POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC PURPOSE

HEGEL, MARX, AND THE NECESSITY AND FREEDOM DIALECTIC

MARXIST-HUMANISM AND CRITICAL THEORY IN THE UNITED STATES



RUSSELL ROCKWELL

Political Philosophy and Public Purpose

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Russell Rockwell

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Marxist-Humanism and Critical Theory in the United States

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Russell Rockwell
Woodside, NY, USA

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Series Editor's Preface

Marxist theory throughout the twentieth century was plagued by the tension between what Ernst Bloch referred to as its "warm" and "cold" currents. On the one hand, Marxist theory put forth an explanatory, scientific exposition of the mechanics of capitalist society. Its "laws" of motion of capital attracted a kind of positivist stance, which fed a materialist teleology that suspended the need for ethical reflection and moral critique. On the other hand, the "warm" current consisted of the humanistic critiques that Marx leveled at capitalist society: of alienation, of the degradation of man under the shredding logic of exploitation and exchange. Critical theory and Marxist Humanism have been repositories for this warm current in Marxian theory. These traditions have maintained that a consistent emphasis on the human, ethical elements of Marx's ideas and critiques are central for the continued relevance and sustenance of Marx's thought.

One of the core philosophical components of both Critical Theory and Marxist Humanism is the centrality of Hegel's philosophical ideas and their unity with Marx's theoretical investigations into capitalist society. Russell Rockwell's study is an expression of this tradition, but it goes much further. Rockwell holds to the basic foundations of both Critical Theory and Marxist Humanism by exploring the relation between the ideas of Herbert Marcuse on the one hand and Raya Dunayevskaya on the other. By examining the dialectic between "freedom" and "necessity", Rockwell wants to argue that this conceptual and social relation is at the core of what we could call a critical Marxist humanism. Rockwell focuses on Hegel's concept of "reciprocity" (*Wechselwirkung*) from his *Science of Logic*. Rockwell argues that this dimension of Hegel's *Logic* is missed by

Marcuse and influences the way that he approached Marx's theory of labor and value. By not seeing the twofold character of labor—that is, as a producer of value and a system of cooperation and interdependence—Marcuse misses the human element within capitalist labor and industrial, technological production.

The core thrust of his argument is that the elements of a post-capitalist, socialist society ripen along and within the developing structures of capitalist society. Freedom and necessity is therefore a necessary dynamic in the movement not only of the conceptual ideas of Hegelian Marxism, it is also an objective, social process that we can grasp. Once grasped by us collectively, the humanistic element comes into view of a society where its members become capable of determining their own forms of life rather than being dominated by the control of others and the processes and structures that they have set in motion. Such a society would instantiate the most basic tenets of humanism: of a world organized around the needs of human beings *as ends in themselves*, not as means toward the ends of others. Rockwell's is therefore more than a study that keeps the flame of radical humanism alive, and it also extends its philosophical depth and sophistication. His labors have produced a well-argued and trenchant study, which begs us to pull our attention back to the core aspects of critical theory and Marxist humanism. For it reminds us of Marxism's essential project: the emancipation of human society from dominance, control, and unreason, a project that should command our efforts in the twenty-first century just as it did in the past.

New York, NY
Winter, 2018

Michael J. Thompson

Preface

Karl Marx's passage on the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom took hold of me from my first encounter with it. It persisted over several decades, from my undergraduate student days in the early 1970s, when I first became acquainted with the young Marx on philosophy and society in a theory course at the University of Washington in Seattle given by a young political science professor recently graduated from Harvard, through years of activism with the Marxist Humanist group News & Letters Committees, where I met and worked with the philosopher Raya Dunayevskaya, to my (over) extended graduate study years at City University in New York. In my studies, the passage always stood out to me, even among Marx's own writings. When various interpreters of his work referred to the passage, it often seemed to shine forth as a barely known, hidden dimension of Marx's theory, one yet to be fully uncovered (even by the writer who had just evoked it). This work is written for all the students, activists, and revolutionaries, who have ever felt that there was more to Marx's vision of a post-capitalist society than meets the eye, and have also felt the need to dig deep to bring it to the surface.

The first two chapters cover the biographical and philosophic backgrounds of Herbert Marcuse and Raya Dunayevskaya, whom I regard as the initiators within the United States of, respectively, the Critical Theory and Marxist Humanist traditions. The two carried on a long correspondence. I cover the early part of it, examining it through the lens of the necessity and freedom dialectic. Chapters 3–5 trace Marcuse's Hegelian Marxism, and the trajectory of Critical Theory into the 1960s, including both Marcuse's assessments of the current social relevance of Hegel's

philosophy and his changing assessments of Marx's late texts—*Capital*, certainly, but especially the *Grundrisse*. I compare Marcuse's changing interpretations of the latter text with those of Jurgen Habermas to show an important but often overlooked aspect of the trajectory of Critical Theory in the United States. Chapters 6–8 focus on the practical ramifications of the Dunayevskaya–Marcuse dialogue, that is, how it reflected and helped shape their evolving deep political differences connected with their conceptualizations of the necessity and freedom dialectic. Chapters 7 and 8 begin to develop a case that Moishe Postone's reinterpretations of Marx's mature critical theory provide an immanent critique of the trajectory of Marcuse's Critical Theory, and open the way for resolving crucial questions raised in the Dunayevskaya–Marcuse dialogue, yet were not soluble, absent the theoretical breakthroughs Postone's work achieved.

Chapters 1 and 2 of this work are an expanded version of an article, "The Dunayevskaya–Marcuse Correspondence: Crystallization of Two Marxist Traditions", co-authored by Kevin B. Anderson and me, which appeared in the volume, *The Great Refusal: Herbert Marcuse and Contemporary Social Movements*, edited by Andrew T. Lamas, Todd Wolfson, and Peter N. Funke, and published by Temple University Press, Philadelphia (2017).

Woodside, NY Russell Rockwell

Contents

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Necessity and Freedom in the Origins of Hegelian Marxism in the United States

In the part on "relative surplus value", especially the chapter on machinery and large-scale industry, Karl Marx presented a remarkable and fairly detailed description of a highly technologically developed capitalist economy. Moishe Postone, the US-based theorist whose intellectual roots are in the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory tradition, elaborated in *Time, Labor and Social Domination* (1995)—especially in the section on the social implications of the *trajectory* of (capitalist) production—the current social relevance and significance of this core part of Marx's *Capital* (1867/1990). Postone also tied the very possibility of this part of *Capital* to the dialectic of Marx's self-critiques of his own earlier interpretations of Hegel's works—interpretations that Postone identified and developed prior to his presentation of the section on the trajectory of capitalist production. These, and a third "autocritique" involving Hegel's philosophy, which I identify in Marx's work, are crucial for understanding the necessity and freedom dialectic internal to capitalist society, as well as for a contemporary concept of a post-capitalist society.

There is a strong case to be made that the American origins of the by now famous Frankfurt School Critical Theory tradition is represented in Herbert Marcuse's (1941/1999) seminal work *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory*. The work was the culmination of a decade of Marcuse's collaboration—as the principal philosopher of the group—with other Frankfurt School members who had left Germany in

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the early 1930s and wound up in New York just ahead of Hitler's rise to power. The obvious caveat is that, as has become the norm today, the Frankfurt School soon splintered into various tendencies, with figures such as Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno focusing more on cultural issues, and at least one, namely Erich Fromm, breaking from the School altogether—in his case, over an important study of workers' political dispositions, including in regard to Fascism,[1] and not, as is often assumed, because of disputes in connection with interpretations of the relationship of the theories of Marx and Sigmund Freud.

In contrast to what might be considered the dual national origins of the Frankfurt School, the Marxist–Humanist tradition evolved gradually in the United States. Also, in the United States, there were more reciprocal influences between the two traditions in their origins and development than has often been acknowledged. Raya Dunayevskaya, the principal figure involved in the founding of Marxist Humanism in the United States, was born in the Ukraine, emigrated to the United States in the 1920s, and before breaking with Leon Trotsky over the question of the nature of the Soviet Union's economy, worked with him during the Stalinist frame-up trials of the late 1930s. It was during World War II that Dunayevskaya discovered Marcuse's *Reason and Revolution* (1941/1999). Impressed as much by how the work "established the Humanism of Marxism" as by its "reestablishment" of the Hegelian–Marxian dialectic (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 233), her own work on the role of labor in the Soviet Union's state-planned economy *intersected* with her discovery of Marx's 1844 *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* (1844/1975b, 229–346). It was in Marcuse's work where she read an analysis of these manuscripts in English for the first time. Dunayevskaya's article, "Labor and Society" (1942/1992), already indicates the emerging importance for her own work of early Marx's manuscripts, often referred to as the young Marx's humanist essays.

Interestingly, however, Dunayevskaya referred to the establishment of Marxist Humanism in the United States only after several years of contentious exchanges with Marcuse on the Hegel–Marx relationship (and on labor). Her early article displays some close affinities with "The Abolition of Labor", the important chapter in *Reason and Revolution* (Marcuse, 1941/1999) that was pivotal for Marcuse's articulation of the necessity

[1] See Fromm, E. (1984). *The Working Class in Weimar Germany: A Psychological and Sociological Study* (Wolfgang Bonss, Trans.). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

and freedom dialectic underlying the various theories of Hegel and Marx. Early in the 1950s, Dunayevskaya discovered Hegel's own development of the necessity and freedom dialectic in his under-appreciated Introduction to the *Philosophy of Mind* (Hegel, 1817/1973). Increasingly, then, the Hegelian part of the dialectic became a focal point for Dunayevskaya's theory development. In this, the necessity and freedom dialectic became central, although not always overtly, to the decades-long Dunayevskaya–Marcuse dialogue, which was sustained in both personal correspondence and in their published works.

Unlike in Dunayevskaya's work, Marcuse's theorization of the necessity and freedom dialectic did not develop from an interpretation of Marx's analysis of Hegel's philosophy that concluded Marx's *1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*. This was the case even though the young Marx in those essays discussed the relation of communism and humanism as the "genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and man", and the "true resolution of the strife … between freedom and necessity" (Marx, 1844/1975b, 296–297). Upon their publication, Marcuse (1932/2005a) reviewed these writings of the young Marx, which had been buried in the archives for nearly a half-century; his review marked (along with his first book on Hegel)[2] Marcuse's move away from his mentor Martin Heidegger's existential philosophy. It was only in the following year in Marcuse's (1933/2005b) long essay "On the Philosophic Concept of Labor in Economics" that Marcuse traced the necessity and freedom dialectic from antiquity to the predominance of capitalism. In this, Marcuse noted Aristotle's distinction between "necessity" and "beautiful things", the latter of which Marcuse associates with Marx's concept of the "realm of freedom" (Marcuse, 1933/2005b, 144).

By 1941, Marcuse's *Reason and Revolution* (1941/1999) strongly suggested that the necessity and freedom dialectic was central to Hegel's philosophy. For the development of this idea, he did *not* imply the importance of Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind* (1817/1973) (as did Dunayevskaya little more than a decade later), either in *Reason and Revolution*, or in his earlier review (Marcuse, 1932/2005a) of Marx's *1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*. However, later *additions* Marcuse made to *Reason and Revolution* are vital for marking the parameters of the central part of his long correspondence with Dunayevskaya, which often, at her initiative, centered on the Hegel–Marx relationship, especially the necessity and

[2] See (Marcuse, 1932/1987).

freedom dialectic, and specifically the current social relevance of Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind*.

Written just prior to the beginning of the correspondence with Dunayevskaya (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012), Marcuse's 1954 Epilogue to *Reason and Revolution* (1941/1999, 433–439) analyzed the social implications of the conclusion to Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind* (1817/1973). If the 1954 Epilogue could *not* have been in rebuttal to Dunayevskaya's positive perspectives on the current relevance and importance of the Hegelian side of Hegelian Marxism, Marcuse's new preface to the 1960 edition of *Reason and Revolution*, "A Note on Dialectic" (Marcuse, 1960b, vii–xiv),[3] written a few years into the intensive dialogue with Dunayevskaya, may appear to some readers of the Dunayevskaya–Marcuse correspondence as a direct, critical response to Dunayevskaya's arguments.

[3] Karel Kosik, a dissident philosopher in Czechoslovakia in the 1960s, commented on Marcuse's "A Note on Dialectic", suggesting (mistakenly) that Marcuse's work *Reason and Revolution* held that "Marx, compared with Hegel, is shown to be a 'liquadator' of philosophy and the founder of a dialectical theory of society" (Kosik, 1963/1976, 104); but in regard to "A Note on Dialectic" (Marcuse's new 1960 preface to *Reason and Revolution*), Kosik declares, "[Marcuse] became to a certain extent aware of the problematic character of his basic thesis, though he continued to maintain it" (Kosik, 1961/1976, 128n.10). For evidence of Marcuse's "awareness", Kosik quotes from "A Note on Dialectic": "Marx's materialist 'subversion' of Hegel … was not a shift from one philosophical position to another, but rather a recognition that the established forms of life were reaching the stage of their historical negation" (Marcuse, 1941/1960b, xiii, quoted in Kosik, 1961/1976, 128n.11). As opposed to Kosik's implicit *contrast* of the text of the main body of *Reason and Revolution* with "A Note on Dialectic", Marcuse actually wrote *similarly* in the former compared with the latter: "The transition from philosophy to the domain of state and society had been an intrinsic part of Hegel's system. His basic philosophic ideas had fulfilled themselves in the specific historical form that state and society had assumed, and the latter became central to a new theoretical interest. Philosophy in this way devolved upon social theory" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 251). Hence, the turn to social theory was *internal* to Hegel's philosophy. The tensions and perhaps ambiguities evident in Marcuse's work and Kosik's critique have broader implications that become manifest in Kosik's interpretations of Marx's dialectic of the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom. Unlike Marcuse, Kosik offers a succinct case for a form of freedom associated with labor in the realm of necessity as the basis for the realm of freedom (Kosik, 1960/1976, 124–125). Here, Kosik asserts the idea that Hegel's concept of labor was more "democratic" than was Schelling's. He nonetheless places Schelling's concept of art as "free activity" above Hegel's concept (Kosik, 1960/1976, 124). This contributes to an historical diversion from the need to understand the importance of uncovering the critical necessity and freedom dialectic in Hegel's overall philosophy and, therefore, Marx's extraordinary social appropriation of the latter.

I pay close attention to the Dunayevskaya–Marcuse correspondence because, in certain instances, it provides uniquely important background for understanding the content and trajectory of Dunayevskaya's and Marcuse's respective theory development, *and* for appreciating the importance of Moishe Postone's (1995) later reinterpretations of philosophic and social theoretic categories central to their debates. For instance, Dunayevskaya and Marcuse's differences on the theory and practice of Marxism in respect to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were reflected first in their correspondence, and resulted in a chain of theoretical events. First, in *Marxism and Freedom* (1958/1988), Dunayevskaya cites Marx's *Grundrisse* (1858/1993), a heretofore scarcely known work, and by tying it both to Marx's passages on the necessity and freedom dialectic in *Capital* (1894/1981, 958–959), and to Marx's *1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* (1975b), clearly enlists the whole range of Marx's work as a critical tool against the actually existing communism and in support of Dunayevskaya's idea of the latter as representing only an initial negation, and then historical restoration, of capitalism, albeit in its state form. Marcuse (1958/1988, xviii–xxiii) appears to respond in his preface to Dunayevskaya's *Marxism and Freedom* by citing different passages of the *Grundrisse* than did Dunayevskaya and issuing alternative interpretations of the necessity and freedom dialectic in *Capital*. Especially important in this regard, Marcuse appears to argue that the realm of necessity, whether in capitalist or post-capitalist society is devoid of freedom. Moreover, in a work published later in the same year, Marcuse explicitly notes the prime importance of the necessity and freedom dialectic itself. In criticizing Frederick Engels's interpretations, he also emphasizes Hegel's alert that, among all categories, the passage from necessity and freedom represents "the 'hardest' of all dialectical transitions" (Marcuse, 1961, 136).

In my analysis of Moishe Postone's reinterpretation of Marx's critical theory, I consider his re-establishment of the key importance and current social relevance of Marx's value theory, especially the interaction of concrete and abstract labor in a highly technologically developed capitalist society, and try to show that several of the key issues taken up in the Dunayevskaya–Marcuse correspondence—such as automation, the social relevance of the Hegelian–Marxian dialectic, and post-capitalist society—were not resolved and could not have been absent from such reinterpretations. Central to my analysis of Postone's reinterpretations are close considerations of the differences he attributes to the theories of the young and mature Marx in respect to an appropriation of Hegel's theories of

objectification and alienation, and of substance and the historical Subject. I understand these as two of Marx's "autocritiques", which constitute the heart of his unique theory of capitalism. I also identify Marx's third autocritique, this one in respect to, on the one hand, his implicit critique of his own 1844 approach to Hegel, and on the other, his presentation of the dialectic of the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom. Postone does not consider this aspect of the early Marx–late Marx autocritique. Also, it may, in fact, have been impossible to identify this (third) autocritique prior to Postone's reinterpretations of the Hegel–Marx relationship, and Marx's late works, the *Grundrisse* (1858/1993) and *Capital* (1867/1990).

In 1954, Raya Dunayevskaya, the Marxist–Humanist philosopher and organizer, initiated a correspondence focused mostly on the relationships of philosophy, critical social theory, labor, and automation with Herbert Marcuse, the noted Frankfurt School Critical Theorist and Institute for Social Research (I.S.R.) member (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012). Most of the letters were exchanged between 1954 and 1960, tapering off through the years of Marcuse's research for and publication of *One-Dimensional Man* in 1964, before becoming sporadic in the years leading up to Marcuse's death in 1978. At the time she initiated her correspondence with Marcuse, Dunayevskaya had made what she regarded as the original and socially relevant analyses of some of Hegel's later texts. Especially important for Dunayevskaya's approach was *Philosophy of Mind* (Hegel, 1817/1973) in which the necessity and freedom dialectic was central. This particular research, and certain conclusions she had drawn, may in fact have been the catalyst for her initiation of the correspondence with Marcuse, whose work *Reason and Revolution*: *Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory* (Marcuse, 1941/1999) was published during World War II, a decade or so after his move from Germany, just ahead of Hitler's rise to power. *Reason and Revolution*, which had had a great impact on Dunayevskaya, already pointed to the necessity and freedom dialectic as central to Hegel's *Science of Logic* (1812/1976). *Reason and Revolution* was the first work by a Marxist to provide an interpretation of all of Hegel's work and, as well, included the first analysis in English of Marx's *1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* (Marx, 1975b, 229–346).

In any case, the period of much of the most important correspondence with Marcuse was a productive half-dozen years. Dunayevskaya published *Marxism and Freedom*: *From 1776 Until Today* (1958/1988), a work that included her first reference to the heretofore hardly known *Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Oekonomie* (Marx, 1941/1953), which she related

to Marx's analysis of the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom in *Capital* (Marx, 1894/1981). The original edition also included Dunayevskaya's translation of Marx's *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, or "humanist essays"—the first published English translations of these key writings. It was Marcuse's (1958/1988) preface to *Marxism and Freedom* in which he first analyzed Marx's *Grundrisse*, a text that proved to be central to his theory development in the ensuing decade or more. During these same years, Marcuse published his perhaps most well-known work, *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud* (1962), as well as *Soviet Marxism*: *A Critical Analysis* (1961). The latter may be among Marcuse's lessor known works, but in the next and later chapters, I shall show its singular importance for the development of Marcuse's later Critical Theory. *Soviet Marxism* can be seen at least in part as a product of the dialogue with Dunayevskaya, as well as a work that in its own right provides his most thorough documentation and affirmation of the contemporary social relevance of the necessity and freedom dialectic in Hegel and Marx. I shall argue that the social relevance of the concepts of necessity and freedom had its origins in Hegel's philosophy. It was later taken up by Marx, albeit somewhat circuitously, in such a way that it served to round-out his own critical theory of labor, and capitalist and post-capitalist society.

In addition to publishing these original works during the period under consideration, Marcuse also twice returned to make additions to *Reason and Revolution* (1941/1999), his seminal work on the Hegel–Marx relationship. In 1954, he added an Epilogue (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 433–439) with substantial clarifications of the theories presented in great detail in the main text. A few years later, Marcuse (1960b, vii–xiv) also added a new Preface, "A Note on Dialectic", an important theoretical document in its own right, on Hegel's philosophy and Marx's critical social theory.

As in any attempt to grasp and convey the significance of correspondence focused on ideas, there is a need to investigate both the topics of discussion and the *timing* of their emergence. A consideration of "timing" takes into account the theoretical trajectories of the correspondents' works, as well as what is going on in the world, in this period especially the post–World War II Cold War marked by two nuclear-armed superpowers and an expanding automated production in factories and mines. At least in a preliminary sense, we might begin by saying that Hegel's dialectical philosophy and Marx's critique of the capitalist social formation were primary topics for both Marcuse and Dunayevskaya in 1954—although the

trajectories of their respective assessments of the contemporary relevance of Hegel's philosophy proved to have been in opposite directions. Marcuse's analyses of technology were linked to his increasingly strict *circumscription* of the contemporary relevance of Hegel's philosophy for concretizing Marx's dialectical social theory—at the same time that Dunayevskaya concluded that her political activity around the application of technology (automated production) demanded new insights into Hegel's philosophy to bring the full potential of Marx's critical theory to bear on efforts to grasp and shape the rapidly changing social reality.

The nature and extent of the contemporary relevance of Hegel's philosophy for interpreting and determining the utility of Marx's critical theory, and thus indirectly for the prospects of overcoming capitalism, formed the basis for the Dunayevskaya–Marcuse dialogue. Other topics, such as the structure and contradictions of modern capitalism, the significance (and potential) of class divisions for social change in the United States, technology and economy, and the past, present and future of the USSR, emerged mainly in the light of the basic dialogue on the Hegelian–Marxian dialectic.

Before providing more detail on the biographical and theoretical backgrounds of Dunayevskaya and Marcuse, it will be useful to note that, despite the fundamental disagreements we will encounter in examining the correspondence, as well as their published work, the two shared some important affinities, which were not in accord with Marcuse's colleagues, who were also leading I.S.R. members and Frankfurt School members, such as Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno. For example, the young Marx's *1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* (Marx, 1975b, 229–346) were central to a significant part of Marcuse's writings and most if not all of Dunayevskaya's, something that could not be said of Adorno or Horkheimer. Also, though they developed historically later than the years that are the focus of this chapter and the next, Marcuse (and certainly Dunayevskaya) generally supported the radical movements of the 1960s, from which Horkheimer and Adorno recoiled.

1.1 Biographical/Philosophical Backgrounds

1.1.1 Dunayevskaya

A self-educated movement intellectual without any university training, Dunayevskaya was born in Ukraine and grew up in the Maxwell Street Jewish ghetto, later torn down and replaced by the University of Illinois at

Chicago. Prior to her correspondence with Marcuse, which she began in December 1954, Dunayevskaya had served as a secretary to Trotsky in Mexico. Dunayevskaya became known as a critic—from the left—of the Soviet Union, and had worked closely with the noted Afro-Caribbean Marxist C.L.R. James. In early 1974, Dunayevskaya recalled the earliest part of this period in a letter she wrote to Erich Fromm,[4] who was then living in Mexico:

> I keep thinking of Cuernavaca [Mexico] as is where LT's [Leon Trotsky's] household "escaped" after those horrid Frame-Up Trials—and it was at their conclusion in 1938 that, along the paths of bougainvillea, began my series of doubts in purple! (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 172)

Dunayevskaya's letter to Fromm refers to Stalin's Moscow frame-up trials of 1936–1938. These purges paved the way for the Hitler–Stalin pact and World War II, which eclipsed worldwide efforts to realize a post-capitalist society. In 1939, shortly after the moment of the young Dunayevskaya's "doubts in purple", she acted on the latter by breaking with *Trotsky*, disagreeing with his position that, even despite the pact, the Soviet Union must still be defended as a workers' state, "though degenerate". By the time World War II was drawing to a close, Dunayevskaya had moved even further to the left. She embarked on a diagnosis of the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union, which she now described as a state-capitalist society (Hudis, 1992).[5] Theorists in the Soviet Union continued to argue that the state represented a *post*-capitalist society in which Marx's concept of socialism had been realized.

Writing for the *American Economic Review* in 1944, Dunayevskaya translated an article from the Russian, ostensibly about pedagogy in the Soviet Union, and issued a commentary on it (Dunayevskaya, 1944).[6] The article she translated had originally appeared in the middle of the war in

[4] Fromm was the only other original I.S.R. member besides Marcuse who was in contact with Dunayevskaya; in Fromm's work, there were more affinities with Dunayevskaya and Marcuse than with Adorno and Horkheimer, especially in respect to the importance he attributed to Marx's early humanist writings for the latter's overall critical social theory.

[5] Most of the key articles written in the three years after Dunayevskaya broke from Trotsksy detail her analyses of the series of Russia's Five-Year Plans (1928–1943), which document the basis for diagnosing state-capitalism in the USSR.

[6] "Teaching of Economics in the Soviet Union" was an unsigned article, which originally appeared in *Pod znamenem Marxizma* (*Under the Banner of Marxism*), No. 7–8, 1943.

the Soviet Union's most prominent theoretical journal. Written by the state's leading theoreticians, the article argued that the law of value, previously endorsed in official state doctrine to be characteristic of capitalist society alone, indeed operated in the Soviet Union, which nonetheless was still held to be socialist. To argue her case, Dunayevskaya's commentary (published in the same issue of *American Economic Review* as her translation of the Russian article) referred to Marx's concept of alienated labor, which Marx first developed most extensively in his (1975b, 229–346) *1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*.[7] Thus, Dunayevskaya's point in translating and publishing the article in the *American Economic Review* in the midst of World War II exposing the USSR's theoreticians' admission of the operation of the law of value sought to reveal the counter-revolutionary tendencies developing within society a generation after the world's first proletarian revolution. It also was intended to point to the *theoretic deceptions* about this turn of events and, perhaps more auspiciously, direct attention to and redress the apparent philosophic void in the USSR, and in Marxism generally. In 1944, the controversy that Dunayevskaya's critique provoked hit the front page of the *New York Times,* and over the next year, several Left economists weighed in on the debate, including Paul Baran, Oscar Lange, and Leo Rogin. Dunayevskaya's 1945 rejoinder closed the debate.

1.1.2 Marcuse

Marcuse was a Marxist from his youth who had also studied with the existentialist philosopher Martin Heidegger. Of Jewish origin, he subsequently joined the I.S.R. (later known as the Frankfurt School) and left Germany after 1933, winding up in New York, where he became the principal philosopher at the then Columbia University–based I.S.R. While still in Germany, he had written *Hegel's Ontology and the Theory of Historicity*

[7] See Raya Dunayevskaya (1944). A New Revision of Marxist Economics (pp. 531–537). *American Economic Review* 34, 3. Among Dunayevskaya's earlier articles, written in the three years after her break with Trotsky (1939–1942), was "Labor and Society" (Dunayevskaya, 1942/1992, 17–25), which already referred repeatedly to two of the central articles in Marx's *1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*. Written in 1942, but unpublished until the mid-1940s, the essay was intended as the introduction to Dunayevskaya's analysis of the USSR's economy. Hence, Dunayevskaya's later 1944 reference to alienated labor in the dispute over teaching economics in the Soviet Union already *presupposed* a new philosophic orientation, which she began to develop immediately in the wake of her break with Trotsky.

(Marcuse, 1932/1987), which has been widely thought to be predominately influenced by Heidegger's philosophy. More recent treatments have not shared that assessment, and shifted attention to the importance of Marcuse's close reading of Hegel's *Science of Logic* (1812/1976),[8] which fills well over half the book's 325 pages. These reinterpretations implied a compression of the period of significant influence of Heidegger's philosophy on Marcuse's work to two articles published in 1928–1929 (Abromeit, 2004).

No doubt Marcuse's discovery of Marx's (1975b, 229–346) *1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, which he reviewed (Marcuse, 1932/2005a) a few months after completing *Hegel's Ontology* (1932/1987), provided many of the philosophical elements he felt had been missing in Marxism, thus paving the way for his departure from Heidegger. However, it would be a mistake to draw the philosophic divide in Marcuse's works between *Hegel's Ontology* and "New Sources on the Foundation of Historical Materialism", his review of Marx's *1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*.[9] While we cannot provide a detailed textual analysis here, the philosophic continuity of the two works (*Hegel's Ontology* and "New Sources") is most starkly presented in a comparison of (a) Marcuse's assessment (in *Hegel's Ontology*) of the contemporary importance of a deeper understanding of Hegel's dialectic for a critical social theory through his analysis of Hegel's concepts of theory and practice in the *Science of Logic* (1817/1976), and (b) Marcuse's continuing to leave open (in *New Sources*) the question of the social relevance of Hegel's philosophy, even after carefully following *Marx's* early critique of Hegel.

For example, in *Hegel's Ontology*, in a discussion of Hegel's (1812/1976) concluding chapter of the *Science of Logic*—on the Absolute Idea—Marcuse (1932/1987, 169–170) explains the transition from the Idea of

[8] cf. Russell Rockwell (2016). Hegel and critical social theory: New perspectives from the Marcuse archives (pp. 141–159). *Sociological Quarterly* 45, 1.

[9] In her introduction to the English translation of *Hegel's Ontology*, Seyla Benhabib (1987, xii) noted a postcard Marcuse wrote to Karl Löwith, dated July 28, 1931, wherein Marcuse summarizes his intentions in writing the work: "It is true that a longer work of mine on Hegel will appear this fall: it is an interpretation of the *Logic* and the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as foundations for a theory of historicity. The *Hegel–Marx* question is not explicitly addressed, although I hope this interpretation will throw some new light on this connection. Nor does this work contain a critical discussion of Heidegger nor is it intended to do so. Rather, the whole is a necessary preparation for articulating the fundamental nature of historical happening."

the true (or the Theoretical Idea) and the Idea of the good (or the Practical Idea) to the Absolute Idea. Marcuse quotes from Hegel's *Science of Logic* that, "[E]xternal reality for the will [identified with the Practical Idea, Idea of the good, 'action'] does not receive the form of true being… The Idea of the good must therefore be supplemented by the Idea of truth" (Hegel, 1976, 821, quoted by Marcuse, 1931/1987, 169–170).[10] Marcuse concludes that the *Absolute* Idea is *both*, "an action that knows and a knowledge that acts" (Marcuse, 1932/1987, 170). Yet, Marcuse critically notes that Hegel's Absolute Idea ultimately represents, "thought thinking itself" (Marcuse, 1932/1987, 182). Thus, he rejects Hegel's conclusion to the *Logic*, which he interprets as a certain type of ontology, rooted as far back as in Aristotle's philosophy (Marcuse, 1932/1987, 182). As Marcuse put it later in *Reason and Revolution*, this "reflected a social separation of the intellectual sphere from the sphere of material production" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 163–164). But, unlike in the later *Reason and Revolution*, in *Hegel's Ontology*, Marcuse still holds out prospects for the current social relevance of Hegel's philosophy. Thus, Marcuse argues that Hegel did not "postulate thought thinking itself" from the beginning (of the *Logic*), which would then "dominate the ontological investigations" (Marcuse, 1932/1987, 182). In fact, Hegel may not have understood the deeper implications of his own philosophy. Marcuse writes:

> [A] purely formal interpretation of his determination ["thought thinking itself"] on the basis of the concept of movement which Hegel considers basic would be insufficient. The concrete determination of the Absolute Idea as the unity of theoretical and practical Idea or as the unity of Life and cognition would speak against this. (Marcuse, 1932/1987, 183)

Thus, in *Hegel's Ontology*, Marcuse left the door open for an interpretation of the current direct relevance of Hegel's philosophy for the development of critical social theory.

The philosophic *continuity* of the two works Marcuse produced in 1932 can be further shown by comparison of the above quotation taken from Marcuse's (1932/1987) *Hegel's Ontology* with his conclusion in his review of Marx's *1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, which included his assessment of Marx's critique of Hegel's philosophy:

[10] The quotation is the translator's English translation of Marcuse's quote of Hegel from the original German. The citation in the text is to the English translation of the *Science of Logic* (Hegel, 1812/1976).

> Marx has expressed in all clarity the inner connection between revolutionary theory and Hegel's philosophy … we cannot go into the question if and how the "mistakes" with which Marx charges Hegel can really be attributed to him. It has perhaps become clear through this paper that the discussion really starts at the center of Hegel's problematic. Marx's critique of Hegel is not an appendage of the preceding critique and foundation of political economy, for his examination of political economy is itself a continuous confrontation with Hegel. (Marcuse, 1932/2005a, 121)

Marcuse discusses the "mistakes" Marx had attributed to Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* (1807) as all revolving around Hegel's substitution of mind for the subject of praxis. Most important for the analysis of Hegel, Marx, and Marcuse I shall develop from this is that Marcuse restricts his analysis of the Marx–Hegel relationship to Marx's critique of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind*, except for a brief mention at the end that the basic critique, "comes out in Hegel's system as a whole in the fact, for example, that 'nature' is not grasped as the 'self expression of man's senses', in its ontological unity with man or its 'humanity', but is taken as externality 'in the sense of alienation, of a mistake, a defect, which ought not to be'—a 'nothing'" (Marcuse, 1932/2005a, 117). Here, Marcuse is referring to the few short sentences in Marx's (1975a, 326–346) "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic" at the point at which Marx moves from a critique of *Phenomenology of Mind* to Hegel's (1817) *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, particularly Hegel's transition from the *Philosophy of Natur*e (1817/2007) to *Philosophy of Mind* (1817/1973). Marx's 1844 analysis does not go beyond this point in Hegel's text, and it is only in the following "Subdivision" that Hegel (1817/1973, 20–24) takes up the necessity and freedom dialectic. Therefore, in 1844, Marx does not yet take up Hegel's philosophical analysis of social necessity and freedom. As I shall develop in this work, two decades later in *Capital*, vol. 3, Marx (1894/1981, 958–959) returns to consideration of these very concepts, specifying the forms of post-capitalist freedom as a dialectical relationship of the "realm of necessity" and the "realm of freedom". Marcuse not having ever established this connection between Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind* and Marx's *Capital* makes Marcuse's early questioning of the mistakes with which Marx charged Hegel all the more poignant.[11]

[11] A recent interpretation of Marx's dialectic of the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom, while rich in analysis, still does not make the link to Hegel's original concepts. See Sayers (2013, 65–77).

Reason and Revolution (Marcuse, 1941/1999), published a decade after *Hegel's Ontology* (1932/1987) and "New Sources" (1932/2005a), is Marcuse's seminal work on Hegel *and* Marx. While it contained many important and unique features, it is certainly significant for understanding the background of his correspondence with Dunayevskaya, which we will take up in the next chapter: The trajectory *from Hegel's Ontology* pointed *away* from the notion that the critical theory represented in Hegel's philosophy remained socially relevant. *Reason and Revolution* was the first work by a Marxist to provide an analysis of all of Hegel's works, as well as the first work in English to assess in some detail Marx's (1975b, 229–346) *1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*. Nonetheless, contrasted to *Hegel's Ontology*, its verdict that Hegel's philosophy lacked contemporary relevance for critical social theory was much abbreviated, direct, and unambiguous.[12]

Also informative, a comparison of Marcuse's (1932/1987) analysis of the relationship of Marx's thought to Hegel's ("the Hegel-Marx question" referred to in his postcard to Löwith[13]) in, on the one hand, "New Sources" (Marcuse, 1932/2005a) and, on the other, *Reason and Revolution* (1941/1999) reveals that Marcuse's consideration of Marx's "Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole" (1975a, 326–346)—the crucial third and final essay of Marx's 1844 *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* (1975b, 229–346) that most directly takes up this issue—is much reduced in *Reason and Revolution*. In fact, of the 15 pages in *Reason and Revolution* (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 273–287) devoted to Marx's *1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, only one passage refers directly to the "Critique of Hegel's Dialectic" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 282), while in *New Sources* (Marcuse, 1932/2005a, 115–121), the entire concluding section, six pages, analyzes the "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic".

[12] According to Marcuse's account in the last pages of his analysis of the *Science of Logic* (1812/1976), on the most basic level, Hegel's absolute idea could be regarded simply as meaning, "[r]ealization of the notion … universal mastery, exercised by men having a rational social organization, over nature—a world that might indeed be imagined as the realization of the notion of all things" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 161). But nonetheless, Marcuse quickly issues a clear statement rejecting the prospect that further detailed examination of Hegel's dialectic proper might still make independent contributions to establishment of a critical social theory. Marcuse remarks, "Hegel tends to dissolve the element of historical practice and replace it with the independent reality of thought" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 161).

[13] See note 9.

Nonetheless, Marcuse, yet again in *Reason and Revolution*, refers to Marx's "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic" in his summary of "The Marxian Dialectic" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 315),[14] and it is also true that Marcuse's single reference to this text goes straight to the heart of the matter. Marcuse, in showing that "economic realities exhibit their own inherent negativity" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 282), notes that

> We are here touching upon the origins of the Marxian dialectic. For Marx as for Hegel, the dialectic takes note of the fact that the negation inherent in reality is the "moving and creative principle". The dialectic is the, "dialectic of negativity". (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 282)

Yet, the context of Marcuse's argument plainly indicates that even this affirmation of the unity of the Hegelian–Marxian dialectic is constitutive of the trajectory of Marcuse's thought since 1932 *away* from the possibility that Hegel's philosophy as such *remains* socially relevant. In the course of Marcuse's argument, he notes that Marx frequently suggested that just because it had a negative character did not prevent the capitalist mode of labor from having "progressive" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 281–246) qualities (increased rational exploitation of material resources, productivity of labor, etc.). Marcuse points out, "With all these qualities, progress only aggravates the negativity of the social order… Here again Hegel's philosophy was right: the progress of reason is not progress of happiness" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 282).

Marcuse (1941/1999, 287–295) develops this argument in the section on "The Abolition of Labor", which follows his analyses of Marx's *1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*. His argument is based predominately on Marx's 1845 *The German ideology*; nonetheless, it employs concepts and terms from Marx's later work, that is, *Capital* (1867/1990) and *Critique of the Gotha Program* (1875/2010), to argue that reason and happiness are *not* separated in Marx's work as they are in Hegel's philosophy. "Happiness", for Marcuse, is a term for "An association of free individuals wherein the material process of production no longer determines the entire pattern of life" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 293). Moreover, for Marx (according to Marcuse), a "rational society implies an order in which

[14] Since here Marcuse refers to Marx's (1975a, 326–346) "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic" to try to show the fundamental distinction between Hegel and Marx's dialectic in the context of his analysis of Marx's *Capital*, my analysis of his interpretation is developed in the last chapter, Chap. 9, which takes up that subject.

it is not the universality of labor but the universal satisfaction of all individual potentialities that constitutes the principal of social organization" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 293). Marcuse notes that Marx "contemplates a society that gives to each not according to his work but his needs. Mankind becomes free only when the material perpetuation of life is the function of the abilities and happiness of associated individuals" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 293). Hence, Marcuse argues that Marx's *theory* conceptualized the possible new form of social organization emerging from within the traditional, and it ultimately stood in "full contradiction" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 293) to Hegel's philosophy. Marcuse writes that with Marx,

> The idea of reason has been superseded by the idea of happiness. Historically the first was interlaced into a society in which the intellectual forces of production were detached from the material ones. Within this framework of social and economic inequities, the life of reason was a life of higher dignity. It dictated individual sacrifice for the sake of some higher universal independent of the "base" impulses and drives of individuals… Hegel had emphatically denied that the progress of reason would have anything to do with the satisfaction of individual happiness. Even the most advanced concepts of the Hegelian philosophy … preserved and in the last analysis condoned the negativity of the existing social system. Reason could prevail even though the reality shrieked of individual frustration: idealist culture and the technological progress of civil society bear witness of that… The demand that free individuals attain satisfaction militated against the entire set-up of traditional culture. The Marxian theory consequently rejected even the advanced ideas of the Hegelian scheme. (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 294)

Marcuse's *Reason and Revolution* (1941/1999) was published contemporaneously with Dunayevskaya's break with Trotsky and her ensuing analyses of the direction of the Soviet Union's economy and society. Her studies continued throughout the war and were coupled with her turn to Marx's (1975b, 229–346) *1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, studies that, in contrast with Marcuse's (1941/1999) analysis of these same writings, were circulated in correspondence and in smaller and less formal political party presses. Thus, it is unlikely that Marcuse knew of Dunayevskaya's work at the time, but clearly *Reason and Revolution* had an impact on Dunayevskaya and a number of her comrades (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 233–235).[15] In any case, a certain work Marcuse engaged

[15] Dunayevskaya's essay, "Labor and Society" (1942/1992) appears to have been significantly influenced by Marcuse's (1941/1999, 287–295) chapter on "The Abolition of Labor".

in during the years around the publication of *Reason and Revolution* and in the aftermath of World War II also involved something of an "underground" activity, and its nature suggests that Dunayevskaya's work at that time would have been of special interest to him had he known of it.

During and after the war, there were two contexts to consider with Marcuse's work. While it is fairly well-known that in the decade or so (1942–1951) after publication of *Reason and Revolution* (Marcuse, 1941/1999), during and after the war, Marcuse worked first with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS, later the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)), then for the State Department. He concentrated on a propaganda, and later on US occupation policies for Germany, while also continuing to carry out studies of war and fascism. Interestingly, research into the Marcuse archives several decades after the time in question showed that in that war period, Marcuse also worked closely with Franz Neumann on a project centering on theories of "social change" (Kellner, 1998, 12–15).[16] Throughout this period, Horkheimer and Adorno moved away from social theory and focused more on cultural critique. An article on "Theories of Social Change" (Marcuse, 1998, 105–137) was one of a series of documents Marcuse co-authored with Neumann, documents that were never published or apparently even referred to in writing by any of the other I.S.R. members (Kellner, 1998, 12–15). This particular article, written around the time of *Reason and Revolution* also indicates that Marcuse had not completely finished working out the socio-historical relevance of Hegel's philosophy. Marcuse and Neumann survey the tradition of Western philosophy in terms of its critical social theoretic potential. Hegel's philosophy in particular is understood as the basis for determining the *current* role of revolutionary *thought* in social transformation.

Then, in a post-war example of this social and political tendency, which is not as well known as the Frankfurt School's turn to cultural critique, Marcuse's (1947/1998, 215–227) piece titled "33 Theses" provides additional evidence for the different theoretical and political perspectives that developed in the 1940s between, on the one hand, Marcuse's work and, on the other, the conventionally known theoretical tendencies of the Frankfurt School at the time. In fact, the Marcusean tendency aligns with Dunayevskaya's efforts in the 1940s. In connection with this, a central

[16] Kellner suggested that his recent research indicated that there was something of an incipient post-*Reason and Revolution* Marcusean "social" tendency. Kellner suggests that perhaps this tendency was even vying for supremacy within the I.S.R.

feature of the importance of "33 Theses" lies in the context formed by Marcuse's efforts, which failed completely, to actually secure the repeatedly promised collaboration of other I.S.R. members in establishing a theoretical nucleus aimed at social change in the post-war years. In "33 Theses", Marcuse essentially proposed that a statement of distinctly Hegelian–Marxist political–philosophical orientation forms the basis for the resumption of publication of *Zeitscrift für Sozialforschung*, the I.S.R.'s journal, after the defeat of German fascism. With obvious yet sometimes intriguing ambiguities,[17] Marcuse argues in "33 Theses" that the post–World War II world was dividing into Soviet and neo-fascist camps, a situation demanding that revolutionary theory "ruthlessly and openly criticize" (Marcuse, 1947/1998, 217) both camps. The thesis was never publicly tested, even though Marcuse held that the rationale for such critique was that the,

> working class and political praxis of the working class, and changing class relations (at the national and international level) continue to determine the conceptual development of theory, as they in turn are determined by it—not by the theory without praxis, but by the one which "seizes the masses". (Marcuse, 1947/1998, 218)

In contrast, that the post-war stirrings in the West were *not* headed toward anything like the Russian Revolution that emerged out of World War I was reflected in the first of the two major additions Marcuse made to *Reason and Revolution* (1954/1999, 433–439). The new 1954 edition of *Reason and Revolution* included an added Epilogue, which took up what would become the two most important themes in the soon to be initiated Dunayevskaya–Marcuse correspondence—Hegel's Absolutes, particularly Absolute Mind in the final volume of Hegel's *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1817/1973) and the revolutionary potential of the contemporary working class. Since Dunayevskaya's opening letter to Marcuse was written in December 1954, it could not have affected Marcuse's choice of topics for the 1954 Epilogue.[18] This Epilogue is all

[17] In Theses 32 and 33 of this manifesto-like document, Marcuse suggests a hypothesis wherein some version of the Leninist concept of the vanguard part might be correct and possible grounds for dissident Marxist theoreticians to work within the "Western European and West Germany's communist parties".

[18] Nor could the Epilogue have affected Dunayevskaya's choice of topics during the crucial first year of the correspondence, since she indicates in a letter written late in 1955 (Anderson

the more remarkable, then, in that it stands at the intersection of Marcuse and Dunayevskaya's theoretical trajectories, and the ensuing correspondence is the evidence that the two were moving in opposite directions. The second major addition to *Reason and Revolution* appeared in 1960 (Marcuse, 1960b, vii–xiv). Thus, the latter addition capped a half-dozen year span, coinciding with the peak of Marcuse's correspondence with Dunayevskaya.

Before we finally turn to the correspondence, it will be helpful to briefly summarize at least that part of the Epilogue (Marcuse, 1941/1954/1999, 433–439) that takes up Hegel's (1817/1973) Absolute Mind and the contemporary working class. Marcuse's Epilogue is in stark contrast to the anticipatory tone, and even some of the diagnoses of the prospects for revolutionary theory and practice found in his unpublished 1940s work I just described above. The Epilogue sharply focuses on the central themes of *Reason and Revolution* (Marcuse, 1941/1954/1999) up to which Marcuse's theoretical trajectory from the 1930s (and then even more so into the 1950s) had been toward reduced expectations concerning the social and political prospects for overcoming capitalism. Perhaps more significant in connection with a philosopher such as Marcuse, for whom social change was a central focus, the emphases in his interpretations of Hegel's dialectic were also undergoing modifications. The opening sentences are quite dramatic: "The defeat of Fascism and National Socialism has not arrested the trend toward totalitarianism. Freedom is on the retreat—in the realm of thought as well as in the realm of society" (Marcuse, 1941/1954/1999, 433). Yet, in a comparison of the new Epilogue with the text of *Reason and Revolution*, it is difficult to identify any substantial *reinterpretations* of the ideas of Hegel or Marx, or the relationship of the two. Marcuse takes up, in turn, Hegel, then Marx. In the cases of both, Marcuse strikingly anticipates and offers interpretations *opposite* to those Dunayevskaya introduces in her early letters to him.

On Hegel and the absolute, Marcuse returns in the Epilogue (Marcuse, 1941/1954/1999, 433–438) to the thesis he developed in the text of *Reason and Revolution*: "Hegel tends to dissolve the element of historical practice and replace it with the independent reality of thought" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 161).[19] In the text of *Reason and Revolution*, Marcuse wrote

& Rockwell, 2012, 13) that she had not yet seen the new (1954) edition of *Reason and Revolution*.

[19] See note 12.

that, "The truth of philosophy … became a function of its remoteness from material practice… Hegel protested this trend … considering it the complete abdication of reason [and] spoke for the actual power of reason and for the concrete materialization of freedom" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 164). Yet, according to Marcuse, Hegel was "frightened by the social forces that had undertaken this task" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 164). The French Revolution pointed to modern society's "irreconcilable antagonisms" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 164).[20] Hegel even specified "the particular mode of labor" underpinning the relations of civil society, which Hegel recognized as the barrier to "perfect freedom and perfect reason" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 164). Marcuse remarks that, "[T]he final truth had therefore to be sought in another sphere of reality … the *Logic* bears the mark of resignation" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 164).

In the Epilogue—in clear contrast to where, following Marx in the latter's 1844 "Critique of Hegel's Dialectic", he had *stopped* his analysis of *Philosophy of Mind*[21]—now Marcuse (1941/1954/1999, 433) refers to the *conclusion* of Hegel's (1817/1973) *Encyclopaedia* presentation of his system. Marcuse refers to the final paragraphs of *The Philosophy of Mind* (1817/1973) and a passage from Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, which Hegel attached. Marcuse argues that the final paragraphs and Aristotle's passage represented "deification of the spirit", and "Western philosophy's answer to the quest for Reason and Freedom … implies acknowledgement of its defeat in the reality" (Marcuse, 1941/1954/1999, 433).[22] Moreover, Marcuse re-emphasizes the idea he had already clearly presented in the main text (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 232): "Hegel's philosophy was the last which could dare to comprehend reality as manifestation of the Spirit. The subsequent history made such an attempt impossible" (Marcuse, 1941/1954/1999, 433).

[20] In Chap. 9, I shall argue for the importance of Susan Buck-Morss's recent critique of Marcuse and other Hegelian–Marxists' historical blindness to the relationship of the Haitian Revolution and the French Revolution and, most remarkably, to Hegel's implicit incorporation of the dialectic of these revolutions as underlying the master–slave dialectic in his *Phenomenology of Mind* (1807).

[21] See note 11.

[22] Though not mentioned by Marcuse, Hegel added the final sentence to the original 1817 text in 1830, shortly before his death. As I shall discuss in later chapters, especially in the conclusion to Chap. 9, Dunayevskaya and Marcuse's divergent interpretations of this added final sentence are key for both Marcuse and Dunayevskaya's assessments of the current social relevance of Hegel's dialectic and, as well, for grasping the implications of Moishe Postone's concept of Marx's social appropriations of Hegel's philosophy or, what I shall conceptualize as Marx's series of autocritiques.

On Marx and the proletariat, Marcuse (1941/1999, 434) also returns to the thesis first presented in the text of *Reason and Revolution*, where he referred to Marx's 1843 *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*. Marcuse had pointed out that Marx held, on the negative side, that the very *existence* of the proletariat vitiated bourgeois society's self-image of "reason, right, and freedom", and through the social condition of this class, "history and reality thus negate [Hegel's] philosophy" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 261). In the later Epilogue, Marcuse turns to the "fate" of the "positive" side of this thesis—with the notion of the proletariat as the revolutionary social class, "the Marxian attempt to redefine Reason" (Marcuse, 1941/1954/1999, 434). Arguing that historically Marx's theory seemed to fare no better than Hegel's philosophy, Marcuse issues an extended argument for the bases of the historical integration of the working class into "the national interest" (Marcuse, 1941/1954/1999, 438), and the principal factors "enabling late industrial civilization to absorb its negativity" (Marcuse, 1941/1954/1999, 437). I shall not discuss these arguments here, and instead consider them next in the context of the correspondence with Dunayevskaya as they became central topics.

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CHAPTER 2

Inside the Development of Marxist Humanism and Critical Theory: The Dunayevskaya–Marcuse Correspondence

2.1 The First Phase, 1954–1955: The Social Relevance of the Proletariat and of Hegel's Philosophy

The first exchanges between Dunayevskaya and Marcuse might well have appeared to the unsuspecting reader that the two already knew of each other's most recent work and were out to rebut each other's positions on the revolutionary potential of the contemporary working class and the social relevance of Hegel's philosophy from the very start of their correspondence. Dunayevskaya's opening letter to Marcuse introduces her as the translator, in 1944, of the Russian article, "Teaching Economics in the Soviet Union", as well as the author of the two other articles at the center of the controversy around the operation of the law of value in the Soviet Union (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 3). However, after indicating that she had since "turned to philosophy" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 3), and had been working on a book for a decade, the second half of the letter describes why she had not finished the work: All her time had been absorbed helping to establish a newspaper, "written mainly by workers", projecting a "working-class view of the world" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 4).[1] The letter concludes with a note indicating that she had sent

[1] The newspaper Dunayevskaya referred to was *Correspondence*, published for a couple of years (1953–1955) by Committees of Correspondence, the revolutionary organization led

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several back issues of the newspaper *Correspondence* to Marcuse under separate cover. Marcuse's response the following month indicates that he agreed with much of what he had read in *Correspondence*, and made clear he was willing to begin a discussion. Yet, virtually the entire content of his brief reply was directed at criticizing a dual tendency he had identified in the issues of *Correspondence* sent to him: anti-intellectualism and "glorification of the 'common people'" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 5).

After this somewhat uncertain exchange initiated by Dunayevskaya, what transpired over the next three months—two letters to Marcuse, an in-person meeting with him, and a follow-up letter to her from Marcuse—already put most of the cards on the table. And they clearly demonstrated that Dunayevskaya's views were opposite to those of Marcuse's expressed in his just published 1954 Epilogue to *Reason and Revolution* for example, "[F]reedom is in retreat in the realm of thought as well as that of society" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 433). Dunayevskaya, in the first of her two follow-up letters, perhaps noticing that Marcuse's reply had focused exclusively on his disagreements with her apparently optimistic view of the ideas and activities of the working class, directly stated that her principal interest in a dialogue with Marcuse was "dialectics for I had been working for quite some time on [Hegel's] Absolute Idea, Absolute Knowledge, Absolute Mind" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 5). This letter was written on February 12, 1955, followed by another on April 3, 1955. In the latter, Dunayevskaya indicates that she and Marcuse had already met in person, she had left with him two letters on Hegel that she had originally written to her comrade Grace Lee in 1953, and that she was "very anxious to hear your reaction to those two letters where I first posed the question of the absolute idea in terms of a movement from practice to theory as well as from theory to practice" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 6).[2] Finally, to round out this initial phase of the correspondence, Marcuse wrote to record his response to reading the two letters Dunayevskaya had left to him:

by Dunayevskaya (along with C.L.R. James [1901–1989] and Grace Lee Boggs [1915–]) from 1951–1955. The group is usually referred to as the Johnson–Forest Tendency (James used the pseudonym J.R. Johnson and Dunayevskaya the pseudonym Freddie Forest), although Dunayevskaya favored the term State–Capitalist Tendency.

[2] The two letters Dunayevskaya refers to here, which she passed to Marcuse at their first meeting, were written in May 1953 to Grace Lee, a philosopher who was active along with Dunayevskaya in the Johnson–Forest Tendency. The letters analyze Hegel's Absolutes, the first in his *Science of Logic* (1812/1976), the second in his *Philosophy of Mind* (1817/1973). These letters are collected in Hudis and Anderson (Eds.) (2002).

> I have now read the notes on Hegel which you lent me. This is fascinating, and I admire your way of concretizing the most abstract philosophical notions. However, I still cannot get along with the direct translation of idealistic philosophy into politics: I think you somehow minimize the "negation" which the application of the Hegelian dialectic to political phenomenon presupposes. (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 7)

Marcuse indicates that Dunayevskaya's letters (both the 1953 letters to Grace Lee on Hegel and those since exchanged with Marcuse), as well as his responses to her, needed further in-person discussions, and he would be quite willing to engage in these with her in due time (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 7). But keeping the focus on this initial phase of the correspondence, two observations can be offered at once: (1) As it turned out, fully five years passed before Marcuse finally clarified his perspectives on the contemporary status of Hegel's philosophy (especially the aforementioned "'negation' which the application of the Hegelian dialectic to political phenomenon presupposes"). This explanation appeared in his new 1960 Preface to *Reason and Revolution*, "A Note on Dialectic" (Marcuse, 1960, iv, vii–xiii), certainly highlighting his differences with Dunayevskaya's views[3]; (2) Dunayevskaya and Marcuse maintained their correspondence despite the initial fundamental differences on Hegel as well as on the proletariat,[4] primarily on the basis of a shift of attention to the book Dunayevskaya had been writing prior to initiating the correspondence with Marcuse. Along with the letters on Hegel, Dunayevskaya had left a draft chapter of this book with Marcuse, and wrote to him that, "I want the two poles of the book on Marx to be that of automation and the absolute idea" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 6, 9).

[3] Here Marcuse writes that, "[T]he element of reconciliation with the established state of affairs, so strong in [Hegel's] work… Freedom is relegated to the realm of pure thought, to the Absolute Idea… Idealism by default: Hegel shares this fate with the main philosophical tradition" (Marcuse, 1960, ix).

[4] It is clear from the final paragraph of Marcuse's (1960, xiv) new Preface to *Reason and Revolution* that the by then five-year-long dialogue with Dunayevskaya had no effect on the position Marcuse had taken in the 1954 Epilogue to that work, written just prior to the beginning of the correspondence with Dunayevskaya, concerning the integration of the proletariat in late industrial society (discussed in the text above). Remarkably, in this final paragraph of the 1960 Preface, Marcuse announces that he had omitted this (1954) Epilogue from the current (1960) edition of *Reason and Revolution* because "[I]t treated in a much too condensed form developments which I discuss more fully in my forthcoming book, study of advanced industrial society" (Marcuse, 1960, xiv), clearly a reference to the development of his argument on the non-oppositional position of the proletariat which he published a few years later (Marcuse, 1966).

