

# **HYPOCRISY** **IN AMERICAN POLITICAL ATTITUDES**



**A DEFENSE  
OF ATTITUDINAL  
INCONGRUENCE**

**TIMOTHY P.  
COLLINS**



# Hypocrisy in American Political Attitudes

Timothy P. Collins

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A Defense of Attitudinal Incongruence

palgrave  
macmillan

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ISBN 978-3-319-54011-5      ISBN 978-3-319-54012-2 (eBook)  
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-54012-2

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017947210

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Cover illustration: GL Archive / Alamy Stock Photo

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature  
The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG  
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

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## Introduction

*BURR: The Constitution's a mess*  
*HAMILTON: So it needs amendments!*  
*BURR: It's full of contradictions*  
*HAMILTON: So is independence!*  
—“*Non-Stop*” by Lin-Manuel Miranda (2015)

To human society, hypocrisy is a negative trait (see Grant, 1997, pp. 1–2; Hale & Pillow, 2015; Kurzban, 2010). Akin to the contradictions in the US Constitution—as illustrated in the exchange from *Hamilton: An American Musical* above—the contradiction that emerges with the betrayal of one’s espoused principles is a universally disreputable characteristic throughout nearly all communities (Kurzban, 2010), and has been for millennia: a regular character flaw in Greek comedies (Oliver, 1960, p. 24); an engine for subjugation in Taoism (see Aronson, 2003, p. 97); and a sin of horror in the Christian Gospels (see Oliver, 1960, pp. 54–55) and Satanism (Lott, 2006, p. 77). Within the Eighth Circle of Hell in Dante’s *Inferno* is a ditch reserved for hypocrites who, because of their transgressions, had been damned to forever trudge in tightly packed circles while under the leaden weight of dazzling and golden hooded cloaks heavier than anything humans could make (Canto XXIII: 64–66; see Durling, 1996, pp. 348–349).

The moral hypocrisy in the examples above serves as a vibrant and vital area of interdisciplinary study (see Lott, 2006), with constantly updating volumes of exemplifications in American politics (see Lott, 2006; Stark,

1997; e.g., Rhodes, 2009; Van Natta, 2002). But, moral hypocrisy is not the focus of this book.

Instead, this book's focus is on attitudinal hypocrisy.

The wielding of hypocritical attitudes in politics—that is, opinions that conflict with and logically contradict each other—is internalized and weaponized as an off-shoot of moral hypocrisy (Runciman, 2008; see, e.g., Schultz, 2016, pp. 24–25). As illustrated in the accusatory and brazen examples below, the interrogative of “Isn’t that hypocritical” has served as a leitmotif of American political discourse in syntheses of government intervention or indifference for centuries, in various but interrelated forms—for example, the supposed violation of government philosophy (viz., limited government versus active government), or the supposed violation of one issue stance’s underlying logic (e.g., abortion rights and the death penalty). The treachery in the ditch of general hypocrisy still swirls around in this realm, but—as I hope to demonstrate in this book—it takes very little thought to realize that having logically contradictory political attitudes is not even in the same moral universe as the damned souls of Dante: Instead, the dichotomy of government having a role to play in one political arena but not another is a stipulation of involvement in any society with any type of government and a net positive for American politics. In other words, brandishing attitudes that do not logically fit with each other is an absolute necessity for those who wish to have any degree of an effect on politics in the United States.

But, in spite of attitudinal hypocrisy being a required component of modern democracy and political participation, it has not stopped its use as an attack since even the foundations of the American experiment.

## 1.1 ILLUSTRATING ATTITUDINAL HYPOCRISY AND ATTACKS BECAUSE OF IT

**Illustration 1: Hamilton on Jefferson.** As an early example, Alexander Hamilton attacked the logical inconsistency of Thomas Jefferson and his acolytes for failing to, essentially, think things through, writing in 1792,

A certain description of men are for getting out of debt; yet are against all taxes for raising money to pay it off; they are amongst the foremost for carrying on war, and yet will have neither loans nor taxes. They are alike opposed to what creates debt, and to what avoids it. (Hamilton, 1851, p. 31)

Later, after calling Jefferson “a contemptible hypocrite” who is, nonetheless, not enough of a “zealot ... to do anything in pursuance of his

principles which will contravene his popularity, or his interest” in 1801 (Hamilton, 1879, p. 454), Hamilton was quietly “amused” when his synthesis was supported in Jefferson’s 1803 orchestration of the Louisiana Purchase (Chernow, 2004, p. 671). This series of actions by Jefferson doubled US territory, which, without question, stood in direct violation of Jefferson’s oft-stated core values, principles, and doctrines of government: constructionism and at-all-costs limitations on federal power (Balleck, 1992, p. 692)—which, critically, have also come to define modern libertarianism (Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012). Jefferson did what he could to keep his close and direct involvement with the Louisiana Purchase plan from being known, because he feared that Federalists would oppose and “attack any sentiment or principle” that came from him with “bloody teeth and fangs,” and feared “what blackguardisms and personalities they make it the occasion of vomiting forth” (Peterson, 1970, pp. 781–782).

Jefferson was correct in this prediction (Peterson, 1970, p. 782), with most Federalists opposing the Louisiana Purchase, and doing so on—ironically and hypocritically—strict-constructionist grounds (Chernow, 2004, p. 671). For example, John Quincy Adams—whose own principles of government are “Hamiltonian” themselves (Nester, 2013, p. 304)—wrote in an 1821 diary entry that,

the Louisiana purchase was in substance a dissolution and recomposition of the whole Union. It made a Union totally different from that for which the Constitution had been formed. It gives despotic powers over the territories purchased. It naturalizes foreign nations in a mass. It makes French and Spanish laws a part of the laws of the Union. It introduces whole systems of legislation abhorrent to the spirit and character of our institutions, and all this done by an Administration which came in blowing a trumpet against implied powers. After this, to nibble at a bank, a road, a canal, the mere mint and cummin of the law, was but glorious inconsistency. (Adams, 1875, p. 401)

Incidentally, Adams’s own presidency began in 1825 with an inaugural address that laid out ambitious plans and policy proposals in line with a philosophy of expansive, powerful government unconstrained by the strict constructionists’ reading of the Constitution (Nester, 2013, p. 304). This lies in obvious and plain contrast to Adams’s criticisms of Jefferson for doing just that.

Put simply, Jefferson indeed acted in direct violation of his philosophy of government and was attacked for that violation. But, along with some of the most vehement charges of hypocrisy came elegant exemplifications of hypocrisy.

**Illustration 2: Mailer on Buckley.** In a 1962 debate with William F. Buckley, Norman Mailer granted Buckley’s earlier premise on liberal elites’ policy failures before calling out the “contradictory stew of reactionaries and individualists, of fascists and libertarians” who subscribe to Buckley’s conservatism at the group level (Mailer, 1963, p. 163). Many within “the Right Wing,” Mailer contends, are not individualists (p. 167). He continues,

The Right Wing knows better than I would know how many of them are collectivists in their own hearts, how many detest questions and want answers, loathe paradox, and live with a void inside themselves, a void of fear, a void of fear for the future and for what is unexpected, which fastens upon Communists and equal, one to one, with the Devil. The Right Wing often speaks of freedom when what it desires is iron law, when what it really desires is collectivism managed by itself. If the Right Wing is reacting to the plague, all too many of the powerful people on the Right—the presidents of more than a few corporations in California, for example—are helping to disseminate the plague. (Mailer, 1963, pp. 167–168)

In essence, Mailer argued that the philosophy of small and limited government for which Buckley so vociferously advocated was simultaneously contradicted by the militarism that was also advocated, and—to Mailer—this was a core dissonance in contemporary conservative thought (Schultz, 2016, pp. 24–25).

**Illustration 3: Reed and Ingraham’s Defense.** In mid-April 2013, a debate for the podcast and radio show *Intelligence Squared U.S.* was held in New York City on the topic of the future of the Republican Party and conservative principles. About one hour in, Ralph Reed—among the most important organizers behind several iterations of the conservative voting bloc (see Goodstein, 2012)—took a moment to define *conservatism*. The moderator, John Donvan, then caught Reed in what may constitute the biggest source of attacks on the ideology itself: the big contradictions at the heart of the modern conservative belief system.

REED                      Well, I think conservatism in a nutshell is a philosophy that argues that as government gets bigger, that freedom necessarily constricts. And we believe people are best able to rise as high and as far as their God-given talents, abilities, ambitions, and desires will carry them, when government gets out of the way and allows free men and women to do those things that are best left to them. Government should be small. It should be limited, and it should be confined to specific enumerated purposes.

DONVAN       Where do the social issues fit in?  
 REED           Well—  
 AUDIENCE    [*Applause*]  
 DONVAN       [*Smiling*] Wait a minute—I am not trying to zing at all.  
                   Please do not applaud me. (Donvan, 2013, p. 37)

Reed exalts small, limited government—except when it comes to some issues. The *except* part of that is key, and a common attack on conservatives in particular, as illustrated by the round of applause from what was probably a fairly liberal New York City audience.

After the applause died down, and after Reed’s debate partner Laura Ingraham—a talk radio megaphone for several millions of people in Reed’s voting blocs (Donvan, 2013, p. 5)—cracked a joke about media bias, Ingraham and Reed answered Donvan’s unintentional zing.

INGRAHAM    It’s the idea of ordered liberty—Jefferson wrote about it; Madison ... wrote about it—that liberty without virtue is really meaningless because my idea of liberty could conflict with your personal space. Or, everyone does what everyone wants to do in his or her own time, and obviously you’ll have natural conflict. So, ordered liberty is obviously the best. And a moral core, encouraging moral behavior—society changes.

Maybe society will change what the meaning of the word “moral” is, and I understand that. But the morality has a place... We can try to say that government has no role in it. But reality actually matters.

REED        By the way, it fits in the same place that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 fits in, okay? I’m not allowed to deny you the right to sit at a lunch counter simply because of the color of your skin. And we believe that if you take, for example, the issue of abortion, that an unborn child is a person for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution; therefore, to take their life without due process, as we’re seeing unfold in this gruesome trial in Pennsylvania, with this doctor who systemically executed children who could perform outside the womb, violated their God-given right, and—by the way—their *Constitutional* right to life and liberty and the pursuit of happiness. (Donvan, 2013, p. 38)

For Ingraham and Reed, government should “get out of the way,” and be “small,” “limited,” and “confined to specific enumerated purposes,” provided that government also upholds “virtue,” because “morality has a place,” and that is where government “fits in.”

One of their debate opponents, Mickey Edwards—a founding trustee of the Heritage Foundation, former American Conservative Union chair, and former US Representative from Oklahoma and member of House

Republican leadership (Donvan, 2013, p. 5)—looked exasperated as he replied to their lines of reasoning.

EDWARDS Yeah, I have some thoughts here, but I kind of got stunned here by this definition of liberty. So, in the case of the civil rights and you cannot deny African-Americans—obviously you shouldn't—these rights. You know, that's a good thing. But denying gays rights—that's different, right?

AUDIENCE [*Applause*]

EDWARDS So, I mean, there's a point where you're not being consistent. Are you for liberty, or are you for restrictions on liberty? Are you for a workable government, or are you against it? Are you for limited government or not? I mean, you're on every side of everything. That doesn't work. (Donvan, 2013, p. 38)

Reed responded in kind.

REED First of all, gays and lesbians have not experienced the same level of Jim Crow-like invidious historic discrimination that African Americans did.

AUDIENCE [*A few boos*]

REED They've not—wait a minute—they've not been denied the right to vote. They've not been prevented to run for political office. If you believe that gays and lesbians were subjected to slavery and segregation, and denied the right to vote for over a hundred years, after the Thirteenth Amendment granted them the right to vote—that has never happened in American history. So, they are free in a free society to make moral choices with which I may disagree. Just by the way straights are. There are straight men and women who live together outside of wedlock, do so every day, and they're free to do so in a free society. I'm not going in there to try to interfere with their personal decision. The issue before the country is whether or not that relationship should be defined as the institution of marriage. (Donvan, 2013, p. 39)

This exchange exemplifies what is likely the fundamental logical contradiction at the heart of modern American conservatism: Government should be tiny, but also big; it should let people make their own decisions, but it should not let people make their own marriage decisions. This attitudinal incongruence is certainly not limited to conservatism, although conservatism is more direct about it.

**Illustration 4: Clinton on Republicans.** In an October 2015 Democratic Party debate for the then-upcoming presidential primaries on CNN, moderator Dana Bash and Hillary Clinton had an exchange that, like the



previous illustration, exemplified the broader constructs of attitudinal hypocrisy in American politics.

- BASH Secretary Clinton, even many people who agree with you might say, “Look, [paid family leave] is very hard to do, especially in today’s day and age.” There are so many people who say, “Really? Another government program? Is that what you’re proposing? And at the expense of tax-payer money?”
- CLINTON Well, look, you know, when people say that—it’s always the Republicans or their sympathizers who say, “You can’t have paid leave; you can’t provide health care.” They don’t mind having big government to interfere with a woman’s right to choose and to try to take down Planned Parenthood. They’re fine with big government when it comes to that. I’m sick of it.
- AUDIENCE [Applause]
- CLINTON You know, we can do these things. We should not be paralyzed by the Republicans and their constant refrain—“Big government this, big government that,” except for what *they* want to impose on the American people.

More raucous applause followed that line, which puts my core argument into sharper focus: Hypocrisy of political attitudes grabbed the audience’s attention as an attack, while—assuming the audience for the Democratic Party debate was mostly liberal—they may not have registered that they were probably *also* logically inconsistent; and, incidentally, also with social issues. Most American liberals, in fact, themselves decry “big government”—at least implicitly—in terms of its involvement in women’s health (Pew Research Center, 2014, p. 57), while also calling for government involvement elsewhere (p. 38). Although, importantly, liberals’ calls for increased government are not perfect mirrors of conservatives’ calls for decreased government and the *rolling back* of government involvement, as this book will explicate.

Within these illustrations, this type of hypocrisy—*attitudinal* hypocrisy—is, at least from the normative outset, far from the sin worthy of infernal punishment in Dante, but it goes beyond that from the objective outset as well. Espousing the virtues or vices of government for some issues but not others is certainly hypocritical in the literal self-contradiction

sense—even etymologically (Oliver, 1960, p. 23), the word *hypocrisy* roots itself in ὑπό (hupó; i.e., *underneath*) and κρίνω (krínō; i.e., *separate* and *judge*). As I seek to demonstrate in this book, it is also a normative necessity of American politics.

However, attitudinal hypocrisy still weighs us down like Dante’s lead cloaks.

The case I hope to make is that the cloaks of attitudinal hypocrisy we wear are no heavier than Uncle Sam’s jacket, and they dazzle and glitter nonetheless.

But, there are exceptions to the positive effects of attitudinal hypocrisy. One exception, in particular, should be on the minds of most readers by this point, and it is critical that I address it upfront.

**Illustration 5: Donald Trump.** The positive perspective of this book is tested with the rise of Donald Trump, and his ultimate Electoral College victory and, as of this writing, his presidency.

President Trump’s policy platform is, and has long been, impossible to nail down: Over the course of his 16-month presidential campaign, he explicated what may be a majority of the available positions on most issues (see Timm, 2016)—a pattern that has, thus far, continued into his presidency (e.g., Gooding, 2017). Trump’s handful of substantive policy proposals may be described as at least one, if not all, of the following characteristics:

- blatantly unconstitutional, as is the case with his proposed entry ban on migrants of a specific religion (see Brettschneider, 2016; Markon, 2015);
- less quantifiable than the placement of an electron, as is the case with his healthcare plan (see Diamond, 2015); or
- logically gaseous and ludicrous, as is the case with his proposed wall along the southern border of the United States, which would do nothing to stem the flow of undocumented immigration (see Barry, 2016; Dean, 2016; Dear, 2016; Garfield, 2016; Harlan & Markon, 2016)—which is not increasing anyway (Pew Research Center, 2016)—and instead, would cost at least \$25,000,000,000 to even *begin* to construct (Garfield, 2016), and be subverted and overcome entirely by something as simple as a ladder or a rowboat (Dear, 2016).

Unlike most political sophisticates and elites (Lupton, Myers, & Thornton, 2015)—and possibly even most Americans (Jost, 2006; cf.

Lupton et al., 2015)—there is no conceivable, measurable logic or set of principles undergirding Trump’s attitudes or worldview. To illustrate, as noted throughout this book, political orientations can usually be described as a decently stable dot on a two-dimensional, social–economic ideological plane (see Chap. 2; Feldman & Johnston, 2014). Donald Trump’s dot would add a third dimension of sheer entropy and could only be represented by a marble that bounced around in perpetuity, in defiance of Newtonian physics. The Trump belief system should be a case study for quantum physicists, as it exists in multiple places at once, and *potentially* crystallizes into measurable spacetime only when it is held down and questioned; thereupon it will dissipate into an immaterial void again immediately, while also continuing to exist in every location all at the same time.

Or, rather, Trump would not be represented by a marble, let alone a dot. Instead, the political orientation of Donald Trump is a giant amoeba—appropriately, of the *Chaos* genus—or some other undefinable organism with motility dependent on protoplasmic goo that flows unpredictably and absorbs, digests, and metabolizes whatever it comes across. It sees the two-dimensional plane and bellows—or, more appropriately, tweets—“Sad!” at it during phagocytosis.

Trump exemplifies the most extreme edges of logical incongruence and attitudinal hypocrisy that, throughout this book, I *defend* as necessary—while I *attack* the use of *accusations* of hypocrisy as attacks—and even praiseworthy. His amoeboid of an ideological worldview, though, perfectly illustrates how the effects of hypocritical attitudes are not always good for all parties and are potentially dangerous. Trump has indeed fostered the political re-involvement of many who had previously shut themselves out of the process (see Carmines, Ensley, & Wagner, 2016), and increased political involvement is normatively positive at the surface level (see Theocharis & Lowe, 2016). But, a high magnitude of Trump supporters’ re-involvement was spurred by Trump’s exploitations of (1) activations of racial resentment (see Tesler, 2013, 2016a, 2016b), (2) activations of sexism (see Schaffner, 2016; Wayne, Valentino, & Ocen, 2016; cited by Carmines et al., 2016, p. 385), (3) activations of general xenophobia and racism (see Schaffner, 2016; cited by Carmines et al., 2016, p. 385), and (4) perpetrations of pure-strain lies of the highest order (Kessler, 2016). All of the above are unquestionably bad for and detrimental to American politics (see Taub, 2016).

There are obvious limits, then, to the normative, societal good that comes with attitudinal hypocrisy (see Grant, 1997, pp. 180–181), and Trump epitomizes them.

## 1.2 WHAT TO EXPECT IN THIS BOOK

What follows is a breakdown of what readers can expect from this book.

**Chapter 2.** How can attitudinal hypocrisy and the magnitudes thereof be defined, explained, and measured? After explaining the salience of attitudinal hypocrisy as a research idea, I lay out the path forward for the book's approaches, with conceptualizations, operationalizations, and quantifications of attitudes, ideologies, and the hypocrisies that result from the collision thereof, for American liberalism, conservatism, libertarianism, and populism. Because no previous scholarship has taken on the task with anything above pairwise or whimsical qualitative approaches, novel methods must be devised. I utilize work from attitude research paradigms to formulate a series of quasi-algorithms for the quantification of logical inconsistency in individuals' attitudes and attitude structures, with simple standard deviation calculations as the go-to method by which hypocrisy can be computed and, ultimately, analyzed.

**Chapter 3.** I first define the strongest, most robust psychological factors, personality traits, and cognitive variables that compose the bottom-up substructure of political attitudes and ideologies. I then track and profile their interconnections and many multidirectional relationships, and compare them to the top-down "discursive superstructure" (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2013). After I reject the notion of any role being played by unidimensional "intelligence" as it has been often defined—and nefariously misappropriated—I formulate the central model for the book: the External–Philosophy Dispositions–Attitudes Model. The core assumptions behind and expectations of the EPDAM are the comparatively, and somewhat ideologically dependent associations and relationships within political orientations: (1) philosophy of government is more related to external (i.e., top-down) factors like demographics and more controllable traits like education; and (2) individual attitudes and attitude structures are more related to dispositional (i.e., bottom-up) factors like personality and non-conscious traits.

**Chapter 4.** Beginning in 1964, I trace the path of ideological distinctions in America's last half-century of attitudinal hypocrisy: Barry Goldwater's quasi-libertarian congruence, and the exploitation thereof by, among others, George Wallace to further subjugate Black Americans; the Vietnam War's fracturing of the Democratic Party establishment at the expense of Hubert Humphrey and racial progress; the Reagan coalition of stated social authoritarianism at, perhaps, the expense of everyone

outside of wealthy elites; the rise of the Tea Party as the crystallized small-government (but still socially traditionalist) movement; and today, the Trump presidency, for which quantifying ideological consistency requires dividing by zero. Ultimately, I offer two lenses through which this history may be viewed: a hyper-cynical view, in which latent prejudices are exploited by elites to advance neoliberalism; or a positive salvation view, in which hypocritical attitudes are always around, but inevitably lead toward a more perfect union.

**Chapter 5.** In three studies of the American electorate, I utilize every available metric in the American National Election Studies data since 1990 to explore what, exactly, has been and continues to be associated with and predictive of attitudinal hypocrisy of several different types: individual hypocrisy “scores,” overall hypocrisy, and total horizontal constraint—operationalized here as its inverse of “logical anti-constraint.” As hypothesized, traditionalist Christian religiosity, racial resentment, and egalitarianism have strong and robust effects, especially for social issues, while measures of sophistication are limited in their explanatory power, at best. The results, altogether, paint a contextualized, and unfortunately more convoluted, portrait of what the EPDAM’s central expectations are.

**Chapter 6.** The extent to which a person has attitudes that contradict other attitudes is simply cognitive dissonance by another name. I review cognitive dissonance literature and design a survey experiment in which Midwestern university students’ personal perceptions of and distastes for being accused of being hypocritical are tested in an induced compliance research procedure. The results suggest that, in contrast to previous research and the well-established expectations, the participants were only minimally troubled by the idea that they may be hypocritical. For those who were troubled, political ideology and identity had only marginal predictive effects; instead, the traits of dogmatism and openness to experience appeared to supplant the expected roles of ideological orientations.

**Chapter 7.** After conglomerating the eclectic empirical and aesthetic concoctions of the previous chapters, what conclusions can be drawn? Broadly, the deep distinctions between social issues and economic issues are tough to overstate; what drove either category of issue hypocrisies was typically rooted in ideologically interactive effects and fundamental dispositional divisions. As a result, I discourage all who are even negligibly politically engaged from attacking one another for wielding contradictory attitudes—and not just because the 2016 electorate had absolutely zero people with non-hypocritical attitudes (*viz.*, the pot calling the ket-

tle black). Instead, I celebrate attitudinal hypocrisy because it is mostly uncontrollable, and universal to political ideology. Though it has its limits (e.g., prejudicial attitudes and avoidance of scientific progress) and its drawbacks (e.g., unprincipled people with political power), attitudinal hypocrisy is an important research avenue and an important part of including oneself in a political community.

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# What Is Attitudinal Hypocrisy and Why Does It Matter?

## 2.1 WHAT IS ATTITUDINAL HYPOCRISY?

A healthy majority of American conservatives believes that the federal government is too large and too active (Pew Research Center, 2014, p. 6), prefers a small government with fewer services (Pew Research Center, 2011, p. 51), and opposes “most” government regulation of business (p. 98) and the environment (Jones, Cox, & Navarro-Rivera, 2013, p. 35). But, a healthy majority *also* believes that the federal government should actively expand foreign military interventions (Pew Research Center, 2015, pp. 4–5) and actively prohibit—among other activities—abortion (Pew Research Center, 2011, p. 77), marriages between people of the same gender identity (p. 78), marijuana use (p. 86), and physician-assisted suicide (Jones et al., 2013, p. 35). It can be said, then, that most conservatives want a libertarian economic government and an activist—that is, authoritarian—social government.

Meanwhile, a healthy majority of American liberals indicates support for a larger government with more services (Pew Research Center, 2011, p. 51), government regulation of business (p. 98), strict regulation of the environment (p. 99), and believe the government should play a “significant role” in reducing childhood obesity (p. 87). But, they *also* believe that the government should be ostensibly uninvolved in the first trimester of a pregnancy (p. 77), uninvolved in the bedrooms of consenting adults (p. 77), and that the military is too large (p. 34). Most liberals, then, want

an authoritarian economic government and a libertarian social and military government.

Upon reading the two preceding paragraphs, I expect that adherents to both ideologies will take issue with the assertions about their own ideology—perhaps accusing me of bias in one direction or the other or taking polling data out of context, and denying that the issue stances are comparable at the outset. I also expect that adherents to the ideologies will take pride in the assertions about the other ideology, contending that *of course the other ideology is inconsistent and hypocritical, although what is asserted about my ideology is not true.*

Conservatives and liberals, in all of these instances, exemplify a common quirk of American political orientations: They wield attitudes about when the government should and should not act—a direct reflection of political ideology and subsequent stances on political issues—that do not comport with each other, and survey data demonstrate this phenomenon regularly.

Put simply, but accurately, people with ideological leanings toward one orientation or the other are attitudinally hypocritical. For their part, conservatives tend to want an uninvolved financial government but an activist cultural and military government; they extol libertarianism and exalt the limiting of government, *except* when it comes to social issues and the military. On the other side, while liberals tend to want an energetic economic government but a more limited cultural and military government; they commend government and sing of its necessity, *except*, again, when it comes to some social and military issues. In other words, the ideas and concepts for which conservatives and liberals are willing to violate their stated principles and philosophies of government are identical across the ideologies: the issue stances that make conservatives and liberals into hypocrites are social issues and military issues.

This is attitudinal hypocrisy. The purpose of this book is to explore and explain it, its macro- and micro-level origins and effects, and—ultimately—to defend it, its healthiness, and the effects that follow from and are associated with it.

## 2.2 WHY EXPLORE ATTITUDINAL HYPOCRISY?

The objectively defined attitudinal hypocrisy exhibited by American conservatives and liberals is a common observation in the political world (see Kaletsky, 2012; Kurzban, 2010; Stark, 1997) and gets at the heart

of a series of questions that are commonly asked in American politics (e.g., Baumeister, 1991, p. 65; Hayes, 1939; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009, p. 328; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003a, pp. 386–387; Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012, p. 184; Lakoff, 2008, p. 75; Schuman, 1972) but never really answered:

- Why do modern conservatives preach the virtues of a small and limited government, especially with regard to the economy, but demand *action* from the federal government when it comes to social/cultural issues and militarism?
- Why do modern liberals demand the use of government as a tool for ensuring civil equality and economic fairness but vacillate between rejecting and supporting using it as a tool of militarism and social freedom?
- What makes consistently “small-government” libertarians and “big-government” populists so non-hypocritical?

I seek to better understand attitudinal hypocrisy not only to answer those questions, and not only for the simple sake of learning more about how people think politically—although learning for the sake of learning is a worthwhile pursuit. This topic is also important because it serves as a window into an often overlooked aspect of political attitudes and ideologies in terms of their conscious and non-conscious roots and serves to demonstrate that logically contradictory attitudes are a critical and positive side-effect of those roots. Subsequently, understanding what drives attitudinal hypocrisy—that is, having contradictory attitudes and being, essentially, logically discordant in one’s personal politics—could help to reduce the negative notion and disparaging effect of *being* discrepant, in terms of how people view both others’ and their own hypocrisy. As I demonstrate later, this is exemplified in attitudinal hypocrisy’s regular and long-standing use as a political attack in American political discourse.

This notion of the fallaciousness of hypocrisy attacks would be especially true if I find what I ultimately predict: that people *have* hypocritical attitudes because people’s attitudes are driven in large part by forces outside of their control, and the hypocrisies are a natural and even necessary side-effect of those non-conscious forces.

In other words, it may not be a person’s *fault* if they are hypocritical in terms of their political stances—and it may not even *be* a logical, political, or philosophical fault if they *are* hypocritical. This is in spite of the fact

that attitudinal hypocrisy is a near-daily attack<sup>1</sup> lobbed at virtually everyone at every level of politics who espouses any political attitudes (e.g., Eclectablog, 2013; Rich, 1995; Schlichter, 2013; see Hernandez, 2010). It was even an attack during the 1787 Federal Convention debates in Philadelphia that constructed the United States Constitution: On July 17, 1787, Virginian George Mason spitefully charged that other delegates—a thinly veiled swipe at Pennsylvanians James Wilson and Gouverneur Morris—were being logically inconsistent and hypocritical because they asserted that the national legislature deserves “at one moment ... indefinite power,” but, “at another ... cannot be trusted at all” (Farrand, 1911b, p. 31). For his part, Wilson responded immediately to the charges, denying that such a “contrariety” existed (p. 31), while Morris waited until July 24 to respond, clarifying his stance as trusting the legislature when their personal interests align with their constituents’ interests but distrusting when they did not (p. 104). Moreover, on top of that series of exchanges is a shroud of elegantly ironic hypocrisy on the part of George Mason himself: On May 28, Mason had argued against keeping a record of individual delegates’ votes, as those opinions would frequently change and give ammunition to “adversaries” (Farrand, 1911a, p. 10).

Critically, the preceding illustration of the 1787 debates relies entirely on nebulous and suspiciously variable-in-detail notes taken—and then revised, with prejudice, decades later (see Bilder, 2015; Farrand, 1911a, p. vii; Hutson & Rapport, 1987, p. xx)—on those dates by James Madison. This is because the recording and publication of the convention’s proceedings and speeches were prohibited by the secrecy rule to which the delegates agreed before any true convention business began due to concerns about even marginally descriptive notes of proceedings filling “with contradictions” (Bilder, 2015, p. 58; Farrand, 1911a, p. 10). In an 1830 visit with historian Jared Sparks, Madison explained that the closed-door rule was motivated by the delegates’ desire to discuss their embryonic ideas of government systems openly without facing public accusations of opinion inconsistency upon publication, telling Sparks,

It was ... best for the convention for forming the Constitution to sit with closed doors, because opinions were so various and at first so crude that it was necessary that they should be long debated before any uniform system of opinion could be formed. Meantime the minds of the members were changing, and much was to be gained by a yielding and accommodating spirit. Had the members committed themselves publicly at first, they would

have afterwards supposed consistency required them to maintain their ground, whereas by secret discussion no man felt himself obliged to retain his opinions any longer than he was satisfied of their propriety and truth, and was open to the force of argument. (Adams, 1893, pp. 560–561)

Thus, on top of *using* hypocrisy of beliefs as an attack among themselves, convention delegates were aware of how crucial even the *appearance* of opinion consistency—or lack thereof—was in political discourse.

In any case, this chapter first defines and operationalizes attitudes and ideologies and then fits them into a context that allows for the fuller understanding of attitudes as hypocritical, and potentially incongruent with each other, especially as a function of different political orientations and ideologies.

## 2.3 HOW SHOULD WE CONCEPTUALIZE AND MEASURE POLITICAL ATTITUDES?

First, to answer my central questions, it is necessary to settle on an operationalization and classification paradigm of political attitudes and issue stances in America because having an arithmetic representation of attitudes will obviously allow for the subsequent quantitative analysis of attitudinal hypocrisy.

Typically, political attitudes and issue stances are seen as a function of *systems* of beliefs, and classified accordingly—especially with respect to a liberal–conservative, left–right continuum (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960; Jost, 2006). The modern liberal–conservative divide is colloquially and, occasionally, academically conceptualized as a singular left–right axis, with liberals on the left and conservatives on the right (Geser, 2009; Jost, 2009). But, although there is *widespread* agreement, there is no universally agreed-upon academic or empirical explanation as to what “left” and “right” mean and in what context (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003; Knight, 1999; Wildavsky, 1987).

Many researchers have moved away from this one-dimensional model—especially those doing research on and in two-party states like the United States, as the two parties’ platforms can generally be constructed without referring to larger models of ideology (Geser, 2009, p. 243)—with critical scholars citing its inherent problems and contradictions and the fact that its utility may be limited to a superficial perception of a few political attitudes (Feldman, 2003; Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Wildavsky, 1987).

For the purposes of exploring attitudinal hypocrisy, the colloquial left–right framework would need to be accurate, exude full academic agreement, and illuminate something unique about political attitudes that would justify using an ideological framework as opposed to a more simple operationalization. Thus, even if scholars of American politics and political psychology *were* in widespread agreement as to what the definitions of “left” and “right” are, and what their respective likely attitudes are, the agreement would need to be near-universal to truly warrant employment of a “left–right” model—as demonstrated by the disagreement between two of the most well-known scholars of political attitudes and beliefs (Feldman, 2003; Jost, 2009). The importance of objectivity in the study of political behavior—or any science for that matter—is second to none; in the absence of objectivity, biases are able to bubble up to the empirical surface and have the subsequent potential to take hold of and cloud results.

Meanwhile, likely the most common method of demonstrating and, consequently, operationalizing what equates to people’s brandishing of contradictory political attitudes is the operationalization of social and economic ideological spectra, or dimensions (as shown below in Fig. 2.1),




Fig. 2.1 A common two-dimensional view of political orientations

with conservatives being economic libertarians and—ostensibly hypocritically—social authoritarians, and vice versa for liberals (see Feldman & Johnston, 2014). In other words, it is about conceiving of political orientations as existing along an economic dimension of egalitarianism–laissez-faire and a social dimension of authoritarianism–libertarianism (see Achterberg & Houtman, 2009, p. 1650).

Whether ideologies are, indeed, best operationalized in terms of one or two dimensions is the subject of “considerable debate” (Koleva & Rip, 2009, p. 242). But, the larger and more multifaceted problem for both conceptualizations is the same: Which issue attitude goes with which side of which spectrum? In terms of specifically exploring *political attitudes*, this book takes a different approach.

Instead, in operationalizing simple political attitudes—and, eventually, the wielding of hypocritical attitudes—the focus in this book is narrowed to usually center, specifically, on support or opposition to *any* government involvement or action. In other words, with some exceptions, the *general conceptualization* of political attitudes, beliefs, considerations, and stances for this book will be a single scale that measures the degrees of support for government involvement, with *involvement* including the use of government resources to **either** *promote* or *prohibit* specific behaviors or sets of behaviors. Essentially, then, this operationalization is a strictly **libertarianism–authoritarianism** lens of political attitudes (see Fig. 2.2).

There are two primary reasons for this conceptualization.

**Reason 1: Parsimony.** First, for both the reviewing of existing literature and future experimentation, it enables efficient and parsimonious quantification of political attitudes and, consequently, of the magnitude of attitudinal hypocrisy—especially with regard to the way attitudinal hypocrisy is ultimately operationalized in this book (see Sect. 2.6).




Fig. 2.2 Libertarianism–authoritarianism lens of political attitudes



To illustrate, if someone indicates attitudes that are consistent in their application of when they want the government involved in something—for example, if they did not want the government involved in stem cell research, abortion, or the death penalty—they would be congruent in their attitudes and be positioned either high or low on, again, what *equates* to an overall libertarian–authoritarian scale. If they indicate differential applications of support for government involvement, however—for example, if they wanted the government to prohibit abortions and the death penalty but also wanted the government uninvolved in stem cell research—they would be indicating incongruent attitudes. Consequently, then, the magnitudes of hypocrisy could be easily quantified (see Sect. 2.6) and, subsequently, tied to other variables—for example, psychological trait scales (see Sect. 3.1).

A common alternative to this approach would be through the use of classifying attitudes based on ideological scales, either through (1) participant self-identification, (2) post hoc calculation based on participant responses to survey items, or (3) a combination of the two (e.g., Federico, Deason, & Fisher, 2012). For example, someone may have “conservative” attitudes on financial regulation and social issues but “liberal” attitudes on immigration—a pattern of attitudes often applied to President George W. Bush, which led to him being considered a hypocrite by other conservatives (see Lakoff, 2008, p. 72).

The primary advantage of this alternative approach would be the deeper conceptualization of political ideology, and keeping study within the realm of the popularly and academically understood conservative–liberal dichotomy (Jost, 2009), and at least allowing for conceptualizing ideologies’ attitudes as something deeper than a one-dimensional construct—a common argument of those who criticize a one-dimensional model, especially those who criticize it when it is used in literature on ideological constraint (e.g., Converse, 1964; see Knight, 1985, p. 834).

But, with that deeper conceptualization comes a risk of misappropriating the objective definitions of deeper ideologies, those ideologies’ respective attitudes, and, eventually, what *drives* the *contradictions* within those ideologies. Again, the one-dimensional conservative–liberal dichotomy—and, consequently, scholarship that explores its dispositional origins and interrelationships—is imperfect at the outset due to the lack of a separate placement for other ideologies, like “small-government” libertarians and “big-government” populists (Carmines, Ensley, & Wagner, 2012; Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Holsti & Rosenau, 1996). This means that, as

one example, people who *qualify* as “conservatives” on a single dimension will run the gamut from strict libertarians to evangelical conservatives—two groups that are multitudinally different and often at odds (Keckler & Rozell, 2015; Zumbrennen & Gangl, 2008), even though *both* groups will usually *identify* themselves as conservatives (Holsti & Rosenau, 1996; Weber & Federico, 2013). While this ailment can be alleviated by pulling ideology apart into two dimensions, as mentioned above, this is a mere treatment of a symptom, and it not only ignores the larger problem—that is, many people will not fit *cleanly* into one of the four figurative quadrants (Cole, 1995)—but it also begs the question of, again, what exactly qualifies as a social issue versus an economic issue (see Carmines et al., 2012; Johnston & Wronski, 2015; Jost, Krochik, Gaucher, & Hennes, 2009), and what qualifies as *conservative* or *liberal*, as those labels are fairly dynamic and far from perfectly settled (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003; Knight, 1999).

Obviously, no framework is perfect. Aside from the oft-mentioned inherent difficulties in attempting to measure an abstract concept like attitudes (Petty, Wegener, & Fabrigar, 1997, p. 613), each framework is subject to definitions and social compositions of different ideological groups that have both changed dramatically since the end of the previous decade (Carmines et al., 2012), let alone in the last *five* decades (see Chap. 4), not to mention their respective incomplete abilities to demonstrate logical hypocrisy between attitudes—an obvious need for this book.

**Reason 2: Objectivity.** This illustrates the second reason for conceptualizing sets of specific political attitudes in this fashion: It allows for full objectivity, independent of the current definition of each ideology. *It is a simple matter of whether a person supports or opposes the government acting.* From there, then, it is a question of who that person is, how *that* impacts their attitudes and attitudinal hypocrisies, and, perhaps, how their attitudes and attitudinal hypocrisies *impact* who that person is (see Chaps. 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7).

Therefore, while this libertarianism–authoritarianism lens is certainly narrow in scope, it is undeniably objective, situated in the purest possible logic, and parsimonious: A person either supports government involvement in a specific issue or they do not. While libertarians and populists may rejoice at this news, as it makes them seem, at the very least, less hypocritical and contradictory than conservatives and liberals, use of the terms *hypocrisy* and *contradictory* is only used objectively and without

overarching judgment, normative or otherwise. The purpose of the lens is to understand what drives how contradictory a person is; it is certainly not about philosophically understanding why one group may be “better” than another.

The libertarian–authoritarian lens’s objectivity and strict focus on government intervention also sets it apart from the occasionally employed “libertarian–totalitarian” scale of Mehrabian (1996)—totalitarianism differs from authoritarianism in several ways that vary depending on who is being asked, and according to Mehrabian, totalitarianism is simply the strictly political form of authoritarianism (p. 471), which is quite terminologically broad—who includes items related to personal values. My lens is not a scale at the outset, and, again, it only deals with political attitudes in terms of whether they endorse or reject government action and not their ties to larger, abstract political values.

Really, looking at attitudes in this narrow way is operationally similar to other types of conceptualizations in academia in that it is admittedly imperfect but gets the job done at least in terms of illustrating an *idea*. Along those lines, my lens is somewhat analogous to the Bechdel test<sup>2</sup> (see Tolmie, 2011) and the Four Humors<sup>3</sup> (see Abrams & Harpham, 2011, p. 57) used in literary studies, in terms of my lens’s application to political science; both of those models are, indeed, flawed methods of viewing feminism and character archetypes, respectively but are still empirically useful and meaningful and provide, at the very least, indirect methods for viewing and measuring their targets. Again, this analogy is not perfect, as the libertarian–authoritarian lens actually has a great deal of direct empirical support at the outset due to its operationalization within an established *scientific*—rather than literary or philosophical—paradigm (see Knight, 1999). This puts it an experimental and academic step above the Bechdel test and Four Humors model. I explicate the analogy above in order to illustrate the lens’s potentially powerful role in the examination of a larger, somewhat murky concept.

Therefore, when possible, analyses of attitudes will be limited to attitudes only as they strictly relate to government intervention versus government non-intervention. For example, the oft-used Wilson–Patterson Attitude Inventory (WPAI, 1968)—likely the most common measure of conservatism in the literature (Knight, 1999, p. 109) and since modified to be less out-of-date (Smith, Oxley, Hibbing, Alford, & Hibbing, 2011)—on its face would, for this book’s purposes, require that participants responding to it infer that the issues discussed are being done *strictly in terms of whether or not the government should be involved*. To maximize

utility, in this book’s analyses of public opinion and other survey data, only issues and ideas that fit cleanly into the libertarian–authoritarian lens will be included.

Thus, the updated WPAI includes several items that would apply; although, even though it is not a cleanly either/or government-intervention item, I will not automatically dismiss the item *small government*—it has general applicability, indeed, but I will utilize it as a tribute to Wilson and Patterson. Items in the inventory that would qualify must be, at the very least, closely related to whether the government is intervening. An out-of-date item (thus, ultimately excluded) like *women judges* would qualify, since if a person opposes having judges that are female, they would—whether or not they *realize* it, which is critical for understanding the themes of this book (see Chap. 3)—necessarily support a prohibition on females becoming government-employed judges. “White superiority,” on the other hand, would not qualify because it does not *necessarily* relate to government intervention.

This specific lens makes this book somewhat unique with regard to the study of political attitudes. Typically, scholars—primarily those who tread the empirical line between social psychology and political science (e.g., Jost, 2006; 2009; Lupton, Myers, & Thornton, 2015; Wilson, 1973)—utilize the aforementioned left–right, liberal–conservative dimension or dimensions in exploring political attitudes and attitude structures. The conceptualization of attitudes as figuratively *structural* and *interconnected*, as opposed to *isolated* elements, is used nearly universally in scholarship today (see Crano & Lyrintzis, 2015), with Converse’s (1964) conceptualization of “belief systems” being the common ancestor of most of that scholarship.

In fact, it is thanks to Converse (1964) and *his* forebears (e.g., Abelson & Rosenberg, 1958; Campbell et al., 1960) that it nearly goes without saying at this point—although, of course, in a true review of academic literature, it never really goes without saying (see Sect. 2.6)—that attitudes are structured similarly within similar-minded groups of people. To use a still-relevant example from Converse (1964), if someone opposes expanding Social Security, they also *probably* oppose expanding progressive taxation (p. 207); those two stances, as well as a swath of other conservative stances, usually “go together” because of volumes of seen and unseen factors that bind or “constrain” them together (p. 209). For his part, Converse asserted, quite correctly (see Sect. 3.1), that, generally speaking, logic (Converse, 1964, p. 209), social identity (p. 211), and psychological dynamics (p. 210) were those factors.

In the case of my libertarianism–authoritarianism lens, I expect to find that a majority of people who oppose government regulation of the financial sector and oppose affirmative action programs will also support government involvement in the military and government regulation and prevention of immigration. Those four attitudes exist in an abstract structural cluster—a constellation floating in and out of *potential* conscious awareness and even spatial processing and working memory (see von Hecker, Hahn, & Rollings, 2016). Conceptualizing this cluster as a one-dimensional score along a for-or-against-government continuum—especially as that continuum relates to antecedent factors—allows for the understanding of the underlying factors driving support or opposition to government involvement. Finding those specific factors that drive that specific attitude structure and other attitude structures is the point of this book. A structure may be logical to the person who wields those attitudes, but by situating structures within a lens of consistent logical coherence, this book is taking a consistent, logical, and coherent approach.

Other work has, indeed, done this, albeit more indirectly than I intend to do. Several have explored the potential mechanisms that drive attitude structures (Judd & Downing, 1990; Lavine, Thomsen, & Gonzales, 1997). These scholars, however, primarily focus on the relationship between attitudes as being based on a particular conceptualization of *ideology*—not on a fully objective operationalization of attitudes—and the subsequent logical, social, and psychological pressures of wielding an ideology. As explained above, there are important empirical disadvantages to operationalizing attitudes and the structures thereof based on where they fit in political ideologies. This is acknowledged readily by those scholars, who point out that almost all people’s cognitive systems structure *and* organize attitudes on the basis of “relatively idiosyncratic factors” instead of objective, measureable traits (Lavine et al., 1997, p. 736). Thus, the importance of maintaining an objective lens of attitudes is not lost on other researchers.

## 2.4 HOW SHOULD WE CONCEPTUALIZE AND MEASURE POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES?

Of course, I will not be *ignoring* political ideologies. A person’s political ideology is obviously critical not just in terms of the potential social identity impact of belonging to an ideology and the relationship that identity has with wielding specific political attitudes—ideological identifiers will be

more likely to support a policy if they think or are told that other members of their ideology do as well, without necessarily regarding the substance of the policy (Bullock, 2011; Cohen, 2003; Devine, 2015; Hartman & Weber, 2009; Lelkes & Sniderman, 2016; Malka & Lelkes, 2010; Poteat & Mereish, 2012; Smith, Ratliff, & Nosek, 2012). A person's ideology is also vital for this book's central questions: By most definitions of the respective ideologies, conservatives' attitudes will conflict with each other in different ways than liberals' will (Critcher, Huber, Ho, & Koleva, 2009; Nam, Jost, & Van Bavel, 2013); libertarians and populists, meanwhile, are—by the definitions of *those* descriptors—minimally conflicted. But, what are those definitions? How are conservatives, liberals, libertarians, and populists defined?

It must be made clear, again, that in attempting to define those ideologies, and eventually classifying people as members of or adherents to those ideologies, there exist margins of error. The definitions are not always clear, with substantial variance in terms of what constitutes, for example, a conservative: Definitions range from someone who supports existing institutions, as opposed to a reactionary (Muller, 2001, p. 2625), to someone who simply wants less government (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003, p. 377), to someone whose attitudes are all driven by a fear or dislike of uncertainty and, consequently, driven by the sub-factors thereof (Wilson, 1973).

Because my intentions are to eventually explore the differential attitudinal hypocrisies *by* ideology, it is necessary to offer a few methods of classifying people *into* ideologies. I use three primary methods, each of which were referenced in the previous section and each of which offers different, but tangentially related, potential results.

**Ideological Conceptualization 1: Self-Identification.** First, participants can be classified as a member of a specific ideology by their own identification—they can *self-identify* as, specifically, a general conservative, liberal, libertarian, populist, moderate, or an economic conservative, economic liberal, and so forth. This method is common in political science and political psychology, and it is, in many ways, an effective one, as “symbolic ideology” is an important aspect of political orientations (Ellis & Stimson, 2009; Jacoby, 1991; Jost, 2006, 2009; Malka & Lelkes, 2010).

It also gets at the heart of what it means on some deeper level to identify with a group, a mechanism that research shows has an additional effect beyond simple political orientations (Federico, Hunt, & Ergun, 2009). In

other words, it has an *affective* effect which is even more pronounced—in certain circumstances (see Bullock, 2011)—than that of the logical implications on political attitudes of wielding an ideology (Cohen, 2003; Malka & Lelkes, 2010; Poteat & Mereish, 2012).

The method is not without its flaws, however. After all, one’s substantive “operational” ideology is often quite different from the “symbolic” ideology that a person *thinks* they have (Conover & Feldman, 1981; Ellis, 2012; Luttbeg & Gant, 1985; Treier & Hillygus, 2009), as evidenced by the following: (1) substantive libertarians self-identify as *conservative* more than anything else (Holsti & Rosenau, 1996; Weber & Federico, 2013)—in one nationally representative analysis, over half identified as *conservative* or *very conservative* (Jones et al., 2013, p. 11)—and (2) over one-fifth of self-identified conservatives, according to an estimate by Stimson (2004), are operationally liberal (Federico et al., 2012, p. 383)—which necessitates the need for other metrics.

**Ideological Conceptualization 2: Post hoc Typification.** Second, participants can be ideologically typified based on their indicated political attitudes. For example, people who indicate a relatively large enough number of “conservative” issue attitudes may be *classified* as conservative by having a conservatism “score”—calculated by adding together similarly scaled responses on issues—in the top quartile of respondents, leaving them with an operational, more substantive ideological classification (see Table 2.1). This process eliminates any effect of *identifying* with a specific ideology and keeps the classification based on more measurable attributes. But, the process also depends entirely on what constitutes a “conservative” attitude, and that constitution is often, if not usually dependent on contextual factors (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003)—especially if analyzing a cross-national sample, which exemplifies the need to fully explore the potential descriptions of respective ideologies (Inbar, Pizarro, Iyer, & Haidt, 2012, p. 541)—and, subsequently, will result in differing results across studies.

**Ideological Conceptualization 3: Post hoc Scores.** Third and finally, similar to the classification typology above, participants can be typified based on their attitudes in terms of ideology composite *scores*, instead of categorization as one or another (Conover & Feldman, 1981; Kerlinger, 1984; Malka & Lelkes, 2010). Attitudes can be categorized as any number of composite types, and participants can subsequently have any number of ideological composite scores. This method serves as somewhat of an

**Table 2.1** Issue attitudes, government involvement, and typical ideological stances

<i>Updated WPAI item</i>	<i>Gov't</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Liberals</i>	<i>Libertarians</i>	<i>Populists</i>
Organized school prayer	Yes	Agree	Disagree	Disagree	Agree
Bans on obscene material	Yes	Agree	Disagree	Disagree	Agree
Border wall	Yes	Agree	Disagree	Disagree	Agree
Gov't-guaranteed women's equality	Yes	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree
Federal death penalty	Yes	Agree	Disagree	Disagree	Agree
Federal surveillance program	Yes	Agree	Agree	Disagree	Agree
Ban sodomy	Yes	Agree	Disagree	Disagree	Agree
Ban gay marriage	Yes	Agree	Disagree	Disagree	Agree
Right to an abortion	No	Disagree	Agree	Agree	Disagree
Drone strikes	Yes	Agree	Agree	Disagree	Agree
Require creationism alongside evolution	Yes	Agree	Disagree	Disagree	Agree
2003 Invasion of Iraq	Yes	Agree	Disagree	Disagree	Agree
Increase federal welfare spending	Yes	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree
Tax cuts	No	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
Gun control	Yes	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree
Increase federal military spending	Yes	Agree	Disagree	Disagree	Agree
Torture terror suspects	Yes	Agree	Disagree	Disagree	Agree
Pollution control	Yes	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree
Small government	No	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
Foreign aid	Yes	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree
Free trade	No	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree

extension of the libertarian–authoritarian scale introduced in the previous section but also as a set of individual difference variables: People can have a conservatism score, a liberalism score, a social welfare score, and so on; although, again, what constitutes a “conservative” position, for example, is far from set in academic stone.

Meanwhile, although there would be a risk in having a score on a conservatism variable simply be the opposite of a liberalism score—since liberalism is not simply the opposite of conservatism, as they are, in several



key ways, orthogonal (Kerlinger, 1984)—scholars have long been able to avoid this conundrum by incorporating different issue attitudes into different scales (Conover & Feldman, 1981; Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Kerlinger, 1984). However, in operationalizing attitudinal hypocrisy, the metrics most often utilized use the same issue attitudes in determining hypocrisy scores, meaning that there will be significant overlap between the items used in ideological variable scores and the items used in hypocrisy scores. Therefore, this technique is not employed in all of this book’s analyses, in spite of the technique’s utility.


So, how will I define conservatives, liberals, libertarians, and populists, aside from self-identification? In other words, when not having someone identify as a member of a specific ideological group, how will someone be classified and categorized as a member of an ideological group?

The series of issue attitudes by ideology of the Pew Research Center’s (2011, 2014) nationally representative survey results referenced at the beginning of this chapter serves as a guideline for classifying people into one ideology or another. Pew’s designations fall short, however, in that the range of political attitudes gathered is not comprehensive or all-encompassing. Necessarily, other methodologies will need to be used to optimize the categorization of individuals—for example, using the results of latent class analyses that demonstrate additional issue attitudes’ respective ideological classifications (Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Johnston, 2011).

At any rate, certain sets of attitudes and stances will only be held by conservatives, other sets will only be held by liberals, and so on. To illustrate, taking a person’s total number of conservative stances, then, will yield a conservatism *score*, and if that score is high enough—that is, as noted above, if it passes a numerical threshold determined in each respective analysis, since it depends on the range of potential answers—the person can be classified as a conservative.

Obviously, the classification paradigms will be dictated by the available data, but generally, the process will largely accord with the procedure described as follows (see Fig. 2.3) with common issue attitudes noted where applicable (see also Table 2.1).

**Conservatives.** American conservatives tend to have a desire for a relatively uninvolved, mostly libertarian and laissez-faire economic government and an activist/authoritarian social and military/security government: They want as little government intervention in the economy



**Fig. 2.3** A two-dimensional view of American political ideologies

as possible, while still wanting a great deal of intervention on cultural and security-related issues (Pew Research Center, 2011, 2014). For conservatives, people are naturally unequal, and success is up to an individual’s initiative to thrive (Kerlinger, 1984, pp. 15–16; cited by Knight, 1999, p. 69)—philosophical attributes that were especially crystallized in the Tea Party movement of the early 2010s (Arceneaux & Nicholson, 2012). In essence, “conservative” attitudes are consistent with a resistance to social change and a resistance to new ideas—especially the latter when it comes to economics (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003b; Luttbeg & Gant, 1985). Substantive conservatives constitute around 22% of the American public and 27% of voters (Pew Research Center, 2014, p. 1), even though self-identified conservatives constitute nearly one-third of Americans (Jones et al. 2013, p. 10).

**Liberals.** Liberals inversely reflect conservatives in that liberals desire egalitarian economic regulation and a social government that only involves itself to ensure social equality and civil rights (Kerlinger, 1984; Knight, 1999; Pew Research Center, 2011)—an active government in treating “social deficiencies” and improving the welfare of humanity

(Kerlinger, 1984, p. 15)—because of liberalism’s inherent philosophical penchant for “constructive social progress and change” (Kerlinger, 1984, p. 15). For the most part, liberals’ attitudes—specifically their support for government spending and social welfare (Luttbeg & Gant, 1985)—follow logically from their general acceptance of new ideas (see Choma, 2008). They also vacillate between supporting military actions and security programs, mostly depending, it seems, on who is in charge—a notion evidenced by liberals’ *initial* majority **support** for the National Security Agency’s phone-tracking programs under President Obama but majority **opposition** under President Bush (Pew Research Center, 2013). Substantive liberals constitute around 30% of the American public (Pew Research Center, 2014, p. 1), although self-identified liberals only constitute around 20% (Jones et al., 2013, p. 10).

**Libertarians.** Also confusingly known philosophically as “classical liberals,” and often referred to as “liberals” in *international* political science research (De Lange, 2007), libertarians are easy to define in that they are, by definition, opposed to all but minimal government intervention (Jones et al., 2013; Pew Research Center, 2011). They want a small and heavily restricted federal government, with as much social and economic freedom as possible, including the legalization of recreational drug use and prostitution (Jones et al., 2013; Pew Research Center, 2011; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000). As a simple rule, if there is a question about whether the government should be involved in something, libertarians’ default response is a fast *no*. People who are consistently, substantively libertarian comprise between 7% (Jones et al., 2013, p. 8) and 10% (Pew Research Center, 2011, p. 1) of the American electorate, although self-identified libertarians constitute 13% (Jones et al., 2013, p. 8).

**Populists.** Populists present the biggest research problem, for a few reasons. First, there is no universally accepted definition or even *term* for people who support government action and involvement for social and economic issues—they are also occasionally referred to as “communitarians” (Carmines et al., 2012; Janoff-Bulman, 2009) or “communalists” (Jones et al., 2013). Second, they are often only studied in contexts outside of the United States—or they, at least, were not given as much attention in American politics prior to the 2016 presidential campaigns of Donald Trump and, to a lesser extent, Bernie Sanders (see Oliver & Rahn, 2016).

More importantly, for empirical purposes, populists are difficult to study because, in research exploring ideological differences, they are, or can often be, equated with conservatives *and* liberals, depending on the situation: economically *and* socially liberal to some (e.g., Pew Research Center, 2011), economically liberal and socially conservative to others (e.g., Carmines et al., 2012; Johnston, 2011; Zaller, 1992). So, while there is definitional agreement that populists are, overall, supportive of government intervention in economic and military matters, it is over the *type* of intervention—prohibition versus promotion—in social and cultural issues that there is disagreement. Populists can be considered to be socially conservative if they are more concerned with social traditionalism than economic regulation or considered to be socially liberal if they are more concerned with social equality—and thus, another form of government activism, in that the government is intervening to ensure social equality—so prohibition of social activity and promotion of social equality, respectively.

These differential effects would be easier to discern and more pronounced if other research were to utilize my libertarian–authoritarian lens, since populists would simply constitute liberals who go several steps farther. This makes sense in light of liberals’ general support of instead of opposition to government intervention that has been increasing in the last several decades (Holsti & Rosenau, 1996), likely due to cue-taking (Zaller, 1992) from increasingly polarized political parties in America (McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal, 2006). But, as mentioned above, modern liberals do vacillate between supporting government intervention in some areas and opposing in others. Therefore, the few areas in which liberals regularly *oppose* government intervention and favor libertarianism—for example, obscenity, first-trimester abortions, and, in some respects, civil rights, since most liberals do not want the local, state, or federal government involved in preventing, for example, gay couples from adopting children (Pew Research Center, 2011)—should be the primary markers for defining populism and distinguishing it from liberalism in general and social conservatism more specifically (Johnston, 2011). This obviously limits the qualitative distinction and, eventually, the quantitative differentiation between populists and liberals, and thus may present a problem for this book. During analyses, the distinction will be made clear, and steps will be taken to ensure adequate separation.

It should be noted that other groups certainly exist—namely, moderates and apathetics (see Hibbing, 2013, p. 483)—which, in terms of

substantive issue stances, may constitute a plurality of the American public (Jones et al., 2013, p. 8). Both groups, however, are far too heterogeneous and varied to make any real conclusions about them. Since this book is mostly exploring different ideological groups in terms of post hoc calculations and subjects' scores on ideological variable scales, moderates and apathetics will rarely be included in analyses. The handful of times they are included, they will be defined in terms of the frequency of "no opinion" responses for apathetics or in terms of their scores on those ideological variable scales for moderates. In other words, apathetics will be defined by indifference to political issues, and moderates will be defined by their degree of measurable centrism with regard to the aforementioned ideological classifications.

It may be alarming to note that, in discussing substantive ideologues, the discussion may actually be about barely half of the American public, leaving the other half underanalyzed. However, even if comparing the attitudinal content of the four primary ideological groups is a matter of comparing small percentages—as noted earlier, anywhere from 7% to 25% per group and, in sum, somewhere around 50%—of the American population (Jones et al. 2013; Pew Research Center, 2011, 2014), the comparison is still between groups of, even in the smallest group, at least 22 million Americans.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, even though the relative percentages may not be massive, the groups are still quite large, with ostensible membership in the tens of millions.

Upon settling on series of definitions of attitudes and ideologies, it is possible, then, to move toward potential methodologies for explaining ideological differences in attitudinal congruence and incongruence.

## 2.5 HOW SHOULD WE CONCEPTUALIZE AND MEASURE ATTITUDINAL HYPOCRISY?

At this point, it is necessary to set the scene in terms of definitions and to situate this work more firmly within existing literature. In terms of vocabulary, previous work in this topic has no wording upon which every scholar has agreed. The terms *congruent*, *congruous*, *consistent*, and *constrained*, as well as their respective antonyms, have essentially been used as synonyms (Luskin, 1987, pp. 860–861; Petersen, Slothuus, & Togeby, 2010, p. 532), while other work has used the terms *logical interrelationship* and *coherence* to describe the same topic (Gerring, 1997, p. 974).

When not using *hypocrisy* and *hypocritical attitudes*, I will primarily use the first two terms, however: *congruent* and the respective state of *congruence* when discussing more quantitative and geometric elements, and *congruous* and *congruity* for qualitative. The English language has no formal rule for these Latin-rooted terms, meaning that, coincidentally, English's application of Latin in this instance is very incongruous and hypocritical.

*Constraint*, meanwhile, has primarily been utilized in scholarly responses to Converse (1964), who uses the term to refer to both temporal and logical consistency in political attitudes and belief systems. In terms of attitudinal constraint—that is, congruence—for Converse, sets of attitudes may trickle down *vertically* from a larger value or ideology (p. 212), or they may be logically constrained around *each other* and, essentially, trickle across *horizontally*.

This book's empirical and operational focus will be on *horizontal* constraint—as opposed to *vertical* constraint or a *combination* of the two types—for two reasons, both of which are similar to the reasons justifying my attitudinal modeling.

First, horizontal constraint is a more efficient lens through which hypocrisy can be analyzed. With *vertical* constraint, attitude items may technically be consistent with each other through a number of ways. To illustrate, a person may hold the value of individual freedom in the highest regard and only want the government to act if someone's individual freedom is in question. This person may be *horizontally* incongruent (i.e., hypocritical) with regard to Social Security and Medicare—supporting the privatization of Social Security on the grounds of an individual's right to make decisions about their retirement for themselves but supporting the government's insurance system so that they may have their health looked after in their retirement—but they would be *vertically* congruent with individual freedom being their guiding value. Additionally, someone else could use that same value to justify opposition to both Social Security and Medicare, with Medicare being a social program that interferes with their freedom by taking their tax dollars to pay for it.

Second, with the same value being able to drive differing attitudes for different people, most likely depending on their differing understandings of the value itself, the importance of sticking with a simple and objective measurement is clear. By only focusing on attitudes with regard to government activity, the metric remains sound and objective.

I will allude to “attitudinal congruence” and “attitudinal incongruence” in place of “horizontal constraint” and a lack thereof, respectively, in order to help situate this book in a new research paradigm—one that is different from the paradigm previously occupied primarily by Converse-related political science scholarship and, instead, includes more explicitly *psychological* research and empirical work. Moreover, as previously mentioned, constraint literature focuses not just on the logical and rational constraints of wielding specific attitudes but also on temporal shifts and changes in mass-level and individual-level attitudes, or “attitude stability” (e.g., Federico & Schneider, 2007)—that is, the way a person’s or groups of people’s attitudes and belief systems may morph and change over time. I want to be clear: **This book is not concerned with temporal constraint or attitude stability**, as my central questions relate to what drives people to, hypocritically, support or oppose government intervention in some areas and not others—not how that support or opposition may change from one time period to the next.<sup>5</sup>

Therefore, the best overall systemic lens for this book and the best way of answering my central questions—both for reviewing and dissecting existing literature and conducting new experiments and analyzing the results thereof—is by answering the more specific questions of what factors affect why and how people wield hypocritical attitudes about any government intervention. In other words, I am answering the question of what drives attitudinal hypocrisy and, ultimately, defending its prevalence.

**Quantitative Operationalization of Hypocrisy.** Subsequently, it is necessary to quantitatively operationalize an individual’s attitudinal hypocrisy. Recalling that attitudinal hypocrisy specifically serves as a more paradigmatically appropriate—for the purposes of this book—term for, essentially, horizontal non-constraint, utilizing previous research’s operationalizations of horizontal constraint serves as a useful starting point.

