Nisha Bellinger

GOVERNING HUMAN WELL-BEING

Domestic and International Determinants

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Dedicated to my parents, Smita Mukherjee and Sandip Mukherjee

Preface and Acknowledgements

This book assesses the effect of domestic and international political determinants of human well-being outcomes and attempts to provide a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between the two. The book demonstrates the significance of political factors in influencing human lives.

Several people played an instrumental role in helping me finish this book, and I have amassed numerous debts of gratitude over the years that I would like to acknowledge here. If I have inadvertently overlooked someone, I apologize. The inception of this book can be traced to my years in graduate school at the University of Missouri. My advisor at the university, Dr. Jonathan Krieckhaus, has guided me through every step of my graduate and now professional career. He helped me develop this project over the years and prodded me along to get it published as a book. He finds a way to be critical and encouraging at the same time, and I think this makes him a great mentor and colleague. I am fortunate to have the opportunity of working with him. Other faculty members, Dr. A. Cooper Drury, Dr. Steven Quackenbush, and Dr. Leslie Schwindt-Bayer, provided valuable advice on various stages of the development of the project and the publication process. Interactions with Dr. Moises Arce and Dr. Doh C. Shin during my graduate school years and beyond have sharpened my research ideas and helped in my professionalization as an academic scholar.

I am thankful to my editor, Ms. Alina Yurova, for her initial interest in the project and her support through the review and publication process. Additionally, many thanks go to Mr. Ben Bailey and the production team at Palgrave Macmillan for their assistance. The feedback on the book from

the anonymous reviewer helped tremendously to improve the book, specifically in helping me identify the contributions of this book to the larger body of research on human well-being.

The completion of this project would not have been possible without the support of my family. I have spent countless hours discussing various aspects of this book with my husband, Paul T. Bellinger, Jr. Paul started out as an academic and is now a professional photographer, and this book has benefited from both the academic and the creative bent of his mind. His incisive feedback on the content of the book has tremendously improved the end project, and the striking book cover of Mumbai, India is a photograph taken by him on one of our visits to the country. Most importantly, though, he has always been extremely supportive of my professional aspirations, and for that I am very grateful.

My grandmother, Pratima Mukherjee, my late-grandfather, Sanat Kumar Mukherjee, and my brother, Kaushik Mukherjee, have all played important roles in my professional success, supporting and encouraging me over the years when most needed. The book is dedicated to my parents, Smita Mukherjee and Sandip Mukherjee, who have made innumerable sacrifices over the years so I could pursue the career I wanted. From my mother, Smita Mukherjee, I have learned patience, and from my father, Sandip Mukherjee, I have inherited my work ethic. Both these qualities have been crucial in enabling me to finish this book and continue to do the work I enjoy. Thank you, ma and baba.

Boise, ID, USA Nisha Bellinger

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Why are there large disparities in the quality of life people lead? What factors account for the general well-being of humanity? How do we improve human lives? These are some of the perennial questions that policymakers, leaders, thinkers, and academicians alike have pondered for years. The Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations lays out the primary objectives of the international organization and emphasizes the pursuit of the betterment of human lives by stating that it aspires to "…save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom…" While international organizations such as the United Nations undoubtedly play an important role in improving human lives, individual governments are the primary actors who are uniquely placed to improve the well-being of their citizens. Thinkers such as Hobbes, writing in 1651, underlined the significance of the form of government in improving the quality of human lives. The American Declaration of Independence of 1776 emphasized that the government is formed to ensure that citizens have the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Political statesmen such as Churchill and Roosevelt signed the Atlantic Charter in 1941,

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which outlined the governing guidelines to assure a life without misery for humanity.

Even though humankind has made strides in improving human lives, vast disparities in living conditions of people still exist. As prominent academician Amartya Sen rightly notes, in spite of all the progress that has been made in human welfare over the years, "…we also live in a world with remarkable deprivation, destitution and oppression," thereby emphasizing that much needs to be done to enhance the quality of life people lead (Sen 1999, xi). Therefore, the issue of human well-being has always been of significance as we constantly strive to improve human lives. In this book I focus on the politics of human well-being by answering fundamental questions such as the following: What domestic and international political factors influence societal welfare? How do they affect human lives? How can we enhance the quality of the lives people lead? In doing so, the book not only contributes to the existing scholarship on human well-being but also makes an effort to answer pivotal questions that have policy relevance for the world today. Overall, this book demonstrates that politics extends to the realm of human lives.

The Concept of Human Well-Being

Understanding the determinants of human well-being is a colossal task; one of the primary reasons for this is that human well-being is a broad concept subject to different interpretations.[1] Fundamental questions that arise are: What is human well-being? How do we conceptualize and measure it? Relatedly, how do we compare human well-being among individuals, societies, and countries over time? If we hope to improve human well-being, then answers to these questions are crucial. There is indeed a large body of research that sheds light on these questions, and this body of literature has greatly enhanced our understanding of the meaning of well-being. The notion can be broadly conceptualized in two categories: subjective and objective human well-being. Both these approaches have their relative advantages and as such are equally important for obtaining a holistic understanding of the concept. This necessitates the need for us to study the different dimensions of well-being. Moreover, subjective and objective well-being may not always be present in equal measure. In other words, the prevalence of subjective well-being may not suggest the presence of objective well-being, and vice versa, making it important to

focus on the determinants of both aspects of well-being if the goal is to improve every aspect of human life.

A subjective approach focuses primarily on indicators such as, for example, levels of happiness, life satisfaction, or personal achievement (e.g., Veenhoven and Ehrhardt 1995; Frey and Stutzer 2000; Radcliff 2001, 2005; Shin and Rutkowski 2003; Dorn et al. 2007; Helliwell and Huang 2008; Bjørnskov et al. 2010; Álvarez-Díaz et al. 2010; Stutzer and Frey 2010; D'Acci 2011). These indicators provide insight into individuals' assessment of their quality of life and thus enable us to better understand well-being from an individual's perspective. This is especially significant as well-being certainly has a subjective component, which can only be understood when we know how people perceive their own quality of life. Individuals may be wealthy and enjoy good health by an objective criterion, but are they also happy and satisfied with their lives? Do they have a high sense of personal achievement? A subjective conceptualization of well-being sheds light on such questions. Studies that focus on subjective well-being primarily utilize survey data to gain insight into individual perceptions of quality of life.

An objective approach, on the other hand, refers to outcomes such as infant mortality, child mortality, life expectancy, literacy, and education levels, among others (Moon and Dixon 1985; Przeworski et al. 2000; Lake and Baum 2001; Gerring et al. 2005, 2009; Ross 2006). This book primarily adopts the objective approach by focusing on four primary well-being outcomes: infant mortality, child mortality, gross education enrollment ratio, and the human development index. An objective approach does not provide a subjective individual perspective of how individuals view their personal well-being. Indicators of education, health, and income, for instance, provide an objective way of assessing well-being. However, the objective indicators are relatively more comparable across countries and over time and provide tremendous utility in examining general trends. Such comparisons are relatively difficult to make with subjective indicators where the very meaning of "happiness" or "life satisfaction," for instance, may differ from country to country. This is not to say that there are no potential measurement issues with the objective indicators. Indeed, there may be differences in the ways countries collect information on health and education statistics, but comparisons are relatively easier to make when we focus on widely accepted definitions of health status or educational attainment. A more practical reason for focusing on objective indicators of well-being is that the data for objective well-being indicators



Fig. 1.1 Global distribution of infant mortality

are more widely available across countries and over time. This book primarily uses a quantitative methodology to identify broader patterns of relationship, which makes the objective approach in particular a more appropriate alternative.

The tremendous cross-national variation in human well-being is indicative of the large disparities in human lives prevalent even today. Figure 1.1 displays the global variation of one of the primary indicators of well-being, infant mortality, which ranges from 2 to 270 infant deaths per 1000 live births per year from 1960 to 2013, with a mean infant mortality rate of approximately 55 and a median rate of approximately 42.[2] Understanding such vast disparities in basic living conditions that influence fundamental quality-of-life indicators is critical and of paramount importance. Infant mortality in particular is prevalent among the poorest sections of society and reflects basic living conditions of the poor, such as poverty, housing quality, resistance to diseases, sanitation, air quality, availability of clean water, accessibility to neonatal and prenatal health service, among others (Victora et al. 2003), for which cross-national time-series data are not widely available. Thus, the well-being outcomes under study especially help us understand the political dynamics that affect the most disadvan-

Table 1.1 Correlation among human well-being indicators

	Infant mortality	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment ratio*	*HDI*
Infant mortality	1			
Child mortality	0.9798	1		
Education enrollment ratio	−0.8312	−0.8405	1	
HDI	−0.9111	−0.9099	0.8852	1

taged segments of a population.[3] Overall, since this book focuses on a diverse set of objective indicators, namely, infant mortality, child mortality, education, and human development, studying these four aspects of objective well-being enables us to gain a holistic understanding of quality of life through an objective criterion.

Infant mortality refers to the number of deaths of infants (aged 1 year or less) per 1000 live births. Child mortality refers to the number of deaths per 1000 inhabitants of children under 5 years of age. The data for the two variables come from the World Bank (2015). Lower levels of infant and child mortality indicate higher levels of human well-being. The third indicator, gross enrollment ratio, measures primary, secondary, and tertiary education for both genders. The fourth indicator, the hybrid human development index (HDI), is an aggregate measure that includes life expectancy, adult literacy, gross enrollment ratio, and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. Life expectancy measures the number of years an infant would live if existing conditions of mortality were to remain the same for the rest of his or her life. Literacy measures the percentage of the population over 15 years of age that is able to read. Gross enrollment ratio was discussed earlier. Lastly, GDP per capita measures wealth.[4] The data for gross enrollment ratio and the HDI)are available from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Table 1.1 shows the correlation between the four objective well-being indicators. We see that all four are highly correlated, with correlations exceeding 0.80, indicating that objective well-being indicators generally tend to coexist. However, these indicators do tap into different aspects of well-being, namely, health, education, and overall human development. Moreover, analyzing multiple indicators will also enable us to assess whether the political determinants under study in this book have a significant effect across all or only a few indicators. This will offer valuable policy recommendations about ways we can enhance different dimensions of human well-being.

What Do We Know About Human Well-Being?

Subjective Well-Being

The subject of human well-being has been of interest to scholars across disciplines, and understandably so, because the human well-being outcomes under study are the building blocks of development and as such play a crucial developmental role in the lives of citizens, states, and the global community.[5] This book focuses primarily on the politics of human well-being by demonstrating the influential role that political factors can play in enhancing the quality of human lives. Even though the book emphasizes objective well-being indicators, an overview of the existing literature on the determinants of subjective and objective well-being will provide a thorough understanding of the factors that can improve human lives. It will also help the readers better understand the contributions of this book to the larger body of research on well-being.[6] There is an extensive literature that sheds light on a range of factors from individual-level determinants to aggregate national-level determinants that enhance subjective well-being indicators, such as individual happiness and life satisfaction.

Since subjective indicators provide insight into an individual's perception of well-being, it is reasonable to expect that individual-level determinants would play an important role, and existing studies have identified numerous such determinants. Among individual-level determinants, religion seems to play an important role in explaining subjective well-being, and most studies identify a positive association between the two, where stronger religious beliefs (Hadaway 1978; Ellison 1991; Witter et al. 1985) or lesser religious doubt (Krause 2008) is associated with higher levels of well-being. Lim and Putnam (2010) identify a plausible reason that explains the link between religion and well-being and argue that religious people exhibit higher levels of life satisfaction through greater participation in religious affairs such as attending services and having opportunities to network within their congregations. Yet others identify spiritual experiences as playing an important role in enhancing well-being (Pollner 1989; Greeley and Hout 2006). An alternative individual-level factor that plays an important role is the employment status of an individual, where unemployed people are more likely to exhibit higher levels of unhappiness or lower subjective well-being compared to those who are employed (Clark and Oswald 1994; Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998; Frey and Stutzer 1999, 2002). Additional determinants, such as marital status (Shin and Inoguchi 2009), education level

(Yang 2008), gender (Blanchflower and Oswald 2004), and age (Blanchflower and Oswald 2008), also affect subjective well-being.

Among national-level determinants of subjective well-being, existing research can be categorized into economic and political factors. Prominent economic factors include income and inequality. Several studies examine the link between income and well-being. However, there is a lack of consensus in the literature about whether greater income increases or decreases well-being. Easterlin's (1974, 1995) seminal work shows that economic growth has no effect on happiness levels. However, subsequent studies have attempted to provide a nuanced understanding of the relationship between economic conditions and happiness levels. Some postulate the relative preference theory (Duesenberry 1949; Michalos 1985), where individuals view the utility of income in relative terms, as compared to other people or to one's own past income. An alternative perspective suggests that increasing income can satisfy human needs and will lead to higher levels of happiness (Veenhoven 1991; Hagerty and Veenhoven 2003).

Distinguishing between richer versus poorer countries, Delhey's (2010) analysis demonstrates that richer countries have postmaterialist concerns compared to materialist pursuits among poorer countries. Indicators such as personal autonomy and job creativity capture postmaterialist concerns and enhance well-being among richer countries, while income captures materialist concerns and is associated with higher levels of well-being among poorer countries. Thus, economic conditions as captured by income levels play an especially important role in influencing subjective well-being outcomes among poorer countries. This distinction between materialist versus postmaterialist concerns builds on Inglehart's (1977, 1997) research on varying preferences among citizens of developed versus developing countries.

Inequality is yet another economic factor that influences well-being. However, much like income, its effect on subjective well-being is unclear. Hirschman and Rothschild's (1973) "tunnel effect" theory suggests that the presence of inequality may lead to the possibility of upward mobility, and this enhances well-being. This view postulates a positive relationship between inequality and well-being. In contrast, Runciman (1966) and Yitzhaki (1979) emphasize the significance of social justice, where greater inequality may aggravate relative deprivation, which reduces well-being, thereby suggesting a negative relationship between the two. Empirical evidence is divided on the effects of inequality on subjective well-being, with some studies finding a positive relationship between the two (Clark 2003;

Rözer and Kraaykamp 2013), others finding a negative relationship (Alesina et al. 2004; Verme 2011); and still others not finding a significant link (Helliwell 2003; Veenhoven 1996). Alternatively, some studies demonstrate that the effect of inequality may differ depending on the country and income group (Alesina et al. 2004; Graham and Felton 2006) or the presence of social and institutional trust (Rözer and Kraaykamp 2013). Overall, even though there is a lack of consensus about how economic factors influence well-being, the vast body of research on the topic establishes a link between economic factors and subjective well-being outcomes.

The primary political determinants of subjective well-being indicators include democracy, the nature of social policies, and institutional determinants. Several studies analyze the relationship between democracy and subjective well-being and highlight the positive association between the two for a variety of reasons (Frey and Stutzer 2000, 2002, 2005; Owen et al. 2008; Dorn et al. 2007). Democratic regimes, particularly those that practice direct democracy, produce outcomes that are closer to the preferences of the citizens (Frey and Stutzer 2000, 2002). The policy outcomes reflect their interests, and this enhances subjective well-being. Democracies also permit citizens to participate in the decision-making process, and this creates a "procedural utility" that enhances subjective well-being since citizens can be involved in democratic political processes (Frey and Stutzer 2005; Owen et al. 2008). The emphasis here is on the utility derived from participation where citizens can play an influential role in determining political outcomes. This is consistent with other studies, such as that by Welzel and Inglehart (2010), which emphasizes the role of agency or ability among individuals to control their lives in enhancing levels of life satisfaction. Their study lends support to the procedural utility argument that highlights the perceived benefits of participation prevalent in democratic societies. However, some studies express skepticism about the relationship between the two (e.g., Bjørnskov et al. 2008). A plausible explanation for the lack of agreement among these studies could be that they differ with respect to the specific country or in the overall sample size or the time frame used for conducting the analyses. This may suggest that the determinants of subjective well-being may differ depending on the country or countries under study as well as the time period under study.[7]

Among other political factors, the nature of social policies and political ideology plays an important role. Radcliff (2001) argues that states with social democratic policies and left-dominant parties provide better

protection to citizens against market forces and are consequently more likely to produce higher levels of life satisfaction among industrial democracies. These findings are reiterated in Pacek and Radcliff (2008), where the prevalence of a welfare state is associated with higher levels of happiness and life satisfaction among industrial societies. Álvarez-Díaz et al. (2010) analyzed the determinants of life satisfaction among American states and found that higher levels of spending, policies that protect individuals from markets, and control by a Democratic government is associated with high levels of life satisfaction. The role of social policies is also emphasized by studies that focus on the role of labor unions. Radcliff (2005) demonstrates that labor unionization enhances life satisfaction as it provides benefits to members of the organization and is beneficial to the society at large as well due to contagion effects where the more people interact with satisfied union members within society, the greater the level of life satisfaction. Flavin et al. (2010) reiterate these findings and further demonstrate that labor unionization especially enhances life satisfaction among lower-income citizens.

Yet another domestic political determinant of subjective well-being is the nature of political institutions. Owen et al. (2008) make an important contribution by exploring this relatively understudied area of research. The study assesses differences in life satisfaction among institutional systems, such as presidential versus parliamentary systems and proportional representation versus majoritarian electoral systems, and find that the effect of these institutional factors is mediated by whether individuals hold minority views. Helliwell and Huang (2008) also study the consequences of political institutions and find that proportional and presidential systems are associated with higher levels of life satisfaction compared to majoritarian and parliamentary systems.

Adopting a different approach by emphasizing the significance of *how* governments rule, Helliwell and Huang (2008) demonstrate that better governance is associated with higher levels of life satisfaction, and this is especially so among poorer countries that seem to place more emphasis on how governments perform their job compared to richer countries. This study highlights the role of political factors by drawing attention to the way political officials use their position to exercise their power. Adopting a broader approach, Inglehart et al. (2008) conducted a comprehensive study that analyzed the economic and political determinants of happiness and showed that greater economic development, democracy, and tolerance enhance individual freedom, which increases happiness levels.

While considerable attention has been paid to the domestic determinants of subjective well-being, relatively less research has been conducted on the role of international determinants. However, there are a few exceptions. For instance, Bjørnskov et al. (2008) demonstrate that economic openness is associated with higher levels of life satisfaction, plausibly owing to the availability of a wider range of commodities at lower costs. Assessing the effect of globalization at the individual level, Tsai et al. (2012) demonstrate that globalization enhances well-being by increasing individual capacity through exposure to the English language as well as greater global awareness. Overall, this vast body of research on subjective well-being has greatly enhanced our understanding of subjective well-being. However,there is some disagreement among scholars about the role of determinants of subjective well-being, and, as mentioned earlier, a plausible reason for this lack of consensus could be differences in the countries under study, the time period of a given study, or the individuals being surveyed. Since this book focuses primarily on the role of political determinants on objective well-being, the next section discusses this literature in greater detail.

Objective Well-Being

The bulk of the existing literature on human well-being in political science focuses on regime type, where researchers primarily argue that democratic regimes perform better than nondemocratic ones. A number of explanations have been put forth to draw the link between political regimes and human well-being. First, the electoral process makes democracies more competitive and participative in nature (Shin 1989), which makes them more accountable to the needs of the citizens (Deacon 2003), and it constrains democratic leaders from extracting rents from society (Lake and Baum 2001), which consequently leads to the better performance of democracies versus nondemocracies. Second, since democracies have a larger support base to appease, democratic leaders provide greater public goods than nondemocracies that subsequently enhance societal welfare (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Third, the presence of a free press among democracies keeps the political leaders better informed and puts pressure on them to address the welfare needs of their citizens (Sen 1999). Wigley and Akkoyunlu-Wigley (2011b) demonstrate a link between press freedom and health outcomes, which they argue can be attributed to a greater transmission of information about government performance to the public, health-related information about the citizenry to the government, and best practices that improve societal health.

Fourth, democracies provide civil and political rights to their citizens. The existence of civil rights is conducive to formations of voluntary associations (Parker 1994). These associations can play an important role in promoting the interests of the poor by putting pressure on governing bodies to enhance human welfare (Sondhi 2000). Fifth, democracy empowers citizens by granting citizenship rights to the lower segments of society. This in turn fosters a culture where the relatively deprived segments play a proactive role themselves in politics by demanding necessary goods and provisions from governments (Piven and Cloward 1977; Rubin 1997; Alvarez et al. 1998). Sixth, effective implementation of welfare policies reduces infant mortality, which can occur only when democratization leads to the replacement of chief executives through democratic elections (Kudamatsu 2012). Alternatively, the relationship between the two may be nonlinear (Emizet 2000), where democracies may enhance quality of life initially, but any steps to consolidate a given democracy leads to greater conflicting demands made by societal actors, resulting in a stalemate and hampering decision making, thereby adversely affecting human lives.

Some of these mechanisms may take time to play out such that a democratic regime will enhance welfare outcomes only when it has existed for a long period of time. Indeed, empirical evidence supports the idea that democracies confer long-term benefits on their citizens (Besley and Kudamatsu 2006; McGuire 2010; Wigley and Akkoyunlu-Wigley 2011a; Gerring et al. 2012). One or more of these reasons may account for the better performance of democratic regimes, as demonstrated by the bulk of empirical evidence (Moon and Dixon 1985; Shin 1989; Przeworski et al. 2000; Zweifel and Navia 2000; Lake and Baum 2001; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Besley and Kudamatsu 2006; McGuire 2010; Gerring et al. 2012). However, contradictory findings question the welfare-enhancing attributes of democratic regimes (Williamson 1987; Weede 1993; Ross 2006). The lack of consensus among political scientists suggests that focusing on regime type provides limited leverage in understanding the wide variation in human well-being across the globe today.

A plausible explanation for this ongoing debate could be the tremendous variation in human well-being *within* both democratic and nondemocratic regimes. Figure 1.2 presents box plots displaying the distribution of infant mortality in all countries globally and within democracies and nondemocracies from 1960 to 2013.[8] The figure displays considerable variation in infant mortality globally as well as within democracies and nondemocracies. Infant mortality among all countries ranges from 2 to



Fig. 1.2 Distribution of infant mortality: All countries, democracies and nondemocracies.

Note: The boxes represent the middle range of the data, also known as the interquartile range. The vertical lines at the bottom and top of the boxes represent the data in the first and fourth quartiles, respectively, and the dots represent outliers. The lines across the three boxes show the median infant mortality in the three subgroups

270 infant deaths per thousand live births, with mean and median rates of 56 and 42, respectively. Within democracies, infant mortality ranges from 2 to 270 infant deaths per thousand live births, with mean and median rates of 39 and 24, respectively. Within nondemocracies, infant mortality ranges from 2 to 243 infant deaths per thousand live births, with mean and median rates of 83 and 78, respectively. These figures indicate that the mean and median infant mortality is lower among democracies compared to nondemocracies, which is consistent with the bulk of the empirical evidence discussed earlier. However, the figures also demonstrate the wide variation in infant mortality within both democratic *and* nondemocratic regimes.[9] If the nature of a given regime is critical for the betterment of the populace, as suggested by the literature, then how do we account for disparities within regimes? This poses a puzzle for academics and policymakers. If regime type cannot account for differences in welfare outcomes, then what political factors can shed light on these disparities? This is a

critical question that needs to be answered. Thus, taking the debate beyond political regimes is imperative in order to gain a better understanding of the subject.

Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the existing studies that emphasize the welfare-enhancing aspects of democracy propose various theoretical mechanisms to draw the link between political regimes and outcomes. However, most of these studies use aggregate measures of democracy (e.g., Moon and Dixon 1985; Shin 1989; Boone 1996; Przeworski et al. 2000; Zweifel and Navia 2000; Lake and Baum 2001), which include a variety of regime characteristics that obscure distinctions within regimes. As a result, the empirical measures do not capture the theoretical dimensions precisely. This yet again demonstrates the need to go beyond a regime-type explanation and assess the impact of specific political factors on welfare outcomes by using empirical measures that are better aligned with the theoretical concepts.

More recently, scholars have indeed been pursuing such a strategy by disaggregating political regimes. For instance, recent studies explore the institutional determinants of welfare outcomes within democracies. Gerring et al. (2005) argue that centripetal systems are associated with better societal outcomes compared to decentralized ones. The centripetal model encompasses unitary, parliamentary, and party-list proportional representation institutional systems, which emphasize inclusion and centralized decision making, thereby enhancing societal welfare.[10] In contrast, decentralism refers to political institutions that are inclusive but not authoritative in nature such that while it incorporates diverse interests, decision making is not centralized because the consent of multiple actors is required to bring about changes in society, and this may adversely influence welfare outcomes. Decentralism is associated with a federal, presidential, and a single-member district or preferential voting system, among other institutional alternatives. In another study that also focuses on democratic institutions, Gerring et al. (2009) empirically demonstrate that parliamentary systems lead to better welfare outcomes compared to presidential and semi-presidential systems. In the same vein, Wigley and Akkoyunlu-Wigley (2011a) propose that electoral proportionality enhances well-being outcomes among parliamentary democracies, possibly through the availability of greater resources. By disaggregating democracies, this institutional approach has been able to account for the variation in human well-being within democratic regimes. However, as Fig. 1.2 illustrates, disparities in welfare outcomes are prevalent among both

democracies *and* nondemocracies. Thus, much remains to be known about the intricacies of politics and quality of human lives globally.

One of the few studies that provide an integrated theory to explain welfare outcomes across political regimes is the selectorate theory by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003). The theory provides a novel explanation by arguing that the size of the support base (as captured by the winning coalition) determines whether governments provide public or private goods to citizens. Political representatives in democracies have a larger support base to please and therefore are more likely to provide public goods, which benefits the society at large and enhances welfare outcomes. Nondemocratic leaders, on the other hand, have a smaller support base to please and can therefore provide private goods to please their supporters, which adversely affects societal well-being. While the study develops a common framework to understand welfare outcomes within both types of political regime, it primarily focuses on domestic politics. This demonstrates the need for future research that incorporates domestic *and* international political explanations.

Yet another study that enhances our understanding of human well-being is Ghobarah et al.'s (2004) research that analyzes the effect of a range of factors such as healthcare expenditures, urbanization, inequality, ethnic heterogeneity, education, and civil conflicts on life expectancy in a cross-sectional sample of countries. The study makes an important contribution to the existing literature as it uses a broader approach to understanding well-being outcomes by identifying the significance of a variety of political factors. This book adopts a similar approach by focusing on domestic and international political determinants of human well-being. Moreover, contrary to the aforementioned study, this book analyzes the relationship between political factors and human well-being over time to assess how changes in political dynamics influence societal welfare.

Public health experts and economists provide an alternative explanation of welfare outcomes by focusing on social spending. However, while some studies demonstrate that higher levels of social spending lead to better welfare outcomes (Gupta et al. 1999; Baldacci et al. 2004), others have failed to find a significant relationship between the two (Landau 1986; Kim and Moody 1992; Filmer and Pritchett 1997). Indeed differences in time period and sample size may very well account for these inconsistent findings. But more importantly, while spending levels certainly ensure the availability of resources, of equal or greater significance perhaps is how the resources are utilized. I maintain that the formulation of good policies and

effective policy implementation play a significant role by ensuring that available resources are channeled appropriately. For instance, existing development and medical research has identified several factors that influence infant mortality, such as quality of hospital infrastructure (Aguilera and Marrufo 2007), the presence of water pollution (Jorgenson 2004), environmental factors and the condition of mothers (Folasade 2000), family health programs and female illiteracy (Macinko et al. 2006), quality of infrastructure (Fay et al. 2005), and the provision of national health services by the government, among others. However, even though we know how to directly influence well-being outcomes, large disparities among countries remain. This poses a challenge for academics and policymakers alike. If we know which policies can enhance the quality of human lives, then why are there disparities in human well-being among countries? Why do some governments adopt welfare-enhancing policies but others do not? I argue that political factors play a determining role in motivating or enabling governments to enhance welfare outcomes.

Domestic and International Determinants of Human Well-Being

Politics plays a crucial role in influencing societal welfare, and the role of politics is not confined to state borders. Interactions between countries have increased tremendously over the years, such that the consequences of politics cross sovereign boundaries today. Thus, the politics of human well-being transcends subfields of comparative politics and international relations within political science because politics within *and* between countries play an important role in influencing human lives. Given the global disparities in living conditions of people, this book attempts to provide a comprehensive explanation of human well-being by focusing on domestic and international political dynamics.

The book has four substantive chapters. Each of the chapters provides a theoretical argument linking political factors to human well-being and empirically tests the relationship between the two. The domestic determinants of human well-being are analyzed in Chaps. 2 and 3. The international determinants of human well-being are analyzed in Chaps. 4 and 5. Chapter 6 provides concluding remarks and discusses policy implications as well as avenues of future research. In this section, I summarize the primary theoretical arguments postulated in each of the four substantive chapters.

Figure 1.2 indicates that disparities in human well-being are prevalent among both democratic and nondemocratic regimes. This demonstrates that political regimes are not homogeneous in their performance, so any discourse that centers on regime type will have explanatory limitations. This book provides alternative explanations of human well-being that go beyond political regimes. In a world of sovereign nations, domestic factors play an especially important role in influencing societal welfare because domestic politics can directly influence human well-being outcomes. Political representatives within countries are primarily responsible for their citizens' well-being. Thus, the chapters on domestic determinants emphasize the significance of within-state politics. As mentioned earlier, the bulk of the existing research focuses on *whether* democracies perform better than nondemocracies, and most of the empirical evidence support the welfare-enhancing effects of democracies. However, while this research identifies several mechanisms through which democracies perform better, most studies use aggregate measures of political regimes, which do not distinguish between alternative theoretical mechanisms. As a result, we do not know *why* democratic regimes perform better than nondemocracies because the quantitative measures of regimes cannot specifically test the theoretical explanations. Thus, the question that needs probing is: what is it about a democratic regime that leads to better welfare outcomes than in nondemocracies? Political regimes differ from each other with respect to various attributes such as representation, participation, competition, judicial independence, institutional variations, and press freedom, among other features. Which of these attributes play an important role in enhancing human lives?

Chapter 2 directly engages these questions by focusing on one core attribute—political representation—to explain disparities in human well-being globally as well as shed light on variations in well-being among democratic and nondemocratic regimes.[11] Representation is one of the distinguishing features that separate democracies from nondemocracies, and even though democracies are more representative in nature than nondemocracies, variations in political representation occur worldwide. This chapter addresses imperative questions such as the extent to which political representation matters and how political representation influences human well-being. I argue that a more representative system enhances human well-being because it is indicative of an inclusive and a competitive society. The significance of inclusiveness and competitiveness can be traced to prominent scholars such as Lijphart (2012) and Dahl (1971). I hypothesize that a higher degree of

representation connotes the presence of a more inclusive political system because it enables multiple swaths of society to convey their needs and preferences to decision makers. A more representative society ensures that the interests of multiple groups within society are incorporated in the policy-making process, and policies formulated in such a society are better able to address the interests of the masses. A less representative system, on the other hand, is not as inclusive in nature and may only represent the interests of select groups within society. Second, a better-represented system also signals the presence of a more competitive system, which provides incentives for all representatives to perform better to remain in office to ensure their political survival. Lower levels of representation may lead to a less competitive system, where incumbents do not have strong challengers to replace them and may thus lack motivation to perform well in office.

However, are there potential drawbacks associated with too much representation? It is plausible that too much representation could hamper the decision-making process where alternative representative groups may take an intransigent stand, making it difficult to formulate important policies that influence welfare outcomes. Indeed at conflict are two competing objectives: better representation versus political expediency in decision making. I argue that the advantages of a better-represented society outweigh the potential adverse consequences of too much representation because the electorate can replace poor-performing incumbents who fail to satisfy the needs of their supporters. These competing perspectives are addressed in greater detail in the chapter.

Since democracies are by nature more representative than nondemocracies, the argument proposed in the chapter is consistent with the bulk of the literature that emphasizes the benefits of democracies. More importantly, the argument also goes beyond the existing research by providing a theoretical explanation of why democracies perform better than nondemocracies and furthermore tests the theoretical mechanism as closely as possible on a global sample of countries. Overall, the chapter sheds light on whether *and* why democracies perform better than nondemocracies and accounts for variations in human well-being outcomes across political regimes. Thus, this chapter speaks to the vast literature on regime type and welfare outcomes and contributes to the existing literature by identifying political representation as an important determinant of human well-being across political regimes.

While Chap. 2 focuses on the representativeness or the structure of a political system, of equal significance is how rulers exercise their authority

in office. Governing officials play an imperative role in influencing the quality of human lives. Chapter 3 makes a concerted effort to explain variations in human well-being globally by focusing on an alternative domestic factor—governance. Governance refers to the way government officials exercise their authority in pursuit of developmental policies, which determines whether or not welfare objectives are eventually achieved. Government officials play an important role in governance in all political regimes. I conceptualize governance through three fundamental attributes: bureaucratic quality, corruption, and rule of law. I further develop the notion of "good governance" where good governance is associated with high-quality bureaucracy, low levels of corruption, and a strong rule of law that ensures an effective implementation of welfare policies, reduced rent-seeking behavior, and greater accountability of government officials, which consequently leads to higher levels of human well-being in both democracies and nondemocracies.

The consequences of these three governance attributes are far from unambiguous. For instance, high-quality bureaucracy is indicative of meritocratic recruitment of bureaucrats who are more likely to comply with formal rules because they do not owe their allegiance to political patrons (Evans and Rauch 1999). Moreover, they are also more objective and transparent in their performance (Nee and Opper 2009), which consequently leads to better welfare outcomes. An alternative view, however, suggests that strict allegiance to formal rules may result in more red tape, thereby causing delays in policymaking (Goodsell 1983) and adversely affecting societal welfare. Similarly, while corruption is generally associated with adverse consequences for welfare outcomes, a competing perspective suggests that corruption may in fact enhance developmental outcomes by circumventing stringent rules and regulations (Huntington 1968), providing an opportunity for groups to influence policymaking if they are unable to do so through existing channels (Bayley 1966), for example. Lastly, even the consequences of a strong rule of law are not devoid of uncertainty. Rule of law is defined as "a set of stable political rules and rights applied impartially to all citizens" (Weingast 1997, 245). A strong rule of law will ensure that the law is uniformly applied to everyone. However, what if the existing laws themselves are unjust or partial or do not serve the masses? This chapter explores these competing perspectives associated with the three governance indicators in greater detail.

Overall, the chapter makes a theoretical contribution to the existing literature by shedding light on the role of governance in influencing

human well-being and makes an empirical contribution by explaining the variation in human well-being globally, among democratic and nondemocratic regimes. In doing so, the chapter attempts to answer specific policy-relevant questions such as: How does governance matter? Which of the three governance indicators plays a more important role in influencing the quality of human lives?

While domestic determinants play a proximate role in influencing human well-being, international factors have a distal yet significant impact on the lives of individual citizens. We are now living in a time and age where interactions between countries have increased over the years and individual countries are no more isolated. So the question arises: how does international politics influence societal welfare? Chapters 5 and 6 shift gears from domestic to international politics. International interactions among countries could generally be categorized as being either cooperative or hostile.[12] International political determinants such as globalization and conflict encompass different types of political interactions among states. By focusing on these two factors, this book highlights the role of international political determinants of human well-being.

Chapter 4 focuses on the impact of globalization.[13] Overall, states have become more globalized with time, which has facilitated greater integration, interaction, and communication among states. The trend toward globalization seems irreversible today, and given the pervasiveness of the phenomenon, it is important to know how globalization has come to affect human lives. Globalization is a multidimensional concept that includes diverse processes such as greater mobility of capital, goods, and services, the diffusion of ideas, norms, and culture, greater communication and exchange of information among countries, and greater participation in the international community through memberships in international organizations and international treaties. In keeping with its multidimensional nature, this chapter adopts a holistic conceptualization of globalization by incorporating three distinct aspects of globalization: economic, social, and political. Economic globalization refers to increased flows of capital, goods, and services across international boundaries. Social globalization refers to the spread of ideas, norms, and cultures across borders as well as greater informal interaction among the states through international tourism, media, and other forms of information exchange. Lastly, political globalization refers to the extent of involvement of states with the international community by joining international organizations, participating in UN missions, entering into international treaties, and establishing embassies in

foreign countries. The questions that this chapter addresses are: How does globalization influence human well-being? Does it have a positive or a negative effect on human lives? Which of the three dimensions play the most important substantive role in influencing societal welfare?

The consequences of globalization have been a contentious issue among scholars, where each of the three aspects of globalization—economic, social, and political—has contradictory effects. For instance, critics of globalization argue it increases susceptibility to economic shocks (Stallings 1992), amplifies income inequality (Williamson 1997; Wade 2003; Milanovic 2005), and threatens social identity (Appadurai 1998), and international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank that emphasize the benefits of open economies augment the debt problems of the developing world (Payer 1991). On the other hand, advocates of globalization argue that it leads to long-run growth (Collier and Dollar 2002; Bhagwati 2004; Wolf 2004), the emergence of transnational networks that emphasize the problems in the developing world at international forums (Caouette 2006), diffusion of knowledge that generates awareness about ways to improve human health (Deaton 2004), and the emergence of international organizations such as the World Health Organization and UNDP, among others, that primarily focus on enhancing the quality of human lives around the world. The chapter synthesizes these alternative perspectives and attempts to adjudicate between these competing views of globalization by systematically analyzing the effects of economic, social, and political globalization on human well-being, thereby reducing some of the ambiguities associated with the consequences of globalization.

Globalization, however, captures one aspect of interactions among countries, but relationships can also be conflict-ridden. While interstate conflicts indicate strained relations between countries, the consequences of intrastate conflicts or civil conflicts may also have international ramifications. Countries that are not actively involved in conflicts may suffer from its consequences by virtue of an ongoing conflict in a neighboring state through spillover effects. Chapter 5 analyzes the consequences of interstate and intrastate conflicts by examining how the occurrence, magnitude, and duration of these conflicts among states as well as the magnitude of interstate and intrastate conflicts among neighboring states influence human well-being outcomes.[14] This is one of the first studies to assess the effect of multiple dimensions of conflict with the hope of gaining a thorough understanding of the consequences of conflict on human lives.