Dunayevskaya includes descriptions of her book plans in the lengthy letter (May 5, 1955) following Marcuse's brief disagreement with her "direct translation of idealistic philosophy into politics" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 7–9).

A pattern emerged in their correspondence in which Marcuse's responses to Dunayevskaya's positions, especially on Hegel, proved to be rather brief and cryptic, often suggesting that far more time would be needed to fully address the emerging issues, followed by Dunayevskaya's more detailed letters in which she often attempted to have the issues resolved in the form of the correspondence. For example, Dunayevskaya's response to Marcuse's disagreement with her "direct translation of idealistic philosophy into politics" amounted to a two-page rebuttal. Yet within this rebuttal, it was Dunayevskaya's mention of Marx (not Hegel), which Marcuse latched on to in his reply, responding to it first instead of Dunayevskaya's elaborations of her use of Hegel. He wrote, "Let me just tell you that I read your draft re Marxism and state capitalism and found it most needed and useful. The whole idea is excellent" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 10). But, in the emerging pattern, Dunayevskaya writes back within a week, again in a fairly lengthy letter, that the outline of the book to which Marcuse responded favorably, was not "the form of the book I intend to write now… I turned more to philosophy than to economics" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 10–11). She also added additional justifications for her approach to Hegel's absolutes (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 10–11).

Perhaps more remarkably, following this letter, and after a three-month break in the correspondence, Dunayevskaya writes, this time, a short letter to Marcuse. She suddenly raises a question about the 1954 edition of *Reason and Revolution*, which included the added Epilogue I discussed above. Dunayevskaya, noting she had *not* seen the new addition, asks "whether you had grappled with Stalinism and its violent attempts in 1943 and 1947 to break Marx from Hegel … that of course will be integral to my work" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 13). In the context of the initial exchanges in their correspondence, Dunayevskaya's statement implies a deep criticism of what she probably suspects (and *only* suspects because of her not yet having read Marcuse's recent Epilogue for *Reason and Revolution*) in regard to Marcuse's current minimization of the contemporary relevance of the Hegelian element in the Hegelian–Marxian dialectic.

These 1955 letters, the first in September inquiring about Marcuse's new edition of *Reason and Revolution* (1941/1999) and the other in December, marked the end of the first full year of the correspondence; we have only one more letter each from Dunayevskaya and Marcuse in this period. In October 1955, Dunayevskaya sent Marcuse a fairly detailed account of her tour of the West Coast to discuss her book-in-progress, including an account of a lecture in which she elaborated the comments in her earlier letter concerning "Stalinism's violent attempts in 1943 and 1947 to break Marx from Hegel and transform the Marxian dialectic from development through contradiction to an idealistic totalitarian development of 'criticism and self criticism'" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 13). Marcuse, though not responding to either Dunayevskaya's question concerning Hegel and the Epilogue, nor Stalinism and Hegel and Marx, sent a short note, which Dunayevskaya could only have interpreted as a ringing endorsement of her own work on Marxism: "I have read—at least as a first reading—your notes and I should like to tell you that I must encourage you to go ahead with the elaboration. Your ideas are a real oasis in the desert of Marxist thought—there are many things I have to discuss with you—points of disagreement and points which require clarification" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 14–15).

Having presented an overview of the crucial first year of the correspondence, it will now be helpful to return to and review in more detail a couple of the most significant topics. While not *elaborated* within the correspondence, they nonetheless anticipated ensuing exchanges between Dunayevskaya and Marcuse, as well as the wealth of their publications that materialized over the next mere couple of years. In this regard, it is informative to return to Dunayevskaya's letter (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 7–9) to Marcuse of May 5, 1955, the one in which she attempted to respond to Marcuse's critique of her analysis of the Hegelian–Marxian dialectic in the two letters written to Grace Lee in 1953, and which he had read soon after first meeting with Dunayevskaya. Interestingly, while Marcuse's critique, which she responded to, was couched in very general terms (her "direct translation of idealistic philosophy into politics"), Dunayevskaya's rebuttal specifically defended her, "translation of [Hegel's] Absolute Mind as the new society" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 8). Given her response, it is easy to see both his interest in and the stake Marcuse must have felt there was in discussions of this issue: Without Dunayevskaya's knowledge of either of them at the time, Marcuse's most recent works, pointing immediately backward and forward, described

Hegel's Absolute Mind, first, in the 1954 Epilogue as, "The deification of the Spirit [that] implies acknowledgement of its defeat in reality" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 433), and, second, in his soon-to-be-published "Freud book" (*Eros and Civilization*) as, "True freedom … only in the idea. Liberation thus is a spiritual event" (Marcuse, 1962, 107).

However, there is in that same May 5, 1955 letter from Dunayevskaya to Marcuse a seemingly obscure formulation that nonetheless may have had a more significant meaning for Dunayevskaya (and Marcuse as well) than immediately evident to any later readers of the correspondence: "1955 compels that where Hegel made it the job of philosophy to elicit necessity under the semblance of contingency, today's intellectuals must elicit the new society present in the old by seeing the human freedom totally unfolded in freely associated labor deciding its own fate" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 9). Here, and as we shall see in the next section, even much more so in her "translation of Hegel's Absolute Mind as the new society", Dunayevskaya is trying to work out the "freedom and necessity" dialectic—a dialectic that had preoccupied Marcuse as well, since at least his post-1932 work. Dunayevskaya's (2002, 24–30) assessment of the dialectic of necessity and freedom was central to the second of her two letters to Grace Lee on Hegel's absolutes, which focused on Hegel's (1817/1973, 292–315) Absolute Mind. We will have more to say on Marcuse's and Dunayevskaya's analyses of the freedom and necessity dialectic in Hegel—and in Marx as well. As we proceed in our survey of the correspondence, we will soon come again upon its importance, not least in the works each published in 1958—Dunayevskaya's (1958/1988) *Marxism and Freedom* and Marcuse's (1958/1961) *Soviet Marxism*.

The initial phase of the Dunayevskaya–Marcuse correspondence, the first year or so, documents a process of mutual discovery of just how deep were the two theorists' differences—not so much on the importance of a historically contextualized interpretation of Hegel's philosophy, but rather precisely what that interpretation should be. Additional complexity of this process of discovery is introduced because there was a certain asymmetry in the mode of existence of each theorist's recent work: All of Dunayevskaya's philosophic work was informal and relatively recent, confined for the most part to the form of letters written to other members in the leadership of her political organization, while Marcuse had been publishing on philosophic topics for nearly thirty years, including the very recent Epilogue to *Reason and Revolution* (1941/1999, 433–439), the latter a

work that was the first in English (or any language) by a Marxist to discuss all of Hegel's works. Yet, the stakes were high for both Dunayevskaya and Marcuse, because both of their most recent philosophic works, such as they were, strongly implied the positions they were to assume in the ensuing dialogue, as well as in future published work.

2.2 The Dunayevskaya–Marcuse Correspondence: The Second Phase, 1956–1958: Theoretical Intersections of Critical Theory and Marxist Humanism

The second phase of the correspondence, far from a process of discovery of each other's theoretical interpretations, focused mostly, but not completely, one-sidedly on Dunayevskaya's work aimed at achieving the publication of her book *Marxism and Freedom* (1958/1988). This phase consists of three parts: (1) 1956, perhaps the most harmonious of all the years' correspondence, except for an important letter from Marcuse stating disagreement with both Dunayevskaya's "non-dialectical" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 26) stance on the revolutionary nature of the contemporary proletariat, and on her position on the USSR via the fundamental distinctions she had drawn on basic questions and polices in respect to Lenin versus Stalin; overall, the year included four letters from Marcuse, which commented on Dunayevskaya's draft chapters, provided news on his help with potential publishers, and offered valuable words of encouragement to push ahead with the work. In addition, in a letter on the publication of Marcuse's *Eros and Civilization* (1962), Dunayevskaya commented favorably (Anderson & Rockwell, 24–25), which is interesting considering the work's expanded argument concerning Hegel's lack of contemporary social relevance[5]; (2) 1957, a contentious year in which Marcuse's (1958/1988, xviii–xxiii) Preface to *Marxism and Freedom* and Dunayevskaya's (1958/1988, 21) characterization of the "American roots of Marxism" (both in the text of the work and in pre-publication publicity) were the center of attention; and (3) 1958, post-*Marxism and Freedom* publication, which consists of only four letters; of the three among them written by Dunayevskaya, two return to the question of the contemporary relevance of Hegel's philosophy and Dunayevskaya's determination to

[5] See page 30.

pursue the topic—despite or perhaps because of the unsatisfying form this discussion ultimately assumed in *Marxism and Freedom*.[6]

Regarding the first point mentioned above, on the correspondence year 1956, the intersection of Dunayevskaya's and Marcuse's theoretical trajectories in their collaboration on *Marxism and Freedom* (1958/1988) is interesting on a couple of key issues. First, within the otherwise affirmative framework of his approach to Dunayevskaya's book, Marcuse's sharp dissents both in regard to her position on the proletariat and the implications of her arguments on a fundamental break between Lenin and Stalin for analyzing the contemporary USSR amounted to the reversals of Marcuse's views (unpublished at the time), which were in accord with Dunayevskaya's analyses. Recall that Marcuse had argued that the post–World War II world was dividing into Soviet and neo-fascist camps, a situation demanding that revolutionary theory, "ruthlessly and openly criticize" both camps, as "the working class and political praxis of the working class, and changing class relations (at the national and international level) continue to determine the conceptual development of theory as they in turn are determined by it—not by the theory without praxis, but by the one which 'seizes the masses'" (Marcuse, 1947/1998, 217–218). Thus, beyond the theoretical intersection observable in their collaboration on *Marxism and Freedom*, his apparently changed views on the proletariat, and his developing analyses that seemed now less critical than in the mid-1940s of the post–World War II USSR, highlight a wider arc of separation of Marcuse's theories form those of Dunayevskaya's.

Remarkable for what was *missing* in this second phase of the correspondence (1956–1957), until 1958 after *Marxism and Freedom* (Dunayevskaya, 1958/1988) had already been published, was any mention of Hegel's relevance, apart from Dunayevskaya's two declarations, one in April and another in May 1956, in which she wrote that she was about to settle down "to write the chapter on Hegel" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 24). However, Dunayevskaya *does* refer to Marcuse's response to this topic during *oral* discussions with him—in fact, precisely to her analysis of Hegel's (1830/1973) *Philosophy of Mind* in her letters on Hegel (Dunayevskaya, 2002, 15–30) she had left with him at their first meeting in early 1955. In a letter to John Dwyer,[7] Dunayevskaya writes:

[6] See Dunayevskaya (1958/1988, 33–43) for her discussion of Hegel in *Marxism and Freedom*, and for Dunayevskaya's comments agreeing with Marcuse that her original 1953 letters on Hegel's Absolutes and what appeared in *Marxism and Freedom* were "miles apart", see Anderson and Rockwell (2012, 50–51).

[7] John Dwyer (1912–1989) was Dunayevskaya's husband and political associate.

> [M]arcuse's favorite chapter remains "A New Humanism," to which he also added that although he disagrees with my automation chapter, my interpretation of the Absolute Idea in that form rather than in the letters is clearest. He kept saying "What would Father Marx say if he lived now" and his eyes lit up as to the paragraph where Marx stopped in the *Philosophy of Mind* and where my analysis began. (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 29)

The young Marx (1975, 326–346) concluded his 1844 *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* with the essay titled, "Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole", and he ended that essay by alluding to ¶381 and then ¶384 of Hegel's Introduction to *Philosophy of Mind* (1830/1973). The second of Dunayevskaya's (2002, 24–32) two letters on Hegel, written in May 1953, takes up Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind*, and *begins* with ¶385.

Hegel's (1817/1973, 1–24) Introduction to *Philosophy of Mind* consists of 10 paragraphs, ¶¶377–386, divided into three parts: Hegel places no heading over the first part, ¶¶377–380, which surveys various historical approaches to the "knowledge of mind … the highest and hardest, just because it is the most 'concrete' of sciences" (Hegel, 1817/1973, 1).

The part Marx commented on, ¶¶381–384, Hegel (1817/1973, 8–20) had titled, "What Mind Is". In these paragraphs, Hegel characterizes the dialectical relationship between mind and nature, arguing that mind is the "absolute prius", though it has nature for its "presupposition" (Hegel, 1817/1973, 8).

The third and last part (which Marx did *not* and Dunayevskaya *did* comment on) Hegel (1817/1973, 20–24) gave a separate heading, "Subdivision"; it consists of the final two paragraphs of the Introduction, ¶¶385–386, where Hegel describes Absolute Mind as the dialectic of subjective (*freedom*) and objective (*necessity*) Mind.

In first examining Hegel's text prior to the Subdivision, Marx (1975, 346) issues critical comments on Hegel's interpretations of nature and mind; these comments preface passages from Hegel's paragraph 381 (which Marx quotes in full) and Hegel's paragraph 384 (from which Marx quotes about half the text). The main thrust of Marx's critique here revolves around Hegel's notion of nature as externalization (of mind). Marx writes:

> It [nature] has to be taken here [in *Philosophy of Mind*] in the sense of alienation, an error, a defect, that which ought not to be… For the abstract thinker, nature must therefore supersede itself, because it is already posited by him as a potentially superseded being. (Marx, 1975, 346)

Marx's argument is that Hegel's dialectic is itself limited in that it does not point the way to overcoming alienation in actuality. In respect to the "abstract thinker" [Hegel], nature as externality, "has something outside itself which it lacks … its being is something other than itself" (Marx, 1975, 346). According to Hegel, nature, as such, lacks freedom, and freedom consists in overcoming nature, not in mind's living, dialectical relationship with nature. In any case, Marx's 1844 *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* ended by quoting Hegel's statement, "The absolute is mind. This is the highest definition of the Absolute" (Marx, 1975, 346); thus, the young Marx's interpretations stopped at the threshold of the Subdivision of the Introduction to Hegel's (1817/1973) *Philosophy of Mind* and left Hegel's (1817/1973, 8–20) analysis at the definition ("What Mind Is")—where Hegel appeared most idealistic and least socially relevant.

In contrast to Marx's analysis in 1844, the Subdivision was precisely where Dunayevskaya's (2002, 26) analysis began in her May 20, 1953, letter to Grace Lee (shared with Marcuse within the year, in April, 1954). Dunayevskaya's (2002, 26) approach began at the third part of Hegel's Introduction to *Philosophy of Mind*, just at the point where Marx's text ended. She closely follows how Hegel explicated movement and development at the pinnacle of his "system", which strongly suggested the *development* of the concepts of nature and mind, and the *societal* relevance of the dialectic.

Hegel's ¶385 (the first of the two comprising the Subdivision) begins with the statement: "The development of Mind (Spirit) is in three stages" (Hegel, 1817/1973, 20). First is in the form of "self-relation", the "ideal totality of the idea", "self-contained and free", that is, *Mind Subjective* (Hegel, 1817/1973, 20). Second is in the form of "reality", mind "realized, i.e. in a world produced and to be produced by it: in this world freedom presents itself under the shape of necessity", that is, *Mind Objective* (Hegel, 1817/1973, 20). The third stage is, "unity of mind as objectivity and of mind as ideality and concept, which essentially and actually is and forever produces itself", that is, *Mind Absolute* (Hegel, 1817/1973, 20).

Next, Dunayevskaya's (2002, 26) 1953 letter moves to the final ¶386 of Hegel's (1817/1973, 314–315) Introduction. There Hegel characterizes the very identification of these three stages (freedom, necessity, and the unity of the two) as a veritable process of, in Hegel's own word, "liberation" (Hegel, 1817/1973, 22), that is, "finding a world presupposed before us, generating a world as our own creation, and gaining freedom from it and in it" (Hegel, 1817/1973, 22).

Dunayevskaya's (2002, 24–30) 1953 letter, moving from Hegel's Introduction to and main body of *Philosophy of Mind* (1817/1973) to that work's concluding syllogisms of the main text, attempted to identify the internal logic, the movement, to a new (post-capitalist) society in the work's final three paragraphs (Hegel, 1817/1973, 314–315). Those paragraphs *compress* the dialectic of necessity and freedom and parallel the movement in the work's Introduction: (1) the "Logical system as the starting point" [Subjective], nature as the middle term (Hegel, 1817/1973, 314) (or "finding a world presupposed before us") (Hegel, 1817/1973, 22); (2) Nature as the starting point (or presupposition) [Objective], with Mind the "mediating agent in the process" (Hegel, 1817/1973, 314) (or "generating a world as our own creation") (Hegel, 1817/1973, 22); and (3) "Self-knowing reason as the middle term" (Hegel, 1817/1973, 314) [Absolute], mediating subjective and objective (or "gaining freedom from [the world] and in [the world"]) (Hegel, 1817/1973, 22).

Yet, between the end of 1956, when Marcuse's "eyes lit up" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 29) when Dunayevskaya introduced him to this analysis, and the publication of *Marxism and Freedom* (1958), little remained of the interpretation of *Philosophy of Mind* that Dunayevskaya (2002, 24–30) had developed in the 1953 letters. At the book's publication, Dunayevskaya wrote to Marcuse, rather cryptically it seems:

> You know I had many more rough ideas than those that I developed on Hegel's Absolute Idea ever since I broke through the sound barrier of Hegelian terminology. For obvious and not so obvious reasons it was not necessary to develop them for the book [*Marxism and Freedom*] itself. (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 45)

However, an examination of the crucial and surprising developments around two of Marcuse's 1958 writings can help provide a meaningful context for the January 28, 1958 letter cited above, which Dunayevskaya sent to Marcuse only after her work *Marxism and Freedom* (1958/1988) had been published. The works of interest here are Marcuse's (1958/1988, xviii–xxiii) Preface to *Marxism and Freedom*, and Dunayevskaya's (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 39) response prior to its publication, as well as his next work *Soviet Marxism* (Marcuse, 1961), also originally published in 1958.

To begin with the preface, the main consideration is whether Marcuse (1958/1988) was correct in his apparent assumption that Dunayevskaya's and his own views were in accord on their interpretations of the dialectic of necessity and freedom in the mature Marx's texts, the *Grundrisse* (1858/1993) and the *Capital* (1867/1990). Marcuse (1958/1988) focuses on the section in *Marxism and Freedom* in which Dunayevskaya (1958/1988, 137–149) cites Marx's *Grundrisse* at the conclusion of her analyses of all three volumes of Marx's *Capital*. In the text of *Marxism and Freedom*, where she combined an analysis of the *Grundrisse* with *Capital,* vol. 3 (Marx, 1894/1981), Dunayevskaya (1958/1988, 145) quoted a long passage from the latter in which Marx describes the dialectic of capitalist and post-capitalist *society* in terms of the necessity and freedom dialectic. Recall, Dunayevskaya (2002, 26) had already described this dialectic five years earlier in *philosophy*, that is, in the Subdivision of Hegel's (1817/1973, 20–24) Introduction to *Philosophy of Mind,* precisely the section where Marx (1975, 346) had "left off" three decades prior to his completion of *Capital*. She had also shared this discovery (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 29) with Marcuse during one of their lengthy meetings on her writing *Marxism and Freedom*. Remarkably, neither she (in the text of *Marxism and Freedom*) nor Marcuse (in the Preface to the work) noted *this* dialectic of necessity and freedom (of Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind* and Marx's *social theory* of overcoming capitalism in the text of *Capital,* vol. 3) (1894/1981).[8]

Nonetheless, still of considerable importance, Marcuse (1958/1988) in his preface to *Marxism and Freedom* attributed a major breakthrough to Dunayevskaya's work. Notably, this was the first occasion in which Marcuse himself, following the initial reference in Dunayevskaya's (1958/1988, 145) text, cited Marx's *Grundrisse* (1858/1993), a heretofore little known work. Marcuse (1958/1988, xix) remarks that since as far back as the 1920s, Marx's *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, after years of oblivion and neglect, had become the focus of attention as the "ground" of Marx's writings on economics and politics. Now, Marcuse writes, heretofore

> [T]he inner identity of the philosophical with the economic and political "stage" of Marxian theory was not elucidated (and perhaps could not be

[8] Dunayevskaya (2002, 25) at least implied this link when she mentioned that she was reading the third part of *Capital,* vol. 3 (where Marx discusses the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom) at the time she was studying Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind*.

> adequately elucidated because a most decisive link was still missing, namely, the *Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Oekonomie* of 1857–1858, first published in 1939 and 1941). Dunayevskaya's book goes beyond the previous interpretations. It shows not only that Marxian economics and politics are throughout philosophy, but also that the latter is from the beginning economics and politics. Marxian theory emerges and develops under the impact of the historical dialectic which it expounds. The starting point is the comprehended situation of capitalist society. Its "notion" derives from the philosophical insight into the capitalist economy: this society creates the preconditions for a free and rational human existence while precluding the realization of freedom and reason. In other words (since the prevalent abuse of the word "freedom" all but prohibits the use of the term), Marx holds that capitalist society creates the preconditions for an existence without toil, poverty, injustice, and anxiety while perpetuating toil, poverty, injustice, and anxiety. (Marcuse, 1958/1988, xix–xx)

Next, Marcuse (1958/1988, xx–xxi), closely following Dunayevskaya's (1958/1988, 145) method in the text of *Marxism and Freedom*, combines a paraphrase of Marx's passage on the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom from *Capital*, vol. 3, with a quotation from Marx's *Grundrisse* meant to elaborate the meaning of the passage in *Capital*, vol. 3. However, while Marcuse seemed to imply that his position was in accord with that found in Dunayevskaya's text, his analyses of Marx's two texts implied that *no* freedom could be found in labor for the necessities of life (Marcuse, 1958/1988, xx–xxi), which Marcuse identified with Marx's concept of the "realm of necessity". In contrast, in the text of *Marxism and Freedom*, Dunayevskaya had first quoted from Marx's *Capital*, vol. 3:

> The freedom in this field [realm of necessity] cannot consist of anything else but of the fact that socialized man, the associated producers, regulate their interchange with nature rationally, bring it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by some blind power; that they accomplish their task with the least expenditure of energy under conditions most adequate to their human nature and most worthy of it. But it always remains a realm of necessity… Beyond it begins that development of human power which is its own end, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can flourish only upon the realm of necessity as its basis. The shortening of the workday is the fundamental premise. (Marx, 1894/1909, 955 [Marx, 1894/1981, 958–959]), quoted by Dunayevskaya, 1958/1988, 145)[9]

[9] Dunayevskaya quotes from the earlier Charles H. Kerr edition; I have included the citation for the later Penguin edition in brackets.

Dunayevskaya concludes:

> Thus we see that it isn't only the young Marx but the mature Marx to whom the creative role of labor is the key to all else… In the *Grundrisse* Marx said that, once the productive process "is stripped of its antagonistic form," "the measure of wealth will then no longer be labor time, but leisure time." The free time liberated from capitalist exploitation would be for the free development of the *individual's powers*. (Marx, 1858/1941, 596 [Marx, 1858/1993, 705–706], quoted by Dunayevskaya, 1958/1988, 145)[10]

Returning to Marcuse's preface (1958/1988), as it turns out, half of the final sentence of the passage from the *Grundrisse* he reproduced was cut off. Editing the last sentence in this passage substantially altered its meaning: Marcuse, rendering the sentence as "[F]ree time—which is leisure time as well as time for higher activity—transforms its possessor into a different subject" (Marx, 1858/1953, 599 [Marx, 1858/1993, 712], quoted by Marcuse, 1958/1988, xxiii), leaves off the final clause, "*and he then enters into the direct production process as this different subject*" (my emphasis) (Marx, 1858/1953, 599 [Marx, 1858/1993, 712]).[11] Clearly, in the context of a discussion of the necessity and freedom dialectic in Marx's mature critical theory, exclusion of the second half of the sentence significantly changed the meaning of the passage. With the full sentence included, it now strongly reinforces Dunayevskaya's interpretation—there *is an important element of freedom within the realm of necessity*. Since the dialectic of freedom continues, not only from work (realm of necessity, e.g., shortening of the working day) to free time (realm of freedom), but also in the other direction—from free time to work in the realm of necessity—the question then becomes, how much will this "different subject" entering into the direct production process submit to work versus how much will "work" have to conform to the demands of the collectivity of free individuals?[12]

[10] Dunayevskaya translates from the first German edition of the *Grundrisse* (1939–1941). I have included the citation for the Penguin edition in brackets.

[11] Marcuse quotes from the second (1953) version of the original German edition. The full passage in the German original is: *Die freie Zeit, die sowohl Mußezeit als Zeit für höhre Tätigkeit ist—hat ihren Besitzer natürlichin ein andres Subjekt verwandelt, und als dies andre Subjekt tritt er dann auch in den unmittelbaren Produktionsprozeß.*

[12] An article written for the 150th anniversary of the *Grundrisse* (Fetscher, 2010) clearly indicates that the relationship between the two principal works of Marx's mature critical theory, *Grundrisse* and *Capital,* remains, to this day, an open and vital question. Fetscher states that Marx developed a "different kind of connection between labor and free time" in

In any case, when Dunayevskaya saw Marcuse's (1958/1988) preface just before it was published, she did *not* focus, at least directly, on this topic (Anderson & Rockwell, 39–40). Rather, in a letter to Marcuse, she began by acknowledging the differences in their views of the working class and making clear that Marcuse's indications of these differences in the preface were welcome. What she expressed genuine surprise at was that Marcuse *concluded* the preface with a statement of his differences with Dunayevskaya. Dunayevskaya suggested that Marcuse instead "continue with one more sentence", such as, "Whether you agree or disagree with Dunayevskaya, her book creates a solid foundation on a vast scope for the re-examination of Marxism from its roots in Hegelian philosophy" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 39). In the event, Marcuse published the preface without the change Dunayevskaya suggested and, in fact, Marcuse included in the preface no mention at all of Dunayevskaya's treatment of Hegel.

A look at both correspondents' pre-publication references to Marcuse's *Soviet Marxism* (first published in January 1958) in the Dunayevskaya–Marcuse correspondence, and a close examination of the work itself, a work published by Marcuse in the same year he published the preface to Dunayevskaya's *Marxism and Freedom* (1958/1988), may reduce if not eliminate some of the obscurities that are found in the correspondence. For example, in the September 21, 1956, letter (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 26), in which Marcuse disagreed with Dunayevskaya on the contemporary revolutionary potential of the proletariat, as well as on her analysis of the Soviet Union, that is, her "assumption of a complete break between Leninism and Stalinism" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 26),

the *Grundrisse* contrasted with *Capital*. In the "often quoted formulation" in *Capital*, vol. 3, on the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom, Fetscher suggests that "necessity and external expediency", terms Marx used to characterize pre-capitalist and capitalist labor, extended to his concept of post-capitalist labor as well. Fetscher attempts to reinforce this interpretation by implying that the opening sentences of the passage of the *Grundrisse* cited by Marcuse, in which Marx writes of a post-capitalist society, "direct labor time itself cannot remain in the abstract antithesis to free time in which it appears from the perspective of bourgeois economy", conflict with Marx's concept of labor and free time in *Capital*, vol. 3. However, similarly, in the latter text, the concept of the "different subject" emerging from "free time" Marx describes (and Marcuse had also cited) in the *Grundrisse* (and that Fetscher now quotes) is central to labor and free time in regard to *post-capitalist society's* "realm of necessity", which Marx describes in the passage in *Capital*, vol. 3. This suggests, rather than a *different* connection of labor and free time in *Capital* versus the *Grundrisse*, a process of mutual illumination between the two works.

Marcuse also mentioned for the first time his study of Soviet Marxism. He anticipated its imminent publication by Columbia University Press, and promised to send Dunayevskaya the "typescript for your comments and your critique before it goes to the printer's" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 26). After a month and a half passed, Dunayevskaya wrote to Marcuse, "What has happened to your typescript? I am looking forward to reading your book before it reaches the public. I will create time for a careful criticism" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 28).

Perhaps only coincidentally, but in the time between Marcuse's promise and Dunayevskaya's follow-up letter, Marcuse (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 27) reported reading Dunayevskaya's (1958/1988, 126–149) chapter on volumes two and three of Marx's *Capital*, which included her original analyses of Marx's *Grundrisse* and assessment of Marx's analysis of the dialectic of the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom in *Capital*, vol. 3 (1894/1981). Moreover, as it turned out, publication of *Soviet Marxism* (Marcuse, 1961) had *not* been imminent. A year and a half passed *from* the time of Marcuse's stated intent (September–October 1956) to send Dunayevskaya the typescript of *Soviet Marxism* (followed by his report of reading Dunayevskaya's chapter that included Marx's analysis of the freedom and necessity dialectic) *to* publication of *Soviet Marxism* (April, 1958). Yet, the only new mentions of this work in the correspondence during that period, both of them from Dunayevskaya (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 28, 45) seemed to indicate that she had not seen the work, and by now she was only asking to be kept "informed when its official publication date is" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 45).

Thus, though an analysis of the correspondence suggests that Marcuse never sent a draft of *Soviet Marxism* (Marcuse, 1961) to Dunayevskaya, it cannot be determined what, if any, discussions about the work otherwise took place between the two of them prior to or even after its publication. However, judging by Dunayevskaya's polemical (though curiously belated) review of the book (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 222–226) and condemnatory comments concerning it in a letter to Erich Fromm in late 1963 (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 126–127), there was apparently a long delay before Dunayevskaya read the book, and no real dialogue around it was initiated by either Marcuse or Dunayevskaya.

Turning to the text of *Soviet Marxism* (Marcuse, 1961), what can be said for certain is that following in the steps of Dunayevskaya's *Marxism and Freedom* (1958/1988, 145) and expanding on his Preface to that work, Marcuse (1958/1988) puts important emphasis on Marx's

Grundrisse (1858/1993).[13] In *Soviet Marxism*, Marcuse writes in a footnote, "This is the most important of Marx's manuscripts, which shows to what extent the humanist philosophy is fulfilled and formulated in the economic theory of *Capital*" (Marcuse, 1961, 185n5). On the necessity and freedom dialectic, Marcuse writes, "The relation between necessity and freedom … is the key problem in the Hegelian as well as the Marxian dialectic" (Marcuse, 1961, 135). Marcuse (1961, 136) cites Hegel's smaller *Logic* of the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, where Hegel (1817/1975, 221) terms the passage from necessity to freedom the "hardest" of all dialectical transitions. Note it was *first* the case with Dunayevskaya in the text of *Marxism and Freedom* (1958/1988) that she did not directly connect her analysis of Hegel's necessity and freedom dialectic with Marx's concept of the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom. Still, surprisingly enough, despite the intensive correspondence between her and Marcuse, Dunayevskaya's (1953/2002, 26, 28–30) interpretation of the sections of Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind* that included the necessity and freedom dialectic, and Marcuse's (1958/1988, xxi) interpretation of Dunayevskaya's analysis of the concepts of the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom in *Capital*, vol. 3, Marcuse does not now (in *Soviet Marxism*) attempt to link (or even compare) the necessity and freedom dialectic in these two key works of Hegel and Marx that had been at the heart of their correspondence.

However, Marcuse criticizes Soviet Marxism for following Engels (and not Marx) in viewing freedom as "recognized necessity", or as Hegel put it, as an "abstract negation" instead of "freedom concrete and positive" (Marcuse, 1961, 136). But in view of the Dunayevskaya–Marcuse correspondence, it is equally interesting to follow Hegel's text itself one more step, to "what we may learn" (from "freedom concrete and positive" over "abstract negation"), that is, to Hegel's warning of, "what a mistake it is to regard freedom and necessity as mutually exclusive" (Hegel, 1817/1975, 220). For, sure enough, in the section on *Soviet Marxism* on "Principles of

[13] It is worth noting that even prior to Dunayevskaya's initiation of the correspondence with him, Marcuse recorded his appreciation of the importance of Marx's *Grundrisse*. In "A Supplement to the Bibliography", he added to the 1954 edition of *Reason and Revolution*, he wrote under the heading, "Marx": "Most important is the first publication of Marx's manuscript '*Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Oekonomie*' written in 1857–1858. This is actually the first version, previously unknown, of *Das Kapital*. It is far more 'philosophical' than the final version and shows how Marx' mature economic theory grows out of his philosophical conceptions" (Marcuse, 1941/1999).

Communist Morality", Marcuse writes, "Man comes into his own *only* outside and 'beyond' the entire realm of material production for the mere necessities of life" (my emphasis) (Marcuse, 1961, 219).

2.3 The Dunayevskaya–Marcuse Correspondence: The Third Phase, 1960–1961: Crystallization of Marxist Humanism and Critical Theory

Following the publication of Dunayevskaya's *Marxism and Freedom* (1958/1988) and his own *Soviet Marxism* (1961), and nearly three years since his last letter to Dunayevskaya, Marcuse renewed the correspondence with her to "ask you a favor" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 59), that is, for her perspectives on themes he was developing for a work on *Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Societies*, particularly, "a more affirmative attitude of the laborer not only towards the system as a whole but even to the organization of work in the more highly modernized plants" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 59).[14] It can be said right from the start that the short burst of exchanges Marcuse's letter ignited, though interesting and providing new insights into the trajectories of their post-*Marxism and Freedom* and *Soviet Marxism* theory development (which I will take up more extensively in Chap. 6) also pretty much marked the end of a sustained and direct dialogue between the two of them.

Before considering the status of the dialogue through a brief look at this latest phase of the correspondence, it will be helpful to point out that Marcuse sent his letter out to Dunayevskaya, dated August 8, 1960, only a few months after he published the new Preface to *Reason and Revolution*, "A Note on Dialectic" (Marcuse, 1960, xii–xiv). Many of the points developed in "A Note on Dialectic" could have been formulated as well-considered responses to the dialogue on dialectics he engaged in with Dunayevskaya, especially in the first year of their correspondence, when he repeatedly asked for more time to respond properly to the points she raised on Hegel's dialectic.

Tracing back a little further, however, shows the connection to his current interest. Marcuse (1941/1999, 433–439) first wrote in the 1954 Epilogue to *Reason and Revolution* (right before the correspondence with Dunayevskaya began) that by the turn of the twentieth century the "larger

[14] Marcuse was referring to research for the book that would be published as *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (Marcuse, 1966).

part of the laboring classes were made into a positive part of the established society" (Marcuse, 1999, 436). Marcuse now concludes the new Preface to *Reason and Revolution*, "A Note on Dialectic" (1960, xii–xiv), with the notice, "I have omitted the Epilogue written for the second edition because it treated in a much condensed form developments which I discuss more fully in my forthcoming book, a study of advanced industrial society" (Marcuse, 1960, xiv). So, while I have shown in the sections above that Marcuse's theory development may well have been importantly influenced through the correspondence with Dunayevskaya, for example, interpretations of Marx (if not Hegel), primarily the dialectical relationship of the *Grundrisse* (1858/1993) and *Capital* (particularly volume three) (1894/1981), he now turns to her again for her views on the very topic on which his ideas, against hers, seemed to remain remarkably uniform throughout the half-dozen years of their correspondence.

After Marcuse's reinitiation of the dialogue in August 1960, the pattern of the correspondence quickly reverts to form—Marcuse's brief comments (all four of his letters in this section consist of a page or less), mostly followed by Dunayevskaya's multi-page responses (five letters in all, totaling twenty-four pages). I shall consider these exchanges in more detail in Chap. 6. Here, I want to emphasize that Marcuse opens the new phase of correspondence with Dunayevskaya on the "old" topic of the "integration of the working class"; the somewhat new twist concerns the distinction he now draws between the more than century-long process in which, as he wrote in the 1954 Epilogue to *Reason and Revolution*, the working classes, "were made into a positive part of the established society" (Marcuse, 1999, 436), and the current "more affirmative attitude of the laborer to the organization of work" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 59). In a letter in which Dunayevskaya for the first time refers to members of her "News and Letters" group as Marxist Humanist, she responds to Marcuse with a brief description of a pamphlet "just off the press" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 60) titled "Workers Battle Automation", indicating that she would send it along to him. Before also providing a detailed annotated bibliography of economic and sociologic references germane to the subject of Marcuse's book-in-progress, she points out that the workers writing in the pamphlet expressed various viewpoints on the topic of automation and work.

In his response to Dunayevskaya, Marcuse expressed general agreement with most of what he had read in the pamphlet, but after referring Dunayevskaya to Marx's *Grundrisse* (1858/1953/1993) to support his

argument that partial automation (the kind he said was experienced by the workers writing in *Workers Battle Automation*) "saves the capitalist system" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 66), while "consummated automation would inevitably explode it" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 66), Marcuse forcefully disagreed with one of the worker's views that was published in *News and Letters*:

> [You] should really tell her about all that humanization of labor, its connection with life, etc.—that this is possible only through complete automation, because such humanization is correctly relegated by Marx to the realm of freedom beyond the realm of necessity, i.e., beyond the entire realm of socially necessary labor in the material production. Total *de*-humanization of the latter is the prerequisite. (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 66)

In one of the three new hypotheses Marcuse seems to be testing in this period, he rules out not only any possible freedom in the realm of necessity. He now views the realm of necessity itself as practically nothing more than a relic. Along with this point, we have already mentioned his view of the changing position of the working class in advanced industrial society, beyond even increasing integration into the system as a whole, to a more affirmative attitude to the organization of work itself, at least in the, "more highly modernized plants". The third new hypothesis evident in Marcuse's brief remarks is that not only is there an observable long-term trend in the integration of the working class, but this class and the capitalists *share* a powerful economic and social *interest* antithetical to Critical Theory—the arrest of automation. Moreover, Marcuse seems to imply that the different reasons behind these interests, for example, decline in the rate of profit for the capitalists, technological unemployment for the workers, are less significant than the combined forces of workers' and capitalists' conflicts with Critical Theory.

This phase of the correspondence ended in early 1961. Though Dunayevskaya reviewed *One-Dimensional Man* (Marcuse, 1966)[15] (not entirely unfavorably) when it was published in1964 (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 226–231), there were only sporadic exchanges that continued nearly up until Marcuse's death in 1979. The 1960 exchanges offered the clearest signs to date that the trajectory of Dunayevskaya's and Marcuse's

[15] Dunayevskaya's review first appeared in The Activist, Oberlin, No. 11 (January 1965), pp. 32–34.

theory development was in opposite directions despite or perhaps also as a result of the long correspondence. This correspondence had to persevere under the impact of rapidly developing technology, especially automated production, and intensive challenges to developing the Hegelian–Marxian dialectic to the point where it could grasp and mold these trends in the direction of a post-capitalist society of freedom. Increasingly, Dunayevskaya's trajectory took the name "Marxist-Humanism", while Marcuse's recommitted to the original Critical Theory tradition.

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CHAPTER 3

Hegel in Herbert Marcuse's Hegelian Marxism, Critical Theory, and Value Theory

As I indicated in the two prior chapters, there is a long record of Marcuse's attempts to characterize capitalist society by developing the dialectic of necessity and freedom: in both his correspondence with Dunayevskaya and in his preface to her book, *Marxism and Freedom* (1958/1988); shortly thereafter in his work, *Soviet Marxism* (1961); and finally, a few years later, in *One-Dimensional Man* (1966). In fact, decades prior to publication of the latter work, Marcuse (1933/2005, 150) concluded his long article, "On the Philosophical Foundations of the Concept of Labour in Economics" with the important passage on the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom from Marx's *Capital*, vol. 3 (1894/1981, 958–959).

Less than a decade after that important essay, Marcuse (1941/1999) presented a fuller philosophical account, which actually anticipated his analysis of the contemporary importance of Hegel on the necessity and freedom dialectic, which he explicitly stated in *Soviet Marxism* (1961). In *Reason and Revolution* (1941/1999), Marcuse traced the necessity and freedom dialectic back to Hegel's *Science of Logic* (1812/1976), and also indicated how Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* (1820/2000) led to the temporal dimension of Marx's labor theory of value. From *Reason and Revolution's* perspectives on Hegel, Marcuse also provided in another chapter on Marx's *Capital* (1867/1990) an extensive analysis of Marx's

R. Rockwell, *Hegel, Marx, and the Necessity and Freedom Dialectic*,
Political Philosophy and Public Purpose,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75611-0_3

concept of value. Marcuse (1941/1999, 295–312) focused on the temporal dimension of value, and tied it, albeit extrinsically, to the necessity and freedom dialectic.

Marcuse's analysis of the necessity and freedom dialectic in each of the instances of his work mentioned above taken separately marks important advances in the Critical Theory's understanding of Marx's theory and, taken together, they may constitute the basic underlying structure of a distinctly Marcusean critical theory of society. Nonetheless, in dispensing with Marx's value theory (with the important exceptions in *Reason and Revolution* (1941/1999)), or only touching on elements of it, and certainly not uncovering the necessity and freedom dialectic as its essential *core*, Marcuse's account of it is incomplete. As such, eventually it can even prove misleading in terms of an adequate critical theory of contemporary society. Marcuse's extensive philosophic analyses provide the background to highlight Postone's (1995) remarkable theoretical advance, which shifts the focus to the social forms of the necessity and freedom dialectic *intrinsic* to Marx's value theory.

In crucial works before and even after *Reason and Revolution* (1941/1999), including when he is developing the necessity and freedom dialectic, Marcuse dispenses with Marx's value theory or merely touches on elements of it. Marcuse's essay "On the Philosophical Foundations of the Concept of Labour in Economics" (1933/2005) is brilliant in tracing the necessity and freedom dialectic from Aristotle to Hegel, to Marx, and to contemporary times; but here, Marcuse's essay largely dispenses with value theory by attributing an external relationship of the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom to a distortion of labor (Marcuse, 1933/2005, 149–150). Even *within* capitalism, then, the predominance of the value form appears to be a matter of historical contingency. Later, Marcuse (1962, 1966) also dispensed with or dismissed Marx's value theory in works after *Reason and Revolution*. Hence, *Reason and Revolution*—deeper and philosophically more comprehensive than the later *Soviet Marxism* (1961), notwithstanding the fact that the latter work was more specific than the former work in its analyses of Hegel on the necessity and freedom dialectic—stands out among all of Marcuse's work mentioned so far in its detailed analysis of and apparent endorsement of Marx's value theory.

3.1 Hegel's Science of Logic

3.1.1 Hegel's Objective and Subjective Logic Link: Necessity and Freedom Dialectic

Most remarkably, in *Reason and Revolution* (1941/1999), Marcuse first takes up Hegel to philosophically ground his interpretation of Marx's value theory. In the following, I shall describe Marcuse's analysis of necessity and freedom in Hegel's *Science of Logic* (1812/1976),[1] and later I shall show how he carries this analysis through to uncovering the inklings in Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* (1820/2000) of what Marx later developed in his value theory. In his analysis of the *Science of Logic*, Marcuse (1941/1999, 154–155) suggested but did not fully develop the idea that the necessity and freedom dialectic linked the Objective Logic (Being and Essence) to the Subjective Logic, or the Notion (which concludes Hegel's *Science of Logic*). Marcuse (1941/1999, 149–154) provides a close reading of Hegel's (1812/1976, 541–553) chapter titled merely "Actuality", which, as Chapter 2, is situated as the penultimate chapter of the final section (3) of the Doctrine of Essence. Marcuse explains Hegel's concept of the actual as a dialectical process of reality and possibility, contingency, and necessity. Marcuse writes:

> A reality is actual if it is preserved and perpetuated through the absolute negation of all contingencies … [I]n such a reality, the opposition between contingency and necessity has been overcome. Its process is of necessity, because it follows the inherent law of its own nature and remains in all conditions the same… At the same time this necessity is freedom because the process is not determined from outside, by external forces, but, in a strict sense, is a self-development; all conditions are grasped and "posited" by the developing real itself. Actuality thus is the title for the final unity of being

[1] In my discussion of Marcuse and Hegel on the necessity and freedom dialectic, I refer to (and note as such) *Zusätze* (additions) based on Hegel's lectures, and added posthumously. As noted by J.N. Findlay, Leopold von Henning compiled these, "from his own notes, and from the notes of his valued colleagues [Heinrich] Hotho, [Karl Ludwig] Michelet, and [Friedrich] Geyer… Some passages … have led whole generations of students to a better understanding of Hegel" (Findlay, 1975, v). Marcuse (1941/1999), in his original analyses of the *Science of Logic*, also referred to these additions, and noted them as such. However, in *Soviet Marxism* (Marcuse, 1961, 135–136), in perhaps a sign they had become thoroughly integrated in the text, Marcuse's important critique of Frederick Engels's analysis of the necessity and freedom dialectic was based, with no special notice, on one of these additions.

> that is no longer subject to change, because it exercises autonomous power over all change—not simple identity, but "self-identity" (my emphasis). (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 154)

It is important to note here that *contingency becomes necessity*, especially in connection with the later stage of Hegel's immanent presentation of the necessity and freedom dialectic I shall describe below, in which *contingency becomes freedom*.[2] Marcuse continues:

> Such a self-identity can only be obtained through the medium of self-consciousness and cognition… True reality presupposes freedom, and freedom presupposes knowledge of the truth. The true reality, therefore, must be understood as the realization of a knowing subject. Hegel's analysis of actuality thus leads to the idea of the subject as the truly actual in all reality…
>
> We have reached the point where the Objective Logic turns into Subjective Logic, or, where subjectivity emerges as the true form of objectivity. (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 154)

Again, in regard to the above passage, it is important to note the importance of Hegel's immanent investigation of the necessity and freedom dialectic. I shall show that at a later phase of Hegel's presentation, the concept of a "knowing subject" is strongly conditioned by Hegel's concept of the movement from "blind" to "seeing" necessity. In connection with this, in directly linking Chapter 2 ("Actuality") of the final section of the Objective Logic to the Subjective Logic, or Doctrine of the Notion, Marcuse's reading does not consider this same section's Chapter 3 (Absolute Relation), which includes "Reciprocity" as its final concept. Overall, in his elaboration of necessity in the chapter on "The Absolute Relation", Hegel (1812/1976, 554–571) illuminates the dialectical concepts of both "freedom" and "necessity", showing how each undergoes a significant development, especially in the chapter's final section on "Reciprocity". In that section, "causality" (Hegel, 1812/1976, 569), and with it necessity, is

[2] Geert Reuten (2015, 260) identifies necessity as "the most substantial element of the Logic of Essence's last Division C: 'Actuality'" in Hegel's *Encyclopaedia Logic*. However, that characterization may be misleading. The prime importance of this Division C is Hegel's identification of the "passage from necessity to freedom" as the "very hardest" transition (Hegel, 1830/1975, 221).

Moreover, we find the following in the *Zusatz* (addition) to the penultimate final paragraph of the "Logic of Essence" (¶158): "[F]reedom presupposes necessity, and contains it as an *unsubstantial* element in itself" (Hegel, 1830/1975, 220).

shown to "vanish" (Hegel, 1812/1976, 570). Yet, the emphasis Hegel lends to his conclusion that, nonetheless, "Necessity does not become freedom by vanishing" (Hegel, 1812/1976, 571), but rather, in fact, necessity is shown to be *intrinsic* to freedom, assumes the form of an admonition with great importance when Marcuse (1961, 136) returns (in *Soviet Marxism*) to the necessity and freedom dialectic in Hegel's *Logic*, this time referring directly to the section on "Reciprocity".

3.1.2 Actuality to the Notion: The Missing Analysis of Reciprocity

It is advisable, then, *not* to follow Marcuse's (1941/1999, 149–155) argument here without question, that is, not to follow his close reading of the chapter on "Actuality" directly into the Subjective Logic. Investigation of the "The Absolute Relation", the final chapter (3) of the Objective Logic, including its final section "Reciprocity", which Marcuse does not touch upon in *Reason and Revolution* (1941, 1999), and which I consider next, may provide important insights not only into the theoretical links between *Reason and Revolution* (1941, 1999) and *Soviet Marxism* (1961).[3] It may help disclose the limitations of Marcuse's conclusions on the necessity and freedom dialectic, and thereby also support a reinterpretation of Marx's value theory that clearly suggests its continuing contemporary social relevance.

In the above, the actuality Marcuse analyzes in the chapter with the title "Actuality" is the dialectic of "blind" necessity (Hegel, 1812/1976, 552–553) and thus only "immediacy" or abstract freedom (Hegel, 1812/1976, 553). What I aim to get at, in addition, is Hegel's further development of the concepts of necessity and freedom in the following chapter's final section on "Reciprocity" as the transition to the Notion and, from there, first the Notion's significance and second, its *further concretization*. Whereas in the chapter titled "Actuality" Hegel character-

[3] The structure and interconnections of Hegel's *Logic's* Book of Essence, Section 3, is important to keep in mind: Actuality (Chapter 1, The Absolute; Chapter 2, Actuality; Chapter 3, The Absolute Relation). Hegel's concept "freedom" only first appears in "Reciprocity", the last part of Chapter 3. Also, "Reciprocity" cannot be understood without close attention to Hegel's further discussion of freedom and necessity in the first part of the Notion—"The Notion in General"—which directly follows in Hegel's text. Finally, after attention to these sections, I shall follow-up with a close reading of the smaller *Encyclopaedia Logic*, especially the final two paragraphs.

ized the immanent development of necessity as "blind" (1812/1976, 552, 553), in "Reciprocity", Hegel (1812/1976, 571) proceeds to demonstrate how necessity at first "vanished" and then re-emerged seeing and "unveiled".

So, what is the significance underlying these transformations of necessity—from "blind" and "veiled", to seeing and unveiled? There is no immediate and complete answer in the Book of Essence itself. In fact, as *transition*, Hegel (1812/1976, 569–595) unfolds this dialectic of necessity over the final section of the final chapter of the Book of Essence and the following introductory pages of the Subjective Logic, or Doctrine of the Notion, that is, in remarks comprising "The Notion in General". Moreover, the smaller *Encyclopaedia Logic* (1817/1975, 207–211, 220–222),[4] which is usually seen as a compressed rendering of the *Logic's* categories, instead expands in a quite remarkable fashion beyond their philosophic content in two passages with social and historical insights, which I will take up later, apparently without which the philosophic categories may not be fully interpretable.

In the closing pages of the Book of essence ("Reciprocity"), necessity is *at first* "raised to freedom" (Hegel, 1812/1976, 570) by the process of causality—inside of which was the *appearance* of necessity (Hegel, 1812/1976, 570). At the same time, causality, in dispelling its *own* "illusory show of otherness" (Hegel, 1812/1976, 570) (in this case, otherness from reciprocity) sublates itself in it (reciprocity) (Hegel, 1812/1976, 570). The sublation of causality also releases necessity's *appearance* of its *inextricable link* to causality by virtue of necessity being constitutive of causality (Hegel, 1812/1976, 570). It is precisely in this release (from causality) to independence that, "necessity is raised to freedom" (Hegel, 1812/1976, 570). (It is ultimately shown in necessity that it is, accordingly, neither the cause nor the effect of anything other than itself.) Hegel continues, "In reciprocity, therefore, necessity and causality have vanished; they [necessity and causality *in* reciprocity] contain both, immediate identity as connection and relation, and the absolute substantiality of the different sides, hence the absolute contingency of them; the original unity of substantial difference and therefore absolute contradiction" (my emphasis) (Hegel, 1812/1976, 570). What does "vanish", then, mean here?

[4] Hegel's *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1817) includes *Logic* as the first of three volumes, followed by the *Philosophy of Nature* (1817/2007), and the Philosophy of Mind (1817/1973).

First of all, although the contradiction of necessity and causality in reciprocity is "absolute", the "vanishing" of necessity is not—it is "vanishing" *in* reciprocity. For the one side, Hegel argues that when necessity vanishes in reciprocity, reciprocity—itself being the fully developed form of causality—is likewise negated by necessity. So, in this, according to Hegel, it is only the *immediate* forms of necessity and causality that vanish, not the original forms. The original form of necessity is being—"because it is—the unity of being with itself that has itself for ground; but, conversely, because it has a ground it is not being, it is an altogether illusory being, relation or mediation" (Hegel, 1812/1976, 570). On the other hand, causality, which, as it turns out, is a sort of vehicle of necessity, is a "posited transition of originative being, of cause, into illusory being or mere positedness" (Hegel, 1812/1976, 570). Hegel concludes, "[T]he identity itself of being and illusory being [belonging though in different ways to both necessity and cause] is still [only] an *inner* necessity" [my emphasis] (Hegel, 1812/1976, 571).

As it had at first "vanished" in the movement of causality through reciprocity, necessity, now as contingency (along with causality), "sublates the movement of causality, with the result that the *substantiality* of the sides [causality and necessity] standing in relation is *lost*" [my emphasis] (Hegel, 1812/1976, 571), that is, also vanishes. Hegel continues:

> [A]nd necessity [previously only inner or in itself] *unveils* itself [appears outwardly]… *Necessity does not become freedom by vanishing*, but only because its still *inner* identity is manifested [unveiled], a manifestation which is the identical movement of the different sides within themselves, the reflection of the illusory being as illusory being into itself. [Blind necessity now sees and shows that it is a true being through its illusory being, or by negating its being as illusory being]. Conversely, at the same time, *contingency* [appearing first in the forms of necessity and causality before the negation of the movement of causality mentioned above] *becomes freedom*, for the sides of necessity [being and essence, the first two books of the *Logic*], which have the shape of independent, free actualities not reflecting themselves in one another, are now posited as an identity, so that these totalities of-reflection-into-self in their difference are now also reflected as identical, or are posited as only one and the same reflection. [my emphasis] (Hegel, 1812/1976, 571)

In this process, then, necessity divides itself into necessity and freedom. Compare this stage of Hegel's argument to Marcuse's exposition, based on Hegel's prior chapter, of how "contingency becomes *necessity*"

(Marcuse, 1941/1999, 154). Here, on the threshold of the Notion, Hegel explains the opposite—how contingency becomes *freedom*. This is the transition to the "realm of freedom", which Hegel introduces in the last sentence of "Reciprocity": "This is the Notion, the realm of subjectivity or of freedom" (Hegel, 1812/1976, 571). Hegel will explicate this in the first few pages of the Notion.

3.1.3 The Completion of the Transition of Necessity to Freedom Only in Hegel's Notion

In the introductory pages of the Notion, "The Notion in General", Hegel (1812/1976, 577–583) recapitulates the transition of necessity to freedom or, what he also terms, substance to the Notion. He defines "substance", very much akin to Marcuse's (1941/1999) conclusions that were apparently based on Hegel's expositions in the chapter titled "Actuality" (Hegel, 1812/1976, 541–553), which precedes the chapter on "The Absolute Relation" (Hegel, 1812/1976, 554–571). There Hegel wrote:

> Substance is the absolute, the actuality that is in and for itself—in itself as the simple identity of possibility and actuality, absolute essence containing all actuality and possibility within itself; and for itself, being this identity as absolute power or purely self-related negativity. (Hegel, 1812/1976, 578)

Moreover, in regard to all of the *Logic* covered thus far, Hegel writes:

> Objective logic … which treats of being and essence constitutes properly the genetic exposition of the notion. More precisely, substance is already real essence, or essence in so far as it is united with being and has entered into actuality. Consequently, the Notion has substance for its immediate presupposition; what is implicit in substance is manifested in the Notion. (Hegel, 1812/1976, 577)

Here, substance, necessity, which initially is only in itself becomes for itself, that is, becomes what it is to itself—from a *blind* to a *seeing* being. Hegel continues:

> Thus the dialectical movement of substance through causality and reciprocity is the immediate genesis of the Notion; the exposition of the process of its becoming. But the significance of its becoming, as of every becoming, is

> that it is the reflection of the transient into its ground and that the at first apparent other into which the former has passed constitutes its truth. Accordingly, the Notion is the truth of substance; and since substance has necessity for its specific mode of relationship, freedom reveals itself as the truth of necessity and as the mode of relationship proper to the notion. (Hegel, 1812/1976, 577–578)

The *unveiling* of necessity *entails* the revelation of freedom and, as such, links the latter to the newly "seeing" necessity (just described above). Moreover, the emergence of freedom is a necessary *condition* for completing the unfolding of the concept of necessity, its truth: hence, freedom "is" the truth of necessity.

Here in the *Science of Logic*, Hegel's explication of the great transition of necessity to freedom is apparently (and not unexpectedly) abstract—confined to development of its idea, and apparently remote from social practice. Hegel is conscious of and confirms this approach in a discussion of the *force* of philosophical critique underlying the dual movement of the restoration of vision and of self-revelation in the movement from necessity to freedom. But Hegel, in introducing this notion of *philosophical critique* as an elaboration of the immanence he had just recapitulated in respect to the development of the concept of necessity, also introduces the subject. (The "subject" itself is rife with contradictions, and I shall show how Hegel notes and determines the significance of these contradictions in remarkable passages in the *Encyclopaedia Logic* on the historical and social bases of the transition from necessity to freedom.)

