palgrave macmillan

Russian Bureaucracy and the State

Officialdom From Alexander III to Vladimir Putin

Edited by

Don K. Rowney and Eugene Huskey



Russian Bureaucracy and the State

Also by Don K. Rowney

RUSSIAN OFFICIALDOM: The Bureaucratization of Russian Society from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century (*co-editor with Walter McKenzie Pintner*)

TRANSITION TO TECHNOCRACY: The Structural Foundations of the Soviet Administrative State

Also by Eugene Huskey

EXECUTIVE POWER AND SOVIET POLITICS: The Rise and Decline of the Soviet State (*editor*)

PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN RUSSIA

RUSSIAN LAWYERS AND THE SOVIET STATE: The Origins and Development of the Soviet Bar, 1917–1939

Russian Bureaucracy and the State

Officialdom From Alexander III to Vladimir Putin

Edited by

Don K. Rowney

Professor of History and Senior Research Fellow
Bowling Green State University, USA

and

Eugene Huskey

William R. Kenan, Jr. Professor of Political Science and Director of Russian Studies
Stetson University, USA

palgrave
macmillan



Editorial matter, selection, introduction and conclusion © Don K. Rowney and Eugene Huskey 2009
All remaining chapters © respective authors 2009

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2009 978-0-230-22884-9

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission.

No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6-10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS.

Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

First published 2009 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN

Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin's Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.

ISBN 978-1-349-31026-5 ISBN 978-0-230-24499-3 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9780230244993

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 09

Contents

List of Tables vii

Preface and Acknowledgements viii

Contributors x

1 Introduction: Russian Officialdom since 1881 1
Don K. Rowney and Eugene Huskey

Part I Late Tsarist Officialdom

2 The Institutional Structure of Late Tsarist Officialdom: An Introduction 19
Don K. Rowney

3 Imperial Russian Officialdom during Modernization 26
Don K. Rowney

4 Identities, Loyalties and Government Service in Tsarist Ukraine 46
Stephen Velychenko

5 Multi-ethnicity and Estonian Tsarist State Officials in Estland Province, 1881–1914 72
Bradley D. Woodworth

6 The Military Bureaucracy in the Samarkand *Oblast'* of Russian Turkestan 89
Alexander Morrison

Part II Soviet Officialdom

7 An Introduction to Soviet Officialdom 111
Eugene Huskey and Don K. Rowney

8 The Communist Party and the Weakness of Bureaucratic Norms 118
Graeme Gill

9 White-Collar Workers in the Second Revolution and Postwar Reconstruction 135
Daniel Orlovsky

10 Survival Strategies in the Soviet Bureaucracy: The Case of the Statistics Administration 152
Martine Mespoulet

11 Corruption among Officials and Anticorruption Drives in the USSR, 1945–1964 169
James Heinzen

12 Soviet Foreign Policy from the 1970s through the Gorbachev Era: The Role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Communist Party International Department 189
Marie-Pierre Rey

Part III Post-communist Officialdom

13 An Introduction to Post-communist Officialdom 215
Eugene Huskey

14 Hiring and Promoting Young Civil Servants: Weberian Ideals versus Russian Reality 231
Vladimir Gimpelson, Vladimir Magun, and Robert J. Brym

15 The Politics–Administration Nexus in Post-communist Russia 253
Eugene Huskey

16 Delivering State Services to the Population: The Development of State Welfare Agencies in Post-Soviet Russia 273
Cecile Lefevre

17 The Fate of Russian Officialdom: Fundamental Reform or Technical Improvements? 290
Alexei Barabashev, Mikhail Krasnov, Alexander Obolonsky, and Tatiana Zaitseva

18 Why Is It So Difficult to Reform Russian Officialdom? 301
Alexander Obolonsky

19 Conclusion 317
Eugene Huskey and Don K. Rowney

Select Bibliography 334

Index 338

List of Tables

4.1 Population and estimated number of administrators by province 1897 — 50
4.2 Estimated number of administrators and auxiliary personnel in government, civil councils, and private organizations in 1897 — 50
4.3 Rail, communications and legal personnel in 1897 — 51
4.4 Declared Ukrainians and Jews literate in Russian, 1897 — 53
6.1 Education of military officers serving in Turkestan, 1874 — 93
6.2 Comparative education figures — 102
A6.1 Religious and educational profile of the Officer Corps of the Russian army in 1867 — 104
A6.2 Analysis of Military Records of officers serving as administrators in Samarkand 1868–c.1890 — 105
14.1 Formal recruitment procedures by rank — 235
14.2 Formal recruitment procedures by administrative level — 236
14.3 Social and institutional network recruitment procedures by administrative level — 237
14.4 'Who is the referee who directly recommended you for this job?' by administrative level — 238
14.5 'Imagine a young professional who entered an organization through one of the lowest posts. Up to which position will s/he be able to advance?' by administrative level — 241
14.6 Perceived promotion criteria — 242
14.7 Factors underlying perceived promotion criteria — 244
14.8 Probit regression for desire to change employer — 247
14.9 Coefficients for wage regression, OLS — 249
15.1 The careers of deputy ministers after state service 1995–2004 — 264

Preface and Acknowledgements

It has been 30 years since the appearance of the forerunner to this work, *Russian Officialdom: The Bureaucratization of Russian Society from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Centuries*. In the years since its publication, three developments occurred that invited a thorough reassessment of the Russian bureaucracy, past and present. First, new methods in the social sciences, most notably neo-institutionalism, revolutionized the study of organizations. Second, public administration moved beyond its Weberian conceptual roots toward a new understanding of relations among politicians, state employees, and the private sector, embodied in the New Public Management (NPM) and related movements. Finally, and most significantly, Russia experienced a regime transition that has reshaped state-societal relations and the role of the state bureaucracy in public life.

The challenges posed by today's reforms have opened up new perspectives on bureaucratic change in earlier episodes of regime transition in Russian history. In response to these parallel revolutions in methodologies and in the Russian state itself, this volume brings together an international team of scholars who offer empirically rich and conceptually innovative studies of Russian state administration since the late 19th century.

Modern states rely on markets, politics, law, and administration to allocate goods. In Russia, the particular mix of these decision-making mechanisms has been skewed heavily toward administration, whether in the tsarist, Soviet, or post-communist eras. Given the importance of state administration for an understanding of Russian political and economic development, one of the goals of this work is to move the analysis of the state bureaucracy from the fringes of Russian studies to its rightful place among the core concerns of the discipline. Whether in scholarly work on Russia, such as Stephen Solnick's *Stealing the State*, or in the attempts to construct state institutions in countries like Afghanistan and Iraq, one finds in recent years a new appreciation of the significance of the machinery of state for governance, political change and economic development.

This volume is not only designed to bring the study of state administration center stage in the Imperial, Soviet and post-communist fields but to provide students of comparative state and bureaucracy analyses of how the organization, personnel, and practices of Russian officialdom relate to bureaucratic norms and behavior elsewhere. The topical chapters that follow focus on the perennial tensions in state administration as they apply to Russia—tensions between center and periphery, formal rules and informal practices, professional and legal versus political loyalties, and a reliance on public or private purveyors of services. Framing these chapters are editors'

introductions to Russian officialdom in each of the three periods under study—tsarist, Soviet, and post-communist. We also provide extended essays in the Introduction and Conclusion that locate the Russian experience in the comparative literature on bureaucracy and the state.

In common with its predecessor, this work is the result of a lengthy intellectual collaboration and exchange that is rare for edited volumes. In this case, however, collaboration has extended to authors from diverse disciplinary and geo-political backgrounds. Conceived at the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS) 2002 conference in Pittsburgh, this project brought together contributors at several subsequent AAASS conferences and at the International Council for Central and East European Studies Congress in Berlin in July 2005. A concluding conference took place in March 2008 at the CNRS institute, Cultures et sociétés urbaines (CSU) in Paris. We are grateful to our French hosts, Martine Mespoulet and the Director of CSU, Anne-Marie Devreux, for arranging this two-day colloquium.

Numerous individuals and organizations were instrumental in shaping and supporting this project. Our home institutions, Bowling Green State University and Stetson University, provided travel funds and other assistance. The National Council for Eurasian and East European Research supported the work of Eugene Huskey and Alexander Obolonsky during the initial stages of research. The Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, provided a forum in which to discuss research findings. To John Armstrong, Alena Ledeneva, Barbara Lehmbruch, Joel Moses,Walter Pintner, William Tompson, Michael Urban, and Peter Solomon we express our gratitude for helping us to think more clearly about the role of officialdom in Russia.

* * *

Don K. Rowney translated Chapter 10 from the French and Eugene Huskey translated Chapters 12 and 16 from the French and Chapters 17 and 18 from the Russian. Chapter 6, which is a revised and shortened version of a chapter from A. S. Morrison, *Russian Rule in Samarkand, 1868–1910. A Comparison with British India* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 126–171, appears by kind permission of Oxford University Press.

DKR
EEH

Contributors

Alexei Barabashev is Dean and Professor, School of Public Administration, at the Higher School of Economics, Moscow. A major participant in public administration reform efforts, he is the author of works that include *Gosudarstvennaia sluzhba: kompleksnyi podkhod* (with Alexander Obolonsky). He received his Doctor of Sciences from Moscow State Pedagogical University.

Robert Brym is Professor of Sociology at the University of Toronto, where he received the PhD in Sociology. Among his books are *The Jews of Moscow, Kiev, and Minsk* and *Sociology as a Life or Death Issue*. He is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada.

Graeme Gill is Professor and Australian Professorial Fellow at the University of Sydney. Among his works is *The Collapse of a Single-Party System: The Disintegration of the CPSU*. He holds the PhD in Politics from the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Vladimir Gimpelson is the Director, Center for Labor Market Studies, at the Higher School of Economics, Moscow. His books include *The Russian Labour Market: Between Transition and Turmoil*. He received the Doctor of Sciences from the Institute of Economic Problems, Moscow.

James Heinzen is Associate Professor of History at Rowan University and the author of *Inventing a Soviet Countryside: State Power and the Transformation of Rural Russia, 1917–1929*. He received the PhD in History from the University of Pennsylvania.

Eugene Huskey is William R. Kenan, Jr. Professor of Political Science and Director of Russian Studies at Stetson University. His books include *Russian Lawyers and the Soviet State* and *Presidential Power in Russia*. He has a PhD in Politics from the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Mikhail Krasnov is Deputy Chair of Department and Professor of Constitutional and Administrative Law at the Higher School of Economics, Moscow, and was Boris Yeltsin's counsellor on legal affairs in the 1990s. He received the Doctor of Sciences degree from the Institute of State and Law, Russian Academy of Sciences.

Cecile Lefevre is the Head of the Survey Research Department at the Institut nationale d'études démographiques, Paris. Her work focuses in part on social policies in Russia. She is Docteur en economie from l'École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS).

Vladimir Magun is Professor of Sociology at the Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow. His many works on Russian youth include *Sotsial'nye izmeneniia v Rossii i molodezh'*. Professor Magun received the Candidate of Sciences degree from Leningrad State University.

Martine Mespoulet is Professor of Sociology at the University of Nantes and Research Associate, CNRS (Cultures et sociétés urbaines), Paris. Her books include *Statistique et révolution en Russie: un compromis impossible (1880–1930)*. She is Docteur en démographie et sciences sociales from l'École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS).

Alexander Morrison is Lecturer in Imperial History at the University of Liverpool and author of *Russian Rule in Samarkand, 1868–1910*. He received his DPhil in History from the University of Oxford.

Alexander Obolonsky is Vice-Dean and Professor, School of Public Administration, at the Higher School of Economics, Moscow. A leading participant in presidential working groups responsible for the reform of Russian officialdom, he is the author of numerous works, including *The Drama of Russian Political History: System against Individuality*. Professor Obolonsky received the Doctor of Sciences in Law from the Institute of State and Law, Russian Academy of Sciences.

Daniel Orlovsky is Professor of History at Southern Methodist University. His many works include *The Limits of Reform: The Ministry of Internal Affairs in Imperial Russia, 1802–1881*. He received his PhD in History from Harvard University.

Marie-Pierre Rey is Professor of Russian and Soviet History and Director, Center for Slavic History, at the University of Paris I—Panthéon Sorbonne. Her latest work is *Alexandre Ier*. Professor Rey is Docteur en histoire, ancienne élève de l'École Normale Supérieure.

Don K. Rowney is Professor of History and Senior Research Fellow of the Social Philosophy and Policy Center, Bowling Green State University. He is co-editor of *Russian Officialdom: The Bureaucratization of Russian Society from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Centuries*, and the author of *Transition to Technocracy: The Structural Origins of the Soviet Administrative State*. He received his PhD in History from Indiana University.

Stephen Velychenko is Research Fellow, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Toronto, and Visiting Professor at the Kyiv Mohyla Academy. He is co-editor of the recently published work, *Ukraine, the EU, and Russia: History, Culture, and International Relations*. He has a PhD in History from the University of London.

Bradley Woodworth is Lecturer in History and Global Studies at the University of New Haven and Coordinator of the Baltic Studies Program at Yale University. His PhD dissertation in History from Indiana University was written on 'Civil Society and Nationality in the Multiethnic Russian Empire: Tallinn/Reval, 1860–1914.'

Tatiana Zaitseva is Associate Professor of Human Resources Management at Moscow State University, where she received the Candidate of Sciences degree in Psychology. Her works on personnel management and the reform of public administration include *Motivatsiia trudovoi deiatel'nosti*.

1
Introduction: Russian Officialdom since 1881

Don K. Rowney and Eugene Huskey

This book is about the civil agents, or officialdom, of three states: the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. The study begins with the reign of Emperor Alexander III (1881–94), who succeeded his assassinated father at a moment of new departures for Russian state administration. As we shall see, the increasing size of state service, combined with the demand for state oversight of an increasingly industrialized political economy, requirements for new administrative specializations, and attempts to retrieve state administration from the liberalizing turns of the previous reign, all combined to create an officialdom which struggled to adapt to a changing imperium in a changing world.

The study ends with an analysis of attempted administrative reforms during a somewhat similar era in the life of the Russian state at the beginning of the 21st century, during the presidential administration of Vladimir V. Putin. It aims to detail the institutional and organizational evolution of what we shall call here a 'Russian officialdom'[1] over the past 125 years. Unsurprisingly, the studies created for this book have found both significant continuities and changes. These are documented as endurances and variations across time, geographic space and organizational hierarchies.

At least as much as the inhabitants of other states which are called 'urban-industrial', the generations who have lived within the boundaries of the Imperial, Soviet and post-communist Russian states during the late 19th, 20th and early 21st centuries experienced dramatic and unprecedented transformations in their personal and social lives. The boundaries of these states, the largest in the world, were modified by political interventions, war, revolution and even political paralysis. Industrialization and its concomitants—urbanization, mass education and mass politics—changed the lives and life expectations of virtually everyone. On an area of roughly comparable geographic size, the population burgeoned from a little less than 130 million at the beginning of our period of study to more than 286 million by the fall of the Soviet Union, in spite of catastrophes brought on by famine, disease, war and revolution.[2] Today, owing to decline in standards of

living and birth rates, and to the failure of social safety nets, the Russian Federation is experiencing what both journalistic and professional demographic studies have described as population 'freefall'.[3]

Any one of these transformations could challenge the civil administration of any state in the world. All of them together, as their impact accumulated over the last century and a quarter, presented challenges to a Russian officialdom which was often incapable of responding fully and effectively, and which, when responding, did not always do so with the effect and force of other state administrations in urban-industrial societies.

Patterns of endurance and change

The challenges which state administrations have presented to scholars determined to understand and critique them have been especially great during the past 125 years, an era of historically unprecedented growth in the size, scope and complexity of state activity throughout the world. Departing from the ideal view of state bureaucracy as a potentially neutral agent of governments' political power, famously constructed by Max Weber,[4] historians and social scientists continued to develop new paradigms that increasingly recognized the importance of relations among officials and the public and private interests that bear on them. These new paradigms included narratives focusing on politics internal to bureaucracies, the effects of personnel and structural changes, the consequences of technological, economic and demographic changes, war, regime change and revolution.[5]

In turn, these perspectives began to be superseded by the work of students of institutionalist and neo-institutionalist analysis from the mid-20th century onward. These new interpretations re-conceptualized relations between politics and administration within states. This research recognized that state organizations serve as a training ground for many political leaders, that they shape the discourse of politics (especially in regimes in which the state is relatively autonomous), that they provide the political leadership with its means of governance and control, and that they offer services to the population. A given state's public administration is not, in this view, a one-size-fits-all, ideal-typical bureaucracy, interchangeable within any political system. Instead, it is an idiosyncratic network of organizational structures (bureaus), personnel and institutions that shape political, social and economic developments over time and is shaped by them in turn. Of special note for the purposes of this study is the fact that the literature argues that such a network is sometimes better explained through historical institutionalism—i.e. narratives that tell 'how it got that way' by tracing its evolution over time—than by behavioral or structural/functional analyses.[6]

Definitions of state bureaucracy became more complex and inclusive as one moved across this range of scholarship, beginning from the mid-20th

century. Writing at the end of the 1960s, Anthony Downs defined 'bureaucracy' as hierarchical, non-market organizations, choosing, apparently, to exclude in theory such hierarchical administrations as those of large corporations. 'Bureaucrats', the functionaries in bureaucracies, were identified by their hierarchical roles and also by the fact that their work was not compensated directly from the values arising through market exchanges.[7]

In his still widely referenced study, *Inside Bureaucracy*, Downs did not discuss institutions. He used this term only as a synonym for organizations. Across time, however, the concept of 'institution' came to add a significant interpretive dimension to the understanding of bureaucracies and the stricture that bureaucracies (public ones, at least) are non-market organizations became less defensible, as we shall see.[8]

Beginning in the 1980s and continuing up to the present time, the institutional economist, Douglass C. North, and, after him, many scholars, including authors of works focused on Russia, such as Stephen L. Solnick and Stefan Hedlund, attempted to address the widening concern among historians, social scientists and some economists about problems of organizational participants' understanding (cognition) of their institutional and organizational roles and how these might account for differences in what organizations actually do.[9] They were compelled to do this, as North observed, because it is not unusual to find two organizations with very similar resources, structures and organizational objectives achieving quite different, bottom-line, results. This neo-institutionalist approach to organizational study calls attention to the fact that organizations are more than their formal structures (offices, budgets, authorized staff with their training and experience, and formally specified operational goals and responsibilities). They are, in addition, historically shaped and behaviorally governed by their evolved organizational cultures, which North called 'institutions'.[10] These are the sorts of institutional differences, for example, that sometimes doom corporate mergers, which, at their inception, looked very good 'on paper'. As a consequence, this research emphasizes that organizations are more than the aggregation of the formally defined behavior of their participants.

Neo-institutionalism, then, goes well beyond Weberian and mid-20th century organizational and behavioral studies and joins itself to the evolving interpretations of those who see state administrations as networks of principals (bosses) and agents who are acting both on the state's behalf and in their own interests. In doing this, the scholarship emphasizes that effecting change in organizations may, for example, involve much more than changing organizational structures, laws and formal work rules. It also involves changing the motivational environments of the nominal bosses (principals), the capacity of independent (non-state) organizations to enforce norms of behavior on both bosses and their subordinates (agents), the transparency of public administrations' work environments and, perhaps above

all, the personnel themselves. These are not trivial tasks, in the view of this scholarship.[11]

These complex and kaleidoscopically changing analyses of public administration have recently taken on a much more vigorous and organized character in the form of the New Public Management movement. Interpreted in a rapidly growing body of scholarship and, importantly, aggressively fostered by influential non-governmental organizations such as the World Bank and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, reform schemes for public administration which explicitly aim to integrate the public into policy making and to ensure public transparency in the execution of policy have become common, if not always successful, in some industrial-urban countries.[12]

Initially introduced in Anglo-Saxon countries, the New Public Management aims to redefine relations between the state and the public, its 'clients' who are conceived as a market. The role of the public in policy formation is recognized (in principle, at least) just as the role of the client, or consumer, is recognized (in principle) in creating new products and shaping marketing strategies for private enterprise. In addition, officials' status and behavior are seen as more closely connected with the roles of actors in the private sector than previously. In our judgment it is important that it was in the wake of the emerging New Public Management movement that the USSR and Russia experienced the regime transitions that began to realign economic and political organizations and institutions in the 1980s.

Partly in response to the re-conceptualizations of bureaucratic theory summarized above, since the appearance of the original version of *Russian Officialdom* in 1980 a major realignment between the state and markets developed in the Anglo-American world. Where neo-liberal approaches began to dominate economic thought and practice, partisans of the New Public Management and related movements initiated changes in state administration.[13] Because the rise of these robust challenges to earlier economic and political paradigms in the West accompanied the decline and fall of communist regimes in the East, neo-liberalism and the New Public Management exerted a considerable pull on governments trying to negotiate late-communist and post-communist transitions.[14] The off-the-shelf solutions developed in the West held an attraction for some in societies where state-dominated approaches to economics and public administration had been discredited, or, at the very least, called into question. Enhancing the attractiveness of radical market approaches to economics and public administration were monetary and membership incentives offered by international financial organizations and by individual Western states. Thus, the sequencing of the neo-liberal initiatives in the West and the post-communist transitions in the East interacted in ways that shaped the debate over Russian state administration after the end of the Soviet era in 1991.

While the international context into which post-communist Russia emerged clearly influenced its development, it was not the only factor shaping outcomes for post-communist officialdom. Resistance to reform, and especially neo-liberal reform, drew energy from several sources. Besides the obvious institutional, ideational and personnel legacies from the Soviet era, these included politicians and many academic specialists who continued to see the state as the key agent of change and control during the transition and therefore did not wish to dismantle its traditional roles and institutions as neo-liberals wished to do. This is a perspective, or institutional culture, which, as we shall see, has deep roots in the history of the three 'Russian' states under examination here.

Even Western scholars have questioned the appropriateness of exporting the New Public Management to Russia and other post-communist states. In the words of Ezra Suleiman:

> If today's consolidated democracies can come to regard the state bureaucracy as being largely superfluous, does it follow that a fledgling democratic state, fresh out of the shackles of authoritarian rule, can dispense with the need for a professional, or at least a largely competent, bureaucracy?[15]

Whereas in the West the privatization and decentralization of state functions was a conscious—if not always widely understood or supported—policy of state, in Russia and some other post-communist regimes it has resulted from poorly conceived political intrusion, corruption and a desperate attempt by some executive agencies to survive in an era of underfunded budgets (owing to the availability of special funds to support 'reform' and to the possibility of garnering income from private sources). The Russian case, therefore, is among those posing the most fundamental questions about the universality of neo-liberal approaches to state administration.

Of central interest to our study, finally, is the fact that, whether inspired by Weberian, institutionalist, or New Public Management principles, reform movements in Russian state administration have generally failed by the standards set early on, and nearly always have followed their own unique paths. This book has been explicitly structured to interrogate this 'irreformability' of Russian state administration from an interdisciplinary perspective by focusing on the independence of political elites, the vulnerabilities of officialdom to political intrusion, intra-administrative competition, endemic corruption, the ambiguities of identity among participants in state administration and the endurance and variability of these characteristics across time.

Endurances

One can readily identify patterns which appear to have endured even across the most dramatic and comprehensive moments of crisis and transformation such as the two World Wars, acquisition of 'Super Power' status and, of course, the Bolshevik and post-communist regime changes. The following list is not meant to be exhaustive, but illustrative.

Most obviously, perhaps, the ministerial governance system has survived for centuries in Russia and is thriving today. As the first version of *Russian Officialdom* showed, the Russian choice, dating from at least the 17th century, has been a ministerial governance system in which elite, powerful executives (including monarchs) presided over more specialized administrative entities (ministry, commissariat, *kollegia, prikaz*).[16] The size and number of these entities varied over time depending upon state objectives and such factors as novel technologies, educational resources, the social and demographic character of the governed, and the nature of perceived challenges from abroad.[17]

A second continuity is the dependence of officialdom on political will for resources, status and scope of authority. This may not seem unusual to the reader. After all, state administrators are normally constitutionally obliged to implement the legal policies of political power in even the most democratic states. The difference in Russia, historically, has been that political power has almost never answered to public will, whether at the local, regional or national level. By the same token, state officialdom in Russia has, almost without exception, always been just that—the servant of the state, not of citizenry or the public. In Russia, neither legislation nor state organizations of the highest levels have ever enjoined officials, either formally or informally, to serve the *public*. Service to the state—the *gosudarstvennaia sluzhba* of the tsarist and post-communist eras or the *partiinyi-sovetskyi apparat* of the Soviet era—has, instead, been the prevailing norm. As we shall see in later chapters, there have been modest exceptions to this rule during the last two generations of the imperial state and in the late Soviet and post-Soviet regimes, but these moments have been limited in their scope and generally threatened by reassertion of central state control. Throughout the period covered by this study, state administrative organizations, and more importantly, state officials, have been open to political intervention and manipulation. Operational independence from changing political regimes, envisioned by Weber as essential to bureaucrats' capacity to respond to policy changes evenhandedly and within the bounds both of professional competence and constitutional limitations, has never held sway in Russia.

A third enduring characteristic in Russian state administration has been the centrist territorial administration model. This has been a system that, since early modern times, extended across highly diverse regions and highly diverse, ethno-linguistic and cultural communities—one state intending to

govern many different societies. This centrist pattern, enhanced by the legal establishment of serfdom in the 17th century, was reinforced in the 19th and 20th centuries by large-scale policies for social control which aimed to monitor and limit changes in habitation and movement across territories by using devices such as internal passports and required registration with law enforcement agencies.

State administration's willingness and capacity to mobilize large-scale administrative methodologies for intervention into civil society and the national economy constitute another, related, continuity—at least in modern times. While the histories of some state administrations suggest that such programs have been comparatively rare, often owing to the dispersal of investment, development and managerial authority among non-state enterprises, Russian history indicates that such large-scale methods have been common for the Russian state apparatus. During the period under consideration here, they included the programs intended to limit and manage population transfer mentioned above; repeated, large-scale state interventions into peasant affairs after land reform and massive infrastructure development programs that were demanded by the huge areas within state boundaries during industrialization. These last included most of the construction and management of enormous railway, telegraph and electrical networks across the vast territories of the three states in the second half of the 19th century and during the entire 20th century; of course, they also include the infrastructures that were demanded by forced industrialization and the collectivization of agriculture during the era of the planned economy. Each of these programs has carried with it a correspondingly strong set of consequences for ministerial structures and functions.[18]

A final endurance has been official corruption. Historically, this has been a costly and destabilizing system of compensation for state action. It has taken numerous forms in the history of Russian officialdom and it has endured throughout the period under examination here.[19]

Changes/discontinuities

Changes or discontinuities came in several forms. Again, without attempting to be comprehensive, we indicate some of the most significant forms, each of which can be seen to have changed both organizational and institutional characteristics across the 125 years under study here.

Ideologies

The argument that the tsarist and Soviet states sought legitimacy and authority through ideals, symbols and systems of thought introduced and sponsored from on high is not new.[20] One encounters it frequently in the memoirs of high state officials from the 18th century to the end of the Old Regime, at which point the mobilizing role of symbols and ideals employed

by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union began to achieve exemplary, world-class status in an era when many states were discovering the power of propagandized ideologies. While the ideologies, which combined religious faith with commitment to empire and the politics of autocracy, did not disappear during the Revolution of 1917 and ensuing civil war, they seem to have lost any justifying or driving force within state administration.[21] Similarly, the images and ideologies rooted in class-consciousness and Communist Party claims for monopolistic leadership authority and legitimacy were the guiding values of the Soviet state apparatus. After Stalin's death in 1953, however, they began to attenuate and then lose their force in the 1970s and 1980s. Stephen Solnick, among others, has written a persuasive narrative detailing the organizational and material consequences of the administrative hierarchy's increasing paralysis in the wake of lost values, the rapid onset of which he characterized as a political and organizational 'bank run'.[22]

Structures and personnel

What about officialdom—its principals and agents—and state organizations themselves? Surely the huge economic and socio-political transformations visited upon Russia during the 125 years under examination cannot have left personnel and organizational structures intact. The short answer, of course, is that significant change did occur. The most obvious changes occurred in organizational structures—the numbers of ministries (or commissariats), their specializations, the superior structures to which they were nominally responsible, the number and nature of their connections with the public. This was owing, first, to the fact that supreme, central political authorities could alter structures more predictably than they could change or supplement personnel.[23] However, it was also owing to dramatic changes in administrative agendas, the imperial economy, technology and demography already much in evidence before the end of the Old Regime. As we shall see, each of these dynamic factors forced changes in the number, scope and size of imperial ministries and Soviet commissariats as well as in regional and local agents and agencies. Among the most dramatic of these were two in the post-revolutionary era. First, there were changes in the connections between administrative agencies and higher political authorities occasioned by the Leninist/Stalinist strategy of 'dual administration', which interleaved, in detail, positions and personnel of the Communist Party with those of state administration.[24] Second, there were structural changes demanded by the insertion of state and party agencies into the national economy during the 1920s and 1930s, a process so universal and pervasive in its scope that one writer has described it as 'society becomes bureaucracy.'[25]

Changes to the compliment of officialdom itself, the '*sostav*' of state administration, were more complicated, controversial and less certain of outcome. Under the Old Regime the incorporation of officials demanded

by changes in local government, urbanization and industrialization entailed an acceleration of the displacement of traditional noble elites in some areas of state administration and the insertion of agents with novel expertise and sometimes unwelcome political agendas. Inevitably, criticism and controversy ensued.[26] As well, or better, known are the controversies and uncertainties occasioned by the inclusion of 'bourgeois specialists', often holdovers from the Old Regime, in the ranks of post-revolutionary state administration in the 1920s.[27] Finally, throughout the Soviet era, conflict endured between the values and agendas of social, life and physical scientists and their administrative and political bosses.[28]

A further dimension of personnel adaptation underlies the reconstruction of state service throughout the entire era of our survey here, but it has only come explicitly to the fore since the advent of *perestroika* in the 1980s. This is the problem of bureaucratic professionalization as addressed by several essays in this collection.[29] As we shall see in the discussion that follows on the change in legal networks intended to define and control officialdom, the objective of creating a professional civil service in Russia is one of long standing, dating to the early 18th century. Specifying the objective, however, has always been fraught with difficulty.

What is the meaning of 'professionalization' in this case? As we suggested earlier in this essay, the facile answers, rooted in Weberian idealism, which liberal democracies mobilized in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, have never been seriously advanced in Russia, but the question has been given new urgency by the commitment of academics and some political elites in today's Russia to the construction of an administrative service that is capable of applying the laws of the land as well as obeying them.

Law

Another important universe of change affecting—or intended to affect—Russian officialdom throughout its modern history is to be found in the networks of legislation, decrees and rules designed by higher political authorities to define, control and sometimes protect and privilege participants in state service. One can identify at least three major eras of transformation in this history that are relevant to the time frame of our narratives.

The first era, although reaching its climax at the end of the empire, began in the first quarter of the 18th century when Peter the Great and the Imperial Ruling Senate attempted to define state service with precision and to demand details regarding service careers. Specifically, the creation of the Table of Ranks in 1722, and legislation subsequently based on it, were early attempts to establish a professionally defined, corporate body of state officials separate from the social class of hereditary, landowning nobility [*dvorianstvo*] with whom service of all kinds had previously been identified.[30] This policy continued to be reflected in a massive body of legislation that remained,

theoretically at least, in force until 1917. These statutes were synthesized into a single *Code of Administration of the State and Provinces*, the third part of which was an *Ustav o sluzhbe*, or *Statute on Service*, which appeared in several editions between 1842 and 1917. The 19th and early 20th century *Ustavy o sluzhbe* referenced thousands of individual pieces of legislation and regulation that were specifically intended to define and control the behavior of state officials.[31]

A second major change in the legislative environment of service came immediately after the Revolution of 1917, when the Soviet state set out to ensure its own withering away by turning Russian officialdom into the compliant agents of the Communist Party and a workforce that was indistinguishable from any other in Soviet society. Political leadership attempted to achieve this objective, in part, through the device of inserting Communist Party officials into all levels of all state administrations. This policy of dual administration was accompanied by the system of *nomenklatura*, introduced formally in 1923.[32] *Nomenklatura* was meant to guarantee that the party apparatus vetted the incumbents of a huge list of state offices. The Marxist ambition to, as it were, 'wither the state away' was also supported, in part, by obliterating all titles and distinctions previously attaching to offices and officials and by abandoning the accumulated mass of legislation on state service.[33] The program, meant to facilitate the withering away of the state, was gradually reversed when Bolshevik leadership began, instead, to use state organizations as instruments of economic and social reconstruction under the New Economic Policy (1921–8), and then during the construction of a centrally planned economy and mass agricultural collectivization in the late 1920s and 1930s. Rather than constructing a unified body of law defining state administration and administrators, however, this approach usually imbedded administrative law within other legislation: for example, labor, civil, property and criminal law.[34] These policies required the reconstruction of labor and civil law and were formulated into codes which began to appear in the early 1920s, culminating in the constitution of 1936.

A third transformational period began in the late Soviet era when political authorities once again launched policies intended to define state service as such, to establish norms of administrative behavior and to create a new network of legislation which aimed to control it.[35] This effort continued into the post-Soviet era when attempts were made to strengthen state capacities such as taxation and regulatory oversight in the wake of the collapse and abandonment of the planned economy and the opening of Russian society and its economy to international investment and market competition. As several essays in this study show, this process of re-conceptualizing both Russian officialdom itself and the laws that define and control official behavior is far from complete. Its direction, moreover, is far from certain.

Themes and arguments

In the light of a consideration of these continuities and changes, and within the context of the interpretive scholarship described above, we identify several general themes and perspectives in the essays that follow. First, note that measured, rationally conceived and broadly agreed reform agendas have been rare in the history of Russian state administration. Instead, political interventions into ministerial behavior in order to achieve specific political objectives have been more common, as chapters below by Mespoulet, Rey and Gimpelson et al. show. In the absence of independent, homegrown movements for reform (such as the New Public Management movement in the United States and Western Europe) Russian state administration has been vulnerable to imported strategies of reform that are overly dependent upon assumptions about the beneficial effect of changes to formal laws and work-place rules.

Owing to deeply entrenched institutional behavior, this phenomenon is also reflected in the approach within the Russian academic community to research on state administration. The literature in the Russian language on contemporary state administration remains heavily oriented toward legal approaches. It is hesitant to move beyond formal rules to informal practices and behavior or to examine the linkages between state administration and its social, political and economic contexts. In the Soviet era, most writing on the bureaucracy appeared in works on administrative law, which were often little more than restatements of relevant legislation.[36] This perspective is still prevalent today in many Russian-language treatises in the field and in the two leading journals of Russian state administration, *Gosudarstvennaia sluzhba* and *Chinovnik*.[37]

Owing to its openness to exceptionally powerful and arbitrary political influences across the 20th century, Russian state administration has been unable to establish transparent and equitable institutions of recruitment, internal advancement, dismissal and compensation.[38] While, as described above, the tsarist legal system, in place until the early 20th century, sought to impose formal regulations, which would require the application of a rule-based system for recruitment, advancement and other organizational procedures in state administration, in practice it too was vexed by problems of transparency and equitable enforcement. The Soviet system, owing to its highly centralized structure, the pervasive presence of Communist Party members and the secretiveness of the *nomenklatura*, was even less transparent and more arbitrary. The question for the 21st century is whether the post-Soviet regime has the political will and organizational resources to overcome these institutionalized behaviors and achieve the enforcement of impersonal and uniform standards. Essays by Barabashev et al., Gill, Heinzen, Huskey and Obolonsky address both the history of this system and whether post-Soviet Russia has a capable solution in hand.

A closely related problem arises from the fact that the state has been unable to maintain uniform standards of recruitment, advancement and compensation for its officialdom across the entire geography of the Empire, the USSR or the Russian Federation. This phenomenon is obviously linked with and dependent upon long-enduring patterns of the centralized administrative control of diverse ethno-linguistic regions, described in essays by Morrison, Velychenko and Woodworth. The formal objective of centralist administration is, clearly, to achieve uniform standards of conformity to policy; however, the realities of the enormous social, political and economic diversity of the regions in question and of the frequently ad hoc measures adopted to cope with this diversity have resulted (especially at the turn of the 20th century and, again, in the final decades of that century) in widely varying rates of political, social and economic development. This circumstance is addressed several times, in the analyses presented by Barabashev et al., Huskey, Lefevre, Morrison, Rowney, Velychenko and Woodworth.

Note that these perspectives call for careful study of the axis that runs from communities of political elites to the offices and bureaus of central, regional and local administrators. They demand investigation both into the continuing intrusion of arbitrary political (and, by extension, economic) power into administrative behavior and development. As a mentor and source of political appointees, moreover, senior political authority's incapacity to establish ethical codes of conduct and transparency has not only facilitated political intervention but also enabled its sibling, corruption. Several chapters of this study address this problem of the political-administrative axis. These include the essays by Barabashev et al., Heinzen, Huskey, Mespoulet, Orlovsky and Rey.

Note, in addition, that in spite of the proposition that impetus for administrative reconstruction has not come, in 20th century Russia, from within the Russian political intelligentsia, critically important—and not entirely uncommon—episodes of the history of Russian (Soviet) state administration oblige us to conclude that there *were* cycles of decay and productive reconstruction across the time frame of this study. Certainly, some portions of the history of scientific, educational and military-industrial administration illustrate this point vividly. While many segments of the national economy during the 20th century were insulated from Western standards of achievement by state policies of autarchy, Russian science and military-industrial administration, on the whole, were not. These state administrations nevertheless competed, by many standards, quite successfully on an international scale. Chapters contributed by Lefèvre and Rey address this point.

Summary

This work is designed, therefore, to contribute to the larger debate on the role of the bureaucracy in modern states as well as to provide an assessment of Russian state administration during the last century and a quarter.

The following chapters will demonstrate that, owing to the institutional and organizational history of its past 125 years, the evolving condition of Russian officialdom offers numerous insights into the meaning and viability of contemporary views of state administration—especially under conditions of regime change and reform. In order to achieve its ambitious objectives, this study benefits from the contributions of demographers, historians, legal specialists, political scientists and sociologists from several countries in Eurasia, North America and Western Europe whose focal interests are on Russia, the USSR and the post-Soviet successor states.

The book consists of three chronologically based sections, each of which is preceded by an editorial introduction. Although the emphasis of the authors writing on each period varies, readers will find similar themes examined in the Imperial, Soviet and post-communist eras. As indicated earlier, these include the structure of formal and informal incentives for bureaucratic behavior; the social composition of officialdom and its systems of training, selection and placement; the lines of bureaucratic authority and communication within the capital and between the center and periphery; and the ways in which the bureaucracy adapts to economic, technological, political and social change. In a concluding chapter, the editors revisit these themes in an essay that considers the continuities and discontinuities across the Imperial, Soviet and post-communist eras in the light of the book's findings and the relationship between the Russian experience and the patterns of bureaucratic development and behavior that characterize post-communist societies.

Notes

1. After the title of another book on the same topic, *Russian Officialdom. The Bureaucratization of Russian Society from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Centuries*, Walter McKenzie Pintner and Don Karl Rowney, eds (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980).
2. Russian Empire data: Tsentral'nyi Statisticheskii Komitet, *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis' naseleniia Rossiiskoi Imperii 1897 g. Naselenie Rossiiskoi Imperii po perepisi 1897 g. po guberniam* (St. Petersburg: Central Statistical Committee, Ministry of Internal Affairs, 1897), Issue 1, 29; USSR data: Gosudarstvennyi Komitet SSSR po Statistike, *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia, 1989 g.* (Moscow: Goskomstat SSSR, 1991–3), 1. *Chislennost i razmeshchenie naseleniia SSSR* in *1989 USSR Population Census [computer file]* (Minneapolis, MN: Eastview, 1996).
3. Graeme Smith, *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 24 April 2006: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20060421.w0422russia/BNStory/RussiaShrinks/home; Julie DaVanzo, *Dire Demographics. Population Trends in the Russian Federation* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001). We recognize, of course, that the territory of post-communist Russia is considerably smaller than that of Imperial Russia or the Soviet Union.
4. Max Weber, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, trans. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 214–21, 224–8.
5. John A. Armstrong, *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite. A Case Study of the Ukrainian Apparatus* (New York: Praeger, 1959); Armstrong, *The European Administrative Elite*

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973); Reinhard Bendix, *Work and Authority in Industry. Ideologies of Management in the Course of Industrialization* (New York: Harper, 1956); Peter M. Blau, 'Co-operation and Competition in a Bureaucracy,' *American Journal of Sociology*, 59 (May 1954): 530–45; T. P. Korzhikhina, *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i ego uchrezhdeniia. Noiabr' 1917 g.—dekabr' 1991 g.* (Moscow: Russian State Humanities University 1995); Rolf Torstendahl, *Bureaucratization in Northwestern Europe, 1880–1985. Domination and Governance* (New York: Routledge, 1991); George Yaney, 'Bureaucracy and Freedom: N. M. Korkunov's Theory of the State,' *American Historical Review*, 71 (January 1966): 468–86; Yaney, *The Systematization of Russian Government* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973); Robert Presthus, *The Organizational Society: An Analysis and a Theory* (New York: Knopf, 1962); James G. March and Herbert A. Simon with the collaboration of Harold Guetzkow, *Organizations* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958).

6. For example, Steven L. Solnick, *Stealing the State. Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); *Capitalism and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. Assessing the Legacy of Communist Rule*, Grzegorz Ekiert and Stephen E. Hanson, eds (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), especially Part III; Don K. Rowney, 'Narrating the Russian Revolution: Institutionalism and Continuity across Regime Change,' *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 47 (January 2005): 79–105; for work on the related topic of path dependence in institutions and politics, see Paul Pierson, 'Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,' *American Political Science Review*, 94 (June 2000): 251–67; Pierson, *Politics in Time. History, Institutions, and Social Analysis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Paul A David, 'Why are Institutions the "Carriers of History"? Path Dependence and the Evolution of Conventions, Organizations and Institutions.' *Structural Change and Economic Dynamics*, 5 (December 1994): 205–220; Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, 'Order and Time in Institutional Study: A Brief for the Historical Approach,' in *Political Science in History. Research Programs and Political Traditions*, James Farr, John S. Dryzek and Stephen T. Leonard, eds (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 296–31; Stephen Skowronek, *Building a New American State. The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877–1928* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Skowronek, *The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to George Bush* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).
7. Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy* (Boston: Little Brown, 1967); March and Simon, *Organizations*.
8. The contrast of 'public' and 'private' (or market-driven) bureaucracies is in Marshall W. Meyer, 'The Growth of Public and Private Bureaucracies,' *Theory and Society*, 16 (1987): 215–35; also Torstendahl, *Bureaucratization in Northwestern Europe*, 79–123.
9. Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Solnick, *Stealing the State*; Stefan Hedlund, *Russian Path Dependence* (London: Routledge, 2005); also see the discussion of 'personalistic' and paternalistic norms in Chapter 8 of this volume by Gill.
10. Douglass C. North, 'Institutions, Economic Growth and Freedom: An Historical Introduction,' in *Freedom, Democracy and Economic Welfare*, M. Walker, ed. (Vancouver, 1988), 3–25 and North, 'Institutions,' *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 5 (Winter 1991): 97–112.
11. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change*, 125–30; Solnick, *Stealing the State*.

12. Michael Barzelay, *The New Public Management: Improving Research and Policy Dialogue* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson, *National, International and Transnational Constructions of New Public Management* (Stockholm: Stockholm Center for Organizational Research, 2000); Nick Manning and Neil Parison, *International Public Administration Reform: Implications for the Russian Federation* (Washington: World Bank, 2003).
13. See, for example, Manning and Parison, *International Public Administration Reform*, 12–30 and 45–8 and, for the relevant economic agenda, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Centre for Co-operation with Non-Members, *Russia Programme, 2001* (Paris: OECD, 2001).
14. Ezra N. Suleiman, *Dismantling Democratic States* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 279–304; Manning and Parison, *International Public Administration Reform*; OECD, *Russia Programme*.
15. Suleiman, *Dismantling Democratic States*, 279.
16. Robert O. Crummey, 'The Origins of the Noble Official: The Boyar Elite, 1613–1689'; Robert D. Givens, 'Eighteenth-Century Nobiliary Career Patterns and Provincial Government'; Bruce W. Menning, 'The Emergence of a Military-Administrative Elite in the Don Cossack Lands' in *Russian Officialdom*, ed. Pintner and Rowney, 46–75, 106–29, 130–61, respectively.
17. This list of variables is suggested by a reading of Thomas Ertman, *Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), which offers a detailed explanation of their nature and relevance—even though his analysis excludes Russia. For a summary of the legal evolution of these entities in Russia from the 18th century to the present, see T. G. Arkhipova, M. F. Rumiantseva, A. S. Senin, *Istoriia gosudarstvennoi sluzhby v Rossii. XVIII–XX veka. Uchebnoe posobie* (Moscow: Russian State Humanities University, 2001); a more general survey across the same period is P. E. Shepelev, *Chinovnyi mir Rossii XVIII-nachalo XX v.* (St. Petersburg: 'Iskusstvo-SPB', 1999).
18. For example, Paul R. Gregory, *The Political Economy of Stalinism: Evidence from the Soviet Secret Archives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 22–75, 126–52, 183–212; Don K. Rowney, 'The Scope, Authority, and Personnel of the New Industrial Commissariats, 1928–1936,' in *Social Dimensions of Soviet Industrialization*, William G. Rosenberg and Lewis H. Siegelbaum, eds (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 124–45.
19. See Chapter 11 in this book by James Heinzen and, more generally, *Bribery and* Blat *in Russia: Negotiating Reciprocity from the Middle Ages to the 1990s*, ed. Stephen Lovell, Alena Ledeneva, and Andrei Rogachevskii (New York: St. Martin's, 2000).
20. M. M. Shevchenko, *Konets odnogo velichiia: vlast', obrazovanie i pechatnoe slovo v Imperatorskoi Rossii na poroge Osvoboditelnykh reform* (Moscow: Tri kvadrata, 2003); Alexander V. Riasanovsky, *Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825–55* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959); Orlando Figes and Boris Kolonitskii, *Interpreting the Russian Revolution. The Language and Symbols of 1917* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999). For a study that focuses specifically on the ideals of 'administrative culture,' 1870–1917, see Anna-Liisa Heusala, *The Transitions of Local Administration Culture in Russia* (Saarijärvi: Kikimora, 2005).
21. Figes and Kolonitsky, *Interpreting the Russian Revolution*, 9–29; Heusala, *Transitions*, 117–64.
22. Solnick, *Stealing the State*, 218–40; Heusala, *Transitions*, 234–305.
23. Rowney, 'Narrating the Russian Revolution'; Rowney, 'Industrial Commissariats.'

24. See the chapters in this book by Gill, Mespoulet, and Orlovsky.
25. Heusalla, 117–31; Gregory, *Political Economy of Stalinism*, 49–75, 126–52. Note, too, the full title of the original *Russian Officialdom: 'The Bureaucratization of Russian Society'.*
26. See Chapter 3 by Rowney.
27. Matthew J. Payne, *Stalin's Railroad: Turksib and the Building of Socialism* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001), 39–125; Kendall E. Bailes, *Technology and Society under Lenin and Stalin: Origins of the Soviet Technical Intelligentsia, 1917–1941* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).
28. See Chapter 10 below by Martine Mespoulet; Loren R. Graham, *What Have We Learned about Science and Technology from the Russian Experience?* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).
29. See Chapters 14 and 15, below, by Gimpelson et al. and Huskey, respectively.
30. *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii*, First Series (St. Petersburg: Gosudarstvennaia tipografiia, 1830–39), 24 January 1722, no. 284; James Hassel, 'Implementation of the Russian Table of Ranks during the Eighteenth Century,' *Slavic Review*, 29, no. 2 (1970): 283–95; M. F. Rumiantseva, 'State Service in the Period of the Rise of the Russian Empire' in Arkhipova et al., *Istoriia gosudarstvennoi sluzhby*, 15–98 and Shepelev, *Chinovnyi mir*, 131–45.
31. *Svod uchrezhdenii gosudarstvennykh i gubernskikh. Chast' tretiia. Ustavy o sluzhbe grazhdanskoi* (St. Petersburg: Imperial Chancellery, 1842) which synthesizes more than 3,000 pieces of legislation from the mid-18th century until the year of its publication, 1842.
32. Heusala, *Transitions*, 145; also Gill's discussion below.
33. *Dekrety Oktiabr'skoi Revoliutsii. I. Ot oktiabrskogo perevorota do rospuska uchreditel'nogo sobraniia*, 'Dekret ob unichtozhenii soslovnykh i grazhdanskikh chinov, 23 (10) noiabria, 1917,' no. 28 (Moscow: Partiinoe izdatel'stvo, 1933), 68–9.
34. John N. Hazard, William E. Butler and Peter B. Maggs, *The Soviet Legal System: Fundamental Principles and Historical Commentary*, third edition (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1977), 183–240; Chapter 2 on 'Self-administration', 15–34; Chapter 15 on 'Cooperatives as Supplementary Agencies', 278–96.
35. For example, *Sbornik normativnykih aktov po sovetskomu administrativnomu pravu. [Po sostoianiiu na 1 noiabria 1963 g.]* (Moscow: Higher School, 1964); *Sbornik zakonodatel'nykh i normativnykh aktov ob administrativnoi otvetstvennosti* (Moscow: Juridical Literature, 1971); *Sbornik normativnykh aktov po administrativnoi deiatel'nosti organov vnytrennykh del* (Moscow: Chief Administration of Internal Affairs of Moscow City Executive Administration, 1985); a general analysis of the evolution of Soviet labor law, including modifications in the 1970s, is Chantal Kourilsky, 'La nouvelle legislation du travail en U.R.S.S.' *Annuaire de legislation française et etrangère*, nouvelle série, 21 (1972): 11–35.
36. For example, M. I. Piskotin, *Sotsializm i gosudarstvennoe upravlenie* (Moscow: Nauka, 1984).
37. A. P. Alekhin, Iu. M. Kozlov and A. A. Karmolitskii, *Administrativnoe pravo Rossiiskoi Federatsii* (Moscow: TEIS, 1995).
38. For recent studies of these phenomena that span, in the first case, most of the twentieth century, and, in the second, the history of the state from the tenth century, see Karl W. Ryavec, *Russian Bureaucracy: Power and Pathology* (Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield, 2003); Hedlund, *Russian Path Dependence*.

Part I

Late Tsarist Officialdom

2
The Institutional Structure of Late Tsarist Officialdom: An Introduction

Don K. Rowney

The objective of this brief introduction to essays on the last generation of tsarist officialdom is to sketch the organizational and institutional structure of state governance in order to help readers understand the formal environments in which officialdom governed. While, for the most part, this book focuses on civil (i.e. non-military) officialdom, here we must also pay some attention to domestic military administration, owing to long-established institutional and organizational patterns of tsarist territorial governance.

In common with many other states Russia's early modern state administration was small, focused on territorial control and taxation and dominated by landed gentry.[1] As the scope of monarchic authority and ambition expanded, however, these essentially patrimonial institutions imposed costs (arising, for example, from the inheritable rights of noble families) on governing authority and on revenues, which were increasingly burdensome and objectionable to royal authority. As a result, instead of engaging the difficult process of modifying an established institution, Russian monarchs began to rely more upon commoners, individuals without powerful families in possession of patrimonial rights, whose sole source of income and status derived from their state employment. An associated development evolved as government undertook more complex tasks, some of which, such as revenue and trade management, demanded skills which were quite different from the military and land control roles to which most nobility attributed importance.

It is not an exaggeration to say that, throughout its modern history, the primary objective of the Russian monarchy was to achieve dependable, predictable control, from its political center, over its entire territory and population. To some extent this objective explains the deceptively simple nature of the formal structure of the state's administrative apparatus: all state administration tended to be defined straightforwardly from the perspective of the center. In the 19th century and until the end of the Old Regime this structure consisted of three levels. Physically and legally closest to the monarch was the superior [*vysshii*] group, composed of policy-making

organizations that were dominated by Russian social and political elites. Next, there was the central administrative group comprising the ministers (who usually had direct access to the monarch) and their agencies, which employed the great mass of officialdom. The lowest level consisted of the regional, or territorial administrative, group, often referred to in the official and scholarly literature as *oblastnoe* [provincial] or *mestnoe* [local] administration for the Russian core provinces of the empire and *okrainoe* [outskirt, peripheral] for territories beyond the core. In practice this terminology concealed much more diversity than it revealed, reflecting the *wish* for a degree of central control which, in the given geo-political environment, was rarely, if ever, achieved.

One aspect of the search for control was centered on the effort to maintain a documentary record of the work activity of state employees, a process that contributed, ever so slightly, to the professionalization of Russian officialdom. This effort began seriously in the 17th century, evolving into more and more formal career dossiers.[2] It was enhanced by law in the 18th century and continued as the well-known *formuliarnye spiski* [official lists], which were synthesized into the *Adres-Kalendar*, the first of which was published in 1765. Coupled with the famous Table of Ranks, enacted during the reign of Peter the Great in 1722, and the formal classification of virtually every position [*dolzhnost'*] in state service, these devices were meant to verify the qualification of every person for every job. Of course, they could attain this objective only if standards of qualification and achievement were applied rigorously to every candidate for every position. The endurance of patrimonial values, which often gave preference in both obvious and subtle ways to sons of the landed gentry, the frequent preference for seniority over novel forms of qualification (such as technical expertise) in an era of rapid technological change, the tendency for lower ranking individuals—especially those in the provinces—to work permanently in lower ranked positions, and the simple fact that qualified personnel were in chronically short supply and therefore often regarded as irrelevant, all conspired to prevent career data and the ranking systems from functioning as intended.

The most evident characteristics of the 19th century administrative system evolved during the reigns of five emperors: Peter the Great (1689–1725), Catherine the Great (1762–96), Alexander I (1801–25), Alexander II (1855–81) and Nicholas II (1894–1917). It was Peter who approved the establishment of the most important organ of superior administration in the 18th century, the Ruling Senate (1711), a body that continued to play an important policy making role until the end of the Old Regime. Catherine's officials (1775) attempted to rationalize territorial administration by establishing the system of 50 *gubernii* [regional governments] in the imperial core, which were subdivided into *uezdy* [districts, or counties] and *volosty* [settlements], a system that continued, for the most part, throughout the 19th century. Under Alexander I, the ministerial system of central administration—which

endures to this day—was created (1802) and major modifications to superior administration, which lasted until 1917, were introduced. Alexander II's regime was responsible for the most important 19th century modifications (beginning in 1864) of regional and local administration (the *zemstvo* system of representative local governance, peasant landholding and urban governance in certain areas) and for changes to state policies in education, finance, the administration of justice, military conscription and other realms. While many of these policies aimed to reduce the dominance of the central state apparatus in local affairs, they actually had the effect of enlarging the structure and size of both the central and territorial administrations. During the reign of Nicholas II, the Revolution of 1905 and its aftermath saw the creation of unprecedented organs of formal and informal governance at all levels.

In addition to the major changes in administrative structures during these reigns, other factors forced change upon the structure of state administration, as we shall see in the chapters which follow. These factors included rapid population growth (discussed by Rowney, Chapter 2), urbanization and increasing literacy (Velychenko, Chapter 4 and Woodworth, Chapter 5), rising national consciousness (Velychenko and Woodworth), technological developments such as railroads, the telegraph and electricity, and territorial expansion, which resulted in military occupation, colonization and frontier settlement (Morrison, Chapter 6).

In the following paragraphs we summarize briefly the structural characteristics at each of the levels of state administration within the time frame of this book.

Superior administrative organs

While they arose out of the need for grand policy making that reflected the emperor's will, the highest organs of state administration were increasingly drawn into the details of policy implementation during the 19th century. Nevertheless, their evolution as policy-making bodies continued until the end of the Old Regime. In 1914 they consisted of nine organizations, including a constitutionally elected legislature, the State Duma, created in the wake of the Revolution of 1905. We focus here on those organizations that had formal or de facto roles which were significant for officialdom and its functions at the turn of the 20th century.

His Imperial Majesty's Chancellery was a sort of enduring privy council, dating, in this form, from 1812. By mid-century, its functions were separated into four major operational divisions and numerous subdivisions overseeing the affairs of religious sects, the collection and codification of laws, reports on peasant unrest, censorship and police activities. Many of these functions were redundant to those of other bodies, especially in the Ministry

of Internal Affairs. The Imperial Chancellery survived until 1917 and the end of the monarchy.

The State Council [*Gosudarstvennyi Sovet*], created in 1810, was meant to be the primary law-making body of the imperial state. Its members were to be drawn from the most experienced and distinguished elite officials of the realm and, in principle, no law could be presented to the emperor for enactment without passing through the State Council. Over time, however, other officials and organizations having direct access to the crown were able to present draft documents for imperial consideration and the approval, which gave them the force, and sometimes the formal quality, of law. The State Council's ambiguous law-making function continued after the Revolution of 1905, when it was formally assigned a role roughly comparable to that of the upper house in a bicameral legislature. Although it continued as an organization whose leading figures were well-known in state administration and rapidly developing national politics, its actual political influence was limited.

When Alexander I transformed the main units of central government into ministries in 1802, the need for a senior, coordinating meeting of ministers arose. Therefore, the same statute that created the eight original ministries (War, Marine, Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, Finance, Commerce, Justice and Public Enlightenment) also established a Committee of Ministers, consisting of the heads of these ministries and other chiefs of organizations with ministerial-level status. Other officials were subsequently added, including senior functionaries of the State Council and individuals named at the discretion of the tsar. The Committee of Ministers was not, explicitly, a senior policy-making body—much less a law-making one. It was principally meant to coordinate matters among ministry-level organizations that could not be managed by a single minister or ministry. It did consult on legislative proposals which eventually were meant to be approved (or not) by State Council and it engaged in other forms of management of state affairs, such as overseeing appointments, promotions and honorifics for state officials.

The creation of a true governmental cabinet, a body that could easily be seen as a challenge to the autocratic authority of the crown, was slow in coming. In 1857, during an accumulating series of crises, a Council of Ministers was formed under the chairmanship of Alexander II. Its formal role as an organ of superior state administration was confirmed by legislation that was published in 1861. In common with the brief of other superior organs of state administration, the Council's mandate was ambiguous, competing with those of other bodies. After the assassination of Alexander II in 1881, its authority declined. Following the Revolution of 1905 the Council's role was enhanced again, since it became the principal political meeting ground for ministers and ministerial-level officials who reported, in theory, both to the new national legislature [*Duma*] and to the emperor. Until the

end of the Old Regime and its successor Provisional Government in 1917, the Council served as an important platform for political exchange and achieved a status similar to the policy-making, cabinet authority associated with prime-ministerial governments in Europe.

Several other bodies exercised authority at the superior, general policy-making level of tsarist government from the late 19th century until 1917. Their significance for Russian officialdom, however, was not as great as those mentioned above, principally owing to the fact that their administrative reach did not uniformly extend through all levels of imperial administration. Of these, the most important across the period under consideration here was the Senate, whose role had evolved from principal executive in the absence of the tsar during the reign of Peter the Great into that of the court of last resort in the imperial judicial system, as a consequence of the Great Reforms introduced under Alexander II. As the Russian judicial system evolved during the 19th century, the Senate's role as overseer of criminal and civil judicial appeals expanded. Additionally, the Senate's First Department was responsible for oversight of local courts and, ultimately, evaluation of the operation and possible criminality of local administration and police. From 1872 it was assigned responsibility for adjudicating cases of official (i.e. governmental) criminality and illegality.

Central administrative organs

The modern history of Russian centralized state administration began with the creation of eight ministries under the terms of a manifesto issued by Alexander I on 8 September 1802. A minister, a vice-minister and a ministerial council headed each ministry. Ministries were provided with a Department of General Affairs which served as the communications record-keeping hub of the organization and each was further sub-divided into departments, established by administrative regulations; their functions were specialized according to the mandate of the ministry.

This, of course, was not the first time that the monarchy had attempted to centralize and rationalize the distribution of all imperial administrative authority within the structure of a small number of organizations presided over by responsible individuals known personally to the tsar. It was, however, to be the most enduring of these efforts. Although the names of these organizations were changed from ministries to commissariats during the first 30 years following the Revolution of 1917 and their number enlarged enormously with the extension of state roles, the ministerial system of rationalizing the distribution of administrative power and authority, meant to flow from Russia's political center to the farthest borders and beyond, has survived to the present and seems likely to continue.

Territorial administration

Territorial administration was by far the most structurally complex of the three levels of Russian governance before 1917, since there were no uniform patterns of local governance across the entire empire. One way to address this complexity is to recall the political geography of the empire at the turn of the 20th century. As noted above, this vast polity, the largest state in the world, was divided by law and scholarly literature into two principal, but not consistently distinguished, categories of territorial governance: *oblastnoe* or *mestnoe*, on the one hand, and *okrainnoe*, on the other. The first two terms usually designated the provincial and local governance of Russia itself—i.e. the territories within the 50 provinces that the state defined as European Russia. While it is true that this group mainly included provinces which were predominantly inhabited by individuals who described themselves as Russians, were Orthodox Christians and claimed Russian as their native language, at the turn of the century it also conventionally included Kiev and other provinces on the right bank of the Dnepr river as well as Courland, Estland and Livland, none of which was predominantly Russian.

The second term, *okrainnoe upravlenie*, literally means outskirts administration in English. It referred to territories surrounding the core, such as Finland, Siberia, Central Asia, the Caucasus and the ten provinces of Tsarist Poland, also sometimes called the Vistula Region [*Privislianskii krai*]. Unfortunately, these categories were neither firm nor unambiguous. For example, state policies and academic studies that focused on outskirts administration often included the Baltic provinces, Courland, Estland and Livland. As is noted in Chapter 3, moreover, *mestnoe upravlenie* distinguished in important ways between the 34 ethnically *most* Russian provinces and the remainder of those in provincial or local administration during the process of constructing limited urban and rural self-government as part of the Great Reforms.

The Russian empire was thus an ethnically highly diverse imperium—what the British, French and German empires might have been if they had not been separated from most of their imperial possessions by greater or lesser amounts of water. Importantly, moreover, these ethnic variations were not diffused throughout the polity; instead, the norm was for Russians to be concentrated in one region, Poles in another, Kazakhs in another and so on. This phenomenon of diverse, ethnically homogenous regions within a continuous land mass, together with whether a given region was more or less 'Westernized'—i.e. conforming to such conventions as settled agriculture, urban settlements and, of course, recognizing the authority and superiority of occupying Russian overlords—appears to have determined the structure of territorial administration in final decades of the empire.

At the turn of the 20th century, imperial territorial administration was divided among what one competent study identifies as seven territorial

zones in addition to the 34 most Russian *gubernii* of the ethnic Russian core.[3] Some of these, in the early 20th century, were sub-divided into *gubernii* under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, while others were administered by military detachments whose commanders reported to the War Minister. Very common across all peripheral administrative territories was the system of governors-general, which overlay whatever administrative structure (*guberniia*, military governor, district administration) was inferior. Unlike governors, who reported to the minister of Internal Affairs, these officers had the privilege of reporting personally to the monarch. To add to this complexity, governors-general were also appointed over civil administrations in core *gubernii* such as those of St. Petersburg, Moscow and others.

A final pair of countervailing tendencies should be underscored. In the wake of the Great Reforms, local self government organizations—both rural and urban—sanctioned administrative behavior that was distinctly at odds with the centralizing institutions of the monarchy and the bureaucratic organizations of the imperial capital. At the same time, however, the continuous expansion of imperial boundaries created both opportunities and challenges for the centralizing institutions of the Russian state to continue their centuries-old gathering of both lands and peoples under an authoritarian system which was enforced by military power.

Notes

1. For a summary of the evolution of European state bureaucratic organizations see Don K. Rowney, 'Bureaucracy', in *Encyclopedia of European Social History. From 1350 to 2000*, Peter N. Stearns ed. (New York: Scribner's, 2001), 2: 533–43.
2. An overview of this process at it developed from the late 17th century is M. F. Rumiantseva, 'Gosudarstvennaia sluzhba v period stanovleniia Rossiiskoi Imperii,' in *Istoriia gosudarstvennoi sluzhby v Rossii. XVIII–XX vv.: Uchebnoe posobie*, T. G. Arkhipova, M. F. Rumantseva and A. S. Senin, eds (Moscow: Russian State Humanities University, 2001), 37–81.
3. S. G. Agadzhanov and V. V. Trepavlov, eds, *Natsional'nye okrainy Rossiiskoi Imperii. Stanovlenie i razvitie sistemy upravleniia* (Moscow: Slavianskii dialog, 1997).

3
Imperial Russian Officialdom during Modernization

Don K. Rowney

Russian state administration and the problem of a single bureaucratic culture

The imperial Russian state was served, in the 19th century, by what we call in this book a 'Russian' officialdom. Although this service actually enrolled an ethnically diverse officialdom, it was a body of individuals that, especially at its senior levels, was overwhelmingly Russian in birth, name, language, habitation and religion. These were the exponents of a Russian bureaucratic culture serving an absolutist monarch who ruled a collection of multi-ethnic, modernizing societies.

In this chapter I offer an interpretation of officialdom's inadequate adaptation both to the empire's increasing multi-ethnicity and to the increasing information about this multi-ethnicity. I argue that officialdom's attempts at adaptation resulted in the emergence of not one but two imperial administrations—one for the Russian, or quasi-Russian, core of the imperial space and another for its colonized peripheries. In this respect, and in spite of extensive modifications to the structures and operations of state administration in the 18th and 19th centuries, it continued an administrative pattern dating back to the 17th century and before. In addition, I argue that the state's attempts to mobilize and incorporate the technologies of modernization contributed to divisions within and between ministries. Finally, I argue that these differences in imperial administration were not benign but that they produced outcomes favoring both the rights and the wealth of the Russian core at the expense of the imperial peripheries.

This was a state that relied very heavily on military prowess—especially in its early history—to the neglect of its civil administration. As the contributions by Borivoj Plavsic and Robert O. Crummey to the predecessor of this book show, however, civil administration was already becoming an essential component of the Moscow state apparatus in the 16th century. For reasons that will be discussed below, elite civil officials were usually drawn from elite military families, but lifelong civil officials of lower ranks, the

'chancery men' [*prikaznye liudi*], were numerous and growing rapidly as an employment category.[1]

It was this land empire's continental, or geo-physical, solidarity, coupled with its history of contiguous territorial conquest and outbursts of mass violence, which seem to have been the obvious functional reasons why the state placed so much emphasis on its control of a large armed force. To this functionalist explanation, however, Perry Anderson added the structuralist argument that military power was needed because Russia was Europe's 'most durable absolutism'. 'Its time', he argued, 'was not that of the Wilhelmine Empire or the Third Republic, its rivals or partners: its true contemporaries were the Absolute Monarchies of the transition from feudalism to capitalism in the West.'[2]

The Russian empire was inhabited by many distinct societies, whose number and diversity increased throughout the 19th century. The numerous societies that lived in the continually expanding Russian imperial space evolved in different directions and at different tempos. Some, such as the inhabitants of the Baltic region in the northwestern corner of the empire, relatively well educated and cosmopolitan, were well known to senior state administration because Baltic family names appeared on the registers of the army and navy officer corps and of the higher civil service. Other inhabitants of the empire were physically and culturally far more remote from the political, commercial and demographic centers of the state. Most spaces in this huge imperial territory were populated at one time by indistinctly defined, faceless peasantries and nomadic tribes. During the 19th century these populations were becoming increasingly well defined to themselves and to the state.

In addition, settled populations were growing rapidly across many regions of the empire and concentrations in cities were also increasing. The accumulation of all of this social and demographic change, I argue here, made the task of managing the whole as an imperial patrimony increasingly complex and indecipherable and obliged the monarchy and its Russian officialdom, after mid-19th century, to search for adaptations that would allow the absolutist empire to administer many regions as colonial possessions even while they steadfastly maintained key administrative structures, some of which were created generations earlier.

The Russian empire of the 19th century was becoming two empires governed by one state. What I shall call the patrimonial absolutist[3] empire sought to 'Russify' inhabitants (mainly in European Russia). Its heartland stretched from Olonets, Volgda and Perm provinces in the north to Tauride in the south and from Pskov in the west to Perm and Ufa in the east, the area that would, after 1864, constitute that part of the empire with limited local self government and an enduring, native Russian landed elite—the zemstvo provinces. The other empire, a colonial absolutist administration, sought to dominate non-Russian peoples on the imperial peripheries and to settle

Russians in some of these regions with colonial privileges.[4] These peripheries were distinguished by the fact that their regional administrations were ultimately dominated not by the civil officialdom of the Russian core, which was overseen by the Ministries of Internal Affairs and Finance, but by a network which answered both to the Ministry of War and to organs of civil administration. Of course other European states of the 19th and 20th centuries also operated with similarly militarized administrations in colonial regions. What was unique about Russia's situation was that these policies were pursued within the boundaries of a single, unbroken geographic unit, the largest state territory in the world.[5]

At the same time, the state's historic commitment to its militaristic, absolutist roots demanded that it develop technologies to sustain its competitive status with its peers in Central and Western Europe. While in the 17th and 18th centuries this may have been a comparatively straightforward task of borrowing relatively simple technologies from other countries, in the 19th century it became much more challenging and eventually forced the state into socio-economic modernization by engaging industrial capitalism.[6] As occurred elsewhere in Europe, the process of modernization tended to render obsolete the traditions of patrimonialism—the relevance and privilege associated with proximity to the imperial court, the importance of family connections and of land ownership.[7] Some state organizations began to aim at developing direct access to the taxable and increasingly mobilized population without the intermediation of a self-interested patrimonial officialdom. By the end of the 19th century, as we shall see, officialdom itself was in the process of modernization, but this was a task that was far from complete by the early 20th century, and the resulting dualities and endurance of patrimonial norms divided and obscured segments of officialdom from each other.

This combination of challenges established the environments in which Russian officialdom tried to function during the final half-century of the empire's existence. As a direct consequence of this evolution and of the attempt by imperial authority to operate with similar effect, with a single bureaucratic culture, across a vast territory, state administration itself became increasingly complex, unintelligible and unmanageable.

Increasing resources and declining authority

What does it mean to say that the march toward uniform imperial control, industrialization and modernism resulted in increasing complexity and indecipherability for the state apparatus? We focus first on industrialization and modernization. To use the language of recent versions of organization theory, industrialization and modernization created 'information asymmetries' that resulted in unexpected and sometimes paralyzing contests for authority over, or 'ownership' of, state assets.[8]

Why should we not have expected that the huge apparatus of imperial state administration, notorious for its corruption and aloofness from society, the butt of lampooning literature in an otherwise heavily censored intellectual universe, would become ever more useless as an instrument of governance during an era of unprecedented economic development? There are several answers to this question. The first is that, even at the end of the 19th century, the state demonstrated the vigorous survival of its historic capacity to suppress potential rivals to its supreme status and power.

The literature on Russian socio-economic development at the turn of the 20th century is extensive regarding the inhibitions and limitations on the evolving size and influence of the empire's bourgeoisie, a potential competitor with senior officialdom for status and authority.[9] It is helpful to recall, however, that the rulers and the senior, central state apparatus of Moscow had been engaged in campaigns to suppress the roles and powers of competing elites at least from the 14th century. Muscovite territorial expansion was consummated in large measure by forcible cooptation or suppression of local elites and seizure of their resources together with a dismantling of representative or electoral bodies.[10] Major landmarks in the history of the construction of the Russian imperial state in the turbulent 17th century consisted principally of moments of conflict between the Imperial court and its mainly military supporters, on the one hand, and independent, or semi-independent elites and the institutions with which they were associated, on the other. The *zemskii sobor*, or consultative land assembly, which had chosen the Romanovs as hereditary rulers in 1613, was convened last in 1653. As V. O. Kliuchevskii noted, attenuation of the power and patrimonial influence of the boyar elites in the 17th century was accompanied by the suppression of systems and organizations, which were the arenas for their power.[11] The *mestnichestvo* system of boyar precedence and seniority, which limited the monarch's freedom of appointment, was ceremoniously and publicly abolished in 1682. The boyar *duma* was allowed to disappear as a state organ before the end of the 17th century. The Ruling Senate replaced it in 1711 as part of Peter the Great's relentless program to modernize and bureaucratize the absolutist state.[12] By the time Peter had crushed the ultra-conservative *streltsy* military elite (1698), the groups that had in any sense competed with the monarchs and their loyal officials for power and authority were all but eliminated. This allowed Tsar Peter, in particular, the free hand he assumed to construct his version of the absolutist state. Thus, the cooptation of even the wealthiest and best connected industrial magnates during 19th century industrialization was quite consistent with the historic strategies of Russian state building.

While there have been excellent studies of the organization and influence of business elites in Russia at the turn of the 20th century, the argument that they exercised the kinds of constraining political influence on state administration or the monarchy that were common in late 19th century Britain,

France, or Germany is generally confined to Marxist scholars who see this evolving power as critical to the capitalist victory in its epochal struggle with feudalism.[13] In fact, the absence of powerful and enduringly influential non-state elites in Russia permitted the survival, in a modernizing society, of an autocratic monarch, whose royal court and senior officialdom continued occupying the pinnacles of status and state power until virtually the last hours of imperial history.[14]

The decline in power and authority of Russian state administration was contradicted by its record of rapid growth. State administration established a pattern of robust growth in the 19th century that outstripped the increase of population until the end of the Old Regime. According to data aggregated by B. N. Mironov, in 1796 there were roughly 21,000 officials in the Russian empire (excluding Poland) and the proportion of officials to population was 0.57 per thousand. By 1897 there were over 144,000 officials and their ratio to the population was 1.24 per thousand (excluding Poland and Finland). By 1913, the number of officials had risen to nearly 253,000 and their proportion in the population was 1.63 per thousand. In the century that began in 1796, the number of ranking officials increased more than six-fold.[15]

This record of growth, however, raises important questions about the interconnections between organizational expansion and performance. Although the relationship is complex, rapid growth is often counterproductive in the history of large organizations—particularly if the newcomers have been hired because they possess novel domains of expertise and experience. This is a point to which we shall return.

A paradox arose from Russian officialdom's apparently vigorous attempts at renewal after the mid-century debacles that began with the Crimean War (1853–6). These efforts were, in some measure, the result of two regime transitions: that from Nicholas I to Alexander II (1855) and that from Alexander II to Alexander III (1881). Under Alexander II, renewal included serf emancipation and land reform (1861), creation of novel organizations for local government in the Russian heartland (1864, 1870), extensive changes to education (1863), the judiciary (1864) and the military (1874).[16] Alexander III introduced additional policies that demonstrated administrative vigor with a far more conservative bent. Some of the first of these led to state-supported industrialization and attempts to extend control over investment in economic development. This was a reassertion of state authority that aimed to root itself in desired new industrial technologies—especially railways, but also telegraph, roads, ports and, eventually, electrical nets. They also included tariff and taxation reform, reconstruction of the labor supply, efforts to gain stable relations with more mature industrial economies such as those of Germany and France, and re-equipment of the military. In taking this direction, however, the architects of these policies during both reigns deprived the autocracy of its control over resources upon which,

in its previous more fully patrimonial incarnation, it had relied heavily. While these changes could be counted as a modernizing plus for emerging industrial and commercial elites, they deprived senior Russian officialdom of much of its traditional control, or ownership rights, over economy and society. This is another point to which we shall return.

A further paradox arose from the rapid changes in the universes of information that were evolving in the 19th century. When the state began to assume its role as overseer of local economic, law enforcement and juridical affairs as a consequence of the reforms introduced during Alexander II's reign in the 1860s, it did this in intellectual and technical environments that, by European standards, were exceptionally promising for the collection of data on social and economic behavior.

The survey research, statistical and comparatively instantaneous communication tools that were becoming available in the second half of the 19th century could have created social information resources never available to Russian officialdom before. A likely outcome of the creation of such data resources might have been that, as they grew, officialdom would exploit its increasing information about imperial societies to become ever more efficient at social control and economic management. Moreover, while one could argue that the monarchy and its senior elite officials always attached great importance to their roles as tax collectors, they were notorious for tolerating the inefficiency and corruption that could only be addressed by the more detailed, accurate and practically useful descriptions of taxable activities and populations which were becoming available in the 19th century.

But the senior civil state apparatus, structurally unchanged throughout most of the 19th century, was inundated by a flood of information and analytic techniques. These novel techniques were, on their face, powerful tools for state exploitation of economic and social resources. Instead, they steadily reduced the state's control (ownership rights) over its own assets (both material and personnel), just as they increased the complexity of its administrative responsibilities and divided its officialdom into groups which were often not well known to one another and which directly competed among themselves for control of organizational resources and outcomes.

Other scholars have analyzed the struggle for mastery of these novel and increasingly important information resources. James C. Scott identifies the task of 'legibility'—the modern state's detailed grasp of the social, demographic and economic characteristics of the societies which it serves or rules—as key to understanding the modern state's challenge of social management. As he puts it, 'The pre-modern state was, in many crucial respects, partially blind; it knew precious little about its subjects, their wealth, their landholdings and yields, their location, their very identity.'[17]

Scott pursues his analysis, in part, by describing states' pre-emptive activism in rendering societies more comprehensible, or legible. He describes

at some length various programs of urban reconstruction and land reform of the 18th to 20th centuries as intended primarily to enhance state information necessary for control over previously difficult to administer—especially communal—segments of society.[18] Scott discusses the early 20th century land reforms that were pursued by Petr A. Stolypin (1862–1911) in Russia. He interprets this program not, as Perry Anderson did, as an imitation of Prussian policy intended to kick-start rural capitalism, but as officialdom's attempt to improve its vision and, thereby, its taxation and capital mobilization powers over rural society.[19]

The Russian state's land reform policies from the middle of the 19th century onward did involve the goals of improving 'legibility' by slowly and inconsistently increasing its capacity to tax and mobilize individuals directly rather than dealing with officially defined estates [*sosloviia*] and communes; but they also stimulated conflict within and between state organizations and precipitated reversals that made officialdom's roles in the process of modernization highly ambiguous. As described by Martine Mespoulet, Alessandro Stanziani, Esther Kingston-Mann and others, young, ambitious, well educated and often leftist, statisticians were revolutionizing data gathering in the most Russian heartland provinces of the empire (i.e. the zemstvo provinces with local self-government) at the end of the 19th century. Apart from objecting to their frequently left-wing political values, senior state officials were resisting their data collection strategies and the implications of their findings about agricultural output and land values, for example, and searching for ways to recast them.[20]

Illegibility arose from the state's ill-conceived and inconsistent notions both of *what* it chose to read and *how* it read these new languages of control and progress. Some writers have explained this policy of resistance as owing to the endurance of the ancient communal tradition of *krugovaia poruka*.[21] This is a term that is variously translated. In an illuminating passage in his recent book, *Rulers and Victims*, Geoffrey Hosking translates it, literally, as 'circular surety' and then notes that it is perhaps best translated as 'joint responsibility'.[22] Of critical importance, as Hosking notes, '[a] member of the community had to accept shared liability for settling conflicts, preventing crime, apprehending criminals and maintaining common facilities'. With the passage of time, similar communal arrangements in other European states were attenuated. But, Hosking notes, 'In Russia the opposite happened: with the coming of absolute monarchy "joint responsibility" was actually strengthened. The state took over *krugovaia poruka* as an administrative device, which helped it to restrain crime, collect taxes, and raise recruits for the army.'[23]

Russian officialdom's treatment of increasingly sensitive data—for example, those recording ethnicity or its substitutes such as race, nationality or native language—reflected fundamental conflicts over the need for, and uses of, legibility. These included conflicts between data gathering operatives

in the field and senior-level policy makers who were acting to sustain their notion of empire and what Hugh Seton-Watson famously termed 'official nationalism'.[24] Evidence of the problem, as we shall see, can be found in the way in which crucially important data were categorized and edited.

These complexities and lacunae intensified the already existing administrative conflicts between central and provincial officialdoms over such issues as whether to extend the zemstvo statutes to additional provinces and appropriate taxation policies.[25] They also contributed to the ongoing policy conflicts between elite officials in the central state administration, such as Konstantin P. Pobedonostsev, Procurator of the Holy Synod (1880–1905) and Count Dmitrii A. Tolstoi, Minister of Internal Affairs (1882–9), on the one hand, and Ministers of Finance Nikolai Kh. Bunge (1881–7), Ivan A. Vyshnegradski (1887–92) and Sergei Iu. Witte (1892–1903), on the other.[26]

Finally, although law, the Procuracy and the Ministry of Justice are not a focus of this chapter, work by Jonathan W. Daly, Peter Waldron, Richard Wortman and others calls attention to enduring policy conflicts following attempts to modernize and rationalize legal practice in 1864. As Daly puts it, countervailing emergency legislation passed between 1866 and 1881 'was the focus of deep tensions within Russian officialdom between advocates of the regularization of power relationships through the rule of law and those who strove to uphold Russia's traditional pattern of broad administrative discretion.'[27]

Complexity within organizations: Modernization and technical diversity

What parts of state administration were growing? Measured in budgetary amounts, the most obvious sources of growth included military expenditures and even more rapidly increasing investment in human infrastructures (health and education, especially at the local levels) necessary to respond, in a modernizing society, to continuous growth in the population and the demand for literacy and ciphering skills. But even when one separates out state budgetary items such as defense, investment in infrastructure, debt repayments and state subsidies, and focuses only on state organizations and state-owned enterprises, these 'entrepreneurial' functions grew at a remarkable rate. In 1885 they accounted for about one third of total state fiscal activity; by 1913 they accounted for nearly half (49 percent) of all state activities as measured in current rubles. In 1885 administration and state enterprises amounted to 5 percent of Net National Product (NNP). By 1913 they had reached 10 percent of a considerably larger NNP. Defense expenditures, by contrast, accounted for 3.8 percent of NNP in 1885; in 1913, an exceptionally strong year for defense expenditures all across Europe including Russia, they had indeed risen—but only to 4.9 percent of NNP.[28]

This part of the history of state administration occurred simultaneously with the rapid onset of large-scale industrial manufacturing and commerce, Russia's industrial revolution. We should thus expect that a considerable share of the new state functions focused on the exploitation of new technologies, on coordination, oversight and enforcement of commerce legislation (e.g. licensing, inspection), on the collection of taxes, and on the control of infrastructure (e.g. control of roads, harbors, borders) in these commercial and manufacturing economic sectors. As I have shown elsewhere, this indeed appears to have been the case.[29]

The creation of these administrations also pointed toward the beginning of the end—much delayed in Russia—of an era in which large, multiple function ministries that harbored lingering vestiges of patrimonialism dominated the institution of the Russian civil bureaucracy. It was the bureaucratic institution of an earlier time that explained why a high proportion of the sub-ministerial organizations created in the 1880–1914 period were placed under the authority of two long-established civil bureaucracies—the Ministries of Internal Affairs and Finance—instead of being accorded independent ministerial-level status. But this pattern reflected more than the conceptions of state administration that created these ministries in the early 19th century. It also demonstrated the competitive advantage of officials in these ministries who, over time, prevented the State Council from proliferating new ministries and who concentrated even quite novel activities (such as telegraphy, radiotelegraphy and a unified state health administration) under the administrative control of old-line organizations. The expansion of specialist organizations within the structures of state administration that had been established at the beginning of the 19th century, on foundations laid in the 18th century, created intensifying information and authority problems for the generalist, or amateur, principals—often the scions of noble, landowning families—who were responsible for monitoring their agents' behavior and organizational outcomes.[30] As Armstrong has shown, these anomalies were common elsewhere in Europe.[31]

Erosion of officialdom's property rights: Modernization and finance

Fiscal and monetary measures that were introduced during the industrialization spurt at the end of the 19th century were a particular threat to the property rights of several generalist ministries and their senior officials. It is noteworthy that some of these measures were introduced and sustained by three decidedly atypical, post-patrimonial, senior officials: Bunge (a former professor of chemistry; Minister of Finance); Vyshnegradskii (a former professor of mechanics, inventor and railway executive; Minister of Finance); and Witte (a former railway executive; Minister of Finance).[32] Until their time, for example, the capacity to manipulate the imperial money supply

had been a political tool that was one of the state's great sources of absolutist power. From the late 1880s forward, the combination of state investment in industrial development, increased reliance upon foreign states for technical assistance and especially investment capital, and the creation of a paper currency on the gold standard, formed a network of restraints from which the senior state apparatus could never entirely extract itself and never entirely control. It became a source of controversy among ministries and ministers, owing to the fact that it was the Ministry of Finance which was not only the source of the policy but also its enforcer. Budgetary constraints on other ministries and the Ministry of Finance's aggressive attempts to control tax policy without the benefit of a disinterested arbiter (such as the central banks in other industrialized countries were becoming and Russia's was not) sowed many seeds of inter-ministerial conflict.[33] In addition, the policy, while it survived, may have increased, rather than reduced, the opacity of ministerial operations, owing to ministries' need to conceal off-budget expenditures. It finally spun entirely out of control during Russia's participation in World War I.[34]

The constraint of the gold standard was but the last in a series of limitations on imperial administrative autonomy, or absolutist authority, which had been introduced in the second half of the 19th century. From at least the time of Peter the Great (1689–1725) until well into the 19th century, the state's unrestrained control over the money supply, tax policy, rents collected by the biggest serf owners (the state and royal family), and military conscription of a serf population were main sources of officialdom's absolutist, patrimonial authority over the empire. By the time large-scale Russian industrialization was advancing, in the 1880s and 1890s, each of these had been either severely curtailed or dissolved.

With the abolition of serfdom in 1861, the imposition of arbitrary rents [*obrok*] for land and labor exactions [*barshchina*] were no longer possible, or at least no longer legally sanctioned. While these were, in some sense, replaced by annual land redemption tolls, these new charges were relatively stable across time and were not, in any case, tied to the imperial state debt, as was the poll tax.[35] The poll, or soul tax, imposed on male peasants by Peter the Great in 1722 in order to finance his many wars of territorial conquest, was curtailed in 1861 and finally, if perhaps reluctantly, abolished between 1883 and 1899. To be sure, such patrimonial fiscal resources, which were dependent upon the principal of *krugovaia poruka*, were replaced by more modernist revenue raising schemes; but in important respects these novel approaches exceeded the state's information and administrative resources.[36]

Seen from the modernist perspective all of these measures may be understood as investments in technological and fiscal renewal and economic growth and, thus, a brighter future whose rising tides would raise all boats. From the viewpoint of the territorial, imperial state they can only be seen as

bad bets that had the immediate, and unintended, consequence of undermining, or at the very least rendering ambiguous, the state's property rights over its patrimonial imperial resources. In short, the monetary and fiscal disciplines imposed by the advent of industrialization resulted in reductions of officialdom's authority.

Declining vision from the instruments of legibility

Among the most important instruments of legibility that were becoming available to the tsarist state were methods for gathering and interpreting quantitative data that described the world beyond the bureaucrat's desktop. As the bundle of techniques that came to be known as statistics developed in the 18th and 19th centuries, it might have endowed the Russian state with powerful resources for the increasingly accurate oversight of trade and industry, agriculture, taxable resources, the rapidly changing population of the empire and state administration itself. In fact, however, this oversight, while improving at times, never realized the potential that survey research and statistical analysis achieved in other countries. In the view of Alexander A. Kaufman (1864–1919), a late-19th century authority on statistical methods and practice in Russia, social, economic and fiscal data collection and analysis in the empire were enmeshed in inter-organizational conflicts and ineffectual collection methods that frequently prevented the productive use of their data and the timely publication of their results.[37]

Part of the problem, as ably detailed by Martine Mespoulet, was that many issues native to the discipline of statistics awaited resolution at the very moment when Russian officialdom was demanding more and more information.[38] By the end of the 19th century one could count dozens of official statistical data sources: demographic land use, land value, harvest, tax, banking and so on. Many of these were issued from the Ministry of Internal Affairs' Central Statistical Committee.[39] But offices responsible for collecting these data were also distributed across virtually every ministerial-level body. Owing both to the fact that the discipline of statistics was still developing and to widespread illiteracy (when collection rubrics required primary data collectors to read data schedules), the quality and regularity of data collection and their interpretation varied enormously, just as the accuracy of final data tallies did.[40] Given that this pattern of broad distribution of statistical offices was different from more centralized structures in West European states (especially in Germany), calls for reform were often grounded in the argument for a strong, centralized statistical administration—a concept that raised concern over an increase in the already dominant role of the Central Statistical Council, which oversaw statistical data collections for the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Tables 12 and 13 of the *First Universal Census of the Population of the Russian Empire*[41] consist of distributions of regional populations for the

single variables, religion and language. Table 13, 'Native language', is especially interesting. It finds as many as 61 different language categories (plus 'People not indicating a language'). It provides a summary category for 'Russians' (that is, *Russkie*, the nationality), which includes the subcategories '*Velikorusskii*', '*Malorusskii*' and '*Belorusskii*'—in today's English terminology, the languages 'Russian', 'Ukrainian' and 'Belorussian'.[42] In its annual statistical reports (*Ezhegodniki Rossii*),[43] however, the Central Statistical Committee repeatedly presented a table called 'Race Composition of the Population of Russia' [*Plemennoi sostav naseleniia Rossii*] in which one finds only a figure for the category 'Russians' [*Russkie*] without the linguistic subdivisions.

The purpose of this treatment seems clear. The category 'Russians' was only meant to exclude everyone who was not a native speaker of Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian and, thus, not classified into the 'official nationality'. In European Russia this treatment excluded native speakers of Polish and Finnish as well as Jews, among others. However, given the fact that, since at least the 1870s, the state had sought to impose the Russian language (i.e. *Velikorusskii*) on the public life of increasing numbers of provinces in the west and northwest and to prevent the publication of some materials in languages such as Ukrainian [*Malorusskii*], one is entitled to conclude that this summary in the *Annuals* was meant to conceal diversity within the 'official nationality'. This treatment, which indistinguishably aggregated Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians, resulted in an ethnic percentage of 'Russians' in the entire empire of approximately 65 percent.[44] In 1904 this treatment resulted in a total of 52 provinces out of 96 in the empire where the majority of inhabitants was of the 'Russian race'. In 1914 there were 53 such provinces.[45] The list of majority-Russian provinces in the *Annuals* included Kiev (82 percent Russian) and Minsk (79.6 percent Russian).

This treatment of ethno-linguistic demographic variables closely mirrored what Benedict Anderson describes in Southeast Asia colonial censuses as 'superficially arbitrary changes in which categories are continuously agglomerated, disaggregated, recombined, intermixed, and reordered (but the politically powerful identity categories always lead the list)'.[46] Anderson goes on to identify three 'institutions of power which, although invented before the mid-nineteenth century, changed their form and function as the colonized zones entered the age of mechanical reproduction'.[47] The institutions of power included the map and the museum but, first of all, the census.

Anderson's comment brings the ambiguity of Russian officialdom's territorial administrative agenda into sharp focus. Was this a patrimonial absolutist empire on the European model of the 17th century as Perry Anderson asserts? Or, a colonial absolutist empire on the European model of the 19th century, as Benedict Anderson might conclude? In fact, it was inevitably both and, as its adaptation to the tools of modern, bureaucratic

rule increased during the 19th century, so did its paralysis before the paradox of its condition increase. It wished to assert itself both as a *Russian* (dynastic) empire and as the colonial ruler of subject non-Russian peoples. But the more it found out about itself as it mobilized the tools of legibility, the more impossible the task of imperial rule became. The reader will find a much more detailed and nuanced discussion of the politics of ethnicity and language in Estland and Ukraine during this same period in chapters by Stephen Velychenko and Bradley Woodworth which follow.

Privilege from diversity: zemstvo Russia, official nationality and colonialism

Finally, consider the increasing divisions within the empire perpetrated by officialdom's fundamental decisions about territorial administration. Any consideration of the evolution of 'Russian' officialdom's territorial administration at this time, of course, must necessarily take account of the increasing importance of local, semi-authentic officialdoms (from a 'Russian' perspective), about which we shall read more in subsequent chapters by Morrison, Velychenko and Woodworth. Without underrating the importance of these officialdoms for the problems of information access and control that confronted senior officialdom, I call attention to another increasingly important source of division, the zemstvo system.

There were at least three characteristics of the zemstvo reform of 1864 and its subsequent modifications that bore significantly on the apparatus of imperial administration.[48] First, the zemstvo provinces that emerged out of these changes to local and regional government were overwhelmingly Russian. That is, even considering the tendency of official statistics to overstate the dominance of the 'Russian race', the zemstvo reforms made changes to the governance and human infrastructures of only the most Russian provinces in the empire.

Taken as a group, these provinces were 86 percent Russian according to the *Ezhegodnik Rossii. 1904 g.*[49] But, as we now know, this figure actually referred not to native Russian language speakers but to people defined as 'Russian' because they spoke Russian, Ukrainian or Belorussian natively. What we can conclude from official data is that most of these provinces were relatively more devoid of the native speakers of the 58 non-'Russian' tongues than other provinces. Given the flexibility of official data on these variables that defined ethnicity, however, we might be better off saying that the provinces chosen in the legislation of 1864 for the zemstvo group defined 'Russianness' to the satisfaction of the state more than others—even others that the census of 1897 found to be overwhelmingly 'officially Russian', such as Kiev and Minsk, which, until 1911, were excluded from the zemstvo group.

Under the same statistical treatment, the 26 non-zemstvo provinces (in European Russia and the provinces of Imperial Poland) were only 34 percent

'Russian', taken as a group. As we have noted, some of the latter, such as Minsk, Mogilev, Podolia and even Kiev were arbitrarily defined by the state as much more Russian—about 80 percent—and finally included in the zemstvo group in 1911. But many others, including all of the Polish provinces, except Lublin and Siedlce, were defined as totally non-Russian—owing, presumably, to actual circumstances on the ground. On these grounds we conclude that the zemstvo reforms were infused with a racist bias resulting in significant modifications to the relations among the central, provincial and local governments of only the most authentically Russian parts of this multi-ethnic, absolutist, patrimonial/colonial empire.

Second, the zemstvo reforms gave zemstvo provinces access to influence over development policy that was highly important across the final 50 years of the empire's existence. In particular, the capacity of these provinces to make limited decisions about taxation and the expenditure of tax revenues gave them opportunities for the development of both economic and social infrastructures not available elsewhere in the empire. An important aspect of this capacity was that it empowered a generation of professionally trained activists—for example, statisticians, as we have seen, but also physicians, lawyers and teachers—whose behavior and reformist values often placed them at odds with local noble landowners and senior officials inside the ministries (especially Internal Affairs, Finance, State Domains and Peoples' Enlightenment) that were nominally responsible for overseeing their organizational work.[50] These emerging professionals, in their scores and hundreds, added new and often unwanted dimensions to the agendas of state administration—new administrative roles, new proposals for budgets and new terms or manners of thinking about official responsibilities. In short, they were major contributors to the new grammars and syntaxes of legibility. Moreover, as discussed by Bowman and Kotsonis, they created substantial new opportunities for agent/principal conflicts within the ministerial organizations that were responsible for overseeing them by possessing much more knowledge about their professional responsibilities than their Russian officialdom bosses.[51]

As expected from the legislation that defined and empowered zemstvo organizations, zemstvo provinces, at least for the tax periods covered in early 20th-century official data, had much greater discretion in the use of local taxes for local purposes than non-zemstvo ones. According to official state sources, for example, 34 zemstvo provinces paid local taxes in 1909 amounting to an average of 56 kopecks per person while they benefited from expenditures of 58 kopecks per person, or 104 percent of collections. In the 16 non-zemstvo provinces of European Russia, by contrast, local taxes in the same year amounted to 60 kopecks per person while expenditures were only 11 kopecks per person, or 18 percent of collections.[52]

If the data are accurate—i.e. if the variations reported in official publications were actually experienced in these different groups of provinces—we

should find manifestations of them in community infrastructure. In fact, there was a strong relationship in these provinces between income from zemstvo taxes and such public programs as schools, hospitals and local transport that were funded, at least in part, by the zemstvos.

The difference between zemstvo and non-zemstvo provinces resulted not only in differences in the development of certain kinds of infrastructure but also in differences in overall level of modernization, affecting quality of life. For example, in 1903 the average number of primary schools in 47 provinces in European Russia (excluding St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Kiev provinces, all of which were atypical in certain ways) was 1386; in 31 zemstvo provinces it was 1568. On average there were 76 primary school pupils per 1000 inhabitants in European Russia, but 96 per 1000 in the zemstvo provinces. Hospital beds averaged 1708 per province in European Russia but 2296 per province for the zemstvo group. There were, on average, fewer than three cities (2.76) in each province of European Russia with a safe water supply, while, in the zemstvo provinces, the number was 3.41.[53]

The zemstvo difference, as defined above, thus allows us to distinguish more fully the two types of empire in the Russian imperial state system at the end of the 19th century mentioned earlier—the patrimonial absolutist empire which, in the process of the 'Great Reforms', accorded rights and privileges to the Russian heartland not available elsewhere, and the colonial absolutist empire.

Summary and conclusions

I have created a scenario here for the gathering impotence of the Old Regime's imperial state administration in the person of its Russian officialdom. I have argued above that, across the last half-century of the era of imperial history, there were several enduring, negative constants within the house of Russian officialdom. It is my objective here to summarize these briefly.

First, there was the erosion of officialdom's property rights occasioned by policies in which officialdom itself was an important agent. These included both the Great Reforms introduced under Alexander II and the classical liberal economic reforms occasioned by Russia's industrial revolution under his reactionary successor, Alexander III. Each of these programs amplified the roles of specific segments of officialdom. The Ministry of Internal Affairs received significant new responsibilities for local economic and taxation oversight under the Great Reforms, but its reach into local affairs was diminished by the creation, in the Russian heartland, of organizations for comparatively independent local government. Moreover, the state's capacity for arbitrary intrusion into the empire's labor force and its powers of taxation were constrained by the Great Reforms in ways that were entirely unprecedented.

Similarly, while the reactionary domestic programs engaged by appointees of Alexander III aimed (mostly without success) to give the Ministry of Internal Affairs fresh powers of intrusion into local government, the fiscal reform measures occasioned by efforts of the Ministry of Finance to lead a program of rapid heavy industrialization resulted in novel budgetary constraints on the flexibility and freedom of every state organization. It was, finally, the monarchy's and officialdom's decision to engage programs of economic modernization that resulted in unprecedented policy and behavioral constraints on officialdom.

Second, officialdom failed to use opportunities for increasing the legibility of society, economy and the state. Instead, it chose to obscure the findings of its own social and demographic research and to deny or limit the roles of other research initiatives. This policy appears to have been a central component of the ultimately fruitless effort to create an 'official nationality'. Additionally, there was a structural failure to respond to the increasing technical and behavioral complexity that was inevitable in a rapidly industrializing and urbanizing society. Rather than creating an organizational environment, which would allow specialist agencies to be managed by knowledgeable specialists, long-established multi-functional generalist ministries, such as Internal Affairs, continued to dominate the structural terrain. This strategy resulted both in the inefficient use of specialist capacities and a growing, perhaps paralyzing, culture of agent/principal conflicts as illustrated in antagonisms over zemstvo statisticians and other specialists.