Drawing on existing research, I argue that conflict drives states to divert resources from productive areas that enhance human well-being (Mintz 1989; Yildirim and Sezgin 2002), adversely affects the economic performance of countries embroiled in conflicts (Stewart et al. 2001), deteriorates the quality of infrastructure (Ghobarah et al. 2003), hampers trade between countries (Polachek 1980; Gowa 1994; Mansfield 1994; Anderson and Carter 2001; Bayer and Rupert 2004), and may incite conflicts among other neighboring countries as well (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Gleditsch 2007; Gleditsch et al. 2008; Salehyan 2008). All these mechanisms may reduce the quality of human lives. The chapter sheds light on several imperative questions such as: does interstate and intrastate conflict influence human well-being outcomes? Which of the two types of conflicts (interstate or intrastate) has a more devastating effect on human well-being? Among the different dimensions of conflict, namely, occurrence, magnitude, and duration, which of the dimensions has the strongest substantive effect on human lives?

Lastly, Chap. 6 summarizes the primary findings in the book and discusses the implications of these findings in the larger context of existing research on objective and subjective human well-being. While this book primarily focuses on the determinants of objective well-being, the conclusion helps identify the contributions of this book to the broader literature on well-being. Furthermore, it discusses policy implications of the findings and identifies avenues of future research.

The book employs nested analysis to assess the relationship between the theoretical variables of interest over time, thereby combining quantitative or statistical analysis along with case narratives in each of the chapters (Lieberman 2005). The statistical analyses help identify global trends; however, they are unable to test specific causal mechanisms. Similarly, a purely case-study approach provides tremendous depth of understanding, but such an approach is ill equipped to identify broader trends. A nested methodology, on the other hand, is particularly useful because it draws on the strengths of both where a statistical analysis helps one identify general patterns of relationship between the political factors and human well-being outcomes. The case narratives, on the other hand, shed light on the causal mechanisms at work that are difficult to trace in a statistical analysis. Chapter 2 looks at Brazil to elucidate the relationship between political representation and human well-being. Chapter 3 examines the effect of governance in Japan. Chapter 4 focuses on China to better understand the effect of the three dimensions of globalization on human well-being.

Lastly, Chap. 5 assesses the consequences of conflict in Iraq on welfare outcomes. Combining quantitative and qualitative methodology will give us a holistic view of how domestic and international political factors influence human well-being outcomes. Indeed as discussed earlier, a number of policy alternatives could influence human well-being, and while a statistical analysis can help identify the relationship between the political factors and human well-being outcomes under study, the methodology cannot reveal the intermediate mechanisms at work. This is where case narratives can be especially useful. All four empirical chapters use a global sample of countries to assess the relationship between political factors and human well-being. The time period under study ranges from 1960 until 2013 with slight variations between chapters, largely conditioned by the availability of data. Overall, this book theorizes and systematically assesses the effects of various political determinants of human well-being.

Concluding Remarks

The objective of this book is to develop a research agenda on the politics of human well-being by demonstrating that politics extends to the domain of human welfare. In this book, I provide a comprehensive explanation of human well-being by shedding light on the domestic and international political dynamics. In doing so, the book makes a unique contribution to existing research in two significant ways. First, it emphasizes the significance of going beyond an explanation that primarily focuses on regime type by identifying and systematically testing the effect of specific political factors that influence human well-being. Thus, it explains the variation in well-being outcomes within democratic *and* nondemocratic regimes. Second, while there is plenty of research that analyzes the determinants of political outputs such as spending levels (Hibbs 1977, 1992; Castles 1989; Blais et al. 1993; Schmidt 1996; Alesina et al. 1997; Ghobarah et al. 2004; Wigley and Akkoyunlu-Wigley 2011b, among others), much remains unknown about political outcomes such as the well-being outcomes under study. This book seeks to address this lacuna in existing research. These outcomes are directly indicative of the welfare of the masses and therefore represent a worthwhile avenue of research. The implications of this research extend beyond political science and into related disciplines concerned with development. The book will be of interest to academic scholars and students who wish to understand the political dynamics of human well-being more specifically and development more generally. Additionally,

it will also find appeal among policymakers and international organizations as it sheds light on one of the most pressing issues that is of perennial interest—the betterment of human lives.

Notes

1. The terms *human well-being*, *human welfare*, and *quality of life* are used interchangeably in this book.
2. Infant mortality data are available from the World Bank (2015), and infant mortality is measured as the number of infant deaths per thousand live births.
3. This is another relative advantage of focusing on objective well-being indicators over subjective well-being indicators as it will give us unique insight into the political determinants of well-being for the most deprived segments of society.
4. See Gidwitz et al. (2010) for a detailed overview of the construction of the HDI index.
5. Note the terms *states* and *countries* are used interchangeably in this book.
6. The literature on the determinants of subjective and objective well-being is vast. Since this book primarily focuses on objective well-being, this literature is discussed in greater detail in this chapter as compared to existing research on subjective well-being.
7. Note, however, that such disagreements are prevalent in other areas of study as well. For instance, studies on the objective determinants of human well-being are not always in agreement, plausibly for the same reasons mentioned here.
8. I use the "polity2" variable from the Polity IV data set to classify democracies and nondemocracies (Marshall et al. 2014). The variable ranges from −10 to +10, where higher values indicate higher levels of democracy. All countries with a polity2 score greater than 0 are classified as democracies, and countries with a polity2 score of less than or equal to 0 are classified as nondemocracies.
9. Indeed nondemocracies also display considerable variation in infant mortality, but disparities in infant mortality exist in both regime-types. Thus, we need to understand the dynamics of well-being outcomes within both political regimes.
10. See Gerring et al. (2005) for other features of centripetalism and decentralism.
11. Chapter 2 is an extension of a previously published article by Nisha Mukherjee, Party Systems and Human Well-Being, Party Politics (Volume 19, Issue 4) pp. 601–623. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068811407601. Copyright © 2011 (The Author). Reprinted by permission of SAGE Publications.

12. This is indeed a simplistic classification, and there may be more variations of state interactions.
13. Chapter 4 is an extension of a previously published article by Mukherjee, Nisha and Jonathan Krieckhaus, Globalization and Human Well-Being, International Political Science Review (Volume 33 Issue 2) pp. 150–170. DOI: 10.1177/0192512111402592. Copyright © 2012 (The Author). Reprinted by permission of SAGE Publications.
14. Chapter 5 is an extension of an unpublished co-authored manuscript by Jonathan Krieckhaus and myself.

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PART I

Domestic Determinants

CHAPTER 2

Political Representation

The concept of representation can be traced to Thomas Hobbes, who proposed the idea of a representative sovereign. However, Hobbes' sovereign was unconstrained: once the people chose the sovereign as their representative, they could not take away the sovereign's authority. Since that time, the meaning of representation has evolved over the years.[1] While predemocratic societies of Britain and France practiced limited representation, modern democracy has now come to adopt a more inclusive conception of representation, wherein a larger number of people can influence governance. Scholars also came to recognize the significance of representation in a society. James Stuart Mill in 1820 referred to representation as "the grand discovery of modern times."[2] At the core of the idea of representation is the inherent desire of people to have a say in the decision-making process, and this is prevalent in the many struggles for independence. The very basis of a demand for democracy historically was partly motivated by the lack of representation. For instance, prominent revolutions, such as in Britain in the seventeenth century, the American and French revolutions in the eighteenth century, and the more recent fight for independence among African and Asian countries, were primarily influenced by the desire of the masses to influence governance.

Nobel Prize–winning economist Sir Arthur Lewis (1965, 64–65) points out that democracy means "all who are affected by a decision should have the chance to participate in making that decision either directly or through chosen representatives." Indeed democratic citizens have the opportunity

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to influence governance and have a say in decision making through direct democracy or representative democracy, and both forms of democracy have their benefits and drawbacks. The primary advantage of direct democracy, such as in Athenian democracy, is that it enables people to directly participate in the governance process. It exists to a limited extent even today in several countries, and some of these practices have been in place for a long time. For instance, between 1898 and 1918, several US states had mechanisms of direct democracy such as ballot initiatives and referendums (Cronin 1989). Some of the Canadian provinces instituted direct legislative reforms in the second half of the twentieth century (Laycock 1990). Japan held its first referendum in a small town in 1996 (Pollack 1996). Direct democracy gives people the opportunity to be more involved in democratic politics and empowers them to share in the making of important decisions affecting the society in which they live. However, a drawback of direct democracy is that the masses that are involved in governance may not have the expertise, knowledge or information necessary to formulate policies that are in the public interest (Brennan and Hamlin 1999). Moreover, there are practical limitations to direct democracy in a large polity because of the costs involved, both in terms of time and resources. Giving the masses an opportunity to weigh in on some or all policy decisions may adversely affect expedient decision making.

Representative democracy provides a viable alternative to offset the drawbacks associated with direct democracy. The French writer de Tracy (1811, 19) noted that "Representative democracy … is democracy rendered practicable for a long time and over a great extent of territory."[3] Representative democracy enables people to influence governance through their chosen representatives and has the advantage of allowing people to select representatives who have the expertise, knowledge, and ability to advance policies that are in the greater interest of the masses (Brennan and Hamlin 1999). Political representation is one of the essential democratic attributes, as Manin et al. (1999, 4) note: "…a central claim of democratic theory is that democracy systematically causes governments to be representative." Compared to direct democracy, a representative democracy gives citizens relatively less of a role in governance because they are further removed from directly influencing policymaking. However, the institution of a representative government is becoming increasingly prevalent today. Not only is political representation a core attribute of democratic regimes, but it is also prevalent among nondemocratic regimes to varying degrees. Some nondemocracies hold elections and permit limited representation, though others do not.



Fig. 2.1 Variation in political representation: All countries, democracies, and nondemocracies.

Note: The boxes represent the middle range of the data, also known as the interquartile range. The vertical lines on the bottom and the top of the boxes represent the data in the first and fourth quartiles, respectively, and the dots represent outliers. The lines across the three boxes show the median political representation scores in the three subgroups

Consider Fig. 2.1, which presents three histograms that measure political representation among all countries globally and among democracies and nondemocracies from 1960 to 2013. Political representation is measured by the variable "parcomp" and ranges from 0 to 5, from least to most representative system.[4] We see considerable variation in all three groups. The first histogram capturing political representation globally displays the whole gamut of representation ranging from countries that are least representative (with a score of 0) to the highest levels of representation (with a score of 5), with a median as well as a mean score of 3. As expected, we see that democracies have higher levels of political representation compared to nondemocracies. The mean and median levels of representation among democracies and nondemocracies are 4 and 3, respectively. Democracies are more representative by nature compared to nondemocracies, and this is consistent with the bulk of existing research that emphasizes the representation attribute of democratic regimes, as

discussed earlier. But what we also observe is that both political regimes display variation in political representation as the representation score ranges from 0 to 5 within democracies and nondemocracies. Overall, I argue that the global variation in political representation is significant because it has important consequences for citizens worldwide.

This chapter sheds light on the role of political representation and provides a theoretical explanation that links political representation to human well-being outcomes to account for the global variation in human well-being; furthermore, it also sheds light on disparities in well-being within democratic as well as nondemocratic countries. I argue that a more representative system enhances human well-being for two reasons. A higher degree of representation connotes the prevalence of a more inclusive political system that enables multiple swaths of society to convey their needs and preferences to the decision makers. Thus, a more representative society ensures that the interests of multiple groups within society are incorporated in the policy-making process and policies formulated in such a society are better able to encompass the interests of the masses. A less representative system, on the other hand, is not as inclusive by nature and may only represent the interests of select groups within society. Second, a more representative system also signals the presence of a more competitive system where multiple representatives also fuel competition among representatives, which provides incentives for all representatives to perform better if they wish to remain in office. Lower levels of representation may lead to a less competitive system, where incumbents do not have strong challengers to oust them from office, increasing the likelihood of poor performance of political representatives.

Political Parties as Representational Actors

Political parties perform several functions in a polity, for example, facilitating representation, structuring political competition, formulating public policies, serving as critics of government, recruiting and socializing elites, and mobilizing voters (Merriam 1923; Norris 2004). The variety of functions performed by parties is indicative of the important role that they have come to play today. From the perspective of the argument presented in this chapter, the most important role performed by political parties is that of representation. Parties play a representational role in that they serve as important intermediaries between citizens and the government.[5] They ensure that the preferences and needs of citizens are conveyed to

those in office involved in the policymaking process. In the absence of parties, government officials would find it difficult to identify the needs and preferences of the masses and, moreover, to formulate policies that are beneficial for their supporters. The nature of policies adopted by parties has ramifications for citizens. Parties are expected to take into account the preferences of their supporters when policy alternatives are being explored and decided upon in legislatures. Since parties represent different interests within society, they are familiar with the needs of their supporters and have electoral incentives to deliver on their promises, failing which their competitors will be positioned to replace them. Apart from their representational role, other functions performed by parties discussed in what follows ensure that a representative society will perform effectively.

First, political parties provide structure to politics by facilitating decision making among representatives collectively and by simplifying the political world for voters. In the absence of parties, all individual representatives would have an incentive to pursue their preferred policy outcome, thereby complicating the decision-making process and making it difficult for elected officials to reach any kind of consensus and ensure efficiency in policymaking. Parties simplify the decision-making process by coordinating the actions of their members. This ensures that elected officials will be able to work with one another in formulating policies that benefit their supporters. Additionally, they also provide an informational shortcut (Downs 1957; Fiorina 1980) to voters. Voters may not have the time or inclination to learn about different policies and their consequences. Parties can play an educational role here by informing the masses of pertinent issues that affect them. Citizens may not have an understanding of which policies are in the public interest and how different policies affect them at the individual level. Parties can educate the masses about policy alternatives so that they can weigh in on issues of importance that matter to them. Additionally, parties also structure the political environment for voters such that they come to identify themselves with specific parties, which simplifies the act of participating in a polity through mechanisms such as voting. This enhances the accountability of governing representatives and makes it relatively easier for voters to observe the performance of political parties and hold them accountable as compared to individual representatives.

Second, parties, especially in the opposition, also serve as critics of elected officials in office. In a representative system, citizens have the opportunity to hold representatives accountable, but parties can also

enhance accountability by closely observing the performance of their competitors to ensure that all parties are performing in the general interest of the masses at all times. Since parties are primarily interested in holding office, they have an incentive to closely watch the performance of their opponents and keep citizens informed about how their elected representatives are performing in office. This enhances the responsiveness of elected officials. Third, parties help in the recruitment and socialization of those who desire to run for office. It is difficult for individuals to get elected to office on their own. Parties have access to resources and organizational strength to run campaigns effectively. Being associated with a party increases the likelihood of getting elected and acquiring a prominent position of authority. As Gallagher et al. (2006, 308) note, "Gaining access to political power requires being accepted by a party, and usually being a leading figure in it. Parties also socialize the political elite; most government ministers have spent a number of years as party members, working with other party members and learning to see the political world from the party's perspective." Given the electoral incentives, parties will recruit and socialize individuals who will be able to ensure the party's success by pleasing their constituents.

Lastly, parties also mobilize the masses by encouraging them to participate in elections (Uhlaner 1989; Morton 1991). Voting may be costly for citizens in terms of, for example, time spent in gathering information about who to vote for in voting (Downs 1957). Moreover, the probability that an individual voter can influence the outcome of elections is extremely small (Aldrich 1993), which provides a disincentive for voters to actually vote during elections. Parties encourage voters to participate by emphasizing the significance of voting and oftentimes provide assistance to voters to reduce their costs associated with voting, such as by furnishing information to voters about the policy platforms of different parties. Overall, parties perform several functions that can enhance the performance of a representative society. Indeed while most of these arguments may seem to apply to democracies since the majority of democracies have political parties, it is important to note that semi-democracies and nondemocracies also exhibit varying levels of political representation by permitting political parties to participate in the governance process to a limited degree or, alternatively, by denying parties the opportunity to represent the citizenry in any way. This is demonstrated in Fig. 2.1, which displays variations in political representation among democratic and nondemocratic regimes.

Political Representation and Human Well-Being

Given that parties play an important representational role, they can capture the variation in political representation globally. I argue that countries where multiple parties are allowed to exist and compete in elections are associated with better human well-being outcomes, for two primary reasons. First, such systems are more inclusive by nature, which enables multiple-issue dimensions within society to be heard in the policymaking process. Second, such systems signal the presence of more competitors within the political system, which provides an incentive for all political parties to perform better in order to ensure their political survival. Both these mechanisms enhance human well-being and each is discussed in greater detail in what follows.

The first theoretical explanation focuses on the inclusiveness of a more representative society. The significance of an inclusive political system has been highlighted in Lijphart's (2012) consensual model and Gerring et al.'s (2005) centripetal model of democratic politics. Lijphart distinguishes between consensual and majoritarian models, where the former seeks to incorporate more than the majority in the decision-making process while the latter focuses primarily on the majority. He argues in favor of the consensual model because it is more inclusive by nature since it gives voice to diverse interests within society.[6] Similarly, Gerring et al. (2005) differentiate between centripetalism and decentralism, and while there are differences between the two models, inclusiveness plays a significant role in both.[7] Regardless of the differences between the two institutional alternatives, both studies emphasize that an inclusive society is necessary to ensure that decision makers will take into account the interests of multiple groups within society.

The presence of multiple parties is one way of enhancing the inclusiveness of a political system. Such societies provide channels through which diverse societal interests can be represented by giving different groups a platform through which their voices can be heard in the policymaking process. The presence of multiple parties also entails an informational advantage in that under such circumstances crucial information is more easily conveyed to key decision makers, ensuring that the needs of diverse groups are taken into account over the course of the policy-making process so that resulting policies will benefit as many people as possible. Policies formulated in such a system are a function of input from multiple parties, thereby enabling greater cooperation, negotiation, and compro-

mise among the various parties. This provides a safeguard against the adoption of policies that may be detrimental to the interests of some and, furthermore, results in policies that do not overlook or neglect the interests of societal groups owing to a lack of information. Several practitioners of democratic politics have echoed the advantages of a well-represented society. For instance, John Adams stated that a representative legislature "should be an exact portrait, in miniature, of the people at large, as it should think, feel, reason and act like them."[8] In the same vein, James Wilson asserted that as "the portrait is excellent in proportion to its being a good likeness," so "the legislature ought to be the most exact transcript of the whole society," "the faithful echo of the voices of the people."[9]

The advantage of a well-represented society can be illustrated from the presence of a large welfare state in Sweden. Sweden has a multiparty system and one of the lowest infant mortality rates in the world—2.4 per thousand live births in 2013. The Social Democratic Party can be credited with many of the welfare policies initiated in the country; Social Democrats came to power in 1932 and remained in power for the next 44 years. Sweden has since witnessed alterations in power between the party and its leftist coalition allies and the center–right coalition. The prevalence of multiple parties has resulted in a welfare state that incorporates the needs of multiple segments of society. Sweden's welfare state includes several social services and programs geared toward families, women, and the masses to ensure equality within the country (Olsen 2007). For instance, allowances are given to families with children, the country has initiated programs for mothers through subsidies, parental and paternity leaves are available that extend benefits to both parents, adequate childcare support is also provided by the government, and universal sickness insurance and health care services are either free or available to people at affordable prices. These policies benefit the populace at large and are difficult to dismantle today given the vast support for the policies among the people.

A multiparty system in Sweden enabled the Social Democrats to implement policies that helped several groups within the country and provided incentives for all parties to cooperate with one another in creating the welfare state. As Lundberg and Amark (2001, 176) state, "The Social Democratic Party played a major role in the shaping of the modern Swedish welfare state. At the same time, the Social Democrats were acting within a political system, which promoted negotiations with other political parties and interest organizations, compromises and even consensus around the major social political reforms. There were many actors behind the creation of the welfare state."

Yet another piece of anecdotal evidence comes from the state of Kerala, in India, which also helps illustrate the benefits of a well-represented society. Human well-being in the state of Kerala is higher than in the rest of the country (Veron 2001; Kenny 2005); it had an infant mortality rate of 13 deaths per thousand live births in 2010, comparable to that of most developed countries in the world.[10] One of the reasons for citizens' well-being in Kerala can be attributed to government policies that provide broad-based services (World Bank 2004). The state of Kerala is a multiparty state, which has enabled multiple parties to influence policymaking. For instance, the inclusion of the Muslim League political party in governmental coalitions between 1960 and 1979 led to a greater diversion of resources toward education since Muslims were lagging in education compared to other communities in the state (Chiriyankandath 1997). Not only did this benefit the Muslim community specifically but also led to a considerable increase in overall levels of literacy in the state. Better political representation in Kerala provided an opportunity for the Muslim League to influence policymaking by bringing attention to the welfare needs of its supporters and facilitated cooperation among political parties to address the needs of a minority community.

Alternatively, a country where fewer or no political parties are allowed to exist for representational purposes are not as inclusive by nature because such countries can only represent the interests of certain groups within society. If the interests of such groups are markedly different from what is in the public interest, then representatives are less likely to implement policies that serve the broader interests of society. Moreover, existing representatives in such systems may not have the information necessary to incorporate the needs of diverse groups in the policymaking process. In a nondemocratic system, limited levels or a complete lack of political representation will make it unlikely for governing officials to implement policies that take into account the needs, preferences, and interests of the majority. In a society with representative political parties, on the other hand, parties represent a variety of groups and are therefore able to advocate the interests of these diverse groups.

Moreover, a country with relatively less representation may encounter greater principal–agent problems. In the principal–agent framework of delegation, voters serve as the principals while elected representatives serve as the agents; in a democracy agents are answerable to principals (Strøm et al. 2003). In the context of the argument made in this chapter, parties perform the role of agents. While the voters or principals are

numerous, the agents or political parties are far fewer in number in a representative system. Parties are expected to be responsive to the needs, demands, and interests of their principals in order to retain their position in office. This is a challenging task given that the preferences of individual voters may vary dramatically such that elected officials from parties may not be able to satisfy a diverse group of principals. The problem is amplified in a society with fewer parties as existing parties may not be acquainted with the diverse needs of the populace and will not be able to incorporate diverse preferences in policymaking. In a nondemocracy, incentives to cater to the needs of the majority may be absent altogether, and the interests of the masses are less likely to be heard by the rulers because the masses have little or no say in the governance of the state. Societies with more parties are able to reduce principal–agent problems to an extent because political parties can represent the interests of diverse groups within society relatively better.

The second theoretical explanation focuses on the consequences of having additional competitors in a more representative society. The significance of a competitive environment has been stressed in Dahl's (1971) polyarchy. Dahl emphasizes that citizens need to have the opportunity to formulate and signify their preferences and ensure that these preferences influence governance.[11] To this end, he emphasizes two democratic attributes, contestation and inclusion, where contestation relates to the extent of political competition among groups and inclusiveness refers to citizens' participation in the democratic process. Higher levels of contestation and inclusion bring society closer to a polyarchic polity, where citizens are in a better position to influence decision making. This chapter draws on Dahl's notion of contestation by arguing that the presence of multiple groups in a system permits competition among various political parties.[12] This has a twofold effect on the performance of individuals/parties seeking positions of authority assuming that political survival in office is one of the primary motivations of political officials (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). The existence of additional parties provides incentives for political officials to ensure that their supporters are satisfied with their representatives and motivates them to make broader appeals to the populace by proposing policies that advance the general well-being of the masses.

Parties operating in a more representative system must keep their constituents happy if they want to stay in office. Several scholars emphasize this notion of democratic accountability (Dahl 1971; Schmitter and Karl

1991), where voters can penalize poor performance during elections and thereby ensure responsive behavior by elected officials. The presence of competitors provides additional incentives for all parties to ensure that their supporters are satisfied. In a competitive environment where alternative parties vie for support of the electorate and continually try to increase their support base, all elected officials are motivated to work harder to keep their constituents happy. Nonperformance or poor performance in office may easily result in a situation where supporters abstain from voting or consider joining another party that might serve society better. Both these outcomes would be detrimental to the electoral success of poorly performing parties, motivating them to perform well in office. In a less representative democracy or a nondemocracy with limited levels of representation and few if any political parties, this relative lack of competition presents fewer incentives for rulers to perform well in office by catering to the needs of the masses. The lack of competition does not provide the same motivation for political representatives as do systems with more intensive competition, and this likely adversely influences human well-being outcomes.

Additionally, a competitive environment also motivates all parties to make broader appeals to the populace by proposing policies that advance the general well-being of the masses. To bolster their position in office and to expand their support base, parties are more likely to reach out to multiple segments of the population. While pursuing policies that primarily advance the welfare of their constituents may secure their position in power temporarily, the presence of additional competitors will always pose a threat that other parties will woo away their supporters. Particularistic policies may only benefit certain segments of society, and in an environment of multiple office-seeking parties, policies that benefit only select groups within society may endanger the long-term political prospects of parties who make narrow appeals to voters. Parties thus need to appeal to as many groups as possible not only to hold on to their power but to enlarge their support base as well. In a nondemocratic system, once again the absence of any real competition presents fewer incentives for rulers to implement policies that enhance the well-being of large swaths of society. A less competitive democratic country is also likely to have fewer incentives for political parties to make broader appeals to the masses and enhance human well-being on a large scale.

The incentive to make broader appeals to the masses in a competitive environment can be illustrated by the 2014 Indian parliamentary elec-

tions. The Indian National Congress (INC) dominated India for almost four decades following independence in 1947. Gradually several other political parties emerged on the political landscape, national parties such as the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) and other regional parties that have had considerable success in different regions of the country and have allied with either the INC or the BJP at the center to form a coalition government. Today, India can be characterized as a multiparty system.

In the 2014 elections, the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition overwhelmingly defeated the INC-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition that had been in power since 2004. Both coalitions made attempts to appeal to the masses by proposing inclusive policies. The UPA government initiated several welfare policies to help the poor, such as the National Food Security Act, a direct cash transfer program, among others (Saikia 2014). However, inefficient administration of these programs and the government's involvement in a number of corruption scandals led to the party's removal from office in 2014 (Chhibber and Verma 2014).

The BJP ran a campaign in which it emphasized issues such as economic performance, infrastructure development, and better administration without corruption that resonated well with the masses (Palshikar and Suri 2014; Sridharan 2014). Even though the BJP has been known for its Hindu nationalist ideology, with its traditional support base coming from urban areas, the middle class, and the upper caste, the party was able to make inroads among other segments of the population and garner the support of Other Backward Classes (OBCs), scheduled castes, and scheduled tribes by drawing attention to issues that appealed to the broader society (Chhibber and Verma 2014; Palshikar and Suri 2014; Sridharan 2014). These two latter groups traditionally have supported the INC, especially in the northern, western, and central states, but poor economic performance, corruption, and unemployment seemed to be important reasons for the rejection of the Congress-led UPA coalition government. Whether the BJP is able to deliver on its promises remains to be seen. However, this narrative on India reveals the incentives parties have to make broader appeals to the masses in a competitive environment.

The presence of multiple parties has often been associated with drawbacks as well. Lawrence Lowell (1896) expressed skepticism about too many parties in the cabinet, which would create instability. Such systems may provide too much voice to smaller or extremist parties in the legislature that adopt unaccommodating or uncompromising positions to secure

their preferred policy outcome. This sentiment is echoed by Beer (1998, 25), who asserts that a "representative government must not only represent, it must also govern." Indeed, too many political parties could very well hamper the decision-making process in legislatures where individual parties may take an intransigent stand, making it difficult and cumbersome to reach a consensus on policies and obstruct prompt decision making. This could adversely affect human well-being outcomes. Indeed at conflict are two competing objectives: better representation versus efficient and prompt decision making. A more representative system, as argued here, provides a more inclusive and competitive system that enhances human well-being. However, high levels of representation may come with obstructionist actors.

I argue that the representational advantages outweigh the potential adverse consequences of too much representation because the electorate can replace poorly performing incumbents who fail to satisfy the needs of their supporters in a representative society. A truly representative society in which parties compete with one another has a certain degree of transparency so that multiple parties must compete and voters can choose among alternative representatives. Countries in which political institutions are transparent will ensure that a rigid posture that proves to be a hindrance to policymaking and hurts the general well-being of the masses will be brought to the attention of voters. The presence of multiple parties in the legislature makes it more likely that parties will keep an eye on each other and keep the electorate informed about an uncooperative stance adopted by other parties. Therefore, parties must work with one another to keep their constituents happy. In a less representative system or in a nondemocracy, on the other hand, the presence of a single party or the lack of any political party may facilitate prompt decision making, but at the expense of ensuring that diverse interests are taken into account during policymaking; additionally, the lack of any real political competition also removes any incentives for existing parties or leaders to perform well in office from fear of losing power.

Drawing on the veto-player theory (Tsebelis 1995, 1999, 2002), other reservations are associated with the presence of multiple actors or groups as well. The presence of multiple parties increases the number of veto players or actors whose consensus is required to change policies. This may increase policy stability and make it difficult to change the status quo or existing policies. Indeed, in such a system, it may take longer for parties to reach a decision or change existing policies. However, quick decision making may

not always equal good policies. In fact, policies that incorporate the well-being of the masses may require contemplation and negotiation among parties to ensure that policies are inclusive and effective and do not intentionally or inadvertently adversely affect the interests of other groups within society. Overall, this discussion leads to the primary hypothesis:

H2.1a: Countries with higher levels of political representation are associated with higher levels of human well-being.

Case Narrative: Brazil

A narrative on Brazil helps probe the theoretical reasoning presented in this chapter. This study illustrates the significance of an inclusive and competitive society in a multiparty environment that has enhanced societal well-being in the country.

Brazil has experienced uninterrupted democratic rule since the late 1980s, when the country transitioned to democracy from a military rule and has been characterized by a multiparty system since the 1990 election. The two main competitors since this election have been the center–left Party of Brazilian Social Democracy (PSDB) and the leftist Worker's Party (PT), along with several other political parties in the country. The PSDB controlled the presidency under Fernando Henrique Cardoso as well as the legislature through a coalition of parties from 1994 to 2002 when PT captured the presidency under Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, and that party has controlled the legislature ever since through a coalition of parties.

Even though PSDB was a center–left party, it moved toward the right in the 1990s forming a coalition with rightist parties, such as the Liberal Front Party (PLF), the Liberal Party (PL), and the Brazilian Progressive Party (PPB), and initiated market reforms (Power 2001/2002). In spite of PSDB's coalition with right-of-center parties, it initiated programs to benefit the masses, such as raising the minimum wage and implementing Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs (Hall 2006). However, choosing to align with rightist parties created a vacuum in the center–left, which was subsequently filled by the PT (Power 1998). The PT had to appeal to people who had been voting for conservative parties (small towns, rural areas and northeast, north, center–west, least educated, poorest, elderly, women).

Promising change by rejecting patronage politics and elitism, the PT came to power in 2002 (Hunter and Power 2007) and initiated several pro-

grams with mass appeal and benefitted multiple segments of society (Anderson 2011). Scholarship programs were launched that increased enrollments in universities. One of the party's most prominent programs, Bolsa Familia (family grant program), gave cash incentives to poor families for ensuring that their children attended school and received medical care; anybody could have access to these benefits, party supporters and nonsupporters alike. Additionally, the minimum wage was increased and programs like *credito consignado*, where bank loans for household purchases were extended to those who had never had a bank account and repayments were deducted from wages or pensions, were introduced. All these programs facilitated greater consumption, thereby expanding the domestic market and creating more jobs. The party helped the poorer segments of the population whose concerns had been inadequately addressed under the PSDB coalition. Thus, the representational benefits of having multiple parties in Brazil ensured that even with the PSDB drift toward the PLF (a rightist party), the concerns of the masses were still taken into account by the PT.

A multiparty system also provides incentives for parties to work closely with each other, thereby emphasizing negotiation, compromise, and coordination. The two major parties in Brazil, the PT and PSDB, realized the significance of doing so, as demonstrated by the trend set by Cardoso of PSDB, which aligned itself with the conservative PLF and the clientelistic Brazilian Labor Party (PTB). Similarly, the PT has been open to the idea of forming alliances with parties that are further away from it ideologically (Power 2010). This has made it relatively easier for parties to make progress in policymaking.

A multiparty system signals the presence of a competitive environment and ensures that parties will perform well in office to please their supporters and propose broader policies to retain their power. Incentives to make broader appeals have been evident in both major parties, the PSDB and PT, as both supported the other in arenas of social policy that benefitted several social groups (Power 2010). For instance, Cardoso and Lula both supported wage hikes and the CCT programs. Cardoso implemented a conditional cash program contingent upon school attendance (Bolsa Escola) at the federal level in the 1990s after its success in some of the provinces. When Lula came to office in 2002, he merged Bolsa Escola with other CCTs to create Bolsa Familia (Hall 2006). In fact, in the 2006 presidential elections, the PSDB candidate, Geraldo Alckmin, promised to further expand the Bolsa Familia program that had been initiated by PT under Lula (Hunter and Power 2007). Incentives to make broader appeals

in a competitive environment by parties in Brazil have benefitted the masses at large. As Power (2010, 229) notes, "Virtually no political actor in Brazil opposes the social policies of the Lula government, which built on and expanded initiatives of the Cardoso period, which themselves were heavily influenced by innovations by PT at the subnational level. The result is a social safety net that provides a guaranteed income to more than 12 million families, covering nearly a quarter of the national population."

Overall, the study on Brazil demonstrates the benefits of a well-represented society by illustrating the consequences of an inclusive and a competitive system. Inclusiveness ensured that the interests of multiple segments of society were taken into account during policymaking while competitiveness propelled parties to perform well in office and make broader appeals to the masses to bolster their position of authority. The relationship between political representation and human well-being is now subjected to an empirical analysis to identify a possible general pattern among the theoretical variables of interest in a global sample of countries.

Empirical Analyses

The primary dependent variable is human well-being, measured by infant and child mortality, gross enrollment ratio, and the hybrid human development index (HDI). Infant mortality refers to the number of deaths of infants (of 1 year or less) per 1000 live births. Child mortality refers to the number of deaths per 1000 inhabitants of children under 5 years of age. I use log values of both variables to normalize their distribution, since both variables are skewed. The data for the two variables come from World Bank (2015). Lower levels of infant and child mortality indicate higher levels of human well-being. The third indicator, gross enrollment ratio, measures primary, secondary, and tertiary education for both genders. The fourth indicator, the hybrid HDI, is an aggregate measure that includes life expectancy, adult literacy, gross enrollment ratio, and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. Life expectancy measures the number of years an infant would live if existing conditions of mortality were to remain constant for the rest of his/her life. Literacy measures the percentage of the population over 15 years of age that is able to read. Lastly, GDP per capita measures wealth.[13] The data for gross enrollment ratio and the HDI are available from the United Nations Development Programme.

The primary independent variable is political representation measured by the variable "parcomp," or political competition, from the Polity IV data set (Marshall et al. 2014). The variable ranges from 0 to 5, where higher values refer to higher degrees of political representation (0 refers to lack of competition, 1 refers to repression, 2 refers to suppression, 3 refers to factional, 4 refers to transitional, and 5 refers to competitiveness or multiparty competition). The advantage of using this variable to measure political representation is that it provides a measure of representation for democracies as well as nondemocracies. Once again, it is important to note that, even though democracies are by their very nature more representative than nondemocracies, nondemocratic regimes may also display varying levels of representation. Thus, this measure enables one to assess the effect of representation among a global sample of countries.

The analysis also controls for alternative determinants of human well-being. The level of economic development may influence human well-being. High levels of economic development provide greater private and public resources for food, health, education, and human well-being more generally, thereby enhancing welfare outcomes. I measure economic development with logged per-capita GDP. The level of population density may also influence human well-being where governments may find it difficult to distribute essential social services to populations that are sparsely scattered or have low densities (Ross 2006). I measure population density with logged population density. The percentage of urban population is yet another alternative determinant of human well-being, where a higher percentage of urban population may have better access to essential social services compared to rural populations. The data for all control variables are available from World Bank (2015). Another prominent control is the level of democracy or regime type, as discussed in the introduction. However, a regime variable is not included in the models because the primary independent variable, political representation, is one of the core attributes of political regimes, and inclusion of both variables might lead to multicollinearity. The baseline models were estimated with both the variables in the same model, and the primary findings remain unchanged.

I use time-series cross-section analyses to assess the relationship between political representation and human well-being. All models are estimated using xtscc and adopt driscoll and kraay standard errors and address heteroscedasticity as well as autocorrelation (Driscoll and Kraay 1998; Hoechle 2007). This technique is also appropriate when the number of

observations (N) is greater than time (T) or number of years. $N > T$ in all the analyses carried out in each of the empirical chapters, which makes this an appropriate technique. All baseline models were estimated using within-country fixed effects to rule out the possibility that any one country will influence the results. This technique assesses the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variables within a country. Robustness tests discussed here include models without country fixed effects to assess the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variables between countries. The results are presented in the appendix. A 1-year lag is used in all models to reduce the possibility of reverse causality.

Table 2.1 presents the primary findings, where models 1 and 2 assess the effect of political representation on infant mortality and child mortality, respectively, and models 3 and 4 include educational enrollment and the HDI, respectively. The political representation coefficients in models 1 and 2 are negative and statistically significant, indicating that a higher level of political representation is associated with lower levels of infant and child mortality. Political representation fails to reach statistical levels of significance in model 3, which includes educational enrollment ratio as the dependent variable. This suggests that political representation may play a

Table 2.1 Political representation and human well-being

	Model (1)	*Model (2)*	*Model (3)*	*Model (4)*
	Infant mortality	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*
Political representation	−0.0503***	−0.0515***	0.390	0.0026**
	(0.0053)	(0.0058)	(0.272)	(0.0011)
GDP per capita	−0.395***	−0.389***	5.508***	
	(0.0177)	(0.0173)	(0.283)	
Population density	−0.293***	−0.374***	11.60***	0.0767***
	(0.0594)	(0.0584)	(1.114)	(0.0030)
Urban population	−0.0059***	−0.0084***	0.285***	0.0047***
	(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0305)	(0.0001)
Constant	7.980***	8.663***	−38.44***	0.0677***
	(0.140)	(0.134)	(3.666)	(0.0082)
Observations	6354	6370	4377	4614
Number of countries	162	162	129	128
R-squared	0.810	0.816	0.595	0.703
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$

relatively less important role in explaining variation in education enrollment within countries. Its effect on the education variable is significant in alternative models, discussed subsequently, which assess the effect of political representation on human well-being outcomes between countries.[14] Political representation is positive and significant in model 4, indicating that higher levels of representation are associated with higher levels of human development.[15] Overall, the primary independent variable of interest, political representation, is significant in the majority of the models. This lends support to the primary hypothesis (*H2.1a*).

In substantive terms, changing the value of the political representation variable from its minimum to its maximum value reduces infant and child mortality by approximately 22% and increases the HDI by approximately 1.3%. The substantive effect of political representation on the HDI is relatively smaller than its effect on health outcomes. A plausible reason for this could be that the HDI is an aggregate index that includes various dimensions of well-being, and there may be scenarios in which countries perform better with respect to some aspects of well-being but lagging in others. It is for this reason that there is value in disaggregating well-being indicators as well so we have a better understanding of how the political factors influence individual and aggregate well-being indicators.