Converse (1964) used simple correlation coefficients to measure the degree to which different groups—for example, Congressional candidates and the general public—agreed on different types of issues. Obviously, this means that Converse was not measuring individual-level congruence but rather, group-level agreement *around* single issue items. While it could be possible to measure the degree to which a person’s attitudes correlated together in a single direction, this would overcomplicate the value—both

figurative value and literal, quantitative value—of what I am attempting to find: the degree to which attitudes are congruent with *each other* or, inversely, the *dispersion* of attitudes. So, while a correlation coefficient could potentially yield a single correlation value for each person, doing so adds an unneeded arithmetic dimension (Balch, 1979; Wyckoff, 1980), and its use has been criticized in studies that have *attempted* to use it (Herzon, 1980).

Barton and Parsons (1977) were among the first to attempt to quantify individual-level horizontal constraint in a simple arithmetic manner. Their approach, which has subsequently been used by a great deal of scholars (e.g., Arceneaux, Johnson, & Maes, 2012; Federico & Hunt, 2013; Federico et al., 2012; Griffin, 2013; Hagner & Pierce, 1983; Hamill, Lodge, & Blake, 1985; Jelen, 1990; Jennings, 1992; Kiecolt & Nelsen, 1988; Kim, Wyatt, & Katz, 1999; Lavine et al., 1997; Luskin, 1987; Mason, 2015; Miller, Hesli, & Reisinger, 1995; Norrander, 1989; Wyckoff, 1980, 1987a, 1987b), quantifies the level of an individual's attitudes' logical consistency—since, according to the authors, it is a “standard” in psychology to discern that the “beliefs which ‘go together’ as consistent” (Barton & Parsons, 1977, p. 164). It does so by calculating the *standard deviation* of a participant's mean score on a series of political attitudes that have been rescaled to all “go together” in the same direction.<sup>6</sup> Therefore, the higher the standard deviation, the lower the degree of congruence, and the higher the degree of hypocrisy; it is that principle I use in three operationalizations of hypocrisy.

**Method 1: Individual Attitudinal Hypocrisy.** This computation compares people's mean stated philosophy of government against individual issue stances. Subjects' individual stances with regard to the ideal size,<sup>7</sup> function, and activity of government (“government philosophy”) are averaged together to place subjects on a continuum of less-to-more government—that is, of ostensibly anarchic libertarianism to ostensibly fascistic authoritarianism. After that, using a series of individual standard deviation computations, subjects' placement on that continuum is compared to an issue stance that is *itself* necessarily on a continuum of government activity—that is, on a given issue, a scale of government doing *nothing* to government doing *something*. Thus, the higher the standard deviation that is calculated, the more hypocritical the subject is on that issue.



The ostensible algorithm for calculating hypocrisy scores is more clearly explicated as follows:

1. Government philosophy items and issue stance items are chosen.
  - (a) Government philosophy items must make reference to respondents' preferred size, function, or power of government.
  - (b) Issue stance items must make implicit or explicit reference to government size, function, or power.
2. Items are rescaled.
  - (a) 0.0-coded must denote no government involvement, with increasing magnitudes of involvement up to 1.0, which denotes the maximum magnitude of involvement allowed by the parameters of the item in question.
3. Government philosophy items are averaged.
4. Hypocrisy scores are calculated.
  - (a) For example, *hypocrisy for Issue A* = standard deviation of *subject's mean government philosophy* and *subject's stance on Issue A*.

Methodologically, the metric allows for discerning what specific factors impact where on a given *scale of hypocrisy* a person is placed. To illustrate, the hypocrisy metric for where a subject stands on abortion places the subject somewhere on a line running from (1), consistently indicating that they believe in limited government *and* no prohibitions on abortion *or* saying they believe in a strong government *and* full prohibitions on abortion (each of which will = 0.000) to (2) consistently indicating that they believe in limited government and full prohibitions on abortion or saying they believe in a strong government and no prohibitions on abortion (each of which will be the maximum calculable standard deviation score: the square root of the maximum variance or 0.707). Statistically linking that placement to specific predictors is necessary in answering the central questions of this book.

**Method 2: Mean Attitudinal Hypocrisy.** This is the simple average across each score calculated from Method 1, methodologically important because of its ability to demonstrate overall hypocrisy—that is, overall violation of stated government philosophy in issue stances.

**Method 3: Logical Horizontal Constraint.** This method is the most pure exercise of the Barton and Parsons (1977) metric. The simple standard

deviation of rescaled issue stances along the libertarian–authoritarian axis (i.e., at one end or the other) is calculated. Lower scores are less hypocritical and more logically constrained; higher scores are more hypocritical and less logically constrained.

*Method 3: Logical Horizontal Constraint (see Barton & Parsons, 1977)*

$$\text{Logical horizontal constraint} = \sqrt{\frac{1}{n-1} \sum (x - \bar{x})^2}$$

$n$  = number of issues included in the scale

$x$  = value (typically from 0 to 1) of response to a specific issue

$\bar{x}$  = mean value (typically between 0 and 1) of responses scaled in the same direction with regard to support for government intervention

The Barton and Parsons (1977) idea—utilized abstractly in Method 1 and Method 2 and directly in Method 3—demonstrates a simple aspect of congruence. While an alternative equation from Hagner and Pierce (1983) is a more arithmetically complete and complex picture of the same idea, it should be noted that, according to Wyckoff (1987a, 1987b), the Hagner and Pierce (1983) equation is better suited to measuring political sophistication than what equates to attitudinal congruence. Their method takes the individual’s *range* of attitudes—that is, how much they know—into account but rarely adds anything to the greater analytical picture (Wyckoff, 1987b, pp. 150–151).

Nevertheless, to illustrate the methods outlined above, I offer two people—a conservative and a liberal—and six responses: five of their attitudes on the same respective political issues, operationalized with regard to the lens I described in Sect. 2.3, and two of their stated philosophies of government. For each of their stances, a value from 0 to 1 can be assigned, with a *higher* value corresponding to *strong* support for government intervention.

The conservative strongly favors the government prohibiting all abortions (1), strongly opposes the individual mandate for health insurance (0), strongly opposes any government action about climate change (0), strongly favors expanding aid to Israel (1), strongly supports building a border fence (1), and, philosophically, strongly agrees with the statement “The less government, the better” (0) and just agrees (i.e., not *strongly*)

with the statement “the free market can handle complicated problems without government being involved” (0.25). The liberal opposes government involvement in abortion for the first two trimesters (0.25), strongly favors the individual mandate for health insurance (1), strongly favors government action on climate change (1), strongly opposes government aid to Israel (0), strongly opposes a border fence (0), and, philosophically, strongly agrees with the statement “There are more things that government should be doing” (1) and strongly agrees with the statement “We need a strong government to handle today’s complex economic problems” (1) (i.e., the opposite of the conservative’s philosophy in those common respective American National Election Study items; see Chap. 5).

Method 1 allows for the comparison of stated philosophy of government to individual issue stances, meaning that hypocrisy scores for any of the measured issue stances can be calculated. In this case, I will use the stance on prohibiting abortion: The standard deviations are calculated from the mean of the participants’ two government philosophy stances and the participants’ respective stances on the prohibit-abortion item. The resulting abortion hypocrisy scores—with the notation I will be utilizing for Method 1 calculations—are  $H(\text{abortion}) = 0.619$  for the conservative and  $H(\text{abortion}) = 0.530$  for the liberal.

Method 2 essentially constitutes the average violation of government philosophy across issue stances: Method 1 is calculated for each issue stance, and the mean is calculated across each resulting hypocrisy score. This leads to the resulting mean hypocrisy scores of  $H(\text{mean}) = 0.407$  for the conservative and  $H(\text{mean}) = 0.389$  for the liberal.

Finally, Method 3 calculates attitudinal incongruence (i.e., 1—horizontal constraint) but with the constraining framework being specifically within the lens of libertarianism—authoritarianism. Importantly, it only includes issue stances and not government philosophy items. This is because horizontal constraint—or lack thereof—is (1) *already* codified based around the backbone of the libertarian—authoritarian axis and (2) about the fitting-together of issue attitudes specifically, in a structure that varies in logical consistency—in other words, horizontal constraint/logical congruence is not specifically related to government philosophy items because it is a measurement of the potential logical incoherence of issue stances (see Barton & Parsons, 1977, pp. 164–165). Thus, the attitudinal incongruence score is  $H(\text{incongruence}) = 0.600$  for the conservative and  $H(\text{incongruence}) = 0.450$  for the liberal.

Obviously, no real conclusion can be made with a total sample size of 2. I provide these examples, again, as a mere illustration of the operational mechanisms and without subjective judgment about whether the scores themselves and the differences therein *mean anything* for society. Chapter 5 provides more statistically viable elucidations and executions of the methods, since it includes much larger sample sizes and the ability to compare average hypocrisy scores by ideology, by hypocrisy type, and the potential dispositional covariates (see Sect. 3.1) therein.

## 2.6 WHAT HAS PREVIOUS WORK FOUND ON ATTITUDINAL HYPOCRISY?

The existence of this oft-cited approach to horizontal constraint is evidence that hypocrisy's operationalization of attitudinal congruence and incongruence is not a wholly new scholarly topic or procedural methodology altogether. However, much of the work that uses the Barton and Parsons (1977) metric only does so to show a positive correlation between attitudinal congruence, education, and political sophistication (e.g., Federico & Hunt, 2013; Griffin, 2013; Hagner & Pierce, 1983; Jennings, 1992; Miller et al., 1995). In fact, the congruence metric itself was, at one point, thought to be a direct measure of sophistication (Luskin, 1987), an idea that was quickly dismantled (Wyckoff, 1987a)—if it even goes *that* far (Wyckoff, 1987a, 1987b). Consistent with Converse's (1964) conclusions, some research has found that political elites tend to be, at the individual level, more attitudinally congruent and less hypocritical, with people who are not politically knowledgeable and instead concern themselves with specific issues one at a time, rather than ideological principles (Knight, 1985). Although, it is worth noting that scholars have also used the Barton and Parsons method to compare attitudinal congruence (i.e., inverted hypocrisy) across religious groups (Jelen, 1990; Kiecolt & Nelsen, 1988) and primary versus general election voters (Norrander, 1989) as well as the competing role of genetics in the logical consistency of attitudes (Arceneaux et al., 2012) and the impact of media use on wielding congruent attitudes (Kim et al., 1999).

More specific to the ends of this book, however, Kesebir et al. (2013) demonstrate that, contrary to their—and a sample of the general public's—expectations, self-identified Democrats, liberals, Obama voters in 2008, and moderates were, in each of the five studies, more congruent with respect to congruence with the ideologies (i.e., not *logical*

congruence with respect to government involvement) than Republicans, conservatives, and McCain voters in their political attitudes. Although, interestingly, after being primed with reminders of their own mortality (see “mortality salience” in Sect. 3.1), conservatives became slightly more congruent and liberals became slightly less congruent. It is also worth noting that some studies have found no main effect of ideology on hypocrisy or its inverse (e.g., Arceneaux et al., 2012), although Kesebir et al.’s (2013) main-effect results have otherwise been replicated as well (see Federico et al., 2012).

Outside of the use of the Barton and Parsons (1977) metric, however, only a few others have explored the specific idea of attitudinal incongruence or even partially related concepts (e.g., Hoffman, 1971). In particular, Critcher et al. (2009) study the way that conservatives and liberals *reconcile* differential support for abortion rights and the death penalty—that is, hypocrisy with regard to those issues inasmuch as the “value of life” is concerned, so the same political attitudes but with a different empirical lens, oriented toward “values” and not the government-action operationalization of this book. The authors find that, in each of three studies, conservatives tend to see their simultaneous *support* for the death penalty and *opposition* to abortion rights as logical and consistent, and reject the notion that they are being hypocritical. Meanwhile, liberals tend to see *their* simultaneous support for abortion rights and opposition to the death penalty as essentially hypocritical and inconsistent, but not particularly bothersome.

These results are interesting for a number of reasons. First, for conservatives to simply *reject* the notion that those attitudes may contradict one another with respect to values means that the conservatives in the sample are objectively incorrect, in both (1) a logical understanding of those attitudes (see Sect. 4.5 for why this is not necessarily a bad thing) and (2) in terms of my libertarian–authoritarian lens. They may be correct in *their understanding* of the “value of life,” or they may have simply not *thought through* the larger implications of wielding those two attitudes. Either way, the conservatives are exhibiting psychological denial (see Reicherter, Aylward, Student, & Koopman, 2010).

Second, liberals’ basic acknowledgment of hypocrisy may demonstrate what equates to—but certainly does not verify—a deeper understanding of the intricacies of political ideologies. In cases when liberals are less logically hypocritical, this may naturally follow from research finding a positive relationship between political sophistication and attitudinal congruence

(Federico & Hunt, 2013; Federico & Schneider, 2007; Griffin, 2013; Hagner & Pierce, 1983; Jennings, 1992; Judd & Krosnick, 1989; Miller et al., 1995; Wyckoff, 1980; cf. Wyckoff, 1987a, 1987b). Thus, the liberals in the Critcher et al. (2009) sample exemplify the narrator in Walt Whitman's *Song of Myself* (Whitman, 1892):

Do I contradict myself?  
 Very well then I contradict myself,  
 (I am large, I contain multitudes.) (p. 73)

But, it must be noted that Critcher et al.'s (2009) results are severely limited. They have no ability to generalize beyond their small, heavily liberal, and mostly undergraduate participant samples. Moreover, their focus on abortion and the death penalty limits extrapolation of their findings to other issue domains, in addition to the fact that abortion and the death penalty are two of the most seriously contentious and deeply personal political issues—quite possibly more heavily impacted by religion, personal morality, and personal experience than any other issue (Koleva et al., 2012; Wiecko & Gau, 2008).

Still, other scholars have also investigated the anti-abortion / pro-death penalty bloc and found interesting results: a deep-seated propensity for punishment—that is, *punitiveness*—is likely the strongest driver of *that* specific hypocrisy (Cook, 1998; Wiecko & Gau, 2008). Basic demographics, traditionalism, Biblical literalism, and a preference for “simple, low-cognition tasks over complex and cognitively demanding activities” also play a role (Wiecko & Gau, 2008, p. 557).

Meanwhile, for scholars exploring attitude structure, hypocritical attitudes present a curious point of study. When politically sophisticated people—but probably not political novices—are either repeatedly *reminded* of the logical implications of specific attitudes (Judd & Downing, 1990), or simply asked to “think about” pairs of attitudes (Lavine et al., 1997; see also Millar & Tesser, 1986), attitudinal congruence *increases* and, incidentally, ostensible hypocrisy *decreases*, with the *importance* of a specific issue to a specific person informing whether that person's other attitudes can be congruent with the important ones. These results suggest, but certainly do not confirm (see Crano & Lyrintzis, 2015, pp. 26–27), that many Americans—especially those with above-average political knowledge and especially those with strong attitudes and values (Blankenship, Wegener, & Murray, 2015)—operate within a motivational framework of

hypocrisy avoidance and consistency of logic when they ruminate about political issues (see Lavine et al., 1997).

Nonetheless, Critcher et al. (2009), Kesebir (2013), and Wiecko and Gau (2008) stand as among the most important pieces for this book due to their scholarly proximity to the topic of attitudinal incongruence. Moreover, both pieces readily point to the factors that lie outside of the realm of conscious control that drive the attitudes in their samples' participants—an area of research that requires some background.

The following chapter provides that background and uses it to present the central theoretical framework of this book.

## NOTES

1. Although even a cursory familiarity with the last two decades of American politics may bring to mind charges of hypocrisy in the personal lives of specific political figures—to give just two brief examples (see Lott, 2006): (1) liberal attacks on social conservative politicians for sexual indiscretions (see Rhodes, 2009) and (2) conservative attacks on liberals for decrying the state of campaign finance and utilizing its loopholes themselves (see Van Natta, 2002)—this book only discusses hypocrisy of attitudes, or incongruence of attitudes, to maintain objectivity and civility. The point is to advance knowledge and understanding, not bring people down.
2. When attempting to determine whether a book, film, or television series is pro- or anti-woman, the Bechdel test—or Bechdel rule—essentially assigns a 0, 1, or 2 to a piece based on whether it features two or more women talking to each other (=1) about something other than a man (=2). In other words, if a piece does not feature two or more women talking to each other, chances are strong, but not 100%, that the piece is not particularly pro-woman; the more women talk to each other, and the more they talk about something other than men, the more likely it is that the piece is more in line with pro-woman feminist thought.
3. This common media trope is the notion that, essentially, each time there are four characters in a piece, more often than not they fit within four general archetypes due not only to general temperament and personality traits that are reflected in the general population but also to the idea that these four characters feed off of each other in interesting and entertaining ways. To illustrate, the four main characters from the *Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles* comic books and television series are archetypically and temperamentally identical to the four main characters from *Seinfeld*.
4. If substantive libertarians—the smallest group—constitute 7% of the United States population of 316,000,000, 7% of 316,000,000 yields 22,120,000.

5. An alternative to the phrases “attitudinal hypocrisy” or “attitudinal congruence” would be to modify “inter-attitudinal consistency” to refer specifically to logical—that is, non-temporal—consistency between attitude structures. Since the bizarre rules of English would seem to dictate that this would then become “inter-attitudino-structural consistency” or “inter-attitudinal-structural consistency,” and that this would *still* not be specifically referring to non-temporal consistency, the best way to refer to this idea would be to specify its figurative geometry with “congruence” and “congruity”—hence, the ultimate choice of “attitudinal congruence and incongruence” as operationalized versions of hypocrisy.
6. It should be noted that the Barton and Parsons (1977) method is slightly problematic due to the fact that it does not take into account subjects who either (1) do not answer questions or (2) answer indifferently—a “major flaw” as described by Wyckoff (1980, p. 127). Hagner and Pierce (1983) work around this flaw in their alternative equation by arithmetically weighing “the individual’s number of missing values in each set of potential responses” (p. 318) and, in doing so, refrain from arbitrarily designating a division between issue “directions” (p. 343)—or, in my operationalization, the level of overall *support for*, rather than *opposition to*, government intervention. Their method, in addition to excluding subjects with missing data, weighs the standard deviation by the ratio of the number of *potential* item pairs to the number of *complete*, non-missing item pairs (see Kiecolt & Nelsen, 1988, p. 55). However, my analyses will utilize *only* the Barton and Parsons (1977) equation and *not* the Hagner and Pierce (1983) equation.
7. Importantly, it should be noted that while Jost (2006) claims that asking one’s preferred government size is, with respect to conservatism and liberalism, “peripheral,” because it is sensitive to the time and place of the survey (p. 654), others disagree: Stimson (2004), for example, includes “size of government” as an issue with some temporal variability but not enough to discount it as an attitude item worthy of model inclusion—especially, it logically follows, if controls for potential time and place effects are included in attempts to model attitudes toward the size of government.

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# Psychological Dispositions, Political Orientations, and a Theoretical Framework of Ideological Differences in Attitudinal Hypocrisy

*Before I go on with this short history, let me make a general observation—the test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function. One should, for example, be able to see that things are hopeless and yet be determined to make them otherwise. This philosophy fitted on to my early adult life, when I saw the improbable, the implausible, often the “impossible,” come true. Life was something you dominated if you were any good. Life yielded easily to intelligence and effort, or to what proportion could be mustered of both. It seemed a romantic business to be a successful literary man—you were not ever going to be as famous as a movie star but what note you had was probably longer-lived; you were never going to have the power of a man of strong political or religious convictions but you were certainly more independent. Of course within the practice of your trade you were forever unsatisfied—but I, for one, would not have chosen any other.*

—F. Scott Fitzgerald (1936)

## 3.1 THE BOTTOM-UP PSYCHOLOGICAL DRIVERS OF PERSONAL POLITICS

To paint the best picture of the ultimate forces and antecedents—that is, systemic and dispositional drivers—behind attitudinal hypocrisy and, perhaps, its positive and negative consequences (see Fitzgerald, 1936),

it is fundamentally necessary to explore the psychological drivers of and, potentially, origins of political attitudes and ideologies. These drivers and origins undoubtedly serve to at least inform a large extent, if not *a majority* of personal politics (see Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009). In order to do that, this chapter will approach the topics of attitudes and ideologies at a deep and foundational level—social and environmental factors that inform attitudes and ideologies notwithstanding, although they will be noted—and use the fundamentals of research in social, cognitive, and political psychology to build a scholarly scaffolding upon which the central model and theoretical framework of this book will ultimately be explicated. From there, attitudinal hypocrisy’s status as a sign of “a first-rate intelligence”—along with the notion that its alternative (i.e., consistency) is “foolish,” and “a hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines” (Emerson, 1841, p. 47)—can be duly tested.

As an academic field, political psychology is wide and deep, and current research in the psychological underpinnings of political attitudes is built upon and around several areas of research, all of which implicitly reflect the words of Wilson (1973), who noted that it was clear that attitudes were *not* simply the product of “rational processes” (p. 265). It is these areas of research—specifically, research into the psychological and cognitive traits that have been repeatedly shown to drive political attitudes and ideologies—that must be well elucidated before a central theoretical framework of attitudinal hypocrisy can be formulated.

The foundational meta-analytic work of Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway (2003b) serves as a cornerstone of research on the psychological factors that tend to drive general political conservatism and, in some ways—but not all (Choma, Hafer, Dywan, Segalowitz, & Busseri, 2012; Conover & Feldman, 1981)—inversely, liberalism (Jost, 2009). Jost et al. (2003b) define political conservatism as an ideology organized around a deep resistance-to-change (i.e., as previously discussed, support-for-*tradition*) and an underlying acceptance of social and economic inequality—as opposed to general political liberalism’s *advocacy* of change and *rejection* of inequality. This echoes other scholars’ conceptualization of political orientations being based on the two perhaps orthogonal dimensional axes of openness–conformity and equality–inequality (e.g., Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt, 2001; Feldman, 2003).

The list of psychological factors driving political orientations—in particular, conservatism and, again, in *some* inverse cases, liberalism—that are even peripherally relevant to this book’s central ideas that the authors

demonstrate *most strongly* and *robustly* with their 88-study meta-analysis consists of the traits that follow.

**Dogmatism.** This is an epistemically motivational trait that ostensibly measures and refers to a fairly closed-off “cognitive organization” of beliefs related to the world that are situated around a more central belief system about “absolute authority” that, “in turn, provides a framework for patterns of intolerance” toward other people (Rokeach, 1954, p. 195). Some scholars, meanwhile, hash it out to relate to an essential *cognitive style* informed by the degree to which a person’s belief system is “open or closed” (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994, p. 1054). Importantly, high dogmatism tends to lead a person to a higher likelihood of rejecting the idea that there are facts that contradict their worldview (Rokeach, 1954, p. 197). Overall, dogmatism and conservatism are typically correlated (Choma et al., 2012; Jost et al., 2003b, p. 353), as are dogmatism and Christian fundamentalism, and conservatism and Christian fundamentalism (Altemeyer, 2002).

The trait is often measured with the 40-item Dogmatism Scale “Form E,” which was developed by Rokeach (1960). The scale consists of items related to “double-think” beliefs—that is, a type of cognitive compartmentalization that refers to the degree to which people indicate beliefs that *logically contradicted each other* (Rokeach, 1960, p. 36), for unclear reasons (Rokeach, 1963)—coupled with a common denial of that double-think (Rokeach, 1960, p. 37), as well as items measuring general orientation toward threat and authority (see Eckhardt, 1991, p. 114). Some have criticized the scale for being subject to political biases of subjects (Parrott & Brown, 1972), although subsequent analyses have supported the scale’s objectivity (Hanson, 1989). A 20-item version has been shown to be a fairly reliable analogue for the full scale (Troidahl & Powell, 1965).

**Fear and Prevention of Loss/Fear of Death.** Intertwined, these two traits constitute an overarching central measurement of how sensitive a person is to the threat or possibility that they could lose someone or something close to them (see Altemeyer, 1998). Jost et al. (2003b) describe conservatism’s relationship with the construct by elucidating the idea that conservatives are extremely sensitive to the potentialities of loss, which contributes to their preference toward the status quo and knee-jerk rejection of progression beyond it (p. 364). It is conceptualized using a variety of different constructs, most of which correspond to mortality salience—a closely related psychological factor outlined more fully below. But, unique to fear of loss is the inclusion within the respective studies of

statements related to a “belief in a dangerous world” (Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt, 2001), which ties it conceptually to social dominance orientation (outlined below). It is typically measured with small numbers of items that ask respondents whether they feel “life is changing for the worse” (see Jost et al., 2003b, p. 364).

**Intolerance of Ambiguity.** This is originally an offshoot from Freudian psychoanalysis research (see Frenkel-Brunswick, 1949), often abbreviated as IA—and, confusingly, sporadically identified as “ambiguity tolerance” or a variant thereof (MacDonald, 1970). It measures the methods with which a person “perceives and processes information” related to stimuli that are ambiguous in nature when the person is confronted with clues that are unfamiliar, too complicated to readily grasp, or—importantly and relevantly—logically inconsistent (Furnham & Ribchester, 1995, p. 179). High-IA individuals tend to interpret ambiguous events as threatening or discomforting (Budner, 1962) and respond to them by increasing their at-that-moment worldview to be more absolutist, black-and-white, and, in many cases, religious (Sagioglou & Forstmann, 2013). It is ostensibly a personality variable that manifests itself in behaviors such as

resistance to reversal of apparent fluctuating stimuli, the early selection and maintenance of one solution in a perceptually ambiguous situation, inability to allow for the possibility of good and bad traits in the same person, acceptance of attitude statements representing a rigid, black-white view of life, seeking for certainty, a rigid dichotomizing into fixed categories, premature closure, and remaining closed to familiar characteristics of stimuli. (Furnham & Ribchester, 1995, p. 180; see also Jost et al., 2003b, p. 346)

Scholars posit that IA is manifested in three *reaction* types: (1) cognitive, in which people interpret an ambiguous situation as an absolutist, black-or-white scenario; (2) emotional, in which people exhibit negative emotions such as unease, anger, and anxiety; and (3) behavioral, in which people reject or avoid a situation with ambiguity (Grenier, Barrette, & Ladouceur, 2005, p. 594).

It is often measured using Budner’s (1962) Intolerance of Ambiguity scale or the Rydell–Rosen Ambiguity Tolerance Scale (MacDonald, 1970; Rydell & Rosen, 1966). Both have been found to have operational use (Kirton, 1981), although according to a Google Scholar search, Budner’s (1962) 16-item scale has been used—or at least referred to—at least three times as often. Kirton (1981) shortened and combined the two scales to create an effective 18-item composite (Furnham, 1994).

**Mortality Salience.** Centrally derived from terror management theory—the notion that thoughts and reminders of death lead one to desire and seek out greater security, meaning, and self-esteem (Greenberg et al., 1990)—this construct relates to the impact of death-related thinking and a general fear of death on a person’s behavior and attitudes (Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Chatel, 1992), and can be, and *has been* conceptually combined with fear and prevention of loss, and fear of death, with its roots firmly situated in evolutionary and biological mechanisms (Tritt, Inzlicht, & Harmon-Jones, 2012). Conservatives tend to become more conservative in their beliefs when reminded of human mortality—specifically, their *own* mortality (Greenberg et al., 1990; Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989)—while, depending on the experimental context (see Nail, McGregor, Drinkwater, Steele, & Thompson, 2009, p. 902), liberals seem to become more liberal (Greenberg et al., 1992).

MS is usually measured with the 15-item Death Anxiety Scale (Templer, 1970) and/or *induced* with a number of different manipulations—for example, having participants write open-ended essays responding to prompts regarding the emotions that are aroused by thinking about their death, or what they believe will happen physically *upon* dying, and *after* dying (Kesebir, Phillips, Anson, Pyszczynski, & Motyl, 2013, p. 26)—all of the above seek to explicitly remind subjects of death (Burke, Kosloff, & Landau, 2013; Kesebir et al., 2013).

**Need for Cognitive Closure.** Also referred to somewhat interchangeably as simply “need for closure” (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994, p. 1049), it denotes a person’s level of preference for an immediate *answer* as opposed to confusion or ambiguity (Kruglanski, 1989). In other words, it is a quickly developing drive to wield a firm—as opposed to uncertain or unclear—belief (Jost et al., 2003b, p. 348). Oftentimes, personal preferences for order and structure are included within explorations of NFCC, as the concepts are basically analogous and refer to the same underlying construct (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994, p. 1050). Moreover, a basic preference for the status quo—a la resistance to change (Jost et al., 2003b)—is also a common correlate (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003a, p. 384). People with high NFCC will “seize and freeze” on newly encountered information in that they will cling to information that allows or fosters an answer and proceed to stick with that information (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996).

Conservatives tend to be higher in NFCC than other ideological groups (Chirumbolo, 2002; Chirumbolo & Leone, 2008), and conservative

attitudes on cultural issues are driven quite strongly by NFCC (Golec de Zavala & Van Bergh, 2007), especially with regard to Biblical literalism (Brandt & Reyna, 2010). Although, liberal attitudes can be driven by NFCC as well (p. 601); in fact, liberal identifiers with *high* NFCC have been shown to be, on average, lower in horizontal constraint than conservatives with high NFCC (Federico, Deason, & Fisher, 2012).

NFCC is generally measured with the Need for Closure Scale (Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993), a 42-item scale that measures preference for order, preference for predictability, decisiveness, ambiguity discomfort, and closed-mindedness (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Shorter versions exist, however: a 15-item scale has also been shown to be effective when practical considerations prohibit the use of the full 42-item scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011), although the 15-item version lacks the full dimensionality of the 42-item version, so it should not be seen as a replacement for it (p. 93). The same effective-but-not-ideal notion is true for a 14-item scale as well (Pierro & Kruglanski, 2006, 2008), while a five-item version was, as would be expected with such a short scale, psychometrically invalid (Federico, Jost, Pierro, & Kruglanski, 2007).

**Need for Structure.** Also referred to as “personal need for structure”—in this book, however, “NFS” will be used in order to emphasize the “need” aspect upfront—this factor denotes the degree to which a person desires a homogeneous, simple structure in their thought and cognition (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). People with high NFS are relatively more likely to feel uncomfortable in response to uncertainty and ambiguity (Barrett, Patock-Peckham, Hutchinson, & Nagoshi, 2005) and develop stereotypes based around misconceptions, an effect that is partially mediated by other psychological factors (Schaller, Boyd, Yohannes, & O’Brien, 1995). NFS has a lot in common with NFCC, rendering the NFCC Scale partially redundant (Neuberg, Judice, & West, 1997), but not enough to mean that NFS and NFCC are not measuring unique constructs. NFS is measured with the 12-item Need for Structure Scale (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993).

**Openness to Experience.** One of the Big Five personality traits, and often abbreviated to simply “openness,” it measures “intellectual curiosity, aesthetic sensitivity, liberal values, and emotional differentiation,” and is marked by creativity, originality, imagination, and non-conformity (McCrae, 1987, p. 1259). Openness generally has a positive correlation with liberalism and negative correlation with conservatism (Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2008; Mehrabian, 1996); these correlations are

significantly stronger with regard to liberal and conservative attitudes on immigration respectively (Dinesen, Klemmensen, & Nørgaard, 2014). Openness is conceptualized as consisting of six traits: (1) fantasy and imagination; (2) appreciation for art; (3) receptivity to and importance of emotions; (4) readiness to try new activities; (5) intellectual curiosity; and (6) willingness to be skeptical toward one's values (Onraet, Van Hiel, Roets, & Cornelis, 2011, p. 184). It should be noted that recent analyses have demonstrated that personality appears to be simply correlated (i.e., not necessarily *causally* linked) with ideology, with both being driven ostensibly to the same degree by common genetic traits (Verhulst, Hatemi, & Eaves, 2012), meaning that measuring openness is essentially indirectly measuring ideology—a common critique (Charney, 2015; Conway et al., 2016). Although, openness still represents an elemental and logical abstraction away from ideology, so to speak, which means it still plays a somewhat unique role in attitude formation, ideology, and the understanding thereof (see Perry & Sibley, 2013). Therefore, it is still worth exploring. At any rate, it seems that, most commonly, openness is measured with ten items from the full Big Five battery used in the 44-item set developed by John, Donahue, and Kentle (1991).

**Uncertainty Avoidance.** Empirically and substantively similar to Intolerance of Ambiguity (Grenier et al., 2005)—to a point of, understandably, being used interchangeably in some studies (p. 594)—but instead of measuring a “here and now” response to an ambiguous situation, uncertainty avoidance (identified in other research as intolerance of uncertainty, or IU, see Grenier et al., 2005) refers to the *future* (p. 596). In other words, in looking toward the future, people high in IU will tend to become uncomfortable and focus more than other people on *negative* potential events, regardless of their likelihood (Dugas, Gosselin, & Ladouceur, 2001). Early scholars of conservatism have gone as far as to say that the singular foundational factor of the conservative ideology is how likely it is that someone will feel threatened or anxious when confronting uncertainty (Wilson, 1973, p. 259). IU is typically measured by the 27-item Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (Freston, Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994).

There are four additional dispositional factors similar to those above, but which are not included in Jost et al.'s (2003b) model that are worth mentioning.

**Conscientiousness.** This is another of the Big Five personality traits and describes a person's propensity for competence, order, duty, striving

for achievement, self-discipline, and deliberation (see Mondak, 2010, p. 53). Conscientiousness's relationship with conservatism, and especially with more authoritarian components of conservatism, is observed regularly (Dallago & Roccato, 2010; Dirilen-Gümüş, Cross, & Dönmez, 2012; Perry & Sibley, 2012; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008; Van Hiel, Mervielde, & De Fruyt, 2004)—although it was wholly unmentioned by Jost et al. (2003b)—but most often to a smaller relative degree than openness (Carney et al., 2008; Cohrs, Kämpfe-Hargrave, & Riemann, 2012; Mondak, 2010; Stenner, 2005; Van Hiel et al., 2004). Like openness, conscientiousness is measured with a section (viz., 9 items) of the 44-item Big Five battery developed by John et al. (1991).

**Need for Cognition.** Not to be confused with NFCC—although they are similar in some respects, and correlate to a moderate degree (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011), and, confusingly, both are referred to as NFC in different contexts—this trait was developed by Cacioppo and Petty (1982) off of earlier work in the acquisition of knowledge (e.g., Cohen, Stotland, & Wolfe, 1955), and refers to a person's propensity to, essentially, think effortfully, and enjoy doing so. This does not mean that people low in NFC avoid thinking about the world around them, but they usually require outside motivation to do so, and, subsequently, to process and comprehend message arguments (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996). When it is possible, people low in NFC typically depend on judgmental strategies that require the least effort—for example, heuristics, or cognitive shortcuts—leading to them being described as “chronic cognitive misers,” as opposed to people who are high in NFC being described as “chronic cognizers” (Cacioppo et al., 1996, p. 197), who demonstrate a higher relative degree of “rational” beliefs (Mahoney & Kaufman, 1997). Jost et al. (2003b) mention NFC as a motivational factor, but do not incorporate it into their analysis due to the fact that it is “non-directional,” and does not *satisfy needs* in the same way that factors like NFCC and Dogmatism do (pp. 340–341), but I mention it now due to its essentially negative relationship—either indirect or direct—with conservatism (Crowson, 2009a). NFC is measured with the Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984), an 18-item statement battery shown to be *negatively* related to (1) conservatism (Crowson, 2009a; Hennes, Nam, Stern, & Jost, 2012), (2) support for punishment (Sargent, 2004; Tam, Au, & Leung, 2008), (3) prejudice (Waller, 1993), and (4) group-based dominance (Kugler, Cooper, & Nosek, 2010); but not significantly related to strictly *economic* conservatism (Crowson, 2009a).



**Need to Evaluate.** Another “cognitive style” variable (Jarvis & Petty, 1996), NE measures the degree to which a person impulsively evaluates a stimulus of any type as either positive or negative (Bizer et al., 2004; Federico, 2004; Jarvis & Petty, 1996). People who are high in NE are significantly less likely to respond “no opinion” on surveys, and tend to form strong opinions on ideas and concepts quickly and in binary, good-or-bad terms (Federico, 2007, p. 538). They tend to have “extreme likes and dislikes,” with a lot of attention paid to the good and bad of everything, even when they are not personally involved in a given conceptual target (Higgins, Kruglanski, & Pierro, 2003, p. 316). People who are *low* in NE, meanwhile, structure their opinions with more effort, and with a greater consideration of existing beliefs (Federico & Schneider, 2007, p. 226). NE went unmentioned by Jost et al. (2003b), but since then, has gained moderate traction as a relevant covariate of other psychological drivers of conservatism (Bizer et al., 2004; Cornelis & Van Hiel, 2006), if not itself a driver of conservatism (Crowson, Thoma, & Hestevold, 2005). It is normally measured with the 16-item Need to Evaluate Scale (NES; Jarvis & Petty, 1996).

**Preference for Consistency.** This construct is a measure of a person’s propensity for ostensible logical consistency and congruence in their own thoughts and behaviors, as well as a person’s desire for others to be congruent, and a desire to be seen by others as congruent (Cialdini, Trost, & Newsom, 1995, p. 319). Formulated out of cognitive dissonance research (see Chap. 6), PFC is positively related to NFS and conscientiousness, and negatively related to openness (Cialdini et al., 1995, p. 320). Some outside of cognitive dissonance research have conceptualized PFC as a way to tap into aversions to general inconsistency, unpredictability, and diversion from the status quo (Nail et al., 2009, p. 903), going as far as to discuss how PFC fits squarely with Jost et al.’s (2003b) assertions, and finding it to correlate with a “need to belong” (Nichols & Webster, 2013)—which is defined as a deep drive to establish and preserve “enduring interpersonal relationships” (Baumeister & Leary, 1995, p. 522). PFC also partially moderates the relationship of religious fundamentalism with prejudice (Hill, Cohen, Terrell, & Nagoshi, 2010). People high in PFC are more likely to attempt to distract themselves from thoughts that are incongruent with their existing beliefs, and will report negative affect when that incongruence is made clear to them (Newby-Clark, McGregor, & Zanna, 2002), while people low in PFC will not necessarily have the opposite effect of those high in PFC, but may actually have an actual *aversion* to

consistency (Bator & Cialdini, 2006, p. 229). Some scholars have decried a need for the relatively young metric to be standardized in terms of in what academic contexts it is employed and how low and high scores vary based on academic contexts (Guadagno & Cialdini, 2010, p. 161). At any rate, PFC is measured with the Preference for Consistency Scale (Cialdini et al., 1995), an 18-item battery, although some have successfully used a 9-item scale with 9-point responses (e.g., Newby-Clark et al., 2002).

**The Authoritarian and Dominant Personalities.** Other scholarship has put a more primary focus on the impact of the more broadly ideology-oriented measures of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) on conservatism and ideology in general. RWA was first conceptualized and operationalized by Altemeyer (1981), based off of the foundational work of Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, and Sanford (1950) on general personality authoritarianism—which Adorno et al. believed, via a Freudian psychoanalytical framework, to be rooted heavily in a person’s early childhood and relationship with their parents. RWA serves as a composite measure of three core factors: (1) *authoritarian aggression*, or supporting punishment for wrongdoers; (2) *authoritarian submission*, or obeying authorities; and (3) *conventionalism*, or upholding moral absolutes and requiring others to follow those moral absolutes (Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1998; Christie, 1954; Peterson, Doty, & Winter, 1993; Sanford, 1973). It may be because of their general deferral to and reception toward their preferred authorities in forming their political attitudes that people high in RWA often “harbor many double standards and hypocrisies” (Altemeyer, 1998, p. 48), since *their* preferred authorities—for example, political elites (Zaller, 1992)—like the preferred authorities of liberals as well, often express incongruent/hypocritical attitudes without explicitly *or* implicitly noting the problematic logic inherent in doing so (see Chap. 4).

RWA is often empirically *equated* with a resistance to change (Mavor, Louis, & Sibley, 2010), which makes sense in light of its oft-observed positive relationship with conservatism and negative relationship with liberalism (Altemeyer, 1998; Crowson et al., 2005; Jost et al., 2003b). People who have high RWA scores tend to view the world as dangerous and constantly veering toward destruction—for example, they will perceive threat much more readily than other groups (Feldman & Stenner, 1997)—and they imagine themselves to be very high in morality and honor (Altemeyer, 1998). As Altemeyer (1998) puts it, they are “scared” and they are “self-righteous” (p. 52).

RWA's long-observed relationship with political conservatism has drawn the understandable ire of conservatives who (1) reject the notion that they believe in an authoritarian, controlling society, as well as some scholars who either explicitly reject Jost et al.'s (2003b) somewhat blanket view of conservatism (e.g., Greenberg & Jonas, 2003), or (2) probably would reject it, if they had not written prior to 2003 (e.g., Ray, 1985). They counter—as demonstrated in a large amount of literature and history (see Greenberg & Jonas, 2003, p. 377)—that it is *left*-wingers that are authoritarian; evidenced, for example, by the array of dictatorial socialist regimes of the twentieth century (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003). In a response to those critics, Jost et al. (2003a) acknowledge the existence of left-wing authoritarianism, but make it clear that the empirical evidence points to a much larger relative degree of right-wing authoritarianism in the world—which echoes other scholars' sentiments (Stone, 1980), in addition to the notion that authoritarianism is both a means and an end in politics and not always an ideology in itself (Lakoff, 2008, p. 73).

At any rate, RWA is typically measured with the RWA Scale, originally developed by Altemeyer (1981) and since updated by Altemeyer (1998), that consists of 30 statements, each of which relates to one of the three authoritarianism dimensions. Shortened versions of the scale have also been constructed that have high degrees of reliability (Manganelli Rattazzi, Bobbio, & Canova, 2007; Zakrisson, 2005).

SDO, meanwhile, emerged from social dominance theory—a framework based on the postulation that civilizations work to reduce intergroup conflict by fostering widespread belief systems of one group dominating over others (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994)—as a variable for measuring a person's degree of desiring to have *their* in-group dominate and “be superior to out-groups” (p. 742). In social and political psychology, SDO is said to have become “one of the most versatile and useful constructs for understanding sociopolitical ideologies, the psychology of prejudice, and intergroup behavior” (Ho et al., 2012, p. 584).

High SDO indicates greater opposition to egalitarianism and a greater belief in a dog-eat-dog, “competitive jungle” world, while low SDO corresponds to greater general support for equality (Duckitt, 2001; Federico, Hunt, & Ergun, 2009). Conservatives tend to have high SDO scores, while liberals tend to have low SDO scores (Altemeyer, 1998); although, it is important to note that recent research suggests that “extreme” liberalism *requires* low SDO while conservatism does *not* require high SDO (Wilson & Sibley, 2013, p. 283).

Issue domains are relevant as well, with SDO shown to have a relatively higher impact on issues related to economics and societal hierarchy, as opposed to issues related to culture (Altemeyer, 1998; Duriez & Van Hiel, 2002). SDO will drive a person to believe in human *dominance* over the environment to a degree that they reject the importance or even existence of climate change, for example (Milfont, Richter, Sibley, Wilson, & Fischer, 2013). It should be noted, however, that SDO still plays at least a covariant and indirect role in most issue areas (Altemeyer, 1998), with an especially high impact on some prejudicial attitudes (p. 54). Positive inter-ethnic contact, for example, may reduce SDO and prejudicial attitudes over time (Dhont, Van Hiel, & Hewstone, 2014). Still, its impact on prejudicial attitudes is likely different from RWA's, since high RWAs are usually very religious, and use religious reasons to justify prejudice, while high religiosity is not a necessary trait of high SDOs (Altemeyer, 1998, p. 61).

SDO is measured using the SDO Scale, a 16-statement battery developed by Pratto et al. (1994). Other scholars have used factor analysis to determine that the scale is best viewed as having two somewhat overlapping, but still separate components—group dominance orientation and egalitarian orientation (Ho et al., 2012; Jost & Thompson, 2000).

In what has become known as the dual-process model (DPM), scholars have basically combined RWA and SDO into a two-pronged approach to the study of general ideology and attitudes (Duckitt, 2001, 2006; Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002), corresponding RWA and SDO to the Jost et al. (2003b) model of ideology as, respectively, opposition-to-change and acceptance-of-inequality (Federico, Weber, Ergun, & Hunt, 2013; Wilson & Sibley, 2013). According to some scholars, this makes DPM essentially analogous to a measure of social and economic ideology, with RWA representing social ideology and SDO representing economic ideology (Duckitt, 2001; Federico et al., 2013; Heaven & Connors, 2001). In essence, then, DPM functions as a conglomeration of RWA and SDO into a more widespread set of psychological factors that describe ideology—not overall predisposition factors in themselves (Van Hiel, Pandelaere, & Duriez, 2004)—and it has become an “increasingly popular framework” as a result (Sidanius et al., 2013, p. 314).

**Moral Foundations.** Meanwhile, researchers exploring the psychological underpinnings of morality have posited the existence of five “moral foundations” derived from psychological intuitions that drive values and attitudes (Haidt, 2012b; Haidt & Graham, 2007), and function

differentially by political orientation (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Graham et al., 2011; Haidt, 2012b). The five foundations—which serve as answers to the question of to what extent a consideration is relevant to one’s thinking when deciding whether something is right or wrong—are built upon five respective axis constructs, and are listed as follows, with the corresponding answer to the question posed above in parentheses: Harm/care (whether someone was harmed), fairness/reciprocity (whether someone acted unfairly), in-group/loyalty (whether someone betrayed their group), authority/respect (whether the people involved were of the same authoritative and worthy-of-respect-and-obedience *rank* in a society),<sup>1</sup> and purity/sanctity (whether someone did something disgusting). Liberals tend to utilize the first two foundations—harm/care and fairness/reciprocity, known together as the “individualizing foundations”—while conservatives utilize *all five* in informing their politics, with the final three foundations known as the “binding foundations” (Graham et al., 2009, 2011).

Currently, subjects’ moral foundations scores are measured through the use of the Moral Foundations metric—the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ), which is either a 30-item questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011) or a 32-item questionnaire (Haidt, 2012a), both of which are divided into two sections denoting, respectively, whether a subject believes a certain value is relevant in their moral decision-making, and whether an action is moral or immoral.

Absent from most of the analyses above, however, are populists and libertarians. Direct research on populists’ psychological motivations is nearly non-existent. Research explicitly on people who qualify as populists—economically liberal social conservatives, by one definition (Johnston, 2011)—has found that they are somewhat similar to conservatives in their responses to uncertainty (p. 89), but the dearth of literature, and lack of agreement on definitions means that dispositional traits of populists remain very much unexplored.

Meanwhile, scholars exploring libertarians tend to conclude that they constitute a functionally different group from conservatives and liberals based on all of the above factors. When separated into cultural and economic conservatism, Crowson (2009a) finds that several of the motivations above—specifically Dogmatism, NFCC, NFC, NE, fear of death, and RWA—only have an impact on cultural conservatism, and not economic conservatism, the latter of which is essentially one of the two sides of libertarianism (Lester, 1994).

The idea that libertarians would have relatively low—especially when compared to conservatives—existential motivation is not a new idea (Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000), but the degree to which libertarians are actually a motivationally and psychologically unique group is a fairly new area of research, albeit one grounded in the well-discussed philosophical idea of libertarians having a penchant for neoliberal economics coupled with the Old Enlightenment idea of conscious rationality above all else, including emotion and empathy (Lakoff, 2008, p. 51).

Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, and Haidt (2012) were likely the first to define libertarians from the quasi-motivational perspective akin to that of Jost et al. (2003b). The authors eventually come to paint libertarians as rationalist individualists at their core. Libertarians tend to have the lowest—relative to conservatives and liberals—average totals for the five Moral Foundations, which led Iyer et al. (2012) to formulate two additional quasi-moral-foundations: Economic liberty and lifestyle liberty; libertarians had the highest relative scores on both of these dimensions. This led Haidt (2012b) and Graham et al. (2013) to formulate the *actual* sixth moral foundation: Liberty/oppression. Although other scholars have found libertarians to value the individualizing foundations more than conservatives (Weber & Federico, 2013), the general result of the moral foundations analyses—that is, libertarians’ *lower general scores* on the five moral foundations—still remains.

Additionally, when compared to conservatives and liberals, libertarians were shown to have high NFC scores, and—as also demonstrated, albeit indirectly, by Crowson (2009a) and Tetlock et al. (2000)—low psychological reactance and, again, existential motivation. They also exhibit more utilitarian, less emotional responses to moral dilemmas (Iyer et al., 2012). Along those rationalist lines, libertarians also have a less emotional, more reason- and rationality-based cognitive style in general, with high scores in systemizing, low scores in empathizing (Baron-Cohen, 2009; Baron-Cohen, Richler, Bisarya, Gurunathan, & Wheelwright, 2003), and general rejection of the use of emotion in political decision-making (Lakoff, 2008, p. 88). Recent studies have taken this research to heart and actually excluded people who self-identify as libertarians from their analyses of conservatives (e.g., Okdie, Rempala, & Garvey, 2013).

In spite of the fact that my lens of political attitudes would suggest that populists are simple the opposite of libertarians, the complexities of ideologies confound such a suggestion. Like conservatives and liberals (Conover & Feldman, 1981), libertarians and populists are not clean

inverses. Some hypotheses can be made, however, if populists are assumed to be socially conservative, as some have done (Johnston, 2011); but, government intervention in social affairs is not limited to social conservatism, as others may support government *funding* of, for example, abortion, instead of a total lack of government involvement. Again, populists are a tricky lot.

At any rate, all of the above factors lie largely outside of the realm of conscious control. While, of course, subjects can simply lie on the prompts designed to gauge their levels of the respective psychological factors, this is not much of a worry, as, for the most part, the metrics for the factors above come across as abstract enough to avoid those potential issues, especially given the fact that they all tend to use batteries and respective post hoc score calculations.

### 3.2 THE BOTTOM-UP COGNITIVE DRIVERS OF PERSONAL POLITICS

An additional set of factors, meanwhile, has resulted from work in cognitive psychology, with specific foci on the dynamics of cognitive complexity, cognitive functions, cognitive rigidity, and cognitive ability. The greater relative objectivity of the tools used to measure these dynamics—which, in the cases of those factors, consist of *behavioral tasks* in which participants *do something* instead of simply indicating what they *believe* to be their opinions, attitudes, or responses to prompts—sets them apart from the psychological factors of the previous section, which, again, are typically measured by simple questionnaires, and potentially subject to conscious and non-conscious biases.

**Cognitive Complexity.** Although treated as a simple psychological factor in Jost et al.’s (2003b) meta-analysis, cognitive complexity—also called “integrative complexity”—as defined herein is different from the psychological factors listed in the previous section by its more direct involvement in non-conscious factors and, subsequently, by virtue of the methods by which it is measured. Instead of being a simple psychological factor, it is a matter of the degree of complexity and, essentially, *sophistication* of thoughts and cognitions, and thus, it is often measured with tasks in which participants to complete certain tasks that require complexity of thought—such as tasks that require a person to avoid static problem-solving patterns in order to answer a multi-step math equation (Rokeach, 1948) or word problems (Crano & Schroder, 1967)—or with content



analyses of, for example, speeches and interviews (Conway et al., 2012; Fiske, Kinder, & Larter, 1983; Fiske, Lau, & Smith, 1990; Gruenfeld, 1995; Tetlock, 1983, 1984; Tetlock, Bernzweig, & Gallant, 1985).

The concept of cognitive complexity itself can be divided into two variables: (1) *differentiation*, or the variety of “characteristics or dimensions” of problems over which people cogitate when confronting an issue (Van Hiel, Onraet, & De Pauw, 2010, p. 1770), with *low* degrees of differentiation elemental to good–bad, black–white thinking, and *high* degrees of differentiation elemental to considering issues from multiple perspectives (p. 1771); and (2) *integration*, or the degree to which someone identifies the characteristics of an issue that have been differentiated as either independent and simple or synergistic and multifaceted—that is, *low* and *high* in integration respectively (p. 1771). In other words, a person with a high degree of differentiation and integration is first able to acknowledge the many different and, importantly, “often contradictory” aspects of political attitudes, and the magnitude to which those aspects may be connected (Tetlock, 1986, p. 819).

Typically, general political conservatism has been shown to have a negative correlation with cognitive complexity in a variety of contexts (Hinze, Doster, & Joe, 1997; Jost et al., 2003b), while liberalism’s relationship with the greater ease in deviating from habitual cognitive responses often leads scholars to conclude that liberals are higher in cognitively complexity, or at least better suited to deal with complex information and stimuli (Amodio, Jost, Master, & Yee, 2007; Jost, Krochik, Gaucher, & Hennes, 2009). However, scholars have also demonstrated that economic conservatism—that is, economic libertarianism—correlates *positively* with the same cognitive measurements (Crowson, 2009a). Still, in all of the above cases, political sophistication and knowledge play a role, and politically sophisticated people tend to have higher cognitive complexity (Fiske et al., 1983, 1990), as do, on occasion, political extremists (Sidanius, 1984, 1988; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2003). So, the degree to which cognitive complexity is truly related to ideology is, at the very least, partially impacted by political sophistication.

**Cognitive Functions.** As defined here, I refer to the application of specific types and direct outputs of cognition, and, in this case, primarily include research related to attention in cognition. To illustrate, research that uses gaze-cuing experiments to influence the direction toward which participants will point their eyes generally find that liberals are more easily influenced by experimental cues than conservatives, who were essentially



unaffected by the cues (Dodd, Hibbing, & Smith, 2011). This makes sense in light of conservatives' regular espousal of the values of personal autonomy and individualism (p. 27), but it should be noted that other work has shown conservatives can, indeed, be affected by gaze cues when the cues come from other conservatives (Liuzza et al., 2011).

Other research that focuses on visual attention has found additional differences between conservatives and liberals. In another experiment in which eye movement is tracked—in this case, while participants view collages of positive/appetitive and negative/aversive images—it was demonstrated that, while every participant tended to focus more on aversive images than appetitive images, conservatives spent *more* time than liberals dwelling on those aversive images (Dodd et al., 2012). Negative and generally threatening stimuli are regularly shown to have a greater set of attentional effects on conservatives than liberals (Carraro, Castelli, & Macchiella, 2011; Joel, Burton, & Plaks, 2014; Jost et al., 2007; Shook & Clay, 2011; Shook & Fazio, 2009), especially when factoring in authoritarianism (Lavine, Lodge, Polichak, & Taber, 2002). This series of findings has contributed to the framework of conservatives having a stronger *negativity bias* (Hibbing, Smith, & Alford, 2014), a human universal but significantly more widely, robustly, and regularly observed in conservatives.

**Cognitive Rigidity.** Also treated as a psychological variable and “widely” measured with survey instruments (Schultz & Searleman, 2002, p. 171), I am referring here to its strictly objectively measured definition. Measuring it with surveys renders it vulnerable to the problems with self-reported responses, and results in a fairly indirect metric—essentially constituting a measurement of a sibling of IA, NFCC, and openness to experience (p. 172). At any rate, strictly *cognitive* (i.e., non-survey measured) rigidity relates to the degree to which a person's mental and behavioral patterns and expectations persevere (p. 170). For Ionescu (2012), it is executive functioning and other factors of cognition that interact with context, sensorimotor mechanisms, and general cognition in a person's development that drive and shape cognitive rigidity (p. 195).

Developed from the aforementioned work of Adorno et al. (1950) is the “rigidity of the right” hypothesis (see Tetlock, 1984), which postulates that conservatives interpret the world around them rigidly, dichotomously, and laden with simplicity and, consequently, simple values in order to provide for a sense of order in an ambiguous, chaotic, or threatening world (Gruenfeld, 1995, p. 6; Tetlock, 1984, p. 365). This is due to the very nature of conservatism and the non-conscious factors that drive

it (Chirumbolo & Leone, 2008, p. 1286). For those high in cognitive rigidity, the world is dichotomous—good or evil; black or white—which fits with the academically emerging typification of conservatives and liberals into “absolutists” and “contextualists” respectively (Alford, Funk, & Hibbing, 2005, pp. 165–166), in which absolutists see the world as a world of good-versus-evil and moral absolutes and contextualists see the world as one with a postmodern sensibility, dependent on an array of contexts (Napier & Jost, 2008).

Generally, objective cognitive rigidity tasks reveal that conservatives tend to be more cognitively rigid than liberals and moderates, while liberals tend to be more cognitively flexible than conservatives (Amodio et al., 2007). This logically follows from the finding that the ethnocentric and prejudicial attitudes that often constitute politically conservative attitudes are strongly related to cognitive rigidity (Johnson et al., 2011; Rokeach, 1948; Sidanius, 1985). Still, the findings are not universal, as it is possible to experimentally induce rigidity for liberals as well (Crawford, 2012).

**Cognitive Ability.** This research works to demonstrate individual and group differences in larger *abilities* within people’s intellectual systems and behaviors, with an obvious connection between cognitive ability research and cognitive complexity research—that is, cognitive ability and cognitive complexity are generally positively correlated (Heaven, Ciarrochi, & Leeson, 2011). A connection between cognitive ability and the notion of “intelligence” can be and has been made as well, and research has demonstrated links between political attitudes, sophistication, intelligence, and cognitive ability (Luskin, 1990; Stankov, 2009), although these are often postulations and severely, perhaps even fatally limited in terms of empirics and contextualizations (Gould, 1981).

Among the first researchers to point toward cognitive ability as a potential driver of general political orientations—in this case, authoritarianism—were Wilson and Patterson (1968). They contended that the evidence available at the time suggested that the current understanding of general authoritarianism was a product of “ignorance and confusion” (p. 264)—that is, in their conceptualization, lower cognitive ability. Since then, others have demonstrated similar findings, with general conservatism and composite sets of conservative attitudes correlating negatively with cognitive ability (Hodson & Busseri, 2012; McCourt, Bouchard, Lykken, Tellegen, & Keyes, 1999; Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson, & Chamberlin, 2002; Stankov, 2009; Van Hiel et al., 2010), effort-of-thought (Eidelman, Crandall, Goodman, & Blanchar, 2012), and

ostensibly one-dimensional intelligence (Heaven et al., 2011; Lapsley & Enright, 1979; McCourt et al., 1999).

It is very important to note that these findings do *not* indicate conservative inferiority—intellectually or evolutionarily, for two reasons. First, cognitive ability research—defined as generously as possible—typically operationalizes the notions of cognitive ability and intelligence with regard to (1) various educational outputs and the possible liberal, anti-conservative indoctrination therein (Heaven et al., 2011; Van Hiel et al., 2010, p. 1772; Woodley, 2011), meaning that these ability studies are *possibly* biased against those without a liberal, culturally sophisticated education; and (2) academic test and “IQ” test performance, both of which are deeply and troublingly flawed (Murdoch, 2007), along with the empirically and objectively absurd method of having interviewers rate “apparent intelligence” (see Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996, pp. 194–195).

Second, heightened cognitive ability is not necessarily a good thing. High cognitive ability does *not* lead to a more accomplished, effective, fulfilling, or meaningful life, and, according to some scholars, often does the opposite (Kanazawa, 2012). As one example, the novelty-seeking behavior that corresponds to higher supposed “intelligence” leads them to use drugs relatively more often than others, and, subsequently, be harmed by those drugs (Kanazawa, 2012). As another example, the highest scorers on cognitive ability tests in men who try out for the National Football League (e.g., the Wonderlic) may actually be *less* likely to be successful than average scorers due to high scorers’ higher likelihood to read *too much* into the opposing side’s play schemes and react discordantly with the *actual* scheme (Lyons, Hoffman, & Michel, 2009).

I will not be using measures of supposed cognitive ability and/or intelligence as individual difference variables in this book. I bring up the topic of cognitive abilities as a way of illustrating a debate in the literature—meaning that this topic is not settled—and as a way of staying objective and presenting the most complete picture possible. While *thinking through* certain ideas *may* lead some people toward increased attitudinal consistency—but only under certain conditions, for certain people, for certain attitude structures (Judd & Downing, 1990)—and while it is certainly *possible* that heightened intellect leads to heightened likelihood to “think something through,” that has not been shown to be the case in the scholarship: Dedicating the time and cognitive energy to think about the large, big-picture ideas and logic behind different policy positions will not necessarily decrease political hypocrisy for everyone (Lavine, 1994). In other

words, attitudinal hypocrisy is not a product of any conceptualization of larger cognitive ability and/or intelligence.

Still, the fact that the construct of “intelligence,” as many academics define it, is not indicative of any kind of real superiority is in spite of the deeply ironic fact that many conservatives and libertarians—for example, David Brooks (2012), Charles Koch (see Moore, 2006), Ralph Reed (see Donovan, 2013), and the Heritage Foundation (see Drezner, 2013)—are quick to use the assertions of some writers (viz., Herrnstein & Murray, 1994; Jensen, 1969; Murray, 1984) who falsely claim that there are what equate to interracial genetic differences in intelligence, measured primarily with IQ tests (see Gould, 1981). In Murray’s (1984) case, he explicitly stated in his book proposal that,

Because a huge number of well-meaning whites fear that they are closet racists, and this book tells them they are not. It’s going to make them feel better about things they already think but do not know how to say. (DeParle, 1994)

These writers go on to recommend that policies should be implemented that are in accordance with this notion and that subsequently directly and indirectly favor the more supposedly “intelligent” races and do *not* provide for the “unintelligent” races (see Jensen, 1969; Murray, 1984)—recommendations that were thought to be taken to heart by the Reagan administration in their cuts to federal social welfare programs (“Losing more ground,” 1985). Claims of intelligence differences between races are false (see Dahl, 1976; Eisenberg & Richmond, 1997; Weinstein, 1997), let alone the fact that IQ tests are not legitimate measures of full-scale intelligence, however intelligence may be defined (Hampshire, Highfield, Parkin, & Owen, 2012; Murdoch, 2007). On top of that, the notion that intelligence of any scholarly definition is a product of genes alone, or even a product of genes to any meaningful degree without regard for environmental and educational context is categorically false on innumerable orders of magnitude (Chabris et al., 2012; Nisbett, 2007).

So, irony aside—and fortunately for those conservatives in the previous paragraph—even though some conservatives may, *perhaps*, be likely to have lower relative cognitive abilities than liberals, this should not itself lead to differences in hypocrisy rates between the two, since, in indirect studies of ability and hypocrisy (Judd & Downing, 1990; Lavine, 1994), the impact of cognitive ability on attitudinal hypocrisy is likely marginal

at best. Moreover, cognitive ability and intelligence have not been shown to be indirectly reflective of an increased ability or increased drive to be logically congruent or to understand logical congruence. Therefore, the observation that conservatives reject the notion that they are inconsistent in their values and that liberals accept it (Cricher, Huber, Ho, & Koleva, 2009) is not indicative of differences in cognitive ability or intelligence.

### 3.3 SYNTHESIZING THE DRIVERS OF PERSONAL POLITICS

In some ways, this book and many other academic tomes are exercises in cognitive complexity and the practice of analyzing research and synthesizing and integrating those analyses together to form a larger, interconnected picture. Accordingly, it is necessary and important that the interrelationships of the variety of factors listed in the previous two sections be more fully elucidated.

A series of conceptual overlaps should be immediately apparent in reading about the factors in the previous two sections, an idea that has not been lost on scholars: for example, Eckhardt (1991) asserted that conservatism, authoritarianism, and dogmatism are quite similar—definitionally congruent, if you will—in that they represent similar constructs across different contexts, like affect, behavior, cognition, and ideology (pp. 98–99).

