

Human Nature *and the* Causes of War

JOHN DAVID ORME

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Contents

Human Nature, the Regime and War

To understand world politics, one must strive first to comprehend what statesmen seek, not only their explicit objectives but also their unspoken and unconscious desires. According to the doctrine of Neo-Realism and its offshoots, Offensive Realism and Defensive Realism, the crucial motivation is fear.[1] The cause of insecurity is said to be international anarchy. Because there is no effective international authority to establish order, the leaders of states are anxious. To protect their lands and peoples, they seek power. Power is relative, however. An augmentation of the power of one state diminishes that of others. Competition thus ensues. The surest method of increasing power and reducing vulnerability is to accumulate resources and add strategic depth through expansion. Rival states, anticipating this, may choose to attack first. Hazardous as the pursuit of power may be, it is the lesser risk, for opting out of the competition could leave one vulnerable. Others may be peacefully inclined, but one cannot be sure. It is safer to assume the worst. Persistent danger transforms contented states into aggressors. Anarchy engenders anxiety; anxiety rivalry; and rivalry war. For the Offensive Realists, world politics is an inescapable tragedy.[2]

Defensive Realists deduce from the same premises a more hopeful conclusion.[3] The international system provides considerable protection to states and is resistant to aggression. Military technology usually favors the defender and aggressors are promptly confronted by opposing coalitions. Anarchy correctly understood should encourage caution

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not belligerence. The greatest danger is that an anxious statesman, untutored in the wisdom of Defensive Realism, might try too hard to increase his strength, alarming his neighbors and provoking a spiral of misunderstanding. To augment one's power is more dangerous than to neglect it.[4]

Neither version of Neo-Realism is convincing. Regarding Offensive Realism, Randall Schweller has posed a pertinent question. In a world with "all cops and no robbers," why would there be crime? (If all states were seeking only security, why would they ever go to war?) The standard argument is that statesmen misperceive their neighbors' unstinting efforts to acquire power, setting in motion a dangerous spiral of hostility that can lead to war. The crucial problem is uncertainty. Other states may harbor aggressive intentions, and it may not be possible to recognize them.[5] As Thomas Hobbes explained:

> …because there be some that taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires, if others (that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds) should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by standing on their defense, to subsist.[6]

This concern is not baseless, but seems somewhat exaggerated. Serious errors in the assessment of other states are certainly possible, but the intentions of others are not entirely unintelligible. Peaceful countries have ways of communicating their intent.[7] Statesmen need not assume the worst about opposing states if they have some objective basis for understanding them. Moreover, statesmen not only fear their enemies, they also fear war. War brings death, destruction and sometimes defeat. It is not to be undertaken lightly. Fear would convince a leader to fight if he feels threatened by an enemy and confident that the enemy can be defeated. Those with the most to fear from others (weaker states) have the motive for such a war but not the means; those with the means (stronger states) lack the motive. War for the sake of security requires a curious combination of perceived vulnerability and confidence that, if not logically impossible, must be rather unusual. If Offensive Realism is sometimes right, it is right for the wrong reasons.

Defensive Realism faces a more basic problem. The cheerful prospect envisaged by its proponents is belied by the often-bloody history of world politics.[8] The balance of power and the presumed advantages of the defender have not afforded states consistent security. The robust

resistance to aggression expected by Defensive Realists depends upon the willingness of defenders to threaten retaliation and the attentiveness of potential aggressors to those deterrent threats. Neither is certain. Either the white blood cells of the international system are less reliable or the germs more virulent than the Defensive Realists have recognized. The anarchic international system is neither the catalyst nor the impediment to war that it is purported to be by these contending strands of Neo-Realism.

The root of the Neo-Realists' errors lies in a deficient conception of the principal subject of the social sciences, human beings. Reinhold Niebuhr, writing in 1944, noted that "the conception of human nature which underlies the social and political attitudes of a liberal and democratic culture is that of an essentially harmless individual. The survival impulse, which man shares with the animals, is regarded as the normative form of the egoistic drive."[9] Seven decades later, this observation still seems apposite. The starting point for most academic commentary and theorizing about international politics in the last generation has been the assumption that leaders value security and prosperity above all else. The Classical Realist tradition, better grounded in political philosophy, provides a richer and more compelling description of humanity.

Readers of Chapter XIII of Hobbes's *Leviathan* may be left with the impression that it is the desire for security alone that transforms the state of nature into a state of war. Elsewhere, Hobbes posits "a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restless desire of power after power that ceaseth only in death." He speaks initially of power as "a means to obtain some future apparent good," but includes "dignity" as an important component of power. Later, in Chapter XVII, Hobbes asks why human beings cannot "live sociably one with another" as do bees and ants. His answer is that human beings are "continually in competition for honor and dignity."[10]

Jean-Jacques Rousseau contends that Hobbes's assertion is anachronistic; he attributes to cavemen the behavior of courtiers. According to Rousseau, primordial men were solitary creatures, motivated solely by a desire for self-preservation. Because their needs were simple and their aggressiveness tempered by compassion, violence was infrequent. Only when men were drawn into society and became obsessed with their standing relative to others did conflict intensify. Vanity transformed the tranquil state of nature into a state of war.[11]

The serpent in Rousseau's Garden of Eden is known today by such names as status, recognition, respect, prestige or esteem, all of which

connote a high valuation by others. Public esteem can be pursued collectively or individually. It is sought by governments through acquisition of symbols that demonstrate international status in much the way that luxury automobiles, designer clothes or admission to exclusive clubs establish the standing of the socially ambitious. The most salient emblems of prestige and the most convincing proofs of great power standing throughout history have been the control of territory, the possession of advanced weaponry and victory in battle. One state's appropriation of any symbol of status implicitly diminishes that of others. Security may be plentiful, as a leading Defensive Realist contends, but prestige is scarce. Only in Lake Woebegone are all children "above average."[12] Possessions, arms and victories not only raise a country's status, but increase its power. Rivals are threatened with a diminution of security as well as a loss of esteem.

Most leaders desire personal prestige. Some are willing to risk war to attain it. Individual glory, like national status, is inherently scarce and its attainment is fraught with hazard. Glory is attributed only when a leader's actions are acclaimed by his chosen audience. Hence, the most dangerous contingency is when the public's yearnings reinforce private ambition, when a leader strives to win glory by enhancing the standing of his nation.

"Prestige," Robert Gilpin states, "is the reputation for power," especially military power. It has instrumental value, for strength that is recognized does not have be used. Prestige is thus for Gilpin the "everyday currency of international relations."[13] More specifically, statesmen seek security by forming alliances. Credibility is the cement that binds them. To maintain their alliances leaders must convince friends and foes that their promises of protection can be trusted. Because alignment with an unreliable partner diminishes rather than enhances a state's security, leaders continually reassess their allies' reliability. Those who fail to honor their commitments risk losing their credibility and eventually their allies. Whether an international system tends toward balancing or bandwagoning depends in large part on whether defenders maintain their credibility. Reputation matters, and prudent statesmen understand this. Territories take on greater significance when they become test cases of a defender's reliability. Leaders may feel compelled to fight for them even if their intrinsic importance is negligible. War for the sake of reputation is not always indicated, of course. Statesmen must make hard decisions about where to expend scarce resources and the preservation

of credibility is not the only objective of policy. Hard experience teaches, however, that when leaders neglect credibility long enough unpleasant consequences follow.

Statesmen go to war not only to attain greater glory and to preserve their credibility but also to avoid dishonor, the loss of self-respect and the respect of others. Honor as traditionally understood is earned when a man acts courageously and is forfeited when he displays cowardice. (Traditional honor is sex-specific: bravery for men; chastity for women.) Retaliation is expected in response to insults and injuries.[14] If men or nations strive primarily to maintain not enhance their reputations, the honor accorded to one need not dishonor the others. Not everyone yearns to be remembered as a hero; but few wish to be remembered as poltroons. Offended honor is a potent animus for violence. The desire to avoid or avenge dishonor can lead to actions that appear "irrational" according to customary ways of thinking. Max Weber contrasted the decision-making model of modern economics, "instrumental rationality" (*Zweckrationalität*), with an alternative mode of decision-making he termed "value rationality" (*Wertrationalität*). Individuals acting in an instrumentally rational manner calculate the most efficient means of reaching given ends (usually prosperity and security) employing a comparative analysis of costs and benefits. Individuals acting in a value-rational manner do not calculate cost and benefits but simply do what they believe their morality demands of them. Such behavior is not "irrational" if sacrifices are borne for the sake of an unconditional duty.[15] If a leader deems an issue "a matter of honor," he may feel obliged to fight regardless of the consequences.

The desire for esteem can be expressed as glory, reputation or honor. Whether individual or collective, instrumental or intrinsic, aggrandizing or defensive, it can draw states into conflict. Leaders may attempt to attain greater status for their countries by the acquisition of weapons, territory or other symbols of status, thereby diminishing the status and perhaps the security of their rivals. They may seek personal glory by victories in battle or dramatic successes in diplomacy. They may conclude that encroachment on a territory they are expected to defend will undermine their credibility, demoralizing their allies and encouraging their enemies. Or they may believe that inaction in response to a perceived provocation would be disgraceful, leaving them no alternative to fight if they are to avoid dishonor, regardless how difficult the fight may be. The most disruptive force in world politics may not be fear but pride.[16]

The desire for power is connected with prestige psychologically and politically. Bertrand Russell observes, especially for those active in the public arena, that "the easiest way to obtain glory is to obtain power." The desire for esteem therefore "prompts…the same actions as are prompted by the desire for power and the two motives may, for most practical purposes, be regarded as one."[17] According to Raymond Aron, states "do not seek to be strong only in order to deter aggression and enjoy peace; they seek to be strong …in order to be feared, respected or admired."[18] Saint Augustine, however, draws a useful distinction between "glory" and "domination." The former is "the good opinion of enlightened judges." Although not the highest human motive, glory provides an incentive for valor and patriotism; but "those who are indifferent to glory and… eager only for domination [are] worse than the beasts in [their] cruelty…"[19] If the *libido dominandi* is as pervasive, urgent and vicious as Augustine contends the problem of achieving order in anarchy may be intractable. "The boa constrictor, when he has had his meal, sleeps until appetite revives," Russell declares, but a man's yearnings for power and glory "are limited only by what imagination suggests as possible. Every man would like to be like God, if it were possible; some few find it difficult to admit the impossibility." Men "framed after the model of Milton's Satan refuse "to admit the limitations of individual human power." Their yearnings thus become "insatiable and infinite."[20] "[While] the selfishness of man has limits," Hans Morgenthau asserts, "his will to power has none. For while man's vital needs are capable of satisfaction, his lust for power would be satisfied only if the last man became an object of his domination…".[21]

Why do human beings seek power and glory? Friedrich Nietzsche contends that the "will to power" is the fundamental human motive, the impetus for all that we do. He speaks of it in *The Gay Science* as an organic drive: "The struggle for existence is only an exception…The great and small struggle always revolves around superiority, around growth and expansion, around power—in accordance with the will to power, which is the will of life."[22] He reiterates in *Beyond Good and Evil*: "physiologists should think again before postulating the drive to self-preservation as the cardinal drive in an organic being. A living thing desires above all to vent its strength—life as such is will to power."[23] Morgenthau, following Nietzsche, avers that "man is born to seek power" and "aspires toward exercising political domination over

others."[24] Power is said to be an "elemental bio-psychological drive" similar to the instinct to live and propagate. He supports the claim by reference to the work of zoologists.[25]

Such biological explanations ignore the uniqueness of human beings.[26] We, alone among animals, have a keen awareness of own mortality. This awareness amplifies and distorts the impulses that we share with lower creatures. According to Niebuhr, "man is the kind of animal who cannot merely live." The will to power is rooted in the human condition.

> Man, being more than a natural creature, is not interested merely in physical survival but in prestige and social approval. … Possessing a darkly unconscious sense of his insignificance in the total scheme of things, he seeks to compensate for his insignificance by pretensions of pride. The conflicts between men are thus never conflicts between competing survival impulses. …Since the very possession of power and prestige always involves some encroachment on the prestige and power of others, this conflict is by its very nature a more stubborn and difficult one than the competition between the various survival impulses of nature.[27]

These longings are all too easily displaced from the individual to the collective level, where they become much more dangerous. Modern societies, Morgenthau contends, frown upon one man's naked grasping for power, but "what the individual is not allowed to want for himself, he is encouraged to seek for the legal fiction called the state." Power seeking is redirected but exacerbated and the moral limits on its pursuit and employment attenuated.[28] Niebuhr reasons similarly. The most obvious route to honor, he notes, is through individual achievement, but this path is open only to a few gifted or fortunate individuals. For most people, identification with a collectivity provides a greater sense of worth. The "frustrations of the average man, who can never realize the power and the glory which his imagination sets as the ideal," he says, "gain a measure of satisfaction in the power and the aggrandizement of his nation." Nationalism has been the predominant form of the collective pursuit of honor in the modern era. Sadly, he observes, "patriotism transmutes individual unselfishness into national egoism."[29] Niebuhr's conclusion is pessimistic. Because the desire for distinction is so deeply ingrained, conflict is ineradicable and the state of nature remains a state of war.[30]

Richard Ned Lebow makes Plato's concept of "spirit" a focus of *A Cultural Theory of International Relations.* Lebow understands spirit to mean 'self-esteem,' the universal desire of human beings to "feel good about themselves."[31] Some can fulfill this need by adherence to an exacting standard of behavior. The satisfaction resulting from a high but accurate evaluation of oneself is termed "magnanimity" by Aristotle or "self-approbation" by Adam Smith. "Magnanimous" men are not reliant on public approval to sustain their self-esteem and thus indifferent to honor.[32] Alfred Adler would be skeptical of this. "Human beings," he maintains, "are very sensitive media for the development of inferiority complexes of all kinds." Hence, vanity is rife. Nearly everyone seeks superiority in some form and to some degree. The desire for power results from the individual's "tortured feeling of inferiority." For some, the feeling of inferiority is overwhelming and the striving for prestige and power desperate. The unfortunate "stepchildren of nature" burdened with "organ inferiorities," are especially vulnerable, as are children subject to "a very severe education" that "artificially" intensifies the feeling of inferiority.[33] Bertrand Russell, by contrast, declares that "I know nothing of the mothers of Attila or Jenghiz Khan, but I rather suspect that they spoilt the little darlings, who subsequently found the world irritating because it sometimes resisted their whims."[34] Both hypotheses have their defenders, and academic psychology has not resolved the issue.[35]

Psychologist David McClelland contends that the will to power is a preoccupation of a certain type of personality. McClelland characterizes individuals according to their dominant motive. Some seek achievement (excellence in the performance of a task) or affiliation (love and friendship); others strive for power, which he defines broadly as "having an impact." Power seekers can be recognized by their tendency to take forceful actions, their attempts to regulate, influence or persuade others, a tendency to offer unsolicited advice, efforts to elicit strong emotional reactions and an eagerness to impress others and achieve prestige. They tend to accumulate status possessions and weapons, play competitive sports, watch violent television programs, view pornography, and, when they do not find constructive outlets for their energies, gamble, drink to excess, pick fights and seduce women. They have greater difficulty establishing successful marriages, are susceptible to flattery and are prone to stress and illness, especially when frustrated. The need for power, as measured by McClelland, is also associated with a variety of

positive results: greater participation in teaching and the ministry; more charitable giving; greater job satisfaction; and, for American presidents, a higher evaluation by historians.[36]

People are generally unaware of how much the desire for power influences their actions. It is manifested in foreign policy in different ways and to different degrees. Office is for some primarily a prestige possession, like Steinway pianos purchased by those who cannot play them. Others delight in playing the instrument. They seek positions of power in order to exercise power. All those who enjoy the powers and perquisites of office have something to lose, and this often induces caution. A politician fearful of losing his position, however, may attempt to retain it by provoking a war or crisis. Some seek power compulsively and will put the power they have at risk to acquire more. Even those whose desire for power is better regulated have a strong preference for active (if not violent) responses to threats and opportunities, often with insufficient regard to the risks and costs of such policies.

The *libido dominandi* is mysterious in its origins and unpredictable in its effects. Power, David McClelland observes, can show both "the image of the devil and the image of God."[37] What, then, determines how the desire for power is expressed and the effects that it has upon the world? When does the will to power elevate and when does it vitiate?

Lebow, following Plato, contends that reason must rule over appetite and spirit. Reason enables rivals for scarce goods to recognize and adhere to formal or informal limits on their struggle. The state of nature is not perforce a state of war, but ages when reason's grip over the psyche weakens are ages of disorder.[38] Lebow's conclusion may be too optimistic. Although human beings are born with the capacity to direct their lives by the use of reason, that potential is not always realized. Reinhold Niebuhr remarked dismissively many years before that social scientists are "forever seeking…to find a surrogate for Plato's and Aristotle's disinterested 'reason' in the scientific method."[39] According to Niebuhr, man is an "ironic creature" who, through his ingenuity in self-deception, overestimates his own goodness, wisdom and control.[40] Reason all too easily becomes an instrument of the passions, as it was for Hobbes, particularly of the lust for domination.[41] Sigmund Freud confidently asserted early in his career that control over the *id* (his term for appetite) could be shifted from the religious-based, allegedly neurosis-inducing *super-ego* (conscience) to the *ego* (or rational mind).[42] Freud concluded late in his life that although civilization has brought impressive

technological achievement, "man is [still] a wolf to man," and thanks to those technological advances, one armed with immensely destructive weaponry. At this point, Freud the advocate of "*logos* as our god" was in full retreat, grudgingly accepting the necessity of the *super-ego* fortified by Christianity as a last line of defense against man's "death instinct."[43]

The distinguished clinical psychologist Karen Horney identifies what she terms the "expansive" neurotic, driven by a desperate yearning for power and glory. The difference between neurotic and healthy striving is not simply a matter of degree; the expansive neurotic does not pursue what he wants to have but what he must have. His desires are compulsive and insatiable.[44] He makes a "devil's pact," acquiring a grandiose self-image at the risk of a devastating collapse of self-esteem should his delusions be revealed.[45] Neurotic pride rests on both internal and external supports. It is maintained internally by a tyrannical regime of censorship that suppresses all information discordant with the inflated self-image. Truth (about oneself) is the first casualty. It is sustained from the outside by others' obedience and admiration, but is vulnerable to collapse if these are diminished or withdrawn. Expansive neurotics are often self-defeating because, driven and deluded as they are, they tend to exaggerate their own abilities and underestimate the obstacles before them.[46]

When an expansive neurotic's self-esteem is deflated the resulting desire for "vindictive triumph" is overpowering. One need not have done him direct harm; the expansive neurotic cannot tolerate any threat to his superiority, even by another's example. Neurotic ambition is often held in check by love or fear, but the urge for vindication is so powerful it can override habitual caution. When his pretentions are exposed, "getting even" is not enough; only a triumph that humiliates the offender can restore neurotic pride.[47] The expansive neurotic, Dr. Horney concludes, is often "driven on the road to glory with an utter *disregard for himself, for his best interests.*" Hence, "we have reason to wonder whether more human lives—literally and figuratively—are not sacrificed on the altar of glory than for any other reason."[48]

Nietzsche maintains that both "benefiting and hurting others are ways of exercising one's power," although, "pain is a more efficient means to that end than pleasure."[49] An optimistic reading of Nietzsche's writings leads one to hope that aggressive psychological energy can be sublimated into creative activity. This can be achieved, however, only by dint of harsh self-mastery.[50] McClelland's explanation is similar.

The key difference, he theorizes, is "Activity Inhibition," which he measures by the frequency of negation in a subject's speech. Those high in the need for power but low in Activity Inhibition fight, drink, boast and fornicate, but do not lead. High AI scores are associated with a "social" rather than "personal" use of power, that is, with an impact that benefits others.[51] The development of Activity Inhibition is thus a matter of the greatest importance. McClelland contends that "patriarchal religions" (Christianity and Judaism) teach individuals self-control and self-sacrifice through submission to divine authority. In this way their "personal aggressiveness can be sublimated to serving others."[52]

McClelland's thesis is applicable to international politics and highly plausible. To believe is natural. Human beings desire not only power and pride but purpose. Man, Nietzsche proclaims, "has become a fantastic animal that has to fulfill one more condition of existence than any other animal: man has to believe, to know, from time to time why he exists." This need is met by "a philosophical justification of his way of living and thinking," which he describes metaphorically as a "sun that shines especially for him and bestows warmth, blessing, and fertility on him."[53] "Men cannot do without dogmatic belief," Alexis de Tocqueville observes, those "fixed ideas of God, of the soul, and of their general duties to their Creator and their fellow man…received on the word of another" that "furnish to each of these fundamental questions a solution that is at once clear, precise, intelligible and lasting…". Tocqueville's implication is that if religion ceased to provide convincing answers to life's questions, most men would not live an "examined life" in the manner of Socrates, but would turn to political ideology, with consequences inimical to human freedom.[54] Christianity and Judaism expect perfection only in the life to come and, when they are not ignored or willfully misinterpreted, place restraints on the gratification of individual desires, including the desires for power and glory. Secular ideology strives to bring heaven to earth and depends upon the use of power to achieve this supposed utopia. Religion restrains power; ideology justifies it. Whether the *libido dominandi* becomes constructive or destructive—whether it shows the image of the devil or the image of God–depends importantly on the beliefs that guide and animate statesmen.[55]

Glory, power and honor have been among the most powerful human motivations in the past and, in all likelihood, will so remain. The question is not whether these motives find expression in foreign policy but how. This depends not only on the international environment but also

on domestic politics. Human beings are not a blank slate on which authorities can write anything they wish. A stone cannot be habituated to fall upwards, as Aristotle reminds us.[56] Nonetheless, society can and does influence how fundamental human desires are displayed. There are variations in the strength of the need for power and prestige between individuals. Individuals of one type may fare better or worse in politics, depending on the values and practices of their society. Human motives can be suppressed or encouraged by priests, educators and propagandists, and can also be directed toward or away from particular objects. Socialization, especially the instilling of fundamental religious beliefs or political ideologies, is a crucial influence. Hence, the forms of government differ, and these differences are consequential. The human desires for power and glory are manifested to different degrees and in different ways, depending on the character of the regime. Some governments encourage and exacerbate belligerence; others temper it. The concept of regime, therefore, will be the organizational framework of this study.

Regimes can be categorized according to who rules, how and why. Aristotle distinguished regimes according to the procedures that determine "the authoritative element" or "governing body." He states initially in *The Politics* that societies are ruled by "the one, the few or the many," but it is clear from his subsequent discussion that the distinction between the few and the many is primarily one of social class.[57] Contemporary typologies categorize non-democratic governments not on the basis of class but organization. The four sub-types of modern authoritarian rule are personal dictatorship (in which organizations are weak), charismatic dictatorship, praetorian dictatorships led or dominated by the military and totalitarian governments controlled by a single party.[58]

Regimes govern differently. Republics permit broader participation in politics, minimize reliance on coercion and tolerate dissenting opinion. Autocratic governments exclude most from participation and rely on coercion to suppress dissent. Governments of all types must concentrate power to deal with dangerous emergencies.[59] The Baron de Montesquieu considered Republics and Monarchies to be "moderate" regimes because unlike Despotism they have representative bodies or organized interests that impose limitations on executive power.[60] Among dictatorships, Juan Linz posits a categorical difference between the extreme concentration of power of totalitarian regimes and the "limited pluralism" of authoritarian ones (of which military regimes are the most prevalent).[61]

When authority is highly concentrated the quality of the ruler is especially important. The abilities and traits of leaders do not arise by chance. They are strongly influenced by recruitment and socialization. Regimes intentionally or inadvertently select particular personality types, foster some qualities and suppress others. How leaders are formed and chosen strongly influences the style and substance of foreign policy. If a leader has deficiencies the advisory process can provide a corrective, but only if it functions effectively. If war is to be rational, there must be an honest discussion of the alternatives, including their costs, risks and consequences. A bad process tends to produce bad policy.

Aristotle's definition of the regime is not strictly institutional. The regime not only determines who rules but "what the ends of the partnership are." It is, fundamentally, the "way of life."[62] It determines not only who rules but for what purposes. To govern for Aristotle is not just to allocate resources, to tax, spend and defend, but to shape the character and convictions of the public. "Whatever the authoritative element conceives to be honorable," he observes, "will necessarily be followed by the opinion of the other citizens."[63] Aristotle may overestimate the capacity of politics to shape culture; modern scholarship frequently argues the converse. What can be said, without attempting to resolve the issue of causation, is that there is usually a connection between the form of a government and the values it upholds. Regimes have an ethos (a set of ideas, attitudes, values and habits) that strongly influences foreign policy. Single party regimes proclaim an explicit ideology according to which they seek to alter the world. Military regimes have a looser "mentality," by which Linz means "ways of thinking and feeling, more emotional than rational, that provide noncodified ways of reacting to different situations…". Unlike ideologies, mentalities do not inspire broad participation or constrain the leadership to implement a specific program.[64] The most important distinction for our purposes is between regimes that deprecate violence, accepting war at best as a necessary evil, and regimes that justify or glorify it.

All governments are reliant to some extent on material rewards and coercion to achieve the compliance of the public, but rulers prefer an unstinting, unconditional loyalty that provides them a margin of safety should results disappoint. In other words, they desire legitimacy. Suffice it to say for now that regimes differ not only in how they seek legitimacy but also in the extent to which they achieve it. Rulers whose legitimacy

is fragile or failing may be tempted to bolster their support through victories in battle or risky successes in foreign policy.

Six regimes will be investigated here: Monarchy, Republic, and Sultanistic, Charismatic, Praetorian or Totalitarian Dictatorship. The regimes will be defined and described in the introductions of the chapters to follow and contrasted in the manner suggested in the preceding paragraphs. The conclusions of the chapters will assess the regimes' impact on foreign policy.

Empirical investigation will demonstrate that regimes with a violent ethos, a dysfunctional policy process, highly concentrated authority and dubious legitimacy are much more likely to initiate wars, including wars they cannot win. The most perilous development is the ascension of men of questionable character and judgment to supreme power. Dictatorships are the regimes most likely to display these characteristics and consequently those in which human ambition is most likely to run amuck. Governments that use violence against their own people are more likely to employ it against foreigners. Repression presages aggression.[65] Other countries must be prepared to meet the challenge such regimes present or face the consequences. The desire for power and glory, unhindered or encouraged by authoritarian politics, is the most important cause of war.

Let us pause for a moment to consider how and why war would occur according to the theories contrasted here. Defensive Realism contends that the world is resistant to aggression. Discontented states, should they exist, will normally be deterred by the efficiency of balancing and the dominance of defense. As long as this is understood by leaders, the prospects for peace are favorable. If it is not, defensively-minded states, desiring only to preserve their territory, could blunder into war if one state arms beyond the low level needed for its security and alarms others, beginning a spiral of misperception and competitive armament. The greatest danger is not that revisionist states will perceive an opportunity, but that a contented state will perceive others' preparations as a threat. Wars are caused by a spiral of hostility.

Offensive Realists see the world as perilous. War is a tragic but rational response to anxiety and insecurity. States seek security through armament, expansion and perhaps preventive war after a calculation of the risks and rewards. Otto von Bismarck once remarked that going to war in this way was much like committing suicide out of fear of death. Yet, a war of this sort is not an altogether absurd proposition. Think of the

plight of a passenger on a sinking ship. Around the ship sharks may be circling and waves surging, but if the boat is going to sink, diving into a stormy, shark-infested sea is the braver and wiser course. How frequently do such unhappy contingencies arise in international politics? Offensive Realists would have us believe that states will run the risk of war and defeat to increase their security because they cannot be sure that the intentions of others are benign. Wars are caused by the insecurity of contented states menaced by the capabilities and uncertain of the intentions of others.

Classical Realism views international politics differently.[66] Although the world remains anarchic, states can and often do achieve mutual security. One state's safety and prosperity need not preclude that of others. Land is finite, however, and human desires expansive. The acquisition of territory not only provides new resources and opportunities to exercise power but often affords status or vindicates honor. The aggrandizement of one state diminishes the possessions, power and prestige of others. Wars result not from the anxieties of the contented but the ambitions of the discontented.

Ambition is manifested when the desires for power or glory are aroused, encouraged and released from restraint by a particular regime. If unconstrained by politics or morality the will to war can overwhelm reason and material interest. Once the leadership of one state is actively revisionist (prepared to alter the territorial status quo by force) only fear can prevent war. There is no guarantee that defenders will cooperate or implement effective measures of deterrence. Revisionist leaders respond to perceived opportunity. They make war not because they are too fearful, but because they are not fearful enough. In some instances, their designs are evident to defenders of the status quo, leading the defenders to contemplate striking first before the blow falls on them. Preventive war is a controversial proposition even in the face of a looming threat. When realistic fear does not convince a defending statesman, power and glory may provide the additional impetus to attack. Wars ensue when a confident, revisionist leader seeking power and glory attempts to seize territory or provokes others (who correctly perceive his intentions) to attack first. Contented states may also resist or retaliate to preserve their honor.

The validity of these contentions will be assessed in several case studies, arranged according to regime type. The most important question posed in the cases to be investigated is why the leadership of one country chose war or the risk of war. Many of these wars were morally

questionable. The most relevant issue for this inquiry, however, is not whether the wars were just, but whether they were advantageous. The intent of the cases is to explore why leaders dealt with the circumstances facing them as they did and how the problems and processes of their regimes influenced their choices. The focus will be on the side that started the war or took the steps that made war probable. The presentation will be chronological, but will also include sections elucidating the regime's politics and to the extent possible the personality of its key decision maker. This approach may be demanding of the reader, but it is adopted in the belief that learning how things happened is usually helpful in understanding why they happened.

Wars result from human decisions. To understand why wars occur, one must understand how and why these decisions are made. Calculation matters as much as motivation in this process. The desires for power, glory and honor influence not only the objectives of states, but the assessment of the means chosen to pursue them. As will be seen, their effect is not always salutary. Let us then examine these human decisions, beginning with the wars of kings.

Notes

1. The best known Neo-Realist is Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954); *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1979). A notable forerunner is John Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951).
2. Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism*, pp. 3–4, 18, 24, 209. The leading exponent of Offensive Realism is John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2014).
3. Two leading scholars of this school are Stephen Walt, *The Origin of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987) and Stephen Van Evera, *Causes of War: Power and Roots of Conflict* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999). Waltz and Herz anticipate their arguments.
4. Waltz, *Man, the State and War*, pp. 221–23; Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), Chapter 3 sets forth a clear version of this argument without necessarily endorsing it.
5. Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism*, p. 3; Randall Schweller, "Neo-Realism's Status-Quo Bias," in Benjamin Frankel, editor, *Realism: Restatements and Renewal* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 90–91, 117–19.

6. *Leviathan*, Chapter XIII, paragraph 4.
7. Schweller, "Neo-Realism's Status Quo Bias," pp. 103–4.
8. Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 25–31.
9. Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness* (New York: Scribner, 1944), p. 18.
10. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Chapter XI, paragraph 2; Chapter XVII, paragraph 6.
11. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *A Discourse on Inequality*, Maurice Cranston, translator (London: Penguin, 1984), pp. 98–99, 114–15, 119–20.
12. Randall Schweller, "Realism and the Present Great Power System," in Ethan Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, editors, *Unipolar Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 29–35; the Defensive Realist quoted is Walt, *Origin of Alliances*, p. 49.
13. Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 31; Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism*, p. 4; as Hobbes states tersely, the "reputation for power is power." *Leviathan*, Chapter X, paragraph 5.
14. James Bowman, *Honor: A History* (New York: Encounter, 2006), pp. 1–5, 37.
15. Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, editors (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 24–26; also H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, editors, *From Max Weber* (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 119–21.
16. Honor, prestige and glory have been receiving increasing attention from scholars. See Daniel Markey, "Prestige and the Origins of War." *Security Studies* 8 (4), pp. 126–73; Schweller, "Realism and the Great Power System"; Michael Donelan, *Honor in Foreign Policy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Richard Ned Lebow, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Barry O'Neill, *Honor, Symbols and War* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999); and especially Donald Kagan, *On the Origins of War* (New York: Doubleday, 1995). Power has been relatively neglected. The contributors to Jerrold Post, editor, *The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003) are an honorable exception.
17. Bertrand Russell, *Power: A New Social Analysis* (New York: Norton, 1938), pp. 11–12.
18. Raymond Aron, *Peace and War*, Rémy Inglis Hall, translator (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1973), p. 65.
19. Augustine, *The City of God*, Book V, Chapter 19. Augustine means by glory what the present author means by honor.
20. Bertrand Russell, *Power: A New Social Analysis* (New York: Norton, 1938), pp. 9–11.

21. Hans Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946), p. 193.
22. *The Gay Science*, Sect. 349.
23. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Sect. 13.
24. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*, pp. 168, 177.
25. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, pp. 38–39.
26. An impressive example of the biological approach is Stephen Peter Rosen, *War and Human Nature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
27. Niebuhr, *Children of Light*, pp. 19–20; see also Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man* (New York: Scribner's, 1941), pp. 188–94 and Augustine, *The City of God*, Book V, Chapter 13.
28. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man and Power Politics*, pp. 197–99.
29. Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (New York: Scribner's, 1960), pp. 18, 91–93.
30. Niebuhr, *Children of Light*, p. 20; Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, pp. 18–19.
31. Lebow, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*, p. 61.
32. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book IV, 1123b–1125a35; Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Part III, Chapter 2.
33. Alfred Adler, *Understanding Human Nature*, Walter Béran Wolfe translator (New York: Greenberg, 1927), pp. 35–38, 69, 74–78, 161–67, 191, 285.
34. Russell, *Power*, p. 20.
35. David Winter, "Origins of Power Motivation in Males," unpublished paper.
36. However, presidents high in the need for power have also been more likely to enter into war. David McClelland, *Power: The Inner Experience* (New York: Irvington, 1975), pp. 7–12, 66, 252–53, 328; McClelland, *Human Motivation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 316–18, 597; David Winter, *The Power Motive*, p. 203; David Winter, "Measuring the Motives of Political Actors at a Distance," pp. 155–57, 161.
37. McClelland, *Human Motivation*, pp. 596–97.
38. Lebow, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*, pp. 83–87, 99, 199–200, 257–58, 315, 510–15.
39. Reinhold Niebuhr, "Augustine's Political Realism," in Robert McAfee Brown, editor, *The Essential Reinhold Niebuhr* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), p. 126.
40. Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Irony of American History* (New York: Charles Scribner, 1962), pp. 2–3, 21, 65–68, 72, 132–33, 154–56, 160, 174.
41. Niebuhr, "Augustine's Political Realism," pp. 125, 140; Augustine, *City of God*, Book I, preface; Book V, Chapter 20; Book XIV, Chapters 3–5, 13–15, Book XIX, Chapter 4.

42. Sigmund Freud, *The Future of an Illusion* (New York: Norton, 1961), pp. 44–53.
43. Freud, *Future of an Illusion*, pp. 68–70; Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents* (New York: Norton, 1961), pp. 94–96, 108–11, 114, 143–49. *Thanatos*, the death instinct, is Freud's violent version of the will to power or *libido dominandi*.
44. Karen Horney, *Neurosis and Human Growth* (New York: Norton, 1950), pp. 18–20, 29–31, 86–87, 191, 202.
45. Horney, *Neurosis and Human Growth*, pp. 22, 37–39, 154.
46. Horney, *Neurosis and Human Growth*, pp. 30, 36–38, 84–85, 86–89, 94, 109, 192–95.
47. Horney, *Neurosis and Human Growth*, pp. 26–27, 103–4, 197–99.
48. Horney, *Neurosis and Human Growth*, pp. 29–30. The italics are hers.
49. Nietzsche, *Gay Science*, Sect. 13.
50. See *Gay Science*, Sects. 290, 311. Section 370 is more troubling, as is Sect. 259 of *Beyond Good and Evil.*
51. McClelland, *Power*, pp. 66, 292, 295,
52. McClelland, *Power*, pp. 283–84.
53. *The Gay Science*, Sects. 1 and 289.
54. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, Phillips Bradley, translator (New York: Vintage, 1990), Volume II, First Book, Chapters 2 and 5, pp. 8–9, 20–21.
55. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, *The GULAG Archipelago*, Volume I, "The Bluecaps" (New York: Harper & Row, 1978).
56. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book II 1103a19–26.
57. *The Politics*, Book III, Chapter 6; Book IV, Chapters 1–3.
58. Natasha Ezrow and Erica Frantz, *Dictators and Dictatorships* (New York: Continuum, 2011), pp. 15, 19–22; Paul Brooker, *Non-Democratic Regimes* (New York: Palgrave, 2009), pp. 14–17.
59. John Locke, *Second Treatise of Government*, Chapters XII–XIV.
60. Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*, Anne Cohler, Basia Miller, and Harold Stone, translators (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), Book 5, Chapter 16, p. 66; also, translator's preface, p. xxii.
61. Juan Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000), passim; Brooker, *Non-Democratic Regimes*, pp. 70–77.
62. *The Politics*, Book IV, 1295a40.
63. Aristotle, *The Politics*, Carnes Lord, translator (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), Book II, 1273a39–42.
64. Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*, pp. 162–64.
65. A view advocated passionately by Natan Sharansky, *The Case for Democracy* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

66. As understood by the present author, of course. Schweller's contribution to this author's thinking has been significant. See "Neo-Realism's Status Quo Bias," in Benjamin Frankel, editor, *Realism: Restatement and Renewal* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 106–7, 115, 117, 119–20 and also "Bandwagoning for Profit." *International Security*, Volume 19 #1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72–107. In addition, Arnold Wolfers distinguishes two types of Realism in "The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference," *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), pp. 83–85; Wolfer's distinction is developed nicely by Michael Spirtas, "A House Divided: Tragedy and Evil in Realist Theory," in Benjamin Frankel, editor, *Realism: Restatement and Renewal* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 385–423; also most helpful is Sten Rynning and Jens Ringsmose, "Why Are Revisionist States Revisionist: Reviving Classical Realism as an Approach to Understanding International Change." *International Politics* Volume 48 (2008) pp. 19–39.

Kings and Counselors

Monarchy

Monarchy has been the most prevalent form of government in human history. Even in Europe, the region whose political culture was least supportive of the institution, only three republics had been established in the early twentieth century.[1] That there were risks to this concentration of authority was apparent to perceptive observers from the beginning. In the time of the Judges (circa 1200–1000 BC) "there was no king in Israel [and] every man did what was right in his own eyes."[2] When the Israelites clamored for a king around 1000 BC "to govern us like all the nations," Samuel warned them sternly:

> These will be the ways of the king who will reign over you: he will take your sons and appoint them to his chariots and to be his horsemen, and to run before his chariots; and he will appoint for himself commanders of thousands and commanders of fifties, and some to plow his ground and to reap his harvest, and to make his implements of war and the equipment of his chariots. He will take your daughters to be perfumers and cooks and bakers. He will take the best of your fields and vineyards and olive orchards and give them to his servants. He will take the tenth of your grain and of your vineyards and give it to his officers and to his servants. He will take your menservants and maidservants, and the best of your cattle and your asses, and put them to his work. He will take the tenth of your flocks and you shall be his slaves. And in that day, you will cry out because of your

J. D. Orme, *Human Nature and the Causes of War*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77167-0_2

> king, whom you have chosen for yourselves, but the Lord will not answer you in that day.[3]

After Israel's acme under David, Samuel's warning came to pass during the reign of Solomon, who imposed a crushing burden of taxation and forced labor on the Hebrews to maintain his 1400 chariots and 12,000 cavalry. When his foolish successor, Rehoboam, refused to heed the advice of elders to ease the peoples' burden, threatening instead to "chastise [them] with scorpions," they rose in a revolt that fragmented ancient Israel.[4]

Why, in view of these risks, was monarchy so widely adopted?[5] The most insightful treatment of monarchy remains that of the Baron de Montesquieu. Montesquieu proposed a typology of governments based not only on their form but also their "principle," the predominant passion animating its people. Republics are ruled by some (Aristocracy) or all (Democracy); their principle is civic virtue. Despotism is the rule of one according to his will, untrammeled by law; its principle is fear. Monarchy is the rule of one by 'fixed and established law;' its principle is honor.[6] Honor, for the nobility, is the desire for "preferences and distinctions," especially those achieved in battle. The King is a member of the nobility and shares the values of that class. Hence, glory for the citizens, the state and the prince is the "purpose" of monarchy and "the spirit of monarchy is war and expansion."[7]

Montesquieu's treatment of monarchy is less critical than it first appears. The foreign policy of monarchy is more rational and humane than that of despotism. A despot is capable of rapid decision making, but there is no check on his impulsiveness or errant judgment. Monarchs, constrained by law and some degree of institutional pluralism, are not so prone to reckless haste.[8] Because a monarch's rule is legitimate, he can trust his subjects, making a defensive strategy involving fortification more feasible.[9] Montesquieu defines just war broadly enough to include preventive war to forestall grave threats. Although he condemns wars fought solely for the glory of the king, one may deduce that if the desire for glory motivates a ruler to eliminate a threat before it becomes imminent, the result would be praiseworthy.[10] Republics, by contrast, face a dilemma in providing for their defense. If they remain small enough to preserve the civic virtue that is their animating spirit, they are easily overmatched by despotisms, but if they expand in size to increase their power, the resulting differentiation of interests could diminish

the public's virtue. Monarchies, whose appeals to ambition produce "impressive" results, succeed without civic virtue. A confederation of smaller republics promises to resolve this dilemma, but the reader is left to wonder whether such an association could ever match the promptitude, unity and energy of regimes led by a single decision maker.[11]

Montesquieu's presentation clarifies why Samuel's advice was so often rejected. The world has been a dangerous place: "a city without power risk[s] greater perils."[12] The Israelites demanded a king because they were mortally threatened by the Philistines.[13] Only a powerful executive capable of assembling sufficient resources and applying them promptly and vigorously could guarantee a people's survival. Discretionary executive power, animated by a desire for glory, was the most effective form of protection in a perilous world. Once constituted, however, that power could be abused at home and abroad. Those who granted such authority might endure the trials of the Hebrews under Rehoboam; but those who did not could meet the fate of the Canaanites. To be without a king in a world of kings was to risk destruction.

The wars of five monarchies will now be examined to determine how and why they went to war and with what consequences. The best guide through these complicated histories will be the Baron de Montesquieu.

The Wars of Louis XIV

Situation, Alternatives and Decisions

When Louis XIV's personal rule began in 1661, France enjoyed greater security than at any time in the last three centuries. "All was calm in all places," the King himself observed. The United Provinces (The Netherlands) were allied to France, neither Spain nor England posed an immediate threat and France's eastern border was shielded by the Rhine League, an association of German states opposed to the Austrian Habsburgs. This favorable state of affairs was the achievement of Cardinal Mazarin, who had conducted French policy during Louis's minority. Louis XIV squandered Mazarin's inheritance within a decade, embroiling France in a series of lengthy and exhausting wars.[14]

The aim of the first of these, the War of Devolution, was to seize territory from the Spanish Netherlands (modern day Belgium). A claim of the Queen provided the pretext. Louis rode to battle in May 1667 accompanied not only by his wife but also his two mistresses and a dozen

other ladies of the court. His forces met little resistance from enfeebled Spain, but his success alarmed Europe. Several members of the Rhine League grew suspicious and refused to renew their alliance with France. The United Provinces broke off a war with England and began cooperating with her to restrain France. Compelled by this coalition to make peace with Spain, Louis was incensed at what he deemed the treachery of his erstwhile allies, who, in his mind, owed their very existence as an independent state to France. "[The Dutch] insolence struck me to the quick," he exclaimed.[15]

Sir William Temple, an English resident in and later ambassador to the United Provinces, stated:

> that trade had brought "the most prodigious growth that has been seen in the world" with the result that the Dutch "have [been] treated upon an equal foot with all the great Princes in Europe." He predicted, however, that "their vast trade, which was the occasion of their greatness [will also be] the one likewise of their fall, by having wholly directed the genius of their native subjects and inhabitants from arms to traffic and the arts of peace, leaving their whole fortune to be managed by foreign and mercenary troops, which much abased the courage of their nation and made the burghers of so little moment towards the defence of their towns."[16]

France struck back at the United Provinces in May 1672. Outnumbered, unprepared and initially isolated by French diplomacy, the Dutch could not stop the French offensive, which advanced to the heart of the Netherlands. Facing disaster, the Dutch offered generous terms. Their concessions would have left the United Provinces powerless to hinder a French attack on the Spanish Netherlands, but Louis and his advisors, "intoxicated with their own strength," would be satisfied with nothing less than their enemy's destruction. The Dutch government was toppled in a violent uprising in July ending in the restoration of Prince William III of Orange as *stadholder*. William opened the dykes to inundate the polders surrounding Amsterdam. The winter was mild, and the waters girding Amsterdam did not freeze. France was stymied. In the meantime, Spain, Austria and several smaller states had rallied to the Netherlands' defense. France was forced to withdraw to fight on other fronts. The Dutch War, now a European war, continued until early 1679. France obtained no territory from the United Provinces, but did incorporate the Franche-Comté and additional towns in the Spanish

Netherlands. These gains cost Louis XIV dearly. The French peasantry was impoverished by taxation and, in a few places, driven to revolt. France was now widely distrusted abroad. Louis had aroused the persistent enmity of the Dutch and raised to office a tenacious enemy.[17]

After the conclusion of the Dutch War and the death of Louis's senior military commanders, the influence of Sébastien Vauban on the king grew. Vauban was anxious. "Almost in the middle of the most considerable powers of Christendom," he lamented, "[France] is equally in range of blows from Spain, Italy, Germany, the Low Countries and England. France has today attained a high degree of elevation that renders her formidable to her neighbors, in a manner that they all interest themselves in her ruin, or at least in the diminution of her power." Louis viewed the rising fortunes of Austria with apprehension. In September 1681, Polish and Austrian troops defeated the Ottoman host besieging Vienna and began a counter-offensive. After the rout of the Ottomans at Mohacs in 1687, the entire Danube Valley lay open to Austria. Louis and his advisors worried that once the Ottomans were defeated, Austria's augmented power would be turned against France.[18]

This fear seems exaggerated. Austria was a geographically vulnerable state facing a permanent threat from the Ottoman Empire. Her economy was less developed than France's and her state less absolute. The Emperor, threatened from many quarters and more dependent on the cooperation of his estates, was chronically short of funds. The German princes remained jealous of their independence.[19] Vauban, a brilliant military engineer, estimated that a superiority of 10:1 in manpower was required to reduce the most advanced fortifications of the era. If there was ever a time to follow the advice of Defensive Realists and place one's trust in defensive technology, this would seem to have been it.[20]

Nevertheless, Louis endeavored to establish an impenetrable eastern frontier. Linear borders were to be achieved by adding (of course never subtracting) territory and closing the eastern "gates" to France. The city of Strasbourg had permitted Austrian soldiers to enter Alsace three times during the Dutch War. Strasbourg was seized shortly after the Ottoman's defeat in Vienna, and additional territory was incorporated over the next four years. Spain objected but was defeated again in the brief War of Reunions. The German states agreed in the Treaty of Ratisbon of 1684 to accept France's recent acquisitions for a period of twenty years.[21] Convening at Augsburg in two years later, Spain, Sweden and several German states formed a league to protect the upper Rhine region against

further incursions by France. The stated aim of the League of Augsburg was defensive, but Louis's advisors suspected that it could be converted later into an offensive instrument of Austria.[22]

Louis was informed by his spies in September 1688 that English lords had appealed to William of Orange to transport his army from the Netherlands to overthrow James II. Louis offered his fellow Catholic the protection of the French navy, but James was wary of too close an association with France. Louis XIV faced a stark choice: to march north to the Netherlands to forestall William or east to the Rhineland to seal his borders. Louis feared that without some encouragement from France the Ottomans would capitulate, enabling Austria to redeploy her forces to the west. He surmised that if William intervened England would fall into protracted disorder, as in the 1640s, precluding her opposition to his designs on the continent.[23] Contemptuous of the Germans' martial qualities, Louis's chief advisor Louvois anticipated a brief and successful application of force like the War of Reunions. Louis's aims were limited and defensive, but at this point no one outside France believed it.[24] The Dutch War had fixed in the minds of his contemporaries the image of Louis XIV as an aggressor; his incremental acquisitions had reinforced it; and the brutal methods he was soon to employ were taken as conclusive evidence of aggressive intent.[25]

The Nine Years War began in late September 1688 with a costly but successful siege of Phillipsburg, the last bridge over the Rhine that France did not control. While France was occupied with fortresses on the Rhine, William proceeded unhindered across the North Sea to topple James. In the years to come, Britain, led by William, was to become the foremost obstacle to French hegemony. The German states, encouraged by William's success, refused to capitulate to France. They were soon joined in a coalition by Austria, Spain and the Netherlands. Louis XIV made the fateful decision in March 1689 to raze towns, castles and villages across the Rhineland. His objective was to prevent an invasion by making it impossible to support an army close to France's borders. In so doing, he antagonized the Germans irrevocably. The good will built painstakingly in Germany by Mazarin turned to bitter hatred.[26] "Louis's fears, not his pride, best explain the onset of war in 1688," historian John Lynn contends. Louis, characteristically, met the theoretical threat of a revived Austria by a *défense aggressive* that in the end embroiled him in the war he had sought to prevent.[27]

The last of Louis's wars, the War of the Spanish Succession, was not sought by the King, but he bears responsibility if not for its occurrence then for its scale. The trouble arose because Spain's decrepit King Charles, lacking an heir, bequeathed his crown upon his death on 1 November 1700 to Louis's grandson Philippe with the stipulation that his dominions must remain undivided. Should the French reject these terms, Charles's possessions (not only Spain but her American colonies, the Spanish Netherlands, and several Italian provinces) would pass intact to a son of the Austrian Emperor. Louis and his advisors concluded that they faced war with Austria regardless of what they did. If Philippe accepted, Austria would fight France; if Philippe declined, France would fight Austria rather than permit the entire inheritance to come into the possession of her long-time rivals. Better, they calculated, to accept the proffered territories and fight on the defensive with the support of Spain. This course was not unreasonable, but Louis widened the war by a series of needless provocations of Austria's former allies, England and the Netherlands, who were initially reluctant to enter a war. In December 1700, Louis formally recognized the right of Philippe to succeed to the French throne, raising the specter of a unification of France and Spain. Shortly after Philippe's entry into Spain, he drove Dutch soldiers out of the fortresses of the Spanish Netherlands and garrisoned them with French troops. Philippe awarded French merchants (and denied to the English) the coveted *asiento*, the right to supply slaves to the new world. He completed his alienation of the English by recognizing the son of James II as his father's rightful successor. England and the Netherlands reconstituted their coalition with Austria and declared war in May 1702. "Perhaps," speculates John Wolf, "[Louis] saw himself again as the Sun King who could give the law to Europe."[28]

The forces assembled by the two alliances were roughly equal: 255,000 for France, in addition to the support of Bavaria, opposed by 40,000 English, 60,000 Dutch and 90,000 Austrians. The coalition was blessed with two of the finest generals of the eighteenth century in the Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene.[29] The war dragged on until 1714. France, reduced to penury by war, famine and taxation, accepted a partition that preserved Spain and her colonies for Philippe but ceded the Spanish Netherlands and the Italian possessions to Austria. During his personal reign from 1661 to 1715, Louis added Alsace, Lorraine, the *Franche Comté* and the Flemish region of Dunkirk and Lille to his domains and installed a Bourbon in Madrid. His realm was larger and

more defensible; her borders remained inviolable until 1790. But at the end of his reign France, 2.5 million *livres* in debt, was close to bankruptcy. "I have loved war too much," lamented the King in August 1714.[30]

The Regime

Louis XIV was five years old when his father died in 1643. His mother Anne ruled as regent during his minority, assisted by the crafty Mazarin. Grievances against Mazarin's policy expressed initially by the *Parlement* of Paris in 1648 intensified into a national rebellion, the *Fronde*, which was not suppressed until 1653. These turbulent years convinced Louis XIV and many of his subjects of the necessity of absolute monarchy. Thereafter, the bodies that might have imposed some limitation on royal power were weakened decisively. The Estates General was not convened again until the French Revolution; the provincial estates rendered ineffective; and the *Parlement* of Paris subdued. The monarch was free to extract resources sufficient to support his ambitions, unencumbered by institutional constraints.[31]

France's "absolute monarch" still ruled in domestic affairs within the constraints of tradition, law and privilege. Over foreign policy, however, Louis exercised complete control.[32] The atmosphere at Versailles was not entirely conducive to rational discussion of foreign policy. At the center of the palace were the *salon de Guerre* and *salon de Mars*, "pagan temples dedicated to the cult of war and the triumph of the royal warrior." The rituals of court, which elevated the king and debased individuals, surrounded the king with deference and flattery. The court-sponsored architecture, art, music and drama, though excellent in quality, were political in design, their aim being to celebrate the magnificence of the monarch.[33] Louis may have heard enough criticism early in his life from a very exacting tutor, Cardinal Mazarin, to acquire some resistance to flattery. He advised his son later to be wary of it. Louis XIV intended to act as his own first minister, but he appointed a coterie of advisors who were able, expert, diligent and, early in his reign, senior to him in age. Policy was made by the *Conseil d'en haut*, a body of three or four officials selected by the king. Its deliberations remained secret and his ministers discussed matters freely. The king was attentive and enjoyed the proceedings. He usually accepted the majority's decision, but overruled them when he disagreed. The ministers had different personalities and interests

and at least initially provided contrasting points of view. Early on, his advisors seem to have exercised a moderating influence. Ministers served at the king's pleasure, however. In the end, they could not restrain him when he was determined, as he was in his twenties, "to dazzle the world with glorious exploits."[34] One example will suffice. Colbert, Louis's able finance minister, attempting in late 1671 to dissuade him from attacking the Dutch, told the young king that he did not see how the war could be financed. "Think about it," Louis responded coldly. "If you can't do it, there will be somebody who can."[35]

The Man

Louis XIV called *gloire* "the thing which is the most precious in the world." Most of his contemporaries agreed. *Gloire* meant renown, reputation, and eventually the favorable verdict of history. "In my heart," he declared, "I valued above all else, more than life itself, a high reputation…A governing and overriding passion for greatness and *gloire* stifles all others…".[36] Many things contributed to the *gloire* of a ruler—governance of his own emotions, projects beneficial to his kingdom, achievements in the arts, sciences and letters—but success in international affairs, which in his day meant victory in war, was paramount. War was viewed as the vocation of kings. Louis's upbringing emphasized martial training, and he took to it enthusiastically. Legal reform, the construction of infrastructure and other mundane subjects of domestic policy he was content to leave in the hands of his able minister Colbert, but when the discussion turned to diplomacy and war the king's eyes would light up. Louis maintained that, because *gloire* had instrumental value, his interest and that of the French state were one. "A king need never be ashamed of seeking fame," Louis explained, "for it is a good that must be ceaselessly and avidly desired and which alone is better able to secure success of our aims than any other thing. Reputation is often more effective than the most powerful armies. All conquerors have gained more by reputation than by the sword." This was true at home as well as abroad. Louis was, among other things, the "first gentleman" of his kingdom, the head of the nobility as well as the head of the state. The nobility's social function had been war; its mentality remained feudal. Failure to fulfill their expectations for a warrior-king could diminish his authority. The French remained a warlike race whose energies, if not directed

abroad, could erupt again in rebellion.[37] Jan de Witt, then leader the United Provinces, noted perceptively in 1664:

> France has a 26 year old king, vigorous in mind and body…who possesses a kingdom inhabited by an extremely bellicose people. Such a king would have to have "an extraordinary, almost miraculous moderation if he thrust aside the ambition which is so natural to princes and did not extend his frontiers where they are most restricting.[38]

No such moderation was in evidence early in his reign. His first two wars were fought primarily for *gloire*.[39]

Louis XIV, according to one biographer, felt "an instinctive need to exercise control and mastery." Grandeur was an important component of his authority. Only 5'4" in stature, the handsome, athletic and graceful monarch bore himself majestically. Louis was phlegmatic in temperament and somewhat diffident, but when he donned his robe, these qualities were transformed into a kingly reserve and composure. Kingship was for Louis a theatrical performance, but in a role that he enjoyed and in which he excelled. One woman at court described him as "readily approachable but with a lofty and serious air which impressed all with respect and awe and prevented even his most confidential advisers from forgetting his position."[40] Kingship, he wrote, could be "rude and thorny," but also brought "sweetness and pleasure." "Nothing," he said, "could be more burdensome than inactivity." Louis was intelligent, industrious, and knowledgeable about contemporary Europe to a degree that impressed foreign visitors. He remained calm in the face of adversity. He was courteous, not only slow to anger but also unfailing in expressions of gratitude for even the smallest services. At times, he seemed sensitive to the plight of his subjects and soldiers.[41]

Louis' presentation of himself was undeniably impressive, but his outward serenity was reinforced, to some degree, by a somewhat compulsive regularity and possibly a subconscious exclusion of disconcerting facts or opinions.[42] Moreover, at least in the eyes of one recent biographer, he could be indifferent to the suffering of those around him and even cruel, seeking to bully and humiliate others. This he attributes to Louis's "formation" as a child, which burdened him with a high degree of insecurity as well as a large capacity for self-deception. Anthony Levi believes that Louis's ambition, which proved so costly for France and Europe, was a result of this lack of self-confidence implanted in his

childhood and perhaps exacerbated by the tension between the strict religious morality of the day and his chronic womanizing. The Sun King was outwardly self-assured but this may indicate only that he was a skillful actor who played his assigned role to perfection. Although John Wolf disputes Levi's contentions regarding Louis's childhood, he also notes that study of the written record reveals a man who "felt psychologically insecure" and who "had trouble trusting his decisions or believing in his actions."[43]

To Louis XIV, power was glory and glory was power. He desired both. Political institutions posed little hindrance to his ambitions. What of religion? Anne of Austria, Louis' mother, did all she could to instill piety in her son. He seemed receptive as a child and as an adult prayed and attended mass regularly. His inner state is more difficult to discern. The King's Catholicism did not curb his youthful lechery (although it may have given him a bad conscience about it), which has led some to wonder how much influence his faith had in other areas.[44] One contemporary, François Fénelon, bitterly reproached the King: "Your religion consists only of superstitions and petty, superficial practices…You are scrupulous about bagatelles and hardened to terrible wrongs. You love only your glory and your comforts."[45] Seventeenth century spirituality may well have emphasized worship, private devotion and ritual to the neglect of ethics, but this criticism is certainly not generous and probably not entirely accurate. Louis XIV was taught by his tutor that "the principal duty of a Christian prince is to serve God," and he offered similar nostrums to his son. The prevailing theory of Divine Right asserted that God had granted authority to Kings but also imposed on them obligations. Cardinal Mazarin, Louis's regent and surrogate father, admonished him that if a king disregarded these duties, God would abandon him. Because his power was viewed as a trust from God, Louis averred that he must not delegate his authority but must act as his own "first minister," especially in foreign policy.[46] Louis heard over one thousand sermons during his reign, many of high quality, and he is said to have been an attentive listener. French historian François Bluche contends that these preachers espoused an Old Testament conception of Kingship subject to divine law, exemplified by the sinful but faithful David, that tempered his use of the extensive powers in his possession. If Louis, as Bluche maintains, displayed the "relative moderation, genuine restraint and reasonableness," this was the cause.[47] Readers may judge for themselves whether Fénelon or Bluche is closer to the truth.

Louis miscalculated frequently, not necessarily in the prospects for success, but in weighing the costs in relation to the gains. France can be said to have won the first four of Louis's wars and fought well enough in the last to place a Bourbon monarch on the throne of Spain. Three of these wars were exhausting wars of attrition. This can be attributed in part to the character of warfare during this era, the difficulty in winning a decisive battle and the slow pace of operations. The defensive bias in warfare might have convinced another statesman to rely more heavily on Vauban's genius at fortification. Louis typically went to war in the belief that opponents would be isolated, only to find that coalitions rallied to the side of his enemy. His worst judgments were not military but diplomatic.

"*Gouverner c'est prévoir*," remarked one of Louis's successors. Louis XIV's foresight left much to be desired. Biographer Philippe Erlanger concludes that Louis's compulsive desire for order and serenity, manifested in the ordered beauty of Versailles, led him to discourage criticism and discussion and to isolate himself from the wider world. The advisory process, initially functional if not always effective, degenerated over time. After the dismissal of foreign minister Arnaud de Pomponne in 1679, Louis's advisors were more unanimous in their preference for force over diplomacy. By the 1690s, Louis became so quick to take offense that many subjects could not be raised in conversation. After the death of Colbert, advisors and courtiers did not speak openly with him. The magnificent halls and gardens of his palace became "a realm of illusions" offering "perilous satisfaction of a wizard in the grip of his own enchantments."[48] Early in his reign, Louis believed that God acts in history indirectly by bestowing talents on those he favors. The effective use of those talents remains the individual's responsibility. For Louis, this meant planning. Careful attention to detail, he convinced himself, would enable him exercise control over the course of history. The king's assiduous study of administrative trivia often obscured the larger picture. Louis's mastery of detail did not make him master of events. After the reverses of the Dutch War, he began to speak of Providence guiding events, possibly because it excused him from error, but the conviction that he could achieve control by means of planning, he never renounced. His greatest failing, in the judgment of military historian John Lynn, was not ambition but arrogance.[49]

Charles XII's Invasion of Russia

The Regime

When Charles XII became king of Sweden in October 1697, he inherited impressive powers at home and abroad. Absolute monarchy was firmly established. His father had gained authority and prestige from his conduct of the Scanian War in the 1670s. He later carried out a sweeping *Reduktion* that transferred more than one-third of the land from the nobility to the peasants and the Crown, diminishing the wealth and influence of the upper nobility and further strengthening the monarchy. Sweden's parliament, the *Riksdag*, declared that royal power was limited neither by the constitution nor the King's Council. The *Riksdag* retained only the power of approving taxation in peacetime. The King's resources were sufficient to maintain a standing army of 65,000 without additional requests for funds. According to a proclamation of 1693, Sweden's monarch was "an absolute sovereign King, responsible to no one on earth."[50]

Situation, Alternatives, Decision

Sweden's empire at the time of Charles XII's accession encompassed Finland, the eastern Baltic provinces of Livonia, Estonia, Karelia and Ingria as well as the German possessions of Bremen-Verden, Wismar and Pomerania. A disaffected Livonian nobleman, Johan Patkul, organized an anti-Swedish coalition of Denmark, Russia, Saxony and Poland (the Elector of Saxony, Augustus the Strong, was also King of Poland). Confident in their superiority, the coalition began the Great Northern War in 1700 with attacks by Denmark on Sweden's ally Holstein, Saxony on Livonia and Russia on Ingria.[51] After three years of famine, Sweden's treasury was empty. Her king was still an adolescent and, at times, had acted like it. Fortunately for Sweden, Charles matured in his role faster than Shakespeare's Prince Hal. Several of his counselors believed the situation to be hopeless, but the young king declared, in words that became his motto, that "nothing is impossible!"[52] With assistance from England and the Netherlands, he landed an army of 10,000 on Zealand and compelled Denmark to capitulate in August. On 20 November 1700, the Swedes fought the Russians at Narva in a

snowstorm. Attacking an entrenched enemy and outnumbered 3:1, the Swedes broke the enemy's line and killed 8–10,000 of the 40,000 Russian defenders. The victory was won by the "firm and unbending resolution" of Sweden's young king. Another brilliant victory followed at Kliszów in 1702, where Charles defeated the combined Saxon and Polish armies of Augustus. The Poles deposed Augustus in 1704 and elected an ally of Sweden as king. Charles invaded Saxony in 1706. Augustus sued for peace and delivered Patkul for execution.[53]

While Charles was with dealing with Augustus, the Russian Tsar, Peter (later "the Great") occupied Ingria and began construction of St. Petersburg. Peter offered to make peace if Sweden would accept the loss. Charles refused adamantly. Perhaps this would have been the lesser evil, but if Russia consolidated her hold over Ingria and gained access to the Baltic Sweden's control over that sea, on which her empire depended, would inevitably be challenged. Sweden's generals favored a northern offensive to drive Russia out of the Baltic territories and capture the Russian stronghold at Pskov, which could be held as negotiating leverage or used as a base for further campaigning. Livonia, already heavily burdened by years of war, would have borne the brunt of the army's requisitions.[54]

Charles's choice was to attack the heart of Muscovy, proceeding toward Smolensk and on to Moscow. Some modern scholars defend this decision. The limited Baltic campaign advocated by Sweden's generals would not have brought lasting peace. Under Peter's forceful leadership Russia was aggressive and growing in strength, but in 1708 still had serious vulnerabilities. Peter's domestic reforms were not firmly established; the core of his army was not large; and the Cossacks were disaffected. An English diplomat in Moscow reported that "should [Russia's] army come to any considerable miscarriage, it would probably draw after it the ruin of the entire empire, since I do not know where the Czar would be able to get another…not to mention the usual despondency of the Russians after any misfortunes and their general discontent and inclination to revolt." The Russian army was improving, however, and this was known to Sweden's generals. Although still lacking competent officers, constant drilling had improved the Russian infantry. Charles fought a preventive war to diminish the Russian threat while it was still possible.[55]

Charles was confident. Swedish valor and Charles's inspiring leadership had produced an unbroken series of successes since 1700. The Russians' flight at Narva had left Charles contemptuous of his enemy. He believed that his 40,000 troops would defeat 70,000 Russians.[56]

Sweden's generals were not convinced. Even Marshall Rehnskjöld, normally an enthusiastic supporter of the King's proposals, was critical of the king's decision to risk his army in a campaign where the lines of communications would be lengthy and provisions uncertain.[57] Charles had ignored his generals in the past, however, and won brilliant victories.[58]

The greatest obstacle was logistical. Peter had practiced scorched earth tactics in Poland. To do so in his own country might be seem analogous, as one Swedish countess observed, to a husband emasculating himself to spite his wife, but this possibility had to be taken seriously. To ensure that his army had adequate supplies, Charles ordered General Lewenhaupt to lead a convoy from Riga to the Dnieper River, where it was expected to join the main force. The invasion's success could have succeeded only if "friction" was minimal, but as the campaign unfolded nearly everything that could have gone wrong did go wrong.[59]

Charles outmaneuvered the Russian forces in Poland and marched east, reaching the eastern territory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth by early 1708. He encamped for the winter west of Minsk. The Swedes broke camp in early June 1708 and encountered the Russians first at Hołowczyn, where yet again they defeated a numerically superior adversary. Charles paused on the western bank of the Dnieper to rest his troops and await arrival of the supply train. Lewenhaupt was slow to begin and late to arrive, his progress hindered by an unseasonably rainy summer that turned the roads to mud. Peter utilized the delay to put the lands between the Swedes and Smolensk to the torch. The air above the invaders' camp was soon so thick with smoke that the sun was barely visible. Charles crossed the Dnieper in early August and vainly sought a decisive engagement with Russia without ranging so far as to lose contact with Lewenhaupt. The Russians avoided a pitched battle, harassed and retreated.[60] Charles arrived at Tatarsk in early September, close to the border and less than fifty miles from Smolensk. He faced a difficult decision. Precious time in the campaign season had been wasted in inactivity. His men were hungry; there were no supplies ahead on the road to Moscow; and it appeared that if he waited much longer for Lewenhaupt he would face a mutiny or widespread desertion. General Gyllenkrook advised pulling back to the Dnieper to find Lewenhaupt, but in the words of R. Nisbet Bain "Charles XII had an invincible repugnance to any strategical movement which had the remotest resemblance to a retreat." Lewenhaupt was intercepted in late September by the Russians. All of the supplies and nearly half of his force of 11,000 were lost.[61]

Charles turned to the south in search of food, passing unsuccessfully through Severia (latter day Chernigov) and arriving in the Ukraine in mid-November. Supplies were ample, but the Swedes were harassed incessantly by Russian irregulars. To make matters worse, the winter was so severe that birds dropped dead out of the trees and alcoholic spirits froze solid. At least three thousand Swedes froze to death. By the spring, only 22,000 of Charles's original army of 41,000 remained.[62]

Rejecting again any suggestion of retreat to Poland, Charles brought the enemy to battle on 28 June 1709 by besieging the Russian fortress at Poltava. Although the Russian host was double that of the Swedes (45,000 to 22,000), the tactical situation afforded the Swedes an opportunity. Luck deserted the Swedish king. Struck in the foot by a bullet while reconnoitering, Charles had to be carried to the battle on a litter. Poor coordination led to a delay in Sweden's attack, enabling the Tsar to concentrate 22,000 infantry and 68 guns on the 4000 advancing Swedes. Overwhelmed by Russia's immense superiority in numbers and firepower, the attackers were annihilated. Charles escaped to the Ottoman Empire, but his commanding general inexplicably surrendered the remaining 15,000 Swedish troops a few days later. Although Charles persevered until the end of his life, Sweden never recovered from the losses in the Russian campaign. By the end of the Great Northern War in 1721, Sweden had lost all of her German and Baltic possessions and retained only Finland.[63]

The Man

Of all the prominent men in history, Charles XII was one of the most reticent.[64] Ragnhild Hatton provides the best description and interpretation of this difficult subject. There were two sides to Charles's character, she says. In more intimate and informal settings, he displayed patience, generosity, consideration, cheerfulness and a lack of pretense. Although reserved, he enjoyed the company of others, sharing with them witticisms and stories. On public occasions, however, Charles had "an aura of power and ruthless determination that sent premonitory shivers down the spine."[65] In the words of one Swedish historian, "he led his troops in person, straight-backed and laconic in his utterances [and] gave the impression of having something indefinable about him, 'awe-inspiring and almost sinister'."[66] Although his father had been autocratic, Charles XII was even more overbearing and less tolerant of public criticism.[67]

As a child, Charles was bright, but quiet and, when "he considered himself in right," obstinate. When he ascended to the throne, his personality was not fully formed. At the onset of the Great Northern War three years later, he was still only eighteen. The responsibilities of office in time of war shaped Charles's character. To encourage others, he had to seem hopeful; to accomplish his tasks, he had to be determined; to keep military secrets, he needed to be discreet; and to endure and to win, he had to be tough on himself and others. Above all else, he was assiduous and dutiful. It is true that he showed many of the same tendencies as a child, before assuming office, but responsibility fostered some traits to the detriment of others. Charles XII became the role he was playing, although his underlying temperament was more complex than a casual observer might have assumed.[68]

The danger of this combination of optimism and obstinacy was apparent in a conversation between Charles and General Gyllenkrook on the eve of the Russian campaign:

Gyllenkrook: "The enemy will surely dispute our advance."
Charles XII: "They cannot prevent it. Tell me your opinion; how think you they could do so?"
Gyllenkrook: "I do not believe that the enemy would venture upon a battle with Your Majesty, but they would entrench themselves at difficult passages and defend them to the best of their power."
Charles XII: "Their entrenchments are worthless and could not hinder our march."
Gyllenkrook: "If the enemy cannot stop us, they will not fail to set their country afire."
Charles XII: "And should they not, I will do it for them."
Gyllenkrook: "Your Majesty will in time make proof whether it be dangerous to venture so far into enemy country away from Your Majesty's own land and communications."
Charles XII: "We must venture while fortune is with us."
Gyllenkrook: "Fortune can be treacherous. Your Majesty has the example of the King of France, who was most fortunate in all his enterprises; yet he committed the error of sending his forces too far away from his country, to Höchstedt of the Danube, whereby well nigh his whole army was taken. He

cannot recover, as Your Majesty sees; and though he ventures to fight battles nearly every year, yet he always loses."