Political representation is indicative of a more inclusive and competitive society. Higher levels of political representation provide an opportunity for multiple groups within a society to have a say in the policymaking process and encourages parties to work together and find policy solutions that enhance the well-being of the populace at large. It also leads to a more competitive system where the presence of potential challengers encourages both incumbents and challengers to perform well in office. While it is plausible that higher levels of representation may make it difficult for political parties to make expeditious decisions or make it easier for intransigent parties to influence policymaking, on balance, the advantages of a more representative society outweigh the potential drawbacks. Overall, the evidence confirms the benefits of a more representative society. The control variables perform as expected. Higher levels of GDP per capita, population density, and a larger urban population lead to lower levels of infant and child mortality and higher levels of education enrollment and human development.

As a robustness test, the effect of political representation on human well-being is assessed by using alternative model specifications as well. As a first robustness test, the baseline models are assessed by accounting for

time dummies to rule out the possibility that any single year would influence the dependent variables. As a second robustness test, the baseline models are estimated without country or time dummies while controlling for additional control variables. I include regional dummies for Africa, Latin America, and Asia to control for distinct cultural, geographic, and historical factors common to these regions; the data for these regional controls come from Gerring et al. (2005). The current literature also argues that states that are ethnically diverse are likely to provide fewer public goods owing to a lack of consensus among different ethnic groups regarding the kind of public goods to be provided (Alesina et al. 1999; Easterly and Levine 1997). Thus, one might expect ethnically diverse states to have lower levels of human well-being. Ethnic heterogeneity is measured as a probability, which ranges from 0 to 1, where higher values indicate greater ethnic diversity, and the data come from Alesina et al. (2003). Appendix A and Tables A 2.2 and A 2.3 present the findings, and political representation continues to have a negative and statistically significant effect on infant and child mortality and a positive and a statistically significant effect on education enrollment and the HDI. This suggests that overall political representation continues to play an important role in enhancing human well-being outcomes. Among the regional dummies, Africa and Latin America are associated with higher levels of infant and child mortality, while Asian countries seem to perform better with lower levels of infant and child mortality. In the case of educational enrollment, Africa seems to perform poorly, with lower levels of education, and all three regions display lower levels of human development. This suggests that while Asia performs relatively well in health outcomes, all three regions can improve the overall levels of human development. Thus, distinct regional patterns in well-being outcomes can be observed. As expected, countries that are ethnically heterogeneous also perform poorly, with higher levels of infant and child mortality and lower levels of education and human development. Overall, the results lend support to the notion that a more representative society is beneficial for populations in terms of the robustness tests as well.

Conclusion

The structure of the political environment plays an important role in influencing human well-being. By demonstrating the significance of political representation globally, this chapter engages the vast research on political regimes

and welfare outcomes. Specifically, the findings indicate that higher levels of political representation enhance global well-being outcomes. While in theory a direct democracy may be the most representative by its very nature, there are limitations to the functioning of a direct democracy, as discussed earlier. Most democracies today are representative by nature, and one way to ensure that representatives take into account the varied preferences, interests, and needs of a population is to make the political system more inherently representative. Indeed one must guard against the possibility of creating a representative government that is hamstrung owing to the presence of too many actors in policymaking. Governments may need to get creative to address the potential drawbacks associated with too much representation by creating laws that disincentivize representatives from acting as obstructionists and finding common ground to work together with competitors. This will create an environment of negotiation, accommodation, and compromise and result in policies that are in the general interest of the populace.

While the bulk of the existing literature focuses on whether democracies perform better than nondemocracies, this chapter presents a theoretical argument that explains why democracies may perform better than nondemocracies and provides empirical evidence in support of the theoretical argument. Democracies generally are more representative by nature than nondemocracies, and the primary finding lends support to the benefits of a democratic system that can be traced to its representativeness. Additionally, this helps shed light on variations in human well-being within democratic regimes and nondemocratic regimes. It is important to keep in mind that there are differences among nondemocracies as well. Some of these regimes do exhibit democratic features where there may be nondemocracies that are partially representative, participative, or competitive by nature. A large body of research discusses variations within nondemocracies (Geddes 1999; O'Donnell 1994; Diamond 2002; Merkel and Croissant 2004; Hadenius and Teorell 2007). The findings in this chapter emphasize that a disaggregated approach that breaks down regime type into its core components can help us better understand the dynamics between political regimes and well-being outcomes.

Notes

1. The literature presents different conceptions of representation. For instance, see Pitkin (1967) for differences between descriptive, symbolic, formal, and substantive representations. This chapter, however, focuses primarily on the consequences of political representation and therefore

does not engage the literature on the meaning of representation. It adopts a generic meaning that is broadly accepted, namely, that representation refers to answerability of officials to their citizens.

2. Cited in George H. Sabine. 1961. *A History of Political Theory.* 3rd ed., New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, p. 695.
3. Destuutt de Tracy. 1811. A Commentary and Review of Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws, Philadelphia: William Duane, p. 19, cited in Adrienne Koch. 1964. *The Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson*, Chicago: Quadrangle, p. 152, 167.
4. This variable is discussed in greater detail below in the empirical analysis section.
5. Indeed there are a few countries that are representative but do not have political parties, such as small Pacific islands of Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, and Tuvalu (Anckar and Anckar 2000). This chapter, however, primarily focuses on the representational role played by political parties.
6. Lijphart's (2012) consensual model comprises multiparty coalitions, a balance of power between the executive and legislative branches, multiparty systems, proportional electoral systems, coordinated and corporatist interest groups, federal and decentralized government, a bicameral legislature, rigid constitutions, judicial review, and independent central banks. The majoritarian model is associated with institutional alternatives that fall on the other end of the spectrum.
7. Centripetalism is primarily associated with a unitary, parliamentary, and a party-list proportional representation electoral system, among other institutions. Decentralism is associated with a federal, presidential, and single-member district or preferential voting system, among other institutional alternatives. Centripetal systems are similar to consensual systems in that both emphasize an inclusive political system. However, in contrast to consensual systems, centripetal systems emphasize centralized authority while consensual systems emphasize decentralized authority. More specifically, one key difference between the consensual and centripetal models is that, whereas the former emphasizes federal systems, centripetal models emphasize unitary systems. See Gerring et al. (2005) for a detailed overview of the centripetal model.
8. John Adams, Letter to John Penn, *Works* (Boston, 1882–1865) cited in Pitkin (1967).
9. James Wilson. 1986. *Works.* Edited by James DeWitt Andrews: Chicago. Cited in *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787*, edited by Max Ferrand: New Haven.
10. Infant mortality data for Kerala are available from the Sample Registration Systems published by the Census of India (various years). The average infant mortality rate among OECD countries in the developed world between 1960 and 2013 was 12 per thousand live births (WDI 2015).

11. See Dahl (1971) for specific institutional guarantees that provide these opportunities to citizens.
12. While inclusiveness in Dahl's model refers to the extent of citizens' participation, inclusiveness in this chapter refers to the inclusiveness of the political system in terms of political representation.
13. See Gidwitz et al. (2010) for a detailed overview of the construction of the HDI. Note that the primary dependent and control variables, as well as the methodology, are discussed here and thus not repeated in subsequent chapters.
14. Note that the baseline models are fixed effects models, which assess whether a change in political representation within a country brings about a change in human well-being outcomes within the same country. Subsequent models do not use a fixed effects estimation technique, which enables us to analyze the effect of political representation on human well-being between countries. The findings indicate that political representation plays a more important role in explaining variations in education across countries than within countries.
15. This model does not include GDP per capita as a control because the HDI index includes GDP as a component of human development.

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CHAPTER 3

Governance

The subject of governance is not of recent origin. As Kaufmann and Kraay (2008, 3) mention, "Early discussions go back to at least 400 BCE to the *Arthashastra*, a treatise on governance attributed to Kautilya … Kautilya presents key pillars of the 'art of governance,' emphasizing justice, ethics, and anti-autocratic tendencies." More recently, the emphasis on governance can be traced to international organizations such as the World Bank and the United Nations. The World Bank since the 1990s has regarded good governance as a prerequisite for aid recipients (Nanda 2006), and it has been actively involved in initiating governance reforms in several countries (Development Committee 2000). The United Nations in its 2000 UN Millennium Declaration emphasized the role of good governance in enhancing development and eradicating poverty (United Nations 2000, para. 13). However, even though the significance of governance has been stressed for centuries now, there seems to be little consensus on its meaning. This disagreement has been identified as one of the fundamental problems in the study of governance (Kaufmann and Kraay 2008).

The objective of this chapter is not to add to the long list of alternative definitions but to focus on the notions of governance that make it amenable to further empirical inquiry such that we can assess its consequences on human well-being. Two common problems are associated with most definitions of governance. The first problem is the tautological nature of the definition, where the notion of governance encompasses developmental outcomes. For instance, Huther and Shah (2005, 40)

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define governance as "…a multifaceted concept encompassing all aspects of the exercise of authority through formal and informal institutions in the management of the resource endowment of a state. The quality of governance is thus determined by the impact of this exercise of power on the quality of life enjoyed by its citizens." However, as Rothstein and Teorell (2008) point out, this is a tautological argument where good governance refers to better quality of life and the latter can only be achieved when there is good governance. Adopting this definition is particularly problematic for this study because the purpose of the study here is to assess how governance affects quality of life. The World Bank's definition of governance falls prey to this criticism as well, where governance is defined as "…the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development" (World Bank 1992, 1). Once again, such a conceptualization of governance is inappropriate for analyzing its effect on developmental outcomes such as human well-being because the definition incorporates how resources are utilized to formulate better policies.

The second problem with definitions of governance relates to incorporating characteristics of political regimes into those definitions. For instance, Kaufmann et al. (2004, 3) define governance as "the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised," which includes "(1) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced, (2) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them." The first part of the definition includes the mode of selection and replacement of government officials, which relates to the nature of political regimes and seems to favor democratic regimes since democracies have politicians who are elected by citizens to office and can be removed from office as well. This definition implicitly suggests that democracies have better governance compared to nondemocracies and makes it difficult to analyze the effects of governance across political regimes, thereby making the conceptualization of governance problematic for the purpose of this study because this chapter proposes to provide an explanation of human well-being independent of regime type.[1] The second part of the definition conflates governance with good policymaking, thereby making it difficult to analyze the effect of governance on policy outcomes such as human well-being.

Given the nature of the problems associated with existing conceptualizations of governance, this chapter focuses on notions of governance that are

universal in nature and do not succumb to the two previously discussed issues that are prevalent in most definitions. To summarize the two issues, first, the notion of *good governance* should not be reflective of developmental outcomes to avoid a tautology while assessing its effect on human well-being. Second, an attempt will be made to elaborate on the notion of good governance that can be applied to political regimes without favoring one specific regime type over another. The purpose of this chapter is to develop a common framework for analyzing the effects of governance on human well-being among democratic and nondemocratic countries. Thus, governance here primarily refers to the way *authority is exercised* by government officials, who play an important role in pursuing development objectives because they are involved in the formulation and implementation of a variety of welfare policies. *Government officials* here refers to both elected political representatives and nonelected bureaucratic officials, and the way officials exercise their authority in pursuit of welfare policies determines whether or not welfare objectives are eventually achieved. Elected officials are generally involved in the formulation of policies and rules, and bureaucratic officials are primarily involved in implementation of policies. As such, both groups play an important role in the governance of the country. Political officials may choose to use authority to govern in a way that either promotes or hinders societal well-being and other general developmental outcomes within a country. This is where the notion of "good" or "bad" governance becomes important. To the extent that government officials use authority to promote the well-being of their citizens, we witness evidence of good governance, whereas when they use their authority to the detriment of the masses to further their own personal interests at the expense of the well-being of society, that is called poor governance.

Governance is a latent concept, which cannot be easily observed or measured. Kaufmann and Kraay (2008, 1) aptly invoke Albert Einstein's adage "not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can be counted" to demonstrate the complexity associated with conceptualizing and measuring governance. Despite the problems associated with capturing the notion of governance, one needs to identify observable indicators in order to understand the consequences of governance. This chapter focuses on three primary indicators of governance—bureaucratic quality, corruption, and rule of law. I critically analyze the three indicators of governance and argue that good governance is indicative of a society with high bureaucratic quality, low levels of corruption, and a strong rule of law that ensure an effective implementation of



Fig. 3.1 Variation in governance: all countries, democracies, and nondemocracies. Note: The boxes represent the middle range of the data, also known as the interquartile range. The vertical lines on the bottom and the top of the boxes represent the data in the first and fourth quartiles, respectively, and the dots represent outliers. The lines across the three boxes show the median governance scores in the three subgroups

welfare policies, reduced rent-seeking behavior, and greater accountability of government officials.

Countries display considerable variation in governance. Figure 3.1 captures disparities in governance among a global sample of countries, as well as within democratic and nondemocratic countries, and all three groups display variations in governance from 1984 to 2008.[2] The governance variable ranges from 0.22 to 4.55, where higher numbers indicate better governance.[3] The first histogram captures the global variation in governance ranging from 0.22 to 4.55, with mean and median governance scores of 2.5 and 2.3, respectively. Among democracies, the governance score ranges from 0.53 to 4.55, with mean and median governance scores of 2.8 and 2.6, respectively. Among nondemocracies, the governance scores range from 0.22 to 4.09, with mean and median governance scores of 2. Democracies seem to perform slightly better than nondemocracies in good governance, with democracies having higher minimum, maximum, mean, and median governance scores. However, both political regimes

display variations in governance. This chapter sheds light on the aggregate role of governance for human well-being globally, critically assesses the effect of the three governance indicators, identifies the relative significance of the three individual governance indicators, and assesses whether the role of good governance differs across political regimes.

Good Governance and Human Well-Being

Bureaucratic Quality

The first governance indicator is *bureaucratic quality*. The bureaucracy plays an important role in the formulation and implementation of a range of policies (Peabody and Rourke 1965) and is able to influence several welfare outcomes. I draw on Max Weber's conception of bureaucracy to evaluate the consequences of bureaucratic quality for human well-being. Weber conceived of bureaucracy as an administrative organization with specified jurisdictional areas allocated to government officials and managed on the basis of established rules and regulations (Roth and Wittich 1968).[4] High-quality bureaucracy, I argue, embodies meritocratic recruitment and political autonomy, which ensures the selection of capable bureaucrats who are able to perform their tasks without too much interference from political officials, thereby leading to higher levels of human well-being.[5]

High bureaucratic quality is indicative of a meritocratic bureaucracy that is based on an examination process for the selection of bureaucrats (Gerth and Mills 1958; Parsons 1964). This ensures the selection of competent and qualified candidates having the capability and expertise to implement policies effectively. Meritocratic bureaucrats are more likely to develop a sense of camaraderie among themselves as they share similar expertise and thus come to identify with the goals of the organization since they do not owe their allegiance to political patrons (Evans and Rauch 1999). This generates greater cohesiveness among bureaucrats and enhances their performance because they are more likely to work collectively to accomplish their objectives. South Korea exhibits features of a high-quality bureaucracy (Fukuyama 2012), where bureaucrats are recruited through the competitive National Civil Service Exam and promoted based on seniority, performance in examinations, and reviews by superiors (Hwang 1996). This ensures the selection of competent individuals involved in the making and implementation of policy.

Bureaucracies are likely to be more motivated to perform well when there is greater accountability and elected officials can enhance accountability through existing legislation. For instance, in the 1990s, South Korea initiated series of laws commonly known as Administrative Procedure Acts (APAs) to increase the transparency of the bureaucracy by requiring agencies to hold public hearings and share information with the public, ensuring participation of the public (Baum 2009). The laws passed included the Basic Law on Administrative Regulations and Civil Affairs Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Basic Act on Administrative Regulations, which imposed regulations with which the bureaucratic agencies had to comply. Baum's (2009) analysis reveals that there was greater public confidence in the bureaucracy following the passage of these laws.

Weber's bureaucracy is also more likely to conform to formal rules and regulations (Roth and Wittich 1968). Interestingly, while the presence of competent bureaucrats may be unequivocally positive, the effect of compliance with formal rules is relatively ambiguous on welfare outcomes. Strict allegiance to formal rules has come to be equated with red tape, which is associated with numerous unnecessary constraints or the presence of identical or contradictory requirements, which merely serve as bottlenecks and cause delays in policymaking (Kaufman 1977; Goodsell 1983). This is highly plausible in public bureaucracies, which are more likely to have red tape compared to private firms (Bozeman et al. 1992). Alternatively, a contrary perspective is that adherence to formal rules and regulations may encourage policymakers to give significant thought to important policies and reduce the possibility that public officials will use their position for personal gain (Kaufman 1977; Goodsell 1983). As Kaufman (1977, 4) states, "One person's 'red tape' may be another's treasured safeguard." Adherence to regulations leads to a certain degree of objectivity and transparency in the performance of work by public officials. Furthermore, it might enhance predictability in policy formulation and implementation as well. On balance, the observance of formal rules may serve the interests of the masses better because it facilitates a degree of legitimacy and accountability such that citizens become aware of the workings of the bureaucracy and the decision-making process.

Bureaucrats can work effectively when they enjoy political autonomy. A merit-based bureaucracy also ensures that bureaucrats are not under the influence of elected officials and are removed from politics. Elected political officials have their own agendas because they have incentives to cater to specific support bases and therefore may try to influence the function-

ing of the bureaucracy to serve their electorate. However, too much interference may make it difficult for the bureaucracy to function effectively. Recruitment in a high-quality bureaucracy is meritocratic, which ensures that bureaucrats have greater autonomy to pursue policies that have merit and are in the interest of the general public. Additionally, bureaucrats are more likely to utilize resources to pursue developmental goals, and there is a greater commitment among bureaucrats to achieve these goals since their careers depend on good performance (Geddes 1990).

While on one end of the spectrum are high-quality bureaucracies that are merit-based and adhere to rules and regulations, low-quality bureaucracy is found at the other end of the spectrum, where bureaucrats do not have the requisite qualifications and expertise, which adversely affects performance, reduces their motivation to implement policies in such a way that they advance overarching developmental goals, restricts their autonomy in discharging their duties, and, finally, provides incentives to officials to politicize the bureaucracy, which further reduces the motivation to reform the bureaucracy in a positive way (Huber and McCarty 2004). Such low-quality bureaucracies are often found in neo-patrimonial regimes where key positions in the bureaucracy are allocated on the basis of personal loyalty to political leaders (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994), which undermine merit, expertise, and autonomy of the bureaucracy. Not only are the bureaucrats in such systems incapable of implementing policies effectively as a result of the biased selection criteria, but they may also indulge in corrupt rent-seeking behavior by using their offices to amass personal wealth. Since bureaucrats owe their allegiance to leaders who have appointed them to office, public officials may be less likely to adhere to existing rules or regulations. This makes governance less transparent and accountable to citizens, and while the bureaucrats may be accountable to the political leaders, this nonetheless adversely affects the autonomy of the bureaucrats, who end up serving at the pleasure of political officials.

Neo-patrimonial regimes are especially common in developing countries such as in Africa. As Sandbrook (2000, 91) notes while discussing African bureaucracy post-1970s, "…presidents treated the public administration as their personal property. They and their lieutenants arbitrarily filled the expanding ranks of the state apparatus with political appointees, selected the top administrators on the basis of personal loyalties, and assigned bureaucratic tasks." The consequences of this can be seen in the relatively poor performance of African countries in welfare outcomes, with a mean infant mortality rate of 55 in 2013 relative to a mean infant

mortality rate of 4 among OECD countries, 14 among Latin American countries, and 26 among Asian countries (World Bank 2015). Overall, a lack of meritocratic selection and autonomy and low accountability to the citizenry and low transparency are prominent features that generally seem to coexist in low-quality bureaucracies, and these can have a detrimental effect on a range of welfare outcomes.

Corruption

The second governance indicator is *corruption*. Corruption has been defined as "an act by a public official (or with the acquiescence of a public official) that violates legal or social norms for private or particularistic gain" (Gerring and Thacker 2005, 234). Others refer to corruption as the "…use of public office for private gains, where an official (the agent) entrusted with carrying out a task by the public (the principal) engages in some sort of malfeasance for private enrichment which is difficult to monitor for the principal" (Bardhan 1997, 1321) or as "the sale by government officials of government property for personal gain" (Schleifer and Vishny 1993, 599). Thus, pursuit of personal interest by government officials is the common feature prevalent in most definitions of corruption. While it may seem that scholars would be in agreement about the drawbacks of corruption, competing theoretical perspectives have been proposed about its consequences.

One school of thought proposes that corruption enhances developmental outcomes. As Huntington (1968, 69) claims, "the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, overcentralized, dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid, overcentralized, *honest* bureaucracy" (emphasis added). According to Huntington, corruption may be a way to circumvent rules and regulations that stifle economic performance. Bayley (1966) argues that corruption provides an opportunity for people to influence governance if they are unable to do so due to exclusion or institutional bottlenecks. Corruption may also enhance the quality of bureaucrats by attracting talented individuals who have the opportunity to augment their salary through corrupt practices. An alternative explanation posits that governments may prioritize other objectives such as increasing its military power, which diverts resources away from developmental goals (Leff 1964). Corruption in this scenario may be beneficial as it provides incentives for officials to initiate policies that are conducive to developmental objectives by finding ways to circumvent existing rules and regulations. However,

these proposed advantages of corruption can come to fruition and enhance developmental outcomes if officials choose to do so. Whether the subsequent policies adopted by government officials as a result of corruption will be in the larger interest of the populace is doubtful. Much depends on the political motivations of the individuals concerned. It is far more likely that citizens with resources will try to influence policies that benefit only themselves and that government officials may be more responsive to individuals with resources and cater to the interests of these smaller groups within society.

Yet another plausible argument in favor of corruption is that it provides incentives for private firms to obtain special favors from the government, thereby creating a competitive environment for firms to become more efficient (Leff 1964). The success of these firms enhances the state's tax base by creating greater resources at the government's disposal (Nye 1967). Again, whether or not these resources are actually used for citizens' welfare remains questionable. Moreover, scholars who emphasize the benefits of corruption focus primarily on the effects of corruption on economic development or growth. Economic development and human well-being are different developmental outcomes, and even if one were to agree with the positive effects of corruption on economic development, its effect on human well-being is unlikely to be positive.

I argue that corruption adversely affects human well-being outcomes and is associated with lower levels of human well-being via a number of causal mechanisms. The first mechanism relates to the ways officials use their position to advance their personal interests. Public officials involved in corruption may influence the price of government goods and services by either driving up the price of welfare provisions for citizens or by stealing those provisions from the government (Schleifer and Vishny 1993); both forms of corruption may adversely affect human well-being. Government officials may drive up the price of essential goods and services by charging a higher price than the market value for the commodity or service from consumers, as a form of graft. While this benefits corrupt officials, it adversely affects consumers, who are unable to afford the high prices. This primarily relates to the provision of welfare goods and services such as medical supplies that influence health outcomes. For instance, in Tanzania, bribes extracted from the health sector reduced the availability of health care for the poor as it drove up prices, depriving individuals of essential welfare provisions (Tibandebage and Mackintosh 2005).[6] Alternatively, corruption may also involve theft of necessary welfare goods and services by public officials from

the government. This results in a loss of government revenue, which may lower the quantity and quality of goods and services provided by the government in the future (Bearse et al. 2000). More generally, since corruption is associated with the misuse of public funds by government officials (Lewis 2006), it prevents government spending on human welfare from being realized owing to the siphoning off of government resources for private gain. For instance, while public spending on basic health services in Uganda increased in the 1980s, it did not result in an improvement in health outcomes, largely because of the expropriation of funds allocated for healthcare by public officials, which was estimated to be almost 70% of the total funds earmarked for healthcare (Reinikka 1999), thereby depriving the poor of essential welfare benefits.[7]

The second mechanism relates to the reallocation of resources to sectors that may be more amenable to corrupt practices. Corruption entails activities that are considered illegal. Insofar as corruption may be carried out easily without detection in certain areas compared to others, it may lead to a diversion of resources from productive avenues like health and education to other areas like defense and infrastructure, especially if the latter provide better opportunities for carrying out corrupt activities (Schleifer and Vishny 1993). A lack of investment in productive areas such as societal well-being may in turn adversely influence welfare outcomes. Alternative mechanisms could adversely influence human well-being for varied reasons. Corruption is also associated with various other activities like absenteeism of public officials in health sectors, demands for illegal payments for health services, unnecessary medical procedures being conducted by public health providers, or selling counterfeit or expired drugs (Di Tella and Savedoff 2001; UNDP 2008), all of which can negatively influence human welfare. More generally, corruption undermines the quality of infrastructure (Tanzi and Davoodi 1997), is often associated with tax evasion, thereby reducing tax revenue for governments (Mauro 1996; Ghura 2002), and leads to greater income inequality and poverty among people (Gupta et al. 2002). On balance, the negative consequences of corruption seem to outweigh the positive effects of corruption.

Rule of Law

The third governance indicator is *rule of law*. Scholars have heatedly debated the concept of rule of law. While some propose a narrow conception that is primarily procedural, others are in favor of a broader

conception that is essentially substantive (Rose 2004). Rose (2004, 259) defines the narrow view as "… procedural in nature, focusing on the prevention of arbitrary governmental action and the protection of individual rights." Given the narrower and more objective approach, there is greater consensus about the definition among scholars who prefer a narrow conceptualization. However, the drawback of this objective approach is that the concept may be compatible with laws that may be viewed as bad or wrong (Summers 1993). On the other hand, a substantive approach has led scholars to adopt a broader conceptualization and, consequently, include diverse concepts in the definition. Indeed, there is greater disagreement among scholars who prefer a substantive approach about the way rule of law is defined. For instance, Ronald Dworkin (1985, 1986) incorporates justice, equality, and moral rights in the term. However, this conceptualization also includes outcomes such as a more "just" or "equal" society, which makes it difficult to assess its effect on welfare outcomes because it comes very close to falling prey to the problem of tautology. Moreover, this approach is also more subjective, making the meaning of "just," "equal," and "moral" debatable. Alternatively, Judith Shklar (1987) equates rule of law with representative democracy. This approach is also problematic because it equates prevalence of rule of law with democracy. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, conceptualization of rule of law needs to be independent of regime type.[8]

This chapter adopts a narrow conceptualization of rule of law to avoid the aforementioned pitfalls associated with a broader or substantive conceptualization. While there are problems associated with a procedural conceptualization as well, it enables an objective way of defining rule of law. Emphasizing the benefits of a narrow conceptualization, Rose (2004, 464) notes, "Developing a concept that guards against arbitrary use of government authority, insures the protection of individual rights, and provides a mechanism for equitable dispute resolution is a laudable objective and no small accomplishment." Thus, this study uses a definition of the rule of law that encompasses the concept of "impartiality" or equal applicability of law to all, which is an essential component of rule of law that has been emphasized by several scholars (Weingast 1997; Carothers 1998; O'Donnell 2004). While this conceptualization might appear to apply mostly to democratic regimes, theoretically a strong rule of law can exist under both democratic and nondemocratic regimes.

The existence of a strong rule of law ensures that the violation of existing rules and laws of the state will have adverse consequences for those who do not observe them. Government officials, such as political leaders, bureaucrats, or the judiciary, may violate the rule of law by engaging in corrupt activities to further their personal or material interests. Insofar as the rule of law is impartial, it ensures a vigilant system that holds the violators of law accountable. Thus, a strong rule of law is associated with better human well-being by minimizing corrupt rent-seeking behavior and enhancing responsiveness and accountability among government officials. In the event that the rule of law is weak or nonexistent, owing to a lack of uniformity in the application of laws by the judiciary, difficulty of access to the judiciary, or the presence of absolute lawlessness (O'Donnell 2004), the violators of law may go unpunished since a weak rule of law fails to deter them from resorting to fraudulent or unscrupulous behavior.[9] This may be associated with lower levels of human well-being, as government officials who are entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring the provision of welfare goods and services or with bringing the violators to justice do not perform their assigned tasks effectively. For instance, surveys conducted in Bangladesh indicate that two-thirds of respondents who used lower-tier courts paid bribes amounting to $108 per case, which comes close to a quarter of the average annual income of the world's poorest countries (UNDP 2008). This illustrates a scenario where the very institution that is responsible for enforcing the rule of law, namely the judiciary, has itself succumbed to corruption. The absence of a strong rule of law may also lead to absolute lawlessness in a society, often degenerating into widespread crime and violence that could adversely affect welfare outcomes and reduce access to essential services (Narayan et al. 2000).

Good governance is a holistic concept such that high-quality bureaucracy, low levels of corruption, and a strong rule of law collectively engender an environment associated with better human well-being. In other words, the benefits of a meritocratic bureaucracy may not translate into better health outcomes in the presence of corruption where officials use public office for personal benefits or a weak rule of law that does not penalize the unscrupulous behavior of state officials. Similarly, a society with high-quality bureaucracy may not be able to function well in the presence of a weak rule of law, which may incentivize government officials to engage in corrupt practices. Thus, governance needs to be conceptualized as an aggregate concept given the interdependent nature of the individual components of governance. Based on the presented theoretical

perspective, hypothesis *H3.1a* suggests that *good governance is associated with higher levels of human well-being than poor governance.*

Governance, Political Regimes, and Human Well-Being

The hypothesis just stated (*H3.1a*) postulates that good governance enhances human well-being in a global sample of countries. In other words, the beneficial influence of good governance will prevail among democratic and nondemocratic regimes. However, variations in human well-being exist within political regimes as well. Not all democracies enjoy the same welfare outcomes. A country may continue to be democratic without being responsive to the welfare needs of its citizens. Democratic regimes may hold periodic elections, experience a turnover of power, and yet leave much to be desired in terms of government performance. Similarly, there is variation in the performance of nondemocracies as well. Regardless of the relative lack of accountability, competition, and participation among nondemocracies, some nondemocratic regimes may perform better than others (Mesquita et al. 2003; Ross 2006; Gandhi 2008). Figure 1.2 in Chap. 1 demonstrates disparities in infant mortality rates within democratic and nondemocratic regimes, suggesting a lack of homogeneity in human health outcomes in both regimes. This is underscored by the lack of consensus in existing research about the performance of democratic versus nondemocratic regimes, where even though the bulk of empirical evidence demonstrates that democracies perform better (Moon and Dixon 1985; Shin 1989; Przeworski et al. 2000; Zweifel and Navia 2000; Lake and Baum 2001; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Besley and Kudamatsu 2006; McGuire 2010; Gerring et al. 2012), some studies do question the relationship between regime type and human well-being (Williamson 1987; Weede 1993; Ross 2006). Thus, not only do we need to account for the global variation in human well-being, but we must also try to explain variations within political regimes. I argue that the positive effect of good governance can also account for disparities in human well-being *within* democratic and nondemocratic regimes. By focusing on a single determinant, namely governance, we are able to explain the variation in human well-being within both types of regime, thereby facilitating a better understanding of the political dynamics of human well-being outcomes across regimes. This leads to hypothesis *H3.1b*: *democracies with good governance perform better than democracies with poor governance.*

Similarly, nondemocracies with good governance perform better than nondemocracies with poor governance.

Figure 1.2 not only demonstrates the variation in infant mortality within the two political regimes (democratic and nondemocratic) but also reveals disparities between the two regimes. The median infant mortality rate in democracies is 24 while among nondemocracies is 78. Democracies on average do seem to have lower levels of infant mortality compared to nondemocracies. Even though few quantitative studies cast doubt on the relationship between regime type and human well-being, the bulk of the literature provides compelling theoretical reasons as to why democracies may be expected to perform better than nondemocracies.[10] Given the theoretical perspectives that favor good governance and democratic regimes, this chapter addresses an additional question: do democracies with good governance perform better than nondemocracies with good governance? I argue that good governance can explain the disparities in human well-being *between* the two regimes as well. Generally the two prominent groups that are involved in developmental policies in both regimes are the political representatives and the bureaucracy. While political representatives focus primarily on policy formulation, the bureaucracy is engaged in policy implementation.[11] To ensure that welfare-enhancing policies are initiated and implemented effectively, both sets of government officials need to perform well. I argue that democracies with good governance perform better than nondemocracies with good governance. A fundamental difference between political regimes is the mode of selection and replacement of political representatives. Based on the numerous studies discussed in Chap. 1, we know that democratic leaders can be held accountable because elections provide a mechanism to select competent political representatives and replace poorly performing representatives. This ensures that elected officials will have to cater to the welfare needs of their citizens if they wish to maintain their position of power, thereby generating the motivation for political leaders to implement policies that enhance human well-being. Democracies with good governance present a better environment for their citizens because both groups of individuals (political leaders and nonelected officials or bureaucrats) that are involved in developmental policies are motivated to perform well. Moreover, since democratic regimes are more transparent, instances of corruption are more likely to be detected and the rule of law more likely to be enforced compared to nondemocratic regimes. Overall, the agents (elected officials) in a democracy are more likely to be responsive to their principals (citizens) than in a nondemocracy.

In contrast, nondemocratic leaders are not elected to office, and there may be no legal, nonviolent mechanism to replace poorly performing incumbents from office, such as an election. In this scenario, even if the country exhibits attributes of good governance, political leaders in these regimes may not have the same incentives as leaders in democracies have to cater to the needs of their citizens. Thus, both groups involved in developmental policies do not have the same motivation to perform well. Indeed it is plausible for nondemocratic leaders to cater to the welfare needs of their citizens in spite of the absence of any mechanism to hold them accountable. However, on balance, since nondemocratic leaders do not face the same electoral constraints that democratic leaders do, it is more likely for the former to ignore the well-being needs of the masses. The agents in a nondemocracy (political leaders) may not have the necessary motivation to be responsive to the needs of their principals (citizens) because of the relative absence of the accountability mechanism. Based on this theoretical argument, hypothesis *H3.1c* suggests that *democracies with good governance are associated with higher levels of human well-being compared to nondemocracies with good governance.*

Case Narrative: Japan

The effect of good governance on human well-being is demonstrated through a case narrative of Japan. Japan's bureaucracy serves as a good example of a high-quality bureaucracy. It has a long historical origin; Fukuyama and Marwah (2000, 87) note Japan's "…long tradition of bureaucratic professionalism going back not just to the imperial bureaucracy but, more importantly, to the Han or provincial bureaucracies of the Tokugawa period (1600–1867)." Bureaucratic reforms initiated post-1868 under the Meiji system laid the groundwork for a modern bureaucracy where recruitment was based on an examination (Silberman 1970). This mode of recruitment is prevalent in contemporary times as well, where the competitive Principal Senior A-Class Entrance Examination is used to attract the best individuals as bureaucrats who play a key role in the policymaking process (Pempel 1992).

Japan also embodies an autonomous bureaucracy, which can be traced to the Meiji period from 1868 to the 1880s (Silberman 1967, 1970; Spaulding 1967). The Meiji leaders ensured the autonomy of the bureaucracy "by avoiding a bureaucratic role that depended for its legitimacy on the personal will of an emperor or its accountability to a popularly elected

body of officials" (Silberman 1995, 159). No bureaucracy is completely independent of the influence of political representatives today, and Japan is no exception. However, bureaucrats are able to distance themselves from politics as Pempel (1992, 21) notes: "… its individual members are rarely involved in partisan or electoral politics while they hold office." Despite the presence of a meritocratic bureaucracy, instances of corruption among bureaucrats and political representatives may be widespread (Johnson 1986; Reed 1996; Nyblade and Reed 2008) and rule of law may not always be upheld. However, it is important to note that good governance is a relative concept, and the quality of governance may not be ideal at all times.[12] However, the extent to which it prevails within a country ensures that policies are formulated and implemented taking into account the needs of the populace.

Japan has achieved commendable levels of human well-being, as indicated by a low infant mortality rate of 2.1 in 2013. Good governance has played an important role in achieving better health outcomes for the populace where government officials have responded to the needs of the citizenry. Prior to 1990, social welfare was primarily directed toward citizens involved in the productive sectors such as workers in industries, members of the military, and teachers, while post-1990 welfare policies were extended to the citizenry at large, including women, children, and the older population (Peng 2014). The impetus to implement more inclusive policies can be traced to demographic changes within the country as well as international and domestic political factors (Peng 2000, 2002, 2004).

Demographic changes such as an aging population, increased number of women in the workforce, and falling fertility rates put pressure on the government to initiate policies to address these changes (Peng 2002). Additional pressure exerted by globalization may have propelled the state to take a more active role in welfare (Peng 2000). Domestic incentives for political representatives to initiate inclusive pro-welfare policies were also prevalent in Japan. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had continuously occupied office from 1955 through 1993, but after the party lost its dominant position, other parties competed in elections by emphasizing social policies (Peng 2004).

What is noteworthy is that the Ministry of Health and Welfare and the Ministry of Labor played an important role in broadening social welfare policies (Peng 2014).[13] The Ministry of Health and Welfare took the initiative and sent policymakers to Western countries to adopt and adapt

welfare policies to domestic needs. They initiated the Angel Plan, which bore a resemblance to policies in the EU and included better maternity and parental leaves and better support for workers with children, raising the age for universal child care from 3 to 7 years in 2000 to 15 years in 2009. Additionally, the government implemented the Gold Plan for the elderly population in 1989, which was replaced by the Long-Term-Care Insurance (LTCI) program in 2000. LTCI was modeled after Germany's LTCI plan and provided universal public care for the elderly. These welfare policies were much more comprehensive in nature in that they included children, women, and the elderly. The Ministry of Labor revised the employment insurance (EI) policy to align it better with the policies of the Ministry of Health and Welfare to make welfare policies more inclusive as well. For instance, the minimum retirement age was raised to 60, and employers were encouraged to retain employees over age 65. Additionally, EI was expanded to include the welfare of women, children, and the elderly. While both the government and bureaucratic officials were involved in these policies, the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare (MOHLW) especially favored pro-welfare policies (Japan-MOHLW 1999). Overall, this illustrative case sheds light on the role of governance on well-being outcomes in Japan. The next section tests the primary hypothesis and associated hypotheses across a global sample of countries through time-series cross-section analyses to assess whether the relationship between governance and human well-being is prevalent globally as well.