One method of organizing the psychological factors is by categorizing them based on whether they relate to *epistemic*, *existential*, or *relational* motives, as done by recent scholarship (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009, 2013; Jost, Ledgerwood, & Hardin, 2008): epistemic motives primarily relate to the *certainty* of different types and aspects of knowledge; existential motives primarily relate to fear, threat, and survival; and relational motives primarily relate to interpersonal desires and solidarity. In other words, people are intra- and inter-rationally motivated to seek certainty and avoid uncertainty in a threatening and ambiguous world wherein survival is the above-all-else goal (Jost et al., 2003b, p. 351).

Alternatively, it is possible to organize the factors as they relate to *motivation* in terms of knowledge, consistency, self-worth, and social approval (Briñol & Petty, 2005). Although, such a designation does require that some factors fit into more than one motivational lens—for example, NFCC is driven by a motivation for knowledge *and* a motivation for consistency (p. 577). So, the most effective arrangement of these factors may be with the epistemic/existential/relational lens while also factoring the motivational components therein.

Of the dispositional factors listed above, epistemic psychological factors, then, include dogmatism, IA, NFCC, NFS, NFC, PFC, IU, and NE; existential factors include fear of loss and mortality salience. For Jost et al. (2003b) and similar scholarship (e.g., Hibbing et al., 2014; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009, 2013), it is the higher-than-average need for both epistemic and existential factors that drive conservatism. Note again the two components of conservatism and how they are relevant in these considerations: the connection of epistemic needs to change resistance, the connection of existential needs to inequality acceptance, and the overlaps and interrelationships of all of the above together, and with cognitive rigidity, is clear.

More than anything, due to the factors that drive it, conservatism is about uncertainty, fear, and the interaction of the two (Jost et al., 2007). Accordingly, then, some people may *identify* as liberals when they have high NFCC, meaning that they may actually *be* conservative—and, consequently, more attitudinally hypocritical, if conservative attitudes happen to be, by definition, more hypocritical—because of epistemic motivations outweighing their symbolic identity (Federico et al., 2012).

In any case, there are several important overlaps between the epistemic factors that are worth noting (see Fig. 3.1): NFC and dogmatism are negatively correlated (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982); NFCC is positively correlated with dogmatism and IA (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994); IA and IU are strongly correlated (Grenier et al., 2005); NE and NFC have a moderate positive correlation (Tormala & Petty, 2001); NFS is strongly positively




Fig. 3.1 Epistemic factors and how they overlap

correlated with NFCC and IA (Leone, Wallace, & Modglin, 1999; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994); NFS is positively correlated with dogmatism (Leone et al., 1999; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994); IA and dogmatism are strongly correlated (Feather, 1969); dogmatism and NFCC are both associated with Christian fundamentalism (Altemeyer, 2002; Brandt & Reyna, 2010); and, finally, dogmatism and PFC are likely to be correlated, since the dogmatism metric's focus on double-think suggests that dogmatism and PFC are measuring different parts of the same construct—in fact, Feather (1969) seemed to postulate the existence of a PFC-like construct in noting dogmatism's sibling-like role in the manifestation of the construct (p. 245).

Moreover, although they are measured with simple and not-fully objective surveys and questionnaires, the aforementioned factors of NFC and NFCC fit into a more cognitive lens of attitude-drivers in a few key ways. For example, with liberals' greater relative levels of NFC, the more detailed and complex manner in which many liberals process information helps to elucidate their decision-making patterns—especially with regard to the finding that liberals will avoid stereotypes and, instead, form more effortful opinions, most notably on social and cultural issues like gay rights (Stern, West, Jost, & Rule, 2014). To that end, libertarians' high NFC scores (Crowson, 2009a) may explain their socially liberal attitudes, like their general support of gay rights (Iyer et al., 2012).

In terms of existential factors, general fear is enough of a driver of conservatism that simply using an experiment to, essentially, threaten liberals drives them to be more conservative (Nail et al., 2009). An analogous effect is observed when instilling threat-of-disease in an experiment, as it drives people to be more conformist (Murray & Schaller, 2012)—a common trait of those high in RWA (Altemeyer, 1998).

Along those lines, the role of the DPM and its sub-factors of RWA and SDO in those epistemic and existential factors is less clear, however, which led Jost et al. (2003b) to include RWA and SDO in the category of *relational* or *ideological* motivations. However, as noted above, RWA's relationship with change resistance and SDO's relationship with inequality acceptance provide roots for the DPM in epistemic and existential factors—in addition to RWA's moderator role in NFCC's relationship with ideology (Chirumbolo, 2002)—again, an idea not lost on recent research (Feldman & Johnston, 2014). So, ideological motivations overlap with epistemic and existential factors—as evidenced by the fact that dogmatism is occasionally treated as an ideological variable itself, because of its

large overlap with RWA and items almost explicitly related to ideology (Crowson, 2009b; Van Hiel et al., 2010)—just as epistemic and existential factors overlap to a degree themselves.

The attitudes of people high in RWA show some additional interesting interactive effects with other factors; for example, RWA mediates NFCC's effects on conservatism and prejudicial attitudes (Van Hiel, Pandelaere, & Duriez, 2004). Additionally, the fact that conservatives' greater relative levels of NFCC and NFS likely drive their rigid and inflexible thinking (Barrett et al., 2005) makes sense especially in light of work showing the positive interrelatedness of RWA, dogmatism, IA, NFCC, NFS, and cognitive rigidity (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993)—although, interestingly, RWA and NFS are only associated for men, not women (Kimmelmeier, 2010). Moreover, the negative relationship between a desire for punishing wrongdoers—punitiveness, which has at least some roots within RWA (see Tam, Leung, & Chiu, 2008, p. 79)—and openness strengthens when factoring in RWA (Colémont, Van Hiel, & Cornelis, 2011).

Moral Foundations, meanwhile, seem to be manifested in people's attitudes through a structural relationship with DPM, with RWA's relationship with the *binding* foundations and SDO's relationship with the *individualizing* foundations being key drivers of attitudes (Federico et al., 2013). Subsequently, then, this figurative interactional spiderweb—or cobweb—has a role to play in the formation and locomotion of attitudinal hypocrisy.

Incorporating cognitive factors into this larger synthesis, then—aside from the aforementioned connections between all four sets of cognitive factors—illustrates several important associations.

Cognitive complexity and cognitive rigidity have an obvious connection to the factors that contribute to aspects of the absolutist, black-and-white worldview—for example, dogmatism, IA, NFCC, NE, and IU—and this is especially important in discerning a larger picture of conservatives. Dogmatism's link to rigidity especially is a notion not lost on scholars (Rokeach, 1960, p. 67; cited by Jost et al., 2003b, p. 346). Additionally, the IA subscales of need for certainty and uniformity are positively correlated with several measures of cognitive rigidity (Sidanius, 1985). At any rate, conceiving of conservatives and liberals as absolutists and contextualists respectively is a helpful lens in exploring their epistemic cognitive and psychological roots.

It may be that those cognitive differences between conservatives and liberals drive their differential absolutist or contextualist worldviews



respectively (see Hibbing, Smith, & Alford, 2013). Absolutist tendencies could ostensibly blind conservatives to the notion of shades of gray, while contextualist tendencies may blind liberals to outliers, extremes, and legitimate evils in the world that do, in fact, pose a danger to others (see Zimbardo, 2007). Although one study demonstrated that absolutist thinking is not a reflection of even negligible degrees of RWA subscales, still within the realm of conservative thought was the study's finding that social-Darwinist economic conservatism—especially SDO—and support for aggressive foreign policy and torture were related to the absolutist worldview of “pure evil” existing in the world (Webster & Saucier, 2013).

Meanwhile, in terms of existential factors, the fact that *threat* is associated with reduced cognitive resources—and, subsequently, reduced cognition (Mogg, Mathews, Bird, & MacGregor-Morris, 1990; Preston, Buchanan, Stansfield, & Bechara, 2007)—may partially explain conservatives' lower relative scores on cognitive ability tasks (Thórisdóttir & Jost, 2011). Coupled with that notion, because of their high NFCC, NFS, and cognitive rigidity, conservatives' tendency to “seize and freeze” on information may leave them seizing on *incorrect* information at a higher rate than other groups (Peterson, Duncan, & Pang, 2002; Schaller et al., 1995; see Nyhan & Reifler, 2010), leaving their scores on cognitive ability tasks—which, again, may just be testing a combination of knowledge and cultural sophistication and not actual ability (Heaven et al., 2011; Woodley, 2011)—lower as a result.

In line with this, Thórisdóttir and Jost (2011) point to conservatives' greater relative need to reduce uncertainty and, semi-subsequently, their higher closed-mindedness as being a factor that drives—or is possibly driven *by*—the cognitive differences between conservatives and other groups. Still, the degree to which threat affects attitudes, as well as the cognitive mechanisms through which it does so, depends on the *type* of threat—that is, whether the threat originates in the private life of a person or in the external world—and the level of adherence to RWA and SDO within the person (Cohrs & Ibler, 2009; Onraet, Van Hiel, Dhont, & Pattyn, 2012). Conservatives with high RWA, then—so, *most* political conservatives in America (Altemeyer, 1981, 1998)—may be *better suited* than others to handle internal stress, as RWA could serve as an emotional buffer against distress (Van Hiel & De Clercq, 2009). Although, meta-analyses reveal that a right-wing orientation itself is *not* enough to, simply, drive a positive well-being (Onraet, Van Hiel, & Dhont, 2013).

Nevertheless, this all sharpens the picture somewhat to distinguish conservatives from liberals, both in terms of (1) epistemic motivations, in line with the absolutist-contextualist dimensionality; and (2) existential motivations, in line with threat and fear's dimensional effects on attitude formation in non-conscious systems. It is not a coincidence that this picture has two dimensions—they correspond quite well to the modular viewpoint of Jost et al. (2003b) that was foreshadowed in Chap. 2 (see Fig. 2.3). It cannot be overstated, then, that the simplest, most parsimonious, and most efficacious method of exploring the underlying roots of differences between different ideologies is Jost et al.'s (2003b) two-pronged approach: Conservatives' orientation toward societal stability and social hierarchy “reflects and reinforces” their motivation toward structure, obedience, and duty in the world around them; liberals' orientation toward equality and social change “reflects and reinforces” their motivation toward curiosity, openness, novelty, and defiance (Carney et al., 2008, p. 817).

This conceptualization of the ideologies' underpinnings is exemplified in research on the differences in *tastes* and *preferences* of conservatives and liberals (e.g., Carney et al., 2008; Gillies & Campbell, 1985; Glasgow, Cartier, & Wilson, 1985; Ruch & Hehl, 1986; Wilson, 1990; Wilson, Ausman, & Mathews, 1973), most studies of which generally find that conservatives are oriented toward structure, familiarity, and certainty, while liberals are relatively more accepting of and even *preferential toward* ambiguity, new sensations, and a lack of structure. Nowhere is this relationship clearer than in analyses demonstrating, respectively, conservatives' high preference and liberals' low preference for the following elements: representational, as opposed to abstract, paintings (Wilson et al., 1973); poetry that rhymes, as opposed to non-rhyming free-verse (Gillies & Campbell, 1985); and humor in which “incongruous” elements of a joke are resolved, as opposed to absurdism and non sequiturs (Ruch & Hehl, 1986; Wilson, 1990).

Anecdotally, but as a more specific illustration, I have noticed that my conservative friends tend to abhor the endings of recent films of the Coen brothers—such as 2007's *No Country for Old Men* (Coen, Coen, & Rudin, 2007), and 2009's *A Serious Man* (Coen & Coen, 2009)—in which there is little to no character resolution, and in which the story ends essentially mid-sentence; my liberal friends, meanwhile, are much more tolerant of and, in some cases, somewhat confusingly *satisfied* with a purposefully *unsatisfying* ending.

The general effect is robust enough to suggest that, in some experimental or analytical contexts, those characteristics can serve as decent stand-ins for those underpinnings and deeper traits—especially if analyzing data that do not include batteries.

Nonetheless, even though conservatives may tend to reject the idea of potential quality in humor in which incongruities *remain*—meaning that they seek and prefer jokes in which logical inconsistencies are alleviated, instead of jokes that stay ambiguous and up in the air—they, like liberals, remain incongruent and hypocritical in their attitudes. They prefer congruence and structure in how they are entertained, in how they have their time occupied, and, more generally, in the world around them, but this preference does not seem to extend to their personal politics, which are rife with incongruities and hypocrisies. Why this is the case is a product of the dispositional traits that are associated with a person being politically conservative, and likely *drive* a person to be conservative, and this notion edges closer to understanding why people have hypocritical attitudes in the first place.

These orientation motivations are much less clear for libertarians and populists, although recent research has produced a few results of note. Iyer et al. (2012) found that libertarians, especially when compared to conservatives, have the highest overall scores on the Cognitive Reflection Task—a task that essentially requires higher-order thinking, or at least the rejection of initial, incorrect thinking, to solve questions (Frederick, 2005). Populists, meanwhile, seem to be among the least politically sophisticated, and the most epistemically motivated (Johnston, 2011)—although, again, the literature on populists is quite sparse. Drawing comparatively explanatory synthetic conclusions about these groups, then, is an impossible task, given the relative lack of empirical work. Still, all of the above psychological and cognitive factors are listed because it is important to provide as full of a picture as possible of what we know about what drives our politics.

At any rate, this summary of many of the non-conscious factors behind attitudes and ideology serves as groundwork for the central framework of this book, described in the following section.

The interaction of psycho-*cognitive* drivers (i.e., bottom-up processes) with top-down processes (e.g., elite cuing, socialization; see Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009, pp. 315–317) corresponds illustratively and empirically to a cross-cutting portrait of ideology in America: Relatively speaking, bottom-up processes are stronger predictors of specific issue stances and

culture-related approximations of political orientations, while top-down processes are stronger predictors of stated philosophies of government and, incidentally, personal values. Included within this portrait is (1) the caveat that not all ideologies are equal in their usages of the two sides of the coin and (2) the caveat that the metaphorical coin's two sides are themselves variable in size.

### 3.4 A MODEL OF POLITICAL HYPOCRISY'S DRIVERS

The fact that a number of psychological and cognitive factors have been shown to directly and indirectly drive personal politics obviously suggests that those underlying factors will also drive attitudinal hypocrisy and the recognition or lack of recognition thereof. On top of that, the fact that conservatism and conservative attitudes seem to be more directly linked to epistemic and existential factors than liberalism and liberal attitudes are serves to inform the rest of this book's vision.

But, again, personal politics are not the product of these factors alone; they are still subject to variety of comparatively more conscious and controllable—but still heavily and, perhaps, mostly automatic (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009, 2013)—traits as well. These include traits such as social identity, symbolic ideology, party identification, elite cues, education, and historico-political context (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960; Cohen, 2003; Kinder & Sears, 1985; Sniderman & Citrin, 1971; Zaller, 1992)—each of which has been studied for upwards of a century in the discipline (Sniderman & Citrin, 1971, p. 402), and each of which is still largely non-conscious and automatic, or at least still *affected* to a large degree by non-conscious effects.

In a now-classic flyover investigation of the vast literature on the origins of political attitudes, Kinder and Sears (1985) note that political attitudes are primarily “badges of social membership” that entail personal allegiances, but are still reflective of additional characteristics of individuals' social lives, including one's ethnicity, religiosity, gender, and occupation (p. 682).

Then again, scholars have long known that the ultimate “roots” of most Americans' attitudes and ideologies are far from the product of logical deduction alone, or even a moderate amount of the time (Kinder & Sears, 1985, p. 671), thereby lending support to the non-logical, non-conscious psychological and cognitive forces of attitude formation (see Wilson, 1973). As the authors famously noted, “Americans are not

creatures of coherent, wide-ranging ideologies” (Kinder & Sears, 1985, p. 682); rather, six large conceptual actuators with varying degrees of respective influence from conscious and non-conscious forces provide for perhaps the best understanding of from where attitude structures originate (p. 671): (1) self-interest, (2) group identification, (3) leadership of elites, (4) personal values, (5) personality, and (6) historical context and inferences. Although, it must be noted that even those more environmentally and societally based—as opposed to psychologically or cognition based—sources are also subject to non-conscious effects: for example, the degree to which a person may be affected by cues and leadership from political elites will depend on their feelings toward those elites *and* the elites of the other proverbial side, their ability to absorb and process those cues, and their personal and rational sense of logic and political knowledge that constrains everything else, and *vice versa* (see Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009, p. 316). As explained by Jost, Federico, and Napier (2009), there are bottom-up processes that are often the focus of psychologists and top-down processes that are often the focus of political scientists (p. 314), and these processes overlap and interact (see Jost, 2009). This echoes the transposed theses of Sniderman and Citrin (1971), who noted that political attitudes were reflective of “personal motives and inner needs” and express “economic self-interest or reference group identifications” (p. 402).

In other words, there are (1) more internally rooted, non-conscious, disposition-based factors that quite nearly always come from within an individual, and (2) more externally rooted, *still mostly non-conscious* but, at the very least, relatively *more controllable* factors that either *can* come from outside of an individual or do come from outside of an individual and may *interact with* factors that come from within. Dispositional (i.e., bottom-up) and external (i.e., top-down) factors drive attitude structures—and, subsequently, attitudinal hypocrisy—independently *and* in tandem with one another. Thus, to best answer my central questions of what drives attitudinal hypocrisy, and, eventually, how and why it is generally *and* specifically manifested in different ideologies—questions also asked by Jost, Federico, and Napier (2009) when they wrote of a need for future work to explain why specific “constellations” of attitudes come together into packages both congruent and incongruent (p. 328)—it is necessary to put forth a framework that incorporates this dispositional-external, bottom-up-top-down divide.

To do that, I offer a simplified model that categorizes the drivers of political attitudes as either (1) external, and more identity-based, and

encompassed within a socially constructed “discursive superstructure” (Jost et al., 2013, p. 233) or (2) disposition-based, more internal, and grounded within a psychologically based “motivational substructure” (p. 233). I entitle this framework the external–philosophy and dispositions–attitudes model (EPDAM; see Fig. 3.2).

With cues taken from work on political values (e.g., Lavine, Thomsen, & Gonzales, 1997; Schwartz, Caprara, & Vecchione, 2010; Schwartz et al., 2014; Tetlock, 1986; Tetlock et al., 2000) in addition to social and political psychology (e.g., Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009), the central idea behind the EPDAM is that factors related to people’s identities are stronger predictors of their stated government philosophy, while factors related to people’s psychological and cognitive dispositions are stronger predictors of their stated issue attitudes. The stronger the figurative collision of the two factor sets is, the stronger the hypocrisy will be.

**External Factors.** Factors I operationalize as *external* include social, environmental, logical, and *some* relational variables, *including* ideological identification; but, *excluding* RWA or SDO. I deem the elements of the DPM to be dispositional due to (1) their abstract and post hoc nature and (2) the fact that they are *almost* strictly non-conscious measurements (Altemeyer, 1981, 1998; Duckitt, 2001; Jost & Banaji, 1994; see Zschau, 2010, pp. 170–171).




Fig. 3.2 External–philosophy dispositions–attitudes model

External factors should be stronger comparative predictors of government philosophy because government philosophy stances—for example, support for reducing the size of government—are simplified and heavily symbolic versions of complicated processes that are adopted because of cues and communications from political elites that trickle through socialization and other mechanisms that intertwine with individuals' identities (see Camobreco, 2016; Claassen, Tucker, & Smith, 2015; Devine, 2015; Stimson, 2004; Zaller, 1992). They also appear to be—among other things—the simplest forms of stances on economic issues (Pollock, Lilie, & Vittes, 1993, pp. 30–31; cited by Johnston, 2011, pp. 16–17). It is this line of logic that partially explains the prevalence of symbolic conservatives but operational liberals in the American electorate (Ellis & Stimson, 2009, 2011; Lelkes & Sniderman, 2016; Stimson, 2004).

**Dispositional Factors.** Factors I operationalize as *dispositional* include epistemic, existential, and cognitive variables. Identification—in spite of the fact that it *is* heavily non-conscious (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009, p. 323)—is not *always* a direct and pure psychological motivation, and *can be* and often *is* affected by outside cues (Cohen, 2003). Identifying as one ideology or another is likely closer to non-consciousness on an axis of non-consciousness–consciousness (see Jost et al., 2013, p. 241); but, it is on an axis nonetheless, and it is a matter of interpersonal interaction (pp. 240–242), unlike the factors I have operationalized as dispositional. Dispositional factors should be stronger comparative predictors of issue stances because most issue stances—especially those of the *cultural* or *social* issue classification (Johnston & Wronski, 2015), which characterize the hypocrisy divide between the ideologies better than their counterparts—tend to be “easier,” more directly reflective of deep-seated, intrapersonal psychological attributes and characteristics (Crowson, 2009a; Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Johnston & Wronski, 2015), and more closely tied to individuals' quick-firing, automatic, gut reactions (Eidelman & Crandall, 2014, pp. 75–81). The closeness of these gut–attitude ties is especially true for substantive conservatives and conservative identifiers (Carraro et al., 2011; Johnston & Wronski, 2015), but can also be observed or even elicited for substantive liberals and liberal identifiers (Helzer & Pizarro, 2011; Nail et al., 2009).

In this model, external factors are stronger relative drivers of government philosophy (*viz.*, position on the libertarian–authoritarian axis), while dispositional factors are stronger relative drivers of issue stances; again, and most importantly, it is in the overlap of philosophy and attitudes

that hypocritical issue-stance structures emerge. Put differently, the EPDAM is a framework through which the potential origins and drivers of attitudes can be viewed and analyzed in terms of the extents to which attitudes originate in, and/or are driven by external factors or disposition-based factors. The EPDAM takes individual factors and sets of factors and utilizes them to explore the direct or indirect role they do or do not have in driving hypocritical attitudes.

Importantly, unlike epistemic and existential motivational factors, relational motivational factors are obviously not purely within one pathway (viz., external or dispositions) or the other. Relational motivations lead a person to want to belong to a group and follow what that group does (see Cohen, 2003; Zaller, 1992), or serve the aforementioned “badge of social membership” described by Kinder and Sears (1985, p. 685), but are varyingly subject to conscious awareness and outside input (see Malka & Lelkes, 2010). For the purposes of the EPDAM, most relational motivations will be included within the external category for the following reasons: (1) parsimony, and the subsequent ease of the scientific desideratum of falsifiability therein (Popper, 1959, p. 142); (2) a greater ease of analysis of attitudinal hypocrisy; and (3) the fact that the factors considered dispositional are *almost* entirely non-conscious, especially when comparing them with the factors that are *more* relational and *more* subject to conscious control.

Admittedly, classifying factors as external- or disposition-based is, admittedly, a glaring and confusing misnomer, and not just because of the dichotomy’s either/or format that over-simplifies the nature of the human psyche and subsequent human behavior (see Zschau, 2010, p. 143; p. 290). On top of that, as mentioned, included in the external side of the model are factors that are, to a large extent, also non-conscious and uncontrolled; and by the nature of research involving survey responses—that is, research *not* involving cognitive tasks and tests—the internal, dispositional factors that survey research attempts to measure are, by *their* nature, necessarily subject to *some* degree of responsive consciousness and conscious output (see Smith, Oxley, Hibbing, Alford, & Hibbing, 2011, p. 382).

What, then, sets the factors apart? What makes the descriptors worth using in spite of the flaws?

The clues to the distinction’s utility lie in this chapter’s synthesis of the psychological factors underlying ideologies and attitudes and the research described therein. The primary assumption is that the factors (e.g., epistemic and existential factors) I am operationalizing as disposition-based are



almost entirely non-conscious and non-controlled. While the exact proportion of non-consciousness versus consciousness is currently unknown, what *is* known is that dispositional factors are *very* deeply rooted and directly reflective, predictive, and impactful of underlying personality and—at this point in empirical history—irreducible psychological traits and orientations at an individual level (see Jost et al., 2013, p. 235). Moreover, they are remarkably stable over time (Ludeke & Krueger, 2013).

The factors I operationalize as external, on the other hand, vary between being deeply rooted (e.g., ideological identification, see Alford et al., 2005) and being relatively more controllable (e.g., economic self-interest, see Kinder & Sears, 1985; cf. Sands, 2017). But, they share the fact that they are, at most, indirectly reflective of, predictive of, and impactful on underlying traits and orientations. To illustrate, even though identifying with an ideology is heavily automatic (see Hibbing et al., 2014), it is still not as innate and unchanging as the personality and psychological traits that a person holds through much of their life (see Mondak, 2010; Verhulst et al., 2012). On top of that, ideological identity changes over time at a higher (albeit still fairly low) rate than psychological factors (Jennings, 1992), along with the (albeit indirectly) subsequent attitudes that are often (but not always) informed by the identity. Caveats and parenthetical exceptions abound in the social sciences, if that was not already clear.

Therefore, the division between disposition-based and external is predicated on the degree to which the factors are or are not *directly* reflective of processes and motivations that are deep-seated and automatic: the most directly reflective factors are disposition-based; the most indirectly reflective are external. The division is admittedly imperfect, yes: Some external factors—for example, ideological identity (Jennings, 1992)—are more automatic and non-conscious in origin and effect than others; some dispositional factors—for example, traditionalism (see Malka, Lelkes, Srivastava, Cohen, & Miller, 2012, pp. 275–276)—are somewhat more controllable and conscious when compared with others. But, the intention of the division itself is not as a true dichotomy with mutually exclusive sides, but rather as the model and framework that can best elucidate attitudinal hypocrisy because of attitudes’—and the subsequent hypocrisies therefrom—origins in processes that are bottom-up and top-down in nature.

Figure 3.3 better illustrates the overarching and somewhat confusing distinction paradigm: the near-solely non-conscious dispositional factors of motivations and cognitions are included *only within the person*, and




Fig. 3.3 Sketch of the external–disposition factor divide

relational motivations and social identification effects—even though they are within a figurative area of higher levels of non-consciousness (the dotted circle)—lie outside of the *head* of the person.

Moreover, the model avoids an assumption—in either direction—about human free will, which is a subject of ongoing and prickly debate in cognitive and social psychology (Baumeister & Monroe, 2014). I make *no* assumptions regarding whether or not an individual makes logical deductions regarding, for example, their rationalistic individual desires. Awareness and consciousness are not upon what the model’s division is founded—although the ways in which awareness and consciousness *interact* with the model and its assumptions is a mechanism that is necessary to explore in order to better explain the central ideas of this book, and is, therefore, explored in a cognitive dissonance experiment in Chap. 6.

**Comparing the EPDAM.** Nevertheless, I am not the first to propose an overall model of the origins of political attitudes. Over time, the focus has gone from attitudes formulating as a result of rational, logical deduction (Downs, 1957; Key, 1966), to combining those with socialization (Campbell et al., 1960), to combining those with aforementioned psychological factors (Jost et al., 2003b), to combining those with genetics (Alford et al., 2005; Hatemi et al., 2011). None before me, however, have attempted to model attitude origins in such a way that also permitted and fostered the analysis of attitudinal hypocrisy.

The “dual-processing model” of Lodge and Taber (2013) *seems* to be related to the EPDAM. Not to be confused with the dual-process

RWA-SDO-conglomeration model discussed earlier (see Sect. 3.1), their model—also referred to as the “John Q. Public” model—incorporates notions of different types of cognition, both conscious and non-conscious, and how they affect the way a person will evaluate different targets and, subsequently, rationalize those evaluations. However, the model’s general inability to describe differential potential *drivers* of attitudes means that it is unsuitable as a way of elucidating attitudinal hypocrisy.

Additionally, the “Cognitive-Social Theory” of Lavine and Latané (1996) also appears to be a counterpart to the EPDAM, as it is a model for predicting or theorizing human behavior based on different sets of factors. The model elucidates the interrelationship between cognitive and social processes and, accordingly, describes how individuals will “bundle” sets of issues—potentially contradictory issues, for example—together because of public opinion, which is itself informed by individuals’ bundling. Cognitive and social processes, according to the model, reinforce each other mutually (Popham, 2008, p. 39), and will likely lead to an increase in logical consistency of attitudes because people *want* to be consistent (Lavine & Latané, 1996, p. 55).

At first glance, this framework seems to be almost analogous to the EPDAM. But, the attitudinal congruence to which it alludes is not automatically based on *objective* congruence; rather, it is a product of what public opinion suggests and what individuals believe, neither of which are necessarily rooted in objectivity or logic (Converse, 1964). Moreover, the Cognitive-Social Theory is worthwhile in explaining the *interaction* between widespread social identity and individual social identity, especially with regard to public opinion on abortion and the death penalty (Popham, 2008), and the way this interaction happens over time—as explained by Jost et al. (2003a), hypocrisies in attitudes inevitably accumulate over time, after all (p. 387). However, it does not have the potential to explain attitude origins, much less how those origins will drive hypocrisy. The EPDAM, meanwhile, has the potential to do so, without operating under an assumption that people will (1) figure out when they *are* hypocritical, and (2) *want* to be non-hypocritical.

Accordingly, Converse (1964) asserted that people have hypocritical and contradictory attitudes because a healthy majority of people simply do not have *meaningful* attitudes or beliefs (p. 245). However, this paints an incomplete picture. First, this contention does not address *why* the percentage of people with meaningful attitudes was so low. Second, subsequent research and polling has demonstrated that people *have* attitudes

nonetheless (Conover & Feldman, 1981; Feldman, 2003; Goren, 2013; Kerlinger, 1984; Knight, 1985, 1999). And third, but most importantly, scholarly work has shown that most people's attitudes may not be stable or loyal, but they *are* "meaningful and interpretable" (Jost, 2006, p. 656). Thus, Converse's (1964) argument does not lend itself as a functional model of attitudes; and therefore, the EPDAM operates under the assumption that people's political attitudes are, at the very least, meaningful.

One way to conceptualize the characteristics of the EPDAM is by thinking of it as an analogue to Smith et al.'s (2011) elegant conceptualization of the connection between genetic factors and political attitudes (see p. 372). The authors envision a one-directional step-by-step flowing chain of stages that ultimately go on to inform political attitudes. The stages are listed as follows in chronological order, relatively speaking: (1) genetics, (2) biological systems, (3) cognition, (4) personality and values, (5) ideology, and (6) issue attitudes; steps (2) through (6) are impacted by the environment around a person. Certainly, (1) through (4) are undoubtedly dispositional factors by my definitions, and the overarching effect of the environment—on (2) through (6)—constitutes an external factor.

What, then, of ideology, which Smith et al. (2011, p. 373) go on to define as consisting of a series of preferences (e.g., for religion, occupation, social organization, etc.)? It is at this stage—due to the "preferences" classification and inclusion of factors I have demonstrated to be significantly more indirectly reflective of underlying processes than earlier stages—that the items could be considered *external*. On top of that, the fact that the preferences in this stage also entail some relational motivations (e.g., preferences for bedrock issues of social organization), the category which Jost et al. (2013) consider to be more in the realm of top-down processes (p. 241), is further reinforcement for considering these stage 5 factors to be external—although **I do acknowledge the messiness of the idea**, and will note as much throughout this book's analytical and experimental operationalizations of the EPDAM.

**Supplementing the EPDAM Interdisciplinarily.** The effects that are ultimately predicted by the EPDAM cannot be fully extrapolated until more fully disentangling the EPDAM's still-hazy dynamics. To pull the EPDAM apart, then, effects that follow from it should relate to what should drive a person to express attitudes that contradict their stated philosophy of government—but, not necessarily their stated political values, given what research related to *those* topics (e.g., Lavine et al., 1997; Schwartz et al., 2010, 2014; Tetlock, 1986; Tetlock et al., 2000) has demonstrated.

In particular, in a huge international set of analyses of the “personal values” that drive people’s “political values” (see Schwartz et al., 2010), Schwartz et al. (2014) demonstrated that—in countries without communist rule in their history—significant and valid effects and correlations ( $R$  values  $> |.100|$ ,  $p$  values  $< .05$ ) were observed for political values and personal values:

- The political value of “traditional morality” correlated *positively* with the personal values of security, conformity, and tradition, and *negatively* with the personal values of benevolence, universalism, self-direction, stimulation, and hedonism (Schwartz et al., 2014, p. 916); and,
- The political value of “equality” correlated *positively* with the personal values of benevolence, universalism, and self-direction, and *negatively* with the personal values of security, conformity, achievement, and power (Schwartz et al., 2014, pp. 916–917).

These measured relationships are important in establishing hypothesized drivers of hypocritical attitudes. But, the relationships’ abilities to transpose are extremely limited for this book’s purposes. The political values used by Schwartz et al. (2014) were about either political value independent of one another, and, thus, not intertwined with each other, around which the central crux of this book is wrapped. Neither of the political values were purely government-related, as they included items related to what respondents want from *society*, not just as it relates to one’s conceptualization of “the government” (p. 905).

Thus, the political value/personal value relationships validated by Schwartz et al. (2014) serve as jumping-off points that necessitate logical and literary extrapolation. But, this is a task exasperated by statistics demonstrating that those two political values share zero of the same significant personal value relationships: None of the positive and significant correlates of traditional morality are also positive correlates of equality, for example.

Although, research has demonstrated that, functionally, *traditional morality* and *equality* have no significant relationship with *each other* (Schwartz et al., 2010, p. 437). This means that their lack of predictive-factor overlap is irrelevant; though, I suspect that running the analyses separately for conservatives and liberals would change that, as support for traditionalist policies is high for conservatives and low for liberals, and vice versa for support for equality policies; but, when conservatives and liberals

are analyzed together, the correlation is hobbled because of the ostensible differences in the relationships.

With those facts in mind, several central hypotheses can be made about what should drive hypocrisy, and where and how conservatives and liberals—and even, but to a lesser degree, the identifiers to either—should differ in those drivers. Assuming that the overlap between identity and ideology will be strong enough, what makes someone fall where they do on the axes of change-resistance and inequality-acceptance should, thus, also be among (and not exclusively) the dynamics that make them have the hypocrisies that they have. This means that the ideologies’ and ideological *identities*’ differences should be reflective of what drives their identities in the first place.

### 3.5 HYPOTHESES: PRIMARY EXPECTATIONS

How the EPDAM drives attitudinal hypocrisy differentially and asymmetrically by ideology due to the very nature of the primary American ideologies informs the central theoretical framework and overarching subsequent hypotheses of this book. Because conservatism, liberalism—and, for that matter, libertarianism and populism—are themselves driven by a wide variety of differing factors in differing degrees from both the more and less automatic/non-conscious sides of the EPDAM (see Sect. 3.3), it should be apparent that the EPDAM will *push* each ideology’s attitudes—and thus, each ideology’s attitudinal hypocrisies—differently.

My central theory,<sup>2</sup> then, is that dispositional factors will drive *conservatism*’s hypocrisies to a greater degree than *liberalism*’s hypocrisies, and vice versa for external factors and liberalism’s hypocrisies. Libertarianism and populism, meanwhile, by their very definitions, lack any meaningful degree of hypocrisy; however, the negligible quantities of hypocrisies within libertarianism and populism will vary in their origins based on the specific type of hypocrisies: Hypocrisies in socially conservative and economically liberal directions will be associated with dispositional factors, while socially liberal and economically conservative hypocrisies will be associated with external factors. Therefore, the ideologies in order of descending influence of dispositional factors on hypocrisy are conservatism, liberalism, and then tied together, libertarianism and populism.

Put *more* simply, I theorize that the effect *tends toward* the following: **Conservatives** are hypocritical because of dispositions and **liberals** are hypocritical because of externalities (see Fig. 3.4). The effect is,




Fig. 3.4 Hypothesized ideologically asymmetric use of EPDAM

as pictured, non-absolute—I do not expect conservatives’ attitudes to be *completely* driven by dispositional factors, nor do I expect liberals’ attitudes to be *completely* driven by external factors. I refer here to likelihoods; not pure determinations, and certainly not universals—really, the only universal in social science, let alone political psychology, is that there are no universals.

The derivation of this theoretical framework is relatively straightforward. The social authoritarianism and system justification that are so strongly intertwined with modern conservatism are the product of dispositional, almost purely non-conscious factors likely more than anything else (Hennes et al., 2012)—primarily those factors included in the aforementioned epistemic and existential motivations, and especially for social issues (Johnston & Wronski, 2015). Research has continuously demonstrated a stronger relative effect of *these* dispositional, non-conscious factors on conservatism when compared with liberalism, with conservatism being driven more strongly than liberalism by epistemic and existential factors like NFCC, MS, and IA (Jost et al., 2003b). Moreover, conservatives’ general attentional biases toward negative stimuli (see Hibbing et al., 2014) *remain* even when controlling for other factors—for example, NFCC, but not absolutely (Meirick & Bessarabova, 2016)—that may otherwise orient

attention (Carraro et al., 2011), which suggests a greater impact of dispositional forces: There is something deeper, even biological within a conservative political orientation and mindset, farther away from conscious awareness, that drives a bias toward, among other things, negative stimuli and, subsequently, conservative attitudes (see Dodd et al., 2011, 2012; Hibbing et al., 2014).

Therefore, the dispositional factors that drive conservatism and conservative attitudes will *also* drive attitudinal hypocrisies by the very nature of conservatism, its non-conscious drivers, and its more dispositionally rooted and dispositionally driven general nature (see Abramowitz, 1973; Gootnick, 1974; Gurin, Gurin, & Morrison, 1978; Sweetser, 2014). Conservatives' higher relative amount of, to use one example, IA, coupled with their lower relative degree of cognitive complexity, should—and, according to my theoretical framework, *does*—lead them to (1) possess a simpler, black-and-white view of the world; (2) possess simpler, black-and-white attitudes about how the world should be; and (3) simply avoid thinking about how their attitudes may be hypocritical. Importantly, this mechanism somewhat ironically happens in spite of the fact that conservatives desire consistency in their worlds (see Nail et al., 2009).

The inverse effect is expected for liberals. Even though *low* scores on the dispositional trait batteries that predict conservatism often predict liberalism, it is not necessarily a matter of liberalism being negatively driven by, to use the above example, IA—although that *is* the case when comparing liberals' reactions to ambiguous or conflicting information to conservatives' reactions (Amodio et al., 2007), and, hence, why I do not hypothesize this effect to be uniform. Rather, I expect that, especially when compared to conservatives, liberals' attitudinal hypocrisies are more readily informed by external factors than they are by dispositional factors, which is consistent with the notion that liberalism is not a strict inverse of conservatism, but rather a negligibly overlapping factor not mechanistically unlike conservatism (Choma et al., 2012; Conover & Feldman, 1981; Feldman & Johnston, 2014).

Put together, I expect that predicting attitudinal hypocrisy with psychological and other dispositional traits will be more powerful for conservatives than liberals, while predicting hypocrisy with societal and other more external traits will be more powerful for liberals than conservatives.

Moreover, I expect that these external factors inform attitudes through mostly non-conscious mechanisms, but I choose to remain agnostic on the exact differential magnitudes of consciousness involved in dispositional



versus external factors, outside of contending that, again, external factors are less non-conscious than dispositional factors. At this point in research history, and with the tools available, consciousness is too difficult of a construct to explore adequately (see Gawronski, Hofmann, & Wilbur, 2006). It may suffice to note again that some previous work has *instilled* conscious awareness of political attitudes in subjects, finding that when moderately politically sophisticated subjects are tasked with ruminating about different pairs of specific political attitudes—albeit, not the larger structural “constellations” that from ideological worldviews (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009, p. 328)—and then indicate their attitudes, the congruence of those two attitudes is higher than it would be when compared with people who do not ruminate (Judd & Downing, 1990; Lavine et al., 1997). Although, again, it must be noted that no significant rumination effect was observed for people who were not politically sophisticated, and only for the most sophisticated was there a continued return-of-investment of ruminating trials on positive correlation between attitudes (Judd & Downing, 1990).

Nevertheless, I will refrain from making broad claims of consciousness with regard to ideologically asymmetrical rates of attitudinal hypocrisy, and the potential origins thereof, outside of noting, again, that the many dispositional factors are almost always non-conscious, while the many external factors are subject to non-conscious effects and, potentially, conscious thought as well.

Soaring over and impacting all of the above is the direction of research exploring the perceived relationship between political orientations and the driving forces within a person’s life—defined as the locus of control (see Abramowitz, 1973; Gootnick, 1974; Rotter, 1966; Sweetser, 2014). This research has found that liberals tend to view their lives and the rest of the world as more externally driven; that is, subject to forces beyond their own actions—for example, fate, chance, and society (Rotter, 1966, p. 11). Conservatives, on the other hand, tend to view their lives and the rest of the world as more internally driven; that is, subject to their direct actions more than anything else—for example, effort, initiative, and drive, as opposed to laziness and ignorance (p. 12).

I hypothesize that the viewpoints held by these ideological adherents are accurate, but only with regard to their own actions and attitudes. The hypothesized accuracy is in spite of the generally poor job that people do in directly indicating objective traits about themselves (Kruger & Dunning, 1999, 2002), as opposed to the decent job that people do

responding to psychological survey batteries, which are thought to be measuring an abstract trait and doing so accurately in spite of survey research's constraints (see Smith et al., 2011, p. 382). Rather, I believe the respondents in these cases are accurate due to their underlying root traits, especially those obviously related to SDO—notably, the belief in the degree to which the world is a “competitive jungle,” most notably (Altemeyer, 1998). Due to the fact that conservatives tend to have a belief in a dog-eat-dog world in which one must only work hard to get ahead, and that only those who do not work hard enough tend to be the ones who fall behind (Duriez & Van Hiel, 2002; Federico et al., 2009), conservatives' point of view here of how they view their place in the world is reflective of what makes them who they are as people. In other words, according to their thinking, since conservatives' success in life is dictated more than anything else—the key divider here, compared with liberals—by *their* individual initiative and *not* by societal constraints or prejudices, this is one of many attributes that defines them at a deeper level, especially relative to liberals. That is one of the key aspects of my central theory, and why the EPDAM would necessitate the theoretical framework of ideological asymmetry with regard to dispositional and external factors' impacts on hypocrisy.

In a discussion of my research interests with some acquaintances, one—a conservative—pointed to his own attitudinal hypocrisies and stated, “If I weren't a Catholic conservative, I'd be a libertarian nihilist.” This is anecdotally illustrative of the multifaceted process of attitudinal hypocrisy and reflective of the hypothesized ideological differentiation I seek to demonstrate. This acquaintance, a strong conservative and dyed-in-the-wool Republican identifier, notes his evident awareness of his religious identification and religiosity affecting his lack of logical consistency in his attitudes. In his estimation, were he not raised as a strong social-traditionalist Catholic—albeit without regard to the Catholic Church's history of objectively populist economic teachings (see Ross, Lelkes, & Russell, 2012, p. 3621)—with all of the assumed attitudinal and behavioral attributes that come dispositionally and externally with that upbringing (see Donahue, 1985), his moral philosophy would consist of nihilism that would, in turn, drive libertarian politics. Thus, in my hypothesized modeling of this mechanism, for him, dispositional drivers of attitudes and behaviors are stronger than whatever external drivers there may be; importantly, he notes that it is his identity that shapes his philosophical outlooks, I hypothesize that it is the dispositional underpinnings *of that*

*identity* playing the largest role. If he were a liberal, it would probably be identification as the stronger force driving his attitudinal hypocrisy.

The case could be made, of course, that his awareness of his hypocrisies contradicts my central hypothesis. However, again, I make no hypotheses about broad consciousness of hypocrisy *per se*, but rather the origins and drivers of hypocrisy itself. An implication of the EPDAM is, of course, that consciousness plays *less* of a role for conservatives than liberals; but, in my acquaintance's case, his awareness serves as somewhat of an exception that also supports my point: libertarianism *would be* his orientation if he did not have a system of strong *dispositional* drivers toward conservatism and its respective hypocrisies.

As a further illustration, in an interview with ReasonTV, conservative political commentator Tucker Carlson said, "I have libertarian instincts, but I also have all kinds of views that are in conflict with one another ... there is a place where theory bumps up against reality. I'm not sure what that place is" (see Moynihan, 2010). The same mechanism as my conservative acquaintance is evident, with Carlson—a strongly religious Christian (see Olasky, 2013)—noting a theoretical *theory-versus-reality* conflict in his own rooted-in-"libertarian-instincts" views, out of which his religiosity emerges the figurative victor.

My central theory will be effectively tested in this book in two primary ways.

The first method is with analyses of survey data that not only contain issue attitudes—and, through the use of post hoc calculations, hypocrisy scores—and ideological identification, but also, in several contexts, dispositional trait batteries. The degree to which certain psychological traits are, at the very least, associated with—if not directly having some type of effect on—hypocrisy scores can then be calculated. This method will be used in Chap. 5 in particular, but also indirectly in Chap. 6.

The second method uses a common cognitive dissonance research procedure to elucidate differential *reactions* to the attitudinal hypocrisy. With this design, participants are forced to confront the idea that their attitudes are, essentially, hypocritical, and either accept or reject the idea. Chapter 6 uses this method and also collects dispositional trait data to provide a more complete picture of the participants and, other than political orientation, what could be having an effect on their reaction to their own and others' hypocrisy.

The final chapter of this book brings together all of the above. I conclude by pointing out that attitudinal hypocrisy can not only be an

individually philosophical and normative *positive*—and, thus, not a good way of trying to undermine political opponents—but can actually be a good thing for American politics because it is (1) reflective of millennia-old mechanisms that are *necessary for a civilization to thrive*; (2) a way for people to better understand how they, and others, feel about the larger idea of *government*; and (3) often necessary in making the most effective, pragmatic, and helpful political decisions in spite of the logical constraints of other attitudes. Although, of course, this is not a universal conclusion.

## NOTES

1. It is worth noting that the modern trend in the Moral Foundations scholarship is to conceptualize this dimension as *authority/subversion* instead (Graham et al., 2013, p. 60).
2. The terminology I will be using to refer to these ideas is that of my “central theory” or “theoretical framework” as a result of the strong theoretical backbone, off-shooting hypotheses, and ability to be falsified. I do not mean to use the term to compare it to more legitimately empirical theories (e.g., gravity, natural selection, relativity, and germ theories), but, instead, as a descriptor that is interchangeable with “theoretical framework.”

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## Gay Is the New Black (but Black Is Still Black): The History and Current Trends of Attitudinal Hypocrisy

*I am not a Know-Nothing. That is certain. How could I be? How can any one who abhors the oppression of negroes, be in favor of degrading classes of white people? Our progress in degeneracy appears to me to be pretty rapid. As a nation, we began by declaring that "all men are created equal." We now practically read it "all men are created equal, except negroes." When the Know-Nothings get control, it will read "all men are created equal, except negroes, and foreigners, and catholics." When it comes to this I should prefer emigrating to some country where they make no pretence of loving liberty—to Russia, for instance, where despotism can be taken pure, and without the base alloy of hypocrisy.*  
—Abraham Lincoln (Letter to Joshua Speed, August 24, 1855) (Basler, 1953, p. 323)

### 4.1 INTRODUCTION

There is no shortage of examples of attitudinal hypocrisy in American politics, and it may as well be a physical law of the American politics discipline—akin to the laws of thermodynamics in physics—that there never *will be* a shortage. In presenting a brief overview of attitudinal hypocrisy in the last several decades in America—already nearly impossible to do, as evidenced by the amount of scholarship about short periods in American politics (e.g., White, 1965), let alone entire centuries (e.g., Kabaservice, 2012), and the deep roots of a core tenet of American hypocrisy illustrated by the epigraph from the “late, great Abraham Lincoln” (Shalby, 2016)—choosing



a small number of examples is therefore a difficult task. I will focus primarily on three time periods for the ways in which they exemplify some of the central tenets of attitudinal incongruence: (1) the 1960s, (2) the 1980s, and (3) as of this writing, the *current* era of the 2010s.

I provide this anecdotal and illustrative overview of hypocrisy in different political periods because of the importance of grounding this topic in the comparatively “real” world outside of the world of strict academic and empirical research. Being able to tie the central theoretical constructs and hypotheses of this book to applications within political and social landscapes reflects the strength of those constructs, allows for testing of those hypotheses, and serves to exemplify essentially abstract conceptualizations and frameworks in societal contexts. Moreover, in demonstrating how hypocrisy has, at least from this superficial and anecdotal standpoint, been reflected along the same societal dimensions, I am thereby demonstrating the pervasive, inescapable nature of wielding hypocritical attitudes in American politics.

The sibling to this chapter, Chap. 5, provides a quantitative attitudinal analysis of the electorate in different political eras and explains the implications of the findings for the larger academic picture of attitudinal hypocrisy. Eventually, I make the case that the surviving-and-thriving of attitudinal incongruence is a temporal manifestation of what drives attitudes and constrains or does *not* constrain them.

There are two viewpoints one can take when exploring the last half-century of hypocritical political attitudes that explain the same ideas in different ways. One is cynical and depressing; the other is apathetic but ultimately uplifting.

**Viewpoint 1: The Cynic.** This lens wears the dazzling but ultra-heavy cloak of Dante’s trudging hypocrites: it is dark and troubling, and perhaps no more accurate than the other viewpoint, but certainly catches the eye. The cynical approach to this chapter’s bird’s-eye view of modern American politics helps to explain the processes at play in a way that downplays the effect of everyday citizens and emphasizes the effect of elites—conservative elites, in particular.

In this view, in order to motivate voters to support laissez-faire economic policies—which may only favor a select few elites (see Ames, 2013; Balmer, 2007; Haney López, 2013; Mann & Ornstein, 2016; Mayer, 2016; Perlstein, 2010)—flames are stoked in the dark and depressing edges of American politics: latent racial resentment, prejudice, and penchants for social authoritarianism (see Kruse, 2015; Perlstein, 2010; Taibbi, 2017).



The extent of this view's accuracy is difficult to quantify; but, it is at least an explanation for attitudinal hypocrisy's breadth at a surface level. For example, elites want to maximize their incomes and see a path for doing so: rolling back government protections for labor unions that cut *into* the elites' incomes—to illustrate, Kruse (2015) compellingly points to Walt Disney, Cecil B. DeMille, and other corporate tycoons' or, somewhat ironically (see Mattera, 2012), "Hollywood" elites' explicitly anti-union behaviors and statements in the mid-twentieth century. Incidentally, in Kruse's (2015) analyses, it was these behaviors that preceded their investment in what they deemed to be "Christian libertarian" art and media (e.g., DeMille, 1956) and prayer campaigns (see Kruse, 2015, pp. 140–146).

Elites veil their neoliberal economic policies by first personifying *government*, and then villainizing the mere idea of it (see Ames, 2013; Kruse, 2015; Mayer, 2016; Taibbi, 2017); they do this at the same time that they draw support from social traditionalists in the electorate for whom economic policies are lower in priority than others (see Balmer, 2007, 2014; Kruse, 2015), which crystallizes and, perhaps, *explains* the contradictory nature of the modern fusionist conservative ideology (see Sect. 4.2).

**Viewpoint 2: The Oni.** On the other side, a more holistic viewpoint is worth utilizing—perhaps at the same time as the other (see Fitzgerald, 1936). For ideologues—and everyone else, really—attitudinal hypocrisy can be represented by the *oni* of Japanese folklore: an unsettling ghost creature that indefatigably follows and often torments its victims (see Reider, 2003) but may ultimately prove to be benign, or may even provide salvation (e.g., Publick & Hammer, 2006). The role of the *oni* here, however, varies by year and by ideology.

## 4.2 THE 1960S' CONSERVATISM: FUSION AND FISSION

I begin with the 1960s because the decade represents, among many other ideas, a robust turning point in American political history. The half-century between then and the writing of this book may, at first glance, appear to be arbitrary. But the 1960s era—in particular, the 1964 Presidential Election—serves as perhaps the most exemplary of any era of this common quirk of political ideology: that of emergent attitudinal hypocrisy. Moreover, the way in which the quirk is exemplified is largely manifested through issues related to *race*. It is race-related issues that are keys to the ways in which attitudinal hypocrisy has reached the status it has today.

In the Presidential Election of 1964, the people who would likely call themselves “liberal” today (see Ellis & Stimson, 2009)—that is, the economic populists who, at the time (but not for long), tended to devote most of their attention to issues of economics—voted primarily for Democrats and the Democratic President Lyndon Johnson (Field & Anderson, 1969; White & Stuart, 1966). This was in spite of the fact that much of the electorate resisted the self-label of *liberal*, considered Johnson and the Democratic Party to *be* solidly liberal, and considered themselves to be conservatives instead (Field & Anderson, 1969, p. 393).<sup>1</sup> In post-mortem research of the election (e.g., Converse, Clausen, & Miller, 1965; Field & Anderson, 1969), scholars make regular references to the ideological *wings* of the two major parties, especially in the Republican Party, in which the amount of infighting in the lead-up to the national convention between the hawkish conservative libertarianism of US Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona and the liberal moderation of Governor Nelson Rockefeller of New York was visible from outer space (Donaldson, 2003, p. 62), and made a large contribution to Johnson’s eventual electoral landslide (see Field & Anderson, 1969). This infighting serves to at least anecdotally and illustratively epitomize my central ideas, central model, and theoretical framework: top-down, external factors like those related to social identity drive values and government philosophy, while bottom-up antecedent and disposition factors drive issue stances (see Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009)—that is, the external–philosophy and dispositions–attitudes model (EPDAM)—and that this duality is ideologically asymmetric, with the former being stronger for liberals and the latter being stronger for conservatives (see Chap. 3).

For his part, Rockefeller preached anti-communism and supported the invasion of Vietnam (White & Stuart, 1966), but he was otherwise lacking in anything resembling a coherently conservative—by any historical or modern definition (see Sect. 2.4)—belief system, at times even being indistinguishable from Democrats (Kabaservice, 2012, p. 84), leading upwards of 40% of his primary voters to vote for Johnson over Goldwater in the general election (Converse et al., 1965, p. 326). He was a 1960s Republican moderate, and in a number of ways, a strong social liberal (Donaldson, 2003, p. 63). He was attitudinally hypocritical, however, in an oft-observed and oft-repeated way for conservatives since that era (see also Sect. 4.5) in that, on the economic issues for which he did *not* have a liberal stance—so, aside from his support of federal welfare, education, and housing programs, and civil rights laws

(Donaldson, 2003, p. 63)—he was a moderate economic libertarian, a set of beliefs that historians have attributed to his personal wealth (Kabaservice, 2012, p. 84). It seems to be the case, then, that the—by my framework (see Chap. 3)—top-down demographic and identity factors associated with his bank account drove his attitudinal hypocrisy. Considering the fact that, today, the bulk of his policy platform would unquestionably align him with the Democratic Party and qualify him as a liberal (Donaldson, 2003, p. 63)—*not* coincidentally like his nephew, former US Senator Jay Rockefeller of West Virginia, a liberal Democrat (Bonica, 2013a)—his reliance on external factors for his attitudes lends at least anecdotal support to my central hypothesis that liberals will rely more heavily on external factors than dispositional factors in the formation of their general attitudes and hypocritical attitude structures (see Chap. 3).

Goldwater, while hypocritical with respect to his domestic libertarianism and militaristic hawkishness, had his stark libertarianism and coldly rationalist, states'-rights logical congruence reflected in his opposition to federal civil rights laws (White, 1965; White & Stuart, 1966), even though he was personally opposed to segregation and racism in practice (Cohen, Goldwater, & Anderson, 2006). Nevertheless, upwards of a majority of Goldwater's support came from people—exemplified by anti-Black, pro-segregation political leaders like Governor George Wallace of Alabama—who opposed civil rights laws because of personal prejudices and racism, perhaps illustrated most explicitly by their near-success at the Republican state convention in California in adding to the Party Platform a resolution to “send Negroes back to Africa” (Kabaservice, 2012, p. 118).

In other words, outside of the philosophical discrepancy between his domestic and foreign policy platforms, Goldwater and his supporters were logically non-hypocritical, but for different reasons. As postulated by my central theory, because what drove many, if not most conservative supporters of Goldwater was deep-seated racism (Ansell, 1997, p. 10; Kabaservice, 2012, p. 118), their attitudes—and their subsequent inter-attitudinal *hypocrisies*, in this case—were driven by dispositional processes that had an indirect result of being manifested in their political beliefs.

Again, recall that, in my central framework, the mechanism in which attitudes *do or do not* fit logically together is a by-product of the collision of top-down or bottom-up factors with attitude structures: conservatives

are more dispositionally (i.e., bottom-up) driven toward their attitudes; liberals are more externally (i.e., top-down) driven. Conservatives' drive is generally epitomized by their hypocritical support for government involvement in that they tend to want a small economic government but a large social and military government; some sort of dissonant cognition is taking place in which they do not recognize—consciously or not—the hypocrisy in claiming the virtues of a small government while, at the same time, proclaiming the need for the government to prohibit an array of behaviors and spend somewhat exorbitantly on militarism.

For the many anti-Black, pro-segregation supporters of Goldwater, economic issues were not central to their cause, although they were still important. Their focus was, instead, laser-sighted on issues of race, leading large percentages of supporters of the segregationist and Democrat George Wallace—who attempted an insurgent campaign against Johnson—to become Goldwater supporters and, thus, Republican voters in 1964 (Rohler, 2004, p. 40).

Unbeknownst at the time, this change foreshadowed an upcoming movement in the South and, ultimately, the so-called “Southern Strategy” that capitalized on those sentiments (Carmines & Stimson, 1989, p. 54; Knuckey, 2005, p. 10)—although, this association did not have sizably tangible traction until the following presidential election (see Sect. 4.3).

While this movement simmered, conservative writers made it known that they were aware of the apparent conflict within their ideology, making the case that the traditionalist conservatism strand and libertarian conservatism strand should co-exist and thrive together—an idea known as “fusionism” (Aberbach, 2015, p. 3; Edwards, 2007). Contrary to the lens through which this book elucidates inter-attitudinal structures, the two strands, according to Frank Meyer and William Buckley (Edwards, 2007, pp. 2–3)—the framers of modern American conservatism (Gross, Medvetz, & Russell, 2011, p. 331)—actually *fit together* structurally and logically, as a result of those writers' understanding of the conservative political philosophy. Socially “traditional” institutions, they contended, must be preserved in order to maximize the virile potential of the free market (Edwards, 2007, p. 3). More cynically, but still accurately, fusionism was an electoral necessity: It served as an infrastructural unifier carefully organized and argued in order to appeal to nationalist, anti-communist, and anti-Black sensibilities that were, at least at that time, present in both

strands of conservatism within the electorate (Gross et al., 2011, p. 331; Kabaservice, 2012, p. 26).

Nevertheless, in a 2009 speech, Republican Paul Ryan of Wisconsin explained it thusly,

A “libertarian” who wants limited government should embrace the means to his freedom: thriving mediating institutions that create the moral preconditions for economic markets and choice. A “social issues” conservative with a zeal for righteousness should insist on a free market economy to supply the material needs for families, schools, and churches that inspire moral and spiritual life. In a nutshell, the notion of separating the social from the economic issues is a false choice. They stem from the same root. (Ryan, 2009, para. 27)

Fusionism rests on the notion that the supreme value of the free market is hand-in-hand with the supreme value of traditionalist-conservative Christian morality. Although, it should be noted that some libertarians—who, consequently, tend to be *non*-nationalist (e.g., Welch & Gillespie, 2012)—explicitly reject this argument, asserting that the government must be logically consistent in how it practices the coercion central to most conceptualizations of ancient and modern political philosophy (see Williamson, 1970), *and* how it intervenes in markets. Otherwise, to those libertarians, the free market is not, in fact, free.

But, regardless of its libertarian critics, the mere existence of the Fusionist school of thought is evidence of a long-running train of cognition within American politics. The topic of attitudinal hypocrisy is clearly not a new idea, and serves to exemplify my central ideas remarkably well. For conservatives, it does so directly; for liberals, however, the exemplification is more indirect, and more of a matter of comparison and relativity.

### 4.3 IDEOLOGIES IN THE LATE 1960S: *WAR HAS CAUSED UNREST*<sup>2</sup>

The liberals of the *early* 1960s utilized electoral strategy quite successfully on a national level. Later in the decade, two huge issues shaped essentially everything else (Converse, Miller, Rusk, & Wolfe, 1969, p. 1086): (1) the Vietnam War, the media coverage of which moved a portion of the window of public thought to the abject horrors of the war and a subsequently less militaristic and less hawkish mass foreign policy platform (p. 1085);

and (2) race, which was primarily—though certainly not completely (see Perlstein, 2010)—localized as the most important issue for individuals in the South (Converse et al., 1969, p. 1101).

With regard to the war, it was a mere *one* policy position—supporting or opposing a continued military presence in Vietnam—that characterized the first steep divide between Democratic Party factions. Lyndon Johnson, the man the public saw as instigating the war (Converse et al., 1969, p. 1085), declined pursuing re-election in 1968, leaving Vice President Hubert Humphrey to haphazardly pick up the pieces of Johnson’s campaign apparatus and, albeit reluctantly and somewhat ignorantly—having been kept out of the loop until the same time as the public (White, 1969, p. 7)—run, at least initially, on a steadfast-but-begrudging pro-military platform (Rivkin & Stuart, 1969).

Capitalizing on the public’s growing anti-war sentiments—let alone the anti-war sentiments of the liberal *contingent* of the public, which, since then, has continued to be a fairly resolute policy position of liberals (Button, Grant, Hannah, & Ross, 1993, p. 232)—were US Senator Robert Kennedy of New York and US Senator Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota, until the June 1968 assassination of Kennedy, at which point the sentiments were, figuratively and emotionally,<sup>3</sup> depressed (White, 1969, p. 233). When it was clear that Humphrey would be the nominee, the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago infamously became a site of anti-war protests and violence, and opposition to Humphrey—in spite of the fact that he came to endorse a withdrawal policy (Rivkin & Stuart, 1969), but only after a long period of public vacillation (Kinder & Sears, 1985, p. 663)—stayed firm, likely driving the election of Richard Nixon (see Converse et al., 1969).

The rifts in the Democratic Party following the 1968 election mirrored the rifts in the Republican Party in 1964 and thereafter; although, the Democrats’ rifts were not the product of the singular policy of Vietnam as they had once been and, for the first time in its history, the Democratic Party was actually approaching a deeper, more logically coherent ideology (White, 1969, p. 62). Social issues—primarily those related to race—began to further the larger divide (Converse et al., 1969). This was especially apparent in anti-Black southerners, who occupied a fluid ground between the two major parties, and eventually began to vote without much attention paid to the populist economic issues that actually sustained many of them—for example, agriculture subsidies and unionized labor (p. 1091)—thus driving a plateful of hypocrisy. Instead, they largely voted for the big

issue that caught their attention—race—and the candidate who most readily reflected their ideas about that issue: conservative Democrat George Wallace (p. 1087).

It is Wallace who perhaps best characterizes the theme of these years and the theme's applicability to this book. As Governor of Alabama, Wallace exemplified some of what has come to be known as modern liberalism—at the *state* level—in his support for and implementation of “heavy appropriations” for schools, hospitals, infrastructure, and Social Security (White, 1969, p. 344), although Wallace argued against implementing those appropriations at the federal level (Carter, 2000, p. 352). Wallace was also a major-league, old-fashioned racist (Carter, 2000).

Hence, it is because of this *prejudiced state-level progressivism*—the *state-level progressivism* was irrelevant in the minds of most of his supporters because of the overarching importance of segregation to them (Carter, 2000, p. 370), so it was mostly just the *prejudiced* part—exhibited by Wallace that many have argued that, if Wallace did not “southernize” American politics *himself*, he at least anticipated the process, given the success of his campaign in gathering support (p. 466), chiefly by nurturing voters’ “deep discontents” of minorities (p. 370). His success was in spite of objectively poor campaign organization and infrastructure, which was astutely noted by Wallace himself, who stated that it was not until he stopped “talking about school and highways and prisons and taxes,” and “began talking about [N-words]” that he was able to garner mass support (Carter, 2000, p. 109).