Let us now address the problem of the 'single bureaucratic culture' with which we began. Was there one? Yes, it was a Russian officialdom charged with extending itself across the empire, but which, increasingly in the 19th century, failed to do so. The attenuation of patrimonialism in the face of increasing bureaucratization limited the single bureaucratic culture's survival. In addition, there were the well-known differences between central and provincial officialdoms and increasing separation caused by the state's inevitably growing reliance on technology, especially information technology. In spite of the ambitions of the royal court and elite officialdom to sustain the force of the traditional unifying ideologies of religion (Orthodoxy), official nationalism (Nationality) and absolutist authority (Autocracy), in practice this was an officialdom which was increasingly at odds with itself and its vision of the Russian empire.

Regime change or transition played a signal role in undermining the unity of bureaucratic culture of Russian officialdom. The Great Reforms, which were Alexander II's major policy response to Nicholas I's reactionary failures, laid the foundations for a different 'officialdom' (actually, a quasi-official cohort of technical specialists and activists) in the zemstvo provinces. It was also the regime transition in which Alexander III followed his murdered father to the throne that created further divisions within the

community of officialdom. On the one hand, this reign introduced policies to stimulate an era of intense economic modernization—Russia's industrial revolution—and appointed some senior officials whose careers were notable departures from those of the traditional elites of officialdom. These same policies created conflicts over taxes, tariffs and ministerial budgets. On the other hand, this regime adopted a broad range of reactionary domestic programs, re-emphasizing the institutions of absolutism and even patrimonialism, appointing extremely conservative officials to important elite positions and imposing landowning noble officials on local government in the Russian heartland. These policies set the stage for increasing conflict and competition within and between state official organizations.

And, of course, it was the regime change initiated in 1917, otherwise known as the Russian Revolutions of 1917, which destroyed the organizational framework of the patrimonial absolutism and colonialism of the old regime. That so many of the old regime's structures and policies survived the change is witness to the degree to which the Bolshevik state committed itself to reconstruction of the imperial state and adapted to its institutional endurance.

Notes

1. Borivoj Plavsic, 'Seventeenth-Century Chanceries and their Staffs,' in *Russian Officialdom. The Bureaucratization of Russian Society from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century*, Walter McKenzie Pintner and Don Karl Rowney, eds (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 19–45; Robert O. Crummey, 'The Origins of the Noble Official: The Boyar Elite, 1613–1689,' in ibid., 46–75.
2. Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (London: NLB, 1974), 328, 358; also Walter M. Pintner, 'The Burden of Defense in Imperial Russia, 1725–1914,' *The Russian Review*, 43, no. 3 (1984): 231–59.
3. These two terms are discussed extensively by Thomas Ertman in *Birth of the Leviathan. Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 35–155. For discussions that focus specifically on pre-1917 Russia, see John A. Armstrong, 'Old-Regime Governors: Bureaucratic and Patrimonial Attributes,' *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 14, no. 1 (1972): 2–28, and Stefan Hedlund, *Russian Path Dependence* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 125–89.
4. Willard Sunderland, *Taming the Wild Field. Colonization and Empire on the Russian Steppe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); Mark Bassin, *Imperial Visions. Nationalist Imagination and Geographical Expansion in the Russian Far East, 1840–1865* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
5. An alternative interpretation of the nature of the Russian 'land empire' will be found in Dominic C. B. Lieven, *Empire. The Russian Empire and its Rivals* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 206–16.
6. See Pintner's characterization in 'Burden of Defense,' 232–5.
7. An enduring tension which John A. Armstrong named 'patrimonial regression'. See 'Old Regime Governors,' 3–5, 7–9; Armstrong, *The European Bureaucratic Elite* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 19–20.

8. A brief explanation of these concepts as they are understood in neo-institutional theory will be found in Steven L. Solnick, *Stealing the State. Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 29–33. Further discussion, as it applies to scientific and technologically dependent organizations, will be found in Loren R. Graham, *What Have we Learned about Science and Technology from the Russian Experience?* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).
9. For example, see Peter Gatrell, *Government, Industry and Rearmament in Russia, 1900–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 161–259; Thomas C. Owen, *Capitalism and Politics in Russia: A Social History of Moscow Merchants, 1855–1900* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Owen, *Entrepreneurship, Government and Society in Russia* (London: Arnold, 1999). The difficulty with which the emerging bourgeoisie was accepted as a component of society during industrialization is discussed in B. N. Mironov, *Sotsial'naia istoriia Rossii perioda imperii (XVIII-nachalo XX v.) Genezis lichnosti, demokraticheskoi sem'i, grazhdanskogo obshchestva i pravovogo gosudarstva* (St. Petersburg: RGNF, 1999), 1: 337–45, 2: 317–26; a Marxist-Soviet perspective, emphasizing the role and importance of the state, will be found in Leonid E. Shepelev, *Tsarism i burzhuaziia vo vtoroi polovine XIX veka. Problemy torgovo-promyshlennoi politiki* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1981).
10. For example, see V. N. Bernadskii, *Novgorod i novgorodskaia zemlia v XV veke* (Moscow: Nauka, 1961), 200–313.
11. V. Kliuchevskii, *Boiarskaia duma drevnei Rusi*, 3rd edition, revised (Moscow: Synod Press, 1902), 524–30.
12. *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii*, I, 4: 1711, #2321 (St. Petersburg: Pechatano v Tipografii II Otdelieniia Sobstvennoi Ego Imperatorskago Velichestva Kantseliarii, 1830).
13. For example, Shepelev, *Tsarism i burzhuaziia*, 135–90, 217–253. Alfred J. Rieber found a growing capacity for cooperation with the state and influence on its programs among Moscow 'entrepreneurs' which was extinguished after the Revolution of 1905 in *Merchants and Entrepreneurs in Imperial Russia* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 179–218.
14. Richard Wortman, *Scenarios of Power. Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 2: 177–234, 365–91; Helju Aulik Bennett, 'Chiny, Ordena, and Officialdom', in *Russian Officialdom*, 162–89.
15. Mironov, *Sotsial'naia istoriia*, 2: 200–3, Table X.1.
16. Larissa Zakharova, 'Autocracy and the Reforms of 1861–1874 in Russia. Choosing Paths of Development,' in *Russia's Great Reforms, 1855–1881*, Ben Eklof, John Bushnell and Larissa Zakharova, eds (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 19–39 and Valeriia A. Nardova, 'Municipal Self-Government after the 1870 Reform,' in ibid., 181–96.
17. James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State. How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); on the problem of 'legibility' in connection with imperial tax policy: Yanni Kotsonis, ' "Face-to-Face": The State, the Individual, and the Citizen in Russian Taxation, 1863–1917,' *Slavic Review*, 63, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 221–46.
18. Scott, *Seeing Like a State*, 181–306.
19. Anderson, *Lineages*, 350–51; Scott, *Seeing Like a State*, 39–44.
20. Alessandro Stanziani, 'Statisticiens, zemstva et état dans la Russie des années 1880,' *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique*, 32, no. 4 (1991): 445–68; Martine Mespoulet, *Statistique et révolution en Russie: un compromise impossible, 1880–1930*

(Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2001), 97–109; Esther Kingston-Mann, 'Statistics, Social Science, and Social Justice: The Zemstvo Statisticians of Pre-Revolutionary Russia,' in *Russia in the European Context, 1789–1914*, Susan P. McCaffray and Michael Melancon, eds (New York: Palgrave, 2005), 113–39.

21. See, for example, Yanni Kotsonis, *Making Peasants Backward: Agricultural Cooperatives and the Agrarian Question in Russia, 1861–1914* (New York: St. Martin's, 1999).
22. Geoffrey Hosking, *Rulers and Victims. The Russians in the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 11–14.
23. Ibid.
24. Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States. An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Policies of Nationalism* (Boulder: Westview, 1977), 148; Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, revised and extended, 1991), 86–90 and generally, 83–111.
25. On separation between central and provincial officialdoms, see Walter M. Pintner, 'The Evolution of Civil Officialdom, 1755–1855,' in *Russian Officialdom*, 191–226 and Pintner, 'Civil Officialdom and the Nobility in the 1850s,' in ibid., 227–49. We return to the conflict over tax policy below.
26. Thomas S. Pearson, 'Ministerial Conflict and the Politics of Zemstvo Reform, 1864–1905,' in *The Politics of Local Government in Russia*, Alfred B. Evans, Jr. and Vladimir Gel'man, eds (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), 45–67.
27. Jonathan W. Daly, 'On the Significance of Emergency Legislation in Late Imperial Russia,' *Slavic Review*, 54, no. 3 (1995): 602–03; also Peter Waldron, 'States of Emergency: Autocracy and Extraordinary Legislation, 1881–1917,' *Revolutionary Russia*, 8, no, 1 (1995): 1–25; P. A. Zaionchkovskii, *Rossiiskoe samoderzhavie v kontse XIX stoletiia (politicheskaia reaktsiia 80-x—nachala 90-x godov)* (Moscow: Mysl', 1970), Chapter 3; Mironov, *Sotsial'naia istoriia Rossii*, 2: 141–82; Richard Wortman, 'Russian Monarchy and the Rule of Law. New Considerations of the Court Reform of 1864,' *Kritika*, 6, no. 1 (2005): 145–70.
28. Data from Paul R. Gregory, *Russian National Income* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 252, Table F1, 162–3, Table G103; also Don K. Rowney, 'The Autonomous State and Economic Development: Industrial Administration in Russia, 1880–1920,' *Journal of Policy History*, 7, no. 2 (1995): 226–62.
29. For a list of new agencies responsible for management or oversight of sectors in the imperial economy, see Rowney, 'Autonomous State,' 248–53, Table 4.
30. On the endurance of noble landowning families in elite positions, see Seymour Becker, *Nobility and Privilege in Late Imperial Russia* (De Kalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1985), 109–29; also, Armstrong, *European Administrative Elite*, 223–7.
31. Armstrong, *European Administrative Elite*, 105–74, 201–27.
32. V. L. Stepanov, 'Nikolai Khristianovich Bunge,' in *Russian Studies in History*, 35, no. 2 (1996): 42–72 and 'Ivan Alekseevich Vyshnegradskii,' in ibid., 73–103; also Frank Wcislo, 'Rereading Old Texts: Sergei Witte and the Industrialization of Russia,' in *Russia in the European Context*, McCaffray and Melancon, eds, 74–81.
33. Douglas J. Forsyth and Daniel Verdier, eds, *The Origin of National Financial Systems. Alexander Gerschenkron Reconsidered* (New York: Routledge, 2003); also, Don K. Rowney, 'Universal Banking in Russia,' in ibid., 162–81.
34. Not the only country where this happened, of course. On the Russian crisis see Iu. P. Bokarev, A. N. Bokhanov, L. A. Katykhova and V. L. Stepanov, *Russkii rubl'. Dva veka istorii, XIX–XX vv* (Moscow, Progress-Academy, 1994), 175–85.

35. To be sure, exploiting the standards of *krugovaia poruka*, communes could arbitrarily shift these burdens onto the shoulders of politically vulnerable, but economically productive members, such as laborers who were absent while working in manufacturing or trade. See Jeffrey Burds, *Peasant Dreams and Market Politics. Labor Migration and the Russian Village, 1861–1905* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998), 85–90.
36. Linda Bowman, 'Russia's First Income Taxes: The Effects of Modernized Taxes on Commerce and Industry, 1885–1914,' *Slavic Review*, 52, no. 2 (1993): 256–82; Kotsonis, 'Face to Face,' 246.
37. Alexander A. Kaufman, 'The History and Development of the Official Russian Statistics', in *The History of Statistics. Their Development and Progress in Many Countries*, John Koren, ed. (1918; repr., New York: Franklin, 1970), 469–534; also Kaufman, *Statistika: ee priemy i ee znachenie dlia obshchestvennykh nauk: Lektsii* (Moscow: Sytina, 1911).
38. Mespoulet, *Statistique et Revolution*, 75–96.
39. Kaufman, 'History and Development,' 469–98.
40. Don K. Rowney and Edward G. Stockwell, 'The Russian Census of 1897: Some Observations on the Age Data,' *Slavic Review*, 36, no. 1 (1978): 217–27.
41. *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis' naseleniia Rossiiskoi Imperii 1897 g. Izdanie Tsentral'nago Statisticheskago Komiteta Ministerstva Vnutrennykh Del pod redaktsieiu N. A Troinitskago*, 89 vols. (St. Petersburg: Ministry of Internal Affairs, 1899–1905).
42. For example, see *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis', S.-Petersburgskaia Guberniia*, 37: 90–5, Table 13.
43. Tsentral'nyi Statisticheskii Komitet Ministerstva Vnutrennykh Del, *Ezhegodnik Rossii* (St. Petersburg: Ministry of Internal Affairs, 1904–1915).
44. For example, *Ezhegodnik Rossii, 1904 g.*, 90–91.
45. *Ezhegodnik Rossii, 1904 g.*, 87–9; *Ezhegodnik Rossii, 1914 g.*, 63–5.
46. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 164.
47. Ibid.
48. Legislation in force at the end of the 19th century is summarized in *Svod zakonov Rossiskoi Imperii, Tom vtoroi. Svod gubernskikh uchrezhdenii, Polozhenie o gubernskikh i uezdnykh zemskikh uchrezhdeniiakh. Izd. 1892 g. po Prod. 1906 g.* (St. Petersburg: Zakonovedenie, 1911.), 735–73.
49. *Ezhegodnik Rossii 1904 g.*, 87–89.
50. For example, Mespoulet, *Statistique et Revolution*, 51–74.
51. Bowman, 'Russia's First Income Taxes,' 262–67; Kotsonis, 'Face-to Face,' 244, 246.
52. Zemstvo provinces: *Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik Rossii, 1911 g. (God Vos'moi)* (St. Petersburg: Central Statistical Committee, MVD, 1912) sec. XII, 1–4; non-zemstvo provinces: *Ezhegodnik Ministerstva Finansov, Vypusk 1909 g.* (St. Petersburg: Ministry of Finance, 1909) 394–413; *per capita* calculations based on *Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik Rossii* population estimates for 1911.
53. Schools data: *Ezhegodnik Rossii, 1905 g.* (*God Vtoroi*. From 1911, *Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik Rossii*) 472–83 (data for 1903); hospital beds: *Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik Rossii, 1911 g.*, sec. V, 7–8 (data for 1903); water supply: *Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik Rossii, 1911 g.*, sec. V, 4–5 (data for 1904).

4
Identities, Loyalties and Government Service in Tsarist Ukraine

Stephen Velychenko

Introduction

During the last 20 years historians of government have begun to study how bureaucrats and clients interacted and influenced each others' behavior. They have begun studying the imperial dimension of tsarist government and comparing tsarist Russia with other empires and not with national states. Since 1991 Ukraine's historians have also begun looking at topics they previously ignored, such as local administration and administrators.[1] Taking up this line of inquiry, this chapter examines staffing and work conditions in local government in the Ukrainian provinces. It identifies Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians, studies how they and their Russian-speaking co-workers may have influenced policy implementation and studies interrelationships between declared-Ukrainians in service, Ukrainian national leaders, local Russians and the central government.

Cities, language and bureaucrats

In 1900 present-day Ukraine was ruled by the Habsburgs and the Romanovs. Tsarist Ukraine consisted of nine provinces [*guberniia*], 99 districts [*uezd/povit* (ukr)], 1,733 counties [*volost*] and 57,906 towns and villages directly subordinate to St. Petersburg. Of a total population in 1917 of almost 30 million, 22 million declared Ukrainian their first language. Between 1861 and 1914, urban growth was phenomenal and by 1917 the total urban population had at least doubled from its 1897 total.

Russian was the language of administration and imperial ministers ruled the provinces. But not until the beginning of the 20th century, when *povit* and *volost* capitals were linked to the imperial telegraph grid and provincial capitals to the rail network, could ministers directly contact urban administrators within 24 hours—and thus exercise control effectively. Telephone communication remained limited to provincial capitals.[2] Therefore, local

officials were only beginning to function, literally, under central control, when the war broke-out.

Published pre-war urban population figures as well as percentages of Ukrainian-speakers must be considered as minimal. Officially in 1897 there were 761 commercial-manufacturing centers west of the Urals with at least 2,000 inhabitants listed as 'towns'. However, 227 of these had little trade or manufacturing, while 703 with trade and manufacturing inhabited by more than 2,000 people were officially listed as 'villages'. Accordingly, the empire west of the Urals actually had 1,237 towns in 1897. In eight Ukrainian provinces (excluding Taurida) approximately 100 commercial-manufacturing centers with at least 2,000 inhabitants were categorized as 'urban'. But there were at least 700 settlements with more than 3,000 inhabitants where at least 50 percent of the labor force worked in manufacturing, processing or transport and it was to such 'villages' that most peasant migrants moved. Places like Iuzivka and Kryvyi Rih (Krivoi Rog), with factories and populations of over 10,000, were officially 'villages'. Uman district in Kyiv province officially had 61 settlements listed as 'villages' and eight listed as towns, which together included 19 percent of the district's population. In reality, one of these 'towns' had no trade or manufacturing and only 1,734 inhabitants, while four settlements with mills, manufacturing, trade, a clinic or pharmacy and at least 3,000 inhabitants each were listed as 'villages'. If we add these 14,628 people officially listed as 'rural' to the district's urban population, its percentage would rise from 19 to 23—double that given in the 1897 census.[3] Similar re-counting of all Ukraine's urban population would reveal it could have been as much as 25 percent of the total by 1914. This was comparable with Canada, the United States and smaller European countries.

Census figures did not distinguish between declared Russians and ethnic Russians, but if the number of Ukrainians who considered their first language Ukrainian is correlated with the above revised urban population totals, then they would not appear as a tiny but a sizable urban minority. Ukrainian speakers were less than 20 percent of the population in the four cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants (Odessa, Kyiv, Kharkiv, Katerynoslav), but in the remaining 148 towns they averaged almost 40 percent.[4] Accordingly, given that there were more Ukrainian speakers and de facto towns in reality than in official statistics, the total percentage of urban Ukrainian speakers was also obviously higher than in official statistics.

Commercialization and industrialization began creating urban jobs at a faster rate in the 1890s than before. Despite what official figures suggest, however, modernization did not leave out Ukrainians because much of it occurred either in places officially listed as 'villages' or in one of the 140 'towns' with 50,000 inhabitants or less. This is vital when considering administration because in both these places, Ukrainian speakers were the majority. Except for Kharkiv province, where they constituted 35 percent of

the provincial total, approximately 80 percent of Ukraine's commercial and small manufacturing establishments, whose total employed had doubled between 1885 and 1897, were outside provincial capitals.

Government increased in size at the turn of the century. In absolute terms the bureaucracy appeared huge and most assumed that the empire had too many officials. However, ministers knew that in proportion to the population, the government's nine ministries actually had few administrators.[5] No ministry, moreover, had permanent agencies at the lowest local level [*volost*]. Practical daily authority extended at best only as far as district capitals. The base of the tsarist bureaucratic pyramid was not in villages but in the small provincial towns. It was here that most officials interacted with subjects and where, as a result, the people formed their understanding of what 'the state' and 'government' were.

Aggregate totals suggest the Ukrainian provinces averaged one official for every 1,668 persons at the turn of the century. At the same time the per capita average was 1:555 for France, Austria and Germany, 1:1,063 for French Indo-China and 1:1,903 for French Algeria.[6] Government staffing appears to have been weakest in the four Left-Bank provinces that included historical Cossack Ukraine (1:1,885). It dropped to 1:1,721 in the three Right-Bank provinces and was strongest in Kherson province (1:1,203). Provincial capitals could have 30 or more government clerks and secretaries in the governor's office. Districts [*povit*] averaged 1,000 officials (including police and guards). With 15–20 counties [*volost*] under their jurisdiction, each of which included 30–40 villages, *povit* officials rarely appeared in villages, where the only full-time official was the council secretary [*pysar*]—who could have up to five assistants.[7] Eleven of the 14 secular officials who made the decisions in the district chancery (the police chief, bank manager, postmaster, chief of customs and excise, high-school director, the school and tax inspectors, the town judge, treasurer and attorney) were appointed and could be imported Russians, in particular the military commanders. The remainder were probably local-born.[8]

With urban growth came urban problems, which, together with the tendency of government to expand in size and scope, resulted in more hiring. After 1914 the number of clerks rose again due to the war, as did the number of central ministries. Alongside them appeared four new central 'civil' organizations with branches and employees throughout the empire, which eventually became ministries in their own right—the Military-Industrial Committee, the Army Supply Committee, the Union of Towns and the Union of Zemstva [*Zemgor*]. By 1917, 101,000 people worked for the latter two organizations in the Ukrainian provinces—including 38,000 Red Cross workers. Alongside these were as many as 33,000 government administrators, not counting county secretaries, and at least 200,000 rail and communications personnel.[9] The city of Kyiv alone in 1917 had approximately

26,000 'administrative legal personnel and police' personnel—15,000 more than there had been in the entire province in 1897.[10]

The 1897 census showed that 52 percent of Ukraine's 'administrative legal and police' personnel declared Russian and 40 percent declared Ukrainian their native languages. Clearly there was no exclusion of Ukrainian-speaking 'Little Russians' from government service. Once hired, Ukrainian-speakers faced no organizational limits to promotion nor were their careers restricted to their territories of origins—as were those of native officials in European overseas empires. The number of Ukrainian-speakers in government and non-government clerical jobs increased before the revolution to the degree that they began to be conspicuous as a group within offices. But whether there was an internal backlash against them that would have aroused among them a collective reactive resentment based on national identity is unknown.[11] Some undoubtedly suffered personal slight or insults from Russian or Russified co-workers, whereas others were fired or imprisoned for nationalist activities. However, whether declared Ukrainians in service thought that their Russian superiors targeted them as a group is unknown. Accordingly, although there may have been ethnic grounds for Ukrainians/'Little Russians' in bureaucracies to develop a dissatisfaction favorably predisposing them as a group to a nationalist message, the issue needs research. Whether or not language use served as a basis for intra-office coteries and cliques is unstudied. As of 1897, in the entire empire, 14,000 government, zemstva, city duma and village council officials gave their native language as Ukrainian. In the nine Ukrainian provinces, of the approximately 60,000 people who worked directly or indirectly as administrators, at least half were declared Ukrainian speakers (see Table 4.1). Thirty-eight thousand of those were clerks in private companies. At least half of the other Ukrainian speakers worked in central government, zemstva, city dumas and co-ops. Attached to administrative institutions were 12,500 auxiliary personnel such as couriers, doormen and guards. Again, there was a marked difference in staffing between Kherson, the three Right-Bank and the five Left-Bank provinces. With 14 percent of the regions' population, Kherson had 19 percent of its government officials. With 41 percent of the population, Right-Bank Ukraine had approximately 41 percent of the officials. With 45 percent of the population, the five Left-Bank provinces had 40 percent of the administrators. Whereas approximately half of Left-Bank government administrators declared Ukrainian their native language, 41 percent of Right-Bank officials did so (see Table 4.2).

A vital intermediary between supplicant and official was the lawyer. Of 2,500 lawyers, 16 percent were declared Ukrainian speakers. The census category for legal personnel, however, 'private legal activity', excludes thousands of non-licensed legal practitioners [*podpolnaia* or *nepatentovanna advokatura*], who were familiar with administrative/legal procedure and cheaper than professional lawyers. Unfortunately, there are no data on this

Table 4.1 Population and estimated number of administrators by province 1897

Province	Total Population	Urban Population	Estimated Total Administrators	Estimated Urban Administrators
Kyiv	3,527,208	431,508	2,424	1,991
Volyn	2,939,208	204,406	1,558	1,069
Podillia	2,984,615	204,773	1,508	991
Chernihiv	2,929,761	205,520	1,397	1,131
Poltava	2,766,938	264,292	1,320	1,256
Kharkiv	2,477,660	353,594	1,670	1,535
Katerynoslav	2,106,398	234,227	1,066	839
Kherson	3,094,815	765,800	2,572	2,577
Total	**22,826,603**	**2,664,120**	**13,515**	**11,389**

*In cities at the imperial level only 49 percent of census Category 1 were administrators; 40 percent were police and firemen. Provincial figures are not broken down and in this table I have applied the imperial average to reach the estimates for the Ukrainian provinces. The total for Kherson likely reflected an inapplicable average regional urban percentage. Odessa's large population meant that police and firefighters probably comprised more than 40 percent and administrators less than 49 percent of census Category 1 in the province.
Source: endnotes 6, 15.

Table 4.2 Estimated number of administrators and auxiliary personnel in government, civil councils, and private organizations in 1897

Province	Government	Councils	Private	Total	Auxiliary Government	Councils
Kyiv	2,424	824	7,190	10,438	941	761
Volyn	1,558	771	3,837	6,166	616	1,408
Podillia	1,508	748	4,546	6,802	596	691
Subtotal	**5,490**	**2,343**	**15,573**	**23,406**		
Chernihiv	1,397	756	3,837	5,990	552	697
Poltava	1,320	1,032	3,849	6,201	522	952
Kharkiv	1,670	1,274	4,171	7,115	388	1,176
Katerynoslav	1,066	802	3,601	5,469	422	741
Subtotal	**5,453**	**3,866**	**15,458**	**24,775**		
Kherson	2,572	1,201	6,611	10,384	987	1,109
Total	**13,515**	**7,408**	**37,642**	**58,565**	**5,024**	**7,535**

Source: endnotes 15, 22.

group, variously called *'ablakaty'*, *'zhidomory'*, *'iazychniki'*, *'kodatai po delam'* or *'kodatai po iz krestian'*. In the Ukrainian provinces this group included a disproportionately high percentage of educated Jews—whose petitions to enter the Bar were no longer accepted after 1910, and who were forbidden to become apprentice lawyers after 1912.[12]

Although officials were only a small percentage of Ukraine's total workforce, in absolute terms there were almost as many government administrators as there were metal and textile workers (59,000 each). Allowed to unionize in 1917, administrators made up a sizable proportion of unionized public employees.[13] By that summer, in the entire empire almost 400,000 public employees belonging to approximately 300 separate unions represented the third largest group of organized workers after the textile and metal workers—also divided into approximately 300 unions.[14] Women comprised less than 1 percent (at most 400) of administrators and only about 120 were declared Ukrainian speakers. No more than 250 Jews worked as government administrators. Approximately 43,000 people operated the rail, telephone and telegraph system—with 64 percent of the rail personnel and 29 percent of the telephone and telegraph personnel declared Ukrainian speakers (see Table 4.3).[15]

From 1831 anyone with primary schooling could join the bureaucracy and as of 1871 all children could attend schools. By the end of the century the number of commoners in the imperial bureaucracy was rising while the number of nobles was falling. Schools taught in literary Russian but the language of instruction was not an insurmountable barrier to social mobility for Ukrainian peasants, as indicated by the sizable group of Ukrainian speakers in the administration.

Before the economic boom of the 1890s, peasant families as a rule did take their children out of schools after only a few years, but not because they were Russian-language institutions. Since everyone in any given vicinity knew vernacular Ukrainian, there was little practical need to learn more literary Russian in school than necessary to pass. Teaching had to be in Russian, but since the children understood little or nothing of it, teachers who knew

Table 4.3 Rail, communications and legal personnel in 1897

Province	**Rail**		**Communications**		**Legal**	
	Total	**Ukrainians**	**Total**	**Ukrainians**	**Total**	**Ukrainians**
Kyiv	5,186	2,781	1,327	338	519	24
Volyn	3,806	3,032	723	163	297	24
Podillia	3,152	1,791	982	350	219	22
Chernihiv	4,570	2,632	591	233	218	72
Poltava	2,833	2,006	596	354	273	126
Kharkiv	8,678	4,019	1,117	361	348	86
Katerynoslav	12,577	3,717	1,085	236	173	18
Kherson	6,919	2,661	1,392	193	555	34
Total	**35,156**	**22,638**	**7,813**	**2,228**	**2,602**	**406**

Source: endnote 15.

the language used Ukrainian surreptitiously. More importantly, like their counterparts in almost all non-industrialized countries, Ukrainian peasants cared little about the language of instruction at school because they saw little practical need for learning. Parents did want some education and minimal literacy for their children, however, they were not interested in their children getting the only jobs readily available to village-school graduates: clerks in local institutions. That meant fewer hands on the farm. Additionally, peasants regarded clerks as leeches, because they demanded bribes, and as drunks because, in keeping with custom, they imbibed freely with each closed deal. Faced with a choice between landed respectability and the perks that relatives in office would bring, most apparently chose the former. Families thus regarded formal instruction in village schools as useless, even if free.[16]

This attitude began to change after the 1861 emancipation, when peasants found they had less work to do and written documentation in daily affairs began displacing the traditional-verbal authority of the lord. No longer subject to forced labor, with plots that did not require more than 121 work-days annually, with increasing populations and little or no non-agricultural work available, villagers began to see an increase in the number of idle youth each decade.[17] Within a generation, the importance of written documentation increased while the economic spurt of the 1890s that increased the number of co-ops and companies opened the perspective of private-sector or higher-level government jobs for literate peasants. Primary school attendance, accordingly, more than doubled between 1890 and 1900.[18] Figures from Poltava, Kharkiv and Chernihiv provinces reveal that in the 1890s the percentage of pupils who attended and then finished primary schools was the same there as in the rest of the empire, including the Russian provinces.[19] A Ukrainian Bolshevik writing in 1917 observed that ten years earlier life in villages had begun to improve markedly, as brick houses with tin roofs began replacing thatched cottages. Anyone who could, rich or poor, wanted to give their children schooling and see them as clerks or professionals. The youth, in turn, outdid their parents' expectations 'and soon acquired all the mannerisms and traditions of the tsarist educated officialdom; awards, promotions and privileges became their ideal.'[20] The more ambitious and able from among this generation got jobs as clerks in local small companies, larger estates, co-ops, municipal offices, zemstva or provincial level bureaucracy.[21]

Literacy in Russian and primary schooling was the basic formal prerequisite for a clerkship. In 1897, Russians and Jews as a group in the Ukrainian provinces had proportionately more literates with higher education than did Ukrainians as a group (see Table 4.4). Eleven percent of declared Ukrainians who were literate in Russian lived in cities, as did 54 percent of literate Jews. Nonetheless, 60 percent of all those who were literate in Russian, and 25 percent of the 916,141 urban literate, gave Ukrainian as their native

Table 4.4 Declared Ukrainians and Jews literate in Russian, 1897

	Jews		**Ukrainians**		**All literate in Russian**
	Total	**Urban**	**Total**	**Urban**	
Kyiv	99,341	41,934	323,421	35,482	
Volyn	68,527	28,035	189,764	11,688	
Podillia	72,830	25,782	251,471	13,467	
Chernihiv	39,611	18,459	245,311	28,164	
Poltava	44,362	32,002	364,649	38,789	
Kharkiv	6,221	5,778	265,704	50,259	
Katerynoslav	41,633	26,971	206,509	17,598	
Kherson	112,201	84,083	221,466	36,393	
Total	**484,726**	**263,044**	**2,068,315**	**231,840**	**3,477,591**

Source: endnote 22.

language—the respective figures for the Jews were 14 percent and 29 percent.[22] In absolute terms this amounted to at least 2 million bi-lingual literate Ukrainian speakers between the ages of 9 and 60 that served as a pool of candidates for desk jobs. This total would be considerably higher if we add to it the unknown number of those who knew Ukrainian but declared themselves Russian.

Administrators as a social group

At the turn of the century, at 25–35 rubles monthly, the average wages of lower-level urban officials equaled those of most workers, teachers, private-sector clerks and actors. Middle-level officials, with 50–100 rubles monthly, made as much as highly-skilled workers like printers, while the highest officials earned up to 1,000 rubles per month. Pay was steady and full-time staff with rank [*chin*] got pensions, accommodation and lunch subsidies, overtime, Christmas bonuses and a ten percent pay raise every three years. For peasant families the badly paid government job for their sons at the bottom of the hierarchy did at least bring status and covert perks, which presumably made it preferable to subsistence farming, emigration or factory work. If he managed to attain a full-time middle level position by the time he got married, a clerk could survive economically. By contrast, life for a married lower-level official working on contract for anywhere between 60 kopeks and one ruble a day was hard—unless he could supplement his income with bribes.[23]

Bilingual Ukrainian-born officials probably predominated among middle and low-level contract-officials. The biggest group, village secretaries [*pysar*] and their assistants, were overwhelmingly ethnic Ukrainians. Working 10–12

hour daily for 40–45 rubles monthly (assistants earned between 20–25 rubles after 1905), they unsurprisingly demanded bribes. These men normally spoke a Ukrainian version of Russian to demonstrate their superiority to their fellows, but native Russians could not understand them. In May 1915, on the grounds that in 1905 radicals were most successful in districts where they had the sympathy of local village heads and secretaries, the secret police vetted the entire rural administration of Kyiv Province in anticipation of unrest. The resulting survey was completed within a year and had no summary. But a cursory overview indicates that, whatever their sympathies, few among the hundreds of village secretaries reviewed who were 30 years of age or older had a police record.[24] Nor are sympathies mentioned in a critical article written in 1917 about local officials, which focuses on how clerks used their literacy and knowledge to exploit their fellows. As slaves of the old regime, the author explained, they treated their fellow citizens despotically because that is how their superiors treated them. Their habits reflected imperial ministerial norms. Receiving an order to submit within three days a full account of all planting, harvesting, costs and profits for the year 1917–18, for example, a clerk would write up a report off the top of his head in three hours and then submit it knowing that, as in tsarist times, he would be judged on whether or not he submitted the report on time—not on its contents. Commenting on the failure of the tsarist system to incorporate this lowest administrative level of empire into its administrative order, the author observed that behavior would not change until the clerk's position was changed from a poorly-paid elective one into a centrally appointed well-paid one open only to those with professional qualifications. Village clerks, in short, had to be changed into bureaucrats.[25]

A marked distinction between lower level personnel on contract without rank [*chin*] and higher full-time personnel with rank provided grounds for institutional group dissatisfaction among the thousands of lower level personnel. These were people like Iakiv Stepanchenko. Village-born and self-educated, in the ten years before the war he worked on contract in various Kyiv province *povit* offices. Ivan Troshchansky—also self-taught and village-born—worked for 25 years as a *povit pysar* on contract before joining the Kyiv *povit* zemstvo in 1917. Iakov Sviridov, a Kyiv-born Russian fluent in Ukrainian who finished secondary school, was no better off—working on contract in provincial government offices from 1902 through to 1914.[26] There does not seem to have been an animus against hiring peasants. A list of 67 candidates for positions in the Kyiv governor's office from 1910 indicates that 18 were peasants by status and an additional six were probably of peasant origin (36 percent of the total). Of the 16 that were hired, five (30 percent) were peasants. Eight (53 percent) of the 15 that were ultimately dropped were peasants and the usual reason given was lack of previous office experience.[27]

Invaluable insight into clerks' conditions is provided by *Sputnik Chinovnika*, a journal published in Kyiv between 1911 and 1914 by Aleksandr Miretsky.[28] While working as a clerk in Kyiv's provincial financial office he decided to publish his newspaper using his own money. Confronted by his superiors and offered the choice of either shutting-down or being fired, he chose the latter option. Not affiliated with any party, he sympathized with the left-Kadets and circulated his paper in Mogilev and Perm provinces and the Ukrainian provinces of Volyn, Katerynoslav and Kharkiv. He also sent 200 free copies to the Third Duma. Probably an ethnic Ukrainian, he was not involved in the national movement and his close associate was an assimilated Jew residing in Bratslav, Artem Moisevich Liubovich. Miretsky included many articles in his paper favorably contrasting the working conditions of French, British and German clerks with those of their tsarist counterparts. He urged administrators to form professional clubs and credit/self-help associations, and printed 7,000 copies of a leaflet listing grievances and demands that he tried to distribute to officials throughout the empire. Despite widespread fear and apathy, by 1909 he had managed to organize 300 of Kyiv's approximately 10,000 officials in the empire's first clerks' organization—the Kyivan Chinovnik Club. He claimed that by 1913 almost every provincial capital had such an organization and announced his intention to call an All-Russian congress of government administrators.[29] Repeatedly fined and imprisoned for his investigative exposure of working conditions, Miretsky's journal provided a picture of his co-workers at odds with the prevailing literary image of tsarist officials as mindless, inhuman martinets. In May 1914 in St. Petersburg he organized the first ever public lecture on the plight of lower government officials, where the audience learned that this group had little in common with their superiors [*vlast'*], and shared common interests with moderate liberals [*obshchestvo*].[30] In response to its *exposes* the Kyiv governor-general in 1912 specifically forbade officials from meeting with reporters, and reporters from entering government offices. In December 1913 the secret-police shut down the journal and Miretsky moved to the capital.[31] There, Miretsky's efforts bore fruit in the Fourth Duma, where delegates organized a special commission on administrators' grievances and passed a resolution advocating more pay, higher pensions and better working conditions—not enacted because of the war.

Sputnik informed the public that administrators were paid according to rates compiled before 1900. It demonstrated statistically that while single men might survive on a wage that averaged between 10–30 rubles monthly, married men could not. In Kyiv province, it revealed, post and telegraph apprentices, who were forced to live in their offices, were made to work for months for nothing while learning their jobs.[32] It also claimed that while there were office clerks with eight-hour days, regular holidays, and little work, who ignored their clients, as often as not they were the pampered favorites of a local office potentate. Postal and telegraph clerks and civilian

police administrators, by contrast, worked seven days a week, 10–12 hours daily with added hours for night-duty—which could amount to as much as 100 working hours per week. They also had to work overtime without pay and, although in theory they had three days holiday annually, they were obliged even then to work if necessary.[33]

Village clerks were similarly burdened. An *expose* from Lodz province showed that for 15 rubles per month the average clerk had to deal with 25,000 incoming and 30,000 outgoing documents annually and maintain 229 books and ledgers. With five to six days off annually, the normal work day was ten hours long—three hours on holidays and Sundays. Sometimes the clerk had assistants, who might get as little as 10 rubles monthly.[34] Working conditions were unpleasant, not only because offices were normally cold, damp, dirty, dark and small, but also because the social atmosphere was stifling. Employees hated each other, were petty and spiteful. Losing themselves in their tiny worlds of boring routine, contributors informed readers, they ultimately lost their sense of humanity and ability to interact normally. Where individuals managed to rise above their circumstances and informally organize friendly social gatherings, their superiors eventually instructed them either to desist as their meetings were illegal, or, to formally register with the police and get a charter—which involved long arduous procedures that few wanted to undertake.[35]

Particularly revealing are *Sputnik*'s revelations about the breakdown of entrance and promotion procedures. By 1900 rank no longer guaranteed a full-time well-paid position with a pension, and few could afford the time or the money necessary to study and then take the examination for rank. This produced thousands of petty clerks, scribes and secretaries who worked for low wages, sometimes on contract, with no prospects for normal promotion or a pension—regardless of their education. Interested in saving money, senior officials would often fire such persons after they had worked a number of years and then hire new people at the starting rate rather than giving the older ones a pay raise. In the State Bank the recommendation of a well-positioned manager could replace the higher educational requirement for applicants. As a result, of 117 heads of departments in 1911, 59 had no higher education whatsoever, while 22 had degrees unrelated to banking. Of the remaining, few had formal qualifications in accounting or commerce.[36] In general, entrance and promotion depended on bribes and/or protection and someone without either could find themselves in the position of an anonymous writer who, in a heart-breaking letter, told readers that at age 56 after 30 years service, still single, he was without prospects or pension.[37] The fate of employees without ready cash, patrons or rank depended exclusively on the office secretary, as the senior official formally in charge rarely if ever actually entered his offices or interacted with employees. The head of the Warsaw treasury office, for instance, went into his offices no more than five times during his 15-year tenure. The future of local employees also suffered

whenever new senior appointed officials arrived. In their wake they would bring favorites, who were either related or clients and placed first in line for pay raises and promotion.[38] In 1912 *Sputnik* made public information about the buying and selling of rank within the administrative system. The long expose concluded that nothing could be done about the problem legally because the law as written punished plaintiffs.[39]

Sputnik was critical of attempts by extreme-Right politicians, via their supporters in the higher bureaucracy, to intimidate lower officials to support their aims. The editors regretted that some gave in to pressure and said this had to stop, as a man's conscience belonged only to him. A caption beneath a cartoon of a lower official replying to a superior who asked him if he was a nationalist reads: 'It's all the same to me, your excellency. [If you like] I could be a Decembrist.' The editors bemoaned such occurrences and asked how administrators had ever allowed themselves to fall to such depths. Officials had to concern themselves exclusively with their jobs and their professional interests.[40] *Sputnik* never ran articles related to Ukrainian issues but throughout 1912 and 1913 it did run Ukrainian-language advertisements for the moderate Ukrainian-language newspaper *Rada*.

Besides publishing numerous anonymous letters describing the internal mechanisms of the tsarist administrative system, *Sputnik* also released in 1912 the results of a reader's poll it had organized. Officials, it emerged, wanted the right to organize unions and a say in the running and staffing of their offices. They wanted assemblies of peers to deal with disagreements and dismissals, courses to improve their qualifications, compulsory confirmation of all qualifications, a five to six hour working day, pay rates related to costs, overtime pay, holiday bonuses, higher pensions, less pay differentials, no arbitrary dismissals without cause, day care, medical care and the right to holidays.[41]

Alongside the dissatisfactions of those working must be added the frustration of those educated but unable to get jobs. Every year hundreds of applications flowed in to provincial gubernatorial offices. Letters from Kyiv province in 1913 show all applicants had finished at least a village school, that most knew office procedure and could type, and that some, like Kuzma Derkach, were already working as secretaries or assistants in small towns or villages and wanted to move to the capital. Many pleaded hardship and for them the 1 ruble 50 kopek application fee represented a significant sum. Pavlo Nekrashchuk, aged 19, sent no less than four letters between March and October in which he explained that his father, who had worked for the excise department in his village, had died and that he, his mother and four siblings had nothing to live on. While Pavlo may have wondered why he was constantly rejected, 27 year-old Oleksandr Rokytiansky, who had been unable to complete secondary school in Kharkiv province because of poverty, was not afraid to identify his problem. Perhaps hoping that someone would look sympathetically at his application he wrote: 'Everywhere I

have turned to ask for a job they told me I needed contacts [*protektsiia*]. I don't have any.'[42]

Identities and attitudes

Before the revolution, patron–client, family and local networks crossed national lines easily. The empire was still a place where local people who would not condemn a local official for using his position to favor his kin, would roundly condemn an outsider official if he favored his. Accordingly, any assessment of the influence administrators had on local events in non-Russian areas must consider first that the relationship between language use, identity and political loyalty was still mediated by kinship and clientelism. Second, it must be remembered, that where state literary languages were different from local vernaculars, language use depended on custom and pragmatic assessments of utility. Using the imperial language was not necessarily tantamount to repudiation of heritage or the 'destruction of the soul'. In the words of an anonymous Slovak peasant replying to a Czechoslovak government enumerator's question about nationality in 1919: 'I did not ask which language you speak but whether you are Hungarian or Slovak,' asked the official. 'If the bread is buttered on the Hungarian side I am Magyar, if it is buttered on the Czech side, I am Slovak.'[43] Analogously, in Ukraine, language use and identity were related to the political climate. As one national-movement activist noted, educated Ukrainians presented themselves as 'Ukrainian' or 'Russian' according to circumstances.[44]

In the 19th century, literate non-Russians became cultured to imperial Russian ways, most were bilingual, and use of a native language did not imply a person was nationally conscious or that their primary loyalty was to that language group. For the literate and illiterate, imperial and regional identities could coexist for as long as ministers believed that the unity of the state should depend on loyalty to the tsar and not on uniformity of language and culture. Regional/national backgrounds provided a basis for 'dual loyalty' and Russians living in non-Russian areas, or non-Russians who used literary Russian, were not necessarily Russian nationalists or devoid of a regional/local loyalty to which they might tie their professional interests. Region and social status was as important as language in determining political attitudes, and perceived difference of itself was not a basis for conflict. In short, national-cultural issues represented only one facet of life. The relationship between ethnicity, cultural and political loyalties was not fixed.

Someone opposed to Ukrainian political separatism was not necessarily opposed to Ukrainian cultural demands or territorial autonomy. Foreigners and locals in non-Russian regions who identified with a political-legal historical entity such as the Cossack-Hetmanate, and did not think in nationalist terms of territory defined culturally and linguistically, could have advocated or supported two kinds of regionalism even if they did not support Ukrainian

cultural demands. Proposals by powerful 'Little Russian' nobles in the mid-19th century for railroads in their provinces are an example of geographical-economic regionalism, for instance. Count Kapnist, the Octobrist Duma delegate from Poltava and descendant of a famous Cossack family, provides an example of historical-traditionalist regionalism. In a 1914 speech protesting the prohibition of public celebration of the centenary of Shevchenko's birth, he distinguished between the dangerous political separatism of the 'so-called Ukrainian movement' and the 'natural affinity of every Little Russian to his native country', which if repressed would constitute an insult to his patriotism.[45] The German Volynian landowner Baron Shteingel was active in the Ukrainian national movement and later joined the Central Rada even though he never learned Ukrainian. Russians in Ukraine like princes Kurakin, Rumiantsev and Repnin represented regional concerns and placed estate above state interests. Prince Dolgorukov, Chernihiv gentry marshal in the 1890s, participated in the Ukrainian national movement and his successor, A. Mukhanov, supported the movement in the first Duma.[46] Russians like Tikhon Rudnev, the head of the Poltava Appeals Court, sought out and worked with Ukrainian intellectuals to stamp out speculation. In New Russia, Mikhail Vorontsov was the first to propose building rail lines in his jurisdiction to facilitate industrial development—rather than grain export—and he later financed an unsuccessful project to build a line.[47] Some changed with the times. The writer Borys Antonenko-Davydovych related how his pre-war russified, ethnic-Polish high school principal and teacher in eastern Ukraine by the end of 1917 had changed from a Russian-speaking monarchist who had warned his students about the dangerous consequences of Ukrainian national sympathies, into a Ukrainian-speaking supporter of the Central Rada who wondered why there was no statue to Mazepa in Kyiv.[48]

In short, dynastic-imperial, community-regional and familial-national loyalties crisscrossed and interrelationships between territorial, cultural, professional and group identities and loyalties were complex. The loyalties of Russians in Ukraine were not necessarily those of Russians in Russia and language use did not always define political attitudes. To link Ukrainian-related issues exclusively to language-use statistics is wrong, just as it is ahistorical to judge peoples' behavior according to their opinions about Ukrainian political independence. Behavior depended on local circumstances, personal attitudes, and affiliations. Obviously there were notorious individuals whose opportunism and ambition overrode all concern for any greater social good. Yet there were also employees not indifferent to their society's welfare. The structural weaknesses of the tsarist administration, despite improving communications, allowed such people the possibility of softening and/or frustrating formal authority. Covert evasion, false reporting, procrastination, collusion and bribery mediated relations between supplicant and official, and superior and subordinate. Though hardly conducive to public morality or civic culture, such practices tempered central authority, got things done,

and those concerned thought they were better-off because of them. Accordingly, imperial government institutions should not only be regarded as agencies of Russian nationalization, particularly at the lower levels where the majority of clerks were local-born. Confrontations between specific elites, or between Ukrainian and extremist-Russian nationalists, must not be read into the political behavior of the majority, who were sooner motivated by circumstances and interests than ideology or convictions. Offices also can be regarded as 'sites of contact' where people worked out their own understanding of what 'government' was and what it meant to be 'Ukrainian' or 'Russian' or 'Little Russian'. This, in turn, did not necessarily correspond to what Ukrainian or Russian nationalists or imperial patriots thought that 'Ukrainians' or 'Russians' or 'Little Russians' should be.

We cannot assume that government employees in Ukraine inevitably shared the extreme Russian Right's hostility to Ukrainian national issues. On the one hand, local Ukrainian-born rural officials who read the moderate Ukrainian-language newspaper *Rada* quite probably also impeded the dissemination of Ukrainian-language publications and education. Almost every government office in the Ukrainian provinces before the war had to subscribe to the extreme-Right newspaper *Kievlianin*, for example, which regularly contained articles accusing the Ukrainian national movement of treason. After reading such diatribes some local officials were unable to understand why the central government tolerated national activists and saw no reason why they could not do something about such people on their own initiative. Thus, village policemen and postmasters would arbitrarily confiscate any published Ukrainian-language material that they found.[49]

On the other hand, the extreme Right feared minority 'infiltration' into what they felt should be an exclusively Russian national bureaucracy. General Kuropatkin complained in 1910 that government administrators who were unwaveringly loyal to the dynasty, nonetheless, 'do not consider Russia their native land, they do not recognize themselves as Russians, they use Russian only at work and at home speak their local language.' He argued that only those prepared to use Russian at home as well as work and to consider Russia their native land should be allowed into government service. That same year, Russian nationalist-extremist officials in the Right-Bank Ukrainian provinces expressed concern to the Kyivan governor-general about the shortage of native Russians in the local administration. They pointed out that local Poles and Ukrainians working in government offices could not be expected to implement policies made 'in the spirit of the Russian national idea', since they were little influenced by Russia's 'national state ideals'.[50]

Although it is unlikely that anyone will ever be able to locate and quantify all these 'infiltrators', it is possible to identify some of them. Newly-examined police files reveal that hundreds of officials between 1900 and

1908 either actively sympathized with, eagerly took bribes from, or had close relations in one or other revolutionary group. In light of this evidence, it is reasonable to think that analogous relationships between officials, national activists and moderate ministers existed in the Ukrainian provinces.[51] Memoir literature contains references to the kinds of links that made extremist critics uneasy. In 1912, in response to a job advertisement for clerical positions that one of its Ukrainian directors placed in the Ukrainian-language newspaper, *Rada,* a rail company in the Kuban region received over 30 replies from village clerks and treasurers written in perfect literary Ukrainian.[52] Eighteen-year old Petro Kramar in Kyiv province, after finishing his two-year village school, got a job as a clerical assistant in the local zemstvo in 1916.[53] In Uman, Stepan Shevchenko got a job in 1910 at the government notary archive. He was active in the local national movement, subscribed to Ukrainian newspapers, read to peasants in the reading club and apparently had no problems at work because of this.[54] People like Shevchenko presumably comprised the group that Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky referred to seven years later: 'I know our class of lesser intelligentsia [sic] very well . . . all lesser administrators, clerks and telegraphists always spoke in Ukrainian, [and] received *Rada*.'[55] An examination of 170 personnel forms completed by Kyiv zemstva staff in October 1918 that asked applicants about place of birth, native language, language competence and home language use, reveal that all the Ukrainians could write and read Ukrainian, and that of 46 Russians only 13 could not speak or write in Ukrainian—although they could presumably read it as they filled out the form. These 13 were either Kyiv-born or immigrants. All the other Russians, like the eight Poles, were born in small Ukrainian towns and could read, write and speak Ukrainian. Some filled out their forms in Ukrainian.[56]

It was likely that such people surreptitiously manipulated the system in 'Ukrainian interests' as defined by activists at the time. Government administrators could influence local affairs in general, and cultural issues in particular, because in practice it was often up to them how they implemented or delayed implementing rules and polices. Regularity in policy was impeded also by the vacillation of ministers and governors-general in Kyiv and St. Petersburg, who in cultural-linguistic matters wavered between repression and tolerance. Additionally, regardless of what the ministers decided, the inertia, feuding patronage systems, nepotism, corruption and overlapping jurisdictions that plagued tsarist administration gave scope to local agents to act as harshly or as leniently as they thought they should. Regions were subject to arbitrary intervention but little administrative due process, which meant that full-time administrators had more influence on local affairs than the law or their formal status allowed. Particularly influential were provincial permanent secretaries and office heads who worked for indolent, incompetent or indifferent superiors.

On the local level in the 1870s Illia Hladky, a clerk in the Nizhyn excise office and an activist in the Ukrainian movement, used his office to influence the local student and populist movements. In the 1860s, F. Rashevsky, the head of the Chernihiv excise office, gave positions to Ukrainian activists in 15 local districts. While performing their professional duties they promulgated the use of Ukrainian books and language among the peasants. I. Rashevsky, who worked in the provincial administration in the 1870s, got permission for Ukrainian concerts and intervened on behalf of anyone who fell foul of the authorities. A member of the first Ukrainian political party, K. Kokhlych, worked in the Kyiv post office where he slipped illegal publications into mail for activists after the censors had screened it. From the 1890s, the informal and semi-legal All-Ukraine Non-Party Organization traced openings in the administration in order to place nationally conscious activists. Police reports reveal that this network was strong enough to be able to forewarn its members of all raids—men from this organization later formed the Ukrainian Democratic Workers' Party (UDRP). In Kyiv, Ivan Rudchenko, a colleague of Mykhailo Drahomaniv and the brother of a leading writer (Panas Mirny), worked in the Kyiv governor-general's office in the 1880s. It was rumored that through his friendship with the powerful chancery secretary, M. Merkulov, he influenced the governor-general to enact pro-peasant policies in Right-Bank Ukraine. In the 1890s, a Ukrainian activist, N. Molchanovsky, met A. Ignatiev when he was governor-general of Siberia. When Ignatiev was appointed governor-general of the South-Western Region in 1894, he took Molchanovsky with him to Kyiv and placed him in charge of the chancery. In office until 1905, Molchanovsky did what he could to support Ukrainian cultural interests.[57]

The writer Panas Mirny was the first to develop the character of the Ukrainian petty official in Ukrainian literature. He worked as a clerk and provided an interesting example of an honest official. While drawing due attention to the scoundrels in his stories, he also demonstrated that some officials were basically good men destroyed by circumstances. Personally, Mirny became depressed and sad whenever he reflected about the drudgery of his job. Yet, he was a loyal and efficient provincial administrator who seems to have balanced political loyalty, cultural identity and conscientious government service.[58]

Few who worked in Ukraine's offices left accounts of their experiences and milieu, and it is difficult to generalize how they, or administrators in general, navigated between political loyalty, professional grievances, duties and cultural identity in the Ukrainian provinces. As far as we know, no bureaucrat seems to have been assassinated because of his nationality. Nor does it appear that Ukrainians/'Little Russians' before 1914 avoided working for the government because they feared death from nationalist assassins. In 1905 clerks and secretaries in the private sector were politically active and formed unions, but except for Post and Telegraph personnel and some zemstvo and

city duma clerks, government officials in the Ukrainian provinces apparently were passive. I have found only one reference in a Poltava newspaper to local government clerks forming a union that November.[59]

The nationalist idea that faithful service to the tsar and 'Rossiia' was incompatible with concern for the native group and its territory took root later in Ukraine than in countries further west. Until 1917 most national leaders were moderates. They did not consider that employees of a government they believed to be tyrannical were national apostates or renegades, and there is no evidence of discussions among them, as there were among Irish and Polish nationalists, about whether or not they should support working for the imperial government. The Austrian Consul in Kyiv, a Czech, observed in 1893 that national activists strove to occupy any and all government positions in Ukraine that they could. While remaining true to their ideals they behaved correctly at work. 'I personally know many administrators and teachers whose professional behavior is impeccable, yet who, in private express views about the government that can hardly be considered favorable.'[60]

Lines between Russians, 'Little Russians' and national activists began to harden at the turn of the century. The first national political party, the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (1900), claimed in its manifesto that only Russians and 'russified renegades' staffed government offices in Ukraine. Twelve years later, a public protest, signed, among others by Mykhailo Hrushevsky, condemned a Duma delegate named Skoropadsky for claiming he represented Ukrainians/Little-Russians. He, like all 'conscious turncoats' from among intellectuals and 'the dark masses' could not voice the views or wishes of Ukrainian intellectuals and nationally conscious Ukrainians, wrote Hrushevsky.[61] In a letter to a Russian newspaper, an anonymous group in 1914 threatened with imminent horrific punishment the 'many scoundrels' who out of selfish personal interests, had forsaken 'Mother Ukraine', 'held on to Muscovite pockets', 'fawned before torturers' and enjoyed ruling while 'standing on foreign shoulders'.[62] Between 1905 and 1910 revolutionary terrorist groups did kill at least 17,000 people throughout the empire. Approximately 6,000 of these were civilian government officials, an unknown percentage of whom were middle and lower level administrators. Ukrainians in Ukraine were among the assassins both within All-Russian and Ukrainian parties or groups, but whether any of them killed their victims because they represented a 'foreign' authority is unknown.[63]

Under a veneer of Russian-language use and indifference, if not hostility toward public expressions of Ukrainian national identity, clerical behavior varied. In Podillia province, where 'Little Russians' were a majority in many offices, the atmosphere was not 'official Petersburgian' but specifically local. Nationally conscious students promulgated their ideas among Russian-speaking Ukrainian acquaintances who worked as clerks, for instance, by organizing parties where they explained to them that everything they had

heard about 'Ukrainians' was wrong. Declared Ukrainians working as clerks were openly active members of legally permitted national organizations and subscribers to Ukrainian-language publications. Some were prepared to suffer imprisonment or dismissal: others were not. In one case, an active member of the local *Prosvita* quickly ran to its office on the morning after he had heard its other members had been arrested and erased his name from all records. Some employees participated in national activities and read national literature, without becoming members or taking subscriptions.[64] An account from Chernihiv province, on the other hand, suggests the gap between nationalist and anational clerks could be wide. The author here saw his colleagues as overwhelmingly 'men of the twentieth'—a phrase used in tsarist times to refer to administrators who sprang to life only on the twentieth of each month because it was payday. These were people of limited abilities and horizons who could be properly described only by a Gogol, he continued. 'Many of them were primordial [*stykhiinyi*] Ukrainians quite unconscious of their Ukrainianism [ethnic identity]; they could not even speak Russian correctly and they probably heard real Russian very rarely. There were among them some nationally conscious Ukrainians of the "educational" sort [interested exclusively in cultural activities] . . . but this entire milieu was so singular and foreign to me that I could not bear it very long and [within a year] I resigned.'[65]

There is no data on how many administrators belonged to parties and most middle and lower level personnel probably avoided them. Between 1905 and 1917 approximately 1 percent (250,000) of Ukraine's population belonged to political parties.[66] Incomplete data at the imperial level from 1906–7 show that less than 5 percent of the Russian Social Democrats and Party of Socialist Revolutionaries were administrators.[67] No more than 10 percent of Kadet and Octobrist party membership were administrators—with most in the Ukrainian provinces belonging to the latter.[68] Usually only higher-level officials became formal party members. There is no occupational data for rank and file members of extreme-Right parties other than the tiny *Russkoe sobranie* (1 percent of all Right party membership), where officials averaged between 30 and 40 percent in the decades before the war.[69]

After 1906 only the Octobrists and extreme-Right parties were legal. That September Prime Minister Stolypin specified that government administrators could not join any political organization advocating revolution or 'struggle against the government'.[70] Extreme-Right party leaders did not think this injunction applied to them and even sent Stolypin a telegram praising his initiative. The police also considered extreme-Right parties exempt from this restriction for the next few years and reportedly gave speeches to administrators urging them to join, while sympathetic senior officials tacitly supported extreme-Right groups without formally joining.[71] However, senior officials unsympathetic to the extreme Right did consider them involved in

'struggle against the government' and steered employees away from them and toward the Octobrists—at least until 1911. In 1905 Governor Eiler in Podillia province, for instance, after hearing his officials were stopping peasants from joining extreme-Right parties, ordered them not to hinder their recruiting efforts. By 1913 his successor Governor Ignatiev was instructing his police to watch and curtail rightist activities.[72] Extreme-Right leaders, in response, began writing to ministers complaining about police 'interference' in their attempts to raise the moral and social well-being of peasants and asking them to rescind Stolypin's injunction because local officials were using it to prevent government employees from joining their parties.[73] By 1914 police reports note that officials were avoiding all parties, while the fortunes and numbers of the Right had declined dramatically.[74] So unsure were local leaders of official support that they did not know which governor would allow them to hold a conference that year in his province.[75]

Conclusion

The use of Russian or a Ukrainian-Russian jargon in offices and the grim squalor of bigger cities that attracted massive inflows of rural migrants added credence to the populist-inspired conviction that capitalist modernization and urbanization was an alien force destroying 'traditional Ukrainian' society via 'Russification'. The bureaucracy in this scenario appears as an agency russifying both its employees and society at large. This view has persisted and is one reason for the unpopularity of administration in Ukraine as a subject of inquiry. Yet, not everyone shared this view. In the 1880s Vladimir Vernadsky was struck by the diffusion of Ukrainophile sympathies in central-eastern Ukrainian towns where most still spoke Ukrainian.[76] Mykola Porsh claimed in 1912 that Ukrainian towns were becoming 'Ukrainian' just as Bohemian towns had become 'Czech' and that ultimately landless Ukrainian rural migrants would swamp Russian immigrants. Implicit in his argument was that just as local Ukrainian merchants, markets and labor were 'nationalizing' capitalism and leading Russian companies were beginning to advertise in Ukrainian, the government also would inevitably have to use Ukrainian in its Ukrainian offices.[77]

Analogously, this preliminary review suggests that government bureaucracy may not have been as powerful a 'nationalizing' agent in empires as it was in national states. Bilingual local-born officials predominated at middle and lower levels of the administration, and the educational system had not turned all of them into empire-loyalists. Some engaged in semi-legal and illegal activity for personal interests—which could deflect, shape or stymie, policy implementation. Others, legally, illegally or semi-legally, used their positions for what they understood to be a 'national Ukrainian' or 'local Little-Russian', as opposed to 'imperial Russian' interest.

Notes

1. V. Shandra, *Administratyvni ustanovy Pravoberezhnoi Ukrainy kintsia XVIII-pochatku XX st. v rosiiskomu zakonodavstvi: dzhereloznavchyi analitychnyi ohliad* (Kyiv, 1998); *Malorosiiske heneral-hubernatorstvo, 1802–1856: funktsii, struktura, arkhiv* (Kyiv, 2001); *Heneral-hubernatorstva v Ukraïni: XIX-pochatok XX st.* (Kyiv, 2005), 'Chynovnyk z osoblyvykh doruchen pry Kyivskomu General Gubernatorovi: sotsiolohichnyi portret,' *Problemy istorii Ukrainy XIX–XX st.* vyp XIII (2007): 156–76; M. R. Zhvaliuk, *Podatkovi orhany Rossiiskoi imperii v Ukraini u druhyi polovyni XIX—na pochatku XX st.* (Kyiv, 2001). O. F. Melnychuk, *Administratyvnyi aparat ta orhany mistsevoho samovriaduvannia na Podilli u druhii polovyni XIX stolittia* (Vinnytsia, 2001); S. Velychenko, 'Identities, Loyalties and Service in Imperial Russia: Who Administered the Borderlands?' *Russian Review*, no. 2 (1995): 188–208; 'The Bureaucracy Police and Army in Twentieth century Ukraine: A Comparative Quantitative Study', *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, no. 3–4 (1999): 63–103; 'Local Officialdom and National Movements in Imperial Russia in light of Administrative Shortcomings and Under-government,' in *National Issues in Russian and East European History*, J. Morison, ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 74–85; 'The Size of the Imperial Russian Bureaucracy and Army in Comparative Perspective', *Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas*, no. 3 (2001): 346–62; 'The Issue of Russian Colonialism in Ukrainian Thought', *Ab Imperio*, no. 1 (2002): 323–66. Most studies devoted to the history of administration in Ukraine are published in *Pravo Ukrainy* and *Visnyk Ukrainskoi Akademii derzhavnoho upravlinnia pry Prezydentovi Ukrainy*. Detailed descriptions of formal structure may be found in any *Istoriia derzhavy i prava Ukrainy*.
2. *Goroda Rossii v 1904 goda* (St. Petersburg, 1906), 410–13, 574–78. The nine Ukrainian provinces had 13,867 telephones, with Chernihiv province having the fewest (218) and Kyiv province the most (4141), followed by Kherson province (2878—of which 2236 were in Odessa). By comparison, with just under 17,400 telephones in 1921, Soviet Ukraine had 30 times fewer than Germany.
3. The 'village' of Hulai Pole in 1914 had 16,000 inhabitants. It had three high schools, a library, bank, theater and printing press, 50 retail stores, a telegraph and post office, a resident doctor, pharmacist and lawyer, two steam mills and two big agricultural-machinery factories—converted to armaments works during the war. P. G. Ryndzionskii, *Krestiane i gorod v kapitalisticheskoi Rossii vtoroi poloviny XIX veka* (Moscow, 1983), 151, 156, 171, 176, 230; *Ves iugo-zapadnyi krai. Spravochnaia i adresnaia kniga po kievskoi, volynskoi i podolskoi guberniiam*, A. I. Iaroshevich, ed. (Kyiv, 1914), 618–27.
4. B. Krawchenko, *Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine* (London: Macmillan, 1985), 11; M. Shapoval, *Misto i selo* (Prague, 1926), 10.
5. By 'administrator' I mean government office staff—Russian: *sluzhashchie po uchrezhdenie*. The term includes *chinovniki*, but not every *sluzhashchii* was a *chinovnik*. The latter, unlike the former, had a rank, automatic promotion and guaranteed pension. I do not count public employees like teachers, policemen or caretakers as 'administrators' although in Russia they were also *sluzhashchie*.
6. Velychenko, 'The Bureaucracy Police and Army in Twentieth Century Ukraine', 69, 73.
7. P. N. Zyrianov, 'Sotsialnaia struktura mestnogo upravlenniia kapitalisticheskoi Rossii (1861–1914),' *Istoricheskie zapiski*, 107 (1972): 248, 276; N. P. Matkhanova,

'Formalnaia i neformalnaia ierarkhiia gubernskogo chinovnichestva v Rossii XIX veka,' *Sibir'—moi krai.*, V. A. Zverev, ed. (Novosibirsk: Novosibirskii gos. ped. univ., 1999), 160.

8. Iu. A. Ivanov, *Uezdnaia Rossiia: mestnye vlasti, tserkov' i obshchestvo vo vtoroi polovine XIX—nachale XX v.* (Ivanovo: Ivanovskii gos. univ., 2003), 44. The mayor and the chairmen of the local zemstvo and gentry assembly were elected.
9. *Rossiia 1913 god. Statistiko-dokumental'nyi spravochnik*, A. M. Anfimov and A. P. Korelin, eds (St. Petersburg: BLITS, 1995), 265; *Rossia v mirovoi voine 1914–1918 goda*, V. Efremov, ed. (Moscow: Tipografiia Lavrova, 1925), 24–5; N. D. Sudavtsov, *Zemskoe i gorodskoe samoupravlenie Rossii v gody pervoi mirovoi voine* (Moscow-Stavropol: Stavropolskii gos. univ., 2001), 39; S. Ostapenko, 'Kapitalizm na Ukraini', *Chervonyi shliakh*, no. 1 (1924): 124, gives no source for his totals of 33,600 government officials and 66 000 county (*volost*) secretaries. S. Bohatchuk, 'Sotsialne stanovyshche zaliznychnykiv Ukrainy', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zbirnyk 2000* (Kyiv, 2002), 91.
10. S. Guthier, 'Ukrainian Cities During the Revolution and the Interwar Era', in *Rethinking Ukrainian History*, I. L. Rudnytsky, ed. (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1981), 160; *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis' naseleniia Rossiiskoi Imperii, 1897 g.* (St. Petersburg, 1899–1905), vol. 18, chart XXI.
11. Velychenko, 'Identities, Loyalties and Service in Imperial Russia: Who Administered the Borderlands?', 205, 209.
12. W. Pomeranz, 'Justice from the Underground: The History of the Underground *Advokatura*', *Russian Review* (July 1993): 321–30. Though condemned by the legal profession, common people used their services extensively in cities and towns.
13. V. Sadovsky, *Pratsia v SSSR* (Warsaw, 1932), 13; Korolivskii et al., *Pobeda sovetskoi vlasti na Ukraine* (Moscow: Nauka, 1967), 35; L. S. Gaponenko, *Rabochii klass rossii v 1917 godu* (Moscow: Nauka, 1970), 444.
14. *Tret'ya Vserossiiskaya Konferentsiya Professionalnykh Soyuzov 3–11 iyulya (20–28) iyunaya st.st.) 1917 goda. Stenograficheskii otchet*, reprint edition, D. Koenker, ed. (Millwood, NY: Kraus International Publications, 1982), xii.
15. *Obshchii svod po Imperii rezultatov razrabotki dannykh perepisi 1897 g. po Imperii* (St. Petersburg, 1905), vol. I, 1, 9, 11; vol. 2, charts 20, 20a, 23. Census Category 1 includes among the 43 percent listed as administrators an unspecified number of lawyers and judges. Seventeen percent were auxiliary personnel (caretakers, guards, couriers). In Category 13, 6 percent were administrators. In the 50 provinces west of the Urals, 52 percent of Category 2 (*obshchestvennaia sluzhba)* were elected, full time and part-time officials. Forty-eight percent were auxiliaries. Sub-categories are not indicated or divided according to language or gender for the provinces. I applied imperial percentages to reach estimates on Ukraine. *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis' naseleniia Rossiiskoi imperii*, charts no. 21, 22, vols. 8, 13, 16, 32, 33, 41, 46, 47 and 48. 'Civil councils' includes zemstva, city duma, and village councils. Sadovsky, *Pratsia*.
16. P. Chubinskii, 'Dva slova o selskom uchilishche voobshche i ob uchileshche dlia selskikh uchitelei', *Osnova*, no. 4 (1862): 54–9.
17. A. Golubov and A. Lokhmatova, 'Reformirovanie obshchestva i sudby liudei: popytki analiza psykhologicheskikh aspektov preobrazovanii serediny XIX veka', in *Istoriia ta kultura livoberezhzhia Ukrainy*, H. V. Samoilenko, ed. (Kyiv: NDPI, 1997), 77–8; Iu. P. Prysiazhniuk, *Ukrainske selianstvo XIX–XX st.: evoliutsiia, mentalnist, tradytsionalizm* (Cherkasy: Vidlunnia Plus, 2002), 71–2.

18. The total number of pupils in Katerynoslav province increased from 46,650 in 1891 to 108,703 in 1897. K. Kohtiants, 'Tserkovno-parafiialni shkoly u Katerynoslavskii eparkhii v 1884–1916 rokakh', in *Kovcheh* II (2000): 396; Velychenko, 'Identities Loyalties and Service in Imperial Russia: Who Administered the Borderlands?', 199–204.
19. B. Eklof, *Russian Peasant Schools* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 292, 452; in *Borotba demokratychnykh syl za narodnu osvitu na Ukraini v 60-90kh rokakh XIX st.*, V. I. Borysenko, ed. (Kyiv, 1980), 47.
20. [Anon], 'Na ukraine', *Izvestiia*, 6 Jan/24 Dec 1917.
21. Within the latter group, noted one observer, for the first time in the Ukrainian provinces since the abolition of the Hetmanate at the end of the 18th century began appearing clerks speaking broken Russian instead of vernacular Ukrainian at work; i.e. Chykalenko, *Shchodennyk (1907–1917)* (Lviv, 1931), 383; M. Livytska, *Na hrani dvokh epokh* (New York, 1972), 330.
22. *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis'*, chart no. 15, vols. 8, 13, 16, 32, 33, 41, 46, 47 and 48. Figures include ages 1–9 and 60+.
23. In 1903 average urban prices per pound outside Kyiv were as follows: good meat 10–14 kopeks, sugar 15 kopeks, rye-bread 2–3 kopeks, salt 1–2 kopeks. On top of food costs income had to cover rent, fuel and clothing. *Goroda Rossii*, 450–51. See also V. Molchanov, *Zhyttevyi riven miskoho neselennia pravoberezhnoi Ukraine (1900–1914)* (Kyiv, 2005).
24. Tsentralny Derzhavny Istorychny Arkhiv Ukrainy (TsDIAU), f. 274, op. 4, sprava 514.
25. *Zemske dilo*, 1/14 and 1/20 November 1917. He concluded that since all secretaries could not be summarily fired, the best way to begin would be for *zemstva* to establish improvement courses for them. This echoed pre-revolutionary calls to improve control and administration on the local level by making secretaries part of the ministerial bureaucracy with uniforms, rank and more pay. Corrinne Gaudin, *Ruling peasants: village and state in late Imperial Russia* (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2007), 72.
26. Derzhavny Arkhiv Kyivskoi oblasti (DAKO), f. 1239, op. 196, sprava no. 58, 60, 69.
27. DAKO, f. 2, op. 26, sprava 355.
28. Born in 1885 in a village in Kyiv province he completed a town primary school and then was apparently taught by his parents at home. Miretsky's police files are in the TsDIAU, f. 274, op. 1, sprava 3005; sprava 3159, and op. 4, sprava 251.
29. *Sputnik Chinovnika*, no. 19 (1913): 11.
30. Ibid., no. 5; nos. 82–9 (1914): 8.
31. Ibid., no. 3 (1912): 29.
32. Ibid., no. 20 (1913).
33. Ibid., no. 33 (1914): 16–17.
34. Ibid., no. 9 and 20–22 (1913); nos. 14, 15 (1913). The volost office in Malyn in 1906 (pop. 44,000) in western Kyiv province processed on average 1200 items monthly. A. V. Bondarevsky, *Volosne upravlennia ta stanovyshche selian na Ukraini pislia reformy 1861 roku* (Kyiv, 1961), 63, 71.
35. *Sputnik Chinovnika*, no. 6 (1911); no. 23 (1912); no. 32 (1913). On the eve of the war, policy was beginning to change. While the Education Ministry continued to forbid teachers to form or join any organizations, the Land Ministry was encouraging its employees to do so in the hope they would thereby improve their knowledge and skills. Ibid., no. 6 (1914).

36. Ibid., no. 22, 18–20 (1912); no. 4, 23 (1913).
37. Ibid., no. 14, 27–30 (1911).
38. Ibid., no. 21, 22 (1912); no. 10, 20–3 (1911); no. 12, 15–20 (1911).
39. Ibid., no. 25 (1912): 1–13. Inspections and complaints by those who lost out in the trading merely resulted in a quiet removal and later reinstatement of the guilty somewhere else.
40. Ibid., nos. 18, 21 (1911).
41. Ibid., no. 20 (1912): 1–6. That August the Kyivan provincial governor accepted a recommendation from his chancery head to increase wages to attract better candidates and stem high turnover rates. In two years 17 had left the office seeking better jobs elsewhere. DAKO, f. 2, op. 78, sprava 130, no 1–4.
42. DAKO, f. 2, op. 79, sprava 37, no. 85, 205–231, 382. All applications in the sample were rejected. Replies were sent out within days unless the application was sent for vetting to the police, which could take up to four months. The governor's assistant secretary sent replies to the applicant's local police chief rather than to the applicant.
43. Cited in F. Peroutka, *Budovani statu*, 3rd edition (Prague, 1991) I, 135.
44. 'Svidomyi Ukrainets ili obshcheross, po obstsoiatelstvam.' V. Prykhodo, *Nepevni elementy v Ukainstvi* (Kyiv, 1909), 17–18.
45. Cited in O. Lototsky, *Storinky mynuloho* (Warsaw, 1932–34) 3, 127.
46. S. Rusova, 'Moi spomyny,' *Za sto let*, book 3 (1928), 177; Lototsky, Storinky mynuloho, 2, 16. On language and identity, see J. Edwards, *Language, Society and Identity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985).
47. S. Velychenko, 'Local Officialdom and National Movements in Imperial Russia in light of Administrative Shortcomings and Under-government', 74–85.
48. B. Antonenko-Davydovych, *Tvory v dvokh tomakh* (Kyiv, 1999) II, 514, 534–5.
49. Chykalenko, *Shchodennyk (1907–1917)*, 115, 254.
50. S. Pyvovar, 'Truzheniki na polzu obruseniia kraia', *Kyivska starina*, no. 5 (1995): 69. A. N. Kuropatkin, *Rossiia dlia russkih: zadachi russkoi armii* (St. Petersburg, 1910), vol. 3, 241.
51. A. Ostrovskii, *Kto stoial za spinoi Stalina* (St. Petersburg: Neva, 2002), 530–74.
52. Chykalenko, *Shchodennyk*, 290.
53. TsDAVO, f. 1092c, op. 4, sprava 153. The form is written in Ukrainian. DAKO, f. 1239, op. 196, sprava 21, no 12.
54. *Rada*, 10 June 1914.
55. P. Skoropadsky, *Spohady* (Kyiv-Philadelphia, 1995) 12. Drahomanov pointed out that educated 'Little Russians' were bilingual and eagerly bought the few Ukrainian publications that went beyond 'ethnographic patriotism' and dealt with current issues. See *Mykhailo Petrovych Drahomanov. Literaturno-publitsystychni pratsi u dvokh tomakh*, Dei, Zasenko and Lysenko, eds (Kyiv, 1970) I, 138, 308, 2: 401–2.
56. DAKO, f. 1239, op. 196, sprava 21.
57. Velychenko, 'Local Officialdom'.
58. M. Korsunsky, 'Panas Iakovych Rudchenko (Panas Myrnyi) iak sluzhbovets, hromadianyn i liudyna . . . (Z vlasnykh spomyniv)', *Chervonyi shliakh*, nos. 7–8 (1927): 236–56; Panas Myrnyi, *Zibrannia tvoriv u semy tomakh* (Kyiv, 1971) VII, 323.
59. *Professionalnoe dvizhenie sluzashchikh Ukrainy (1905–1907)*, I. S. Predislovii and I. S. Stepanskii, eds (Kharkiv, 1923), 145. D. Antoshkin, *Professionalnoe dvizhenie sluzhashchikh 1917–1924* gg. (Moscow, 1927), 141–2, notes that pre-1917 officials

in Ukraine were less militant than their Russian counterparts. It is unclear what he means, given that Miretsky published his *Sputnik chinovnika* in Kyiv.

60. D. Doroshenko, 'Ukrainskyi rukh 1890-ykh rokiv v osvitlenni Avstriiskoho konsula v Kyivi', *Z Mynuloho. Zbirnyk*. (Warsaw, 1938), I, 63–4; H. Kasianov, *Ukrainska intelihentsiia na rubezhi XIX–XX stolit* (Kyiv, 1993), 49–50, identifies similar activity done from 1897 by the informal All-Ukraine Non-Party Organization.
61. *Ukrainski politychni partii kintsia XIX-pochatku XX stolittia*, V. Shevchenko, ed. (Kyiv, 1993), 30; Chykalenko, *Shchodennyk (1907–1917)*, 379–81. The named delegate was not the future Hetman. At the same time rural activists circulated a petition signed by 200 peasants condemning Rodzianko, the Ukrainian-born duma chairman, for claiming Ukrainians did not want to see Ukrainian used in schools.
62. 'Materialy do istorii Ukrainskoho rukhu za svitovoi viiny,' in *Ukrainskyi arkheohrafichnyi zbirnyk*, vol. I, O. Hermaize, ed. (1926): 292.
63. A. Geifman, *Thou Shalt Kill. Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia 1894–1917* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 21; O. Holubovsky, V. Kulyk, *Ukrainskyi politychnyi rukh na naddniprianshchyni kintsia XIX pochatku XX stolittia* (Kyiv, 1996), 79–81.
64. V. Prykhodko, *Pid sontsem Podillia* (Lviv, 1931), 67–8, 130, 157–60, 196–7, 246.
65. M. Halahan, *Z moikh spomyniv* (Lviv, 1930), I, 198.
66. In 1905–7, 84 percent of the 222, 488 in Ukraine who belonged to parties belonged to an extreme-Right group. I. N. Kiselev et al., 'Politicheskie partii v Rossii v 1905–1907 gg.: chislennost', sostav, razmeshchenie', *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 4 (1990): 77–8. In 1917, total party membership in Ukraine was at least 214,500, not including Ukrainian memberships of the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries (All-Russian 500,000), Zionists (All-Russian 28,000) and Kadets (All Russian 60,000), which are unknown. By that year membership in extreme-Right parties in Ukraine plummeted to 8500. O. Ia. Naiman, *Ievreiski partii ta ob'eidnannia Ukrainy (1917–1925)* (Kyiv, 1998), 46; *Politicheskie partii Rossii konets XIX-pervaia tret XX veka. Entsiklopediia*, V. V. Shelokhaev, ed. (Moscow: Rosspen, 1996); L. M. Spirin, *Krusheniie pomeshchichykh i burzhuaznykh partii v Rossii* (Moscow: Mysl', 1977), 300–31; Iu. I. Kirianov, 'Chislennost i sostav pravykh partii v Rossii v 1914–1917 gg.', in *Rossiia i pervaia mirovaia voina*, N. N. Smirnov et al., eds (St. Petersburg: D. Balunin, 1999), 219–21.
67. No more than 5 percent of Bolsheviks and 7.5 percent of SRs were employees (*sluzhashchie*)—which here included private sector as well as government personnel. M. Brovin, 'K voprosu ob izuchenii sostava bolshevistskoi partii nakanune i v period revoliutsii,' in *Revoliutsiia 1905–07 godov v Rossii i ee vsemirno-istoricheskoe znachenie*, P. A. Rodionov et al., eds (Moscow: Politizdat, 1976), 175; N. D. Erofeev, 'K voprosu o chislennosti i sostave partii eserov nakanune pervoi rossiiskoi revoliutsii,' in *Neproletarskie partii Rossii v trekh revoliutsiakh*, K. V. Gusev, ed. (Moscow; Nauka, 1989), 126–30; M. I. Leonov, *Partiia sotsialistov-revoliutsionerov v 1905–1907 gg.* (Moscow: Rosspen, 1997), 59–67. See also M. Hildermeier, *The Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party before the First World War* (New York: St. Martin's, 2000), 278.
68. V. V. Shelokhaev, *Kadety-glavnaia partiia liberalnoi burzhuazii v borbe s revoliutsiei 1905–1907 gg.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1983), 67–69; Shelokhaev, *Partiia oktiabristov v period pervoi rossiiskoi revoliutsii* (Moscow: Nauka, 1987), 43–45; T. Emmons, *The Formation of Political Parties and the First National Elections in Russia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 177, 217.

69. Iu. I. Kirianov, *Russkoe sobranie 1900–1917* (Moscow: Rosspen, 2003), 78–87, 102.
70. N. I. Sidorov, 'Mobilizatsiia reaktsii v 1906,' *Krasnyi arkhiv*, no. 32 (1929): 162; Emmons, *The Formation of Political Parties*, 184. In January 1906, superiors were allowed to decide whether subordinates' could participate in political organizations.
71. I. H. Samartsev, 'Chornosotentsi na Ukraini (1905–1917 rr.),' *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 1 (1992): 94; S. A. Stepanov, *Chernaia sotnia v Rossii (1905–1914 gg.)* (Moscow: VZPI, 1992), 114–5.
72. O. Fedkov, 'Chornosotentsi i chutky na Podilli,' *Moloda Ukraina*, no. 4 (2004): 6, 15.
73. Iu. I. Kirianov, 'Krainie pravye partii i obshchestvo,' in *Politicheskie partii i obshchestvo v Rossii 1914–1917 gg.*, Iu. A., Kirianov and V. M. Shevyrin, eds (Moscow: INION, 2000), 173–77; Kirianov, *Russkoe Sobranie*, 88; T. Emmons, *The Formation of Political Parties*, 190–1.
74. Kirianov, 'Chislennost i sostav pravykh partii v Rossii v 1914–1917 gg.,' 219–21.
75. Iu. I. Kirianov, 'Pravye v 1915-fevrale 1917 po perliustrirovannym Departmentom politsii pismam,' *Minuvshee. Istoricheskii almanakh* 14 (1993): 182. In Ukraine, extreme-Right party membership dropped from almost 250,000 in 1906, to no more than 9,000 by 1916.
76. 'Vladimir Vernadskii. Volnoe,' *Rodina*, I. Mochalova, ed., no. 8 (1891): 86.
77. M. Porsh, ' P. Struve v Ukrainskii spravi,' *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk*, vol. 58 (May 1912): 333–41; abridged in M. Hordienko [pseud], 'Kapitalizm i russkaia kultura na Ukraine,' *Ukrainskaia zhizn'* 9 (1912): 16–32, 20–28. He wrote in response to P. B. Struve, 'Obshcherusskaia kultura i ukrainskii partikularizm,' *Russkaia mysl'* (January 1912): 65–86.

5
Multi-ethnicity and Estonian Tsarist State Officials in Estland Province, 1881–1914

Bradley D. Woodworth

For several decades historians of the Baltic region of the Russian empire have given increased attention to the complex relationships between its inhabitants and the state in the late tsarist period. The actions of the state, particularly the reforms undertaken in the last quarter of the 19th century, are seen to have been contradictory, in both intent and outcome.[1] The reforms weakened the locally dominant Baltic German urban and rural elites and strengthened—in many areas creating for the first time—Russian state institutions. While the reforms did not result in a complete eclipse of Baltic German participation in public life, the widespread changes in public life and government in the Baltic region they brought about coincided with the formation of an Estonian educated class. Estonians began to participate, to degrees not previously seen, in the institutions of public life, from the level of the rural township to the structures of the Russian provincial administration.

The Baltic German nobility and their corporative bodies [Ger. *Ritterschaften*] that had dominated life in the region since the Middle Ages transferred their loyalty to Russian emperor Peter I in 1710 and 1712 in the course of the Great Northern War. German-speaking burghers, led by their guilds and magistracies, did likewise, thus solidifying their control over urban life. Baltic Germans continued to maintain their traditional autonomy into the second half of the 19th century, and until the 1880s all local officials except those at the very highest level were Baltic Germans. The tsarist state's most senior local official (governor-general) was sometimes a Baltic German, but even when a Russian filled this position, agreement between St. Petersburg and the Baltic Germans was rarely difficult. One governor-general (from 1848 to 1861), Prince A. A. Suvorov, was so close to the Baltic German nobility in his views that Russian Interior Minister P. A. Valuev (himself a supporter of Baltic German hegemony and former governor of Kurland province) said of him that he was 'more the permanent

representative of the Baltic region in St. Petersburg than a representative of St. Petersburg in that region.'[2]

The Great Reforms carried out in the reign of Alexander II were strongly resisted by the Baltic Germans, who saw these as incursions upon their autonomy. Key among the reforms was the implementation in the Baltic provinces of Estland, Livland and Kurland in 1877 of the Russian Municipal Statute of 1870 and the expansion of Russian-language instruction in schools beginning in 1874–5. Reforms intended to integrate the Baltic region with the rest of the Russian empire continued under Alexander III; in 1888 and 1889 St. Petersburg appointed commissars for peasant affairs in peasant townships, replacing the previously existing Baltic German judiciary bodies, and the police system was placed under the direction of the Russian Ministry of Interior, whose highest representative was the provincial governor. (The three Baltic provinces were governed separately after 1876.) The combined effect of all these reforms was to eliminate the power that corporate Baltic German bodies had over Estonian and Latvian peasants and urban dwellers and to begin to weaken Baltic German dominance throughout all of Baltic society.

While the period between approximately 1880 and 1905 is known in the historical literature as the era of Russification, it was also characterized by increasing estonization and latvianization. Both of these mainly peasant peoples had begun already in the 1860s to emerge from under the tutelage and cultural domination of the Baltic Germans to participate for the first time in civic life and to create their own civic institutions where Estonian and Latvian, not German, were the common languages. This process was greatly strengthened by the reforms emerging from St. Petersburg.

Included in the loosening of the social hierarchy in the Baltic region that began in the last decades of the 19th century was an increase in the ethnic diversity among those who served the Russian state as civil servants. For the province of Estland (Estonians made up the majority population in Estland and the northern half of Livland), historians have already described some aspects of change within the tsarist bureaucracy. During the governorship of S. V. Shakhovskoi (1885–94) the percentage of German officials fell, a development that paralleled (though with some delay) the decline in the number of Baltic Germans in the tsarist bureaucracy on the empire-wide level. This was accompanied by an increase in the number of Russian civil servants, who replaced Baltic Germans in most of the leading positions in the province.[3]

The significant rise in the number of Estonians in state bureaucratic structures that began in the final decade or perhaps 15 years of the 19th century has, curiously, not been examined in depth. The participation by upwardly-mobile Estonians in the structures of tsarist state administration must been seen not as a minor footnote to the larger narrative of national awakening and consolidation that took place between 1860 and 1905, but as

integral to Estonians' reaction to modernization. This trend toward a greater estonization of the state bureaucracy continued to the end of the tsarist regime.

Census data

Let us begin with a look at overall changes in the ethnic composition of state officials living in the Estland provincial capital of Tallinn [Rus. *Revel'*, Ger. *Reval*] as reflected in the censuses of 1871, 1881 and 1897.[4] In 1871, of the 236 administrative state officials [Ger. *Staatsbeamte*] in the city, 173 (73.3 percent) were German, 52 (22.0 percent) were Russian and 4 (1.7 percent) were Estonian. There were also 7 officials (3.0 percent) of other—unspecified—nationality.[5] The following decade witnessed modest growth of the tsarist bureaucracy in Tallinn, particularly in the number of Russians and Estonians. Of the 300 state officials (in the terminology of the census, those in *Staatdienst*, or 'state service') in Tallinn in 1881, 185 (61.7 percent) were German, 88 (29.3 percent) were Russian, 20 (6.7 percent) were Estonian, and 7 (2.3 percent) were of other nationality. The Estonians were concentrated in areas related to finance (12), and in the Internal Affairs Ministry and police (5).[6]

By the end of the century, great change was occurring within the ethnic profile of state officials in Tallinn. Overall, there was extensive growth in the number of civil servants, whose numbers in 1897 reached 861. Much of this expansion was due to the sharp increase of Estonian officials, who now numbered 442, 51.3 percent of all officials. (The category in the 1897 census is those whose occupation was in 'administration, the courts, and the police.'[7]) The fall in the number of Germans from 185 in 1881 to 123 in 1897 meant a precipitous decline in their relative portion within the bureaucracy (61.7 percent to 14.3 percent). Unsurprisingly, the number of Russians rose sharply, from 88 in 1881 to 236 in 1897. However, because of the rapid growth in the number of Estonians in the bureaucracy, the share of Russians actually dropped slightly, from 29.3 percent to 27.4 percent. The numbers of officials of other nationalities also expanded by 1897, when 33 Poles, 7 Latvians, 4 Swedes, 3 Ukrainians and 13 of other nationalities were employed as officials.[8] Throughout all of Estland province, the number of state officials who were Estonians increased from 85 in 1881 (15.6 percent of all officials) to 673 in 1897 (52.3 percent).[9] Most of the influx of Estonians into state service most likely occurred in the 1890s, when the first generation of Estonians came of age who had received secondary education (and, increasingly, university education) in Russian.

Who is an Estonian?

Studying the role and activity of Estonians in state service in the 19th century is complicated by the problem of determining precisely who is an

Estonian. Before the late 19th century, ethnicity in the Baltic provinces tended to parallel differences in estate [*soslovie, Stand*] and religious affiliation. Peasant status was equivalent to being an Estonian; participants in guild life, educated professionals and landowners were overwhelmingly Germans, and the largely urban, diverse Russian population (merchants, artisans, peasants and workers and military officers) were of the Orthodox, not Lutheran faith. Estonians who sought to improve their social position adopted German dress and manners, Germanized their names, and otherwise did all they could to distance themselves from their peasant past.[10] The 1881 census reported that 2,121 Estonians in Tallinn (7.3 percent of all Estonians in the city) used German as their primary language.[11] The number of Germanized Estonians was undoubtedly even higher, as this figure represents only those Estonians who, though Germanized linguistically, still considered themselves Estonians; Estonians who held themselves as fully German were counted as Germans, in this as in all other censuses.

As late as the early 20th century, many educated Estonians in Tallinn had an ambiguous ethnic and cultural identity. Estonian was not used even in primary schools in the city except for lessons in religion. Educated Estonians commonly spoke German among each other and worshiped in German-language congregations on Sunday.[12] The process of Germanization in Tallinn was eased by the fact that many Estonians already had German or German-sounding surnames. Estonian choir director Konstantin Türnpu was born Konstantin Türnbaum in 1865 on a Baltic German estate to the west of Tallinn. Sometime after his arrival in the city in the following decade to attend school, he Estonicized his surname to 'Türnpu' (pu[u] = Baum). Türnpu's brother Hermann, who later in the century owned a wine shop in Tallinn, retained the surname 'Türnbaum'.[13] The majority of state servitors who were Baltic German can be identified by their specific family name, known to contemporaries (and later historians) as typically Baltic German; however, in the case of many Estonians who were rising socially from the relative obscurity of the peasant estate, the issue of ethnicity can be a tangled one.

Estonian state officials earlier in the century

As early as the mid-19th century, several Estonians who were not Germanized did number among tsarist officials in Estland. Estonians were leaders in a small group of reform-minded Estland officials and literati in Tallinn active in the late 1850s and early 1860s who were involved in several initiatives distant from the agenda of the Baltic German elite in the province. First, the group helped to set the liberal agenda and outlook that marked the early years of the German-language Tallinn daily, *Revalsche Zeitung*, published from 1860. The newspaper was the first politically-oriented newspaper published in any of the three Baltic provinces. Second, the group is associated

with the anonymous publication in Berlin in 1861 of a book strongly critical of the working and living conditions of the Estonian peasantry, *Der Ehste und sein Herr.*[14]

Best known in the group was Friedrich Nikolai Russow (1828–1906), a Tallinn-born Estonian law graduate, who for nearly a decade occupied relatively high positions in the Estland capital. In 1852 Russow was named secretary of the Estland state revenue department [Rus. *kazennaia palata*], and in 1859 he became the administrator of the governor's palace in Tallinn. He also was the official Estonian translator for the Estland provincial administration. While holding these positions, Russow became the first editor of *Revalsche Zeitung*. In 1863 he was transferred to Petersburg, never to return to work in the city of his birth.[15] This group of reform-minded individuals was multi-ethnic and included several non-Estonians.[16]

Estonian ascendancy to positions in the bureaucracy

The sharp increase in the overall number of state officials in the last two decades of the 19th century reflected the need for officials in an increasingly complex and urban society. Particularly noteworthy is greater social differentiation among Estonians, including the emergence of an Estonian bourgeoisie. The rise in the number of state civil servants also points to a renewed determination on the part of the Russian state to strengthen all-Russian institutions at the expense of the traditional Baltic German elite. This was particularly the case during the governorship of Shakhovskoi, who sought to bolster both Russian and Estonian society in Estland in order to weaken the influence of Baltic German elites.

Paralleling the increase of Estonian tsarist officials in the later years of the 19th century was a rise in the number of Estonians with secondary and university education.[17] While higher education among Estonians was a precondition for, rather than a direct cause of, the increase of Estonians entering the bureaucracy, there seems to have been a greater willingness on the part of the tsarist state to employ educated Estonians. In the last third of the century, the number of male students in secondary schools in Estland and northern Livland who were from the peasant estate rose more rapidly than those from any other social estate, increasing from 42 (6.6 percent of all students) in 1862 to 406 (18.7 percent) in 1899.[18] The number of students from merchant and artisan families consistently made up the largest group in secondary schools in the same period, both in absolute and relative terms. As Estonians' portion within these social groups rose greatly in the last third of the century, many of these students were inevitably Estonians as well.

It is noteworthy that this increase in the number of Estonians in secondary schools occurred despite the Russifying reforms in education carried out in the Baltic provinces from the mid-1880s to the mid-1890s. The introduction in 1887 of Russian as the language of instruction beginning in the

third school year was perhaps the most notable of these. From 1892 Russian was a required subject of study beginning in the first year as well, and the teaching corps was increasingly Russian, not Baltic German. For many young Estonians, the weakening of Baltic German control over schools was a breath of fresh air. While efforts in the 1870s and early 1880s to found an Estonian-language secondary school failed, the new Russian orientation in education presented the rising Estonian elite an escape from schools that were increasingly enamored of Bismarck's Prussia.[19]

The number of Estonians who received university education also grew steadily in the last quarter of the 19th century. While in 1875 an estimated 25–35 Estonians were students at Tartu University, this number rose to some 50 in 1880 and then to over 100 by 1890, despite the phasing-in of Russian as the language of instruction between 1887 and 1892.[20] This increase in Russian-language instruction was of key significance in strengthening Estonians' profile in the tsarist administration in the late 19th century.

Greater knowledge of Russian toward the very end of the 19th century and into the 20th century gave an increasing number of Estonians access to university education beyond Tartu University, and many studied in Petersburg and Moscow. The desire of many ambitious Estonians to distance themselves both from Baltic German culture and a perceived smallness of life in the Baltic was a factor in higher numbers of them rejecting Tartu University in favor of study in Russia proper.[21] Many Estonians were attracted to university study in St. Petersburg, where they had access to fields of specialization not offered at Tartu University, such as technical studies and fine arts. While in the late 19th century there were 35 Estonian university students in Petersburg, by 1909 there were 150. By 1915, 30.1 percent of all Estonian university students (257 out of 830 total) were in St. Petersburg, though Tartu still remained the most common choice (386 students, or 46.5 percent).[22]

While prosopographical work on Estonian state officials in the 19th and early 20th century is needed to determine trends in the education of Estonian officials more precisely, it is clear that some of the most highly-placed Estonians in the tsarist bureaucracy were graduated from St. Petersburg University, particularly with degrees in law. Prominent Estonian law graduates from the 19th century included the law professor and diplomat Friedrich Fromhold Martens (known in Russian as *Fedor Fedorovich Martens*) (1845–1909); peasant affairs and finance specialist Tõnis Vares (1859–1925); and jurist Karl Hellat (1862–1935). Law graduates from St. Petersburg University played an important role in the formation of the Estonian intelligentsia both in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Estonian law graduates from the period 1906 to 1917 numbered in the dozens.[23]

Hellat was perhaps typical of Estonian state officials with a law degree from St. Petersburg and of mid-level Estonian civil servants in general. Born in the countryside of Tartu district, Hellat studied in Tartu schools and graduated

from St. Petersburg University in 1889. From 1889 to 1900 he was the head of the higher peasant court in the western Estland coastal town of Haapsalu, where in 1895 he also founded the Estonian temperance society *Kungla*. After a disagreement with Estland Governor E. N. Skalon (governor from 1894–1902), Hellat was transferred out of the Baltic to Russia proper. From 1900 to 1906 he was a judge in the town of Ustiuzhna, Novgorod province, after which he left state service to work for the Russian Trade and Industry Bank in Russia and Ukraine.[24]

Spending a portion, even years, of one's career outside the Baltic region was common for educated Estonians, state officials and other professionals alike. Many educated Estonians in both the late 19th and early 20th century were dissatisfied with their prospects at home and chose, or were forced, to leave to live and work in Russia. According to a list of Estonian university students and graduates published in 1915, 234 (37.1 percent) lived outside of Estland or northern Livland, while 379 (60.2 percent) lived in Estonian areas; only 11 resided outside the Russian the empire.[25] The career of Tõnis Vares, discussed below, also bears out this trend.[26] Another example is Miron Paul (1863–1921); after completing the Riga Theological Seminary in 1885, Paul studied in the Petersburg Theological Academy, graduating in 1889. From 1890 to 1891 he was employed in the Estland provincial administration, becoming the head of peasant affairs for Rapla parish in 1891, a post he held until 1905, when he left the Baltic region for Russia.[27]

Prominence of Estonian Orthodox officials

Estonians who were of the Orthodox faith (rather than Lutheran) appear often enough among the names of those in relatively high administrative positions to conclude that they were over-represented among all state officials who were Estonian. The worldview and pre-occupational preparation of Orthodox Estonians better prepared them for Russian state service, even likely predisposing them to seek such a career path. The study of Russian was emphasized in the elementary schools run by the Orthodox Church, and even after the 1887 introduction of Russian as the primary language of instruction in all schools in the Baltic provinces, graduates of Orthodox schools were likely to be better prepared for advanced study in Russian and for careers in which knowledge of Russian was vital than were those who completed schools dominated by German-speaking Lutheran clergy.