Charles XII (smiling): "Poor Frenchman! He is unlucky, and will never rise again."

Gyllenkrook: "It lies in God's hand. May the Lord preserve Your Majesty's army from such misfortune; I fear the consequences would be evil."

Charles XII: "No evil shall befall it—have no fear."[69]

General Lewenhaupt was no more successful. By the time of the invasion of Russia Charles "seemed indifferent to [his] lectures and memoranda on this and that."[70] Even after the catastrophe at Poltava, Charles remained incorrigibly optimistic.[71] Not for nothing did the Turks, who hosted the Swedish King for five years, refer to their guest as "the iron head."[72]

Charles's decision to turn east can be attributed to fear of the rising power of Russia, confidence in the valor of his troops and sheer pertinacity. But, according to Voltaire, another motive was decisive:

> His great qualities, any one of which would have immortalized another prince, were the ruin of his nation. He never attacked anyone, but was less prudent than implacable in his vengeance. He was the first man who aspired to be a conqueror without wishing to enlarge his domains; what he wanted was to win empires to give away. His passion for glory, war and revenge kept him from being a good statesman…. His life should teach kings how superior to such renown is a peaceful and happy reign.[73]

Tutors of the young prince found they could overcome his stubbornness by appeals to honor and nothing else. Bored initially by Latin, he was told that the kings of Poland and Denmark could read it, and thereafter applied himself energetically. One of the texts he was asked to translate was a life of Alexander by Quintus Curtius. Asked for his opinion of the subject by his tutor, Charles replied "I think that I would like to be like him." Reminded that Alexander only lived to be 33, he responded "isn't that enough when one has conquered kingdoms?"[74] Charles carried the aforementioned *Life of Alexander* with him on his campaigns and was able to quote from it.[75] At the beginning of the war, Swedish officials expressed concern that the headstrong young king, already quite independent of his advisors by virtue of his innate intelligence, might

"acquire a penchant for military glory" and become more difficult to influence.[76] In Charles's defense, it ought to be noted that as a commander he was invariably modest in victory and generous in his praise of others. At Thorn, in 1704, Charles proposed to lead a charge up the walls, saying "Where my soldiers are, there also will I be. As for Sweden, I should be no great loss to her, for she has had little profit out of me hitherto."[77] The loss of his beloved sister seemed to affect him every bit as much as the debacle at Poltava.[78]

Charles XII was reared to be pious and remained so through his life. In the field, he prayed and sang hymns in the morning and evening and the phrase "with God's help" was constantly on his lips. Even after Poltava, he continued with his routine of prayer, bible study and, four times each year, confession.[79] Charles's Lutheranism expressed itself in politics as a form of fatalism. He believed that God decided the time and place of one's death and that fate was inescapable. God not men controlled history. This conviction infused Charles with courage and he in turn inspired his troops. The Swedes were too phlegmatic to be instinctive soldiers, he thought. To encourage them, he must share the risk.[80] In the campaign in Saxony, artillery killed a man where Charles had stood only moments before. The event convinced him that God had spared his life for a purpose. He was driven onward in part by a sense of destiny.[81] According to his biographer Ragnhild Hatton, "his belief in his *Lyckan* held no flippancy, but arose from his deep trust—which the field-marshal shared—that God was with him and would bring about the glorious accomplishment of his design."[82]

Charles's faith reinforced rather than moderated the rigidity of his temperament. As biographer Frans Bengtsson puts it, "There was nothing original in the moral instruction he received; the same, generally speaking, has been preached since the time of Solon. The originality lay in the pupil, who took it seriously." "One may cease to be lucky," he said late in his life, "but one should never cease to be honest."[83] Before the Great Northern War began, Peter and Augustus had both assured the young king of their friendship. After they attacked, Charles, who had seemingly grown to manhood overnight, declared before the Swedish Senate: "I have resolved never to begin an unrighteous war; but I have also resolved never to finish a righteous war till I have utterly crushed my enemies."[84] Charles took this betrayal personally. He told the Austrian ambassador that he intended overthrow Peter as he had Augustus (in Poland).[85] The Duke of Marlborough, like most observers,

found Charles impenetrable at their meeting in 1707, but noted "his eyes flashed and his cheeks kindled" whenever the name of the Tsar was mentioned.[86]

Let us leave the last word to Voltaire:

> For where is the monarch who can say 'I am braver and more virtuous than Charles XII; I have a more resolute spirit and a sturdier body; I have a greater understanding of warfare; I have better troops than he?' For if, despite all these advantages and after so many victories, that king was so ill-fated, what ought to be the expectations of other princes, of equal ambition but lesser talents and resourcefulness? There is assuredly no sovereign who, on reading the life of Charles XII, must not be cured of the rage to conquer.[87]

Frederick II and the Aggrandizement of Prussia

The Regime

The year 1740 brought the death of the King of Prussia and Emperor of Austria and the accession of two young monarchs to their thrones. Prussia's new king, Frederick II, began well, easing censorship, extending religious toleration, abolishing torture, moderating criminal punishments and increasing support of the arts. Voltaire and other enlightenment luminaries graced his court. Yet the autocratic structure of government remained. By the 1680s, the estates in the miscellaneous Hohenzollern possessions in northern Germany and the Baltic had conceded to the elector (later king) the authority to conduct foreign policy, yielded their capacity to legislate and been bribed or browbeaten into surrendering their fiscal powers. Their continued acquiescence was ensured by the existence of a standing army, maintained by burdensome taxation on the lower classes. The personal rule of the king was now the essence of Prussian government. Seven new regiments were added by Frederick to an already disproportionate Prussian military. This was a clearer indication of the future course of events.[88]

Prussia under the Hohenzollerns was an absolute monarchy in which the king was not only the chief administrator but the highest military commander. Frederick believed that the king must rule not reign. It can be said without much exaggeration that he was the Prussian state for five decades.[89] The decision to invade Silesia was the King's and he was more

than willing to accept responsibility for it. Taking command of the army, he explained to a senior general, "I reserve this expedition to myself alone, so that the world does not believe the King of Prussia takes the field with a tutor."[90]

The War of the Austrian Succession: Situation, Alternatives, Decision

Charles VI of Austria had attempted to secure the succession to his extensive but disparate holdings by winning diplomatic acceptance for the Pragmatic Sanction, his proclamation in 1713 that in the absence of a male heir the Habsburg territories would pass intact to one of his daughters. Along with this paper guarantee he bequeathed to Maria Theresa a bankrupt treasury, a demoralized army and cabinet of senile advisors. Frederick invaded the prosperous Austrian province of Silesia on 16 December 1740, drawing the powers of Europe into nearly two decades of war on three continents.[91] England and Saxony rallied to Austria's support in March, but Frederick's brash incursion brought neither Austria's acquiescence nor France's diplomatic support. Frederick's fortunate victory Mollwitz galvanized France and Bavaria, who entered the war against Austria. The fighting continued off and on until Christmas 1745, when Austria recognized Prussia's possession of Silesia in the Peace of Dresden. Frederick matured into an excellent field commander but ruthless diplomat. He won notable victories at Chotusitz and Hohenfriedberg but broke faith with France three times by suspending hostilities unilaterally against Austria.[92]

The appellation "the Great" was already being applied to Frederick by his subjects. From this moment, however, the weary monarch would live in fear. Austria was not reconciled to the loss of Silesia and his aggression and cynical diplomacy had raised alarm and mistrust in many quarters.[93] "Henceforth, I won't even bother a cat," he protested, "unless it is in self-defense. [But] we have drawn upon ourselves the envy of Europe by the acquisition of Silesia, and it has put all our neighbors on the alert; there is not one who does not distrust us."[94]

Prussia's legal claim to Silesia was feeble, but this did not much trouble her king. When presented with an official declaration prepared by his officials to justify the seizure of Silesia, he complimented its author: "Bravo, that is the work of a good charlatan."[95] For Frederick, the fundamental facts were that Silesia was valuable, Prussia was strong and

Austria was vulnerable. There were sound geopolitical reasons for the acquisition of Silesia. Prussia, a state with great power aspirations but without great power resources, was not only poor but also insecure. Most of the realm was sand and forest. The odd configuration of its non-contiguous territories made it difficult to defend. The Rhineland could not be held against France; East Prussia was indefensible against Russia; and the capital, Berlin, was proximate to Saxony. "The dangers resulting from this disadvantageous territorial structure," one historian explains, "stimulated an urge to expand and a dynamism which the more consolidated and less imperiled rivals of Prussia lacked."[96] Silesia, with an area of 14,000 square miles, lay adjacent to Brandenburg at the center of both east-west and north-south trade routes. With a population of 1.5 million, a thriving woolen industry and rich mineral resources, Silesia provided one-fourth of Austria's tax revenues.[97] The addition of Silesia would greatly enlarge Prussia's current population of 2.2 million, broadening the tax base and permitting an expansion of the army to 135,000. Frederick's conquest of Silesia was "the decisive step toward the consolidation of a great power between the Elbe and the Vistula."[98]

Austria's problems were many, and Frederick was well aware of them. The Hungarians were restive, the treasury nearly empty and the army exhausted, poorly funded and discredited after a derisory campaign against the Ottoman Empire. Charles's daughter and successor, 23 years old and inexperienced, did not appear to the misogynist Frederick to be a particularly formidable adversary.[99] Maria Theresa lamented later that she found herself upon her coronation "without money, without credit, without an army, without experience and knowledge of my own and finally, also without any counsel."[100] Austria had undergone a steep decline since her glorious victories over the Ottomans and Louis XIV. The army's recent performance against the Ottomans had been so embarrassing that several commanders had been imprisoned. The fisc had been badly mismanaged as well, leaving the army at half its authorized strength.[101]

In a long war, Austria might succeed by mobilizing her superior resources, but Frederick did not intend to fight a long war and hoped that he would not have to. By acting promptly, he could impose a fait accompli on Austria and negotiate from strength with a desperate Austrian empress.[102] The jackals would soon gather, he reckoned. France would surely endeavor take advantage of her long-time rival's distress. Saxony, Spain, Piedmont and Bavaria all desired portions of

the sprawling Habsburg domains, and the King of Bavaria coveted the Imperial crown. If France were hesitant, Britain would presumably be available as an ally.[103] Frederick was wary of Russia but expected that the political turmoil following the death of Empress Anna (and, if necessary, some bribery) would prevent her from intervening.[104] Frederick assessed this situation carefully and took a calculated risk. One factor he failed to account for, however: Maria Theresa. She assumed the task of reclaiming Silesia with confidence, "systematically repressing what both experience and common sense taught about belligerence, suspending all reasonable calculation of probabilities and mistaking hope for reality."[105] The young Empress was stubborn, courageous and defiant. Her appearance before the Hungarian estates not only ended their rebellion but inspired Hungary's nobles to rally to her defense. Maria Theresa proved to be a determined adversary.[106]

The foundation for Frederick's achievements was laid during the reign of his father, Frederick William I, from 1713 to 1740. Despite his realm's comparative poverty, Frederick William expanded Prussia's army from 45,000 in 1713 to 83,000 in 1739 by rationalization of tax collection, economization on court luxuries and avoidance of debt. France, with a population ten times as large, fielded an army of 160,000. Prussia's troops were well armed and well trained. Her finances were sound. The treasury held 10,000 thalers at Frederick's accession, more than a year's revenue. Silesia was initially defended by only 2–3000 troops (reinforced hurriedly to 7800). Prussia mobilized 27,000 troops in six weeks (very rapidly for that era) to occupy the province.[107] "When a man is in a strong position," Frederick asked, "is he to take advantage of it? If I do not take advantage of it, I hold in my hands a force which I do not know how to use; if I do take advantage of it, it will be said that I have the wit to make use of the superiority which I have over my neighbor."[108]

Frederick's design on Silesia was long standing. He had written nine years before as a prince that as king he would abandon the cautious policy of his father and attempt to increase and consolidate Prussia's dispersed lands. In 1737, he predicted a scramble for the Habsburg inheritance upon Charles's death.[109] Frederick consulted only two advisors about the invasion, Field Marshall Kurt von Schwerin and his foreign minister, Heinrich von Podewils. Podewils, foreseeing many of the difficulties that lay ahead, considered the invasion a "great folly." (The view was widely shared. "That man is a fool," Louis XV of France exclaimed when he heard of the invasion of Silesia.) Podewils tried his

best to discourage his master, recalling the fate of Louis XIV and Charles XII, who had ruled states stronger and less vulnerable than Prussia. Podewils proposed that Prussia offer to assist Maria Theresa in the defense of her beleaguered dominions in return for the right to purchase Silesia. If she agreed, Prussia could count on the support of Britain, the Netherlands and Russia. If rejected, as Podewils expected, Prussia could still obtain Silesia by cooperating with Saxony and Bavaria to partition Austria. In any case, Frederick ought to avoid isolation.[110] Frederick rejected this advice, believing that he could take possession of Silesia and then negotiate recognition of his acquisition. Frederick's action was not only "unprecedented and daring," it was risky. The invasion was, in the words of one historian, a "spectacular miscalculation" that "determined the course of Prussian policy for over two decades."[111] As Gerhard Ritter observes, "his entire life was to be spent in overcoming the consequences of this adventure [and] meeting the dangers that resulted from it. But overcome them he did."[112] Why, then, did Frederick risk it?

The Young Man

Frederick was optimistic, even ebullient, as the war commenced. "I have crossed the Rubicon with flags flying and drums beating," he wrote to Podewils. "My troops are very willing, the officers ambitious, our generals starved for glory; all will go according to our wishes, and I have reason to anticipate all possible good from the enterprise."[113] Part of the explanation for this may be found in a seemingly small incident that occurred a few months before. Prussian officials had been treated disrespectfully in Herstal, a barony recently inherited by the Hohenzollerns but claimed by the Bishop of Liège, to whom the inhabitants were sympathetic. His ministers recommended negotiations, noting that the Bishop had the support of Austria and France, but Frederick responded they knew no more about war than "Iroquois talking about astronomy." On 11 September 1740, Prussia occupied a town in the jurisdiction of the Bishop of Liège and informed him that he would sell the duchy for double the price his father had offered. It was an offer the bishop could not refuse. A French diplomat concluded: "It is impossible to exaggerate the influence which this small episode had on the violent measures which ensued, and how it encouraged the presumption of the king of Prussia."[114]

Frederick came to the throne with a chip of his shoulder. "He was convinced," explains Ritter, "that above all Prussia lacked reputation—the respect due to a state which needed to be feared."[115] Others agreed. One contemporary noted that "the name of 'Prussian' seldom occurred without some contumelious jest, or some disgraceful epithet."[116] He felt that his father had been particularly ill used by Austria, which had promised to support Prussia's claims to the duchies of Jülich and Berg in return for her approval of the Pragmatic Sanction only to renege. "It was his burning desire to avenge this chain of snubs and humiliations—as he interpreted them—and to let other powers at last feel the full weight of Prussia."[117] Frederick's father, with whom the future king had a deeply troubled relationship, suffered Austria's domineering behavior in silence, but once pointed to his son and told those assembled: "There stands one who will avenge me."[118]

Voltaire, lately a guest and admirer of the King of Prussia, wrote to a friend in January that his former host was "passionate about glory." Two months later, the Frenchman's tone grew more critical and was communicated in verse to a correspondent:

> I've seen his good intentions dropped
> At the first trumpet blast
> They are nothing more than kings
> And live their lives with bloody things
> They take or rape a few provinces
> To suit their ambitious ends
> I give up, say goodbye princes
> I want no one now but friends[119]

Foreign diplomats perceived Frederick's character earlier than Voltaire. The Austrian ambassador predicted in 1736 that the prince would begin his reign with "a startling stroke." The following year, another Austrian diplomat reported that "his ambition is to begin with a great victory." The French ambassador in Berlin concluded after three or four interviews with the new king that "levity, presumption and pride are the ruling traits of his character." France's foreign minister contrasted Frederick with his father in July 1740. "The late king of Prussia was an indecisive prince whose natural timidity made him little to be feared. The prince who has succeeded him already shows that he is quite different. He makes it clear that he is ambitious for glory, confident of the solidity of

his rights [and] conscious of his strength.[120] Others observed the same tendencies. Referring to Frederick's conversations with intellectuals such as Voltaire, as well as his love for music, Colonel Louis de Beauval inferred that "the King of Prussia…actually regarded all those things as recreations, or consolation in the kind of life he has chosen. His true inclinations drive him on to serious action and to war."[121]

Frederick's own statements corroborate these assessments. In a letter written in 1732, the young prince confided that only "progressive aggrandizement" would be a successful policy for Prussia in the long term. Frederick defended his conclusion on the grounds that Prussia was too weak and vulnerable to let opportunities pass, but expansion appealed to him emotionally as well. "I [will] stride from state to state, from conquest to conquest," he predicted. "And like Alexander, proudly consider new worlds to conquer."[122] Frederick wrote to Voltaire a week after the campaign, complaining of the effort and tedium of conducting it. "Such were my occupations, which I would gladly give to another person if it were not that I aspire to glory."[123] Writing of the beginning of his reign in his *Histoire de mon Temps*, he recalled: "Ambition, the opportunity for gain, the desire to establish my reputation—these were decisive, and thus war became certain."[124] And in a letter written on 3 March 1741, he admitted: "My youth, the fire of passions, the desire for glory, yes, to be frank, even curiosity, finally a secret instinct, has torn me away from the delights of tranquility. The satisfaction of seeing my name in the papers and later in history has seduced me."[125] At 28, Frederick was not an adolescent, but he had no direct experience of war. His upbringing had been influenced by officers who intended to instill the belief that "nothing in the world can endow a prince with more honor and glory than the sword."[126]

The relationship between Frederick and his father had been turbulent. Frederick's father was a devout man of simple tastes, whose greatest pleasures were hunting and carousing with a circle of cronies. Bored by his father's amusements, the young prince interested himself in books, music, fashion and the French language. Frederick William's disappointment in his son was transformed into suspicion by spies placed in the Prussian court determined to undermine the influence of Frederick's pro-English mother. Verbal abuse was succeeded by violence. Frederick was beaten regularly. This culminated at a festival sponsored by Augustus

of Saxony where Frederick, now 18 years old, was thrashed by his father in front of thousands of people.[127]

Frederick's harrowing adolescence affected him in complex ways. The pain and humiliation visited on him by his father gave rise to a determination to vindicate himself. Yet Frederick also continued to love his father and seek his approval despite all that happened. He experienced for the first time in 1745 what was to be a recurrent dream. "He saw his father coming towards him with soldiers to put him under arrest; for what crime? 'For not loving his father enough.' Then the scene changed. He was on a campaign. Again, suddenly his father stood before him. 'Have I done well?' the dreamer asked and Frederick William answered, 'Yes,' 'Then I am content. Your approval is worth more to me than that of the whole world." Frederick had been instructed that the king was first a soldier and glory was to be won through war. Biographer Edith Simon believes that despite everything Frederick came to identify with his father, thereby becoming "a super-Frederick William." "There is a Frederick William in you after all," said the elder Hohenzollern at one perceptive moment.[128]

The fundamental cause of the War of the Austrian Succession, in the judgment of historian M. S. Anderson, was "the personal ambition of one man." "Few events in history," he observes, "show more clearly the way in which its course can be changed by the arbitrary and unpredictable effects of an individual personality." Not every young king would have defied the counsel of his advisors and gambled with the fate of his country. Frederick had desired a "rendezvous with fame" and now he had it.[129] As Frederick foresaw, the war he commenced expanded in scope, thereby affording Prussia some protection. In the end, at least 100,000 men died on the far-flung fields of battle and as many as 400,000 civilians perished indirectly.[130] The British historian T. B. McCauley was moved to outrage:

> The selfish rapacity of the King of Prussia gave the signal to his neighbors. The whole world sprang to arms. On the head of Frederick is all the blood which was shed in every quarter of the globe. The evils produced by his wickedness were felt in the lands where the name of Prussia was unknown, and in order that he might rob a neighbour whom he had promised to defend, black men fought on the coast of Coromandel and red men scalped each other by the Great Lakes of North America.[131]

For Frederick, however, the balance could be reckoned favorable. At the cost of 20,000 men (killed, wounded and deserted), he had won the rich province of Silesia—provided that he could keep it![132]

The Seven Years War: Situation and Decision

The Seven Years War began on 25 August 1756 with Prussia's invasion of Saxony. Frederick had learned the previous month that Austria and Russia were planning an attack on Prussia but had delayed it until the following spring. His generals, with the important exception of Karl von Winterfeldt, were opposed to starting the war, as were his brothers. The ambassadors of Great Britain and France urged caution. His foreign minister, Podewils, advised him to use the next ten months to make alliances, hire mercenaries and mediate between Britain and France to preserve the peace. Precipitous action, he warned, might draw into the conflict states that would otherwise abstain. Frederick rejected Podewils cavalierly, saying: "Goodbye, mister timid policy." Podewils concerns were well founded, however. The military advantages were less than expected and the political disadvantages worse. Saxony was defeated, but held out long enough to prevent Frederick from moving into Bohemia before winter, permitting Austria to organize her defenses there before operations resumed. Frederick's invasion not only strengthened cooperation between Russia and Austria but added France to his long roster of enemies.[133] In the end, Frederick retained Silesia and established Prussia's status as a great power, but at immense cost: one-ninth of the population dead; the territory "repeatedly devastated" by invading armies; inflation and heavy indebtedness; and the King himself driven to despair, worked to exhaustion, aged and embittered by all he had seen.[134]

Frederick did not exaggerate the enmity of his opponents. He knew full well that Maria Theresa was not reconciled to the loss Silesia and, given the opportunity, would attempt to reclaim it. Tsarina Elizabeth of Russia detested Frederick and made no attempt to disguise it. Elizabeth was just as determined to bring him down and, perhaps because of her fragile health, more impatient to act. Frederick requested that Austria and Russia clarify their intentions repeatedly in the summer of 1756. They refused to provide assurances. (The Russian response was simply "Her Majesty is offended by the King of Prussia…".)[135] Frederick knew that the Tsarina was in poor health and upon her death in early 1762 Tsar Peter did as expected cease hostilities with Prussia.[136]

Frederick feared that an attack was imminent in June 1756, but learned the next month that it had been postponed because of Austria's lagging preparations. If this had been the only consideration for Prussia, fighting sooner might have been better than fighting later. Empress Maria Theresa's clever chancellor, Wenzel von Kaunitz, was hesitating because he was not fully confident that Austria and Russia could defeat Prussia even with a slight numerical advantage. France's resources (money if not troops) could make a critical difference. With the addition of France, Prussia, a state with a population less than 5 million, would be facing three great powers with a combined population of 36 million. The question for the Austrian chancellor was how to convince France to enter the war. Perhaps if Frederick were threatened with encirclement, Kaunitz surmised, he would lash out.[137] Frederick failed to anticipate the antagonism of France, whom he had betrayed in signing the Convention of Westminster with Britain, in part because it seemed to him to defy geopolitical logic. He found it inconceivable that the heirs of Richelieu would risk strengthening Austria by crushing her major rival in Germany, but the King's pique over the Convention was exploited skillfully by Kaunitz to achieve the "Diplomatic Revolution" of 1756. The immediate fruit of this was a defensive alliance between the two long-time antagonists, which was activated by Prussia's incursion into Saxony.[138]

Saxony, in Frederick's hands, was a valuable resource; in the hands of his enemies, it was a menace. Prussia extracted 48 million thalers from the unfortunate Saxons during the course of the war, enough to pay for one-third of the war's cost. Berlin was only 35 miles from the Saxon border. The Elbe, which flowed from Dresden to the strategically important city of Magdeburg, was a critical logistical asset. Frederick anticipated that the Austrians would attack through Saxony. Prussia's lack of strategic depth afforded him little margin for error. He maintained that he could not afford to absorb the first blow and appeal to the sympathy of others.[139]

Frederick attacked Austria and Russia before they could attack him. Even with passage of two centuries, it is not easy to assert with assurance whether Frederick's choice was correct or not.[140] He took this fateful step with blithe confidence. "If our enemies compel us to fight," he wrote to his sister in August, "we must not ask how many but where they are. We have nothing to fear."[141] Contemptuous of Russia's commanders, Frederick boasted that he would rout them despite their early mobilization. He and his belligerent advisor Winterfeldt underestimated

the progress made by their opponents, especially in gunnery, and failed to foresee that French subsidies could compensate for Austria's financial weakness. He expected, in the words of Dennis Showalter, "to run a physical and moral steamroller over the Austrians." After the bloody clash at Lobositz, however, he was forced to admit that "these animals have learned something."[142] Frederick's preventive war against two irredeemably antagonistic queens embroiled Prussia in a state of peril from which only a military genius could rescue her. Fortunately for Prussia, Frederick was one.[143]

The Mature Man

Character, not geography, determined Prussia's policy. As Dennis Showalter concludes: "Frederick's critics and admirers agreed that the King, at least at this stage in his career, was not a man to await events."[144] Frederick had set forth his views about national security and warfare clearly. He was skeptical of deterrence as a policy and of attrition as a military strategy. He preferred to take the offensive and seek a quick resolution in a decisive battle. "Our own wars must be short and lively," he asserted. "It does not suit us in the least to spin things out." This strategy reflected Brandenburg-Prussia's vulnerability and limited resource base, but also expressed the king's personality.[145]

Frederick's expected *blitzkrieg* was halted abruptly at Kolin in Bohemia, where he lost one-third of his army. Notable victories at Rossbach and Leuthen staved off defeat in 1757, but Frederick still faced overwhelming odds. He abandoned his outer provinces and exploited interior lines of communication to prevent his enemies from combining against him. They remained hesitant and disunited. Prussia's deliverance finally came with the death of the Tsarina in January 1762 and the accession of the Prussophile Paul.[146]

Prussia's aggrandizement and preservation rested not only on Frederick's genius, but his courage and determination. Frederick was no automaton. Defeats drove him to despair, even thoughts of suicide; and the strain of constant effort on his frail physique wearied him to exhaustion.[147] Yet he persevered. Prussia's king found consolation during the evenings in conversation, flute playing, poetry and reading, including the Stoics and Racine.[148] His thoughts turned back to the doctrine in which he was instructed as a youth, predestination, which reinforced his

sense of duty and, when things went badly, eased the burden of responsibility. References to glory in his writings were displaced by references to duty and honor, understood as the well-being of the state. He had to remain a king. "My body is worn out, my mind is dull, my energies are departing from me, but honor speaks, it makes me think and act." Honor and pride prohibited him from seeking peace by ceding territory, as was urged on him by his family and friends, but did not interfere with dispassionate appraisal of the military situation. His was a form of courage "without illusions."[149]

Aloof, haughty, misanthropic and suspicious, Frederick II is not an entirely sympathetic figure. In extenuation, it must be acknowledged that he experienced a traumatic childhood, which culminated in an ill-advised decision in his teenage years to flee from his overbearing father only to see his confederate in the adventure executed before his eyes. He derived from these traumas an emotional self-control that made him largely impenetrable to others.[150] His dissatisfaction with his arranged marriage to the mediocre but unobjectionable Elisabeth Christina of Brunswick was expressed not in the serial womanizing of some of her peers,[151] but in polite indifference and devotion to work. Most likely, Frederick was more interested in his kingship and the fulfillment of his ambitions than in women, or, for that matter, people in general. Reserved and distrustful, Frederick did not inspire affection in others. He kept humanity at arm's length and suffered increasing loneliness and isolation as the years wore on.[152]

The King of Prussia was responsible, assiduous, and, in the many crises he faced in the Seven Year's War, courageous and persevering. He did not accept the austere Protestantism of his father, but its moral residues remained, perhaps reinforced by his interest in Stoicism. He remained a Deist, but the God of his conception was too distant from the world to provide much succor or guidance.[153] Shortly before his accession, Frederick published a treatise entitled the *Anti-Machiavel*, and then proceeded to employ force and faithlessness in the next few years in precisely the manner advocated by the notorious Florentine. Viewing this performance charitably, it can be said that Frederick saw himself as "first servant of the state" and in this capacity, it was his obligation to act not to gratify his own wants and ambitions, but in the interest of Prussia. That interest was defined in terms of power. To increase the military might of the state was to enhance the security and welfare of its inhabitants and

its capacity for humanitarian action.[154] While not questioning the King's sincerity, suffice it to note here that such a view was, from a psychological point of view, convenient. To Podewils, he wrote early in Silesian campaign that "I would far rather perish with honor than be lost to glory and repute for the whole of my life. It is a point of honor with me to have contributed more than any other man to the aggrandizement of my House…. I have crossed the Rubicon; either I must uphold my power or else let everything perish and even the name of Prussian sink to oblivion along with me."[155]

Frederick strove to reach decisions rationally, dispassionately analyzing circumstances and calculating the consequences of his actions. He assimilated factual information eagerly, conceived plans imaginatively, implemented them flexibly and, when necessary, unscrupulously. If he appeared calm and collected, this was not because he was phlegmatic in temperament but by virtue of the strict discipline he imposed on himself. The remarkable thing is that his rationality did not lead to vacillation. He was decisive and, as we have seen, confident to a fault.[156] His desire for glory was linked with an intense desire for power.[157] This was manifested in impatience, meddlesome behavior, occasional emotional cruelty, an "arrogant, feverish and stubborn courage" and a general predisposition to activity. According to Pierre Gaxotte:

> He had the enthusiasm, the fundamental optimism of a man of action which showed him the profit behind each trial rather than the hazard of it… He had extraordinary vivacity, exuberance of speech, transports of anger, and fits of violence. For a man of such a temperament to want and to act were necessities, were instinctive and irresistible natural functions. Decision and action were synonymous to giving way to a nature of irrepressible strength, giving way joyfully as to a delicious and tyrannical passion.[158]

Frederick was a living oxymoron, a terrible combination of fire and ice. His passion for power and glory provided the impetus; his keen intellect provided the guidance; and his belief in *raison d'etat* relaxed the moral restraints.[159] Acting (on others) not reacting (to others) was his *modus operandi*. In a situation of grave danger, "it was in accord with Frederick's personality that he defended himself not passively, but by taking the offensive."[160] In the end, after many tribulations, Frederick's trust in his abilities was vindicated, though at great cost.

Nicholas I and the Crimean War

Situation, Alternatives, Decision

The self-appointed Emperor of the French, Louis Napoleon, sought to bolster his political position soon after the *coup d'etat* that enabled him to retain power. France's ambassador, backed by the 90 guns of the warship *Charlemagne*, prevailed upon the Ottoman Empire in December 1852 to transfer the keys to Bethlehem's Church of the Nativity from Orthodox to Catholic monks. This elevation of Louis Napoleon's prestige came at the expense of that of Nicholas I, Tsar of Russia. In response, the Tsar mobilized two army corps on the borders of the Ottoman principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia and dispatched Admiral Alexander Menshikov to present counter-demands. Menshikov, an imposing figure with no prior experience as a diplomat, might seem a curious choice. The purpose of his mission was not to bargain with his hosts but to overawe them. He arrived at Constantinople on 28 February 1853, accompanied by an impressive retinue of officers. The Ottomans readily accepted a compromise regarding the Holy Places, but rejected his additional demand for a convention formally recognizing Russia as protector of the Empire's 12 million Orthodox Christians. Some have attributed this to the influence of Britain's formidable ambassador, Stratford de Redcliffe, but more likely it was the extremity of Russia's demands (which the Ottomans viewed as a threat to their autonomy) and the supercilious manner of the Tsar's envoy that led to the deadlock. Menshikov departed on 21 May without having secured the Ottomans' agreement to the protectorate.[161]

Britain and Russia then made nearly simultaneous moves that drew Europe into an intractable crisis. To compel the Ottoman Empire's to acquiesce, the Tsar ordered his army on 27 May to occupy its Danube principalities. Russia crossed the Pruth River and entered Moldavia on 2 July. On 28 May, Britain ordered her fleet to sail from Malta to Besika Bay, proximate to the Dardanelles. France joined Britain and the two fleets arrived on 13 June. For both sides, to remain where they were risked war, but to retreat meant a substantial loss of face. Furthermore, decisions would have to be made soon by both parties. Because the weather generally turned harsh in October, Russia would have to withdraw by the fall when the roads turned to mud or be prepared to winter

in the Balkans; Britain would either have to advance into the Dardanelles or withdraw to more a distant port.[162]

Austria was alarmed by these developments and sought to mediate. Consultation among the great powers led to a joint proposal, the "Vienna Note," which envisaged France and Russia as joint guardians of the Ottoman Christians. Enthusiasm in Britain dimmed when it was reported that Russia interpreted the note so broadly that the Ottoman Empire's independence would be endangered. Britain and France ordered their fleets to proceed to Constantinople on 23 September. Now confident in British and French support and pressured by an outraged public, the Ottoman government rejected the Vienna Note and threatened Russia with war should she refuse to evacuate the principalities. Russia stayed put and the Ottomans attacked on 28 October. Britain and France entered the war on the side of the Ottoman Empire after Russia attacked and sunk a Turkish flotilla at Sinope in March of the following year.[163] The war that ensued was one of the most destructive of the nineteenth century. Approximately 450,000 Russians, 80–95,000 French, 20–25,000 British and 200–400,000 Ottomans perished, most from disease rather than wounds.[164]

The Tsar was primarily if not exclusively to blame for this disaster. It was he who sent the overbearing Menshikov to Constantinople; who insisted on a formal recognition of Russia's interest in the Orthodox Christians; and who occupied the Balkan principalities when the negotiations deadlocked. Nicholas's misjudgments brought Russia into war against a powerful coalition of the Ottoman Empire, Britain and France, while her presumed allies, Austria and Prussia, stood aside.[165] Why did he do so?

The recent past provides part of the explanation. When Hungary rose in revolt against Austria rule in 1848, the Tsar intervened and assisted Austria in crushing the rebellion. The following year, when Prussia proposed the formation of a German union without Austria, the Tsar mobilized his four corps in Poland. Prussia abandoned the union in a humiliating meeting with Austria's representatives at Olmütz. Russia was respected and feared. Nicholas believed that he could rely upon the gratitude of Austria and the deference of Prussia.[166] Recent experience also led him to think that the Ottomans would yield to threats. Louis Napoleon's gunboat diplomacy was not the only instance.[167]

No doubt the Tsar's intention was to duplicate these successes, utilizing the threat of force to extract concessions from the beleaguered

Ottomans.[168] He had no reason to believe that his threats would fail. "Russia is strong and Turkey is weak," one of the Tsar's advisors asserted baldly. "That is the preamble to all our treaties…". Russia's army was not particularly well trained or well-led, but it was immense, with 1.1 million regulars and 730,000 reserves. Of these, about 700,000 regulars were available for use in Europe. The Ottoman Empire had 220,000. Russia's Black Sea fleet was double the size of the Ottomans' and superior in quality. Nicholas's confidence in his military was well placed. Once the fighting commenced, Russia defeated the Ottomans consistently before her allies came to their aid. The Tsar's crucial misjudgments were not military but diplomatic.[169]

The gravest of these was his assessment of Britain. The cabinet formed in December 1852 was headed by the Earl of Aberdeen, who had assured Nicholas in a meeting several years earlier that he viewed Russia's claims as a protector of the Ottoman Empire's Christians with sympathy. Aberdeen was suspicious of the French usurper and contemptuous of the Ottomans, whose regime he referred to as "the most evil and the most oppressive in all the world." Nicholas did not misjudge Aberdeen. The British prime minister was inclined to attribute limited objectives to Russia that could be satisfied by concessions by the Ottomans. Aberdeen's reaction to the Menshikov mission was "whether right or wrong, we advise the Turks to yield." What Nicholas failed to understand is that a British prime minster did not control his own government as the Tsar did Russia's. Russia was hated by much of the British public and the cabinet could not ignore public sentiment in the formation of policy. Regardless what the Tsar's immediate objectives were, if the agreement eventually enabled Russia to gain access to the eastern Mediterranean, Britain's communications with India would be threatened.[170]

Aberdeen's cabinet included both the forceful Russophobe Palmerston and pacific liberals such as Gladstone. Aberdeen's government was not exceedingly rancorous, but it took them time to reach consensus. When they finally agreed to dispatch the fleet, (primarily to mollify the British public) it was with the unwarranted expectation that its presence would temper the Tsar's ardor and reduce the risk of war. Unfortunately, the fleet's arrival sent the wrong messages to both St. Petersburg and Constantinople, stiffening the Ottomans' resistance and committing Britain to their defense without giving pause to Russia. Had the more assertive Palmerston achieved control over policy at the

outset, he would have threatened to send a squadron to Besika Bay *before* the Tsar had decided to occupy the principalities. "If only England and France had acted with more harmony and energy in declaring to the Russians beforehand that the passage of the Pruth would cause the entry of their fleets into the Black Sea," a Dutch diplomat observed, "I think they would have avoided it and the Russians thought twice before taking such a step." Louis Napoleon and his ministers agreed, as did the British opposition and, with the perspective of a few months' time, the foreign secretary, Lord Clarendon. At the most propitious moment, however, Aberdeen and his supporters were not yet ready and by the time consensus was achieved, it was too late.[171]

The Regime

Russia under the reign of Nicholas I was an autocracy. There were no legal limits to the Tsar's power. Nicholas resisted the delegation of authority and greatly added to his own burden by attempting to supervise programs in detail. The Tsar was supreme commander. When he reviewed his troops on the parade ground, Nicholas saw a colossal host prepared to respond immediately to his command. This may have encouraged the illusion that he could exercise the same degree of control over the immense territory of Russia if not the world beyond her borders.[172] The Tsar's untrammeled power had not guaranteed the stability of his rule or even his physical safety. Nicholas's father Paul I was overthrown and strangled by conspirators in 1801, when Nicholas was only a young child, and Nicholas was threatened by a coup only weeks after his accession to the throne in December 1825.[173] Censorship was not too strict in the first two decades of his rule, permitting a flowering of Russian literature. After a revolt in Austrian Galicia in 1846 surveillance and censorship became more extensive and arbitrary. By 1850, no less than twelve agencies were monitoring Russian writers and according to one estimate, the number of censors outnumbered the books published in that year.[174] Thus, "relentless harshness became the outstanding characteristic of his reign."[175]

In foreign policy, Nicholas was advised by men with long records of service who were not easily cowed. Their advice was generally sensible and their analyses at times penetrating. During the previous war against the Ottoman Empire, early in Nicholas's reign in 1828–1829, an advisory committee emphasized the usefulness to Russia of a state too weak

to present a threat that still provided a buffer against more dangerous rivals. The preservation of the Ottoman Empire, they concluded, was in Russia's interest, and its collapse would present Russia with new dangers. Russia's ambassador to Britain wrote in spring 1853 that there was no need to press the Ottomans for formal recognition of Russia's influence, for this was "determined by the facts of the situation, not by words." Should the Ottomans collapse, he warned, new states would be formed in the Balkans that would be no more grateful or helpful to Russia than Greece had been. Russia would have to compete for their allegiance with the other great powers, with the prospects for success uncertain. The foreign minister, Karl Nesselrode, had attained a sophisticated understand of international politics in his many years of service and was courageous enough to speak up to the Tsar. Advisors served at the Tsar's pleasure, however. When Nicholas refused to listen, which was not unusual, there was little Nesselrode or the ambassadors could do except put the best face on the Tsar's pronouncements and deeds.[176]

The Man

Tsar Nicholas's reign, prior to the Crimean War, must have seemed to him highly successful. He had won victories abroad against Turkey, Persia, Poland and Hungary, and maintained stability at home while most of Europe was undergoing revolution. "This sovereign," stated France's ambassador, "born with the best possible qualities, has been spoiled by adulation, by success and by the religious and political prejudices of the Muscovite nation." Nicholas I, asserts biographer Nicholas Riasanovsky, "reacted to his success by becoming more blunt, uncompromising, doctrinaire and domineering than ever before. The stage was set for a colossal debacle…". Hence, "there was [probably] no deep calculation in sending Menshikov to Turkey, only the recollection of Russia's past achievements…".[177]

If ever a man looked like a king, it was Nicholas. Queen Victoria described him thus in 1844: "He is certainly a very striking man; still very handsome; his profile is beautiful, and his manners most dignified and graceful; extremely civil—quite alarmingly so, as he is full of attentions and politenesses."[178] By all accounts the Tsar was a devoted husband, father and friend who remained faithful to his wife, with one exception late in his life. In informal settings, he could display charm and warmth.[179] In public, however, Nicholas exercised rigid

self-control. Victoria remarked that "the expression of his eyes is formidable, and unlike anything I ever saw before…He seldom smiles and when he does the expression is not a happy one."[180] The Marquis de Custine found the Tsar's voice "unforgettable, so full of authority it is, so solemn and firm…this voice certainly belongs to a man born to command." Furthermore, "His carriage and attitudes are naturally imposing, [although he] has a habitual expression of severity which sometimes gives the impression of harshness and inflexibility…The Emperor Nicholas …desires to be obeyed where others desire to be loved."[181] He did not inspire affection in others. "The usual expression of his face," noted one contemporary, "has something severe and misanthropic about it, something that does not put one at all at one's ease." Another Russian was blunter: "To tell the truth, absolutely no one liked him."[182]

Underneath this formidable exterior lay a turbulent temperament. The calm Nicholas tried to project covered strong passions, especially anger, fear and at times hatred focused on one individual. Nicholas was willful and irascible as a child. When thwarted or insulted by other children, he quickly resorted to verbal abuse and violence. Hardly a day in his early life went by without a quarrel or fight. As he aged, he became prone again to fits of temper.[183] According to Riasanovsky, Nicholas's instinctive reaction to crisis was impulsive aggressiveness. This was rooted not in confidence but a nervousness "verging on panic." His impulse was to strike, repeatedly, until his anger was satisfied. When successful he exhibited "exultation" in dealing blows to his opponent.[184]

Nicholas exhibited a lifelong love for the army. Like many boys, he loved playing with toy soldiers, but he also had a particular fascination with fortresses, constructing them out of chairs inside or out of earth in the garden. More lacking in curiosity than intelligence, he took little interest in his lessons, but military studies were the exception. For that subject, his interest was "passionate." Appointed supreme commander of Russia's forces in 1825, he became preoccupied with small details of the troops' appearance (and, unfortunately, not their performance). Military reviews afforded him the moments of greatest happiness. Named honorary commander of Prussian and Austrian regiments, he insisted on drilling the troops personally and learning their field manuals. What appealed to him about the army, he explained, was that "there is order… everything is subordinated to a single, defined goal and everything has its precise designations." Order, for Nicholas, meant achieving perfection

in small matters of detail. This obsession with minutiae may have been a psychological defense. "The emperor of Russia is a military commander," the Marquis of Custine noted, "and each of his days is a day of battle." The battle, Nicholas Riasanovsky asserts, was waged first and foremost by the Tsar against his own wayward emotions. His own life was minutely and carefully regulated. His compulsions thereby became policy. Nicholas ran Russia like a drill sergeant, with the result that "After the revolutions of 1848 government and life in Russia acquired a certain nightmarish quality which forced even many supporters of the existing regime to cry out in despair. The debacle of the Crimean War came both as logical retribution and as liberation." In the end, the Tsar's actual and emotional battles exhausted him.[185]

Nicholas was devout, in his own words, "in the manner of a peasant." He observed Orthodox ritual punctiliously and made frequent references to God in his correspondence. Orthodoxy, as interpreted by the Tsar and his ideologists, justified Autocracy, but it also laid on him a heavy burden of responsibility. Nicholas derived from his faith a strong sense of duty and took his obligations seriously. "All human life," he stated, "is nothing more than service." On one occasion, at a large military review, the Tsar placed his hand over his heart, looked to the heavens and, with tears in his, thanked God "for making me so mighty" and asked for "the strength never to abuse this power." N. M. Karamzin, Nicholas's closest advisor early in his reign, argued that although the Tsar need answer only to God, he served God best by serving the interests of Russia."[186] The ideologists of Nicholas's Russia asserted that mankind in its fallen condition needed strong rulers to maintain order. Hence, severity was true kindness. Nicholas exhibited this in his manner, whether it was entirely natural to him or not. In foreign policy, Nicholas explained early in his reign that although he would seek to avoid conflicts with other powers, he "must always defend the dignity of Russia." The Tsar must always remember that he is Russian, for that "means everything."[187]

The author of a recent study of the origins of the Crimean War concludes that "neither France nor Russia had any rational grounds for provoking a war against a coalition of other powers." Hence, "only an irrational impulse, one sufficiently powerful to override simple considerations of other states' interests and the correlation of forces, could set off a war under these circumstances."[188] Riasanovsky, by contrast, argues that "Nicholas I [did not] ignore Russian interests. Rather he saw those interests in terms of his fundamental beliefs, not apart from them."[189]

Orthodoxy, no doubt an "irrational impulse" in the view of many modern scholars, was a crucial influence on Russian policy. Nicholas had stated repeatedly in the past that he had no designs on Ottoman territory, and these claims were plausible. (He did not take advantage of the opportunity to seize Constantinople in 1829.) Nonetheless, he was distrusted by the British, especially Palmerston.[190] Explaining his decision to go to war against the Ottomans, Nicholas wrote to the King of Prussia: "Waging war neither for worldly advantages nor for conquests, but for a solely Christian purpose, and to see the others, who call themselves Christians, all unite around the Crescent to combat Christendom? Now nothing is left to me, but to fight and when I say this I declare it in the name of all of Russia."[191] There is no reason to doubt his sincerity; even the Tsar's detractors acknowledged that he was honest and direct to the point of bluntness.[192] In a more colloquial vein, he told a group of diplomats in 1853 that "I love the Emperor of Austria as if he were my son; I know that he will be my ally in putting an end to this foul administration on the Bosporus and the oppression of poor Christians by these damned infidels."[193]

A second motive for Nicholas's policy toward the Ottomans was his "exaggerated sense of pride and honor, his need to save face and his insistence on exacting grim retribution for real or fancied humiliations to himself and his country."[194] Menshikov explained that "Russia's honor, Russia's self-love, Russia's prestige is at stake. [We] cannot allow the preponderance of England to continue [at Constantinople} to our detriment."[195] Nicholas was described by one contemporary as a man who had a "passionate and immoderate desire to succeed in everything" who "loves the theatrical." After the initial concessions to France, the Tsar yearned for a "dramatic success."[196] Upon receipt of the news of Menshikov's failure, "I feel the five fingers of the Sultan on my face," he exclaimed.[197] Nicholas reacted by ordering the occupation of the principalities, a brash act whose "only unequivocal aim was the vague and dangerous one of teaching the Turks (and indirectly the French and the British) not to trifle with Russia." Thus, according to Paul Schroeder, "it was the Tsar's own foolish pride that led him into trouble."[198] Although the Tsar may have begun pressuring the Ottomans in a mood of confidence, once the conflict escalated he adopted an attitude of fatalism. After Menshikov's failure in May 1853, he announced that "I shall march along my own path on the strength of my convictions, as Russia's dignity demands."[199]

The dual strains of the Crimean crisis and his beloved wife's illness aged Nicholas rapidly. A maid of honor at the court recorded in her journal in October 1854 that "his tall figure is beginning to bend. He has a sort of lifeless stare, his face a leaden color. His brow, haughty not long ago, each day is lined with new furrows [and] his nerves are in an absolutely lamentable state." Only 58, his constitution was now too weak to fight off a common cold. Informed by his physician on 18 February that he had only a short time to live, he told his son and heir to assure the troops that he "would continue to pray for them in the next world." His last words to his son were simply "serve Russia."[200] For Tsar Nicholas, Riasanovsky concludes, "life was burdensome and painful…" and "death came as a liberation."[201]

Otto von Bismarck and the Austro-Prussian War

The Regime

Otto von Bismarck was appointed Minister-President of Prussia in September 1862, primarily to manage a political deadlock between King William and Parliament over the Army Bill of 1860. Bismarck continued expenditures without the *Landtag's* authorization, pleasing his monarch but eroding parliamentary influence. This also made possible a three-fold increase in the size of Prussia's army, an essential precondition for her future success on the battlefield.[202]

Bismarck was neither a parliamentary prime minister nor a dictator but an official and advisor who served on the sufferance of his monarch.[203] The political challenge he faced ought not to be underestimated. Wits in Berlin said that Bismarck was "wound up [King William] like a clock each morning," but this is too glib a description of their relationship. Bismarck's position remained precarious in his first years in office. He had to win and retain the King's favor, and it was necessary initially to adjust policy with that in mind. Bismarck's victory over the *Landtag* won him William's trust, but exerting consistent control over policy was another matter.[204] The King's outlook was not congruent with Bismarck's. William adhered to the conventional conservative assumption that Prussia must maintain the cooperation of Austria to contain "revolutionary" France; Bismarck had concluded long before that Austria was the main obstacle to the ascent of Prussia.[205] The constitution granted to the King the decision to make war, and

William was not one to be hurried. William was a principled monarch who judged situations primarily on the basis of right and wrong, not power and advantage. It was difficult to convince him to go to war, but also, paradoxically, difficult to get him to stop fighting once the war commenced.[206]

Situation, Alternatives, Decision

The immediate issue between Austria and Prussia was the disposition of two German populated duchies, Schleswig and Holstein, which they had wrested from Danish rule in 1964. Bismarck hoped to absorb the provinces, but Austria resisted. The larger issue was which power would establish hegemony in Germany. Bismarck had warned Austria in December 1862 to acknowledge Prussia's dominance north of the Main or "our bayonets will cross." Unfortunately, in Bismarck's estimation, "the belief in the military superiority of Austria was too strong both at Vienna and at the Courts of the middle states, for a *modus vivendi* on the footing of equality with Prussia." Bismarck concluded that no change could be expected unless Austria were coerced, although he continued to hope that means short of war would suffice.[207] In preparation, he attempted to isolate Austria. Russia's neutrality was secured by Prussia's assistance in suppressing a Polish revolt in 1862. He tempted France's ambitious ruler, Louis Napoleon, with hints of compensation in Belgium and Luxembourg, but with less success. Bismarck was not confident in 1865 that the military, fiscal and diplomatic preconditions for a successful war had been established. On 23 January 1866, Austria's governor in Holstein permitted demonstrations for a rival claimant to the duchies. The long hesitant King William was now prepared to consider war with Austria.[208]

Bismarck concluded an alliance with Italy on 8 April, but Louis Napoleon refused to commit himself to neutrality. Austria's foreign minister desperately tried to stave off war, but reports of Italian mobilization convinced Austria's Emperor to order a general mobilization (including mobilization against Prussia) on 27 April. William was finally prevailed upon to mobilize on 7 May. Austria rejected a proposed compromise, and Prussia occupied Holstein without resistance on 8 June. The German Confederation, at Austria's instigation, voted by a margin of 9-6 for war with Prussia on 14 June.[209]

The war came about at the initiative of Prussia. As Helmuth von Moltke, the chief of Prussia's general staff, later explained:

> The war of 1866 did not take place because the existence of Prussia was threatened, or in obedience to public opinion, or to the will of the people. It was a war which was foreseen long before, which was prepared with deliberation and recognized as necessary by the Cabinet, not in order to obtain territorial aggrandizement, but in order to secure the establishment of Prussian hegemony in Germany.[210]

The wisdom of this decision was not obvious to contemporaries. Austria had larger population than Prussia (34 to 19 million), a larger army (400,000 to 300,000) and the support of a solid majority of the German Confederation. Allied with Saxony, Austria's army would begin the war only a three days march from Berlin. The Austrian Emperor "took victory for granted" and this expectation was shared in most foreign capitals.[211]

General von Moltke expressed confidence at the Crown Council, provided that an alliance could be made with Italy. Moltke estimated that an Italian offensive against Venetia would draw away enough Austrian forces to provide Prussia a small advantage (roughly 254,000 to 245,000) on the crucial Bohemian front. Prussia also held two qualitative advantages, although their efficacy was unproven in war. Her infantry was equipped with a breech-loading rifle with a rate of fire four times that of Austria's muzzle-loaders. Conventional military opinion was skeptical of its value, assuming that anxious troops would too rapidly and deplete their ammunition stocks, but Moltke astutely adjusted organization, tactics and training to maximize the gun's impact. Prussia had constructed six railway lines leading to the border; Austria had but one. Moltke expected to have as much as a six-week head start in mobilization and intended to exploit this by moving three armies independently and uniting them in Bohemia to envelope the Austrian force. The plan, although brilliant, was not without risk. The three Prussian armies had to cross mountain ranges to reach central Bohemia. Even a limited defensive success by the Austrians in the passes could delay the junction of Prussia's forces. Moltke's tactics and strategy were innovative but controversial.[212]

Bismarck had done what he could to reduce the risk, but dangers remained. Whether the Prussian leader was taking a calculated risk or boldly, perhaps recklessly, staking everything and going for broke has

been disputed by historians.[213] Had the Prussia army failed, Bismarck's plight would not have been enviable.[214] To Britain's Ambassador, he expressed fatalism. Late in the evening of 15 June, Bismarck stated that "If we are beaten, I shall not return here. I shall fall in the last charge. One can die but once; and if beaten, it is better to die."[215] Such risks were justifiable, Bismarck told the Crown Council, because "a decisive struggle was only a matter of time" and the present moment was propitious. Austria was determined to thwart Prussia's rise, and war was inescapable.[216]

France presented a possible complication. Even with an Italian alliance, Moltke needed all available forces to cope with Austria and her German allies. No troops were available to defend the west. The war was predicated on French neutrality. France's dictator, Louis Napoleon, expected the fighting to be protracted, permitting him to exploit his bargaining leverage to extract concessions from the belligerents. Prussia's remarkable victory at Königgrätz on 3 July obviated the need to placate France, leaving Louis empty handed and embarrassed. Had he mobilized in June, his intervention might have been decisive, but Louis, wracked with bladder trouble, let the moment pass.[217] Bismarck had judged Louis Napoleon astutely.[218]

The author of Prussia's victory was Helmuth von Moltke, a man of whom Bismarck knew little and perhaps insufficiently appreciated.[219] Nevertheless, Grant Robertson's assessment seems fair:

> Bismarck had divined the real weakness of Austria—the vulnerability of her European position, the competition in her councils between concentrated egoism of the dynasty and the dissipated interests of the Empire, the administrative dry rot, the lack of vision and the absence of moral imagination in her ministers, and the insoluble antagonism between the ambition for supremacy in Germany and her historic claims in Italy and Hungary. No less had he divined the strength of Prussia, economic, political and military.[220]

Bismarck could not afford to rest on his laurels, however. King William and Moltke were eager to advance to Vienna. Continuation of the war, Bismarck feared, might encourage great power intervention to limit Prussia's gains. In the worst case, Prussia would be drawn into a military quagmire and provoke the undying enmity of Austria. He became highly agitated on 23 July, so distressed that he broke down

in tears after one meeting and later wondered "whether it would not be better to fall out of the open window" in his room on the fourth floor at Nikolsburg Castle. With Bismarck at his wits' end, the Crown Prince persuaded William to "bite this sour apple" and the Peace of Prague was concluded.[221] Prussia absorbed the duchies and various other spoils, but took no territory from Austria or Saxony. A North German Confederation excluding Austria was formed to replace the old *Bund*, while South Germany remained independent. Bismarck displayed "a moderation in victory which no other statesman has ever shown."[222]

The Man

Bismarck's biographers are agreed that the strongest force in his personality was the *libido dominandi*.[223] One contemporary, who knew him well, characterized Bismarck early in his years in power as "a wholly political man. His whole being is a ferment of impulses and desires to be expressed, manipulated, shaped. He is determined to command the political arena, to master the chaos in Berlin, but he does not yet know how."[224] Statesmen are motivated, Bismarck himself observed, by "pride, the desire to command, to be admired and renowned. I confess that I am not free from these passions and many kinds of distinction—that of a soldier in war, of a statesman under a free constitution…of a participant in some vigorous political movement, would attract me as the flame does the moth."[225] A perceptive biographer, Edward Crankshaw, infers why Bismarck aged so rapidly: "He grew old, as it were deliberately, as though distancing himself from all contacts and memories that might show up the terrible aridity of his almost exclusive preoccupation: power, how to keep it and extend it."[226]

Yet, unlike many other leaders discussed here, Bismarck's desire for power was no hindrance to success in foreign policy. The reason was Christianity. The Prussian minister-president was not without sensitivity and humanity, but he was far from being an exemplar of Christian charity. He remained irascible, suspicious, unforgiving, and, when the situation demanded it, ruthless. He did not believe that affairs of state could be conducted according to Christian principles. In view of this, it is not surprising that some scholars are inclined to dismiss religion as an influence.[227] They are mistaken.

As a student Bismarck had caroused, womanized and fought (reportedly 25 duels). Frequently absent from the lecture hall, he educated

himself by extensive reading. The impression one gleans from this era is one of immense but unguided vitality. His erratic and somewhat amusing antics continued through his twenties, earning him the sobriquet "the mad Junker." He underwent a conversion experience in his early thirties under the influence of two devout young women. Bismarck's love, conversion and marriage coincided with and fostered an integration of his personality in which the forces in his psyche were brought under some degree of regulation.[228]

Faith was a formative influence on Bismarck as a man and as a statesman. It strengthened his sense of duty. He was instinctively insubordinate. Reflecting on his experience as a civil servant early in his career, he likened it to playing in an orchestra. "I want to play the tune the way it sounds good to me or not at all." His unwillingness to accept the authority of others posed a serious obstacle to his ambitions. Christian belief, which he termed, significantly, "submission to a higher power" enabled Bismarck to obey without feeling that he was abasing himself. "I believe that I am obeying God when I serve the King," he stated. He came to believe that the power to which he was so strongly attracted ought not to be used solely for his personal fulfillment but higher ends.[229] Christianity enabled Bismarck to rule his desire to rule.

As Prussia's delegate to the Federal Diet in Frankfurt, Bismarck had ample opportunity to observe the practice of politics in his own day. He concluded from this experience that despite their professions of idealism states are fundamentally egoistic. Viewed from his religious perspective, all of nature, including politics, is a part of a divine plan. Therefore, his duty as a statesman was to "discern [Prussia's] interest and dedicate himself to its fulfillment." Bismarck, despite his reputation, felt a strong sense of responsibility. *Raison d'état* was his lodestar. In an early audience with King William, Bismarck reminded him that every one of his Hohenzollern ancestors, with the exception of his brother and immediate predecessor, had "won an increment of territory for the state…and I encouraged him to do likewise." What was characteristic and controversial was the ruthlessness and flexibility with which he pursued Prussia's interest, his *Realpolitik*. He felt bound neither by Christian ethics, which in his view did not apply to those acting under political necessity, nor by conservative ideology. He parted company with conventional conservatives in his willingness to cooperate with "revolutionary" France. "You cannot play chess if from the beginning sixteen out of the sixty-four squares are forbidden to you," he explained. Faith provided the

foundation for his sense of duty, which in turn provided justification—too much, some would say—for his vigorous and when necessary, violent, pursuit of the interests of Prussia.[230]

Belief provided justification for his decisions and fortified his resolution. Bismarck did his best to calculate and limit risk, but risks remained in June 1866. Bismarck summoned the courage to face the danger at this juncture and others. The moral foundation was "an unquestioning conviction of personal rectitude," which was, in turn, based on religious faith. "You would not have had such a Chancellor if I had not the wonderful basis of religion," he avowed. Bismarck persuaded himself that in striving to strengthen Prussia he was acting in accordance with God's will. "The belief of itself brought power," explains A. J. P. Taylor. War with Austria risked defeat, disgrace and ruin. Bismarck accepted these risks, and his faith gave him the courage to do so.[231]

Once the war was won, Bismarck resisted the temptation to overreach. His belief in Providence also fostered a certain degree of humility. Bismarck, whose grasp of the trends of his age was unsurpassed, nevertheless accepted that he did not know everything, did not control everything and could not foresee everything. "By himself the individual can create nothing," he observed. "He can only wait until he hears God's footsteps resounding through events and then spring forward to grasp the hem of his mantle—that is all." Human beings, even clever ones, are unable to predict all the consequences of their actions. "My entire life was spent gambling for high stakes with other people's money," he recalled. "I could never foresee exactly whether my plans would succeed." Furthermore, "in politics there is no such thing as complete certainty and definitive results…everything goes continually uphill, downhill." His awareness of man's limitations tempered his own desire to exert control.[232]

Bismarck concluded that success in politics and diplomacy is not achieved by imposing one's will on an intractable world but by waiting for an opportunity and then seizing it. Timing is crucial and patience a cardinal virtue of statecraft. Bismarck likened his role to that of a hunter waiting "for long periods in the hunting blind…stung by insects before the moment came to shoot."[233] He believed that history teaches lessons to perceptive students. One such lesson, from the fate of Napoleon, is the need for "wise moderation after the greatest success." More likely, he adduced examples from his extensive knowledge of history to confirm decisions he had already made on other grounds.[234] He knew that

there were limits to what Prussia could claim without provoking alarm and opposition from other parties and understood better than his King and generals that nothing fails like success when it tempts the victor to reach too far.

Christianity did not make this domineering, ambitious politician a saint, but it fostered qualities conducive to success in domestic and foreign affairs: the responsibility to serve, the patience to wait, the courage to act and the moderation to quit while still ahead. Bismarck's beliefs shaped his character and his character shaped events. Victory in 1866 and German unity in 1871 were the fruits.

The Wars of Kings and Counselors

European Monarchy was, as Montesquieu contended, a form of government with its own principles and spirit. Similarities in the behavior and character of kings can be observed. Socialization for the role of monarch denatured the temperaments and molded the personalities of these men to make them kings. The office shaped the man. The leading qualities of the kingly personality were devotion, diligence and dignity. Kings not only possessed power, they projected it. If not born to rule, they were bred to do so, and rule they did. Their magnificent personae commanded a dignified submission. The ease with which they worked their will in domestic politics may have led even the best of them to underestimate the intractability of the world beyond the borders of their realms.[235] The reality of control at home may have fostered the illusion of control abroad. Louis and Nicholas all displayed a somewhat compulsive attention to detail. The devil is of course often in the details; but a single-minded focus on factual information may have led kings to imagine that mastery of detail meant mastery of events.

These kings were not despots or usurpers but legitimate rulers. Their power rested primarily not on the fear but the love of their subjects. They were generally obeyed.[236] Although political violence did occur early in the lifetimes of both Louis and Nicholas, none of the kings was desperate to justify his rule. The accession to power was for some not corrupting but sobering. Confident in their authority, kings tolerated free discussion, at least among advisors. The advisory process usually provided kings with an accurate picture of the world and realistic discussion of the alternatives. Nevertheless, they embarked repeatedly on military campaigns that proved to be costly, unsuccessful, even calamitous.

Montesquieu contended that monarchy is a regime whose motives, ethos and values, especially the emphasis on honor attained in battle, create an impetus to war. The histories presented in this chapter are broadly consistent with this contention, but qualifications must be made. The absence of any clear and present danger to France early in Louis' reign, to Prussia upon the accession of Frederick II and to Russia under Nicholas I in 1852 suggests *prima facie* that these kings were motivated by something other than security. Sweden under Charles XII faced a serious threat, and Louis later in his reign believed that he did. They responded with offensive strategies. Eager to emulate Alexander, Charles XII pursued security by the means that promised the greatest glory. Tsar Nicholas went to war because refusing to do so seemed dishonorable. His decision was not made primarily by calculations of material utility but was heavily influenced by the demands of duty and honor, that is, *Wertrationalität*.

The bellicosity of kings could have been held in check by external (political and institutional) or internal (psychological and moral) restraints. Max Weber states that "traditional authority" is permitted a sphere of discretionary power but is subject to the limits of custom outside that sphere.[237] Montesquieu considered Monarchy to be a "moderate" regime. Unlike despots, kings do not act with excessive haste because of the legal and the institutional checks on their authority. Monarchy is susceptible to "corruption," however, when the corporate bodies weaken.[238] All of the monarchies discussed above had become "absolute" and thus "corrupt" by Montesquieu's standard. Institutional checks on the executive had eroded. The estates of France, Sweden and Prussia lost control of the purse strings in the seventeenth century and with this the ability to restrain their kings. In Russia, such barriers never existed.

With the erosion of external controls, internal checks were all that remained. The most obvious was Christianity. All but Frederick were devout. Although they were not saints, each had a conscience and a capacity for indignation over real or perceived wrongs. Nicholas was moved by the plight of the Balkan Christians suffering under Ottoman rule; Charles was outraged over the treachery that began the Great Northern War. Even Louis XIV was upset that former allies who owed so much to France should defect to an opposing alliance, even though he had given them good cause to do so. These kings believed their resort to force to be justified.

