon* [Fifty years, after leaving hometown]. Heilyongjiang: Heukryonggang Minjokchulpansa.

Kang, Chang Rok, et al. 1992. *Ju Deok Hae*. Seoul: Silcheonmunhaksa.
Koh, B.C. 1965/1966, 2014. North Korea and its quest for autonomy. *Pacific Affairs* 38 (3–4) reprinted in 87 (4): 765–778.
Kolstø, PÅL. 2008. Nationalism, ethnic conflict, and job competition: Non-Russian collective action in the USSR under perestroika. *Nations and Nationalism* 14 (1): 151–169.
Lee, Hoon Koo. 1931. *Korean immigrants in Manchuria*. Pyeongyang: College of Pyeongyang Sungsil, previously Union Christian College Press.
Lee, Jong Suk. 2000. *Bukhan-jungkuk guangyue: 1945–2000* [North Korea-China relations: 1945–2000]. Seoul: Jungshim.
Lee, Ok Hee. 2011. *Buk-jung jeopgyeongjiyeok: Jeonhwangi bukjung jeopgyeongji-yeokui dosi-network* [The Sino-North Korean border: City network of Sino-North Korean border areas in the era of transition]. Seoul: Pureungil.
Li, Dong, and Mingxiang Xu. 2014. Pianli yu tiaoshi: Woguo shaoshu minzu youhui zhengce yanjiu [Deviance and adjustment: A study on the China's preferential policy for ethnic minorities] *Intelligence* 26: 309–310.
Ling, L.H.M. 2000. Globalization and the spectre of Fu Manchu: White man's burden as dark irony. In *Value pluralism, normative theory and international relations,* ed. Maria Lensu and Jan-Stefan Fritz. London: Macmillan.
Matsusaka, Yoshihisa Tak. 2001. *The making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904–1932*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center.
Miller, David. 1995. *On Nationality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Morris-Suzuki, Tessa. 2005. *The past within us: Media, memory, history*. London: Verso.
Nam, Il Sung. 1995. *Joseoneoui baetajeok sayonggua geu hyeonsil* [Exclusive usage of Joseon language and the reality]. In *A Study on Joseonjok national education: Reality and prospects,* ed. Cui Xianlu JI, Kim Cheng San, and Kim Ryong Cheol. Yanbian: Northeast China Research Institute of Korean National Education.
Parekh, Bhikhu. 2003. Cosmopolitanism and global citizenship. *Review of International Studies* 29: 3–17.
Park, Hyun Ok. 2000. Korean Manchuria: The racial politics of territorial osmosis. *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 99 (1): 193–217.
Park, Hyun Ok. 2005. *Two dreams in one bed: Empire, social life, and the origins of the North Korean revolution in Manchuria*. Durham: Duke University Press.
Park, Cheol Hee. 2009. The pattern of cooperation and conflict between Korea and Japan: Theoretical expectations and empirical realities. *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 10 (3): 247–265.
Park, Hyun Ok. 2015. *The capitalist unconscious: Form Korean unification to transnational Korea*. New York: Colombia University Press.

Park, Jeongwon Bourdais. 2017. Ethnic relations in Northeast China: ethnic revival or de-ethnicization in the Korean diaspora?. *European Journal of East Asian Studies* 16: 36–66.

Park, Young Seok. 1985. *Manbosan sageon yeongu* [Study of Manbosan incident]. Seoul: Aseamunhuasa.

Park, Jin Hwan. 1998. *Byeosaengsan, gukyeongnongjang-gua geukdong Russia-ui hanin* [Rice production, state farm, and Korean-Russians in Russian Far East], Research Report, Rural Development Institute Agricultural Cooperative College 109.

Payne, Richard J. 2013. *Global issues: Politics, economics and culture*. Boston: Pearson.

Réaume, Denise G. 2000. Official language rights: Intrinsic value and the protection of difference. In *Citizenship in diverse societies,* ed. Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rigger, Shelly. 1995. Voices of Manchu identity, 1635–1935. In *Cultural encounters on China's ethnic frontiers,* ed. Stevan Harrell. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Ryu, Yeon San. 2008. *Samin samsaekui unmyeong* [Three stories of Joseonjok]. Yanbian: Yeonbyeon Minjokchulpansa.

Sautman, Barry. 1998. Preferential policies for ethnic minorities in China: The case of Xinjiang. *Nationalism and Ethnic Poltiics* 4 (1–2): 86–118.

Scalapino, Robert A., and Chong-Sik Lee. 1972. *Communism in Korea, Part I: The movement*. Berkeley, London: University of California Press.

Shen, Zhihua, and Jie Dong. 2011. Post-war reconstruction of the DPRK and economic aid from China (1954–1960). *Studies on the Chinese Communist Party* 3: 48–57.

Shin, I. 1988. *Yeonbyeon Joseonjok jachijuui hyeongseong* [The formation of Yanbian Josseonjok autonomous prefecture]. In *Yanbian Joseonjok jachiju yeongu,* ed. Hong Seung Jik. Seoul: Korea University Press.

Son, Choon Il. 2001. *Haebangjeon dongbuk Joseonjok tojiguangyuesa yeongu* [History of land relationship in northeast China], Vols. I, II. Jilin: Jilin Inminchulpansa.

Tian, Xiaolu. 1999. Eight preferential policies for carrying out the 9-year compulsory education program in ethnic minority autonomous prefectures [Zizhizhou 'pujiu' gongcheng xiangmu shixing bada youhui zhengce]. *Hunan Education Review* 17.

Wang, Xiaozhou, R.S. Oropesa, and Glenn Firebaugh. 2013. Permanent migrants to cities in China: Hukou origin and earnings among men in an era of economic transformation. *Migration and Development* 2 (1): 37–56.

Wilson, Sandra. 2002. *The Manchurian crisis and Japanese society, 1931–1933*. London: Routledge.

Wu, Xiaohui. 2014. From assimilation to autonomy: Realizing ethnic minority rights in China's national autonomous regions. *Chinese Journal of International Law* 13 (1): 55–90.

Yahuda, Michael. 2000. The changing faces of Chinese nationalism: The dimensions of statehood. In *Asian Nationalism*, ed. Michael Liefer. London: Routledge.

Yeom, In Ho. 2013. Struggle for liquidating the debts of the 1946 fall Haerangang massacre in Yanji China and its main characteristics [1946-nyeon gaeul yeongilsi Haerangang hyeolchae cheongsantujaengui sihaenggua teukjing]. *Hangukhak Yeongu* 44: 169–201.

Young, Iris Marion. 1998. Polity and Group Difference. In *The citizenship debates*, ed. Gershon Shafir. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Zhou, M. 2000. Language policy and illiteracy in ethnic minority communities in China. *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* 21 (2): 129–148.

CHAPTER 4

Economic Reforms, De-ethnicization, and the Survival of Identity

In this chapter, I explore how the PRC's reform policy, marketization, and subsequent external forces influenced *Joseonjok* society, particularly in terms of its identity building and in the wider context of regional development in *Dongbei*. I focus first on China's economic reform since the 1990s and how it affected minority regions and ethnic relations in the country. My primary questions are as follows. How has the tension between the host country's changing policy and an ethnic group's a priori irreconcilable aspiration for full integration with a distinctive collective identity been managed? What are the implications of the PRC's implicit and explicit policy changes for *Joseonjok* society? What roles do the Korean motherlands play in shaping ethnic relations in *Joseonjok* society in China? This chapter includes detailed discussions on Yanbian's cultural and economic contact with South Korea in the context of the changing Sino–Korean relationship, renewed communication between the *Joseonjok* and South Korea, and changes in the community's interaction with its two motherlands (ROK and DPRK). I argue that the *Joseonjok* people (agents) have proactively reacted to these internal and external forces and quickly adapted to the state's economic development agenda via the South Korean motherland and have continuously struggled to secure their collective identity (which I call striving for a third national identity), resisting both the PRC's implicit but gradual de-ethnicization pressure and South Korea's ethnicized transnationalism.

After the end of the Cold War, the late 1980s witnessed a surge in minority ethnonationalism across the globe. The Chinese government

J.B. Park, *Identity, Policy, and Prosperity*, China in Transformation,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-4849-4_4

became increasingly concerned because of the Soviet Union's disintegration and the breakout of the Tiananmen Square incident. A later external watershed was the USA's war against terrorism, prompted by the attacks of September 11, 2001. Before 1989, ethnic conflicts largely existed below the surface, with occasional outbursts. Within this context, Beijing identified three "evils" that threatened Xinjiang: terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Kin and diplomatic relationships with bordered countries were key factors for the parties involved, including the Turkish Uyghurs, Tibetan refugees in Nepal, the Republic of Mongolia, and the Chinese Mongols in Inner Mongolia (Dreyer 2005, pp. 77–78). In contrast, primordialists and ethnicists would argue that strong politicized national identity cannot occur in a short period merely because of unexpected external impulses, such as a neighboring country's de-federalization or disintegration or instigations by a kin state. States gave greater attention to (potentially) volatile minorities that were dormant and under-politicized on the surface but that could rebel when external conditions were met.

Dreyer argues that "as ethnic minority prosperity increases, grievances will diminish" (Dreyer 2005, p. 81). Four categories of grievance are categorized: religious/cultural, resource distribution, discrimination, and self-governance. Yet, even when the prosperity gap is significantly reduced, antagonism may prevail, as material satisfaction may not suffice for a stable collective identity. An additional point in the Chinese context is related to the government's effort to close the gap between Han and non-Han areas by the internal migration of Han to non-Han regions (Dreyer 2005, p. 82), although this does not neatly fit for explanations of *Joseonjok* society. While there are mixed messages in previous research on the causal link between poverty and ethnicity in contemporary China, a crucial point is that the approach of the government's policy intervention in reducing the revenue gaps between different ethnic groups is neither fundamental nor sustainable, as seen from the cases of relying heavily on subsidies (Tibet) (Fischer 2015), extra unofficial off-farm income (Hui Muslim minority) (Gustafsson and Sai 2014), or kin networks in the case of the *Joseonjok* (Luova 2009). Furthermore, it has not been clearly proven, in ethnic politics in the real world, whether ethnic oppression nurtures distinctive identity leading to conflicts or vice versa. Various forms of autonomy may also trigger conflicts. Likewise, who dominates historical memories and how oppressive memories are handled beyond the current oppressive situation also substantially shapes ethnic politics.

Accordingly, many factors used in theorization of ethnic conflicts and additional factors and their unexpected interactions may contribute to the formation of ethnonationalism among the *Joseonjok*.

China's Economic Reforms and Their Effects on Minority Policy

Economic Reform and Lagged Multiculturalism

China has experienced tremendous economic growth over the past 25 years and has reduced the number of its citizens living in poverty by 400 million. However, the rural poor have not experienced growth equal to that in urban areas, as development projects have been concentrated in the four special economic zones (SEZ) along China's eastern coast since the beginning of the country's economic opening. The Party has recognized this and is now prioritizing investment in rural areas. China has passed legislation to create or strengthen job training programs, reduce farmers' tax burdens, increase funding for unemployment compensation and farmers' pensions, increase grain subsidies, and improve education (Bosely 2007, p. 297). Under these conditions, because of colonial and industrial historical features, China's transition to a political economy has caused many problems for *Dongbei*: "The most prosperous provinces of the Mao years that benefited from the emphasis on heavy industry have suffered significant relative decline under the reforms" (Saich 2011, p. 190). This is particularly true for issues associated with state-owned enterprises (SOE) and the state's failure to enact effective reforms until recently (*SCMP*, November 16, 2017; *The Economist*, September 19, 2015).[1] Such problems occurred during the changeover of the managerial and ownership system from state-owned (80% in 1987) to socialist-collective and then to individual (Moore 1989, p. 747). Consequently, the region has an odd hybrid system and struggles to preserve both equity and productivity. This has resulted in inconsistency, contradictions, and unpredictability in the wage system, work conditions, recruitment, education and training, human resource management, investments, and internal migration (Moore 1989; Auty 1992; Nolan 2014; Wright 2010; Woodward 1985). In the mid-1990s, "urban workers started to experience massive layoffs during the country's widespread restructuring of state-owned enterprises," and it was during this

period that the government first implemented nationwide interventions to address urban poverty (Cho 2013, p. 154).

Against this backround, the "desirable" minority citizen has changed from a socialist worker (or agriculturally dexterous farmer) and territorial border keeper (a communist warrior) to an efficient capitalist economic agent (trader). A diaspora's nationalism continuously requires renewed recognition in terms of political rhetoric and material equity. Diasporas frequently exploit multiple standards while taking advantage of their status. China's governments also use such multiple standards as governing tools. The recognition of cultural attributes seems to be a contemporary version of re-ethnicization (e.g., tourism, natural resources, use of ethnic ties with motherlands) to the extent that it is lucrative; however, even under the instrumentalist approach, equitable development and recognition have been insufficient. Outside commentators have suggested that the PRC's policy on minority groups is becoming increasingly—albeit implicitly—oriented toward the dismantling of ethnic concentrations in parallel with the development of "marketized socialism," which could be considered desirable. However, as a state policy, this option could be costly considering the historical evolution of ethnic relations in China.

Regional Development, De-ethnicization, and Policy Intervention

Rapid urbanization in previously *Joseonjok*-dominant areas has given the *Joseonjok* people apprehensions about losing their collective identity and their territorial base. Regional identities tend to replace national identities, and the two can be inseparably interlinked. If the two are not congruent, it is because regional identity is a more territorialized interest-based identity that involves a relatively weaker feeling of membership with other people in the same place. A person can still have nostalgic feelings about the landscape, food, lifestyle, and people in the region, but this regional identity could be a more detached form than national identity. Unsurprisingly, the *Joseonjok*'s identity is strongly interlinked with locality and regionality. Interestingly, the local people in the region refer to Beijing and the surrounding areas and any cities outside *Dongbei* as "mainland China or inner China," reflecting the community's physical isolation and perceived distance from the country's center.

The *Joseonjok*'s exposure to capitalist democratic ideas and globalization came primarily via South Korea, which means that in the course of

de-ethnicization, external forces will be less controllable by the central government and the minority community. An examination of the interaction between the state and the community in the region during the 1990s and early 2000s indicates that the *Joseonjok*'s ethnic disposition has been erroneously and exaggeratedly perceived as the primary cause rediasporization of the *Joseonjok* population.

The *Joseonjok*'s massive exodus and "hyperflow" (Miyajima 2013, pp. 70–71) and the rapid urbanization of *Joseonjok* areas are similar but not identical to the experiences of other minority groups, as migration and contact with the outside world occur externally than internally although, according to the 2000 census, nationwide in China, the urban population itself grew by nearly 50% (Wang et al. 2013, p. 37). Under the strict communist-planned economic policy, minority national groups were encouraged to attend local educational institutions; afterward, they were appointed to work units in their own areas. This is no longer the case, but the state's traditional culturally confined multiculturalism does not embrace the change to expand its coverage to social and economic multiculturalism. The performance of *Joseonjok* students on state-level entrance examinations has declined, and this trend extends to the university level. At Yanbian University, Chinese books and language have gradually taken the place of Korean versions because of the increasing number of Han Chinese students and academic staff. Despite the Joseonjok's strong belief in the need for their own national education through Yanbian University, isolation is a persistent risk due to the geographical disadvantage. *Joseonjok* society is built around the university in a self-sufficient way because it encourages *Joseonjok* education and guarantees lifetime jobs afterward. Consequently, *Joseonjok* identity has been largely confined to this narrow circle of life, which has hindered their interaction with mainstream society. Because of a government designation under the strict communist-planned economy, until 1990 most Yanbian University graduates were appointed to local work units such as the local newspaper, broadcasting companies, the public sector, and national educational institutions. Since 1992, however, *Joseonjok* university graduates have increasingly preferred to leave the region for better salaries and opportunities in cities. *Joseonjok* public concerns and debates over maintaining their exclusive educational system have mirrored the gradual transformation of the community itself.

The *hukou* system has also contributed to ethnic minority groups' isolation and retarded integration to the mainstream society, moving

toward an urban citizen. The system creates two classes of migrants to cities: "permanent" migrants, who are authorized by the state to change their household registration, and "temporary" migrants, whose moves are unauthorized (Liang and Ma 2004; Yang 2000). These segments of the migrant population are large. The 2000 census identified 144 million temporary migrants—those who left their registered place of residence for more than six months without obtaining *hukou* registration at their destination.[2] Between 1995 and 2000, nearly 59 million people became part of this "floating population." Moreover, 80% of temporary migrants were from rural villages, and roughly 80% of these migrated to towns and cities, consistent with China's overall urbanization pattern (Liang and Ma 2004, pp. 37–38).

Similarly, since the 1990s, Yanbian has experienced significant urbanization and massive population movement resulting in the population's decrease and dispersal, and it thereby gradually lost its distinctive ethnic characteristics. For example, the *Joseonjok*'s Korean language publishing activities have decreased, and government subsidies of their cultural (invisible) heritage have been dramatically reduced (e.g., research centers for history and culture, local newspapers, writers' associations). The government's objective in this aspect is not particularly to de-ethnicize the minority community but to establish a market mechanism in the publication sector, a language/culture-sensitive domain. The Association of *Joseonjok* Writers was left to the market economy system. However, as the market for *Joseonjok* writing is small, the association encountered difficulty without government subsidies, and it returned to public management under government protection. However, the government subsidy is only nominal, and the rate for creative writing is fixed at a 1980s level (30 yuan per 1000 words). In some regions, the payment rate has gone up to 350 yuan per four pages (equivalent to 1000 words) because the readers' pool has been reduced due to the limited market for books, magazines, and newspapers (Interview 2015 Yanbian).

I had a similar discussion with an interviewee about the *Yanbian Science Technology Newspaper* (YBST), which is agricultural technology focused. There are 50 science technology newspapers in China at the province level, but YBST is the only exclusively "national" science technology newspaper published in the Korean language, although a Chinese version is also published now because of increasing numbers of Han Chinese farmers. Before 1996, around 50,000 copies were sold daily, as many *Joseonjok* of the older generation, particularly those in rural areas,

were unable to read Chinese well. Since 1996, circulation has dropped rapidly to approximately 15,000 copies sold per day because of population decreases in agricultural towns. For this reason, it includes soft lifestyle content rather than purely agricultural science and technology content. The interviewee said, "I think prosperity through agricultural development is essential for human beings, but no special care has been given to *Joseonjok* farmers. Regionally specialized agricultural commodities are important not only for *Joseonjok* farmers but for the wider regions. At present, such commodities are barely self-sufficient and do not contribute to increasing farms' income." Thus, policy changes and government inaction to intervene in rampant urbanization and decommunization have unintentionally accelerated the de-ethnicization process. Moreover, the new wage system is generally divided into three parts: 70% is basic wages, 15% is bonuses, and 15% is subsidies (Moore 1989, p. 751). This has directly affected the *Joseonjok* because degrees from *Joseonjok* schools and universities no longer guarantee stable employment and because *Joseonjok*-specific work units no longer guarantee stable income. This means competition has opened to others, including the Han Chinese community, and the *Joseonjok* still suffer from many practical constraints to compete with Han Chinese.

The educated *Joseonjok* of the younger generation thus prefer jobs in large cities to remaining in the *Joseonjok* region despite the government's support of a minority educational institute that supposedly encourages minority national groups' autonomy. The *Joseonjok* have seized opportunities to work and study in large cities in China, South Korea, Japan, and other foreign countries. By 2000, one-tenth of the total *Joseonjok* population had left the region for various reasons.

Meanwhile, the nationality mix has shifted through intermarriage and emigration, and the *Joseonjok*'s agricultural community has been disintegrated. On the question of interethnic marriage between Han Chinese and *Joseonjok*, in 1999 and 2000, almost all of the interviewees stated that they preferred their children to marry *Joseonjok* rather than Han Chinese. However, in 2015, a majority stated that they did not care, and some even answered that they preferred their daughters to marry Han Chinese men because they were, what they perceive, less patriarchal than *Joseonjok* men.

Over the last decade, in rural areas, fewer people are leaving their farmland to their offspring. Yet, the locals tend to believe that the main reason for the rapid disintegration of community life is that many

members of the diaspora regularly travel back and forth between South Korea and *Dongbei* (Chae et al. 2013; Kim 2013). The government's schemes to support ethnically concentrated regions may not be designed to promote ethnic minorities' welfare. Thus, increasing numbers of Han Chinese have been indirectly encouraged to migrate to previously minority regions in border areas. The One Child Policy was a typical example: Local residents who belong to ethnic minority groups often express apprehensions about the influx of Han Chinese because it blurs ethnic and regional lines in border areas.

Muddling "Ethnic" and "Regional" Boundaries: From Ethnicized to Regionalized Development

In *Dongbei*, Jiang Zemin's development agenda for modernizing western China was not accompanied by explicitly ethnicized economic development, a multiculturalist approach to economic development. It is therefore difficult to argue that either party (the state or community) exclusively constructed the notion of ethnicization and de-ethnicization. The de-ethnicization of both *Joseonjok* identity and the *Joseonjok* community has been ongoing since before the reform era, and it is both a voluntary process and an outcome of the implicit changes to the Chinese government's ethnicity-neutral economic policy. The economic domain has witnessed a faster and more tangible transition to de-ethnicization within the ethnic–regional (ethnicity-neutral) spectrum.

"Government policy is to incorporate other cities where Han Chinese is the dominant population to Yanbian with the justification of broadening and developing the *Joseonjok* region. For instance, Donghwa, where the Han Chinese population is over 80%, was included in the Yanbian *Joseonjok* autonomous prefecture in early 1990. The policy accelerated the decrease of the *Joseonjok* population in this region. Autonomy and self-governance became only nominal these days. Reflecting this, the number of *Joseonjok* officials in Yanbian has been obviously decreasing since late 1989" (Interview 2015 Yanbian) (Table 4.1). Baotou, Inner Mongolia, provides an interesting example of the decoupling of industrialization from ethnicization. Although only a few minority regions accommodate prominent industries, Baotou has major iron and steel works, and the Chinese government is developing it into a new Han city (Mackerras 2003, p. 59). When economic interests are involved, "ethnic" becomes "regional." Another example is the public health service

Table 4.1 *Joseonjok* cadres in Yanbian

Year	*Han Chinese*	*Joseonjok*	*Percentage of Joseonjok(%)*	*Percentage of Joseonjok in Yanbian(%)*
1952	550	1710	74	62
1965	2530	3080	58	46
1976	16,370	25,500	59.5	41
1985	26,370	27,646	51.6	40.5
1992	65,192	58,100	45	39.5

Adapted from Kim, Jong Guk*21saegiuiJoseonjok* (Yanbian: minjokchulpansa, 1999) p. 66

offered by South Korea as official aid to Yanbian. Although its original (unwritten) purpose was to provide aid to the Korean community in China, the proportion of Han Chinese beneficiaries increased steadily. Tourism was previously not considered a significant contributor to the economy in China (Mackerras 2003, pp. 70–74), but Yanbian's tourism has resulted in considerable contributions to the Korean autonomous areas, although the benefits are more widely shared at the province level, and few preferential policies (such as tax relief or higher levels of subsidies) are implemented for the autonomous areas. One interviewee said, "compared with Xinjiang, Yanbian Autonomous Prefecture has no special economic measures, regardless of *Joseonjok*'s contributions to the regional economy" (Interview 2015 Yanbian). In relation to his concerns on the weakening power of the *Joseonjok*, Kim (1999, p. 88) said that to achieve the goal of training national leaders in *Joseonjok* society and to enhance *Joseonjok* autonomy, the *Joseonjok* need to learn from other autonomous prefectures. His view is that rebellious groups' respond to China's policy actively thus draw governments' attention more effectively. Otherwise, the only aspect in which minority national groups can achieve full autonomy in China, he said, has been by participating in culture and education, as this has been the safest way to survive. However, minority's language including the Korean language is often regarded as the language of culture and the arts and Chinese as the language of science, politics, and the state.