Though Estonians were overwhelmingly Lutheran, Orthodox schools were actually proportionally more widespread than Lutheran ones with regard to the size of the Estonian population, particularly in northern Livland province, where some 65,000 Estonians (just under 17 percent of the area's peasant population) had converted to Orthodoxy in the 1840s.[28] In the mid-1880s, 19.5 percent of rural elementary schools (315 out of 1,612 schools) in Estland and northern Livland were affiliated with the Orthodox Church,

with nearly all the remaining rural schools associated with the Lutheran Church.[29] Many young Estonians—Orthodox and Lutherans alike—received their primary education in Orthodox schools.[30] A wave of voluntary conversions by Estonians to Orthodoxy had swept through western Estland province in the first half of the decade. Estland Governor V. P. Polivanov (governor 1875–85) reacted with caution and was initially slow to countenance conversions by Estonians out of concern that converts were merely seeking some sort of economic benefit by abandoning their Lutheran faith for Orthodoxy. While motivations for conversion varied, certainly a major attraction of Orthodoxy was access to Orthodox schools, completion of which would make easier entrance to higher schools, where instruction was exclusively in Russian.[31]

A typical example of the mid-level Estonian tsarist officials in the late tsarist period is the Orthodox Tõnis Vares. Born in the western Estland district of Läänemaa, Vares studied from 1872 to 1882 at an Orthodox school in Riga and then at the Orthodox Riga Theological Academy. He served as a translator for Russian Senator N. A. Manasein during the latter's inspection of Livland and Kurland in 1882 and 1883. In 1887 Vares graduated from the faculty of law at St. Petersburg University. From 1889 to 1903 he was the head of peasant affairs in the capital of his home district of Haapsalu, after which he filled positions elsewhere in the Baltic region, including serving on the Riga peasant bank council from 1906 to 1908. From 1908 Vares was stationed in St. Petersburg, where he was a member of the peasant bank council.[32]

Curiously, a position in the tsarist bureaucracy held by several Estonians of Orthodox faith was that of censor. Particularly noteworthy were Jüri Truusmann (1856–1930), head tsarist censor in Tallinn from 1885 to 1907; and Jaan Jõgever (1860–1924), censor of domestic news in Tartu from 1892 to 1903. Both Truusmann and Jõgever were graduates of the Riga Theological Seminary, a number of whose Estonian graduates worked as censors; Truusmann continued his studies in the Petersburg Theological Academy, graduating in 1883.[33]

Positions held by Estonians in tsarist state service

Estonians working in the tsarist bureaucracy in the late 19th century generally held low- to mid-level positions: often they were policemen, railway officials and mail officials.[34] As described above, some Estonians with higher education held posts as heads of peasant affairs at the district [Est. *maakond*, Rus. *uezd*] level, as heads of peasant courts and also as rural school inspectors.[35] Within the Estland provincial administration, some rose to the position of department head [*stolonachal'nik*].

There is some indication that Estonians considered the securing of even a low-level position in the bureaucracy desirable and sought to advance

within it. An example is Eduard Brunberg (1862–1923), who worked in the Ministry of Justice in Tallinn in the 1890s and in the early 20th century.[36] Brunberg's parents, consciously upwardly-mobile, relocated the family from the countryside near the town of Rakvere in eastern Estland to Tallinn, where they wanted their children to be educated. Brunberg's primary education was in German and he completed middle school [Ger. *Kreisschule*] with distinction. At the same time, it is believed that the Brunberg household was caught up in the growing Estonian national movement.[37] In 1888, after several years of travel and work in various regions of the Russian empire, Brunberg passed, with high marks, examinations in Tallinn that granted him the status of a Gymnasium graduate, for which oral and written fluency in Russian were required. After working as a schoolteacher, he matriculated at Tartu University to study classical languages, though financial difficulties forced him soon to abandon his studies. He subsequently worked as a tutor for various Russian families in Russia proper, and he also made several trips to Germany in the hope of becoming successful as a journalist. Brunberg's Estonian-language literary efforts, for which he later became famous, brought him little income. In 1893 he secured a position in the chancellery of the Tallinn district court. His fluency in Estonian, Russian and German proved useful, and in 1897 he was officially appointed as translator for the court and was made a Collegiate Registrar, the initial (and lowest) position in the Russian bureaucracy's Table of Ranks. Brunberg continued to move up in seniority, becoming a Collegiate Secretary in 1903, Titular Councilor in 1906, Collegiate Assessor in 1909 and, in 1913, Court Councilor, the seventh among the 14 ranks in the tsarist civil service. In 1907 he was made head of the higher rural court in the small town of Jõhvi in eastern Estland, and he remained in this position to the end of the tsarist era.[38] Brunberg's early life had been greatly affected by penury, and for years he lacked a secure position that held his interest and that was at least somewhat commensurate with his ambition. Employment in the tsarist bureaucracy provided him both a steady income and occupational stability.

Estonian civil servants in the 20th century

Much of what is known about the social and occupational composition of Estland and northern Livland in the late tsarist period is based on the censuses of 1871, 1881 and 1897; unfortunately, less comprehensive data exist for the early 20th century as no census was completed in these years. It does appear that in the waning years of the tsarist era, and particularly after 1905, Estonians held an increasing number of positions in the Estland bureaucracy. In response to an inquiry by Prime Minister Stolypin into the ethnic composition of the higher levels of the tsarist bureaucracy in the Baltic provinces, five of the 12 chancellery department heads in the Estland provincial administration in 1908 were reported to be Estonians (six were Russian

and one was a Pole). Russians occupied four of the five highest positions in the Estland provincial administration in Tallinn, with the fifth position held by a German. Germans remained a significant presence only in medical and technical areas of state service.[39]

In any case, the number of Estonian civil servants in Estland grew. A comparison of the contents of unofficial address books published for Tallinn in the years 1893, 1900 and 1913 shows an increase in the number of Estonians listed within the provincial administration.[40]

Estonian civil servants and the broader Estland society

Estonian tsarist officials are an extremely understudied group within Estonian society. More needs to be learned about how Estonian officials were viewed by, and interacted with, other members of Baltic society at all levels. Scholarly study has focused on the views toward the Russian state held by the small number of Estonian intellectuals, particularly those whose worldviews were set during the Estonian national awakening of the 1860s to mid-1880s, and those of the following generation, a cohort heavily influenced by the all-Russian liberation movement and the 1905 Revolution.

Though Estonian assimilation to Baltic German culture and German language continued among upwardly-mobile Estonians to some degree even into the early 20th century, memoir literature leaves the clear impression that some Estonians in the early 20th century were quite comfortable in Russian-speaking work environments. Kaarel-Robert Pusta, an Estonian revolutionary in the early 20th century and later a diplomat in independent Estonia, wrote that the 'Russian spirit' [Est. *vene vaim*] was widespread among Estonian civil servants.[41] This did not preclude state officials who were Estonians from being active in Estonian associational and intellectual life.[42]

In the early 20th century in Tallinn, leading Estonian figures and local high-level Russian officials had a notable amount of social interaction, both in the association called the Tallinn Literary Circle [*Revel'skii literaturnyi kruzhok*] and in a social salon run by the Russian wife of Estonian lawyer Jaan Poska.[43] (In 1917 Poska was commissar of a unified Estland and northern Livland under Russia's Provisional Government.) This interaction was particularly noted after the victory of an Estonian-Russian bloc in Tallinn city council elections in 1904.

The increase of non-Russians and non-Germans in tsarist state service was noted by contemporaries. In 1912, a Russian-language newspaper in Tartu published a letter to the editor critical of the rising numbers of 'low and second-rate administrative personnel', who were young Estonians and Latvians. These new civil servants, according to the letter writer, had 'learned Russian only so-so' in Russian schools and 'relate to everything Russian in a

far from friendly way.' The writer continued, 'Those who do not sympathize with the strengthening of Russian affairs [*russkoe delo*] in the borderlands will always find ways and means to bring to naught the most lawful demands of Russian superiors [*nachal'niki*], who are forced to serve here and to work without loyal and trustworthy assistants.'[44]

In the last decade of tsarist rule, an increasing proportion of interactions between state officials and both the Estonian rural population and the strengthening Estonian urban bourgeoisie were interactions between Estonians, not between an Estonian and a Baltic German or Russian. Estonians perceived Estonian civil servants not as something foreign, but rather as representatives of Estonians themselves. The unnamed author of an editorial article in the Estonian-language Tallinn daily *Päevaleht* in 1913 criticized Estonian civil servants for valuing their office more than their work, and called upon them to exemplify in their work the traditional (or stereotypical) qualities attributed in Petersburg to the female Estonian hired domestic hand: 'orderliness, trustworthiness, sobriety, and dedication to one's work.' The author concluded:

> If Estonian [*Eesti*] society wishes officials who love order, it will have to bear up under a firmer mindset than it has in the past . . . We long for order, which reigns in the depths of the sky's firmaments. Thus we need to begin purposively to put into place this healthy, firm order in Estonian life, and to use the protective power of outward forms for the good of the body of society.[45]

At first glance, the growth and development of the tsarist bureaucracy in the Baltic region seems to parallel trends elsewhere in the empire. The number of all officials [Rus. *chinovniki*] in tsarist Russia (excluding Poland and Finland) grew from 129,000 in 1880 to 252,900 in 1913.[46] However, historian of imperial Russia Boris Mironov disputes that this increase produced a bureaucracy that played an ever more influential role in broader Russian society. On the contrary, Mironov asserts, many of these officials were employees of city councils and employees of the zemstvo. If these are considered members of public, rather than state administration, then the relative number of officials vis-à-vis the population actually fell in these years. The power and influence of the bureaucracy was in decline, not on the rise, he concludes.[47]

In the Baltic region, however, the cooperation of individuals of differing ethnicity within the tsarist administration in directing and serving a multiethnic society undergoing rapid social change, in addition to the future role that Estonian civil servants trained under tsarist rule played in independent Estonia, leads one to reject the thesis of bureaucracy in decline. Certainly, the rise in numbers and growth in responsibility of Estonians in tsarist state service in the late 19th and early 20th century indicate that this group played

an increasingly important role both within the bureaucracy in the Baltic region itself, as well as within the broader Baltic society.

The abilities of civil servants were put to the test once the newly independent Estonia emerged from the cauldron of World War I. Many Russian officials left, and some of those who remained were not retained in their positions. Numerous Germans remained in the bureaucracy, though precisely to what degree is not clear. All non-Estonian officials had to learn the new language of administration—Estonian; many Russified or Germanized Estonians were obliged to improve competency in Estonian. Differences in definition and usage of the term 'official' [Est. *ametnik*] pose problems for comparison, but in any case the number of officials working for the state and local government clearly grew. By 1925, state officials numbered 25,740.[48]

Historians' views of Estonian society in the late tsarist period perhaps too often suffer from their awareness of the major lines of development in the 20th century: namely, the formation of an independent Estonian state and the conflict between this state and the Soviet Union. Understanding the growing presence of Estonians in the multi-ethnic tsarist bureaucracy in the Baltic region gives us a clearer, more accurate picture of the lived experience that this region's inhabitants had with expanding state institutions.

An increasingly Estonian state bureaucracy in Estonian areas of late tsarist Russia also calls into question the traditional paradigm of Russification, which pits, on the one hand, a Russian state intent on effacing both social and administrative differences between non-Russian areas and the Russian interior, and on the other hand, increasingly resistant, nationalizing local populations. As historian of the multi-ethnic Russian empire Alexei Miller points out, the social changes taking place in predominantly non-Russian regions in the later years of the empire are ill-described by the catch-all of 'Russification':

> Those who underwent Russification in the form of assimilation or acculturation had their own motives, ones that sometimes were quite unexpected by the 'Russifiers,' for acquiring fluency in Russian or certain elements of Russian culture. In many regions of the empire, Westernization flowed out of Russia, through Russian institutions, and modernizing strategies of local communities could imply a partial, instrumental Russification.[49]

Identifying the emergence of a multi-ethnic bureaucracy in the late tsarist period in the Baltic region that was increasingly representative of the population it served helps us to understand the late 19th and early 20th century not in terms of national conflict between Baltic Germans, Estonians and a Russian state, but rather as a time when civic identity began to be created

within this complex, multi-ethnic region. Though the structures for this civic identity frequently had their origins in administrative reforms and structures put into place by the tsarist state, this did not mean that the region was becoming culturally Russified. For Estonians, the numerically dominant group in Estland province, these changes brought new opportunities for gaining experience, skills and confidence.

Notes

1. See especially the studies in Edward C. Thaden et al., *Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981).

   The author would like to thank the members of the Working Group on Russian and Soviet Officialdom and Dr Alexei Miller of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, and the Central European University, Budapest for their comments on this paper. Dr Endel Laul of the Estonian Academy of Sciences and Dr Lea Leppik of the University of Tartu are thanked for bibliographic assistance.
2. Cited in Thaden, *Russification in the Baltic Provinces*, 34. For a review of Suvorov's tenure from a Russian nationalist position, see A. Chumikov, 'General-gubernatorsvto Kniazia A. A. Surovova v Pribaltiiskom krae,' in *Russkii Arkhiv*, 1890, kn. tret'ia (Moscow, 1890), 58–88. On the office of governor-general, see Lea Leppik, 'Die Generalgouverneure im Baltikum—Instrumente zur Vereinheitlichung des Russichen Imperiums oder ein Schutz der baltischen Sonderordnung?', in *Estland und Russland: Aspekte der Beziehungen beider Länder*, Olaf Mertelsmann, ed. (Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovač, 2005), 53–76.
3. Toivo Raun, 'The Estonians,' in Thaden, *Russification in the Baltic Provinces*, 304.
4. The censuses are presented in the following: *Die Resultate der Volkszählung der Stadt Reval am 16. November 1871*, Paul Jordan, ed. (Reval: Kluge and Ströhm, 1874); *Ergebnisse der ehstländischen Volkszählung, 29 December, 1881*, Paul Jordan, ed., 3 vols. (Reval: Lindfors' Erben, 1883–5); and *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis' naseleniia Rossiiskoi Imperii, 1897 g.*, N. A. Troinitskii, ed., 49 (St. Petersburg, 1905).
5. *Die Resultate der Volkszählung der Stadt Reval*, 132.
6. *Ergebnisse der ehstländischen Volkszählung*, 1: 10–11.
7. Some caution must be taken in comparing figures from these censuses as categories are not always precisely parallel. While the 1871 and 1881 censuses measured 'nationality', the 1897 census inquired after 'native language' (*rodnoi iazyk*). Analyzing the use of census data in studying social change in Estland and northern Livland, Toivo Raun finds the categories for administrative officials used in the 1871, 1881 and 1897 censuses broadly comparable, though he cautions against making 'finer distinctions' given the general nature of the categories in the 1897 census. See Raun, 'Social Change in Estland and Northern Livland, 1871–1897: The Limits and Uses of Census Data' in *Bevölkerungsverschiebungen und sozialer Wandel in den baltischen Provinzen Russlands 1850–1914*, Gert von Pistohlkors et al., eds (Lüneburg: Institut Nordostdeutsches Kulturwerk, 1995), 93. Raun uses a broader definition of 'officials', including ones who worked outside of the Russian state bureaucracy, and thus the figures he provides differ somewhat from those given here.
8. *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis'*, 49: 96–7.
9. *Ergebnisse der ehstländischen Volkszählung*, 1: 10–11, 2: 8, 3: 28; *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis'*, 49: 96–7.

10. Wilhelm Lenz, 'Volkstumwechsel in den baltischen Ländern', *Ostdeutsche Wissenschaft*, 3–4 (1958): 183.
11. *Ergebnisse der ehstländischen Volkszählung*, 1: 68.
12. Märt Raud, *Kaks suurt: Jaan Tõnisson, Konstantin Päts ja nende ajastu* (Tallinn: Olion, 1991), 30; Elfried Lender, *Minu lastele* (Stockholm, EMP, 1967), 97.
13. This is not meant to imply that Hermann Türnbaum considered himself to be German. Most likely he saw himself as an Estonian. In her memoirs Elfriede Lender remarks that his shop was one of the few in central Tallinn owned by Estonians. Konstantin Türnpu moved easily in both Estonian- and German-language spheres, directing choirs in both languages. Lender, *Minu lastele*, 31, 83–84. See also Artur Vahter, *Konstantin Türnpu* (Tallinn: Eest Muusikaakadeemia, 2003), especially 126–32.
14. V. Miller, 'A. I. Herzeni sidemeist Tallinna progressiivsete haritlastega,' *Eesti NSV Teaduste Akadeemia Toimetised*, 3, no. 2 (1954): 290–1; Karl Laigna, ' "Revalsche Zeitung'i" esimeste aastakäikude suunast,' *Keel ja Kirjandus*, no. 3 (1974): 156–61.
15. *Eesti biograafiline leksikon leksikon* (Tartu: Loodus, 1926–1929), 439. Russow was also publisher of an Estonian-language government publication, *Ma-walla Kulutaja*, and was the author of a number of occasional works on Estonian folk poetry.
16. Other members of the group included Russian V. T. Blagoveshchenskii (1802–64), a pedagogue and censor, and German Alexander Heinrich Neus (1795–1876), inspector of the district (*uezd*) school in Haapsalu before his early retirement and move to Tallinn in 1841, where he published a number of important works on Estonian folk poetry and folklore. See *Eesti biograafiline leksikon*, 337–8 and *Eesti biograafilise leksikoni täienduskõide* (Tartu: Loodus, 1940), 24.
17. Toomas Karjahärm has pointed to the rise in the number of officials in the late 19th century as a source for the Estonian intelligentsia. See Karjahärm, 'Eesti rahvusliku haritlaskonna kujunemisest möödunud sajandi lõpul ja praeguse algul', *Keel ja Kirjandus*, 16 (1973): 628. But it seems that the opposite point is equally valid.
18. Allan Liim, 'Poeglaste keskhariduskoolide õpilaste seisuslik ja rahvuslik koosseis Eestis (1860. aastaist 1917. aastani)' in *Hariduse ja kooli ajaloost Eestis*, Endel Laul, ed. (Tallinn: Eesti NSV Teaduste Akadeemia/Ajaloo Instituut, 1979), 60. See also *Universitas Tartuensis*, Toomas Hiio and Helmut Piirimäe, eds (Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, 2007), 221.
19. Estonian writer Eduard Vilde wrote that as schoolboy in Tallinn in the 1870s he was taught to admire the electors of Brandenburg and the kings of Prussia and even Bismarck's diplomacy and the military strategy of Field Marshal von Moltke. See Eduard Vilde, *Artikleid ja kirju* (Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus, 1957), 240.
20. *Eesti Ülikooli algus. Tartu Ülikooli uuestisünd rahvusülikoolina 1919 I*, Helmut Piirimäe, ed. (Tartu: Tartu Ülikool, 1994), 15. The precise number of Estonians who were university students cannot be determined, just as it cannot be for the number of Estonians in secondary schools, as census data on students' background uses the category of social estate, not nationality.
21. One young Estonian wrote of favoring Petersburg over Tartu because of the latter's 'Baltic juniper-German-churchly environment and provincial [Estonian] fatherlandish romanticism'. Cited in Toomas Karjahärm, *Ida ja Lääne vahel. Eesti-Vene suhted 1850–1917* (Tallinn: Eesti Entsüklopeediakirjastus, 1998), 294.

22. Raimo Pullat, *Lootuse linn. Peterburi ja eesti haritlaskonna kujunemine kuni 1917* (Tallinn: Estopol, 2004), 100–1. In 1915, 95 Estonians (11.4 percent) studied in Riga and 58 (7.0 percent) in Moscow.
23. Ibid., 23.
24. *Postimees*, 10 April 1935, 3. Hellat was elected to the first State Duma in 1906. He returned in 1921 to Estonia, where he worked in banking; from 1926 to his retirement in 1929 he was the chairman of the Estonian Land Bank.
25. V. Ernits, 'Eesti üliõpilaste ja vilistlaste üleüldise Nimekirja arvustikulised kokkuvõtted', *Üliõpilaste Leht* (1915): 204–5. The location of 17 of the group (2.7 percent) was unknown. Approximately half of those living in other places within the empire lived fairly near Estonian areas: in Riga, St. Petersburg and its environs and Pskov province.
26. The career of Martens, the Estonian who rose the highest in tsarist state service, was an exception. Born in the coastal city of Pärnu in Livland province and orphaned at a young age, Martens completed primary and secondary school in St. Petersburg. He received his law degree in 1867 from St. Petersburg University, where in 1873 he became a professor of international law. He soon began serving as a Russian diplomat, acquiring a worldwide reputation. Martens' Estonian ethnicity was discovered only fairly recently. On Martens, see *Entsiklopedicheskii slovar' Brokgauza i Efrona* (St. Petersburg, 1896), 18: 691–2; Pullat, *Lootuste linn*, 110.
27. The circumstances of Paul's departure are not clear, though it is known that he died in Novocherkassk. Anu Raudsepp, *Riia Vaimulik Seminar 1846–1918* (Tartu: Eesti Kirjandusmuuseum, 1998), 49, 125.
28. Hans Kruus, *Talurahva käärimine Lõuna-Eestis XIX sajandi 40-ndail aastail* (Tartu: Eesti Kirjanduse Seltsi Kirjastus, 1930), 340, 400.
29. Elmar Ernits, 'Õigeusu koolid 1840. aastatest 1880. aastate reformideni', *Nõukogude Kool*, 31 (1973): 853–4. In 1897, several years after the conversions among Estonian peasants in the 1880s discussed here, 4.6 percent of Estonians in Estland and 17.7 percent of Estonians in northern Livland were Orthodox. See Raun, 'The Estonians', 325. On the growing association of Orthodoxy with Estonian identity in this time, see Sebastian Rimestad, 'Orthodox Christianity in Estonia', University of Erfurt M.A. thesis, 2007, 46 and 49–52.
30. Lembit Andresen, *Eesti rahvakooli ja pedagoogika ajalugu*, 3 (Tallinn: Avita, 2002): 215.
31. Leida Rebane, 'Usuvahetuslik liikumine Läänemaal aa. 1883–1885', *Ajalooline Ajakiri* 12 (1933): 131, 135–140. Officials in St. Petersburg did not share Polivanov's caution. Glad to see conversions to Orthodoxy regardless of motivation, they directed him not to impede conversions to Orthodoxy. In 1883 and 1884, 3407 Estonians converted to Orthodoxy; between 1885 and 1887, 7266 Estonians throughout Estland province converted. Ibid., 132, 141, 145, 203, 205.
32. Pullat, *Lootuste linn*, 125–6; Raudsepp, *Riia Vaimulik Seminar*, 146. In March 1917 Vares requested a release from all positions in the Russian state and returned to Estland province, which was pressing the Provisional Government for wide-ranging autonomy. Vares served as assistant Finance Minister in independent Estonia and held the minister's portfolio for three months in 1921; from 1922 to 1924 he was a state judge; and in 1924–5 he was the director of the Bank of Estonia.
33. Truusmann and Jõgever have very differing reputations as censors. Truusmann was loyal to the aims of Russification in the late 19th century, cooperating with

Estland governor Shakhovskoi in limiting the activity of associations and individuals perceived to be opponents of a more prominent role for the Russian state in Estland. This did not prevent him, though, from supporting Estonian national efforts that he saw as pro-Russian in orientation, such as Konstantin Päts' founding of the newspaper *Teataja*. Jõgever, on the other hand, was seen as a more dedicated advocate of Estonian national development. After working as a censor, Jõgever went on to teach Estonian in a leading Tartu Gymnasium, becoming before his death professor of Estonian at Tartu University in independent Estonia. Truusmann, on the other hand, lived out his final years in a Russian Orthodox monastery in Pechory. On Truusmann, see *Eesti ajalugu elulugedes. 101 tähtsat eestlast*, Sulev Vahtre, ed. (Tallinn: Olion, 1997), 92–3 and *Eesti biograafiline leksikon*, 529–31. On Jõgever, see *Eesti biograafiline leksikon*, 187–8.

34. Jansen, *Eestlane muutuvas ajas*, 373.
35. Toomas Karjahärm and Väino Sirk, *Eesti haritlaskonna kujunemine ja ideed 1850–1917* (Tallinn: Eesti Entsüklopeediakirjastus, 1997), 61.
36. Better known by his pen name, Eduard Bornhöhe, Brunberg published a number of volumes of fiction, including satirical and realist stories about Estonians in Tallinn in the late nineteenth century. The central arena of his Tallinn stories are interactions between Estonians, Germans, and germanized Estonians ('juniper Germans' in the city. His stories are collected in Eduard Bornhöhe, *Tallinna jutud* (Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus, 1962). On Brunberg in general, see See Endel Nirk, *Eduard Bornhöhe* (Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus, 1961).
37. Nirk, *Eduard Bornhöhe*, 14.
38. Ibid., 88–9, 111, 115. In 1919 Brunberg returned to Tallinn, where he became a magistrate in the Tallinn-Haapsalu district court in independent Estonia.
39. Manfred Hagen, 'Russification via "Democratization"? Civil Service in the Baltic after 1905', *Journal of Baltic Studies*, 9 (1978): 56–8.
40. A. W. Kröger, *Ehstländisches Verkehrs- und Adreßbuch für 1893–94* (Riga: A. W. Kröger, 1893), 12–19; *Richter's Baltische Verkehrs- und Adreßbücher. III. Band. Ehstland* (Riga: Adolf Richter, 1900), 9–12, 17–20; and *Adolf Richters Baltische Verkehrs- und Adreßbücher. Band 3. Estland* (Riga: Adolf Richter, 1913), 10–13.
41. Kaarel-Robert Pusta, *Kehra metsast maailma: Mälestusi* (Stockholm: EMP, 1960), 45. See also the account of teachers of Estonian ethnicity at the Nikolai Gymnasium in Tallinn in Ernst Nurm, 'Mälestusi Tallinna Nikolai Gümnaasiumist 1907–1914', *Keel ja Kirjandus*, 24 (1981): 302–6.
42. Estonian Jaan Linnamägi (1862–1930) was probably the most notable individual who combined a career in the tsarist provincial administration with intense activity in Estonian associational life. From 1891 to 1897 Linnamägi was employed as an archivist for the Tallinn district court and was a state-approved translator. During these years he was active in rebuilding the Estonian voluntary association *Estonia* after it had fallen into neglect, and in 1894 he became the association's chairman. From 1897 to 1906 he was a notary in Narva, after which he held the same office in Tallinn for a number of years, apparently to the end of the tsarist regime. In Tallinn he was active in *Estonia*, serving for a number of years as its chairman. See *Eesti biograafiline leksikon*, 280.
43. Bradley D. Woodworth, 'Civil Society and Nationality in the Multiethnic Russian Empire: Tallinn/Reval, 1860–1914,' Indiana University Ph.D. dissertation, 2003, 135–6; Karjahärm, *Ida ja Lääne vahel*, 236.
44. *Iurevskii Listok*, no. 74 (1912): 2.
45. 'Eesti ametnik,' *Päevaleht*, 11 December 1913, 1.

46. B. N. Mironov, *Sotsial'naia istoriia Rossii perioda imperii (XVIII-nachalo XX v.)* (St. Peterburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 1999), 1: 200.
47. Ibid., 201–3.
48. Toomas Karjahärm and Väino Sirk, *Vaim ja võim. Eesti haritlaskond 1917–1940* (Tallinn: Argo, 2001), 153–9.
49. Aleksei Miller, *Imperiia Romanovykh i natsionalizm. Esse po metodologii istoricheskogo issledovaniia* (Moscow: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie, 2006), 62.

6
The Military Bureaucracy in the Samarkand *Oblast'* of Russian Turkestan*

Alexander Morrison

Russian Turkestan[1] was administered under what was known as *Voenno-narodnoe upravlenie* or 'Military-Popular Government',[2] a system dating in its essentials from Catherine the Great's administrative reforms of 1775, as extended by Speransky in Siberia and Bariatinsky in the Caucasus.[3] The variant introduced in Turkestan closely resembled that introduced in the mountainous regions of the North Caucasus after 1864.[4] The governors of provinces under this system normally had the rank at least of major-general, and the senior *chinovniki* or civil servants were army officers seconded from their units to perform administrative, judicial, medical and even educational duties. Whilst civilian *chinovniki* could be clerks, surveyors and accountants, almost all jobs that involved executive or judicial power were filled by military officers, and this remained the case until the Revolution. Apart from the Military Governors and those who served in the governor-general's Chancellery and *Sovet*, the most important official posts were those of *uezdnoi nachal'nik* [district commandant][5] and their assistants, and the local police chiefs or *uchastkovye pristavy*. Below these executive positions power was almost entirely devolved to a separate 'native administration'.[6] The *zemstva*, or provincial elected assemblies, together with the independent civilian courts which had been created by Alexander II's reforms after 1864, did not exist in Turkestan or the other Asiatic military governorships, which placed a very heavy burden on these officers, and this created an administrative division between metropolis and periphery in the Russian empire which is often overlooked. In civilian areas the *zemstva* were responsible for education, public health and sanitation and numerous other duties, whilst there

*This is a revised and shortened version of a chapter from my book, A. S. Morrison, *Russian Rule in Samarkand, 1868–1910. A Comparison with British India* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 126–171, and appears by kind permission of Oxford University Press.

was an independent judiciary separate from the executive: here all this fell to the lot of a small group of military men, usually with no specialist training, who were presented with an extremely heavy administrative burden, carrying out duties which would have been the responsibility of 12 or more different officials in European Russia.[7]

The district commandant was the most crucial cog in the administrative machine, but we know little about their social background, the sort of education they received or how they coped with their complex raft of duties. On the whole contemporary sources are not complimentary, laying stress on a lack of education and training, chronic under-staffing, and, in the case of Saltykov-Shchedrin's scurrilous *Gospoda Tashkentsy*, greed and immorality.[8] As early as the 1880s the efficacy of *Voenno-narodnoe upravlenie* was questioned in the press, and it was pointed out that very few army officers had a university education and most were intellectually and culturally unsuited to the posts they occupied.[9] Together with complaints about lack of education, criticisms of the culture, habits and morals of Turkestani officers were also common, with the emphasis on alcoholism and card games for high stakes.[10]

This lack of individual qualities was compounded by a sheer lack of manpower when compared to other areas of the Russian empire. Overall the 1897 census listed just 500 people in all varieties of Government employment in the Samarkand *oblast'*, out of a population of 860,021: of these 219 were members of the 'native administration' and only a small proportion of the remainder were actually military administrators.[11] Writing his annual report to the Tsar in 1898, Acting Governor-General Philippov pointed out that whilst even in Transcaucasia the Tiflis and Yerevan *gubernii* had an average *uezd* complement of 52 and 44 officers respectively, in the Ferghana *oblast'*, with a much larger population, each *uezd* had an average of just 17. The Samarkand *oblast'*, with a similar population to the Elizavetpol *guberniia*, had just 11 senior administrative officers, as opposed to 43.[12] These problems became more acute in the early 20th century as the population grew and Turkestan's economy, fuelled by cotton production, became more sophisticated. The Report of Count K. K. Pahlen's reforming commission of 1908 concluded that the military system was inadequate, and he recommended a professional civil service on the Indian model.[13] In short, Russian administrators in Turkestan, particularly at the district level, were a much-despised caste, seen as uneducated, uncouth and far too thinly spread. However, some more objective assessment of these officers, both collectively and as individuals, is needed to test this stereotype.

I

Very little work has been done on the education or social background of the military bureaucrats who ran Russia's Asiatic provinces, in Turkestan or anywhere else outside European Russia. Even in the heartland of the empire

a pitiful amount is known about those who manned the provincial administration, and most of the points of comparison with Turkestan's officers that can be made on the basis of existing research are not particularly helpful. A world away from Central Asia are the civil servants who worked in the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who have been studied by Pintner, although unfortunately only for the years 1840–55. In the provincial agencies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the group whose role was closest to that of Turkestan's Officers, 77 percent of the higher positions were occupied by nobles, of whom 46 percent had received higher education at one of the universities, and a further 7 percent at the Lycée or School of Jurisprudence in St. Petersburg.[14] Peter Zaionchkovsky's work on the government apparatus of the autocracy deals only with civilian areas and with an earlier period (1841–59), but it is probably the most complete survey of the European provincial administration available, based on a mixture of the annual *Adres Kalendary* (which typically only listed about a third of serving personnel) and representative samples of *formuliarnye spiski* [records of service]. It shows that in the highest four classes of civilians the proportion of hereditary nobles was 71.5 percent. In ranks V to VIII it was 37.9 percent and in ranks IX to XIV 22.3 percent. Between 1842 and 1859, 3.2 percent in all ranks had a university degree, 11.3 percent had a secondary education and 85.5 percent had attended primary school, although some of the latter probably had no formal education. By 1894–5 the proportion with a university education had grown considerably to 32.5 percent, whilst 15 percent had attended secondary school and 52 percent primary, leaving 8 percent who had been 'educated at home'.[15] However, as civilians in European Russia this group of *chinovniki* is quite far removed from those officers administering Central Asia.

Direct comparison with the Estonian and Ukrainian examples examined by Woodworth and Velychenko elsewhere in this volume is complicated by the fact that these places were not under military rule, and therefore the distinction between 'native' and 'Russian' administration did not apply. Velychenko has found that whilst lower-level officials in Ukraine were overwhelmingly Ukrainian-speakers, with Russians more heavily represented amongst more senior bureaucrats, many of the latter were also Ukrainian (and some even nationalist sympathizers).[16] The late 19th century increase in the proportion of Estonians and Ukrainians amongst officials in these regions also had no parallel in Turkestan, where the higher military officials remained almost exclusively European until 1917.

N. P. Matkhanova's work on higher officials in Eastern Siberia provides perhaps the best comparison with the bureaucracy in Turkestan. The group whose role most closely resembles that of the district commandants in Turkestan are the heads of the Okhotsk, Amur and Kamchatka divisions, together with their heads of chancery and subordinates. Out of the 70 who served in these positions from c.1840–70 for whom records of service

survive, 49 (70 percent) were nobles, of whom 15 (22 percent overall) were landowners. Fifteen were born in Siberia, 24 had a higher education and 20 a secondary education, or 64.7 percent overall. Seventeen were serving officers of the army or navy (predominantly the latter) but 54 (74.2 percent) had formerly served in the armed forces. The heads of these administrative divisions were exclusively nobles and naval captains of the first or second rank.[17]

For the military there are the annual compendia or *Voenno-statisticheskie Ezhegodniki*, which list the officers and men serving in the different military *okruga* of the Empire, though not those seconded for administrative duties, together with a body of Soviet research on this and related material which enable the compilation of some reasonably reliable statistics about the officer corps as a whole. In 1867, 76 percent of officers in the Russian Army were Orthodox, 14.68 percent Catholic (i.e. probably Polish), but only 1.08 percent Muslim. The percentage who had been educated at a Cadet Corps or Military Academy was 37.19, but 37.54 percent had no formal education.[18] As far as social background is concerned, even in 1912, 87.5 percent of generals were drawn from the hereditary nobility, as were 71.5 percent of staff officers and 50.4 percent of line officers.[19] Amongst the latter many were 'personal' (i.e. non-hereditary) nobles, although promotion to Colonel automatically brought with it hereditary nobility. There was a higher proportion of nobles in the elite Guards Regiments and correspondingly lower in Line Regiments, especially those of Turkestan. Apart from the Guards, most of these nobles were *bezpomestnyi*, i.e. they did not have estates of their own or private incomes, and were normally entirely dependent on their pay and pensions as officers. They were normally defined as 'bourgeois' members of the exploiting classes by Soviet historians,[20] or even *raznochintsy*, men of indeterminate rank and correspondingly unpredictable opinions.

There is considerable difficulty in compiling comprehensive statistics on officers who served as administrators in Turkestan. Baskhanov's biographical dictionary supplies details of those who were more intellectually distinguished,[21] but otherwise information on their education and social background has to be assembled from their individual records of service in the Military-Historical Archive in Moscow, which are difficult to use. Zaionchkovsky estimates that only 75 percent of civilian *formuliarnye spiski* are still extant, and the figure is unlikely to be any higher for the military.[22] Educational statistics for the officer corps in Turkestan as a whole are somewhat easier to come by, although at best they provide only a snapshot of a particular time and place, and they nearly always refer to line officers. Of 304 officers with the forces in the Syr-Darya *Oblast'* in 1868, 149 (49 percent) had attended a Cadet Corps or Military Academy, four (1.3 percent) had a university education, 28 (9.2 percent) had received secondary education at a Gymnasium, 31 (10.2 percent) had a primary education at a district school, 14 (4.6 percent) had completed a *Junker* course, though not at

Table 6.1 Education of military officers serving in Turkestan, 1874 (%)

Institution	1873	1874	1875
Cadet Corps or Military School	34	43.7	43.6
University, Lycée or Institute of Higher Learning	1	0.8	1.3
Gymnasium or other secondary school	7	9.1	6.2
Course at a lower provincial institution	16.5	9.6	11.6
Junker course completed, but not at a recognized institution	12	13.7	16.9
Educated at home	29.5	23.1	20.4

Source: endnote 25.

a recognized institution, and 78 (25.6 percent) had no formal education of any kind. This figure included 14 officers seconded for administrative duties. No doubt because of their greater need for technical training, the Turkestan Artillery Brigade's officers were noticeably better educated than average, with 85.7 percent of them having attended a Cadet Corps or Military Academy.[23] In 1874, Governor-General Von Kaufman's military deputy, Major-General Tardokensky, provided Alexander II with the figures set out in Table 6.1 for the education of military officers serving in Turkestan.[24]

This included all officers serving in the infantry, artillery, cavalry and the sappers, but *not* those seconded for administrative work. Tardokensky viewed these statistics as encouraging:

> Of late years circumstances have begun to change for the better: thus, the old element of poorly-educated officers . . . is beginning little by little to melt away, partly through death, partly through willing retirement, or at the insistence of the authorities, and furthermore they are being exchanged for fresh forces of officers from the military and *Junker* academies, with rare exceptions tending towards better intellectual development and knowledge of military affairs. This removal of the old, poorly-educated officers from the ranks of the Turkestan regional forces is most encouraging—it serves as a real earnest of the moral and intellectual improvement in the composition of the officer corps in the army here.[25]

Tardokensky's figures for 1874 suggest a better-educated officer corps than those for 1867, though whether this is because a higher caliber of officers than the average was serving in Turkestan or whether it reflects an older generation of officers retiring in the interim is unclear.[26] There are indications that the level of education of those who had obtained appointments under *Voenno-narodnoe upravlenie* was higher than the average. Positions in the administration were better-paid than service in the line, and consequently

sought after as means of securing influence and advancement. Eugene Schuyler quoted an officer who wrote in 1871 that:

> The best officers, on account of their good instruction, easily obtain places in this administration, which presents to them without contradiction more advantages than would be offered to them by simple service in the army. There are few officers who do not pull every string of intrigue in order to secure some place in the local administration, which will guarantee to them notorious advantages over the ordinary service.[27]

II

Before the formation of the Samarkand *oblast'* in 1886, the heavily-populated region along the river Zarafshan (which lies at the heart of the settled oasis region of Central Asia) was administered as a special military *okrug* on the newly-delineated border with the Bukharan Protectorate. The officers who served there, many of whom at other stages in their careers also worked in the Syr-Darya and Ferghana *oblasti* of Turkestan, can be taken as a fairly representative cross-section of Central Asia's administrative cadres. Eugene Schuyler's impressions of the administration in Samarkand in 1871 were largely positive, in contrast to what he had written about Tashkent:

> General Abramof, the commander of the province . . . is a most active man, and knows well the whole of the country. I do not believe that there is a village under his rule which he has not visited. He endeavours to keep himself thoroughly informed of all that goes on, and, although his will in Samarkand is law, as the administrative regulations for the rest of Turkistan have never been applied to that province, he is most anxious to act always with justice, and in the spirit of the Russian law. He is ably seconded in his administration by men who know well the people with whom they have to deal.[28]

Abramov was from the nobility of Lifland *Guberniia* (present-day Latvia), and had joined the Orenburg Artillery brigade as an ensign in 1854. He had been promoted from Captain to Colonel after the fall of Tashkent, and continued his meteoric rise thereafter, becoming a major-general in 1868. The Russian Orientalist Nikolai Ostroumov described him in the following terms: 'The general was a man of sound, healthy common-sense, but without a broad education.'[29] His record of service confirms that he had been educated within the regiment of the nobility, since abolished.[30] An examination of the records of service of the other officers who were serving in the Zarafshan O*krug* and Samarkand *Oblast'* between 1868 and c.1890, combined with

information from Baskhanov's biographical dictionary, shows that of 27 officers 22 (81 percent) had received their training in a Cadet Corps, Military Academy or artillery training school, two (7 percent) in cantonal battalions (lower provincial), one at a religious seminary, one in the old Regiment of the Nobility and one at a 'private educational establishment' (4 percent each). This was better than the average although it did not include anyone with university training. However, eight officers had been educated at Military Academies, and two of these would later go on to complete the course at the elite Nikolaevskaya Academy of the General Staff (although these last were rather atypical of the run of administrators), meaning that they were from the intellectual elite of the officer corps—these were Miliutin's and Tardokensky's 'new breed' of officer with a full military education. No fewer than seven had been educated at the Neplyuevsky Cadet Corps in Orenburg, underlining the importance of this garrison town as a launching-pad for the conquest of Turkestan. Three of these officers (11 percent) were Muslim, and the remainder Orthodox. Two of them were from Ufa, two from Orenburg *Guberniia*, one from the Urals, four came from Siberia, four from Ukraine, one from White Russia, two from the Baltic region and the remaining nine from European Russia. None was from Moscow, and only one from St. Petersburg. All but four (15 percent) were of noble extraction. These indications are suggestive, and although the sample is small, those listed were executive officers, and many served in Turkestan in various capacities for over 20 years, notably General Ivanov, who became *nachal'nik* of the Zarafshan *Okrug* in succession to General Abramov (who was put in charge of the newly-constituted Ferghana *oblast'* in 1877), and later governor-general.[31]

Amongst these officers is Georgii Arendarenko (quite a well-known member of the elite Asiatic 'frontier cadre' of Turkestani Officers identified by Alexander Marshall),[32] who in 1880, when he was still head of the Samarkand *Otdel*, was despatched to Bukhara by Von Kaufman to investigate the Emir's intrigues with Abdurrahman Khan, the exiled Emir of Afghanistan.[33] Among those who served in Samarkand for any significant length of time, Arendarenko was one of only two men listed as having an estate—his mother owned 700 *desiatin* in the Nezhinsk *Uezd* of Chernigov *Guberniia*.[34] In 1889 he was still commandant of the Samarkand *Uezd*, and he ended his career as a major-general and military governor of the Ferghana *oblast'*—he also published a collection of essays on the geography and ethnography of Turkestan.[35] From a younger generation (he was born in 1860), N. S. Lykoshin was a member of Turkestan's small elite of scholar-administrators, and his example helps to show why a university education (he attended the Pavlovskaia military academy) was not necessarily a pre-requisite for producing knowledgeable officers who were skilled in the local languages: amongst other things, Lykoshin translated the early Bukharan historian Narshakhi into Russian.[36]

Schuyler reported that one of the principal reasons the administration was functioning so well when he visited Samarkand in 1871 was that:

> The Prefect of the city was, at that time, Captain Syrtlanof, a Mussulman gentleman of Bashkir origin, speaking Kirghiz, Turki and Persian with great fluency ... the inhabitants were well pleased with him, not only because he was a Mussulman, but because he was able to listen himself to their complaints and to decide their disputes, and was, what is rare enough to deserve mention, thoroughly honest.[37]

Shahaidar Shaikhgardovich Syrtlanov was a Bashkir nobleman from the Ufa *Guberniia*, educated at the Orenburg Cadet Corps and the largest landowner of all the officers listed with 2,200 *desiatin*—he appears to have been quite thoroughly Russified, apart from his religion.[38] Although only just over 1 percent of the Russian officer corps was Muslim in 1867,[39] such officers were potentially the Russian military administration's best intermediaries with the local population. In Samarkand however, Muslim officers rapidly fell foul of Russian suspicion of Islam. By 1876, when his book was published, Schuyler had to write that:

> Unfortunately both for the population and for the best interests of the Russian Government, Captain Syrtlanof is no longer there. The governor-general got an idea into his head that he was a fanatic, and removed him.[40]

The incident which led to Syrtlanov's dismissal appears to have taken place during the festival of Qurban Bairam in 1873, when a group of Muslim officers, Syrtlanov almost certainly amongst them, attended public prayers in a Samarkand mosque wearing native dress, and accepted turbans and *khalaty* [robes of honor] from the Samarkand *Qazi*. A highly critical article describing the incident appeared in issue no.126 of the *St. Petersburg Gazette* of that year, and was forwarded in full to all members of the Samarkand administration; the governor-general wrote to Abramov to ask for an explanation.[41] Syrtlanov was reprimanded, and it seems reasonable to assume that it was this incident that provoked Von Kaufman's suspicion of 'fanaticism' and led to his dismissal.[42] Von Kaufman's almost pathological suspicion of Tatars and Bashkirs meant that, although the proportion of Muslims in the officer corps there seems to have been higher than in the empire as whole, it was rare for Muslims to be given positions of real responsibility in the administration of Turkestan.

By 1896, not one of the officers serving in the crucial executive positions of district commandant and *pristav* in Samarkand Province was a Muslim: the only commissioned officer listed, Niyaz Muhammad Kulchanov, was

the assistant to the Samarkand district commandant, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel.[43] This suspicion of Muslim officers, as Schuyler observed, meant that direct contact between officials and the local population was rendered extremely difficult, and was dependent on a much-despised group of Tatar and Bashkir translators. Officers who had completed the *Junker* course would have been instructed in theology, Russian, mathematics, geography, history, tactics, service regulations, military administration, weapons and artillery training, fortifications, military topography and military law.[44] A notable omission from this list was training in Oriental languages.

III

From its foundation in 1825 the Orenburg Neplyuevsky Cadet Corps had provided limited instruction in Tatar, Persian and Arabic: the number of graduates was extremely small, but it is conceivable that Arendarenko and one or two other early Samarkand administrators may have benefited from this.[45] The first formal courses to teach native languages in Turkestan itself began only in 1886. Early results were not encouraging: of 50 students who enrolled in the first year, only two remained at the end of the course.[46] Training in oriental languages received little official support largely owing to the Turkestan governor-generalship's acute financial problems, but this was also a by-product of Governor-General Von Kaufman's policy of *ignorirovanie* ['not-knowing' or 'ignoring'] of Islam and Islamic culture. Muslims were supposed to be learning Russian enthusiastically, drawn toward the higher European culture the language represented and away from their own vernaculars. In this, as in the rest of his policy toward Islam, Von Kaufman made a grave error. Local resources proved inadequate to rectify it, and little help was forthcoming from the Oriental Faculty of St. Petersburg University or the courses in Oriental languages run by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although by 1888 these institutions were teaching Persian and Turkic, most of those who graduated entered the diplomatic service. When a course in Turkic languages was established at the Academy of the General Staff in 1883, with an intake of five officers, it did not offer a solution, as those who had completed it were normally unwilling to serve in Central Asia.[47] Between 1883 and 1903, 68 officers qualified in Turki and Azeri, but of these only 15 became administrators, most of whom did not end up working in the East: only three of the district commandants working in Turkestan in 1905 had completed the course.[48] The Military Administration was still complaining about the dearth of officers with language skills in Turkestan and for the second time attempted to set up a comprehensive program for teaching its officers Persian and Turki in Tashkent itself: even then it simply meant that a commission was appointed to examine the question. In the preamble to

its report to the War Ministry, then Governor-General D. I. Subotich painted a bleak picture:

> We have ruled in Turkestan for 40 years, and in Transcaspia for 25, and up until now members of the administration who know the native languages even slightly can be counted on the fingers of one hand. In the Judicial Department they are still fewer. The state of things is disastrous. How can the people be ruled, how can lawsuits be investigated, without understanding the speech of the ruled and the judged? There is no point in dwelling on this—measures need to be taken.[49]

The administrator and Orientalist N. S. Lykoshin expatiated at length on the benefits that would accrue were district commandants and *pristavy* to learn the local languages, both in terms of cutting down the number of petitions flooding in and preventing corruption and oppression amongst the translators, although he did not advocate attempting to abolish the latter altogether. He argued instead for increasing their pay and allowances to discourage corruption, and to attempt to recruit more Russians as translators as they would not have relatives among the populace.[50] The consequences of this reliance on translators were perhaps not as grave as many Russians liked to believe: the Tatars in particular were seen as forming a crucial element in V. P. Nalivkin's 'Living Wall'[51] separating the Russians from the populace and they provided a convenient scapegoat for various administrative failings.[52] The widespread resentment toward them is a common trope of imperial polemic against 'intermediaries', whether *Mestizos*, Indians or Levantines in other Empires.[53] Nonetheless, there seems little doubt that many translators were corrupt, and that furthermore the inability of most officers to speak local languages greatly hampered the process of investigating the petitions that flowed into Russian chancelleries. Sometimes these cases, normally relating to petty corruption amongst village headmen and q*azi*s, could remain open for five years or more whilst witness statements were laboriously taken down, often requiring several visits by the officer and his interpreter to remote villages.[54]

Subotich's commission recommended that all new officers should spend their first year of service studying local languages, whilst those already serving were given two years, at the end of which time if they had failed to acquire the necessary proficiency they were (at least in theory) to be transferred away from Turkestan or dismissed.[55] This initiative did not get much further than the more half-hearted ones which had preceded it: it was not until 1911 that five officers a year began to be enrolled into a new language program in Tashkent, and even this was suspended on the outbreak of the First World War.[56] However, it would be wrong to imagine that all officers were entirely ignorant of the local languages even at this stage. As we have seen, some outstanding members of the first generation of

Turkestan administrators such as Arendarenko had learnt native languages. Governors-General Rosenbach, Vrevsky and Dukhovskoi had all made efforts to encourage officers to apply themselves, and in consequence by the 1890s there were increasing numbers of Russians in the administration who did not have to govern through translators. One unforeseen consequence of this, however, was that certain officers decided they preferred to 'rule Orientals as Orientals' through their own languages and customs, rather than following the official line, which was to endeavor to wean the people away from *Sharia* and persuade them to learn Russian themselves. A. I. Termen, like Lykoshin one of the new generation of officers who spoke the native languages, served in Samarkand in the 1890s. His brief memoirs, offering the 'results of researches into the principles of administering *inorodtsy*',[57] and published in 1914, offer a vivid insight into the mentality of 'Orientalist' administrative officers in Turkestan. He described with relish how he sought to rule the people of his *uchastok* 'in accordance with the principles of the Koran' as he interpreted them, which seemed to involve a good deal of violence. His contempt for his superiors and their ideas of Europeanization is palpable, and clearly a by-product of a training in Oriental languages and a study of Islam that was much more thorough than that of an earlier generation: in short, he strove to be a paternalist, oriental despot.[58]

In Turkestan, Termen's was a minority view, and one far removed from the official line, partly because the sort of specialist training that would have been needed to produce a cadre of officers who could 'rule Orientals as Orientals' was still so limited (he recorded the opposition of his superiors, something echoed by Pahlen).[59] Nonetheless, his appointment, together with that of three other officers skilled in languages, to the Samarkand *oblast'* administration in 1898 (when Termen held the rank of staff-captain) did make a considerable difference to the speed and ease with which petitions and complaints could be followed up, with many of those questioned by Termen evidently so taken aback by the fact that they were expected to answer him directly, rather than through a translator, that to a man they denied all knowledge of the petitions which they had supposedly signed and sent to the Samarkand chancellery a few months previously.[60] It seems probable that it was his ability to speak their language and interrogate them directly which really disconcerted them, so used were the inhabitants of Turkestan to dealing with the Russians at one remove.

IV

Complaints and petitions against Russian members of the bureaucracy were much less common than those against the far more numerous native administrators, but corruption was far from unknown. One of the earliest cases concerned Baron Nolde, the district commandant in Khujand

before 1876, who was accused of exacting a bribe every time he received a petition, levying heavy fines on the population and pocketing the proceeds, and taking kickbacks when the chancellery buildings were being repaired. His successor complained bitterly that the entire *uezd* administration was so heavily embroiled in these scams that it was impossible to find anyone who would testify to the Baron's wrong-doings, although he was eventually tried, found guilty and sentenced to eight years hard labor in Siberia.[61] In 1908 the Pahlen Commission unearthed a major scandal in the Samarkand *oblast'* involving College Counsellor Ilya Virsky, brother of the head of the chancellery and a member of the Samarkand statistical committee, together with the chief translator, Imam Utkulbaev. It transpired that the two of them, Virsky using the translator as a go-between, had been receiving sums ranging from 200 to 500 rubles from *aksakal* [local elders] and district administrators [*volostnye upraviteli*] in the area around Samarkand, in return for settling land disputes in their favor, turning aside official investigations into the rigging of elections and other special treatment.[62]

V

Pahlen's report offers a good opportunity to see what progress had been made in the administration of Turkestan since the conquest 50 years before. As he pointed out, on average the expenditure in an *oblast'* in Turkestan was 9,000 rubles higher than for the average *guberniia* in European Russia. This was largely owing to higher levels of pay for Russian officers serving in Central Asia, but this did not necessarily translate into a higher calibre of recruit:

> The low educational standard in the ranks, even of those occupying positions of the highest responsibility, amongst whom one occasionally meets individuals, who have only received primary education (one vice-governor[63] and two senior advisors). The majority of the lower ranks belong to the group of individuals who have received primary, or even so-called 'domestic', education. Those with a higher education constitute just 20 percent of the total number of officials in the *oblast'* administration, and are found principally amongst the technicians of the Works Departments. Apart from this, as far as the main o*blasti* of Turkestan are concerned, it should be noted that that the submission of the latter to the authority of the Ministry of War has as its result this situation, where the personnel serving on both the *oblast'* and *uezd* establishments consist, for the most part, of line officers with an average military education, lacking both the essential experience and the specialist preparation needed for administrative duties.[64]

The problem was particularly acute because in Turkestan there was a lack of 'social elements' and 'intellectual resources' (by which Pahlen probably meant the *zemstva* and the cadres which were associated with them) upon which the officers could rely. The crucial executive positions of *pristav* and district commandant were still monopolized by military officers.[65] By the time of Pahlen's report, there were 42 *chinovniki*, military and civilian, serving in the Samarkand *oblast'* administration who were on the regular establishment. Of these seven had received higher education, 11 had been educated up to the secondary level, 19 at the primary level and five had received no formal education.[66] The officials with a higher education were the engineers in the Public Works Department and the doctors, not the executive officers. Not one official had a higher legal training, and the Military Governor's chief adviser, who was in charge of the Chancellery, had been educated only at a *Junker* school. Pahlen did acknowledge that:

> On the whole, both in the central oblasts of Turkestan and in Semirechie, the quality of serving officials is often higher than that of the c*hinovniki* serving in many internal g*ubernii*. This phenomenon can only be explained by the military character of the administration in Turkestan, which makes it possible to attract the best line officers into the ranks of the administration.[67]

The Miliutin reforms may have been partly rolled back in Alexander III's reign, but they still set a benchmark which had contributed to the gradual but growing military professionalization of a minority of officers by the early 20th century: all the indications are that this professionalized minority was heavily represented in the ranks of those chosen for *Voenno-narodnoe upravlenie*.[68] Although in theory it was now possible for civilians to become district commandants in Turkestan, the Pahlen report revealed that all but two of them had received a military education and been seconded from military service. Most had completed a 'military course' at one of the military institutes by this stage, and only a few had merely attended a *Junker* academy. They had all served as *pristavy* or as assistants to district commandants before being appointed to the post themselves. Lack of knowledge of native languages was now the exception rather than the rule, with several of them (including the heads of the Kokand, Samarkand and Khujand *uezdy*—this latter was Lykoshin) having become noted scholars of Persian and Turki.[69]

However, Pahlen concluded that despite the officers' personal qualities, there were severe deficiencies in the administration, attributable to the immense variety of burdens they were expected to sustain, combined with a stifling of individual initiative from above. In practice they were unable to supervise the police effectively, with only the most serious crimes ever coming to their attention, and then only in very exceptional circumstances.

Similarly they exercised only the most formal control over the devolved Islamic judicial system that existed in Turkestan. As the pressure of office work prevented them from travelling much outside the *uezd* town, the report also criticized them for spending too much time on urban affairs, and too little on rural administration. They were unable, through lack of time, to carry out the necessary crop surveys and tax assessments: instead the same rates were levied year after year with no alteration to take into account the expansion of the cultivated area or changes of use, providing ample opportunity for corruption and the withholding of revenue amongst the *aksakal* who levied the land tax. Pahlen concluded that the whole system had become far too hide-bound and centralized, with almost no opportunity for officers to exercise individual initiative.[70]

Conclusion

The figures in Pahlen's report of 1910 enable a tentative comparison, shown in Table 6.2, of the education of officers in Russia proper, Siberia, Turkestan as a whole, and the Samarkand region.

As might be expected, both European Russia and Siberia show marked superiority in terms of the number of university graduates. However, eight

Table 6.2 Comparative education figures (%)

Service Category	**Education Level**			
	Higher	**Secondary**	**Primary**	**None**
Civilian officials European Russia, 1894–5	32.5	15	Both Primary and None 52.5	
Heads of divisions, Eastern Siberia, 1840–70	34.2	28.5	Both Primary and None 37.3	
Line officers, Turkestan Military *Okrug*, 1875	1.3	60.8	11.6	20.4
Military officers serving as administrators Zarafshan *Okrug*, 1878	0(30)	88(58)	12	0
Military bureaucracy, Samarkand *Oblast'*, 1910	17	26	45	11

Source: endnotes 70–1 and 80–4

of the officers who served in Samarkand before 1890 had attended military academies after completing the *Junker* course, and two of those would later attend the General Staff Academy. If this is considered higher education, then the overall figure of 88 percent of officers receiving secondary education can be broken down into 30 percent with a higher education and 58 percent with secondary education. Either way, those officers seconded on *Voenno-narodnoe upravlenie* do seem to have been significantly better educated than the generality of the officer corps in the region. The discrepancy between these figures and those for 1910 is explained by the fact that the latter (from the Pahlen Report) do not distinguish between military officers in executive positions, doctors, engineers and civilian clerks. Nevertheless, there was almost certainly an increase in the number of university and other graduates serving in Turkestan by 1910, thanks to the greater number of positions requiring technical and medical qualifications. So far as the ethnic composition of the administration in the late colonial period is concerned, the 1897 census returns listed 500 government servants in the Samarkand *oblast'*, but did not distinguish between those in the higher and those in the 'native' administration. Nevertheless, we can safely assume that the 119 Tajiks, five 'Kirghiz-Kaisaks' (Kazakhs), nine Sarts, seven Persians and 79 Uzbeks listed were all members of the lower 'native' tier of the bureaucracy. Out of the remaining 281 there were 231 Russians (82 percent), 16 Ukrainians, two White Russians, 15 Poles, five from the Baltic region, three Germans, one Finn, one Jew and six Tatars.[71]

Thus, although it is not as complete as it ought to be, the information from the *formuliarnye spiski* of officers seconded to *Voenno-narodnoe upravlenie* in Samarkand, taken together with other sources, most notably the Pahlen Report, enables us to present a fairly vivid picture of a typical military bureaucrat in Russian Turkestan. He would be Orthodox, a noble from one of the Ukrainian, Siberian or the Orenburg and Ufa *gubernii*, educated at the Orenburg Neplyuevsky Cadet Corps and then one of the Military Academies up to the age of 18 or so. Most probably his family would not have an estate, and he would not have substantial private means to supplement his fairly meagre salary. Belying his rather shoddy image as a poorly-educated, drunken, card-playing wastrel, by the 1890s he was likely to have a reasonable command of at least one of the local languages (Turkic or Persian), and this might also be true of exceptional members of the earlier generation of administrators, such as Arendarenko. Nevertheless he would still rely extensively on translators. Whatever his personal qualities (and as we see from the example of Termen, a good education in oriental languages and interest in Islam by no means guaranteed that a Turkestani administrator would be wise and humane) he was hamstrung by a system which expected him to do the work of, at a conservative estimate, ten men. Turkestan's bureaucracy, even by Russian standards, was chronically under-funded and under-manned, and this was compounded by over-centralization, which saw many trivial decisions referred to Tashkent or even St. Petersburg. With the exception of those

in Transcaspia, the Turkestani bureaucrat probably did not deserve the abuse heaped upon him by contemporary sources. Some, such as V. P. Nalivkin and N. S. Lykoshin were prominent oriental scholars, reformers and very constructive critics of the regime. However, the writings of the officers themselves abounded with laments over the slow progress of modernization in Turkestan and the failure of Russian rule to transform local society and weaken the attachment of its inhabitants to Islam. This they normally attributed to the *zhivaia stena* or 'living wall' formed by the native administration, which was elected on a limited franchise modeled on systems of peasant self-government in European Russia.[72] The gulf between the military administration and native officials, they wrote, had helped both to preserve and enrich village and urban elites and cut off the population at large from the benefits of Russian civilization. In the end *Voenno-narodnoe upravlenie* in Turkestan was not only inefficient, but would prevent the region from ever becoming an integrated part of the Empire.[73]

Appendix 6.1 Religious and educational profile of the Officer Corps of the Russian army in 1867

Religion	**Infantry**	**Cavalry**	**Artillery**	**Engineers**	**Total**	**%**
Orthodox	12,582	2,024	1,746	333	16,685	76.16
Uniate	4	0	5	0	9	0.05
Catholic	2,458	370	315	74	3,217	14.68
Protestant	1,006	294	170	61	1,531	6.99
Armenian	198	22	16	5	241	1.10
Muslim	129	91	3	1	224	1.02
Total	16,377	2,801	2,255	474	21,907	

Education	**Infantry**	**Cavalry**	**Artillery**	**Engineers**	**Total**	**%**
Cadet Corps, Military Academy	4,774	1,163	1,830	382	8,149	37.19
University	184	93	48	13	338	1.55
Gymnasium or Seminary	1,667	261	91	18	2,037	9.29
Primary School	1,757	155	50	5	1,967	8.98
Junker School course	965	141	72	18	1,196	5.45
No formal education	7,031	988	164	40	8,223	37.54
Total	16,378	2,801	2,255	476	21,910	

Source: *Voenno-statisticheskii sbornik Rossii*, N. N. Obruchev, ed., vyp. IV (St. Petersburg: Voennaia tipografiia, 1871), 846.

Appendix 6.2 Analysis of Military Records of officers serving as administrators in Samarkand 1868–c.1890

Education	**No.**	**%**
General Staff Academy	2	7.4
Military Academy	8	29.6
Cadet Corps	12	44.4
(of which Orenburg)	(7)	(25.9)
Gymnasium or Seminary	2	7.4
Other or none	3	11.1

Religion	**No.**	**%**
Orthodox	24	89.9
Muslim	3	11.1

Place of Origin	**No.**	**Percent**
St. Petersburg	1	3.7
European Russia	9	33.3
Western Borderlands	3	11.1
Ukraine	4	14.8
Siberia	4	14.8
Steppe/Urals	6	22.2

Soslovie	**No.**	**%**
Noble	23	85.2
Non-noble	4	14.8

Source: A. S. Morrison, *Russian Rule in Samarkand, 1868–1910. A Comparison with British India* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), Appendix 6.

Notes

1. Russian Turkestan was a vast governor-generalship, which at its height in the late 1890s stretched from the Aral Sea in the north to the Afghan border in the south, and from the Tian-Shan mountains in the east to the Caspian in the west. It comprised three main provinces: Syr-Darya, Ferghana and Samarkand, together with the largely nomadic region of Semirechie to the northeast, with its capital at Vernoe (present-day Almaty) and the province of Transcaspia (present-day Turkmenistan) to the west after 1883, whilst the governor-general also had effective control over the two protectorates of Bukhara and Khiva.

2. This is the literal translation, but the distinctive feature of *Voenno-narodnoe upravlenie* was the division between the higher, military administration and local self-government by 'the natives'.
3. Hugh Seton-Watson, *The Russian Empire 1801–1917* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 20, 96–8; N. E. Bekmakhanova, 'Kazakhstan i Srednyaya Aziya', in *Natsional'nye Okrainy Rossiiskoi Imperii*, S. G. Agadzhanov and V. V. Trepavlov, eds (Moscow: Slavianskii dialog, 1997), 394.
4. Austin Jersild, *Orientalism and Empire: North Caucasus Mountain Peoples and the Georgian Frontier, 1845–1917* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002), 34–5.
5. An *uezd* in Central Asia could contain upwards of 150,000 people.
6. See Morrison, *Russian Rule in Samarkand*, 172–200.
7. Graf K. K. Palen *Otchet po revizii turkestanskogo kraia* (St. Petersburg: Senatskaia tipografiia, 1909–10), vol. 12, *Uezdnoe upravlenie*, 156.
8. M. E. Saltykov-Shchedrin, *Gospoda tashkentsy. kartiny nravov* (St. Petersburg, 1873). Saltykov-Shchedrin had never actually visited Tashkent. He chose the city as a proverbial archetype of all that was crass, corrupt and vice-ridden in Russian provincial society, although his novel was also an attack on irresponsible military adventurism. See J. F. Sahadeo, *Russian Colonial Society in Tashkent* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2007), 60–2, for a discussion of his writings and settler reactions to them.
9. 'Voenno-narodnoe upravlenie v turkestanskom krae' *Vostochnoe Obozrenie* 1884g, no. 8, *Turkestanskii Sbornik*, vol. 377 (St. Petersburg: 1883), 1–2; on the nature of military education in the Russian empire, see Bruce Menning, *Bayonets Before Bullets. The Imperial Russian Army, 1861–1914* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), 34–5; Carl Van Dyke, *Russian Imperial Military Doctrine and Education, 1832–1914* (New York: Greenwood, 1990), and Alexander Marshall, *The Russian General Staff and Asia* (London: Routledge, 2006), 47–9.
10. See, for instance, Eugene Schuyler, *Turkistan* (London: S. Low, Marston, Searle and Rivington, 1876), vol. I, 83; G. N. Curzon, *Russia in Central Asia* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1889), 240–1. A fluent Russian speaker, Schuyler was the American consul in St Petersburg, and his book is by far the most detailed and observant of all English-language accounts of Central Asia in this period. Curzon would, of course, later go on to be Viceroy of India.
11. *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis' naseleniia Rossiskoi Imperii 1897g.*, vol. LXXXIII, *Samarkandskaia oblast'*, N. A. Troinitskii, ed. (St. Petersburg: Tsentral'nyi statisticheskii komitet, 1905), iii, 98.
12. Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF), f. 1099, op. 1, d. 619, 28–9.
13. Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv (RGIA), f. 1396, op. 1, d. 437; 'Kratkii vsepoddanneishii doklad K. K. Palena o revizii turkestanskogo kraia. Chernovik,' (1909), 31–4.
14. *Russian Officialdom: The Bureaucratization of Russian Society from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century*, W. M. Pintner and D. K. Rowney, eds (London: Macmillan, 1980), 247.
15. P. A. Zaionchkovskii, *Pravitel'stvennyi apparat samoderzhavnoi Rossii v XIX v.* (Moscow: Mysl', 1978), 29, 33–4.
16. See further Stephen Velychenko 'Identities, Loyalty and Service in Imperial Russia: Who Administered the Borderlands?', *Russian Review*, 54, no. 2 (1995): 188–208.
17. N. P. Matkhanova, *Vysshaia administratsiia vostochnoi Sibiri v seredine XIX v* (Novosibirsk: Sibirskii khonograf, 2002), 113–9.

18. See Appendix 1; *Voenno-statisticheskii sbornik Rossii*, N. N. Obruchev, ed., vyp. IV (St. Petersburg: Voennaia tipografiia,1871), 846.
19. P. A. Zaionchkovskii 'Russkii ofitserskii korpus nakanune voiny,' *P. A. Zaionchkovskii 1904–1983gg.* (Moscow: Rosspen, 1998), 30. The figures are from the *Voenno-statisticheskii Ezhegodnik* for 1912, 473–515.
20. A. G. Kavtaradze *Voennye spetsialisty na sluzhbe respubliki sovetov* (Moscow: Nauka, 1988), 23–5.
21. M. K. Baskhanov *Russkie voennye vostokovedy* (Moscow: Vostochnaia literature RAN, 2005).
22. Zaionchkovskii, *Pravitel'stvennyi apparat*, 10.
23. Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv (RGVIA), f. 1396, op. 2, d. 6, 47, 103–4, 198, 202–3.
24. GARF, f. 678, op. 1, d. 407 ('Vsepoddaneishii otchet komanduiushchego voiskami turkestanskogo voennogo okruga za 1874 god,' 26).
25. Ibid., 32–4, 50.
26. See Appendix 1; Obruchev *Voenno-statisticheskii sbornik*, Vypusk IV, 846.
27. Schuyler, *Turkistan*, vol. II, 221.
28. Ibid., vol. I, 266–7.
29. N. P. Ostroumov, *Konstantin Petrovich fon-Kaufman, Ustroitel' turkestanskogo kraia. Lichnyya vospominaniia 1877–1881gg.* (Tashkent: F. i G. Br. Kamenskie, 1899), 21.
30. RGVIA, f. 400, op. 12, d. 672, 1868.
31. Figures taken from table in Appendix 2. For full references, see Morrison, *Russian Rule in Samarkand*, Appendix 6.
32. Marshall, *The Russian General Staff*, 138–9.
33. G. A. Arendarenko, *Bukhara i Afganistan v nachale 80-kh godov XIX veka* (Moscow: Nauka, 1974).
34. RGVIA, f. 400, op. 17, d. 4535, 1889; This is what one would expect—Zaionchkovsky pointed out that civilian bureaucrats were far more likely to own estates than military men: in 1912 only 4.9 percent of military officers even in the 3rd class of the table of ranks had estates, as opposed to 30.8 percent of civilians in this rank. Zaionchkovskii 'Ofitserskii Korpus,' p. 47.
35. Arendarenko, *Bukhara*, 9, 33; G. A. Arandarenko [sic] *Dosugi v Turkestane* (St. Petersburg, Tip. M. M. Stasiulevicha, 1889).
36. *Istoriia Bukhary Mukhameda Narshakhi*, trans. N. S. Lykoshin and ed. V. V. Bartol'd (Tashkent: F. i G. Br. Kamenskie, 1897).
37. Schuyler, *Turkistan*, vol. I, 267.
38. L. A. Yamaeva, *Musul'manskie deputaty Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Rossii 1906–1917gg.* (Ufa: Kitap, 1998), 302.
39. See Appendix 1; Obruchev, *Voenno-statisticheskii sbornik*, vyp. IV, 846.
40. Schuyler, *Turkistan*, vol. I, 267.
41. Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Respubliki Uzbekistan (TsGARUz), f. I–5, op. 1, d. 228, 1*ob*.
42. Ibid., 5*ob*.
43. *Adres-Kalendar' samarkandskoi oblasti na 1896g.*, M. M. Virskii, ed., vypusk IV (Samarkand: 1896), 1–10.
44. RGVIA, f. 400, op. 12, d. 894, 3–8.
45. Marshall, *The Russian General Staff*, 28.
46. N. S. Lykoshin, *Polzhizni v Turkestane. Ocherki byta tuzemnogo naseleniia* (Petrograd: Sklad T-va Berezovskii, 1916), 34–5.

47. *Sbornik materialov po voprosu ob izuchenii tuzemnykh iazykov sluzhashchimi po voenno-narodnomu upravleniiu turkestanskogo kraia*, I. D. Iagello, ed. (Tashkent: 1905), 59.
48. Ibid., 60–1.
49. Ibid., 1.
50. Ibid., 93.
51. '*Zhivaia Stena*'; V. P. Nalivkin, *Tuzemtsy, ran'she i teper'* (Tashkent: Turk. t-va pechatnago diela, 1913), 67–8, 71; Vladimir Petrovich Nalivkin (1852–1918) was a brilliant linguist and pioneering anthropologist, and perhaps more than any other the voice of the 'Third Element' in Turkestan. See Natal'ia Lukashova, 'V. P. Nalivkin: eshche odna zamechatel'naya zhizn', in *Evraziia. Liudi i mify*, ed. S. Panarin (Moscow: Natalis, 2003), 72–94; Baskhanov, *Voennye vostokovedy*, 170.
52. See Robert Geraci, *Window on the East* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 40–6, on suspicion and estrangement between the Russians and Kazan Tatars.
53. See C. A. Bayly, *Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780–1870* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 7–8, 45–7, 75–9.
54. See Morrison, *Russian Rule in Samarkand*, 182–91.
55. Iagello, *Sbornik*, 93.
56. Marshall, *The Russian General Staff*, 170–2.
57. See John W. Slocum, 'Who, and When, Were the *Inorodtsy*? The Evolution of the Category of Aliens in Imperial Russia,' *Russian Review*, 57 (April 1998): 173–90.
58. A. I. Termen, *Vospominaniia administratora. Opyt' izsledovaniia printsipov upravleniia inorodtsev* (Petrograd: 1914), 4–5, 7–8, 20.
59. Ibid., 20; RGIA, f. 1396, op. 1, d. 437, 31.
60. TsGARUz, f. I–18, op. 1, d. 800, 2–6*ob*; TsGARUz, f. I–18, op. 1, d. 832, 4–7*ob*.
61. TsGARUz, f. I–1, op. 27, d. 1523d, 222; M. A. Terent'ev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia Srednei Azii* (St. Petersburg: V. V. Komarova, 1906), vol. II, 415.
62. TsGARUz, f. I–18, op. 1, d. 2583, 3–5*ob*.
63. Of Semirechie; Palen, *Otchet*, vol. 13, *Oblastnoe upravlenie*, 110.
64. RGIA, f. 1396, op. 1, d. 440, 44*ob*–5.
65. Palen, *Otchet*, vol. 13, 219.
66. Ibid., 72.
67. RGIA, f. 1396, op. 1, d. 437, 43*ob*.
68. William C. Fuller, *Civil—Military Conflict in Imperial Russia, 1881–1914* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 3–47; 259–63.
69. Palen, *Otchet*, vol. 12, 41–2.
70. RGIA, f. 1396, op. 1, d. 437, 33*ob*.
71. Troinitskii, *Samarkandskaia oblast'*, 98.
72. Nalivkin, *Tuzemtsy*, 71.
73. On the native administration, see Morrison, *Russian Rule in Samarkand,* 147–168; on the failure of modernization in Turkestan, see Daniel Brower, *Turkestan and the fate of the Russian Empire* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003).

Part II

Soviet Officialdom

7
An Introduction to Soviet Officialdom

Eugene Huskey and Don K. Rowney

Amid the heroic projects of modernization and industrialization launched by the Soviet regime, state administration remained in many respects a distinctly un-revolutionary activity. Despite the Bolsheviks' utopian rhetoric about the withering away of the state, and the ability of any washerwoman to manage public affairs, once in power Soviet leaders faced the same mundane tasks of governance common to all modern states: collecting taxes, policing the streets, and collecting and analyzing information on the country's human, economic, and physical resources. Who would perform these functions? With no reservoir of professionally competent and politically reliable personnel to draw from, the Soviet leadership was forced to govern using the agents of state that they had inherited from the Old Regime. Some high-ranking officials emigrated or turned to armed resistance during the Civil War, but the majority of state employees continued to man their desks, albeit in a changed political and economic environment and in state organizations that had new names, new leadership, and new responsibilities.

For a time, as Daniel Orlovsky illustrates below in his study of state white-collar workers, the Soviet regime refused to accord these employees the same respect and ideological status enjoyed by blue-collar workers, in whose name the Communist Party seized power. But even after the new regime made its peace with the idea of an administrative class, it struggled to assure the loyalty, competence, and legitimacy of its bureaucrats. As the number of 'bourgeois specialists' trained under the Old Regime began to dwindle in the late 1920s and 1930s, due to advancing age and/or political repression, the political leadership found it difficult to recruit a replacement generation of competent Soviet cadres. One of the regime's responses to this 'personnel famine' was to use 'short courses' to prepare personnel with limited formal schooling to assume positions in the state bureaucracy that would have been occupied by better-educated cadres in Western countries. The dearth of talent was especially pronounced in the provincial and rural areas, and not surprisingly, it was there that the actions of agents of the state were most

often at variance with the goals set out by the principals in Moscow and the republican capitals.[1]

Unable at first to recruit personnel who were both 'red and expert', the political leadership created a tightly-controlled system of personnel management that remained a central feature of the Soviet experience long after the last 'bourgeois specialist' had left the stage. As the chapter by Graeme Gill explains, personnel policy in the Soviet Union rested on two pillars, the first of which was the appointive principle, which empowered the Communist Party to hire, rotate, and fire all leading cadres, even those who held nominally elective offices or were directly responsible for economic production. In one of the many ironies of the Soviet era, the political leadership, which itself descended into a succession crisis at the loss of each of the country's chief executives, insisted on succession planning for other vacancies in officialdom, which were often filled by candidates drawn from carefully constructed 'cadres reserve lists'. The second pillar of Soviet cadres policy was an intricate network of checking mechanisms, which included not only the Communist Party and the secret police but also numerous government inspectorates. In the words of Merle Fainsod, 'it is not too far-fetched to describe this complex network of controls as a system of power founded on the institutionalization of mutual suspicion.'[2]

Despite these impressive levers of control, the Communist Party encountered difficulties at every turn in mobilizing 'the state' and its personnel behind the policy campaigns of the day.[3] The challenges of managing the state bureaucracy came not only from the human capital inherited from the tsarist era but also from the very ambition of the Soviet experiment. State officials were called upon to carry out the great projects of Soviet history, from the collectivization of the peasantry and the mass terror to the defeat of the Nazis and the construction of the Baikal-Amur Railway. Equally noteworthy, however, was the role of officials in the everyday life of the Soviet state. The adoption of a one-party system and a command economy forced the state and its agents to assume an enormous decision-making burden in routine social and economic matters.[4] By reducing to a minimum the law and the market as arbiters of disputes and allocators of scarce resources, the Soviet leadership saddled officialdom with unprecedented responsibility for the management of society. The effective functioning of such a system required rapid and reliable information flows, clear lines of authority, and highly-qualified administrative personnel, yet these were lacking in the Soviet Union. The result was an exacerbation of many of the institutional pathologies, such as corruption and bureaucratic caprice, or *proizvol*, which plagued administration in tsarist Russia and in other developing states.[5]

Not surprisingly, in the absence of a vibrant market, an independent legal system, and a free press, the bureaucracy often abused its vast power and discretion. Because the *nomenklatura* system and checking mechanisms

were unable on their own to prevent these abuses, the party leadership resorted to periodic anti-bureaucratic campaigns that were designed to cleanse the apparatus of hostile elements or 'anti-Soviet' practices, such as self-enrichment, false reporting, 'eye-washing', and 'nationalist deviationism'.[6] The postwar campaign to rid the state bureaucracy of widespread corruption forms the subject of a chapter below by James Heinzen.[7]

Soviet officialdom was in most respects the antithesis of the Weberian-style bureaucracy that was lauded, if never fully realized, in the West. The Soviet approach to administration elevated the spoils principle above merit in personnel recruitment; it required the permanent staff of state to be politically engaged rather than politically neutral, which encouraged devotion to party or person rather than loyalty to office; it eliminated the boundaries between political and administrative careers;[8] and it preferred organizational shapelessness to clear jurisdictional boundaries.[9] The Soviet Union did not have, therefore, a civil service in the Weberian sense but a corps of party-state officials whose tenure and promotion—and at times even physical survival—depended in part on their ability to read political signals from above. In her chapter in this book, Martine Mespoulet explores the survival strategies of one segment of the state bureaucracy whose professional training and loyalties often conflicted with political directives designed to advance the party's power and policies.

To offer an assessment of the main features of Soviet officialdom is not to suggest that state administration in the USSR was an undifferentiated whole. Just as in the tsarist era, Soviet ministries varied widely in terms of their power, status, and authority, their pay and perquisites, and their organizational cultures.[10] And although there was remarkable uniformity across the vast territories of the country—assured by a geographic rotation of leading cadres, a common education and political socialization, and a single method of dealing with paperwork [*deloproizvodstvo i dokumentoborot*]—local administration in the Baltic exhibited features that were distinct from those in the Central Asian republics, where traditional institutions such as the mahalla helped to shape societal relations with the state.[11]

In many respects, the most important organizational distinction in Soviet officialdom was between the structures of the Communist Party and those of the Soviet state.[12] Although some elite circulation occurred across this organizational divide, there was nonetheless a tendency—to use the Soviet-era formula—for the party to rule while the state governed, if by governed one meant implementing policies adopted by higher-level party bodies. This slogan oversimplifies, of course, a complex relationship, where the arrows of influence were by no means unidirectional. That the Soviet state was not simply the agent of the Communist Party is evident in the influence that 'state-based' members of the Politburo exerted in policy debates, in the technical expertise possessed by the state, which helped to shape the policy agenda, and in the discretion that officials in the ministries and provincial

governments enjoyed in the execution of policy.[13] At times, as Marie-Pierre Rey illustrates in her study of foreign policy in the late Soviet era, the 'state' organization responsible for a policy field exercised greater influence than its counterpart in the Communist Party bureaucracy.[14]

Among the most serious challenges facing Soviet officialdom was how to legitimate policies and procedures emanating from Moscow in the country's far-flung provinces, especially those with large non-Russian populations. In a country where the state maintained a virtual monopoly of information, the idea of proletarian brotherhood was a potent unifying force, but the containment of particularist sentiments required more than a common ideology. After initial attempts to govern without recourse to the politics of ethnic identity, the Soviet leadership offered significant concessions to non-Russian minorities in the 1920s, which included the formation of ethnically-based territories for the largest minority communities, the elevation of ethnic identity to an official category of state, and the indigenization of cadres policy in non-Russian territories.[15] This indigenization of personnel had its limits, however. During the purges of the 1930s, the Stalinist regime targeted many home-grown leaders for elimination in the ethnic republics, and thereafter the party institutionalized a system of personnel rotation that placed Slavic officials in key oversight roles in the non-Russian areas, most notably as second secretaries of the republican party organizations and heads of the republican branches of the KGB (*Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti*).

Yet because the geographic circulation of elites was restricted to a few posts at the very apex of the party and government apparatus in each republic—and temporary secondment to Moscow was used sparingly for cadres from non-Slavic republics—careers of non-Russian officials tended to begin and end within their home republic. This pattern of bureaucratic careers gave rise to republican officialdoms that became increasingly jealous of their control over patronage, resources, and information on economic production within their territories. While continuing to express deference toward Moscow, by the 1970s elites in several republics began to carve out pockets of autonomy that recalled forms of indirect rule used by European colonial powers. Facilitated by Brezhnev's 'stability of cadres' policy, which allowed republican leaders to consolidate their local patronage networks, this indigenization of state administration undermined the ability of the principals in the political leadership in Moscow to control their agents in the periphery. Perhaps the most dramatic illustration of the indigenization of rule was the cotton scandal in Uzbekistan in the 1980s.[16]

Until the era of *perestroika*, the most vivid examples of particularism were associated with the emergence of personalist regimes in the Soviet Union's southern republics. However, when Mikhail Gorbachev allowed the formation of mass-based nationalist movements in the late 1980s, localism took a very different form in several republics, most notably those in the Baltic

region. Here leaders were not seeking to capture republic officialdom for self-aggrandizing motives, as had been the case in Central Asia and the Caucasus, but to mobilize it behind a struggle for national renewal. As early as the fall of 1988, republican officials in Lithuania had begun to openly resist directives from Moscow. As destabilizing as such developments were for the Soviet Union, it was only the defection of Russian officialdom three years later that sealed the fate of the USSR. In the wake of Boris Yeltsin's election as Russian president in June 1991, and the abortive conservative coup by a majority of the senior Soviet leadership two months later, Moscow-based bureaucrats voted with their feet to abandon Soviet power in favor of successor regimes in the 15 republics.

Notes

1. This was especially evident in the legal system. See Peter H. Solomon, Jr., *Soviet Criminal Justice under Stalin* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
2. Merle Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled*, revised edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), 388, quoted in David Christian, 'The Supervisory Function in Russian and Soviet History', *Slavic Review*, no. 1 (1982), 73–90. Christian's article offers an excellent survey of checking mechanisms in Russian history.
3. In the narrow sense used by Soviet officials, the term 'state' does not embrace the Communist Party, which was formally a 'social organization' [*obshchestvennaia organizatsiia*]. It referred instead to the official structures of government, at the center of which was the Council of Ministers and the individual ministries and agencies. However, the political fusion of party and state institutions led some to refer to the Soviet Union as a party-state, and in this work we recognize that the party was simply another side of state administration, as that latter concept is used in the comparative literature.
4. On state administration in the management of the Soviet economy, see David Granick, *The Red Executive: A Study of the Organizational Man in Russian Industry* (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1961); J. S. Berliner, *Factory and Manager in the USS*R (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957); *Behind the Façade of Stalin's Command Economy: Evidence from the Soviet Party and State Archive*, Paul Gregory, ed. (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2001); David Shearer, *Industry, State, and Society in Stalin's Russia, 1926–1934* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).
5. As John Armstrong and others have observed, further complicating the functioning of Soviet officialdom was the tendency to overload vertical communication channels. Instead of delegating authority to lower-level officials, Soviet practice encouraged bureaucrats to push decisions up the line to superiors, which allowed them to minimize their own responsibility. The efficiency costs of this practice were enormous. See John Armstrong, 'Sources of Administrative Behavior: Some Soviet and Western European Comparisons', *American Political Science Review*, no. 3 (1965): 646. On efforts to apply Western management techniques to administration, see E. Arfon Rees, 'Politics, Administration and Decision-Making in the Soviet Union, 1917–1953', *Jahrbuch fur europaische Verwaltungsgeschichte (JEV)*, 16 (2004): 259–90.

6. At times, the general secretary himself launched the initiative, such as 'Khrushchev's disbanding of more than one hundred industrial ministries at the stroke of a pen', which Moshe Lewin argues was the Soviet Union's 'most spectacular anti-bureaucratic initiative—the only one on such a scale.' Lewin, *The Soviet Century* (London: Verso, 2005), 343. At other times, the initiatives for assaults on bureaucracy came from below. On the anti-bureaucracy enthusiasts in the Komsomol, see Sheila Fitzpatrick, *The Cultural Front, Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia* (Cornell University Press, 1992), 132–6.
7. For an argument that the failure of anti-corruption campaigns led ultimately to communism's collapse, see Leslie Holmes, *The End of Communist Party: Anti-Corruption Campaigns and Legitimation Crisis* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
8. Although some leaders, like Trotsky and Bukharin, sought to advance their careers without a firm institutional base, this path to advancement was closed off by the middle of the 1920s, after which political power fell to those, like Stalin, who had made bureaucratic careers.
9. See Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., 'Jurisdictional Conflict and Coordination of the American and Soviet Bureaucracy', *Studies in Comparative Communism*, no. 2 (1988): 153–74.
10. On the ministerial system and the Governmental apparatus that oversaw it, see T. H. Rigby, *Lenin's Government: Sovnarkom, 1917–1922* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Stephen Whitefield, *Industrial Power and the Soviet State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); and *Executive Power and Soviet Politics*, Eugene Huskey, ed. (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1992).
11. As Olivier Roy explains, it was not only traditional institutions like the mahalla that gave Central Asia its distinctive flavor in the Soviet era, but also the indigenization of certain Soviet institutions, such as the kolkhoz. See Roy, *The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations* (New York: New York University Press, 2000), especially 85–109.
12. The best study of the relationship between the Communist Party and the Soviet state, which focuses on economic decision-making in the regions, is Jerry Hough, *The Soviet Prefects* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969). Among the most useful works on the party apparatus are Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled*; John Armstrong, *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite: A Case Study of the Ukrainian Apparatus* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959); and Graeme J. Gill, *The Collapse of a Single-Party System: The Disintegration of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
13. Because the Soviet system repressed popular involvement in politics that was not mobilized and directed by the state, it was the conflicts between and within party and state organizations that shaped political life in the USSR. In this sense, bureaucratic politics was the only game in town. Despite the presence of highly-developed ideational and organizational controls, where you stood on issues still depended to a large extent on where you sat. For an enlightening case study of bureaucratic politics in the USSR, see Jiri Valenta, *Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979).
14. Moshe Lewin has argued that in the wake of Stalin's death, governance in the Soviet Union was based on a 'complex process of negotiation-coordination [*soglasovyvanie*] between top political leaders and administrative agencies.' There was, in his view, 'an interminable process of negotiation–coordination, similar

to a variety of bargaining, between ministerial departments, as well as between government and party officials.' Moshe Lewin, *The Soviet Century* (London: Verso, 2005), 217–8.

15. See Terry Martin, *Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001).
16. See William A. Clark, *Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom: Combating Corruption in the Political Elite, 1965–1990* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993).

8
The Communist Party and the Weakness of Bureaucratic Norms

Graeme Gill

The Bolshevik revolution in October 1917 ushered into existence a new type of political system very different from any which had preceded it. The innovative thing about this new system was the place that the ruling Communist Party occupied in it.[1] The party was dominant in the system. Its branches were found in all organizations in the USSR, its members were meant to exercise leading and guiding authority in all of those organizations, and throughout the society in general, and its leadership made all of the most important decisions for the Soviet state. It was clearly the most influential institutional body in the Soviet system. But throughout its life as the ruling institution of the Soviet Union, the party suffered from a basic tension within the rules, norms and procedures that were designed to structure the way the party worked.

The bureaucratic-personalist dichotomy

All institutional structures tend to develop their own unique patterns of action and norms of behavior based upon the bureaucratic imperatives of the structure itself. Those patterns and norms will emerge out of the actual processes whereby the bureaucratic machine functions; in order for that machine to operate, activities and processes emerge which, over time, create patterns that recur over the institution's life. In this sense, an institution will generate its own bureaucratic ethos and patterns of functioning.

However, all bureaucratic structures are characterized by a gap between the official rules and the patterns of informal behavior adopted by those who work within them.[2] Such gaps are inevitable given that human behavior cannot, by its nature, be contained in all of its aspects within formal rules and regulations. Without the flexibility that this provides, institutional structures would be excessively rigid and rule-bound and would have only weak capacity to act either quickly or efficiently. The frequently heard criticisms of 'bureaucratism' and 'red tape' are often a complaint against such an excessively rule-bound approach. In this sense, such unofficial patterns

of behavior may be a positive force in the life of the institution, providing a means of facilitating the functioning of that body. Such behavior may strengthen the political power of those who run that institution by overcoming bureaucratic blockages in the institution and enabling it more effectively to project central power. It may even strengthen the institution as a whole by contributing to its capacity to meet the challenges it confronts. However, such behavior may also weaken the institution.[3] It can do this by creating alternative channels or modes of activity that effectively supplant, in whole or in part, the formal machinery of which the institution consists. In this way, rather than strengthening the institution by enabling it to function flexibly, such behavior may undercut the institution and, in the most extreme case, make it redundant. The basis for such patterns of behavior is usually personal relations, networks of personal contact and behavior structured by considerations of a personal nature rather than the constraints of formal rules, regulations and institutions. Thus within all bureaucratic structures, two logics exist: one stemming from the bureaucratic structure itself and shaped by the rules, norms and imperatives of that structure, which seeks bureaucratic regularization; and one arising from the more personalist-oriented considerations of officials, both individually and collectively, which turns on considerations of personal power and personal loyalty. Both logics were evident in the Communist Party from the beginning of its rule.

The pressures for bureaucratic regularization stemmed from the functional needs of the institutional structure itself. The party as an institutional structure had a dual purpose: a legislative role reflected in the decision-making activities of party committees, congresses and conferences, and an administrative function located in the work of the party apparatus at all levels. As a bureaucratic institution seeking to rule the largest country on earth, with both legislative and administrative machinery at all levels of the party structure, rules were necessary if the party was to function with even a modicum of efficiency. The party certainly had a substantial body of rules and regulations designed to govern its operation. The official party 'Rules' were the principal corpus of rules and regulations that were meant to structure internal party life. This document became much more extensive once power had been seized, including sections on the conditions of party membership, the organizational structure of the party, including sections on each level of organization, on discipline, on party finances, and on party fractions in non-party organizations. Modified frequently during the party's life, the Rules were effectively the constitutional charter of the party. In addition, the formal meetings of the legislative bodies of the party issued decisions that were binding for the party organizations below them in the hierarchy. Most importantly, party congresses and conferences, plenums of the Central Committee and meetings of the Politburo issued decisions that were binding on the party as a whole. Administrative party organs also issued orders and instructions, chiefly about the internal functioning of the party

machine. Over time, the accumulation of these decisions, orders, regulations and instructions amounted to a formidable quantum of legislation. This ever-expanding body of legislation, designed in part to determine the way the party functioned, constituted a significant potential basis upon which the processes of bureaucratic regularization could rest. However, the normative authority of this body of rules was problematic, principally because it was subverted by the personal logic mentioned above.[4]

The origins of the personal logic lay in the patterns developed in the party's early development and in the circumstances under which the party seized and held power. From the party's birth in 1898 until it seized power in 1917, it was an underground revolutionary organization, usually with its leadership in West European exile and the bulk of its functionaries operating in a clandestine fashion inside Russia. The physical difficulties of communication between leadership and rank-and-file, compounded by the harassment of the revolutionary movement by the tsarist police, made the growth of a pattern of regular institutional interaction on the part of party organs impossible. Meetings were not held according to a regular schedule but whenever possible, while the normative authority of the decisions made in such meetings was undercut by the party center's inability to ensure their implementation on the ground and by the continual differences of opinion among party leaders. Accordingly, the normative authority of the revolutionary party structure was weak, and there was no tradition of the regular functioning of party bodies. What was important in terms of both advancing the revolutionary cause and of pure survival (of both the institution and its members) were personal contacts and personal loyalties. The revolutionaries relied for their sustenance much more on their circle of personal contacts within the revolutionary movement than they did upon the formal party machine, and for guidance they looked to prominent individual revolutionaries more than they did to formal party deliberations.

When the party came to power, a greater regularity of functioning did emerge around its leading legislative institutions. The party's leading organs, the Congress, the Central Committee and after March 1919 the Politburo, took on a more concrete existence than they had before 1917. From 1919, the Congress met with the regularity specified in the party's Rules throughout most of the 1920s, while the Central Committee and the Politburo both met frequently throughout the year. Furthermore, throughout this decade, all of these bodies were real decision-making organs. Both the Central Committee and, at least until the XIV Congress in 1925, the Congress were organs characterized by vigorous and extensive policy debate which could have a direct effect on the decisions that were reached. The ritualistic proceedings that later became common in these bodies were still a thing of the future. Similarly, in the Politburo, policy debate was free-wheeling and relatively unconstrained. The legislative organs of the party had a vigorous organizational life, taking on their own institutional profiles and developing a real

sense of their importance as fundamental arenas of policy discussion, debate and resolution. With their frequency of meeting and the growing normative authority they were able to wield, there was significant potential for these bodies to be able to develop a sense of institutional coherence and integrity, to consolidate their position as the principal decision-making bodies in the system.

There was also significant pressure for the institutional development of the party's administrative bodies at this time. Having seized power and thereby needing to establish control over the vast mass of the Russian Empire, but distrusting the loyalty of those bureaucrats they inherited from the tsarist administration, and having to contend with widespread hostility from both external adversaries and internal opponents, the new rulers of Russia had to establish a means of staffing the new state's administration. This meant distributing trusted personnel throughout the country on a regular and efficient basis. Initially this was done in an ad hoc fashion, relying on the efforts of the party secretary Yakov Sverdlov and a few assistants.[5] However Sverdlov's death in 1919 hastened the development of institutions to take over this role. The Central Committee Secretariat, although mentioned in 1917, was formalized and placed on a regular footing only at the VIII Congress in March 1919.[6] Headed by six secretaries plus a member of the Organizational Bureau, this body was to comprise a series of departments[7] whose brief covered many of the main aspects of intra-party life. Most importantly, this included the collection and maintenance of data on all party members, oversight of the institutional forms of the party apparatus and their functioning, including both the activities of party organs at all levels and their links with higher and lower standing party bodies. At the same time as the formalization of the Secretariat, the Congress created the Organizational Bureau, or Orgburo. This was the body where all of the important decisions of an administrative and personnel nature were to be made, with the Secretariat to both provide information for those decisions and ensure their implementation once made. In theory, according to Lenin in 1920, 'the Orgburo allocates forces, while the Politburo decides policy',[8] although in practice many decisions about the distribution of party members were made routinely in the Secretariat while the most important ones were decided, or at least ratified, in the Politburo.

Having created the machinery for the handling of questions of personnel distribution, the party leaders now moved to establish a regularized personnel system. This was achieved with the establishment of the *nomenklatura* system in mid-1923.[9] The essence of this was the allocation to the party committee, at each level of the hierarchy, of a list of positions that was within its competence to fill, plus a list of responsible workers who were eligible for appointment to those positions. Although initial problems with this arrangement led to a new *nomenklatura* regime being introduced in late 1925–early 1926, in which lower level organs were to work out their own *nomenklatura*

listings based on central guidelines,[10] and despite the slowness with which this system began to take on a systematic character, the principle underpinning the personnel system was clearly established: responsible posts were to be filled by appointment from above, with central organs having direct responsibility for the most important posts.

Although a formal personnel system had thus been created by the middle of the 1920s, the form it took introduced an element of incoherence and tension into the operating norms of the party. The principle of personnel placement inherent in the creation of the Secretariat, Orgburo and *nomenklatura* was appointment from above. However, the principle whereby responsible positions in the party were to be filled as contained in the party Rules was election from below. The only way that both of these principles could be at least formally upheld was if one of them was nothing but a ratification of the other: a person could be nominated from above and then that person would be formally ratified through a process of election, or a person could be elected to office and that decision would then be ratified through that person's formal appointment. In practice, the outbreak of elite conflict and the way it was conducted ensured the former outcome.