Devout and powerful men, the kings reflected on their impact on history and how it related to God's purposes. Louis believed that God acts through kings, who could, by the proper use of their talents, bring the results God desires. The king ought therefore to employ his judgment and skill to direct the course of history in conformity with God's design. Charles XII, having survived a brush with death, concluded that God had spared him for a reason and was determined to follow his destiny. Nicholas, an unsympathetic man in some respects, displayed a kind of noble folly in the Crimean crisis. Sincerely concerned about the Balkan Christians, trusting in his own good intentions and blind to how he was perceived abroad, the Tsar wanted to believe that that which ought to be would be. Surely God would not allow him to fail if his intentions were good. Frederick's condemnation of Machiavellianism during his years as crown prince was soon forgotten when opportunity beckoned; no religious scruples limited his youthful ambition. Bismarck derived from his faith not only justification for the ruthless pursuit of Prussia's interests, but also loyalty, courage, judgment and restraint. War was justified in the respective cases by voluntarism, destiny, idealism and (for the two Prussians) *raison d'état*.

Monarchy shapes the individual, but also magnifies the importance of those individual traits that remain. Louis XIV, Charles XII and Frederick II were crowned as eager, ambitious, young men, their ardor undiminished by experience. Louis dragged France into several more wars, Charles refused to capitulate even after the catastrophe at Poltava. Frederick professed peace, but when threatened later in his life, put his reliance on offensive defense. Nicholas was an experienced leader, but a long series of successes taught him not caution but arrogance.

If monarchy is performance, there must be an inner man separate from the impressive outer man visible to the world. The former may not be fully known or knowable, but we must endeavor to understand what we can. Charles XII was an obstinate man. Indignation was the impetus for his actions. Frederick, Nicholas and Louis are more complicated cases. Frederick II, suffered a wretched childhood at the hands of a domestic tyrant. He responded not be repudiating his legacy but striving to meet his father's expectations. For the Tsar, life was difficult. The self-mastery he exhibited was achieved only by dint of great effort. Inner turmoil was manifested when his will was thwarted as "impulsive aggression." According to the interpretation of Anthony Levi, Louis emerged from childhood with a high degree of insecurity that he sought

to suppress by psychologically bullying his courtiers. His faults eventually found expression in foreign policy, particularly the policies that led to the outbreak of the Nine Years War. If the biographers are correct, the will to power of Louis and Nicholas and had its origins in a feeling of inner weakness, a hollow interior covered by a magnificent façade.

Monarchy of the sort practiced in Europe in this age was by no means the worst form of government. Its processes of socialization fostered good qualities in rulers, who at their best were loved as much as feared. It provided a tolerably effective solution to the problem of order in unruly societies. Its policy process was rational; kings were generally well advised. The ethos of monarchy remained that of a military aristocracy desirous of glory and protective of honor. Subject to rational guidance and control, these passions might have energized the rulers to defend their realms vigorously without drawing them into unprofitable aggression. The problem was not so much the essence of monarchy but its corruption. Institutional controls on executive power weakened in early modern Europe and were not supplemented effectively by moral and psychological ones, given the manner in which Christianity was interpreted or ignored. Monarchical absolutism thus exposed subjects and neighbors to the frailties, passions and ambitions of their kings.

Wars, many of them of doubtful wisdom, were the consequence. There were also some astounding successes. In Prussia, legislative controls over the monarchy atrophied in the early modern era and did not recover under King William. When this augmented authority was placed in the hands of a man of superlative ability and exceptional fortitude (Frederick the Great) or a minister with insight, courage and restraint (Bismarck), great achievements were possible. Even statesmen of this caliber might have failed if fortune had not favored them. Had Tsarina Elizabeth had lived a few months longer, or had Austria's commander attacked Moltke's columns as they crossed through the mountain passes, Frederick and Bismarck might be remembered today much like Charles XII. Monarchy could work wonders, provided that the monarch was King David.

Notes

1. W. N. Spellman, *Monarchies 1000–2000* (London: Reaktion Books, 2001), p. 11.
2. Judges 21:25.

3. 1 Samuel 8:10–18.
4. 1 Kings, 5:13–18; 10:26–29; 12:1–11. Scorpions were stinging whips, worse than the usual variety. Rehoboam remains the archetype of kingly arrogance and stupidity for Barbara Tuchman in *The March of Folly* (New York: Ballantine, 1984), pp. 8–9.
5. Spellman, *Monarchies*, pp. 12–15, 150–54 emphasizes the religious duties of non-Occidental monarchs.
6. *The Spirit of the Laws*, Anne Cohler, Basia Miller, and Harold Stone, translators (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), Author's Foreword, Book 2, Chapter 1; Book 3, Chapters 1, 3, 7, 9.
7. *Spirit of the Laws*, Book 2, Chapter 7; Book 4, Chapter 2; Book 9, Chapter 2; Book 11, Chapters 5, 7.
8. *Spirit of the Laws*, Book 5, Chapter 10–11.
9. *Spirit of the Laws*, Book 8, Chapters 6–7; Book 9, Chapter 5.
10. *Spirit of the Laws*, Book 10, Chapter 2.
11. *Spirit of the Laws*, Book 3, Chapters 5 and 7; Book 8, Chapters 15–16; Book 9, Chapter 1.
12. *Spirit of the Laws*, Book 9, Chapter 1.
13. 1 Samuel 9:16.
14. Andrew Lossky, *Louis XIV and the French Monarchy* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1994), pp. 60–61; John A Lynn, *The Wars of Louis XIV* 1667–*1714* (New York: Longman, 1999), pp. 12–13. Lynn (p. 46) notes that France won all of these wars except for the last, and even in that case, saved the Spanish throne for the French candidate. The cost, however, he deems "unacceptable to France and it people."
15. Lynn, *Wars of Louis XIV*, pp. 108–9; Geoffrey Treasure, *Louis XIV* (New York: Longman, 2001), pp. 165, 168; John B. Wolf, *Louis XIV* (New York: Norton, 1968), p. 201; Lossky, *Louis XIV and the French Monarchy*, pp. 134–35; William Church, "Louis XIV and Reason of State," in John Rule, editor, *Louis XIV and the Craft of Kingship* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1969), pp. 387–88.
16. Ian Dunlop, *Louis XIV* (New York: St. Martin's, 2000), p. 219.
17. Lossky, *Louis XIV and the French Monarchy*, pp. 144–45, 228; Lynn, *Wars of Louis XIV*, pp. 113–18, 156; Wolf, *Louis XIV*, pp. 222–27; Treasure, *Louis XIV*, pp. 169–70; Anthony Levi, *Louis XIV* (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2004), pp. 248–53; Dunlop, *Louis XIV*, pp. 236–37; Derek MacKay and H. M. Scott, *The Rise of the Great Powers*, (London: Longman, 1983), pp. 34–35.
18. MacKay and Scott, *Rise of the Great Powers*, p. 41; Wolf, *European Balance of Power*, pp. 89–91, 100–1.
19. Michael Hochedlinger, *Austria's Wars of Emergence 1683–1797* (New York: Pearson, 1993), pp. 26–30, 58–60, 64; MacKay and Scott, *Rise of the Great Powers*, pp. 38, 41, 47.

20. Geoffrey Parker, "The Gunpowder Revolution," in Geoffrey Parker, editor, *The Cambridge History of Warfare* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 109.
21. Lynn, *Wars of Louis XIV*, pp. 35–38, 162–71, 191–92; Wolf, *Louis XIV*, pp. 403–8; Treasure, *Louis XIV*, pp. 203, 210.
22. Treasure, *Louis XIV*, pp. 240–43; Wolf, *Louis XIV*, pp. 429, 440; Levi, *Louis XIV*, p. 254; Lynn, *Wars of Louis XIV*, pp. 36–38; Lossky, *Louis XIV and the French Monarchy*, pp. 232–33.
23. Treasure, *Louis XIV*, pp. 242–43; Wolf, *Louis XIV*, p. 440; Wolf, *Louis XIV*, pp. 441–45; Lossky, *Louis XIV and the French Monarchy*, p. 243; MacKay and Scott, *Rise of the Great Powers*, pp. 43–44.
24. Wolf, *Louis XIV*, pp. 441–45; Lossky, *Louis XIV and the French Monarchy*, p. 243.
25. Lynn, *Wars of Louis XIV*, p. 38.
26. Treasure, *Louis XIV*, pp. 239, 243–45; Lynn, *Wars of Louis XIV*, pp. 192–99; Lossky, *Louis XIV and the French Monarchy*, pp. 233–36; Wolf, *Louis XIV*, pp. 451–55.
27. Lynn, *Wars of Louis XIV*, pp. 37–38, 191.
28. Wolf, *Louis XIV*, pp. 504, 507, 510–12, quotation on p. 512; Lynn, *Wars of Louis XIV*, pp. 268–70; Levi, *Louis XIV*, pp. 261, 271.
29. Lynn, *Wars of Louis XIV*, p. 271.
30. Pierre Goubert, *Louis XIV and Twenty Million Frenchmen*, Anne Carter, translator (New York: Pantheon, 1966), pp. 258–59, 292–93, quotation on p. 272; Lynn, *Wars of Louis XIV*, pp. 46, 361–62; Wolf, *Louis XIV*, pp. 593–95; François Bluche, *Louis XIV*, Mark Greengrass, translator (New York: Franklin Watts, 1990), pp. 385–86, pp. xvii, 235, 596, 628; Church, "Louis XIV and Reason of State," pp. 393, 399–400.
31. Thomas Munck, *Seventeenth Century Europe* (New York: St. Martin's, 1990), pp. 215, 343; D. H. Pennington, *Europe in the Seventeenth Century* (New York: Longman, 1989), pp. 33–34, 327, 252–53, 501; Richard Dunn, *The Age of Religious Wars: 1559–1689* (New York: Norton, 1970), pp. 137–38, 157.
32. Lynn, *Wars of Louis XIV*, pp. 17–19; Lossky, *Louis XIV and the French Monarchy*, p. 37; Herbert Rowen, "Louis XIV and Absolutism," in John Rule, editor, *Louis XIV and the Craft of Kingship* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1969), pp. 303–5, 313–14.
33. Treasure, *Louis XIV*, pp. 200–1; Levi, *Louis XIV*, pp. 142–43, 147–48.
34. Lossky, *Louis XIV and the French Monarchy*, pp. 68, 75–76, 87, 149–50, 169, 232; Wolf, *Louis XIV*, pp. 75–75, 80, 146–47, 160–64, 180, 402–3; Lynn, *Wars of Louis XIV*, pp. 20–21; Dunlop, *Louis XIV*, p. 362; Rowen, "Louis XIV and Absolutism," pp. 314–15; MacKay and Scott, *Rise of the Great Powers*, pp. 17, 23.

35. Parker, "States in Conflict," in *The Cambridge History of Warfare*, p. 169.
36. Dunlop, *Louis XIV*, p. 198; Lynn, *Wars of Louis XIV*, pp. 30–31; Lossky, *Louis XIV and the French Monarchy*, pp. 72–73; Ragnhild Hatton, "Louis XIV and His Fellow Monarchs," in John Rule, editor, *Louis XIV and the Craft of Kingship* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1969), pp. 159–60; quoted in Phillipe Erlanger, *Louis XIV*, Stephen Cox, translator (London: Weidefeld & Nicolson, 1970), p. 104.
37. Lossky, *Louis XIV and the French Monarchy*, p. 46; Wolf, *Louis XIV*, pp. 78, 181–85; Levi, *Louis XIV*, p. 161; Dunlop, *Louis XIV*, p. 218; Lynn, *Wars of Louis XIV*, pp. 28–29; Church, "Louis XIV and Reason of State," pp. 381, 393; Rowen, "Louis XIV and Absolutism," p. 304.
38. Quoted in Dunlop, *Louis XIV*, p. 219.
39. Lynn, *Wars of Louis XIV*, pp. 33, 44, 113–14, 359; Lossky, *Louis XIV and the French Monarchy*, pp. 149–50.
40. Treasure, *Louis XIV*, pp. 91–93; Wolf, *Louis XIV*, pp. 115–16; Bluche, *Louis XIV*, pp. 82–83; Erlanger, *Louis XIV*, p. 66; Wolf, "Formation of a King," pp. 124–25; Wolf, *Louis XIV*, p. 181.
41. Lossky, *Louis XIV and the French Monarchy*, pp. 71–72, 74; Wolf, *Louis XIV*, pp. 163–65, 184, 205; Levi, *Louis XIV*, p. 2; Treasure is more guarded regarding Louis's enjoyment of his role, *Louis XIV*, pp. 88–89.
42. Erlanger, *Louis XIV*, p. 274.
43. Levi, *Louis XIV*, pp. 2–3, 82–83, 223, 293, 304–6; Wolf, *Louis XIV*, pp. xiii, 88, 181; Lossky, *Louis XIV and the French Monarchy*, pp. 64–68; Wolf, "The Formation of a King," pp. 124–27 gives a different interpretation of Louis's childhood.
44. Erlanger, *Louis XIV*, p. 159; Wolf, "The Formation of a King," in Rule, pp. 109–10, 112; Wolf, pp. 25–26, 61–62; Bluche, *Louis XIV*, p. 382.
45. William Church, "Louis XIV and Reason of State," in John Rule, *Louis XIV and the Craft of Kingship* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1969), p. 396.
46. Wolf, "The Formation of a King," in Rule, pp. 122–24.
47. Bluche, *Louis XIV*, pp. 385–86. Louis may have seen much of himself in David, whose sexual ethics also fell somewhat short of perfection.
48. Erlanger, *Louis XIV*, pp. 274–75; Wolf, *Louis XIV*, pp. 402–3.
49. Lynn, *Wars of Louis XIV*, pp. 45–46, 359–60; quotation in Dunlop, *Louis XIV*, p. 304; Lossky, *Louis XIV and the French Monarchy*, pp. 69–72, 168–69; Wolf, *Louis XIV*, pp. 179, 216, 615.
50. Ingvar Anderson, *A History of Sweden*, Carolyn Hannay, translator (New York: Praeger, 1956), pp. 211–17, 221; Franklin Scott, *Sweden: The Nation's History* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977), pp. 217–20; Thomas Munck, *Seventeenth Century Europe* (New York:

St. Martin's, 1990), pp. 358–59; Robert I. Frost, *The Northern Wars 1558–1721* (London: Longman, 2000), pp. 216–23.

51. Scott, *Sweden*, pp. 212, 229; Anderson, *History of Sweden*, p. 226; Frost, *Northern Wars*, pp. 227, 229.
52. Robert Nisbet Bain, *Charles XII and the Collapse of the Swedish Empire* (Freeport: Books for Libraries, 1969), p. 59. While entertaining the Duke of Holstein in the spring and summer of 1698, Charles was responsible for a considerable amount of mischief. See Bain, pp. 46–47 and Ragnhild M. Hatton, *Charles XII of Sweden* (New York: Weybright and Talley, 1968), pp. 92–95.
53. Scott, *Sweden*, pp. 229–30; Frost, *Northern Wars*, p. 230; Anderson, *History of Sweden*, pp. 224–25, 228.
54. Michael Roberts, *The Swedish Imperial Experience* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 148–51; Bain, *Charles XII*, pp. 149–59; Hatton, *Charles XII of Sweden*, pp. 241, 247–48, 252–53; Frost, *Northern Wars*, pp. 278–81.
55. Frost, *Northern Wars*, pp. 280, 283–85, 318; Hatton, *Charles XII of Sweden*, p. 241.
56. Frost, *Northern Wars*, pp. 273–77, 283–85; Frans Bengtsson, *The Life of Charles XII*, Naomi Walford, translator (London: Macmillan, 1960), p. 245; Bain, *Charles XII*, pp. 150, 159; Hatton, *Charles XII of Sweden*, pp. 115–16, 153, 233, 236–39.
57. Bain, *Charles XII*, p. 159.
58. Bengtsson, *Life of Charles XII*, p. 259; Hatton, *Charles XII of Sweden*, p. 151.
59. Bain, *Charles XII*, p. 171; Hatton, *Charles XII of Sweden*, pp. 241–45, 257; Frost, *Northern Wars*, pp. 278–79.
60. Bain, *Charles XII*, pp. 160–65; Hatton, *Charles XII of Sweden*, pp. 261–62, 268–69; Anderson, *History of Sweden*, p. 232. By the Swedes' count, twenty-four Russia villages were incinerated; Frost, p. 287.
61. Bain, *Charles XII*, pp. 165–67, 172–73. Lewenhaupt may have been much closer than he realized, Frost, p. 279.
62. Bain, *Charles XII*, pp. 175–76, 181; Frost, *Northern Wars*, p. 278.
63. Anderson, *History of Sweden*, pp. 232–36; Scott, *Sweden*, pp. 233–36; Frost, *Northern Wars*, pp. 275–76, 290–92; Bain, *Charles XII*, pp. 177–79, 188–89; Hatton, *Charles XII of Sweden*, p. 299.
64. Scott, *Sweden*, p. 232; Bain, *Charles XII*, p. 41.
65. Hatton, *Charles XII of Sweden*, pp. 10–12, 217; Bain, *Charles XII*, pp. 309–11. According to Anderson, *History of Sweden*, p. 230,
66. Anderson, *History of Sweden*, p. 230.
67. Bain, *Charles XII*, pp. 44–45.

68. Hatton, *Charles XII of Sweden*, pp. 14–15, 18, 52–53, 209; Bain, *Charles XII*, pp. 37–38, 41, 45, 309–11.
69. Quoted in Bengtsson, *Life of Charles XII*, pp. 258–59.
70. Bengtsson, *Life of Charles XII*, p. 289. See also Hatton, *Charles XII of Sweden*, p. 245.
71. Scott, *Sweden*, pp. 226–27.
72. Anderson, *History of Sweden*, p. 240.
73. Voltaire, *Lion of the North*, M. F. O. Jenkins, translator (East Brunswick: Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 1981), p. 249; Bain, *Charles XII*, p. 314.
74. Voltaire, *Lion of the North*, pp. 26–27.
75. Bengtsson, *Life of Charles XII*, p. 10.
76. Hatton, *Charles XII of Sweden*, p. 125.
77. Bain, *Charles XII*, p. 312, quotation on p. 117.
78. Hatton, *Charles XII of Sweden*, p. 312.
79. Hatton, *Charles XII of Sweden*, pp. 13, 45, 153–54, 173, 431–32. For one example, see Bain, *Charles XII*, p. 41.
80. Hatton, *Charles XII of Sweden*, pp. 116, 164–65, 282; Bain, *Charles XII*, pp. 312–13.
81. Voltaire, *Lion of the North*, pp. 76–77. This was believed by others, including the highly competent Marshall Rehnskjöld, Bengtsson, *Life of Charles XII*, pp. 257–58.
82. Hatton, *Charles XII of Sweden*, p. 256.
83. Bengtsson, *Life of Charles XII*, pp. 12–13.
84. Bain, *Charles XII*, pp. 54–55. Charles was familiar with Pufendorf's writings, see Hatton, *Charles XII of Sweden*, p. 111.
85. Bain, *Charles XII*, p. 157; Hatton's interpretation differs, *Charles XII of Sweden*, p. 243.
86. Bain, *Charles XII*, p. 143.
87. Voltaire, *Lion of the North*, p. 19.
88. Hajo Holborn, *A History of Modern Germany: 1648–1840* (New York: Knopf, 1964), pp. 45–46, 59–60, 196–97, 202, 208; Christopher Clark, *Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia* (Cambridge: Belknap, 2006), pp. 60–63; Thomas Munck, *Seventeenth Century Europe* (New York: St. Martin's, 1990), pp. 355–57; Hans Rosenberg, *Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy* (Boston: Beacon, 1958), pp. 32–41; Gerhard Ritter, *Frederick the Great*, Peter Paret, translator (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), p. 75.
89. Pierre Gaxotte, *Frederick the Great*, R. A. Bell, translator (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942), p. 301; Gooch, *Frederick the Great*, p. 281; Ritter, *Frederick the Great*, pp. 1, 9–10; Theodor Schieder, *Frederick the Great*, Sabina Berkeley and H. M. Scott, translators, (London: Longman, 2000), pp. 119, 125.

90. M. S. Anderson, *The War of the Austrian Succession*, (London: Longman, 1965), pp. 61, 65.
91. Gaxotte, *Frederick the Great*, pp. 196, 200–1; Anderson, *War of Austrian Succession*, p. 7.
92. Ritter, *Frederick the Great*, pp. 82–91; Holborn, *History of Modern Germany*, pp. 210–18; Reed Browning, *The War of the Austrian Succession* (New York: St. Martin's, 1993), pp. 53–54, 366–67.
93. Anderson, *War of the Austrian Succession*, pp. 149, 152–53, 210.
94. Quoted in George Peabody Gooch, *Frederick the Great* (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon, 1962), p. 26.
95. Quoted in Gaxotte, *Frederick the Great*, p. 194; Ritter, *Frederick the Great*, p. 82.
96. W. Mediger, "Great Britain, Hanover and the Rise of Prussia," in R. M. Hatton and M. S. Anderson, editors, *Studies in Diplomatic History* (London: Longman, 1970), pp. 199–200; Gooch, *Frederick the Great*, p. 10; Gaxotte, *Frederick the Great*, pp. 218, 280.
97. Christopher Duffy, *The Military Life of Frederick the Great* (New York: Atheneum, 1986), p. 22; Browning, *War of the Austrian Succession*, p. 42; Dennis Showalter, *The Wars of Frederick the Great* (London: Longman, 1996), p. 40.
98. Mediger, "Great Britain, Hanover and the Rise of Prussia," pp. 199–200.
99. Robert Asprey, *Frederick the Great: The Magnificent Enigma* (New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1986), p. 157; Ritter, *Frederick the Great*, p. 82; Showalter, *Wars of Frederick the Great*, pp. 39, 356; Holborn, *History of Modern Germany*, p. 218; Browning, *War of the Austrian Succession*, pp. 20, 33; M. S. Anderson, *The War of the Austrian Succession* (London: Longman, 1965), p. 62; Theodor Schieder, *Frederick the Great*, Sabina Berkeley and H. M. Scott, translators (London: Longman, 2000), pp. 101–2.
100. Browning, *War of the Austrian Succession*, p. 37.
101. Browning, *War of the Austrian Succession*, pp. 18–20, 42; Anderson, *War of Austrian Succession*, pp. 62, 68.
102. Anderson, *War of the Austrian Succession*, pp. 67–69.
103. Asprey, *Frederick the Great*, p. 143; Gooch, *Frederick the Great*, pp. 6–7; Browning, *War of the Austrian Succession*, pp. 33, 39; Duffy, *Military Life of Frederick the Great*, p. 22; Gaxotte, *Frederick the Great*, p. 193; Anderson, pp. 60, 63.
104. Gooch, *Frederick the Great*, pp. 6–7; Browning, *War of the Austrian Succession*, p. 39; Gaxotte, *Frederick the Great*, p. 202; Anderson, *War of Austrian Succession*, pp. 63–66.
105. Browning, *War of the Austrian Succession*, p. 44. Prior to Mollwitz, the Austrians were confident, Anderson, *War of the Austrian Succession*, p. 76.
106. Holborn, *History of Modern Germany*, pp. 210, 212, 218.

107. Asprey, *Frederick the Great*, pp. 144, 157; Duffy, *Military Life of Frederick the Great*, p. 23; Browning, *War of the Austrian Succession*, p. 42; Showalter, *Wars of Frederick the Great*, pp. 40–41; Gooch, *Frederick the Great*, pp. 6–7; Gaxotte, *Frederick the Great*, p. 199; Anderson, *War of the Austrian Succession*, p. 68.
108. Quoted in Gaxotte, *Frederick the Great*, p. 194.
109. Asprey, *Frederick the Great*, p. 154; Browning, *War of the Austrian Succession*, p. 33; Gooch, *Frederick the Great*, p. 7; Anderson, *War of the Austrian Succession*, p. 67; Ritter dissents, *Frederick the Great*, pp. 76–77.
110. Asprey, *Frederick the Great*, pp. 158–59; Ritter, *Frederick the Great*, pp. 81–82; Gooch, *Frederick the Great*, pp. 6, 14–15, including quotation from Louis XV; Gaxotte, *Frederick the Great*, p. 197; Anderson, *War of the Austrian Succession*, p. 66.
111. Showalter, *Wars of Frederick the Great*, p. 356; Browning, *War of the Austrian Succession*, p. 365.
112. Ritter, *Frederick the Great*, pp. 80–81.
113. Quoted in Asprey, *Frederick the Great*, p. 164.
114. Asprey, *Frederick the Great*, pp. 151–53; Duffy, *Military Life of Frederick the Great*, pp. 21–22.
115. Quoted in Ritter, *Frederick the Great*, p. 75.
116. Quoted in Duffy, *Military Life of Frederick the Great*, p. 23.
117. Quoted in Ritter, *Frederick the Great*, p. 75; see also Gooch, *Frederick the Great*, p. 9.
118. Quoted in Gooch, *Frederick the Great*, p. 12.
119. Giles McDonough, *Frederick the Great* (New York: St. Martin's, 2000), pp. 154–55.
120. Anderson, *War of the Austrian Succession*, pp. 60–61; Gaxotte, *Frederick the Great*, p. 204; Schieder, *Frederick the Great*, p. 91.
121. Duffy, *Military Life of Frederick the Great*, pp. 20–21.
122. Schieder, *Frederick the Great*, p. 93.
123. Asprey, *Frederick the Great*, p. 171.
124. Quoted in Ritter, *Frederick the Great*, p. 7.
125. Quoted in Gooch, *Frederick the Great*, p. 10; see also Schieder, *Frederick the Great*, pp. 95, 102.
126. Duffy, *Military Life of Frederick the Great*, p. 5; Gooch, *Frederick the Great*, p. 14; Schieder, *Frederick the Great*, pp. 12–13. The most perceptive of his many biographers is Ritter, *Frederick the Great*, pp. 6–7.
127. Edith Simon, *The Making of Frederick the Great* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963), pp. 43–45, 48–50, 59–62, 66–67, 70–72; Schieder, *Frederick the Great*, p. 19.
128. Simon, *Making of Frederick the Great*, pp. 3–4, 19, 48, 62, 272–74; Schieder, *Frederick the Great*, pp. 28, 31.

129. Anderson, *War of the Austrian Succession*, pp. 68–69; Showalter, *Wars of Frederick the Great*, p. 40; quotation in Gooch, *Frederick the Great*, p. 13.
130. Browning, *War of the Austrian Succession*, pp. 39, 375–77.
131. Quoted in Gooch, *Frederick the Great*, p. 11.
132. Gaxotte, *Frederick the Great*, p. 218.
133. Robert Asprey, *Frederick the Great: The Magnificent Enigma* (New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1986), p. 422; Herbert Kaplan, *Russia and the Outbreak of the Seven Years War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), p. 90; George Peabody Gooch, *Frederick the Great* (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon, 1947), pp. 36, 41–43; Gerhard Ritter, *Frederick the Great: A Historical Profile*, Peter Paret, translator (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 103–5; Dennis Showalter, *The Wars of Frederick the Great* (London: Longman, 1996), p. 322; Christopher Duffy, *The Military Life of Frederick the Great* (New York: Atheneum, 1986), p. 86; Pierre Gaxotte, *Frederick the Great*, R. A. Bell, translator (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942), p. 319; David Bayne Horn, *Frederick the Great and the Rise of Prussia* (London: English Universities Press, 1964), pp. 79–83, 84–86, 100, 155, 160; Theodor Schieder, *Frederick the Great*, Sabina Berkeley and H. M. Scott, translators (London: Longman, 2000), pp. 121–22.
134. Schieder, *Frederick the Great*, pp. 146–47.
135. Kaplan, *Russia and the Outbreak of the Seven Years War*, pp. 3–4, 54–55, 92–94, 125–26.
136. Kaplan, *Russia and the Outbreak of the Seven Years War*, p. 127.
137. Prussia and her ally Hannover hoped to put 200,000 men in the field. Russia had committed 12,000 and Austria 67,000. Austria hoped to add 50,000 more before the hostilities began. Kaplan, *Russia and the Outbreak of the Seven Years War*, pp. 57–58, 84–87, 91–92; Gaxotte, *Frederick*, p. 323; Duffy, *Military Life of Frederick the Great*, pp. 82, 86–87; Ritter, *Frederick*, p. 154; Gooch, *Frederick*, pp. 30, 34; Showalter, *Wars of Frederick the Great*, p. 131.
138. Duffy, *Military Life of Frederick the Great*, p. 83; Showalter, *Wars of Frederick the Great*, pp. 132–33; R. Waddington, *Louis XV et le renversement des alliances* (1896).
139. Ritter, *Frederick*, pp. 105–6; Duffy, *Military Life of Frederick the Great*, pp. 86–87; Gooch, *Frederick*, pp. 34–35; Showalter, *Wars of Frederick the Great*, pp. 75–87; Horn, *Frederick and the Rise of Prussia*, pp. 79–80.
140. Schieder, *Frederick the Great*, p. 124. For example, Horn, *Frederick and the Rise of Prussia*, pp. 79–80.
141. Gooch, *Frederick*, p. 36.

142. Duffy, *Military Life of Frederick the Great*, p. 87; Kaplan, *Russia and the Outbreak of the Seven Years War*, p. 83; Horn, *Frederick and the Rise of Prussia*, p. 82; Showalter, *Wars of Frederick the Great*, p. 143.
143. Gooch, *Frederick*, p. 36.
144. Showalter, *Wars of Frederick the Great*, pp. 132–33; also Horn, *Frederick and the Rise of Prussia*, pp. 79–80; Schieder, *Frederick the Great*, pp. 121–22.
145. Showalter, *Wars of Frederick the Great*, pp. 30, 34, 132; Duffy, *Military Life of Frederick the Great*, pp. 78–79; Gaxotte, *Frederick*, pp. 321–22; quotation on p. 322.
146. Derek McKay and H. M. Scott, *The Rise of the Great Powers 1648–1815* (London: Longman, 1983), p. 194; Giles McDonough, *Frederick the Great* (New York: St. Martin's, 2000), pp. 248, 254–55, 262–68, 283, 307–9, 314; Schieder, *Frederick the Great*, pp. 129–32, 139, 143–46; Gaxotte, *Frederick*, p. 338.
147. McDonough, *Frederick the Great*, pp. 270, 280, 315; Gaxotte, *Frederick*, pp. 331–32, 339, 342; Ritter, *Frederick*, pp. 112–14, 117, 121.
148. McDonough, *Frederick the Great*, pp. 260–61, 270–71; Gaxotte, *Frederick*, p. 334; Ritter, *Frederick*, p. 112.
149. Schieder, *Frederick the Great*, pp. 137–39, 224; McDonough, *Frederick the Great*, pp. 288, 305; quotation from Gaxotte, *Frederick*, pp. 336–37; Ritter, *Frederick*, pp. 112–15, 123–24.
150. McDonough, *Frederick the Great*, pp. 36–37, 184; Asprey, *Frederick the Great*, p. 148; Ritter, *Frederick*, pp. 25–28, 36, 57; Gaxotte, *Frederick*, pp. 82, 188, 277, 332–33; Gooch, *Frederick*, p. 117; Schieder, *Frederick the Great*, pp. 16, 19, 23, 31.
151. Augustus the Strong, then the Elector of Saxony and King of Poland, probably merits an entry in the *Guinness Book of World Records*, having sired an estimated 300 children by his many mistresses.
152. Gooch, *Frederick*, pp. 110–15, 119–20; Ritter, *Frederick*, pp. 26, 33–34, 43, 201; Asprey, *Frederick the Great*, pp. 95, 114; Gaxotte, *Frederick*, p. 302.
153. Ritter, *Frederick*, pp. 51–53, 59–60; McDonough, *Frederick the Great*, pp. 270–71; Gooch, *Frederick*, p. 113; Schieder, *Frederick the Great*, p. 32.
154. Ritter, *Frederick*, pp. 5, 64–71; Gooch, *Frederick*, pp. 3–4; Schieder, *Frederick the Great*, pp. 100–1, 106.
155. Gaxotte, *Frederick*, p. 225.
156. Ritter, *Frederick*, pp. 36, 55, 58–59, 73–74; Gaxotte, *Frederick*, pp. 218, 269, 276–79; Schieder, *Frederick the Great*, pp. 23, 29, 31, 93.
157. Ritter, *Frederick*, pp. 7, 33, 66, 70, 106–7.
158. Gaxotte, *Frederick*, pp. 188, 225, 276; MacDonogh, *Frederick the Great*, p. 184; Simon, *Making of Frederick the Great*, p. 247.

159. Ritter, *Frederick*, p. 7. But did not silence his conscience altogether. Writing in 1762, he stated that "I have not a clear conscience in regard to this princess [Maria Theresa]." Quoted in Gaxotte, *Frederick*, p. 278.
160. Ritter, *Frederick*, quotation on p. 107. See also Showalter, *Wars of Frederick the Great*, p. 133; Horn, *Frederick and the Rise of Prussia*, pp. 29–30, 139, 158.
161. Barbara Jelavich, *A Century of Russian Foreign Policy 1814–1914*, (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964), pp. 116–17; Trevor Royle, *Crimea: The Great Crimean War 1854–1856* (New York: St. Martin's, 2000), pp. 15–20, 47–50; Norman Rich, *Why the Crimean War?, A Cautionary Tale* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1985), pp. 34, 37–39, 48–49; M. S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question* (London: Macmillan, 1966), p. 122; Hugh Seton-Watson, *The Russian Empire 1801–1917* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1967), pp. 318–20; Harold Temperley, *England, the Near East and Crimea* (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1936), pp. 301, 305.
162. Temperley, *England, the Near East and Crimea*, p. 333; Royle, *Crimea*, pp. 53–54; Anderson, *Eastern Question*, p. 125; David Goldfrank, *The Origins of the Crimean War* (London: Longman, 1994), p. 168.
163. Anderson, *Eastern Question*, p. 128; Temperley, *England, the Near East and Crimea*, pp. 304, 321, 364–69, 378; Bruce Lincoln, *Nicholas I: Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russians* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), p. 338.
164. Goldfrank, *Origins of the Crimean War*, pp. 289–90.
165. Jelavich, *A Century of Russian Foreign Policy*, p. 121; Goldfrank, *Origins of the Crimean War*, pp. 273, 284.
166. Seton-Watson, *Russian Empire*, pp. 316, 321; Jelavich, *A Century of Russian Foreign Policy*, pp. 109–12, 118; David Wetzel, *The Crimean War: A Diplomatic History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), pp. 31, 77; Rich, *Why the Crimean War?*, p. 25; Anderson, *Eastern Question*, pp. 125–26; Lincoln, *Nicholas I*, pp. 329–30.
167. Seton-Watson, *Russian Empire*, p. 317; Royle, *Crimea*, pp. 34–35; Anderson, *Eastern Question*, pp. 116–17; Wetzel, *Crimean War*, p. 49; Temperley, *England, the Near East and Crimea*, pp. 304–5.
168. Royle, *Crimea*, pp. 38–39; Anderson, *Eastern Question*, pp. 120–21; Temperley, *England, the Near East and Crimea*, p. 301.
169. Goldfrank, *Origins of the Crimean War*, pp. 30–37; Lincoln, *Nicholas I*, pp. 341–44, quotation on p. 336.
170. Anderson, *Eastern Question*, pp. 118–19, 131; Royle, *Crimea*, pp. 24, 31; Temperley, *England, the Near East and Crimea*, pp. 299–300, 388; Wetzel, *Crimean War*, pp. 64, 67–70, 78; Lincoln, *Nicholas I*, pp. 331–33; Rich, *Why the Crimean War?*, pp. 25, 40; Seton-Watson,

Russian Empire, pp. 320–21; Goldfrank, *Origins of the Crimean War*, p. 110.

171. Temperley, *England, the Near East and Crimea*, pp. 336–38; Rich, *Why the Crimean War?*, pp. 61, 64; Goldfrank, *Origins of the Crimean War*, pp. 136–38, 279.
172. Lincoln, *Nicholas I*, pp. 160–61, 166–70, 180; Wetzel, *Crimean War*, pp. 25–26.
173. Seton-Watson, *Russian Empire*, pp. 68, 194–95.
174. Lincoln, *Nicholas I*, pp. 295–98, 318–20.
175. Nicholas Riasanovsky, *Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), p. 13.
176. Rich, *Why the Crimean War?*, pp. 15–16, 58–59, 62–63; Wetzel, *Crimean War*, pp. 27–28; Riasanovsky, *Nicholas I and Official Nationality,* pp. 259–60; Goldfrank, *Origins of the Crimean War*, pp. 20–12, 27.
177. Lincoln, *Nicholas I*, pp. 329–30, quotation on p. 340; Riasanovsky, *Nicholas I and Official Nationality*, p. 250; Wetzel, *Crimean War*, p. 49.
178. Riasanovsky, *Nicholas I and Official Nationality*, pp. 1–2; quotations in Lincoln, *Nicholas I*, p. 68.
179. Riasanovsky, *Nicholas I and Official Nationality*, pp. 17, 20; Lincoln, *Nicholas I*, pp. 111, 116, 155–59.
180. Lincoln, *Nicholas I*, pp. 67–68.
181. Quoted in Riasanovsky, *Nicholas I and Official Nationality*, p. 3, footnote 10 and Lincoln, *Nicholas I*, p. 48.
182. Lincoln, *Nicholas I*, pp. 52, 67; Riasanovsky, *Nicholas I and Official Nationality*, p. 12; quotations in Lincoln, *Nicholas I*, p. 67 and Riasanovsky, *Nicholas I and Official Nationality*, p. 9.
183. Riasanovsky, *Nicholas I and Official Nationality*, pp. 3–7; Lincoln, *Nicholas I*, p. 58. Nicholas was also prey even as an adult to phobias of various kinds.
184. Riasanovsky, *Nicholas I and Official Nationality*, pp. 7–10.
185. Riasanovsky, *Nicholas I and Official Nationality*, pp. 5–11; Lincoln, *Nicholas I*, pp. 58–60, 111; quotation on p. 270.
186. Riasanovsky, *Nicholas I and Official Nationality*, pp. 11–16, 85; Lincoln, *Nicholas I*, pp. 86, 244, 246, 350.
187. Riasanovsky, *Nicholas I and Official Nationality*, pp. 9, 12, 99–101; Lincoln, *Nicholas I*, pp. 86, 245–48.
188. Goldfrank, *Origins of the Crimean War*, p. 77, also p. 284.
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190. Lincoln, *Nicholas I*, pp. 116, 200–1, 208–9.
191. Quoted in Riasanovsky, *Nicholas I and Official Nationality*, p. 265.

192. Riasanovsky, *Nicholas I and Official Nationality*, p. 16.
193. Lincoln, *Nicholas I*, p. 348.
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195. Wetzel, *Crimean War*, pp. 50, 75, also pp. 76–77; Temperley, *England, the Near East and Crimea*, p. 321.
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197. Rich, *Why the Crimean War?*, p. 61.
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228. Crankshaw, *Bismarck*, pp. 14–15, 20–28, 72–73, 99, 385–86; Richter, *Bismarck*, p. 38; Holborn, *History of Modern Germany*, p. 149.
229. Pflanze, *Bismarck and the Development of Germany*, pp. 9, 11, 60–61, 72, quotation on p. 60; Taylor, *Bismarck*, p. 21; Holborn, *History of Modern Germany*, pp. 150–52; Crankshaw, *Bismarck*, pp. 14, 18, 24, 177, 182, 367.
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231. Taylor, *Bismarck,* pp. 21–22; Pflanze, *Bismarck and the Development of Germany*, p. 61; Richter, *Bismarck*, p. 138; Crankshaw, *Bismarck*, pp. 3–4, 24.
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Heroes and Sultans

Tyranny, Charisma and Sultanism

Tyranny is defined by Aristotle as a perversion of kingship, the unjust rule of one. It is unlimited by law and directed not at the good of the whole but the tyrant's own pleasure. Tyrannies begin when a demagogue incites the masses against the prominent and prosperous, but after the oligarchs are stripped of their prerogatives the democrats are deprived of their freedom as well. Combining the deleterious attributes of oligarchy and populist democracy, tyranny is the worst regime of all. Tyrants covet riches, which enable them to live luxuriously while maintaining a "guard" for protection. To forestall opposition, tyrants weaken organizations, infiltrate society with spies and sow distrust. The best regime for Aristotle is conducive to friendship and public virtue. Under tyranny, neighbors become strangers, and human beings capable of governing themselves through reasoned discussion are ruled in the manner of slaves. Because "no freeman will voluntarily endure such a system… [tyranny] is … a rule of force."[1] Tyrants drive out the honest and capable and surround themselves with flatterers. Thus, "tyranny is friendly to the base."[2] Because of the fundamental illegitimacy of his rule, the tyrant must either reform or rely on stratagems to maintain his power. The former is difficult, for, as Tocqueville observes, "the most dangerous time for a bad government is when it begins to amend its ways." If embroiled in foreign conflict, the people are distracted and reliant on the only leader they have. Hence, "the tyrant is a warmonger."[3]

J. D. Orme, *Human Nature and the Causes of War*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77167-0_3

Tyranny thwarts realization of the human *telos*, which is achievable for citizens through their participation in politics. While it has an appeal to the most degraded elements in society, it is inconceivable to Aristotle that spirited peoples would submit to it willingly. Montesquieu observed, however, that "despite men's love of liberty, most people are subjected to this form of government." "Moderate government," (kingship or republicanism) requires a precise balance between powers. Such a "masterpiece of legislation" can only be constituted with great skill. Despotism is easy, for it requires no virtue of the residents and no wisdom in the architecture of the state. Regrettably, it is the most common form of government.[4]

Autocracy has taken many different forms in the modern world, some of which are different in important respects from the ancient tyrannies described by Aristotle. Two of them will be discussed in later chapters. The type of government closest to Aristotle's unjust rule of one is sometimes referred to by contemporary political scientists as "personal dictatorship." Juan Linz, borrowing the term from the eminent sociologist Max Weber, labels these dictatorships "Sultanistic." Much like Aristotle's tyrants, modern sultans rule for their own private ends, primarily power and pleasure. Their exercise of power is neither justified nor motivated by ideology. It is unrestrained by norms, laws or countervailing political forces. The base of support is often narrow. Family members, cronies and enforcers comprise the ruling class. They owe their positions not to merit but loyalty, a loyalty that is sustained by greed and fear. Public monies are diverted to patronage, and opportunities for corruption abound. The rewards for the sultan's supporters are substantial, but they are threatened continuously with a loss of favor. Violence is used freely, even against elites. The essential precondition for Sultanism is the weakness of institutions (especially the military and political parties) that could challenge or constrain the ruler. The military is too fragmented and politicized to prevent its use against the public or even its own ranks. Such institutional weakness is most probable in societies at a low level of economic development, with a numerous, politically passive peasantry and few urban centers. Some contend that personalist dictatorships are generally stable, at least until the dictator's death. It ought not to escape notice, however, that many of the regimes studied in the leading work on Sultanistic dictatorship were overthrown. What is not

in dispute is that personal dictatorships concentrate authority to an extraordinary degree, enabling the rulers to "enact their personal fantasies and whims."[5]

Personal rule is possible on less sordid but even more precarious foundation. Max Weber distinguished between three types of legitimate authority: "Rational" (a bureaucratic officer enforcing impersonal rules); "Traditional" (a king exerting personal authority sanctioned by "immemorial traditions"); and "Charismatic." Some individuals, he contends, are "set apart from ordinary men by…exceptional powers or qualities" such as "sanctity, heroism or exemplary character." Early in human history, they were prophets, sages or heroes of the hunt and battle. Modern examples include: Joseph Smith, the founder of Mormonism; Kurt Eisner, an erstwhile man of letters and communist organizer; and Oliver Cromwell, the revolutionary dictator. Napoleon Bonaparte and his nephew Louis Napoleon, both of whom will be examined below, are categorized by Weber as "plebiscitary leaders" whose charismatic appeal was cloaked in formal electoral endorsement. Charismatic leaders are the agents of revolutionary change in history, sometimes for good and sometimes not. Charisma, the "gift of grace," inspires deep devotion. It is implicitly authoritarian, for disciples obey their leader, not law. Despite its unsurpassed power, charisma is transitory. If sustained until the leader's death, it can be "routinized" into permanent institutions, such as churches, states or parties. The strong sense of mission animating leaders and followers is inimical to normal economic calculation and production, however. Born of crisis, the intense emotion charisma evokes is ephemeral. It must be manifested in "signs" and "proofs." If the leader ceases to provide them the spell is swiftly broken. Prophets must work miracles; warlords must perform brave deeds; and a modern ruler must make "a brilliant display of his ability to bolster his prestige."[6] Charisma, Weber asserts, "rests on 'heroism' of an ascetic, military, judicial, magical or whichever kind," and is "activated whenever an extraordinary event occurs…especially a military threat."[7] The implications for foreign policy are ominous.

In this chapter, charismatic heroes and their epigones will stand alongside corrupt and brutal Sultans. Drastically different in many respects, these men were alike, as will be seen, in plenitude of power they acquired and the terrible consequences the use of that power brought to their countries.

Napoleon's Invasion of Russia

Situation, Alternatives, Decision

The war begun by the French revolutionaries in 1792 was brought to a successful conclusion by the young general Napoleon Bonaparte. By 1801, France had expanded to her "natural frontiers" by absorbing Belgium and the left bank of the Rhine and also established buffer states in the Netherlands, Switzerland and northern Italy. It was a strategic situation of which Louis XIV would have been envious. Napoleon's most persistent adversary, William Pitt, had fallen from power in Britain and been replaced by the war-weary Henry Addington. Addington negotiated the Treaty of Amiens with France in March 1802. Britain tacitly acknowledged that a balance of power no longer obtained in western and central Europe, but France's predominance on land was to some extent offset by Britain's continued dominance at sea. The Amiens Treaty could have provided the foundation for peace in Europe. Addington cut defense expenditures (releasing 70,000 of the navy's 130,000 sailors) and repealed Pitt's 10% income tax. France, under the leadership of Consul Bonaparte, continued to amass power. Napoleon announced a 50% increase in the French fleet; tightened his grip on Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland and incorporated Piedmont into France, immediately organizing it into military districts to provide men and resources. Napoleon's actions convinced even the pacific Addington that he could not be trusted. Britain declared war on 17 May 1803 and Pitt was recalled to office the following year.[8]

Austria, Russia and Sweden joined Britain in the Third Coalition against France. Two decisive battles followed in the fall of 1805. On 20 October, the British fleet under the command of Horatio Nelson incapacitated France's navy, ending any threat of invasion from France for the foreseeable future. On 2 December, Napoleon won his greatest victory, routing the combined forces of Austria and Russia at Austerlitz. Prussia, provoked by Napoleon's reorganization of Germany, entered the war belatedly and was beaten decisively at Jena-Auerstedt. The war against the Fourth Coalition was concluded in June 1807 after a costly victory by France over Russia at Friedland.[9]

Forced into negotiations after the defeat at Friedland, Tsar Alexander met Napoleon in June 1807 on a raft on the river Niemen. The Treaty of Tilsit made Russia an ally of France and obliged her to participate fully in

the continental system, Napoleon's blockade of British goods. In return, Russia was to be given free hand in her own periphery. Their cooperation was short-lived. Alexander issued a ukase at the end of 1810 withdrawing Russia from the continental system. Unable to induce Alexander to alter his course, Napoleon invaded Russia in June 1812 with an army of 600,000, the largest force the western world had ever seen. Only twenty thousand of them escaped from Russia five months later.[10]

There were diplomatic alternatives to war with Russia. The breach between Russia and France had occurred because the alliance, as interpreted by Napoleon, was simply not advantageous to Russia. Adherence to the continental system caused a steep decline in the ruble and a rise in the cost of luxury goods while impeding the expansion of trade with neutral countries. Napoleon created the Grand Duchy of Warsaw out of lands stripped from defeated Prussia, raising concerns that Russia's own Polish territory could be at risk or that the introduction of the Napoleonic Code in the Duchy could destabilize feudal Russia. These concerns were compounded when Austria was forced to cede additional land to the Duchy after her defeat in 1809. The alliance was highly unpopular in Russia. Alexander, whose legitimacy was shaky because of the dubious circumstances of his accession to the throne, could not afford to ignore public opinion indefinitely.[11] Although Poland and the blockade were not the only issues dividing Russia and France, they were the most important. The obvious solution was for France to offer reassurance regarding Poland in return for Russia's continued effort to enforce the continental system. France's ambassador to Russia, Armand-Augustin de Caulaincourt, reached an agreement with the Tsar in 1810 guaranteeing that an independent Poland would not be revived, but the agreement was rejected by Napoleon on the grounds that a betrayal of Poland would "dishonor" him. In the last-ditch efforts to avert war in the spring of 1812 the Tsar asked for even less, agreeing to resume the blockade of Britain if only French forces were withdrawn from Prussia and Swedish Pomerania.[12]

An accommodation with Russia would have permitted Napoleon to continue his conflict with Britain. Alternatively, he might have sought settlement with Britain. Both France and Britain were heavily burdened by the costs of their ongoing conflict and neither had the means to bring it to a rapid conclusion. France had become embroiled in a protracted and frustrating war in Spain after Napoleon ousted the Bourbon king and installed his brother in 1808. Two hundred thousand French troops

had been unable to subdue the Spanish guerrillas, who were being aided by a British expeditionary force. France could mount no direct threat to Britain after Nelson destroyed the French fleet at Trafalgar. Nor did it appear that the continental system would bring Britain to her knees. Britain's prospects were not much better. Napoleon's overwhelming victories over Austria and Prussia had convinced those powers to adopt policies subservient to France. The Low Countries, Switzerland and Italy were all quiescent. Outside of Iberia, there were no continental allies to be found. Britain was also suffering a severe depression.[13]

Rather than compromising with either power, Napoleon chose to invade Russia. Her submission, he maintained, would put an end to Britain's opposition.[14] Napoleon was confident. His *Grande Armée* was twice the size of his enemy's. Alexander might be intimidated by France's preparations, but if not, this campaign would doubtless end as had his others with a decisive victory. Russian commanders had always pursued an offensive strategy and appeared to be so deployed. In any case, they would surely fight to protect Smolensk and Moscow. The destruction of the Russian army in a decisive battle would compel Alexander to capitulate. If he proved to be stubborn, neither the nobles nor the serfs would have any enthusiasm for a protracted war.[15] France's ambassador to Russia, the perceptive Caulaincourt, warned Napoleon of the risks of this course, noting how taxing the previous battles against Russia had been for France and how hazardous would be an invasion of Russia while Spain was still in rebellion. He predicted that the Russians would avoid a pitched battle and retreat to the east. Finally, he emphasized that Alexander was not the man Napoleon had charmed at Tilsit. "I would rather retreat as far as Kamchatka," the Tsar had declared, "than give away provinces and sign in my capital any treaty which would only be a truce." Napoleon heaped abuse on Caulaincourt for his honesty and dismissed the warnings: "Bah. A battle will dispose of the fine resolutions of your friend Alexander and his fortifications of sand. He is false and feeble."[16]

Looking at Napoleon's career as a whole, Franklin Ford poses the right question. Why did he not stop? At several junctures—1797, 1802, 1807, even 1811—he could have shifted to a defensive strategy and preserved his empire at home and abroad, provided that he was willing to accommodate some of the other powers of Europe. Yet at each point, the chance for peace was lost and another round of fighting ensued.[17] In the end, the Russian campaign destroyed him.

The Regime

Napoleon rose to power in a coup of 9 November 1799 that overthrew the ruling Directory. Although at the outset he was only one of three consuls, Napoleon's victory at Marengo enabled him to achieve dominance over the new government. The constitution of 1799 established a dictatorship which Napoleon subsequently strengthened by packing the legislature with his supporters. After declaring himself Emperor in May 1804, Napoleon's power was greater than that of any Bourbon monarch. The revolution intended to end arbitrary power created a government far more arbitrary and despotic than the one it displaced.[18] Napoleon's accumulation of power was accepted without much resistance by the French. The revolution had confiscated land from the church and nobility and transferred it to bourgeois "notables" who were its greatest beneficiaries. The settlement was threatened on the right by Royalists who promised to restore the property to its original owners and on the left by Jacobins who favored a more radical redistribution. Napoleon put an end to the uncertainty by repressing the Jacobins and weakening the Royalists by his Concordat with the Catholic Church. The notables became what he termed "masses of granite" supporting his rule. By consolidating the revolution Napoleon had brought France stability after a decade of turmoil.[19]

Napoleon's regime does not precisely fit any of the templates of modern scholarship. His government can be seen as a forerunner of the modern police state.[20] Censorship was extended in 1800. Sixty of seventy-three newspapers and all but eight of Paris's thirty-three theaters were closed. The minister of police, Joseph Fouché, extended surveillance by police spies throughout society. State prisons were established in 1810 where individuals could be detained for one year without facing trial. The levels of repression fell far short not only of those of the twentieth century totalitarianism but also the preceding Terror. In a nation of 30 million, there were only 2500 political prisoners in 1814 and another 3–4000 internal exiles. By comparison, 300,000–500,000 were imprisoned and 50,000 executed by the Convention during the French Revolution.[21] The most notorious incident was the abduction and execution of the duke of Enghien while the victim was hunting in Baden, allegedly for plotting to topple Napoleon. It was this act of gratuitous cruelty, perpetrated to intimidate royalist opponents, that was condemned by Talleyrand as "worse than a crime, a blunder." Beethoven

in response deleted the dedication of his great Eroica Symphony to Bonaparte, declaring prophetically that "Now he will trample on the rights of mankind and indulge only his own ambition; from now on he will make himself superior to others and become a tyrant."[22]

Napoleon can be called the first propagandist, in that he was the first systemically to exploit the apparatus of government to shape public option. The government controlled press suppressed unwelcome news, exaggerated successes and misrepresented ambiguous events.[23] After France's decade of domestic upheaval, Napoleon was fearful of faction and preferred to suppress rather than encourage political association. Unlike twentieth century European dictators, he did not attempt to organize a political movement.[24]

Napoleon's France may have foreshadowed totalitarianism, but was not totalitarian. Nor can the regime be classified a military dictatorship. There was little military participation in the government and it was not heavily dependent upon the military for support. "I do not govern in the capacity of General," Napoleon explained, "but by virtue of the civil qualities which in the eyes of the nation qualify me for the Government."[25] Unlike the military regimes discussed elsewhere in this volume, Napoleon did achieve some degree of legitimacy through ideology and charisma. Napoleon was heir to the revolution and made use of its symbols, the tricolor and the *Marseillaise*. Revolutionary sentiment was most ardent in the army, which had provided more "careers open to talents" than any sphere in French society. French patriotism became infused with military ambition. Over time, references to "the Republic" were replaced by references to "*la Grande Nation*" whose Emperor was her direct and authentic representative, his status validated by plebiscite, whose citizens could fancy themselves the leaders and liberators of Europe.[26] Napoleon, the prototype of Weberian charisma, had a unique personal appeal.[27] As René de Chateaubriand, his brilliant contemporary, remarked:

> The French turn instinctively towards power; they have no love for liberty; equality alone is their idol. Now, equality and despotism have secret links. From both these aspects, Napoleon drew his strength from the hearts of the French, who were militarily inclined towards power and democratically in love with the idea of equal status. When he ascended the throne, he brought the people to sit there with him; a proletarian king, he humiliated kings and nobles in his antechambers…[28]

Having seized power by an act of violence, Napoleon suspected that obedience to him rested more on fear than loyalty and maintained that he had to win new victories to unify and distract the querulous French and to bolster his own dubious legitimacy.[29]

> Five or six families share the thrones of Europe and they take it badly that a Corsican has seated himself at their table, "he complained." I can maintain myself there by force; I can only get them used to regarding me as their equal by keeping them in thrall; my empire will be destroyed if I cease being fearsome…Thus I cannot afford to let anyone threaten me without striking out at them. Things that would be unimportant for a king of an old house are very serious for me…Louis XIV, despite all his victories, would still have lost his throne at the end of his life if he had not inherited it from a long line of kings.[30]

This is highly exaggerated. Napoleon faced no crisis of legitimacy. The French were grateful for the stability he had brought to their unruly land and proud enough of his achievements to allow him to rest on his laurels. His professed anxiety about the legitimacy of his rule was not the cause of his aggression but the pretext.[31] "The thought that Napoleon's quest for world dictatorship was imposed on him by fatal necessity just as the cross was imposed on Christ (with whom he occasionally deigned to compare himself) taxes one's credulity," asserts Christopher Herold. "The necessity arose only out of his character, not out of the circumstances, which merely presented him with opportunities."[32]

The Man

According to a recent biographer, the humiliations he suffered in childhood left Napoleon Bonaparte with a "deep internal anger" that led him to take revenge on the world.[33] Whatever may have been its origins, Napoleon clearly exhibited the traits of a power-driven personality. One of his teachers remembered him as "domineering, imperious and stubborn."[34] Although he could be an engaging conversationalist, even patient listeners often found his monologues prolix. He offered unsolicited advice on subjects that were not his proper concern. He was jealous of anyone who diverted attention from himself. He was so competitive that he cheated at cards. He gleefully humiliated women by informing them in public of their husbands' infidelities. He could not bear to be

seen in the wrong and refused to acknowledge his mistakes. He claimed to have no true friends and to love no one, despite the loyalty of many of his followers. One of his generals recollected that "he never loved anybody in his life…but himself."[35] His passion for his wife Josephine may have had a moderating effect on him, but after their divorce, he drifted into a "hard, unimaginative middle age…of calculation of material loss and gain, of having always to be in the right…more brutal, more overbearing [and] more coarse in his judgments of men, women and affairs."[36] "Power is my mistress," Napoleon remarked. "I have worked too hard at her conquest to allow anyone to take her from me."[37] His will to power was expressed primarily in the desire to dominate and control others. "The only attitude that comes naturally to him is that of a man giving orders," observed Madame de Stael. And, "the terror he inspires is inconceivable." He lashed out at all who challenged his supremacy or thwarted his will.[38]

Important though the desire to obtain and exercise power was to Napoleon, it was ultimately an instrument for the attainment of something more precious to him. His thirst for glory was limitless.[39] Napoleon lamented around 1800–1801 that although "it is true that in less than two years I have conquered Cairo, Milan and Paris…if I were to die tomorrow, ten centuries hence, only half a page in a world history would be dedicated to me."[40] In 1804, he told one general that "Death is nothing, but to live defeated and inglorious is to die daily."[41] This yearning was not easily satisfied. As one of his ministers noted: "It is strange that though Napoleon's common sense amounted to genius, he could not see where the possible left off. … He was much less concerned to leave behind him a "race" or a dynasty than a name which should have no equal and glory that could not be surpassed."[42] Presenting his rationale for the invasion of Russia to the ambassador to Russia in March 1812, Napoleon exclaimed: "Let Russia be crushed under my hatred of England." After a pause, he continued: "After all, that long road is the road to India. Alexander the Great, to reach the Ganges, started from just as distant a point as Moscow. I have said this to myself ever since Acre." In exile four years later, he returned to the same theme. "Seated beneath the North Pole, resting its back against masses of eternal ice, the Russia Empire is safe from invasion three-quarters of the year. Nothing would be easier for it than to conquer India and China, and Europe as well. If [I were Tsar Alexander] I would reach Calais according to a fixed timetable."[43] One biographer suggests that the defeat of Britain was

to open the possibility of world conquest in 1806–1808 and that the occupation of Spain, which would enable him to close the Mediterranean to the British navy, was intended as the first step.[44] According to an old joke, Napoleon suffered from the delusion that he was Napoleon. He was, "the eternal Don Juan of politics and war."[45]

Napoleon was not a French patriot and expressed scant enthusiasm for political doctrines.[46] He was a religious skeptic. As he explained on St. Helena, "I am glad I have no religion. It is a great consolation. I have no imaginary fears. I do not fear the future."[47] This skepticism was associated, in the judgment of one perceptive observer, Madame de Stael, with a lack of scruple and empathy:

> He regards a human being like a fact or a thing, never as an equal person like himself. He neither hates nor loves.... the force of his will resides in the imperturbable calculations of his egoism. He is a chess-master whose opponents happen to be the rest of humanity.... Neither pity nor attraction, nor religion, nor attachment would ever divert him from his ends.... [No] spark of enthusiasm was mingled with his desire to astound the human race.[48]

By his own report, his denial of an afterlife inflamed his ambition. "As far as I am concerned," he remarked in 1801, "there is no immortality but the memory that is left in the minds of men." The following year, he reiterated, "Everything on earth is soon forgotten, except the opinion that we leave imprinted on history."[49]

Despite his superlative ability, Napoleon often exhibited a "startling obtuseness in his judgments of men and events."[50] He had always found it difficult to admit error. Consequently, "his pride refused to accept the award of his intellect."[51] Caulaincourt observed, somewhat generously under the circumstances, that "once and idea which he considered expedient had lodged itself in his head, the emperor became his own dupe."[52] After 1806, many observers noted a deterioration in his physique, character and intelligence. He became testy, impatient and, Talleyrand noted, "*inamusable*." His ablest counselors were driven away and replaced by corrupt mediocrities. His grip of reality weakened and unmistakable signs of megalomania emerged. He entertained plans to conquer Constantinople, North Africa, the Cape of Good Hope, India and even South America.[53] "I have 300,000 to spend," he told Tsar Alexander. "Once my great empire has been launched, no one must be

allowed to get in its path; woe unto him who gets crushed under its wheels."[54] As early as 1806, the Minister of Marine concluded that "the Emperor is mad and will destroy us all." The American ambassador in Paris found him "a man possessed of absolute power and actuated by violent and unmanageable passions." Talleyrand, seeing the handwriting on the wall, resigned after Tilsit.[55] One minister told Marshal Marmont in confidence that "the emperor is crazy, stark staring mad, and we are all going to pay for it, all will end up a colossal catastrophe for us." "God has given me the will and the force to overcome all obstacles," Napoleon the people of Madrid in 1808.[56] Across the English Channel, south of the Pyrenees and east of the Niemen Napoleon encountered obstacles his will and force could not overcome.