> This infinite reflection-into-self, namely, that being is in and for itself only so far as it is posited, is the consummation of *substance*. But this consummation is no longer substance itself but something higher, the Notion, the *subject*. The transition of the relation of *substantiality* takes place through its own immanent necessity and is nothing more than the manifestation of itself, that the Notion is its truth, and that freedom is the truth of necessity [my emphasis]. (Hegel, 1812/1976, 580)

Next, Hegel begins to fully unfold the dialectic of the necessary: "positing", "subject", and the activity of "philosophical critique". If "being is in and for itself only insofar as it is posited", and this positedness is the "consummation of substance", it necessarily incorporates the prior philosophical high point:

> [T]he philosophy which adopts the standpoint of substance and stops there is the system of Spinoza… [S]peculative thinking in the course of its progress finds itself necessarily occupying [the Spinozian] standpoint and to that extent the system is perfectly true; but it is not the highest standpoint… [T]he true system cannot have the relation to it of being merely opposed to it; for if this were so, the system, as this opposite, would itself be one-sided. On the contrary, the true system as the higher must contain the subordinate system within itself. (Hegel, 1812/1976, 584)

Hence, freedom *contains* necessity. Hegel continues by distinguishing the concepts "unity" and "identity":

> [T]he exposition of substance (contained in the last book) which leads on to the
>
> Notion is, therefore, the sole and genuine refutation of Spinozism. It is the *unveiling of substance*, and this is the genesis of the Notion… The unity of substance is its relation of *necessity*; but this unity is only an *inner* necessity; in positing itself through the moment of absolute negativity it becomes a manifested or posited identity, and thereby the *freedom* which is the identity of the Notion. The Notion, the totality resulting from the reciprocal relation, is the unity of the *two substances* standing in that relation; but in this unity they are now free, for they no longer possess their identity as something *blind*, that is to say, as something merely *inner*; on the contrary, the substances now have essentially the status of an *illusory being*, of being moments of reflection, whereby each is no less immediately united with its other or its positedness and each contains its positedness *within itself*, and consequently in its other is posited as simply and solely identical with itself…
>
> With the Notion, therefore, we have entered the realm of *freedom*. Freedom belongs to the Notion because that identity, which, as absolutely determined, constitutes the necessity of substance, is now also sublated or is a positedness, and this positedness, as self-related is simply that identity. The mutual opacity of the substances standing in the causal relationship has vanished and become a self-transparent clarity; for the originality of their self-subsistence has passed into a positedness; the *original* substance is original in that it is only *the cause of itself*, and this is *substance raised to the freedom of the Notion*. (Hegel, 1812/1976, 581–582)

The idea that the Notion is the truth of substance implies, then, that it is in the identity of the Notion that the *concept* of necessity is finally established, and fully known: necessity as contingency becomes freedom.

Marcuse in his account, had concluded that, "necessity is freedom" (1941/1999, 154) in so far as necessity is the concept of a self-development, instead of one that is imposed from outside. In Marcuse's analysis, necessity has overcome all contingencies. However, Hegel goes further, as I have shown through a close examination of the parts of Hegel's *Logic* that directly follow those Marcuse analyses in *Reason and Revolution* (1941/1999). Hegel's account strongly implies that the detailed exposition of the transition from necessity to freedom is crucial, and has as its central development the opposite of Marcuse's account wherein contingency becomes necessity: *After* contingency becomes necessity, in the actual transition Hegel shows not only that contingency *becomes* freedom, but also that necessity is intrinsic to it. In not following the necessity and freedom dialectic all the way through the transition of the Objective to the Subjective Logic, where Hegel shows that necessity is intrinsic to freedom, necessity is left alone to languish in the Objective Logic.

In unfolding in minute detail the transition from Objective to Subjective Logic, Hegel describes both the implicit dynamic of the appearances and positing of the categories and the explicit force of philosophic critique. In fact, his argument suggests that the very "positing" of the categories is the "becoming" of philosophical critique—in this case, Hegel's critique of Spinoza's system.

However, there is yet another indispensable dimension to Hegel's explication of the transition from the Objective to the Subjective Logic, or the necessity and freedom dialectic. For this, I must next turn to the smaller *Encyclopaedia Logic*, the first volume of Hegel's *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1817/1975).

3.2 Hegel's Encyclopaedia Logic

3.2.1 The Historical and Social in the Necessity and Freedom Dialectic

As I discussed in Chap. 2, Marcuse in his work *Soviet Marxism* (1961), written quite a few years after completing *Reason and Revolution* (1941/1999), also directed attention to the necessity and freedom dialectic in Hegel's *Logic*.[5] In *Reason and Revolution*, as I just described,

[5] Marcuse (1958, 136n6) cites both Hegel's smaller *Encyclopaedia Logic* (1817/1975) and Hegel's larger *Logic* (1812/1976).

Marcuse suggested but did not develop the idea that the necessity and freedom dialectic was at the center of the transition from the Objective to the Subjective Logic. By contrast, in *Soviet Marxism*, he wrote:

> [T]he relation between necessity and freedom … is the key problem in the Hegelian as well as the Marxian dialectic, and … it is also a key problem in the idea of socialism itself.
>
> The transition from necessity to freedom … Hegel calls … the "hardest of all dialectical transitions". (Marcuse, 1961, 135–136)

Yet, in Chap. 2, I raised questions concerning Marcuse's interpretations of Hegel's dialectic of necessity and freedom. Hegel's concept of the necessity and freedom dialectic in fact seemed to go further than Marcuse's characterizations of it. Hegel put forth a key insight just past the point in his text of the smaller *Encyclopaedia Logic*, where Marcuse documented that, contrary to the official doctrines of Soviet Marxism, and even Frederick Engels, Marx's closest theoretic collaborator, Hegel's concept of freedom went deeper than "recognized necessity" (Marcuse, 1961, 136). This fuller concept reflected "not merely the freedom of abstract negation, but rather concrete and positive freedom" (Marcuse, 1961, 136).[6] Yet, Hegel's text goes even further than Marcuse recognized. Hegel writes: "From which we may learn what a mistake it is to regard freedom and necessity as mutually exclusive" (Hegel, 1817/1975, 220). I linked Hegel's apparent anticipation of future difficulties with these concepts to Marcuse's apparently untenable conclusion in a later chapter of his *Soviet Marxism*: "Man comes into his own only outside and beyond the entire realm of material production for the mere necessities of life" (Marcuse, 1961, 219).

When Marcuse returned to consideration of the necessity and freedom dialectic in *Soviet Marxism* (1961), he rather summarily introduced Hegel's concept of the transition of necessity to freedom. However, he provided specific references to Hegel's texts, which precisely identify Hegel's elaborations of the necessity and freedom dialectic—elaborations that Marcuse did not reference or fully consider in his original treatment

[6] Here, Marcuse's citations are first to Hegel's *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (The smaller *Logic*), ¶158, including the *Zusatz* (addition), and ¶159, and then to Hegel's *Science of Logic* (1812/1976), specifically that work's section on "Reciprocity", which concludes the final chapter, "The Absolute Relation", of the Book of Essence.

in *Reason and Revolution* (1941/1999). In the following, in briefly reviewing once again the elements in Hegel's *Science of Logic* that Marcuse took up in *Soviet Marxism*, I shall, in addition, introduce crucial features of Hegel's text that enrich the context of the latter's presentation of the necessity and freedom dialectic, even beyond the specific points Marcuse included in his expanded assessment in *Soviet Marxism* compared with *Reason and Revolution*. These are, on the one hand, social and, on the other, historical.

In *Soviet Marxism* (1961), Marcuse cites the last two paragraphs of Hegel's smaller *Encyclopaedia Logic's* (1817/1975) part on "Reciprocity" (¶¶158–159). These paragraphs correspond with the section on "Reciprocity" in Hegel's larger *Logic* (1812/1976, 569–571), which as I mentioned previously, Marcuse's analysis in *Reason and Revolution* (1941/1999) apparently did not take into account. In referencing these sections, Marcuse singles out—rightfully so—first the passage in which Hegel insists that the change of necessity to freedom involves *not* "abstract negation" but "concrete and positive freedom" (1817/1975, 220) and, second, the one in which Hegel writes, "The passage from necessity to freedom, or from actuality into the notion, is the very hardest" (Hegel, 1817/1975, 220–221).

Now, a full appreciation of the new elements in the passages Marcuse quotes entails a closer look at ¶¶158–159, which complete the section on "Reciprocity", and the Doctrine of Essence, in Hegel's smaller *Encyclopaedia Logic* (1817/1975). Compared with the larger *Logic* (1812/1976), these passages provide subtle but startling, unmistakable allusions to an underlying social dimension of the necessity and freedom dialectic. In the course of explaining his notion that "the truth of necessity is freedom", Hegel begins by remarking that "necessity is often called hard" (Hegel, 1817/1975, 220). In explaining why this is so, he sticks to the perspective of the concept (which is reflected in Marcuse's interpretation): Necessity in its immediate or abstract form is given as a state or fact "possessing an independent subsistence" (Hegel, 1817/1975, 220).

But Hegel continues, "Necessity primarily implies that that there falls upon such a fact something else by which it is brought low. This is what is hard and sad in necessity immediate or abstract" (Hegel, 1817/1975, 220). Poverty, oppression, and exploitation as the results of material scarcity are the first sorts of such "states" or "facts" that come to mind here. And, Hegel does nothing to discourage such an image, as he continues: "The identity of the two things [necessity and freedom], which

necessity presents as bound to each other and thus bereft of their independence, is at first only inward, and therefore has no existence for those under the *yoke of necessity*" [my emphasis] (Hegel, 1817/1975, 220). In this, in his reference to real people, and in the following, Hegel seems to wish to leave no doubt that the necessity and freedom dialectic is about complete human liberation: "Freedom too from this point of view [independent of necessity] is only abstract, and is only preserved by renouncing all that we immediately are and have" (Hegel, 1817/1975, 220). Clearly, in the latter, Hegel is referring to the historical class-specific freedom, the social class divide, particularly the division between human toil and intellectual life, philosophy in particular.

In combination, the force of philosophical critique Hegel (1812/1976) features in the opening passages of the larger *Logic's* chapter on "The Notion in General", in which he critiques Spinoza's philosophy, and which is not treated by Marcuse, *and* Hegel's evocation of these underlying social implications he develops in the smaller *Encyclopaedia Logic* (1817/1975) as the context of his insistence on "concrete freedom" over "abstract negation", serve to unfold necessity and freedom as the underlying dialectic of Hegel's philosophy. There is another addition to the smaller *Encyclopaedia Logic*, this one historical, which can be seen as the final element necessary to fully appreciate Hegel's exposition of the transition from necessity to freedom.

A section of Hegel's smaller *Encyclopaedia Logic* (1817/1975) parallels the text of the larger *Logic* (1812/1976) that falls under the chapter heading, "Actuality" (the focus of Marcuse's exposition I reviewed above). Here, Hegel writes:

> Necessity has been defined, and rightly so, as the union of possibility and actuality. This mode of expression, however, gives a superficial and therefore unintelligible description of the very difficult notion of necessity. It is difficult because it is the notion itself, only that its stages or factors are still as *actualities*, which are yet at the same time to be viewed as forms only, *collapsing and transient* (my emphasis). (Hegel, 1975, 208)

Then, in the following,[7] wherein he compares the ancient and modern worlds, Hegel leaves no doubt that "collapsing and transient" are not just the fate of the concept, but also of historical social forms:

[7] Here, and in the following, references are to the *Zusatz* (addition) to ¶147.

> In the creed of the ancients … necessity figured as Destiny. The modern point of view … is that of Consolation. And Consolation means that, if we renounce our aims and interests, we do so only in prospect of receiving compensation. Destiny … leaves no room for Consolation… But… [in] ancient feeling about Destiny [there is no] sense of bondage to its [Destiny's] power. (Hegel, 1817/1975, 209–210)

Hegel proceeds to explain that, "[T]he sense of bondage springs from inability to surmount the antithesis, and from looking at what is, and what happens, as contradictory to what ought to be and happen" (Hegel, 1817/1975, 210). Hegel continues:

> In the ancient mind the feeling was more of the following kind: Because such a thing is, it is, and as it is, so ought it to be. Hence there is no contrast to be seen, and therefore no sense of bondage, no pain, and no sorrow. True indeed … this attitude toward destiny is void of consolation. But then, on the other hand, it is a frame of mind which does not need consolation, so long as personal subjectivity has not acquired its infinite significance. (Hegel, 1817/1975, 210)

In an elaboration of destiny and consolation that follows, Hegel first discusses the nature of this "personal subjectivity" in modern society and then contrasts it with that of ancient society. Unlike ancient society, in modern society, subjectivity is divided into the finite and infinite—the former as person, natural, "with its contingent and arbitrary content of private interests and inclinations", and the latter as "thing" or "fact" (Hegel, 1817/1975, 210). With finite subjectivity, Hegel describes "moderns, who obstinately pursue their subjective aims, and when they find themselves constrained to resign the hope of reaching them, console themselves with the prospect of reward in some other shape" (Hegel, 1817/1975, 210). In developing the notion that subjectivity should *not* be confined as the *opposition* to the *fact*, but rather *immanent* in it, Hegel suggests that in the Christianity of the modern world, "[T]he doctrine of consolation receives a newer and a higher significance" (Hegel, 1817/1975, 210). According to Hegel, this "higher significance" rests on the qualitative development of subjectivity. The *achievable* consolation of finite subjectivity, now *within* that "fact or thing" (instead of its external opposition), which Hegel brought up earlier, is the *infinite* value of that subjectivity itself. Hegel explains:

> [The] Christian religion is to be regarded as the religion of consolation, and even of absolute consolation. Christianity … teaches that God wishes all men to be saved. That teaching declares that subjectivity has an infinite value. And that consoling power of Christianity just lies in the fact that God himself is in it known as the absolute subjectivity, so that, inasmuch as subjectivity involves the element of particularity, our particular personality too is recognized as something not merely to be solely and simply nullified, but as at the same time something to be preserved. (Hegel, 1817/1975, 210)

Hegel contrasts this form of subjectivity, the "religion of absolute consolation", with the subjectivity of even the highest forms of ancient destiny. In doing so, he immediately emphasizes, by making it the starting point, the following: "The gods of the ancient world were also [as god had become in Christianity] looked upon as personal" (Hegel, 1817/1975, 210). However, this characteristic, shared in modern and ancient forms of subjectivity, actually seems to *veil* rather than *reveal* the *potential* of "personality" for the realization of historical freedom:

> [B]ut the personality of a Zeus and an Apollo is not a real personality: it is only a figure in the mind… [T]hese gods are mere personifications which, being such, do not know themselves, and are only known. An evidence of this defect and this powerlessness of the old gods is found even in the religious beliefs of antiquity. In the ancient creeds not only men, but even gods, were represented as subject to destiny … a destiny which we must conceive as *necessity not unveiled*, and thus as something wholly impersonal, selfless, and *blind*. On the other hand, the Christian God is God not known merely, but also self-knowing; he is a personality not merely figured in our minds, but rather absolutely actual. [my emphasis] (Hegel, 1817/1975, 210–211)

These passages on the *social* and *historical*, both from the "Doctrine of Essence", are textually located, in the case of the latter,[8] in the new, elaborated conclusion to the "Actuality" chapter Marcuse took up in *Reason and Revolution* in its original larger *Logic* (Hegel, 1812/1976) version and, in the case of the former, as the penultimate paragraph[9] of the final section of the smaller *Logic* ("Reciprocity") (Hegel, 1817/1975), which Marcuse did not treat at all in *Reason and Revolution* (1941/1999) but accorded such special notice in *Soviet Marxism* (1961). Both passages are

[8] *Zusatz* to ¶147.
[9] *Zusatz* to ¶158.

found exclusively in the smaller *Encyclopaedia Logic*; they serve to round out and amplify my contention that the distinction Hegel ultimately drew between "blind" and "unveiled" necessity is crucial for the transition from the Objective to the Subjective Logic, for Hegel's philosophical concept of the dialectic of necessity and freedom, and for preparing the ground for Marx's appropriation of the latter.

3.2.2 The Final Two Paragraphs of the Objective Logic

Now we may return to complete our reading of the final paragraphs of the section on "Reciprocity", which Hegel developed as the conclusion to the smaller *Encyclopaedia Logic* (1817/1975). Recall that Marcuse's return to the necessity and freedom dialectic in his work *Soviet Marxism* (1961) referred to Hegel's passages (¶¶158–159)[10] in the smaller *Logic*. Marcuse noted Hegel's sharp distinction between "abstract negation" and "concrete freedom", and in the latter, Hegel's declaration that the transition from necessity to freedom is the "hardest" of all dialectical transitions.

To start, in taking a closer look at these paragraphs, not only the "hardest", but also an actual *hierarchy* of "hardness" comes into view. First, in ¶158, Hegel notes that the concept of necessity is "hard"—and not only hard, but "sad".[11] Why sad? While Marcuse (1961) did not note this characteristic of "sadness", he explained Hegel's recognition of the "abstract negation" of necessity by freedom as entailing his critique of the notion that defines freedom as "recognized necessity". According to Marcuse, Hegel insisted that "recognized", or "insight into", necessity "can never change necessity into freedom" (Marcuse, 1961, 136). Rather, Marcuse argues, according to Hegel, freedom is "comprehended" necessity, "which implies a change in the actual conditions" (Marcuse, 1961, 136). But Marcuse's interpretation itself seems to impart an unwarranted level of abstraction to Hegel's text. Though certainly interpretable as implying "a change in actual conditions", the passage in Hegel's text I quoted above on the identity of necessity and freedom as only "inward" and therefore, on the one hand, has no existence for those "under the yoke of necessity" and, on the other, is "only abstract" and "preserved only by renouncing all that we are and have", is extraordinarily concrete (Hegel, 1817/1975, 220).

[10] Including *Zusatz* to ¶158.

[11] This reference and those following are to the *Zusatz* (addition) to ¶158, part of which Marcuse quoted as well in *Soviet Marxism* (1961, 135–136).

It seems Hegel already provides the theoretical basis for the recognition of a social class barrier to real freedom, both for those under the "yoke of necessity" and those who have escaped it: the identity of necessity and freedom is inaccessible for those under the yoke of necessity, and the actually existing freedom, that is, among those who have escaped the "yoke of necessity", is a *sham*. The "change in actual conditions" seems at least in in part explicitly objective (and material) in Hegel; but it remains surprisingly unspecified in Marcuse's account. Moreover, it is just here that Hegel points out the great mistake of "regarding freedom and necessity as mutually exclusive" (Hegel, 1917/1975, 220). Hegel sums up: "Necessity indeed, qua necessity, is far from being freedom: yet freedom presupposes necessity, and contains it as an unsubstantial element in itself" (Hegel, 1975, 220). This formulation implies the movement from blind to seeing necessity, or the transition from necessity in its form of "substance" to its "unsubstantial" form in the Notion. In Hegel's hierarchy of "hardness" I mentioned above, then, necessity, in ¶158, is "hard", and its presentation leads into ¶159, where the "*passage* from necessity to freedom, or from actuality into the notion, is the very hardest" (my emphasis) (Hegel, 1975, 221).

In concluding ¶159, Hegel characterizes the passage from necessity to freedom: Its "very hardest" nature consists in its proposal that, "[I]ndependent actuality shall be thought as having all its *substantiality* in the passing over and identity with the other independent actuality [my emphasis]" (Hegel, 1817/1975, 221–222). The extraordinary brevity with which Hegel pinpoints what makes the "hardest passage" from one category to another so hard may only succeed in light of the link it provides back to the idea in the concluding sentence of the analysis of the "hardness" of necessity in ¶158, that is, "freedom presupposes necessity, and contains it as an *unsubstantial* element in itself [my emphasis]" (Hegel, 1817/1975, 221). From the passage from necessity to freedom, filled with all the accumulated riches of the unfolding categories of Being and Essence, necessity releases itself, as itself, in another identity, the Notion that though not the *hardest*, nonetheless is "extremely hard, because it is itself just this very identity" (Hegel, 1817/1975, 222).

Recall that, in Hegel's philosophy, necessity and freedom are not discrete categories, but rather are "relations"—the former of the categories of objective logic or substance, the latter of the subjective logic or the notion. In the objective logic, necessity, on the threshold of the notion, blind and veiled, submerged in causality and reciprocity, emerged seeing and unveiled. Now, *in* the Notion, Hegel writes:

> But the actual substance as such, the cause, which in its exclusiveness, resists all invasion, is ipso facto subjected to necessity or the destiny of passing into dependency; and it is this subjection rather where the *chief hardness* lies. To *think necessity*, on the contrary, rather tends to melt that hardness. For thinking means that, in the other, one meets with one's self. It means a *liberation*, which is not a flight of abstraction, but consists in that which is actual having itself not as something else, but as its own being and creation, in the other actuality with which it is bound up by the force of necessity. (my emphasis) (Hegel, 1817/1975, 222)

Hence of the final two contingencies—causality and necessity—it is only the latter, by virtue of its "melting" and *permeability*, or *porousness*, which attains the standpoint of freedom. The freedom here is no longer "internal", but rather fully manifest, a result of the thinking subject. In the foregoing, Hegel made clear that the latter is not only the subjectivity of philosophy, but equally of the historical and social dialectic of destiny and consolation, the coupling of the self-development of those "under the yoke of necessity" and the vantage point of the "realm of freedom".

3.3 Marx's Capital Within the Exposition of Hegel's Notion in Marcuse's Critical Theory

Marcuse's further references for explication of Hegel's idea of the actuality of the subject, and the notion, are from this point on located in Hegel's (1812/1976, 575–844) Doctrine of the Notion (Subjective Logic). However, this explication can be divided conceptually into two parts. In the first part, Marcuse refers to Hegel's (1812/1976, 577–595, 605–618) early sections of the notion, "Notion in General", and the "Particular Notion". Thus, Marcuse's investigation's first part amounts to a detour on the path to a "knowing subject", while the second part, more on subjectivity and the notion proper ("knowing subject"), refers to the final section of Hegel's (1812/1976, 761–844) *Logic*, "The idea", including its Chapter 2 on the "The Idea of Cognition", and the work's final chapter on "The Absolute Idea". It should be noted that Marcuse's explication of Hegel's Notion is quite affirmative in the first part. However, its starting point is several pages into the text, after Hegel's recapitulation and further illumination of the transition from necessity to freedom, which I described above. In the second part, which I do not take up here, Marcuse's account

turns mostly negative.[12] The following passage from the first part of Marcuse's analysis as denoted above is most relevant for further describing the theoretical link from Marcuse (1941/1999) to Postone (1995) on the necessity and freedom dialectic. Marcuse writes:

> According to Hegel, the notion is the subject's activity and, as such, is the true form of reality. On the other hand, the subject is characterized by freedom, so that Hegel's Doctrine of the Notion really develops the categories of freedom. These comprehend the world as it appears when thought has liberated itself from the power of a "reified" reality… Hegel's idea of the notion reverses the ordinary relation between thought and reality, and becomes the cornerstone of philosophy as a critical theory. According to common sense thinking, knowledge becomes the more unreal the more it abstracts from reality. For Hegel, the opposite is true. The abstraction from reality, which the formation of the notion requires, makes the notion not poorer but richer than reality, because it leads from the facts to their essential content. The truth cannot be gleaned from the facts as long as the subject does not yet live in them but rather stands against them… As long as this has not been accomplished, the truth rests with the abstract notion and not with the concrete reality… With the formation of the notion, the abstraction does not desert, but leads into actuality. What nature and history actually are will not be found in the prevailing facts; the world is not that harmonious. (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 156–157)

The initial lines of the above passage, stipulating that Hegel's Doctrine of the Notion "really develops the categories of freedom", reflects Hegel's text. But, it also reinforces and suggests an extension of my interpretation of Marcuse's analysis of Hegel's *Logic* (1812/1976). Because it only points to but does not develop the necessity and freedom dialectic as the center of the transition from the Objective to the Subjective Logic, it does not and cannot develop in the succeeding analyses the implications of Hegel's key finding in regard to that transition—that *necessity is determined as internal to freedom*.

In accord with this, and it should be kept in mind that the account above appears at the center of his exposition of Hegel's *Logic*, Marcuse briefly summarizes the abstract categories in Marx's *Capital* as "no more adequate example" of [Hegel's] notion (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 158), and

[12] For a detailed analysis of Marcuse's analysis of the latter part of Hegel's Notion, see Rockwell (2002).

in doing so focuses, notably, on the category of *surplus* value, not value, the implications of which I shall develop in the next and following chapters. Marcuse's summary of Marx's *Capital* (1867/1990) here is remarkable in its brevity and sureness:

> The concept of capitalism is no less than the totality of the capitalist process, comprehended in the "principle" by which it progresses. The notion of capitalism starts with the separation of the actual producers from the means of production,[13] resulting in the establishment of free labor and the appropriation of surplus value, which, with the development of technology, brings about the accumulation and centralization of capital, the progressive decline in the rate of profit, and the breakdown of the entire system. The notion of capitalism is no less than the three volumes of *Capital*, just as Hegel's notion of the notion comprises all three books of his *Science of Logic*. (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 158–159)[14]

Actually, there are three most striking features of this passage. Taking them in order: First is the identity (but perhaps only apparent) of Hegel's and Marx's concept of dialectic—the latter's work *Capital* (1867/1990) an exemplar of the former's *Logic* (1812/1976). (I will investigate the trajectory of Marcuse's ideas on this subject in the following sections and chapters.) Second is Marcuse's recognition of the conceptual importance of capitalism's "origins" in the "separation of the producers from the means of production", which I will show in Chap. 5 that Marx (1858/1993, 459) had strongly emphasized in a key section of the *Grundrisse* (1858/1993) such that he titled the section where he analyzed it "Original Accumulation of Capital". The third, which I noted above, is Marcuse's focus on the concept of surplus value. The significance of the latter, according to Marcuse's analysis, is that combined with (or constitutive of) technology, it leads to the breakdown of capitalism through a decline in the rate of profit. As I will develop below in respect to Postone's (1995) new Critical Theory approach to Marx's value theory, it is the value form of wealth itself (even prior to elaboration of the concept of *surplus* value) that is key to Marx's critical "notion" of capitalism. Nonetheless, such a critical notion is coherent only on the basis of Marcuse's second summary

[13] In Chap. 5, I will discuss the *Grundrisse's* section in which Marx introduced the concept of "abstract labor" in his discussion of "original accumulation"—the separation of "free labor" from its means of realization.

[14] The "three books" are: Being, Essence, and the Notion.

point, which I cited above, that the beginning of any true notion of capitalism is an understanding of the "separation of the actual producers from the means of production". This is the basis of the "value form" of wealth, the key to the social implications of which is its temporal dimension.

3.4 Hegel's Philosophy of Right and the Temporal Dimension of Marx's Value Theory

The second instance in *Reason and Revolution* (1941/1999), where Marcuse traced the concepts of necessity and freedom to Hegel was in the latter's *Philosophy of Right* (1820/2000).

> [Hegel's] principle of freedom, which was to demonstrate the supremacy of the person over all things, has not only turned this person into a thing, but has also made him a function of time. Hegel struck upon the same fact that impelled Marx later to stipulate "the shortening of the working day" as the condition for man's passing into the "realm of freedom". Hegel's conceptions carry far enough, also, to touch upon the hidden force of labor time and to reveal that the difference between ancient slave and the "free worker" can be expressed in the terms of the quantity of time belonging to the "lord". (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 195)[15]

So, according to Marcuse's critical reading of Hegel, the producer, even in the escape from slavery, and as a "free laborer", remains subject to the process of "thingification", and her status as a "function of time" remains unchanged.

Marcuse develops this "turning a person into a thing":

> The process of transforming the relations between men into relations of things operates in Hegel's formulation. The person is submerged in his property right and is a person only by virtue of his property… The process of reification continues to permeate Hegel's analysis. He derives the entire Law of Contracts and Obligations from the Law of Property. Since the freedom of the person is exercised in the external sphere of things, the person can "externalize" himself, that is, deal with himself as an external object. He

[15] Marcuse's analysis thus far identifies surplus value, but not the value form itself—the all-important potential of the form the surplus takes (only) in capitalist society; in addition, he has identified the importance of the quantity of labor time, but not the original quality of capitalist time.

> can of his own free will "alienate" himself and sell his performances and services. (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 195)

Then, in explaining the critical limitations in Hegel's analysis, which *does* already imply how a person can be made a "function of time", Marcuse also notes that for Hegel a limit in time to that "reification" and "alienation" is decisive in preserving the totality and the universality that may still characterize the person. Marcuse quotes from ¶67 in Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* (1820, 2000)[16]: If I were to sell, "the entire time of my concrete labor, and the totality of my produce, my personality would become the property of someone else; I would no longer be a person and would place myself outside of the realm of right" (my emphasis) (quoted by Marcuse, 1941/1999, 195). Hence, Hegel's historical framework is the movement from slavery to free labor.

There is a telling compromise of philosophy implicit in Hegel's analysis of time and social domination, apparent to Marcuse, wherein only the *amount* of time in which the person was made its function determined the critical perspective. Recognition of Hegel's theoretical compromise opened the door for Marx's fundamental critique of the "free labor" associated with capitalism. Hence, Marx's critique incorporated and surpassed even Hegel's unprecedented though still implicit conception of the emergence of time itself as a measure of social domination. In support of his critique of Hegel, though without citing its source, Marcuse (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 195) borrows from a key phrase found in Marx's *Capital*, vol. 3 (1981, 958–959): There Marx attempted to describe, perhaps more succinctly than anywhere else in his greatest work, how even "free labor" is transcended in a post-capitalist society—the dialectic of the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom.

Contrary to Hegel's notion of the crucial determinate for freedom being whether or not the "entire time" of "concrete labor", and the "totality" of the produce belonged to the "master", for Marx, according to Marcuse, it was the absolute "shortening of the working day" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 195), even when "free labor" has become the norm, which was the real beginning of the historical negation of "making the person a function of time". This is because it was *also* the prime "condition for man's passing from the 'realm of necessity' into the 'realm of freedom'"

[16] Marcuse quotes from an early translation of Hegel's work: Hegel, G.W.F. (1896). *Philosophy of Right* (S.W. Dyde, Trans.). London: George Bell and Sons.

(Marcuse, 1941/1999, 195).[17] However, for Marcuse, the "realm of freedom" did *not* entail—as we shall see in Chap. 7—how Marx described it in the *Grundrisse* (1958/1993)—the *interaction* of the transformation and overcoming of labor. But rather, following the *logic* of merely quantitative reduction in labor time, Marcuse ultimately posited the realm of freedom as the "abolition" of labor (time) altogether. Marcuse continues:

> Hegel's conceptions carry far enough, also, to touch upon the hidden force of labor time and to reveal that the difference between ancient slave and the "free worker" can be expressed in the terms of the *quantity of time* belonging to the "lord". (my emphasis) (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 195)

However, it is not until Marcuse's chapters on Marx (which I will examine next), that Marcuse's analysis follows Hegel's argument from this deeper level of the "hidden force of labor time": In this, Marcuse also points to the non-overt social forces of capitalist labor time generally.

But even at this stage—while still in his discussion of the points Hegel makes in the *Philosophy of Right* (1820/2000)—instead of the slavery and "free labor" distinction, which was Hegel's subject, Marcuse focuses on the fundamental distinction between capitalist and post-capitalist labor. As we saw initially, Marcuse pointed out the relevance if not the intent of Hegel's remarks. In suggesting that people were made a function of time, Hegel brought to light for Marcuse the overt cause and effect relationship involved in the transition from capitalist to post-capitalist society, or the reduction in labor time that underlies the realm of necessity as "the condition" for the emergence of the realm of freedom. The initial point Marcuse makes is that changes in the quantity of labor time (ultimately its abolition) is a prerequisite for a qualitative change from necessity to freedom on the societal level. In connection with the additional point Marcuse makes in the passage above—about historical differences in social class formations determined by the control of this labor time—he again quotes from Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* (1820/2000), ¶67:

[17] In Chap. 2, I indicated Marcuse and Dunayevskaya's alternative interpretations of Marx's concepts of the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom. Especially important in the present context are the sentences in the passage Marcuse refers to here in which Marx describes the qualitative changes in the *kinds* of work people may do when they control their labor instead of being controlled by it.

> The distinction discussed here is that between a slave and a modern servant or hired labourer. The Athenian slave perhaps had easier tasks and more intellectual [*geistigere*] work to perform than our servants normally do, but he was nevertheless a slave, because the *entire scope of his activity* had been alienated to his master. [my emphasis] (Hegel, 1820/2000, ¶67, quoted by Marcuse, 1941/1999, 195)[18]

Yet, according to Marcuse's argument stretching *from* this, *Reason and Revolution*'s (1941/1999) chapter mostly on Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* (1820/2000) (1941/1999, 169–223), *to* the chapters on Marx's *Capital* (1867/1990) (1941/1999, 295–322), Hegel's observations, which were recorded decades prior to Marx's *Capital*, included recognition of a qualitative element *within* the quantitative. Hegel's analysis implied that, *imbedded* in the quantitative aspect, there is a significant qualitative side to labor time—a social "force", according to Marcuse, which, if not eclipsed, is not readily apparent. It is the meaning of this sort of "force" that Marcuse tries to develop later in his analysis of the labor process in *Reason and Revolution*. Marcuse's analysis shows that Marx appropriated Hegel's further insight regarding labor time and society, which was already implicit in the latter's theory.

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[18] Marcuse quotes from an earlier edition of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, trans. S.W. Dyde, George Bell and Sons: London, 1896.

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CHAPTER 4

Marx in Marcuse's Hegelian Marxism, Critical Theory, and Value Theory

In the chapter of *Reason and Revolution* (1941/1999) on Marx's *Capital*[1] (1867/1909b/1990), Marcuse wrote:

> [T]his "surplus value", created by the abstract universal labor hidden behind its concrete form, falls to the buyer of labor-power without any equivalent, since it does not appear as an independent commodity. The value of the labor-power sold to the capitalist is replaced in part of the time the laborer actually works; the rest of the time goes unpaid … this argument, however, if isolated from Marx's entire conception of labor, retains an *accidental* element. Actually, Marx's presentation of the production of surplus value is *intrinsically connected* with his analysis of the two-fold character of labor and must be interpreted in light of this phenomenon. (my emphases) (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 307)

Marcuse's significant conclusion:

> This property possessed by abstract, universal labor, hidden behind its concrete forms, though it is the sole source of new value, itself has no proper

[1] Here and in all following references to *Capital,* vol. 1, Marcuse refers to Karl Marx (1909b), *Capital*: *A Critique of Political Economy*, vol. 1. (Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, Trans.). Chicago: Charles H. Kerr and Co. For all his citations of this work, I shall provide Marcuse's original pagination, as well as, in brackets, the corresponding pagination to Marx (1867/1990).

R. Rockwell, *Hegel, Marx, and the Necessity and Freedom Dialectic*,
Political Philosophy and Public Purpose,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75611-0_4

> value. The labor contract thus necessarily involves exploitation…. The twofold character of labor, then, is the condition that makes surplus value possible. By virtue of the fact that labor has this dual form, the private appropriation of labor power *inevitably* leads to exploitation. (my emphasis) (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 308)

The "hidden force of labor time" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 195), the idea of which Marcuse originally uncovered in Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* (1820/2000), involved for Hegel quantity over quality—it did not matter that the work of the slave may have lent her more dignity by being in some cases more intellectual (*geistigere*), and less arduous, than that of the modern servant. The fact that *all* her time belonged to the master negated any consideration of the relative higher *quality* of labor. To the contrary, according to Marcuse, in capitalist labor, the "hidden force of labor time" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 195), even beyond the "unpaid time" of surplus labor that "surreptitiously" belongs to the capitalist, and may have a merely "accidental element", actually lies in the gratuitous "force" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 195) of the qualitative dimensions of concrete labor for the benefit of the capitalist. To make this point, Marcuse quotes Marx:

> While the laborer, by virtue of his labor being of a specialized kind that has a special object (*durch die zwecmässige Form der Arbeit*), preserves and transfers to the product the value of the means of production, he at the same time, by the mere act of working, creates each instant an additional or new value. (Marx, 1867/1909b, 231 [1867/1990, 314–315], quoted by Marcuse, 1941/1999, 308)

Marcuse points out that the performance of concrete labor, "labor power in action" (Marx, 1867/1909b, 231 [1867/1990, 315], quoted by Marcuse, 1941/1999, 308), not only *preserves* value in *adding* new value, but also performs the service of hiding (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 308), or is the form of appearance of, unpaid abstract labor time. Now the time in question belongs not to the lord but to the capitalist. More importantly for Marcuse's analysis, in addition, just *this* dimension of the contribution of the interaction of concrete and abstract labor, or the twofold character of labor, of preserving and transferring value is, as Marcuse quotes Marx, a "natural gift" of labor power, "which costs the laborer nothing, but which is very advantageous to the capitalist" (Marx, 1867/1909b, 230 [1867/1990, 315], quoted by Marcuse, 1941/1999, 308).

Thus, Marcuse's conclusion contains a theory of the way in which Marx appropriated, by way of transformation into its opposite, Hegel's historical analysis of the quantity over the quality of labor time to define labor's determinate role in social domination. With capitalism, according to Marcuse, it is concrete labor—a qualitative aspect of the twofold nature of capitalist labor—that separates Marx's concept from Hegel's concept of the role of time in class domination. In fact, according to Marcuse, Hegel and Marx drew opposite conclusions. For Hegel, the hidden force of labor, that is, both its role in social domination and its liberatory potential, is the quantitative within the qualitative. For Marx what is pivotal is the qualitative within the quantitative. The logic of Marcuse's argument suggests the necessity for *abolition* of the concrete labor behind which the socially prevalent form of abstract labor predominates in capitalism.

However, for this, it is important to locate the textual focal point of Marcuse's analysis: The third of eight parts, "The Production of Absolute Surplus Value", contains five chapters, beginning with Chapter 7, titled "The Labor Process and the Valorization Process". The latter contains two parts, the first of which is titled "The Labor Process"—the focus of Marcuse's main chapter on *Capital*, vol. 1. Hence, just as Marcuse's analysis did not take into account the part in Hegel's *Logic* on "Reciprocity" (which I discussed in Chap. 3), here Marcuse's analysis does not consider Marx's extensive elaboration of the *reciprocity* of concrete and abstract labor, principally the concept of "relative surplus value", which Marx develops particularly in Part 4, Chapters 12–15.

4.1 Marcuse's Hegelian–Marxian Interpretation of Capital: "Analysis of the Labor Process"

Marcuse in only one text, *Reason and Revolution* (1941/1999), provided an extensive analysis of Marx's *Capital* (1867/1909b/1990). The final two chapters of the section on "The Foundations of the Dialectical Theory of Society" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 295–322) develop in some detail the points Marcuse included in his initial summary of *Capital*, which in Chap. 3 I quoted from *Reason and Revolution's* section on Hegel's Notion. In his analysis of *Capital*, Marcuse has numerous references to *Capital*, vol. 1, and *Capital*, vol. 3 (1894/1909a/1981). In the following, I will characterize this analysis by (1) assessing Marcuse's interpretations of the concepts he takes up as well as, in the light of Postone's (1995)

later reinterpretations (which I investigate in Chap. 8), the significance of those he did not; and (2) elaborating specific limitations that may explain Marcuse's later *retreat* from Marx's value theory, which he actually characterized as underlying the "obsolescence of socialism" (Marcuse, 1965/2013) as early as 1964 when he wrote *One-Dimensional Man* (1966).

In *Reason and Revolution* (1941/1999), Marcuse provides original and penetrating analyses of some, but not all, of the most important concepts in Marx's *Capital*, vol. 1 (1867/1909b/1990). In this Marcuse has a deliberate focus, as indicated by the title, "The Analysis of the Labor Process". He takes up the question of the nature of labor, first attributing to it a transhistorical primary social function, followed by a description of labor's specifically capitalist form. For the latter, he discusses the importance of Marx's idea of alienated labor and associated concepts; the twofold character of labor (concrete and abstract); socially necessary labor time; and the specifically capitalist class exploitation. Ultimately, Marcuse's analyses also point to the ramifications of the labor process proper for capitalist *society*, tracing from this process a "falling rate of profit", which precipitates social crises. However, Marx develops the latter points, as Marcuse's own references show, in *Capital*, vol. 3. Thus, I regard this part of Marcuse's argument as providing a marker for the important concepts he left incompletely treated in his analyses of *Capital*, vol. 1. Chief among the concepts Marcuse left untreated are some of the most important for the current stage of technological production—the *reciprocities* of the two pairs of concepts, concrete and abstract labor, and abstract and historical time, the former of which I will delineate in the following, and the latter begin to develop in Chap. 8 on Moishe Postone's (1995) interpretations of *Capital*.

4.1.1 Marcuse's Interpretation of Marx's Concept of Labor as Transhistorical

Marcuse begins his interpretations of the labor process in Marx's *Capital*, vol. 1 (1867/1909b/1990) with a statement suggesting that Marx's concept of labor was transhistorical: In Marx's theory, labor "determines the totality of human existence and thus gives to society its basic pattern" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 295). Hence, in Marcuse's analysis, capitalist society shares this quality with all the prior forms—it is just that "alienated labor" is the type of labor Marx describes that gives capitalist society *its*

specific "basic pattern". The question of labor and *post*-capitalist society is thus interesting, since according to Marcuse's interpretations of Hegel and Marx, which I began to develop above, there is no longer labor to "give society its basic pattern". Hence, Marcuse's concept of labor, apparently unlike the one he attributes to Marx, is not "transhistorical"—the concept's relevance ends with capitalism's end. At the end of the section that directly follows Marcuse's "Analysis of the Labor Process", "The Marxian Dialectic", Marcuse writes: "Theory has demonstrated the tendencies that make the attainment of a rational order of life, the conditions for creating this, and the initial steps to be taken. The final aim of the new social practice has been formulated: the abolition of labor, the employment of the socialized means of production for the free development of all individuals" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 321–322).

In extending his interpretation, Marcuse further argues that there has been a "natural" form of labor, and that compared with it alienated labor is "unnatural"; thus, compared to prior forms, capitalist labor is a "degenerated form of labour" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 295). Though quoting directly from Marx in *Capital*, vol. 1 (from the initial paragraphs of Chapter 7 on "The Labor Process" (1867/1909b, 197 [1867/1990, 283–284])), Marcuse attributes the following idea to Marx's "early writings": "Labor is at first a process between man and nature, a process in which man mediates, regulates, and controls the material relations between himself and nature by his own action" (Marx, 1867/1909b, 197 [1867/1990, 283], quoted by Marcuse, 1941/1999, 295).[2] While Marcuse hastens to add a statement here affirming that the labor just described is indeed "*basic to all forms of society*" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 295),[3] some ambiguity remains: According to Marcuse's idea (I introduced

[2] Marcuse, while citing the Kerr edition, provides his own translation of this passage (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 295n77).

[3] That the labor Marx describes at the outset of his chapter of *Capital* (Seven) on the "Labor Process" indeed may *not*, contrary to what Marcuse affirms, be "basic to all forms of society" (even the potentially fully developed capitalist formation) is suggested in Marx's two concluding sentences of the prior paragraph leading to his description of such labor: "The fact that the production of use values, or goods, is carried on under the control of a capitalist and on his behalf does not alter the general character of that production. We shall therefore have to consider the labor process independently of any specific social formation" (Marx, 1867/1909b, 197 [Marx, 1867/1990, 283]). Keep in mind that at this stage of his analysis Marx refers to concrete labor and the use value dimension, and has not yet detailed the "valorization" process of abstract labor and value; therefore, he has not unfolded the concept of the twofold character of labor that defines the specificity of the capitalist social formation.

above) that labor determines the totality of human existence and thus gives to society its basic pattern, and his ensuing analysis, wherein he attributes to Marx's early writings the position that Marx puts forth in the section of *Capital* on "The Labor Process"—that labor is at first a process between man and nature—are we to conclude that it is Marcuse's position that Marx's characterization of labor and society in his early writings—that is, that labor (as a process between man and nature) determines the totality of human existence and thus gives to society its basic pattern—is applicable to capitalist society as it is fully conceptualized in Marx's "mature" theory? If so, according to Marcuse's interpretation, as long as labor exists, it will "determine" society; therefore, true freedom cannot be founded on changing the *way* people work, but only in the complete "abolition" of labor. However, this is hard to square with Marcuse's other position—that labor as a "process between man and nature, a process in which man mediates, regulates, and controls the material reactions between himself and nature by his own action" is *basic* to *all* forms of society.

Nonetheless, in striking and original analyses Marcuse proceeds through consideration of Marx's concepts of socially necessary labor time, abstract labor, the labor theory of value, the relationship of abstract and concrete labor, the law of value, use value and exchange value, notion and reality, primary accumulation, surplus value, exploitation, and the necessity and freedom dialectic. Consideration of Marcuse's interpretations of these concepts can lead to Postone's (1995) theories, important among which is a key insight that the basic structures of capitalist society, which are actually historically unique, are at the same time socially conducive for the formation of a certain concept of the relationship of labor and society that is universal. Indeed, Postone's position is that labor determines social relations *only* in capitalist society. Much of the significance of Postone's theories may be attributable, on the one hand, to his critical appropriation of Marcuse's interpretations of Marx's concepts in *Capital* (Marx, 1867/1909b/1990) enumerated above, which are distinguished from other first-generation critical theorists both in their detail and penetration; on the other hand, Postone's further exploration of some of these concepts leads to uncovering new theoretical terrain. A prime example is Marcuse's analysis of abstract labor. Here, I will focus on this analysis and, in the Chap. 8, as Postone (1995) developed it even further.

4.1.2 Marcuse's Abstract Labor: Reduction of Concrete to "Specifically Social" Labor

The principal characteristic of the concept of abstract labor is its power to pull the other aforementioned critical concepts into its orbit so that the beginnings of Marx's mature critical theory are evident in their interrelationships. As I previously noted, Marcuse in the text of *Reason and Revolution* (1941/1999) had already highlighted the importance of the dimension of time in social domination by demonstrating the manner in which Hegel, in his *Philosophy of Right* (1820/2000) had anticipated Marx's concept. In the later section of *Reason and Revolution* on the "analysis of the labor process", which we are considering now, Marcuse previews Marx's key concept of the twofold character of labor (abstract and concrete) specific to capitalism by rooting the universal exchangeability of commodities in the one element they all held in common—that all were products of labor. Marcuse notes, "If … the property common to all commodities is labor, it must be labor stripped of all qualitative distinctions … the standard of such measurement is given by *time*" (emphasis added) (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 297).

It is important to note here that prior to Marcuse's description of the determination of abstract labor by time, he characterized the other side of labor, concrete labor, first as "natural" and then later "as diversified as the use values produced by it" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 297). Hence, Marcuse describes abstract labor, specific to capitalism, as a *negation* of concrete labor. To jump a bit ahead in his analysis, Marcuse concludes:

> The process in which labor power becomes an abstract quantitative unit characterizes a "specifically social form of labor" to be distinguished from that form which is "the natural condition of human existence" namely, labor as productive activity directed at the adaptation of nature. This specifically social form of labor is that prevalent in capitalism. (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 299)

Here, Marcuse quotes, *not* from *Capital* (Marx, 1867/1909b/1990) as I showed above in the previous section that he did in respect to a similar sounding passage that he linked by a definition of (concrete) labor, the young and mature Marx, and all forms of society; rather, Marcuse now refers to Marx's earlier 1859 *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (Marx, 1859/1904, 33 [Marx, 1859/1987, 278]). Marcuse's

paraphrase of this text (and the translation he cites)[4] substantially changes the meaning Marx apparently intended. Compare the following passage with Marcuse's paraphrase I just quoted above:

> [L]abor is a natural condition of human existence, a condition of material interchange between man and nature, quite independent of the form of society. On the other hand, the labor which posits exchange value is a specific social form of labor. (Marx, 1859/1987, 278)

The central point here is that there seems to be an important difference between Marx's concept of a "specific social form of labor" versus Marcuse's paraphrase, which identifies a "specifically social" form of labor: Marx's concept implies that all labor is social and that capitalist labor is *one* of those forms, while Marcuse's paraphrase suggests that the specificity of capitalism consists in that labor therein *is* social. Marcuse's position therefore implies that only capitalist labor takes a social form, and that abstract labor is social, while concrete labor is not.

Moreover, it is interesting that Marcuse quotes from Marx's earlier 1859 work, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (Marx, 1859/1987, 296–299) to document Marx's theory of the twofold character of labor. Marx notes in the first pages of *Capital*, vol. 1 (1867/1909b/1990) itself how earlier, in *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, he had directed special attention to this theory and indicates he will now, in *Capital*, proceed to *develop* it [my emphasis] (Marx, 1867/1990, 132). In *Capital*, then, Marx *includes* the passage from which Marcuse *first* quoted, which as I noted is similar to the one Marcuse *later* quoted from *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*. However, a *third* similarly sounding passage Marx includes in the earliest pages of the first chapter of *Capital,* vol. 1, reflects a significant theoretical difference from those Marcuse quoted and interpreted, first, from the first page of *Capital*'s Chapter 7 on "Absolute Surplus Value" and, second, from the 1859 *A Contribution to the Critique of Political*

[4] Marcuse cites the Charles H. Kerr edition, where in the original German text, the passage Marcuse paraphrases reads: *Als zweckmäßige Tätigkeit zur Aneignung des Natürlichen in einer oder der anderen Form ist die Arbeit Naturbedingung der menschlichen Existenz, eine von allen sozialen Formen unabhängige Bedingung des Stoffwechsels zwischen Mensch und Natur. Tauschwert setzende Arbeit ist dagegen eine spezifisch gesellschaftliche Form der Arbeit.* The key word, *spezifisch,* translates to "specific" in English, a translation that is reflected in a later version than the one used by Marcuse. See (Marx, 1859/1987, 278).

Economy. In the passage Marcuse never cites, in Chapter 1 of *Capital*, Marx writes, "Labor, then, as the creator of use values, as useful labor, is a condition of human existence which is independent of all forms of society; it is an *eternal natural necessity* which mediates the metabolism between man and nature, and therefore human life itself" (my emphasis) (Marx, 1867/1990, 133). Clearly, useful labor as an eternal natural necessity (even when in fully developed technological society) is different from being "basic" to all *societies*; also, Marx's "eternal natural necessity" perspective points to the significance of my critique of Marcuse's positions I developed in Chap. 3 in which, as Hegel puts it, "necessity does not become freedom by vanishing" (Hegel, 1812/1976, 571).

More generally, what is also important is the weight Marcuse lends to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (Marx, 1859/1987) in his overall discussion of Marx's concept of the twofold nature of capitalist labor. Interestingly (and perhaps coincidentally), this comes at the expense of references to Chapter 1 of *Capital:* vol. 1 (Marx, 1867/1990), at a time when Raya Dunayevskaya (1944) was focusing a critique of "Teaching Economics in the Soviet Union" on the theoreticians in that country who were advocating *not* beginning with Chapter 1 in the study of *Capital*. In any case, Marcuse takes up two additional concepts, "socially necessary labor time", and Marx's "labor theory of value", which retain their importance in all of Marcuse's ensuing analyses.

4.1.3 Socially Necessary Labor Time

Marcuse introduces the concept of "socially necessary labour time" as the last element required for concrete labor's *reduction to* abstract labor (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 298), which he places at the foundation of Marx's labor theory of value. According to Marcuse, the establishment of the standard of the quantitative measurement of labor by time, "still leaves an individual factor" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 297). Various amounts of labor time are spent by individual workers in the production of the same kind of commodity, according to their physical and mental abilities, and to the technical equipment employed. Marcuse explains, "These individual variations are cancelled in a further step of reduction" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 297). Marcuse elaborates this "cancellation" as the core of Marx's "labor theory of value":

> The labor time is computed for the average technical standard prevailing in production, hence, the time that determines exchange value is "socially necessary labor time" … Marx's conclusion that the value of commodities is determined by the quantity of abstract labor necessary for their reproduction is the fundamental thesis of his labor theory of value. (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 298)

Marcuse implies that this cancelation of individual labor defines the limit of the dialectic of abstract and concrete labor in capitalism and characterizes the prevalence of the social over the individual; but, as I shall develop in Chap. 5 on Habermas, and 7 and 8 on Postone's interpretations, Marx shows that even beginning within his analysis of capitalism (with cooperation, the "general intellect", i.e., appropriation of "historical time" etc.) there is a ground emerging for a "higher" form of the individual—the social individual.

4.1.4 Labor Theory of Value

In his initial descriptions of the reduction of concrete labor to abstract labor in the capitalist labor process, Marcuse nonetheless makes sure to emphasize the continuing existence of concrete labor: "Every single act of labor in commodity production comprises both abstract and concrete labor—just as any product of social labor represents both exchange value and use value" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 298). However, from here on out, even in Marcuse's own analysis, "concrete labor" undergoes a metamorphosis: from the (human) essence, it becomes the appearance behind which abstract labor grounds surplus value and thus class exploitation. Marcuse further notes, quoting Marx in the early pages of *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1858/1904/1987), that the reduction of concrete to abstract labor "appears to be an abstraction, but it is an abstraction that takes place daily in the social process of production" (Marx, 1859/1904, 24 [Marx, 1859/1987, 272],[5] quoted in Marcuse, 1941/1999, 298). However, it is notable that up to this point Marcuse has begun to analyze "exchange value" and "use value", as well as the relationship between the two—but not "value" itself.

[5] Here, Marcuse refers to Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, trans. N.I. Stone, Chicago: Charles H. Kerr and Co., 1904. Pagination refers to this edition, followed in brackets, to (Marx, 1859/1987).

Shortly, however, Marcuse does take up, though indirectly, the concept of "value" itself—interestingly in a discussion of the "well-known fact that Marx considered the discovery of the two-fold character of labor to be his original contribution to economic theory, and to be pivotal for a clear comprehension of political economy" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 298). Marx's critique of the classical economists, according to Marcuse, centered on their concept of (concrete) "labor" in which the latter was the "sole source of all social wealth" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 299). Instead, in Marx's analysis of "commodity producing society", bourgeois society in particular, only "abstract universal labor" creates value (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 299). In making this point, Marcuse means, most directly, to note that not only is "labor" *not* the sole source of "wealth", but also to demonstrate moreover that in capitalist society things are quite the reverse: *only* abstract labor, not (concrete) "labor", creates *value*. Crucially, what Marcuse does not say is that, furthermore, the real social significance of "value", in Marx's analysis, is that it is the *form of wealth specific* to capitalism.

As I shall show in Chap. 8 on Postone's interpretation of *Capital* (Marx, 1867/1990), though the value form of wealth characterizes capitalist society in particular, it does so in a dialectical relationship with the material form of wealth. There I shall be able to show in some detail that the social significance of the interconnections of the value and material forms of wealth, within capitalist society, is grounded in Marx's analyses in *Capital*, vol. 1, that are *not* taken up by Marcuse, particularly the *interaction* between concrete and abstract labor—indeed, not only the reduction of the former to the latter but, *equally* important, the determination of the latter by the former. Also, I shall connect this to the theoretically relevant history of Marcuse's treatments of Hegel's concept of "reciprocity".

Even if in Marcuse's analysis the determinate relationship of abstract labor and concrete labor is ultimately one-sided (reduction of concrete labor to abstract labor or to concrete labor as mere form of appearance of abstract labor), his sharp observations of Marx's articulations of the relationship are of major interest. Thus, Marcuse points out that in Marx's analysis in *Capital*, vol. 1 (Marx, 1867/1909b/1990) that while abstract labor is the sole source of *value*, it is concrete labor that preserves and transfers the (already existing) value of the means of production to the product. Marcuse writes, "Since the worker does not do double work in the same time, the double result (preservation of value and creation of new value) can be explained only by the dual character of his labor" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 299).

