Gender, Institutions and Political Representation

Reproducing Male Dominance in Europe's New Democracies

GENDER AND POLITICS

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Gender and Politics

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Despite the rapid diffusion of gender quotas, politics continues to be overwhelmingly male dominated. In 1997, the first year for which the Inter-Parliamentary Union's database on Women in Parliaments reports a world average, men represented 88.3 per cent of the number of Member of Parliament (MPs) elected to national legislatures; by the end of 2016, the share of men among the world's MPs had decreased to 'only' 77 per cent. On average, then, the monopoly of men over political power has decreased at a rate of approximately 0.6 per cent per year over the past two decades, indicating that, while there has certainly been an erosion of male privilege, progress has been very slow. Furthermore, the pace of change has not been the same everywhere. For instance, there is considerable variation among the countries that are routinely characterised as democracies: on the one hand, women have recently made significant gains in descriptive representation in both new democracies and established democracies, such as in South Africa, Spain and Belgium; on the other hand, some democracies (whether new, such as Hungary, or established, such as Japan) have yet to shed male monopolies on political representation.

Why are some democracies locked into seemingly immutable cycles of male dominance, while others succeed in 'breaking' long-established patterns of male privilege? The influential findings of the recent literature on gender quotas notwithstanding, we have very few systematic answers to these questions, for two main reasons. First, the primary focus of feminist scholarship has been on explaining the causes and consequences of women's under-representation in politics. Yet, as recent work by Bjarnegård

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(2013) and Dahlerup and Leyenaar (2013a) has shown, it is equally important to understand the mechanisms that sustain male over-representation in politics: at the very least, they note, 'any explanation of gender gaps in representation is incomplete without considering how male elites reproduce, maintain power and exclude other groups from acceding to power' (Bjarnegård and Murray 2015, 1). A second reason why the reproduction of male privilege has seldom formed the subject of scholarly scrutiny is that the overwhelming majority of studies of gender and political representation have tended to concentrate either on explaining the outcomes of a particular election in a single country case study or, alternatively, on accounting for variation among a specific cluster of case studies at a particular point in time. Yet, as Hughes and Paxton (2008) argue, there is much to be gained from reorienting existing explanations of women's political representation towards a longitudinal perspective. Most importantly, the causal mechanisms that sustain male privilege can only be discerned over relatively long periods of time, whether in individual countries or in a cross-regional perspective.

Over the past few decades, male dominance has been a strikingly resilient feature of political representation in one particular group of new democracies: the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. A brief look at the evidence on women's representation in politics in the region lends strong support to this characterisation. Women's descriptive representation in the national legislatures of most post-communist European countries has increased at a much slower pace than in the established democracies of Western Europe since the collapse of communism. At the very beginning of the transition from communist rule, the proportion of women elected to the six national legislatures examined in this study ranged from 4.5 per cent in Romania's Chamber of Deputies to 13 per cent in the Czech National Council. By the end of 2016, the percentage of women MPs ranged from 9.5 per cent in Hungary to 20 per cent in Bulgaria and 27.2 per cent in Poland. By and large, Europe's new democracies have also proved impervious to legislated gender quotas, with only 3 of the 11 post-communist member states of the European Union (EU) — Slovenia, Croatia and Poland—having implemented mandatory quotas in parliamentary elections. Furthermore, there is widespread consensus among scholars that the opportunities for transformative state feminism have been severely limited by a region-specific combination of weak civil societies, on the one hand, and ineffective women's policy agencies, on the other hand. On the whole, then, feminist scholars working on Central and

Eastern Europe have had good reason to be critical of the multiple points of resistance to gender equality in the region during the years that have passed since the collapse of communism.

Why has male dominance been such a deeply entrenched feature of post-communist politics? This study seeks to answer this question by uncovering the causal mechanisms that have sustained or, alternatively, challenged male privilege in Europe's new democracies by focusing on descriptive, substantive and symbolic representation. To date, there are two major findings in this area. Dahlerup and Leyenaar (2013c) focus primarily on the process of breaking male over-representation in politics in established democracies. They argue that this process has occurred in several stages, with initial 'male monopolies' on political power being gradually displaced by the entry of increasing numbers of women into politics, to the extent that, in countries such as Sweden or Finland, women represent over 40 per cent of elected representatives (Dahlerup and Leyenaar 2013c, 296–299). However, the next and final stage—gender balance—continues to prove elusive for men and women in the overwhelming majority of the world's 'old democracies' (Dahlerup and Leyenaar 2013c, 296–299). Bjarnegård (2013) analyses the informal mechanisms that maintain male over-representation in politics, arguing that homosocial capital enables male insiders to work together to preserve their privileged status in politics. Overall, renewed scholarly interest in the concept of male dominance has been immensely rewarding for our understanding of how gendered power relations are embedded within the institutions of political representation. Nevertheless, work on conceptualising and analysing male dominance has only just begun.

This study analyses the puzzles of male dominance in Central and Eastern Europe by focusing on three processes occurring in a distinct temporal sequence: first, the process whereby political actors first established the institutions of male dominance in Central and Eastern Europe in the aftermath of state socialism; second, the processes whereby, once created, these institutions were subsequently reproduced within the post-communist political order; and finally, the processes of change that have begun to undermine male dominance in Europe's new democracies. In doing so, I draw on historical institutionalism's insight that institutions are best seen as 'enduring legacies of political struggles' (Thelen 1999, 388) between different groups of actors, such as political parties, women's advocates inside and outside the state and international organisations. Within this context, 'institutions' are broadly conceptualised as 'the rules

of the game in a society or, more formally, (…) the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction' (North 1990, 3). From the perspective of this study, the institutions of male dominance are best described as 'the outcome (conscious or unintended) of deliberate political strategies, of political conflict, and of choice' (Thelen and Steinmo 1992, 10). Within the context of Central and Eastern Europe, these strategies, conflicts and choices were nested within the historical processes of transition and democratic consolidation over the period that has elapsed since the collapse of communism.

This study therefore begins by outlining the puzzles of male dominance in Europe's new democracies: on the one hand, the fact that, almost three decades after the fall of state socialism, male over-representation in politics continues to be such a deeply entrenched feature of politics in the region; on the other hand, the fact that actors seeking to 'act for' women have found it considerably more difficult to achieve positive gender outcomes than their counterparts in Europe's established democracies. Within this context, I conceptualise male dominance in relation to two strands of scholarship on gender and politics: feminist institutionalist approaches (Waylen 2007; Mackay et al. 2010; Krook and Mackay 2011; Chappell and Waylen 2013; Bjarnegård 2013; Kenny 2013) and the scholarship on women's descriptive, substantive and symbolic representation (Celis et al. 2008; Celis 2009; Celis and Childs 2012; Celis et al. 2014; Lombardo and Meier 2014). I bring these perspectives together into a two-dimensional model for analysing male dominance: on one dimension, the origins, reproduction and change of the institutions of male dominance; on the other dimension, descriptive, substantive and symbolic representation. Overall, this study seeks to shed light onto: (1) the historical and social processes whereby male dominance becomes an established feature of political representation in a particular country or region, (2) the causal mechanisms that reproduce male dominance over time and (3) the processes whereby the institutions of male dominance are challenged and eventually replaced with gender-equitable institutions of political representation. The overarching emphasis is on processes of reproduction, understood as causal mechanisms responsible for sustaining male dominance in the politics of Europe's new democracies since the collapse of communism.

This introduction sets out the aims and structure of the study in four steps. First, I provide a brief overview of the puzzles that post-communist Central and Eastern Europe raises for the study of male dominance.

Second, I outline a feminist institutionalist model for conceptualising male dominance in Europe's new democracies. Third, I discuss the selection of the six country case studies covered here: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. Finally, I provide an overview of the structure of the book and a summary of the individual chapters.

1.1 The Puzzles of Male Dominance in Central and Eastern Europe

This study draws on the rich literature on gender relations and democratic consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe, which has extensively documented the ways in which gender inequalities have been built into the very foundations and functioning of Europe's new democracies. This is true of both the literature that is directly concerned with women's representation (Einhorn 1991; Saxonberg 2000; Moser 2001; Matland and Montgomery 2003; Ilonszki 2004; Galligan et al. 2007; Waylen 2007; Rueschemeyer and Wolchik 2009) and of the broader scholarship on gender and democratisation in the region (Corrin 1992; Funk and Mueller 1993; Einhorn 1993; Gal 1994; Rueschemeyer 1998; Jaquette and Wolchik 1998; Gal and Kligman 2000a, b; Einhorn 2006; Regulska et al. 2006; Roth 2008). While the former strand of scholarship has generated important findings about women's descriptive and substantive representation, the latter has seldom been brought to bear on our understanding of gender and political representation in the region. This is, in many ways, a curious gap, because, as this study argues in greater detail in Chap. 2, scholarship on gender and democratisation enables us to access a wealth of evidence concerning women's substantive and symbolic representation in the politics of post-communist Europe.

Let us begin by reading the rich literature on women's representation in post-communist Europe through the conceptual lens of male dominance. From this perspective, existing feminist scholarship has identified two distinct puzzles concerning women's representation in Central and Eastern Europe. As far as descriptive representation is concerned, women's numerical under-representation in politics has been an enduring puzzle for regional specialists ever since the collapse of communism (Einhorn 1993; Saxonberg 2000; Moser 2001; Matland and Montgomery 2003; Ilonszki 2004; Galligan et al. 2007; Waylen 2007). When viewed through the prism of this study, it is clear that this is essentially a puzzle about male over-representation in the politics of post-communist Europe. In the early

1990s, Barbara Einhorn's concise 'where have all the women gone?' (Einhorn 1991) aptly conveyed feminist scholars' shock at the sheer scale of the re-assertion of masculine power in Central and Eastern Europe. Twenty-five years later, there has certainly been no 'fast track' journey towards parity between men and women in post-communist politics. Instead, increases in women's descriptive representation have been occurring at a much slower rate than in the established democracies of the West.

A closer look at the empirical evidence on male over-representation in politics on the European continent demonstrates the existence of two distinct patterns characterising 'old' and 'new' democracies. Figure 1.1 summarises trends in men's descriptive representation in the parliaments of six Western European countries between 1990 and 2016 (Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK), while Fig. 1.2 summarises the trends in men's descriptive representation for the same period in the parliaments of the six Central and East European countries under scrutiny here (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia). In the early 1990s, the levels of male over-representation varied widely in the West, while occurring within a much narrower range in the East. For instance, men constituted 93.7 per cent of MPs in the UK House of Commons and 91.9 per cent of deputies in Italy's lower chamber in 1992, while the corresponding percentages were 83 per cent in the Netherlands in 1989, 79.5 per cent in Germany in 1990 and 69 per cent in Sweden and Finland. In Central and Eastern Europe in 1990, however, the proportion of male MPs in the Czech National Council stood at 87 per cent, in Hungary at 92.8 per cent and in Romania at 95.5 per cent. Thus, male monopolies on political power were undoubtedly a cross-regional feature of post-communist politics from the very beginning of the transition from communist rule—a trend that hardly escaped commentators then (Einhorn 1991, 1993; Rueschemeyer 1998) or since (Matland and Montgomery 2003; Galligan et al. 2007; Rueschemeyer and Wolchik 2009).

Most importantly, the data presented in Figs. 1.1 and 1.2 clearly show that, while the proportion of men elected to national legislatures of the established democracies has decreased substantially in all cases, it has only diminished by less than ten percentage points on average in Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, Europe's established democracies have been experiencing a gradual—but overall much steeper—decline in male over-representation during the past two decades than new democracies on the continent. In fact, if, as Dahlerup and Leyenaar (2013a) argue, in Western Europe the pattern is one of 'breaking' male over-representation



Fig. 1.1 The representation of men in the parliaments of selected Western European countries, 1990–2016 (%). *Sources:* Calculated on the basis of the data reported by the Inter-Parliamentary Union's Parline database (www.ipu.org). *Notes:* Lower chamber, where applicable.



Fig. 1.2 The representation of men in the parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe, 1990–2016 (%). *Sources:* Calculated on the basis of the data on women's descriptive representation in Appendix B. *Notes:* Lower chamber, where applicable.

in politics, then Figs. 1.1 and 1.2 amply demonstrate that Central and Eastern Europe is best characterised as a case of reproducing male over-representation in politics. In post-communist Europe, male monopolies have continued to persist well into the post-communist period, or, in cases such as Hungary, appear to have been virtually unchallenged since the early 1990s.

The second puzzle that has intrigued scholars of Central and East European politics for the best part of two decades concerns substantive representation. This puzzle has two aspects. First, scholars were quick to note the relatively low degree of mobilisation among women during the transitions from communist rule. This was particularly striking when compared to the ways in which women successfully mobilised in other countries undergoing transitions from authoritarian rule, for instance, in Latin America (Waylen 1994; Jaquette and Wolchik 1998; Waylen 2007). Second, scholars of post-communist politics have also noted that, although women did begin to organise themselves in order to 'act for' women over the period of democratic consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe, positive policy outcomes have so far been somewhat of a rare occurrence in the region. For instance, actors engaging in the substantive representation of women in Hungary and Poland have so far been unsuccessful in reversing the anti-abortion legislation passed in the early 1990s. Furthermore, post-communist countries have been generally more reluctant than established democracies to introduce legislated gender quotas, with Poland being the exception among our case studies.

In historical institutionalist terms, the two aspects of this puzzle are connected through the notion of path dependence. As Pierson argues, 'early stages in a sequence can place particular aspects of political systems onto distinct tracks, which are then reinforced through time' (2004, 45). Thus, the relative lack of positive gender outcomes in the early period of the transition continued throughout the subsequent decades-long process of democratic consolidation. A first generation of the literature on the post-communist region identified the weakness of women's organisations at the beginning of the transitions from communist rule as the key explanatory factor for the relative absence of positive gender outcomes in post-communist Europe in the early 1990s (Einhorn 1993; Gal and Kligman 2000a, b). A 'second generation' of explanations has drawn on the insights of the literature on state feminism (Lovenduski 2005; McBride and Mazur 2010) by focusing on the relationship between women's advocates inside and outside the state. For instance, Waylen (2007) argues that the different

gender outcomes of the transitions from communist and authoritarian rule in Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America, respectively, have been shaped by distinct patterns of women's mobilisation, the presence of critical actors within the state, the effective framing of issues in ways that resonate with domestic audience and the degree of openness of the policy environment. Thus, to the degree that these conditions were absent in post-communist Europe at the time of the transitions from state socialism, positive gender outcomes were unlikely; conversely, the extent to which these conditions were met in some Latin American countries resulted in positive gender outcomes during the transitions from authoritarian rule.

These significant advances in our understanding of substantive representation in post-communist Europe notwithstanding, we still lack a conceptualisation of the precise mechanisms that have *sustained* the factors identified by Waylen as determining the negative gender outcomes in post-communist Europe during the period after 1990: the weakness of organised women's movements, the relative absence of critical actors within the state, the effective framing of issues in ways that disadvantage women's interests and the relative closure of the policy environment. This is the task that this study seeks to accomplish.

In sum, the puzzle that I seek to examine concerns the causal mechanisms enabling male dominance vis-à-vis the substantive representation of women in post-communist Europe. Within this context, we need to start, as Waylen does, with the conceptual framework of state feminism. As McBride and Mazur (2010) argue, the success of demands for substantive representation depends on the formation of strategic alliances between women's movements outside the state and women's advocates inside the state. Under circumstances of male dominance, such as in Central and Eastern Europe, actors seeking to represent women can be marginalised, both inside and outside the state. Marginalisation can take different forms, such as the silencing of women's advocates' voices, the delegitimisation of women's claims for gender-equitable policies or the weakening of the institutional capacity of actors formally created in order to 'act for' women, such as women's policy agencies. Whenever patterns of marginalisation persist over long periods of time, as it has been the case in post-communist Europe, the question arises as to the causal mechanisms that reproduce these outcomes. Thus, this study seeks to uncover the precise mechanisms that reproduce the marginalisation women's issues and interests in democratising polities such as those of Central and Eastern Europe.

In order to elucidate these puzzles, this study argues that we need a particular theoretical toolkit, one that brings together three distinct strands of literature: conceptualisations of male dominance; scholarship on descriptive, substantive and symbolic representation and debates on the causal mechanisms underpinning path dependence in politics. Within this theoretical context, this study tells the story of how the institutions of male dominance first became established, and were subsequently reproduced, within the politics of post-communist Europe. As region-specific, and to that extent idiosyncratic, as this approach may be at times, this study's principal emphasis is on gender, power, institutions and agency—all of which, as Kantola and Lombardo (2017, 17) argue, form the core conceptual tools of political analysis for scholars concerned with gender and politics.

1.2 Conceptualising Male Dominance

What is male dominance? How do we conceptualise and measure it? How are the institutions of male dominance first established in particular contexts, how do they vary with different historical settings and how do they evolve over time? In answering these questions, it is useful to start with Dahlerup and Leyenaar's distinction between the scope of male dominance and the degree of male dominance (2013b, 8–10). They conceptualise the scope of male dominance along six dimensions: women's numerical under-representation, vertical sex segregation and horizontal sex segregation in politics, male-coded norms and practices, policy biases favour men and masculinity and the gendered perceptions of politicians (Dahlerup and Leyenaar 2013b, 8–9). The degree of male dominance captures variations in descriptive representation along four categories: male monopoly (fewer than 10 per cent women elected), small minority of women (between 10 and 25 per cent), large minority of women (between 25 and 40 per cent) and gender balance (40–60 per cent) (Dahlerup and Leyenaar 2013b, 10).

The concept of male dominance employed in this study extends Dahlerup and Leyenaar's (2013b) definition in order to include not only the descriptive representation of women (which, as Dahlerup and Leyenaar note, constitutes 'the leading dimension' of their study [2013b, 8]) but also the substantive and symbolic representation of women. I therefore define male dominance in politics as occurring when men, men's interests and/or masculine norms are privileged within the institutions of political

representation. Male dominance in politics can therefore take various forms, such as the numerical over-representation of men among political elites, the primacy of the substantive representation of men's interests in policymaking, male-coded norms shaping the formal and informal practices of political representation or the symbolic representation of women as citizens with gender-specific roles and responsibilities vis-à-vis their respective national or political communities.

Scholars have also recently embarked on systematic explorations of the establishment, evolution and change of the institutions of male dominance. For instance, the contributions to Dahlerup and Leyenaar's project provide a longitudinal analysis of women's representation, the trajectories and sequences manifest at country and party levels, the evolution of discourses and perceptions about women as politicians, and party system change in eight established democracies (Dahlerup and Leyenaar 2013b, 7). Bjarnegård's study of the informal institutions of political recruitment in Thailand (2013) casts significant new light onto the issue of male dominance by identifying the mechanisms that reproduce male dominance in politics. Most importantly, her finding that male homosocial capital helps to sustain clientelist practices is the first to demonstrate the existence of a causal mechanism whereby male dominance is reproduced within the wider setting of representative politics (Bjarnegård 2013).

This study contributes to existing scholarship by arguing that we need to pay much greater attention to the issue of the *reproduction* of male dominance and therefore flesh out the causal mechanisms that sustain it over time (for an exception, as noted above, see Bjarnegård 2013). Feminist scholars have so far focused to a much greater extent on the other two elements of an institutionalist framework: first, on the origins of the gendered institutions of political representation (for instance, during critical junctures such as transitions to democracy [Waylen 2007, 2011] or during devolution in Scotland [Kenny 2013]), and second, on changing or 'breaking' the institutions of male dominance (Dahlerup and Leyenaar 2013a). Thus, the crucial question of how male dominance is reproduced over time has remained largely unanswered. This gap needs to be addressed not in the least because it can provide valuable insights into breaking the cycle of male dominance and bringing about positive gender outcomes.

Figure 1.3 outlines the key aims of the two-dimensional model proposed here. The first dimension concerns defining male dominance in relation to the concepts of descriptive, substantive and symbolic representation. Feminist scholars drawing on Hanna Pitkin's seminal work understand the

	Definition	Establishment --»	Reproduction --»	Change
Descriptive	*The numerical over-representation of men:* male monopoly (90% or higher); large majority of men (75–90%); small majority of men (60-75%) (Dahlerupand Leyenaar 2013b)	How can we account for the establishment of the institutions of male over-representation?	Map out cross-regional trends in male over-representation in politics over time Identify the relevant mechanisms of reproduction sustaining these trends over time	Identify mechanisms of change responsible for 'breaking' male dominance
Substantive and symbolic	*'Acting for'* (substantive representation) Dominant symbolic frames on gender and political representation	What kinds of substantive claims are possible with a given symbolic and normative context? Who are the actors making these claims?	Identify the mechanisms sustaining the persistent weakness of women's interests' advocates over long periods of time	

Fig. 1.3 Analysing male dominance

concept of descriptive representation as referring to 'standing for' others—in Pitkin's words, 'by virtue of a correspondence or connection between them, a resemblance or reflection' (Pitkin 1972, 61). Within this context, male dominance is defined as a situation where the overwhelming majority of elected representatives are men, and therefore 'stand for' other men—in other words, a situation where men are numerically over-represented and women are numerically under-represented. Drawing on Dahlerup and Leyenaar's work (2013a), I distinguish between three degrees of male dominance: male monopoly, a large majority of men and a small majority

of men. Correspondingly, gender balance is achieved when men are represented in a proportion that approximates their share of the total population (just under 50 per cent).

Feminist scholarship on substantive representation has provided rich theoretical reformulations of Pitkin's original definition of the concept as 'acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them' (Pitkin 1972, 209). The focus on substantive representation has been prompted by a conceptual shift from critical mass to an emphasis on critical acts and critical actors (Childs and Krook 2006; Childs and Krook 2009). Thus, Celis et al. (2008, 104) make a compelling case for focusing on two key areas in relation to women's substantive representation: on the one hand, actors ('who claims to act for women?'); on the other hand, representative acts ('where, why and how does [the substantive representation of women] occur?'). Recent literature on (women's) substantive representation has taken a decidedly constructivist turn, building on Michael Saward's 'representative claim' framework (Saward 2006, 2010). For instance, Severs (2012) seeks to reconcile Pitkin's original concept of substantive representation with Saward's conception, developing the concept of 'substantive claims' and proposing an interpretive model for identifying and analysing such claims when they occur. Similarly, Celis et al. (2014, 158) argue that it is important to recognise that both male lawmakers and women and men outside legislatures 'participate actively in claims-making in the name of "women" as a group', and develop a framework for identifying and analysing women's substantive representation in relation to the representative claims made by elected and non-elected actors.

This study draws on MacKay's 'thick' conception of substantive representation—an approach that 'does not "fix" the who, where, when and how of [the substantive representation of women] in advance but incorporates the theoretical uncertainty and contested nature of substantive representation' (Mackay 2008, 131). I also draw on recent work by Celis et al. (2014) by following a two-step research strategy for analysing substantive representation: first, I identify the actors involved in the process of substantive representation; second, I focus on those claims that meet Celis et al.'s (2014) criteria for representative claims made on behalf of women as a group: interventions that are '(1) directly constructed as being of importance to women; (2) presented as only affecting women; (3) discussed in terms of gender difference, (4) spoken of in terms of gendered effects, and/or (5) framed in terms of equality between women and men'

(Celis et al. 2014, 159). When viewed through the conceptual lens of male dominance, Celis et al.'s (2014) framework is particularly fruitful because it allows for a two-pronged approach: on the one hand, male dominance can be deeply entrenched in the actor constellations involved in the politics of group representation in a particular setting; on the other hand, male dominance can also occur when representative claims are gendered in ways that benefit men to a larger extent than they benefit women.

Symbolic representation has been the least researched of Pitkin's dimensions of political representation. Pitkin emphasised that, although, like descriptive representation, symbolic representation involved 'standing for' the represented, it was also different from the other types of representation because of 'symbols' power to evoke feelings or attitudes' (1972, 97). Recent work by Lombardo and Meier (2014) has drawn renewed attention to the importance of symbolic representation for both descriptive and substantive representation. It is the latter relationship that is of primary concern in this study. I therefore draw on Lombardo and Meier's argument that 'substantive claims for representation are made in a given context, largely shaped by symbolic representation' and that this context needs to be considered in greater detail, because it shapes both 'the ways in which substantive representation takes place and whether it is likely to succeed' (Lombardo and Meier 2014, 140).