Louis Napoleon and the Franco-Prussian War

Situation, Alternatives, Decision

The Franco-Prussian War of 1870, like the last of Louis XIV's wars, arose out of a controversy over the succession in Spain. After an uprising in 1869 forced the Spanish queen to abdicate, Prussia's Minister-President, Otto von Bismarck, stealthily promoted the candidacy of Leopold, a member of the ruling dynasty of Prussia. Bismarck's objective at the outset was not to provoke a war with France but to bolster Prussia's position should France attempt to block the unification of Germany. This development was not imminent, Bismarck believed, because of the continued reluctance of the south German states to accede to a Prussian-dominated union. Once "the fruit was ripe," a pro-Prussian Spain would divert 40–80,000 French troops from Prussia's border. Bismarck hoped that Leopold could be installed as king in a fait accompli before the French could react.[57]

When the French government learned on 2 July 1870 that Leopold had accepted the Spanish crown, they were determined to reverse his decision. Speaking to the parliament, France's foreign minister, the Duke of Gramont, assigned blame to Prussia and issued a clear warning: "We do not believe that respect for the rights of a neighboring people obliges us to endure a foreign power seating one of its princes on the throne of Charles V [that] may upset to our disadvantage the present equilibrium in Europe and place in jeopardy the interests and honor of France." He offered to Spain and Prussia the choice of either "backing

down or taking up arms." France's ambassador in Berlin was instructed to "invite" King William I to advise Leopold to withdraw and threaten war if he refused. The message was conveyed to William on 8 July at Bad Ems. After several days of confusion, the candidacy was withdrawn on 12 July. Bismarck, France's premier asserted, "had been made a laughing stock." Bismarck concurred. The reversal was for him a "second Olmütz." "God alone can help," he recorded in his bible.[58]

Help soon arrived, whatever its source. Gramont decided that Prussia's cooperation behind the scenes was not sufficient. Prussia would have to acknowledge her responsibility for the candidacy and make a public pledge that the candidacy would not be revived. France's premier, Emile Ollivier, sensed the danger, but he lacked the authority under France's current constitution to restrain Gramont, who was responsible only to the Emperor. Gramont argued that the French public would not be content with a mere "Sadowa of the salons." Emperor Louis Napoleon acquiesced, and new instructions were sent to France's envoy. Acting on these instructions, he accosted William on 13 July while the king was on a morning walk in the garden of his hotel at Bad Ems and presented the demand for a guarantee. William was courteous, but when pressed responded that what he was being asked to do was impossible, tipped his hat and walked away. Bismarck now sensed his opportunity. What he needed, he told his colleagues, was "a red rag to taunt the Gallic bull." A telegram sent by the foreign ministry describing the encounter at Bad Ems provided it. Bismarck edited the dispatch to make it appear that France's ambassador had been treated rudely and released it to the press.[59] France's previously cautious minister of the interior exclaimed: "When someone gives me a slap in the face, I don't want to examine the question of how well I know how to fight, I give one back to him."[60]

When the Emperor's advisors convened on Bastille Day (14 July), however, some were beginning to hesitate. The possibility of a European Congress was raised as an alternative to war. But Prussia was reported to be mobilizing. The minister of war, Edmond Le Boeuf, reminded them that military necessity did not permit the French government to dither and threatened to resign if they refused to act. France's professional army of 400,000 held the initial advantage over Prussia's peacetime force of 300,000, but, because of conscription, Prussia also had 400,000 reserves and another 500,000 *Landwehr*. Fully mobilized, Prussia could crush the French with superior numbers, but it would take an estimated seven

weeks for them to assemble. The French hoped to overcome Prussia's size with speed. If France could attack within two weeks, Prussia could be defeated before her reserves could be brought to bear, especially if other powers joined the fray. Provided that they mobilized quickly, the French were confident. Aggrieved, assured but hurried, the French declared war on 19 July 1870.[61]

The most important step towards war was the gratuitous demand of 12 July that King William provide public assurances that the Hohenzollern candidacy would not be revived. At this point, France's security needs had been satisfied. Pressing further left France less not more secure. The decision was Gramont's. Whether he wished to provoke war or was aiming at an even greater diplomatic victory, the French foreign minister's overreaching turned a diplomatic victory into a crushing military defeat.[62]

The Regime

When revolution broke out in Paris in 1848, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, nephew of Napoleon, seized the opportunity to achieve his lifelong dream. "The Republic has been proclaimed. I must be its master," he declared. He won the Presidency of the Second Republic in a competitive election, but, rather than surrender his position, staged a *coup d'etat* with the assistance of the army in December 1851. His seizure of power was welcomed or at least tolerated in many quarters because of fear of the socialist left. Martial law was declared, more than 26,000 arrested and over 9500 deported. Circumstances did not permit and Louis did not aspire to despotic rule. The regime's controls did not approach the levels of twentieth century totalitarianism and were gradually loosened in the 1860s. A constitution provided for occasional elections and a weak *Corps Législatif*. The army remained a key constituency. Its loyalty, though less than total, increased over time as honors and perquisites were bestowed generously on the soldiers.[63] Louis Napoleon, in the judgment of the distinguished English historian Lewis Namier, rose not on the basis on his own slim qualifications but on the strength of the Napoleonic legend and the confused yearnings of the French public. He was "the first mountebank dictator," a counterfeit of his prodigious uncle. The regime was "plebiscitarian Caesarism," disdained by the educated but enjoying mass support by means of demagoguery, "gigantic, blatant display" and militarism.[64] The empire remained dependent

on foreign policy successes to provide legitimacy, and these had become scarce in later years. When Prussia went to war with Austria in 1866, Louis held back, expecting a protracted struggle. Prussia's rapid and unanticipated victory deprived him of any chance to acquire spoils in return for his acquiescence, and his subsequent efforts to achieve compensation in Belgium or Luxembourg came to naught. Louis's intervention in Mexico in 1867 was another fiasco. "Grandeur is relative," one of his counselors asserted, and in the eyes of the French public, France's grandeur had declined as Prussia's had risen.[65]

Corruption was rife. Louis diverted vast sums of money from the treasury for his own use and the pleasure and convenience of his relatives and mistress. By 1869, Napoleon III was in serious difficulty. The electoral campaign during the spring had been accompanied by riots and resulted in a substantial increase in the opposition's vote. (Had it not been for the government's fraud and gerrymandering, the totals would have been even worse.) Demonstrators in Paris fought with police for three nights in June, leading some to conclude that another revolution was at hand. To stave off disaster, Louis agreed to strengthen the role of the *Corps Législatif* and accepted the liberal Emile Ollivier as premier. On 8 May 1870, the French were asked to endorse the liberalization in a referendum, and they did so by a comfortable margin. Many historians view the plebiscite as a masterful gambit that consolidated the regime.[66] There were 1.9 million abstentions and 1.5 million votes against it, however, including one-fifth of the army. Street violence and unceasing vituperation in the press soon compelled Ollivier to reverse his relaxation of controls. It is probable that Louis Napoleon and his followers saw war as a means to stabilizing the regime, securing the future for his son and perhaps rolling back the liberal reforms. If so, the appointment of the firebrand Gramont in May was no accident. He was brought back to Paris for the explicit purpose of fomenting a war.[67] As Otto von Bismarck observed:

> A king of Prussia can make mistakes, can suffer misfortunes and even humiliation, but old loyalties remain. The adventurer on the throne [of France] possesses no such heritage of confidence. He must always produce an effect. His safety depends on his personal prestige and to enhance it, he will want to start a war with us on some pretext or other. I do not believe that he personally wants war, but the insecurity of his advisors will drive him on.[68]

The Spanish candidacy was both a threat and an opportunity for Louis Napoleon. It promised to restore some of the "glitter" for which the French public seemed to yearn and thus consolidate the regime; but if mishandled, could cost him his throne.[69]

The Man and His Minions

Louis Napoleon was something of an enigma. Sickly and unprepossessing, he did not look the part of the man on horseback and temperamentally, he was ill suited for it. His eyes and face perpetually wore a dreamy gaze that revealed nothing. Reticent in public, sensual in private, stoical in adversity and often indecisive in action, he had, according to the perceptive Walter Bagehot, "the foible of men whose position is slightly uncertain… [and thus exhibited a] jealous impatience of capacities unlike or superior to his own." His advisors did little to compensate for his own failings.[70]

One biographer surmises that the Napoleonic mission was not integral to his personality; rather, "it had to be assumed each day or submitted to with resignation." Consider in this light the advice he wrote to his son in 1865, long before the final debacle: "Power is heavy burden. You cannot always do the good you would like to do, and your contemporaries are seldom fair. A man, therefore, must do his work and have faith in himself, a sense of his duty."[71] The nephew of Napoleon was ambitious but not in the manner of most politicians. His mother said that he had the disposition of a poet. Not without insight into the trends of his own age but more imaginative than prudent, he barely existed at all in the present moment. He lived for the sake of his historical legacy. In the words of his brilliant contemporary, Alexis de Tocqueville, Louis Napoleon was "a fantastic dreamer" capable of focusing his attention on the realities for a time, but "always ready to put some fantastic idea beside a reasonable one." Trusting in his destiny, he "owed his success and strength more to his madness than to his sense."[72]

Louis Napoleon, whatever may have been his original intentions, was far from ebullient at the prospect of war. Hesitant throughout, he appeared relieved when the crisis seemed to be easing with Leopold's withdrawal. Later, he grasped at the proposal for a European Congress and wept when the decision was made to pursue it. Reviewing the troops at the front, his suspicions about France's lack of preparedness were confirmed.[73] By the summer of 1870 he was a very sick man. He was

suffering from arthritis, neuralgia, hemorrhoids and most likely a kidney stone. He faced heavy pressure from Gramont, the authoritarian-hawkish faction of his entourage (led by his wife Eugénie) as well as from popular opinion. It was not easy for a man in his debilitated condition to resist the entreaties of strong-willed advisors and a clamorous public. One might suppose that Louis was simply too feeble to exert control over his bellicose foreign minister during the crisis, but Gramont did consult the emperor in the afternoon of 12 July before sending the fateful instructions to Berlin. Louis remained in charge and must bear full responsibility for the decisions and their consequences.[74]

Of all the influences on Napoleon III, public opinion was the most significant. Before the crisis, a foreign spy reported that "France is irritated at Prussia and alarmed at her increases in territory. Louis Napoleon is not, himself, too eager for war. But public opinion insists on the policy being national and absolutely French."[75] It was reported in July that majorities in 63 of the 80 prefectures favored war unless a favorable diplomatic outcome could be arranged. By mid-July, *before* the publication of the Ems Dispatch, the French press, foreign diplomats and premier Ollivier all concluded that the public demanded action. Britain's ambassador thought it "doubtful [that] the government [can] withstand the cry for war." The Emperor could observe the excited crowds of Paris and draw his own conclusions.[76] His role, the exalted expectations of the public and his own ideals and objectives made it difficult for him to defy this sentiment. "He had come to power on the strength of the Napoleonic legend and, no matter what his better judgment might be, he could not deny it now." In other words, "his very name impelled him to lead his army into an inevitable debacle."[77] Victory over Prussia was thus not only a means of "securing the position of the regime" but also "restoring French domination in Europe." "Napoleon's vision of the unrealized greatness of France was a widely shared feature of the general political culture, reinforced in his case by his Bonapartist inheritance."[78]

Louis Napoleon's advisors and confidantes were decidedly optimistic regarding France's military prospects.[79] Eugénie recalled being assured by military experts that "our offensive across the Rhine will be so shattering that it will cut Germany in two and we shall swallow Prussia whole."[80] "In a few days we will be on the Rhine," opined Gramont.[81] "From Paris to Berlin," boasted Le Boeuf, "it will be a mere stroll, walking stick in hand."[82] Asked if the army was ready, Le Boeuf replied, "if the war were to last a year, we would not need a single gaiter button."[83]

The deference of the political leadership to these supposed experts is bewildering. Their attitude is all the more remarkable when one considers that Louis' efforts to reform the French army after 1866 were only partially successful. France introduced weapons thought to be superior to those of Prussia, a breech-loading rifle and a machine gun, but the adoption of Prussian-style conscription was blocked by opposition from the army, the *Corps Législatif* and the middle class.[84]

Louis Napoleon, like his predecessor, preferred to surround himself with mediocrities. The professionalism of the army was compromised by patronage. Louis was especially ill-served by his foreign minister. Impatient, abrasive, stubborn and lethargic, Gramont was eager for the limelight, but also obsessed with the prestige of France and hostile to Prussia. He was, in Bismarck's words, "the stupidest man in Europe."[85] Whether Gramont wished to provoke war or was aiming at a greater diplomatic victory, his willingness to run the risk rested on his assumption that once the war began, states wronged by Prussia (Denmark and Austria) and aided by France (Italy) would coalesce to assist him. But he did nothing to verify this assumption or to elicit firm commitments from these prospective allies.[86]

A tired, infirm Louis Napoleon, poorly advised, pressured by an excitable public and burdened by his uncle's legacy, overreached in the summer of 1870, transforming a diplomatic success into a military debacle. Louis's eventful tenure had reached its end. For his countrymen, now confronting the united Germany his predecessors had labored for generations to forestall, further tribulations lay ahead.

Francisco Solano López and the War of the Triple Alliance

Situation, Alternatives, Decision

In 1865, diminutive Paraguay found herself at war with the two largest states in South America, Brazil and Argentina. The sequence of events began with a civil war in Uruguay between the Blanco and Colorado factions. In April 1863, the leader of the Colorado faction returned to Uruguay from Argentina, rallied some gauchos to him, and attempted to overthrow the Blanco-dominated government. Brazil attempted to resolve the conflict through mediation. The effort failed because of

the Blanco's belief that Paraguay would extend her support. Paraguay warned Brazil not to interfere in Uruguay, but Brazil dismissed the threat and intervened on behalf of the Colorados in the fall of 1864. Paraguay retaliated in December by invading the Brazilian state of Mato Grosso. The campaign went reasonably well, leading the capture of Coimbra and Corumbá in a few weeks, but did not prevent the Colorados, abetted by Brazil, from taking control in Uruguay in February 1865. Paraguay then attempted to attack Brazil by marching through the Argentine territory of Corrientes in April 1865. Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay formed the triple alliance 1 May, committing themselves to the overthrow of the Paraguayan government. When the war ended five years later, less than 29,000 males (of all ages) remained alive in Paraguay.[87]

Four Paraguayan decisions led to this catastrophe: the promise of support that stiffened the Blancos' backs and undermined the mediation; a military buildup in 1864; the invasion of Mato Grosso; and the incursion into Corrientes. The last is the hardest to comprehend. The Colorados had been installed in power by Brazil, but Paraguay held the territory in Mato Grosso and was invulnerable to attack by Brazil as long as Argentina stayed neutral. Because of the precarious unity of the country, the popular antagonism to Brazil and the enthusiasm for the Blanco cause in some provinces, neutrality was the preference of Argentina's president, Bartolomé Mitre. Paraguay had settled the boundary dispute to his country's satisfaction. Mato Grosso was not easily accessible to Brazil by land, and a series of formidable forts on the Paraguay blocked access by river. If, despite this, it was deemed necessary to carry the fight to the enemy, Paraguay could have been attacked Brazil without provoking Argentina by advancing through the disputed territory of Misiones instead of Corrientes.[88]

Situated between the two greatest powers in South America, Paraguay had led a precarious existence. She was assigned to the Vice-Royalty of La Plata in 1776 and became the first independent nation on the continent only after repelling an attack from Buenos Aires. Her founder, Dr. José Francia, limited Paraguay's standing army to 5000 and pursued a policy of isolation, avoiding involvement in Argentina's internal controversies. His successor, Carlos Antonio López, unwisely antagonized Argentina, which began claiming Paraguay as a province. Brazil supported Paraguay's independence against Argentina but later encroached

on border lands claimed by Paraguay. The Paraguayans, who possessed a "national self-consciousness of morbid intensity," remained anxious and fearful. When Argentina and Brazil unexpectedly combined to support the Colorados, their suspicions were aroused. If Brazil were permitted to swallow little Uruguay unopposed, Brazil and Argentina might think that they could do the same to Paraguay. This was unlikely. Brazil viewed Paraguay as a useful buffer against Argentina, and none of the conditions that had drawn Brazil into Uruguay obtained in Paraguay. The supposed hostility of Argentina was wildly exaggerated. President Mitre could not believe that Paraguay would blunder into a conflict with a country whose neutrality was so beneficial to her. He sought to reassure Paraguay, denying Brazil passage of a flotilla up the Paraná to its confluence with the Paraguay River, where it was intended to blockade the land-locked republic. This gesture, made in late March, came too late to alter Paraguayan thinking. Most historians believe that Argentina and Brazil would have had a better chance of preventing the war if they had threatened Paraguay explicitly.[89]

The military balance was not initially unfavorable to Paraguay. In 1857, while Carlos Antonio López was still president, Paraguay had a standing army of 18,000 and a reserve of 40,000. A general conscription was declared by his son and successor in February 1864, which inducted 64,000 men in the next six months, exclusive of the 6000 who died in training. When fully mobilized in 1864, Paraguay could put 70,000 men in the field. Argentina, by comparison, had a standing army of 6000 and another 6000 reserves; Brazil, 14,000 active and 25,000 reserves; and Uruguay, only 2–2500. The Paraguayans' morale was excellent. Their country, unlike its neighbors, was a cohesive community with a strong sense of nationhood. Brazil's forces were scattered, and she faced serious logistical challenges. Paraguay had assembled a formidable war machine (by regional standards), albeit one that was not sustainable with so many men missing from the economy. Paraguay had 0.5 million inhabitants, as opposed to Argentina's 1.2 million and Brazil's 8–10 million. In a long war, the disparity of resources and Paraguay's vulnerability to blockade would inevitably result in defeat. If Paraguay could attack quickly, however, she had a chance. Some observers even expected her to win. Her leader spoke as if he believed that war with Brazil was unavoidable. With Brazil embroiled in Uruguay, the present moment appeared to be the time to strike.[90]

The Regime

Paraguay's young president, Francisco Solano López, ruled an authoritarian political system built by the founder of Paraguay, Jose de Francia, and his father, Carlos Antonio López. The 36-year old dictator, previously appointed Minister of War, exploited his influence over the presidential guard to seize power upon his father's death in 1862. Twenty or more suspected opponents were arrested prior to the convening of a congress to nominate a new president. One brave orator in that body noted that according to the constitution promulgated by Carlos Antonio, the presidency was not to be the possession of one family. A "short, sharp repression" after Francisco Solano's selection as president created "a palpable climate of fear" in the capital.[91]

The army remained the regime's "center of political gravity" and was favored accordingly. López faced little overt opposition. The growth of a middle class had been hampered by the regime's monopolies; the only newspaper was controlled by the government; spies were ubiquitous; and an ethic of unquestioning obedience had been instilled in the population through the educational system.[92] Reports of "popular discontent" were known to López, and this may have led him to believe that he could win greater respect from the public by improving the standing of his country. Whether or not domestic politics offered much inducement to adventurism, it certainly offered no impediments. López convened an Extraordinary Congress in March 1865. The Congress endorsed the government's views and bestowed honors on López. It was little more than an echo chamber for the president. Privately, some members of the Congress expressed anxiety and regret. One delegate felt "pallid and heartsick with a great sadness." The absence of institutional checks left Paraguay entirely dependent on López's erratic judgment.[93]

The Man

In warning Brazil not to meddle in Uruguay, the younger López stated that his government would view "any occupation of [Uruguayan] territory as an attempt against the equilibrium of the states of the Plate, which interests the Republic of Paraguay as a guarantee for its security, peace and prosperity…".[94] Paraguay's policy was animated less by fear than by hatred, pride and ambition. Shortly after taking power in 1862—well before Brazil intervened in Uruguay—López told the US

ambassador that he intended to settle the boundary dispute with Brazil. He not only expressed "bitter hatred" of his colossal neighbor in this conversation, but also contempt, referring to the Brazilians as "*macacos*" (monkeys). Ambassador Washburn concluded that he intended to "whip Brazil."[95] The following year, Washburn said of López that "he evidently has an ambition to be something more than a petty despot and … evidently desires reputation abroad as well as at home…". Previously, he had stated that his goal was for Paraguay "to be a weighty factor in the balance of power of these anarchical peoples…". The military expansion of 1864 was, according to López, intended as "precautionary," but his concern at this point was not primarily the protection of Paraguay's territory. "You may count on us," he said, "putting ourselves in a position to make the voice of the Paraguayan Government heard in the events that are developing in the Rio de la Plata."[96] If Paraguay failed to exert influence in the Uruguayan crisis, she would fail, in the words of her foreign minister "to cut a pretty figure in the eyes of the world."[97] Brazil's intervention in Uruguay was not so much a threat in López's eyes as an opportunity to attack while Brazil was preoccupied. The foreign minister's dispatches refer not to a fear of partition at the hands of Brazil and Argentina, but rather a desire for Paraguay to cease her "humble role" and assume a more prominent place in the region's politics.[98] In the words of historian Pelham Box:

> It was not based on an exact appraisement of the national interests, but on a purely romantic, one might say Fascist, estimate of the national worth, the national power, the important position that so worthy a nation ought to occupy—an importance estimated in terms of the fear and deference of neighbors. The decision to call a general mobilization was made on the fiasco of a diplomatic attempt to vindicate that purely imaginary position of importance.[99]

As the fighting commenced, López remarked to the American ambassador that "the situation in Paraguay was such that only by a war could the attention and respect of the world be secured to her. Isolated as she was, and scarcely known beyond the South American states, so would she remain till by her feats of arms she could compel other nations to treat her with more consideration." George Thompson, a military engineer in his service, confirms this. "He had an idea that only by having a

war could Paraguay become known and his own personal ambition drove him on…".[100] Inspired by the spectacle of the Second Empire on a visit to France and urged on by his Francophile Irish paramour, Elisa Lynch, he strove to become "the Napoleon of South America."[101] The central concern of López was "to win the recognition that he knew he and his country personally were due."[102]

Francisco Solano López was a man of some intelligence and charm, affectionate toward his common law wife and their offspring, but obstinate, proud, lecherous and cruel. López displayed a stupendous but rather comical vanity. Five feet four inches tall, stout and bow-legged, he spent lavishly on clothes, including shoes with elevated heels. After one of his camps was overrun, the allies found one hundred pairs of patent leather boots.[103] His behavior towards women was no laughing matter, however. Most were too terrified to reject his advances, but two tried. The fiancée of the first was found dead and stripped naked in front of his mother's house, a sight that drove the lady to madness; the second was flogged, put to hard labor and ultimately murdered.[104]

López was "ready to believe almost anything, provided it harmonized with his predilections." During the war he flogged prisoners until they would report that the leader of Argentina was dead.[105] It is unlikely that he was challenged frequently because, according to one insider, "he entertains friendly feelings for no one, as he has shot almost all those who have been most favored by himself."[106] Birthday celebrations for the president began in July 1864 and continued until the fall. The parades, decorations, fireworks, speeches and nightly balls stirred the patriotic sentiments of the people as intended, but also convinced the all too receptive López that his people were eager for war.[107]

Pelham Box, author of the most authoritative history of the war's origins, offers this characterization:

> The diplomatic attention paid to Paraguay caused him to overestimate her influence; at the same time, he attributed the attitude of his neighbors to fear. This type of man in public and private life has a fatal tendency to be reckless. He must keep up his prestige, to which he fancies all consideration shown him is due. Accordingly, he strains at gnats, sticks at straws, trails his coat and takes ridiculously easy offense. His demands eventually become so absurd that he is bound to receive a serious rebuff, which is likely to madden him into plunging into desperate courses.[108]

These traits contributed to the single biggest mistake López made, the decision to enter the Argentine province of Corrientes. López's temperament was aggressive. "All his natural inclinations, reinforced by a history of bad relations with his neighbors, told him to strike hard and swiftly." Advisors such as the foreign minister, who probably knew better, were reluctant to address him candidly.[109]

The geography of the Plate region made it difficult to attack Brazil directly. López may have hoped that the Argentine provinces of Entre Rios and Corrientes would rise in revolt against Buenos Aires if he acted boldly. His encroachment unified his enemies, driving the two provinces into the arms of Buenos Aires and Buenos Aires into the arms of Brazil. López was inflexible and reluctant once set upon a course to reverse it. He had, according the US ambassador, "a fixity of purpose bordering on stupidity."[110] After receiving a refusal from Argentina to permit his forces to traverse Corrientes, he asked a visiting Argentine whether former president Urquiza would ally with him against the government. Advised that Urquiza would not, López, raising his voice, bellowed that "if they provoke me I shall go straight ahead with everything."[111] According to one source, he was made aware by late February that Urquiza and other provincial Argentines were unreliable and that an alliance between Argentina and Brazil was "very likely to happen" if he entered Corrientes. "Yet if the war with [Argentina] becomes inevitable," he said fatalistically, "counting on the firmness and enthusiasm of my fellow countrymen, I hope to bring it to a good conclusion."[112]

As a child, Francisco had been treated like "a little Sultan" in the home, not subject to the slightest control or correction. López's upbringing was "designed to make him arrogant, tyrannical, and to develop all the worst features of his character." According to the captured diary of General Resquin, one of the cruelest of his henchmen, López amused himself as a youth by torturing animals. Yet he was accustomed to respect, obedience and flattery in his own country and, of course, a deferential press. The journalists of cosmopolitan Buenos Aires mocked López's pretensions, describing his capital Asunción as a collection of wigwams and advising their "chief" to refrain from interference in the affairs of more advanced nations and confine himself to resolving the disputes of his "half-naked squaws." López was deeply offended. This last, fatal step appears to have been taken, more than for any other reason, because of Francisco Solano López's wounded vanity.[113]

In the first four months of the war, Paraguay's fleet was eliminated and two Paraguayan offensives ended in disaster. Thereafter, Paraguay was on the defensive. The allies crossed the Paraná in April 1866. López tried to halt their advance by throwing human waves at the enemy's cannons. The Paraguayans displayed extraordinary tenacity. At Tuyutí on 24 May, two-thirds were casualties. The campaign of 1866 was a demographic catastrophe. When López called up additional reserves the following year, the only ones to report were boys and old men. The war had already destroyed most of the country's young male population.[114] Yet López persisted. According to the US ambassador, concern for his historical reputation and belief in his own destiny drove him on.[115] His actions, in the judgment of one historian, were those of one "who in his journey through life has left reality for behind him."[116]

When López realized that the key fortress of Humaitá on the Paraguay River could not hold out, he ordered the evacuation of Asunción. Some prominent citizens may have discussed surrendering to the allies at this time. Hearing rumors to this effect, López descended into murderous paranoia. As Paraguay's pathetic army was annihilated, over a thousand people, including 500 foreigners, many top officials and military commanders, the bishop, two of his brothers and two of his brother-in-laws, were arrested, tortured and executed. In the last months, hundreds of leading families were rounded up and murdered.[117] On 1 March 1870, the Brazilians finally cornered him in the remote northeast and ran him through with a lance. López's legacy was a country ruined by war. Sixty percent of the population had perished and only 529 adult males were left capable of bearing arms.[118] American emigre George Thompson pronounced a fitting epitaph: "he was a monster without parallel."[119]

Idi Amin's Invasion of Tanzania

Uganda invaded her larger neighbor Tanzania on 30 October 1978. Exploiting Tanzania's weak border defenses, 3000 Ugandan troops occupied the 1800 square miles north of the Kagera River and west of Lake Victoria, looting, raping and killing an estimated 1500 civilians. Uganda's strapping, 6'4" dictator, Idi Amin, suggested that the issue be resolved with President Julius Nyerere in the boxing ring. Instead, the Tanzanian People's Defense Forces taught the Ugandans a lesson

in military professionalism. They traversed the Kagera on a pontoon bridge on 19 November and reclaimed the Kagera Salient, then crossed the border on 21 January and drove toward Kampala. Uganda's army scattered, Kampala fell on 10 April and Amin departed for Saudi Arabia. Tanzania defeated Uganda at a cost of 373 casualties, only 96 of which were in combat. Approximately 1000 Ugandans lost their lives in battle.[120]

Likened to "Paradise on Earth" by Winston Churchill, Uganda was a bountiful but ethnically divided land. The former British colony, which received its independence in 1962, was a union of four monarchies, the most prominent of which was Buganda, ruled by its *Kabaka*. The success, educational attainment and self-satisfaction of its residents were resented by the other tribes, especially the Nilotic peoples of the north who comprised the majority of the army. In 1967, Milton Obote, with support from the army, overthrew the *Kabaka* and established a one-party republic.[121] Obote was toppled in turn by General Idi Amin on 25 January 1971. Although Amin was acting to forestall prosecution for the murder of a military rival, his seizure of power was greeted in many quarters as a relief from Obote's oppressive rule.[122]

Amin suspended all political institutions and consolidated power by a sanguinary purge of the army. His primary instrument was the three thousand-man State Research Bureau, staffed primarily by Nubians (Sudanese immigrants) clad conspicuously in flowered shirts, bell bottoms, platform shoes and sunglasses. Death squads from the SRB and the 'Public Safety' units of the army selected 3000 victims primarily among the Acholi and Langi tribes that had long dominated the army. Their methods were unspeakably cruel. Murders were carried out nightly at Karuma Falls, where the corpses were fed to the crocodiles. Repression ramified through the wider society, striking the judiciary, the civil service, the academy and the Christian majority. To instill fear, some of the violence was perpetrated in public. Once the army was permitted to arrest anyone on suspicion of sedition, personal animosity, ambition, greed and lust swept innocent Ugandans randomly into the dictatorship's web. Violence created its own momentum as new crimes were committed to hide old ones. An estimated 80–90,000 Ugandans died in the first two years of Amin's dictatorship and as many as 300,000 during his eight years in power.[123] The depleted ranks of the army were filled by men from Amin's Kakwa tribe as well as large numbers of Nubians and

foreigners from Zaire and Sudan. Uganda was in effect occupied by a mercenary army.[124]

According to Samuel Decalo, the country became the "personal fiefdom of a brutal despot, within which there was no semblance of law and order, established administration, or set policy guidelines" where "personal whims dictated policy."[125] These were the regime's characteristics:

> 1) the awesome totality of power…that [the tyrant] arrogated to himself; 2) the excessively brutal…manner in which [he] utilized these powers to gratify…every personal whim….; 3) the absence of even a semblance of moral, collegial, or pragmatic restraints on the highly arbitrary and brutal utilization of these powers; 4) the total absence of any….legitimacy; 5) the fact that the personal autocracy… [was] supported primarily, and at times solely, by cowed cohorts and sycophantic power-seekers…; 6) a total lack of concern with the plight of society at large…; and finally 7), the manner in which the social order was forcefully restructured to better conform with [the] tyrant's personal self-image or perverted vision of the world.[126]

Uganda's government was transformed from a military dictatorship into a Sultanistic tyranny, an unjust rule of one, and an odd one at that. The despot's aberrant personality and disabilities became the main determinant of policy.[127] Idi Amin, a Muslim of the Kakwa tribe in the remote northwest corner of Uganda, rose in the King's African Rifles during the colonial era despite a worrisome record of brutality. Amin was physically imposing, zealous and obedient, even obsequious, to his superiors. He was also brave and reliable and displayed some qualities of leadership. Jovial and gregarious, he possessed, according to his Scottish physician, "a quality of naked, visceral attraction that commanded the attention, mustering assent, overcoming resistance…". He bore grudges for real and imagined slights, however, and was sensitive to criticism, especially in print. He craved attention, and thus insisted on being addressed by grandiose (and ridiculous) titles (Officially, "His Excellency President for Life Field Marshall Al Hadj Doctor Idi Amin Dada, VC, DSO, MC, Lord of All the Beasts of the Earth and Fishes of the Sea and Conqueror of the British Empire in Africa in General and Uganda in Particular"). Amin was charming, but manipulative; cunning but not wise. By his own admission, he "loved to rule…to be [the] head man." He boasted of siring 50 children by his five wives and numerous mistresses, some attracted by his reputation for sexual performance and some coerced. Above all

else he was cruel. He exerted domination as a child by squeezing the most sensitive parts of other boys' anatomy with his huge hand. As a boxer, he appeared to the medical advisor of the Ugandan boxing association to be intent not just on defeating but killing his opponents. His preferred method of interrogation in the field was to compel his male captives to present their reproductive organs on a table and threaten them with mutilation if they withheld information. (The threat was in one instance fulfilled.) A Ugandan professor observed: "Psychopaths of his type do not seem to learn from experience. They get pleasure out of [inflicting] pain, pain in other people or animals." Amin's British superiors, although concerned about the reports of his abuses, were reluctant to dismiss one of the two native commissioned officers when Uganda was close to independence. The desire for rapid Africanization enabled a man of mediocre talents, inferior education and dubious character to rise far above the level appropriate to his ability and training.[128]

Idi Amin, according to a defecting civilian minister, was "an illiterate soldier who became President of a modern state." Uneducated, medically unfit for office and altogether lacking "principles, moral standards or scruples," Amin would "kill or cause to be killed anyone without hesitation as long as it served his interest," which he understood as "prolonging his stay in power or getting what he wanted such as a woman or money."[129] The medical issue to which the minister referred is hypomania, in which periods of hyperactivity are followed by exhaustion. The dictator's powers of concentration were limited even in the best of times. When in the manic state, Amin leaped from topic to topic without consideration of consistency or feasibility. He was prone to delusions of grandeur; his anger was ungovernable; and his impulsivity precluded rational planning.[130] According to the minister:

> Amin finds it well-nigh impossible to sit in an office for a day. He cannot concentrate on any serious topic for half a morning. He does not read. He cannot write. The sum total of all these disabilities makes it impossible for him either to sit in the regular cabinet, to follow up the cabinet minutes, or to comprehend the briefs written to him by his ministers.[131]

Amin inherited from the British a well-trained civil service. Educated civilian ministers aggravated Amin's feeling of inferiority. Poorly spoken in English as well as the major Ugandan languages, Amin ceased

attending cabinet meetings, then suspended the cabinet for nine months before incorporating it into the army, where it was subject to military punishments. Ministers who contradicted Amin were sometimes whipped. By 1972, the advisory process had completely broken down. Government became what the defecting finance minister termed "a one man show" resulting in decisions that "[bore] no relationship to the country's available resources."[132]

The impact of this strange combination of brutality and incompetence was evident first in the economy. Military spending tripled and unbudgeted expenditures proliferated. Public funds were diverted to support Amin and his families in luxury. When money ran short, the Bank of Uganda was instructed to print more of it. The result was roaring inflation, at a yearly rate of 1000%. On 9 August 1972, Amin ordered the expulsion of Uganda's 70,000 South Asians. Their businesses were transferred to government favorites incapable of managing them. Most failed, leading to acute shortages. The expulsion also depopulated the ranks of professionals and technicians, crippling hospitals, schools and repair shops. Trade and tourism collapsed. Government revenues declined sharply. Uganda's bleak condition deteriorated even further in 1976–1977 when world coffee prices fell by 40%.[133]

Once the other institutions in society were neutralized, power was concentrated in the clique surrounding Idi Amin. By 1977, 15 of the 17 main units of the security forces were headed by Muslims, primarily Nubians and Kakwas. Amin raised these men from modest circumstances, presumably because he was most at ease with them. Most were undistinguished, many were illiterate thugs. They enriched themselves while abasing the former elite of the country. Even the inner circle lived in fear. The dictator's unpredictability kept his cronies in perpetual anxiety. "He could turn from laughing fat man to evil sadist in a moment," one judge recalled. Amin narrowly escaped assassination on several occasions. Over time he grew increasingly isolated from the public and the army rank and file. By 1978 nearly every group in society had been alienated, even the residents of West Nile district who had been the regime's main beneficiaries. His brother-in-law, Mustafa Adrisi, expressed concern in April about the narrowness of the regime's support. His warning was summarily dismissed. Shortly thereafter, Adrisi nearly died in a traffic accident. Amin attempted to weaken his supporters, provoking a mutiny that spread rapidly through the army. The mutineers complained of pay,

benefits (free beer was demanded) and the preferential treatment of the Nubians.[134]

Forces loyal to Amin pursued a contingent of mutineers across the Tanzanian border in mid-October. Amin's propagandists alleged that Tanzania had encroached on Ugandan territory. On 30 October, after no military planning whatsoever, an armored Uganda force of 3000 invaded and occupied the Kagera Salient. The invasion, deposed president Obote charged, "was a desperate measure to extricate Amin from the consequences of the failure of his *own* plots against his *own* army." According to a former general, the war began largely because Amin wanted "to show off."[135]

It is true that Obote had attempted to invade Uganda with an army of supporters in 1972, but the attack was an abject failure that convinced President Nyerere to demobilize Obote's followers. Obote posed no immediate threat.[136] Uganda's army had expanded to 25,000, but had been debilitated by years of purges and mutinies, ineffective training and slack discipline. Its commanders had been promoted on the basis of loyalty not competence. A Ugandan attack seemed inconceivable to Tanzania's leaders; the regional commander's pleas for reinforcements were ignored. The Tanzanian People's Defense Forces had been effectively trained according to an eclectic mixture of Western and Communist methods, but initially had only four brigades dispersed across Tanzania's extensive territory. The TPDF was expanded to 75,000 by emergency recruitment, 45,000 of which were dispatched to Uganda. Unhindered by the Ugandans' demolition of the Kagera Bridge, the TPDF swiftly reclaimed the Kagera Salient and demolished the Uganda border town of Mutukula in retaliation. After long deliberation, President Nyerere made the decision to invade Uganda and overthrow Amin, primarily to forestall reprisals against the southern Ugandans. Untested in actual battle and incompetently led, the Ugandan troops frequently panicked when attacked by artillery. On the few occasions when they stood their ground they were routed. Amin's 2700 Libyan allies fought harder, but took horrendous losses. As the Tanzanians occupied Uganda they were greeted by cheering civilians as liberators. They met no more than token resistance as they entered the capital. Amin's henchmen refused to risk their lives and ill-gotten wealth for the tottering dictatorship. When confronted by a real army, they and their erstwhile leader fled, leaving behind a beautiful country ravaged by oppression.[137]

The Wars of Sultans and Charismatic Dictators

Sultanistic and Charismatic dictatorships initiated and lost the four wars that comprise this chapter. The ethos of these regimes was without exception conducive to war. French patriotism by the time of Napoleon had become fused with prideful military ambition. Louis Napoleon's Caesarism was its nostalgic echo. The intense national identity of the Paraguayans did not cause but certainly facilitated López's megalomania. The "mentality" of Idi Amin's followers was one of coarse brutality.

The belligerence of two of these governments can be attributed to their instability. Louis Napoleon's rule rested on an inherited, imputed charisma that imposed upon him inescapable but unrealistic demands. More a dreamy poet than a man on horseback, Louis Napoleon was expected to emulate his famous uncle. He was cast in a role for which he was unsuited and his country unprepared. Idi Amin, a prototypical Sultan, could rule his unfortunate country without charisma or legality as long as his henchmen were loyal and his military submissive. Once his cronies dissented and his legions mutinied, Amin was vulnerable. His invasion of Tanzania was an act of desperation, undertaken with characteristic carelessness.

Napoleon Bonaparte was the prototype of Weber's charismatic hero. Illegitimate by monarchical standards, he professed to be worried what would happen if he no longer dazzled the French with victories on the battlefield; but his rule rested firmly on the post-revolutionary "blocks of granite." Bonaparte faced no imminent crisis of legitimacy and had no need to attack Russia to preserve his power. Legitimacy was the pretext for the invasion, not the motive. Francisco Solano López's grip on power was also secure; there was no political necessity for his incursion into Corrientes. A provincial South American awestruck by the splendor of Paris, López aspired to emulate Louis Napoleon and his famous uncle. Striving for the unattainable, he brought Paraguay to ruin.

The advising process in these cases was generally ineffective. Uganda's well trained civil servants were supplanted by grasping, unlettered hoodlums. When one of them saw the handwriting on the wall and said so, he nearly died in a car crash. Louis Napoleon surrounded himself by men less prudent than he, most notably, "the stupidest man in Europe," Gramont. Napoleon and López were warned about their proposed course of action by sensible (and considering the circumstances, brave) advisors. These admonitions were ignored.

All four of these regimes were tyrannies, ruled unjustly by one. The concentration of authority left these countries dependent on the judgment of a single individual. The abilities of the dictators ran the gamut. Napoleon was possibly the ablest man to hold high office in modern history. Victories abroad and solid achievements at home continued for many years, but in the end the operation of Napoleon's splendid brain was fatally impaired by his yearning for glory. The Corsican's much abused nephew governed France with surprising success for two decades. By 1870, however, Louis Napoleon had ceased to provide the signs and proofs required to bolster his fading charisma. López's abilities were adequate to master the undemanding politics of his native country. A brutish but reasonably intelligent man made stupid by his desire for glory, López's ambitions exceeded his native country's modest resources. Idi Amin, a sergeant promoted to the rank of general, undermined his position through unceasing cruelty and incompetence, then destroyed his regime by embarking on an unwinnable war. In all four instances, men with grave flaws of intellect or character acquired unlimited control over foreign policy. Unrestrained power in the hands of reckless and ambitious men was an invitation to catastrophe.

Notes

1. Aristotle, *The Politics*, III 1278b–1279b; IV 1294b; V 1310b–1311b; V 1313a–1313b.
2. Aristotle, *The Politics*, V 1313b39–1314a9.
3. Aristotle, *The Politics*, V 1313b28–29.
4. Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*, Book 5, Chapter 14.
5. Juan Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000), pp. 151–54; H. E. Chehabi and Juan Linz, editors, *Sultanistic Regimes* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), pp. 7, 11–16, 24–25; Natasha Ezrow and Erica Frantz, *Dictators and Dictatorship* (New York: Continuum, 2011), pp. 58–61, Samuel Decalo quoted on p. 220; Paul Brooker, *Non-Democratic Regimes* (London: Palgrave, 2009), p. 172.
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Press, 1964), pp. 328, 358–63; Arthur Schweitzer, *The Age of Charisma* (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1984), pp. 38–39.

7. Weber, *Economy and Society*, pp. 1116, 1134.
8. Franklin Ford, *Europe: 1780–1830* (New York: Longman, 1989), pp. 161–64, 199–210, 438–39; Paul Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics 1763–1848* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 227–29, 233, 239–40; Felix Markham, *Napoleon* (New York: New American Library, 1963), p. 107; Steven Englund, *Napoleon: A Political Life* (New York: Scriber, 2004), p. 262.
9. Ford, *Europe: 1780–1830*, pp. 210–13.
10. Markham, *Napoleon*, pp. 129–30; Richard Riehn, *1812* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1990), pp. 6–7; Charles Esdaile, *The Wars of Napoleon* (New York: Longman, 1995), p. 260.
11. Adam Zamoyski, *Moscow 1812* (New York: HarperCollins, 2004), pp. 30–31, 36–37, 58–60, 65–67; Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, pp. 416–20; Riehn, *1812*, p. 27.
12. Markham, *Napoleon*, p. 188; Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, p. 427; Zamoyski, *Moscow 1812*, pp. 72–73.
13. Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, pp. 403–6, 410–13; Ford, *Europe: 1780–1830*, pp. 215–16, 224.
14. Zamoyski, *Moscow 1812*, p. 74, 83; J. M. Thompson, *Napoleon Bonaparte* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 352.
15. Christopher Herold, *The Age of Napoleon* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2002), p. 298; Markham, *Napoleon*, pp. 189, 192, 195; Thompson, *Napoleon Bonaparte*, pp. 353–54; Riehn, *1812*, pp. 54–55; Zamoyski, *Moscow 1812*, p. 73; Englund, *Napoleon*, pp. 374–75.
16. Markham, *Napoleon*, p. 184, quotation on p. 189; Alan Schom, *Napoleon Bonaparte* (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), pp. 587–90; Zamoyski, *Moscow 1812*, p. 73.
17. Ford, *Europe: 1780–1830*, p. 197.
18. Markham, *Napoleon*, pp. 99–101; D. M. G. Sutherland, *France 1789–1815* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 357–65; Robert Holtman, *The Napoleonic Revolution* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1987), p. 78.
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1770–1890, Antonia Nevill, translator (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 215, 236; Englund, *Napoleon*, pp. 194–96.

20. Holtman, *Napoleonic Revolution*, p. 85; Lyons, *Napoleon Bonaparte and the Legacy*, pp. 117–18; Alexander, *Napoleon*, pp. 95–96.
21. Ford, *Europe: 1780–1830*, pp. 180–81, 189; Herold, *Age of Napoleon*, p. 205; Englund, *Napoleon*, pp. 313–16; Lyons, *Napoleon Bonaparte and the Legacy*, pp. 121–24; Sutherland, *France 1789–1815*, pp. 390–91; Schom, *Napoleon Bonaparte*, pp. 226, 261–63.
22. Ford, *Europe: 1780–1830*, pp. 180–81, 189; Herold, *Age of Napoleon*, pp. 153, 159–62, 295; Markham, *Napoleon*, pp. 88–89, 101, 111; Englund, *Napoleon*, pp. 315–16; Schom, *Napoleon Bonaparte*, pp. 226, 261–63.
23. Holtman, *Napoleonic Revolution*, pp. 163–65, 173.
24. Alexander, *Napoleon*, pp. 93–94; Sutherland, p. 361; Englund, *Napoleon*, pp. 142–45.
25. Furet, *Revolutionary France*, p. 234; Lyons, *Napoleon Bonaparte and the Legacy*, p. 111; Markham, *Napoleon*, pp. 98–99; Alexander, *Napoleon*, pp. 63–64, 86; Sutherland, *France 1789–1815*, pp. 360, 365.
26. Furet, *Revolutionary France*, pp. 214–15; Holtman, *Napoleonic Revolution*, pp. 180–82; Doyle, *Oxford History*, p. 409; Englund, *Napoleon*, pp. 197–200, 249.
27. Alexander, *Napoleon*, p. 180.
28. Quoted in Furet, *Revolutionary France*, p. 224.
29. H. A. L. Fisher, *Napoleon* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 67; Herold, *Age of Napoleon*, pp. 132, 152–53, 156, 163, 293; Paul Johnson, *Napoleon* (New York: Viking, 2002), p. 42.
30. Quoted in Englund, *Napoleon*, p. 250.
31. Englund, *Napoleon*, pp. 250–51, 261, 268.
32. Herold, *Age of Napoleon*, p. 123.
33. Schom, *Napoleon Bonaparte*, p. 306.
34. Schom, *Napoleon Bonaparte*, p. 5.
35. Schom, *Napoleon Bonaparte*, pp. 379–80, p. 72; Markham, *Napoleon*, pp. 137, 265; Thompson, *Napoleon Bonaparte*, p. 210.
36. Thompson, *Napoleon Bonaparte*, p. 327.
37. Christopher Herold, editor, *The Mind of Napoleon* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953), p. 257.
38. Herold, *Age of Napoleon*, pp. 121–22, 292, 379; Schom, *Napoleon Bonaparte*, p. 306; Englund, *Napoleon*, pp. 373–74; Thompson, *Napoleon Bonaparte*, p. 210.
39. Albert Guérard, *Napoleon I* (New York: Knopf, 1965), pp. 67–89.
40. Quoted in Schom, *Napoleon Bonaparte*, p. 307.
41. Markham, *Napoleon*, p. 55.

42. Markham, *Napoleon*, p. 56.
43. Quoted in Herold, *Age of Napoleon*, pp. 298–99.
44. Schom, *Napoleon Bonaparte*, p. 461.
45. Guérard, *Napoleon I*, pp. 67, 69.
46. Herold, *Age of Napoleon*, p. 454; Guérard, *Napoleon I*, pp. 65–67.
47. Markham, *Napoleon*, p. 258.
48. Quoted in Johnson, *Napoleon*, p. 115.
49. Herold, *Age of Napoleon*, p. 437; Schom, *Napoleon Bonaparte*, p. 264.
50. Markham, *Napoleon*, pp. 92, 266.
51. Fisher, *Napoleon*, pp. 124–25; Schom, *Napoleon Bonaparte*, p. 472.
52. Herold, *Age of Napoleon*, p. 297.
53. Herold, *Age of Napoleon*, pp. 292–95; Schom, *Napoleon Bonaparte*, pp. 462–62; Markham, *Napoleon*, p. 154; Herbert Butterfield, *Napoleon* (New York: Collier, 1962), p. 89.
54. Schom, *Napoleon Bonaparte*, p. 527.
55. Markham, *Napoleon*, pp. 153–54; Schom, *Napoleon Bonaparte*, p. 472.
56. Herold, *Age of Napoleon*, p. 293; Butterfield, *Napoleon*, pp. 89–90; Markham, *Napoleon*, p. 154.
57. David Wetzel, *Duel of Giants: Bismarck, Napoleon III and the Origins of the Franco-Prussian War* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2001), pp. 38, 72, 93–94, 103; Lawrence Steefel, *Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy and the Origins of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 9–13, 231, 239, 243–45; T. A. B. Corley, *Democratic Despot: A Life of Napoleon III* (New York: Potter, 1961), p. 321.
58. Wetzel, *Duel of Giants*, pp. 107, 111, 115, 142; Geoffrey Wawro, *The Franco-Prussian War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 34–35; Steefel, *Hohenzollern Candidacy*, pp. 125, 141–47, 246; Roger Price, *The French Second Empire* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 426; James McMillan, *Napoleon III* (London: Longman, 1991), pp. 156–57.
59. Wetzel, *Duel of Giants*, pp. 145–49, 159–66; Wawro, *Franco-Prussian War*, pp. 36–37; Steefel, *Hohenzollern Candidacy*, pp. 159–60; John Bierman, *Napoleon III and His Carnival Empire* (New York: St. Martin's, 1998), pp. 326–28.
60. Steefel, *Hohenzollern Candidacy*, pp. 209–10.
61. Wetzel, *Duel of Giants*, pp. 166–70; Wawro, *Franco-Prussian War*, pp. 41–43, 65–67, 73; Steefel, *Hohenzollern Candidacy*, pp. 112–13, 198–210; Price, *French Second Empire*, p. 430.
62. Steefel, *Hohenzollern Candidacy*, p. 223.
63. Price, *French Second Empire*, pp. 33–35, 146, 167, 413, quotation on p. 15; McMillan, *Napoleon III*, pp. 42, 56–60.

64. Sir Lewis Namier, *Vanished Supremacies* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1958), pp. 54–55, 57–58, 62–63.
65. Wawro, *Franco-Prussian War*, pp. 16–17, 21, 25–29; Steefel, *Hohenzollern Candidacy*, pp. 1, 224; J. M. Thompson, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955) pp. 276–77.
66. McMillan, *Napoleon III*, pp. 126–30, 133; Price, *French Second Empire*, p. 425; David Baguley, *Napoleon III and His Regime* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000), p. 372; Wawro, *Franco-Prussian War*, pp. 25–28; Wetzel, *Duel of Giants*, p. 44.
67. Wawro, *Franco-Prussian War*, pp. 25, 28–30, 33, 36; Wetzel, *Duel of Giants*, p. 44; Bierman, *Carnival Empire*, p. 318–19; see also quotation in Price, *French Second Empire*, p. 406.
68. Quoted in Wetzel, *Duel of Giants*, p. 82; see also Steefel, *Hohenzollern Candidacy*, pp. 240–41; Thompson, *Louis Napoleon and the Second Empire*, p. 276.
69. Wawro, *Franco-Prussian War*, pp. 16–17, 21, 25–29; Steefel, *Hohenzollern Candidacy*, pp. 1, 224; Thompson, *Louis Napoleon and the Second Empire*, pp. 276–77.
70. Baguley, *Napoleon III and His Regime*, pp. 122–23, 125, 129–30; Williams, pp. 191–92; Corley, *Democratic Despot*, pp. 12, 354–58.
71. Quotation in Roger L. Williams, *The Mortal Napoleon III* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 193; Baguley, *Napoleon III and His Regime*, pp. 130–31.
72. Corley, *Democratic Despot*, pp. 356–58; Baguley, pp. 126–27; Quotation in Baguley, *Napoleon III and His Regime*, p. 123.
73. Wetzel, *Duel of Giants*, pp. 138, 169–70; Williams, *Mortal Napoleon III*, pp. 142–43, 149–50.
74. Baguley, *Napoleon III and his Regime*, pp. 377–78; Price, *French Second Empire*, pp. 429–31, 435; Bierman, *Carnival Empire*, pp. 324–26; McMillan, *Napoleon III*, p. 155; Thompson, *Louis Napoleon and the Second Empire*, pp. 297–99; Williams, *Mortal Napoleon III*, pp. 145–46, 166, 191–92.
75. Steefel, *Hohenzollern Candidacy*, p. 224.
76. Steefel, *Hohenzollern Candidacy*, pp. 195–96, 199, 206, 229–30; Thompson, pp. 299–300; Wetzel, *Duel of Giants*, pp. 160–61; Price, *French Second Empire*, p. 431; Bierman, *Carnival Empire*, pp. 323–24. It is possible that the prefects focused too closely on local notables and ignored the views of peasants, who were preoccupied with matters such as summer drought and not insults to the French ambassador, but, of course, the Emperor would not have known this. Price, pp. 432–33.
77. Baguley, *Napoleon III and His Regime*, p. 374.
78. Price, *French Second Empire*, pp. 406, 431, 435; Williams, *Mortal Napoleon III*, pp. 146–47.

79. Price, *French Second Empire*, p. 433.
80. Bierman, *Carnival Empire*, p. 335.
81. Bierman, *Carnival Empire*, p. 326.
82. Baguley, *Napoleon III and His Regime*, p. 373; Price, *French Second Empire*, p. 440.
83. Baguley, *Napoleon III and His Regime*, p. 376.
84. McMillan, *Napoleon III*, pp. 123–24, 160–61; Wawro, *Franco-Prussian War*, p. 25; Price, *French Second Empire*, pp. 414–15.
85. Wetzel, *Duel of Giants*, pp. 31–33, 107; Price, *French Second Empire*, p. 431; Bierman, *Carnival Empire*, p. 329.
86. Wetzel, *Duel of Giants*, p. 179; Wawro, *Franco-Prussian War*, p. 35; Steefel, *Hohenzollern Candidacy*, p. 223.
87. Chris Leuchars, *To the Bitter End: Paraguay and the War of the Triple Alliance* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2002), p. 27; Pelham Box, *The Origins of the Paraguayan War* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1967), pp. 112–13, 118, 141–45, 148, 152, 177; George Pendle, *Paraguay: A Riverside Nation* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 22; John Hoyt Williams, *The Rise and Fall of the Paraguayan Republic, 1800–1870* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), p. 202.
88. R. B. Cunninghame Graham, *Portrait of a Dictator: Francisco Solano López* (London: Heinemann, 1933), pp. 119–20, 146; Box, *Origins of the Paraguayan War*, pp. 105–6, 240, 252, 276, 286–88; Thomas Whigham, *The Paraguayan War*, volume I (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), pp. 230, 239–40, 243. Brazil would have had a hard time even reclaiming the land seized in Mato Grosso, because she was reliant on river transport to supply troops there and Argentina could block the rivers (Whigham, *Paraguayan War*, p. 230).
89. Leuchars, *Bitter End*, p. 29; Whigham, *Paraguayan War*, pp. 243–45, 251–52; Box, *Origins of the Paraguayan War*, p. 186.
90. Leuchars, *Bitter End*, pp. 32–33, 47–53; Whigham, *Paraguayan War*, pp. 150, 167–91; Box, *Origins of the Paraguayan War*, pp. 185, 208–9, 225, 233, 236, 284–85, 289.
91. Williams, *Rise and Fall of Paraguayan Republic*, pp. 195–96.
92. Box, *Origins of the Paraguayan War*, pp. 281–82; Leuchars, *Bitter End*, pp. 8–9, 13–14; Whigham, *The Paraguayan War*, volume I, pp. 92, 191.
93. Whigham, *Paraguayan War*, pp. 246–50; Leuchars, *Bitter End*, pp. 40–41; Williams, *Rise and Fall of Paraguayan Republic*, pp. 195–96.
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Paraguay, pp. 14–15; Box, *Origins of the Paraguayan War*, pp. 16–28, 33–50, 282.

95. Box, *Origins of the Paraguayan War*, pp. 49, 53.
96. Box, *Origins of the Paraguayan War*, quotations on pp. 184, 209–11; see also pp. 170, 194–95.
97. Box, *Origins of the Paraguayan War*, pp. 193–94.
98. Box, *Origins of the Paraguayan War*, pp. 217, 219.
99. Box, *Origins of the Paraguayan War*, p. 211.
100. Quoted in Graham, *Portrait of a Dictator*, pp. 140, 80.
101. Graham, *Portrait of a Dictator*, pp. 101, 105, 116, 141, 167; on Madame Lynch's role, pp. 102–7.
102. Williams, *Rise and Fall of Paraguayan Republic*, pp. 198–99.
103. Harris Gaylord Warren, *Paraguay: An Informal History* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1949), pp. 198–201; Pendle, *Paraguay: A Riverside Nation* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 21; Graham, *Portrait of a Dictator*, pp. 97–99, 102, 120; Box, *Origins of the Paraguayan War*, p. 183.
104. Graham, *Portrait of a Dictator*, pp. 95, 111–12.
105. Box, *Origins of the Paraguayan War*, pp. 184–85.
106. Quoted in Pendle, *Paraguay*, p. 20.
107. Leuchars, *Bitter End*, pp. 31–32.
108. Box, *Origins of the Paraguayan War*, p. 186.
109. Whigham, *Paraguayan War*, pp. 230, 239.
110. Box, *Origins of the Paraguayan War*, pp. 252, 286–87; Leuchars, *Bitter End*, p. 11; Whigham, *Paraguayan War*, pp. 219–20.
111. Box, *Origins of the Paraguayan War*, p. 259; Whigham, *Paraguayan War*, p. 244.
112. Whigham, *Paraguayan War*, p. 246.
113. Pendle, *Paraguay*, p. 20; Whigham, *Paraguayan War*, pp. 243–44; Leuchars, *Bitter End*, pp. 29, 41; Box, *Origins of the Paraguayan War*, pp. 181–82; Graham, *Portrait of a Dictator*, pp. 90–93, 128–29, 143–44.
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122. Gwyn, *Idi Amin*, pp. 41–43, 64; Kyemba, *State of Blood*, p. 39; Martin, *General Amin*, pp. 25–26; Smith, *Ghosts of Kampala*, pp. 65, 74–75; Avirgan and Honey, *War in Uganda*, p. 4.
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124. Decalo, *Psychoses of Power*, p. 98; Avirgan and Honey, *War in Uganda*, pp. 7–8; Martin, *General Amin*, p. 240; Smith, *Ghosts of Kampala*, pp. 32–33, 135.
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130. Gwyn, *Idi Amin*, pp. 5, 152–53; Decalo, *Psychoses of Power*, p. 24; Smith, *Ghosts of Kampala*, 107–9; Kyemba, *State of Blood*, 111.
131. Quoted in Martin, *General Amin*, p. 223.
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133. Decalo, *Psychoses of Power*, pp. 98–103, 110–11; Kyemba, *State of Blood*, p. 50; Martin, *General Amin*, pp. 233–34; Avirgan and Honey, *War in Uganda*, p. 48; Smith, *Ghosts of Kampala*, pp. 98–99.
134. Smith, *Ghosts of Kampala*, pp. 8–9, 135, 176–78; quotation in Rice, *Teeth May Smile*, pp. 193–96, 199; Kasozi, *Social Origins of Violence*, p. 112; Decalo, *Psychoses of Power*, pp. 97, 103, 111–12; Martin, *General Amin*, pp. 246–47; Kyemba, *State of Blood*, pp. 114–15, 136–37, 251; Avirgan and Honey, *War in Uganda*, pp. 49–52, quotation on p. 52; Foden, *Last King of Scotland*, pp. 181–82.
135. Smith, *Ghosts of Kampala*, pp. 178; Avirgan and Honey, *War in Uganda*, pp. 54–57, 61; Kasozi, *Social Origins of Violence*, p. 122; Rice, *Teeth May Smile*, p. 199.
136. Decalo, *Psychoses of Power*, p. 108; Martin, *General Amin*, pp. 242–26; Rice, *Teeth May Smile*, pp. 178, 191.
137. Rice, *Teeth May Smile*, pp. 160, 199, 202–4, 208, 211; Decalo, *Psychoses of Power*, pp. 102, 113; Avirgan and Honey, *War in Uganda*, pp. 53–54, 58, 61–63, 67–70, 72, 81–85, 93, 122–23, 133–35, 138–39; Smith, *Ghosts of Kampala*, pp. 22–23, 179; Kasozi, *Social Origins of Violence*, p. 125.

Soldiers and Subordinates

Praetorian Dictatorship

Military government is a distinct type of regime with its own characteristics. It can be defined as a dictatorship either ruled directly or heavily influenced by and dependent upon elements of the professional military. Praetorian dictatorship has been one the most prevalent forms of government in modern history. Of the 79 independent states existing before 1955, 45 experienced *coups d'etat* by the early sixties.[1] Samuel Huntington explains why. Praetorianism is to be understood, he says, not as an attribute of militaries but as the consequence of broader problems in societies. Colonialism and the dissemination of the doctrine of popular sovereignty weakened traditional authority in Latin America, the Middle East, African and Asia, but in many instances failed to provide an alternative source of legitimacy when these societies were granted independence.[2] In Praetorian societies at a lower level of socioeconomic development, no rules regulate the competition between oligarchic contenders for power. When these societies reach higher levels of development, social groups employ all means at their disposal to exert influence. Politics degenerates into a chaotic Hobbesian struggle leading the armed forces to impose such order as is possible. Samuel Finer contends that the public sinks into sullen apathy when constitutional politics fails to address their concerns and reacts with indifference or even enthusiasm when the soldiers push the civilian politicians aside. What Praetorian societies lack is a "political formula," a commonly accepted principle of

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legitimacy that determines who ought to hold power and how decisions ought to be made.[3]

The weakness of the political formula that enabled soldiers to take power also makes it difficult for them to keep it.[4] Far-sighted soldiers such as Atatürk and Mexico's revolutionary generals achieved political stability for their countries by incorporating the peasantry and building political parties, but Huntington recognizes that most soldiers find partisan politics too distasteful to emulate them. The longer they procrastinate, the more difficult their task becomes. Military rule more frequently retards than encourages a society's political maturation. Once Praetorianism takes root, it often persists.[5]

Machiavelli asserts that usurpers can consolidate power through an adroit mix of force and fraud. Modern usurpers face challenges even more daunting than those of Renaissance Italy, however. Military regimes are more collegial than other autocracies. Power is exercised initially by a junta ("committee") of officers. As in all autocracies there is s a tendency toward the concentration of power. A dictator usually emerges from the junta, but he remains subject to challenge or constraint from his colleagues.[6] Military dictators must not only fend off rivals within the military but balance the demands of their original backers with those of civilians. The societies they rule remain stubbornly pluralistic, with private firms, churches and political organizations that cannot all be silenced or intimidated by repression alone. Most career military men lack the experience and aptitude to deal with these complicated political problems. If dependent on their own political talents, most will fail.[7] Military dictatorships have been the least stable form of autocracy.[8]

Praetorian rulers lacking legitimacy and deficient in political skill will be sorely tempted to bolster their support and perhaps to attain charismatic status by diplomatic or military victories. Shakespeare's Henry IV, who overthrew Richard II to become king of England, is the most eloquent usurper in literature. Approaching death, he counsels his son:

> By whose fell working I was first advanced
> And by whose power I well might lodge a fear
> To be again displaced; which to avoid,
> I cut them off; and had a purpose now
> To lead out many to the Holy Land,
> Lest rest and lying still might make them look

Too near unto my state. Therefore my Harry,
Be it thy course to busy giddy minds
With foreign quarrels; that action, hence
borne out,
May waste the memory of the former days.[9]

Four wars will be considered below, each initiated by a military regime. As will be seen, rulers of dubious origin began wars of dubious rationality. War in each case was the result of illegitimacy, incompetence and misjudgment.

The Japanese Military and the Pacific War

The Situation

Imperialist officers of Japan's Kwantung Army, acting on their own initiative, established a puppet state in Manchuria in 1931; detached much of north China from the control of the Chinese government in 1935; and in the summer of 1937 embroiled Japan in a full-scale war with China, which was termed euphemistically "the China Incident." By 1939, Japan was occupying half of China, but unable to coerce the Chinese government to accept peace on her terms.[10] After border clashes with the Soviet Union 1938 and 1939, Japan's General Staff worried that they lacked the manpower to prosecute the war with China while defending against the Soviet Union in Manchuria. Officers in China pleaded for more forces, arguing if only they had a little more, they could deal the knockout blow. Two more divisions were sent. Japan advanced further up the Yangtze in the spring of 1940, but China's leader, Chiang Kai-shek, still refused to capitulate. Japan's Institute for Total War Studies estimated in October 1940 that the Japanese economy could not bear the burden of "the China Incident" for several more years. By the end of 1941, 29 divisions—half of the Army—were still bogged down in China.[11]

Japan's leaders, frustrated with the impasse, laid blame on the western nations' support of China. Germany's dramatic successes on European battlefields in 1939–1940 raised hope that the deadlock could be broken.[12] Japan's leaders decided at an Imperial Conference of 19 September 1940 to adhere to a Tripartite Alliance with Italy and Germany. The Axis was the brainchild of Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke. He maintained that the German connection would compel

Britain to yield, induce Russia to cooperate and deter the United States. The Army favored the alliance, but elements in the Navy were more skeptical. Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, later architect of the attack Pearl Harbor, pointed out that Japan depended on Britain and the United States for 80% of the raw materials needed for war. If Japan threw in her lot with the Axis, where and how were essential supplies to be obtained? Matsuoka answered that Germany would pressure the Netherlands to make available the oil of their East Indian possessions. He admitted that there was a fifty percent chance that the United States would respond with firmness. In that event, concluded War Minister Tojo Hideki, Japan might be required to use force to gain access to the resources of Southeast Asia. Later in the month of September, Japan occupied the northern area of French Indochina to prevent supplies from entering China. France was unable to mount resistance, but the Japanese were startled by the reaction of the other powers. Britain reopened the Burma Road to China; the United States declared an embargo on the sale of steel scrap to Japan; the Netherlands rebuffed Japanese demands for access to resources; and the Chinese took heart, now hopeful that increased western support would soon be on the way.[13] The Japanese had tightened the noose around their own throats.[14]

Germany's unexpected invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 presented Japan with both problems and opportunities. The problem of resource access grew even more acute with the closing of the Trans-Siberian railway, but with the Soviets desperately fending off the onrushing *Wehrmacht*, the Soviet threat to Japan's continental possessions was diminished. Japan's leadership might have seized the chance to move forces from the Soviet border to China to conclude the "China Incident." But they were convinced that the land rush was on and did not want to miss their chance. Their debate was not about whether to attack, but where. Some supported an invasion of the eastern provinces of the Soviet Union, but too many Soviet forces remained in the east. The Navy worried that a land war would allow the Army to devour Japan's scarce resources. An advance to the south, which would require contributions from (and allocations to) both services, was more acceptable, but the admirals remained wary. In the previous year's war games, the American fleet had played havoc with a southern offensive. The strategic issue was settled at the Imperial Conference of 2 July 1941. Japan would continue to prosecute the war against China, and preparations would be made for a campaign against the Soviet Union. The

next step was to be to the south, however, where Japan, to achieve her objectives, "will not decline a war" with Britain and the United States.[15] Japan occupied southern Indochina on 29 July, territory useful primarily as a staging area for an offensive farther south. The United States froze Japan's assets in the United States and applied an embargo on the sale of petroleum to Japan.[16] The Netherlands and Britain went farther, imposing a total ban on trade with Japan. Matusoka had warned his colleagues that such a step could lead to war with Britain and the United States. Better, he advised, to remain faithful to the Germans and strike at the Soviets' rear. His warning was dismissed because the leadership did not believe the United States would impose any penalty on Japan, even an economic one.[17]

President Franklin Roosevelt lamented that he "did not have enough butter to cover the bread." Lacking a Navy large enough to support Britain in the Atlantic and oppose Japan in the Pacific, Roosevelt had given priority to the Atlantic. Although the Pacific Fleet had been moved from San Diego to Pearl Harbor in 1940 to induce caution in Tokyo, American officials doubted that the U.S. fleet had the ships and training to go toe to toe with the Imperial Navy. At this stage, the Philippines was still more of a strategic liability than an asset.[18] In 1940 only 12% of Americans polled favored fighting a war with Japan to liberate China. Mindful of this, Roosevelt was reluctant to state with clarity what the United States would not tolerate and what the consequences would be if Japan went too far. Even after the incursion into Indochina, Roosevelt remained reluctant to draw a firm line in East Asia.[19]

The administration's credibility may have further weakened by well-meaning amateur diplomacy by a leader of the Catholic Maryknoll Society. The vicar prepared a draft agreement 9 April 1940 that was highly favorable to Japan. (Under its terms, the United States would cease aid to Chiang, but Japan would be permitted to retain troops in China and to remain in alliance with Germany.) It was passed on to Tokyo by Japan's ambassador without any of the stipulations added by American diplomats, giving a highly misleading picture of the United States' position regarding China. That Japanese erroneously concluded that the United States desired to avoid conflict and would acquiesce in Japanese aggression. Cordell Hull, the American Secretary of State, had hoped to strengthen moderate opinion in the Japanese leadership through this initiative. He achieved the opposite.[20]

Alternatives and Decision

Now subject to multiple embargoes, Japan faced the threat of strangulation. She was consuming oil at a rate of 12,000 tons per day. It was estimated in August that the Navy had enough oil to fight for 18 months, the Army for a year.[21] The various factions in the Japanese government agreed in early September to begin preparations for war with the ABCD coalition (America, Britain, China and the Dutch) while simultaneously negotiating with the United States. A deadline for decision was set for 10 October. When this proposal was brought before the Emperor prior to the Imperial Conference on 6 September, Hirohito posed unexpected resistance. Asked how long a southern campaign would take, General Sugiyama estimated the first phase would be complete in three months. The Emperor interjected that he had been told the "China Incident" would be concluded in one month and after four years Japan was still fighting. Sugiyama protested that China was huge. "If the interior of China is huge," responded the monarch, "isn't the Pacific Ocean bigger? How can you be sure that war will end in three months?" Hirohito presented a poem written by Emperor Meiji, which concluded with the question "Why, then, do the winds and waves of strife rage so turbulently throughout the world?" Although Hirohito gave formal approval to the proposed policy, his implication was that the leadership was not putting enough emphasis on diplomacy.[22]

Prime Minister Konoye held out some hope for the negotiations with the United States, but the results were unacceptable to the cabinet. As the deadline approached, War Minister Tojo Hideki insisted that his colleagues adhere to the September agreement to go to war if the deadlock continued. Konoye resigned, and a new cabinet was formed with Tojo as premier. The leadership reached agreement on policy at a lengthy Liaison Conference on 1–2 November. Tojo allowed diplomacy to continue until the end of the month. Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori was to seek agreement with the United States by offering either a comprehensive settlement (including a resolution of the China issue) or a *modus vivendi* (in essence, an agreement by Japan to halt her expansion if the United States would restore trade). Togo failed to convince the Americans, and the decision for war was confirmed at an Imperial Conference on 1 December. The war with the United States began a week later.[23]

Japan's strategy was to strike the United States' Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor and then rush to exploit America's temporary weakness by seizing the resource rich territories of Malaya and the Dutch East Indies and occupying military bases such as the Philippines. Once in possession of these territories, the Japanese could hold out for some time, perhaps long enough to discourage the Americans. The Japanese were optimistic about the prospects for initial success, correctly as it turned out, but the long run was much less certain.[24] Admiral Nagano admitted at an early September conference that unless the Americans blundered into a battle where their entire fleet was destroyed "it will probably be a long war" and "there is no series of steps that will guarantee our checkmating the enemy…".[25] Even the bellicose Tojo concurred. A long war, he thought, was 80% probable.[26]

Japan's military leaders knew that war would be hard. If war was unavoidable, the present, though not particularly favorable, at least looked better than the future. The United States' Navy had far more tonnage under construction than Japan and would grow to a size three or four times greater than that of Japan by 1948. In the late summer of 1941, however, Japan held an advantage of 11 to 9 over the ABCD alliance in battleships and 10 to 3 in carriers. Oil stocks were dwindling, and the Philippines was being converted into a formidable airbase. By March 1942, Americans expected to have 165 heavy bombers on the island, as well as dive bombers and fighters. Philippine-based air power would pose a serious obstacle to Japanese expansion to the south.[27] Japan's military leaders knew the war would be a gamble, but they were willing to risk defeat in order to preserve a chance of ultimate success. If a collapse could be averted, events might eventually turn in their favor.[28]

Japan's civilian leadership looked at the same facts and concluded that compromise would be the wisest course. Konoye believed that Japan had little chance of victory and could not comprehend why the Army was so inflexible. Foreign Minister Togo concurred. Kido Koichi, the Emperor's closest advisor, suggested that it would be preferable to postpone the advance south until the balance of power was more favorable, regardless how unpalatable this seemed.[29] President Roosevelt accepted negotiations with the intent of buying time for the buildup on the Philippines but rejected anything resembling an "Asian Munich." This precluded any agreement that accepted Japan's occupation of Chinese territory.[30]

The Japanese Army refused to accept anything less. As Tojo explained at one conference:

> Premier Konoye and the Foreign Minister, Toyoda, were of the opinion that if Japan withdrew troops from China there would be hope for a diplomatic rapprochement with America, but I, as spokesman for the Army, felt that since some million men had been sent to China and fighting was still going on a general withdrawal without arriving at an understanding was out of the question…This would be a withdrawal with the aims of the war still unaccomplished which *would not be in keeping with the dignity of the Army*, so the whole General Staff as well as the troops abroad we absolutely opposed to such a withdrawal without guarantees.[31]

The Army was confronted in the autumn of 1941 with a choice between "massive loss of face, economic suicide or war." The resolution of this dilemma was determined by the culture of Imperial Japan.[32]

The Regime

Japanese militarism gave rise to a dysfunctional process of decision-making, resulting in the adoption of policies injurious to others and ultimately ruinous to Japan. Three aspects of the regime's politics contributed: weak civilian control of the military; devolution of authority within the services; and bureaucratic politics.