Politics and transformation

The consolidation of the party structure, the growth of traditions and principles of party work, and the establishment of the personnel system would have been difficult enough given the hostile environment within which this was taking place without the added complication of the growth of elite conflict. For the first decade and a half of the party's life in power, politics at its apex was shaped by the constant clash of opinion and ego among the party leadership. This process was exacerbated by Lenin's death in January 1924, when political rivalries were sharpened by the succession issue. The growth of bitter political conflict over issues of major policy significance, taking place in a context of newly-established institutions seeking to develop a regularity and a sense of normative authority, had a dire effect on such aspirations. In their search for political advantage, the leading politicians sought to use whatever means they had available. The espousal of policy positions was one important factor in drawing political support. Another was the manipulation of the emergent political institutions. Crucial in this was the regular use of party forums to condemn opponents. Meetings of the Central Committee and the regular congresses and conferences of the party became occasions where not only was party policy discussed and formally ratified, but opponents were vigorously condemned and, from the XIV Congress in 1925, shouted down and prevented from even presenting their views in a considered fashion. While the defeat of opposition through the votes of leading party organs may appear to be an affirmation of the normative authority of those organs, in fact the way this was engineered

subverted any normative claims these organs may have made. The majorities in favor of the victors at each of these gatherings were not only a function of the support for the policy positions these people were espousing, but of the manipulation of the personnel system to ensure a supportive audience. Increasingly, Stalin as general secretary was able to stack the central administrative bodies of the party with his own supporters and to use this to appoint supporters or would-be supporters to lower-level responsible positions in the party apparatus. These officials could, through the manipulation of elections to legislative bodies, ensure that those bodies took on a similar political hue. This so-called 'circular flow of power'[11] was a major means of transforming the leading party bodies from organs with normative power and authority in their own right into bodies that could be used instrumentally by the leading political faction for its own interests. It also ensured the dominance of the appointive principle over the elective one; indeed, it could not function unless the identity of lower level responsible workers could be assured from above.

The effect of these sorts of pressures was increased by the conception of the task upon which the party was engaged. The party's self-appointed task was not simply to provide sound government for the new Soviet state. Rather it was to transform the society it had inherited, to drive that society along the road to the communist millennium, an aim which lay at the heart of the party's own *raison d'être*. Although the view that the party's task was to guide the achievement of communism was not formally accepted until the mid-1930s, from the seizure of power party members saw its role as being to guide the society along the correct path, which would ultimately result in communism. This means that the party's role was transformative and teleological; it was about transforming the society in order to achieve an ultimate goal. This involved its own form of legitimation.[12] The justification for action within the party was not consideration of rational bureaucratic functioning, of what would make the bureaucratic structure that was the party function more efficiently, of Weber's notion of legal rationalism, but rather what would serve the attainment of the goal of communism. Such a basis for legitimation meant that obedience to the strictures of bureaucratic life, to the rules and regulations that were meant to govern internal party functioning, was less important than the achievement of outcomes which contributed to the overall goal. The party's teleology and the legitimation based upon it had three consequences.

First, it justified party dominance in all spheres of life. This meant that the organizational structure of the state was not an autonomous sphere but was totally penetrated by the party. The effect of this was that the principles that were emerging to structure political life in the party also applied in the state; the two comprised an integrated hierarchy, but with the state effectively subordinate to the party. Second, it strengthened the pressures favoring the appointment principle over the elective principle. If it was the

building toward the communist future that was all-important, it was essential that the right people be placed in positions of authority throughout the party structure. This could not be left to the elective principle, especially given the doubts about the political sophistication of many of those who had joined the party after it achieved power.[13] Only through appointment could one hope to get reliable people in posts, where they would then be able to further the party's cause. But third, it made the positions to which such people were appointed highly tenuous and uncertain. Individuals appointed to responsible posts found themselves in a difficult position. They were being encouraged to do whatever they could to advance the party's substantive goal of moving the society along the path toward communism. This was their primary responsibility, taking precedence over everything else. If this necessitated ignoring central instructions or party norms, or even going against them, such action could be justified as long as the outcome was a positive one for the transcendent goal. This is most clearly shown in the way in which functionaries on the ground almost routinely ignored the detailed provisions of the five-year plans.[14] The problem is that such action also made them vulnerable. Even if the breaking of rules could be justified by the transcendent goal, such action still rendered the official formally in breach of party directives and therefore potentially subject to party discipline. Penalties for breaching party discipline were severe. This means that lower level officials were in a no-win situation. If they broke party rules, regulations or instructions in order to further the transcendent goal, they could be accused of breaching party discipline, but if they adhered to those instructions and failed to achieve the goals that had been set down, they could be accused of political failure. They sought the solution to this problem through personal loyalty.

Personal power

With neither strict adherence to the rules nor consistent achievement of the set targets a guarantee of job (and in the late 1930s even personal) security, the strategy adopted by many officials was to look to a protector. Lower level officials looked to higher-level officials to provide them with protection and, increasingly, promotion. The development of clientelistic relations became a key feature of the party as officials looked to consolidate their positions through forming alliances with other officials above and below them. Officials would look to the higher levels to find someone with whom to ally in the expectation that that person would defend them from attack from above. In exchange, these lower level officials offered two things: the adding of lustre to the reputation of their patron, through the successful achievement of the tasks that they were set, and support in higher-level forums through the mechanism of the circular flow of power. Accordingly, chains of patrons and clients stretched throughout the length of the party as officials at all levels sought higher protectors and lower supporters. This was

reinforced by the growth of family group structures. At lower levels, the *modus operandi* that emerged within the party was powered primarily by the logic of personalism. Apart from the conditions of civil war, which promoted a militarization of party life and encouraged the tendency to look to individual leaders/commanders for guidance, the drive to establish an effective administrative apparatus promoted personal networks at the expense of routinized, institutional structures. As officials confronted the challenge of administering the regions newly placed under their control, they naturally looked to those with whom they were acquainted to fill responsible positions both alongside and below them. The result was the growth of local cliques, or family groups, where unity rested upon the personal relationships of the members rather than the official positions they held. Such groups came to exercise power over their particular geographical regions, banding together to provide mutual protection and support and the means for improving (or at least giving the appearance of improving) their performance of the tasks allotted to them. Such groups were often also tied into vertical chains of dependence through the patron–client relations that were established between leaders at the different levels. At the middle and lower levels of the party structure, personalism suffused administration right from the start.

The establishment of patron–client chains and the consequent vertical linking of family group structures confirmed the importance of the personalist principle at the expense of concerns about bureaucratic functioning, regularity and routine. Such relations constituted political machines based upon ties of personal loyalty and service that cut across both the rungs of the bureaucratic structure and the constituencies that developed around particular parts of the party apparatus. Throughout much of the 1920s and 1930s, the party press criticized the family groups.[15] Such groups were usually geographically based, and therefore included the heads of not just the local party apparatus but also major organs like the soviets, trade unions and large productive enterprises or farms. In this way they tended to cut across the formal institutional boundaries between different institutions in the Soviet structure and, within the party, different parts of the apparatus, as well as the formal lines of subordination both within and between these different organizational structures. Resting as they did on personal authority, informal structures needed someone at the apex. This was constituted by Joseph Stalin. Through the joint process of removing all challengers while building up his own entourage, partly through judicious use of the appointment weapon, Stalin was able to strengthen his personal dominance at the top. This was consolidated through the extensive cult of Stalin that unrolled after 1929, something which sought to establish a charismatic (and hence anti-bureaucratic) basis for his authority,[16] and by the threat of the use of force, was personified by the security apparatus, from the mid-1930s.

Stalin's personal dominance was crucial in shaping the continuing development of the party by further undercutting the likelihood that that structure would generate a sense of institutional coherence and integrity based on bureaucratic functioning, and its organs a notion of normative authority. Stalin did not, of course, personally take all decisions that needed to be made within the Soviet Union, or even within the more limited leadership circles. But Stalin was the dominant figure.[17] The involvement of the supreme leader provided a means to cut through the swathe of competing bureaucratic constituencies that was natural in a structure as large as the party had become, as well as to provide direction and a point of resolution for the structure as a whole. With a whole range of what one observer has called 'little Stalins' throughout the political structure,[18] that structure needed a 'big Stalin' if it was to retain any coherence at all. What was important here was not just the practical impact of Stalin the leader as a primary decision-maker in the system, but the symbolism of the image of Stalin that was projected through the cult.

The leader cult projected Stalin as not just the principal source of decision-making within the Soviet Union, but as the single central source of legitimacy for the system as a whole. The image conveyed was that it was Stalin who defined the party's goals, guided it toward the achievement of the ends he set, and gave it its real *raison d'être*. Communism, while still the transcendent aim, was itself defined by the great leader, thereby making his word the touchstone of political orthodoxy. The effect of this was to undercut completely the party as anything like an autonomous entity with its own rules, regulations and ethos. The practical reflection of this was the atrophy of the party's leading organs after the war, when they met infrequently and irregularly, essentially at Stalin's whim.

Renewal of bureaucratic norms?

Stalin's death in March 1953 provided an opportunity to break this process. By removing the dominant leader figure and the legitimation of activity on charismatic grounds, his death seemed to raise the possibility of the development of norms and patterns of behavior from out of the regular functioning of party institutions rather than the imperatives of the personalist principle. This would not be an easy development because officials at all levels of the party structure were used to functioning within the system of patron–client relations; the 'little Stalins' were still in place in their patrimonies, and there was no evidence that they would be enthusiastic about moving to a new set of rules of the game. Despite the uncertainties of clientelism, this had brought many of them power, prestige and privilege, and anyway it was the only game they knew how to play. However the early steps by the new post-Stalin leadership seemed designed to promote the development of bureaucratic norms.

As soon as Stalin died, the new leadership began to emphasize the importance of collective leadership,[19] implicitly rejecting the model that had been in place for the preceding two and a half decades. This was accompanied by the removal of security chief Lavrentii Beria, an act which sent the message that the security apparatus would no longer be able to play an independent part in political life. This not only removed one of the struts that had sustained the dictatorial position occupied by Stalin, but it also reduced the levels of uncertainty in political life; failure was no longer likely to cost an official's life. Most spectacularly, the attack on Stalin posed by the program of de-Stalinization[20] involved not just a rejection of the model of leader dominance exercised by Stalin, but an affirmation that the growth and development of the party had been distorted by Stalin and the *modus operandi* he had employed. The new collective leadership seemed to be promising the sort of program that would have enabled institutional norms to become dominant within the party and its functioning, and thereby to transform the party from being the instrument of a dominant leader into one in which its own rules and regulations had normative authority and its operations and functioning were structured according to those rules. However, this was not realized in the post-Stalin USSR.

Some aspects of the way the Soviet system functioned following Stalin's death certainly seemed to be favorable to the development of institutional norms. Party bodies met more frequently and on a more regular basis than they had done in the final years of Stalin's rule. Discussion was more open and although there were still significant penalties for being on the losing side in a policy dispute, principally demotion or retirement, they were not so great as to restrain debate. The security apparatus by and large remained out of political life and many major decisions seem to have come before regular party organs for discussion and adoption. There was also frequent public emphasis on the need to observe party rules and regulations and on the central role that the party was to play in guiding the society toward communism. But there were also a significant number of aspects of political life that countered any such move in the direction of a higher level of bureaucratic institutionalization of the party.

Despite the continuing emphasis on collective leadership during the period 1953–64, Khrushchev increasingly adopted a highly personalized, indeed idiosyncratic, leadership style. Following the defeat of the anti-party group in 1957 in particular, the image of Khrushchev as the foremost leader, clearly superior to his leadership colleagues, was consistently presented by the media. Rather than the image of a collective leadership, it portrayed a leading group in which Khrushchev was the dominant personality. More importantly, Khrushchev sought to act in this fashion. He would harangue and attempt to bully not just his leadership colleagues but officials at all levels in an attempt to get his way. He would pre-empt official meetings by announcing policy decisions before they met, or even attempt to introduce

measures without getting the approval of leading party bodies. His decision-making style was highly personalistic, taking little account of institutional norms or boundaries. His treatment of the leading institutions of Soviet society, especially the party, effectively undercut the growth of any sense of institutional coherence and integrity. He encouraged popular participation in decision-making, but in such a way as to undercut the established institutional structures. Experts were invited to participate in meetings of the party Central Committee, even though many of them were not only not members of that body but may not even have been members of the party. Party officials were exposed to public scrutiny and criticism. Khrushchev downgraded the party and its constituent organs by seeking to shift decision-making responsibility into other bodies (from 1958 he was simultaneously party First Secretary and state Premier, so the shifting of responsibility into state organs did not restrict his own power) and by creating new bodies like the regional economic councils [*sovnarkhozy*], which cut across traditional vertical lines of responsibility. He brought about institutional changes with little preparatory work and insufficient consideration or consultation, the chief example being the 1962 division of the party apparatus into agricultural and industrial wings. And he sought to use clientelism to manipulate party processes both to consolidate his own position and to strengthen his power. An important part of the way he used the personnel mechanism was to create uncertainty among office holders by both very high turnover levels among party officials[21] and the introduction of strict time limits on the occupancy of office. What this meant was that officials had little confidence in their job tenure, which they saw to be vulnerable to the whims of the First Secretary.

Thus, although there was greater regularity in the meeting dates of leading party organs, there was little regularity or routine in the way the party actually functioned at its upper levels. Khrushchev's personal leadership style and many of the policy measures he introduced disrupted the regular functioning of the party and blocked pressures for institutionalization. When he was overthrown in 1964, it seemed that there was another opportunity for the development of bureaucratic norms arising out of the regular functioning of the apparatus, but in practice the norms which emerged reflected not the dominance of bureaucratic considerations but the continuing strength of the personalist principle.

The primary emphasis of the post-Khrushchev leadership was the need to move away from the idiosyncratic leadership style of Khrushchev. Criticism of his 'hare-brained scheming'[22] implied a shift toward a more considered decision-making style and a more routinized approach to political life. Emphasis was placed on broad consultation with bureaucratic constituencies, on involving all of those who might have a stake in the outcome in the discussion of policy issues before they were decided.[23] Moreover, the adventurism that was believed to have characterized Khrushchev's policy, with the

Cuban missile crisis seen as the most egregious case, was eschewed in favor of a more careful and considered approach to questions. The emphasis upon routine functioning, a priority that later in the eyes of some seemed to have taken precedence over actual outcomes, created a politics of interest brokerage and of 'the ordinary' in sharp contrast to the way many leading officials had experienced the Khrushchev era. It also seemed to create an environment within which the opportunity existed for the institutional structures of the system, including the party, to strengthen their own organizational norms and invest them with normative authority.

One way in which this was clear was in the much lower profile of personal leadership at the national level and the apparent strengthening of collective leadership. It is clear that, from at least 1968, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev was the leading figure in the leadership group. He was given much greater prominence than any of his colleagues; he delivered the main reports at party congresses and at plenums of the Central Committee (CC), it was he who was described as having 'headed' the leadership of the party and the CC.[24] His words and writings were publicly lauded, and a minor cult developed around him. But while there was an image of him as the leading figure within the party elite, this image was not translated in practice into a dominant personal role. Brezhnev remained very much part of a collective leadership group and did not use his standing to override the party's institutional procedures in the way that Khrushchev had done. Party organs met on a regular basis and conducted their business in a routine manner. The frequent circulation of personnel was ended as a new policy expressing faith in cadres was implemented. Many of the institutional innovations introduced by Khrushchev were reversed and further innovation largely eschewed. All of this was associated with a discernible crackdown on free thought and expression, marked most importantly by the long-term campaign against the dissidents. The net effect of all of this was the settling of Soviet institutions into patterns of more regularized behavior. However, while much of this behavior was shaped by the content of the rules and regulations that the system had spawned, a significant part of party life continued to operate on the basis of principles at variance with those that might lead to the strengthening of bureaucratic norms. Central here was the continuing strength of patrimonial principles.

Patrimonialism is a system in which the distinction between private property and public property disappears, with those in positions of authority using public resources as if they were their own, and where the power and identity of an institution are defined in terms of the leader's power and identity.[25] There had been strong patrimonial elements to the Stalinist regime, but it seems to have become even more pronounced at lower levels under Brezhnev. The strengthening of this principle was facilitated by the new personnel policy introduced by Brezhnev; that policy, 'stability of cadres'/'trust in cadres' effectively guaranteed officials security of tenure in their offices

almost regardless of performance. But what made it possible was the sort of family group organization that had become so important during the early years of the regime.

Central to the development of family groups had been the imperative to protect the group members against attack from above for the inadequate performance of the tasks set before them. With the diminution of the likelihood of this following upon Brezhnev's personnel policy, the imperative to establish clique control at various nodes in the structure remained strong. The essence of this control was the avoidance of conflict in the region by co-opting the leaders of local organizations into the ruling clique, and facilitating the exploitation of local resources for their own profit. The latter became particularly acute under Brezhnev, and is reflected in the details that came out during the anti-corruption campaign at the end of the 1970s–early 1980s.[26] Local leaders ran the areas for which they had responsibility almost as their own fiefs, using the region's resources to build up their personal wealth and lifestyle. Some lived as opulent satraps, using public resources for their own benefit.[27] Such behavior breached all of the rules of the party and, although party organs may have met on a regular basis, undermined the principles of party life. The party became in part a congeries of personal cliques, operating according to the principles of personalized power, within a husk of the formal party structure and its rules.

Crucially, however, Brezhnev's personal position was not as strong as that of Stalin and, temperamentally, Brezhnev and those around him were less inclined to force development and change than Stalin and his entourage had been, at least before the war. This means that while in its Stalinist form this clientelist structure had been wielded to drive socio-economic change while at the same time providing the means for its local hubs to facilitate the enrichment of clique members: under Brezhnev only the latter function remained. Thus, with the shift in the regime's rationale from transformation to administration, and a leadership whose concern was with stability after the uncertainties of the Khrushchev period, the party experienced some 20 years without substantial disruption. But despite the increased regularity of the functioning of party organs, this period did not witness the substantial growth of institutional coherence or integrity; the modus operandi within the party remained at significant variance with its formal Rules, while the existence of clientelist networks continued to undercut the growth of normative authority on the part of party organs.

The disruption of norms

Although Gorbachev did not have a coherent plan for the reworking of the Soviet system, as his proposals unrolled over time, they had a dire impact upon the party and the coherence of its internal operating procedures. Many of his measures posed a direct challenge to the way the party functioned, and they did this by exposing the gulf between the party's bureaucratic rules,

in particular its democratic rhetoric, and the personalist logic whereby it operated. While the party's Rules had emphasized democratic centralism, collective leadership, intra-party democracy and criticism and self-criticism, there had never been any real mechanisms to ensure that the democratic nature of this rhetoric had any substance. While lip service was given to the idea of leaders being accountable to their rank-and-file, there were no effective mechanisms to realize this principle in practice. Gorbachev set about creating such mechanisms.

The introduction of glasnost', and its radicalization in the wake of the Chernobyl disaster in April 1986, was the first step in this process. This called upon rank-and-file party members, and also non-party members, to criticize in public those party leaders whose actions were deemed deficient. All of a sudden, party leaders at all levels seemed potentially subject to public accountability for their actions in ways they had rarely been before. Calls for criticism and self-criticism on the part of party members had been common fare in earlier periods, especially in the 1930s[28] and under Khrushchev,[29] but this time such calls were supported by the promise of institutional measures to give them teeth. This came in the form of Gorbachev's call for competitive elections within the party, and although the party leadership as a whole initially refused to endorse this proposal[30] their opposition was soon overrun by events in the form of the election of some delegates to the XIX Conference of the party in 1988[31] and the decisions of that conference. The Conference endorsed the democratization of the political system as a whole, and set in motion a series of institutional changes designed to shift the party from the center of power and transfer this into revived state organs. The net effect of Gorbachev's changes would have been to fundamentally transform the party, the way it functioned, and its place in the Soviet system.

In the short term, the measures Gorbachev championed caused increased incoherence in the party. They challenged the established way in which the party operated, calling into question those norms which had validated the party's centralized operating procedure and seeking to remove the privilege and much of the power generally exercised by party bosses. In this way the whole ethos of the party and the collective understandings about how it should function were thrown into doubt. But at the same time there was a fundamental contradiction in the means whereby this paradigm shift within the party was to be brought about. The vesting of sovereignty in the party rank-and-file to be exercised through a competitive electoral process would have involved the destruction of the established system of clientelism; office-holding at all levels should be subject to rank-and-file election, not clientelist appointment. The implementation of such a system needed strong champions in leadership posts throughout the apparatus. However, most of those who had gained their positions through clientelist means were unsympathetic to the new system. Their replacement by those more

sympathetic to Gorbachev's measures could only be carried out through personnel placement from above. Thus, the new system could be implemented only through the old means. This problem compounded the growing incoherence that stemmed from the challenge to the old ways of operating. Such incoherence was also generated by the confusion about what the party's role should be in the new system given Gorbachev's attempt to withdraw it from a direct role in production and to shift power to new state organs. The result was a party which effectively became immobilized, unable either to control the situation or to change with it.

Notes

1. The party went through a series of name changes: Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (March 1898), Russian Communist Party (March 1918), All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (December 1925) and Communist Party of the Soviet Union (October 1952).
2. This has become a matter of significant scholarly attention. In particular, on the Soviet period, see Alena V. Ledeneva, *Russia's Economy of Favours: Blat, networking and informal exchange* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
3. Although Gerald Easter emphasizes the importance of informal patterns of behavior, he does not recognize the way that they can weaken an institution, in part because he is confused in his understanding and usage of Mann's distinction between infrastructural and despotic power. Easter sees this distinction as being one between despotic power as the state's decision-making power and infrastructural power as its implementing power. However for Mann, infrastructural power is the way a state projects its power through regularized, institutionalized means, while despotic power is the projection through extraordinary means. By confusing this distinction, Easter misses the essential contrast in Mann between processes involving a regularization of practice (infrastructural power) and those undercutting such a result (despotic power). Gerald M. Easter, 'Personal Networks and Postrevolutionary State Building: Soviet Russia Re-examined,' *World Politics* 48, no. 4 (1996): 551–78.
4. It was not only the personal logic that undermined the formal rules. Also important were other aspects of early practice, like '*podmena*' whereby instead of exercising leadership over other bodies, party organs effectively displaced them.
5. For example, see the comments at the VIII Congress. *Vos'moi s'ezd RKP(b) Mart 1919 goda. Protokoly* (Moscow: 1959), 165.
6. Vosmoi s'ezd, 424–5.
7. Initially seven but soon increased to ten. On the development of the Secretariat, see Graeme Gill, *The Origins of the Stalinist Political System* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 68–81.
8. *Deviatyi s'ezd RKP(b) Mart-aprel' 1920 goda. Protokoly* (Moscow: 1960), 86. Lenin acknowledged the difficulty of maintaining that distinction.
9. *Izvestiia tsentral'nogo komiteta rossiiskoi kommunisticheskoi partii (bol'shevikov)* 1 (59), January 1924, 64–7; 4 (62), April 1924, 41; and 1 (122), 18 January 1926, 4. Also *Trinadtsatyi s'ezd RKP(b) Mai 1924 goda. Stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow: 1962), 805.

10. Izvestiia Ts.K., 12–13 (133–4), 5 April 1926, vi–x, and 14 (135), 12 April 1926, 1.
11. The term was originated by Robert V. Daniels, 'Stalin's Rise to Dictatorship, 1922–9', in *Politics in the Soviet Union: 7 Cases*, Alexander Dallin and Alan F. Westin, eds (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966), 4–5.
12. On this notion of goal rationality as a basis for legitimation, see T. H. Rigby, 'Introduction: Political Legitimacy, Weber and Communist Mono-organisational Systems', in *Political Legitimation in Communist States*, T. H. Rigby and Ferenc Feher, eds (London: Macmillan, 1982), 1–26.
13. Suspicion about the reliability of those from a non-proletarian background was present throughout the 1920s, and among some there were even concerns about many of those from proletarian origins.
14. Paul R. Gregory, *The Political Economy of Stalinism. Evidence from the Soviet Secret Archives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), Chapter 6.
15. For a discussion of this, see Gill, *The Origins*.
16. On charisma, see Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, 2 (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), 241–66. On the beginnings of the Stalin cult, see Graeme Gill, 'Political Myth and Stalin's Quest for Authority in the Party', in *Authority, Power and Policy in the USSR. Essays dedicated to Leonard Schapiro*, T. H. Rigby, Archie Brown and Peter Reddaway, eds (London: Macmillan, 1980), 98–117, and Robert C. Tucker, 'The Rise of Stalin's Personality Cult', *American Historical Review* 84, no. 2 (1979): 347–66.
17. For a study that looks at the nuances of Stalin's personal position in leadership circles, see Stephen Wheatcroft, 'From Team-Stalin to Degenerate Tyranny', in *The Nature of Stalin's Dictatorship. The Politburo 1924–1953,* E.A. Rees, ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004), 79–107.
18. Georg Lukacs, 'Reflections on the cult of Stalin', *Survey* 47 (April 1963): 105.
19. For example, see the editorial in *Pravda,* 16 April 1953.
20. In particular, see Khrushchev's speeches, 'O kul'te lichnosti i ego posledstviiakh', *Izvestiia Ts.K KPSS* 3 (290) (March 1989), 128–70 and 'Zakliuchitel'noe slovo Pervogo sekretaria TsK KPSS tovarishcha N.S. Khrushcheva', *XXII s'ezd kommunisticheskoi partii sovetskogo soiuza 17–31 oktiabria 1961 goda. Stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow: 1962), 564–97.
21. For some figures, see Graeme Gill and Roderic Pitty, *Power in the Party. The Organization of Power and Central-Republican Relations in the CPSU* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), 126.
22. See *Pravda,* 17 October 1964.
23. Which is not to say that Brezhnev always adhered to the institutional proprieties. For Mazurov's criticism that major issues were decided before being placed before the Politburo, see Ian D. Thatcher, 'Brezhnev as Leader,' in *Brezhnev Reconsidered,* Edwin Bacon and Mark Sandle, eds (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 28.
24. For example, *Partiinaia zhizn'* 1, 1977, 4, 7.
25. See the discussion in Kenneth Jowitt, *Revolutionary breakthroughs and national development. The case of Romania 1944–1965* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 69.
26. Leslie Holmes, *The End of Communist Power. Anti-Corruption Campaigns and Legitimation Crisis* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1993), 220–31.
27. For a discussion of the criticism of this in the post-Brezhnev era, see Gill and Pitty, *Power in the Party*, Chapter 4.

28. For example, see *Partiinoe stroitel'stvo* 9 (11), May 1930, 3–7; 11–2 (13–14), June 1930, 21–9; 10, May 1933, 34; 16, August 1933, 10; 17, September 1933, 16–18; 11, June 1934, 1–2. At this time criticism and self-criticism were specifically directed against family groups.
29. Khrushchev often called for criticism of leaders (see *Pravda*). But there were also campaigns launched in different republics. For a review, see Gill and Pitty, *Power in the Party*, Chapter 2 and 102–14.
30. Compare the plenum resolution with Gorbachev's speech. 'O perestroike i kadrovoi politike partii', *Pravda,* 28 January 1987, and Mikhail S. Gorbachev, 'O perestroike i kadrovoi politike partii', *Pravda,* 29 January 1987.
31. For example, see the reports in *Sovetskaia Rossiia,* 1 June 1988; *Pravda,* 6 June 1988; and *Izvestiia,* 18 June 1988.

9

White-Collar Workers in the Second Revolution and Postwar Reconstruction

Daniel Orlovsky

White-collar workers remain an understudied though important social group in Soviet history. Though much has been written about workers, peasants, and now even certain professions, the life and fate of the ordinary *sluzhashchie* remain obscure.[1] And this despite the fact that this social formation was in absolute terms larger than the so-called intelligentsia, and in the early years of Soviet power it was as large as the working class itself.

This chapter offers an overview of the white-collar workers during the years 1930–4, crucial years in the formation of Soviet society that embraced industrialization, collectivization and cultural revolution. It then considers the status, agendas and dilemmas of white-collar workers (sometimes referred to in the text as employees) during the years immediately after World War II up to the death of Stalin. This history of employees in the Soviet era may be seen as the evolution of a large and somewhat incoherent social group whose leaders devoted considerable energy to self-defense in a hostile ideological environment (during the 1920s and 30s), then to gradual participation and ever greater responsibilities in the growing state apparatus and even in the management and operations of the economy.

How do the categories of white-collar workers, or employees, relate to officialdom or state officials, or to the question of bureaucracy as raised in this volume or its predecessor.[2] Our approach is to look at state officialdom in terms of social strata and occupations. We accept the premise that in the Soviet Union all employees were in the broadest sense state officials and that their identity was composed of multiple parts and influences, institutional, occupational and social. However, the social and institutional history of the Soviet Union cannot be written in terms of workers, peasants and the intelligentsia alone. Bureaucracy, officialdom and the Soviet professions also must be investigated.[3] Framing the social dimension of bureaucracy in terms of white-collar workers or employees and their occupations is one

more way, though by no means the only way, of decoding the central role of bureaucracy in the Soviet experience.

This chapter is based largely on materials from the trade union press and archives. The trade unions, often portrayed as very weak and mainly subservient to the powerful organizations of state and party, were still charged with large responsibilities for the social, economic and cultural welfare of white-collar workers. There were white-collar members in virtually all Soviet trade unions, but here we consider what was first known in the 1920s as the All-Russian Union of Soviet and Commercial Employees [*Vserossiiskii professional'nyi soiuz sovetskikh i kommercheskikh sluzhashchikh*] in its various adumbrations, until the 1950s when it was called—in its awkward English translation—the All-Union Union of State Employees [*Vsesoiuznyi professional'nyi soiuz gosudarstvennykh rabotnikov*]. At various times in Soviet history this was the largest Soviet trade union, and the one devoted specifically to state functionaries. This trade union originated in the fertile ground of the first revolutionary era of 1905–07, when it was already clear that white-collar workers provided key layers of productive office work for the burgeoning industrial economy and that these employees shared many concerns and needs with their blue-collar counterparts. In the years of the post-1907 'constitutional experiment', the various shop-oriented white-collar unions were either disbanded or forced underground. During World War I, however, the seeds of union activism and organization were sown once more. And when the February Revolution ushered legalized unions once more onto the stage of history, white-collar and professional groups were more than ready to share in the general euphoric wave of union building and political participation. Building on the experiences of World War I, groups such as zemstvo and other public organization employees, and even state functionaries, joined white-collar workers in the private sector to form a large phalanx of white-collar power during the course of 1917 and beyond into the Soviet era. After the October Revolution, Lenin included the white-collar workers in his plans to centralize all trade unions and form them into large scale so-called 'production unions'. This ended the long pre-history of disparate white-collar unions and began the hyper-centralized era of unions within the state that forms the subject of our analysis.

Background

The white-collar workers, or *sluzhashchie*, had already staked out their claim as a key social force in the Bolshevik revolution, during 1917 and beyond.[4] It was a large and volatile social formation that could be found in a variety of occupations ranging from service personnel in trade and commerce, through the cooperatives[5] and on into the offices of industry of all sorts and the vast apparatuses of government and public organizations.[6] White-collar occupations included the lower layers of the new Soviet professions. White-collar

workers, as outlined above, had a long history of trade unionism and (unlike their counterparts in Western Europe) allegiance to the political left (usually the Mensheviks and SRs as well as Kadets and Bolsheviks). We could argue that the mass of white-collar workers was absorbed into the new Soviet state and its institutions during the Civil War. But 'absorbed' with its connotation of passivity may not be the right term. The white-collar workers built actively even as they were absorbed. These small people of small responsibilities had political and social power insofar as they made possible the rapid expansion of the new socialist state and economy. The huge existing infrastructure was taken over and absorbed by the revolution and whole new institutions were also created. All of these required specialist knowledge of varying degrees and the full array of white-collar skills.

The early Soviet state was an administrative state meant to overcome in heroic, rapid and militant fashion the market and most other Old Regime institutions. White-collar workers were the agents of this transformation. They, like workers and peasants, were the raw material of the new society. The key to white-collar political and social influence during the 1920s was the group's ability to fit in to the party's socialist agendas—to appear to be allied with or even part of the proletariat and to share with the proletariat its aspirations and interests. This was not easy to accomplish because whether one looked at it from the point of view of social origin (that is the social position of one's parents), the parents' occupation or the position or occupation of the individual in question, working in the office or shop was just not the same as life at the lathe, loom or elsewhere on the factory floor.[7] 'White-collar' was always a marker of otherness, a label to be used or abused according to the general line of the day or the specific decisions of responsible administrators. The spokespersons for the *sluzhashchie* put a positive spin on things throughout the 1920s. The white-collar workers always supported the party line and proletarian interests. They as a group always carried out their assigned tasks (as spelled out in most general form by Lenin in 1921) and acted as facilitators, mediators, links, educators, skilled operatives, in the great campaigns and reconstructions of the 1920s. For example, white-collar workers were central in all rationalization campaigns, building infrastructure of the soviets and economic trusts, and carrying out ministerial administrative edicts at all levels.

Because they were often literate workers doing intellectual, if sometimes menial, tasks, it was crucial to the white-collar nation to clearly differentiate itself from those located both above and below them in old social and occupational hierarchies, who were coded negatively in the new proletarian state. It was crucial not to be misidentified as belonging or having once belonged to or having had parents who belonged to the groups of 'formers' [*byvshie*] (priests and other *sosloviia* of the Old Regime) or on the other side of the spectrum as connected in some way to the higher status intelligentsia, especially engineers, certain other intellectual, technical and

professional categories requiring higher levels of formal education. Proletarian credibility was the mask that hid a tacit, but inherently unstable, understanding between the regime and this large social formation. All of this is to underscore once again that the very essence of white-collar labor left the employees encumbered by political liability.

By the end of the 1920s the white-collar workers were doing better than their union leaders, who were caught up in the purges and re-ordering of institutions that characterized the first big wave of Stalinist revolution. In 1929, the party launched major purges against the Soviets, followed soon thereafter by major show trials against the Mensheviks and layers of industrial management (The Industrial Party Affairs). This wave of purges targeted the trade unions along with many other administrative, economic and cultural institutions. Their leadership was swept away during the era of the New Economic Policy (NEP), as the party tightened its grip on the transmission belts of policy. The rank and file, by contrast, stood on the frontline of Stalin's revolution since not a single part of the regime's agenda could be accomplished without the active participation of the *sluzhashchie*.[8] Industrialization and collectivization both required vast increases in numbers of white and blue-collar workers alike. Even the collective and state farms must be seen as new white-collar incubators.[9]

The Union of White-collar Workers was very large, in fact among the largest of all Soviet trade unions, and its leadership as well as rank and file had undergone a generational and political change. Youth was the key here as by 1929 the rank and file were already largely a post-revolution generation and the leaders had long since lost any traces of Menshevik or SR influence, most often the party affiliation of the 1917 generation of white-collar workers, not to mention the earlier life experience in the trade unions of the revolution or even the Civil War. In 1934, for example, the Union reviewed its history at the time of the October Revolution anniversary and since, noting that the members were now a youthful post-revolution group who had either accepted the revolution or who were raised within it.[10]

White collar workers in the second revolution

Census material and other statistics tell a story of large white-collar growth during the later 1920s and throughout the 1930s.[11] Recent estimates put the total population of the USSR at 147,000,000 for 1926 and 163,000,000 for 1937—and 167,600,000 for 1939. According to the 1926 census, the numbers of urban blue and white-collar workers were just about equal (blue-collar—2,330,950 or 29.5 percent; white-collar—2,168,473 or 27.5 percent; free professions—37,408 or 0.5 percent). Soviet census data also include dependents of state and social organizations—816,150 or 10.3 percent. Including entire families in the numbers rounds out our picture of white-collar strength as a social formation. Add to this the so-called intelligentsia,

or those engaged in mental labor and who possessed higher qualifications, 427,000 in 1926 for the entire USSR, and we see an even larger segment of the population outside the regime's defining worker and peasant categories. By the end of the 1930s blue-collar workers comprised 31.2 percent and 30.2 percent (1937 and 1939) and white-collar workers 13.6 percent and 15.6 percent of the entire population of the USSR. This reflected the massive growth of both groups. The urban population, which largely embodied these trends, had grown from 26 million to approximately 48 million during those same years. By 1939, even in the villages of Russia, white-collar workers comprised 9.6 percent of the population and 32.7 percent of the entire population of Russian cities. For the 1930s (as revealed in the censuses of 1937 and 1939), the number of white-collar workers in the state apparatus, for example, grew more than six times as compared to the 1926 data. The data reveal clearly that these white-collar workers were by and large young (25 percent of the entire group were between 20 and 29 years of age, and another 44.8 percent were between 30 and 39). Literacy was high, in the 99 percent range, but educational qualifications were notably low, with less than one third of so-called leading managerial personnel having completed secondary education and only 6.7 percent having a higher education qualification. Higher status professional occupations in medicine and science had the highest number of all individuals with higher education and the judicial organs were filled with many who had only a secondary education (48 percent among judges and prosecutors).

It is difficult to ascertain the composition of the white-collar workers according to gender. Data on gender often include blue and white-collar labor in disaggregated form. But according to Zhiromskaia, by the mid 1930s, in the cities women comprised only 15.5 percent of administrative personnel and 8.6 percent of administrators in the villages. The great expansion of state administrative personnel during the early 1930s was not accomplished by opening chancery doors to women. This is supported by Wendy Goldman's data on gender re-segregation in the formation of the new and larger working class of the 1930s. Women, whatever their social background (blue-collar, white-collar or peasant), were channeled into certain white-collar occupations outside the administrative offices (shops, other forms of commerce and services etc.).

The residue or inheritance of the purges of 1929 had a major impact on white-collar workers in the 1930s. At this time the Union of Soviet and Commercial Employees not only lost its 1920s leadership, but a template was set for the regime's intensified and ongoing search to root out white-collar workers of the wrong social origin (particularly acute in the economic institutions, planning apparatus and throughout the commercial organs and cooperatives). Not only did the party/state use its various control and police mechanisms to conduct cleansing operations based on social origin, but it also projected upon employees all other criminal activities made so

prominent later throughout the thirties—wrecking, sabotage, embezzling, bureaucratic malfeasance and espionage. The archives document numerous Communist Party Central Control Commission/Worker and Peasant Inspectorate (TsKK/RKI) investigations, as do various union materials and its press.[12] The union became a great facilitator and participant in these agendas set by the party. Entrenched 'former' people were always discovered and the local chiefs, managers and of course the larger population of civic activists and participants in local politics and public life [*obshchestvennost'*] was often blamed for laxity in understanding its proper unmasking role. Social and political backgrounds and crimes were publicly advertised as lessons for the rank and file and those in charge alike.[13] Elements hostile to the working class, its interests and projects, were to be tolerated no longer.

One major event that shaped white-collar activities and social development during the early 1930s was the break up [*razukrupnenie*] in early 1931 of its gigantic trade union into three smaller units.[14] The Union of Soviet and Commercial Employees was divided into three smaller, but still quite large unions: The Union of Employees in State Trade and Cooperatives; the Union of Employees of State Institutions; and the Union of Employees of Finance and Credit Institutions. On the surface this might have appeared to be another of the frequent administrative adjustments and reorganizations of early Soviet state institutions. Yet the state meant to reintegrate the unions into the state structure after a period in the 1920s when unions quietly had reassumed some of their traditional roles as protectors of labor and representatives of labor interests against managers, administrations and the state itself. According to official dogma the breakup was meant to bring the unions closer to the rank and file and to make easier the tasks of promoting social and economic projects of the regime, which included reforming the methods of work in all white-collar settings through use of campaign modes, rationalization, adoption of technology, raising cultural levels and norms, educating the rank and file in the theory and practice of socialism, ridding the unions of opportunists, thereby inoculating white-collar workers against them, and of course improving the material well being and daily living conditions of the white-collar workers and their families, which were viewed as a mass union constituency.

Of course much of this mirrored Soviet campaign terminology and categories, including the use of medical metaphors to describe the need for perpetual vigilance and prophylactic measures to protect innocent 'healthy' employees from pathological influences. Kotliar, the chair of the new Union of Employees in State Institutions, defended his organization and both its traditions and new role. Kotliar said that the old union of 1.5 million members was too large and too full of know-it-all employees who actually knew little of the workings of their own organizations. Critics, however, who derisively had called his union the Union of Sovbureaucrats or Sovchinovniki, were dead wrong. His union had been and would continue to

be a leader in introducing new technology (such as stenography and mechanization in accounting), fighting the battle against excessive formalism and paper work and bringing new energy and vitality into the white-collar workplace by means of sponsorship (*shefstvo*, a kind of mentoring system whereby one production unit took responsibility for uplifting and improving the work of another unit) and socialist competition.[15] Furthermore the revitalized credit workers would use their institutions to mobilize the capital of the population for use in the great project of socialist construction. (This was in relation to a major campaign to float a loan from the general population to support the second five-year plan.)

The union followed Stalin's attacks on pay equalization. It publicized numerous examples of self-seekers who spoke out at meetings in favor of raising white-collar pay and enhancing access to commodities and educational opportunities to parity with factory workers. The work of Elena Osokina and Julie Hessler has set out the elaborate rationing schemes of the early 1930s, schemes that placed most white-collar workers in less favored supply categories than workers at the bench.[16] For example, in March 1931, the secretary of a union shop committee [*tsekhkomitet*] in the Moscow Region complained about the lack of planning in the supply sector and weak union response.[17] She accused commercial workers of great laxity and slovenliness [*razgil'diastvo*] in managing reserves and timely delivery of goods. Another union voice called for the union to do more to enhance the cultural life and supply the daily material needs of the new armies of commercial employees. About 2,300 people were working in his geographical area, but there was still neither a club nor red corners, in short, no place to develop enlightenment and cultural work.[18] About 10 percent of the employees had not received work-related clothing. There were also no buffets and in several stores even the most elementary conveniences were lacking. Although he blamed some of this on inheriting the old commercial network, he advocated capital outlays to improve the working conditions of shop assistants. He called for close coordination and special and immediate provision for shock workers. Comrade Sokolov of the Lenin district union also decried the lack of leadership for shock workers and the need for enlightenment and production campaigns.

In both a recognition of the vast social changes underway in the lower capillaries of the state and perhaps the culturally determined sexism of the world of commercial employees, Sokolov noted that 900 female workers and large numbers of youth from the villages (sent by the labor exchange) had been sent to the local commercial and credit cooperative. These newcomers had to be taught how to carry out commercial work in a cultured manner. Also, he noted that many of the new commercial employees were coming to the cooperative from production, or blue-collar occupations, and that these affirmative action promotees [*vydvizhentsy*] needed in the first place to master the technical side of trade. True, they were enrolled in a six-month course

on these matters, but the course had proven inadequate to the task. Another local representative complained that there were simply too many 'illiterates and half literates' in his organization. Shock work bonuses had been given to five people, but later it was learned that they were the wrong people.

Some other topics given publicity in white-collar discourse between 1930 and 1934 included the need for new cadres in collective farms, in the state administration and especially in all areas of trade and commerce. In addition, new state officials would require specialized and relevant education and training (again with special emphasis on trade and commerce). This was true also for all occupations associated with economic planning and financial institutions. The press and archives contain masses of material reflecting union support for existing and new campaigns, including collectivization, socialist competition and *sheftstvo*, cultured trade, state loans, rationalization and technology.[19] Anti-bureaucracy campaigns, a central trope of Soviet history and of white-collar worker experience, were consistently promoted. The union also experienced the arrival on their turf of militant detachments of factory workers to assist in clean-ups or purges of the white-collar workplace. Union leadership itself attacked local union committees for not fulfilling their social contracts or for not verifying contracted obligations.

Other topics of union concern included proper accounting and implementation of new work norms, piece work, wage differentials and the like. Great fanfare surrounded calls for support of collectivization, planting and harvesting campaigns, growing one's own food to help various supply crises (ongoing into the war years and post-World War II reconstruction), and migration of labor [*otkhod*] to solve shortages. A number of important issues related to increasing the numbers of employees. In the wake of collectivization and industrialization the union wondered how best to fill white-collar labor shortages with the only two sources available, families of urban blue and white-collar workers, which meant women and rural surplus labor. The union strongly advocated affirmative action [*vydvizhenie*], while recognizing its problems and supported the elevation or transfer of workers into the white-collar and commercial workplace. Here there was much discourse replete with the usual examples of how to treat and not to treat the newly promoted proletarians in their white-collar positions. All the usual obstacles to such placements were publicized, including hostility and lack of support from managers and co-workers, outright deception of innocent *vydvizhentsy*, poor support from the union and so on. There was considerable talk of the need to bring women into the state administration, but little archival record of success in this endeavor.

The centrality of supply was reflected in the highlighting of problems and needs in the cooperative and other commercial institutions. From the era of War Communism (1918–21) right up to the division of the union into smaller components, commercial service employees comprised a significant segment of union membership. Already by 1931 the union was on board

with the party and state campaigns for cultured trade. The union exhorted employees to view commercial exchange not just as an economic activity, but also as an educational activity for commercial personnel and consumers alike. The union demanded that cooperative personnel master technology and develop in their workplaces the socialist competition and shock work campaigns.[20] False shock work existed and had to be eliminated. Of course there were also ongoing complaints against absenteeism, drunkenness, self-provisioning [*samosnabzhenie*], embezzlement, rudeness, the arbitrary raising of prices and obvious failures in supply mechanisms. Personal biographies of commercial personnel were cited that drew sharp contrasts between slave-like pre-1917 working conditions, the morally flawed era of NEP and the now orderly and morally healthy situations of the early 1930s.[21] Of course there were lots of positive examples of shock workers and others who excelled in the various campaigns. As the years passed there was an increase in scape-goating of the cooperative employees for deficiencies in the rural supply situation. One cure was always proletarianization of the workplace. Culture was a frequent topic in the sense of the need for union sponsored cultural work among the rank and file. This included clubs, red corners and libraries, improvements in literacy rates and care of the young (opening day care and summer camps for example).

Perhaps the major campaign of the period was *shefstvo*, which, as described above, sent brigades of workers from chosen factories into offices or commercial enterprises to act as energizers and ideological models. These brigades would observe and then participate in white-collar work and ostensibly pass on to their comrades still in transition proper socialist and production minded labor consciousness and technique. Purges of Gosplan and the commercial apparatus reveal clearly the nexus of state interests and the centrality of white-collar workers to any hopes of carrying out the second revolution, Stalin's assault on the peasantry and use of hyper-industrialization to complete the revolution and create an industrialized socialist great power. The state apparatus itself had to be made over in productionist terms. Here too, criticisms of the People's Commissariat of Labor and its failures on the personnel front foreshadowed the abolition of that institution and the transfer of many of its functions to the unions. The union recognized its failures to influence in a positive way its constituents in the militia, especially in rural areas.

The big aim of getting white-collar workers to turn toward production of course had been heard before, throughout the 1920s in fact. But the thirties brought to this theme a heightened and obsessive urgency. Purification and integration were the goals set for the white-collar workers as the chief mediators between the vast array of structures that were market substitutes and the population. White-collar leaders, if not the rank and file, were aware of the history of this social group, however. Obsessive proletarian ideology of the regime worked against the social and cultural development of white-collar

workers apart from the proletariat. They were destined to remain a large and ambiguous social force that was deprived of honor and hence of potential in the ongoing Soviet project. The seventeenth Party Congress in 1934 in fact transferred lower level control functions from the TsKK/RKI to the trade unions. Kotliar went on record claiming that the earlier breaking up of the trade unions (not only the white-collar union) would allow greater autonomy and capacity for fulfilling a wide range of social and cultural goals for the rank and file. (Total union membership had risen from 11 million in 1922 to 23 million in 1934; the Union of Government Employees had 550,000 in 1931 after *razukrupnenie* and in 1934 was up to 800,000, embracing 80,000 workplaces.) This was not a return to *tsekhovshchina* [shop loyalty], as opponents had argued, but a source of new union strength, especially given the important occupations represented by the union. It would be decades however, before rank and file white-collar workers would begin to share fully in the promises of the Soviet project.

Postwar reconstruction and renewal

The end of World War II brought new challenges to white-collar workers, challenges that once again were reflections of the larger social, economic and political framework. By 1945 it was no longer a question of proving the 'proletarian' nature of white-collar workers. They were already an integral part of the social body. But like the larger society, white-collar workers had to fight for survival under the harsh economic conditions of postwar reconstruction and the, sometimes complicating, political agendas of the regime.[22] Just as during the war, when the white-collar workers were called upon for extraordinary service in helping to manage the evacuated state apparatus and economic institutions, work which included caring for the wounded and their families, raising funds and restoring Soviet power in areas formerly occupied by the Germans, now white-collar workers were needed to rebuild the state and overcome the unimaginable destruction of the economy.[23]

Some of the key issues for the postwar Union of State Employees included renovation and construction of new housing, including renovation and supply of apartments for war veterans and invalids and the creation of workshops for the sewing of clothing and making of footwear (in this discussion it was argued that Gosplan officials needed their own workshops—*masterskie*—to process acquired raw materials). A major topic of all union plenums and congresses from 1945 into the early 1950s was food supply and more specifically gardens. A large quantity of white-collar food intake was provided by the employees' own gardens, and the union promoted this activity with energy and insistence. In 1945, for example, 186,073 union members had gardens and this represented an increase of 34.9 percent over 1944.[24] These gardens produced 128,519 tons of potatoes and 27,381 tons of vegetables. The union also promoted individual livestock and poultry production. This

would continue to be necessary until poor harvests and flawed distribution could be overcome. The union recognized the need for better sanitary conditions in cafeterias and intensification and improvement of consumer culture and service in shops as well as general control over store operations.[25] There were complaints at the tenth plenum of the union that the war had derailed organizational work, that there was little reporting and few union elections. This, the union leadership noted, was being fixed. New union cadres were working hard to accomplish this and were raising practical questions, often about labor law.[26] During the war both state and union paid little attention to questions of overtime, regular payment of wages and workplace safety. Large supplies of literature were needed for lower level organs to educate union activists and employees on these matters. On 1 January 1946 there were only 2,289 members of commissions on workplace safety and 1,663 inspectors for the entire Soviet Union. Tellingly, the union described preparations for the winter of 1946, which included securing enough light, heat and building reparations to permit ongoing work. White-collar workers were, it would appear, physically involved in the reconstruction of Soviet cities. By 1951, union concerns had shifted away from the immediate food and housing needs, for example, to renewed concern for innovation and rationalization in office work and in the various specialization occupations. This signaled the beginning of a paradigm shift away from the earlier sense of inferiority and the material hardships of postwar reconstruction to growing confidence and a shared sense of responsibility for administration of the economy and the well-being of the state apparatus itself. In addition, as was revealed in the materials of the fourth Congress of the Union of State Employees, the union was promoting verification of the work of production conferences. The union was proud that it now had some 850 paid officials of its own, a union *aktiv*, whose mission it was to educate and train new state officials. One speaker cited problems in Uzbekistan, where cultural barriers persisted, including the forcing of women to take the veil and to stay out of the workforce.[27] The Procuracy was accused of not doing its job in preventing such violations of the law. And it was noted that there was too little literature and too few libraries to educate and promote culture change. The question of the composition of the union was raised. It was now, in the most recent reorganization, a union of state employees, but many economic organs as well as all manner of others not strictly related to core government institutions had been included. Noted also was a special need to educate employees in Western Ukraine, because they had lived under Soviet power for such a short time, and the need for greater pay differentials according to occupation.

By 1952, the union had regained sufficient confidence to declare that white-collar workers were now part of the Soviet intelligentsia. This was quite a statement considering that for decades this massive social layer had claimed allegiance if not membership in the proletariat. Did this signify

the maturation of Soviet society and white-collar workers as a social group? Were white-collar workers, by differentiating themselves from workers, in fact distancing themselves from the proletariat, believing themselves to have higher status conferred by education, job skills, technical expertise and the like? This would certainly fit our picture of the postwar Soviet ministerial bureaucracy as growing in size and stature. It would signal that the Union of State Employees now viewed its constituency as having new clout derived through its numbers and occupations, and possibly even its youth and energy. Again there was talk of production conferences, rationalization, budget savings, socialist competition and abuse by administrators.[28] There was new emphasis on honorary signifiers, boards of honor, certificates of achievement, comrades courts and the like.

The Union of State Employees held its next and fifth All-Union Congress more than one year after Stalin's death on 11–13 April 1954.[29] Here the emphasis was on anti-bureaucracy discourse, the availability of more consumer goods and rising standards of living. Petelin, the long-standing survivor in the ranks of union leadership, gave the chair's report. He noted that it had been three years since the last congress, but that these were years of great successes for the Soviet people. He noted that the 1955 plan for production of consumer goods would be reached in 1954, but that further gains in this area would depend upon improvements in agriculture. The state had also lowered prices.

The central committee had been reviewing the work of judicial organs in various regions. As a signal to the delegates, he noted that in Azerbaijan, the state had removed one high judicial official for excessive '*biurokratizm*' (of course this might have been interpreted by those same delegates as a weak response to the problem). The union's domain now was centered in economic, soviet and judicial apparatuses as well as many central ministries, and yet the age-old battle against red tape continued. The union, as in the past, was taking its cue from the signals of the highest leadership. In this case, Petelin cited Georgii Malenkov, who had given an anti-bureaucracy speech at a meeting of Moscow voters. Petelin described the vast quantities of paper produced and expenditures in money and time. The rush toward economic growth and entire realms of state activity were choking in paper and the state institutions had put up a wall of bureaucracy to block effective 'social control'.

Officials decried the situation in many ministries and offered many examples of ministerial officials producing endless formalistic bureaucratic reports instead of substantive work. There was apparently a proliferation of insulting language and behavior in the offices and courts. Meaningless reports [*otchetnost'*] were generated, as lower levels were required to make all requests up the reporting hierarchies in writing. Nikita Khrushchev, general secretary of the Communist Party in 1954 and emerging at that time as the number one Soviet leader, was cited as supporting the discourse of

anti-bureaucracy (as was and would be the case with virtually all new Soviet leaders). Opposition from the bureaucracy itself could be expected for education rationalization campaigns and attempts to reform the internal work regimes in the ministries.

The union was also concerned with the health and safety of children, increasing numbers of Pioneer camps (summer camps for young children) and improving them, and a host of issues related to medical care and insurance of employees and their families. Cases of abuse were cited, including payments for pregnancies that did not exist. The union had spent 80 million rubles on sending 135,000 employee members to rest and vacation facilities. Delegates expressed quite a few complaints about the lack of effective workplace safety inspectors. And the large-scale inspection of employee dormitories in 1952 had uncovered massive inadequacies. Similar problems existed in the functioning of people's courts, social security department and the militia. The union was clearly a sounding board for the very real problems of daily life encountered by white-collar workers and their families. The voluminous materials of the 1954 union congress do not mention Stalin.

The sixth Congress of the Union of Employees of State Institutions met in Moscow on 9–11 April 1956.[30] Petelin remained Chair of the Central Committee and again he emphasized the positive, Soviet economic growth, the high status of the Soviet model abroad, Soviet foreign policy advances, and, of course, the 'great historical circumstances' surrounding the work and decisions of the 20th Party Congress.[31] As set forth by high government authority, the mission [*zadacha*] of the white-collar workers was to assist the Soviet people in catching up with and surpassing the productivity of the most developed capitalist countries. This required continued improvement of the working conditions and daily life of both workers and employees. Now the agenda was to raise real wages, move toward a seven-hour work day (and for some occupations and professions a six-hour day), increase pensions (especially at the lower end of the scale), cancel fees for education in senior level classes in secondary schools, middle, specialized and higher education institutions. Beginning on 10 March 1956, the state shortened workdays by two hours in the days prior to days off and holidays. And 1 April 1956 brought increased pregnancy and birth leaves. Public dining facilities had been improved as well as housing construction, which had doubled in comparison to the previous five-year plan. The template of issues covered in these documents of the early 1950s shed light on both the domestic and workplace lives of white-collar workers.

A large part of union effort had gone toward strengthening the state apparatus by working with the ministries to implement a combination of staff and budget cuts mandated by government edicts. In 1955 alone, union-sponsored measures resulted in savings of more than 6 billion rubles. 37,500 positions had been cut in the financial and credit sectors (saving 300 million rubles per year), 5,700 positions were cut in the Central Statistical

Administration (saving 40 million rubles per year) and 5,000 positions in the Ministry of Justice (30 million rubles saved). The union was also working to remove duplicate institutions and branches within the state administration. Petelin recognized Gosplan, the Ministry of Finance and the Central Statistical Administration for their efforts here, but noted that the bureaucracy was still vast and expensive—and that 'chancery methods' still distanced officialdom from laboring people. White-collar workers were at once part of the problem and its solution as well as victims of bureaucratic malpractices. Labor security and safety measures, collective wage agreements, rationalization and innovation were also topics for discussion. The Union at all levels had to put more pressure on administrators and economic managers who violated collective wage agreements.[32]

Petelin reviewed the January 1956 reunification of financial and banking employees with the union of state employees. This, he noted, had brought back into the union a significant number of Soviet intelligentsia. This would permit better performance at lower costs and the creation of new union organizations in the villages. The 20th Party Congress celebrated a new level of Soviet economic achievement and standard of living of the people. The fifth five-year plan had been fulfilled in four years and four months and grain production in 1955 was up 22 percent over the previous year. The union had to join in and make real recent party and Council of Minister calls for the mobilization of all workers and employees in the agrarian sphere. As to the cult of personality, the union echoed party calls for recognizing its particular sins and the need for collective leadership. Unions, after all, were the true vanguard of the party line. The unions had been criticized for not being militant enough and not showing enough initiative in carrying out this function. The Union of Government Employees, which represented the rank and file functionaries in the financial, economic, statistical, planning and judicial organs, as well as the Ministry of Internal Affairs, KGB and Ministry of Defense, saw itself well placed to shape the daily life and workplace experiences of a new generation of Soviet officials.

Conclusion

White-collar workers were an integral part of the Soviet experience, both in their social roles as a significant portion of the Soviet population and in their occupational roles as functionaries in state institutions. It is in the latter role that we may see them most clearly as 'bureaucrats' or 'officials'. The history of the employees is one of the central processes of the long 20th century in the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union and now the Russian Federation. This is clearly seen in several of the essays in this volume. For example, Stephen Velychenko's chapter shows clearly how the process of white-collar social formation came about in Ukraine. Administering the borderlands was

a central problem for the Russian Empire and ironically, the army of white-collar administrators who were meant to be Russian state builders was in fact capable of holding multiple identities. In the maelstrom of war and revolution many turned to Ukrainian nationalism and they became bearers of a new state building project. In fact white-collar workers and by extension state officials cannot be separated from any state building or imperial project, including the Soviet and Russian Federation examples studied in this volume (see Alexander Morrison's essay on colonial administrators and the series of essays on post-Soviet bureaucracy).

The survey of white-collar worker history offered here is by no means complete. There is still no accurate and complete map of Soviet occupations. Ethnicity and gender and white-collar social and administrative roles in the borderlands must be integrated into the analysis. The subject is vast and here we have tried to paint a general picture formed on the basis of several fruitful conjunctures of white-collar experience. The purges of the late 1930s and the experience of World War II are largely omitted in favor of the earlier 1930s and post-World War II reconstruction. The 1950s provide a glimpse into the maturation process of white-collar 'class consciousness'. This maturing social group would have a central role in the ensuing decades of high Sovietism culminating in the Gorbachev era and the end of the Soviet Union.

Notes

1. Moshe Lewin takes some notice of the white-collar workers in Lewin, *The Soviet Century* (London and New York: Verso, 2005), 55–72.
2. The best study of early Soviet bureaucracy from its institutional and social standpoints is Don K. Rowney, *Transition to Technocracy: The Structural Origins of the Soviet Administrative State* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).
3. Fortunately, the handful of in-depth studies of Soviet professions during the first decades of the Soviet period (usually with reference to the pre-revolutionary background) are excellent. For example, Martine Mespoulet, *Statistique et revolution en Russie. Un compromis impossible (1880–1930)* (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2001); Alain Blum and Martine Mespoulet, *L'anarchie bureaucratique: pouvoir et statistique sous Staline* (Paris: Editions la Decouverte, 2003); E. Thomas Ewing, *The Teachers of Stalinism: Policy, Practice and Power in Soviet Schools of the 1930s* (New York: Peter Lang, 2002); Kendall E. Bailes, *Technology and Society under Lenin and Stalin: Origins of the Soviet Technical Intelligentsia, 1917–1941* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).
4. Daniel Orlovsky, 'The Hidden Class: White Collar Workers in the Soviet 1920s', in *Making Workers Soviet*, L. Siegelbaum and R. Suny, eds (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994) and 'The Lower Middle Strata in Revolutionary Russia', in *Civil Society in Late Imperial Russia*, Clewes, S. Kassow and J. West, eds (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).
5. It is telling that cooperative workers were included in the new union. The cooperatives were a fundamental economic and building block of the new socialist order. Their roots, like those of the white-collar unions, went back to the 1905 era, when activists created the cooperative movement as an alternative form of

exchange and credit that promised social justice within a capitalist system. The cooperative movement flourished in Russia in the prewar years and through the war itself. After February 1917, the Provisional Government favored the cooperative networks over the traditional merchants in key areas of food supply and credit. Lenin took his cue from all this and declared the cooperatives to be a fundamental element in the building of socialism. This view, articulated during the era of War Communism, was carried over into the 1920s and the New Economic Policy.

6. Some basic statistics may be found in V. B. Zhiromskaia, *Naselenie Rossii v XX veke: istoricheski ocherki* (Moscow: Rosspen, 2001) and subsequent volumes and parts, and V. B. Zhiromskaia, *Demografisheskaia istoriia Rossii v 1930-e gody: vzgliad v neizvestnoe* (Moscow: Rosspen, 2001).
7. An excellent discussion of early Soviet social definitions is found in T. Smirnova, 'Byvshie liudi', *Sovetskoi Rossii: Strategii vyzhivaniia i puti integratsii 1917–1936 gody* (Moscow: Mir istorii, 2003), 23–52.
8. Hiroaki Kuromiya, *Stalin's Industrial Revolution: Politics and Workers, 1928–1932* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Donald Filtzer, *Soviet Workers and Stalinist Industrialization: The Formation of Modern Soviet Production Relations, 1928–1941* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1986); Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930's* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
9. Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Stalin's Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village After Collectivization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
10. *Nasha Gazeta*. Ezhedevnaia gazeta TsK I MOO profsoiuza sovtorgsluzhashchikh SSSR, 7 November 1934.
11. V. B. Zhiromskaia, *Demografisheskaia istoriia Rossii.*
12. GARF f. 7709, op. 23 and 24.
13. *Nasha gazeta*, 11 January 1931 and GARF f. 7709, op. 24 and 25.
14. *Nasha gazeta*, 11 March 1931.
15. These were two campaign modes developed in the 1920s that remained part of the Soviet arsenal of ways to work harder, to produce more. These mechanisms involved various forms of group pressure and incentive. The Soviet system required these group motivational tactics as substitutes for labor incentives common to market economies.
16. Julie Hessler, *A Social History of Soviet Trade: Trade Policy, Retail Practices, and Consumption, 1917–1953* (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 2004) and Elena Osokina, *Za fasadom stalinskogo 'Izobiliia'; raspredelenie i rynok v snabzhenii naseleniia v gody industrializatsii, 1927–1941* (Moscow: Rosspen, 1998).
17. *Nasha gazeta*, 16 March 1931.
18. Social clubs and Red Corners were elemental locations of the Soviet regime's cultural work. The former supplied organized cultural activity and the latter basic reading material and these helped to define and official version of Soviet leisure time.
19. Cultured trade was a campaign to elevate behavioral norms in the retail sales setting. It may be seen as a feature of the general turn in official policy toward more middle class values in the 1930s.
20. For example, *Nasha gazeta*, 6, 16, 25 March 1931.
21. *Nasha gazeta*, 26 February 1931.
22. For the economic situation and political pressures faced by blue-collar labor during the immediate postwar years, see Donald Filtzer, *Soviet Workers and*

Late Stalinism: Labor and the Restoration of the Soviet System after World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). A more general treatment of the postwar Soviet Union is Elena Zubkova, *Russia after the War: Hopes, Illusions and Disappointments 1945–1957* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998). On the high politics of the period see Y. Gorlizki and O. Khlevniuk, *Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945–1953* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). Moshe Lewin has done pioneering work on the general status and shape of the post World War II bureaucracy in Lewin, *The Soviet Century*, 121–42.

23. GARF f. 7709, op. 27II, d. 46 1943. It is clear, though we have no concrete numbers, that there were large numbers of white-collar casualties during the war as, for example, in Stalingrad.
24. GARF f. 7709, op. 27 II, d. 47.
25. For the background on these issues, Hessler, *A Social History of Soviet Trade* and Osokina, Za fasadom 'stalinskogo ozobiliia'.
26. GARF f. 7709, op. 16, d. 3.11. 4–24
27. GARF f. 7709, op. 21, d. 1a.
28. See the various plenums of the union Central Committee for 1952 in GARF f. 7709, op. 22, d. 1, 4 and GARF f. 7709, op. 23, d. 1.
29. GARF f. 7709, op. 24, d. 2a ll 42–158.
30. GARF f. 7709, op. 26, d. 1.
31. It was at that party congress that Khrushchev officially launched the process of de-Stalinization. He criticized Stalin's 'cult of personality' as well as his lawless repressions of party leaders and his failure to prepare the Soviet Union adequately for Hitler's 1941 attack of the Soviet Union. His so-called secret speech at the Congress had major reverberations throughout the Soviet bloc as well as at home. See William Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (New York: Norton, 2003), 270–300.
32. At the congress, union leadership noted quantitative improvements in several areas including culture, health and especially physical education, while also documenting material inadequacies, abuses, and comic contradictions. GARF f. 7709, op. 26, d.31.1 II Plenum TsK Union of State Employees, 24–25 July 1956.

10
Survival Strategies in the Soviet Bureaucracy: The Case of the Statistics Administration

Martine Mespoulet

In every state the production of statistical data is distinct. A 'field of interaction between the worlds of knowledge and power',[1] statistics is located between the regimes of scientific information and of political action, between the world of science and that of administration. As a result, statisticians operate at the nexus of constraints imposed by the administrators of the organizations in which they work and the exigencies of a discipline that requires scientific rigor that is defined by methodological rules established by the community of statisticians. The production of statistical data is thus a field of confrontation between one logic aimed at the construction of knowledge of a scientific nature—that of the statisticians—and another logic essentially aimed toward political action—that of persons of power, their principals and agents. This condition creates a field of tension, debate and conflict. Both as a scholar and pragmatic expert, the statistician in state administration is subject to the tension between two extreme poles in the use of numbers, which are knowledge and power. The state statistician is therefore torn between the application of statistics as a tool of government, which justifies official policy, and as an instrument of knowledge.[2]

This tension became all the stronger in the USSR when the state advanced a plan for the radical transformation of economy and society, in which the production of statistical data acquired the status of a challenge for the state, at once a tool of information and an instrument of propaganda.[3] The legitimacy of the Bolshevik state, an *état-savant*, was founded in part upon the attribution of an aura of scientific authority to decisions of power. The product of statistics was information and tools of decision, but it also became an instrument of power for it sought to demonstrate the justice of state actions. Set up to serve as proof of this justice, statistics contributed to the symbolic construction of the social and economic worlds of the Soviet state. This function of statistics emerged most plainly in the implementation of economic planning: one and the same statistic indicating an objective

to be attained and evidence of its realization. There was to have been no discrepancy between the two.

Such an ambition presumed a statistical revolution. This revolution subsumed several dimensions, which were characterized by a certain number of internal contradictions. Some of these contradictions evolved, during the 1920s and 1930s, through the enduring scientific and administrative practices of the first statisticians who were in charge of Soviet statistical administration, and who were attached to the notion of statistics as a science in the service of the construction of the modern state. In 1918 these individuals had organized a centralized administration of state statistics, the Central Statistical Administration (TsSU),[4] the institutional foundations of which rested upon principles enunciated by international congresses of statisticians during the 19th century.[5]

The first statisticians of the Soviet state remained faithful to their understanding of the role of statistics as science, a position that provoked tension with Bolshevik political authorities during the 1920s. For the statisticians, science was supposed to elucidate the art of governance and thus to be independent of power. For the Bolsheviks, on the contrary, statistics had to serve the construction of a new society and thus be controlled by state power. As Lenin wrote:

> The Central Administration of Statistics must not be an organ which is 'academic' and 'independent,' a present-day characteristic of the nine-tenths who follow old bourgeois habits; it must be an organ for the construction of socialism, for verification and accountability of that which the socialist state must comprehend now, today.[6]

Statisticians defended a realist notion of statistics that was based upon data that were reflective of empirical reality. By contrast, political authorities treated statistical data as one instrument (among many) for the construction of socialist reality.

The institutional continuity of the TsSU with the pre-revolutionary era, which was also bound up with the continuity of personnel, was merely the observable face of various legacies from the discipline of statistical work, the methods and tools of observation, which were applicable to the maintenance of certain administrative practices that operated behind the observable institutional changes.[7] This coexistence between a strong continuity of individuals and practices and a political discourse of rupture explained the numerous tensions between statisticians and political administrators that emerged from the beginning of the 1920s.[8] Statisticians were subjected to different forms of political pressure with which they nevertheless managed to cope. In particular they continued to develop statistical plans and theories meant to respond to the proposals which the

Bolshevik political authorities actually needed from statistical data in order to construct a socialist economy and society.

When these tensions assumed an extreme form with the purge which reached into the TsSU in 1937, several administrators were arrested, imprisoned and even shot.[9] However, others were not touched. Many statisticians continued to work within the TsSU; others found employment in other organizations, whether in administration or in research, or in a higher education establishment.

The purge of 1937 was not all-consuming, then, within the TsSU. This outcome demonstrates the inadequacy of any analysis that would aim at presenting the purges as a political logic, which was thoroughly coherent and implacable. In such circumstances, it is necessary to take into account the behavior of individual actors in order to understand better the way in which a given decision was taken and implemented. How will the careers of high-ranking statisticians in the TsSU in this period illustrate the behavior of adaption, or survival of certain statisticians who found themselves out of step with the authorities? How will they illustrate the strategies of self-preservation shaped by individuals who were facing real or perceived threats from the authorities? Following the work of Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot, we shall consider that these social actors shaped their conduct according to their understanding of their social environment and the analysis of situations that they created.[10]

In order to explain the fate of statisticians who occupied important positions in the TsSU during the 1930s, it is necessary to reconstruct their different professional and organizational trajectories. Can one distinguish different types of career paths corresponding to precise forms of adaptation or survival behaviors? What types of resources did these statisticians mobilize in order to construct these behaviors? We shall consider as analytic variables their education and their varying responsibilities as well as their participation in certain social or professional networks or in the Communist Party. Finally, what role did theoretical and methodological compromise play in the context of their redefinition of the concepts, tools and methods deployed for the construction of a new type of economy and society?

A study of the career biographies of these statisticians between 1930 and 1960 allows us to distinguish three types of career paths that take into account the degree of their distance from political power: the path of adherence, the path of adaptation and the path of avoidance. These paths can be associated with different forms of political engagement and relations between the world of science and the sphere of politics.

Three types of career paths

The route of political adherence

One may include in this category paths marked by militant, political engagement in both the pre-revolutionary period and after October 1917. In these

cases, scientific activity was a form of political engagement designed to serve the construction of a new state.[11] The attitude of these statisticians was marked by a commitment to a social system that goes beyond the idea of loyalty as used by Albert Hirschman. Three statisticians are representative of this behavior, V. I. Khotimskii, S. G. Strumilin and B. S. Iastremskii, but their fate through the purges and beyond differed. The purges were fatal for the first while the other two lived until the 1960s.

Political activities dominated the career of Khotimskii between 1917 and 1923. After serving as a member of the executive committee of the Ekaterinburg Soviet from April 1917 to July 1918, he occupied positions of political responsibility in various regions until March 1921. The most important of these was in the central committee of Workers and Peasants Inspection. He became vice rector of the Communist University of Workers of the Orient in Moscow until December 1923. Meanwhile, when he turned to activities that were strictly scientific, his political past seemed to serve as a passport for entrance into certain new organizations of Soviet education and provided him with an aura of political reliability. Thus, from 1924 to 1927, he taught mathematics at the Plekhanov National Institute in Moscow and from 1927 to 1932, he was a researcher and then director of the mathematics section of the Communist Academy. After this he joined the State Planning Commission (Gosplan) at the moment when this organization was developing its authority over administrative statistics. In 1934 and 1935 he directed the auditing section of Gosplan in the Russian Republic (RSFSR), and then became the head of the department of population and health statistics of the Central Directorate of Accounting for the National Economy (TsUNKhU).[12] In this case as well, his political and professional past—combining scientific competence and political reliability—seems to have been regarded as a guarantee of fulfilling the roles of administering the plan and statistical auditing. This background also qualified him to serve as general editor, with Iastremskii, of the official statistical reference manual used during the 1930s, which was published under the authority of Gosplan.[13]

Nonetheless, after 1935, his role as head of the department of population and health statistics in the TsUNKhU exposed him to the threat of the purge that fell upon those who played an active role in the preparation and organization of the census of 1937.[14] He was arrested in 1937 and died in 1939. His case calls into question the degree of confidence which the powers of an authoritarian state such as the USSR might accord to senior functionaries whom they had chosen at a given moment on the basis of professional competence and political reliability, the latter based upon either of two criteria: their participation in the revolutionary movement before 1917 or their association with the Bolshevik Party.

Confronted with the same situation, Strumilin did not experience the same fate, since he survived the purges of the 1930s, but with this difference as compared to Khotimskii: he became a member of the Communist (Bolshevik) Party beginning in 1923 after having resigned from the

Mensheviks in 1920.[15] Did this attachment to the Bolsheviks give him greater protection from the threat of repression? Strumilin was initiated into statistics in the economics department of the Polytechnic Institute of St Petersburg where he had pursued his higher education. Following this he directed statistics departments, first, at the National Council for Fuel Supply, 1916–17, and the Petrograd Commissariat of Labor, 1918–19, and then at the Central Office of Statistics of the Moscow Commissariat of Labor until 1921.[16]

His scientific work was intimately bound up with his political preoccupations. In the course of his years at the Commissariat of Labor, he was the initiator of numerous statistical investigations into the organization of labor and problems of work-place qualification. He also started the first worker time studies prior to his departure for Gosplan, where he became a member of the presidium in 1923 and vice-chairman from 1928.[17] The objective of these inquiries was in particular to analyze the effects on workers' living conditions of the decree of November 1917, regarding the reduction of the work-day to a maximum of eight hours. Under his direction, time-budget inquiries were integrated into a much broader range of studies on work, education and the training and way of life of workers, the objective of which was to study the concrete influence on the life of Soviet citizens of measures taken by the new authorities for the construction of socialism. For Strumilin, a fervent defender of the economic Plan, these inquiries were equally useful for evaluating problems of planning relating to manpower resources, investments devoted to everyday life and culture, and to city management.

His dismissal from the TsSU in June 1937 neither placed his life in danger nor his professional career in jeopardy. After 1951, he occupied different positions within Gosplan. Notably he was a vice president, a member of the presidium, and on the Council on Scientific Expertise and Technology. At the same time he was intensely active in the fields of economics and statistics, and he wrote various works in statistics and labor economics.[18]

How should one analyze the two different destinies of Khotimskii and Strumilin? Membership in the Communist Party of the latter, his leadership roles in Gosplan and his position as a member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR beginning in 1931 in all likelihood worked in his favor after 1937. He was much more involved than Khotimskii in the organizational apparatus of economic management of the Soviet state and had surely nourished close linkages with the authorities of that apparatus. During the 1920s and the 1930s, his scientific work had shifted smoothly from questions of labor statistics toward others bound up with economic planning.[19] A sign of the maintenance of his close proximity with the party was his receipt, for the third time, in 1957, of the Order of Lenin for his work in the discipline of economics. Surely, one can concur with E. B. Korsitsky: 'Perhaps the secret of Strumilin's longevity was contained not only in the details of his personality but also in his vision of the means of development of

socialism which always coincided perfectly with the views of the supreme authorities of the country.'[20] Strumilin fully adhered to the ideal of progress upon which the Bolshevik state's project for the construction of socialism rested. He developed his work within this framework.

Although he was also a member of the party, the life course of Iastremskii represented a different case. The son of a famous populist from the Peoples' Will group, he grew up in the revolutionary tradition of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. This past allowed him to benefit from Lenin's confidence after the October revolution. Lenin invited him to join the small group of statisticians who were organizing the central administration of statistics of the new Bolshevik state. We note, moreover, that his training had fully prepared him for statistical work. Having finished his studies in the faculty of physics and mathematics at the University of Kharkov, he worked on the theory of applied probability in the field of insurance, notably in the mathematics section of the Society for the Study of Insurance, of which he was secretary beginning in 1909. After October 1917 he was named director of the department of Statistics of the Commissariat for Affairs of Insurance after which, in 1918, he joined the TsSU as chief of the Department for Problems of Social Insurance. He resigned from this position in 1926 to assume the leadership of the Department of Statistical Methods and then the Section of Statistical Theory within the Institute for Experimental Statistics and Statistical Methods, where he remained until 1933.

The year 1931 was a turning point in Iastremskii's career. He accepted a position with Gosplan and simultaneously pursued both a career in teaching and as a state statistician. Beginning in 1932 he taught mathematical statistics at Moscow State University and in other higher education establishments in Moscow—notably the Plekhanov Institute of National Economy, the Planning Institute, and the Institute of Economics and Statistics. He held chairs of mathematics and subsequently of statistics at the Moscow Institute of Economics and Statistics (MIES). In these positions he was at the center of the theoretical debates on the adaptation of statistics to the quantitative needs connected with the construction of socialism. He was responsible for training numerous statisticians within the TsUNKhU—notably, L. S. Brandgendler, arrested in 1937, I. Iu. Pisarev, promoted in 1938 to director of the department of demography of the TsUNKhU after the purge of 1937, and V. N. Starovskii, Director of the TsUNKhU beginning in 1938. This double activity—scientific and pedagogical—explains why he assumed, with Khotimskii, the role of co-director of the preparation of the statistics reference manual, mentioned above, published by the Statistical Administration. Two of his students, Brandgendler and Starovskii, were also part of the team of authors of that work. Joining the party in 1936, he devoted numerous works to the study of the reformulation of questions of statistics following the approach of historical materialism.[21] In 1938 he became a member of the Scientific and Methodological Council of the TsSU of the USSR. He died in 1962.

Khotimskii and Strumilin perfectly personified the continuation during the Bolshevik regime of the interconnections between professional engagement and political commitment that characterized the behavior of certain Russian intellectuals of the pre-revolutionary period. Their adhesion to the political program of the Bolsheviks conditioned them to accept the constraints—indeed, the threats—of the Bolshevik way of exercising power, and to suppress their eventual disagreements, leading them to accept certain adjustments to their own vision of the world. For them the aim of progress was primary. The case of Khotimskii, nevertheless, demonstrates that the confidence of the party was far from complete.

In the light of his case one might also formulate the hypothesis that scientific organizations could have served, at the moment under consideration, as a place of refuge, less exposed, when the political situation became menacing for certain statisticians who were profoundly involved in the development of data for the state. To the extent that these organizations confronted the political powers less directly and less frequently, they served as refuges in periods of great tension. That could explain the various comings and goings of certain statisticians between the two spheres of statistical activity, that of science and administration, which tend to complicate the understanding which one might have of the relation between science and politics in the USSR.

The route of adaptation

This route may be characterized by the fact that scientific activity was always a priority for the statisticians concerned, even for those who had been strongly engaged politically before 1917. Their belief in science as the instrument of progress went together with a concern for preserving the greatest possible margin of autonomy from political authorities in their work. This attitude encouraged them to work out scientific compromises in their attempt to find practicable scientific modes of action that met their own scientific standards and the political demands that were imposed upon them. The cases of Polliak and Boiarskii illustrate this type of behavior very well.

G. S. Polliak was taken on as a statistician in the St. Petersburg Bureau of Research into River Routes at the conclusion of his studies in 1911. He joined the TsSU at its creation in 1918, becoming chief of the Department of Labor Statistics in 1919, a position he occupied until 1926. He was a former Menshevik like Strumilin, but unlike the latter he did not join the Communist Party after the October Revolution. He concentrated his professional activity on labor statistics. After 1926 he occupied various positions in this field within the Statistical Directorate. His participation in the organization and implementation of various demographic censuses between 1920 and 1937 was also linked to his interest in questions concerning labor, since he was charged with the development of the nomenclature for professional occupations.[22]

For Polliak and the statisticians of the TsSU, demographic censuses constituted a moment of confrontation between the construction of socialist reality and the forms of resistance to change in the society and the economy. In the effort to confirm an image of success in constructing a socialist society, the population census constituted a pivotal link between statistical tools and the construction of the reality of the Soviet state.[23]

As in every country, the categorization of individuals and phenomena under study was an object of negotiation between different administrations or organizations, but it assumed a special risk in the USSR where the management of society rested on the classification of the population into diverse categories. In particular the TsSU statisticians struggled to make the necessary adaptations to square the census categories with the social class structure adopted by the party or the officially adopted list of nationalities. This work of adjustment, which varied according to period and to the discourses and political priorities of the moment, was an ongoing source of tensions between statisticians and political authorities as well as a source of the warnings addressed to the former by the latter. The case of the definition of professional categories in the 1920s and 1930s highlighted certain forms of adjustment undertaken by Polliak.

The occupation categories in the censuses of 1920 and 1926 were developed under Polliak's authority in accord with resolutions of international congresses of statisticians and the experiences of European censuses. But in 1926, the greatest difficulty for him consisted in the specification of a professional categorization that would present an analysis of social classes that conformed with the wishes of the party. In his introduction to a dictionary of occupations used for the treatment of census data, Polliak specified how to classify census interviewees in this way, all the while recognizing the difficulties presented by such an exercise.[24] In the explanations which he provided, the use of the category 'class' seemed more a linguistic compromise than the appropriation of an empirically useful concept for analysis.

The questionnaire protocol developed by statisticians in 1935 for the 1937 census was in conformity with that of the census of 1926. Polliak was again responsible for establishing occupational categories, upon whose foundation the social classification of individuals would rest. In reality, underneath a reductionist classification into large social groups, or classes, in accordance with the times, there remained a very detailed nomenclature of 'occupations' which made an understanding of social diversity possible.

Polliak would be among those who were ousted from the TsSU after Stalin's decision to annul the results of the census of 1937. This happened in May 1938. It is difficult to find information about him in the following years, in all likelihood owing to the Second World War and also perhaps because he found one or more places of refuge. He died in 1954.

Aron Iakovlevich Boiarskii (1906–85) received his education during the 1920s. Having been educated from the age of 14 in a children's commune

in the Moscow region, he began his advanced studies in 1923 in the statistics department of the Faculty of Social Sciences of Moscow State University. Upon completion of his work at the university he was employed at the Communist Academy and afterwards at the TsSU, where he became a researcher in the department of statistical methods. During this time he continued to teach statistics in higher education establishments in Moscow. Did his status as a member of the Communist Party, beginning in 1931, have an influence on his appointment to the various academic responsibilities in which he was employed? From 1933 to 1945 he was adjunct director of the National Institute of Accounts. From this base he subsequently contributed to the organization of the Moscow Institute of Economics and Statistics (MIES), of which, for several years, he held the chair of statistics and then of demography. In 1940 he received the title of Doctor of Economic Sciences.

Boiarskii was named professor in 1953 and, from 1964 until 1983, he held the chair of statistics in the Economics Faculty of Moscow State University. In 1963 he resumed scientific activity within the statistical administration of the state, assuming the direction of the Scientific Institute of Research, newly created, within the TsSU of the USSR. Thus, he again pursued two parallel careers, one in the university and the other in the sector of research of statistical administration, where he worked until 1978, his seventy-second year. In 1979 he was re-appointed to the chair of statistics of Moscow State University and then, in 1983, to the chair of mathematical methods of economic analysis.

The entirety of his academic career was associated with prestigious venues of statistical education in the USSR. It was also within this capacity that he participated in the activities of the TsSU, where, for many years, he was the vice president of its council of science and methods. In 1967, at the age of 61, he received the honorific title of Master Emeritus of Science of the Russian Federal Republic in recognition of his contribution to the organization and development of state statistics. He presided over the statistical section of the House of Savants of the USSR Academy of Sciences until the end of his life. Boiarskii produced numerous books and articles and collaborated with others in the preparation of the reference manual of statistics of the 1930s directed by Iastremskii and Khotimskii. The fact that he had an essentially academic career surely protected him during the period of great stress within the central administration of statistics. A member of the party, he pursued the career of a Soviet scientific functionary devoted principally to statistical education and theoretical research in the realm of demographic statistics. In this capacity he participated actively in the preparation and execution of the censuses of 1939, 1959, 1970 and 1979. His status as a member of the party could explain the regime's confidence in this regard even if he did not distinguish himself in the political arena. His lifelong devotion to scientific activity seems to have protected him against the risk of political engagement. Even though Boiarskii's career did not have major roadblocks,

it did not exempt him from the struggles for theoretical adjustment, which he was obliged to make during his labors, notably when he participated in the preparation of the statistical manual of 1936. The efforts of Polliak and Boiarskii to reconcile statistical theory and historical materialism and to develop appropriate methodological tools characterize the path of adaptation of statisticians who were committed to pursuing their craft even within the context of institutional difficulties.

The route of evasion

To remain within the core of the state's system of statistics was too dangerous for many other statisticians, who held themselves at some distance and developed a path of evasion. Such career paths moved through the statistical services or bureaus of Soviet state administration, which were further removed from central political power and thus less exposed than those of the TsSU or of Gosplan. This relative obscurity could be found in the statistical services of large enterprises and research organizations or agencies considered non-strategic from the perspective of the state. The trajectories of two statisticians allow for an illustration of this type of career: those of N. S. Chetverikov and E. E. Slutskii. In contrast with N. D. Kondratiev and other members of the Conjuncture Institute, with whom they had been associated before its closing in 1930, these two men survived the trial which consumed the group known by the name of the 'Party of Peasant Labor'. Afterwards they were constantly under surveillance. Nevertheless, their trajectory, most notably the arrest of Chetverikov, demonstrates that the practices of evasion did not protect one totally from repression. A reading of their career paths suggests that these two statisticians were able to construct, each in his own way, careers that evaded places of decision and power. They worked in places of refuge, away from the centers of state statistical administration and university statistics.

Chetverikov concluded his studies at the St. Petersburg Polytechnic Institute in 1914. His final student paper was entitled 'The Method of Index Numbers as a Procedure for Studying Changes in the Value of Money.'[25] After being drafted as a soldier during the First World War, he served in the Red Army until May 1919. In that year he entered the TsSU as chief of the Department of Methodology. He occupied this position until his departure in 1923 for the Conjuncture Institute in the Commissariat of Finance. In 1926 he assumed the leadership of the Methodology Section for the Study of Conjuncture, in which he worked with V. G. Groman, A. I. Vainshtein, A. A. Konius and Ia. P. Gerchuk. He directed work in applied calculations relative to Kondratiev's theory of cycles. In 1929 he returned to the TsSU when the Conjuncture Institute was attached to it; after several months he left for the Institute of Market Cultures, a place less exposed to political decisions. The Conjuncture Institute became the object of virulent political attacks and

was threatened with closure. In 1930 it was shut down and Kondratiev was arrested.

Chetverikov was arrested in connection with the trial of the 'Party of Peasant Work' and condemned to five years of corrective labor. Freed in 1934, he lived for some time with his brother, a geneticist, in Vladimir; he then found a position as director of Research at the Institute of Medicine and Genetics in Moscow. There he worked on theoretical problems in statistics, but also on the use of radioactive elements in medical practice. Arrested again in 1937, he was condemned, without any formal charge, to five years detention in the Kolyma labor camp. After his release in 1942 he lived for several years in provincial areas. In 1954 he went once again to the home of his brother in Gorky. Beyond the constraints connected with the war, the fact that he remained in the provinces until the mid-1950s may be interpreted as an attempt to protect himself and to remain at a distance from the centers of power. Beyond this, the career path of Chetverikov after his release in 1942 seemed to confirm the hypothesis of the mobilization of resources connected with a social network, in this case that of his brother, in order to find new conditions for re-establishing his career.

After the death of his brother, Chetverikov returned to Moscow where he worked at the Central Institute of Radiography, there studying the problem of the emergence of mutations following radiation treatment of cancerous cells. At the same time he actively pursued his research work in statistical methods. He devoted the end of his life to the publication of his own works and also to the translation of foundational works in statistics by non-Russians such as Lexis, Bortkiewicz or Cournot. The bulk of these published translations concerned the theory of probability and its application to statistics. An important part of this work was devoted to the publication in the USSR of the works of A. A. Chuprov, which had previously been published abroad. Chetverikov was officially rehabilitated in 1965.

After the closure of the Conjuncture Institute, Slutskii continued to work at the TsSU until 1931. The fact that he was not arrested is probably due to his not working directly on the most controversial questions addressed by the institute.[26] He was therefore able to stay at the TsSU for a slightly longer time while searching out a position where he would be less politically exposed. Thus, his professional life during the 1930s no longer progressed in the state statistics agencies. Instead he oriented himself toward the study of hydrology and meteorology. From 1931 until 1934 he worked at the Central Institute of Meteorology, then at the Research Institute of Mathematics and Mechanics of the University of Moscow until 1938. Subsequently, until his death in 1948, he occupied a low-profile position within the Steklov Institute of Mathematics of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. As was the case for Chetverikov, these research institutes seem to have played the role of refuge for Slutskii, just as the statistical bureaus of large enterprises did for others.

Work in places of refuge, at a distance from the sight of the powerful, made it possible for these statisticians to pursue scientific activity in their field, usually in an unofficial context. On the other hand, those who remained within the core of the Soviet state statistical system were obliged to resolve a number of theoretical contradictions.

A case study. Starovskii: Longevity at the cost of permanent adjustments

V. N. Starovskii was born in 1905 into a family of rural teachers employed by the state in Vologda in the north of Russia. After going to the primary school in his village, at the age of 14 he began work as a clerk in the statistical office of the rural district of Ust'-Sysol'sk, and then rose to the position of second-level statistician before becoming an adjunct director of the office in 1921, at the age of 16. In this period, owing to a lack of sufficient candidates, promotions were rapid in the statistical bureaus of rural districts.[27] Starovskii pursued his secondary studies at night while continuing his employment; he completed these studies in 1923 at the age of 18.

He began his activity as a professional statistician at the moment of the construction of the statistical administration of the Bolshevik state, in an era when practical apprenticeship was the predominant preparation for the craft of statistician.[28] He took part in two foundational events for the corps of statisticians of the Bolshevik state, the 1920 census of the population, the first demographic census following the October Revolution, and the 1922 Congress of Russian Statisticians. From 1923 to 1926 he studied statistics in the Department of Statistics of the Faculty of Social Sciences of Moscow State University, where some pre-1917 professors such as N. A. Svavitskii and P. A. Vikhliaev were still teaching. He received classical training in statistics, similar to that dispensed at this time in western European countries. In 1924 and 1925, in parallel with his studies, he worked as a statistician in the Central Department of Statistics of the Supreme Council for the National Economy of the USSR (VSNKh) in Moscow. Subsequently, his professional path took him to Gosplan, where he occupied various positions—researcher, consultant and adjunct director of the office of orientation and methodology of the department of personnel.

From 1926 to 1930 he worked on a thesis at the Economics Institute of the Russian Association of Research Institutes in the Social Sciences. Then he taught in various higher education establishments, notably the Academy of Planning, from 1934 to 1940. During the 1930s he devoted a large part of his scientific activity to the treatment of theoretical questions in statistics posed by the demands resulting from the construction of a socialist economy. Within this framework the utility of the mathematics tool had to be subordinated to the principles and concepts of Marxist political economy. The introduction of a 1930 manual of statistics, *The Theory of Mathematical*

Statistics, to which he contributed,[29] clearly underscored these intentions: the role of statistics is uniquely to measure the regularities placed in evidence by Marxist analysis.

The end of the 1930s marked a decisive turning point in his career. In 1939 he was named adjunct director of the TsUNKhU, Bureau of the National Economy, and of USSR Gosplan Accounting. In this position he was charged with supervising the preparation and execution of the population census of 1939 in the wake of the rejection of the results of census of 1937.[30] Success in this task earned him the Order of Lenin, in 1939, the same year that he joined the Communist Party. The following year he became director of TsUnKhU, a position which he held until his death in 1975.

In addition to these bureaucratic responsibilities, he pursued an academic career shaped by the dogma of historical materialism. At age 34, in 1940, he received the title of Doctor in Economic Sciences. In 1958 he was elected corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. The title, Hero of Socialist Labor, which he received in 1975 at the age of 70, crowned a life of service to the Soviet state.

Several episodes in Starovskii's career, however, demonstrated that his long service was not secure from threats and dangers, which was testimony to the fact that confidence in subordinates was a relative concept in the relations between Stalin and his administrators.[31] At the conclusion of the Second World War, Stalin ordered Starovskii to organize an enumeration of fatalities connected with the war, having previously refused to announce the total calculated by the Central Directorate of Statistics (under its previous name of TsSU[32]), which had reached a figure of 18 million dead. Certainly remembering the purges of 1937, Starovskii did not turn his back on Stalin, officially confirming the figure of 7 million dead announced by Stalin.[33]

A short time later, in August 1948, Starovskii was confronted with a situation even more menacing. A special decree of the USSR Council of Ministers placed the practice of Soviet statistics under critical scrutiny. Used to this ritualistic pattern of Stalin's style of governing, Starovskii expressed his total agreement with the officially formulated reproaches. While this brought him escape from repression, it quite unexpectedly reinforced his status and that of the TsSU. The TsSU was removed from the control of Gosplan, under which it had functioned since the reform of 1930, and again became an independent administration attached directly to the Council of Ministers. Starovskii thereafter would have the rank of minister.

In 1951, however, he was exposed to yet another menace. L. Iaroshenko, one of his former doctoral students who had become an economist, wrote a less than flattering introduction to the book, *Political Economy*, written by Stalin.[34] Iaroshenko was dismissed from the Communist Party and arrested. He later renewed his criticism with respect to another brochure written by Stalin, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*. This resulted in an inquiry as to the director of Iaroshenko's thesis, who turned out to be Starovskii.

Starovskii was summoned by the Politburo. There, Stalin accused him of having personally given Iaroshenko instructions to draw up an indictment against the teachings of Marxist economics. Starovskii attempted in vain to exculpate himself. He was dismissed from his positions and sanctioned by the party committee of the city of Moscow, of which Khrushchev was the first secretary. As a result, he was expelled from the party. But what followed the carrying out of this sentence was a bit astonishing.

Although Starovskii would normally have been arrested as a result of his expulsion, the execution of the sentence was in process for a very long time. Moreover, no one was named to replace him at the head of TsSU. He himself did not know to whom he was required to transmit sensitive files, notably certain secret documents that were particularly important. Moreover, although officially he ought to have been in prison, Starovskii was obliged to report each day to his place of work, even though he was considered an 'enemy of the people'. This situation continued for three months. Finally, he personally telephoned Stalin in order to ask when a decree would be published replacing him in his position as director of the TsSU. Stalin answered that, since there had been no decree replacing him in the position of director of the TsSU, Starovskii should continue to work. It seems likely that, in the aftermath of the war, and in the context of a shortage of workers and managers, it had been difficult to find someone to replace Starovskii in his position. This allowed him to remain in his position, in spite of the fact that his dismissal had been announced, and to rejoin the party. Starovskii's troubles ceased permanently after Stalin's death. He was elected a delegate to the 22nd, 23rd and 24th Communist Party congresses and became a member of the party's Central Control Commission. He subsequently accumulated all of the honorifics of the Soviet state. In 1958 he became a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. He received the gold medal of Hero of Socialist Labor, the Order of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, Order of the Red Flag of Labor and the Legion of Honor. Among other things, he was elected three times (1962, 1966 and 1970) as a deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR from the Komi Republic.

In the era of the 'thaw' which followed Khrushchev's arrival in power, Starovskii published several self-critical essays which, even if they assumed an excessively florid form, exposed some of the difficulties he had encountered as the head of the Central Administration of Statistics when Stalin was in power. For example, in 1960 he published a history of Soviet statistics in which he 'admitted' to having defended, in the 1930s, positions in favor of the theory of the withering away of statistics and of its transformation into accounting, a position for which V. V. Osinskii, but not Starovskii, had been condemned and shot in 1938.[35] After Osinski's rehabilitation in 1957, Starovskii could recall that period of his life without exposing himself to reprisals. However, his attitude remained very prudent, to the extent that he made Osinskii responsible for the theoretical errors that he discussed.

Clearly, one can see the manifestation of a behavior of prudence and retreat in situations where he might have been threatened, which may explain his endurance at the head of the TsSU. When he died, still at his post in 1975, he had survived the purges of 1937, the death of Stalin, the departure of Khrushchev, and had retained his position after the arrival in power of Brezhnev. His was the career of a member of the *nomenklatura*.

Conclusion

Reading the careers of statisticians set out in this chapter, the distinction among three types of careers can assist in the comprehension of their different fates, but it will not always produce a simplification that reveals the even more complex institutional and political reality of the USSR. Even in the case of the path of close adherence, such as that of Starovksii, and thus of the statisticians whose behavior and opinions were the closest to the positions of political authorities, one may observe that some among them had to demonstrate efforts of adjustment and conciliation in certain situations. Even a fidelity to the regime which was never in doubt, such as that of Starovskii, would not protect against possible repression, a situation demanding prudence and adaptability on the part of the individuals involved.

In reality these statisticians had, perpetually, to adapt their behavior in response to the constraining conditions which they confronted or anticipated on the basis of their personal or family experience or because of signals coming from political authorities which they were obliged to decode. The three types of career path presented in this chapter were constructed in response to the character of Stalinist power, which lacked coherent decision-making and clear, logical and intelligible instructions from political leaders to their administrative agents.[36] Consequently, the statisticians adapted their behavior to respond to diverse situations with which they were confronted or to anticipate future risks.

In a world difficult to decode but replete with threats in certain periods, imprecise direction from senior authorities and contradictory signals, the network of available information varied according to the position occupied by the different statisticians. This could explain the varying strategies of adaptation and self-protection. The received network of information constituted a resource that varied according to the individual. It was mobilized by the statisticians, in order to decode that which they thought open to interpretation as signals were deployed, deliberately or not, by senior authorities. Inspection reports and accusations aimed at the statistical administration and its personnel constituted sources of indirect information for orienting the attitude of the statisticians.