On top and because of the stark cultural shifts of the late 1960s (see White, 1969, pp. 54–55), the conservative ideology gained adherents and identifiers as a result of individuals’ anti-Black concerns outweighing most other concerns (Gross et al., 2011, pp. 336–338), particularly in the South. In fact, some scholars (e.g., Edsall, 1992) bluntly assert and empirically demonstrate that the observed growth of self-identified conservatives in the South was *almost entirely* because of racism (see Gross et al., 2011, p. 335).

Wallace served as a catalyst. From his campaign, a new ideological strand materialized in the electorate that was predicated on and built around prejudice. Thus, given their emphasis on *what they deemed to be* traditionalism and traditional morality (i.e., anti-Black stances), and their somewhat hazy support for a mixture of libertarian economic policies that would follow, most of the adherents to that strand qualified as what could be considered modern-day conservatives.

Therefore, the conservatism and liberalism that emerged from the late 1960s served as ostensible templates of conservatism and liberalism as they are known today. The percentage of centrist conservatives and Rockefeller Republicans in the electorate began to decrease as more trickled over to modern substantive liberalism as time went on (Pfeffer, 2012, p. 16), while the inverse effect was true for conservative and/or Southern Democrats (Gross et al., 2011, p. 334; Schiffer, 2000). As illustratively explained in a review by Kousser (2010), conservatives' eventual successes were the result of "making segregated appeals—racist grits for the lower white orders and economic prime rib for their betters" (p. 371).

Likely as at least a partial result of these appeals, the growth in the number of substantive and electoral adherents to conservatism was faster and stronger than the growth on the other ideological side. Again, liberalism as a political belief system was not as limited to one party as it is today (Field & Anderson, 1969); as noted earlier, the platform of Republican Nelson Rockefeller would qualify as solidly liberal by modern definitions (Donaldson, 2003, p. 63). America's two major political parties have certainly changed dramatically since the late 1960s, but the respective *substances* of America's two major political *ideologies* have *not* changed to nearly the same degree (Ellis & Stimson, 2009). Conservatism has largely remained a steadfast mixture of the two major strands and their subsequent fusionist synthesis, and liberalism a solution of what is colloquially considered to be *progressivism*—expansive civil rights, norms of broad social equality, and Keynesian economic policies. In other words, according to one conservative elite, "the bitter fruit of liberalism" consists solely of societally "destructive" policies that are, at all levels, "anti-family, anti-religion, and devoid of respect for traditional values" (Weyrich, 1982, p. 52).

Two ideas characterize these notions. The first is the previously noted division between Humphrey Democrats and Wallace Democrats, perhaps best characterized by White (1969) as

a symbiotic relationship between the Humphrey campaign and the Wallace campaign—for if Humphrey preached Trust, Wallace preached Distrust; when one gained, the other faltered....There were any number of ways to approach this strange relationship. The cruelest way was to strip the euphemisms and get down to the naked issue of race and hate. (pp. 362–363)

In fact, the October prior to the election saw Humphrey telling a rally in Detroit, "Let's lay it on the line: George Wallace's pitch is racism"



(White, 1969, p. 363). In other words, the divide in the Democratic Party and the creation of its ideological core—and the hypocrisies that would follow—came because of a split over issues explicitly related to race, and the elites knew that this was the case and made that case explicitly.

The second illustrative idea, and more to the point, is that the shift in presidential nominees for the Democratic Party from 1968 to 1972 was quite evocative of the crystallization of liberalism—and its subsequent hypocrisies—that would follow in subsequent decades: 1968's cautious progressive Humphrey was supplanted in 1972 by the objectively unrealistic idealist populist-liberal US Senator George McGovern of South Dakota, who somewhat incomprehensibly responded to charges that he was “too far left” with only the word “nuts” (“McGovern lashes out,” 1972; see Kabaservice, 2012, p. 332). Quite astutely, soon-to-be-reelected President Richard Nixon privately noted on Election Day in 1972 that what McGovern did to the Democratic Party was akin to what Goldwater did to the Republican Party in 1964 (White, 1973), with the thrashing of Goldwater even among conservatives in the electorate immediately observed by scholars (Field & Anderson, 1969, p. 393). The supplanting of more liberals and liberalism in the Democratic Party would, nevertheless, take some time.

In any case, the heterogeneity of America's ideologies that was apparent at the beginning of the 1960s was dissipating; and as the ideologies entered the following decades more homogeneous than before, the separation between conservatives and liberals became clearer.

#### 4.4 IDEOLOGICAL STRANDS' BRANCHING IN THE 1980s

In a 1975 interview with libertarian magazine *Reason*, Ronald Reagan was famously quoted as saying,

If you analyze it I believe the very heart and soul of conservatism is libertarianism. I think conservatism is really a misnomer just as liberalism is a misnomer for the liberals—if we were back in the days of the Revolution, so-called conservatives today would be the Liberals and the liberals would be the Tories. The basis of conservatism is a desire for less government interference or less centralized authority or more individual freedom and this is a pretty general description also of what libertarianism is. (Klausner, 1975, para. 7)

That passage has been used a vast number of times by American conservatives in making their case for conservatism *actually being* libertarianism

(e.g., Kibbe, 2014, pp. 217–218), even among conservatives for whom “libertarianism” is far from an apt substantive-ideological descriptor (see Gillespie, 2013). Even more problematically for the conservatives above, Reagan continues on to note that, although conservatism and libertarianism “are travelling the same path,” his belief system is a matter of “shades,” not a black-and-white, absolutist worldview, stating,

Now, I can't say that I will agree with all the things that the present group who call themselves Libertarians in the sense of a Party say, because I think that like in any political movement there are shades, and there are libertarians who are almost over at the point of wanting no government at all or anarchy. I believe there are legitimate government functions. There is a legitimate need in an orderly society for some government to maintain freedom or we will have tyranny by individuals. The strongest man on the block will run the neighborhood. We have government to insure that we don't each one of us have to carry a club to defend ourselves. (Klausner, 1975, para. 8)

All of this is exemplary of two central theoretical ideas in studies of American conservatism, and the central constructs of this book.

First, many conservatives utilize only the first passage—as an example of the saint of modern American conservatism (see Pew Research Center, 2014a, p. 36) stating that other conservatives should believe that there is no need for government outside of an extremely limited one—and *ignore* the sentiment of the quote that literally *immediately* follows the first and quite vividly contextualizes and qualifies the absolutist language therein. This dichotomy is reflective of an oft-observed ignorance and confusion among most people who are politically involved, but *especially* among conservatives: Research has demonstrated that, although liberals are guilty of it as well, conservatives appear to be *more likely* than liberals to resist new facts and new science when it does not comport with their pre-existing beliefs (Liu & Ditto, 2013; Mooney, 2012; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010); although, it should be made clear that this asymmetry is not a normatively negative notion—cognitively steadfastness has a meaningfully large magnitude of utility in human behavior (see Eidelman & Crandall, 2014, pp. 94–95; cf. Nam, Jost, & Van Bavel, 2013, p. 7).

Second, for Reagan himself *and* those who admire Reagan and use the first quote in explicating their political philosophy, the quotation demonstrates hypocrisy within Reagan's later tenure as president, in spite of his

regular *espousal* of limited government and economic conservatism (see Valentino & Sears, 2005, p. 673). During his presidency, especially his second term—to the chagrin of many libertarians (e.g., Samples, 2010)—he oversaw somewhat dramatic increases of the federal government's size and involvement in many areas (Huang & McDonnell, 1997; Shull & Shaw, 2004), most notably in areas related to national defense (see Eckhardt, 1991; Glad, 1983), and cultural issues like abortion rights (Green & Guth, 1989, p. 42). Both of these were key issue areas for Evangelical conservatives and close to their hearts—but, especially in the case of abortion rights, not at first.

Religious conservatives and Christian leaders were initially indifferent to or even in favor of abortion rights in the years leading up to, and even in the years *following* the 1973 *Roe v. Wade* decision (Balmer, 2007, pp. 12–14). It was only upon refining the message and realizing the *massive* get-out-the-vote power of the issue in 1980 and the few years leading up to it that conservative elites took the issue on as a *centerpiece* to campaigns at nearly all levels (p. 10). It was this realization or perhaps coincidence—depending on which viewpoint one uses—that gave rise to one of the key hypocrisies in today's American conservatism, and perhaps the most classically used example of attitudinal hypocrisies that is exhibited by a vast majority of Republicans and conservatives, most of whom regularly ring the bell of small government (Critchler et al., 2009; Wiecko & Gau, 2008).

Ironically, but still in accordance with work in epistemic motivations (see Chap. 3), research has demonstrated that people who are the most solidly anti-abortion—that is, opposed to abortion rights in all or most circumstances—have a more rigid, black-and-white, dogmatic, and “monolithic” style of cognition (Stets & Leik, 1993, p. 280). Abortion is among the most important political issues for them, and everything else falls by the wayside when voting and responding to surveys (see Abramowitz, 1995). The objectively high degree of attitudinal hypocrisy that they and other Evangelical/laissez-faire conservatives have makes sense, then: they are politically motivated by abortion and other cultural issues, not by economic conservatism—demonstrated by the fact that they actually vary to a comparatively large extent in their economic attitudes when asked about economic issues (Olson & Carroll, 1992). However, they still overwhelmingly vote for, qualify as, and identify as conservatives (Johnson & Tamney, 2001, p. 234)—in spite of the fact that, until the 1980s, most

Evangelicals tended to vote for and qualify as liberals and Democrats (see Olson & Carroll, 1992, p. 779).

Therefore, assuming Balmer's (2007) contentions are correct, 1980s conservative elites—that is, Republican Party organizers and candidates, and Evangelical conservative leadership—made abortion into a keystone because it was electorally advantageous to do so; they would be able to mobilize the 10%–20% of voters to whom abortion was the most important issue (see Pew Research Center, 2013a, p. 10). Elites drove the hypocrisy with messaging and campaigning, and voters responded dramatically. In the 1980s, in fact, religious traditionalism on a mass scale shifted to a more *offensive* as opposed to *defensive* stance (Evans, 1988, p. 463). While these events may not be directly related, their intrinsic connection is clear—with empirical work supporting the extrapolation of this cynical view even in the electorate (Hodson & MacInnis, 2017; MacInnis, MacLean, & Hodson, 2014).

However, elite-driven hypocrisy is not directly limited to issues like abortion that are often defined with religion; although, the hypocrisy likely has the same set of root, driving mechanisms at work: that of deep-seated psychological traits (MacInnis et al., 2014)—in particular, sexism and anti-Black prejudice (Hodson & MacInnis, 2017)—and the electoral exploitation thereof (see Perlstein, 2010).

Lee Atwater, an at-the-time purposely unidentified Reagan adviser, perfectly illustrated the broader picture of this process in a 1981 interview.

You start out in 1954 by saying, “[N-word], [n-word], [n-word].” By 1968 you can't say “[n-word]”—that hurts you, it backfires. So you say stuff like forced busing, states' rights, and all that stuff, and you're getting so abstract. Now, you're talking about cutting taxes, and all these things you're talking about are totally economic things and the byproduct of them is blacks get hurt worse than whites. And, subconsciously, maybe that is part of it. I'm not saying that. But I'm saying that if it is getting that abstract and that coded then we're doing away with the racial problem one way or the other, you follow me? “We want to cut this” is much more abstract than even the busing thing, uh, and a hell of a lot more abstract than “[n-word], [n-word].” (Lamis, 1999, p. 8)

It was this strategy of being “abstract” that Atwater, as campaign manager for the 1988 Presidential Campaign of George H. W. Bush, unofficially—and, according to those who knew Atwater, with “glee” (Jacobs & Tope, 2007, p. 1466)—employed in, among other campaign strategies,

the infamous anti-Dukakis advertisements that linked Dukakis with convicted rapist and murderer Willie Horton, the latter of whom was, not coincidentally, a Black man (Jennings, 1992, p. 420).

Racism, at any number of levels and in any form, is well known to be a clear driver and associate of attitudes (see Knuckey, 2005; Sears, 1993). Beyond that, racism is, in huge part, itself a product of deeper, internal, non-conscious processes, many of which are shared with the drivers of religious traditionalism (Altemeyer, 1998; Ho et al., 2012; Hodson & Busseri, 2012; Sidanius, 1985). In accordance with the EPDAM (see Chap. 3), it is not a surprise, then, that these two sets of attitudes are linked to the degree that they are (Altemeyer, 1998), nor is it a surprise that they are both reflected in conservatism and conservative attitudes more than liberalism (Altemeyer, 1998; Heaven & Furnham, 1987; Knuckey, 2005; McCann, 2010; Mendelberg, 2008).

Elites and other opinion-makers may as well operate outside of the predictions of my central model themselves, but they, at the very least, understand the important role played by deep-seated dispositional processes in driving attitudes. My expectations of ideological asymmetry of the EPDAM is a product of the broad success of, as one example, code words (see Haney López, 2013; Hurwitz & Peffley, 2005) in eliciting—in this, and many other cases—anti-Black affect and attitudes that are “chilling” in how starkly racist and strong they can be (Hurwitz & Peffley, 2005, p. 109).

A strong demonstration of this would be to administer issue-stance survey items asking conservative respondents' attitudes on gun rights *in general*—a longtime massively important issue for American conservatives (see Pew Research Center, 2014a, p. 60)—and gun rights *specifically for Blacks*. For example, asking about ensuring gun rights for “people in urban areas,” or “people in the inner-city,” or “people on welfare” would tie the construct to code-words (see Hurwitz & Peffley, 2005), and quite exquisitely test the extent to which conservatives' opposition to gun control and support for gun rights was affected by any latent prejudice, implicit or explicit (Future research would be well-served to take up this experiment).

Perhaps most directly reflective of this notion altogether is a more contextualist (no pun intended) history of American Evangelical conservatism. Echoing the central construct of a typical American conservative's belief system, in an obituary for Paul Weyrich—the “ultra-conservative” Evangelical elite (Weber, 2008, para. 4), who, among other achievements,

co-founded the Heritage Foundation (para. 2), coined the phrase “moral majority” (para. 3), and was, perhaps more than anyone, an “architect” of late-twentieth-century conservatism (para. 11)—friends of Weyrich explicitly noted the fact that Weyrich “prized free-market economics” *and* “old-fashioned, traditional values” (para. 21). Although, interestingly, his *economic* libertarianism came with an unequivocal exception—that is, hypocrisy—for the government-subsidized Amtrak train service, which corresponded to his “lifelong” enthusiasm for trains (para. 8).<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, Weyrich himself wrote of the existence of a “necessary, unbreakable, and causal relationship between traditional Western, Judeo-Christian values, definitions of right and wrong, ways of thinking and ways of living—the parameters of Western culture—and the secular success of Western societies” (para. 10).

In noting the words of a 1990 speech by Weyrich coupled with a fact-based perspective, Balmer (2014) adds to and supports his earlier argument by making a more fully encompassing case for the tripartite prejudice-conservatism-incongruence linkage: abortion did not become *the* mobilizing issue for Evangelicals until *after* (1) according to Weyrich, ultimately failing in attempts to use, alternatively, pornography, school prayer, the Equal Rights Amendment, and even abortion as *the* mobilizing issue (para. 15); (2) the organizational infrastructure was in place, which is why abortion failed to be a mobilizer the first time (para. 13); and (3) *the* primary mobilizers until that point—what equated to *support for school segregation and racial discrimination* (para. 16–17) that were, until then, justified in the public on the grounds of religious freedom (para. 18)—became increasingly challenging to defend (para. 23). All of this echoes the conclusions of Carter (2000), who, again, contends that the widespread support of George Wallace served to catalyze *this understanding of* traditionalism as a belief system: namely, conservative cultural attitudes, especially with regard to race, mixed with libertarian economics (p. 12). Evangelical conservative leader Ralph Reed made this case as well in a 2012 speech, asserting that Evangelicals turned away from Democratic President (and Christian Evangelical/Southern Baptist) Jimmy Carter only after 1978 when Carter’s IRS issued regulations pressuring religious schools to explicitly desegregate or lose tax exemption, which prompted Evangelicals to protest the regulations on the grounds of their religious liberties being infringed (Carter, 2012).

Therefore, for conservatives, when explicit *de jure* racism became publicly unpalatable, abortion became the mobilizer. As mentioned earlier,

this gave rise to, for many conservatives, the key mobilizer, and, for my purposes, a key attitudinal hypocrisy. Logical congruence of attitudes was not the concern; rather, it was about finding a way to get a sizeable voting bloc to the polls. For Balmer (2007; 2014), it was doing so without marked racism. For Atwater, it was doing so with *implicit* racism.

Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo (1996) empirically demonstrate this tripartite linkage in their critique and takedown of the “principled conservatism” perspective—that is, the notion that conservative attitudes on race-related issues (e.g., opposition to civil rights and affirmative action legislation) are rooted in individualist values, *not* prejudice. Sidanius et al.’s results—as well as subsequent replications (Federico & Sidanius, 2002) and refinements (Burdein, 2007)—reject that perspective. Instead, empirical results demonstrate that those racial attitudes are best understood with a group-dominance, SDO-related view (see Sect. 3.1), in which conservatism’s positive relationship with racism and opposition to affirmative action *strengthened* as subjects’ political knowledge and sophistication increased. In other words, conservative attitudes are related to prejudice not just because of support for individualism but also because of legitimate prejudicial attitudes held more often by those with conservative attitudes and exploited by campaigns using “subtler and more complex” expressions of anti-out-group—in this case, anti-Black—attitudes (see Federico & Sidanius, 2002, p. 490). For many conservatives, deeper, implicit dispositions about racial out-groups dictate their attitudes and attitude structures more strongly than anything else (see Valentino & Sears, 2005), in spite of their regular claims of indifference to issues of race, and colorblindness (Burdein, 2007). Overall, the tripartite linkage has, at the very least, maintained its strength as an effect (Sears & Henry, 2005).

But what of liberals? Although empirical demonstrations are limited, many scholars have explored the role liberals played, and the scholarly explorations echo what was noted in this and previous sections. If my modeling of the 1960s–1980s era is correct, what is likely the case is that the liberals and liberal-identifiers who most readily absorbed the anti-Black and/or prejudicial cultural messages became conservatives and conservative identifiers. With Democratic Party in disarray at the end of the 1960s and into the 1970s, utilizing the deep-seated anti-Black affect (mostly in southern Democrats), the Republican Party and the conservative ideology reaped the benefits and added to their respective memberships (see Pfeffer, 2012, p. 254). In the early 1980s, with Democrats in disarray once again, the end result—in particular, an increase in mass conservative

identification—was replicated *especially* with Evangelicals, primarily utilizing abortion as the motivating issue (Balmer, 2007).

Extrapolating this, then, ostensibly left remaining after the departure of so many Southerners and Evangelicals was a Democratic Party that consisted heavily of those who were, essentially, more purely liberal and progressive, with more open-mindedness as a result of not being persuaded by prejudicial and anti-Black messaging (see Sibley & Duckitt, 2008), more complicated and heterogeneous attitude structures as a result of not being persuaded by the anti-abortion messaging and organization (Stets & Leik, 1993), and less authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1998).

Therefore, logically, rates of hypocrisy overall were likely higher for liberals at this point. For conservatives, many of whom were motivated to *be* conservatives in large part because of (1) anti-Black prejudices, (2) religious traditionalism, or (3) a combination of the two, *overall average* hypocrisy rates may have been just as high as liberals' because of the mixture of those groups within the ideology and Republican Party, but broken down into those three groups, the story was, perhaps, a little different, but still descriptive of the larger themes of this topic.

It is in the modern era that these themes are readily exemplified to clear and vivid magnitudes.

#### 4.5 MODERN TRENDS: CONSERVATISM AND CIVIL RIGHTS

As noted above, it would be an impossible task to provide every example of attitudinal hypocrisy in today's American politics. I will therefore limit my overview of the modern era to four exemplary and illustrative reflections—conservatives and civil rights (Sect. 4.5); liberals and privacy (Sect. 4.6); libertarianism, corporate interests, and how the relationship is reflective of the current state of ideology in America (Sect. 4.7); and President Donald Trump, his targets, his lack of an ideological logic, and his supporters' indifference or embrace of that (Sect. 4.8)—of the central topic of this book, potential confounds therein, and what all of that means for the current state of politics in the United States.

At the 2010 Values Voters Summit—an annual conference of conservatives, sponsored primarily by the conservative Family Research Council (Wilson & Burack, 2012, p. 174)—then-US Senator Jim DeMint of South Carolina, a Republican, stated that conservatives have wanted a “small government for years,” but also that the government should not ignore



religious values (C-SPAN, 2010). DeMint went on to note that those who are truly fiscal conservatives must necessarily want religious values to be instilled by a government because doing so will lead to lower rates of pregnancies out of wedlock, sexually transmitted diseases, and gambling—each of which cost “trillions of dollars” of federal money to address.

In other words, according to DeMint—who, quite appropriately when considering Paul Weyrich’s foundational role in the organization, later became the president of the Heritage Foundation—it is a *moral* matter, and a *practical* and *pragmatic* matter to want a government to be instilled with cultural conservatism.

DeMint made no attempt to cite any sources for any of his factual claims and was likely being hyperbolic for the sake of rhetorical effectiveness. Perhaps more than coincidentally, there is no research backing his claim of the powers of a Christianity-oriented government system, and the “trillions of dollars” remark is also false unless approaching its substance by the broadest possible definition and the broadest possible time parameters, at which points virtually everything else also amounts to costing trillions of dollars.

At any rate, DeMint also noted upfront that his sentiments were intended to appeal to people who were members of, or sympathetic to the Tea Party: the movement of pure, crystallized American conservatism—given the fact that, across polls, Tea Party identifiers were symbolically and substantively politically conservative in the American sense (Jones & Cox, 2010)—that formed after the 2008 elections (see Arceneaux & Nicholson, 2012, p. 700), constituting between 25% (Pew Research Center, 2011, p. 1) and 29% (Arceneaux & Nicholson, 2012, p. 702) of the American electorate, and who report voting for Republicans between 80% and 90% of the time (Jones & Cox, 2010, p. 28). Really, then, Tea Party identifiers and sympathizers—though a plurality (48%) identify as Republicans, and a huge majority (71%) identify as conservative (p. 28)—are almost entirely Republicans in terms of alignment of their substantive ideology with the GOP platform.

However, considering those who *identify* as political conservatives to be *substantive* political conservatives is *worth avoiding* for the descriptive overview purposes of this section for reasons explained earlier (see Sect. 2.4). Primarily, though, this is due to the overarching issue of symbolic ideology, on top of the fact that one in five of those who self-identify as conservatives could be substantively liberal (Federico et al., 2012, p. 383). Since this discussion is already dealing with a non-majority sample of the

electorate, breaking that sample down further will necessarily lead to a breakdown in explanatory power; thus, it is important to crystallize the discussion here to revolve around the crystallized conservatives that are manifested most apparently in the Tea Party and its identifiers.

Beyond that, however, to many scholars, the stated belief systems of the Tea Party have been described as “a confusing array” of positions (see Fishman, 2012, p. 40), given the economic libertarianism they wield alongside their social and militaristic authoritarianism (Arceneaux & Nicholson, 2012; Jones & Cox, 2010). To illustrate, an analysis of polling data on Tea Party identifiers demonstrates that nearly two-thirds view immigrants as a “burden” (Jones & Cox, 2010, p. 30), think abortion should be illegal in all or most cases (p. 28), while over four-fifths attribute government growth to the downfall of individual effort (p. 31).

In fact, and to tie these findings to the previous section of this chapter, the authors of the study note “no significant differences” between Tea Party identifiers and Christian conservative identifiers (p. 5). Thus, it is safe to make the following conclusion: *Identifying with the Tea Party actually constitutes the majority of the current incarnation of the substantively conservative belief system in America* and that system’s subsequent attitudinal hypocrisies. Although there are certainly exceptions to this conceptualization, it serves as the most appropriate method of dividing the electorate into ideological groups and the illustrating thereof.

For modern conservatives—so, by my conceptualization, Tea Party identifiers, who are one and the same with the strongly conservative, especially on social issues (Beasley, 2012, p. 123)—attitudinal hypocrisy is *still* best epitomized by the logically inconsistent wielding of economic libertarianism coupled with cultural and military authoritarianism, although the latter appears to be decreasing; so, the following attitudes, each of which is supported by *at least* 57% of the contingent:

- opposition to increasing the minimum wage (Jones et al., 2013, p. 21),
- opposition to environmental protection laws (p. 21),
- opposition to marriage rights for gays and lesbians (p. 22),
- opposition to marijuana legalization (p. 23),
- opposition to cutting defense spending (Pew Research Center, 2011, p. 109),
- support for “making it more difficult” for abortions to be obtained (Jones et al., 2013, p. 35),

- support for hindering pornography access (p. 35), and
- support for making the budget deficit the top priority for Congress and the president (Pew Research Center, 2011, p. 109).

As noted, however, broad military authoritarianism *no longer has solid majority support* for this contingent of conservatives, in spite of the strong (65%) opposition to cutting defense spending (p. 109) and strong (72%) support for “overwhelming force” as the “best way to defeat terrorism” (Pew Research Center, 2014a, p. 64)—a slight majority agrees with the notion of the United States focusing “more on domestic problems” as opposed to being “active in world affairs” (Pew Research Center, 2011, p. 110), while a plurality deviates between considering the interests of international allies and the interests of the United States in foreign policy (p. 110). Although, it should be mentioned that more in-depth analyses—that is, not strictly survey research results—of Tea Party members *do* demonstrate broad support of surveillance programs, racial profiling, and the detaining of those deemed to be “suspicious” (Barreto, Cooper, Gonzalez, Parker, & Towler, 2011).

Nevertheless, the aforementioned convictions of DeMint have been *regularly* echoed by other conservative elites, including perhaps most appropriately, the previously mentioned Ralph Reed (see Chap. 1), a contemporary and protégé of Lee Atwater, and—like Paul Weyrich—a “pioneer” of Evangelical mobilization (Goodstein, 2012). For Reed, the conservative belief system is best represented by support for free-market economics combined with social conservatism and, specifically, “policies that strengthen the family” which, according to Reed, decrease the likelihood of poverty (Donvan, 2013).

The picture of modern American conservatives is still clear, nonetheless, and the sentiments of DeMint and Reed serve as vivid illustrations of the current state of the conservative species. Where the belief system *used to be* characterized by explicitly and/or implicitly anti-Black issue stances (Ansell, 1997; Burdein, 2007; Knuckey, 2005), it is now marked by at least a clear set of explicitly anti-gay issue stances (Jones et al., 2013; Pew Research Center, 2011, 2014a, 2014b), most readily demonstrated by the fact that somewhere between 73% (Jones et al., 2013, p. 22) and 85% (Pew Research Center, 2011, p. 78) of conservatives indicate opposition to basic marriage rights for gays and lesbians, and the fact that 71% indicate feeling that gays and lesbians raising children is a “bad thing for American society” (pp. 79–80).

For today’s conservatives, gay is the new Black.

## 4.6 MODERN TRENDS: LIBERALISM AND PRIVACY

Modern American liberals, though, are much more difficult to illustrate. In typifying the contemporary ideological groups in 2011, Pew Research Center separated the leftist contingents of the electorate into across-the-board *Solid Liberals* (16% of the electorate), the more socially moderate and religious *New Coalition* and *Hard-Pressed Democrats* (9% and 15% of the electorate respectively), and the more economically moderate *Post-Moderns* (14% of the electorate). In 2014, this was observed again (2014b), with the respectively analogous groups being *Solid Liberals*, *Faith and Family Left*, *Hard-Pressed Skeptics*, and *Next Generation Left* (17%, 16%, 13%, and 13% of the electorate respectively). These classifications are in stark contrast to Pew's *two* conservative groups in 2011 (*Staunch Conservatives* and *Main Street Republicans*, 11% and 14% of the electorate respectively) and 2014 (*Steadfast Conservatives* and *Business Conservatives*, 15% and 12% of the electorate respectively, 2014b)—who have statistically identical responses to every one of major issues asked, except for Main Street and Business Conservatives both demonstrating relative centrism on a few economic issues when compared to their more extreme counterparts (2011, p. 71; 2014b, p. 6).

In fact, in looking at the current state of American liberals, similar to the way it has been in previous decades (Ellis & Stimson, 2009), being willing to identify as “liberal” is a much more effective indicator of a *substantively* liberal ideology (see Sect. 2.4) than identifying as “conservative” is for substantive conservative ideology. Whereas more than half of substantive libertarians will *also* identify as “conservative” (Pew Research Center, 2011, p. 106)—rendering that label useless as a separator for the ideologies because it includes far too many non-conservatives—three of Pew's (2011) leftist groups vary distinctly: 60% of Solid Liberals identify as liberal, compared to 24% of New Coalition Democrats and 21% of Post-Moderns. Interestingly, 9%, 32%, and 19% of the groups, respectively, identify as *conservative*, which again reinforces the substantive uselessness of the conservative label for my purposes. The problems for symbolic ideology here are inverses: compared to people's substantive, *actual* ideologies and belief systems, too many identify as conservative and too few identify as liberal (see Ellis & Stimson, 2009). In exploring today's liberals, then, focusing on Pew's (2011) Solid Liberals as well as other surveys' respondents who are willing to identify as liberal is probably the best course of action.

Unlike conservatives, choosing current political figures who exemplify today's liberalism, let alone singular speeches, is comparatively difficult. Looking at polling data of a nationally representative sample of Americans from before the heat of the 2016 presidential campaign, those who identify as “very liberal” or “somewhat liberal” indicate favorability—that is, among those who have an opinion, *over 60%* indicate a favorable opinion—of Vice President Joe Biden (Public Policy Polling, 2014, p. 7), later Democratic Party nominee for US President Hillary Clinton (p. 8), and US Senator Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts (p. 8). Like the three Pew (2011) groups, the three people are ideologically similar but still distinct. However, one of the three most readily meets the requirements to be certified as one of Pew's solid liberals: Warren.

Warren is among the most *quantifiably* liberal members of Congress today (Bonica, 2013a)—according to “ideological cartography” scholars (see Bonica, 2013b)—identified as a “liberal champion” by political writers (Tumulty, 2012), and representative of the populist sect of Democratic Party by journalists (Balz & Rucker, 2014). Thus, to anecdotally illustrate present-day American liberalism's most robust incongruities, Warren—like DeMint and Reed for conservatism—serves as, at the very least, an instructive figure.

In a 2013 speech to the AFL-CIO, Warren celebrated “federal laws on wages and hours,” the right to organize, and Social Security (Warren, 2013, para. 11). Warren's populism is known far and wide in American politics; unlike conservative political figures and citizens—again, at least with regard to economic issues—Warren regularly praises government's ability to function properly (Jones, 2013). Yet, Warren is also on the record as *not* believing in a government's ability to manage legalized marijuana (Goodnough, 2011), and, more to the point, not believing in a government's ability to respect citizens' privacy rights (Sullivan, 2014).

US Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont—the *self*-described “democratic socialist” (Bierman, 2014, para. 3), close ally and longtime friend of Warren (Eidelson, 2014; see also Sanders & Warren, 2013), and probably the country's other top figure of progressivism (Bierman, 2014, para. 23)—regularly makes the same economic-populist arguments as Warren, sometimes as a co-author (see Sanders & Warren, 2013). But, Sanders too has exhibited and expressed civil libertarianism, especially with regard to government surveillance—in particular, the 2001 USA PATRIOT ACT and its subsequent revisions (see Sanders, 2013).

Current polling demonstrates this belief system in the national population as well. Even though liberals were initially hesitant to oppose their supposed ideological leadership—in this case, the Obama administration—on the 2013 disclosure of the National Security Agency’s domestic spying apparatus (Pew Research Center, 2013b), they have since shifted to civil libertarianism, with over two-thirds opposing the NSA’s surveillance program and, instead, supporting privacy rights (Cass, 2014; Pew Research Center, 2014b, p. 65). Although, this is likely the biggest differentiation between today’s liberals and a populist orientation; without it, liberalism *appears* to see a potential for government action in most sectors of individual life.

For today’s liberals, government is a positive and effective tool in most arenas, but, for some reason, not when it interferes with individuals’ privacy—*unless* that privacy is related to the personal economic information of the wealthy, in which case it is fair game (Sanders, 2014).

#### 4.7 MODERN TRENDS: LIBERTARIANISM AGAINST CONSERVATISM

Unlike previous eras and their respective sections in this chapter, the *present* time period is an interesting one for libertarians, and not just because there *appear* to be more libertarians today than in previous eras (Pew Research Center, 2011, p. 20) but also because of the difference between substantive and symbolic ideologies of many libertarians (see Holsti & Rosenau, 1996; Weber & Federico, 2013). 77% identify as Republican or Republican-leaning (Pew Research Center, 2011, p. 12), 63% state that they voted for a Republican in their 2010 Congressional vote (p. 12), and 53% identify as conservatives (p. 106). This is all in spite of multitudinal differences between modern libertarians and conservatives. Between 7% (Jones et al., 2013, p. 8) and 10% (Pew Research Center, 2011, p. 1) of the American electorate qualifies as substantive libertarians, while 13% *identifies* as libertarians when given the option to do so (Jones et al., 2013, p. 8).

Still, the large percentage of libertarians who identify as conservatives flies in the face of the many issues they do not share with conservatives today. This is perhaps best exemplified by attitudes toward LGBT rights: 71% of libertarians assert the importance of societal acceptance of homosexuality, which contrasts hugely with conservatives, 68% of whom assert the importance of societal *discouragement* of homosexuality (Pew Research Center, 2011, p. 32). Yet, in what should cause joy on the part

of conservative elites, libertarians nevertheless still tend to support and vote for Republican candidates (Jones et al., 2013), in spite of the fact that almost all of the Republican candidates for office categorically reject the libertarian mindset on a huge number of issues (Beasley, 2012).

The Ayn Randian self-interested viewpoint—that is, distrust of most things *government*-related in favor of private industry and profit motive—of today’s libertarians seems to explain their *comparative* but somewhat contradictory trust in large for-profit private corporations. For libertarians today, the pursuit of profit is the end-all moral motivation (Tetlock et al., 2000), and a not-for-profit government is, by its very definition, inferior in most, if not all, respects.

Another perspective on their motivations is worth noting, however. Journalist Mark Ames contends that the libertarian ideology, as it is today, serves as little more than the current state of what objectively began as “a project of the corporate lobby world” in the mid-1940s (Ames, 2013, para. 10), designed to serve as pseudo-academic support for the dissolving of federal labor laws and regulations that would, upon dissolving, make wealthy elites exponentially wealthier (para. 11). Whether or not those are the true motivations, the result of libertarian economics quite often *is* the wealthy becoming wealthier (see para. 16), noted even by those who espouse this Randian libertarianism (paras. 19–21). It should also be noted that Mayer’s (2016) analytical reporting only strengthens Ames’ argument.

For conservatism, the fusion of libertarianism and traditionalism could, as it was before (see Sect. 4.2), be a way to exploit the traditionalist sympathies of most within, in this case, the Tea Party and the remainder of the conservative electorate for a combination of increased electoral power and, on top of that, increased wealth for the libertarian elites. According to Ames (2013) and Mayer (2016), then, libertarians’ stark lacking of attitudinal hypocrisy is irrelevant for the electorate—what matters is the electoral utilization of the other attitudes that are commonly linked to economic libertarianism in the conservative polity.

Even without giving Ames (2013) and Mayer (2016) the benefit of the doubt, the current state of libertarianism—if it is *actually* increasing in the proportion of Americans who adhere to it—does not mean that conservatives will naturally grow in their libertarianism. The ideological debate to which Thomas Jefferson alluded in an 1813 letter to John Adams as existing “through all time” (Randolph, 1830, p. 202)—exemplified at the time in the distinction between the Whigs and Tories<sup>5</sup>—will not by nature



come down to all-or-nothing perspectives on the role of government in line with my lens. Given the fairly similar trends of the previous eras, the only prediction that can be made with certainty is that the current debate between conservatism and liberalism—in spite of the ideologies’ respective hypocrisies and in spite of what many psychology scholars assert in terms of humans’ natural inclination to work to reduce personal inconsistencies (see Chap. 6)—will *continue* in its current form for some time. Libertarianism, in spite of its logic with regard to government action, is not the end-state for conservatism, because *today’s* form of conservatism has been present for decades and, if anything, is *itself* growing in strength in no small part because of the notion that moderate conservatives in and outside of leadership are a dying breed (Kabaservice, 2012; Pew Research Center, 2014a).

The trend of the debate between the ideologies—and the existence of attitudinal hypocrisies *in* both ideologies—is especially static when taking into account the fact that American society has ostensibly *replaced* one out-group for another over time. Jews, Catholics, Hispanics, Native Americans, and *especially* Blacks have all served as the *primary* out-group, so to speak, and many people still treat each of those groups as such today. The arguments used to deprive each group of civil rights have incidentally corresponded with each other to astonishingly high degrees; scholars typically find the ultimate roots for those anti-out-group attitudes in religious traditionalism, receptiveness to implicitly and explicitly negative messaging, and the psychological underpinnings of all of the above (Altemeyer, 1998; Balmer, 2014; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008).

This effect, then, and the overall trend of incongruence is most readily *seen with* and *reflected in* the notion of LGBT people serving as the explicit out-group today for many, if not *most* conservatives, and inversely for liberals and libertarians. As previously stated, LGBT people serve as the “new” out-group not just for conservatives but also for liberals and libertarians, just in the opposite direction.

Thus, for adherents to *each* ideology, gay is the new Black, *but Black is still Black*. Blacks still face considerable discrimination and prejudice in both explicit and implicit ways. As of this writing, state- and federal-level attempts to restrict voting rights by requiring people to provide photo identification prior to voting—which disproportionately affects Blacks’ voting rights (Bentele & O’Brien, 2013) and appears to be rooted in anti-Black prejudices (Mendez & Grose, 2014)—serve as clear examples



of this discrimination. Moreover, nearly 20% of conservatives state *explicitly* that they believe that interracial marriage is “a bad thing” for America (Pew Research Center, 2011, p. 80), compared to a marginal percentage of liberals (pp. 80–81). So, while LGBT people are the current explicit focus, Blacks are still an implicit target.

#### 4.8 MODERN TRENDS: PRESIDENT TRUMP AND PEOPLE WHO ARE BLACK, CRITICAL JOURNALISTS, DISABLED, FEMALE, GOLD STAR FAMILIES, HISPANIC, IMMIGRANTS, LATINO, MUSLIM, NATIVE AMERICAN, PRISONERS OF WAR, REFUGEES, OR ELECTORAL OPPONENTS

As discussed in this book’s preface, Donald Trump’s ideology can be described as a nebulous, contradictory haze:

- of capitalism (e.g., advocating a 0% corporate tax rate; Trump, 2011, p. 63; see also Taft, 2017), *and* socialism (see Mathis-Lilley, 2016);
- of social libertarianism (Johnson, 2015, paras. 2–5), *and* social authoritarianism (para. 6);
- of nationalism, *and* globalism, and that’s according to Trump himself, too, telling interviewers, “Hey, I’m a nationalist and a globalist ... I’m both” (Nicholas, Vieira, & de Córdoba, 2017).

Any measurement taken of Trump’s issue stances necessarily reduces the accuracy of other measurements, which means that quantifying the political orientation of President Trump requires the work of quantum and particle physicists who specialize in the operationalization of Heisenberg’s (1930) uncertainty principle (see Einstein & Glick, 2015, p. 681; Gerring, 1997, p. 965).

The nebulous haze of the Trump orientation is, nevertheless, a positive asset to some. During a 2017 *Intelligence Squared US* debate about Trump (see Donovan, 2017), one of the debaters—conservative commentator Gayle Trotter—made the case that Trump’s absence of logically coherent attitudes was a normative good, explaining that “Trump is not bound by ideological consistency. Instead, he asks ‘What will work?’” (p. 10). Additionally, in policy negotiations, reporters have identified Trump’s “ideological flexibility” as an advantage (Thrush & Haberman, 2017).

Again, Trump’s chaotic bundles of attitudes are beyond mere attitudinal hypocrisy; they are a house of cards with tweets printed on them, assembled in a zero-gravity environment, with each card having a unique spin and momentum. And yet, survey evidence suggests that his strong supporters are unfazed by this (see Gerson, 2016). This fits with recent research demonstrating most people’s animosity for hypocrites *unless* the hypocrites are upfront and—the thinking is—*honest* about it (Jordan, Sommers, Bloom, & Rand, 2017). Positive evaluations of Trump are at least superficially rooted in negative reactions to the idea of “political correctness” and positive reactions to refreshing brashness (see Bartlett, 2017).

In fact, a quick analysis of the 2016 ANES (see Chap. 5) supports that beyond surface-level qualitative reporting. In the pre-election survey, the following item was asked:

Some people think that the way people talk needs to change with the times to be more sensitive to people from different backgrounds. Others think that this has already gone too far and many people are just too easily offended. Which is closer to your opinion?<sup>6</sup>

Table 4.1 shows the breakdown in responses to the item. Clearly, and as expected, Trump voters were hugely negative in their reactions to the more politically correct side of the item ( $\chi^2 = 494.10$ ,  $df = 3$ ,  $p < .001$ ), and mean warm feelings toward Trump coincided dramatically along those same lines,  $F(3,3466) = 229.21$ ,  $p < .001$ . Additionally, all

**Table 4.1** Responses to political correctness items in the 2016 electorate

	% All subjects	% Trump voters	% Clinton voters	Mean feeling thermometer rating	
				Trump (SD)	Clinton (SD)
The way people talk needs to change a lot	19.01	7.87	29.68	20.14 (30.50)	60.38 (32.55)
The way people talk needs to change a little	23.79	13.39	33.33	24.48 (29.70)	56.60 (30.72)
People are a little too easily offended	29.22	30.62	26.76	38.06 (33.09)	39.22 (31.75)
People are much too easily offended	27.99	48.12	10.22	56.77 (33.10)	20.48 (27.54)

of the above are reversed and amplified in their strengths when looking at Clinton voters' responses ( $\chi^2 = 527.96$ ,  $df = 3$ ,  $p < .001$ ) and mean Clinton warmth— $F(3,3468) = 306.07$ ,  $p < .001$ —and when comparing Clinton voters to Trump voters in their proportions of responses to each of the items ( $\chi^2 = 548.98$ ,  $df = 3$ ,  $p < .001$ ).

Trump's brash and unrefined image may be an asset, then, for those tired of clean-cut, slick politicians—as pontificated by one of the more cynical of those representing that viewpoint (viz., Taibbi, 2017, pp. xx–xxix). So, a meaningful proportion of Trump's support is from people who either (1) do not realize the extent of his attitudinal incoherence or (2) are indifferent to, or even appreciate, his chaotic set of attitude structures.

## 4.9 CONCLUSION

According to *House of Cards's* Frank Underwood, “The road to power is paved with hypocrisy” (Willimon & Foster, 2014). In other words, the hypocrisies that accumulate among elites are the result of gaining power. Underwood's contention is correct, but the individuals who *follow* and *take cues from* those elites are not pursuing those same interests. At the micro-, layperson-level, it is *not* about power; rather, *their* attitudinal hypocrisies are the result of and subject to the forces explicated within the EPDAM.

Thus, the EPDAM serves as an individual-level model of attitudes, not a model of macro-level attitudes. Conservative elites are likely fully aware of social traditionalism and anti-Black affect serving as extremely effective mobilizing tools and use them as such, regardless of whether conservative leaders are social traditionalists or affectively anti-Black themselves; perhaps because the economic libertarianism that, for whatever reason—increasing personal wealth, gaining political power, etc.—is so salient to conservative leaders is supported regardless of the cultural orientation of the candidates (see Ames, 2013). At least until the current time, a reliable bloc of social conservatives will most assuredly turn out to vote for candidates with even a semblance of that orientation (Goren & Chapp, 2017). Because this above-all-else-traditionalism has been such an electorally advantageous platform, it is because of, in my terminology, *external* forces (e.g., elite leadership) at a macro-level that *dispositional* forces (e.g., anti-gay affect) are exploited at a micro-level.

It is this micro-level that will be statistically analyzed in the following chapter.

## NOTES

1. As a side note that foreshadows the current state of the primary ideologies in America today (see Sect. 4.6), the dynamic ideological mix in those who ultimately voted for Johnson was undoubtedly *more* mixed than it is today for national elections (Ellis & Stimson, 2009, p. 397), because ideological heterogeneity of that magnitude was, even at that point, an exception to long-observed voting trends. The exception in that case was primarily a result of the poor campaigning and image management of Goldwater, his campaign, and the Republican Party that followed (see Field & Anderson, 1969, p. 393).
2. For an insightful overview, see Whitfield and Strong (1970).
3. The latter type of depression is vividly captured in real time by Rivkin and Stuart (1969).
4. I invite those in the quasi-Freudian Adorno et al. (1950) school of ideological formation to pontificate on what exactly could be going on here.
5. Jefferson famously noted that “the terms of whig and tory belong to natural, as well as to civil history. They denote the temper and constitution of mind of different individuals” (Randolph, 1830, p. 202).
6. Variable V161362 in the 2016 ANES.

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## Analyzing and Predicting Hypocrisy in the Electorate

*If you know the position a person takes on taxes, you can tell their whole philosophy. The tax code, once you get to know it, embodies all the essence of life: greed, politics, power, goodness, charity.*  
—Sheldon Cohen (*Birnbaum & Murray, 1987, p. 289*)

### 5.1 STUDY 1.1: 1990–2008 AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTION STUDIES

This chapter uses survey data from American National Election Study (ANES) studies. The data will first be described and then analyzed in order to explore 26 years of attitudinal hypocrisy in America—both generally and across ideological identification—as well as the potential psychological factors underlying the differential rates of hypocrisy. Put differently, I will operationalize the different forms of attitudinal hypocrisy, and disentangle and statistically predict those hypocrisy scores with the available variables. Although, importantly, many of the hypocrisy scores themselves revolve around respondents’ perspectives on federal spending—and logical inconsistencies therein—which is, indeed, a limitation, but using Cohen’s perspective above helps to alleviate that limitation (see Birnbaum & Murray, 1987, p. 289).

Nevertheless, no nationally representative, freely available datasets exist that contain enough information about their sample to definitively and fully test how robust of a model the EPDAM is—namely, datasets with a

substantial number of factors included in the EPDAM (e.g., need to evaluate, preference for consistency). This chapter more than makes do with the available metrics, but this limitation should be kept in mind. (Chapter 6 includes most of the relevant factors in an undergraduate sample.)

Additionally, this chapter's survey analysis approach is broader than a more proper empirical analysis. My hypotheses are wide and my perspective is investigative as much as it is predictive. Again, this book is the first in what will hopefully be a long line of explorations of attitudinal hypocrisy; but, spelunking without a torch is no different from wandering around in the dark—so, the broad hypotheses and kitchen-sink approaches that comprise this chapter represent the first time these caves of hypocrisy have ever seen light.

My role here is that of Virgil guiding Dante through the underworld. However, it quickly becomes clear that, unlike Virgil, I don't have an answer for all of the weird stuff we see.

Study 1.1 utilizes the cumulative dataset of the ANES (Stanford University & the University of Michigan, 2014), which includes responses to national surveys of the American populace from 1948–2008. The ANES is a tried-and-true nationally representative dataset, employed in a vast amount of research already cited in this book (e.g., Arceneaux, Johnson, & Maes, 2012; Federico, Deason, & Fisher, 2012; Federico & Hunt, 2013). For Study 1.1, only the studies from 1990, 1992, 2000, 2004, and 2008 will be analyzed, however, as (1) the other studies did not include specific ideological identification items, enough attitude items, or government philosophy items; and (2) the 2012 study will be more directly analyzed and probed in Study 1.2.

**Variables.** A drawback of the ANES is that its iterations rarely contain even a medium-sized battery of political attitude items—namely, where the respondent stands on abortion, the estate tax, etc.—and usually only includes a few specific attitude-stance items and an assortment of related items, including most regularly the degree to which the respondent supports increasing-versus-decreasing federal spending in certain areas. In addition to analyzing the rarely available issue-stance items, I will also be including the federal spending items as admittedly imperfect analogues for attitude items. While they are certainly not direct measures of where a respondent stands on an issue, they do measure an aspect of government involvement on specific issues. However, I expect that more conservatism-oriented respondents will be more likely to indicate across-the-board resistance to supporting increases in spending as

a result of the combination and interaction of (1) the effect of identifying as an ideology (see Cohen, 2003), and (2) the conformity-priming effects well-observed in survey research (Tourangeau, Rasinsky, & D’Andrade, 1991).

Ideally, only items that were included with identical wording in every year would be included, and only items that fit within my lens of government involvement, but neither of those ideal circumstances—especially the latter—is possible with the available data. Nevertheless, the purpose of Study 1.1 is to demonstrate trends in hypocrisy over time, and how hypocrisy of different types, over time, has been tied or not tied to ideological identification; just looking at the trends over time in broad strokes may not be *fully* scientifically valid, but it is necessary here.

Items to be included in hypocrisy calculations were chosen if they were (1) included in over four iterations of the ANES, and (2) involved specific issue attitudes, government philosophy, or federal spending. No items that met both of those criteria were excluded.

A total of three items related to philosophy of government were available for more than four of the ANES iterations, and of those three, only one was unrelated to more subjective values (e.g., self-reliance, individualism). Each item asked respondents “to choose which of two statements” comes closer to their opinion, while explicitly noting that respondents “might agree to some extent with both,” but are nevertheless instructed to indicate “which one is closer to” their own views. Interviewers were instructed to “if necessary, probe” the “which one is closer,” if they received an ambivalent response, after which point they were willing to accept a more ambivalent or undecided response, which will be coded as a midpoint response for these and the other attitude items.

The three items are as follows, and shown here with the more libertarian—that is, the “0”-coded—of the two options presented first:

- VCF9131: “the less government the better,” or, “there are more things that government should be doing”
- VCF9132: “the free market can handle these problems without government being involved,” or “we need a strong government to handle today’s complex economic problems”
- VCF9133: “the main reason government has become bigger over the years is because it has gotten involved in things that people should do for themselves,” or, “government has become bigger because the problems we face have become bigger.”



The first of those items—VCF9131—is the most critical for my purposes, and will be utilized as the government-philosophy item in the first two of the three hypocrisy calculation methods outlined in Chap. 2: Method 1, in which attitude items are individually compared to government philosophy; and Method 2, in which the mean of the individual item scores calculated in Method 1 is calculated for each participant. VCF9132 and VCF9133 will be included, along with every other item related to political attitudes, in Method 3—the *logical anti-constraint* calculation.

The attitude items that are available to be tested are shown in Table 5.1.

Additional information about participants will also be utilized, obviously, including standard demographics (viz., age, gender identification, racial identification, ethnic identification, religious identification, stated income, and stated education level). Moreover, given their availability and relevance to the topic (see Smith, Oxley, Hibbing, Alford, & Hibbing, 2011, p. 385; Zaller, 1992, p. 23), other pieces of information will also be included: region (viz., South vs. non-South; see Carmines & Stimson, 1989), union membership (see Zingher, 2014), Biblical literalism, and indexes of religiosity (viz., self-reported importance of religion, church attendance, and religious guidance; see Schmidt, 2017), racial resentment (see Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996), moral traditionalism (see Goren, Federico, & Kittilson, 2009), and egalitarianism (see Feldman, 2003).

In accordance with usual practice (e.g., Federico et al., 2012), and the most parsimonious presentation of analyses possible, each variable was recoded—standardized to run from 0 to 1. Attitude items were coded to run from libertarianism to authoritarianism.

**Hypothesized Hypocrisy Scores.** First, it is important to note that the magnitudes of hypocrisy scores overall are relatively unimportant for this book's purposes, as my ultimate goal is not to elucidate hypocrisy *itself*, but to elucidate what *drives* that hypocrisy and what the effects are that are inherent to the respective issues and the respective ideological identifications. However, given what they may say about the body politic—namely, that hypocrisy is universal and expansive across the population—scores *are* worth touching on, and the first hypothesis speaks to that.

*Hypothesis 1a Negligible percentages of participants will be fully non-hypocritical, and no significant differences in scores should be observed between ideological identities.* I expect that only small percentages of participants will be fully non-hypocritical (i.e., Method 2's *hypocrisy score* = .000) on any respective issue. This is all due to the aforementioned inevitable accumulation of incongruities in people's attitudes (Jost, Glaser,

**Table 5.1** Attitude items available to be tested by year

Item	1990			1992			2000			2004			2008			Total		
	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Guaranteed jobs and income	1960	.480	.290	2475	.455	.280	1006	.404	.279	1212	.468	.296	1151	.506	.306	7804	.464	.290
Aid to Blacks	1957	.426	.287	2464	.400	.280	997	.377	.274	1195	.419	.283	2311	.429	.302	8924	.413	.288
Abortion prohibitions	1963	.408	.387	2467	.358	.382	1797	.386	.386	1061	.416	.385	1039	.410	.397	8327	.390	.387
Government services	1962	.555	.249	2480	.515	.236	1005	.558	.245	1212	.575	.250	1153	.591	.259	7812	.551	.248
Defense spending	1966	.436	.240	2479	.428	.221	1005	.588	.224	1212	.584	.233	1153	.523	.262	7815	.489	.244
Fedl spnd: Poor people	2467	.736	.310	1801	.709	.326	1192	.744	.320	2318	.799	.300	7778	.750	.314			
Fedl spnd: Child care	1969	.719	.326	2470	.696	.330	1806	.767	.320	1188	.768	.311	2318	.781	.300	9751	.743	.320
Fedl spnd: Crime	2470	.828	.271	1807	.800	.294	1198	.818	.275	2319	.816	.285	7794	.817	.281			
Fedl spnd: Public schools	1967	.797	.282	2470	.804	.282	1807	.851	.283	1201	.859	.270	2320	.871	.260	9765	.834	.277
Fedl spnd: Foreign aid	1971	.205	.284				1805	.321	.320	1195	.337	.343	2318	.346	.335	7289	.300	.325
Fedl spnd: Welfare programs	2478	.377	.359	1805	.392	.355	1190	.457	.368	2316	.521	.376	7789	.436	.370			
Fedl spnd: Environment	1973	.742	.295	2471	.779	.288	1806	.707	.327				2319	.801	.295	8569	.761	.302
Fedl spnd: Space/science/tech	1972	.359	.338	2473	.641	.338				1211	.732	.313	2317	.739	.311	7973	.613	.360
Fedl spnd: Social security	1972	.795	.275	2471	.719	.287	1807	.789	.287	1196	.794	.283	2316	.834	.265	9762	.784	.282

Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003a, p. 387), the hypocrisies of the most observable and follower-informing, -inducing, and -cuing elites (Cohen, 2003; see Chap. 4), and the near-negligible number of purely rationalistic and logical members of the citizenry (Bendor & Bullock, 2008; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; see also Ellis & Stimson, 2009, p. 396).

I also expect mostly insignificant *differences* in general hypocrisy scores across the ideological identities: For example, a majority of conservative identifiers will indicate strong penchants for smaller, more limited government (i.e., lower government philosophy score) *and* strong preferences for prohibitions on abortion, while a majority of liberal identifiers will indicate strong penchants for the utility of government *and* strong preferences for libertarianism on abortion. This similarity should mean that both groups should have similar hypocrisy scores for the issue of abortion, and I expect that this will be repeated regardless of the issue.

*Hypothesis 1b More of the variance in liberal identifiers' hypocrisy scores will be explained than variance in conservative identifiers' hypocrisy scores.* I expect that liberal identifiers' hypocrisy scores will be significantly more predictable—in terms of *R*-squared values—than conservative identifiers' hypocrisy scores. This is due to the stronger prevalence of attitudinal schisms in the conservative identity than in the liberal identity (see Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012; Weber & Federico, 2013), with more people who are operationally *not* conservative nevertheless identifying as conservative than people who are operationally not liberal identifying as liberal, resulting in liberal identifiers likely to be comparatively more homogeneous in their philosophies and issue stance than conservative identifiers (Carmines, Ensley, & Wagner, 2012; Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Stimson, 2004)—a counterintuitive ideological unity observed recently among elites (Kopicki, 2014).

**Hypothesized Hypocrisy Drivers.** In general, each hypothesized effect in this section follows from the EPDAM and my central theoretical framework.

I primarily hypothesize important roles played by two conceptual factors in particular (viz., religiosity and sophistication), as well as an assortment of others (viz., demographics, identity, racial resentment, and explicit and implicit philosophical values), each of which is in line with the EPDAM and the theoretical framework of this book.

In other words, the broad expectation is that more *external* factors like demographics and identity should be more strongly associated with the government philosophy item, and *dispositional* factors like moral traditionalism should be more strongly associated with individual issue stances: The more violent the collision of external–philosophy and dispositions–attitudes, the stronger the emergent hypocrisy. Moreover, in general, liberals’ hypocrisies should be more strongly driven by external factors, and vice versa for conservatives and dispositional factors.

Importantly, while each potential Method 1 hypocrisy score will be calculated, my primary focus will be on the Method 2 calculation of overall hypocrisy and the Barton and Parsons (1977) constraint equation—covered in more detail in Hypothesis 5.

*Hypothesis 2 Religiosity and Christian fundamentalism will increase hypocrisy on abortion prohibition, overall hypocrisy, and logical anti-constraint for all subjects and for conservative identifiers, and decrease those hypocrisy scores for liberal identifiers.* There are readily observed drivers of conservatives’ attitudes that are not explicitly related to their extolled value of *overall individualism*—that is, not exclusively *economic* individualism, otherwise Schwartz et al.’s (2014) analyses could be used, as “free enterprise” as a political value measures one’s stated beliefs in laissez-faire economics (p. 909). Instead, they are related to the authoritarian traditionalism that *contradicts* their exalted libertarianism, most notably on the issue of abortion. These include factors measuring the strength of one’s religiosity, or in many cases, even their *stated* religiosity, as measured by self-reported church attendance, personal importance of religion, and guidance from religion. Moreover, beliefs in a literal interpretation of the Bible accord to an even stronger degree with social authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1998; Feldman & Johnston, 2014; see Malka, Lelkes, Srivastava, Cohen, & Miller, 2012, p. 276). Each of these increases the degree to which people indicate conservative identification and conservative issue stances—especially in tandem with one another, as they are not mutually exclusive (see Malka et al., 2012, p. 277). Including additional controls for religious affiliation—in particular, for Catholic affiliation, given the Catholic Church’s official stance on abortion and its permeation among American Catholics (see Jelen, 1990)—should also help to tease this apart.

Moreover, for conservative identifiers who do *not* have high religiosity, if they stick to the small-government philosophy, it is less likely that they will support traditionalist social issue stances (Iyer et al., 2012). This essentially qualifies them as substantively more libertarian than conservative, further strengthening the traditionalism–hypocrisy relationship. Thus, even by including conservative identifiers who are substantively more libertarian, each religiosity factor should be a *positive* predictor of conservative identifiers’ political hypocrisy scores.

Additionally, even though their numbers are limited (Pew Research Center, 2014b), there are liberal identifiers who also identify, for example, as born-again Christians. Because of this, religiosity predictors should *negatively* predict hypocrisy on abortion for liberal identifiers, as deviations from a philosophy of a more active government will be less observed if they are taking cues from their religiosity on issue stances more than they are taking cues from their ideological identity; while they should take cues from their ideological identity for their government philosophy, which should be that of a stronger and more active government. The same predicted effect should logically be observed, then, of those who do not indicate any non-solid ideological identity—that is, in full models that predict hypocrisy for all subjects, religiosity should negatively predict hypocrisy scores.

Ideally, tests of this hypothesis would also incorporate the underlying drivers of religiosity and related dispositional traits (e.g., dogmatism, right-wing authoritarianism). However, as stated earlier, with the limited availability of valid measures of such traits in nationally representative data, this task is reserved for future research (see Study 1.2 and Study 1.3). Even so, the trait–religiosity relationships are statistically strong enough to allow for, at the very least, preliminary conclusions to be drawn; for example, Crowson (2009) measured a correlation between dogmatism and fundamentalism to be  $R = .611$ , and even significantly higher ( $R = .798$ ) when looking only at males (see also Toner, Leary, Asher, & Jongman-Sereno, 2013).

Nevertheless, the predictions of the EPDAM are plainly illustrated: *Ideological identity drives government philosophies*, while *religiosity*—and its many non-conscious, subterranean drivers—drives, for example, abortion stances.

*Hypothesis 3 Sophistication should increase overall hypocrisy scores for liberal identifiers, but have no effect for others—except for all-subjects’ logical anti-constraint, which should be decreased by sophistication.* Measured here by its contemporaries/quasi-stand-ins/siblings—namely, educational

attainment and political knowledge (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996)—nearly all of the research done on topics *related* to attitudinal hypocrisy (e.g., ideological constraint and inter-attitudinal consistency) ties those concepts to political sophistication and expertise (e.g., Judd & Downing, 1990; Lavine, Thomsen, & Gonzales, 1997; cf. Critcher, Huber, Ho, & Koleva, 2009; Wiecko & Gau, 2008). Although the vast majority of Americans are “impoverished” when it comes to political information and sophistication (Borgida, Federico, & Sullivan, 2009, p. 4; see Bendor & Bullock, 2008; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996), the fact that some are *not*, coupled with the fact that *most* people know *something* also helps to make the factor an important one for most research on the American electorate—especially research on the connectedness (or lack thereof) of attitude structures.

Typically, relationships between attitudes strengthen as political sophistication increases (Lavine et al., 1997). Importantly, however, ideological identification plays a crucial moderating role, with the relationship between ideological constraint—that is, the strength of adherence to an ideology and its respective issue stances—and sophistication generally shown to be positive for liberal identifiers and negative for conservative identifiers (Federico et al., 2012, p. 390).

So, arithmetically, while it should have no significant effect when predicting individual hypocrisy scores in all-subjects or conservative-identifier models, sophistication should increase hypocrisy for liberal identifiers and decrease logical anti-constraint for all subjects.

Worth keeping in mind, however, are the findings that (1) conservative stances’ correlation with religiosity appear to increase as political engagement increases (Malka et al., 2012), (2) increasing knowledge appears to increase conservatives’ tolerance of others (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Hall, 2014), and (3) sophistication has no effect on psychological authoritarianism’s relationship with social conservatism (Feldman & Johnston, 2014)—each of which is further demonstrative of the need for strong statistical control.

Hypothesis 3 represents the biggest shot in the dark, in many ways, because sophistication metrics are typically only used in attitude-congruence research to explore temporal consistency (see Converse, 1964), or attitude-pair logical consistencies (see Judd & Downing, 1990). Sophistication’s roles in attitudinal hypocrisies will vary dramatically in two expansive ways: (1) naturally, due to the arithmetic construction of the metrics, on top of how many metrics I will utilize, and the massive

logical distinctions therein; and (2) ideologically, due to the interactive relationships of sophistication and political orientations that have been demonstrated in previous research (e.g., Federico et al., 2012).

Really, then, a sub-hypothesis of Hypothesis 3 is that I will not be surprised when my hypotheses are completely rejected.

*Hypothesis 4 Other factors.* A number of demographics are worthy of inclusion regardless of their capacity to predict hypocrisy scores because their inclusion maximizes the obviously important statistical control as long as care is taken to avoid dilution (see Zigerell, 2015). Several demographic factors should actually influence hypocrisy scores, though (viz., racial identification, age, and income), in addition to other various predictors (viz., symbolic racism, egalitarianism, strength of ideological identity, and government philosophy).