Although the government that committed Japan to war in Manchuria and China was formally under the direction of civilian politicians, civilian control was tenuous. Konoye Fumimaro, who served as prime minister three times in the years 1937–1941, concluded that "we are indeed likened to marionettes, and it is a very dangerous situation."[33] The Meiji Constitution gave the Diet rather limited control of the executive and contained an obscure clause that subverted civilian control of the military. The Army was permitted to name the War Minister, which came to mean in practice that they could bring down the government by withholding the appointment. These problems were exacerbated by a wave of assassinations in the years following Japan's first election by universal suffrage in 1928. The violence reached its nadir with the attempted coup of 26 February 1936. The Emperor thwarted the coup, but only after seven top politicians and advisors were murdered by the plotters. Those who survived were reluctant thereafter to resist

the military's demands. The cumulative effect of the violence eroded the substance of parliamentary government. In the election of 1937, Japan's two largest parties received three-quarters of the vote but received no representation whatsoever in the government. Konoye Fumimaro, who was strongly nationalist in his sympathies, was appointed in the hope that he would be acceptable to the armed forces and thus capable of exercising some control over them. To many observers, Konoye appeared in the crisis of the summer of 1937 to lack strength of character and independence of judgment[34]; but is task was not an easy one. As Tojo Hideki explained to American interrogators after the war, "Premier Konoye had a terrible time."[35]

If Konoye and the other civilians in the cabinet could not restrain the military, there were two other possible checks, the Emperor and the public. Hirohito frequently showed better judgment than those advising him. He believed, however, that his throne would be safest if he remained removed from the determination of policy. His role, as he and others understood it, was to legitimize decisions made by others by granting his formal approval. It is doubtful that a more forceful stance by Hirohito would have altered Japan's fateful course. Had he taken further steps to slow the rush to war, the militarists would have simply defied him and claimed that he had fallen under the influence of "evil counselors."[36]

Imperial Japan was repressive, but not on the scale of European totalitarianism. Dissent was suppressed by the neighborhood associations established in 1940 in which membership was mandatory and Special Higher Police informers ubiquitous.[37] Under the powers granted in the Peace Preservation law 74,000 Japanese were arrested from 1928 to the outbreak of the war in 1941. Incarceration was harsh but not lengthy for those who recanted. There were no concentration camps and, although torture was employed, executions were rare.[38] Political parties were abolished in October and replaced by the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.[39]

The most vociferous elements of the Japanese public were the ultra-nationalist associations, which were able to exert disproportionate influence because of the divisions in the government and prevailing nationalist climate of opinion. Their "violent nationalism," according to Richard Storry's arresting analogy, "like some deep-sea cuttle fish, was able to emit a fluid that would stain and darken and finally blacken the surrounding waters."[40] The public was subjected to Shinto

nationalist propaganda delivered through all of the communications media. American educators described the public school curriculum as "education for war."[41] The extent of the impact of this propaganda is not easily established, but, according to Delmer Brown, "the literature, art, and news of the period gives evidence that the nation was overwhelmed by nationalist thoughts and feelings…" which, unfortunately, had "assumed a virulent form".[42] *The New York Times*' correspondent in Tokyo reported in November 1941 that "in so far as Diet members speak at all, they are so belligerent that the government appears moderate by comparison."[43]

Robert Butow, author of a penetrating study of Japanese decision-making, concludes that the displacement of civilian judgment by the military resulted in "greater occupational astigmatism." The armed forces, he explains, were subject to a "Bering Straits tunnel psychology," seeing things only from a military point of view. Tojo, for example, seemed incapable of perceiving any connection between the American measures to which he objected and prior Japanese actions that had provoked them.[44] This tendency was exacerbated by the lack of centralized control often found in the Japanese military.

> The Japan of which General Hideki Tojo became premier was operated by remote control. It was a country in which puppet politics had reached a high state of development, to the detriment of the national welfare. The ranking members of the military services were the robots of their subordinates—the so-called *chuken shoko*, the nucleus group, which was active "at the center" and which was composed largely of field-grade officers. They, in turn, were influenced by younger elements within the services at large and by ultranationalists outside military ranks. The civilian members of the cabinet were the robots of the military—especially of the nucleus group, working through the service ministers and the chiefs of the army and navy general staffs. The Emperor himself, through no fault of his own, was the robot of the government—of cabinet and the supreme command, a prisoner of the circumstances into which he was born…Finally, the nation—the one hundred million dedicated souls, the sum and substance of Japan, from whom the blood and toil and tears and sweat of Churchill's phrase were wrung—the nation was the robot of the throne.[45]

In the modified Confucian culture of Japan, formal deference was accorded to venerable figureheads permitting others to exercise power behind the scenes. The resulting phenomenon of *gekokujo* ("ruling from

below") was characteristic of the society and government as a whole but ramified through the military in the 1930s. Initiative often lay with the field grade officers of the General Staff who ruled "under a cloak of military secrecy and bureaucratic anonymity." Many were chauvinistic fanatics who were professionally unqualified to make judgments about complex matters of foreign policy and in any case indisposed to consider policy from any perspective other than narrow organizational interest or military efficiency.[46]

The Army's intransigence on China was the key obstacle to a diplomatic settlement. According to Yale Maxon, "the prestige of the army" became a "desirable goal in itself." Prestige was to be enhanced by victories on the battlefield, regardless whether these victories were part of a sensible strategy. The notion of the prestige of the army also shielded reckless officers from scrutiny. Those "on the spot" were deemed to be in the best position to make decisions and their authority was not to be questioned by those lacking expertise or timely information. "The reiteration of the phrase 'prestige of the army' in both senses and under varying conditions in Japan," Maxon concludes, "suggests that the promotion and defense of its own amour-propre were leading motivations of the Japanese military caste in the thirties."[47]

The Navy, the weaker of the two services, showed more prudence than the Army. Admiral Yamamoto, for one, believed that Japan had almost no chance of winning a war with the United States. He stated his warnings publicly on many occasions and told friends privately that the Army "was run by a gang of fools."[48] The Navy's representatives were reluctant to voice their concerns in the joint conferences in the summer and fall of 1941. The Navy's prestige, unlike the Army's, was not tied to the "China Incident;" but the Navy's own conception of "the prestige of the service" made it difficult for them to admit that despite the funds lavished upon them they might have difficulty executing the southern campaign against American opposition. Its leadership also worried that expressions of doubt could undermine their sailors' morale.[49] The invasion of China and ensuing American embargo of scrap iron had turned steel into a scarce commodity and sharpened the rivalry between the Army, the Navy and civilians. The Navy's anxiety regarding steel was ruthlessly exploited by the aggressive Army. At the Liaison Conference of 1 November, the Army accepted a cut in its steel allotment while the Navy was rewarded with an increase from a projected 850,000 to

1,100,000 metric tons. The revised allocations were to apply, however, only in the event that "southern operations commence."[50]

According to one Japanese historian, the Navy's reticence must be attributed ultimately to a lack of moral courage, particularly on the part of the Navy Minister, Admiral Oikawa Koshiro, whose resignation would have paralyzed the government. The liaison conferences established by Konoye as the primary decision-making body in foreign policy led to a diffusion of responsibility in which each waited for the other to express formally the hesitation about the war that (inwardly) they all felt. The burden was thus thrust entirely on Konoye, and it was a burden he was reluctant to shoulder. He resigned 16 October and was succeeded by Tojo Hideki.[51]

A Man

Tojo rose in Japan's military hierarchy through diligence and determination. He lived for his work and took little pleasure in anything else. Although possessed of a keen mind and administrative ability, he was also "a great plugger," convinced that application and effort could overcome nearly any obstacle. These otherwise admirable habits encouraged the delusion that a materially superior opponent could be defeated by force of will alone. After Japan began suffering reverses in the war, Tojo's first instinct was to assert that the war could still be won if only the Japanese would "work harder."[52] Tojo was honest and direct (to the point of brusqueness) and not only decisive but a little impatient. His mind was said to be "razor" sharp, but he seemed to lack the ability to empathize with the enemy. The connection between Japan's actions and America's reactions remained totally obscure to him.[53] Tojo was no dictator and probably had no desire to be. In the judgment of one biographer, Tojo had "no yearning for personal power, in the manner of a Hitler or a Mussolini…". Rather, "his motivation…was to extend the Japanese empire and promote the welfare of Japan."[54] To retreat, Tojo asserted on one occasion, would "relegate Japan to the status of a third-rate nation." By submitting to the Americans Japan would forfeit all for which she had fought for fifteen years; resistance might fail, but as Akira Iriye explains "would at least safeguard the nation's honor."[55]

This concern was shared more broadly. Whatever doubts the Japanese public may have felt before, they responded enthusiastically to the news

of the attack on Pearl Harbor. One Japanese eyewitness recalls the popular mood:

> The attitudes of ordinary people, who had felt ambivalent about the war against China, and even of intellectuals who denounced it as an invasion, were transformed as soon as the war against Britain and the U. S. began… Everyone worried about what would happen to Japan…At the same time, there was a sense of euphoria that we'd done it at last; we'd landed a punch on those arrogant great powers Britain and America, on those white fellows. As the news of one victory after another came in, the worries faded, and fear turned to pride and joy…All the feelings of inferiority of a colored people from a backward country, towards white people from the developed world, disappeared in one blow…Never in our history had we Japanese felt such pride in ourselves as a race as we did then.[56]

Japan was a dictatorship without a dictator. If any one man bore primary responsibility, however, it would have to Tojo. He was prime minister of the government that initiated the Pacific War and the most insistent advocate of war in the cabinet during the weeks before Pearl Harbor. That decision led to the deaths of over 2.5 million Japanese. It was without doubt "the greatest misfortune in Japan's history."[57]

Tojo's father was a samurai who had risen to the rank of lieutenant general. As a boy, young Hideki was known as "fighting Tojo," feisty and combative, willing to take up any challenge regardless of his chances.[58] Dressed in German-style uniforms, Tojo and his colleagues, observes Edwin Hoyt, "had all the trappings of modernity [but] beneath the modernity beat the hearts of warriors who were essentially samurai in their attitudes."[59] Asked at the Tokyo War Crimes Trials why he risked war with the United States, Tojo responded: "It was considered that, although Japan was not prepared, she had been challenged and had to fight, no matter what the state of her preparedness was."[60] Several years before, as the deadline for diplomacy set in the September Imperial Conference approached, Konoye remained reluctant. Tojo reminded him of a samurai tale: "You know, at some point in man's lifetime he may find it necessary to jump with his eyes closed from the veranda of *Kiyomizu-dera* into the gulch below." Konoye replied that as premier of Japan, responsible for the lives of 100 million people, he could not approach issues in this way.[61] On 7 December 1941, Tojo Hideki leapt off the veranda, dragging 100 million Japanese with him.

Mohammad Ayub Khan and the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965

Situation, Alternatives, Decision

In early August 1965 Pakistan sent several thousand guerrillas into Kashmir, over which India and Pakistan had been in dispute since their independence and partition in 1947. The infiltrators failed to rouse the Muslim majority of Kashmir, so Pakistan invaded. When the initial success of the offensive threatened to sever Kashmir from India, India counterattacked across the plains of the Punjab far to the south. The fighting reached a stalemate by mid-September, and a ceasefire was declared on the 22nd. The armistice restored the *status quo ante bellum*. Three thousand eight hundred Pakistanis gave their lives, but the disputed land remained in India's possession.

Pakistan's path to war was convoluted, and the subject remains somewhat obscure. Pakistan's president, Mohammad Ayub Khan, authorized some military planning for Kashmir in December 1964. Initially, he was skeptical of the optimistic claims of Pakistani intelligence that the Kashmiris were ready to rise in revolt. Infiltration had been tried in 1964, without much success. When an enthusiastic presentation advocating irregular warfare in Kashmir was made in February, Ayub dismissed it gruffly. In May, Ayub suggested to General Malik that he develop a plan to take the crucial transportation hub of Akhnur. Around the 24th of July Ayub gave his approval to Operation Gibraltar, a plan to infiltrate Kashmir to instigate a revolt against India. Why did Ayub change his mind?[62]

The Pakistanis believed that a window of opportunity was closing.[63] India and China had bickered regarding their border for years. In October 1962, China drove India out of the contested territory in a vigorous offensive that sent them reeling back toward the Ganges delta. Much to the surprise of Indian Prime Minister Nehru, Ayub refrained from exploiting India's difficulties. Neither Nehru nor his successor Lal Shastri reciprocated this gesture. After the military debacle, Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union rushed to arm India. The Western powers tried to encourage India to be more flexible on Kashmir, but refused to withhold weapons. India was too important a country to risk losing to the Soviets. Once the reluctance of the Western powers

was clear, Shastri broke off negotiations with Pakistan and incorporated Kashmir into India. With access to weaponry from both the East and the West and a defense budget seven times that of Pakistan, India was headed toward "unassailable superiority" by 1968. Shastri's actions indicated that no generosity could be expected from India. The arrest of the most prominent Kashmiri leader in May 1965 removed all doubt in the minds of the Pakistanis.[64]

Despite this, the mood in Islamabad was far from despairing. Many Pakistani officials believed that Kashmir was ripe for rebellion. Riots had broken out in the Vale of Kashmir in December 1963 after a relic (thought to be a hair from the prophet Mohammad) was stolen.[65] Ayub was more skeptical of the Kashmiris, but hopeful on other grounds. After the failure of his conciliatory policy toward India, Ayub had achieved what appeared to be a dramatic improvement in relations with China. During his visit to Beijing in March 1965, his hosts pledged that they would "go to the defense of every friend if asked for against an aggressor." India's divisions outnumbered Pakistan's by 17 to 9, but 6 of these had to be deployed in the northeast against China. Another 150,000 men were needed to garrison Kashmir. That left only 8 divisions for the Punjab, where they faced the bulk of Pakistan's forces. The danger of Chinese intervention negated much of India's numerical advantage.[66] Pakistan's foreign minister, of whom more will be said below, assured President Ayub that India would not attack Pakistan in the Punjab.[67]

Furthermore, India's credibility had eroded severely. Ayub met his successor, Lal Shastri, in October 1964 and concluded that he was a inconsequential "little" man who would not be tough enough to stand up to a challenge.[68] Ayub's preconception that "Hindu morale would not stand more than a couple of hard blows" was confirmed by events in a desolate swamp on the border.[69] Pakistan initiated a skirmish in April 1965 in the Rann of Kutch and drove the Indian forces back seven miles. The Pakistani leadership concluded that the Indian army had not yet recovered from its defeat at the hands of China. The terrain and position of the forces had favored the Pakistanis, and the remote, unpopulated salt marsh was of no strategic or symbolic value to India. Kashmir was a different situation entirely.[70] Nonetheless, India's weak response inspired a feeling of "euphoria" in the Pakistani government and "intoxication" in the army. "Morale could not have been higher," recalls General Gul Hassan Khan, therefore, "we took the plunge blithely."[71]

The Regime and the Man

Mohammad Ayub Khan seized power in a coup in October 1958. Martial law was declared and remained in effect for four years. Controls over the press were imposed later. The dictatorship was neither harsh nor reactionary. Ayub was sincerely committed to social reform. Unfortunately, his well-intentioned paternalism failed to build political institutions or reform agriculture and industry. He established a multi-tiered system of representation with direct elections only at the lowest level, termed "Basic Democracy," in the belief that parliamentary democracy could not function effectively in Pakistan. The constitution of 1962 permitted indirect presidential elections with the 80,000 basic democrats serving as an electoral college. Ayub did not have the "aura" of contemporaries such as Nehru and Sukarno, but had enjoyed the grudging respect of Pakistanis. His decision to reconstitute political parties and assume leadership of the Convention Muslim League diminished that respect. The opposition mounted a surprisingly vigorous challenge in the campaign of 1964. Ayub's support eroded in part because of his unwillingness to exploit India's vulnerability during the crisis with China in 1962. Rather than building legitimacy for the regime, the electoral process revealed the lack of it. Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto rallied public support for the government by staking out a militant stance on Kashmir, calling for the province's liberation late in the campaign. Bhutto's demagoguery proved crucial. Without it, Ayub might not have secured his reelection even with the limited franchise.[72]

Prior to the elections, Ayub had come to enjoy his position of power and was not necessarily eager to put it at risk by challenging an enemy with superior military capability.[73] According to his former minister of information, Ayub was generally cautious and disinclined to risk war for Kashmir. The reasons for Ayub's reversal remain obscure. He "must have known," Altaf Gaudar observes plaintively, that "the adventure would plunge Pakistan into a crisis and destroy all his work and career."[74] One likely explanation is that Ayub hoped that success would "bolster his generally failing fortunes."[75]

Ayub may have concluded that support for his government and perhaps the stability of the regime itself depended on his performance regarding Kashmir. Bhutto certainly thought so. Allowing the cause to "die out" was inconceivable to him because "such a course would amount to a debacle which could threaten the existence of Pakistan."[76]

One scholar of Pakistani politics agrees. "Kashmir," according to Lawrence Ziring, "became the litmus test for governments seeking legitimacy in an inchoate and deeply divided and troubled state." "The justification for Pakistan's existence as an Islamic republic," he says, "was made to hinge on the liberation of India's only Muslim dominated state."[77]

It is also plausible to infer that Ayub's dependence on Bhutto increased as a result of the campaign's course and outcome. The effect was to exacerbate Ayub's deficiencies as a statesman. Honest, diligent, public spirited and disinclined to cruelty, Ayub was resistant to the grosser temptations of office but not to "the more insidious spiritual ones." Ayub lacked the common touch and was an uninspiring and ineffective communicator. According to the former British high commissioner, Ayub "ran what was virtually a one-man show." He was decisive, but "made little demand—and gave little time—for previous research or examination of likely consequences." Previously commander in chief of the army, he was accustomed to obedience and impatient with opposition. Those who spoke up did not remain in the inner circle. A decent but vain man, he was vulnerable to flattery. Ayub was, in the judgment of a British diplomat, "a narrow, serious, steady, enduring, authoritarian and fallible sort of person with little imagination and good instincts." His temperament and the effects of his extended preeminence left him increasingly vulnerable to sycophancy and unreceptive to criticism, with the result that "people who stood up to him generally suffered for it, so eventually few of those who surrounded him were game to do so."[78]

A Young Man in a Hurry

Bhutto, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, bears heavy responsibility for the war. He pressed the generals and the president to take action in the summer of 1965. After the Rann of Kutch, he was pushing on an open door with the former, but the Ayub was more cautious. Bhutto apparently succeeded in convincing Ayub that the danger of escalation to general war could be limited by Chinese support and the qualitative advantages held by Pakistan's military (especially the Patton tanks supplied by the United States).[79]

Ayub convened a meeting on 24 July, but immediately departed and left Bhutto to chair the conference. Bhutto wanted there to be no doubt as to who was in charge. On the pretext of secrecy, he refused to answer

questions, and the military leadership, mostly sympathetic anyway, declined to challenge him. He presented an eloquent speech advocating action in Kashmir, then simply said, "that will be all" and left. The generals, including the Chief of Staff, sat in silence. Ayub added his approval afterward, perhaps concluding that he could not reject the plan without antagonizing much of the army and that even if Pakistan did not win, India would be compelled to negotiate.[80]

Having given his approval, Ayub withdrew to Swat in the mountains, apparently assuming that this would disguise his intentions. Operation Gibraltar, which began on 8 August, failed at the outset. Pakistan's infiltrators were unable to rouse the Kashmiris, whose frustration with Indian rule did not translate directly into enthusiasm for Pakistan. Unbeknownst to Pakistani intelligence, India had effectively suppressed the unrest by jailing opposition activists, leaving Kashmiris too intimidated to cooperate with the guerrillas. Gibraltar was poorly planned and executed. Pakistan's guerrillas trained only six weeks and failed to establish contacts with the Kashmiri opposition. Few spoke Kashmiri. Many were killed or captured during the operation; the rest were cut off from Pakistan after India occupied a strategic pass.[81]

Bhutto visited Ayub at Swat and returned with the following directive, dated 29 August:

> Take such action as will de-freeze Kashmir problem, weaken India's resolve and bring her to a conference table without provoking a general war. However, the element of escalation is always present in such struggles. … To expect quick results in this struggle, when India has much larger forces than us, would be unrealistic. Therefore, our action should be such that can be sustained over a long period.[82]

The tone of the directive gives no indication that Ayub was aware that the guerrilla strategy had failed. Much of the reporting from the field was optimistic to the point of being delusional if not dishonest. Ayub may not have realized at this juncture how badly things were going. Bhutto dithered, then gave the order to implement the pre-existing plan to take Kashmir by a conventional military invasion. Bhutto's delay enabled India to reinforce the route to Akhnur. The offensive was bogging down by 30 August, but India, not realizing this, counterattacked in the Punjab. Bhutto's glib assurances to Ayub were belied.[83]

Ayub Khan, field marshal and president of Pakistan, had left the initiative to his young foreign minister. The largest conventional war since World War II was the consequence. By 19 September, according the American ambassador's report, Ayub was "disenchanted with Bhutto's adventurism, grieved at Pak losses, strongly averse to entering Chiccom association and open to a sensible compromise way out." He accepted a cease-fire three days later. Having pleaded with his opposite number for some face-saving concession and received none, Ayub suffered a heart attack in late January and was eventually removed from office. The war accomplished nothing except to intensify the grievances of East Pakistanis, who complained that they had been left undefended. Six years later, they rebelled.[84]

The war came about in large part at the initiative of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a man with large aspirations for himself and for his country. Success in Kashmir would win new popularity for Ayub, he maintained, and win greater respect for Pakistan, vaulting her to the top rank among Muslim nations.[85] It was his personal destiny, he believed, to lead his land toward "greater world recognition."[86] Bhutto, who entered the cabinet at the ripe old age of 29, has been described as self-confident, charismatic, proud, vain, arrogant, passionate and mercurial. Once, when traveling with General Hassan Khan, Bhutto's car reached a red light. "Drive on," Bhutto instructed his driver. "No one can stop me."[87]

Bhutto possessed a burning ambition to rule. He viewed himself as "an Islamic Napoleon," the "Shah-in-Shah of Pakistan." He was acutely sensitive to criticism and, in the words of a perceptive biographer, "never able to reconcile his romantic dreams of glory with the mundane realities." Rather than accept responsibility for the failure to liberate Kashmir, Bhutto cast blame first on the United States, (leading Ayub to dismiss him as "a madman") and later on Ayub himself. When Ayub returned empty handed from the post-war summit with Shastri at Tashkent, Bhutto alleged that Pakistan had been betrayed and hinted that he would later reveal shocking "secrets" about the meeting. In view of the indifferent results on the battlefield, Pakistan could hardly have expected significant concessions. The baseless charges allowed Bhutto to distance himself from the tarnished president, increase his popularity and clear the way for his own accession to power later. In 1972, after further misadventures of his own making, Bhutto admitted that there were no secrets to reveal.[88] This was how an unscrupulous schemer requited the man

who raised him to eminence less than a decade after his graduation from law school.

Britain's High Commissioner for Pakistan, Sir Morrice James, knew Bhutto well. This is his assessment:

> Bhutto certainly had the right qualities for reaching the heights—drive, charm, imagination, a quick and penetrating mind, zest for life, eloquence, energy, a strong constitution, a sense of humour, and a thick skin. Such a blend is rare anywhere, and Bhutto deserved his swift rise to power… But there was—how shall I put it? —a rank odour of hellfire about him. It was a case of *corruptio optima pessima*. He was a Lucifer, a flawed angel. I believe that at heart he lacked a sense of the dignity and value of other people; his own self was what counted. I sensed in him ruthlessness and capacity for ill-doing which went far beyond what is natural. …Lacking humility, he thus came to believe himself infallible, even when yawning gaps in his own experience (e.g. of military matters) laid him—as over the 1965 war—wide open to disastrous error. Despite his gifts I judged that one day Bhutto would destroy himself—when I could not tell. I wrote in one of my last dispatches from Pakistan…that Bhutto was born to be hanged.[89]

Fourteen years after the futile war Bhutto was hanged in a Rawalpindi jail.

Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Six Day War

Situation, Alternatives and Decision

Israel went to war in 1967 in response to a series of steps taken by the preceding days the President of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser. Egypt first mobilized her army and took up positions in the Sinai Peninsula adjacent to Israel in May 14–16. The United Nations' buffer force, the UNEF, was withdrawn at Nasser's insistence on May 19. On May 22, Egypt announced that the Gulf of Aqaba would be closed to Israeli vessels. On June 3, Nasser declared that "the issue today is not the question of Aqaba [but] the issue is the rights of the people of Palestine." The following day, Jordan signed a defense treaty placing her forces under Egyptian command during war. Israel launched a preemptive strike on Egypt's airfields on June 5, followed by an offensive on the ground. The Arab forces were routed on three fronts before a week had passed.[90]

The decision to mobilize was made in response to a report by the Soviet Union that Israel was preparing to attack Syria, a country Egypt was bound by treaty to defend. The purpose of the mobilization was to deter Israel, not to provoke a war. The Soviet report was false; no Israeli attack was imminent. Why the flawed intelligence was communicated remains obscure; it may have simply been an honest mistake by an overzealous KGB agent. By the time Nasser realized this, his forces were already in the Sinai.[91]

The Egyptian army's presence stirred the Arab populace and restored to Nasser some of his previous popularity. Had he taken no further steps, Israel probably would not have attacked Syria and Nasser would have enhanced his standing at home and abroad without a shot being fired. But Arab rivals taunted the Egyptian President for hiding behind the United Nations' buffer force. The U.N.'s Secretary General agreed to his demand for their removal, perhaps with undo haste.[92] Nasser anticipated that his critics and rivals would next try to belittle his success by pointing to the Strait of Tiran, where Israeli ships passed unhindered. The trend of events convinced him that the risks of a blockade were acceptable. The United States was reluctant to get involved and the Israeli cabinet, led by Levi Eshkol, seemed hesitant.[93]

The C. I. A. concluded on May 26 that Nasser did not want war and was still seeking a diplomatic victory, which he had a reasonable probability of achieving. Israel might acquiesce in the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba rather than risk war.[94] On June 3, Nasser went farther. Addressing Egypt's National Assembly, he asserted that the central issue was "the… aggression which took place in Palestine."[95] A more provocative challenge to Israel is hard to imagine.

Nasser said later that the probability of war increased to 20% with the mobilization, 50% with the withdrawal of the UNEF and 80% after his later steps.[96] Why did he assume these risks? Three general explanations have been proposed. One possibility is that Egypt was not as weak as she later appeared to be on the battlefield. The initial mobilization was disorganized and confusing to Egypt's troops. Once Israel seized the offensive, Egypt's field commander (of whom more will be said shortly) made the precipitous decision to withdraw to west of the Suez Canal rather than mount what might have been a highly effective defense at the Mitla and Gidi Passes in the western Sinai. The problem, according to this line of thinking, was not so much miscalculation before as mismanagement during the war.[97]

The quantitative balance before the war did not appear unfavorable to Egypt. Egypt and Israel had equal numbers of fighters. Egypt had four times as many bombers, but Israel's pilots were much better trained. Israel had about 1000 tanks, equipped with a powerful 105 mm gun. Egypt had 900 tanks, Syria 250, and Jordan 270. Twenty percent of Egypt's tanks and one-third of her planes were unready for action. Many of Egypt's troops had been deployed for five years fighting a civil war in Yemen, precluding their training for combat against Israel. One-third of the army, the best third, was still there. Israel's superior speed in mobilization meant that she would hold a numerical edge after 48 hours of 26 to 24 brigades. American and British intelligence both expected an Israeli victory; the only question for them was how long it would take. The C. I. A.'s prediction was one week. The Israeli Defense Force's command was also confident. Looking at the same information, Egypt's chief of staff had endorsed a report at the end of 1966 recommending that Egypt undertake no offensive operations against Israel as long as she was engaged in Yemen.[98]

Foreign observers were struck by the confidence of the Egyptians. It was as if, someone said at the U.S. Embassy, they possessed a secret weapon unknown to everyone else.[99] A surge of emotion was sweeping the Arab world. Several Arab states not on the front lines of the conflict pledged forces (including Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Tunisia and Libya), bringing the coalition's total strength to 500,000 men, 5000 tanks and 900 combat aircraft. Israel's enemies seemed united as never before. The Arabs were exuberant. Nasser may have been caught up in the wave of enthusiasm. When U.N. Secretary General U Thant urged caution, Nasser responded: "my generals tell me we will win—what would you say to them?"[100]

A Friend and Rival

The most optimistic was Abd al-Hakim Amer, who held the rank of Field Marshall. An incompetent commander in 1956 and equally undistinguished joint governor of Syria in the United Arab Republic, Amer had exhibited more enthusiasm for hashish than aptitude for the military profession. He had risen as Nasser loyalist, but now entertained ambitions of his own. According to one report, he hoped "to elevate his status yet higher [by] leading the army to a glorious victory." In a phone conversation during the crisis, Amer asserted that "we'll soon be able to take the

initiative and rid ourselves of Israel once and for all." The following day, he was still brimming with confidence. "Our goal is the destruction of the enemy's main armed forces. Our army can accomplish that with the immense capabilities at its disposal."[101] The removal of the UNEF and blockading the Strait of Tiran were both suggestions of Amer.[102]

Amer had been a close friend of and collaborator with Nasser. Their families had intermarried; they had bestowed each other's names on their children. Friendship eventually turned to fear. Amer won a following in the army with his amiable personality and the extension of privileges to the officers. Unsure of the army's loyalty, Nasser could not rid himself of Amer. The Vice President took it upon himself to speak for the armed forces, and the more cautious voices were not heard.[103] Asked by Nasser on 13 May whether the military could conduct an offensive against Israel, he reassured Nasser that "We will never be in a better position than now. Our forces are well-equipped and trained…We are sure of victory." Nasser inquired again on 22 May whether they were ready and was told: "On my head be it, boss! Everything is in tip top shape."[104] Egypt, a society known otherwise for a greater level of cooperation and discipline than its neighbors, lacked "a functioning command structure which can come up with an objective assessment."[105]

Former American diplomat Richard Parker interviewed six Egyptian insiders after the war. Three of them blamed Amer for misinforming Nasser. Possibly their concern to preserve Nasser's reputation distorted their recollections. The others contended that Nasser was aware of the Egyptian military's deficiencies. The war occurred, they believe, because Nasser attempted to win a bloodless victory only to find his bluff called.[106]

The Regime

Egypt was a one-party state with a rubber stamp legislature and manipulated elections. The regime's legitimacy rested not on democratic procedure but on Nasser's popularity and the economic benefits provided to various groups.[107] Both were weakening before the outbreak of the war. Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal made him a hero with the Arab masses, but his initiatives in inter-Arab politics after the Suez Crisis met with limited success. His dream of a United Arab Republic collapsed between 1958 and 1961 when Iraq refused to join and Syria withdrew. After this setback, Nasser, in order to promote his ideology of

Arab Socialism, became embroiled in a protracted and frustrating war in Yemen. By 1967, his reputation was badly tarnished, and his rule rested increasingly on repression. The secret police tightened its grip and, as literary critic Louis Awad put it, "law…went on a holiday."[108]

The state of the economy was poor. Nasser attempted to increase investment and consumption simultaneously, relying on his skill at playing off the superpowers to raise economic aid to limit the deficits. The beginnings of détente were reducing his leverage, however, and without aid his policy was unsustainable. Retrenchment was impossible without endangering his political support. The lower class's allegiance had been purchased by generous subsidies. Nasser arrested some 27,000 suspected supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood in August 1965, a clear indication of the depth of his anxiety. A British diplomat asserted that Nasser's Egypt was on "the road to ruin" and suggested that "the scent of blood and distant noise of battle may start some hotheads wanting to fight." The U.S. ambassador to Egypt surmised that the deteriorating domestic situation would lead Nasser to take some decisive action abroad. The C. I. A. concurred.[109] Nasser worried that his regime could not survive a refusal to defend Syria.[110]

The Man

Gamal Abdel Nasser was proud and thin-skinned. He never forgot or forgave the humiliation he felt under British rule. Nasser's domestic and foreign frustrations left him, in the judgment of the U.S. *chargé d'affaires*, in a state of "irrationality bordering on madness," even more sensitive to slight and eager to redeem himself. The taunts broadcast by Jordanian radio that he was hiding behind the skirts of the UNEF were an intolerable vexation. The UNEF was to him an embarrassment and Israel's passage through the Straits "hateful." The initial mobilization in the Sinai to deter the imagined aggression by Israel, was no less than Arab dignity and honor demanded.[111] Nasser's early success had made him, in the words of Anthony Nutting, a "prisoner of his own prestige," or, in Mohammed Haykal's formulation, a "lion chained." "Because of the compulsions of his role as the Arab's champion," Nutting explains, "he was driven to overreach himself on every issue…"[112] Nasser had concluded before the crisis that the situation was not propitious and that

the issue of Palestine would have to be kept "in the icebox." Continued inaction would make his status as standard bearer for Arab nationalism unsustainable, however. Egypt's closure of the Straits of Tiran brought exultant crowds into the streets of the leading cities of the Arab world. Nasser was restored to the eminence he had enjoyed in 1956, for the moment.[113]

The Egyptian political system exacerbated rather than moderated Nasser's faults as a man and a leader. Nasser had been the most cautious of the officers who overthrew the Egyptian monarchy, but as his power grew his character changed for the worse. He consulted less with his colleagues and took more decisions on his own. His successes made him conceited; his failures left him desperate for vindication. Diabetes may have contributed to the deterioration in his judgment.[114] Nasser, who did not like being proven wrong, surrounded himself with yes-men who provided no criticism.[115] The Council of Ministers became an "audience" whose only role was to listen to the President's monologues and rants. Nasser's innate suspicion led him to mistake honest criticism for disloyalty. "Nasser,' Anwar Sadat recalled, "looked on any protests, any objection or criticism, any attempt at fact-finding or the least expression of resentment, as a counter-revolutionary reaction that must be ruthlessly suppressed." Suspected opponents were incarcerated and tortured. Observing that Nasser did not want to hear criticism, officials became reluctant to provide it. Thus, "Nasser became the prisoner of the authoritarian system he had been instrumental in establishing."[116] One example may suffice. The head of Egypt's air force, Sidqi Mahmoud, warned during the pre-war deliberations that his aircraft were vulnerable and would probably be attacked by Israel. Nasser, unaccustomed to being challenged, addressed Sidqi "like an impertinent school boy." The "chastened and humiliated" general then assured his boss that Egypt would lose only 20% of her force in a surprise attack. On the morning of June 5, Israel destroyed half of Egypt's air force in the first 30 minutes of the war.[117]

Gamal Abdel Nasser, the hero of Suez, had become by 1967 an embittered, isolated dictator—"*Athanasius contra mundum*," as one British diplomat analogized.[118] His pride, ambition and anxiety, unchecked by the politics of Egyptian Praetorianism but abetted by the feckless belligerence of his friend and rival Amer, led Egypt and her allies into one of the most one-sided defeats in modern military history.

The Argentine Junta's War Over the Malvinas

Situation, Alternatives, Decision

Argentina occupied the Falkland Islands on 2 April 1982 expecting that Britain would be compelled to accept a formal transfer of sovereignty to Argentina. To the Argentines' surprise and dismay, Britain dispatched a naval task force to the South Atlantic, then mounted a successful amphibious assault on the islands in May, forcing Argentina's surrender on 14 June. How and why did Britain and Argentina end up at war over these distant and desolate islands?

Britain's policy had done little to discourage the Argentines. The conservative government had proposed the concept of "leaseback" as a compromise in the summer of 1980, but the Falkland islanders were adamant in their opposition and the offer was withdrawn. Having failed to conciliate, the government then failed to deter. The underlying problem was that the islands offered so little of tangible value that it was difficult to persuade Argentina that Britain was in earnest about defending them. The government's recent policies had reinforced this impression. Britain's sole ship in the region, the ice patrol craft HMS *Endurance*, was scheduled to be withdrawn at the end of her current tour of duty. Britain's foreign secretary warned that this would be seen in Buenos Aires as evidence of weakening commitment. The evidence that emerged after the war confirms this.[119]

The difficulties of staging an amphibious assault from a distance of some 8000 miles were forbidding, but Britain's Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, stated her opposition to the occupation immediately. She felt, in the words of one official, that "we were going to have to do something," a sentiment that was supported nearly unanimously in the cabinet. Her decision was made without regard for "the finer points of the strategic balance" and despite cautionary advice from experts about the hazards of the mission. She was determined, and public support was solid.[120] The trifling material stakes were irrelevant. "Had Britain left the Falklanders to their fate on 2 April," two British journalists explain, "the British people's respect for themselves and their confidence in the political and military leadership would have experienced a severe blow." Most Britons believed they had no choice.[121] The Argentines found it hard to believe that Britain would risk defeat for "such a small problem as these few rocky islands." Alexander Haig, the United States' mediator,

vainly tried to explain that economic concerns were not paramount for Britain.[122]

Argentina's military junta agreed to begin military planning for an invasion on 5 January 1982, "convinced," as National Security Directive 1/81 stated, that the "the prolongation of this situation [regarding the Falklands] affects national honor." If diplomacy failed to resolve the issue, the junta originally expected to act sometime between July and mid-September. Britain was scheduled to complete her withdrawal from the region by this time, so Argentina's occupation of the islands would be unopposed. Provided that the British were caught by surprise and the islands taken with no loss of life, Britain would have no choice but to capitulate rather than wage war under very unfavorable conditions. Argentina's 8000 troops would prepare defensive positions on the Falklands, and the harsh South Atlantic winter would hinder Britain's navy. The Argentines were so confident that they did not prepare a plan for actual combat operations on the island until after the invasion.[123] The junta assumed that gratitude for Argentina's support in Central America would convince the United States to ignore her historic ties and NATO obligations and restrain Britain. Washington instead provided Britain with crucial intelligence acquired by satellite.[124]

Argentina's navy and air force posed a considerable threat to Britain. Argentina had approximately 200 aircraft and an ageing navy, but had added two quiet diesel submarines and was acquiring 14 *Super-Étendard* strike fighters and 15 Exocet anti-ship missiles from France. By late March, Argentina had received and fitted six ships with the Exocets but had taken delivery of only five of the fighters. The units to be deployed on the islands had not completed their training, and Argentina's best trained units were still stationed on the border with Chile. Even in March, objective observers were not certain Britain could defeat Argentina. By September, the war would have been even more difficult. If the Falklands were an odd place for a war, April was an odd time.[125]

On 19 March 1982, a team of workers employed by Argentine entrepreneur Constantino Davidoff landed on the South Georgia Islands (a dependency of the Falklands lying 700 miles to the southeast) to remove scrap iron from their disused whaling stations. Davidoff had received permission from Britain several years before. He also had an enthusiastic endorsement from Argentina's Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the Navy, who welcomed an opportunity "to reaffirm an Argentine presence on all South Atlantic islands."

Davidoff's men raised the Argentine flag, shot and roasted some reindeer (a protected species), but failed to provide proper notification to the local British authorities. Argentina had established a permanent presence covertly on the South Sandwich Islands in 1976. The Falklands' governor suspected that Davidoff's party had similar intentions and that more intrusions would follow if Britain did not respond firmly. His suspicions were not without foundation. A party from the British Antarctic Survey observed in Davidoff's contingent not only civilians, but men dressed in para-military uniforms. They brought a powerful radio transmitter, and were making preparations to generate electricity. Argentina's Foreign Minister had warned that the Davidoff gambit could endanger the junta's plan to occupy the Malvinas, but "those who had originally developed the project decided that the opportunity provided by Davidoff's next visit was simply irresistible." The attempted infiltration was a fiasco. Britain ordered the *Endurance* to convey marines to the island to evict the Argentines, an action the junta deemed an intolerable humiliation. Furthermore, Britain would undoubtedly strengthen her military presence in the South Atlantic in response, thwarting the unopposed occupation of the Falklands. Hence, the Argentines decided on 26 March to proceed with the operation several months ahead of schedule.[126]

The Regime

The civilian government of Isabel Peron was toppled by a military coup on 24 March 1976. The Argentine military wished to avoid a personal dictatorship like Chile's. Members of the ruling junta were given fixed terms, and positions were allocated by quota to each service. Decisions by the junta were to be made by unanimity. Suppression of the *Montoneros* and other leftist guerrillas was the junta's most urgent priority. This was accomplished by 1980, but only with the routine use of torture and "disappearance" of some 8900 guerrillas and suspected guerrillas. The presidency was transferred without incident from General Jorge Videla to General Roberto Viola in 1981. Shortly thereafter, the economy, which had been prospering, suffered a financial crisis, followed by a precipitous decline in the peso, triple digit inflation and a sharp contraction.[127] Viola loosened restrictions on Argentina's political parties and unions in the hope of coopting their leaders. His liberalization

enabled opposition forces to reconstitute without winning support for his government.[128]

Viola was removed from power by the hardline faction led by General Leopoldo Galtieri in December 1981. According to one report, Galtieri secured Admiral Jorge Anaya's backing for the coup by pledging to achieve sovereignty over the Falklands by 1983. The report may be exaggerated, but Anaya was in any event passionately committed to the acquisition of the islands.[129] Galtieri, a bibulous and an emotionally volatile general, had risen to high rank more on the basis of popularity than ability. Ambitious but not politically astute, Galtieri had no intention of returning power to civilians.[130]

Argentina's soldiers and sailors had not been honored for their victory in the "dirty war" against the guerrillas but widely condemned as "power-hungry, immoral ogres." A successful "clean war" would restore their prestige.[131] For a time, it looked as if Argentina's dispute with Chile over three islands in the Beagle Channel would provide the opportunity. A fleet was sent by the junta to Tierra del Fuego in 1978 and army units actually crossed the border before Argentina, under pressure from the United States, accepted mediation by the Vatican. The reaction of the junta was more one of frustration than relief. Argentina's gunboat diplomacy prevented Chile from establishing her claim irreversibly, but the issue remained in contention. A Navy publication contended that success with the Falklands would strengthen Argentina's position with Chile.[132]

The junta has been classified by political scientists as a "bureaucratic authoritarian" regime. These regimes are led pragmatically by elements of the military and bureaucracy but exclude labor organizations from participation. Although they can govern effectively for a time, they cannot endure. Their dilemma is that if they continue to deny representation to labor they lose legitimacy, but if they attempt to ease restrictions on labor they are likely to experience internal division and a growing opposition. Argentine fits this pattern. By early 1982, the political situation had deteriorated to the point where only a "dramatic occurrence" appealing to national pride could stabilize the Galtieri's government. In the judgment of Gerardo Munck, "the deeper causes [of the war] must be sought in the internal or domestic problems that pushed the military to make a gamble they had no realistic chance of winning…".[133]

On 30 March 1982, 30–50,000 Argentines took to the streets to protest the junta's economic policies. Although the demonstration was

organized by the General Labor Confederation, it had broad support. This was the most serious challenge to the military's authority since its seizure of power. "The only thing which can save this government is a war," asserted *La Prensa*. The junta was, in the judgment of one American scholar, "desperate for popular support" in the face of growing public discontent. "Authorities needed a popular cause," he contends, "and the Malvinas issue was the best that they could find." More charitably, one might conclude that given the prominence of the issue in Argentina's press, the inflaming of passions following the confrontation on South Georgia Island and the junta's political weakness, they could not afford to appear hesitant.[134]

After the Argentines' landing on the islands, the length of the British navy's journey afforded some time for diplomacy, but no compromise was possible. The consensual decision-making style of the junta left it hostage to the most chauvinistic officers, especially Anaya, whose confidence was unshaken despite Britain's mobilization. If Galtieri harbored doubts, they were silenced by the cheers of the exuberant crowds outside his window, as well as whiskey.[135]

The decision to occupy the Falklands was made during the greatest upsurge in opposition during the entire period of military rule. Although the disputed islands had been theirs for less than six years in the early nineteenth century, Argentines had been taught since the days of Juan Peron that "*las Malvinas son Argentinas*" and most believed it. Considering the islands' ongoing decline in population, the Argentines had a splendid chance of achieving sovereignty peacefully if they exercised patience.[136] Galtieri and his colleagues shared their countrymen's aspirations and were eager to fulfill them, in part to burnish the military's tarnished reputation and to preserve their tenuous hold on power. These considerations account for the junta's decision to land forces on the Falklands, but not its timing and ultimate consequences.[137] The invasion took place too soon, before Argentina's military modernization was complete and Britain had withdrawn her forces from the region. The junta's haste owed something to happenstance and a great deal to misjudgment. By intruding into the South Georgia islands Argentina's generals and admirals alerted Britain and forfeited their military advantage, blundering into a war they could not win. The historical record regarding the South Georgia imbroglio is not entirely clear and may never be. All we know for certain is that in the end 712 Argentine and

225 British lives were lost fighting over islands that were home to 1813 residents.[138]

The Wars of Praetorian Dictators

Praetorian regimes began and lost all four of these wars. Why did they start wars they could not win? Let us re-examine first their calculations of cost and risk and then their purposes and motivation.

The process of advising, decision-making and implementation was dysfunctional to some degree in every instance. The foreign policy process in Pakistan and Egypt was damaged by political appointments, toadyism, moral cowardice and ambition. The leaders disliked and discouraged honest criticism. An unwarranted optimism was the result. Argentina's collective dictatorship was less deluded, but the consensual decision-making process left moderates captive to extreme opinion. There were sensible men in the Japanese government, notably Yamamoto and Emperor Hirohito, but their warnings were not heeded. A peculiar feature of Japanese militarism was the ability of subordinates to impose *faits accompli*, committing their nominal superiors to positions from which it was difficult to retreat. The inflexibility of policy was reinforced by a Japanese variant of bureaucratic politics that neutralized the opposition of the more cautious navy. These decision-making systems did not work. Dictatorship distorted the flow of information and increased the likelihood of errors in assessment. Praetorian regimes, like most dictatorships, are prone to belligerence in part because they are prone to miscalculation.

If the dictators were strongly inclined to ignore discouraging information, it was important for their opponents to speak to them loudly and clearly. This they failed to do. The defenders, democracies all, failed to implement effective policies of deterrence. India lost to Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch; Israel hesitated in response to Nasser's initial provocations; Britain did not seem committed to protecting the Falklands; and the United States appeared to lack the will and the capability to hinder Japan. These failures were inadvertent but costly. War occurred not because the dictators of Japan, Pakistan, Argentina and Egypt feared too much but because they feared too little.

What did these soldier–statesmen hope to achieve? Security was plainly not the principle goal of Egypt, Pakistan and Argentina. In the post-1945 cases, the initiating governments sought to reclaim territories

whose possession by others seemed to them unjust. These wars did not arise from a spiral of fear, but rather a desire to change a repugnant status quo. The wars were not fought to increase the safety of their countries; their countries' safety was put at risk to achieve what they deemed to be justice. The contracting world economy of the 1930s did endanger Japan's prosperity. After their initial conquest of Manchuria, the Japanese consistently chose the most aggressive option in dealing with the consequences. Whenever they faced resistance, they chose to expand rather than retreat, committing more resources and making more enemies. The institutional ethos of the army precluded retrenchment and drew Japan ineluctably toward catastrophe.

The legitimacy of the dictatorships of Egypt, Pakistan and Argentina was eroding prior to the outbreak of war, but the mood of the masses was bellicose. To temper public passion in these circumstances was risky; to rally support by war tempting. Military regimes are vulnerable to crises of legitimacy because they lack the moral authority of a traditional monarch or a government chosen in free and fair elections. They are more dependent on performance, especially in foreign policy. If Praetorian dictatorships have any claim to rule on the basis of expertise, it is in the field of military affairs. A reluctance to fight is for them especially embarrassing. Japan was an exception to this pattern. A Japanese public misled by chauvinistic propaganda followed the military's lead like the children of Hamelin. Still venerated by a credulous public, Hirohito lent legitimacy to his military dominated cabinet, but was unable to moderate their policy. Japan's indirect rule legitimized the military upstarts without restraining them.

War provided an opportunity for regimes to retain and consolidate power and for individuals (and, in Japan, entire services) to advance their fortunes or enhance fading reputations. Like Gramont in a previous chapter, Amer and Bhutto, hopeful that victory would propel them to power and acclaim, overcame the hesitation of their cautious superiors. Their glib promises of victory proved to be disastrously inaccurate.

For Nasser, like Louis Napoleon before him, prestige was a trap. Charisma was the only title to rule he possessed, and a series of setbacks had tarnished it. The fickle public demanded new "signs" and "proofs." If they were not supplied, the former hero would be exposed as a naked Emperor, unclothed in the raiment of justice, a cranky and distracted old man clinging to an office to which he had no rightful claim. The willfulness and ignorance of parochial Japanese officers placed their chief in

an indefensible position from which they in their collective pride forbade him to retreat. To persist would lead to war; but to climb down meant a loss of face. Tojo, like Nasser, was prestige's prisoner.

Notes

1. Samuel Finer, *The Man on Horseback* (New York: Transaction, 2008), pp. 3–4, 165ff, 184; Eric Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1977), pp. 6–7.
2. Finer, *Man on Horseback*, pp. 211–14, 226; Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 198–200; Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics*, pp. 124–25.
3. Huntington, *Political Order*, p. 196; Finer, *Man on Horseback*, pp. 20–22, 113–18; Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, Hannah Kahn, translator (New York: McGraw Hill, 1939), pp. 70, 94.
4. Finer, *Man on Horseback*, pp. 118–19.
5. Huntington, *Political Order*, pp. 237, 241–45, 256; Finer, *Man on Horseback*, pp. 241–43; Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics*, pp. 114–16.
6. Paul Brooker, *Non-Democratic Regimes* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), pp. 70–77, 148–51.
7. Finer, *Man on Horseback*, pp. 118–19, 191–95, 243; Huntington, *Political Order*, pp. 243–45.
8. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics*, p. 138; Natasha Ezrow and Erica Frantz, *Dictators and Dictatorships* (London: Continuum, 2011), pp. 58–61.
9. Henry IV Part II, Act IV, Scene IV, lines 208–14.
10. W. G. Beasley, *Japanese Imperialism 1894–1945* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); Haruo Tohmatsu and H. P. Willmott, *A Gathering Darkness* (Oxford: SR Books, 2004); Edwin Hoyt, *Japan's War* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986); Michael Montgomery, *Imperialist Japan: The Yen to Dominate* (New York: St. Martin's, 1987); James Morley (editor), *The China Quagmire* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); James Crowley, *Japan's Quest for Autonomy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); Hugh Borton, *Japan's Modern Century* (New York: Ronald Press, 1970), pp. 371–73.
11. Akira Iriye, *The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific* (London: Longman, 1987), pp. 90–93; Montgomery, *Imperialist Japan*, pp. 415–16; Barnhart, *Japan and the World Since 1868*, pp. 126–27; Borton, *Japan's Modern Century*, pp. 408, 410; Tohmatsu and Willmott, *A Gathering Darkness*, pp. 98–99.
12. Borton, *Japan's Modern Century*, pp. 409–12.

13. Eri Hotta, *Japan 1941: Countdown to Infamy* (New York: Vintage, 2013), pp. 58–74, 112, 118, 139; Butow, *Tojo and the Coming of the War*, pp. 162–66, 187; Iriye, *Origins of the Second World War in Asia*, pp. 114–16, 118; Montgomery, *Imperialist Japan*, p. 442; Borton, *Japan's Modern Century*, p. 411; Hoyt, *Japan's War*, pp. 192–94; Barnhart, *Japan and the World Since 1868*, pp. 129–30; Beasley, *Japanese Imperialism*, pp. 229–30.
14. Beasley, *Japanese Imperialism*, pp. 223–24, 227–30.
15. Hoyt, *Japan's War*, p. 205; Waldo Heinrichs, *Threshold of War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 120–21; Barnhart, *Japan and the World Since 1868*, p. 132; Butow, *Tojo and the Coming of the War*, pp. 218–20; Iriye, *Origins of the Second World War in Asia*, p. 143; Michael Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 212; Storry, *History*, p. 210.
16. In theory, Japan would apply for export licenses which would be examined individually, but in practice Japan received no more oil from the United States after 25 July. Despite Roosevelt's effort to finesse them, the Japanese were under no illusions about the policy's effects.
17. Butow, *Tojo and the Coming of the War*, pp. 196–97, 210, 221; Richard Storry, *The Double Patriots*, (Westport: Greenwood, 1973), p. 288, Footnote 1; Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War*, pp. 203–4; Iriye, *Origins of the Second World War in Asia*, pp. 143, 148–49; Hoyt, *Japan's War*, pp. 203–4; Beasley, *Japanese Imperialism*, pp. 230–32; Tohmatsu and Willmott, *A Gathering Darkness*, p. 92.
18. Heinrichs, *Threshold of War*, pp. 36, 38, 56; Butow, *Tojo and the Coming of the War*, p. 189.
19. Montgomery, *Imperialist Japan*, pp. 440–41; Heinrichs, *Threshold of War*, pp. 153–54, 162, 217; Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War*, p. 271.
20. Heinrichs, *Threshold of War*, pp. 49–54; Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War*, pp. 203–4.
21. Butow, *Tojo and the Coming of the War*, pp. 236–37, 243, 314; Storry, *Double Patriots*, p. 288.
22. Hoyt, *Japan's War*, pp. 212–23; Butow, *Tojo and the Coming of the War*, pp. 254–59; Iriye, *Origins of the Second World War in Asia*, pp. 159–60; Hotta, *Japan 1941*, pp. 171–77; Borton, *Japan's Modern Century*, p. 422.
23. Iriye, *Origins of the Second World War in Asia*, pp. 173–76; Butow, *Tojo and the Coming of the War*, pp. 325, 358–63; Hotta, *Japan 1941*, pp. 230–34.
24. Iriye, *Origins of the Second World War in Asia*, pp. 151, 161, 171; Butow, *Tojo and the Coming of the War*, pp. 328–30, 347–48.

25. Quoted in Hoyt, *Japan's War*, pp. 211–12; Hotta, *Japan 1941*, pp. 200, 234.
26. Montgomery, *Imperialist Japan*, p. 487.
27. Tohmatsu and Willmott, *A Gathering Darkness*, p. 92; Heinrich, pp. 183, 193–96, 204.
28. Iriye, *Origins of the Second World War in Asia*, pp. 161, 174; Butow, *Tojo and the Coming of the War*, pp. 267, 320–21.
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30. Iriye, *Origins of the Second World War in Asia*, p. 163.
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137. The aforementioned demonstration of 30 March was announced 10 days earlier; the junta's decision was on 26 March (Gamba, *Falklands/Malvinas*, p. 132). Munck, who favors a domestic politics explanation, attributes the premature enactment of the plan to the South Georgia confrontation, not the demonstration (Munck, *Authoritarianism and Democratization*, pp. 139–40).
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Despots and Demagogues

Totalitarianism

Although the ancient tyranny described by Aristotle has persisted in poorer societies, its crass corruption and naked, unapologetic coercion has become difficult to impose on educated publics.[1] Tyranny survived in the modern world by mutating, a development that was anticipated by Alexis de Tocqueville. Tocqueville perceived that under some circumstances men might attempt to "escape from freedom" by willingly embracing despotic government. The modern age—the democratic age—is characterized by individualism, materialism, egalitarianism, skepticism and, if correctives to these trends are not found, a novel form of despotism. Modern men, more weakly connected to others than their predecessors and preoccupied with their own affairs, are disposed to leave public responsibilities to others. The passion of egalitarians for leveling becomes more insistent even as inequality diminishes. The most dangerous development is skepticism. Societies rest on a moral consensus and individuals cannot live without some assurance that their actions have meaning and justification. Therefore, "men cannot do without dogmatic belief," convictions "men receive on trust without discussing." In the past, Christianity provided that foundation. "When religion is destroyed in a people," Tocqueville warns, "doubt takes hold of the highest portions of the intellect and half paralyzes all of the others." This condition is unendurable. "When authority in the matter of religion no

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longer exists…and [the people] are no longer able to recapture their former beliefs," he warns, "they give themselves a master."[2]

Scholars in the mid-twentieth century confirmed that the contemporary world had given rise to a new form of despotism, totalitarian autocracy, for the reasons Tocqueville anticipated. The social conditions brought about by modernity were unprecedented. The weakening of religious faith deprived men of a sense of meaning and purpose, and the extension of individualism deprived them of a feeling of belonging. Totalitarian movements offered to the lonely and demoralized, those cast adrift by modernity, a pseudo-community and pseudo-religion.[3] Montesquieu defined despotism as the rule of one according to his own caprice, whose principle was fear.[4] Modern despotism culminates in the rule of one outside constitutional limitations but consistent with its own vision; its principle can be said to be ideology.[5]

Modern autocracies approached total control ("totalitarianism") as they eliminated or neutralized all competing sources of initiative and representation (firms, churches, opposition parties, civic associations). A monopoly of the media and education was established, and industry was seized or subjected to central control. For earlier scholars, the essence of modern autocracy was terror. The totalitarian party, its paramilitaries and the secret police monitored and intimidated the public; concentration camps awaited the refractory.[6] Puzzling though it may seem, these regimes not only enjoyed the enthusiastic support of a minority but the acquiescence and approval of a much larger segment of the public. Their obedience was secured in part by conviction and charisma. Ideology justified violence to reach utopia. The belief in a secular utopia was an essential motivation for the rank and file of the party and justification for the wider public. Although regimes utilized propaganda to promote a cult of personality, these efforts could succeed only because the public or some portion of it was receptive. As Weber emphasized, charisma is not primarily an inherent quality of a leader, but one attributed to him by his followers. This authority is powerful but brittle.[7]

The decision-making process of modern despotism has been described variously as polyocracy or autocracy. Proponents of the former view assert that fascist regimes, unlike communist ones, came to power not through revolution but compromise with the older elites, with whom they had to share power. Even proponents of the "dual state" notion must acknowledge that leader's power tended to increase over time, and, more to the point, was unchallenged in foreign policy. Like older

despotisms, these regimes concentrated authority in one man.[8] Unlike them, the public obeyed not just out of fear but also love (for the ruler) and conviction, often with great enthusiasm. The modern tyrannies were diabolical machines with powerful systems of propulsion, unreliable guidance and faulty brakes. They were the most dangerous governments in history.

Mussolini's Entry into World War II

Situation, Alternatives, Decisions

The fascists' March on Rome of October 1922 induced the King of Italy to appoint the 39-year-old Benito Mussolini prime minister. Mussolini manipulated the elections of 1924 and then gradually eliminated opposition until he achieved dictatorial (but not absolute) power by 1929. For more than a decade Italy's foreign policy remained, for the most part, cautious and moderate.[9] Then, in 1935–1936, Italy seized Abyssinia and intervened in Spain, where she remained embroiled from three years. No sooner was that episode concluded than Italy invaded Albania. Finally, in June 1940, Italy took the fatal step, joining her ally Nazi Germany in World War II. This decision was followed by a serious of setbacks, culminating in the invasion of Italy by the Allies and Mussolini's overthrow and execution. Why did Mussolini lead a country with Italy's modest capabilities on a campaign of conquest and yoke his fate and that of his country to the maniacal Adolph Hitler?

Italy's expansion began with the invasion of Abyssinia, one of two independent states then remaining in Africa, on 3 October 1935. The unfortunate Ethiopians, with only a few hundred machine guns and an air force with ten unarmed planes, were overmatched, but 500,000 soldiers and civilians were deployed, ten times the manpower military experts thought necessary. Despite these advantages, the Italians employed mustard gas. When the Mussolini's army entered Abyssinia's capital in May Italians, though initially skeptical, were enthusiastic. To suppress opposition, hundreds of villages were burned and their inhabitants massacred. Thirty thousand may have died. Economic and humanitarian arguments were advanced to defend the annexation, but they do not hold up under examination. The decision was Mussolini's. It was clear from public and private statements by regime insiders that concerns of glory and prestige were paramount. France and Britain had colonies;

Italy must have them, too. In the words of historian Denis Mack Smith: "Certainly [Mussolini] seems to have been concerned less with making rational calculations of national interest than with dazzling and fascinating his fellow citizens, playing up their collective vanity and their loose ideas about national glory, because this helped him think that fascism was serious and important." The campaign cost Italy 5000 dead and three times the yearly defense budget.[10]

The invasion was not without risk. Austria was a guarantee of Italy's security. Italy deployed troops to the Brenner Pass in 1934 in support of Austria's independence. After Hitler repudiated the Versailles Treaty in March 1935, Mussolini met with the leaders of Britain and France at Stresa, hoping to secure their acceptance of his occupation of Abyssinia in exchange for his support against Germany. Two months later, Britain negotiated a naval treaty unilaterally permitting Germany to expand her navy to 35% that of Britain. Britain's first step in appeasement convinced Mussolini that he had little to fear and little to hope from London.[11] The invasion of Abyssinia required the transport of 150,000 Italian troops across the eastern Mediterranean and through the Suez Canal. Britain, with her powerful navy, could swiftly quash Mussolini's imperial dream. To emphasize the point, Britain's Mediterranean fleet was reinforced in September. Mussolini was convinced, however, that Britain, whose interests in the Horn of Africa were negligible and whose public was pacifist, would not stop him. His surmise was confirmed when Italy gained possession of a secret document stating that if Italy invaded Abyssinia neither Britain nor France would go to war or to close the canal.[12] Success strengthened Mussolini's belief in his own powers and diminished his already slight inclination to listen to more cautious voices. The conquest of Abyssinia won him prestige and popularity, but also diminished Italy's security. Embroiled in Africa and at odds with Britain and France, Italy was no longer able to extend protection to Austria, an indispensable buffer against German power. When Hitler offered recognition of Italy's conquest of Abyssinia in October 1936 in return for a free hand in Austria, Mussolini acquiesced, proclaiming that an "axis" (though not an alliance) now linked Rome and Berlin.[13]

The Abyssinian campaign was only recently completed when, in late July 1936, Mussolini decided to extend support to General Franco's rebellion against the Spanish republic. The *Duce* expected that Franco's presence on France's southern border would facilitate Italy's expansion in the Mediterranean. The major powers pledged non-intervention

in September. Mussolini ignored the agreement and dispatched a contingent that eventually reached 70,000. The fight proved harder than expected, but withdrawal would have been too damaging to his prestige. After an embarrassing defeat by republican forces at Guadalajara, Mussolini shocked Europe by carrying out savage air raids on Madrid and Barcelona. Trapped by his commitment, the *Duce* had little leverage with Franco and derived almost no tangible benefit from the protracted war. Several thousand Italian lives were lost, and half a year's tax revenue expended. Italy would soon face the consequences.[14]

Tied down in Spain until March 1939 and further estranged from France and Britain, Italy had no choice but to acquiesce in the Hitler's incorporation of Austria in 1938, which left Italy naked before Germany's growing military might. Hitler's occupation of the Czech lands, a violation of the Munich agreement to which Italy was a party, followed in March 1939. The *Anschluss* was particularly damaging to Mussolini's prestige in Italy. He sought compensation by seizing Albania in April 1939 without consultation with Hitler. The occupation was not executed smoothly, but the Albanians' weak resistance permitted Mussolini to escape embarrassment. Rather than reconsidering the axis, Mussolini instead entered into an unconditional alliance, which he dubbed the "pact of steel," on 22 May 1939. Italy was obliged under the terms of the treaty to come to Germany's support regardless of the reasons for the war. No formal assurance about the timing of the war was provided.[15] Mussolini had expressed concern years before about the threat of German hegemony, but his policies had hastened its arrival.[16]

When Germany invaded Poland in September 1939, long before Mussolini had expected, Italy declared "non-belligerency" while Mussolini vacillated.[17] Germany, now allied to the Soviet Union, had a diplomatic alternative to Italy and, thanks to Mussolini's previous decisions, could mobilize on Italy's border.[18] Fascist propaganda had glorified war and proclaimed Italy's armed might for years. To "act like *puttane* [whores] with the western democracies," he asserted, "would downgrade Italy for a century as a great power and for eternity as a fascist regime."[19] The regime was at a low point in popularity; signs of opposition were rising. Although there was little public enthusiasm for war and the Fascist Party's Grand Council advocated neutrality, Mussolini feared that his rule was too fragile to survive unless he presented the Italians with new successes. The *Duce* was, in the words of Dennis Mack Smith, "enslaved by his own myth."[20]

None of the military services displayed confidence. Italy spent 11.8% of her national income on defense from 1935–1938 (compared to 12.9% for Germany, 6.9% for France and 5.5% for Britain), but much of it had been on present not future wars. Italy had the capability to support greater procurement, but much of her industrial capacity had been devoted to grandiose public works. Mussolini had concluded that land war was likely to be indecisive, as in World War I, and failed to fund the army adequately.[21] Fascist propaganda asserted that Italy had 100 divisions, but only 10 were ready in January 1940. Italy's standard armored vehicle weighed only 3.5 tons and was so lightly armored that it was vulnerable to small arms fire. Italy's ground forces—worse than those sent into battle in 1914—were dismissed by one old guard fascist as nothing more than a "toy army."[22] Mussolini claimed that Italy had the finest air force in the world, boasting of over 8500 planes, superior in quality to Britain's. In actuality, Italy had 454 bombers and 129 fighters in 1939, of lesser quality than her adversary. Mussolini was shocked to learn the magnitude of this fabrication.[23] Italy had invested most heavily in her navy, with somewhat better results. Italy had a 113 ship navy, and her submarine fleet was the largest in the world. Both the surface ships and submarines had serious design flaws, but their quality was competitive. No carriers had been constructed on the theory that air cover could be supplied from airfields on land. In practice, coordination between the services was so poor that Italy's bombers posed as much a threat to their own fleet as to that of the enemy. Mussolini's instructions on 31 March 1940 to plan for war were met with little enthusiasm by the commanders of all three services, including the navy.[24]

The Regime

The concept of "totalitarianism" was proclaimed by the fascist ideologue Giovanni Gentile and implemented within certain limits by Mussolini. All parties but the fascist P. N. F. were banned. The fascists' violence was curbed by the late twenties, and after extensive purges the P. N. F. was subordinated to the state. The information and entertainment media were brought under complete government control and organized to convey a consistent message. A cult of personality (Mussolini's) was created with prose, photographs and newsreels. Legislation in 1926 granted to the prefects and the secret police nearly unlimited authority against those deemed dangerous to public order. A Special Tribunal

was established to try political cases. Police surveillance was pervasive; informers were everywhere. In this climate of fear, public political discussion ceased. Although the repression was thorough, it was not extraordinarily cruel, at least by the standards of Germany and Russia. Dossiers were assembled on 130,000 Italians; 13,000 were condemned to *confino* (internal exile in remote villages) or incarceration in island penal colonies; only nine victims were sentenced to death by the Special Tribunal. The regime faced little opposition by 1936. The fascist party's ranks grew, more because of Mussolini's charisma than fascist ideology.[25] His rule did not rest wholly on force. Like Hitler, he was intrigued by the Gustave LeBon's theory of the psychology of crowds, who were said to be easily manipulated by irrational impulses and beliefs. This was grist for the mill of an ex-journalist, for whom well-chosen words were weapons. The "real secret of how to govern, he explained," is that "one must always know how to strike the imagination of the public." To maintain one's grip, one must "keep people at their windows." When politics was not violent struggle, it was spectacle.[26]

Mussolini was designated *capo del governo* ("head of government") and given the power to legislate by decree. The P. N. F.'s Grand Council was reduced to a rubber stamp. Fascism was transformed into "the absolute rule of a single man." *Fascismo* became, in effect, *ducismo*.[27] Mussolini's management style had been dictatorial even as editor of limited circulation newspaper. Now, he was referred to as "the divine *Duce*." Peasants knelt before him, and his name was pronounced before operations in hospitals. The constant adulation by a captive media and an enraptured public did not have an edifying effect on his judgment and character.[28] His unwillingness to tolerate any challenge to his authority prevented the development of capable managers. The incompetence and venality of those he raised to higher office confirmed his pessimism about others.[29] Distrustful and loath to delegate, he assumed control of half the ministries in the cabinet by 1933, including all three of the military services. This was a burden no one, let alone a leader of Mussolini's superficiality, could have shouldered. Mussolini succeeded in promoting an image of himself as a forceful and decisive leader, but his mind did not penetrate difficult subjects to any great depth. Yet the regime was heavily dependent on his prestige. The responsibility for planning and decision making in foreign policy was concentrated in his hands. Unfortunately for Italy, Mussolini was not a latter-day Julius Caesar but a real-life Wizard of Oz.[30]

The Man

In his young adulthood Mussolini was anti-clerical and non-observant but had few fixed ideas. His initial attraction to socialism and anarchism, in the view of one perceptive contemporary, arose from "his own rebellious egoism" and "his own sense of indignity and frustration, from a passion to assert his own ego and from a determination for personal revenge." As editor of socialist papers, he attacked the Church, the Army, the parliament and private property, advocating violence as a remedy. After the outbreak of World War I, he founded *Il Popolo d'Italia* with support from industrialists and the government. His initial socialist but pro-war stance evolved over time into an aggressive nationalism. Mussolini founded Italian Fascism after the war as a leftist movement. Its original supporters were eventually disillusioned as fascism under his leadership adhered to few fixed principles and remained open to alliance with nearly anyone. The main source of cohesion was a commitment to violence, practiced by paramilitary squads throughout Italy. After his accession to power, the domestic program of fascism remained ambiguous to allow Mussolini to hold together a diverse coalition of conflicting tendencies. He resisted efforts at ideological clarification, declaring that he had a "horror of dogma." It is difficult to escape the conclusion that fascism was for Mussolini not so much a coherent doctrine as a "technique for winning power." His experience as journalist led him to conclude that ideas were effective weapons in political struggle; that the masses had a need to believe (in something) and were thus highly receptive and amenable to propaganda; and that the most extreme positions were the likeliest to attract attention. What he had not acquired was a coherent set of ideals. Mussolini remained a chameleon who adapted adroitly to multiple roles but seemed to possess no inner core of character or conviction, no "genuine self."[31]

"The driving force of [Mussolini's] life was ambition and lust for power for power's sake," observes one biographer.[32] Mussolini agreed. "I need glory and wealth," he told a potential mistress is his early thirties. He intended to be a "man of destiny…greater than Napoleon," he told her.[33] "What have I achieved after all up to now?" he asked shortly after becoming prime minister. "Nothing.… But I have a frenzied ambition which burns, gnaws, and consumes me like a physical malady. It is, with my will, to engrave my mark on this age, like a lion with his claw."[34] Fraud and force he employed without scruple. Men were, for him, "the

material on which to build the structure of his own personal domination."[35] The *Duce*'s own analogy is revealing:

> The capacity of the modern man for faith is illimitable. The masses are like wax in my hands, when I stir their faith or when I mingle with them. All the same, there persists in me a certain aversion, like that which the modeler feels for the clay he is molding. Does not the sculptor sometimes smash his block of marble into fragments because he cannot shape it to represent the vision he has conceived? Now and then this crude matter rebels against the creator. Everything turns upon one's ability to control the masses like an artist.[36]

Mussolini displayed many of the usual traits of power-obsessed men. From childhood, he had been a "singularly friendless creature" and lived in isolation after becoming prime minister. "I cannot have any friends," he explained. "First of all because of my temperament; secondly because of my view of human beings [which was entirely cynical]. That is why I avoid both intimacy and discussion."[37] He was neither desirous of luxury nor greedy for wealth. Although no romantic, he was exceedingly lecherous. Mussolini cheated on his wife with a succession of mistresses and cheated on mistresses with other mistresses, who were retired and replaced arbitrarily. He had a low opinion of women and made no pretense of treating them with courtesy, let alone affection. They were simply summoned to his office. The beautiful, young Claretta Petacci was expected to wait at his pleasure in an apartment above his office in the Palazzo Venezia. On one occasion, he struck her so hard that she fell to the floor half-conscious. The element of sadism in this relationship and others is unmistakable.[38]

An impulsive decision maker, Mussolini had a bias toward action, possibly because he wanted to feel and to seem as if he were "putting his stamp on events," acting as the *volitivo*, one of strong will and decisiveness. Allusions to warfare and combat were rife in his speeches. To his enemies, he was vindictive. He enjoyed boxing as a spectator sport and was an enthusiastic duelist as a youth, leading some to speculate that underneath his flamboyant bravery lay Adlerian inferiority.[39]

Interpreters agree that Mussolini loved power and was willing to take big risks to attain it.[40] They differ on one important point. For many, Mussolini was "an archetypal mountebank…an opportunist who aimed to acquire and exercise power."[41] Mussolini had some rudimentary ideas

and objectives in foreign policy, however, as well as a program to implement them. Much like Hitler, he viewed life as a struggle in which the "fittest" emerged victorious. The antagonists in this struggle in the modern era were nation states. Italy and Italians had to disprove the "ignoble legend" that they were "a nation of rabbits" by fighting "a great war."[42] Mussolini's view of power was raw and brutal. Fascist rhetoric glorified war. It alone could "imprint with the seal of nobility those people who have the courage to confront it." Praise of Italy's art and natural beauty only annoyed him. He did not want Italy thought of as an "archaeological bordello." "Words are a beautiful thing," he allowed, "but rifles, cannon, warships and aircraft are still more beautiful." Better that Italy be feared than ignored. "I would rather see the Italians terrify the world with their aggressiveness than charm it with their guitars," he professed. Humiliation of other countries became an objective of foreign policy. No less than thirty countries, including distant Guatemala, were subject to verbal attacks in 1934 by regime propagandists.[43]

Mussolini lacked executive ability. He was indecisive, did not inspire energetic implementation and wasted much of his time with administrative trivia. Preoccupied with public relations, he neglected the substance of policy.[44] Among his many failings, vanity and superficiality were of the most consequential. The lack of serious application left him dangerously ignorant of military planning and preparation. One of Italy's generals recalled an amusing example. When receiving his daily report of the course of the war, the *Duce* would appear to examine carefully a topographical map with positions marked in little red and green flags, pointing out things with a ruler. On one occasion, a general inadvertently knocked over the flags when Mussolini was not looking. He set them upright randomly, and Mussolini never noticed the difference.