As the first and second generations pass, the *Joseonjok*'s nationalist activism remains as collective history. This secondary experience is retold and reproduced as the community's collective memories. Since the diaspora lacks political boundaries, the recording and reproduction of its history are

guided by the host nation. In due course, emphasis shifts; what is important to remember is not fixed. The *Joseonjok* highlighted how much they have contributed to China's state building. Little of their past antagonism is recorded, which helps the community avoid surveillance by the central and local governments. Claims of the *Joseonjok*'s instrumental value have also changed. Since the Open Door policy was implemented, *Joseonjok* have changed from being recognized for being the agricultural and ideological backbone of *Dongbei* to being recognized for their economic contributions. Such contributions have been materialized via tourism, trade with the DPRK, and remittances from abroad and from the ROK including massive undeclared revenues from black markets in the ROK.

Ethnicity-neutral regionalization and the gradual disintegration of the ethnic community generate overall insecurity in the *Joseonjok*'s community life. As I explained in the previous chapter, this has led to over-enthusiasm about their children's education, which ironically has resulted in lower birth rates, a decreasing population, and the closure of previously exclusive *Joseonjok* schools. Thus, although the quality of education for *Joseonjok* children might have been enhanced, "ethnic" education has diminished (together with the shifting emphasis on particular school subjects, Korean history, and the Korean language). Given that constitutions and official policy guidelines (White Papers) articulate the legal and political grounds, there remains more room for government make efforts to implement extensive and proactive intervention. This renders possible rectification, better management in an autonomous region's government to adjust the relations of production or economic structure including foreign trade, formulating the national economic and social development plan, and provide capital for infrastructure development and the exploitation of resources (e.g., roads, highways, hydropower stations, petroleum exploration, railroads, and airports).[3]

Most of the interviewees mentioned that to date, because of protective laws on minorities, the *Joseonjok* are guaranteed to share cadre positions with the Han Chinese in all of the work units in the public sector. However, in *Joseonjok*-concentrated areas, official multicultural approaches to the political inclusion of minorities are safety nets to prevent minorities from holding a majority of public positions. Quantity-based arbitrarily set quotas per population defy the rationale of such a system and make ethnic compositions more disproportional (Table 4.1). In *Joseonjok*-dominant cities and counties, without top-down legal multiculturalism, the *Joseonjok* would naturally take most of the positions, not only because of their population and qualifications but also

because such regions are meant to practice ethnic self-governance. This explains why in minorities' autonomous regions, prefectures, counties, and towns, legal frameworks to "protect minority rights" are actually protecting the rights of the Han Chinese in minority regions, who are the minority in those areas. Thus, "autonomous regions" are often so in name only from the minority nationality's point of view. When I visited Yanbian University in 1999, all of the employees in the office of overseas students were *Joseonjok*. In 2015, I visited the same office again. It had been enlarged and had more staff, but only a few *Joseonjok* worked there and naturally few among the staff spoke Korean. The *Joseonjok* still believe that Yanbian University is a minority nationality university (*minjok daehak*). However, Yanbian University is not one of the six institutions designated by the State Ethnic Affairs Commission (SEAC) as "officially recognized ethnic universities." These ethnic universities are governed directly by China's State Council and fully financed by the central government. In contrast, China's local universities are governed by the Ministry of Education (MOE) and financially supported by both the MOE and their respective local governments. Thus, Yanbian University is classified as a "local" rather than an "ethnic" university.

A question arises from this context as to whether China will eventually accommodate amalgamation as a vision of ethnic relations, similar to the case of Québec. Although the case has stark differences, it provides a good comparable reference for an ethnically divided country like China, particularly in view of implementing more balanced and equitable "rural-urban" and "Hanjok (Han Chinese)-minority" community development. "Anglophones no longer dominated the Québec economy; most Anglophones were required to learn French if they planned on having careers in Québec; and most new immigrants were, by law, required to attend French schools" (Pettinicchio 2012, p. 738). At present, other national groups living in *Joseonjok* areas have little incentives to use the Korean language. Moreover, most interviews conducted in the late 1990s indicated that *Joseonjok* officials in local government were voluntarily (and sometimes unnecessarily) obedient to and cooperative with the Party. One *Joseonjok* professor said, "We don't enjoy even a limited degree of autonomy that is officially given by the central government because of the local *Joseonjok* officials' attitude toward the CCP. A nationalist leader who can advocate the *Joseonjok*'s interests does not exist in our society. The head of the local government gives public speeches in the Chinese language, whereas in other autonomous

prefectures, their own local languages are used in public and official communication." Another interviewee said, "The young generation does not perceive the local government as the center of *Joseonjok* society any longer. It has remained merely as propaganda of the Chinese benevolent policy towards minority national groups" (Interview 1999 Yanbian).

Kim (1999) had suggested that the fundamental self-reform of society should have taken place in the early years of government reform. He viewed the *Joseonjok*'s traditional values as one of the major reasons for their delayed response to China's economic and political changes. Kim's analysis went as follows. The *Joseonjok* used to have more autonomy than they do now. The distribution of power in the four major fields in which *Joseonjok* cadres participated—the Party, politics, finance, and culture and education—became increasingly disproportionate. The number of *Joseonjok* cadres in the field of culture and education has gradually increased, and they are now outnumbered. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the eastern communist bloc in 1989, China has reduced local power in politics and the Party; thus, it is impossible for minorities to increase their political power. To survive the market economy mechanism, more intellectuals should be encouraged to participate in the economic field rather than in culture. Educated *Joseonjok* still hold too strongly to the traditional value system. Approximately 70% of *Joseonjok* cadres were involved in fields related to culture and education, such as teaching and research. Thus, economic power in the region was naturally flowing to the *Hanjok* (Han Chinese).

A clear observation on minority regions' dilemma in China is offered as follows.

> Chinese policy results in quite a paradox: China claims to have preferential policies and a system of regional autonomy for ethnic minorities, but if the ultimate plan, assimilation, succeeds, no ethnic minorities will exist to benefit. In other words, if ethnic minorities assimilate, any benefits they gain from their status will disappear… Further, if the ethnic minorities do not assimilate by their own volition, their ethnic minority regions may cease to be minority regions since China is moving so many Han into those regions. Once Hans become the numerical majority, those regions will no longer be ethnic minorities regions and the government will have no reason to confer special status upon them. (Bosely 2007, p. 299)

In this regard, the universal nature of multiculturalism can be explained as in the summary below (Table 4.2), representing the dilemma of

Table 4.2 Multicultural policy measures and consequences in China

Multicultural approach (positive discrimination)	*Intended outcomes*	*Disadvantages for minority communities*
Exemption from the One Child policy	Help preserve minority nationals' population size (preserving physical ethnic boundaries)	Encourage influx of Han Chinese into previously minority-concentrated regions
Official recognition of bilingualism	Help maintain collective identity and bilingual skills that can be linked with job opportunities (Armstrong 1976)	Widen the gap in capacity between Han Chinese and minority nationals (bilingual trap) (Borchigud 1995)
Quota/ratio control of minority cadres in local governments	Guarantee the political and contractual rights of minority groups (Birch 1989, 53)	Guarantee may be only nominal and more disproportional and may be used as a monitoring tool
Written legal codes articulating the state's obligations to minority people's welfare and regional development	Ensure various positive rights (Birch 1989, 53)	Reinterpretation of legal codes leading to policy failure and delayed adjustment to changing circumstances (Lin 2015)
Additional points on college entry exams	Provide younger-generation minority nationals with equal opportunity to access education	Only symbolic if the points are not sufficiently high (five points for Han Chinese school graduates and ten for *Joseonjok* school graduates) to close the gap between Han Chinese and minority students
Separate educational institutions for minority nationals	Maintain ethnicity-specific education content and contribute to the community's prosperity	Barriers to enter mainstream society without guaranteeing employment upon graduation
Collectivization and household registration system	Preserve agricultural lands and the collective boundaries of minority communities	Hamper effective adaptation to marketization, urbanization, and globalization

Author

integration (either as a group (federalism) or as an individual (liberalism)) versus recognition (depending on the quality of recognition). This helps understanding why, regardless of the political system, ethnic relations require careful policy design for the sake of security and prosperity.

As demonstrated, selective policy intervention combined with other external drivers dynamically shapes a collective identity. At present, China is in a relatively advantageous position compared with a liberal democracy, as state policy implementation should theoretically be more effective.

The struggle between the community's future and the practical and immediate interests of their own families is reflected in locals' public discourses. "Public" debates, which frequently appear in major local *Joseonjok* newspapers such as *Heilyongjiang Shinbao* and *Yeonbeon Ilbo,* on the preservation of *Joseon-mal* (spoken Korean) and *Joseon-geul* (written Korean) among *Joseonjok* intellectuals often illustrate the meaning of the Korean language to them. "It is extremely disappointing to come across the truth that six *Joseonjok* out of twenty-six in a work unit in Yanji city cannot read or even speak Korean. Since China and the *Joseonjok* region are opened to the outside world, the importance of the Korean language ability in the *Joseonjok* region has been emphasized more" (e.g., *Heilyongjiang Shinbao* May 6, 1997). My own interviews also revealed the *Joseonjok*'s fears of losing elements of their national culture, especially younger generations' language ability. Their "public-minded" remarks also included deep concerns about decreased population, dispersal, loss of agricultural lands, and interethnic marriage. Post-interview conversations with parents usually included their children's education. Almost all of the parents interviewed had only one child because they wanted to provide them with the best quality education. Parents whose children performed well at Han Chinese schools seemed to be prouder than those who sent their children to *Joseonjok* schools. They also proudly said that the *Joseonjok* community would have been trapped in severe poverty like other minority populations in China if they had profited the government's policy of exempting minorities and rural populations from the One Child Policy. A generation gap was also found: Whereas older people, mostly first- and second-generation *Joseonjok*, deeply regretted that the *Joseonjok* were losing land that they regarded as an important part of their national identity, the younger generations—third- and fourth-generation *Joseonjok*—believed that as long as the *Joseonjok* were obsessed with land, they could not expect further development. Since I conducted my fieldwork in 1999 and 2000 as for the first round, fundamental societal changes were noticed: public discourses starated to cover a wider range of issues, particularly economic changes. In the past, newspapers focused on how efficiently *Joseonjok* farmers and workers fulfilled their production quotas. This discourse has

shifted to how to revive the regional economy; enhance skills, human capacity, and entrepreneurship; increase wages; accumulate capital; and buy property suitable for rapid marketization and the re-modernizing economy.

If multiculturalism can be understood as a kind of social idea and state policy, it covers the motivation/intention, implementation, and outcome of such idea and policy. In China's context, notwithstanding the state's initially non-assimilation intention, the regional setting that has been imposed has resulted in conflicts and the disappearance of groups. Limiting individual or group actions to promote non-state-sanctioned multicultural policies or to demand increased autonomy is strictly forbidden. The degree and scope of autonomy are determined by the central government. At the local level, less autonomy than the central government mandates is acceptable, but more is not. Few individuals and groups demand greater autonomy. Apart from authorized experts who belong to or are sponsored by state agencies, the public is not permitted to be critical of the government's ethnic policy. Minority issues become highly securitized, and the right to discourse (open discussions, suggestions, and comments) is limited to state elites. In this regard, multiculturalism is only a top-down phenomenon. The discussion of such tensions and greater participation is not necessarily a threat to state unity or the integrity of China. Vis-à-vis the outside world at least, the *Joseonjok* often express that they are proud of being Chinese, particularly with regard to China's growing global status. However, internally, only when they perceive that their contributions to China's development are sufficiently recognized are they included among the significant actors in China's re-modernization and development.

The Community's Reaction to De-ethnicization

It can be argued that there is a lack of "politics" in these ethnic relations, as the *Joseonjok* largely accept the government's direction without making trouble. I introduced in Chap. 2, the theoretical implications for the politics of ethnic relations as an academic field have prompted three responses. To recap, first, studies of ethnic relations in China have over-concentrated on a few conflict-prone minority regions linked with separatism. Second, there is a hypertendency to link the rise of modernization and development with democratization based on pluralism; thus, groups in China with strong ethnonationalism are likely to rebel.

Third, Chinese exceptionalism also exists in the study of multiculturalism because of the fixed framework of either secession or assimilation/disappearance when speaking of major outcome of ethnic policy in China. Consequently, scholars and experts on the politics of ethnic relations usually begin with the list of reasons for secession (Birch 1989, pp. 63–65) and try to find what is missing in non-volatile ethnic relations cases compared with prominent case studies of ethnic conflicts. Commonly used variables for ethnic conflicts include historical animosity (invasion and conquer), violence, religion, discriminations, kin relations, material exploitation, cultural hatred. If one poses the question, "Why are there no ethnic conflicts if the *Joseonjok* have such a strong distinctive national identity and ethnonationalism equipped with most of the elements of plausible ethnic conflicts?", one should also ask the question, "Why should there be ethnic conflicts?" The Han Chinese and *Joseonjok* have not had "sensational" clashes (e.g., incidences in Tibet in 2008 and in Xinjiang in 2009 and continuous unrest in 2013 and 2014) nor has the community collectively protested against anything. However, changes in the community and in collective identity inform theory and policy implications. As discussed, studies of ethnic relations in China have overconcentrated on cases of conflicts and separatism because of the erroneous perception that all minority groups in China are potential separatists. Two consequences may be followed, dearth of analysis of various types of migrants and integration issues. There are more migrants and integrationists than separatists among China's minorities, and the number of migrants is increasing. Second, from the prescriptive point of view (policy implications), any ethnic disturbances (even if by non-separatists) are categorized as security threats (indiscriminate securitization), and no further efforts are made to adjust state policy in accordance with dynamic exogenous changes. In that vein, the politicization of the *Joseonjok* does not mean establishing minority organizations or mobilizing people against the PRC or CCP; rather, it connotes political socialization with a rising awareness of public and political issues, especially of issues related to trade policy or foreign affairs. This process also entails the politicization of ethnicity and has no connection with the rise of separatism.

The political participation of the general public is controlled, especially in ethnic minority communities. Regarding potential activism, the powerful influence of Korean churches has been a major concern to successive Chinese governments. The first issue is that external religious groups' activities in China are strictly banned based on the basic

religious policy guidelines of *zizhi* (self-administration), *ziyang* (self-support), and *zichuan* (self-propagation). The third *zizhi* in particular connotes that China prohibits any kind of propagation activity. Only the churches that follow these three principles are allowed to exist, albeit under surveillance. Second, Korean Christian churches have built a large network among Korean diasporas in Western countries, and they actively provide North Korean defectors with indirect support from *Joseonjok* churchgoers. Third, Beijing is concerned that the *Joseonjok*'s national reunification efforts or assistance of defectors may instigate Korean ethnic nationalism among them. Fourth, allowing Korean Christian activities to help North Korean defectors has a negative effect on the China–DPRK relationship.

The Yeongil Church in Yanji is the largest church building in China, with 3000 seats, and was built with the financial support of South Korean churches. Over 4000 *Joseonjok* attend this church, and the numbers increase by 50–70 people every week. At the beginning of the rise of Christianity in Yanji, the main reason for the *Joseonjok*'s church attendance was to network and gather information, particularly on how to go to South Korea for business. In China, many Korean missionaries are actively involved in humanitarian activities, but they hide their identity for fear of forced expulsion. Unofficial statistics indicate that over 220 mission workers have been sent by South Korean churches, 320 from evangelism associations, and another 200–300 on their own initiative.

Among the 700–800 Korean missionaries in China, 400–500 are based in Jilin province surrounding Yanbian, 150 in Liaoning, and 150 in Beijing and Tianjin. A considerable number of Korean missionaries also evangelize non-*Joseonjok* Chinese according to the Korean Bible Society's data released in 2000. In 2001, with China's permission, DPRK public security officers attacked a Korean church in Yanji and took away North Korean defectors. It had been reported that foreign national missionaries were active in the region, influencing over 300,000 DPRK defectors yearly (*SCMP*, October 18, 2001). In 2000, Korean churches in *Dongbei* were attacked by police, and a number of church leaders were expelled or executed. In December 2014, in northeastern Yanbian prefecture, 74-year-old Korean-American aid worker Peter Hahn was arrested on charges of embezzlement and counterfeiting receipts, but the charges were ultimately revealed as an excuse to incriminate Hahn, who had regularly provided food to North Korean children (*SCMP*, December 12, 2014).[4] This case indicates the authorities'

sensitivity about activities by foreigners in this border region. In addition to these high-profile events, numerous unreported cases have become well known among people in the region. The government often highlights tensions between the *Joseonjok* and the Koreas, as seen in the *Peskama-ho* incident and more recent examples, including that of the North Korean defector who killed two Chinese in the border town of Nanping. People in the region are much more sensitive about potential political tension than before, as outside observers highlight any sign of potential ethnically motivated political tensions or collective actions.

Seeing from the point that China is still governed under a rigid one-party communist system, any political activity via routes other than the autonomous prefecture is practically infeasible. This is particularly the case in minority regions, where, depending on the Sino–DPRK relationship, the level of government attention on North Korean defectors in China unpredictably varies. The general trend is that the region has been the subject of increasing attention, surveillance, and control. The *Joseonjok*'s main concern is that the central government is enacting a "securitization" process (Buzan et al. 1998). As explained, political participation has been guided by local representatives nominated by Beijing, and political autonomy is nominal. Under the rigid communism before capitalization, because of the state policy of collectivization, most people were effectively mobilized as members of the local CCP. Although there are local social (quasi-political) organizations with ethnic features (which used to be exclusively and explicitly ethnicized), these have gradually become de-ethnicized, and people are reluctant to claim any "exclusive" ethnicity for such organizations, including Yanbian University. Any political activism is strictly banned, and a well-known secret among local people is that some have been executed without trial for being activists, having contributed to activism, or even just providing information about the region to outsiders. Historically, this region and the *Joseonjok* were politically active when the CCP fought against Japan, the USA, and the KMT, and this has been recognized by China and continuously celebrated by the *Joseonjok* themselves. Communist activists who participated in Korean independence movements became national heroes including Kim Il Sung. However, their views on national leadership gradually changed. Although the first governor of the prefecture, Ju Deok Hae, was respected, other leaders have not been viewed as "*Joseonjok* leaders" per se, but as government officials not necessarily concerned with *Joseonjok*-specific issues. During the rules of Mao and Deng, regional and ethnic organizations were labeled as "ethnic," but

they are now considered more "regional." Due to gradual pressure for de-ethnicization and re-diasporization, *Joseonjok* associations and institutions have been built outside the region, mostly in South Korea, the USA, and Japan, and are led by re-diasporized *Joseonjok* intellectuals and students. More recently, the *Joseonjok*'s political participation has been noticeable in an agency role, especially regarding North Korean issues, as they are in an advantageous position to bridge the three parties on both ad hoc and permanent bases and are expected to play a greater role in this area in the future. South Korean politicians often include Yanbian and other *Joseonjok*-concentrated areas as part of their typical official visiting routes. Nevertheless, at the beginning of diplomatic normalization, Beijing sent an official warning to the ROK government against any possible approaches to people in the region using ethnic ties.

The factors I considered in analyzing the collective identity of different diasporas can be broadly summarized into the following three categories: collectively politicized diasporas with strong cultural attachment to ethnicity, diasporas with a third sphere of identity, and diasporas weakly bound with neither significant collectivity nor strong cultural attachment. The different types I suggest as follows do not signify the consequences of different ethnicities; rather, They are suggested as consequences of interactions between and among ethnic groups. The first type of diaspora tends to use cultural features in the political arena for political bargaining. In such cases, the means and ends became intermingled. Such diasporas are highly political and ready to translate ethnic relations into aggressive action. The second type is diasporas that have built their own sphere of collective identity. Korean diasporas fall into this group, which does not use cultural features as political means, although there is a considerable degree of cultural maintenance involved. The identity of such groups seems stable, and they are less likely to act collectively against the host government. The last type of diaspora is destined to be absorbed by another ethnic group. For this type of diaspora, identity is weak, and the level of maintenance for the distinctive cultural features of the community is relatively low.

The Sino–Korean Relationship and the Third Survival of the *Joseonjok*'s Community

The multifaceted de-ethnicization process has generated many subsequent push factors for out-migration and re-disposal. Accordingly, Yanbian's renewed contact with South Korean society played a critical

role in reshaping the community, society, and the people's identity. The *Joseonjok*'s struggle for their collective identity continued in their communication with the ROK. *Joseonjok* society's earliest encounters with ROK citizens did not go smoothly, leaving the *Joseonjok* frustrated and humiliated (Kim 2010). Due to high expectations and misunderstandings by both parties, the damage to the ROK–Yanbian relationship has been long-lasting, and the ROK's efforts to redress the *Joseonjok* community's collective trauma continue to the present. Although the next chapter includes more discussions on the reconciliation process, I focus here on how such miscommunication evolved and the *Joseonjok*'s reaction to it, particularly in terms of rebuilding of their national identity.

The community has experienced a collective trauma through its experiences of fake marriage, labor exports, mistreatment and discrimination in South Korean workplaces, human trafficking, black market trade, and the disintegration of the family. The tension culminated at the *Peskama-ho* incident, where their collective anger exploded against the ROK (Chae et al. 2013; Kim 2010, pp. 88–96). "The *Joseonjok* are proud people… In one sense, today, many people are pleased that China became rich and developed and powerful so that ROK people cannot look down on us" (Interview 2015 Yanbian). The *Joseonjok*'s integration into the ROK labor market over the last several decades was a mixture of fortunate and painful experiences for them. In spite of various discriminations against *Joseonjok*, their status is the highest in the labor market hierarchy among low-skill migrant workers.

The Turning Point: The Peskama-ho Incident and Afterward

The criminal case of the fishing ferry *Peskama-ho* was a turning point that caused *Joseonjok* society to reconsider the meaning of homeland and the Korean nation to them. Although the *Peskama-ho* incident attracted little interest from the South Korean media, for the *Joseonjok*, it was a humiliating event that triggered an explosion of collective anger. The development of a criminal motive demonstrates the *Joseonjok*' growing antagonism toward South Korea resulting from frustrated expectations and psychological conflicts. By continuously dealing with related issues in highly provoking manners, *Joseonjok* newspapers have encouraged *Joseonjok*'s disappointment and antagonism against South Korea.

Around that period, large numbers of illegal *Joseonjok* workers had entered South Korea and taken jobs in low-wage manual sectors of the

economy. The incident occurred in 1996, when the *Joseonjok*'s Korean dream reached its peak. Six *Joseonjok* crew members who had been hired by the South Korean captain of the *Peskama-ho*, a fishing ferry, were involved in the murders of seven South Korean crewmembers and four crewmembers of other nationalities in August 1996. The six *Joseonjok* were charged with and convicted of murder, violence, and neglecting dead bodies (*Jilin Shinbao*, April 6, 2000; *Chosun Pub*, July 6, 2016).[5] The case was not highlighted until the brutality of the South Korean crew and the captain toward the *Joseonjok* crew was revealed in great detail during the investigation. It was discovered that the *Joseonjok* had endured cruel discrimination in terms of not only wages but also various humiliations and physical harassment. *Joseonjok* society was shocked and infuriated by the case. The trial was delayed until the mid-2000s, in part because of efforts by South Korean civil associations. The associations represented by social activists, including lawyers (led by Mun Jae In, who was at that time a well-known human rights lawyer and now the President of ROK), students, and ordinary citizens, appealed continually to South Korea's congress and president. The case was complicated, involving such factors as over-expectations based on ethnic ties, clashes between social classes, nationality issues, *Joseonjok*'s insufficient understanding of market mechanism including the relationship between employers and employees, the illegal hiring of low-skill migrant workers, the abuse of power, and language problems. While the *Peskama-ho* incident was under-reported in the ROK, it was over-reported by local newspapers in Yanbian, and local Chinese governments also seized on it.