Empirical Analyses

Governance is a holistic concept that can be best captured by analyzing the impact of governance indicators collectively. It is operationalized with three indicators—bureaucratic quality, corruption, and the rule of law. The data for the governance indicators come from the political risk assessment, available from the International Country Risk Guide (Political Risk Services 2011).[14] The three indicators are based on subjective assessments of country experts, and the weights given to each of the components is the same for all countries, which enables comparisons across countries and over time. Most of the governance data suffer from two primary shortcomings. First, governance data sources, such as the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), and other well-known alternative sources, such as Transparency International (TI) and the World Governance Indicators (WGIs), are largely subjective in nature, which somewhat hinders replica-

bility and transparency of the data (Arndt and Oman 2006). Second, measurement errors are prevalent in most governance indicators (Arndt and Oman 2006), primarily because it is difficult to quantify complex theoretical concepts such as bureaucratic quality, extent of corruption, and rule of law. Thus, the conclusions drawn from the findings need to be treated with circumspection.

However, I have made an attempt to use the best available data to analyze the research question addressed here. The ICRG data have two relative advantages over TI and WGI. First, ICRG's data are based on subjective assessments of country experts, whereas TI's corruption data are based on surveys from private investors and experts, and WGI uses a large variety of existing surveys, including those of TI, to construct its governance indicators. One of the problems associated with surveys based on investors is the inherent assumption that their interests are compatible with national interests, which is questionable as individual biases of investors toward certain policies may very well influence their assessments (Kurtz and Schrank 2007). Second, TI's methodology differs from year to year, while WGI's data sources keep changing, both of which factors may make comparisons over time difficult (Arndt and Oman 2006). ICRG's data, on the other hand, are available on a yearly basis starting in 1984, and the methodology remains the same, facilitating comparisons across countries and over time.

The first indicator, bureaucratic quality, assesses the nature of recruitment, training, and political autonomy of bureaucracies. The variable ranges from 0 to 4, where higher values indicate better bureaucratic quality. The second indicator, corruption, assesses the extent of corruption faced by foreign investors in the form of bribes or illegal payments made by them to government officials. While the indicator does not refer to corruption that is directly relevant to health outcomes, it is useful to the extent that it is indicative of corruption in the public sector (Gupta et al. 2000). The corruption variable ranges from 0 to 6, where higher values indicate lower levels of corruption. The third indicator, rule of law, assesses the strength and impartiality of the legal system and observance of the law. The variable ranges from 0 to 6, where higher values indicate a stronger rule of law. For all three indicators, higher values indicate better governance.

High bureaucratic quality, low levels of corruption, and a strong rule of law collectively capture good governance. I use the factor-analysis method to measure this latent concept. The factor loadings of each of the governance indicators are above 0.7, which suggests that the three components

constitute a cohesive cluster of good governance. The variable "good governance" ranges from −2.21 to 2.05, where higher values indicate better governance. I reconstructed the governance variable so that it ranges from 0.22 to 4.55 in order to make the findings easy to interpret.

The other independent variable of interest is *political regime*. Since the theory section discusses the impact of political regime in terms of democracies versus nondemocracies, a binary conceptualization of the variable is most appropriate. I measure political regime with a dummy variable, where a value of 1 indicates democratic regimes and a 0 is indicative of nondemocratic regimes. The data come from the DD (Democracy Dictatorship) data set (Cheibub et al. 2010). The control variables included in the models are economic development, population density, urban population, region dummies, and ethnic heterogeneity.[15] Based on the availability of data, the time period of analysis in this chapter ranges from 1984 to 2008.

Since the primary variable of interest, governance, does not vary over time for a large number of countries, a fixed-effects estimation technique is not used (Beck 2001; Beck and Katz 2001). Moreover, this chapter argues that political regimes that govern better are associated with higher levels of human well-being. Thus, the chapter assesses the impact of governance and political regimes on human well-being between countries and not within countries, which makes a random-effects technique more appropriate than a fixed-effects technique. However, one of the primary drawbacks associated with a random-effects technique is that one cannot account for unobserved country-specific features. To mitigate this problem, regional dummies are included to address the problem of regional heterogeneity, as mentioned earlier. The independent variables were all lagged by 1 year to address the possibility of reverse causality.

Table 3.1 presents the findings assessing the relationship between good governance and human well-being. Models 1–4 analyze the independent effect of good governance on infant mortality, child mortality, education enrollment, and the human development index (HDI), respectively. The coefficient for good governance in models 1 and 2 are negative and statistically significant, indicating that a higher level of governance is associated with lower levels of infant and child mortality, respectively, in a global sample of countries. The coefficient is positive and significant in models 3 and 4, indicating that a higher level of governance is associated with higher levels of education enrollment and human development. This provides support to hypothesis *H3.1a*. Good governance is collectively indicative of a better governing environment with a high bureaucratic quality,

Table 3.1 Governance, regime type, and human well-being

Variables	*Model (1)*	*Model (2)*	*Model (3)*	*Model (4)*	*Model (5)*	*Model (6)*	*Model (7)*	*Model (8)*
	Infant mortality	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*	*Infant mortality*	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*
Governance	−0.180***	−0.176***	1.614***	0.0522***	−0.113***	−0.119***	0.391	0.0467***
	(0.0110)	(0.0128)	(0.601)	(0.0018)	(0.0120)	(0.0118)	(0.594)	(0.0036)
Democracy	−0.140***	−0.135***	5.069***	0.0233***	0.112*	0.0807	0.877	0.0050
	(0.0171)	(0.0179)	(0.703)	(0.0034)	(0.0641)	(0.0638)	(1.464)	(0.0136)
Governance*democracy (interaction term)					−0.107***	−0.0916***	1.788***	0.0077*
					(0.0192)	(0.0192)	(0.474)	(0.0045)
GDP per capita	−0.378***	−0.394***	3.531***		−0.372***	−0.389***	3.430***	
	(0.0132)	(0.0146)	(0.496)		(0.0137)	(0.0151)	(0.512)	
Population density	−0.0724***	−0.0746***	−0.501	0.0054***	−0.0757***	−0.0774***	−0.460	0.0056***
	(0.0044)	(0.0049)	(0.310)	(0.0006)	(0.0049)	(0.0053)	(0.314)	(0.0007)
Urban population	−0.0042***	−0.0048***	0.212***	0.0031***	−0.0044***	−0.0049***	0.213***	0.0031***
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0181)	(4.67e−05)	(0.0004)	(0.0005)	(0.0186)	(4.02e−05)
Africa	0.240***	0.498***	−11.81***	−0.192***	0.252***	0.507***	−12.23***	−0.193***
	(0.0506)	(0.0615)	(1.128)	(0.0046)	(0.0539)	(0.0645)	(1.259)	(0.0041)
Asia	−0.126***	−0.0989***	−4.168***	−0.0442***	−0.153***	−0.122***	−3.910***	−0.0429***
	(0.0280)	(0.0300)	(0.824)	(0.0020)	(0.0322)	(0.0335)	(0.802)	(0.0023)
Latin America	0.0565	0.0550	−1.226	−0.0076	0.0345	0.0363	−0.923	−0.0061
	(0.0408)	(0.0457)	(0.812)	(0.0048)	(0.0472)	(0.0512)	(0.842)	(0.0057)
Ethnic heterogeneity	0.430***	0.406***	−0.239	0.0186***	0.395***	0.376***	0.185	0.0203***
	(0.0263)	(0.0302)	(1.273)	(0.0042)	(0.0270)	(0.0312)	(1.214)	(0.0043)
Constant	6.974***	7.341***	26.02***	0.349***	6.829***	7.217***	29.00***	0.360***
	(0.0936)	(0.117)	(4.566)	(0.0114)	(0.0948)	(0.116)	(5.033)	(0.0080)
Observations	3003	3003	2540	2578	3003	3003	2540	2578
Number of countries	133	133	112	112	133	133	112	112
R-squared	0.885	0.896	0.688	0.873	0.886	0.897	0.689	0.873

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.1$

a lower level of corruption, and a stronger rule of law, which facilitate an effective implementation of welfare policies, reduced rent-seeking behavior, and greater accountability of government officials, and the findings corroborate this theoretical proposition.

The effect of good governance within democratic regimes is analyzed in model 1 by changing the governance variable from its minimum to its maximum value while holding the political regime variable at 1, indicating a democratic regime, and holding all other independent variables at their mean values while setting regional dummies at 0. Going from poor governance to good governance within democracies reduces infant mortality by almost 54%. Not all democracies perform equally well, and democracies that govern better produce beneficial outcomes for their citizens. Similarly, holding the political regime variable at 0, indicating a nondemocratic regime, the effect of good governance within nondemocratic regimes is also associated with an approximate 54% reduction in infant mortality. This suggests that the variation in infant mortality among nondemocracies could possibly be attributed to governance as well. Despite the relative absence of accountability and responsiveness in these regimes, some nondemocratic regimes do govern better, thereby enhancing societal welfare. The percentage reduction in child mortality as countries move from poor governance to good governance is approximately 53% within democracies and nondemocracies. In the case of educational enrollment, the percentage increase in enrollment as countries move from poor to good governance is approximately 10% within democracies and nondemocracies. Lastly, the percentage increase in human development is about 38% among democracies and nondemocracies as countries move from a poor governing environment to a good governance environment. These findings lend support to hypothesis *H3.1b*, which states that democracies and nondemocracies perform better under good governance than their counterparts that do not govern as well (Fig. 3.2).

In Table 3.1, models 4 through 8 present interaction effects between governance and regime type. The governance coefficients in all four models show the effect of governance on well-being outcomes among nondemocratic regimes (i.e., when the political regime variable is set at 0). The coefficient is negative and statistically significant in models 5, 6, and 8, indicating that better governance (good governance) is associated with lower levels of infant and child mortality and higher levels of human development among nondemocracies. The variable fails to reach statistical levels of significance for education enrollment (model 7). The political regime



Fig. 3.2 Effect of governance and political regime on infant mortality

coefficient shows the effect of regime type on human well-being outcomes under conditions of poor governance (i.e., when the governance variable is set at its lowest value). The coefficient here is insignificant in models 6–8, indicating that statistically there is no difference in the performance of the two regimes when governance is poor. The political regime variable in subsequent analyses also remains insignificant in the majority of models. This suggests that whether or not democracies are associated with better health outcomes than nondemocracies under conditions of poor governance is unclear.

However, is there a difference between democratic and nondemocratic regimes under good governance? The effect of good governance among political regimes can be interpreted from the interaction variable, which is negative and statistically significant in models 5 and 6 and positive and significant in models 7 and 8. Figure 3.2 graphically illustrates the interaction effect, which shows the effect of regime type on infant mortality at various levels of governance. The x-axis shows the range of governance values (from 0 to 4.55), where higher values indicate better governance. The y-axis shows the marginal coefficients of political regime on infant mortality. The figure illustrates that at low levels of governance, the effect

of democracies on infant mortality is statistically indistinguishable from that of nondemocracies, but as governance improves, democracies seem to perform better and are associated with lower levels of infant mortality than nondemocracies. The interaction variable is statistically significant in models 5–8. Overall, good governance seems to play an important role in enhancing well-being outcomes within democracies. Hypothesis *3.1c* argues that democracies perform better than nondemocracies under conditions of good governance. Democratic leaders have electoral constraints that are more likely to motivate better performance by political representatives compared to nondemocratic leaders who do not face the same electoral incentives to perform well. The evidence here provides some support to this hypothesis.

Among the control variables, higher levels of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, population density, and larger urban populations are associated with lower levels of infant and child mortality and higher levels of human development. The effect of population density on education enrollment, however, remains insignificant. Overall, these controls perform as expected. Higher levels of ethnic heterogeneity are associated with higher levels of infant and child mortality as well as high levels of human development while it has no statistically significant effect on education enrollment. The effect of ethnic heterogeneity on human well-being overall seems unclear because it seems to hurt health outcomes (infant and child mortality) but enhance human development overall. It is plausible that the effect of ethnic diversity is difficult to decipher on the overall HDI since it incorporates different aspects of development. With regard to regional dummies, Asia performs better in health outcomes such as infant and child mortality compared to the other regions, while Africa performs poorly in health outcomes as well as human development. However, Asia does not perform well in the case of educational enrollment and human development. The Latin American dummy continues to be statistically insignificant in a majority of the models. These regional dummies capture regional differences such that the findings emphasize variation in human well-being dynamics across regions.

Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 present the findings by disaggregating governance and assessing the effect of individual governance indicators. While it is important to conceptualize governance as a holistic concept and analyze its effects collectively, disaggregating the governance indicators enables one to analyze their effects individually as well. All three governance indicators are statistically significant in the majority of

Table 3.2 Bureaucracy, regime type, and human well-being

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6*	*Model 7*	*Model 8*
	Infant mortality	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*	*Infant mortality*	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*
Bureaucracy	−0.0849***	−0.0848***	1.847***	0.0404***	−0.0218	−0.0285**	0.415	0.0292***
	(0.0097)	(0.0082)	(0.526)	(0.0023)	(0.0143)	(0.0118)	(0.356)	(0.0039)
Democracy	−0.162***	−0.156***	4.905***	0.0258***	0.0596	0.0418	0.300	−0.0080
	(0.0121)	(0.0133)	(0.563)	(0.0017)	(0.0411)	(0.0413)	(1.162)	(0.0067)
Bureaucracy* democracy (interaction term)					−0.112***	−0.100***	2.331***	0.0170***
					(0.0152)	(0.0149)	(0.461)	(0.0033)
GDP per capita	−0.407***	−0.421***	3.174***		−0.396***	−0.411***	2.935***	
	(0.0134)	(0.0149)	(0.557)		(0.0123)	(0.0139)	(0.577)	
Population density	−0.0674***	−0.0697***	−0.580*	0.0024***	−0.0688***	−0.0710***	−0.565*	0.0025***
	(0.0039)	(0.0044)	(0.303)	(0.0005)	(0.0045)	(0.0050)	(0.314)	(0.0006)
Urban population	−0.0042***	−0.00485***	0.218***	0.0031***	−0.0047***	−0.0052***	0.220***	0.0031***
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0168)	(5.18e−05)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0174)	(4.56e−05)
Africa	0.231***	0.489***	−12.17***	−0.197***	0.236***	0.494***	−12.81***	−0.200***
	(0.0577)	(0.0683)	(1.156)	(0.0034)	(0.0620)	(0.0722)	(1.343)	(0.00369)
Asia	−0.110***	−0.0823**	−4.877***	−0.0575***	−0.141***	−0.110***	−4.625***	−0.0546***
	(0.0321)	(0.0333)	(1.024)	(0.0009)	(0.0335)	(0.0345)	(0.965)	(0.0011)
Latin America	0.120***	0.116**	−1.492*	−0.0227***	0.0944*	0.0938*	−1.039	−0.0185***
	(0.0414)	(0.0456)	(0.870)	(0.0046)	(0.0485)	(0.0520)	(0.887)	(0.0055)
Ethnic heterogeneity	0.487***	0.461***	−0.331	0.0071***	0.452***	0.431***	0.126	0.0104***
	(0.0326)	(0.0371)	(1.130)	(0.0023)	(0.0335)	(0.0381)	(1.016)	(0.0022)
Constant	6.884***	7.249***	29.24***	0.413***	6.750***	7.129***	33.09***	0.432***
	(0.109)	(0.130)	(5.292)	(0.0059)	(0.100)	(0.123)	(5.872)	(0.0063)
Observations	3003	3003	2540	2578	3003	3003	2540	2578
Number of countries	133	133	112	112	133	133	112	112
R-squared	0.877	0.890	0.690	0.869	0.880	0.892	0.694	0.871

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$

Table 3.3 Corruption, regime type, and human well-being

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6*	*Model 7*	*Model 8*
	Infant mortality	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*	*Infant mortality*	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*
Corruption	−0.0628***	−0.0586***	−0.152	0.0193***	−0.0164***	−0.0175**	−0.405	0.0160***
	(0.0085)	(0.0100)	(0.362)	(0.0017)	(0.0054)	(0.0072)	(0.420)	(0.0014)
Democracy	−0.160***	−0.156***	5.794***	0.0377***	0.0505	0.0305	4.746***	0.0237**
	(0.0186)	(0.0190)	(0.713)	(0.0036)	(0.0581)	(0.0542)	(0.747)	(0.0095)
Corruption*democracy (interaction term)					−0.0746***	−0.0661***	0.377*	0.0049**
					(0.0121)	(0.0110)	(0.199)	(0.0022)
GDP per capita	−0.435***	−0.450***	4.313***		−0.431***	−0.447***	4.291***	
	(0.0096)	(0.0116)	(0.330)		(0.0098)	(0.0118)	(0.335)	
Population density	−0.0715***	−0.0735***	−0.658**	0.0047***	−0.0746***	−0.0762***	−0.648**	0.0049***
	(0.0041)	(0.0046)	(0.314)	(0.0005)	(0.0044)	(0.0049)	(0.312)	(0.0005)
Urban population	−0.0036***	−0.0042***	0.203***	0.0035***	−0.0035***	−0.0041***	0.203***	0.0035***
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0163)	(5.75e−05)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0163)	(5.22e−05)
Africa	0.221***	0.478***	−11.48***	−0.202***	0.227***	0.483***	−11.55***	−0.203***
	(0.0604)	(0.0717)	(1.227)	(0.0084)	(0.0631)	(0.0742)	(1.254)	(0.0083)
Asia	−0.155***	−0.127***	−3.945***	−0.0431***	−0.177***	−0.147***	−3.870***	−0.0421***
	(0.0297)	(0.0323)	(0.795)	(0.0023)	(0.0344)	(0.0362)	(0.783)	(0.0026)
Latin America	0.112**	0.111**	−2.229***	−0.0384***	0.0932*	0.0942*	−2.151**	−0.0372***
	(0.0449)	(0.0484)	(0.838)	(0.0053)	(0.0500)	(0.0528)	(0.829)	(0.0058)
Ethnic heterogeneity	0.472***	0.449***	−1.152	0.0006	0.440***	0.421***	−1.027	0.0022
	(0.0297)	(0.0343)	(1.228)	(0.0045)	(0.0303)	(0.0349)	(1.184)	(0.0045)
Constant	7.108***	7.471***	25.57***	0.405***	6.987***	7.364***	26.31***	0.413***
	(0.108)	(0.134)	(4.574)	(0.0176)	(0.103)	(0.129)	(4.806)	(0.0157)
Observations	3003	3003	2540	2578	3003	3003	2540	2578
Number of countries	133	133	112	112	133	133	112	112
R-squared	0.878	0.891	0.685	0.844	0.880	0.892	0.686	0.844

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$

Table 3.4 Rule of law, regime type, and human well-being

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6*	*Model 7*	*Model 8*
	Infant mortality	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*	*Infant mortality*	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*
Rule of law	−0.120***	−0.120***	1.320***	0.0317***	−0.0890***	−0.0921***	0.650**	0.0243***
	(0.0072)	(0.0080)	(0.260)	(0.0013)	(0.0088)	(0.0101)	(0.303)	(0.0018)
Democracy	−0.182***	−0.176***	5.422***	0.0385***	0.0440	0.0260	1.093	−0.0066
	(0.0222)	(0.0224)	(0.711)	(0.0050)	(0.0371)	(0.0415)	(1.608)	(0.0116)
Rule of law*democracy (interaction term)					−0.0632***	−0.0565***	1.193***	0.0123***
					(0.0070)	(0.0085)	(0.309)	(0.0022)
GDP per capita	−0.390***	−0.404***	3.478***		−0.379***	−0.394***	3.292***	
	(0.0090)	(0.0098)	(0.410)		(0.0097)	(0.0103)	(0.436)	
Population density	−0.0689***	−0.0712***	−0.510	0.0041***	−0.0729***	−0.0748***	−0.424	0.0050***
	(0.0046)	(0.0051)	(0.328)	(0.0008)	(0.0050)	(0.0054)	(0.335)	(0.0009)
Urban population	−0.0041***	−0.0047***	0.214***	0.0033***	−0.0044***	−0.0049***	0.219***	0.0032***
	(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0192)	(6.44e−05)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0207)	(5.80e−05)
Africa	0.194***	0.453***	−11.35***	−0.183***	0.214***	0.470***	−11.84***	−0.186***
	(0.0478)	(0.0590)	(0.998)	(0.0051)	(0.0500)	(0.0611)	(1.081)	(0.0051)
Asia	−0.167***	−0.139***	−3.832***	−0.0367***	−0.183***	−0.154***	−3.620***	−0.0338***
	(0.0294)	(0.0322)	(0.755)	(0.0018)	(0.0308)	(0.0333)	(0.764)	(0.0024)
Latin America	0.0299	0.0268	−0.648	−0.0056*	0.0042	0.0039	−0.204	−5.54e−05
	(0.0321)	(0.0368)	(0.887)	(0.0030)	(0.0327)	(0.0373)	(0.913)	(0.0039)
Ethnic heterogeneity	0.439***	0.413***	−0.143	0.0128**	0.403***	0.382***	0.397	0.0181***
	(0.0270)	(0.0309)	(1.350)	(0.0052)	(0.0282)	(0.0325)	(1.365)	(0.0048)
Constant	7.073***	7.438***	25.05***	0.349***	6.937***	7.317***	27.88***	0.369***
	(0.0654)	(0.0874)	(4.179)	(0.0113)	(0.0715)	(0.0930)	(4.265)	(0.0115)
Observations	3003	3003	2540	2578	3003	3003	2540	2578
Number of countries	133	133	112	112	133	133	112	112
R-squared	0.888	0.899	0.690	0.867	0.889	0.900	0.691	0.869

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$

noninteraction models. This underscores the positive effects of governance from Table 3.1. Higher bureaucratic quality, lower levels of corruption, and a stronger rule of law are associated with lower levels of infant and child mortality and higher levels of education enrollment and human development. The substantive effects of the three governance indicators are calculated from model 1 in Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4, where the values of the governance indicators were changed from their minimum to maximum values, while all other variables were set to their mean values and all dummy variables were set to 0. High bureaucratic quality, low levels of corruption, and a strong rule of law are associated with a 28, 32, and 51% reduction in infant mortality, respectively. Rule of law seems to have the strongest substantive effect compared to bureaucratic quality and corruption. Rule of law ensures that existing laws will be equally applicable to all individuals, and this may in turn influence how government officials (both elected officials and bureaucrats) exercise their authority; government officials may be more likely to perform their tasks diligently and effectively and less likely to indulge in corrupt activities owing to the presence of a strong rule of law. Without the presence of a strong rule of law, officials might tend to use their authority and advance their own personal interests since the accountability mechanism is likely to be weaker in such countries. Models 5–8 include interaction models of each of the three individual governance indicators, namely, bureaucratic quality, corruption, and rule of law. The regime-type variable in the interaction models again performs inconsistently, indicating that no definitive conclusions can be drawn about the performance of the two regimes when governance is poor. The interaction terms are statistically significant in the majority of models, suggesting that democracies under good governance may perform better than nondemocracies.

Furthermore, the baseline models (Table 3.1) were reassessed using an additive index of governance instead of a factor analysis method, and the results are presented in Table 3.5. The findings remain largely consistent with the findings discussed earlier. Good governance is associated with better human well-being outcomes overall, with the exception of model 7, which has education enrollment as the dependent variable. Most of the interaction terms are significant, except the interaction term in model 8, with the HDI as the dependent variable. A series of robustness tests was also carried out, and the results are included in the appendix. All the models from Tables 3.1 through 3.5 were analyzed with time dummies, and Appendix A and Tables A 3.6 to A 3.10 present the findings. Overall, the

Table 3.5 Governance, regime type, and human well-being (additive measure of governance)

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6*	*Model 7*	*Model 8*
	Infant mortality	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*	*Infant mortality*	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*
Governance	−0.0516***	−0.0505***	0.445***	0.0147***	−0.0335***	−0.0350***	0.114	0.0132***
	(0.0031)	(0.0036)	(0.165)	(0.0005)	(0.0033)	(0.0034)	(0.167)	(0.0009)
Democracy	−0.141***	−0.136***	5.096***	0.0240***	0.101	0.0704	1.082	0.0068
	(0.0177)	(0.0184)	(0.707)	(0.0036)	(0.0640)	(0.0639)	(1.462)	(0.0138)
Governance*democracy (interaction term)					−0.0290***	−0.0247***	0.483***	0.0020
					(0.0054)	(0.0054)	(0.132)	(0.0012)
GDP per capita	−0.379***	−0.394***	3.558***		−0.373***	−0.389***	3.462***	
	(0.0130)	(0.0144)	(0.485)		(0.0136)	(0.0149)	(0.501)	
Population density	−0.0726***	−0.0748***	−0.500	0.0055***	−0.0759***	−0.0776***	−0.458	0.0057***
	(0.0044)	(0.0049)	(0.312)	(0.0006)	(0.0049)	(0.0053)	(0.316)	(0.0007)
Urban population	−0.0042***	−0.0047***	0.212***	0.0031***	−0.0043***	−0.0049***	0.212***	0.0031***
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0181)	(4.65e−05)	(0.0004)	(0.0005)	(0.0187)	(4.00e−05)
Africa	0.238***	0.495***	−11.77***	−0.191***	0.250***	0.505***	−12.19***	−0.192***
	(0.0502)	(0.0612)	(1.120)	(0.0048)	(0.0533)	(0.0640)	(1.244)	(0.0043)
Asia	−0.130***	−0.103***	−4.123***	−0.0430***	−0.155***	−0.124***	−3.877***	−0.0418***
	(0.0279)	(0.0300)	(0.809)	(0.0021)	(0.0321)	(0.0335)	(0.791)	(0.0024)
Latin America	0.0518	0.0505	−1.214	−0.0070	0.0306	0.0325	−0.924	−0.0056
	(0.0405)	(0.0453)	(0.820)	(0.0048)	(0.0465)	(0.0505)	(0.849)	(0.0057)
Ethnic heterogeneity	0.427***	0.403***	−0.247	0.0188***	0.393***	0.374***	0.168	0.0204***
	(0.0259)	(0.0297)	(1.288)	(0.0045)	(0.0267)	(0.0309)	(1.234)	(0.0046)
Constant	6.985***	7.352***	25.89***	0.348***	6.845***	7.233***	28.74***	0.358***
	(0.0918)	(0.115)	(4.537)	(0.0119)	(0.0934)	(0.115)	(4.966)	(0.0084)
Observations	3003	3003	2540	2578	3003	3003	2540	2578
Number of countries	133	133	112	112	133	133	112	112
R-squared	0.885	0.896	0.688	0.872	0.887	0.897	0.689	0.872

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***$p < 0.01$

primary finding remains the same. Good governance is associated with higher levels of human well-being overall. Some of the governance variables do not reach statistical levels of significance for education enrollment, and the interaction variables for HDI are also insignificant in some of the models. This is consistent with the findings discussed earlier and may suggest that the effect of governance is especially robust in the case of health outcomes. The democracy variable in the interaction models, which captures regime type, is significant in some of the models and insignificant in others, suggesting that the effect of regime type under conditions of poor governance remains unclear.

Conclusion

The way government officials use existing authority in pursuit of welfare objectives plays an important role for their citizens. While the bulk of the literature focuses on the role of political regimes, there is a need to analyze the way those in power use authority to promote or hinder social welfare, regardless of regime type. Good governance can be prevalent in both democratic and nondemocratic regimes and can play an important role in enhancing human well-being outcomes globally. This indicates that while regime type certainly plays an important role in predicting the performance of governments, the role of governance must be taken into account as well. Elections within democratic regimes can enhance the accountability and responsiveness of government officials; however, good governance can exist in nondemocratic regimes as well. The two concepts, regime type and governance, must be considered independently.

The findings indicate that while democracies do have an advantage over nondemocracies under conditions of good governance, there is no statistical difference between regimes under conditions of poor governance. Thus, a democratic regime with poor governance may have no potential advantage for its citizens compared to a nondemocratic regime with poor governance. This underscores the need to think of regime type and governance separately. Disaggregating the governance indicators, namely, quality of bureaucracy, corruption, and rule of law, the analysis reveals that rule of law has the strongest substantive effect on well-being outcomes compared to bureaucratic quality and corruption. Furthermore, the effect of governance is particularly pronounced on health outcomes compared to the other indicators of human well-being under study.

Notes

1. Indeed this is by no means an exhaustive list of governance definitions. However, these definitions are most commonly used in the literature.
2. I use the "polity2" variable from the Polity IV data set to classify democracies and nondemocracies (Marshall et al. 2014). The variable ranges from −10 to +10, where higher values indicate higher levels of democracy. All countries with a polity2 score greater than 0 are classified as democracies; countries with a polity2 score of less than or equal to 0 are classified as nondemocracies.
3. The variable "governance" is discussed in detail in the empirical analysis section that follows.
4. See Roth and Wittich (1968) for a detailed overview of all the characteristics of Weber's bureaucracy. Weber's description of bureaucracy can be applied to both public and private spheres, but this chapter primarily refers to public bureaucracy. The term *bureaucracy* is often used in a pejorative light referring to the presence of red tape, rigidity, and centralized government, among others (Beck 1932; Mises 1944). However, here, the term is not used in a negative connotation and primarily refers to public officials who are involved in the formulation and implementation of government policies.
5. It is indeed difficult to segregate the role of political representatives versus the bureaucracy in enhancing human well-being because both sets of actors play an important role in this regard.
6. In the education sector as well, bribes may be extracted for getting children admitted into schools. For instance, in China, illegally collected fees mounted to nearly $2 million in the southern province of Jiangxi (UNDP 2008).
7. Even in the arena of education, in spite of an increase in budget allocations for primary education between 1991 and 1995 in Uganda, district education authorities siphoned off a considerable amount of funds, such that schools did not receive the entire allocated amounts (Reinikka 1999).
8. The debate between a narrow versus a broader conceptualization is not just characteristic of "rule of law" or "governance" more generally but has been a point of contention for other concepts such as "democracy" as well.
9. O'Donnell (2004) discusses other forms of violation of the rule of law as well. This paper focuses on the forms of violation that are relevant to human well-being.
10. Chapter 1 discusses these theoretical perspectives in detail.
11. In some countries, however, bureaucracies do play a larger role, which may entail policy formulation as well.
12. A parallel can be drawn between good governance and Robert Dahl's (1971) conception of polyarchy or democracy, according to which no country could be considered an ideal democracy.

13. Eventually the two ministries were merged into Health, Labor, and Welfare (MOHLW).
14. ICRG labels "rule of law" as "law and order" in its data set. However, in keeping with the existing literature, the term "rule of law" is used in this chapter.
15. Please see Chap. 2 for data sources for all control variables.

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PART II

International Determinants

CHAPTER 4

Globalization

While domestic factors undeniably play an important role in influencing human lives, the role of international factors cannot be overlooked. The increasing interconnectedness and interactions between countries is bound to impact the quality of life across national sovereign borders such that developments in one part of the globe may have repercussions in other places, transcending national boundaries. This chapter focuses on one of the most pervasive international phenomena today, globalization. Globalization is a prominent international development that encompasses numerous countries with far-reaching consequences. Naim (2009, 28) asserts that "Globalization is such a diverse, broad-based, and potent force … Love it or hate it, globalization is here to stay." This speaks to the irreversibility of globalization. While there has been considerable research on globalization, there is little agreement among scholars about its meaning. Easton (2003, 2) captures this lack of consensus when he states, "The definition of globalization is problematic. Many writers avoid defining it analytically, instead characterizing it by a series of particular phenomena such as increasing trade, or capital flows, or logos, or international inequality, or to particular international institutions such as the World Trade Organization or the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank or the European Union, or multinational corporations, or to particular policies such as free trade, liberalized capital movements, and so on." While this does demonstrate the existing disagreement about its meaning, it also reveals that scholars emphasize different aspects of globalization given its multidimensional nature.

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To capture the essence of globalization, this chapter adopts a broader conceptualization by referring to diverse processes, including greater mobility of capital, goods, and services, the diffusion of ideas and norms, faster and easier modes of communication and transport, and greater political interactions among states. Globalization is a multidimensional concept that has economic, social, cultural, political, and environmental dimensions, among others (Keohane and Nye 2000; Leidner 2010; Martens et al. 2010). To do justice to globalization's multifaceted nature and still obtain analytic tractability, I aggregate these various components into three general aspects of globalization: economic, social, and political. Economic globalization refers to increased flows of capital, goods, and services across international boundaries. Social globalization refers to the spread of ideas, norms, and cultures across borders as well as greater informal interactions among states through international tourism, media, and other forms of information exchange. Lastly, political globalization refers to the extent of involvement of states with the international community by joining international organizations, participating in UN missions, entering into international treaties, and establishing embassies in foreign countries.

Whether globalization is a positive or negative force in the world has long been a major point of contention among scholars. Critics argue that globalization leads to long-run economic stagnation (Frank 1967; Chase-Dunn 1975), greater vulnerability to economic shocks (Stallings 1992), diminished sovereignty (Stallings 1992; Mahon 1996), and higher income inequality (Williamson 1997; Wade 2003; Milanovic 2005). Critics further argue that globalization is a threat to social identity (Appadurai 1998) and increases the spread of infectious diseases like HIV (Kawachi and Wamala 2007).

Moreover, institutions propagating greater openness, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, are criticized for magnifying the debt problems of the developing world (Payer 1991) and exacerbating internationally induced recessions (Stiglitz 2002). These are just some of the prominent criticisms leveled against globalization.

Optimists, on the other hand, argue that, despite its many flaws, globalization nonetheless leads to long-run prosperity (Collier and Dollar 2002; Bhagwati 2004; Wolf 2004) as well as a more equitable income distribution among countries (Dollar 2005; Dollar and Kraay 2002). Globalization has also led to the emergence of transnational networks, such as the Third World Network (TWN), that draw attention to the concerns of developing countries in international forums (Caouette 2006). From an information

perspective, the transmission of medical knowledge across national boundaries creates awareness about ways and means to enhance health conditions (Deaton 2004). Finally, international organizations, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations (UN), and its subsidiary organizational bodies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), are important global actors seeking to enhance the well-being of citizens across the globe.

This chapter attempts to bring some clarity to this contentious debate by assessing the effect of globalization on human well-being. Additionally, since it assesses the effect of three different dimensions of globalization, namely economic, social, and political, it is able to identify which of these has the strongest substantive effect on human well-being. I argue that while globalization has many negative effects, as mentioned earlier and elaborated upon in what follows, on balance the powerful positive effects dominate and enhance human well-being as countries become more and more deeply incorporated into the global system. In this sense, the argument proposed here is closest to that of prominent skeptics such as Stiglitz, who may be extremely critical of globalization but ultimately conclude that "Because of globalization, many people in the world now live longer than before and their standard of living is far better" (2002, 4).

Globalization: Inception and Phases

While most scholars agree that globalization is not a recent phenomenon, there is little consensus about its inception. Some trace globalization to the 1500s. A proponent of this view, Frank (1998, 52), states, "There was a single global world economy with a worldwide division of labor and multilateral trade from 1500 onward." Reiterating the same view, Frank and Gills (1993, 3) point out that "the existence of the same world system in which we live stretches back at least 5000 years." Similarly, Flynn and Giraldez (2004) contend that globalization can be traced to 1571 when Manila was founded to establish links between America and other continents. Held et al. (1999) argue that globalization can be traced to the migration of people across borders, especially going back to the sixteenth century, when Europeans crossed borders to colonize other countries, followed by the migration of slaves from Africa and the subsequent move of Europeans to America. Alternatively, some hold that globalization came about later. O'Rourke and Williamson (2000) argue that globalization can

be traced to the nineteenth century when actual commodity price convergence started to occur. Proposing a similar perspective, Findlay and O'Rourke (2003) posit that, while trade between continents gradually increased from 1500 to 1800, only in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries does price convergence take place. Overall, scholars attribute the inception of globalization to different time periods.

Despite disagreements about the beginning of globalization, there is some consensus among scholars that the current wave of globalization is distinct from previous waves. Bordo et al. (1999, 49) assert that "facile comparisons with the late nineteenth century notwithstanding, the international integration of capital and commercial markets goes further and runs deeper than ever before," possibly because economies are commercially and financially far more integrated today than ever before. These scholars emphasize that the extent of globalization in current times is greater compared to globalization at its inception. Providing an alternative explanation, Baldwin and Martin (1999) distinguish between two periods of globalization: 1820–1914 and 1960–present. While globalization during the former took place when countries were poor, the second wave unfolded in an era between rich and poor countries. The distinction here is between the economic status of countries that were involved in globalization in the past versus globalization today. Garrett (2000) provides yet another explanation by arguing that between 1870 and 1914, while world trade grew in raw materials as the industrial revolution reduced transportation costs, today, trade extends to manufacturing as well as services. Similarly, while capital lending initially was restricted to the extraction and transportation of raw materials, today capital lending encompasses various stages in production. Globalization, according to this view, entails trade in different types of commodities over time.

Temin (1999) argues that three distinct periods of globalization can be identified: before World War I, between the First and Second World Wars, and the postwar period. The first period of globalization was facilitated by lower costs of shipping, which led to comparable prices of traded commodities. While the period between the world wars was characterized by an ebbing trend in globalization, the postwar period is different from the preceding years of globalization and is characterized by reductions in trade barriers, reciprocal regional trade agreements to facilitate free trade, reducing transport costs, and greater capital flows and migration between countries. Each phase of globalization over the years has been characterized by distinct attributes, where unique trends can be identified in each of the three phases.

Bhagwati (2004) notes that the initial period of globalization (in the 1800s) was driven by improvements in technology, transportation, and communication, while globalization today is driven more by policy changes initiated by governments. This view emphasizes that governments have come to play an especially important role in globalization today compared to the past. Collier and Dollar (2002) identify three waves of globalization, which is conceptualized in terms of economic integration through trade, migration, and capital flows. The first wave can be traced to 1870, when these flows grew in magnitude; the second wave, from 1914 to 1980, witnessed greater trade barriers that hindered globalization. The year 1980 marks the era of a new, third phase of globalization when developing countries started entering global markets and participating in the manufacture of goods and services. While previously the developing countries produced primary commodities only, today they compete with the developed world. The first two phases of globalization differ in the extent of globalization, while the third phase is different primarily due to the greater participation of developing countries where they can compete with the developed world.

From a different perspective, Pries (2005) distinguishes between internationalization (referring to interstate interactions) versus globalization (referring to a more recent process in which states are embedded in a worldwide nexus of increased interactions, communications, and transactions). Here the term globalization is primarily used to describe the current phenomenon, which is different from previous interactions among countries. Even though these scholars emphasize different features in the nature of globalization over time, they agree that the recent period differs markedly from earlier periods for a variety of reasons. Given the consensus among scholars that the recent trend of globalization is indeed distinct from previous phases of globalization, I focus the theoretical and empirical analysis here on the recent wave of globalization rather than earlier historical periods. This approach will help us better understand the consequences of current trends in globalization for human well-being outcomes.