The regime magnified its leader's deficiencies. Fascist doctrine, which emphasized authority and obedience, weakened responsibility and constructive dissent. The *Duce*'s personality further exacerbated the problem. "You must not contradict Mussolini," advised the foreign minister, "because it only makes things worse." By the mid-thirties, discussion was typically cut short by the *Duce*'s peremptory pronouncements. One general who advised against going to war was dismissed on the spot. Ambitious diplomats concluded that objective analysis was not welcomed in Rome. Italy's ambassador in London fed Mussolini a stream of pleasing falsehoods, reporting, for example, that the *Duce* was beloved by the British masses. The armed forces were encouraged to tell the public

that Italy was stronger than Britain and France. The chief of staff, was reluctant to put the perquisites of office at risk by contradicting his boss. Journalists and fascist officials repeated bogus claims regarding Italy's military preparedness. No one would run the risk of dissenting.[45]

Mussolini preferred to rely on his own intuition and demonstrate his independence from experts. The toadies who surrounded him denied him information that he needed to know but was reluctant to acknowledge while bolstering his confidence with praise and reinforcing his self-deception. "*Il duce ha sempre raggione* (the *Duce* is always right)" the fascist slogan went. The party secretary insisted that all honors were to be monopolized by Mussolini. Senior generals and admirals customarily ran twenty meters towards his desk before saluting, a practice even the Nazis found ridiculous. The constant public and private adulation was corrupting. As early as 1934, one insider lamented that "Mussolini thinks he is God now. He has lost all contact with the country and no one can make him listen to reason anymore." Isolated from others and increasingly from reality, he likened himself to Napoleon or even Jesus Christ. In 1940, when the *Duce* agonized over the entry into the war, further doubts were expressed privately about his judgment. One party official observed caustically that "Il *Duce* ought to get really adequate treatment for his syphilis."[46] Mussolini's boundless vanity led to isolation and eventually delusion.[47]

Italy's feckless performance in World War II resulted in large part from the dysfunctional characteristics of Italian Fascism. Mussolini's talents were in the sphere of persuasion not administration. Propaganda was his priority. Image mattered more than substance. The *Duce* boasted incessantly of Italy's military prowess but, curiously, made little serious and sustained effort to develop his armed forces before the outbreak of war. When the moment of truth arrived, Italy was scandalously unprepared for a war that Mussolini could not avoid.[48]

Although deficient in power, Mussolini still harbored ambitious objectives. No country could be counted a great power, he reasoned, whose access to the ocean was impeded. Italy must achieve domination in the Mediterranean and freedom of egress from it. This was to be achieved by victory over Britain in a "parallel war" fought not to support Germany but to exploit her victories. Because of the weakness of her army, Italy would have to remain on the defensive on land except in the event of a French collapse. The major campaign would be at sea. Italy's navy was to break open the doors of her Mediterranean prison, Suez and Gibraltar.

Victory in the Mediterranean would permit Mussolini to eliminate the remaining barriers to absolute power at home, the monarchy, the church and the bourgeoisie. The Italians would be transformed into an imperious master race.[49]

Once the fighting began, Mussolini was impatient to act. He found it "humiliating to stand with one' hands in one's pockets while others are making history." "His hands itch," noted Galeazzo Ciano, his foreign minister and son-in-law. "To push [him] forward is an easy task; to pull him back difficult."[50] The *Duce* attempted to reconcile his extensive ambitions with his limited means by delaying entry into the war until the right moment. He grasped belatedly that Italy's preparation for war was inadequate, but hoped that in a short war Italy's shortage of supplies would not matter. By beginning late, but not too late, he hoped to escape the horns of the dilemma of his own making. This strategy would fail if the war remained deadlocked or if he mistimed the entry. Germany's victory on the western front in the late spring of 1940 presented Italy with an irresistible opportunity. Although Italy had made significant progress in military procurement after the outbreak of the war, his generals and even his admirals remained very reluctant. The magnitude of the French defeat enabled Mussolini to overcome their hesitation.[51] Cautioned by his military commanders that they could only fight for two or three months, Mussolini responded that that would be enough time to "collect my booty." When Marshall Badoglio, the chief of staff, warned him that "this is suicide," he responded that all he needed was, "a few thousand dead" to strengthen his hand in post-war negotiations.[52] A brief but intense campaign could end Britain's naval supremacy. Hence, the navy was instructed on 31 March that when hostilities began they were to attack Britain at sea "right down the line."[53]

Mussolini reached the decision to fight on 26 May. His military advisors unanimously opposed the decision, but none of them spoke out or resigned. Italy declared war on France on 10 June and took the offensive in the Alps ten days later. An armistice with France was signed on 24 June. Seven thousand Italians were killed, wounded or frozen in the Maritime Alps to achieve minimal gains on the ground.

The *Duce* assumed that Britain would soon be defeated by Germany and was eager to claim further spoils before the opportunity was lost. Without consultation with his generals, he ordered an attack on Egypt by Italy's forces in Libya in the summer of 1940. Germany offered assistance, and Italy declined it. With German support Italy might

have seized the Suez Canal and interdicted Britain's line of communications to the Indian Ocean. Instead, the invading Italians were routed by a combined British and Indian force in December.[54] Their troubles arose in part because resources that ought to have been allocated to the campaign were diverted to the Balkans, a theater irrelevant to the struggle against Britain. When Mussolini informed his military chiefs that he intended to invade Greece, they were strongly opposed, but as usual their objections were ignored. Mussolini was certain that bribery of Greece's generals and bombardment of her cities would bring a quick victory. No serious planning for the campaign was undertaken, and a series of avoidable blunders followed. The *Duce*'s incapacity as a strategist was never more evident. Italy attacked Greece from Albania on 28 October and was immediately driven back. Italy remained on the defensive until Germany intervened to subdue the Greeks the following spring. Mussolini insisted that the administration be turned over to Italy and soon faced a national uprising that became a quagmire. The defeats in North Africa and Greece discredited Italian fascism.[55]

Mussolini compounded these errors by insisting that Italy take part in Hitler's invasion of Russia in 1941, recounted elsewhere in this chapter. Mussolini's parallel war against Britain in the Mediterranean had long since collapsed. Italy's admirals refused to take the initiative against the British in the Mediterranean and eventually saw their fleet crippled when British torpedo bombers struck the harbor at Taranto in November 1940. The allies landed in Sicily in June 1943, inciting Mussolini's overthrow and the collapse of his regime in the following month. Installed as a puppet ruler of the "Republic of Salò" after his rescue by the Germans, Mussolini fled as the allies moved north in the spring of 1945. He and his mistress Claretta were apprehended by partisans on 28 April 1945, shot and left to hang by their feet from a gas station girder.[56]

Hitler's Invasion of Soviet Russia

Situation, Alternatives, Decision

The war that began on September 1939 had its origins in a plan for conquest conceived in the 1920s by Germany's future dictator, Adolph Hitler. Confined to Landesberg prison for his role in the 1923 putsch, Hitler developed a social Darwinist theory of international politics. Not classes, states or individuals comprised the world, he averred, but races.

Each race seeks its "self-preservation," which implies not only survival but propagation. To maintain the balance between population and living space by restricting one's own population grown would only weaken one's race in competition with more fecund rivals. Survival necessitates acquisition. Races are fated to struggle eternally for "living space" (*Lebensraum*) and in the end this struggle will always be settled by violence. The struggle for survival will be won, and deserves to be won, by the stronger race. The key elements of racial strength are nationalism, authoritarian leadership and a military ethos. The presence of the Jews, proponents of internationalism, democracy and pacifism, debilitates the race and threatens its survival.[57]

Germany possesses insufficient living space, Hitler asserted. History has shown how vulnerable she was to blockade and invasion within her current borders. These vulnerabilities could not be eliminated by colonial expansion but only by the acquisition of contiguous territories. Soviet Russia presented Germany's greatest threat and also her greatest opportunity. The worldview animating the Soviet Union, "Jewish Bolshevism," was the worst menace facing Germany and the rest of humanity; but the vast expanse of Russia afforded the solution to Germany's problem of living space. By destroying the Soviet regime Hitler would not only eliminate the immediate danger but also safeguard Germany against all future dangers. Russia's lands were to be appropriated from the Slavs and resettled by hearty German and other Nordic peasants, creating a self-sufficient and invulnerable empire. The Germans' survival would then be assured. To conquer the Soviet Union, however, Germany would have to avoid the error of the previous generation, war on two fronts. Possibly this could be accomplished through diplomacy; if not, through a preparatory war. Once Germany consolidated her control over continental Europe, the struggle for world domination would begin, with the United States as the principle adversary.[58]

Hitler's designs made war a wider inevitable. An attack on Russia could not succeed, Hitler reasoned, unless the threat from the west were eliminated first. An attack on France required the neutralization of threats from the south and the east. Prior to 1939, Hitler represented his claims as protests against injustices of the Versailles Treaty, allowing him to break free of the treaty's military restrictions, occupy the Rhineland, incorporate Austria and, finally, in the fall of 1938, to persuade Britain and France to compel Czechoslovakia to cede the Sudetenland. None of

these steps was resisted forcefully by the western powers. As Propaganda Minister Goebbels explained in April 1940:

> Up to now we have succeeded in leaving the enemy in the dark concerning Germany's real goals, just as before 1932 our domestic foes never saw where we were going or that our oath of legality was just a trick. We wanted to come to power legally…They could have suppressed us. They could have arrested a couple of us in 1925 and that would have been that, the end. No they let us through the danger zone. That's exactly how it was in foreign policy, too…In 1933 a French premier ought to have said… 'The new Reich Chancellor is that man who wrote *Mein Kampf*, which says this and that. This man cannot be tolerated in our vicinity. Either he disappears or we march!' But they didn't do it. The left us alone and let us slip through the risky zone, and we were able to sail around all dangerous reefs. And when we were done, and well-armed, better than they, then they started the war.[59]

On March 15, 1939, Hitler abruptly changed course, bullying President Hacha of Czechoslovakia into accepting the status of a German protectorate and permitting the entry of German forces without resistance. Shocked by Hitler's blatant violation of the Munich agreement, Britain and France ceased their misguided efforts to appease Hitler and extended a guarantee to Poland. Hitler's seizure of the Czech lands was intended in part to intimidate Poland, but it had the opposite effect. Now enjoying the support of Britain and France, the Poles were even less inclined to accommodate the Führer. Thwarted from pursuing his expected diplomatic course, Hitler struck an agreement with his arch-enemy, Soviet Russia, which removed her temporarily from his roster of enemies, and attacked Poland on 1 September 1939.[60]

Germany's preparation for the looming conflict was still unsatisfactory in many respects. The German air force was superior to those of the enemy, but the navy was overmatched against Britain. Only half of the army's 102 divisions were ready for battle, and supplies were short (half the available ammunition had been expended in the brief campaign against Poland). In all likelihood, Germany could not have withstood even a small offensive from the west in 1939.[61]

Why, then, did Hitler risk it? He had thought originally that the war ought to be postponed until 1943–1945, but now he was convinced that waiting would be disadvantageous. The western powers had begun to rearm; the military balance would worsen with time. Above all else,

Germany and her allies benefited from his inspiring and forceful leadership, while the opposing countries lacked strong personalities.[62] Hitler dismissed the warnings from London and Paris contemptuously. "Our enemies are small fry," he observed. "I saw them at Munich." Hitler's long string of successes had eroded his respect for his opponents and, some would say, inflated his own confidence and self-importance to an alarming degree. During discussions with guests in the privacy of his own residence, Hitler compared himself to Napoleon, Bismarck and other noteworthy historical figures. After his long string of successes, few were willing to contradict him.[63]

German forces overran Poland, occupied Norway, conquered France and drove Britain's expeditionary force from the continent. But Germany's air campaign failed to shake the resolve of the British. Rallied by Winston Churchill, Britain refused to capitulate. By mid-1941 Hitler faced a strategic situation analogous to that faced by Napoleon in 1811. He chose to deal with it in the same manner. On 22 June 1941, Germany invaded Soviet Russia.[64]

Hitler cited two reasons for going to war: first, Russia was sustaining the hopes of Britain, therefore it was necessary to defeat the Soviets to compel Britain to make peace; and second, in view of the deterioration of relations with the Soviets, it was better to attack them before they attacked Germany. Neither argument is persuasive. Hitler had contended before that Germany must first defeat or neutralize the western powers before undertaking expansion in the east. By the fall of 1940, Germany had lost the Battle of Britain. Great Britain stood in stubborn opposition to Nazi Germany, battered but unbowed. Hitler now inverted his reasoning. Britain's defeat was no longer a prerequisite for the defeat of Soviet Russia; the defeat of Soviet Russia was now the prerequisite for the defeat of Britain. Hitler contended, as had Napoleon, that once Britain was deprived of a continental ally, she would be forced to make peace.[65] Hitler believed that the hopes of the British were sustained by possibility of United States entry into the war. If Germany defeated the Soviet Union, the United States would have to shoulder the burden of defense against Japan in the Far East and would be unable to intervene in Europe.[66] It was probable that Japan's expansion in Asia would eventually draw her into conflict with Britain and the United States, but Hitler was too impatient to wait.[67]

There was a more direct and less risky means of bringing pressure to bear on Britain. Admiral Erich Raeder pointed out that only 36,000

British were defending Egypt. If Germany and Italy defeated them and closed the Suez Canal, Britain would be driven from the Eastern Mediterranean, and the entire region would be open to domination by the Axis. With Britain's access to oil disrupted, Germany's own supplies secure and Soviet Russia threatened on her southern as well as western border, Germany could have faced the prospect of a protracted war with confidence. As Churchill noted, the continuation of the war under these conditions would have been for Britain a "long, hard and bleak proposition." This peripheral strategy would have dovetailed nicely with foreign minister von Ribbentrop's preferred diplomacy, the continuation and extension of cooperation with the Soviet Union, Japan and Italy.[68]

Hitler greatly distrusted the Soviets, on whom he remained heavily dependent for raw materials, and worried that Stalin would break faith with him. Germany's ambassador to the Soviet Union reported that Stalin was "doing everything he could to avoid a conflict with Germany" and had no intention of attacking. Stalin took pains to eliminate any gesture or action that might provoke the Germans, limiting troop concentrations on the border and instructing his troops to hold fire if Germans violated the border. Furthermore, the Soviet Union was dismissed by Heinrich Himmler at this time as "militarily harmless."[69] The spheres of influence agreement between Stalin and Hitler had come under stress in 1940–1941 as Stalin attempted to consolidate a defensive barrier in Eastern Europe and Hitler attempted to undermine these efforts in Finland, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey. Economic cooperation continued, however, in large part because it was highly profitable to the Soviets. Stalin had not attacked Germany in 1940, when the *Wehrmacht* was embroiled in France. Why would he do so now when Germany's western flank was secure? Hitler tried to defend the war later by claiming that "Russia intended to fall on us at the first opportunity," but in January 1941 he was singing a different tune. Stalin "was a shrewd man" and "would not make any open move against Germany." Soviet documents obtained by the Germans in May 1941 indicated that Stalin was trying to avoid conflict with Germany and Italy and intended to adhere to the spheres of influence policy.[70]

Hitler's invasion faced a fundamental difficulty. Germany's dependence necessitated a quick victory; but the Soviet Union's immensity made it difficult to achieve. At the beginning of the war in 1939, Germany was reliant on imports to meet more than half her demand for rubber, oil and several other commodities and many of these goods came

from the Soviet Union. General Thomas estimated that if Soviet imports were unavailable Germany would deplete her stores of natural rubber within eight months and run short of aviation fuel.[71] If the Russians were to be beaten, they would have to be beaten quickly. Russia's strategic depth posed an enormous problem, however. The breadth of the front in France had been 150 miles and the maximum distance of the *Wehrmacht's* advance to the sea was 250 miles. Against Soviet Russia, the breadth of the front was 750 miles and Moscow 350 miles east of the Dvina–Dnieper line. The northern and central sectors were forested and the few roads that existed turned to mud during the spring. Nevertheless, Hitler expressed confidence that Soviet Russia could be conquered in a single campaign lasting two to three months and his generals convinced themselves that this would be possible. General Marcks's study of August 1940 predicted victory in 9–17 weeks. The Russians would be unable to exploit Russia's strategic depth to defeat Hitler as they had defeated Napoleon, he reasoned, because much of their industry was located west of the Dnieper and they would have to fight to save it. Marcks expected that the Soviets would not have "numerical superiority as they did in the last war" and thus would "quickly succumb to the superiority of German troops and leadership."[72]

Hitler assembled the largest invasion force in European history: 3 million men organized in 151 divisions (19 of which were Panzer divisions); equipped with 3350 tanks, 2770 aircraft, and 7200 artillery pieces. They were joined by 20 allied (Finnish and Romanian) divisions; but there was almost no strategic reserve.[73] German intelligence estimated in late 1940 that the Red Army had 113 divisions and 28 mechanized brigades. The estimate was raised in April 1941 to 196 divisions and 31 mechanized brigades. The Soviets successfully mobilized 1 million reservists from May to July. By August, after the invasion was underway, the Germans learned that they were facing 360 Soviet divisions. Despite their initial success, the Germans could not deal their enemy a mortal blow; for the Soviets continued to reconstitute units shattered by the *Wehrmacht*.[74] The Red Army was not only larger but far better equipped than the attackers realized. The Germans estimated that the Soviets had 10,000 tanks overall and 3300 aircraft in the European theater. The actual numbers were 23,100 tanks (including the formidable T-34) and 9100 aircraft. Perfection is not to be expected in reporting from a totalitarian police state, but it is hard to understand how the Germans could have failed to notice the Soviet's massive arms production between 1939 and

1941, when 43% of the Soviet government's budget was spent on the military.[75]

Hitler lamented later that if accurately informed of Russian tank strength "I would not—I believe—have ever started this war."[76] This is doubtful, for as General Warlimont observed, Hitler "allowed himself to be guided predominantly by the obsessive nature of his political concepts, without giving enough weight to the military circumstances."[77] The advisory process reinforced rather than corrected the *Führer*'s misconceptions. Initially opposed to an invasion of Russia, the *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht* quickly capitulated when Hitler made his intentions clear in 1940. Eventually, according to General Guderian, "they evinced an unshakable optimism and were quite impervious to criticism or objections."[78] "In the end," historian Robert Cecil observes, "it was if a collective madness had seized them."[79]

The German general staff was dependent on the judgment of Germany's military attaché in Moscow, a post assumed in March 1941 by an ambitious young colonel named Hans Krebs. Krebs agreed with one interlocutor privately that the Russians could not be defeated, but explained that Hitler would no longer listen to cautionary words from the General Staff. Kreb's report of May, emphasizing Russia's deficiencies, gave Hitler and his generals no reason to hesitate. He was rewarded for his mendacity by being appointed the last Chief of the General Staff in 1945. The head of military intelligence kept his doubts to himself and presented inaccurate but reassuring assessments of Soviet industry. Although the high command had shared Hitler's contemptuous assessment of the Russians earlier, doubts were expressed privately about the wisdom of the plan at later stage. General Halder questioned the assumption that the Red Army would accept battle in a forward position rather than withdraw to the east. He and his colleagues did not raise questions in public, however, and Hitler took the decision unopposed.[80]

The Regime

The dictator's personality and the nature and ethos of the Nazi regime militated against candid discussion of alternatives. Opposition had long since been silenced. Political parties and unions were suppressed and voluntary associations subjected to control in the first year of Nazi rule. The threat of force was sufficient to deter opposition thereafter. The Nazi Party's presence in German society was pervasive. By 1936, 269,501

cells had been established; one for every 40–60 households in the cities. Although the Gestapo was not large, because of the threat of informers its reach was long. Twenty-five thousand people were incarcerated in prison camps at the outbreak of the war.[81] The regime may have been a "dual state" at the outset, with the older "normative state" bound by law and procedure coexisting with the Nazi "prerogative state;" but the latter strengthened its grip over time through purges and the "shadow state" more than one million party officials who monitored local, regional and national governments.[82]

The regime excited fear, but it was not totally reliant on repression.[83] Hitler was popular. At the pinnacle of his success, it is estimated that he enjoyed the support of 90% of the German public. Ideology alone cannot account for this. Although the promise of palingenesis was appealing to Germans, the most notorious elements of later Nazi rule did not elicit public enthusiasm. (Even amoung Nazi activists, only a minority were attracted by anti-Semitism and Hitler concealed from the public the extent of his international ambitions.) Nor was the Nazi party well regarded; the public was quickly disillusioned with the quality of the men who rose to positions of responsibility at the local and regional levels. The basis of the regime's support was the "Hitler Myth," the belief, much at variance with reality, that Hitler was a heroic but compassionate leader, a versatile genius, a "Peoples' Chancellor."[84] The widespread acceptance of the Hitler Myth can be attributed to Hitler's personal magnetism and mesmerizing oratory, which roused his audiences to ecstasy and exercised a baneful fascination on his followers; to his early successes in domestic and foreign policy; to the skillful propaganda of Goebbels; and to the curious receptivity of the German people. The regime's propaganda "tapped a vein of pseudo-religious 'secular salvation' emotions forming a not insignificant strand of popular psychology…".[85] The propaganda efforts were at their best scintillating. *Triumph of the Will*, a documentary of the Nuremberg rally, was a masterpiece of its genre. Even the most sophisticated propaganda is subject to diminishing returns, however. It appears that over time the regime's controls over the arts and culture, the repetition and the narrowing of expression, eventually began to bore the public. Nonetheless, support for the *Führer* remained enthusiastic. Witnessing a party rally in 1934, an American journalist deduced this explanation of the movement's success: "Borrowing a chapter from the Roman church, he is restoring pageantry and color and mysticism to the drab lives of twentieth century Germans.

[The rally] had something of the mysticism and religious fervor of an Easter or Christmas Mass in a great Gothic cathedral." Later, he observed the reaction of the crowds to Hitler. "They looked up at him as if he were a Messiah, their faces transformed into something positively inhuman. If he had remained in sight for more than a few moments, I think many of the women would have swooned from excitement."[86]

Hitler himself thus became the primary source of legitimacy of the Nazi dictatorship.[87] The cult of personality inspired fanatical devotion in the party,; loosened the restraints imposed on Hitler by the conservative elites who invited him into the government; broadened the regime's base to include many of the Catholics and workers initially resistant to the Nazis' appeal; and, not least of all, corrupted the judgment of a cynically manipulative leader as he began to believe his own propaganda.[88]

Charisma not only legitimized the regime, but produced an extreme concentration of power within it.[89] Initially, Germany's military leaders were decidedly unimpressed by Hitler's charisma and skeptical of his military plans. They might have posed a serious obstacle, but Hitler's early successes and the 1938 purge of the head of the army and several other senior officers neutralized their opposition.[90] After the death of Hindenburg, the offices of chancellor and president were merged to create the position of "Leader and Reich Chancellor," to whom the armed forces swore allegiance. The upper level of government had turned from a cabinet into a "court." The Nazi inner circle referred to Hitler not as "*der* Führer but *mein* Führer." They remained spellbound, loyal and obedient to the last. Hitler became increasingly isolated from normal human relationships and vulnerable to sycophancy. Advice became a competition in servility as Hitler turned his ears to those most generous with praise or most receptive to his notions. This atmosphere not only "killed" intelligence but provided no check whatsoever on his considerable but erratic abilities.[91] Albert Speer, former Minister of Armaments, observes:

> [In] normal circumstances people who turn their backs on reality are soon set straight by the mockery and criticism of those around them, which makes them aware they have lost credibility. In the Third Reich there were no such correctives, especially for those who belonged to the upper stratum. On the contrary, every self-deception was multiplied as in a hall of distorting mirrors, becoming a repeatedly confirmed picture of a fantastical dream world which no longer bore any relationship to the grim outside world.[92]

The Man

Hitler expressed supreme confidence in the outcome of his war. He was convinced of the fragility of the Soviet regime. "We have only to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down," he declared.[93] The Red Army, he exclaimed, was "no more than a joke." It will be "cut to pieces" and the *Wehrmacht* will reach St. Petersburg in three weeks. The Red Army did have its problems and Hitler was not the only observer to underestimate it. Britain and France also held the Soviets in low regard. The Soviet Army had fought badly in the campaigns against Poland in 1939 and Finland in 1940. German intelligence reported that its communications and transport were poor, its leadership inexperienced and its morale questionable.[94] The Red Army's more recent effectiveness against Japan was ignored, however, and Hitler seemed curiously blind to the ability of a totalitarian regime to inspire some loyalty and exercise control over its population.[95]

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the long run of successes had begun to erode Hitler's judgment. Once a cagy observer of others' weakness, he now asserted that "to the German soldier nothing is impossible [under his leadership, of course]." According to General von Manstein, Hitler had lost "all sense of judgment regarding what could be achieved and what could not."[96] Corrupted by his own success, the *Führer*, in the words of Alan Bullock, "curtained him[self] in illusion…leading to that arrogant overestimate of his own genius which brought him to defeat. The sin which Hitler committed was that which the ancient Greeks called *hybris*, the sin of overweening pride…."[97] Hitler's advisors did not disabuse him. Some of them fell victim to delusions, others kept their doubts to themselves. In the end, the German generals accepted Hitler's order to prepare to wage war on Soviet Russia without a single word of opposition.[98] Later, on one occasion during the war, a department of the army reported Soviet tank production honestly, Hitler raged at the head of the army and demanded that the office that had made the "defeatist" estimate be silenced. General Halder, observing the episode, noted that Hitler "went off the deep end—he was no longer a rational being… he foamed at the mouth and threatened me with his fists. Any rational discussion was out of the question."[99]

Hitler made contradictory assertions regarding the Soviet Union. The communist regime was supposedly both a mortal threat and a military cypher. He may have concluded on the basis of reporting by Krebs's predecessor in Moscow that the Red Army, although weakened by Stalin's purges, was improving and would be much more formidable in four years.[100] Yet the decision to invade the Soviet Union was not made in desperation but confidence. Why did he choose so costly a concept of security in preference to obvious and less risky alternatives? Why attempt to "defend" Germany by attacking Russia? The most straightforward explanation is probably closest to the truth. Hitler attacked Russia to achieve the goals he had stated many years before in *Mein Kampf*: the acquisition of living space for the German people and the destruction of the "Jewish-Bolshevik threat" to civilization.[101] The world war occurred because Hitler desired to conquer Soviet Russia and convinced himself that it was possible.

Hitler's grandiose objectives sprung from his troubled psyche. Resentment, hatred and vanity—expressed as an insatiable hunger for praise and a complete unwillingness to brook criticism—were conspicuous traits of his character.[102] Told that he had made a mistake in whistling a classical melody, Hitler responded that the composer, not he, had erred. With the exception of Speer, those chosen for his inner circle were all men to whom the Führer could feel superior, either because of their intellectual limitations or their various physical abnormalities and personal vices. Subordinates were pestered frequently to supply reassurance to Hitler regarding matters as diverse as his appearance or the success of his policies. As early as 1923, one nationalist intellectual concluded after spending a holiday with Hitler that he was possessed by a "megalomania halfway between a Messiah complex and Neroism." Astutely, one acquaintance in Munich described him as "weak but wanting to be hard, half-educated wishing to be an all-rounder…so full of inferiority-complex towards all who were anything or were on the way to outflank him…." His "narcissistic egomania" later rose to "monumental proportions," as Hitler drew constant comparisons of himself with Napoleon and opined that he was indispensable, that without him, Germany would collapse. "I shall become the greatest man in history," he once told his doctor. "I have to gain immortality even if the whole German nation perishes in the process."[103]

"Power," Ian Kershaw states, "was Hitler's aphrodisiac." It was "all-consuming for him," leading him to "dare all to preserve and

magnify his power."[104] Alan Bullock concurs: "To say that Hitler was ambitious scarcely describes the intensity of the lust for power and the craving to dominate which consumed him."[105] For Hitler, power was primarily domination and force the preferred means.[106] Hitler glorified war in his speeches in the most lurid terms and viewed the army as a model of organization for the entire society. There is every reason to think that this was not simply instrumental or demagogic but instead a reflection of Hitler's own compulsions. Albert Speer, Hitler's Minister of Armaments, concluded after observing the *Fuehrer* privately that he had a "pathological need for battle." As Hitler exclaimed in one speech, "I did not establish the *Wehrmacht* in order not to strike. The decision to strike was always in me." On another occasion, Hitler admitted to his foreign minister, von Ribbentrop, that "if I [were] an ally of Russia today, I could attack her tomorrow. I just can't help myself."[107] His rhetoric was replete with references to "hardness" and "brutality," which were transformed into virtues in his perverse ethics. Hitler boasted that he was "the hardest man Germany has had for many decades, perhaps for centuries." The next generation was to be "a cruel, unflinching youth hard as steel—Krupp steel." The exertion of power over others was spoken of as an act of domination and humiliation.[108] The thought of blood "excited and intoxicated" Hitler. Early on, he relished the prospect of a violent reckoning with the communists in the streets. During the first phase of the war, he rejected his general's assurances that Warsaw would fall without a fight and demanded the destruction of the city. Envisioning Warsaw "drenched in blood," one general recollects, "his eyes popped out of his head and he became a quite different person. He was suddenly seized by a lust for blood."[109]

Hitler's will to power was expressed with great brutality in domestic politics. One notorious example was the purge of the *Sturmabteilung* paramilitary on 30 June 1934. At least 400 old Nazis and random unfortunates were abducted and murdered without trial in the "Night of Long Knives." Strangely, most foreigner observers drew no conclusions from these events regarding Germany's future foreign policy. The suppression of the *Sturmabteilung*, the resulting understanding with the army and Hitler's absorption of the powers of the presidency upon Hindenburg's death removed the last obstacles to his achievement of absolute power. "Our constitution," Hans Frank explained later, "is the will of the Fuehrer."[110] Absolute power over Germany did not satisfy Hitler. Each extension of his control afforded only temporary satisfaction

and soon gave way to a yearning for more.[111] Hermann Rauschning, a disillusioned Nazi, concluded in 1939 that Hitler's rule was a "revolution of nihilism." That is, Nazi propaganda's sole purpose was to facilitate the attainment and extension of Hitler's power. Foreign policy in his view was similarly objectless. Nazism meant war, but for no other aim than extending German domination.[112] Rauschning's picture misses something important about Hitler, however. Confined in Landesberg prison, Hitler had come to see himself as Germany's Messiah. Absolute power for him was also a means to fulfill his mission.[113] Although tactically opportunistic, Hitler believed in his own ideas passionately. The goals set forth in *Mein Kampf* were implemented all too faithfully. The exercise of power over Germany was not enough for him because it was only a means to achieving his broader goals of *Lebensraum* and anti-Semitism.[114]

Hitler was both cynic and fanatic, a manipulator out of the pages of Machiavelli and a crazed ideologue out of the pages of Dostoyevsky.[115] How did Hitler become Hitler? Ralph Waite contends that the sinister form that the will to power took in Hitler's case was an expression of a deep inner insecurity. It is likely that Hitler was a latent homosexual. A British diplomat, described Hitler as "the most profoundly feminine man [he had] ever met," but also deduced that Hitler did not practice homosexuality. It is doubtful that Hitler had the capacity to love anyone deeply. His sexual interest was said to be coprophilia, a perversion so vile that it drove six of the seven women with whom he was intimate to attempt or commit suicide. It is also suspected that Hitler suffered from monorchism (the absence of one testicle). Monorchids tend either to femininity or exaggerated assertions of masculinity. It is not unreasonable to conclude that for Hitler aggression and brutality functioned as defenses against fears of femininity, homosexuality and perversion. Fearful of the weakness or depravity he saw in himself, Hitler strove to subdue others in order to subdue his own doubts and disgust.[116]

Walter Langer prepared a penetrating psychological profile of Hitler for the OSS during World War II. According to Langer, there were "two Hitlers," rather like Dr. Jekyl and Mr. Hyde; one "soft, sentimental and indecisive who has little drive and wants nothing so much as to be amused, liked and looked after" and another "hard, cruel and decisive, with an abundant reservoir of energy at his command…". Although Hitler preferred to think that the second "*Führer* personality" is his true self, its "grossly exaggerated and distorted conception of masculinity"

was most likely a "reaction formation" against elements of the first personality that he hated. Beneath the forceful, cruel, "heroic" exterior, Hitler remained anxious, unable to forget that "there is quite another Hitler who is a very despicable fellow." (Hitler's effeminate manner and sexual perversion were known to Langer.) The despised traits were projected onto the unfortunate Jews, but this psychological defense was not entirely successful. Inner anxiety drove Hitler to new proofs of his identity and worth. Langer commented:

> As Hitler's personal world becomes smaller he must extend the boundaries of his physical domains. Meanwhile, his image of himself must become ever more inflated in order to compensate for his deprivations and the maintenance of his repressions. He must build bigger and better buildings, bridges, stadia and what not, as tangible symbols of his power and greatness and then use these as evidence that he really is what he wants to believe he is.

Hitler's notorious rages were brought on whenever his self-conception as the infallible and invincible leader was called into question. Because Hitler's emotional insecurity was perpetual, his desire for psychological compensation was insatiable and his desire for reinforcement unrelenting.[117]

Hitler's young adulthood also provides clues to the origins of his beliefs. Hitler left his native Linz in February 1908 to study art in Vienna only to be rejected twice by the Academy of Fine Arts. By late 1909 he had run through his inheritance and was forced to seek refuge in a flop house. The outbreak of the world war in 1914 was for Hitler an escape from an unsuccessful, aimless and lonely existence. The war gave him a regular living, structure, purpose and a feeling of belonging. His commitment to the German cause was fervent. Blinded by a mustard gas attack near Ypres in October 1918, he was sent to Pasewalk to recuperate. During his recovery, he learned of Germany's revolution and defeat. Out of these experiences his ideology began to form.[118] The key elements of his thinking were anti-Semitism, *Lebensraum* (at the expense of Russia) and political messianism, with him in the leading role. Harold Lasswell's contention that policy is often an expression of personal neuroses was never more apposite.[119] One can speculate that Nazi ideology performed three psychological functions for Hitler: it provided a convenient set of enemies on whom his hatred and violence could be

vented; it made possible self-glorification and the exercise of power not only against purported enemies but also over friends and followers; and it provided moral justification for the use of violence, rationalizing the gratification of his impulses rather than limiting them.[120]

Hitler's ruthlessness in repression and diabolical art of spellbinding the German masses and the Nazi elites raised him to a position of power untrammeled by formal or informal constraints. "Hitler was one of those inexplicable historical phenomena which emerge at rare intervals among mankind," Speer noted. "His person determined the fate of the nation."[121] Once he possessed absolute power, Hitler's inner demons, whatever their source, could be expressed first as ideology and ultimately as policy. The material consequences for Germany were an estimated 5.6 million dead, fifty cities lying in ruins, three provinces with a total population of 11.6 million lost and a country divided for four decades.[122]

Mao's Intervention in the Korean War

Situation, Alternatives, Decision

North Korea's dictator, Kim Il Sung, visited Beijing in May 1950 at the behest of the Soviet dictator Josef Stalin, who wanted to confirm that an invasion of South Korea would have the support of China. Stalin had advised Kim that if things went badly, he would have to rely on his own forces or those of China. Kim was confident nonetheless. The Chinese had set their sights on Taiwan, which was still held by the rival Kuomintang, but they could not object to Kim's attack without risking the loss of Stalin's support for their own. If the Chinese communists had reservations, they did not express them. North Korea was promised support should the United States enter the war.[123] North Korea invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950 and immediately drove the defenders back into an enclave around Pusan. On 15 September, General Douglas MacArthur's forces executed a brilliant amphibious landing behind North Korean lines at Inchon. North Korea was routed, and MacArthur took the offensive. On 3 October, the Chinese informed India's ambassador that "we will not sit still" if the United States crossed the 38th parallel, not with any serious intention of preventing the war, but most likely to gain time for preparations and put themselves in more sympathetic light with their own public and the world.[124] China also mobilized 320,000 troops in Manchuria. MacArthur crossed the pre-war border in

early October and continued north, encountering Chinese troops later in the month. The Chinese fought briefly then broke off contact. On 24 November, MacArthur proclaimed a 'Home for Christmas' offensive and resumed his march to the Yalu River. It was met by a massive Chinese counterattack, resulting in three more years of fighting in Korea.

The Chinese communists still faced opposition at home from some three million people. The resistance was heartened by General MacArthur's advance; there were rumors that Chinese Nationalists would soon land on the mainland.[125] If this was the Chinese leadership's concern, the most obvious solution would have been to employ security forces directly against domestic opponents, not against the United States. China's main industrial complex, accounting for 80% of her steel production, lay in southern Manchuria within 200 km of the Yalu River.[126] If the Chinese feared an attack on these facilities, deterrence and defense were a less costly alternative than war. Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong dismissed this option. Even if the United States did not attack, hostile forces would remain south of the Yalu, and Manchuria would still have to be defended, precluding the use of the defending troops elsewhere. "We would have to wait there year after year, unsure of when the enemy will attack us," he complained. It was better to attack first. An American victory would leave his foe "dizzy with success" and "swollen with arrogance." Mao and his supporters asserted that the United States would never accept a communist regime. At some point in the future communist China might face a war on three fronts (Korea, Indochina, Taiwan). The United States' intervention in Korea and positioning of the 7th Fleet between the mainland and Taiwan gave rise to fears of "encirclement" among the Chinese leadership. Many of them believed that war with the United States was "inescapable," although, as Shu Guang Zhang coyly observes, this was "not based on any realistic understanding." In point of fact, Secretary of State Acheson was hoping to exploit China's differences with the Soviet Union to drive a wedge between them, as had been done previously with Yugoslavia.[127]

Mao convened members of the Politburo's standing committee on 2 October 1950. He opened the meeting with the statement that the question was not whether to intervene but when. Mao's assertion of authority determined the meeting's outcome. The Soviet Union was informed, and the army was told to hasten their preparation. The body met again two days later and on this occasion Mao encouraged open discussion.[128]

A majority of those present voiced reservations about going to war: China needed time for reconstruction after years of strife; unemployment was high and the budget was in deficit; the communists had not consolidated control inside the country or secured the offshore islands; the United States was a formidable opponent; and the extent of Soviet support was uncertain. If the Soviets failed to provide air cover, the United States would have complete command of the air in addition to a 40:1 edge in artillery. The United States had warned that not only Chinese forces in the field but also Chinese territory might be attacked. Surely, the skeptics reasoned, China would have a better chance if confrontation with the United States were postponed at least three to five years.[129]

Mao was unmoved by these arguments. According to one sympathetic academic, the Politburo was persuaded by Mao's "wisdom and authority." Lo Lung-chi, who was present at the meeting, recalls that when he questioned Mao's analysis, the Chairman exploded in anger and accused Lo and others of cowardice. Dissent was silenced. The Politburo accepted his recommendation to enter the war on 5 October.[130] The Chinese learned a few days later that Stalin was reneging on his promise to provide air support. Mao suspended military movements and, after a night of soul searching, reconvened the Politburo. On 13 October, at Mao's urging, the Politburo reaffirmed their previous decision to fight in Korea, if need be, without Soviet assistance.[131]

Mao was not fearful. He and his advisors understood that their foe had complete naval and air superiority, better equipped ground forces and nuclear weapons. If the Americans decided to detonate an atomic bomb, he acknowledged, "we are in no position to stop them." He surmised that fear of Soviet retaliation and adverse international reaction would forestall this. If not, he did not expect their use to be decisive against a largely agrarian country. Mao and his generals believed that American forces would be annihilated in one campaign and driven from the peninsula. China's advantages would outweigh those of the United States. China was closer to the battlefield, and Korea was mountainous, which would negate some of the American's advantage in mechanization. The Americans' tactics were predictable, but the Chinese excelled at close combat and maneuver. The Americans and their allies had 205,000 troops in Korea, but only six or seven divisions on the front line; China and North Korea had over 400,000, which, if concentrated for attack, could achieve a 4:1 advantage. Mao hoped to deceive U.S. intelligence by marching at night and setting fires during the day. Most important

of all, the Chinese would be more willing to risk their lives than the cowardly Americans, fighting as they were for a just cause. The United States' technological advantages would be more than offset by China's advantages in numbers, logistics, tactics, strategy, geography and, above all else, morale. Mao expected to win.[132]

The Regime

The Chinese communists intended initially to proceed gradually. The outbreak of the Korean War led to an abrupt radicalization of policy and a corresponding intensification of repression. Land redistribution was extended to the newly occupied areas of south and central China. Landlords were humiliated and murdered in public meetings in China's villages. By design, much of this was perpetrated not by the security forces but the public, to implicate the masses and habituate them to brutality. The number of deaths from this campaign is usually estimated at between 2 and 5 million, with another 4–6 million transported to the *laogai* (forced labor camps) and approximately 10 million kept under surveillance. Terror was extended to the cities, where approximately 1 million people were executed and another 2.5 million (over 4% of the urban population) were sent to the *laogai*. Mao may not have intended the Korean War, but its occurrence was convenient. It fit the Chinese concept of "crisis" (*weiji*) as both a danger and an opportunity. According to the memoirs of one insider, the Chinese communist leadership saw the war as a pretext to strengthen their authority and mobilize the public in support of their program. In domestic politics, Mao's gamble succeeded. By 1953, the regime was more firmly established and the transformation to communism farther advanced than he would have thought possible in 1949.[133]

The decision to go to war can be attributed primarily to the influence of Mao Zedong. Mao had risen to the top of the Chinese Communist Party by treachery, intimidation and large-scale violence. He instigated two major purges of the party. The purge of the supposed "anti-Bolshevik Corps" claimed tens of thousands of victims in the early 1930s, before the Great Purge in the Soviet Union. The Yenan Rectification Campaign, begun in 1941, utilized the same methods—torture to induce confessions, leading to more arrests, and then more torture. It was less sanguinary but still effective. Most leading figures in the party were completely cowed and henceforth cautious, even obsequious. The

one senior communist who would not grovel, Wang Ming, was poisoned. In 1944, Mao was named Chairman of the CCP and given the power of decision when the leadership was deadlocked.[134]

Mao's leadership style after the revolution was described by one former insider as "courteous…but very dictatorial." Mao observed the party's official norm of collective leadership formally, allowing discussion leading to consensus on many matters, but reserved the right to decide on issues of the highest importance. Above criticism himself, his ability to focus criticism on individuals was an effective means of reinforcing his own authority. The politics of the Chinese Communist Party resembled those of a court. The careers, status and influence of prominent leaders became dependent on maintaining the favor of "the emperor."[135]

The Man

Mao Zedong was the crucial influence on China's foreign policy. Lucian Pye concludes that the dominant trait of his personality was narcissism, which was the root of many other traits and behaviors. Mao yearned for praise.[136] The party's propaganda organs encouraged a cult of personality on an unprecedented scale. According to biographer Eric Chou, Mao "thrived on adulation" and was gratified to be "glorified and worshiped like a deity."[137] His physician, Dr. Li, recalled: "He was not a modern man. Instead, he talked about making the country rich and returning it to its original glory. A rebel and iconoclast, he would dare to transform China and make it great. He would build his own Great Walls. His own greatness and China's were intertwined. All China was Mao's to experiment with as he wished. Mao was China, and he was suspicious of anyone who might challenge his place or whose vision differed from his."[138]

Mao was keenly aware of others' emotions and adept at manipulating them but was careful not to reveal his own. He avoided emotional dependence on others.[139] Mao deserted his first wife when she was in grave danger, treated his second with utter callousness, married the notorious Jiang Qing and then cheated on her with a bevy of young women procured for him by communist officials.[140] Dr. Li found him "devoid of human feeling, incapable of love, friendship or warmth." Nor was he able to empathize. Li recalls that when a young acrobat fell during a performance and apparently sustained serious injury Mao continued talking and laughing as if nothing had happened. "The life of his subjects was [to him] cheap," Dr. Li concluded. "I did not immediately

understand, because it was so hard to accept, how willing Mao was to sacrifice his own citizens in order to achieve his goals."[141] Shortly after the victory over the KMT, Mao was overheard speaking of his elimination of 700,000 souls on his road to power, "as though they were but ants."[142]

Mao was a risk taker. "Whereas most statesmen live with a vivid dread of the penalties for failure," Pye notes, "Mao has been attracted to the potentially great payoffs that can come from success against long odds." He often won these gambles in his rise to power, but his rash domestic initiative in the late fifties, the Great Leap Forward, did immense harm. Perhaps Mao's risk-taking was related to another trait observed by Pye, the tendency to "blur the distinction between wishing and wish fulfillment."[143]

According to Chang and Halliday, Mao's core motivation was the desire for power. Mao's youthful description of the great leader, written in 1917–1918, is revealing:

> The truly great person develops…and expands upon the best, the greatest of the capacities of his original nature…All restraints and restrictions [are] cast aside by the great motive power that is contained in his original nature…The great actions of the hero are his own, are the expression of his motive power, lofty and cleansing, relying on no precedent. His force is like that of a powerful wind arising from a deep gorge…All obstacles dissolve before him…Because he cannot be stopped or eliminated, he is the strongest and most powerful. This is true also of the spirit of the great man and the spirit of the sage.[144]

What is especially alarming about this is the implication that the will to power of the hero is to be completely untrammeled by conventional morality. Mao applied these ideas to himself: "People like me want to… satisfy our hearts to the full," he wrote, "and in doing so we automatically have the most valuable moral codes. Of course, there are people and objects in the world, but they are there only for me."[145]

These sentiments remained dormant until he was appointed head of a local communist party branch in 1921. Previously considerate to others, his appetite for power grew with the first taste, and his personality began to change. He no longer sought friendship on a basis of mutuality and monopolized discussion at party meetings.[146] Four years later, strolling along the Xiang River, Mao composed this poem:

Eagles soar up the long vault
Fish fly down the shallow riverbed
Under a sky of frost, ten thousand creatures vie to impose their will
Touched by this vastness
I ask the boundless earth
Who after all will be your master?[147]

Chang and Halliday's assertions regarding Mao's personality are consistent with other evidence. Chang Kuo-tao, an early rival who survived Mao's purges, charges that Mao "cherished the reactionary thoughts of an emperor" and "would not stop short of grasping the full power of a dictator."[148] Mao once wrote to his wife that he was part tiger and part monkey. The tiger symbolizes for the Chinese more or less what the lion does for Occidental people, one who is feared and respected. The monkey is thought of as being impish and unpredictable, but also, according to anthropologists, "aggressive and assertive" with "an insatiable desire for prestige and power."[149]

The will to power took a particularly sinister form in Mao's disordered psyche. As early as 1917, at age 24, Mao had asserted that "there must be a complete transformation, like matter that takes form after destruction…I look forward to [China's] destruction, because from the demise of the old universe will come a new universe." These sentiments did not become manifest until he toured the countryside in Hunan province in the winter of 1926–1927. Observing communist peasant associations shaming and terrorizing their victims, he felt "a kind of ecstasy never experienced before." "It is wonderful," he exclaimed. At this point, he became convinced that "it is necessary to bring about…a reign of terror in every county." By the summer of 1927, he was firmly committed to the Soviet model of violent revolution.[150]

What mattered to Mao Zedong, Chang and Halliday contend, was the gratification of his desires in the present. Mao learned early in his life to take pleasure in violence and destruction. The communist movement was attractive to him because it afforded such opportunities. Chang and Halliday contend that Mao sought the Korean War as a means of extracting from Stalin the wherewithal to industrialize China rapidly, making possible her swift assent to great power status. Economic development was a goal that most Chinese, including non-communists, supported. What was distinctive about Mao's approach was the breakneck speed with which it was pursued, which led to a series of catastrophic

blunders. Mao's haste was not a result of any concern about his legacy; the chairman was indifferent to his future reputation. Mao was in his late fifties at the time of the Korean War. If China could become a great military power during his lifetime, Chang and Halliday observe, "the world [would have to listen] when he spoke."[151]

Mao's beliefs expressed his desires. He stated in 1938 that to become applicable to China Marxism would have to be "Sinified." Eventually, this came to mean that Mao's thought would displace all else, including even Marx, as the official ideology. Revolution was to be made by guerrilla warfare in the countryside, which the peasants would be inspired to support by the appeal of nationalism and land reform. Once power was seized, it would be used to transform society. Mao's notions owed much to Lenin, but two ideas differentiated him, nationalism and voluntarism. "Men are not the slaves of objective reality," Mao asserted. "The subjective activity of the popular masses can manifest itself in full measure, overcome all difficulties, create the necessary conditions, and carry forward the revolution. In this sense, the subjective creates the objective."[152]

Some are skeptical that Mao harbored any deep convictions. Chang Kuo-tao alleged that Mao "merely used communism to veil his personal ambitions and thirst for power."[153] Mao's conversion to Marxism, Chang and Halliday contend, occurred in large part because Soviet agents offered Mao a comfortable living. By implication, his attachment to the party deepened when he began to see it as a vehicle for his own aggrandizement and cruelty. In their view, Mao was never a "fanatic."[154] Maoism in their eyes was nothing more than a means of legitimizing his power and convincing others to serve his ends.

Mao was no orator, but he was remarkable in his ability to wield both pen and sword to advance himself and his cause. Mao was not only an astute strategist but a persuasive propagandist.[155] He recognized the importance of ideas early in his life: "Those who wish to move the world must move the world's hearts and minds," he said, "and to move people's hearts one must have great ultimate principles."[156] Pye speculates that Mao learned to use moral arguments to get his way in his family growing up. Later in life, Mao's indignation at "injustice" provided him a justification for violence. "To right a wrong," Mao asserted in 1926, "it is necessary to exceed the proper limits; the wrong cannot be righted without doing so."[157] Mao's initial scruples regarding the use of violence gave way in stages: first, in converting from anarchism to

communism, he accepted the need for violence in theory; next, its use in practice against perceived enemies of the communist party; then against his rivals inside the party; and finally, the construction of utopia through violence.[158]

Mao's peculiar interpretation of Marxism played an important role in the miscalculation that brought about the war with the United States. As Tang Tsou noted many years ago, "the Chinese communist mentality was a paradoxical combination of a deep sense of insecurity and a tremendous confidence in ultimate victory." Tsou attributes this to Marxist ideology, which taught that the United States was implacably hostile but also declining and vulnerable.[159] Professor Zhang attributes Mao's decision to what he terms the Great Helmsman's "military romanticism." This was the belief, based on Mao's interpretation of Chinese history, that a weaker army could defeat a better-armed enemy if it had superior motivation and leadership. "Subjective" factors had indeed been decisive in his prior struggle against the nationalists. He believed that the United States, like the Japanese and the KMT, would prove to be a "paper tiger." His belief in his own forces' superiority was based on his confidence in the party's skills in mobilization and propaganda, his certitude in the justice of his cause and perhaps to some extent in his belief in the superiority of Chinese civilization. Despite their initial success, the anticipated annihilation of enemy forces was never achieved. The communists often failed even when attacking a battalion with an entire army. Mao was told to expect 60,000 dead in one year of fighting. The Chinese communists have admittedly privately that 400,000 of their soldiers died in Korea; a Russian source estimates that the number may be as high as 1 million.[160]

Maoism was distinctive from orthodox Marxism not only in its voluntarism but its emphasis on nationalism. In defense of the war Zhou Enlai proposed a Chinese version of the domino theory, stating that "if Korea fell down, breaches in other places would also be opened one by one." Mao saw a connection between Korea and "the whole east." China's entry was thus intended in part to encourage communist revolutions elsewhere in Asia. Defeat in Korea, in the judgment of Chen Jian, was "intolerable for Mao and other Chinese Communist leaders, especially because they had been so eager to advance China's international prestige through the promotion of an Eastern revolution following the model of the Chinese revolution."[161] Mao and his colleagues viewed Korea as a part of their traditional sphere of influence and felt

"some sense of obligation" to protect it. "When other people are in crisis," Mao asked the Politiburo, "how can we stand aside with our arms folded?" To do nothing, he exclaimed, "will make me feel sad."[162] The single most important sentence for understanding why China fought in Korea, according to Shu Guang Zhang, is Mao's assertion on October 1, 1949 in Tienanmen Square: "the Chinese people have finally stood up." The eminent Sinologist John King Fairbank described the reaction of the Chinese to their "century of humiliation" at the hands of foreigners as one of "self-pity, resentment and the need for an explanation of history in terms of evil and justice." Hence, as Zhang puts it, "the CCP leaders believed that the Korean victory helped China to reclaim its long-lost status and respect in Asia."[163]

If the Chinese Communists' sole concern had been security, deterrence and defense were wiser alternatives. Mao intervened in Korea not primarily to make China more secure, but to make his country (and by extension himself) more powerful, more respected and more communist.[164] The Chinese people were dragged into ill-advised war with a powerful enemy, in which hundreds of thousands of them were to die, by a man of raging ambition, misled by self-induced ideological illusions, ruling unchecked by comrades cowed into silence.

Saddam Hussein's Wars

Situations, Alternatives, Decisions

Upon seizing power in Iran in February 1979, the Ayatollah Khomeini announced that "we intend to export our revolution to the four corners of the world." Iran's neighbor Iraq was ruled by the secular nationalist Baath party. Although the Baath leadership initially adopted a conciliatory policy toward the Ayatollah's regime, the Iranian theocrats denounced the Baathist regime as illegitimate and called for its overthrow. Iran trained guerrillas to infiltrate Iraq and provided assistance to the underground Shia party *al Dawa*, which had posed some danger to Baathist rule in the past. On 1 April 1980 *al Dawa* attempted to assassinate Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, missing their intended target but killing a bystander. Iraqi intelligence laid blame on Iran. The Iraqi government took these words and deeds seriously, for the Shiites comprised over half of Iraq's population. A stiff warning was issued to Tehran; skirmishes on the border escalated.[165] Observing no moderation of Iranian

policy, Iraq invaded in September 1980.[166] After initial successes, the offensive was stymied. The war degenerated into sanguinary attrition, lasting eight years, claiming 200–300,000 Iraqi lives and impoverishing both countries.[167]

Iraq was sorely aggrieved, but had good reasons to be cautious. Iran was three times as large as Iraq. Her major cities, unlike Iraq's, were far from the border. Half of Iraq's 12 divisions had to be deployed against the Kurds in the north, and the loyalty of Iraq's Shia troops once they entered Iran was open to question.[168] If ever there were a moment to strike Iran, however, this seemed to be the time. The revolution had left Iran in disarray. Desertions reduced the army from 285,000 to 100,000, and the morale of the officers was poor. Iraq's force had grown to 190,000 and was equipped with 1700 Soviet tanks. The Arabs of Iran's Khuzestan province were demanding autonomy, and forces had been sent into Iranian Kurdistan to quell an insurgency. Terrorism and political infighting continued in the capital. After the seizure of American hostages in 1979 Iran was diplomatically isolated. The Shah's exiled generals predicted that the disorganized Iranians would be quickly subdued.[169] "We'll be out of there in fourteen days," Saddam boasted.[170] In the event, the Khuzestan Arabs failed to assist the invading Iraqi troops, and Iraq's offensive met furious resistance at Khorramshahr. The invasion did not fragment Iran and topple Khomeini, as was hoped, but unified the country and rallied support for the revolution.[171]

Some scholars contend that fear led Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to attack Iraq. If so, the rationality of the decision is open to question. The security services, flush with oil revenue, were immense for a country of Iraq's size. After the assassination attempt, hundreds of Shias were killed, thousands more arrested, and thirty-five thousand expelled to Iran. These measures greatly weakened *al Dawa* and other dissident Shia organizations. If, for some reason, repression alone did not suffice, Iraq could have retaliated by increasing support to Iran's minority communities (who comprised one-third of Iran's population). Furthermore, if the Shias were supposedly on the verge of rebellion, did it make sense to go to war? They remained loyal to the regime even in the darkest days of the war. The Shia threat was not unmanageable, and war was not the most obvious solution.[172] An offensive strategy had the additional benefit of enabling Iraq to reverse the Algiers Agreement he had been coerced into signing in 1975 by the Shah of Iran. Under its terms, Iraq ceded control

of the east bank of the Shatt-al-Arab. Iraq appropriated the disputed border territories on 10 September.[173]

Iraq suffered $230 billion in damage during the war with Iran and accumulated $80 billion in foreign debt. The price of oil fell, leaving Iraq's export earnings ($13 billion) far short of her imports ($23 billion). The economic problems could have been ameliorated by liberalization of Iraq's state-dominated economy, but this would have endangered Baathist rule. Saddam laid blame instead on the Kuwait, which was supposedly impeding Iraq's recovery by exceeding her OPEC production quotas and taking an unfair share from the Rumailia oil field. Saddam presented his demands to Kuwait on 16 July publicly, in a manner that made it difficult for him to retreat. King Fahd of Saudi Arabia supposedly convinced Kuwait shortly thereafter to meet Saddam's demands, but Saddam ignored him. No longer content to alter his neighbor's offending policy, the Iraqi leader now desired to appropriate Kuwait's riches, enabling him to escape debt and begin the lavish rebuilding projects he had promised his public. Land-locked Iraq would also acquire best natural harbor in the Gulf. Iraqis, who had been taught that Kuwait belonged to them, would be grateful, and Saddam's political standing would be bolstered.[174]

Before attacking Kuwait, Saddam sought to clarify the position of the United States. The U.S. ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, met with Saddam at his request on 25 July. Ambassador Glaspie, who, like many other observers, was not expecting an invasion of Kuwait, stated that Washington has "no opinion on inter-Arab disputes such as your border dispute with Kuwait." Saddam concluded from the exchange that he could proceed without risking United States intervention.[175] On 2 August 1990, 100,000 Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait, overwhelming its 16,000 defenders. Iraq proclaimed Kuwait's annexation. President George H. W. Bush condemned the invasion and dispatched forces to protect Saudi Arabia. The United States announced in November that additional forces would be sent, bringing the total to 430,000. Both the U.N. Security Council and Congress authorized the United States to take military action should Iraq remain in Kuwait. Yet Saddam Hussein refused to leave. Coalition air strikes on Iraqi forces commenced on 17 January. The ensuing ground offensive, begun on 24 February, and drove the Iraqis out of Kuwait City within three days.[176]

When Saddam discovered that he had miscalculated the American response, he did not change course. He probably hoped initially that he

could hold out for some concessions as a price for withdrawal. President Bush took the position that no reward could be given for aggression. His principled stance precluded face saving concessions.[177] The coalition forged by Bush was fragile, and it was not inconceivable that it would fragment before or during hostilities. Saddam expected a bloody stalemate on the battlefield, similar to his war with Iran. The United States, he observed on more than one occasion, was a society "which cannot accept ten thousand dead in one battle." The U.S. commander, Norman Schwartzkopf, feared exactly that.[178] To withdraw without concessions would be humiliating for Saddam. Better, he thought, to fight and lose. In his world, a loss of face risked a loss of authority. Nasser and Sadat had suffered defeats in 1956 and 1973 but won acclaim and held onto power. By losing bravely, he might mitigate the damage to his position or even strengthen it.[179]

The United Nations required Iraq as a condition of peace to end her nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programs, as well as research into ballistic missiles of a range exceeding 150 km. Sanctions would remain in place until Iraq's compliance was confirmed. A U.N. inspection team, UNSCOM, arrived in May 1991 to verify Iraq's disarmament. Saddam instructed Iraqi officials to subvert the inspections and to preserve as much of the weapons of mass destruction programs as possible. His expectation, based on his previous experience with the U.N., was that the inspections would not continue more than a few months; but UNSCOM proved to be more competent and determined than its predecessors. A deadlock ensued and the sanctions continued, impoverishing the Iraqi public but not denying Saddam funds for rearmament and personal gratification. Saddam suspended cooperation with UNSCOM in November 1998. After the departure of the inspectors, the United States carried out air strikes against suspected weapons of mass destruction facilities. At this juncture, 20 tons of growth media for biological weapons and 200 tons of precursor chemicals for nerve gas had not been located.

In the months after the al Qaeda terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, President George W. Bush reached the conclusion that a policy of "containing" Iraq might be insufficient if Saddam were willing to supply weapons of mass destruction to al Qaeda. Far from reassuring Bush and the American public, Saddam declined the advice of his ministers to issue a condemnation of the terrorists and expression of sympathy for the victims. Iraqi media, unlike most in the Middle East, praised the terrorists.

Saddam also rejected a proposal in November to weaken the sanctions against Iraq if he would permit inspectors to return. On 8 November 2002, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1441, which demanded that Iraq permit "immediate, unimpeded, unconditional and unrestricted access" to any facilities the new inspectors asked to see. Even facing the threat of war, Iraq failed to give the inspectors complete cooperation.[180]

Saddam's obstinacy is puzzling. The Gulf War, the inspections and the bombing campaign in December 1998 came close to eliminating Iraq's WMD. Saddam refused to admit this or to permit UNSCOM to verify it, even though the admission would have freed Iraq from UN sanctions. Iran presented no imminent threat, the Iraqis were confident that Iran could not achieve strategic surprise and believed that Iraqi forces were a match for Iran's qualitatively. Iran remained implacable, however, and was suspected of harboring nuclear ambitions. Chemical weapons had saved the Baathist regime from defeat in the 1980s. Saddam was convinced of their utility. Ambiguity regarding Iraq's WMDs induced Iran's caution; full disclosure would weaken Iraqi deterrence.[181]

After the war, the U.S. Joint Forces Command obtained Iraqi government documents and conducted interviews with former high ranking Iraqi officials. Their conclusion is that Saddam believed that the Americans would probably not attack Iraq but if they did, they would be repelled. A crucial influence on Saddam's thinking was his relationship with France and Russia, who had extensive commercial interests in Iraq. To preserve their lucrative contracts with Iraq and assert their importance as members of the U.N. Security Council, he believed, they would use their vetoes to stop the war. Should the United States proceed without the Security Council's authorization, his forces would put up a "heroic resistance and inflict such enormous losses on the Americans that they would stop their advance." The enemy would never reach Baghdad, and his regime would survive yet another challenge.[182] The war began on 21 March 2003. On 9 April US marines toppled a gigantic statue of Saddam in Baghdad, marking a symbolic end to the regime. Saddam was captured in December and executed three years later.