A book entitled *South Korea Doesn't Exist* by *Joseonjok* writer Kim Jae Guk (1998) offered significant reflections on *Joseonjok* society and warned against the Korean dream. Another local writer said, "Some have had serious misunderstandings about South Korean society from the very beginning. The *Joseonjok* assume that our society shares all cultural features with mainland Korean society in spite of different political regimes forming different states. In reality, however, *Joseonjok* culture has changed a great deal. Culture is not permanently static regardless of any social and political changes" (Interview 1999 Yanbian). He warned of the exaggeration of cultural and emotional attachment to the motherland: "Even the *Joseon-mal* (the Korean language) that the *Joseonjok* use has been modified to a considerable extent, although it is still communicable with Koreans from the two Koreas." Conservative *Joseonjok* nationalists tend to emphasize the *Joseonjok* identity as being different

from both the Chinese and Korean nations. The *Joseonjok* are struggling not to preserve the authenticity of their national culture, but to form their own stable identity without any hierarchical assumptions among the involved national identities. The keys to the distinctiveness of a diaspora's identity are its history and how it constructs and reconstructs its collective stories. This is applicable to both the host and home countries. Culture is modifiable and shareable; thus, acculturation occurs. For a separate history filled with collective memories, only interpretations are refashioned, especially when memories are oppressive thus negative. For example, Koreans in the ROK would never be able to share the *Joseonjok*'s oppressive memories of the *Minsaengdan* Incident or Cultural Revolution.

Scholars and specialists on the region generally concur that the *Joseonjok* became antagonistic toward South Koreans mainly because the South Koreans had mistreated them from 1989 through the early 1990s. The formation of the *Joseonjok* identity now involves highlighting the differences with the Korean motherland after a short period of positive identification with Korean diasporas elsewhere. In a sense, however, *Joseonjok* antagonism toward South Korea was also nurtured by ideological division before the diplomatic normalization between China and the ROK. For example, political ideology, a compulsory subject, features many negative images and descriptions of capitalist countries, including South Korea.

After the *Peskama-ho* case, the *Joseonjok*'s negative view of the ROK continued to increase (Jang 2007, pp. 59–64). In February and March 2000, crimes committed by the *Joseonjok* against South Korean visitors and students in China became a serious social issue. As the ROK was more open to *Joseonjok* immigration in the 2000s, similar crimes were committed within the ROK while crimes targeting ROK citizens in China decreased. One explanation is that the *Joseonjok* were exposed to a capitalist world without sufficient socialization in their home country. In addition, the South Koreans who had first contact with the *Joseonjok* failed to build a positive impression. The sudden influx of *Joseonjok* labor into South Korea raised many issues, which also worsened the relationship between the *Joseonjok* and ROK society. Before the *Joseonjok* inflow, dealing with migrant workers had never been a significant topic of public discourses in the ROK, as its labor market was relatively protective and exclusive of low-skilled migrants. In the 1990s and 2000s, laws and regulations monitoring and protecting foreign labor were loose

Table 4.3 Wage differences among immigrants in South Korea Currency unit: Won

	Joseonjok	*Filipinos*	*Bangladeshis*	*Nepalese*	*Others*
Monthly income	830,000	480,000	530,000	560,000	450,000
Monthly consumption	240,000	150,000	170,000	170,000	130,000

Dong-a Ilbo, November 30, 1996

and dysfunctional. Statistics for the 1990s show the extent to which smaller-sized South Korean companies exploited *Joseonjok* laborers in Korea, including payment delays, non-compensation for industrial injury, and remittance-related forgery (*Dong-a Ilbo*, November 30, 1996). However, due to the *Joseonjok*'s ability to speak Korean, the *Joseonjok*'s wages were relatively higher than those of other guest worker groups (Table 4.3). The *Joseonjok* believe that the South Korean government discriminated against them, treating them differently from Korean emigrants in richer countries. In this context, one interviewee proudly stated that he had been contacted by an overseas Korean network that was finally considering Yanbian as a member of the Korean Overseas Trade Association and the interviewee strongly believed that it was only because China became an economically powerful country.

During the period, from the 1980s until the mid-2000s, the ROK authorities and society had growing concerns over the *Joseonjok*'s possible abuse of their dual nationalities, changeable cultural codes, multiple spatial bases, and China-ROK's diplomatic uneasiness. Therefore, *Joseonjok*'s influx to the ROK was regarded as an unwelcome invasion while in reality integration of the two societies already occurred rapidly beyond authorities' control. In this regard, *Joseonjok* society's new stratification and awareness of their social and economic class and national identity were reshaped through their experience of partial integration with the capitalist South Korean market rather than through integration with mainstream Chinese society. Meanwhile, their collective frustration associated with new consciousness on their social status and ethnicity developed into some degree of antagonism against the ROK.

The Chinese government intervened immediately after the *Peskamaho* incident by providing compensation and official condolences for the families of the accused. Local conservative intellectuals played a role in redirecting *Joseonjok* society. Jeong (1997), for example, maintained that

the *Joseonjok* were "neither Chinese nor Koreans." He said, "We are not and never can be Koreans; we are of the *Joseonjok* nationality within China. We do not exist without China, but at the same time, neither do we exist without our own identity as *Joseonjok*." The *Joseonjok* have not demanded a fuller degree of political citizenship from China because they are aware that they are not living in their own country. "Anyway we are living in other's place." By "others' place" the interviewees mean not the *Joseonjok*'s own country. One interviewee said, "We have to admit that what China has done to the *Joseonjok* was absolutely beneficial. We are not supposed to rebel against China and focus on the past. China is not our own country anyway" (Interview 2000 Yanbian). Many episodes were told on minor quarrels and tensions between *Joseonjok* and Han Chinese in their daily life. All of the interviewees also remarked that the individual-level difficulties were only insignificant. The *Joseonjok* believe that because they are not living in their own state and because the Chinese government has made efforts to restrict Hanism, they should bear what they take to be Han Chinese arrogance.

Overall, *Joseonjok* intellectuals had already seen their *Joseonjok* identity and the community as in danger of disappearing in the late 1990s. Choi Hong Il, an influential *Joseonjok* writer, said, "*Joseonjok* writers in this period should strongly hold nationalistic spirit as *Joseonjok*. Writers should have a clear picture about the future of *Joseonjok* in the crisis of national identity…Now is the time to overcome political ideology, and we *Joseonjok* should search for our own identity, which is rather fundamental and based on individuality. The life of our parents' generation was, in a word, tragic. Now we have to overcome the past" (Choi, interview with Yanbian TV 1999).[6]

Forming their national identity means interpreting and reinterpreting their collective existence in relation to the nations involved. To the extent that their identity as a minority group becomes clearer, their national identity linked to the Chinese nation and state could also be either fortified or weakened. They perceived China to be "the only power that can maintain a check-and-balance role against American imperial influences in East Asia" (Interview 2000 Changbai). Many still believed that the USA interfered with the national re-unification of Korea, which is more commonly believed in China and the DPRK than in the ROK.

South Korean Transnationalism: Primordial Ethnic Revival or Modern De-ethnicization?

Even after three decades of communication between *Dongbei*'s *Joseonjok* society and the ROK, deep-seated misunderstandings and misperceptions prevail on both sides despite the myriad official social, cultural, and economic exchange programs. The gap between the two sides is often displayed by prominent political leaders' views on the *Joseonjok*. Three contrasting views inform the South Koreans' diverse images of the *Joseonjok*. The first view is represented by Mun Jae In, who defended the *Joseonjok* involved in the *Peskama-ho* incident in 1996, the current President backed by the Minjoo Party of Korea (Democratic Party of Korea). He enthusiastically defended the accused *Joseonjok* while highlighting the structural problems in the ROK and the special situation and status of the accused.[7] However, Mun has been criticized by many South Korean citizens, including the families of the victims and their surroundings. The second view is represented by Kim Eul Dong, an influential congresswoman from the current ruling party, Jayu-hanguk-dang (The Liberty Korea Party, formerly, The Grand National Party) and the descendant of a well-known leading anti-imperialism activist Kim Jwa Jin (1889–1930), who established the Northern Military Administration Office Army and led the Korean Righteous Armies in the *Qingshanli* (*Cheongsanri*) battle (1920) in Manchuria. Kim visited *Dongbei* several times and met with the locals. She is usually well received and viewed there, as she tends to evoke ethnonationalism, reminding the locals of the shared historical memory of anti-colonial struggles in Manchuria, and she often stated that she herself might have been a *Joseonjok*. In contrast, Kim Moo Sung, another influential member of the ROK legislature and former leader of the current ruling party, was severely criticized by re-diasporized *Joseonjok* for his remarks on the population decrease in South Korea. He stated publicly that the decreasing fertility problems in the ROK society will be easily resolved because South Korea can always relax, if necessary, any migration barrier to the *Joseonjok*, particularly women. *Joseonjok* society fiercely criticized the implication in his remarks that *Joseonjok* women were less civilized and readier to give birth. A lack of accurate understanding and analysis of the *Joseonjok* people and community among high-profile decision makers and opinion leaders in the ROK have resulted in ineffective policies, bad subsidies and investments, the mismanagement of the *Joseonjok* community in the ROK, and

a failure to control social problems including hate crimes. Some Chinese commentators have expressed concern about the rise of Korean ethnocentric ultra-nationalism (Zhang 2009; Hu and Chen 2011; Yan 2005), arguing that the increasingly close relationship between South Korea and the *Joseonjok* community and the *hangukbaram* (the Korean Wave or Korea Dream) phenomenon in Yanbian provide a priori evidence of an ethnic revival. Several studies conducted by South Korean scholars have indicated that the *Joseonjok*'s ethnic ties and increasing contact with South Korea have refashioned the *Joseonjok* into an overseas Korean community (*hanminjok*). Some Koreans have sought to re-consolidate their ethnic ties with the *Joseonjok* to construct a pan-Korean community, or *hanminjok gongdongchaeron* (extraterritorial citizenship strategies), an objective that is also advocated by a number of *Joseonjok* scholars and opinion leaders and Korean civil associations (Cha 2006; Ho 2011). However, most *Joseonjok* are uncomfortable with the ROK's imposition of a transnational framework that represents the community as a less modernized version of the Korean nation. South Korean-imposed transnationalism (more accurately, "transnational South Korea nationalism") and pan-Korean nationalism (through diaspora networks) have evolved in different directions. The Korean motherland is an imaginary construction for many *Joseonjok*, who choose to independently (re)produce their community's identity rather than seek a connection with Korea (Park 2014). As a result, the *Joseonjok* have maintained a certain distance from South Korea, and this has contributed to the *Joseonjok*'s redefinition of their national identity, which has allowed more room for them to reinterpret their diaspora identity. Table 4.4 summarizes *Joseonjok* society's changing view toward the ROK.

Temporary Exit, Tone Toward South Korea, and Loyalty to China

Pettinicchio (2012) asked a relevant question: Why some threatened minority ethnic groups chose to fight while others chose flight. Pettinicchio explained that Québec's peaceful ethnic nationalism was due to the relative ease of exit: "Louder Anglophone voices left, in turn decreasing intergroup conflict" (p. 735). However, a diasporized minority under authoritarian rule will have limited options regarding voice and may thus have only "be loyal" and "exit" as options. Ironically, the "exit" choice further limits the right to raise voices, and diaspora's "stronger voice" may hardly be considered as "voice to stay" but

Table 4.4 Summary of interviewee views on the motherland in 1999–2000 and 2015

Question topic	*1999–2000*	*2015*
Views on South Korea's influence	• Sudden inflow of vulgar capitalist culture had had negative effects on *Joseonjok* society (e.g., labor migration to ROK, family disintegration, divorce, separation, public crime, further dispersal and decrease of the *Joseonjok* population) • Antagonism nurtured by miscommunication between the ROK and *Joseonjok* society • Ideological and cultural barriers hampering a closer relationship • Many are eager to find connections with the ROK to seek employment opportunities (e.g., low-skill employment) • Critical of the ROK government's discriminatory nationality laws toward the diaspora	• Aid from various ROK agencies and government institutions has been helpful • The ROK is increasingly regarded as a trading partner and open labor market for the *Joseonjok* • Realization of the difference between the reality and image of different groups of people from the ROK and enhanced understanding (both negative and positive) of the ROK via media and *Joseonjok* settlers in the ROK • *Joseonjok* settlers' working conditions and mistreatment in the ROK are still a sensitive issue • Many believe that *Joseonjok* settlers' status among the Korean diaspora has risen together with the overall development of China • All interviewees reported experience with the ROK (work, travel, study, etc.)
Views on North Korea and re-unification	• The *Joseonjok* feel deep sympathy toward North Koreans but are critical of the DPPK government • Most interviewees are psychologically and ideologically more attached to the DPRK than the ROK • Many feel ashamed of the DPRK when Han Chinese in the region criticize the DPRK and look down on its people • Most welcome the ROK's Sunshine Policy • *Joseonjok* intellectuals and professionals are proud of being engaged in facilitating projects and events to enhance the relationships between the DPRK and the ROK and between the ROK and China	• Private-level contacts between Yanbian and the DPRK monitored by local governments to a greater extent since Kim Jong-un took power • The stricter security situation means that unofficial contacts with the DPRK are limited, although trade and cultural exchanges via public agencies are increasing • Many believe that re-unification will bring prosperity to the region • Many believe that the most serious barriers to re-unification are external (regional politics in Northeast Asia and the USA) • Professionals strongly believe that *Joseonjok* can (and should) play an important role in reconciliation among the DPRK, China, and the ROK

Based on the author's interviews conducted in 1999–2000 and 2015 in *Dongbei*

suspiciously taken as "voice to betray." The *Joseonjok* diaspora's option to exit accelerated the disintegration of the community (Han 2013, pp. 7–11). *Joseonjok* migrants to South Korea have experienced both explicit and implicit discrimination from the South Korean government and the public (Kim 1998; Mun 2008). It is estimated that more than 700,000 *Joseonjok* migrants are residing in South Korea on a short- or long-term basis (Yonhap News 2015),[8] and an increasing number have re-collectivized by creating *Joseonjok* organizations (Piao 2014). Reflecting this circumstance, there has also been phenomenal growth in the literature on South Korea's integration policy and sociological studies of the *Joseonjok* community in the ROK written by South Korean scholars (e.g., Park 1989; Kim 1992; Han and Gwon 1993). This burgeoning of scholarly interest began in the early 1990s and peaked midway through 2000. The "*Joseonjok* are primarily interested in reconstructing their own collective identity vis-à-vis the ROK and China, whereas South Koreans emphasize unity based on their historical memory of *Dongbei* as a lost land" (Park 2017, p. 60; See, also, Harold 2012, pp. 288–293). Korean historians are paying increasing attention to *Balhae* (698–926) and *Goguryeo* (37 BC–668 AD) history and their territory included northern part of the Korean peninsula and Northeastern Manchuria (Table 4.5). *Joseonjok* individuals who have chosen to leave China and settle in South Korea have faced marginalization in both mainstream Chinese society and in the South Korean labor market and society. Most *Joseonjok* immigrants in the ROK return to China with memories of various forms of social and legal discrimination and personal humiliation in the workplace (Kim

Table 4.5 Rising research trends on the history of the Manchu in the 1990s

	ROK	*DPRK*	*Japan*	*China*	*Russia*	*Total*
Before 1949	10		124	18	19	171
1950–1959	2	0	24	7	9	42
1960–1969	6	10	39	15	22	92
1970–1979	18	8	44	31	33	134
1980–1989	80	17	78	432	48	655
1990–1994	131	46	51	184	20	432
Total	247	81	360	687	151	1526
Percentage	16%	5%	24%	45%	10%	100%

Guksa-pyeonchan-uiwonhoe 'Balhae', *Hanguksa*, vol. 10, Seoul: Guksa-pyeonchan-uiwonhoe, 1996

1998). One interviewee said, "I find it awkward to put us in the category of *dongpo* (same nation or overseas Koreans) given South Koreans' negative perceptions of the *Joseonjok*. Currently, over 7.2 million Koreans are categorized as *dongpo* according to the Korean Overseas Foundation of the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs. During a heyday of the *Joseonjok* community, around 2 million *Joseonjok* lived in *Dongbei* (taking more than 70% of the total population of designated minority regions) forming a stable diaspora society contributing to the region in various forms. "I'm glad that the *Joseonjok* abroad are now officially recognized by the Chinese authority as *huagyo* (overseas Chinese). This means that we're also protected by the state of China, even abroad" (Interview 2015 Yanbian). Nevertheless, linked with the notion of the diaspora guest workers' attitudes toward the host country, the *Joseonjok*'s reaction to their perceived or real mistreatment by the ROK is much more organized and explicit. Beginning with their collective protest against the ROK's 1999 Act on Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans (Baek et al. 1999), their responses have covered a wide range of rights-based claims concerning a variety of issues, such as labor conditions, employment opportunities, access to health care, travel convenience, and even promotion of the *Joseonjok*'s own "ethnic" culture, which contrasts sharply with what they expect from the local or central governments in China. This demonstrates the *Joseonjok*'s growing awareness on political citizenship which is formed in the process of their exposure to the South Korean society.

The ROK government official policy toward overseas Koreans, including the *Joseonjok*, is to encourage and help them to continue to live stable lives as citizens of their host countries while also helping diasporas access their Korean cultural heritage. The ROK has used various civil channels to enhance communication with the region at all levels, but has been increasingly doing so unofficially to avoid any diplomatic unease. The Chinese government has subtly discouraged any aid that is specifically earmarked for the *Joseonjok*. Some ROK government agencies have complained that aid intended for the *Joseonjok* community often goes to the Han Chinese, as it is absorbed as regional aid. The ROK's aid is thus distributed at the local-to-local level or through quasi-government agencies and bodies or exchange programs such as universities, research units, hospitals, schools, cultural centers, and broadcasting companies. Academic and policy research in this region has been steadily supported by various government agencies since the 1990s, demonstrating the

ROK government's focus on the region. This reflects that the ROK government and society still believe that the *Joseonjok* community and people have been playing and will play an important role in bridging the DPRK and ROK (ultimately toward re-unification) and enhance Sino–ROK relations. Some academics are also concerned about the Sino–Korean peninsula relationship in a post-re-unification scenario, especially regarding territorial disputes (particularly any unfinished border negotiation between the DPRK and China) and interpretations of history and history education regarding *Balhae*.[9] Experts have advised the ROK government to avoid setting policy that would generate diplomatic misunderstandings and to provide systematic and sustainable longer-term aid to the region to enhance the welfare of the people, but in a less direct manner (e.g., through networking with *Joseonjok* business associations, such as the *Joseonjok* Entrepreneurs Society and the *Joseonjok* Trade Association).

In 2007, the ROK government changed its policy toward the *Joseonjok*, adopting a more open approach that included an increase in the temporary work scheme quota of up to 300,000 people. Qualifications for naturalization and for visa applications were relaxed. An official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that technically almost all barriers had been removed for any *Joseonjok* wishing to naturalize. In December 2014, the ROK government stated in its 2015 Economic Policy that it would further relax regulations on overseas Koreans' employment in response to the emerging social problems of the low birth rate that resulting population and labor force decreases. Today, the *Joseonjok* perceives that around one-third of their population live in the ROK, another third in the rest of China, and a third in *Dongbei*. Beijing has not officially altered its policy framework toward the *Joseonjok*, although discussions within government think tanks have revealed controversies, especially since the mid-2000s, when South Korea's influence on the region increased substantially. When the South Korean media and society began to make implied territorial claims on the region, Chinese officials became concerned about any surge of activism, fearing that separatist sentiments would prevail, and Beijing's implicit strategy of de-ethnicization became more subtle and indirect.

Thus far, I have discussed to what extent and in what way the *Joseonjok* have survived as a distinctive group in China. While the process is dynamic and continuous, the three major watersheds represent the time around which the group had to face to deal with prominent crises. The first survival was the establishment of the CCP and *Joseonjok*

communist selective integration to the Party; the second survival was the community's struggle during the Cultural Revolution; and the third survival was the period of quasi-integration to the South Korean labor market and subsequent disintegration of their community in *Dongbei*.

A Third Type of National Identity?

In this chapter, I have highlighted the de-ethnicization process that has naturally accompanied the politicization of ethnicity throughout the PRC's state building. This process of politicizing ethnicity and culture happens in most ethnic regions, *albeit* in different forms. When inequality and discontent are high, the process is costly. For the *Joseonjok*, this has been a nationalization effort, as they have struggled for their collective identity and fuller citizenship. Interestingly, because of their particular geopolitical conditions, most of the undesirable but inevitable by-products and risks (social stratification, conflicts in labor markets, and demand for political rights) during this period of China's rapid marketization and re-modernization have been shared with the ROK. Quality communication, sufficient knowledge, and a system that allows full choice are important preconditions for stabilizing a diaspora's complicated national identity. In comparison with communication in the early years of the Open Door policy, the *Joseonjok* gradually have a better understanding of the ROK's society and system. Accordingly, *Joseonjok* who enter the ROK by choice differentiate ethnic ties from material needs. Lax government policy has also provided them with the ability to freely enter, stay, or leave.

Although the *Joseonjok* in *Dongbei* now enjoy a far higher standard of living than they did previously, the emergence of a new system of class stratification has reinforced rather than blurred their identity as members of a minority ethnicity. The interviewees explained that in practice, their minority status prevented them from moving up the social ladder in mainstream Chinese society. Becoming wealthy in China requires close relationships with powerful people in the Party and the central government. Therefore, contact with both Chinese and South Korean societies makes the *Joseonjok* keenly aware of their minority status in both contexts and their lack of affiliation with the majority populations of both nations. The *Joseonjok* case demonstrates that the outcomes of ethnic interactions in various stages of communism have not yet resulted in clear de-ethnicization through assimilation. In the same vein,

theorizing a diaspora's nationalism by emphasizing de-territorialized transnationalism provides an incomplete picture of that diaspora's national identity. As this case shows, increased communication and network ties with a motherland do not necessarily lead to an ethnic revival or the enforcement of a national identity attached to that motherland.

De-ethnicization and the Formation of a Third Type of National Identity

After a period of confusion, the South Korean factor reshaped the diasporic identity in a way that differentiated the *Joseonjok* from the ROK. Although the collective action of the *Joseonjok*, including their collective movements, has been limited, their strategic non-collective action has been an active choice. The *Joseonjok* have been a nonvolatile and seemingly subservient minority group struggling to achieve their own identity and recognition. They elected not to challenge the host country and learned how to switch between its dual national identities as required, adopting its civic-obligation-oriented identity (*gongmin*) for security purposes while, more recently, claiming its Korean ethnic roots to pursue economic opportunities. However, the *Joseonjok*'s identity formation can be understood as efforts to establish a third national identity belonging to neither China nor the Korean nations. This process is informed by the community's collective vision and determines the future prospects of its regional prosperity.