That the behavior of one individual could vary in the course of his career complicates an understanding of career trajectories followed by individual

statisticians. This absence of a coherent or predictable career path, however, allowed the development of open spaces—temporary and limited, to be sure—within which the statisticians whose career itineraries have been studied in this chapter could develop their professional and scientific activity while they were trying to evaluate, according to the circumstances, the limits of that margin of freedom which could not be transgressed.

Notes

1. Alain Desrosières, *The Politics of Large Numbers. A History of Statistical Reasoning* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).
2. Ibid.; Theodore M. Porter, *Trust in Numbers. The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995)
3. Alain Blum and Martine Mespoulet, *L'anarchie bureaucratique. Statistique et pouvoir sous Staline* (Paris: La Découverte, 2003).
4. TsSU: Tsentral'noe statisticheskoe upravlenie (Central Statistical Administration).
5. On the statisticians of the TsSU during the 1920s, see Stephen G. Wheatcroft, *Views on Grain Output. Agriculture Reality and Planning in the Soviet Union in the 1920s*, unpublished M.Soc.Sci. thesis, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham, 1974. See also Martine Mespoulet, *Statistique et révolution en Russie. Un compromis impossible (1880–1930)* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2001).
6. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, 28, 3rd edition, 16.
7. Mespoulet, *Statistique et révolution en Russie.*
8. Blum and Mespoulet, *L'anarchie bureaucratique.*
9. Ibid.
10. L. Boltanski and L. Thevenot, *De la justification. Les economies de la grandeur* (Paris: Gallimard, 1991).
11. On the different forms of engagement, see Laurent Thévenot, *L'action au pluriel. Sociologie des régimes d'engagement* (Paris: La Découverte, 2006).
12. TsUNKhU: Tsentral'noe upravlenie narodno-khoziaistvestnnogo ucheta. TsUNKhU replaced TsSU after the reform of 1930 that attached the Central Statistical Department to Gosplan.
13. *Teoria matematicheskoi statistiki*, B. S. Iastremskii and V. Khotimskii, eds (Moscow: Plankhozgiz, 1930). This work was re-written six times during the 1930s, under different titles. The other authors were A. Ia., Boiarskii, L. S. Brand, and V. N Starovskii.
14. The figures from the 1937 census were clearly lower than those announced by Stalin, as a result of which the census was annulled and those responsible were arrested, exiled, or shot.
15. Entering the Social Democratic Party in 1905, he joined the ranks of the Mensheviks in 1906.
16. 'K 90-letiu so dnia rozhdenia akademika S. G Strumilina', *Vestnik statistiki*, no. 1 (1967): 35–43.
17. S. G. Strumilin, *Problemy ekonomiki truda* (Moscow: Nauka, 1982).
18. To gain insight into the scope of his work, see S. G. Strumilin, *Izbrannye proizvedenia* (Moscow: 1963–1965). At the end of his life, he edited the work *Statistika* (Moscow, 1969).

19. L. Mints, 'Statistika v trudakh S. G. Strumilina', *Vestnik statistiki*, no. 1 (1967): 36–43.
20. *Kakim byt' planu: diskussii 20-kh godov. Stat'i i sovremennyi kommentarii*, E. B. Koritsky, ed. (Leningrad: Leninzdat, 1989).
21. A. Boiarskii and G. Kil'dish, 'B. S. Iastremskii,' *Vestnik statistiki*, no. 5 (1967): 35–40.
22. This issue was not new for him because, under the direction of Chuprov, he had written his thesis on 'the profession as an object of statistical counting.'
23. Blum et Mespoulet, *L'anarchie bureaucratique*.
24. TsSOu, *Programmy i posobiia k razrabotke vsesoiuznoi perepisi naselenia 1926 goda* (Moscow, 1927), 4.
25. A. Manellia, 'Zhizn' i nauchnaia deiatel'nost' N. S. Chetverikova (1885–1973 gg.)', *Voprosy statistiki*, no. 10 (1998): 94–6.
26. Vincent Barnett, 'E. E. Slutsky: Mathematical Statistician, Economist, and Political Economist?' *Journal of the History of Economic Thought*, 26, no. 1 (2004): 5–18.
27. Mespoulet, *Statistique et révolution en Russie*.
28. Ibid.
29. *Teoria matematicheskoi statistiki*, Iastremskii and Khotimskii, eds.
30. Blum et Mespoulet, *L'anarchie bureaucratique*.
31. See Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk, *Cold Peace. Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945–1953* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
32. The Central Statistical Administration acquired the name TsSU after WWII.
33. I. Bobrakov, 'Gosudarstevennyi chelovek', *Voprosy statistiki*, no. 9 (1996): 76–80.
34. Ibid., 78.
35. V. N. Starovskii, 'Sovetskaia statisticheskaia nauka i praktika', in V. N. Starovskii, *Istoria sovetskoi gosudarstvennoi statistiki. Sbornik statei* (Moscow: Gosstatizdat, 1960), 16.
36. Blum et Mespoulet, *L'anarchie bureaucratique*.

11
Corruption among Officials and Anticorruption Drives in the USSR, 1945–1964

James Heinzen

Introduction

This chapter examines the issue of corruption and anticorruption efforts in the Soviet Union between the 1940s and the early 1960s, between the end of World War II and the end of the Khrushchev period.[1] Corruption existed before the war, of course, in many areas of state and economic administration. This study, however, focuses on the two decades after the war, a relatively unstudied period of Soviet history, examining elements of continuity and several features that lent this period some distinctive coloration.

Corruption, of course, was not limited to the Soviet Union. Many regimes—both authoritarian dictatorships and functioning democracies—experience serious difficulties maintaining discipline among their officials. Despite the threat of severe punishment, civil servants in many countries enrich themselves at state expense.

A study of Soviet corruption in this period underscores a number of critical issues. As many in the regime understood, malfeasance by officials tended to weaken the state's legitimacy in the eyes of the population, constrained state capacities, and interfered with relations between principals and agents. Corrupt officials siphoned away the resources of the state while weakening its ability to achieve its political and economic goals.

This study cannot answer why certain people were targeted for prosecution, when in fact many officials were guilty of *some* kind of transgression yet were not charged. Answering the question would require a detailed study of patronage and clientelism in various Soviet bureaucracies, and that lies beyond the evidence outlined in this chapter. Instead, this chapter examines a variety of questions, including the types of actions the government considered corruption, and why the regime prosecuted the corrupt behavior of

officials. What forms did corruption take in the Soviet system in the 1940s–early 1960s? What was the nature of—and limits on—campaigns against the malfeasance of officials? In addition to published reports in the Soviet and American press, this study relies on material located in former Soviet state and Communist Party archives, primarily from the USSR Ministry of Justice, the USSR Procuracy, and the Party Control Committee (KPK) of the Communist Party. Archives have the advantage of offering instances of both low and mid-level wrongdoing and (more rarely) corruption scandals at the upper levels of the hierarchy. They also provide general analyses of varieties of corruption and other crime nation-wide. The press studiously avoided publishing details of official crime in the higher reaches of the party, the military, and the police, instead honing in on incidents at the local and regional levels only, implying that they were isolated events.

In the mid-1950s, Joseph Berliner observed that desperate enterprise managers in the Stalin-era USSR padded reports, took advantage of personal connections, illegally sold and bartered excess equipment and materials, and undertook other dubious practices in order to fulfill and exceed their plan targets in conditions that were often chaotic.[2] Since then, however, scholars have devoted little attention to the questions of corruption and the state's anti-corruption measures in the 1940s and 1950s, the very time when the regime's concern about protecting state property reached new heights. Berliner did not study self-profiting corruption, such as outright theft, embezzlement and bribery, but that undertaken in the interest of production [*v pol'zu proizvodstva*]. He did so in part because of a lack of sources; scholars were mainly dependent on fragmentary reports in the Soviet press, which offered little evidence on corruption during the Stalin period and only a bit more for the Khrushchev era. Sources for the 1940s and 1950s simply could not support the kinds of fine empirical studies of corruption in the 1970s and 1980s, based on the periodical press, that were undertaken by scholars such as F. J. M. Feldbrugge, Nick Lampert, Charles Schwartz, and William Clark.[3]

A definition of corruption in the USSR

What constitutes official corruption is peculiar to a given time, place, culture, and political environment. This study takes as its point of departure a classic definition: the use of one's official position for the purpose of self-enrichment or other private advantage at the expense of the public good.[4] And yet, even this ostensibly straightforward and relatively specific notion of corruption contains substantial ambiguity. Indeed, classic Weberian definitions of corruption can be poorly suited to polities such as the USSR where distinctions between notions of public and private are blurred. To qualify as corruption as we understand it, an act must satisfy three tests. First, the action must be in knowing contravention of an existing law. Second, it must result in material benefit for the perpetrator. And third, it must

be carried out by an official acting in his or her official capacity.[5] We must acknowledge, of course, that there is very often no absolute demarcation between a 'corrupt' and 'non-corrupt' act.

This relatively narrow definition of corruption would include embezzlement and misappropriation of state funds, bribery, certain types of abuse of office for personal gain, and theft of state or cooperative property for personal use by functionaries using their official position to commit the crime.[6] Such a definition excludes actions involving a negligent or careless attitude toward one's work, exceeding one's authority, drunkenness at work, and the production of shoddy goods (because these actions are not done for the purpose of self-enrichment); theft of state property by *non-officials*; failing to fulfill plans (for which enterprise managers could be charged with 'abuse of office'); and profiteering in scarce products. This definition also excludes technically illegal but regularly tolerated acts undertaken by managers 'in the interests of production' (meaning in the regime's economic interests) to fulfill plans, to meet quotas, or to overstate an organization's performance, but which did not result in personal profit; the wheeling and dealing, bartering, report padding, and other unofficial shenanigans that allowed managers to run their enterprises and fulfill instructions.[7]

The view from the state: the danger of persistent corruption

From the regime's perspective, the most unsettling question may have been 'Why does corruption still exist?' In official rhetoric produced for public consumption after WWII, crime by officials in the Soviet Union was characterized as rare, on the verge of extinction, and limited to a few self-serving, 'backward' individuals. The demise of corruption was inevitable as standards of living increase and as the 'consciousness' and cultural level of the population rapidly expands.[8] How could the regime explain, then, the fact that corruption continued to exist (even if its full parameters were never publicly acknowledged) among a generation that was raised entirely after the socialist revolution, and that had fought in a noble war to save the Soviet Union—and the world—from fascism? The regime reacted with alarm to evidence that—like many social ills, including alcoholism, domestic violence, and prostitution—malfeasance among its own bureaucrats was not subsiding after victory in the Great Patriotic War and, indeed, appeared to be increasing in key areas.

Soviet legal scholars made a distinction in theory between the *state* and its *officials*. The law was a tool of the state; it did not serve to protect individuals from the state or its policies, since the state by definition served the interests of all Soviet people in the socialist era. Instead, the law guaranteed Soviet citizens protection against the wrongdoing of state *officials*.[9] As state leaders came to understand, however, individual Soviet citizens did not always make such a distinction, often regarding the face of the corrupt official as the face

of the state itself. Resentment toward individual bureaucrats, police, or other functionaries would challenge the very legitimacy of the state.[10]

Internal Procuracy reports in the late-Stalin years lamented the insidious nature of graft, arguing that bribery enabled the theft of state property and other types of crime. An officialdom susceptible to bribery is a gateway to illegality, even anarchy, as paid-off civil servants would suspend their vigilance, fail to uphold social norms, and open the door to crime and chaos. When the conscience of a morally weak official can be purchased, the consequences are extremely dangerous. Indeed, the Procuracy accused local prosecutors and judges of underestimating the 'social danger' of bribery.[11] In this understanding, bribery has two pernicious, related effects: officials become morally corrupted and the state's interests are 'damaged' as the state is robbed. This language, which asserted that corruption was dangerous to society and harmful to state interests, was pervasive.[12] A 15 July 1946 *prikaz* of the USSR Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Procuracy General warned that 'bribery in all its forms corrupts workers of the government and economic apparatuses, enables the theft and resale of socialist property and every kind of illegality.'[13] The defense of state property lay at the very center of Stalinist (and post-Stalinist) ideology. The 1936 Constitution of the USSR stated, 'It is the duty of every citizen of the USSR to safeguard and strengthen public, socialist property as the sacred and inviolable foundation of the Soviet system.' Using the harsh rhetoric of the day, the Constitution goes on: 'Persons committing offenses against public, socialist property are enemies of the people.'

Whence corruption?

The regime offered two major reasons for corruption. First, they continued to blame undesirable social phenomena on the remnants of a pre-revolutionary 'capitalist mentality' that lingered among some people. Many ideologists and legal experts still argued that the notoriously corrupt mores of tsarist *chinovniki* had infected Soviet functionaries across the revolutionary divide. The persistence of bribery, for example, was to be regarded as a direct legacy of the corrupt imperial civil service. Decades after the revolution, these tsarist-era mores somehow stubbornly held on in the minds of some functionaries.

Expressing a fundamental principle of Soviet legal theory, the Soviet Procurator General A. Ia. Vyshinskii wrote in his 1939 pamphlet, 'Crime Recedes in the USSR', that crime in capitalist societies stems from a social system that has not yet been perfected.[14] According to Vyshinskii, crime springs from the greed of capitalist elites, the exploitation of the working masses, and the mass poverty that ensues. The October Revolution obliterated the foundations for these evils by replacing the decrepit Old Regime, socializing the economy, and creating a new society and morality. Although crime in the Soviet Union is dying out, criminality lingers because the capitalist

'environment' and its 'ideology' have not yet been fully eradicated. In a 1959 book, the legal specialist V. F. Kirichenko continued to insist that certain persistent mentalities held over from the tsarist bureaucracy provided the medium for corruption among a few Soviet functionaries. 'Despite the fact that during the Great October Socialist Revolution the old state apparatus was destroyed and a new one was created, certain views, habits, and traditions of the old state apparatus were preserved'.[15] Officially, then, a few bad apples clung to the discredited morality of the past. It is clear, however, that by the 1940s, and certainly by the 1950s, corrupt officials, many of whom were party members, were indisputably creations of the Soviet system.

Cadres' poor education and training was the second major reason cited by party and legal officials for the persistence of official malfeasance. Some officials were insufficiently trained or mentored, and they had failed to internalize the mores required to serve the Soviet public. In other cases, they were simply lazy and selfish 'parasites', who refused honest labor; these officials were greedy people who lusted for comfort and ease at the expense of the state and their fellow citizens. Flawed education and guidance, combined with poor supervision at the workplace, encouraged some cadres to 'take the criminal path'.

Bribery, *dolzhnostnye prestupleniia*, and theft of state property by officials in the late Stalin years

Two articles of the Russian Criminal Code covered bribery, defined as an inducement that improperly influenced the performance of an official's public function. The receipt of bribes was addressed by Article 117, while Article 118 covered the offering of bribes and acting as an intermediary. Soviet people resorted to bribery to gain access to scarce, but essential, goods and services. One might offer a bribe to secure release from military service or a job, or to obtain a position as the chief of a store or warehouse, a prime source of self-enrichment. Bribes found their way into the pockets of prosecutors and judges willing to suspend criminal cases or reduce punishments. The Criminal Code called for imprisonment of up to two years for taking bribes, and from two to ten years for giving them.

The late Stalin years saw an early spike in the number of convictions for bribery. The number peaked in 1947, with about 5,600 convictions for receipt and offering of bribes. Twice as many people were convicted of giving bribes in 1947 as before the war, and four times as many for taking bribes. This brief rise can partly be attributed to a joint *prikaz* of the Ministry of Justice USSR, the Ministry of Internal Affairs USSR, and the Procurator General of 15 July 1946, which called for accelerating the struggle against bribery, mainly by increasing penalties for both the givers and receivers of bribes.[16]

Yet, despite voluminous official rhetoric against bribery (and theft of state property), there seems to have been a high degree of tolerance of it, both in society as a whole and in the party. Soon after the end of the war, for

example, the USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov observed that too many party members in 'responsible' positions tolerated bribery. He supported his allegation in a letter to the Central Committee.[17] In June 1946, information came to the attention of the Ministry of Transportation that at Moscow's Paveletsk station employees of the railroad police were demanding bribes. A Procuracy auditor determined that 15 tickets were reserved at the station for employees of the police every day. Certain police employees, however, sold any unused tickets for bribes to bystanders. The case was suspended when a high railroad official called the chiefs of the station to his office and merely 'suggested' that 'they cease with this scandal.' Neither he nor any other responsible party member ever passed on information about this criminal behavior to the Procuracy. Legal officials also pointed out that most cases of large-scale theft of state property were abetted by bribes. As B. S. Grishin pointed out, 'The majority of large-scale thefts, as a rule, are accompanied by bribery, which is closely intertwined with direct theft and is often one of the conditions that gives birth to it.'[18]

Other *dolzhnostnye prestupleniia*

Most of the deeds treated in this study as 'corruption', including bribery and abuse of office, fell under the category of 'crimes by officials acting in their official capacity' [*dolzhnostnye prestupleniia*] in the Criminal Code. Abuse of office (Article 109 of the RSFSR Criminal Code) was defined as, any action by an official that caused interference in the proper operating of an institution or enterprise that caused it material loss or damaged public order. Indeed, Article 109 tended to serve as a catchall, a dumping ground for charging officials with crimes resulting in material loss to the state that did not fit neatly into other articles of the Criminal Code. The numbers of convictions for abuse of office grew from 47,000 in 1940, to 48,500 in 1944, to 62,000 in 1945, to 72,000 in 1946, and to a peak of 82,000 in 1947. Convictions dropped off quickly after 1947.[19] Article 116 covered the misappropriation or embezzlement by officials of money, valuables, or other property entrusted to them in their official capacity. Such crimes were subsumed into the 4 June 1947 *ukaz* on theft of state and social property. Embezzlement and misappropriation were then qualified under the *ukaz* as theft of state property, and therefore were punished much more severely.

A secret 1952 draft instruction, written by USSR Procurator General Safonov for the Supreme Court, sheds light on the prosecution of crimes committed by officials.[20] The report chastises judges for several reasons. Too often, judges hand out harsh prison sentences when corrective labor on the job would serve the purpose. Officials are groundlessly convicted of serious crimes, and this is 'a politically harmful practice that does serious harm to the task of strengthening the state apparatus.'[21] Yet, in other cases (the report continues), when 'serious harm is done to state interests'—in certain cases of negligence (Article 111) that result in major material losses, for

example—the Justice Ministry complained that officials were not punished harshly *enough*.[22] Safonov argued that frequently courts improperly convict officials for relatively minor crimes such as negligence or abuse of office when judges should convict them for violating the 4 June 1947 *ukaz* on theft of state property, with its much harsher penalties.[23] The report notes, for example, that store managers who had embezzled funds were too often convicted by judges for abuse of office or negligence rather than for theft of state property.[24]

It is also clear that party agencies often aggressively pressured prosecutors and judges to acquit or go easy on party members accused of official crimes, especially those who were well connected or high-ranking.[25] Legal authorities complained that party organizations interfered in prosecutions of certain party members. Procuracy archives document hundreds of cases of interference by local party leaders in the prosecution of criminal cases, including cases of officials arrested for theft of state property or other types of corruption. For example, Procuracy officials complained that *obkom* or *gorkom* secretaries pressured prosecutors to refrain from bringing cases to court, to dismiss the charges, or to recommend lenient sentences. One 1949 Procuracy report describes party officials' attempts to influence prosecutions. The report, which runs to 97 pages, lists dozens of instances of interference in 1948 alone.[26] In some cases, this meddling may have been by local party bosses flexing their muscles to intervene in the prosecution of friends or colleagues. In other cases, however, they may have been arguing that managers guilty of a minor infraction should not be given harsh sentences that would remove them from the workplace for an extended period.[27] Officials often protected each other from prosecution, and it follows that many party members seem to have had a sense of impunity that effectively encouraged more extravagant self-enrichment.[28]

Theft of state property by officials

The most significant postwar 'campaign' affecting officialdom attacked the theft of 'socialist' property. The draconian 4 June 1947 *ukaz* mandated a seven-year minimum sentence for the theft of socialist property, a crime for which the minimum penalty had been three months imprisonment. The *ukaz* also called for 10–25 years for repeat offenses, 'group' offenses, and other 'egregious' cases.[29] The infamous 4 June decree addressed what some officials argued was contributing to widespread theft of state (and personal) property across the Soviet Union after the war: insufficiently harsh punishments.[30] According to a report sent to Stalin and Malenkov by USSR Minister of Justice Gorshenin, estimates of material losses due to theft of state property reached nearly 1.5 billion rubles in 1948, and over 1.2 billion rubles in 1949. As Gorshenin pointed out, however, the actual figure was surely much higher.[31]

The 1947 decree on the theft of state property engendered a classic campaign: a short period of mass arrests in the months following its publication, followed by a sharp drop-off in prosecutions as the campaign lost steam. Three categories of Soviet citizens were swept up in the campaign. First, the *ukaz* led to the arrests between 1947 and 1953 of many hundreds of thousands of collective farmers [*kolkhozniki*] accused of stealing food, animals, or grain from the collective farms in the wake of the 1946 famine. The decree seems to have had its genesis in the massive theft of produce from *kolkhozy* by hungry collective farmers during the wartime and postwar crop failures. In addition to collective farmers, hundreds of thousands of factory workers accused of pilfering factory property were also arrested.[32]

Yet, there was also a third category of person who was arrested *en masse* under the 4 June 1947 *ukaz*. This third type of property crime has received little attention from scholars who have discussed the 4 June decree. As the data show, only one-half of those arrested for theft of state property between 1947 and 1952 were either workers or collective farmers; among the remainder, many were functionaries. Tens of thousands of officials were arrested, convicted, and given long mandatory sentences for theft of socialist property in the course of their duties.

It can be argued that we should think of the 4 June decree not exclusively as a measure directed against pilfering peasants and workers, but rather as a three-pronged approach that included officialdom. The law served as a weapon against lower and middle officialdom, buttressed by a sense among some law enforcement and party authorities that thieving by officials was spiraling out of control.

Why was officialdom targeted by this law? The theft of state property was growing during and in the aftermath of the war, and this was said to be very detrimental to state interests.[33] The socialist ownership of property, of course, was a critical foundation of Soviet society. Soviet authorities claimed that socialist ownership of the means of production was responsible for its scientific and engineering achievements, which contributed to victory in World War II. A secret 26 August 1949 *prikaz* of the USSR Procuracy General called for intensifying the struggle against 'conspirators' who assist theft and embezzlement in the trade network and industry. Such conspirators were typically auditors, bookkeepers, and directors of enterprises.[34] Data on convictions are slim, but incomplete figures show that 2,194 people were charged and handed over to the courts in the first quarter of 1950 for such 'conspiratorial' activity.[35]

Moreover, prosecutors discovered that officials were at the center of many theft schemes. Many examples of tips reported by informers pertain to functionaries profiting illegally during the course of their official duties.[36] Quite often the large-scale, well-organized crimes involved officials in key roles taking advantage of numerous opportunities to exploit their positions. They were able to facilitate crimes through bookkeeping maneuvers, covering up

thefts from warehouses, passing on goods to speculators, or using their connections or power in the enterprise to mask crimes, exploiting their access or power to benefit themselves. As early as late 1946, when food procurement authorities were complaining about the great volume of thefts from collective farms, many of them were blaming not only peasants but officials. In September 1946, for example, the deputy Minister of Procurements for the USSR, V. Dvinskii, complained to the Council of Ministers that 'in the majority of cases' officials responsible for protecting the stolen products, such as the chiefs of warehouses, were involved in the thefts.[37] In a letter to Beria dated 30 December 1946, Justice Minister Rychkov detailed several major cases of grain theft. In nearly every case, an official, such as a kolkhoz chairman or a sovkhoz director, was the driving force in the scheme.[38]

After the original burst of arrests, mostly for petty theft and pilfering, the regime after 1947 became increasingly concerned with *large-scale* theft of state property, prioritizing the exposure of the larger, more ambitious schemes. When the theft of grain diminished after 1947, large-scale thefts of state property, often involving officials, continued. As the MVD complained, law enforcement had some success cracking down on cases of petty crime, but the more serious cases under articles 2 and 4 of the June 4 decree (covering grand thefts and repeat offenses) went unsolved. Large-scale thefts grew in number. In 1950, USSR Minister of Justice Gorshenin wrote to Stalin that 'the more dangerous forms of these crimes—theft undertaken repeatedly or by organized gangs, or in large quantities, not only have not declined, but have increased.'[39] Such grand thefts of state property were very frequently aided by an official. The number of kolkhoz chairpersons convicted of theft of state property, for example, increased from 935 in 1948 to 1,483 in 1949.[40]

The regime's sharp focus on defending state property, combined with the social breakdown and chaos after the war, created an environment in which any attempt to crack down on theft of state property would result in the large-scale arrests of officials. This study treats the June 1947 *ukaz* as part of an anticorruption effort aimed especially at the middle and lower levels of the bureaucracy. This is not to say that the June 1947 law, which was drafted and revised by Stalin himself,[41] was conceived primarily to target officials suspected of stealing state property. More likely, the *ukaz* was conceived during the famine to update the August 1932 law on theft of state property, which focused on peasants. Nevertheless, the June 4 law also subsumed several white-collar *dolzhnostnye* crimes, including embezzlement and misappropriation of state or collective property, which had not been categorized as property crimes in the Penal Code. Once folded into the 4 June decree, these crimes by officials, previously punished with a maximum of two years in prison, were treated much more harshly. The decree's utility in combating official malfeasance likely became more apparent as it was applied in practice.[42] The regime clearly wished to use the June *ukaz* as a tool to fight theft

of state property on many fronts, including among those officials using their positions to steal and embezzle from the state.

After Stalin

At the time of the 19th Party Congress in late 1952 (which convened a few months before Stalin's death) numerous reports of major theft and embezzlement cases appeared in major Soviet newspapers. On 18 December 1952, *Izvestiia* reported that a stunning 30 million rubles had been embezzled from fisheries in Khabarovsk. As was so often the case, senior officials were at the center of the scheme. The regional prosecutor and his deputy, according to the report, were in league with the thieves. One of the most revealing stories at this time involved a variation on an age-old Russian swindle, that was reported in *Pravda*. An enterprising individual named Pavlenko, posing as an auditor from Moscow, traveled from village to village throughout Vinnitsa in the style of the 'Inspector General' threatening to report the 'corruption' of kolkhoz officials. Without knowing who he was, collective farm chairmen paid off the 'inspector' in attempts to cover up whatever crimes they may have committed.[43]

Published and archival evidence indicates that black market capitalism, theft of state property by officials, embezzlement, and bribery honeycombed the system after Stalin's death, and there was very little the regime could do about it.[44] Several major scandals were reported in the newspapers between 1954 and 1960. Archives confirm that alarming data about a rise in crime, especially among the young and 'recidivists', reached the highest levels of the government, party, and police.[45] Law enforcement agencies remained vigilant about theft of state property. At a conference of justice and Supreme Court representatives on 3 July 1955, the USSR Minister of Justice said that a Central Committee *postanovlenie* of 19 January 1955 on 'measures to strengthen socialist legality' meant that the rights of citizens should be strengthened, in part by intensifying the struggle against theft of state property.[46] The Central Committee and Minister of Justice continued to consider theft of state property an 'especially dangerous' crime. The regime's obsession about the need to 'defend state property' survived the transition to a Khrushchev-era discourse that emphasized 'socialist legality' and the 'rights of citizens.'

Indeed, analysis of which categories of prisoners were included in—and excluded from—amnesties from the Gulag illustrate the regime's approach to certain types of crimes by officials. In addition to mothers with children, pregnant women, the ill, and the elderly, the 27 March 1953 amnesty provided for the release of all those convicted of '*dolzhnostnye*' and 'economic' crimes. Yet that amnesty excluded from release all those guilty of 'particularly dangerous crimes', including those convicted under Article 58 with sentences over five years (which was almost every person convicted of a

political offense), 'bandits', and those convicted of premeditated murder or certain military crimes. It is also important to note that the amnesty also excluded those convicted of committing large-scale theft of state property, together with those imprisoned for taking bribes. Bribe-taking and major thefts of state property were grouped together with the 'most dangerous' political and anti-Soviet crimes.[47] The regime's understanding of the theft of state property as a serious 'danger' explains the persistence of public campaigns (albeit limited) against thieves and embezzlers of state property after 1953.

To be sure, the number of people convicted under the 4 June *ukaz* dropped after Stalin's death. In 1954, a total of 113,000 people were sentenced under all four articles of the *ukaz*, a sharp drop from 180,000 in 1952, 196,000 in 1950, and 221,000 in 1949. At the same time, however, as USSR Minister of Justice Gorshenin reported, 'The number of large-scale and organized thefts of socialist property has not decreased, and the damage done to the state is enormous.'[48]

With the relaxation of controls after Stalin's death, large-scale thefts of state property trended upward later in the decade. The *Otdel bor'by s khishcheniem sotsialisticheskoi sobstvennosti*, or OBKhSS, the national police department charged with uprooting speculation, bribery, and theft of state property, reported to the MVD in mid-1958 that it had arrested 110,000 people for these crimes in the first half of the year. As the report noted, 'The MVD USSR knows that the theft of socialist property in various forms is widespread in agriculture, in construction, in the supply and transport organizations, at enterprises in light industry and food industry and especially in the trade organizations, industrial cooperation and local industry.' More than 300 million rubles in the system of consumer cooperatives were stolen or had disappeared as a result of major, coordinated schemes.[49] The report went on to note that in many cases responsible officials were involved in these schemes and benefited handsomely. They spent the stolen money on the construction of dachas, the purchase of automobiles and other expensive items, and 'carousing'. The report pointed to an increasing quantity of organized thefts, and pointed out that 'bribery is widespread and takes many varied forms.' One case involved the theft of 172 tons of wool and rayon thread, made possible after more than two million rubles in bribes changed hands.[50]

By the late 1950s, newspaper stories detailing elaborate embezzlement schemes were common. On 13 August 1958, front-page editorials in both *Pravda* and *Izvestiia* denounced a wave of theft and embezzlement. The papers reported that a regional economic council [s*ovnarkhoz*] in Kazakhstan spent 74 million rubles of the money allocated for coal mines and metallurgy on a movie theatre, swimming pools, lavish dog kennels, and other perks for top regional officials.[51] In Gorkii, 28 million rubles intended for the chemical and oil industries were diverted to the construction of dachas for

top officials. Similar stories cropped up all over the country. In the summer of 1959, a major scandal involving officials in the USSR Ministry of Agriculture was described in *Pravda*.[52] Leading officials were accused of taking bribes, embezzling state property, and illegally constructing dachas for themselves. Officials had embezzled more than one million rubles to renovate and expand their dachas. To accomplish this, they bought materials at a fraction of their cost from enterprises under their supervision. Although *Pravda* did not reveal the names of the officials involved, documents in the archive of the Party Control Committee show that they included Minister of Agriculture Morozov and his first deputy, Fedin.[53]

The persistence of bribery

Alongside these major scandals, the scourge of petty graft, so common to the tsarist bureaucracy, remained widespread. In December 1957, *Izvestiia* reported that cemetery employees had been extorting bribes from bereaved families to guarantee space for their loved ones' bodies in Moscow graveyards. Typically, gravediggers 'found' space by digging up an old coffin in overcrowded graveyards, then placing a fresh coffin in the just-vacated spot. When she asked at the Vaganovskii Cemetery, a certain N. G. Diakova was told that there was no available space. Only after paying a gravedigger 100 rubles was she able to secure a spot for her granddaughter's body. Even as the coffin was lowered into the ground, the gravedigger suddenly demanded another 12 rubles to pay for 'supplies' due to a last minute shortage of nails. At Rogozhevsky Cemetery in Moscow, one had to pay a 500-ruble bribe to secure a plot.[54] The accusations in the article led to the arrest of the former director of the cemetery and two other employees.[55]

The public image of the police suffered in this period, as some police officers also accepted or extorted bribes.[56] In 1964, *Izvestiia* reported that three police officers were sentenced to death for their participation in a large ring that forced patients in institutions for the mentally ill to work making knitted clothing and other goods.[57] According to the newspaper, the huge ring, with operatives in Moscow, Leningrad, Tashkent, and other cities, and with links to dozens of collective farms and other enterprises, allegedly netted over two million rubles in six years. In this scheme, a man paid a large bribe to become the manager of a physical therapy workshop for mentally ill patients. He then sold the goods that patients produced for private profit on illegal markets. *Izvestiia* reported that bribes were paid totaling $195,000 at the official exchange rate to enable production and distribution, the equivalent of a month's pay for nearly 2,500 textile workers.

During the Khrushchev era, major bribery scandals in industry surfaced in the press. In exchange for large bribes, the director and head of marketing of the Shuisky machine-tool plant delivered extra machinery to textile factories. They were convicted of bribery and sentenced to death.[58] On 25–6 May 1963, *Trud* published a story denouncing kolkhoz directors who

used '*tolkachi*' or '*kombinatory*' ('fixers', sometimes translated as 'pushers' or 'lobbyists') to pay bribes to acquire hard-to-get construction materials and spare parts. Fixers knew how to make and exploit contacts in factories, farms, and economic administrations in order to obtain hard-to-find materials. The newspaper *Trud* alleged that the case involved dozens of people and hundreds of thousands of rubles in institutions such as Gosplan and the Ministry of Railways.

In light of scandals large and small, official rhetoric gradually ceased claiming that crime would soon disappear in Soviet society as communism approached. Indeed, by the early 1960s party spokesmen began to emphasize that major crimes against socialist property were growing in frequency and severity.[59] A party plenum at the end of 1962 addressed this problem following the exposure of an enormous embezzlement case. The case involved two knitwear factories in the Kirghiz Republic where managers embezzled more than three million rubles over the course of ten years. The managers commandeered over 100 looms for their personal use, selling the extra textiles they produced on the black market. With the proceeds, they purchased gold and silver and spent extravagantly on cars, jewelry, and dachas. The plenum also pondered why not one witness with knowledge of the theft scheme (and there were many) ever bothered to report the crimes to the authorities.

The decrees of 1961 and 1962

Considering the regime's persistent concern about protecting state property and fighting the irresponsible behavior of functionaries, it is not surprising that a high-profile, public campaign against major cases of crimes by officials, economic crimes, and crimes against socialist property was launched in 1961.[60] New laws accompanied the subsequent campaign, which kicked off with the publication of an 'anti-parasite' law, published on 4 May 1961 by the Presidium of the Russian Republic Supreme Soviet. Directed against those who 'turn away from socially useful work or lead an antisocial, parasitical way of life', the law singled out those who built homes or dachas with unearned income, using 'illegally obtained building materials'. Clearly, many officials fell into these categories. Those convicted were to be 'exiled to a distant locality for periods of between two and five years' with confiscation of illegally obtained property.

On 5 May 1961, the USSR Supreme Soviet published a law, 'On strengthening the struggle against especially dangerous crimes', declaring that the theft or embezzlement of state property in especially large amounts, repeatedly or in other aggravating circumstances, was punishable with death by firing squad. (Stalin had abolished the death penalty in May 1947, though it was reintroduced in 1950 for certain anti-state crimes such as treason and espionage.) A law of 1 July 1961 made serious cases of large-scale speculation in foreign currency or securities punishable by death. On 20

February 1962, another decree, 'On strengthening criminal responsibility for bribery', made the accepting of bribes punishable by death before a firing squad if done repeatedly or in large amounts by an official who holds a responsible position. This law declared that 'bribery is one of the disgraceful and disgusting relics of the past', an 'ugly' and 'alien' fossil of capitalism. The bribe-taker would receive 3–10 years imprisonment with the confiscation of property in normal circumstances. If a 'responsible' person took the bribe or extorted the bribe, or if it were a repeat offense, the convicted person would get 8–15 years in prison. Those who offered bribes would get 3–8 years. A second offense or a crime by a person in a responsible position brought 7–15 years.

Harold Berman has estimated that about 250 people were executed for these economic crimes and bribery between May 1961 and May 1962, with another 250 or more executed between June 1962 and December 1962.[61] Previously, the death penalty in peacetime had been limited to cases of treason, espionage, and particularly heinous cases of first-degree murder. Compared with the frenetic campaigns against crime of the Stalin era, with their draconian punishments and mass repressions, this campaign was very mild indeed. The liberalization of criminal law after Stalin's death had reduced punishments for speculation, theft of state property and embezzlement. A decree of 10 January 1955, for example, reduced the maximum sentence for petty theft of state property to six months in prison, while downgrading many cases from crimes to administrative violations, which were subject to less severe sanctions. It may be that crime increased in the late 1950s partly as a result of this liberalization, as some observers have speculated, though we cannot say this definitively.[62] The new 1961 RSFSR Criminal Code moved penalties in the opposite direction, increasing the maximum penalties for theft of state property to between three and 15 years.

How much effect on criminality did these anticorruption decrees have in the early 1960s? Judging by one document lamenting the continued presence of major thefts of state property, the results were minimal. A secret *postanovlenie* of the Plenum of the USSR Supreme Court discussed the state of crime in 1963 and the first half of 1964.[63] Written by the chair of the Supreme Court USSR, A. F. Gorkin, the instruction noted that 'The main attention in the struggle against crime should be directed toward taking measures to prevent and liquidate those crimes that represent the biggest social danger and are still quite widespread, such as the theft of socialist property, bribery, premeditated murder, rape, hooliganism, and also further strengthening of the struggle with juvenile delinquency.' Indeed, the official position that the demise of corruption was imminent and persisted only because of the 'remnants of capitalism' was increasingly difficult to support by the 1960s. As a commentator for the newspaper *Trud* put it in an article about a huge bribery case in 1963, in which many of the participants were party members:

> You read the thick files with documents that support a court case, and you just cannot believe that it's possible. It's not just a case of the numbers, of course. It is much sadder that bribery has infected employees brought up and shaped completely during Soviet times.[64]

Conclusion

The Soviet state was trapped in a contradiction—maintaining a system that created the conditions in which corruption could thrive, while simultaneously attempting to eradicate that corruption. To understand the patterns of prosecution detailed above, one must acknowledge the power relations that help to determine the definition of corruption in any society and who will be prosecuted for it. Many activities among the elite that could fairly be described as 'abuse of office for personal profit' were not prosecuted. One could argue that the Soviet authorities limited the definition of corruption to the graft, theft, and special privileges for officials not sanctioned by the system itself. After all, the system was built on certain 'legal' privileges for those at the top of the hierarchy. The party did not label the high salaries, expensive dachas, fancy automobiles, and other perquisites for the elite to have been obtained through 'corruption'.

In the period between World War II and the end of the Khrushchev era, corruption was fueled by many factors—a poorly paid and rapidly expanding officialdom, huge demand to bypass inefficient bureaucracies to obtain scarce goods and services, traditions of bureaucratic malfeasance and a poorly developed legal consciousness inherited from tsarist times, and lax and inconsistent control and law enforcement. By the late Stalin period, illegal dealings with—and among—state officials had become a way of life. As the country recovered from war, the desire among a growing middle class (including officialdom itself) for newly available consumer goods and individual (rather than communal) apartments spurred demands to cut through red tape via informal channels.

At the same time, popular anger about official corruption was reinforced by resentment at the appearance of a 'new class' of party functionaries and *apparatchiki*—an entrenched elite that acted as though they 'owned' their offices, seeking 'rents' from them.[65] Beginning already in the late Stalin era, many functionaries, feeling progressively invulnerable with the end of mass purges, acted as if they were above the law—and the party often treated its members as if they were. Campaigns against corruption launched after Stalin's death lost much of their edge, as party members at all levels of the hierarchy were charged with crimes much more rarely. At the same time, expulsions from the party for corruption dropped sharply after 1953.[66] Even as newspapers contained more coverage of crime, corruption among elites was mentioned only extremely rarely as the post-Stalin elite consolidated

itself. Corrupt bureaucrats at all levels of the state and economic administrations began to personify an increasingly ossified Soviet system. After the collapse of the regime in 1991, officials who had locked in their positions found themselves perfectly placed to profit from their posts to an extent that was inconceivable in Soviet times.

Notes

1. I would like to thank Don Rowney, Eugene Huskey, Daniel Orlovsky, Doug Manton, and Rebecca Griffin for their comments on drafts of this chapter and other assistance. The research and writing of the chapter were supported by the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, the Hoover Institution, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Open Society Archives, and the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies.
2. Joseph Berliner, *Factory and Manager in the USSR* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 160–230; and his 'Blat is Higher than Stalin!' *Problems of Communism*, 3, no. 1 (Jan–Feb. 1954): 22–31. Berliner's work was informed by interviews with émigrés during the 'Project on the Soviet Social System', informally known as the Harvard Interview Project. In the 1970s, Gregory Grossman undertook groundbreaking work on the relationship between the Soviet 'second economy' and state corruption in the Brezhnev era. Gregory Grossman, 'The "Second Economy" of the USSR', *Problems of Communism* (Sept–Oct. 1977): 25–40. More commonly than academics, émigrés and a few journalists described, mostly anecdotally, a thriving black market, widespread *blat,* and official malfeasance in the 1940s and 1950s. See, for example, David Dallin, 'The Black Market in Russia', *American Mercury*, 69 (1949): 676–89 ; Kirill Alexeiev, 'Russia's Underground Capitalism', *Plain Talk* (December 1949), 19–24; Boris A. Konstinovsky, *Soviet Law in Action: The Recollected Cases of a Soviet Lawyer*, edited by Harold J. Berman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953). On the black market and theft by employees in the 1930s, see Elena Osokina, *Ierarkhiia potreblieniia. O zhizni liudei v usloviiakh Stalinskogo snabzheniia: 1928–1935 gg.* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo MGOU, 1993).
3. F. J. M. Feldbrugge, 'Government and Shadow Economy in the Soviet Union', *Soviet Studies*, 36, no. 4 (October 1984); William Clark, *Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom: Combating Corruption in the Political Elite, 1965–1990* (Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993); Nick Lampert, 'Law and Order in the USSR: The Case of Economic and Official Crime', *Soviet Studies*, 36, no. 3 (July 1984); Charles A. Schwartz, 'Economic Crime in the USSR: A Comparison of Khrushchev and Brezhnev Eras', *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, 30, no. 2 (April 1981): 281–96. The émigré lawyer Konstantin Simis wrote an excellent if anecdotal memoir, *USSR: The Corrupt Society.* Simis labels the wake of the 1956 Secret Speech 'the turning point in the spread of corruption' (see his article 'The Machinery of Corruption in the Soviet Union', *Survey* (1977): 35), as party members lost both their scruples and their faith in the system. An important exception to this rule is an archive-based article focusing on party and state control agencies in the postwar Stalin period by Cynthia V. Hooper. Hooper argues that some elite crimes were increasingly hushed up in the late Stalin period. Hooper, 'A Darker "Big Deal": Covering Up Party Crimes in the Post-WWII Era', in *Late Stalinist Russia*, Juliane Fürst, ed. (London: Routledge, 2006). See also Gorlizki,

'De-Stalinization and the Politics of Russian Criminal Justice, 1953–64.' Unpublished D. Phil Thesis, University of Oxford, 1992. Katsenelinboigen's classic study of 'colored markets' provides one example from the 'late fifties;' all others are from the later period. Katsenelinboigen, 'Coloured Markets in the Soviet Union', *Soviet Studies*, 29, no. 1 (January 1977): 62–85. Nick Lampert's study begins with the 1960s.

4. Leslie Palmier, 'Bureaucratic Corruption and its Remedies', in *Corruption: Causes, Consequences, and Control*, Michael Clarke, ed. (New York: St. Martins, 1983), 207.
5. By the term 'official' the Soviet law code meant 'any person occupying a permanent or temporary post in any state (Soviet) institution or enterprise, or in any organization or association entrusted by law with definite duties, rights or powers for the execution of any economic, administrative, trade-union or other task.'
6. After the war, these crimes were subsumed into the 4 June 1947 *ukaz* on theft of state and social property. Embezzlement and misappropriation were then requalified under the *ukaz* as theft of state property, and therefore punished much more severely.
7. On corruption in the interests of production, see Steven J. Staats, 'Corruption in the Soviet System', *Problems of Communism*, 21, no. 1 (1972): 40–7. Staats notes that his survey of the Soviet press found that none of those executed for economic crimes were convicted of offenses that could be interpreted as *v pol'zu dela*, such as illegal procurement activities by enterprises (43, f. 12). Charles A. Schwartz noted in 1979, for example, 'Some kinds of corruption are functionally required and politically condoned for the effective operation of the Soviet system.' Schwartz, 'Corruption and Political Development in the U.S.S.R', *Comparative Politics*, 11, no. 4 (July 1979): 430. James Scott makes a distinction between corruption, which includes actions prohibited by law, and 'proto-corruption', which are deeds that are not specifically forbidden by law, including practices such as patronage and gift-giving. Scott, *Comparative Political Corruption* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1972), 7–10.
8. Letter to Malenkov of 3 August 1953, signed by Voroshilov, Shvernik, Gorshenin et al. GARF, f. 7523 (USSR Supreme Soviet), op. 85, d. 34, l. 19.
9. John Hazard made this point in 'Socialism, Abuse of Power, and Soviet Law', *Columbia Law Review*, 50, no. 4 (April 1950): 452–3.
10. See the 1946 letter of Minin to Stalin, in which he writes that bribes 'corrupt both the giver and the receiver, corrupt the work of government institutions and enterprises, become a serious obstacle in our construction, [and] provoke legitimate dissatisfaction and indignation among the laboring masses.' GARF, f. 9492, op. 2, d. 44, ll. 227–29.
11. GARF, f. 8131 (USSR Procuracy), op. 38, d. 449, l. 31.
12. See, for example, GARF, f. 8131, op. 38, d. 282, l. 33.
13. GARF, f. 8131, op. 38, d. 282, l. 76.
14. A. Ia. Vyshinskii, *Crime Recedes in the USSR* (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1939).
15. V. F. Kirichenko, *Vidy dolzhnostnykh prestuplenii* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk, 1959), 58. The 1970 edition of the *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia entsiklopediia* continued to echo these words.
16. On the tepid 1946 measures against bribery by the legal agencies, see Heinzen, 'A "Campaign Spasm": Graft and the Limits of the "Campaign" against Bribery after the Great Patriotic Wa,' in *Late Stalinist Russia: Between Reconstruction and Reinvention*, Juliane Fürst, ed. (Routledge, 2006).

17. GARF, f. 8131, op. 37, d. 2817, l. 6.
18. B. S. Grishin, 'Ob otvetstvennost' za vziatochnichestvo,' *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, no. 12 (1959): 60.
19. GARF, f. 9492, op. 2, d. 49, l. 275. Report entitled 'Obzor osnovnykh dannykh o sudimosti v SSSR za 1947 god', signed by K. Gorshenin.
20. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 1023, ll. 2–6.
21. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 1023, l. 3.
22. In April 1953, the Ministry of Justice noted that many people convicted of negligence (art. 111) were guilty only of inexperience. Fifty-seven thousand people were convicted under article 111 in 1952. GARF, f. 9492, op. 2, d. 93, l. 62.
23. It had long been common that officials would be charged with article 109 rather than something more serious, and given punishments up to one year in prison, as a way of minimizing the effect of the conviction. Peter H. Solomon, Jr., *Soviet Criminal Justice under Stalin* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 437–8.
24. Safonov made similar charges in a circular letter to Procuracy employees around the union. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 1023, ll. 17–22. Undated, but likely composed May–July 1952 based on surrounding documents in file and internal evidence. See, for example, a July 1952 report by the head of the Procuracy department responsible for supervision of police organs, a certain Sverdlov, to Deputy Procuror General Khokhlov. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 941, l. 305.
25. On the late Stalin period, see Hooper, 'A Darker "Big Deal"' and Heinzen, 'A Campaign Spasm'. On friction between the Procuracy and party control officials, see Edward Cohn, 'Disciplining the Party: The Expulsion and Censure of Communists in the Post-War Soviet Union, 1945–1961', unpublished PhD dissertation (University of Chicago, 2007), esp. 190–9.
26. GARF, f. 8131, op. 29, d. 11, ll. 133–219. These are solely cases involving the railroads.
27. Peter Solomon points out that 'few local politicians were willing to have key managers removed from their posts.' Solomon, *Soviet Criminal Justice*. The practice did not cease. As a 1963 *Kommunist* article pointed out, 'This incorrect practice leads to a situation in which non-Party people are liable for criminal prosecution, while party members are privileged before the law by being answerable, for the same crime, only to party organs.' N. Mironov, 'Nasushchnye voprosy dal'neishego upkrepleniia sotsialisticheskoi zakonnosti', *Kommunist*, no. 1 (January 1963): 57.
28. On the Communist Party's ability to protect its members from criminal prosecution, see Robert Sharlet, 'The Communist Party and the Administration of Justice in the USSR', in *Soviet Law after Stalin*, Part III of No. 20 Law in Eastern Europe Series, Donald Barry et al., eds (Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979).
29. On the 1947 campaign against theft of socialist property, see especially Solomon, *Soviet Criminal Justice under Stalin*, 410–2; and Yoram Gorlizki, 'Rules, Incentives and Soviet Campaign Justice after World War II,' *Europe-Asia Studies*, 51, no. 7 (November 1999): 1245–65; Elena Zubkova, *Russia after the War* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 49.
30. GARF, f. 9474, op. 16, d. 318, l. 18, authored by the Ministry of Justice. N/d, but probably April 1947, based on internal evidence.
31. GARF, f. 9492, op. 2, d. 63, ll. 32–3. Gorshenin: 'This information reflects only that material damage which was uncovered by courts in the course of

investigations, but the investigations make clear what enormous losses the theft of state and socialist property have inflicted on the economy.'

32. As Donald A. Filtzer points out, only in the year 1947 were more collective farmers than workers arrested under the 4 June *ukaz*. Filtzer, *Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism: Labour and the Restoration of the Stalinist System after WWII* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 28–9.
33. Stalin's *osobaia papka* is full of reports sent to him in 1944–47 documenting large schemes involving theft of state property. *Osobaia papka I.V. Stalina*, V. A. Kozlov and S. V. Mironenko, eds (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Blagovest, 1994), from materials of the Secretariat of the NKVD-MVD, 1944–53.
34. The regime sounded the call about corruption in the trade and distribution systems partly to scapegoat them because the economy was not *producing* enough.
35. GARF, f. 8131, op. 29, d. 23, l. 129.
36. J. Heinzen, 'Informers and the State in the Late Stalinist USSR: Informant Networks and Crimes against "Socialist Property", 1940–1953.' *Kritika*, 8, no. 4 (Fall 2007): 789–815.
37. GARF, f. 9492, op. 2, d. 37, ll. 65–66. Letter of Dvinskii of 30 September 1946, to Mikoian, deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers USSR.
38. GARF, f. 5446 (Sovmin USSR), op. 48a, d. 1614, ll. 102–98. Reprinted in *Istoriia stalinskogo GULaga: massovye repressii v SSSR*, tom 1: 557–9.
39. GARF, f. 9492, op. 2, d. 63, l. 33.
40. GARF, f. 9492, op. 2, d. 63, l. 37.
41. Solomon, *Soviet Criminal Justice*, 408–14.
42. By 1947, relatively few people arrested for theft were prosecuted under the August 1932 law (about 5000 of approximately 300,000 arrested in 1946—they typically received a ten-year sentence.) GARF, f. 9474, op. 16, d. 318, l. 11. Letter to Stalin. After 1935, the August law was used only to prosecute cases of large-scale theft. GARF, f. 9474, op. 16, d. 318, l. 21; Peter Solomon, *Soviet Criminal Justice under Stalin*, 408–9.
43. *Pravda*, 1 July 1952. Yoram Gorlizki highlights a re-intensification of the campaign against theft of state property in the final months of Stalin's life. Gorlizki, 'De-Stalinization and the Politics of Russian Criminal Justice, 1953–64,' 42–6.
44. On 8 September 1955, the Presidium of the Central Committee issued an instruction, 'On strengthening the struggle against embezzlers and thieves in trade organizations, industrial cooperation, and local industry.'
45. GARF, f. 9474, op. 16, d. 420, ll. 57–8. Letter to Malenkov of July 1953 from Voroshilov, Shvernik, et al.
46. GARF, f. 9492, op. 1a, d. 838, l. 4.
47. The 1 November 1957 amnesty similarly excluded thieves of state property in especially large amounts from release.
48. GARF, f. 9492, op. 1a, d. 838, l. 22.
49. 'Report on work in the struggle against theft and speculation in the first half of 1958.' GARF, f. 9415, op. 5, d. 165, ll. 68–9. This figure does not include petty thefts.
50. Ibid., l. 72.
51. The *Christian Science Monitor* noted the reports, and also reported that the case was described on Moscow Radio. *Christian Science Monitor*, 19 August 1958 and 20 September 1958.
52. The scandal was reported in the *New York Times* on 17 August 1959.

53. RGANI, f. 6 (Party Central Control Commission), op. 6, d. 1687, ll. l–1a.
54. The most outrageous example reported in *Izvestiia* involved the installation of railings around the gravesites at Vvedenskie Cemetery. One had to pay a bribe of 2100 rubles to get a railing. In exchange for that fee, a gravedigger would pull the fence off a nearby grave and install it at the new one. *New York Times*, 10 December 1957.
55. *Izvestiia*, 16 January 1958. *Izvestiia* reported that the city would build seven new cemeteries, the first new ones in 20 years. Evidence collected by Gregory Grossman and associates in the 1970s indicates that this form of graft remained very common in urban areas.
56. See complaints by the police about their tarnished image in *Izvestiia*, 13 June 1962.
57. As reported in the *New York Times*, 28 February 1964.
58. *Pravda*, 9 August 1963.
59. See, for example, N. Mironov's discussion of major cases of embezzlement and official theft in 'Nasushchnye voprosy . . .'.
60. It lies outside the parameters of this article to examine the degree to which the 1961–2 *ukazy* contained anti-Semitic undertones. Without access to still inaccessible party and police archival material, it will be difficult to determine definitively what the authorities had in mind. There is a fair amount of scholarship on the anti-Semitic undertones of the trials, though nearly all follow the basic contours of the uproar in the American and international press that broke out at the time of the trials. In the West, reaction to the introduction of capital punishment for economic and property crimes ranged from shock, to bafflement, to moral outrage. Prominent American theologians and writers, including Linus Pauling, Arthur Miller, and Martin Luther King Jr., denounced the legislation. Benjamin Pinkus, *The Soviet Government and the Jews, 1948–1967* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), argues that the trials were anti-Semitic, as do a number of other specialists on Soviet Jewry. Evgeniia Evel'son, in *Sudebnye protsessy po ekonomicheskim delam v SSSR* (London: Overseas Publications Interchange, 1986) also treats the subject. An anonymous 'Staff Study' by the *Journal of the International Commission of Jurists* in its summer 1964 issue made a strong argument that coverage of the trials was part of a larger pattern of press reports containing anti-Semitic stereotypes.
61. Harold Berman, *Justice in the USSR* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), 86.
62. Berman suggests this explanation in ibid., 69.
63. GARF, f. 7523, op. 109, d. 441, ll. 8–9. Dated 12 December 1964.
64. Dmitriev and Evgen'ev, 'Firma terpit krakh.'
65. The term 'new class' was coined by Milovan Djilas in *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System* (New York: Praeger, 1957).
66. Edward Cohn, 'Disciplining the Party', 150.

12

Soviet Foreign Policy from the 1970s through the Gorbachev Era: The Role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Communist Party International Department

Marie-Pierre Rey

From his accession to power as Communist Party leader in March 1985—and even more forcefully from the beginning of 1986—Mikhail Gorbachev advocated radical changes to the conduct of foreign affairs and domestic policy, the latter evident in the campaigns for glasnost and perestroika. Formulated officially in February 1986, the 'New Thinking' [*Novoe myshlenie*] offered a novel approach to international relations, which rested on several key concepts, among the most important of which were the nuclear threat, the common challenges facing humanity, the 'deideologization' of international relations,[1] and the abandonment of the principle of class struggle.[2] On this last point, of great symbolic importance for a socialist regime, Gorbachev's adviser, Georgii Shakhnazarov, went as far as to declare that 'the fight for survival is more important than the struggle for class interests, national interests, or any other interests.'[3]

Based on these general principles, three specific policies quickly emerged. They were the need to move from peaceful coexistence to cooperation between states; to have mutual security, promoted by the United States and the Soviet Union; and to base strategic policy on the concept of reasonable sufficiency.[4] These principles signaled a veritable revolution in Soviet perceptions of the world. The state no longer saw itself as an endangered fortress; it no longer dreamed of imperial grandeur or an aggressive expansionism toward the Third World;[5] it gave priority to domestic development rather than foreign affairs;[6] and it sought to promote a real policy of cooperation and disarmament with the West.[7] Such a policy was less expensive than the senseless offensive diplomacy that had been in place because it allowed the state to redirect resources previously devoted to the military to the civilian sector.

However, in order to promote and implement the 'New Thinking', Gorbachev had to rely on *apparatchiki* working in the existing foreign policy establishment. As his memoirs indicate, he had a very negative view of this establishment when he arrived in office.

> I had to convince the country's collective leadership of the need to change. And the problem did not end there. The international agencies of the Central Committee, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the KGB and the foreign trade organizations were, as a rule, at least as conservative and ideologically 'drilled' as most of the bureaucrats in our domestic administration. However, one must say that quite a few of our international analysts and experts supported the idea of change in foreign policy. *One of my main tasks therefore became the promotion of these people to leading positions in foreign affairs*.[8]

Was Gorbachev able to implement his announced goals? Did he succeed in transforming the existing diplomatic structures and reshaping the perceptions and worldview of the persons in charge of foreign policy? Did the policy transformations require structural reforms or simply a refitting of the existing apparatus? Finally, to what extent did these changes affect the conduct of Soviet foreign policy? To answer these questions, this chapter is divided in two parts. The first will describe the broad contours of the organization and operation of Soviet diplomacy in the period from 1970 to 1985 in order to assess the accusations of conservatism advanced by Gorbachev. With this picture in place, the second part will examine the upheavals in the years from 1985 to 1991 in order to understand their character and purpose and to reach conclusions about the organizational changes undertaken by Gorbachev.

Two organizations between partnership and rivalry

After the founding congress of the Comintern in 1919, and even more clearly after its second congress in March 1920,[9] Soviet foreign policy employed a parallel organizational structure that had no equivalent elsewhere. Until 1985, in addition to the traditional organizations directing Soviet diplomacy—first the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs [*Narkomindel*], and from 1946 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID)—there was a department within the Communist Party that was responsible for shaping the opinions and perceptions of foreign countries about the USSR and, where opportunities presented themselves, for helping to install communist regimes abroad.

After Stalin's death, the thaw introduced a number of changes in Soviet diplomatic perspectives and practices.[10] Now that peaceful coexistence had become 'the general line of Soviet foreign policy' the political leadership

advocated the establishment of improved relations with the West. In April 1956, as a result of this policy reorientation, Nikita Khrushchev decided to dissolve the Cominform, which had served since WWII as the successor to the Comintern. However, if this dissolution put an end to the visible ties that united the communist world, it did not represent a break with the traditions of the 1920s and 1930s. On the contrary, in March 1953, a new structure appeared. Known as the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), it was more discreet and modest than the Cominform, but from the 1950s to the 1980s, this organization played a paramount role in the development of Soviet foreign policy.

The International Department

Employing in the 1960s and 1970s from 100 to 150 persons who were recruited from diverse backgrounds—research institutes of the Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, espionage agencies, and friendship societies with foreign countries, the International Department was under the firm leadership of Boris Ponomarev from 1955 until the XXVII Congress of the CPSU in 1986.[11] Under the baton of Ponomarev, a rigorous guardian of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy, the International Department rapidly acquired a status and legitimacy that were reflected in the advancement of Ponomarev within the country's leadership. In 1961, he was elected a member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and in 1972 he became a candidate member of the Politburo.

From the first years of its existence, and within the framework of its primary mission, which was to employ its influence and propaganda for the benefit of the CPSU, the International Department pursued two specific goals. The first was the maintenance and development of close ideological and financial ties with communist parties that were not yet in power, the so-called non-ruling parties, the most prominent of which were in Western Europe. The second goal was to monitor and manipulate the entire constellation of front organizations created in Western societies in the second half of the 1940s.[12] In the view of Vadim Zagladin, one of the principal figures in the International Department, through the entire period from 1955 to 1985 'the Department's first priority was the communist parties [abroad].'[13] In fact, during these 30 years, the International Department devoted much of its energy to supporting virtually all of the world's communist parties through close relations in ideological and financial affairs.[14]

The ideological guidance exercised by the CPSU through its International Department assumed various forms, but it was most concerned with working out and then disseminating common positions designed to impose discipline on the international communist movement. The primary vehicle through which this guidance appeared was the journal, *Problems of Peace and Socialism* (published in English as *World Marxist Review*). Meticulously prepared over a period of months in late 1956 and early 1957, and officially

unveiled after the world congress of communist parties in November 1957, the journal reflected the desire of the Soviet leadership to reassert control over the communist world. Published in Russian, with parallel editions appearing in French, English, and Spanish, *Problems of Peace and Socialism* sought from the beginning to insure the ideological and intellectual cohesion of the international communist movement, while recognizing, according to the precepts of the XX Congress of the CPSU, a certain diversity of views.

Throughout its existence, the editor-in-chief of the journal was always a Soviet official and a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU,[15] although the editorial board contained representatives from ten East European communist parties as well as members from the French and Italian communist parties and underground communist parties from Latin America. Representatives from the non-ruling parties remained few in number, however, and the composition of the editorial board continued through 1985 to reflect the primacy of the Eastern bloc.[16] For the Soviet Union, it was important to use its dominance of the editorial policy of the journal to maintain control of this vital source of influence. Although the journal represented a valuable tool for the international communist movement, it was never, in the view of Anatolii Cherniaev, an adviser to Gorbachev, a substitute for the Comintern or Cominform. In this different context, the margin for maneuver enjoyed by Western communist parties was larger than during the Stalin years.

The publication of *Problems of Peace and Socialism* was supplemented by the appearance of various brochures, booklets, and pamphlets, all of which were distributed in their national languages by communist party organizations in Western Europe. Many reports originating in the International Department of the CPSU confirm the regular dissemination of these materials. Labeled ‘propaganda materials’ by the Soviet authorities themselves, they were designed to justify to Western European communists the initiatives undertaken by the Soviet leadership on international political issues, strictly defined, as well as on questions that concerned the international socialist community as a whole. In each case, these publications were to express the ‘truth’ as advanced by the Soviet Communist Party. Direct and frequent meetings between communist parties supplemented this written ‘conditioning’. These forums included Soviet party congresses and international communist conferences, in which foreign communists were invited to participate;[17] congresses of communist parties outside the USSR, where Soviet comrades were in attendance; and the overseas visits of the Soviet leader, during which he would hold talks with the leaders of fraternal communist parties.

These official encounters represented only a portion of the contacts between communist leaders. The majority of meetings remained out of public view, including the frequent contacts between local communist party

officials and the Soviet ambassadors posted in Western countries. In the case of Soviet ambassadors in Paris and Rome, these discreet encounters, carefully described in the reports addressed to the International Department and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow, took place every two or three weeks[18] and granted the ambassadors no room for individual initiative. According to former Soviet ambassador to France, Nicholas Polianskii, the envoy from the USSR was limited to transmitting letters of instruction received from party bodies in Moscow.

> The ambassador regularly received 'news' (or more often instructions) from the Central Committee of the Communist Party to transmit to 'friends', as the telegrams referred to communists. . . . These materials were approved in meetings of the Politburo that took place on Thursday. As a rule, the ambassador would receive them on Friday evening, and then instruct his staff to translate the text, which at times ran to 20 pages, from Russian to French on Saturday and Sunday.[19]

Noting the circumstances in which meetings between the Soviet ambassador and Western European communists took place,[20] Nicolas Polianskii offered more detail.

> The ambassador read the document word for word because he did not have the authority to make the slightest change to the instructions from the Central Committee. Immediately afterwards, he asked his interlocutor to provide his reaction (which was transmitted at once to Moscow) and then he gave him a copy of the text in French and asked him to convey the contents to the other members of the party leadership.[21]

At least until 1974–5, leading personnel from Western European communist parties also made unpublicized visits to Moscow for further training.[22] And it was to the International School named after Lenin in Moscow that future secretaries of national communist parties came to receive schooling under the aegis of the International Department of the CPSU.[23]

The examples above illustrate the essential role that the International Department played in the development of the international communist movement. Its influence was not limited, however, to work with other communists. Its activities extended to various front organizations operating outside the USSR as well. In the wake of WWII, as the Cold War was beginning, the first great front organizations were formed, organizations that were theoretically independent of any Soviet structures.[24] The number of such organizations continued to grow from 1946 to 1985 in keeping with the new needs and international objectives of Soviet power.

Directed and financed by the International Department's Bureau of International Social Organizations, the front organizations overseas were

allegedly apolitical and open to all. In reality, they were responsible for promoting ideas and instructions designed to align foreign public opinion with the diplomatic and strategic interests of the USSR. Among these front organizations was the World Peace Council, which was founded in 1948 and brought under the influence of the Cominform the following year (and the International Department after the demise of the Cominform). Employed as a tool of Soviet foreign policy until 1985, the World Peace Council was one of the most important front organizations under Soviet control. Among the other organizations used by the Soviet leadership—and controlled and financed by the International Department's Bureau of International Social Organizations—were the World Federation of Trade Unions, the International Union of Students, the International Democratic Women's Federation, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, and the Christian Confederation for Peace. Finally, certain front organizations were created on an ad hoc basis to carry out more narrowly focused or temporary assignments. Such was the case with the International Committee for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which was created in 1963 to disseminate in the West information favorable to the holding of a conference in Europe that would ultimately lead to the signing in 1975 of Final Helsinki Act.

Although the propaganda activities of the International Department gave priority to the communist world and front organizations in the West, they were gradually developing a focus on national liberation movements in the Third World. In the context of decolonization, they represented for the Department a target of increasing importance. The majority of Soviet economic and military assistance destined for the Third World was funneled through the International Department.[25] Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, due to initiatives taken by its director Ponomarev and the deputy director, Rostislav Ulianovskii, the International Department was the zealous defender of an active Soviet presence in the Third World, which meant in some cases support for revolutionary or terrorist groups.[26] Although Anatolii Cherniaev insists in his memoirs that the International Department never subsidized terrorist activities of any kind, other sources emphasize the existence of close ties between the International Department and certain dangerous groups.[27]

As the embodiment of the CPSU, the International Department played a major role in the party's machinery of influence and propaganda. It also served to perpetuate and reinforce the umbilical-like ties that had bound foreign communist parties with the Comintern in the interwar period. However, its role was not limited to that of implementation. Its own status and that of its leader, Ponomarev, enabled it to play a key role in the conceptualization and development of the foreign policy of the USSR.

Throughout the period from 1953 to 1985, the International Department influenced the debates in decision-making bodies by providing to the Politburo and the General Secretary of the CPSU its analyses on all the major

issues of foreign policy and by participating regularly in the preparation of speeches on international affairs that were given by Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev.[28] The International Department remained in the shadows, however, during the Khrushchev era. From 1956 to 1964, officials in the International Department were systematically excluded from meetings with Western diplomats, and officially the International Department had no role in the development of Soviet diplomacy. Things changed in the second half of the 1960s and into the early 1970s. Beginning in 1965, the International Department became much more visible, in particular on European, Asian, and African affairs, and its officials appeared with increasing frequency as leading representatives of Soviet diplomacy, even on interstate relations.[29] From this point forward, the Department's leading personnel, who had remained for so long in the wings, appeared on the international stage at a number of meetings and negotiations.

> In his role as president of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet, Ponomarev led the first Soviet parliamentary delegation to visit the United States, where he sounded out the views in Congress relating to detente.[30]

A year later, it was Ponomarev who welcomed to Moscow a joint delegation from the American Senate and House of Representatives. Beginning in 1973, Vadim Zagladin, the first deputy director of the International Department, frequently accompanied Brezhnev on his overseas visits, both to Europe and developing countries.[31]

In addition to its role as adviser on the shaping of Soviet foreign policy, the International Department, as a party supervisory body,[32] had broad monitoring responsibilities for the activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which had by the end of the 1960s approximately 3,500 persons working in its central bureaucracy alone, or 20 times the number of officials employed by the International Department. This right to oversee the operations of the Foreign Ministry extended to reviewing most of the documents and reports that the Ministry sent to the Politburo, whereas the International Department did not regularly send its work product to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[33] Moreover, the International Department had the authority to offer its assessment of the annual report of the Foreign Ministry.[34] This division of labor illustrates that while the International Department was a decision-making body, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remained a mere 'organ of implementation'.[35] Thus, possessing broad functions and prerogatives, the International Department was a major actor in the realms of Soviet foreign policy making and implementation. With regard to the first realm, its prominence began to provoke resistance in the 1970s from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which had its own ambitions with regard to foreign policy decision-making.

The Foreign Ministry's challenge to the International Department

Many sources attest to the growing rivalry in the 1960s and 1970s between the International Department and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the mutual enmity that characterized their relationship. The comments by the emigre diplomat Arkadii Shevchenko illustrate clearly this rivalry.

> One day when we were speaking of [Ponomarev] and his department, Gromyko fulminated that he didn't really understand why two separate organizations were involved in foreign policy.[36]

Likewise, Anatolii Gromyko, the son of the minister, noted the following in his memoirs.

> I understood well the special enmity that reigned between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the leadership of the International Department. The people in the International Department envied the diplomats because in their heart of hearts many dreamed of becoming an ambassador. However, Andrei Gromyko never recruited a single one of them for such a post . . . For his part, Boris Ponomarev was very jealous of one of his close colleagues who had moved into diplomatic work.[37]

Throughout the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, the International Department of the Central Committee retained its pre-eminence, though the balance began to shift toward the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was promoted to a privileged status regarding interstate relations. In this development, two factors were dominant: the personal role played by Andrei Gromyko and the emergence of an international environment that was increasingly favorable to the growth of the Ministry's power.

When one consults the archives of the Communist Party or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the statements of emigres like Arkadii Shevchenko or Nicholas Polianskii, or even the memoirs of Western interlocutors with Soviet leaders such as Henry Kissinger, who could hardly be labeled as soft on communism, there is a unanimity of views concerning the personal role of Andrei Gromyko in the newfound dynamism in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Gromyko was a professional diplomat who had been present at the conferences in Dumbarton Oaks, Yalta, San Francisco, and Potsdam, and whose career had included the prestigious posting as Soviet ambassador to the United States. A candidate member of the Central Committee from 1952, then a full member from 1956, Gromyko made his mark in the Khrushchev period as a competent and reliable official. The very incarnation of a specialist, he survived the fall of Khrushchev in 1964 and realized his hour of glory when Leonid Brezhnev assumed the general secretaryship. The two men developed ties of personal friendship,[38] which contrasted with the strained relations that existed between Brezhnev and Ponomarev.[39]

Gromyko's experience and abilities, which were honed during major international conferences and in meetings with various foreign leaders, helped to make this discreet man for so long the contemporary face, as well as a reminder of the past, of Soviet diplomacy. The testimony provided by his Western counterparts attests without fail to his professionalism. In the words of Henry Kissinger:

> In Gromyko, one found a professional of the highest level, a foreign minister who was able . . . to manage the international affairs of a superpower despite a bureaucratic jungle which ensured that Gromyko's power depended solely on his own competence.[40]

However, this image of seriousness and competence did not obscure from his co-workers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a number of weaknesses, which were captured in these remarks by Andrei Aleksandrov-Agentov.

> A conscientious and competent worker, Gromyko borrowed from Stalin neither the latter's flexibility in external affairs nor his ability to employ innovative methods or sudden shifts in policy . . . On the contrary, he took from Molotov not only his approach to work but a number of traits that were far from positive—a penchant for dogmatism and formalism and a tendency to fail to understand or take into consideration the point of view and interests of his counterparts during negotiations.[41]

Despite these weaknesses, Gromyko showed himself to be a discreet and efficient servant of Soviet diplomacy whose talents were officially recognized in April 1973. At that time, he became a full member of the Politburo, which granted him direct access to the highest decision-making bodies at a moment when Ponomarev remained a candidate member of the Politburo. A month later, Gromyko received the Lenin Peace Prize, and he would be awarded the gold medal at the World Peace Congress in November 1975.

Despite being perceived as a diplomat rather than a politician, Andrei Gromyko succeeded in asserting his authority and obtaining room for maneuver in foreign policy during the 1970s, a time when Brezhnev's policy of detente toward Western Europe and the United States and the policy of seduction toward the Third World played into the hands of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. By encouraging a marked increase in the staffing level of the Foreign Ministry—if the USSR maintained diplomatic outposts in 66 countries in 1959 and 95 in 1965, it was present in 108 countries in December 1970—the policy of detente toward the West and dialog with the new states of the Third World helped to turn the Ministry of Foreign Affairs into a powerful bureaucratic machine.[42] Moreover, when the Soviet leadership decided to accord greater legitimacy to the diplomatic sphere, to the detriment of revolutionary actions that were increasingly perceived as a chimera,

the credibility and prestige of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was enhanced. In general, the growth in importance of strategic issues between East and West in the 1960s and 1970s increased the prominence of the foreign and defense ministries to the detriment of the International Department.

Better educated and more pragmatic than their predecessors, diplomats in the Foreign Ministry were able to create an apparatus that was more efficient and professional and less attached to the ideological approach to diplomacy that had dominated until the middle of the 1960s. At the same time, developments in stature and status were accompanied by changes of a more psychological nature, as explained by Nicholas Polianskii.

> At this time, department heads and their assistants belonged to the old generation of Soviet diplomats. These were officials who had worked in the Komsomol and the Communist Party apparatus, or were engineers or economists trained in the Diplomatic Academy after the war and who filled the void left by the purges and the elimination of diplomatic cadres from the 1930s. But one was already seeing the emergence of a new generation of diplomats who were graduating from the Institute for International Relations and who were often the sons of diplomatic fathers or, more generally, the sons of high-ranking officials in the Party and State. Representing a privileged stratum of Soviet society, the sons differed from their fathers in having a higher level of education, a greater knowledge of foreign languages, and a less dogmatic and more liberal spirit. They were attracted by the Western way of life and they no longer rejected 'capitalism.' Instead, they recognized the success of industrial societies, did not believe in their failure and openly mocked Lenin's prophesy about the 'rotting of capitalism,' observing that the West had not finished 'rotting' and that it was doing it beautifully . . . They began to think that it was absolutely necessary to reform the functioning of the party; they were able to be indignant about the intervention in Czechoslovakia, and they knew well the works of Solzhenitsyn that they brought back quietly from abroad.[43]

This description illustrates the profound transformation that affected the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the second half of the 1970s, when the 'products' of the Khrushchev era began to replace the loyalists put in place by Molotov. Having arrived in their posts in the 1960s and 1970s, these new cadres were radically different from the previous generation. Better trained, at ease in foreign language and in the outside world generally, and more sympathetic to pragmatic and realist approaches, the diplomats of the 1970s were far less attached than their elders to a Marxist-Leninist ideal, to which they had learned to accommodate themselves. They were also less inclined to perceive international relations as a battle with the West that had to be won. These distinct qualities of the new diplomatic corps turned it into a

natural and sincere promoter of a real detente and economic and cultural as well as political exchanges with the West.[44] At the same time, Ponomarev continued to impose on the International Department an approach to international relations that was ideological and Manichean and that perceived detente as a dangerous illusion, thus creating fierce competition within the Soviet foreign policy establishment.

Contrary to what one might have expected, the renunciation of detente at the end of the 1970s did not benefit the International Department. Because detente's demise placed the Soviet-American strategic relationship center stage, the return to a 'Cool War' confirmed the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an indispensable agent in discussions between the two Superpowers. However, if the 1970s played to the advantage of a pragmatic Ministry of Foreign Affairs at a time when the International Department appeared to be committed to an ideological conservatism and a problematic revolutionary agenda, this evolution, just as the differences in the nature of the two organizations, should not be overestimated. On a number of issues, in fact, the International Department showed itself to be more flexible and pragmatic than the Foreign Ministry.

A Foreign Ministry taken over by conservatism?

In terms of ideology, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not always succeed in avoiding the Manicheanism that characterized the International Department. On a number of questions, diplomats from the Foreign Ministry shared the same point of view as specialists in the International Department, and relations between the two institutions remained very close. Vadim Zagladin observed that he had 'a number of personal friends at the Foreign Ministry' and that the International Department and the diplomatic corps 'always worked together'.[45] Moreover, in certain circumstances, Gromyko was even more uncompromising than Ponomarev. That was notably the case in December 1979, when Gromyko supported the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan while Ponomarev, who was not directly involved in the decision-making, disagreed with the action.[46] In addition, with the return of a Cool War in the years from 1979 to 1985, the Foreign Ministry under Gromyko was known for its hard-line position on the issue of Euromissiles and its increasing, and almost exclusive, focus on Soviet–American relations, which became the alpha and omega of East–West relations. On all three of these issues—the invasion of Afghanistan, the deployment of SS-20 missiles aimed at Europe, and the almost obsessive attention accorded to Soviet–American relations—the perspectives of Gorbachev were radically different from those of Gromyko and the Foreign Ministry, which explains his harsh assessment in 1985 of the diplomatic establishment.

At the same time, at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, the International Department no longer seemed as fixated as before on an ideological conservatism. One should recall that in 1963, Ponomarev

brought into the heart of the International Department a small group of consultants, overseen by Vadim Zagladin, whose job it was to reflect on the great problems of foreign policy facing the USSR, and to do so freely but without distributing their work outside the confines of the department. At the request of Ponomarev, these consultants, of whom there were no more than 20 during a period of 30 years,[47] dealt with a very wide range of issues.

> The range of talent was expansive; there were specialists in international law, religious affairs, and even human rights, the latter brought in as a result of the pressure exerted by the West during the Helsinki process.[48]

A stalwart of this group of consultants,[49] Anatolii Cherniaev, emphasized on several occasions the considerable intellectual freedom that Ponomarev accorded to these 'young revisionists'[50] and the protection that he granted them against the sharp attacks that emanated from the KGB and the more conservative departments of the Communist Party Central Committee.[51] In the account that he gave to the oral history collection on perestroika developed by the Hoover Institution and the Gorbachev Foundation, Cherniaev highlights the political and intellectual ferment that surrounded this group of consultants in the International Department.

> We expressed our doubts about everything and Ponomarev knew it. He didn't call us revisionists for nothing. But he had patience with us because he needed able assistants.[52]

This appeal to consultants who were 'considered to be the brain of the Central Committee'[53] and free thinkers marked a radical break with decades of intellectual obsequiousness. Coming from a communist as orthodox and conservative as Ponomarev, this appeal may have appeared paradoxical, but Ponomarev justified it on several grounds, including the need to recruit assistants of high quality.[54] The very existence of this group attests to the fact that inside the International Department, iconoclastic views and a reassessment of positions began to be advanced in the period from 1970 to 1985. Despite the ideological conservatism that it was forced to avow publicly, this group of consultants in the International Department appeared at the beginning of the 1980s as potential allies of the New Thinking of Gorbachev.

Thus, on the eve of Gorbachev's arrival in power, Soviet foreign policy continued to reflect a parallel organizational structure, which, despite the dominant position of the International Department of the Central Committee, witnessed in the 1960s and 1970s the rise in influence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As noted earlier, the Ministry benefited from the importance attached to interstate relations, especially those between the Soviet Union and the United States, and it was able to portray itself as an indispensable actor in Soviet diplomacy and to embody the idea of detente. However,

although it had been a bearer of modernity and reform in the 1960s and 1970s, at the end of the 1970s and in the first half of the 1980s the Ministry of Foreign Affairs began to appear much more conservative, relying on a hard-line vision of East-West relations that was oriented primarily, if not exclusively, toward Soviet-American strategic relations, an approach that did not coincide with the views of Gorbachev in the New Thinking. Where did these changes in the scope of Soviet foreign policy come from at the beginning of the Gorbachev era?

The International Department and the Foreign Ministry in the Gorbachev revolution, 1985–1991

Between 1985 and 1988, major changes occurred in the organization of Soviet foreign policy. In July 1985, the appointment of Eduard Shevardnadze to head the Foreign Ministry was a surprise because he came from neither the International Department nor the Foreign Ministry and, as a former leader in the republic of Georgia, he was not well-informed about foreign policy issues. He was, however, a close ally of Gorbachev and as such was convinced of the need to adopt a new approach to diplomatic questions.[55] The appointment of Shevardnadze, who at the same time became a full member of the Politburo, coincided with the marginalization of Andrei Gromyko, who in Gorbachev's eyes was an overly zealous representative of the perceptions and policies of Leonid Brezhnev. Gromyko found himself 'promoted' to the honorary post of Chair of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, before being deprived of all political responsibilities at the party plenum in the autumn of 1988.[56] Gorbachev then began to search for ways to reduce the autonomy of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs viewed as too conservative. This search led him to turn to the Communist Party for assistance, even though within the Politburo he was only able to rely on a small number of allies.[57]

The appointment of Shevardnadze prompted rapid and fundamental changes in the heart of the diplomatic establishment. For one, the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs changed profoundly. Between May 1986 and August 1986, the nine deputy foreign ministers were removed. Both Yulii Vorontsov, who had been a former aide to Ambassador Anatolii Dobrynin in Washington and involved in issues and negotiations relating to Soviet–American disarmament, and Anatolii Kovalev, who had been responsible for the Western European portfolio and the Helsinki process, were promoted to the rank of first deputy ministers. Alexander Bessmertnykh, former deputy ambassador to Washington, Anatolii Adamishin, former director of the First European Department of the Foreign Ministry, and Vladimir Petrovskii and Boris Chaplin all became deputy ministers.[58] At the same time, there appeared new departments within the ministry, among which were those for disarmament, humanitarian issues, the non-aligned movement, and international economic relations.[59] The leadership also made new

ambassadorial appointments, with Leonid Zamiatin going to London, Yulii Kvitsinskii to Bonn, Victor Maltsev to Belgrade, and Iakov Riabov to Paris.[60] The turnover of ambassadors was far-reaching: 74 of 125 Soviet envoys were replaced at the beginning of the Gorbachev era, which meant an impressive renewal of the diplomatic corps. By March 1989, only 15 percent of the ambassadors (19 of 128) had been in their posts before March 1985.[61]

With this turnover of personnel, Gorbachev as well as Shevardnadze sought, if not to weaken the Foreign Ministry, at least to remove the weighty inheritance of Gromyko, who had been guilty in their eyes of having revived the Cold War, plunged the country into the disaster of Afghanistan, and overseen the failure of Soviet policy toward other socialist countries. If the principal long-term aim was to renovate the 'house of Gromyko' and to make the 'new' ministry a force for advancing the new concepts promoted by Gorbachev, over the short term the many changes in organization and personnel contributed to the destabilization of the diplomatic corps and benefited the International Department, which at this time was acquiring new responsibilities.

Concerned to insure the loyalty of the party apparatus, Gorbachev in a few short months appointed new persons to key posts in this bureaucracy.[62] Anatolii Dobrynin, the former ambassador to the United States, replaced Ponomarev in March 1986 and became a Central Committee secretary as well as director of the International Department, which signaled, in a rather abrupt fashion, the end of the long career of Ponomarev. At the same time, Georgii Kornienko, first deputy minister of foreign affairs since 1977, became Dobrynin's first deputy, while Alexander Yakovlev, then ambassador to Canada, became the Central Committee secretary in charge of propaganda. Most of the new appointees were Americanists, that is to say, specialists with greater depth in American than European affairs. Despite the criticisms that Gorbachev leveled against the diplomacy of Gromyko, this decision to recruit those with an Americanist background led over the short term to a continuation of the policy options defended by the former foreign minister. At the beginning of 1986, the promotion of Anatolii Cherniaev to a post as close aide to Gorbachev redressed the balance somewhat. As a former editor of the journal *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, and a specialist on the Western European communist movement, Cherniaev was a prominent figure in the International Department and an expert on European issues.

During this period, the International Department's responsibilities become more varied and important. To be sure, the traditional functions carried out by the department did not disappear during perestroika. It continued, as before, to cover the entire communist world. Several documents drawn from the archives in the Gorbachev Foundation attest to the close ties that continued between the CPSU and non-ruling communist parties. Examples include the meeting presided over by Zagliadin in May 1985 with two members of the French Communist Party, Etienne Fojan and Francis

Cohen.[63] Three months later, a meeting took place between Zamiatin and Paul Laurent, a member of the Politburo of the PCF, who was vacationing in the USSR.[64] Such meetings continued, with the PCF leader Georges Marchais coming to Moscow at the beginning of September 1985 to discuss with Gorbachev a visit to Paris that he would make less than a month later. Then in May 1987, accompanied by Andre Lajoinie, future French presidential candidate, and Maxime Gremetz, the PCF's spokesperson for foreign affairs, Marchais met Gorbachev in Moscow in the eve of the Prime Minister Jacques Chirac's visit to the Soviet Union.[65]

The structural changes that were taking place in Soviet foreign policy—in the first instance, the abandonment of the concept of class struggle in international relations and the gradual renunciation of a communist empire—tended to push traditional functions into the background in favor of new responsibilities. Because it was an apparatus that was more nimble and flexible than the Foreign Ministry, and because it served as a reliable source of talent for Gorbachev on diplomatic questions,[66] the International Department, led by the experienced Dobrynin, emerged as a think-tank, a dynamic center of analysis, and eventually the favored agent for the modernization of the Soviet approach to international relations. This desire for change is apparent in the memorandum sent by Cherniaev to Gorbachev at the latter's request in April 1986.

> The current situation, and the issues advanced during the Congress, urgently require us to change the profile and functions of the International Department of the Central Committee. In the future, its areas of responsibility should correspond clearly with its title. Until now, it answered to the Central Committee on relations with revolutionary parties, ties with Social-Democratic parties, and work with international civic organizations. With regard to foreign policy, its role was optional, tied as it was to propaganda . . . Today, the Department, just like the Foreign Ministry and the KGB, should engage *all*[67] foreign policy. Moreover, its priorities should fundamentally reflect global politics (the socialist camp excluded), questions relating to the prevention of war, disarmament, detente, and special issues that affect the international activities of the CPSU as well as relations with the Americans, Western Europe, the Asia-Pacific region and the Arab and African world.[68]

Later in the same report Cherniaev insisted that the International Department work in close cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and that it rely, more heavily than in the past, on work originating in research institutes attached to the Academy of Sciences in order to enrich its analyses and actions.

Cherniaev's report would have immediate consequences. In the years from 1986 to 1988, the role of the Academy of Science's research institutes in

international relations increased. Led from 1985 by Evgenii Primakov, the Institute for International Relations and the World Economy (IMEMO) was closely identified with the ideas underpinning Soviet foreign policy during perestroika and was regularly involved in the preparation of reports by Gorbachev to party meetings.[69] Then, in January 1988, a new institute was created to deal specifically with European issues. Headed by Vitalii Churkin, a specialist in disarmament, whose deputy was Vladimir Shenaev, an expert on the German economy, the European Institute was responsible for advancing discussions and offering specific proposals related to the concept of the Common European Home. It was also charged with assessing the future of the Old Continent. However, its role remained limited, and the European Institute was not a real threat to the prominence of IMEMO.[70]

Although the report of Cherniaev helped to elevate the role of research institutes, its impact on the International Department itself was less clear. While Gorbachev and Cherniaev sought to turn the International Department into a center with both theoretical and practical strengths that could serve as a driving force in Soviet diplomacy, the results were less impressive than initially hoped. Beginning in 1988, the International Department was forced to defer to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at a time when the formulation and conduct of foreign policy began to be concentrated increasingly in the hands of Gorbachev and his immediate entourage.

Contrary to Gorbachev's expectations, the International Department was never able to emerge as a major force in Soviet foreign policy or to become the think tank of which the General Secretary had dreamed. This disappointment may be attributed to a choice of personnel, as Cherniaev observed in these comments about Dobrynin.

> Dobrynin never really assumed the role of director of the International Department. Gorbachev told me later that 'he had been ambassador in America and he remained an ambassador for America.' Gorbachev expected that under new leadership, the International Department would be transformed into, say, a brain trust, offering new ideas, new formulations, new analyses. But nothing of the sort emerged because Dobrynin was not up to the task. He served instead as an adviser to the President on American affairs.[71]

However, other factors played an even more crucial role. One should first emphasize the impact of institutional developments that were clearly apparent by the autumn of 1988. In September 1988, the Communist Party plenum introduced an ambitious reform that reassessed the party apparatus and reduced the number of Central Committee departments responsible for foreign affairs from six to only two: the Commission for International Policy and the International Department. Led by Alexander Yakovlev, the Commission, which was responsible for faithfully executing the Politburo's

recommendations,[72] eclipsed the International Department. Under its new leader, Valentin Falin, a specialist on German affairs who took over from the retired Dobrynin, the International Department was denied the range of action that it had earlier enjoyed.

Beginning in 1988, the influence of the International Department also began to decline vis-a-vis the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In his statements in the collection of oral archives of the perestroika era, Anatolii Kovalev emphasized that despite its reputation for liberalism, the International Department gradually lost its influence, finding itself brought into the diplomatic decision-making process less often.[73] The comments by Georgii Kornienko confirm this assessment.

> It is impossible to state that in this period, the International Department and Dobrynin personally had an influence on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as other secretariats [did who were] in charge of other areas such as industrial [affairs]. Dobrynin's influence on the administration of the Foreign Ministry and on Shevardnadze was non-existent because Shevardnadze paid no attention to his positions. The minister used to address himself directly to Gorbachev and receive Gorbachev's approval for one action or another while Dobrynin was keeping his opinions to himself.[74]

Thus, after stumbling to find its way in the period of experimentation from 1985 to 1987, the Foreign Ministry adapted to the new approach of Gorbachev. Pushed in this direction by Shevardnadze, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was able gradually to reassert its pre-eminence in interstate relations. Moreover, the International Department suffered less from an organizational rivalry with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs than a growing personalization of Soviet foreign policy after 1988. If the marginalization of the International Department was the product of its inability to transform itself into a modern organization in the Western sense and to compete against the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it also reflected a broader and more fundamental shift in the structure of Soviet foreign policy.

Despite the apparent diversity of organizational actors—the party, departments of the Central Committee, Foreign Ministry, and research institutes—it was the growing personalization of Soviet diplomacy that marked the period from 1985 to 1991. As the majority of firsthand accounts from the oral archives confirm, Soviet foreign policy tended to be more and more concentrated—some would say captured—by a very small number of officials. Until 1988, that phenomenon was limited. To be sure, Gorbachev had recruited in 1985 and 1986 a small circle of assistants charged with advancing and disseminating his ideas. We have already on several occasions noted the role of Cherniaev, but it is also necessary to emphasize the importance of Georgii Shakhnazarov, a specialist on European affairs, and

Ivan Frolov. However, until 1988, the apparatus of the party, and the International Department in the first instance, remained dominant. But that was no longer the case beginning with the reforms of September 1988. From this date, all the major diplomatic decisions, and in particular the management of the German question, were in the personal domain of Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, a fact that prompted complaints from certain specialists in foreign policy, whether working in the Foreign Ministry, the International Department, or the Commission for International Policy.[75] Valentin Aleksandrov, the secretary of this latter commission, challenged with particular virulence this confiscation of the diplomatic domain by Gorbachev and Shevardnadze. Criticizing Shevardnadze for having marginalized Valentin Falin, who did not share his point of view on the Soviet Union's handling of German unification, Aleksandrov made the following statement in an interview for the oral history collection on perestroika.

> I don't think that Shevardnadze was able to get his bearings because of certain interests that he had developed well in advance. That is why talented specialists who worked in the Foreign Ministry were marginalized. Even Kornienko was no longer necessary to him.[76]

As for Vladimir Kriuchkov, the former head of the KGB, he also stressed this confiscation of foreign policy, emphasizing in particular the issue of information.

> Before 1989, the KGB reports were distributed solely to the members of the Politburo and to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Depending on their content, some of them were also distributed to the Departments of the Central Committee or to the ministries. But the order in which they were distributed was subject to rigid rules. Following the abandoning of Article 6 of the Constitution [which formally eliminated the Communist Party's political monopoly], the diffusion of information from the KGB was drastically revised. We stopped addressing our reports to the Central Committee and were instructed to send them directly to Gorbachev. *He alone decided who would get access.*[77]

To summarize, despite the early goals set by Gorbachev in 1985 and 1986, the International Department, which should have played a role as a driver of the New Thinking, became increasingly marginalized from the conceptualization and development of Soviet foreign policy. At the same time, the General Secretary himself began to monopolize foreign policy, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs became the beneficiary of a redistribution of responsibilities. Three years before the collapse of the USSR, the special role of the Communist Party in foreign affairs, which had conferred on Soviet

diplomacy a significant part of its distinctiveness, was already little more than myth.

Notes

1. This expression was used by Eduard Shevardnadze in his article, 'Dobivat'sia vseob'emliushchei bezopasnosti', *Pravda*, 28 September 1988.
2. Nicolai N. Petro and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Russian Foreign Policy: From Empire to Nation-State* (New York: Longman, 1997), 149. In his work, *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World*, which was published in the autumn of 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev returned to the issue of the class struggle. 'We do not believe that it is possible any longer to retain an understanding of peaceful coexistence between states having different social systems as a specific form of the class struggle.' *Perestroika, vues sur notre pays et sur le monde* (Paris: Flammarion 1987), 208.
3. Cited in Richard Sakwa, *Gorbachev and his Reforms, 1985–1990* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1990), 334. Gorbachev declared in a report to the party congress that 'peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems is not just the absence of war. It is an international order in which relations of good-neighborliness and cooperation should replace military power, and where extensive exchanges on scientific and technological matters as well as cultural values take place for the good of all people.' Cited in Petro and Rubinstein, *Russian Foreign Policy*, 300.
4. In Russian, *razumnaia dostatochnost'*.
5. The unilateral withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and then the gradual abandonment by the Soviet Union of its network of client states in the Third World confirmed this shift.
6. In February 1987, before an international peace forum in Moscow, Gorbachev emphasized that 'our international policy is more than ever determined by domestic policy, by our interest in concentrating on constructive endeavors to improve our country. This is why we need lasting peace, predictability and constructiveness in international relations.' Quotation of the Day, *The New York Times*, 17 February 1989 [A1:6].
7. It is essential to underline this new line of reasoning. Supported by Shevardnadze, Gorbachev was the first Soviet leader since Beria in 1953 to come out for a detailed analysis of the costs and benefits of Soviet diplomacy. Beria had raised this issue with his colleagues but failed to convince them.
8. Mikhail Gorbachev, *On My Country and the World* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 173.
9. This second congress required all left-wing parties desiring to join the Communist International to agree to 21 rigid points.
10. See Marie-Pierre Rey, 'Diplomatie et diplomates sovietiques a l'ere du degel, 1953–1964', *Cahiers du monde russe*, nos. 2–3 (2003): 309–22.
11. These estimates were provided by Robert W. Kitrinos for the 1970s in 'The International Department of the Communist Party', *Problems of Communism*, no. 5 (1984): 50. They were confirmed by Thomas Gomart, who established that 150 officials were working in the International Department at the beginning of the 1960s. See his doctoral thesis, 'Double entente, les relations franco-sovietiques de 1958 a 1964', 110, which was defended in 2002 at the University of Paris, Pantheon-Sorbonne. For details on Ponomarev's biography, see the valuable work

edited by Archie Brown, *The Soviet Union: A Biographical Dictionary* (New York: Macmillan, 1991).

12. According to Anatolii Cherniaev's memoirs, *Moia zhizn' i moe vremia* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnie otnosheniia, 1993), 'Our primary concern was the communist movement and its appendages, including the peace movement, friendship societies, etc.' Cited by Michel Tatu in an appendix to his study, 'Les elites et la politique etrangere, leurs origines et leur evolution', *Recherches et Documents* (Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique), no. 11 (1999).
13. Interview with Vadim Zagladin, 4 November 1999, conducted by Thomas Gomart, in Gomart, 'Double entente, les relations franco-sovietiques de 1958 a 1964', 111.
14. The exceptions were the parties in Albania and China. For those seeking more information on the generous and continual support provided by the CPSU through the International Department to non-ruling communist parties, see my article, 'The Western Communist Parties in the Cold War, 1957–1968', in *Europe, Cold War, and Coexistence, 1953–1965*, Wilfried Loth, ed. (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 202–14.
15. A fact confirmed by Cherniaev in his *Moia zhizn' i moe vremia*, 225.
16. On 1 January 1963, the editorial board of the journal included, besides Alexei Rumiantsev and his Soviet aides, one representative each from the Communist Party in the following countries: Argentina, Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, Italy, USSR, Poland, Romania, France, Czechoslovakia, India, and Great Britain.
17. This was the case throughout the 1960s, which a review of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives confirms.
18. Arkhiv Ministerstva inostrannykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs], *referentura po Italii* and *referentura po Frantsii*.
19. Nicolas Polianski, *Douze ans dans les services diplomatiques du Kremlin* (Paris: Belfond, 1984), 177.
20. In this instance, he was speaking of members of the Swiss Communist Party.
21. Polianski, *Douze ans dans les services diplomatiques*, 177.
22. I did not have access to the archives of the CPSU that dealt with materials after 1974–75.
23. See Philippe Robrieux, *Du programme commun a l'echec historique de Georges Marchais, Histoire du parti communiste francais, 1972–1982* (Paris: Fayard, 1986), 3: 75–6. '[F]rom the standpoint of Colonel Fabien, we did not confine ourselves to a strict adherence to the general Russian strategy. We were also concerned about training the future cadres of the party in a way that would prepare them for this task. We continued, therefore, to select promising personnel of the party in order to send them to the international training school in Moscow, the idea being that one would have to continue to train there the future federal secretaries of the party, and thus, the future members of the Central Committee.' Ibid.
24. See Clive Rose, *The Soviet Propaganda Network: A Directory of Organizations Serving Soviet Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's, 1988), appendix A. Several such organizations emerged in the Leninist era, including Red Aid, the Soviet version of the Red Cross. In the interwar period, however, the Soviet ties to these organizations were so obvious that they were not able to claim the title of 'front' organizations, a concept that was reserved for those bodies that were supposed to be independent. On the other hand, one should note that although the concept of 'front' was frequently employed in the archives of the CPSU, especially in the materials

of the International Department to which we had access, it was never officially defined, inasmuch as its meaning was understood by Soviet leaders.