From the perspective of the relationship between substantive and symbolic representation, we need to bear in mind that claims 'may or may not resonate with dominant frames' (Lombardo and Meier 2014, 150). The key question is 'what substantive claims are possible in what symbolic and normative context?' (Lombardo and Meier 2014, 150). Thus, if a claim for the substantive representation of women does not 'fit' the context it is made in, it will constrain the range of choices available to actors engaged in representing women. Conversely, in order to maximise their chances for a successful outcome, actors engaged in substantive representation formulate their claims in ways that resonate with dominant frames. For instance, Lombardo and Meier (2014, 139–152) draw on Myra Ferree's work in answering a deceptively simple question: 'why do American women not demand paid parental leave as Germans have?' The question, Ferree (2012) argues, is best answered by taking into account the fact that actors' substantive claims in the two countries are shaped by the different ways in which claims about 'mothers and families' in the German context and claims about 'individual citizens' and 'anti-discrimination rights' in the US resonate with legislators and public

opinion. Thus, claims that fit the German context do not necessarily fit the US context; consequently, claims that would be successful in Germany may well be rejected out of hand in the US. For instance, political actors' ability to make claims for greater representation for women via party or legislated gender quotas in Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s was severely constrained by generalised antipathy towards anything remotely resembling the communist-era 'women's emancipation' project. In fact, state socialist planners' construction of women as a 'corporate group' (that is, 'a group of state subjects who were expected to derive their privileges and responsibilities in society from their group membership and were singled out as an identifiable building block of communism') (Fodor 2002, 248) did much to de-legitimise virtually all claims on behalf of women in the immediate aftermath of communism.

As Lombardo and Meier (2014) show, symbolic representation does not only make certain claims more intelligible and/or more successful than others, but it can also sustain male dominance. The *makers* of symbols, who construct particular groups in ways that affect these groups' ability to engage in substantive representation, play the central role in this process. The makers can be state actors, civil society organisations or women's movements (Lombardo and Meier 2014, 144). Drawing on Allen's concept of 'power-over' (Allen 1999), they argue that 'the construction of women as subordinate or second-class citizens in politics (…) and that of men as legitimate political leaders (…) contributes to perpetuating male domination in politics' (Lombardo and Meier 2014, 159). Implicit in Lombardo and Meier's framework, but not explicitly theorised as such, is the idea that male dominance is perpetuated not only by the construction of groups via traditional gender roles ('men make better political leaders' or 'women are more suited to the home') but also by inequalities of voice. In other words, what also matters is which frames are dominant and which frames are subordinate, and who voices these frames.

Paying attention to the interaction between symbolic and substantive representation is especially important in contexts where claims for the substantive representation of women are limited by particular circumstances or historical legacies. As outlined in greater detail in this study, this was precisely the case in Central and Eastern Europe immediately after the fall of communism. Within this context, the combination of unwillingness on the part of political parties to be associated with communist-era notions of 'women's emancipation', on the one hand, and nascent but weak civil societies, on the other hand, resulted in a situation where there were very

few powerful actors willing to 'act for' women. Walsh (2011) makes a similar point, albeit in different terms, when arguing that the 'debate conditions' can play a significant role for the gender outcomes of transitions from non-democratic rule, because they shape women's access to the political arena, women's ability to voice their concerns and women's capacity to challenge dominant frames of representation.

The second dimension of the model presented here draws on historical institutionalism (Pierson 1996; Thelen 1999; Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2004; Mahoney and Thelen 2010) and on feminist historical institutionalism (Waylen 2007, 2011). This perspective is especially valuable in that it allows us to conduct comparative analyses over relatively long periods of time. From the perspective of male dominance, the key to this approach can be found in the concept of path dependence. As Mahoney argues, path dependence 'characterises specifically those historical sequences in which contingent events set into motion institutional patterns or event chains that have deterministic properties' (2000, 507). In historical institutionalist terms, then, what we need to do is to trace given outcomes (in this case, the establishment of the institutions of male dominance) 'back to a particular set of historical events', while also 'showing how these events are themselves contingent occurrences that cannot be explained on the basis of prior historical conditions' (Mahoney 2000, 507–508). Scholars working in the historical institutionalist tradition therefore emphasise the importance of critical junctures, 'when a particular institutional arrangement is selected from among the available alternatives' (Mahoney 2000, 513).

A historical institutionalist approach has two considerable advantages for analysing male dominance in relation to descriptive, substantive and symbolic representation. The first advantage is that it allows us to examine *both* process and outcome: how were the institutions of male dominance established in the first place in particular settings, how have they been reproduced over time and how can we account for changes in the patterns of male dominance in different countries and regions? Thus, the model elaborated here emphasises the importance of tracing the political struggles that shaped the institutions of male dominance, together with the enduring legacies of these struggles. The second advantage of a historical institutionalist approach is that it explicitly raises the question of the *mechanisms of reproduction* sustaining particular institutions over time. This is particularly important for tackling the issue of how male dominance has remained in place over long periods of time. As Mahoney argues, 'institutions that

rapidly and decisively trigger mechanisms of reproduction are especially capable of seizing opportunities provided by contingent events and thus setting into motion self-reinforcing sequences that are path-dependent' (2000, 515).

Drawing on the insights of historical institutionalism, Waylen (2007, 2011) develops a feminist institutionalist approach for the analysis of the gender outcomes of transitions from non-democratic rule. She argues that it is particularly important to pay attention to processes over time in order to identify 'the causal sequences and developmental paths that led to (…) varying outcomes' (Waylen 2011, 154). While building on Waylen's work (2007, 2011), I also argue that there is at least one aspect that has been neglected within the emerging feminist institutionalist framework: the question of the mechanisms of reproduction that sustain particular outcomes over time. Here, Mahoney's discussion of institutional reproduction is especially useful as a starting point. He distinguishes between four accounts: utilitarian, functional, power and legitimation explanations respectively (Mahoney 2000, 517). Of these, the last two are of particular interest to feminist scholars: power-based accounts ('[the] institution is reproduced because it is supported by an elite group of actors') and legitimation accounts ('[the] institution is reproduced because actors believe it is morally just or appropriate') (Mahoney 2000, 517). Accordingly, the respective mechanisms of change are 'the weakening of elites and strengthening of subordinate groups' and 'changes in the values and subjective beliefs of actors' respectively (Mahoney 2000, 517). Yet, Mahoney's classification is also problematic, because, as Mackay et al. argue, new institutionalism often relies on distributional models of power, emphasising 'how powerful actors anchor their privileged institutional positions' and seeing power as self-reinforcing, in the sense that 'power inequalities become amplified and more entrenched over time' (2010, 7). The challenge, then, is to uncover gendered mechanisms of reproduction and to provide 'critical insights into the institutional dynamics of inclusion and exclusion' (Mackay et al. 2010, 11).

Figure 1.4 summarises the ways in which this study brings the strands of literature identified above together in analysing the establishment, reproduction and change of the institutions of male dominance in post-communist Europe in relation to descriptive, substantive and symbolic representation. As outlined, the model indicates that we need to explore three sets of issues. First, we need to examine the origins of the institutions of male dominance in specific historical settings by (1) tracing the process whereby

	Establishment -----»	Reproduction -----»	Change
Descriptive representation	How can we explain the initial patterns of male over-representation in the post-communist region during the transitions from communist rule?	Key mechanisms of reproduction: (1) men's *incumbency advantage* (2) party gatekeepers' strategic use of national *electoral systems*	Key mechanisms of change (1) gender quotas (2) party contagion effects (3) party system change (4) international norm diffusion
Substantive and symbolic representation	How did the symbolic repertoires of the early post-communist period limit the opportunities for the substantive representation of women?	Key mechanism of reproduction: the *asymmetric institutionalisation* of the different arenas of consolidated democracy, which sustains the marginalisation of women's voices during processes of democratisation	(5) the emergence of women's policy agencies and other forms of institutionalized activism within and outside the state

Fig. 1.4 Male dominance in Central and Eastern Europe

men came to be over-represented in politics in the first place (descriptive representation), (2) identifying the particular constellations of actors engaged in the symbolic and substantive representation of women and (3) tracing the dynamic power struggles for representation via actors' representative claims vis-à-vis women and/or men.

A second strand of inquiry concerns the mechanisms of reproduction that sustain male dominance over long periods of time. Within this context, mechanisms of reproduction for male dominance in political representation are understood here as causal mechanisms that meet two conditions:

1. Such mechanisms must 'freeze' the unequal political representation of men and women into place over relatively long periods of time. In descriptive terms, the key is to focus on the distributional effects of mechanisms of reproduction: the unequal power of different

social groups is often reflected in their unequal representation in politics in descriptive terms. In substantive terms, this refers to a situation where actors seeking to act on behalf of women are persistently marginalised within the dynamics of political competition, so that they are, as it were, 'perpetual outcasts' in debates on gender relations.

2. Such mechanisms must sustain, but must not themselves create, inequalities in political power. Within this context, it is useful to distinguish between the factors behind institutional creation and the factors determining institutional reproduction. As historical institutionalists often point out (Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2004), institutions can persist over long periods, even when the circumstances that led to their establishment have long been consigned to a particular moment in history. For instance, male over-representation in politics may well have something to do with the fact that, a century or so ago, only men had the right to vote. This may no longer be the case, yet men continue to be over-represented in politics across the world. The institutions of male dominance, then, have persisted beyond their initial association with male suffrage.

The model proposed here identifies two mutually reinforcing mechanisms of reproduction for the *descriptive* over-representation of men in politics: men's '*incumbency advantag*e' and functioning of national *electoral systems*. Both mechanisms are familiar to students of women's representation as important causal factors for women's under-representation in politics (Moser 2001; Matland and Montgomery 2003; Schwindt-Bayer 2005; Rueschemeyer and Wolchik 2009); yet, neither has been conceptualised so far in relation to the problem of male dominance, especially within the context of a comparative analysis of post-communist Europe. With respect to *symbolic and substantive representation*, the key mechanism of reproduction is conceptualised here as *asymmetric institutionalisation*—an arrangement which privileges competitive politics and the rule of law over civil society or state bureaucracies. The overall effect of asymmetric institutionalisation is that it reduces the likelihood of positive gender outcomes by marginalising women's advocates both within and outside the state, and therefore limiting the opportunities for state feminism in Central and Eastern Europe.

The final strand of inquiry of this study concerns the mechanisms of change at play in political representation in Central and Eastern Europe. As Mahoney and Thelen note, historical institutionalist scholars typically point to 'exogenous shocks that bring about radical institutional reconfigurations, overlooking shifts based on endogenous developments that often unfold incrementally' (2010, 2). Within the context of the analysis undertaken here, the transitions from communist rule themselves, which ushered in an era of economic, social and political change in Central and Eastern Europe, were certainly significant shocks for the region. This study identifies several factors that prompted change in the institutions of political representation in post-communist Europe over the post-communist period. Thus, the process of EU accession brought about changes to legal norms on gender equality across the region (Roth 2008), while international norm diffusion, such as that stemming from international organisations such as the United Nations, brought the issue of institutional mechanisms for women's substantive representation into public policy in post-communist Europe. On the domestic politics side (that is, among those factors that were embedded in the functioning of the political systems of post-communist Europe), party contagion, shifts in the format and mechanisms of national party systems, and the emergence, within and outside the state, of new actors seeking to engage in the substantive representation of women are all causally related to processes of change in Central and Eastern Europe.

This study therefore identifies several causal mechanisms responsible for 'breaking' male dominance in post-communist Europe. In the case of descriptive representation, the key mechanisms of change are quotas, party contagion and shifts in the dynamics of national party systems: quotas displace male incumbents on electoral lists, thereby counteracting both men's 'incumbency advantage' and entrenched patterns of candidate selection within particular electoral systems; party contagion alters the demand-side factors affecting party gatekeepers' willingness to select women candidates; and shifts in the functioning of national party systems lead to the emergence of political parties willing to engage in the substantive representation of women to a much greater extent than before (for example, through supporting gender quota proposals). In the case of substantive and symbolic representation, international norm diffusion re-shapes the symbolic environment in which women's interests' advocates operate, while the gradual emergence of political actors with access to the state, such as women's policy agencies and political parties, on the one hand, and the emergence of strong civil society organisations, on the other hand, enable coalitions of actors to challenge the hegemonic discourses or frames

of symbolic representation, to make substantive claims on behalf of women and to push for gender-sensitive policies.

1.3 The Selection of the Country Case Studies

The rationale behind the case selection is threefold. First, post-communist democracies provide us with an opportunity to test and complement the insights of recent work on male dominance in established democracies (Dahlerup and Leyenaar 2013a) or new democracies outside Europe (Bjarnegård 2013). As argued above in greater detail, the puzzles of gender and political representation in post-communist Europe are, essentially, puzzles about male dominance. Thus, the task is to uncover the mechanisms that have sustained the privileged access of men and masculinity in political representation. Second, unlike the 'long wave' of democratisation in Western Europe, the democratisation of Central and Eastern Europe has occurred relatively recently. This, in turn, facilitates the task of comparative analysis by confining our scrutiny to period since the collapse of communism in 1989.

Why select Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia from among Europe's new democracies? Currently, there are 11 post-communist democracies among the EU member states: our six country case studies, as well as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Croatia. Therefore, it is necessary to specify what distinguishes our case studies as a group from the remaining post-communist EU member states. Overall, the former state socialist members of the EU belong to three distinct groups: first, those that were formerly members of the USSR (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania); second, those that were part of the Yugoslav Federation (Croatia and Slovenia), where a different model of communism prevailed than in the USSR; third, those countries that were 'satellites' of the Soviet Union, but remained, at least formally, independent during state socialist rule (that is, our country case studies). Focusing on Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia serves several purposes within this context. First, there is the issue of timing: the transitions from communist rule in our six case studies were clustered close together in time during the period between 1988 and 1989, and occurred in close succession to each other in a well-known 'domino effect' that is limited to these countries. In contrast, transitions from communist rule in the USSR and the Yugoslav Federation started later and/or were characterised by different patterns of regime change.

Second, the choice of case studies enables us to control for the potential impact of diverging historical legacies on our findings. For instance, in the

former Yugoslavia, where the communist regime encouraged a higher degree of societal participation than their Soviet counterpart, women's organisations began to mobilise earlier and more successfully than in either the Baltic Republics or in our six case studies. Finally, focusing our attention specifically on the six country case studies allows to minimise the impact of diverging paths towards democratisation across the region. For instance, processes of democratisation in the former Yugoslavia followed very distinct paths from those characterising our case studies, so that there is much greater variation between former Yugoslav Republics such as Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia or Macedonia, on the one hand, and the former 'satellites' of the USSR, on the other. Thus, the choice of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia as our case studies is designed to enable a systematic comparison of new democracies with a shared history of a very particular positioning within the communist bloc, as well as relatively closely-clustered processes of transitions and democratic consolidation.

In order to highlight with precision the similarities and differences between Europe's new and established democracies, I have also selected six Western European countries that could usefully serve as comparators for Central and Eastern Europe: Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. The selection of the Western European case studies was undertaken in the following manner. First, since EU accession and eventual membership have played a significant role in post-communist Europe, I restricted the choice of case studies to the 17 non-post-communist EU member states. Second, from within this group of 'old democracies', I did not select those countries with legislated gender quotas (Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain), as this would have skewed the comparison with post-communist Europe, where, with the exception of Poland since 2011, legislated gender quotas tend to be absent. Of the remaining 11 countries (Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Malta, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK), I selected a sample that covered as wide a range of electoral systems as possible, so as to enable a systematic comparison with the variety of electoral systems in our case studies. Thus, Finland and the Netherland operate open-list proportional representation (PR) systems, Sweden and Italy have traditionally had closed-list PR, Germany's system is mixed and the UK electoral system is single-member plurality. In Central and Eastern Europe, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia have open-list PR, Romania and Bulgaria have had closed-list PR for most of the post-communist period and Hungary has had a mixed system since 1990.

This study also seeks to help overcome two of the most intractable problems for scholars of post-communism: the absence of readily available, reliable data on women's representation in the region and the asymmetries between existing research on particular countries. Thus, I began this study by collecting the data on women's descriptive representation in the lower chambers of the Czech Republic, Poland and Romania, as well as in the unicameral legislatures of Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia, for all elections held between 1990 and the end of 2016. In order to ensure a high standard for the data, the information presented in Appendix B was collected almost exclusively from primary sources, such as the databases of the national elections commissions and the national parliaments concerned. I have also collected comprehensive information on women's policy machineries and on parliamentary structures dedicated to gender equality in the region (the data are presented in Chap. 6). As the process of data collection unfolded, it became apparent that each country case study presented very specific challenges. In particular, while Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic are quite well-researched, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia have been much more seldom analysed by feminist political scientists interested in women's representation. Whenever possible, this study seeks to draw on comprehensive data that covers all of the countries concerned, so that comparisons are undertaken across all of the case studies.

It is perhaps well advised, at this point in this discussion, to introduce a note of caution about what is possible to achieve within the context of this study. On the one hand, this study seeks to advance our understanding of Central and Eastern Europe in several ways, such as providing a feminist historical institutionalist analysis of the origins, reproduction and change of male dominance in the region, focusing on descriptive, substantive and symbolic representation and seeking to elucidate what distinguishes our case studies from some of the continent's established democracies. On the other hand, there are certain limitations to this study that are related to the availability of data and relevant literature. For instance, the capacity of this study to explain variation in male over-representation among our case studies is severely constrained by the fact that, to date, there are virtually no case studies of how candidate selection occurs at the party level throughout the region in a way that covers the whole post-communist period. To this extent, some of the findings of this study may need to be tested by country specialists, who are best positioned to access and analyse candidate recruitment in the region.

A second, related, limitation of this study concerns the distinction between formal and informal institutions (on the latter, see Bjarnegård 2013; Waylen 2017). For example, Bjarnegård (2013) makes a compelling case that a third mechanism of reproduction for male overrepresentation may well be in place in (new) democracies. Thus, she argues, male dominance is also sustained by informal institutions such as clientelist networks, which are, in turn, facilitated and maintained by male homosocial capital. Her interviews with male politicians in Thailand revealed that decisions on political recruitment were almost invariably taken on the basis of trust and resources. To the extent that male politicians trusted members of their own sex more than members of the opposite sex, and women possessed fewer resources then men, these decisions had important gendered consequences, most notably in the form of preserving male elite networks in politics (Bjarnegård 2013). It is possible to make a persuasive prima facie case that this may well be the case for postcommunist Europe as well, especially in countries where political and economic elites relied to a great extent on informal networks in pursuing their goals (a process memorably described by David Stark [1990] as a transition 'from plan to clan'). Nevertheless, there is too little evidence in existing literature on Central and Eastern Europe for this study to be able to delve into the role played by male homosocial capital in sustaining clientelist networks and practices in the region.

1.4 The Structure of the Book

The structure of the book follows the analytical map detailed in Figs. 1.3 and 1.4. We begin our analysis in Chap. 2, which outlines the institutional origins of male dominance in Central and Eastern Europe to the critical junctures of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The overarching argument is that male dominance was established via a process whereby the main political actors in the region—the communist (successor) parties and the anticommunist opposition—drew on two main types of strategic resources in entering the arena of competitive politics: organisational networks, in the form of male memberships; and symbolic repertoires, which enabled them to portray themselves as representatives of broad social groups such as 'civil society' or 'the nation' rather than particular interests, and to construct women as citizens with gender-specific roles in the process of democracy-building. The former established the numerical overrepresentation of men in politics, while the latter constrained women's

ability to have their claims to substantive representation recognised as legitimate in the new political landscape.

Chapters 3, 4 and 5 focus on descriptive representation. Chapter 3 surveys the available evidence concerning the over-representation of men in politics in post-communist Europe by drawing on the 'supply and demand' model of candidate recruitment. Chapters 4 and 5 argue that, once established, the institutions of male dominance were subsequently sustained through distinctive mechanisms of reproduction for descriptive representation. As far as descriptive representation is concerned, the key mechanisms of reproduction are incumbency, which sustains men's over-representation in politics through the re-selection and re-election of existing MPs (Chap. 4), and electoral systems, which interact with candidate selection processes and therefore constrain women's ability to enter the political arena (Chap. 5). The third mechanism of reproduction discussed in this study concerns symbolic and substantive representation (Chap. 6). Thus, I argue that the asymmetric institutionalisation of the different arenas of a consolidated democracy limited the opportunities for state feminism in Central and Eastern Europe, while also enabling political parties to define the dominant frames for the substantive representation of women within the party systems of the region.

The sixth and final chapter of this study explores to what extent there has been a gradual shift towards breaking male dominance in Europe's new democracies. Thus, I examine several mechanisms of change: gender quotas, party contagion, international norm diffusion, party system change and the emergence of new actors that make it possible for state feminism to take root in Central and Eastern Europe. Finally, the conclusions summarise the findings and identify potential avenues for further research on the establishment, reproduction and change of the institutions of male dominance in post-communist Europe.

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CHAPTER 2

Establishing Male Dominance: Descriptive, Substantive and Symbolic Representation

The first fully competitive elections after the fall of communism were held in 1990 in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania and in 1991 in Poland. The elections were heralded as a comprehensive break with the state socialist past and the beginning of a new era of democratisation. In practice, a 'clean break' with the state socialist past certainly occurred in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, where the former anti-communist opposition emerged victorious in 1990; in contrast, the Bulgarian and Romanian electorates returned the former communist parties to power. Political scientists have generally considered these initial electoral outcomes to be highly deterministic vis-à-vis subsequent democratisation paths. As Vachudova's influential study showed, whether the anti-communist opposition or the communist (successor) parties won the first post-communist elections mattered a great deal in the long run, with the former playing a key role in building 'liberal' democracies in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, and the latter instrumental in the emergence of 'illiberal democracies' in Bulgaria and Romania (Vachudova 2005).

Feminist scholars working on Central and Eastern Europe were quick to notice a different set of outcomes of the transition from communist rule in the region: the sheer drop in the number of women elected to national legislatures by comparison to the late communist era; the difficulties encountered by nascent women's organisations in pressing for gender-equitable change; the widespread rejection of representational guarantees such as those that had ensured the election of increasing numbers of

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women to communist-era legislatures; and, in countries such as Hungary and Poland, the swift adoption of restrictions on women's reproductive rights (Einhorn 1991; Funk and Mueller 1993; Einhorn 1993; Waylen 1994; Jaquette and Wolchik 1998; Rueschemeyer 1998; Gal and Kligman 2000a, b). Overall, it was clearly not the case that democratisation 'leaders' such as Hungary or the Czech Republic were building more gender-equitable democracies than 'laggards' such as Bulgaria and Romania. Instead, as Watson argued in the early 1990s, the post-communist region as a whole witnessed 'the rise of masculinism', a situation where 'new social power [was] accruing to men in a systematic fashion' (1993, 82).

There is a general agreement in the literature on Central and Eastern Europe that the gender outcomes of the transitions from communist rule were largely negative both in terms of women's descriptive representation and in terms of women's substantive representation. Overall, the explanations that have been proposed for these outcomes can be placed on a continuum between agency and structure, depending on the extent to which they emphasise the role of organised women's movements, at one end of the spectrum, or broader structural constraints such as the policy environment or existing electoral systems, at the other end of the spectrum. For instance, Baldez (2003) focuses primarily on agency in the form of organised women's movements; Walsh (2011) proposes a more structure-based approach, analysing how the interaction between arenas of public contestation, including civil society, the media and legislatures, shapes the 'debate conditions' on gender equality; and Waylen focuses on both agency (civil society, organised women's movements and the activities of key women activists) and structure (the constitutional, the bureaucratic and the electoral arenas, respectively) (Waylen 2007, 39–40). Within this context, the institutions of male dominance are considered only insofar as they are part of the structural constraints that women face when pressing for change, for instance, in the form of overwhelmingly male-dominated legislatures or conservative discourses emphasising women's traditional roles in the family.