A question arises: What is the difference between this de-territorialized third type of diaspora national identity and Korean motherland transnationalism? The former is the local people's indigenous evolution as it relates to the Korean nation that they imagined and later selectively accepted for their own identity and interests, whereas the latter connotes an exogenous top-down push on the diaspora imposed by ROK popular ethnicity empathizing nationalists with a hierarchical presumption. This implies an alternative to the conventional paradigm that perceives national identity as something rigidly belonging to an internationally legitimized political entity with a firm territorial base and exclusive attachment to a singular national culture. In contrast, the third type of national identity connotes an optional and controllable national identity. Diasporas that have this third identity are able to think in terms of both belonging to and being outside of the nation to which they are conventionally supposed to belong. They are exposed to multiple national

cultures, and they deal with the question of how to shift their identities under changing circumstances. Diasporas may thus stabilize their plural national identities through a positive interpretation of the third-ness.

Third-Ness as the Restoration of Lost "National" Identity

The process of differentiation as a part of identity building has continued throughout the history of incorporation. A diaspora's identity evolves as a collective identity that is distinguishable from the existing national identity. This third type of national identity can be conceptualized as opposed to a stable national identity that grows out of a situation in which a person belongs to a dominant national group with its own externally recognized independent state. Therefore, s/he is undoubtedly considered a first-class citizen (in terms of nationality) (Sphere I in Fig. 4.1). The second type of national identity can be understood by comparing it to a person from a minority national group who views his/her dual nationality as highly negative or abnormal and who thus aspires to a further degree of integration (Sphere II). Another ethnocentric category could include those who do not necessarily accept their minority status and strongly advocate collectivity as a distinguishable group and naturally require further recognition at all costs (Sphere III). Their means may include physical confrontations, which could destabilize the host state.



Fig. 4.1 Conceptual quadrant on the third type of national identity (restauration of lost nationality)

The third type of national identity can be nurtured when the plurality of a national identity is positively accepted and considered an advantage, which ultimately leads to a view of national identity as an individual choice (Sphere IV). When minority nationals' satisfaction is balanced between inclusion and recognition, they form a stable community, which motivates them to voluntarily and proactively contribute to the development of their communities and wider society.

Whether a person actually belongs to a diaspora community is dependent on individual choice, as a diaspora is not a fixed political or legal boundary or association. Although it has a kind of historical and cultural demarcation, as Tamir (1993) and Gutmann (2003) implied, providing the social environment in which to make such a choice is a political issue. Some within the diaspora may want to live without a national or ethnic categorization. Social psychologists (e.g., Malesevic and Malesevic 2001) have argued that both primordialism and modernism neglect that individuals have different contextual perceptions of national identity. This suggests the need to consider different types of individuals in terms of their orientations toward national identity. Their categorization suggests that there are different levels or stages of perceiving collective identity in terms of nation or ethnicity: "ritual ethnic identity," which refers to a high level of retention of the practice of ethnic traditions accompanied by low levels of subjective components, such as feelings of group obligation; "ideological ethnic identity," which implies a strong group obligation accompanied by a low level of traditional practice; "identity of resistance/revolt," which involves negative views of one's own ethnic group accompanied by a high degree of awareness of one's ethnic ancestry (a mixture of sympathy and shame regarding the DPRK and a mixture of humiliation and rivalry regarding the ROK); and "identity of ethnic rediscovery," which entails positive images of one's ancestral group and the practice of certain traditions. Thus, a diaspora group includes people with wide interpretations of a diaspora's national identity.

Although I focus on diaspora identity in the extended setting—the Korean motherlands, other diaspora communities, and the globalized international community—the particular aspect of diaspora identity explained here is inseparable from diaspora features developed within the structural relationships between the host nation and the diaspora and between organizations and diaspora individuals. The evolution of diaspora identity has never been separated from host countries' dominance and influence. The diaspora in this study does not have its own separate

nation, but it is not nationless. On the contrary, it belongs to multiple nations, and multiple national identities have evolved. This plurality has been considered a confusing and unstable collective identity and has led to a mistrust of the community. However, once this plurality is accepted, the diaspora's national identity can be understood as a hybrid, a different domain. As diasporas can position themselves in different settings, their interpretations of their collective selves gradually develop into an awareness of their differences and complexity. By expanding and deepening their interpretation of their collective selves, diasporas continuously build their own spheres of identity to different degrees and over different time spans. This can be explained as a response to the paradigm shift from exclusive loyalty to a single nation in a rigid international framework with the hidden nation-state agenda to a flexible understanding of multiple nationalities. The host states, motherlands, and international political environment have pressured diasporas to frame themselves as citizens or non-citizens (or second-class citizens). Through increased communication with the outside public world, diasporas perceive the extended structure in which they are situated.

Recently, the *Joseonjok* community has faced new types of pressures to cope with such as Beijing's security-based approach to minority issues, the diversification of different groups' visions on the future of the community, and rapidly changing geopolitical conditions, particularly concerning North Korea. In dealing with those issues, the *Joseonjok*'s efforts to form a stable third type of national identity have been somewhat frustrated.

Conclusion

China's northeast has been a sensitive region throughout its history. The *Joseonjok* community, together with other ethnic groups including the Han Chinese, has contributed to the region's current stage of development in conjunction with China's efforts to preserve its multicultural characteristics. As long as the region has particular value to Beijing in terms of security and development potential, the *Joseonjok* community will remain a significant part of the Chinese population despite the government's policy adjustments and subsequent changes in ethnic interactions. A considerable degree of de-ethnicization has taken place, both voluntarily by the community and reactively to the central government's less active encouragement of ethnicized development. Consequently, the disintegration of the community's physical form is noteworthy, although

its newly evolving collective identity is driving the community toward re-diasporization outside the traditionally *Joseonjok* lands of *Dongbei*.

In terms of the implications of these changes for the peaceful preservation of multiculturality in China, in contrast to the common Marxist view of the relationship between ethnic nationalism and communism, China's ethnic minorities have benefited substantially from communist-driven modernization. Ethnic relations in China have historically been shaped in large part by the PRC's nationality policy, according to which autonomy is officially recognized within territorialized ethnic boundaries. However, the *Joseonjok* case discussed herein demonstrates that within the framework of this policy, the PRC's emphasis has shifted to a rigid centralized vision of territorial unity accompanied by de-ethnicization pressure. The *Joseonjok* case offers an example of the coexistence of ethnic diversity and socialist solidarity in China, but the research findings also suggest that increasingly less effort is being devoted to maintaining that model. As the combination of gradual de-ethnicization and unequal regional development can be considered a policy failure, the Chinese way of preserving and encouraging multiculturality is shown to be ineffective. The next chapter further elaborates how the interaction between identity formation and policy failure is interlinked with missed opportunity of regional development in a broader sense.

Notes

1. For media analysis, see, for example, "Could SOE reform in China usher in the next economic revolution?" (*The South China Morning Post*, November 16, 2016); "China's owned enterprises: a whimper, not a bang" (*The Economist*, September 19, 2015).
2. For a comment on the current system of *hukou* and its application to Xinjiang, see, for example, "All residents in China's restive Xinjiang region must hand in passports to police" (*The South China Morning Post*, November 24, 2016).
3. This is stipulated in the White Paper on Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities in China in February 2005 (part II: the formation and structure of regional autonomous region); Constitution of the PRC; the Law of the PRC on Regional Autonomy. See Bosely (2007, p. 293).
4. "China arrests US aid worker over NGO activities helping North Koreans" (*The South China Morning Post*, December 21, 2014).
5. "The *Peskama-ho* uprising and murder case that were defended by Mun Jae In" [*Mun Jae-In-ibeonhohaetdeon Peskamahoui seonsang banran salyuk sageon*] (*Chosun Pub*, July 6, 2016). http://pub.chosun.com/client/

news/viw.asp?cate=C01&nCateM=M1003&nNewsNumb=20160720782&nidx=20783. Accessed December 23, 2016.

6. Interview with Yanbian TV (October 25, 1999), celebrating the author's then recently published novel, *Dumangang in Tears.*
7. "The main culprit in the *Peskama-ho* incident received a special commutation despite objections by the Ministry of Justice" [*Seonsang banran Peskamaho jubeom, beopmubu bandae-e-do teukbyeol gamhyeong*] (*Chosun Ilbo*, May 27, 2015). http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2015/05/27/2015052700229.html. Accessed November 28, 2016.
8. "700,000 Joseonjokin South Korean" [*GuknaeJoseonjokchilsipman*], (*Yeonhap News,* articles in series, January 20–February 3, 2015).
9. For comments and internal discourse on the controversy, see, for example, Professor Im Ji Hyeon's interview article, "The history of Goguryeo is neither Korean nor Chinese" [*Goguryeosa-neunhanguksa-do junggguksa-do anida*] (*Media Today*, September 2, 2004). http://www.mediatoday.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=30564. Accessed June 20, 2015.

References

Armstrong, John A. 1976. Mobilized and proletarian diasporas. *American Political Science Review* 70 (2): 393–408.

Auty, Richard M. 1992. Industrial policy reform in China: Structure and regional imbalances. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 17 (4): 481–494.

Baek, Cheong Hyeon, et al. 1999. *Jaeoedongpo guankye ipbeopui naeyonggua hyeonsik-e guanhan geomto* [Review of legislation for overseas Korean]. Seoul: Association of Koreans Abroad, Research paper 98–102.

Birch, Anthony H. 1989. *Nationalism and national integration*. London: Unwin Hyman.

Borchigud, Wulig. 1995. *The impact of urban ethnic education on modern Mongolian ethnicity*, 1949–1966. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Bosely, Corey. 2007. The ethnic minority policies of the People's Republic of China: Patronage and prejudice. *Rutgers Race and Law Review* 8 (2): 291–319.

Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. *Security: A new framework for analysis*. Boulder: Lynne Reinner.

Cha, Han Pil. 2006. *Junggguksok-e ilddeoseoneun hanminjok* [The rising Korean nation in China]. Seoul: Yemun Seowon.

Chae, Yong Chun and Huh Myong Chul, et al. 2013. *Gakkapggodo meon nara* [Close but distant country]. Yanbian: Yeonbyeon Inminchulpansa.

Cho, Mun Young. 2013. *The specter of 'the people': Urban poverty in northeast China*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Dreyer, June Teufel. 2005. China's vulnerability to minority separatism. *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 32: 69–86.

Fischer, Andrew M. 2015. Subsidizing Tibet: An interprovincial comparison of Western China up to the end of the Hu–Wen administration. *The China Quarterly* 221: 73–99.

Gustafsson, Björn, and Ding Sai. 2014. Why is there no income gap between the Hui muslim minority and the Han majority in rural Ningxia, China? *The China Quarterly* 220: 968–987.

Gutmann, Amy. 2003. *Identity in democracy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Han, Enze. 2013. *Contestation and adaptation: The politics of national identity in China*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Han, Sang Bok, and Tae-Hwan Gwon. 1993. *Junggguk yeonbyeon Joseonjok: sahoeui gujowa byeonhua* [Joseonjok in Yanbian, China: social structure and changes]. Seoul: Seoul National University Press.

Harold, S.W. 2012. Ieodo as metaphor?: The growing importance of sovereignty disputes in South Korea-China relations and the role of the United States. *Asian Perspective* 36 (2): 287–307.

Ho, Elaine Lynn-Ee. 2011. Claiming' the diaspora: Elite mobility, sending state strategies and the spatialities of citizenship. *Progress in Human Geography* 35 (6): 757–772.

Hu, Hengfu, and Keqing Chen. 2011. *Minzu zhuyi dui zhongyang yu minzu diqu guangxi de yingxiang he duice* [The impacts of nationalism on the relationship between central government and ethnicity areas and strategies]. *Thinking* 3: 139–140.

Jang, Kyeong Ryul. 2007. *Jinsilgirokeuluihan momburim* [Struggling to write the truth]. Yanbian: Yeonbyeon Inminchulpansa.

Jeong, Pan Ryong. 1997. *Gohyangtteona osipnyeon* [Fifty years, after leaving hometown]. Heilyongjiang: Heukryonggang Minjokchulpansa.

Kim, Jae Guk. 1998. *Hangukeun eopda* [Korea doesn't exist]. Yanbian: Yeonbyeon Minjokchulpansa.

Kim, Jong Guk. 1999. *Ishipil saegiui Joseonjok* [Joseonjok in the 21st century]. Yanbian: Yeonbyeon Minjokchulpansa.

Kim, Hyejin. 2010. *International ethnic networks and intra-ethnic conflict: Koreans in China*. New York: Macmillan.

Kim, Hong Nack. 2013. *China's policy toward North Korea under the Xi Jinping leadership*, 83–98. Fall: North Korean Review.

Liang, Zai, and Zhongdong Ma. 2004. China's floating population: New evidence from the 2000 census. *Population and Development Review* 30 (3): 467–488.

Lin, Chun. 2015. Modernity and the violence of global accumulation: The case of ethnic question in China. In *Global Modernity and Social Contestation*, ed. Breno Bringel and Jose Mauricio Domingues. London: Sage Publication.

Luova, Outi. 2009. Transnational linkages and development initiatives in ethnic Korean Yanbian, Northeast China: "sweet and sour" capital transfers. *Pacific Affairs* 82 (3): 427–446.

Mackerras, Colin. 2003. *China's ethnic minorities and globalisation*. London: Routledge.

Miyajima, Mika. 2013. Transmigratory movement and life-world of the Korean-Chinese in northeast Asia: based on life histories of Chaoxianzu/Chosunjok women. *Frontier of North East Asian Studies* 12: 69–99.

Moore, William M. 1989. China industrial relations: Amid the conflict of tradition and reform. *Labor Law Journal*, December 40 (12): 747–755.

Mun, Hyung Jin. 2008. *Hanguknae Joseonjok nodongjadeului galdeung sarye-e guanhan yeongu* [Case studies of Joseonjok labour conflicts in South Korea]. *Gukjae jiyeok yeongu* 12 (1): 131–156.

Nolan, Peter. 2014. Globalisation and industrial policy: The case of China. *The World Economy* 37 (6): 747–764.

Park, Jeongwon Bourdais. 2017. Ethnic relations in Northeast China: ethnic revival or de-ethnicization in the Korean diaspora?. *European Journal of East Asian Studies* 16: 36–66.

Park, Young Gyun. 2014. *Sangsangdoen gongdongchaeui wahaewa Joseonjokdeului habitus* [Disintegration of the imagined community and the Joseonjok habitus]. *Tongil Inmunhak Nonchong*, 59: 5–30.

Pettinicchio, David. 2012. Migration and ethnic nationalism: Anglophone exit and the 'decolonisation' of Québec. *Nations and Nationalism* 18 (4): 719–743.

Piao, Guangxing. 2014. *Yasuoxing chengshihua xia de minzu gongtongti 'Lisan Weiji' yu 'Chonggou Yundong' – jiyu dui Chaoxianzu chengshihua jingchen de kaocha* [Disperse crisis and reconstructing movement of ethnic communities in compressed urbanization-based on a survey of urbanization process of Korean ethnic group]. *Journal of Minzu University of China* 41 (3): 88–97.

Saich, Tony (ed.). 2011. *Governance and politics of China*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Tamir, Yael. 1993. *Liberal nationalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Wang, Xiaozhou, R.S. Oropesa, and Glenn Firebaugh. 2013. Permanent migrants to cities in China: Hukou origin and earnings among men in an era of economic transformation. *Migration and Development* 2 (1): 37–56.

Woodward, Dennis. 1985. China's industrial reform policy. *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 14: 85–104.

Wright, Teresa. 2010. *Accepting authoritarianism: State-society relations in China's reform era*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Yan, Wenhu. 2005. *Kuajie minzu wenti yu zhongguo de heping huangjing* [Cross-border ethnicity issues and peaceful environments of China]. *Contemporary International Relations,* 5: 24–31.

Zhang, Ming. 2009. *Woguo kuojie minzu de zhengzhi xinli fenxi* [Analysis on the political psychology of cross-border ethnicities in China]. *Legal System and Society* 16: 190–191.

CHAPTER 5

Developmentalism, Nationalism, and the Prosperity of China's Northeast

The *Joseonjok* case demonstrates that, although the physical boundaries of collectivity seem less clear than before, nationalism and collective identity continuously evolve. In the same vein, regarding the *Joseonjok*'s close relationship with their motherlands, theorizing about diaspora nationalism that emphasizes de-territorialized transnationalism[1] does not provide a complete picture of the national identity of a diaspora. As this case shows, increased communications and networking with motherlands do not necessarily lead to an ethnic revival or the enforcement of national identity attached to the motherlands. Moreover, it remains unclear whether the transition from a centralized socialist economy to decentralized market socialism has stabilized the relations of China's various national and ethnic groups. Thus, this chapter further explores the consequences of the PRC's developmentalism on the ethnicity and overall prosperity of the region by examining how the *Joseonjok* community has been motivated to contribute to the development of the region. Accordingly, the main questions raised in this chapter include the following. How have the changing geopolitics in the region and China's dynamic political economy redirected the diaspora and discourses on its future prosperity? How has the *Joseonjok* community responded to these dynamic changes? To what extent has "third type of nationalism" theory (explained in the previous chapter) informed the diaspora's response to the PRC's policy toward ethnic minority and regional development?

J.B. Park, *Identity, Policy, and Prosperity*, China in Transformation,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-4849-4_5

The preceding two chapters discussed how the local people have coped with the diaspora's common paradox: to achieve a fuller degree of integration without losing distinctiveness. I also explained how the PRC's central and local governments' policy intervention and "non-intervention" (inaction) interconnectedly function in driving the community into such struggle. In this chapter, I further discuss how this identity and policy intervention can interact with locality and prosperity. Without a willingness to accept or explicitly discuss multiculturalism as a social vision or public policy, modern China may face increasing challenges in managing its ethnically divided multiculturality. Although the PRC–Yanbian case demonstrated the possibility of peaceful ethnic coexistence under a socialist version of multiculturalism before the reform era,[2] policy failure, both intended and unintended, has led to new concerns regarding the conflict between developmentalism and multiculturalism. This conflict jeopardizes both equality in ethnic relationships and equitable long-term regional development. The *Joseonjok* community has responded proactively, choosing gradual re-diasporization and nationalization of ethnicity. The chapter portrays this phenomenon as their attempt to shed their perpetual minority status, as they have been unofficially pressured to choose either a Korean or a Chinese identity while simultaneously coping with internal divisions within the community. The mobilization of a minority's ethnic nationalism does not always result in antagonistic political action, and a seemingly dormant identity can be mobilized in various forms when certain conditions are met.

China's economic reform and subsequent development from 1989 to 1990 until the mid-2000s has received a great deal of attention, but the Party and government most strongly pushed political reform during this time accompanying policy emphasizing Chinese nationalism for solidarity of the people. Although the Party has tried to promote patriotism using various methods (education, cultural programs, national museums, etc.), it has focused most on historical memories of "state humiliation" and times when China was victimized by outside forces, particularly highlighting the Opium War, unequal treaties, and the subsequent loss of territories. This program has been successful, especially when Chinese citizens react to the outside world. While accepting gradual marketization and recognizing the bourgeois class as partners in the country's development and re-modernization, the Party has naturally adopted an alternative official ideology to replace or compete with communism.

A Place for Ethnic Minority Communities in China's Developmentalism

Developmentalism and Nationalism

The introduction of the market economy has led to a heightened view of entrepreneurs and economic gains compared with the ideology of the CCP and political power groups. As loyalty has shifted from communism to capitalism and the wealthy, a new political ideology is needed for national solidarity. The government has also endeavored to unify the Chinese people, especially since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Tiananmen Square Incident. Mobilization was successful during the Beijing Olympics and publicity related to Nanjing. The more secure the CCP is, the more likely the state is to endorse expansionism and to target neighboring countries as national enemies. Motivations and tools of a state's expansionism can be far more complicated than explanations with a single theoretical perspective. Only limiting my discussions to the relevant scope to understand the relationship between official and ethnic nationalisms, the CCP's use of national humiliation discourse as a tool for mass mobilization is noteworthy. The instigation of popular nationalism was particularly successful when the diplomatic situation worsened because of ongoing territorial disputes over the *Senkaku/Diaoyu* Islands (Dujarric 2016; Wang 2012; Wallace and Weiss 2015). Recently, government-instigated popular patriotism against the ROK on the decision of deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) can be understood in this context. This time again, Beijing linked it with trade restrictions on South Korean products and businesses in China while explicitly encouraging domestic consumers' boycotting South Korean goods and TV dramas. This is one of the clear examples how state-led Chinese patriotism is inevitably conflicting with China's multicultural approach to embracing ethnic minorities' identities. This case directly provokes the *Joseonjok* community's deep anxieties provided that such instigation first started in Dandong city in Liaoning where most of South Korean enterprises have their bases with employing many *Joseonjok* workers (*The Straits Times*, March 5, 2017).[3] Moreover, among around 8,000 Joseonjok tour guides working in South Korea, 40% temporarily lost their contracts with their agencies,[4] which will directly affect Joseonjok's remittance sent back to China. Under President Jiang Zemin and

particularly after the Tiananmen Incident, the discourse on mass mobilization became a "national" question. The "history education" reform under Jiang, which included a "patriotic education campaign" to reinforce the legitimacy of the Party, can be understood in this context.[5]

> The Chinese government's campaign against a US and South Korean anti-missile system has attracted some unusual recruits: children as young as seven who have joined impromptu rallies and boycotts across the country. … The Century Star Elementary School in Yali township, part of Hebei province, put on a rally attended by about 400 students and staff. In an online video, students no older than 12 pledged to boycott South Korean products and 'resist' the deployment of a US-operated […] THAAD. At the rally, a teacher painted a grim picture of the potential consequences of the Thaad deployment. "South Korea is our neighbor," the teacher said. "In the event of war, the US will turn China into a slaughterhouse. For China, [Thaad] is a fatal threat." The teacher urged the students to boycott South Korean trips, television programmes, cosmetics and any products sold by Lotte, the South Korean retailer whose parent company relinquished some of the land needed for Thaad's deployment. "Students, can we do this?" the teacher asks. "Can! Can! Can!" The students reply. […]. (*Financial Times*, 20 March 2017, p. 4)

Previously, the CCP had preferred to use China's class division (bourgeois versus grassroots) and class struggle as critical social forces. The rise of nationalism can use the rigid political ideology of communism to re-mobilize people, making class struggle the final goal. Inclusive collective identity is often most efficiently built in the face of a shared enemy, whether real or fabricated. Thus, an important governing tool is to use economic development to ease public concerns regarding the sudden shift in emphasis from class to the nation, and the Chinese government has used economic development to re-consolidate socialism with Chinese characteristics. During this period of state reform, many strongly believed that China was undergoing a transition to better achieve the socialist goal of an equitable society. Therein, state-led official nationalism could be merged with developmentalism and patriotism. This effort is to some degree associated with China's misapprehension stemming from the Western presumption of functional modernism that interlinks economic development with the political democratization that may accompany a resurgence of mass movements against the PRC government and CCP.[6] Shifting collective anger and discontent from

established ruling groups to outside enemies is an important tactic for eliminating internally destabilizing risks. China's nationalist campaign under Jiang has also focused on a "unified" China and "big" Chinese nationalism as opposed to local nationalism and great Hanism. During the Tiananmen Incident, the rise of local ethnic nationalism in Xinjiang was extensive. In regions such as Xinjiang and Tibet, historical memories about China are more antagonistic than cooperative (Wang 2012). In this respect, renewed efforts to recognize ethnic groups' contributions to the country have symbolic significance, as the government's nationalist campaigns to reinforce collective historical memories may be regarded exclusive rather than inclusive of certain minority groups.