*Hypothesis 4a Identifying as Black or Hispanic should negatively predict hypocrisy for all subjects, positively predict hypocrisy for conservative identifiers, and have no effect for liberal identifiers.* This is due to research demonstrating that both of those categories coincide strongly with increased substantive ideological moderation (Pew Research Center, 2014b), which itself decreases the number of strong issue stances and subsequently, arithmetically, hypocrisy scores—with, logically, no significant effect for liberal identifiers.

This is in spite of early work on ideological constraint demonstrating that the attitudes of Black students were “less tightly knit” (Regens & Bullock, 1979, p. 520). Nearly four decades later, this is likely no longer the case at an attitude-pair level (Pew Research Center, 2014b), and is likely no longer the case at an attitude-structure or attitude-cluster level, as the number of issues on which the population takes stances appears to grow (see Carmines & Wagner, 2006; Holbrook, Sterrett, Johnson, & Krysan, 2016).

I expect that minority racial and/or ethnic identification will increase hypocrisy scores for conservative identifiers primarily because of the inverse effect—that is, identifying as *not* Black or *not* Hispanic should *decrease* conservative identifiers’ hypocrisy. This is due to the number of linkages between whites’ espoused individualism and the “principled conservatism” entailed within that (Federico & Sidanius, 2002; Sidanius et al., 1996).

*Hypothesis 4b* Racial resentment scores should negatively predict hypocrisy scores in all-subjects and liberal-identifiers-only models, and have no effect for conservative identifiers. Conservative identifiers' RR scores should be so low in variance and otherwise measured by the racial identification variables (Burdein, 2007; Reyna, Henry, Korfmacher, & Tucker, 2006) that, for conservative identifiers, RR should have no effect on hypocrisy. For non-conservative identifiers, RR's strong positive relationship with individualistic tendencies—which themselves should be low for liberal identifiers—means that it should arithmetically decrease violations of government philosophy, regardless of the philosophy.

To illustrate that more fully, much like how symbolic racism/RR is a driver of conservatives' *non-hypocritical / individualist* attitudes (Federico & Sidanius, 2002; Sidanius et al., 1996), research has demonstrated, or at least surmised that traditionalist religiosity, its antecedents, and other somewhat-related dispositional traits (e.g., punitiveness) are among the drivers of conservatives' critically *hypocritical/anti-individualist* attitudes on abortion (Cook, 1998; Critcher et al., 2009; Wiecko & Gau, 2008). Again, this ties in with the EPDAM, as a fundamental hypocrisy will emerge out of the collision of government philosophy and issue stances, with the emergence characterized by a soup of traits and values that push one toward issue stances that contradict their identity-derived philosophy. Thus, if RR ever has a significant role for conservative identifiers, it should be that RR increases hypocrisy on aid to Blacks. (The ability to include related measures in Study 1.2 and Study 1.3—namely, disciplinarianism and right-wing authoritarianism—will help to disentangle this further.)

*Hypothesis 4c* Egalitarianism will positively predict hypocrisy for all subjects and liberal identifiers but will have no effect for conservative identifiers. Tying into H4b's mechanism is the predicted positive effect of egalitarianism—another “pre-dispositional” trait (Feldman & Johnston, 2014, pp. 342–343) that measures the extent of one's support for equality-of-opportunity as a national value (Feldman, 1988), and is consequently negatively tied to RR as a result (Feldman & Huddy, 2005). Egalitarianism should *be a positive predictor of hypocrisy for non-conservative identifiers*, as its collision with the widespread American “core” value of individualism reflects a deviation from rationalistic, individualistic, more libertarian and logically constrained stances, and an “inherent tension” out of which contradictions should emerge (see Feldman & Zaller, 1992, p. 272), and



have emerged—tangentially, at least, in the non-ideological near-majority of the national electorate (pp. 292–293). The collision and tension therein should not have an effect for conservative identifiers, however, given *their* low within-group variance in egalitarianism (Federico, Hunt, & Ergun, 2009). Although, importantly, the degree to which this will remain the case is a blind spot of these analyses, given the number of predictors involved.

*Hypothesis 4d Age will be a positive predictor of conservative identifiers' hypocrisy but will have no effect in other models.* This stems from what research demonstrates—at least for the time being—is an emergence of social libertarianism among young conservative identifiers (Zell & Bernstein, 2014). With younger conservative identifiers having more substantively libertarian views, age should decrease hypocrisy for conservative identifiers. Other effects stemming from age should be covered by other variables and, as such, it should not have an effect for non-conservative identifiers.

*Hypothesis 4e Identifying as an extreme ideologue will positively predict hypocrisy scores for all subjects, and both ideological identities.* This should be observed because of the natural—and, in some cases, ideologically asymmetric (Claassen, Tucker, & Smith, 2015; Devine, 2015; Lelkes & Sniderman, 2016)—effects of extremism/strength of ideological identification on relevant constructs like political sophistication and expertise (Federico, Fisher, & Deason, 2011), attitude strength (Poteat & Mereish, 2012), and, importantly, attitudes themselves (Krosnick, 1988; Malka & Lelkes, 2010). But, the effect should *remain* significant even after controlling for factors that can *measure* those constructs, because the strength of ideological identity is itself an important independent predictor of individual attitudes and sets of political attitudes (Cohen, 2003; Devine, 2015; Ellis & Stimson, 2012; Jacoby, 1991; Malka & Lelkes, 2010; Poteat & Mereish, 2012). Those who are motivated and/or knowledgeable enough to internalize their ideological identification to correspond to a substantive, operational ideology should do so in a way that aligns them more closely to a unidimensional, popularly conceptualized liberal–conservative, left–right axis, and strength of identification should be one way of measuring that incidence (Jennings, 1992; Lupton, Myers, & Thornton, 2015).<sup>1</sup>

*Hypothesis 4f Government philosophy will positively predict hypocrisy scores for all subjects and liberal identifiers but negatively for conservative identifiers.* Finally, one expected strong predictor that will be included in every model

of hypocrisy will be one's *government philosophy*—that is, their response to VCF9131—because it is immediately relevant and because it can serve as a control, easing the ability of hypocrisy models to demonstrate what, independent of government philosophy, drives one to *violate* that philosophy.

However, the effect of government philosophy on hypocrisy should invariably be different in valence depending on ideological identification: Given the coding scheme, conservative identifiers who increasingly claim to have libertarian instincts will have higher hypocrisy; liberal identifiers who claim positive-government instincts will have higher hypocrisy—an effect I also expect to be replicated when looking at all subjects, given the nature of the metric. This effect will be significant naturally, given that government philosophy is used to calculate what is being predicted, but it should *remain* significant regardless of additional controls—a critical point.

*Hypothesis 5 EPDAM tests.* With the data available, the central theoretical framework of this book can also be tested. To recap, I hypothesize that, in general, external factors should drive government philosophy, while dispositional factors should drive attitudes. Moreover, the relationship between external factors and hypocrisies should be stronger for liberals than it is for conservatives, while the relationship between dispositional factors and hypocrisies should be stronger for conservatives than it is for liberals.

Thus, Hypothesis 5 is primarily that a regression model predicting government philosophy should demonstrate stronger predictive impacts from the external variables, while a regression model predicting attitudes/issue stances should demonstrate stronger predictive impacts from the dispositional variables. Moreover, what follows from that is the secondary set of hypotheses: namely, that regression models predicting liberals' hypocrisies should derive more predictive power from external factors than regression models predicting conservatives' hypocrisies, while the predictive power of dispositional factors should be stronger for conservatives' hypocrisies than liberals' hypocrisies.

Methodologically, it should be noted that two of the three items that are most closely reflective of government philosophy overlap somewhat with other values. To illustrate, VCF9132 (*viz.*, “the free market can handle these problems without government being involved,” or “we need a strong government to handle today’s complex economic problems”) naturally evokes individualism, among other values (see Schwartz, Caprara, & Vecchione, 2010; Schwartz et al., 2014).

The solution to this issue is to run two regressions: one with just the most purely libertarianism–authoritarianism item (i.e., VCF9131) as the criterion, and one with the mean of the three government philosophy items as the criterion.

This brings up the second issue, however: VCF9131 has a mere three potential values—namely, “the less government, the better” (value = .000); “there are more things that government should be doing” (value = 1.000); and the ambivalent/indifferent response (value = .500)—which means that a linear regression would be severely limited.

However, remarkably, a total of  $n = 231$  of 7943 total subjects gave the ambivalent/indifferent response. For the sake of simplicity, this 2.91% of the total will be disregarded when testing Hypothesis 5, which leaves a binary response option for the government philosophy item. Naturally, then, a logistic regression model can and will be utilized for this criterion variable, along with a standard linear regression model for the mean government philosophy criterion; these two can then be compared to the individual attitude items’ standard linear regression models.

The external factors that can and will be included are as follows: identifying as Black, identifying as Hispanic, age, strength of ideological identity, identifying as female, being a southerner, income, being a union household, identifying as Catholic, the year of the survey, identifying as a liberal, and identifying as a conservative.

The dispositional factors that can and will be included are as follows: religiosity, Christian fundamentalism, mean knowledge score, highest level of education, racial resentment, egalitarianism, and moral traditionalism.

## 5.2 STUDY 1.1: RESULTS

The full sample of subjects for whom government philosophy was available consisted of  $N = 7943$  subjects. Demographically, the sample—which had a mean age of 46.7 ( $SD = 18.0$ )—identifies as 55.4% female, 16.0% Black, and 11.5% Hispanic. 34.9% of subjects were located in the geographic South, 25.4% identified themselves as at least college graduates, 39.5% were Christian fundamentalists (i.e., Biblical literalists), and 50.9% correctly identified the majority party in the US House at the time of the survey.

A total of 14 Method 1 hypocrisy scores were calculated for each participant, along with the Method 2 hypocrisy score for each participant (i.e., the mean of the hypocrisy scores), and the Method 3 *horizontal constraint*

score—hereafter, *logical anti-constraint*. Because the standard deviations for Method 1 were, in nine cases, calculated across a binary variable and a three-point variable (e.g., government philosophy and federal spending on Social Security), there was not a significant amount of variance within those nine Method 1 items (viz., the increase, decrease, or leave-alone federal spending items), which ultimately only had three possible hypocrisy scores: .00, .35, and .71. Thus, the best course of action for those nine hypocrisy scores is to calculate a quasi-Method 2 score for just those nine items; otherwise, very little can be concluded or even surmised from a three-point scale.

A somewhat similar issue arose from the abortion item, which had four potential responses and, thus, five potential hypocrisy scores: .00, .18, .35, .53, and .71. While it will not be combined into any other calculation, this is important to note, as the results are ultimately unexpected.

For illustrative purposes, the mean libertarian–authoritarian scores (i.e., responses to VCF9131) by year and by ideological identity are shown in Fig. 5.1, with error bars for the available data corresponding to  $\pm 1.0$  standard error of the mean. Also included in the figure are the corresponding means (and respective standard errors) for the 2012 ANES and the 2016 ANES.


**Hypothesis 1a.** The percentages of participants with perfectly non-hypocritical scores are shown for each item in Table 5.2 for all participants and for liberal and conservative identifiers.

While significant percentages of participants indicated perfectly non-hypocritical attitudes for the individual issue-stance calculations, the percentages became negligible when looking across hypocrisies. Interestingly, chi-squared tests revealed that for the Method 2 calculation for federal spending, one significant difference emerged across the ideological identities, with 2.92% ( $n = 42$  of 1437) of liberal identifiers indicating perfectly non-hypocritical scores—which is a significantly higher proportion than the 1.53% ( $n = 32$  of 2086) of conservative identifiers who scored .00,  $\chi^2 = 7.98$ ,  $p = .005$ .

Importantly, a total of  $n = 15$  of  $N = 7943$  had perfect logical constraint, as the Barton-Parsons calculation resulted in scores = .00.

These aspects of Hypothesis 1a, then, are mostly supported.

**Hypothesis 1b.** Next, linear regressions were run predicting each of the available hypocrisy scores with the variables of interest and the necessary controls. Models for each of the hypocrisy score methods are presented below, but it should be noted that the most important criterion



**Fig. 5.1** Mean libertarian–authoritarian scores by available study year

variables—that is, the most important models—for this book’s purposes are those with the most ostensible indexing: the mean of federal spending hypocrisy scores, the overall hypocrisy score, and the logical anti-constraint score. The ostensible indexing is key here, because it creates a wider range of potential scores. For the non-indexed hypocrisy calculations (viz., method 1 calculations for guaranteed jobs, aid to Blacks, abortion prohibitions, government services, and defense spending), the range of potential hypocrisy scores is substantially more limited. To illustrate, because the libertarian–authoritarian item has only three response options, when the standard deviation is calculated for it and the four-potential-responses

**Table 5.2** Percentage of participants with scores = .00 by item, 1990–2008 ANES

<i>Hypocrisy item</i>	<i>All participants (%)</i>	<i>Liberal identifiers (%)</i>	<i>Conservative identifiers (%)</i>
Guaranteed jobs and income	16.03	12.50	18.90
Aid to Blacks	14.64	12.70	17.30
Abortion prohibitions	21.51	19.90	23.50
Government services	13.55	13.20	14.70
Defense spending	7.13	6.80	5.90
Federal spending items	2.10	2.95	1.53
Mean hypocrisy	0.24	0.30	0.10
Logical constraint	0.20	0.21	0.05

abortion-prohibitions item, arithmetically, the total number of potential H(abortion prohibition) values is ultimately only five: .00, .18, .35, .53, and .71. With a criterion variable limited to only five potential responses, the predictive capacity of regression models is severely limited—especially in comparison to the hundreds of potential responses for the indexed criterion variables (viz., federal spending, method 2, and logical anti-constraint).

The standardized beta coefficients for each predictor are shown in Table 5.3, which includes each model run with the respective target hypocrisy scores as criterion variables. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 are the models when run only for those who identified as liberal and conservative, respectively.

Critically, because of the kitchen-sink approach I have taken, when significant effects are observed, that is all the more reason to treat them as serious and important. In other words, with so many predictors, the magnitude of statistical control is sheer and stark, which means significant effects—especially those for which the  $p$ -values are below .001—are as truly “significant” as linear regression models can achieve.

Hypothesis 1b is mostly supported, according to Fisher’s  $Z$ -tests. Liberal identifiers’ hypocrisy scores were significantly more effectively predicted than conservative identifiers’, except for the first two individual hypocrisy scores, for which conservative identifiers’ models had significantly higher  $R$ -squared values than liberal identifiers’.

**Table 5.3** Standardized beta coefficients predicting hypocrisy scores for all subjects by hypocrisy score type, 1990–2008 ANES

<i>Predictor</i>	<i>Guaranteed jobs</i>	<i>Aid to Blacks</i>	<i>Abortion prohibition</i>	<i>Government services</i>	<i>Defense spending</i>	<i>Federal spending</i>	<i>Overall</i>	<i>Logical anti-constraint</i>
Religiosity	.017	-.006	-.002	-.011	-.010	-.009	-.008	-.040**
Fundamentalism	-.019	-.020	-.049**	.021	.007	.000	-.013	-.068***
Knowledge	-.014	-.021	.049***	-.052***	.014	-.024*	-.020	-.002
Education	-.010	.010	.062***	-.050**	.076***	-.040***	-.026*	-.002
Black	-.049**	-.081***	-.036*	-.030	-.005	-.038***	-.061***	.013
Hispanic	-.004	-.045***	-.023	.011	-.005	-.024*	-.035**	-.029*
Racial resentment	.057***	.153***	-.020	.042*	-.022	.028**	.051***	.172***
Egalitarianism	.016	.021	.031*	.055***	.005	.023*	.036**	.064***
Age	-.002	-.008	-.043**	.005	-.020	.001	-.014	-.066***
Strength of identity	-.149***	-.122***	.146***	-.170***	.175***	-.146***	-.142***	.026
Libertarianism— authoritarianism	.208***	.362***	.305***	-.135***	.047**	-.732***	-.563***	-.192***
Female	-.021	-.033**	.016	-.011	.028	.001	.004	-.026*
Southerner	.002	.016	-.040**	.015	-.054***	-.003	-.007	.017
Low-income	-.006	-.001	-.062***	-.017	-.019	-.009	-.021	-.025*
High-income	-.006	.001	-.008	-.013	-.006	-.008	-.013	-.010
Union household	.017	.013	-.003	.008	-.003	.015	.022*	.046***
Catholic	.029*	.003	-.022	.030*	-.027	.009	.007	-.005
ANES 1992	.047*	.036*	.051**	.027	.011	-.100***	-.070***	-.138***
ANES 2000	.042**	-.001	.028	-.019	.001	-.067***	-.065***	-.017
ANES 2004	.014	.005	.027	.016	.012	-.074***	-.063***	-.095***
ANES 2008	-.016	.016	.064***	-.021	.009	-.086***	-.106***	-.124***

(continued)

Table 5.3 (continued)

<i>Predictor</i>	<i>Guaranteed jobs</i>	<i>Aid to Blacks</i>	<i>Abortion prohibition</i>	<i>Government services</i>	<i>Defense spending</i>	<i>Federal spending</i>	<i>Overall</i>	<i>Logical anti-constraint</i>
Moral traditionalism	-.011	.023	.068***	-.014	.003	-.011	.001	.031*
Liberal identity	.073**	.046*	-.043	.105***	-.065**	.115***	.112***	.032
Conservative identity	.071**	.054*	-.101***	.036	-.096***	.069***	.055**	-.027
<i>n</i>	5302	6272	5614	5305	5305	6606	6627	6627
<i>R</i> -squared	.066	.152	.118	.039	.029	.516	.325	.579
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	.061	.149	.114	.035	.025	.515	.323	.577

\* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$



**Table 5.4** Standardized beta coefficients predicting hypocrisy scores for liberal identifiers by hypocrisy score type, 1990–2008 ANES

<i>Predictor</i>	<i>Guaranteed jobs</i>	<i>Aid to Blacks</i>	<i>Abortion prohibition</i>	<i>Government services</i>	<i>Defense spending</i>	<i>Federal spending</i>	<i>Overall</i>	<i>Logical anti-constraint</i>
Religiosity	.004	-.019	-.048	-.006	.015	-.013	-.029	-.017
Fundamentalism	-.031	.006	-.100**	.020	-.052	.003	-.012	-.075*
Knowledge	.018	.005	.023	.009	-.010	.015	.023	-.040
Education	-.022	.000	.102***	-.061	.035	-.034	-.013	-.002
Black	-.003	-.078*	-.064*	-.019	-.087**	-.029	-.053*	.012
Hispanic	-.024	.051	.022	.030	-.010	.001	.009	.014
Racial resentment	.198***	.280***	-.030	.089*	-.150***	.043*	.066*	.123***
Egalitarianism	.064	-.002	.047	.001	-.029	-.033	-.035	-.039
Age	.024	-.034	.005	-.011	-.005	-.009	-.022	-.087**
Strength of identity	-.054	-.040	.007	-.037	.094**	-.017	-.024	.110***
Libertarianism—authoritarianism	-.036	.078**	.617***	-.340***	.342***	-.783***	-.633***	-.273***
Female	.011	-.029	.029	.001	.026	-.018	-.010	-.014
Southerner	.004	.001	.021	.027	.000	-.001	.015	-.005
Low-income	-.032	.001	-.039	-.002	-.042	-.008	-.013	-.014
High-income	.033	.036	.030	-.015	-.028	.010	.014	.026
Union household	-.008	.015	.047*	-.013	-.011	-.006	.014	.056*
Catholic	-.006	-.028	-.039	.003	-.001	-.012	-.031	-.055*
ANES 1992	.034	.058	.007	.044	.002	-.120***	-.085**	-.229***
ANES 2000	.022	-.019	.005	-.047	-.039	-.090***	-.110***	-.121***
ANES 2004	.022	-.010	-.017	.027	-.053	-.078***	-.077**	-.239***

(continued)

Table 5.4 (continued)

<i>Predictor</i>	<i>Guaranteed jobs</i>	<i>Aid to Blacks</i>	<i>Abortion prohibition</i>	<i>Government services</i>	<i>Defense spending</i>	<i>Federal spending</i>	<i>Overall</i>	<i>Logical anti-constraint</i>
ANES 2008	-.022	.043	.037	.070	-.087*	-.100***	-.144***	-.342***
Moral traditionalism	-.044	.030	-.003	.005	-.017	.023	.025	.036
<i>n</i>	1036	1248	1111	1036	1037	1333	1338	1338
<i>R</i> -squared	.040	.115	.453	.157	.193	.660	.463	.177
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	.019	.099	.442	.138	.175	.655	.454	.163

\*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .001$

**Table 5.5** Standardized beta coefficients predicting hypocrisy scores for conservative identifiers by hypocrisy score type, 1990–2008 ANES

<i>Predictor</i>	<i>Guaranteed jobs</i>	<i>Aid to Blacks</i>	<i>Abortion prohibition</i>	<i>Government services</i>	<i>Defense spending</i>	<i>Federal spending</i>	<i>Overall</i>	<i>Logical anti-constraint</i>
Religiosity	.046	-.017	.137***	.002	-.022	.027	.056*	-.025
Fundamentalism	-.007	.014	.053	.014	.052	.009	.023	.006
Knowledge	-.042	-.023	.030	-.115***	-.005	-.040*	-.043	-.018
Education	.012	.024	-.012	-.017	.029	-.050*	-.044	-.024
Black	-.100***	-.074**	.018	-.048	.051	-.064**	-.075**	.020
Hispanic	.018	-.045*	-.052*	-.034	.001	-.046*	-.068**	-.023
Racial resentment	.031	-.012	-.033	-.012	.050	.012	.008	.155***
Egalitarianism	.059*	.045	-.007	.103***	.012	.107***	.117***	.085***
Age	-.034	.028	-.074**	.068*	-.009	.025	.013	-.079***
Strength of identity	-.101***	-.052*	.041	-.121***	.058*	-.119***	-.124***	-.031
Libertarianism— authoritarianism	.446***	.530***	.081**	.094***	-.128***	-.655***	-.459***	-.113***
Female	-.029	-.043*	-.041	.006	-.019	.009	.005	-.017
Southerner	-.029	.013	-.074**	.019	-.047	.009	-.004	.028
Low-income	.025	-.017	-.044	-.041	-.059*	-.015	-.033	-.026
High-income	-.024	-.004	-.039	-.002	.011	-.015	-.023	-.046*
Union household	-.017	-.006	-.012	.032	.011	.022	.022	.078***
Catholic	-.002	.015	-.007	.006	-.012	-.001	.005	-.005
ANES 1992	.001	-.032	.064	-.001	-.051	-.031	-.029	-.048
ANES 2000	.007	-.048*	.043	-.034	.084**	-.049*	-.029	.050
ANES 2004	-.006	-.027	.080*	.012	.104**	-.043	-.019	.002

(continued)

Table 5.5 (continued)

<i>Predictor</i>	<i>Guaranteed jobs</i>	<i>Aid to Blacks</i>	<i>Abortion prohibition</i>	<i>Government services</i>	<i>Defense spending</i>	<i>Federal spending</i>	<i>Overall</i>	<i>Logical anti-constraint</i>
ANES 2008	-.037	-.054	.088**	-.043	.063	-.051	-.041	.028
Moral traditionalism	-.005	.023	.114***	-.015	.049	-.045*	-.022	.000
<i>n</i>	1570	1842	1676	1569	1568	1948	1954	1954
<i>R</i> -squared	.241	.273	.077	.072	.073	.403	.220	.055
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	.230	.264	.065	.059	.060	.397	.211	.044

\* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \*\*\* $p < .001$

**Hypothesis 2 Results.** For all subjects, religiosity and Biblical literalism had null effects, except in a few key cases. First, and in a rejection of H2, religiosity was a negative predictor of logical anti-constraint ( $\beta = -.040$ ,  $t$ -test =  $-2.683$ ,  $p = .007$ ), as was Biblical literalism to a stronger relative degree ( $\beta = -.068$ ,  $t$ -test =  $-4.602$ ,  $p < .001$ ). Additionally, literalism also negatively predicted hypocrisy on abortion prohibition for all subjects ( $\beta = -.049$ ,  $t$ -test =  $-3.050$ ,  $p = .002$ ). But, again, in every other model, the effects were not significant.

The same almost-complete null-ness was measured for liberal identifiers, except for when literalism was again a negative predictor of abortion prohibition hypocrisy ( $\beta = -.100$ ,  $t$ -test =  $-3.285$ ,  $p = .001$ ), and logical anti-constraint ( $\beta = -.075$ ,  $t$ -test =  $-2.194$ ,  $p = .028$ ).

For conservative identifiers, only 2 of 16 potential predictive effects were significant; however, one of the effects was provocatively strong: In support of H2, religiosity was a very strong and positive predictor of conservative identifiers' hypocrisy on abortion prohibition ( $\beta = .137$ ,  $t$ -test =  $4.445$ ,  $p < .001$ ), and a small, positive predictor of Method 2 mean hypocrisy ( $\beta = .056$ ,  $t$ -test =  $2.169$ ,  $p = .030$ ). Given the number of predictors, that small degree of significance is still likely to be strong enough to dismiss the possibility of a false positive, but it should not be ignored.

Hypothesis 2, then, is mostly rejected with a few interesting caveats, and supported for conservatives on abortion prohibitions.

**Hypothesis 3 Results.** First, for all subjects, mean knowledge scores positively predicted hypocrisy on abortion prohibition ( $\beta = .049$ ,  $t$ -test =  $3.396$ ,  $p < .001$ ), as did education level ( $\beta = .062$ ,  $t$ -test =  $4.083$ ,  $p < .001$ ). Meanwhile, mean knowledge negatively predicted hypocrisy on government services/spending ( $\beta = -.052$ ,  $t$ -test =  $-3.411$ ,  $p < .001$ ), as did education level ( $\beta = -.050$ ,  $t$ -test =  $-3.064$ ,  $p = .002$ ). Education level also positively predicted defense spending hypocrisy ( $\beta = .076$ ,  $t$ -test =  $4.627$ ,  $p < .001$ ). But, mean knowledge and education level both negatively predicted overall federal spending hypocrisy ( $\beta_{\text{knowledge}} = -.024$ ,  $t$ -test =  $-2.517$ ,  $p = .012$ ;  $\beta_{\text{education}} = -.040$ ,  $t$ -test =  $-3.912$ ,  $p < .001$ ). Finally, education level was a small and negative predictor of overall hypocrisy ( $\beta = -.026$ ,  $t$ -test =  $-2.168$ ,  $p = .030$ ).

For liberal identifiers, education level positively predicted hypocrisy on abortion prohibition ( $\beta = .102$ ,  $t$ -test =  $3.745$ ,  $p < .001$ ), but had no significant effects otherwise.

For conservative identifiers, mean knowledge score was a strong negative predictor of hypocrisy on government spending/services ( $\beta = -.115$ ,

$t$ -test =  $-4.222$ ,  $p < .001$ ), while both measures of “sophistication” were small, but significant negative predictors of federal spending hypocrisy ( $\beta_{\text{knowledge}} = -.040$ ,  $t$ -test =  $-2.077$ ,  $p = .038$ ;  $\beta_{\text{education}} = -.050$ ,  $t$ -test =  $-2.435$ ,  $p = .015$ ). Intriguingly, this suggests that, *ceteris paribus*, conservative identifiers decrease in their attitudinal hypocrisy on government services/spending and on overall federal spending as sophistication increases.

Still, Hypothesis 3 is mostly rejected, with a few exceptions. Moreover, the significant effects of education level in the all-subjects models should not go unnoticed.

**Hypothesis 4 Results.** Each sub-hypothesis was tested against its null hypothesis, with the significant results of each ostensible null hypothesis significance test outlined below. More specific predictor information can be found in Table 5.3 for all subjects, Table 5.4 for liberal identifiers, and Table 5.5 for conservative identifiers, with  $t$ -test information from here on out included in supplemental online materials.

*Hypothesis 4a Black and hispanic identification.* For all subjects, identifying as Black negatively predicted hypocrisy on guaranteed jobs, aid to Blacks, abortion prohibitions, and federal spending, as well as overall hypocrisy. For liberal identifiers, identifying as Black negatively predicted hypocrisy on aid to Blacks, abortion prohibitions, defense spending, as well as overall hypocrisy. For conservative identifiers, identifying as Black negatively predicted hypocrisy on guaranteed jobs, aid to Blacks, and federal spending, as well as overall hypocrisy.

Meanwhile, for all subjects, identifying as Hispanic negatively predicted hypocrisy on aid to Blacks and federal spending, as well as overall hypocrisy and logical anti-constraint. For liberal identifiers, identifying as Hispanic had no significant predictive effects. For conservative identifiers, identifying as Hispanic negatively predicted hypocrisy on aid to Blacks, abortion prohibitions, and federal spending, as well as overall hypocrisy.

Hypothesis 4a is mostly supported for all subjects, somewhat supported for liberal identifiers, and entirely rejected for conservative identifiers.

*Hypothesis 4b Racial resentment.* For all subjects, racial resentment scores *positively* predicted hypocrisy on guaranteed jobs, aid to Blacks, government services, and federal spending, as well as overall hypocrisy, and logical anti-constraint. For liberal identifiers, racial resentment scores *negatively* predicted hypocrisy on defense spending, and *positively* predicted hypocrisy

on guaranteed jobs, aid to Blacks, and federal spending, as well as overall hypocrisy and logical anti-constraint. For conservative identifiers, racial resentment scores only positively predicted logical anti-constraint.

Hypothesis 4b is rejected in all but a few cases.

*Hypothesis 4c Egalitarianism.* For all subjects, egalitarianism scores positively predicted hypocrisy on abortion prohibitions, government services, and federal spending, as well as overall hypocrisy, and logical anti-constraint. For liberal identifiers, egalitarianism scores had no significant predictive effects. For conservative identifiers, egalitarianism scores positively predicted hypocrisy on guaranteed jobs, government services, and federal spending, as well as overall hypocrisy and logical anti-constraint.

Hypothesis 4c is mostly supported for all subjects but rejected for the ideological identifier models.

*Hypothesis 4d Age.* For all subjects, age positively predicted hypocrisy on abortion prohibitions, as well as logical anti-constraint. For liberal identifiers, age negatively predicted logical anti-constraint. For conservative identifiers, age negatively predicted hypocrisy on abortion prohibitions and logical anti-constraint, while it positively predicted hypocrisy on government services.

Hypothesis 4d is rejected in all but one case.

*Hypothesis 4e Strong ideological identification.* For all subjects, strength of ideological identity negatively predicted hypocrisy on guaranteed jobs, aid to Blacks, government services, and federal spending, as well as overall hypocrisy; while it also positively predicted hypocrisy on abortion prohibitions and defense spending. For liberal identifiers, strength of ideological identity positively predicted hypocrisy on defense spending, and logical anti-constraint. For conservative identifiers, strength of ideological identity negatively predicted hypocrisy on guaranteed jobs, aid to Blacks, government services, and federal spending, as well as overall hypocrisy; it also positively predicted hypocrisy on defense spending.

Hypothesis 4e is supported in parts and rejected in others.

*Hypothesis 4f Mean government philosophy.* For all subjects, mean government philosophy (i.e., higher authoritarianism) negatively predicted hypocrisy on government services, federal spending, as well as overall hypocrisy and logical anti-constraint; while it also positively predicted hypocrisy on guaranteed jobs, aid to Blacks, abortion prohibitions, and defense spending. For liberal identifiers, mean government philosophy negatively predicted hypocrisy on government services and federal spending, as well as overall hypocrisy and logical anti-constraint; while it positively predicted hypocrisy on aid to Blacks, abortion prohibitions, and defense spending. For conservative identifiers, mean government philosophy negatively predicted hypocrisy scores on defense spending and federal spending, as well as overall hypocrisy and logical anti-constraint; it also positively predicted hypocrisy on guaranteed jobs, aid to Blacks, abortion prohibitions, and government services.

Hypothesis 4f is supported in parts and rejected in others.

*Hypothesis 5 EPDAM tests' results.* Logistic regression models predicting VCF9131 with external factors and dispositional factors for (1) all subjects, (2) liberal identifiers only, and (3) conservative identifiers only are shown in Table 5.6. Standardized beta coefficients for linear regressions

**Table 5.6** Logistic regression coefficients predicting binary government philosophy, 1990–2008 ANES

<i>Predictor</i>	<i>All subjects</i>		<i>Liberal identifiers</i>		<i>Conservative identifiers</i>	
	<i>b (SE)</i>	<i>Wald</i>	<i>b (SE)</i>	<i>Wald</i>	<i>b (SE)</i>	<i>Wald</i>
Black	1.027*** (.111)	85.993	.585* (.248)	5.576	1.400*** (.240)	34.030
Hispanic	.517*** (.108)	22.996	.238 (.231)	1.057	.871*** (.203)	18.337
Age	-.849*** (.187)	20.673	.851 (.443)	3.691	-1.079** (.353)	9.363
Strength of identity	-.340 (.191)	3.162	.420 (.320)	1.721	-.887** (.275)	10.436
Female	.411*** (.062)	44.494	.174 (.138)	1.601	.623*** (.114)	29.722

(continued)



**Table 5.6** (continued)

<i>Predictor</i>	<i>All subjects</i>		<i>Liberal identifiers</i>		<i>Conservative identifiers</i>	
	<i>b (SE)</i>	<i>Wald</i>	<i>b (SE)</i>	<i>Wald</i>	<i>b (SE)</i>	<i>Wald</i>
Southerner	.018 (.068)	.071	.026 (.157)	.028	.036 (.124)	.085
Low-income	.146 (.093)	2.455	-.135 (.207)	.429	.559** (.195)	8.224
High-income	-.294* (.136)	4.678	-.030 (.277)	.012	-.448 (.238)	3.525
Union household	.152 (.085)	3.227	-.022 (.184)	.015	.272 (.156)	3.060
Catholic	.333*** (.074)	20.222	.274 (.170)	2.608	.338* (.134)	6.347
ANES 1992	-.136 (.100)	1.854	.078 (.237)	.108	-.252 (.182)	1.905
ANES 2000	-.315** (.122)	6.704	.013 (.279)	.002	-.433 (.224)	3.726
ANES 2004	-.520*** (.111)	21.755	-.471 (.256)	3.389	-.673** (.205)	10.729
ANES 2008	-.376*** (.104)	13.146	-.292 (.238)	1.506	-.610** (.196)	9.704
Liberal identity	.332* (.137)	5.884				
Conservative identity	-.657*** (.125)	27.557				
Religiosity	.060 (.110)	.301	.044 (.230)	.037	.248 (.219)	1.286
Fundamentalism	.347** (.110)	9.917	.150 (.256)	.342	.329 (.214)	2.349
Knowledge	-.495*** (.070)	49.986	-.220 (.164)	1.796	-.623*** (.128)	23.737
Education	-.841*** (.117)	51.975	-.443 (.267)	2.755	-1.211*** (.207)	34.099
Racial resentment	-.008 (.155)	.003	-.286 (.336)	.722	.265 (.292)	.821
Egalitarianism	1.941*** (.190)	104.332	2.123*** (.437)	23.565	1.777*** (.341)	27.100
Moral traditionalism	-1.244*** (.170)	53.391	-.301 (.374)	.647	-1.755*** (.318)	30.531
Constant	.998*** (.246)	16.528	-.491 (.571)	.741	1.119* (.467)	5.730
Chi-squared (df)	1587.307*** (23)		86.360*** (21)		544.207*** (21)	
Pseudo <i>R</i> -squared	.300		.095		.336	

\* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$ ; Nagelkerke pseudo *R*-squared

**Table 5.7** Standardized beta coefficients predicting mean government philosophy by ideological identification, 1990–2008 ANES

<i>Predictor</i>	<i>All subjects</i>	<i>Liberal identifiers</i>	<i>Conservative identifiers</i>
Black	.103***	.037	.146***
Hispanic	.060***	.057	.093***
Age	-.048***	.054	-.046*
Strength of identity	-.092***	.026	-.106***
Female	.102***	.064*	.133***
Southerner	-.007	-.006	.006
Low-income	.014	.013	.048*
High-income	-.030**	-.010	-.026
Union household	.026*	-.023	.051**
Catholic	.048***	.024	.047*
ANES 1992	-.034*	.017	-.065*
ANES 2000	-.051***	-.001	-.075**
ANES 2004	-.058***	-.046	-.102***
ANES 2008	-.061***	-.003	-.134***
Liberal identity	.080***		
Conservative identity	-.120***		
Religiosity	-.001	-.011	.035
Fundamentalism	.072***	.047	.063**
Knowledge	-.089***	.007	-.118***
Education	-.093***	-.048	-.129***
Racial resentment	-.033*	-.055	-.014
Egalitarianism	.188***	.209***	.174***
Moral traditionalism	-.121***	-.039	-.143***
<i>n</i>	6602	1329	1946
<i>R</i> -squared	.276	.083	.301
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	.273	.069	.293

\* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$ 

predicting mean government philosophy are shown in Table 5.7. Finally, standardized beta coefficients for linear regressions predicting mean issue stances are shown for all subjects in Table 5.8, liberal identifiers in Table 5.9, and conservative identifiers in Table 5.10.

With simple, though somewhat *over*-simplifying arithmetic, the extents of predictive weight from the two types of predictors can be roughly quantified and compared. The predictive capacities coming from the external predictors as a percentage of the total predictive capacity for each model—the government philosophy items, the issue stance items, and each hypocrisy item—are shown in Table 5.11. Glancing across the predictors’

**Table 5.8** Standardized beta coefficients predicting issue stances for all subjects, 1990–2008 ANES

<i>Predictor</i>	<i>Guaranteed jobs</i>	<i>Aid to Blacks</i>	<i>Abortion prohibition</i>	<i>Government services</i>	<i>Defense spending</i>	<i>Federal spending</i>
Black	.101***	.110***	-.037**	.079***	-.021	.082***
Hispanic	.048***	.088***	.016	.015	.004	.068***
Age	-.045***	-.008	-.023	-.024	.011	-.058***
Strength of identity	.026	.011	.053*	.007	.013	-.046*
Female	.064***	.037***	-.084***	.081***	-.066***	.039***
Southern	-.016	-.044***	.039**	-.021	.081***	.018
Low-income	.061***	.053***	.083***	.038**	-.014	.050***
High-income	-.049***	-.010	-.020	-.027*	.026*	-.031**
Union household	.022	-.001	-.023*	.021	.025	.031**
Catholic	.015	.008	.050***	.023	.004	.021
ANES 1992	-.029	-.032*	-.023	-.078***	-.024	.260***
ANES 2000	-.053***	-.025*	.004	.020	.159***	.143***
ANES 2004	-.005	-.011	.065***	.044**	.252***	.196***
ANES 2008	.014	-.023	.031*	.026	.139***	.278***
Liberal identity	.037	.035	-.082***	.063**	-.094***	.060**
Conservative identity	-.148***	-.051*	.033	-.136***	.040	-.077***
Religiosity	.008	.010	.217***	.010	.002	.031*
Fundamentalism	.081***	.051***	.174***	.017	.061***	.048***
Knowledge	-.025	-.003	-.060***	-.055***	-.003	-.050***
Education	-.042**	-.003	-.135***	-.079***	-.097***	-.062***
Racial resentment	-.072***	-.383***	-.061***	-.034*	.114***	-.062***
Egalitarianism	.177***	.088***	-.058***	.180***	-.049***	.242***
Moral traditionalism	-.081***	-.050***	.160***	-.087***	.081***	-.121***
<i>n</i>	5302	6272	5614	5305	5305	6626
<i>R</i> -squared	.205	.291	.283	.192	.191	.284
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	.202	.289	.280	.188	.188	.281

\**p* < .05; \*\**p* < .01; \*\*\**p* < .001

Table 5.9 Standardized beta coefficients predicting issue stances for liberal identifiers, 1990–2008 ANES

Predictor	Guaranteed jobs	Aid to Blacks	Abortion prohibition	Government services	Defense spending	Federal spending
Black	.024	.125***	.060*	.020	.064*	.034
Hispanic	.066*	.025	.004	-.025	.038	.062*
Age	-.057	-.017	.015	.015	.040	-.010
Strength of identity	.147***	.084***	-.043	.167***	-.095**	.112***
Female	-.014	.019	-.109***	.055	-.065*	.027
Southerner	.000	-.001	.028	-.047	.047	.005
Low-income	.068*	.038	.061*	.043	-.017	.036
High-income	-.056	-.036	-.037	-.005	.039	-.049
Union household	.020	-.007	-.082**	.018	.023	.011
Catholic	.004	.014	.095***	-.011	-.022	-.011
ANES 1992	-.066	-.029	-.049	-.141**	-.002	.239***
ANES 2000	-.070*	-.008	.017	.028	.137***	.211***
ANES 2004	.025	.017	.050	.041	.245***	.185***
ANES 2008	.013	.000	-.031	-.004	.095*	.309***
Religiosity	-.024	.004	.145***	-.021	-.022	.024
Fundamentalism	.102**	.021	.154***	.015	.044	.063
Knowledge	.068*	.028	-.098***	-.059	-.058	-.040
Education	-.053	-.044	-.118***	-.017	-.127***	-.021
Racial resentment	-.159***	-.466***	.001	-.089*	.220***	-.105**
Egalitarianism	.173***	.104***	-.064	.114**	-.047	.213***
Moral traditionalism	.023	-.032	.115***	-.051	.065	-.098***
<i>n</i>	1036	1248	1111	1036	1037	1338
<i>R</i> -squared	.170	.352	.258	.127	.245	.204
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	.153	.341	.243	.109	.230	.191

\*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .001$

**Table 5.10** Standardized beta coefficients predicting issue stances for conservative identifiers, 1990–2008 ANES

<i>Predictor</i>	<i>Guaranteed jobs</i>	<i>Aid to Blacks</i>	<i>Abortion prohibition</i>	<i>Government services</i>	<i>Defense spending</i>	<i>Federal spending</i>
Black	.191***	.087***	-.076***	.125***	-.090***	.119***
Hispanic	.045	.065**	-.006	.068**	-.009	.081***
Age	-.004	.025	-.031	-.021	-.002	-.025
Strength of identity	-.060*	-.065**	.063**	-.090***	.097***	-.096***
Female	.091***	.029	-.057**	.101***	-.047*	.058**
Southerner	.002	-.057**	-.012	.005	.061*	.035
Low-income	.039	.069**	.067**	.071**	.017	.073***
High-income	-.052*	.003	-.015	-.007	.015	-.029
Union household	.049*	-.003	-.034	.008	.025	.056**
Catholic	.043	.009	.063**	.021	.040	.023
ANES 1992	.002	-.020	-.023	-.051	-.038	.182***
ANES 2000	-.036	-.031	-.011	.016	.203***	.084***
ANES 2004	-.046	-.013	.050	.039	.321***	.101***
ANES 2008	-.013	-.050	.095***	-.019	.226***	.165***
Religiosity	.035	.002	.254***	.050	.019	.029
Fundamentalism	.070*	.076**	.189***	.060*	.073*	.093***
Knowledge	-.072**	.000	-.043*	-.086***	.063*	-.080***
Education	-.012	.019	-.082***	-.149***	-.092***	-.102***
Racial resentment	-.081**	-.351***	-.039	-.021	.075**	-.018
Egalitarianism	.154***	.089***	.000	.195***	-.045	.267***
Moral traditionalism	-.103***	-.051*	.256***	-.115***	.056*	-.155***
<i>n</i>	1570	1842	1676	1569	1568	1954
<i>R</i> -squared	.212	.239	.334	.247	.229	.323
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	.202	.230	.326	.237	.218	.316

\*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .001$

**Table 5.11** Percentage of predictive power from external factors by model, 1990–2008 ANES

<i>Philosophy and issue stances</i>	<i>All subjects</i>	<i>Liberal identifiers</i>	<i>Conservative identifiers</i>
Less/more government	51.98%	47.07%	53.65%
Mean government philosophy	61.01%	47.80%	61.46%
Guaranteed jobs	60.13%	51.14%	56.08%
Aid to Blacks	48.19%	37.53%	47.22%
Abortion prohibition	43.50%	49.49%	41.13%
Government services	60.34%	62.88%	48.71%
Defense spending	70.51%	61.44%	73.79%
Federal spending	70.30%	69.76%	60.19%
<i>Hypocrisy items</i>	<i>All subjects</i>	<i>Liberal identifiers</i>	<i>Conservative identifiers</i>
Guaranteed jobs	69.12%	44.71%	58.91%
Aid to Blacks	55.97%	55.01%	63.76%
Abortion prohibition	75.03%	50.34%	63.00%
Government services	75.61%	63.69%	58.77%
Defense spending	79.52%	62.99%	71.77%
Federal spending	76.13%	63.57%	79.90%
Overall hypocrisy	76.74%	63.83%	77.36%
Logical anti-constraint	61.51%	76.44%	64.03%

Note: Percentage compared to dispositional factors, calculated as sum of absolute values of predictors by category as a percentage of the sum of all predictors' absolute values

coefficient sizes, and comparing across predictor type (viz., external or dispositional), several unrefined conclusions can be drawn.

First, cursory estimates suggest that government philosophy is generally better predicted by external factors—especially for the mean government philosophy models—but not for liberal identifiers. In other words, more of the predictive power of the regression models predicting government philosophy comes from external predictors for conservative identifiers and dispositional predictors for liberal identifiers.

Put more simply, looking at the government philosophy models, for the full model and the model including only conservative identifiers, substantially more of the predictive capacity models comes from external predictors when compared to the liberal identifiers model. For liberal identifiers, it appears that more of their government philosophy is predicted by dispositional factors—especially egalitarianism.

For the issue stance models, external factors appear to have more of a predictive effect for liberal identifiers when it comes to abortion

prohibition, government services, and federal spending. External factors appear to be stronger for conservative identifiers when it comes to guaranteed jobs, aid to Blacks, and defense spending. Abortion prohibition stances being so strongly predicted by the small number of dispositional factors for conservative identifiers is likely the most critical takeaway from this fairly rudimentary analytical framework.

Importantly, each of these distinctions is also observed when taking the total predictive capacity of the models into account—that is, when multiplying the percentage of either type of predictor by the total amount of variance explained by the model.


When comparing the relative amounts of external-versus-dispositional factors predicting the eight salient hypocrisy metrics calculated in Study 1.1, the most striking distinctions—and, really, the only analytically semi-legitimate ones—come from comparing liberal and conservative identifiers. Once again, due to the larger number of conservative identifiers and the significant differences in the amount of the variance explained by each model, the percentages of the models' predictive powers that come from external factors should not be taken at face value. Instead, the percentages should be weighted by multiplying them by the adjusted R-squared value of each model (see supplemental online information), which leads to a more analytically sound set of comparisons. Figure 5.2 illustrates the weighted comparative impact of external and dispositional factors by ideological identification.

Comparing across ideological identifiers, several stark differences are notable in the proportionate amount of power coming from external factors when predicting hypocrisy scores. In most instances, conservative identifiers' hypocrisies are more strongly driven by external factors than liberal identifiers' hypocrisies—except for the issue of government services and spending, and the criterion of logical-anti-constraint. And, critically, dispositional factors are almost always stronger drivers of liberal identifiers' hypocrisy scores—except, obviously, for government services and spending, and logical anti-constraint.

Thus, these central extrapolations and expectations of the EPDAM are largely rejected, with some important caveats.

### 5.3 STUDY 1.1: DISCUSSION

**Hypothesis 1.** Virtually everyone was a hypocrite, overall. This was supported when looking at the overall/mean hypocrisy item (Method 2) and the Barton and Parsons (1977) logical anti-constraint item. Moreover, no



**Fig. 5.2** Weighted proportions of external and dispositional factors' predictive powers by hypocrisy model and ideological identification, Study 1.1

distinctions were notable by year, with chi-squared tests demonstrating no significant differences of proportions of .00-scoring from study to study—even when comparing ideological identifiers. In fact, the percentage of non-hypocrites in each year never exceeds 1% of all subjects, nor 1% of either ideological identity.

Moreover, liberal identifiers' hypocrisy scores were significantly more predictable in most cases (Fisher's  $Z$  values  $> 2.58$  for  $p < .01$ ), except when conservative identifiers' hypocrisy scores were significantly more predictable on guaranteed jobs and aid to Blacks (Fisher's  $Z$  values  $> 2.58$  for  $p < .01$ ).

**Hypothesis 2.** While many of the hypothesized effects were rejected here, the hypothesized roles of religiosity and Biblical literalism were mostly supported when it came to ideological identifiers' hypocrisy on abortion prohibitions. Again, abortion's salience as *the* above-all-else issue of importance for a notable percentage of the US population (see Yen & Zampelli, 2017) should strengthen the likelihood of an automatic,



dispositional response to items that attempt to grasp where someone stands on the issue. Importantly, this is what was observed in rough approximations of external predictors' relative predictive powers for issue stances (see Table 5.11), in which the lowest percentage of predictive power coming from external predictors was on the issue of abortion prohibitions for conservative identifiers.

That this external–dispositional distinction did not carry over to hypocrisy scores on abortion prohibitions is the confusing part worthy of future examination.

**Hypothesis 3.** Where null effects were hypothesized for all subjects, null effects were mostly rejected, with education level having a fairly regular effect across the hypocrisy items—except for the three hypocrisy-score items for which *only* null effects of the sophistication measures were observed (viz., guaranteed jobs, aid to Blacks, and logical anti-constraint).

Why were those scores null, compared to the other five hypocrisy scores? Logical attitudinal *constraint* has previously been shown to increase with sophistication (Federico et al., 2012; Lavine et al., 1997), so it would logically follow that logical *anti*-constraint should decrease with sophistication—but that is not what happened. Instead, these results at least suggest that the findings of previous research were incomplete—constraint here was predicted by other factors. The measures of sophistication were, perhaps, washed out by the sheer number of other predictors; however, for neither sophistication variable to even register marginal significance—with other variables picking up the predictive slack (viz., racial resentment, libertarianism–authoritarianism, survey year, and demographics)—appears to be a strike against the previous research. Moreover, education's significant (i.e., not null, as was hypothesized) effects for five of the other hypocrisy items for all subjects were also strikes against previous research. Ultimately, then, these all suggest that previous explorations of attitude structures' relationships with sophistication are far more complicated than otherwise indicated.

**Hypothesis 4.** While mostly a mishmash of leftover predictive relationships that have some indirect academic support, results indicated varying degrees of support for those relationships.

**Racial Identification.** First, the total lack of support for racial identification variables' expected effects for conservative identifiers was interesting. The comparative dearth of racial and ethnic minorities in the sample who identified as conservative may help to explain some of this, but *some* effect should have been observed.

*Racial Resentment.* Second, the all-subjects models demonstrated that racial resentment positively predicted many different types of hypocrisy, *and* logical anti-constraint, contrary to any expectations. In fact, the only hypocrisies *not* driven significantly by racial resentment scores were abortion prohibition and defense spending. One takeaway for that pattern of results, then, is that something deep and impenetrable is being tapped by the racial resentment metric—but in the opposite direction expected.

Racial resentment measures the linkage between implicit racism and individualism (Sidanius et al., 1996), and it increases hypocrisy scores for most of the issues tested here, but only when looking at all subjects—that is, not conservative identifiers (except for logical anti-constraint). One explanation for these effects is that the all-subjects models include the 70.6% of the full sample that does not identify as conservative, many of whom harbor racially resentful attitudes outside of the “principled conservatism” perspective (see Sidanius et al., 1996)—or simply do not categorize themselves as conservatives.

Meanwhile, liberal identifiers’ hypocrisy on aid to Blacks also being positively driven by racial resentment makes sense, and not hypothesizing this effect was an oversight on my part. With most liberal identifiers indicating the more authoritarian position on the government-size item ( $n = 1044$  of 1431), hypocrisy with regard to government aid to Blacks should intuitively increase with racial resentment given the arithmetic involved: Indeed, when looking at the  $n = 1394$  liberal identifiers who did not respond “both” to the government-size item, mean racial resentment scores were significantly higher for the  $n = 350$  who responded with the more libertarian position,  $F(1,1393) = 20.198$ ,  $p < .001$ . For comparison’s sake, the  $n = 826$  conservative identifiers who indicated the more authoritarian position on the government-size item had significantly lower mean racial resentment compared to the  $n = 1201$  on the other side of the item,  $F(1,2026) = 28.887$ ,  $p < .001$ .

*Egalitarianism.* The big surprise here is that the null hypotheses for conservative identifiers were rejected—for five of the eight models, as egalitarianism increased, so did hypocrisy. Intriguingly, this was only observed in the issue items most specifically related to spending, and no such effects were observed for liberal identifiers.

*Libertarianism–Authoritarianism.* This item remaining significant in spite of the somewhat extreme number of other predictors exemplifies hypocrisy’s importance as a topic of study. Beyond that, the metric should have a positive association with the criterion variable it is predicting as

a natural effect of the arithmetic used to calculate the predictor itself—which means that, when its effect is negative, something interesting is happening: Participants are claiming the philosophy that contradicts the stance they are taking.

Specifically and critically, participants made this logical mistake for government services/spending, mean federal spending, issue stances overall, and logically associated issue stances (i.e., logical anti-constraint): Agreeing with “the less government, the better” increased the likelihood that they would favor more government on those issues, and vice versa, such that agreeing with “there are more things that government should be doing” increased the likelihood that they would favor *less* government on those issues. Additionally, both ideological identities had those same results.

In summary, then, claiming one general philosophy of government activity and government size predicts that that philosophy will be violated on a couple of key issues, and on issues in *general*. This is key.

**Hypothesis 5.** The main takeaways for the tests of the EPDAM are that conservative identifiers’ government philosophy stances and issue stances tend to be mostly driven by *external* predictors in the models I ran—except for their stances on aid to Blacks, government services/spending, and especially abortion prohibition.

However, when it came to predicting hypocrisies, the EPDAM was largely a failure, outside of ostensibly one strong difference in comparative external–dispositional drivers: Logical anti-constraint was significantly more strongly driven by external factors for liberal identifiers. Critically, logical anti-constraint is the strongest metric utilized in this book’s analyses—with not only the most academic support but also the most statistical variance. Still, these results do not bode well for the central ideological expectations that follow from the EPDAM. This chapter’s next analyses continue to put those expectations to the test.

## 5.4 STUDY 1.2: 2012 ANES

Naturally, Study 1.2 utilizes the ANES that was run in 2012. The analyses that will be run include most of those from Study 1.1, with an additional issue stance available for modeling, and additional predictors and additions to earlier predictors.

**Variables.** Except for the refinements mentioned below, the variables from Study 1.1 that are included in Study 1.2 are identical in item wording and post hoc indexing across studies. Once again, each variable has been recoded to run from 0 to 1.

*New Variables.* First, the 2012 ANES asked participants, “Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the use of marijuana being legal?” *Favor* responses will be coded as .00, and so on, in accordance with the libertarianism–authoritarianism lens with which this book as viewed issue stances.

Additional psychological traits relevant to understanding the drivers of attitudinal hypocrisy were also measured in the 2012 ANES that were not in previous iterations: the need to evaluate (Jarvis & Petty, 1996), measured decently in one indexed item with, ultimately, a five-point scale (see Federico & Hunt, 2013); authoritarianism, measured in four items that asked participants to choose which of two traits is better for children to possess (see Federico et al., 2011); and the Big Five personality-trait inventory, measured with the ten-item battery (viz., the TIPI-10; see Rammstedt & John, 2007).

The authoritarianism battery is an especially imperfect stand-in. Others have proposed alternative names for the trait as it is measured in the ANES—for example, *disciplinarianism* (e.g., Smith, Hanley, Willson, & Alvord, 2015), which I will be using here to distinguish it from the right-wing authoritarianism discussed in Chap. 3, and measured in Study 1.3. Nonetheless, disciplinarianism is still a functional stand-in and serves its purpose reasonably well (see Brandt, Henry, & Wetherell, 2015, p. 226), but I make no claims about its analogousness to right-wing authoritarianism.

For the Big Five, a ten-item battery is naturally less ideal than the standard 44-item battery (John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991), but the shortened version is reliable and valid (Rammstedt & John, 2007).

*Refinements to Study 1.1 Variables.* Except for foreign aid, the same federal spending issue-stance index items from Study 1.1 are in the Study 1.2 federal spending index: childcare, crime, environmental protection, poor people, public schools, science and technology, Social Security, and welfare programs.

Three other variables have refinements: Religiosity in Study 1.2 is indexed with frequency of prayer in place of religious guidance; knowledge also included identification of the majority party in the US Senate; income is a 28-category scale instead of the top and bottom quintiles from Study 1.1; and an additional degree of support for government regulation of business), and will be included as the mean government philosophy criterion when testing the EPDAM. Each refinement did not appear to change mean scores for all subjects, or either ideological identity compared to their expressions in Study 1.1.

**Hypotheses.** One of many advantages to analyzing the 2012 ANES separately from the cumulative dataset is its comparative proximity to the hyper-polarized context of the US electorate as it currently operates—or, perhaps more appropriately, as it doesn't operate (Mann & Ornstein, 2016). With the current height of ideological polarization in the electorate (Abramowitz, 2013; Pew Research Center, 2014a), *attitudes* are necessarily polarized as well, along with—it would logically follow—the *relationships between those attitudes and their underlying associates* (viz., external and dispositional drivers). While the 2016 ANES is naturally more proximal to the publication of this book—and is the source of Study 1.3 for that reason—the 2012 ANES is a stepping-stone to the, frankly, weird political context in which Donald Trump is somehow the US president. (And, to further tease Study 1.3, it is that *somehow* that will be unspooled.)

Therefore, and in spite of many of their rejections in Study 1.1, most of Study 1.2's hypotheses are only moderately different from those tested in Study 1.1, with the refinements based on reflection of Study 1.1's results, and explained below.

*Hypothesis 1a The number of participants with perfect non-hypocrisy and perfect logical constraint will be negligible, with no significant differences across ideological identities.* The same reasoning from Study 1.1 applies here: Simply by indicating a handful of attitudes, the likelihood of those attitudes logically conflicting with each other increases because of (1) simple random chance (i.e., the more dice one has to roll, the less likely that they will all land on the same side); (2) the structures of the American ideological landscape (see Chap. 4); and (3) the psychological underpinnings of attitudes and issue stances (see Chap. 3).

*Hypothesis 1b Liberal identifiers' hypocrisy scores will be more accurately predicted than conservative identifiers' hypocrisy scores.* Again, this is by virtue<sup>2</sup> of the ironic ideological unity observed recently among liberal elites, and given the observation's recency, I expect that H1b will be supported to a stronger degree than it was in Study 1.1.

*Hypothesis 2a Religiosity, Biblical literalism, and moral traditionalism will decrease hypocrisy on abortion prohibition for liberal identifiers and all subjects.*

*Hypothesis 2b Religiosity, Biblical literalism, and moral traditionalism will increase hypocrisy on abortion prohibition for conservative identifiers.*

These expectations are narrowed considerably from their counterpart hypotheses in Study 1.1 because of (1) Study 1.1's results and (2) the logic behind those results. In particular, what I expect is that religiosity should decrease hypocrisy on abortion for non-conservative identifiers because of the strong association between these religiosity measures and support for prohibitions on abortion. Deviation from an externally derived philosophy of government in either direction (viz., support or oppose prohibitions) should be derived from dispositions.

Additionally, because of its Study 1.1 significance in the same cases as the other two variables—and its fairly close ties to religiosity and Christian fundamentalism (see Malka et al., 2012)—moral traditionalism's predictive effect is also a part of this hypothesis.

*Hypothesis 3a Sophistication will decrease hypocrisy scores for economic issues for all subjects.*

*Hypothesis 3b Sophistication will not affect hypocrisy scores for ideological identifiers.*

Both of these are refinements of their Study 1.1 counterparts, refined to better reflect what was learned from Study 1.1's results. At the same time, they still go beyond what was otherwise demonstrated there, and remain informed by previous research (Lavine et al., 1997).

I expect that sophistication metrics will decrease hypocrisy scores on economic issues (e.g., spending, services) because the inherent contradiction of government philosophy within those scores should logically be most readily apparent to those more likely to have given the “hard” issues of economics more deliberative thought (see Johnston & Wronski, 2015)—that is, those with higher sophistication. These patterns of results—along with the results hypothesized in H3b—were demonstrated in Study 1.1., which therefore adds to the minimal literature even tangentially related to the ideas at hand.

*Hypothesis 4a Identifying as Black or Hispanic will negatively predict hypocrisy for all subjects but have no effects for either ideological identity.*

This is simply a restatement of H4a from Study 1.1, hypothesized once again here for the same reasons but amended to include the results of H4a's results from Study 1.1.

*Hypothesis 4b Racial resentment will increase hypocrisy for all subjects but have no significant effects in the identifier models.* This is a restatement with amendments, once again.

*Hypothesis 4c Egalitarianism will increase hypocrisy for all subjects and conservative identifiers but have no significant effects in the liberal identifiers models.* Again, this is an amended hypothesis, given the results of Study 1.1.

*Hypothesis 4d Age will be a positive predictor of conservative identifiers' hypocrisy but have no effect in other models.*

*Hypothesis 4e Identifying as an extreme ideologue will positively predict hypocrisy scores for all subjects, and both ideological identities.*

*Hypothesis 4f Government philosophy will positively predict hypocrisy scores for all subjects and liberal identifiers but negatively for conservative identifiers.*

Hypothesis 4d through Hypothesis 4f are the same as they were in Study 1.1.

*Hypothesis 5 Government philosophy should be more easily predicted by external factors, while issue stances—especially social issues—should be more easily predicted by dispositional factors.* Again, these are tests of the EPDAM's central constructs, and can be extended out to include ideological distinctions: that is, that the hypothesis should be most strongly supported for conservative identifiers and most weakly supported for liberal identifiers (see Chap. 3).

## 5.5 STUDY 1.2 RESULTS

The full sample of subjects for whom government philosophy was available consisted of  $N = 5459$  subjects. Demographically, the sample's mean age was 49.2 ( $SD = 17.1$ ). The sample identified as 51.3% female, 17.4%

**Table 5.12** Percentage of participants with scores = .00 by item, 2012 ANES

<i>Hypocrisy item</i>	<i>All participants (%)</i>	<i>Liberal identifiers (%)</i>	<i>Conservative identifiers (%)</i>
Guaranteed jobs	17.92	12.24	25.18
Aid to Blacks	21.13	12.99	30.87
Abortion prohibition	24.86	22.66	25.05
Government services	12.76	8.90	18.32
Defense spending	5.39	5.14	4.15
Federal spending	3.85	4.66	2.37
Cannabis prohibition	34.29	31.82	31.51
Overall	0.06	0.07	0.00
Logical anti-constraint	0.04	0.07	0.00

Black, and 16.7% Hispanic. 38.2% of subjects were located in the geographic South, 19.2% identified themselves as at least college graduates, 32.4% were Christian Fundamentalists (i.e., Biblical literalists), and 44.3% correctly identified the majority parties in both respective chambers of Congress.

**Hypothesis 1 Results.** The percentages of participants with perfectly non-hypocritical scores are shown for each hypocrisy item in Table 5.12 for all participants and for liberal and conservative identifiers.

In terms of method 2 hypocrisy and in terms logical anti-constraint, there are virtually no non-hypocrites. However, when comparing across ideological identities, in four cases, conservative identifiers are significantly more likely to demonstrate non-hypocritical attitudes than liberal identifiers. According to chi-squared tests, conservative identifiers have hypocrisy scores of .00 at significantly higher rates than liberal identifiers for the following items: guaranteed jobs and income ( $\chi^2 = 85.94, p < .001$ ), aid to Blacks ( $\chi^2 = 144.75, p < .001$ ), government services ( $\chi^2 = 58.78, p < .001$ ), and federal spending ( $\chi^2 = 12.97, p < .001$ ).