Figure 4.1 displays large variations in the overall globalization index, economic globalization, social globalization, and political globalization from 1970 to 2012 on a global sample of countries.[1] Each of these dimensions ranges from 1 to 100, where higher numbers indicate higher levels of globalization. The overall globalization index ranges from 11.3 to 92.3, with mean and median scores of 45 and 42, respectively. Economic globalization ranges from 8.4 to 99, with mean and median scores of 50 and 49,



Fig. 4.1 Variation in globalization: different dimensions.
Note: The boxes represent the middle range of the data, also known as the interquartile range. The vertical lines on the bottom and the top of the boxes represent the data in the first and fourth quartiles, respectively, and the dots represent outliers. The lines across the three boxes show the median globalization scores across the four dimensions of globalization

respectively. Social globalization ranges from 2.63 and 93.54, with mean and median scores of 41 and 39, respectively. Lastly, political globalization ranges from 1 to 98, with mean and median scores of 47 and 46, respectively. The figure indicates that the mean and median scores are highest for economic globalization compared to social and political globalization, suggesting that countries are most globalized economically rather than socially and politically.

Globalization and Human Well-Being

Most studies on globalization assess its effect primarily on per-capita GDP. Early tests of dependency theory, for instance, yielded conflicting findings as to whether globalization had a negative or positive effect on

changes in per-capita incomes (Chase-Dunn 1975; Kaufman et al. 1975). The literature on contemporary globalization has maintained this emphasis on per-capita GDP, with most economists arguing that globalization leads to higher incomes (e.g., Sachs and Warner 1995; Frankel and Romer 1999; Dreher 2006), although dissenters make a plausible case that globalization might damage income levels (e.g., Milanovic 2005; Reuveny and Thompson 2008).

Recently, the literature has taken a new turn with the growing realization that per-capita GDP is merely a means to an end. Sen (1999, 14) has been particularly forceful in arguing "an adequate conception of development must go much beyond the accumulation of wealth and the growth of gross national product and other income-related variables." Per-capita GDP is valuable not in itself but because it brings with it protection from famine and malnourishment as well as access to affordable housing, medicine, and education. The UNDP has long incorporated this perspective in its annual Human Development Reports, and political scientists now increasingly realize that development is a broader concept than GDP alone. This new emphasis has led to something of a revolution in recent studies, with emerging scholarship focusing on human well-being rather than per-capita GDP (Tsai 2007; Bergh and Nilsson 2010). While GDP per capita obviously correlates with human well-being, the two phenomena can be surprisingly divergent. In India, for example, the state of Kerala has an extremely low per-capita income of below $300, and yet human well-being is above world averages, with a life expectancy of 72 years, an infant mortality rate of 13 per thousand, and illiteracy of only 9% (Kenny 2005). This chapter adopts an expansive view of development to assess the effect of globalization on human well-being. Given that globalization is multifaceted, it should be no surprise that it affects human well-being through a wide variety of mechanisms.

Economic Globalization

Economic globalization refers to increased flows of capital, goods, and services across international boundaries. Dependency theory provided a powerful critique of economic globalization in the 1970s, arguing that international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) was impoverishing the developing world, causing substantial inequality and undermining democratic governance.[2] Dependency theorists such as Frank (1967) criticized the effect of an earlier period of globalization, arguing that

advanced countries extract resources from developing countries and condemn them to long-run stagnation.[3] A more influential version of dependency theory concedes that growth can occur under globalization but argues that such development takes an inequitable form. Evans (1979), for instance, argued that FDI leads to economic growth but that an alliance between the state and international capital will exclude the mass of the population, resulting in greater inequality and poverty. This is likely to adversely affect well-being outcomes. The neoliberal movement of the 1980s articulated the counterthesis, namely that free markets are the fundamental basis of human prosperity.[4] While neoliberalism emphasizes the virtues of markets in general, pride of place is given to economic globalization, particularly free international trade and liberalized capital markets.[5]

Modern critics also emphasize the distributional consequences of economic globalization. Greater trade may increase inequality in developing countries because its benefits may accrue primarily to the well-off, the well-educated, and those with control over trade-related services (Wade 2003; Foellmi and Oechslin 2010).[6] Critics of globalization also note that participating in international commodity markets and capital markets leaves developing countries highly vulnerable to international shocks, such as during the late 1970s and early 1980s, when rising oil prices, rising international interest rates, and falling commodity prices led to a severe economic crisis in Latin America (e.g., Bacha 1986). Globalization also increases the risk of financial contagion, contributing to capital flight in Latin America in the 1980s (Mahon 1996) and East Asia in 1998 (Radelet and Sachs 1998; Wade 2000). These arguments about the supposed negative consequences of economic globalization on the economy will affect well-being outcomes as well. Economic problems within countries are likely to put pressure on the availability of resources available to governments to divert toward enhancing well-being outcomes for the general population.

Yet while economic globalization certainly has serious negative consequences and risks, a large body of literature suggests that, on net, globalization has had a positive effect on human well-being. Greater trade, for instance, enhances welfare outcomes through various channels (Levine and Rothman 2006; Owen and Wu 2007). Particularly prominent are arguments that international trade enhances economic growth both directly (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1997; Frankel and Romer 1999; Dollar and Kraay 2003) and indirectly by improving property rights and rule of

law (Rodrik et al. 2004) and reducing poverty (Bergh and Nilsson 2014). Greater prosperity, in turn, allows for the acquisition of resources for better nutrition, clean water, and basic health care services.

From a political science perspective, economic globalization also has another important indirect effect on human well-being. Seminal work by Katzenstein (1985) and Cameron (1978) demonstrated that rising levels of international trade lead to greater public pressure for social welfare policies to ameliorate the risks that come with free trade, and this finding has been confirmed by subsequent work (Pierson 1996; Garrett 1998). Capital flows also affect human well-being. For instance, FDI is a primary source of technological transfer and know-how to developing countries, generates employment opportunities, facilitates access to foreign resources, and improves economic efficiency more generally through spillover effects to local firms (BlomStrom et al. 2000; Dunning 2001; Reddy 2006). This could enhance the availability of resources available to governments and, consequently, improve well-being outcomes.

Economic globalization also entails greater trade in agricultural flows, with greater availability to developing countries of corn hybrids and rice seeds, low-cost nitrogen fertilizer, and better production techniques. Countries in Latin America and Asia, for instance, more than doubled their yields of staple crops since 1950s (World Bank 1998), while breakthroughs in agricultural technology ended famine in South Asia and reduced undernutrition from 40% in the 1970s to 23% in 1997 (UNDP 2001). Of course, here too globalization has double-edged effects. Greater agricultural trade led to monopolistic control of trade by countries in the West (Shiva 2000), monocultures of high-yielding varieties of crops that adversely affect the environment (Aggarwal 2006), and greater sensitivity to variations in agricultural prices (Dorward et al. 2004). Yet despite these problems, it is hard to gainsay that improvements in agricultural technology have had a large positive effect on food production and food supply in most developing countries. This can enhance food security among such countries and improve health outcomes of citizens.

Trade entails exchange in essential drugs as well, which tend to be in short supply and too expensive because of faulty domestic distribution and procurement strategies (Foster 1990) as well as major pharmaceutical firms' resistance to producing generic drugs (Turshen 2001; Shadlen 2007). Given the high prices, greater incorporation into the international economic system is an important means of obtaining the scarce foreign exchange needed to buy essential drugs. More generally, breakthroughs in

medical technology have led to the development of vaccines and essential medicines, which enhance welfare outcomes, leading to declining mortality rates in Asia, Africa, and Latin America (UNDP 2001). Thus, the availability of affordable drugs can enhance human health outcomes.

Lastly, Burnside and Dollar's (2000) influential study argues that foreign aid only works if it is given to countries with liberalized economic systems. The World Bank (1998) strongly endorses this perspective as well. While such conditionality raises troubling normative questions about policy autonomy in developing countries, it nevertheless suggests that nations adopting economic globalization will receive greater foreign aid, much of which can be targeted at improving human well-being. To the extent that recipient countries utilize these resources toward enhancing the quality of lives of their citizens, economic globalization can benefit human lives.

Social Globalization

Globalization also has a social aspect. Social globalization primarily refers to the extent of informal interactions among states, such as international tourism, media, and other forms of information exchange. Social globalization leads to greater exposure to the prevailing conditions, ideas, norms, and cultures of other states. Here again we can identify the negative and positive effects associated with social globalization.

Many argue that globalizing culture leads to xenophobia and domestic cultural conflict. Western culture, at its worst, glorifies lust, greed, sex, and power (Schapiro 1991). Conservatives view these trends, exemplified by Hollywood, as morally corrosive within America, as do developing countries, who react negatively to a vulgar and homogenizing "McWorld" ideology.[7] A particularly important line of criticism is that this cultural invasion threatens traditional sources of social identity, leading not only to anomie but even intragroup violence as social groups attempt to reestablish and reaffirm their sense of identity (Appadurai 1998). This may adversely influence human well-being outcomes to the extent that prevalence of conflict may lead to, for example, a disruption in the functioning of schools, the provision of essential health services, and the destruction of infrastructure. However, the empirical evidence seems unclear because, while some studies demonstrate that globalization increases fatalities in ethnic conflicts (such as Olzak 2011), others show little evidence of a systematic link between globalization and conflict in developing countries (Sadowski 1998; Ishiyama 2004).

Alternatively, greater interactions among people across borders have also facilitated the spread of infectious agents (Fidler 1997; Smith et al. 2007), such as SARS, which spread from China to other countries. This could adversely influence health outcomes and general human well-being. However, reversing globalization to deter the spread of diseases may not be viable, especially given the pervasiveness of the phenomenon. Instead, perhaps efforts should be made to use global institutions to foster greater cooperation among countries to address these challenges (Hung 2004).

Moreover, social globalization has clear beneficial consequences. First, social globalization increases awareness about welfare conditions in other states. Huntington (1993) notes that a powerful force for democratization in the last twentieth century was a "demonstration effect," in which societies saw democratic freedoms in other countries and began to demand them locally. In much the same fashion, improvements in public health and education, when internationally publicized, let local citizens know that a better world is possible, particularly if they advocate for better government policy responses to poverty. A good example is the recent mushrooming of transnational networks empowering citizens in Southeast Asia, such as the Asian Regional Exchange for New Alternatives, TWN, and Asia Pacific Research Network. These networks nurture local organizations, advocate for the interests of developing countries in forums like the World Trade Organization (WTO), and articulate alternative means of bringing to the attention of governments the problems of poverty and the marginalization of the poor (Caouette 2006). Thus, social globalization spreads knowledge and enhances awareness of living conditions of people across the globe. Citizens and nongovernmental organizations can use this information to hold their respective governments more accountable and make them more responsive to their preferences and welfare needs.

Second, social globalization not only enables states and citizens to see discrepancies in welfare conditions but also educates them in ways that can help improve human welfare. The role of the media is especially significant since it strongly facilitates the transmission of information about the latest developments in health-related medicines and services, such as knowledge about vaccines, antibiotics, and other related research (Deaton 2004). A particularly striking example is the way in which Pasteur's discovery of germs in 1873 led to a twentieth-century revolution in health as states and societies increasingly understood the importance of clean water (Johnson 2002). More recently, diffusion of knowledge about oral rehydration therapy (ORT) since 1979 has been beneficial for improving health outcomes (Deaton 2004). For instance, ORT treatments have reduced the number

of child deaths due to diarrhea from 4.6 million in 1980 to 1.5 million as of 2000 (Victora et al. 2000).[8] Similarly, a survey study conducted in rural Guatemala revealed a diffusion of contraceptive knowledge through social interactions between rural residents and urban and international migrants, which could account for the decline in fertility rates in the country (Lindstrom and Muñoz-Franco 2005). Further emphasizing the significance of knowledge dissemination, Caldwell and Caldwell (1991) contend that an international workshop in Australia on the determinants of health has furthered our understanding of the social and cultural factors that affect mortality. This can also be observed in the case of HIV/AIDS, which has been a prominent health issue in several countries, especially in Africa, and international organizations have been playing an important role to promote best practices among countries. For instance, Vieira (2011) discusses how the notion of global securitization of HIV/AIDS advocated by international organizations was assimilated in varying degrees in Botswana, Mozambique, and South Africa. The educational advantages of social globalization can benefit people across the globe and especially enhance living conditions of people in developing countries. Given the ease and low costs involved in the transmission of information today, social globalization can be viewed as a cost-effective way to enhance human lives everywhere.

Political Globalization

Globalization has a political dimension as well. This occurs when countries involve themselves in international political relationships, such as establishing embassies in foreign countries, joining international organizations, participating in UN missions, and entering into international treaties. These myriad forms of political globalization have complex and often contradictory effects, but countries presumably join such political organizations because they provide some kind of national benefit, and this benefit can enhance human welfare. Much like economic and social globalization, political globalization can also have contradictory effects on human well-being.

For instance, when a developing country opens an embassy in another country, this presumably enhances its ability to ask for foreign aid, emergency assistance, and even military protection, all of which can provide protection against physical hardship. Embassies also facilitate social globalization by increasing tourism and cultural exchanges. The benefits associated with social globalization were discussed earlier; it can lead to a greater

spread of information, and knowledge can enhance well-being outcomes of people globally. International treaties bring concrete benefits to countries as well. For instance, security treaties may deter third-party aggression and shield against the negative effects of conflict on human well-being, while economic treaties may facilitate trade and capital flows that undergird economic globalization and improve economic conditions in countries. In short, countries presumably participate in the international system because they believe they will gain some benefit, and these benefits may be diffuse and range widely across military, economic, and social dimensions.

To illustrate the multifaceted nature of political globalization and its mixed effects, I briefly discuss in more detail one of the four subindices that constitute political globalization, namely 'membership in international organizations' (see Appendix B for details). Even within this subcomponent globalization exhibits substantial diversity, including, among others, the WTO, the IMF, the WHO, and the UN and its subsidiary organizational bodies such as the UNDP, UNICEF, and the World Food Program.

As with other dimensions of globalization, there is ongoing controversy over whether these international bodies are a positive or negative force. Some agencies, such as the IMF and World Bank, are frequently seen as reflecting developed countries' interests and are specifically criticized for encouraging excessive international debt in the 1970s (Payer 1991), exacerbating the East Asian crisis of 2008 (Stiglitz 2002), and overly intruding in the domestic policies of developing countries (Wolf 2004, 289). While these criticisms are plausible, it is important to note that countries that appeal to the IMF and World Bank for help are usually already in considerable economic distress, such that the unfortunate correlation between IMF assistance and poor economic performance is largely spurious (Kahler 1992, 95). Moreover, these organizations have taken initiatives to reduce the debt burden of poorer countries, such as the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative in 1996 and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) in 2005. Such steps are taken with the intention of helping developing countries deal with their economic issues and consequently enable them to address the welfare needs of their citizens.

Other international organizations are more unequivocally a positive force for human well-being, namely the UN and its subsidiary organizational bodies such as the UNDP, UNICEF, the World Food Program, and many others that primarily focus on the promotion of human welfare. To the extent that states interact with and participate in these transnational organi-

zations, they are more likely to adopt international norms and best practices propagated by these organizations (Eckstein 1988; Finnemore 1993; Cortell and Davis 1996). In addition to their direct efforts, it is noteworthy that these international organizations also play a high-profile role advocating on behalf of developing countries. The UNDP's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is an obvious example, in which the organization actively beseeches governments to invest in human welfare. Friedman et al. (2013) argue that global health organizations play an important role in advocating the idea of right to health by facilitating participation in governance, influencing norms, policies, and leadership within countries, enhancing capacity and funding availability, and forging international engagements. The current momentum toward a Framework Convention on Global Health (FCGH) can play a significant part in building upon the efforts of health organizations to address epidemics such as AIDS (Buse et al. 2013). This is not to say that membership in any of these organizations automatically enables a country to receive aid flows, but to the extent that countries belong to humanitarian agencies, there presumably is a somewhat higher chance that such countries will receive aid.

Clearly there exists a rather bewildering array of arguments for and against globalization, as indicated by the (necessarily limited) literature review. This discussion suggests that while globalization may have negative effects, the consequences of economic, social, and political globalization, on balance, are more likely to be positive. This leads to three primary hypotheses:

H4a: *A higher level of economic globalization is associated with higher levels of human well-being.*

H4b: *A higher level of social globalization is associated with higher levels of human well-being.*

H4c: *A higher level of political globalization is associated with higher levels of human well-being.*

Case Narrative: China

The effect of globalization on human well-being can be unraveled through an in-depth analysis of China. China is a nondemocratic country that initiated market reforms in 1979 by opening its economy to the world market. It is one of the few countries that has balanced political control domestically by maintaining a one-party system while adopting a globalized eco-

nomic system. Globalization has had far-reaching consequences for the country, both negative and positive. This brief analysis demonstrates that, despite the adverse effects of globalization, it has positively influenced human well-being outcomes for its citizens.

Infant mortality in China has plunged from 92 infant deaths per thousand live births in 1968 to 11 infant deaths in 2013 (World Bank 2015). Both domestic and international factors played an important role in reducing infant mortality rates within the country. Among domestic factors, Mao's leadership (1949–1976) was consequential with the initiation of universal welfare coverage, provision of health services at a low cost, and health campaigns creating health awareness among people (Hesketh and Zhu 1997; Banister and Hill 2004). Post-Mao, Deng Xiao Ping shifted from a socialist to a privatized health system, which increased the costs of medical care; however, mortality rates continued to decline (Banister and Hill 2004), perhaps owing to higher levels of economic growth.

With regard to international forces, China has become increasingly economically globalized with greater flows of capital and goods across borders, which has had important consequences for its economy. While on the one hand a number of empirical studies suggest that globalization has increased inequality within the country (Zhang and Zhang 2003; Kanbur and Zhang 2005; Wan et al. 2007), others emphasize the positive effects of greater economic integration. Several studies demonstrate a relationship between trade, FDI, and economic growth in China. Some argue that an open economy and growth may lead to greater FDI (Wang and Swain 1997), whereas others propose that FDI increases growth (Dees 1998) or that trade, FDI, and growth reinforce one another (Liu et al. 2002). Regardless of the direction of causality, findings from these studies suggest a link between globalization flows such as trade and FDI and economic growth. A growing economy increases the availability of resources to the government, enabling it to better address the welfare concerns of the populace. China has been making efforts to improve its health policy by increasing its healthcare budget to extend health insurance coverage to over 90% of citizens and adopting a national essential medicines system to meet the basic healthcare needs of the population, among other measures (Guan et al. 2011). Indeed improvements can be made by providing better health services to the people (Manning 2011) and improving urban–rural disparities in health services within the country (Liu et al. 2007).

China is also becoming increasingly socially globalized through the dissemination of ideas, norms, and cultures across borders and greater interactions with other countries. This is facilitated by advancements in technology, and China is making great strides in the telecommunications sector. While there is some inequality along economic and regional lines (Harwit 2004), the consequence of this development has important implications for human well-being within the country. With developments in technology, the transmission of necessary medical information has become easier and faster. For instance, the UCLA School of Public Health and the Institute of Health Studies of Kunning Medical College (IHS-KMC) conducted an experimental study in three rural counties of China to improve women's health. The findings demonstrated the possibility of information dissemination and the adoption of best practices by the local population (Tang et al. 2009). Similarly, the John Hopkins University (JHU) Medical College and the Peking Union Medical College (PUMC) are collaborating with each other to address the health concerns of the elderly population in China through faculty training, exchange, and consultation (Leng et al. 2010). Social globalization entails greater awareness and education through the spread of information, and this has been beneficial to welfare outcomes in the country.

Lastly, China has been making attempts to become more politically globalized as well by forging links and working closely with international organizations and other countries. This has enabled the country to obtain assistance from external actors to address its health concerns and improve health outcomes. While China initially denied having health issues or tried to conceal the severity of health problems in the country such as AIDS and SARS, it has changed its approach since 2000 as it participates in global health governance and is working with multilateral institutions today to address its health concerns (Chan et al. 2009). Furthermore, it participates in the Global Fund (against AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria), ASEAN conferences on AIDS and SARS, International AIDS conferences, and several UN conferences. This has resulted in generous grants from international organizations to address its health problems. For instance, China is slated to receive US$6.8 million from the United States, of which US$1.5 million will go toward addressing health concerns in the country.[9] Additionally, over the last 20 years, China has received over US$500 million from over 40 international organizations to address AIDS, and this has enabled the country to adopt several best practices to cope with this epidemic (Sun et al. 2010). The WHO's emphasis on essential medicines

that should be available to all segments of society has also led China to recently adopt its own national essential medicines system (Guan et al. 2011). International organizations have played an important role in assisting China to enhance the well-being of its citizens. Overall, this discussion demonstrates that, despite the negative effects of globalization, it has positively influenced human well-being in China through various mechanisms.

Empirical Analyses

Given the multidimensional nature of globalization, I disaggregate globalization into three different dimensions: economic, social, and political. Dreher (2006) provides novel measures of these dimensions. Illustrating the extremely multifaceted nature of globalization, his three indices are themselves drawn from 23 different subindices, each capturing some distinct element of globalization. Dreher's data set is the best existing measure of different dimensions of globalization, not only because it disaggregates globalization but because it also takes into account the diverse components of each dimension and measures these across a broad sample of countries and years. Use of this data set also mirrors a continuous conceptualization of globalization, examining variations in globalization over time and across countries.

Economic globalization refers to an aggregate measure of trade and capital flows and tariffs and import barriers, thereby providing a multifaceted measure of economic globalization. *Social globalization* is a measure of the extent of informal interaction and information flows and aggregates data on the extent of personal contact (telephone traffic, tourism, size of foreign populations, and international letters); information flows (Internet users, televisions per capita, trade in newspapers), and cultural proximity (number of books, Ikea, and McDonald's). *Political globalization* is a measure of the extent of participation in international organizations and includes the number of embassies in a country, participation in UN Security Council missions, and the number of international treaties. This measure captures the extent to which states interact with other states and are politically active in international organizations, which provides a multifaceted measure of political globalization. Some aspects of the index may appear problematic, such as the idea that the number of McDonald's or IKEA stores is an appropriate measure of cultural proximity, but in the absence of other comprehensive measures of globalization, Dreher's mea-

sure provides the best existing measure of globalization, and one that does do justice to the multidimensional nature of globalization. All three measures of globalization range from an index of 1 to 100, where higher values indicate higher levels of globalization. Dreher also provides an overall level of globalization, which is an aggregate of all three dimensions. Since the data are available from 1970 onward, the time period of the analysis is from 1970 to 2012. A full list of all components, and the percentage role of each component in the index, is provided in Appendix B. Further details can be found in Dreher (2006), Dreher et al. (2008).[10]

Tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 assess the relationship between globalization and human well-being. Table 4.1 shows the effect of economic globalization on human well-being. The coefficient for economic globalization is negative and significant in models 1 and 2, indicating that higher levels of economic globalization is associated with lower levels of infant and child mortality, respectively. As expected, the coefficient is positive and

Table 4.1 Economic globalization and human well-being

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*
	Infant mortality	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*
Economic globalization	−0.0119***	−0.0120***	0.180***	0.0017***
	(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0216)	(0.0001)
GDP per capita	−0.309***	−0.307***	4.802***	
	(0.0185)	(0.0179)	(0.292)	
Population density	−0.368***	−0.446***	9.401***	0.0656***
	(0.0525)	(0.0524)	(0.827)	(0.0033)
Democracy	−0.0025***	−0.0027***	0.0626	−0.0004***
	(0.0009)	(0.0009)	(0.0409)	(9.69e-05)
Urban population	−0.0042***	−0.0064***	0.215***	0.0037***
	(0.0006)	(0.0005)	(0.0289)	(0.0001)
Constant	7.992***	8.689***	−29.25***	0.0822***
	(0.160)	(0.156)	(3.192)	(0.0140)
Observations	5223	5231	4321	4515
Number of countries	148	148	123	122
R-squared	0.807	0.810	0.609	0.746
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***$p < 0.01$

Table 4.2 Social globalization and human well-being

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*
	Infant mortality	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*
Social globalization	−0.0187***	−0.0188***	0.216***	0.00196***
	(0.0008)	(0.0009)	(0.0186)	(0.0001)
GDP per capita	−0.216***	−0.213***	3.797***	
	(0.0124)	(0.0131)	(0.263)	
Population density	−0.370***	−0.447***	10.16***	0.0714***
	(0.0372)	(0.0369)	(0.797)	(0.0039)
Democracy	−0.0056***	−0.0061***	0.129***	−0.0002*
	(0.0008)	(0.0008)	(0.0454)	(0.0001)
Urban population	−0.0049***	−0.0072***	0.231***	0.0033***
	(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0196)	(0.0001)
Constant	7.496***	8.171***	−25.27***	0.0878***
	(0.0908)	(0.0910)	(3.003)	(0.0169)
Observations	5619	5633	4464	4713
Number of countries	163	163	129	128
R-squared	0.834	0.833	0.606	0.753
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.1$

significant in models 3 and 4, indicating that higher levels of economic globalization are associated with higher levels of education and human development. This is consistent with hypothesis *H4a*. Greater economic interactions between states facilitating exchange of goods, capital, and services are beneficial for human well-being despite the drawbacks associated with economic globalization. While the critics of economic globalization point to increasing inequality within countries, proponents argue that it leads to greater trade, agricultural productivity, and increased accessibility to essential drugs, and these reasons could possibly account for the positive effect of economic globalization. In substantive terms, changing the economic globalization index from its minimum to maximum value while holding all other factors constant reduces infant and child mortality by approximately 66% and increases education and human development by about 30%. Economic globalization has a stronger substantive effect on health outcomes compared to education and human development.

Table 4.3 Political globalization and human well-being

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*
	Infant mortality	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*
Political globalization	−0.0042***	−0.0045***	0.0441**	0.0011***
	(0.0006)	(0.0007)	(0.0194)	(0.0001)
GDP per capita	−0.338***	−0.333***	5.345***	
	(0.0199)	(0.0191)	(0.275)	
Population density	−0.344***	−0.415***	10.07***	0.0599***
	(0.0655)	(0.0657)	(0.951)	(0.0051)
Democracy	−0.0059***	−0.0063***	0.130**	−0.0002**
	(0.0012)	(0.0012)	(0.0500)	(0.0001)
Urban population	−0.0068***	−0.0089***	0.257***	0.0039***
	(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0267)	(0.0001)
Constant	7.910***	8.553***	−31.79***	0.111***
	(0.209)	(0.203)	(3.830)	(0.0117)
Observations	5619	5633	4464	4713
Number of groups	163	163	129	128
R-squared	0.768	0.775	0.587	0.711
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$

Table 4.2 shows the effect of social globalization on human well-being. The coefficient for social globalization is negative and significant in models 1 and 2, indicating that higher levels of social globalization is associated with lower levels of infant and child mortality respectively while the coefficient is positive and significant in models 3 and 4, indicating that higher levels of social globalization are associated with higher levels of education and human development. This is consistent with hypothesis *H4b*. In substantive terms, changing the social globalization index from its minimum to maximum value while holding all other factors constant reduces infant and child mortality by approximately 80% and increases education and human development by 35 and 32%, respectively. The effect of social globalization is stronger for health outcomes compared to education and human development. Despite the potential negative effects of social globalization, such as an increased risk of violence or the spread of infectious diseases, greater social interactions between states in the form of ideas, norms, and cultures through tourism, media, and other forms of interna-

Table 4.4 Overall globalization and human well-being

Variables	*Model (1)*	*Model (2)*	*Model (3)*	*Model (4)*
	Infant mortality	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*
Overall globalization	−0.0211***	−0.0215***	0.265***	0.0025***
	(0.0011)	(0.0012)	(0.0274)	(0.0001)
GDP per capita	−0.223***	−0.218***	3.733***	
	(0.0127)	(0.0133)	(0.288)	
Population density	−0.254***	−0.329***	8.661***	0.0575***
	(0.0476)	(0.0475)	(0.820)	(0.0047)
Democracy	−0.0021**	−0.0025***	0.0798*	−0.0006***
	(0.0008)	(0.0008)	(0.0434)	(0.0001)
Urban population	−0.0044***	−0.0065***	0.226***	0.0031***
	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0215)	(0.0001)
Constant	7.341***	8.003***	−22.87***	0.109***
	(0.126)	(0.126)	(3.187)	(0.0164)
Observations	5619	5633	4464	4713
Number of countries	163	163	129	128
R-squared	0.822	0.823	0.604	0.762
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$

tional exchange enhance human well-being. This may be due to the diffusion of necessary knowledge about improving welfare outcomes through formal and informal exchanges.

Table 4.3 shows the effect of political globalization on human well-being. The coefficient for political globalization is negative and significant in models 1 and 2, indicating that higher levels of political globalization are associated with lower levels of infant and child mortality, respectively. Models 3 and 4 indicate that political globalization is positively associated with education and human development, respectively. This is consistent with hypothesis *H4c*. In substantive terms, changing the political globalization index from its minimum to maximum value while holding all other factors constant reduces infant and child mortality by 32 and 34%, respectively, and increases education and human development by approximately 6 and 19%, respectively. Greater political interchange between states in the form of participation in international organizations,

UN missions, international treaties, and embassies in foreign countries benefits human well-being. Here again, while political globalization is often associated with problems, especially with regard to the role of the IMF and World Bank among developing countries, other organizations, including WHO and UNDP, among several others, have played an important and unambiguous role in helping countries obtain assistance to enhance human well-being. Overall, while all three dimensions of globalization have positive and negative effects, the empirical evidence overwhelmingly lends support to the positive effects of globalization. This provides strong support for the primary hypothesis about the benefits of globalization for human well-being outcomes. Among the three dimensions of globalization, social globalization seems to have the strongest substantive effect on human well-being, followed by economic globalization and political globalization. Furthermore, the effect of all three dimensions of globalization is stronger for health outcomes, such as infant and child mortality, compared to education and human development. A plausible reason for this could be that some of the benefits associated with globalization, such as the transmission of health-related knowledge and availability of essential drugs through trade, can directly influence health outcomes, while the effect of globalization on education and aggregate measures of human development may be more indirect.

Lastly, Table 4.4 shows the effect of overall globalization on human well-being. The coefficient is negative and significant in models 1 and 2, indicating that a higher level of overall globalization is associated with lower levels of infant and child mortality, respectively. Overall globalization is positive and significant in models 3 and 4, indicating that a higher level of overall globalization is associated with higher levels of education and human development. In substantive terms, changing the overall globalization index from its minimum to maximum value while holding all other factors constant reduces infant and child mortality by 82% and increases education and human development by approximately 39%. Thus, globalization collectively also plays an important role in influencing human well-being. The control variables primarily perform as expected. Greater income, a higher level of democracy and population density, and a larger urban population are associated with lower levels of infant and child mortality and higher levels of education and human development in majority of the models. The democracy variable performs inconsistently when human development index is used as the dependent variable. The variable is negative and significant in some of the models, indicating that a higher

level of democracy is associated with lower levels of human development. This may reflect the lack of consensus in the political regime literature, where some studies question the positive effect of democracy on human well-being outcomes (Williamson 1987; Weede 1993; Ross 2006). Alternatively, it is possible that since the human development index is an aggregate index, not all components of the index work in tandem. This could account for the inconsistent effect of democracy on the human development index.

Appendix A presents results with alternative model specifications as well. Tables A 4.5 to A 4.8 analyze the effect of different dimensions of globalization on human well-being when time dummies are included. This guards against the possibility of any one year influencing the primary findings. Tables A 4.9 to A 4.12 present results without any country or time dummies while including other control variables such as region dummies for Africa, Asia, and Latin America and ethnic heterogeneity. Overall, the overall globalization index and economic and social globalization are consistently significant across all the models. Political globalization is significant for the majority of models but does not have a significant effect on child mortality and education enrollment, indicating that the effect of political globalization is relatively weaker than economic and social globalization. Note that political globalization also has the weakest substantive effect on well-being outcomes compared to economic and social globalization in the baseline models (discussed earlier). Thus, the economic and social aspects of globalization seem to play a more important role than political globalization.

Among the additional controls, Africa consistently performs poorly, displaying higher levels of infant and child mortality and lower levels of education and human development, while Asia performs well in health outcomes with lower levels of infant and child mortality. However, Asia does not perform as well in terms of education and human development. Latin America displays lower levels of human well-being, but these effects are present in only some of the models. This indicates that Africa is especially lagging in well-being outcomes. One can conclude that the region dummies do capture distinct characteristics. Ethnically heterogeneous countries are also associated with higher levels of infant and child mortality or poorer health outcomes and lower levels of education and human development in the majority of models. Overall, the positive effects of globalization are prevalent across a wide array of robustness tests.

Conclusion

Globalization is increasingly prevalent in the modern world, and scholars have rightly explored both its causes and consequences. While globalization has advantages and disadvantages, the findings in this chapter indicate that, on balance, globalization has a positive effect on human well-being owing to its ability to attract increased development, technology, knowledge, and foreign aid. Thus, the findings contribute to the longstanding debate as to whether the forces of globalization are a positive or negative force in the world. Although the results speak only to the issue of human well-being, it is an important criterion for evaluating globalization and its different dimensions. This suggests that, despite the potential drawbacks associated with globalization, its benefits cannot be ignored.

Among the three dimensions of globalization, social globalization seems to have the strongest substantive effect on human well-being, followed by economic and then political globalization. Social globalization is associated with the spread of knowledge, and this diffusion of essential know-how helps advance well-being outcomes. Indeed, social globalization has its drawbacks, and the theory section of this chapter discusses some of these challenges, namely the effect of social globalization on potential conflicts. Social globalization can be perceived as threatening to different cultures owing to the spread of Westernization, which in turn may incite violence between culturally different societies. However, the findings here suggest that there are benefits associated with social globalization that enhance human well-being. These benefits could be more pronounced than the benefits of economic and political globalization. In fact, as discussed in the theory section, the consequences of economic and political globalization on human well-being outcomes are double-edged, while the effect of social globalization on well-being outcomes is relatively unambiguous. For instance, while economic globalization is associated with economic growth through trade, it is also associated with income inequality. Similarly, while the role of international organizations such as the UNDP, UNICEF, and the World Food Program are more unequivocally associated with benefits for its members, the role of the World Bank and the IMF has been relatively more controversial. Overall, this underscores the need to acknowledge the multidimensional aspect of globalization and study the individual consequences of these different aspects of globalization in a more disaggregated manner. Clearly there is need for further research to parse out the causal mechanisms that link each dimension of globalization to well-being outcomes.

Notes

1. The globalization data are discussed in detail in the subsequent empirical analysis section.
2. Particularly influential statements of dependency theory are Frank (1967), Cardoso and Faletto (1979), Evans (1979), and Palma (1978).
3. For related arguments, see Palma (1978, 906–909).
4. The phrase neoliberalism is more often used by its critics than advocates, but the term nicely captures the new (*neo*) emphasis on liberal markets as the basis for long-run prosperity. See, for instance, Wade (1992, 270–271).
5. Trade liberalization, for instance, was the most common condition for World Bank Structural Adjustment loans in the 1980s, and a poll of 1000 economists in five nations showed that of 27 different economic propositions, the one capturing the most support was a statement that "tariffs and import controls lower economic welfare" (Wade 1993, 147).
6. For related criticisms, see Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) and Ukpere and Slabbert (2009).
7. The McWorld phrase comes from Barber (1992). For a good overview of Western culture's global contaminating effects, see Sadowski (1998).
8. Of course, local conditions may diffuse or even negate the arrival of health innovations. As Appadurai notes (Appadurai 1996, 48), globalizing forces meet domestic forces in a complex interaction, such that positive efforts can be derailed, such as in the case of the former president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, who denied access to antiretroviral drugs to the people of South Africa (Boseley 2008).
9. Based on data from Foreign Assistance, accessed from http://beta.foreignassistance.gov/explore/country/China.
10. The dependent variables, control controls, and the methodology are discussed in detail in Chap. 2. All the models also control for the level of democracy. I use the "polity2" variable from the Polity IV data set to classify democracies and nondemocracies (Marshall et al. 2014). The variable ranges from −10 to +10, where higher values indicate higher levels of democracy.

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CHAPTER 5

Conflict

The nature of interactions between states has important ramifications for human well-being. While greater trade, foreign aid, social and political interactions, and treaties are manifestations of cordial relations, conflicts, on the other hand, are manifestations of hostile relations between states. Given the interconnectedness of the world we live in today, interactions of any kind between states have an impact on citizens worldwide. This chapter focuses on the consequences of conflictual relations between states on human well-being. Hostility between states may adversely affect the economy, infrastructure, and property of the involved states and lead to widespread social dislocation, disease, and a high death toll among vulnerable populations. Few would dispute that conflicts adversely affect human well-being. As Levy and Sidel (1997, ix) note, "War has an enormous and tragic impact—both directly and indirectly—on public health. War accounts for more death and disability than many major diseases combined. It destroys families, communities, and sometimes whole cultures. It directs scarce resources away from health and human services, and often destroys the infrastructure for these services. It limits—and often eliminates—human rights. War leads many people to think that violence is the only way to resolve conflicts, a mindset that contributes to domestic violence, street crime, and many other kinds of violence in the world. War contributes to the destruction of the environment. In sum, war threatens large elements of the fabric of our civilization." Given the large-scale repercussions of conflict, there is a need to understand how different types and different dimensions of conflict affect societal well-being.

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

Fig. 5.1 Number of interstate conflicts by year

To this end, the chapter analyzes the consequences of interstate and intrastate conflict by examining how the occurrence, magnitude, and duration of these conflicts among states, as well as the magnitude of interstate and intrastate conflicts among neighboring states, influence human well-being outcomes. This is one of the first studies to comprehensively assess the effect of multiple dimensions of conflict with the hope of gaining a thorough understanding of the consequences of conflict on human lives. While conflicts clearly put a strain on relations between states, they are not a frequent phenomenon. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the cumulative number of interstate and intrastate conflicts respectively among countries from 1960 to 2014. While the number of conflicts worldwide can differ over the years, the figures highlight two important patterns. First, conflicts generally are a relatively rare phenomenon as illustrated by the mean and median cumulative numbers of interstate conflicts, approximately 2.6 and 2, respectively (Fig. 5.1), while the mean and median cumulative number of intrastate conflicts is approximately 14 and 12, respectively, from 1960 to 2014 (Fig. 5.2).[1] Furthermore, the highest number of interstate conflicts is approximately 13 and the highest number of intrastate conflicts is approximately 46. Overall, even though conflicts are not a common phe-



Fig. 5.2 Number of intrastate conflicts by year

nomenon, the prevalence of conflict at all can have far-reaching consequences for human well-being. While anecdotal evidence suggests that conflicts can devastate civilian physical well-being, relatively little systematic research has been conducted on this question. To address the existing lacuna in the literature, this chapter examines the effects of two different types of conflict and three different dimensions of conflict on human well-being outcomes. I argue that conflict drives states to divert resources from productive areas that enhance human well-being, adversely affects the economic performance of countries embroiled in conflicts, deteriorates the quality of infrastructure, hampers trade between countries, and leads to the dislocation of populations. All these mechanisms may hamper the quality of human lives and hurt well-being outcomes. Thus, conflicts, even if rare, can be extremely deleterious for human lives.