At this stage of development, the role of a sound middle class (balanced with relatively high education and strong social values) becomes important for the stability and future development of society. The bourgeois class, previously an "enemy" of the people, has become integral to the Party, and the rise of capitalism has made bourgeois entrepreneurs into national heroes defending the nation's future from complete socialism. If a society becomes more open and diversified, nationalism naturally becomes diversified, as the state has various stakeholders who insist they have the best blueprint for the nation. Thus, nationalism is not a standalone political ideology per se; and it can develop different facets depending on the direction of social stratification. Official state nationalism is often an ideologically overarching political framework that requires substantive ideas and values and concrete programs. If a state is the only leading actor, nationalism may easily become a hollow belief that may only periodically serve to mobilize emotive collective action to consolidate the legitimacy of the state.

Connor's (1984) explanation of the diverse strains of Marxism informs the coexistence of Marxism and nationalism. Whereas classical Marxism is understood to be irreconcilable with nationalism, a second strain of Marxism formally recognizes the right of national self-determination and selectively supports national movements in real politics. A third strain is seen as national characteristics transcending epochs and in recognition of "the role of nations as the principal instrumentality of historical forces" (Connor 1984, pp. 19–20). Thus, while classical Marxism is irreconcilable with nationalism because of class warfare in practice, Marxism can be nationalized and then coexist with nationalism. Although Marxism is skeptical about the notions of nations and nationalism in general, considering them "false consciousness" and doomed to

disappear, Marx himself recognized their value when they could "help the revolutionary cause of the proletariat" (Szporluk 1988, pp. 185–186). This communist instrumentalism provides a relevant insight into the consistency in the midst of China's changing policy and attitudes toward ethnic minority groups. This resolves to some degree the odd hybridity of marketization under communism. In contemporary China, most members of the bourgeois class are already established power elites who could easily seize political and financial power. Thus, the middle class does not represent civil society in such a way as to check the CCP's political elites and powerful governing groups. "For example, the CEOs of several of the largest enterprises hold an ex officio ministerial rank in the Chinese government" (OECD 2015, p. 138). Successful bourgeois class entrepreneurs join the CCP, which should go against the rule of communism and which nurtures corruption. Thus, it is unsurprising that the government's agenda is to preserve the hybrid political system by reinforcing its power structure at all costs.

The totalitarian government has had difficulty promoting diverse nationalisms and patriotism among all of the ethnic groups and diverse social classes across the country. This in turn hampers equitable implementation of state's development agenda acorss minority regions. Woodward (1985) noted that socialism with Chinese characteristics emphasizes the development of the heavy industrial sector to the exclusion of other sectors. Investment has concentrated on a number of large-scale plants under central control. Amidst industrialization, agriculture in particular has been neglected, and light industrial sectors are also often overlooked. Given that minority regions are concentrated in remote rural areas, including those of the *Joseonjok* farms, the economies of minority regions have deteriorated, and the adverse effects of industrialization in these areas have become more severe than in cities.

Developmentalism, Nationalism, and Ethnic Minorities

China's developmentalism as a national agenda was brought to the fore in the mid-2000s. Rapid development inevitably prioritizes optimality and efficiency and reinforces strong social harmony and solidarity, and China's case has led to Han-centered state-led nationalism and gradual withdrawal from the country's rhetoric and self-celebration of socialist multicultural diversity. Similar to the Soviet case, where nation building (Russification) and state building (Sovietization) coevolved under Yeltsin's federalism policy (Tanrisever 2009, pp. 342–343), China's Sinification evolved

in parallel with Hanification due to fear of ethnic surges and subsequent insecurity. Totalitarian developmentalism is closely linked with the rise of nationalism, and the effects of state-led developmentalism have produced a negative synergy with regionalism. Ethnic communities have faced disintegration, as they have been implicitly driven to become highly self-sufficient while struggling against assimilation pressure. This policy crisis has arisen from the reform ideology of developmentalism, which stems from a reinterpretation of the PRC's constitutional principles, the government's efforts to depoliticize ethnicity, and its weakening commitment to promoting ethnic equality and solidarity (Lin 2015, p. 63).

Also significant is the opportunity cost of hindering potential development due to the securitization of the region and the diaspora people, who feel pressured by changes in policy direction to fulfill their duty as valuable guest workers. The *Joseonjok*'s wanderlust disposition is often blamed, but the deterioration of the agricultural sector should be considered a substantial rural development policy failure than problems with ethnicity itself. The imbalance in the economy brought about by the focus on heavy industry has led to low rates of growth in other sectors and to periodic investment crises (Woodward 1985, p. 86). The contradiction became more explicit as the central planned economy was imposed while opening the market, as bureaucratic and regulatory control ironically became harsher. The success of enterprises is measured in terms of fulfilling outputs and is often problematic in terms of quality control. Private corporations are developed on the surface, but most infrastructure-related industry is state-owned, operated by the Party rather than by true market mechanisms. Consequently, efficiency levels remain low and financial sources are allocated where benefits are unclear and invisible. However, overcoming structural problems means implementing measures such as social security, minimum wage law, and service sector (finance) development, which halt growth. In this regard, China's developmentalism agenda at this stage promulgates growthism rather than developmentalism in a real sense. The developmentalism vision needs to include longer-term perspectives to take into account the complexity and interconnectivity of today's world and China's increased role and responsibility as an influential global power.

Against the background of imposing state developmentalism, Jiang's reconstruction of the Party after 1989 using the humiliation discourse proceeded in parallel with Han Chinese-centered patriotism. Thus, more room has been created for volatile minorities to become further marginalized both materially and psychologically. To certain minority

nationals, humiliation comes more from the Han Chinese, not from outsiders. In addition, the state's stricter sense of One China policy and territorial integrity against autonomy directly contradicts certain minority groups' goals and visions. The series of White Papers issued by the PRC government reconfirms the fundamental principles of regional integrity, including "The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China" (August 1993), "China's Policy on 'Three Direct Links' Across the Taiwan Straits" (Dec 2003), "The Practice of the 'One Country Two Systems' Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region" (June 2014), and "China Adheres to the Position of Settling Through Negotiation the Relevant Disputes Between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea" (July 2016). Reconfirming the PRC's principle of territorial integrity has somehow coevolved with securitization of all other ethnic minority regions in China. Although most of these regions have little to do with separatism, indiscriminate securitization of ethnic and regional conflicts has resulted in gradual diminution of minority's autonomy.

In line with Hanification, it was around this time that the state began widely promoting Confucian institutions. The first Confucius Institute opened in November 2004 in Seoul. In 2006, a new institute was established every 4 days and expected to have 1,000 by 2020.[7] Confucianism, whether as a religion, ideology, or social doctrine, is not accepted by all ethnic groups in China. The marriage between developmentalism and Han-centered nationalism has created numerous issues, especially regarding the question of national and ethnic minorities given that development involves the prioritization of regions and that popular nationalism entails new resolutions of conflicting (or unshared) historical memories between Han Chinese and ethnic minorities. During the educational campaign, efforts were made to incorporate minorities into the "big China" concept to share the history of humiliation and future goals, but some did not share this humiliation history, even holding antagonistic memories regarding the Han Chinese; thus, discomfort increased among certain minority groups. The two national agendas of developmentalism and dealing with minorities (tensions between nostalgic Han-dominated popular nationalism and inclusive multiculturalism) have been a problem in modern China. The more the two agendas progress in synergy, the less the minority national groups can secure their own space and historical memories. The *Joseonjok* are not an exception, although the way

the group has responded to these forces has differed greatly from the responses of other prominent ethnic groups in China.

The religion factor is often over-stressed in studies of ethnic tensions and polarization in China (Han and Paik 2014). Koreans are religiously heterogeneous. Although it is believed that one of the crucial factors in their non-conflicting relationship with other ethnic groups is attributed to Koreans being acculturated to China's Confucian beliefs before diasporization. Confucian acculturation is often used among Chinese scholars as a barometer of civilization, which itself can be regarded as a form of Han-centered culturalism. It is often interpreted that Confucian acculturation is one of the most crucial factors in building trust and preserving an ethnic relationship without conflict. Although it is true that some level of Confucian belief is embedded in *Joseonjok* society in terms of customs and moral code in daily life, it is not considered a religion. A large number of *Joseonjok* have identified as Christian over the last several decades, as they have been heavily influenced by the ROK and overseas Koreans form Western countries. "Christians are not persecuted to the same extent as other religious groups, but are still subject to stringent government regulation" (Bosely 2007, p. 296). Neither "non-religiousness" nor "sharing Confucius doctrine as a religious belief" explains clearly non-conflicting ethnic relations. In fact, the Korean nation's long history of religious heterogeneity itself might have contributed to the development of a non-exclusive ethnic boundary with other nations unless collectively offended, oppressed, or materially disadvantaged. Many have erroneously asserted that *Joseonjok* or Korean society have preserved Confucius doctrine even more rigidly than the Han Chinese society. As it is not accurate to say that the *Joseonjok* and Koreans are non-religious, the *Joseonjok* case demonstrates that religion cannot unarguably be considered the key determinant in explaining antagonistic ethnic relations.

Developmentalism, State Nationalism, and Ethnic Relations in *Dongbei*

As discussed briefly earlier, without being combined with a substantive political ideology, the state's official nationalism may only be propaganda, which may focus on the country's glorious or victimized moments or other sharable memories. In this regard, in a multinational state, collective memories may unavoidably clash with one another

depending on the particular integrational histories of the group in question. "Imagined communities" (Anderson 1983) in nationalism may pose a danger because the psychological map of each country in the collective imagination is usually much larger than the actual map under the current setting of the international system (Bae 1998; Harding 1993). This leads to inevitable clashes as states continuously instigate among the general public with their official selection of historical episodes from the most glorious or most victimized eras as the core programs of nationalism. For example, Japan's revisionist elites see Manchuria as the country's lost land where imperial Japan's vision of fulfilling Asian nationalism was frustrated. This is linked with the danger of politicizing collective memories, but it is not constructed from nothing as Marxist modernists would argue. Official programs are designed and implemented by a small group of national elites in a core governing group consisting of well-educated conservatives who are adaptive to mainstream society. In other words, the programming of ordinary people's memories is governed by a group of leaders who have the first type of exclusive national identity (Fig. 4.1) explained in the previous chapter.

China's Northeast Project (begun in 2005) was interlinked with a refresh of Chinese nationalism that defined 1840–1945 as a period of national humiliation to instigate popular nationalism against outsiders (Callahan 2006). It is a process of rebuilding a new collective national identity that marks certain groups of people as outsiders using typical policy tools to promote social ideology, such as textbooks, museums, television dramas, and films (Vickers 2007). In this context, Reilly's analysis is informative, especially his discussions on the contradicting and fluctuating constructions of wartime memory regarding Japan. Reilly divides these fluctuations into four timeframes: China's benevolent amnesia regarding Japan's wartime atrocities before 1982; China's patriotic education campaign in the mid-1980s; the rise of history activism in China in the late 1990s; and the 2005 reversal in official rhetoric on Japan and the wartime past (Reilly 2011). However, how this official nationalism discourse targeting Japan to make historical enemies more real and vivid affects the reconstruction of ethnic minorities' national identity is a separate issue. For example, the détente over historical memories concerning Japan has had little effect on Yanbian. Around 2005, China's Education Ministry urged local educational authorities to develop their own approaches to "patriotic education" based on local history. The "Red Tourism" campaign promotes and commemorates local instances

of heroism and patriotism. Different versions of high school history textbooks in different regions now contain national history with local examples and individuals (Reilly 2011, p. 482). "The displacement of socialism by nationalism (popular nationalism in post-socialist China) as the ideological ballast of the Communist regime has become a commonplace of scholarship on contemporary China" (Vickers 2007, p. 365).

Vickers offered an interesting analysis of the implications of the shifting emphasis (from socialism to patriotism) as represented in museums (Vickers 2007, p. 366). It seems less known that Beijing is using museums to reinforce nationalism, which has implications for minorities. Yanbian National Museum is an example of the local implementation of Beijing's nationalism program to align central and local histories. Having visited the museum in 2000 and 2015, I noted stark differences in its modernization and its presentation of the history of the *Joseonjok*'s participation in the Korean War, as it removed the exhibition on the *Joseonjok*'s preservation of the state border. It was interesting to observe the reappraisal of history, particularly regarding Kim Il Sung, who is now less emphasized, and the link to conflicts of interpretations over historical events. "This is concerned with the nature of the vision of national identity that museum exhibitions encapsulate, implicitly or explicitly, through the way in which they interpret national and local history, by what they choose to emphasize, and what they choose to omit" (Vickers 2007, p. 366). It has significant implications for ethnic minorities, as China is in the midst of rebuilding a "nation"-state, which may signify the transition from a multinational socialist state to an exclusive Han-centered nation-state.

Another issue concerns the commercialization of local history and the museumization of ethnicity. Although many locals have benefited from industry developments and obtained employment at tourist agencies, as tour guides, or at maintenance jobs in popular tourist spots, among the educated, in 2000, local people were concerned that minority regions had become places to visit to meet aboriginals, as in Australia or New Zealand (Interview 2000 Ryongjeong). When I spoke with an interviewee again in 2015, the interviewee spoke about the benefits that Yanbian had gained from the uncomfortable conflicts over historical facts and interpretations between the ROK and China. The interviewee said, "We cannot just rely on the ROK. We'll lose our historical heritage such as several hundred-thousands of *Goguryeo* murals, tombs, and mountain fortress in Lioning and Jilin, over 200 (in Yanbian alone) *Balhae* remains, and traces of loyal palaces in Heilongjiang, if we don't report those valuable heritages as Chinese,

but the ordinary South Koreans urged us to act against the Chinese government's guidelines when *Joseonjok* community was asked to report and register historical heritage. Concerned people from the ROK have urged the *Joseonjok* to preserve those clearly showing a firm stance to maintain Korean historical heritage, and they have often criticized us as opportunistic, but who will protect us if anything goes wrong? I doubt that the ROK would be in the position to protect our community, and we might be in trouble with Beijing." These statements reflect the local people's anxiety regarding government-led historical revisionism and potential conflicts with the ROK and the DPRK. In this process, if nationalism is instigated to support marketized socialism as an engine of developmentalism, the official nationalism will inevitably contradict multiculturalism. Guo (1998) also identified a surge of China's nationalism in the 1990s as inevitably "Han nationalism," which can be a cause of psychological distance between the *Joseonjok* and China. When there is a lower possibility of finding overlapping historical elements between official and local nationalism programs, positive constructivism may no longer function, and the minority's voice may become louder because of deepening antagonism, as seen in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia. In the *Joseonjok*'s case, the rise of Han-centered historical revisionism has evoked subtler tensions. The *Joseonjok* community has been made uncomfortable by the deconstruction of *Hanjok–Joseonjok* cooperative historical memories (explained in Chap. 2). Accordingly, the voluntary aspect of the de-ethnicization of the *Joseonjok* community is also partly understood as a counter-reaction to the rise of the Hanification of China since the 1990s.

Within this context, Chinese historians seek to interpret any bit of Korean heritage in *Dongbei* as also possibly Chinese, and the *Joseonjok* have defended their historical heritage to reinforce their collective boundary with the Han Chinese. In this regard, Kim Il Sung who led the establishment of North Korea were also considered under the CCP's boundary of "*Joseonjok* nationalist communists" because they were finally able to build their own independent country with help of the CCP. The CCP's re-collectivization efforts in certain *Joseonjok* towns reflect the PRC's inclusive approach to Chinese nationalism (e.g., the restoration of *Joseonjok* collective farms and towns in Heilongjiang in 2005). During the PRC's Northeastern Project, the *Joseonjok* were again forced to safeguard *Joseonjok* and Chinese culture and history against the ROK's rising research interests in the *Joseonjok* and Koreans' common historical heritage (Korean national heroes, historical monuments, invisible

cultures, and myths) in China. Kim Jeong Ryeol, a South Korean historian and professor of history at Sung-Sil University in Seoul, wrote one of many recently evolving conflicting interpretations over historical facts, records, and episodes. China has gradually attempted to incorporate Korea's 6,000-year-old totem myth (the story of the bear) into Chinese myth.[8] If re-unification is achieved, from China's point of view, blurred cultural and historical distinctions between the *Joseonjok* and Koreans (North and South) will support territorial claims regarding the country's border areas with the DPRK. The PRC's revisionist perception on historical territories is well represented in the 2009 White Paper, "China's Ethnic Policy and Common Prosperity and Development of All Ethnic Groups":

> The boundaries and territory of today's China were developed by all ethnic groups in the big family of the Chinese nation during the long course of historical development. The ancestors of the Han people were the first to develop the Yellow River basin and the Central Plains; those of the Tibetan and Qiang peoples, the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau; those of the Yi and Bai peoples, southwestern China; those of the Manchu, Xibe, Ewenki and Oroqen peoples, northeastern China; those of the Xiongnu, Tujue and Mongolian peoples, the Mongolian grasslands; those of the Li people, Hainan Island; and the ancestors of the ethnic minority peoples of Taiwan, Taiwan Island.

Highlighting the glorious past to foster nationalism in this region carries risk, as these countries' dreams—Japan's imperial era, Korea's Balhae, and China's pre-Opium War era—clash territorially. Patriotism as a culture-neutral political doctrine may be less perpetuating, but when its goal is to impose Han-centered Sinicization, it becomes much more powerful. When the dominant ethnic group's patriotism programs are not culture- or history-free, it becomes extremely difficult to construct a universally inclusive forward-looking collective identity. Similarly, regarding the One China policy, Beijing's dilemma is that the more the CCP relies on national solidarity based on national nostalgia, the more difficult it becomes to justify the logic of embracing Hong Kong and Taiwan; thus, "Pan-Chinese nationalism (while demonstrating more flexibility)" should be China's approach (Guo 1998, p. 185).

Referring to the minority culture sections in the Urumqi and Hohhot museums, as part of the revival of nationalism, Vickers (2007) argued that past and present ethnic relationships portrayed the Han Chinese

"as the source of advanced technology and civilization, and the minorities at the periphery as providing raw materials, luxurious frippery and a touch of exoticism" featuring "an array of colorful ethnic costumes and cases full of various ceremonial and everyday objects" (Vickers 2007, p. 377). The *Joseonjok* are no exception. For example, the voluntarily or by recommendation, ethnic minorities often welcome officials in their exotic traditional costumes, which are no longer worn in daily life. Given that China has become a highly urbanized developed country, the current ethnoregional Chinese model of multicultural self-governance may need to accommodate economic- and finance-related preferential policy in addition to cultural diversity, transforming from stagnated cultural multiculturalism to comprehensive multi-level multiculturalism. A legitimate ground can be found from the two relevant White Papers, particularly the two, "China's Ethnic Policy and Common Prosperity and Development of All Ethnic Groups" (Sept 2009) and "New Progress in Development-oriented Poverty Reduction Program for Rural China" (Nov 2011). The former has higher relevancy to the Joseonjok's case. This chapter addresses the related issues directly:

> The Constitution stipulates, "The state does its utmost to promote the common prosperity of all ethnic groups in the country." The Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy stipulates that it is a legal obligation of the higher-level state organs to help the minority areas accelerate their development. Over the years, the state has made it a major part of national development to promote the economic and social progress of the ethnic minorities and minority areas, and has worked out from time to time policies and measures to this end.

The administrative inefficiency is often criticized. While the central government implemented preferential system in ethnic minority regions (Sun et al. 2014; Zhu 2002; Yang and Sun 2009),[9] there remain prevailing barriers and challenges fundamentally stemming from lack of incentives to cooperate between local governments due to competitions among local cadres (Lu et al. 2013, p. 62) and local governments' limited autonomy in the current tax redistribution system after the 1994 fiscal reform (OECD 2015, p. 192). With marketization and modernization, the regional–ethnic boundary has become increasingly blurred, and policy has become more neutral, particularly economic policy.

Geopolitical Dynamics and the Changing Values of the Diaspora

A question is why the *Joseonjok* have become increasingly cautious and even intimidated without any official change in state policy. Where did their collective fear come from? How is it linked with the perceived security of their community? In this vein, a timely question is how the rapid changes in the region interact with the collective identity of the people, as the answer will highlight the subtle psychological struggle of negotiating for the fundamental security of the community. One of the differences in the development of China's West and East (*Dongbei*) is that in the West the implementation entailed the internal immigration of Han Chinese. Concerning the frequent anti-Beijing and anti-Han Chinese insurgents in Xinjiang, "Beijing's critics say the violence in Xinjiang is prompted by government policies that have marginalized Uyghurs in their native region, which has seen a massive influx of Han Chinese who dominate the local economy, security forces and civil service."[10] In contrast, in *Dongbei*, development has been far more self-sufficient because of the indirect encouragement of the use of ethnic ties for economic development and because of various forms of aid influx from the ROK. In this regard, the "kin relationship" factor plays a substantial role.

As mentioned in the previous chapters, some scholars (Han 2013; Mackerras 2003) have used kin relationship as an important variable in determining ethnic relationships in contemporary China. Likewise, on the question of the significance of foreign policy in ethnic relationships, Clarke (2013, p. 132) explained, "from the establishment of the PRC, Beijing's handling of China's ethnic minorities, particularly in Xinjiang and Tibet, has always been a factor in its foreign relations" with the USA and Soviet Union during the Cold War. Clarke further argued, "With the Soviet collapse, however, China became more concerned with the potential influence of Uyghur and Tibetan diasporas on its foreign relations. … With respect to the Xinjiang and Uyghur issues, Chinese diplomacy was relatively successful in manipulating the post-9/11 climate to paint those Uyghurs advocating independence or autonomy as 'terrorists' and 'extremists'" (Clarke 2013, p. 132). In a similar context, Beijing would also be concerned about the possible internationalization of security issues on the Yanbian–DPRK border in *Dongbei*. In this context, the Yanbian case remains unpredictable given the unsettled and fluctuating

relationships between the groups and countries involved. Conflicts have been latent, but many variables may alter the situation, and tension may be catalyzed and exposed in a variety of forms.

De-securitizing Conventional Risks, Creating New Risks, and Hindrances to Regional Development

Inequalities in regional development have grown continuously since 1985 along with an urban–rural divide and based on whether regions attract domestic and foreign investments. Eastern China's development increased in the 1990s (Zhao and Tong 2000, p. 558; Wu 2009, pp. 34–36). In the early era of re-modernization, *Dongbei* received the full attention of the government's development agenda. In 1983, Deng climbed Mt. *Baekdu*, visited PLA soldiers, and developed 18 guidelines for managing Yanbian autonomous prefecture. Shortly after, Deng urged the acceleration of the Yanbian development plan.[11] However, the plans were not carried out, and Beijing's subsequent development focus on coastal areas left Yanbian relatively undeveloped. The interviewees stated that each time the central and local governments promised development, the community became hopeful, but nothing ever seemed to happen. Beijing's earlier attempt to reform the DPRK by distributing Pyongyang's power to the second center (economic) via Jang Sung Taek resulted in Jang's execution by Pyongyang (Beauchamp-Mustafaga 2014) and more recently in killing of Kim Jong Nam, a half brother of Kim Jong Eun in February 2017. Besides, explicitly (officially) closer economic cooperation between the two countries halted from the late 2000s until recently, when Beijing established equal diplomacy between the DPRK and ROK. In this regard, compared with "normal" non-diaspora national groups, members of diasporas tend to be much more alert to foreign policy issues. The *Joseonjok* people are highly informed about the foreign relations between the three countries, which directly affect their lives.