Still, although distinctions by ideological identity were not predicted, Hypothesis 1a is largely supported, given the lack of .00 scores in overall attitudinal hypocrisy and logical anti-constraint. Indeed, nearly everyone in the sample has attitudes about government involvement that contradict other attitudes about government involvement.



Hypothesis 1b, meanwhile, was not as fully supported. Conservative identifiers' hypocrisy scores on guaranteed jobs ( $Z = 5.15, p < .01$ ) and aid to Blacks ( $Z = 11.53, p < .001$ ) were significantly higher than liberal identifiers', and on the edge of significantly higher for government services ( $Z = 1.967, p = .05$ ). R-squared values were statistically identical for defense spending, cannabis prohibition, overall hypocrisy, and logical anti-constraint ( $Z < 1.96, p > .05$ ). Only for abortion prohibition ( $Z = 11.58, p < .001$ ) and federal spending ( $Z = 15.10, p < .001$ ) were liberal identifiers' hypocrisy scores significantly more accurately predicted than conservative identifiers'.

Thus, H1b is rejected for seven of the nine models.

Hypotheses 2 through 4 were tested next, with the results of the respective linear regressions shown in Table 5.13 for all subjects, Table 5.14 for liberal identifiers, and Table 5.15 for conservative identifiers.

**Hypothesis 2 Results.** For all subjects, two of the three hypothesized predictors increased hypocrisy on abortion prohibition, while Biblical literalism had no effect. H2a is rejected for all subjects.

For liberal identifiers, meanwhile, hypocrisy on abortion prohibition is, as hypothesized, *decreased* by religiosity and moral traditionalism; although, fundamentalism has no effect. Altogether then, H2a is supported for liberal identifiers but rejected when it comes to the hypothesized and unobserved effect of Biblical literalism.

Finally, for conservative identifiers, H2b is fully supported. The religiosity index, Biblical literalism, and moral traditionalism significantly and strongly increased hypocrisy on abortion prohibition. In fact, they are quantitatively the strongest predictors in that model.

Intriguing significant effects are observable outside of the hypotheses, as well. For all subjects, moral traditionalism increased hypocrisy on defense spending and cannabis prohibition, as well as overall hypocrisy; while religiosity decreased hypocrisy on federal spending and increased hypocrisy on cannabis prohibition. Though the effects for liberal identifiers were small and barely significant, for conservative identifiers, all three predictors had significant positive effects on cannabis prohibition hypocrisy and overall hypocrisy, while the religiosity index had a strong positive effect on hypocrisy on government services and spending.

In any case, hypothesis 2 has mixed support, with the strongest support coming for conservative identifiers on one of the most salient cultural issues of the past several decades (see Sect. 4.4)—an effect observed similarly in Study 1.1.

Table 5.13 Standardized regression coefficients predicting hypocrisy scores for all subjects in the 2012 ANES

<i>Predictor</i>	<i>Guaranteed jobs</i>	<i>Aid to Blacks</i>	<i>Abortion prohibition</i>	<i>Government services</i>	<i>Defense spending</i>	<i>Federal spending</i>	<i>Cannabis prohibition</i>	<i>Overall</i>	<i>Logical anti-constraint</i>
Religiosity	-.022	.015	.053**	.020	-.006	-.042**	.049*	.036	-.018
Fundamentalism	.011	-.017	.014	.006	-.015	.012	-.006	-.001	-.001
Moral traditionalism	-.039*	-.006	.062***	-.015	.054**	-.023	.051*	.046*	-.003
Knowledge	-.073***	-.037**	.068***	-.078***	.051**	-.076***	.059***	.002	-.060***
Education	-.001	.007	.057***	-.036*	.012	-.021	.016	.020	-.022
Black	-.030	-.074***	-.016	-.034*	-.046*	-.052***	-.032	-.084***	-.021
Hispanic	.006	.003	-.043**	.016	.013	.012	-.013	-.015	-.012
Racial resentment	.017	.029	-.031	.003	.004	.001	-.027	-.010	.158***
Egalitarianism	.122***	.108***	.014	.134***	-.014	.168***	-.008	.141***	.116***
Age	.005	.002	.000	-.020	.045**	-.020	.038*	.024	-.070***
Strength of identity	-.209***	-.198***	.182***	-.244***	.206***	-.191***	.208***	.002	.089***
Libertarianism—authoritarianism	.003	.391***	.465***	-.058***	.022	-.699***	.097***	.190***	-.142***
Disciplinarianism	.034*	.031	.011	.042*	.007	.025	-.019	.033	.024
Need to evaluate	-.076***	-.051***	.034*	-.096***	.022	-.087***	.031*	-.049***	.006
Openness	-.017	-.022	-.026	-.031	.006	-.019	-.004	-.034*	.058***
Conscientiousness	-.010	-.009	-.015	.002	-.008	-.010	.032*	-.001	.006
Extraversion	-.022	-.001	-.011	-.003	-.003	.017	.005	-.007	.023
Agreeableness	-.004	.006	-.008	-.039*	-.021	.005	-.002	-.019	-.011
Neuroticism	-.009	.034*	-.011	-.004	-.034*	.018	.031	.013	.019
Female	.022	.032*	.012	.054***	-.012	.032*	-.005	.036*	-.008
Southerner	.008	-.001	-.032*	.020	.032*	.026*	-.021	-.002	.017
Income	-.022	-.017	-.007	-.036*	.047**	-.021	-.005	-.017	-.011

(continued)

Table 5.13 (continued)

<i>Predictor</i>	<i>Guaranteed jobs</i>	<i>Aid to Blacks</i>	<i>Abortion prohibition</i>	<i>Government services</i>	<i>Defense spending</i>	<i>Federal spending</i>	<i>Cannabis prohibition</i>	<i>Overall</i>	<i>Logical anti-constraint</i>
Union household	.021	-.016	.014	-.004	.019	.002	.027	.023	.034*
Catholic	.012	.014	.017	-.007	-.019	.007	-.024	-.002	.008
Liberal identity	.126***	.084***	-.046	.161***	-.080**	.119***	-.068*	.059*	.018
Conservative identity	.006	.114***	-.063*	.000	-.093**	.013	-.065*	-.043	-.069*
<i>n</i>	4472	4465	4464	4474	4475	4462	4472	4434	4419
<i>R</i> -squared	.103	.220	.238	.132	.047	.408	.055	.097	.060
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	.098	.215	.234	.127	.042	.405	.049	.092	.055

\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$

Table 5.14 Standardized regression coefficients predicting hypocrisy scores for liberal identifiers in the 2012 ANES

<i>Predictor</i>	<i>Guaranteed jobs</i>	<i>Aid to Blacks</i>	<i>Abortion prohibition</i>	<i>Government services</i>	<i>Defense spending</i>	<i>Federal spending</i>	<i>Cannabis prohibition</i>	<i>Overall</i>	<i>Logical anti-constraint</i>
Religiosity	-.065	-.008	-.063*	-.060	.011	-.045	-.028	-.090*	-.061
Fundamentalism	.082*	-.070	-.024	.017	-.096*	-.029	-.044	-.057	-.050
Moral traditionalism	-.017	.019	-.058*	.073*	.023	.018	-.022	-.009	-.033
Knowledge	.037	-.009	.023	-.032	.027	.003	.038	.039	-.009
Education	.043	-.001	.027	.051	.027	.009	-.018	.035	-.049
Black	-.008	-.029	.012	-.014	-.105**	-.045*	-.045	-.070*	-.045
Hispanic	-.008	-.001	-.003	.038	.016	.012	-.009	.007	-.017
Racial resentment	.125***	.197***	.000	.032	-.105**	.025	.022	.089**	.136***
Egalitarianism	.003	-.012	.064**	-.004	-.005	.022	.035	.050	.066
Age	.006	-.001	.043*	-.056*	-.018	-.015	-.003	-.001	-.100***
Strength of identity	-.056	-.066*	-.002	-.050	.044	-.043*	.044	-.027	.073*
Libertarianism—authoritarianism	-.174***	.177***	.661***	-.327***	.344***	-.756***	.373***	.306***	-.176***
Disciplinarianism	.019	.031	-.015	.069*	-.012	.023	-.044	.006	-.011
Need to evaluate	-.100***	-.047	-.020	-.072**	.034	-.028	.048	-.040	.055
Openness	.013	-.027	-.001	-.045	-.004	-.059**	.005	-.029	.019
Conscientiousness	-.064*	-.026	-.003	.024	.004	.012	.042	.002	.022
Extraversion	.005	-.016	.004	.020	-.010	.008	-.013	-.007	.021
Agreeableness	-.017	.043	-.010	-.021	-.035	-.002	-.016	-.019	-.027
Neuroticism	-.054	.029	-.022	.019	-.022	.022	.065*	.015	.007
Female	.025	.047	.022	.004	-.029	.017	-.059*	-.003	-.044
Southerner	.012	.035	-.008	.000	.031	.010	-.045	.000	.010
Income	-.001	.028	.057*	-.012	.046	.005	-.010	.041	-.026

(continued)

Table 5.14 (continued)

<i>Predictor</i>	<i>Guaranteed jobs</i>	<i>Aid to Blacks</i>	<i>Abortion prohibition</i>	<i>Government services</i>	<i>Defense spending</i>	<i>Federal spending</i>	<i>Cannabis prohibition</i>	<i>Overall</i>	<i>Logical anti-constraint</i>
Union household	.024	.000	.022	-.045	-.011	-.041*	.040	.008	.022
Catholic	-.013	.015	.003	-.009	-.046	-.021	-.015	-.027	-.015
<i>n</i>	1287	1284	1286	1288	1288	1287	1286	1278	1276
<i>R</i> -squared	.082	.082	.508	.183	.187	.631	.191	.129	.106
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	.065	.064	.499	.168	.171	.624	.175	.112	.089

\**p* < .05, \*\**p* < .01, \*\*\**p* < .001

**Table 5.15** Standardized regression coefficients predicting hypocrisy scores for conservative identifiers in the 2012 ANES

<i>Predictor</i>	<i>Guaranteed jobs</i>	<i>Aid to Blacks</i>	<i>Abortion prohibition</i>	<i>Government services</i>	<i>Defense spending</i>	<i>Federal spending</i>	<i>Cannabis prohibition</i>	<i>Overall</i>	<i>Logical anti-constraint</i>
Religiosity	.020	.009	.188***	.095***	.005	-.010	.093**	.152***	-.005
Fundamentalism	-.042	.011	.128***	-.053	.030	.006	.077***	.077***	.055
Moral traditionalism	-.015	.046	.148***	-.017	.038	-.025	.114***	.128***	.043
Knowledge	-.081**	-.024	.037	-.068**	.011	-.108***	.008	-.046	-.067*
Education	-.002	.044	.025	-.048	-.043	-.043	-.010	-.016	-.014
Black	-.020	-.091***	.024	-.017	.041	-.017	.027	-.014	.038
Hispanic	-.019	-.034	-.019	-.013	.044	.002	-.007	-.021	.045
Racial resentment	-.029	-.126***	-.044	-.013	.081**	.006	-.059*	-.077***	.156***
Egalitarianism	.152***	.136***	-.009	.174***	-.038	.249***	-.055*	.149***	.074*
Age	.007	.034	-.092***	.005	.080**	-.029	.055*	.017	-.051*
Strength of identity	-.141***	-.098***	.065**	-.159***	.095***	-.135***	.086***	-.047	.016
Libertarianism—authoritarianism	.238***	.513***	.052	.221***	-.282***	-.465***	-.246***	.012	-.053
Disciplinarianism	.049*	-.010	.044	.011	.056*	.025	.013	.060*	.075**
Need to evaluate	-.018	-.011	.050*	-.071**	.003	-.091***	-.007	-.035	-.008
Openness	-.040	-.017	-.055*	-.043	.054*	.014	.009	-.027	.074**
Conscientiousness	-.021	-.024	-.053*	.008	-.034	-.024	.041	-.023	-.017
Extraversion	-.036	-.004	-.048*	-.003	.042	.026	.011	-.009	.028
Agreeableness	.026	.002	.003	-.023	.001	.031	.005	.009	.001
Neuroticism	.008	.027	-.005	.003	-.025	.041	.008	.016	.025

(continued)

Table 5.15 (continued)

<i>Predictor</i>	<i>Guaranteed jobs</i>	<i>Aid to Blacks</i>	<i>Abortion prohibition</i>	<i>Government services</i>	<i>Defense spending</i>	<i>Federal spending</i>	<i>Cannabis prohibition</i>	<i>Overall</i>	<i>Logical anti-constraint</i>
Female	.023	.018	-.002	.064**	.008	.070**	.017	.052*	.048
Southerner	.027	.003	-.046*	.050*	.051*	.055*	-.015	.019	.012
Income	-.047	-.024	-.089***	-.045	-.005	-.027	-.027	-.090***	-.025
Union household	.027	-.025	-.016	.037	.051*	.039	.008	.027	.057*
Catholic	.044	.033	.032	.001	.005	.033	-.007	.038	.032
<i>n</i>	1642	1639	1639	1641	1642	1633	1642	1626	1620
<i>R</i> -squared	.205	.383	.186	.236	.151	.228	.155	.171	.071
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	.193	.374	.174	.224	.139	.216	.142	.159	.057

\**p* < .05; \*\**p* < .01; \*\*\**p* < .001

**Hypothesis 3 Results.** For all subjects, knowledge had significant effects almost across the board: It decreased hypocrisy on guaranteed jobs, aid to Blacks, government services and spending, federal spending, and logical anti-constraint; and increased hypocrisy on abortion prohibition, defense spending, and cannabis prohibition. Education level, meanwhile, had only two significant effects: It marginally decreased hypocrisy on government services and spending, and strongly increased hypocrisy on abortion.

For liberal identifiers, there were zero significant predictive effects from either sophistication measure. For no hypocrisy scores did knowledge nor education have significant predictive power.

For conservative identifiers, knowledge decreased hypocrisy on guaranteed jobs and income, government services and spending, federal spending, and logical anti-constraint.

Therefore, Hypothesis 3 has little support outside of the null effects observed for liberal identifiers, and knowledge's effects for all subjects.

**Hypothesis 4a Results.** In terms of racial identification for all subjects, identifying as Black decreased hypocrisy on aid to Blacks, government services, defense spending, federal spending, and overall hypocrisy; identifying as Hispanic decreased hypocrisy on abortion prohibition.

For liberal identifiers, identifying as Black significantly decreased hypocrisy scores on defense spending, federal spending, and overall hypocrisy, while identifying as Hispanic had no significant effects.

For conservative identifiers, identifying as Black strongly decreased hypocrisy on aid to Blacks; no other significant effects were observed for identifying as Black or identifying as Hispanic.

Hypothesis 4a has mixed support, then—it is mostly supported for all subjects, somewhat supported for liberal identifiers, and not at all supported for conservative identifiers. In fact, for conservative identifiers, the intriguing result is the negative effect of identifying as Black on hypocrisy with regard to aid to Blacks. The effect there is strong and significant, but may also be a fluke of low statistical power, given the comparatively low percentage of conservative identifiers who identify as Black ( $n = 142$  of 1831). The result is nevertheless intriguing.

**Hypothesis 4b Results.** For all subjects, racial resentment significantly increased logical anti-constraint. No other significant effects were observed, which means H4b is rejected outside of the one case, for all subjects.



For liberal identifiers, racial resentment decreased hypocrisy on defense spending and increased hypocrisy on guaranteed jobs, aid to Blacks, overall hypocrisy, *and* increased logical anti-constraint. H4b is rejected for liberal identifiers for those cases, but it is otherwise supported.

For conservative identifiers, racial resentment decreased hypocrisy on aid to Blacks, cannabis prohibition, and overall hypocrisy; while it increased hypocrisy on defense spending and increased logical anti-constraint.

Nevertheless, hypothesis 4b is largely rejected, with a few caveats.

**Hypothesis 4c.** For all subjects, egalitarianism significantly increased hypocrisy on guaranteed jobs, aid to Blacks, government services, federal spending, and increased overall hypocrisy and logical anti-constraint. Except in three cases, Hypothesis 4c is supported for all subjects.

For liberal identifiers, egalitarianism had only one significant effect: It increased hypocrisy on abortion prohibition. So, for liberal identifiers, Hypothesis 4c is mostly supported.

For conservative identifiers, egalitarianism had hugely significant predictive effects: It decreased hypocrisy on cannabis prohibition, and increased hypocrisy on guaranteed jobs, aid to Blacks, government services, and federal spending, and increased overall hypocrisy and logical anti-constraint. So, H4c is mostly supported for conservative identifiers.

**Hypothesis 4d.** For all subjects, age increased hypocrisy on defense spending and cannabis prohibition, while it decreased logical anti-constraint. However, because the other six tests demonstrated null effects, the hypothesis is mostly supported.

For liberal identifiers, age had three significant effects: It decreased hypocrisy on government services, strongly decreased logical anti-constraint, and increased hypocrisy on abortion prohibition (marginally). Thus, the hypothesis is mostly supported here, too.

For conservative identifiers, age decreased hypocrisy on abortion prohibition and decreased logical anti-constraint, while it also increased hypocrisy on defense spending and cannabis prohibition. The last two logically follow from those ideas being more firmly ensconced among older conservative identifiers that so strongly favor expanding government in defense and drug prohibition (Pew Research Center, 2014b), but this is merely a postulation; for the most part, the hypothesis is rejected nonetheless.

**Hypothesis 4e.** For all subjects, strength of ideological identity decreased hypocrisy on guaranteed jobs, aid to Blacks, government

services, and federal spending—all of which contradict the hypothesis—but it also increased hypocrisy on abortion prohibition, defense spending, and cannabis prohibition, and increased logical anti-constraint. So, the hypothesis is mostly rejected, but supported for those four models.

For liberal identifiers, strength of ideological identity was mostly a null predictor, except for decreasing hypocrisy on aid to Blacks and federal spending, and—in the only support for the hypothesis—increasing logical anti-constraint.

For conservative identifiers, strength of ideological identity decreased hypocrisy on guaranteed jobs, aid to Blacks, government services, and federal spending. It increased hypocrisy on abortion prohibition, defense spending, and cannabis prohibition—the only three models that supported the hypothesis.

**Hypothesis 4f.** Finally, for all subjects, government philosophy (i.e., libertarianism–authoritarianism) decreased hypocrisy on government services and federal spending, and decreased logical anti-constraint; while it increased hypocrisy on aid to Blacks, abortion prohibition, cannabis prohibition, and increased overall hypocrisy—which means that the hypothesis is mostly rejected, but supported for those four items.

For liberal identifiers, government philosophy decreased hypocrisy on guaranteed jobs, government services, federal spending, and decreased logical anti-constraint. It also increased hypocrisy on aid to Blacks, abortion prohibition, defense spending, cannabis prohibition, and increased overall hypocrisy. So, a slim majority of the models supported the hypothesis.

For conservative identifiers, government philosophy decreased hypocrisy on defense spending, federal spending, and cannabis prohibition, and increased hypocrisy on guaranteed jobs, aid to Blacks, and government services. Mostly, then, the hypothesis is rejected.

**Hypothesis 5.** Once again, the EPDAM can be put to the test with some simplistic arithmetic. Linear regressions were run predicting mean government philosophy and the seven issue items, across all subjects, liberal identifiers only, and conservative identifiers only. Additionally, linear regressions were run predicting the nine hypocrisy items. For each of these regression models, the percentages of predictive power that came from external predictors—as opposed to dispositional predictors—are shown in Table 5.16. Critically, again, it must be noted that this comparison is rough, and does not take into account the numbers of each predictor type, for example.


**Table 5.16** Percentage of predictive power from external factors, 2012 ANES

	<i>All subjects (%)</i>	<i>Liberal identifiers (%)</i>	<i>Conservative identifiers (%)</i>
<i>Criterion</i>			
Mean government philosophy	41.24	35.64	34.91
Guaranteed jobs	37.80	35.43	39.51
Aid to Blacks	35.55	31.12	31.16
Abortion prohibition	40.75	30.29	32.63
Government services	44.39	35.16	38.00
Defense spending	36.65	29.90	36.73
Federal spending	40.36	44.15	34.38
Cannabis prohibition	40.81	25.71	38.86
<i>Hypocrisy items</i>			
Guaranteed jobs	50.38	21.69	36.08
Aid to Blacks	49.14	28.95	30.19
Abortion prohibition	50.90	33.91	32.53
Government services	55.35	31.96	35.80
Defense spending	71.35	38.85	39.27
Federal spending	57.66	37.25	41.87
Cannabis prohibition	61.02	33.25	30.86
Overall	41.48	21.13	27.89
Logical anti-constraint	39.83	40.15	33.04

Note: Percentage compared to dispositional factors, calculated as sum of absolute values of predictors by category as a percentage of the sum of all predictors' absolute values

The strongest distinctions in issue stances by ideological identity appear to be with (1) defense spending, for which conservative identifiers demonstrate substantially more external power than liberals; (2) federal spending, for which liberal identifiers demonstrate more external power; and (3) cannabis prohibition, for which external factors predict substantially more for conservative identifiers.

For hypocrisy's predictors, when taking into account the predictive capacities of the respective models (see Fig. 5.3), there are fewer relative distinctions across ideological identities. Hypocrisy scores for guaranteed jobs, government services, and federal spending are more external for conservative identifiers than liberal identifiers. Hypocrisy on cannabis prohibition is substantially more external for liberal identifiers. Critically, overall hypocrisy is much more external for conservative identifiers, but logical anti-constraint is much more external for liberal identifiers. Importantly, once again, each of these distinctions holds up when factoring in the ultimate explanatory power of the models.



**Fig. 5.3** Weighted proportions of external and dispositional factors' predictive powers by hypocrisy model and ideological identification, Study 1.2

## 5.6 STUDY 1.2 DISCUSSION

**Everyone's a Hypocrite.** Once again, almost all participants qualified as attitudinal hypocrites, with negligible numbers of people indicating perfectly logical attitude structures. But, for only two issues were liberal identifiers' hypocrisy scores significantly more predictable than conservative identifiers' hypocrisy scores. Why this is the case is unclear.

In Study 1.1, H1b was also rejected for guaranteed jobs and aid to Blacks but was supported for every other issue. One explanation for why liberal identifiers' scores for the other issues are *not* significantly more explainable than conservative identifiers' would be that the ideological identities in the electorate shifted enough from 1990–2008 to 2012 to weaken the schisms within the social-movement and social-typology mass identity of conservatism enough to solidify it around a more universalized orientation and set of stances (see Pew Research Center, 2014a).

Government philosophy has changed over time for both ideological identities (see Fig. 5.1). With a significant downturn in 2008—pun

intended—in percentages of participants indicating “the less government, the better,” followed by a *return* to the downward (i.e., more libertarian) trend for conservative identifiers in 2012, conservative hypocrisy scores necessarily became less variable. With that, they necessarily become more predictable—in fact, the standard error of the mean hypocrisy score for conservative identifiers in 2012 was their lowest of any year recorded thus far. And although Fig. 5.1 gives away one of the prime cuts of this chapter’s carcass (viz., a continuation of the downward trend in the 2016 ANES), the return to the libertarian government philosophy for conservative identifiers after a stark punctuation in 2008—almost perfectly along the pre-formed trend line prior to 2008—is telling, and should not go unnoticed.

**Religiosity Drives Conservative Identifiers’ Hypocrisy on Abortion Attitudes.** The middling overall support for the hypothesized effects of religiosity was scientifically alleviated by its measurably strong effects on hypocrisy on abortion prohibition for conservative identifiers. Indeed, the respective strengths of the three religiosity predictors were the three highest for abortion prohibition hypocrisy, appearing to take away what would have been the significance coming from the libertarianism–authoritarianism predictor.

Moreover, for conservative identifiers, religiosity’s strength in predicting the cannabis prohibition hypocrisy item is logical, if *that* is operationalized as a cultural issue not unlike abortion. It’s religiosity’s strength in predicting *overall* hypocrisy that begets new questions. While the religiosity index had a significant positive role in overall hypocrisy in Study 1.1, it was a small one—especially when compared to its and moral traditionalism’s strengths in predicting abortion-prohibition hypocrisy scores in Study 1.1.

**Sophistication Continues to have Minimal Impact on Having Hypocritical Attitudes.** Sophistication metrics’ effects have proved to be the most difficult effects to predict and explain in this chapter thus far, and harkens back to the spelunking metaphor utilized at the outset: The expansiveness of these caves keeps on growing.

So, it is worthwhile to compare sophistication’s effects in Study 1.2 to its counterparts in Study 1.1.

In 2012, knowledge suddenly had a significant and negative effect for guaranteed jobs, aid to Blacks, and government services—each of which was null (i.e., not significant, although they were also negative) in Study 1.1. Knowledge also suddenly had a significant positive effect on defense spending where the effect was null before.

Importantly, for all subjects, Study 1.1 and Study 1.2 align in demonstrating knowledge *and* education's significant positive effects on abortion prohibition hypocrisy, and significant negative effects on government services hypocrisy—albeit weakly for education in 2012. These parallels obviously suggest robustness of the effects and point to underlying validation of the epistemological justification for the sophistication–hypocrisy linkages. Study 1.3's results should ultimately lend support to this viewpoint, or reject it.

**Strength of Ideological Identity had Strong Effects, But Not for Liberal Identifiers.** It is logical that the degree to which a person indicated identifying with a political ideology would have significant effects on the degree to which they indicated hypocritical attitudes. What is less logical is the near-negligible effect of identity strength on liberal identifiers' hypocrisy scores—outside of small negative effects for aid to Blacks and federal spending, and a small positive effect for logical anti-constraint—when their conservative counterparts have hugely strong predictive power from identity strength.

This may be explained to some degree by Americans' lower relative willingness to identify as *liberal* of any strength, especially when compared to their higher relative willingness to identify as conservatives generally (see Conover & Feldman, 1981; Ellis & Stimson, 2009; Sect. 2.4). This would result in less unity across measurements and more heterogeneity for conservative identifiers compared to liberal identifiers, whose respective measurements would be, on average, more homogeneous. It is this logic, in fact, that led to the formulation of H1b. Study 1.3 should help to confirm to what extent this finding remains the case, given that this set of results was, in part, also observed in Study 1.1.

Intriguingly, meanwhile, for conservative identifiers, identity strength negatively predicted each issue hypocrisy except for its positive effect on hypocrisy scores for abortion prohibition, defense spending, and cannabis prohibition. This is the only instance in which those three items are the only hypocrisy scores predicted with the same valence by the same predictor, which suggests an underlying factor between identity strength and those three items—but only for conservative identifiers.

**Strength and Weaknesses of the EPDAM.** External and dispositional factors, overall, predict more of the variance in hypocrisy scores than they did in Study 1.1, which is natural and expected, given that Study 1.1 had a larger sample collected over 18 years.

When comparing the weighted strengths of external and dispositional factors in predicting hypocrisy scores by ideological identity between

Study 1.1 and Study 1.2, several key distinctions stand out. First, the cross-identity comparative strengths of external factors in predicting liberal identifiers' hypocrisy scores on aid to Blacks and liberal identifiers' logical anti-constraint appear to have vanished in 2012: External factors' predictive powers for both of those criterion variables decreased substantially while staying the same or increasing dramatically for conservative identifiers, for logical anti-constraint and aid to Blacks, respectively.

At the same time, dispositional factors have spiked in explanatory power for conservative identifiers on every criterion variable. Dispositional factor spikes should be expected, again, due to the more localized sample and the fact that more dispositional traits were included in Study 1.2 models; but, critically, the spikes are substantially larger for conservative identifiers than they are for liberal identifiers—in fact, for hypocrisy on aid to Blacks and for overall hypocrisy, the weighted strengths of dispositional factors' explanatory powers appear to *decrease*.

Pontificating on these shifts may be a fool's errand until more evidence can be compiled in either direction. As such, the 2016 ANES allows for that additional compilation of evidence and, subsequently, analyses thereof.

## 5.7 STUDY 1.3: 2016 ANES

Almost without exception, political scientists' expectations of the ultimate outcomes going into and including the 2016 election—especially when it came to the Republican primaries—were completely wrong (see Gelman, 2016), and, frankly, embarrassing for some of us. To be sure, it was a weird campaign and weird election, with the Republicans' national party organization and management apparently more disorganized and mismanaged than it may have ever been (Silver, 2015; Wilkinson, 2015), which either meant that (1) the oft-cited “rules” of the political science discipline did not apply the way they usually did (see Silver, 2016), or (2) they weren't real rules.

So, analyzing the people in the electorate—that is, those who were *targeted* in the weird campaign and who *voted* in the weird election—may be a problematic endeavor from the outset. However, unless the results of the analyses demonstrate massive divergences from the trends already established, there is no huge need to dramatically re-frame my hypothesis tests outside of using what was learned in Study 1.2 to, perhaps, better encompass the ultimate expected observations.

**Variables.** Variables for Study 1.3 were identical to those in Study 1.2, except in the cases explicated below.

*New Variables.* Right-wing authoritarianism was measured with a three-item battery.

Additional issue attitudes with direct applicability to government acting or not acting—that is, falling somewhere on an accordant libertarianism–authoritarianism axis—were surveyed as well. Five were related to LGBT rights: (1) whether businesses should be required to serve same-sex couples, (2) whether trans people should be required to use the bathroom of the gender they were assigned at birth, (3) whether laws should protect gays and lesbians from job discrimination, (4) whether gay and lesbian couples should be prohibited from adopting children, and (5) whether same-sex marriage should be prohibited.

Two new issue attitudes were related to immigration policy: (1) whether a wall should be built along the border with Mexico and (2) whether children brought to the US “illegally” should be “sent back where they came from.”

Six additional attitudes were asked that have relevance to this book’s focus, and fit within the libertarian–authoritarian lens: (1) whether campaign spending should be limited, (2) whether banks should be more regulated, (3) whether government should reduce income inequality, (4) whether employers should be required to “offer paid leave to parents of new children,” (5) whether equal pay for men and women should be required, and (6) whether government should do more about rising global temperatures.

Because these issues add 13 hypocrisy items to an already long list, regression analyses of them will be limited to their inclusion in the overall hypocrisy and logical anti-constraint measures. They will be included in tests of Hypothesis 1, however.

*Refinements to Study 1.1 and Study 1.2 Variables.* The metric for the need to evaluate was expanded to a six-item battery. While suitability of this stand-in metric has not yet been fully tested, near-identical iterations appear to be valid and reliable analogs (Luttig & Callaghan, 2016).

Knowledge here was calculated with five items, in which participants were asked to identify the respective political offices of Joe Biden, Paul Ryan, Angela Merkel, Vladimir Putin, and John Roberts. Again, it is worthwhile to question the legitimacy of questions like these as appropriate measures of political knowledge (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996); as such, I make no normative judgments, and only use this metric for what it is: a method by which accurate responses to political trivia items can be measured.

**Hypotheses.** For simplicity’s sake, the hypotheses tested in Study 1.3 are identical to those tested in Study 1.2.



## 5.8 STUDY 1.3 RESULTS

The full sample of subjects for whom government philosophy was available consisted of  $N = 3545$  subjects. Demographically, the sample's mean age was 49.4 ( $SD = 17.6$ ). The sample identified as 52.4% female, 9.4% Black, and 10.2% Hispanic. 38.0% of subjects were located in the geographic South, 18.7% identified themselves as at least college graduates, 27.4% were Christian Fundamentalists (i.e., Biblical literalists), and 4.4% correctly answered all five knowledge questions (mean score = .54,  $SD = .30$ ).

**Hypothesis 1.** Table 5.17 shows the percentage of .000-scorers in the entire sample, and then in either ideological identity. Due to some notably stark distinctions in proportions, Table 5.17 also includes chi-squared tests of independence comparing the proportions of the identities with .000-scorers by hypocrisy item.

A total of  $n = 0$  participants were perfectly non-hypocritical *or* perfectly logically constrained, which supports, if not *confirms* H1a. Although chi-squared tests demonstrate more differences than similarities across the identities in the proportions therein with scores = .000, these are not relevant for my purposes here—I include them for illustrative purposes only, though I will discuss these distinctions in the general discussion and Chap. 7.

Next, and once again, the nine linear regression models from Study 1.2 were run—with the additional inclusion of RWA. Results for all subjects, only liberal identifiers, and only conservative identifiers are shown, respectively, in Tables 5.18, 5.19, and 5.20.

On H1b, in only four of nine potential cases were liberal identifiers' scores *significantly* more predictable than conservative identifiers: abortion prohibition ( $Z = 12.594$ ,  $p < .01$ ), federal spending ( $Z = 14.442$ ,  $p < .01$ ), cannabis prohibition ( $Z = 5.438$ ,  $p < .01$ ), and logical anti-constraint ( $Z = 6.373$ ,  $p < .01$ ). In the other five models, conservatives were either more predictable—guaranteed jobs, aid to Blacks, and defense spending (all  $Z$  values'  $p < .01$ )—or there was no significant difference.

H1b is mostly rejected, although liberals' overall hypocrisy scores being significantly more predictable than conservatives is important to note, as it was also the case in Study 1.1.

**Hypothesis 2.** All three items related to traditionalist American religiosity increased abortion-prohibition hypocrisy scores for conservative identifiers, with weaker, but significant positive effects also observed for overall hypocrisy—moral traditionalism notwithstanding—and cannabis-prohibition hypocrisy.

**Table 5.17** Percentage of participants with scores = .00 by item, 2016 ANES

<i>Hypocrisy item</i>	<i>All participants (%)</i>	<i>Liberal identifiers (%)</i>	<i>Conservative identifiers (%)</i>	$\chi^2$ ( <i>df</i> = 1)
Guaranteed jobs	18.09	10.73	25.67	72.526***
Aid to Blacks	20.38	15.59	26.24	33.058***
Abortion prohibition	24.59	21.15	25.66	5.966*
Government services	15.39	11.74	22.59	39.364***
Defense spending	6.84	6.02	5.53	.213
Federal spending	4.90	7.28	2.12	33.315***
Cannabis prohibition	32.13	27.21	31.90	5.592*
Require service to LGBT couples	39.31	41.29	49.96	15.943***
Require sex-specific bathroom use	20.09	15.24	15.63	.059
Prohibit LGBT job discrimination	44.23	68.30	25.68	387.094***
Prohibit LGBT adoption	45.65	28.26	55.75	161.402***
Prohibit LGBT marriage	32.79	24.61	33.19	18.802***
Send back undocumented children	2.92	1.56	1.81	.200
Build border wall	17.51	19.00	14.36	8.340**
Limit campaign spending	37.73	64.59	17.81	489.780***
Regulate banks	17.56	31.57	10.83	141.249***
Combat income inequality	51.86	58.03	61.93	3.368
Require paid parental leave	30.08	45.07	18.01	184.616***
Require equal pay	41.29	66.32	17.86	522.665***
Combat rising temperatures	26.87	44.84	21.88	127.192***
Overall	0.00	0.00	0.00	n.s.
Logical anti-constraint	0.00	0.00	0.00	n.s.

\* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$

**Table 5.18** Standardized regression coefficients predicting hypocrisy scores for all subjects in the 2016 ANES

<i>Predictor</i>	<i>Guaranteed jobs</i>	<i>Aid to Blacks</i>	<i>Abortion prohibition</i>	<i>Government services</i>	<i>Defense spending</i>	<i>Federal spending</i>	<i>Cannabis prohibition</i>	<i>Overall</i>	<i>Logical anti-constraint</i>
Religiosity	.011	.056*	.034	.019	-.004	.005	-.001	.014	-.021
Fundamentalism	.030	-.003	.033	.046	-.006	.025	.015	.067**	-.065**
Moral traditionalism	-.016	-.011	.085***	-.064*	.018	-.043*	.079**	-.003	-.069**
Knowledge	-.065**	-.068**	.080***	-.089***	.022	-.043**	.058**	-.003	-.009
Education	-.018	-.034	.026	-.036	-.029	-.046**	.027	-.038*	-.039*
Black	-.056**	-.094***	.013	-.032	-.015	-.036**	-.008	-.070***	.015
Hispanic	-.008	-.019	-.042*	-.006	-.042*	-.019	-.034	-.001	.030
Racial resentment	.020	.065*	-.061**	-.011	-.053*	.019	-.065**	-.024	.098***
Egalitarianism	.062**	.068**	-.011	.056*	-.015	.050**	.008	.056**	.108***
Age	-.014	.010	-.022	-.018	.059**	-.037**	.036	-.014	-.035*
Strength of identity	-.206***	-.198***	.242***	-.212***	.227***	-.160***	.177***	.005	.355***
Libertarianism—authoritarianism	.069**	.239***	.390***	-.055*	-.255***	-.787***	.236***	-.552***	-.217***
Disciplinarianism	.060*	.026	-.032	.046	-.046*	.009	-.006	.031	-.017
Need to evaluate RWA	-.040	-.007	-.021	.052*	.020	-.015	.047**	-.028	.087***
Openness	-.007	-.016	-.014	-.018	-.005	.030	-.015	.020	-.005
Conscientiousness	-.017	-.007	-.017	-.032	.003	-.005	-.031	-.030	.069***
Extraversion	.020	.051**	.002	.013	.016	-.029*	.016	-.003	-.015
Agreeableness	-.023	-.015	.038*	-.025	-.005	.022	-.016	.031	.041*
Neuroticism	-.012	.005	.005	-.033	.010	.017	.024	.013	.018
					.021	.008	.039*	.024	.008

(continued)

Table 5.18 (continued)

<i>Predictor</i>	<i>Guaranteed jobs</i>	<i>Aid to Blacks</i>	<i>Abortion prohibition</i>	<i>Government services</i>	<i>Defense spending</i>	<i>Federal spending</i>	<i>Cannabis prohibition</i>	<i>Overall</i>	<i>Logical anti-constraint</i>
Female	.000	.008	-.024	.027	-.011	.027*	-.038*	-.018	-.007
Southerner	.039*	.024	-.020	.034	-.009	.006	-.001	-.011	.026
Income	-.027	.001	.010	.031	.003	-.004	-.005	-.035	-.008
Union household	.000	-.044*	-.001	-.021	.006	-.018	-.022	-.018	.019
Catholic	-.027	.002	.010	.029	-.016	.006	-.012	-.010	-.018
Liberal identity	.164***	.072*	-.075*	.138***	-.084*	.102***	-.043	.066*	-.112***
Conservative identity	.010	.050	-.145***	-.042	-.035	-.015	-.038	-.101**	-.223***
<i>N</i>	2892	2884	3217	2792	2815	3225	3227	3232	3232
<i>R</i> -squared	.084	.114	.206	.092	.137	.550	.096	.265	.144
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	.075	.106	.199	.083	.129	.546	.088	.259	.136

\* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$

**Table 5.19** Standardized regression coefficients predicting hypocrisy scores for liberal identifiers in the 2016 ANES

<i>Predictor</i>	<i>Guaranteed jobs</i>	<i>Aid to Blacks</i>	<i>Abortion prohibition</i>	<i>Government services</i>	<i>Defense spending</i>	<i>Federal spending</i>	<i>Cannabis prohibition</i>	<i>Overall</i>	<i>Logical anti-constraint</i>
Religiosity	-.043	.044	-.088**	.005	.031	-.036	-.087*	-.120**	-.083*
Fundamentalism	.064	-.007	.020	.043	-.029	.044	.031	.100*	-.086*
Moral traditionalism	-.014	-.039	-.026	-.013	-.013	-.005	-.065	-.090*	-.118**
Knowledge	-.001	-.018	.061*	-.035	-.044	.019	.076*	.041	-.060
Education	.012	-.024	.014	.020	.029	.001	.001	.036	-.027
Black	.024	-.012	.006	.031	-.050	.004	.037	-.003	.003
Hispanic	.031	.016	-.040	.040	-.026	.004	-.029	.042	.033
Racial resentment	.102*	.215***	-.082**	.023	-.167***	.038	.017	-.023	-.050
Egalitarianism	.043	.106*	-.022	-.020	-.099*	-.020	.052	-.035	.049
Age	-.010	.020	-.014	-.050	-.060	-.019	-.028	-.025	-.071*
Strength of identity	-.061	-.092*	-.015	-.083*	.049	-.035	.018	-.065*	.208***
Libertarianism—authoritarianism	-.213***	-.245***	.735***	-.401***	.238***	-.819***	.503***	-.507***	-.176***
Disciplinarianism	.059	.056	-.023	.067	-.081	.021	-.033	-.007	-.032
Need to evaluate	-.005	-.083*	-.003	-.001	.014	-.005	.056	-.040	.097**
RWA	-.025	.016	-.020	.005	-.080	-.004	.005	-.001	-.101**
Openness	-.007	.026	-.019	-.028	-.058	.006	-.012	-.061	.094**
Conscientiousness	.032	.005	.003	-.060	.020	-.014	-.031	-.024	-.009
Extraversion	.018	.038	.007	.043	-.040	.006	.012	.033	.036
Agreeableness	.023	-.013	-.007	-.035	.014	.010	.008	-.013	-.004
Neuroticism	.015	.038	-.033	-.039	.001	.009	.045	-.017	.014
Female	.001	.018	.015	.085*	-.026	.025	-.034	.017	-.051
Southerner	.033	.002	-.003	-.041	.035	-.003	.025	.000	.038

(continued)

Table 5.19 (continued)

<i>Predictor</i>	<i>Guaranteed jobs</i>	<i>Aid to Blacks</i>	<i>Abortion prohibition</i>	<i>Government services</i>	<i>Defense spending</i>	<i>Federal spending</i>	<i>Cannabis prohibition</i>	<i>Overall</i>	<i>Logical anti-constraint</i>
Income	.021	.010	.006	.041	-.028	-.023	-.039	-.053	-.012
Union household	-.039	-.029	.000	-.043	.023	-.006	.014	.011	.016
Catholic	-.013	-.008	-.007	-.008	-.027	-.013	.016	-.015	-.021
<i>N</i>	845	828	895	823	816	896	898	899	899
<i>R</i> -squared	.088	.163	.620	.243	.154	.719	.332	.292	.292
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	.060	.137	.609	.219	.127	.711	.313	.272	.272

\* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$

**Table 5.20** Standardized regression coefficients predicting hypocrisy scores for conservative identifiers in the 2016 ANES

<i>Predictor</i>	<i>Guaranteed jobs</i>	<i>Aid to Blacks</i>	<i>Abortion prohibition</i>	<i>Government services</i>	<i>Defense spending</i>	<i>Federal spending</i>	<i>Cannabis prohibition</i>	<i>Overall</i>	<i>Logical anti-constraint</i>
Religiosity	.024	.048	.209***	.045	.006	.043	.085*	.107**	.007
Fundamentalism	.041	.010	.123***	.025	.051	-.014	.078*	.107**	-.023
Moral traditionalism	-.010	-.068*	.167***	-.092*	.053	-.103**	.171***	.059	.091*
Knowledge	-.041	-.034	.003	-.062*	-.007	-.058	.032	-.047	-.064*
Education	-.032	-.027	.015	-.017	-.059*	-.070*	.075*	-.063*	-.032
Black	-.096**	-.128***	.064*	-.064*	.015	-.048	-.007	-.025	.072*
Hispanic	.009	-.028	-.005	-.043	.029	-.004	-.008	.007	.024
Racial resentment	-.047	-.087**	-.029	-.045	.042	-.002	-.015	-.036	.144***
Egalitarianism	.077*	.046	-.067*	.089**	-.015	.100***	-.022	.104***	.042
Age	-.028	.055	-.087**	.047	.145***	.001	.114***	.045	.004
Strength of identity	-.128***	-.010	.078*	-.097**	.038	-.127***	-.019	-.088**	.091**
Libertarianism—authoritarianism	.396***	.576***	-.098**	.393***	-.531***	-.523***	-.101**	-.506***	-.207***
Disciplinarianism	.008	-.048	-.003	.010	.016	.000	.011	.077**	.047
Need to evaluate	.025	.028	.003	.015	.019	-.026	.059	-.019	.043
RWA	-.040	-.025	.004	.017	.029	.049	.022	.071*	.061
Openness	.000	-.035	.051	-.033	.038	-.025	-.077*	-.021	.076*
Conscientiousness	-.057	-.042	-.063*	.003	.028	-.040	.021	.002	-.029
Extraversion	.015	.010	-.042	-.025	.027	.035	-.029	.009	.040
Agreeableness	-.002	.012	.056	.018	-.016	.035	.066	.008	-.011
Neuroticism	-.051	-.045	.016	-.008	.040	-.010	.073*	.010	.002

(continued)

Table 5.20 (continued)

<i>Predictor</i>	<i>Guaranteed jobs</i>	<i>Aid to Blacks</i>	<i>Abortion prohibition</i>	<i>Government services</i>	<i>Defense spending</i>	<i>Federal spending</i>	<i>Cannabis prohibition</i>	<i>Overall</i>	<i>Logical anti-constraint</i>
Female	-.005	-.037	-.005	.018	.039	.071*	-.011	-.002	.036
Southerner	.013	.018	-.029	.068*	-.040	.051	-.080**	-.009	.013
Income	-.065*	.012	-.028	-.002	-.010	.007	-.003	-.085**	.035
Union household	-.020	-.037	.014	-.016	.019	-.038	-.030	.003	.017
Catholic	-.007	.017	.041	.027	-.012	.046	-.031	.033	-.010
N	1016	1009	1071	979	994	1072	1072	1074	1074
R-squared	.241	.361	.208	.240	.348	.273	.154	.296	.124
Adjusted R-squared	.222	.345	.189	.220	.331	.255	.134	.279	.103

\* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$



Moral traditionalism was the only metric that had an effect on abortion-prohibition hypocrisy for all subjects, which means that aspect of H2 is mostly rejected.

**Hypothesis 3.** Sophistication's metrics were limited in their significance once again, with the only effects that were strong *and* significant (i.e., beyond  $p < .01$ ) observed in several of the all-subjects models: Knowledge decreased hypocrisy on guaranteed jobs, aid to Blacks, government services, and federal spending, and increased hypocrisy on abortion prohibition; education also decreased hypocrisy on federal spending and had small-but-significant negative effects on overall hypocrisy and logical anti-constraint.

For liberal identifiers, 2 of 18 potential effects were significant, and only at the  $p < .05$  level, knowledge increased abortion prohibition hypocrisy and cannabis prohibition hypocrisy.

For conservative identifiers as well, the only significant effects did not break the  $p$ -value threshold of  $p < .05$ , and continued to reject the hypotheses: Knowledge decreased government services hypocrisy and logical anti-constraint, and education decreased hypocrisy on defense spending, federal spending, and overall hypocrisy, and increased hypocrisy on cannabis prohibition.

Altogether, H3 is supported somewhat for all subjects but mostly rejected for ideological identifiers.

**Hypothesis 4a.** For all subjects, identifying as Black negatively predicted hypocrisy scores for guaranteed jobs, and federal spending, as well as overall hypocrisy; identifying as Hispanic eked out significant negative effects for abortion-prohibition and defense-spending hypocrisy scores. These are the only points of support for H4a for all subjects.

Meanwhile, identifying as either Black or Hispanic had no significant effects for liberal identifiers, which is fully supportive of that aspect of H4a. However, for conservative identifiers, interestingly, for identifying as Black, there were non-null effects: It negatively predicted hypocrisy scores for guaranteed jobs, aid to Blacks, and government services, and positively predicted abortion prohibition hypocrisy and logical anti-constraint—each of the above is a rejection of H4a, but the null effect of Hispanic identification overall should be noted.

**Hypothesis 4b.** For all subjects, racial resentment had three significant negative predictive effects (*viz.*, abortion prohibition, defense spending, and cannabis prohibition), and two significant positive effects (*viz.*, aid to Blacks and logical anti-constraint)—thus, only two points of support for the hypothesis.

For liberal identifiers, racial resentment significantly decreased hypocrisy scores on abortion prohibition and defense spending, and significantly increased hypocrisy scores on guaranteed jobs and aid to Blacks. For conservative identifiers, it significantly decreased hypocrisy on aid to Blacks and significantly increased hypocrisy on logical anti-constraint. The 13 null effects observed otherwise support H4b here, but the non-null effects should not go unnoticed.

**Hypothesis 4c.** For all subjects, egalitarianism had positive and significant effects on four hypocrisy scores (*viz.*, guaranteed jobs, aid to Blacks, government services, federal spending), as well as overall hypocrisy and logical anti-constraint. Thus, H4c is supported here in all but three cases.

For liberal identifiers, egalitarianism had null effects except for its negative (and weak) effects in predicting aid-to-Blacks and defense-spending hypocrisy scores.

For conservative identifiers, egalitarianism had small and negligibly significant predictive effects for abortion prohibition (negatively) and guaranteed jobs (positively), while it had stronger predictive effects—each of which was positive—for government services, federal spending, and overall hypocrisy.

**Hypothesis 4d.** Age had just three significant effects for all subjects: It negatively predicted federal spending hypocrisy and logical anti-constraint, and positively predicted defense spending hypocrisy. For liberal identifiers, it had one significant effect as a negative predictor of logical anti-constraint. For conservative identifiers, age negatively predicted hypocrisy on abortion prohibition, and positively predicted hypocrisy on defense spending and cannabis prohibition.

**Hypothesis 4e.** For all subjects, identity strength negatively predicted hypocrisy on guaranteed jobs, aid to Blacks, government services, and federal spending, while it positively predicted hypocrisy on abortion prohibition, defense spending, and cannabis prohibition, and logical anti-constraint. For liberal identifiers, it had three weak negative effects (*viz.*, on aid to Blacks, government services, and overall hypocrisy), and was a strong positive predictor of logical anti-constraint. For conservative identifiers, it was a negative predictor of guaranteed jobs, government services, federal spending, and overall hypocrisy, and a positive predictor of hypocrisy on abortion prohibition (weakly) and logical anti-constraint.

**Hypothesis 4f.** For all subjects, preferred government size was a negative predictor of hypocrisy on government services (weakly), defense spending, and federal spending, and on overall hypocrisy and logical anti-constraint; it was, meanwhile, a positive predictor of hypocrisy on guaranteed jobs, aid to Blacks, abortion prohibition, and cannabis prohibition.

For liberal identifiers, it was hugely significant across the board, but variable in direction: negatively predictive of hypocrisy on guaranteed jobs, aid to Blacks, government services, and federal spending, and overall hypocrisy and logical anti-constraint; positively predictive of hypocrisy on abortion prohibition, defense spending, and cannabis prohibition—which is the only time those are similarly valenced for liberal identifiers.

For conservative identifiers, the libertarianism–authoritarianism item was a negative predictor of hypocrisy on abortion prohibition, defense spending, federal spending, and cannabis prohibition, as well as overall hypocrisy and logical anti-constraint; it was a positive predictor of hypocrisy on guaranteed jobs, aid to Blacks, and government services.

**Hypothesis 5.** As computed in the previous two studies, the extents of the predictive capacities coming from external factors in models predicting mean government philosophy, issue stances, and hypocrisy scores were calculated. Results are shown in Table 5.21.

While, once again, noting that these estimates are approximations, several strong distinctions across ideological identities are apparent in the

**Table 5.21** Percentage of predictive power from external factors, 2016 ANES


<i>Criterion</i>	<i>All subjects</i>	<i>Liberal identifiers</i>	<i>Conservative identifiers</i>
Mean government philosophy	40.35%	33.29%	37.93%
Guaranteed jobs	42.11%	49.10%	38.76%
Aid to Blacks	36.40%	30.38%	27.43%
Abortion prohibition	38.63%	19.66%	30.08%
Government services	44.74%	46.72%	41.37%
Defense spending	34.35%	36.95%	30.46%
Federal spending	39.16%	35.73%	38.23%
Cannabis prohibition	36.57%	28.68%	28.27%
Hypocrisy items	All subjects	Liberal identifiers	Conservative identifiers
Guaranteed jobs	56.32%	38.80%	41.11%
Aid to Blacks	47.78%	27.34%	22.78%
Abortion prohibition	60.07%	27.70%	28.36%
Government services	51.34%	46.27%	33.54%
Defense spending	63.51%	26.41%	42.82%
Federal spending	54.18%	36.02%	41.78%
Cannabis prohibition	46.57%	31.42%	28.88%
Overall	46.54%	32.58%	43.45%
Logical anti-constraint	54.15%	35.90%	29.40%

Note: Percentage compared to dispositional factors, calculated as sum of absolute values of predictors by category as a percentage of the sum of all predictors' absolute values

proportions of mean government philosophy and issue stances explained by external factors: Substantially more of conservative identifiers' than liberal identifiers' criterion variables in those cases are explained by external factors when it comes to mean government philosophy, abortion prohibition, and almost federal spending; while liberal identifiers have substantially more of *their* criterion explained by external factors for guaranteed jobs, government services, defense spending, and almost aid to Blacks. For cannabis prohibition, about the same proportion of explanatory power came from external factors for both ideological identities.

For hypocrisy scores, comparing the two identities, conservative identifiers had substantially more of their variance explained by external factors for defense spending, federal spending, and overall hypocrisy; liberal identifiers had substantially more external power for aid to Blacks, government services, and logical anti-constraint.

Additionally, the weighted proportions of each factor type's effects for both ideological identities on hypocrisy scores are shown in Fig. 5.4.



**Fig. 5.4** Weighted proportions of external and dispositional factors' predictive powers by hypocrisy model and ideological identification, Study 1.3

Notably—and noting again that these are distinct from the models in the full models above that include libertarianism–authoritarianism—massive inter-identity distinctions are apparent for several of the hypocrisy scores.

First, for guaranteed jobs, conservative identifiers have more of their hypocrisy explained by either external or dispositional factors than liberal identifiers have for both sets of factors put together.

Second, that same effect is apparent for liberal identifiers and federal spending and logical anti-constraint: Either set of factors explains more of the criterion than both put together for conservative identifiers.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, conservative identifiers have more of their hypocrisy on abortion prohibition and cannabis prohibition explained by dispositional traits than liberal identifiers do.

These sets of results present both the strongest case yet for the EPDAM in general, and the strongest case for a more nuanced approach to the utilization of the EPDAM.

## 5.9 STUDY 1.3 DISCUSSION

**Literally Everyone is a Hypocrite.** No participants in the 2016 ANES data had sets of attitudes that were constrained around a consistent, congruent logic of government involvement.

But, for many of the individual issues and smaller sets of issues, some subjects were .000-scorers, and identity distinctions were significant. Again, this is heavily a natural effect of the arithmetic for the Method 1 hypocrisy scores (i.e., calculating the standard deviation for two items with limited arithmetic ranges will almost certainly have some people indicating an underlying logic, by simple chance). For the other item that used an index rather than a single issue stance (viz., federal spending), the number of .000-scorers was still small, however.

Meanwhile, significantly higher proportions of conservative identifiers are non-hypocrites on the issues of guaranteed jobs, aid to Blacks, abortion prohibition (barely), government services, cannabis prohibition (barely), LGBT services requirements, LGBT adoption prohibition, and LGBT marriage prohibition; while significantly higher proportions of liberal identifiers are non-hypocrites on the issues of federal spending, LGBT job-discrimination prohibition, building a border wall, campaign spending limits, bank regulation, paid parental leave requirements, equal pay requirements, action on rising global temperatures.

The issues for which the strongest distinctions across the identities were observable in the percentages of non-hypocrites (i.e.,  $p < .01$ ; thus, excluding the barely significant distinctions noted above) make sense logically: The distinctions go so far beyond what could otherwise be expected by chance—and by the arithmetic quirks of the metric—likely because they are crystallized exemplifications of attitudinal hypocrisy. People stay aligned with their stated philosophy of government when doing so conforms them to their ideological identity, and people diverge from their stated philosophy of government when doing so conforms them to their dispositions.

Simply put, in all but a few cases, the following result serves as a broad takeaway for Study 1.3's analyses of hypocrites across the ideological identities, and perhaps the strongest support for and refinement of the EPDAM: Conservative identifiers are *less* likely to be hypocritical on government involvement when *preferring* government involvement would contradict the conservative *identity's* libertarian philosophy of economic government, but *more* likely to be hypocritical when *opposing* government involvement would contradict the conservative *disposition's* authoritarian philosophy of social government. This is key.

This is probably why conservative identifiers are more likely to be non-hypocrites on issues tied to economic libertarianism and individualism: government-guaranteed jobs and income, government services and spending, and—assuming it's a matter of individualism to a greater extent here—government aid to Black people. This is also probably why liberal identifiers are more likely to be non-hypocrites on issues related to social and cultural progressivism (i.e., the inverse of resistance to change; see Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003b; Sect. 3.1): job-discrimination protections for LGBT people, building a wall along America's southern border, paid family leave requirements, equal pay requirements, and government intervention in global temperature increases.

In the cases that are inconsistent with that broad takeaway, the distinction in metrics is an easy target for initial blame: Prohibiting adoption by LGBT couples had only two response options (and 58.5% of conservative identifiers chose the libertarian option), and prohibiting LGBT marriage had just three (with 33.6% of conservative identifiers choosing the most libertarian option). Moreover, the six-point scale for LGBT job-discrimination protections coupled with its accordant result consistent with the broad takeaway is further evidence of a metric issue here.

But, there are three other instances in which the broad takeaway is not supported on its face (*viz.*, federal spending, campaign spending limits, and banking regulation)—however, each of them is explained in large part by one aspect of the weirdness of the 2016 election: populism.

For non-hypocrisy on federal spending, the distinction makes sense right off the bat: Almost no conservative identifiers indicated support for decreases in *all* of the items included in the federal spending index ( $n = 9$  of 1181), with the mean index score for conservative identifiers actually being on the authoritarian side of the range (mean = .56,  $SD = .20$ ). This is significantly higher than conservative identifiers' mean federal spending stance in the 2012 ANES ( $n = 1818$ , mean = .51,  $SD = .22$ ),  $F(1,2999) = 50.50$ ,  $p < .001$ . Thus, compared to 2012, conservative identifiers in 2016 were less libertarian (*i.e.*, more authoritarian) in their federal spending attitudes.

While the items were not asked of participants in 2012, conservative identifiers in 2016 were also mostly non-libertarian on limiting campaign spending (mean = .83,  $SD = .30$ ) and regulating the banks (mean = .54,  $SD = .29$ ), with majorities in both cases indicating the bigger-government stance—*especially* for limiting campaign spending. So, again, with conservative identifiers so much more likely to advocate “The less government, the better,” their lack of non-hypocrisy makes perfect sense on these populist issues when they do not hold up that end of the government-size bargain.

**Religiosity Still Increases Conservative Identifiers' Hypocrisy on Abortion.** In addition to the three religiosity items increasing their abortion prohibition hypocrisy, conservative identifiers' overall hypocrisy is also ostensibly increased by religiosity and fundamentalism but not moral traditionalism, with the slack perhaps picked up there by a combination of disciplinarianism and RWA, which were not significant predictors for abortion prohibition—but *nothing* else, interestingly.

Also interestingly, fundamentalism and moral traditionalism decreased logical anti-constraint for all subjects, as did all three religiosity predictors for liberal identifiers' logical anti-constraint—but especially moral traditionalism. Conversely, however, fundamentalism was a positive predictor of overall hypocrisy for all subjects and liberal identifiers, but the other two religiosity items were negative predictors for liberal identifiers' overall hypocrisy—and null for all subjects.

While more fully extrapolated in the general discussion below, the importance of the conservative-identifier findings should not be under-sold—by themselves, they are among the starkest pieces of support for the EPDAM.

### **Sophistication is a Reliably Null Predictor of Overall Hypocrisy.**

Though knowledge had more regular effects for all subjects in Study 1.3, the lack of strong impacts on overall hypocrisy or logical anti-constraint continues to nullify the extrapolations of previous research. Simply put, sophistication helped to better logically align issue pairs with their accordant government philosophies in several of the full all-subjects models, but had the opposite effect for the most strictly defined *social issues* in Study 1.3—abortion and cannabis prohibitions—and only marginally significant effects on overall hypocrisy and logical anti-constraint.

**The Importance of Racial Resentment and Egalitarianism.** Yet again, these two dispositional traits had strong positive impacts on overall hypocrisy and logical anti-constraint for all subjects, and for conservative identifiers (except egalitarianism)—and had no effects for liberal identifiers two hypocrisy indexes. Thus, what are likely the two most well-established dispositional traits included in the 2016 ANES did not have relevant effects on liberal identifiers' hypocrisy indexes, but had huge and substantial impacts when looking at everyone—and for conservative identifiers in particular, racial resentment increasing logical anti-constraint is further evidence of the EPDAM.

## 5.10 GENERAL DISCUSSION

**Hypocrisy in the Electorate Over Time.** Figure 5.5 shows the mean overall hypocrisy scores over time for all subjects and both ideological identities, while Fig. 5.6 does the same for logical anti-constraint.

As elucidated in both figures, both ostensible measures of hypocrisy have been increasing in the last decade. Arithmetically, this makes sense, given that attitudes about the size and energy of government have shifted dramatically between 1990 and 2016 for everyone but those who identified as liberals. After a move toward *support* for government in 2008, in the midst of the financial crisis, the trend returned in 2012 (see Sect. 4.7), and continued in 2016.

The sudden spike of logical anti-constraint in 2016 is noteworthy for its magnitude and that ideological identification appeared to have no real effect on the spike. One explanation for this is that Americans are more of information specialists than they used to be (see Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996, p. 136; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002, p. 22), but because the information's sources are balkanized (Wells et al., 2017), the specialization is limited, blind, and flailing.






Fig. 5.5 Mean overall hypocrisy over time




Fig. 5.6 Mean logical anti-constraint over time

**Predictors with Regular, Robust, Significant, Strong Predictive Effects Across Studies.** A number of predictors were, indeed, legitimately predictive across studies, with strength and significance.

*Traditionalist Religiosity.* The various measures of traditionalist, Evangelical Christian religiosity tended to be positive predictors of social-issue hypocrisy in all-subjects models, and were almost always positive predictors of social-issue hypocrisy and overall hypocrisy for conservative identifiers. To illustrate, in only one instance were all three religiosity metrics *not* significant positive predictors of conservative identifiers' hypocrisy on abortion prohibition—namely, Biblical literalism in Study 1.1. Beyond that, though, each religiosity predictor was strong and positive for conservative identifiers' hypocrisies on social issues—especially abortion—which serves as strong, vibrant support for, if not confirmation of this tenet of the EPDAM. In other words, even with every other conceivable predictor of issue stances, measures of traditionalist religiosity almost always increased conservative identifiers' hypocrisy on abortion prohibition, which is exactly in line with what the EPDAM would suggest.

What are *less* in line are the scattered and irregular predictive capacities for liberal identifiers and traditionalist religiosity's predictors: Typically, one or two of the three predictors will significantly decrease liberal identifiers' abortion-prohibition hypocrisy, but the effects are more variable for cannabis prohibition, and, intriguingly, the index items, for which the religiosity items appear to have negative effects generally, with a smattering of positive ones, and chiefly, null effects.

*Racial Resentment.* Whatever the new Black winds up being (see Chap. 4), Black is, indeed, still Black. This is shown quite conclusively in the data: Racial resentment—that is, symbolic racism toward Black people—is consistently predictive and powerful. As a predictor, it has not really gone anywhere as a predictor of government philosophies, issue stances, or the hypocritical—or non-hypocritical—collisions of all of the above.

The robust, powerful, and pervasive effect of racial resentment in almost every model for almost every hypocrisy type is astounding, and serves as one of the biggest findings to come out of this book's analyses, on top of the fact that racial resentment's effects *remain* significant even when almost every other conceivable predictor is included in the models.