Several pages later, after he has described in reference to *Capital,* vol. 3 (Marx, 1894/1909a/1981)[6] the "law of value" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 301) under which, "The individual's desires and wants are shaped and, with the vast majority, restricted by the situation of the class to which he belongs, in such a way that he cannot express his real need" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 301) and, according to Marx, "The need for commodities on the market, the demand, differs quantitatively from the actual social need" (Marx, 1894/1909a, 223 [Marx, 1894/1981, 290)], quoted by Marcuse,1941/1999, 302), Marcuse returns to his analysis of the labor process proper in *Capital*, vol. 1. After noting that the labor process itself, "contains both an objective and a subjective factor" (the means of production and labor power, respectively) (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 307), and that the "objective factor creates no new value" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 307), Marcuse quotes Marx in a key passage, part of which I reproduced above:

> It is otherwise with the subjective factor of the labor process, with labor power in action. While the laborer, by virtue of his labor being of a specialized kind that has a special object … preserves and transfers to the product the value of the means of production, he at the same time, by the mere act of working, creates each instant an additional or new value. (Marx, 1867/1909b, 231 [Marx, 1867/1990, 315], quoted in Marcuse, 1941/1999, 308)

In a passage I noted earlier in this chapter, Marcuse continues, "The quality of preserving value by adding new value is, as it were", again quoting Marx, a "natural gift [of labor power] which costs the laborer nothing, but which is very advantageous to the capitalist" (emphasis added) (Marx, 1867/1909b, 231 [Marx, 1867/1990, 315], quoted in Marcuse, 1941/1999, 308). Here, it is then wherein the "act of working" constitutes a qualitative element intrinsic to the heretofore purely quantitative "abstract labor". Marcuse concludes with a focus on the latter: "This property possessed by abstract, universal labor, hidden behind its concrete forms, though it is the sole source of new value, itself has no proper value" (emphasis added) (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 308).

In one of those intriguing twists, then, which Marx shows to be characteristic of capitalism, it seems that it is abstract labor that is actually

[6] Here, Marcuse quotes from Karl Marx, *Capital,* vol. 3, ed. Frederick Engels; trans. Ernest Untermann, Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 1909a. Pagination refers to this edition, followed in brackets to (Marx, 1894/1981).

"concrete"—with capitalist society concrete labor is abstract labor's mere form of appearance. In fact, Marcuse first confronts this peculiar articulation of abstract and concrete labor at the outset of his return to the idea of the dual concept of labor *after* the detour he took with his turn to *Capital,* vol. 3 (Marx, 1894/1909a/1981) in which he investigated the individual and social levels of Marx's analyses. Marcuse writes in a footnote at the conclusion of his account of Marx's analysis of the question as to whether and how the social, that is, the economic process, fulfills the real needs of individuals: "When Marx declares that use values [produced by concrete labor] lie outside the scope of economic theory, he is at first describing the actual state of affairs in classical political economy" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 304n.5). Marcuse continues, concluding by quoting Marx from early in *Capital*, vol. 1: "[Marx's] own analysis begins by accepting and explaining the fact that in capitalism, use values only appear as the 'material depositories of exchange value'" (1867/1909b, 43 [Marx, 1867/1990, 126], quoted in Marcuse, 1999, 304n.95).

4.2 *Capital*: Volume 1 to Volume 3—and Back to Volume 1

Though his stated focus was the capitalist labor process, Marcuse's analysis of *Capital*, vol. 1 (Marx, 1867/1909b/1990) indeed pointed to the ramifications of the unprecedented nature of the *social* forces, integrative and centrifugal, inherent in Marx's concept of the dual character of labor. I already quoted (above) Marcuse's conclusions on Marx's concept of the twofold nature of labor in which abstract labor is "prevalent" in the sense it "cancels individual variations" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 297) among workers in a commodity mode of production "not directly oriented to the satisfaction of individual needs" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 300). This conclusion prompts him to next pose a question that does not at first lead deeper into determinations of the capitalist labor process, but rather into market relations—fulfillment of needs, distribution, and consumption of commodities—and their socially integrative functions. This analysis covers several pages and contains five references to Marx's *Capital,* vol. 3 (Marx, 1894/1909a/1981) not to *Capital*, vol. 1 (where Marx's analyses of the labor process are developed). Marcuse traces the social ramifications of the prevalence of abstract labor for the "individual" laborer and defines the law of value as a "blind mechanism operating outside the conscious control of individuals" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 302), a mechanism of domination

underlying social integration, which shapes the spheres of distribution and consumption. It is only after this point in the text that Marcuse deepens his analysis of Marx's theory of the labor process by, first, offering a clarification of Hegel's concept of the Notion and, second, via a return to *Capital*, vol. 1.

Marcuse's conclusion—drawn from his detour to *Capital*, vol. 3 (Marx, 1894/1909a/1981)—in turn leads back to an analysis of the labor process, and continues his explication of the entirety of Marx's *Capital*, which he had begun to develop in his earlier chapter[7] on Hegel's *Science of Logic* (1812/1976):

> Marx's analysis showed him the law of value as the general "form of Reason" in the existent social system. The law of value was the form in which the common interest (the perpetuation of society) asserted itself through individual freedom. That law, though it manifested itself on the market, was seen to originate in the process of production (the socially necessary labor time that lay at its root was production time). For this reason, it was only analysis of the process of production that would yield a yes or no answer to the question, Can this society ever fulfill its promise: individual liberty within a rational whole? (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 304)

To try to answer this question, Marcuse returns to *Capital*, vol. 1 (Marx, 1867/1909b/1990). Immediately, Marcuse finds that abstract labor is not only a key concept in the determination of freedom, both individual and social, but also that it was *historically prior* to concrete labor in the very emergence of capitalist society out of the old, feudal society. Marcuse centers this analysis on Marx's concept of "primary" or "primitive" accumulation, citing first the penultimate Part 7 of *Capital*, vol. 1, "The Accumulation of Capital", and next the textually much earlier Part 2, "The Transformation of Money into Capital" (Chapter VI on "The Buying and Selling of Labor Power"). In the former, Marcuse highlights Marx's historical analyses:

> The capitalist mode of production is a specifically historical form of commodity production that originated under the conditions of "primary accumulation", such as the wholesale expulsion of peasants from their land … [and] the breakdown of the guild system when it met the power of the merchant and industrialist … Labor-power and the means for its material realization became commodities possessed by different owners. (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 305)

[7] See Marcuse (1941/1999, 169–223).

The origins of "abstract labor" are implicit in the commodity "labor power" alienated from the "means for its material realization".

In the reference to an early section of *Capital*, vol. 1 (Marx, 1867/1909b/1990), Marcuse points to the immanent limits of freedom in the relationship of the individual to the social emerging from the "modern laborer freed of all dependence on feudal lords and guild masters" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 305). He quotes Marx: "The exchange of commodities itself implies no other relations of dependence than those which result from its own nature" (Marx, 1867/1909b, 186 [Marx, 1867/1990, 270–71] quoted by Marcuse, 1941/1999, 306). Developing then the ramifications of commodity exchange's "own nature", Marcuse notes that "labor power is a peculiar kind of commodity … the only commodity whose value is to be", again quoting Marx, "a source not only of value, but of more value than it has itself" (emphasis in original) (Marx, 1867/1909b, 216 [Marx, 1867/1990, 301], quoted by Marcuse, 1941/1999, 307).

As I cited in a different context above, Marcuse observes, "This 'surplus value', created by the abstract universal labor hidden behind its concrete form, falls to the buyer of labor-power without any equivalent, since it does not appear as an independent commodity" (my emphasis) (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 307). Already here, then, Marcuse begins to uncover capitalism's abstract form of social domination intrinsic to the formal freedom achieved in the status of the free laborer. However, Marcuse, rather than following this idea—overt social domination in the form of personal dependence was replaced with abstract forms of social domination—instead elaborates an historical development of the basically same overt forms.

4.3 Limitations in Marcuse's Interpretations

Marcuse, in turning back to the production process to ascertain the barriers to "individual liberty within a rational whole" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 304), follows Marx's analysis only to a certain point as he develops it in *Capital*, vol. 1 (Marx, 1867/1909b/1990). From this, Marcuse concludes that the real significance of the twofold character of labor is that it is the necessary condition for the possibility of surplus value—"[T]he private appropriation of labor power inevitably leads to exploitation. The result issues from the very nature of labor whenever labor power becomes a commodity" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 308). Hence, rather than deepening a

concept of the abstract form of social domination, that is, the value categories intrinsic to the twofold character of labor, the level of analysis covered by Marcuse remains the one in which class exploitation defines the historical limits of bourgeois freedom.

Before I complete this overview of Marcuse's analysis of *Capital*, it will be useful to preface it with a note on his textual references from this point forward. As reflected in Marcuse's chapter's title—"Analysis of the Labor Process"—the core of Marcuse's argument is based on Part 3 of Marx's *Capital*, vol. 1, titled, "The Production of Absolute Surplus Value", particularly the Part's first chapter, Chapter 7, "The Labor Process and the Process of Producing Surplus Value." The latter is in turn divided into two sections, "The Labor Process or the Production of Use Value" and "The Production of Surplus Value". Following several references to this Part 3, Marcuse next refers to later concluding parts of *Capital* and, in doing so, does not once refer to the crucial Part 4, "The Production of Relative Surplus Value", until the final pages of his chapter (a very brief reference that I will consider shortly).

What remains to be done, then, in this chapter is to complete an overview of Marcuse's analyses of Marx's *Capital* from the point where Marcuse shows the peculiar identity of opposites—freedom and exploitation—intrinsic to capitalist labor and, in fact, as the "fundamental pattern for all relations in civil society" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 309). Clearly developing his arguments that are consistent with a transhistorical concept of labor and within the confines of the sections where Marx articulated his concepts of the manufacturing stage of production and "absolute surplus value", Marcuse maintains that "Labor is the way men develop their abilities and needs in the struggle with nature and history" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 309), at the same time in capitalism, "[L]abor produces and perpetuates its own exploitation" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 309). Moreover, Freedom produces and perpetuates its own opposite … [Marx's analysis] is an immanent critique of individual freedom as it originates in capitalist society … the economic forces of capitalism … create enslavement, poverty, and the intensity of class conflicts. The truth of this form of freedom is thus its negation (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 309). In connection with Marcuse's argument, I will show later, in Moishe Postone's (1995) interpretations, that freedom's perpetuation of its own opposite involves, primarily, the creation of the present as *necessity*.

Marcuse links his most important conclusions here on labor in capitalism—"labor produces and perpetuates its own exploitation", "freedom produces and perpetuates its own opposite", "the truth of this form

of freedom is thus its negation"—to his readings of the first three parts of *Capital*, vol. 1 (1867/1909b/1990); they apparently reflect his study of the concepts Marx developed under the broad categories of the commodity, labor, value, and "absolute" surplus value in these parts. He concludes this analysis with references to the last two parts of *Capital*, vol. 1 (Parts 7 and 8), along with a reference to *Capital,* vol. 3 (Marx, 1894/1909a/1981) (Marcuse, 1999, 310–312).

As I just noted above, Marcuse pointed out "freedom produces and perpetuates its own opposite". Immediately, he identifies this opposite in general terms, "enslavement, poverty, the intensity of class conflicts" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 309), none of which are historically new. Even in his expanded discussion of these opposites as an elaboration of the "laws of capitalism" (Marcuse, 1941/1999), Marcuse does not specify the opposite "necessity" intrinsic to capitalist "freedom". Hence, Marcuse notes that "living labor" in producing value not only "produces its own exploitation but also the means for this exploitation, namely capital" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 310). Accumulation on an increasing scale is the necessary result of the surplus value produced by living labor, as the surplus is, in turn, converted into capital. Marcuse further notes, "The inherent requirements of capital demand that surplus value be increased through increase in the productivity of labor (rationalization and intensification)" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 310). Thus, the laws of capitalist development result in a diminution of living labor, "the sole source of surplus value" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 311), and hence a "danger of the falling rate of profit" [which] "aggravates the competitive struggle as well as the class struggle" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 311).

Hence, by way of references to the last parts of Marx's work, Marcuse fills in the "proofs" of his basic conclusions on historical forms of freedom he derived from his readings of the early parts of *Capital*, vol. 1. In fact, Marcuse turns to Marx's *Capital,* vol. 3, to finally characterize capitalist society as "a union of contradictions" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 311) by identifying the opposite of capitalist freedom in this general way: "The law of value, which governs the social contradictions, has the force of a natural necessity" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 312). Yet, it is actually the middle parts of *Capital*, vol. 1 (Parts 4–6) in which Marx specifies the forms of necessity underlying capitalist society's forms of freedom (as well as the implications for post-capitalist freedom—and necessity). Without careful attention to the latter, the pivotal importance of Marx's dialectic of necessity and freedom, the core of which is the interaction of abstract and concrete labor, cannot be made visible.

In his only reference to the key Part 4 of *Capital*, vol. 1, Marcuse notes that science was, quoting Marx, "pressed into the service of capital" (Marx, 1867/1909b, 397 [Marx, 1867/1990, 482], quoted by Marcuse, 1941/1999, 320). Or, Marcuse continued, it was "degraded to the position of a leisurely pastime remote from any concern with the actual struggles of mankind, while philosophy undertook in the medium of abstract thought to guard the solutions to man's problems of needs, fears, and desires" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 321). Marcuse concludes, "'Pure Reason', reason purified of empirical contingencies, became the proper realm of truth" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 321).

In Chap. 8, I shall describe what bearing science "pressed into the service of capital" had on Marx's analysis of freedom (and necessity) in his development of the concept of the twofold character of labor characteristic of capitalism, especially as this analysis moved from the absolute form of surplus value associated with manufacturing (to which Marcuse's analysis is primarily related) to the production of the relative form of surplus value, associated with large-scale industry (where Postone's (1995) analyses represent a development beyond those of Marcuse). Central to this stage of the presentation of the new Critical Theory approach to Marx's value theory is a focus on concrete labor's determination of abstract labor. This side of the twofold character of the form of labor in capitalism has received far less theoretical attention than the notion that in capitalism abstract labor shapes concrete labor, or that the latter is "reduced" to the former. Nonetheless, concrete labor's determination of abstract labor is actually the pivotal point of Marx's mature critical theory of capitalist and post-capitalist society.

To return to the analysis of Marcuse's interpretation of Marx's *Capital*, we have reached the chapter on "The Marxian Dialectic". This chapter develops three great themes, which Marcuse has been pursuing throughout the analysis of Marx's *Capital*: the relationship of Hegel and Marx's dialectics, abstract and concrete labor, and the necessity and freedom dialectic. Here, I will only touch upon the first, as it is the subject of the last chapter of this book, and consider the second and third in more detail.

While Marcuse will ultimately argue for a fundamental difference in the Hegelian and Marxian dialectic, he begins by noting that both were "motivated by the same datum … the negative character of reality" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 312). Clarifying the concept of "negative totality" Marx shared with Hegel, Marcuse discusses his method of relating Marx's categories in the early parts of *Capital*, vol. 1 (1867/1909b/1990) with

the later parts of the volume, and to *Capital*, vol. 3 (Marx, 1894/1909a/1981), by explaining the relationship of actual and theoretical abstraction:

> The social world becomes a negative totality only in the process of abstraction, which is imposed upon the dialectical method by the structure of its subject matter, capitalist society. We may even say that the abstraction is capitalism's own work, and that the Marxian method only follows this process. Marx's analysis has shown that capitalist economy is built upon and perpetuated by the constant reduction of concrete to abstract labor. (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 313)

Marcuse characterizes this "reduction of concrete to abstract labor" in a linear fashion:

> The economy step by step retreats from the concrete of human activity and needs, and achieves the integration of individual activities and needs only through a complex of abstract relations in which individual works counts merely in so far as it represents socially necessary labor time. (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 313)

This necessity, according to Marcuse's analysis, underlies the "negative character of reality" as a "social condition" and is traceable to a definite historical period (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 314). In this he distinguishes Hegels and Marx's dialectic by arguing that according to Marx but not Hegel the necessity underlying "reality" is restricted to what Marx called prehistory (or class society). Yet, Marcuse writes:

> To be sure, the struggle with the "realm of necessity" will continue with man's passage to the stage of "actual history", and the negativity and the contradiction will not disappear. Nonetheless, when society has become the free subject of this struggle, the latter will be waged in entirely different forms. For this reason, it is not permissible to impose the dialectical structure of prehistory upon the future history of mankind. (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 316–317)

Marcuse does in fact go on to argue that social necessity distinguishes "prehistory" from "actual history", writing, "The concept that definitely connects Marx's dialectic with the history of class society is the concept of necessity" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 317). The critical implication of this

point, according to Marcuse, is that, "[I]t would be a distortion of the entire significance of Marxian theory to argue from the inexorable necessity that governs the development of capitalism to a similar necessity in the matter of transformation to socialism" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 317). Yet, it is not clear that the question of necessity of the "transformation" of capitalism to socialism is the same as the theoretical issue of necessity *within* a post-capitalist society.

While insisting that necessity cannot determine freedom, Marcuse also argues, conversely, neither can "freedom" determine "necessity" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 317). Marcuse traces the latter idea from Marx's *Capital*, vol. 3 (Marx, 1894/1909a/1981) where Marx narrates the "counteracting tendencies" of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, to the present-day capitalism that "has been subjected in certain areas to large-scale political and administrative regulations" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 318). About the latter, Marcuse writes:

> Planning, for example, is not an exclusive feature of socialist society. The natural necessity of the social laws Marx expounded implied the possibility of such planning under capitalism, when they referred to an interplay of order and chance, of conscious action and blind mechanisms. The possibility of rational planning under capitalism does not, of course, impair the validity of the fundamental laws that Marx discovered in the system—the system is destined to perish by virtue of these laws. (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 319)

In other words, according to Marcuse's interpretations of Marx, political recognition of and action to modify or even abrogate the "blind" economic forces characteristic of capitalist necessity may amount to a form of freedom. Yet, the forces of necessity remain, and ultimately such freedom, while perhaps prolonging the life of the old social formation, also intensifies the internal contradictions.

Hence, Marcuse's chapters on Marx's *Capital* contain an important elaboration of the dialectic of necessity and freedom in Hegel and Marx's dialectic.[8] Marcuse concludes the chapters with the declaration that the

[8] Christian Fuchs (2017) discusses the necessity and freedom dialectic in the context of social media. Importantly, Fuchs takes up Marcuse's original analyses of the "mature Marx" in Marcuse's under-studied chapters in *Reason and Revolution* (Marcuse, 1941/1999)—"The Analysis of the Labor Process" (on Marx's *Capital*), and "The Marxian Dialectic" (distinguished from the Hegelian dialectic). Fuchs recognizes that, "The dialectic of society is shaped by a dialectic of freedom and necessity" (Fuchs, 2017, 244). On this basis, he first

"abolition of labor" is central to the new post-capitalist society (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 322). This points both backward to his preceding chapters on the young Marx (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 273–295), and to the latest points in the chapters I just reviewed, particularly Marcuse's theory of the articulation of necessity and freedom in capitalist and post-capitalist society. A close reading of Moishe Postone's *Time, Labor, and Social Domination* (1995) can help clarify the contemporary importance of these issues, as well as provide the possibility for re-establishing the unique and current relevance of Marx's "mature critical theory".

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quotes Marcuse to the effect that since there is no "natural" necessity leading to freedom, the latter outcome requires the "maturity of many forces, but the greatest among them is the subjective force, namely the revolutionary class itself" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 319, quoted by Fuchs, 2017, 244). However, in contrast to Fuchs's presentation of Marcuse's views here, in which for his interpretation of Marx and the "revolutionary class itself" Marcuse cites Marx's early work *The Poverty of philosophy* (1845), in the following chapters I develop an idea of Moishe Postone's approach as an immanent critique of Marcuse's theories of the relationship of the young and mature Marx, and of the historical Subject. Postone's analyses suggest the limitations in Marcuse's idea of what for Marx constitutes "maturity of (the) many forces", especially in Postone's analyses of relative surplus value, cooperation, and machinery and large-scale industry in *Capital*, vol. 1 (1867/1990).

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CHAPTER 5

Changes in Critical Theory Interpretations of Marx's Value Theory

In the next several chapters, I will attempt to illuminate the necessity and freedom dialectic underlying changing Critical Theory approaches to Marx's value theory in which interpretations of Marx's *Grundrisse* (1858/1993) were a central focus of attention. In these, I take up analyses developed by Herbert Marcuse (1966, 2013), Jürgen Habermas (1963/1974, 1968/1972), and Moishe Postone (1995), which span several decades of the post–World War II period. Habermas, and eventually even Marcuse, concluded that the viability of the theory of value Marx developed in his mature critical theory was *contingent* on the stage of development of science and technology *within* capitalism. The combination of the absence of proletarian revolution when the working class was at its strongest and the soaring post–World War II levels of material productivity attributable not to direct labor but to the application of science to production, pointed away from traditional interpretations of Marx's analyses in *Capital* (1867/1990) where the *labor* theory of value was fully developed.

For Habermas (1963/1974), in an important early 1960s work,[1] followed by Marcuse (1966, 2013) in the mid-1960s, Marx's *Grundrisse* (1858/1993) offered alternative perspectives from which a theory

[1] Jürgen Habermas, "Between Philosophy and Science, Marxism as Critique", was first published in the German in 1963.

R. Rockwell, *Hegel, Marx, and the Necessity and Freedom Dialectic*,
Political Philosophy and Public Purpose,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75611-0_5

adequate to historical conditions was still thought to be possible. Postone (1995), in contrast, based partly on his criticisms of two important texts of Habermas's that I take up below, argued similarly to Marcuse's *original* interpretations of the *Grundrisse* that that work fully affirmed, and deepened, the understanding of Marx's analyses in *Capital* (1867/1990). As I shall develop here and in Chap. 7, two of Marx's key concepts are important in this regard: the value and material forms of wealth in which productivity is the primary factor in the latter and does not affect the former; and, the twofold character of labor, concrete, and abstract, which Marx first fully developed in *Capital*. It is precisely from this twofold character of labor that Postone elaborates Marx's concept of labor as the social mediation specific to capitalism. The overcoming of just this mediation is what is necessary for overcoming capitalism itself, that is, for achieving freedom from social domination, including the abstract forms peculiar to capitalism that are the focus of Postone's analyses.

These investigations of the necessity and freedom dialectic underlying the changing interpretations of Marx's *Grundrisse* (1858/1993) within the Critical Theory tradition are against the background of my examination of the Dunayevskaya–Marcuse correspondence described in Chap. 2. In this dialogue, agreement between the two theoreticians on the "unity" of Marx's works *Grundrisse* and *Capital* (1867/1990) did not *appear* to be open to question. In connection with this, in Chap. 6, I will discuss Dunayevskaya's (1966) own recollection in Erich Fromm's *Symposium on Socialist Humanism* (1966) that Western philosophy had heretofore failed to grasp the *philosophic* importance of her analysis of Marx's value theory in her early 1940s critique of the Stalinist USSR's economy and society.[2] As I also touched on in Chap. 2, Dunayevskaya's and Marcuse's *disagreements* over interpretations of Marx's *Grundrisse* in 1960, which at this point became explicit and anticipated Marcuse's revised interpretations publicly evident in *One-Dimensional Man* (1966), were at the center of the final substantive exchange of their theoretically important correspondence. These disagreements reflected different interpretations of the dialectic of the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom both within the *Grundrisse*, and between that work and *Capital*, vol. 3 (Marx, 1894/1981). Their differences had far-reaching implications for understanding labor in capitalist *and* post-capitalist society, while nonetheless neither bringing to the fore explicit discussions of the necessity and freedom dialectic, nor any

[2] See Dunayevskaya (1944).

indication that either of them believed that the main texts of Marx's mature critical theory contained *conflicting* theories.

However, by the mid-1960s, two key works from *within* the Critical Theory tradition, not the first of which was written by Marcuse, departed from this premise, developing arguments that the *Grundrisse* (1858/1993) and *Capital* (1867/1990) contained conflicting theories: Surprisingly sharing some important perspectives, though also including significant differences, Jürgen Habermas (1963/1974), a second-generation Critical Theorist, published the long essay, "Between Philosophy and Science: Marxism as Critique" (first appearing in the German in 1963), with Marcuse's *One-Dimensional Man* (1966) following shortly thereafter. In this chapter, I will first consider Habermas's aforementioned article, as well as another (a chapter in Habermas's *Knowledge and Human Interests* (1968/1972)), written several years later, which also deals with the *Grundrisse*. Following my critique and alternative interpretations of important conceptual links within Marx's *Grundrisse*, I will briefly take up *One-Dimensional Man*, and Marcuse's farewell lecture (Marcuse, 2013), only recently published, which he delivered at Brandeis University in 1965, a year or so after the publication of *One-Dimensional Man*.

5.1 Jürgen Habermas on Marx's *Grundrisse* (1963, 1968)

5.1.1 "Between Philosophy and Science: Marxism as Critique" (1963)

In an early essay (the 1963 "Between Philosophy and Science: Marxism as Critique"), and a few years later in perhaps his most important work (the 1968 *Knowledge and Human Interests*), Habermas (1963/1974, 1968/1972) presented telling interpretations of Marx's *Grundrisse* (1858/1993). I will argue that what is most significant, though not explicitly so, in these texts is their questioning of the theoretical consistencies in Marx's analyses of the relationship between necessity and freedom in his theory of value. In "Marxism as Critique", Habermas argued that Marx's analysis in the *Grundrisse* suggested a labor theory of value *contingent* on the level of development of science and technology, a contingency Marx nonetheless later allegedly ignored in the writing of *Capital* (1867/1990). Habermas responded by concluding that given the

purported inconsistent theories in the two texts, and in light of historical developments in technological production—the principal issue involved—the concept of value itself undergoes a redefinition: inclusion of advances in technical knowledge and productivity as such in the very *determination* of value as conceptualized by Marx. Habermas writes:

> As the unorthodox reflections in the *Grundrisse* show, Marx even interpreted the conditions of thoroughly automated production in such a way that the *production of value* would be transferred from directly productive labor to science and technology. (my emphasis) (Habermas, 1963/1974, 229)

5.1.1.1 Introduction of Interpretations of the Grundrisse's Section on "Machines"

To support this approach, Habermas (1963/1974) refers to a by now quite well-known passage in the section of the *Grundrisse* (1858/1993), which later most often was referred to as "The Fragment on Machines",[3] a subsection Marx subtitled, "Contradiction between the foundation of bourgeois production (value as measure) and its development" (Marx, 1858/1993, 704–706).[4] Here, Marx described the development of large-scale industry. Habermas cites how Marx noted that the creation of "real wealth" comes to depend less on direct labor than on the mechanized agents set in motion (Habermas, 1963/1974, 226). However, Marx initiates this same passage with the statement that even under the conditions of advancing technological production, labor time is and r*emains* the sole source of *value*—and that the latter is and remains the specifically *capitalist form* of wealth (Marx, 1867/1990, 704). Moreover, within the passage from the *Grundrisse* Habermas presented in his text, in which the opening phrase containing the key critical concept was not included, Marx had also completed it by clearly conceptualizing the explosive potential of the *coexisting* production of "real wealth", the material form of wealth, and the *value form* of wealth, *within* capitalism (Marx, 1858/1993, 706).

[3] Christian Fuchs (2016) finds that the earliest use in the English literature of the title "Fragment on Machines", which extends from the end of the sixth through the beginning pages of the seventh notebook of Marx's *Grundrisse* (pp. 690–714) was in Pier Aldo Rovatti's 1973 article "The Critique of Fetishism in Marx's '*Grundrisse*'". Fuchs also notes that an Italian translation of the "Fragment" was published in 1964 under the title *Frammento sulle macchine*, translated by Renato Solmi in *Quaderni Rossi* 4: 289–300.

[4] Here and in chapters that follow, I shall refer to this subsection as "Foundation/Development Contradiction".

In disregarding Marx's emphasis on this *contradictory* relationship and its real social effects, Habermas conflates Marx's concepts of the value and material forms of wealth. Thus, he explains the *relationship* between Marx's analyses in the *Grundrisse* and *Capital* by suggesting that in the latter text, Marx simply dropped the "revisionist notion" he developed in the former text (Habermas, 1963/1974, 227).

5.1.1.2 Science, Technology, Value, and Surplus Value: Social Necessity and Freedom

Arguing in effect that what he claimed to be Marx's "revisionist" theory of value in the *Grundrisse* (1858/1993) turned out to be the one adequate to historical developments, principally the domination of science and technology in the production process, Habermas next takes up *surplus* value. Habermas argues that—in conformity with Marx's "revisionist" version (*Grundrisse*) that allows increases in *productivity* due to the application of science to production to determine value and hence surplus value—both an appropriate rate of profit and rising real wages are sustainable *within* the capitalist mode of production (Habermas, 1963, 232). In this analysis, Habermas implies that the "orthodox" version of Marx's theory—in which socially *necessary labor time*[5] is the sole measure of *value*—may become outmoded, and the historical form of social necessity may be overcome politically *within* capitalism. In other words, Habermas proposed a "democratic factor"—ostensibly a form of freedom realizable within capitalism—in place of the necessity determined by (pre-technological) capitalist labor (Habermas, 1963/1974, 232). As I will show, Marx actually theorized that labor, technological as well as pre-technological, constituted an abstract form of social domination intrinsic to capitalism's foundation, and *determined development* of the capitalist social formation.

5.1.2 Knowledge and Human Interests (1968)

Habermas (1974) in "Marxism as Critique" had argued in conjunction with his analysis of Marx's *Grundrisse* (1858/1993) that technological production negated Marx's labor theory of value. In *Knowledge and Human Interests*, Habermas (1968/1972) expanded his account of

[5] I will develop the importance of Marx's concept of "socially necessary labor time" in the chapters on Postone.

Marx's analyses in the *Grundrisse*. He extends his earlier argument concerning "orthodox" and "revisionist" theories, and reconceptualizes his critique with the claim that Marx's approach actually contained different and conflicting theories *within* the *Grundrisse*, as well as *between* that work and Marx's *Capital* (1867/1990). Habermas now characterizes these as *official* and *unofficial* versions of Marx's theory (Habermas, 1968/1972, 50–51). In respect to his updated interpretations of the *Grundrisse* and *Capital*, Habermas concludes: "The two versions we have examined make visible an indecision that has its foundation in Marx's theoretical approach itself" (Habermas, 1968/1972, 52). In *Knowledge and Human Interests*, then Habermas proposed a new, bi-level social theory of labor and interaction (Habermas, 1968/1972, 53), with necessity defining the former and freedom the latter. Such a theory would be consistent with the assumption of the negation of the labor theory of value he had proposed in the earlier "Marxism as Critique".

5.1.2.1 Alien Will, General Intellect, and Marx's "Unofficial" and "Official" Theories

According to Habermas, in addition to negation of Marx's value theory, the part of the *Grundrisse* (1858/1993) ("Foundation/Development Contradiction"), which he had quoted in "Between Philosophy and Science: Marxism as Critique" (1963/1974), that is, Marx's analyses of labor and technological production, implied, along with Marx's concept of the "general intellect" (Habermas, 1968/1972, 47) an "automatic regulation of social relations" (Habermas, 1968/1972, 51) (necessity over freedom). This amounted to an "unofficial" version of Marx's theory (Habermas, 1968/1972, 50–51). As I will elaborate shortly, meanwhile Habermas (1968/1972, 51–52) suggests that in an earlier section of the *Grundrisse*,[6] Marx himself had already recognized the "alien will and alien intelligence" (Habermas, 1968/1972, 51) integral to workers' "forced" association in "scientized production" (Habermas, 1968/1972, 51), and was *critical* of such "automatic regulation" of social relations (Habermas, 1968/1972, 51). Marx's "official" version of his theory, in which the freedom associated with social self-determination was indispensable, is *consistent* with this *earlier* section, and was elaborated in his "material investigations" (Habermas, 1968/1972, 53). The latter primarily concern "class struggle" (Habermas, 1968/1972, 54).

[6] Habermas refers here to Marx's *Grundrisse's* section on "Original Accumulation", p. 470.

Habermas also includes in the description of Marx's "official" version an interpretation of Marx's concept of commodity fetishism in *Capital* (Marx, 1867/1990) (Habermas, 1968/1972, 59–60). However, Habermas's textual interpretations of the latter do not include most of Chap. 1 (of *Capital*) of which the critique of commodity fetishism is merely the *conclusion*. Thus, Habermas does not take up the difficult but crucial basic concepts of Marx's value theory as they are developed in the first chapter of *Capital*, such as the dual nature of labor in capitalism, value, and socially necessary labor time. As a result of his conclusions regarding Marx's efforts, Habermas then proceeds to develop an argument that the fundamental "indecision" at the core of Marx's theory development (Habermas, 1968/1972, 52) impelled Habermas's development of a bi-level social theory (Habermas, 1968/1972, 62), which takes into account the different spheres of labor and interaction which, as presented by Habermas, are separate in an ontological sense.[7]

5.1.2.2 Marx's Alleged Conflicting Theories of the "General Intellect" Within the Grundrisse

As I mentioned above, for Marx's "unofficial view" Habermas first refers to the *Grundrisse's* (1858/1993) "Foundation/Development Contradiction" on automated production. He characterizes as "unusual" a passage of Marx's "containing a model according to which the history of the species is linked to an automatic transposition of natural science and technology into a self-consciousness of the social subject (general intellect)—a consciousness that controls the material life process" (Habermas, 1968/1972, 48). (Recall that several years earlier in "Marxism as Critique" Habermas's critique of this section already implied that actually existing automated production negated Marx's labor theory of value, but that Marx's approach in *Capital* (1867/1990) had failed to incorporate this possibility.) Habermas notes that Marx's "unofficial view" has changes in the labor process at its center, the *evolutionary* logic of which, Habermas argues, implies an end to labor all together (Habermas, 1968/1972, 48). First, the introduction of machinery in large-scale production reflects an epochal transformation in the relationship between

[7] Postone (1995, 253) develops his critique of Habermas's interpretation of Marx's concept of labor by showing how this interpretation in *Knowledge and Human Interests* shapes Habermas's later concepts of "lifeworld" and "system", especially in the 1980s work, *The Theory of Communicative Action*.

labor and the tool. Instead of the worker being at the center of production, wherein he or she controls the tool, the system of machinery now achieves predominance in a process wherein the powers of nature itself are inserted into the relationship between the worker and inorganic nature. Habermas characterizes this as the basis for Marx's notion that "general social knowledge has become an immediate force of production, and therefore the conditions of the social life process itself have come under the control of the general intellect" (Habermas, 1968/1972, 47). Crucially, Habermas holds that Marx's theory thus stated implies an affirmative stance in respect to the knowledge that makes possible the control of natural processes "turns into knowledge that makes possible the control of the social life process" (Habermas, 1968/1972, 47). Habermas concludes that the version of Marx's theory he imputes to this part of the text is *not* salvageable—not even by Marx himself. However, while a different—"official"—theory could be found in Marx's text, which did not imply automatic regulation of social relations, Marx never provided an alternative basic theory of these *relations* themselves (Habermas, 1968/1972, 50–51).

For the "official" version of Marx's theory, Habermas turns to a section in the *Grundrisse* about 200 pages earlier in the text than the one on the "Foundation/Development Contradiction". Habermas (1968/1972, 51) argues that this earlier section, "Original Accumulation" (including a subsection titled "Parenthesis on inversion of the law of property, real alien relation of the worker to his product, division of labor, machinery") (Marx, 1858/1993, 469), is *inconsistent* with Marx's purported conclusion in the later section—especially with the idea that "the transformation of science into machinery leads of itself to the liberation of a self-conscious general subject that masters the process of production" (Habermas, 1968/1972, 51).

In the following, I will provide alternative interpretations that fundamentally challenge this concept and others, such as Marx's purported affirmative stance on "knowledge for [social] control" (Habermas, 1968/1972, 47), which Habermas's uses to characterize Marx's conclusions in "Foundation/Development Contradiction" (Marx, 1858/1993, 704–706). My alternative interpretations—of what Habermas understands as Marx's contradictory concepts of social regulation—will argue that the two sections of the *Grundrisse* taken up by Habermas, which I consider as Marx's theoretical development of the earlier part by the latter

part, provide the *ground* for Marx's theory of the dual character of labor unique to capitalism from which Postone (1995) develops concepts of social mediation and social transformation, which Marx brought to fruition in *Capital* (1867/1990).

5.1.3 Reinvestigation of the Grundrisse's Conceptual Links

Thus, it will prove helpful to reflect on the conceptual *links* between the two sections of the *Grundrisse* (1858/1993) in question. The first section as a whole, following from Marx's own general heading—"Original Accumulation of Capital" (Marx, 1858/1993, 459–471)—has as its starting point the emergence of capitalist from within non-capitalist relations. Here, Marx develops basic concepts, which he will later follow up and connect to his examination of the "Contradiction between the *foundation* of bourgeois production (value as measure) and its development" (the title of the later section) (Marx, 1858/1993, 704–706).[8] But now, in a few brief pages, Marx traces the origins of "labor power" and capital, and their personifications—the proletariat and the capitalist. He demonstrates how these forces have come into being by way of the dissolution of prior modes of production based on different kinds of labor—primarily slavery and serfdom. The type of labor that follows slavery and serfdom is free: the individual has the right to dispose over labor power as his or her property. Marx presents a detailed account of the *contradictory* nature of this property—it (labor power) belongs to living labor, which, however, becomes completely separated from the conditions of its (living labor's) *realization*, so that,

> [I]t [living labor] appears as a mere means to realize objectified, dead labor, to penetrate it with an animating soul while losing its own soul to it—and having produced, as the end product, alien wealth on one side and [on the other] the penury which is living labor capacity's sole possession. (Marx, 1858/1993, 461)

Marx, in fact, begins to provocatively suggest here that capital, rather than the *cause*, is the *result* of free, though alienated, labor:

[8] The focus in the later section on the contradiction of the "foundation" with its development is a most important concept and another step forward in his overall analysis and, as such, I return to it below.

> The material on which [alienated labor] works is *alien* material; the instrument is likewise an *alien* instrument; its labor appears as mere *accessory* to their substance and hence objectifies itself in things not *belonging* to it. (Marx, 1858/1993, 462)[9]

Marx continues:

> Indeed, living labor itself [concrete labor] appears as *alien vis-à-vis* living labor capacity [abstract labor, the commodity], whose labor it is, whose own life's expression it is, for it [living labor] has been surrendered to capital in exchange for objectified labor, for the product of labor itself. (Marx, 1858/1993, 462)

In this, Marx not only demonstrates the "inversion of the law of property" in respect to labor ("penury as living labor capacity's sole possession"), he also begins to suggest a fundamental—and unique—contradiction *within* capitalist labor—living labor and living labor capacity (Marx, 1858/1993, 463).[10] In fact, the beginnings of this key element of Marx's fully developed social theory that is found in *Capital* (Marx, 1867/1990) can be glimpsed in the first of several conditions he now lists as the historical *preconditions* for wage labor and capital.

Marx describes in detail four conditions, which had to have been given historically for, "money to become capital and labor to become capital-positing, *capital-creating labor*, wage labor (my emphasis)" (Marx, 1858/1993, 463). These include (1) on the one hand, "the complete abstraction" of living labor capacity, its mere subjective existence, separated from the "*means of existence, the necessary goods* … of living labor capacity" (Marx, 1858/1993, 463)[11]; (2) on the other hand, objectified labor representing an accumulation of use values sufficient to provide for

[9] This shows that Marx's concept of labor as "accessory" is not contingent on machinery and large-scale production, where the worker "steps to the side of the production process" (Marx, 1858/1993, 705), but rather is capitalist labor from the beginning, and an example of what Marx described as "foreshadowings of the future" (1858/1993, 461). I develop the latter point below and in Chap. 7.

[10] Later, in *Capital*, vol. 1, Marx will describe this contradictory nature of labor as one of a very few of his truly original theoretical contributions, that is, the dual character of labor, concrete, and abstract, specific to capitalism.

[11] Marx will develop the first point on "the complete abstraction of living labor capacity" in *Capital* (its first chapter), and I will return to it in an analysis of Habermas's discussion of the relationship of Marx's *Grundrisse* to *Capital*.

not only living labor capacity, but also for the objective material for the absorption of surplus labor (Marx, 1858/1993, 463); (3) free exchange relation, "which does not directly furnish the producer with the necessaries … cannot therefore usurp alien labor directly, but must buy it" (Marx, 1858/1993, 463); and finally, (4) the side representing the objective conditions of labor must, "present itself as *value*, self-realization, money-making, as the ultimate purpose—not direct consumption or the creation of use value" (Marx, 1858/1993, 464). Marx's last point, on the presupposition of *value* for capitalism, is particularly relevant for clarifying the conceptual links of this earlier section of the *Grundrisse* (on "Original Accumulation") (Marx, 1858/1993, 459–471), with the section that appears later in Marx's text ("Foundation/Development Contradiction") (Marx, 1858/1993, 704–706), though Habermas had taken up the latter section first, out of the chronological order of Marx's text.

Nonetheless, it should be clear by now that this earlier section as a whole (Marx, 1858/1993, 459–471) is actually Marx's *preliminary* discussion of labor, machines, and social integration, which he develops later in "Foundation/Development Contradiction" (Marx, 1858/1993, 704–706). The fourth point, the one on value (the last among those I enumerated above) in this earlier section, forms a key conceptual link to that later section of the *Grundrisse*. In the earlier section, Marx maps a theoretical trajectory by providing a description of the exchange of objectified labor (value or money) for living labor from its starting point "within the relation of simple circulation" (Marx, 1858/1993, 465). Historically, the relationship in this is still one of *use value for use value*, typically personal service for money, and not yet an exchange that "constitute[s] capital and hence wage labor" (my emphasis) (Marx, 1858/1993, 469). Marx concludes that the latter exchange is rather, "the exchange of objectified labor as *value*, as self-sufficient value, for living labor as *its* use value, as use value not for a specific, particular use or consumption, but as *use value for value*" (my emphasis) (Marx, 1858/1993, 469).

Marx moves on to describe a new epoch, the "periods of the dissolution of *pre-bourgeois* relations" (Marx, 1858/1993, 469). He shows the historical and logical processes by which "free workers" emerge and coexist with serfdom in, for example, their employment by noblemen in production (Marx, 1858/1993, 469). In this pre-bourgeois production, the workers may create value for the noblemen when the latter resell a portion of the workers' product. However, such production remains within the bounds of pre-bourgeois relations, when this exchange takes place for the

sake of luxury consumption—"veiled purchase of alien labor for immediate consumption or use value" (Marx, 1858/1993, 469). Marx emphasizes that in this way "free labor" may emerge and vanish again without a change in the mode of production (Marx, 1858/1993, 469). However, *dissolution* of pre-bourgeois relations coincides with an increase in the *numbers* of these free workers and *growth* of the relation described above (Marx, 1858/1993, 469).

In his description of the *entry* of bourgeois property relations, Marx analyzes the *evolution* of the capital and wage labor relation. In the conduct of both sides the realization of these relations is an appropriation process. In this, Marx identifies two property laws, the first of which is the *identity* of labor with property, wherein the semblance of labor power as the property of the individual worker ("one of his moments") (Marx, 1858/1993, 465) is negated; and, in the second, the actual individual worker him or herself is negated. In the first, surplus labor is posited as surplus value, which implies that the worker does not "appropriate the product of his own labor; that it appears to him as alien property; inversely that alien labor appears as the property of capital" (Marx, 1858/1993, 469–470). The second law of bourgeois property, "labor as negated property or property as negation of the alien quality of alien labor" (Marx, 1858/1993, 470), follows from the positing of surplus *value* from surplus labor. Marx indicates here that a full explication of this law requires further development of the production process of capital. However, the starting point of this further development is the fact that

> [L]abor is a totality, combination of labors—whose individual component parts are alien to one another, so that the overall process as a totality is not the work of the individual worker, and it's furthermore the work of the different workers together only to the extent they are [forcibly] combined, and do not [voluntarily] enter into combination with one another. The combination of this labor appears just as subservient to and led by an alien will and an alien intelligence—having its animating unity elsewhere—as its material unity appears subordinate to the objective unity of the machinery, of fixed capital, which, as animated monster, objectifies the scientific idea, and is in fact the coordinator, does not in any way relate to the individual worker as his instrument; but rather he himself exists as an animated individual punctuation mark, as its living isolated accessory. (Marx, 1858/1993, 470)

Marx concludes this section with the observation that in its representation of both labor and its product as negated individualized labor and hence as the negated property of the individualized worker, "[C]apital

therefore is the existence of social labor—the combination of labor as subject as well as object" (Marx, 1858/1993, 471). Marx adds, *this* existence of social labor is actually "independently opposite its real moments" and hence is a particular existence apart from them (my emphasis) (Marx, 1858/1993, 471). As such, "capital therefore appears as the predominant subject and owner of alien labor, and its relation is itself as complete a contradiction as that of wage labor" (Marx, 1858/1993, 471). Hence, Marx's analysis of "original accumulation" first makes it possible to see the full implications of the contradiction *between* labor and capital by revealing the contradictions *within* each of the two forces.

When Marx notes that the second "law of property"—labor as negated property or property as negation of the alien quality of alien labor—follows from the positing of surplus *value* from surplus labor, he both indicates that a full explication of this law requires further development of the production process of capital as a process of alienation, and that it has do with the relationship of the social to the individual—namely social domination (and its overcoming). Marx then provides an analysis of this "further development" in "The Foundation/Development Contradiction" (Marx, 1858/1993, 704–706), which can be seen most clearly in a comparison between the concept of the *general intellect* in that section (resolution of its internal contradiction pointing to social self-determination) with that of *alien intelligence* in the earlier section that we are considering now (which focuses on the *consolidation* of bourgeois *domination*).

In the earlier section ("Original Accumulation") (Marx, 1858/1993, 459–471), Marx clearly ends up identifying "alien intelligence" with value in the form of capital itself, the *subsuming* of the individual by the social. In the later section ("Foundation/Development Contradiction") (Marx, 1858/1993, 704–706), with the "development of the production process of capital", Marx unfolds the *internal contradiction* of the "alien intelligence" he had described in "Original Accumulation", and now describes as the value form of wealth. The *presupposition* of this form of wealth is the mass of direct labor time, the quantity of labor employed, as the determinant factor in the production of wealth—and it remains so despite the fact that with the application of science to production, "[R]eal wealth manifests itself, rather … in the monstrous disproportion between the labor time applied, and its product, as well as in the qualitative imbalance between labor, reduced to a pure abstraction, and the power of the production process it superintends" (Marx, 1858/1993, 705).

5.1.4 *Marx's "Theoretical Indecision", or His "Foreshadowings of the Future"?*

A careful examination of the earlier of the two sections of the *Grundrisse* I have been discussing ("Original Accumulation") (Marx, 1858/1993, 459–471), while keeping in mind the contradictory aspects of capitalist wealth, further reveals that Marx's equally important purpose in that section was to identify the "points at which the suspension of the present form of production relations gives signs of its becoming—foreshadowings of the future" (Marx, 1858/1993, 461). Marx elaborates, "Just as on the one side the pre-bourgeois phases appear as *merely historical*, i.e. suspended presuppositions, so do the contemporary conditions of production likewise appear as engaged in suspending themselves and hence in positing the historic presuppositions for a new state of society" (Marx, 1858/1993, 461).

In this, Marx's concept of alienated capitalist labor is illustrative. As described by Marx in the passage from "Original Accumulation" quoted above, in its very emergence in capitalist society labor appears as both the *cause* of capital and its effect, a mere *accessory* to it. Yet, also in "Original Accumulation", Marx writes:

> The recognition of the products as its own, and the judgment that its [living labor's] separation from the conditions of its realization is improper—forcibly imposed—is an enormous [advance in] awareness, itself the product of the mode of production resting on capital, and as much the knell to its doom as, with the slave's awareness that he *cannot be the property of another*, with his consciousness of himself as a person, the existence of slavery becomes a merely artificial, vegetative existence, and ceases to be able to prevail as the basis of production. (emphasis in the original) (Marx, 1858/1993, 463)

Thus, the most fruitful perspective on the two sections of the *Grundrisse* we have been considering, which are irreconcilable from Habermas's standpoint, is to view both as forging the concepts of necessary conditions—the first section primarily for the emergence of capitalism from pre-capitalist society (abolition of serfdom and slavery), the second section, building on these, for overcoming the more abstract social compulsions of capitalism itself.

With this in mind, I can return to a consideration of how Marx presupposes the fourth condition listed above (for "money to become capital and labor to become capital-positing, *capital-creating labor*, wage labor")

(Marx, 1858/1993, 464) in the idea he develops in the "Foundation/Development Contradiction" (Marx, 1858/1993, 704–706). Opening this section, Marx writes:

> The exchange of labor for objectified labor—i.e. the positing of social labor in the form of the contradiction of capital and wage labor—is the ultimate development of the *value relation* and of production resting on value. Its [the value relation's] presupposition is—and remains—the mass of direct labor time, the quantity of labor employed, as the determinant factor in the production of wealth. (Marx, 1858/1993, 704)

Whereas in the earlier section, Marx had established that the exchange of labor for objectified labor was at the origin of the value relation, and that the negation of the individual by the social was integral to the latter, Marx opens the new section with a supposition that this exchange is also its (value relation's) "ultimate development". Deepening his descriptions of the contradictory developments he described in the earlier section, Marx now emphasizes that while the exchange of labor for objectified labor is at the origin of value, the latter's own presupposition is and "remains" labor time—despite the great technological changes underlying the previously inconceivable increases in material wealth productivity he will describe in the ensuing paragraphs. Simply put, the wage labor/capital relation defines the value relation's beginning *and* presupposes its end. Inexplicably, however, it is precisely *after* the passage I just quoted above where Habermas (1968/1972, 48) first *begins* his analysis of Marx's "Foundation/Development Contradiction".

Hence, the plausibility of Habermas's interpretations, in which these two key parts of Marx's *Grundrisse* are fundamentally contradictory, is established only by the absence of a close reading of the earlier part, and an interpretation of the later part in which he disregards the opening passage on the value relation. Habermas's principal conclusion is that the contradictory relationship of the two parts—"Original Accumulation" (Marx, 1858/1993, 459–471) and "Foundation/Development Contradiction" (Marx, 1858/1993, 704–706)—which remains unresolved, is characteristic of Marx's theory of labor and social regulation generally, and thus reveals a basic flaw in his theoretical approach from the start (Habermas, 1968/1972, 52). Yet, in the "Foundation/Development Contradiction", just as in the earlier part on "Original Accumulation" in respect to the emergence of the bourgeois society based on value,

Marx begins to set down the "preconditions" for a "post-value" society. Principal among these are the increased material productivity associated with technological production, the application of science to industry, along with the *end* of the necessity of the *predominance* of direct labor it implies. Marx writes:

> In this transformation, it is neither the direct human labor he himself performs, nor the time during which he works, but rather the appropriation of his own general productive power, his understanding of nature and his mastery over it by virtue of his presence as a social body—it is, in a word, the social individual which appears as the great foundation-stone of production and of wealth. (Marx, 1858/1993, 705)

Thus, seen as a description of necessary *conditions* for overcoming value relations, Marx's arguments in this part deepen the analysis he put forth in the earlier part concerning "foreshadowings of the future" (Marx, 1858/1993, 461).[12]

5.1.5 A Re-examination of Habermas's Reading of Marx's Grundrisse

A close examination of Habermas's text reveals that there are two sentences in the "Foundation/Development Contradiction" section (Marx, 1858/1993, 704–706) that separate, on the one hand, the passage in that section of Marx's *Grundrisse* that Habermas uses for evidence of Marx's "unofficial" theory in which a "transformation of the labor process into a scientific process … would bring man's 'material exchange' with nature under control of a human species totally emancipated from necessary labor" (Habermas, 1968/1972, 50) and, on the other, the passage in the same section he later uses for evidence of an "official" version in which

[12] See Marx (1858/1993, 461). Beyond his beginning an analysis of Marx's "Foundation/Development Contradiction" only after the crucial opening passage on capital, wage labor, and the value relation, wherein labor time is and remains the latter's presupposition, Habermas's entire textual analysis of the *Grundrisse* is peculiar. First, he quotes a long passage (one and a half pages) from the "Foundation/Development Contradiction" section to establish the "unofficial version" of Marx's theory. Next, he quotes from the section that appears 200 pages earlier in Marx's text to establish the "official" version of Marx's theory. Finally, after adumbrating this "official" version, he returns to the "Foundation/Development Contradiction" section he had used for the "unofficial version" to further buttress his argument for the "official version".

"the most progressive scientization of production could not lead to the emancipation of a self-conscious subject that knows and regulates the social life process" (Habermas, 1968/1972, 52); these sentences, which separate the supposed two versions of Marx's social theory, are crucial for seeing that the "contradiction" Habermas perceived in Marx's theory development—automatic determination of social relations versus social self-determination—*necessity or freedom*—was precisely the one that Marx, to the contrary, painstaking develops as definitive for value production and capitalism itself, that is, the value and material forms of wealth:

> Capital is itself the moving contradiction, [in] that it presses to reduce labor time to a minimum, while it posits labor time, on the other side, as sole measure and source of wealth. Hence it diminishes labor time in the necessary form so as to increase it in the superfluous form; hence posits the superfluous in growing measure as a condition—question of life or death—for the necessary. (Marx, 1858/1993, 706)

The contradiction Marx unfolds is real, that is "social", not alone theoretical, in the sense that, "Forces of production and social relations—two different sides of the development of the social individual—appear to capital as mere means, and are merely means for it to produce on its limited foundations. In fact, however they are the material conditions to blow this foundation sky-high" (Marx, 1858/1993, 706).

In the course of his argument, Habermas says of the "unofficial" (and to Habermas undesirable) version of Marx's theory that he had uncovered in "Foundation/Development Contradiction" (Marx, 1858/1993, 704–706):

> was not pursued beyond the 'rough sketch' of *Capital [Grundrisse]*… Self-constitution through social labor is conceived at the categorical level as a process of production, and instrumental action, labor in the sense of material activity or work designates the dimension in which natural history moves. At the level of his material investigations, on the other hand, Marx always takes account of social practice that encompasses both work and interaction. (Habermas, 1968/1972, 50; 52–53)

The point Habermas wants to make, then, is that while his "investigations" retain social relevance, Marx did not directly articulate a social theory of the *relationship* of labor and interaction. As his key example, Habermas interprets the commodity fetishism section from Marx's *Capital*

(1867/1990): "[H]ere it is only the specific social relations of men themselves that assumes for them the phantasagamoric form of a relation between things"—as indicating that, "the institutionally secured suppression of the communication through which the society is divided into classes amounts to fetishizing the true social relations" (Habermas, 1968/1972, 60).

Habermas's analyses of the *Grundrisse* in *Knowledge and Human Interests* underutilize the textual resources for resolution of the theoretical issues most important for Habermas (the social implications of labor and its evolution, and its relationship to social integration). In doing so, however, Habermas also identified the nexus of the *Grundrisse* (Marx, 1858/1993) and *Capital* (Marx, 1867/1993) in which theoretical development was required. But his own analyses went no further; he began his reading of the dense first chapter of *Capital* with its conclusion ("Fetishism of the Commodity"), and with no apparent consideration of the value categories, its main, if not sole, purpose was to explain.

5.2 Marcuse on Marx's Grundrisse (1964–1965)

In addition to the *content* of Habermas's interpretations of the mature Marx's theories I just reviewed, the necessity and freedom dialectic is also vital for an understanding of the new Critical Theory approach to Marx's value theory as the basis for assessing the chronological and dialectical trajectories of interpretations of Marx's *Grundrisse* (1858/1993). Marcuse's work was central to two important phases.

In short, Marcuse initiated a "first phase" of Critical Theory's approach to Marx's *Grundrisse* (1858/1993). His first reference to the text appeared in an updated bibliography, which he attached to the 1954 Epilogue to *Reason and Revolution* (Marcuse, 1999, 433–439). In this, he drew attention to how the *Grundrisse* was far more "philosophical" than the final version (*Capital*) (Marx, 1867/1990), and emphasized how Marx's mature economic theory "grows out of his philosophical conceptions" (Marcuse, 1999, 440). Next, in the preface he wrote for Dunayevskaya's *Marxism and Freedom* (1958/1988), he again emphasized the "unity" of the *Grundrisse* and *Capital*, the former the heretofore missing link that revealed the inner identity of the philosophical with the economic and political "stage" of Marxian theory (Marcuse, 1958/1988, xix). Completing this first phase, in *Soviet Marxism* (1961), published the same year as his preface to *Marxism and Freedom*, Marcuse judged the *Grundrisse*

to be "the most important of Marx's manuscripts", writing that the work shows to "what extent the humanist philosophy is fulfilled and formulated in the economic theory of *Capital*" (Marcuse, 1961, 185, n. 85).

5.2.1 One-Dimensional Man

Marcuse's work was also central to a "second phase" of Critical Theory's approach to Marx's *Grundrisse* (1858/1993). Marcuse's publication of *One-Dimensional Man* (1966) followed shortly after Habermas's long essay, "Marxism as Critique" (1963/1974), which was published in the German in 1963. We described Habermas's argument above; he claimed that in the *Grundrisse* Marx (1858/1993) presented a "revisionist" argument against his own labor theory of value. Habermas claims that Marx subsequently "dropped" this "revisionist" argument in the published version, which appeared in *Capital* (1867/1990). In *One-Dimensional Man,* Marcuse argues for an interpretation of the *Grundrisse* that is significantly different from those he presented in1954–1958 (the first phase of Critical Theory interpretations), and instead has some affinity with Habermas's then recent interpretations.[13] Marcuse's 1964–1965 interpretations share at least one area of agreement with Habermas's 1963 essay: Quoting the same passage from the *Grundrisse* that Habermas cited in "Marxism as Critique", Marcuse now suggests that (1) Marx's labor theory of value was opened to question in Marx's *Grundrisse* (Marcuse, 1966, 28); and (2) there is a critical discontinuity between the analyses of value in the *Grundrisse* and *Capital* in which Marx in the latter evidently "repressed" the more *revolutionary* perspective he developed in the former (Marcuse, 2013, 298).