In order to 'read' existing literature from the perspective of male dominance, we need to begin with the concept of a critical juncture. For historical institutionalists, the creation of new institutions often occurs during 'critical junctures', defined as 'relatively short periods of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents' choices will affect the outcome of interest' (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, 348). Hughes and Paxton's framework for analysing women's representation

over time proposes the concept of 'critical periods', when 'a country, a government or a legislature is first formed' (Hughes and Paxton 2008, 247). 'Critical periods' are not necessarily as short-lived as new institutionalism's 'critical junctures'. A key feature of critical periods is that forces acting during such developmental windows may have enduring effects over many years (2008, 247). Most importantly, Hughes and Paxton argue that, during critical periods, gender outcomes are essentially a function of the interaction between 'forces of resistance' (for instance, colonial legacies, the adoption of plurality-based electoral systems or the formation of centre–right parties) and 'forces of change' (most notably, post-conflict reconstruction, PR-based electoral systems and the emergence of strong left-wing parties) (Hughes and Paxton 2008, 251).

Within the context of Central and Eastern Europe, there is widespread consensus on two issues. First, scholars agree that the period of 1988–1990, when communism collapsed across Central and Eastern Europe, generally meets the definition of critical junctures (for one of the earliest studies making this case, see Ekiert 1996). Post-communist transitions also meet Hughes and Paxton's (2008) criterion for critical periods in that they certainly resulted in the adoption of new political and electoral systems, and the first free elections to national legislatures since the end of the Second World War. Second, scholars also agree that the anti-communist opposition and the communist (successor) parties were the key actors involved in building the institutions of representative politics in what was soon to become post-communist Europe. The question, then, is to explain how actors' strategic choices and political struggles shaped the institutions of male dominance in the region after state socialism.

From this perspective, there is ample evidence in the existing literature that, in terms of descriptive representation, the first post-communist elections embedded the over-representation of men within the political system to the degree described by Dahlerup and Leyenaar (2013) as male monopolies (see also Appendix B for women's descriptive representation). Second, in terms of substantive representation, the transitions from communist rule were notable because of the relative absence of organised women's movements pressing for gender-equitable change (Baldez 2003; Waylen 2007). Finally, from the perspective of symbolic representation, dominant political discourses tended to portray women as having a gender-specific role in the process of democracy-building, with no equivalent role for men (Einhorn 1993; Gal and Kligman 2000b; Einhorn 2006).

This chapter traces the establishment of the institutions of male dominance in Central and Eastern Europe to political actors' deployment of two strategic resources at their disposal during the transitions from communist rule: (1) *organisational networks,* which enabled them to draw on male memberships when negotiating the collapse of state socialism and then when selecting their candidates for the founding elections of 1990; (2) *symbolic repertoires*, which enabled them to portray themselves as representatives of broad social groups such as 'civil society' or 'the nation' rather than particular interests, and to construct women as citizens with gender-specific roles in the process of democracy-building.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I build a profile of the actors involved in the collapse of communism: the communist (successor) parties and the anti-communist opposition. Then, I discuss the evidence for the ways in which actors drew on their predominantly male memberships while making the transitions to competitive politics. Finally, I review these actors' symbolic repertoires, showing how these repertoires became incorporated within the nascent party systems in the region.

2.1 The Actors: The Communist (Successor) Parties and the Anti-communist Opposition

As elsewhere in the world at the time, the representation of women in communist Central and Eastern Europe varied in inverse proportion with the power of a particular organisation or institution. Thus, women constituted a much higher proportion of the relatively powerless communist legislatures than of the much more powerful party structures. For instance, in the mid-1980s, the proportion of women was 21 per cent in the Bulgarian National Assembly, 29 per cent in the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly, 20 per cent in the Hungarian National Assembly and in the Polish Sejm, and 34 per cent in Romania's Grand National Assembly (Inter-Parliamentary Union).

The most important role in strategic as well as day-to-day decision making in state socialist regimes was played by communist or workers' parties. Women's representation among the rank-and-file fell well short of parity, decreasing even further as one ascended towards the top of the hierarchy. For instance, Hanley's study of Communist Party recruitment throughout the region showed that 'the negative effect of being a woman' remained 'large and statistically significant' throughout the communist period (2003, 1101). Beyond the rank-and-file party membership, only

7.5 per cent and 11 per cent of the members of the Central Committee of the Polish Socialist Workers' Party in 1980 and 1986, respectively, were women (Jancar 1985, 169; Titkow 1993, 254). Even in Romania, where the Communist Party conducted a sustained affirmative action campaign from 1973 onwards, women constituted no more than 20 per cent of the membership of the Central Committee (Fischer 1985, 128). As for the Politburo, the top party structure, less than a handful of women were present among its members for the entirety of the communist period in Hungary and in Romania (Tökés 1996, 78–79; Fischer 1985, 128).

Dissident or opposition movements in the USSR 'satellite countries' were very diverse, reflecting not only variation among state socialist regimes but also past experiences of revolution (such as in Hungary in 1956), liberalisation followed by 'normalisation' (such as in the case of the Prague Spring of 1968), or struggles between organised trade union movements and the regime (as in Poland in 1980). Thus, in the Czech lands, dissent was primarily the domain of intellectuals, most notably writers and artists; in Poland, the trade union Solidarity was a mass movement operating underground for most of the 1980s; and, in Hungary, the anti-communist opposition acquired a distinctively party political flavour, especially after the formation of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) in 1987. Anti-communist opposition was a much rarer occurrence in Bulgaria, due to the country's historically close ties to the USSR, and in Romania, due to the extremely coercive nature of the Ceaușescu regime.

In Czechoslovakia, Charter 77 arose in protest against the infringement of human rights by the communist regime in the wake of the 1975 Helsinki Accords. The organisation defined itself as 'loose, informal and open association of people of various shades of opinion, faiths and professions united by the will to strive individually and collectively for the respecting of civic and human rights in our own country and throughout the world' (Charter 77). These rights, the signatories to the Charter continued, were 'accorded to all men' through a variety of international treaties and pacts, including the Helsinki Final Act and the UN Declaration of Human Rights (Charter 77). The Charter was signed by 1874 people—a remarkably high number given the risks associated with such an act of defiance during communist rule; of these, 18 per cent were women (Šiklová 1993, 77). Moreover, one of the three rotating spokespersons of the Charter was almost invariably a woman (Jancar 1985, 171; Heitlinger 1993, 104).

Poland's Solidarity was the only independent trade union in Central and Eastern Europe to successfully challenge the communist regime.

Women were well-represented among the rank-and-file membership (approximately 50 per cent of its members before December 1981 were women), but the percentage of women diminished towards the top: only 7.8 per cent of the 881 delegates to the Solidarity Congress were women, and there was only one woman on the National Executive Council (Jancar 1985, 169). By the late 1980s and the roundtable negotiations, Solidarity's strategy of 'self-limiting revolution' worked against women because 'the union's male leaders' emphasis on compromise and reform overrode the commitment to social change' (Grabowska 2012, 393–394). Thus, by 1990, women were very poorly represented within Solidarity's leadership structures: only four women were selected to sit on the 96-strong National Committee (Titkow 1998, 27).

In Hungary, the roundtable negotiations of 1989 were made possible by the emergence of political parties from 1987 onwards, and by their subsequent successful organisation in the Opposition Roundtable, which allowed them to present a coherent front to the communist incumbents in the National Roundtable (Bruszt and Stark 1992; Tökés 1996). The new parties were—unsurprisingly—male-dominated. For instance, Bozóki found that only 8 per cent of the representatives of the new parties in the Opposition Roundtable were women (2000, 245). Furthermore, he notes, 'the closer a party stood to power, the fewer opportunities were offered to women in its ranks', so that the lowest levels of women's representation could be found in the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), the formation which eventually won the 1990 elections (Bozóki 2000, 245).

2.2 Male Over-Representation in Transitional Settings

The modes of transition from communism varied across Central and Eastern Europe. In the case of pacted transitions, the collapse of the regime and its replacement with democratic institutions was managed through roundtable negotiations, first in Poland in 1988, then in Hungary in 1989 and eventually in Bulgaria in 1990. In Romania, communism collapsed suddenly at the end of December 1989, with the National Salvation Front (FSN) swiftly stepping in to take the reins of government. In February 1990, the Provisional Council for National Unity (CPUN) was formed, comprising representatives of the FSN, former anti-communist dissidents and representatives of the re-established 'historic' parties that had been banned by the communist regime.

Whether pact-led or resulting from the implosion of the state socialist regime, all the transitions to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe involved an eventual settlement between the 'new' and the 'old' political elites as to the precise design of the post-communist political order. The sheer scale of the task was daunting, because it involved the complete overhaul of the existing economic and political structures and bringing in new political and electoral systems, as well as new constitutional arrangements. In this process, post-communist elites had to draw heavily on whatever organisational networks they had at their disposal for participating in the negotiations, as well as for participating in the first post-communist elections. As I show in this section, these organisational networks included overwhelmingly male memberships, both before and after the collapse of communism.

In order to establish whether men were over-represented among the 'new' and the 'old' political elites of Central and Eastern Europe, I first examined the gender composition of the parties to the negotiations of 1989–1990. In order provide accurate evidence in this respect, I collated a range of data concerning the various groups involved in negotiating the post-communist settlements. For instance, two of the case studies in Jon Elster's edited volume on the roundtable discussions of 1989 (Elster 1996) provided useful appendixes listing the name of the negotiators and their affiliation (Kolarova and Dimitrov 1996; Čalda 1996). The data demonstrate that the political actors of the late communist and early post-communist era were overwhelmingly men. Let us briefly examine these transitions in the order in which they took place. In Poland, which began its post-communist journey as early as 1988, only one of the 60 participants in the roundtable negotiations was a woman, although women were fairly well-represented overall within the Solidarity trade union (Titkow 1993, 254). In Hungary, women constituted only 13 per cent of all the participants in the roundtable negotiations. They were best represented among the negotiators on the so-called Third Side (21 per cent), and severely under-represented among the negotiators of the Opposition Roundtable (8 per cent) (Bozóki 2000, 245). The Third Side, which brought together the representatives of social organisations affiliated to the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSZMP), including the Alliance of Hungarian Women, was, as Bozóki notes, 'the most politically weightless party in the negotiations' (Bozóki 2000, 245).

In Czechoslovakia, the talks convened in November 1989 after the resignation of the communist leadership included one woman among 35

participants on the regime side, and one woman among the 31 participants on the opposition side (there were also two intermediaries from 'Most' [Bridge], whose role was to contact the two sides and facilitate their meeting; both were men) (Čalda 1996, 168–170). In Bulgaria, the roundtable talks starting in January 1990 comprised 6 women among the 43 participants on the communist side (however, none of these women were from the Bulgarian Communist Party), and 1 woman among the 43 participants on the opposition side (Kolarova and Dimitrov 1996, 203–205). Finally, in Romania, the Provisional Council of National Unity (CPUN) included three women among the 112 National Salvation Front representatives, and three women among the 152 representatives of political parties and national minorities (Pavel and Huiu 2003, 510–514).

Throughout the region, the results of the 1990 elections showed the extent to which male over-representation was becoming deeply entrenched in post-communist politics. This occurred on both sides of the regime divide. On the one hand, a brief overview of communist (successor) parties' performance in the founding elections of 1990 gives the full measure of the region-wide retreat from communist-era policies on women's representation. After the founding elections of 1990, it became apparent that the representation of women within the successor parties was very low indeed: only 4.9 per cent of the deputies elected from within the ranks of the National Salvation Front (FSN) in Romania in 1990 were women, 16.7 per cent of the MPs of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) in Poland in 1991 were women and 15.2 per cent of the MPs of the Hungarian Socialist Party in 1990 were women (Appendix B). In contrast, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ), which embraced, rather than discarded, its Marxist Leninist identity, elected 21.9 per cent women to the Czech National Council in 1990. This trend has continued throughout the post-communist period, with the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) in the Czech Republic consistently having a much higher proportion of women deputies than its 'reformed' counterparts in the region.

The former anti-communist parties and movements were also little inclined to recruit women candidates and/or to place them in relatively safe positions on the lists. This occurred irrespectively of the electoral strength of these formations. For instance, the former anti-communist opposition won the founding elections in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. However, in the Czech lands, the Civic Forum elected only 14.2 per cent women to the National Council, while in Hungary women represented

4.9 per cent and 8.7 per cent of the deputies elected from within the ranks of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) and the Free Democrats (SZDSZ), respectively. In Romania and Bulgaria, where the former communist parties engineered a return to power in 1990, the former anti-communist opposition was less successful electorally. For example, in Bulgaria, there were only 7 women among the 106 MPs of the Union of Democratic Forces elected in the first round of the 1990 elections (Kostadinova 2003, 315). In Romania, the anti-communist opposition largely consisted in two most important 'historic' formations that had played a prominent role in the inter-war period and were re-established in 1989, the National Liberal Party (PNL) and the National Peasant Party (PNT-cd). The two parties won a total of 41 seats between them in the 1990 elections; of these, only two were held by women.

There is also evidence that men were over-represented not only in the legislatures of the region, but also more generally across the board among both the 'old' and the 'new' elites of Central and Eastern Europe during the transitions from communist rule. Szelényi and Szelényi (1995) argue that, while countries such as Hungary and Poland were characterised overall by elite circulation (that is, the replacement of the communist-era elites with the new elites that had not held leadership positions under the previous regime), in Russia the pattern was one of elite reproduction (that is, the return of the old *nomenklatura* elites in large numbers). These differences notwithstanding, men were over-represented among both sets of elites. Thus, Fodor et al. show that 'if we compare the percentage of women in the new and old political elites, we find little change': women represented 13.1 per cent of the nomenklatura elites in Hungary, and 7.1 per cent in Poland; their proportion among the new political elites was 11.9 per cent and 11.8 per cent, respectively (Fodor et al. 1995, 788–795). In Russia, the proportion of women was even smaller: 4.7 per cent among the new elites and 5.5 per cent among the nomenklatura elites (Fodor et al. 1995, 788–795).

Finally, it is important to note that recent scholarship has begun to uncover some of the informal rules and practices that shaped women's access to political power in the immediate aftermath of communism. For instance, Forest's fine-grained study of the Czech Republic traces the paths of men and women dissidents during the crucial days of November and December 1989, demonstrating that the activities of the dissidents within the Civic Forum were sustained by a gendered division of labour between male and female dissidents, with men at the

top of the leadership and women responsible for the 'communication' dimension of dissident activities (Forest 2009, 166).[1] In fact, as former Czech dissident Jirina Šiklová aptly summarises the situation, 'female dissidents primarily typed, retyped, translated, and generally did the dirty work, while male dissidents drafted political programmes and declarations' (Šiklová 1997, 269). At the end of 1989, when the Centre for Coordination of the Civic Forum set about organising itself in the wake of the mass resignation of the communist leadership, the movement was characterised by 'a largely feminized environment as far as the collection, copying and dissemination of information was concerned' (Forest 2009, 171).[2] Shana Penn's study of women in the Solidarity movement in Poland uncovered a similar gendered effect: an all-women team was in charge of the movement's clandestine publication, *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, effectively sustaining the Solidarity's visibility and strength, over more than a decade (Penn 2005).

As this section has shown, Central and Eastern Europe is characterised by a clearly discernible pattern: the political parties that eventually competed with each other in the electoral arena in 1990 were formed by political elites where men were heavily over-represented either in the form of 'male monopolies' or as very large male majorities. Thus, the numerical over-representation of men was embedded into the fabric of the political system from the very first post-communist elections. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 demonstrate how the male dominance was further reproduced throughout the post-communist period by men's 'incumbency advantage' and by the functioning of the electoral systems of the region.

2.3 Repertoires of Symbolic Representation

Scholars of post-communist politics have been intrigued by the absence of claims for the substantive representation of women during the transitions from communist rule. This absence is all the more striking when we consider that it characterised both the former communist parties, which reneged on previous commitments to 'women's emancipation', and the anti-communist opposition, which appeared not particularly inclined to include gender equality on their agendas. When viewed together with the weakness of women's movements, and the dismantling of the satellite organisations of the communist parties, the overarching picture is dismal.

This section argues that (post-communist) political elites did in fact have a set of tools at their disposal that enabled them to embed gender as

a category in their discourses and later, when they were in a position to do so, in their policies. I refer to these tools as *symbolic repertoires*, because they were intrinsically linked to the politics of symbolic representation. By drawing on these symbolic repertoires, the key political actors of Central and Eastern Europe—the communist (successor) parties and the anti-communist opposition—established dominant frames that continued to define party ideologies and public policies for the greatest part of the post-communist era. As I show below, these symbolic repertoires assigned women a very much gender-specific role in the post-communist era. Some of these repertoires were subsequently incorporated in the functioning of political competition within the national party systems.

In Poland and Hungary, the symbolic repertoires of actors with their origins in the anti-communist opposition, such as Solidarity and the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), viewed women's role as reproducers of the nation as a key element of their legitimation strategies. This has been well-documented in the literature since the early 1990s. In one of the earliest analyses of the Polish case, Holc examines the 'ethos' of Solidarity—'the language of values that was used by opposition activists to justify the existence and activities of the movement itself and to serve as a counterdiscourse to the language of the Communist party-ruled government' (1995, 1). She argues that Solidarity's 'ethos' had several elements: self-determination, unity, moral guidelines for individual behaviour, religiosity, nationalism and gender (1995, 3). Gender was 'embedded within all elements': for instance, 'the moral guidelines were those that allowed trust and reliance among a fraternal community of resisters (1995, 6), while the heroines of the Solidarity movement were by definition anonymous, quiet and sacrificial' (1995, 7). Furthermore, as Grabowska shows, while Solidarity was initially inclusive of women, 'both as women and as feminists', the paths of Solidarity and feminism separated after 1989, when the necessity to compromise with the Catholic church became increasingly important for Solidarity leaders (2012, 393–395). By 1990, when the Solidarity women's section tried to oppose an anti-abortion resolution of the Party Congress on the grounds that this was a women's issue, and women, who represented 50 per cent of the movement's membership, had not been consulted, they were summarily dismissed by the party leadership (Watson 1993, 75). As the case of Poland clearly illustrates, women's ability to 'act for' women was severely constrained not only by Solidarity's symbolic repertoire but also by the alliance of two organisations characterised by male monopolies of political power: if men made up 90 per cent of

Solidarity's leadership at the time (Watson 1993, 75), they also constituted 100 per cent of the leadership of the Catholic Church.

In Hungary, the formation of the anti-communist political parties in the late 1980s was underpinned by claims about the 'proper' role for women. As Goven (1993b) persuasively shows, the 'ethnic anti-feminism' strand of the opposition parties 'depict[ed] the "nation" as "dying out" due both to continued low birth rates and the oppression of the cultural and language rights of the Hungarian minorities living in neighbouring countries' (1993b, 333). Thus, for political parties such as the Hungarian Democratic Forum, 'redeeming the nation meant re-subordinating women, recontaining them within the private' (Goven 1993b, 362).

In the event, both the Hungarian Democratic Forum and Solidarity emerged victorious after the 1990 and 1991 elections respectively. As soon as this happened, previous plans to restrict women's access to abortion were implemented. In Poland, calls for restrictions on abortion, which had been made by Catholic organisations as early as 1980 (Zielinska 2000, 26), formed an integral part of Solidarity's legitimation strategy. This process resulted in the introduction of an anti-abortion bill in the Sejm in the spring of 1989, before the partly competitive elections that were to prove a resounding victory for Solidarity (Zielinska 2000, 28). Although this first attempt was unsuccessful, on 7 January 1993 the Polish parliament passed the Law on Family Planning, Legal Protection of the Foetus and the Conditions for the Permissibility of Abortion, a piece of legislation that, among others, declares the life and health of the unborn should be protected from the moment of conception (Zielinska 2000, 31). The law is still in place today.

In Hungary, the issue of reproductive rights played out as part of the increasingly open competition between 'ethnic anti-feminism' and 'civic anti-feminism' in the late 1980s. The former was the preferred symbolic repertoire of the Democratic Forum, while the latter primarily characterised the Free Democrats (SZDSZ). 'Civic anti-feminism', Goven argues', saw women as 'undermining the autonomy of the (male) citizen' (1993a, 363). Consequently, 'masculine autonomy, so insulted by the [communist] state, [had to] be re-established in the private' through the subordination of women (Goven 1993a, 417). As Gal (1994) shows, this division was mirrored in the debates that eventually led to restrictions on abortion in 1992: for the populists within the MDF, a state built on moral consensus required banning abortion; for the liberals within the parliamentary opposition (primarily SZDSZ and FIDESZ), the minimalist state required the conceptualisation of abortion as a private issue. 'The abortion debate',

Gal concludes, 'makes politics. It also makes political groups' (1994, 286). In the event, the new abortion law allowed women to obtain an abortion on the basis of declaring that they were in a crisis situation, introduced a three-day waiting period, and allowed doctors to refuse to perform an abortion (Gal 1994, 265).

Calls for restrictions on abortion were also made in Czechoslovakia in the immediate aftermath of communism, initially by religious leaders such as the Bishops' Conference (Wolchik 2000, 82). However, they were unsuccessful: in the more secular Czech lands, parties with links to the Church had a relatively minor position within the government and were therefore unable to impose their preference on the others; in Slovakia, the Minister of Health, which represented the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), proposed a law restricting access to abortion that failed to pass due to the collapse of the Čarnogurský government in 1992 (Wolchik 2000, 82). These outcomes illustrate the significance of the (neo-)liberal symbolic repertoire in the Czech Republic. This stance—which, in the case of the Czech Republic, has manifested mostly as a resounding official silence on gender relations on the part of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) for the first decade and a half of the transition—illustrates the extent to which women as a group were simply not considered important enough to merit explicit attention. Over time, as ODS's stance shifted from the 'pure' neo-liberalism of the early years into a more national conservative direction (Hanley 2008), public assertions of the 'natural' role of women have come to the fore in the party's public discourses (see, for instance, Weiner 2010).

If the symbolic repertoire of the national conservative parties constructed women as reproducers, and that of the liberal parties linked women and the private sphere of the family, the communist (successor) parties had considerably less room for manoeuvre developing their symbolic repertoires, largely owing to their association with the 'women's emancipation' policies of the state socialist era. The sizeable literature on the success of the former communist parties after 1990 virtually never addresses the issue of gender relations or women's representation. Nevertheless, two of the most notable contributions (Bozóki and Ishiyama 2002a, b; Grzymala-Busse 2002) offer some potentially fruitful avenues for inquiry.

Bozóki and Ishiyama (2002a, 7–8) classify communist successor parties on two dimensions: first, whether they are reformed (that is, whether they have abandoned the communist ideology and 'moved towards a more

moderate leftist position'); second, whether they are transmuted (which describes a Communist Party that 'has moved away from the left and adopted culturally right-wing, nationalistic and anti-west elements into its ideology'). When seen from the perspective of gender, the question is whether cases of successful transformation into social democratic parties (political parties that have reformed successfully, but not shifted towards the right) are more likely to act like their counterparts in the West in terms of 'acting for' women than those communist successor parties that have moved in a different direction. The evidence in this respect is mixed. Of the two cases classified by Bozóki and Ishiyama (2002a, 8) as fully reformed, modern social democratic formations, Poland's Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) has been considerably more likely to engage in the substantive representation of women's interests than the Hungarian Socialists (MSZP). Thus, for instance, in 1996 SLD made a concerted effort to reverse the anti-abortion legislation (Zielinska 2000; Kramer 2003). During the 1996 parliamentary debates on a liberalisation amendment that was eventually unsuccessful, SLD MPs deliberately framed their support for the amendment in ways that reflected both their pro-choice stance and their desire to disassociate themselves from the practices of the communist past, when, due to the relative unavailability of reliable contraceptives, abortion was 'a universal method of birth control' (Kramer 2003, 112–113). For instance, SLD MP Izabella Sierakowska stated that 'none of us support abortion, but the possibility [of abortion] must be guaranteed to women' (Kramer 2003, 112). In contrast, the Hungarian socialists did not make a serious attempt to repeal the 1992 anti-abortion law. One reason for this situation may well be the much milder prohibition of abortion in the Hungarian law: in practice, the requirement that women were entitled to an abortion on socio-economic grounds made abortion relatively easily available to women. Thus, in practice if not in theory, both communist (successor) parties acquiesced to the (new) status quo on reproductive rights.