Second, the figures also indicate that intrastate conflicts are more frequent than interstate conflicts. As mentioned earlier, the mean and median cumulative number of intrastate conflicts is higher than the mean cumulative number of interstate conflicts. Moreover, the highest number of intra-

state conflicts is also higher than interstate conflicts. While interstate conflicts obviously adversely affect relationships between states, intrastate conflicts today more than ever before also have international ramifications. We are living in a globalized world where developments in one part of the globe are very likely to influence developments in other parts of the globe. Thus, the prevalence of an intrastate conflict in one state is likely to influence other states. Even though intrastate conflicts primarily relate to conflict among groups within a state, their emergence, duration, and consequences may not be restricted to the borders of any single country such that conflicts in one country may be linked to other countries or have repercussions for neighboring countries as well. This justifies the need to study the effects of both types of conflict collectively as both influence interstate relations. By assessing the effect of two types of conflict, the chapter seeks to identify whether interstate or intrastate conflict has a more devastating effect on human well-being. Additionally, by analyzing three different dimensions of conflict (namely, occurrence, magnitude, and duration), the chapter also sheds light on which of the three dimensions has the strongest effect on human well-being outcomes. The objective here is to provide a thorough investigation of how conflicts influence societal welfare.

Conflict and Human Well-Being

The bulk of research that analyzes the consequences of conflict focuses on the economic effects of conflicts (Angell 1933; Thorp 1941; Wright 1943; Kuznets 1973; Wheeler 1975; Arbetman and Kugler 1989). While this is an important avenue of research, economic conditions and well-being outcomes are two distinct outcomes of interest, and both avenues of research should be given adequate attention. Relatively less is known about the consequences of conflict for human well-being outcomes. There is, however, a growing body of research that is addressing this issue. A case study by Bundervoet et al. (2008) demonstrates that Burundi's civil war adversely affected health outcomes among children who were exposed to the war. Similarly, Alderman et al.'s (2004) study shows that conflict in Zimbabwe increased malnutrition among children. While case studies such as these are valuable in that they provide an in-depth understanding of the consequences of specific conflicts, it is equally important to identify general trends between conflict and human well-being among a larger sample of countries over time. This can assist political leaders as well as policymakers to better manage the fallout from conflicts.

A few studies have made important contributions in this regard. Ghobarah et al. (2003, 2004) argue that civil conflicts adversely affect welfare, as proxied by the health-adjusted life expectancy (HALE), while Iqbal (2006) demonstrates the adverse effects of interstate and intrastate conflicts on HALE, particularly in the short term. Unfortunately, however, while Ghobarah et al. (2003, 2004) only utilize cross-sectional data, Iqbal's (2006) study is over a 3-year period, which severely limits the available information on conflict and welfare, especially given that rich time-series cross-section data sets exist on both conflict and well-being. This shortcoming has been addressed by other researchers. For instance, Li and Wen (2005) provide a time-series cross-section analysis from 1961 to 1998 and demonstrate that international and intrastate conflicts reduce adult mortality. Davis and Kuritsky's (2002) study shows the negative effects of conflict on life expectancy and infant mortality among Sub-Saharan countries from 1968 to 1999. While this study represents a valuable step forward in the literature, the effects of conflict on human well-being outcomes, such as infant and child mortality, as well as education and human development, remain to be explored through a time-series cross-section analysis on a global sample of countries. Moreover, while most of the aforementioned studies focus on individual aspects of conflict, this chapter hopes to contribute to this growing body of research by examining different dimensions of conflict, namely occurrence, duration, magnitude of interstate and intrastate conflict within countries, and the magnitude of interstate and intrastate conflicts among neighboring countries. This certainly does not exhaust the different ways conflicts can hurt societal welfare, but it is one of the most comprehensive analyses thus far and serves as a good start in enhancing our understanding of the consequences of conflict.

This chapter assesses the effects of interstate as well as intrastate conflicts. Even though the two are different types of conflicts, we can expect both to diminish the well-being of citizens through similar causal mechanisms. Few would deny that conflicts can hurt the quality of life of people in conflict-ridden states, but it is important to specify the causal pathways and provide empirical tests confirming (or not) conflict's negative effects. There are multiple mechanisms, both direct and indirect, through which conflicts adversely affect human well-being. Governments are primarily responsible for the welfare of their citizens. They can enhance human well-being outcomes through the formulation and implementation of good policies as well as through the diversion of resources to ensure general well-being and health-care provisions and services for their citi-

zens. Conflicts can be detrimental to human well-being since they divert resources away from productive avenues, such as health and education expenditures, to military spending (Peroff and Podolak-Warren 1979; Mintz 1989; Chan 1995; Yildirim and Sezgin 2002). Moreover, studies also show that increases in defense spending also reduce private spending on education and health services (Chan 1986; Knight et al. 1996). These military expenditures can be quite substantial, effectively ruling out meaningful social spending. During wars in Mozambique and Chad, for instance, military spending was 30%, of total federal spending and crowding out was even worse in Uganda, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Cape Verde, where fully 40% of all spending was on the military (Shindo and McCormack 1985).[2] War is an expensive proposition and as such constitutes a fundamental constraint on governmental efforts to help citizens through public policy measures. This is especially worrisome because resources are generally limited, and any diversion of resources to address security concerns may come at the expense of the quality of human lives. Such tradeoffs are especially likely to hurt developing countries, where economic resources are already scarce. Moreover, the very occurrence of conflicts may lead to a loss of human lives, thereby directly enhancing mortality and reducing the length of human lives.

Conflicts also often severely damage the aggregate economy. Kuznets (1964, 1971), for instance, documents that World War II had a negative effect on per-capita output in major powers. Stewart et al. (2001) note more specifically that war leads to unsustainable economic policies, such as deficit financing and price controls, which discriminate against small producers, discourage export incentives, allow unchecked inflation, and often lead to foreign exchange shortages. The adverse consequences of conflict on the economy of a developing country are especially devastating. For instance, following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the inflation rate in the country was estimated at 29.3% (WHO 2006). According to a private consultancy firm, Frontier Economics (2015), the civil conflict in South Sudan since December 2013 may cost the country between US$22 and US$28 billion if it continues for another 5 years. Kugler et al. (2013) empirically demonstrate that the economic effects of interstate and civil conflicts are especially severe for less-developed and least-developed belligerent countries. Obviously, when the economy is weak, this inhibits the state's ability to enhance human welfare through social spending or public health infrastructure. Additionally, when the economy collapses, it means that unemployment is rising and family incomes are falling, which under-

mines food security and general well-being and limits private resources available for health and welfare spending. Poor economic conditions make it difficult for governments to address the welfare concerns of its citizens.

More generally, conflicts destroy general infrastructure such as roads, railways, and modes of communication, as well as health infrastructure such as hospitals, clinics, medical supplies, and the availability of medical personnel (Ghobarah et al. 2003). This aggravates the spread of diseases and infections in war-torn areas, hurting all segments of the population, including children, but probably has a disproportionate impact on children given their general vulnerability. For instance, the Israeli military operation in Gaza in January 2009 led to the deaths of many Palestinians, most of them children. In fact, between January 8 and January 14, 2009, child fatalities increased by 340% in Gaza because public infrastructure, water, sanitation, and services were destroyed in the conflict (UNDP 2009).[3] Similarly, in the case of the interstate conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia, infants and children were the worst-hit age group in Somalia, resulting in an infant and child mortality in the country that is among the highest in the world today (UNDP 2009). The younger segment of a population can grow to become a productive part of the workforce in the future, and to the extent that conflicts disproportionately hurt this segment of the population, they can also hamper a country's future development prospects. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, conflict hurts the general population as well. According to a World Health Organization report (2003), the civil war in Liberia has made it difficult for the government to check the spread of cholera among the general population, and people are unable to seek medical assistance due to the turbulent situation in the country. An unhealthy population is unable to contribute to the economy effectively, and this could further aggravate the economic conditions in a conflict-ridden country.

Additionally, conflicts may worsen human welfare via reduced trade that could have adverse consequences for the economy. Cordial relations facilitate cooperation between states that take the form of treaties, foreign aid, and trade agreements, among others. The extent that conflicts may cause disruption in economic activities between countries and hamper trade, it could adversely influence the well-being of the masses. Empirical evidence demonstrates that interstate conflicts (Polachek 1980; Gowa 1994; Mansfield 1994; Anderson and Carter 2001), militarized interstate disputes (Li and Sacko 2002; Keshk et al. 2004; Kim and Rousseau 2005),

and intrastate conflicts reduce trade (Bayer and Rupert 2004) because conflicts adversely affect the economy of conflict-ridden states.[4] The benefits of trade for health outcomes have also been demonstrated by existing scholarship (Levine and Rothman 2006; Owen and Wu 2007). This may be attributed to the spillover effects of knowledge, transfer of technology, availability of aid from trade partners, or better economic performance more generally. Based on these two strands of research, the available evidence suggests that conflict can inhibit human well-being by reducing a country's ability to engage in international trade.

Alternatively, conflicts often result in the forced migration of people within a country, also known as internally displaced people (IDPs). IDPs are defined as "persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violation of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border" (United Nations 1998). Over 38 million people have been internally displaced owing to armed conflict and violence, and almost 77% of IDPs live in 10 countries, namely, Syria, Colombia, Iraq, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Pakistan, South Sudan, Somalia, Nigeria, and Turkey (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2015). IDPs live under precarious conditions and may not have access to basic necessities such as housing, food, clean water, and health services and provisions, which are necessary to maintain a standard quality of life. Given the adverse consequences of conflict for a country's economy and infrastructure as discussed earlier, it further worsens the likelihood that IDPs will be able to obtain assistance in ensuring their well-being because conflict puts additional pressure on war-ravaged countries. Moreover, the prevalence of IDPs may also adversely affect the well-being of the rest of the population within the country because governments are forced to deal with additional economic and security challenges.

Conflicts may specifically affect the health status of the adult population as well. Conflicts lead to unemployment, often for a prolonged time period. This could give rise to feelings of anxiety and stress among people, thereby impairing people's physical health and increasing the probability of suicide (Durkheim 1951; Morris et al. 1994; Montgomery et al. 1999). Adults are more likely to understand the seriousness and ramifications of ongoing conflicts for themselves and their families, and this could put a strain on their mental and physical health. Alternatively, conflicts could

threaten social cohesion within society. The relationship between social integration and health has been demonstrated (Berkman et al. 2000) where conflicts could exacerbate social disintegration, thereby adversely affecting the health of adults more generally. An unhealthy adult population is also likely to put the well-being of the younger segment of the population at higher risk as well.

The aforementioned mechanisms focus on the consequences of interstate and intrastate conflicts for human well-being in countries involved in conflicts. Oftentimes, however, states that are not actively involved in conflicts may suffer the consequences of an ongoing conflict in a neighboring state through spillover effects. These effects may entail the spread of conflict to other states or an influx of refugees from conflict-ridden states. Both these mechanisms may adversely influence human well-being.

Several studies demonstrate that conflicts in neighboring states increase the probability of disputes between states (Gleditsch et al. 2008; Salehyan 2008) as well as civil conflicts within states (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Gleditsch 2007) for various reasons. Gleditsch (2007) emphasizes the different transnational dimensions of civil conflict, such as the number of ethnic groups across borders, regime type, and trade linkages between countries, that may influence the emergence of civil conflicts among states. Gleditsch et al. (2008) argue that civil conflicts increase the probability of militarized interstate disputes between states because other states may try to influence the outcome of civil conflicts.

Yet another adverse consequence of conflict in neighboring states is refugee influx. The 1951 Refugee Convention defines a refugee as someone who, "owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country." Salehyan (2008) argues that a refugee influx into other countries may actually increase the probability of militarized interstate disputes between refugee-sending and refugee-receiving states. Refugee-hosting states may initiate attacks on refugee-sending states to prevent further influxes within their country, while refugee-sending states may attack refugee host states for providing haven to regime dissidents or critics. Refugees may also alter the demographic makeup of the country, threatening its identity, creating discontent among the local population, and increasing feelings of hostility between the refugee and local populations. As Brown (1996, 576) states, "The sudden influx of refugees can aggravate ethnic

problems and further complicate the picture by changing the domestic balance of power." Consider, for instance, the emergence of conflict in Northeastern India owing to the refugee influx from Bangladesh (Ganguly 1996). Alternatively, Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) posit that refugees and displaced people may increase the probability of conflict through the spread of arms, combatants, and ideologies across borders, which can increase the likelihood of civil conflicts among host countries. The spread of conflict from one state to another may also entail all the negative effects of conflict-ridden states on human well-being as discussed earlier.

Additionally, an influx of refugees can put pressure on host governments' resources. Funding that could be used to address health, education, and other general welfare needs of citizens may need to be diverted to address the immediate concerns of the refugee population. This may adversely affect the well-being of the populace in the host states. Refugee crises have been a prominent issue in recent conflicts. For instance, the conflict in Iraq, which started as an interstate conflict between the United States and Iraq in 2003, has now degenerated into an intrastate conflict with the rise of ISIS. The conflict has led to an influx of refugees in neighboring Syria, whose numbers are estimated at 369,904, although only 30,000 are registered with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as of December 2014 (UNHCR 2015). The Syrian civil war started when protests broke out in 2011 against the nondemocratic regime of President Assad. However, the uprising gradually degenerated into a civil war. As of July 15, 2015, the total number of registered Syrian refugees is 4,015,256, which includes 2.2 million in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, 1.8 million in Turkey, and over 24,000 in Northern Africa (The UN Refugee Agency 2015). Overall, greater pressure on economic resources, diversion of resources from welfare spending to addressing security concerns, destruction of essential infrastructure, obstruction of trade, and greater forced migration within the country in the form of internally displaced people (IDPs) are some of the potential consequences of conflicts spreading to other states.

As this discussion suggests, there are several plausible routes through which conflict can worsen human well-being. The following analyses do not attempt to distinguish between these mechanisms, as time-series data for a global sample of countries are unavailable for several of the intervening mechanisms. However, the analyses provide the most comprehensive assessment of the consequences of the different dimensions of interstate and intrastate conflicts. To reiterate, this chapter examines the effects of the occurrence, magnitude, and duration of inter- and intrastate conflicts among states as well as the effects of the magnitude of inter- and intrastate

conflicts in neighboring states on human well-being outcomes. I do not determine a priori which types or dimensions of conflict are *most* damaging but rather turn to the empirical evidence. Based on the preceding discussion, the chapter assesses the following hypotheses:

H5.1a: The occurrence of interstate conflict will worsen human well-being.

H5.1b: The occurrence of intrastate conflict will worsen human well-being.

H5.2a: Interstate conflicts of higher magnitude will worsen human well-being.

H5.2b: Intrastate conflicts of higher magnitude will worsen human well-being.

H5.3a: A longer duration of interstate conflict will worsen human well-being.

H5.3b: A longer duration of intrastate conflict will worsen human well-being.

H5.4a: Interstate conflicts of higher magnitude in neighboring states will worsen human well-being.

H5.4b: Intrastate conflicts of higher magnitude in neighboring states will worsen human well-being.

Case Narrative: Iraq

The relationship between conflict and human well-being is illustrated by a case narrative on Iraq. Iraq has been involved in several conflicts in the twentieth century, including its participation in World Wars I and II and Gulf Wars I and II. In the twenty-first century, conflict in Iraq goes back to 2003 when the United States attacked Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein as president. While the interstate conflict is over, the country is now involved in a civil conflict with ISIS, going back to early 2014 when the terrorist organization captured parts of northern Iraq. Iraq's history of hostility with other states as well as among groups within the state provides an opportunity to assess the effects of conflict on human well-being within the country.

Iraq performed relatively well in health outcomes prior to 1991. As Frankish (2003, 1) noted in the early part of this century, "Just over a decade ago, Iraq boasted a modern social infrastructure with a world-class range of health-care facilities, and its people enjoyed one of the highest standards of living in the Middle East." The country had an extensive network of infrastructure where healthcare services and clean water were accessible to large majorities of the urban and rural populations. However, the onset of a series of conflicts over the years has adversely influenced human well-being within the country.

The theory section discusses a variety of mechanisms through which conflict can adversely affect human well-being, and most of these mechanisms can be identified in the case of Iraq. The prevalence of conflict has led to a diversion of resources from productive areas that enhance societal well-being. Healthcare spending in Iraq is between 3 and 4% of GDP, which is 2–3% lower than that of upper-middle-income countries and 5–7% lower than that of high-income countries, and this is partially a result of years of conflict (World Bank 2014). The economy more generally has also been adversely affected by conflicts. While in 2003, when the United States attacked Iraq, Iraq's GDP growth was −33%, it recovered after 2003, increasing to 12.6% in 2012, after which it again declined to 6.8% in 2013 (World Development Indicators 2015). This fall in GDP growth has coincided with the rise in prominence of the terrorist organization ISIS operating in the country as well as the region.

The consequences for the infrastructure of the country have also been significant. The first Gulf War in 1991 caused large-scale destruction of the country's infrastructure and increased the spread of infectious diseases (Frankish 2003). Following the first Gulf War in 1991, for instance, surveys indicated that parts of Iraq witnessed a twofold increase in childhood mortality compared with levels in the previous two decades (Ali and Shah 2000). Additionally, in 1993 the water supply in Iraq deteriorated to 50% of prewar levels (Hoskins 1997) and the number of civilian deaths postwar approached 100,000 (Garfield and Neugut 1997). Recent conflicts have also led to a deterioration in water quality, increasing the likelihood of waterborne diseases (Zolnikov 2013). Moreover, the outbreak of fighting against ISIS has led to the closure of hospitals in northern Iraq, adversely affecting the provision of medical services to citizens (Cousins 2014).

Conflict in Iraq has influenced the normal flow of trade between countries. While the consequences of the emergence of ISIS for oil exports from Iraq can only be conclusively determined over time, the presence of ISIS in northern Iraq is putting financial pressure on the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), the semiautonomous government in the region (Kennedy 2015). Moreover, the group has also taken control of some of the oil fields in northern Iraq (Al-Khatteeb 2014). This deprives the government of necessary revenue while ISIS uses the resources to fuel the conflict within Iraq and beyond. The existing turmoil could potentially affect oil production in the region, hampering future trade prospects.

Additionally, the situation in Iraq has resulted in the migration of people, both IDPs and refugees. IDPs in Iraq are estimated to have numbered

almost 3.3 million by the end of 2014 (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2015). Not only has Iraq been involved in a conflict itself, but other neighboring states have also been embroiled in conflicts. This has led to a spillover of refugees from Iraq to other states such as Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Iran, and Lebanon (Leenders 2008). Similarly, the civil war in Syria has resulted in a refugee influx into Iraq. A rough estimate of the number of refugees originating from Iraq is 369,904, while 271,143 refugees are estimated to be living in Iraq who originally came from other states (UNHCR 2015). Similarly, IDPs are not just found in Iraq but, given the lack of stability in the Middle East and the North African region, the number of IDPs by the end of 2014 was estimated to be about 11.9 million. The terrorist organization ISIS is now operating in Syria and Iraq (Lawson 2014). This has led to a situation where conflict in one country is fueling conflict in another. The large magnitude of movement of people across and within borders is bound to impose a heavy burden on the government of Iraq and neighboring states to meet the welfare needs of both the displaced population and Iraqi citizens. The case of Iraq displays most of the causal mechanisms resulting from conflict, as discussed earlier in the theory section. The following section assesses the effect of conflict on human well-being outcomes across a global sample of countries over time.

Empirical Analyses

This chapter assesses the effect of three different dimensions of interstate and intrastate conflict: the occurrence, magnitude, and duration of conflicts among states as well as the effect of the magnitude of conflict among neighboring states on human well-being. The data for all conflict variables come from Major Episodes of Political Violence (Marshall 2015). The occurrence of interstate and intrastate conflicts is coded from variables "inttot" and "civtot," respectively. "Inttot" measures the magnitude of interstate conflicts, which includes the sum of the magnitude of international conflict (ranging from 0 to 10) and the magnitude of international warfare (ranging from 0 to 10), where higher numbers indicate conflicts of higher magnitude. The occurrence of interstate conflicts is coded as 1 if "inttot" is greater than 0; otherwise, it is coded 0. Similarly, "civtot" measures the magnitude of intrastate conflicts, which includes the sum of magnitudes of civil violence (ranging from 0 to 10), civil war (0 to 10), ethnic violence (0 to 10), and ethnic war (0 to 10), where higher numbers indicate conflicts of higher magnitude. The occurrence of intrastate con-

flicts is coded as 1 if "civtot" is greater than 0; otherwise, it is coded as 0. Occurrences of Both interstate and intrastate conflicts are coded as dichotomous variables. The magnitude of interstate and intrastate conflicts is measured using "intot" and "civtot," respectively (see earlier discussion of both variables). The duration of interstate and intrastate conflicts is measured by the number of years a country has been involved in an interstate or intrastate conflict. The effect of conflict among neighboring states on human well-being outcomes is measured by the variables "totint" and "totciv." "Totint" provides the sum of total interstate conflict magnitude scores for all neighboring states, while "totciv" provides the sum of total intrastate conflict magnitude scores for all neighboring states.[5]

Tables 5.1 through 5.4 present the empirical findings. Table 5.1 assesses the relationship between the occurrence of interstate (models 1–4) and intrastate (models 5–8) conflict and infant mortality, child mortality, education enrollment, and human development index. Both conflict variables are positive and significant for infant mortality and child mortality, indicating that the presence of conflict is associated with higher mortality rates. The prevalence of intrastate conflict is negative and significant in models 7 and 8, indicating that it reduces education and human development. Interstate conflict has a statistically significant effect only on human development, not on education. This may suggest that the effect of interstate conflicts on education enrollment is relatively weaker. Overall, the results are consistent with hypotheses *H5.1a* and *H5.1b*, where the very presence or occurrence of both types of conflict is detrimental to human well-being. The substantive effect of conflict is calculated by changing the conflict variables from their minimum to maximum values while holding all other variables at their mean. The presence of an interstate conflict increases infant mortality by 17% and child mortality by 18% and reduces education enrollment by 1.3% and human development by 2.9%. Civil conflict increases infant and child mortality by approximately 4% and reduces education and human development by 1.5 and 3.7%, respectively. These findings indicate that while both types of conflict adversely influence human well-being, interstate conflicts seem to have a stronger effect than intrastate conflicts. Furthermore, the effect of conflict occurrence is more pronounced in the case of infant and child mortality compared to education and human development. This suggests that the political dynamics may differ between health and education outcomes. Moreover, human development is an aggregate concept incorporating different dimensions of well-being, and these aspects of human well-being may not always exist in tandem, such that improvements in some indicators are not always reflected in others.

Table 5.1 Occurrence of conflict and human well-being

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6*	*Model 7*	*Model 8*
	Infant mortality	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*	*Infant mortality*	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*
Interstate conflict	0.155***	0.166***	−0.816	−0.0171***				
	(0.0250)	(0.0266)	(0.585)	(0.0040)				
Intrastate conflict					0.0413***	0.0433***	−0.949**	−0.0222***
					(0.0113)	(0.0123)	(0.411)	(0.0021)
GDP per capita	−0.388***	−0.383***	5.458***		−0.389***	−0.384***	5.413***	
	(0.0184)	(0.0178)	(0.265)		(0.0187)	(0.0182)	(0.273)	
Population density	−0.303***	−0.382***	11.29***	0.0792***	−0.307***	−0.387***	11.38***	0.0801***
	(0.0576)	(0.0566)	(0.965)	(0.0030)	(0.0583)	(0.0573)	(0.963)	(0.0030)
Democracy	−0.0101***	−0.0108***	0.121**	0.0003**	−0.0100***	−0.0107***	0.120**	0.0003**
	(0.0010)	(0.0010)	(0.0469)	(0.0001)	(0.0010)	(0.0011)	(0.0468)	(0.0001)
Urban population	−0.0057***	−0.0080***	0.279***	0.0046***	−0.0057***	−0.0080***	0.279***	0.0045***
	(0.0007)	(0.0006)	(0.0265)	(0.0001)	(0.0007)	(0.0006)	(0.0262)	(0.0001)
Constant	7.824***	8.497***	−35.75***	0.0712***	7.847***	8.521***	−35.54***	0.0739***
	(0.145)	(0.140)	(3.784)	(0.0085)	(0.140)	(0.135)	(3.797)	(0.0095)
Observations	6509	6525	4482	4732	6510	6526	4482	4732
Number of countries	163	163	129	128	163	163	129	128
R-squared	0.809	0.816	0.589	0.683	0.808	0.814	0.589	0.693
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$

Table 5.2 assesses the relationship between the duration of interstate (models 1–4) and intrastate (models 5–6) conflicts on infant mortality, child mortality, education enrollment, and human development. Both conflict variables are positive and significant for infant mortality and child mortality, indicating that conflicts of longer duration are associated with higher mortality rates. Coefficients for intrastate conflict are negative and significant in models 7 and 8, indicating that it reduces education enrollment and human development. Interstate conflict has a statistically significant effect only on human development, not on education. This is similar to the effect for the occurrence of interstate conflict discussed earlier, suggesting that interstate conflicts have a relatively weaker impact on education. Overall, the findings are consistent with hypotheses *H5.3a* and *H5.3b*. In substantive terms, a longer duration of interstate conflict increases infant and child mortality by approximately 56 and 58%, respectively, and reduces education enrollment and human development by 1 and 6%, respectively. A longer duration of intrastate conflicts increases infant and child mortality by 14 and 13%, respectively, and reduces education enrollment and human development by approximately 5%. This once again underscores the stronger effect of interstate versus intrastate conflicts on health outcomes.

Table 5.3 assesses the effect of the magnitude of interstate (models 1–4) and intrastate (models 5–8) conflicts on infant mortality, child mortality, education enrollment, and human development. Both conflict variables are positive and statistically significant for infant mortality and child mortality, indicating that conflicts of higher magnitude are associated with higher mortality rates. The conflict variables are negative and significant for education enrollment and human development, indicating that higher-magnitude interstate and intrastate conflicts are associated with lower levels of education enrollment and human development. This is consistent with hypotheses *H5.2a* and *H5.2b*. In substantive terms, higher-magnitude interstate conflicts increase infant mortality by 42% and child mortality by 45% and reduce education enrollment by approximately 5.7% and human development by about 10%. Higher-magnitude intrastate conflicts increase infant and child mortality by approximately 10% and reduce education enrollment and human development by about 7 and 10%, respectively. Here again we see that interstate conflicts have a stronger substantive effect on health outcomes than intrastate conflicts. Furthermore, both types of conflicts have a stronger effect on health outcomes compared to education and human development.

Table 5.4 assesses the relationship between the magnitude of interstate (models 1–4) and intrastate (models 5–8) conflicts in neighboring states on infant mortality, child mortality, education enrollment, and human

Table 5.2 Duration of conflict and human well-being

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6*	*Model 7*	*Model 8*
	Infant mortality	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*	*Infant mortality*	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*
Interstate conflict	0.0172***	0.0178***	−0.0328	−0.0017***				
	(0.0032)	(0.0031)	(0.0646)	(0.0003)				
Intrastate conflict					0.0024***	0.0023***	−0.0628***	−0.0004***
					(0.0004)	(0.0003)	(0.0134)	(9.85e−05)
GDP per capita	−0.390***	−0.385***	5.462***		−0.391***	−0.386***	5.474***	
	(0.0187)	(0.0181)	(0.264)		(0.0187)	(0.0182)	(0.264)	
Population density	−0.308***	−0.388***	11.31***	0.0796***	−0.315***	−0.394***	11.62***	0.0815***
	(0.0574)	(0.0564)	(0.962)	(0.0030)	(0.0570)	(0.0561)	(0.973)	(0.0032)
Democracy	−0.0099***	−0.0106***	0.121**	0.0003**	−0.0100***	−0.0107***	0.118**	0.0003**
	(0.0010)	(0.0010)	(0.0471)	(0.0001)	(0.0010)	(0.0011)	(0.0466)	(0.0001)
Urban population	−0.0056***	−0.0079***	0.279***	0.0046***	−0.0056***	−0.0079***	0.277***	0.0046***
	(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0267)	(0.0001)	(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0270)	(0.0001)
Constant	7.853***	8.527***	−35.85***	0.0689***	7.884***	8.555***	−36.80***	0.0627***
	(0.143)	(0.138)	(3.773)	(0.0085)	(0.140)	(0.135)	(3.712)	(0.0087)
Observations	6509	6525	4482	4732	6510	6526	4482	4732
Number of countries	163	163	129	128	163	163	129	128
R-squared	0.809	0.815	0.588	0.682	0.808	0.814	0.589	0.682
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$

Table 5.3 Magnitude of conflict and human well-being

	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6*	*Model 7*	*Model 8*
Variables	*Infant mortality*	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*	*Infant mortality*	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*
Interstate conflict	0.0441***	0.0470***	−0.429***	−0.0076***				
	(0.0069)	(0.0073)	(0.116)	(0.0009)				
Intrastate conflict					0.0090**	0.0095**	−0.417***	−0.0058***
					(0.0035)	(0.0039)	(0.121)	(0.0004)
GDP per capita	−0.389***	−0.384***	5.452***		−0.390***	−0.385***	5.413***	
	(0.0183)	(0.0177)	(0.266)		(0.0186)	(0.0180)	(0.267)	
Population density	−0.301***	−0.380***	11.27***	0.0786***	−0.307***	−0.387***	11.36***	0.0794***
	(0.0581)	(0.0571)	(0.966)	(0.0030)	(0.0578)	(0.0569)	(0.952)	(0.0028)
Democracy	−0.0101***	−0.0108***	0.122**	0.0003**	−0.0099***	−0.0107***	0.116**	0.0003*
	(0.0010)	(0.0010)	(0.0469)	(0.0001)	(0.0010)	(0.00112)	(0.0456)	(0.0001)
Urban population	−0.0058***	−0.0081***	0.279***	0.0046***	−0.0057***	−0.0080***	0.279***	0.0045***
	(0.0007)	(0.0006)	(0.0263)	(0.0001)	(0.0007)	(0.0006)	(0.0252)	(0.0001)
Constant	7.828***	8.501***	−35.62***	0.0729***	7.849***	8.523***	−35.37***	0.0747***
	(0.145)	(0.141)	(3.784)	(0.0087)	(0.141)	(0.136)	(3.743)	(0.0099)
Observations	6509	6525	4482	4732	6510	6526	4482	4732
Number of countries	163	163	129	128	163	163	129	128
R-squared	0.809	0.815	0.589	0.685	0.807	0.814	0.591	0.694
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$

Table 5.4 Magnitude of conflict among neighboring states and human well-being

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6*	*Model 7*	*Model 8*
	Infant mortality	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*	*Infant mortality*	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*
Interstate conflict	0.00654	0.0064	−0.222***	−0.0017***				
	(0.0049)	(0.0054)	(0.0542)	(0.0004)				
Intrastate conflict					0.0115***	0.0118***	−0.0036	−0.0010***
					(0.0018)	(0.0019)	(0.0689)	(0.0003)
GDP per capita	−0.386***	−0.381***	5.468***		−0.384***	−0.379***	5.462***	
	(0.0187)	(0.0183)	(0.267)		(0.0186)	(0.0180)	(0.272)	
Population density	−0.315***	−0.393***	11.36***	0.0799***	−0.322***	−0.401***	11.31***	0.0800***
	(0.0586)	(0.0578)	(0.961)	(0.0030)	(0.0584)	(0.0575)	(0.987)	(0.0031)
Democracy	−0.0100***	−0.0107***	0.116**	0.0003*	−0.0097***	−0.0104***	0.121**	0.0003**
	(0.0010)	(0.0011)	(0.0462)	(0.0001)	(0.0009)	(0.0010)	(0.0471)	(0.0001)
Urban population	−0.0057***	−0.0080***	0.278***	0.0046***	−0.0058***	−0.0081***	0.279***	0.0045***
	(0.0007)	(0.0006)	(0.0263)	(0.0001)	(0.0007)	(0.0006)	(0.0274)	(0.0001)
Constant	7.859***	8.530***	−35.95***	0.0684***	7.849***	8.519***	−35.84***	0.0722***
	(0.145)	(0.140)	(3.734)	(0.0088)	(0.137)	(0.132)	(3.778)	(0.0087)
Observations	6345	6361	4482	4732	6345	6361	4482	4732
Number of countries	162	162	129	128	162	162	129	128
R-squared	0.805	0.810	0.589	0.682	0.808	0.813	0.588	0.683
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$

development. Interstate conflicts among neighboring states is positive but insignificant both in the case of infant and child mortality. However, the variable is negative and significant for education and human development, indicating that higher levels of conflict magnitude in neighboring states are associated with lower levels of education and human development. This finding only provides partial support to hypothesis *H5.4a*. Higher-magnitude intrastate conflicts in neighboring states are, however, positive and significant in models 5 and 6, indicating that higher-magnitude intrastate conflicts in surrounding states may increase infant and child mortality. This is negative and significant in the human development model, indicating that higher levels of conflicts reduce human development in neighboring states, but its effect is insignificant in the education model (model 7). This provides some support to hypothesis *H5.4b*. In substantive terms, higher-magnitude interstate conflicts in neighboring states may reduce education enrollment and human development by approximately 6.7 and 5.3%, respectively. A civil conflict of higher magnitude in neighboring states may increase infant and child mortality by 39 and 41%, respectively, and reduce human development by approximately 5%. A plausible explanation for this finding may be the displacement of population, specifically the refugee problem caused by intrastate conflicts such as the kind we are witnessing today in Syria or due to the diffusion of conflict across borders. An inflow of refugees from neighboring countries may put pressure on the resources of surrounding countries or even incite violence between refugee-sending and refugee-receiving countries, thereby adversely affecting human well-being. In the case of interstate conflicts, the countries involved in the conflict may have incentives to minimize the effect of conflict on civilian populations since the warring parties are not groups within the same country, causing less of a spillover effect on neighboring countries owing to an exodus of refugees. In the case of intrastate conflicts, civilians may be more likely to be affected by the ongoing violence because groups within the country often challenge the government such that crossing borders may be the only way to escape the violence.

Overall, substantively, the duration of conflicts has the strongest detrimental effect on human well-being compared to occurrence, magnitude, and prevalence of conflict in neighboring areas. The control variables in all the tables perform as expected. Higher levels of GDP per capita, higher levels of democracy, greater population density, and a larger urban population are associated with lower levels of infant and child mortality and higher levels of education enrollment and human development. Greater diversion

of resources from productive to nonproductive avenues, strain on the overall economy, deteriorating infrastructure for basic social services, reduced trade, and displacement of population are some of the mechanisms through which conflicts could adversely influence human well-being.

Overall, the findings confirm that conflicts in general are detrimental to human well-being. While this is an important finding, as it confirms the conventional wisdom about the drawbacks associated with conflicts, the empirical analyses also shed light on other interesting observations regarding the types of conflicts and dimensions of conflicts. First, interstate conflicts seem to have a greater negative effect on human well-being than intrastate conflicts across the multiple dimensions of conflict under study. Even though intrastate conflicts seem to be more common today than interstate conflicts, as Figs. 5.1 and 5.2 indicate, the latter has a stronger effect on a global sample of countries. Interstate conflicts may involve multiple countries, so resources diverted toward the conflict may be greater, thereby reducing the availability of resources for productive avenues. Moreover, interstate conflicts may generate a rally effect, whereby citizens can develop nationalistic sentiments toward the country and become more likely to support greater spending while confronting an outside hostile actor. This could make it easier for governments to divert greater resources from productive areas to enhance security. Similarly, the magnitude of the effect of interstate conflicts on the economy, trade, and infrastructure may be greater given that governments may have more resources at their disposal to utilize in such conflicts, possibly due to the rally effect, while this may not necessarily be the case in intrastate conflicts, where governments confront hostile groups within the country. Of course, these are conjectures, and future research can explore this line of thinking more closely. This will help us better determine whether a diversion of resources occurs more frequently under interstate or intrastate conflicts. Second, the duration of interstate and intrastate conflicts has the strongest effect on human well-being compared to occurrence and magnitude. Conflicts that last longer seem to be worse than the mere occurrence of a conflict or a high-magnitude conflict. A plausible explanation could be that such conflicts, by virtue of lasting longer, lead to a continued diversion of resources over time and cause long-term damage to the economy, infrastructure, trade prospects, and displacement of population.

As robustness tests, alternative models using time fixed effects (Tables A 5.5–A 5.8) and additional controls without country or time fixed effects (Tables A 5.9–A 5.12) are presented in Appendix A. Most of the substantive

findings remain the same across all the models. Among the four dependent variables, infant mortality, child mortality, and human development perform more consistently compared to education enrollment. This is similar to the baseline findings discussed earlier, where the education variable performs inconsistently as well. The dynamics associated with education enrollment seem to be different compared to the other dependent variables under study. The mechanisms discussed earlier seem to be especially applicable to health outcomes compared to education enrollment. For instance, conflicts can directly cost human lives, facilitate the spread of diseases owing to the breakdown of essential health infrastructure, which again adversely affects health outcomes, and affect the mental and physical health of the adult and the younger population. These mechanisms are more likely to result in detrimental health outcomes. To the extent that conflicts lead to the destruction of the education infrastructure and to a diversion of resources from education, lower education enrollment may result, and some of the models do lend support to these theoretical propositions.