In even the most scientifically conservative and reserved interpretation, symbolic, implicit racism is tremendously important here: In virtually all potential ways, racial resentment increased people's hypocrisy on most specific issues, *and* especially their overall hypocrisy and logical

anti-constraint. If what is being measured by the racial resentment scale is measuring symbolic racism—and not, for example, individualism (see Sidanius et al., 1996)—then an obvious, if a bit overly simplistic dual conclusion is that symbolic racism increases hypocrisy while symbolic *anti*-racism decreases hypocrisy.

This, then, could be interpreted as a cloud in my otherwise sunny portrait of incongruence in Americans' political attitudes, if—as many have argued (see Federico & Sidanius, 2002)—racial resentment is also predictive of prejudice. Some simple tests on the 2016 data demonstrate strong links between racial resentment and pro-“white,” anti-Black, prejudicial attitudes and beliefs: On a three-point scale from “too much” to “too little,” those who indicated their belief that whites have “too little influence” had significantly higher mean racial resentment ( $n = 211$ ; mean = .74;  $SD = .23$ ) than those who indicated “just about the right amount of influence” ( $n = 2066$ ; mean = .65;  $SD = .23$ ), and those who indicated “too much influence” ( $n = 1192$ ; mean = .34;  $SD = .26$ ),  $F(2,3468) = 678.44$ ,  $p < .001$ .

In 2012, the differences in mean racial resentment scores were also significant across responses to the same item: Those who indicated thinking that whites have “too little influence” had significantly higher mean racial resentment ( $n = 445$ ; mean = .79;  $SD = .20$ ) than those who indicated “just about the right amount of influence” ( $n = 3140$ ; mean = .66;  $SD = .22$ ), and those who indicated “too much influence” ( $n = 1799$ ; mean = .47;  $SD = .25$ ),  $F(2,5383) = 578.58$ ,  $p < .001$ .

Importantly, it was a stronger mean difference in 2016 ( $z = 6.484$ ,  $p < .01$ )—which, altogether, suggests a heightening of racial fears and backlash between 2012 and 2016.

Nonetheless, put more simply, the more racially resentful a person is, the likelier that they will have hypocritical attitudes, and vice versa: Low racial resentment is associated with lower hypocrisy. And, stunningly, ideological identity did not have an effect either way—racial resentment has the same effect regardless!

*Egalitarianism.* The strong and robust effects of egalitarianism throughout this chapter were not expected, which has happened in previous large-scale psychometric analyses of the American electorate, too—Feldman and Johnston (2014) considered the regular strength of egalitarianism's associations in large predictive models of ideology to be “striking” (p. 344). Indeed, in all three studies, egalitarianism increased

overall hypocrisy in the all-subjects models and the conservative-identifiers models—and had no effects observed for liberal identifiers in more than one model at a time, as its significant effect in Study 1.2 for abortion-prohibition hypocrisy was not replicated in either of the other studies.

A few conclusions can be drawn, then. First, this could be utilized as another arrow in libertarians' quivers full of attacks on conservatives,<sup>3</sup> which I lament and condemn; although conservative identifiers can take solace in the fact that conservatives win elections, and libertarians do not.

Additionally, egalitarianism's robustness throughout this chapter's analyses is important to note, especially as the political psychology sub-discipline has kept it on the back burner, at most, of many research agendas. A quick-and-dirty review of conference programs and year-by-year Google Scholar searches suggests as much, with egalitarianism mentioned in paper titles and abstracts to a lesser degree as time has gone on.

In any case, egalitarianism was far from the most powerful predictor in most models, but it remained significant even when the discipline's usual suspects for predicting political attitudes—namely, authoritarianism/disciplinarianism, traditionalism, and the Big Five (see Lakoff, 2008; Mondak, 2010; Young, 2009)—were null, negligible, or comparatively marginal.

So, logically, why did overall hypocrisy increase when egalitarianism increased? The answer gets back to the fundamentals of this book: People violated their philosophy of government to a higher degree the more they expressed an egalitarian worldview, and this was especially the case for conservative identifiers. The worldview that follows from dispositional egalitarianism is rooted extraordinarily deeply within a person (see Funk et al., 2013)—deeply rooted enough, perhaps, to go unnoticed—and sprouts strongly enough to block out the other vegetation, which, in this case, is government philosophy, if this already-absurd analogy is extended.

*Openness to Experience.* When it was available as a predictor (viz., in 2012 and 2016), openness had a reasonably strong positive effect on logical anti-constraint. Outside of liberal identifiers in 2012, in every other case, it increased the degree to which participants' attitudes were incongruent with their other attitudes. This effect was not formally hypothesized, but it makes perfect sense from a logical standpoint: As someone's openness to experience increases—that is, as someone's creative, divergent thinking increases (McCrae, 1987)—the horizontal constraint of their attitudes decreases, somewhat necessarily on top of the statistical finding here.

**Predictors that Did Not Work Very Well.** In one case in particular, the hypothesized effects rarely achieved full support and were mostly rejected.

*Sophistication.* One of the most surprising takeaways from this chapter's analyses was the lack of powerful, or even meaningful significant effects coming from sophistication on the larger hypocrisy score metrics. The role of the sophistication metrics is almost entirely limited to significant effects on the individual hypocrisy items; neither knowledge scores nor education level has significant and robust effects for overall hypocrisy scores or logical anti-constraint.

Altogether, then, sophistication did not have a long-lasting, strong effect on overall hypocrisy or logical anti-constraint: Neither the number of correct answers to political trivia questions nor the highest level of education a person had in their life appeared to greatly *or* regularly affect (1) their individual degree of philosophy-violating attitudes or (2) the extent to which their attitudes reflected an inconsistent framework of logic.

Null results are meaningful in their own right, however—especially when they go against the broad expectations gathered from previous research. Earlier literature's findings about sophistication's relationship with logically consistent attitudes—that is, horizontally constrained attitudes (see Sect. 2.6)—were supported in this empirical realm, but in a limited sense: In each respective study, for all subjects, knowledge scores had a positive effect on abortion-prohibition hypocrisy and cannabis-prohibition hypocrisy and a negative effect on government-services hypocrisy and federal spending hypocrisy. (The latter effects were observed somewhat regularly for conservative identifiers, too.)

Nonetheless, what the results of testing the potential roles of sophistication mean, all put together, is that sophistication's effects are, overall, only marginal: The most well-informed and knowledgeable participants were, at most, minimally less hypocritical in some of their attitudes. Even less of an effect was observed for education level, which had a barely significant negative effect on overall hypocrisy and logical anti-constraint in the all-subjects model for 2016—and little else.

Instead, hypocrisy is comparatively more subject to significant effects from more non-conscious forces. The most robust of which were (1) racial resentment, for each of the three populations modeled; (2) egalitarianism, which was always impactful on overall hypocrisy for all subjects; and (3) openness, surprisingly, when it was included (*viz.*, in 2012 and 2016).

Thus, for elites and others use the supposed “stupidity” of attitudinal hypocrites as an attack *on* those attitudinal hypocrites (e.g., Eclectablog,

2013), they are being unhelpfully insolent (see Sect. 7.5); ignorantly ironic, given that they are almost certainly also hypocritical; and—according to these results—inaccurate, assuming they equate “stupidity” with lower political knowledge and education. Many imply or explicitly contend that conservatives, in particular, *must be* imbeciles for not realizing that their issue stances often contradict their philosophy of government and/or their other issue stances (see Chap. 7). This chapter’s results dispute that perspective, because sophistication—that is, anti-ignorance—rarely rises above negligible, and when it does, it is usually not for conservatives. As examined earlier (see Chap. 4), contradictory systems and constellations of political attitudes come with the territory for any ideological orientation in any political system, as evidenced by the dearth of subjects who scored .000 on overall hypocrisy or logical anti-constraint.

**Methodological Drawbacks.** When hypocrisy was predicted and modeled, I used a kitchen-sink approach, because (1) this is the first venture into this realm, and exploration is naturally done within a haze, and (2) control should be maximized.

Thus, when significant, robust, and strong effects were discerned, their strengths may be getting underestimated, especially given the stark col-linearity of many of the predictors. Chapter 7 takes this into account and develops equations that predict hypocrisy using as few variables as possible, eventually explaining around a quarter of the variance in overall hypocrisy scores with a mere handful of predictors.

## 5.11 CONCLUSIONS: WHAT CAN BE SAID FOR THE EPDAM AND MY CENTRAL THEORY?

While the EPDAM is not a definitively accurate lens of viewing hypocritical attitudes, its utility in distinguishing across predictor types’ effects on ideological identities is, evidently, reliable.

A key resolution to this chapter’s story is in the now-robust findings that indeed, a great deal of explanatory power rests in individuals’ respective personalities and psyches, and that the power varies by ideological identity.

It is always useful to know more about the world and each other. It is probably *more* useful to understand our differing perspectives in that world, and why we have those perspectives.

Does knowing our differences are rooted heavily in these non-conscious effects mean that it is *natural* to be the hypocrites we are?

## NOTES

1. Party identification and the strength thereof would be additional important drivers for those reasons, and would be included in models in this study if not for their strong pre-existing correlation with *ideological* identification (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2006; Jacoby, 1991; Sharp & Lodge, 1985; cf. Carmines & Berkman, 1994)—which would subsequently increase predictor collinearity and, thus, reduce predictor efficacy—and the fact that the aforementioned issues with ideological identity are even more strongly observed for party identity (Bullock, 2011; Jacoby, 1991). So, they will be excluded from analyses here—although, it should be noted that their inclusion makes no ultimate difference in the results.
2. Given my holistic and sunny perspective toward the necessity of attitudinal hypocrisy and incongruence, I do not reject the normative terminological implications of *virtuosity*.
3. The February 21, 2013, episode of Fox Business Channel’s *Stossel*—entitled “Liberty 101”—featured an intense, vituperative back-and-forth between Ann Coulter and libertarian college students that characterizes this quite well.

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## Having Your Cake and Eating It Too: Using Cognitive Dissonance to Explore Attitudinal Hypocrisy

*Obviously they [conservatives] are hypocrites in that they want small government but then want to ban gay marriage and increase spending on national defense. You simply can't have the best of both worlds.*  
—Liberal experimental participant

*Liberals are hypocrites because like Obama he wants equality but then he is exempt from Obamacare.*  
—Conservative experimental participant

### 6.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF LEON FESTINGER

As previously discussed, a person who has attitudes that contradict each other is attitudinally hypocritical. For many social psychology scholars, this person exemplifies *cognitive dissonance*. This research field began in the 1950s with Leon Festinger (Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2007) and, subsequently, his landmark 1957 work—as of this writing, according to Google Scholar, Festinger's (1957) tome has been cited nearly 23,000 times, so its status as a landmark piece is essentially unquestionable—on people exhibiting attitudes or behaviors that are logically inconsistent with each other.

As an attitudinal example, for Festinger (1957), a white person may not think of themselves as racist, even if they oppose having non-whites living near their home (p. 1). As a behavioral example, a smoker may smoke even after learning of the dangers of smoking (pp. 5–6). It is apparent, then, that these people exhibit cognitive dissonance, and according to Festinger, they will try to deal with this discrepancy because it causes them discomfort—the “symptoms” of which can be observed (p. 24).

In terms of vocabulary, *dissonance* and *inconsistency* are synonyms—a fact Festinger (1957) acknowledges early on (p. 2). Festinger chooses *dissonance* instead to take his research outside of the “logical” realm that “inconsistency” occupies, definitionally (p. 2); while *consistency* is replaced by *consonance* (p. 3). While these simple vocabulary changes simplify research in cognitive dissonance, they also wall the research off from similar work in the structure of attitudes that may not specifically explore *dissonance*, but still explores the way attitudes will affect other attitudes (e.g., Judd & Downing, 1990; Judd, Krosnick, & Milburn, 1981; Lavine, Thomsen, & Gonzales, 1997)—although, it should be noted that some related scholarship has briefly noted the connection between dissonance and attitude structures (e.g., Critcher, Huber, Ho, & Koleva, 2009; Hoffman, 1971; Lavine, Borgida, & Sullivan, 2000).

For political psychology research in particular, then, Converse’s (1964) massively influential work on ideology is ostensibly one step removed from Festinger—a branch away on a tree of psychology scholarship.

This book and this chapter in particular serve as a direct unification of Converse’s (1964) belief system constraint and Festinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance. For Converse (1964), people have belief systems—probably not very stable ones, but belief systems nonetheless—that dictate their political attitudes. For Festinger (1957), people have political attitudes, many of which will contradict each other—and if, or when people figure this out, they will try to deal with it. Combining the two lenses, then, *when people confront their attitudinal hypocrisy, it should, at some level, cause them to experience psychological arousal and discomfort*. This is the central thinking behind this chapter.

Before continuing, I must make a definition clear: I will employ *cognitive dissonance* when specifically discussing cognitive dissonance literature but use *hypocrisy* when explicitly deviating from previous research on dissonance and focusing instead on the topic of focus from throughout this book.

## 6.2 COGNITIVE DISSONANCE AND ATTITUDINAL INCONGRUENCE

Festinger's (1957) model holds that people will naturally be motivated to deal with dissonance, either (1) because they may otherwise damage their self-image (Aronson, 1992) or other people (Cooper & Fazio, 1984), or (2) because they are fulfilling a commitment (Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2007), or (3) as simply put by Festinger (1957), because dissonance "is extremely painful and intolerable" for some people (p. 266). Whatever the underlying cause of dissonance may be, the negative psychological arousal and emotional discomfort (Cooper & Fazio, 1984, p. 257) that people will feel in response to their dissonant attitudes or behaviors is obviously dependent on whether they *realize* the dissonance.

Realizing dissonance, or even general awareness of dissonance and the effect it can have, is an idea that—according to some—has been "seldom" investigated (Lieberman, Ochsner, Gilbert, & Schacter, 2001, p. 138), in spite of the obvious notion that it should be an important aspect of the topic of dissonance. Research *has* demonstrated that dissonance reduction is largely automatic (Brock & Grant, 1963), with amnesiacs and people placed under cognitive load reducing dissonance to nearly the same degree as a control group (Lieberman et al., 2001). Additionally, research has found that monkeys and, to a lesser degree, toddlers may be subject to a drive to reduce cognitive dissonance to a similar degree as adult humans (Egan, Santos, & Bloom, 2007). These findings suggest that cognitive dissonance reduction does not require higher-order thinking or significant rumination. For dissonance scholars, people are not *rational*, but they are, or at least *try* to be, *rationalizing* (Aronson, 1969, p. 3); or, if not, then they at least tend to wind up dealing with dissonance in similar ways to people who are relatively rational (Brock & Grant, 1963; Egan et al., 2007; Lieberman et al., 2001).

Accordingly, people *deal with* dissonance in one of three ways: *modification* of dissonant elements, *addition* of elements that are not dissonant, or *minimization* of dissonant elements (Festinger, 1957). Others have since hypothesized and demonstrated additional dissonance-reduction strategies, but each tends to be variations on or combinations of the original three. For example, *denial* (Gosling, Denizeau, & Oberlé, 2006; Reicherter, Aylward, Student, & Koopman, 2010) and *trivialization* (Simon, Greenberg, & Brehm, 1995) are both forms of minimization,



while *attitude bolstering*—for example, self-identified feminists *strengthening*, or at least *superficially strengthening* pro-woman attitudes after being made to look anti-woman (Sherman & Gorkin, 1980)—is a form of addition and modification. Along that notion, making subjects acknowledge the importance of safe sex and the dangers of AIDS *increased* those subjects' safe sex habits (Stone, Aronson, Crain, Winslow, & Fried, 1994). In any case, it is clear that people *react* when they confront dissonance, one way or another.

Reviews of cognitive dissonance research suggest that the “most often assessed” form of dissonance reduction is modification, in which people simply change their attitudes to make them more consonant with each other (Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2007, p. 8)—or, to extrapolate into my paradigm, less hypocritical. Others have demonstrated that people will cope with dissonance with whatever method is presented to them first (Voisin, Stone, & Becker, 2013, p. 58), with experimental context being key to how participants will react (Lasorsa, 2009), as well as individual characteristics of those participants—for example, smoking behavior (Brock & Balloun, 1967) and political orientation (Critcher et al., 2009; Nam, Jost, & Van Bavel, 2013).

I suggest an overarching alternative explored by Brehm and Cohen (1962), among others (e.g., Cohen, 1960), in their assessments of the widely differing reactions to dissonance-arousing stimuli: *individual differences* and, in an experimental situation, *context* will first dictate *whether* a person will attempt to reduce dissonance—that is, if they discern that they are being dissonant in the first place—and, if they will, what method they will use to react. In other words, all people will not react to dissonance in the same way; a person's reaction, if they have one, will depend on their individual psychological, cognitive, and biological constitution, and the design of the experiment in which they are placed (e.g., Critcher et al., 2009; Nam et al., 2013; Newby-Clark, McGregor, & Zanna, 2002).

Clearly, individual differences people play a role in whether a person will be aware at the outset that they are being dissonant, with a large role played by—for my purposes, critically—a *resistance to change* (Scheier & Carver, 1980). Consequently, the underlying factors that drive a resistance to change also likely play a role—for example, dogmatism (Rokeach, 1954), IA (Budner, 1962), NFCC (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), and more (see Sects. 3.1–3.3). It is an effort to reduce uncertainty and a dispositional preference for consistency—along with other individual differences (Cohen, 1960, p. 316)—that could drive attitude change for some

people (Mills, 1965). Even Festinger (1957) noted this, stating that dissonance reduction's effectiveness depends on "the resistance to change of the cognitive elements involved in the dissonance" (p. 265).

Festinger (1957) goes on to note that people with a *low tolerance of dissonance* are probably more likely to "see issues more in terms of 'black and white,'" as opposed to others who can "maintain 'greys'" (p. 267). Again, this clearly harkens back to the epistemic and existential drivers of political attitudes (see Sect. 3.1), with NFCC, as one example, driving the absolutist worldview of conservatives (Golec de Zavala & Van Bergh, 2007). Cognitive dissonance obviously has a place in the assertions of the EPDAM (see Sect. 6.3).

Meanwhile, dissonance in politics more generally is an obvious—because of the regularly exhibited hypocrisy of politicians and readily observable absurdity of modern political systems—but only negligibly walked direct avenue of research (Bølstad, Dinas, & Riera, 2013; Elinder, 2012; Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Ni Sullivan, 2003; McGregor, 2013; Moshe, 2010; Mullainathan & Washington, 2009; Nam et al., 2013). Interest in the strict applications of cognitive dissonance theory has only developed "recently" in political science (McGregor, 2013, p. 169).

Academically proximal applications, however, are found in a number of scholars using cognitive dissonance theory to explore the effects of selective political information exposure (Garrett, 2009a, 2009b; Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, 2009; Lavine, Lodge, & Freitas, 2005; Westerwick, Kleinman, & Knobloch-Westerwick, 2013), due to the fact that people prefer to seek out information in line with beliefs that they already hold (Hyman & Sheatsley, 1947), a notion postulated by Festinger (1957, p. 128). These experiments generally conclude that people are going to seek out information that supports their pre-existing attitudes and avoid or dismiss information that might contradict them (Hart et al., 2009), but this exercise depends, again, on individual cognitive, psychological, and ideological differences (Case, Andrews, Johnson, & Allard, 2005; Cialdini, Trost, & Newsom, 1995; Nam et al., 2013; Newby-Clark et al., 2002), especially with regard to biases in general (Klaczynski & Robinson, 2000). It also depends on the method by which subjects are exposed to information (Schwind & Buder, 2012), and subjects' respective familiarity with that information (Schwind & Buder, 2012; Schwind, Buder, Cress, & Hesse, 2012)—although, according to those scholars, incorporating high-involvement operational institutions like "politics or religion" could yield different results (p. 795).

### 6.3 COGNITIVE DISSONANCE AND THE EPDAM

The mechanisms through which cognitive dissonance research fits with and applies to attitudinal hypocrisy and political psychology more generally are, again, obvious. It is important, then, to elucidate where and how cognitive dissonance fits into the EPDAM. Several articles exemplify the relationship.

After demonstrating how conservatives and liberals react differently to the idea that their stances on abortion and the death penalty may contradict each other, Critcher et al. (2009) point to cognitive dissonance reactions as a potential explanation. Conservatives simply reject the idea that their attitudes are logically inconsistent, likely due to underlying motivations that drive a *desire* for consistency. So, whether or not they are actually attempting to cope with dissonance—that is, if they realize they are being hypocritical—they are using a form of the *minimization* strategy, or even the *denial* strategy (Gosling et al., 2006). It is a safe bet that these conservatives' tendency toward rejection of the mere *idea* that they are hypocritical is, perhaps, reflective of an uncomplicated, absolutist worldview in which the only good belief system is theirs, and the supposed contradictions are nothing of the sort.

Liberals, meanwhile, exemplify the *addition* strategy by acknowledging their hypocrisy, but *justifying it* as a necessary compromise of principles and values, thereby adding a consonant cognition (Critcher et al., 2009, p. 201). Essentially, liberals agree that they are being hypocritical but that it does not matter in the larger scheme of things. This ambivalent ambiguity is fine in the minds of these liberals, which makes sense in light of their lower IA (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003).

Conservatives' absolute rejection and denial of the notion that they are hypocritical is echoed in Nam et al.'s (2013) study of the degree to which conservatives and liberals are willing to write an essay that contradicts their stated political beliefs—a classic paradigm in cognitive dissonance research (see Sect. 6.4). Neither group has trouble writing an essay about why tea is better than coffee if they prefer coffee, or why PCs are better than Macs if they are Mac users, but when given the option to not do so—as opposed to another condition in which they were required to do so—zero *Bush supporters were willing to write an essay about why Barack Obama was a better president than George W. Bush was*, as opposed to over one-quarter of Obama supporters who were willing to write an essay about why George W. Bush was a better president than Barack Obama

is. Nearly the same result was observed when looking at Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton instead, although about one-tenth of Reagan supporters were willing to write a counter-attitudinal essay versus one-fifth of Clinton supporters.

Although Nam et al. (2013) demonstrate that the effect does not extend to the apolitical realm—but acknowledge that their apolitical items were possibly “too weak” (p. 6)—considering that the Bush and Reagan supporters in the study were very likely to also identify as conservatives and vice versa for Obama and Clinton supporters and liberals (p. 3; p. 5), this is clear support of Critcher et al. (2009). Again, conservatives were largely unwilling to consider an idea that potentially contradicted their worldview, unless they were forced to do so. Most liberals were guilty of this as well but not nearly to the same degree. It was “a *relative* (rather than an absolute) difference in dissonance avoidance” (Nam et al., 2013, p. 6, emphasis in original). It is important, then, that analyses of this effect treat it as a probability, not an absolute.<sup>1</sup>

I propose that internal factors’ greater relative effect on conservatives drive their more closed-minded approach to the dissonance inherent in wielding hypocritical attitudes. While internal factors obviously play a role in liberals’ hypocrisy in those two papers as well—with, for example, liberals’ greater *tolerance* of ambiguity likely playing a key role, albeit not necessarily a direct one—liberals are also employing a fuller view of the experimental conditions. In other words, liberals are much more willing to accept the idea that they are hypocritical than conservatives are because liberals are more likely to employ deliberation in their attitude formation (Jost et al., 2003) and more likely to look at the world from other points of view, which is both a conscious and non-conscious trait (Choma, 2008; Jost et al., 2003).

The EPDAM, then, is a valid lens for exploring cognitive dissonance, as it demonstrates the differential driving factors of attitudinal hypocrisy—that is, cognitive dissonance—by ideology. Of course, absent from dissonance literature are libertarians and populists, in spite of the fact they constitute empirically distinct groups from liberals and conservatives (Carmines, Ensley, & Wagner, 2012; Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012).

The experiment in this chapter seeks to explore conservatives’ and liberals’ reactions to dissonance, as well as libertarians’ and populists’. By doing so, and using attitude structures as a common thread, the fields of political psychology and cognitive dissonance are unified, and as such, the

central theoretical framework of this book can be transpositionally tested in a way that logically follows from an extrapolation of the framework.

#### 6.4 EXPLORING COGNITIVE DISSONANCE EXPERIMENTALLY

An oft-utilized methodological paradigm in cognitive dissonance research is the “induced compliance” paradigm—also occasionally called the “forced compliance” paradigm (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959)—which was first executed by Festinger and Carlsmith (1959). Their original procedure had subjects perform the “repetitive, monotonous” hour-long individual task of tediously maneuvering spools (p. 204; also confirmed by a control group), and then receive either \$1 or \$20—according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Inflation Calculator, about \$8 and \$167 in 2017 dollars, respectively—and tell the subject coming in after them how enjoyable the experiment was. A significantly higher proportion of subjects who received \$1 later indicated that they *actually* enjoyed the experiment, compared with the subjects who received \$20. As explained by the authors, since those in the \$1 condition had a higher relative degree of dissonance compared with the \$20 group—because those who received \$20 had an external motivation to spend an hour being extremely bored—the \$1 group needed to resolve the tension from the dissonance of receiving very little money for a terrible task, and did so by changing their attitude. Although, it should be noted that replications of the experiment have found the same results, but also that the dissonance of the \$1 group depended on whether they thought they actually convinced the subject coming in after them (Cooper & Worchel, 1970), meaning that the attitude change depended on an additional, external influence—in this case, the influence of a situation that was “at odds with one’s self-interest” (p. 205).

Since the original publication, the procedure and its variants have been used in hundreds of studies, according to Google Scholar searches for “induced compliance paradigm” and “forced compliance paradigm.” An oft-used subsequent refinement of the design typically entails having subjects write a response to a statement or prompt with which the experimenter has already determined the subjects disagree (see Brock & Blackwood, 1962; Rabbie, Brehm, & Cohen, 1959)—that is, a “counter-attitudinal” essay (Scheier & Carver, 1980). Subjects are generally told either that they *need* to respond or that the experimenter would appreci-

ate that they respond but they are free to not respond—“low-choice” and “high-choice” conditions, respectively.

The primary way of separating the two choice conditions is through the simple inclusion of a statement and question pairing—such as that used by Gosling et al. (2006), “You are of course free to accept or refuse. Do you accept?” (p. 724)—at the end of the prompt, which, in that case, turns the low-choice condition into the high-choice condition. A potential addition to some of the studies that use this paradigm is the inclusion of an additional consent form on which participants agree with a statement such as “I voluntarily give my consent to write this essay” on a separate page (Elliot & Devine, 1994; Wakslak, 2012). To *most* starkly separate the choice conditions, high-choice participants have read and signed release forms that state the following:

I realize what is involved in this task and that I am performing it of my own free will. The essay I write will be sent to a committee on campus that is intending to make decisions on this issue based on the arguments it receives from me and other students. I am aware that I may stop participating in this survey now without loss of participation credit. (Elkin & Leippe, 1986, p. 58)

While some experiments use the content of the responses as the dependent variable (e.g., Linder, Cooper, & Jones, 1967), others simply use *whether* the subjects wrote an essay *in compliance with* the essay prompt as the dependent variable (e.g., Gawronski & Strack, 2004; Harmon-Jones, 2000; Nam et al., 2013; Sénémeaud & Somat, 2009). This is *thought* to be measuring whether an individual was willing to confront a personally dissonant—or, in my case, hypocritical—cognition; although, as it will be noted in the results, it may also or even *alternatively* be measuring *not* sincere cognitive compliance, but simple compliance with experimental-project essay-writing *instructions* in general.<sup>2</sup>

A commonly observed result of the induced compliance paradigm is that subjects in the high-choice condition will *change* their attitude to the one they were induced into writing about supporting, while the low-choice subjects will not (Devine, Tauer, Barron, Elliot, & Vance, 1999; Linder et al., 1967). This effect depends on subjects’ individual PFC scores, with those who are higher in PFC more likely to change (Cialdini et al., 1995; Heitland & Bohner, 2010)—an effect that may persist at least one month after the experiment (Sénémeaud & Somat, 2009). Also shown to play a

moderating role in the attitude change effect in general is, oddly enough, mixed-handedness (Jasper, Prothero, & Christman, 2009). More specifically playing a role in the induced compliance paradigm itself are the factors of IU (Case et al., 2005, p. 355), the NFCC subfactor of a need for order (Stalder, 2010)—but *not* overall NFCC (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994)—and the related NFS (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993; Stalder, 2010).

Additionally, general psychopathic personality traits have a negative relationship with attitude change, with subjects with higher psychopathic personality traits less likely to experience a change in attitudes, although that particular set of results was fairly limited (Murray, Wood, & Lilienfeld, 2012). It is very likely that other factors play a role as well, as a large swath of motivational factors have a demonstrated role in structural changes of attitudes (see Briñol & Petty, 2005), but research has yet to catch up with hypotheses in this case. Either way, as will be noted in the following section, it is important to understand and, ultimately, control for factors that could lead to the effect of attitude change because the definitive purpose herein is to explore either/or compliance with the idea.

In any experiment in which the desire is to simply see *how* and *why* people react when confronting an idea, a focus should be placed on the factors above that have shown conclusively to play a role therein (see Harmon-Jones, Amodio, & Harmon-Jones, 2009). In the next section, I outline an experimental procedure that employs the induced compliance paradigm, and the method by which those factors will be recorded and analyzed in accordance with participants' behavior within the paradigm.

## 6.5 METHODS AND PROCEDURE

The induced compliance paradigm is a solid experimental tool for exploring how subjects will deal with the confrontation of, in this case, their own contradictions and attitudinal hypocrisy. Therefore, this chapter will employ a version of the paradigm in an experiment designed to elucidate what, if anything, happens when people are shown their ostensible hypocrisy in their attitudes regarding when the government should be involved in something.

The experiment was conducted with the use of Qualtrics Research Suite (Provo, UT) online survey software. In the fall of 2013, an email was sent to an undergraduate participant pool with a link to the survey and IRB information. Those who choose to participate will click the link and complete the web-based survey on an internet-enabled computer.

First, each subject was asked to indicate their age and gender. Since the participant pool consisted of students enrolled in introductory undergraduate political science courses at a large Midwestern university who received course credit for participating in experiments, two additional attributes were obtained, both of which have been shown to have *some* effect in experiments on undergraduates: year in college (Matthews, Levin, & Sidanius, 2009; Reyna, Henry, Korfmacher, & Tucker, 2006), and major (Sidanius, Pratto, Martin, & Stallworth, 1991). Additionally, due to the strong effects of wielding a symbolic, self-identified ideology (Cohen, 2003; Ellis & Stimson, 2009; Hartman & Weber, 2009; Malka & Lelkes, 2010; Smith, Ratliff, & Nosek, 2012)—and, subsequently, the potential effects of group identity on dissonance response (Matz & Wood, 2005)—participants were asked to indicate their *party* identification on a seven-point scale and their *ideological* identification on a categorical list, including *Liberal*, *Conservative*, *Moderate*, *Libertarian*, *Socialist*, and *None*. (I chose to include *Socialist* over *Populist* because of the former's higher relative recognition rate compared with the latter.)

Next, subjects responded to a version of the Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory (Wilson & Patterson, 1968), in which they were asked to indicate the degree to which they agreed with or were uncertain or undecided about—using a five-point Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree scale—21 political issues (see the Appendix). The 21-item version used in this experiment most closely resembled that used by Smith, Oxley, Hibbing, Alford, and Hibbing (2011, p. 392), although mine substituted in a few items more related to current events and ensured that the items fit within my government-intervention lens by wording them to necessitate government action or not, based on the agreement or disagreement with the item. For example, instead of participants indicating their level of agreement with *Illegal immigration*, the item I used was *Border wall* (see Sect. 2.6 for my reasoning).

Subjects were asked to indicate their ideology and positions on political issues prior to—as opposed to following—the administration of the counter-attitudinal essay-writing aspect of the induced compliance paradigm so that the issues were fresh in their minds for the subsequent essay-writing task. Essentially, then, participants received a non-negligible priming effect about their own political attitudes and ideology. The purpose of the experiment was to see *what* affected *how* they responded or refused to respond to a proposition that ran counter to their viewpoints. For ideologues, the counter-attitudinal proposition was that participants'



respective ideologies' political attitudes were hypocritical and incongruent with each other. Therefore, after the preceding sections, each subject was randomly divided into one of two choice conditions and asked to respond in essay form to one prompt, then another prompt. *The prompts asked all participants to write an essay agreeing with the idea that conservatives contradict themselves in their political attitudes and an essay agreeing with the idea that liberals contradict themselves.*

The order of the two prompts was randomly determined, meaning that each subject was in one of a total of four conditions, listed as follows:

- Condition 1: Low-choice condition A: “Conservatives contradict themselves,” followed by “liberals contradict themselves.”
- Condition 2: Low-choice condition B: “Liberals contradict themselves,” followed by “conservatives contradict themselves.”
- Condition 3: High-choice condition A: “Conservatives contradict themselves,” followed by “liberals contradict themselves.”
- Condition 4: High-choice condition B: “Liberals contradict themselves,” followed by “conservatives contradict themselves.”

In accordance with other induced compliance experiments, each *low-choice* prompt was preceded by the following statement, with the text box into which they typed their essay below the following prompt:

The purpose of this study is to gather student opinions about politics. You have been assigned to write an essay in response to a particular issue in the study of politics. Please take a total of five minutes to write a short essay responding to the following prompt:

Participants in the *high-choice* conditions received a similar prompt; however, theirs was different in that it included additions to the prompt that made it clear to the participants that they had a choice to participate or not, and that they would receive course credit for participating either way. The high-choice prompts were, thus, preceded by the following statement:

The purpose of this study is to gather student opinions about politics. You have been assigned to write an essay in response to a particular issue in the study of politics. You are free to accept or to refuse. You will receive course credit regardless of whether you respond. Please take a total of five minutes to write a short essay responding to the following prompt:

The prompts for the “Conservatives contradict themselves” and “liberals contradict themselves” conditions were, respectively, as follows:

1. Most political conservatives contradict themselves. For example, they say they want a small government, but they also want to ban gay marriage and increase spending on national defense. Conservatives, then, are hypocrites. In the box below, write an essay explaining why.
2. Most political liberals contradict themselves. For example, they think the government can regulate the financial system, but they don't want the government to get involved in social issues, and they want to decrease spending on national defense. Liberals, then, are hypocrites. In the box below, write an essay explaining why.

For those in the high-choice conditions, above the essay text box were two boxes corresponding to the following statements (Elkin & Leippe, 1986):

1. By checking this box, I realize what is involved in this task and that I am performing it of my own free will. The essay I write will be sent to a committee on campus that is intending to design polls based on the arguments it receives from me and other students. I am aware that I may stop participating in this survey now without loss of credit.
2. By checking this box, I choose not to write an essay. I understand that I will not lose course credit as a result of not participating.

At the bottom of the page was a button for participants to click after they finished an essay, or after they checked the second box. The following page consisted of the other respective ideology prompt and also contained the statements from the first page amended to reference the fact that they already completed an essay.

While many other experiments that use the induced compliance paradigm only have participants write one essay, having participants respond to two prompts enabled the analysis of how participants view the supposed contradictions of the other ideology, as well as how they viewed those contradictions in relation to those of their own ideology. Moreover, randomizing the order will help to alleviate any potential order effects. The fact that having a total of four, instead of two, conditions halves the number of participants otherwise available is admittedly a potential limitation of the study. However, the benefits and greater statistical control of randomization outweigh the risks of problems with statistical power.

As made clear in Chap. 2 of this book, because my intentions are *not* to *change* attitudes, but rather to see *how*, or even *if* people *react* to their hypocritical attitudes—although, reactions could obviously include attitude change—it was important to take steps to reduce the possibility that subjects’ attitudes could be changed, or at least to provide for a method of determining what may cause potential attitude change. Therefore, it was necessary to design the procedure to provide for those potential causes of attitude change as well as potential covariates of how subjects may react in general within the experiment. Included in this chapter’s experimental procedure were a handedness scale (The Edinburgh Handedness Inventory; Oldfield, 1971), as well as the PFC Scale (Cialdini et al., 1995), the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994), the NFCC subscale measuring a need for order (Stalder, 2010), and the NFS Scale (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993).

Moreover, because attitudinal hypocrisy itself, and a greater understanding of what that may mean, has been shown to be dependent, in large part, on political expertise and sophistication (Federico & Hunt, 2013; Federico, Hunt, & Ergun, 2009; Federico & Schneider, 2007; Griffin, 2013; Jennings, 1992), a measure of political sophistication was also included.

It was important to gather as much relevant information about experimental participants without over-doing it, so to speak, by including as many measures as possible with the fewest possible response items. So, subjects were given shortened scales when possible.

Accordingly, following the two essays were batteries for the scales above, as well as a few other batteries and items that have been shown to have, or *potentially* have a role in cognitive dissonance: openness, which has been shown to have an indirect role (Cialdini et al., 1995), measured with ten of the items from the Big Five battery (John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991); dogmatism, shown to have a role by Feather (1969), and logically plays a role due to its inclusion of “double-think” items (Rokeach, 1960, p. 74), measured with a shortened scale (Troidahl & Powell, 1965); intolerance of ambiguity (Budner, 1962), shown to have a role by Shaffer and Hendrick (1974), measured with the Kirton (1981) shortened Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale; and need to evaluate—which has not yet been shown to have a clear role in cognitive dissonance, but, with its role in opinion formation and strength, and attitude accessibility (Federico, 2007; Tormala & Petty, 2001), it is worth including—measured with the Need to Evaluate Scale (Jarvis & Petty, 1996).

In total, the following batteries were used after the two essay prompts, in the order presented (see the Appendix):

- the 18-item Preference for Consistency Scale (Cialdini et al., 1995);
- an updated 15-item political knowledge battery (see Federico et al., 2009; adapted from Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996);
- the 27-item Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (Freeston et al., 1994);
- the 10 items of the NFCC Scale measuring a need for order (NFCCO; Roets & Van Hiel, 2011);
- the 12-item Need for Structure Scale (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993);
- the 10 items of the Big Five battery measuring openness (John et al., 1991);
- the 20-item Shortened Dogmatism Scale (Troidahl & Powell, 1965);
- the 18-item combined Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale (Kirton, 1981);
- the 16-item Need to Evaluate Scale (Jarvis & Petty, 1996); and
- the 9-item Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971).

It was important that the order of the batteries be organized to maximize honest, valid answers and, subsequently, proper analysis. I expected participant fatigue given the number of batteries, so the most important items were administered earlier on. Since the primary target of study was whether participants in the high-choice conditions were willing to write counter-attitudinal essays, focusing on potential driving factors of attitude change in response to the induced compliance paradigm took a backseat to dispositional factors that may play a role in the dependent variable. The Handedness Inventory, then, was the final set of items of the batteries above, since handedness likely did not have much to do with whether participants would write a counter-attitudinal essay, and was only included because of the role it plays in attitude change (Jasper et al., 2009).

The final page of the survey included several manipulation check questions, including questions asking whether the subject believed they had a choice in writing an essay or not writing an essay, whether the subject indicated that they were paying attention during the whole survey, and whether they subject was only doing the survey to earn course credit. Before those questions, participants were informed that their answers would have no effect on whether they received credit for the survey, meaning they would not be punished if they reported that they simply breezed through the survey without paying attention.

## 6.6 HYPOTHESES

*Hypothesis 1* In terms of general results, I expect the several variable inter-relationships, without regard to the experimental paradigm.

*Hypothesis 1a Dogmatism, NE, NFCCO, NFS, PFC, IA, and IU will be positively correlated with each other and negatively correlated with openness.* H1a echoes the mountains of research on the interrelatedness of those psychological factors (Jost et al., 2003), and as a result, also serves as a manipulation check for the experiment. In other words, if H1a is not supported, something has probably gone wrong with the experimental procedure or with the participants.

*Hypothesis 1b Political knowledge will have no significant main-effect relationships with any psychological factors.*

*Hypothesis 1c For conservatives, political knowledge will have a positive relationship with Dogmatism, NE, NFCCO, NFS, PFC, IA, and IU, and a negative relationship with openness; the opposite effect will be observed for liberals.* H1b and H1c are attempts at replicating the findings of Federico et al. (2009), who found that those highest in political sophistication tended to have the strongest relationships between the respective psychological—or, to use the language of the authors, “pre-political”—factors and ideological affinities. This is a very common finding (Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996), which makes H1c in particular an additional manipulation check.

Altogether, H1 can be thought of as a sub-hypothesis to the rest of the chapter’s experiment. It is not *directly* applicable to the point of the manipulation, but it is relevant to gain a better understanding of the participants who *are* applicable to the point of the manipulation.

*Hypothesis 2* In terms of the experimental paradigm, I expect an overall replication of Nam et al. (2013), with a few additions.

*Hypothesis 2a Conservatives—self-identified and calculated with post hoc issue-stance composites, so symbolic and operational conservatives—in high-choice conditions will be almost universally unwilling to write*

*an essay about why conservatives are hypocrites.* H2a's substance relating to conservatives obviously presents the most interesting potential result, since such a result would figuratively separate conservatives—in terms of responding to their own attitudinal incongruity—from the other groups to the greatest relative degree. The hypothesis also stems from research similar to that of Nam et al. (2013), and cited by Nam et al. (2013, p. 7) in explaining their findings, that demonstrates that conservatives are more likely to strengthen their attitudes when confronted with contradictory information (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010) and weigh morality more favorably than pragmatism (Liu & Ditto, 2013).

*Hypothesis 2b Liberals in high-choice conditions will be more unwilling than willing to write a counter-behavioral essay, but they will be significantly more willing to write an essay than conservatives.*

*Hypothesis 2c Libertarians and populists—calculated post hoc, not via self-identification—in high-choice conditions will readily write both essays when their self-identification is neither conservative nor liberal.* H2b and H2c are simple extensions of those findings, treating the other ideological groups as decreasingly reliant on epistemic motivations in formulating and understanding their political attitudes (Iyer et al., 2012). But, as noted earlier in this book (see Sect. 2.4), the dearth of literature on populists' underlying motivations hinders the prediction of their responses, meaning that this specific hypothesis is somewhat of a figurative shot in the dark.

*Hypothesis 2d Conservatives in low-choice conditions will be more likely to write both types of essays than liberals in low-choice conditions.* H2d contradicts the null result of low-choice participants' compliance rates in Nam et al.'s (2013) sample, but I nevertheless would expect it to be true in this design due to conservatives' high rates of RWA—not to mention the fact that my experiment does not ask them to justify an idea as antithetical to their identity as the notion that Bill Clinton was a better president than Ronald Reagan—and as a result, conservatives' higher relative willingness to submit to established authorities. If the choice to *not* write an essay is *not* made clear, conservatives' general tendency to follow the instructions given by the authorities (see Dodd, Hibbing, & Smith, 2011)

should drive them to be more compliant than liberals, regardless of the content of the prompt in-question.

*Hypothesis 3* Breaking down the psychological factors and their relationships with the overall results, I expect results, consistent, for the most part, with respective findings in the literature related to those factors.

*Hypothesis 3a* *Refusal to write a counter-behavioral essay will increase with dogmatism, NE, NFCCO, NFS, PFC, IA, and IU, and decrease with openness, especially for participants in high-choice conditions, and even more so for conservatives.*

*Hypothesis 3b* *Willingness to write an essay in either choice condition will increase with openness, especially for liberals, and for conservatives as well (especially in low-choice conditions) but to a significantly smaller degree.*

Because dogmatism, NE, NFCCO, NFS, PFC, IA, and IU, and—inversely—openness drive a conservative ideological affinity (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009), and because conservatives will refuse to write counter-attitudinal essays in high-choice conditions (Nam et al., 2013), it stands to reason that these, ostensibly, “super-conservatives” will be most apt to exhibit the effect because they have all of the characteristics that have been shown to drive this response to dissonant cognitions. Although, conservatives in low-choice conditions again present an interesting group, and I expect that they will be more likely to be compliant more generally as a result of the instruction-following effects described earlier (see Dodd et al., 2011). Meanwhile, because a great deal of collinearity is expected when including all of the dispositional factors alongside each other, the dispositional traits that drive conservative attitudes with batteries that are *not* included in the experiment (see Chap. 3) will be reflected by including substantive conservatism as an additional predictor. Conversely, for H3b, increased openness is a driver of willingness to write a counter-attitudinal essay (Cialdini et al., 1995), so they—especially for adherents to openness’s basic political counterpart of liberalism (Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2008)—should have the opposite effect.

**Table 6.1** Political demographics, Study 2

<i>Self-identified ideology</i>	<i>Percent of sample</i>
Liberal	17.00
Moderate	27.94
Conservative	44.13
Libertarian	5.26
Socialist	0.00
None	5.67
<i>Self-identified partisanship</i>	<i>Percent of sample</i>
Strong Democrat	3.64
Democrat	6.07
Moderate Democrat	14.57
No party affiliation	21.05
Moderate Republican	23.08
Republican	25.51
Strong Republican	6.07

## 6.7 GENERAL RESULTS

The political demographics of the total sample ( $n = 247$ ; 44.9% female; mean age = 20.17,  $SD = 3.25$ ) are shown in Table 6.1. A plurality (44.1%) of the sample identified as conservative, while a majority (54.7%) indicated at least a moderate affiliation with the Republican Party—indicating a fairly conservative sample.

Next, a composite ideological variable was calculated using participant responses to the updated Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory, with issues re-scaled along the lines of a conservative political orientation—in accordance with Pew Research Center’s (2011) issue analysis—summed together to form a substantive “conservatism” variable (see the Appendix), and standardized. Additionally, a categorical, quartile variable was constructed from this composite variable, with those who scored in the top 25%, middle 50%, and bottom 25% computed as three separate groups. Unfortunately, the negligible percentage of libertarian identifiers—not to mention the non-existent percentage of socialist identifiers—does not bode well for the analysis thereof. On top of that, the calculation of a libertarian score showed significantly less deviation than that found in the conservatism score. Thus, the ability to make broad claims about libertarians and populists is already threatened.



**Table 6.2** Bivariate correlations between measured traits

Traits	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
1. Conservatism	1										
2. Knowledge	-.053	1									
3. PEC	.288***	-.091	1								
4. IU	.093	-.281***	.358***	1							
5. NFCCO	.054	.001	.401***	.314***	1						
6. NFS	.145*	-.086	.454***	.616***	.676***	1					
7. Openness	-.211***	.190**	-.009	-.242***	-.085	-.231***	1				
8. Dogmatism	.162*	-.250***	.304***	.500***	.076	.243***	-.069	1			
9. IA	.250***	-.145*	.415***	.441***	.338***	.483***	-.291***	.501***	1		
10. NE	.214***	.184**	.100	.013	.078	.037	.101	.049	.095	1	
11. Mixed-handedness	.019	.122	-.009	-.015	-.091	.002	.066	-.085	-.129*	-.087	1

\*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .001$

## 6.8 DISPOSITIONAL TRAIT RESULTS

In terms of the dispositional variables, each scale was calculated and standardized. Their inter-correlations are shown in Table 6.2.

Most of H1a's hypothesized relationships are supported, with null relationships only observed for NFCCO & dogmatism and NE; openness & PFC, NFCCO, dogmatism, and NE; and NE and everything, really. Still, these exceptions do not outweigh the rest of H1a's support<sup>3</sup>; although, the lack of significant main-effect relationships between, for example, dogmatism and NFCCO when that relationship is so well-established in the literature is definitely worth noting, nonetheless.

Political knowledge's significant main-effect relationships with IU, openness, dogmatism, IA, and NE are rejections of the hypothesized null effects of H1b—although the correlation with IA is not powerful enough to be able to dismiss the possibility of a false-positive, and can be treated as a null relationship (Cohen, 1988). Still, four rejections of H1b should not go unnoticed.

Trait correlations with political knowledge by self-identified ideology and by substantive, post hoc-calculated ideology (see Table 6.3) revealed a few significant relationships of note.

For self-identified liberals, knowledge scores are negatively correlated with political conservatism. For self-identified conservatives, knowledge scores are positively correlated with conservatism and the need to evalu-

**Table 6.3** Bivariate correlations of knowledge with traits, by ideology

<i>Trait</i>	<i>Self-identified ideology</i>		<i>Substantive ideology</i>	
	<i>Liberal</i>	<i>Conservative</i>	<i>Liberal</i>	<i>Conservative</i>
Conservatism	-.513***	.294**	-.449***	.200
PFC	-.153	-.029	-.257*	-.207
IU	-.174	-.242*	-.429***	-.299*
NFCCO	-.059	.063	-.216	.098
NFS	-.192	.079	-.345**	.088
Openness	.277	.159	.425***	.056
Dogmatism	-.185	-.118	-.359**	-.275*
IA	-.239	.016	-.361**	.048
NE	.267	.257**	.271*	.259*
Mixed-handedness	-.070	.172	.049	.185

\* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$

ate, and negatively correlated—albeit weakly ( $p = .011$ )—with intolerance of uncertainty.

For substantive liberals, knowledge scores have a number of strong correlations: negatively with conservatism, preference for consistency, intolerance of uncertainty, need for structure, dogmatism, and intolerance of ambiguity; and positively with openness and need to evaluate. Except for the last one, each of those relationships demonstrates support for H1c.

Meanwhile, for substantive conservatives, knowledge negatively correlates with intolerance of uncertainty and dogmatism, and positively correlates with need to evaluate—although, each correlation is fairly low in statistical power: Only the effect sizes over .350 or under  $-.350$  have enough statistical power, given the sample sizes, which means substantive conservatives' knowledge scores' relationships are all ostensibly null. This is mostly a rejection, then, of H1c, meaning that something is strange and unexpected with regard to conservative participants' political knowledge scores.

## 6.9 ESSAY COMPLIANCE: GENERAL RESULTS

Essay compliance—the dependent variable of the study—was determined for both essay types in accordance with previous research, with full compliance-with-the-prompt noted in comparison to partial compliance (in which subjects were coded as having written an essay that ignored the explicit instructions of the prompt<sup>4</sup>) and full non-compliance (in which subjects were coded as having either not written anything or having written something to the effect of “I will not write this”). In previous research, those who were *partially* compliant are not generally used in analyses or are included with those who are non-compliant; the focus is only on those who were *fully* compliant or *not-at-all* compliant. I will be proceeding along this line. In total, the number of participants in each condition was nearly identical, with 63, 62, 60, and 62 in conditions 1 through 4, respectively.

Pearson chi-squared tests reveal that the choice manipulation worked splendidly. Low-choice participants were significantly more likely to comply with the prompt than high-choice participants than would be expected by chance: For the conservative-hypocrisy essay,  $n = 64$  of 125 low-choice participants complied, compared with only  $n = 18$  of 122 high-choice

participants—a significantly lower proportion than would be expected by chance ( $\chi^2 = 36.980, p < .001$ ); for the liberal-hypocrisy essay,  $n = 81$  of 125 low-choice participants complied, compared with  $n = 17$  of 122—again, a significantly lower proportion ( $\chi^2 = 66.742, p < .001$ ). Moreover, significantly more high-choice than low-choice participants agreed with the statement “I felt like I had a choice in writing an essay or not writing an essay,”  $F(1,245) = 108.149, p < .001$ .

**Essay compliance comparisons.** Compliance with the essays was first compared across ideological types for high-choice participants. Chi-squared tests reveal that, for high-choice participants, when looking at just self-identified liberals vs. conservatives, identity had *no* significant effect on compliance with writing either the conservative essay ( $\chi^2 = .497, p = .481$ ) or the liberal essay ( $\chi^2 = .032, p = .858$ ). The same null effects were observed when looking at self-identified liberals and conservatives complying with either essay compared with everyone else (all  $p$ -values  $> .05$ ).

Looking at substantive ideology, chi-squared tests reveal that substantive ideology *does* appear to have played a minimal role in compliance for high-choice participants. When comparing just the bottom and top conservatism quartiles,  $n = 1$  of 31 substantive liberals complied with the liberal-hypocrisy essay, compared with  $n = 7$  of 30 substantive conservatives ( $\chi^2 = 5.410, p = .020$ )—a significant difference that holds up even with a Fisher’s Exact Test (two-sided  $p = .026$ ). This contradicts rejects H2a, with substantive liberals significantly less willing to write essays about why liberals have hypocritical attitudes. No such effect was observed when looking at the conservative-hypocrisy essay, for which statistically identical proportions of both substantive ideologies were compliant ( $\chi^2 = .172, p = .679$ ).

When comparing substantive liberals with everyone else, the significant difference in compliance rates with the liberal-hypocrisy essay was observed again ( $\chi^2 = 3.974, p = .046$ ), but a Fisher’s Exact Test demonstrates that this was likely a false-positive (two-sided  $p = .068$ ). No other differences were observed when comparing either substantive ideology with everyone else.

In any case, H2b either the null hypothesis is confirmed or the opposite of the hypothesized effect is confirmed, meaning that H2b is rejected.


For substantive libertarians and populists, meanwhile—calculated in the quartile manner above, except scored as the sum of issues that

require government intervention; so, an anti-libertarianism / populism score—there was no significant effect on compliance for either essay for high-choice participants (all  $p$ -values  $> .05$ ). In other words, neither substantive libertarians nor substantive populists were more or less likely to comply with either essay than would otherwise be expected by random chance; libertarianism score has no role in compliance. H2c is fully rejected.

For H2d, when looking at just self-identified liberals and self-identified conservatives in low-choice conditions, several key distinctions are observed. First, a significantly higher proportion of self-identified liberals ( $n = 12$  of 17) than self-identified conservatives ( $n = 23$  of 58) are compliant with the conservative-hypocrisy essay ( $\chi^2 = 5.054$ ,  $p = .025$ )—significance that holds up with a Fisher's Exact Test (two-sided  $p = .030$ ). However, no difference in proportions is observed when looking at low-choice compliance rates with the liberal-hypocrisy essay across the two self-identified ideologies ( $\chi^2 = 1.487$ ,  $p = .223$ ).

When comparing self-identified liberals with everyone else in low-choice conditions, there were no significant differences for either essay prompt (both  $p$ -values  $> .05$ ). When comparing conservative identifiers with everyone else, however, they were significantly less likely to comply with the conservative-hypocrisy essay ( $\chi^2 = 5.772$ ,  $p = .016$ ; Fisher's Exact Test two-sided  $p = .020$ ), and nearly significantly more likely to comply with the liberal-hypocrisy essay ( $\chi^2 = 4.137$ ,  $p = .042$ ; Fisher's Exact Test two-sided  $p = .060$ ). All of this is to say that in only that last comparison was H2d supported, and even then, only marginally, with a far-than-ideal Fisher's Exact Test result.

In terms of substantive ideology and low-choice compliance rates, when looking just at substantive liberals and substantive conservatives compared with each other, substantive liberals ( $n = 21$  of 33) were significantly more likely to comply than substantive conservatives ( $n = 11$  of 34) with the conservative-hypocrisy prompt ( $\chi^2 = 6.569$ ,  $p = .010$ ; Fisher's Exact Test two-sided  $p = .015$ ). Meanwhile, substantive liberals ( $n = 19$  of 33) were significantly less likely to comply than substantive conservatives ( $n = 30$  of 34) with the liberal-hypocrisy essay ( $\chi^2 = 8.012$ ,  $p = .005$ ; Fisher's Exact Test two-sided  $p = .006$ ). Importantly, when comparing substantive conservatives with everyone else, both of these findings are strengthened: They are significantly less likely to comply with the conservative-hypocrisy essay ( $\chi^2 = 6.640$ ,  $p = .010$ ; Fisher's Exact Test two-sided  $p = .015$ ), and significantly more likely to comply with the liberal-hypocrisy essay ( $\chi^2 = 11.245$ ,



**Fig. 6.1** Compliance rates by essay condition and ideology

$p < .001$ ; Fisher's Exact Test two-sided  $p < .001$ ), with no significant differences observed when comparing substantive liberals with everyone else.

Thus, H2d is partially supported, but partially rejected as well: Conservatives in low-choice conditions were somewhat more likely to comply with liberal-hypocrisy essay prompts, but also less likely to comply with conservative-hypocrisy essay prompts.

Full results for both essays are pictured in Fig. 6.1.

## 6.10 ESSAY COMPLIANCE AND DISPOSITIONAL TRAITS

Using ANOVA  $F$ -tests to compare the dispositional trait scores between those who were and were not compliant with either essay in either choice condition yields a few significant differences. First, low-choice participants who were compliant with the conservative-hypocrisy essay had significantly lower mean conservatism scores than those who were non-compliant,  $F(1,124) = 6.991, p = .009$ . The opposite was true for the liberal-hypocrisy essay, for which those who were compliant had significantly *higher* mean conservatism scores than those who were non-compliant,  $F(1,124) = 7.376, p = .008$ . Each of those effects has enough statistical power to dismiss the possibility of a false-positive (Cohen, 1988).

Meanwhile, for high-choice participants, those who were compliant with the conservative-hypocrisy essay had significantly higher mean dogmatism than those who were non-compliant,  $F(1,121) = 7.179, p = .008$ . For the liberal-hypocrisy essay, those who were compliant had marginally higher mean conservatism scores than those who were non-compliant,  $F(1,121) = 4.360, p = .039$ . In only the former instance is the sample size large enough to give the effect enough statistical power to dismiss the possibility of a Type I error (Cohen, 1988).

**Predicting essay compliance.** Next, binary logistic regressions predicting compliance with either essay prompt were run using the dispositional trait scores as predictors, as well as the following: choice condition (1 = high; 0 = low), which prompt they received first (1 = conservative; 0 = liberal), gender (1 = female), and conservatism score. Table 6.4 shows the results.

As would be expected in even the most simplistic induced compliance experiments—including those without perfect experimental control (*viz.*, Study 2)—whether participants were told they did not need to comply with the essay-writing task was a significant predictor of compliance with both essay-writing tasks: For both essay conditions, being in the high-choice condition significantly reduced the odds of writing the essay ( $p < .001$ ). Therefore, at the very least, the experimental manipulation worked, even when taking dispositional traits into account.

Looking at just the conservative-hypocrisy essay, in addition to the choice condition, substantive conservatism and dogmatism were also significant—albeit, near the margins of statistical significance—predictors: Substantive conservatism decreased the odds of compliance ( $b = -2.013, SE = .945, Wald = 4.542, p = .033$ ), while dogmatism increased the odds of compliance ( $b = 3.416, SE = 1.632, Wald = 4.378, p = .036$ ).

**Table 6.4** Binary logistic regressions predicting compliance by essay topic

<i>Predictor</i>	<i>Essay topic</i>				
	<i>Conservative hypocrisy</i>		<i>Liberal hypocrisy</i>		
	<i>b (SE)</i>	<i>Wald</i>	<i>b (SE)</i>	<i>Wald</i>	
Choice	-1.865*** (.333)	31.345	-2.821*** (.375)	56.587	
Essay order	-.208 (.317)	.428	.471 (.338)	1.943	
Female	-.300 (.316)	.898	.367 (.339)	1.172	
Conservatism	-2.013* (.945)	4.542	2.590* (1.012)	6.549	
Knowledge	.606 (.771)	.616	1.513 (.804)	3.538	
PFC	-.973 (1.201)	.656	2.243 (1.279)	3.074	
IU	.010 (1.500)	.000	.312 (1.544)	.041	
NFCCO	-.185 (1.152)	.026	-.699 (1.182)	.350	
NFS	.386 (1.521)	.065	-1.607 (1.577)	1.038	
Openness	.999 (1.059)	.891	-1.939 (1.133)	2.931	
Dogmatism	3.416* (1.632)	4.378	2.182 (1.687)	1.673	
IA	.667 (1.463)	.208	-.648 (1.581)	.168	
NE	.138 (.950)	.021	.008 (1.025)	.000	
Mixed-handedness	-.597 (.972)	.377	-.706 (1.101)	.411	
Constant	-.827 (1.157)	.511	-1.365 (1.232)	1.228	
<i>n</i>	247		247		
$\chi^2$ (df)	54.642*** (14)		95.056*** (14)		
Pseudo <i>R</i> -squared	.276		.432		

\* $p < .05$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$

For the liberal-hypocrisy essay, on top of the choice condition, only substantive conservatism was a significant predictor ( $b = 2.590$ ,  $SE = 1.012$ ,  $Wald = 6.549$ ,  $p = .010$ ).

Importantly, all of those significant patterns of results are repeated when the full model is automatically reduced in the backward-conditional Wald method. For the conservative-hypocrisy essay, choice ( $b = -1.876$ ,  $SE = .323$ ,  $Wald = 33.697$ ,  $p < .001$ ), substantive conservatism ( $b = -2.218$ ,  $SE = .853$ ,  $Wald = 6.763$ ,  $p = .009$ ), and dogmatism ( $b = 3.168$ ,  $SE = 1.258$ ,  $Wald = 6.341$ ,  $p = .012$ ) are automatically included in the model ( $\chi^2 = 50.317$ ,  $df = 3$ ,  $p < .001$ ; Nagelkerke pseudo  $R$ -squared = .256). For the liberal-hypocrisy essay, choice ( $b = -2.565$ ,  $SE = .338$ ,  $Wald = 57.420$ ,  $p < .001$ ) and substantive conservatism ( $b = 2.939$ ,  $SE = .894$ ,  $Wald = 10.807$ ,  $p = .001$ ) are automatically included in the model ( $\chi^2 = 82.762$ ,  $df = 2$ ,  $p < .001$ ; Nagelkerke pseudo  $R$ -squared = .385).



Thus, these results are almost-complete rejections of H3a and H3b, with the only support coming from substantive conservatism decreasing the odds of compliance with the conservative-hypocrisy essay and increasing the odds of compliance with the liberal-hypocrisy essay.

## 6.11 DISCUSSION OF GENERAL RESULTS

It is immediately apparent that the notion that conservatives, however they are defined or operationalized, would be completely unwilling to write an essay about why conservatives are hypocritical was false; although substantive conservatism did decrease compliance rates for the conservative-hypocrisy essay, it was both (1) non-universal and (2) not observed with the liberal-hypocrisy essay. This is a rejection of Nam et al. (2013)—a rejection replicated by others (Brandt & Crawford, 2013; Collins, Crawford, & Brandt, 2017).

The use of a student sample, however, does make the findings questionable—at least at the outset—for a few reasons.

First, it would be understandable to expect that undergraduates are not as politically knowledgeable enough for the sample to wield external validity. However, compared with the mean (.43) and standard error (.014) of the fairly externally valid sample of Federico et al. (2009)—after using the same methodology to calculate them—the mean (.51) and accordant standard error (.014) of my sample actually appears to demonstrate that my sample has significantly higher political knowledge,  $F(1,533) = 15.886$ ,  $p < .001$ . This indicates that a lack of political knowledge is not a problem for my sample. In fact, this likely explains the almost-complete rejection of H1b and H1c: The high average political knowledge scores overall likely washed out any potential effects. This is in *addition* to the notion that political knowledge is not, by its somewhat trivial nature, measuring political sophistication—the variable of interest here, really—necessarily (see Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996).

Moreover, it is also worth mentioning that a few participants, in spite of the explicit instructions within the survey to *not* do so, appeared to look up the answers to the knowledge questions, as demonstrated by the fact that a non-negligible number of responses to items asking, for example, the office currently held by Chuck Grassley were along the lines of “Senior United States Senator from Iowa since 1981,” which likely means that they simply searched for the answer to the item in another browser tab and typed in the first result. In other words, it is very unlikely that even

the most politically sophisticated respondents would reply with *that* much information about Senator Grassley, but it is next to impossible to control for this apparent cheating outside of analytically denoting those participants who gave too much information, so to speak. Nevertheless, I choose to give participants here the benefit of the doubt.