President Xi's visit to the region in July 2015 attracted a great deal of media interest. The visit was interpreted to mean that the government was aware of the region's sluggish economic growth and its implications for ethnic relationships.[12] Nevertheless, although the One Belt, One Road regional project was vaguely interpreted as including *Dongbei* (with Hunchun as the center of the development linking Russia and the DPRK with *Dongbei*), President Xi's only substantial statement regarding

the region was his recommendation to modernize sanitation in rural *Dongbei*. Several days later, President Xi visited the Changbai Shan Unit of Military Forces in Shenyang, but attracted less attention from the Chinese media, although the ROK media interpreted it as a security warning following the DPRK's security threats. Notwithstanding international sanctions on North Korea as a temporary obstacle, the locals hope that the Chinese government's One Belt, One Road project will promote the region's further development by linking China with North Korean ports, enabling the resumption of the Tumen River project.[13]

More recently, with cautious signals from the central and local governments, the *Joseonjok* have become more involved in the China–DPRK relationship, particularly in trade, both legal and illegal, and cultural exchanges and family visits (Interview 2016 Seoul). As discussed in the preceding chapters, one reason for Beijing's selectively cautious approach to the Yanbian–DPRK relationship has been the issue of North Korean defectors who enter the border regions of China, hoping to eventually reach South Korea. Despite criticism from the international community, China's attitude toward these defectors has been consistently in line with DPRK's policy. The activities of foreign non-governmental organizations are strictly monitored and suppressed, particularly those conducted by members of the Korean diaspora in the USA, who seek to influence DPRK society via Yanbian through human resources and geopolitical advantages (e.g., Greenhill 2011).

Immediately after UN sanctions of the DPRK in June 2016, China declared it would increase food aid and the volume of energy traded to the DPRK.[14] Around this time, the China–DPRK trade volume rose from USD393.83 million to USD537.7 million (China General Administration of Customs 2016). The diplomatic relationship between the aggravating ROK and China may reinforce China's material interests, and China may have little incentive to share its material and security influence over the DPRK with the outside world. Pressures on China from the UN, the USA, and the ROK were stronger than in previous periods of sanctions, and China ultimately revealed a detailed list of DPRK-linked Chinese enterprises. In early 2017, an agreement was reached between the USA and China (with agreement from the UK and France) at the Security Council to extend (revising the loopholes regarding exception clauses to protect the general public's livelihood) the trade ban on coal and steel from the DPRK.

Returning to the development issue, a straightforward question to test inequality is posed as follows: China has risen; have its ethnic minorities risen along with it? The answer is likely yes, but not to an equitable degree. Why are there gaps? The prosperity of an ethnic group is heavily influenced by state policy, and yet the characteristics of minority groups shape their own collectivity in relation to the state's policy. Since the mid-2000s, without a firm direction on ethnic relationships, external forces such as marketization, globalization, and urbanization have reinforced the *Joseonjok*'s guest worker status. This is closely linked to a fear of the state labeling minority regions, especially border areas, as security threats. Furthermore, the *Joseonjok* community's dynamic changes are attributed to frequent full-scale communication with its two motherlands. This has stimulated the *Joseonjok* population's hybrid political socialization, as they have been exposed to at least three different political systems. The ROK provides a place in which the *Joseonjok* can practice their role as political citizens. Many *Joseonjok* have been engaged in the ROK's political process in various ways: participating in local civil movements and lobbying, mobilizing civil movements and collective campaigns concerning various social issues, running for office, and setting up social organizations of various purposes to target *Joseonjok* populations in the ROK. Interviews with the *Joseonjok* in the ROK have shown their aspiration to practice full political citizenship, not as a minority ethnic group but as part of the majority. This phenomenon can be explained as the nationalization (re-politicization) of ethnicity. Many *Joseonjok* have expressed their frustration about being perpetually treated as minorities, even in the ROK. Today, some *Joseonjok*-dominated communities in South Korea are flourishing even faster than those in *Dongbei*. However, in daily life, many still suffer from various forms of discrimination, and some even hide their identity as *Joseonjok* and claim to be DPRK defectors, who the *Joseonjok* believe are better received and protected by ROK society.

Research on China's dilemma has focused on internal discussions versus outsiders' views on the future of China's ethnic map and has revealed that economic development has not been sufficiently shared with minority regions. Local intellectuals stated in interviews that they felt that there was little chance to participate in policymaking, even concerning the regional development in *Dongbei*. One explained, "Although there are many experts on development and experts on this region, Beijing does not need minority intellectuals like us. The central government think tanks are well equipped with highly qualified experts. In the course

of the state's securitization (social construction) of the region, perpetual guest worker status and mentality are reinforced. In China, we as minority nationals would scarcely dream of a successful diaspora-run big enterprise like the *zainichi* (Japan-born Koreans) *Lotte* in Japan because of the social barriers to integrating into the mainstream economic system" (Interview 2015 Jangchun). Although there are approximately 17,500 *Joseonjok*-run enterprises in China by 2005, research has shown that 74% of those enterprises fall under the category of small businesses whereas 21% categorized as medium-sized, according to China's national standard (Lee et al. 2006, pp. 356–364). In the field of trade with the DPRK, even with the *Joseonjok*'s advantageous position, *Joseonjok* entrepreneurs' roles are limited only to small-scale business because China–DPRK trade is directed, monitored and controlled by the state. Most of the corporations involved in investment and business in the DPRK are state-owned (or supported), and their top managers have close relationships with Beijing. *Joseonjok* communities fear indiscriminate securitization. At the beginning of China's Open Door policy, *Joseonjok* autonomous counties and towns served as trade agencies connecting the three parties, but their roles have rapidly diminished, as Beijing has become concerned that the unstable DPRK regime may disturb the sensitive border region and that the *Joseonjok*'s integration with either of the two Koreas could create problems in such circumstances.

Developmentalists' economic positivism in dealing with ethnic minorities was clearly exhibited in a June 2000 article written by the head of the CCP's Ethnic Affairs Commission, Li Dezhu. Li stated that the key to "'solving' China's 'ethnic question' lay in accelerating the development of the 'economy' and 'culture' of the ethnic minorities" (Clarke 2013, p. 126). Its historical root is linked to Deng's slogan: "It doesn't matter if a cat is black or white as long as it catches mice." In the late 1990s, during my first field trip, it was not hard to find local intellectuals who truly believed that the CCP's emphasis on economic development was to reconstruct healthy socialism, but few believe this today. The weaknesses of the developmentalist approach include its over-reliance on economic development as the solution to any potential conflict. This approach has been included in China's policy toward the DPRK. Beijing has sought to persuade the outside world that once the DPRK's economy becomes marketized (following China's development model) and people became well-off, its leader will no longer be obsessed with nuclear weapons and tensions will naturally dissipate.[15]

Since the establishment of the DPRK, Beijing and Pyongyang have maintained a close communist brotherhood and strategic diplomatic relationships, with only a few interruptions. In connection with China's reform policy, in January 2005, Kim Jong Il and Wen Jiabao agreed on a blueprint for China–DPRK economic cooperation. It was implemented in August 2009, starting with development in the Liaoning–Russia economic belt, and was linked to the further development (2009–2018) of *Jangjitu* (Jangchun-Jilin-Tumen*)*. The plan, which included the exploitation of natural resources, a border trade center, and a special economic zone for export industries, peaked in 2009. This plan was also closely linked with economic cooperation in *Rajin* and *Seonbong* in the DPRK. The DPRK opened this region and designated it a special economic zone responding to the plan until 2011. This attracted participation from not only China and the DPRK but also Russia, the ROK, and Mongolia. In 2012, Jang Seong Taek met Hu Jintao and signed an agreement to further open the border for closer economic cooperation and infrastructure, enlarging the zone to Huanggeumryeong, Uihwa-do, and the Raseon special economic zone. Accordingly, trade between China and the DPRK increased by 41.3% between 2004 and 2008. China's trade dependency on the DPRK ranks 64th for imports and 70th for exports, whereas China is first in both exports and imports for the DPRK (Lee 2012, p. 25). The total trade volume between China and the DPRK reached 6.86 billion USD by 2014 with an average 17.8% yearly increase since 2000 (KOTRA 2015).

The amicable political and economic relationship at the state level did not ameliorate human rights conditions in the DPRK, which generates increasing numbers of defectors; today, several hundred-thousands of (unrecognized) refugees and asylum seekers are dispersed throughout *Dongbei* and as far as Siberia, most of whom wish to enter South Korea. During Kim Jong Un's rule, "the government has significantly expanded efforts to stop irregular crossings of North Koreans into China. (…) Chinese authorities have also targeted broker networks in China. North Koreans handed back by China face interrogation, torture, and consignment to political prison camps or forced labor camps. (…) North Korean women fleeing their country are frequently trafficked into forced marriages with Chinese men or the sex trade. Many children from these unrecognized marriages lack legal identity or access to elementary education in China" (Human Rights Watch 2016, p. 428). Annually, about 1,000 are forcefully sent back to the DPRK Chinese police (*Chosun Premium*, January 10, 2016; *Yonhap News Agency* 2011).[16]

Starting in the 1990s, NGOs and UN agencies urged China to give North Korean defectors refugee status rather than stigmatizing them as "illegal economic migrants" and routinely repatriates them. Beijing regularly restricts access of staff of the UN Refugee Agency to border areas where North Koreans are present (Greenhill 2011, pp. 234–259; Human Rights Watch 2016, p. 428). In China, these defectors are often treated as traitors to the regime. Neither Japan nor China took a humanitarian stance toward the DPRK people, at least not to the scale of the Japanese government's fierce response to the kidnaping of Japanese citizens in the DPRK. Political leaders in East Asia, including the South Korean government, have been relatively silent about human rights issues, considering them non-political domestic issues and citing non-interventionist principles, despite countries' obligation to protect refugees under the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 protocol, to which China is a state party. The Chinese government's careful investigation of the lives of DPRK people and defectors all around Asia and the pressure placed by Japan and the ROK on the international community may resolve the problems more effectively, although China and Japan have little practical incentive to push this agenda forward or to absorb North Korean refugees in coperation with South Korea. During the Sunshine Policy, the government of South Korea was opposed to accepting defectors lest it spoil the good diplomatic relationship between the two Koreas. Ironically, the apparent peace and stability on North Korean issues among the USA, Russia, the DPRK, the ROK, China, and Japan under the Sunshine Policy was preserved at the expense of more severe human rights abuses of North Korean defectors. China's cooperation fluctuates depending on her diplmatic relationhsip with the ROK government. One recent example is that China smoothly facilitated the entrance of 13 North Korean employees of the well-known DPRK state-run restaurant *Ryugyeong* in Zhejiang into South Korea in April 2016. This would ordinarily have been unthinkable, as China is typically harsh on cooperation with the DPRK government. As Greenhill's observations indicate, migration can be a crucial bottom-up destabilization factor in any society (Greenhill 2011, p. 253). Furthermore, the Sunshine Policy did not benefit ordinary North Koreans, which was proved when, soon after the end of the policy, the ROK's new leadership allowed the number of refugees to increase rapidly (Cathcart 2010; Kim 2013; Reilly 2014). Due to failures in handling the people and the particular geopolitical conditions, mistrust between different groups of Koreans in the region has developed.

Despite the massive potential for the further development of the region, policy has sought to increase its securitization, including enlarging military bases on the border between the DPRK and China, arresting DPRK defectors and sending them back to the DPRK, and prosecuting people for protecting DPRK defectors. Nevertheless, the evidence shows a failure in minority policy in general and of inter-border policy in particular. China's attitude toward DPRK defectors has been consistent with the DPRK's official policy, although for a short period under the Xi–Park (Park Geun Hye) partnership, deporting defectors to the DPRK was approached more cautiously (Kim 2013; Chung et al. 2009). The activities of foreign NGOs are strictly monitored and restricted, particularly Korean diasporas from the USA, who seek to influence DPRK society through this region using human resources and geopolitical advantages. However, by enhancing its diplomatic relationship with China, the ROK government expected Beijing to become more flexible and to seek to more actively influence the DPRK. Several thousands of defectors with illegal migrant status are scattered all around *Dongbei* reaching the Russian Far East. China's unofficial stance implies that as long as the DPRK is well directed, the DPRK's nuclear program is not a threat, only a form of self-defense against US military action (*Asahi Shimbun*).[17] In contrast, Japan sees the DPRK as its most serious security threat, regarding not only nuclear weapons but also possible refugees. In this structure of regional security perception, humanitarian or human security issues tend to receive only minor or secondary attention. A Chinese citizen living in Yanji wrote on Weibo, "If there were any technical errors during the DPRK's nuclear tests, the *Dongbei* border region would become uninhabitable, and the *Dongbei* people will become refugees. How long will China overlook the DPRK's nuclear threats?" In fact, earthquakes that destroyed buildings were reported in the city of Tumen, which is only 100 km away from the DPRK's *Punggyue-ri*, where its nuclear tests are usually conducted.

China's government has continued to raise security alerts nationwide, including in *Dongbei*,[18] and the South Korean government rarely brings human rights problems to the diplomatic table. The problems that the community faces today are structural; they are becoming increasingly complex and thus more difficult to fix. These include *Dongbei*'s pattern of urbanization; people's re-dispersal; emigration; environmental problems; peoples' disturbed identity; increasing organized crime committed by the *Joseonjok* linked with South Korea, North Korea, China, and Japan; and various kinds of human rights abuse cases (involving issues

Table 5.1 Foreign exchange earnings from tourism (USD million)

		1995	*2000*	*2005*	*2010*	*2013*
Dongbei	Jilin	41.48	58.04	119.52	304.92	552.37
	Liaoning	189.01	382.65	737.77	2259.33	3477.14
	Heilongjiang	60.62	189.05	340.43	762.5	604.36
Beijing		2181.6	2768	3618.91	5044.61	4794.68
Shanghai		939.42	1612.67	3555.88	6340.92	5244.7
Henan		60.2	123.9	216.04	498.77	659.98
Sichuan		125.32	121.87	315.95	354.09	764.76
Tibet		11.3	52.26	44.43	103.59	127.86
Xinjiang		74.36	94.94	100.09	185.42	585.02

Adapted and re-formulated from the Yanbian Yearbook, the National Statistics Bureau, and local newspapers

related to employment, marriage, and crime) against defectors in rural China. The *Joseonjok*'s aspirations to regain a nationalized (politicized) identity resulted in frustration, especially for those who wanted to ascend the social ladder in mainstream society. Chinese marketized socialism and Han-centered development have gradually lost the human face of socialism, not because of theoretical conflicts between socialism and the market (or a theoretical clash between multiculturalism and inefficiency), but because of policy failure: the worst combination of a distorted market and policy failure in authoritarian multiculturalism precipitated inequality and isolation. China's multiculturalism was territorially confined, conditional within designated areas only.

State's lagged multiculturalism is similar to a state-led market economy. As much as a market loses efficiency when it becomes distorted, society also loses welfare efficiency in terms of where to distribute resources. In the cycle of production and distribution, asymmetry is often revealed. During the production stage, ethnicization is re-imposed and practiced (in relation to the DPRK and ROK). In contrast, in the distributional procedure, the de-ethnicized rationality of the market mechanism is applied. This mechanism coevolves with the diaspora's practice of duality. "We [*Joseonjok*] have contributed to the extensive development of tourism (Table 5.1). However, revenues provide little to Yanbian in terms of tax relief, compensation, or, at the minimum, political rhetoric. Beijing seems only ready to accuse the minority peoples on the borders of security threats

while fully taking the benefits of the ethnic network" (Interview 2015 Yanbian).

The *Joseonjok* face new risks resulting from rapid changes in many areas. In accordance with societal changes, individual capabilities have been stressed, particularly to achieve financial success. An economically productive and self-reliant individual is China's new idea of a moral person (Cho 2013). State-imposed societal equality is now less emphasized, which means that the mechanisms of capitalism and competition between individuals have gradually been adopted. Government funding has gradually decreased as a result of the new economic policies. Some of the *Joseonjok* people adjusted quickly to the new social changes by engaging in the private sector. Increasing numbers of Han Chinese and other ethnic groups have fled to previously *Joseonjok*-dominated regions.

Economic dimension of multiculturalism has also failed. Local governments have endeavored to nurture ethnic industry (while limiting its size) but have lost legitimacy by showing favoritism to certain ethnic groups under market socialism, where individual competence is a more important barometer of success. Thus, incentives are decreasing for the Chinese government to provide special ethnic-specific considerations in the market. The ROK's inbound investment in China is growing, whereas China's investment in the ROK remains low. However, investment is controlled by the Chinese government, as banks and agencies are state-owned, and although they are not under explicit orders, they are policy-sensitive. If the ROK's investment had been left to the market, trade between *Dongbei* and North and South Korea via China/Yanbian could have been much higher and development could have increased. When Korean politicians have traveled to *Dongbei*, the PRC governments have sent a warning signal not to make such visits official. Development aids flow from the ROK to the region is welcomed but mostly should be kept as a local level unofficial ethnically neutral sporadic aid. Numerous policy studies by private research institutes and public think tanks have produced findings on the development potential of *Dongbei* and have made many useful suggestions regarding strategies and policy tools (Lee 2012) to maximize the use of region's material and human resources.

The ROK sees the *Joseonjok* community as a catalyst for re-unification, while the PRC has gradually lost her intention or incentive to proactively protect the group or to implement more comprehensive package of multiculturalism. The ROK has begun to treat the *Joseonjok* as a special category of immigrants at the same time that China has re-categorized them

as a potential security risk and has replaced *Joseonjok* in crucial roles in trade with the DPRK with Han Chinese entrepreneurs "in the absence of transparent and protective laws and institutions" (Haggard et al. 2012). However, governments' policies toward minorities are based on pragmatism and instrumentalism; thus, the policies may change according to the value of and gains from the motherland–diaspora network. During Park Geun Hye Administration, the balance between security concerns about the DPRK and the economic relationship with the ROK was changed, as China has used the temporal re-consolidation of the USA–Japan–ROK pseudo-security alliance to re-normalize its trade and security ties with the DPRK.

Although the ROK believes that *Dongbei* has greater potential to contribute to the security and economic development of the region, China has been cautious about concentrating its development agenda in the region. While potentially increasing amount of investment can be expected by the ROK, ROK capital must follow the Chinese government rather than the market mechanism; thus, investment has decreased, mostly because of the deterioration of infrastructure in the region (Interviews 2015 Yanbian), which largely requires central government's attention.

A Modality of Motherland–Diaspora Cooperation, Case Analysis

The following is one of a myriad of relevant examples of social-level cooperation between *Dongbei* and the ROK over the last 15 years. This example also shows China's intentional and strategic vagueness regarding distinctions between region and ethnicity using the ROK's emotive transnational ethnonationalist approach to the people and region.

Re-ethnicization continues superficially although policies to preserve ethnic diversity is still viewed as successful. This has been the case in tourism, trade, and aid to the Korean community. The following interview text depicts the small-scale aid relationship between the ROK and Yanbian. Two interviews were conducted: one with the director and the other with a chief external auditor of the Korea Veterans Welfare and Health Care Corporate (*Bohungongdan*) in *Wonju*, Korea, in 2016.

The aid program started in 2001, when the institute (*Bohungongdan*) was approached by a local government official who was introduced by an agency in charge of "Yanbian–ROK investment." He said there were many independence veterans in *Dongbei* and that support could be provided. The program started with small-scale medical services via, for

example, a local hospital (Hwaryong Hospital) that provided medical support for four people as a pilot project. As the outcome was satisfactory, the local government of Jilin decided to continue the project at a governmental level. The Chinese Association of Persons with Physical Disabilities under the CCP was directly involved, and it published a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the Yanji government and *Bohungongdan*. Around the time that project was launched, in Yanji city, the *Joseonjok* comprised 60–70% of the total population; they have now decreased to around 45–50%. The first mode of aid was medical surgery in China by doctors sent by Choong-ang Hospital. In the wake of an after-effect incident after the surgery due to a lack of proper equipment and facilities in Yanji, the mode was altered to surgery at a Korean hospital for medical operations in 2000–2010. However, in 2011, when the head of Korea Veterans Welfare and Health Care Corporate changed, citing a lack of funds, the project was ended. China's economic development was considered to make the ROK's aid less necessary. "I personally think that this kind of program should continue, as it was started with good will irrespective of whether China is a developed or developing country. The important point is that China is behind in this field in terms of technology (e.g., in terms of artificial legs, China is 10–15 years behind Korea, what the interviewee believes) and policy due to China's perceptions of the disabled. China lacked a specific policy toward amputees, particularly regarding investment in development and physical therapy." It was a curious point to confirm that the general public of South Korea usually saw *Joseonjok* region as backward and believed they had a duty to provide aid, notwithstanding their increasing awareness that China's national level technological advancement exceeded the overall capacity of the ROK, rapidly closing the technological gap even with the USA.[19] In 2011, when the program was stopped, China's local governments intervened again and expressed a strong hope of resuming the program. The Yanji city mayor (Han Chinese) and vice mayor (*Joseonjok*) came to Korea to explain its significance and necessity, mentioning that the Party Secretary of Jilin province also strongly hoped to resume the program. The plan was approved to resume. My second interview with the auditor of the institute informed a different perspective, however. "This kind of program should be re-examined. Its initial purpose was to help the *Joseonjok* people in *Dongbei*, but increasing numbers of Han Chinese are being selected as beneficiaries with the excuse that the *Joseonjok* population is decreasing, and the local governments do this deliberately." To date, around 420 Chinese nationals in Yanji city have been beneficiaries of this program. Since 2015, the

program has been extensively revised and now entails managing and monitoring existing beneficiaries rather than taking new cases (in favor of a less risky and more outcome-based approach). Contrarily, when I asked whether the first interviewee thought program should continue, the first interviewee responded that Yanji and Yanbian were special regions with greater autonomy and thus the officials should seek their own ways to implement welfare for their people in the region. As Yanji is closely linked with Korea, there could be higher expectations of aid and cooperation. The interviewee added, "In the same way, we also feel a special obligation to the people that is different from any other region in China" (thus, something in addition to the technological gap). Although the program was begun to help war veterans, a practical difficulty is how to select beneficiaries in accordance with the original purpose of the program. This confirms how ROK's ethnicized transnationalism has been implemented, which has been the basis for the allocation of resources to many *Joseonjok*-involved institutions, agencies, associations, and organizations in *Dongbei*. These bodies have been eager to create some kind of connections with ROK society in the forms of MOUs, training and education programs, and cultural exchange programs, which are usually fully financed by the various ROK public agencies.

A new pilot program was recently begun to provide support for three households (siblings of war veterans) in Yanbian. Local institutions and human resources were used for the selection process, but the selection was to be approved by the Korean public authority, the Ministry of Patriots-Veterans, under the condition that the three selected *Joseonjok* families (around 20 people) be offered free medical services for 5 years. An MOU was signed in August 2016 at a local hospital headed by its director who hoped to build a rehabilitation center following the system used in South Korea. The center, which was modeled after Choong-ang Hospital Rehabilitation Centre, has been completed. The ROK has fully supported the training program at Choong-ang Hospital for three months for two medical doctors. One interviewee said, "We have shifted the model of aid to technology transfer and training for longer-term development (adopting a self-reliance and localization approach). The *Joseonjok* are part of our nation, and they originally emigrated from the Korean peninsula; thus, regardless of China's economic development, we can naturally consider that we have special obligations to them." In response to my question on what he would like to see happen in the future, he identified gradual improvement in cooperation, such as post-service management rather than undertaking new beneficiaries

and extending similar programs to other *Joseonjok*-concentrated areas in *Dongbei* (Heilongjiang) related to how the cooperation was also involved in remodeling (converting) sanitation in *Joseonjok* schools as part of health program, which was linked to President Xi's recent statements on modernizing rural areas. Recently, PLA veterans protested against Beijing regarding government benefits.[20] Similar social-welfare-related demands will increase in China with economic development, social openness, and the widening gap between the rich and poor. Minority issues are also highly likely interwoven into those issues.