The communist (successor) parties of Bulgaria and Romania were classified by Bozóki and Ishiyama (2002a) as partly reformed and (partly) transmuted. While this constitutes an accurate assessment of these parties' programmatic identities for the first decade of post-communism, it should be noted that both the Bulgarian socialists (BSP) and the Romanian social democrats (PDSR, later PSD) have since completed their move towards the 'reform' side of the spectrum, and are currently members of the

Socialist International and the Party of European Socialists (for a more detailed outline, see Pop-Eleches [2008] and Spirova [2008]). Information on these parties' stance on women's issues in the early 1990s is scarce, not in the least because, unlike in Poland or Hungary, reproductive rights did not play an important role on the political agenda. Instead, the communist (successor) parties in Bulgaria and Romania were instrumental in legalising abortion in the early 1990s. Whether, by addressing this problem, party leaderships also considered that they had solved 'the woman question' is unclear. Nevertheless, there is evidence that suggests that both BSP and PSD committed to policies that envisaged women as having a dual role as mothers, on the one hand, and participants in economic and political life, on the other. For instance, the 1996 manifesto of the Romanian social democrats (PDSR) stated that the party 'recognize[d] that women (…) have been more affected than men by the negative impact of the transition', while also advocating 'social welfare [measures] that safeguard[ed] women's dignity as mothers'. These frames resonate strongly with communist-era notions of women's emancipation, which, as Funk and Mueller (1993), Corrin (1992) and Einhorn (1993) argue, viewed women as having a dual role as producers and reproducers.

Scholarship on communist (successor) parties also indicates that there may well have been a process of 'degendering' of party strategies during the post-communist era. Grzymala-Busse (2002) argues that the success or regeneration of communist parties after 1990 can be explained by their capacity to use their 'elite portable skills' and 'usable pasts' in transforming themselves into credible competitors in the post-communist era. She shows that communist-era recruitment policies shaped 'the composition and skills of the elites of 1989' (2002, 28). Although Grzymala-Busse does not directly address gender, it is clear that, as shown above, communist-era recruitment policies resulted in the recruitment of a great number of men, and a very small number of women. Thus, women were considerably less likely to have the 'portable skills' required of them in the new era. Second, communist (successor) parties privileged 'usable pasts', such as a track record in political representation or leadership, that were mostly available to men rather than to women. Overall, the communist (successor) parties' appeals to expertise were clearly coded male.

Although the symbolic repertoires of the anti-communist opposition and the communist (successor) parties varied across a spectrum running from the national conservative to the social democratic, what they all had

in common was the symbolic representation of women as essentially 'second-class' citizens in the new democracies of the region. As Chap. 6 argues, over time these symbolic frames were incorporated into the functioning of the national party systems, and severely constrained women actors' ability to press for change effectively.

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter has shown that the establishment of male dominance in Central and Eastern Europe during the transitions from communist rule was the result of purposeful actions by the key political actors emerging on the scene at the time: the anti-communist opposition and the communist (successor) parties. In particular, the establishment of male dominance in both descriptive and substantive representation occurred as (1) a result of political actors' use of pre-existing networks during the transition to democracy (in descriptive terms) and (2) as a result of political actors' use of specific symbolic repertoires (in substantive terms). On the one hand, the numerical over-representation of men became deeply embedded into the politics of the region through political elites' deployment of pre-existing organisational networks such as predominantly male memberships. On the other hand, opportunities for substantive representation were curtailed by inequalities of voice resulting from the early emergence (and eventual institutionalisation) of specific symbolic repertoires at the core of post-communist multi-party systems.

Having thus established that the initial outcomes of the transitions from communist rule were very much gender-specific, in the next chapters I discuss the mechanisms that have reproduced these initial outcomes over the post-communist period: in the case of descriptive representation, incumbency and the electoral systems of the region; in the case of substantive representation, the 'asymmetric institutionalisation' of national party systems and civil societies.

Notes

1. 'un mouvement essentiellement masculin à son sommet, mais féminisé dans sa dimension communicationnelle' (Forest 2009, 166) (my translation above).
2. 'la lecture attentive du compte rendu des discussions dans les différentes arènes du KCOF, de même que les entretiens avec les actrices de ce dernier, livrent en filigrane la description d'un environnement largement féminisé pour tout ce qui concerne la saisie, la copie et la diffusion de l'information' (Forest 2009, 171) (my translation above).

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CHAPTER 3

Candidate Selection and Male Dominance in Europe's New Democracies

As Chap. 2 has argued, the descriptive over-representation of men in the politics of Europe's new democracies during the late 1980s and early 1990s was the outcome of a process that overwhelmingly favoured male aspirants for political office. On the one hand, communist successor parties' chances of survival were predicated on their ability to persuade domestic electorates that their experience in government was a valuable asset for managing the transition from communist rule. Within this context, male candidates were much more likely to have the kind of 'portable skills' and 'usable pasts' (Grzymala-Busse 2002) necessary for the communist successor parties' ability to present themselves as credible contenders after state socialism. On the other hand, the anti-communist opposition drew on informal networks characterised by a gendered division of labour between male and female dissidents, with men typically more present in high-visibility roles and women mostly occupying support roles. On the relatively rare occasions when women did try to organise themselves as women, they were explicitly marginalised by political leaders. In sum, although the precise forms of male dominance varied with parties' positioning on the communist/anti-communist spectrum, the overarching outcome—men's numerical over-representation in politics—was remarkably uniform across the region.

This chapter is principally concerned with the decades that followed. Indeed, male over-representation in politics was not simply a fleeting effect of the particular circumstances characterising the transitions from communist rule, nor was it limited to the early 1990s. Instead, as the data

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on descriptive representation presented in this study consistently show, male dominance has been a remarkably resilient feature of politics throughout the region over the post-communist period. A brief comparison of the proportion of men elected to post-communist legislatures in the early 1990s and in the most recent elections covered in this study illustrates this point succinctly: in Hungary, the proportion of men elected to the National Assembly in 2014 is barely 2 percentage points lower than in 1990; in Slovakia, the difference between the outcomes of 1990 and the 2016 elections is 4 per cent; in the Czech Republic, the proportion of men elected to the Chamber of Deputies is 6 percentage points lower than in the Czech National Council in 1990. Only in Poland and Romania has the proportion of men elected to the lower chamber of parliament dropped significantly between the first post-communist elections and the most recent elections: in Poland, due to the introduction of a 35 per cent candidate quota in 2011; in Romania, due to a sustained effort by some of the main parties to recruit women candidates in 2016. The next challenge, then, is to highlight the mechanisms that have largely sustained, or, alternatively, challenged, male over-representation in Europe's new democracies over the post-communist period.

Where might we look most usefully for the evidence as to why male over-representation has been such a stable feature of post-communist politics? The answer, this chapter suggests, has to do with how gender became institutionalised within the practice of candidate selection in Europe's new democracies. Within this context, I draw on feminist conceptualisations of candidate recruitment (Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Norris 1997; Krook 2010a, b; Kenny 2011), as well as on the rich scholarship on women's representation in politics in Central and Eastern Europe (Saxonberg 2000; Moser 2001; Matland and Montgomery 2003; Rueschemeyer and Wolchik 2009). Overall, this chapter assesses the evidence as to whether the mechanisms responsible for the reproduction and change of the institutions of male over-representation in post-communist Europe are most plausibly located on the supply side (for instance, if men are consistently more likely to move from eligibles to aspirants in the candidate selection process), or, alternatively, on the demand side (for instance, if party gatekeepers prefer to select male candidates or, alternatively, voters prefer to cast their ballot for men).

This chapter's analytical starting point consists in reading the existing literature on candidate recruitment and on women's representation in post-communist Europe through the conceptual lens of feminist

institutionalism, with a particular focus on the how the gendered institutions of male dominance shape the supply and demand of male and female candidates. From this perspective, Norris and Lovenduski's influential 'supply and demand' model of political recruitment (Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Norris 1997) provides us with three potential avenues of inquiry. First, we can look at the *supply* of male and female candidates in the post-communist region: What is it about the gender environment of post-communism that shapes men's and women's motivation, interest in politics, skills and resources in ways that makes men more likely to run for political office than women? Second, we can examine the *demand* side, and in particular the role of party gatekeepers in the recruitment of candidates: Are party selectors more likely to choose male than female candidates? If so, do these choices vary with party ideology and/or positioning on the left–right spectrum? Third, we can explore the role that voters play in deciding the *outcome* of elections: do electorates endorse traditional views of politics as the realm of men and masculine norms, and what evidence is there that these views shape voters' preference for male rather than female candidates?

Altogether, this chapter seeks to make a *prima facie* case as to where the balance of the evidence lies with respect to uncovering the mechanisms that have sustained men's numerical over-representation in politics over the post-communist period: Is it on the supply side, on the demand side or perhaps on both sides? Throughout, the emphasis is on patterns of candidate recruitment throughout the post-communist period, rather than at a particular moment in time. Thus, the supply and demand model constitutes a powerful analytical toolkit that enables us to uncover evidence for the reproduction and change of the institutions of male dominance across the post-communist period. I therefore discuss a wide range of empirical evidence concerning women's and men's representation in politics in post-communist Europe, including longitudinal trends in public perceptions of whether men make better political leaders than women do, party gatekeepers' selection of male and female candidates and voters' choice at the ballot box.

The principal findings of this chapter are that the mechanisms responsible for sustaining male over-representation in politics over the post-communist period are located at the stage where party gatekeepers select candidates for political office. Additionally, there is also some evidence that supply-side factors—such as the fact that Central and East European men are more likely to have resources that enable them

to be active citizens than women do—also play a role in the shift from eligible to aspirant. However, there is virtually no evidence that voters in the post-communist region actively prefer male candidates to the extent that they vote against women in elections. Having thus presented a prima facie case that party gatekeepers are the key to understanding why male over-representation in politics has been sustained over time in Central and Eastern Europe, Chaps. 4 and 5 further substantiate these findings empirically by focusing on the two specific mechanisms of reproduction: men's 'incumbency advantage' and the gender effects of national electoral systems on party selectors' selection of candidates. Within this context, this chapter shifts the terms of analysis away from conventional wisdom about the post-communist region as a bastion of patriarchal values and towards a more precise understanding of what exactly is distinctive about our case studies at the regional level, as well as individually, over the post-communist period.

This chapter therefore proceeds as follows. First, I provide a brief overview of the recruitment of women candidates in post-communist Europe since 1990, as seen through the conceptual lens of the supply and demand model and its recent feminist institutionalist critics. Second, I look at the supply side by examining variation in men's and women's interest in politics in Europe's new and 'old' democracies and particularly the extent to which the gender environment of post-communism shapes men and women's ability to run for political office. Third, I explore party gatekeepers' demand for male and female candidates, focusing on how party ideology shapes men's and women's access to political office. Finally, I look at the ways in which candidates' gender informs the ways in which the voters cast their ballots in national parliamentary elections in the region.

3.1 Candidate Recruitment in Post-communist Europe

The only study of Europe's new democracies to have engaged directly with the supply and demand model from a comparative perspective is Richard Matland and Kathleen Montgomery's influential project on women's access to political power, published more than a decade ago (Matland and Montgomery 2003). On the supply side, Matland and Montgomery found that, although overall women in post-communist Europe did have some of the resources valued by selectors in Western democracies, such as high levels

of education and visible positions in society, women's political ambition might well be affected by societal culture, most notably by public support for patriarchal values (Matland 2003, 325). On the demand side, they found that, despite significant variation among the case studies, new parties with close ties to Western Europe were more likely to be sympathetic to recruiting women candidates (Matland 2003, 326–328), and that, while parties of the left tended to do best, there were also significant levels of representation for women within some parties of the right (Matland 2003, 338). Finally, concerning the outcome of the elections, they found 'exceedingly little evidence' that voters were unlikely to cast a ballot for women candidates (Matland 2003, 330). This chapter expands Matland and Montgomery's analysis to the 27 years that have passed since the collapse of communism.

Let us begin by taking stock of the trends in the recruitment of women candidates since 1990. Table 3.1 presents an overview of the proportion of women candidates and MPs in national legislatures in the region during the post-communist period. Several notable trends merit further attention. First, the proportion of women *candidates* running in national parliamentary elections has increased in all our case studies by comparison to the beginning of the transition from communism, while the corresponding proportion of male candidates has decreased. While the proportion of male candidates has decreased most substantially in Poland (by as much as 30.4 per cent between the 1991 elections and the 2015 elections to the Sejm), this effect is clearly due to the introduction of legislated gender quotas in 2011. However, it should be noted that Poland is the exception rather than the rule: the case of Poland notwithstanding, none of the elections covered in Table 3.1 provided for candidate gender quotas at the national level. The remaining countries can be split into two distinct groups: on the one hand, in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, women's representation among candidates for parliamentary office has increased by between 5 and 10 per cent since the first post-communist elections; in Bulgaria and Romania, the increase has been around 15 per cent. Second, the proportion of women elected to national legislatures in post-communist Europe has also increased by comparison to the beginning of the transition. The highest increases have occurred in Poland and Romania (by 17.6 and 15.8 per cent respectively), with Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia registering more modest improvements in women's representation over the same period. Hungary appears to be somewhat of an outlier: not only has it had the lowest proportion of women MPs in the region across the period

Table 3.1 The proportion of women candidates and elected MPs in Central and Eastern European legislatures, (1990–2016)

	Bulgaria		*Czech Republic*		*Hungary*		*Poland*		*Romania*		*Slovakia*	
	% cand.	*% MPs*	*% cand.*	*% MPs*	*% cand.*	*% MPs*	*% cand.*	*% MPs*	*% cand.*	*% MPs*	*% cand.*	*% MPs*
1st election	n/a	n/a	12.9	13.0	9.0	7.3	11.2	9.6	n/a	4.7	n/a	12.0
2nd election	n/a	13.7	14.9	10.5	11.5	11.1	13.1	13.0	8.7	3.6	n/a	15.3
3rd election	13.9	11.7	15.5	15.0	14.2	8.3	13.8	13.0	12.0	7.0	14.9	14.7
4th election	17.7	10.8	17.7	15.0	17.8	9.1	23.0	20.2	n/a	10.7	14.2	11.3
5th election	24.0	26.7	20.3	17.0	16.7	10.6	21.7	20.4	21.3	11.4	19.4	14.7
6th election	27.8	20.8	25.5	15.5	19.2	9.1	20.1	20.4	14.6	11.4	19.3	16.0
7th election	26.1	20.8	25.4	22.0	16.2	9.5	42.7	23.9	15.2	13.7	21.6	15.3
8th election	28.1	25.4	22.8	19.5	–	–	41.6	27.2	24.5	20.5	19.0	16.0
9th election	28.6	20.0	–	–	–	–	–				20.3	19.3
Difference	+14.7	+6.3	+9.9	+6.5	+7.2	+2.2	+30.4	+17.6	+15.8	+15.8	+5.4	+7.3

Sources: As for Appendix B

Notes: The data refer to the proportion of women candidates and elected MPs among the parties that won seats in the elections, and to the lower chamber of the legislature, where applicable. The exception is Hungary, where the Elections Office reports the data concerning the proportion of women candidates among all parties running in the election

covered here, but the proportion of women in the National Assembly has risen by only 2.2 per cent since 1990. Third, the increase in women's representation, and the corresponding decrease in male over-representation, has by no means occurred in leaps and bounds. Instead, with the exception of Bulgaria in 2001 and Poland in 2011, the proportion of women candidates, as well as the proportion of women MPs, has increased incrementally over time. Overall, although there has been an erosion of male over-representation in politics, none of countries of Central and Eastern Europe covered in this study can be meaningfully described as having embarked on the 'fast track' towards gender equitable representation in politics since the collapse of communism in 1990.

The fourth—and perhaps the most striking—trend captured by the data in Table 3.1 becomes apparent when we compare the proportion of women candidates and the proportion of women MPs for each election: in almost no instance is the proportion of women MPs higher than the proportion of women candidates. In other words, women may make it to the candidate stage in increasing numbers, but consistently stand fewer chances of being elected that their share of the number of candidates would indicate. Conversely, male candidates stand a much better chance of being elected than women do. In particular, it is clear from the data that women candidates simply do not 'make it' through to legislative office in the same proportion as male candidates. Taking one of the more egregious examples provided by the data, there is a difference of almost 20 percentage points between the proportion of women candidates running for office in Poland and the proportion of women elected to the Sejm in 2011, indicating that gender quotas had a limited impact on breaking male dominance the first time that they were applied. In other countries, the gap between the proportion of women candidates and the proportion of female MPs is lower, ranging from 1 per cent in Slovakia in 2016 to 8.6 per cent in Bulgaria in 2014. Overall, this region-wide trend suggests the existence of particularly strong distorting mechanisms that shape male and female candidates' chances of electoral success.

This brief overview of patterns of candidate recruitment in post-communist Europe suggests the existence of two main trends in need of explanation. First, how can we explain the incremental pace of change in the selection of male and female candidates? In particular, although the over-representation of men has generally decreased, this has only occurred very slowly over the decades that have passed since the collapse of communism. One explanation has to do with the supply of male

and female candidates: while more women are willing to come forward as a candidate than in the early 1990s, men continue to constitute the overwhelming majority of candidates for legislative office. This may well have something to do with men's and women's different motivations and resources to run for political office. Another explanation identifies changes on the demand side: specifically, political parties are more willing to recruit women candidates, and this has led to a slow decrease in the overrepresentation of men. Within this context, political parties' willingness is generally linked to their ideological predisposition towards gender equality. For instance, it is well documented in the literature that parties of the left are much more women-friendly than parties of the right. Thus, we need to find out whether this is indeed the case in Central and Eastern Europe. Second, how can we explain the fact that the discrepancy between the proportion of women candidates and the proportion of women among elected MPs? Here, we need to investigate whether this discrepancy is due to political parties' reluctance to place women in winning positions on party lists or in safe seats or, alternatively, whether electorates tend to vote against female candidates. The remainder of this chapter addresses these issues in turn.

3.2 The Supply of Candidates for Legislative Office

Norris and Lovenduski's classic study of candidate recruitment for the UK House of Commons distinguishes between two factors that affect the supply of women candidates: motivation (including drive, ambition and interest in politics) and resources (time, money and experience) (Norris and Lovenduski 1995). This section of the chapter focuses on the supply of male and female candidates in Central and Eastern Europe, asking whether there is any evidence that there is anything specific about the motivation, interest in politics, skills and resources of men and women in the region that makes them more, or alternatively, less likely to run for political office.

One potential explanation for the greater supply of male candidates in politics in post-communist Europe is that men's higher levels of interest in politics have tended to translate into higher levels of political participation. Thus, the question that we need to answer is whether men in our country case studies are less interested in politics than women, and the types of effects these differing levels of interest tend to produce over time. Within this context, it is important to note that any analysis of the post-communist region needs to be set against the fact that the gender gap in interest

in politics is well documented across the world. The question, then, is not whether men in Central and Eastern Europe are more interested in politics than women; since this is a worldwide trend, we fully expect that this is indeed the case. Instead, the question is whether there is anything distinctive about men's and women's respective levels of interest in politics in Central and Eastern Europe by comparison to established democracies in the West. For instance, it may well be the case that men are more interested in politics than women in both regions, but women in post-communist Europe are less interested in politics than their counterparts in established democracies, thereby indicating that there are issues on the supply side that help to explain men's higher rates of engagement in politics in new democracies.

Table 3.2 summarises the evidence on men's and women's levels of interest in politics on the basis of the data from the 1990 and 2008 waves of the European Values Study respectively. The table reports the total percentage of respondents who chose 'very interested' and 'somewhat interested' in answering the question 'How interested would you say you are in politics?'. The countries covered are our six post-communist case studies and, for the purposes of comparison, six established democracies

Table 3.2 Interest in politics in post-communist Europe and Western Europe (European Values Study, 1990 and 2008)[a]

Country	*1990*			*2008*		
	% women	*% men*	*Difference*	*% women*	*% men*	*Difference*
Bulgaria	67.6	78.7	−11.1	45.0	57.6	−12.6
Czech Republic	66.8	81.4	−14.6	34.6	53.0	−18.4
Hungary	44.2	60.3	−16.1	34.3	43.0	−8.7
Poland	34.7	65.2	−30.5	29.7	51.1	−21.4
Romania	11.4	24.4	−13.0	26.4	42.0	−15.6
Slovakia	39.5	57.8	−18.3	40.4	56.0	−15.6
Finland	38.6	55.6	−17.0	34.4	51.1	−16.7
Germany[b]	62.9	83.0	−20.1	62.4	75.8	−13.4
Great Britain	42.5	56.0	−13.5	36.2	48.1	−11.9
Italy	18.0	40.0	−22.0	32.1	47.5	−15.4
Netherlands	55.1	70.6	−15.5	51.2	69.9	−18.7
Sweden	39.9	52.5	−12.6	37.6	50.5	−12.9

Source: The European Values Study

[a]'How interested would you say you are in politics?' The percentages refer to the total proportion of respondents indicating that they are 'very interested' and 'somewhat interested' in politics

[b]The data for 1990 refer to Germany after reunification

from Western Europe. Overall, the data show that men are indeed more likely to be interested in politics than women, but this is irrespective of whether they live in new or established democracies. This is true of all the countries in our sample, and of both waves of the European Values Study. In some post-communist countries—most notably Bulgaria and the Czech Republic—interest in politics among both men and women was particularly high in 1990, as was the case in Germany. In all three countries, levels of interest in politics among both men and women have dropped over the period under scrutiny, although this is by no means valid for all the countries covered in Table 3.2. Romania is clearly an outlier: interest in politics among men and women was particularly low in 1990, possibly as the result of the Ceaușescu regime's strategy of coercive mobilisation of the population throughout the 1980s. Since then, levels of interest in politics have increased among both men and women, broadly in line with the modest increase in the participation of women in politics over the same period (Table 3.1). Finally, it is worth noting that the gender gap in interest in politics is highest in Poland in both waves of the study, suggesting that the existence of country-specific cultural factors driving levels of engagement with politics among men and women.

Overall, the data in Table 3.2 provide virtually no indication that there is anything exceptional about men's and women's interest in politics in the post-communist region that would make them significantly more—or, alternatively, less—likely to aspire to political office than their counterparts in the Western world. Furthermore, the data also show that, over time, levels of interest in politics have tended to converge: in countries with particularly low levels of interest in politics in 1990 (such as Romania and Italy), there has been an increase in levels of interest in politics among both men and women; in countries with particularly high levels of interest in politics in 1990 (such as Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Germany), there has been a downward trend in engagement, particularly among men; finally, in some countries (such as the Netherlands and Slovakia) levels of interest in politics have remained constant between 1990 and 2008. Nonetheless, there is nothing in the data that makes Central and Eastern Europe as a region stand out in ways that would help explain differences in the supply of male and women candidates by comparison to Western Europe.