Overall, however, the detrimental effects of interstate and intrastate conflicts on human well-being outcomes are confirmed in the robustness tests as well. Among the additional control variables, distinct regional patterns can be observed. African and Latin American countries are associated with higher levels of infant and child mortality, while Asian countries seem to perform better in terms of health outcomes. However, Asian countries perform better in education enrollment and human development. With regard to education enrollment and human development, African countries consistently perform poorly, with lower levels of education enrollment and human development, as do Latin American countries in most of the models. As expected, ethnic heterogeneity or greater levels of diversity within countries are associated with higher levels of infant and child mortality and lower levels of education and human development.

Conclusion

Although conflicts are relatively rare in international relations, they are prevalent and have important consequences for human well-being. While the adverse effects of conflict are well known, with many examples of anecdotal evidence about the relationship between conflicts and human well-being, relatively less is known about the differences between the different types of conflict (namely, interstate versus intrastate) and the effects of

different dimensions of conflicts (namely, occurrence, duration, and magnitude). Not all conflicts are the same, and analyzing the effects of the different types and dimensions of conflict enable us to better understand the consequences of conflict more generally. Only when we have a complete understanding of how conflicts influence welfare outcomes can we formulate policies to adequately address its adverse effects.

Overall, this chapter attempts to arrive at a deeper understand of conflicts and their effects on human well-being, and the findings in the chapter demonstrate that interstate conflicts are especially detrimental to human well-being outcomes compared to intrastate conflicts. Furthermore, the effect of conflicts is especially prevalent in health outcomes compared to education and human development. Thus, while efforts need to be made to reduce the occurrence of all types of conflicts, reducing the likelihood of interstate conflicts is especially necessary, and finding ways to offset the impact of conflicts on health outcomes is equally important. Additionally, the duration of conflicts seems to have the greatest substantive effect on human well-being compared to the occurrence and magnitude of conflicts. Therefore, making an effort to reduce in particular the duration of conflicts will help reduce human suffering. Overall, much remains unknown about the consequences of conflicts because there are numerous mechanisms through which conflicts can adversely affect human well-being outcomes. A better understanding of these causal mechanisms will enable us to minimize the ramifications of conflicts. Perhaps it is utopian to visualize a society without conflicts, but a better understanding of conflicts will enable us to better deal with the challenges posed by interstate and intrastate conflicts.

Notes

1. The conflict data come from Major Episodes of Political Violence (Marshall 2015). The subsequent empirical analyses section discusses how both interstate and intrastate conflict variables are measured.
2. These countries were involved in civil conflicts, and the extravagant figures suggest the extent to which resources are diverted to military expenditures in spite of the fact that there were more pressing problems in these countries, like famines.
3. Even though Palestine is not recognized as an international entity, the alarming rate of child deaths in Gaza indicates that children, being one of the most vulnerable groups, undergo tremendous suffering during conflicts.

4. It is worth noting, however, that there is not a complete consensus that conflict reduces trade (e.g., Barbieri and Levy 1999, 2001).
5. A detailed description of all the dependent variables and control variables and methodology is discussed in Chap. 2. All the models also control for the level of democracy. I use the "polity2" variable from the Polity IV data set to classify democracies and nondemocracies (Marshall et al. 2014). The variable ranges from −10 to +10, where higher values indicate higher levels of democracy.

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CHAPTER 6

Conclusion: Concluding Remarks, Policy Implications, and Future Research

Human well-being has been one of the primary concerns among prominent thinkers, policymakers, and the scholarly community for some time. However, the prevailing persistence of large disparities in human well-being outcomes globally necessitates the need for more research on an issue of fundamental significance. Enhancing human well-being is a complex process, and it becomes imperative for academic scholars to adopt a comprehensive approach to improve our understanding of human well-being. This book demonstrates that the quest for the enhancement of human lives pervades subfields of comparative politics and international relations in political science. Both within-state politics as well as between-state politics play a determining role in influencing human lives. How do these political dynamics enhance or inhibit human well-being? How can we improve the general welfare of citizens? These are pivotal lingering questions that this book has sought to address. The concept of human well-being encompasses various aspects of human lives that are essential to leading a wholesome life, namely, better health, proper housing, employment, income, education, living conditions, happiness, and life satisfaction, among several others. This book assesses the effect of domestic and international political factors on objective indicators, such as infant and child mortality, educational enrollment, and the human development index (HDI).

Domestic politics directly affects welfare outcomes, which makes it essential for us to understand its consequences on human well-being.

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Political representation and the governing environment shed light on domestic determinants. The structure of the political environment varies globally with countries exhibiting large variations in political representation. Additionally, the way political officials exercise their power in office is of significance, with some officials governing better than others. Both these domestic factors have ramifications for citizens' well-being. No less important is the role of international forces in determining well-being outcomes. The two international factors I focus on are globalization and conflict. Globalization, with its multidimensional nature, has permeated various aspects of human lives, and the consequences of this pervasive phenomenon are far from unambiguous and therefore need to be further investigated. History provides testament to peaceful and conflictual relations between states, and both forms of interaction have ramifications for citizens' well-being around the globe. By focusing on conflictual relations, the book also sheds light on the consequences of hostile relations between countries. Overall, this book has made an attempt to develop the literature on the politics of general welfare. The four empirical chapters explore the effects of domestic and international political determinants of human well-being individually by theorizing and systematically assessing the relationship between the theoretical variables of interest.[1]

In this chapter, all four theoretical variables of interest are included in the same model to see how the political determinants collectively influence well-being outcomes. Table 6.1 presents the findings where models 1–4 include the four dependent variables of interest, namely, infant mortality, child mortality, education enrollment, and the HDI.[2] The findings demonstrate that all four theoretical variables of interest—political representation, good governance, globalization, and conflict—are associated with human well-being outcomes. As expected, higher levels of political representation, good governance, and overall globalization are associated with lower levels of infant and child mortality and higher levels of education and human development. The only exception here is that the governance variable does not reach statistical levels of significance in model 3, where education enrollment is the dependent variable. The occurrence of interstate or intrastate conflict is associated with higher levels of infant and child mortality and lower levels of education and human development. The control variables perform as expected, where higher levels of income, population density, and urban population are associated with lower levels of infant and child mortality and higher levels of education enrollment and human development. Overall, the findings here demonstrate that even

Table 6.1 Domestic and international political determinants of human well-being

	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*
Variables	*Infant mortality*	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*
Domestic determinants				
Political representation	−0.0416***	−0.0447***	1.587***	0.0054**
	(0.0084)	(0.0107)	(0.133)	(0.0022)
Governance	−0.127***	−0.108***	−0.437	0.0196***
	(0.0130)	(0.0145)	(0.555)	(0.0035)
International determinants				
Overall globalization	−0.0134***	−0.0138***	0.338***	0.0034***
	(0.0008)	(0.0011)	(0.0279)	(0.0002)
Conflict	0.0998***	0.0992***	−2.503***	−0.0157***
	(0.0090)	(0.0113)	(0.523)	(0.0037)
Controls				
GDP per capita	−0.333***	−0.374***	1.782***	
	(0.0099)	(0.0122)	(0.425)	
Population density	−0.113***	−0.125***	0.0682	0.0125***
	(0.0030)	(0.0034)	(0.283)	(0.0011)
Urban population	−0.0047***	−0.00669***	0.310***	0.0041***
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0153)	(9.09e-05)
Constant	7.674***	8.398***	14.06***	0.123***
	(0.0477)	(0.0562)	(1.692)	(0.0068)
Observations	2971	2971	2533	2564
Number of countries	132	132	110	110
R-squared	0.877	0.871	0.681	0.826

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$

when we examine the effects of all the domestic and international political determinants collectively, all four political factors are associated with human well-being. This underscores the significance of politics for welfare outcomes. The substantive effect of these political factors also provides interesting insights. Changing political representation, governance, and globalization from their minimum to maximum values is associated with an 18, 41, and 64% reduction in infant mortality, respectively, while the occurrence of conflict is associated with a 10% increase in infant mortality.[3] This suggests that globalization has the largest substantive effect on infant mortality, followed by governance, political representation, and, finally,

conflict. These substantive effects are similar to those discussed in Chaps. 2, 3, 4, and 5, where globalization also has the strongest substantive effect, followed by the others. This speaks to the consistency of the empirical findings and demonstrates that while both domestic and international political factors play an important role in enhancing human well-being, the role of international political determinants such as globalization is especially prominent. This may be because globalization is pervasive today. Conflict, on the other hand, is a relatively rare phenomenon, and this could explain its relatively weaker substantive effect compared to the other factors. Political representation and governance are both domestic factors that also have a large substantive effect on human well-being. This is consistent with our expectations since governments are in a position to play an especially important role in enhancing human lives.

The objective here is to highlight the role of political determinants that can explain the variation in human well-being globally and shed light on variations in well-being within democratic and nondemocratic countries. The following section summarizes the findings, discusses the policy implications and contributions of the book to the larger body of research on well-being, and identifies avenues of future research.

Chapter 2 assesses the relationship between political representation and human well-being. Political representation is prevalent in varying degrees among countries globally, and this variation plays an important role in predicting the global disparities in human well-being. Countries that have better representation are more inclusive and competitive in nature. A more inclusive system provides opportunities for various groups within society to influence welfare policies, and a more competitive system provides the necessary motivation for representatives to perform well in office to ensure their political survival. The empirical evidence lends support to the beneficial effects of a more representative society, where countries that are more representative are associated with higher levels of human well-being compared to countries that are less-representative in nature. While it is plausible that higher levels of political representation may lead to policy gridlocks and obstruct policymaking, the findings provide overwhelming support for the positive association between political representation and better human well-being outcomes.

The findings of this chapter are especially relevant for governments worldwide more generally that are striving to enhance the well-being outcomes of their citizens as well as for newly transitioned countries, more specifically those that are contemplating institutional alternatives that can

maximize the welfare of their citizens. Adopting institutions that promote representation is one way to ensure greater well-being. While it may be difficult to directly manipulate the level of representation, efforts could be made to permit and encourage multiple groups within society to participate in the governing process. Even though nondemocratic regimes may not have the incentives to allow competing groups to participate in the governing process, permitting some degree of representation may pay large dividends for the populace. The chapter identifies two plausible mechanisms through which political representation enhances human well-being, inclusiveness and competitiveness. The findings primarily provide evidence of the positive association between political representation and human well-being, but the chapter does not test the specific causal mechanisms. Future studies could pursue this line of research to identify which of the two mechanisms plays a more important role in improving human lives. This chapter focuses on one attribute of political regimes, political representation. Scholars could also identify other attributes that vary across countries globally as well as within political regimes to shed light on alternative domestic political determinants of human well-being.

Besides political representation, equally important is how governing officials exercise their authority in office. Chapter 3 pursues this line of thinking and assesses the relationship between governance and human well-being. I argue that good governance relates to high bureaucratic quality, low levels of corruption, and a strong rule of law, which collectively influence societal well-being by ensuring an effective implementation of welfare policies, reduced rent-seeking behavior, and greater accountability of government officials. The empirical evidence provides support to the beneficial effects of good governance globally. Furthermore, the findings demonstrate that under conditions of poor governance, there is no statistical difference between democracies and nondemocracies. This suggests that establishing a democracy that is only considered a democracy for its bare minimum qualities and devoid of good governance is insufficient to enhance human welfare, so much so, that these democracies perform no better than nondemocratic regimes. Thus, the way authority is exercised by political representatives is critical, regardless of regime-type. Lastly, the findings do provide some support for the hypothesis that democracies perform better than nondemocracies under conditions of good governance.

The policy implications of these findings suggest that measures to enhance the quality of governance, namely, improving the quality of

bureaucracy, lowering corruption, and strengthening the rule of law, can pay large dividends for human welfare. Thus, efforts need to be directed toward the improvement of governance. The existing research has made attempts to identify ways in which corruption can be reduced in the health sector (Kutzin et al. 2003; Barber et al. 2004) or the quality of bureaucracy can be improved (Rauch and Evans 2000). Organizations like the World Health Organization (WHO) have also initiated programs like "Good Governance for Medicines" in various countries to increase transparency and prevent corruption in the health sector (Baghdadi-Sabeti and Serhan 2010). Others, like the World Bank, have initiated programs like the "Comprehensive Development Framework," which focuses on improving the functioning of the public sector and the legal system, since both are critical to good governance (World Bank 2000). Future studies can further explore this line of research by analyzing whether the initiatives undertaken by international organizations such as the WHO or the World Bank to improve governance have actually enhanced the quality of governance. Yet another avenue of future research could be to analyze why only some democracies and nondemocracies govern better compared to others. Is there something inherent about specific regimes that leads to better governance? Do certain regime attributes improve governance? Are certain types of democracies and nondemocracies more conducive to good governance? The pursuit of such research questions will shed more light on the relationship between political regimes and quality of governance.

Overall, Chaps. 2 and 3, mark a departure from the bulk of the existing literature that primarily focusses on regime type and provide better leverage in understanding how domestic politics influences the quality of human lives across political regimes in a global sample of countries. While domestic determinants are undeniably important, the role of international forces cannot be overlooked today. Chapters 4 and 5 focus on the international determinants of human well-being. Globalization is an international phenomenon that has come to acquire tremendous prominence today. Chapter 4 analyzes the effect of three different dimensions of globalization—economic, social, and political—on human well-being. While there are advantages and disadvantages associated with globalization, despite its shortcomings, on net, globalization has a positive effect on human welfare owing to its ability to bring increased development, technology, dissemination of knowledge, and greater foreign support for other countries as well as international organizations. The findings indicate that all three forms of globalization have enhanced human welfare. Substantively, social

globalization has the strongest effect on the well-being outcomes under study as compared to economic and political globalization. A plausible reason for this could be that the effects of social globalization are more unequivocally positive compared to economic and political globalization. Furthermore, the effects of all three dimensions of globalization are most prevalent in the case of health outcomes such as infant and child mortality compared to education and the HDI.

Overall, these findings have significance for both social science and public policy. Concerning social science, the findings contribute to the longstanding debate as to whether the forces of globalization are a positive or negative force in the world. Although the results speak only to the issue of some of the well-being outcomes, this is an important criterion for evaluating globalization. Concerning public policy, the findings have clear implications for human well-being advocates. While organizations like the United Nations Development Programme and the United Nations Children's Fund can, and should, continue to advocate for the interests of developing countries, they should also keep in mind that encouraging developing countries to incorporate themselves into the global system (economically, socially, and politically) will also enhance well-being outcomes. For these same reasons, the results should be of considerable interest to policymakers in the developing world, who often face difficult choices concerning the political costs and benefits of economic liberalization and decreased cultural autonomy.

While I have not been able to provide here a full cost/benefit analysis of globalization, it needs to be noted that a new and important dimension must enter such calculations, namely, globalization's positive effects on well-being. However, the vast theoretical literature reviewed in Chap. 3 provides markedly mixed conclusions on the costs and benefits of globalization. This therefore suggests that there is substantial room for improving the net effects of globalization through determined efforts to minimize its negative effects. Scholars such as Stiglitz (2007) advocate this line of thinking by ultimately endorsing globalization but arguing that it could be made much more beneficial, such as by creating a fairer trade regime, increasing foreign assistance, and providing greater debt relief to developing countries.

There are a number of fruitful avenues for further research. First, Chap. 3 disaggregates globalization to a large extent; it will be important for future researchers to further disaggregate this concept and determine whether all components of globalization are important or whether just

certain aspects are key to enhancing human welfare. As just one example, does social globalization enhance welfare merely through increased access to information, such that increasing the raw number of radios and televisions will suffice? Or is it necessary that a global culture thoroughly pervade a country, such as the incorporation of foreign ideologies? Similarly, does economic globalization enhance human well-being through greater economic growth, trade, or foreign aid? In the case of political globalization, is it the interaction among independent countries or greater involvement of international organizations that enhances human well-being? Overall, what are the primary causal mechanisms through which globalization exerts its effects? Multiple theoretical mechanisms have been identified between globalization and well-being, but in a first analysis such as this it is impossible to evaluate each mechanism separately. By gathering data on some of the intervening processes, such as personal health practices, diffusion of knowledge, and the role of international organizations, among others, scholars can understand more precisely *why* globalization has such a positive effect on human well-being. Hopefully the findings presented here will stimulate such research.

Hostile relations between countries often characterize international interactions as well. Chapter 5 facilitates a better understanding of conflictual relations between states by analyzing the effects of interstate and intrastate conflict on human well-being. More importantly, this represents one of the first attempts to analyze different dimensions of interstate and intrastate conflict, namely, the occurrence, magnitude, and duration of conflicts. I argue that conflict drives states to divert resources from productive areas that enhance human well-being, adversely affects the economic performance of countries embroiled in conflicts, deteriorates the quality of infrastructure, hampers trade between countries, and leads to dislocations of populations. Thus, multiple mechanisms shed light on the different ways in which conflict influences human well-being. The empirical findings demonstrate that, overall, conflicts adversely affect well-being outcomes. More specifically, interstate conflicts have a stronger substantive effect than intrastate conflicts on human well-being. Additionally, the duration of conflicts seems to have a stronger effect than the occurrence and magnitude of both types of conflict.

In terms of policy implications, while total prevention of conflicts between states is highly improbable, the findings suggest that states involved in conflicts—as well as international organizations like the United Nations—should ensure that the destruction of public and private

infrastructure and services critical to well-being outcomes as well as dislocation of population be minimized during conflicts. Additionally, since the duration of conflicts has the strongest substantive effect on human well-being, attempts should be made to prevent the prolongation of conflicts. Several avenues for future research can be pursued. The chapter identifies numerous mechanisms through which conflicts hurt human well-being. Future research can identify which of these mechanisms play a more important role. Alternatively, future studies can analyze whether human welfare deteriorates more in the initiating or the defending state in an interstate conflict. A plausible expectation would be that an attacked country will suffer substantially higher civilian deaths than the attacker, assuming the aggressor is the more powerful state between the two. Thus, future research can explore whether there are discernible differences in welfare outcomes between the initiating and defending state.

I have endeavored here to bring attention to the politics of human well-being by identifying the factors that play a propelling or constraining role in improving human lives and establishing general patterns of relationship between the political determinants and well-being outcomes. Naturally this approach comes at the expense of measuring and testing the intermediate mechanisms that link the political factors to the well-being outcomes under study. The mechanisms discussed in each of the chapters are numerous, and it is beyond the scope of this book to test each of these mechanisms. Moreover, they are often difficult to capture empirically, which necessitates a degree of conjecture in the study. Indeed much work remains to be done and future research can and should explore ways to develop this line of research further.

The subject of human well-being is of interest in various other disciplines besides political science that focus on nonpolitical determinants of well-being. Some of these factors include the health of mothers, caste or tribe membership, mother's age at the time of birth, access to bathrooms (Pandey et al. 1998), presence of trained personnel during childbirth (Baird et al. 2011), hospital infrastructure and quality (Aguilera and Marrufo 2007), education level of mother (Hobcraft et al. 1984; Song and Burgard 2011), time between births (Trussell and Pebley 1984), fertility levels, family health programs, female illiteracy (Macinko et al. 2006), water pollution (Jorgenson 2004), and public infrastructure (Fay et al. 2005), among others. While these factors are important determinants of human well-being, the empirical analyses presented in the book do not control for them for theoretical and empirical reasons. Theoretically, these factors present policy alternatives

available with governments to influence human well-being. For instance, the health and education of the mother are important intervening determinants of well-being indicators such as infant mortality, and one way for the government to reduce infant mortality is by implementing programs that enhance the health and education levels of mothers. Thus, controlling for these correlates is inappropriate because they can be regarded as consequences or outcomes of the primary independent variables of interest (King et al. 1994). Moreover, the objective of the book is to highlight the politics of well-being outcomes. The nonpolitical determinants of well-being are relatively well known, as briefly discussed earlier, and as such are less of a puzzle. What is intriguing is what motivates political officials to pursue policies that enhance well-being, and the study of political factors provides unique insights in this regard. The empirical reason as to why I do not control for the aforementioned determinants is because data for a number of these factors, such as the mother's health, mother's age at the time of birth, access to bathrooms during childbirth, time between births, and public infrastructure, among other determinants identified earlier, are not available or comparable across countries and over time.

Overall, several broad avenues of future research can also be identified. While this book analyzes the domestic and international determinants of human well-being separately, enhancing human well-being is a complex process, and it is plausible for domestic and international political factors to work in conjunction with one another. Future researchers could benefit by investigating how those two sets of factors combine in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the politics of human well-being. Thus, scholars need to develop theoretical explanations that focus on the interplay between domestic and international determinants of human well-being. Additionally, this book focuses on four primary indicators of human well-being: infant mortality, child mortality, education enrollment, and the HDI. Future research could explore the political determinants of a variety of welfare outcomes, for example, poverty, literacy, income distribution, unemployment, and social spending. Lastly, while this book has focused on global variations in human well-being, there is room and need for additional research among developing countries in particular since the dynamics of welfare outcomes may differ between the developed and developing worlds. In the same vein, differences or similarities in political dynamics across regions will be yet another fruitful avenue of future research.

While this book focuses primarily on the political determinants of objective well-being outcomes, the findings in this book have implications for subjective well-being as well. The introduction provides an overview of existing research on subjective well-being. This section discusses the contributions of this book to the literature on subjective well-being. Both economic and political factors influence subjective well-being outcomes. Among economic factors, income seems to play an important role in both subjective and objective well-being. Income as measured by GDP per capita continues to be statistically significant across a majority of models in this book. A plausible explanation is that the availability of greater resources enables governments to divert funds toward welfare outcomes. Even though income is not the theoretical focus of this book, it has come to be accepted as a standard control in most quantitative studies of well-being. While there is no unanimous consensus in the literature on subjective well-being about the role of economic conditions, some studies do suggest that absolute or relative economic conditions are associated with higher levels of happiness. Absolute economic conditions as captured by aggregate measures of the economy may help satisfy human needs (Veenhoven 1991; Hagerty and Veenhoven 2003), while relative economic theory suggests that individuals primarily compare their economic standing to that of others or their own past situation (Duesenberry 1949; Michalos 1985). Both strands of research emphasize that economic factors play an important role. Overall, this suggests that economic factors are influential in enhancing both subjective and objective indicators of well-being.

Among political factors, regime type plays an important role in determining both objective and subjective well-being as well. A large body of research confirms the significance of democratic regime type over non-democratic regimes (Moon and Dixon 1985; Shin 1989; Przeworski et al. 2000; Zweifel and Navia 2000; Lake and Baum 2001; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Besley and Kudamatsu 2006; McGuire 2010; Gerring et al. 2012) in enhancing objective well-being outcomes, and the introduction discusses in detail the theoretical perspectives linking regime type to human well-being. Regime type is included as a control in the majority of statistical models in the chapters, and it remains statistically significant across most models. The importance of democracy is also emphasized by several studies in the subjective well-being literature (Frey and Stutzer 2000a, b, 2005; Owen et al. 2008; Dorn et al. 2007).[4] One can conclude that there is broad consensus in the literature on the beneficial effects of a

democratic regime type in terms of enhancing both subjective and objective well-being outcomes.

Chapter 2 assesses the relationship between political representation and human well-being outcomes, and the findings demonstrate the significance of a more representative society. Political representation, as captured by multiparty competition, is indicative of a more inclusive and competitive society that provides the necessary motivation for political representatives to formulate policies that enhance well-being. Existing research on subjective well-being has yet to analyze the effect of political representation on individual levels of life satisfaction, happiness, and personal achievement, for example. If a more representative society enhances objective well-being outcomes, it is plausible that the benefits of such a society would also improve people's subjective well-being. Higher levels of political representation enhance objective well-being outcomes, and to the extent that this enhances the subjective well-being of citizens, we might find a positive association between political representation and subjective well-being. While existing research on subjective well-being does not explicitly analyze the role of political representation, several studies do emphasize the role of democracy in enhancing subjective well-being (Frey and Stutzer 2000a, b, 2005; Owen et al. 2008; Dorn et al. 2007), as mentioned earlier. Since political representation is an attribute of democratic regimes, it is plausible that higher levels of political representation may enhance subjective well-being as well. Of course, future research can explore this line of study in a more systematic manner.

Chapter 3 assesses the relationship between governance and objective well-being, and the findings in this book demonstrate the significance of governance for objective well-being indicators. Governance is captured by bureaucratic quality, level of corruption, and rule of law, and the findings presented confirm that good governance is associated with better well-being outcomes globally. This is also consistent with Helliwell and Huang's (2008) study, which analyzes the effect of governance on subjective well-being and demonstrates that good governance is associated with higher levels of life satisfaction. This suggests that good governance is essential for both objective and subjective well-being, an important finding for policymakers and governments that are working to enhance human lives in a holistic manner.

The two international political determinants of well-being in this book are globalization and conflict. Chapter 4 analyzes the relationship between globalization and human well-being. Globalization is a complex phenom-

enon with theoretically competing consequences. However, the findings here overwhelmingly demonstrate that globalization enhances well-being outcomes; economic, social, and political globalization is beneficial for societal welfare. Relatively less is known about how globalization influences subjective well-being, although a few studies have explored the relationship between the two. Bjørnskov et al. (2008) demonstrate that economic openness is associated with higher levels of life satisfaction, plausibly owing to the availability of a wider range of commodities at lower costs. Assessing the effect of globalization at the individual level, Tsai et al. (2012) demonstrate that globalization enhances well-being by increasing individual capacity through exposure to the English language as well as greater global awareness. Because globalization is a multidimensional concept, there is tremendous scope for research here. Future studies will need to explore how the different dimensions of globalization enhance subjective well-being. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, globalization can influence well-being through a variety of causal mechanisms, and testing these numerous mechanisms can be another avenue of research in the context of objective and subjective well-being outcomes. Overall, this is an important area of research that has yet to be explored thoroughly, and such a research endeavor can help us better understand the role of international determinants that influence individuals' perceptions of their lives.

Chapter 5 analyzes the effect of conflict on human well-being. I argue in the chapter that conflict may drive states to divert resources from productive areas that enhance human well-being, adversely affects the economic performance of the country embroiled in conflicts, deteriorates the quality of infrastructure, hampers trade between countries, and leads to dislocations of populations. The chapter assesses the effects of different dimensions of intrastate and interstate conflict. The findings confirm the drawbacks of conflict for objective well-being outcomes. The adverse effects of conflict may hurt subjective well-being as well. Shemyakina and Plagnol (2013) analyze the effect of the Bosnian War (1992–1995) on subjective well-being and demonstrate that war adversely affects individual well-being. To the extent that the adverse effects of conflict on objective well-being will also negatively affect subjective indicators of well-being, we could expect a similar relationship between the different dimensions of conflict and subjective well-being outcomes. Future research can explore this in a more systematic manner. Overall, relatively less is known about the international determinants of subjective well-being, and this could be a fruitful avenue of future research.

Broadly speaking, this discussion highlights the significance of political factors in improving objective and subjective well-being and demonstrates that the role of politics is crucial to the enhancement of human life. Though it is beyond the scope of this book to assess the determinants of subjective and objective determinants collectively, this can be an important avenue of future research that would provide us with a holistic understanding of how we can enhance well-being. This approach can shed light on the similarities or differences in the determinants of objective versus subjective well-being. Do the factors that enhance objective well-being also enhance subjective well-being? Do subjective and objective well-being outcomes coexist? Can individuals express high levels of subjective well-being even if objectively their quality of life is not satisfactory or vice versa? Do the causal mechanisms that help account for objective well-being also enhance subjective well-being? These are some of the important questions that future studies can help explore. Because most scholars studying human well-being would agree that the concept of well-being has objective and subjective dimensions, future studies would benefit from adopting a comprehensive approach to studying well-being that combines both objective and subjective indicators. A concerted effort needs to be made to develop measures of well-being that include both objective and subjective indicators. For instance, D'Acci (2011) has created the Well-Being and Progress Index (WIP), which combines subjective and objective well-being indicators. Use of such comprehensive indicators in future research, together with the use of disaggregated measures, will be an important contribution to the existing research on well-being.

Notes

1. By no means is this an exhaustive list of political factors that influence human well-being outcomes. Please refer to Chap. 1 for an overview of the vast literature on the political determinants of subjective and objective well-being outcomes.
2. There are some differences and similarities between the models presented here and the statistical models presented in other chapters that need to be pointed out. First, note that the models in Chap. 2 that assess the effect of political representation on human well-being outcomes do not control for the level of democracy since political representation is an attribute of democratic regimes. However, the models in all other chapters do control for the level of democracy. Since political representation is included in all the

models in this table, I do not control for the level of democracy in these models as well. Second, similar to all the other models that analyze the determinants of the HDI, model 4 in Table 6.1 also does not include GDP per capita as a control since the HDI includes income in its measure. Third, the empirical analysis in Chap. 3 does not include country fixed effects in considering the effect of governance on human well-being outcomes since governance does not vary much within countries. Since governance is included in all the models in Table 6.1, these models also do not include country fixed effects either. Fourth, Chap. 4 assesses the effect of economic, social, political, and overall globalization on human well-being. Table 6.1 only focuses on the overall globalization index in the interest of brevity. Lastly, Chap. 5 analyzes the effect of different types and dimensions of conflict on human well-being. In the interest of conciseness, the conflict variable in Table 6.1 is measured using a dichotomous variable, which takes a value of 1 if there is an occurrence of interstate or intrastate conflict in a country and 0 otherwise. The conflict variables are discussed in greater detail in Chap. 5.

3. These substantive effects are calculated by changing the values of the theoretical variables of interest while holding all other variables at their mean values.
4. Please refer to Chap. 1 for an overview of the different reasons linking regime type to objective and subjective well-being outcomes.

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Appendix A

Table A 2.2 Political representation and human well-being (with time dummies)

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*
	Infant mortality	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*
Political representation	−0.105***	−0.110***	2.084***	0.0278***
	(0.0073)	(0.0082)	(0.133)	(0.0009)
GDP per capita	−0.488***	−0.522***	4.557***	
	(0.0100)	(0.0096)	(0.344)	
Population density	−0.119***	−0.135***	0.735***	0.0190***
	(0.0041)	(0.0033)	(0.204)	(0.0006)
Urban population	−0.0028***	−0.0047***	0.269***	0.0057***
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0183)	(6.51e−05)
Constant	7.960***	8.648***	0.321	0.144***
	(0.0510)	(0.0400)	(1.351)	(0.0028)
Observations	6354	6370	4358	4614
Number of countries	162	162	129	128
R-squared	0.854	0.855	0.665	0.774
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***$p < 0.01$

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Table A 2.3 Political representation and human well-being (with additional controls)

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*
	Infant mortality	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*
Political representation	−0.116***	−0.119***	2.400***	0.0259***
	(0.0082)	(0.0084)	(0.208)	(0.0005)
GDP per capita	−0.437***	−0.461***	4.450***	
	(0.0115)	(0.0126)	(0.486)	
Population density	−0.0775***	−0.0856***	0.573**	0.0106***
	(0.0054)	(0.0052)	(0.261)	(0.0008)
Urban population	−0.0029***	−0.0038***	0.168***	0.0039***
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0243)	(0.0001)
Ethnic heterogeneity	0.335***	0.383***	−1.965***	−0.0446***
	(0.0405)	(0.0491)	(0.527)	(0.0040)
Africa	0.186***	0.352***	−11.33***	−0.152***
	(0.0677)	(0.0785)	(2.081)	(0.0094)
Asia	−0.143***	−0.133***	−2.820*	−0.0660***
	(0.0374)	(0.0439)	(1.455)	(0.0028)
Latin America	0.161***	0.150***	−0.522	−0.0313***
	(0.0237)	(0.0281)	(1.254)	(0.0041)
Constant	7.320***	7.804***	15.27***	0.359***
	(0.0525)	(0.0709)	(5.434)	(0.0155)
Observations	5651	5667	4201	4435
Number of countries	156	156	128	127
R-squared	0.863	0.874	0.667	0.845

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$

Table A 2.4 Descriptive statistics for political representation and human well-being

Variable	*Obs.*	*Mean*	*Std. Dev.*	*Min.*	*Max.*
Infant mortality	6354	3.54	1.09	0.47	5.45
Child mortality	6370	3.84	1.20	0.69	6.03
Education enrollment ratio	4377	62.63	20.76	5.22	115.81
Hybrid HDI	4614	0.611	0.18	0.12	0.93
Political representation	6354	2.96	1.52	0	5
GDP per capita	6354	7.33	1.65	3.62	11.64
Population density	6354	3.74	1.42	−0.15	8.95
Urban population	6354	49.24	24.31	2.15	100

Table A 3.6 Governance, regime type, and human well-being (with time dummies)

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6*	*Model 7*	*Model 8*
	Infant mortality	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*	*Infant mortality*	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*
Governance	−0.239***	−0.214***	2.488***	0.0575***	−0.167***	−0.166***	1.761*	0.0691***
	(0.0182)	(0.0184)	(0.766)	(0.0054)	(0.0236)	(0.0260)	(1.001)	(0.0131)
Democracy	−0.203***	−0.251***	5.767***	0.0466***	0.0505	−0.0836	3.478**	0.0818***
	(0.0095)	(0.0116)	(0.472)	(0.0022)	(0.0535)	(0.0573)	(1.351)	(0.0217)
Governance*democracy (interaction term)					−0.109***	−0.0721***	0.997**	−0.0153
					(0.0191)	(0.0214)	(0.457)	(0.0096)
GDP per capita	−0.387***	−0.431***	3.415***		−0.379***	−0.425***	3.361***	
	(0.0077)	(0.0097)	(0.314)		(0.0068)	(0.0088)	(0.287)	
Population density	−0.108***	−0.121***	−0.243	0.0123***	−0.112***	−0.124***	−0.219	0.0120***
	(0.0040)	(0.0042)	(0.234)	(0.0005)	(0.0044)	(0.0048)	(0.240)	(0.0007)
Urban population	−0.0057***	−0.00755***	0.312***	0.0049***	−0.0060***	−0.0077***	0.315***	0.0049***
	(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0126)	(7.64e−05)	(0.0002)	(0.0003)	(0.0125)	(8.11e−05)
Constant	7.622***	8.374***	17.76***	0.184***	7.427***	8.245***	19.56***	0.160***
	(0.0453)	(0.0497)	(1.663)	(0.0068)	(0.0655)	(0.0626)	(1.616)	(0.0218)
Observations	3050	3050	2565	2603	3050	3050	2565	2603
Number of groups	136	136	113	113	136	136	113	113
R-squared	0.876	0.872	0.689	0.802	0.878	0.873	0.690	0.803
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$

Table A 3.7 Bureaucracy, regime type, and human well-being (with time dummies)

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6*	*Model 7*	*Model 8*
	Infant mortality	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*	*Infant mortality*	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*
Bureaucracy	−0.114***	−0.0976***	1.685**	0.0433***	−0.0457**	−0.0429*	0.967	0.0414***
	(0.0167)	(0.0175)	(0.663)	(0.0058)	(0.0216)	(0.0232)	(0.674)	(0.0108)
Democracy	−0.217***	−0.265***	5.864***	0.0494***	0.0174	−0.0766**	3.719***	0.0441***
	(0.0111)	(0.0144)	(0.396)	(0.0052)	(0.0317)	(0.0341)	(0.860)	(0.0129)
Bureaucracy*democracy (interaction term)					−0.119***	−0.0960***	1.124***	0.0027
					(0.0154)	(0.0171)	(0.280)	(0.0076)
GDP per capita	−0.443***	−0.483***	3.718***		−0.427***	−0.470***	3.597***	
	(0.0101)	(0.0114)	(0.373)		(0.00973)	(0.0107)	(0.359)	
Population density	−0.106***	−0.120***	−0.351	0.0103***	−0.108***	−0.121***	−0.340	0.0103***
	(0.0035)	(0.0038)	(0.258)	(0.0008)	(0.0038)	(0.0042)	(0.260)	(0.0008)
Urban population	−0.0049***	−0.0068***	0.310***	0.0051***	−0.0055***	−0.0073***	0.313***	0.0051***
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0129)	(8.33e−05)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0130)	(7.40e−05)
Constant	7.737***	8.489***	17.97***	0.220***	7.530***	8.323***	19.89***	0.223***
	(0.0434)	(0.0513)	(2.345)	(0.0044)	(0.0521)	(0.0531)	(2.319)	(0.0126)
Observations	3050	3050	2565	2603	3050	3050	2565	2603
Number of countries	136	136	113	113	136	136	113	113
R-squared	0.864	0.864	0.687	0.790	0.867	0.865	0.688	0.790
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$

Table A 3.8 Corruption, regime type, and human well-being (with time dummies)

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6*	*Model 7*	*Model 8*
	Infant mortality	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*	*Infant mortality*	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*
Corruption	−0.114***	−0.0976***	1.155***	0.0290***	−0.0636***	−0.0583***	1.100***	0.0302***
	(0.0054)	(0.0073)	(0.289)	(0.0016)	(0.0063)	(0.0071)	(0.419)	(0.0034)
Democracy	−0.193***	−0.244***	5.663***	0.0508***	0.0263	−0.0742	5.445***	0.0556***
	(0.0102)	(0.0112)	(0.525)	(0.0019)	(0.0537)	(0.0479)	(0.760)	(0.0077)
Corruption*democracy (interaction term)					−0.0785***	−0.0610***	0.0797	−0.0017
					(0.0141)	(0.0130)	(0.208)	(0.0027)
GDP per capita	−0.460***	−0.498***	4.183***		−0.453***	−0.492***	4.177***	
	(0.0101)	(0.0111)	(0.206)		(0.0104)	(0.0113)	(0.208)	
Population density	−0.114***	−0.127***	−0.186	0.0153***	−0.117***	−0.129***	−0.184	0.0153***
	(0.0031)	(0.0034)	(0.226)	(0.0003)	(0.0032)	(0.0037)	(0.228)	(0.0003)
Urban population	−0.0042***	−0.0062***	0.297***	0.0054***	−0.0042***	−0.0062***	0.297***	0.0054***
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0129)	(4.31e−05)	(0.0002)	(0.0003)	(0.0129)	(4.62e−05)
Constant	7.903***	8.632***	14.88***	0.199***	7.725***	8.494***	15.07***	0.196***
	(0.0619)	(0.0593)	(1.496)	(0.00654)	(0.0839)	(0.0747)	(1.743)	(0.0111)
Observations	3050	3050	2565	2603	3050	3050	2565	2603
Number of countries	136	136	113	113	136	136	113	113
R-squared	0.869	0.867	0.687	0.768	0.871	0.868	0.687	0.768
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***$p < 0.01$

Table A 3.9 Rule of law, regime type, and human well-being (with time dummies)