This illustrates how ethnic tie and network can be effectively used for local development. Considering the rising demand by ordinary citizens for welfare improvements (in terms of quality rather than quantity) in both rural and urban areas, this "ethnic" dimension in local and regional development provides a positive direction for reducing host country governments' immediate burdens. However, it remains doubtful whether minority people will be able to attain an increased quality of life to the same degree as the Han Chinese. Although ethnic composition is not reported, *Joseonjok* participants in such protests will not be perceived in the same way as Han Chinese participants. During industrial modernization, having lost their state-run industrial base, some members of the *Joseonjok* community have swiftly adjusted to social consequences by successfully engaging with the private sector, and the *Joseonjok*, as a homeland-connected diaspora, have largely held an advantageous position compared with other isolated minority border regions. The *Joseonjok* have been adapting to the direction of the state's development policy. However, communities cannot respond effectively to external forces by themselves. During China's first two decades of economic reform, the inequality in the levels of its regional industrial productivity increased, specifically the technology gap between industrial productivity in different industries and provinces and international frontiers (Deng and Jefferson 2011, p. 818). Rates of economic growth have been particularly high in such Chinese regions as Guangdong and Zhejiang. The growth of industries serving national interests was once actively encouraged and supported by the government,[21] but this is no longer the case. Even the concept of a "national" industry has eroded.

Re-Politicizing Ethnicity and Forming a *XinJoseonjok* Identity

Social Stratification

In the previous chapter, I explained that, internally, the *Joseonjok*'s vision for their community has been broadly divided into two groups. One is a relatively conservative group of people, mostly of the older generation, who defend the traditional ethnicized model of the PRC toward regional development with a nostalgia for Maoism (similar to some ordinary mainland Han Chinese today). The most serious concern of these *Joseonjok* is the community's loss of the ability to speak the Korean language. With the support of this conservative group of people, the community (through the 14th Yanbian Prefectural-level People's Congress Standing Committee) decided in April 2014 to launch an official "Joseon Language and Characters Day" to be celebrated each year on September 2. This is the first example of this kind of movement among minority groups in China. The second group includes those, taking more integrationist approach, who place less emphasis on the importance of maintaining a visible form of the minority group's collectivity and are more concerned about geographical isolation from mainstream Chinese society. The former are more anxious about the *Joseonjok*'s decreasing population, permanent dispersal, and gradual loss of ethnic features. The latter, integrationist group, believes that fuller degree of integration into mainstream society will better equip the *Joseonjok* to survive the fast-changing Chinese and outside worlds without necessarily losing their national identity. Despite stark differences in the historical relationships, this dilemma is widely shared by other regional and ethnic minorities in China. Both groups believe that Korean re-unification would provide the greatest opportunity for their community, and most *Joseonjok* believe that their identity will not be jeopardized as long as the Korean motherland exists. In addition to the conservatives and integrationists, a third group emerged among those who are taking an individualistic localism stance with multiculturalist approach.

There has also been a positive rise in strong localism (nostalgia and love for a hometown) among residents of *Dongbei* and re-diasporized *Joseonjok* elsewhere. This diversification within the same diaspora group demonstrates the diverse ways in which diasporas internalize their national identity. For many, individual and family comfort and safety

are of first priority. However, those people have not become antagonistic against China or the Han Chinese people. Their growing localism (increased nostalgic sentiments, sense of belonging to the community) is not associated with separatism. A collective movement of reconstructing ethnic communities is part of localism but it does not threaten host society as Murphy made an analogy with such cases as Belgium and Switzerland in which not ethnic distrust but policy matters (Murphy 1989, p. 419). Interviewees often expressed that *Joseonjok* simply envy the Korean diasporas from Western liberal societies that are proud of having a hybrid national identity. Locals are often annoyed by standardized survey questions asked by outside researchers, such as "which team will you support if there is a sports game between South Korea and China?" Answers to this question, of course, vary, and they have little significance. The core members of the aforementioned third group are the returnees from the re-diasporized *Joseonjok* community (Piao 2014) who had settled in South Korea and elsewhere outside *Dongbei*. This trend may also be understood in line with the nationwide phenomenon, entering into the era of ending Chinese massive emigration known as the Lewis Turning Point (*Financial Times*).[22] Among the *Joseonjok* who have been re-settled in South Korea for over 10 years and been relatively successful there, some (mostly well-educated and relatively wealthy) have come to believe that their hometowns are in China and that *Joseonjok maeul* (towns) should be rebuilt (interview with *Joseonjok* in *Daerimdong* that appeared on a television program). These multiculturalism mined people long to preserve their ethnic boundaries and attain recognition (group identity within the Chinese state). These people often play a leading role in *Joseonjok* migrant communities in major cities in South Korea. The diaspora's spatial characteristics at some point may become more important than its temporal characteristics. If following a primordialist or perennialist assumption, it is difficult to understand the *Joseonjok*'s collective antagonistic perspective against South Koreans. This antagonism is nurtured by not only miscommunication between the ROK and *Joseonjok* society, but also the *Joseonjok*'s close affinity with the North Korean people and regionalism attached to their hometowns in China combined with a sense of belonging to China as a Chinese citizen.

Having categorized diversity within the *Joseonjok* society, the important commonality of those aforementioned three groups can be found in their aspiration for inclusion to the Chinese society. With the rapid marketization, the significance of diasporas can be multiplied. "The

combination of cosmopolitanism and ethnic collectivism is an important constituent in successful business ventures" (Cohen 1997, p. 171). In order to accommodate smoothly such diversification of *Joseonjok* society's stratification and to close the gaps between reality and vision, enhancing the quality of education for the third and fourth generations would be utmost important (KIEP 2013) as their collective identity will differ greatly from that of earlier generations. A widely accepted view on human development, as the most important element to fulfill developmentalism, connotes "directly enhancing human abilities" and "creating conditions for human development" (UNDP 2015). While the former is individual citizens' task, the latter concerns governments policy.

Ethnostratification of Joseonjok Society

Young professionals, such as civil servants who work outside the region or employees of state-owned firms, tend to assimilate more readily into Han Chinese society because they speak better Chinese and are naturally integrated into Chinese networks. When the interviewees mentioned "Han Chinese mainstream society," they seemed to exclude the Han Chinese communities in major *Joseonjok* autonomous areas, where the economic status of the *Joseonjok* remains higher than that of other ethnic groups including the Han Chinese. "Conversely, those who are employed in South Korean-run companies in China tend to be more assimilated into South Korean society. Progressive young people tend to believe that as long as individuals can enhance their own capacity, they will face few ethnic barriers to entering mainstream society, whereas more conservative *Joseonjok* and younger people living in the autonomous prefecture tend to believe they will have difficulty overcoming their minority status in mainland China" (Park 2017, p. 64). Why the evolution of social stratification is minimal compared with other poorer minority regions can be explained by *Joseonjok* society's dual engagement and quasi-integration into the ROK labor market. ROK society has absorbed most of the events (including conflicts between and within social classes over limited jobs in the market) that might have otherwise taken place in Yanbian and other *Joseonjok*-concentrated regions in *Dongbei*, partially because of China's ill-planned and poorly managed transition from socialist modernization to market-oriented reform. Mackerras (2005) reviewed whether and how much the rise of the middle class intensifies ethnic inequality based on his observations of the

Uygurs of Xinjiang in northwestern China, the Hui (Sininc Muslims spread all over China), the Mongolians (mainly Inner Mongolians), the Koreans (mainly Jilin), the Manchus (northeastern provinces), the Dai (Yunnan), and the Naxi (northwestern Yunnan). However, the causal link between the new rise of the middle class and ethnicized social stratification remains weak, particularly in the *Joseonjok*'s case. Adding the "modernization versus de-ethnicization" debate makes the *Joseonjok*'s case more intriguing because the "modernization equals Hanification" logic is less appealing to minority people. The *Joseonjok* consider South Korean society a "modernized version of the same nation." Under pressure to re-modernize, the *Joseonjok* have been split between Hanification and Koreanization, while the DPRK has always been a painful mirror for them.

Furthermore, the formation of clear perceptions on social class is not necessarily hostile toward other classes. Ethnicity may mitigate class tension. In reality, the division between ethnicity and class exists between individuals and between communities. As much as a class division should be managed by an effective political system and institutional reforms rather than through revolution, ethnicity can be managed by policy intervention. Entrepreneurs and professionals have become a clearer category of the middle class in China. To some extent, this is applicable to *Joseonjok* society. My interviews with medical doctors and well-established businessmen revealed that they perceived themselves as middle class, socially higher than "ordinary" people and, unlike in the past, higher than local government officials. Yet, they were also clear that their enjoyment of being relatively upper class was confined to *Joseonjok*-concentrated areas in *Dongbei*. The *Joseonjok* still enjoy relative superiority within the social ethnic hierarchy, which is one reason why China's current multicultural setting in minority-concentrated regions is critical to stabilizing ethnic relationships. When I asked people in Yanbian whether they felt there was class stratification caused by marketization within *Joseonjok* society or in relation to other ethnic groups in *Dongbei*, all of my interviewees answered along these lines: "It's so easy for *Joseonjok* to travel back and forth between Korea and *Dongbei* and relatively easy to make significant sum of money. We can easily work and earn money if one needs to save. Many invested and bought houses or shops quite easily if they did not waste their money in the ROK. The Han Chinese living in poor areas and people from Shantou (Shandung) in *Dongbei* are envious of our economically advantageous condition. There's no serious antagonism between

different ethnic groups, either. Many prefer working with *Joseonjok* or for *Joseonjok* enterprises to working for the Han Chinese, as it is known that the *Joseonjok* tend to spend more generously to their employees."

A common significant trend is the locals' efforts to shed their minority status, which is closely connected to the image of a pre-modern and poorer version of Koreans. This struggle is well reflected in their public debates on an alternative ethnonym over the last two decades. Some suggested "*Seonjok*," but this was rejected because it was the name colonial Japan used for Koreans during its occupation. A group of intellectuals discussed "*XinJoseonjok*" ("new *Joseonjok*"). In this context, one way *Joseonjok* seek to escape from their minority status is by developing a sense of belonging to the overseas Korean network. Since the early 2000s, with the strong globalization wave under the Kim Young Sam Administration, South Korea has steadily institutionalized the network of Korean diasporas across the globe. The Overseas Korean Foundation was established in 1997 under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to offer various cultural and educational programs to diaspora communities. "We have accepted the fact that we are minority nationals in China but did not expect to be treated differently in motherlands. In the ROK, we experienced the worst, as we were treated as a minority again. Many *Joseonjok* people were and are puzzled by this question. We often discuss among our peers who we are and where our community and people are heading" (a group interview with local students, Yanbian 2015). As an outcome of the extensive communication between the *Joseonjok* and ROK society, the official policy of the ROK now explicitly promulgates multiculturalism, and many barriers have been removed. Legal articulation to implement multiculturalism was provided, resulting in enhanced social conditions for minorities. However, in this process, costs were higher because of an early period of mismanagement—once group resentment rises (imagined, constructed, or reproduced), it may be difficult to allay.

In the late 1990s, Korean diasporas in the former Soviet Union and China had particular significance for the ROK government because of its human networks in the DPRK, which were extremely valuable for its reunification agenda. In parallel, a societal-level overseas Korean network emerged that focused on individual human rights issues. Most civilian-level institutions were led by Christian associations originating from Korean communities in North America. Together with consolidated networks, non-exclusive pan-Korean nationalism in diasporas all over the

world has gradually been strengthened based on both secular (re-unification) and religious (Christianity) ideologies. If the collective agenda of re-unification of Korean peninsula and the Christian religious belief clash with China's official nationalism and Han Chinese-ness, tension may occur.

As shown in the previous chapter, the *Joseonjok* diaspora as a clear human group category is constructed by the ROK, deconstructs its Chinese identity (as they will never willingly become Han Chinese), and deconstructs its Korean identity (resistance from the ROK and unwillingness to belong to the DPRK). Yet, the community is also highly fragmented, and the people have come to appreciate new types of leaders who will re-categorize themselves as *XinJoseonjok*.

From a Guest Communist Warrior/Farmer to a Globally Re-Diasporized Guest Worker

According to previous research (e.g., Shim 2003; Lee 2012; KIEP 2011), the region has high potential for development. As discussed earlier, this is thanks to rich natural resources such as timber, oil, natural gas, magnesite, steel, and coal; a heavy industry infrastructure (for automobiles, tanks, shipments, and missiles) that was used for military goods and hardware under Japan's colonial rule; and human resources with relatively low wage rates. However, research has also shown that further intensive investment in industrial structural reforms is necessary to regain industrial development. Reform is required due to the outdated infrastructure, the high proportion of state-owned companies (with the accompanying high burden on both the state and firms), the lack of implementation of the market mechanism, and a lack of entrepreneurship and vision for equitable distribution.

Accordingly, in spite of many opportunities and the potential economic and cultural capacity of the region, Beijing has gradually reduced government investment while encouraging only private-level small-scale economic activities and small-scale controlled foreign investment. Consequently, *Dongbei* development might continue to slow in the foreseeable future. This contrasts with Beijing's enthusiastic development efforts on the Russian border. In June 2011, there were 27 *Joseonjok* enterprises in the Russian Far East maritime province of Jilin origin, accounting for an investment volume of USD320 million. The Russian Science Academy (September 6, 2011) stated that annual meetings have been regularly held

between Russia and China to discuss enhancing cooperation on the border. Most recently, on January 18–20, 2011, the seventh Sino–Russian Border Alliance Committee was held in Beijing, which was attended by officials from both foreign ministries and representatives from the three provinces in *Dongbei* and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, and from the Russian Federation Transportation Ministry and Tax Office (KIEP 2011). Expanded zonal cooperation in this region may further accelerate economic development, also bringing multiple political benefits in the long run.

Contrary to the pluralistic social evolution and the potential role of *Joseonjok* society in the overall prosperity of the region, the *Joseonjok*'s voice and roles are controlled, monitored, and limited. Thus, to the outside world, their collective discourse has become much more unified, increasing interest in their community and their identity to outsiders (especially the ROK). The *Joseonjok* now know to emphasize only material ties and to disconnect from national identity. Material ties have increased while antagonism has grown against both South and North Koreans; meanwhile, another group is becoming increasingly engaged in pan-Koreanism among Korean diasporas outside the Korean peninsula. Several thousands of DPRK defectors have been added to this network, including 700 in the UK and 1200 in the European Union (EU) who are not officially recognized as defectors and those naturalized as EU or UK citizens. On a popular ROK television program ("Now Let's Go and Meet" [*Ijaemannareogapnida*], TVN, October 9, 2016), Kim Joo Il, Chief of the Association for the DPRK Defectors UK (and a defector himself) said, "Today, our nation as a whole is undergoing a special historical moment because of the uncontrollable fate of the state, but we defectors, together with Korean diasporas all over the world, will always make every effort to bring changes to our country, longing for the day when we can return to our home country no matter where we are at the moment. Although our nation is dispersed today and having a difficult time, someone in the future will write about us, and our struggle will be recorded and recognized in history." Although the *Joseonjok* are in a much better position to help with the relationships between the three parties than Korean diasporas elsewhere, they have been the least active group in this respect because of political constraints.

Under rigid communism, diasporas can increase their recognition from the state by participating in anti-colonial communist building,

cultivating barren land and raising agricultural productivity, performing industrial labor for heavy industry, and constructing infrastructure for the state's collectivization projects. To support the state's developmentalism agenda, the *Joseonjok* have been efficient trade facilitators and brokers for the Sino–Korean relationship. What could be required next? Public discourse in the *Joseonjok* community has focused on how to enhance individual capacity in terms of skills, technology, training, and education, which the *Joseonjok* believe will determine the future and vision of the people and community. More open-minded and educated *Joseonjok* are now beginning to adopt a globalized vision, looking at integrating into Korean-ness across the world by nationalizing their ethnicity. They believe strongly in unification as a national agenda for all Koreans and that individual struggles contribute to the establishment of multi-collectivity among Koreans with diverse backgrounds. This multi-*Joseonjok* collectivity has spread through all of China's major cities, and new Korean towns have been established along with articulating their historical memories on establishing their own communities (e.g., Han 2008). Such people are beginning to interact with South Koreans in a different way, without feeling as minorities and without the insecurity of losing their collective identity as Korean. The *Joseonjok*'s unintentional proactive reaction to successive governments' implicit de-ethnicizing policies can be understood in terms of voluntary dispersal, the formation of multi-collectivity, the materialization of ethnicity, and the de-securitization of minority-concentrated border regions.

Influence of globalization and increased communication have been beneficial in using skilled diasporas, including translators, travel agencies, and trading agencies, and providing information for good will, diplomatic interlocutors, and humanitarian purposes, such as brokering North and South Korean family reunions. However, crime that involves *Joseonjok* has also become globalized, with a wide regional network spanning the ROK, the DPRK, Japan, and China. A great number of social issues has emerged, particularly some *Joseonjok*'s increasingly aggressive use of criminal networks for phishing, the human trafficking of female North Korean defectors, and industrial spying on ROK companies for China. However, positive roles are also much emphasized and expected to emerge. When China undertook the lead Hu Jin Tao in hosting and mediating the Six Party Talk, a number of *Joseonjok* intellectuals and local government officials actively participated as translators, interlocutors, and

Table 5.2 Summary of ethnic relations in China and the identity–policy–prosperity nexus

	Ethnicization with state-engineered multiculturalism	*De-ethnicization and 'selective' authoritarian multiculturalism*	*Re-politicization of ethnicity*
Recognition	Positive and active recognition based on political instrumentalism	Non-active recognition with partial economic instrumentalism and weakening state intervention	Non-recognition with pressure of securitization and Han Chinese-centered patriotism
Integration	Territorially confined isolation and localization of ethnicity	Re-dispersal and dis-integration of collectivity; Increasing barriers to integration to mainstream society	Higher demands of a fuller degree of economic and social citizenship
National identity	Formation of ethnicized identity (separation of culture from politics)	Destabilized identity formation, heavily influenced by external forces	Struggle to forming a third type of national identity
Ethnic equality	Hardly tested due to territorial isolation	Growing disparities in seizing opportunity and undergoing ethnostratification	Growing awareness of collective consciousness and rise of demands of equitable development
Development and prosperity	State protected stability and community development contributing to regional development	Destabilizing ethnic communities leading to a lower level contribution to regional development	Increasing potential but losing timely opportunities

Author

information providers. Today, many are known to contribute to family reunions and provide communication facilities to connect people in the two Koreas and to support trade.

The Korean Ambassador to China has emphasized that it is important to establish a system with the help of the *Joseonjok* and ROK that allows cooperation and constructive coexistence to help the *Joseonjok* return to and re-settle in China.[23] For security and economic reasons, from the ROK's point of view, having a stable *Joseonjok* community near the border is beneficial. Yanbian and *Dongbei* are, implicitly, a useful buffer zone for the DPRK, the ROK, and China. Improving the political management of the people and the region will maximize the potential of its geopolitical advantages.

This implies the possibility of a better policy alignment and coordination over the *Joseonjok* community, including re-diasporized *XinJoseonjok*, matching China's clear inclusion of the *Joseonjok* as *huagyo*[24] with the ROK's clear official goal of assisting their stable re-settlement in China to rebuild Yanbian and *Dongbei*. China's adjusted and renewed multiculturalism in this region may provide an alternative model for regional development, possibly similar to Québec, where strong ethnonationalism spurs harmonious, inclusive, and reciprocal regional development.

Conclusion: Toward Reciprocal Prosperity

In sum, the *Joseonjok*'s inaction—the absence of collective politicized ethnic movements—is a rational response to Beijing's attitude that any indication of such movements will lead immediately to increased pressure from Beijing and to being labeled as anti-government separatists. This provides Beijing with an excuse for harsher surveillance and oppression and may result in the *Joseonjok* losing the autonomy they have attained in return for their proactive instrumental contributions to the CCP and cooperation with central and local government policy.

The more the communication volumes increase (trade, travel, exchange of goods and people), the higher the possibility of geopolitical change may occur in the region. Although it is against Beijing's political and security agenda, the region's development potential includes both material and human prosperity and would thus bring mutual and long-term benefits. The region's further prosperity (inclusive and reciprocal) is inseparably linked with Beijing's stance toward the DPRK and longer-term perspectives on China's increasing role in the Northeast Asia

region. The central government's policy toward the region and the people has been inconsistent and strategically opaque recently, sending confusing signals to the people in the region, neither clearly supporting nor discouraging the multicultural setting of the regions where *Joseonjok* are concentrated.

The analysis of the *Joseonjok* case reveals that ethnicity is highly likely linked positively with regional development in China and that this relationship unquestionably existed before the 1990s. Although the region has benefited from globalization through South Korean investment and sporadic aid schemes, the local people do not fairly share the benefits of the nation's growth with Chinese citizens. Although the ethnic tie between the *Joseonjok* community and its motherland is typical of a diaspora, which may benefit both the members of the diaspora and their host country, relying on this tie is neither sufficient nor sustainable. How the vicissitudes of ethnic relationship, "ethnicization, de-ethnicization, and re-politicization", evolved is summarized in the dynamic interplay between diaspora's collective identity, multiculturalism policy, and long-term development (Table 5.2).

Notes

1. See Levitt in Knott and McLoughlin eds. (2010), chapter 5, for useful discussions of the concept of transnationalism and its various uses.
2. China's reform started with the 1978 Ping Pong Diplomacy and Open Door policy by Deng. The second phase of opening started in 2001 with the WTO accession under Jiang Zemin. Experts consider that the third phase should come with the Chinese way of shaping the FTAs in connection with China's new normal, meaning (1) from export-led to domestic consumption (through urbanization and farmers' internal movement to urban areas); (2) rejuvenating the service industry; (3) technological independence (from "Assembled in China" to "Made in China"); and (4) environment-friendly growth. (Choi Byeong Il, Public Lecture, Korea Foundation for Advanced Studies: China Lecture Series, Seoul April 15, 2015).
3. "Chinese protest against South Korea's Lotte" (*The Straits Times*, March 5, 2017). http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/chinese-protest-against-south-koreas-lotte. Accessed 8 March 2017. Lotte also has a symbolic significance as it has been a dream enterprise for Joseonjok businessmen. The very first boycott started in Shenyang, Dongbei, targeting the Lotte Department Store. Lotte is a Japanese multinational company

founded and run by a *zainichi* (Korean-Japanese) family. Joseonjok regard the company's success as a model that Joseonjok should follow. Whereas, in the past, the success of the Yanbian University used to be the barometer for Joseonjok to compare a superiority of the PRC's policy toward ethnic minorities compared with the Japanese' assimilation and segregation approach, Joseonjok today considers a successful minority-owned conglomerate like Lotte as an example of superior minority policy.