Additional examination of the data from the European Values Study casts additional light onto how the supply of candidates for political office may be shaped by men's and women's different levels of interest in

politics in Central and Eastern Europe and Western Europe respectively (European Values Study 1990, 2008). The survey offered respondents four options in answer to the question 'how interested are you in politics?' These options were 'very interested', 'somewhat interested', 'not very interested' or 'not at all interested'. Let us start from the assumption that candidates for political office are most likely to be found among those who answer that they are 'very interested' in politics; conversely, it would also be reasonable to assume that those that reply 'not at all interested' in politics are the least likely to seek political office. The data clearly show a large gender gap in both regions: one the one hand, women constituted the overwhelming majority of the respondents declaring that they are not at all interested in politics in both waves of the survey, while men formed the overwhelming majority within the group of respondents declaring to be very interested in politics in all of the countries concerned in 1990 and 2008 alike. However, men in most of the countries included in Table 3.2 have become less inclined to respond 'very interested' during the period between 1990 and 2008, while women have become more inclined to do so. For example, in Finland, Italy, Poland and Romania in 2008, only about 60 per cent of those replying that they are very interested in politics were men, by comparison to over 70 per cent in 1990. Most interestingly, the proportion of women among choosing 'very interested' from among the options has increased in all of the countries concerned (with the exception of the Netherlands) between 1990 and 2008. Although this cannot be unambiguously described as a significant surge in interest in politics among women, it is perhaps not entirely misguided to conclude that some of the increase is related to women's greater willingness to come forward as candidates in elections. However, any such conclusions are, at best, tentative in the absence of additional supporting evidence at this stage.

If different levels of interest in politics provide little in the way of an explanation for the particularly low supply of women candidates in post-communist Europe by comparison to Western Europe, then it may well be the case that other factors are responsible for the trends in male over-representation during the post-communist period. In particular, female aspirants may be deterred from running for political office by the perception that politics is 'men's job'; conversely, the over-supply of male candidates may have something to do with the perception that men are more suited for political office. Research by Wilcox et al. (2003) found that this was indeed the case as far as the early 1990s were concerned. Using data from the 1995–1998 wave of the World Values Survey, they found that both men and women in post-communist Europe were much more likely to agree with the statement 'men make better

political leaders' than were their counterparts in the West (Wilcox et al. 2003). This finding was also highlighted in Matland and Montgomery's comparative study of women's access to political power (2003). As Matland argues in the conclusions to the study, public opinion in the region was 'much more patriarchal in its view of the proper role of women' than in Western Europe (Matland 2003, 325). The post-communist region was therefore distinctive in that it had much higher levels of societal consensus around patriarchal gender relations; this, in turn, helped to explain, at least in part, the remarkably low proportion of women involved in politics by comparison to the continent's established democracies. The question that we have to examine, then, is whether this characterisation has withstood the test of time.

Several decades after the fall of communism, are men and women in post-communist Europe still significantly more likely to endorse male dominance in political leadership than men and women in the West? Table 3.3 presents the data on the proportion of respondents agreeing to the statement 'men make better political leaders than women do' in

Table 3.3 Do men make better political leaders? Perceptions of political leadership in post-communist Europe and Western Europe. (World Values Survey, 1995/98 and 2005/2009)[a]

	World Values Survey 1995–1998			*World Values Survey 2005–2009*		
	% women	*% men*	*Difference*	*% women*	*% men*	*Difference*
Bulgaria	43.4	60.7	−17.3	7.8	18.4	−10.6
Czech Republic[b]	39.6	56.1	−16.5	–	–	–
Hungary	44.7	54.8	−10.1	10.5	13.7	−3.2
Poland	46.2	57.1	−10.9	8.2	10.6	−2.4
Romania	53.1	64.8	−11.7	9.7	17.9	−8.2
Slovakia[b]	57.4	68.5	−11.1	–	–	–
Germany[c]	10.6	15.5	−4.9	2.0	5.1	−3.1
Norway	15.5	16	−0.5	2.9	3.7	−0.8
Spain	18.6	29.2	−10.6	4.3	5.0	−0.7
Sweden	16.2	17.1	−0.9	1.8	1.0	0.8
United States	23.6	34.1	−10.5	5.3	3.2	2.1

Source: The World Values Survey

[a]The statements were 'On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do' in the 1995–1998 series and 'Men make better political leaders than women do' in the 2005–2009 series. The percentages refer to the total proportion of respondents indicating that they 'strongly agree' and 'agree' with the statement

[b]The 2005–2009 wave did not cover the Czech Republic and Slovakia

[c]The data for 1995–1998 are for West Germany

post-communist Europe and in the West for the 1995–1998 and 2005–2009 waves of the World Values Survey. Clearly, support for male dominance in political leadership tends to be higher among men than among women in both waves and in both regions. By and large, this is unsurprising, reflecting as it does deeply entrenched patterns of male privilege in politics across the world. However, it should be noted that agreement with the statement 'men make better political leaders' has declined in both regions during the period between the 1995–1998 wave of the survey and the 2005–2009 wave. This is, in all likelihood, due to a variety of factors, including feminist movements' critique of societal attitudes associating political leadership with masculinity, and broader inter-generational shifts in societal values.

The most remarkable finding from the data in Table 3.3 concerns the precipitous decline in support for male political leadership in Central and Eastern Europe between the two waves of the survey. In the 1995–1998 wave, the overwhelming majority of men, as well as two in five women, agreed that men make better political leaders; by 2005–2009, only one in five men and only one in ten women agreed with the statement. This raises the question of why, given the relatively rapid shift in attitudes vis-à-vis masculinity and political leadership, the increase in the proportion of women candidates in post-communist Europe has been so very incremental (see Table 3.1). Certainly, one should not over-estimate the strength of the conclusions to be drawn from the data presented here. Nonetheless, given the vertiginous drop in the proportion of male and female respondents agreeing that men make better political leaders between the mid-1990s and the mid- to late 2000s, one would expect the principal cultural obstacle holding women back to have been at least partially overcome, resulting in a relatively rapid increase in the supply of women candidates in post-communist Europe. The fact that the pace of change has been incremental at best suggests the difference between men's and women's levels of willingness to run for political office in the region may be driven by factors other than a perception of politics as 'men's job' (see also Table 3.1).

In sum, the motivation of aspirants for political office is unlikely to constitute the driving factor behind different patterns of representation of men and women in the politics of post-communist Europe and Western Europe over the period that has elapsed since 1990. On the one hand, although men in established and new democracies alike are more interested in politics than women, there is no compelling evidence that men in the East are particularly

well-motivated to participate in politics, or that post-communist women are particularly disenchanted with politics. On the other hand, support for masculine norms of political leadership has declined dramatically in post-communist Europe by comparison to the early 1990s, so that there is also little evidence that the perception of politics as 'men's job' is still a barrier to women's entry into politics.

Since the explanation for the lower supply of women candidates in the East is unlikely to lie primarily with men's and women's different motivations to enter politics, we must now turn to a second potential explanation: the different *resources* of male and female aspirants (Norris and Lovenduski 1995). At the time of the transition from state socialism, male aspirants in the communist successor parties and in the anti-communist opposition alike had valuable resources at their disposal that women aspirants lacked for the most part, including political experience in communist-era party organisations, dissident groups and resistance movements. One of the key reasons why this was the case had to do with the gendered division of labour shaping men's and women's resources, most notably *time* to engage in politics, under communism. In this respect, Central and Eastern Europe was very different from Western Europe indeed. As Einhorn argues, Marxist–Leninist systems assigned women a dual role as both producers and reproducers of the (socialist) nation, with no equivalent role for men (Einhorn 1993; see also Corrin 1992). Furthermore, it should also be noted that, in communist Europe, the double burden was predicated on full-time employment for women. Part-time employment was simply not an option, so that women in communist systems were particularly likely to suffer from time poverty due to the fact that they had to undertake the lion's share of household duties, while also working in a full-time job. In this sense, communist-era Central and Eastern Europe was indeed distinct from the established democracies of the West. In both regions, politics and economic activity were male dominated, but gendered power relations operated differently East and West. As Eva Fodor's comparative study of Hungary and Austria between 1945 and 1995 makes apparent, gender operated 'as a source of exclusion' in both countries, but did so differently, thereby illustrating both the perseverance and the adaptability of patriarchal forms of domination (Fodor 2003, 152).

To what extent have communist-era patterns of full-time employment and the gendered division of labour within the household persisted into the post-communist era? In particular, what evidence is there that men have more extensive resources—especially in the form of time—to participate in

politics than women do? If there are significant differences between East and West in this respect, then this would help explain some of the differences in the supply of male and female candidates in the post-communist region by comparison to the established democracies of the West. Thus, if women in post-communist Europe have significantly less time in an average working week due to the need to undertake both full-time employment and household duties than men in their respective countries, *and* than their counterparts in the West, then this would go some way towards accounting for the under-supply of women candidates and the comparative over-supply of male candidates in Europe's new democracies. As this section shows, this is indeed the case: in brief, women in Central and Eastern Europe do have significantly less time than men in the region, but also significantly less time than women in Western Europe, to become involved in politics. Resources, then, rather than motivation, may hold the key to understanding the supply of candidates for political office in Central and Eastern Europe.

Are there any significant differences between men's and women's working patterns East and West? Table 3.4 presents selected Eurostat data on the number of hours worked each week by men and women East and West in

Table 3.4 The participation of men and women in the labour market, post-communist and Western Europe (number of hours worked each week, 2002–2014)

	Women				*Men*			
	2002	*2006*	*2010*	*2014*	*2002*	*2006*	*2010*	*2014*
Bulgaria	40.2	40.5	40.6	40.3	41.3	41.6	41.6	41.0
Czech Republic	39.5	39.5	39.0	38.5	43.2	43.3	42.8	42.0
Hungary	39.7	39.4	39.0	38.9	41.8	41.1	40.5	40.4
Poland	38.0	37.8	38.0	38.5	42.8	42.6	42.4	42.4
Romania	39.2	39.6	39.3	39.2	41.1	40.9	40.6	40.2
Slovakia	41.3	39.7	39.6	39.3	42.7	41.9	41.6	41.6
Finland	35.5	35.1	34.9	34.3	39.7	39.5	39.0	38.5
Germany	n/a	29.9	30.4	30.4	n/a	39.8	40.1	39.5
Italy	35.5	34.0	33.1	32.4	41.4	41.3	40.9	40.0
Netherlands	24.5	24.1	24.5	24.4	36.6	36.1	35.9	34.8
Sweden	33.9	33.7	33.7	34.2	38.8	38.5	38.2	37.9
United Kingdom	31.1	31.3	31.2	31.6	42.8	41.7	41.0	40.9

Source: Eurostat (datasets lfsq_ewhun2 and lfsq_ewhuna)

Notes: The data are for the first quarter of the year concerned

2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014 (Eurostat 2015). On average, men and women in Central and Eastern Europe work longer hours than their counterparts in the West. Most strikingly, women in post-communist Europe work an additional 5–15 hours each week by comparison to their counterparts in Western Europe, while the differences between men in the two regions are much smaller, typically at 1–2 hours. Furthermore, in the post-communist region, the gap between the number of hours that women and men work is relatively small, with women closely approximating the levels of full-time employment (that is, 40 hours per week) that are also characteristic of men's working patterns. By contrast, in established democracies, women work much fewer hours than men, with the largest gap in the Netherlands and the UK (the two countries where the male breadwinner model was most deeply entrenched from among our case studies in Western Europe).

Why are women in Central and Eastern Europe more likely to work full-time than women in the West? Part of the explanation for these differences lies with the fact that the profound economic crisis of the 1990s in post-communist Europe meant that, for most families in the region, one salary was simply not enough to survive. Thus, women may well have continued working out of necessity in economies that continued to be segregated both horizontally (with women concentrated in the lowest-paid sectors of the economy), and vertically (with women largely absent from the top levels of decision-making in the economy). Yet another part of the explanation has to do with the fact that part-time work is seldom a real option of post-communist women, certainly not in the same proportion as for women in the West. This may be for a combination of reasons, including the fact that part-time work is not widely available in post-communist democracies, the fact that part-time jobs may well have not provided a sufficient income for the families concerned, and the fact that grandparents continue to be relatively closely involved in childcare, thereby enabling women and men to continue working full-time.

Thus, full-time employment continues to be the pattern of participation in the labour market for many post-communist women. This marks a significant and persistent difference with the West. For example, Eurostat data show that only 12 per cent of Czech women aged 25–49 with two children were employed part-time in 2014, with the corresponding figures for Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia being 10.1, 8.8, 8.4 and 6.8 per cent respectively (Eurostat 2015). In contrast, 37.1 per cent of Swedish women, 58.2 per cent of British women, 74.6 per cent of German women, and 86.1 per cent of Dutch women with two children were employed

part-time in 2014 (Eurostat 2015). This, in turn, means that, due to the fact that they tend to be employed full-time in much greater proportion than their Western counterparts, women in Central and Eastern Europe are also more likely to have less time than women in established democracies in order to become engaged in politics. As Table 3.4 also shows, the two regions are not that different as far as men's pattern of participation in the labour market is concerned: men tend to work full-time both in the East and in the West.

If patterns of full-time employment for women have persisted well into the post-communist era in Central and Eastern Europe, so has the gendered division of household labour. Although frequently collected through methods that do not exactly meet current Eurostat standards, the information that we have on the state socialist period illustrates women's burden of housework quite eloquently. For example, in 1976–1977, women in Hungary spent an average of 4 hours and 19 minutes on housework every day, while men spent an average of 1 hour and 26 minutes on housework every day (Kulcsár 1985, 212). A limited survey in Yugoslavia in 1965 showed that employed women spent 9–10 hours on cooking, 7–8 hours on house chores and 5–7 hours on laundry each week; in contrast, employed men spent between 0.3 and 1.3 hours on the same activities each week (Woodward 1985, 249). By 2010, women were still responsible for most of the housework across the post-communist region. As Table 3.5 shows, between 35.1 per cent and 44.4 per cent of women in Central and Eastern Europe spent 21 to 40 hours a week on housework in 2010. In contrast, only between 6.5 per cent and 19.3 per cent of men did the same. In Western Europe, women are still doing most of the housework as well, but they do less housework than women in post-communist Europe: 'only' between 17.0 per cent and 34.7 per cent of women in our Western European case studies did 21–40 hours of housework a week, with the corresponding proportion of men standing at between 4.1 per cent and 5.0 per cent (Table 3.5). On the whole, although women in both regions tend to do a lot more housework than men do, women in post-communist Europe tend to spend more time engaged in housework than women in the West.

In sum, women in Europe's new democracies simply work much longer hours than women in the West, both outside and inside the home. Altogether, it is clear that post-communist women have significantly less time to dedicate to politics than women in established democracies. In contrast, there is little evidence that men in post-communist Europe are

Table 3.5 Time spent on housework by men and women in post-communist Europe and Western Europe (2010)[a]

Country	*0–20 hours a week*		*21–40 hours a week*	
	% men	*% women*	*% men*	*% women*
Bulgaria	92.8	50.2	6.5	44.2
Czech Republic	90.7	56.4	9.3	35.1
Hungary	87.6	43.3	10.4	41.9
Poland	86.0	44.1	11.6	40.3
Romania	–	–	–	–
Slovakia	76.8	43.7	19.3	44.4
Finland	94.9	75.6	4.4	20.9
Germany	94.3	60.9	5.0	34.7
United Kingdom	95.2	78.7	4.5	17.0
Italy	–	–	–	–
Netherlands	94.7	74.7	4.6	21.7
Sweden	96.2	78.5	4.1	21.4

Source: The European Social Survey

[a]The data refer only to those respondents who indicated that they were living with a spouse or a partner at the time of the survey. The question was 'About how many hours a week, in total, do you personally spend on housework?' The survey did not cover Italy and Romania in 2010

hampered by a double burden of similar proportions. The latter is also true of men in Western Europe, who, on average, also work long hours but are still less likely to do household work. In this sense, persistently high levels of participation in the labour market, together with the gendered division of household duties, tends to depress the supply of women candidates in the post-communist region to a much greater degree than in the West. This, as argued in the final part of our examination of the supply of candidates, is not simply a matter of economic necessity, but also one of deeply entrenched societal values and expectations, albeit not in the way that the literature on the post-communist region typically expects.

Has women's dual burden of work outside and inside the home been simply incorporated into the logic of economic life after communism, perhaps due to the sheer necessity of having two incomes in times of economic upheaval? Or, alternatively, does the double burden reflect a more complex set of social values that distinguish Europe's new and established democracies? If the former, then one would expect respondents in post-communist Europe to reject the idea of women's economic participation and support their role in the home. If the latter, then one would expect post-communist publics to hold a slightly different series of values on gender roles than

Table 3.6 Attitudes towards women's economic and family roles (selected EU member states, 1990 and 2008)

Country	*Both husband and wife should contribute to household income*				*A job is all right but what most women really want is a home and children*			
	1990		*2008*		*1990*		*2008*	
	% women	*% men*	*% women*	*% men*	*% women*	*% men*	*% women*	*% men*
Bulgaria	85.7	79.7	97.2	97.0	88.2	91.6	70.0	75.2
Czech Republic	92.9	90.0	90.6	91.1	82.6	85.4	68.3	73.5
Hungary	84.2	81.2	95.2	91.7	72.2	80.6	64.1	67.8
Poland	83.8	78.5	85.8	86.1	86.9	89.1	67.0	69.1
Romania	92.6	89.7	87.8	86.7	79.5	83.9	83.6	82.8
Slovakia	87.2	77.1	92.8	93.7	84.1	85.3	54.7	57.7
Finland	76.3	78.6	78.2	81.7	32.1	53.0	27.5	47.3
Germany	72.9	64.9	85.8	79.3	49.4	52.9	38.4	43.2
Great Britain	72.5	67.3	74.3	72.3	42.7	47.5	43.3	48.7
Italy	83.3	76.8	91.3	84.6	71.4	71.9	63.2	71.1
Netherlands	32.6	26.7	51.6	40.4	45.8	36.4	36.4	40.0
Sweden	87.5	87.2	93.4	91.8	–	–	26.6	34.8

Source: The European Values Study

Note: The data refer to the total percentage of respondents who answered 'agree' and 'strongly agree' to the statements 'Both the husband and wife should contribute to household income' and 'A job is all right but what most women really want is a home and children'

their counterparts in the West, a set of values that simultaneously views women as economic actors and primary caretakers for their families. Table 3.6 outlines some of the relevant European Values Study data on men's and women's attitudes towards gender roles in selected EU member states in 1990 and 2008 respectively. The data refer to the total percentage of respondents who answered 'agree' and 'strongly agree' to the statements 'both husband and wife should contribute to household income' and 'a job is all right but what most women really want is a home and children'. Within this context, there is a striking degree of social consensus in Central and Eastern Europe concerning *both* women's economic role *and* women's role in the family across the two waves of the survey. As the data show, they may well be indeed something different about the East; the double burden has been profoundly embedded into the social fabric of post-communist societies, to the extent that the overwhelming majority of both men and women expect women to be *both* active economic actors

and the primary actors within their families. In contrast, our case studies from Western Europe show a different pattern: on the one hand, with the exception of the Netherlands, there is strong support for women's contribution to household incomes; on the other hand, there is significantly less support for the idea that what women 'really want' is a home and children than in post-communist Europe.

Thus, it is by no means an accident that respondents in the post-communist region agree with what would appear two contradictory statements in a different context: on the one hand, the idea that women should have an independent economic role; on the other hand, the idea that women are primarily responsible for 'home and children'. Instead, this is simply a reflection of a distinctively post-communist mode of social organisation assigning women a dual role in the public and the private spheres. This apparent contradiction has long puzzled scholars seeking to analyse patterns of support for gender equality in the region (see, for instance, Wilcox et al. 2003). Yet, if we take into account the fact that the double burden is reflected in social expectations that women contribute both to the household income and to the family, then it is clear that women's time poverty is not simply a transition-induced effect of individual families' economic needs. Instead, there is a general expectation, consistently manifest across post-communist Europe, for women to work outside the home, as well as take care of their families.

Given the fact that the double burden is embedded among the values of electorates across post-communist Europe, it is unsurprising that women in the region tend to have considerably less of that valuable resource necessary for political participation: *time*. The problem on the supply side, then, is not that women in the East are less interested in politics: as Table 3.1 showed, the gender gap in interest in politics is characteristic of both new and established democracies. Instead, the problem is that women do not have *time* to the same extent as men, and therefore are often unable to take on the additional burden of political participation.

In conclusion, there are some significant differences between Europe's new and old democracies when it comes to the supply of male and female candidates for political office. However, the difference is certainly not to be found in overwhelming levels of support for male political leadership. Instead, the difference between the two regions has a lot to do with resources, and in particular with the fact that, on the whole, women in post-communist Europe have considerably less

time to participate in politics than men do, due to deeply entrenched social expectations of women's double burden.

3.3 Party Ideology and Male Over-representation in Politics

The development of party systems in Europe's new democracies has long puzzled regional specialists, for several reasons. First, the social cleavages that had shaped the formation of the party systems of Western Europe were largely absent in post-communist Europe, so that it was unclear which social bases of support the new parties could mobilise in the political arena. Second, during the first decade of the process of democratisation at least, parties were, in Kopecký's apt definition, 'formations with loose electoral constituencies, in which a relatively unimportant role [was] played by the party membership, and the dominant role by party leaders' (1995, 517). Third, party ideologies were in flux for a considerable amount of time, with most of the communist successor parties seeking to transform themselves into Western-style social democrats, and the former anti-communist opposition seeking an identity on somewhere the centre-right of the political spectrum. Overall, the political parties of the post-communist region have long been in the process of building their own programmatic identities, while at the same time creating the 'patterned interaction' characteristic of stable party systems (Sartori 1976).

How have post-communist parties tackled the issue of gender and political representation? The argument presented in Chap. 2 suggests that it is possible to formulate a set of reasonably well-defined expectations concerning men's and women's descriptive representation during the post-communist period. First, we expect the recruitment of women candidates within parties of the left to be well below those in their counterparts in Western Europe. These effects are likely to be particularly strong as far as communist successor parties are concerned. This is because, as outlined in greater detail in Chap. 2, communist successor parties' chances of survival in the post-1990 political landscape depended on their ability to draw on 'portable skills' and 'usable pasts' of the communist era—both of which were far more likely to be held by male candidates. Conversely, we expect social democratic or socialist parties of a non-communist successor party persuasion to be less hampered by communist-era legacies. Second, we expect parties originating in the former anti-communist opposition to display little enthu-

siasm for gender equality. There are two main types of resistance to gender equality within this group of parties. On the one hand, national-conservative parties grounding their programmatic appeals in notions of tradition and national identity are expected to be particularly inclined to recruit male candidates, because of their view of democratisation as a return to a 'natural' gender order that had been somehow subverted by state socialism. On the other hand, liberal parties are expected to reproduce male dominance under the guise of the gender-neutral, impartial norms characteristic of newly established democracies. Third, we expect the high salience of ethnic minority rights issues in countries such as Romania, Slovakia and Bulgaria to have led to a gradual acceptance of arguments for a politics of presence for ethnic minorities, especially due to consistent advocacy of ethnic minority rights by ethnic minority parties elected to the national legislature. We further expect ethnic minority parties to have mixed records on the descriptive representation of women, depending on whether they tend to privilege ethnic identity at the expense of a more inclusive approach to diversity.

Our analysis begins with the communist successor parties of Central and Eastern Europe. *A priori*, there is one plausible hypothesis with respect to the programmatic stances of the former 'vanguard' parties towards women's representation. The hypothesis concerns the link between a political party's relationship with the communist past, on the one hand, and that party's record on promoting women, on the one hand. It draws on the ample literature on the communist successor parties of Central and Eastern Europe, such as Bozoki and Ishiyama's (2002b) study. Thus, the hypothesis states that a communist successor parties' commitment to gender equality varies with its relationship with the communist past: since women were very poorly represented in politics during the state socialist era, one would expect the communist successor parties that have been the most successful in making the transition to modern social democratic formations to also be the most enthusiastic supporters of gender equality.