Based on his evolving reading of the *Grundrisse* (1858/1993), Marcuse writes in *One-Dimensional Man* (1966) in regard to the increasing dominance of machines in technological production that since, according to Marx's value theory, machines cannot create value but only transfer their own value to the product, not only does the theory of surplus value (and hence the critical intent of the concept of value itself) seem invalid (Marcuse, 1966, 28), but that Marx himself foresaw this as a theoretical problem.

[13] Marcuse's 1960 comments (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 66) several years earlier in the correspondence with Dunayevskaya on Marx's *Grundrisse* are transitional, in that they do not overtly revise his earlier interpretations of the "unity" of the *Grundrisse* and *Capital* (Marcuse, 1958/1988), but they do foreshadow such a changed perspective, which he develops in *One-Dimensional Man* (1966).

5.2.2 The Obsolescence of Socialism

In the "The Obsolescence of Socialism" (2013), after again quoting the long passage from the *Grundrisse* on the "Foundation/Development Contradiction" (Marx, 1858/1993, 704–706), Marcuse explained:

> Marx himself … later on repressed this version, which now appears as his most realistic and his most amazing insight. It includes … the simple rejection of the labor theory of value and the acknowledgment that the capitalist society will reach this stage within its own development where this theory is no longer valid. (Marcuse, 2013, 298)

However, just as Habermas (1963/1974) before him, Marcuse does not take into account how Marx made clear in the opening sentences of the passage from the *Grundrisse* (1858/1993, 704), which Marcuse (1966) quotes (as did Habermas), that the specifically capitalist form of wealth is the value form, not the material form, and as such has as its *presupposition* the mass of direct labor *time* as the determinant factor in the production of that kind of wealth. It is in this that Marx thus identifies the central contradiction of capitalism no matter what the technological level of production attained within it, and he goes on to develop it in great detail in *Capital* (Marx, 1867/1990)—on the one hand, direct labor as the sole source of the specifically capitalist form of wealth and, on the other hand, the logic in capitalism for replacing direct labor with, as we see today, robots, digital technology, and artificial intelligence. Marx thus describes a process of internal negation, the logic of the abolition of the actual and the emergence of the conditions of the possible future.

Thus, Postone's (1995) new affirmative approach to value theory, which I take up in Chap. 7, characterizes the "third phase" of the Critical Theory interpretations of Marx's *Grundrisse* (1858/1993), and it includes explicit and extensive critiques of Habermas's interpretations of the *Grundrisse* and Marx's *Capital* (1867/1990) and how they are linked. For the most part, Postone's critique of *Marcuse's* "second phase" approach, which may owe something to Habermas's analyses, remains implicit.

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CHAPTER 6

Historical Configurations of the Necessity and Freedom Dialectic: The Dunayevskaya–Marcuse Correspondence, Automated Production, and the Question of Post-capitalist Society

This chapter examines more closely the phase of the correspondence with which I concluded Chap. 2. This is the point at which Marcuse reinitiated the correspondence after a hiatus of more than two years (July 15, 1958 to August 8, 1960). Its historical context includes "destalinization" in the Soviet Union and "peaceful coexistence" between the latter and the United States, the world's other superpower; theoretically, it provides a more detailed perspective on major turns in Marcuse's assessments of both Hegel and Marx, the former on the necessity and freedom dialectic in the *Science of Logic* (Hegel, 1812/1976), the latter on the *Grundrisse* (Marx, 1858/1993), and tries to convey Marcuse and Dunayevskaya's different understandings of the relationships of history, automated production, and Marx's value theory. It brings to the fore major political differences embedded in theoretical differences, which had been pushed aside in earlier stages of the correspondence—the main vehicle for which was Marcuse's work *Soviet Marxism* (Marcuse, 1961), a work the two never directly discussed, even when it underlay the final angry exchanges of this phase of the dialogue.

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Worth mentioning here is Marcuse's new preface to *Soviet Marxism* (Marcuse, 1961, v–xvi), which had not yet appeared at the time of this exchange of letters, but *was* available prior to Dunayevskaya's review of Marcuse's book (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 222–226).[1] One of the concluding points in Marcuse's new preface was that, due to nationalized property, there was no internal resistance to complete automation in the Soviet Union (Marcuse, 1961, xv). This is contrasted with Marcuse's assessment of the United States, in which he criticizes both capitalists and workers alike for blocking such automation (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 66); the latter point is in fact elaborated in a mid-1960s article, not only when he highlights "peaceful coexistence" (Marcuse, 1966b), but where he implies that barriers to socialist humanism in actually existing communism are not internal, but are rather imposed by competition from the non-communist advanced industrial societies (Marcuse, 1966b, 114). A close look at this phase of the correspondence (early to mid-1960s) offers new perspectives on Dunayevskaya and Marcuse's underlying debates on the *historical* relationship of value theory and the Hegelian–Marxian dialectic of necessity and freedom.

6.1 Necessity and Freedom and Value Theory: The Elusive Dialectic

Especially at the height of their cooperation on the publication of *Marxism and Freedom* (Dunayevskaya, 1958/1988), we saw come to the surface the slightest hints of the possibility of some convergence in the theories of Marcuse, a leading philosopher of the Critical Theory tradition in the United States, and those of Dunayevskaya, who became a founder of the Marxist–Humanist tradition. Perhaps the central link to this theoretical intersection was Marx's *Grundrisse* (1858/1993), but in the unfolding dialogue that now storied text was also central to the collaboration's undoing.

Perhaps even more significant, shared or differences of views on the *Grundrisse* (1858/1993) may have served to cover a battle of ideas raging at a deeper level, some parts of which may never have achieved complete transparency for either theorist. As I have already described in the previous

[1] Dunayevskaya's review of Marcuse's *Soviet Marxism* first appeared under the title, "Intellectuals in the Age of State Capitalism" in *News and Letters* (June–July and August–September 1961).

chapters, and will develop below, this level pertained to one of Marcuse's key theoretical findings in *Reason and Revolution* (1941/1999). This went to the core of the originality of that seminal work's development of the philosophical foundations of Critical Theory: the necessity and freedom dialectic in Hegel's transition from the Objective to the Subjective Logic (but not in Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind*, wherein only Dunayevskaya identified it in her 1953 letter on Hegel) (Dunayevskaya, 2002, 24–30).[2] So, a related question concerns the significance of Marx, in his 1844 *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* (1975a, 326–346) stopping his analysis of *Philosophy of Mind* in its Introduction, precisely in fact, at Hegel's abstract definition of Absolute Mind, that is, just before the final "Subdivision" section wherein Hegel developed original perspectives on the necessity and freedom dialectic (Hegel, 1817/1973, 20–24).

Neither in his 1941 *Reason and Revolution*, nor in any later work, did Marcuse *connect* Hegel's necessity and freedom dialectic he had noted in the transition from the Objective to the Subjective Logic (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 154–155, 1961, 135–136) *with* Hegel's later development of that same dialectic in the *Philosophy of Mind* (Hegel, 1817/1973, 20–24), because he never identified that dialectic in the latter work. Moreover, that is consistent with Marcuse's (2005, 86–121) original review, written nearly a decade earlier, of the analysis Marx (1975a) put forth in his *1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*. Marcuse's review, among the first worldwide to take up Marx's newly unearthed manuscripts, adhered closely to Marx's text and, in doing so, paid no attention to the last part of the Introduction to Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind*. Thus, Marcuse left unmentioned the third and final part Hegel (1973, 20–24) labeled "Subdivision", which contains the deep analysis of the necessity and freedom dialectic. Crucially, in this section, Hegel's analysis achieves a special concreteness, contrasted with the more abstract level that defined the transition from the Objective to Subjective Logic. In doing so, Hegel also actually provides what can be read as an elaboration of the main text

[2] As I noted in Chap. 1, Hegel added a concluding sentence to the final three syllogisms of *Philosophy of Mind* in 1830, the year before his death. Without noting it as a late addition, Marcuse twice analyzed this particular sentence (but not integral to the necessity and freedom dialectic)—first in a 1954 Epilogue to *Reason and Revolution* (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 432) just before Dunayevskaya's initiation in December 1954 of their decades-long correspondence, and again in *Eros and Civilization* (Marcuse, 1962, 105–107) soon after meeting with her and receiving and commenting on her 1953 letters on Hegel.

of *Philosophy of Mind's* final syllogisms (Hegel, 1973, 314–315).[3] In the original text of *Reason and Revolution,* Marcuse did not take up Hegel's conclusions to *The Philosophy of Mind* (flowing from the final syllogisms), but he did do so in the new 1954 Epilogue to that work (Marcuse, 1999, 433) and again in the 1955 *Eros and Civilization* (Marcuse, 1962, 105–107).

In any case, the overall trend of the Dunayevskaya–Marcuse dialogue, within and without the correspondence, perhaps on the "surface" and on a deeper level, increasingly moved away from any convergence; rather, it served more as a means of crystallization of two developing Marxist traditions, Critical Theory and Marxist Humanism. Two principal underlying issues, or more precisely the dialectical relationship of the two, defined this theoretical divide: Marx's value theory and the necessity and freedom dialectic.

"Underlying" is a particularly apt description in regard to Dunayevskaya's approach, as the importance for her of Marx's value theory per se appeared to be strongly associated with debates concerning the social nature of the Soviet Union, and particularly the significance of Stalinism for defining a new world stage of capitalism. In respect to development of the necessity and freedom dialectic, her attention to it appeared at best implicit or even *dormant* after the publication of *Marxism and Freedom* (1958/1988). This was the case despite the fact that in many of her writings Dunayevskaya continued to reference her second 1953 letter to Grace Lee (Dunayevskaya, 2002, 24–30), which prominently featured Dunayevskaya's attention to Hegel's necessity and freedom dialectic in *The Philosophy of Mind* (1817/1973).

In Marcuse's dialogue with Dunayevskaya, both in the correspondence and in his contemporaneous published works (*Soviet Marxism* (1961), *One-Dimensional Man* (1966a), and his article, "Socialist Humanism?" (1966b), which he wrote for Erich Fromm's symposium on Socialist Humanism), Marcuse gradually retreated from Marx's value theory, but he continued to develop an interpretation of the necessity and freedom dialectic, including both areas of agreement and increasingly serious disagreements with the positions Dunayevskaya had put forth in her 1953 letters on Hegel (Dunayevskaya, 2002, 24–30), in her book *Marxism and*

[3] I view the final syllogisms as an abbreviated rendering of the more elaborated account Hegel provides in the Introduction's Subdivision on the necessity and freedom dialectic. See Rockwell (2008).

Freedom (1958/1988), and in the pamphlet *Workers Battle Automation* (Denby, 1960). Recall it was Marcuse's comments in his August 24, 1960, letter (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 66) on the latter work, which, if not immediately, ultimately ended any substantial dialogue with Dunayevskaya, at least within their correspondence. In the following, I shall return to the correspondence where we left off at the end of Chap. 2 to review the point at which Marcuse cited the *Grundrisse* (1858/1993) in perhaps his most provocative comments in the entire correspondence (the nature of Dunayevskaya's responses are also quite telling), followed by a summary of the importance for her dialogue with Marcuse, which Dunayevskaya, taking it public, finally attributed to the "value theory" with which she critiqued social relations in the Soviet Union in the early 1940s.

6.2 The Path to Implosion of the Correspondence: Philosophy and Reality Dialectic

In Marcuse's correspondence with Dunayevskaya (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012), he further considers the dialectic of Marx's analysis of the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom in the *Grundrisse* (Marx, 1858/1993) and *Capital*, vol. 3 (Marx, 1894/1981). The trajectory of Marcuse's theory culminates in the view, apparently distinct from Marx's text:

> [H]umanization of labor, its connection with life, etc … is possible only *through* complete automation, because such humanization is correctly relegated by Marx to the realm of freedom beyond the realm of necessity, i.e., beyond the entire realm of socially necessary labor in the material production. Total de-humanization of the latter is the prerequisite. (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 66)[4]

In a sign that the dialogue in the correspondence is nearing exhaustion, and that each theorist is hewing their own separate path, Dunayevskaya, instead of recognizing and criticizing unprecedented steps in Marcuse's social theory, ignores the comments and instead responds with a quite

[4] To jump ahead a bit, a few years later, Marcuse develops new approaches to his assessments of the social relevance of central ideas of both the young and mature Marx, given the changing historical conditions represented in advanced industrial society. See Marcuse (1966b, 107–117). Marcuse uses the term "advanced industrial society" to cover both the Soviet Union and the United States although, and as he suggests in the article, the common element is neither the law of value nor capitalism.

detailed analysis of Hegel's *Science of Logic* (1812/1976; Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 66–71). At one point in this lengthy October 16, 1960, letter, Dunayevskaya critiqued the "mechanistic" theory of Nikolai Bukharin, and described Hegel's concept "negation of negation" in an interesting and unusual way:

> [Where] Bukharin remained in Teleology, Lenin passed on as [he] saw Hegel laying the premises for historical materialism—the transformation of the subjectivity of purpose by means of working upon, negating object; opposition of subjective end to external object was only first negation, while second negation takes place *through the means*. (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 71)

So, though apparently leaving unchallenged Marcuse's latest comments on automation and Marx's *Grundrisse* (1858/1993), as well as his sharpened interpretation of the necessity and freedom dialectic, the observation quoted above, near the end of Dunayevskaya's first letter in response, could itself, nonetheless, be construed as offering a Hegelian basis for a different interpretation of the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom. This, then, would amount to an *indirect* response to Marcuse's latest letter. In the short passage from Dunayevskaya quoted above, the realm of necessity is a first negation, that is, it is about the means enclosed in the relation of "subjective end to external object", while freedom is the realm that emerges through transformation, not of an object by a subject, or even the reciprocal impact of the "changed" former on the latter, but rather of the *means*, the realm of necessity itself. Hence, Hegel's idea (or at least Dunayevskaya's interpretation of it) seems to ground Marx's theory of the *transformation* of labor as intrinsic to a sort of permanent social revolution in the realm of necessity, certainly not—as Marcuse began to argue—the latter's virtual *elimination*. Neither, however, do the transforming means become the end. In an idea, which I will take up in the next chapter, which Marx develops in the *Grundrisse*, the "transforming means", within which "labor … appears no longer as labor" (Marx, 1858/1993, 325), are rather the "basis" of the new society in as much it constitutes a dialectical relationship with the realm of freedom. The "*end in itself*", rather, is "human power", which only "*begins beyond*" the realm of necessity (Marx, 1894/1981, 958–959).

Noting Marcuse's initial lack of response to her October 16, 1960, letter (understandably perhaps attributing it to Marcuse's dissatisfaction with her having not answered *his* sharp critical comments on the worker's view of automation described in the pamphlet *Workers Battle Automation*

(Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 66; Denby, 1960)), alongside his own developing perspective on Marx's *Grundrisse* (1858/1993), Dunayevskaya sends another long letter, dated November 22, 1960 (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 71–75). As if having been reminded by the current exchange on "Workers Battle Automation" and the *Grundrisse* of the full range of unresolved philosophical and political differences highlighted in the completion of *Marxism and Freedom* (1958/1988) several years prior, including the absence of Marcuse's assessments of her interpretations of Hegel's current social relevance in his preface (Marcuse, 1988, xviii–xxiii) to the work, his public criticisms of her views on the proletariat, state-capitalism in the USSR, and the recent East European revolts, Dunayevskaya recalls that at the time, about five years earlier, she was actually "walking gingerly" in her assessments of Hegel, since she was "dealing more with Marx's age than with ours" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 73).

Yet, quite remarkably, her comments amount to what appear to be not only implicit criticism of Marcuse's lack of appreciation for her more general arguments for Hegel's *current social* relevance, but even more so severe *self*-criticism directed at the outcome—the *political* and philosophical ramifications—of the earlier stage of the correspondence. She recalls for Marcuse:

> A short month after my [1953] letters [on Hegel] were dispatched the first revolt from behind the Iron Curtain started so that both the man on the street and the philosopher, not to speak of the vanguardists, had to change the question: Can man gain freedom from out of totalitarian stranglehold to *Will* he? (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 73)[5]

> From 1953–1956 (Hungarian Revolution) we were confronted, on the theoretical front, by the sudden attacks of Russian Communism on Marx's humanist writings, which turned out to have been used by "revisionist" Marxists as the banner under which they fought Communism not only in Western Europe but in far away Africa where, on the practical front, the most significant revolutions of our epoch were unfolding. (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 73)

[5] Dunayevskaya is referring to the 1953 East German Workers' Uprising for "bread and freedom". Her description of the depth of its implications sounds similar to what Marcuse wrote about the fight against "Fascist barbarism"—now "The 'ideal' has become so concrete and so universal that it grips the life of every human being, and the whole of mankind is drawn into the struggle for its realization… Faced with Fascist barbarism, everyone knows what freedom means, and everyone is aware of the irrationality in the prevailing rationality" (Marcuse, 1941/1998, 62).

Thus, in returning Marcuse's attention to her analysis of Marx's humanist essays, she also reminds Marcuse of the political stakes in play, concerning revolts in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself, which she had already analyzed in *Marxism and Freedom* (Dunayevskaya, 1958/1988, 249–257).

But most important is the *perspective* through which at this point in the correspondence with Marcuse she revives the topic of Marx's *1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* (Marx, 1975b)—surprisingly it encompasses a *critique* of none other than the young Marx himself, a critique, she recounts, only crystalized retrospectively for her, when she realized she *began* her reading of Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind* (1817/1973) in her 1953 letters on Hegel just where Marx's 1844 manuscript had left off (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 88, n. 77).[6] After quoting a full paragraph of Marx's negative observations in his response to Hegel's closing paragraphs of *Philosophy of Nature*, Dunayevskaya notes that Marx actually does, nonetheless, "follow Hegel from nature to Mind, breaking off, however, in very short order" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 73). Dunayevskaya concludes:

> From then on the Marxian dialectic is the creative dialectic of the actual historic movement and not only that of thought. The continuation therefore resides in the three volumes of *Capital*, the First International, the *Civil War in France*, and the *Critique of the Gotha Program*. (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 73–74)[7]

[6] It was also an implicit critique of Marcuse, though she could not have known at the time she wrote this letter, since even as late as Erich Fromm's Socialist Humanism symposium in 1965 (Fromm, 1966), it was clear that Dunayevskaya had not yet become aware of Marcuse's (1932/2005, 86–121) review of Marx's *1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*: While Dunayevskaya here criticizes the young Marx for not continuing his 1844 analysis, that is, not following Hegel from nature through the entire *Philosophy of Mind* (Hegel, 1817/1973), as I described in Chap. 2, Marcuse stopped short in his reading of Marx's manuscript itself—he stops his analysis before the point at which Marx briefly considered Hegel's transition from Nature to Mind, observing, "We shall not go into the other features of the negative critique here. They are already familiar from the *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy Right*; for example, the conversion of mind into an absolute, the hypostatization of an absolute subject as the bearer of an historical process, the inversion of subject and predicate" (Marcuse, 1932/2005, 117). This is followed by Marcuse's comment: "What must be borne in mind is that Marx regards all these 'inadequacies' as 'inadequacies' of a real state of affairs" (Marcuse, 1932/2005, 117); but Marcuse nonetheless never returns to analyze the Subdivision on necessity and freedom, the dialectic with which Hegel concluded this key text.

[7] As I have pointed out (see especially Chap. 2), Dunayevskaya, in her 1953 letters, focused a good deal of attention on the part of Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind* in which he details what appears to be the social relevance of the necessity and freedom dialectic.

In her 1953 letter on Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind* (1817/1973) itself, describing her experience studying this text, Dunayevskaya (2002, 25) provided a listing of her follow-up reading, which included sections of *Capital*, vol. 1 (Marx, 1867/1990), as well as other writings of the mature Marx, and specifically, "the final part in Volume III of *Capital*" (Dunayevskaya, 2002, 25). The final part of *Capital*, vol. 3 (Marx, 1894/1981) includes the opening chapter titled, "The Trinity Formula", which includes Marx's passage on the dialectic of the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom (Marx, 1981, 958–959). It is this passage that bears such close resemblance to Hegel's description of the necessity and freedom dialectic in the Subdivision Section of the Introduction to The *Philosophy of Mind* (Hegel, 1817/1973, 20–24), the place in the text Dunayevskaya had just reminded Marcuse that Marx had left off in 1844, and where she had begun her study in 1953.

Evidenced by this letter, Dunayevskaya must have re-engaged with Marcuse with a renewed sense of self-confidence concerning their divergent philosophical and political directions, starting from Marcuse's preface to *Marxism and Freedom* (Marcuse, 1988, xviii–xxiii) and its aftermath (and even looking back to revolts in Russia and East Europe during the few years between her 1953 letters on Hegel (Dunayevskaya, 2002, 15–30) and publication of *Marxism and Freedom*), especially since Marcuse had opened this whole new phase of the correspondence (after a lengthy break following the tension-filled aftermath of the publication of *Marxism and Freedom*) by prefacing his request for Dunayevskaya's input on his plans for his new book with this description: "[M]y new book with the tentative title *Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society*, is some sort of western counterpart of *Soviet Marxism*—that is to say it will deal not only with the ideology but with the corresponding reality" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 59).[8]

[8] In turn, Dunayevskaya's October 16, 1960, letter to Marcuse began with background that also, like Marcuse's opening letter of this phase of the correspondence, suggested a new departure in her concerns with Hegel and Marx, which will eventually *widen* her perspectives on Marx's *Grundrisse* (1858/1993). It began with a statement that seems to echo, if only in form, Marcuse's own characterization of the relationship of his planned book on *One-Dimensional Man* (1966a) to the earlier *Soviet Marxism* (1961) Her statement began: "I proceed to work out the philosophical foundations (the Hegelian Absolute Idea and Marx's Humanism for the present day struggles for freedom in the underdeveloped economies, a sort of counterpart to *Marxism and Freedom* which limited itself to the present-day descent from ontology to technology") (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 67); the body of the letter

Indeed, following the first two letters Dunayevskaya wrote after "ignoring" Marcuse's new, sharp interpretations of Marx's *Grundrisse* (1858/1993) I mentioned above (in the first letter, describing the concept of negation of negation in her critique of Bukharin (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 71), and in the second referring to Marx's incomplete analysis of Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind* (1817/1973) and her own reading of it that "unconsciously" began at the point where Marx stopped in Hegel's text) (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 88, n. 87),[9] there is a letter from Marcuse that, nonetheless, clearly indicates his continued interest in the dialogue with Dunayevskaya on *Hegel's philosophy* (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 75). This is despite their just concluded sharp exchange which, after all, was not on that topic but on US workers' responses to the introduction of automated production. Yet, his brief comments on Hegel's *philosophy* manage to both restate his previous disagreements *and* point ahead to a new theoretic stage for him, exemplified a few years later in *One-Dimensional Man* (Marcuse, 1966a) and other writings, such as "The Obsolescence of Socialism," (Marcuse, 2013) and "Socialist Humanism?", his contribution to Erich Fromm's Symposium on Socialist Humanism (Marcuse, 1966b).

Referring to Dunayevskaya's two letters I just described, dated October 16, 1960, (the one including a description of negation of negation, quoted above) (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 66–71) and the one from November 22, 1960 (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 71–74), namely the parts on the USSR and Eastern Europe, and those on the young Marx's breaking off his "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic" (Marx, 1975a, 326–346) very shortly after first approaching the Introduction to Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind* (1817/1973), Marcuse writes in a letter dated December 22, 1960:

> To me, the most important passages are those in which you stress the need for a reformulation of the relation between theory and practice, and the notion of the new Subject. This is indeed the key, and I fully agree with your statement that the solution lies in the link between the first and second negation. Perhaps I would say: in the self-transcendence of materialism, or in the *technological Aufhebung* of the reified technical apparatus.

includes a reference to Hegel on slavery, and an important difference between the *Encyclopaedia* (smaller) *Logic* and the larger *Logic*.

[9] The issue here does not seem at all to be one of individual self-promotion. Rather, Dunayevskaya's point (not very well articulated) is that the current historical moment, and its specific problematic, conditioned her selection of where to begin in Marx's text.

> But again, although I am trying hard, I cannot see why you need the Absolute Idea in order to say what you want to say. Surely you don't need it in order to demonstrate the Marxian content of self-determination, of the Subject, etc. The very concept of the Absolute Idea is altogether tied to and justifies the separation of material and intellectual productivity at the *pre*-technological stage. Certainly you can "translate" also this part of Hegel—but why translate if you can speak the original language?? (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 75)

So, Marcuse addresses Dunayevskaya's October 16, 1960, letter, but rejects the key theoretical point of her November 22, 1960, letter, which comes closest to connecting Hegel's necessity and freedom with Marx's *Capital*, vol. 3 (1894/1981). Consistent with this argument, Dunayevskaya tries in her very next letter (January 12, 1961) to re-engage Marcuse on her starting her reading of "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic" just where Marx left off (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 76).

Whether or not with Dunayevskaya's full awareness, the crucial *context* of these remarkable, persistent attempts to re-engage Marcuse on her reading of Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind* (1817/1973) (and Marx's approach to that work) is twofold: At least two years had passed since the original publication, in 1958, of Marcuse's *Soviet Marxism* (1961). During those years, Dunayevskaya seemed never to have commented on the work. Against this background of silence, Marcuse apparently had felt free to open a new phase of the correspondence with Dunayevskaya by announcing that *Soviet Marxism* was the virtual "model" for his future work on the US "ideology but also with the corresponding reality" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 59). Whether or not in response, at least partially, to his ongoing correspondence with Dunayevskaya in which the theoretical issue of the relation of necessity and freedom emerged at a critical juncture, in *Soviet Marxism* Marcuse had cited precise chapters and sections in both Hegel's (smaller) *Encyclopaedia Logic* and larger *Logic* as the basis of his declarations that this dialectic was the "key problem in the Hegelian as well as the Marxian dialectic, and we have seen it is also a key problem in the idea of socialism itself … Hegel calls it the 'hardest' of all dialectical transitions" (Marcuse, 1961, 135–136).[10] Yet, in much of Marcuse's

[10] Crucially, as I indicated in Chap. 3, here Marcuse refers specifically to the section on "Reciprocity", the Objective Logic's final section, which is central to the passage from the Objective to the Subjective Logic, and what Marcuse now notes that Hegel in that section, referring to the necessity and freedom dialectic, called "the hardest transition". However, as

theoretical work (both before and after identifying the crucial section on "Reciprocity" in Hegel's *Encyclopaedia Logic* that contains Hegel's warning about treating them as "mutually exclusive" (1817/1975, 220)), Marcuse appeared to ignore Hegel's assessment of the *implications* of the necessity and freedom dialectic.

Additionally, if we recall that just *before* Marcuse met Dunayevskaya, he had already analyzed the final paragraph of Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind* (1817/1973) in the 1954 Epilogue to the new edition of *Reason and Revolution* (Marcuse, 1999, 433), and again soon after they met, in his next work *Eros and Civilization* (Marcuse, 1962, 105–107), completed just a few months after he read Dunayevskaya's (2002, 15–30) 1953 letters on Hegel's *Science of Logic* (1812/1976) and *Philosophy of Mind* (1817/1973), then the key point here is the following: In what could be considered a "concession" to Dunayevskaya's side of the earliest stage of their dialogue, Marcuse not only features the necessity and freedom dialectic in his current work (*Soviet Marxism*) (Marcuse, 1961), but in doing so returns the idea of the *social relevance of Hegel's philosophy to a central position* in any contemporary concept of socialism, certainly something vital to Dunayevskaya's theoretic concerns. Most remarkably, however, Dunayevskaya never indicated in her correspondence with Marcuse that she recognized this "concession". Certainly, Marcuse as well, in the correspondence, never stated anything specific about it to Dunayevskaya, and as I noted in Chap. 2, he in fact did not respond on at least two occasions to her inquiries about the content of the manuscript of *Soviet Marxism* before it went to press.

6.3 Eclipse of the Correspondence: Dunayevskaya Takes Differences with Marcuse Public

It was only in the wake of a somewhat dramatic break in the correspondence (described below), which would result in no letters exchanged over three years, that Dunayevskaya, for the first time going public with her theoretic differences with Marcuse, directly confronted *Soviet Marxism* (Marcuse, 1961). However, as I shall indicate below, even here she did not recognize Marcuse's concession on the current social relevance of Hegel's

important as Marcuse's addition is, the elaboration he offers is mostly limited to a critique of Friedrich Engels. Important as that is, Marcuse's analysis does not capture the full social relevance of Hegel's penetrating analysis of the necessity and freedom dialectic.

philosophy, and hence what is particularly relevant in this regard, Marcuse's centering of the necessity and freedom dialectic in Hegel, Marx, and socialism. At the same time, with Dunayevskaya's letter I just described (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 76), she managed to coalesce Marx, Marcuse, and her at a critical juncture in Hegel's transitions, not only from logic to nature, and nature to mind, but also, from *within* Mind, to the social relevance of the necessity and freedom dialectic, a position Marcuse appeared to completely reject.

Although there is no direct evidence, it seems likely that Dunayevskaya reviewed Marcuse's *Soviet Marxism* (Marcuse, 1961) soon after receiving his August 8, 1960, letter (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 59–60) reopening the correspondence, which had broken off in mid-July 1958, just around the time of *Soviet Marxism's* publication.[11] To date, Dunayevskaya had published no commentary on the work. Also, recall that even prior to publication of *Marxism and Freedom* (Dunayevskaya, 1958/1988) Marcuse had volunteered to share with Dunayevskaya the pre-publication manuscript of *Soviet Marxism*, but despite two subsequent promptings from her in the correspondence alone, Marcuse failed to deliver on this promise. The most likely reason was that as their dialogue progressed it became clearer to Marcuse that not only had Dunayevskaya's critique of the Soviet Union as a deeply counter-revolutionary state-capitalist society not moderated from the 1940s, it in fact had intensified. This was the background against which Dunayevskaya confronted Marcuse's framing of his *new* study as modeled on *Soviet Marxism*. Dunayevskaya eventually severely criticized *Soviet Marxism* (Anderson & Rockwell, 222–226) and unlike Marcuse's developed analysis in a new preface to the work (Marcuse, 1961, vi, xv–xvi), she apparently attributed no fundamental significance to current political developments around "destalinization" and "peaceful coexistence".

[11] A new edition of *Soviet Marxism*, including a new preface by Marcuse dated October 1960 (in the midst of the correspondence described in this chapter), was published in March 1961 (just at the conclusion of this section of the correspondence). Of particular note is one of Marcuse's conclusions, since Dunayevskaya would not have had the opportunity to have read it at the time of the exchange of letters described in this chapter: "The [Soviet Union's] nationalized economy offers no internal resistance to a rationalization of technical progress which would accelerate the reduction of the working day in the realm of necessary labor, and it does not depend on the creation of new necessary labor—necessary for the continual functioning of the economic apparatus, but unnecessary for, and even at the expense of, the free development of individual faculties" (Marcuse, 1961, xv). Considering the timing, Dunayevskaya would not have had access to this new edition during the period of correspondence I am examining here, but she did have such access at the time of writing her review of *Soviet Marxism* in the summer 1961 (as she indicated in the review itself).

In informing Dunayevskaya that the book he was now working on was "some sort of western counter-part of *Soviet Marxism*" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 59), Marcuse's first letter to Dunayevskaya after more than two years, immediately showed clear signs that his positions on the working class and technological production had moved even further away from those of Dunayevskaya than before the break in correspondence. In summarizing this part of the correspondence (August 1960 to January 1961) in Chap. 2, I emphasized that Dunayevskaya's determined focus, if not Marcuse's, remained on the issue of the social relevance of Hegel's philosophy. Upon a careful re-examination of this section of the correspondence, it becomes evident that an equally persistent theme in the four letters Dunayevskaya wrote in the period was what she regarded as Russian state-capitalist totalitarianism, a particularly insidious counter-revolutionary force owing to its support of concerted assaults first in the 1940s on Marx's value theory, and then in the 1950s on the young humanist Marx. In fact, when read as a series, each of her successive letters—in failing to draw a direct response from Marcuse on the topic—escalated her attack on the special threat she associated with "Russian state-capitalism."

Dunayevskaya's apparent determination in pressing this *combination* of themes—Hegel's contemporary social relevance and state capitalism—helps explain the next hiatus in the correspondence, lasting more than three years (March 10, 1961 to August 6, 1964), in fact, until the publication of *One-Dimensional Man* in 1964. It might be concluded that the issue of the dialectic of philosophy and reality finally exploded in the last exchange before this break—Marcuse's letter of March 6, 1961 (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 82–83) and Dunayevskaya's response a few days later on March 10, 1961 (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 83–84). In the first show of anger in the correspondence, Marcuse left unaddressed Dunayevskaya's extensive rebuttals (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 75–82)[12] of Marcuse's most recent assessments of Hegel's Absolute Idea—that it is "altogether tied to and justifies the separation of material and

[12] Important among Dunayevskaya's rebuttals was her argument that Marx's *oeuvre* itself contained instances in which he had broken with Hegel's Absolute Idea, but later returned to it, for example, in "his recreation of the Dialectic from the life of the historic period, 1861–1867, you see at once that [in] this break from Hegel, the final transcendence, the Absolute reappears but is this time split in two—for capitalism the general absolute law of capitalist accumulation, and for 'negation of negation', the new passions and new forces" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 76).

intellectual productivity at the *pre*-technological stage" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 75)—implicit in which is the idea that the mature Marx's social theory rendered Hegel's Absolute Idea socially irrelevant.

Marcuse reacted vehemently to two enclosures Dunayevskaya included in her January 12, 1961, letter (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 75–82), one of which was her recent article, "The New Russian Communist Manifesto" (Dunayevskaya, 1961), which was sharply critical of the author Isaac Deutscher, who had just reported on a recent meeting of 81 Communist Parties in Moscow. Dunayevskaya's article posed multiple *questions* on the *point* of Deutscher's favorable comparison of this recent conference with one in 1928, which, as Dunayevskaya writes, "first proclaimed Stalin as leader" (Dunayevskaya, 1961); his description of the meeting as "very nearly a revival of the old Communist International" (Dunayevskaya, 1961), which would then—in Dunayevskaya's view—put it on a par with "the Communist International of Lenin's Day" (Dunayevskaya, 1961); and, Deutscher's independence from actually existing self-identified Marxist regimes (Dunayevskaya, 1961). Actually, the *main* theme of Dunayevskaya's article was the contemporary Russian and Chinese attempts to influence anti-imperialist struggles in the Third World, interventions that Dunayevskaya portrayed as thoroughly negative. She instead stressed the positive implications of anti-colonial struggles, with important social, political, and even philosophical potentials, *untethered* from the global ambitions of the dominant world powers, primarily the United States, Russia, and China.

The second enclosure included an article on Haiti (not written by Dunayevskaya), but appearing in the newspaper she founded, *News & Letters*, which at least in Marcuse's judgment, conflated Fidel Castro's Cuba with the Rafael Trujillo dictatorship in the Dominican Republic. Marcuse went on to suggest a lack of serious political analysis in Dunayevskaya's writings on current events, asserting that they were instead driven by her "emotional predilections", and not "worthy of the names which you claim … Marx and Hegel" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 83). Finally, he concluded, "I wonder whether, sometimes, you are not slightly worried about the vicinity of such formulations with those of the State Department and CIA—but perhaps I am unjust to these agencies: I think they indeed see the difference (the essential one!)" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 83).

Dunayevskaya's shocked response (letter of March 10, 1961) (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 83–84) is no doubt primarily due to the stark contrast between, on the one hand, Marcuse's apparently uncritical attitude in respect to Deutscher's debatable analysis and, on the other, his dismissal of Dunayevskaya's uncompromising critique. In other words, Marcuse appeared to prefer Deutscher's relatively sanguine view of present-day Communism and its historical and future trajectory to Dunayevskaya's objections, in which she tended to place the USSR right alongside any other capitalist regime facing internal threats—proletarian and other opposition forces—and geopolitically directed not toward human liberation but rather world domination.

With this the correspondence broke off, and within a couple of months Dunayevskaya wrote a review of Marcuse's *Soviet Marxism* (1961) and published it under the title, "Intellectuals in the Age of State-Capitalism" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 222–226).[13] As a sure sign this review was a continuation of her last exchange of letters with Marcuse, Dunayevskaya opened it with the following:

> We live in an age of state capitalism which, at one end, Russia, persists in calling itself "Communist", and on the other end, America, still designates itself as "free enterprise" … As befits one who chooses to defend the American side, a Daniel Bell will speak of "The End of Ideology" to mark the alleged end of a "proletarian cause." As befits one who chooses to white-wash the other power, an Isaac Deutscher will proclaim the near-identity of interests of the proletariat and the Russian state. (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 222)

Whereas all her prior correspondence with him suggested that she viewed Marcuse's Hegelian Marxism as perhaps a singular revolutionary achievement, by now she assessed his current theoretical trajectory as itself *emblematic* of a deep and even ominous social *crisis*:

> In the 1940s [Marcuse] produced the profound study, "Reason and Revolution", which established a continuity of analysis of the young and mature Marx which went beyond the economics of production to the human relations. In the 1950s, however, he was impelled to the fantastic notion of establishing … continuity between Marxism and Stalinism. (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 222)

[13] The article was originally published in *News and Letters* (June–July and August–September 1961).

Dunayevskaya argues the above point in two ways: First, she develops arguments she had first raised in her dispute with Marcuse at the time of their collaboration on *Marxism and Freedom* (Dunayevskaya, 1958/1988) in which he argued that political and even philosophical differences between Lenin and Stalin were negligible and insignificant in a practical sense (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 26). Since she generally defended a position that Lenin was a genuine continuator of Marx's Marxism (Dunayevskaya, 1958/1988, 168–172), if Stalin is considered Lenin's continuator (as Marcuse suggested) then, at least indirectly, Stalin is anointed Marx's legitimate heir. Perhaps more significantly (and convincingly), Dunayevskaya writes in a footnote:

> [Marcuse] manages not to make a single mention of either the 1943 reversal of all previous teachings of the Marxian law of value, or of the 1955 attack on the humanist essays of Marx [but] he does find space for the lesser linguistic controversy. (Anderson & Rockwell, 239, n. 3)[14]

Following from Dunayevskaya's observation here, two central points need to be emphasized: (1) Though she does not say so directly, clearly Marx's value theory is not (and perhaps had not been for some years) an essential element in Marcuse's current interpretations of the contemporary relevance of Marx's critical social theory,[15] and (2) Dunayevskaya, even while singling out the 1955 Russian attacks on Marx's *1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, the most important among which for Dunayevskaya's interpretations is "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic" (Marx, 1975a, 326–346), does not seem to notice Marcuse's apparent concession in the text of *Soviet Marxism* (Marcuse, 1961, 135–136) to Dunayevskaya's persistent arguments for the current social relevance of Hegel's philosophy.

In *Soviet Marxism* (1958, 135–136), Marcuse focuses on the premier status of the necessity and freedom dialectic in Hegel, Marx, and even in socialism itself. While in these passages he does not identify *Marx's* relevant texts, in a footnote he pinpoints in Hegel's work the section on "Reciprocity"—the transition point from necessity to freedom, the Objective to the Subjective Logic, giving textual references to both the

[14] See Marcuse (1961, 142–143).

[15] This of course could be due to the nature of Marx's theory itself or perhaps, as I argued in Chap. 4, Marcuse's interpretation of the theory, which was based on a truncated reading of Marx's *Capital,* vol. 1.

Science of Logic (1812/1976) and the *Encyclopaedia* smaller *Logic* (Marcuse, 1958/1988, 136, n. 6). Granted, while this can be *interpreted* as a *concession*, it does not represent any sort of *capitulation* to Dunayevskaya's arguments for the current social relevance of Hegel's *Absolute*. However, it certainly left the door wide open for expansion and deepening of the dialogue with her, an opening Dunayevskaya seemed to crave but, in the end, did not enter. Had she done so, it seems she would have made a convincing case, since her interpretations, at least as I have argued in this work, ultimately centered on the social relevance of Hegel's necessity and freedom dialectic in Hegel's Absolute Mind.[16] Dunayevskaya (2002, 25) also implied Marx's appropriation of this dialectic in the "Trinity Formula", the first chapter of the last part of *Capital*, vol. 3 (Marx, 1981, 958–959).

In any case, as I suggested earlier, the concluding statements of the extended Dunayevskaya–Marcuse dialogue are from this point on for the most part found in publications, although several additional letters were exchanged up to Marcuse's death in 1979. One of the latter letters Dunayevskaya wrote to Marcuse was on August 6, 1964 (Anderson & Rockwell, 93–94), about three years since their last exchange. She notes that she had received a copy of Marcuse's new book *One-Dimensional Man* (Marcuse, 1966a), and that her review of the work would appear that fall (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 226–231).[17] It is that review, plus articles both she and Marcuse authored for the work Erich Fromm edited in 1965, *Symposium on Socialist Humanism* (Fromm, 1966), which really round out the Dunayevskaya–Marcuse dialogue, and thus point ahead to new historical forms of the Hegelian–Marxian necessity and freedom dialectic.

Generally, the most striking feature of Dunayevskaya's review of *One-Dimensional Man* (Marcuse, 1966a) is its positive tone, for example, "[No] one who has read the book can put it aside without hearing a ringing challenge to thought to live up to a historical commitment to transform 'technological rationality' into a truly real, rational, free society" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 227). However, this is what is most relevant from the perspective of my interpretations of the dialogue with Marcuse thus far: keeping in mind the key footnote in her review of Marcuse's *Soviet Marxism* (1961) (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 239n3), which criticized

[16] See Dunayevskaya (2002, 26; 29–30).

[17] The article originally appeared under the title, Reason and Revolution versus conformism and technology (pp. 32–34). In, *The Activist* (Oberlin).

the author for not taking up Stalin's 1943 reversal of all previous teachings on Marx's value theory, in her review of *One-Dimensional Man* (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 226–231), Dunayevskaya does not notice Marcuse's new interpretations of Marx's *Grundrisse* (1858/1993) in which a certain stage of technological production "cancels" that (value) theory (Marcuse, 1966a, 28).

It is an interesting comparison, then, that in her review of *Soviet Marxism* a few years earlier, Dunayevskaya *recognizes* Marcuse's missing attention to value theory (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 239n3), while in that same review *misses* his new recognition of the vital current social relevance of Hegel's dialectic of the necessity and freedom (Marcuse, 1961, 135–136); in her review of *One-Dimensional Man*, she is silent on Marcuse's interpretation of Marx's *Grundrisse* (1858/1993) as a negation of value theory (Marcuse, 1966a, 28) while recognizing (and perhaps unintentionally affirming) Marcuse's idea of a "historical commitment to transform 'technological rationality' into a truly real, rational society" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 227)—a society according to Marcuse, however, in which the "realm of freedom" would be in a certain sense the residual of the *abolition* of the realm of necessity (Marcuse, 1966a, 37), rather than the development of the freedom *intrinsic* to the latter.

In any case, Dunayevskaya, in a considerably longer article the same year (Dunayevskaya, 1966, 68–83), while still *not* noting Marcuse's own reinterpretation of Marx's *Grundrisse* in which value theory is negated by technological production, returned to her critique of Marcuse on the issue, albeit indirectly. Referring to her original response to the Stalinist reversal of all previous teachings on Marx's value theory, she wrote:

> [When] in 1943 … the Russian theoreticians first openly broke with the Marxian analysis of value, they had to deny the dialectic structure of *Capital* and ask that in "teaching" it, Chapter 1 be omitted. It does not speak highly of "Western" philosophy that it never saw the philosophic implications in this economic debate, and therefore also failed to discern the reason why the theoretical magazine of Soviet Marxism (*Under the Banner of Marxism*), which had carried on the tradition of Marx's dialectic philosophy, ceased its publication. Thereafter, without further ado or any reference to any previous interpretation of Marxist economics, the revision of the Marxian analysis of value became the standard Communist analysis. (Dunayevskaya, 1966, 71–72)

Symmetrically in respect to Marcuse and Western philosophy not seeing the philosophical implications of Dunayevskaya's critique of "Russian theoreticians" breaking with the Marxian law of value, Dunayevskaya herself seems not to have seen the implications of Marcuse's (1932/2005) original analysis of Marx's *1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* (1975b). In her contribution to the Fromm Symposium on Socialist Humanism (Fromm, 1966), Dunayevskaya acknowledges that Marcuse's analysis of these writings in his 1941 *Reason and Revolution* was the first on the American scene and adds, mistakenly, even preceded "by four or five years … Europe's first rediscovery" of them (Dunayevskaya, 1966, 81n10). As I discussed in Chap. 2, Marcuse's by now very well-known review of Marx's *1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* appeared in 1932 (Marcuse, 1932/2005, 86–121). The important point here is that apparently, *to date*, Dunayevskaya had not been aware of Marcuse's 1932 analysis.

Marcuse's 1932 analysis (as I discussed in Chap. 1) differed significantly from, but was certainly not less philosophically important than, the one Marcuse published in 1941 (Marcuse, 1941/1999). For example, in the earlier analysis, Marcuse devotes six pages to "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic" (Marcuse, 1932/2005, 115–121), whereas in *Reason and Revolution*, he makes only two brief citations (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 156, 315). In the earlier work, he closely follows Marx's text, though he stops short, that is, does not, with Marx, actually enter Mind (from Nature). Perhaps most important for understanding the underlying tensions in the Dunayevskaya–Marcuse dialogue, *the elusive dialectic of necessity and freedom and Marx's value theory*, is Marcuse's stated reason not only for *not* following Marx's text into its confrontation with Hegel's Mind, but for dismissing any remaining content as irrelevant: Marx, according to Marcuse, had already dealt with it in an earlier work, *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* (1843), that is, "the conversion of mind into an absolute, the hypostatization of an absolute subject as the bearer of an historical process, the inversion of subject and predicate" (Marcuse, 1932/2005, 117). The very next section in Hegel's text (Hegel, 1817/1973, 20–24), consideration of which Marcuse so readily here preempted, developed the necessity and freedom dialectic, to which Marx returned in *Capital* (Marx, 1981, 958–959). The ability of Dunayevskaya to argue her positions would have been greatly strengthened had she known the details of Marcuse's own theoretic determinations.

6.4 Marcuse on the Historical Eclipse of the Young and Mature Marx: The Assimilation of the Necessity and Freedom Dialectic in "Advanced Industrial Society"

To conclude this chapter, Marcuse's contribution to Fromm's *Symposium on Socialist Humanism* (Fromm, 1966), titled "Socialist Humanism?" (Marcuse, 1966b, 107–117), more than the title suggests, *questions* not merely a certain possible form of "anti-capitalism", but also, implicitly, the usefulness of the very categories socialism and capitalism. Marcuse, in fact, questions the current relevance of Marx's theories (whether associated with the young or mature Marx).

This approach is certainly reasonable when seen as following from (and continuing) the recent developments in the dialogue with Dunayevskaya. *Inexplicably*, in her review of *One-Dimensional Man* (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 226–231) written shortly before her contribution to Fromm's Symposium on Socialist Humanism (1966), Dunayevskaya (1966, 68–83) did not criticize Marcuse's interpretation of Marx's *Grundrisse* (1858/1993), in which he found the theoretical basis for Marx's negation of his own value theory in the event of highly technological production (Marcuse, 1966a, 28). In fact, again in Dunayevskaya's article (1966) in Fromm's *Symposium on Socialist Humanism* (1966), she still did not note this important change in Marcuse's approach in *One-Dimensional Man*. She did fault Marcuse ("Western philosophy") for not seeing the *philosophical implications* in *her* criticism of the Stalinist reversal of teachings on the law of value, and she put forth an unambiguous defense of the theory: "Because the Marxian law of value is the supreme manifestation of capitalism, not even Stalin—at least not for very nearly two decades after he already had total power, the State Plan, and the monolithic party—dared admit its operation in Russia since he claimed the land was socialist" (Dunayevskaya, 1966, 75).

Perhaps just as inexplicably, Marcuse, in the Fromm Socialist Humanist symposium, did not either directly state his conclusions on Marx's value theory, which he had very recently laid out in his discussion of Marx's *Grundrisse* (1858/1953/1993) in *One-Dimensional Man* (Marcuse, 1966a, 28), and in a lecture, just recently brought to light, which he delivered at Brandeis University in 1965 (Marcuse, 2013, 295–302). However, less directly, he wrote:

> [T]he developed Marxian theory retains an idea of man which now appears as too optimistic and idealistic. Marx underrated the extent of the conquest of nature and of man, of the technological management of freedom and self-realization. He did not foresee the great achievement of technological society: the *assimilation of freedom and necessity*, of satisfaction and repression, of the aspirations of politics, business, and the individual. (Marcuse, 1966b, 112)

But, in the last three of the six references he provides in this article, Marcuse does indeed cite Marx's *Grundrisse*—twice—and then *One-Dimensional Man* (1966a) as well to argue the following: Even the mature Marx did not foresee these "achievements" of technological society, but now that they are social facts "socialist humanism can no longer be defined in terms of the individual, the all-round personality, and self-determination" (Marcuse, 1966b, 112). Marcuse continues: "Their realization would call for conditions in which man would fulfill himself in his daily work, in which socially necessary labor would be 'attractive labor'" (Marcuse, 1966b, 112–113).

In considering the technological developments, unforeseen by Marx, which render taken-for-granted theoretical concepts historically outmoded, Marcuse nonetheless quotes the *Grundrisse*, in a passage in which, in light of these technological developments, "Marx emphatically denied" (Marcuse, 1966b, 113) the possibility of attractive socially necessary labor (Marcuse, 1966b, 113), "[L]abor cannot become play, as Fourier wants" (Marx, 1858/1953, 599 [Marx, 1858/1993, 712]), quoted by Marcuse, 1966b, 113).

From this, Marcuse delineates an apparently key division in Marx's theory development in which the early Marx's concept of labor was still embedded in the "repressive connotation of pretechnological 'higher culture', which leaves the lower culture on which it is built unaffected" (Marcuse, 1966b, 113). According to Marcuse, Marx remedied this theoretical deficiency when he "translated the 'metaphysical terms' of the early writings into those of political economy" (Marcuse, 1966b, 113). It is from just this point—at which he grants that Marx reconceptualized labor as the rationalization and socialist organization of the realm of necessity that though it could not make socially necessary labor attractive, would create "free time" (Marcuse, 1966b, 113)—that Marcuse implies, perhaps for the first time on his part, that even Marx's *mature* theory has nonetheless also already been surpassed in the emergence of "advanced industrial society" (Marcuse, 1966b, 113).

Marcuse's second reference to the *Grundrisse* (Marx, 1858/1953/1993) is to the same passage from which I quoted above on Fourier:

> [T]he socialist organization of labor has created free time, and [here Marcuse begins to quote from Marx's *Grundrisse*], "the free time which is leisure time as well as time for higher activity has naturally [sic!] transformed man into a different subject … and as this different subject, man also enters into the process of immediate production" (Marx, 1858/1953, 599) [Marx, 1858/1993, 712]), quoted by Marcuse, 1966b, 113)

An interesting difference is that now—years later—Marcuse completes the closing sentence, the last part (after the ellipsis in the passage quoted above) of which had not appeared in his preface to Dunayevskaya's work (Marcuse, 1988, xxi); as such, it had tended to reinforce the argument Marcuse was just then initiating—that theoretically, even in a post-capitalist society, freedom was absent from the realm of necessity. Now, moreover, Marcuse takes as given an *actually existing* "socialist organization of labor" wherein freedom is not only absent from necessity, but even what he regards as post-capitalist "free time" created by the rationalization of the realm of necessity is distinct from the "possessor of this free time" (Marcuse, 1966b, 113). Marcuse melds this untenable assumption of an already achieved "socialist organization of labor" into the passage taken from Marx's *Grundrisse*. Marcuse concludes:

> Today, advanced industrial society is creating free time, but the possessor of this free time is not a "different subject"; in the capitalist and communist systems, the subject of free time is subordinated to the same norms and powers that rule the realm of necessity. The mature Marxian conception, too, appears idealistic and optimistic. (Marcuse, 1966b, 113)[18]

[18] In an article published several years later, Marcuse both affirms and even extends his long-standing interpretation of the dialectic of necessity and freedom found in Marx's *Capital*, vol. 3. Marcuse holds that even in a post-capitalist society, not only is the realm of necessity devoid of freedom, it would "remain a realm of alienation" (Marcuse, 1969, 22). Also, in this article, he publishes for the first time the view he had developed in his farewell lecture at Brandeis University (see Chap. 5)—that Marx's *Grundrisse*, compared to *Capital*, offered an alternative, more revolutionary theory. Marcuse now asserts that the necessity and freedom dialectic Marx developed in the *Grundrisse* was not only *different* from the version in *Capital*, but that this earlier "most advanced vision of a free society was apparently dropped by Marx himself" (Marcuse, 1969, 22).

Marcuse's conclusion implies *both* that capitalist and Soviet Union-dominated regimes (or to adopt Marcuse's conceptual terms, non-communist advanced and communist advanced industrial society) may be differentiated from each other according to Marx's theories, *and* that the realm of necessity is transhistorical in the sense that it is not fundamentally distinguishable in a post-capitalist compared with a capitalist society. For, if communism is a type of technologically advanced society, it has historically surpassed the limits, now exposed, which were inherent in Marx's social theory.[19] But Marcuse posits actually existing communism, and *not* technologically advanced non-communist society (at least not so definitively), as an adequate stand-in for Marx's conception of a post-capitalist society. Upon this basis, Marcuse argues for a basic continuity in a comparison of the realm of necessity in capitalist and communist society; even more iconoclastically, Marcuse concludes that even in his assumption of some basic difference between capitalism and communism, in both systems, "the subject of free time is subordinated to the same norms and powers that rule the realm of necessity" (Marcuse, 1966b, 113). Hence, while Marcuse supposes capitalism and communism are significantly different (a claim I will address below), the characteristics they share as advanced industrial societies provide the evidence for proof of Marcuse's emergent post-Marx theory—*the real assimilation of a series of oppositions, the most important of which is necessity and freedom itself.*

Against the background of the "passing of the objective conditions for the identity of socialism and humanism" (Marcuse, 1966b, 113), which I described above, Marcuse concludes with an argument containing two major themes: the predominance of the negative impact of the non-communist on the communist advanced industrial societies, rather than barriers internal to the latter, for prospects of communist socialist humanism; and the ability of non-communist advanced industrial society to "take care of humanistic values while continuing to pursue its inhuman goals" (Marcuse, 1966b, 114). Indeed, the non-communist variant of advanced industrial society confronts internal tensions between the continuing fight for "the rights of man" (Marcuse, 1966b, 113), with those *waging* the battle hamstrung to the extent they respect the "liberal values and legality, which the adversary meets with unpunished violence" (Marcuse, 1966b, 113). In any case, according to Marcuse, clearly ascendant is "the intensity

[19] In his preface to Dunayevskaya's *Marxism and Freedom*, Marcuse (1958/1988, xviii–xiv) indicated that serious consideration be given to the notion that Marx's theories were no longer viable in light of significant social changes not foreseen or were not possible to be foreseen at the time Marx developed them.

with which the powers that be mobilize the underlying population against their liberation" (Marcuse, 1966b, 114). In fact, this conscious mobilization on the part of the powers that be "goes hand in hand with the growing capabilities of society to accomplish this liberation" (Marcuse, 1966b, 114). Marcuse writes:

> What appeared in the pretotalitarian era as the precondition for freedom [revolution in the realm of necessity] may well turn out to be its substance, its historical content… Advanced industrial society is a society in which the technical apparatus of production and distribution has become a totalitarian political apparatus, coordinating and managing all dimensions of life, free time as well as working time, negative as well as positive thinking. To the victims, beneficiaries, and heirs of such a society, the realm of freedom has lost its classical content, its qualitative difference from the realm of necessity. (Marcuse, 1966b, 115)

Marcuse thus diagrams a historical crossroads in which the realm of necessity has swallowed the realm of freedom and, in so doing, he squarely faces up to the social implications: The actually existing human beings, and even those about to be born, have been rendered, for the time being at least, incapable of attaining freedom. Marcuse's conclusion thus ends in a double irony: Since in his view there never was real freedom in the realm of necessity, it was always at most only a precondition of freedom, now, "It is the work world, the technical world which they must first make their own: the realm of necessity must become the realm of their freedom" (Marcuse, 1966b, 115). Marcuse writes:

> Technological rationality must be redirected to make the work world a place for human beings who one day may perhaps be willing to live in peace and do away with the masters who guide them to desist from this effort. This means not "humanization" of labor but its mechanization. (Marcuse, 1966b, 115)

Already, the realm of necessity has negated the realm of freedom; the best view on the horizon is, in a sort of negation of the negation, the re-emergence of freedom in the *abolition* of the realm of necessity. Notably, as we turn now to Moishe Postone's "reinterpretation of Marx's critical theory" (Postone, 1995), even in Marcuse's final word in his dialogue with Dunayevskaya, the social domination central to his conclusions is still in the form of the *personal*—victims and masters.