25. On the role of the International Department in Soviet policy toward the developing world, see Jan S. Adams, 'Incremental Activism in Soviet Third World Policy: The Role of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee', *Slavic Review*, no. 4 (1989): 614–30.
26. See Mark Kramer, 'The Role of the CPSU International Department in Soviet Foreign Relations and National Security Policy', *Soviet Studies*, no. 3 (1990): 431.
27. Like ETA, the Basque separatist group, which was believed to have benefited from the support of the International Department. At the present time, however, without access to the relevant archives, it is not possible to confirm or deny these claims.
28. Cherniaev, *Moia zhizh' i moe vremia*, *passim*.
29. 'Les elites et la politique etrangere, leurs origines et leur evolution', 6. 'With Gromyko concentrating almost exclusively on relations with the United States, the ID [International Department] was able to gain the upper hand on all the areas that he ignored, which was a lot: communist parties, Asia, the Third World in general, and even a part of Europe.' Ibid.; Cherniaev, *Moia zhizn' i moe vremia*, cited by Tatu in ibid., appendix, where Cherniaev states, 'As officials of the International Department of the Central Committee, we only had indirect influence on foreign policy in its literal sense, with the exception, perhaps, of the Middle East. There, Ponomarev had succeeded in advancing a policy of state in cases where the parties that we dealt with formed a part of the Government.'
30. 'The Soviet Foreign Apparatus', PR 76-10037 C, CSI-2001-00003, CIA Report. CIA Archives. The meeting in the US took place from 20 to 29 May 1974.
31. Kramer, 'The Role of the CPSU International Department in Soviet Foreign Relations and National Security Policy', 431.
32. 'The Soviet Foreign Apparatus.'
33. Tatu, 'Les elites et la politique etrangere, leurs origines et leur evolution', 6.
34. 'The Soviet Foreign Apparatus.'
35. Tatu, 'Les elites et la politique etrangere, leurs origines et leur evolution', 6.
36. Arkadi Chevtchenko, *Rupture avec Moscou* (Paris: Payot, 1985), 232.
37. Karen Broutents, *30 let na straroi ploshchadi* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1998), cited by Tatu in the appendix of 'Les elites et la politique etrangere, leurs origines et leur evolution.'
38. On this point see the account of Andrei Aleksandrov-Agentov in *Ot Kollontaia do Gorbacheva—vospominaniia diplomata* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1994), 71.
39. Several firsthand accounts confirm this, including those in the memoirs of Cherniaev and Georgii Arbatov.
40. Henry Kissinger, *A la Maison-Blanche, 1968–1973* (Paris: Fayard, 1979), 2: 848.
41. Aleksandrov-Agentov in *Ot Kollontaia do Gorbacheva—vospominaniia diplomata*, 69.
42. *Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior: Emerging New Context for U.S. Diplomacy, Congressional Research Service* (Washington, DC: G.P.O., 1979), 1: 6.
43. Polianski, *Douze ans dans les services diplomatiques du Kremlin*, 28–9.
44. 'Numerous representatives of the Soviet intelligentsia, including many diplomats, supported the policy of detente with the West and sought to implement it because they desired the liberalization of the Soviet system.' Ibid., 168.
45. Cited by Gomart, *Double detente, les relations franco-sovietiques*, 111.

46. On this subject, see the dossier prepared by the Cold War International History Project (Washington) on the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.
47. That is to say, between 1963 and 1993. These estimated figures come from Tatu, 'Les elites russes et la politique etrangere, leurs origines et leur evolution', 8.
48. Ibid.
49. It was not only Cherniaev who characterized himself in this way. See also the memoirs of Vadim Zagladin and Georgii Arbatov.
50. The term is Ponomarev's.
51. The most notable example was the Department of Agitation and Propaganda.
52. Interview with Anatolii Cherniaev, 24 May 2001, in the Oral History Collection on Perestroika, organized by the Hoover Institution and the Gorbachev Foundation.
53. The expression is that of Karen Broutents. See the interview that he gave to Michel Tatu in 'Les elites russes et la politique etrangere, leurs origines et leur evolution', appendix.
54. Note the following extract from Cherniaev's memoirs, which is cited in ibid., appendix. 'Boris Ponomarev told me one day that all of his colleagues in the Central Committee Secretariat had given him a difficult time because he was keeping persons on his staff who were ideologically suspect . . . And what should I do?, he asked me. I know that such and such a person (he gave me their names) is tempted by revisionism. But these are educated people who know how to analyze and write. As a rule, the real hardliners don't know how to do either one.'
55. See Archie Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 108.
56. Gromyko died several months later, in July 1989.
57. Several members of the Politburo, most notably Yegor Ligachev, who was head of the Cadres Department, did not hesitate to become resolute opponents of the foreign policy decisions taken by Gorbachev.
58. See Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor*, 217.
59. On the changes within the Foreign Ministry, see note no. 666/EU, Sous-Direction de l'Europe orientale, 25 juin 1986, archives du Quai d'Orsay, Europe 1986–1990, URSS, carton no. 6677. The box was consulted by special dispensation.
60. Ibid.
61. Figures provided in Kramer, 'The Role of the CPSU International Department', 434.
62. Note no. 666/EU, Sous-Direction de l'Europe orientale.
63. Report of Zagladin on his meeting with the French communists Fajon and Cohen, 11 May 1985, in the Archives of the Gorbachev Foundation, fond no. 3 (fond Zagladin), document no. 4762.
64. Taking summer vacations in the USSR had been a longstanding tradition for communists from France and other countries.
65. Interview with Gorbachev and the General Secretary of the PCF, George Marchais, 4 May 1987, in the Archives of the Gorbachev Foundation, fond no. 2 (fond Cherniaev), document 87may04.doc.
66. Including in the first instance Cherniaev and Zagladin.
67. The word is emphasized in the original.
68. Report of Anatolii Cherniaev to Mikhail Gorbachev, in the Archives of the Gorbachev Foundation, fond no. 1 (fond Gorbachev), opis no. 1, 14 April 1986, document ch86apr14.doc.

69. Hannes Adomeit, *Imperial Overstretch: Germany in Soviet Policy from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998), 303.
70. Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor*, 234–44.
71. Statement of Cherniaev, 24 May 2001, in the Oral History Collection on Perestroika.
72. Petro and Rubinstein, *Russian Foreign Policy*, 96.
73. Statement of Anatolii Kovalev in the Oral History Collection on Perestroika.
74. Statement of Georgii Kornienko in the Oral History Collection on Perestroika.
75. See the statement of Anatolii Adamishin in the Oral History Collection on Perestroika.
76. Interview given by Valentin Aleksandrov, Oral History Collection on Perestroika.
77. Statement of Vladimir Kriuchkov, Oral History Collection on Perestroika.

Part III

Post-communist Officialdom

13
An Introduction to Post-communist Officialdom

Eugene Huskey

Institutions and personnel

The personnel and organizational culture of Russian officialdom changed little in the initial stages of the transition from Soviet rule,[1] but the collapse of the Communist Party bureaucracy in the last months of the Soviet era weakened the state and unleashed a protracted political struggle that reshaped the institutional landscape in which Russian officialdom functioned. This contest, which involved the federal president, the federal parliament, and the governments of Russia's 89 regions and republics, passed through two decisive stages. In the first stage, from 1991 to 1993, the president emerged triumphant in a bitter battle with parliament. President Yeltsin institutionalized his victory in the December 1993 Constitution, the provisions of which reduced the ability of parliament to restrain presidential power.

It was premature, however, to label Russia a super-presidential order. In order to assure his dominance in federal politics, President Yeltsin conceded considerable autonomy to the country's regional political leaders. Moreover, the lack of a pro-presidential majority in the parliament often forced the president to compromise with the legislature on matters of policy and patronage. Thus, through the remainder of the 1990s, Russian officialdom operated in a turbulent political environment in which lines of authority were contested and ministries and regions took advantage of weak presidential leadership to champion their own departmental and local interests. Perhaps more importantly, the Russian state lost much of its capacity to regulate the economy and to provide citizens with social services.

Vladimir Putin's accession to power launched the second stage in the recasting of Russia's institutional arrangements. From 2000 to 2006, the new Russian leader pushed through an ambitious series of reforms designed to reclaim power from the periphery and revitalize a weakened state. These reforms included the formation of presidential 'embassies' in seven regions of the country, the elimination of territorial legislation that conflicted with

federal laws, a revision of tax policy to benefit the center at the expense of the periphery, and the passage of fundamental revisions to electoral rules, which replaced elected governors with appointed ones and ensured that parliamentary deputies had a national, rather than a local, constituency.[2] The first years of the new millennium also witnessed the successful taming of what had been for more than a decade a raucous and recalcitrant parliament. Through a combination of 'party construction' and favoritism in electoral administration, President Putin was able, by the end of 2003, to rely on a large and relatively disciplined pro-presidential majority in parliament. Finally, Putin put an end to the political ambitions of the new class of business tycoons that had emerged in the Yeltsin era by allowing the prosecution of one of its most outspoken members, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and by launching a partial renationalization of the commanding heights of the economy.

It is tempting to conclude, therefore, that by the end of Putin's second term, the Russian presidency had reclaimed the authority and power of the old Communist Party apparatus. Like the Communist Party, the Russian presidency maintains a massive bureaucracy whose departments monitor the behavior of the state and society. Although Russia's model of government bears a superficial resemblance to semi-presidentialism in countries such as France, which have elected presidents who rule alongside prime ministers, in the Russian case the president, like the Communist Party before it, stands above all three branches of government to 'ensure the coordinated functioning and interaction of state institutions' and to 'determine the basic course of the country's domestic and foreign policies.'[3] The constitutionally privileged position of the president is evident in his power to appoint presidential agents to represent his interests in the Government, parliament, the courts, and the regions. By the end of his second term in office in 2008, Putin had consolidated impressive despotic power, if we accept Michael Mann's definition of despotic power as the 'range of actions which the elite is empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalized negotiation with civil society groups.'[4]

Despite the organizational similarities with the old order, however, the presidency now operates in a very different social, economic, and ideational environment. Even with the erosion of political pluralism under Putin, the presidency, unlike the Communist Party, does not control a state that serves as a monopoly provider of information, housing, education, and employment. This was particularly evident in the budget crises of the 1990s, which eroded the presidency's power of the purse by encouraging cash-starved executive agencies to establish their own 'off-budget funds' through entrepreneurial activities. This entrepreneurial spirit of post-communist Russian officialdom is on full display in the chapter, later in this volume, by Cecile Lefevre, who details the fund-raising initiatives undertaken by social workers desperate to provide for their clientele.

If restraints on rent-seeking by state officials had been in decline in the late Soviet era, they all but collapsed in the early post-communist period as a result of the mass privatization of state assets, the weakening of law enforcement institutions, and the erosion of what Alexander Obolonsky calls the 'moral code' of officialdom.[5] In spite of an improving financial environment after 1998 and Putin's and Medvedev's rhetorical attacks on rent-seeking behavior by state agencies, the presidency's levers of control over the bureaucracy remain less potent than those in place in the Soviet era.[6] Furthermore, Russian officialdom's functions are more modest and its penetration of society is less complete than under Soviet rule.

As the chapter in this section by Gimpelson, Magun, and Brym makes clear, however, the movement away from an all-embracing state has not reduced the size of the state apparatus. For all the job losses in agencies whose functions were associated with state planning and the command economy, many replacement posts have emerged in federal bureaucracies created to monitor emerging market relations and in regional and local governments, which now account for approximately 60 percent of all members of Russian officialdom.[7] Although the size of officialdom across the communist/post-communist divide remained relatively constant through the 1990s, the number of state personnel increased significantly under Putin.

The composition of state administration changed appreciably after 1991.[8] First, Russian officialdom experienced a hemorrhaging of talent to the private sector in the initial years of the post-communist era. Many of the country's best and brightest administrative personnel used their expertise in finance, foreign languages, and security to obtain better-paying positions in the newly emerging business community. Taken together with the steady decline in birth rates, the loss of many able young administrators to the private sector has resulted in a graying of Russian officialdom, whose average age was almost 45 at the beginning of the 20th century. Second, there has been a 'militarization of cadres' in post-communist Russian officialdom. That is, since the late 1990s, personnel with backgrounds in the uniformed services, whether the armed forces or the security organs, have filled a disproportionate share of vacancies in the state bureaucracy. Although some of this is explained by the 'Putin enrollment' of high-ranking military and security officials into strategic posts in civilian administration, such as the heads of six of the seven new federal territories, demobilized officers from a downsized Russian military have also moved in significant numbers into mid-level posts in Russian officialdom.[9]

The transition from communist rule brought important changes in the career patterns of state officials. In order to combat localism, Soviet cadres policy had encouraged the geographic mobility of senior figures in party and state administration.[10] This practice is now a rarity in post-communist

Russia, which helps to explain why Russian presidents have had such difficulty in taming the periphery. Although the presidential and Government bureaucracies serve as way stations in the careers of a limited number of high-ranking administrators, there is no equivalent in the post-communist era to the widespread circulation of elites through the Communist Party apparatus. In the Soviet era, officials who rotated through the Central Committee apparatus returned to a higher post in their former bureaucracy, or moved to another state body, having absorbed values of party rule that were designed to combat the narrow organizational loyalties which can develop when administrative careers are made within a single state agency.

New forms of career mobility have emerged, however, in the post-communist era. The first is the circulation of elites between the public and private sector, which is especially pronounced among senior state administrators. As the chapter by Huskey explains, the movement of personnel between businesses and state administration poses the most fundamental questions about the relationship between economic and political power in post-communist Russia. The second innovation in bureaucratic careers is an increased willingness to promote laterally rather than from below for the posts of ministers and deputy ministers. Whereas the Soviet tradition in many ministries was to look for internal, technocratic candidates to promote to leadership positions, post-communist Russian officials are more likely to assume a ministerial portfolio without lengthy service in that ministry. The most dramatic examples in the Putin era were appointees to the post of defense ministry, including the first civilian to serve in that role since the early Soviet era.

The recruitment of cabinet members and other political leaders from the senior ranks of state administration is a reminder of the endurances in officialdom across the Soviet and post-communist eras. Like their Soviet counterparts, post-communist Russian leaders have been drawn overwhelmingly from careers in the permanent bureaucracy of state rather than from the worlds of business, the professions, or elective and party politics. This *formation professionelle* results in a very different ruling class, therefore, than one finds in democratic polities. In fact, one may ask whether students seeking to measure democracy's consolidation should focus as much on the career backgrounds of politicians as the levels of contestation and participation in elections. Among the other continuities in careers across the communist/post-communist divide is the marginal role of women in state administration. Although women make up approximately three-quarters of the personnel working in post-communist officialdom, they continue to be poorly represented in senior positions. When they have a presence there, it is usually in sectors that have long been defined as special female preserves, such as labor and culture.[11]

Reform

Changes in post-communist officialdom have resulted from state-sponsored reform initiatives as well as the collateral effects of transformations in the social and economic environment. As the chapter in this section by Obolonsky explains, the reform of state administration remained a low priority for the political leadership until the end of the 1990s. The collapse of communism had generated a consensus among Russia's leaders that the first target of state action should be the economy. Thus, it was only in 1997, once the political environment had stabilized and the initial waves of marketization had passed, that the presidential administration turned its attention to the reform of officialdom.

Reforming the bureaucracy has proved to be a far more difficult and protracted project than macroeconomic change. When the scope of reform includes personnel, procedures, financing, organization, and culture, there are no quick fixes in any country. Further complicating reform in the Russian case are the scale and diversity of the country, the resistance to change of politically powerful ministries, the inconsistency of the president's commitment to reform, and the absence of popular pressure for change. As in many other reform projects in post-communist Russia, the presidency has attempted to impose change from above through legislation crafted by working groups of experts and high-ranking officials rather than by mobilizing support broadly in the state bureaucracy and in society. The result of this model of governance is impressive-looking legislation that is often delayed, distorted, or blocked by officials in the bureaucracy who are defenders of the status quo.[12] Such has been the case in the post-communist era with initiatives designed to modernize Russian officialdom, a theme developed in the chapter later in this volume by Barabashev, Krasnov, Obolonsky, and Zaitseva.

The Russian approach to public administration envisions two distinct arenas of reform. The first, administrative reform, embraces issues relating to the organizations and structures of officialdom. After more than a decade of debate, Russia launched an administrative reform in 2004 that reduced the number of ministries from 23 to 13, divided the newly merged ministries into three discrete functional units, and simplified the internal organization of ministries by scaling back dramatically the number of deputy ministers.[13] Modeled in part on New Public Management initiatives adopted in Anglo-Saxon countries, the reorganization dispensed with the traditionally unified ministries in favor of a tripartite structure in each policy area.[14] The new units are agencies [*agenstva*], which monitor the behavior of the bureaucracy and society in a particular sector; services [*sluzhby*], which provide goods and services to the population; and ministries, which in their new, smaller incarnations are responsible for policy development.

Within the ministries, the reduction in the number of first deputy and deputy ministers was designed in part to streamline the management structure so that ministers would face less resistance to their authority from the unusually thick layer of bureaucracy that had traditionally separated the political leader of a ministry from the department heads. Where large ministries like the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) had included as many as a dozen deputy ministers in the 1990s, the administrative reform of 2004 reduced this number by two-thirds. During Putin's presidency, there was a similar decrease in the number of deputy leaders in the Russian Government, where the proliferation of deputy prime ministers in the Soviet period and through the Yeltsin era had complicated the coordination of state policy.

Even with these administrative reforms, however, Russian officialdom continues to suffer from a number of longstanding management pathologies that the elimination of the Communist Party only exacerbated. These include the awkward tension between traditions of collective leadership and one-man rule within the ministries and Government; the porousness of jurisdictional boundaries within and between ministries; and the existence of two large, parallel executive management structures, in the presidency and the Government. In the Western tradition, the antidotes to such organizational pathologies are usually found in a blend of law and politics that is unique to each country. However, post-communist Russia lacks the mature legal system or the vibrant ruling party, whether democratic or authoritarian, that could provide the policy coordination and discipline that are essential to modern states. For all its political authority, the Russian presidency has not yet developed the rules and machinery of governance that will enable it to manage effectively Russian officialdom.

The second arena of change in Russian public administration, state service reform, includes a wide range of problems that bear on the recruitment and promotion, remuneration, status, and responsibilities of members of officialdom. As Alexander Obolonsky points out in his chapter in this volume, Russia has struggled in the post-communist era to transform a state service [*gosudareva sluzhba*] inherited from the tsarist and Soviet eras into a public or civil service [*publichnaia or grazhdanskaia sluzhba*] that will advance civic rather than patrimonial values. Instead of encouraging the development of a politically neutral, transparent, and merit-based officialdom, policy and practice in the post-communist era have continued to sustain the existence of the state bureaucracy as a corporate caste that is insulated from society. Despite the introduction of legislation that envisions competitive hiring, the following chapter in this volume, by Gimpelson, Magun, and Brym, illustrates that, with rare exceptions, the spoils rather than the merit system continues to govern the hiring of members of state administration. The one encouraging result of this study is that officials perceive merit to be an important factor in the promotion of personnel through the ranks.[15]

How—and how much—to pay state officials have been central questions in the debates over state service reform in the post-communist era. Facing rising competition from the private sector, the state has steadily increased the remuneration offered to its employees, but even with an increase in pay of 28 percent from 2005 to 2006 and a 31 percent increase in the first nine months of 2008, the salaries of state servants still lag behind those in large business organizations, especially in their senior management ranks.[16] For example, where project managers in the private sector receive 1.5 to 3 times as much as their public sector counterparts, members of senior management in private business receive 10 to 15 times more than those in equivalent state posts.[17] There are, however, other benefits in Russian officialdom that allow the state to compete for talent. Among these are job security, a well-established career path, the status of rank, opportunities for bribe-taking, especially in agencies like customs and natural resources, and generous in-kind benefits that serve to top up modest base salaries. Finally, in many regions of the country, there is not a well-developed private sector that could compete for employees, and the pay of state officials is, after all, higher than that of the average Russian worker.

The seemingly arcane issue of the appropriate division between base pay [*dolzhnostnoi oklad*] and other pay and benefits has been one of the most controversial issues in state service reform in the post-communist era. In an attempt to contain expenditures and align Russian officialdom more closely with modern practices in public administration, Putin sought to raise base salaries in exchange for reducing supplemental pay for time in rank, bonuses, and special skills and for eliminating benefits like free transportation and subsidized housing and health care. Not surprisingly, attempts to fully monetize the remuneration of officials have prompted fierce resistance from the state bureaucracy.[18] Regional governments worry that they will have to step in to pay for the services that the federal authorities are no longer providing; rank-and-file officials worry that additional pay will not be adequate to cover the costs of benefits acquired in the market; and many bosses want to retain their discretion in the distribution of bonuses and benefits as a means of assuring loyalty to superiors.[19] The personalism in administration that Graeme Gill described in an earlier chapter rests in large measure on the scope of patronage power, which reaches beyond hiring and promotion decisions to what Soviet officials called material incentives. On this question, as on so many others, it is officialdom itself that serves as a brake on reform in post-communist Russia.

Relations between center and periphery

One of the most dramatic departures in state administration in the transition from communism was the decoupling of the bureaucratic corps in the

center from that in the periphery. With the collapse of the patronage system maintained by the Communist Party, and the attempts of many regions and republics to, in Yeltsin's words, 'take as much sovereignty as they could swallow', officialdom in Russia's territories began to follow distinct developmental trajectories—distinct from each other and from the federal state service. Thus, referring to a single Russian officialdom made little sense in the early post-communist era.

By 1998, all but two of the regions and republics had adopted their own laws on state service.[20] Not only was regional legislation often more detailed and carefully crafted than that introduced by federal authorities, but regional state bureaucracies in the 1990s were growing faster and paying better than the federal state service. Whereas the size of the federal state bureaucracy increased 8.5 percent from 1994 to 1999, from 486,000 to 528,000 personnel, the number of officials working in regional and local governments in the same period grew by 17 percent, from 518,500 to 607,700.[21] In the Putin years, the considerable growth that did occur in the federal state bureaucracy was almost exclusively in the ranks of federal territorial workers—those federal employees stationed outside of Moscow—rather than among federal officials in the capital. Whereas the number of federal workers in Moscow rose from 38,000 in 2000 to 42,500 in 2006, the number of federal territorial workers increased from 483,700 to 786,000 in this period, for a gain of over 62 percent.[22] Thus, the image of a bloated central bureaucracy in Moscow simply does not accord with the statistics. Even such visible organizations as the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Agriculture had only 1,091 and 451 personnel, respectively, in their Moscow offices in 2005.[23]

The separate development of federal and regional bureaucracies was also evident in their wage differentials. By the end of the 1990s, the average pay of regional officials exceeded that of federal territorial workers by more than 50 percent, and in some regions, officials were receiving two or three times the salary of their federal territorial counterparts.[24] The discrepancies in pay across regions were, in places, staggering: the average monthly salary in Kalmykia was 7,720 rubles as opposed to over 61,000 rubles in the oil-rich Taimir Autonomous Region.[25] It was only toward the end of Putin's second term that the income gap between federal territorial employees and regional government workers began to narrow, though the differential still stood at over 28 percent in 2007.[26]

Besides creating their own large and well-paid bureaucracies in the wake of communism's collapse, ambitious regional leaders sought to maximize their hold on power by 'capturing', or at a minimum neutralizing, federal territorial workers stationed in their regions, who vastly outnumbered federal officials working in Moscow. By co-opting federal personnel responsible for monitoring financial and legal operations in the provinces, many regional leaders were able to govern with relative impunity in their territories.[27]

Facilitating this rise of regional power in the 1990s was an inattentive political leadership in Moscow and a federal budget that chronically under funded federal offices in the provinces. By providing essential goods and services to cash-starved federal territorial workers, the governors were often able to draw these federal officials into their regional patronage network. Frustrated by the inability of the center to control federal officials in the provinces, the deputy head of the Urals Federal District complained in late 2000 that 'it's obvious that many federal structures have forgotten that they are federal.'[28] Moreover, leaders in many regions and republics were able to select the nominees for vacancies in federal territorial offices, or, at a minimum, to veto candidates advanced by a ministry in Moscow.

By the end of the 1990s, therefore, the centuries-old system of centralized rule in Russia was under threat. Russia's regions were still being run by political strongmen—now called governors or presidents rather than *namestniki* or party secretaries—but the elective principle allowed these regional elites to enjoy a level of autonomy from the capital that was unthinkable in the late tsarist or Soviet eras. One result was a new form of dual subordination in the provinces. Instead of federal agencies answering both up the line to their ministerial superiors in Moscow and laterally to the party first secretary in the region, as was the case in the Soviet period, federal territorial officials now answered to the regional governor, or district head of administration, as well as to the relevant federal ministry.[29] The head of a federal agency in one district admitted that 'I fulfill his [the district head of administration's] assignments just as I do those of my boss, although legally he is not my boss'. That state bureaucrats adapted so readily to this kind of organizational redundancy is attributable in part to the power of cultural legacies. Answering to two masters at once did not seem unusual for those socialized in the Soviet era. But where a blurring of the lines of authority between party and state was the essence of the Soviet system, the effacement of the boundaries between federal and regional government in Russia's provinces threatened the viability of the central Russian state by encouraging the emergence of mini-patrimonial regimes in many regions and republics.

Reacting to these developments, Vladimir Putin launched a broad-based campaign, after his inauguration as president in May 2000, to reintroduce centralized rule in Russia. Besides the measures discussed at the beginning of the chapter, Putin also formed a high-profile working group, chaired by Dmitrii Kozak, to develop new rules on the division of labor and authority between federal and regional governments. As a result of these efforts, regional state bureaucracies began to shed their distinctive features and to align themselves more closely with each other and federal officialdom. Although a single Russian officialdom had not yet taken shape by the end of Putin's second term, the centralization drive eliminated the bureaucratic protectionism inherent in certain regional governments, which, for

example, prevented non-residents of the region from applying for jobs in regional government. New legislation also introduced a single system of service grades and social benefits for those working in federal or regional state service, which encouraged labor mobility across regions of the country and levels of government. And although there was no attempt to create a single pay scale for federal and regional officials, procurators in several 'recipient' regions—those whose transfers from the federal budget exceeded the tax revenues sent to the center—successfully sued regional governments to prevent them from paying their own officials more than federal territorial workers were making in the region.[30] A final, and decisive, factor in the homogenizing of federal and regional officialdom was the controversial move—initiated by Putin after the Beslan tragedy in September 2004—to appoint, rather than elect, governors. The removal of the elective principle changed fundamentally the balance of power between center and periphery and created a potent incentive for provincial elites to adapt to the centralizing policies emanating from Moscow.[31]

To this point, the analysis has focused on officials in federal and regional bureaucracies. There were also, however, over 465,000 officials who worked for the governments of cities, districts, villages, and settlements by Putin's second term.[32] Throughout most of the last 150 years, Russian governments have insisted that 'local institutions ... remain part of an integrated system of state government.'[33] This 'state' model conflicted, however, with the 'society' approach of some tsarist-era reformers, who favored a measure of autonomy implicit in the current Russian term for local authorities, *mestnoe samoupravlenie*, or local self-government.[34] With its highly centralized rule, the Soviet state gave only lip service to the idea of self-government at the local level, but the end of the Soviet era witnessed the re-emergence of 'society' approaches to local governance. A new statute on principles of local self-government, as Anatolii Kruzhkov writes, 'reintroduced the [society-based] concept into law' on 9 April 1990.[35]

Legislation adopted on local government since the collapse of communism has reinforced, in formal terms at least, the distinctiveness and relative autonomy of local officialdom in Russia's more than 12,000 cities, districts [*raiony*], villages, and settlements. Thus, whereas those who work for regional and federal government form part of a 'state service' [*gosudarstvennaia sluzhba*], officials in the service of city and district governments are in a corps apart.[36] Although subject to overarching federal legislation on local self-government, cities and districts have adopted varied approaches to recruitment and promotion, pay levels, service grades, and rules of conduct, usually based on provisions in relevant regional legislation. In this sense, the Russian experience in the post-communist era has moved in the direction of American federalism, where each municipality establishes its own norms for officials, within the framework of state and federal laws.

In the Russian case, however, the formal recognition of a separate, and relatively autonomous, sphere for local government has not led to the development of a vibrant and self-regulating officialdom at the local level. The impediments to a mature system of local self-government are several.[37] First, outside of regional capitals, most cities and districts do not have a tax base that is sufficient to sustain the requisite bureaucracy. Indeed, in the Novosibirsk region in 2000, the overwhelming majority of local authorities transferred all budgeting responsibilities to the regional government.[38] Without a shift away from property taxes as the basis for local budgeting, or a dramatic increase in property values, local officials in most of Russia's cities and districts will remain de facto appendages of regional authorities.

Second, local governments in many areas of Russia find it difficult to hire qualified personnel, given the relatively low level of remuneration and the unattractiveness of the surroundings for persons with a higher education. On average, a third of Russian local officials lack a higher education, though that figure varies widely by region.[39] If 92 percent of regional officials in the Belgorod region had a higher education in 2000, the figure was 70 percent for municipal officials and 34 percent for those working in village or settlement administrations.[40] There is also a deficit of computer technology as well as qualified cadres in many districts, which serves as a reminder that the quality of governance in Russia's vast provinces continues to lag well behind that in local governments in the advanced industrial world.[41]

The most serious obstacle to the emergence of a mature system of local self-government, however, remains the resistance to the devolution of political authority by elites in Moscow and the regional capitals. For federal and regional officials, local governments have been pawns in an ongoing struggle between the center and periphery for control of resources, patronage, and policy.[42] In the 1990s, the willingness of federal politicians to champion legislation on home rule for cities and districts reflected in no small part their desire to prevent regional governments from fully integrating local officialdom into regional administration.[43] Now that President Putin has asserted federal authority over the regions, through the appointment of governors and the rebalancing of tax receipts to favor the federal as opposed to regional budgets, there appears to be less concern about protecting local governments from the heavy hand of regional elites.[44] Indeed, the logic of the vertical of power [*vertikal' vlasti*], which was at the center of Putin's political revolution, required the integration of local government into a single state administrative hierarchy, even if the 'society-centered' label of local self-government was retained for legitimation purposes.[45]

A dramatic example of the implications of gubernatorial appointments for Russian officialdom came in late 2006, when the leader of the pro-Putin party, United Russia, proposed a merging of a streamlined corps of federal territorial workers into regional state bureaucracies. The proposal was justified in part on the grounds of eliminating unnecessary duplication

in officialdom—in the fisheries sector, for example, federal authorities monitored carp while regional officials monitored pike.[46] But also at stake was a desire to mollify regional elites, whose status and freedom of maneuver had been diminished by the removal of the electoral mandate. Reacting to this concern, Putin granted regional governors in 2006 the right to approve the appointment of the leaders of federal offices in their regions, a measure that returned to governors one of the powers that they had enjoyed in the Yeltsin era.[47]

Blurring—or removing altogether—the boundaries between federal and regional officials working in Russia's provinces would affect not only center-periphery relations but also the role of the presidency and Government in Russian politics. Since the early 19th century, Russian state administration has been grounded in a ministerial system, in which ministries based in the national capital have governed through a network of subordinate institutions in the provinces. If the provincial appendages of these ministries were scaled back, the ministries in Moscow, and hence the Russian Government writ large [*pravitel'stvo*], would find itself even further eclipsed by presidential power. Instead of using the Government and its ministries as a primary instrument of rule in the provinces, the president could rely instead on two alternative agents appointed by him: the leaders of the regions and republics, and presidential 'ambassadors' working in the seven federal district headquarters and in each of the territories of the country.[48] At the beginning of the 21st century, therefore, Russia still faces fundamental choices about its model of governance, choices that will determine the future development of a Russian officialdom.

Notes

1. According to one source, '[t]he extent of the carryover of members of officialdom in this period [the early 1990s] was 60–70 percent, and higher in some agencies. The bulk of personnel [from the Soviet era], who had been hired on the *nomenklatura* principle, kept their positions.' Alexei Barabashev et al., *Reforma gosudarstvennoi sluzhby Rossiiskoi Federatsii (2000–2003)* (Moscow: Izdatel'skii dom GU VshE, 2006), 28. The authors argue here that many of the problems of the 1990s could be traced to the traditional attitudes of those implementing reforms.
2. Formally, the president nominated governors, who were then approved by the regional parliament, but no regional parliament had turned down a nominee through the end of 2008.
3. *Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii* (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia literatura, 1994), art. 80.
4. Michael Mann, 'The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results', in *States in History*, John A. Hall, ed. (London: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 109–36.
5. On the efforts to codify new ethics rules for Russian officialdom, see Alexander Obolonsky, *Moral' i pravo v politike i upravlenii* (Moscow: Vysshaia shkola ekonomiki, 2006).

6. In Dmitrii Medvedev's first State of the Union as president in November 2008, he identified corruption as 'enemy Number 1' of Russian society. Poslanie Federal'nomu Sobraniiu, 5 November 2008. www.kremlin.ru/sdocs/appears.shtml?stype=63372.
7. *Statisticheskii biulliten'* [Goskomstat], no. 4 (2001): 10. All 122 pages of this issue are devoted to statistics on Russian officialdom. In calculating the size of Russian officialdom, we include only those persons who are civilian state servants [in Russian, *gosudarstvennye sluzhashchie, zameshchaiushchie gosudarstvennye dolzhnosti*]. Excluded from this number are elected officials and high-ranking appointed officials, such as ministers; state employees providing health and education services to the population, such as doctors and teachers; and personnel in the uniformed services. For a discussion of the relative size of the Russian bureaucracy, see Stephen Velychenko, 'Accroitre ou reduire? L'administration des etats successeurs de l'URSS: un point de vue historique comparatiste sur le niveau des effectifs', *Revue d'etudes comparatives Est-Ouest*, no. 1 (2002), 77–111, and Robert J. Brym and Vladimir Gimpelson, 'The Size, Composition, and Dynamics of Russian State Bureaucracy in the 1990s', *Slavic Review*, no. 1 (2004), 90–112. Both of these articles argue that, in terms of the size of officialdom, Russia has been an under-governed country.
8. Between 1994 and 2005, the personnel in Russian officialdom grew from 1,004,000 to 1,462,000. The sharpest increase was among officials working for regional assemblies, whose numbers grew in this period from 4000 to 20,200. Spravka o chislennosti rabotnikov organov gosudarstvennoi sluzhby i mestnogo samoupravleniia v 2005 godu, 1. www.gks.ru/kadr/text.htm
9. On the militarization of cadres, see Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White, 'Putin's Militocracy', *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 19, no. 4 (2003): 289–306, and Ol'ga Kryshtanovskaia, 'Elita v pogonakh', *Vremia MN*, 18 September 2002, 9, viewed at http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.jsp?id=5066872.
10. The exceptions to this rule in the Soviet period were cadres from Central Asia, who very rarely made careers outside of their region.
11. On the breakdown by gender, see *Statisticheskii biulleten'*.
12. Another impediment to administrative reform is the complexity of the rule-making process in Russia. Instead of adopting a single, detailed parliamentary statute that would offer clear direction to the bureaucracy, the legislative process begins with a broad 'framework' law that sets out the principles and parameters of change and serves as the inspiration for follow-on statutes that offer more detailed norms. In the case of the reform of officialdom, the framework law inspires branch [*vidovoi*] laws on separate sectors of the state bureaucracy—civilian, military, and law enforcement, each of which must then be 'concretized' by the individual ministries, which issue precise directives that apply the legislative principles to its own bureaucracy. At each stage of the process, the opponents of reform have an opportunity to block or weaken the legislation, and until the ministerial directives provide the marching orders to the bureaucracy, officials may ignore the more broadly-worded parliamentary statutes.
13. See 'Struktura ispolnitel'noi vlasti', *Otechestvennye zapiski*, no. 2 (2004).
14. The influence of NPM has been evident in a number of initiatives in Russian public administration, including the Concept of Administrative Reform in the Russian Federation, 2006–2008, which has a section on 'results-based management.' Kontseptsiia administrativnoi reformy v Rossiiskoi Federatsii v

2006–2008 godakh (copy in possession of the author). For the document that preceded this, see Federal'naia prezidentskaia tselevaia programma 'Reformirovanie godudarstvennoi sluzhby Rossiiskoi Federatsii na 2002–2005 gody' (Moscow, 2001) (copy in possession of the author).

15. There was mounting evidence in the Putin era that competitive hiring was being introduced on a broader scale in federal and regional bureaucracies. In 2006, for example, procurators in some areas were bringing suits against regional and local governments that were not using competitive hiring. Pavel Arsen'ev, 'Nechistyi otbor', *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, 12 October 2006, 7, viewed at http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.jsp?id=10175987. However, Russian officials themselves are deeply pessimistic about the chances for the introduction of merit-based hiring. In one survey, 72 percent of the respondents were doubtful it would happen, whereas only seven percent were optimistic. E. Vinogradova, O, Kirichenko, and P. Kudiukin, Gosudarstvennaia i munitsipal'naia sluzhba: s chem stolknetsia budushchaia reform (Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center, 2000).
16. Dmitrii Bal'burov, Konstantin Smirnov, and Gennadii Petrov, 'Printsy i nishchie rossiiskogo chinovnichestva', *Gazeta*, 19 December 2006, 5, viewed at http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.jsd?id=11216417; Aleksandra Sheiko, 'Chinovniki podorozhali na tret", Gazeta.ru, 13 December 2008, www.gazeta.ru/politics/2008/12/12_a_2909880.shtml. This increase is explained in part by the monetization of benefits, discussed below.
17. *Reforma gosudarstvennoi sluzhby Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, 208.
18. Recall that the most serious public protests in the Putin era occurred after attempts to replace in-kind benefits with monetary payments for select segments of the population.
19. Dar'ia Guseva and Larisa Nikitina, 'Dressirovka elit', *Vremia novostei*, 14 March 2005, 4, viewed at http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.jsp?id=7457125.
20. Vladimir Slatinov, 'Zakonodatel"noe regulirovanie gosudarstvennoi sluzhby', *Pro et Contra*, 5 (Winter 2000). This work describes the four different structures of regional government found in Russia in the Putin era. On the varied structures used in local government, see Hellmut Wollmann, 'Institution Building of Local Self-Government in Russia: Between Legal Design and Power Politics', in *The Politics of Local Government in Russia*, Alfred B. Evans, Jr. and Vladimir Gel'man, ed. (Littleton, CO: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), 116–9.
21. Spravka o chislennosti rabotnikov gosudarstvennoi vlast i mestnogo samoupravleniia v 2005 godu.
22. Chislennost' rabotnikov gosudarstvennoi vlasti i mestnogo samoupravleniia po vetviam vlasti i urovniam upravleniia. http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/2007/kadr/tab1.htm
23. Spavka o chislennosti rabotnikov gosudarstvennoi vlast i mestnogo samoupravleniia v 2005. The number of federal officials working in the capital actually declined from 33,800 in 1994 to 26,400 in 2004 before rising to 31,700 the following year. Ibid.
24. For a table comparing figures across Russia and in selected regions, see Nadezhda Ivanova and Vasilii Kashin, 'Bogatye biurokraty', *Vedomosti*, no. 53, 27 March 2007, viewed at http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.jsp?id=11743691.
25. Dmitrii Bal'burov, Konstantin Smirnov, and Gennadii Petrov, 'Printsy i nishchie rossiiskogo chinovnichestva', *Gazeta*, 19 December 2006, 5, viewed at http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.jsp?id=11216417.

26. Ob oplate truda rabotnikov ispolnitel'noi vlasti Rossiiskoi Federatsii i mestnogo samoupravleniia v 2007. www.gks.ru/bgd/free/B04_03/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d040/40.htm
27. One writer noted in 2000 that 'leaders of regions, especially those from strong regions, had pressed into their service the regional representatives of [federal] ministries and agencies, including the power ministries.' Boris Guseletov, 'Nuzhna dekontsentratsiia vlasti', *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 20 December 2000, 8. The 'power ministries' are the ministries responsible for law enforcement and national security, such as the FSB and the MVD, and they answer directly to the president, rather than the prime minister, on operational matters.
28. Lev Luzin, 'Pravovaia ruka polpreda', *Chelianbinskii rabochii*, 16 November 2000.
29. On dual subordination at the regional and local level, see Hellmut Wollman, 'Institution Building of Local Self-Government in Russia', 105–7.
30. Maksim Rossoshanskii and Ekaterina Selezneva, 'Saratovskie chinovniki pereotsenili sebia', *Vedomosti*, 14 April 2006, viewed at http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.jsp?id=9321615.
31. As Mikhail Krasnov observed, rulers in Moscow 'were not federalists but centralizers.' Vladimir Tikhomirov, 'Nyneshnei biurokratii nravitsia vertikal' vlasti. Byvshii sovetnik prezidenta Mikhail Krasnov vidit opasnost' v tsentralistskikh tendentsiiakh Kremlia', *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 27 July 2001, 1.
32. Aleksandr Kolesnichenko, 'Bez sem'i i nagrad', *Novye izvestiia*, 29 June 2006, 2, viewed at http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.jsp?id=9693145.
33. Anatolii Kruzhkov, 'Local Self-Government in Russia: An Unrealized Project', *Russian Politics and Law*, no. 6 (2005): 34.
34. On the more positive interpretation of the *zemstva* by recent Russian scholars, see Alfred B. Evans, Jr. 'Contemporary Russian Scholars' Changing Views on Local Government in Late Tsarist Russia', in *The Politics of Local Government in Russia*, 68–81.
35. Anatolii Kruzhkov, 'Local Self-Government in Russia: An Unrealized Project', 36.
36. The federal law governing local self-administration, passed in 2007, is O munitsipal'noi sluzhbe v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, available in *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, 7 March 2007, 17. One difference between local officials and those working for regional and federal agencies is that the former are hired on the basis of a standard labor contract [*trudovoi kontrakt*], used for employees in other sectors, whereas federal and regional state servants operate under a service contract [*sluzhebnyi kontrakt*], which supersedes the Russian Labor Code. See Tamara Shkel', 'Otdel'nye kniazhestva likvidiruiut', *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, 16 September 2006, 1, viewed at http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.jsp?id=10044766.
37. On the politics of local government reform, see Vladimir Gel'man, 'Federal Policies toward Local Government in Russia,' in *The Politics of Local Government in Russia*, 1–18.
38. 'Na 'fronte' mestnoi vlasti–bol'shie peremeny', *Sovetskaia Sibir'*, 19 April 2001.
39. Prilozhenie 4 k Spravke o sostoianii mestnogo samoupravleniia, Informatsionnye materialy Ministerstva po delam federatsii, national'noi i migratsionnoi politike Rossiiskoi Federatsii po voprosam mestnogo samoupravleniia (copy in possession of the author).
40. Dannikov, 'Kadry, kak i prezhde, reshaiut vse', *Belgorodskaia pravda*, 5 December 2000. As one official put it, 'the overall quality of cadres does not correspond to the quality of personnel in the branches of industry that the government

has to regulate.' Gosudarstvennaia i munitsipal'naia sluzhba: s chem stolknetsia budushchaia reforma.

41. The formation of new local authorities in villages and settlements will only exacerbate this 'cadres famine.' Regional and local-level officials interviewed for the World Bank project on civil service reform in Russian reported various impediments to the computerization of government. One deputy department head at the regional level noted that they had an e-mail system that worked with superiors in their ministry but not with other state bodies; another commented that in their agency there was only one computer for each department; and a third official observed that there were completely different levels of technological provision in different bureaucracies as well as incompatible software and information storage systems. Interviews 8, 9, and 11 of World Bank project on Russian public administration reform (parreform.ru/ve/reports/materials) viewed on 20 September 2002 (the cite is no longer active and copies of interviews are in possession of author).
42. Eugene Huskey, *Presidential Power in Russia* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 183–211.
43. The regional governor in Udmurtia sought to merge regional and local government in the late 1990s before he was stopped by a decision of the Constitutional Court, which was supported by the president.
44. 'The federal government's share of all income that was received by governments in Russia increased from 40 percent in 1998 to 63 percent in 2002.' Vladimir Gel'man and Alfred B. Evans, Jr., 'Conclusion: Toward a New Politics of Local Government in Russia', in *The Politics of Local Government in Russia*, 275.
45. With the new federal legislation on local self-government adopted in 2007, 'federal legislators were seeking to set out in the fullest possible detail the rules governing local officialdom, thereby leaving to the regional and local authorities the minimum room for maneuver in regulating the work of local officials.' Andrei Rossiev, 'Munitsipalam propishut sluzhby "ot" i "do"', *Ekonomika i zhizn'*, no. 48 (2 December 2006): 9, viewed at http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.jsp?id=10484085. Yet the center has never abandoned the mythology about the role of local self-government in creating a 'civil society.' See Ob utverzhdenii Osnovnykh polozhenii gosudarstvennoi politiki v oblasti razvitiia mestnogo samoupravleniia v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, *Sobranie zakonodatel'stva*, no. 42 (1999), st. 5011.
46. Kira Latukhina, Nadezhda Ivanitskaia, and Iuliia Vetchinkina, 'Edinstvo shchuki i karasia', *Vedomosti*, 15 November 2006, viewed at http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.jsp?id=10367289.
47. Liudmila Romanova, 'Putin vozvrashchaet gubernatoram vlast' protsentami', *Gazeta*, 4 July 2005, 1, viewed at http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.jsp?=7905686. Excluded from this decree were federal territorial officials in the FSB and Ministry of Defense.
48. The latter are known as federal inspectors. With the appointment of Vladimir Putin as prime minister under President Dmitrii Medvedev, the running down of ministerial structures in the regions appeared less likely than before the creation of the Medvedev-Putin 'tandem' in 2008.

14

Hiring and Promoting Young Civil Servants: Weberian Ideals versus Russian Reality*

Vladimir Gimpelson, Vladimir Magun, and Robert J. Brym

Characteristics of bureaucratic efficiency

Russians have always disliked public officials and often blamed the government bureaucracy for the country's difficulties. According to public opinion polls, Russians overwhelmingly give low marks to the performance of state officials and oppose any raise in their remuneration.[1] Their sentiment is based on fact. Bureaucratic incompetence is widespread. Transparency International ranks the Russian state among the most corrupt in the world.[2]

Given the attention Russians and others have paid to the government bureaucracy as a source of Russia's woes, it is remarkable how little we know about its inner workings. For example, among the most important correlates of bureaucratic quality are selection procedures and promotion rules. Yet precious little research has been conducted on these issues in modern Russia.[3] Most bureaucratic organizations prefer to remain closed to outside observers, and this is especially true in Russia, where civil society exerts only weak pressure for more transparency.

The main goal of this chapter is to clarify the inner workings of the contemporary Russian state bureaucracy. We focus in particular on how public officials are recruited and promoted. Using data from a unique survey of young civil servants, we address four interrelated questions:

1. What channels and procedures govern bureaucratic selection and recruitment?
2. Once admitted to the civil service, how do young officials see their government career?

* The University of Calgary-Gorbachev Foundation Joint Trust funded the research on which this chapter is based. We thank Lev Gudkov, Rostislav Kapeliushnikov, Sergey Morozkov, Andrei Yakovlev, and Lev Yakobson for helpful comments and suggestions.

3. What are the key criteria governing promotion in bureaucratic hierarchies?
4. How do the career expectations of young civil servants affect their organizational behavior and motivation, including their commitment to the civil service?

Bureaucratic efficiency is almost a synonym for an efficient state. If officials are inefficient, incompetent, and poorly motivated, the state is often unable to provide the public goods that are its *raison d'être*. As a result, the 'contract' between the state and its citizens erodes, stimulating further degradation of state institutions.

State officials become efficient, competent, and highly motivated only if a certain set of institutional preconditions prevail. These conditions were first laid out by Max Weber.[4] Weber saw the ideal bureaucracy as rational, highly professional, and apolitical. According to Weber, the bureaucrat should serve the public interest, not higher authorities, irrespective of who governs the country. To ensure such service, special rules and procedures are needed, among which are competitive recruitment, meritocratically guided promotions up hierarchical job ladders, depoliticization of the bureaucratic career and the bureaucrat's duties, professionalization of the civil service, and a competitive remuneration package. Remuneration should be linked to status within the hierarchy and should depend on merit and tenure, not the volume of work. For insiders, the bureaucratic career must be seen as predictable if not guaranteed. All of these conditions ensure that civil servants are professionals identified with the state, not with ideologies, political parties or lobbies. As Weber repeatedly emphasized, a bureaucracy needs calculable rules and it should act 'without regard for persons . . . Bureaucracy develops the more perfectly, the more it is "dehumanized," the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation.'[5] (Of course, Weber was sketching an ideal type. Even officials in the most efficient bureaucratic organization have emotions, feelings, personal interests, and so on. There is always room for human weaknesses, informal relations and latent motivations in human affairs; they cannot be totally suppressed by any rational system of formal rules.)

Sociologists subsequently demonstrated that the higher the degree to which state bureaucracies approximate the Weberian ideal, the more beneficial the state bureaucracy's effect on macroeconomic performance as measured by GDP growth.[6] Key aspects of 'Weberianness' examined in this connection are procedures governing entry into, and promotion in, the civil service. Such procedures included meritocratic and competitive recruitment, life-long-tenure, and career predictability, as measured by the filling of medium- and top-level positions mainly by means of promotions in what labor economists call 'internal labor markets.'[7]

Internal labor markets usually develop in organizations where firm-specific skills are important. These skills reflect investment in firm-specific human capital, making their replacement by outsiders too costly. Demand for skills encourages employers to safeguard human capital by introducing entry and exit rules and job ladders. The correlation between the properties of bureaucratic efficiency and those of internal labor markets is not accidental. Public administration assumes task-specific skills, many of which can be acquired only by on-the-job experience in the civil service.[8]

Hypotheses and methodology

Official statistics demonstrate the inertia of the Russian state bureaucracy. The speed of personnel renewal in the second half of the nineties was slow. Considerable staff turnover occurred at lower levels but the top ranks experienced little change. Promotions from lower to higher positions were few. As a result, young bureaucrats lacked incentives to commit themselves to the civil service, outsiders lacked incentives to seek entry, and older officials at lower levels lacked incentives to excel.[9]

The situation just described discourages accumulation of human capital. Older employees enjoy a virtual monopoly on needed skills. They protect their positions and minimize competition from young colleagues. Meanwhile, most young civil servants find themselves stuck on the lower rungs of the hierarchy. In this context, selection for promotion becomes informal and promotes the formation of clan-like teams, cemented by paternalistic relationships and implicit loyalty provisions between rank-and-file officials and their bosses. In the end, this practice undermines efficiency and the image of the public service.[10]

Official data provide only the roughest sketch of the internal dynamics of the Russian state bureaucracy. They are highly aggregated and classify bureaucrats by only a few variables. If we want to know in detail how and why individuals move through the ranks (or fail to do so), we require individual-level data on many variables that are not available from official sources—including recruitment, promotion, exit, pay, and so on. These data should, moreover, be representative of the Russian bureaucracy as a whole.

Our survey of young civil servants roughly approximates these characteristics. The survey was conducted in 2001–2 and covered all officials under the age of 35 working in federal, regional, and municipal public administration. At the federal level, we surveyed personnel in ten federal ministries and agencies dealing with economic regulation, including the ministries of Economic Development and Trade, State Property, Justice, Labor and Social Development, Health, and Industry; and governmental agencies for Statistics, Fisheries, and Bankruptcies. We also surveyed the staff at the Office of the Government [*Apparat Pravitel'stva*]. In addition, we selected three regions in European Russia located to the north, east, and

south of Moscow. In these regions, we surveyed regional and municipal officials.

Using a standardized questionnaire we interviewed all public servants with higher education who were available during the survey week: 819 at the federal level, 294 at the regional level, and 344 at the municipal level. This constitutes just over 50 percent of all listed personnel matching our age and education criteria in the selected organizations.[11]

Four hypotheses frame our analysis of the survey data:

1. Personal (informal) ties play a more important role in providing entry into the civil service than depersonalized, competitive, and meritocratic procedures do.
2. Internal promotion is governed more by loyalty than by meritocratic considerations.
3. Prevailing entry and promotion policies have a big impact on young officials' expectations concerning the civil service career, thus affecting their organizational commitment and attitudes toward quitting.
4. The use of meritocratic procedures in hiring and promotion is associated with higher levels of remuneration.

Let us examine each of these hypotheses in turn.

Recruitment channels and procedures

Developing countries that enjoy rapid economic growth tend to employ meritocratic civil service selection procedures.[12] There are at least three explanations for why selection rules matter so much. First, competitive selection at the point of entry helps to ensure equal access to civil service positions. This is not just fair but also increases the likelihood of selecting the most worthy candidates. Second, because meritocratic recruitment means selecting the best human capital, the high cost of firing incompetent employees is reduced. Third, the use of recruitment procedures that are test-based and independent of personal discretion provide selected employees with considerable autonomy. Such procedures protect civil servants from informal top-down pressures and hinder the creation of close-knit clans, thus contributing to transparency. This encourages civil servants to be guided mainly by the interests of society and the state instead of the interests of senior officials.

Are current recruitment procedures aimed at selecting the most skilled and highly motivated employees? Table 14.1 summarizes the frequency with which various *formal* selection procedures were used to recruit our respondents. It shows that in 94 percent of cases, interviews were used to select new personnel. Interviews, however, are the least objective of available procedures and they are the most subject to misuse. In contrast, written

Table 14.1 Formal recruitment procedures by rank (in percent)*

Procedure \ Rank	1 (n = 25)	2 (n = 16)	3 (n = 7)	4 (n = 43)	5 (n = 179)	6 (n = 382)	7 (n = 471)	8 (n = 204)	9 (n = 46)	Total (n = 1,443)
Interview	84	88	86	91	97	94	94	95	94	94
More meritocratic procedures:										
Officially announced open competition	<1	<1	<1	<1	7	6	3	<1	<1	4
Standardized test	<1	<1	<1	12	9	4	3	3	<1	4
Oral exam	<1	<1	<1	<1	<1	<1	2	<1	<1	1
Written exam	<1	<1	<1	<1	<1	<1	<1	<1	<1	<1
At least one 'more meritocratic procedure'	<1	<1	<1	12	16	9	8	6	<1	8

* Because respondents were free to select any number of procedures, percentages do not add up to 100 and the bottom row does not equal the sum of the four preceding rows. Rank 1 = Sub-department Head; Rank 2 = Deputy Sub-department Head; Rank 3 = Councilor; Rank 4 = Adviser; Rank 5 = Head specialist; Rank 6 = Leading specialist; Rank 7 = Specialist 1; Rank 8 = Specialist 2; Rank 9 = Specialist. In Russia, a *departament* is a high-level organizational unit and a *rukovoditel' departamenta* (department head) is a very high position. Few such people are under the age of 35, and only 4 showed up among our respondents. We excluded them from our analysis. For purposes of categorizing our respondents, we use "sub-department" as the equivalent of the Russian *otdel*, that is, the unit below the *departament*.

examinations are the most objective and efficient selection device. Yet less than 1 percent of civil servants took a written exam. Note also variation by rank (highest rank = 1, lowest = 9). There is a weak tendency for top positions to be filled using selection devices other than interviews. Thus, the bottom row of Table 14.1 indicates how many young public servants passed through at least one of four meritocratic selection procedures. There is a weak positive association between this indicator and hierarchical position. Nonetheless, as we note later, many people hired for senior positions were invited to apply by top administrators.

Table 14.2 shows how formal recruitment procedures vary by administrative level. Regional administrations use open competition and tests for recruitment screening more often than federal ministries and municipal authorities do. In regional administration, the proportion of employees who have passed through at least one of four more meritocratic selection procedures is three times higher than in federal or municipal administrations.

Several screening procedures are not listed in Table 14.2. Among them are preliminary on-the-job training and work on short-term employment contracts. These forms of employment allow employers to evaluate an employee's skills and motivation before making a long-term job commitment. But these forms of screening are not often used. About 11 percent of respondents were evaluated during on-the-job training or short-term contracts.

Apart from formal recruitment and screening procedures, there exists another way of reducing uncertainty in hiring. It involves relying on personal or institutional networks to recruit officials. Such practices run a high

Table 14.2 Formal recruitment procedures by administrative level (in percent)*

Administrative Level Procedure	**Federal (n = 814)**	**Regional (n = 290)**	**Municipal (n = 343)**	**Total (n = 1,447)**
Interview	94	93	94	94
More meritocratic procedures:				
Officially announced open competition	3	9	2	4
Standardized test	3	9	3	4
Oral exam	1	1	2	1
Written exam	<1	<1	1	<1
At least one 'more meritocratic procedure'	6	17	6	8

*Because respondents were free to select any number of procedures, percentages do not add up to 100 and the bottom row does not equal the sum of the four preceding rows.

Table 14.3 Social and institutional network recruitment procedures by administrative level (in percent)*

Administrative Level Procedure	Federal (n = 814)	Regional (n = 290)	Municipal (n = 343)	Total (n = 1,447)
Personal recommendation	51	40	34	45
The boss knew me personally and offered me the job	28	41	37	32
I contacted the boss myself but s/he already knew me	6	12	10	8
I contacted the boss on my own initiative without a recommendation	10	9	16	11
I applied through a higher school	4	2	2	3
I applied through an employment service	1	1	4	2
Other	6	1	1	4

* Because respondents were free to select any number of informal recruitment methods, percentages do not add up to 100.

risk of patriarchalism and nepotism because the employer or his acquaintances may already be familiar with the candidate. Table 14.3 shows that, in fact, personal recommendations and personal relationships with prospective employees predominate among network recruitment procedures. Some 34 percent of respondents were recommended by an acquaintance of their future employer and 47 percent knew their boss personally before they were hired. Only 22 percent of young officials were hired without any preceding social contacts with their future employer.

In general, federal, regional, and municipal administrations use similar recruitment channels, though some minor differences exist. The entry gate into federal ministries is opened more often by informal personal recommendations and a bit less often by personal acquaintance than is the case at the regional and municipal levels. This difference is probably a result of the fact that in Moscow, where the federal ministries are located, the large population decreases the probability of direct ties to a prospective employer. Correspondingly, indirect ties (for example, through someone's recommendation) play a bigger role.

Municipal administrations are more prone than administrations at higher levels to hire employees 'from the street' and are more likely to use an employment service to identify worthy candidates. This difference may

reflect the lower prestige of working in municipal administrations, which must use less selective methods to fill vacancies. More open access to these jobs probably results not from employment policy but from the existence of a relatively small labor supply at the municipal level.

If a recommendation contains information on the work experience and productivity of the applicant, then it reduces uncertainty associated with the new hire. For this purpose, the referee should be familiar with the professional qualities and experience of the applicant. In the case of the Russian civil service, however, recommendations do not often play such a role. Table 14.4 shows that most referees had no professional contact with the applicant they recommended. Some 59 percent of all referees are parents, relatives or acquaintances of the applicant or acquaintances of the applicant's parents, relatives or acquaintances. These contacts open access to jobs not by providing information on productivity but by using informal relations to request personal favors and subtly invoke mutual obligations. Another 15 percent of respondents were personally acquainted with their future employer and did not need to solicit a reference while another seven percent were not recommended for a position. Only 28 percent of respondents were recommended by their university professor or others who may have been familiar with, and able to report objectively on, their work experience and productivity. These data suggest that selection procedures at the

Table 14.4 'Who is the referee who directly recommended you for this job?' by administrative level (in percent)*

Administrative level referee	**Federal (n = 801)**	**Regional (n = 287)**	**Municipal (n = 335)**	**Total (n = 1,423)**
My acquaintance	26	25	22	25
My parent or relative	10	13	15	12
An acquaintance of my parent or relative	18	12	14	16
An acquaintance of my acquaintances	8	3	4	6
Nobody; I was personally acquainted with the person who hired me	11	20	19	15
My university professor	9	11	6	8
Nobody recommended me and I was not personally familiar with the person who hired me	6	5	9	7
Others	13	14	13	13

* Because respondents were free to select any number of informal recruitment methods, percentages do not add up to 100.

civil service entry gate do more to create loyal, clan-like teams than a rational Weberian bureaucracy.

The practice of noncompetitive recruitment with selection biased toward loyalty and personal subordination was strongly supported by many top-ranking officials interviewed in the course of our project. That is hardly surprising. Top officials tailor recruitment policies to suit their interests. They criticize competitive selection procedures for taking too much time and for their rigidity and high cost. Nor do they believe that competition will attract employees who best fit the demands of the workplace. Another factor, not mentioned by top officials, probably also explains their negative attitude toward the competitive and meritocratic selection of personnel. Such procedures diminish the authority of top bureaucrats and limit their ability to create loyal clans. Department bosses try to use loopholes in hiring rules to avoid competitive hiring that is beyond their control. This approach hinders the introduction of meritocratic principles into the Russian civil service.

Although resistance to competitive recruitment can be explained by the vested interests of top officials, there are still other reasons for their attitude. Competitive recruitment relies on 'signals' that allow employers to select the best applicants from the pool of job seekers. For these signals to be reliable, a special recruitment infrastructure is necessary. The infrastructure includes a culture of trust in the accuracy of résumés and recommendations, independent ratings by educational institutions, reliable and elaborate tests, and competitive procedures. An employer comparing competing applicants must be isolated from false signals and must be willing and able to identify the false signals that filter through. The abundance of false signals—common in the Russian labor market in general—is especially acute for executive searches. Interestingly, young civil servants themselves strongly favor competitive and meritocratic recruitment. Only 12 percent of our respondents opposed it. Presumably, they believe that competition will positively affect vertical mobility in the public service.

Joining the civil service is just the first step in a bureaucratic career. The next step involves adjusting to the rules and norms that govern the organization and working out one's own *modus vivendi* within it. For example, all young civil servants must decide whether there exist realistic opportunities for a professional career within their organization. If so, they must figure out what they need to do to maximize their mobility. If the likelihood of such a career is too low or the cost of success is too high, they must consider alternatives. Their future within the civil service and the future of the civil service itself hang on the answers to such questions. Let us therefore now turn to an examination of how young bureaucrats expect their public service career to develop and how they construct their professional plans.

Career expectations

According to Weber, a long-term career is an essential characteristic of an efficient civil service because tenure duration indicates considerable investment in specific knowledge and skills acquired on the job. The key motivational device that ensures long-term careers is a credible system of promotion. To induce civil servants to remain in the organization and work effectively over a long period it is necessary to persuade them that current efforts and achievements will predictably result in higher status and earnings.

The success of this long-term process depends on the mobility of all system elements. To promote people at the bottom of the hierarchy, people in middle positions must move up, and to promote people in middle positions, top officials cannot stay forever and must retire at a particular age. Moreover, the system will function properly only if it is relatively self-sustaining, with outsiders having access only to the lowest positions. 'Lateral' entrance into middle- and high-level positions interrupts harmonious internal mobility dynamics. If few vacancies open up and vacancies for senior positions are filled by outsiders, young civil servants' expectations for a successful career are undermined.

Such is the Weberian ideal. Let us now turn to the Russian reality. We asked our respondents: 'How frequently do vacancies for the head of a sub-department open up in your organization?' We inquired specifically about sub-department heads because young civil servants may realistically aspire to that position as a first step up the bureaucratic hierarchy. It is widely perceived as a stepping-stone to further advancement. Yet only 26 percent of the young civil servants from federal ministries and a mere 6–9 percent from regional and municipal administrations shared the opinion that such vacancies open up rather frequently, indicating more favorable conditions for upward mobility at the federal level but unfavorable conditions overall. About 50 percent of officials at all levels said that such positions are filled by the most competent people from within their organizations.

Compulsory retirement based on length of tenure or age is a logical and common way to increase chances for promotion. However, only a little more than half of our respondents supported various restrictions on their pensionable colleagues, including compulsory retirement, moving them to lower posts, transferring them to temporary contract employment, and so on. A mere 18 percent favored compulsory retirement. Respondents in municipal and regional administrations were more inclined than those at the federal level to support compulsory retirement, undoubtedly because they face lower mobility.

To foster the motivation to achieve, it is necessary to give people the freedom to choose their level of aspiration and to remove ceilings limiting their potential achievement. Table 14.5 is interesting in this regard because it shows how young civil servants see their careers developing. According to

Table 14.5 'Imagine a young professional who entered an organization through one of the lowest posts. Up to which position will s/he be able to advance?' by administrative level (in percent)

Administrative level position	**Federal (n = 785)**	**Regional (n = 282)**	**Municipal (n = 329)**	**Total (n = 1,396)**
In most cases, one or two steps and no more	20	28	29	24
Three or four steps, but the probability that s/he will reach the level of sub-department head is rather low	20	14	16	18
At least in several cases s/he can reach the sub-department head level, but not higher	28	27	27	28
In rare cases s/he can reach the highest positions in the organization	32	30	28	31
Total	100	99*	100	101*

* Does not equal 100 because of rounding.

42 percent of our respondents, the young professional who enters an organization through one of the lowest posts, 'in most cases will advance on one or two steps' or 'can advance three or four steps, but the probability that s/he will advance to the level of sub-department head is rather low.' Some 28 percent of respondents believed that 'at least in several cases s/he can reach the sub-department head level, but not higher.'[13] Thus, although more than two-thirds of our respondents see opportunities for promotion, they regard the promotion ceiling as quite low.

Nearly one-third of our respondents believed that the young professional can in rare cases reach the highest positions in the organization. Using the phrase 'in rare cases' undoubtedly encouraged the selection of this response. Still, we believe that this result is evidence of the existence of a substantial number of civil servants who are self-assured and have a strong orientation toward upward social mobility. Perceived mobility ceilings are about the same at all administrative levels, but federal employees are a little more optimistic about their careers.

To progress in a bureaucracy, one must be able to see the career horizon and access 'vehicles' for reaching it. If the career horizon is beyond one's line of sight and available vehicles (traits such as competence, initiative or loyalty) are in short supply, ambitious and capable employees will soon begin looking elsewhere for opportunities. Accordingly, we asked our respondents: 'In your opinion, what in the first instance ensures promotion in your

Table 14.6 Perceived promotion criteria (in percent)*

Administrative Level criteria	Federal (n = 813)	Regional (n = 291)	Municipal (n = 340)	Total (n = 1,444)
Task-oriented qualities				
A level of competence sufficient for a new position	50	70	49	54
Ability to master new kinds of jobs and develop one's professional abilities	41	59	43	45
Initiative	35	48	38	38
Independence in work	28	41	33	32
Good work in one's previous position	27	39	28	30
Social capital				
Belonging to a team	37	42	32	37
Skill in self-presentation as a good worker	41	29	34	37
Knowledge of the subtleties of bureaucratic functioning	27	29	27	27
Connections and acquaintances	38	25	31	34
Loyalty to managers	24	14	17	20
Formal criteria				
Seniority in the organization	40	37	34	38
Seniority in civil service	13	14	14	13
Acquiring another higher education diploma or degree	8	7	9	8
Having a scientific degree	9	7	3	8
Age	15	15	12	14
Gender	12	10	6	10
Mean number of items chosen by respondent	4.4	4.8	4.1	4.4

* Because respondents were free to select any number of informal recruitment methods, percentages do not add up to 100.

organization?' Respondents were allowed to choose any number of the 16 promotion criteria we listed but on average they chose about four.

Table 14.6 shows that our respondents believed promotion is most frequently facilitated by a level of competence sufficient for a new position (54 percent) and ability to master new kinds of jobs and develop one's professional abilities (45 percent). Thus, the most frequently mentioned

promotion criteria are task-oriented qualities necessary for learning and performing a new job. Aspects of one's current job (for example, a record of high productivity and demonstrating initiative and independence) are mentioned less often. That is probably why people from outside the organization are often preferred for managerial positions, such as sub-department head (see Table 14.5).

Another frequently perceived promotion criterion is belonging to a clan-like team. The existence of teams is not necessarily inimical to the efficient performance of administrative tasks, but it is incompatible with the Weberian bureaucratic ideal. The Weberian approach is essentially individualistic. In Weber's view, officials should ideally be free from any interest other than the declared tasks of the administrative body. Their promotion should be based on personal merit only. Thus, the existence of bureaucratic teams testifies to the imperfection of the Russian bureaucracy from the point of view of Weber's criteria. Teams emphasize personal fidelity and service to individuals rather than the task at hand, hence the importance of such promotion criteria as skill in self-presentation, connections and acquaintances, knowledge of the subtleties of bureaucratic functioning, and loyalty to managers.[14]

We can see whether and how the various promotion criteria are interconnected in the minds of our respondents by means of factor analysis. This statistical procedure detects underlying dimensions that may link variables. We discovered two sharply contrasting underlying dimensions and we arrayed the results of our analysis in Table 14.7 to highlight them. The two factors are:

- *The merit factor*. The first six variables listed in Table 14.7 load high (above 0.35) on factor 1 and low (below 0.27) on factor 2. These six variables all concern meritocratic promotion criteria. Ability to master new kinds of jobs and develop one's professional abilities; independence in work; initiative; a level of competence sufficient for a new position; good work in one's previous position; and acquiring more higher education—these are the perceived promotion criteria that are connected in the minds of meritocratic respondents.
- *The loyalty factor*. The last seven variables listed in Table 14.7 are almost a mirror image of the first six. They load low (below 0.17) on factor 1 and high (above 0.31) on factor 2. These seven variables include promotion criteria based on loyalty. Connections and acquaintances; gender; loyalty to managers; age; knowledge of the subtleties of bureaucracy functioning; skill in self-presentation as a good worker; and belonging to a team—these are the perceived promotion criteria that are connected in the minds of loyalist respondents. (Note that the three unshaded promotion criteria listed in Table 14.7 are ambiguous; each of them appears meritocratic to some respondents and non-meritocratic to others.)

Table 14.7 Factors underlying perceived promotion criteria (n = 1,444)*

Criteria	Factor 1: Merit	Factor 2: Loyalty
Ability to master new kinds of jobs and develop one's professional abilities	0.70	–0.03
Independence in work	0.65	–0.01
Initiative	0.59	0.03
A level of competence sufficient for a new position	0.55	–0.13
Good work in one's previous position	0.47	0.00
Acquiring another higher education diploma or degree	0.36	0.26
Having a scientific degree	0.32	0.34
Seniority in the organization	.30	.24
Seniority in civil service	.19	.26
Connections and acquaintances	–0.31	0.58
Gender	–0.01	0.57
Loyalty to managers	–0.16	0.56
Age	0.16	0.50
Knowledge of the subtleties of bureaucracy functioning	–0.01	0.49
Skill in self-presentation as a good worker	–0.01	0.44
Belonging to a team	–0.07	0.32
Explained variance (%)	**14**	**13**

* For the factor analysis we used the principal components method without rotation.

The implication of our findings is that the higher individual respondents scored on factor 1, the stronger their conviction that promotion criteria are based on task abilities and merit. Such individuals believe that relations with management are largely irrelevant to their progress through the ranks and that ‘connections and acquaintances’ have a *negative* influence on career progress. In contrast, the higher individual respondents scored on factor 2, the stronger their conviction that promotion criteria are based on (1) loyalty to their managers and their team, (2) characteristics that have nothing to do with merit (age and gender), and (3) maintaining cordial relations with managers and other valuable connections and acquaintances, skill in presenting oneself as a good worker, and so on.

With one important difference, the two factors just described correspond to the bureaucratic and patrimonial forms of state management analyzed by Weber. The difference is this: Weber held that these two administrative forms are opposite poles of a single dimension, so that the stronger the operation of meritocratic criteria, the weaker the operation of loyalty and related criteria, and vice-versa. But our factor analysis shows that two *independent* administrative dimensions exist in the minds of civil servants. In each administrative

organization, meritocratic and loyalty criteria vary independently of one another.

We also found that belief in meritocratic promotion is strongest at the regional level and belief in loyalty-based promotion is strongest at the federal level. When we asked our respondents directly what is preferred when a civil servant in their organization is promoted—competence or loyalty—two-thirds of all respondents said that competence and skills are more important than loyalty. Again, this belief was most widespread among employees of regional administrations.[15] (We explain the higher level of meritocracy at the regional level below.)

It is worth bearing in mind that promotion criteria come into effect only after hiring criteria have been applied. As we saw, hiring is based mainly on personal connections and recommendations, thus ensuring a necessary minimum degree of loyalty. It seems reasonable to assume that the existence of this 'loyalty filter' allows managers to emphasize meritocratic criteria to a greater degree in the promotion process.

Opportunities for promotion and willingness to quit

Long-term careers are characteristic of Weberian bureaucracy but most young civil servants in Russia are not committed to them. Only 44 percent of our respondents were sure that they would not like to change their employer. Those who did not express opposition to a job change said they would like to change jobs (27 percent) or gave an equivocal answer (29 percent). Some 64 percent of our respondents expressed the possibility that they would leave not only their current organization but the civil service entirely. This indicates that most young officials are not attracted to the kind of work in which they are currently employed. It is entirely possible that they view their civil service work as a way of accumulating human and social capital for alternative employment, perhaps in the private sector.

The proportion of civil servants who wish to quit the agency in which they are employed is smallest in the regional administrations and largest in the federal ministries. Exact estimates of potential turnover depend on the criteria used to judge the desire to leave. We estimate the propensity to leave at roughly 20–30 percent at the regional level, 40–50 percent at the municipal level, and 60 percent at the federal level.

If, from an employee's point of view, meritocratic procedures and rules prevail in their organization, a positive relationship between employee productivity and career success is established. Career success is then in the employee's hands. Failure cannot be attributed to outside circumstances. The existence of such a relationship encourages high-quality work and organizational commitment.

Belief that promotion is based on loyalty and ascriptive variables (age, gender, and the like) has quite different implications. In the latter case, a direct

connection between high-quality work and career success is absent, chances for promotion are vague, and promotion is mostly controlled by bosses. The best workers will be induced to leave the organization. The worst will remain. Said differently, loss of control over one's career increases uncertainty and switches on exit mechanisms.[16]

Using a statistical procedure known as probit regression, we can test the hypothesis that desire to change employer is (1) negatively associated with civil servants' belief in the operation of meritocratic promotion principles and (2) positively associated with belief in the operation of the loyalty principle. Simply stated, probit regression allows us to determine the degree to which numerous variables independently and jointly influence the probability that a respondent wishes to change employer. These variables include the strength of the respondent's belief in the existence of a meritocracy, and the respondent's gender, age, tenure, and level of administration. (Readers lacking the necessary statistical background may wish to skip the next three paragraphs.)

Specifically, we employ the following probit regression equation:

$$\mathrm{Prob}(y = 1) = b_0 + BX_i + CD_i + u_i,$$

where Prob(y = 1) is the probability that respondent i wishes to change employer, X_i is a proxy for respondent i's belief that a meritocracy exists, D_i represents control variables for respondent i (respondent's gender, age, tenure, position in the organization, and level of administration), b_0 is a constant, B and C are estimated coefficients, and u_i is the residual.

We provide two specifications of our model. In the first case, we use the factor values identified in Table 14.7 as a proxy for belief in meritocratically based promotion. In the second case, we replace the factor values with answers to the question, 'Which employee trait—loyalty or competence—is crucial for promotion in your organization?' Recall that in both cases we are dealing with our respondents' *beliefs* concerning promotion criteria, not with the criteria themselves. This is just what is needed to understand the degree to which an employee wishes to change his or her employer.

The marginal effects from the probit regression are presented in Table 14.8.[17] The reference group consists of women between the ages of 31 and 35 with more than three years and up to four years of employment in the municipal civil service and occupying a position higher than main specialist. Both specifications of the model are statistically significant at the 99 percent level. The coefficient patterns and signs of both specifications are very similar and in line with our hypothesis. Therefore, our hypothesis cannot be rejected.

To concretize our findings, we note that the predominance of belief in competence over belief in loyalty as promotion criteria reduces potential turnover by 18 percent, other things being equal. (This is according

Table 14.8 Probit regression for desire to change employer

Independent variable	Dependent variable: desire to change employer			
	Marginal effects	**z**	**Marginal effects**	**z**
F1—individual values of the meritocratic factor	−0.090	−7.25***	–	–
F2—individual values of the loyalty factor	0.060	5.13***	–	–
Competence (1) vs. loyalty (0) is crucial for promotion	–	–	−0.176	−6.72***
Male	−0.051	−1.91*	−0.061	−2.21**
Age < 25 years	0.106	2.97***	0.102	2.81***
Age 26–30 years	0.058	1.78*	0.062	1.847*
Tenure in organization 1 year or less	−0.181	−6.23***	−0.163	−5.44***
Tenure in organization more than 2 years and up to 3 years	−0.052	−1.78*	−0.050	−1.63
Federal level	0.113	3.80***	0.120	3.96***
Regional level	−0.101	−2.63***	−0.130	−3.41***
Ranks 7, 8, and 9: Specialists****	0.082	1.93*	0.093	2.13**
Rank 6: Leading specialist	0.085	2.13**	0.092	2.25**
Rank 5: Head specialist	0.107	2.59**	0.122	2.87***
N	1,419		1,347	
χ^2	211.32		162.78	
Prob. > χ^2	0.0000		0.0000	
−2 LL	−722.85		−703.57	
Pseudo-R^2	0.1275		0.1037	

* = statistically significant at the 90 percent level.
** = statistically significant at the 95 percent level.
*** = statistically significant at the 99 percent level.
**** See Table 14.1 for explanation of these ranks.

to the second specification.) Moreover, the desire to change employer is stronger for women than men, younger employees than older employees, and employees with more years of employment in the organization than employees with shorter tenure. Presumably, young women with quite a few years of employment are the most pessimistic about their chances for promotion since they have learned about their actual prospects.

The regression coefficients also demonstrate that, all else the same, employees of federal ministries express the desire to change their job more often than employees at the municipal level, and the latter express such

a desire more often than civil servants at the regional level. This pattern is partly the result of wage differentials. Wages are highest in the regional administrations and lowest at the municipal level. (Salaries in regional administrations are set regionally and are used to enforce regional loyalty and to preserve clan-like teams. Centralized wage setting for bureaucrats under federal jurisdiction moderates wage increases in federal governmental offices. Municipal wages are lowest because local budgets are small.) Also relevant is the fact that federal officials with relatively low wages have attractive job alternatives in the private sector. For regional and municipal civil servants alternative opportunities are less advantageous since their relative wages are higher and job opportunities more limited. The greater 'Weberianness' of regional administrations and the more patrimonial nature of the federal ministries are thus evident from various indicators of recruitment, promotion, and personnel retention.

Finally, it should be noted that the higher the employee's organizational position, the stronger his or her desire to change jobs, all else the same. Just the contrary might be expected. Higher positions should be accompanied by higher wages and more influence, and should therefore decrease the desire to look for employment outside the organization. There are two possible, interconnected explanations of this paradox. First, occupying a higher position means that one has come closer to exhausting the possibility for further advancement. Promotion to upper levels is regulated by another set of rules and the number of such positions is quite limited while the pool of alternatives may expand. Second, the higher the position in the bureaucratic hierarchy, the lower the *relative* salary of civil servants in comparison with hierarchically equivalent positions in the private sector. Hence, the heightened desire on the part of the more senior official to leave.

Promotion principles and salary

In a meritocracy, achievement and efficiency are rewarded by remuneration. It may therefore be expected that the mean wage level will be higher in more meritocratic organizations, which will also reward their effective employees more highly than less meritocratic organizations do. Meritocracy also implies selection and promotion of the best employees and elimination of the worst ones; that process leads to a general increase in the wage level of meritocratic organizations too. Contrariwise, an emphasis on loyalty will eliminate the most competent employees and retain those for whom obedience is the main resource for promotion. Such a situation will preclude wage increases and in some cases even lead to wage decreases.

To test these hypotheses we employed multiple regression analysis—a statistical procedure that allows us to determine the degree to which numerous variables independently and jointly influence respondents' wages. These variables include the strength of the respondent's belief in the existence of a

meritocracy, and the respondent's gender, age, tenure, and level of administration. Our main finding is that, as predicted, wages increase with belief in the importance of the meritocratic principle. (For statistical details, see the next two paragraphs.)

Once again, the factor values identified in Table 14.7 and the answers to the question, 'Which employee trait—loyalty or competence—is crucial for promotion?' are used as independent variables for two specifications of our model. The control group consists of women between the ages of 31 and 35 years with five or more years of employment in the municipal civil service and occupying a position higher than main specialist. Table 14.9 demonstrates that, for the our first model specification, the wages of respondents who believe more strongly in meritocratic promotion are higher than the wages of those who believe less strongly in this principle.[18] Moreover, strength of belief in the importance of the loyalty principle does not influence wages. In our second model specification (where the merit and loyalty principles compete), the respondent's choice of one principle over the other significantly influences wages. Belief in the meritocratic principle is associated with higher wages while belief in the loyalty principle is associated with lower wages. In both specifications, the patterns and signs of the regression coefficients are very similar. In total, these results support our hypotheses.

Table 14.9 Coefficients for wage regression, OLS

Independent variables	**Dependent variable: log wage**			
	b	**t**	**b**	**T**
F1—individual values of the meritocratic factor	0.013	3.56***	–	–
F2—individual values of the loyalty factor	−0.001	−0.38	–	–
Competence (1) vs. loyalty (0) is crucial for promotion	–	–	0.019	2.54**
Male	0.025	3.07***	0.026	3.07***
Age < 25 years	−0.044	−4.47***	−0.043	−4.26***
Age 26–30 years	−0.025	−2.74***	−0.025	−2.69***
Tenure in organization 1 year or less	−0.135	−1.64	−0.071	−0.91
Tenure in organization more than 1 year and up to 2 years	−0.106	−1.28	−0.046	−0.53
Tenure in organization more than 2 years and up to 3 years	−0.098	−1.18	−0.034	−0.43

Table 14.9 (Continued)

Independent variables	Dependent variable: log wage			
	b	**t**	**b**	**T**
Tenure in organization more than 4–5 years and up to 5 years	–0.072	–0.88	–0.001	–0.12
Federal level	–0.017	–1.83*	–0.025	–2.64***
Regional level	0.102	8.23***	0.097	7.64***
Rank: Specialists****	–0.282	–23.13***	–0.285	–22.60***
Rank: Leading specialist	–0.176	–16.21***	–0.179	–16.10***
Rank: Head specialist	–0.124	–10.97***	–0.128	–11.13***
Constant	3.684	44.22***	3.618	45.70***
n	1,352		1,287	
R^2	0.506		0.504	

* = statistically significant at the 90 percent level.
** = statistically significant at the 95 percent level.
*** = statistically significant at the 99 percent level.
**** See Table 14.1 for explanation of these ranks.

Conclusion

The inefficiency of the Russian civil service has many deep roots, one of which comprises recruitment policies. Most young bureaucrats who participated in our survey recognized that they and their cohorts were hired mainly through informal relationships [*sviazi i znakomstva*], not formalized and transparent competitions, tests, and exams.

Procedures inside the office building differ from those at the entrance gate. Contrary to our initial expectations, performance-based criteria constitute a relatively important basis of promotion decisions, at least in the eyes of civil servants. Social adaptability—skill in conforming to the requirements of clan-like teams, forging close personal ties to one's boss, and the like—appears to be relatively less important. Thus, while entrance filters secure organizational and personal loyalty, performance-oriented criteria allow a measure of internal competition between rank-and-file officers, rendering the bureaucratic system workable although far from desirable.

Imperfections in recruitment and promotion practices create other deviations from the Weberian ideal-type. For example, they weaken young civil servants' commitment to public administration and cause them to seek alternative job opportunities. This situation results in the loss of human capital in public administration and the retention of the least productive and competitive employees, and it presumably contributes to corruption and inefficiency.

We believe that existing recruitment practices persist because they bestow advantages on top insiders. Not coincidentally, most top administrators involved in personnel recruitment share negative attitudes toward competition-based selection procedures. They regard competition as inflexible, time-consuming, and expensive, but it seems to us that these characterizations are rationalizations that reveal their vested interest in the status quo. The promotion of efficiency in Russian public administration requires the introduction of meritocratic principles at the entrance gate. For such principles to work, stronger incentives are needed to attract a bigger supply of well-trained and enthusiastic candidates. Little of this can transpire, however, without a thorough housecleaning in the top tiers.

Notes

1. Svetlana G. Klimova, 'Chinovniki', Baza dannykh FOM, 27 April 2001, http://bd.fom.ru/report/map/articles/klimova/pa0016 (accessed 19 May 2007).
2. 'Indeks Vospriyatiya Korruptsii 2005', Transparency International, http://transparency.org.ru/doc/CPI_2005_russ_01000_144.pdf (accessed 19 May 2007).
3. But see Robert J. Brym and Vladimir Gimpelson, 'The Size, Composition, and Dynamics of the Russian State Bureaucracy in the 1990s', *Slavic Review*, 63 (2004): 90–112; Lev Jakobson, 'Administrative Reform in Russia's Economic Development', in *Administrative Reform and National Economic Development*, Kuotsai Tom Liou, ed. (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2000), 241–70.
4. Max Weber, 'Bureaucracy', *Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretative Sociology*, vol. 2, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, eds (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978), 956–1,004.
5. Ibid., 975.
6. Peter Evans and James E. Rauch, 'Bureaucracy and Growth: A Cross-national Analysis of the Effects of "Weberian" State Structures on Economic Growth', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 64 (1999): 748–65; James E. Rauch and Peter Evans, 'Bureaucratic Structure and Bureaucratic Performance in Less Developed Countries', *Journal of Public Economics*, vol. 75 (2000): 49–71.
7. Peter B. Doeringer and Michael J. Piore, *Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis* (Lexington, MA: Heath, 1971); *Internal Labor Markets*, Paul Osterman, ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984). For studies of state bureaucracy from this point of view, see Thomas A. DiPrete, 'The Professionalization of Administration and Equal Employment Opportunity in the U.S. Federal Government', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 93 (1987): 119–40; Thomas A. DiPrete, *The Bureaucratic Labor Market: The Case of the Federal Civil Service* (New York: Plenum, 1989).
8. Recently, a contrary view known as 'new public management' has become popular in some circles. *Inter alia*, it promotes the weakening of hierarchical structures and traditional grade ladders and the introduction of performance-based pay systems and the partial outsourcing of administrative duties. See David Osborne and Petr Plastrik, *Banishing Bureaucracy: The Five Strategies for Reinventing Government* (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1997). In Russia these ideas became popular thanks to Alexander Obolonsky. See *Gosudarstvennaia sluzhba*: *kompleksnyi podkhod*, 2nd edition, Aleksei Barabashev and Aleksandr Obolonskii, eds (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo 'Delo', 2009). However, countries that have launched such reforms

have encountered many difficulties in their implementation. See Nick Manning and Neil Parrison, *International Public Administration Reform: Implications for the Russian Federation*. (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank 2002). This experience suggests that the time to write off Weberian-type bureaucracy has not yet arrived.

9. Brym and Gimpelson, "The Size, Composition, and Dynamics of the Russian State Bureaucracy.'
10. On clan-like teams in the Russian bureaucracy, see Eugene Huskey, 'Nomenklatura Lite? The Cadres Reserve in Russian Public Administration', *Problems of Post-Communism*, 51, no. 2 (2004): 30–9.
11. For detailed results, see Vladimir Magun, Robert Brym, Vladimir Gimpelson, Sergei Morozkov, and Alla Chirikova, *Molodye spetsialisty na rossiiskoi gosudarstvennoi i munitsipal'noi sluzhbe: Nauchnyi doklad po itogam issledovaniia oblastnykh i gorodskikh administratsii* (Moscow: Institut sotsiologii, 2003), http://www.chass.utoronto.ca//brym/pubs.htm (accessed 23 February 2009).
12. Peter Evans, *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Peter Evans, 'The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and Structural Change', in *The Politics of Economic Adjustment*, Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, eds (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 139–81.
13. The question was borrowed from Evans and Rauch, 'Bureaucracy and Growth'.
14. M. N. Afanas'ev, *Klientelizm i rossiiskaia gosudarstvennost': Issledovanie klientarnykh otnoshenii, ikh roli v evoliutsii i upadke proshlykh form rossiiskoi gosudarstvennosti, ikh vliianiia na politicheskie instituty i deiatel'nost' vlastvuiushchikh grupp v sovremennoi Rossii*. (Moscow: Tsentr konstitutsionnykh issledovanii Moskovskogo obshchestvennogo nauchnogo fonda, 1997), 228–30.
15. Perceived preference of competence versus loyalty correlates positively with individual values along factor 1 ($r = 0.39$) and negatively with individual values along factor 2 ($r = -0.26$).
16. Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).
17. For the probit regressions we report marginal effects since they are easier to interpret than coefficients. They indicate how a unit change in the independent variable affects the probability of a positive outcome for the dependent dummy variable.
18. To avoid heteroscedasticity, we estimated robust White-corrected standard errors.

15

The Politics–Administration Nexus in Post-communist Russia

Eugene Huskey

A democracy fetish has characterized much Western research on Russia in the post-communist era. Although Russia's adherence to democratic principles is a legitimate concern of the social sciences—as well as of Western governmental and non-governmental organizations—the development of modern states is too complex a phenomenon to be dominated by a single normative or empirical category. Besides assessing the capacity of society to hold its leaders accountable—the democracy test—one must also measure the capacity of the state to 'control the governed,' to use Madison's phrase. Yet it is only recently that scholars have begun to examine seriously the capacity of the post-communist Russian state, by which we mean the ability of the political leadership in Moscow to implement its decisions throughout Russia's far-flung territory.[1]

The subject of this chapter is an even less understood dimension of governance in Russia: the relationship between political and administrative authority. According to Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman, 'the problematic relationship between [elected politicians and career administrators] is perhaps the distinctive puzzle of the contemporary state, reflecting as it does the clash between the dual and conflicting imperatives of technical effectiveness and democratic responsiveness.'[2] Just as countries differ in their method of selecting leaders, in their capacity to govern, and in the restrictions imposed on society, they exhibit widely divergent arrangements for the division of labor and careers between politicians and administrative personnel. Especially in a country like Russia, where society lacks the means to discipline the state, the organization of labor and careers inside the state itself can assume decisive importance.[3]

While the Western literature on Russia has focused on the recruitment of politicians—specifically, on whether they are chosen by electoral competition or elite cooptation—it has largely neglected the recruitment of administrative and economic personnel, and thus has given inadequate attention to a key feature of post-communist Russia: the emergence of an interlocking elite. We shall illustrate below that senior civil servants in

post-communist Russia have served as a vital recruitment pool for leadership posts across the political, administrative, and economic landscape, just as in the *pantouflage* system in France.[4] In the contemporary Russian context, we argue, this integration of the ruling elite—or perhaps more accurately its re-integration—has impeded policy reforms and democratization.[5] It also has the potential to undermine state capacity, most noticeably by exacerbating the principal-agent problem that plagues all complex organizations. When promotion through the administrative ranks serves as a springboard to membership in a country's ruling class, the temptation grows to allow spoils as opposed to merit-based criteria to shape personnel decisions. The result is a politicized bureaucracy in which principals cannot rely on the loyalty of administrative agents who lie outside of their family circles.

Theoretical and historical background

Max Weber assumed that modern states would exhibit certain common features, including the presence of three classes of state officials: a political elite brought into office by voters; the politicians' personal staffs, who are temporary appointees selected as much for their personal loyalty as their professional competence; and a vast army of permanent civil servants, whose hiring and career advancement depend on merit rather than loyalty to person, party, or ideology. But this template for the division of labor in the modern state was overtaken by developments in state administration in the late 20th century. The privatization of state functions, the erosion of life tenure for civil servants, and the blurring of distinctions between political and administrative personnel were among the numerous novelties in public administration that undermined the Weberian paradigm, even in the West.

The absence of a dominant theoretical paradigm on questions of politics and administration, taken together with the distinct development paths of modern states, has produced an extraordinarily diverse institutional landscape. Even among European countries with similar levels of economic and political development, one finds great variety in the division of labor between political and administrative personnel. European democracies differ markedly, for example, in the share of political appointees in officialdom; in the degree of insulation of administrative personnel from political influence; in the relationship between political and administrative careers and the private sector; and in the methods of training and recruiting political and administrative elites. Although it is possible to create rough typologies, or families, of political–administrative systems, such as the one embracing Britain and many countries of the Old Commonwealth, every state has developed a distinctive array of rules and organizations that govern relations between politicians and administrative personnel.[6] As Peter Hall has illustrated, such differences are not organizational curiosities but vital elements

of a country's institutional design, which can profoundly alter political outcomes.[7]

To recognize the diversity of Western approaches to issues at the nexus of politics and administration, such as the appropriate balance between the merit and spoils systems, is not to claim that state administration in the West has no common features. One has only to examine the contours of Soviet officialdom to understand the gap between the politics–administration nexus in open and closed societies. As earlier chapters in this volume have shown, the existence of a one-party state in the Soviet era undermined a fundamental premise of a modern state bureaucracy: that the bulk of officialdom should be politically neutral so that it can serve Governments of varied political orientations. In a political system where a single party enjoys a monopoly of power, the insulation of administrative personnel from overt political influence has little logic. Because the Soviet state was intent on mobilizing all available forces behind the policy campaign of the day, the usual legal, professional, or ethical constraints that would have shaped administrative behavior in open societies were supposed to give way to party directives.

In reality, of course, things were not so simple, as Graeme Gill pointed out earlier in this volume. Whether due to policy disagreements, conflicting personal loyalties, corruption, or more mundane causes, such as professional incompetence or poor communications, party directives were often ignored, distorted, or only partially implemented. In the first few decades of Soviet rule, this principal-agent problem was attributed primarily to shortcomings in cadres policy, most notably those caused by bourgeois specialists inherited from the old order or newly-promoted personnel who had minimal preparation for administrative tasks. But even after a new generation of better-trained Soviet personnel entered state administration, tensions between reds and experts remained, and decisions made by Soviet leaders were subject to 'authority leakage' that was often more serious than that found in the West. Unable to eliminate the contradictions between city and country and mental and manual labor, the Soviet Union was also incapable of removing the tensions between politics and administration.

Recognizing that controlling the state was in many ways more difficult than controlling society, the Soviet political leadership adopted a range of tactics designed to transform administrative personnel into the loyal agents of party rule and to combat the longstanding pathologies of the Russian state, such as departmentalism [*vedomstvennost'*] and localism [*mestnichestvo*]. These tactics, which set the Soviet Union apart from its Western counterparts, included a program of education and training that supplemented the usual technical preparation with heavy doses of civic/political socialization. Large numbers of administrative elites, for example, received their tertiary education at Higher Party Schools, where courses in such fields

as dialectical materialism and a history of the workers' movement were intended to forge a single bureaucratic culture.[8]

The Soviet Union also used an intricate version of the spoils system to recruit personnel for leading posts in all institutions, whether in state administration or economic enterprises. The apparatus of the Communist Party maintained lists of personnel eligible for promotion to these posts, the so-called cadres reserve, as well as lists of the posts whose occupants required party approval. Although a ministry or other non-party organization often nominated an administrative official, the Communist Party retained the right to confirm the nominee to the post. On a formal level, at least, this so-called *nomenklatura* system largely eliminated the distinction between political and administrative elites because all managers in the Soviet state, at whatever level, advanced their careers only with the forbearance of the party.[9] The conceit of the Soviet system was that politics as an 'art of reconciling competing claims' could be replaced by government based on principles of scientific management.[10] As the earlier work on *Russian Officialdom* observed, in this vision, the bureaucrat, and not the politician, was king.[11]

If a distinctive education, appointments policy, and idea of the state set Soviet officialdom apart from its Western counterparts, so did its approach to career mobility and to monitoring bureaucratic behavior. To combat localism and departmentalism, the Soviet leadership relied heavily on geographic and sectoral rotation of cadres. For example, the apparatus of the Central Committee of the Communist Party served as a way station in the careers of many senior officials. It was here that they were supposed to perfect the habits of the heart that would assure their functioning as loyal agents of party rule once they returned to leading posts in the central ministries or in regional or republican administration.[12] To repeat, the goal was the creation of a single bureaucratic culture. In practice, however, the forging of a common set of values and procedures based on party principles was never realized. Not only was Soviet officialdom subject to the universal affliction of the bureaucratic mindset, captured in Graham Allison's much-quoted phrase, 'where you stand depends on where you sit',[13] but the influx of cadres into the party apparatus from the factories, the ministries, and the republics infused the country's core institution with values that bore the marks of their sectoral and territorial origins.

Because the subtle and precise tool of law required a commitment to stable rules that served as an unwanted check on power, the Soviet leadership was unable to control officialdom through the 'rational-legal' means common to Western governments. It resorted instead to force, to 'material and moral stimuli', and to redundant checking mechanisms to discipline the bureaucracy. Among the best-known of these monitoring institutions were the party cells, which functioned inside all non-party bodies, and the Communist Party oversight departments, which operated at each

political–administrative level in the country. For example, judges working in a city court would be monitored not only by their own judicial superiors and the local branch of the Ministry of Justice but also by officials from the city organization of the Communist Party. Much of Soviet officialdom, therefore, was not engaged in the provision of services to the population or in the purveying of expertise to policymakers but in monitoring the performance of other officials of state.

Given the limited role of law and the market in the USSR, Soviet officialdom was called on to do more than its Western counterparts. The refusal to embrace legal and market principles created a society that was administered, rather than merely regulated, by the state.[14] The resulting relationship between state and society turned state officials into overseers rather than civil servants. Absent the traditional mechanisms of accountability before society found in the West, Soviet officialdom acquired the attributes of a self-serving caste, which lurched from periods of purges and anti-bureaucracy campaigns, designed to attack ill-discipline in the ranks, to periods of stagnation, during which the leadership sought to protect and reward the bureaucracy, which was its most important political base.

It was only in the Gorbachev era that these pillars of the Soviet bureaucratic paradigm begin to crack. By the end of the 1980s, officialdom had lost its virtual monopoly of information to the glasnost' campaign and it was beginning to lose its institutional cohesion, as autonomy-minded republics sought to wrest control over local officials from Moscow. Although legal and economic reform was still in its infancy, it started to create openings for a civil society that appeared to presage a shift from an administered to a regulated society. Subsequent reforms launched by Gorbachev began to undermine the party's monopoly of power by shifting decision-making and oversight responsibilities from the Central Committee apparatus to a presidential bureaucracy and by allowing the election of republican leaders, who had previously been appointed by party chiefs in Moscow. Initiatives to 'depoliticize' and decentralize officialdom inspired a revolt of traditionalists in the summer of 1991. However, the August putsch only succeeded in assuring the final de-legitimation of the Soviet party-state and the collapse of the USSR in December 1991.

Politics and administration in the post-communist era

Viewed through the teleological lens of much Western social science, the collapse of communism signaled the introduction of a new relationship between politics and administration in Russia and Eastern Europe.[15] Eliminating the Communist Party as a ruling institution and holding competitive elections appeared to establish the necessary preconditions for a state administrative apparatus that was politically neutral, if by political neutrality one means loyalty to offices and laws rather than to persons or parties.

Several developments in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union's demise seemed to confirm this trajectory. First, the heavy-handed ideological training of the Soviet era gave way to an emphasis on technical and management expertise. Primary responsibility for preparing Russian officials shifted from the network of Higher Party Schools to their successor institutions, the academies of state service, which offered a Western-style curriculum in public administration.[16] Moreover, the competition between executive and legislative authority in the early 1990s, taken together with the weakness of political parties, prevented the rise of a dominant political force that could exert undue influence over state administration.