Table 3.7 presents the trends in women's descriptive representation in the communist successor parties of our country case studies after 1990. As the data show, virtually all the parties in this group have a fairly unexceptional record in terms of ensuring that the principle of gender equality informs their recruitment practices. Furthermore, the hypothesis that modern social democratic identities are a prerequisite for political parties' commitment to gender equality in recruitment is certainly not confirmed. Instead, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM), the only communist successor party among our case studies to have not attempted the conversion to a social democratic identity, has the highest proportion of women MPs. As Stegmaier

Table 3.7 The proportion of women candidates and MPs within parties of the left in Central and Eastern Europe (2002–2016)

	Election year	*Women candidates*		*Women MPs*		*Difference*
		N	*%*	*N*	*%*	
Bulgaria—BSP	2005	114/453	25.2	16/82	19.5	−5.7
	2009	120/392	30.6	7/40	17.5	−13.1
	2013	142/436	32.6	18/84	21.4	−11.2
	2014	151/475	31.8	5/39	12.8	−19
Czech Republic—ČSSD	2002	86/342	25.2	10/70	14.3	−10.9
	2006	79/341	23.2	9/74	12.2	−11
	2010	86/340	25.3	5/56	8.9	−16.4
	2013	84/343	24.5	6/50	12.0	−12.5
Czech Republic—KSČM	2002	75/342	21.9	12/41	29.3	7.4
	2006	91/343	26.5	8/26	30.8	4.3
	2010	103/342	30.1	11/26	42.3	12.2
	2013	96/343	28.0	11/33	33.3	5.3
Hungary—MSZP	2002	121/515	23.5	23/178	12.9	−10.6
	2006	115/522	22.3	24/186	12.9	−9.4
	2010	124/521	23.8	5/59	8.5	−15.3
	2014	45/244	18.4	6/38	15.8	−2.6
Poland—SLD	2005	205/742	27.6	11/55	20.0	−7.6
	2007	197/889	22.2	11/53	20.8	−1.4
	2011	405/913	44.4	4/27	14.8	−29.6
Romania—PSD	2004	94/415	22.6	15/119	13.3	−9.3
	2008	49/315	15.6	13/110	11.8	−3.8
	2012	22/166	13.2	20/151	13.2	0
Slovakia—Smer	2006	25/150	16.7	6/50	12.0	−4.7
	2010	28/150	18.7	10/62	16.1	−2.6
	2012	26/150	17.3	15/83	18.1	0.8
	2016	28/150	18.7	4/49	8.2	−10.5

Sources: As for Appendix B

et al. (2014) argue, the party has an informal quota for women that it has consistently enforced since the early post-communist period. At the other end of the spectrum are the Hungarian socialists (MSZP), who successfully recast their identity as social democratic very early on, and were one of the first post-communist parties to join the Socialist International. Nevertheless, the party has only been intermittently committed to gender equality in the recruitment of candidates, and, as Ilonszki (2012) suggests, has enforced its commitments in this area even less since its electoral fortune has been on the wane. Overall, then, trends in female representation within communist successor parties are certainly not driven by their programmatic closeness to Western European

models of social democracy; if they were, we would see these parties recruit far more women candidates. Instead, persistent patterns of male over-representation suggest the 'lock in' effects of initial decisions by party leaderships to draw on the 'portable skills' and 'usable pasts' of male party members. The one exception—the Czech Republic's KSČM—is the only case where ideology (in this case, communist-era commitment to equal representation) takes precedence over the tendency to jettison notions of gender equality, otherwise prevalent among parties of the left in post-communist Europe.

Table 3.8 summarises the data on women's recruitment among centre-right parties in Central and Eastern Europe. Overall, the picture is fairly dismal, suggesting that virtually none of these parties have a consistent commitment to gender equality. The one exception is Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria, a formation which has been represented in the National Assembly only since 2009. The reasons for GERB's rather spec-

Table 3.8 The proportion of women candidates and MPs within parties of the centre-right in Central and Eastern Europe (2002–2016)

	Election year	*Women candidates*		*Women MPs*		*Difference*
		N	*%*	*N*	*%*	
Bulgaria—GERB	2009	138/418	33.0	32/116	27.6	−5.4
	2013	151/480	31.5	32/97	33.0	1.5
	2014	156/480	32.5	28.84	33.3	0.8
Czech	2002	63/343	18.4	8/58	13.8	−4.6
Republic—ODS	2006	83/342	24.3	9/81	11.1	−13.2
	2010	68/342	19.9	9/53	16.9	−3
	2013	81/343	23.6	3/16	18.8	−4.8
Hungary—FIDESZ	2002	37/413	9.0	9/164	5.5	−3.5
	2006	51/460	11.1	13/164	7.9	−3.2
	2010	51/443	11.5	22/262	8.4	−3.1
	2014	56/356	20.0	9/133	6.8	−13.2
Poland—PiS	2005	193/917	21.0	29/155	18.7	−2.3
	2007	176/918	19.2	34/166	20.4	1.2
	2011	365/916	39.8	27/157	17.2	−22.6
	2015	363/919	39.5	54/235	23.0	−16.5
Romania—PDL	2004	82/415	19.8	7/48	14.6	−5.2
	2008	39/314	12.4	13/115	11.3	−1.1
	2012	45/280	16.1	9/52	17.3	1.2
Slovakia—	2006	34/150	22.7	6/31	19.4	−3.3
SDKU-DS	2010	24/150	16.0	6/28	21.4	5.4
	2012	32/150	21.3	2/11	18.2	−3.1

Sources: As for Appendix B

tacular record in recruiting women by Central and East European standards are discussed in greater detail in Chap. 6 in the section on contagion effects. For the moment, it is sufficient to note that the party's strategy was to capitalise on the success of the liberal National Movement Simeon II, including the latter's record on recruiting significant numbers of women.

Table 3.9 outlines the data on women's descriptive representation among the liberal parties of Central and Eastern Europe. Somewhat surprisingly, as the data demonstrate, women's representation is highest among some liberal parties, such as the National Movement Simeon II (NDSV) in Bulgaria and Civic Platform (PO) in Poland. The reasons for the two parties' performance are very much shaped by contextual factors. In Bulgaria, NDSV, which was formed just before the 2001 elections, entered an electoral alliance with the Party of Bulgarian Women, in order to be legally registered for the forthcoming elections. Thus, the high proportion of women within the party delegation was the result of strategic alliance-building, rather than of an explicit commitment to gender equality. Nevertheless, there is some reason to think that this decision proved part-dependent: to its credit, the party maintained high levels of representation in the 2005 elections as well, and the proportion of women on its candidate lists has remained high, although the party has been unsuccessful in winning parliamentary representation

Table 3.9 The proportion of women candidates and MPs within liberal parties in Central and Eastern Europe (2002–2016)

	Election year	*Women candidates*		*Women MPs*		*Difference*
		N	*%*	*N*	*%*	
Bulgaria—NDSV	2001	85/240	35.4	48/120	40.0	4.6
	2005	196/464	42.2	21/53	39.6	−2.6
Hungary—SZDSZ	2002	90/482	18.7	2/19	10.5	−8.2
	2006	89/467	19.1	1/18	5.6	−13.5
Poland—PO	2005	183/873	21.0	33/133	24.8	3.8
	2007	192/910	21.1	48/209	23.0	1.9
	2011	397/915	43.4	72/207	34.8	−8.6
	2015	393/916	42.9	50/138	36.2	−6.7
Romania—PNL	2004	82/415	19.8	3/64	4.7	−15.1
	2008	24/315	7.6	7/65	10.8	3.2
	2012	15/119	12.6	13/101	12.9	0.3
Slovakia—SaS	2010	27/148	18.2	4/22	18.2	0
	2012	27/150	18.0	1/11	9.1	−8.9
	2016	26/150	17.3	5/21	23.8	6.5

Sources: As for Appendix B

after 2009. The case of PO in Poland illustrates the importance of women's activism within political parties for increasing representation: PO women were exceptionally successful in persuading the party leadership to support the 35 per cent legislated quota that was eventually introduced in 2011. Gender-based voting may have also played an important role: in 2007, 43 per cent of women voters had cast their ballot for PO (Markowski 2008, 1064), so that the party had a significant incentive to be seen as doing 'acting for' women. The cases of NDSV and PO notwithstanding, the overall data suggests that the same pattern of lack of commitment to gender equality displayed by the communist successor parties and the centre-right parties is also characteristic of the liberals. In some cases, such as Romania's National Liberal Party (PNL), women's descriptive representation has been exceptionally low for most of the post-communist period.

The final set of data concerning political parties' commitment to gender equality in recruitment pertains to the ethnic parties of Central and Eastern Europe. These are parties that represent the Hungarian ethnic minorities in Romania and Slovakia (UDMR, SMK-MKP and Most-Hìd respectively), and the Turkish minority in Bulgaria (the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, DPS). As Table 3.10 shows, women's representation among the ethnic parties has consistently been exceptionally low in post-communist Europe. This supports Holmsten et al.'s (2010) findings that ethnic parties in proportional representation (PR) systems tend to

Table 3.10 The proportion of women candidates and MPs within ethnic parties in Central and Eastern Europe (2002–2016)

	Election year	*Women candidates*		*Women MPs*		*Difference*
		N	*%*	*N*	*%*	
Bulgaria—DPS	2005	108/450	24.0	3/34	8.8	−15.2
	2009	90/373	24.1	4/38	10.5	−13.6
	2013	94/391	24.0	6/36	16.7	−7.3
	2014	103/375	27.5	4/38	10.5	−17
Romania—UDMR	2004	71/279	25.4	0/22	0.0	−25.4
	2008	71/313	22.7	2/22	9.1	−13.6
	2012	58/315	18.4	0/18	0.0	−18.4
Slovakia—MOST-HID	2010	29/150	19.3	0/14	0.0	−19.3
	2012	33/150	22.0	0/13	0.0	−22
	2016	35/149	23.5	1/11	9.1	−14.4

Sources: As for Appendix B

recruit fewer women. It should also be noted that, because of their highly loyal electorates, UDMR and SMK-MKP in particular have had high incumbency rates, which may place additional limits on gender equality in candidate recruitment.

Overall, the analysis of the interaction between party ideology and women's representation reveals that, in numerical terms, parties of the left are not substantially different from parties of the right. Interestingly, some parties on the centre-right and on the liberal side of the political spectrum have tended to be the most favourable environments to women candidates. Finally, ethnic parties appear to privilege ethnicity over gender in their recruitment practices.

3.4 The Voters

Given the evidence that Central and East European electorates are, on many measures, more inclined to endorse patriarchal values than their counterparts in the West, we would expect that they actually prefer male candidates. Yet, as this section of the chapter argues, there is very little indication that this is the case.

Let us begin with the exploring the evidence as to whether, when given the choice, post-communist electorates tend to vote against women. From among our case studies, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland have open-list systems, where it is possible to test whether voters prefer male candidates. In order to ascertain the precise effects of open-list electoral systems across our case studies, I compared the effects of open-list systems with a simulation of women's descriptive representation under closed-list PR in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. I used these in conjunction with Millard's (2014) data on the effects of open-list versus closed-list PR in Poland. The closed-list simulation simply assumed that candidates were elected in precisely the same order of their ranking on the candidate lists, as would have been the case under closed-list PR. Table 3.11 summarises the findings, demonstrating that the impact of open lists can be best described as mixed, albeit mostly favourable, to women candidates. It should be noted that a close scrutiny of the electoral lists reveals that voters have gradually started to make more extensive use of preferential voting in all three countries concerned during the period covered by the data. Thus, a significantly higher proportion of candidates had their initial rank altered by voters in the mid- to late 2000s by comparison to when preferential voting was introduced or, as was the case with the Czech Republic, by comparison

Table 3.11 The gender profile of national legislatures under open and closed lists in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia (lower chamber where applicable)

	Year	*% women elected under open-list PR*	*% women under closed-list PR simulation*	*Difference*[a]
Czech Republic	2002	17.0	16.5	+0.5
	2006	15.5	14.5	+1.0
	2010	22.0	17.5	+4.5
	2013	21.50	19.50	−2.0
Poland	1991[b]	9.5	10.7	−1.2
	1993[b]	13.8	9.7	+4.1
	1997[b]	14.6	12.3	+2.3
	2001	20.2	17.8	+2.4
	2005	20.4	21.5	−1.1
	2007	20.4	17.4	+3.0
	2011	23.9	28.5	−4.6
Slovakia	1998	10.7	10.7	0.0
	2002	14.7	15.3	−0.6
	2006	16.0	14.7	+1.3
	2010	15.3	16.0	−0.7
	2012	16.0	17.3	−1.3

Sources: Millard (2010, 175) for the data for Poland between 1991 and 2007; for all other elections, author's own data sets based on the candidate lists and elections results published by the Czech Statistical Office (www.volby.cz), Poland's Central Electoral Commission (pkw.gov.pl) and the Slovak Statistical Office (www.statistics.sk)

[a]Percentage of women elected under open-list PR minus the percentage of women that would have been elected under closed-list PR

[b]The data for Poland in 1991–1997 excludes national list deputies

to the electoral system used before 2000. However, there are also considerable cross-country variations that merit some attention.

In the Czech Republic, open lists have had a positive impact on the election of women to political office across the three of the four elections listed in Table 3.11. In 2002, one additional woman was elected to the Chamber of Deputies under the open-list system than would have been under closed-list PR. Similarly, in 2006, two more women were elected under the open-list system than would have been elected had the lists been closed. In 2010, women were undoubtedly one of the main beneficiaries of the open-list system: had the Chamber of Deputies been elected under a closed-list system, there would have been 35 rather than 44 women in the lower chamber of Parliament (that is, 17.5 per cent rather than 22 per cent). The

data also suggest that the effect of open lists is party-specific across the three elections. For instance, the centre-right Civic Democratic Party (ODS) would have elected fewer women under closed lists in 2002, 2006 and 2010 alike. Similarly, the unreformed communists (KSČM) would have elected 6 women under closed lists rather instead of 8 under open lists in 2006; in 2010, nearly half of the women elected for KSČM (5 out of 11) would not have been elected under a closed-list system. However, the impact of open lists on the social democrats (ČSSD) was negative in 2006, 2010 and 2013, when the party would have elected additional women under closed-list PR (in 2013, it would have elected ten rather than six women). The Christian democrats (KDU-ČSL) were unaffected by the open-list system across the three elections, but would have elected one woman under closed-list PR in 2013 (the party currently has no women MPs).

In the case of Poland, Millard's simulation of a closed-list system yielded mixed results across the post-communist elections. She found that, overall, women benefited from the open-list system in 1993, 1997, 2001 and 2007 (2010, 175–177). However, she notes, when we compare the impact of preferential voting of both male and female candidates, 'a similar place on the list of winning parties offers similar chances regardless of gender' (Millard 2010, 177). The 2011 elections to the Sejm present a somewhat different picture in that they clearly indicate the negative impact of open lists: had closed lists been used, there would be 131 women (28.5 per cent) in the lower chamber instead of 110 (23.9 per cent). This finding needs to be interpreted in conjunction with the introduction of a 35 per cent quota for women's representation prior to the 2011 elections. As discussed in greater detail in Chap. 6, although all the parties abided by the quota in putting together their candidate lists, they were not particularly eager to place women in top positions. This is particularly the case for Law and Justice (PiS), whose proportion of women MPs would have increased by nearly 50 per cent (from 27 women to 40 women MPs), but also, to a much lesser extent, of the governing Civic Platform (PO) which would have elected 6 additional women under closed lists. In brief, the evidence for the 2011 Sejm elections in Poland supports the idea that closed lists ensure a better implementation of quotas than open lists.

In Slovakia, the impact of open lists on women's representation overall can be best described as marginal. Thus, the difference between the two systems would have yielded one or two additional women MPs in 2002, 2010 and 2012, and two fewer women MPs in 2006. However, the party

data suggests an interesting pattern for the two parties representing the Hungarian ethnic minority. Thus, the Hungarian Coalition (SMK-MKP) would have elected one additional woman under closed lists in 2002 and 2006, while Bridge (Most-Híd) would have also elected one additional woman in 2012. The other parties were largely unaffected across the three elections concerned.

In all three countries, preferential voting is also a feature of the systems used in the European Parliament (EP) elections. As in the case of national parliamentary elections, the use of open lists has also had a generally positive impact on women's representation in the European Parliament delegations of the post-communist member states. The exception is the Czech Republic, where, unlike in national parliamentary elections, voters appear to have been less inclined to move women candidates up the lists. However, in Poland, the positive effect of open lists for women is apparent in both the 2004 and the 2009 EP elections (in both cases, two more women were elected than would have been under a closed-list system). This is all the more remarkable given the small district and party magnitude characterising the Polish elections to the EP. In Slovakia, open lists have also had a favourable outcome for women in the 2009 EP elections, when five women were elected to the 13-strong delegation to the EP on open lists, instead of the three women that would have been elected under a closed-list system.

3.5 Conclusions

This chapter has sought to make a prima facie case as to where the evidence concerning the reproduction of male dominance in relation to candidate recruitment in Central and Eastern Europe might be most plausibly found. On balance, it has found some evidence that there are some issues with the supply of women candidates, but virtually no evidence that post-communist electorates are particularly averse to women candidates. Instead, the bulk of the evidence clearly lies with political parties, which are almost uniformly much less inclined to recruit women than their counterparts in the West, irrespective of ideological orientation. This suggests that we need to place party gatekeepers at the centre of our analysis, and examine the two mechanisms—incumbency and electoral systems—that enable party gatekeepers to give priority to male candidates. It is to these issues that we turn next.

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CHAPTER 4

Reproducing Male Dominance: The Role of Incumbency

As the first post-communist elections amply demonstrated, the national parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe were male monopolies, with the proportion of men ranging between 87 per cent in the Czech National Council and 95 per cent in the Romanian Chamber of Deputies. Twenty-five years later, the over-representation of men remains deeply entrenched in politics across the region, with men constituting between 76 per cent of the MPs elected to the Polish Sejm and 91 per cent of the MPs elected to the Hungarian legislature. Overall, the levels of male over-representation have decreased very little in recent elections by comparison to 1990: in Hungary, there are only 2.2 per cent fewer male MPs than in the first post-communist elections; in Poland, despite the adoption of a gender quota, there are only 14 per cent fewer male MPs than in 1991.

The persistence of male over-representation in politics over the post-communist period raises important questions about the mechanisms that sustain the institutions of male over-representation over relatively long periods of time. Here, I start with Mahoney's observation that 'path-dependent institutions persist in the absence of the forces responsible for their original production' (2000, 515). As Chap. 2 has shown, the institutions of male dominance were firmly established within Europe's new democracies during the transitions from communist rule. The historical forces responsible for this outcome are hardly in place any longer: political competition is no longer dominated by the communist versus anti-communist divide, and political actors seldom refer to the state-socialist past in their discourses to the same extent that they did in the early post-communist period. Yet,

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the institutions of male dominance have been remarkably resilient, even if the initial conditions in which they came into being are no longer met.

The persistence of institutions has been a central concern for historical institutionalism. Pierson (2000, 2004) draws attention to the importance of timing and sequence for the study of path-dependent processes that sustain institutions via 'increasing returns', while Thelen (1999) and Mahoney (2000) emphasise the importance of identifying the 'mechanisms of reproduction' responsible for the persistence of institutional arrangements over time. From this perspective, the central concern of this chapter—as well as of the next chapter—is to specify the causal mechanisms that have sustained the numerical over-representation of men in Central and Eastern Europe during the period since the collapse of communism.

Feminist scholars have long established the fact that high rates of re-election among men have a negative impact on women's descriptive representation. Men's 'incumbency advantage' was first identified in the context of legislative elections in the US and the UK in the 1980s and early 1990s (Andersen and Thorson 1984; Norris et al. 1992). Recently, Schwindt-Bayer's time-serial analysis of 33 countries (2005) showed that the effects of men's incumbency travel across a wide range of case studies and across time, rather than being limited to high-incumbency countries such as the US and the UK. Thus, she argues, 'as the rate at which incumbents get re-elected increases, it creates a growing disadvantage for women's participation in legislative politics' (Schwindt-Bayer 2005, 240).

Conceptualising incumbency as a mechanism of reproduction for male dominance (understood here as the numerical over-representation of men in politics) allows us to specify the causal status of incumbency more precisely than it has been done so far. For instance, Schwindt-Bayer's argument concerning women's 'incumbency disadvantage' takes the form of a conditional statement: '*if* men hold the dominant positions in the political arena *and* the system permits unlimited re-election, *then* the election of female legislators will be unlikely' (2005, 229). In other words, the institutions of male over-representation have to be already in place for men's 'incumbency advantage' to have full effect on women's representation. This brings us back to historical institutionalism's key insight that institutional *creation* and institutional *reproduction* are two distinct processes underpinned by distinct causal mechanisms (see, in particular, Mahoney 2000 for a discussion). Thus, conceptualising incumbency as a mechanism of reproduction draws attention to the fact that incumbency *sustains*, but does not by itself *create*, male over-representation in politics.

I argue that incumbency functions as a mechanism of reproduction for male dominance in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe in two main ways. First, incumbency sustains the over-representation of men in legislative politics over time by 'freezing' the proportions of male and female MPs re-elected to the national parliaments of the region. Thus, in cases where incumbency rates increase over time, the 'incumbency advantage' favours men, who tend to be disproportionately represented among returning MPs. Second, we need to bear in mind that the selection of candidates takes place within a broader context in which, while giving priority to sitting MPs when putting together candidate lists, political parties also make strategic calculations about the ways votes are translated into seats in particular districts or nationally. Thus, incumbency interacts with the other mechanism of reproduction—electoral systems—in shaping men's and women's chances of getting elected to the national parliaments of the region. As this chapter shows, the gendered effects of incumbency are mitigated, to a very limited extent, by the electoral volatility and unstable party systems of post-communist Europe. In particular, as this chapter shows, the effects of incumbency in sustaining male dominance in Central and Eastern Europe are strongest in countries with stable party systems, such as Hungary, and weakest in countries with less consolidated party systems, such as the Czech Republic or Poland.

The analysis presented in this chapter proceeds in several steps. First, I provide an overview of incumbency rates in post-communist Europe, in order to shed light onto the question of whether a distinctively male 'incumbency advantage' characterises the region. Second, I look at how incumbency interacts with the party systems of Central and Eastern Europe, addressing the question of whether party system instability mitigates some of the effects of incumbency on the gender composition of national legislatures by making it possible for female newcomers to be elected to national parliaments.

4.1 Incumbency in Post-communist Europe: An Overview

Feminist scholarship on Central and Eastern Europe has generally discussed incumbency within the setting of individual country case studies. For instance, in one of the earliest analyses on the subject, Kunovich (2003) looked at the factors that enabled women to gain access to political power in the Czech Republic and Poland in the elections held during the first decade of post-communism. She found that incumbency had a significant effect on

women's chances of election: in Poland, women who were incumbents were 14 times more likely to secure the top positions on the candidate lists by comparison to women who were not incumbents; in the Czech Republic, women who were incumbents were 17 more likely to achieve the same (Kunovich 2003, 282). Ilonszki examined the recruitment of women candidates in Hungary, arguing that, over time, political parties on both sides of the moderate political spectrum became increasingly likely to deselect (incumbent) women candidates: 'female positions', she notes, 'have become increasingly unsafe' (Ilonszki 2012, 218). Millard looked at the effects of incumbency in Poland across the post-communist period, arguing that it has resulted in 'a profound male bias' in all post-communist elections after 1991 (2014, 14). This chapter draws on existing scholarship in order to provide a region-wide overview of how male over-representation in politics has been reproduced by men's 'incumbency advantage' over the post-communist period.

I begin by outlining the main trends in incumbency rates for five of the six countries covered in this study. As Table 3.1 shows, incumbency rates have risen fairly constantly in Central and Eastern Europe, but there are significant differences between our case studies. On the one hand, in Slovakia, Poland and Hungary, incumbency rates have generally increased during the post-communist period (with the exceptions discussed in greater detail in Section 4.2). Approximately two-thirds of the MPs elected in the previous legislature were returned to political office in Poland and Slovakia in 2011 and 2012 respectively, and a remarkable 83.4 per cent of the MPs elected in 2010 returned to the Hungarian National Assembly in 2014. On the other hand, in the Czech Republic and Romania, incumbency rates have alternated between increasing and decreasing over the past two decades, with a much greater proportion of newcomers entering the lower chambers in recent elections than in previous legislatures.