The Regime

The *Baath* ("Renaissance") was a secular nationalist movement established in the 1940s, socialist and pan-Arab in ideology and Leninist in organization. Deeming the division of the Middle East after World War I

by France and Britain to be illegitimate, its principle goal was the creation of a united Arab state. Violence was endorsed emphatically as a means of achieving this. The *Baath* Party seized power in Iraq in a coup of July 1968. The *Baath*'s membership was less than 5000 at the time, but its cellular organization was superior to its competitors, and it had made inroads in the army. The party ramified after the coup, establishing a pervasive presence in Iraqi society. The *Baath* not only dominated the army's command and the cabinet, but placed monitors into offices, factories, schools and the army. Popular organizations and a paramilitary force were also established. The Baathists' methods broke cycle of *coups d'etat* in Iraq. Officially, the party was opposed to a cult of personality and committed to 'collective leadership.' But after assuming the presidency in July 1979, Saddam Hussein consolidated dictatorial power through a purge of the upper ranks of the party. The power of ultimate decision on all important issues was solely in his hands.[183]

By 1980, Iraq was a totalitarian regime. The internal security forces employed over 250,000 to police a population of 14 million. The state swelled to provide employment to one million *Baath* party members. A network of informers spread throughout Iraqi society, sowing distrust, atomizing the public and creating a climate of pervasive fear. Repression was complemented by the most blatant cult of personality in the world (with the possible exception of North Korea).[184] As Saddam Hussein consolidated his authority in the summer of 1979 hundreds of *Baath* party members and military officers were victimized. The party, like the society, was subjected to a regime of "absolute terror" with no toleration of dissent.[185] The government became little more than an "echo chamber" for Saddam. According to one joke making the rounds in diplomatic circles in Baghdad at the time, when Saddam asked his foreign minister during a late meeting what time it was, the minister answered "Whatever time you like." Saddam's reaction to criticism was no laughing matter, however. In March 1982, Saddam shot one of his own ministers on the spot for daring to suggest that he resign temporarily to facilitate the negotiation of a ceasefire with Iran. His remains were returned to his wife, cut into pieces. No one disputed the decision to attack Iran. "The inner circle rallied sheep-like around their leader," Karsh and Rautsi report.[186]

Iraq under Saddam's dictatorship became the most militarized society in the world. No less than one-fifth of the labor force was involved during peacetime in organizations designed to threaten or employ violence.

The military participation ratio rose from 0.4% at independence in 1933 to 1.8% of the population, double the rate of Iran and Egypt and twelve times that of Brazil. "War," Kanan Makiya contends, "any war, it does not matter against whom, is a not unlikely outcome of the unbridled growth of the means of violence."[187] The glorification of violence by Baathist ideologues and its dissemination through the educational system gave rise to a militarization of everyday speech. If language shapes thought and thought shapes action, Baathist Iraq was predisposed to seek violent solutions in international politics.[188]

Iraq's military was not strengthened by Saddam's rule but debilitated. The greatest threat to him day to day was not defeat in war but overthrow by his officers. The army was subject to continuous and intrusive surveillance. This prevented coups, but disrupted coordination in battle. The Iraqi military tried hard to understand what had gone wrong in the war of 1991, but they were unable to apply any lessons they could have learned because of the danger that frank discussion would reflect badly on Saddam as a commander or on the morale or capabilities of Iraqi forces. It was safer to disparage the United States. Saddam's vanity posed an insuperable obstacle to institutional learning. Saddam was a dilettante ignorant of modern warfare, but his unchecked power allowed him to impose an amateurish strategy on military professionals who knew it was folly. To John Nixon, who interrogated Saddam after his capture, the Iraqi dictator seemed nearly "clueless" about the situation he faced in 2002. No serious plan for the defense of Iraq against an American led invasion was developed. Saddam simply trusted that in the event he would survive as he had always done before.[189]

The regime distorted the flow and analysis of information. Saddam's distrust made him reluctant to bring able men into the inner circle. According to one senior official, he favored "the uneducated, untalented and those who posed no threat to his leadership." His son Qusay, a military ignoramus, was given command of Saddam's elite force, the Republican Guard. Fawning propagandists for the personality cult comprised the inner circle. The few competent individuals who rose to the top soon concluded that the safest course was to flatter Saddam or remain silent rather than to challenge his misconceptions. Even if they had dared to give honest advice, Saddam would probably have rejected it. His two previous decisions for war were taken on his own in isolation with little or no consultation with his advisors. Subordinates continued to feed Saddam false reports. At the end of March 2003, Saddam still

believed that the war was going well. Iraq's foreign minister was directed on the 30th, with US forces 100 miles south of Baghdad, to request the unconditional withdrawal of allied forces from Iraq because "Iraq is now winning and the United States has sunk in the mud of defeat." On 6 April, a Ministry of Defense memorandum stated that "we are doing great." By that time Iraq's forces were on the brink of collapse.[190]

In the late 1980s, the regime began shifting from reliance on secular ideology to historical myths embedded in the collective memory of Iraqis. One story was especially prominent. In the year 570, Christian Abyssinia attacked Mecca and was defeated when Allah called birds to drop stones on the invaders' war elephants. The implication seemed to be that American forces would suffer the same fate if they attempted to evict Iraq from Kuwait. Saddam's propaganda was exaggerated ("the mother of all battles"), emotional and highly repetitive. It succeeded—the masses obeyed—but at a cost. Ofra Bengio, author of a meticulous study of Baathist propaganda, states that it involved "a deliberate effort to obscure, blur, and eventually distort reality." Having boasted so long of his willingness to employ violence, Saddam "[ended] up caught inside a cage of his public declarations and commitments…". Bengio's concludes: "Those who initiate the use of this particular brand of language end up its prisoners."[191]

The Man

Saddam was not strictly bound by the tenets of Baathist ideology, but did develop an "operational code" of sorts. The greatest influence on him was his uncle, Khairallah Tulfah, a fiercely xenophobic teacher who had taken part in a rebellion against Britain in 1941, described by a former pupil as "a very tough man, a Nazi and a Fascist." As president, Saddam made his uncle mayor of Baghdad and published his uplifting essay "Three Whom God Should Not Have Created: Persians, Jews and Flies."[192] Saddam's view of the world was grimly Hobbesian. Life, for him, was a constant struggle. Threats are everywhere; no one can be trusted; all means are permissible. Better to kill those who cannot be cowed before they kill you. Karsh and Rautsi attribute this bleak conception not only to a troubled childhood, but his experience in Iraqi politics, in which the resort to violence had become the rule rather than the exception. Saddam was the most successful practitioner of these methods

in his generation. He was a product of Iraq's internecine politics who exported these methods to the wider world.[193]

Saddam did not excel in school. He failed the entrance examination to the Baghdad Military Academy and was unable to pursue his dream, a career in the military. He was shy, socially awkward and poorly spoken. Although a diligent and able administrator, he was by no stretch of the imagination charismatic in the manner of Nasser. Saddam was by profession a party apparatchik, not an orator. His extensive collection of books on Stalin exemplifies his modus operandi.[194] Saddam's rise to power was made possible by his association with Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr, a general and prominent Baathist from his hometown of Tikrit. Saddam gained Bakr's confidence by organizing the party's private militia in the mid-sixties while he was officially enrolled as a law student. A former classmate remembers Saddam as "brimming with aggression," packing a pistol and surrounded by a coterie of muscular thugs. Saddam boasted in a coffee shop in 1967 that he had just beaten a leftist Baathist to death with the pistol. Bakr seized in 1968 power with Saddam's assistance. Bakr put the 30 year old Saddam in charge of internal security and elevated him to Deputy Chairman of the *Baath*'s leadership committee, the Revolutionary Command. Saddam proved to be a shrewd observer and manipulator of men. He adopted a self-effacing and almost anonymous profile, gradually accumulating power until his patron could be shoved aside in 1979, when Saddam was 42 years old. "Saddam was never an ideologue," one Baathist contemporary recollects. "He was the tough guy who was brought into do the dirty business. But no one took him seriously in the party. That was our big mistake…".[195]

"The employment of physical force," state Karsh and Rautsi, "has been the main hallmark of Saddam Hussein's career."[196] They contend that Saddam's use of violence was largely instrumental, but cruelty was clearly a fundamental part of his character. Saddam took pleasure in humiliating others. Show trials, after victims were coached by his interrogators, were a preferred means, but not the only one. One former palace official suggested that he enjoyed affairs with married women, taken against their will, as a way of shaming their husbands. Khidhir Hamza, a leading scientist in Iraq's nuclear program, alleges that Saddam simply kidnapped women he fancied, especially virgins. One victim said later that what she remembered was his eyes. "They were the eyes of death. He looked at me as if I were a corpse. There was not a hint of humanity or warmth in them."[197]

As a child, he had tormented animals by stabbing them with a red-hot iron bar. By his teens, Saddam, a strapping 6'2", was running his own street gang. He committed his first murder, at the behest of his uncle, in 1958. Saddam was recruited by the *Baath* Party as one of a team of assassins in an attempt to kill President Qassem in October 1959. A former member of the party explained that the *Baath* was "full of professional people—lawyers and doctors—who were not very good with guns. They needed to bring in someone like Saddam from off the streets to do their dirty work for them." Saddam lost his poise, fired too early and was forced to flee the country. In exile in Cairo in 1961, he frequented a café whose owner wanted to ban him because he "would fight for any reason."[198]

After the seizure of power in 1968 his appointee, Nadhim Kazzar, was given free rein to experiment with new methods of torture at the Palace of the End. (Kazzarr's favorite was crushing cigarettes on the eyeballs of prisoners.) One survivor alleges that Saddam personally deposited one victim in a vat of acid. By the time Saddam became president, no less than 107 different methods of torture had been practiced by the regime, including beating, freezing, burning, the twisting and removal of limbs and rape observed by the victim's relatives. Humanitarian that he was, Saddam sometimes offered his victims a menu from which to choose among the torments devised by Kazzar.[199] An estimated 300,000 Iraqis were killed by the Baathist regime after the Gulf War in the 1990s.[200] Yet, as Makiya observers, "the pent-up violence in the man's personal makeup was always controlled and directed by a political sense of judgment." Saddam's cruelty was calculated, put at the service of his ambition.[201] In the end, however, the Iraqi dictator's determination to play the strong man became compulsive. His revulsion against any action that could be seen as weakness led him to resist the cooperation with the United Nations' inspectors that could have preserved his rule and his life.[202]

Saddam's personality has been characterized by psychological profiler Jerrold Post as one of "malignant narcissism," the leading attributes of which are a "messianic ambition for unlimited power, absence of conscience, unconstrained aggression and a paranoid outlook." The root of this complex of motives is said to be Saddam's "wounded self," formed by the many blows to his psyche that he experienced in a difficult childhood. One important manifestation is a pathological vanity, which led Saddam quite literally to shoot the messengers bringing him unwelcome

news. On one occasion during the war with Iran, one assertive but naïve young officer suggested that Iraqi lives could be saved if the army took an enemy position by artillery bombardment rather than a frontal assault. Saddam pulled out a gun and shot the man in the head.[203] David Winter, employing a different methodology, reaches a similar conclusion. The Iraqi leader, he says, is motivated by an "unbounded drive for power and prestige."[204] Mustapha Barzani, the Kurdish leader, is not a trained psychologist but is a survivor of an attempt on his life ordered by Saddam. "Iraq is a police state," he asserted, "run by…a power-obsessed maniac."[205]

Hamza, a physicist who labored reluctantly to build Saddam a bomb, relates a small but revealing incident. Bored by a presentation of the details at Hamza's nuclear laboratory, Saddam asked to see his office. The dictator reproached Hamza at length because he had not framed some pictures of leading scientists he had placed on the wall, which showed "a lack of respect." Hamza inferred that his boss had sensed some degree of independence in him and decided to assert his authority. "He was in charge," Hamza explains. "Anyone who challenged him did so at the risk of his life." Con Coughlin, an insightful biographer, concurs. "No dissent was too trivial or slight in Saddam's eyes. Any opposition to Saddam's will was to be crushed ruthlessly…".[206]

Saddam's attack on Iran was motivated not only by fear but by pride. Iran's seizure of Zayn al-Qaws, a small territory ceded by Iran in the Algiers Agreement negotiated by Saddam Hussein, was taken by Iraq's President as "a deliberate act to humiliate him and undermine his regime." An Iraqi spokesman later referred to this step as "the turning point," and Saddam made references to it in his own public statements.[207] Saddam told biographers that he was not concerned with how he was viewed in the present but "what people will say about us 500 years hence." He paid for an advertisement in the *New York Times* on 17 July 1980 comparing himself with the eminent Abbasid caliph Harun al-Rashid. The war was termed by regime propaganda the *Qadisyyat Saddam*, alluding to a famous Arab victory over the Persians in 636 AD. The phrase is significant. Egypt had been suspended from the Arab League for making peace with Israel. Victory over Iran, and seizure of the oil-rich province of Khuzestan, would not only have made Iraq master of the Gulf but raised Saddam Hussein to a pinnacle of adulation no Arab leader had enjoyed since Nasser. The war on Iran was to be Saddam's Suez.[208]

Saddam remained preoccupied with his legacy even after the Iranian disaster. He wanted to be remembered as a ruler as momentous as Hammurabi, Nebuchadnezzar, Saladin or Ali Mansur, the founder of Baghdad. Under Saddam Hussein's leadership Iraq was to become the greatest power in the Middle East and to lead the Arabs toward fulfillment of the Baathists' vision. To this end, the acquisition of nuclear weapons was crucial. "Saddam wanted personal greatness, a powerful Iraq that could project influence on the world stage and a succession that guaranteed both," concluded the Iraq Survey Group. Weapons of Mass Destruction were seen as a "symbol of modernity." Nuclear weapons remained his top priority, even though little progress was made on them after 1991. One minister suggested that when Saddam realized in the late 1990s how little WMD capability he actually had that "his ego prevented him from publicly acknowledging that the Iraqi WMD program was ineffective."[209]

The *Baath* Party's enforcer had the patience and guile to bide his time until he could displace his unsuspecting rivals. Once they were eliminated and the public and the party terrified into obedience, Saddam turned his attention to international politics. Violence was Saddam's modus operandi, but he desired not only to be feared but respected and remembered. Pride and ambition drove Saddam to take self-defeating risks, leading eventually to his defeat, downfall and death.

The Wars of Totalitarian Tyrants

The regimes discussed in this chapter concentrated power in the hands of one man. They began with violence, ruled with violence and often ended in violence. Their record at home and abroad is one of unparalleled villainy. They embroiled their countries in aggressive, ill-advised or unnecessary foreign wars, sometimes repeatedly, and in most cases with disastrous consequences. Why did they do so?

Despotism concentrates power to an incomparable degree. Lord Acton's famous explanation of the consequences was presented in a letter to an Anglican priest, Mandell Creighton, on the 1st of April 1887:

> If there is any presumption it is the other way against holders of power, increasing as the power increases. Historic responsibility has to make up for the want of legal responsibility. Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost always bad men,

> even when they exercise influence and not authority; still more when you superadd the tendency or the certainty of corruption of authority. There is no worse heresy than that the office sanctifies the holder of it.[210]

Friedrich von Hayek offers a contrasting interpretation of the relationship between power and character in a penetrating chapter in *The Road to Serfdom*. Totalitarian movements, he maintains, attract the gullible and the resentful. Their confused, envious and impressionable followers are united by a common enemy. The slime of hatred is the cement of these movements. The total control they seek cannot be achieved without coercion. Those who will the end must will the means. Compelled to set aside their utopian goals or their scruples, the movements opt for violence. Once this line is crossed, they have need of men who will not hesitate to shed blood. In this way, "the readiness to do bad things becomes a path to promotion and power." That such men could be trusted to use their power with restraint is no more likely than "a tender-hearted person would get the job of whipping master in a slave plantation." In totalitarian regimes "the worst get to the top." Bad men become great.[211]

There is wisdom in both accounts. Tyranny is a regime. It shapes politics and policy initially through the selection of its leader and later through perverse incentives operating on those who achieve unlimited power. Only certain sorts of personalities rise to the top in such a system. Once they attain untrammeled power, their faults are exacerbated and magnified. Both effects are observable in the preceding cases.

Tyrants rose to power through one of three routes. Some were organization men; shrewd, cruel and underestimated plodders who rose doing the dirty work for leaders in their parties until they acquired enough power to displace them. Stalin is the prototype; Saddam the eager pupil. The second type is the warlord, modern Caesars who parlayed victories on the battlefield into domination of domestic politics. Napoleon and Mao are the most significant. A third type is the demagogue-ideologue, adept at rousing the masses with propaganda and oratory, as were Hitler and Mussolini.[212] Unfortunately, the skills needed to take and maintain power are not necessarily those needed to govern, and especially to conduct foreign policy responsibly.

In a regime characterized by the unjust rule of one the "first image" necessarily becomes the dominant influence over foreign policy. Tyranny was for each, like the state for historian Jacob Burckhardt, a "work of art," a form of government fashioned according to his wants and talents.

Leaders who succeed in freeing themselves from political constraints are usually the last men in the world who could be trusted to rule in this manner. Insatiable and vindictive, they correspond closely to Karen Horney's "expansive neurotic." They seek absolute power because they are corrupt. Power reveals who and what they are. The use of violence against political opponents may habituate them and their followers to cruelty, but the root of evil is already within them. Internal repression presages but does not cause external aggression. Both streams flow from the same polluted spring.

The political processes of despotism reinforce rather than restrain aggressive personalities. Representative institutions are impotent; the participation of the masses is limited to waving flags at parades and spying on fellow citizens. If the rulers are to be restrained, only the elites can do so. The tyrant's mind is even less receptive than the average man's to information and analysis incongruent with his own desires. He will be strongly inclined to reject any suggestion that his designs are impractical. Cautionary words are the last thing the ruler is likely to hear, however. The cronies who surround tyrants depend for their own power and perquisites on the good will of their master. Mendacity is the prerequisite for success and survival in such a regime. Rather than advise and admonish, they flatter. Tyranny remains friendly to the base. In this sense, Acton is correct. Although they were hardly angels to begin with, many of the despots underwent intellectual, moral and even physical decline in office.[213] Sycophancy weakens a leader's judgment by isolating him from reality.

The problem often grows worse over time. When a tyrant is ready to embark on a dangerous course of foreign aggression, most likely he has already achieved remarkable results. He has seized power, eliminated opposition and perhaps scored some initial successes abroad. He has come to trust his talent and his destiny. New victories beckon and a continuation of past success is expected. Good fortune erodes the calculation and shrewdness that served him well in the past. The tyrant does not know when and how to stop.

The absence of political restraints on tyranny is exacerbated by the weakness of moral restraints. Scruples fail to regulate a despot's passions either because they are too weak to bridle his will to power or because they are neutralized by his rationalizations. Wickedness triumphs through cynicism or fanaticism. Several of these tyrants were men who not much troubled by pangs of conscience. Antonio, who

has overthrown his brother Prospero to become the Duke of Milan in Shakespeare's *Tempest*, is asked if he conscience ever gave him pause. He replies:

> I feel not
> This deity in my bosom. Twenty consciences,
> That stand between me and Milan, candied be they
> And melt ere they molest![214]

For Mussolini, as with Antonio and Bonaparte, cynicism was associated with the absence religious conviction. Hitler, by contrast, was all to sincere. As both Marx and Lenin to his own revolution, he was uniquely positioned to shape a doctrine to express his own perversions. So it was also with Mao. He found much in Stalinist Communism to express the violence of his character, but was also able to "Sinify" Marxism, which meant, in effect, to "Maoify" the doctrine. War was chosen by him, opportunistically, because in part it was a means of accelerating the transformation of Chinese society prescribed by Stalinist ideology. That transformation and all that resulted from it, proved far more traumatic for China than the war. Mussolini, like Hitler, was an ideologue. Fascism for him was primarily a gimmick to advance his own fortunes, but in foreign policy he was in deadly earnest.

Modern despotism, unlike that known to Aristotle and Montesquieu, is ideological and, consequently, far more dangerous. Ideology provided justification for the cruelty of Hitler and Mao. They believed what they espoused, or most of it. Their beliefs provided legitimacy, enabling them to inspire and manipulate the masses, thus utilizing them as tools for the extension of the power and glory of the leader. In the words of Alexander Solzhenitsyn:

> Ideology—that is what gives evildoing its long-sought justification and gives the evildoer the necessary steadfastness and determination. This is the social theory which helps to make his acts appear good instead of bad in his own and other's eyes, so that he won't hear reproaches and curses but will receive praise and honors…Thanks to ideology, the twentieth century was fated to experience evildoing on a scale calculated in the millions.[215]

Modern tyranny is ideological, and modern ideology is tyrannical. Modern political movements mobilized and regimented their followers

into political armies to seize power and transform society. Their goals of revolution or palingenesis could be achieved only through organization. The ideological passion might wane, but the organizations remained as instruments of domination in the hands dictatorial leaders, as in Baathist Iraq.

The appeal of ideology is often reinforced by the leader's inherent or manufactured charisma. Charismatic despots rule not only by the fear they instill but the fervor they inspire. The obedience of their followers is not grudging, like the thralls of Xerxes, but fervent. Why men should throw off the comparatively benign domination of kings to follow such mountebank messiahs is one of the great mysteries of modern history. But there is no denying the reality of this. As Nietzsche observed:

> What a blissful relief, what a release from pressure which is growing unbearable is the appearance of the absolute commander for these European herd animals. The effect which the appearance of Napoleon made was the most recent major evidence for that—the history of the effect of Napoleon is almost the history of the higher happiness which this entire century derived from its most valuable men and moments.[216]

This authority, projected with such menace at Nuremberg, Rome and other locales, is potent but fragile. Charisma can inspire courage and sacrifice, but dissipates quickly if the results are too much at variance with the image. Dictators who do not permit free discussion and free elections have few reliable methods of gauging their own popularity. They enjoyed greater support than the praetorian governments discussed previously, but most of them remained anxious. Their powers were vast, but possibly brittle. Mao was secure in power but desired a pretext to accelerate the revolution. War in Korea provided it. Saddam had faced challenges to his power and feared that conceding to the United States would erode the aura of toughness on which he relied. Hitler worried what would happen once the cheering stopped. Mussolini was probably in the greatest danger. Entering World War II with inferior capabilities was dangerous but possibly less dangerous than remaining passive after promising Italians military glory for two decades. Despotic charisma appears on further examination to be an unstable compound that either dissolves or explodes.

The modern tyrant, like his ancient predecessor, is a warmonger. Totalitarian movements elevate bad men to high office. The worst—the

ambitious and the cruel—get to the top. Once in power, they are subject to few political or moral restraints, particularly if their power is legitimized by charisma and ideology. They enjoy the support of enraptured disciples and admiring but fickle masses. Emboldened by success but vulnerable to loss of momentum, unrestrained by law, politics or morality and unable to restrain themselves, tyrants unfold their wings and soar like Icarus. Their quest for power and glory ends in wastage and infamy.

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34. Kirkpatrick, *Mussolini*, p. 176.
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113. Bullock, *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny*, p. 651; Bell, *Origins*, pp. 82–84, 285–86, 294; Cecil, *Hitler's Decision to Invade Russia*, p. 167; Overy, *The Dictators*, pp. 21–22, 32, 53, 488; Trevor-Roper, *The Last Days of Hitler*, p. 104.

114. Waite, *Psychopathic God*, pp. 87–88; Rich, *Hitler's War Aims*, p. 11; Jaeckel, *Hitler's Worldview*, p. 81; Kershaw, *Hitler: Hubris*, p. xxxvi; Bullock, *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny*, p. 375.
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Christensen, *Useful Adversaries* p. 170; Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, *Uncertain Partners*, pp. 181, 193–94.

128. Chen, *China's Road*, p. 173; Zhang, *Mao's Military Romanticism*, p. 78; Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, *Uncertain Partners*, pp. 176–77.
129. Chen, *China's Road*, p. 182; Zhang, *Mao's Military Romanticism*, pp. 80–81; Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, *Uncertain Partners*, pp. 173–75, 179–83, 193–94; Chang and Halliday, *Mao*, p. 362; Christensen, *Useful Adversaries*, p. 165.
130. Chen, *China's Road*, p. 184, is the sympathetic one; Lo cited by Eric Chou, *Mao Tse-tung: The Man and the Myth* (London: Cassell, 1982), pp. 180–81.
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140. Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, *Mao: The Unknown Story* (New York: Knopf, 2005), pp. 194–99; see Li, *Private Life*, Chapter 45, for the sordid details. Separation from his wife and young son bothered him very little, but Mao shed tears when he was punished by the party by a demotion, Chang and Halliday, *Mao: The Unknown Story*, pp. 126–27.
141. Li, *Private Life of Chairman Mao*, pp. 120–21, 125.
142. Chou, *Mao Tse-tung*, pp. 236–37.
143. Pye, *Mao Tse-tung*, pp. 38, 50–52, 62–63, 250.
144. Short, *Mao*, p. 60; Chang and Halliday, *Mao*, p. 13.
145. Chang and Halliday, *Mao*, p. 13.
146. Chang and Halliday, *Mao*, pp. 29–31.
147. The poem is quoted by Chang and Halliday, *Mao*, p. 38.
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149. Pye, *Mao Tse-tung*, pp. 14, 37.
150. Chang and Halliday, *Mao*, pp. 15, 41–43, 46–50; Short, *Mao*, p. 79.
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152. Stuart Schramm, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung* (New York: Praeger, 1969), pp. 69, 72, 79–80, 118, 134–36.
153. Paraphrased in Chou, *Mao Tse-tung*, p. 237.
154. Chang and Halliday, *Mao: The Unknown Story*, pp. 19–25, 61, 106–7.
155. Pye, *Mao Tse-tung*, pp. 14–15, 36, 229, 233; Chang and Halliday, *Mao: The Unknown Story*, pp. 28, 322; Chou, *Mao Tse-tung*, p. 225.
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196. Karsh and Rautsi, *Saddam Hussein*, p. 274; also 24.
197. Coughlin, *Saddam*, pp. 85–86, 231, 297–98; Khidhir Hamza, *Saddam's Bombmaker* (New York: Simon & Shuster, 2000), pp. 171–73; an even more shocking story on p. 179.
198. Coughlin, *Saddam*, pp. 8, 18–33, 36.
199. Coughlin, *Saddam*, pp. 42–45, 78, 84–85, 138, 155–56, 164–68, 239, 290–91; Makiya, *Republic of Fear*, p. 6; Karsh and Rautsi, *Saddam Hussein*, pp. 39, 52; The acid immersion story is rejected by Karsh and Rautsi, *Saddam Hussein*, p. 39.
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201. Karsh and Rautsi, *Saddam Hussein*, p. 272; Makiya, *Republic of Fear*, p. 119.
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203. Post, "Saddam Hussein of Iraq," pp. 174–75. Post's contention regarding the "wounded self" is illustrated and corroborated by Coughlin, *Saddam*, pp. 8–9, 16, 20, 63, 68–69.
204. David Winter, "Motivation and Mediation of Self-Other Relationships," in *Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders*, pp. 271–72.
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206. Hamza, *Saddam's Bombmaker* p. 73; Coughlin, *Saddam*, p. 164.
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208. Khadduri, *Gulf War*, pp. 84–85; Coughlin, *Saddam*, pp. 172–73; Hiro, *Longest War*, pp. 38–39; O'Ballance, *Gulf War*, p. 32; Makiya, *Republic of Fear*, pp. 33–35, 264, 270–73.
209. *Iraq Survey Group Final Report*, pp. 21–22, 23–40; Coughlin, *Saddam*, pp. 125, 132, 139, 148.
210. Quoted in Gertrude Himmelfarb, *Lord Acton* (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1993), p. 161.
211. Friedrich von Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944), pp. 135, 137–39, 146–47, 151–52; Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer* (New York: Harper & Row, 1951), pp. 91–94, 124.
212. Some tyrants inherit their offices, such as Kim Jong Un and Bashar Assad in 2017 and Francisco Solano Lopez in an earlier chapter. No inheritors are discussed in the present chapter.

213. Namely, Mussolini, Saddam and Hitler. As did Napoleon and Solano Lopez in a previous chapter. Most likely a longer biographical sketch of Mao would demonstrate it in him as well.
214. *The Tempest*, Act II, Scene II, lines 275–80.
215. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, *The GULAG Archipelago*, volume I, "The Bluecaps" (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 174.
216. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Sect. 199.

Oligarchs, Democrats and Rebels

Republics

Perpetual peace is possible, Immanuel Kant proposed in the late eighteenth century. The mechanism, a "League of Peace," would not be a world state. Anarchy would not be abolished, but transformed. Peace would rest on reassurance. Under monarchy, those who make the decisions reap the rewards of war but do not pay the costs; in a republic, those who bear the costs make or influence the decisions.[1] A Republic is thus reluctant to take up arms; other Republics know this; and Republics know that other Republics know. Mutual confidence develops, which can be reinforced by trade and disarmament. Would republicans never judge war against a sister Republic to be advantageous? Kant offers little clarification. If a peace is to become perpetual, perhaps what is required is not just a change in the form of government but a transformation of the society's ethos.[2]

Alexis de Tocqueville believed that the fundamental principle of modern democracy is equality.[3] From this central principle Tocqueville drew many deductions.[4] Equality of opportunity encourages commercial ambition, leading men to become preoccupied with their businesses and careers. War is viewed as a disruption and threat to prosperity.[5] The equality of conditions enables individuals to empathize with a wider number of people; democracy grows more compassionate and presumably more reluctant to experience or inflict suffering.[6] Aristocratic honor, with its emphasis on martial valor, is displaced by a less demanding

J. D. Orme, *Human Nature and the Causes of War*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77167-0_6

commercial ethic.[7] The intensity of the competition in democratic society leads to a shortening of time horizons and narrowing of ambition. Men preoccupied with climbing the next rung on the long ladder of success do not conceive grand goals. Such a mentality is not conducive to great ambitions in foreign policy or any other field of endeavor.[8] For all these reasons, democracies are reluctant to abandon their peaceful pursuits and take up arms. Such are the deficiencies of democracy that Tocqueville questions whether one could survive in Europe, where it would be continually threatened by undemocratic neighbors.[9]

The distinguished economist Joseph Schumpeter, writing in the early twentieth century, completes his predecessors' arguments. In the past, he maintains, war was frequently "irrational" or "objectless." The stated reasons for war often seemed inadequate to justify the loss of life and destruction of property that ensued. The underlying cause of war was to be found in the structure of society. Societies of the distant past, facing threats from abroad, constituted a warrior aristocracy to provide protection. Once the danger passed, the aristocrats remained. They continued to make war because that is what warriors do. War was not chosen as an act of policy, as theorized by Clausewitz. Aristocrats became like hunters in an era of plenty, who, when they no longer have to kill to eat, hunt for sport. Although aristocratic values persist in modern society, they are atavistic and obsolescent.[10] Capitalism stifles the warrior ethos by fostering "rationality." The use of money and the invention of bookkeeping facilitate the calculation of interest in business on the basis of costs and benefits. Once this calculation is learned, this habit of mind spreads from business to other spheres of human life and eventually into politics. Decision makers of all sorts learn to be analytical regarding means and conscious of costs. Modern rationality is corrosive of all traditional conceptions of duty. Utility, narrowly conceived, eventually supplants all other considerations. Modern society also affords many peaceful outlets for the energies of the ambitious.[11] In the end, Schumpeter concludes, the modern world will expunge the pre-capitalist elements. Imperialism will "wither and die."[12]

For Kant, the crucial question was *who* (makes the decision)?" For Schumpeter, the question is *how* (decisions are reached)? If the many rule and decide on the basis of Weber's *Zweckrationalität*, Kant's conclusions are plausible, if not compelling.

Unfortunately, the record to be recounted in this chapter does not fully corroborate their optimism. Three wars will be investigated

in this chapter, all of them begun by regimes that fit Kant's (and Montesquieu's) definition of a Republic. Their opponents were fellow Republics, and the results were for the initiators deeply disappointing.

Britain and the American Revolution

Situation and Decisions

Britain, through victory in the Seven Years War, had attained the greatest empire since the fall of Rome. Quebec and the Mississippi Valley were acquired from France and Florida from Spain. Eighty thousand Frenchmen remained in the St. Lawrence Valley, however, and across the Appalachians Pontiac led a spirited rebellion against Britain in 1763. The western territories had to be garrisoned by forts that were expensive to maintain.[13] Loss of control over the colonies, it was assumed, would weaken Britain in her ongoing struggle against France. This fear was subtly connected to pride of possession. "Every man in England," Ben Franklin observed in 1767, "seems to consider himself as a piece of sovereign over America, seems to jostle into the throne with the King and talks of our subjects in the colonies."[14] Britons were proud, but also fatigued and anxious.

To ensure the preservation of the empire, the ministry headed by the Earl of Bute decided in March 1763, with surprisingly little discussion in Parliament, to station 10,000 troops permanently in North America. Financing was to be provided by the Sugar Act of 1764 and the Stamp Act of 1765. Britain's national debt had increased from £55 million to £133 million during the Seven Years War. Britons were already heavily taxed, and the economy was sluggish. The cabinet felt that it was only fair that those who benefited from Britain's protection should bear a portion of the cost. The taxes provoked heated opposition in America. The succeeding Rockingham government persuaded Parliament to rescind the Stamp Act in 1766, still declaring in principle the right to tax America. Critics wondered how, if the ministry gave way on the Stamp Tax, it would manage to exercise that hypothetical right in the future.[15]

William Pitt, a man honored on both sides of the Atlantic as architect of victory in the Seven Years War, assumed the post of prime minister in a new cabinet in July 1766. Elevated to the peerage with the title of Lord Chatham, he intended to pursue a permanent settlement with America. Unfortunately, he fell ill in March of the following year and in

his absence the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Charles Townshend, exercised greater influence.[16] Townshend proposed to fund the colonial governments by imposing duties on various imports, believing that external taxes would be more acceptable to Americans. The colonists responded with a boycott of British goods. Britain again backed away from confrontation, suspending all of the taxes in 1768 with the exception of a duty on tea.[17]

The Tea Act, enacted by the North ministry in 1773 to assist the East India Company and defray the costs of colonial government, led to the final crisis. On 16 December 1773, Bostonians dressed as Indians boarded British merchant ships and hurled 90,000 pounds of the East India Company's tea (valued at £10,000) into Boston harbor. Word of the Tea Party reached London on 27 January 1774. The cabinet proposed legislation in March to close the port of Boston until compensation was paid for the tea and to limit popular representation in Massachusetts' government.[18] On 19 April, Edmund Burke, delivering one of the finest speeches ever heard in Parliament, admonished his listeners that "magnanimity in politics is not seldom the truest wisdom." Parliament nonetheless adopted the Coercive Acts by June. The Americans' resistance was not discouraged but intensified. A Continental Congress convened in Philadelphia in September to demand revocation of the acts and to organize a boycott and embargo against Britain.[19]

Two efforts at conciliation were made, but neither succeeded. Chatham proposed on 1 February 1775 that Parliament rescind the Coercive Acts and concede that taxes could be imposed only with the approval of a colonial legislature. In return, the colonists would acknowledge Parliamentary sovereignty and the Crown's right to maintain an army in North America. At this late date, even this may not have been enough to assuage the Americans, but it was solidly defeated in Parliament.[20] Prime minister North realized by the end of 1774 that the Coercive Acts were not working. He convinced the cabinet in January 1775 to offer to refrain from taxing any American colony that would agree to pay for its own government and defense. This gesture, clearly intended to drive a wedge between moderates and radicals in America, was introduced formally in the House of Commons on 19 February.[21]

Whatever its merits, it was soon overtaken by events. Orders by the cabinet were sent in January and February to Thomas Gage, Britain's commander in America, demanding that he suppress the organizers of the rebellion. He was instructed not to shrink from forceful measures.

The letters arrived in mid-April. Gage, acting on his orders, dispatched 800 men from Boston on the night of the 18th to seize the armory at Concord. His men encountered the local militia at Lexington and exchanged fire. On June 17, the British command in Boston ordered 2200 British troops to storm the rebel redoubt on Charlestown Heights rather than cut the rebels' line of communication at Charleston Neck. Gage and his generals apparently agreed with General John Burgoyne that "respect and control…. depend in great measure upon the idea that trained troops are invincible against … undisciplined rabble…" The British took Bunker Hill, but 40% of the attackers were killed or wounded. The cabinet ignored an "Olive Branch Petition" from the Continental Congress and issued a Proclamation of Rebellion on 23 August 1775. An eight year struggle between Britain and America ensued.[22]

The Regime

Eighteenth century Britain can best be described as a mixed constitutional regime with an oligarchic and conservative tendency. Parliament represented the propertied, not only landed aristocrats but also the commercial class. One man in six had a vote. Parliament's fiscal powers precluded absolutism and encouraged the king to seek its consent and cooperation, but there was no precise specification of the limits of executive and legislative power. The House of Commons had the right to remove an offending minister, but nomination belonged to the king. A Prime Minister's tenure rested more on his monarch's confidence than that of Parliament. Ascending to the throne as a young man, George III aspired to be an active executive, unlike his immediate predecessor George II and more in the manner of William III. King George's interpretation of the constitution is considered plausible by many historians.[23]

George III was neither the ogre of Americans' imaging nor the bungler of British popular memory.[24] He was a devout and inwardly humble man, with little patience for flattery.[25] His tutor offered this assessment of the future king at age twenty-one:

> His parts, though not excellent, will be found very tolerable, if they are properly exercised. …His religion is free from all hypocrisy, but is not of the most charitable sort; he has rather too much attention to the sins of his neighbours…He does not want resolution, but it is mixed with too much

> obstinacy…He has great command of his passions, and will seldom do wrong, except when he mistakes wrong for right.[26]

George III was well informed about American affairs and took an active interest in policy, consistently pressing his ministers to remain firm. His thinking was logical but inflexible. He never experienced the slightest doubt regarding his course of action.[27] In late 1774, a time that, as John Shy puts it, "required the most careful calculations of power and interest…policy and honor were becoming hopelessly confused with one another." The king seemed more concerned about desertions from the army in Boston than in the possibility of war.[28] "I am not sorry that the line of conduct seems no chalked out," he declared in November 1774. "Blows must decide whether they are to be subject to this country or independent." In July of the following year he told North that "We must persist and not be dismayed by any difficulties that may arise on either side of the Atlantick. I know I am doing my Duty, and I can never wish to retract." In 1779, as the difficulties mounted, he dismissed concerns regarding the costs of the war, saying that was "only weighing such events in the scale of a tradesman behind his counter." The loss of the American colonies, he averred, would reduce England to second class status.[29] Bernard Donoughue concludes that "responsibility, loyalty, courage, complacency and priggishness were probably the five main ingredients of George III's character. None of them, separately or in combination, caused him to lose his American colonies…but these royal qualities were certainly factors influencing the manner in which Britain faced up to the colonial crisis."[30]

George III does not bear sole or even primary responsibility for the outbreak of the war.[31] His views of policy, though rigid, were by no means exceptional. Benjamin Franklin, then representing the colonies in London, reported in March 1774 that the Boston Tea Party "seems to have united all parties here against [us]."[32] Luminaries such as Samuel Johnson and Edward Gibbon strongly supported coercion of the Americans.[33] Dr. Johnson referred to the Americans as "a race of convicts" who "ought to be content with anything we may allow them short of hanging."[34] The Marquess of Rockingham, a former prime minister, admitted to Edmund Burke that "the generality of the people of England are now led away by the misrepresentations and arts of the ministry, the court, and their abettors; so that the violent measure towards America are freely adopted and countenanced by the majority

of individuals of all ranks, professions, or occupations in this country."[35] A merchant and opponent of the Coercive Acts remarked that "it is not an error of the ministry, it is an error of the nation. I see it everywhere I go."[36]

Conciliation was not politically feasible in 1774.[37] The most pacific factions in parliament, led by Chatham and Rockingham, were at odds.[38] Nor were interests "without doors" much of a factor. A decade earlier, public pressure on Parliament to avoid conflict with America had played a significant role in the overturning of the Stamp Act, particularly by merchants fearful of a reduction in trade in the event of war. In the ensuing decade, trade with the American colonies had fallen to only one-quarter its previous level, while trade with other countries was increasing rapidly. The merchants' protests in 1774 were few and feeble. Radicals favoring reform of the rotten boroughs had driven a wedge between the more pacific Whig faction led by Rockingham and the merchants of the City in London.[39] The effect of this waxing and waning of mercantile influence was that Britain averted war when America was isolated and delayed the reckoning until an alliance between America and France was feasible. Britain appeased when she might have fought and fought when she ought to have appeased.[40]

The Cabinet

Belligerent sentiment was well represented in North's cabinet. Three of the seven principals were strongly committed to coercion (the Earls of Sandwich, Suffolk and Gower) and two others were weaker politically and compliant with the former. The only dissenter was the Earl of Dartmouth, the Secretary for America, a gentle and pious man, but probably not combative enough prevail against vehement opposition.[41] The prime minister was Frederick Lord North. Unprepossessing in appearance and unassuming in manner, North was genial but shrewd. His self-effacing wit had won him influence and friends, not the least of whom was George III. North was not self-aggrandizing (he resisted the title 'prime minister'), but was somewhat less than diligent and prone to lapses of confidence when things went against him. As a politician, North instinctively strove for consensus and avoided confrontation with his colleagues.[42] Although a sympathetic figure and an admirable minister for normal times, Lord North was an unhappy choice in unhappy

circumstances. Decent and easy-going, he was not the man to impose restraint on a belligerent king and cabinet.[43]

The cabinet made serious misjudgments about America. They assumed that the threat or use of force would divide not unite the colonists; they thought that loyalists were a "silent majority" in America and that Boston could be isolated from the other colonies[44]; and they believed that the colonists lacked the skill and spirit to hold their own with professional soldiers.[45] When challenged in the House of Lords, the Earl of Sandwich asserted that the colonists were "raw, undisciplined, cowardly men."[46] Lord North initially shared these misconceptions. "The good of the [Boston Port Act] is that four or five frigates will do the business without any military force."[47] By the time he realized the necessity of compromise with America, it was no longer possible.[48]

No senior member of the government had been to America. The cabinet was dependent on reporting by others, and the quality of information they received from the new world left much to be desired. Colonial officials were for the most part mediocrities bent on accumulating wealth and returning to England to enjoy it. Many were arrogant and disdainful.[49] A former governor of Georgia stated that "we know the real inability of the Americans to make any effectual resistance to any coercive method which might be employed to compel their obedience. They are conscious of it themselves, but may well give scope to their insolent licentiousness when they have so long been suffered to practice it with impunity."[50] A former governor of Massachusetts assured the King that coercive legislation would bring "speedy submission" by the Americans.[51] Some professional military men concurred. One officer boasted in Parliament that 5000 British regulars could march unopposed from one end of America to the other. Another expressed doubt that it would come to that because "whenever we appear they are frightened out of their wits."[52] In fairness, some Britons saw America more realistically. John Gooch, a businessman living temporarily in Boston, wrote to a friend that the "Great Britain knows but little of America and should they proceed to hostilities I'm very doubtful whether we would be able to say with the Roman Tyrant *Veni Vidi Vici*. The Americans are a resolute, hardy and I may add an obstinate people that are not to be dragooned into compliance with arbitrary measures."[53]

The cabinet was eventually told the unvarnished truth. In a meeting with George III shortly after the Boston Tea Party, Gage, possibly succumbing to the temptation to say what the King wanted to hear, left him

with the impression that "they will be lyons whilst we are lambs but if we take the resolute part they will be very meek." After his return to Boston, Gage's reporting grew less optimistic but was infrequent and dilatory.[54] In January 1775, however, Gage warned the cabinet sternly that the 3000 troops currently at his disposal "will encourage resistance, not terrify." "Affairs here are worse than even at the time of the Stamp Act," he reported. "I don't mean in Boston but throughout the country…If you think ten thousand men enough send twenty, if a million pounds is thought enough, give two; you will save both blood and treasure in the end." His view was seconded shortly thereafter by the governor of New York and by many others later in the year.[55] Gage advised Lord Barrington, the Secretary of War, that the Americans might be able to field an army as large as 50,000, which would necessitate a commitment of 100,000 British troops. The entire British army numbered about 36,000 in 1775 and there were only nine regiments of regulars at full strength in England and Wales. Not only would a vast host have to be raised, it would also have to be provisioned on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean.[56] General Edward Harvey concluded that a land war in America was "as wild an idea as ever controverted common sense."[57]

Barrington and Sandwich advocated instead reliance on the navy, but this, too, was problematical.[58] A strictly naval strategy provided no protection to Canadians or American loyalists, nor did it offer the prospect of a quick and decisive victory. The American economy was heavily dependent on maritime transport, but the commander of the American fleet reported that he could not blockade a one-thousand-mile coastline with 27 ships. He asked for 23 more in the fall of 1774 and received 10. North had stinted on naval spending for several years, hoping to strengthen Britain's finances and to lure France into a rapprochement. As a result, the remainder of the fleet was in disrepair, and few ships were fit for reassignment. By 1774, France was implacable, Spain allied with France and no continental ally available. Britain was isolated diplomatically and reliant on her fleet. While North was reducing debt, France had been building ships. By 1775, Britain's fleet was 20% smaller than the combined fleets of France and Spain. Britain could not coerce the colonies by sea without leaving the mother country vulnerable.[59]

The cabinet responded to the warnings from Gage and Graves not by modifying policy but by questioning their character and competence.[60] On 12 December 1774, North took a step "imprudent to the point of folly."[61] Still hoping to avoid both war and debt, he proposed to the

House of Commons that naval personnel be reduced from 20,000 to 16,000 for the next year and requested only 17,547 for the army. Gage had seven regiments of infantry and five companies of artillery. His request in October for more troops was denied. Since no troops could be safely transferred from other uses, the cabinet comforted themselves with the notion that the conflict would be confined to Massachusetts. In January, four additional regiments and several hundred marines were promised, but Gage was told that the cabinet was not prepared to meet his request for 20,000 troops because that would involve "augmenting our army in general to a war establishment." North told Parliament that "the forces now demanded were sufficient" unless resistance spread beyond Massachusetts. After Bunker Hill, Gage requested 40,000 troops. Recruiting efforts lagged, and only 2000 were added, bringing his force to a total of 7000 by Christmas 1775.[62]

Gage warned the cabinet again that "the conquest of this country [would not be] quick or easy" and "could be effected only by Time and Perseverence." North now wondered not only whether the war could be won but whether it could be paid for.[63] Nonetheless, the cabinet, with only Dartmouth dissenting, agreed after Bunker Hill that Britain must deal the rebels "one decisive blow at land." Britain was now embroiled in ground war she was ill-prepared to fight.[64] Dartmouth, unable to prevail against "the wounded military pride of his colleagues,"[65] was replaced by George Germain, an able administrator, but a man of "dark malevolence, unrestrained arrogance, a caustic tongue, a vindictive nature … a deep love of power," and, needless to say, a strong commitment to a military solution.[66] A few despaired, but most Britons remained confident at the end of 1776. The nation rallied to the government. Parliament approved the government's preparations for war by large majorities. Britain entered the war united.[67]

Was there no alternative to war? Thomas Jefferson proposed in 1774 an early version of the British Commonwealth, a confederation of autonomous states, each with its own legislature, united in loyalty to a common crown. According to the distinguished historian Lewis Namier, eighteenth century British politics precluded such a compromise. North, and the English public, insisted on recognition of the supremacy of Parliament because they believed that it was fundamental to the constitutional settlement established in the Glorious Revolution. The dispute between America and Britain, according to this way of thinking, was a

Gordian knot that could not have been unraveled by diplomacy but only severed by war.[68]

Yet one has to wonder what would have happened if Chatham had not fallen ill in 1766 and remained vigorous enough to pursue compromise with the colonies.[69] After this opportunity was missed, the greatest inflexibility may not have been in the eighteenth-century constitution, but in the minds of the British. Ian Christie concludes that "the British…were overtaken by *hubris* after 1763."[70] According to the American historian Robert Middlekauff, their "political sensitivities" had been "deadened" not only by geographical distance and the ignorance that it inevitably fostered but by "years of dominance." The customary metaphors used to describe the relationship between Britain and America were either horticultural (America was a "plant to be tended") or paternal (a child to be watched and, if need be, disciplined). The implication was that because Americans owed their establishment to Britain, they also owed her obedience.[71] This sentiment coexisted and perhaps provided a rationalization for the notion that the colonies existed, as one official candidly put it, to be "useful to the mother country," adding to her power and prosperity. If such views were questioned in England, they were not questioned frequently in the court or the cabinet.[72]

The king and cabinet had been, in the words of Bernard Donoughue, "psychologically prepared for war some months before it broke out." When it came, war seemed to them almost a relief. "Certain ministers," he explains, "repeatedly denigrated the potential strength, courage and resolution of the Americans and…their public and private statements revealed a great deal of vindictiveness. … Ministers did not seem to look beyond the latest outrage and their collective responses rarely rose above the emotions of pride, resentment, anger and revenge."[73] "By the end of 1774," observes the American military historian John Shy, "there was no more calculating of the evidence at Whitehall, Westminster, or St. James's." The British leaders and much of the public had made up their minds. Admonitions were no longer heeded.[74]

Ignorant, resentful and contemptuous of their colonial subjects, Britain's leaders squandered the chance to preserve their American empire and stumbled heedlessly into a costly, protracted and ultimately futile war.

The War of 1812

Situation and Decision

On 4 June 1812, the House of Representatives voted 79-49 to declare war on Great Britain. The Senate followed on the 17th by a margin of 19-13. President Madison added his concurrence and a proclamation was issued on the 19th. The War of 1812 came to an end legally with the signing of the Treaty of Ghent on Christmas Eve two years later. No land was lost or won, but the grievances for which the war was undertaken were not addressed in the treaty. The young republic was probably fortunate that the outcome was not worse. With British troops in occupation of Maine, disaffected New Englanders met at Hartford in December 1814 to demand a series of amendments to the constitution, implying that secession could follow if they were not accepted.[75] The decision for war seems even odder when one considers the balance of forces at the time. Britain had an army of roughly 250,000 and a navy of over 600 vessels, 100 of which were deployed in the western Atlantic. In December of 1811, the United States had 5447 regulars in the army and a 16-ship navy. When some Americans suggested that the United States fight a "triangular war" against both France and Britain, France's ambassador wisecracked that in that event, he would have to seek an audience with Britain's envoy to organize cooperation against "so alarming a power."[76]

The American public was not clamoring for war. The brother in law of the Secretary of the Treasury told him that "the apathy of the Nation is not yet thrown off and never will be." The aforementioned French ambassador reported in January: "This war … is not made with enthusiasm; it is coldly undertaken. Honor may decide the Chiefs of the Nation; but the Citizens make up their minds according to their interest…They regretfully take up arms; they take them up sluggishly…" Although several states passed resolutions in support of war, the opposition party, the Federalists, was strongly opposed. Josiah Quincy wrote a widely circulated broadside accusing the ruling Republicans of "rushing into difficulties, with little calculation about the means, and little concern about the consequences." His party regained control of the legislatures of Massachusetts and New York in elections in the spring of 1812. Opinion was also shifting in Pennsylvania, heretofore a northern outpost of Republican support. Britain's ambassador estimated that 80% of

the public opposed war. This was no doubt exaggerated, but after the spring elections some members of Congress were beginning to hesitate. When the vote was taken, the Federalists in Congress rejected the war unanimously.[77]

The Jefferson administration had remained neutral in the struggle between Britain and Napoleon's France. Disagreements between Britain and the United States arose over maritime issues and sharpened as the European conflict intensified. Between 1803 and 1805, the British were living in fear of an invasion by Napoleon. British captains, desperate for manpower, asserted the right to conscript British sailors serving on American merchant ships. The practice was bitterly resented by Americans. Britain also attempted to suppress the American carrying trade between the West Indies and France. This led to the seizure of many American merchant ships. On 22 June 1807, HMS *Leopard* demanded to board the USS *Chesapeake* to search for deserters. After the request was refused, the *Leopard* fired on the American vessel, killing three sailors and wounding eighteen. The American public exploded in anger. There were many calls for a declaration of war, but President Jefferson rejected retaliation and pursued a diplomatic solution, without success. Emotions subsided, and the moment passed. Jefferson himself had observed the previous year that "opinion in Europe [is that] our government is entirely in Quaker principles." His policy during the crisis did nothing to alter that impression.[78]

Britain enacted the Orders in Council in November 1807, which declared that all American trade with Europe must flow through Britain. France adopted a similar measure, and Americans faced a dilemma. If American ships put in to port in Britain, as required by the Orders in Council, they were liable to seizure by the French; if they did not, they were liable to seizure by the British. The losses to the United States were substantial: nine hundred American vessels were seized by the belligerents over the next five years. Jefferson again sought a non-violent solution. At his urging, Congress passed the Embargo Act in December 1807, which prohibited any American ship from sailing from any American port for any foreign port. Jefferson's Republicans were philosophically averse to armies and navies, which they deemed threatening to peace, liberty and prosperity. Jefferson fancied that he would demonstrate to the Europeans that "there are peaceable means of repressing injustice." James Madison, his secretary of state, concurred. "War contains so much folly, as well as wickedness," he observed in 1792, "that

much is to be hoped from the progress of reason; and if anything is to be hoped, everything ought to be tried." The Republicans' optimism was not entirely unfounded. The United States was the largest market for Britain's exports and the largest neutral carrier of goods, and Britain was not self-sufficient in strategic commodities. Britain survived the embargo by increasing exports to Spanish America and imports from Canada, but it aggravated regional tensions in the United States and led to a Federalist revival in New England. Jefferson accepted the embargo's repeal late in his presidency.[79]

Jefferson's successor, fellow Virginian Madison, continued the attempts to redress the grievances of his country by means short of war. Congress adopted a measure known as Macon's Bill #2, which promised Britain and France that if one rescinded her trade limitations, the United States would resume trading and implement a boycott against the other. Madison decided to treat a deceitful response by Napoleon as evidence of compliance and proceeded to implement non-importation against Britain, hoping that this might elicit a face-saving concession from Britain. None was forthcoming. London newspapers viewed the legislation as surrender. Britain responded to the resumption of trade with France by reinforcing her western Atlantic fleet and continuing to board and capture American merchant vessels, often within sight of the coast. Negotiations with the British ambassador in July were completely unproductive.[80]

The Man

James Madison was a small, slender man with a weak voice. Reserved by nature, he did not make an overwhelming first impression, but longer acquaintance gave evidence of his wisdom and industry. Witty, affable and charming, he was an indifferent speaker but a superb conversationalist.[81] The scholarly Madison tended to deliberate at length. Some mistook his tendency to reserve judgment as indecisiveness, but once he made up his mind, he was firm— "obstinate as a mule," one British diplomat lamented—but mostly on points of principle. Regarding specifics, he was flexible.[82] Once the war began and many tribulations followed, Madison's forbearance and magnanimity preserved the republic in a situation of great peril, and that ought not to be forgotten.[83] The question is whether this crisis might have been avoided by a statesman of a different temperament and outlook.

The Virginian was uncommonly modest for a successful politician. Contemporaries noted his "reluctance to assert his presence and to impose himself and his views on others" in public or private. He espoused a "principled resistance to all temptations of power" and in office eschewed executive aggrandizement. Fairly or not, an early biographer concluded that he was "deficient in command."[84] Contemporaries differed in their assessments of Madison but perceived many of the same traits and tendencies. His private secretary, Edward Coles, recalled later that "it was congenial alike to the life and character of Mr. Madison that he should be reluctant to go to war…a savage and brutal manner of settling disputes among nations."[85] Henry Clay, contrasting Madison with Jefferson, praised Madison as "cool, dispassionate, practical and safe." Jefferson, in his mind, "had the most genius [but] Madison, the most judgment and common sense."[86] Senator John Adair, on the other hand, concluded in 1806 that he was "too cautious—too fearful and timid to direct the affairs of the nation."[87] Calhoun likewise worried in April 1812 that "our president, though a man of amiable manners and great talents, has not I fear those commanding talents, which are necessary to control those about him. He permits division in his cabinet. He reluctantly gives up the system of peace."[88] One modern historian concludes that, fairly or not, Madison acquired at home and abroad a reputation for weakness that stymied his efforts at a peaceful solution.[89]

The Federalist charge that the War of 1812 was "Mr. Madison's War" is polemical and misleading. Madison without question would have preferred to resolve the issues with Britain by some other means, but the United States' puny military and sharply divided politics inspired more contempt than fear. He rightly concluded by late 1811 that the best way to avoid a war was to prepare for it. The president asked Congress on 5 November 1811 to authorize an expansion of the regular army to 10,000 and the construction of 12 ships of the line and 20 frigates. Although specific threats and ultimata were removed from the text on the advice of an anxious advisor, the tone of the address was considered appropriately firm, at least by most Republicans.[90] Congress dawdled for two months, then rejected the proposed addition to the fleet and increased the projected force to 25,000, a figure well beyond the capacity of the United States to recruit and finance. If the intent of Madison's Republican rivals was to embarrass the administration, it succeeded. The effect, in the judgment of James Monroe, was to convince the British that "the Executive did not intend to make war."

The crucial audience for Madison's words and gestures was the young British ambassador, Augustus Foster. Madison informed him that he would await the return of the *Hornet*, which had been dispatched to Britain carrying news of the legislation, before deciding whether to change course. Foster did not grasp Madison's intent. The suspicion that Madison was trying to frighten Britain with an army that existed only on paper was reinforced by the behavior of Congress, which was not only slow to adopt the legislation, but reluctant to pay for it. In February, Congress voted to delay the imposition of the taxes necessary to fund the army until war was declared. Worst of all, although Federalist opposition to the war was muted in much of the country, in New England it was vocal and extravagant. Federalists asserted publicly that the Republicans "would not have nerve enough to meet war" and this, in the judgment of Congressman Jonathan Roberts, "mainly induced Britain to persist in her aggressions." Federalist leaders urged the British privately to maintain the Orders in Council, hoping to thwart a peaceful settlement and leave the Republicans no choice but humiliating capitulation or military defeat. Foster listened too often and too uncritically to his Federalist confidantes. Madison's persistent reluctance to resort to military coercion may have weakened his credibility, but when he finally attempted to procure the means to do so, his efforts were defeated by the Congressional Republicans' hesitation, the Federalists' disloyalty and Augustus Foster's misjudgment. The British did not perceive in America determination but rather, in the words of the London *Courier*, "trembling and hesitating on the slippery verge of war." When the *Hornet* returned from Britain on 19 May with no encouraging news, Madison despaired of a peaceful resolution to the impasse and on 1 June submitted a war message to Congress. Foster realized, too late, that he had underestimated the president's resolve. "Nine tenths of the people will not yet believe it possible that Mr. Madison will go to war," he reported in June, "but it is too apparent that he is now obstinately bent on it as a solution of his difficulties."[91]

Madison, according to biographer Irving Brant, "had a profound belief that the course he was taking was right and proper, although desirable only as the lesser of two evils."[92] That did not make his decision easy. Foster observed in June, just after his war address to Congress, that the president appeared "ghastly pale and weighted down with all the responsibility he would incur."[93] What Madison did not know is British Prime Minister Spencer Perceval had been assassinated entering

Parliament on 11 May. Britain was suffering a severe depression, to which U.S. sanctions had contributed, and petitions were streaming in from manufacturing districts entreating Parliament to restore normal trade with America. Perceval and his Tory cabinet had remained obdurate. The new government led by Lord Liverpool proposed to revoke the hated Orders in Council on 16 June. The navy was also instructed to take "especial care" to avoid incidents with the United States. Madison was apprised of none of this. He acknowledged later that abrogation of the Orders in Council would have convinced him to keep the peace. Hence, any conceivable delay in Washington would have prevented the war. Madison was tempted to slow the decision-making process (for example by encouraging Congress to adjourn), but he was also concerned in light of the mixed signals sent by Washington in the past to project an image of determination. The opportunity was lost.[94]

The Regime

The Twelfth Congress was elected by a broad electorate but not yet by universal manhood suffrage. Approximately two-thirds of white male adults were enfranchised in the 1790s. By 1810, property and tax qualifications had been eliminated in several places, but one or both were still in place in a majority of the states.[95] The supporters of war in that body were labeled "War Hawks" by Federalist polemicists. The name stuck, but it overstates their unity and bellicosity. The War Hawks were a minority faction in the ruling Republican Party, led by the 35-year-old Henry Clay. Clay used his authority as Speaker of the House to place like-minded men in influential positions, but he and his most prominent colleague, John C. Calhoun, did not decide to support war until the fall of 1811. The War Hawks won the Congressional debate largely because the majority of the members felt that everything short of war had already been tried.[96]

Some favored a "triangular war" against France as well as Britain, but this was not feasible. A choice between adversaries had to be made, and recent history determined it. France was a former ally and Britain a former enemy.[97] Some favored a maritime war against British shipping. This option appealed to those whose constituents were most exposed to British retaliation by sea, but representatives from the South and West were rightly skeptical. The miniscule American navy was no match for Britain's.[98]

To the War Hawks, it made sense to risk a wider war by striking not at Britain's strength but her vulnerability. Canada had a land border of nearly 1200 miles with the United States and populations whose loyalty to the Crown was thought to be tenuous. Upper Canada (Ontario) was one-third American in origin; Lower Canada (Québec) was two-thirds French. The United States had an initial advantage of 11,700 to 7000 in enlisted troops, although 5000 of the Americans were recent recruits. Henry Clay believed that 10,000 men would suffice to invade Canada and defend the homeland, but if not, the United States, given its huge edge in population (7.5 million to Canada's 0.5 million), could mobilize more. If the United States seized Montréal, the line of communications between Upper Canada and the Atlantic would be severed. Deprived of lumber and other Canadian commodities, Britain would be much more vulnerable to an American embargo.[99] Most of the Republicans expected what crusty John Randolph called sarcastically a "holiday campaign…with no expense of blood, or treasure, on our part."[100] Thomas Jefferson wrote from Monticello that "the acquisition of Canada…as far as the neighborhood of Quebec will be a mere matter of marching."[101] Madison's able secretary of state, James Monroe, wrote to a friend that "we shall experience little annoyance or embarrassment in the effort."[102]

The conventional military wisdom of the time was that the attacker required a superiority of three or four to one to take a fortified defensive position such as Montréal or Québec City. Secretary of War Henry Dearborn estimated the United States would need 24,000 men to overwhelm Québec with its current garrison. If the war were delayed, permitting Britain to bring reinforcements, the attacking force would have to be doubled. An offensive on Upper Canada appeared to be more feasible. A force of 5000 would be enough, provided that the operation was concluded before the onset of the harsh northern winter. The regular army that Congress had authorized was not ready for either campaign. Republicans assumed that much of the manpower would be provided by volunteers and the existing state militias, but volunteers were not coming forward in large numbers and the states closest to the theater, those of New England, were refusing to cooperate. Madison and the Congressional War Hawks cannot have imagined the invasion of Canada to be the military parade some expected.[103]

When the war came in 1812, the British skillfully parried American thrusts at Detroit, Niagara and Lake Champlain. Geography, as John Randolph had foreseen, posed a greater obstacle to the American

offensive than the War Hawks realized. The United States' inland transportation infrastructure was simply too primitive and the distances too great. American militiamen proved undisciplined and at times cowardly. They were not greeted by the Canadians as liberators. The French of Lower Canada were content under British rule; the former Americans of Upper Canada were Tories. The Canadian front remained in stalemate for two years. In the meantime, a British blockade of America's ports and harbors reduced American exports from $45 million in 1811 to $7 million in 1814. When the war concluded in Europe in 1814, the British were not in a forgiving mood. Fourteen regiments were released from Europe for duty in America. On 18 August, four thousand redcoats under the command of Robert Ross landed at Benedict, Maryland, defeated the defenders at Bladensburg and entered a deserted Washington on the 24th, putting the Capitol, the White House and several other buildings to the torch before returning to the fleet.[104]

Canada was for the War Hawks not the objective of the war, as some historians have contended, but the means. Concerns about maritime rights and the implications for the honor of the United States predominated in the Congressional debates preceding the Declaration, and the resolutions passed by the pro-war states laid heavy emphasis on the importance of national honor.[105] Summing up his argument on New Year's Eve to the Congress, Clay asked "what are we not to lose by peace? Commerce, character, a nation's best treasure, honor!"[106] James Monroe wrote to a British acquaintance: "Instead of the insults & injuries which are so constantly offered to the U. States, & to their government…treat us as a nation having rights, possessing passions, and much sensibility to national honor, & the result would not fail to be satisfactory."[107] John C. Calhoun asserted that the U.S. government must "protect every citizen in the lawful pursuit of his business," and rejected further negotiations because they had failed to uphold "national honor and interest." Further negotiation, he suggested, "might suit an inconsiderable nation, or one that had not such important rights at stake. [But] experience has proved it improper for us. Its effects have been distrust at home and contempt abroad."[108] The editorialist for the Washington *National Intelligencer* declared that "Not only the rights of the nation, but the character of the government are involved in the issue." "If War is not resorted to," averred a Congressman from Tennessee, "this nation, or rather their representatives will be disgraced." Another Republican asserted that "The time has come to humble the

overgrown monsters and to cause our republic to be respected at home and abroad."[109]

The War Hawks felt humiliated by Britain's refusal to respect America's rights and independence.[110] President Madison shared their indignation. Explaining why he chose to hold Britain accountable but not France, he asserted that "the original sin against neutrals lies with Britain and that…she persists in it." Repeated injuries became insults to a country growing in self-regard. Reparation for the Chesapeake, Madison stated, must be such as to satisfy "a nation which values its honor and knows its importance."[111]

More than pride was at stake, important though that was. If the elected government appeared unwilling or unable to assert and protect the rights of Americans, the public might lose confidence and demand its replacement with a government more forceful and effective. The mass political parties that developed early in the republic's history were unexpected by the founders and viewed with suspicion. Each feared that other would subvert the regime established by the revolution of 1776 by transforming it, depending on one's viewpoint, into an aristocratic monarchy subservient to Britain or a Jacobin dictatorship in league with France. Their fears were excessive, particularly those of the Federalists, but experience with mass democracy was as yet too limited to inspire mutual trust. Partisanship led some to conclude that unscrupulousness was justified to prevent the opposite party from retaining control.[112] The domestic conflict between the Federalists and the Republicans exacerbated the international conflict between Britain and the United States. Federalists deliberately undermined the credibility of Madison's policy of coercion by public and private communications with the British, leaving the President with a choice between war or acquiescence. "Only the perception of a disloyal domestic opposition waiting in the wings to capitalize on their humiliation and repudiate what had been achieved forty years before," concludes Richard Buel, "can explain the Republican willingness to embark on a war totally unprepared."[113]

This posed a threat in their eyes not only to the Republican Party but to the republic itself. The infant nation was the only democratic republic in the world. Its success and survival could not be taken for granted. It was essential, in the minds of the Republican leadership, that they demonstrate that they could command the respect of the great powers. If not, the republic would be at risk.[114] The British ambassador, Augustus Foster, remembered James Monroe explaining to him that if

the United States acquiesced in British encroachments and refused to fight "he should feel like a man disgraced and ashamed to shew his face," and that if his colleagues failed to act "they might as well be without a Government at once and for his part would rather quit the United States at once and go somewhere else where there was a Government that could make itself respected."[115] Henry Clay, looking back on the decision for war in 1816, posed a question to his audience:

> Have we gained nothing by the war? Let any man look at the degraded condition of this country before the war; the scorn of the universe, the contempt of ourselves; and tell me if we have gained nothing by the war? What is our present situation? Respectability and character abroad—security and confidence at home. If we have not obtained in the opinion of some the full measure of retribution, our character and Constitution are placed on a solid basis, never to be shaken.[116]

Thus, a weak and divided country went to war against a powerful enemy in 1812, in the words of Irving Brant, because the president and much of the Congress "were opposed to national humiliation."[117]

The Secession of the Confederacy

Situation, Alternatives, Decisions

Abraham Lincoln was elected by a plurality of voters on 6 November 1860. On 20 December, a special convention called by the South Carolina legislature voted to withdraw from the union. This set in motion of wave of similar votes during January and early February in Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana and Texas. Representatives of these states met in Montgomery 4–9 February to form a provisional government. The Confederate States of America was declared and Jefferson Davis selected as President before Lincoln had been inaugurated. Lincoln pledged in his inaugural address of 4 March not to interfere with slavery where it was currently practiced. He rejected secession adamantly, but concluded with an eloquent appeal for unity. The most pressing issue was Fort Sumter in the harbor of Charleston, South Carolina, which had become a symbol of federal authority. The President stated that he would "hold, occupy and possess" federal property inside the Confederacy but refrain from acts of provocation. Lincoln

was striving to strike a balance between appeasement and confrontation in the hope that, if he could buy enough time, unionist sentiment in the South would revive. To this end, he ordered a delivery of supplies to Fort Sumter on 4 April, if possible without the use of force, and so advised the governor of South Carolina. Intentionally or not, he had put the onus of decision on Jefferson Davis. The Confederate cabinet decided on 9 April to force the surrender of the fort before the arrival of the supply ships. Sumter was bombarded into submission on 14 April. The following day, Lincoln called for the states to provide a militia of 75,000. The call was met enthusiastically in the North, and the upper South rallied to the Confederate cause. The two sides met on the battlefield for the first time at Bull Run on 21 July. By the time the War Between the States had run its course, more than 620,000 American lives had been lost.[118]

The Confederates believed that secession would probably not lead to war, but that if it did, the war would be brief, successful and cheap.[119] Ill-chosen words from the North fostered this misguided confidence. Horace Greeley, despite the abolitionist sympathies of his influential newspaper, proclaimed after the election that the South ought to be permitted to "depart in peace." Many northern Democrats were outspoken in their opposition to war. The outgoing President Buchanan denied publicly that he had the means to stop secession and seemed to accept the loss of South Carolina. Private correspondence often confirmed these impressions.[120] Lincoln's awkward beginning compounded the problem. At the end of his journey eastward from Illinois the president-elect was apprised of an assassination plot in Baltimore and advised to switch trains. He arrived in Washington in the darkness before dawn. Lincoln's less than dignified entry into the capital was ridiculed in cartoons and editorials. The impression conveyed was one of fecklessness.[121] Southerners concluded, in the judgment of military historian Brian Holden Reid, that "Bluster and belligerence…would secure their independence because northerners lacked the resolve, which southerners had in abundance, to hold on to what they wanted."[122]

The armed forces at the Federal Government's disposal were not intimidating. The army, numbering only 16,000, was mostly deployed in outposts west of the Mississippi; much of the navy was in distant waters, the rest in disrepair. One-third of the officer corps, including some of the ablest men, defected to the confederacy.[123] Conquest of the Confederacy would be no easy task. Its territory was as vast as European Russia, and

the rivers of the eastern theater ran athwart the line of the Union's advance.[124] The North did possess immense material advantages: 3.5 times as many males of military age, 10 times the industrial production and a far superior transportation system.[125] But Southerners were convinced that they held a trump card, "King Cotton." Were the export of cotton interrupted, one South Carolinian predicted, "not all the ruin which relentless war has ever brought upon a stricken people, will rival the desolation which that single event will spread through the great manufacturing and commercial States of Europe and America." Britain and France were so heavily dependent on southern cotton for their industry that they would surely intervene to stop the fighting or break a northern blockade. Of course, the South also needed to sell, but this did not much trouble the enthusiasts. A long war was not thought to be in prospect.[126]

Senator Chesnut of South Carolina proclaimed that he was prepared to drink all the blood shed for secession; others suggested that a lady's thimble would be sufficient to contain it; the future Secretary of War, Leroy Pope Walker, promised his fellow Alabamans that he would be able to blot out all the blood with his handkerchief.[127] After the celebrated novelist August Evans visited Montgomery and talked to the delegates, she stated "I know positively that there is to be *no* fighting."[128] When it became apparent that war would not be avoided, popular enthusiasm was undimmed. The citizens of Montgomery, according to a local editor, were "praying for a fight," and in Mississippi, the people were said to be "pleased with the prospect of a fight."[129] Southerners felt a justifiable pride in the excellence of their military academies (V. M. I. and the Citadel) and the valor of her native sons in the Mexican War, but this degenerated too often into bumptious pugnacity. William G. Simms boasted to one visiting Yankee that in the event of sectional war, "we shall crush you as I would crush an egg." A judge suggested that if war broke out the South would "whip the Yankees with children's pop-guns."[130]

The odd man out of this happy consensus was Alexander Stephens of Georgia, the eventual vice-president of the Confederacy. Stephens viewed war with great apprehension. "We and our posterity shall see our lovely South desolated by the demon of war," he predicted before Georgia's convention. "We are on the eve of a tremendous conflict," he observed after Fort Sumter. "If one general battle ensues, it will take many more to close the strife." Stephens was appalled by the heedless complacency of his colleagues in Montgomery.[131] He remained firmly

unionist. Stephens knew Lincoln from his years in Congress and trusted him. Yielding to no one in his defense of slavery, he believed that it was safer inside the union than outside of it. "Let us not anticipate a threatened evil," he admonished, for "revolutions are much easier started than controlled."[132]

Secession was, in the words of James McPherson, a "pre-emptive counter-revolution" intended to forestall a threat to the interest of the South. That interest was slavery. As Jefferson Davis explained: "We left the Union to save ourselves from a revolution that threatened to make property in slaves so insecure as to be comparatively worthless."[133] If that was the interest, what was the threat? The price of a robust male slave fell from $1350–1400 to about $1250 after the election, an unwelcome but not exactly ruinous development. Lincoln's stated policy was the "containment" of slavery, not its immediate abolition. His party was still a minority in Congress, the Supreme Court of Justice Taney was well disposed to the South and Southerners were well represented in the federal bureaucracy.[134] As Alexander Stephens would have asked, why the haste?