4. "Was the THAAD revenge miscalculation? Both Chinese tourism industry and Joseonjok will collapse." [*THAAD bobok opanieotna? …jung guanguangeop-gyue Joseonjok, da jukgyuesaenggyeotda*] (*ChosunBiz*, March 23, 2017). http://biz.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/03/23/2017032300063.html?right_key#csidx330df1d0f8f338aae952ed9aa0d81f3. Accessed March 23, 2017.
5. Major changes related to patriotic education: from class struggle narratives to patriotism narratives' "ethnic conflict" between China and Japan; from victor narratives to victimized narratives (reminders of war violence by Japan); new curricula and new history books with standardized Teaching Guidelines for History Education; and new approaches using media to promulgate patriotism, mainstreaming patriotism to soft culture, films, drama, literature, museums, national parks, war memorials, etc. Around that time, many films were produced on Nanjing. All of these programs nurtured nationalism against Japan (Wang 2012).
6. See Wright (2010, p. 12) for detailed discussion on the rise of political activism, including increasing complaints and citizens' protests against local governments and officials.
7. "China's Confucius Institutes and the Soft War: With the closing of Confucius Institutes, China may be heading for a "soft power" war with the West" (David Volodzko, *The Dimplomat*, July 8, 2015).
8. "6000 year-long bear totem culture, South Korea and China both insists as ours" [*Yukcheonnyeonjeon gom totem munhwa … han jung modu urigeot jujang*] (*Chosun Ilbo*, May 18, 2016).
9. See also "The state tax bureau of Tibet Autonomous Region [*Xizang shuizhi gaige fazhang guiji tangxi*]" Analysis on reform and development of taxation in Tibet, http://www.xztax.gov.cn/ssxc/sswh/ssll/201208/t20120831_3285.html. Accessed July 4, 2015.
10. "China tightens Xinjiang border amid rising terrorist threats; regional governor announces crackdown to control movement of suspected insurgents" (*The South China Morning Post*, January 10, 2017).
11. "The core contents of the PRC government's one hundred development plans" [*Junggguk jeongbu saeop gyuehoekseo baekgaji almaeng-i*] (*Yanbian Ilbo,* March 10, 2015). http://www.iybrb.com/news_vew.aspx?id=34580. Accessed December 28, 2016.

12. "Xi Jin Ping visited Yanbian and ordered a revolution?" [*Yeonbyeoneul bangmunhan Xi Jin Ping i hyeokmyeongeul jisihaetda?*] (*Premium Chosun*, August 3, 2015).
13. "Taking a great resolve to stake our national fate on the ancient continent: Korea-China-Russia Eurasia Project" [*Godae daeryuk-e unmyeongeulgeoleotda: Han-Jung-Reo-eurasia project*] (*Chosun Ilbo Business Weekly*, July 25, 2015).
14. "Beijing's dangerous mix of trade and security" (*Financial Times*, January 6, 2017, p. 8); "China threatens business fallout from Seoul decision to host U.S. missile shield" (*Financial Times*, January 6, 2017, p. 1); "China increased oil supply to the DPRK in revenge against ROK's THAAD deployment" [*Jung, nam THAAD siltago haekgaebal buk-e duerae wonyu gonggeup deung neulyeo*] (*Donga Ilbo*, August 15, 2016).
15. Gong Keyu from the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, "Sino-ROK cooperation on North Korea," public lecture organized by the Center for Asian Pacific Studies, Lingnan Universty Hong Kong (December 18, 2015).
16. "The reason why the DPRK's State Political Security cannot crack down the defectors more effectively" [*Bukhan bouibu yowondeul-i talbukjareul simhagae dansokhaji mothaneun iyu*] (*Chosun Premium*, January 10, 2016). http://premium.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2016/01/10/2016011000558.html?Dep0=twitter; "Defectors are arrested in force in Yanbian" [*Junguk yeonbyeonseo talbukja daegeo geomgeo*] (*Yonhap News*, June 16, 2011). http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/society/2011/06/16/0701000000AKR20110616081400097.HTML. Accessed June 15, 2015.
17. "China: North Korea's nuclear plan a problem between U.S. and North Korea" (*Reuters/The Asahi Shimbun*, February 25, 2017). http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201702250021.html. Accessed February 25, 2017.
18. "Xi Jinping vows to fight separatism and any attempts to split territory from China" (*The South China Morning Post*, November 11, 2016). http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/2045110/xi-jinping-vows-fight-separatism-and-any-attempts-split; "China built a brigade level military base 1.5 km away from the China-DPRK border" [*Jung, bukhan gukgeong 1.5 km-e yeodangeup judunji geonseol*] (*Chosun Ilbo*, November 14, 2016). http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2016/11/14/2016111400160.html; "China urgently placed a high performance radar company to monitor DPRK's ICBM in Shenyang" [*Jungguk, Shenyang-e bukhan ICBM gamsi goseongneung radar jungdae gingeup baechi*] (*Donga Ilbo*, January 22, 2017). http://news.donga.com/Main/3/all/20170122/82539254/1. Accessed January 22, 2017.
19. "China closes gap with U.S. in hi-tech breakthroughs, KPMG finds" (*The South China Morning Post*, March 8, 2017). http://www.scmp.com/

tech/innovation/article/2076348/china-closes-gap-us-hi-tech-breakthroughs-kpmg-finds. Accessed March 16, 2017.

20. "PLA veterans stage another protest in Beijing over unpaid benefits: The protest last week comes after October's demonstration, which was biggest in a sensitive location in the capital since 1999" (*The South China Morning Post*, January 4, 2017). http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2059225/pla-veterans-stage-another-protest-beijing-over-unpaid. Accessed January 4, 2017.
21. "Developing goods with ethnic characteristics targeting an international market" [*Minjok teuksu yongpum kukgae baljeon*] (*Yanbian Ilbo*, September 1, 1988).
22. Gabriel Wildau (2015) "China migration: At the turning point" (*Financial Times*, May 4, 2015).
23. "Who are those 600,000 Joseonjok in South Korea?" [*Jaehan jonseonjok yukshipman-myeong geudeuleun nuguinga*] (*Yanbian TV*, January 16, 2015), quoted from *Heilyongjian Newspaper*.
24. Concerning China's changing policy toward overseas Chinese, see "Top political advisor says overseas Chinese can help China achieve centenary goals" (*Xinhua News*, September 26, 2016). http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1008465.shtml; "How Beijing is shaping and controlling huagyo" (*East Asia Forum*, September 14, 2016). http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/09/14/the-chinese-diasporas-role-in-the-rise-of-china/. Accessed January 4, 2017.

References

Anderson, Benedict. 1983. *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origins and spread of nationalism*. London: Verso.

Bae, Ooh Seong. 1998. *Joseonhugi kukkyeonggua saekyeguanui byeonhwa* [Changes in perspectives of national territory and the world in the late Joseon era]. Seoul: Iljisa.

Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Nathan. 2014. China-North Korea relations: Jang Sung-Taek's purge vs. the status quo. *China Analysis* no. 477. EU Asia Center.

Bosely, Corey. 2007. The ethnic minority policies of the People's Republic of China: Patronage and prejudice. *Rutgers Race and Law Review* 8 (2): 291–319.

Callahan, William A. 2006. History, identity, and security: Producing and consuming nationalism in China. *Critical Asian Studies* 38 (2): 179–208.

Cathcart, Adam. 2010. Nationalism and ethnic identity in the Sino-Korean border region of Yanbian, 1945–1950. *Korean Studies* 34: 25–53.

Cho, Mun Young. 2013. *The specter of 'the people': Urban poverty in northeast China*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Chung, Jae Ho, Lai Hong Yi, and Joo Hwan. 2009. Assessing the "revive the northeast" (Zhenxing dongbei) programme: Origins policies and implementation. *The China Quarterly* 197: 108–125.

Clarke, Michael. 2013. Ethnic separatism in the People's Republic of China: History, causes and contemporary challenges. *European Journal of East Asian Studies* 12: 109–133.

Cohen, Robin. 1997. *Global diaspora: An introduction*. London: UCL Press.

Connor, Walker. 1984. *The national question in Marxist-Leninist theory and strategy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Deng, Paul D., and Gary H. Jefferson. 2011. Explaining spatial convergence of China's industrial productivity. *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics* 73 (6): 818–832.

Dujarric, Robert. 2016. China versus the U.S. alliance: The background to Sino-Japanese Rivalry. In *Asian nationalisms reconsidered,* ed. Jeff Kingston. London: Routledge.

Greenhill, Kelly M. 2011. *Weapons of mass migration: Forced displacement, coercion, and foreign policy*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Guo, Yingjie. 1998. Patriotic villains and patriotic heroes: Chinese literary nationalism in the 1990s. In *Nationalism and ethnoregional identities in China,* ed. William Safran. London: Frank Cass.

Haggard, Stephan, Jennifer Lee, and Marcus Noland. 2012. Integration in the absence of institutions: China-North Korea cross-border exchange. *Journal of Asian Economics* 23: 130–145.

Han, Enze. 2013. *Contestation and adaptation: The politics of national identity in China*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Han, Deok Su. 2008. *Sangji-si Joseon minjoksa* [History of Joseonjok in Shangzhi Heilongjiang]. Heilongjiang: Minjokchulpansa.

Han, Enze, and Christopher Paik. 2014. Dynamics of political resistance in Tibet: Religious repression and controversies of demographic change. *The China Quarterly* 217 (March): 69–98.

Harding, Harry. 1993. The concept of greater China: Themes, variations and reservations. *China Quarterly* 136: 660–686.

Human Rights Watch. 2016. *World Report 2016.*

Kim, Hong Nack. 2013. *China's policy toward North Korea under the Xi Jinping leadership*, 83–98. Fall: North Korean Review.

Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA). 2015. *KOTRA Report 2015,* Beijing Office.

Lee, Tae Hwan. 2012. *Three northeast provinces in China and the future of the Korean Peninsula*. Seoul: Oruem Publishing House.

Lee, Jang Seop, Chae-Wan Yim, Eung-Yong Choi, Sun-Seok Yun et al. 2006. *Junggguk Joseonjok giopui gyeongyeong hualdong* [Business Management of Chinese-Korean Enterprises]. Seoul: BookKorea.

Lin, Chun. 2015. Modernity and the violence of global accumulation: The case of ethnic question in China, In *Global modernity and social contestation*, ed. Breno Bringel, and Jose Mauricio Domingues. London: Sage.

Lu, Ming, Chen Zhao, Xiwei Zhu, and Xu Xianxiang (eds.). 2013. *China's regional development: Review and prospect*. London: Routledge.

Mackerras, Colin. 2003. *China's ethnic minorities and globalisation*. London: Routledge.

Mackerras, Colin. 2005. China's ethnic minorities and the middle classes: An overview. *International Journal of Social Economics* 32 (9): 814–826.

Murphy, Alexander B. 1989. Territorial policies in multiethnic states. *Geographical Review* 79 (4): 410–421.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 2015. *Urban policy reviews: China*. Paris: OECD.

Park, Jeongwon Bourdais. 2017. Ethnic relations in Northeast China: ethnic revival or de-ethnicization in the Korean diaspora?. *European Journal of East Asian Studies* 16: 36-66.

Piao, Guangxing. 2014. *Yasuoxing chengshihua xia de minzu gongtongti 'Lisan Weiji' yu 'Chonggou Yundong' – jiyu dui Chaoxianzu chengshihua jingchen de kaocha* [Disperse crisis and reconstructing movement of ethnic communities in compressed urbanization-based on a survey of urbanization process of Korean ethnic group]. *Journal of Minzu University of China* 41 (3): 88–97.

Reilly, James. 2011. Remember history, not hatred: Collective remembrance of China's war of resistance to Japan. *Modern Asian Studies* 45 (2): 463–490.

Reilly, James. 2014. The curious case of China's aid to North Korea. *Asian Survey* 54 (6): 1158–1183.

Shim, Sang Hyeong. 2003. *Dongbuksamseong jiyeokui heonhuanggua baljeon ganeungseong* [Regional development of China's northeast: Development and potential] POSRI Research Report, POSCO Research Institute.

Sun, Xiulin, Feizhou Zhou, and Wanping Lin. 2014. *Tudi caizheng yu fenshuizhi: Yige shizheng jieshi* [Land finance and the tax-sharing system: An empirical interpretation]. *Social Sciences in China* 3: 47–64.

Szporluk, Roman. 1988. *Communism and nationalism; Karl Mark versus Friedrich List*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tanrisever, Oktay F. 2009. Why are federal arrangements not a panacea for containing ethnic nationalism? Lessons from the post-Soviet Russian experience. *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 10 (3): 333–352.

The Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP). 2011. Jungguk dongbuk jiyeok mulryu infrageonseolui choegeun donghyang: Suryuk yeongyuehyeong mulryu guchuk [The trends in the distribution industry infrastructure development in China's northeast: Construction of watercourse-land interconnected distribution industry]. *Provincial Economic Trends in China* 2 (23).

The Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP). 2013. *Junggguk Joseonjok cheongnyeonui ijuwa nodongsijang jinchul yeongu* [A study on China's younger generation Joseonjok's labour market integration]. Seoul: KIEP.

United Nations Development Program (UNDP). 2015. *Human Development Report: Work for Human Development.*

Vickers, Edward. 2007. Museums and nationalism in contemporary China. *Compare* 37 (3): 365–382.

Wallace, Jeremy L., and Jessica Chen Weiss. 2015. The political geography of nationalist protest in China: Cities and the 2012 anti-Japanese protests. *The China Quarterly* 222: 403–429.

Wang, Zheng. 2012. *Never forget national humiliation: Historical memory in Chinese politics and foreign relations.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Woodward, Dennis. 1985. China's industrial reform policy. *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 14: 85–104.

Wu, Xiaogang. 2009. Chapter 3, Household registration, social exclusion, and rural migrants in cities. In *Socialist China, capitalist China,* ed. Wu Guoguang, and Helen Lansdowne, 29–54. London: Routledge.

Yang, Minghong, and Jiqiong Sun. 2009. *Zhongyang caizheng buzhu dui xizang jijing fazhang he shouru fenpei de yingxiang fenxi* [Central government's fiscal aid and its impact on the economic development and income distribution of Tibet]. *Journal of Southwest University for Nationalities (Humanities and Social Science)* 7: 1–5.

Zhao, X.B., and S.P. Tong. 2000. Unequal economic development in China: Spatial disparities and regional policy reconsideration, 1985–1995. *Regional Studies* 34 (6): 549–561.

Zhu, Wenli. 2002. Zhongyang zhizang jiben caizheng zhengce jianlun: Wei xizang difang caizheng jianli 50 zhounian erzuo [Summary of central government's basic fiscal policy in Tibet: For the 50th anniversary of the set-up of local fiscal revenue in Tibet]. *Journal of Tibet Nationalities Institute* 4: 27–30.

CHAPTER 6

Conclusions

The Identity–Policy–Prosperity Nexus and Theoretical Implications

I return to the initial question of this project: "How and by what internal and exogenous forces has the relationship between the state and ethnic minorities' communities, with special reference to the *Joseonjok* community in *Dongbei*, shaped the national identity of ethnicized minority groups?" In addition, bearing in mind the fundamental question of "so what?" this book has discussed the connotations of the historically accumulated ethnic relations in this case for wider regional development, focusing on the contributions of a stabilized ethnic minority group to the real and potential prosperity of the region and the various parties involved: the central and local governments of China, South and North Korea (both the governments and the people), and the *Joseonjok* community.

Although the potentialities of *Dongbei* and the roles of minority nationals have been underestimated, the *Joseonjok* case suggests that the multiculturalism-oriented community development model in China has contributed substantially to the stability and development of *Dongbei*, with immense potential for further prosperity in a broader sense of longer-term development beyond the current form of state-imposed developmentalism. This conclusion evolved from the analysis of the changing state policy toward ethnic minority populations in China from ethnicization to de-ethnicization (depoliticization of national identity),

J.B. Park, *Identity, Policy, and Prosperity*, China in Transformation,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-4849-4_6

whereas more recent policy was examined in the context of selective re-ethnicization to address the various instrumental values of ethnic groups.

Throughout the project, I emphasized the reciprocal interactions among all parties involved in conjunction with the dynamic geopolitics of the region. In this process, the *Joseonjok* community reacted proactively to changing policy and external forces while preserving its collective identity in their own way, which can be described as a compromise and as an outcome of the community's continuous struggle and arduous negotiations with the governing powers and authorities over identity and material interests. Interestingly, this struggle and negotiations have continued for generations and are still ongoing even though most of the current population was born in China. The historical continuity of the diaspora's collective identity vis-a-vis the related political entities is explained using an analytical typology of a third type of national identity. In this context, this project explored the ethnic minorities' various instrumental values and their selective memories regarding their barren land as impoverished but able farmers, their construction of infrastructure, and their contributions to industrial growth as an inexpensive colonial labor force, communist revolutionaries, and warriors against what the Party defined as enemies, including part of their motherland during the Korean Civil War.

I have argued that debates on ethnic relationships in China need to refocus on equitable and smoother integration beyond "cultural" recognition. From the viewpoint of the central government of the host country, the indiscriminate securitization of minority-related matters (while de-securitizing conventional threats, most notably the DPRK's achievement of nuclear status) and the reluctance to further integrate territorialized ethnic groups (particularly those with strong ethnonationalism) stem from a number of fears and concerns. Based on its main findings, this project has suggested that embracing politicized ethnic minorities, if certain conditions are met, contributes more proactively to the state's agenda, supplying plentiful labor and fueling regional economic growth. Strictly culturally confined multiculturalism and depoliticized ethnic relationships do not ensure long-term stability and prosperity regardless of how the host state's political system is defined. The fundamental question of security issues in *Dongbei* may need to clarify "security for what and for whom?" The region suffered a great deal in the modern era from Japan's attempts to achieve the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" (*Dai Tōa Kyōeiken*) built on rigid racial hierarchy

and a mercantilist industrial division of labor. To a certain degree, the region still seems to suffer from these legacies, because there is a lack of positive synergy between historically constructed ethnic diversity as a public good, industrial development with a full account of regional characteristics, and harmonious urban-rural co-development.

Applying multiculturalism to China contributes to work of combining studies of ethnic groups in China with general migration and diaspora studies. The issues of separatism, secession, recognition, and integration are closely interlinked. A diaspora in relation to a dominant nation is inevitably "relational" among different national and ethnic groups. Questions on where they belong and how their particular collective identities should be explained remain important academic and policy issues. Studies on diasporas and global migration have rapidly evolved with globalization. An important aspect of these studies are the linkage between identity and community in relation to "official" nationalism, which has taken various forms throughout history. In China, the "ethnic minority question" is largely viewed through the prism of secession or separatism. In this regard, Chinese exceptionalism existed in the study of migration. This case suggested a shift of analysis to the framework of "integration with multiculturalism" versus "assimilation or disappearance." This research suggested why the former option fits better for the region under this study. This has allowed expanded discussions on more universalized aspects of migration studies, including different types of migrations such as refugees and diasporas (both inbound and outbound), and various types of approaches such as federalism and multiculturalism policies focusing on citizens' well-being and the worthiness of China's status as a leading regional and global power.

Diasporas are often asked to clearly identify their positions and are repeatedly asked to confirm which side they would support in cases of security crises or sporting events. Such questions already connote prejudgment considering a diaspora's national identity something to be fixed and diaspora people potentially disloyal, opportunistic, unjustly privileged, or uprooted groups. A stabilized diaspora community can maintain multiple national identities by generating a different sphere of nationality with their own ethical codes. Nationalism and national identities represent highly complex feelings, values, and visions. In reality, a mixture of primordial, perennial, modern, and postmodern interpretations coexist without problems. A diaspora's interpretations of a nation manifest in a merger of reality and imagination and as a mixture

of complicated multilayered situational rationality and irrationality that can be combined with other political ideas. As this case has demonstrated, such a mobilized and politicized collective national identity can enable a diaspora to absorb changing goals of host country while adaptively changing its approaches. China's future stability and fundamental longer-term security depend not only on how to stabilize conflict-prone ethnic groups but also on how to reinvigorate the unity of other marginalized populations who are excluded from China's rapid development national agenda. How a host state manages its ethnic relations depends on what kind of multiculturalism will be implemented, for whom, and to what degree, not because multiculturalism is particularly and exclusively moral or democratic but because it could be a way for China to secure further stability and revitalize inclusive regional development at a lower cost.

Ethnonationalism is not harmful to the rebuilding of an inclusive modern multinational because integrationist localism (attachment to the hometown, the surrounding community, and the landscape) and patriotism (loyalty to the state) are not irreconcilable values either in theory or in this case study. It is true that Beijing's concerns grew regarding the increasing influence of the ROK in *Dongbei*, particularly in the early 2000s. However, South Korean transnational ethnonationalism differs from the diaspora's pan-Koreanism. This is often the case in diaspora-homeland relations. Diaspora members usually endeavor to be useful to their host societies either as a group or as individuals rather than to achieve a separate independent state of their own. As this study has revealed, from diasporas' point of view, South Korean transnationalism is an assimilation force as much as the reinforcement of Hanism or Han-centered Chinese patriotism.

As a strong centralized power, the Chinese government exerts more control in the central–local relationship. Throughout modern history, potential ethnic tensions between the Han Chinese and the *Joseonjok* have been promptly and effectively dealt with by the local and central governments, which have prioritized communist nation building with an inclusive socialist nature as opposed to the rise of local (ethnic) nationalism or Han Chinese Sino-centric chauvinism. However, policy may need to be extended, beyond China's official discourse on the benevolent cultural aspects of ethnic minority policy, toward promoting economic inclusion and effectively recognizing minority communities' contributions to (re)modernizing the country. The celebration of cultural

diversity is no longer sufficient unless it is closely linked with a broader scale of multiculturalism with Chinese characteristics.

Concluding Remarks

It will be difficult for Beijing to re-implement territorialized authoritarian multiculturalism under the new state agenda of socialist marketization because of changing circumstantial drivers such as a higher degree of integration into the global market, a higher level of communication with outsiders, external ideological influence, a complicated ethnic mix due to population mobility, industrial restructuring, the disintegration of agricultural community life, and rapid urbanization. It will be equally costly to dismantle the historical outcome of the current ethnically differentiated regionality in *Dongbei*. Flexible policy to accommodate the existing multiculturality would be a better option for a balanced stability in ethnically divided minority regions in the PRC. Based on how flexibly the government has updated its policy toward ethnic minorities' different needs and how those minorities have adjusted their capabilities (both individually and collectively) to changing circumstances, some ethnic communities have survived and many are likely to create reciprocal gains for both the host country and the minority region and to synergize with the Chinese method of communal development.

In the current setting, Beijing's policy adjustment is unlikely to be ethnicity-neutral. China's developmentalism agenda in ethnic minority-concentrated areas cannot be easily divorced from the current center-community arrangement. To a certain degree, this case has tested whether a Chinese way of multiculturalism and political pluralism, that extends beyond the commonly viewed theoretical contradictions between ethnonationalism and the current hybrid marketized socialism, may eventually be functional. To that end, this project has provided not only an in-depth case study of a particular minority group but also a dynamic analysis of the nexus of policy, diaspora, and regional prosperity. Given the increasing tensions and incidents of violence between the Han Chinese and ethnic minorities in the other border regions, which reflect a governing crisis in the Chinese state's management of its ethnic relations, this case may offer a useful counterexample that represents the different levels of challenges and tensions that China is likely to face in the coming years.

A paragraph in the 2009 White Paper ("China's Ethnic Policy and Common Prosperity and Development of All Ethnic Groups") under Chap. 4, "Upholding and Improving Regional Ethnic Autonomy," clearly states the following:

> The implementation of regional ethnic autonomy is beneficial to combining the country's centralism and unification with the freedom and equality of ethnic groups, integrating state laws and policies with actual conditions and specific circumstances of ethnic autonomous areas, uniting the goal of building a wealthy, democratic, civilized and harmonious country with the unity, progress, prosperity and development of ethnic peoples, and linking ethnic peoples' love for the motherland with their love for their ethnic group. In the unified big family, China's various ethnic groups live together in peace, work together with one heart and mind and develop together in a harmonious manner, while giving full rein to their respective strengths and advantages.

As long as the central and local governments of the PRC and various types of ethnic, national, or regional communities adhere to this well-defined fundamental policy framework, China could potentially play a leading role in setting a new model of multiculturalism with Chinese characteristics.

Index

J.B. Park, *Identity, Policy, and Prosperity*, China in Transformation,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-4849-4