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CHAPTER 7

Moishe Postone's Deepened Interpretation of Marx's Value Theory: Grundrisse

Though apparently unnoticed in the literature, there is a clear pathway within the Critical Theory tradition from Marcuse to Postone in the former's basic philosophic research on the necessity and freedom dialectic, interpretations of Marx's value theory, and the themes prominent in his assessments of Marx's approach to the capitalist labor process in his work *Reason and Revolution* (Marcuse, 1941/1999). Postone (1995) refocuses attention on the historical dimension of the necessity and freedom dialectic, namely how it underlies the theoretical developments leading to Marx's twofold concept of labor, specification of the *internal* workings of capitalist production, determination of its social relations, and creation of the conditions of post-capitalist society. In Chaps. 3 and 4, I showed that early on Marcuse (in *Reason and Revolution*), especially in his chapters on Hegel's political philosophy and the analysis of the labor process in capitalism, extensively analyzed the twofold nature of labor. Within the first few pages of *Capital*, vol. 1 (1867/1973), Marx had written of this concept:

> Initially the commodity appeared to us as an object with a dual character, possessing both use value and exchange value. Later on, it was seen that labor, too, has a dual character: in so far as its expression in value, it no longer possesses the same characteristics as when it is the center of use values. I was the first to point out and examine critically this twofold nature of the labor

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> contained in commodities[1]… As this point is crucial to an understanding of political economy, it requires further elucidation. (Marx, 1867/1990, 132)

Following from Marcuse's (1941/1999, 298) explicit recognition of *Marx's* singling out this concept to distinguish his theory, he traced Marx's development of it, but only to a certain point in Marx's text. In Chap. 4, I showed that except for *one* very brief reference near the end of his analysis (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 320), Marcuse traced the twofold concept of labor, or more particularly the relationship of abstract and concrete labor, only up to *Capital*'s Part 3 (which takes up "absolute surplus value" and the manufacturing stage of production). Marcuse then moved on to *Capital*'s closing Parts, thus bypassing Parts 4 and 5, which take up "relative surplus value", characteristic of large-scale industry and, arguably, even anticipate issues that much later have been discussed under the heading "post-industrial" society, or even post-capitalist society. Hence, Marcuse's analysis necessarily appeared one-sided, emphasizing concrete labor's negation by or reduction to abstract labor. To Marcuse's great credit though, he also pointed to the peculiarity of capitalism wherein *concrete labor* functioned as a *form of appearance* of abstract labor (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 308), the sole source of value (the specifically capitalist form of wealth). Postone's identification of characteristics of labor *specific to capitalism* that appear to be *transhistorical* owes much to Marcuse in this regard.

Postone's (1995) reinterpretations carry the analysis through Part 4 of *Capital* (1867/1990). In doing so, Postone, like Marcuse before him, analyzes the effect of abstract labor on concrete labor, but *also* the latter's *determination* of the former. Thus, with the full coverage of Marx's dialectic, Postone brings to the fore the concepts Marcuse's analysis of the Hegelian–Marxian dialectic of necessity and freedom in the production process of capitalism had raised but not fully developed—especially the social implications of abstract and concrete *time*. In this chapter and the next (Chap. 8), I shall outline Postone's reinterpretations of the Hegelian–Marxian dialectic of necessity and freedom, first, in this chapter, by considering his analyses of Marx's *Grundrisse* (1858/1993), followed by an assessment, in Chap. 8, of how they shape his reading of *Capital*.

Postone (1995) emphasizes that a critique of labor is central to his reinterpretation of Marx's mature critical theory. He focuses on the idea that Marx's theory was primarily a *critique* of labor. He contrasts this

[1] Here, Marx references his earlier text, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, published in 1859.

interpretation of Marx's theory with a long line of traditional Marxists. Among the latter group, he includes founders and continuators of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory—from Max Horkheimer and Friedrich Pollock to Jürgen Habermas—the tradition from within which his own work is based. Despite significant differences among this group, their critique was either directed at capitalism from the "standpoint" of labor or, as well (in the case of Habermas), Marx's alleged affirmation of that labor even within his (Marx's) *critique* of capitalism.

7.1 Grundrisse: From "Original Accumulation of Capital" to "Foundation/Development Contradiction"

Initially, to demonstrate the rationale for his position, Postone (1995) focuses for the most part on the section of Marx's *Grundrisse* (1958/1993) widely known as "The fragment on machines". Here, he analyzes the subsection I have referred to as "Foundation/Development Contradiction", an abbreviation of the section title given by Marx: "Contradiction between the foundation of bourgeois production (value as measure) and its development. Machines, etc." (Marx, 1858/1993, 704–706). I just indicated above that Marx at the time he wrote the *Grundrisse* had not yet explicitly formulated his category of the dual character of labor in capitalism. In the footnote that appears within the first few pages of *Capital,* Marx (1867/1990, 132) indicates that he first "pointed out" the category in his 1859 work, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (Marx, 1859/1987, 277–278). Thus, Marx had completed the *Grundrisse* and its section "Foundation/Development Contradiction" one year *prior* to his presentation of the dual character of labor in *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy,* and *several years prior* to working the concept out as pivotal for all of *Capital*, unfolding it from its initial determination in the work's very first part. Prior to working out the dual concept of labor, Marx's section in the *Grundrisse focuses* on labor and non-labor. Moreover, as Postone shows, in this section, Marx's stress is on the related notion of the value and material *forms of wealth.* Hence, although Marx conceives of a fundamental social contradiction internal to capitalist *production*, he does not yet explicitly link it to the *twofold nature* of capitalist labor and its wide-ranging historical and social implications.

7.1.1 Original Accumulation of Capital

Before I consider Postone's (1995) own analysis of the *Grundrisse* (1858/1993) in this context, it is worthwhile to look at an earlier section of that work to highlight the point often noted that among its great features is the way in which the *Grundrisse* allows the reader to see Marx's *process of creation* of his key critical concepts. For example, in respect to the important concept Marcuse's analyses covered—the reduction of concrete labor to abstract labor (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 295–322)—Marx actually shows in apparent contrast with the *trajectory* Marcuse defines, that in respect to capitalism abstract labor precedes concrete labor, even historically (Marx, 1858/1993, 469–471). No doubt, as Postone shows, the internal relationship of the value and material forms of wealth Marx analyzed in the *Grundrisse* immediately suggested the ultimate non-viability of the capitalist social form. Yet, Marx made quite visible *deeper* emerging concepts he was in fact developing, even if they were not yet fully crystalized, which sharpened the idea of the non-viability of the capitalist social form. To bring these into focus, Marx began to specify the essential features of capitalism that would need to be overcome to realize a *post*-capitalist society. In the case of the dual concept of labor, abstract and concrete labor, it is clear in retrospect that Marx had already provided the historical ground of abstract labor in a section of the *Grundrisse* that preceded by several hundred pages the often-cited "Foundation/Development Contradiction" (Marx, 1858/1993, 704–706), that is, in "Original Accumulation of Capital" (Marx, 1858/1993, 459–471), which I first discussed in Chap. 5 in connection with my critique of Habermas's analysis in *Knowledge and Human Interests* (1968/1972).

In fact, Marx presents a *succession of forms* of abstract labor important for grasping the historical relationship of necessity and freedom characteristic of his theory—*from* the *Grundrisse's* section on "Original Accumulation of Capital" (Marx, 1858/1993, 459–471), *to* that same work's section on "Foundation/Development Contradiction" (Marx, 1858/1993, 704–706), to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (Marx, 1859/1987) and *Capital* (Marx, 1867/1990) itself. Here, I will limit my analysis of this succession of forms of emergence of abstract labor to the *Grundrisse*. It starts with the *first* of the four conditions Marx listed in the section on "Original accumulation": "[O]n the one side the presence of living labor," which is *only* capacity, merely "subjective", because though it has attained a form of freedom, it is "separated from … the means of existence, the *necessary* goods

(my emphasis)" (Marx, 1858/1993, 463). This is a condition Marx held *had* to have been given historically—"as it appears originally" (Marx, 1858/1993, 463)—for "money to become capital and labor to become capital-positing, capital creating labor" (Marx, 1858/1993, 463). Marx characterizes this dialectic of freedom and necessity internal to the *origins* of capitalist labor as the "living possibility of labor … *in this complete abstraction*" (my emphasis) (Marx, 1858/1993, 463). Here, the *form of the relation* of necessity and freedom constituting abstract labor is their historical bifurcation, their *separation*, though *necessity* is clearly ascendant.

7.1.2 Dialectic of "Original Accumulation" and "Foundation/Development Contradiction"

In contrast, in the later section of the *Grundrisse* ("Foundation/Development Contradiction") (Marx, 1858/1993, 704–706), which is analyzed much more often (though frequently misinterpreted as we saw in Chap. 5 in regard to Habermas and Marcuse's respective readings), Marx identifies the "*contradiction* between the *foundation* of bourgeois production and its development" (Marx, 1858/1993, 704), that is, between the mass of direct labor time as "the determinant factor in the production of wealth" and historical developments in which, "real wealth manifests itself, rather … in the monstrous disproportion between the labour time applied, and its product, as well as in the qualitative imbalance between labour, *reduced to a pure abstraction*, and the power of the production process it superintends" (my emphasis) (Marx, 1858/1993, 705). Here, freedom, in the form of "pure abstraction of labor", *penetrates* necessity rather than being subject to its tyranny as it was in the earlier case of "the living possibility of labor in this complete abstraction". Indeed, this second form of abstract labor, in so far as it represents the potential of universal *release* from direct human labor *enclosed* within the system of material production, points ahead to Marx's theoretical concretization of his analysis I covered in Chap. 5 on Habermas, as Marx described it, "[T]he points at which the suspension of the present form of production relations gives signs of its *becoming*—foreshadowings of the future" (my emphasis) (Marx, 1858/1993, 461). Marx elaborates, "Just as on the one side the pre-bourgeois phases appear as *merely historical*, i.e. suspended presuppositions, so do the contemporary conditions of production likewise appear as engaged in suspending themselves and hence in positing the historic presuppositions for a new state of society" (Marx, 1858/1993, 461).

With Marx's concept of a new society as the context, both potentials together—a great reduction (if not complete elimination) of time in material production and a new *form* of labor—anticipate a social revolution at least as great as that expressed in the movement of feudal to bourgeois society. Hence, with the historical advent of technological production, such as Marx describes in the *Grundrisse's* section "Foundation/Development Contradiction" (Marx, 1858/1993, 704–706), the form of abstraction of labor described therein is in *opposition* to the form of abstraction that prevails in the case of historical "original accumulation". In the latter, on account of history, the means of realization of labor capacity are scarce and dependent for their expansion primarily on exploitation of *direct* labor, lengthening the working day, or what Marx will later in *Capital* (1867/1990) term production of "absolute surplus value". In other words, contrasted with abstract labor's *origin* or its *foundation*, wherein the realization of a "mass of direct labor time" is *problematic* though *determinant* for the *concrete* labor that is necessary for material wealth (including workers' subsistence), Marx's conception of abstract labor in bourgeois production's *development* turns exactly opposite in terms both of quantity and quality: monstrous disproportion between labor time *applied* and its *product*, as well as the "imbalance" Marx detects in the *type* of "superintendent" labor associated with automation *vis-à-vis* the power of the production process it superintends. In the former case of "original accumulation", although "labor time" realization is problematic, relatively large quantities of labor time are *necessary* for qualitative development; in the latter case of "developed" capitalism, it is the qualitative (technological) development itself that is determinate for the problematic (but necessary for capitalism and its form of wealth) *realization* of labor time. In respect to necessary labor time, then, the "primitive accumulation", in which "free labor" first confronts its realization as an ongoing *question*, is not *only* a historical stage of capitalism, but rather it is an intrinsic characteristic of capitalist labor.

Accordingly, as will become clearer in the following, and even more so when we turn to the "interaction" of abstract and concrete labor, which Postone (1995) emphasizes Marx develops in *Capital* (1867/1990), there is no linear development in abstract labor's (or labor time's) historical forms of appearance. The *contradiction* of bourgeois production's foundation, or "original accumulation", and its "development", according to Marx, is intrinsic to and therefore ongoing even in the most advanced forms of *bourgeois* production. Later I shall elucidate this with reference to

Postone's (1995) concept of capitalist production's "treadmill effect". With the latter, the problematic even extends to how much of the labor performed actually *counts* as labor time. In short, no matter how technologically developed production my become—and labor reduced to the "pure abstraction" of supervision over an automated process—the very *possibility* of this remaining direct labor, though it is *necessary* for the individual's subsistence *and* the capitalist mode of production itself, still remains a function of the *means for its realization*, which lie outside the control of the producers themselves.

7.2 Abolition or Transformation of Labor?

As I just described above, abstract labor and the "realization" of concrete labor has taken on a range of problematic forms since capitalism's inception. In his discussions of Marx's theories of capitalism (and its overcoming) in the *Grundrisse* (1858/1993), Postone (1995) discusses Marx's concepts of *transformation* and *abolition* of labor. Do these concepts represent historical stages, for example, the latter necessarily following the former in time under the impact of technological developments? Or, are they opposite tendencies, which, in conditioning one another, both define the capitalist mode of production and determine its trajectory? Perhaps they are different facets of a process, which point to a single epochal revolution? Implicitly, Postone (1995, 21–42) begins to take up these questions when he confronts the opening paragraphs of the *Grundrisse's* section "Foundation/Development Contradiction" (Marx, 1858/1993, 704). In the course of his argument, then, Postone also refers to another crucial section of Marx's *Grundrisse* (Marx, 1858/1993, 321–326), which occurs earlier in that text than any we have considered until now, and which I will take up later in what follows.

First, recall that both Habermas (1963/1974, 1968/1972) and Marcuse (1966, 2013) analyzed the "Foundation/Development Contradiction" section of the *Grundrisse* (Marx, 1858/1993, 704–706) in their work during the 1960s. Postone's (1995) *new* point of departure in regards to that section is starkly evident contrasted with those earlier works, which were also identified with the Critical Theory tradition. First of all, unlike Habermas and Marcuse's Critical Theory approaches preceding his, Postone takes into account Marx's crucial opening remarks in the section, wherein any technological advances in production notwithstanding, *capitalist* production rests on value, a mode of production whose "presupposition is and

remains [despite technological advances] the mass of direct labor time, the quantity of labor employed, as the determinant factor in the production of wealth" (Marx, 1858/1993, 704). Postone writes:

> What characterizes value as a form of wealth … is that it is constituted by the expenditure of direct human labor in the process of production, and it possesses a temporal dimension. Value is a *social form* that expresses and is based on, the expenditure of direct labor *time*. This form, for Marx, is at the very heart of capitalist society. As a category of the fundamental *social relations* that constitute capitalism, value expresses that which is, and remains, the basic foundation of capitalist production. (my emphasis) (Postone, 1995, 25)

In several passages of the "Foundation/Development Contradiction" section of the *Grundrisse*, Marx (1858/1993, 704–706) develops a theory of a deepening contradiction wherein the history of capitalist production, primarily technological developments, undermines direct labor (the expenditure of which remains the foundation of bourgeois production). Also, recall the section in the *Grundrisse* ("Original accumulation") (Marx, 1858/1993, 459–471), which precedes by several hundred pages the "Foundation/Development Contradiction" section. In respect to the former section, I argued above that the attribute that makes labor abstract was shown to be its *freedom*, but as mere *capacity*—separated from the *necessary*, that is, means of existence. Contrasted with that, in the present, "developed" case of the capitalist mode of production, it is the unprecedented and apparently unlimited *growth* of the *means*—what Marx was to eventually characterize as "production for production's sake" (Marx, 1867/1990, 742)—rather than their absolute *scarcity*, which lends to labor its *abstract* quality. In a passage quoted by Postone, Marx writes in the *Grundrisse*:

> Labor no longer appears so much to be included within the production process; rather the human being comes to relate more as watchman and regulator to the production process itself.… He steps to the side of the production process instead of being its chief actor. In this *transformation*, it is neither the direct human labor he himself performs nor the time during which he works, but rather the appropriation of his own general productive power, his understanding of nature and his mastery over it by virtue of his presence as a social body—it is, in a word, the development of the *social individual* which appears as the great foundation stone of production and of wealth. The theft of alien labor time, on which the present wealth is

> based, appears as a miserable foundation in face of this new one, created by large-scale industry itself. (my emphasis) (Marx, 1858/1993, 705, quoted by Postone, 1995, 26–27)

Here, in Marx's analysis of this part of the *Grundrisse* (1858/1993), it is clear that, contrasted with capitalist society, in the post-capitalist society that he conceptualizes, while the human being continues to perform some amount of direct labor, *socially* not only the length of *time* of that labor but also *technically* its very *quality* assume *marginal* positions.[2] Moreover, previously I noted the *persistence* of the contradictory relationship between capitalism's foundation and its development, that is, the relationship internal to the changing *historical* forms of abstract labor and realization of concrete labor. But in the passage above, which points to a *post*-capitalist society, the historical negation of one form of abstract labor by another form appears itself to be negated: The very "foundation" of capitalist production, rather than remaining in contradiction with its process of development, is *abolished not* by yet another form of *labor*, but rather by emergence of *new social relations* characterized by the centrality of the "social individual". Hence, while "direct labor" is indeed *transformed* in its "stepping to the side" of the production process, it is also in a sense abolished—especially in so far it has forfeited its role as the "great foundation stone of production and of wealth". In regard to this "transformation of labor", Postone writes:

> With his theory of value … Marx analyzes the basic social relations of capitalism, its form of wealth, and its material form of production, as interrelated. Because production resting on value, the mode of production founded on wage labor, and industrial production based on proletarian labor are intrinsically related … his conception of the increasingly anachronistic character of value is also one of the increasingly anachronistic character of the industrial process of production developed under capitalism. Overcoming capitalism … entails a fundamental transformation of the material form of production, of the way people work. (Postone, 1995, 27)

[2] Later, I will argue that not only is the social individual a potential post-capitalist foundation of production, compared with Marx's analysis in the *Grundrisse* the *reduced* time and *increased* abstraction of labor apparently associated with a new marginal position for labor in technological *production,* nonetheless assumes a much *greater* not reduced *social* significance, according to Marx's analysis in *Capital*, vol. 1 (1867/1990, 739), *Capital,* vol. 3 (1894/1981, 958–959), and in later works, such as *Critique of the Gotha Program* (1875/2010, 87).

And in regard to the "abolition of labor":

> Hence overcoming capitalism, as presented in the *Grundrisse*, implicitly involves overcoming both the formal and material aspects of the mode of production founded on wage labor. It entails the abolition of a system of distribution based upon the exchange of labor power as a commodity for a wage with which means of consumption are acquired; it also entails the abolition of a system of production based upon proletarian labor, that is, upon the one-sided and fragmented labor characteristic of capitalist industrial production. Overcoming capitalism, in other words, also involves overcoming the concrete labor done by the proletariat. (Postone, 1995, 28)

Hence, Postone's (1995) new Critical Theory approach to Marx's value theory involves developing a *historical* theory of the internal relationship of freedom and social necessity; by the same token then, his approach to this theory development necessarily entails, by way of comparison and contrast, a reinterpretation of Marx's concept of *prehistory*. The basis of Marcuse's interpretation of the latter concept had pivoted on an external comparison of bourgeois class society with the necessity inherent in its "sway of blind economic forces" as against non-class society characterized by "the self-conscious activity of freely associated individuals" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 315–316).[3] Marcuse writes, "The Hegelian dialectic gives the abstract logical form of the pre-historical development, the Marxian dialectic its real concrete movement. Marx's dialectic, therefore, is still bound up with the pre-historical phase" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 315).[4] Postone points *first* to the material conditions as the ground for the redetermination of *necessity*: It is the overcoming of the concrete labor done by the proletariat that characterizes not only the end of capitalism—the "original accumulation" that defined its foundation and remained intrinsic

[3] For Marx's idea of prehistory, Marcuse draws on an early section of Marx's essay, "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic". According to Marcuse, Marx's conception of "prehistory is the history of class society", and "Man's actual history will begin when this society has been abolished" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 316).

[4] As I noted in Chap. 4 on his analysis of Marx's *Capital* on the capitalist labor process, Marcuse does not, in addition, take into account the succeeding parts, especially those on "relative surplus value". For example, in one of the chapters in those parts, "Machinery and Large-Scale Industry", Marx develops the dialectic from, in Postone's analysis, prehistory, not as class society in general, but as characterized by direct labor in production, and the latter's potential overcoming with the application of science and the power of natural forces to material production.

to its development—but the whole period of what Marx called "the prehistory of human society" (Postone, 1995, 28).[5] Postone writes:

> The notion of overcoming proletarian labor implies that "prehistory" should be understood as referring to those social relations in which ongoing surplus production exists and is based primarily on direct human labor. This characteristic is shared by societies in which the surplus is created by slave, serf, or wage labor. Yet the formation based upon wage labor, according to Marx, is uniquely characterized by a dynamic from which arises the historical possibility that surplus production based on human labor as an *internal element* of the process of production can be overcome. (emphasis added) (Postone, 1995, 28–29)[6]

Moreover, Postone's (1995) significant departure here from Marcuse's "class analysis" of the *end of prehistory* is clearest when the *social* transformations in that very *end* are seen as truly epochal, grounded in Marx's analyses in the *Grundrisse* (1858/1993). Postone, in providing what is clearly Marx's elaboration of his concept of the "social individual", depicts how a new social formation from out of capitalism can be created in which "[T]he surplus labour of the mass has ceased to be the condition for the development of general wealth, just as the non-labour of the few, for the development of the general powers of the human head" (Marx 1858/1993, 70, quoted by Postone, 1995, 29). For Postone, then, Marx's analysis in the *Grundrisse* of the *transformation* of labor actually already both *includes* and reaches *beyond* the notion of its abolition. Indeed, it shows how the epochal transformations *in* labor not only shape material production but also continue to resonate even in its "abolition", such that in a historically unprecedented fashion, they deeply affect the very fabric of social life:

> For Marx, then, the end of prehistory signifies the overcoming of the separation and opposition between manual and intellectual labor … His treatment of production in the *Grundrisse* implies that not only the separation of these modes of labor, but also the determining characteristics of each, are

[5] Here, unlike Marcuse, who referred to the early Marx for his concept of "prehistory", Postone, for the same concept, cites Marx's 1859 *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, a work written in the year after the *Grundrisse*. (Also, Marcuse's *Reason and Revolution* (1941/1999) was written *before* Marcuse had access to Marx's *Grundrisse*.)

[6] Marx (1894/1981, 957–958) elaborates this idea leading into his analysis of the necessity and freedom dialectic in the "Trinity Formula" chapter of *Capital,* vol. 3.

> rooted in the existing form of production. Their separation could be overcome only by transforming existing modes of both manual and intellectual labor, that is, by the historical constitution of a new structure and social organization of labor. Such a new structure becomes possible, according to Marx's analysis, when surplus production no longer is *necessarily* based primarily on human labor. (my emphasis) (Postone, 1995, 29)[7]

Even further, Postone elaborates Marx's crucial concept holding that, in a post-capitalist society, the "social individual" was the necessary basis for replacement of surplus labor time as the foundation of production. Postone, in regard to the early section of the *Grundrisse* (1858/1993, 325) I mentioned above, writes:

> People must be able to step *outside* of the direct labor process in which they had previously labored as parts, and control it from above. The control … must be available not only to society as a whole, but to all of its members. (emphasis added) (Postone, 1995, 33)

This is possible only when, according to Marx, "[L]abor in which a human being does what a thing could do has ceased" (Marx, 1858/1993, 325, quoted by Postone, 1995, 33).[8]

In the section of the *Grundrisse* (Marx, 1858/1993, 321–326) from which Postone took the last line of the passage quoted above, and in which Marx discusses his notion of surplus labor time and surplus labor, Marx also develops the *context* for the end of the kind of labor that could be

[7] Postone bases his analysis of the transformation and abolition of labor on his interpretation of Marx's *Grundrisse*. While one of Marcuse's chapters on Marx in *Reason and Revolution* is on "The Abolition of Labor", like his analysis of Marx's concept of "prehistory", he draws on Marx's early writings, that is, the 1845 *German Ideology*.

[8] More than one and a half centuries later, this material condition necessary for bringing prehistory to an end and, according to Postone, first making possible the replacement of surplus labor time by the social individual as the foundation of production, is at the center of a *current* heated debate among (non-Marxist) economists (though none may be conscious of it). On the one hand are mainly labor market economists, principally David Autor (2014), who argue that strict limitations on the substitution of machines for people in the workplace are ontological, citing the philosopher Michael Polanyi, who argued that since "We know more than we can tell", many jobs now being done by humans are not likely to be computer-programmed out of existence. In the other camp are business management economists, such as Eric Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee (2017), who argue that this phenomenon (known as "Polanyi's Paradox") is just now coming under concerted assault by forms of potential automation characterized as "deep learning".

done by a machine. Marx discusses the historical developments of the specifically capitalist mode of production, which shape the immense *potential* of the social conditions arising from it. The conditions are the following: (1) creation of surplus labor, "superfluous labor from the standpoint of mere use value, mere subsistence" (Marx, 1858/1993, 325); (2) fulfillment of capitalist "historic destiny" in "such a development of needs that surplus labor above and beyond necessity has itself become a general need arising out of individual needs themselves" (Marx, 1858/1993, 325); (3) "[O]n the other side, when the severe discipline of capital, acting on succeeding generations, has developed general industriousness as the general property of the new species"(Marx, 1858/1993, 325); (4) "development of the productive powers of labor … have flourished to the stage where the possession and preservation of general wealth require a lesser labor time of society as a whole, and where the laboring society relates scientifically to the process of its progressive reproduction, its reproduction in a constantly greater abundance" (Marx, 1858/1993, 325); and (5) creation of "the material elements for the development of rich individuality which is all-sided in its production as in its consumption, and whose labor no longer appears as labor, but as the full development of activity itself" (Marx, 1858/1993, 325). In regard to the last point, Marx characterizes the development of labor that "no longer appears as labor" as a condition in which "natural necessity in its direct form has disappeared" (Marx, 1858/1993, 325)—the result of "a historically created need" having "taken the place of the natural one" (Marx, 1858/1993, 325).

Equally impressively, following these necessary, material conditions, Marx also develops the other, subjective side, forms of freedom which are equally necessary for ending the period of "prehistory": In the section I have just discussed (Marx, 1858/1993, 321–326), and in the somewhat later section on "Original Accumulation" (Marx, 1858/1993, 459–471), Marx describes broad collective realizations concerning *self*-development marking historical epochs. Additionally, in a section of the *Grundrisse* (Marx, 1858/1993, 711–12) which follows soon after the "Foundation/Development Contradiction" section (Marx, 1858/1993, 704–706), Marx theorizes how the *interaction* of reduced labor time, meaning increased free time, *with* the reorganization of the workplace, points to a revolution in permanence, which catalyzes and animates post-capitalist society. First, in "Original Accumulation", then, Marx describes the overcoming of alienated labor, which he views as the *cause* of alienated property, the "material and instrument", or means, monopolized by the capitalist:

> Thus labor capacity's own labor is as alien to it—and it really is, as regards its direction, etc.—as are material and instrument. Which is why the product then appears to it as a combination of alien material, alien instrument and alien labor—as alien property, and why, after production, it [labor capacity] has become poorer by the life forces expended, but otherwise begins the drudgery anew, existing as a mere subjective labor capacity separated from the conditions of its life. The recognition … of the products as its own, and the judgment that its separation from the conditions of its realization is improper—forcibly imposed—*is an enormous advance in awareness, itself the product of the mode of production resting on capital, and as much the knell to its doom as, with the slave's awareness that he cannot be the property of another, with his consciousness of himself as a person, the existence of slavery becomes a merely artificial, vegetative existence, and ceases to be able to prevail as the basis of production*. (my emphasis) (Marx, 1858/1993, 462–463).[9]

Next, later in the *Grundrisse*, Marx writes:

> The saving of labor time is equal to an increase of free time, i.e. time for the full development of the individual, which in turn reacts back on the productive power of labor as itself the greatest productive power… Free time—which is both idle time and time for higher activity—has naturally transformed its possessor into a different subject, and he then enters into this direct production process as this different subject. (Marx, 1858/1993, 712)

In the above passage, Marx *develops* the idea that he first *introduced* in the earliest section of the *Grundrisse* (1858/1993) we are considering here: "[L]abor that no longer appears as labor, but as the full development of activity itself" (Marx, 1858/1993, 325). Clearly, the passage from Marx's *Grundrisse* quoted above shows that it is the *reciprocity* of reduced labor *time* (in an epochal sense) and labor's *transformation*, which have assumed the central place in Marx's concept of the movement from capitalist to post-capitalist society. Implicitly, Marx's outstanding question is as follows: Since the dialectic continues, not only from work *to* free time, but also from free time *to* work in the realm of necessity, how much will this

[9] Here, Marx's comments support Postone's critique of the traditional Marxist notion of the historical Subject, in that Marx's historical analyses disclose a dialectic of forms of objectivity and subjectivity underlying the capitalist social formation, as well its possible overcoming, Postone convincingly argues that Marx's mature critical theory, far from affirming the concept of subject–object identity, instead has "moved away from the subject-object paradigm and epistemology to a social theory of consciousness" (Postone, 1995, 77).

"different subject" submit to "work" versus how much will *work* have to conform to the collectivity of free individuals?

Postone's (1995) analysis of Marx's *Grundrisse* (1858/1993) shows that Marx develops the concepts of the value and material forms of wealth, with labor *time*, or abstract labor, the determinant of the former and the latter its means (or mere byproduct) (or "form of appearance"). However, even with all of this, Marx's theory of the abolition and transformation of labor within the production process of capitalism is still one-sided—he describes in some detail the impact of automated production in terms of both the developmental process of the capitalist mode of production and the implications for its own ultimate non-viability, and also for the new form of production and social relations that may emerge in its place. Nonetheless, it is still *primarily* a theory of the abolition of direct labor, concrete labor.

It is only in *Capital* (1867/1990) then that Marx *fully* develops the concept of abstract labor. He is able to do so because given even the highest conceivable development of technological production, he puts the concept of concrete labor on an equal footing with abstract labor—so much so that the latter is no more determinate for capitalism and its abolition than is the former: As abstract labor "shapes" concrete labor, concrete labor just as much "determines" abstract labor.

Yet, if there is a transitional passage in Marx's *Grundrisse* (1858/1993), that is to say, in its concepts falls short of but leads most directly into the analysis in Marx's *Capital* (1867/1990), it is the passage I quoted in Chap. 5 (on Habermas) describing capital as a moving contradiction—its underlying tendency to diminish labor time in the *necessary* form so as to increase it in its *superfluous* form. This, according to Marx, makes the superfluous increasingly the condition for the necessary (Marx, 1858/1993, 706). This analysis leads naturally into Marx's concept of socially necessary labor time as underlying the dialectics of concrete and abstract labor, and abstract and concrete time, which, according to Postone (1995), are the basic concepts of Marx's *Capital*.

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CHAPTER 8

Moishe Postone's Deepened Interpretation of Marx's Value Theory: Capital

Marx's description of capital in the *Grundrisse*—a "moving contradiction" (Marx, 1858/1993, 706) wherein the relationship of natural and social necessity undergoes reversals—includes, but only in embryo, Marx's concept of *socially necessary labor time*. This concept is crucial to the inception and development of his theory of the unique twofold character of labor in capitalism, concrete labor and abstract labor. *Concrete* labor, originally the principal element of the mediation of man and nature constituting an historical form of necessity, metamorphoses into a "mere" form of appearance of *abstract* labor. Hence, abstract labor becomes the *social* necessary and, as will become clearer in the following, concrete labor at the same time undergoes a transformation from necessity to freedom.

First of all, Marx will develop the concept of socially necessary labor *time* as the core of his theory of abstract labor and the production of value and surplus value—the capitalist mode of production—and only later concrete labor's determination of that very labor time constituting abstract labor. Since in *Capital*, Marx elaborates this idea in a part of the work closely analyzed by Postone (1995) and not by Marcuse, that is, in Part 4, "The production of relative surplus value" (Marx, 1867/1990, 429–639), I will first look at some related, preliminary concepts, which were taken up by both theorists, before moving on to those aspects of Marx's theory taken up by Postone alone, especially the *relationships* of socially necessary labor time and abstract and concrete time.

R. Rockwell, *Hegel, Marx, and the Necessity and Freedom Dialectic*,
Political Philosophy and Public Purpose,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75611-0_8

8.1 "Necessity" and "Freedom", Pre-capitalism and Capitalism

Both Marcuse and Postone interpret Marx's value theory, in part by criticizing any notion that bourgeois forms of freedom, particularly political volition such as state planning of the economy, could significantly alter the mode in which value production determines and shapes capitalist social relations. These could not fundamentally alter even the overt forms of social domination engendered by this mode of production, for example, hierarchies as such in the material production process, the industrial form of production characteristic of capitalism, and distribution of the means of consumption, let alone the abstract forms taken up in original ways by Postone. Marcuse in fact argues that the concept of necessity is the one that "definitely connects Marx's dialectic with the history of class society" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 317), and yet notes, "Capitalism has been subjected … to large-scale political and administrative regulations" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 318). Citing Marx's post-*Capital* work, *Critique of the Gotha Program* (Marx, 1875/2010), Marcuse notes that state planning of the economy "is not an exclusive feature of socialist society" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 318). Likewise, with Postone (1995): His negative assessment of the widely held view that value is the "principle of capitalism", while state planning is the "principle of socialism" (Postone, 1995, 147), is central to his *critique* of traditional Marxism's understanding of value.

However, Marcuse's point on the concept of necessity being the one definitely connecting Marx's dialectic with the history of *class society*, that is, Marx's analyses of the historical interplay of chance and necessity, moreover, of "conscious action and blind mechanisms" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 318), is not entirely in accord with Postone's views on this subject. For example, in the section on "Abstract Labor and Social Mediation" (Postone, 1995, 148–157), which I will take up extensively in the following, Postone writes of the "interrelated categories" Marx developed in the early parts of *Capital* (Marx, 1867/1990) (commodity, value, and abstract labor), which actually parallel the analysis I already reviewed in Marx's *Grundrisse* (1858/1993).

> We are dealing with a *new sort of interdependence*, one that emerged historically in a slow, spontaneous, and contingent way. Once the social formation based upon this new form of social interdependence became fully developed, however (which occurred when labor power became a commodity), it acquired a necessary and systematic character; it has increasingly undermined, incorporated, and superseded other social forms, while becoming global in scale. (my emphasis) (Postone, 1995, 148)

The passage brings out this difference, while Marcuse argues that social necessity is intrinsic to *class* society generally, Postone shows that *social* necessity is characteristic of only *one* form of class society, that is, the *capitalist* form. This indicates that the thrust of Postone's analysis of capitalism will be to bring out what is specific to that social formation in contrast to *all* those preceding it (and may follow it).

8.2 Whole and Totality

8.2.1 Marcuse, Negative Totality, and the Reduction of Concrete to Abstract Labor

Differing concepts of social totality are key to recognizing Marcuse's and Postone's interpretations of social necessity, and these differences are significant in the trajectory of Marxist theory from Georg Lukács to the present. (In the next chapter, I shall also try to show that these differences are actually closely connected to their contrasting interpretations of Marx's philosophical debt to Hegel, especially the quality of the new form of social interdependence based on abstract labor.) In an original, brilliant analysis in *Reason and Revolution* in the concluding chapter on Marx, "The Marxian Dialectic", Marcuse (1941/1999, 312–322) undertakes to distinguish the Marxian from the Hegelian dialectic. Perhaps unprecedented in Marxist theory since Lukács, he tries to specify the uniquely capitalist form of social interdependence and the dialectical process of thought and actuality bound up with it.[1] In doing so, he first closely analyzes characteristics common to both Hegel and Marx's dialectic. Both, says Marcuse, are "motivated by the same datum … the negative character of reality" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 312). Marx developed this dialectic of negativity for the *social world* in terms of the contradictions internal to any society divisible according to social class. Hence, in holding that the dialectic of negativity for Marx "*remained* the motor of the social process"

[1] Postone analyzes Lukács's theory of the Subject and finds the epistemology associated with it "deeply inconsistent" (1995, 73). Although Lukács's aim is, by means of an analysis of the commodity form and an original "materialist appropriation of Hegel", to demonstrate that Marx's "categories attempt to overcome the classical subject-object dualism", and "refer to forms of practice that are forms of objectivity and subjectivity", he ends up re-establishing the traditional Marxist definitions of capitalism "essentially in terms of private ownership of the means of production", wherein "labor" is considered the standpoint of critique (Postone, 1995, 73). In Chap. 9, I take up Postone's analysis by describing a series of Marx's autocritiques in respect to Hegel's dialectic.

(my emphasis) (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 312), Marcuse indicated that it retained the role in Marx's critical social theory it had originally assumed in Hegel's philosophy of society. More importantly, Marcuse further notes that in the concept of "negative totality", "[F]or Marx as for Hegel, the 'truth' lies only in the *whole*" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 313). Again: "Every single fact and condition was drawn into this process so that its significance could be grasped only when seen in this *totality* to which it belonged" (my emphasis) (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 312–313).

Marcuse thus describes the "identity" of Hegel and Marx's dialectic. This analysis centers on the concepts of the whole and totality, concepts that Marcuse, keep in mind, uses interchangeably. In contrast, as we shall see, Postone's (1995) reinterpretations focus on drawing a distinction between these two concepts, whole and totality. But staying for the moment with Marcuse's analysis, which continues to focus on the "reduction" of concrete to abstract labor, he provides an original analysis of the interpenetration of the philosophical and social:

> [T]he social world becomes a negative totality only in the process of an abstraction, which is imposed upon the dialectical method by the structure of its subject matter, capitalist society. We may even say that the abstraction is capitalism's own work, and that the Marxian method only follows this process. Marx's analysis has shown that capitalist economy is built upon and perpetuated by the *constant reduction of concrete to abstract labor*. This economy step by step retreats from the concrete of human activity and needs, and achieves the integration of individual activities and needs only through a complex of abstract relations in which individual work counts merely in so far as it represents socially necessary labor time, and in which the relations among men appear as relations of things (commodities). (my emphasis) (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 313)

Thus, according to Marcuse's analysis, Marx's method, like Hegel's, involves a concept of totality in a determination of the relationship of, on the one hand, the socio-historical, and, on the other, theory.[2]

[2] In Marcuse's analysis of Hegel's *Science of Logic*, he nonetheless suggested that Hegel's recognition of historical social contradictions preceded the general theory of the dialectic, which "shakes the foundation of Idealism" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 148). Also, Marcuse indicated that Hegel was on a materialist track, but was frightened by social forces, and consequently tended to "dissolve the element of historical practice and replace it with the independent reality of thought" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 161).

The *difference* in the two forms of dialectical thought, Hegel's versus Marx's, according to Marcuse, is the following: In the passage above, history determines Marx's social theory. Marx's theory develops through tracing the historical impact of abstract labor on the social world, in other words, the socially consequential negation of concrete labor. Quite the reverse, Hegel's method—"a universal ontological one"—patterned history on the "metaphysical process of being" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 314). Thus, according to Marcuse, Marx's dialectic of the totality is one in which "the negativity of reality becomes a *social* condition, associated with a particular historical form of society" (my emphasis) (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 314). While Hegel's dialectic was the "totality of reason, a closed ontological system, finally identical with the rational system of history" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 314), Marx's totality is "the totality of class society, and the negativity that underlies its contradictions and shapes its every content is the negativity of class relations" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 314). For Marcuse, social necessity is a function of the reduction of the concrete to the abstract.

8.2.2 Postone's Interpretation of Marx's Concept of Social Interdependence—Value

Postone's (1995) new Critical Theory approach corresponds with Marcuse's analysis to a point, but departs from it in decisive ways. It is in accord with that part of Marcuse's analysis that identifies abstraction as "capitalism's own work", his identification of abstract labor unique to the capitalist social formation. Also, Postone's interpretation notes the highly significant relationship of Marx's method and the social process associated with abstract labor, when he writes, "In Marx's analysis, the category of abstract labor expresses this real social process of abstraction; it is not simply based on a conceptual process of abstraction" (Postone, 1995, 152).

But Postone's approach also significantly *differs* from Marcuse's concept of social interdependence in a broad sense. Marcuse characterizes the social interdependence associated with capitalism as constituted by a *unilinear*, totalizing abstraction, the core of which is the reduction of concrete to abstract labor. This implies the growing predominance—in a linear fashion—of the social effects of abstract labor. (Postone's different approach to labor and social interdependence thus also entails a reinterpretation of the relationship of the Hegelian and Marxian dialectics, which I will address in the next chapter). Postone's concept of abstract (and concrete) labor, in

contrast with Marcuse's descriptions of the intensifying social effects of the "constant" reduction of concrete to abstract labor, begins with an interpretation that classifies the labor in the twofold concept of labor as representing *two forms* of a "whole", both of which continue to subsist, and in their historical, ongoing dynamic *relationship* constitutes the capitalist social formation. Labor in capitalism is thus conceived as "*two* dimensional" (my emphasis) (Postone, 1995, 151), a "self-grounding mediation" (Postone, 1995, 151). Describing the latter, Postone writes:

> In a society characterized by the universality of the commodity form … an individual does not acquire goods produced by others through the medium of overt social relations. Instead, labor itself—either directly or expressed in its products—replaces those relations by serving as an "objective" means by which the products of others are acquired. *Labor itself constitutes a social mediation in lieu of overt social relations.* (emphasis in original) (Postone, 1995, 150)

Postone thus specifies the intrinsic connection of concrete labor and abstract labor by elucidating the conceptual *relationship* of the "whole" and the "totality". Marcuse employs both of the latter terms in his analysis, but he does not distinguish the one from the other, and considers the *relationship* of the two, as Postone does in the following:

> In producing use values, labor in capitalism can be regarded as an intentional activity that transforms material in a determinate fashion—what Marx terms "concrete labor." The *function* of labor as a social mediating activity is what he terms abstract labor… In constituting a self-grounding social mediation, labor constitutes a *determinate* sort of social whole—a totality. (my emphasis) (Postone, 1995, 150–151)

In this, Postone emphasizes the key theoretical difference internal to labor in capitalism between, on the one hand, "the [concrete] labor of all commodity producers", each the "particular part of a whole" (Postone, 1995, 152) and, on the other, the *function* of *abstract* labor. It is the *relationship* of the two facets internal to labor—the particular and the general—that makes totality the "*determinate* sort of a social whole".

> [B]ecause each individual labor functions in the same socially mediating way that all the others do, their abstract labors taken together do *not* constitute an immense collection of various abstract labors but a *general* social mediation… Their products thus constitute a *socially total mediation—value*. (Postone, 1995, 162)

With this, then, I have shown that in analyzing the twofold character of labor and social mediation, as opposed to Marcuse's apparent concept of one-way reduction of concrete to abstract labor, Postone introduced conceptual distinctions between a "whole" and a "totality" (the latter a "determinate" sort of the former).

Relatedly, Postone also describes two theoretically crucial forms of the "general", which will be important for his interpretations of Marx's overall mature critical theory (Postone, 1995, 360).[3] First, he makes the point that, "As *a practice* that constitutes a social mediation, labor is labor in general" (my emphasis) (Postone, 1995, 152). Moreover, in a society in which commodity production has become generalized, everyone's labor must be the means by which the products of others can be obtained. Hence, the labor itself, the *way* of obtaining the products of others, *and* the socially mediating activity—*all three*—are "general".

Against this, though, the most theoretically significant point is not the generalities made up of each of the particular social practices. Rather, according to Postone, "[T]he *character* of the mediation is socially general as well" (Postone, 1995, 152). To make this point, Postone elaborates on how the fundamental *difference* between concrete and abstract labor underlies the types of generality they may represent. All the labors of the commodity producers taken together represent particular parts of a whole, according to Marx, an "immense collection of commodities" in the form of use values. Just the same, and reminiscent of abstract labor, "all of their labors constitute social mediations" (Postone, 1995, 152.) *But* far from the concrete labors comprising a socially constitutive generality that distinguishes capitalism, Postone writes:

> Viewed from the perspective of society as a whole, the concrete labor of the individual is particular and is *part* of a qualitatively heterogeneous *whole*; as abstract labor, however, it is an individuated moment of a qualitatively

[3] Postone's analysis unfolds the two types of the general associated with concrete and abstract labor in his concept of the growing shearing pressure between the existent and the determinate form: Though both dimensions of social labor—value and use value—are dimensions of capital, "it is value that constitutes the foundation of capitalism and is necessarily bound to it. The use value dimension is, to be sure, constituted in a form that is shaped by capital; unlike value, however, it is not bound necessarily to capital…This tension both reinforces capital and gives rise to the possibility that the two constitutive dimensions of the structuring relations of capital be separated. It points toward the possible separation of society from its capitalist form" (Postone, 1995, 360).

> homogenous, general social mediation constituting a social totality… This duality of the concrete and the abstract characterizes the capitalist social formation. (Postone, 1995, 152)

Now, having apparently associated the theoretically *significant* type of the "general" exclusively with abstract labor, Postone proceeds to nonetheless point out the *reflexive* importance of the link of *concrete* to abstract labor after all. He now argues, "[T]he constitution of the duality of the abstract and concrete by the commodity form of social relations entails the constitution of two different sorts of generality" (Postone, 1995, 152). The first, which I just reviewed, is the "abstract general dimension … rooted in labor's function as a socially mediating activity" (Postone, 1995, 152). In this, "all forms of labor and labor products are rendered equivalent" (Postone, 1995, 152–153). The second sort of generality, *also* a social function of labor, "establishes another form of commonality among the particular sorts of labor and labor products" (Postone, 1995, 153). In a sense, this sort of generality is even *prior* to the sort that renders *equivalence* because this social function of labor establishes their very identity—*as* labor and labor products:

> [T]he social function of labor … entails their [labor and labor products] de facto classification as labor and as labor products. Because any particular sort of labor can function as abstract labor and any labor product can serve as a commodity, activities and products that, in other societies, might *not* be classified as similar *are* classified in capitalism as similar, as varieties of (concrete) labor or as particular use values…. [T]he abstract generality historically constituted by abstract labor also establishes "concrete labor" and "use value" as general categories; but this generality is that of a heterogeneous whole, made up of particulars, rather than that of a homogenous totality. (Postone, 1995, 153)

Postone's distinction between "these two forms of generality, of the totality and the whole" (Postone, 1995, 153) implies an early, though fundamental, critique of Marcuse's (1941/1999) interpretation of Marx's *Capital* (1867/1990), especially its early chapters, which introduce and elaborate the twofold concept of labor. To get to the bottom of this critique, it is most important to keep in mind Postone's focus on a new *form* of social interdependence, which coalesced with the consolidation of capitalism. Postone emphasizes that while the overt forms of social relations, such as kinship relations, and relations of direct, personal domination,

continue to exist, the new forms of social interdependence characteristic of capitalism are "ultimately structured by a new underlying level of social relatedness which cannot be grasped adequately in terms of the overtly social relations among people or groups—including classes" (Postone, 1995, 153).

Postone illustrates this point in a reference to Marx's *Grundrisse* (1858/1993). Postone writes that "[T]he categories of an adequate critique … must grasp not only the contradictory character of the totality but also the basis of the sort of unfreedom that characterizes it" (Postone, 1995, 124). He points out that Marx outlines three basic historical social forms—pre-capitalist, capitalist, and post-capitalist: Pre-capitalist society, in its many variations, according to Marx, is based on "relations of personal dependence" (Postone, 1995, 125); "[C]apitalism … based on the commodity form … is characterized by personal independence in the framework of a system of objective [*sachlicher*] dependence… What constitutes that 'objective' dependence is social'"; (Postone, 1995, 125). Postone quotes Marx: "[It] is 'nothing more than social relations which have become independent and now enter into opposition to the seemingly independent individuals; i.e.; the reciprocal relations of production separated from and autonomous of individuals'" (Marx, 1858/1993, 164, quoted by Postone, 1995, 125). Thus, the reciprocal relation of "freedom" and "necessity" underlies the dynamic of abstract and concrete labor characteristic of the capitalist social form. Hence, post-capitalist society is one in which not only the concrete, personal relations of dependence are absent, but abstract forms of compulsion, or social domination, have also been abolished.

8.2.3 Marcuse's Transhistorical Concept of Social Totality and Postone's Reflections on Marx's Concepts of Abstract and Substantive Totality

Yet, as I described above, Marcuse's analyses in the concluding chapter on Marx in *Reason and Revolution*, "The Marxian Dialectic" (Marcuse 1941/1999, 312–322), pivot on the idea of class relations constitutive of what he conceives as the capitalist social totality. Marcuse further interprets this totality as a particular one, and its dissolution also particular, in other words, not the end of social totality as such. For Marcuse, the end of capitalist class relations marks the end of a series of social forms recognizable by their class relations. Hence, with the abolition of capitalism

comes the end of prehistory (identified with necessity), and the beginnings of history (identified with freedom). Marcuse writes:

> The totality that the Marxian dialectic gets to is the totality of class society, and the negativity that underlies its contradictions and shapes its every content is the negativity of class relations… The negative state as well as its negation is a concrete event within the same totality. (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 314, 315)

In fact, as I showed above, Marcuse's interpretation of Marx's concept of "prehistory" had pivoted not on the unique potential developing within *capitalist* class society, but on an external comparison of bourgeois class society with its "sway of blind economic forces" as against non-class society characterized by "the self-conscious activity of freely associated individuals". Thus, Marcuse's concept of totality still tries to grasp capitalist social relations "in terms of the overtly social relations among people or groups" (Postone, 1995, 153), and attempts to trace the negation of one form of historical totality (class society) by another (socialism).

On the contrary, Postone's concept of labor as the social mediation *specific* to capitalism distinguishes between social wholes and totality. It thus theorizes an original "level of social interrelatedness" (Postone, 1995, 153)—*social totality itself as specific to capitalism*—characterized by a "single, abstract, homogenous sort of relation [that] underlies every aspect of social life" (Postone, 1995, 153). Postone writes:

> The Marxian theory does, of course, include an analysis of class exploitation and domination, but it goes beyond investigating the unequal distribution of wealth and power within capitalism to grasp the very nature of its social fabric, its peculiar form of wealth, and its intrinsic form of domination. (Postone, 1995, 151)

The originality of Postone's interpretations can be seen against the backdrop of Marcuse's interpretations of the Hegelian–Marxian dialectic. Marcuse's view that "the concept that definitely connects Marx's dialectic with the history of class society is the concept of necessity" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 317) implies then that freedom is the connecting concept within socialism. Similar to his descriptions of concrete and abstract labor, and of the individual and the social, wherein in both cases the former is reduced to the latter, with regard to necessity and freedom, the process of

the negation of the former by the latter, each a separate totality, characterizes large-scale historical changes in social relations. Above I noted the importance of the necessity and freedom dialectic in connection with Marx's outline of the three great social, historical forms of pre-capitalist, capitalist, and post-capitalist society. In the following, I will attempt to make clear the extent to which Postone's interpretations of abstract and concrete labor, constitutive of capitalist society, are informed by and deepen this dialectic of necessity and freedom for an adequate conception of post-capitalist society.

In developing his reinterpretation of Marx's mature critical theory, Postone (1995) pays close attention to Marx's immanent presentation of the categories in *Capital* (Marx, 1867/1990). In a brief but key section on Marx's concepts of abstract and substantive totality (Postone, 1995, 183–185), Postone reflects on his analysis of the theory thus far. With the concepts of value and commodity-determined labor—especially the latter's twofold character—Marx analyzed social totality. Two aspects of this analysis are of great importance: the totality that begins to define capitalist society thus far arrived at remains on the level of the commodity (not yet capital) and, according to Postone, in unfolding the commodity form as capitalist *society*, Marx will show that *social totality as such* is specific to that (capitalist) form of society. Postone emphasizes that Marx's immanent critique moves from the abstract to the concrete. Accordingly, Marx's analysis of the twofold character of labor begins with his consideration of abstract labor. In Postone's interpretation, Marx's analysis unfolds the social totality by first abstracting from the other dimension of capitalist labor—concrete labor. Postone points out the perils of overlooking Marx's method:

> If the investigation were to stop here, it might seem as though what I have analyzed as the alienated social bond in capitalism does not—given its formal character—differ fundamentally from the market. The analysis of alienation presented thus far could be appropriated and reinterpreted by a theory that would focus on money as the medium of exchange rather than labor as a mediating activity. (Postone, 1995, 183)

According to Postone, it is Marx's analysis that *follows* his focus on the commodity and money that dispel any notion of a static and formal quality and instead characterizes the "alienated social bond" as having a "directionally dynamic character" (Postone, 1995, 184). Capitalism's immanent historical dynamic is first attributable to its form of social mediation, the

double character of labor, which underlies abstract social compulsions: production is not for consumption but rather for its own sake—"production as its own goal" (Postone, 1995, 184).

Yet, Postone emphasizes the social character of labor as a productive activity that *interacts* with the abstract dimension; the former is defined already but not yet *developed* in the first pages of Marx's *Capital*—"the social organization of the process of production, the average skill of the working population, the level of the development, and the application of science, among other factors" (Marx, 1867/1990, 130, quoted by Postone, 1995, 184). Postone writes:

> In order to analyze how [the abstract and concrete dimensions] determine each other, I shall first examine the quantitative and temporal dimension of value; this will allow me to show—in elucidating the dialectic of labor and time—that, with the capital form, the social dimension of concrete labor is incorporated into the alienated dimension constituted by abstract labor. (Postone, 1995, 185)

8.3 The Qualitative Distinction of Time as Social Domination

In the following, I shall show that in taking up time, labor, and social domination Postone's (1995) reinterpretation of Marx's critical theory, contrasted especially with Marcuse's positions I just outlined above, involves two main areas. Postone provides extensive analyses of a theory of abstract time implicit in Marx's early categories in *Capital* (Marx, 1867/1990, 125–177). He then amplifies this analysis with some original historical research on the question, which suggests a socio-historical change in the concept and experience of time itself, thus suggesting that in Marx's theory, time itself is a socio-historical phenomenon (Postone, 1995, 200–216). In addition, in his third and final Part, Postone provides an original interpretation of Marx's development of the concept of the twofold character of labor in chapters of *Capital* that follow those taken up in Marcuse's interpretations. Thus, in the next sections, I continue to follow Postone's development of his analysis of the basic social relations characteristic of capitalism. Only in the last section, I consider Postone's account of the "trajectory of production", that is, the production of "relative surplus value" in capitalist cooperation, manufacture and machinery, large-scale industry, and historical time.

Up to now, I have attempted to describe Postone's approach, in which he argues that basic social relations characteristic of capitalism are constituted by labor. Now, Postone notes that just as important for his interpretations, "What also characterizes these social forms, according to Marx, is their temporal dimension and quantifiability. Marx introduces these aspects of the commodity form early in his discussion when he considers the problem of the magnitude of value" (Postone, 1995, 186).

Indeed, Postone's analysis of the problem of the magnitude of value, which he considers in a chapter focused on abstract time in the part on the commodity, includes an elaboration of his concepts of social necessity, and the value and material forms of wealth. In these, he refers predominately to the first two sections of the first chapter of *Capital* (Marx, 1867/1990, 125–137). Significantly, however, Postone's chapter I am referring to here, titled "Abstract Time" (Postone, 1995, 186–225), also includes within it a *section* with the same title. In this section (which I do not take up in detail), Postone provides a historical analysis of the origins of abstract time as intrinsic to the consolidation of the capitalist social formation in Western Europe in the thirteenth to the fourteenth centuries (Postone, 1995, 200–216). Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind as we proceed that, up to and inclusive of this point, Postone's analysis—of abstract labor, then of abstract time—remains on the level of Marx's presentation of the commodity. Thus, it is only in regard to Part III on capital in Postone's work, which *follows* his initial interpretations of Marx's concepts of abstract labor and abstract time in the earliest sections of *Capital,* that I can begin to examine his reinterpretations of Marx's concept of capital, most importantly the interactions of concrete and abstract labor, abstract and historical time, relative surplus value, and the "trajectory of production".