By the mid-1990s, however, the politics-administration nexus in Russia began to exhibit features that diverged from Western models of public administration.[17] For example, the first major legislation on the post-communist civil service in Russia, enacted in 1995, revived the rigid bureaucratic career paths known in the tsarist-era as *chinoproizvodstvo*. Although the law contained some provisions inspired by the Weberian paradigm, such as those proclaiming the non-partisanship of civil service personnel and the need for carefully formulated disciplinary procedures, it also introduced a hierarchy of posts that bore an uncanny resemblance to Peter the Great's Table of Ranks. Whereas the Table of Ranks included 14 grades, or *chiny*, embracing all state officials below the tsar, the 1995 register of posts boasted 15 grades.[18]

The post-communist version of the Table of Ranks divided Russian officialdom into three distinct categories. Category A contained presidentially-appointed members of the country's political and legal elite, including the prime minister, ministers, and leading figures in the judiciary. Category B embraced employees of state who were hired by, and served as support personnel for, officials in Category A. Thus, Category B personnel came to and left their posts through a 'spoils' system, which engendered loyalty to person rather than to office, not unlike that found in ministers' staffs in all political regimes. Finally, Category C included the vast permanent army of state servants [*gosudarstvennye sluzhashchie, zanimaiushchie gosudarstvennye dolzhnosti*], whose appointments and promotions were supposed to be based on merit rather than political or personal loyalty.

The formal division of Russian state administration into three classes of officials corresponded to widely-accepted conventions about the division of labor in modern states, with the first two categories of officials falling to one side of the political–administrative divide and the third category to the other. However, the apparent respect for Weberian principles was less evident in the operation of post-communist state administration. First, the 1995 law revived not only the rigid hierarchical structure of the tsarist bureaucracy but also its cult of ranks and grades. Although all modern bureaucracies, and especially those on the Continent, accord considerable social and professional status to official posts, Russian officialdom is unusually conscious

of subordinate and super-ordinate relations. The result has been a revival of a caste mentality among many segments of the bureaucracy, which creates a personal identity based on rank, ministry, and state service.[19] As Alexander Obolonsky argues in Chapter 18 of this volume, this caste mentality introduces a social and psychological distance between agencies and between officials and the public, which complicates the emergence of a civil, as opposed to a state, service.

Second, the tripartite division of Russian officials implies a clear boundary between political and administrative posts, whereas in fact the boundary is fluid and porous. Although formally a part of the permanent state service, officials at the apex of the administrative corps exhibit many of the characteristics of political appointees. Deputy ministers, for example, are Category C officials, though their functions are as much political as administrative, especially those who are responsible for liaison with parliament.[20] The most obvious indication of the political status of those working at the deputy ministerial level is their appointment and dismissal by a presidential decree or prime ministerial order. Unlike deputy ministers in so-called presidential ministries, such as Foreign Affairs and Internal Affairs, who are confirmed by the president, those in ministries outside the security sector are subject to appointment and dismissal by the prime minister. Thus, the accession to office of a new president, prime minister, or minister may well prompt the removal of a deputy minister.

As a Category C official, however, deputy ministers usually retain the right to employment elsewhere in state administration. Thus, although there is considerable politicization of the bureaucracy, certain civil service rules do apply, most notably the protection of job tenure. Explaining the nature of job security in contemporary Russian officialdom, a Moscow journalist noted that

> you can't simply fire a bureaucrat, especially a high-ranking one. They must resign of their own volition [*po sobstvennomu zhelaniiu*], or be removed because they violated an article of the Labor Code; or the unneeded comrade must be transferred to another government post that maintains their former status and benefits even if it doesn't have as much authority.[21]

The other frequently-used means of removing a Category C official is to create a parallel structure and transfer their responsibilities to the new office. By respecting the formal rules, while shunting aside the undesirable bureaucrat, the Russian system creates institutional redundancies that not only waste funds but also complicate governance.[22]

That the lines between political and administrative personnel in the state bureaucracy are imprecise is hardly unique to Russia. German politicians, for example, have the ability to send high-ranking members of the permanent

civil service into temporary retirement in order to form a management team in a ministry that is sympathetic to the party in power.[23] But what is unusual about the Russian state is its unwillingness to recognize the extent to which the appointments and promotions process, as well as electoral politics, has politicized administrative elites. For example, the declining competitiveness of Russian elections has been due in no small part to the ability of incumbent politicians to employ 'administrative resources' on their behalf—a euphemism for the diversion of state employees from their official tasks to work on their boss' election campaign. Although this practice became an epidemic in the Putin era, it was already evident on Yeltsin's watch, when, for example, the former Russian president mobilized the Ministry of Railways to collect signatures to place his name on the presidential ballot in 1996.

The politics–administration nexus in post-communist Russia is also unusual in the relative power wielded by senior administrators. Longstanding Russian traditions of collegial rule in ministries, maintained in law if not always in spirit through the tsarist, Soviet, and post-communist eras, have at times granted to deputy ministers and other members of a ministry's collegium an ability to limit the power of the minister. Although some ministers clearly enjoy a more dominant role in their organizations than others, all must share the stage with their leadership team.[24] An indication of the stature of deputy ministerial post is that in the period from 1995 to 2005, a significant minority of those who rose to the post of minister within their organization returned later to the rank of deputy minister.[25]

The politicization of administrative careers

One of the most basic indicators of the relationship between politics and administration in modern states is the scope of 'spoils' appointments. Here one finds an astonishing range of traditions, with two countries that are often regarded as exemplars of democratic governance, Great Britain and the United States, lying at opposite poles in their use of the spoils versus the merit systems. Where Great Britain reserves a miniscule number of places at the top of the ministerial hierarchies for political appointees, many of whom are at one and the same time elected members of parliament, the United States grants its presidents immense patronage powers to install unelected loyalists throughout the federal bureaucracy.[26] In terms of the patronage power of its president, Russia is even more reliant on the spoils system than the United States. Besides the hundreds of officials who serve at the pleasure of the president in his own administrative apparatus, whether in the Kremlin or in the offices of the president's seven regional emissaries, the Russian president also appoints approximately 100 officials in the Russian Federal Government as well as the governors and police chiefs of the country's territories, the former with the approval of the local assemblies.

Moreover, the president appoints the country's 30,000 judges. With the exception of members of the country's supreme courts, who are confirmed by the upper house, the president does not tend to recruit nominees directly but to confirm candidates proposed by nominating commissions, which draw their members from the judiciary, the broader legal community, and the president's office. In addition to this filtering process for judicial nominees, the introduction of permanent appointments to the Bench (to age 65 for lower-level courts and 70 for supreme courts) constrains presidential patronage power in the judiciary. However, the ability of the president to re-appoint the highly influential chairpersons of courts and to refuse a permanent appointment to young judges, who must serve trial periods on the Bench, reminds judges of the potential consequences of reaching decisions that are unpopular with the president or his political allies. Many observers believe that the Russian president's influence over the appointment and dismissal of judges has helped to create a subservient judicial corps, which has been willing to render decisions in criminal and election cases that are desired by the president.[27]

The politicization of administrative careers is also evident in the revival of cadres reserve lists, which had been an important component of the *nomenklatura* system in the Soviet era.[28] Begun on a small scale during Yeltsin's second term, the cultivation of lists of candidates for administrative posts expanded significantly after 2003, when legislation called for the formation of cadres reserves in the federal Government and its ministries as well as in provincial-level governments. Originally designed to address what some officials called a cadres famine [*kadrovoi golod*] in the upper reaches of state administration, the development of pools of eligible young talent for key administrative posts represented a belief that a purely market-based approach to recruitment in Russian officialdom was not producing the desired results. The dearth of talent in certain territories and agencies, taken together with more attractive positions in the private sector, encouraged officials to revive the cadres reserve system, which not only recruits a reservoir of personnel but in some cases offers them formal courses and informal shadowing opportunities as preparation for advancement.[29]

The revival of the cadres reserve system has potentially serious implications for the politics–administration nexus in Russia. First, it complicates the shift from a spoils, to a merit system in state administration by limiting the applicant pool to those personnel—usually bureaucratic insiders—who have been pre-screened by political or administrative leaders. As Gimpelson, Magun, and Brym point out in the previous chapter, the specialized skills required for many posts in modern bureaucracies encourage promotion from below. But where such an approach may be appropriate for mid-level civil servants, especially in institutions requiring more technical training and experience, it may be less desirable in the hiring of senior executives. Second, although the promotion of insiders enhances institutional loyalty, such

loyalty can develop into the 'silo mentality' that is found in closed bureaucratic hierarchies.[30] Again, this problem becomes especially acute among senior administrators, who may find it more difficult to balance departmental interests with more global perspectives. Third, the ability of department heads to stack the pool of reserve cadres with candidates who are personally loyal but professionally deficient has the potential to perpetuate corruption and inefficiency in the ranks.

Even more seriously, the existence of cadres reserve lists creates a structure of incentives that undermines the political neutrality of officialdom. Because those enlisted in the cadres reserve have a stake in maintaining in office superiors who tapped them for future promotion, they will be tempted to exhibit a loyalty to their political and administrative patrons that undermines principles of bureaucratic neutrality. Thus, the existence of cadres reserve lists makes it easier for politicians to employ 'administrative resources' and related tactics to stay in power. Aligning the career prospects of politicians and administrators so closely makes it difficult to ensure that power is wielded only *pro tempore* by political elites.

Russia is among a small number of modern states—France is the other prominent example—where administrative posts often serve as preparation for political careers. Such environments can contribute to the bureaucratization of politics, especially in countries like the Soviet Union and post-communist Russia, whose administrators-cum-politicians lack significant experience in popular and partisan politics. Although many French politicians begin their careers in state administration, they often leave officialdom in mid-career to pursue a route to elective office and/or ministerial service that passes through the crucible of party politics. As we shall see below, a variant of this system of *pantouflage*, which allows talented and ambitious French functionaries to slip in and out of administrative, political, and even business roles, is emerging in Russia.

In the Soviet era, administrative officials tended to become political figures by rising through their own institutional hierarchy to the post of minister, which granted them cabinet status and, more importantly, membership in key party bodies. In the immediate aftermath of communism's collapse, this career path remained little changed for most ministries. This traditional route to power for Russian cabinet members—the promotion of ministers from below—complicated the coordination of policy-making and implementation in the post-communist period because what motivated the ministers was not a party platform, or even a deeply-felt loyalty to the president, but a desire to protect the interests of their own bureaucracy—or their own family circle—in the corridors of power. In the words of Morstein Marx, such 'functional expertise in the bureaucracy seriously weakens the integrative function of status officialdom. The specialist is insular, narrow in his vision as well as his desires; he tends to turn the bureaucracy into a house divided against itself.'[31] Factions in the state, of course, are no less

avoidable than factions in society, but this blurring of administrative and political careers in Russia only exacerbates organizational divisions, whereas the integrating role of parties in the West tends to mitigate them. Thus, Russia's problem is not so much the scale of the spoils system but the fact that patronage consolidates the power of individuals and patron–client networks and not broad-based parties or movements.[32] Although United Russia has in recent years recruited several ministers to its ranks, this party of power has not shown an ability to use ideas or institutions to integrate the elite.

Pantouflage a la russe

In the traditional Weberian state bureaucracy, administrative personnel receive specialized training for their offices and follow a career path that usually restricts them to a single sector, or even a single ministry or agency. Bureaucratic careers in some European states, most notably Britain and Germany, continue to adhere fairly closely to this model of promotion within 'closed bureaucratic hierarchies'. In other countries, however, senior administrative elites circulate regularly between state administration and exogenous institutions. In the French system of *pantouflage*, for example, some high-flyers in the civil service use their state careers as launching pads for prominent positions in politics and business.[33] Although the movement of elites in France tends to be unidirectional—from officialdom into party politics or the upper reaches of the private sector—some senior personnel do return to state service to assume leading ministerial posts. In the United States, it is the private sector that provides many of the presidential appointees who occupy senior management posts in cabinet departments, often overseeing the very industry in which they had worked. In turn, it is not uncommon for certain industries to hire experienced government personnel—whether from executive agencies or Capitol Hill—because of their detailed knowledge of the regulatory environment and their close connections to those responsible for making and implementing government policy. This interlocking elite, especially in its American incarnation, runs counter to the Weberian ideal of the state bureaucracy, which is designed to limit societal penetration of the state.

The Soviet Union, for its part, had insisted on the full autonomy of the state from society. As noted earlier, when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the Russian Federation inherited a bureaucratic tradition in which the vast majority of state officials pursued highly-specialized career trajectories. Such an emphasis on specialization in state administration was possible, of course, because of the coordinating role of the Communist Party, whose leading cadres often had more broad-gauged training and experience. The elimination of the Communist Party as a ruling institution in the early 1990s presented the Russian Government with numerous choices about what had been called 'cadres policy' in the Old Regime. By the end of the 1990s, it was

Table 15.1 The careers of deputy ministers after state service 1995–2004

Academic/Culture/Publishing	42
Business/Industry	95
Doctors/Lawyers	6
International/CIS Positions	10
NGOs/Trade Associations	22
Parliament/Parties	27
Regional Government	10
Other	5

From the total number of 608 deputy ministers, first deputy ministers, and state secretaries who left their post in the period from 1995 to 2005, almost half transferred to other jobs within the same or a related hierarchy. The figures above represent the number of officials who found work outside of their hierarchy and indeed outside of the federal executive. Data on subsequent career moves were not available on 53 of the 608 deputy ministers.
Source: endnote 34.

clear that Russia's reluctance to embrace democratic and market principles had opened the way for senior civil servants to occupy key positions in business as well as politics.

Evidence, shown in Table 15.1, from a database we constructed on the appointments and dismissals of senior state administrators in the decade from 1995 to 2004 illustrates that careers in Russian officialdom frequently served as a springboard to leading positions in business as well as politics.[34] Instead of working to retirement in state administration, the common pattern in the Soviet era, many mid- and late-career officials in post-communist Russia have been leaving state service for high-level posts in the business and non-profit sectors. Among the group of 217 deputy ministers who found work outside their ministries in the period from 1995 to 2004, more than 10 percent entered the Federal Assembly, either as deputies or members of staff, a third moved into the non-profit sector, and about half secured positions in business or industry following their ministerial careers.

The vast majority of the former high-ranking state administrators who entered the business world moved to companies at the commanding heights of the Russian economy, where the state's presence increased in the Putin era. The most common destinations in business and industry were banks (14), the state electrical monopoly, RAO IeES (7), and—unsurprisingly for a resource-based economy—the energy complex, which welcomed more than a quarter (23) of the new entrants into business and industry. Gazprom alone accounted for six hires. Although many of the former deputy ministers moving into the energy sector had served previously in the Ministry of Natural Resources, a significant number had had careers in ministries with no direct

ties to the oil and gas industry. These findings confirm William Tompson's assessment that 'perhaps the defining feature of the relationship between business—particularly big business—and the state in Russia is the extent to which the two have inter-penetrated each other.'[35]

Parallel to the circulation of senior state administrators into posts outside their sector is the movement of many former military and security officials into positions at the apex of politics, state administration, and the economy. The research of Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White illustrates that whereas in the late Soviet era military and security elites were generally restricted to leadership roles in the power ministries and a small share of symbolic posts in a rubber-stamp parliament and party bodies, their post-communist counterparts are occupying an increasing number of positions in Russia's new ruling class. According to Kryshtanovskaya,

> If in the Soviet period and the first post-Soviet period, the KGB and FSB [people] were mainly involved in security issues, now half are still involved in security but the other half are involved in business, political parties, NGOs, regional governments, even culture. They started to use all political institutions.[36]

What our study shows is that these novel assignments for law enforcement and security personnel, known as *siloviki* in Russian, are part of a larger trend toward the use of senior state administrators, whether from the civilian or military sectors, to fill key posts in politics and the economy.[37] From a recruitment standpoint, then, contemporary Russia's ruling class is not only militarized but bureaucratized.

Conclusions

The effacement of the boundaries between careers in politics, administration, and the economy bears some parallels to the American and French models. However, an interlocking elite is more dangerous in the Russian case because it is not checked effectively by the power of law and the market or, as in the American case, by the potent restraints of federalism or the checks and balances between central state institutions. If a primary feature of an open and democratic society is a plurality of elites, then post-communist Russia, and especially Putin's Russia, has witnessed a kind of re-integration of the ruling class that will complicate efforts to move Russia in a liberal and democratic direction. By drawing heavily on administrative personnel—whether from the military or civilian sectors—for leaders in political and economic institutions, Putin used cadres policy as part of his broader campaign to centralize power and eliminate, or at least marginalize, elite groups that could serve as sources of political opposition or provide leadership alternatives in public and private institutions.

Although the solidifying of an interlocking elite presents several potential advantages for governance in Russia, including enhanced coordination between ministries and the core executive and between ministries themselves, it poses two other dangers for post-communist Russia, besides the just-noted weakening of political pluralism.[38] The first is what might be termed *enarquisme*, a reference to the elite French training academy, ENA, which creates a narrow chokepoint for admission to the political and economic elite. If ambitious and talented youth believe that the route to political and/or financial success passes through state service appointments to select state agencies, such as the Ministry of Finance, the FSB, or the Ministry of Natural Resources, then they may eschew private business or the liberal professions in favor of state service as a career choice. Such a development would only reinforce longstanding Russian traditions of *dirigisme* in the economy as well as a Muscovite dominance of politics, culture, and society.

For all its faults, personnel policy in the Soviet era ensured a healthy circulation of elites between the regions and the capital. With rare exceptions, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which drew heavily from the Muscovite ruling class, the staffs of Soviet institutions were geographically diverse. Because of the elimination of the communist-era rotation of cadres, the emergence of more or less autonomous—and often highly paid—regional civil service corps, the continued difficulty of procuring a Moscow residence permit, and weak regional lobbies in a weak parliament, an interlocking elite drawn heavily from officials in federal executive institutions will come overwhelmingly from Moscow (and from the region of the country's president, in the case of Putin and Medvedev, St. Petersburg). Such a narrowing of the geographical base of a country's ruling class may at some point pose serious challenges for regime legitimacy.

What is not yet clear is the impact of an interlocking elite on regime performance. Of the approximately 100 officials in our study who left their posts as deputy ministers for positions in the economy, what percentage of them acquired their new positions through a competitive search that selected individuals based on their sectoral expertise and managerial skills? One suspects, of course, that far more important than professional qualities were personal connections with patrons who could facilitate their movement into lucrative and prestigious posts in the private sector. Given the inefficiencies and corruption found in many ministries and agencies, especially at the deputy minister level, the decision of prominent firms to select key personnel from among deputy ministers raises serious questions about the quality of leadership found in institutions that are of strategic importance to the Russian economy and society.[39]

Another unresolved issue is the extent to which the supply of cadres for Russia's interlocking elite comes from the state or the private sector. Many scholars have noted that the movement of cadres across the divide

between politics–administration and the economy is not unidirectional. Indeed, Rivera and Rivera assert that in recent years there has been an *embourgeoisement* of the Russian state because of the significant numbers of business leaders who have assumed key political and administrative posts.[40] Although this tendency is especially pronounced in many regional governments, where enterprise managers have adopted a high political profile, it is not clear that a similar circulation of elites is occurring at the federal level. In this regard, it is especially important to confirm that those individuals coded as business leaders are not in fact former senior state administrative personnel who are circling back to their former, or a related, ministry. We must also determine whether William Tompson's conclusions about the 'colonizing of state structures' by the oligarchs in the Yeltsin years continued to hold in the Putin era and beyond, and if so, whether these colonizers were 'captured' state administrators or persons with private-sector backgrounds who were filling key posts at the apex of Russian officialdom.[41] If the penetration of the state by society is less pronounced than Rivera and Rivera and Tompson suggest, it will be tempting to conclude that Russia is reverting to what Pintner and Rowney called an ultrabureaucracy, in which 'bureaucrats are answerable only to bureaucrats.'[42]

Clearly, much more research is required in order to understand fully the movement of elites within and between political, administrative, and economic institutions in post-communist Russia. Until this work is more advanced, the conclusions offered here must remain tentative. This study is designed, therefore, not only to assess our current understanding of the role of state administrators in the larger social order but also to renew interest in the study of Russian administrative elites, which had formed a central part of Western research in the late Soviet era but was downgraded as a subject of study when the field shifted to analyses of institutions that were more familiar to those trained in the democratic tradition. Although it may be premature to abandon the study of parties, parliaments, and elections in Russia, it has become increasingly evident that an analysis of who administers Russia will provide important insights into who governs Russia.

Notes

1. See, for example, Timothy J. Colton and Stephen Holmes, *The State after Communism: Governance in the New Russia* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006).
2. Joel D. Aberbach, Robert D. Putnam, and Bert A. Rockman, *Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 3.
3. As James Rauch and Peter Evans note, 'without the help of the central government bureaucracy, it is difficult if not impossible to implement or maintain a policy environment that is conducive to economic growth.' James E. Rauch

and Peter B. Evans, 'Bureaucratic Structure and Bureaucratic Performance in Less Developed Countries', Department of Economics, University of California at San Diego, Working Paper no. 99–06.

4. On *pantouflage* in France, see Pierre Birnbaum, *The Heights of Power* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), and Jeanne Siwek-Pouydesseau, *Le Personnel de Direction des Ministeres* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1969).
5. As Fred Riggs observed, in transitional societies the conflict between administrators often becomes the major form of politics, which has 'ominous implications for democracy.' *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, Joseph La Palombara, ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 16.
6. For an attempt to categorize bureaucracies, see Ferrel Heady, 'Configurations of Civil Service Systems', in *Civil Service Systems in Comparative Perspective*, Hans Bekke, James Perry, and Theo Toonen, eds (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 207–22.
7. Peter Hall, 'Policy Innovation and the Structure of the State: The Politics-Administration Nexus in France and Britain', *Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Science*, 466, no. 1 (1983): 43–59.
8. See John A. Armstrong, *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959), 34–42, and Thomas Remington, *The Truth of Authority: Ideology and Communications in the Soviet Union* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988).
9. For a basic introduction to the *nomenklatura* system, see Ronald Hill and Peter Frank, *The Soviet Communist Party* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981).
10. A. J. Polan, *Lenin and the End of Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
11. *Russian Officialdom: The Bureaucratization of Russian Society from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century*, Walter McKenzie Pintner and Don Karl Rowney, eds (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980).
12. One should note that the use of the core executive as a socializing institution is not unknown in the West, though the practice appears to be less systematic than in the former USSR.
13. Graham T. Allison, *Essence of a Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little Brown, 1971), 176.
14. See John Wilhelm, 'The Soviet Union has an Administered, Not a Planned, Economy', *Soviet Studies*, no. 1 (1985), 118–30.
15. See, for example, *Administrative Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe*, J. J. Hesse, ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), and Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling, 'Getting on track: civil service reform in post-communist Hungary', *Journal of European Public Policy*, no 8 (2001): 960–79. To be sure, these studies focused on Central and Eastern Europe and not the more difficult environments to the East.
16. Eugene Huskey, 'From Higher Party Schools to Academies of State Service: The Marketization of Bureaucratic Training in Russia', *Slavic Review*, no. 2 (2004): 325–48. Changes in personnel, however, were less impressive than changes in curriculum, and so one may question how profoundly and rapidly the education changed in these new academies.
17. Peter Solomon argues that it was too much to expect Russia to move quickly toward Western models of public administration—and indeed he wonders whether many of these models correspond to the Weberian standards of a law-based state that most observers assume. In Solomon's words: 'the shift from a patrimonial bureaucracy (where patron-client relations dominate) to an authentic

civil service is hard to achieve. The lessons of Western history suggest that it requires strong societal demands for curtailment of corruption and establishment of universalistic behavior and determined representation of these demands by politicians operating in a competitive environment.' Peter H. Solomon, Jr., 'Law in Public Administration: How Russia Differs?' *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, no. 1 (2008): 128.

18. Ob osnovakh gosudarstvennoi sluzhby RF, *Sobranie zakonodatel'stvo*, no. 31 (1995), art. 2990; Eugene Huskey and Alexander Obolonsky, 'The Struggle to Reform Russia's Bureaucracy', *Problems of Post-Communism*, no. 4 (2003): 24–5.
19. In a survey conducted in 1995, the majority of the 1,500 Russian citizens and 300 low- and mid-ranking bureaucrats polled agreed that the bureaucracy had degenerated into a 'closed and arrogant caste.' Nabi Abdullaev, 'Civil Servants Called a New Class', *Moscow Times*, 11 November 2005. On the origins of the arcane system of civil service grades in the tsarist period, see Helju Aulik Bennett, 'Chiny Ordena, and Officialdom', in *Russian Officialdom: The Bureaucratization of Russian Society from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century*, 162–88.
20. Many approximate what Joel Aberbach, Robert Putnam, and Bert Rockman labeled Image IV of the civil servant, a category that includes bureaucrats whose functions differ little from the politicians to whom they are formally subordinate. *Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies*, 17–9.
21. Aleksei Polukhin, 'Kvartirnyi ne vopros', *Novaia gazeta*, 6 November 2006.
22. It should be noted that the ability of ministers to use reorganizations to reshuffle civil servants in a ministry is a common practice in modern states. On the Austrian case, see Barbara Liegl and Wolfgang C. Muller, 'Senior Officials in Austria', in *Bureaucratic Elites in Western Europe: A comparative analysis of top officials*, Edward C. Page and Vincent Wright, eds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 100–4. Referring to ministers just appointed to their posts, the former minister of justice, Valentin Kovalev, contends that 'each new boss begins his work by rearranging the furniture and firing persons from the entourage of his predecessor.' Valentin Kovalev, *Versiia ministra iustitsii* (Moscow: Zvonnitsa-MG, 2002), 249.
23. In some respects, deputy ministers in Russia are akin to the *politische Beamte* in Germany, who, though members of the civil service, may be temporarily retired from a post to make way for an official who is more sympathetic to the ruling group. See Klaus H. Goetz, 'Senior Officials in the German Federal Administration: Institutional Change and Positional Differentiation', in *Bureaucratic Elites in Western Europe*, 150.
24. The difficulty of removing deputy ministers does not mean that they cannot be transferred if the minister is intent on replenishing the ranks. Writing in the late 1990s, Alexander Kotchegura noted that '[v]ery often the arrival of a new head means the replacement of most of his or her deputies. The new deputies, in turn, replace most of the heads of departments. The latter often start to rotate their subordinates.' He offers the example of the head of the Federal Tax Service, who replaced six of his eight deputies with predictable consequences for morale, performance, and discipline. Alexander Kotchegura, 'The Russian Civil Service: Legitimacy and Performance', in *Civil Service Systems in Central and Eastern Europe*, Tony Verheijen, ed. (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1999), 30.
25. See endnote 34 below.
26. Britain has recently expanded the number of spoils posts that are subject to removal at a change of Government, including for the first time officials in the

Government's press offices. For a review of some of the changes in Britain under Tony Blair, see Graham K. Wilson and Anthony Barker, 'Bureaucrats and Politicians in Britain', *Governance*, no. 3 (2003): 349–72. Klaus Goetz and others place the German state bureaucracy between the neutral senior civil service of Britain and the 'government of strangers' found in the US Klaus H. Goetz, 'Acquiring Political Craft: Training Grounds for Top Officials in the German Core Executive', *Public Administration* (Winter 1997): 753–75; Hans-Ulrich Derlien, 'Mandarins or Managers? The Bureaucratic Elite in Bonn, 1970 to 1987 and Beyond', *Governance*, no. 3 (2003): 401–28.

27. Peter H. Solomon, Jr., 'Courts in Russia: Independence, Power and Accountability', in *Judicial Integrity*, Andras Sajo, ed. (Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2004), 225–53.
28. On the difficulties that all post-communist states have had in depoliticizing their bureaucracies, see Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling, 'Civil Service Reform in Post-Communist Europe: The Bumpy Road to Depoliticisation', *West European Politics*, no. 1 (2004): 71–103. Meyer-Sahling argues that the trust, which had existed between political leaders and senior administrators in the Soviet era, due to their commitment to a single party, diminished in the post-communist era, when multiple parties came to the fore. This observation seems more appropriate to the multiparty parliamentary regimes of East Europe than Russia and other countries to the East, where parties of power regained a dominant position in the political system. Ibid., 79.
29. A detailed examination of the rise of the cadres reserve system in post-communist Russia may be found in Eugene Huskey, 'Nomenklatura Lite? The Cadres Reserve in Russian Public Administration', *Problems of Post-Communism*, no. 2 (2004): 30–9.
30. In his study of the mid-19th century Ministry of Internal Affairs, Daniel Orlovsky found a very different career pattern than that which emerged in the Soviet and post-communist eras, where internal promotion was the norm. According to Orlovsky, 'it was normal for men to be enlisted from outside the ministry to occupy such important posts as assistant minister, member of the Council of the Minister, or member of the Council of the Main Directorate of Press Affairs', and only 7 percent of this group began their careers in the central ministry. Daniel T. Orlovsky, 'High Officials in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 1855–1881', in *Russian Officialdom: The Bureaucratization of Russian Society from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century*, 271.
31. As quoted in Joseph La Palombara, 'An Overview of Bureaucracy and Political Development', in *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, 16. Iulia Shevchenko has a different view of this dynamic, arguing that because ministers from civil service backgrounds have no party to fall back on, they may in fact be more dependent on the president. *The Central Government of Russia: From Gorbachev to Putin* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2004), 181–2. Much depends on how big the party 'tent' is and the mechanisms for internal party discipline.
32. Fred Riggs argues that a spoils system is one of the incentives for the formation of broad-based political parties. Without some kind of spoils system, he contends, parties can only attract 'intellectuals and dreamers.' Fred W. Riggs, 'Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View', in *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 130.
33. See, for example, Philippe Bezes, 'Defensive versus Offensive Approaches to Administrative Reform in France (1988–1997): The Leadership Dilemmas of

French Prime Ministers', *Governance*, no. 1 (2001): 122; Luc Rouban, 'The Senior Civil Service in France', in *Bureaucratic Elites in Western Europe*, 66–87.

34. These figures and those that follow are taken from a database that I constructed from appointments and dismissals listed in *Sobranie zakonodatel'stva* from issue no. 4 of 1995 through issue no. 52 of 2004. The fields in the database are name, sex, ministry (or presidency or Government apparatus), position, action taken, official taking action (president or prime minister), date of appointment or dismissal, and reason for action. Further biographical information, notably that on post-civil service careers, was gleaned from Labyrinth and other Russian online sources.
35. William Tompson, 'Putting Yukos in Perspective', *Post-Soviet Affairs*, no. 2 (2005): 166.
36. Peter Finn, 'In Russia, A Secretive Force Widens', *Washington Post*, 12 December 2006, A01. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/11/AR2006121101434.html
37. As Rivera and Rivera argue, whether this heavy reliance on the *siloviki* is in fact a threat to democratization and the performance of the political, administrative, and economic systems is still a matter of debate. Sharon Werning Rivera and David W. Rivera, 'The Russian Elite under Putin: Militocratic or Bourgeois?' *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 22, no. 2 (2006): 125–44. Besides its reputation for secrecy and ruthlessness, the KGB was known as an institution whose personnel were less corrupt and more talented than officials in other ministries.
38. It is easy, of course, to overstate the extent to which drawing elites from a common source will assure cooperation. If any institution would be expected to exhibit cooperation among elites it would be the armed forces, yet we know from the very public battles of recent years that Russian military leaders are prone to bitter internal disputes. See Stephen Blank, 'The Great Exception: Russian Civil-Military Relations', *World Affairs*, no. 2 (2002): 91–105.
39. Rauch and Evans find 'three key ingredients in effective state bureaucracies . . . competitive salaries, internal promotion and career stability, and meritocratic recruitment', with the last being the most important of the three—and, in our view, the most likely to be compromised by the interlocking elite system that we have described in Russia. James E. Rauch and Peter B. Evans, 'Bureaucratic Structure and Bureaucratic Performance in Less Developed Countries', 99–06. Perhaps paradoxically, as Alexander Kotchegura has observed, the prominence of high-ranking civil servants in the ruling elite may privilege relations of obligation and exchange over sound management of the economy and society. Alexander Kotchegura, 'The Russian Civil Service: Legitimacy and Performance', in *Civil Service Systems in Central and Eastern Europe*, 40.
40. Sharon Werning Rivera and David W. Rivera, 'The Russian Elite under Putin: Militocratic or Bourgeois?' 125–44.
41. William Tompson, 'Yukos in Perspective', 163–4. If one concludes, however, that the 'main actors are state elites and bureaucrats', then, according to Pauline Jones Luong, in this environment 'business-state relations are blurred and symmetrical, their incentives for building discretionary institutions [informal rent-seeking structures] are likely to converge, and thus, institutions are likely to be weak in terms of both their ability to constrain and [their] predictability . . .' *The Transformation of Central Asia: States and Societies from Soviet Rule to Independence*, Pauline Jones Luong, ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 11. This is not an encouraging prospect for the development of a Russian officialdom that is capable

of maintaining the capacity of the state while nurturing economic growth. For an argument that recent bureaucratic consolidation has replaced state capture with business capture, see Alexander Yakovlev, 'The Evolution of Business-State Interaction in Russia: From State Capture to Business Capture?', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 58, no. 7 (2006): 1033–56.

42. Walter M. Pintner and Don Karl Rowney, 'Officialdom and Bureaucratization: Conclusion', in *Russian Officialdom*, 380.

16

Delivering State Services to the Population: The Development of State Welfare Agencies in Post-Soviet Russia

Cecile Lefevre

One of the stabilizing features of the Soviet order was a social compromise based on a mixture of two delivery systems for social benefits. Where some goods and services were distributed by the state through a system that was officially universal, other benefits were delivered through the workplace. 'Social workers' in this period were not recognized as a profession, but there were large numbers of persons engaged in administering and providing social protection, ranging from leading functionaries in the ministries to trade union personnel in the factories and officials employed by local departments of social affairs in cities and regions. Driven by a desire to improve living conditions and to maintain social control, how did these workers in the social services experience the 'great transformation' in the decades of the 1990s and 2000s? With the collapse of the Soviet political regime and the liberalization of the economy, what became of these officials in the social services? How did their functions evolve? Who enters into employment in this sector today, with what kind of education, and with what beliefs and motivations? The official recognition of poverty and social inequality and the introduction of unemployment and health insurance have significantly altered the role of social workers. The process of decentralization in the 1990s also contributed to the expansion of their autonomy and discretion. In addition, a professionalization of the field has begun. Can one now speak of a new bureaucracy in social services and a new method of managing social questions?

The 1990s: The emergence of a profession

The appearance of the official designation of 'social work' [*sotsial'naia rabota*] can be dated to April 1991. In September of that year, the first degree in social work was offered in an institution of higher education. Fifteen years later,

there were over 120 university courses graduating students with diplomas in social work out of a total of 600 universities nationwide. Two university tracks exist for those preparing to work in this field. The first, lasting four years, grants students a qualification as a 'social worker' [*sotsial'nyi rabotnik*], while the second, five years in length, gives them the designation of a 'specialist in social work' [*spetsialist po sotsial'noi rabote*]. Besides the creation of specific diplomas, one also finds evidence of the emergence of a profession in the appearance of professional journals as well as the structuring of personnel into numerous professional associations. By 2007, four associations were operating in the field. These were the Association of Social Pedagogues and Social Workers, the Association of Social Workers, the Association of Schools of Social Work, and the Association of Social Service Employees. If the first three organizations are academic or research-oriented, the last group, created in 1992, includes many personnel who have worked for many years in the social services without specialized training in this sector. This association acts in many respects like a trade union, pushing for better salaries and better working conditions. There are also four professional journals. The Russian Journal of Social Work [*Rossiiskii zhurnal sotsial'noi raboty*] has a scientific and theoretical bent,[1] whereas the other three—*Social Protection, Social Security*, and *The Social Service Worker*—are oriented toward applied work.[2]

Historical origins: Pedagogy and social control

Social work as a concept, and as a career, did not emerge from scratch in 1991. On the contrary, it has a complex and historically divided pedigree. The first strand of kinship with the past is found in social monitoring at the local level. In each Soviet factory or office, one could find the ambivalent figure of a person, often rising from trade union ranks or from a neighborhood committee, who was responsible for visiting and monitoring workers that were absent, on medical leave, or in a difficult personal situation, due, for example, to alcoholism or responsibilities as a single mother. This person, who had no specialized training for the job, was attached to a place of work or a *domkom* [neighborhood committee] and carried out functions of surveillance and reporting for the authorities. At the same time, in what might appear to be a contradiction, they offered aid and support to needy individuals as well. This tortured idea of a social monitoring that mixes empathy and political surveillance is well described in the dissertation of Nathalie Moine, whose work focuses on the 1930s, though the phenomenon continued throughout the Soviet period.[3]

The other great tradition on which post-Soviet social work is grounded is Soviet-era pedagogy, especially that relating to the upbringing of young pupils in the numerous state boarding schools of the USSR. Working most often with youth in the Young Pioneers and the Komsomol, the figure of

the social pedagogue relied not on the earlier concept of social monitoring but on ideas found in an important theoretical literature from the 1930s, whose founders were Lev Vygotski and Anton Makarenko. Where Vygotskii emphasized the contributions to childhood development of culture and social interactions, especially those between adults and children, Makarenko sought to create new Soviet men and women by mixing discipline with the encouragement of a sense of individual responsibility. Both authors left their imprint on Russian social pedagogy by stressing the role of the educator as guide in the transmission of social norms.

In the post-Soviet era, the link between social pedagogy and social work remains very close. In terms of the evolution of their professional activities, the 'pedagogues' of the 1980s and 1990s grew closer to psychologists than to personnel in the social assistance offices or the social workers in the field. At the same time, however, social pedagogy was an integral part of the university programs in which social workers were trained, and many positions in the social services are open to persons with training in either social work or social pedagogy. As Elena Iarskaia-Smirnova has argued, the proximity between the two fields impedes the emergence of a distinct professional identity of the social worker.[4] In the view of the public, social workers are either indistinguishable from the more recognized professional category of social pedagogue or they are not seen as part of a profession at all because of the perception that social work requires no special skills.

If the concept of the social worker is relatively recent, that of social aid work has a slightly longer pedigree in Russia. Already in the 1970s and 1980s, one began to speak of the need to provide a structure for social assistance. In 1991, the Russian government formed a Ministry for Social Protection.[5] Before this date, however, the portfolio for social protection had always been part of an expansive Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, and from 1996 this was again the case. Thus, a separate Ministry of Social Protection represented only a brief parenthesis in the organizational history of the field. Whatever the formal title of the organization, one of the enduring missions of these post-Soviet ministries was the promotion of social work. In 1992, the author met with officials working in the Ministry's Department of Social Assistance, which was in charge of in-kind social benefits and all social assistance provided outside of *internaty*, a term that in the Russian context includes not only boarding schools for youth but all institutions that shelter those requiring care, whether the aged or younger populations who are physically or mentally needy.[6] These officials explained that until 1976, the standard policy was to isolate the disabled and the aged in institutions, while placing troubled youth in state boarding schools. After that date, however, based on the model developed in Bulgaria and East Germany, the USSR began to expand social assistance to the home or outpatient centers. Behind this change was both an assessment of the negative psychological consequences

of the *internat* and a practical necessity: there were waiting lists of three years for admission to an *internat*.

Although social assistance in the home was officially recognized in the late Soviet period, it had neither its own administration nor infrastructure. It relied instead for support and personnel on the traditional organs of social security, which formed a kind of 'street-level bureaucracy' that was responsible for the allocation of assistance to the aged, the handicapped, and families in need. In the 1980s, each neighborhood office of social assistance had approximately 12 officials, including a driver, and was responsible for servicing about 80 clients, almost all of who were aged. Each homebound elderly person received a visit from what began to be called a 'social worker' at least twice a week. The social worker offered help with the preparation of meals, shopping, housekeeping chores, administrative procedures, the purchase of medicine, and personal correspondence. In the cities, the load of the social worker was eight to ten persons; in the countryside, it was four.

After providing the above details about the social services system, experts in the Social Assistance Department of the Ministry of Social Protection complained about the lack of available training materials for social workers and the limited theoretical knowledge of these agents of state. Such problems were not surprising given that volunteers working for the local social security office were largely responsible for providing social assistance to the aged in the form of home visits. In response to this situation, the Social Assistance Department began to study foreign models of social work and to establish contacts with the Department of Social Work at the University of Goteborg in Sweden. According to experts in the department, the problem of a lack of training programs for social workers became acute in 1992, when they realized that, as a result of the country's economic crisis and the collapse of the old order, self-financing of social assistance would increasingly become the rule. But few cadres trained to work under the Soviet system of social security knew how to take the lead in this new environment. In order to raise funds, local community centers, with their games, televisions, and cinemas, could have served as profit centers, but 'this idea did not even enter their heads.' Besides training that would help social workers adapt to the new budgetary realities, highly-placed officials in the ministry believed that courses in law, medicine, and psychology were necessary for Russian social workers.[7]

Taken together with the practice of rendering social assistance to the home since the 1970s, the two theoretical models of social work noted above, one based on social control within the neighborhood and the factory and the other on the tenets of social pedagogy, have shaped and continue to shape social work in Russia. These earlier traditions are now being integrated, of course, into a new context of social intervention in post-Soviet Russia, to which we now turn.

The emergence of poverty and the principle of 'targeting' in the 1990s: Chronological markers in a new context

The very use of the terms poverty and unemployment marks a break with the Soviet past. Such concepts were only used officially during perestroika, and the first statistics on these categories appeared only in 1991–2. It has been, therefore, only a little over 15 years since the term poverty [*bednost'*] found a place in official documents or in academic works in sociology and economics.

Since the 1990s, the explicit demand for specialists in social work has resulted from both the recognition of poverty as a concept and the increase in poverty as an economic and social phenomenon. No longer could poverty be designated and marginalized as an individual manifestation of 'parasitism'; it had instead become a real social problem. As a result, hundreds of employment agencies and offices of social assistance were created across the country, and they required first of all creating new files on the needy and informing the population of the new policies and benefits.

In August 1993, the political leadership adopted a Concept for the Development of Social Services for the Population of the Russian Federation, which defined the forms of social intervention and the methods to be employed by the social services. These included in-kind services that were often subsidized by private patrons and sponsors; the delivery of services through outpatient clinics; placement in institutions, such as retirement homes and boarding schools for children; housing assistance; responses to requests for advice; and help for those affected by life-altering events. These new responsibilities presaged the creation of a corps of social workers and the institutionalization of this profession.

On 10 December 1995, the Russian parliament adopted a federal law, On the Fundamentals of Social Services,[8] which established the principles of operation for social service bureaus and for the provision of assistance (excluding social welfare insurance related to retirement, health, and unemployment). The law set out the role of the newly recognized social workers and their fields of responsibility, such as aid to families, children, the aged, and the disabled. On 24 November 1993, two years before this law was adopted, the Ministry of Social Protection had issued a directive that provided a list of state services to which the disabled and pensioners were entitled. One should emphasize immediately that these acts oriented social work around the provision of assistance to individuals in their capacity as group members, where membership was longstanding, if not permanent. Entitlements were not accorded to individuals who simply found themselves in a difficult situation, if that situation was temporary or fluid. The system was constructed, therefore, to support a long-term disabled person who had been recognized as such by a state commission rather than an individual who had just lost their job or housing, or was in difficult straits.

In the Russian system of social protection, the domain of social assistance stands apart. Between 1991 and 1993, the system of social protection was organized around four extra-budgetary funds, each of which dealt with a specific field or 'risk'. There was a pension fund for the 'risk of aging', an employment fund for the 'risk of unemployment'; a medical insurance fund; and a social insurance fund, which provided aid to families and salary compensation in case of illness. This new structure rested on two principles. The first was a form of insurance that was underwritten by contributions, submitted almost exclusively by employers, and the second was the system's independence from the federal budget. This approach represented a break with the Soviet period, when social assistance payments were made from the federal budget without being financed by contributions from the population. Conceived as a federal program, the new social insurance system was put into place quite rapidly between 1991 and 1993. A parallel program of social assistance emerged in stages through initiatives in 1993, 1995, and 1997. Almost immediately, however, the fight against poverty and the accompanying policies on social assistance devolved to local governments. Although federal legislation set out policies in this field, it was the local authorities who implemented and financed them.

In 1995, the law on The Fundamentals of Social Service provided a detailed list of social service positions that should be filled by social workers.[9] Although the majority of social service offices were attached to the Ministry of Social Protection or, after 1996, the Ministry of Labor and Social Development, the ministries of Education and of Health Care also developed positions for social pedagogues and social workers in their specialized educational centers and in their health centers, especially those relating to mental health.

Further legislation on social assistance appearing from 1997 to 1999 contained a major innovation, namely the introduction of 'targeted' social assistance as a new category of public policy. The principle underlying this new approach was quite simple: social assistance benefits should be reserved to those having an individual income that is lower than a certain threshold, in this case the minimum standard of living, or subsistence minimum [*prozhitochnyi minimum*]. This measure represented a radical conceptual change by directing assistance to the 'poorest', defined by the sole criterion of monetary resources, rather than to a multiplicity of longstanding categories of beneficiaries that had in many cases been defined for historical or symbolic reasons.

Regarding the minimum standard of living, several things must be borne in mind. First, the methodology for establishing this standard was devised in 1992, but in reality, the idea of determining a minimum budget for consumption as well as the notion of a 'subsistence minimum' did not appear for the first time with the liberalization of the economy and the end of communism. They can be traced instead to the end of the Soviet period. In 1987,

a decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR authorized the calculation of a budget of minimum consumption. It was assumed that this work would be used in reform proposals relating to the calculation of pension benefits and salaries. On the eve of the reforms of 1989, between 16 and 25 percent of the population were considered impoverished by this new calculation, with the differences in assessment due to the prices utilized in the determination of the cost of a basket of goods and services.[10] With the rampant inflation of 1991–2, the share of the population living under the minimum increased to 70 percent, which is why a new formula for calculating the subsistence minimum—one that was more limited as regards the products included in the basket—was introduced in 1992 by the Ministry of Labor.[11]

The standard for measuring poverty in Russia rested on an absolute as opposed to a relative indicator, namely the value of a basket of goods and services necessary for the survival of an individual. The subsistence minimum was thus calculated and utilized by statisticians from 1992,[12] but it was only in 1997 that a federal law gave it an operational role in public policy on social assistance.[13] At that time, it became the threshold for targeting qualified individuals. Thus, a citizen with income above this level had no right to social assistance payments. The law also envisioned a narrowing by stages of the gap between three principal minima, those for retirement, income (salary), and subsistence. It affirmed at the same time that persons receiving income below the subsistence minimum were considered poor and had a right to receive social assistance benefits (Art. 6). Although the law accepted the principles outlined above, it did not introduce the practical means or budgetary allocations necessary for their implementation. Nonetheless, it was a crucial measure because it marked the shift from a social policy based on eligibility by social category or group to a policy that accepted the idea of eligibility on the basis of a single criterion, that of a subsistence minimum.

Highly anticipated and fundamental as it was, the law of 1997 was regarded as being too theoretical and too late because a number of regional laws had already introduced a wide range of new methods and practices relating to social assistance.[14] As in so many fields, the regions were ahead of the center in reform efforts on social policy. In 1999, the federal law on State Social Assistance [*O gosudarstvennoi sotsial'noi pomoshchi*] sought to be more concrete.[15] It identified the objective of social assistance as enhancing the standard of living of households with meager resources if they were poor 'through no fault of their own', which introduced the idea of the poor as victims meriting support. The support was to be assured by the use of budgetary resources in a rational and targeted manner. The idea behind the law was that social assistance benefits should help to make up the gap between the income of the applicant and the subsistence minimum. The law did not, however, make clear if the compensation was designed to merely narrow the gap or bridge it completely. As a result, local social service offices interpreted this provision differently. This federal law also anticipated the introduction

of procedures for verifying monetary income. However, certain regions had already put in place means for assessing all the resources available to each household, and not just monetary income.

The impact of new legislation on the daily work life of social workers

In their daily activities, social workers in contemporary Russia have to adapt to the profound changes occurring in relations between federal and regional authorities and between regional governments and their local counterparts in the cities and districts. Well before 1997, the regions had been forced to deal with poverty, and governments at this level had already adopted rules regarding access to social assistance, rules that relied on eligibility criteria that distinguished among different categories of the needy. Since the adoption of the federal law of 1997, local authorities have not been able to provide social assistance payments to all persons falling below the minimum subsistence threshold. Although the number of persons living below this threshold has varied over the last 15 years due to variations in economic conditions and the methods for calculating the threshold,[16] the share of Russians who qualify as poor has remained between a fourth and a fifth of the total population, which well exceeds the capacity of any system of social assistance.

Viewed broadly, state financing of social assistance is largely decentralized in Russia, if one excludes certain large-scale federal programs such as those related to the consequences of the Chernobyl accident. While respecting federal legislation on the rights and responsibilities of officials, local functionaries must carry out their tasks within the limits of the budgetary resources and organizational structures available at the local level. The result is an inevitable re-interpretation of federal law. Because regional and municipal budgets are inadequate to implement federal mandates, which call for assistance to be granted to all those who fall below the minimum subsistence level, local authorities have introduced additional eligibility criteria for those qualifying for assistance.

Since 2000, legislation in the majority of regions has required social workers to impose a double criterion for eligibility for social assistance: one must belong to one of the categories of persons designated each year as being eligible for aid, such as students with children, the disabled, the families or the aged, and one must have a personal income that is under the subsistence minimum (and in practice it was often half of that threshold).[17] Finally, and paradoxically, regions have been encouraged to recreate eligibility criteria and categories at the same time that the federal government was claiming that this measure (targeting on the basis of the subsistence minimum) was designed to fight the linkage of social benefits and group membership. Although the law of 1999 created at least a framework for federal policy

on social assistance, it is difficult to say that it has served to standardize local practice. In the regions there is still much variation in how one determines to whom assistance will be granted, how one measures and finances the costs of these programs, and how social aid offices are organized. This diversity is encouraged in part by pilot programs funded by the World Bank and the European Union (EU), whose roles are discussed at greater length below.

Across the expanse of Russia, one finds great diversity, therefore, in the provision of social assistance, including significant practical differences in how social workers define the eligibility criteria. Much of the job of the social worker in local agencies is now to verify that the client satisfies these different criteria. The concept of eligibility has therefore been reinterpreted at the local level by regional governments and social workers, and current practice is based on a mixture of ideas from the past and present. To receive social assistance payments, one must, to be sure, have only meager resources, but it is even more important to belong to a category of persons identified as 'meriting' social assistance. In this approach, the past is clearly in evidence; however, there is at the same time a desire to modernize procedures for allocating assistance, using the ideas of a social safety net and narrow definitions of eligibility for the poor that have been encouraged by the IMF and the World Bank. This tension between traditional practice and a modern discourse is apparent in the daily life of social work.

Russian social workers in direct contact with the population report that they are there to assist those who are most needy and alone, but they often add the clarification that their clients are the truly destitute.[18] This means coming to the aid of widows and orphans or those who cannot be accused of social parasitism, a concept that covers those who are able to work but do not. This manifests itself in the virtual absence of the problem of the unemployed in the conversations of social workers. Thus, as long as one is of employment age and not seriously disabled, one is deprived of programs of support.

Very rarely do officials in local offices take an active role to help people find a new job or a place in a retraining program in order to facilitate their integration into a society in transition. At the same time, to the extent that social workers must now evaluate the income of clients in order to determine how far they fall below the threshold of eligibility, part of their functions are novel and require an approach that is more modern and financially-oriented. The vetting of the financial resources of clients has become a new instrument of social monitoring, an instrument that is used differently by region and even by social workers within the same region, who vary in their social vision. Thus, to offer but one example, in certain regions, if a person has an automobile, the social worker will include in their assessment of a client's financial resources not only the value of the car but also the potential revenue that could be generated if the car were used as a taxi.

Who are social workers?

The emergence of the social worker as a professional identity has created a paradoxical situation. Thousands of young persons, male and female, across Russia have now received a diploma in social work, but most of them are not employed as social workers. At the same time, the employees of local social assistance offices are almost exclusively middle-aged women. Their salaries are low, and even in cases where their tenure in office is limited, they have not been recruited on the basis of their educational qualification but their personal contacts.[19] There is still the belief that social work requires no specific form of education but rather certain personal skills such as the ability to listen and be empathetic, skills that are allegedly feminine in nature. Among the public, it remains a job that is not well understood and is seen as employment that one obtains to supplement one's income or while awaiting a better job, which is confirmed by the high turnover rate of 15–20 percent per year.

Examining these officials in detail, one finds not two but three generations of social workers employed in this field. The 'former'—that is, Soviet-era—officials of city and district agencies have seen their numbers diminish, but their traditions remain very influential, resting as they do on claims of experience, competence, a good understanding of the individual situation of their clients, and much subjectivity and personalization of relations with persons looking for help. Recruits from the 1990s represent the majority of Russian social workers. Here one finds thousands of women who are former engineers, professors, accountants, as well as graduates looking for their first job. They are little different from the preceding generation in terms of work style, but they are even less inclined to view the job of social worker as requiring specific know-how. Their method of recruitment is very localized and personal, which often means close ties with their immediate superiors. They are emblematic of the well-known image of Russian officialdom: local agencies of state administration populated by women who work behind rows of wooden tables with plenty of green plants and calendars with landscapes but few computers.

More recent graduates—the third generation—are not much in evidence in this setting. They may be found instead in the higher reaches of administration, in the social service departments of city and regional government, or at the head of new agencies or social service organizations. On the whole, work in the field stands in stark contrast to the training received in universities and to the institutionalization of the profession through membership associations and academic journals. Elena Iarskaia-Smirnova estimates that only 30 percent of the new graduates in social work find a position in their field following university.[20] Two factors explain this phenomenon. The first is that the low salaries for social workers encourage those who have spent four or five years in university training to seek better-paid positions. Second, the sought after posts, which are on the management teams of social

assistance bureaus, are often occupied by persons who have worked their way up the bureaucratic ladder since the late Soviet era. This generational blockage perpetuates the perceptions of social work inherited from the Soviet past and discourages many young persons from trying to apply their training in the field of social work. This coexistence of persons with different kinds of professional background and standing complicates the development of a common understanding and philosophy of social work, most notably the balance to be struck between the roles of providing assistance to the needy or facilitating the reintegration of citizens into the workplace.

The weak professional identity and consciousness surrounding social work owes much to the social workers themselves. The first and second generations of social workers define themselves largely in terms of their empathy and ability to listen. They emphasize their almost familial or friendly relations with those they serve, forgetting at times basic ethical standards of their profession: that one does not use names when speaking to other persons about the family circumstances of their clients or that one does not probe too deeply into the personal lives of clients. Not everyone, of course, fits this stereotype. One recent graduate that we interviewed, who worked in the social affairs department of a regional government, had clear political ambitions, while a second, who headed a new retirement home for the wealthy, had as a goal the pursuit of a lucrative career. In these examples we see the two faces of social workers in Russia: on the one hand, a discourse about charity, on the other, a constant search for private sponsors.

The ambiguous attitude toward the state: To represent it or to compensate for its failure

The first ambiguity rests on the fact that social workers are not clearly differentiated from officials whose job is simply to provide the payment of ongoing social benefits to retirees and needy families. Social workers describe themselves above all as interested in helping the most needy and providing them with any benefits they can locate, however limited they may be. In the public mind, however, the social worker is often regarded as little more than a person who delivers this or that social benefit to the household. These conflicting views indicate confusion in Russia between services of social protection and social assistance, between a person who is a counter clerk in a social security office and a social worker in the Western meaning of that term.

More generally, social workers in contemporary Russia have, of necessity, an ambivalent attitude toward the state. Should they serve as its representatives or agents, or call attention to its inadequacies in providing services to the population? According to the theoretical literature on the sociology of professions, ambivalence and internal conflict characterize any profession in

its formative stage or in a period of transition. Besides the issue of the cohabitation of generations as a source of internal conflict, the question of the status and role of the social worker introduces an additional line of inquiry that is applicable to the study of social work in every country. What is the first mission of the social worker? To represent the state? To contribute to its legitimacy? Or is the profession of the social worker by its very existence a testimony to the inadequacies or failure of the state, which would lead implicitly to its critique? In relation to current Russian conditions, in their daily activities, do social workers have as their principal mission the distribution of the very limited public resources that are allocated to social assistance programs? Or should they deploy their energies to identify other sources of financial support, including fund-raising among private philanthropists, NGOs, and local enterprises? This conjures up two very different images of the social worker: a person 'with a sensitive and even compassionate ear', or a fundraiser going door to door.

The social worker as fundraiser

The vocabulary used to describe private local financing for social assistance is not yet fixed, and it is interesting to note the different terms heard in various regions, such as Tula, Rostov-on-the-Don, and the Republic of Komi. In Komi, the involvement of enterprises revives the idea of a council of patronage or council of guardians, in Russian *popechitel'skii sovet*. In the Don and Tula regions, social assistance provided by local enterprises is often referred to as the boss' aid, or *shevskaia pomoshch'*, or the assistance of sponsors, *sponsorskaia pomoshch'*. One sees in these terms a tension between two different conceptions of participation by private firms. The first, where sponsors or philanthropists are involved, has a modern ring. The second is perceived as something different, as a legacy and a return to former traditions of local patronage. This ambivalence shapes the judgments of social workers about this financial assistance. Some social workers believe that their work in the private sector is a form of charity that helps to supplement state assistance, and it is therefore useful, even if one would wish to do without it. Others believe that patronage is a good thing in itself because it is an expression of the social responsibility of the enterprises and their ties of solidarity with the local community.

According to officials interviewed in the social assistance offices, fundraising activities targeting enterprises are time-consuming because they require the development and maintenance of personal contacts. One of the district social assistance offices in the city of Tula is in regular contact with 80 different enterprises. In a district in Rostov, two officials in the social assistance office work full-time on concluding program agreements with enterprises.[21] Once established, the agreements are rarely broken. In general, the offices of social protection in the districts seek first and foremost

to solicit help from small and mid-sized businesses, such as grocery stores, pharmacies, beauty salons, and repair shops, which are able to offer in-kind assistance. A firm will usually sign a one-year agreement where the amount of assistance and the number of persons to benefit from it are clearly set out in the contract between the enterprise and the social protection department in the district. If the assistance is in the form of in-kind benefits, one must stipulate their monetary equivalent. Besides indicating the number of persons to be assisted, either within six months or one year, the contract at times lists the names of the beneficiaries, which recalls the model noted earlier where social assistance is employed as a means of social monitoring.

International influences on social work in Russia

Three kinds of international influence on the practice of, and debates surrounding, social work in contemporary Russia can be distinguished. One of the channels of international influence on Russian social workers is organizational in nature and derives from technical assistance or cooperative programs. Numerous projects financed by the World Bank or TACIS, which is the EU's program for technical aid in the Soviet successor states, address issues related to social aid and assistance.[22] It is difficult to assess accurately their impact on the practices and methods of operation of Russian social workers. Without question, however, they have introduced officials at the local level to different ways of perceiving issues, in part through the use of questionnaires. These projects, many of which are quite narrowly focused, tend to insist on more precise definitions of eligibility criteria and a more objective understanding of the sources of potential revenues for clients. The emphasis of these international projects is on enhancing or standardizing eligibility criteria rather than on empathetic interviews or more regular client meetings. They also introduce at times the idea of active assistance in employment searches and social and economic reintegration, which could eventually involve a contract between the client and the social assistance office. It would be useful to have assessment studies of these international assistance projects, which generally last from ten months to three years, but such studies are at present uncommon.

The other channel of influence is of course financial. In all the social assistance offices visited for this study evidence was found of relations with one or more NGOs, often foreign, which furnished humanitarian assistance in cash or in kind, often targeting children, who received food, milk and paper products, among other things. One of the crucial responsibilities of the head of a social assistance office is to establish and maintain relations with these international NGOs, just as they do with local enterprises.

The third type of international influence is academic in nature. When one examines university curricula and programs that prepare social workers in institutions of higher education, one is struck by the significant number

of courses that have been shaped by a European or American university, which are at times involved in a partnership with the Russian institution of higher learning. Examples of such cooperation include programs with partners in Canada, Norway, and the UK.[23] These inter-university exchanges are often financed by TACIS funds. Moreover, Russian specialists in social work, such as T. Tregubova and E. Iarskaia-Smirnova, have spent time in American universities as visiting scholars.

Some Western scholars, like Sharon Templeman, accentuate the positive role that these agreements and international exchanges play in training the trainers in social work.[24] Other Western specialists, however, like Kate Gilbert and Sarah Cemlyn, have adopted a more critical view of this practice, noting that Western trainers are not always attuned to the specific features of Russian reality. As a result, Russian students may find that their academic training has little to do with the realities on the ground that they encounter as interns or as new hires.[25] Although Iarskaia-Smirnova finds the international academic exchanges to be interesting, she believes that they are unlikely to lead to a professionalization of social work by themselves. In her words,

> In Russia nowadays, we cannot expect social workers to become immediately what the theorists would like them to be. It seems, rather, that the most appropriate model of professionalism for the social work practitioner in Russia is one which emphasizes the importance of experiential learning... [This] involves a combination of theoretical and practical knowledge, values, cognitive and behavioural competencies in specific contexts through the negotiation of shared meanings.'[26]

Conclusion

In choosing social workers as an example of the new officialdom in Russia, our objective was to investigate how one specific bureaucracy, which housed petty functionaries responsible for managing social policy on the ground, changed in the post-Soviet era. In the case of social workers, one might have expected a radical transformation and redefinition of this group, given the official initiatives to establish a new profession and to recruit new graduates into it. In reality, however, for the social workers as for many other categories of officials, the approaches and practices of the Soviet era endured. Yet Soviet practices were subject to a reinterpretation in a new context of a more liberalized economy, the development of greater social inequalities, and the partial retreat of the federal government from the social domain. Foreign models and discourse also influenced these practices, at least in the way in which social problems were presented, as in the use of 'targeting' criteria to identify those eligible for assistance. Explaining in part the slow and

cautious changes were the life courses and abilities of social workers themselves, who were divided into two, if not three, generations in terms of their training and values. The 'stickiness' of these changes derived as well from interactions between formal legislation and informal practices and between a federal discourse and local realities.

Finally, one witnessed in the 1990s the official designation of a new profession. However, it was never recognized as such by Russian society. This lack of identity and legitimacy also derived from the ambiguous situation of the social worker in relation to the state. Social workers had to transform themselves from figures of social control in an omnipresent state to fundraisers who sought to collect private monies from NGOs and local factories. The latter role revealed the partial privatization of the state in the field of social protection of the Russian population.

Notes

1. Petr Denisovich Pavlenok, 'Social Work as Scientific and Didactic Discipline' (in Russian), *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia*, 26, no. 9 (2006): 119–22.
2. The history of the formation and development of this profession is especially well documented in various studies by Elena Iarskaia-Smirnova, M. V. Firsov, and M. Effendiev. Iarskaia-Smirnova and Pavel Romanov,' "A salary is not important here": the professionalization of social work in contemporary Russia', *Social Policy and Administration*, 36, no. 2 (2004): 123–41; Iarskaia-Smirnova, Pavel Romanov, and Natalia Lovtsova, 'Professional development of Social Work in Russia', *Social Work and Society*, 2, no. 1 (2004): 132–37; M. V. Firsov, *Istoriia sotsialnoi raboty v Rossii* (Moscow: MGCU, 2001); M. K. Effendiev, 'A New Profession-Social Work' (in Russian), *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia*, 21, no. 10 (1994): 207–9. For a Western point of view on the subject, see the works by Kate Gilbert, 'What can Western Management offer Russia Social Work?' *Working Paper Series 009/99, University of Wolverhampton*, UK (1999), and S. Imbrogno, 'The emergence of the profession of social work in the Russian Republic', in *Education for Social Work in Eastern Europe: Changing Horizons*, R. Constable and V. Mehta, ed. (Chicago: Lyceum Books, 1994).
3. Nathalie Moine, *Le pouvoir bolchevique face au petit peuple urbain, Clivages sociaux, assignation des identités et acculturation à Moscou dans les années 1930* (Doctorat, Université de Lyon II, 2000). The *domkom*, or house committee [*domovoi komitet*], consisted of persons operating at the level of the neighborhood or apartment block who were not necessarily members of the Communist Party but whose activities were monitored by the local party committee. Their tasks included resolving everyday problems relating to heating and plumbing, but they were also the persons to whom the police turned for information on the neighborhood and its inhabitants. With the privatization of the housing stock, they now function as a housing owners' association [*tovarishchestvo sobstvennikov zhil'ia*]. It is not known to what extent they continue to operate as a formal social control organization.
4. Iarskaïa-Smirnova and Romanov, ' "A salary is not important here".'
5. Cecile Lefèvre, 'Système de protection sociale et entreprises en Russie: héritages et transformations, 1987–2001.' Doctorat de 3ème cycle en Economie des Institutions, Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales, Paris.

6. Personal interviews with three experts from the Department of Social Assistance, Moscow, 30 July 1992. Notes on these interviews are contained in C. Lefèvre, Collection of interviews conducted in Russian between 1992 and 2001, 2 (2003), 601–3 (manuscript in possession of the author).
7. Ibid.
8. Federal'nyi zakon, 'Ob osnovakh sotsial'nogo obsluzhivaniia naseleniia v Rossiiskoi Federatsii', no. 195-F3 ot 10 dekabria 1995, *Sobranie zakonodatel'stva*, no. 50 (1995), st. 4872.
9. Ibid.
10. Lila Ovtcharova and Lidia Prokofieva, 'Pauvreté et solidarité familiale en Russie à l'heure de la transformation', *Revue d'Etudes Comparatives Est-Ouest*, 31, no. 4 (2000): 151–82.
11. Ukaz Prezidenta RF ot 2 Marta 1992, no. 210, 'O sisteme minimal'nykhy potrebitel'skikh biudzhetov naseleniia Rossiiskoi Federatsii', *Vedomosti S'ezda narodnykh deputatov RF i Verkhovnogo Soveta RF*, no. 11 (1992), st. 558.
12. Ibid.
13. Federal'nyi zakon, 'O prozhitochnom minimume v RF', no. 134-F3 ot 24 oktiabria 1997, *Sobranie zakonodatel'stva*, no. 43 (1997), st. 4904.
14. 'Predlozheniia k strategii sodestviia sokrashcheniia bednosti v Rossii: analiz i rekomendatsii', ILO, Moscow (2002), 79.
15. Federal'nyi zakon 'O gosudarstvennoi sotsial'noi pomoshchi', no. 178-F3 ot 17 iiulia 1999, *Sobranie zakonodatel'stva*, no. 29 (1999), st. 3699.
16. Ovtcharova and Prokofieva, 'Pauvreté et solidarité familiale en Russie à l'heure de la transformation', 151–82.
17. V. Gurov, 'Experience of Social Work with the Family in Stavropol Krai', *Russian Education and Society*, 40, no. 2 (1998): 86–95; J. Zlotnik, *Social Work for Children and Families in the Soviet Union* (Washington, DC: National Association of Social Workers, 1992).
18. This observation is based on personal interviews conducted in Rostov, Tula, and Moscow and the Moscow region with officials in social services and in aid centers for the elderly.
19. This confirms the findings on hiring patterns in the post-Soviet bureaucracy set out in Chapter 14 of this volume by Gimpelson, Magun, and Brym.
20. Iarskaia-Smirnova and Romanov, ' "A salary is not important here".'
21. Cecile Lefèvre, 'L'aide sociale dans la Russie des années 1990–2000: les entreprises, les municipalités et leurs (bons) pauvres', in *Le post-communisme dans l'histoire*, ed. Kott Sandrine and Mespoulet Martine (Brussels: Editions de l'Université Libre de Bruxelles, 2006), 111–23.
22. Cecile Lefèvre, 'Organismes internationaux et protection sociale, analyse de trois catégories de discours', *Le Courrier des Pays de l'Est*, La documentation française, no. 1040 (November–December 2003).
23. The Canada-Russia Disability Program, 2003–7, brought together the University of Manitoba School of Social Work and the schools of social work at Stavropol State Technical University and the University of Omsk; the Norwegian Pomor Project, 1998–2001, was administered by the University of Bodo in Norway; and the British program consisted of an exchange between Sheffield Hallam University and the University of Ekaterinburg in 2004.
24. Sharon B. Templeman, 'Social Work in the New Russia at the Start of the Millenium', *International Social Work*, 47, no. 1 (2001): 95–107; Templeman, 'Social Work Education in Russia in the Wake of Communism: Implications for

International Participation', *Journal of Social Work Research and Evaluation*, 4, no. 2 (2003): 213–24.

25. Kate Gilbert, 'What can Western management offer Russian social work?' (University of Wolverhampton: Working Paper Series 009/99, 1999); Sarah Cemlyn, 'Social Work in Russia and the UK: What are We Exchanging ?' *Social Work Education*, 14, no. 1 (1995): 77–92.
26. Iarskaia-Smirnova and Romanov, ' "A salary is not important here" ', 139.

17

The Fate of Russian Officialdom: Fundamental Reform or Technical Improvements?

Alexei Barabashev, Mikhail Krasnov, Alexander Obolonsky, and Tatiana Zaitseva

Written by persons who participated directly in the development of official drafts and documents designed to advance reform, this chapter represents an attempt to assess the reasons that the transformation of Russian officialdom proved so difficult after the collapse of the USSR. From 1991 to 2005, change—or the appearance of change—touched almost everything in Russia, except the machinery of state. It wasn't that attempts at reform weren't made in this area. Along with superficial and even retrograde measures, there were also serious proposals by well-qualified specialists who based their work on a careful study of world practice, Russian bureaucratic traditions, and the needs of the contemporary state. Russia's first two post-communist presidents repeatedly recognized the need for bureaucratic reform, and their names were associated with various reform projects, which advanced both a theoretical framework for change as well as specific plans to introduce it. Russia even adopted laws on the reform of officialdom, including one in 2004 that marked a kind of breakthrough, in spite of its compromises. Yet the efforts devoted to the reform of the state bureaucracy always seemed far greater than the practical results achieved.

We proceed on the assumption that a fundamental reform of state service in Russia is inevitable. Without it, there can only be a further accumulation of problems in officialdom and an erosion of the ability of the political leadership to manage the state. The questions, then, are what kind of reform, how to implement it, and whether to rely on models developed in other parts of the world. In our view, Russia's experience since the collapse of communism has given a clear answer to the last question. The attempts to reform officialdom have borrowed those elements that are applicable to Russian conditions. Thus, the perennial dispute between 'Slavophiles' and 'Westernizers'—should Russia follow its own distinct path or borrow from the West?—has not been decided fully in favor of one camp or the other.

Although adopting the experience of others is not a simple matter, rejecting it completely is impossible. Russia is far from the first country to use foreign imports in the reform of its state bureaucracy, but it has done so with caution and by adapting foreign models, with a varying tempo and consistency, to its level of development and its social and cultural traditions.

The challenges of reform

It was apparent from the beginning that the reform of Russian officialdom would not be a simple task, given that it faced a whole set of serious and long-neglected economic, social, organizational, and psychological issues. In the transition from Soviet rule, there had been isolated attempts to address these matters within individual ministries in the three branches of officialdom—civilian, military, and law enforcement—but these half-hearted measures could not overcome the fundamental defects in the work of state officials and in the government's management and policymaking in this area. There was the need, therefore, for a systematic and comprehensive program of reform of state service. Because the next chapter in this volume assesses in detail such reform attempts, we will limit ourselves to an assessment of several distinctive features of policymaking on Russian officialdom that are highlighted in the Concept for the Reform of the System of State Service, which was introduced by President Vladimir Putin on 15 August 2001 and the Federal Program, 'Reforming the State Service of the Russian Federation, 2003–2005,' signed by Putin on 19 November 2002.[1]

The Concept—something like the white papers that frame bureaucratic reform in some English-speaking countries—envisioned the formation of a single system of state service that was grounded in the following principles: professionalism, which requires the introduction of a merit-based system of recruitment and advancement in officialdom; a commitment to the interests of civil society, to be assured by the protection of individual rights and liberties and the accessibility and transparency of the bureaucracy to the citizenry; efficiency, which requires state officials to use the most appropriate means to carry out the functions of the state; and a career civil service, which means the establishment of incentives for pay and promotion that would guarantee the continuity of careers in the public sector. The condition of the Russian civil service in the post-communist era has not reflected these principles. First, there have been serious problems in the basic functioning of the state service. These problems are tied to corruption and conflicts of interest, the rules governing the responsibilities and jurisdiction of individual bureaucrats, the levels of pay and social benefits, the procedures for selecting, hiring, and promoting personnel, and the system for educating and retraining government officials.

Second, there are problems in the environment in which the reform of officialdom takes place. Among these is the inadequate participation

of civil society in the reform process, which can compromise the goal of creating a state bureaucracy that works well with society. There is also the danger of limiting change to that which is imposed from above. In this approach, the political leadership and the professional experts retained by them understand and agree on the goals of reform, but the public remains a passive observer of the process. Third, constant pressure to meet reform deadlines—imposed by documents like the 2001 Concept—gives the impression of perpetual delays, which undermines confidence in the idea of reform. Finally, a mechanism for managing officialdom has to this date been lacking in post-communist Russia. Without this in place, there is the danger that progress toward reform could be reversed.

Participants and policies

A large number of actors have participated in the reform of Russian officialdom. These include government leaders at the federal and regional levels, representatives from scholarly institutions and think-tanks, non-governmental organizations representing Russian society, and officials from the numerous executive agencies that have been assigned responsibility for overseeing the implementation of measures contained in the Federal Program 'Reforming the State Service of the Russian Federation (2003–2005)' and its successor documents. In order for reform to be viable, it must account for the interests and concerns of these various participants. Not least among these are the concerns of officialdom that changes could leave them more vulnerable, financially and otherwise, and the fears of society that the bureaucracy will implement reforms in a self-serving manner. Society's ignorance about proposed changes helps to explain why it remains fixated on what it regards as two related features of the contemporary bureaucracy: its low pay and its high degree of corruption. This perception results in part from a lack of communication among the participants in reform. Whereas the scholarly community has the ability to exchange information through the preparation and defense of dissertations and the publication of academic articles, those working in the state bureaucracy are often ignorant of the domestic and comparative literature in the field. Because of this fact, many proposals advanced by experts, including those based on successful pilot projects, do not attract the attention of practitioners and therefore are not included in official reform documents.

There are dangers, of course, in relying too heavily on the community of experts in the reform process. On the one hand, they serve as a valuable buffer between the state and society and are responsive to the perspectives of the citizenry. On the other hand, the consensus on the appropriate course of reform is not absolute. Not only personal policy preferences but also disciplinary orientations divide the expert community. Among experts, specialists in public administration, in whose numbers figure the authors of this

chapter, have taken the lead role in shaping the reform of officialdom. But there are other expert groups drawn into the debates about the reform of officialdom, including jurists, especially students of labor law; psychologists and sociologists, in particular those specializing in issues of personnel management; economists with an orientation toward public sector pay; and political scientists who study political and administrative elites. Each of these latter communities tries to advance the interests and ideas of its discipline, with labor lawyers eschewing unified legislation on the state service in favor of sections on state servants in the labor code and other existing laws. For their part, the psychologists and economists favor borrowing methods of personnel selection, performance assessments, and pay incentives that are used in the private sector. These comments should not be viewed as an attempt by specialists in public administration to erect a Chinese wall against the ideas of other expert communities, especially given that those in public administration are not unanimous in their approaches to reform of officialdom. We simply wish to warn against the advisability of adopting excessively narrow approaches that can emanate from single-disciplinary experts. As Koz'ma Prutkov observed in the 19th century, 'a specialist is like an abscess since its fullness is all on one side.'

In the post-communist era, Russia has had two dominant approaches to a reform of the state bureaucracy. Where one camp favors 'radical', social-political, and economically efficient approaches, the other advocates 'soft', administrative-organizational, and institutional-protectionist alternatives. Only an open dialogue between these two opposing perspectives can produce carefully crafted recommendations designed to maximize the chances for reform. Finding a model that reflects this diversity of views will allow Russia to avoid the pitfalls in the reform process and create a system of state service that meets the needs of a law-based state and a civil society.

It is our view that one of the primary reasons for the failure of reform has been the absence in Russia of a lawmaking tradition that considers the concerns of all interested parties, the broader political, social, and economic environment, and the requirements of the specific area of public policy. In the case of the reform of officialdom, for example, efforts have not, to a sufficient extent, taken into consideration the lessons of the past, the peculiar conditions of the present, or changes in the conditions of the bureaucracy relating to such issues as the graying of officialdom, the gender imbalance, low pay, or career stability. This inattention to the full range of issues that relate to officialdom puts the reform process at risk, whether in the making or implementation of policy.

Another impediment to reform has been its fragmented character. We mentioned earlier the attempts at partial reform within individual agencies, but a more serious challenge to effective reform has been the introduction of regional and even local initiatives that target only the bureaucracy in a single geographical area. Provincial personnel introduce these local initiatives

without inviting input from the best academic specialists or coordinating their efforts with federal authorities. From a positive standpoint, such initiatives may represent a response to pressure from a more demanding society at the regional and local levels, and they can be introduced more quickly because of their smaller scale. At the same time, this approach makes it more difficult to coordinate policy on Russian officialdom and even undermines the integrity of a single system of state service, especially with regard to the consistency of the laws.

Whatever the governmental level on which reform is introduced, the greatest challenges arise at the implementation stage. This is due in part to the covert resistance of many in the bureaucracy. High-ranking state officials will often line up behind reform during the policy-making stage only to exhibit a painful slowness and a nit-picking attitude about details when it's time to carry out the new policies. There is also a danger to reform from the opposite camp: some view the reform of officialdom as a 'thing in itself', which can lead to distorting or even ignoring altogether the relations between state service and civil society. Thus, forces on both sides of the debate may prefer to keep society 'demobilized' on issues relating to state service.

The technocratic danger

A more subtle danger to reform is that it will turn into nothing more than a technocratic project, something akin to the Soviet-era campaigns that were long on rhetoric and short on action.[2] Let us illustrate this by referring to section 2 of the Federal Program 'Reforming the State Service of the Russian Federation, 2003–2005', which states that 'the goal of the Program is to enhance the overall efficiency of state service in all its branches and administrative levels, to optimize expenditures on state servants, and to provide the necessary resource support for officialdom.'[3] The country's political leadership has recognized that state service in Russia is inefficient and that its financial and personnel situation is not optimal. However, can terms such as efficiency and optimality capture the nature of the problems facing Russian officialdom? On the answer to this question, and more broadly on the intellectual framework informing debate on state service, rests the success or failure of reform of contemporary Russian officialdom.

We wish to argue that the use of terms like 'efficiency' and 'optimality' has practical political consequences. Reform requires a remaking or recasting of something, yet one can optimize or make more efficient without reform. In so doing, one will perfect the system in which one is operating. Thus, in a totalitarian regime, enhancing efficiency brings even greater centralization of authority and the introduction of technical innovations in the management of society. However, the *nomenklatura* principle of political recruitment, a highly ideological state service, and the leading role of

a single party remain the backbone of the system, which holds in place a whole set of social relations. Within the framework of a democratic regime, a reform of officialdom may bring a privatization of a portion of the traditional structures and functions associated with government and the development of a new administrative culture, but the basic principles—a professional corps of officials working in a context of political pluralism and freedom, transparency, and an independent judiciary—remain intact.

As a state in transition, contemporary Russia represents an intermediary position between the two above-mentioned regimes. In the conditions of transition, a reform of state service must have a goal of introducing methods of management and a status for officials that are completely different from those in place under the old regime. Reform requires, therefore, radically new approaches affecting not only the structures and functions of state but also the mentality, or worldview, of officials themselves. Yet the conceptual foundation of the Federal Program restricts itself to the use of purely instrumental terms like efficiency and optimality, which, again, encourage the transformation of the idea of reform into nothing more than a technocratic project. By narrowing the focus of the reform project to mere enhancements, the Federal Reform disengages itself from the cultural, political, social, and economic conditions in which it is located. It fails to recognize that Russian officialdom is still filled with personnel, many of them extremely influential, who carry forward patterns of work and professional traditions and stereotypes from the Soviet era.[4] The risk here is that at the end of the reform process, instead of a democratically-oriented civil service committed to the service of the public, we will have a cosmetically altered officialdom of the Soviet type, oriented toward the service of the patron.

On the basic issues facing officialdom, the imprecision of the language in the Federal Program invites varying interpretations, including politically neutral or even reactionary ones. These include pay and performance assessments of officials; the means of assuring the transparency of the bureaucracy; the introduction of effective means for the selection and promotion of personnel; the education, training, and retraining of bureaucrats; rules for the prevention of conflicts of interests and the regulations of professional ethics; the provision of adequate technical support for the bureaucracy; and the introduction of a system for managing the bureaucracy. To prevent the opponents of reform from distorting the implementation of the Federal Program, and other reform documents, it is essential, wherever possible, to assess the progress of change on the basis of quantitative indicators. An example would be in the size of the bureaucracy, where the Federal Program only calls for 'optimizing' the number of persons in officialdom, a term that is often interpreted as signifying a reduction in force. The point here is not that the language itself is unreasonable, but rather that it gives maximum freedom of maneuver to those making and implementing reform. In the end, of course, the success of reform will not depend as much on the stated

goals as on the concrete measures adopted, the environment in which they are introduced, and the degree of political will employed to ensure their full implementation.

Politics and values in the struggle for reform

The inequality of political and social forces in the Russian Federation is built into the very fabric of the system of government, and in particular its semi-presidential or mixed form of rule, which contains elements of both presidentialism and parliamentarism.[5] Although an examination of Russia's socio-political order suggests that it is an inhospitable environment for carrying out a reform of the machinery of state in a genuinely modernizing spirit, it does not preclude a remaking of the state service. It is important, however, to anticipate the constraining features of the socio-political environment in the elaboration of reform documents and proposals.

As noted earlier, a reform of officialdom in the context of a transition from one form of rule to another cannot be a purely technical exercise; it requires clarity about the new values to be introduced. One may object at this point that reform documents like the Federal Program do not need to specify that the changes are designed to remake the state service in accordance with democratic principles, including the orientation of officials toward the citizenry, because such values are already set out in the Constitution. There is a certain logic to this objection, given that Article 1 of the Constitution describes the Russian Federation as a democratic, federal, and law-based state. Article 2 notes that individual rights and liberties represent the country's pre-eminent values, and Article 18 states that the concerns for citizens' rights inform executive, legislative, and judicial actions throughout all levels of government.

It would indeed be redundant to restate the country's founding principles in each policy document. And a mechanical repetition of constitutional formulae by itself will change little, witness the constant refrain in the Soviet era about values like 'everything for the benefit of man' and 'the party and people are one.' However, by clarifying the values of reform we do not mean a simple incantation about adherence to democratic values. In program documents the main goals of reform must be communicated not only through instrumental and value-neutral categories like 'enhancing efficiency' and 'optimization' but through categories that demonstrate a sincere attempt to subordinate the system of state service to the constitutional principles elucidated above.

An examination of the Federal Program illustrates that instrumental categories dominate. In its critique of the existing system of state service, the Program identifies numerous problems that require attention. These include a declining professionalism among state officials; an age structure of officialdom that does not correspond to the demographics of society as a whole;

small pay differentials, which prevent the introduction of an appropriate structure of incentives for job performance; and shortcomings in the education and retraining of bureaucrats. There is also criticism of the existing system for hiring and promoting cadres, which relies heavily on personal ties to well-placed persons in the apparatus rather than on professional qualifications and work product.

Where the above issues are largely technical in nature, the Federal Program does highlight two shortcomings that go to the heart of the democratic values required for a genuine reform of officialdom. The first laments the inability of civil society to hold the bureaucracy accountable. But here the observation appears in the same paragraph with a technical criticism of the inadequacy of procedures used in the state service. The fleeting reference to accountability of the bureaucracy is all but lost in the mass of less lofty complaints, which seems to reduce it to simply another technical problem.

Second, the Federal Program highlights the erosion of a moral code and ideological commitment that, in the Soviet era, had held in check corruption, the abuse of office, and the petty tyranny of bureaucrats. The transition brought, therefore, the loss of a moral compass without establishing a new system of professional ethics with the laws and procedures to implement it. In a society in transition, where many citizens adopted questionable values and succumbed to the temptation of reactionary socio-political appeals, this moral or ideological vacuum was dangerous. It is especially worrying that in making this critique, the Federal Program implicitly advanced the idea that the former totalitarian order protected against these pathologies of corruption, abuse of office, and petty tyranny, a view that fits into a mythology about the Soviet era that is shared by a large part of society. Confirmation that this interpretation was not intended comes in the clear language on this point in the Concept of State Service Reform, the document on which the Federal Program is based. But the linguistic uncertainty introduced by the Federal Program allows two very different, and even contradictory, worldviews to inform the thinking of society and the bureaucracy about the reform of state service.

The Federal Program also relies excessively on a set of rules of professional ethics as a substitute for the earlier system of norms and incentives of the Soviet era. In a totalitarian order, the 'norms of morality' were a less important motivation than the *nomenklatura*-based selection system, which introduced a powerful incentive to meet the expectations of party rule. To violate the established norms would invite the most serious personal and professional consequences. Thus, a code of professional ethics is not an adequate replacement for the entire set of behavioral regulators contained in the political economy and ideology of communism. And such a highly-developed ideology is, in any event, unnecessary in the transition period. The introduction of a code of ethics should only represent one part,

therefore, of a whole structure of incentives that inform the behavior of post-communist officialdom.

One may object that we are expecting too much of the Federal Program. After all, in its opening section the Program states that it is based on the Concept for Reform of State Service, which was issued under the President's signature on 15 August 2001. In other words, one could assert that the Concept sets out the ideology or intellectual framework for reform and the Program provides its 'technology' or means of implementation. This two-tiered approach clearly has its advantages; however, in current Russian conditions this structure heightens considerably the risk of failure. First, the Program contains some measures that could easily be interpreted differently from the formulation in the Concept. Second, the Concept was never officially published after the President signed it. Here we have the unusual situation of a more detailed and technical document, the Federal Program, being published while the conceptual framework for reform is not widely available to the public.[6] Thus, citizens are forced to assess the essence of reform through an enabling document rather than by reading the conceptual document that allegedly inspired it. Society finds it difficult, therefore, to monitor the extent to which the practical steps associated with the reform are grounded in the principles set out in the Concept for Reform of State Service.

This bifurcation of the reform process into conceptual and practical stages threatens to transfer responsibility for the reform of the bureaucracy into the hands of the bureaucrats themselves, who are charged with working out the actions steps required for reform and then monitoring their introduction. This lack of transparency shields reform not only from the public but at times even from academic experts on public administration. One publication on administrative law noted that 'eight years have transpired since the introduction of the seminal law on state service [the Law on the Principles of State Service of the Russian Federation of 31 July 1995]. Follow-on legislation relating to the state service has been developed at the federal and regional levels. Thus, a "radical turnabout" in the development of legislation on officialdom could hardly have been predicted. It appears that the well-known "secrecy" in the development and transformation of state service is a direct result of what we consider to be negative developments within the institution of state service.'[7] In our view, however, the newly-introduced secrecy was not the result but the cause of problems in officialdom, and lying at the root of this change was a hardening of the current political environment.

Conclusion

In light of the analysis above, is it reasonable to conclude that a reform of state service is destined to fail? One could, of course, have high confidence

in the chances of reform if it took place in a country with a common identity, a consensus about basic political values, a developed civil society, longstanding traditions of political competition, and a regime in which the political authorities functioned openly. Russia is not such a country. Nevertheless, the political environment alone does not preclude the introduction of a successful reform of officialdom if certain conditions are in place, conditions that it is possible to establish.

First, for reform to succeed in Russia, there must be the necessary political patronage, which has assured positive reform outcomes in other countries. Of course, such patronage must not emanate only from a single individual. No matter how high his or her post, an individual politician cannot, and should not, simply eliminate the inevitable resistance to change or resist timely revisions made in a democratic spirit. Thus, the President of the Russian Federation, who serves now as the main patron of the reform of state service, as of all other reforms, should create a body, separate from the bureaucracy, which could serve as a kind of collective patron. This body could take the form of a small consultative council, attached to the presidency, which would monitor the reform of state service without replacing organs charged with managing the corps of state servants.[8] The members of such a council could include prominent individuals whose values coincided with those of the reform program. Among council members would be well-known politicians from the legislative and executive branches as well as representatives from civil society, the business community, and academic specialists on public administration.[9]

As noted earlier, one of the other conditions for the successful transformation of Russian officialdom is transparency in the reform process. The proposed council could assist in this effort by opening its meetings to the public; publishing regular reports, perhaps twice a year, about the course of reform and the structural and personnel obstacles encountered along the way; holding conferences in which academic specialists, human rights activists, and representatives from non-governmental organizations would participate; arranging joint open meetings with the presidential council for the struggle against corruption; and carrying out sociological surveys, whose results would then be widely disseminated.

Both of these measures are designed to increase the bureaucracy's accountability to society. With the right people, this council would not only have a positive influence on the making and implementation of reforms but would also fill a large void that exists in contemporary Russia by encouraging a dialog between the state and society on major social and political projects. In turn, this dialog would create favorable conditions for public activism, an activism that could move beyond a mere criticism of the authorities to offering ideas and political support for the transformation of Russia.

Notes

1. For a more detailed assessment of this federal program, see Aleksei Barabashev et al., *Reforma gosudarstvennoi sluzhby Rossiiskoi Federatsii* (Moscow: Higher School of Economics, 2006), 73–101. *Gosudarstvennaia sluzhba: kompleksnyi podkhod*, ed. Aleksei Barabashev and Aleksander Obolonskii, eds (Moscow: Delo, 2009), provides an overview of reforms of the state service in Chapters 2 and 5.
2. See Chapter 11 in this volume by James Heinzen, who chronicles campaigns against corruption in the Soviet era.
3. Ukaz Prezidenta RF ot 19 noiabria 2002, no. 1336, 'O federal'noi programme "Reformirovanie gosudarstvennoi sluzhby Rossiiskoi Federatsii (2003–2005)".'
4. Where the Federal Program identifies the tasks and expected results of the reform of state service, the language becomes broader and less technical. There is still, however, considerable conceptual imprecision, which leaves open the possibility for alternative interpretations of the document and therefore the risk that it could be turned into a technocratic project.
5. An analysis of the lack of equilibrium in its system of checks and balances lies outside of the concerns of the present chapter.
6. 'Kontseptsiia reformirovaniia sistemy gosudarstvennoi sluzhby Rossiiskoi Federatsii', available at www.pags.renet.ru/site/files/phpP4tNLb.doc.
7. Iu. N. Starilov, *Administrativnoe pravo: na uroven' pravovogo gosudarstva* (Voronezh, 2003), 36.
8. Just such a body was set up on 16 July 2004, under the name of the Presidential Commission for the Improvement of State Service. This commission includes within it an interagency working group designed to assist in the carrying out of the reform of officialdom.
9. This council should have a small, permanent staff and access to the President. The President may ask the council to request reports from agencies responsible for state service, on the basis of which the council would issue their assessments and recommendations.

18

Why Is It So Difficult to Reform Russian Officialdom?

Alexander Obolonsky

The protracted fight to reform Russian state service has now entered its fifth round, and it is unclear whether more rounds will follow. The purpose of this chapter is to assess why this process has been so long, tortured, and—to this point—unimpressive in its results. This requires a reassessment of the course of reform from a more comprehensive angle than that adopted by earlier works on this subject, such as the World Bank's 'The Transformation of Russian State Service: A History of Reform Efforts from 1992 to 2000', whose authors offered a detailed description of the events and clash of ideas associated with the reform of Russian officialdom.[1]

Before revisiting the contemporary history of reform, it is important to identify the fundamental tension underlying the battle over post-communist Russian officialdom. At the heart of the conflict over Russian state service has been a hidden struggle between two opposing approaches to change. The first champions a kind of 'virtual reform' [*psevdo-reforma*] that would minimize the practical effects on bureaucratic behavior or even, if possible, take a step backward in order to institutionalize the privileged and protected status of officialdom as a bureaucratic corporation or caste. The second approach seeks to carry out a genuine modernization of Russian state administration, which would result in a bureaucracy of a new type, one that would correspond to the demands of the times and the challenges of modern democratic development. In other words, what has been taking place since 1991 is an irreconcilable struggle between two fundamentally incompatible models of state administration.

The first model rests on the age-old Russian idea of a 'ruler's service', or, in Russian, *gosudareva sluzhba*. Characteristic of the Soviet as well as tsarist periods, this patrimonial model of officialdom is primarily oriented toward servicing the needs of the ruler [*khoziain gosudarstva*], whatever their formal title or, indeed, whether or not the leadership role is embodied in a single individual or a group of persons, as occurred during certain periods of Soviet history when the Politburo was the collective leader of the country. The second model, which would be a novelty for Russia, is a civil or public service,

in Russian, *grazhdanskaia ili publichnaia sluzhba*, whose first priority would be servicing the needs of citizens. Following from the premise that the contemporary history of Russian officialdom reflects a struggle between efforts to introduce a civil service or maintain a state service, we turn now to a brief review of the attempts since 1991 to reform Russian state administration.

The first round of reform (1991–1995)

Despite the dramatic announcements of early reformers that a new state administration would be created from scratch, the post-communist state bureaucracy was very much the successor to Soviet officialdom in terms of both personnel and practices. These practices represented a style of bureaucratic management that formed part of what was known in the perestroika era as the 'administrative-command system'. In July 1990, in an attempt to reform this system, then chair of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Republic, Boris Yeltsin, issued a decree outlawing the functioning of Communist Party organizations in state administration. With this initiative to 'departyize officialdom' Yeltsin was pursuing the laudable goal of eliminating the influence of the Communist Party in the state apparatus, and thereby transforming officialdom into a politically neutral administrative instrument. But in fact this measure all but eliminated the possibility for changing the composition of Communist Party bureaucracy, which was required to transform both the country's government and its economy. As a result, those persons whose entire careers had been spent serving as the 'transmission belts' for Communist Party policies were now in the position of carrying out the post-communist reforms of state administration.

In a formal sense, the process of reform did start from scratch because the Yeltsin government tried to abandon all remaining vestiges of its predecessors' authority. On 28 November 1991, President Yeltsin signed a decree that established, as part of the Russian Government, a Main Department for the Training of State Officials. The functions of this agency were considerably broader, however, than the name suggests. The new department effectively monopolized all activities relating to the training of members of the state service, an assignment that was evident in the department's acronym, *Roskadry*, or Russian personnel. Such an agency could have been useful if it had actually undertaken a reform of state administration. But the main issue—what kind of state service did Russia need—was never seriously addressed, let alone resolved, in this period.

Instead, a completely different set of issues made its way to the top of the agenda. Besides the typical questions about who would 'call the tune' within the state bureaucracy, the main concern became the struggle for control of a prominent and potentially lucrative part of the communist inheritance, the system of Higher Party Schools, at the head of which stood the Academy of Social Sciences of the Central Committee, which for decades had served

as a 'crucible of personnel' for the higher ranks of the party apparatus.[2] At local levels this struggle set two different types of educational institutions against each other—the aforementioned Higher Party Schools vs. the newly-emerging departments of public administration in the universities and institutes that formed part of the general system of higher education in Russia. Each side sought to be the main supplier of personnel for state administration, but in the event, the 'heirs of the party' emerged victorious.

This outcome had serious negative consequences for personnel renewal in state administration, inasmuch as the faculty of the former institutes for 'party study' had been carefully selected by Communist Party organs on the basis of their ideological loyalty and their ability and willingness to train personnel who would serve as the defenders and champions of the policies of a totalitarian government. At the beginning of the 1990s, these schools were filled with personnel who had a revanchist attitude toward post-communist, and especially market, institutions. Even now, a decade and a half after the collapse of the USSR, the spirit prevailing in these schools is distinctly anti-reform and retains elements of nostalgia for the old order, despite a cosmetic modernization and a name change—they are now known as academies of state service.

Despite their retrograde character, the academies of state service received the lion's share of budget allocations for the retraining of state personnel, and therefore they were the major points of instruction for state bureaucrats pursuing 'qualification raising' courses of varying lengths. Moreover, the direct successor to the old Academy of Social Sciences, the Russian Academy of State Service (RAGS),[3] fulfilled the role of primary advisor to the president on the reorganization of the state service. It is revealing that when RAGS itself looked overseas for advice, it was primarily to representatives of the French administrative tradition, which, despite its positive features, has stood aside from the New Public Management movement and has therefore been reluctant to embrace many progressive policies that have contributed to the de-bureaucratization of officialdom in other Western countries since the 1980s. Put another way, Russia was arming itself with weapons from an already outdated arsenal, as Yeltsin noted in a speech to RAGS in 1994.[4]

As a result, the few legislative changes that targeted officialdom in this period contained little that was new, and in some cases they actually revived archaic policies from the Russian past. An example of this was the rigid system of service grades that was introduced as part of the 1995 law, 'On the Fundamentals of State Service of the Russian Federation'.[5] Almost three centuries after its initial introduction, Russia had revived a form of the Table of Ranks.[6] It is a bitter irony that this was one of the first acts of the new democratic Russian government, given that the elimination of the special corporatist status of Russian officialdom, which tsarist leaders had sought unsuccessfully to remove throughout the 19th century, was one of the few real achievements of the revolutions of 1917. Not only forward-thinking

officials like Mikhail Speransky but almost all Russian monarchs in the 19th century recognized that the positive potential of the Table of Ranks had been all but exhausted, and that its negative features were becoming ever more prominent. In the West, service grades and ranking had always played a less important role than in Russia. Even in Prussia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the attitude associated with what Yurii Lotman called 'the mystical power of rank' [*mistika china*] was less developed than in the Russian consciousness. Over a century ago, Mikhail Saltykov-Shchedrin observed bitterly that among all the achievements of Europe, Russia borrowed only the division of persons into ranks, which by that time Europe had already abandoned.

While Russia was reintroducing an institution whose inadequacy had already been recognized in the 19th century, the real issues remain unaddressed. These included the introduction of new blood into state administration and the creation of effective procedures for the recruitment and rotation of qualified personnel. Until the onset in the late 1990s of a generational shift in the bureaucracy, caused by demographic trends, the continuity of administrative officials inherited from the Soviet era remained at 60–70 percent, and was even higher in some agencies.[7] These were officials who had been recruited originally on the *nomenklatura* principle of 'the priority of political over professional qualities.' Thus, persons who had worked during their entire careers in an anti-market, administrative-command environment were implementing fundamental policy reforms, most notably those on the economy. This configuration of personnel was at the root of many of the problems of this period.

Although *Roskadry* was closed in 1994, policy in this realm changed little, as evidenced by the passage of the 'Fundamentals of State Service' in 1995. If one were to provide a general assessment of this first round of reforms, it would be not only an absence of progress in the transformation of officialdom but a growing separation of state administration from the reforms taking place in the economic and social life of the country.