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6*	*Model 7*	*Model 8*
	Infant mortality	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*	*Infant mortality*	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*
Rule of law	−0.136***	−0.129***	1.221***	0.0365***	−0.0995***	−0.108***	0.455	0.0382***
	(0.0077)	(0.0089)	(0.280)	(0.0020)	(0.0064)	(0.0087)	(0.381)	(0.0036)
Democracy	−0.260***	−0.304***	6.465***	0.0652***	−0.0317	−0.173***	2.231*	0.0742***
	(0.0162)	(0.0148)	(0.649)	(0.0037)	(0.0396)	(0.0465)	(1.246)	(0.0132)
Rule of law*democracy (interaction term)					−0.0651***	−0.0371***	1.194***	−0.0024
					(0.0097)	(0.0109)	(0.239)	(0.0027)
GDP per capita	−0.419***	−0.454***	3.873***		−0.407***	−0.447***	3.692***	
	(0.0066)	(0.0079)	(0.227)		(0.0064)	(0.0071)	(0.225)	
Population density	−0.106***	−0.120***	−0.297	0.0115***	−0.110***	−0.122***	−0.223	0.0114***
	(0.0051)	(0.0054)	(0.256)	(0.0008)	(0.0054)	(0.0056)	(0.260)	(0.0009)
Urban population	−0.0049***	−0.0069***	0.303***	0.0050***	−0.0054***	−0.0072***	0.312***	0.0050***
	(0.0002)	(0.0003)	(0.0128)	(6.37e−05)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0136)	(6.51e−05)
Constant	7.810***	8.527***	15.56***	0.170***	7.623***	8.420***	18.97***	0.164***
	(0.0595)	(0.0571)	(1.592)	(0.00490)	(0.0543)	(0.0507)	(1.701)	(0.0096)
Observations	3050	3050	2565	2603	3050	3050	2565	2603
Number of countries	136	136	113	113	136	136	113	113
R-squared	0.875	0.873	0.687	0.799	0.876	0.873	0.689	0.799
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.1$

Table A 3.10 Governance, regime type, and human well-being (with additive measure of governance and time dummies)

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6*	*Model 7*	*Model 8*
	Infant mortality	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*	*Infant mortality*	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*
Governance	−0.0681***	−0.0610***	0.694***	0.0162***	−0.0485***	−0.0485***	0.487*	0.0196***
	(0.0049)	(0.0050)	(0.208)	(0.0014)	(0.0063)	(0.0070)	(0.276)	(0.0035)
Democracy	−0.205***	−0.253***	5.802***	0.0474***	0.0387	−0.0968*	3.485**	0.0839***
	(0.0096)	(0.0114)	(0.487)	(0.0019)	(0.0537)	(0.0577)	(1.366)	(0.0214)
Governance*democracy (interaction term)					−0.0296***	−0.0190***	0.284**	−0.0044*
					(0.0053)	(0.0059)	(0.130)	(0.0026)
GDP per capita	−0.388***	−0.430***	3.438***		−0.379***	−0.425***	3.384***	
	(0.0075)	(0.0096)	(0.297)		(0.0067)	(0.0087)	(0.271)	
Population density	−0.108***	−0.122***	−0.238	0.0124***	−0.112***	−0.124***	−0.213	0.0121***
	(0.0041)	(0.0043)	(0.234)	(0.0005)	(0.0045)	(0.0048)	(0.241)	(0.0007)
Urban population	−0.0056***	−0.0075***	0.312***	0.0049***	−0.0059***	−0.0077***	0.314***	0.0049***
	(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0126)	(7.29e−05)	(0.0002)	(0.0003)	(0.0125)	(7.82e−05)
Constant	7.627***	8.377***	17.64***	0.183***	7.439***	8.256***	19.47***	0.159***
	(0.0475)	(0.0511)	(1.614)	(0.0067)	(0.0669)	(0.0635)	(1.597)	(0.0211)
Observations	3050	3050	2565	2603	3050	3050	2565	2603
Number of groups	136	136	113	113	136	136	113	113
R-squared	0.877	0.873	0.689	0.802	0.878	0.873	0.690	0.803
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$

Table A 3.11 Descriptive statistics for governance and human well-being

Variable	*Obs.*	*Mean*	*Std. Dev.*	*Min.*	*Max.*
Infant mortality	3003	3.21	1.08	0.74	5.13
Child mortality	3003	3.48	1.19	0.99	5.81
Education enrollment ratio	2540	68.09	19.38	11.56	115.81
Hybrid HDI	2578	0.65	0.18	0.12	0.93
Governance	3003	2.51	0.98	0.22	4.55
Bureaucracy	3003	2.15	1.17	0	4
Corruption	3003	3.05	1.35	0	6.16
Rule of law	3003	3.67	1.48	0	6
Governance: Additive index	3003	8.88	3.49	0.75	16.16
Democracy	3003	0.54	0.49	0	1
GDP per capita	3003	7.83	1.63	4.17	11.63
Population density	3003	3.88	1.44	0.24	8.84
Urban population	3003	56.31	23.20	8.534	100
Africa	3003	0.25	0.43	0	1
Asia	3003	0.11	0.31	0	1
Latin America and Caribbean	3003	0.19	0.39	0	1
Ethnic heterogeneity	3003	0.45	0.26	0.002	0.93

Table A 4.5 Economic globalization and human well-being (with time dummies)

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*
	Infant mortality	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*
Economic globalization	−0.0046***	−0.0055***	0.231***	0.0032***
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0178)	(0.0001)
GDP per capita	−0.452***	−0.476***	1.876***	
	(0.0140)	(0.0137)	(0.339)	
Population density	−0.115***	−0.132***	1.090***	0.0195***
	(0.0035)	(0.0028)	(0.205)	(0.0005)
Democracy	−0.0218***	−0.0242***	0.448***	0.0040***
	(0.0012)	(0.0013)	(0.0253)	(0.0002)
Urban population	−0.0036***	−0.0057***	0.333***	0.0046***
	(0.0004)	(0.0005)	(0.0151)	(5.01e−05)
Constant	7.634***	8.323***	10.28***	0.142***
	(0.0797)	(0.0717)	(1.187)	(0.0054)
Observations	5223	5231	4321	4515
Number of countries	148	148	123	122
R-squared	0.868	0.869	0.705	0.842
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***$p < 0.01$

Table A 4.6 Social globalization and human well-being (with time dummies)

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*
	Infant mortality	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*
Social globalization	−0.0170***	−0.0173***	0.158***	0.0037***
	(0.0014)	(0.0015)	(0.0303)	(0.0001)
GDP per capita	−0.303***	−0.332***	2.960***	
	(0.0146)	(0.0167)	(0.331)	
Population density	−0.0957***	−0.110***	0.646***	0.0132***
	(0.0015)	(0.0023)	(0.242)	(0.0009)
Democracy	−0.0174***	−0.0193***	0.408***	0.0030***
	(0.0013)	(0.0015)	(0.0228)	(0.0002)
Urban population	−0.0033***	−0.0052***	0.277***	0.0038***
	(0.0002)	(0.0003)	(0.0189)	(0.0001)
Constant	6.992***	7.669***	12.41***	0.200***
	(0.0487)	(0.0574)	(1.625)	(0.0047)
Observations	5619	5633	4464	4713
Number of countries	163	163	129	128
R-squared	0.875	0.874	0.673	0.832
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***$p < 0.01$

Table A 4.7 Political globalization and human well-being (with time dummies)

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*
	Infant mortality	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*
Political globalization	−0.0013***	−0.0001	−0.0038	0.0003***
	(0.0004)	(0.0005)	(0.0136)	(5.36e−05)
GDP per capita	−0.483***	−0.518***	4.803***	
	(0.0098)	(0.0095)	(0.328)	
Population density	−0.114***	−0.130***	0.726***	0.0187***
	(0.0037)	(0.0030)	(0.209)	(0.0008)
Democracy	−0.0206***	−0.0236***	0.449***	0.0051***
	(0.0011)	(0.0012)	(0.0219)	(0.0001)
Urban population	−0.0035***	−0.0057***	0.272***	0.0058***
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0177)	(7.28e−05)
Constant	7.714***	8.379***	5.073***	0.202***
	(0.0684)	(0.0574)	(0.950)	(0.0044)
Observations	5619	5633	4464	4713
Number of countries	163	163	129	128
R-squared	0.854	0.855	0.668	0.767
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***$p < 0.01$

Table A 4.8 Overall globalization and human well-being (with time dummies)

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*
	Infant mortality	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*
Overall globalization	−0.0150***	−0.0141***	0.258***	0.0048***
	(0.0012)	(0.0013)	(0.0327)	(0.0001)
GDP per capita	−0.371***	−0.410***	2.619***	
	(0.0116)	(0.0120)	(0.424)	
Population density	−0.105***	−0.120***	0.683***	0.0143***
	(0.0019)	(0.0015)	(0.233)	(0.0006)
Democracy	−0.0155***	−0.0178***	0.345***	0.0021***
	(0.0014)	(0.0015)	(0.0221)	(0.0003)
Urban population	−0.0027***	−0.0047***	0.267***	0.0038***
	(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0172)	(7.55e−05)
Constant	7.445***	8.142***	9.724***	0.136***
	(0.0581)	(0.0501)	(1.324)	(0.0032)
Observations	5619	5633	4464	4713
Number of countries	163	163	129	128
R-squared	0.865	0.863	0.676	0.830
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***$p < 0.01$

Table A 4.9 Economic globalization and human well-being (with additional controls)

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*
	Infant mortality	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*
Economic globalization	−0.0071***	−0.0081***	0.287***	0.0026***
	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0188)	(8.15e−05)
GDP per capita	−0.360***	−0.372***	1.457***	
	(0.0148)	(0.0159)	(0.504)	
Population density	−0.0702***	−0.0775***	0.839***	0.0106***
	(0.0032)	(0.0029)	(0.266)	(0.0008)
Democracy	−0.0239***	−0.0248***	0.464***	0.0033***
	(0.0015)	(0.0017)	(0.0310)	(0.0002)
Urban population	−0.0043***	−0.0050***	0.239***	0.0032***
	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0191)	(8.63e−05)
Africa	0.186***	0.371***	−8.485***	−0.126***
	(0.0645)	(0.0770)	(1.473)	(0.0066)
Asia	−0.122***	−0.106***	−1.590	−0.0464***
	(0.0335)	(0.0395)	(1.097)	(0.0027)
Latin America	0.231***	0.219***	−0.339	−0.0157***
	(0.0330)	(0.0375)	(1.159)	(0.0037)
Ethnic heterogeneity	0.418***	0.453***	−3.225***	−0.0432***
	(0.0334)	(0.0405)	(1.080)	(0.0030)
Constant	6.779***	7.210***	25.12***	0.328***
	(0.0645)	(0.0799)	(4.659)	(0.0086)
Observations	4706	4714	4150	4341
Number of countries	142	142	122	121
R-squared	0.883	0.892	0.715	0.886

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***$p < 0.01$

Table A 4.10 Social globalization and human well-being (with additional controls)

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*
	Infant mortality	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*
Social globalization	−0.0172***	−0.0178***	0.221t***	0.0033***
	(0.0012)	(0.0012)	(0.0352)	(9.34e−05)
GDP per capita	−0.258***	−0.270***	2.185***	
	(0.0179)	(0.0211)	(0.730)	
Population density	−0.0576***	−0.0640***	0.328	0.0058***
	(0.0017)	(0.0016)	(0.300)	(0.0011)
Democracy	−0.0180***	−0.0189***	0.434***	0.0023***
	(0.0013)	(0.0014)	(0.0330)	(0.0002)
Urban population	−0.0036***	−0.0046***	0.186***	0.0027***
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0226)	(0.0001)
Africa	0.160***	0.334***	−10.21***	−0.120***
	(0.0492)	(0.0604)	(1.804)	(0.0059)
Asia	−0.215***	−0.198***	−0.986	−0.0172***
	(0.0312)	(0.0380)	(1.280)	(0.0036)
Latin America	0.0940***	0.0829***	0.0746	0.0058***
	(0.0192)	(0.0237)	(1.170)	(0.0017)
Ethnic heterogeneity	0.336***	0.377***	−2.415***	−0.0390***
	(0.0318)	(0.0391)	(0.593)	(0.0030)
Constant	6.332***	6.743***	29.47***	0.359***
	(0.0959)	(0.125)	(6.130)	(0.0121)
Observations	5056	5070	4286	4532
Number of countries	157	157	128	127
R-squared	0.887	0.896	0.685	0.884

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***$p < 0.01$

Table A 4.11 Political globalization and human well-being (with additional controls)

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*
	Infant mortality	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*
Political globalization	−0.0014***	−0.0004	0.0324*	0.0003***
	(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0166)	(6.61e−05)
GDP per capita	−0.414***	−0.435***	4.260***	
	(0.0105)	(0.0122)	(0.407)	
Population density	−0.0791***	−0.0875***	0.455*	0.0091***
	(0.0040)	(0.0038)	(0.263)	(0.0006)
Democracy	−0.0227***	−0.0248***	0.482***	0.0044***
	(0.0015)	(0.0016)	(0.0325)	(0.0001)
Urban population	−0.0043***	−0.0055***	0.174***	0.0039***
	(0.0004)	(0.0005)	(0.0228)	(8.09e−05)
Africa	0.219***	0.394***	−11.30***	−0.150***
	(0.0716)	(0.0830)	(1.975)	(0.0096)
Asia	−0.0803**	−0.0598	−3.695***	−0.0728***
	(0.0386)	(0.0441)	(1.368)	(0.0016)
Latin America	0.185***	0.180***	−1.217	−0.0337***
	(0.0322)	(0.0372)	(1.353)	(0.0046)
Ethnic heterogeneity	0.339***	0.382***	−2.803***	−0.0595***
	(0.0389)	(0.0475)	(0.519)	(0.0047)
Constant	6.974***	7.388***	21.94***	0.419***
	(0.0644)	(0.0870)	(5.304)	(0.0132)
Observations	5056	5070	4286	4532
Number of groups	157	157	128	127
R-squared	0.863	0.875	0.676	0.841

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$

Table A 4.12 Overall globalization and human well-being (with additional controls)

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*
	Infant mortality	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*
Overall globalization	−0.0164***	−0.0162***	0.369***	0.0039***
	(0.0012)	(0.0014)	(0.0451)	(9.17e−05)
GDP per capita	−0.297***	−0.316***	1.453**	
	(0.0142)	(0.0161)	(0.561)	
Population density	−0.0651***	−0.0725***	0.341	0.0064***
	(0.0026)	(0.0023)	(0.296)	(0.0009)
Democracy	−0.0158***	−0.0169***	0.329***	0.0016***
	(0.0014)	(0.0014)	(0.0243)	(0.0002)
Urban population	−0.0032***	−0.0042***	0.172***	0.0026***
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0190)	(8.81e−05)
Africa	0.205***	0.380***	−10.74***	−0.130***
	(0.0608)	(0.0732)	(1.930)	(0.0078)
Asia	−0.139***	−0.117**	−1.512	−0.0330***
	(0.0382)	(0.0454)	(1.504)	(0.0023)
Latin America	0.138***	0.131***	−0.0734	−0.0028
	(0.0272)	(0.0326)	(1.314)	(0.0034)
Ethnic heterogeneity	0.348***	0.391***	−2.025***	−0.0379***
	(0.0299)	(0.0376)	(0.713)	(0.0023)
Constant	6.684***	7.117***	26.92***	0.311***
	(0.0652)	(0.0875)	(5.333)	(0.0118)
Observations	5056	5070	4286	4532
Number of countries	157	157	128	127
R-squared	0.879	0.887	0.695	0.883

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$

Table A 4.13 Descriptive statistics for globalization and human well-being

Variable	*Obs.*	*Mean*	*Std. Dev.*	*Min*	*Max*
Infant mortality	5619	3.49	1.08	0.53	5.33
Child mortality	5633	3.78	1.19	0.78	5.98
Education enrollment ratio	4464	62.24	20.93	5.22	115.81
Hybrid HDI	4713	0.60	0.19	0.12	0.93
Overall globalization index	5619	47.37	18.30	11.3	92.37
Economic globalization	5223	49.93	19.30	8.49	99.03
Social globalization	5231	40.33	21.97	5.22	93.54
Political globalization	5619	57.45	22.19	4.54	98.16
GDP per capita	5619	7.46	1.61	4.05	11.64
Population density	5619	3.78	1.41	0.10	8.93
Democracy	5619	1.50	7.32	−10	10
Urban population	5619	50.11	24.03	2.84	100

Table A 5.5 Occurrence of conflict and human well-being (with time dummies)

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6*	*Model 7*	*Model 8*
	Infant mortality	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*	*Infant mortality*	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*
Interstate conflict	0.0601**	0.0456*	1.989***	−0.0183***				
	(0.0257)	(0.0266)	(0.739)	(0.0058)				
Intrastate conflict					0.113***	0.115***	−3.375***	−0.0594***
					(0.0140)	(0.0150)	(0.460)	(0.0022)
GDP per capita	−0.489***	−0.521***	4.778***		−0.481***	−0.513***	4.436***	
	(0.0101)	(0.0096)	(0.314)		(0.0109)	(0.0103)	(0.341)	
Population density	−0.116***	−0.132***	0.725***	0.0194***	−0.119***	−0.135***	0.890***	0.0211***
	(0.0040)	(0.0032)	(0.215)	(0.0007)	(0.0042)	(0.0035)	(0.225)	(0.0006)
Democracy	−0.0224***	−0.0248***	0.443***	0.0053***	−0.0227***	−0.0250***	0.449***	0.0053***
	(0.0013)	(0.0014)	(0.0227)	(0.0001)	(0.0013)	(0.0014)	(0.0237)	(0.0002)
Urban population	−0.0033***	−0.0053***	0.273***	0.0059***	−0.0033***	−0.0053***	0.280***	0.00576***
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0190)	(5.98e−05)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0198)	(6.94e−05)
Constant	7.704***	8.365***	4.020***	0.208***	7.652***	8.313***	6.443***	0.219***
	(0.0631)	(0.0533)	(1.272)	(0.0050)	(0.0656)	(0.0553)	(1.164)	(0.0046)
Observations	6509	6525	4482	4732	6510	6526	4482	4732
Number of countries	163	163	129	128	163	163	129	128
R-squared	0.856	0.859	0.670	0.767	0.858	0.860	0.673	0.780
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$

Table A 5.6 Duration of conflict and human well-being (with time dummies)

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6*	*Model 7*	*Model 8*
	Infant mortality	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*	*Infant mortality*	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*
Interstate conflict	0.0098***	0.0091**	0.251***	0.0002				
	(0.0034)	(0.0038)	(0.0817)	(0.0009)				
Intrastate conflict					0.0058***	0.0061***	−0.151***	−0.0020***
					(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0150)	(0.0001)
GDP per capita	−0.490***	−0.521***	4.762***		−0.483***	−0.514***	4.557***	
	(0.0102)	(0.0097)	(0.312)		(0.0103)	(0.0097)	(0.323)	
Population density	−0.116***	−0.132***	0.726***	0.0192***	−0.120***	−0.136***	0.885***	0.0208***
	(0.00408	(0.0032)	(0.211)	(0.0007)	(0.0044)	(0.0036)	(0.213)	(0.0008)
Democracy	−0.0224***	−0.0248***	0.443***	0.0053***	−0.0227***	−0.0251***	0.450***	0.0054***
	(0.0013)	(0.0014)	(0.0226)	(0.0001)	(0.0013)	(0.0014)	(0.0234)	(0.0001)
Urban population	−0.0033***	−0.0053***	0.274***	0.0059***	−0.0033***	−0.0053***	0.275***	0.0058***
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0189)	(6.05e−05)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0192)	(6.86e−05)
Constant	7.708***	8.369***	4.675***	0.208***	7.673***	8.334***	5.312***	0.211***
	(0.0637)	(0.0540)	(1.049)	(0.0049)	(0.0640)	(0.0539)	(1.359)	(0.0052)
Observations	6509	6525	4482	4732	6510	6526	4482	4732
Number of countries	163	163	129	128	163	163	129	128
R-squared	0.856	0.859	0.670	0.766	0.858	0.860	0.672	0.773
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***$p < 0.01$

Table A 5.7 Magnitude of conflict and human well-being (with time dummies)

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6*	*Model 7*	*Model 8*
	Infant mortality	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*	*Infant mortality*	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*
Interstate conflict	0.0215**	0.0180*	0.316	−0.0046***				
	(0.0107)	(0.0106)	(0.233)	(0.0014)				
Intrastate conflict					0.0243***	0.0247***	−0.603***	−0.0121***
					(0.0040)	(0.0041)	(0.114)	(0.0004)
GDP per capita	−0.489***	−0.521***	4.774***		−0.483***	−0.515***	4.572***	
	(0.0101)	(0.0096)	(0.313)		(0.0103)	(0.0097)	(0.313)	
Population density	−0.116***	−0.132***	0.732***	0.0194***	−0.118***	−0.134***	0.832***	0.0206***
	(0.0040)	(0.0032)	(0.214)	(0.0007)	(0.0043)	(0.0035)	(0.211)	(0.0006)
Democracy	−0.0223***	−0.0247***	0.443***	0.0053***	−0.0225***	−0.0249***	0.446***	0.0053***
	(0.0013)	(0.0014)	(0.0226)	(0.0001)	(0.0013)	(0.0014)	(0.0230)	(0.0001)
Urban population	−0.0033***	−0.0053***	0.273***	0.0059***	−0.0033***	−0.0053***	0.276***	0.0057***
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0189)	(5.99e−05)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0190)	(6.27e−05)
Constant	7.705***	8.365***	4.042***	0.209***	7.662***	8.324***	5.540***	0.217***
	(0.0630)	(0.0531)	(1.269)	(0.00477)	(0.0630)	(0.0528)	(1.361)	(0.0044)
Observations	6509	6525	4482	4732	6510	6526	4482	4732
Number of countries	163	163	129	128	163	163	129	128
R-squared	0.856	0.859	0.669	0.766	0.857	0.860	0.671	0.776
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$

Table A 5.8 Magnitude of conflict among neighboring states and human well-being (with time dummies)

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6*	*Model 7*	*Model 8*
	Infant mortality	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*	*Infant mortality*	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*
Interstate conflict	0.0054	−0.0017	−0.156	0.0004				
	(0.0035)	(0.0038)	(0.169)	(0.0009)				
Intrastate conflict					0.0243***	0.0247***	−0.603***	−0.0121***
					(0.0040)	(0.0041)	(0.114)	(0.0004)
GDP per capita	−0.487***	−0.519***	4.758***		−0.483***	−0.515***	4.572***	
	(0.0102)	(0.0097)	(0.306)		(0.0103)	(0.0097)	(0.313)	
Population density	−0.115***	−0.131***	0.749***	0.0192***	−0.118***	−0.134***	0.832***	0.0206***
	(0.0041)	(0.0033)	(0.213)	(0.0008)	(0.0043)	(0.0035)	(0.211)	(0.0006)
Democracy	−0.0222***	−0.0248***	0.436***	0.0054***	−0.0225***	−0.0249***	0.446***	0.0053***
	(0.0013)	(0.0014)	(0.0232)	(0.0001)	(0.0013)	(0.0014)	(0.0230)	(0.0001)
Urban population	−0.0033***	−0.0053***	0.275***	0.0059***	−0.0033***	−0.0053***	0.276***	0.0057***
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0184)	(6.34e−05)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0190)	(6.27e−05)
Constant	7.691***	8.354***	4.711***	0.208***	7.662***	8.324***	5.540***	0.217***
	(0.0635)	(0.0539)	(1.009)	(0.00483)	(0.0630)	(0.0528)	(1.361)	(0.0044)
Observations	6345	6361	4482	4732	6510	6526	4482	4732
Number of countries	162	162	129	128	163	163	129	128
R-squared	0.856	0.859	0.670	0.766	0.857	0.860	0.671	0.776
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***$p < 0.01$

Table A 5.9 Occurrence of conflict and human well-being (with additional controls)

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6*	*Model 7*	*Model 8*
	Infant mortality	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*	*Infant mortality*	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*
Interstate conflict	0.127***	0.138***	−0.0359	−0.0328***				
	(0.0292)	(0.0311)	(0.855)	(0.0057)				
Intrastate conflict					0.147***	0.159***	−4.287***	−0.0605***
					(0.0156)	(0.0176)	(0.536)	(0.0030)
GDP per capita	−0.429***	−0.451***	4.361***		−0.424***	−0.445***	3.964***	
	(0.0110)	(0.0117)	(0.431)		(0.0125)	(0.0135)	(0.473)	
Population density	−0.0760***	−0.0839***	0.522*	0.0101***	−0.0795***	−0.0877***	0.697**	0.0120***
	(0.0054)	(0.0052)	(0.270)	(0.0008)	(0.0055)	(0.0054)	(0.277)	(0.0007)
Democracy	−0.0240***	−0.0254***	0.517***	0.00487***	−0.0244***	−0.0258***	0.527***	0.0048***
	(0.0016)	(0.0017)	(0.0402)	(0.0001)	(0.0016)	(0.0016)	(0.0384)	(0.0002)
Urban population	−0.0040***	−0.0049***	0.184***	0.0041***	−0.0038***	−0.0048***	0.189***	0.0039***
	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0237)	(9.45e−05)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0238)	(0.0001)
Africa	0.173***	0.338***	−11.11***	−0.151***	0.180***	0.346***	−11.59***	−0.155***
	(0.0656)	(0.0762)	(1.966)	(0.0091)	(0.0658)	(0.0763)	(1.913)	(0.0085)
Asia	−0.122***	−0.111**	−3.476**	−0.0721***	−0.137***	−0.128***	−3.183**	−0.0647***
	(0.0361)	(0.0426)	(1.357)	(0.0019)	(0.0361)	(0.0426)	(1.376)	(0.0016)
Latin America	0.189***	0.182***	−1.204	−0.0351***	0.191***	0.184***	−1.408	−0.0342***
	(0.0273)	(0.0317)	(1.343)	(0.0048)	(0.0283)	(0.0327)	(1.346)	(0.0050)
Ethnic heterogeneity	0.357***	0.401***	−2.892***	−0.0614***	0.332***	0.374***	−2.304***	−0.0487***
	(0.0396)	(0.0478)	(0.537)	(0.0051)	(0.0398)	(0.0481)	(0.566)	(0.0047)
Constant	6.984***	7.449***	22.21***	0.432***	6.942***	7.404***	24.97***	0.441***
	(0.0504)	(0.0611)	(5.285)	(0.0137)	(0.0604)	(0.0737)	(5.406)	(0.0138)
Observations	5790	5806	4304	4551	5791	5807	4304	4551
Number of countries	157	157	128	127	157	157	128	127
R-squared	0.865	0.877	0.676	0.841	0.868	0.879	0.682	0.855

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$

Table A 5.10 Duration of conflict and human well-being (with additional controls)

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6*	*Model 7*	*Model 8*
	Infant mortality	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*	*Infant mortality*	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*
Interstate conflict	0.0144***	0.0154***	0.0996	−0.0012				
	(0.0035)	(0.0037)	(0.0951)	(0.0009)				
Intrastate conflict					0.0060***	0.0064***	−0.113***	−0.0017***
					(0.0005)	(0.0006)	(0.0287)	(0.0002)
GDP per capita	−0.431***	−0.452***	4.363***		−0.430***	−0.451***	4.262***	
	(0.0112)	(0.0119)	(0.433)		(0.0118)	(0.0127)	(0.458)	
Population density	−0.0759***	−0.0838***	0.516*	0.0099***	−0.0794***	−0.0876***	0.632**	0.0114***
	(0.0054)	(0.0052)	(0.270)	(0.0008)	(0.0057)	(0.0055)	(0.261)	(0.0007)
Democracy	−0.0241***	−0.0255***	0.517***	0.0049***	−0.0245***	−0.0259***	0.527***	0.0050***
	(0.0016)	(0.0017)	(0.0402)	(0.0001)	(0.0016)	(0.0016)	(0.0395)	(0.0001)
Urban population	−0.0040***	−0.0049***	0.184***	0.00412***	−0.0038***	−0.0048***	0.185***	0.0040***
	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0237)	(9.49e−05)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0238)	(0.0001)
Africa	0.170**	0.335***	−11.09***	−0.150***	0.172**	0.337***	−11.23***	−0.152***
	(0.0659)	(0.0766)	(1.977)	(0.0091)	(0.0662)	(0.0768)	(1.977)	(0.0090)
Asia	−0.123***	−0.112***	−3.461**	−0.0721***	−0.144***	−0.135***	−3.004**	−0.0643***
	(0.0361)	(0.0425)	(1.366)	(0.0019)	(0.0355)	(0.0418)	(1.345)	(0.0018)
Latin America	0.187***	0.181***	−1.185	−0.0350***	0.188***	0.181***	−1.287	−0.0353***
	(0.0276)	(0.0320)	(1.348)	(0.0049)	(0.0278)	(0.0322)	(1.351)	(0.00499)
Ethnic heterogeneity	0.355***	0.399***	−2.894***	−0.0609***	0.330***	0.372***	−2.320***	−0.0505***
	(0.0399)	(0.0481)	(0.542)	(0.0051)	(0.0415)	(0.0497)	(0.566)	(0.00482)
Constant	6.998***	7.463***	22.19***	0.431***	6.997***	7.463***	22.57***	0.429***
	(0.0509)	(0.0615)	(5.313)	(0.0138)	(0.0556)	(0.0672)	(5.387)	(0.0140)
Observations	5790	5806	4304	4551	5791	5807	4304	4551
Number of countries	157	157	128	127	157	157	128	127
R-squared	0.865	0.876	0.676	0.840	0.866	0.878	0.678	0.845

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$

Table A 5.11 Magnitude of conflict and human well-being (with additional controls)

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6*	*Model 7*	*Model 8*
	Infant mortality	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*	*Infant mortality*	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*
Interstate conflict	0.0410***	0.0448***	−0.400*	−0.0098***				
	(0.0124)	(0.0130)	(0.213)	(0.0013)				
Intrastate conflict					0.0290***	0.0317***	−0.862***	−0.0132***
					(0.0039)	(0.0044)	(0.132)	(0.0004)
GDP per capita	−0.429***	−0.451***	4.347***		−0.427***	−0.448***	4.112***	
	(0.0111)	(0.0119)	(0.432)		(0.0119)	(0.0129)	(0.462)	
Population density	−0.0760***	−0.0839***	0.532**	0.0101***	−0.0783***	−0.0865***	0.638**	0.0115***
	(0.0054)	(0.0052)	(0.268)	(0.0008)	(0.0055)	(0.0053)	(0.267)	(0.0007)
Democracy	−0.0240***	−0.0253***	0.516***	0.0048***	−0.0242***	−0.0255***	0.521***	0.0048***
	(0.0016)	(0.0016)	(0.0403)	(0.0001)	(0.0015)	(0.0016)	(0.0398)	(0.0002)
Urban population	−0.0040***	−0.00502***	0.184***	0.0041***	−0.0038***	−0.0047***	0.183***	0.0039***
	(0.0005)	(0.000525)	(0.0235)	(9.49e−05)	(0.0004)	(0.0005)	(0.0232)	(0.0001)
Africa	0.174***	0.339***	−11.16***	−0.151***	0.177***	0.343***	−11.58***	−0.157***
	(0.0653)	(0.0758)	(1.973)	(0.0091)	(0.0656)	(0.0761)	(1.944)	(0.0089)
Asia	−0.121***	−0.110**	−3.499**	−0.0715***	−0.134***	−0.125***	−3.187**	−0.0668***
	(0.0359)	(0.0423)	(1.371)	(0.00187)	(0.0350)	(0.0414)	(1.368)	(0.0019)
Latin America	0.190***	0.184***	−1.247	−0.0356***	0.188***	0.181***	−1.301	−0.0345***
	(0.0271)	(0.0315)	(1.351)	(0.0049)	(0.0277)	(0.0321)	(1.346)	(0.0048)
Ethnic heterogeneity	0.356***	0.399***	−2.882***	−0.0611***	0.336***	0.378***	−2.316***	−0.0487***
	(0.0392)	(0.0474)	(0.539)	(0.0052)	(0.0383)	(0.0464)	(0.572)	(0.0050)
Constant	6.986***	7.451***	22.30***	0.432***	6.964***	7.427***	24.09***	0.440***
	(0.0518)	(0.0625)	(5.315)	(0.0138)	(0.0572)	(0.0702)	(5.524)	(0.0144)
Observations	5790	5806	4304	4551	5791	5807	4304	4551
Number of countries	157	157	128	127	157	157	128	127
R-squared	0.865	0.877	0.676	0.841	0.867	0.878	0.680	0.852

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$

Table A 5.12 Magnitude of conflict among neighboring states and human well-being (with additional controls)

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6*	*Model 7*	*Model 8*
	Infant mortality	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*	*Infant mortality*	*Child mortality*	*Education enrollment*	*HDI*
Interstate conflict	0.0199***	0.0186***	−0.437**	−0.0029***				
	(0.0051)	(0.0059)	(0.172)	(0.0007)				
Intrastate conflict					0.0085***	0.0072***	−0.0051	−0.0024***
					(0.0012)	(0.0013)	(0.0652)	(0.0002)
GDP per capita	−0.430***	−0.451***	4.321***		−0.428***	−0.450***	4.358***	
	(0.0112)	(0.0120)	(0.448)		(0.0118)	(0.0126)	(0.454)	
Population density	−0.0753***	−0.0832***	0.519*	0.0098***	−0.0737***	−0.0818***	0.521*	0.0093***
	(0.0055)	(0.0053)	(0.270)	(0.0008)	(0.0054)	(0.0052)	(0.277)	(0.0008)
Democracy	−0.0234***	−0.0248***	0.501***	0.0047***	−0.0235***	−0.0250***	0.516***	0.0047***
	(0.0016)	(0.0017)	(0.0397)	(0.0002)	(0.0015)	(0.0016)	(0.0401)	(0.0002)
Urban population	−0.0040***	−0.0050***	0.186***	0.0041***	−0.0038***	−0.0048***	0.184***	0.0040***
	(0.0004)	(0.0005)	(0.0229)	(9.79e−05)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0236)	(9.98e−05)
Africa	0.185***	0.348***	−11.45***	−0.153***	0.176***	0.339***	−11.11***	−0.151***
	(0.0665)	(0.0769)	(2.045)	(0.0096)	(0.0647)	(0.0754)	(1.996)	(0.0089)
Asia	−0.123***	−0.113**	−3.407**	−0.0709***	−0.146***	−0.132***	−3.459***	−0.0630***
	(0.0370)	(0.0433)	(1.381)	(0.0019)	(0.0378)	(0.0439)	(1.254)	(0.0021)
Latin America	0.198***	0.190***	−1.463	−0.0364***	0.193***	0.185***	−1.207	−0.0354***
	(0.0274)	(0.0316)	(1.405)	(0.0051)	(0.0274)	(0.0318)	(1.378)	(0.0048)
Ethnic heterogeneity	0.346***	0.391***	−2.753***	−0.0600***	0.334***	0.381***	−2.881***	−0.0537***
	(0.0396)	(0.0477)	(0.510)	(0.00518)	(0.0372)	(0.0456)	(0.529)	(0.0045)
Constant	6.980***	7.448***	22.70***	0.433***	6.954***	7.427***	22.24***	0.440***
	(0.0559)	(0.0670)	(5.502)	(0.0145)	(0.0596)	(0.0704)	(5.687)	(0.0147)
Observations	5790	5806	4304	4551	5790	5806	4304	4551
Number of countries	157	157	128	127	157	157	128	127
R-squared	0.866	0.877	0.677	0.841	0.866	0.877	0.676	0.843

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$

Table A 5.13 Descriptive statistics for conflict and human well-being

Variable	*Obs.*	*Mean*	*Std. Dev.*	*Min.*	*Max.*
Infant mortality	6509	3.56	1.09	0.47	5.45
Child mortality	6525	3.86	1.20	0.69	6.03
Education enrollment ratio	4482	62.14	20.95	5.22	115.81
Human development index	4732	0.60	0.19	0.12	0.93
Interstate conflict: Occurrence	6509	0.03	0.17	0	1
Intrastate conflict: Occurrence	6510	0.17	0.38	0	1
Interstate conflict: Duration	6509	0.17	1.33	0	26
Intrastate conflict: Duration	6510	2.72	7.68	0	54
Interstate conflict: Magnitude	6509	0.07	0.54	0	8
Intrastate conflict: Magnitude	6510	0.59	1.54	0	10
Interstate conflict: Neighboring states	6345	0.41	1.57	0	18
Intrastate conflict: Neighboring states	6345	2.82	4.30	0	29
GDP per capita	6509	7.30	1.65	3.62	11.64
Population density	6509	3.74	1.42	−0.15	8.95
Democracy	6509	1.48	7.32	−10	10
Urban population	6509	48.90	24.25	2.154	100

Appendix B: KOF Index of Globalization

	Indices and variables	*Weights (%)*
A.	Economic globalization	**36**
	(i) Actual flows	(50)
	Trade (percentage of GDP)	(22)
	Foreign direct investment, stocks (percentage of GDP)	(27)
	Portfolio investment (percentage of GDP)	(24)
	Income payments to foreign nationals (percentage of GDP)	(27)
	(ii) Restrictions	(50)
	Hidden import barriers	(24)
	Mean tariff rate	(28)
	Taxes on international trade (percentage of current revenue)	(26)
	Capital account restrictions	(23)

(*continued*)

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	Indices and variables	*Weights (%)*
B.	Social globalization	**38**
	(i) Data on personal contact	(33)
	Telephone traffic	(25)
	Transfers (percentage of GDP)	(3)
	International tourism	(26)
	Foreign population (percentage of Total population)	(21)
	International letters (per capita)	(25)
	(ii) Data on information flows	(35)
	Internet users (per 1000 people)	(36)
	Television (per 1000 people)	(38)
	Trade in newspapers (percentage of GDP)	(26)
	(iii) Data on cultural proximity	(32)
	Number of McDonald's restaurants (per capita)	(44)
	Number of Ikea stores (per capita)	(44)
	Trade in books (percentage of GDP)	(11)
C.	Political globalization	**26**
	Embassies in country	(25)
	Membership in international organizations	(27)
	Participation in UN Security Council missions	(22)
	International treaties	(26)

Source: Dreher (2006); updated—Dreher, Gaston, and Martens (2008)

Note: The KOF Index of Globalization includes economic globalization, social globalization, and political globalziation. The table presents the weightage assigned to the primary indices and the sub-indices. The bold numbers indicate the weightage of the primary indices.

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[1] Note: Page numbers followed by "n" refers to notes.

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