8.3.1 Abstract Time, Social Necessity, and Concrete Time

As I just noted above, the aspects of Postone's interpretations of Marx's "mature critical theory" taken up in my review thus far are those related to his analysis of the commodity. In fact, to further clarify the structure of Postone's analysis, it will be helpful to note that his work, *Time, Labor and Social Domination* (1995), is presented in three parts. After the first part, a "critique of traditional Marxism", the next two parts, which are approximately of equal length, take up stages of a "reconstruction of the Marxian critique", first the commodity (three chapters) and then the capital (also three chapters). The chapters making up the part on the commodity deal

with, respectively, abstract labor, abstract time, and Habermas's critique of Marx (which I touched upon in Chap. 5, and will not be taking up here); the chapters making up the next part on capital include, "Toward a theory of capital"; "The dialectic of labor and time"; and "The trajectory of production".

Above, I analyzed the first chapter on the commodity, that is, Postone's interpretations of abstract labor, particularly by comparing and contrasting them with Marcuse's theories. In the following, then, I will continue the comparison with Marcuse in taking up Postone's original analysis of Marx's concepts of abstract time, particularly the magnitude of value (Postone, 1995, 186–192) and the forms of social necessity associated with it, including the determination of socially necessary labor time in the fundamental contradiction that defines the value and material forms of wealth (Postone, 1995, 193–200). Finally, in concluding my discussion of his part on the commodity, I will discuss Postone's introduction of the concept of "concrete time" in the context of his discussion of abstract time (Postone, 1995, 201–202).

Concrete time, and its interaction with abstract time (Postone, 1995, 291), will lead into Postone's key concept of historical time. The latter, as a form of concrete time, interacts with abstract time, points to Postone's important conclusive break with Marcuse's interpretations, and opens the way for his discussion of Marx's developed critique, that is, of capital itself.

8.3.2 Abstract Time, the "Magnitude of Value", and Time as Necessity: Critique of Marcuse's Concept of the Measure and Form of Value

We saw the way in which Marx explicitly singled out his concept of the twofold nature of capitalist labor (abstract and concrete), noting that he was the first to recognize and examine it critically (Marx, 1867/1990, 132). Apparently, there is no such helpful marker to be found in respect to the associated concepts of abstract time and concrete time. Postone's (1995) explication of abstract time proceeds by following his chapter on abstract labor with an entire chapter on abstract time (both are included in the part on the commodity in his "reconstruction of the Marxian critique"). The concept abstract time is only implicit in Marx's *Capital* (1867/1990), and Postone elucidates it through an analysis of the earliest parts of Chapter 1 of that work. In addition, a *section* within Postone's Abstract Time chapter, also titled "abstract time", contains Postone's

original historical research, which identifies the time in a capitalist society as a historically specific sort of time (Postone, 1995, 215).

Postone initiates his discussion of *abstract time* by dissecting Marx's (1867/1990) concept of the magnitude of *value* (Postone, 1995, 186). Thus, Postone's argument implies that the necessary first step toward grasping the concept of abstract time is further clarification of the concept of value. In my analysis of Marcuse's interpretations of the movement from Hegel to Marx regarding the social and historical implications of the concepts of labor and time in his examination of the labor process and the law of value in *Reason and Revolution* (Marcuse, 1941/1999), I argued that Marcuse uncovered Marx's implicit *critique* of Hegel's "negation" (by quantity of labor time) of the qualitative side of labor in two ways. First Marcuse implies that Marx's critique of Hegel's theory involves the former's appropriation of the latter's concept of the "reduction" of concrete to abstract labor—yet the "reduction" to abstract labor in *Marx's* theory, according to Marcuse's interpretation, ultimately implies the *abolition* of labor time altogether, not, as in Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* (1820/2000), its mere limitation. In Hegel's theory, the *significance* of the reduction of quality to quantity of labor is, however, *already* social, centered in the historical divide between slavery and "free labor", specifically in the concept of labor time versus non-labor time. Since there was an explicit demarcation between time belonging to the lord and one's own time, although the bulk of modern labor may actually be rendered *menial* even compared with much of the labor performed by the slave, the laborer was *not* the property of someone else, retained personality, and remained in the realm of right.

Crucially for Marx (1867/1990), the reduction of the qualitative to the quantitative apparently excludes the possibility that the *entire* time of my concrete labor, and the totality of my produce, would become the property of someone else such that I would no longer be a person and would place myself outside of the realm of right. Yet such dehumanization is seen to return as a virtual possibility *within* the working day. And in this there would be no clear demarcation of the division of time between the worker and the capitalist, a point emphasized in Marcuse's (1941/1999) interpretation of concrete labor as a form of appearance of abstract labor. The limit on labor time belonging to the lord had apparently excluded the possibility of the conditions of slavery; but within the capitalist working day, the drive to extract surplus value logically implied restricting to the smallest proportion possible the *paid* part of the working day. As we shall see later, especially in

taking up relative surplus value and "machinery and large-scale industry", this paid part of the working day may indeed become miniscule.

Second, within his interpretation of Marx's (1867/1990) concept of the twofold nature of labor, which he conceptualizes as a version of Hegel's (1820/2000) idea that abstract labor, or labor measured by time, negates concrete labor in a social sense, Marcuse (1941/1999) nonetheless posits a residual (though also hidden) *social force* internal to *concrete* labor. At once, the latter serves as a (qualitative) form of appearance of the worker's side of equal exchange *and* actually *hides* surplus labor time (quantitative), which falls to the capitalist. Moreover, concrete labor, according to Marcuse, has its own hidden form as well—*within* the negating labor time, each instance of which creates new value, the negated concrete labor of the individual (qualitative) nonetheless preserves and transfers to the product the *value* of the means of production.

Yet as penetrating as Marcuse's (1941/1999) analysis appears, it unfolds along the limited historical continuum of the interaction of the *qualitative* and *quantitative* aspects of the twofold character of *labor*. Aside from deeper theoretical considerations, especially of the analysis of the *magnitude* of value for further *qualitative* determinations of the social formation, which I will discuss below, such an analysis of labor is adequate only to the *manufacturing* stage of capitalism, not to Marx's detailed description of "Machinery and Large-Scale Industry", let alone a concept of post-capitalist society parallel to Hegel's (1820/2000) theory of the movement out of slave society to a new society.

At the manufacturing stage of capitalist development, direct individual labor, labor "inside" the production process, can still be conceived of as "labor being of a specialized kind that has a special object (*durch die zweckmässige Form der Arbeit*)" (Marx, 1867/1990, 308, quoted in Marcuse, 1941/1999, 308), and is still central to material wealth production. Marx takes up this stage of capitalist production in the early chapters of *Capital* (Marx, 1867/1990). These chapters still deal primarily with the commodity form (of the mode of production) rather than the capital form. Hence, Marcuse's analysis in *Reason and Revolution* (1941/1999) is consistent with (and hardly goes further than) a concept of the magnitude of value around which revolves issues concerning the quantity and social distribution of what Marx termed absolute surplus value flowing from class conflict, especially struggles concerning the length of the working day. In contrast, Postone (1995) suggests that a reinterpretation of Marx's concept of the *magnitude* of value is necessary, first of all, to clarify basic elements

of value proper, the "value form", such as abstract time and social mediation, and ultimately the movement from absolute surplus value to relative surplus value, and capital itself, the latter two of which are *not* substantially covered by Marcuse.

Earlier, I showed how Marcuse (1941/1999) argued that *abstract labor* measured by time constituted the *social* form of labor—a form that *by virtue of its being social* characterized and prevailed in capitalism *alone*. "The metabolic relationship between man and nature" was the "natural form of labor", or was "concrete labor"—at least conceivable as such prior to its molding by capitalist abstract labor. In contrast, the capitalist economy (and society) is "built upon and perpetuated by the *constant reduction of concrete to abstract labor*" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 313).

In a departure that is fundamental for his reinterpretations of this theory, Postone (1995) *notes that concrete labor, no less than abstract labor, is capitalist labor and is social.* In the section of *Time, Labor, and Social Domination*, "Abstract and Substantive Totality" (Postone, 1995, 183–185), which serves as a transition in the work between parts on abstract labor and abstract time (and which I described above), Postone writes that the "abstract *social* dimension of labor as a *socially* mediating activity … should not be confused with the *social* character of labor as a productive activity" (emphasis added) (Postone, 1995, 184). In other words, though concrete labor and abstract labor are two different dimensions of the labor specific to capitalism, *both* are social.

That *both* dimensions of labor are social, each in a particular way, is *crucial* for how Postone distinguishes his analysis of Marx's critical social theory as a *basic* reinterpretation of Marx's late texts. Above I pointed out how Marcuse (1941/1999, 169–223) presented his interpretation of Marx's concept of the labor process through, first, an original analysis of Hegel's theory of labor and time in the latter's work, *The Philosophy of Right* (1820/2000). Later in the same text, *Reason and Revolution* (1941/1999), Marcuse extended this analysis to Marx's *Capital* (1867/1990), an analysis which primarily interpolated early and late chapters of *Capital*: vol. 1, with references to *Capital*, vol. 3 (1894/1981). In doing so, with the important exception of his development of the idea of concrete labor as a form of appearance of abstract labor, Marcuse extended and deepened Hegel's analyses of the qualitative and quantitative sides of labor.

Postone's (1995) discussion of Marx's concept of the magnitude of value goes beyond the analysis of the qualitative and quantitative sides of labor. He begins by singling out for criticism theoretical positions of Marxists as seemingly diverse as those associated with Paul Sweezy and Isaac Illich

Rubin (Postone, 1995, 186). Attentive to directions in Marx's text related to the concept, Sweezy and Rubin attempted to provide, in addition to explanations of the quantitative aspects of the concept magnitude of value, also qualitative analyses of the social structure associated with it as well. However, Postone notes, "[S]uch theories do not go far enough. They undertake a qualitative analysis of the social content of value but treat the magnitude of value only in quantitative terms" (Postone, 1995, 187). Postone's general critique of the limitations of the interpretations of the magnitude of value like those of Sweezy and Rubin, which attempt to analyze its qualitative (as well as quantitative) side, cites as the prime example each of the theorists' similar descriptions of the determination of the distribution of labor—in Sweezy's view, "the laws which govern the allocation of the labor force to different spheres of production" (Postone, 1995, 187) and, for Rubin, "the quantitative interrelations among the quantities of social labor distributed among the different branches of production and different enterprises" (Postone, 1995, 187). For Sweezy, "[T]he task of qualitative value theory is to analyze these laws in terms of the nature of social relations and modes of consciousness" (Postone, 1995, 187). For his part, Rubin points to the importance of the "qualitative sociological side of Marx's theory of value" for seeing the magnitude of value as a "regulator for the quantitative distribution of social labor" (Postone, 1995, 187).

Postone grants that these interpretations, "do not … treat the magnitude of value in a narrow quantitative sense—that is, in terms of relative exchange values alone—as does political economy. They do, however, treat it only as the quantification of the qualitative dimension of value" (Postone, 1995, 187). In fact, in terms of these qualitative assessments of society, Postone concludes that their critical thrust focuses on social distribution rather than production—they "interpret the categories of value and the magnitude of value solely in terms of the lack of conscious social regulation of distribution in capitalism, [and] implicitly conceive of the historical negation of capitalism only in terms of public planning in the absence of private property" (Postone, 1995, 188).[4]

[4] Earlier, I noted how Marcuse's analysis of the labor process indicated by reference to Marx's point that "public planning" was not inconsistent with capitalism returned the focus to the mode of production, specific to capitalism, which was shaped by the twofold nature of labor. While this suggests the relative sophistication of Marcuse's interpretations of the first parts of Marx's *Capital*, nonetheless by not carrying through the analysis beyond the sections on Absolute Surplus Value, Marcuse's otherwise promising analyses of concepts such as the interactions of abstract and concrete labor in capitalist production are ultimately unfulfilled.

There are several remarkable facets related to the above, which is Postone's (1995) starting point of his analysis of abstract time. First, on the face of it, "magnitude of value" hardly appears to be necessarily constitutive of abstract time and to fall within the types of expansive concepts Postone analyzes alongside it—all of these are more or less synthetic concepts. As he does first with "The magnitude of value", Postone treats and features each of the other concepts in an entire section devoted to it, that is, "abstract time and social necessity", "value and material wealth", and "forms of social mediation and forms of consciousness". In connection with this, a reconsideration of my earlier statement might be in order—that in regard to Marx's analysis of abstract time, he lays down no marker pointing to its originality and significance comparable to the one he issued in regard to abstract labor (or the dual concept of labor).

In fact, Postone shows, although not as directly as in his statement on the dual concept of labor, that Marx indicates that none before him in his current work, even among the classical political economists, had even raised (let alone answered) the following question: Why "labor is expressed in *value*"? (my emphasis) (Marx, 1867/1990, 174, quoted by Postone, 1995, 187); moreover, Postone emphasizes, Marx also asks why, "the measurement of labor by its duration is expressed in the magnitude of the value of the product" (Marx, 1867/1990, 174, quoted by Postone, 1995, 187). So, the second remarkable point is that Postone's choice of the otherwise disparate theories of Sweezy and Rubin as virtual objects of Marx's critique is hardly arbitrary. In fact, Postone suggests that both of their analyses of basic concepts that Marx develops in the earliest sections of *Capital* (1867/1990) still fall especially neatly into the general category of those who have either not asked or failed to adequately address or answer the questions (cited above) that Marx at least implied a study of his own work would demonstrate he alone had done. Corollary to this, a third remarkable point, Postone quotes the footnote Marx attaches to his implicit claims to the originality of his work in posing and answering the questions (cited above):

> It is one of the chief failings of political economy… Even its best representatives, Adam Smith and Ricardo, treat the *form* of value as something of indifference, something external to the nature of the commodity itself. The explanation is not simply that their attention is entirely absorbed by the analysis of the magnitude of value. (my emphasis) (Marx 1867/1990, 174n34, quoted in Postone, 1995, 187n3)

Postone's conclusion from Marx's point in this footnote only goes thus far: "This however does not mean that political economy's analysis of the magnitude of value can be retained and simply supplemented by a qualitative analysis of the value form" (Postone, 1995, 187n3). But from that point forward, Postone attempts to demonstrate what sort of analysis *is* thus required. In the remainder of this work, I shall attempt to complete an account of the significant departures of Postone's theories from those he criticizes, Marcuse's theories in particular, as well as explicate, more generally, Postone's original interpretations of Marx's mature critical theory.

Nonetheless, before proceeding, it is relevant for continuation of my investigation, and otherwise of considerable interest to see—since it is *not*, according to Marx, that "attention is entirely absorbed by the analysis of the magnitude of value"—what it is Marx *does* specify as the "explanation" for political economy's treatment of the *form* of value as something of indifference:

> It [the explanation] lies deeper. The value form of the product of labor is the most abstract, but also the most universal form of the bourgeois mode of production; by that fact it stamps the bourgeois mode of production as a particular kind of social production of a historical and transitory character. If then we make the mistake of treating it as the eternal natural form of social production, we necessarily overlook the specificity of the value form, and consequently of the commodity form together with its further developments, the money form, the capital form, etc. (Marx, 1867/1990, 174n34)

Hence, Postone (1995) provides as contemporary examples Sweezy and Rubin's theories for Marx's hypothesis that the answer to his question as to why the form of value was treated as something of indifference was *not* because attention was "entirely absorbed by the analysis of the magnitude of value" (as Marx originally stated was not the case with the classical political economists either). In fact, according to Postone, Sweezy and Rubin went further than the classical political economists and did in fact offer analyses of the qualitative dimension of value—but only in terms of its quantification. Alternatively, according to Postone's interpretations, Marx suggested in his footnote (just quoted above) that what was needed was a "further qualitative determination of the *social formation*" (my emphasis) (Postone, 1995, 187). Concluding his assessment of theories like those of Sweezy and Rubin, Postone writes:

> They do not provide an adequate basis for a categorical critique of the capital determined *form of production*. The Marxian analysis of the magnitude of value is, however, an integral element of precisely such a critique: it entails a qualitative determination of the relation of labor, time, and social necessity in the capitalist social formation. (my emphasis) (Postone, 1995, 188)

The core of Marx's critique, according to Postone, then, is that treating the *form* of value as something of indifference implies the notion that *some* form of necessity underlies the bourgeois mode of production. What makes this assumption plausible is that there is indeed "necessity" associated with that mode, but such necessity is not external, say, in its timelessness or permanence, in comparison with prior historical modes. Quite the opposite, the "necessity" that characterizes capitalism, as will become clear in the following, is *internal* to its forms of appearance.

Though he demonstrates the basis of his particular critique of theories such as those of Sweezy and Rubin, Postone (1995) pointedly concedes that his text does not (and need not) include a detailed account of *their* specific analyses of the "structure of social relations in capitalism" (Postone, 1995, 187). In contrast, my approach to Postone's (1995) reinterpretation of Marx's critical theory attempts to develop, and show the necessity of, an immanent critique of Marcuse's social theory. I have been arguing that whether deliberately or not such a critique is in any case implicit in Postone's reinterpretations of Marx's key texts, especially *Capital*, vol. 1 (1867/1990), which depart significantly from the conclusions Marcuse draws in his major, relevant texts, primarily *Reason and Revolution* (1941/1999) and *One-Dimensional Man* (1966). Clearly, as described in the preceding chapters and earlier sections of this one, Marcuse offered interpretations of Marx's *Capital*, some of them brilliant and original, of the "relation of labor, time, and social necessity". Yet at key junctures, Marcuse substituted an analysis of *surplus* value for the value *form*. Hence, the concepts also could not, according to Postone, "provide an adequate basis for a categorical critique of the capital determined form of production", about which I just showed Marx warned in his footnote. Postone writes:

> Because abstract human labor constitutes a general social mediation, in Marx's analysis, the labor time that serves as the measure of value is not individual and contingent, but *social* and *necessary*… As a category of the totality, socially necessary labor time expresses a quasi-objective social necessity with which the producers are confronted. It is the temporal dimension

> of the abstract domination that characterizes the structure of alienated social relations in capitalism. The social totality constituted by labor as an objective general mediation has a temporal character, wherein *time becomes necessity*. (Postone, 1995, 190, 191)

8.3.2.1 Value and Material Forms of Wealth and the Fundamental Contradiction

Marx's (1867/1990) concept of the dual nature of labor in capitalism—abstract and concrete—underlies his idea of the fundamental contradiction of capitalism: the value and material forms of wealth. The value form, the specifically capitalist form of wealth, is an objectification of abstract labor, the measure of which is *labor time* (Postone, 1995, 188). The material form is an objectification of concrete labor, the measure of which is the quantity and quality of goods (Postone, 1995, 189). The fundamental contradiction is the following: Once the length of the working day has been set, the logic of capitalism is to reduce the *necessary* labor time, that is, the proportion of the working day needed for the reproduction of the workers' means of subsistence, so as to *increase* the *surplus* labor time, or the *unpaid proportion* of the working day, and hence surplus *value*. The primary means for this is an increase in efficiency by introduction of machines and/or the application of science to material production. As Marx explained, with increasingly technological production, the labor time (or value) and material wealth no longer correspond (Postone, 1995, 197). While the specifically capitalist form of wealth (value) is based on labor time (with the goal of *surplus* labor time), material wealth is *not*. Objectively, with automated production intensified by developments like robots, digital technology, and artificial intelligence, the *link* between direct labor time and production of material wealth has been dramatically reduced. Yet, working hours are not reduced and better and more satisfying forms of labor introduced, although such could be the case were it not for the *necessity* of direct labor intrinsic to the capitalist formation. Moreover, in capitalist society, wherein one is *required* to sell their labor power to purchase commodities to live, this broken link between direct labor and material wealth is not easily discerned on the *surface* of society (Postone, 1995, 198).

8.3.2.2 The Interaction of Concrete and Abstract Time: Tyranny of Time

Postone describes concrete time, as a "dependent variable" (Postone, 1995, 202):

> The modes of reckoning associated with concrete time do not depend on a continuous succession of constant temporal units but either are based on events—for example, repetitive natural events such as days, lunar cycles, or seasons—or on temporal units that vary. (Postone, 1995, 201)

According to Postone, its opposite is abstract time: "'Abstract time' … uniform, continuous, homogenous, 'empty' time, is independent of events. The conception of abstract time, which became increasingly dominant in Western Europe between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries, was expressed most emphatically in [Isaac] Newton's formulation" (Postone, 1995, 202). Newton wrote of "absolute, true, and mathematical time [which] flows equably without relation to anything external" (quoted by Postone, 1995, 202n41).[5] The latter kind of time is constitutive of the social necessity at the core of "socially necessary labor time". Socially necessary labor time, the *substance* of value as a social *mediation*, is behind the form of social domination that, as opposed to *overt* forms expressed in power relations between groups and individuals, exerts a form of *socially determined, non-overt social compulsion*—the "tyranny of time" (Postone, 1995, 214).

8.3.2.3 From Reduction of Concrete to Abstract Labor to "Science in the Service of Capital"

It is evident in Marcuse's (1941/1999) text itself that his analysis focuses, in the earlier sections of Marx's immanent presentation in *Capital* (Marx, 1867/1990), on the commodity form and the money form (from which, as I reviewed in the section above on "abstract and substantive totality", Marx proceeds to unfold the capital form in later sections). These are central for Marx's initial approach to the valorization process, especially the reduction of concrete to abstract labor, the production of *absolute* surplus value, and the social distribution of the surplus product determined by the inherent class exploitation.[6] Yet, in what appears from hindsight to be a direct "hand-off" to Postone, Marcuse does offer *one* citation to Marx's

[5] Postone takes this description of abstract time from Isaac Newton, *Principia*, as quoted in L.R. Heath (1936). *The Concept of Time* (p. 88). Chicago.

[6] I do not mean that Marcuse in focusing on the commodity and money forms and absolute surplus value does not take up later sections of *Capital*, vol. 1, as well as sections of *Capital*, vol. 3. Rather, his analysis skips over "Relative Surplus Value", takes up later parts of *Capital*, and then returns to the sections in *Capital*, vol. 1, that are prior to the "Relative Surplus Value" section.

key section on "*relative* surplus value". Marx develops this aspect of the valorization process in his explication of the "materialization" of an abstract form of domination, and the capital form as most adequate to fully developed capitalist society. In the last pages of Marcuse's analysis of *Capital*, he touches on Part 4 ("Relative Surplus Value"). He quotes from Marx's chapter on "Cooperation", which follows directly after the introductory chapter defining the concept of relative surplus value. In connection with this, Marcuse observes that, "the labor process is the ground on which the various branches of theory and practice operate in capitalist society" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 320) and for *this* he cites Marx's observation in the section on "Relative Surplus Value" that "science was pressed into the service of capital" (Marx, 1867/1909, 397 [Marx, 1867/1990, 482] quoted by Marcuse, 1941/1999, 320). This part in Marx's text, cited by Marcuse, proves to be just the *starting point* for Postone's analysis of relative surplus value in the last chapter of his own text focused on the analysis of Marx's concept of capital: Postone develops in some detail how this new "moment" of surplus value—*relative* surplus value—only briefly noted by Marcuse was *pivotal* and necessary for an understanding of fully developed capitalism, as well as for how it conditions the potential *post*-capitalist society (Postone, 1995, 326–349).

8.3.3 Postone's Explication of the "Interaction" of Concrete and Abstract Labor

In describing the capitalist process of production as both a "valorization" process and a labor process, Marx (1867/1990) analyzes how abstract labor "transforms" concrete labor and, ultimately, how the productive attributes of labor (its concrete dimension) are incorporated into capital, or "subsumed": So not only labor, but the mode of *production* is thus *inherently* capitalist. Marx describes this process as passing from "formal" to "real subsumption" of labor (Postone, 1995, 283–284). This conclusion, taken alone, does not appear to depart substantially from Marcuse's account of the "reduction" of concrete to abstract labor. However, Postone's later analysis indicates that it is the "trajectory of production" (Postone, 1995, 307–384), which Marx unfolds from the dual concept of labor, which affords a *progression* of vantage points, which allows for more or less precise identification of what he terms the "growing shearing pressure" of the two dimensions of labor (Postone, 1995, 348). I shall show in taking up Postone's account of how Marx unfolds the categories of capitalist production (cooperation, manufacturing, and machinery and

large-scale industry) how it ultimately also uncovers the *potential* within the actual: It is determination of the capital form from out of the commodity and money forms, or the "materialized expression of an abstract form of domination" (Postone, 1995, 348), which nonetheless alone points to the possibility of the end of capitalism and the beginnings of post-capitalist society (Postone, 1995, 326–348).

The key concept, which distinguishes Postone's reinterpretation from Marcuse's original analysis of the labor process is the "*interaction*" of abstract and concrete labor (Postone, 1995, 289). Since, with capitalism, the goal of production is value, or *surplus* value, once the length of the working day has been set, rather than increasing surplus value by extending the working day as far as possible beyond the hours that cover the subsistence needs of the workers, the logic of capitalist production now becomes to minimize to the extent possible the amount of labor *time* required to reproduce the necessities of the workers—so as to increase the proportion (of time) of the workday that goes unpaid, and hence surplus *value*. The principal means for achieving this "relative surplus value" is by increasing *productivity*, the production of more goods with less labor. Recall, however, that the goal of capitalist production is surplus *value*, not material wealth. At this stage of the development of the capitalist form, it becomes possible to see that, perversely, the production of material wealth is merely a *means* for the production of *value*—and, as Marcuse (1999, 307, 308) had much earlier noted, concrete labor can be seen as a mere form of appearance of abstract labor.

According to Marx (1867/1990), while an increase in average productivity results in an increase in material wealth, the amount of value produced in any given time unit remains unchanged: Increased productivity only distributes the value produced per unit time over a greater number of products (Postone, 1995, 193, 287). The replacement of labor by machines in a given sector (the principal means by which increased productivity is achieved) results in only a temporary increase in value—only until the new level of productivity becomes the social norm, which then must be met by the remaining producers who otherwise do not receive the full value of their product (Postone, 1995, 288). Hence, productivity, an attribute of the *concrete* dimension of labor, "determines" abstract labor in the sense that changes in concrete labor underlie the *socially necessary* quantity (i.e., *time*) of abstract labor for the production of any commodity, the base level of which, however, is reset for the society as a whole with each new rise in average productivity (Postone, 1995, 289). Postone calls this the "treadmill effect", wherein productivity increases material wealth

without affecting value—it does not change the amount of value produced per unit time, but in changing what "counts" as a labor hour, alters the time unit itself (Postone, 1995, 289–290).

8.3.3.1 Abstract and Historical Time

"Historical time", a form of concrete time, holds within it the stored-up knowledge and productive capacities of the human species, for example science and technology, which, as Postone emphasizes, lie beyond the knowledge and skills of the proletariat, any individual, or specific group. Though alienated, these may be incorporated by capital, but they can be reappropriated by people such that any remaining direct labor is minimized and revolutionized as the basis of universal individual self-development (Postone, 1995, 296, 377). In Postone's analysis of Marx's *Capital* (1867/1990) abstract labor, however, ultimately incorporates concrete labor. Science and the forces of nature are increasingly inserted inside the production process, with labor merely superintendent: As large-scale industry develops, direct labor is no longer "necessary" for material wealth creation, but is as *necessary as ever for value*, the specifically *capitalist* form of wealth (Postone, 1995, 297–298).

I have pointed out how Marcuse, apparently one-sidedly, emphasized the capitalist labor process' "reduction" of concrete labor to abstract labor; he also argued that concrete labor was the "natural" form of labor. In regard to abstract labor, Marcuse's argument actually involved two major claims, one explicit and one implicit: Marcuse directly argued that abstract labor was "prevalent" in capitalism, and he implied that *because* its form was social, it distinguished capitalism and/or was historically unique. In contrast, Postone demonstrates that Marx's approach presupposed that both dimensions of capitalist labor—concrete as well as abstract—were "social" (albeit in different ways). The *unique* quality of labor in capitalism, then, did not involve a determination that it alone among all forms was social, but rather its "two-fold" character. For the latter quality, the main significance is not the moment of predominance of one side or the other. For the *identification* of capitalism, the *reciprocity* of the two sides of labor is determinant, and for overcoming capitalism, it is necessary to abolish the peculiar form of labor's social mediating function. While the social character of abstract labor lies precisely in its socially mediating function (socially necessary labor time), concrete labor is "determined by the social organization of production, the level of development and application of science, and the acquired skills of the working population, among other factors" (Marx, 1867/1990, 130, quoted in Postone, 1995, 195).

8.3.3.2 The Unique Relevance of Marx's Critical Theory: Environmental Destruction

Before following what Postone (1995) acknowledges is his highly abstract account of Marx's critical theory, the potential within the actual in his determination of the dialectic of labor and time (Postone, 286–306), it is equally important to highlight the unique relevance Marx's mature critical theory holds for understanding environmental destruction on a vast scale: "Capital tends to generate a constant acceleration in the growth of productivity" (Postone, 1995, 311) to *reduce* the necessary labor time for the production of the means of subsistence of the working population—thus *increasing surplus* labor time; while increases in productivity correspond with increases in *material* wealth, the amount of value yielded per unit time does *not* increase. Therefore, according to Postone's interpretation:

> The higher the level of surplus labor time and, relatedly, of productivity, the *more* productivity must be *further increased* in order to achieve a determinate increase in the mass of surplus value per determinate portion of capital… The difference between the two forms of wealth in their relation to productivity means that, on the one hand, the ever increasing levels of productivity generated by capital accumulation entail directly corresponding increases in the masses of products produced *and of raw materials consumed in production*. On the other hand, though, because the social form of the surplus in capitalism is *value* rather than *material* wealth, the result—in spite of appearances—is not a commensurate increase in the surplus product. The ever-increasing amounts of material wealth produced under capitalism do *not* represent correspondingly high levels of social wealth in the form of value… [O]ne consequence implied by this particular dynamic—which yields increases in material wealth greater than those in surplus value—is the accelerating destruction of the natural environment. (Postone, 1995, 311)

8.4 Relative Surplus Value and Cooperation: Manufacture and Machinery, Large-Scale Industry, and Historical Time

Marx depicts the passage from formal to real subsumption of labor by first describing the former as distinguished by the commodification of labor as labor power (Postone, 1995, 182); in the "simple cooperation" characterizing capitalism's incipient form of manufacture, collective labor achieves higher levels of productivity than the sum total of each individual working separately—at no cost to the capitalist, so according to Marx, amounting

to a "free gift" to capital (Postone, 1995, 328). Nonetheless, at this stage the labor process is still little more than the gathering together of workers with various handicraft skills, "which does not necessarily transform the material from of production," or entail, "a qualitative change in the mode of producing" (Postone, 1995, 182, 326). Marcuse offered a similar analysis of the labor process, but that was in respect to his account of Marx's *earlier* Part on "Absolute Surplus Value". There Marcuse identified the "natural gift" of labor power, "so advantageous to the capitalist" (Marx, 1867/1909, 230 [1867/1990, 315], quoted by Marcuse, 1941/1999, 308), which by virtue of its qualitative aspect ("labor being of a specialized kind that has a special object") (Marx, 1867/1909, 230 [1867/1990, 315], quoted by Marcuse, 1941/1999, 308), "preserves and transfers to the product the value of the means of production, while at the same time by the mere act of working creates each instant an additional or new value" (Marx, 1867/1909, 231 [1867/1990, 315], quoted by Marcuse, 1941/1999, 308). The distinguishing feature of this *initial* "gift" of labor power to capital is its subjective and even individual quality, intrinsic to the act of labor itself. To the contrary, the "free gift" to capital, which Postone analyzes in his description of "Cooperation" in the early part of Marx's explication of "Relative Surplus Value", focuses on two levels of increasing productivity, only the first of which directly concerns the individual. Cooperation increases the productive capacity of the individuals, but it also "entails the creation of a new productive power that is intrinsically collective" (Postone, 1995, 327). Postone writes:

> In Marx's analysis … the productive power … that arises as a result of cooperation is a function of concrete labor's social dimension. The power is social, however, not only in the sense that it is collective but also in the sense that it is greater than the sum of the productive powers of the individuals immediately involved; it cannot be reduced to the power of its constituting individuals… It is this aspect of concrete labor's social dimension which is crucial to Marx's analysis. (Postone, 1995, 327)

In "Cooperation", there is already visible the beginnings of the transformation of labor compared to what Marcuse cited from Marx's section on "absolute surplus value": Earlier, in Marcuse's account, the focus was on the role of concrete labor in the preservation and transfer of value from the means of production to the product (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 308). One part of the alienation described there is as only a sort of side effect of

the expenditure of abstract labor and hence production of value; the other, on a deeper level, consists of the emergence of concrete labor as a mere form of appearance of abstract labor (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 307). The specific contribution of concrete labor was nonetheless real and constituted a "natural gift" to the capitalist. So, although through alienation, it was, by direct human action, a "gift" of "preservation" and "transfer".

In contrast, Postone emphasizes that in Marx's (1867/1990) description of cooperation and the increased productivity of the individuals, but especially "the new productive power that is intrinsically collective", the alienation is *centrally* that of the dimension of *concrete* labor, its appropriation by capital (Postone, 1995, 328). In pointing this out, however, Postone issues a qualification, with important consequences for grasping the process of the deepening of his reinterpretations of Marx's *Capital*:

> At this point in Marx's exposition … the nature of this process of alienation is not yet clear. The alienated productive power of labor is greater than the sum of its parts, but is still constituted essentially by the workers immediately involved; hence when Marx speaks of the "species capacities" that are developed in cooperation, these capacities appear to be those of the collectivity of workers. A mode of socially general knowledge and experience has not yet been constituted within the sphere of production in a form intrinsically independent of the immediate producers. Consequently, it seems that the transformation of the productive powers of labor into those of capital is only a function of private ownership. (Postone, 1995, 328–329)

There are two key points from the passage above, which Postone (1995) will carry into his account of the manufacturing stage of capitalist production, and develop their full implications in the section on "machinery and large-scale industry" (Marx, 1867/1990, 492–639). First, the "collectivity" he alludes to is apparently two-sided: It is both alienated and, at least potentially, mutually beneficial to the individual workers. Second, such a collectivity, externally forged from the outside (not determined internally by the workers themselves), appears to represent only the genesis of the conditions for the molding of concrete labor by abstract labor—a development *through* the collectivity of workers of the process of production as the materialization of an abstract form of social domination. So, initially, in unfolding the production process as specifically capitalist, Marx points to an *external* determination. Then, *from* simple cooperation, the capitalist determination becomes *intrinsic* in further determinations.

It is in support of this point that Postone provides the full summary passage from Marx's chapter on "Relative Surplus Value" from which I earlier noted came Marcuse's only citation of this section in his analysis of the labor process in Marx's *Capital* (1867/1990). Recall that Marcuse only noted from this passage, and in fact stopped his analysis of the labor process there, what is now becoming clear was just a fragment of Marx's conclusion—science was "pressed into the service of capital" (Marx, 1867/1909, 397 [Marx, 1867/1990, 482] quoted by Marcuse, 1941/1999, 320). It will be helpful now to provide more of Marx's summary of which, according to Postone, represents the further determinations of the "alienation of the use value dimension" (Postone, 1995, 329) as a preface to my considerations of Postone's analyses *beyond* Marcuse's textual stopping point at "Manufacture", that is, "Large-Scale Industry":

> It is a result of the division of labor in manufacture that the worker is brought face to face with the intellectual potentialities of the material process of production as the property of another and as a power which rules over him. This process of separation starts in simple cooperation, where the capitalist represents to the individual workers the unity and the will of the whole body of social labor. It is developed in manufacture, which mutilates the worker, turning him into a fragment of himself. It is completed in large scale industry, which makes science a potentiality for production which is distinct from labor and presses it into the service of capital. (Marx, 1867/1990, 482, quoted by Postone, 1995, 329)

Organization of labor—the division of labor— is the initial means in the drive for increasing productivity, at the bottom of which is the compulsion of socially necessary labor time. Decreasing the time of production for commodities increases the ratio of unpaid to paid labor time. Labor becomes increasingly a collective process in which the individual worker is degraded. The need to sell labor power begins as grounded in the propertylessness of the worker, but later is subject to the technical nature of the labor process itself. With the advent of manufacturing, even though the worker is still "inside" the production process, labor first begins to be broken down into specialized functions, and with that a strict division of labor is instilled.

The "real subsumption" of labor by capital is fully achieved in "large-scale industry", the distinguishing features of which are derived from the fact that, "[W]hat characterizes the use value dimension of labor in

industrial production … is that it is constituted in a form that becomes increasingly independent of the labor of the immediate producers" (Postone, 1995, 337). Postone highlights Marx's descriptions of the historical developments associated with machine production, as well as the development of motive mechanisms, such as the steam engine, that like, "the working machine, exist in an independent form, emancipated from the limits of human strength, and, unlike water or animal-power, are entirely under human control" (Postone, 1995, 337). These provide the technical foundations for a machine system, "a sort of 'division of labor' among machines modeled on the division of labor in manufacture" (Postone, 1995, 337).

In tracing Marx's arguments from simple cooperation to manufacturing, Postone (1995) notes a most important qualitative difference with the advent of "machinery and large-scale industry". In the former, the production process must be adapted to the worker and is "in this sense subjective" (Postone, 1995, 337), but in the latter, the production process becomes "objective" (Postone, 1995, 337): "[T]he production process is analyzed into its constituent elements with the aid of the natural sciences and without regard to earlier 'worker-centered' principles of the division of labor" (Postone, 1995, 337). Finally, it is the "production of machines by machines", which, according to Marx, provides the "adequate technical foundation of large scale industry" (Marx, 1867/1990, 506, quoted by Postone, 1995, 338). Postone concludes his overview of Marx's descriptions of the distinctive character of machinery and large-scale industry:

> When Marx describes the development of large-scale industry in terms of the replacement of human strength by natural forces, he is referring not only to the harnessing of natural forces such as steam and water but also to the development of socially productive forces. Thus, he characterizes as "natural forces of social labor" productive forces resulting from cooperation and the division of labor, noting that—like natural forces such as steam and water—they cost nothing… In this regard, he observes that science also is like a natural force; once a scientific principle is discovered, it costs nothing… Finally, in describing the objectified means of production, Marx asserts that aside from the costs of depreciation and auxiliary substances consumed (oil, coal, and so on), machines and tools do their work for nothing; the greater the productive effectiveness of the machine compared with that of the tool, the greater the extent of gratuitous service. (Postone, 1995, 338)

Postone concludes that Marx relates this productive effectiveness to the accumulation of past labor and productive knowledge, describing large-scale industry as a form of production in which "man [has] succeeded in making the product of his past labor … perform gratuitous service on a large scale, like a force of nature" (Marx, 1867/1990, 510, quoted by Postone, 1995, 338).

Thus, in contrast to simple cooperation and manufacturing, large-scale industry "entails the historical constitution of socially general productive capacities and modes of scientific, technical, and organizational knowledge that are *not* a function of, and cannot be reduced to workers' strength, knowledge and experience" (my emphasis) (Postone, 1995, 339). In what he interprets as Marx's concept of "historical time", Postone writes:

> This historically constituted aspect of the use value dimension of labor in capitalism is like a "natural force" inasmuch as it is independent of direct labor, costs nothing, and increasingly replaces human toil as the central social factor in the transformation of matter, the social 'metabolism' of humanity with nature that is a necessary condition of social life. With the development of large-scale industry, then, the incorporation into production of these "immense forces of nature"—that is, the acquired ability to tap the powers of nature and objectify and make use of the past—increasingly supersedes direct human labor as the social source of material wealth. The production of material wealth increasingly becomes a function of the objectification of *historical time*. (my emphasis) (Postone, 1995, 339)

Postone argues that the historical development of concrete labor raises the level of productivity enormously and, by making material wealth increasingly independent of direct human labor, undermines "the technical need for manufacture's characteristic division of labor, both within the workshop and throughout society … this historical development implicitly points to the possibility of a different social organization of labor" (Postone, 1995, 339). Yet, such a transformation cannot be realized in the form of large-scale industry. Postone describes Marx's reasons:

> Although society's productive forces are highly developed with capitalist large-scale industry, the form in which those forces are constituted historically does not liberate the workers from partial, repetitive labor… On the contrary it subsumes them under production and turns them into cogs of a productive apparatus, parts of specialized machines. (Postone, 1995, 339)

In an important and unusual analysis, Postone emphasizes that on a total social scale, with the development of large-scale industry, replacement of labor by machines does *not* occur; rather, the logic of this stage of production is to "soak up" as much of the remaining direct labor as possible (Postone, 1995, 344). In other words, it is true, on the one hand, that the fundamental contradiction of capitalism is the drive to increase productivity by *replacement of labor* by machines; on the other hand, since the goal of production is surplus *value*, reproduction of the *necessity of direct labor* time is intrinsic to capitalism.

In Postone's analysis, the contradiction between the value and material forms of wealth, which he characterizes as the "shearing" tendency of capitalist development (Postone, 1995, 348), opens up the possibility of a *post*-capitalist society in which labor and society may be *separated*—a society in which some direct labor remains necessary, but one in which it is no longer *mediated* by that labor, and thus dispenses with the deep and abstract forms of social domination Postone's reinterpretations so powerfully illuminate. In a famous passage, which can still be misconstrued on the basis of fundamental misinterpretations of Marx's concept of labor,[7] which is the basic theme of Postone's immanent critique of Marcuse's theories of labor and society, Marx describes the post-capitalist society in the following:

> The realm of freedom actually begins only where labor, which is determined by necessity and external goals, ceases; thus in the very nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material production… Freedom in this field [actual material production] can only consist in socialized humans, the associated producers, rationally regulating their material interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by a blind force; and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favorable to, and worthy of, their human nature. But it nonetheless remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human power, which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can blossom forth only upon the realm of necessity as its basis. (Marx, 1981, 958–959)

[7] After stating in the text that the realm of freedom does not have to wait until the realm of necessity has been ended, Michael Liebowitz writes in a note, "Although Marx commented with respect to the realm of freedom that 'the reduction of the workday is its basic prerequisite', that is a conception of labor within the workday as inherently alienated and separate from human development. In contrast, I have argued that, rather than reducing the workday, the point is to transform it into a socialist workday" (Liebowitz, 2014, 105, n. 70).

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CHAPTER 9

Conclusion: New Forms of the Necessity and Freedom Dialectic

This chapter attempts to illuminate new Critical Theory and Marxist–Humanist approaches to Hegel, Marx, and the necessity and freedom dialectic. I assess two of Marx's significant self-critiques, or "autocritiques", which are elaborated by Moishe Postone (1995), and which underlay the former's original conceptions of the necessity and freedom dialectic—the first on the historical Subject, the second on labor and objectification. Both self-critiques are central to Marx's critical theory. I find them embedded in Postone's reinterpretations of that theory; they involve new forms of incorporation and deepening of the Hegelian dialectic in the development of Marx's own critical theory. In addition, I identify a third "autocritique" in Marx's work, which is *not* recognized in Postone's investigations. This one explicitly has to do with Marx's conceptualization of necessity and freedom. Finally, in comparing and contrasting Postone's interpretation of the Hegelian–Marxian dialectic with that at least implicit in Susan Buck-Morss's (2009) *Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History,* I propose a different sort of autocritique, this one beginning *not* from an original critique of Hegel that Marx had previously issued, but rather from the high point of Marx's own original theory.

Hence my discussions of Postone's (1995) analysis of the relationship of the young and late Marx leads to an inquiry into new forms of the necessity and freedom dialectic. These, then, include both the third "autocritique" mentioned above—explicit as opposed to the earlier implicit forms—as well

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as others that originally emerged, often underappreciated or unrecognized, from *within Marx's own theory development*. Within *Capital,* Marx (1867/1990, 739) discussed the historical necessity of capitalism itself, and within his post-*Capital* writings, labor as life's "prime want" (Marx, 1875/2010, 87), as well as the historical dialectic of capitalist and non-capitalist lands (Marx, 1882/1983).[1] These investigations of new forms of the necessity and freedom dialectic are relevant for both conceptualizing post-capitalist society and developing ideas of the potentialities of today's relationships of more and less technologically developed countries. As the conclusion to this work, these investigations entail a restatement of frequently unnoted critical features of Hegel's dialectic, Marx's "autocritique" in respect to them, and a reassessment of the trajectory and current theoretical viability of Marxist Humanism and Critical Theory.

9.1 Marx's Two Autocritiques in Postone's Reinterpretations of Marx's Critical Theory

9.1.1 Labor: Objectification, Alienation, and Mediation of Capitalist Social Relations

Here I examine Moishe Postone's (1995, 159–160) distinctive reading of Marx's (1975a, 326–346) essay "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic", a key text of the young Marx's (1975b, 229–346) *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*. In the following, I will describe Postone's approach to Marx's "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic" as primarily an interpretation of the reflexive nature of Marx's theory development.[2] According to Postone (1995, 159), the young Marx incisively developed a concept of alienated labor, which at the time he still understood in a transhistorical sense. Marx (1867/1990) only presented the fully developed concept, the twofold character of labor, with the publication of *Capital*, vol. 1. Two *different forms of critique of Hegel's philosophy* were central to Marx's development of the concept of labor: Marx (1975a, 326–346) explicitly worked out the

[1] Compare Dunayevskaya's evolving assessments of this issue in *Marxism and Freedom* (1957/1988, 132–134) and *Philosophy and Revolution* (1973/2003, 76).

[2] Compare this with my descriptions in earlier chapters in which I noted that Marx, in his "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic", ended his analysis at the Subdivision section of Hegel's Introduction to *Philosophy of Mind*. The latter contained Hegel's most detailed account of the necessity and freedom dialectic. I argue that Marx, more than two decades later, returned to reconsider and incorporate the ideas in that section into key sections of *Capital*.

first in "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic", and the second implicitly in *Capital* (1867, 1990). (Preliminarily, I will note here that in both forms of critique Marx focused on one of Hegel's earliest key texts, the 1807 *Phenomenology of Mind*). The second form of critique in each instance may actually be understood as an "autocritique". In a certain sense, Marx's modified critique entailed a restoration of Hegel's original basic idea. In this, Marx's developed concept of labor, with its internal dialectical movement of concrete and abstract, wherein the latter shapes and even "subsumes" the former, and in doing so mediates capitalism's social relations, shares important characteristics with Hegel's concept of *Geist*—an impersonal, supra-individual process of development through stages of alienation and their transcendence.

Postone (1995) identifies the transhistorical character of early Marx's concept of labor, evident in the latter's critique of Hegel's notion that objectification is alienation. Postone writes:

> Marx maintains that labor objectifying itself in products need not be alienating, and criticizes Hegel for not having distinguished between alienation and objectification… Yet how one conceptualizes the relation of alienation and objectification depends on how one understands labor. If one proceeds from a transhistorical notion of "labor", the difference between objectification and alienation necessarily must be grounded in factors extrinsic to the objectifying activity. (Postone, 1995, 159)

An example of an extrinsic factor is property relations, "whether the immediate producers are able to dispose of their own labor and its products, or whether the capitalist class appropriates them" (Postone, 1995, 159). Here, Marx's concept is still confined to "what occurs to concrete labor and its products" (Postone, 1995, 160). Postone continues:

> Such a notion of alienated labor does not adequately grasp the sort of socially constituted abstract necessity I have begun to analyze. In Marx's later writings, however, alienation is rooted in the double character of commodity-determined labor, and as such, is intrinsic to the character of that labor itself. Its function as a socially mediating activity is externalized as an independent, abstract social sphere that exerts a form of impersonal compulsion on the people who constitute it. Labor in capitalism gives rise to a social structure that dominates it. This form of self-generated reflexive domination is alienation… [Marx's] analysis [in *Capital*] shows that *objectification is indeed alienation—if what labor objectifies are social relations.* (emphasis in original) (Postone, 1995, 160)

Remarkably, then, over nearly two decades, Marx's critique of Hegel's theory of objectification and alienation turns into his critique of that critique, an autocritique in which Hegel's original critique of alienation through objectification is restored and maintained *within* Marx's (1867/1990) presentation in *Capital*.

9.1.2 Hegel's Philosophical Concept of Substance, Value, and the Historical Subject

Earlier in his investigations, Postone (1995) provides the *first* example of Marx's autocritique when he describes the young Marx's explicit critique of Hegel's concept of the Subject, and then identifies another, implicit mode of this critique as it appears in *Capital* (Marx, 1867/1990). Postone writes:

> Marx does not simply invert Hegel's concepts in a "materialist" fashion. Rather, in an effort to grasp the peculiar nature of social relations in capitalism, Marx analyzes the social validity for capitalist society of precisely those idealist Hegelian concepts, which he earlier condemned as mystified inversions. (Postone, 1995, 74–75)

Whereas the early Marx in, for example, *The Holy Family* (1845), directly "criticizes the philosophical concept of 'substance' and, in particular, Hegel's understanding of the 'substance' as Subject … at the beginning of *Capital* he himself makes use of the category of 'substance'" (Postone, 1995, 75).[3]

At the beginning of *Capital* (1867/1990) in conceptualizing *value*, Marx identifies abstract labor as its "social substance" (Marx, 1867/1990, 128). On this basis, Postone proceeds to characterize Marx's presentation in terms of how he incorporates and unfolds this initial Hegelian concept, that is, "the commodity and money forms from the categories of use value, value, and its 'substance'" (Postone, 1995, 75). Moreover, in initially determining the category of capital in terms of value—self-valorizing

[3] Patrick Murray notes, "In both the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, Hegel maintains that the absolute—spirit—is substance subject … and resembles the movement of capital" (1990, 216, 217). However, in Chap. 3, I discussed what Hegel in the *Science of Logic* described as the "hardest transition", from necessity to freedom, the former is the relation that underlies substance in the Objective Logic, to the latter, which is the relation that underlies subject in the Subjective Logic. In this chapter, I shall try to show that Marx's "autocritique", immanent to Marx's *Capital*, including its third volume, represents Marx's social appropriation of Hegel's necessity and freedom dialectic, which the latter developed in *Philosophy of Mind*, the third and final volume of the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*.

value—Marx "describes his concept of capital in terms that clearly relate it to Hegel's concept of *Geist*" (Postone, 1995, 75). From a passage he quotes in which Marx describes value "constantly changing from one form to the other without becoming lost in this movement" and "thus transforms itself into an automatic subject … In truth … value is here the subject of a process" (1867/1990, 255–256), Postone concludes, "Marx then explicitly characterizes capital as the self-moving substance which is Subject" (Postone, 1995, 75). Nonetheless, Postone does not clearly distinguish substance and Subject, a distinction that is perhaps the central point of Hegel's work *after* the *Phenomenology of Mind* (1807/1977).

Generally, in his example of Marx's evolving critique of Hegel around the question of the historical Subject, Postone refers to instances in which Marx (1867/1990), in early sections of *Capital*, uses terminology and argues at a conceptual level more consistent with Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* (1807/1977) than with Hegel's more developed *Science of Logic* (1812/1976) and *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, especially *Philosophy of Mind* (1817/1973). Hence, in his discussion of Marx's incorporation of Hegel's idea of a historical Subject into *Capital*, Postone concludes: "As the Subject, capital is a remarkable 'subject'. Whereas Hegel's Subject is transhistorical and knowing, in Marx's analysis it is historically determinate and blind" (Postone, 1995, 77). Here, Postone's analysis both does not take into account the social and historical factors Hegel incorporated into his idea of the development of subjectivity (which I describe in some detail in Chap. 3) *and* attributes "blindness" to (Hegel's) Subject, which Marx purportedly incorporated into his analyses of capital.

The mistakes Postone's analysis reflect may be attributable in part, at least, to a certain original imprecision in Marx's articulation of Hegel's concepts that underlay the latter's idea of Subject. Nonetheless, clearly Postone does not take into account Hegel's more developed analysis in the *Logic*, what Hegel latter described as the "hardest transition" (1817/1975, 221–222), the necessity and freedom dialectic, which I attempted to demonstrate in Chap. 3. In that text, Hegel shows that it is the overcoming of the blindness in necessity (substance) that constitutes the *transition* to the Subjective *Logic*; Hegel, before Marx, termed this the "realm of freedom" (1812/1976, 571). Consequently, in light of Hegel's developed philosophy, it would be more accurate to describe Marx's incorporation of Hegel's ideas in *Capital* (1867/1990) as an appropriation of Hegel's concept of *necessity*, especially at the stage when the latter is "blind" and "veiled", prior to its determination as "seeing" and "unveiled".

In any case, the main point Postone tries to make here—in his interpretation of Marx's conception of value as incorporating Hegel's notion of a "self-moving substance" mediating a process of changing forms—is a precursor to Postone's (1995, 159) analysis of objectification and alienation (which I just described above). In that analysis, further along in Postone's text, labor itself, its double character, functions as the socially mediating activity. From it arises socially constituted abstract necessity, in regards to which the mature Marx's analysis "suggests that a historical Subject in the Hegelian sense does indeed exist in capitalism, yet he does not identify it with any social grouping, such as the proletariat or humanity" (Postone, 1995, 75). Marx analyzes this Subject in "terms of the social structure of social relations constituted by forms of objectifying practice and grasped by the category of capital (and, hence, value)" (Postone, 1995, 75).

With due consideration of the criticisms of Postone's interpretations of Hegel's concept of necessity I outlined above, the importance and relevance of which I will develop below, Postone's exposition of Marx's incorporation of Hegel's concept of the historical Subject into *Capital* (1867/1990) retains some heuristic value. Something that reinforces the idea that this may have been Marx's intent to begin with is a comment (not noted by Postone) that Marx (1867/1990, 255) attaches by asterisk to the passage I (following Postone's text) quoted from Marx above, on abstract labor and substance. Following the part of his sentence, "In truth, however, value is here the subject", Marx comments, "i.e. the independently acting agent" (1867/1990, 255). Recall that Marcuse (1941/1999, 154) described necessity's independence in the same way in his analysis of Hegel's (1812/1976) Objective Logic. It is, in fact, this important idea that Postone begins to flesh out later from the point in his text where he identifies a form of "socially constituted abstract necessity" in his analysis of the difference between, on the one hand, the transhistorical and, on the other, the twofold concept of labor, associated with, respectively, the early and mature Marx's theory.

As I just described, Postone, then, provides two examples of the relation of the young and mature Marx in which he demonstrates Marx's critique of Hegel. Both of Marx's critiques are actually autocritiques. In both instances, Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* (1807/1977) is the underlying object of Marx's critique—in Postone's analysis of Marx's implicit critique of his own critique of Hegel's notion of substance as Subject, as well as in Postone's analysis of Marx's critique (and subsequent autocritique) of Hegel's notion of objectification and alienation.

The latter is derived from Postone's (1995, 159–160) interpretations of Marx's 1844 "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic" (1975a).

Postone (1995, 159–160), then, in taking up "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic", focuses his analysis on Marx's (1975a, 326–346) critique of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* in which the concept of *Geist* is central, but Postone also clearly *indicates* the relevance of the closing paragraphs of Marx's critical essay wherein Marx briefly comments on Hegel's *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1817), particularly the transition from Nature to Mind. In Chap. 2, I noted Marcuse's (1932/2005, 86–121) 1930s and Dunayevskaya's 1950s (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 73, 88n77) interpretations of this section of early Marx's text. While, on the one hand, Postone (1995, 159n95) references the last pages of Marx's essay, in which Marx quoted two paragraphs from Hegel's text while critically noting an apparent negation of nature in Hegel's concept of Absolute Mind, Marcuse (1932/2005, 117), on the other hand, explicitly advised against the need to follow Marx even that far. Only Dunayevskaya (2002, 26), among the three, traced Hegel's progress past where Marx's analysis stopped. Her analysis carried deeper into *Philosophy of Mind* (1817/1973), starting from the "Subsection" in the Introduction (Hegel, 1817/1973, 20–24), which contains a detailed analysis of the necessity and freedom dialectic.

In contrast, and what was common to Marcuse's and Postone's interpretations, and all their subsequent analyses, was their apparent lack of awareness of this phase of Hegel's development of these key concepts. I attribute enhanced importance to Hegel's often overlooked analysis of the necessity and freedom dialectic he developed in Hegel's Introduction to *Philosophy of Mind* (1817/1973) *when* it is viewed as a continuation of the necessity and freedom dialectic I detailed in Chap. 3, namely, Hegel's elaboration of the transition from the Objective to the Subjective Logic. Especially important there was Hegel's exposition of the concept of necessity, which blind and veiled in the Objective Logic, emerged seeing and unveiled in the transition to the Subjective Logic. Hegel's exposition of this transition and its fuller development in *Philosophy of Mind* forms an important background for a *critical* appreciation of Postone's perspectives on Marx's integration, in *Capital* (1867/1990), of Hegel's concept of the historical Subject, or of *Geist*—as well as for an assessment of Marx's method of autocritique generally.