Second round (1997–1998)

The second round began on a much more promising note. In 1997, President Yeltsin issued a decree that created the Commission on State Construction, later renamed the Commission on Administrative Reform, which was comprised largely of academic experts in law and public administration, including the present author.[8] One of the commission's primary tasks was the development of a conceptual model [*kontseptsiia*] for the genuine modernization of state administration, where personnel more than organizational issues would be in the forefront. This model would then serve as the inspiration for specific measures designed to introduce, for the first time in Russian history, something more than a modification of the 'ruler's

service'. The goal was a civil service that would not only provide the efficiency necessary to a modern state but that would work first and foremost for the citizens, for the taxpayers, rather than for the bosses [*nachal'stvo*]. This model was based on a careful study of Russia's unique history and culture as well as the latest experience of civil service reforms that had been carried out in a number of leading Western countries, especially those in the Anglo-Saxon world, which had taken the most radical and decisive steps to reform officialdom.

This plan for reform was in most essentials in place by the fall of 1997. An indication that the proposed reform enjoyed political support at the highest levels came in the spring of 1998, when President Yeltsin included references to the model of civil service reform in his annual message to parliament. This speech called for, among other things, the introduction of competitive hiring in order to attract the most competent and honest personnel into the state bureaucracy; a clearer differentiation between political appointees and career bureaucrats; the monetization of benefits that had been previously provided in-kind; fewer, but better-paid, state officials; and the protection of officials from the caprice and incompetence of their superiors.[9]

Although the Commission on Administrative Reform enjoyed the patronage of the president, not all forces within the presidential bureaucracy were pleased with the direction that the reform process was taking. There emerged within the Kremlin a group of officials who, while recognizing the need for some changes in state administration, sought to reduce these to a minimum by proposing palliatives that would not advance reform along the radical path favored by the Commission on Administrative Reform. Thus, parallel to the work carried out by the commission, several officials in the Administration of the President were asked to develop a draft Code on State Service. The heads of both of these working groups knew of the existence of the other, but there was no contact between them. In spite of this information 'vacuum' the state officials crafted a model of reform that in several important respects was similar to that advanced by the academic experts, especially regarding the legal status of civil servants. This similarity apparently did not please the deputy leader of the Administration of the President, Evgenii Savost'ianov, and in September 1997 he organized a discussion of the question of civil service reform at a meeting of the Security Council. In advance of this discussion, Savost'ianov invited yet another actor into the debate. He asked the leadership of the RAGS as well as the head of an experts' group within the Commission to prepare competing outlines of civil service reform. Thus, there emerged several different documents, the most conservative of which belonged to RAGS. The details of the discussions at the Security Council are not available, but they apparently had little impact, because the single draft emerging from the reviews at the higher levels of the administration contained the proposals of the Commission on Administrative Reform.

Although the draft was greeted coolly in the corridors of power, it did not prompt any fundamental objections. Yet neither the enthusiastic support for the document by Yeltsin's legal affairs adviser, Mikhail Krasnov, nor the inclusion of a substantial portion of the draft in the president's annual message to parliament produced any practical steps to advance reform. On the contrary, in December 1997, parliament adopted a Law on the Government, which not only was out of step with the Commission's conceptual model but also revealed no intentions or plans to reform state service. Along with other political circumstances, the financial crisis of August 1998 led to the placement of bureaucratic reform on the back burner.

At first glance, then, the second round appeared to represent a complete victory for the anti-reformist wing of the state bureaucracy. However, in our view the results were not wholly negative. First, it soon became apparent that the second round articulated a theoretical foundation of reform for which there appeared to be no satisfactory alternative. Second, the reformist ideas advanced during this second round began to be absorbed into the consciousness of the country's political-administrative elite as well as its university students, who would emerge as the next generation of managers in the state bureaucracy. Subsequent events illustrated that the main principles of the Commission's model would very soon be in demand.

Third round (1999–2000)

The fall of 1999 witnessed a new, and fairly brief, flurry of activity surrounding the reform of state service, which was stimulated less by a serious reformist impulse than by political circumstances. Dominating the political agenda was the succession crisis surrounding Yeltsin's imminent departure from the presidency as well as the consequences of the financial crisis unleashed by the 1998 default. In keeping with the age-old Russian tradition of seeking a scapegoat during troubled times, blame for the policy failures was placed at the feet of the bureaucrats, a position that united the political elite, the press, and public opinion. For the majority of politicians positioning themselves for the parliamentary elections of December 1999 and the presidential election of June 2000, anti-bureaucratic attacks, whether feigned or heartfelt, were a prominent part of their electoral strategy. Virtually all serious contenders for office used every opportunity to condemn Russian officialdom.

The most successful players in this game were members of the pro-Putin party, Unity. A think-tank related to Unity, the Center for Strategic Research, headed by the economist German Gref, prepared a substantial working paper on the subject of state service reform.[10] Half of the contributors to this study were 'the people of '97', that is co-authors of the previous conceptual model of administrative reform. The overlapping authorship assured that the content of this study differed little from the earlier document emanating from

the Commission on Administrative Reform. Besides minor differences in emphasis and a more detailed development of certain elements of reform, the two documents diverged most markedly in the harsher criticism directed against officialdom in the Gref draft. Reflecting the electoral atmosphere in which it emerged, the new study argued that state administration in post-communist Russia reproduced some of the worst features of Soviet officialdom, especially its corporatism, or caste-like character. A favorite target of criticism was the huge expansion of organizations and personnel that formed part of the network of federal ministries in the provinces. In some regions, federal employees outnumbered their regional counterparts by a stunning ratio of ten to one.[11]

In its overall format, however, the Gref document was far less a political manifesto than a program addressing technical issues and advocating specific legislative initiatives. It was, then, a more pragmatic version of the program of '97. However, the ideas contained in the Gref proposal never produced practical results. After the elections of 1999 and 2000, interest in the reform of state service collapsed, as other issues arrived center stage and the usual drag of bureaucracy on innovation took hold. As a result, the third round of reform shared the same fate as its predecessors.

Fourth round (2001–2002)

The beginning of the fourth round of reform testified to the pressing need to do something about the problems accumulating in Russian state service.[12] In the fall of 2001, there appeared a new reform commission, this one composed of high-ranking officials and led by the Prime Minister, Mikhail Kasianov. However, the real responsibility for developing reform proposals fell to several parallel working groups operating in the presidential bureaucracy, the Duma, and the Ministry of Economic Development, which was headed by German Gref. Unfortunately, in contrast with the Yeltsin era, these groups operated in the spirit of Soviet organizations, secretly and outside of public scrutiny. Instead of making steady progress, the groups worked in fits and starts and at times their activity seemed to grind to a halt.

In the spring of 2002, President Putin devoted a considerable portion of his State of the Union address to the need for a radical reform of Russian officialdom. Once again, however, the elevation of the issue to a prominent place on the political agenda did not seem to accelerate reform. Work continued only sporadically and behind a curtain of secrecy. It is indicative of the times that even a draft Law on Freedom of Information—which was never adopted, or even introduced, by the Duma—also took shape under a closed regime, without the participation of the public or an airing in the higher reaches of the bureaucracy.

With regard to the politics of reform, it is important to recognize that the division between the proponents of 'progressive' and 'conservative'

models of change did not neatly follow ministerial or departmental lines. The situation was far more complicated and fluid than that. Thus, it would not be appropriate to tie the friends and foes of reform firmly to particular state organizations. An example that illustrates this point is the law 'On the System of State Service', which was adopted in 2003 after undergoing numerous metamorphoses over a lengthy period. Before being presented to the president, who in turn submitted the bill to parliament, the draft had to be reviewed and approved by a multitude of officials, a process that led to a refining of the proposal. The bill that emerged from this process was a lengthy text of almost 120 pages, which included many innovations that were designed to inform follow-on legislation governing the specific branches of federal officialdom as well as the state service in the regions. This draft was then sent to the State-Legal Department of the presidency for final polishing and review.

Unexpectedly, and against all logic, a mid-level bureaucrat in the State-Legal Department—not the head or even the deputy head—subjected the draft to a harsh 'sequestration', reducing the document to one-sixth of its size and eliminating the majority of its innovations. The details of the internal negotiations over this intervention remain obscure, but it is known that the emasculated draft was forwarded to the deputy chief of staff of the president, Dmitrii Medvedev, who oversaw work on state service reform and was therefore responsible for the integrity of the documents. Nonetheless, he transferred the bill to the president in this pared-down form, and President Putin then submitted it to the Duma, where it was adopted without serious discussion, inasmuch as the contents imposed few demands on anyone.

It appears that this gutting of the document was not the result of a philosophical conflict, or even a struggle between different ministries, but a behind-the-scenes battle between offices, or even individuals, in the Kremlin who were defending narrow bureaucratic interests. Their intervention annulled the work of large committees of academic experts as well as persons at the highest level of the administrative hierarchy, all of whom had examined the issues in depth. This incident raises suspicions about the real priorities of certain individuals and groups that had held themselves out as champions of radical reform. By way of concluding comments on the fourth round, we should note that, when compared to officials in the presidency, deputies in the Duma who participated in the reform process adhered in many cases to conservative, and even reactionary, positions on Russian officialdom.

Fifth round (2002–)

The fifth round began on 19 November 2002, when President Putin signed a document with the promising title, 'Federal Program for the Reform of

State Service, 2003–2005'. By the standards of reform proposals, this was a very weighty document. It contained a detailed statistical analysis of developments in Russian officialdom in the post-communist era; harsh criticism of shortcomings in the state bureaucracy; the main priorities of the reform; a list of specific measures needed to implement the reform, with a detailed timetable tying action steps to particular executive agencies; budget outlays associated with each of these steps; and finally, a list of federal statutes, presidential decrees, Government directives, and other normative acts that were needed to implement the Program.

The analysis offered by the Federal Program was so critical of the status quo in officialdom as to be almost alarming. In a certain sense, it revived the 'spirit of '97', that is the model advanced during the second round of reform. At the same time, however, there were traces of compromise with the advocates of a 'virtual reform', including a desire to allow the machinery of state to protect itself from external scrutiny. Despite this internal inconsistency, the Program as a whole represented a significant advance along the path of transforming Russia's traditional model of a 'ruler's service' into a civil service.

The practical steps that followed it did not match the boldness of the Federal Program itself. Implementation encountered significant delays and a spirit of inertia within the bureaucracy. For example, it was only eight to ten months after the issuance of the Federal Program that the ministries responsible for various aspects of the reform announced an open tender—a requirement of the Program—for project documents (in Russia, much of the drafting of reform documents is contracted out to academic institutions and other organizations). Moreover, funding for the reform was not forthcoming until the end of 2003, more than a year after the announcement of the Federal Program. In our view, these delays were clear examples of the behind-the-scenes resistance of officialdom to the reform.

Even more revealing was the fate of the draft law 'On Civilian State Service', which, after the emasculation of the contents of the law 'On the System of State Service', was viewed by the advocates of reform as a critical document. From our perspective, the process of revising and reaching agreement on this bill introduced some provisions that exceeded permissible compromise and provided all manner of loopholes. In particular, the creation of an equivalency scale matching military and civilian ranks paved the way for a massive transfer of retired military personnel into high-ranking posts in civilian administration, with no provision for careful review of their qualifications. This initiative appeared to contradict the spirit of reform and potentially to undermine the level of management competence in the civilian state service. This and other elements of the draft were the subjects of serious criticism during parliamentary hearings held in the spring of 2003. In particular, some hearing participants noted that in its current form, the law would tend to serve bureaucratic rather than public interests.

Unfortunately, however, these criticisms were not reflected in the final version of the law.[13]

During its first reading, the draft law passed without discussion or significant amendments. This is not surprising given that the reading was held at the last session of the Duma before the December 2003 parliamentary elections, when the deputies were absorbed with their re-election campaigns. The fate of the bill was decided, therefore, by the membership of the new Duma, where one-party dominance by United Russia, the successor to the Unity Party, prevented any serious revisions to a text championed by the presidency. Of course, the very fact that the adoption of the law was delayed by the new Duma raises doubts about the seriousness of the administration's commitment to the reform of officialdom. One may conclude, therefore, that the country's political leadership had still not recognized the necessity of making a decisive choice between democratic and purely technocratic means of modernizing the country.

Developments after the adoption in 2004 of the Law on Civilian State Service raise the possibility that the fifth round represents the culmination of the reform process relating to Russian officialdom. By the summer of 2007, this round of reform, which had started out with such promise, seemed to be coming to a sluggish and lackluster end. It is true that, in a formal sense, work continued apace. President Putin had signed 12 of the 19 decrees anticipated by reform documents, decrees that were supposed to improve performance assessment [*attestatsiia*], create reserve lists of personnel targeted for advancement [*kadrovoi rezerv*], establish a commission to handle disciplinary and ethical complaints against officials, and introduce competitive hiring.[14]

Some agencies, most notably the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, did begin to use competitive hiring practices in their recruitment of personnel. Preparation was also underway for the elevation in status and responsibilities of a department within the presidency that could assume overall responsibility for personnel matters in the state bureaucracy. After the failure of *Roskadry* in the early 1990s, offices of personnel management operated within each state organization, with no effective coordination from the center.[15]

However, it was difficult to find substantive changes in the style and nature of work in the bureaucracy. More noticeable was the growth in the size of the state bureaucracy, which now exceeded one and a half million persons, and an increase in the bureaucracy's sense of self-importance, which suggested the rise of a 'new class' in officialdom. Even the positive actions noted above appeared to derive more from an obligatory response to the formal innovations in the law—reminiscent of what was called a 'wiping clean of the slate' [*ochistit' bumagu*] in the tsarist era—than a desire to advance reform. More to the point, there are now countercurrents at work, which were evident during parliamentary hearings in November 2006, where some

deputies proposed revisions to the Law on Civilian State Service because of its alleged impracticality [*nevypolnimost'*]. In addition, the draft of the project for improving the state bureaucracy from 2008–2012 no longer bore the term 'reform' in its title but rather the more flexible concept of 'development' of the state service. Although the document was provisional, and subject to serious criticism at a conference in the Higher School of Economics, the very fact that 'development' replaced 'reform' was an indication that the struggle to reform the state bureaucracy was approaching its conclusion.

If we return to the boxing metaphor, the end of the fifth round found the fighters a pale imitation of their former selves, having lost their will and merely awaiting the bell or the cry of the manager. For his part, the 'manager' did not wish to undermine the stability and loyalty of the state apparatus in a period when their 'administrative resources', whose use was formally prohibited, would be needed to assure victory in the next electoral cycle.

The specific reasons for policy failure

Strictly speaking, the reasons for the failure of reform are different in each stage of the transition from communist rule. It is important to recall that in the period from 1991 to 1996—that is until the re-election of Boris Yeltsin to a second presidential term—the political situation in the country was highly unstable and was fraught with the possibility of a communist restoration or even more dangerous outcomes. The physical health of the Russian president also prevented the adoption of decisive measures on officialdom. And of course the leading priority at the end of the 1990s was the near catastrophic economic condition of the country. In this period, then, one looks first to political explanations for the lack of success of reform efforts. It was a time of radically divergent views about the changes taking place in the country, even if one excludes from consideration the invectives of orthodox Communists and marginal political forces, such as those in the national-socialist camp.

If we view the 1990s as an incomplete anticommunist revolution, which is the approach that dominates in democratic circles in Russia, then among the reasons for the absence of a serious transformation of officialdom in this period was the risk of unleashing yet another reform in a fragile political environment where the authority of the state was weak.[16] The fear of many was that a reform of state service would ignite new conflicts and lead to an unneeded schism within state administration. These concerns had some validity, to be sure. On the other hand, it was precisely in these conditions, when there was an outpouring of anti-nomenklatura and anti-communist feeling among the citizenry, that the political leadership enjoyed a 'popular mandate' to reform the bureaucracy. Indeed, it may have been easier to mobilize popular support for this reform than for any other.

The aversion to political risk was not the only factor complicating the reform of Russian officialdom. First, the dominant leaders at the helm of

state in the early 1990s were economists or, at the least, those who exhibited a penchant for economic determinism. It is ironic that Russia, which had drunk to excess the elixir of economics under Soviet rule, returned to that same source in the post-communist era. Russia's new generation of liberal economists were, as a rule, honest and highly-qualified, if intellectually rigid, individuals who helped to save the country from economic catastrophe in the early 1990s. Although they occasionally ventured beyond the confines of economics to speak on issues such as freedom of expression or individual rights, they did so without passion or conviction. It was as if the freedom of the human spirit, as opposed to economic freedom, was not their sphere, and they could not bring themselves to believe that man did not live by bread alone. They set great store in the invisible hand of the market, which would put everything right and resolve all problems. In a word, they were not humanists in terms of their professional experience or their outlook on the world. As a result, they allowed very different political forces to dominate the national debate on spiritual or cultural values, such as patriotism.

In the phrase of Alexander Nikolaevich Yakovlev, these latter forces were largely 'political riff-raff'. Our home-grown 'fascists' as well as the communists, who had just traded in the rhetoric of 'people's power' for the banner of Russian chauvinism and Orthodoxy, claimed the sole right to call themselves patriots, this in spite of the historical responsibility of the Communist Party for the annihilation of tens of millions of Russians. The first politician to fully grasp the weakness of a purely economic version of liberalism was Vladimir Zhirinovsky during the parliamentary election campaign in late 1993. In contrast to the tedious proposals of the liberals on taxes, investments, interest rates, and other financial matters, which were poorly understood by the vast majority of the population, Zhirinovsky tapped into the popular dream of a mystical provider of goods, such as the 'golden fish' in the Russian fairy-tale. In addition, he promised to satisfy the popular craving for Great Power status. That is, he promised to restore, even if in a distorted form, the sense of self-respect of a people that had experienced humiliation and embarrassment as a result of the Soviet Union's collapse. Ten years later, in 2003, the Motherland, or *Rodina*, Party successfully used the same tactics in its electoral campaign, which was testimony to the fact that a rational *homo oeconomicus* represents an incomplete model of humanity, including, and perhaps especially, Russian men and women. Russian liberals had failed to understand that politics is about a search for identity and self-respect as well as a search for prosperity.

The underestimation of the importance of the reform of officialdom was another reason for its failure. Here we find further blind-spots of economic determinists—an undervaluing of the role of government and legal institutions as agents of change and a neglect of the state bureaucracy's natural tendencies toward self-consciousness, self-protection, and

self-development. For example, one of the country's leading ministers, in an attempt to illustrate that his organization had quickly and fully reformed itself in response to the new conditions, stated that not only had 'they resolved all questions by themselves', but that this had been done by his signing a document containing already prepared resolutions. Viewing the bureaucracy as a matter of minor importance, Russia's leaders did not include the transformation of officialdom among 'first-generation' reforms.

Attempts to change the state bureaucracy also suffered from a reluctance to reject clearly and unequivocally the Soviet and communist inheritance, although Boris Yeltsin and his team made some efforts in this direction, the most prominent of which was the proscription of the Communist Party after the putsch of August 1991. However, persons in the *nomenklatura* who retained their positions in officialdom used all available means to resist the 'de-communization' of the country, including the state bureaucracy. The decision of the Constitutional Court, effectively annulling Yeltsin's decree of 1991, facilitated this resistance, as did Yeltsin's own lack of persistence on this issue. Given the failure to apply a form of lustration to the communist state apparatus that had been inherited by the new order, it is not surprising that, after recovering from the initial scare, the old *nomenklatura* at first cautiously, and then more aggressively, began to carry out a 'quiet *revanche*', blocking or undermining whenever possible the reformist policies adopted by the political leadership.[17]

The Supreme Soviet, and from 1993 its new parliamentary incarnation the Duma, carried out a similar line. Among the many instances of communist revivalism in the 1990s, one of the most illustrative related to the Bolshevik revolutionary holiday of 7 November, which was not eliminated, or recognized as a day of mourning and repentance, but retained as a 'Day of Reconciliation and Concord'. As would soon become apparent, this absurd, and counter-productive, gesture served as a signal that there would be no serious campaign of de-communization. The decision gave traditional forces in the bureaucracy added confidence in the stability of the system and their own security, which in turn encouraged them to pursue anti-reformist and turf-protecting measures.

While recognizing that many of the birthmarks of the old order remained and that, exploiting the paternalistic consciousness of much of the population, the former *nomenklatura* enjoyed much success in holding on to its elite status and 'transforming power into property',[18] we would adhere to our contention that Russia experienced a revolution in the 1990s, albeit an incomplete one. This was not only Russia's fate but that of other societies experiencing post-revolutionary exhaustion, disappointment that the impossibly high expectations for change were not realized, and the temptation to succumb to the rhetoric of chauvinists intent on defending the country's honor. Despite all this, the 1990s brought many progressive changes in a relatively brief period. Instead of grieving or feeling ashamed

about this decade, like some pessimists and maximalists, Russian citizens have more reason to feel a sense of pride about the final decade of the 20th century. The challenge now is to prevent the undoing of these democratic achievements.

Although some of the factors outlined above continued to impede change after 1997, including the lack of political will and consistency on the part of Russia's leaders, new barriers to the reform of officialdom have emerged in the last decade. The first of these is the absence of openness, or *glasnost'*, in the reform process. One of the most serious obstacles to the transformation of a 'ruler's service' into a civil service is the closed or semi-secret manner of drafting reform proposals. Because this reform of Russian officialdom involves a fundamental change in relations between the state and society, its success requires the support and approval of the citizenry. That is not possible without their knowledge and understanding of the proposed changes. One has to prepare the social base for reform. The goals and plans of the reformers should be clearly, succinctly, and continually explained to society, which must then be able to offer feedback to those crafting the reform. If society feels that it is a partner in the reform of officialdom, it will provide fresh ideas and a necessary political counterweight to the anti-reformist forces in the bureaucracy, during both the making and implementation of the laws. Moreover, a civil society mobilized around the reform of officialdom will force the bureaucracy to be more accountable and transparent to the public. Among the many groups in society that have an incentive to support reform are small and mid-sized businessmen, whose firms have suffered at the hands of capricious and avaricious officials. The inability, or unwillingness, of Russia's leaders to mobilize society behind reform projects helps to explain not only the failure of those initiatives but the growing alienation of the public from the political process.

Contrary to the claims of some leaders, there is no reason to fear the incomprehension or even negative reactions of a portion of the public. In fact, public discussion of the reform drafts will enrich them and will transform citizens into political allies. It is better to confront the inevitable, and possibly harsh, public criticism before the adoption of the laws, when there is still a chance to revise them, than to try to convince citizens of the reform's value after the fact. As the historian V. O. Kliuchevsky noted over a century ago, impeding the path of reform in Russia is 'the deep-seated indifference and distrust with which the population greets a new appeal from the government . . . knowing from experience that nothing will come of this but new burdens and incomprehensible directives.'[19]

Whether in Russia, the United States, or elsewhere, the experience of both successful and unsuccessful attempts to reform officialdom illustrates that it is vital to attract allies within the bureaucracy as well as in society. Officialdom is, after all, heterogeneous, and there are advocates of progressive change throughout the state bureaucracy. It would, of course, be naive

to assume that even the most forward-looking officials have developed comprehensive programs for change that are comparable to those worked out by groups of experts, who have the time and knowledge to prepare refined initiatives. However, what is needed from the state bureaucracy is something different: officials who recognize the necessity of reform and agree with the general direction of change. As this author can attest from extensive contacts with Russian state officials, there are significant numbers of such persons in the Russian state. They work at every level of the apparatus and in the most varied, and at times, most unexpected agencies. In the majority of cases, these officials can become allies, and even champions, of reform. There is, it must be remembered, no deficit of discontent among state officials with their working conditions and the negative reputation of the bureaucrat in the public mind.

To achieve a breakthrough, the political leadership must have an open dialogue with the state and society and stop setting one against the other by labeling reform initiatives a 'struggle against bureaucracy' or an 'anti-apparatus offensive'. Such approaches will only encourage the bureaucracy to employ a subtle, clandestine counter-offensive, which will ultimately force the political leadership to accept compromises that emasculate the reform. After all, even Stalin, never mind his successors, was unable to fully subordinate the bureaucracy to his will. Only clear political will and administrative consistency can assure the success of the reformist movement, qualities that are now, unfortunately, in short supply.

Notes

1. *Istoriia popytok reformirovaniia s 1992 po 2000 god*, T. V. Zaitseva, ed. (Moscow: Ves mir, 2003).
2. On this issue, see Eugene Huskey, 'The Higher Party Schools to Civil Service Academies: The Marketization of Bureaucratic Training in Russia', *Slavic Review*, no. 2 (2004): 325–48.
3. From 1991 to 1995, RAGS was known as RAU, or the Russian Academy of Management.
4. On the French tradition, see Ezra Suleiman, *Dismantling Democratic States* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 168–9.
5. Ob osnovakh gosudarstvennoi sluzhbe Rossiiskoi Federatsii, *Sobranie zakonodatel'stva*, no. 3 (1995), st. 174.
6. On the role of status and rank in the history of Russian officialdom, see Helju Aulik Bennett, 'Chiny, Ordena, and Officialdom', in *Russian Officialdom: The Bureaucratization of Russian Society from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century*, Walter McKenzie Pintner and Don Karl Rowney, eds (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 162–89.
7. Ol'ga Kryshtanovskaia, 'Finansovaia oligarkhiia Rossii', *Izvestiia*, 10 January 1996.
8. The composition of this group included M. A. Krasnov, A. V. Obolonskii, A. G. Barabashev, O. F. Nozdrachev, V. D. Rudashevskii, V. A. Kozbanenko, and M. Z. Skundin.
9. Poslanie Federal'nomu Sobraniiu, 17 February 1998.

10. For a discussion of Gref's proposals, see Reforma gosudarstvennogo upravleniia v Rossii (www.parreform.ru/bulletin/), a website maintained by the World Bank.
11. Chislennost' rabotnikov organov gosudarstvennoi vlasti i mestnogo samoupravleniia po sub'ektam Rossiiskoi Federatsii na konets 2000 goda (Goskomstat table in possession of the author).
12. These issues are discussed in the previous chapter of this volume.
13. Deputies from the Union of Right Forces must bear some responsibility for the failings in this legislation. Their criticisms of the bill were only designed to score political points and not to make constructive suggestions for improvements in the text, which is the role of responsible lawmakers.
14. For a text of the decree on the disciplinary commissions, see Polozhenie o komissiiakh po sobliodeniiu trebovanii k sluzhebnomu povedeniiu gosudarstvennykh grazhdanskikh sluzhashchikh Rossiiskoi Federatsii i uregulirovaniiu konflikta interesov, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, 7 March 2007, 19.
15. A department of state service had existed in the Administration of the President since the 1990s, but its responsibilities and visibility were minimal.
16. We cannot accept the reductionist view of the 1990s advanced by authors like Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski, who view the decade's events as an antidemocratic coup designed to empower and enrich a small segment of Russian society. Reddaway and Glinski, *The Tragedy of Russia's Reform. Market Bolshevism against Democracy* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2001).
17. The opponents of reform within the bureaucracy were joined in their resistance to reform either directly or indirectly, by criminal and semi-criminal elements in Russia, who had no interest in seeing a more professional, transparent, and honest state bureaucracy.
18. The phrase is that of Egor Gaidar.
19. V. O. Kliuchevskii, *Kurs rosskoi istorii v 8 tomov*, vol. 8 (Moscow, 1958), 87.

19
Conclusion

Eugene Huskey and Don K. Rowney

Bureaucracy: The Russian franchise

The development of Russian officialdom during the last century and a quarter paralleled in many respects the evolution of state administrations in other industrial states. Like its counterparts throughout the developed world, Russia's state bureaucracy became larger, more complex, more technologically sophisticated, and better able to 'see', and thus penetrate, society. These secular trends persisted with only occasional interruptions across the history of the three different states that governed Imperial, Soviet and post-communist Russian territory between 1881 and the early 21st century.

Despite periodic administrative reforms designed to streamline an increasingly complex state bureaucracy, new executive departments and agencies proliferated relentlessly during the 120 years surveyed in this book. And, as in other technologically advancing states, new means of information collection and analysis during the last century consistently improved the Russian state's capacity to understand and shape the composition, attitudes, and behavior of society. Yet a closer look at Russian officialdom at the beginning of the 21st century reveals profound differences with some state bureaucracies in other parts of the world. In this Conclusion we use the findings in this book to frame the special characteristics and behavior of Russian officialdom.

New public management or old corrupt practices?

Our look at Russian officialdom at the beginning of the 21st century exposes major differences with state bureaucracies in the West. Some of these differences are due to the revolution in public administration that swept much of the Western world in the last third of the 20th century—a revolution that largely passed Russia by in the late Soviet and post-communist eras. Put simply, the goal of the New Public Management (NPM) and related movements

was to make the state leaner and friendlier, whether by contracting out public services to private firms or by introducing private sector management practices into state organizations. Relationships between state and citizen were to be based on efficiency rather than power, with citizens treated as clients or consumers of services rather than as subjects or supplicants before the Leviathan state. Whether the new approaches to public management in the West represented a long-overdue correction to staid and unresponsive bureaucracies or a lamentable 'dismantling' of the democratic state,[1] they charted a course of development that diverged significantly from that pursued by the Russian state in its Soviet and post-communist incarnations.

There were occasional attempts in post-communist Russia to reduce bureaucratic 'red tape' and improve citizen access, such as the law of 2001 that created a 'one window' system for registering new companies—a reform that largely failed to deliver on its promises to make the registration process more client-friendly.[2] There was also the massive, but still partial, privatization of state-controlled enterprises in late Soviet and post-communist Russia. These programs, beginning in the Gorbachev era, at first glance appeared to mirror the outsourcing and privatization programs launched in the West under the NPM banner, which served to 'hollow out' the state.[3] However, the privatization of public services in Russia was not a broad-based initiative by the political leadership to modernize officialdom but rather a set of *ad hoc* responses by agencies to financial exigencies and by individual officials to opportunities for self-enrichment. Where some officials, such as the enterprising social workers described by Cecile Lefevre, turned to private fund-raising to supplement meager state allotments for the needy, other personnel engaged in commercial activities in order to improve their own position as well as that of their ministry. From these perspectives the history of outsourcing and privatization in post-communist Russia may have had more in common with the corrupt practices described in Chapter 11 of this volume by James Heinzen than with the outcomes envisioned by NPM, whatever academic economists, the World Bank or the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development may have thought at the time.[4]

The distinctive features of the contemporary Russian bureaucracy also result in part from the confluence of a challenging regime transition and the potent legacies of Russian officialdom. For example, the longstanding Russian tradition of departmentalism [*vedomstvennost'*] and the late Soviet practice of off-budget funding combined with the financial and institutional crises of the 1990s to allow many state organizations to carve out pockets of autonomy that had no parallels in Western practice or in recent Russian history.[5] In most cases, however, the divergence between bureaucratic practices in Russia and the West began well before the launching of the NPM movement or Russia's transition from communism.

Endurances and their evolution: confronting the political-administrative divide

During its modern history Russia has relied on combinations of strategies to manage and discipline the bureaucracy. These have included the formation of special educational organizations such as the *Tsarskoe Selo* (Alexander Lyceum) founded in 1810 for training bureaucratic elites, or the Higher Party Schools described by Eugene Huskey, 'where courses in dialectical materialism and the history of the workers' movement were intended to form a single bureaucratic culture' imbuing students with the principles of party discipline. Control strategies have also included suppression and intimidation, ranging from the measures noted by Don Rowney that were adopted by Peter the Great to rationalize his model of state authority, to the arrests and large-scale dismissals described by Martine Mespoulet, the anti-corruption drives described by James Heinzen, and the anti-bureaucracy campaigns noted in Daniel Orlovsky's study of white-collar workers. Oversight strategies have entailed the widespread use of formal checking mechanisms since before the 18th century to monitor constantly the machinery of state. These mechanisms ranged from the ubiquitous but often ineffectual career diaries and official lists noted in Chapter 2 of this volume, to Communist Party organizations and myriad state inspectorates in the Soviet era, to the Procuracy and presidential overseers in Moscow, the seven federal regions, and the more than 80 regions and republics in the post-communist period.

Most other technologically advanced state administrations have been much less dependent on a bureaucracy of state control, relying, instead, on a greater transparency that allows society to identify misalignments between the policies of state and the behavior of officialdom. The mobilization of society as a check on bureaucratic self-dealing has been possible in other state systems because citizens could 'pull the fire alarm' by seeking remedies through the voting booth, an independent press, or the courts—remedies that are absent or far less developed in more authoritarian regimes.[6] As Heinzen's chapter illustrates, instead of society's serving as an institutionalized monitor of the everyday life of state, the Russian public has been called on only periodically, during anti-corruption or anti-bureaucracy campaigns, to express their outrage at the self-interested behavior of officialdom. One of the costs, therefore, of the 'demobilized' society,[7] which has been a feature of Russian life throughout most of the last century and a quarter, is the absence of a continuous and predictably robust source of external discipline for state administration.

Continuous attempts at oversight, whether by state or society, are not the only, or even the most effective, means of aligning the behavior of agents with their superiors. Because monitoring and material incentives are necessary to the extent that the values, information, and interests of political leaders and administrative personnel diverge, many modern states

have sought to create a common culture of law and professionalism that cuts across the political–administrative divide. This broad-based adherence to legal and professional norms limits greatly the freedom of maneuver of those at the helm of state. Political orders do not easily overturn longstanding legal and professional standards. In exchange for this restraint on their power, political authorities can rely on the agents of state to operate within relatively predictable bounds. As Stefan Hedlund puts it, 'substantially different incentive effects are produced by simple commands, as distinct from generally accepted and credibly enforceable rules.'[8]

It would be wrong, of course, to assert that the tsarist, Soviet, and post-communist eras lacked legal and professional cultures. Chapters 10 and 12 in this volume, by Mespoulet and Rey, together with other work by Mespoulet, make clear that, due to the diffusion of professional norms internationally, many tsarist and Soviet government officials working in fields such as statistics, demography, and diplomacy had a highly developed sense of professional identity and tended to adhere to internationally-recognized professional conventions.[9] Likewise, legal norms have helped to shape the behavior of Russian officialdom in important ways throughout the last century and a quarter. And yet legal and professional standards have been far less central to the operation of Russian officialdom than to that of bureaucracies in most wealthy, technologically advanced states.[10]

Rather than acting as constraints on bureaucratic behavior, formal rules in Russia have often served as weapons in the hands of officials, who apply them selectively in order to advance their narrow self-interests. Insisting on adherence to the letter rather than the spirit of the law has for centuries enabled bureaucrats in Russia and elsewhere to inflate their power and the value of their services. Moreover, the weakness of formal rules associated with law and professionalism has invited the institutionalization of informal practices that produce numerous pathologies in Russian officialdom, such as corruption and false reporting. Of course, informal practices are part of the institutional culture in all organizations, and in many cases they further the organizations' goals. In Russian officialdom, however, the imbalance between formal and informal rules—and between mission-enhancing and mission-eroding informal norms—has undermined consistency and efficiency in the everyday life of the state.[11]

The lag in legal and professional development in Russia is also attributable to other factors. As Rowney, Gill, and Gimpelson et al. have shown, in all three periods under study in this volume, Russia has embraced elements of personalist and patrimonial rule that have prevented the emergence of legal-rational authority.[12] Such authority exists in some technologically advanced state bureaucracies, but the Russian case differs because instead of merit-based hiring, the state has long relied upon a spoils system of administrative recruitment, even for those beginning their careers in officialdom, as Velychenko notes in his discussion of turn-of-the-century Ukraine. Gimpelson

et al., using survey research on the post-communist era, show that personal contacts rather than civil service exams or other merit-based criteria continue to assure state employment for those wishing to enter government service in the post-communist era. Although the political science literature normally associates personalist rule with high politics,[13] the use of a spoils system for new hires in Russian officialdom is a reminder that personalism, which is the antithesis of legal and professional cultures, may endure in offices throughout the bureaucracy and not just in the core executive in Moscow.

Finally, we note that the relative immaturity of law and professionalism in Russia's state administration has also been due in part to factors external to the politics–administration nexus. Financial constraints that are present in all developing societies played a significant role. It is expensive to train and support highly-skilled administrative personnel, and so countries at a lower level of economic development tend to employ less qualified cadres to carry out the functions of state. During the Soviet period, this was evident in the large percentage of judges who had correspondence degrees in law; in the post-communist era, it is illustrated by the frequent use of amateurs to fill positions as social workers.

The distinctiveness of Russian officialdom also flows from the ambition of the Russian state and its leaders. Russia is not only a developmental state committed to grand projects of social and economic transformation,[14] it is also a state whose leaders resist constraints on their management of bureaucracy and society, whether those constraints originate in legal or professional standards, the market, or democratic institutions, such as parties and elections. Although Russian leaders have at times granted important concessions to these alternative sources of influence on national development, they have been unwilling to accord them the relative autonomy that they enjoy in most technologically advanced societies. As a result, the preconditions for the development of a rational-legal bureaucracy have never been in place in Russia.

Limits on power and the capacity to govern

It is one of the many ironies of Russian history that state elites' desire for control has reduced the state's capacity to govern. The unwillingness of principals to bind their own power creates a fertile field for mischief, caprice, and self-dealing by the civil agents of state, whose freedom of maneuver is not subject to the full range of disciplinary tools available to other modern states. More than this, however, state power has been limited by the effect of 'silo politics', to use a term from public administration and American business management, through which central state authorities and their subordinates seek to retain functional control over their particular domains and in so doing limit the capacity of agents to respond to societal demands.[15]

As we argued in the Introduction, one of the strongest endurances in the history of modern Russian state administration is that of the ministerial system, in which state roles are divided into separate functions (foreign affairs, war, financial affairs, infrastructure construction and maintenance, education, communication and censorship, and others), each of which is organized into a ministry or quasi-ministry under the authority of an official who is answerable only to supreme political authority. Problems arise from this structure when objectives must be served that cross established functional boundaries. International interests may best be served, for example, by a combination of War Ministry and Foreign Ministry roles; revenue enhancement or economic growth may best by served by a combination of infrastructure development and creative management of financial affairs.

Vedomstvennost' [departmentalism], mentioned earlier in this essay, was the result of this often rigid, functionally defined structural system. In large part, these rigidities were owing to the absence of strong, countervailing systems, such as independent legislatures and judiciaries, or even permanent, local administrative offices. In some other societies these tend to be organizations that have a serious interest in 'results' and that, therefore, have an interest in stimulating the crossing of ministerial boundaries in order to achieve objectives—such as an adequately constructed, funded and staffed school, for example—which no single ministry could legally manage. The studies in this volume by Velychenko and Morrison are eloquent on this point. During the tsarist era, as Velychenko observes, 'No ministry . . . had permanent agencies at the lowest level [*volost'*]. Practical day to day authority extended at best only as far as district capitals.' Morrison's findings are especially interesting, owing to the fact that his data show that these problems extended to the military territorial administrations. In a comparison of zemstvo (where local self-government was established after 1864) and non-zemstvo provinces, Rowney shows that the absence of local government institutions translated into quality of life deficits measured by such resources as schools, hospital beds, and safe, potable water supply. In tsarist Russia, higher-level ministerial officials competed among themselves for authority and power and they could lay blame for failed policy outcomes on their official colleagues in other ministries with fear of retribution only from the remote and often uninterested or uninformed supreme political authorities.

In the Soviet era, as Gill observes, the insertion of the Communist Party into nearly every facet of official life was meant to break down siloism, or *vedomstvennost'*. Although our research is silent on this point, one could also make the argument that the Soviet-era State Administration for Labor Camps (GULag) achieved cross-agency breakthroughs using the brutally forced labor of tens of thousands of prisoners to achieve landmarks in construction and manufacturing. As Gill argues, however, the party, at least, was subject to

its own internal divisions and competitions, a condition that resulted in the inefficiencies arising from dependence upon the influence of one man, Stalin.

A further undesirable consequence of ministerial siloism has been the degree to which it concentrated authority at the political center of the state, St. Petersburg, until 1918, and then Moscow. Although ministries had regional offices, their capacity to manage and discipline local officials was limited by a lack of transparency, by the enormous distances of separation in this, the largest state in the world, by the second- or third-class status of regional and local officials and offices, and by elite officials' ambition to concentrate their careers and residence in the capital. Thus political elites' insatiable desire for control and status confirmation limited the state's capacity to govern.

A further irony of Russian state development is the effort by Russia's political leaders to heighten their legitimacy by distancing themselves from officialdom. There is nothing surprising, of course, in the desire of tsars, general secretaries, and presidents to portray themselves as the people's protectors against a corrupt and unresponsive bureaucracy. After all, American politicians routinely try to get to Washington by running against it. In the Russian case, however, the country's leaders themselves have often come from the upper reaches of the bureaucracy. One of the results of this recruitment pattern, as Huskey's chapter in this volume illustrates, is the effacement in Russia of the distinction between politics and administration, a distinction that is a central, if admittedly muddied, feature of Western states. As Gill shows, this elision of bureaucracy and politics was evident in the penetration of Communist Party politics into the everyday life of the administrative apparatus. In the words of S. A. Denisov, a 'division between politicians and bureaucrats emerges in a democratic political regime, where the population actively participates in the formation of the organs of power. In an authoritarian regime, the entire apparatus of state, from top to bottom, is formed from the bureaucracy.'[16] Thus, one can reasonably argue that Russia has had bureaucrats of various ranks, authority, and power but no politicians in the constitutional/institutional sense in which states in Western Europe and North America use the term. When asked in 2006 if he planned to venture into business, the elected governor of the Tver' province responded, 'No, I feel myself to be a *chinovnik* [the traditional, and not always complimentary, Russian term for a professional bureaucrat].'[17]

Principals and agents

Because political life in Russia has taken place within the confines of officialdom throughout most of the last century and a quarter, not all of the Western literature on principal-agent theory is directly applicable to Russia or other patrimonial regimes. For example, most Western studies rest on the

assumption that the primary principal, or boss, is the public, that politicians as principals can rely on bureaucratic agents to adhere closely to legal and professional standards in the absence of political interference, and that there is 'a court system capable of enforcing due process and legislative procedural mandates.' As Rauch and Evans argue, the very logic of principal–agent theory, that the principal is interested in enhancing the delivery of public goods and services, may be absent in countries like Russia, where 'the political will to engage in vigorous monitoring and implement appropriate strategies is lacking, or worse yet the principal is himself corrupt.'[18]

Thus, although the tension between master and expert identified by Max Weber is universal, the interplay between principals and agents is deeply dependent on the shape of the playing field and the rules of the game, which differ between and even within countries. Several contributors to this book (for example, Gill, Mespoulet and Gimpelson et al.) document how patrimonial, personalist rule in Russia nurtured social networks and patron–client links in the bureaucracy that bind principals to agents in ways that have been, or are being, abandoned in other state systems.[19]

As elsewhere, principals in Russian officialdom induce agents-cum-clients to act by offering financial incentives, promotions, and the promise of protection from retribution by competing principals. In the absence of open markets, independent courts, and stable rules governing political competition, however, bureaucratic agents in Russia are far more dependent on principals for their financial, career, and, at times, even personal security. In short, clients are more vulnerable vis-à-vis their patrons than most agents are to their principals in Western bureaucracies, where civil service rules are more fully articulated and respected and the market provides a fuller array of attractive alternative careers. This vulnerability perpetuates the numerous pathologies evident in Russian officialdom, such as the use of administrative resources in electoral campaigns, the widespread use of public office for personal gain, a fear of delegating authority, and its corollary, over-centralization of decision-making.[20]

Forces of change

To emphasize the elements of continuity and distinctiveness in Russian officialdom is not to deny the existence of formidable forces for change in Russian state administration. As noted in the Introduction to this book and earlier in this Conclusion, the most obvious, sudden changes emerged at moments of regime transition, while continuous transformative forces accumulated during industrialization. During industrialization, and, now post-industrialization, the acquisition of new technologies combined with novel administrative functions to change officialdom and the everyday life of the state in ways that are likely to have made it unrecognizable to Russian bureaucrats of the mid-19th century. The two regime changes also produced

stunning transformations in the dominant ideological framework within which officialdom functioned. These transformations enforced fundamental alterations to the rules governing the exercise of political and economic power and, as a result, to both the roles and status of officials.

The Introduction has already documented the ideologically-driven attempt of the first Soviet government to obliterate the special legal status of officials and to make them indistinguishable from others in the workforce. In addition, the imposition of a collectivized, centrally planned, command economy at the end of the first decade of Soviet rule brought new tasks and organizational complexity to a state bureaucracy that assumed expanded and novel responsibilities for the production, distribution, and pricing of goods and services. Likewise, the decades immediately preceding and leading into the transition to post-communist rule saw a restoration of some of the pre-revolutionary status distinctions of officialdom and led ultimately to a partial dismantling of the Soviet-era bureaucracy of centralized economic decision making and control. As we note below, status restoration continued and intensified under President Putin.

The incipient market economy of the 1990s required the formation of its own specific state infrastructure that could record deeds, regulate securities, attend to the unemployed, and provide for the registration, oversight, and bankruptcy of private firms. While significant, and in some cases dramatic, change occurred in the portions of post-communist Russian officialdom that dealt with the economy, other state bureaucracies were less affected by regime transition—most notably the power ministries, whose structures, policies, and even personnel weathered the transfer of regimes virtually intact.[21]

For all segments of post-communist Russian officialdom, however, the dismantling of the command economy fundamentally altered the nature of the labor market. Whereas in the tsarist and Soviet eras the state as employer faced virtually no competition for employees, ministries and agencies in the post-communist era have found it more difficult to attract qualified personnel because of the pay and perquisites offered by some private firms. Moreover, the privatization of state property and the partial marketization of the economy changed the playing field by creating new incentives for bureaucratic corruption, whether in the insider acquisition of denationalized property for sub-market prices, the sale of licenses or favorable tax treatment, or the extortion of vulnerable small and mid-sized businesses by health, fire, and other inspectorates.

While regime transitions brought highly visible changes to some organizational and operational features of Russian officialdom, demographic developments gradually and often imperceptibly transformed the composition of the bureaucracy as well as the environment in which it functioned. Although it was overwhelmingly ethnic Russian in 1881, Russian officialdom began to reflect the ethnic diversity of the Empire in the last years

of the 19th century, at least on its borderlands, as the chapters in this volume by Velychenko and Woodworth reveal. Morrison's study illustrates that this indigenization of cadres began later in Central Asia, with its more recent inclusion into the Empire and its lower level of education and economic development. Even here, however, one found a de-Russification of the administrative corps by the late 1920s, which was interrupted by the Terror of the 1930s, only to be resumed during World War II.

Although the senior administrative corps in Moscow remained disproportionately Russian and Slavic through the end of the Soviet era, state administration in the non-Russian periphery was largely in the hands of the titular nationalities, a change which served as a powerful legitimating force for the Soviet regime. This pattern of an ethnic Russian-dominated central state bureaucracy and regional administrative corps recruited heavily from local populations has only deepened in the post-communist era due to the elimination of the Soviet practice of geographic circulation of elites and a softening of official attitudes toward manifestations of ethnic nationalism that do not overtly challenge the regime.

The century and a quarter covered by this volume also witnessed important changes in the gender composition of Russian officialdom. Until the Bolshevik Revolution, Russia, like other states, effectively excluded women from the state bureaucracy. In the last half of the 20th century, there was a pronounced feminization of officialdom, so that by the beginning of the 21st century over 70 percent of personnel in the state bureaucracy were female.[22]

Throughout the Soviet and post-communist eras, however, the distribution of women in the state bureaucracy was highly uneven. The overwhelming majority of women were concentrated in the lower reaches of the bureaucracy, with the post of department head [*nachal'nik otdela*] serving as a glass ceiling. Of the five non-management grades within Category V, which contained the permanent civil service, women accounted for 88 percent of the lowest two grades and only 14 percent of the highest.[23] In the relatively few instances where women moved into the ranks of senior state administration, it was in fields that were judged as 'female-appropriate'.

The transition from communist to post-communist rule had little impact on this pattern of gender distribution within Russian officialdom. Although women did begin to assume a significant number of staff positions in the Russian presidential bureaucracy in the 1990s, they continued to be excluded from prominent line positions in all but a handful of 'female-appropriate' agencies. The research of Jessica Auer has illustrated that of the 600 senior administrators who changed jobs in the period from 1995 to 2004, only 60 were female, and three-quarters of this group worked in only three ministries: finance, labor, and culture.[24]

The evidence available on age distribution within Russian officialdom since 1881 is incomplete, but it is clear that political and demographic

factors in the early decades of Soviet rule assured a relatively youthful corps of state administrators, while the last decades of Soviet rule and the post-communist era produced a graying of the state bureaucracy. The removal of 'bourgeois specialists' and the official leadership of the NEP era discussed in this volume by Orlovsky in the first two decades of the Soviet era led to the recruitment of younger and relatively inexperienced *vydvizhentsy* [promotees] into the lower and middle reaches of the bureaucracy as well as the early promotion of the post-Purge generation of 1938 into senior posts in state administration. By contrast, the relative political calm of the late Soviet period, taken together with a conscious policy of 'stability of cadres', allowed administrative personnel to age in place, thereby impeding the promotion of younger officials into leading administrative posts.[25]

The collapse of communism did not lead to a dramatic turnover in Russian officialdom. As a result, the pattern of officials aging in place continued unabated into the post-communist era. The graying of the bureaucracy alone would have posed hiring challenges for the Russian state, but three other factors magnified this problem. The first was the lower life expectancy of males, which declined to below 60 years by the end of the Soviet era and has not recovered significantly in the last two decades. The result has been significant numbers of deaths and premature retirements, often for health reasons, of senior administrative personnel. The second factor was a declining population base, which made it more difficult to replenish the ranks of officialdom from below. The final reason for concerns about a looming cadres deficit in the senior state bureaucracy is the competition with the private sector for qualified executive personnel. If in the Soviet era, administrative personnel remained in state service to the end of their careers, often in the same ministry or agency, many are now abandoning their government posts in mid- or late-career to assume positions in business.[26]

After the turn of the new century, the Putin administration advanced a novel solution to the cadres deficit by directing demobilized officers from a scaled-down military into responsible posts in civilian state administration. As Rowney points out in Chapter 2 of this volume, military personnel also moved into key senior civilian posts in tsarist Russia, though in that period they represented elite families who were at the political and social core of the Russian service state. If the current group of military officers, who are far more representative of the broader population than their tsarist predecessors, is unable to solve the demographic challenge facing Russian officialdom, or if the Russian political leadership decides to retreat from the formation of what Ol'ga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White have called a militocracy, the only solutions would appear to be promoting younger personnel more rapidly through the ranks or reversing the flow of experienced managers from the public to the private sector.[27] President Putin has already acted to make careers in state administration more attractive by significantly enhancing pay and perquisites and by reasserting state power over

the economy, which may change the calculation of senior managers who are trying to choose between careers in state or private organizations.

In Russia, as noted earlier, technological innovations have continually reshaped relations within the state and between the state and society. Like demographic forces, technological developments exert pressures for change that transcend regimes. Although the political leadership has some influence over the pace, direction, and consequences of demographic or technological change, it cannot ignore their inexorable march without inviting catastrophe. Where improvements in the country's transportation network facilitated the standardization of state administration in the diverse territories of late tsarist and early Soviet Russia, continued developments in information technology and telecommunications during the last half century reduced the operational distance within the state bureaucracy by improving access to information and to modern forms of data analysis. Where legal aid offices in the Soviet capital in the 1970s had only a single copy of the criminal code chained to the wall, law offices in Moscow are now computerized, with access to sophisticated and comprehensive legal databases.

However, the penetration of technology into Russian officialdom has always been limited and highly uneven. In part this is owing to inequalities of status and budgeting between individual agencies in the central bureaucracy and between the center and the periphery. These are distinctions, as noted earlier, that have been maintained across the tsarist, Soviet, and post-communist eras. Some executive agencies in post-communist Russia, such as the state committees formed to regulate aspects of the market economy, are fully computerized, while the legacy ministries in the social and cultural sectors still function in a more traditional informational environment. Moreover, the widespread use of computers in the central state administration in Moscow has not yet eliminated vestiges from the past like the state courier service [*fel'd'egerskaia sluzhba*], which transports documents for review and signature from ministry to ministry. In this case, as in so many others, the resistance to change is due less to financial constraints or to a lack of access to high technology than to aspects of the ministerial siloism discussed earlier—an unwillingness to abandon traditional methods of operation, whether for reasons of inertia, security, or an aversion to information-sharing with other state bureaucracies.[28] An institutionalized 'silo mentality' impedes global, or results-oriented, perspectives, and it prevents the establishment of cooperative ventures in information technology that would enhance coordination and communication within Russian officialdom just as it has within other officialdoms.

The same reluctance to upgrade inter-office communications and data-sharing is evident in the Russian state's relations with its citizens. To be sure, there have been important innovations in the post-communist era that are modernizing the state's role as purveyor of information and services to the population, eroding the deeply institutionalized standard that officialdom

served the state, not the public. New technologies have therefore had a dual impact on legibility, not only improving the state's capacity to penetrate society but also making the state more transparent and responsive to its citizens. Although Russia does not yet have an e-government of the sort that is touted in Great Britain, it does maintain websites that provide extensive information about the organization, personnel, rules, and operation of officialdom, information that was far less accessible throughout the previous history of Russian officialdom. The state has also constructed centralized and searchable databases, such as the State Registry of Companies [*Reestr iuridicheckikh lits*], which represent part of the essential information infrastructure of a modern market economy. Moreover, in some cities, such as Moscow, local governments have relied on new information systems to simplify procedures relating to the sale, transfer, and improvement of real property.

Despite these developments, Russian officialdom has been extraordinarily slow to realize the potential afforded by new technologies. Once again, the introduction of a more citizen-friendly state administration is hampered by budgetary constraints, especially in the provinces. However, a more serious impediment is the resistance of officialdom itself to disintermediation, that is, to the sweeping aside of the barriers imposed by the bureaucrat-middleman who constructs 'toll booths' that make everyday life more complicated and expensive for individuals and businesses. Because modestly-remunerated state officials can sell information and services to willing citizen-consumers with little fear of retribution, there are few incentives for them to roll out new technologies that would make their work environment more efficient and client-friendly. Even when the political leadership desires to remove this bureaucratic obstructionism, which appeared to have been the case with President Putin, they have few tools at their immediate disposal with which to force the hand of their agents, aside from exhortation, public criticism, or selective prosecution.

The chapters in this volume by Obolonsky and Barabashev, Krasnov, Obolonsky, and Zaitseva argue that transformations in Russian officialdom have occurred not only as a result of regime, demographic, or technological change but also because of periodic modernizing campaigns launched by the political leadership. The current campaign, now more than a decade old, is seeking to reform officialdom by introducing legislation that integrates elements of rational-legal bureaucracies, such as competitive hiring and tenders, into Russian officialdom. The question is whether one can transform officialdom, in Alexander Obolonsky's words, from a rulers' service to a civil or public service while leaving undisturbed the patrimonial pillars of political and administrative rule in Russia. In many respects, the current reform campaign is reminiscent of the rationalizing or liberalizing initiatives of the post-Stalin era in the USSR, which ameliorated conditions in the economy

and the bureaucracy but did not address the underlying causes of the poor performance of the Soviet state. For example, instead of battling corruption by altering the structure of incentives for those in officialdom, Russian regimes have relied instead on palliatives like law enforcement measures and a code of ethics.

Final thoughts

There is no simple answer to the question posed by our Russian colleagues: why has it been so difficult to reform Russian officialdom? Of the many culprits mentioned in their chapters and in this Conclusion, one of the most serious has been the two-centuries old ministerial tradition that sustains individual bureaucracies, most notably the power ministries, which are potent defenders of their organizational turf and values, values that are often at odds with the requirements of efficient economies and open societies. However, the organizational, environmental, and cultural barriers to reform—formidable as they may be—are not insurmountable. What is lacking is a political leadership that is willing to share power with law, professionalism, parties, and voters, and thereby mobilize the instruments of rule that can tame principals and agents while cutting across the silos created by functional ministerial boundaries.

Perhaps the most enduring feature of the Russian state is its ability to modernize, or at least to adapt to industrial and post-industrial technologies, without embracing key features of Western political and economic life. It is possible that Russia—like China and some other emerging societies—will continue to pursue alternative developmental paths while remaining economically and strategically competitive. It is also possible, however, that Russia's preference for state capitalism over a market economy, for managed political participation over liberal democracy, and for a patrimonial state over a rational-legal bureaucracy will lead it into a developmental impasse, the only escape from which would be yet another regime crisis. As long as the West itself does not descend into the abyss, Russian officialdom will likely find that the underperformance of its bureaucracy will continue to pose serious challenges for the legitimacy of the state and the competitiveness of the economy.

Notes

1. See Ezra Suleiman, *Dismantling Democratic States* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).
2. Eugene Huskey, 'Lowering the Barriers for Small Business: Is the 2001 Law on the Registration of Juridical Persons Making a Difference?', in *Remaking the Role of Law: Commercial Law in Russia and the CIS*, Kathryn Hendley, ed. (Huntington, NY: Juris Publishing, 2007), 149–70.

3. For an explanation of 'hollowing out', which applies insights into the 'hollow crown' of late medieval England to modern states, see *The Hollow Crown: Countervailing Trends in Core Executives*, Patrick Weller, Herman Bakvis, and R. A. W. Rhodes, eds (London: Macmillan, 1997).
4. See Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Centre for Co-operation with Non-Members, *Russia Programme, 2001* (Paris: OECD, 2001).
5. Unlike Russia, with its off-budget accounting, the ideal Weberian 'bureaucratic state ... puts its whole administrative expense on the budget and equips the lower authorities with the current means of expenditure, the use of which the state regulates and controls.' Max Weber, 'Bureaucracy', in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 223.
6. Gary Miller, 'The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 8 (2005): 210.
7. A 'demobilized society' is a society where the population is not actively and regularly involved in politics. In the case of Russia, the challenging economic circumstances of the early 1990s and a lack of a sense of efficacy in earlier efforts to participate in politics demobilized a society that had begun to embrace diverse forms of political participation in the late Gorbachev era.
8. Stefan Hedlund, *Russian Path Dependence* (London: Routledge, 2005), 126–7.
9. In addition to her chapter in this book, see Martine Mespoulet, *Statistique et revolution en Russie: un compromis impossible, 1880–1930* (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2001); also see Yoshiko Herrera, 'The Transformation of State Statistics', in *The State after Communism: Governance in the New Russia*, Timothy J. Colton and Stephen Holmes, eds (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 74–5. In the view of Michael Mann, statistics was originally a 'logistical invention' of the state, over which, in the West, it was unable to maintain control. Michael Mann, 'The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms, and Results', in *States in History*, John A. Hall, ed. (London: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 118.
10. For a sustained account of the operational style of Russian officialdom, see Karl W. Ryavec, *Russian Bureaucracy: Power and Pathology* (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).
11. On informal practices, see the works of Alena Ledeneva, *Russia's Economy of Informal Exchange: Blat, Networks, and Informal Exchange* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), and *How the Soviet Union Really Works: The Informal Practices that Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and Business* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).
12. As Rudolph and Rudolph have argued, some elements of patrimonialism are found in rational-legal bureaucracies and may even serve to mitigate some of their rigidities. Lloyd Rudolph and Susanne Rudolph, 'Authority and Power in Bureaucratic and Patrimonial Administration: A Revisionist Interpretation of Weber on Bureaucracy', *World Politics*, no. 1 (1979): 195–227. But the patrimonialism that we have in mind follows Weber's idea that society is seen as an extended household of the ruler, who refuses to be bound by stable rules. It is, more simply, the 'personal appropriation of public authority.' Ibid., 215. Many scholars have noted the value of a less Weberian order for modern states, that is a state administration that is less insulated from society and more open to political influence. See, for example, Peter Evans, *Embedded Autonomy: States and industrial Transformation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), and Ben Ross Schneider, *Politics*

within the State: The Bureaucrats and Industrial Policy in Authoritarian Brazil (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991), who argues that 'personalism can in fact enhance bureaucratic performance', 12.

13. See, for example, Robin Theobald, 'Patrimonialism', *World Politics*, no. 4 (1982): 458–9.
14. A point covered by an ever-growing literature: see Theodore von Laue, *Why Lenin? Why Stalin? A Reappraisal of the Russian Revolution, 1900–1930* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1964), esp. 50–1; George Yaney, *The Urge to Mobilize. Agrarian Reform in Russia, 1861–1930* (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1982) and James C. Scott's extended gloss in *Seeing Like a State. How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), Chapter 6.
15. For disparate examples that apply the concepts of 'silo politics' and its Russian counterpart, *vedomstvennost'*, see Patrick Lencioni, *Silo Politics and Turf Wars. A Leadership Fable about Destroying the Barriers that Turn Colleagues into Competitors* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2006) and Stephen Whitefield, *Industrial Power and the Soviet State* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 51–63.
16. S. A. Denisov, 'Ischeznovenie sotsial'nogo sloia politikov v sovremennoi Rossii', Tezisy dokladov i Vserossiiskoi nauchnoi konferentsii 'Sorokinskie chteniia 2004: Rossiiskoe obshchestvo i vyzovy globalizatsii' (Moscow: Al'fa-M, 2005), 99.
17. Oksana Prilepina, 'Zachem biznesmeny idut v chinovniki', *Ogonek*, no. 11 (2006): 22.
18. James E. Rauch and Peter B. Evans, 'Bureaucratic Structure and Bureaucratic Performance in Less Developed Countries', *Journal of Public Economics*, no. 1 (2000): 51. Much principal-agent theory also rests on suspect assumptions about human rationality. As March and Olsen argue, '[a]lthough self-interest undoubtedly permeates politics, action is often based more on discovering the normatively appropriate behavior than on calculating the return expected from alternative choices.' James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, 'The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life', *American Political Science Review*, 78, no. 3 (1984): 744.
19. Thomas Ertman argues that '[despite] the reforms of the 19th century, patron-client relations, lack of clear boundaries between politics and administration, and redistribution of public funds towards political insiders remain a serious problem in Spain, Portugal, France, and Italy', as well as in former colonies in regions like Latin America. In Southern Europe, however, the problem is less serious than in Russia. Thomas Ertman, *Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 322. On this phenomenon in the Soviet period, see Gerald Easter, *Reconstructing the State: Personal Networks and Elite Identit*y (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
20. In the Soviet era, as Gill points out, the vulnerability of clients led to the manipulation of the personnel system to strengthen the political base of party leaders at all levels of the system.
21. For a definition of power ministries, see endnote 27, Chapter 13.
22. *Statisticheskii biulleten'*, no. 4 (August 2001): 23.
23. Ibid., 24–5. Yoshiko Herrera's conclusions about *Goskomstat* are almost certainly applicable to the late Soviet and post-communist bureaucracies as a whole: '... the existence of so many female workers may have actually boosted productivity and may have been one of the ways that *Goskomstat* was able to proceed with reforms

in a low-compensation environment.' Yoshiko Herrara, 'The Transformation of State Statistics', in *The State after Communism: Governance in the New Russia*, 77.

24. Jessica Auer, 'Gender and Transitional Authority: Women in Senior Administrative Positions in the Russian Bureaucracy' (Senior thesis, Stetson University, 2008).
25. Mark Beissinger, 'In Search of Generations of Soviet Politics', *World Politics*, no. 2 (1986): 288–314.
26. A further factor exacerbating the cadres shortage in the senior ranks is the mandatory retirement age of 65, beyond which officials may only work for a limited time on short-term contracts.
27. Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White, 'Putin's Militocracy', *Post-Soviet Affairs*, no. 4 (2003): 289–306.
28. In part, it is a reflection of path dependence, where the 'results and inferences of past experiences are stored in standard operating procedures, professional rules, and the elementary rules of thumb of a practical person.' March and Olsen, 'The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life', 745.

Select Bibliography

Aberbach, Joel D., Robert D. Putnam, and Bert A. Rockman. *Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981.

Afanas'ev, M. N. *Klientelizm i rossiiskaia gosudarstvennost': Issledovanie klientarnykh otnoshenii, ikh roli v evoliutsii i upadke proshlykh form rossiiskoi gosudarstvennosti, ikh vliianiia na politicheskie instituty i deiatel'nost' vlastvuiushchikh grupp v sovremennoi Rossii*. Moscow: Tsentr konstitutsionnykh issledovanii Moskovskogo obshchestvennogo nauchnogo fonda, 1997.

Agadzhanov, S. G. and V. V. Trepavlov, eds. *Natsional'nye okrainy Rossiiskoi Imperii. Stanovlenie i razvitie sistemy upravleniia*. Moscow: Slavianskii dialog, 1997.

Anderson, Perry. *Lineages of the Absolutist State*. London: NLB, 1974.

———. *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite. A Case Study of the Ukrainian Apparatus*. New York: Praeger, 1959.

Arkhipova, T. G., M. F. Rumiantseva, and A. S. Senin. *Istoriia gosudarstvennoi sluzhby v Rossii. XVIII–XX veka. Uchebnoe posobie*. Moscow: Russian State Humanities University, 2001.

Armstrong, John A. *The European Administrative Elite*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973.

Baiguzin, R. N. et al. *Administrativnye reformy v Rossii: istoriia i sovremennost'*. Moscow: Rosspen, 2006.

Baker, Randall. *Transitions from Authoritarianism: The Role of the Bureaucracy*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002.

Barabashev, Aleksei, and Aleksander Obolonskii, eds. *Gosudarstvennaia sluzhba: kompleksnyi podkhod*. Moscow: Delo, 2009.

Barabashev, Aleksei, et al. *Reforma gosudarstvennoi sluzhby Rossiiskoi Federatsii*. Moscow: Higher School of Economics, 2006.

Barzelay, Michael. *The New Public Management: Improving Research and Policy Dialogue*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001.

Bekke, Hans, James Perry, and Theo Toonen. *Civil Service Systems in Comparative Perspective*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996.

Berliner, Joseph S. *Factory and Manager in the USSR*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957.

Birnbaum, Pierre. *The Heights of Power*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.

Blum, Alain, and Martine Mespoulet. *L'anarchie bureaucratique: pouvoir et statistique sous Staline*. Paris: Editions la Decouverte, 2003.

Clark, William A. *Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom: Combating Corruption in the Political Elite, 1965–1990*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993.

Colton, Timothy J. and Stephen Holmes, eds. *The State after Communism: Governance in the New Russia*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006.

Daniels, Robert V. *The Rise and Fall of Communism in Russia*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007.

Downs, Anthony. *Inside Bureaucracy*. Boston: Little Brown, 1967.

Easter, Gerald. *Reconstructing the State: Personal Networks and Elite Identity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Eroshkin, N. P. *Istoriia gosudarstvennykh uchrezhdenii dorevoliutsionnoi Rossii*, 4th edition. Moscow: Tretii Rim, 1997.

Ertman, Thomas. *Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Evans, Alfred B. Jr., and Vladimir Gel'man, eds. *The Politics of Local Government in Russia*. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004.
Evans, Peter. *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.
Fainsod, Merle. *How Russia is Ruled*, revised edition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963.
Firsov, M. V. *Istoriia sotsial'noi raboty v Rossii*. Moscow: MGCU, 2001.
Fortescue, Stephen. *Policy-Making for Russian Industry*. New York: St. Martin's, 1997.
Gill, Graeme J. *The Collapse of a Single-Party System: The Disintegration of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
———. *The Origins of the Stalinist Political System*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Gorlizki, Yoram, and Oleg Khlevniuk. *Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945–1953*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.
Gorshkov, M. K. et al. *Biurokratiia i vlast' v novoi Rossii: pozitsiia naseleniia i otsenka ekspertov*. Moscow: Institute of Sociology, RAN, 2005.
Gregory, Paul R. *The Political Economy of Stalinism: Evidence from the Soviet Secret Archives*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Grishkovets, A. A. *Problemy pravovogo regulirovaniia gosudarstvennoi sluzhby v Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, Parts I and II. Moscow: RAGS, 2002.
Hall, John A., ed. *States in History*. London: Basil Blackwell, 1986.
Hedlund, Stefan. *Russian Path Dependence*. London: Routledge, 2005.
Hesse, J. J. *Administrative Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993.
Heusala, Anna-Liisa. *The Transitions of Local Administration Culture in Russia*. Saarijärvi: Kikimora, 2005.
Hirschman, Albert O. *Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1970.
Holmes, Leslie. *The End of Communist Party: Anti-Corruption Campaigns and Legitimation Crisis*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Hough, Jerry. *The Soviet Prefects*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969.
Huskey, Eugene. *Presidential Power in Russia*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999.
———, ed. *Executive Power and Soviet Politics*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1992.
La Palombara, Joseph, ed. *Bureaucracy and Political Development*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.
Lane, David, and Cameron Ross. *The Transition from Communism to Capitalism: Ruling Elites from Gorbachev to Yeltsin*. New York: St. Martin's, 1999.
Ledeneva, Alena. *Russia's Economy of Informal Exchange: Blat, Networks, and Informal Exchange*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
———. *How the Soviet Union Really Works: The Informal Practices that Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and Business*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006.
Lewin, Moshe. *The Soviet Century*. London: Verso, 2005.
Lovell, Stephen, Alena Ledeneva, and Andrei Rogachevskii, eds. *Bribery and* Blat *in Russia: Negotiating Reciprocity from the Middle Ages to the 1990s*. New York: St. Martin's, 2000.
Lysenko, V. N. et al. *Vlast': Pravitel'stvo Rossii*. Moscow: Institut sovremennoi politiki, 1997.

Magun, Vladimir, Robert Brym, Vladimir Gimpelson, Sergei Morozkov, and Alla Chirikova. *Molodye spetsialisty na rossiiskoi gosudarstvennoi i munitsipal'noi sluzhbe: Nauchnyi doklad po itogam issledovaniia oblastnykh i gorodskikh administratsii*. Moscow: Institut sotsiologii, 2003.

Manning, Nick, and Neil Parison. *International Public Administration Reform: Implications for the Russian Federation*. Washington: World Bank, 2003.

March, James G. and Herbert A. Simon, with the collaboration of Harold Guetzkow. *Organizations*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958.

Marshall, Alexander. *The Russian General Staff and Asia*. London: Routledge, 2006.

Martin, Terry. *The Affirmative Action Empire. Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001.

Mespoulet, Martine. *Statistique et revolution en Russie: un compromis impossible, 1880–1930*. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2001.

Mironov, B. N. *Sotsial'naia istoriia Rossii perioda imperii: XVIII-nachalo XX v.: genezis lichnosti, demokratiche*, 2 vols. St. Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 1999.

Morrison, A. S. *Russian Rule in Samarkand, 1868–1910: A Comparison with British India*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

North, Douglass C. *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Nunberg, B. *The State after Communism: Administrative Transitions in Central and Eastern Europe*. Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1999.

OECD. *Russia: Building Rules for the Market*. Paris: OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform, November 2005.

Orlovsky, Daniel. *The Limits of Reform: The Ministry of Internal Affairs in Imperial Russia, 1802–1881*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981.

Page, Edward C. and Vincent Wright. *Bureaucratic Elites in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Top Officials*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Peirson, Paul. *Politics in Time. History, Institutions, and Social Analysis*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.

Pintner, Walter McKenzie, and Don Karl Rowney, eds. *Russian Officialdom. The Bureaucratization of Russian Society from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Centuries*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980.

Piskotin, M. I. *Sotsializm i gosudarstvennoe upravlenie*. Moscow: Nauka, 1984.

Rees, E. Arfon. 'Politics, Administration and Decision-Making in the Soviet Union, 1917–1953.' *Jahrbuch fur europaische Verwaltungsgeschichte (JEV),* vol. 16 (2004): 259–290.

———, and Ferenc Feher. *Political Legitimation in Communist States*. London: Macmillan, 1982.

Rigby, T. H. *Lenin's Government: Sovnarkom, 1917–1922*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

Rowney, Don K. *Transition to Technocracy: The Structural Origins of the Soviet Administrative State*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989.

Ryavec, Karl W. *Russian Bureaucracy: Power and Pathology*. Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield, 2003.

Sahlin-Andersson, Kerstin. *National, International and Transnational Constructions of New Public Management*. Stockholm: Stockholm Center for Organizational Research, 2000.

Schapiro, Leonard. *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*. New York: Random House, 1960.

Schneider, Ben Ross. *Politics within the State: The Bureaucrats and Industrial Policy in Authoritarian Brazil*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991.
Scott, James C. *Seeing Like a State. How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition have Failed*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.
Seton-Watson, Hugh, *Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism*. London: Methuen, 1977.
Shearer, David. *Industry, State, and Society in Stalin's Russia, 1926–1934*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997.
Shepelev, P. E. *Chinovnyi mir Rossii XVIII-nachalo XX v*. St. Petersburg: 'Iskusstvo-SPB', 1999.
Shevchenko, Iuliia. *The Central Government of Russia: From Gorbachev to Putin*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2004.
Solnick, Steven L. *Stealing the State. Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1998.
Solomon Peter H., Jr. *Soviet Criminal Justice under Stalin*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Suleiman, Ezra N. *Dismantling Democratic States*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003.
Torstendahl, Rolf. *Bureaucratization in Northwestern Europe, 1880–1985. Domination and Governance*. New York: Routledge, 1991.
Verheijen, Tony. *Civil Service Systems in Central and Eastern Europe*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1999.
Vinogradova, E., O. Kirichenko, and P. Kudiukin. *Gosudarstvennaia i munitsipal'naia sluzhba: s chem tolknetsia budushchaia reforma (rezul'taty pilotnogo sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniia)*. Moscow: Moskovskii tsentr Karnegi, 2000.
Weissman, Neil. *Reform in Tsarist Russia: The State Bureaucracy and Local Government*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1981.
Weller, Patrick, Herman Bakvis, and R. A. W. Rhodes, eds. *The Hollow Crown: Countervailing Trends in Core Executives*. London: Macmillan, 1997.
Whelan, Heide. *Alexander III and the State Council: Bureaucracy and Counter-Reform in Late Imperial Russia*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1982.
Whitefield, Stephen. *Industrial Power and the Soviet State*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.
Zaitseva, T. V., ed. *Istoriia popytok reformirovaniia s 1992 po 2000 god*. Moscow: Ves mir, 2003.
Zaionchkovskii, P. A. *Pravitel'stvennyi apparat samoderzhavnoi Rossii v XIX v*. Moscow: Mysl', 1978.

Index

Aberbach, Joel, 253
academies of state service, 258, 303, 319
  see also Russian Academy of State Service (RAGS)
Academy of Planning, 163
Academy of Sciences
  Estonian, 84
  Russian, x, xi, 84
  USSR, 156, 160, 162, 164, 165, 191, 203
Academy of Social Sciences, 302, 303
Adamishin, Anatolii, 201
administration, imperial
  colonial absolutist, 27–8, 37, 40
  patrimonial absolutist, 27, 37, 40
Adres-Kalendar, 20
Afghanistan, viii, 95, 199, 202, 207 n 5
Aleksandrov-Agentov, Andrei, 197
Alexander I, 20, 22, 23
Alexander II, 20, 22, 23, 30, 40, 73, 96
Alexander III, 1, 30, 40, 41, 73, 101
All-Union Union of Soviet and Commercial Employees, 136, 138, 140–1, 144–8
Anderson, Benedict, 37–8
Anderson, Perry, 27, 32, 37
Antonenko-Davydovych, Borys, 59
Arendarenko, Georgii, 95
Armstrong, John, ix, 34, 115 n 5
Auer, Jessica, 326
Azerbaijan, 146

barshchina, 35
Beria, Lavrentii, 127, 177, 207 n 7
Berliner, Joseph, 170
Berman, Harold, 182
Bessmertnykh, Alexander, 201
Boiarskii, A. I., 158–61
Bowman, Linda, 39
Brandgendler, L. S., 157
Brezhnev, Leonid
  maintenance of personalist networks, 129–30
  post-Stalin leadership and personnel policies, 129–30, 133, n.23
  stability of cadres policy, 114
Brunberg, Eduard, 80
Bunge, Nikolai Kh, 33
bureaucracy
  financing of, 5, 33, 35, 39–40, 216, 223–4, 278, 284–5, 318, 328
  forces for change in: demographic, 304, 325–9; ethnic diversity, 73–4, 325–6; regime change, 42, 324–5; technology, 328–9
  general literature on, 2–4, 11–13, 14 nn 5 and 6
  methods of control of, 10, 112–3, 120, 123, 127–8, 137–40, 143, 146, 153–4, 161, 164–5, 206, 217, 225–6, 256–7, 261–2, 310, 319–29; checking mechanisms on, 112–13, 256–7, 319
  professionalization of, 9, 20, 101, 274, 282, 287, 320–1
  Russification *vs*. indigenization of, 46–65, 72–84, 99, 105, 114, 326
  size of, 30, 48, 51, 74, 82, 90, 138–9, 147–8, 217, 222, 224, 295, 307, 310
  state service *vs*. civil service, 301–2, 305, 329
  structure of, 8, 21–2, 34, 113, 120–1, 128
  work routines in, 52, 54–7, 62, 64, 98, 101–2, 128–9, 145–8, 156, 193, 281–2, 328–9

cadres deficit (*kadrovoi golod*), 327
cadres reserve list (*kadrovoi rezerv*), 261–2
Catherine the Great, 20, 89
Cemlyn, Sarah, 286
center-periphery relations, 6–7, 12, 322–3, 326–7

post-communist, 217–18, 222–3, 225–6, 257, 265, 279–81
Soviet, 111–15, 125, 130
tsarist, 20–1, 23, 25, 26, 29, 33, 41, 46–7, 58–61, 63, 65, 72–3, 76, 83, 99–100, 105 n 1
Center for Strategic Research, 306
Central Directorate of Accounting for the National Economy (*TsUNKhU*), 155
Central Institute of Radiography, 162
Central Statistical Administration (TsSU), 148
in the 1920s and 1930s, 153–4
institutional continuity with pre-revolutionary era, 153
Central Statistical Committee (tsarist), 36–7
chancery men (*prikaznye liudi*), 27
Chaplin, Boris, 201
Cherniaev, Anatolii, 203–4, 210 n 68
Chernobyl, 131, 280
Chetverikov, N. S., 161–2
Chirac, Jacques, 203
Chuprov, A. A., 162, 168 n 22
Churkin, Vitalii, 204
circulation of elites
between public and private sectors, 218, 266–7
see also personnel, geographic rotation of
civil service, *see* bureaucracy
Clark, William, 170
clientelism, *see* patron–client relations
Code of Administration of the State and Provinces, 10
Cohen, Francis, 203
colonial absolutist administration, *see* administration, imperial
Cominform and Comintern, 190–4
Commissariat for Affairs of Insurance, 157
Commission on Administrative Reform, 30–7
Committee of Ministers, 22
Communist Academy, 155, 160
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)
Central Committee, 120–1, 122, 178, 190–6, 200, 203–6, 218, 256–7, 302
Central Control Committee (Commission), 140, 165
Commission for International Policy, 204, 206
conferences and congresses, 120–1, 144, 147, 148, 178, 191, 192, 203
International Department, 191–6, 198–9, 201–7
Orgburo (Organizational Bureau), 121–2
Politburo, 113, 119, 120–1, 195, 201, 206, 301
relations with Soviet state, 112, 114, 115 n 3, 123
role of, 119–20, 123, 131–2
Communist University of Workers of the Orient, 155
Conjuncture Institute, 161–2
Constitutional Court, 230 n 43, 313
Constitution, Stalin (1936), 172
corruption, 7, 12, 112, 231
definition of, 170–1
efforts to combat, 113, 130, 169–84, 257, 319
examples of, 54, 57, 61, 90, 98–100, 114, 143, 170, 173, 176–81, 217, 325
Cossack-Hetmanate, 58
Council of Ministers
post-communist, 226, 244, 260, 302, 327
Soviet, 164, 177, 279
tsarist, 22–3
courts, 80, 89–90, 261
see also law and lawyers
crime, official (*dolzhnostnye prestupleniia*), 173–4
culture, bureaucratic, 28, 41–2, 255–6, 319
endurance of, 1950s and 1960s, 178–81
incidence of, 174–5

Daly, Jonathan W., 33
Denisov, S. A., 323

departmentalism, 255–6, 318, 321–2, 328, 330
Department of General Affairs (tsarist), 23
Derkach, Kuzma, 57
Dobrynin, Anatolii, 201–5
Dolgorukov, Prince, 59
Downs, Anthony, 3
Drahomaniv, Mykhailo, 62
dual administration, 8–11, 121–2, 256, 268 n 9, 294–5
dual subordination (*dvoinoe podchinenie*), 223, 229 n 29
Duma
  boyar, 29
  post-communist, and anti-reformist measures, 313
  tsarist, 21–2
Dvinskii, V., 177

education, *see* personnel
ENA (*Ecole nationale d'administration*), 266
estates (*sosloviia*), 32, 52, 137
Evans, Peter, 324, 332 n18

Fainsod, Merle, 112
Falin, Valentin, 205, 206
Federal Assembly, *see Duma*, post-communist, and anti-reformist measures
Feldbrugge, F. J. M., 170
Finland, 24, 30, 82
Fojan, Etienne, 202
formuliarnye spiski, (records of service), 20, 91–2
FSB (*Federal'naia sluzhba bezopasnosti*), 265, 266

Gerchuk, Ia.P., 161
Gilbert, Kate, 286
Goldman, Wendy, 139
Gorbachev, Mikhail S.
  destruction of personalist networks in Communist Party, 131–2
  negative impact on party bureaucratic norms, 130
  personalization of foreign policy, 205–7
  reduces influence of Gromyko in foreign policy, 199–201
  transformation of the role of the International Department of the CC CPSU, 203–4
  XIX Party Conference, 131
Gorkin, A. F., 182
Gorshenin, K., 175–8, 179
Gosplan, *see* ministries and state committees (commissariats, 1917–46)
Governors-general, 72, 96, 105
Gref, German, 306–7
Gremetz, Maxime, 203
Grishin, B. S., 174
Groman, V. G., 161
Gromyko, Anatolii, 196–7
Gromyko, Andrei A., 196–7, 199, 201–2
GULag (State Administration for Labor Camps), 178, 322

Hall, Peter, 254
Hedlund, Stefan, 3, 320
Hellat, Karl, 77–8
Hessler, Julie, 141
higher party schools, 255–6, 258, 302–3, 319
  see also academies of state service
Higher School of Economics, x, xi, 311
Hirschman, Albert, 155
His Imperial Majesty's Chancellery, 21
Hladky, Illia, 62
Hosking, Geoffrey, 32
Hrushevsky, Mykhallo, 63

Iaroshenko, L., 164–5
Iarskaia-Smirnova, Elena, 275, 282, 286
Iastremskii, B. S., 154, 157–8
ideology, 7–8
IMF (International Monetary Fund), 281
Imperial Ruling Senate, 9
indigenization of officials, 114, 326
  see also bureaucracy
informal practices, 11, 59, 61, 118–20, 125, 130–1, 143, 183, 233, 236–9, 320–1, 324, 329
Institute for International Relations and the World Economy (IMEMO), 204
Institute of Market Cultures, 161
Institute of Medicine and Genetics, 162

institutionalism, viii, 2–3
institutions, 2–4, 14 n 6

Jõgever, Jaan, 79, 86–7 n 33

Kapnist, Count, 59
Kasianov, Mikhail, 307
Kaufman, Alexander A., 36
Kazakhstan, 179
KGB, 114, 148, 190, 200, 203, 206, 265
Khan, Abdurrahman (Emir of Afghanistan), 95
Khotimskii, V. I., 155–60
Khrushchev, Nikita S
 and disruption of bureaucratic norms, 128–9
 and maintenance of personalist leadership, 127–8
 and post-Stalin institutions, 126–7
Kingston-Mann, Esther, 32
Kirghiz Republic, 181
Kirichenko, V. F., 173
Kissinger, Henry, 196–7
Kliuchevsky, V. O., 314
Kokhlych, K., 62
Kondratiev, N. D., 62
Konius, A. A., 161
Kornienko, Georgii, 202, 205–6
Korsitsky, E. B., 156
Kotliar, S., 140, 144
Kotsonis, Yanni, 39
Kovalev, Anatolii, 201, 205
Kozak, Dmitrii, 223
Kramar, Petro, 61
Krasnov, Mikhail, 306
Kriuchkov, Vladimir, 206
Krugovaia poruka (joint responsibility in communes) and Russian absolutism, 32, 36
Kruzhkov, Anatolii, 224
Kryshtanovskaya, Olga, 265, 327–8
Kurakin, Prince, 59
Kvitsinskii, Yulii, 202

Lajoinie, Andre, 203
Lampert, Nick, 170
Laurent, Paul, 154, 203
law and lawyers, 9–11, 33, 49–50, 76–8, 145, 171, 220, 256–7, 320–1, 324
 see also courts; professionalism
Ledeneva, Alena, ix
legibility
 definition of, 31
 of society to the state, 28, 32–3, 38, 317, 329
 of state to society, 314, 329
 of state by the state, 328
 see also technology
Lehmbruch, Barbara, ix
liberalism
 economic, 311–12
 neo-, 4
Lithuania, 115
Livland, 24, 73, 76, 78–81
local government, *see* territorial administration
Lotman, Yurii, 304
Lykoshin, N. S., 95, 98–9, 101, 104

Makarenko, Anton, 275
Malenkov, Georgii, 146, 175
Maltsev, Victor, 202
Manasein, N. A., 79
Mann, Michael, 132 n 3
Martens, Friedrich Fromhold, 77, 86 n 26
Marx, Morstein, 262
Medvedev, Dmitrii, 266, 308
mestnichestvo system (boyar), 29
mestnoe upravlenie, *see* territorial administration
militarization of cadres (Putin enrollment), *see* Kryshtanovskaya
military
 administrators, 25, 89–105
 bureaucrats in Turkestan: adaptation to local culture, 97–9; comparison with other regions in late 19th c., 102–3; social and educational characteristics of, 91–7; typical in late 19th c., 103–5
 general role of, 26–7, 29
 as recruitment source for civilian administrators, 92, 217, 265, 309, 327
Military-Industrial Committee, 48
Miller, Alexei, 83

ministerial system, 6, 20–3, 34, 41, 226, 322
ministries and state committees (commissariats, 1917–46)
Agriculture, 180, 222
Commerce, 22
Defense (War), 28, 100, 148
Economic Development and Trade, 307, 310
Finance, 35, 41, 148, 222, 266
Foreign Affairs, 91, 97, 190, 191, 195; and ideological agreements with International Department, 199; and rivalry with the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, 196–9; *see also* Gorbachev, Mikhail S.; Gromyko, Andrei A.
Health, 233, 278
Internal Affairs (Interior), 25, 36, 40, 41, 73, 91, 148, 172, 173, 220, 270 n 30
Justice, 33, 80, 148, 170, 172, 173, 257
Labor and Social Development, 156, 275, 278, 279
Natural Resources, 264, 266
Public Enlightenment, 22, 39
Railways, 191, 260
Social Protection, 275
State Property (Domains), 39, 233
Transportation, 174
War, 28, 100
Miretsky, Aleksandr, 55
Mirny, Panas, 62
Mironov, Boris N., 30, 82–3
modernization
adaptation of tsarist officials to, 40–2
administrative integration of Estonians as integral to, 73–4
Moine, Nathalie, 274
Molchanovsky, N., 62
Moscow Institute of Economics and Statistics (MIES), 157, 160
Moscow State University, 157, 160, 163
Moses, Joel, ix
Motherland Party (*Rodina*), 312
Mukhanov, A., 59

Nalivkin, V. P., 104
Nekrashchuk, Pavlo, 57
Neplyuevsky Cadet Corps, 97, 103
New Economic Policy (NEP), 138, 143, 150 n 5, 327
New Public Management, 4–5, 11, 219, 303, 317
New Russia, 59
Nicholas II, 20–1
Nikolaevskaya Academy, 95
nomenklatura, 10, 121–2, 256
North, Douglass, C., 3, 13

OBKhSS (*Otdel bor'by s khishcheniem sotsialisticheskoi sobstvennosti*), 179
Oblastnoe upravlenie, see territorial administration
obrok, 35
OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), 4, 318
officialdom, *see* bureaucracy; personnel
official nationalism, 33, 41
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, *see* OECD
Orthodox Riga Theological Academy, 79
Osinskii, V. V., 165
Osokina, Elena, 141
Ostroumov, Nikolai, 94

Pahlen, K. K. (Count), 99, 101, 102
Commission, 100
Report, 101–2
party schools (higher), *see* higher party schools
patrimonial absolutist empire, *see* administration, imperial
patrimonialism
definition, 28, 129–30
in tsarist administration, 28, 34, 41–2, 223, 331 n 12
patron–client relations, 28, 58, 61, 114, 119–20, 124–6, 130–1, 262, 324
Paul, Miron, 78
personnel
age profile of, 95, 139, 217, 240, 247, 249, 283, 304, 326–7
career patterns of, 56–7, 114, 120, 124, 154, 163, 166–7, 201–2, 218, 239–46, 248, 250, 256, 262–4, 266–7, 282–3, 323

competence of, 61, 81, 90, 100, 102–3, 242–5, 247, 249, 266, 276, 323
education of, 51, 56, 61, 76–80, 90–7, 99–105, 137–9, 141–2, 145, 173, 198, 225, 255–6, 258, 274–6, 281, 286, 302–3
ethnic backgrounds of, 24, 26–7, 37, 39, 46–65, 72–84, 97–9, 103, 325
gender of, *see* women
geographic rotation of, 217, 256, 266, 326; its elimination, 326
hiring and promotion of, *see* recruitment system
linguistic background of, 24, 37, 97–8, 101
pay and perquisites of, 11–12, 53–6, 93–4, 98, 100, 103, 141, 144, 147–8, 221–2, 225, 248–9, 325, 327
political orientation of, 55, 57, 59–60, 62–5, 113, 124, 198, 283, 303–5, 315
religious background of, 78–9, 92, 96–7, 104–5, 145
social backgrounds of, 9, 26, 90–2, 95, 105, 135–8, 145–6, 157, 198
survival strategies of, 113, 154–67
turnover of, 217, 233, 327
Peter the Great, 9, 20, 23, 29, 35, 258, 319
Petrovskii, Vladimir, 201
Pintner, Walter, ix, 91, 267
Pisarev, I. Iu, 157
Plekhanov National Institute, 155
Pobedonostsev, Konstantin P., 33
Polianskii, Nicholas, 193, 196, 198
politics and administration (effacement of the distinction in Russia), 6, 253–67, 305, 321, 323
Polivanov, V. P., 79
Polliak, G. S., 158–61
poll tax, 35
Polytechnic Institute of St. Petersburg, 156, 161
Ponomarev, Boris, 191–4, 199, 202
Presidency (Russian), 216, 310
and reform, 219–20, 299
Security Council, 305
State Legal Department, 308
principals and agents, 3, 10, 12, 34, 39, 41, 59, 111–12, 114, 169, 254–5, 257–60, 263, 321, 323–4, 330
Procuracy, 145, 170, 172, 174, 175, 176, 319
Procurator of the Holy Synod, 33
professionalism, 319–21
see also bureaucracy
property and property rights, 34–6, 100, 129, 172–81, 313, 318, 325
property, socialist (campaigns against theft of), 175–6, 177–8, 179
legislation of 1961 and 1962, 181–3
prosecution of officials, 176–7
Provisional Government, 23, 81, 149–50 n 5
Pusta, Kaarel-Robert, 81
Putin, Vladimir
and erosion of political pluralism, 215–16
and integration of local government, 225–6
and 'Putin enrollment', 217
Putnam, Robert, 253

Rada, Central, 59
rank, *see* status (of officials)
RAO IeES (state electrical monopoly), 264
Rashevsky, F., 62
Rauch, James, 267 n 3, 271 n 39, 324
recruitment system, 10–12, 323, 325, 327
post-communist era, 218, 220, 231–2, 234–9, 250, 256, 260, 274, 282, 304–5, 310
Soviet era, 112, 121–4, 128–32
reform of bureaucracy
barriers to, 5, 219, 291–3, 321, 330
efforts at, 219–20, 290–1, 295, 301–15, 318, 329
international influences on, 4, 11–12, 35, 275–6, 281, 285–6, 290–1, 303, 305, 317–18, 330
politics of, 292–4, 296–9, 303, 307–8, 310–15
reasons for, 324–5
regional government, *see* territorial administration
Repnin, Prince, 59
Riabov, Iakov, 202

Riga Theological Seminary, 78, 79
Ritterschaften (Estonia), 72
Rivera, David, 267
Rivera, Sharon Werning, 267
Rockman, Bert, 253
Rokytiansky, Oleksandr, 57
Roskadry (Main Department for the Training of Officials), 302–4, 310
Rudchenko, Ivan, 62
Rudnev, Tikhon, 59
Rumiantsev, Prince, 59
Russian Academy of State Service (RAGS), 303, 305
Russian Trade and Industry Bank, 78
Russification, *see* bureaucracy
Russow, Friedrich Nikolai, 76

St. Petersburg Theological Academy, 78, 79
St. Petersburg University, 77, 78, 79, 97
Saltykov-Shchedrin, Mikhail, 106 n 8, 304
Schuyler, Eugene, 94, 96, 97, 106 n 10
Schwartz, Charles, 170
Scott, James C., 31–2
Senate, *see* Imperial Ruling Senate
Seton-Watson, Hugh, 33
Shakhnazarov, Georgii, 189, 205
Shakhovskoi, S. V., 73, 76
shefstvo (sponsorship), 141, 143–4
Shenaev, Vladimir, 204
Shevardnadze, Eduard
  and marginalization of Gromyko, 201
  and personalization of foreign policy with Gorbachev, 205–7
  see also, Gorbachev, Mikhail S.
Shevchenko, Arkadii, 196
Shevchenko, Stepan, 61
silo politics, *see* departmentalism
single bureaucratic culture, *see* culture, bureaucratic
Skalon, E. N., 78
Skoropadsky, Hetman Pavlo, 61
Slutskii, E. E., 161–2
Solnick, Stephen, 8
Solomon, Peter, ix, 268 n 17
soul tax, *see* poll tax
Speransky, Mikhail, 89, 304
spoils vs. merit system, *see* recruitment system
stability of cadres policy, *see* Brezhnev, Leonid
Stalin, J. V.
  and ‘circular flow of power’, 123
  and decree against corruption of 4 June, 1947, 174
  patron–client chains and personal dominance, 125–6
  as ultimate personalist leader, 125–6
Stanziani, Alessandro, 32
Starovskii, V. N., 157, 163–6
State Bank (tsarist Ukraine), 56
State Council (tsarist), 22
State Courier Service (*Fel’d’egerskaia sluzhba*), 328
statisticians
  Soviet: and adaptation to politics, 154–61; and evasion from politics, 161–3; and political adherence, 154–8
  tsarist, 100
statistics
  between science and political action in the USSR, 152–4
  and the state, 152
status (of officials)
  post-communist revisions, 224, 235, 247, 258–9, 303–4, 309, 325
  and tsarist and Soviet legislation, 9–10, 16 n. 30, 20, 54, 80, 82
Stepanchenko, Iakiv, 54
Stolypin, Petr A., 32
Strumilin, S. G., 155–8
Subotich, D. I., 98
Suleiman, Ezra, 5
Supreme Council for the National Economy (VSNKh), 163
Supreme Court USSR, 174, 178, 182
Supreme Soviet
  Russia, 181, 302, 313
  USSR, 165, 181, 195, 201
Suvorov, A. A., Prince, 72–3
Svavitskii, N. A., 163
Sverdlov, Yakov, 121
Sviridov, Iakov, 54
Syrtlanov, Sh.Sh, 96

Table of Ranks, *see* status (of officials)
TACIS (Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States), 285–6
Tallinn Literary Circle (*Revel'skii literaturnyi kruzhok*), 81
Tartu University, 77, 80
technology
  and enhancement of central control in Ukraine, 46–7
  and legibility of state to society and society to state, 31–8
  and penetration into Russian officialdom, 41, 46, 225, 324, 328–9
Terman, A. I., 99, 103
territorial administration
  post-communist era, 222, 224–5, 237, 245, 248, 250, 307, 322
  tsarist era, 20–1, 24, 28, 38–41, 48–9, 54, 63, 89–105
Thevenot, Laurent, 154
Tolstoi, Count Dmitrii A., 33
Tompson, William, ix, 265, 267
Tregubova, T., 286
Troshchansky, Ivan, 54
Truusmann, Jüri, 79, 86–7 n 33
Tsarskoe Selo (Alexander Lyceum), 319
Türnbaum (Türnpu) Konstantin, 75

Ukraine (tsarist administration), 47–58
Ukrainian Democratic Workers Party (UDRP), 62
Ulianovskii, Rostislav, 194
Union of Towns, 48
Union of Zemstva (*Zemgor*), 48
United Russia Party (earlier Unity), 225, 263, 306, 310
University of Kharkov, 157
Utkulbaev, Imam, 100

Vainshtein, A. I., 161
Valuev, P. A., 72
Vares, Tõnis, 77, 79
vedomstvennost', see departmentalism
Vikhliaev, P. A., 163
village secretaries (*pysar*) (tsarist Ukraine), 48, 53, 54
Virsky, Ilya, 100
Voenno-narodnoe upravlenie (Military-Popular Government, Turkestan), 89, 106 n 2
Vorontsov, Iulii, 201
Vorontsov, Mikhail, 59
Vydvizhentsy (promotees), 141, 142, 327
Vygotskii, Lev, 275
Vyshnegradski, Ivan A., 33

Waldron, Peter, 33
Weberian, 5, 9, 170, 232, 239, 240, 243, 245, 250, 254, 258, 263
Weber, Max, 232–3
white collar workers (*sluzhashchie*)
  after World War II, 144–8
  definition, 136–7
  demographic characteristics, 138–40
  gender, 139
  status in the early Soviet state, 137–8
White, Stephen, 265, 327–8
Witte, Sergei Iu, 33, 34
women
  concentrated in lower reaches of bureaucracy, 218, 246–7, 249, 326
  as post-communist social workers, 282
  proportion in tsarist Ukraine service, 51
  senior state administrators in fields judged 'female-appropriate', 326
  white collar workers in 1930s, 139, 141–2
Workers and Peasant Inspection, 155
World Bank
  and policy on social assistance, 280–1, 285
  and reform of Russian officialdom, 301, 315 n. 1
  see also New Public Management
Wortman, Richard, 33

Yakovlev, Alexander N., 204–5
Yeltsin, Boris
  and enhancement of regional autonomy, 221–2
  and the evolution of post-communist bureaucracy, 302–6
  and the failure of reform, 311–13
  and politicization of administrative careers, 259–63

Zagladin, Vadim, 199–200
Zaionchkovsky, P. A., 92
Zamiatin, Leonid, 202, 203
zemskii sobor, 29
zemstvo system
  and distribution of state resources, 39–40
  and ethnicity, 38–9
  and tsarist administration, 38–40
Zhirinovsky, Vladimir, 312