One possible answer is that slavery had to expand in order to survive. The South, Eugene Genovese maintains, had a cohesive ruling class, the slaveholding planters. They understood their "class interest" not primarily as the maximization of wealth but the preservation of power. Slavery not only provided the gratifying feeling of direct dominance but a broader influence over the politics and culture of the South. The slave economy sustained the planters' superiority by stifling industrialists and yeoman farmers. The South, which had enjoyed great influence over the Union in its early decades, found itself steadily losing ground economically and politically to the prosperous North. Plantation agriculture exhausted the soil, leading the planters to acquire additional land at the expense of poorer farmers. A highly skewed distribution of wealth resulted. Hence, according to another scholar, "the continual maturation of slavery within a fixed geographical area created class and racial stresses that could be relived only through expansion."[135]

Economic circumstances on the eve of secession were far from desperate, however. The South's rate of economic growth exceeded that of the nation as a whole. Cotton production greatly expanded from 1800–1860, but prices remained stable during the two decades preceding Lincoln's election. The value of improved land rose sharply from 1850 to 1860, but plenty of land was still available for settlement. The price

of slaves had also increased substantially. Although the extension of slavery to virgin lands contributed to profitability by increasing the slaves' productivity, it also increased the size of the cotton crop and reduced prices.[136]

Was the decision to secede 'rational'?[137] If Lincoln's election threatened the interests of the South, or at least its dominant class, the threat did not appear to be imminent.[138] Southerners had $3–4 billion of capital invested in slaves; the War Between the States destroyed $20 billion in property, most of it in the Confederacy.[139] Before the war the horrific effect of rifled weapons on the combatants was poorly understood.[140] Ignorance of military technology does not suffice as an explanation, let alone an excuse. In his inaugural address, Lincoln raised some difficult questions for Southern secessionists:

> Will you hazard so desperate a step, while there is any possibility that any portion of the ills you fly from, have no real existence? Will you, while the certain ills you fly to, are greater than the real ones you fly from? Will you risk the commission of so fearful a mistake?[141]

Secession produced a war that ravaged the South and destroyed the institution it was intended to preserve.[142] The Confederates flew from lesser to greater ills, accepting dire consequences they did not foresee or from which they had averted their gaze. Why did they do so?

The Regime

"We have a wolf by the ears," admitted Thomas Jefferson many years before.[143] White Southerners preferred not to speak of such things, but they remembered that a slave revolt in Santo Domingo had exterminated the entire white population. The black population was about half that of the white population in the South as a whole (4–8 million), but in coastal South Carolina, the population was 80–90% black. John Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry in 1850 released a torrent of anxiety across the region and nowhere more than in South Carolina. Rumors of abolitionist instigation and conspiracies to foment slave revolts were rife throughout the South in 1860, and they were given greater currency by the radical press. The climate of opinion was close to hysteria. A friend wrote to Alexander Stephens that the people in Savannah were "wild and driven to desperation." Secessionists tried to exploit these sentiments for

their own purposes, but as one historian puts it, "the fear—of–insurrection–abolition syndrome was the core of the secessionist persuasion not its vehicle."[144] In this context, the election of Lincoln appeared much more menacing. The appointment of Republican officials in the South and the relaxation of the censorship exercised over the flow of mail, it was feared, would increase the public's exposure to abolitionist opinion and might eventually reach the slaves. Had South Carolina not left the union, a professor of mathematics explained four days after the decision, "she was to be Santo Domingo'd."[145]

If calculations of interest divided the white population, fear of the slaves united them. "In retrospect," notes historian Rembert Patrick, "the confidence and flamboyant prophecies prevalent in the South are amazing. Though it is apparent that not everyone succumbed to the current propaganda, there was a remarkable degree of unanimity as to the purposes of war and its ultimate outcome."[146] This unanimity was, as we have seen, not exactly conducive to realistic analysis of the risks of secession. What produced it?

Slavery had a corrupting effect on Southern democracy. Cohesion among the whites was deemed necessary for the continuing subordination of the blacks. Hence, there was a preexisting tendency to suppress questioning and disagreement regarding the fundamental institution of slavery. Printed materials entering the South were subject to strict censorship.[147] Lincoln's victory brought in South Carolina what one contemporary described as "a complete *landsturm*, a general rising of the people, and the politicians far behind them." Carolinians were convinced that the election of an abolitionist President, however moderate he professed to be, would galvanize the slaves. This fearful enthusiasm carried along the upcountry yeomen farmers who in less turbulent times would have perceived little advantage to themselves in the defense of slavery.[148] Ardent secessionists sensed that their moment had come. Controlling most of the governships and state legislatures in the Deep South, they adopted the simple but effective tactic of forcing decisions as quickly as possible before the public frenzy subsided. South Carolina elected a special convention on 6 December. The body met at Charleston and voted to secede on the 20th. South Carolina's impetuous decision created momentum that was sustained by early elections in the neighboring states. Five conventions were called within 23 days of the national election.[149] Haste was supplemented by intimidation. Those holding out hope for compromise were scorned as "submissionists" or "cowards

and traitors." Threats of violence were directed at suspected unionists in South Carolina and Georgia; and in Texas, the state militia arrested more than 200 unionists, of whom 44 were executed and several others lynched. "People are wild," reported secessionist James Hammond of South Carolina. Moderate Southerners were cowed.[150]

If only the momentum had been broken, the looming catastrophe might have been averted. The best chance was in Georgia, the keystone of the southern arc, the richest and most populous state in the lower south, and the one best endowed with political talent.[151] The ablest of the South's politicians was the aforementioned Alexander Stephens. Emaciated, sickly and melancholy, he was an unlikely champion. Yet "Little Aleck," as he was known, was an eloquent orator and formidable debater. Stephens was the best chance the embattled unionists had. Dispirited by the secessionist mania, he repaired to his home in Crawfordville and emerged only once during the campaign for the special assembly. Turnout fell in unionist counties and the secessionists won Georgia's election of 2 January 1861 by a narrow margin (42,744 to 41,717). If only a few hundred more Georgians had braved the winter storms to cast votes, the rush to disaster might have been halted. "You can save the country, I do firmly believe," his brother advised him. But "your despair will be the cause of defeat." Stephens, paralyzed by fatalism, remained silent.[152]

The disproportion between the tangible grievances of the South and the action taken for their redress is striking. The main complaint in 1860 was lax enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law. By one estimate, 0.0003% of the slave population had been fugitives in 1850 and most never reached the North or acted under instigation from the North. Historian Avery Craven suspects that Southerners "resented less what the Republicans had done or might do, than the things they said and the self-righteous way in which they said them." In short, "they placed honor above interest."[153] Lincoln's election was taken as an insult by a proud people. He had declared slavery to be morally wrong and insisted that henceforth policy must be based on that premise. This exasperated a planter elite accustomed to obedience and deference. A pro-Douglas newspaper in Atlanta announced:

> Let the consequences be what they may—whether the Potomac is crimsoned in human gore, and Pennsylvania Avenue is paved ten fathoms in depth with mangled bodies, or whether the last vestige of liberty is swept

> from the face of the American continent, the South will never submit to such humiliation and degradation as the inauguration of Abraham Lincoln.[154]

Historian Bertram Wyatt-Brown contends that in the American South traditional honor played a much greater role in the moral psychology of the people. Traditional honor is the sense of self-worth one feels from receiving the respect of others. Its opposite is shame, a collapse of self-respect resulting from public humiliation. The typical reaction to shame is denial followed by demand for vindication, which, in antebellum Southern society, not infrequently took the form of violence. "Everything with me depends upon the estimation in which I am held," admitted secessionist Beverley Tucker. "Reputation is everything," stated James Henry Hammond. Wyatt-Brown asserts, much like the authors cited above, that the South felt humiliated by the words and deeds of the North. An example is the Wilmot Proviso, which prohibited slave owners from bringing their slaves into the territories acquired from Mexico. It was condemned by the secessionist ideologue William Yancey as "discrimination as degrading as it is injurious. Even the temperate Alexander Stephens considered it "an expression of the world of the deliberate opinion of the Federal Government that institutions tolerated in the South deserve public censure and national odium." Wyatt-Brown concludes that "the purpose of the slaughter was in part the preservation of southern self-respect…Southern whites behaved in this fashion not because they were sinners but because they were faithful servants of archaic custom." Consider one James Jones, an ardent South Carolinian secessionist: "[Even] if we fail, we have saved our honor and lost nothing."[155] Or Senator Albert Gallatin Brown of Mississippi: "If it should cost us the Union, our fortunes, our lives, let them go. Better ruin then meek submission to a disgrace so deep and damning."[156] Or David Clopton, writing in December 1860: "I would be an equal or a corpse."[157]

The Man

Although the state secession meetings and the Montgomery convention had put the union in grave peril, there was still a small chance that war and disunion could be avoided. The act that began the war was the bombardment of Fort Sumter. The decision was made by Jefferson Davis

and his cabinet. An animated Robert Toombs warned that the attack was "unnecessary," would "put us in the wrong" and would be "suicide." Davis rejected his advice. "Let us take Fort Sumter," he declared.[158]

Davis had not sought the office. He received the news of his election, his wife Varina noticed, like a man receives a death sentence. He accepted out of duty not ambition.[159] Davis harbored deep reservations about secession. Unlike many of his colleagues, he understood that war was likely and that it would be protracted, costly and difficult. He had served in the War Department and well understood the South's deficiencies in men and materiel.[160] Although one scholar surmises that Davis miscalculated, expecting that the reduction of Fort Sumter would deter the North, others conclude that he knew that it would to lead to war.[161] Why did he do it?

Jefferson Davis was courageous and devout. He had won renown for his valor at the battles of Monterrey and Buena Vista in the Mexican War, but over time his bravery was transformed into what one biographer terms a "reflexive combativeness and an instinct to fight first and think later."[162] Although he did not join the Episcopal Church until 1861, he had long attended services and made frequent public and private references to God. Davis owned 113 slaves in 1860. His Christian faith encouraged their humane treatment but also provided according to his own understanding a justification for their continuing subjection.[163] Able, diligent and experienced, Jefferson Davis brought many strengths to the Confederate Presidency.[164] At the core of his psyche, however, lay insecurity. According to two biographies, this nagging feeling, rooted in a dearth of parental affection, was the crucial influence on his behavior. Davis's insecurity manifested itself in seemingly contradictory ways. He remained passive at many points in his life and allowed the actions of others to determine his course, which he then accepted as duty. When faced with an inescapable decision, he was thorough, applying his impressive intellect to the mastery of detail, sometimes compulsively. Prolonged indecision was often the result. Once his decision was made, however, he would cling to it rigidly, sensitive to criticism, vulnerable to flattery, closed to experience and aggressive toward opponents. Principled but self-righteous, Davis eschewed compromise, viewing adversaries not as misguided but evil.[165] Davis's obstinacy presented a final obstacle to conciliation.

For Davis and his colleagues "the Union occupation [of Fort Sumter] mocked the independence of the Confederacy [which] could not stand

as an independent nation so long as another power maintained an uninvited force within its borders."[166] According to William C. Davis, "The embarrassment of the tiny Yankee garrison glaring defiantly at all the armed South Carolinians ringing Charleston harbor dug at [the Montgomery convention] delegates like a knife."[167] Davis felt this, too. "A devotion to honor regardless of the consequences," says biographer and historian Clement Eaton, was "an important aspect of the Southern mind in 1861" and Jefferson Davis exemplified this. "The key to the riddle of Davis's self-defeating personality may well have been invincible pride—far beyond that of ordinary individuals—that was closely associated in his mind with the notion of honor."[168] For such a man, "not to act [against Fort Sumter] was to admit defeat and humiliation."[169]

The Wars of Republics

The wars of this chapter were fought by Republics against fellow Republics. None could be considered a success. Britain and the Confederacy were defeated in protracted, exhausting wars; the United States fought to a draw in 1812–1814, but only after frequent embarrassment on the battlefield. In every instance, clear-sighted skeptics issued warnings and the policy process eventually brought to light good reasons for caution. The Republics went to war nonetheless.

All of them had security concerns. Britain needed to maintain her power position in the ongoing rivalry with France. The post-revolutionary generation in America was determined to preserve the nation's hard-won independence. Southern planters wanted to protect slavery. War was not the only way (and in most cases not the best way) of achieving these objectives, however.

Britain prior to 1775 and the United States prior to 1812 tried several expedients before resorting to war, including piecemeal appeasement, economic pressure and the threat of force or limited use of force. None availed. The effectiveness of "coercive diplomacy" depends on credibility. The Republics' prolonged hesitation and conspicuous lack of preparation rendered their threats unconvincing. Their reluctance to go to war made war more likely. Kant's premise was correct, but not his conclusion.

The earlier republics had serious institutional flaws and could be considered immature or incomplete. George III's participation in policy making in Britain was unhelpful but probably not decisive. The fundamental problem was not personal but constitutional. The unresolved

ambiguity regarding the extent of the monarch's powers may have precluded the most promising compromise between Britain and the colonists, a separate colonial parliament under a common king. By 1812, the United States was experiencing political phenomena new not only to Americans, but to mankind. Political parties, now accepted as an essential link between the public and the government, were a novel and disturbing development unforeseen by the founders. The result of this awkward political adolescence was an intense partisanship that crippled Madison's policy of coercion. The Confederacy's failings were the most grievous of all. The American South in 1865 was an unstable compound of oligarchs, plebeians and slaves. Unity among the whites was a precondition for the continued subjection of the blacks. Poor whites had little economic stake in slavery, leading planters to worry that they might defect to the abolitionists. The pressure for conformity had always inhibited free discussion. After John Brown's raid, the atmosphere in the South approached hysteria. The state conventions were elected by a broad franchise, but dissenters were silenced by ostracism, demagoguery and, where those methods did not suffice, thuggery. The decisions by these early Republics to resort to force can be attributed in part to political flaws that have since been remedied. The powers of the monarchy have been curbed; party competition institutionalized; and slavery abolished. The fact remains, however, that the wars were popular with a majority or at least a plurality of the politically active public. If these wars were mistakes, they were mistakes that resulted from a broadly participatory political process.

In each instance large numbers of people convinced themselves that war would be easy. Their optimism was not shared by sophisticated observers such as Gage, Dearborn and Stephens, and it was certainly not born out on the battlefield. It coincided with a mood of anger, exasperation or even hatred of the enemy. English aristocrats and commoners, rulers of a global empire, expected gratitude from their American colonists; Southern planters, scions of an ancient "culture of honor," were accustomed to the submission of their bondsmen and deference of their poorer kinsmen; American Republicans, victors over the eighteenth century's superpower a generation before, demanded to be treated with the consideration due to an independent nation. Although their standards and expectations varied, all felt disrespected. Excessively optimistic assessments of the prospects in battle coincided with outrage over the perceived disrespect of others.

The people or some portion thereof were aroused, and their leaders failed to restrain them. North, Madison and Davis were remarkably self-effacing, as politicians go, perhaps to a fault. Madison's sensible effort to coerce Britain by military threat was undermined not only by the fecklessness of his own party and machinations of the Federalists but also by his own gentle reputation. If the amiable North did harbor doubts about the wisdom of the cabinet's policy, he was probably not the man to challenge his more bellicose colleagues. If anything, the *libido dominandi* was too weak in these leaders. The desire to achieve or exert power cannot explain their resort to force. In the end, North, Madison and Davis went to war reluctantly, with fewer illusions than most of their colleagues and countrymen. If they did not share other's optimism, they shared their outrage. They chose to fight not because they expected the wars to be easy, but because they believed that the alternative was worse.

The expectations of Kant and Schumpeter were not confirmed in these cases. This can be attributed partly to remediable flaws or inexperience in the practice of republicanism, but an overemphasis on the immaturity of these early Republics would provide false comfort. The explanation for the wars must be sought not only in their shortcomings but also in the contradictory tendencies of their culture. Inhabitants of democratic societies perceived war as a deplorable loss of blood and treasure and a disruption of the race to prosperity. Their manifest aversion to the acquisition and use of military power made it difficult for these early Republics to threaten others convincingly. Adversaries, even fellow Republic, were not deterred by their often ambiguous or half-hearted warnings. Their hesitation to threaten force made it likelier that force would eventually have to be used. Although the Republics seemed diffident initially, they later turned abruptly and unexpectedly to violence. Kant, Tocqueville and Schumpeter underestimated the persistence of primal honor in a democratic age. In Britain and the United States, honor did not wither as the aristocracy declined but dispersed to the plebeian population. Democratic peoples retained a sense of shame. Although sluggish in response to danger and disrespect, Republics were capable of lashing out with unexpected ferocity if provoked once too often. Their reluctance invited challenges. Their honor demanded retaliation. Perpetual peace did not obtain.

Notes

1. Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*, Ted Humphrey translator (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1988), pp. 108, 112–17, 1225.
2. Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, p. 125.
3. *Democracy in America*, Introduction.
4. The allusion to Montesquieu is intentional.
5. *Democracy in America*, volume II, Part II, Chapters 10–16.
6. *Democracy in America*, volume II, Part III, Chapter 1.
7. *Democracy in America*, volume II, Part III, Chapter 18.
8. *Democracy in America*, volume II, Part III, Chapter 19.
9. *Democracy in America*, volume I, Part II, Chapter 5.
10. Joseph Schumpeter, *Imperialism*, Bert Hoselitz translator (New York: New American Library, 1951), pp. 3–6, 12, 33, 37, 59–60, 64–69, 98.
11. Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (New York: HarperCollins, 1976), pp. 123–29, 157; Schumpeter, *Imperialism*, pp. 65, 68–69.
12. Schumpeter, *Imperialism*, pp. 65–69, 98.
13. Robert Middlekauff, *The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763–1789* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 55–56; Ian Christie, *Wars and Revolutions: Britain, 1760–1815* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 86–67; John Brooke, *King George III* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1972), pp. 166–68; Jeremy Black, *Crisis of Empire* (London: Continuim, 2008), pp. 86–86, 89, 95, 103; Bernard Donoughue, *British Politics and the American Revolution* (London: Macmillan, 1964), p. 2; Charles Ritcheson, *British Politics and the American Revolution* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954), p. 3; Ian Christie, *Crisis of Empire: Great Britain and the American Colonies 1754–1783* (New York: Norton, 1966), pp. 111–12.
14. Keith Perry, *British Politics and the American Revolution* (New York: St. Martin's, 1990, pp. 45–57, 66, 83.
15. Middlekauff, *Glorious Cause*, pp. 61–62, 77, 119; Donoughue, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, pp. 1–4, 27; Black, *Crisis of Empire*, pp. 86–87; Christie, *Crisis of Empire*, p. 87.
16. Ritcheson, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, pp. 68, 72, 87–94.
17. Middlekauff, *Glorious Cause*, pp. 226–27; Donoughue, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, pp. 5–8; Black, *Crisis of Empire*, p. 110.
18. Black, *Crisis of Empire*, pp. 111–12; Alexander Valentine, *Lord North*, volume I (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), p. 320; Peter D. G. Thomas, *Lord North* (New York: St. Martin's, 1976), p. 76; Don

Cook, *The Long Fuse: How England Lost the America Colonies* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995), pp. 187–88.

19. Cook, *Long Fuse*, pp. 188–99; Valentine, *Lord North*, volume I, pp. 341–43; Donoughue, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, pp. 255–60.
20. Donoughue, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, pp. 235–37, 265; Black, *Crisis of Empire*, pp. 119–20; Perry, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, p. 99; Christie, *Crisis of Empire*, pp. 97–99.
21. Thomas, *Lord North*, pp. 82–87; Donoughue, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, p. 219; Valentine, *Lord North*, volume I, p. 343; Paul Langford, *A Polite and Commerical People: England 1727–1783* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), pp. 537–38.
22. John Shy, *A People Numerous and Armed* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 102–3; Cook, *Long Fuse*, pp. 226, 230; John Ferling, *Almost a Miraacle: The American Victory in the War of Independence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 59–63; Thomas, *Lord North*, p. 88; Valentine, *Lord North*, volume I, pp. 349, 376–77. Donoughue, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, pp. 226–30, 266–68; Thomas, *Lord North*, p. 91; Peter Whiteley, *Lord North: The Prime Minister Who Lost America* (London: Hambledon Press, 1996), p. 150; quotation in Ritcheson, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, p. 191. The proclamation was the equivalent of a declaration of war.
23. Langford, *A Polite and Commercial People*, pp. 677–78, 690–92; Richard Pares, *King George III and the Politicians* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1953), pp. 33–35, 61; Stanley Ayling, *George the Third* (New York: Knopf, 1972), pp. 67–58, 74–75; Brooke, *King George III*, pp. 155–56, 160–61; Perry, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, pp. 12–14, 124.
24. Brooke, *King George III*, pp. 162–63; Christopher Hibbert, *George III* (New York: Basic Books, 1998), p. 146.
25. Brooke, *King George III*, pp. 90, 260–62; Hibbert, *George III*, p. 193.
26. Quoted in Ayling, *George the Third*, p. 34.
27. Brooke, *King George III*, pp. 175–76; Cook, *Long Fuse*, pp. 196–97, 200; Donoughue, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, pp. 43, 163, 284; Whiteley, *Lord North*, pp. 142–44.
28. Shy, *A People Numerous and Armed*, p. 99.
29. Quotatioins from Donoughue, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, pp. 42, 278 and Thomas, *Lord North*, pp. 109–10.
30. Donoughue, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, p. 278; also pp. 41–43.

31. Even if George's view had been different, to have imposed pacific ministers on a belligerent Parliament would have violated the spirit of the constitution. Brooke, *King George III*, pp. 176–77; Donoughue, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, pp. 43–44.
32. Quoted in Donoughue, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, pp. 79–80; note also Burke's statement at the time: "The popular current, both within doors and without, at present sets strongly against America" (Donoughue, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, p. 83).
33. Christopher Hibbert, *George III*, pp. 143–44.
34. Quoted in Ayling, *George the Third*, p. 245.
35. Quoted in Valentine, *Lord North*, volume I, pp. 342–43.
36. Quoted in Cook, *Long Fuse*, p. 190.
37. Thomas, *Lord North*, pp. 91–92; Whiteley, *Lord North*, pp. 144, 150.
38. And not large to begin with, Perry, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, pp. 67–100.
39. Donoughue, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, pp. 148–49, 152–54, 161, 289–90; Ritcheson, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, pp. 38, 46–48, 60–61, 137–38, 181–82; Lewis Namier, *England in the Age of the American Revolution*, (London: Macmillan, 1930), pp. 295–96.
40. Brooke, *King George III*, pp. 170–73.
41. Donoughue, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, pp. 37–45, 70–77, 265, 285; Whitely, pp. 152–53; Ritcheson, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, pp. 149–50, 158–61, 193–94.
42. Ayling, *George the Third*, pp. 239–40; Hibbert, *George III*, pp. 138–40; Thomas, *Lord North*, pp. 1–2, 43–44; Whiteley, *Lord North*, pp. 7–9, 15, 39–40, 67–68, 84, 87–88; Ritcheson, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, p. 197.
43. Valentine, *Lord North*, volume I, pp. 306–7, 311–12; Hibbert, *George III*, pp. 138–40; Thomas, *Lord North*, pp. 1–2, 43–44; Peter Whiteley, *Lord North*, pp. 7–9, 15, 67–68, 126–27, 144–49, 150–53; Donoughue, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, p. 53; Ayling, *George the Third*, pp. 239–40; Ritcheson, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, pp. 178, 193–99.
44. Cook, *Long Fuse*, pp. 186–87; Christie, *Crisis of Empire*, pp. 105, 112–14; Ferling, *Almost a Miraacle*, pp. 25–28; Whiteley, *Lord North*, p. 140.
45. Whiteley, *Lord North*, pp. 149–50.
46. Valentine, *Lord North*, volume I, pp. 347; Christie, *Crisis of Empire*, p. 113.
47. Whiteley, *Lord North*, p. 144.

48. Thomas, *Lord North*, pp. 80–84, 91–92; Whiteley, *Lord North*, pp. 146–49; Valentine, *Lord North*, volume I, pp. 341–42.
49. Valentine, *Lord North*, volume I, pp. 309–10; Whiteley, *Lord North*, p. 132.
50. Quoted Whiteley, *Lord North*, p. 133.
51. Hibbert, *George III*, p. 145; Donoughue, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, p. 253; Ritcheson, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, p. 193.
52. Brooke, *King George III*, p. 177; Valentine, *Lord North*, volume I, pp. 310, 347–68; Hibbert, *George III*, p. 145.
53. Valentine, *Lord North*, volume I, p. 310.
54. Shy, *A People Numerous and Armed*, pp. 94–97, 106; Ayling, *George the Third*, p. 243; Hibbert, *George III*, p. 144; Valentine, *Lord North*, volume I, pp. 242–43.
55. Donoughue, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, pp. 219–20; Hibbert, *George III*, p. 146; Black, *Crisis of Empire*, p. 31.
56. And lest it be thought that Gage was inflating the estimates, let it be noted that other estimates were even higher. Ferling, *Almost a Miraacle*, pp. 28–29. Jeremy Black, *War for America* (Stroud, UK: Alan Sutton, 1991), pp. 27–28, 246; Cook, *Long Fuse*, p. 231; Valentine, *Lord North*, volume I, pp. 383–85, 388. In September 1779, the British had 31,840 men in America, about one-third of them German mercenaries; manpower constraints handicapped the British generals, Black, *War for America*, pp. 28–31.
57. Valentine, *Lord North*, volume I, pp. 378, 382; quotation in Ayling, *George the Third*, p. 248
58. Ayling, *George the Third*, p. 248; Ritcheson, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, pp. 171–72, 199; Cook, *Long Fuse*, p. 231.
59. Bruce Lenman, *Britain's Colonial Wars: 1688–1783* (London: Longman, 2001), pp. 204–5, 208–9, 258–59; Black, *War for America*, pp. 22–24; Ritcheson, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, pp. 171–75, 198; Valentine, *Lord North*, volume I, pp. 340–41, 387–88; Thomas, *Lord North*, pp. 94–96; Ayling, *George the Third*, p. 248–49; Perry, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, pp. 85–86, 89.
60. Valentine, *Lord North*, volume I, p. 341; Middlekauff, *Glorious Cause*, p. 268; Ritcheson, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, p. 170; Ferling, *Almost a Miraacle*, pp. 28–29; Donoughue, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, pp. 211–12; Shy, *A People Numerous and Armed*, pp. 98–99.
61. Ritcheson, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, p. 175.
62. Valentine, *Lord North*, volume I, p. 342; Ferling, *Almost a Miraacle*, pp. 28, 65–66; Perry, *British Politics and the American Revolution*,

p. 79; Donoughue, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, pp. 204–7, 221–22, 226–27; Thomas, *Lord North*, pp. 81–82; Ritcheson, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, pp. 171, 175–76, 197–98.

63. Cook, *Long Fuse*, p. 226; Valentine, *Lord North*, volume I, pp. 376–77, 402.
64. Whitely, *Lord North*, p. 157.
65. Ritcheson, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, p. 194.
66. Whiteley, *Lord North*, p. 161; Cook, *Long Fuse*, pp. 236–37; Ferling, *Almost a Miraacle*, pp. 67–68; Valentine, *Lord North*, volume I, pp. 390, 403.
67. Ritcheson, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, pp. 195–96; Ferling, *Almost a Miracle*, p. 6; Valentine, *Lord North*, volume I, pp. 369, 375, 383, 398–99. Burgoyne's pessimism, Cook, *Long Fuse*, p. 227.
68. Lewis Namier, *England in the Age of the American Revolution* (London: Macmillan, 1930), p. 42; Brooke, *King George III*, p. 173; Donoughue, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, pp. 7–9, 44; Black, *Crisis of Empire*, pp. 103, 117–18, 125–26; Ritcheson, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, pp. viii–ix, 43–44, 54, 68, 191, quotation on pp. 12–13; Thomas, *Lord North*, p. 72; Whiteley, *Lord North*, p. 153; Perry, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, pp. xi, 66, 83.
69. I. R. Christie, *Crisis of Empire* (New York: Norton, 1966), p. 114.
70. Christie, *Crisis of Empire*, p. 113; see also Namier, *England in the Age of the American Revolution*, p. 46 and Christie, *Crisis of Empire*, p. 99.
71. Middlekauff, *Glorious Cause*, pp. 53, 144–45; Namier, *England*, p. 44.
72. Valentine, *Lord North*, volume I, pp. 307–8.
73. Donoughue, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, pp. 213, 268–69, 284, 287; a more sympathetic treatment is offered by Perry, *British Politics and the American Revolution*, pp. 74–75, 79, 82–82.
74. Shy, *A People Numerous and Armed*, pp. 99–100; Christie, *Crisis of Empire*, p. 99.
75. Reginald Horsman, *The Causes of the War of 1812* (South Brunswick: Perpetua, 1962), pp. 180–81, 246–47; Donald Hickey, *The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989), p. 2; Robert Rutland, *James Madison: The Founding Father* (New York: Macmillan, 1987), p. 230; Harry Cole, *The War of 1812* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 244–46, 255.
76. J. C. A. Stagg, *Mr. Madison's War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 3, 164; Horsman, *Causes of the War of 1812*, pp. 236, 259; Cole, *War of 1812*, pp. 71–73; Irving Brant, *James Madison: Commander in Chief* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1961), p. 20.

77. Bradford Perkins, *Prologue to War: England and the United States 1805–1812* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 353, 374, 394–95, 406–7, quotations on pp. 392 and 394; Roger Brown, *The Republic in Peril: 1812* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 166, 171, 182–83, 188; Hickey, *War of 1812*, pp. 54–55.
78. Perkins, *Prologue to War*, pp. 2–3, 8–9, 142–44, 149; Horsman, *Causes of the War of 1812*, pp. 102–11; Cole, *War of 1812*, pp. 2–7; Richard Buel, *America on the Brink* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 30–33.
79. Cole, *War of 1812*, pp. 8–10; Stagg, *Mr. Madison's War*, pp. 35, 39; Buel, *America on the Brink*, pp. 2, 87; Horsman, *Causes of the War of 1812*, pp. 20–21, 120–22, 124–25, 133–36; Hickey, *War of 1812*, p. 19; Madison's quotation in Rutland, p. 224. Britain made some concessions in the Monroe-Pinckney Treaty, but because it did not contain an ironclad prohibition on impressments, President Thomas Jefferson rejected it (Horsman, *Causes of the War of 1812*, pp. 89–90).
80. Cole, *War of 1812*, pp. 12–15; Brant, *Commander in Chief*, pp. 20–21; Stagg, *Mr. Madison's War*, pp. 75–78; Perkins, *Prologue to War*, pp. 241–44, 260; Buel, *America on the Brink*, pp. 124–25.
81. Ralph Ketcham, *James Madison: A Biography* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1990), pp. 47–48, 89, 471, 476–78, 528; Drew McCoy, *The Last of the Fathers: James Madison and the Republican Legacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 26–27; Rutland, pp. 6–8, 18, 179, 247; Perkins, *Prologue to War*, pp. 42–44, 223–24.
82. Ketcham, *James Madison*, pp. 471–73; Rutland, *James Madison*, p. 211.
83. McCoy, *Last of the Fathers*, pp. 12–13, 17–25, 34; Stagg, *Mr. Madison's War*, p. 436.
84. McCoy, *Last of the Fathers*, pp. 15, 17, 26–27. If Washington was the standard, anyone was going to fall short (McCoy, pp. 18–19).
85. Ketcham, *James Madison*, p. 530.
86. Ketcham, *James Madison*, pp. 670–71.
87. Ketcham, *James Madison*, p. 472.
88. Ketcham, *James Madison*, p. 532.
89. Perkins, *Prologue to War*, pp. 42–44, 223–25, 260, 379–80.
90. Horsman, *Causes of the War of 1812*, pp. 195, 217, 220; Stagg, *Mr. Madison's War*, pp. 23–24, 54, 79; Brown, *Republic in Peril*, pp. 45, 83–84, 88; Hickey, *War of 1812*, pp. 47–48; Perkins, *Prologue to War*, pp. 382, 436; Brant, *Commander in Chief*, pp. 15–17; Brant, *James Madison: The President* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1861), pp. 355–61, 374, 481; Ketcham, *James Madison*, p. 509.
91. Horsman, *Causes of the War of 1812*, pp. 241, 259–61; Buel, *America on the Brink*, pp. 134, 141, 154; Brown, *Republic in Peril*, pp. 95–98;

Stagg, 79–80, 91; Hickey, *War of 1812*, pp. 52–53; Cole, *War of 1812*, pp. 18–21; Perkins, *Prologue to War*, pp. 10, 274–75, 348–49, 352–54, 360, 362–66, 372–74, 376, 381, 389–90, 436; Rutland, *James Madison*, pp. 218–19; Ketcham, *James Madison*, pp. 514–16, 531–33; Brant, *The President*, pp. 371–75, 397–98, 402–5, 407, 421, 428–29, 476–77, 482–83, with quotation on p. 476.

92. Brant, *The President*, p. 477.
93. Ketcham, *James Madison*, pp. 528–29.
94. Horsman, *Causes of the War of 1812*, pp. 244–48, 257–58; Hickey, *War of 1812*, pp. 42–43; Perkins, *Prologue to War*, pp. 13, 27, 289–91, 347, 380–82, 398–99, 415; Brant, *Commander in Chief*, p. 16; Brant, *The President*, pp. 478–79.
95. Alexander Keyssar, *The Right to Vote* (New York: Basic Books, 2000), pp. 24, 29 and Table A.3.
96. Brown, *Republic in Peril*, pp. 32, 44, 48–50, 58, 65–66; Perkins, *Prologue to War*, p. 415; Buel, *America on the Brink*, pp. 153–54.
97. Horsman, *Causes of the War of 1812*, pp. 14–15, 243–44; Perkins, *Prologue to War*, pp. 64–66.
98. Brown, *Republic in Peril*, pp. 109, 113, 116–20; Horsman, *Causes of the War of 1812*, p. 235; Hickey, *War of 1812*, pp. 45–46; Cole, *War of 1812*, p. 75; Brat, *The President*, p. 476.
99. Cole, *War of 1812*, pp. 36–43; Hickey, *War of 1812*, pp. 72–73; Brant, *Commander in Chief*, pp. 14–15, 18; Stagg, *Mr. Madison's War*, pp. 39–41, 46–47; Perkins, *Prologue to War*, pp. 405–6; Brown, *Republic in Peril*, p. 59; Horsman, *Causes of the War of 1812*, pp. 182–83. Stagg's estimate of the number of regulars at the beginning of the war is lower: 9823 by November (Stagg, *Mr. Madison's War*, p. 162).
100. Quoted in Hickey, *War of 1812*, p. 73.
101. Quoted in Stagg, *Mr. Madison's War*, p. 5, footnote 8.
102. Quoted in Perkins, *Prologue to War*, p. 416.
103. Buel, *America on the Brink*, pp. 132–33, 150; Stagg, *Mr. Madison's War*, pp. 163–64.
104. Cole, *War of 1812*, pp. 89, 146, 150–51, 170–82, 259; Paul Johnson, *A History of the American People* (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), pp. 260–61.
105. Hickey, *War of 1812*, pp. 46–47; Horsman, *Causes of the War of 1812*, pp. 224, 231, 267; Perkins, *Prologue to War*, pp. 393–94.
106. Quoted in Horsman, *Causes of the War of 1812*, p. 230.
107. Quoted in Perkins, *Prologue to War*, pp. 291–92.
108. Quoted in Brown, *Republic in Peril*, p. 79.
109. Quotations in Hickey, *War of 1812*, p. 27.
110. Perkins, *Prologue to War*, pp. 291, 347.

111. Brant, *Commander in Chief*, p. 20.
112. Brown, *Republic in Peril*, pp. 95–98, 177–82.
113. Buel, *America on the Brink*, pp. 2, 154, 240–42.
114. This is the insightful thesis of Brown, *Republic in Peril*, pp. 1–3, 76–82 189.
115. Quotation in Brown, *Republic in Peril*, pp. 86–87.
116. Quoted in Brown, *Republic in Peril*, p. 87.
117. Brant, *Commander in Chief*, p. 19.
118. David Potter, *The Impending Crisis: 1858–1861* (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), pp. 490, 531, 547, 551–53, 566–67, 570, 578–79, 582–83; James McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 234–35, 262–66, 271–756; William Gienapp, "The Crisis of American Democracy," in Gabor Boritt, editor, *Why the Civil War Came* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 124.
119. Rembert Patrick, *Jefferson Davis and His Cabinet* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1944), pp. 19–26; Brian Holden Reid, *The Origins of the American Civil War* (London: Longman, 1996), pp. 187, 196–98, 325–28, 358, 366, 376, 384–86, 399–401; Allan Nevins, *Ordeal of the Union*, volume II, "A House Dividing 1852–57" (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1947), p. 544.
120. Steven Channing, *Crisis of Fear: Secession in South Carolina* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1970), pp. 274–80.
121. Potter, *Impending Crisis*, pp. 561–62; Reid, *Origins of the American Civil War*, pp. 301, 339, 353.
122. Reid, *Origins of the American Civil War*, p. 366.
123. Reid, *Origins of the American Civil War*, pp. 313, 341–42, 397; McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, p. 250.
124. Richard Sewell, *A House Divided* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), pp. 90–91; Patrick, *Jefferson Davis and His Cabinet*, p. 23.
125. Sewell, *A House Divided*, pp. 87–89. Because of the difficulty of mobilizing the far west, however, the effective manpower advantage was more on the order of 2.5: 1, McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, p. 322.
126. Charles Roland, *The Confederacy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 41; William Barney, *The Road to Secession* (New York: Praeger, 1972), pp. 171, 175; Patrick, *Jefferson Davis and His Cabinet*, pp. 20–21, 26.
127. Quoted in McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, p. 238; see also pp. 316, 332–33; Patrick, *Jefferson Davis and His Cabinet*, p. 21.
128. William C. Davis, *A Government of Our Own: The Making of the Confederacy* (New York: Free Press, 1994), p. 281; also p. 198; "The Southern leaders at Montgomery had intoned the official liturgy of

'peaceful secession' so often that many of them had come to believe it," Thomas, pp. 73–74.

129. Davis, *A Government of Our Own*, pp. 38, 305.
130. Nevins, *Ordeal of the Union*, pp. 543–44.
131. Davis, *A Government of Our Own*, especially p. 133, also pp. 17, 54, 210, 281, 327–28, 372.
132. Sewell, *A House Divided*, p. 79; McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, p. 244; Michael P. Johnson, *Toward a Patriarchal Republic: The Secession in Georgia* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977), pp. 35, 53; Clement Eaton, *A History of the Southern Confederacy* (New York: Macmillan, 1954), p. 16.
133. McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, p. 245.
134. Eaton, *History of the Southern Confederacy*, pp. 4–5, 20; Sewell, *A House Divided*, pp. 77–78. Of course, Republicans might gain more power later, Eaton, *History of the Southern Confederacy*, p. 304, footnote 18; Avery Craven, *An Historian and the Civil War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 201.
135. Eugene Genovese, *The Political Economy of Slavery* (New York: Pantheon, 1965), pp. 3–4, 23–28, 34–35, 246–50; Barney, *Road to Secession*, pp. xiv, 5–6, 9–11, 127, 150–51, 165–67, 171; Potter, *Impending Crisis*, pp. 475–76; Johnson, *Toward a Patriarchal Republic*, p. 83; Davis, *A Government of Our Own*, p. 5; Nevins, *Ordeal of the Union*, pp. 542–43; Barney, *Road to Secession*, p. 202.
136. Roger Ransom, *Conflict and Compromise: The Political Economy of Slavery, Emancipation, and the American Civil War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 46–59, 69–70, 167.
137. Historians differ. Reid says no, *Origins of the American Civil War*, pp. 264–65, 272, 306; Potter says yes, *Impending Crisis*, pp. 477–78; Sewell says yes, *A House Divided*, pp. 76–77.
138. Craven, *An Historian and the Civil War*, pp. 151, 201.
139. Davis, *A Government of Our Own*, p. 4; Gienapp, "Crisis of American Democracy," pp. 123–24; Ransom, *Conflict and Compromise*, p. 70.
140. Sewell, *A House Divided*, pp. 90–91.
141. Quoted in Reid, *Origins of the American Civil War*, p. 306.
142. Barney, *Road to Secession*, p. 205.
143. Barney, *Road to Secession*, p. 3.
144. Potter, *Impending Crisis*, pp. 425–53; Channing, *Crisis of Fear*, pp. 20–22, 265, 272; Davis, *A Government of Our Own*, pp. 20–21, 39–41; Eaton, *History of the Southern Confederacy*, pp. 1–4, 7; Johnson, *Toward a Patriarchal Republic*, pp. 46–48; Barney, *Road to Secession*, pp. 146–50, 154–55, 160, 190, 199; quotation from Channing, *Crisis of Fear*, pp. 265.

145. Sewell, *A House Divided*, p. 77; Eaton, *History of the Southern Confederacy*, p. 20; Potter, *Impending Crisis*, pp. 454–55, 519; Patrick, *Jefferson Davis and His Cabinet*, p. 5; Johnson, *Toward a Patriarchal Republic*, p. 53; Channing, *Crisis of Fear*, p. 28; Barney, p. 169; quotation from Eaton, *History of the Southern Confederacy*, p. 3.
146. Patrick, *Jefferson Davis and His Cabinet*, pp. 12, 24.
147. Potter, *Impending Crisis*, pp. 455–56; Barney, *Road to Secession*, pp. 5, 153.
148. Channing, *Crisis of Fear*, pp. 250–51, 254–55, 270–71, 284–85; Patrick, *Jefferson Davis and His Cabinet*, p. 7; Eaton, *History of the Southern Confederacy*, pp. 7, 21; Barney, *Road to Secession*, p. 193.
149. Potter, *Impending Crisis*, pp. 490–92, 500–4; Sewell, *A House Divided*, p. 78; Barney, pp. 185, 193–94.
150. Bertram Wyatt-Brown, *Yankee Saints and Southern Sinners* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985), pp. 206–9; Johnson, *Toward a Patriarchal Republic*, pp. 19, 24, 38–39; Gienapp, "Crisis of American Democracy," p. 121; Eaton, *History of the Southern Confederacy*, pp. 14–16; Reid, *Origins of the American Civil War*, p. 399; Barney, pp. 189–90.
151. Roland, *The Confederacy*, pp. 13–14; Emory Thomas, *The Confederate Nation* (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), p. 52.
152. Thomas Schott, *Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), pp. 19–22, 58–59, 292, 304–7, 311–12, 316, 318–20; Johnson, *Toward a Patriarchal Republic*. pp. 24, 63; Wyatt-Brown, *Yankee Saints and Southern Sinners*, pp. 208–9.
153. Craven, *An Historian and the Civil War*, pp. 151, 201, quotation on p. 200.
154. Sewell, *A House Divided*, pp. 75–78; Eaton, *History of the Southern Confederacy*, pp. 8, 18–19; quotation in Sewell, p. 76.
155. Wyatt-Brown, *Yankee Saints and Southern Sinners*, pp. 186–89, 199, 203, 213, 217; Stephens quoted in Barney, *Road to Secession*, p. 151.
156. Quotation in Sewell, *A House Divided*, p. 78.
157. Quoted in Patrick, *Jefferson Davis and His Cabinet*, p. 22.
158. William C. Davis, *Jefferson Davis: The Man and His Hour* (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), p. 323.
159. Davis, *Jefferson Davis*, pp. 301–4
160. Davis, *Jefferson Davis*, pp. 295–97, 304, 325; William J. Cooper, *Jefferson Davis, American* (New York: Knopf, 2000), pp. 341, 350–51; Clement Eaton, *Jefferson Davis* (New York: Free Press, 1977), p. 120.
161. Reid, *Origins of the American Civil War*, p. 358; Davis, *Jefferson Davis*, p. 324; Cooper, *Jefferson Davis*, p. 340.
162. Davis, *Jefferson Davis*, p. 690.

163. Herman Hattaway and Richard Beringer, *Jefferson Davis, Confederate President* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), pp. 12, 151–52; Davis, *Jefferson Davis*, p. 690; Cooper, *Jefferson Davis*, pp. 233, 236–69; Eaton, *Jefferson Davis*, pp. 41–44. The value of Davis's slaves has been estimated at $80,000 (Cooper, p. 229).
164. William C. Davis, *Jefferson Davis: The Man and His Hour* (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), pp. 690; pp. 21, 151–52, 242; Hattaway and Beringer, *Jefferson Davis*, pp. 21, 151–52, 242; Cooper, *Jefferson Davis*, pp. 234, 238–39, 262.
165. William C. Davis, *Jefferson Davis: The Man and His Hour* (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), pp. xi, 301, 690–96; Hattaway and Beringer, *Jefferson Davis*, pp. 21–22, 100, 438.
166. Cooper, *Jefferson Davis*, p. 340.
167. Davis, *Jefferson Davis*, p. 133.
168. Eaton, *Jefferson Davis*, pp. 124, 270, 273.
169. Reid, *Origins of the American Civil War*, p. 353.

Classical Realism and History: Findings and Implications

Twenty-three wars or offensive campaigns were undertaken in the case histories presented above. Five were victories (three of them very costly) and three were stalemates. The remaining fifteen were defeats.[1] Why did these statesmen go to war and, with alarming frequency, fight wars they did not win? Let it be said first that the assessment of the cost and risks of warfare is not easy. Many of the determinants of victory or defeat are unquantifiable (morale, skill, strategy and leadership), and much is unforeseeable. "War is the province of chance," as Clausewitz observed. Scholars judging statesmen after the fact owe their subjects a little sympathy when the results on the battlefield fall short of expectations. When difficulties apparent to contemporaries at home and abroad are ignored, however, it is not unreasonable to label the assessments "miscalculation" and ask why they occur. The sheer number of futile wars recounted here is sobering. The most obvious explanation for this appalling record is not that leaders hazarded war to achieve security and miscalculated, but that they frequently put their countries' security at risk in pursuit of other objectives.

The wars are categorized according to their objective in the appendix. The War of 1812 and the Crimean War were fought explicitly over matters of honor. Britain's campaign to preserve her American colonies can be considered defensive, but pride of possession drew Britain into the colonial debacle. Bismarck's intentional injury to France's collective pride convinced many Frenchmen to support a revisionist war for glory against Prussia.

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Three kings and twelve dictators went to war to seize territory. Their pretexts were many; their underlying motives were power and prestige. The evidence previously adduced includes statements by the leaders and their contemporaries as well as the interpretations of their most insightful biographers. Their adversaries frequently neglected to adopt measures sufficient to dissuade them from attacking. Republics were notably unsuccessful, failing twelve times.[2] Ambition causes wars, but fear can prevent them, provided that defenders are strong, clear and credible. These defenders inspired too little fear, not too much.

Eight governments claimed to be fighting wars to eliminate a looming threat. Hitler's protestations are implausible given his expressed desire for *Lebensraum*, and Solano López's ulterior motive (glory) is easily ascertained from independent sources. The fears of the Confederate Americans were exaggerated, but not totally unfounded. A slave revolt set in motion unintentionally by the election of a moderate abolitionist was a remote but terrifying possibility. Preventive action also provided an outlet for the South's the wounded pride.

The War of the League of Augsburg and China's entry into the Korean War are the two actions that come closest to matching the expectations of Neo-Realism. Even in these cases, the spiral explanation does not entirely fit. Mao Zedong endorsed his ally's attack on South Korea, despite the risk that the war could spread to China, then demanded that his country intervene when, as a consequence of his prior decision, the forces of the United States approached China's border.[3] Louis XIV antagonized his allies by his invasion of the Netherlands and then ravaged the Rhineland to protect France from a largely hypothetical Austrian threat. If security was their principle objective, why did Louis and Mao initiate war to begin with, and, having thus aroused the enmity of others, reject the less costly options of deterrence, defense, or accommodation? The obvious answer is that they selected at all junctures the policy most likely to gratify their desire for power and glory. Mao hoped to consolidate his power, advance his cause, and win acclaim. Louis XIV's inclination was always towards action.

The leaders of Sweden, Prussia and Iraq were not chasing ghosts. They had enemies who meant them harm or were acting in a manner that could cause them harm. An expanding Russia encroached on Sweden's empire in the early eighteenth century. Iran's leaders were actively appealing to disaffected ethnic groups in Iraq and made no secret of their hostility. Prussia's enemies in 1763 intended to attack at

the earliest opportunity. Although the threats to these countries were real, alternatives to preventive war were available. Although Prussia was vulnerable, Frederick's decision to attack was still highly questionable. Frederick, like Charles and Louis XIV, reveled in the active use of power, preferring to act rather than react. Charles XII and Saddam Hussein yearned for glory. If these leaders were fearful, they were also proud, restless and ambitious.

To reiterate, four of the wars were fought primarily to defend territory and honor. The others began when revisionist states attacked others or provoked others to attack them. The dreaded spiral of misperception was seldom to be seen. Statesmen willed war not only to enhance their security, but also to attain glory, to preserve their honor or to hold, assert or increase their power. The international state of nature permitted but, in most instances, did not compel them to do so. The fundamental cause of war was not anarchy but human beings.

The yearnings for glory, honor and power are universal. If not desired by all, they are desired by some in all societies. Whether and how they find expression in foreign policy depends on the regime. Monarchy was considered by Montesquieu to be a "moderate" government. Those examined above were legitimate and stable. The advisory process worked well; the monarchs generally received good counsel. The socialization of kings instilled in them many good qualities, but did not eliminate and, in some instances, may have heightened the insecurity or emotional volatility of the men under the robes. The ethos of the regime was aristocratic. Kings were ambitious for military glory, sensitive about honor and possibly a little too eager to exert power beyond their borders. Properly regulated these motivations might have imparted a wholesome energy to the defense of the nation; but absolutism weakened the institutional controls, leaving monarchies heavily dependent on the talents and temperament of the monarch. When the realm was blessed with a king such as Frederick or an advisor such as Bismarck, the concentration of authority produced impressive results. On other occasions, the ambition, sensitivity or assertiveness of kings led their countries into peril and misfortune.

The early republics had serious flaws: the disputed role of the king in Britain; partisanship in America; slavery in the Confederacy. Republicanism was a new and untried form of government, unproven in the eyes of many. Republics did not necessarily enjoy greater legitimacy than monarchies. Nor was the policy process clearly superior. Experts provided accurate but not always timely analysis. Jingoistic blather often

displaced objective analysis in public. Institutional barriers against hasty executive action were posed by public opinion, representative bodies and intermittently assertive commercial interests. The men who rose to power in the early republics were remarkably restrained in their exercise of power. Paradoxically, their reluctance to use force frequently made the resort to force unavoidable. The lock on the gun was so hard to remove, so to speak, that enemies doubted that it could ever be fired. The inability of Republics to practice coercive diplomacy frequently left them no recourse but war. When enemies persisted in their defiance, another strand to the culture of early republics emerged, a capacity for indignant anger if the country seemed to be treated with disrespect. The early Republics were susceptible to a powerful surge of emotion that in some instances overwhelmed good judgment.

Charismatic, Sultanistic and Praetorian dictatorships are modern versions of Montesquieu's "immoderate" regimes. These governments made foreign policy badly. Their policy processes were dysfunctional. The dictators who seized power were, not surprisingly, dictatorial. Either they were not told or they did not listen; in any case they did not hear. Their ethos was chauvinistic; and in Japan, where the public was saturated with militarist propaganda in the schools, uniquely virulent. Institutional controls over the executive were weak, but the regimes were not monolithic. Ambitious subordinates strove to advance their careers through advocacy and in the case of Japan unauthorized implementation of aggressive policies. Their greatest liability was the weakness of their claim to legitimacy and consequent reliance on the fleeting charisma of their leaders.[4] Dictators whose star was fading were sorely tempted to bolster their authority by reaching for spectacular successes in foreign policy.

Totalitarian despotism is not only the worst form of government, but the most dangerous. Institutional controls on the executive are enfeebled. A utopian vision necessitates and justifies violence. The worst get to the top, men who closely resemble Karen Horney's expansive neurotic. Tyrants are prone to believe that they can possess what they desire. If thwarted, they can be vengeful to the point of madness. Their desires may be insatiable. When cloaked in a plausible ideology that justifies their actions they are a menace without parallel. Rising through the ranks and fending off rivals, ambitious men have a strong incentive to estimate political opportunities and risks carefully. After they have reached the pinnacle of power, they are subject to a further and more dangerous

vitiation. Policy formation is corrupted by the tyrant's vanity and his minions' venality. The shrewdness that served tyrants well on their rise of power erodes in an atmosphere of obsequious deception. Once wise in the manner of serpents, tyrants increasingly lose touch with reality. Their will to power, no longer guided by calculation and unencumbered by moral or political restraints, is unleashed on the world.

Anarchy may arouse anxiety, but anxiety alone rarely provokes war. Glory, honor and power are the motives that convince statesmen to take territory or to defend it offensively. When a political regime inflames these passions and releases them from control, the peril of international anarchy is gravely intensified. Absolute monarchy encouraged kingly ambitions it could not contain; the flawed early republics, eager for respect but unable to command it, lashed out in anger; dictators of dubious legitimacy and fading charisma sought to preserve their power by winning glory; and totalitarianism recruited men with a ravenous appetite for power, justified them, released them from restraint and surrounded them with adoring supporters. The caution-inducing fear expected by defensive realists has frequently failed to preserve the peace. Ambition and desperation have led autocrats to ignore the hesitant warnings issued by their Republican adversaries. World politics has often resembled a dialogue between them deaf and the dumb, those unwilling to hear and those reluctant to speak.

The world has been more dangerous than Neo-Realism theorizes but fortunately more amenable to improvement. Legitimate governments with a pacific ethos, a rational policy process and effective controls on executive power, led by men whose will to power is regulated by a humane ethic, will be less likely to stumble into aggressive, ill-conceived wars or to arouse the fear of their neighbors. No form of government can provide unfailing protection against folly and error. The early Republics were prosperous societies, Judeo-Christian in culture, situated in favorable geographical locations. The democracies established after World War II were in countries chastened by their experience of total war, without politically salient irredenta. These conditions will not necessarily obtain in newer Democracies. In the modern era democratic masses and their representatives have been generally but not invariably pacific.[5]

Republics are not perfect, but they are the regimes best designed to check and channel human ambition. In the past, the state of nature posed a grave problem for them, expressed eloquently by Friedrich

Nietzsche: "Those who fight monsters must take care that they do not become monsters;" but (or so he implied) those who fight monsters too scrupulously are soon devoured.[6] If monsters are extinct, there is no longer a dilemma. What if they are not?

International politics is and will remain for the foreseeable future a state of nature. Territorial disputes will continue to stir the emotions of the masses, if not in Western Europe, certainly in the Middle East, East Asia, South Asia and the borderlands of the former Soviet Union. Autocratic regimes do not necessarily invent these conflicts but exploit and exacerbate them for their own purposes. Although formally democratic regimes have replaced many of the military dictatorships and tyrannies, veiled or brazen autocracy has persisted in several leading countries. The prospects for peace depend in large part on whether the new autocracies and political movements share the flaws of their predecessors: a violent, chauvinistic ethos; a dysfunctional policy process; weak institutional and moral checks on executive power; illegitimacy or failing charisma; and especially a cruel and ambitious chief willing if not eager to employ violence.

Violent conflict in international politics has resulted not only from the ambition of autocratic rulers but also the reluctance of republics to restrain it. Their institutional checks on power and pacific ethos have made democratic republics hesitant to take up arms unless provoked to exasperation. In recent times this reluctance has hardened in much of the western world into a dogmatic pacifism. A fundamental tenet of this outlook is the rejection of traditional honor, as a point of pride. This is truly what Nietzsche termed a "transvaluation of value" in which former virtues are now deemed vices by those unwilling or unable to practice them.[7] This devaluation of traditional honor proceeded past the point of prudence. As Winston Churchill's observed regarding the Munich Conference of 1938:

> If the circumstances are such as to warrant it, force may be used. … These are tormenting dilemmas upon which mankind has throughout its history been so frequently impaled. … There is, however, one helpful guide, namely, for a nation to keep its word and to act in accordance with its treaty obligations. This guide is called *honour*. …Honour is often influenced by that element of pride, which plays so large a part in its inspiration. An exaggerated code of honour leading to the performance of utterly

> vain and unreasonable deeds could not be defended, however fine it might look. Here, however, the moment came when Honour pointed the path of Duty, and when also the right judgment of the facts at that time would have reinforced its dictates.[8]

The *libido dominandi* is viewed with suspicion in democratic republics, and with good reason, for it is the most dangerous of all the passions that animate human beings. Most likely it is ineradicable. Societies will continue to breed men who desire to attain and exercise power. The more pertinent question is whether the will to power can be directed and tempered so as to become less menacing, if not socially constructive. The duties of office must be executed with vigor. The *libido dominandi* imparts to the work of government beneficial energy. The most successful statesmen discussed in this volume were not averse to power. What separated them from ineffectual and malevolent politicians was a system of ethics, (usually founded upon Judeo-Christian beliefs) that regulated their use of power, demanding not gratification for themselves but service to others. The worst abuses were in tyrannies where religion was displaced or destroyed by secular ideology.

Until such time as the international system is no longer anarchic, territorial disputes have ceased to agitate humanity and authoritarian regimes and movements have passed into history, the peace of the world will depend significantly on the fear of war. Peoples incapable of feeling indignation and shame will not inspire it. The most dangerous form of disarmament is psychological. Missile gaps can be closed and plowshares beaten into swords, but the ethos of a country cannot be transformed in a fortnight. The Oxford students who vowed not to fight for King and Country in the 1930s did not enlighten Hitler and Mussolini by example, and well-intentioned idealists will not so instruct the miscreants and aggressors of our own time. In the end, the exercise of power is the only means by which power can be restrained and the willingness to die and to kill is the only means by which life and liberty can be preserved. Honor will continue to point the way to duty; power will continue to provide the impetus. These human desires have brought much suffering into the world, but, rightly regulated, they provide the only reliable means by which inordinate and destruction human passions can be contained.

Notes

1. See the appendix. The defeated were Charles XII, Nicholas I, the North Cabinet, the Confederacy, Solano López, Napoleon, Louis Napoleon, Idi Amin, Mussolini, Hitler and Saddam and all four military regimes. The ambiguous outcomes are James Madison, Mao Zedong and Saddam Hussein (against Iran). The classification of Louis XIV's wars is somewhat generous. France gained territory, but at a very high cost.
2. Republics failed twice to deter a king: the Netherlands against Louis XIV and Britain against Tsarist Russia. Republics failed three times against other Republics: Britain against her American colonies; the United States against Britain; and the Federal Union of the USA against the Confederacy. Republics failed to deter dictatorships seven times: the United States against Imperial Japan; Britain against Argentina; India against Pakistan; Israel against Egypt; the United States against Mao's China; France against fascist Italy; and the United States against Iraq. If World War II were divided into two cases to include Germany's attack on Poland in 1939, which Britain and France failed to deter, the total number would be 13.
3. Allen Whiting is the most insistent on a "spiral" explanation of China's entry, *China Crosses the Yalu* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960). Much of the recent scholarship views the war differently, as previously indicated.
4. Japan, Paraguay and Napoleon's France did not have this problem, however.
5. Walter Lippmann, *The Public Philosophy* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2010), p. 20.
6. *Beyond Good and Evil*, Sect. 146.
7. James Bowman, *Honor: A History* (New York: Encounter, 2006); Nietzsche, *The Genealogy of Morals*.
8. Winston Churchill, *The Gathering Storm* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), pp. 320–21.

Appendix

The Wars: Objectives, Threats and Outcomes

	Initiator	*Type of war*	*Threat?*	*Outcome*
1.	Louis XIV vs. Spain & Dutch	Revisionist	No	Costly Victory
2.	Louis XIV vs. Augsburg League	Preventive	Dubious	Costly Victory
3.	Charles XII vs. Russia	Preventive	Yes	Defeat
4.	Frederick II vs. Austria	Revisionist	No	Victory
5.	Frederick II vs. Coalition	Preventive	Yes	Costly Victory
6.	Nicholas I vs. Coalition	Honor	No	Defeat
7.	Bismarck vs. Austria	Revisionist	No	Victory
8.	Napoleon vs. Russia	Revisionist	No	Defeat
9.	Napoleon III vs. Prussia	Revisionist/Honor	No	Defeat
10.	López vs. Triple Alliance	Revisionist	Slight	Defeat
11.	Idi Amin vs. Tanzania	Revisionist	No	Defeat
12.	Imperial Japan vs. USA	Revisionist	No	Defeat
13.	Nasser vs. Israel	Revisionist	No	Defeat
14.	Ayub Khan vs. India	Revisionist	No	Defeat
15.	Argentine Junta vs. Britain	Revisionist	No	Defeat
16.	Mussolini vs. France	Revisionist	No	Defeat
17.	Hitler vs. Soviet Union	Revisionist	No	Defeat
18.	Mao vs. USA	Revisionist	Some	Stalemate
19.	Saddam Hussein vs. Iran	Preventive	Yes	Stalemate

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	Initiator	*Type of war*	*Threat?*	*Outcome*
20.	Saddam Hussein vs. Kuwait	Revisionist	No	Defeat
21.	Britain vs. Colonies	Defensive/Honor	Yes	Defeat
22.	USA vs. Britain	Honor	Slight	Stalemate
23.	Confederacy vs. Union	Preventive/Honor	Some	Defeat

Note Saddam Hussein's last war against the United States and the third and fifth of Louis XIV's wars have been excluded, and the War of Devolution and the Dutch War treated as a one continuous war. The reason is to avoid giving excessive weight to the Louis XIV and Saddam Hussein cases. The categorization of the War of the League of Augsburg is complicated. The war was immensely costly in relation to the gains, but the formal objective, recognition of France's gains from the preceding War of the Reunions, was achieved. The territorial acquisitions of the War of the Reunions were made for defensive purposes, according to John Lynn, *The Wars of Louis XIV*, pp. 169–71, 262–64, 361–62

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