As Table 4.1 makes apparent, the overall picture of parliamentary renewal in post-communist Europe is rather mixed. If we were to place our case studies on a continuum, Romania would be at the low end and Hungary at the high end of the incumbency spectrum, with the other countries somewhere in between. Within this context, there are two factors that can provide an explanation for variation in incumbency rates. First, the party systems of the region have been rather fluid and unstable (Kitschelt 1999; Lewis 2000; van Biezen 2003; Tavits 2013), so that newcomers have had greater access to legislative power than in established democracies such as the UK or the US. Second, incumbency rates decrease when one party, or a coalition thereof, wins a considerably larger number of seats than in the preced-

Table 4.1 Incumbency rates in Central and Eastern Europe (1990–2014)

Country/Chamber	*% MPs returning*	*% change in incumbency rate*	*% change in women's representation*
Czech Chamber of Deputies, 1996	36.5	–	+4.5
Czech Chamber of Deputies, 1998	53.5	+17.0	0
Czech Chamber of Deputies, 2002	57	+3.5	+2.0
Czech Chamber of Deputies, 2006	55.5	−1.5	−1.5
Czech Chamber of Deputies, 2010	43	−12.5	+6.5
Hungarian Parliament, 1994	36.3	–	+3.9
Hungarian Parliament, 1998	51.3	+15.0	−2.9
Hungarian Parliament, 2002	68.7	+17.4	+0.8
Hungarian Parliament, 2006	71.4	+2.7	+1.5
Hungarian Parliament, 2010	54.4	−17.0	−1.5
Hungarian Parliament, 2014[a]	83.4	+29.0	+0.5
Polish Sejm, 1991	23.48	–	n/a
Polish Sejm, 1993	34.57	+11.1	+3.5
Polish Sejm, 1997	48.69	+14.1	0
Polish Sejm, 2001	46.09	−2.6	+7.2
Polish Sejm, 2005	58.3	+12.2	+0.2
Polish Sejm, 2007	65.7	+7.4	0
Polish Sejm, 2011[b]	61.4	−4.3	+3.5
Romanian Chamber of Deputies, 1992	30.79	–	−0.7
Romanian Chamber of Deputies, 1996	41.16	+10.4	+3.5
Romanian Chamber of Deputies, 2000	44.65	+3.5	+3.7
Romanian Chamber of Deputies, 2004	40.45	−4.2	+0.4
Romanian Chamber of Deputies, 2008[a]	33.65	−6.8	+0.1
Romanian Chamber of Deputies, 2012	39.48	+5.8	+1.9
Slovak National Council, 1992	24.00	+24.0	+3.3
Slovak National Council, 1994	32.67	+8.7	−0.7
Slovak National Council, 1998	46.00	+13.3	−3.3
Slovak National Council, 2002	27.33	−18.7	+3.3
Slovak National Council, 2006	41.33	+14.0	+1.3
Slovak National Council, 2010	51.33	+10.0	−0.7
Slovak National Council, 2012	67.33	+16.0	+0.7

Sources: Linek and Mansfeldova (2007, 21); Ilonzki (2007, 50); Nalewajko and Wesolowski (2007, 69); Chiva (2007, 201); Mansfeldová (2011, 135). Own calculations for the Slovak National Council, for Romania in 2008 and 2012, for Poland in 2011 and for Hungary in 2014. Appendix B for women's representation

[a]Change of electoral system

[b]A 35 per cent gender quota was implemented in 2011

ing elections. In this situation, significant numbers of newcomers enter the legislature, and incumbency rates decrease. These sources of variation in incumbency rates—discussed in the next section of this chapter—interact strongly with gender, albeit with important differences between countries.

Given relatively volatile incumbency rates, does incumbency actually sustain men's over-representation in politics in the post-communist region? In order to ascertain whether this is the case, I collected the data on women's and men's incumbency rates in Hungary, Romania and Slovakia over the post-communist period from secondary literature, as well as from primary data sources such as the national elections offices of the countries concerned (Table 4.2). Overall, evidence from the

Table 4.2 Returning MPs by gender (selected post-communist countries, 1990–2014)

	Year	*Women*		*Men*	
		N	*%*[a]	*N*	*%*
Hungary	1994	16	11.1	128	88.9
	1998	16	8.1	181	91.9
	2002	19	7.2	245	92.8
	2006	23	8.2	256	91.8
	2010	14	6.6	197	93.4
	2014	12	7.2	154	92.8
Romania	1992	4	4.0	97	96.0
	1996	5	3.7	130	96.3
	2000	12	8.2	134	91.8
	2004	12	9.4	115	90.6
	2008	9	8.6	96	91.4
	2012	18	12.6	125	87.4
Slovakia	1992	2	5.6	34	94.4
	1994	8	16.3	41	83.7
	1998	10	14.5	59	85.5
	2002	4	9.8	37	90.2
	2006	5	8.1	57	91.9
	2010	11	14.3	66	85.7
	2012	14	13.9	87	86.1

Sources: Author's own data sets, compiled on the basis of the information published by the Hungarian Assembly (www.parlament.hu) and the Hungarian Central Electoral Office (www.valasztas.hu); the Romanian Chamber of Deputies (www.cdep.ro); and the elections results published by the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, slovak.statistics.sk; all last accessed 30 April 2015

[a]Expressed as a proportion of the total number of returning MPs

[b]Electoral system change

three countries selected for an in-depth analysis suggests that incumbency does reproduce male dominance. In all three countries, women are heavily under-represented and men are heavily over-represented among incumbent MPs: the proportion of women ranges between 4 per cent and 16.3 per cent, while the proportion of men ranges between 83.7 per cent and 96 per cent. In Hungary, the gendered effects of incumbency are very strong, with men constituting 91 per cent or more of incumbents re-elected in every election since 1998; conversely, the proportion of women among incumbents is in the single digits. In Romania and Slovakia, men's over-representation among incumbents is also very high (between 83.7 and 96.3 per cent) so that the proportion of women among MPs returning to the legislature is correspondingly low. Nevertheless, it should also be noted that, while in Hungary male over-representation among incumbent MPs has hardly decreased over the past decade, in Romania and Slovakia the trends are more volatile, with the percentage of women among incumbents rising in recent elections.

If, as Table 4.2 shows, incumbency does sustain male over-representation in politics in post-communist Europe, this raises the issue of the role of candidate reselection in reproducing male dominance. The question that we need to address is whether political parties favour men when reselecting their incumbents in forthcoming elections. In order to answer this question, I collected information on the reselection of MPs in Poland and Slovakia (Table 3.3). Overall, the data show that men's incumbency advantage is very much present at the candidate reselection stage. Interestingly, however, if we compare Tables 4.2 and 4.3, female incumbents in both countries constitute a higher proportion of incumbent candidates than incumbent MPs. This suggests that the great majority of female incumbent MPs do get reselected for political office, but only a proportion of this group actually win their seats.

The last two columns of Table 4.3 make this picture clearer by summarising the respective reselection rates of male and female incumbents. Given the relatively small number of women elected to the Polish Sejm and the Slovak National Council by comparison to the number of men, gender-based differences between reselection rates should be treated with caution. Nevertheless, the data show that, at least in the case of Poland, women may be deselected in significant proportions, but so can men. In 1993, 2001 and 2011, a much smaller proportion of female incumbents

were reselected as candidates than the corresponding proportion of men. In contrast, in 1997 and 2005 women stood a much better chance of being reselected as candidates, while in 2007 they had marginally higher reselection rates.

If the reselection of female incumbents in Poland tends to vary across elections, the trends for Slovakia are much clearer: in 2006, 2010 and 2012 alike, women were considerably more likely to be reselected as candidates than men (Table 4.3). In fact, 100 per cent of the female MPs elected in 2006 and 2010 were reselected in the next elections, but only 71.4 and 85.8 per cent of the men were successful in being reselected. Smrek's recent work on the Czech Republic shows that Slovakia is not an isolated case of high reselection rates for women (Smrek 2015). He looked at reselection in the Czech Chamber of Deputies between 1996 and 2013, finding that men did not in fact enjoy an advantage at the reselection stage by comparison to women, and that, somewhat puzzlingly, party loyalty mattered a lot more for men than for women in securing a place at the top of the candidate lists (Smrek 2015, 13).

Thus, the reselection of incumbents in subsequent elections does not particularly disadvantage women in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. This is also true of approximately half the elections held in Poland since 1990. These findings should be interpreted with caution, because patterns of reselection may well be country- and party specific. For instance, as Ilonszki argues, parties such as the Young Democrats (FIDESZ) in Hungary increasingly deselected their female candidates in individual

Table 4.3 MPs reselected as candidates, by gender (selected post-communist countries, 1990–2014)

		Women (N)	*Men (N)*	*% women among incumbents*	*Women's reselection rate*	*Men's reselection rate*
Poland	1993	40	316	11.2	66.67	79.00
	1997	35	155	18.4	58.33	38.75
	2001	49	304	13.9	52.68	82.83
	2005	73	247	22.8	77.66	67.48
	2007	84	321	20.7	89.36	87.70
	2011	88	330	21.4	80.00	94.28
Slovakia	2006	18	71	20.2	81.8	55.5
	2010	24	90	21.1	100.0	71.4
	2012	24	109	17.4	100.0	85.8

Sources: Millard (2014, 6) for Poland; author's own dataset for Slovakia

constituencies: two-thirds of female incumbents were reselected in SMDs in 2002, slightly over one-fifth in 2006, and no female incumbents ran in SMDs in 2010 (Ilonszki 2014, 13–14). In contrast, the Hungarian socialists (MSZP) proceeded to place an increasing proportion of their female incumbents in individual constituencies: 25 per cent in 2002, 40 per cent in 2006 and 42 per cent in 2010 (Ilonszki 2014, 14).

This section has shown that men's descriptive over-representation in the legislatures of post-communist Europe is in fact sustained by incumbency. Thus, having been significantly under-represented in national politics in the late 1980s and early 1990s, women accrued a significant 'incumbency disadvantage' that has been essentially self-reinforcing over time. Furthermore, as incumbency rates increase, women are likely to find it increasingly difficult to run for political office. In cases with exceptionally high incumbency rates (83.4 per cent in Hungary in 2014), newcomers' access to political power is severely curtailed. The next section looks at how variations in incumbency in Central and Eastern Europe are shaped by two key factors: party system instability and party-level electoral volatility. Altogether, these factors have the combined effect of limiting women's access to political power not only because they reproduce men's incumbency advantage but also because they constrain newcomers' entry to national legislatures in ways that are clearly gendered.

4.2 The Gendered Effects of Variation in Incumbency in Post-communist Europe

What are the sources of variation in incumbency trends in post-communist Europe, and what sort of impact does this variation have on women's access to political power? This section discusses two factors shaping variation in incumbency in the post-communist region: party system instability and party-level volatility.

Existing scholarship has long argued that the parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe have had higher turnover rates than other democracies. An early study by Shabad and Slomczynski showed that the rates of parliamentary renewal in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were not only much lower than those in high-incumbency countries such as the US, the UK or Germany but also lower than in other democracies, such as Spain, Italy or Portugal after the transitions from non-democratic rule (2002, 341).

A recent study by Gherghina found that instability continued to characterise post-communist party systems well beyond the initial decade of post-communism, with the average electoral volatility between 1990 and 2008 at 22.30 per cent (Gherghina 2015). Indeed, as Ilonszki and Edinger argue, high turnover rates have not only limited the professionalisation of the representative elites, but they may have also disadvantaged parliaments vis-à-vis the bureaucracy and the core executives of post-communist Europe (2007, 157).

One reason for the relatively low incumbency rates of post-communist Europe has to do with the fact that, due to high electoral volatility, the party systems of the region have been notoriously unstable (Lewis 2000; Tavits 2005; Enyedi and Casal Bertoa 2011; Tavits 2013). Electoral volatility and party system instability can lead to significant changes in the composition of national legislatures, due to the occasionally meteoric ascent of new parties on the political scene, as well as to the disappearance of some of the 'old' parties that had been dominant during the early the post-communist period. For instance, the decrease in incumbency rates in the Czech Republic in 2010 (Table 4.1) occurred at the same time as two new parties entered the Chamber of Deputies, winning 65 of the 200 seats between them (see Appendix B). Similarly, in Slovakia, two new parties entered the legislature in 2002, winning 51 of the 150 seats between them. In Hungary, not only were there two new parties elected to the National Assembly in 2010, but some of the established parties failed to win any seats (Appendix B). Thus, when relatively high numbers of newcomers entered parliament, some incumbents were unable to join the ranks of their former colleagues.

To what extent has party system instability, via the entry of new parties to parliament, mitigated the effect of men's incumbency advantage in Central and Eastern Europe? Table 4.4 summarises the data on women's descriptive representation in the new parties of our country case studies since the fourth post-communist elections. Taking the average proportion of women represented in a particular legislature as the basic unit of comparison, it becomes apparent that party family is a reasonably good predictor of political parties' recruitment of female MPs. The overwhelming majority of parties whose proportion of women MPs is well above the average for the national legislature come from three party families: the liberals, the centre-right and the green parties. In contrast, newly established radical right parties, as well as ethnic parties, are considerably more likely to display the male over-representation pattern characteristic of the 'old' or established parties of the region.

Table 4.4 Women's representation in new parties in Central and Eastern Europe (2000–2014)

Party family	*Party*	*4th election*		*5th election*		*6th election*		*7th election*		*8th election*	
		N	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*
Centre-right	Bulgaria—GERB	–	–	–	–	–	–	32	27.6	32	33.0
	Czech Republic—TOP09	–	–	–	–	–	–	11	26.8	7	27.0
	Poland—PiS	6	13.6	29	18.7	34	20.5	27	17.2		
	Romania—PC	3	50.0	4	21.1	1	25.0	2	16.7		
	Slovakia—SDK/SDKÚ	2	4.8	6	21.4	6	19.4	6	21.4	2	18.2
Radical right	Bulgaria—Ataka	–	–	–	–	1	4.8	3	14.3	5	21.7
	Hungary—Jobbik	–	–	–	–	3	6.4	2	8.7	–	–
Green	Czech Republic—SZ					3	50.0			–	–
	Hungary—LMP	–	–	–	–	5	31.2	2	40.0		
Liberal	Bulgaria—NDSV	–	–	48	40.0	21	39.6	–	–	–	–
	Poland—PO	13	20.0	33	24.8	48	23.0	72	34.8	–	–
	Slovakia—SaS	–	–	–	–	–	–	4	18.2	1	9.1
Ethnic	Slovakia—Most-Híd	–	–	–	–	–	–	0	0.00	0	0.00

Sources: As for Appendix B

Taking the new parties with the highest proportions of women first, an analysis of the liberal and centre-right parties reveals that there are two aspects that may well shape these parties' record on challenging male dominance. First, party size makes a significant difference for parties on the right of the spectrum: the proportion of women MPs is highest in the new parties that have been exceptionally successful in elections. This is the case for two Bulgarian parties, the liberal National Movement Simeon II (NDSV) in 2001 and the centre-right Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) in 2009. Both parties were established a few months before the elections in which they emerged victorious, and both placed a significant number of women MPs on their candidate lists, eventually recruiting high numbers of women MPs to their parliamentary groups. Second, it is necessary to take into account country-specific contextual factors: as I argue in greater detail in Chap. 6, the Bulgarian party system was characterised by party contagion, so that GERB's record on electing women was largely due to the eventually successful strategy of drawing on NDSV's distinctive strengths in previous elections. In contrast, the relatively small size of other centre-right and liberal parties at the time of first entering the legislature—such as Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland, and Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) in Slovakia—may well be connected to higher levels of competition at the top of the candidate lists, so that male-dominated party leaderships were placed in electable positions more often than less-experienced women candidates.

The Greens are the second group of new parties that are clearly committed to gender equality in their recruitment of candidates. Both the Green Party (SZ) in the Czech Republic and Politics Can Be Different (LMP) in Hungary elected over 30 per cent women MPs on entering parliament. In the case of these two parties, the effects of party size are the opposite from those identified in the case of the centre-right and liberal parties: despite the very small size of their parliamentary group (SZ had a total of 6 MPs in 2006, and LMP had 16 in 2010), the green parties did recruit high proportions of women candidates and therefore elected a large percentage of women MPs. For instance, women constituted 115 of SZ's 340 candidates (33.8 per cent) and 3 of the 6 MPs (50 per cent) in 2006.

If, by Central and Eastern European standards, some new parties are remarkably inclined to recruit women candidates in large numbers, others are significantly less likely to do so. In particular, new radical right parties such as Ataka in Bulgaria and Jobbik in Hungary were almost

male monopolies when they were elected to parliament in 2005 and 2010 respectively (Table 3.6). The literature on women's representation in radical right parties is fairly sparse, but, as Mudde (2007) and Spierings et al. (2015) show, populist radical right parties are male-dominated in Western Europe as well, so that post-communist Europe is part of a wider general trend. Within the context of Central and Eastern Europe, Norocel (2010) shows that, in Romania, constructions of hegemonic masculinity formed an intrinsic part of the discourse of the radical right in the early 2000s.

Finally, it should be noted that new ethnic parties do not appear to fare particularly well in terms of recruiting women. The only example of an ethnic party in our sample of new parties is that of Slovakia's Most-Híd (Bridge), whose parliamentary group has been 100 per cent male in both terms that the party has been represented in the National Council. Nevertheless, male over-representation in ethnic parties is not unique to Most-Híd. Instead, Most-Híd fits a more general pattern of male over-representation in the new, as well as established, ethnic parties of Central and Eastern Europe.

The second factor that affects the reproduction of male over-representation, and therefore may have a significant impact on female newcomers' chances of being elected, is a party's exceptionally good electoral performance in a given year. The question is whether, under such circumstances, women candidates are successful in overcoming the effects of male over-representation. In this scenario, to the extent that the proportion of female newcomers is higher than the proportion of women among incumbents, women candidates benefit from electoral volatility by displacing other parties' male incumbents. In order to ascertain whether this is the case, I conducted an analysis of women's representation in several instances where political parties obtained the rarest of gains in post-communist Europe—a parliamentary majority—owing to a significant increase in the number of seats by comparison to the previous election.

In Hungary, there are three such instances during the period between 1990 and 2014: the Socialists' (MSZP) spectacular return to power in 1994 with a two-thirds majority; FIDESZ's electoral victory in 1998; and the 2010 elections, where the alliance between FIDESZ and the Christian democrats obtained a super-majority in parliament. In 1994, MSZP won six times as many seats than in 1990 and increased the number

of its female MPs from five in the previous elections to 22 (Appendix B). Yet, if we look at the proportion of women among MSZP's MPs, it actually dropped from 15.1 in 1990 to 10.5 in 1994. In 1998, FIDESZ won seven times more seats than in the previous elections, increasing the size of its parliamentary group from 20 to 148 (Appendix B). The party had only one woman MP in 1994, who was duly reselected as a candidate and then re-elected to parliament. Thus, nine of the ten female MPs elected from FIDESZ's ranks were newcomers. However, while it is true that the absolute number of FIDESZ women MPs increased tenfold, the overall proportion of women in the party's parliamentary group was only 6.7 per cent, hardly an indicator of FIDESZ's propensity to recruit female newcomers in large numbers. Finally, in 2010, when the FIDESZ-KDNP alliance achieved a two-thirds majority, the number of FIDESZ MPs increased from 164 seats in the previous elections to 262 (Appendix B). Yet, the proportion of women within the parliamentary party registered only a minimal increase, from 7.9 per cent in 2006 to 8.4 in 2010. Thus, the data on Hungary suggest that male over-representation is as characteristic of political parties' pattern of recruiting newcomers as it is in terms of the re-election of incumbent MPs.

These findings are supported by our other cases: Poland in 1993, Romania in 2012 and Slovakia in 2012. In Poland, the Democratic Left Alliance won 171 seats in the 1993 elections, three times more than in 1991. The number of women almost tripled—from 10 to 28—but the proportion of women among SLD's parliamentary groups stayed almost exactly the same at just over 16 per cent in both cases (Appendix B). In Romania in 2012, the Social Liberal Union, comprising the social democrats (PSD), the liberals (PNL) and two smaller parties, won a resounding victory and a two-thirds majority. While less spectacular than in Poland in 1993 or Hungary in 1994, the increase in the social democrats' parliamentary group size was a respectable 37 per cent, and the liberals' an even more respectable 55 per cent (from 110 to 151 seats, and from 65 to 101 seats respectively) (Appendix B). The proportion of social democratic women MPs rose by 50 per cent, while the number of liberal women MPs almost doubled. Yet, there was only an increase of about 2 per cent in the overall proportion of women within the two parties' groups. This means that men continued to be almost as over-represented among the new MPs as they were among the MPs of the previous legislative term. Finally, in Slovakia in 2012, the social democratic Smer (Direction) also won a majority with 83 seats, an increase of 21 over the previous elections

(Appendix B). As in Romania, the decrease in male over-representation within the party was about 2 percentage points, hardly sufficient to suggest that women were considerably more likely to enter parliament as newcomers.

The findings concerning party system instability and party-level volatility suggest that male over-representation is as much a characteristic of the group of newcomer MPs in the region as it is of the incumbents' group. Thus, incumbency is an important factor, but by no means the only factor, that sustains the reproduction of male dominance in post-communist Europe. Other factors, discussed in Chap. 5, have to do with the functioning of national electoral systems.

4.3 Conclusions

This chapter has shown that incumbency has played a key role in sustaining male over-representation in the legislatures of Central and Eastern Europe since 1990. Thus, I have found evidence overall that men's 'incumbency advantage' persists even under circumstances where legislative renewal is not particularly high, as has been the case in post-communist Europe. Furthermore, while men's incumbency advantage reproduces male dominance within the group of returning MPs, the findings on the impact of reselection rates on men's and women's representation are more mixed. Thus, in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, women incumbents do get reselected in proportions that are comparable to men, or higher. However, they do not get re-elected at the same rate as men. This suggests that there are other effects at stake, in particular the ways in which list placement constrains voters' choices, and party gatekeeper's willingness to place women candidates in winnable seats or positions.

This chapter also looked at how the gendered effects of incumbency varied with party system stability and party-level volatility. The most important findings are that, while incumbency is an important mechanism of reproduction for men's over-representation in the legislatures of post-communist Europe, groups of newcomer MPs also include disproportionately high numbers of men. Within this context, women's entry to parliament via new parties is very much a party-specific affair. There is also some evidence that green parties and some liberal parties are considerably more inclined to take a gender-equality agenda seriously.

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CHAPTER 5

Reproducing Male Dominance: The Role of Electoral Systems

The effects of electoral systems on women's descriptive representation have long intrigued scholars of post-communist politics. Early studies showed significant differences between East and West, with women in post-communist states doing 'marginally better' in single-district elections than their counterparts in the West, but 'significantly worse' in PR elections (Moser 2001, 365). As shown in the introduction to this study, this puzzle has continued to characterise Central and Eastern European politics well beyond the initial decade of post-communism. For instance, the proportion of women elected to the Bulgarian National Assembly, the Czech Chamber of Deputies or the Polish Sejm has remained closer to the proportion of women elected under a 'first past the post' system such as the UK's than to women's representation in PR-based systems such as that used in the Netherlands' House of Representatives (Figs. 1.3 and 1.4).

Given the differences in electoral system design across our country case studies, the outcomes for women's descriptive representation should diverge quite significantly, especially over relatively long periods of time such as the two and a half decades since the collapse of state socialism. For instance, one would expect the closed-list PR system used in Romania for most of the post-communist period to have yielded significantly higher proportions of women MPs than in the case of Hungary's mixed system, which, as Ilonszki and Montgomery argue (2003), is best characterised as a case of 'hidden majoritarianism'. Yet, Romania and Hungary have had remarkably similar levels of women's representation

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across the post-communist period (Chiva 2005, Appendix B). Another example is that of Slovakia's National Council, whose 150 MPs have been elected from one single national constituency since 1998. Owing to the fact that high district magnitudes have been typically associated with increases in women's descriptive representation, one would expect the proportion of women elected to the Slovak National Council to be higher than, say, in neighbouring Czech Republic, where the 200-seat Chamber of Deputies has been elected from 14 multi-member districts since 2002. Yet, on average, the Czech Republic elects slightly higher percentages of women MPs than Slovakia (Appendix B).