Second, because the participants were students enrolled in a political science course, they may have felt compelled to write the essay even in high-choice conditions, since they knew they were receiving course credit for participating in the survey, in spite of the respective notations in the survey text. But, again, as mentioned above, this was *also* not the case, as compliance with both essays was heavily dependent on the choice condition. Moreover, responses to the final-page manipulation check item “I felt like I had a choice in writing an essay or not writing an essay” demonstrated a strongly significant mean difference between choice conditions in the expected direction,  $F(1,245) = 108.149, p < .001$ . Therefore, this was most assuredly not a methodological problem.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, the student sample did not prove to be particularly ideological, only demonstrating a minor slant toward substantive conservatism—unique for most research that involves undergraduates (see Corker, Donnellan, Kim, Schwartz, & Zamboanga, 2017). This is likely the only real weakness of my student sample, as the non-compliance effect was hypothesized to occur for conservatives. Without a legitimately large frequency of legitimate conservatives, then, it is not particularly shocking that the effect was not observed because, if the effect was going to exist, it would be most readily visible for strong conservatives.

However, this weakness is perhaps the only problem with my sample, and it was likely not enough of a drawback to prevent my central hypotheses from being confirmed.

These results mean that, unless something went horribly and unnoticeably wrong with the experiment, the conservatives-will-not-comply findings of Nam et al. (2013)—and, accordingly, the conservatives-will-not-acknowledge-their-hypocrisy findings of Critcher et al. (2009)—are the products of poor sampling, improper experimental manipulation, or differential political context. After all, in spite of comparing between every potential ideological dividing variable, and in spite of the experimental manipulation working properly, there were very few significant differences between conservatives and liberals with regard to whether they would be willing to write an essay stating that they have hypocritical attitudes. In other words, the notion of ideologically asymmetric reactions was not sup-

ported by the results: Ostensible political liberalism was just as strong of a predictor of non-compliance with the liberal-hypocrisy essay and political conservatism was with the conservative-hypocrisy essay.

Critcher et al. (2009) acknowledge that their sample is far from nationally representative and externally valid, emphasizing that the effects they observe are not universal across the ideologies, but are, instead, likely reflective of *some* underlying differences between the ideologies. Nam et al. (2013) make no such acknowledgment, but also do not claim that their findings are universal. Interestingly, it is again important to note that a more direct attempted replication of Nam et al. also found null results (Collins et al., 2017). The replication authors were quick to note the differences in the political context during the given sampling frames was the most likely driver of this finding, meaning that something probably happened to drive the Nam et al. (2013) effect in their time frame of late 2011 versus the replication's time frame of 2013—the same rough time period as my experiment. This again emphasizes the importance of historico-political context on this and related topics (see Study 1.1).

Nevertheless, like Critcher et al. (2009), I do not claim that my results are externally valid, and I do not claim that the findings are universal across the American population. Their *internal* validity is without question, however. What is more, the significant positive effect of dogmatism on compliance with the conservative-hypocrisy essay offers a potential addendum to the limited literature on ideological differences in dissonance reaction and clarifies the latent impact of ideology. Instead of simple political ideology—both in terms of identity and substance—being the chief driver of compliance, dogmatism is the only other potential driver, in addition to the explicitly stated ability to choose to not be compliant. But, again, this was only the case for the conservative-hypocrisy essay.

Dogmatism's predictive role is, at first glance, unexpected. After all, why should this indirect metric of closed-mindedness (see Webster & Kruglanski, 1994, p. 1054) be positively associated with ostensible *open*-mindedness with regard to writing the conservatives-are-hypocrites essay? The logit model demonstrates a main effect of dogmatism; the significance is *removed* when running the model for only one ideological group at a time. The main effect of dogmatism, then, may be a statistical fluke, which would make sense because of what dogmatism actually measures. However, this may be a partial confirmation of my earlier suspicions about dogmatic conservatives' higher likelihood of being willing to follow instructions. If highly dogmatic individuals are more willing, under

some conditions, to write an essay about why their beliefs are hypocritical, this may simply be a product of high RWA—a strong positive correlate of dogmatism (Crowson, 2009; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993)—and its increased willingness to follow instructions. I did not expect this degree of an effect, however.

Still, these results all continue to point toward minimal effects of dispositional, ideological, or demographic traits on compliance with counter-behavioral instructions. This suggests only small differences between conservatives and liberals when it comes to the respective ways they react to and deal with the cognitive dissonance of being attitudinally hypocritical, in spite of the expectations that conservatives would be almost universally non-compliant. Instead, the only real difference that is observed is the product of a pre-ideological dispositional trait, and even then, only for one of the essay conditions. Therefore, the broad conclusion that can be made about the non-null observed effects here is that ability and/or willingness to recognize one’s hypocrisy—or, as is likely the case of some dogmatic individuals, ability and/or willingness to follow instructions—is only minimally subject to ideological factors directly, and *indirectly* through the associated psychological factor of dogmatism.

## 6.12 QUALITATIVE DISCUSSION: “MAYBE WE ARE ALL HYPOCRITES”

All of that is not to say that there were *zero* examples of those effects. Notably, for conservatives’ reactions, there were a number of instances of conservatives rejecting the premise of the conservatives-are-hypocrites essay; this effect was qualitatively—albeit, non-scientifically—reflected in the content of a few essays. Several self-identified conservatives noted the “unfairness” of the conservatives-are-hypocrites prompt and pointed out that, even though they want to ban gay marriage, gay marriage “is a very minor issue”—an elegant and vivid example of the *minimization* strategy of dissonance reduction (see Simon et al., 1995). Other self-identified conservatives appeared to either completely ignore the segment of the prompt about defense spending, or asserted that supporting increased defense spending does not contradict supporting a smaller government because, according to one misinformed participant, the Constitution lists that series of opinions as “the duty of the federal government.”

Interestingly, the self-identified conservatives who acknowledged that banning gay marriage, increasing defense spending, and supporting a small

government were contradictory *universally* noted something to the effect of this set of stances not constituting “true conservatism.” Those who made this argument also had stances that were more reflective of legitimate libertarianism than conservatism; although, there were not enough of these respondents to demonstrate differences in their composite ideological scores and dispositional scores with enough statistical power.

The qualitative content of the liberals-are-hypocrites essays was less clearly reflective of underlying individual differences, however. Some conservatives were, indeed, quick to point to this as an example of liberal inferiority, noting that liberals “are selfish,” “uneducated about everything, especially government,” and “can never make up their minds.” One conservative’s essay in particular took this idea to a particularly confusing extreme, stating that liberals

are cry-babies and want so many things but they don’t realize that everything is intertwined together. Like, they want us to get our national debt down but they keep increasing the debt ceiling and spending millions of dollars on pointless things. Obama is a great example, he is the ring leader of Obamacare and wants everyone to have affordable health insurance but the Affordable Care Act isn’t affordable at all. They are more than hypocrites, they are more along the lines of socialists.

Others writing that essay were not as sympathetic and extended their arguments to make broader conclusions, with one conservative stating that liberals

want religious freedoms for all religions except Christianity, with such things as a nativity scene and a cross in the front yard or prayer during school. At the same time, Christianity is the only religion that tolerates other religions. I think Liberal beliefs are mostly anti-God.

Both of the two previous essays demonstrated factual errors and over-generalizations, a characteristic also demonstrated by the conservatives in the Nam et al. (2013) sample (see also Mooney, 2012; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). It should be noted, though, that although those essays were not the only clear examples of factual errors and over-generalizations, a real conclusion cannot be drawn from only a few samples.

One conservative writing the liberal essay, meanwhile, noted, somewhat warmly (emphasis added),

... maybe we are all hypocrites ... just because I am a conservative does not mean that I am going to say that liberals are hypocrites. They are humans just like me, **we are not robots**.

Coincidentally, two participants independently used a variation of the cliché, “You can’t have your cake and eat it.” Oddly, this metaphor was only used for the liberal essay, but an essentially identical point was raised in both conditions, with subjects of all political varieties noting that entire sectors of issues cannot be “compartmentalized” just because of personal preferences, and that the government cannot only regulate one system without regulating another.

Meanwhile, after poring over the essays, the only superficial (i.e., non-scientific, and non-empirical) claim that can be made is that liberals demonstrated both the minimization strategy that conservatives seem to use fairly often—one liberal’s liberal essay literally consisted only of “Liberals are not hypocrites”—*and* general compliance with the prompt. However, only 17% of the sample identified as liberal, meaning that any effect of *identifying* as a liberal would be reflected only minimally within the content of the essays, compared with the conservative-identity effects that follow from 44.1% of the sample identifying as conservative. In other words, because conservative identifiers were over-sampled—even though, again, the sample was *substantively* fairly moderate—the output of the conservative-identity disposition is seen more readily in the content of the essays as a result, in addition to the fact that the essays were *about* respective political identities.

Moreover, many of the essays were both confirmations of the personal discomfort with admitting hypocrisy in one’s own attitudes *and* the willingness to attack the other side for the same thing.

Critically, this is demonstrative of the notion that attitudinal hypocrisy still constitutes a common source of both (1) political attacks *and* (2) personal political anxiety.

Given the fact that hypocrisy has been, currently is, and perhaps always *will be* virtually universal in the national electorate (see Chap. 5), perhaps it should not be a source for either of those.

### 6.13 CONCLUSION

Cognitive dissonance functions effectively as a lens through which attitudinal hypocrisy reactions can be analyzed, but in this case, conservatives and liberals largely react the same way. However, in spite of the fact that no broadly significant ideological differences in dissonance reactions were demonstrated, there are clear ideological differences in psychological dispositions that did not surface in dissonance reactions, as shown in Sect. 6.8.

The implications of these differences on the EPDAM are clear, and will be explored more fully and broadly in this book's final chapter.

### NOTES

1. Necessarily, analyses like these must be done in what could be considered to be a “liberal,” open-minded mindset. Absolute, deterministic conclusions should be avoided when trying to discern differences that are regularly shown to be probabilistic and not universal. Therefore, I want to make clear that this practice is not a reflection of political biases, but rather a reflection of what I hope is proper scientific thinking.
2. This idea was conceived most explicitly—as opposed to the, at most, *implied* conception by myself—by discussant Brendan Nyhan, who deserves sincere thanks here for pointing that out.
3. It should be noted that mixed-handedness's apparently significant negative relationship with IA did not have enough statistical power to be able to dismiss the possibility of a Type I error (Cohen, 1988).
4. For example, in responding to the conservatives essay, if a respondent wrote about why liberals are *also* hypocrites.

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## What Good Is Cake If You Can't Eat It? Prescriptions for and Conclusions About American Attitudinal Hypocrisy

*My candle burns at both ends;  
It will not last the night;  
But ah, my foes, and oh, my friends—  
It gives a lovely light!*  
—Edna St. Vincent Millay (1922), “First Fig”

### 7.1 AMERICA IS ATTITUDINAL HYPOCRISY, ATTITUDINAL HYPOCRISY IS AMERICA

**Hypocrisy as a Universal.** Nearly all Americans are burning the candle of political attitudes at both ends; they have political attitudes that are, in varying degrees, logically inconsistent with other attitudes. It is not an attribute specific to those with stated ideological identifications, but rather, an attribute that applies to all except a very small proportion of the electorate.

In fact, in Chap. 5, *overall* hypocrisy scores were .00 for less than 1% of ANES participants from the years analyzed—with  $n = 0$  participants having perfectly constrained attitudes in the 2016 sample.

Virtually every American, it turns out, has logically inconsistent, hypocritical attitudes.

Virtually every American is a political hypocrite.



In this book, I have sought to explain what drives the attitudinal hypocrisy within that 99% of the American polity, with specific and primary foci on the near-majority of the electorate who either identify as or qualify as one of the two major political orientations (Jones, Cox, & Navarro-Rivera, 2013; Pew Research Center, 2011, 2014b; Public Religion Research Institute, 2013). Mostly in line with my broad expectations, but with a few exceptions, in a series of studies, I demonstrated *differential* and *asymmetric* impacts of some external and dispositional factors for conservatives versus liberals. Specifically, relative to liberals and to everyone else, conservatives' hypocrisies on social issues tended to be more strongly associated with dispositional factors, while their hypocrisies on economic issues tended to be more strongly associated with external factors. Liberals, on the other hand, tended to demonstrate the inverse: economic-issue hypocrisies driven by dispositional factors and social-issue hypocrisies driven by external factors. But, again, these were tendencies with big exceptions and caveats; the effects are not absolute, and that's part of the point.

**America as Attitudinal Hypocrisy.** In a 1774 letter to her husband, Abigail Adams wrote of a dissonance she observed in the country.

I wish most sincerely there was not a slave in the province. It always appeared a most iniquitous scheme to me—fight ourselves for what we are daily robbing and plundering from those who have as good a right freedom as we have. (Butterfield, 1963, pp. 161–162)

Adams's explication there elucidates perhaps the *core* contradiction at the heart of the American experiment. How could Americans so aggressively and rhythmically beat the patriotic snare drum of Liberty and Freedom for all humankind while, at the same time, they see a significant proportion *of* humankind as property?

It is not possible in any sense to traverse America's amber waves of grain or hike America's purple mountain majesties without being intellectually forced to confront the grandeur of this hypocrisy. We must acknowledge, accept, and embrace the hypocrisy as something as foundational as our shared values, while we work to salve the scares and lance the boils it has and will continue to inflame.

Incidentally, this is reflected in the data: In Chap. 5's analyses, racial resentment was a regular and strong predictor of logical anti-constraint, among a large number of other hypocrisies. Like the compromises that

gave us our Constitution (see Bowen, 1966, p. 95), the effects are there and must be treated with academic, empirical seriousness, and certainly not ignored.

In the most objective terms possible, then, it is wrong to not acknowledge the impact of racism here. It is also wrong to only condemn the hypocrisy that comes from that impact—hypocrisy, in that series of instances, is a symptom of something larger.

The EPDAM is a framework for including that *something larger* in a broader picture of hypocrisy, and this book worked to test the power of that framework.

## 7.2 THE CENTRAL FINDINGS: CLARIFYING THE EPDAM AND ASYMMETRY

**Tests of the EPDAM.** It is worth noting again right off the bat that the distinction between external and dispositional factors is difficult to draw—considering, for example, the fact that ideological identification is nearly as *dispositional* and non-conscious, so to speak, as some of the psychological traits that were tested; and the fact that the distinction is not a clean, absolute dichotomy—the understanding of external factors as *being able to be* consciously motivated *mixed* with the understanding of ideological differences in locus-of-control (see Abramowitz, 1973; Sweetser, 2014) means that the distinction not only makes sense but works empirically *and* holds up within my central theory, for the most part.

Nevertheless, most *inconsistent* with my central theoretical expectations were the observations in Chap. 6—in spite of the findings of previous research about differences in dissonance reactions between conservatives and liberals (viz., Critcher, Huber, Ho, & Koleva, 2009; Nam, Jost, & Van Bavel, 2013; cf. Collins, Crawford, & Brandt, 2017), *and* in spite of the hypotheses derived from my central theory. Instead, the willingness to acknowledge one’s own hypocrisy was not completely, or even more than marginally driven by personal politics, but by ideological orientations in concert with psychological traits: namely, and to varying degrees, dogmatism and openness. In other words, conservatives and liberals are more alike than they realize when forced to confront the idea that their attitudes *and* the attitudes of other members of their ideology make *them*—in the words of the prompt to which they were instructed to reply—hypocrites.

So, do the flaws and limitations of my theoretical framework mean it is useless? Certainly not, given the measured accuracy and utility of *much* of it—on the whole, in fact, the theorized asymmetric application of the EPDAM by ideology was demonstrated—coupled with the fact that many of the limits serve to clarify its expectations.

Put differently, a good amount of the model was supported, and what *appeared* to be contradictions were either (1) confirmations, given the contextualist—for example, I did not postulate that conservatives would *only* use dispositional factors, but rather, use dispositional factors *more than* external factors, and to a greater degree than liberals would—nature of the theory; or (2) opportunities for theoretical refinements.

### 7.3 PREDICTING ATTITUDINAL HYPOCRISY

To quantify the *relative* impact of each factor on hypocrisy, the next step would be a cross-study comparison. However, comparing effects across studies is not possible without a large enough degree of identical items in each study; and, given the negligible item overlap between the two studies, putting together a framework that shows the *exact* relative impact of every factor—and, therefore, allows for the quantification thereof—in one total model is impossible.

The best possible series of tests are those in which utility is maximized in the most contemporary context possible. Study 1.3 ostensibly already did this, so this section provides further elucidation of the underlying constructs at play here. I ran the Study 1.3 regression models predicting overall hypocrisy, but had the regression software automatically include only the predictors in the model that, when added in a forward-stepwise method, are *significant* predictors at the  $p < .05$  level.

**Predicting Overall Hypocrisy for All Subjects.** The model that was run resulted in an equation that explained over one-quarter of the variance in the sample with just eight simple predictors—half of which were binary variables. The full results are shown in Table 7.1.

Knowing eight pieces of information about someone can accurately predict the extent of their attitudinal hypocrisy over 25% of the time. In fact, the amount of the variance that is explained with those eight predictors is not actually significantly different from what it explained with only four predictors ( $z = .272, p > .05$ ): The model of just libertarianism—authoritarianism, identifying as a conservative or not, Biblical literalism, and indicating a Black racial identity yields an  $R$ -squared of .252.

**Table 7.1** Automatically constructed linear regression model predicting overall hypocrisy for all subjects in the 2016 ANES

<i>Predictor</i>	<i>Beta</i>
Libertarianism–authoritarianism	−.548***
Conservative identity	−.099***
Fundamentalism	.087***
Black	−.066***
Egalitarianism	.050**
Education	−.048**
Liberal identity	.060**
Income	−.039*
<i>n</i>	3232
<i>R</i> -squared	.260
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	.258

\* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$

That so few variables generally—whether four or eight—can be predictive of any random American’s overall hypocrisy to such a high magnitude is vital for understanding the importance of hypocrisy. That the 4- or 8-predictor model is no different in its predictive capacities as the 27-variable model is also vital to understand: The many, many additional predictors in the full model were ostensibly unimportant outside of their roles as controls.

**Predicting Overall Hypocrisy for Ideological Identifiers.** Two more models were run—predicting either ideological identity’s overall hypocrisy, automatically reduced again to only the significant predictors. Both models resulted in equations that also explained over one-quarter of the variance in their respective samples. The full results are shown in Tables 7.2 and 7.3.

Both models predicted identical amounts of variance ( $z = .216$ ,  $p > .05$ ). For liberal identifiers, it takes five predictors; for conservative identifiers, it takes ten.

What can be deduced from these models is that a decent amount of overall attitudinal hypocrisy can be predicted accurately about one-quarter of the time, with only a few pieces of information about a person. Chiefly among variables is the degree to which they espouse a given philosophy of government size, along with religiosity-related variables and, for conservative identifiers, egalitarianism, disciplinarianism, education, income, and right-wing authoritarianism. In fact, more goes into predicting conservative identifiers’ overall hypocrisy than liberal identifiers’; however, how reliable of an effect that is remains to be seen.

**Table 7.2** Automatically constructed linear regression model predicting overall hypocrisy for liberal identifiers in the 2016 ANES

<i>Predictor</i>	<i>Beta</i>
Libertarianism–authoritarianism	–.510***
Religiosity	–.117**
Strength of identity	–.077*
Moral traditionalism	–.091**
Fundamentalism	.096*
<i>n</i>	899
<i>R</i> -squared	.281
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	.277

\* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$

**Table 7.3** Automatically constructed linear regression model predicting overall hypocrisy for conservative identifiers in the 2016 ANES

<i>Predictor</i>	<i>Beta</i>
Libertarianism–authoritarianism	–.501***
Fundamentalism	.108**
Income	–.083**
Egalitarianism	.104***
Religiosity	.133***
Disciplinarianism	.079**
Education	–.074**
Strength of identity	–.088**
RWA	.078**
Age	.053*
<i>n</i>	1074
<i>R</i> -squared	.289
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	.282

\* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$

**Predicting Social-Issue Hypocrisy Scores.** The same linear regression models run for Study 1.3's tests of the EPDAM were run again, but predicting overall social-issue hypocrisy instead of overall hypocrisy. Social-issue hypocrisy was calculated as the mean of the hypocrisy scores for the social issues available in the sample: abortion prohibition, cannabis prohibition, requiring that businesses serve LGBT couples, requiring that people use the bathroom that corresponds to the sex they were assigned at birth, protections from job discrimination for LGBT people, prohibiting

**Table 7.4** Standardized beta coefficients for full and reduced linear regressions predicting social-issue hypocrisy in the 2016 ANES

<i>Predictor</i>	<i>All subjects</i>		<i>Liberal identifiers</i>		<i>Conservative identifiers</i>	
	<i>Full</i>	<i>Reduced</i>	<i>Full</i>	<i>Reduced</i>	<i>Full</i>	<i>Reduced</i>
Religiosity	.023	.044*	-.128**	-.104**	.152***	.191***
Fundamentalism	.039		.064		.079*	
Moral traditionalism	.099***	.093***	-.117**	-.125**	.201***	.211***
Knowledge	.081***	.083***	.099*	.087*	.081*	.079**
Education	.029		.025		.040	
Black	-.071***	-.068***	.028		-.067*	-.061*
Hispanic	-.046*	-.052**	-.032		-.043	
Racial resentment	-.030		-.087	-.122***	-.006	
Egalitarianism	-.009		-.014		-.027	
Age	-.001		-.014		.056	.069*
Strength of identity	.219***	.195***	.047		.007	
Disciplinarianism	-.013		-.048		-.006	
Need to evaluate	-.013		.002		-.012	
RWA	-.015		-.065		.057	.066*
Openness	-.005		-.058		.016	
Conscientiousness	-.004		-.015		.004	
Extraversion	.014		.011		-.012	
Agreeableness	.032		-.024		.038	
Neuroticism	.024		.004		.004	
Female	-.058**	-.047**	-.010		-.079*	-.066*
Southerner	-.025		.002		-.046	
Income	-.020		-.065		-.055	
Union household	.001		.038		.027	
Catholic	-.007		.034		.010	
Liberal identity	-.047					
Conservative identity	-.087*	-.068**				
<i>n</i>	3034	3034	867	867	1014	1014
<i>R</i> -squared	.071	.066	.107	.088	.175	.162
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	.063	.064	.082	.084	.155	.156

\* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$ 

LGBT couples from adopting, prohibiting LGBT couples from marrying, requiring paid family leave, and requiring equal pay regardless of gender identity. Table 7.4 shows the results of the full regression models and the automatically reduced models as well.

For all subjects, identifying as a conservative decreases social-issue hypocrisy, which logically follows from the social issues included in the index being, in total, more logically in line with using government to

require or protect socially progressive policies—though the prohibition items that would, indeed, require those indicating libertarianism in their philosophy to violate that philosophy, whereas the others would require them to conform to that libertarianism. This was also evident in predicting the abortion and cannabis prohibition items in Study 1.3.

Meanwhile, as it was for the overall hypocrisy models in Chap. 5 and reduced above, social-issue hypocrisy has more significant predictors for conservative than liberal identifiers.

As a critical illustration here, in the EPDAM tests in Study 1.3 that predicted hypocrisy on federal spending, the models showed the inverse of the effect it did for conservative identifiers on social issues: Liberal identifiers' hypocrisy on federal spending was significantly more predictable than conservative identifiers ( $z = 2.67, p < .01$ ), and was predicted by a larger number of variables—including two more dispositional traits. For conservative identifiers, there were three significant predictors in the full model ( $R^2 = .054$ ): identifying as Black ( $\beta = -.101, t\text{-test} = -3.087, p = .002$ ), strength of ideological identity ( $\beta = -.107, t\text{-test} = -3.082, p = .002$ ), and moral traditionalism ( $\beta = -.077, t\text{-test} = -2.042, p = .041$ ). For liberal identifiers, there were five significant predictors in the full model ( $R^2 = .117$ ): age ( $\beta = -.081, t\text{-test} = -2.256, p = .024$ ), strength of ideological identity ( $\beta = -.099, t\text{-test} = -2.761, p = .006$ ), identifying as Catholic ( $\beta = -.089, t\text{-test} = -2.677, p = .008$ ), racial resentment ( $\beta = .143, t\text{-test} = 3.259, p = .001$ ), and egalitarianism ( $\beta = -.132, t\text{-test} = -3.163, p = .002$ ). Liberal identifiers, then, contradicted the EPDAM's predictions here—utilizing more dispositional predictors than conservative identifiers.

Obviously, more is involved in the regression mechanisms here, but the pattern is illustrative of this EPDAM exception that, in a way, actually supports the rule: Liberal identifiers' hypocrisies are more dispositionally rooted—in racial resentment and egalitarianism—than conservative identifiers' on more classically *economic* issues and realms, that is, when the only deviations *from* their more economically authoritarian government philosophy would necessarily have roots in dispositions, analogous to conservative identifiers on *social* issues that are deviations from their more socially authoritarian government philosophy.

Altogether and ultimately clear is the broad takeaway that, for social issues, conservatives' attitudinal hypocrisies are *more dispositionally driven* than liberals' are, and liberals' attitudinal hypocrisies are *more externally driven* than conservatives' are. The differences are clear: An ideological

asymmetry is confirmed, although the distinction is—as expected—not an absolute dichotomy.

These results are not only demonstrative of my central theory, but also serve to reject the assertions of those who criticize this brand of political science—for example, writers like Jonah Goldberg (2003)—who often use the findings linking conservatism, or even political ideologies generally with psychological traits to do one of two things, or both.

First, they accuse researchers of anti-conservative bias for not also linking liberalism to the traits (Goldberg, 2003; see Kruglanski & Jost, 2003)—in spite of the fact that researchers either actually *did do* (Altemeyer, 1998; Bizer et al., 2004; Brandt & Reyna, 2010; Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2008; Choma, 2008; Crowson, 2009; Federico, Deason, & Fisher, 2012; Hibbing, Smith, & Alford, 2014; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003a, 2003b; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009; Nail, McGregor, Drinkwater, Steele, & Thompson, 2009; Onraet, Van Hiel, Roets, & Cornelis, 2011; Wilson & Sibley, 2013), or *attempted to do so* and found that liberalism was *not* linked to some of the traits (see Jost et al., 2003a, 2003b).

Second, often tongue-in-cheek, they use the conservatism findings to link the psychological traits' *inverses* to liberalism. For example, instead of the conservatism and epistemic-needs linkages, Goldberg (2003) asserted linkages between liberalism and “comfort with confusion and ignorance” (para. 1). Instead, along with earlier work in psychological factors and political orientations (see Chap. 3), my results show that these traits *cannot always be thought to have ostensible inverses*; in other words, just because egalitarianism drives overall hypocrisy for conservative identifiers does not mean that it will drive logical *consistency* for liberals.

Indeed, as aptly stated by Conover and Feldman (1981), conservatives and liberals are *not* approaching the world “from different sides of the same coin, but rather, if you will, from the perspective of entirely different currencies” (p. 264).

Importantly, however, liberal and conservative identifiers share in common that *most* of their overall attitudinal hypocrisy remains unexplained. But, that substantial amounts of the variances *are* explained—let alone by so few factors, ultimately—is equally important. Then, altogether, most of the findings support my expectations.

The remainder of this chapter seeks to *use* these findings to demonstrate the necessity, value, and beauty of attitudinal hypocrisy in America, and the limits to all of the above.



## 7.4 PRESCRIPTIONS FOR SCHOLARS

The topic of attitudinal hypocrisy has wide academic and empirical utility that should be employed in two vastly important ways: (1) as an illustration of political ideology and (2) as an under-explored research avenue itself. Although, of course, using a loaded term like *hypocrisy* may push people away from taking academics seriously, so cautious terminology may be preferable going forward.<sup>1</sup>

**Hypocrisy as Elucidation.** First, its role as an illustration of political orientations in general is vital for educators and students alike in political science. The overall topic perfectly elucidates political psychology scholars' understanding of the mechanisms by which our attitudes and ideologies originate, operate, and conflict, and educators could use the topic as a branching and illustrative lecture for an introductory political science or political behavior course—even without the use of the sometimes bizarre but nevertheless cromulent imagery and non-academic references scattered throughout this book. Via individual-level conscious, deliberative, and controlled, and non-conscious, automatic, and uncontrolled factors, we arrive at our political attitudes and our political ideologies—attitudes and ideologies may form the same time, or one before the other (Hatemi et al., 2014, p. 292)—and we use those attitudes and ideologies to act, to varying degrees, in political *and* apolitical contexts.

Critically and centrally, for virtually everyone, some attitudes will conflict with others, *because of those conscious and non-conscious factors*, and the fact that, by virtue of the American system and the party structures, the system *requires it*, and will for the foreseeable future. That is, in order to not be completely shut out of the political world, individuals must have attitudes that align, to some degree, with other individuals, including perhaps most importantly, the political figures for whom they will vote, whose stated belief systems are almost always hypocritical (see Chap. 4), especially in today's political landscape (see Sects. 4.5 and 4.6).

Therefore, attitudinal hypocrisy is a vivid reflection of the drivers of personal politics *interacting with* the American political system. Understanding this undoubtedly serves to help students and educators alike *understand* and/or *explain* personal politics, the political system, and the relationship between the two by shining a light on the idea from a previously unseen direction.

**Hypocrisy as a Research Avenue.** The second prescription for scholars is the use and importance of attitudinal hypocrisy as a research topic

itself. I have worked to demonstrate in this book that attitudinal hypocrisy, as a metric, offers something special that no other measure does, and it goes beyond the role of political sophistication that has already been well-explored (see Sect. 2.6). Hypocrisy potentially serves as a psychological factor and predictor *itself* in that it has demonstrated its empirical value in this book and deserves inclusion in future research models of political psychology and political behavior by virtue of *that* empirical value. Something special, it seems, is achieved by studying this abstraction of an ostensible human irrationality.

Additionally, it is unknown as to whether hypocrisy will be observed to the same degree or in the same respects in other political systems, or if it is a uniquely American construct. In either case, hypocrisy's marked and important role in the American context is definitive, and evocative of the aforementioned interaction of individual-level factors and system-level factors. Surely its utilization as a research avenue in other countries will serve to illustrate that idea as a comparison to America—as in, the uniqueness of American politics—or, potentially, illustrate that idea as *not* uniquely American. In both cases, the research would be objectively empirically useful as demonstrations of the way that individuals wield attitudes *within* a given system or *regardless* of the given system, respectively.

The importance of hypocrisy supersedes scholarly salience, however. Within the general public, its utility is similarly high.

## 7.5 PRESCRIPTIONS FOR THE PUBLIC

Attitudinal hypocrisy serves as an ostensible *meme* in the American polity in two ways. *First*, like the concept of memes in evolutionary biology (see Dawkins, 1976)—and the way the terminology has been co-opted in cultural studies to conceptually illustrate cultural transmission (Graham, 2002, pp. 86–87)—it is an ever-present, widespread, self-replicating, and environmentally responsive attack in political discourse. As one example, campaign advertisements regularly, and with apparent relish, accuse opponents of being hypocritical with regard to government involvement (e.g., Eclectablog, 2013). These attacks are most likely hurled with the assumption that viewers will respond to those indictments with negative feelings toward the indicted because of a natural human tendency for to disdain hypocrisy and hypocritical behavior in any form. Whether or not the advertisements are actually effective is unclear, but their memetic manifestation on the airwaves, internet, and interpersonal discourse cannot be denied.

As another example—and one that bridges to the second form of hypocrisy as an ostensible meme—both traditional media outlets and especially internet media outlets offer regular exemplars of the hypocrisy attack: On top of the fact that searching for *big government hypocrisy* and *small government hypocrisy* retrieves upwards of two million results across search engines, the “#GOPocrisy” hashtag—that is, a Twitter keyword<sup>2</sup>—is illustratively contained in *tens of thousands* of individual tweets *per day*, and the term “GOPocrisy” is even a category tag for at least two popular liberal blogs (viz., Daily Kos and Eclectablog). Of the tweets and blog posts that use the term, a cursory glance suggests that most of them do seem to be policy-related—for example, indicting conservative politicians for supporting a policy under Republican administrations and opposing the identical policy under the Obama administration—rather than being limited to the personal attacks that are also often contained in charges of political hypocrisy. (I recommend that future research explore this more fully, in order to test the accuracy of this glance.)

*Second*, those attempted indictments are frequently utilized in what are known as “internet memes” (see Bauckhage, 2011). These somewhat erroneously named<sup>3</sup> image macros typically consist of a photograph—often of a unique- or humorous-looking animal or person—with large text in the Impact typeface overlaid on the photograph that, in most cases, makes a joke. For example, as an attack on supposed liberal hypocrisy, a commonly seen example is an image of a young white woman who appears to be a stereotypical hippie—with a large hat and long dreadlocks—with the top line of text referring to a belief that more laws will prevent people from having firearms and the bottom line inferring that she uses marijuana in spite of laws prohibiting its use. Or, additionally, another commonly seen example is an image of comedian-activist Janeane Garofalo—a well-known liberal (Oravec, 2005), and frequent target of conservatives (see, e.g., St. John, 2003; Taylor, 2011, p. 41)—with the corresponding text referring to her apparent support for drug legalization and *prohibition* of high fructose corn syrup. Both of these “meme” templates are among the first-retrieved search results for *liberal hypocrisy*, demonstrating the pervasive power of the hypocrisy-as-meme metaphor.

**Hypocritical Attitudes as a Net Positive.** In all of the cases above, those who employ hypocrisy as an attack at any interpersonal level would be well-served to self-reflect, as it is quite likely that they, ironically, are hypocrites as well: Again, only a negligible number of subjects in only one of this book’s analyses scored a zero for their overall hypocrisy scores, and

*none* did in 2016. Additionally, the question of what, if anything, is actually *gained*, in any respect, by attacking someone for being attitudinally hypocritical must also be raised.

Beyond that, after reviewing everything related to this topic, I question whether attitudinal hypocrisy *should* be an attackable offense at all. A large extent—if not a majority—of our personal political orientations, attitudes, and incongruities lie outside of our conscious control (see Hibbing, Smith, & Alford, 2013; Hibbing et al., 2014). They, much like our personalities, constitute a large aspect of who we are, or at least serve as bright reflections thereof. To attack each other for wielding attitudes that are incongruent with other attitudes is no different than attacking each other for our height—an individual’s attitudes and height are heavily outside of their conscious control—on top of the aforementioned fact that the structure of the American political system *necessitates* hypocrisy (see Sect. 7.4). In fact, because an individual’s height is determined by a combination of uncontrollable forces, upbringing, and the overarching environment(s) of that upbringing (see Weedon et al., 2008), height really serves as an analog of attitudinal hypocrisy. Therefore, people of wildly differing respective heights—or respective amounts of attitudinal hypocrisy—may not very readily see eye-to-eye, but if they just move their heads a little bit, it is not that difficult.

Realizing that conservatives and liberals are different people at their respective cores is vital for the progress of our civilization (see Haidt, 2012; Hibbing et al., 2013, 2014). The fact that, as I have shown in my analyses, they are *both* hypocrites—but for different reasons *that are reflective of their underlying differences*—is similarly imperative to understand for the health of the republic, and the political and inter-ideological cooperation therein. I again question whether any good is done at any level by any definition in attacking others for what are actually *broad* and *virtually universal* trends of hypocrisy.

Moreover, this contention rests neither on whether hypocrisy is limited to the American system, nor whether more congruent ideologies are somehow superior. To illustrate, if attitudinal hypocrisy of the magnitudes observed within my analyses *is not* uniquely American and is demonstrated to the same degree in many other states with many other political and electoral systems, then hypocrisy is as inherent to the human species as being a conservative or liberal. In that case, the political orientations in the minority—libertarianism and communitarian populism—should take care to prioritize their beliefs and find ways to vote for the issues that are most

important to them and reflective of their belief systems, as the only alternatives are either (1) conformity with one ideology or the other—both of which have attributes that are distasteful to libertarians and populists—or (2) apathy and non-involvement in politics, which could only contribute to their political wants and needs being unmet.

Or, if attitudinal hypocrisy *is* uniquely American, the alternative political ideologies are, once again, in need of individual-level prioritization of issues. This is due to the fact that, at least for the foreseeable future, both libertarianism and communitarian populism—that is, not the hodgepodge amoeboid “populism” of President Trump—will only be reflected in small portions of the electorate.

On one hand, libertarianism will struggle for electoral support as a result of there being no noticeably significant decline in the proportion of the electorate who are social traditionalists and, thus, conservative voters. To illustrate, no significant changes in the percentage of Americans believing in the necessity of belief in God for morality have been observed since 2002 (Pew Research Center, 2014b, p. 153), and *not even marginal* changes have been observed in the percentage of Americans supporting a federal prohibition of all abortions since 1995 (pp. 166–167)—although the 16-point swing (from 46% to 62%) toward societal acceptance of gays and lesbians (p. 152), and the 32-point swing (from 22% to 54%) in favor of legalizing marijuana use (p. 161) over the same time period is certainly worth noting, albeit it is a small aspect of traditionalism.

On the other hand, populism is also equally unlikely to gain significant adherents either, as its identity variants (see Sect. 2.4) of “socialism” or, in other forms, fuller “authoritarianism,” will remain dirty words—to illustrate, *none* ( $n = 0$ ) of the subjects in the 2013 experiment in Chap. 6 identified themselves as *socialist* when given the opportunity to do so. This was in spite of the undergraduate sample—a population in which one would expect to find at least a few culturally rebellious and non-conforming subjects by the nature of being an undergraduate coupled with the probability of having some subjects who are low in RWA (see Roets & Van Hiel, 2006, pp. 239–240; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008, p. 250)—and in spite of the fact that a percentage of the sample actually qualified as fairly congruent anti-libertarians/populists/socialists. Although, self-described independent socialist Bernie Sanders was able to have a reasonably successful showing in the Democratic Party’s presidential primaries, and as of early 2017, Sanders is one of the most popular politicians in the country (Fox News, 2017), so I do wonder whether Sanders’s brand of socialism

has trickled down to his comrades in the young electorate enough to shift that today.

Nevertheless, all of the above is in spite of the rationalism and logic inherent to the wielding of congruent attitudes in either of those alternative ideologies. Whether or not attitudinal hypocrisy is uniquely American, societal progress and legitimate representation of the interests of the body politic constitute *the* democratic ideal, as has been claimed since the dawn of the republic in—as one example—James Madison’s 1788 *Federalist* 39. Thus, attacking others for having hypocritical attitudes is an impediment to that ideal. By understanding the necessity of hypocrisy, and acting accordingly, it is not a pipe dream to assume that democracy will be more fully functional and effective than the alternative of *not* understanding hypocrisy’s important role to play. It is only by taking into account the fact that attitudinal hypocrisy is not inherently a bad characteristic—and may even be a net positive, all things considered (see Sect. 7.6)—that the political war that has waged for centuries between the two primary political species can advance *beyond* the personal and *toward* policy debates that are heterogeneous in nature and origin, and not predicated on an axis of government involvement to advance the civilization for the betterment of the *entire* species.

## 7.6 ATTITUDE STRUCTURES AS THE MILLAY CANDLE

Believing, as many do, that the government should be completely limited in one area but unlimited in another does seem, at first glance, irrational and specious—and it is, objectively speaking. It is logical and perfectly valid to ask why one would want government action in one realm versus no action in another. Why so many people brandish logically inconsistent attitudes is a question long asked (see Sect. 2.2). And, as noted by Hurwitz and Peffley (1987, p. 1099), logical consistency and the avoidance of personal hypocrisy should be our end-goals as citizens, should they not?

On one hand, *logically speaking*—and at the risk of going off of the figurative and descriptive deep end in the hopes of eventually elucidating a larger point about people, their politics, and their governments—the poem that serves as this chapter’s epigraph (see Millay, 1922) is a metaphor for my conclusions about attitudinal hypocrisy. The wielding of attitudes that are incongruent with one another *is* burning a candle at both ends: The length of time for which the candle will burn is certainly less than one with only one end lit; there is only so much wax, after all—in this

case, there is only so much wax *and* brain matter between the ears that can be burned.

But on the other hand, and in the remaining words of Millay (1922), the burning is “lovely,” indeed. By burning the candle of attitude structures at both ends, scholars and the general public alike are better able to understand the way their attitudes and others’ attitudes fit within the political system in which they reside. This is because *being* attitudinally hypocrisy, if it has any effect on people, can *only* lead them to think more carefully about where they stand on issues, where others stand on issues, and what, exactly, the policy consequences and ramifications of those stances may be.

Although, again, the virtues of *thinking* may be overstated (Kanazawa, 2012; Lyons, Hoffman, & Michel, 2009), though obviously not in absolute, definitive terms. This is beautifully exemplified by the story behind Emerson’s (1841) famous quote to which I alluded at the beginning of Chap. 3—“A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds” (p. 47). Emerson followed that thought with a mixture of aggression and outright sexism, writing

if you would be a man, speak what you think to-day in words as hard as cannon balls, and to-morrow speak what to-morrow thinks in hard words again, though it contradict every thing you said to-day. (p. 47)

Beginning six years after the initial publication, Emerson removed “if you would be a man” and the “cannon” imagery from future releases of the essay (Patell, 2001, p. 52), thereby ridding the passage of the sexism and violence he likely did not process the first time (pp. 52–53). It took reflection on Emerson’s part and revision of earlier thoughts. He ultimately retains his defense of self-contradiction and, incidentally, hypocrisy, but not before reflecting and, in a weird sort of irony, contradicting himself. Further reflection and deliberation, then, is not negative; the act of cognition and thinking is probably good for everyone.

Systemizing attitudes as the contradictory bundle of noodles they are is especially important because of the fact that most Americans’ attitudes are *necessarily* illogical and irrational by virtue of the way the system works. Again, by and large, voters are only able to vote for candidates who exhibit hypocritical belief systems themselves. On top of that, if every American were to attempt to be perfectly logically congruent in their attitudes, and if every issue were truly distilled—or even *able* to be truly distilled—to

the libertarian–authoritarian, either/or axis of government involvement, the end result would necessarily be a hyper-rationalistic realm of issues in which emotion, humanity, and empathy were not directly included in the deliberation of issue stances and the execution of the respective politics. When the political world is reduced to the axis and lens into which I forced them in Chap. 2, through which I forced participants in Chap. 6 to conceive of them, and into which other people force them when—as one example—attacking others for hypocrisy of their political positions, then emotion is uninvolved in attitudes, and this is not an inherently good thing.

Humans *have* emotions because *emotions are necessary for surviving and thriving as a species* (see Hatemi, 2007, pp. 166–167), let alone a *political* species, and thus, emotion *should* play a role in our politics. When the requirement for policy-making is purely rationalistic, logical, and emotionless, the end result is often societal harm, as evidenced by the oft-observed-throughout-modern-history ultimately *negative* and dangerous results of both purely laissez-faire—and, eventually, monopolistic, oligarchic, and corporatocratic—systems (see Ames, 2013), and, on the other side, fully regulated totalitarian-authoritarian systems (see Greenberg & Jonas, 2003).

Beyond that, the amount of wax that *can* be burned is *not* actually very limited in magnitude. People are able to have attitudes about hundreds of political issues, and assuming that there exists a limit to the wax also assumes that there is a limit to the number of issues and respective stances. If the limit *is* actually reached—in spite of the regular vacillation between issue stances that a majority of people exhibit (Converse, 1964)—then the hyper-rationalist, unemotional view of the world is the new norm, and emotion becomes uninvolved in making decisions about other people. By ridding our belief systems of the supposedly irrational factors that hold them together—the wax of the candle—we are ridding our belief systems of the people *affected by* the political output of our belief systems. It does not require a background in philosophy to understand that *harming people is a bad thing*, and the centuries-long right-left debate is necessary for the marketplace of ideas to thrive.

Thus, the question so often asked of why people do not have more congruent attitudes—a question to which scholars are not strangers (see Lakoff, 2008, p. 75; Nie & Andersen, 1974, p. 564)—was, in spite of the supposed normative benefits (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987, p. 1099), not actually a reflection of heightened logic, but rather, ignorance about the



*necessary and fruitful mechanism by which political attitudes must formulate and operate within a given system.*

Thinking of attitudinal hypocrisy as akin to burning a candle at both ends is an interesting idea, and a metaphor employed by those who assert the need for congruence for a healthy democracy (e.g., Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987), but it is fallacious for one key reason: It assumes that the end result is that the candle, in the words of Millay, “will not last the night.” But, the candle has lasted a long time already—recall from Chap. 2 that it was burning at the 1787 Constitutional Convention, *and* used as an attack. It will continue to last for the foreseeable future, too—even with a president with no ideological consistency or constraint, or issue positions with a coherent logic. Moreover, while it burns, the light will be beautifully illuminating of what makes us who we are as political animals.

## 7.7 EXCEPTIONS TO THIS PICTURE OF OUR POLITICS

There are limits to my sunny picture of the ostensibly irrational and illogical behavior on the part of hundreds of millions of Americans, however, and they go beyond the mere notion of the negative side of irrationality and illogic. The same dispositional and external processes that go on to drive hypocrisy for conservatives and liberals also interact with the political system to inform attitudes on both sides that are not only *not helpful* for the polity, but are, in many respects, socially, economically, and environmentally harmful. Those who wield those attitudes *would*, in fact, benefit society and themselves by exercising their muscles of logical deliberation. There are two sets of clear examples of these harmful attitudes that, though rooted in uncontrolled processes, do not excuse those who hold the attitudes from hindering civilization.

First are harmful prejudicial attitudes, which are almost entirely limited to conservatives’ belief systems and their accordant attitudinal hypocrisies therein. The end result of prejudice is toxic for humankind, unless the respective ultimate policy goals of prejudices are limited only to prejudicial policies against individuals who are proven to be looking to do *legitimate* damage to others and/or society—for example, convicted violent criminals and pedophiles—who *need* to be removed from society and/or rehabilitated at the very least. To discriminate against a class of people—through supporting anti-Black or anti-LGBT laws—is objectively a bad thing and contrary to American ideals, even if it is the product of uncontrolled processes, and even if being incongruent is *largely* a normative

positive for society and individuals. Ultimately, in these cases, rationalistic behavior and *thinking through* one's attitudes would be helpful.

Second are attitudes reflective of science denialism, which, again, data indicate are most prevalent among conservatives who are, in many of those cases, being logically *consistent* at the policy level. A strong majority (over 70%) of substantive conservatives—including moderate conservatives *and* traditionalists—deny not only that human activity is causing global warming, but that global warming is happening at all (Pew Research Center, 2014b, p. 69), and that anything should be done about it by anyone, especially not a government (p. 70). So, it's by being *consistent* in many of these cases that they may be causing harm to the planet, and our species. These denialist stances are in spite of the mountains of empirical and observable data that wholly contradict them and that warn of the cataclysmic and direct dangers of global warming (see IPCC, 2013; National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2014)—including but not limited to, by the end of the twenty-first century, directly causing millions of deaths (DARA, 2012; Smith et al., 2013) and losses of hundreds of billions of dollars *annually* (DARA, 2012; IPCC, 2013). But, nevertheless, these conservatives do not think public- *or* private-sector steps should be taken to curb pollution (Pew Research Center, 2014b, p. 70), likely as a result of these beliefs. The incongruence that accords with these attitudes does not give off a lovely light—*especially when the flame may be extinguished by seawater if the oceans continue to rise as a result of human activity and pollution* (see IPCC, 2013).

Though it is more difficult to find widespread examples of it (Haelle, 2014; Mooney, 2012), liberals are not innocent of harmful science denialism that accords with their government-action belief system either. Some prominent liberals and liberal-leaners—Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., and in 2008, prior to correcting himself later on, Senator Barack Obama (Haelle, 2014, para. 14)—erroneously claim that vaccinations and genetically modified foods are inherently unsafe (see Bailey, 2011), the former claim being the one espoused by Kennedy. However, *these* anti-science stances, as societally dangerous as they may be—with refusals to vaccinate, for example, not only causing easily preventable disease outbreaks (Atwell et al., 2013), but likely causing unnecessary deaths as well (see Whitney, Zhou, Singleton, & Schuchat, 2014)—are not nearly as widespread as the stances wielded by conservatives. In the case of anti-vaccination beliefs, according to the data, the stances are actually just as prevalent among conservative identifiers (Kahan, 2014). Although, as postulated by Haelle

(2014), the lack of anti-science homogeneousness among liberals in the electorate, compared with conservatives, could simply be because conservatives are somewhat naturally (see Mooney, 2012)—and perhaps somewhat due to comparatively stronger financial backing—better organized and coordinated than liberals and are able to have science denialism proliferate and promulgate as a result (Haele, 2014, para. 8).

Thus, while a concoction of uncontrolled and illogical motivations is actually a necessary function of individuals in the electorate—and hypocrisy and consistency both being side-effects thereof—not every eventuality of those motivations is benign or positive. It is up to the body politic's anatomical system and the heart that pumps its democratic debate to ensure that the albeit limited number of wholly malignant eventualities are (1) not reflected in political action, (2) surgically removed, and (3) cauterized to avoid their regrowth and the dangers that follow therefrom.

In other words, burning the attitude candle at both ends is lovely, but there is absolutely and definitively a limit to how incongruent one can be, and there are legitimate societal costs of incongruence.

## 7.8 POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS AND GRAND CONCLUSIONS

It is a common hope of my fellow students and scholars of the psychology and biology of political attitudes, behaviors, and ideologies (e.g., Hibbing et al., 2013) that, as the public increases its understanding of our political differences being core to who we are as political animals and largely out of our conscious control, so will the public's political understanding and cooperation. That idea is one of several key implications of what this study could and, according to my hypotheses, *would* demonstrate. As noted by Hibbing (2013),

People need to recognize that their political opponents are not necessarily uninformed or unintelligent but rather that, at a very basic level, they experience and interpret the world differently. These sensory and processing differences lead to distinct ideas for the appropriate way to organize mass-scale social life. (p. 484)

It is those “distinct ideas” that, for most everyone, are logically incongruent with other “distinct ideas.” This is most assuredly, at first glance and cognition, a distasteful and aversive thought to most, but not all (see Chap. 6) people with political attitudes, as it probably should

be—hypocrisy is not thought to be a very good trait to have, after all (Kurzban, 2010).

But, it is my sincere hope that, upon learning of the fuller picture of this form of that trait—that is, upon *learning* about *the drivers, history, and cognition of attitudinal hypocrisy in the American body politic*—people will *not* be as threatened by it, *not* be as angered by it, and *not* be as apt to using it as a political attack (as it is memetically observed in popular culture). “Most of us are hypocrites,” after all (see Sect. 6.12). Accepting one’s own attitudinal hypocrisies and the universality of them within the electorate could very well be a step *toward* cooperation, compromise, and progress, and *away from* petty argument and regressive mass-scale polarization, neither of which show any signs of going away on their own (Abramowitz, 2012).

**A Shiny Bright Bow.** No matter how small, any ecosystem or biome is embiggened by increases in species diversity (see Bright, Barro, & Burtz, 2001). The ecology of political attitudes is no different, as the marketplace of ideas upon which a strong populace is stationed is healthiest with a broad diversity of opinions.

However, one of the few axiomatic principles in the political science discipline—colloquially known as Duverger’s law (see Riker, 1982)—dictates that the plurality-voting structure of the American system *necessitates* only two parties (Duverger, 1959; Riker, 1982). Thus, within this two-party system, the impetus for any congruence would be on the public both directly in terms of them having diverse attitudes themselves *and* indirectly in terms of them electing legislators, executives, and judges—all but a small number of whom nationwide identify with one of the two parties—who deviate from their respective party platforms.

While the two essentially accordant political orientations *of* the two parties have, according to my analyses in Chap. 5, moved slightly away from more logically congruent attitude structures recently, whether this slight change is because of pressure felt by people to avoid hypocrisy in their attitudes is unclear and—given the cognition of *We, the People*—unlikely. What is clear, however, is the small magnitude of this effect.

Thus, in an era of increasingly polarized attitudes in the public (see Pew Research Center, 2014a), the structures of those attitudes still remain logically incongruent. This hypocrisy exists regardless of the stated or measured ideologies of those who wield the attitudes. It is ultimately up to the public to embrace that fact and recognize that *it is the hypocrisies of their attitudes that contribute to the vital opinion diversity of the American political ecosystem*.

Accordingly, in spite of the illogic central to attitudinal hypocrisy, none of what I have asserted, conceptualized, demonstrated, or concluded is meant to shine a wholly negative light on either of the ideologies' incongruities or the differential drivers thereof. If anything, researchers should view these political hypocrisies as opportunities and, as a result, normatively good—after all, logical contradictions are academically useful in that they exemplify the general differences between the ideologies, and do so in a way that allows for representativeness of attitude structures on top of that. This also makes them useful for the public, along with the idea that, perhaps, in understanding both the lack of control over our hypocrisy and the fact that everyone is a hypocrite, we can move beyond the rhetoric, attacks, and anxiety, and toward political and social progress.

So, to co-opt the cliché utilized by the subjects mentioned earlier (see Sect. 6.12), *it may not be logical to have your cake and eat it too*; but after all, in the words of Pizzolatto and Fukunaga (2014), *what good is cake if you can't eat it?*

## NOTES

1. The term should get people to read this book, though; so, there's an internal contradiction staring me in the face, but I'm fine with that.
2. "Hashtags" are used in tweets as keyword words or phrases preceded by the "#" symbol that—when clicked by a Twitter platform user—automatically bring a user to other popular or recent tweets using the same hashtag. Meanwhile, hashtags are exploding as a tool for analytical and empirical research (e.g., Ma, Sun, & Cong, 2013), demonstrated by the increasing number of scholarly articles with "hashtag" in the title, going from 10 works in 2010 to 15 in 2011, 27 in 2012, 33 in 2013, 125 in 2014, 114 in 2015, and 148 in 2016, according to Google Scholar.
3. The terminology is somewhat inappropriate given that the word is meant to only describe something that fits the criteria listed above, and not anything that *anyone* can make for any audience size.

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## APPENDIX

Note: An asterisk [\*] denotes that the item is reverse-scored.

### MODIFIED WILSON-PATTERSON INVENTORY (CONSERVATISM SCALE)

For each of the following items, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement.

[5-point, *Strongly Disagree* to *Strongly Agree*]

Organized school prayer

Bans on obscene material

Border wall

Government-guaranteed women's equality\*

Federal death penalty

Federal surveillance program

Ban sodomy

Ban gay marriage

Right to an abortion\*

Drone strikes

Require creationism alongside evolution

2003 Invasion of Iraq

Increase federal welfare spending\*

Tax cuts

Gun control\*

Increase federal military spending  
Torture terror suspects  
Pollution control\*  
Small government  
Foreign aid\*  
Free trade

THE 9-ITEM EDINBURGH HANDEDNESS INVENTORY  
(OLDFIELD, 1971)

Please indicate your preferences in the use of hands in the following activities by answering left or right. If, in any case, you are COMPLETELY indifferent, mark both.

[*Right, Left, or Both*]

Writing

Drawing

Throwing

Scissors

Toothbrush

Spoon

Striking a match

With which foot do you prefer to kick? [*Right or Left*]

Which eye do you use when using only one? [*Right or Left*]

A 15-ITEM POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE BATTERY (ADAPTED  
FROM FEDERICO, HUNT, & ERGUN, 2009)

Please respond to the following questions in the text boxes provided.

What job or political office does [names inserted here listed below] hold?

Joe Biden

John Roberts

John Boehner

Kim Jong-un

Samuel Alito

Mike Johanns

Chuck Grassley

Hillary Clinton

Jeff Fortenberry  
 Michael Bloomberg  
 Jim Suttle

Which political party currently has the most members in the United States Senate?

Which political party currently has the most members of the United States House of Representatives?

How long is the term of office for a United States Senator?

Whose job is it to nominate justices to the United States Supreme Court?

### THE 18-ITEM PREFERENCE FOR CONSISTENCY SCALE (CIALDINI, TROST, & NEWSOM, 1995)

For each of the following statements, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement.

[5-point, *Strongly Disagree* to *Strongly Agree*]

I prefer to be around people whose reactions I can anticipate.

It is important to me that my actions are consistent with my beliefs.

Even if my attitudes and actions seemed consistent with one another to me, it would bother me if they did not seem consistent in the eyes of others.

It is important to me that those who know me can predict what I will do.

I want to be described by others as a stable, predictable person.

Admirable people are consistent and predictable.

The appearance of consistency is an important part of the image I present to the world.

It bothers me when someone I depend upon is unpredictable.

I don't like to appear as if I am inconsistent.

I get uncomfortable when I find my behavior contradicts my beliefs.

An important requirement for any friend of mine is personal consistency.

I typically prefer to do things the same way.

I dislike people who are constantly changing their opinions.

I want my close friends to be predictable.

It is important to me that others view me as a stable person.

I make an effort to appear consistent to others.

I'm uncomfortable holding two beliefs that are inconsistent.

It doesn't bother me much if my actions are inconsistent. [\*]

THE 27-ITEM INTOLERANCE OF UNCERTAINTY  
SCALE (FREESTON, RHÉAUME, LETARTE, DUGAS, &  
LADOUCEUR, 1994)

For each of the following statements, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement.

[5-point, *Strongly Disagree* to *Strongly Agree*]

Uncertainty stops me from having a strong opinion.

Being uncertain means that a person is disorganized.

Uncertainty makes life intolerable.

It's unfair having no guarantees in life.

My mind can't be relaxed if I don't know what will happen tomorrow.

Uncertainty makes me uneasy, anxious, or stressed.

Unforeseen events upset me greatly.

It frustrates me not having all the information I need.

Uncertainty keeps me from living a full life.

One should always look ahead so as to avoid surprises.

A small unforeseen event can spoil everything, even with the best planning.

When it's time to act, uncertainty paralyzes me.

Being uncertain means that I am not first rate.

When I am uncertain, I can't go forward.

When I am uncertain, I can't function very well.

Unlike me, others seem to know where they are going with their lives.

Uncertainty makes me vulnerable, unhappy, or sad.

I always want to know what the future has in store for me.

I can't stand being taken by surprise.

The smallest doubt can stop me from acting.

I should be able to organize everything in advance.

Being uncertain means that I lack confidence.

I think it's unfair that other people seem to be sure about their future.

Uncertainty keeps me from sleeping soundly.

I must get away from all uncertain situations.

The ambiguities in life stress me.

I can't stand being undecided about my future.

THE 10 ITEMS OF THE NFCC SCALE MEASURING A  
NEED FOR ORDER (ROETS & VAN HIEL, 2011)

For each of the following statements, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement.

[5-point, *Strongly Disagree* to *Strongly Agree*]

I think that having clear rules and order at work is essential for success.

I find that a well ordered life with regular hours suits my temperament.

I hate to change my plans at the last minute.

My personal space is usually messy and disorganized. [\*]

I believe that orderliness and organization are among the most important characteristics of a good student.

I think that I would learn best in a class that lacks clearly stated objectives and requirements. [\*]

I find that establishing a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more.

I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life.

I like to have a place for everything and everything in its place.

I dislike the routine aspects of my studies. [\*]

THE 12-ITEM NEED FOR STRUCTURE SCALE  
(NEUBERG & NEWSOM, 1993)

For each of the following statements, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement.

[5-point, *Strongly Disagree* to *Strongly Agree*]

It upsets me to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it.

I'm not bothered by things that interrupt my daily routine. [\*]

I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life.

I like to have a place for everything and everything in its place.

I enjoy being spontaneous. [\*] [dropped sometimes]

I find that a well-ordered life with regular hours makes my life tedious. [\*]

I don't like situations that are uncertain.

I hate to change my plans at the last minute.

I hate to be with people who are unpredictable.

I find that a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more.

I enjoy the exhilaration of being in unpredictable situations. [\*]

I become uncomfortable when the rules in a situation are not clear.

THE 10 ITEMS OF THE BIG FIVE BATTERY MEASURING  
OPENNESS (JOHN, DONAHUE, & KENTLE, 1991)

For each of the following statements, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement.

[5-point, *Strongly Disagree* to *Strongly Agree*]

[*I see myself as someone who...*]

Is original, comes up with new ideas

Is curious about many different things

Is ingenious, a deep thinker

Has an active imagination

Is inventive

Values artistic, aesthetic experiences

Prefers work that is routine [\*]

Likes to reflect and play with ideas

Has few artistic interests [\*]

Is sophisticated in art, music, or literature

THE 20-ITEM SHORTENED DOGMATISM SCALE  
(TROLDAHL & POWELL, 1965)

For each of the following statements, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement.

[5-point, *Strongly Disagree* to *Strongly Agree*]

In this complicated world of ours the only way we can know what's going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted.

My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit they're [changed from "he's"] wrong.

There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth.

Most people just don't know what's good for them.

Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world there is probably only one which is correct.

The highest form of government is a democracy and the highest form of democracy is a government run by those who are most intelligent.

The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something important.

I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell me how to solve my personal problems.



Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't worth the paper they are printed on.

Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.

It is only when a person devotes themselves [changed from "himself"] to an ideal or cause that life becomes meaningful.

Most people just don't give a "damn" for others.

To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.

It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what's going on until one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those one respects.

The present is all too often full of unhappiness. It is only the *future* that counts.

The United States and Russia have just about nothing in common. [outdated, but will be included]

In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself several times to make sure I am being understood.

While I don't like to admit this even to myself, my secret ambition is to become a great person [changed from man], like Einstein, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare.

Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain political groups.

It is better to be a dead hero than to be a live coward.

### THE 18-ITEM INTOLERANCE OF AMBIGUITY SCALE (KIRTON, 1981)

For each of the following statements, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement.

[5-point, *Strongly Disagree* to *Strongly Agree*]

There's a right way and a wrong way to do almost everything.

Practically every problem has a solution.

I have always felt that there is a clear solution between right and wrong.

Nothing gets accomplished in this world unless you stick to some basic rules.

If I were a doctor, I would prefer the uncertainties of a psychiatrist to the clear and definite work of someone like a surgeon or x-ray specialist. [\*]

Vague and impressionistic pictures really have little appeal for me.

Before an examination, I feel much less anxious if I know how many questions there will be.

The best part of working a jigsaw puzzle is putting in that last piece.

I don't like to work on a problem unless there is a possibility of coming out with a clear cut and unambiguous answer.

I like to fool around with new ideas, even if they turn out later to be a total waste of time. [\*]

Perfect balance is the essence of all good composition.

An expert who doesn't come up with a definite answer probably doesn't know too much.

There is really no such thing as a problem that can't be solved.

A good job is one where what is to be done and how it is to be done are always clear.

In the long run it is possible to get more done by tackling small, simple problems rather than large and complicated ones.

What we are used to is always preferable to what is unfamiliar.

A person who leads an even, regular life in which few surprises or unexpected happenings arise, really has a lot to be grateful for.

I like parties where I know most of the people more than ones where all or most of the people are complete strangers.

### THE 16-ITEM NEED TO EVALUATE SCALE (JARVIS & PETTY, 1996)

For each of the following statements, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement.

[5-point, *Strongly Disagree* to *Strongly Agree*]

I form opinions about everything.

I prefer to avoid taking extreme positions. [\*]

It is very important to me to hold strong opinions.

I want to know exactly what is good and bad about everything.

I often prefer to remain neutral about complex issues. [\*]

If something does not affect me, I do not usually determine if it is good or bad. [\*]

I enjoy strongly liking and disliking new things.

There are many things for which I do not have a preference. [\*]

It bothers me to remain neutral.

I like to have strong opinions even when I am not personally involved.

I have many more opinions than the average person.  
I would rather have a strong opinion than no opinion at all.  
I pay a lot of attention to whether things are good or bad.  
I only form strong opinions when I have to. [\*]  
I like to decide that new things are really good or really bad.  
I am pretty much indifferent to many important issues. [\*]

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