In this discussion of Postone's (1995) interpretations of the historical Subject, I have revisited some of the concepts I discussed in detail in Chap. 3 in respect to Marcuse's analysis of the necessity and freedom dialectic in

his work *Reason and Revolution* (1941/1999) on Hegel's transition from the Subjective to the Objective Logic. There, I developed the idea that, according to Hegel (1812/1976), this transition, from necessity to freedom, was the "hardest" of all dialectical transitions. Hegel elaborated, in the *Logic*, how *necessity* and *freedom* characterized, respectively, the relations of the Objective and Subjective Logic. Perhaps most relevant in the current context, according to Hegel the transition from necessity to freedom is the transition *from* Substance *to* Subject, and the key to the internal movement to the realm of freedom Hegel details is *from* blind and veiled *to* seeing and unveiled *necessity*.

There are then, of course, potential limitations associated with interpretations of sections of Marx's *Capital* (1867/1990) such as Postone's (1995), which are presented in terms of the incorporation of Hegel's incipient ideas, which the latter *developed* in texts written after the *Phenomenology of Mind* (1807). I will discuss this issue below, which considers new forms of the necessity and freedom dialectic, both within some of Marx's post-capitalist writings, and in works such as Susan Buck-Morss's (2009) *Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History*.

Before continuing, it is important to note the broader theoretical context of Postone's efforts at highlighting the assuredly consequential *developments*—from the young to the mature Marx—regarding concepts of labor, alienation, and the Subject. These efforts involve more general issues, which I have previously noted. These include Postone's considerations of the epistemological implications of the outcome of Marx's apparent efforts to overcome the historical subject–object dichotomy, including Marx's distinction between subjectivity and the socio-historical Subject; the ramifications of those efforts for identifying the alienation characterized by an abstract form of social necessity internal to the twofold character of labor specific to capitalism; and, finally, in light of the preceding points, conceptualization of the requirements for a post-alienated, or post-capitalist society.

9.2 Marx's Third Autocritique: Hegel's Philosophy of Mind and the Realm of Necessity and the Realm of Freedom

In light of these considerations, how may a fuller account of Hegel's development of the necessity and freedom dialectic than the one I just identified in Postone's (1995) analysis of labor, objectification and alienation, and the historical Subject lead to the *development* of the reinterpretation of Marx's

mature critical theory Postone has initiated? In an attempt to answer this question, in the following, I will suggest an immanent critique of Postone's interpretation of the necessity and freedom dialectic, the starting point for which is the passage from Marx's (1981, 958–959) *Capital,* vol. 3 on the realm of necessity and realm of freedom. Briefly, I will review once more the background that lends special significance to interpretations of this passage: I have argued, after Dunayevskaya, that Marx (1975a, 326–346) in "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic", perhaps his most important essay among the *1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* (1975b, 229–346) follows Hegel's progression through the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1817), from the *Logic* (1817/1975) to the *Philosophy of Nature* (1817/2007), and into the Introduction to *Philosophy of Mind* (1817/1973); he then breaks off his analysis just before the section of the latter titled "Subdivision" (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 29; 53n23). As I shall show below, there are striking similarities in a comparison of Marx's passage on the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom, which he wrote nearly two decades after stopping right before Hegel's development of this same dialectic in the Subdivision section, which concluded the latter's Introduction to *Philosophy of Mind*. Consistent with his previous two autocritiques, the mature Marx presents an implicit critique of Hegel's philosophy, which replaces an explicit critique issued in his youth.

First the youthful critique: In the closing paragraphs of "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic", Marx (1975a, 346) reproduces two passages each from Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature* (1817/2007) and *Philosophy of Mind* (1817/1973). Marx also provides commentary prior to each pair of the quoted passages. In the first set, Marx overtly criticizes the idea that "nature as nature", when "distinguished" from the "secret sense hidden within it", namely the abstractions presumably supplied by Hegel's philosophy, is "nothing … or has only the sense of being an externality which has to be annulled" (Marx, 1975a, 346). Since, in Hegel's words, "nature does not contain within itself the absolute purpose", then, according to Marx's critique of Hegel, "[Nature's] purpose is the confirmation of abstraction" (Marx, 1975a, 346). Following more detailed critical commentary along these lines on his critique of Hegel's philosophy, Marx (1975a, 346) concludes by reproducing two of the closing paragraphs of the section of the Introduction to *Philosophy of Mind* (Hegel, 1817/1973, 18) that precedes the final Subdivision (Hegel, 1817/1973, 20–24). The final sentences of Hegel's paragraphs, thus quoted by Marx, appear to accentuate Marx's basic critique that Hegel's philosophy mystifies reality by inverting object

and subject, nature, and mind: "Revelation in conception is the creation of nature as the mind's being, in which the mind procures the *affirmation* and *truth* of its freedom" (Hegel, 1817/1973, ¶381, quoted in Marx, 1975a, 346). "*The absolute is mind*. This is the highest definition of the absolute" [Emphasis is in Hegel's original] (Hegel, 1817/1973, quoted in Marx, 1975a, 346). Marx, from this, offers no further commentary, and seems to imply, in refraining, that, for him, the critique is self-evident. In the following, I shall summarize the two paragraphs of Hegel's (1817/1973, 20–24) Introduction to *Philosophy of Mind*, which appear directly after Hegel's text I quoted above, and which Marx (1975a, 326–346) did not analyze in "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic". Hegel elaborated the necessity and freedom dialectic in these concluding paragraphs of the Introduction's final section titled "Subdivision".

Hegel's ¶385 (the first of the two comprising the Subdivision) begins with the statement: "The development of Mind (Spirit) is in three stages" (Hegel, 1817/1973, 20). First is in the form of "self-relation", the "ideal totality of the idea", "self-contained and free", that is, "*Mind Subjective*" (Hegel, 1817/1973, 20). Second is in the form of "reality", mind "realized, i.e. in a world produced [mind produces the world] and to be produced by it [world produces mind]: in this world freedom presents itself under the shape of necessity", that is, "*Mind Objective*" (Hegel, 1817/1973, 20). The third stage is, "unity of mind as objectivity and of mind as ideality and concept, which essentially and actually is and forever produces itself", that is, "Mind Absolute" (Hegel, 1817/1973, 20).

In the final paragraph (¶386) of Hegel's (1817/1973, 22–24) introduction to *Philosophy of Mind*, Hegel characterizes the very identification of these three stages (freedom, necessity, and the unity of the two) as a veritable process of, in Hegel's own word, "liberation" (Hegel, 1817/1973, 22), that is, "finding a world presupposed before us, generating a world as our own creation, and gaining freedom from it and in it" (Hegel, 1817/1973, 22).

With Hegel's analysis fresh before us, which followed directly *after* the paragraphs around which the young Marx had centered an explicit critique of Hegel's philosophy (and which I just recounted above), a striking comparison comes into view in putting forth the mature Marx's (1981, 958–959) articulation of the necessity and freedom dialectic: Marx's concept of the dialectic of the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom now appears as a social appropriation of Hegel's philosophic text. In the following, I provide Marx's passage as Postone (1995) quotes it in *Time, Labor, and Social Domination*:

> The realm of freedom actually begins only where labor, which is determined by necessity and external goals, ceases; thus in the very nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material production… Freedom in this field can only consist in socialized humans, the associated producers, rationally regulating their material interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by a blind force; and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favorable to, and worthy of, their human nature. But it nonetheless remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human power, which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can blossom forth, only with this realm of necessity as its basis. (Marx, 1894/1981, quoted in Postone, 1995, 381)

For the comparison I am putting forth now, just prior to the passage from Marx I quoted, and which is given in Postone's (1995, 381) text, I presented Hegel's (1817/1973, 22) elaborations of the three "stages" of the development of Mind in the quotes I provided from the Subdivision section of Hegel's Introduction to *Philosophy of Mind* (1817/1973, 1–24). The first stage, however, appears to be no more than the reflexive incorporation of the completion of Hegel's own philosophy ("the ideal totality of the idea"). The passage from Marx, quoted by Postone, accordingly, first assumes Hegel's philosophy, then appropriates the second and third stages; it actually represents Marx's third important autocritique associated with his understanding of Hegel's dialectic (although Postone does not characterize it as such).

As I described in some detail above, Marx's two prior autocritiques negated his own earlier concepts by substituting new for initial forms of his critique of Hegel. Both of these prior autocritiques dealt with the development of Marx's concept of the specificity of *capitalist* labor, and the incorporation into *Capital* (Marx, 1867/1990), on the one hand, Hegel's notion of the historical Subject—or abstract labor as the "substance" of value—and, on the other hand, objectification and alienation associated with the dual nature of labor.

Remarkably, Marx's *third autocritique*, represented in the above passage from Marx, quoted by Postone, refers to *post-capitalist* society. Marx's autocritique here negates, first of all, Marx's (1975a, 346) own 1844 assessment of Hegel's (1817/1973, 8–20) section on "What Mind Is" by reformulating his earlier *critique* of Hegel's definition of the Absolute as Mind (the purpose of nature as the confirmation of abstraction). In regard

to Hegel's (1817/1973, 20–24) final, Subdivision section, Marx (in the passage I provided above that Postone quoted) assumes Hegel's philosophy as the Subjective Idea (Hegel, 1817/1973, 20), and then in his autocritique *incorporates* Hegel's concepts of Objective Mind *and* Absolute Mind (Hegel, 1817/1973, 20). Marx incorporates Objective Mind as the "realm of necessity"; of the transition from capitalist to post-capitalist society, Marx characterizes it as a process of transforming the necessary material interchange with nature *from* people's subjection to a "blind force", *to* their rationally regulating this interchange through a new social (collective and associated) form of activity, which, however, is no longer identifiable as "labor".[4] (This significant shift is apparent in the difference of the terms Marx employs—from the more concrete "labor" to the more abstract "material interchange".) Marx, in turn, conceptualizes the "realm of freedom" as the unity of subjective and objective Mind: If objective mind is a process of generating a world as our own creation, that is, negation of both nature's blind force in people's material interchange with it, *and* of the abstract (nature-like) forms of social compulsion characteristic of capitalism, then Marx, in his autocritique, reconceptualizes Hegel's Absolute Mind as the realm of freedom: gaining freedom *from and in* this revolutionized realm of necessity. The "from" refers to the realm of freedom, which only begins where labor determined by necessity and external goals ends, the "in" to the revolutionized realm of necessity itself. Thus, Marx (1894/1981, 958–959) incorporates into *Capital* Hegel's (1867/1973, 20–24) Subdivision of the Introduction to *Philosophy of Mind*, which, according to Hegel, articulates a process of "liberation" (Hegel, 1817/1973, 22), and which Marx had previously ignored.

Marx's third autocritique presupposes the first two, which Postone identified in his interpretation of the relation between the early and mature Marx's theory development. Moreover, the third autocritique, which also entails the mature Marx's critique of the young Marx's original interpretations of Hegel's ideas, may only be intelligible in its emergence against the background of the completed concepts associated with the first two, and only as Marx unfolded these latter two completely in *Capital*, vol. 1 (Marx, 1867/1990). For example, in terms of labor, objectification, and alienation, Postone's interpretations of Marx's concept of relative surplus value suggest, prior to any concept of post-capitalist society, the radical reduction of the role of direct labor in material wealth production. In view

[4] Marx originally develops this idea in the *Grundrisse* (Marx, 1993, 325).

of this, Marx's analysis of the most developed forms of capitalist production, which makes "science a potentiality for production which is distinct from labor and presses it into the service of capital" (Marx, 1867/1990, 482), recognizes the "rational core" (Postone, 1995, 160) of Hegel's philosophy, and incorporates into his mature theory that which the early Marx critiqued: Hegel's notion of nature having only the "sense of being an externality which has to be annulled" (Marx, 1975a, 346), and that "nature does not contain within itself the absolute purpose" (Marx, 1975a, 346, quoting Hegel, 2007, ¶245), suggesting from these, then, that, Nature's "purpose is the confirmation of abstraction" (Marx, 1975a, 346). The abstraction that is actually "confirmed", then, in this historical process is twofold: alienated labor in the form of abstract labor in its "subsumption" of concrete labor and the application of science and technology in the control, direction, and absorption of the forces of nature for the end of production, not of material wealth but of value. Marx's (1981, 958–959) passage on the realm of freedom and the realm of necessity, *continuing* this dialectic, encapsulates the process of negation of this "Hegelian" capitalist abstraction in terms of *post-capitalist* society.

9.3 Postone's Interpretation of Marx's Concepts of the Realm of Necessity and the Realm of Freedom

Postone (1995) prefaces his interpretations of Marx's (1894/1981, 958–959) passage on the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom by noting that Marx's analysis of the twofold character of labor implies a theory wherein such a labor is bound to two forms of necessity. Postone identifies two potential forms of freedom, each from a corresponding sort of necessity, in his reference to Marx's passage, which Postone (1995, 381) quoted and I reproduced above. Postone observes:

> This passage refers to two different forms of freedom—that from transhistorical necessity and that from historically determinate social necessity. The "true realm of freedom" refers to the first form of freedom. Freedom from any sort of necessity must necessarily begin outside the sphere of production. (Postone, 1995, 381)

In Postone's interpretation, the *realm of freedom* is at first a purported "freedom *from*" "transhistorical necessity"; "transhistorical necessity" itself has to do with the material interchange—*nature* relations. Marx

early in *Capital* defined this as "useful labor … a condition of human existence which is independent of all forms of society" (Marx, 1867/1990, 133). In contrast, the realm of necessity's form of freedom is from "historically determinate necessity", and it has to do with the value form of *social* relations. Hence, according to Postone, and further elaborations below, the "freedom from" in the "realm of freedom" is a function of *individual absence* from the social, and lack of content, while the "freedom from" in the "realm of necessity", to the contrary, is a function of *social presence* and substance.

Postone's ensuing interpretations include two basic points: First, despite the realm of necessity's "transhistorical" character of natural necessity *sans* freedom, this realm of necessity may contain an "historical" form of freedom (Postone, 1995, 382); and, second, there can be no freedom "from any sort of necessity" (Postone, 1995, 382). In respect to the freedom contained within the realm of necessity, Postone notes the potential that, "associated producers can control their labor rather than being controlled by it" (Postone, 1995, 381), and convincingly emphasizes—beyond the narrow sense of control of production—the wider context of overcoming "the abstract form of domination rooted in commodity-determined labor" (Postone, 1995, 381). Thus, freedom within necessity, while not altering the basic transhistorical character of the realm of necessity as such, would be historically *original*, and actually only *conceivable* as a determinate historical negation of the fully developed capitalism Postone describes, in which the role of direct labor in the production of material wealth has already been drastically reduced.

However, beyond this point, Postone's interpretation of Marx's passage appears inconsistent. Within the passage I quoted from Postone above, at first he seems to characterize Marx's concept of the realm of freedom (freedom from any sort of necessity) as a potentially *real* form of freedom. However, after a thorough description of the sort of historical freedom *possible* in respect to *negation* of determinate necessity (the specifically capitalist value form that characterizes the present realm of necessity), Postone notes that it is this freedom, moreover, which "*allows* for the *expansion* of 'the true realm of freedom'" (my emphasis) (Postone, 1995, 382). Postone then concludes that "it [the realm of necessity] does not and cannot entail freedom on a total social level from any sort of necessity: society, for Marx, cannot be based on absolute freedom" (Postone, 1995, 382).

"Total social level", then, is the qualification that distinguishes Postone's (1995) initial *definition* of Marx's concept of the realm of freedom as

"freedom from any sort of necessity" and his apparently inconsistent argument that there can be no such thing as the latter. In connection with this, Postone's ensuing argument suggests that the "realm of freedom", freedom from any sort of necessity, is an individual, not a social, potential of post-capitalist society. Postone writes:

> Although the labor of individuals need not be a necessary means for acquiring means of consumption *some* form of social production is a necessary precondition of human social existence. The form and extent of this transhistorical, "natural," social necessity can be historically modified; this necessity itself, however, cannot be abolished. Even when direct human labor in production no longer would be the primary source of social wealth, and society no longer would be structured by a quasi-objective form of social mediation constituted by labor, social labor would have to be performed, according to Marx. For this reason… he maintains that however playful individual labor may become, labor on a socially general level can never acquire the character of pure play. (Postone, 1995, 382)

9.4 Critique of Postone's Interpretations of the Realm of Necessity and the Realm of Freedom

In the following, I shall offer critical perspectives on Postone's (1995, 381–384) interpretation of Marx's passage on the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom: First, *retrospectively*, I shall refer back to my earlier analysis, in Chap. 3, of the necessity and freedom dialectic as Hegel's "hardest transition", and by gathering together several of the insights gleaned from my earlier reviews, in Chap. 7, of Postone's assessment of sections of Marx's *Grundrisse*, and, in Chap. 8, key analyses of the "relative surplus value" sections of *Capital*. Second, *prospectively*, there is a passage I have not yet taken up, which concludes the Introduction to Hegel's (1817/1973, 22–23) *Philosophy of Mind*. Consideration of that passage will open the way for a re-examination of Dunayevskaya's (2002) and Marcuse's (1941/1999, 1962) conflicting interpretations of Hegel's (1817/1973, 315) conclusion to the main text of *The Philosophy of Mind* (1817/1973), a theoretical divergence of which both were apparently unaware, at least for a considerable portion of the most important first few years of their correspondence (1954–1978).

As I noted, Postone emphasizes in a conclusion to his interpretations of Marx's (1894/1981, 958–959) passage on the necessity and freedom dialectic that "*society* cannot be based on absolute freedom" (my emphasis)

(Postone, 1995, 382), that is, according to Postone's definitions, freedom from any kind of necessity. So, the latter kind of freedom, apparently restricted to socially emancipated *individuals* according to Postone's depiction, appears merely quantitative—a temporal expansion claimed by the individual as *opposed* to the social. This result is owed to the historical freedom, for example, the reduction of labor time, attained in the realm of necessity. As such, this realm of freedom, which is "freedom from any necessity", according to Postone, seems uninvitingly devoid of content of its own.

Postone characterizes the form of freedom thus obtained within the realm of necessity as evidence that, in general, the form and extent of transhistorical, "natural", social necessity can be *historically* modified (though not abolished) (Postone, 1995, 382). Consequently, Postone implies that, in the context of theorizing post-capitalist society, the freedom in the realm of necessity is intertwined with history, while the freedom "beyond" the realm of necessity, namely the freedom *in* the "realm of freedom", is *not*. As such, Postone's conclusions strongly imply the "mutually exclusive" relationship of necessity and freedom, about which Hegel (1817/1975, 220) issued warnings and I described in great detail in Chap. 3, particularly in relationship to Marcuse's (1961, 135–136) interpretations. Granted, Marx concludes the passage with the idea that the realm of freedom has its "basis" in the realm of necessity. But, importantly, the realm of necessity to which Marx refers is the "modified" one that in his description, which fills most of the passage, is being revolutionized in a historically *unprecedented* fashion. In fact, one need only combine Postone's own interpretation of the form of freedom Marx identified with the realm of necessity (control of one's labor instead of being controlled by it) with Marx's more detailed account of the range of possibilities in this revolutionized realm of necessity to see that, in content, the "true" realm of freedom is based not on necessity in general, but on the historically acquired *freedom in* necessity. In that sense, freedom in the "realm of freedom" is "based on" the newly acquired freedom in the realm of necessity—"the true realm of freedom" is based not on necessity, but on freedom. This may be conceived as a social form of "absolute freedom" and, as I shall argue below, a social appropriation of Hegel's (1817/1973, 20–23) concept of Absolute Mind.

In Chap. 3, I examined Hegel's (1817/1975, 220) description of the necessity and freedom dialectic as the "hardest transition". The final section of the Objective Logic, "Reciprocity", proved to be crucial for explaining Hegel's idea of the transition to the Subjective Logic, which

he, long before Marx borrowed the term for *Capital* (1894/1981, 959), referred to as "the realm of freedom" (Hegel, 1812/1976, 571, 582). We will *not* need to review this investigation here, but it may suffice to recall that it is through the dialectic of causality and reciprocity that Hegel brings into focus the emergence, from blind and veiled, a "seeing" and "unveiled" necessity. It is the latter necessity that forecloses on the artifactual "mutual exclusivity" (Hegel, 1817/1975, 220) of necessity and freedom: In Hegel's dialectic of the transition from necessity to freedom, freedom incorporates necessity as an "unsubstantial element in itself" (Hegel, 1817/1975, 220). In this, consider Postone's assessment holding that the realm of necessity, modified so that people control their material interchange with nature rather than being controlled by it, is what allows for the *expansion* of "the true realm of freedom" (Postone, 1995, 382, quoting Marx, 1894/1981, 959), as well as his extensive analyses of the production of material wealth's radical historical transformation *from* a function of direct labor *to* one of the application of science and the incorporation of the forces of nature. Given these, it is not at all hard to imagine labor time, and the amount of any person's lifetime, that would be required for the realm of necessity shrinking[5] to the extent that, indeed, like in Hegel's dialectic, freedom incorporates necessity as an "unsubstantial element in itself" (Hegel, 1817/1975, 220).

Postone's (1995, 382) analysis suggests, as well, a sort of "mutual exclusivity" of the individual and the social, which raises questions concerning both the extent and kind of influence subjectivity has in determining the realm of freedom; it also, then, revives the problem of the difference between the historical Subject and subjectivity. First, we can look yet again to Postone's own analyses, which I reviewed in Chap. 7, this time of sections of Marx's *Grundrisse* (1858/1993), to begin to navigate to a full disclosure of Marx's third major autocritique and its theoretical implications.

[5] Although István Mészáros (2008), unlike Postone's identification of the *end of the role of direct labor* as the predominant source of surplus production for the epochal transition to "real history" and the "realm of freedom" as opposed to prehistory, instead links this epochal transition to the end of "the age-old preponderance of the material base in general" (Mészáros, 208, 56), he nonetheless identifies a key concept in a late section of Marx's *Grundrisse* (1858/1993) writing, "In the course of humanity's development, natural necessity progressively leaves its place to historically created necessity, whereas in due course historical necessity itself becomes potentially unnecessary necessity through the vast expansion of productive capacity and real wealth. Thus, representing the seminal condition of actually feasible emancipation, we find that historical necessity is indeed a "'merely historical necessity': a necessarily disappearing necessity" (Mészáros, 2008, 57), or "a 'vanishing necessity'" (Marx, 1858/1993, 832, quoted by Mészáros, 2008, 58).

Earlier in this work, in my considerations of sections of Marx's *Grundrisse* (1858/1993), I described several instances in which, now seen from the perspective of his third autocritique, Marx appeared to imply the "porosity" of the realm of necessity.[6] These involved the dialectic of the individual and the social, as well as the historical force of subjectivity—particularly in regard to the latter how it both arises from and molds the transition to and the coalescence of a post-capitalist society. In Chap. 7, in my discussion of Postone's (1995) interpretations, I examined a section of the *Grundrisse* in which Marx describes in detail the emergence of material conditions conducive to the development of "rich individuality, which is all-sided in its production as in its consumption, and whose labor no longer appears as labor, but as the full development of activity itself" (Marx, 1858/1993, 325). Thus, according to Marx, a potential arises *within* capitalism for a social condition in which labor "no longer appears as labor" (Marx, 1858/1993, 325)—a condition in which "natural necessity in its direct form has disappeared" (Marx, 1858/1993, 325)—the result of "a historically created need" having "taken the place of the natural one" (Marx, 1858/1993, 325).[7] Postone's (1995, 381–384) analysis of the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom incorporated the first concept, a historically modified necessity, though it did not fully reflect the importance, especially the social ramifications, which Marx attributed to a potential form of labor that "no longer appears as labor". In any case, neither Postone's discussions on the section in the *Grundrisse*, nor those on the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom, included an inquiry into the subjective "cause" of, or at least subjectivity's contribution to, the circumstance in which "natural necessity in its direct form has disappeared". According to Marx in the *Grundrisse*, the explanation for the latter lies in the emergence, or a new form, of subjectivity implied in a replacement of a "natural *need*" by a "historically created *need*". Interestingly, as an indication that these were a late theoretic interest of his generally, Marx develops the ideas of "rich individuality"

[6] As I discussed in Chap. 3, Hegel develops the special quality of permeability in his elaboration of the "non-mutual exclusivity" of necessity and freedom, and Susan Buck-Morss (2009, 110–113) discusses the "porosity" of collective subjectivity and the concept.

[7] In a key post-*Capital* theoretical document, Marx characterized post-capitalist society as one in which labor, from a means of life may itself become life's "prime want" (Marx, 1875/2010, 87). Conceptually, this idea should be understood in the context of the dialectic of the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom I have been discussing throughout this work.

(Marx, 1867/1990, 739) and "need" (Marx, 1875/2010), the former in one of the later chapters of *Capital*, vol. 1,[8] and both of them in the post-*Capital* work, "Critique of the Gotha program".[9]

As I also discussed in Chap. 7 of this work, in the often-analyzed section of the *Grundrisse*, most commonly known as "The Fragment on Machines", Marx (1858/1993, 705) developed the dialectic of the replacement of direct labor by the "social individual" as the "great foundation stone of production and wealth" (Marx, 1858/1993, 705); in a section that closely follows, Marx (1858/1993, 711–712) described the pivotal role of subjectivity in the transition to and consolidation of post-capitalism, characterizing the unity of the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom: "Free time—which is both idle time and time for higher activity" (Marx, 1858/1993, 712), naturally transforms "its possessor into a different subject" (1858/1993, 712), who then "enters into this direct production process as this different subject" (Marx, 1858/1993, 712). Finally, Marx (1858/1993) characterizes the pivotal force of subjectivity in the transitions between historical epochs, writing in an early section of the *Grundrisse*:

> [Living labor's] recognition… of the products as its own, and the judgment that its separation from the conditions of its [living labor's] realization is improper—forcibly imposed—is an enormous advance in awareness, itself the product of the mode of production resting on capital, and as much the knell to its doom as, with the slave's awareness that he cannot be the property of another, with his consciousness of himself as a person, the existence of slavery becomes a merely artificial, vegetative existence, and ceases to be able to prevail as the basis of production. (Marx, 1858/1993, 463)

Marx's assessment of the social force of subjectivity, linking historical epochs, is a principle theme in Susan Buck-Morss's (2009) work, *Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History*, which I will take up later in these concluding sections.

[8] Very similar to the text leading into Marx's passage on the realm of necessity and realm of freedom in *Capital,* vol. 3 (1894/1981, 957–958), Marx discusses the high levels of material production historically driven by capitalism's value form of production underlying the potential of a post-capitalist society in which the full development of each person's individuality is the "ruling principle" (Marx, 1867/1990, 739).

[9] Marx writes of the complex of sociohistorical developments underlying the transformation of labor from not only a "means of life, but itself life's prime want" (Marx, 1875/2010, 87).

9.5 Marx's Third "Autocritique": New Perspectives on the Dunayevskaya–Marcuse Dialogue

I shall now return to the concluding passages of the Subdivision section of the Introduction to *Philosophy of Mind* (Hegel, 1817/1973, 20–24). Interestingly, in these, Hegel provides clarifications of the necessity and freedom dialectic he had just previously developed in his text, which address Postone's argument that "society cannot be based on absolute freedom" (Postone, 1995, 382). They complete Hegel's philosophic concepts that Marx draws into his third autocritique. Hegel explains the abstract concepts and subjective barriers involved in the transition from Subjective and Objective Mind to Absolute Mind:

> A rigid application of the category of finitude by the abstract logician is chiefly seen in dealing with Mind and reason: it is held not a mere matter of strict logic, but treated also as a moral and religious concern, to adhere to the point of view of finitude, and the wish to go further is reckoned a matter of audacity, if not of insanity of thought.[10] Whereas in fact such a *modesty* of thought, as treats the finite as something altogether fixed and absolute, is the worst of virtues… This finitude of the spheres so far examined [Subjective and Objective Mind] is the dialectic that makes a thing have its *cessation* (my emphasis) by another and in another: but Spirit, the intelligent unity and the *implicit* Eternal, is itself just the consummation of that internal act by which nullity is nullified. (Hegel, 1817/1973, 23)

Marx's third autocritique has as its central idea the revolution in the realm of necessity—the freedom internal to it—as the *basis* for the realm of freedom. Considering the accompanying concrete descriptions that complete his passage on the realm of necessity, Marx also implies the new forms of productive activity I just showed he had already conceived and described in passages of the *Grundrisse* (Marx, 1858/1993, 325). Marx's idea of the transformation of labor into the "full development of activity" (Marx, 1858/1993, 325) appropriates the "rational core" (Postone, 1995, 160) of Hegel's notion of an "internal act by which nullity is nullified" (Hegel, 1817/1973, 23). Beyond the "dialectic" in which Subjective Mind and Objective Mind are mutually exclusive, or have their "cessation" in each other (Hegel, 1817/1973, 23), Marx (1894/1981, 958–959) also appropriates Hegel's

[10] It is here that Raya Dunayevskaya (2002, 26) ends her analysis, in 1953, of Hegel's "Subdivision" section of his Introduction to *Philosophy of Mind* (1973, 20–24).

continuation of the dialectic. Individuals fresh from the "realm of freedom" (Marx, 1981, 959) imbued with revolutionized subjectivity, enter production (Marx, 1858/1993, 712), animating Hegel's notion of the porousness of the sphere of necessity.[11] This production—the dialectic of the social and individual—is now a realm of necessity in which the "labor that no longer appears as labor" (Marx, 1858/1993, 325) prevails under material conditions that make that necessity an "unsubstantial element" (Hegel, 1817/1975, 220) in that realm of freedom.

The above considerations point the analysis back to the inception of the questions that were raised but not really answerable in the earliest exchanges of the Dunayevskaya–Marcuse correspondence: What is the current relevance of Hegel's philosophy for a reinterpretation of Marx's mature critical social theory, and what was the nature of the salient theoretic differences, which were characteristic of the Dunayevskaya–Marcuse dialogue, in respect to this problem? I shall attempt to further clarify this issue by exploring the significance of the two theorists' divergent perspectives on Hegel's concluding sentence of the main text of *Philosophy of Mind*: "The eternal idea, in full fruition of its essence, eternally sets itself to work, engenders and enjoys itself as absolute Mind" (Hegel, 1817/1973, 315). Since this work followed Hegel's two prior volumes on the *Science of Logic* and the *Philosophy of Nature*, respectively, the sentence actually concludes the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* itself. Focusing on the peculiar importance the sentence accrues for fully appreciating the development of the Dunayevskaya–Marcuse dialogue—even though neither writer explicitly discussed the sentence in the correspondence—can aid in determining the status of Marxist Humanism and Critical Theory *after* Postone's "reinterpretation of Marx's mature critical theory" (Postone, 1995).

Briefly, to review the background to the emergence of this sentence[12] *for us* as a focal point of the divergence of the Dunayevskaya's and Marcuse's interpretation of Hegel's current social relevance (in chronological order): In their first meeting in early 1955, Dunayevskaya handed over to Marcuse her two letters on Hegel's *Science of Logic* (1812/1976)

[11] Hegel writes of "cause, which in its exclusiveness resists all invasion … is subjected to necessity or the destiny of passing into dependency: and it is this subjection rather where the chief hardness lies. To think necessity, on the contrary, rather tends to melt that hardness" (1817/1975, 222).

[12] See *News and Letters*, February–March, April–May, 2006 for an exchange between Anderson, K. B. (2006a, b) and Arthur, C. (2006a, b) on the history and context of Hegel's added final sentence.

and *Philosophy of Mind* (1817/1973), which she originally sent to Grace Lee Boggs in spring 1953 (Anderson & Rockwell, 2012, 7n13). The second letter ended an analysis of the *Philosophy of Mind* by quoting the last sentence (given above), followed by her declaration, "We have entered the new society" (Dunayevskaya, 2002, 30).

The following year, before he met Dunayevskaya and personally received her 1953 letters on Hegel, Marcuse published a new edition of *Reason and Revolution* (1941/1999) with an added epilogue.[13] Here, he referred to Hegel's conclusion to the *Philosophy of Mind*, in which Hegel (1817/1973, 315), after the closing sentence I quoted above, presents "Aristotle's description of the *Nous* as *Theos*" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 433). Marcuse continues:

> At the beginning and at the end, Western philosophy's answer to the quest for Reason and Freedom is the same. The deification of the Spirit implies defeat in the reality. Hegel's philosophy was the last which could dare to comprehend reality as manifestation of the spirit. The subsequent history made such an attempt impossible. (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 433)

A year later in *Eros and Civilization* (1962), Marcuse develops this thought:

> Hegel's presentation of his system in his *Encyclopaedia* ends on the word "enjoys". The philosophy of Western civilization culminates in the idea that the truth lies in the negation of the principle that governs this civilization—negation in the two-fold sense that freedom appears as real only in the idea, and that the endlessly projecting and transcending productivity of being comes to fruition in the perpetual peace of self-conscious receptivity… True freedom is only in the idea. Liberation is thus a spiritual event. (Marcuse, 1962, 105–107)

The contrast could hardly be starker between Dunayevskaya (2002, 30) and Marcuse's (1941/1999, 433, 1962/105, 107) respective readings of Hegel's final sentence of *Philosophy of Mind* (1817/1973). Nonetheless, both interpretations should be considered in the context of their respective original approaches to Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind*, which were mediated by Marx's (1975a, 326–346) 1844 essay, "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic". As I have shown in some detail, Dunayevskaya (2002, 20–22) had attributed

[13] The Epilogue added in 1954 is included in Marcuse (1999, 433–439).

great significance to the terrain of theory Hegel covered in the Introduction to *Philosophy of Mind* past the initial passages Marx referred to in his 1844 essay. This ground included Hegel's tight articulation of the necessity and freedom dialectic in the Introduction itself, which, as I mentioned before, was germane to understanding Marx's *Capital,* vol. 3 (1894/1981, 958–959) passage on the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom. Becoming clear now, in addition, is the importance for Dunayevskaya of the main text of Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind* for uncovering the message for contemporary times embedded in Marx's *historical* writings (Dunayevskaya, 2002, 25, 27, 29). Thus, Dunayevskaya's interpretation focused heavily on the potential of subjectivity in two dimensions—as constitutive of Hegel's and Marx's theories, and for any prospects of contemporary social change. Besides noting that her reading accompanying her studies of Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind* included the last part of *Capital,* vol. 3 ("The Trinity Formula") (Dunayevskaya, 2002, 25), in which Marx (1894/1981, 958–959) presented the passages on the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom, Dunayevskaya listed *The Civil War in France* (written in 1871), Marx's important historical writing on the Paris Commune. Then, in her analysis of the last part of Subjective Mind ("Free Mind"), Dunayevskaya's quote from Hegel begins at the point where he declares that, "When individuals and nations have once got in their heads the abstract concept of full-blown liberty, there is nothing like it in its uncontrollable strength, just because it is the very essence of mind, and that as its actuality" (Hegel, 1973, ¶482, quoted by Dunayevskaya, 2002, 27). Following from that, Dunayevskaya (2002, 29) actually suggests that Marx's and Lenin's analyses, respectively, of the greatness of the Paris Commune, "the form at last discovered to work out the economic emancipation of the proletariat",[14] and the early Soviets in the 1917 Russian Revolution,[15] resemble socio-historical appropriations of the three final syllogisms of *Philosophy of Mind* (Hegel, 1817/1973, 314–315).

Recall that Marcuse (1932/2005, 86–121) not only did *not* follow 1844 Marx's (1975a, 326–346) admittedly brief foray into an analysis of *Philosophy of Mind* (Hegel, 1817/1973). He explicitly advised that such attention would be superfluous, since Marx had already issued a far more extensive and detailed critique of the historically and theoretically relevant

[14] Dunayevskaya (2002, 29) refers to Karl Marx, The Civil War in France, *Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, Collected Works*, 22, 334.

[15] Dunayevskaya (2002, 29) refers to Vladimir Lenin, Volume IX, *Selected Works.*

part of *Philosophy of Mind*, that is, the second section, "Mind Objective", which Hegel developed in great detail in *Philosophy of Right* (1820/2000).[16] The latter, Hegel's final text, was written several years after his completion of the *Philosophy of Mind* and the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1817). In addition to his judgment of its lack of social relevance for his disinterest in the *Philosophy of Mind*, Marcuse (1941/1999, 164) also emphasizes his reading of Hegel's conclusions regarding implicit practical, historical realities—distinct limitations for further social transformations—that conditioned Hegel's unfolding philosophic system (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 164).[17]

Postone's (1995, 159–160) critique of the young Marx on the objectification and alienation referred to one of Marx's (1975a, 326–346) key texts, but it is Marx's text that broke off just prior to Hegel's (1817/1973, 20–24) articulation of the necessity and freedom dialectic. Yet, Postone's reinterpretations of Marx's theories are relevant, even though in Postone's approach Marx's development of the necessity and freedom dialectic is isolated in some important respects from Hegel's original concepts. In regard to this issue, I have strongly argued that Marx's dialectic of the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom (Marx, 1894/1981, 958–959) represents an important addition—a third crucial autocritique—to Postone's concept of Marx's social appropriation of Hegel's philosophy. Dunayevskaya (2002, 25) suggested something similar in pairing her analysis of the necessity and freedom dialectic in Hegel's Subdivision with her concurrent reading of the section in Marx's *Capital*, vol. 3, on the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom, as well as in suggesting, in Marx's historical writings, a social appropriation of the final syllogisms of Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind* (1817/1973).

Along with some distinctive features of Postone's (1995) reinterpretation of Marx's critical theory as background, I shall now revisit the controversial final sentence of Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind* (1817/1973)[18] by

[16] Marcuse's reference was to Marx's 1843 "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right". In *Reason and Revolution* (1941/1999), except for the chapter on Hegel's *Logic*, Marcuse's chapter on Hegel's political philosophy, mainly his analysis of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, is the longest. Also important here is the explanation Marcuse gives concerning freedom and the context of *Philosophy of Right*—that the latter is "but part of the realm of mind, namely that which Hegel denotes as objective mind" (Marcuse, 1941/1999, 178).

[17] Hence, Marcuse's descriptions of Hegel's transition to the Absolute Idea mentions Hegel's fear of social forces unleashed by the French Revolution and the mode of labor underlying modern society.

[18] See Anderson (2006a, b) and Arthur (2006a, b).

contrasting it with the sentence directly preceding it. The rationale for such a comparison is that while Hegel completed the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* in 1817, he added a sentence—which became the *new* final one—in 1830,[19] shortly before his death. While there is not a lot to be said for sure about Hegel's motivations in making this addition, from our own perspective an interesting parallel may be drawn between, on the one hand, the differing implications of the two sentences and, on the other, "traditional Marxism" and Postone's reinterpretations of Marx's "mature theory". Above I quoted the final sentence of the *Philosophy of Mind*, the last of the three sentences comprising the concluding paragraph. Here is the full paragraph prior to Hegel's addition:

> The third syllogism is the idea of philosophy, which has self-knowing reason, the absolutely universal, for its middle term: a middle, which divides itself into Mind and Nature, making the former its presupposition, as process of the Idea's subjective activity, and the latter its universal extreme, as process of the objectively and implicitly existing Idea. The self-judging of the Idea into its two appearances (§§575, 576) characterizes both as its (the self-knowing reason's) manifestations: and in it there is a unification of the two aspects—it is the nature of the fact, the notion, which causes the movement and development; yet this same movement is equally the action of cognition. (Hegel, 1817/1973, 314–315)

In Chap. 2, I summarized and interpreted the three paragraphs (§§ 575, 576, 577), which closed *Philosophy of Mind* (Hegel, 1973, 314–315), proposing that they represented Hegel's (1817/1973, 20–24) summation of the necessity and freedom dialectic he had already more fully elaborated in the work's Introduction.[20] My purpose in quoting the entire final paragraph now (*sans* the new final sentence Hegel added in the year before his death) is to highlight the opposite perspectives embedded in the different final sentence versions: As seen above, the original version of

[19] Thus, in light of Hegel's addition of a new final sentence to *Philosophy of Mind*, the implication in Marcuse's earlier position (1932/2005) that Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* (1820) in some way superseded Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind* (1817) now appears even more controversial, given that Hegel added the final sentence to *Philosophy of Mind* more than ten years after the publication of *Philosophy of Right*.

[20] Also, earlier in this chapter, I described Dunayevskaya's interpretations, which, though not suggesting it was conscious in either case, seemed to *attribute* forms of social appropriations of Hegel's final syllogisms to both Lenin and the Soviets of the Russian Revolution, and Marx and the Paris Commune.

the final sentence is shot through with productive terminology, associated with agency, and consonant with, in Postone's interpretations, that stage of capitalism when material wealth and direct labor are correlated. In contrast, Hegel's new final sentence, with the term "eternally", incorporates the idea of overcoming the "finitude" Hegel (1871/1973, 22–23) described in the Introduction to *Philosophy of Mind* (1817/1973) as inherent in the subject–object relation (Subjective Mind and Objective Mind). In the former final sentence, the production terms also implied the prevalence of external unifying forces, which corresponded with Marx's later concept of value: The preceding paragraphs appeared as "manifestations" of these abstract forces.

The *new* final sentence apparently reflects a transformation in which *self*-movement can and does prevail. Postone's (1995, 338) reconstruction of Marx's idea of the "productive effectiveness" related to the accumulation of past labor and productive knowledge characterizing large-scale industry as a form of production in which, "man [has] succeeded in making the product of his past labor … perform gratuitous service on a large scale, like a force of nature" (Postone, 1995, 338, quoting Marx, 1867/1990, 510), appropriates Hegel's Idea that "eternally sets *itself* to work, engenders and enjoys *itself*" (my emphasis) (Hegel, 1817/1973, 315). The sentence Hegel added in the last year before his death, then, seems to crystalize the idea of a social form of "freedom [that] presupposes necessity, and contains it as an unsubstantial element in itself" (Hegel, 1817/1975, 220) to the extent that it was then possible for Marx to appropriate Hegel's updated summation of the entire *Encyclopaedia*: The appropriation of what Postone interpreted as Marx's concepts of "historical time" and "historical freedom" (Postone, 1995, 377, 382) suggests the potential of people freed from domination by their own labor—an idea of a revolution in the realm of necessity that entails a form of technological production wherein labor no longer appears as labor, where nature remains a *constraint*, but is also, even more so, a *source of liberation*.

In the above, I have shown that within a single year's time (1953–1954), Dunayevskaya (2002, 30) and Marcuse (1941/1999, 433, 1962, 105, 107), unbeknownst to one other, interpreted the final sentence of Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind* (1817/1973). Perhaps more remarkably, they came to opposite conclusions as to its meaning. In a further comparison, this time of Dunayevskaya (2002) and Postone (1995), the former did not explicitly link her interpretations of Hegel's (1817/1973, 20–24, 314–315) conclusions to the *Philosophy of Mind* with Marx's (1894/1981, 958–959) concept

of the dialectic of the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom, while Postone (1995, 381) did not link his interpretations of Marx's passage on the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom with Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind*. In *not* doing so, Postone's otherwise powerful interpretations of Marx's social appropriations of Hegel's philosophy remain incomplete.

9.6 Marx's Capital and the Necessity of Capitalism

In a not very often discussed passage in a later section of *Capital* Marx wrote about the necessity and freedom dialectic underlying capitalism's personal and impersonal forces, and the need to grasp their interrelationship, to navigate to a post-capitalist society of freedom:

> [I]n so far as he is capital personified, his motivating force is not the acquisition and enjoyment of use-values, but the augmentation of exchange values. He is fanatically intent on the valorization of value; consequently he ruthlessly forces the human race to produce for production's sake. In this way he spurs on the development of society's productive forces, and the creation of those material conditions of production which alone can form the real basis of a higher form of society, a society in which the full and free development of every individual forms the ruling principle. Only as a personification of capital is the capitalist respectable. As such, he shares with the miser an absolute drive towards self-enrichment. But what appears in the miser as the mania of an individual is in the capitalist the effect of a social mechanism in which he is merely a cog… It is only to this extent that the necessity of the capitalist's own transitory existence is implied in the transitory necessity of the capitalist mode of production. (Marx, 1867/1990, 739)

9.7 Marx's Letters to Zasulich, Russian Edition of the Communist Manifesto

Even after *Capital* (1867/1990), where, as in the above, Marx articulated the dialectic in his philosophy of social necessity and freedom, he developed still newer forms of the necessity and freedom dialectic. As perhaps suggested in the passage above, *must every* society develop its own productive forces, and the creation of those material conditions of production, which alone can form the basis of a higher form of society? In the last years of his life, Marx's intensive efforts to answer this question to his own satisfaction have been carefully documented (Shanin, 1983). Marx eventually determined that everything depended on the given historical conditions. For

example, in his own time, in answer to a question posed to him by Vera Zasulich, a Russian revolutionary, Marx wrote that "The 'historical inevitability' of [capitalist development] is expressly restricted to the countries of Western Europe" (Marx, 1881, quoted in Shanin, 1983, 124). The next year Marx expanded on this theme in the 1882 Russian (second) edition of the *Communist Manifesto*, his last published writing: Marx determined that Western Europe might first create those material conditions of production, which alone can form the basis of a higher form of society, concluding, "If the Russian revolution becomes the signal for proletarian revolution in the West, so that the two complement each other, then Russia's peasant communal land ownership may serve as the point of departure for a communist development" (Marx, 1882, quoted in Shanin, 1983, 139).

9.8 Subjectivity and Post-capitalist Society

In the *Grundrisse* (1858/1993), Marx appears to be trying to work out forms of subjectivity, and the necessity and freedom dialectic, by uncovering parallels with and interactions of slavery and "free" labor, capitalist and post-capitalist society, *within* fully developed capitalist society. Certainly, when looked at altogether, these passages suggest the slavery at the center of Marx's attention is not ancient slavery, or slavery in general, but the actually existing slavery among Africans in the midst of European and American civilization. In a little noticed passage, which follows directly after his pivotal discussion of "the productive powers of labor … [that] have flourished to the stage where the possession and preservation of general wealth requires a lessor labor time of society as a whole" (Marx, 1858/1993, 325), Marx notes a recent newspaper report containing "an utterly delightful cry of outrage on the part of a West-Indian plantation owner" (Marx, 1858/1993, 326), and comments:

> This advocate analyses with great moral indignation—as a plea for the reintroduction of Negro slavery—how the Quashees (the free blacks of Jamaica) content themselves with producing only what is strictly necessary for their own consumption, and, alongside this "use value", regard loafing (indulgence and idleness) as the real luxury good; how they do not care a damn for the sugar and fixed capital invested in the plantations, but rather observe the planters' impending bankruptcy with an ironic grin of malicious pleasure… They have ceased to be slaves, but not in order to become wage labourers, but, instead, self-sustaining peasants working for their own consumption. (Marx, 1858/1993, 326)

In this description, Marx certainly aims to bring out the social force of an anti-capitalist subjectivity. Here, though, *unlike* in his later letters to Zasulich and the Russian edition of the *Communist Manifesto* (Shanin, 1983, 124, 139), Marx's analysis still implies the notion that to overcome capitalism the maximum conditions, particularly "general industriousness" (Marx, 1858/1993, 326), are universal necessary prerequisites.

It is informative as well, then, to revisit a second passage in Marx's *Grundrisse* (1858/1993) in view of the passage in *Capital*, vol. 1 (Marx, 1867/1990, 739) I quoted above in respect to the necessity of capitalism itself. In the latter, Marx had to develop the dialectical relationship between the objectivity he attributed to value production, which was at the center of capitalist development, and the transformative potential of subjectivity—both that kind, such as Zasulich's (Shanin, 1983, 124), which can be motivated by revolutionary theory, and a more general "advance in awareness". In regard to the latter, Marx in the *Grundrisse* (1858/1993, 462–463) identified and coupled with this "advance in awareness" both the slave's determination that he cannot be the property of another person *and* living labor's judgment that "separation from the conditions of its realization is improper—forcibly imposed" (Marx, 1858/1973, 462), which I discussed in Chap. 7. Remarkably, it turns out Marx's type of analysis here is not confined to *distinguishing historical stages*. Rather, he seeks to uncover the very character of modern day social subjectivity and resistance globally, by developing the dialectic of slave and wage labor, race, and class (Marx, 1867/1990, 365–366, 414).[21]

9.9 Susan Buck-Morss: From Critique of Hegelian Marxism to "New Humanism"

Susan Buck-Morss in her remarkable work, *Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History* (2009), breaks new ground in several areas. Most important for this study are the new perspectives on Hegelian Marxism that may be developed from her detailed analysis of the historical basis of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* (1807). Buck-Morss exposes the hidden "model" of the Haitian revolution, which underlay that work's master–slave dialectic. She documents how Hegel assiduously followed in newspaper reports

[21] Dunayevskaya makes central to her analysis of *Capital*, vol. 1, Marx's declaration in that work that "labor cannot emancipate itself in the white skin where in the black skin it is branded" (Marx, 1867/1990, 414, quoted by Dunayevskaya, 1958/1988, 84).

the (Haitian) revolution, as it unfolded, *in* the French revolution. Thus, arguably not only was the Haitian Revolution the core of Hegel's *Phenomenology*, but was as well the impetus for the development of Hegel's entire system. Earlier in this chapter, in discussions of Marx's (1975a, 326–346) "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic", I indicated the predominant place he assigned Hegel's *Phenomenology*, and I described the focus Marcuse (1932/2005), and particularly Postone (1995), placed on the *Phenomenology* in their respective contemporary "Critical Theory" readings of Marx's early text. Susan Buck-Morss asks a key question, writing:

> "Where did Hegel's idea of the relation between lordship and bondage originate", ask the Hegel experts, repeatedly, referring to the famous metaphor of the "struggle to death" between the master and slave, which for Hegel provided the key to the unfolding of freedom in world history and which he first elaborated in the *Phenomenology of Mind*, written in Jena in 1805–1806 (the first year of the Haitian nation's existence) and published in 1807 (the year of the British abolition of the slave trade). Where indeed?… No one has dared to suggest that the idea for the dialectic of lordship and bondage came to Hegel in Jena in the years 1803–1805 from reading the press—journals and newspapers. (Buck-Morss, 2009, 48, 49)

Buck-Morss elaborates:

> In the *Phenomenology of Mind*, Hegel insists that freedom cannot be granted to slaves from above. The self-liberation of the slave is required through a "trial by death"… The goal of *this* liberation, *out* of slavery, cannot be subjugation of the master in turn, which would be merely to repeat the master's "existential impasse" … but, rather, elimination of the institution of slavery altogether. (Buck-Morss, 2009, 55–56)

After noting that Hegel scholars have not only failed to *answer* the question of why the topic of Hegel and Haiti has for so many years been ignored, Buck-Morss comments that, in fact, they have failed to even *ask* the question (Buck-Morss, 2009), She writes:

> Surely a major reason for this omission is the Marxist appropriation of a social interpretation of Hegel's dialectic. Since the 1840s, with the early writings of Karl Marx, the struggle between the master and slave has been abstracted from literal reference and read once again as a metaphor—this time for class struggle. In the twentieth century, this Hegelian-Marxian

> interpretation had powerful proponents, including Georg Lukács and Herbert Marcuse… The problem is that (white) Marxists, of all readers, were the least likely to consider real slavery as significant because within their stagist understanding of history, slavery—no matter how contemporary—was seen as a premodern institution, banned from the story and relegated to the past. (Buck-Morss, 2009, 56–57)

Though not perhaps as technically "Hegelian Marxist", Postone's (1995) reinterpretation of Marx's critical theory, especially considering the central place his reading of Hegel's *Phenomenology* assumes, may be interpretable such that it expands the scope of Buck-Morss's historical critique of (white) Marxists. In contrast, Buck-Morss's barely noticeable *dismissal* of Karl Marx's writings on the master and slave "since the early 1840s", clearly does not take into account the 1850s, namely the passages from Marx's *Grundrisse* (1858/1993) I just cited above, nor the 1860s—Marx's pivotal concept of race and the "emancipation of labor" (1867/1990, 366, 414) in *Capital* itself. In any case, Buck-Morss's project, reconstitution of an idea of universal history and a new "humanism" (Buck-Morss, 2009, 79), the latter she apparently unknowingly borrowed from 1840s Marx, his "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic" (1975a, 336), points in the direction of new determinations of the Marxist Humanist–Critical Theory dialectic.

9.10 The Marxist Humanist–Critical Theory Dialectic

Moishe Postone's work shows, especially in respect to Hegel, that Marx's method of theory development on the most important issues was as much a self-critique as a critique of Hegel: Marx's critiques were indeed critiques of his prior critiques of Hegel. Following Postone's work as an example of revealing this sort of autocritique in respect to Marx's unfolding the critical concepts for an adequate characterization of the capitalist social form in *Capital*, vol. 1, I uncovered a third autocritique, which Marx, in *Capital,* vol. 3, outlined for post-capitalism in the passages on the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom. However, this third autocritique, unlike the first two, did not so much surpass by incorporating rather than simply negating Hegel's ideas. Rather, Marx filled with the densest content, developed over subsequent decades, a void he had left in his original approach to the concluding paragraphs of Hegel's introduction to Hegel's

Philosophy of Mind (1817/1973). Hence, going forward, we should keep a watchful eye out for other possible voids that can be filled with the dialectical resources that have long since been established.

In respect to the Marxist Humanist–Critical Theory dialogue, represented in part in the Dunayevskaya–Marcuse correspondence, as well in their respective published works, the necessity and freedom dialectic was, perhaps surprisingly, never firmly established in the Hegelian–Marxian dialectic. Nor, perhaps, could it have been prior to Postone's (1995) reinterpretations of Marx's *Grundrisse* (1858/1993) and *Capital* (1867/1990). As I detailed in this work, Marcuse, in an apparent response to the dialogue with Dunayevskaya, recognized after all the current social relevance of Hegel's philosophy, in fact identifying the dialectic of necessity and freedom in both Hegel's *Logic* (1812/1976) and smaller *Encyclopaedia Logic* as of prime importance—"*the* key problem in the Hegelian as well as the Marxian dialectic"—as well as, *a* key problem in the idea of socialism itself" (Marcuse, 1961, 135). In doing so, Marcuse conceded that Hegel regarded this dialectic as the "'hardest' of all dialectical transitions" in the *Logic* (Marcuse, 1961, 136). Marcuse's reference to a section of Hegel's *Logic* he had "skipped" in his earlier close reading of it in *Reason and Revolution* (Marcuse, 1941/1999)[22] may be regarded as a form of the autocritique I described in respect to Marx's return to a section of Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind* (1817/1973) to fill out his concept of post-capitalist society in *Capital*, vol. 3. However, what we know about the stage of Marcuse's correspondence with Dunayevskaya alters the historical context considerably. Despite the topic being a central feature of their exchanges, Marcuse neither before nor after publication of his "autocritique" directly discussed this theoretical development with Dunayevskaya. Moreover, in his works published later than *Soviet Marxism*, Marcuse did not develop the Hegelian side of the necessity and freedom dialectic and, and he tended to question rather than develop the Marxian side.[23]

Perhaps more surprisingly, neither did Dunayevskaya follow-up Marcuse's apparent crucial theoretic concession. Not only did Dunayevskaya not recognize, either in the correspondence or in her publications,

[22] Marcuse, in *Soviet Marxism* (1961) refers to ¶¶158–159, the final two paragraphs of Essence in Hegel's *Encyclopaedia Logic*, and to "Reciprocity", the last section of the final paragraph of the volume on Being and Essence in Hegel's larger *Logic*. I took these up extensively in Chap. 3.

[23] See, especially, Marcuse (1966) and Marcuse (1969).

Marcuse's concession on the current social relevance of Hegel's philosophy for developing Marx's critical social theory. Dunayevskaya never connected her *own* analysis of Hegel's dialectic of necessity and freedom in the final paragraphs of Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind* (1817/1973) with her interpretation of Marx's (1994/1981, 958–959) passages on the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom in *Capital,* vol. 3. These considerations are important as we continue to trace and retrace Marx's own theoretical trajectory from the necessity to the non-necessity of direct labor in material wealth production, and of capitalism itself. Subjectivity, including the kind of deep dialogue traceable in the Dunayevskaya–Marcuse correspondence as a matter of historical record, is constitutive of the necessity and freedom dialectic, not unlike the kind driven by theory Marx identified as crucial in his dialogue with Vera Zasulich on the "necessity" of capitalism, that is, when linked to the epochal sort—"the enormous advance in awareness"—Marx was on the lookout for and took the time to uncover and describe so originally in the *Grundrisse*.

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[1] Note: Page numbers followed by 'n' refer to notes.

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