Recent scholarship has begun to provide some clues as to where we might find an answer to these puzzling findings. In particular, scholars have recently started to question the findings of the earlier literature on the impact of electoral systems on women's representation. Thus, conventional wisdom concerning the effects of PR systems for women's representation has come under intense critical scrutiny. For instance, Schmidt's analysis of women's representation in democracies with PR-based electoral systems across the world shows that, on the whole, institutional variables such as closed lists, high district or party magnitudes, or gender quotas have only marginal impacts on women's representation (Schmidt 2008). Moser and Scheiner (2012) argue that the impact of PR systems on women's representation depends on the number of parties in competition with each other and on support for female leaders; thus, where there are many parties and low levels of support for women in politics, PR systems are unlikely to increase women's representation to much higher levels than would occur under plurality systems. Rosen finds that 'the transition to a PR electoral system considerably helps women in the average developed country, but does less to aid women in less developed countries in the absence of other demands for representation' (2013, 318). Furthermore, Roberts et al. (2013) argue that the effects of electoral laws have been overestimated and that the driving factors behind increases in women's descriptive representation may well be social and cultural, rather than electoral.

Overall, recent scholarship demonstrates that, contrary to the findings of earlier literature, systems based on proportional representation (PR) are not always correlated with positive change in women's descriptive representation. Instead, given certain social, cultural or political factors, electoral systems can also sustain male dominance. For example, both Moser and Scheiner (2012) and Rosen (2013) show that support

for women leaders and demands for representation respectively interact with electoral systems in shaping women's descriptive representation. A key implication of their findings is that, absent these elements, electoral systems have no discernible positive effect on women's representation—in other words, electoral systems simply reproduce pre-existing inequalities. Given the remarkably high levels of men's descriptive representation in the politics of post-communist Europe since 1990, there is a strong prima facie case that this is precisely what may have occurred in our case studies.

This chapter assesses the evidence for the proposition that electoral systems have sustained, rather than challenged, the institutions of male dominance in Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of communism. I begin with an overview of the electoral systems adopted in the region in 1989–1990, and then focus on three potential sources of variation in electoral system effects in our country case studies: the type of electoral system (in particular, mixed versus pure PR systems), ballot structure (open versus closed-list PR) and electoral system change.

5.1 The Electoral Systems of Post-communist Europe: An Overview

As communism fell, the political elites of post-communist Europe were faced with the daunting task of designing the very same political and electoral systems that would eventually shape their entry to the first democratically elected legislatures of the region. In the event, the region experienced a remarkably uniform shift away from the majoritarian or mixed systems of the state socialist era and towards either full proportional representation (PR) or mixed systems with significant PR elements (Birch 2001; Bielasiak 2002). Thus, the then-Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania adopted electoral systems based on proportional representation, while Hungary and Bulgaria moved to mixed systems for their first post-communist elections. With the exception of Bulgaria, which abandoned the mixed system in favour of closed-list PR after 1991, the basic type the electoral system adopted in 1989–1990 proved strikingly resilient for the next two decades.

The dilemmas of electoral system design in post-communist Europe are well documented in the literature. Benoit and Schiemann (2001) and Benoit and Hayden (2004) argue that political actors essentially made self-interested choices, assessing the various proposals on the table during

the negotiations in light of the seat shares they anticipated winning in forthcoming elections. Kopecký (2004) traces the struggles over proportional representation in the Czech Republic, and in particular the protracted battle over reforming the electoral system in the later 1990s. In the event, the requirement for a PR-based system for the lower chamber was enshrined in Article 18(1) of the Czech Constitution, which stipulates that 'elections to the Chamber of Deputies shall be held by secret ballot on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage and according to the principles of proportional representation'.

Irrespective of the considerations underpinning political actors' preferences for particular electoral systems, representational guarantees for women were not on the agenda in any of the countries in our study. Instead, policies to ensure a better representation for women in elections were routinely associated with the communist regime, and therefore deemed unsuitable for a democratic political system. In some cases, such as Romania, there was widespread antipathy not only to gender quotas but also to the very idea of women's presence at the top levels of politics. This was not only a reflection of the extent to which Elena Ceaușescu was disliked by the population, but also of the fact that the promotion of women in any public role had become closely associated with the nepotism and corruption of the communist regime (Fischer 1998, 175).

Table 5.1 summarises the main characteristics of the electoral systems of the countries examined in this study. With the exception of Hungary, whose complex mixed system emerged from the National Roundtable negotiations of 1989 (Benoit and Schiemann 2001), all the other countries eventually settled for some form of proportional representation. Bulgaria and Romania have used closed-list PR for most of the post-communist period. The exceptions are the 1990 and the 2009 elections in Bulgaria, which were held under a mixed system; Romania's mixed-member proportional system, in place between 2008 and 2016; and Bulgaria's open-list system, in place since the 2014 elections. The Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia have all used open-list proportional representation. In Poland, voters can express a preference for one candidate, while, in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, voters have up to four preferences but no option to rank these preferences. District magnitude also varies significantly: from 1 (in the single member district [SMD] tier of the Hungarian electoral system, as well as in Romania in the 2008 and 2012 elections) to 150 (in Slovakia, where there is a single national constituency). Finally, the size of the unicameral legislature or lower chamber ranges from 150 seats in Slovakia to 460 seats in Poland.

Table 5.1 The electoral systems of Central and Eastern Europe (1990–2016)

	Type of electoral system	*No. of districts*	*% men (min–max)*
Bulgaria—National Assembly	Mixed (1990)	200 SMDs and 31 multi-member districts (1990)	91.5 (1990)
	Closed-list PR (1991–2005)	31 multi-member districts (1991–2005)	73.4–90.2 (1991–2005)
	Mixed-member proportional (2009)	31 single-member districts, 31 multi-member districts (2009)	79.2 (2009)
	Closed-list PR (2013)	31 multi-member districts (2013–present)	74.6–80.0 (2013–)
	Open-list PR		
Czech Republic—Chamber of Deputies[a]	Open-list PR	8 multi-member districts (1990–1998)	10.5–15.0 (1990–1998)
		14 multi-member districts (2002–present)	15.5–22.0 (2002–)
Hungary—National Assembly	Mixed	176 SMDs, 20 mixed-member districts and a national compensatory list (1990–2010)	92.7–88.8 (1990–2010)
		106 SMDs and a national list (2014–present)	90.5 (2014)
Poland—Sejm	Open-list PR	40 multi-member districts and a national list (1991–1997)	87.0–90.5 (1991–1997)
		40 multi-member districts (2001–present)	76.1–79.8 (2001–)
Romania—Chamber of Deputies	Closed-list PR (1990–2008)	41–42 mixed-member districts (1990–2008)	89.0–95.5 (1990–2008)
	Mixed-member proportional (2008–2016)	315 SMDs with proportional reallocation at the national level (2008–2016)	86.7–88.7 (2008–2016)
	Closed-list PR (2016–present)	43 mixed-member districts (2016–)	79.6 (2016)
Slovakia—National Council[a]	Open-list PR	4 constituencies (1990–1994)	84.7–88.0 (1990–1994)
		One national constituency (1998–present)	84.0–88.7 (1998–)

Sources: The Central Electoral Commission of Bulgaria, www.cik.bg; the Elections Server of the Czech Statistical Office www.volby.cz; the Hungarian National Election Office, www.valasztas.hu; the National Electoral Commission of Poland, pkw.gov.pl; the Permanent Electoral Authority of Romania, www.roaep.ro; the Slovak Statistical Office, www.statistics.sk

[a]The data are for the Slovak National Council in 1990 and 1992
[b]The data are for the Czech National Council in 1990 and 1992

5.2 Mixed Versus PR Systems

As the data presented in the last column of Table 5.1 show, the over-representation of men has been highest in elections conducted under mixed electoral systems, ranging from 86.7 per cent in Romania to 92.7 per cent in Hungary. The exception is Bulgaria in 2009, when the proportion of men elected to the National Assembly was 'only' 79.2 per cent. In order to explain this variation, it is useful to delve more deeply into the precise characteristics of the three countries' electoral systems.

As Table 5.2 shows, Hungary's exceptionally low levels of female representation (under 10 per cent in all elections except in 1994 and 2002) are even more apparent in the SMD tier of the electoral system. The overwhelming majority of MPs elected in the SMD tier have been men, with women constituting under 4 per cent of the MPs in some elections, such as in 1990 and 2014. The regional list has marginally higher levels of female representation (6.7 to 13.0 per cent), while the national list performs better than the other two tiers (8.5 to 17.2 per cent). This demonstrates that the 'hidden majoritarianism' (Ilonszki and Montgomery 2003) of the Hungarian electoral system has remained in place for the entire duration of the post-communist period.

In Romania, mixed-member proportional representation has been in place only for two election cycles so far, so that it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions on the overall trend in male over-representation. It should also be noted that the Central Electoral Office did not provide a breakdown of the allocation of seats by electoral tier in 2008, so we only have information on the 2012 elections. Moreover, the electoral system does not have separate candidate lists for the PR tier, as is the case in Hungary. Instead, parties put forward candidates in individual constituencies; if candidates obtain over 50 per cent of the votes, then they secure the seat; the remaining seats are pooled at the national level and allocated to parties proportionally (Gherghina and Jiglau 2012). Finally, a further complicating factor is that, in a thoroughly unexpected turn of events, the 2012 elections resulted in the allocation of a very large number of surplus seats.[1]

As Table 5.2 shows, male over-representation is lower among those Romanian MPs who won their seats through reallocation, whether in the second or the surplus tier. This suggests that, as in Hungary, the PR segments of the electoral system may mitigate the effects of the exceptionally high levels of men's descriptive representation, although only marginally so in this case. In order to clarify the impact of the Romanian electoral

Table 5.2 Women's representation in the mixed electoral systems of post-communist Europe (lower chamber where applicable)

Year	Hungary							
	Single-member districts (SMDs)		Multi-member districts (MMDs) - regional list		National list		Total	
	N	%	*N*	%	*N*	%	*N*	%
1990	6/176	3.4	8/120	6.7	14/90	15.6	28/386	7.2
1994	15/176	8.5	17/125	12.8	11/85	14.1	43/386	11.1
1998	12/176	6.9	13/128	10.2	7/82	8.5	32/386	8.3
2002	13/176	7.4	16/140	11.4	6/70	8.6	35/386	9.1
2006	15/176	8.5	19/146	13.0	7/64	10.9	41/386	10.6
2010	9/176	5.1	25/146	10.3	11/64	17.2	35/386	9.1
2014	4/106	3.8	–	–	15/93	16.1	19/199	9.5
Year	Bulgaria							
	SMDs		MMDs		–		Total	
	N	%	*N*	%	*N*	%	*N*	%
2009	8/31	25.8	42/209	20.1	–	–	50/240	20.8
Year	Romania							
	SMDs		PR reallocation		Surplus seats		Total	
	N	%	*N*	%	*N*	%	*N*	%
2012	33/280	11.8	7/35	20.0	14/79	17.7	54/394	13.3

Sources: Ilonszki (2012, 216) for Hungary 1990–2010; own databases for the 2014 Hungarian elections, based on the results published by the National Elections Office (www.valasztas.hu), for the 2009 Bulgarian elections (results at pi2009.cik.bg/results/proportional/rik_00.html) and for the 2012 Romanian elections (http://www.becparlamentare2012.ro/)

system on male over-representation, I ran a simulation of the composition of the Chamber of Deputies in the absence of surplus seats in 2012. In this scenario, the number of women elected to Romania's lower chamber would have been lower (40 rather than 54 women MPs). However, the levels of women's descriptive representation would have been essentially the same: 12.7 per cent men when there are no surplus seats and 13.3 per cent men when the surplus seats are included. This suggests that we should not overestimate the potential effects of PR elements in particular electoral systems.

The mixed-member proportional system used in Bulgaria's 2009 elections can be best described as a one-off experiment, due to the fact it was abandoned after one electoral cycle. Only 31 of the 240 seats were won from single-member districts, with the remainder coming from 31 multi-member electoral districts that were, in fact, the same as those that had been in place for the closed-list PR used in the previous elections. As Table 5.2 shows, male over-representation in the SMD tier was consider-

ably lower than in Hungary and Romania: 25.8 per cent of the MPs elected from this tier were women. The data that I collected from the Central Electoral Office shows that this is consistent with the candidate data. Thus, parliamentary parties do not appear to have been particularly reluctant to place women candidates in SMDs: 29 of the 156 candidates of the parties that eventually won seats were women (18.6 per cent), so that the proportion of men among candidates was 81.4 per cent. In the PR tier, the proportion of women was lower among the elected MPs than in the SMD tier (20.1 versus 25.8 per cent), but higher as far as candidate numbers are concerned: 26.7 per cent of the candidates in MMDs were women by comparison to 18.6 per cent in the SMD tier. These data should not be overestimated, especially since the number of SMDs was very small.

The evidence also indicates that the effects of mixed electoral systems in Central and Eastern Europe are very much party-specific. For instance, in Hungary in 1994, 1998, 2002 and 2006, the overwhelming majority of women winning seats in the SMD tier came from within the ranks of the Socialists.[2] In contrast, in 1990 and in 2010, when MSZP was in crisis and obtained very few seats, none of its MPs came from individual constituencies. Instead, the pattern appears to have shifted towards the centre-right. For instance, in 2010, all of the nine women elected in individual constituencies came from the centre-right alliance between the Alliance of Young Democrats (FIDESZ) and the Christian democrats (KDNP). In Romania in 2012, all of the women who won their seats in the first round of the allocation of seats came from the Social-Liberal Union (USL): 19 women from within the ranks of the social democrats (19 women), 12 women from the liberals and 2 from the conservatives, with no women candidates from the other five parties winning seats in the SMD tier. Nevertheless, these findings should not be overestimated, because they may well be due to the electoral system rather than left-wing parties' preference for women candidates: in 2012, USL won 71 per cent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, so that they were allocated the overwhelming majority of seats (280 of the 315 available) in the first round. Finally, in Bulgaria, the SMD effects are concentrated on the centre-right of the political spectrum: men represented 100 per cent of the MPs elected in the SMD tier from within the ranks of all parliamentary parties except the newly formed Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria (GERB). In other words, all of the eight women elected from individual constituencies were from GERB.

In sum, the evidence concerning the impact of mixed electoral systems in our case studies only partially fits expectations. On the one hand, in line with expectations, the levels of male over-representation

are higher in the SMD tier of the electoral systems of Hungary and Romania than in the PR tier; nevertheless, the reverse was true of Bulgaria in 2009. Furthermore, party-specific trends are also somewhat puzzling. There is some evidence that, in Hungary between 1994 and 2006, and in Romania in 2012, parties of the left were considerably more likely to place women in winnable individual constituencies than parties of the right. In contrast, as the outcome of Bulgaria's 2009 elections showed, all of the women were elected in individual constituencies were from the centre-right.

5.3 Closed-List Versus Open-List PR

If Bulgaria and Romania have held most of their post-communist elections under closed-list PR, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia have had open-list PR in place for the greatest part of the period since 1990. Thus, there is considerable scope within our case studies for an in-depth comparison of the effects of closed-list versus open-list PR on male over-representation in Central and Eastern Europe. We begin with closed-list PR, and then discuss the effects of open-list PR.

Table 5.3 summarises the data on the number of women candidates and MPs elected to the Bulgarian National Assembly and to the Romanian

Table 5.3 Women's representation under closed-list PR in Bulgaria and Romania (1990–2014)[a]

		Candidates		*Elected*	
		N	*%*	*N*	*%*
Bulgaria	1994	168/1208	13.9	28/240	11.7
	1997	240/1358	17.7	26/240	10.8
	2001	n/a	n/a	64/240	26.7
	2005	803/2887	27.8	50/240	20.8
	2013	433/1543	28.1	61/240	25.4
Romania	1992	141/1628	8.7	12/328	3.7
	1996	277/2311	12.0	23/328	7.0
	2000	n/a	n/a	35/327	10.7
	2004	325/1524	21.3	36/314	11.5

Sources: For the candidate data, the Political Transformation and Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe Project of the University of Essex (for Romania in 1992 and 1996); izbori.math.bas.bg (for Bulgaria in 1994); the Central Electoral Bureau of Romania and the Central Electoral Commission of Bulgaria for all other elections; for the data on elected MPs, Appendix B

[a]The data refer to the proportion of candidates among parliamentary parties

Chamber of Deputies in the elections held under closed-list PR during the post-communist period. In both countries, it is clear that list placement may well be a significant factor in explaining the resilience of male over-representation and the correspondingly low levels of women's representation. In virtually all elections, a higher proportion of women candidates ran in elections than the proportion of women MPs eventually elected. In some cases, the difference is quite small (−2.2 per cent in Bulgaria in 1994); in others, it is fairly large (−9.8 per cent in Romania in 2004). Thus, political parties were clearly reluctant to place women in winnable positions on the list. This indicates that, in Romania and Bulgaria, the feature that has enabled closed-list electoral systems to function as mechanisms of reproduction for male dominance is list placement, which advantaged male candidates vis-à-vis female candidates.

If list placement can, by and large, explain the discrepancy between the proportion of female candidates and the percentage of women MPs, the difference between the levels of women's under-representation in Bulgaria (25.4 per cent in the 2013 elections, the last to be held under closed-list PR) and Romania (11.5 per cent in the 2004 elections, also the last to be held under closed-list PR) merits additional scrutiny. In particular, why has Romania had such low levels of women's descriptive representation? Taking the data for the 2004 election for illustrative purposes, there are two possible explanations for this situation. On the one hand, it appears that, by the 2004 elections, political parties in Romania were becoming increasingly likely to place women in unwinnable positions on the lists. Both of the main electoral alliances running joint list of candidates placed very few women at the very top of the lists. Thus, both the social democratic-conservative alliance and the democrat-liberal alliance had only 2 women at the top of the lists in the country's 42 multi-member districts that they ran candidates in. In both cases, half the women candidates were listed in positions 4–8 on the list, well outside the potential winnable seats in an election where the average party magnitude for the two alliances was 3.1 and 2.7 respectively. This indicates that part of the explanation for women's under-representation in Romania may well be on the demand side: political parties simply did not value women candidates to the extent of placing them high enough on the list. On the other hand, it is likely that there may also be an issue on the supply side. Romanian women may well be much more reluctant to come forward as candidates than their Central and East European counterparts. This is often called 'the Elena Ceaușescu effect' by the Romanian media and by women poli-

ticians themselves, who often note that the negative image of women politicians is a significant obstacle for women's participation in politics.

If Romania's closed-list system consistently generated the lowest proportion of women deputies in post-communist Europe between 1990 and 2008, Bulgaria's similar system (closed-list, with the allocation of seats according to the d'Hondt method) has resulted in one of the highest percentages of women elected to the national parliament in the region after 2001, when the proportion of women in the National Assembly doubled by comparison to the previous elections. All the more remarkably, this leap in women's descriptive representation occurred largely in the absence of gender quotas. The reasons for this situation are discussed in greater detail in Chap. 6. For the moment, it is sufficient to notice that, as Appendix B shows in greater detail, the overall increase was actually driven by the high proportion of women among the ranks of the National Movement Simeon II (NDSV), rather than characteristic of the party system as a whole.

Open-list electoral systems have been in place in Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia since the beginning of the post-communist period. Table 5.4 summarises the data on women's descriptive representation under the open-lists systems of the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia. Overall, these systems have generated higher levels for women's representation than Hungary's mixed system or Romania's closed-list PR and mixed systems, but the levels have been comparable to Bulgaria under closed-list PR and mixed-member proportional representation (see Tables 5.2 and 5.3). As the data show, the proportion of women candidates in all of the three countries is higher than the proportion of women elected as MPs in virtually every election. This suggests that, although preferential voting is in place and has been increasingly used by voters (Beblavy and Veselkova 2014; Stegmaier et al. 2014), the ranking of candidates on electoral lists functions as a cue for voters as to which candidates are preferable. Thus, because women tend to be listed towards the bottom of the lists, they are less likely to be elected than male candidates.

The impact of candidate ranking notwithstanding, there is an increasing body of evidence that open-list PR has tended to benefit women candidates in post-communist Europe. Thus, Kunovich's analysis of the Polish electoral system (2012) found that voters across the political spectrum shifted women candidates upwards on the electoral lists. Millard (2014) also focuses on the case of Poland, arguing that the impact of the open-list system varies across elections: fewer women would have been elected under closed lists in 1991, 2005, 2007 and 2011, but the effect is

Table 5.4 Women's representation under open-list PR in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia (1990–2014)[a]

		Candidates		*Elected*	
		N	*%*	*N*	*%*
Czech Republic	1996	271/1748	15.5	30/200	15.0
	1998	263/1487	17.7	30/200	15.0
	2002	278/1369	20.3	34/200	17.0
	2006	436/1709	25.5	31/200	15.5
	2010	432/1703	25.7	44/200	22.0
	2013	547/2398	22.8	39/200	19.5
Poland	1991	898/6980	12.9	44/460	9.6
	1993	1151/8787	13.1	60/460	13.0
	1997	466/3389	13.7	60/460	13.0
	2001	1084/4710	23.0	93/460	20.2
	2005	1119/5148	21.7	94/460	20.4
	2007	1428/6187	23.1	94/460	20.4
	2011	3063/7035	43.5	110/460	23.9
Slovakia	1994	171/1151	14.9	22/150	14.7
	1998	128/900	14.2	17/150	11.3
	2002	202/1041	19.4	22/150	14.7
	2006	174/900	19.3	24/150	16.0
	2010	161/746	21.6	23/150	15.3
	2012	171/900	19.0	24/150	16.0

Sources: Millard (2014, 7) for Poland: own data sets for the Czech Republic and Slovakia

the opposite for the elections held in 1993, 1997 and 2001. Stegmaier et al. (2014) examined the case of the Czech Republic by comparing the 2006 and 2010 elections. They show that, under certain conditions, such as the lowering of the threshold for altering list placement (from 7 per cent of the votes in 2006 to 5 per cent in 2010) and a sustained campaign by women's organisations and other NGOs to oust ostensibly corrupt incumbents, open-list voting can certainly benefit women. Thus, an additional ten women were elected to the Czech Chamber of Deputies in 2010 due to the effects of preferential voting. Overall, recent findings cast doubt onto the idea that Central and East European electorates are particularly conservative in their choice of candidates.

As Chap. 3 showed, on balance, open lists have had a mixed impact on women's representation in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, but there are quite a few instances where they have clearly benefited women. Thus, the evidence presented here suggests that post-communist elector-

ates are not particularly prone to voting against women candidates. The one exception is Poland in 2011, when it is clear that the interaction between the quota and the open-list system was generally negative for women's representation.

5.4 The Impact of Electoral System Reform

The final section of this chapter examines to what extent the reform of the electoral systems adopted in the early post-communist period has had an impact on women's representation. Here, there are two case studies that merit detailed attention. In Romania, the closed-list PR system used for most of the 1990s and 2000s was replaced in 2008 with a multi-member proportional system. As noted above, the recruitment of women MPs across the three tiers largely meets the expectation that the PR segment will benefit women more than the SMD tier (Table 5.2). Nevertheless, if we compare the results of the 2004 elections, conducted under closed-list PR, with the results of the 2008 elections, conducted under a mixed-member proportional system, it is clear that there is no discernible effect of electoral system change on women's representation: precisely the same number of women (36) were elected in the contested seats of the Chamber of Deputies in both sets of elections. Interestingly, a brief examination of Bulgaria's 2005 and 2009 elections, held under closed-list PR and a mixed-member proportional system respectively, yields an identical result: precisely the same number of women (50) were elected to the National Assembly in both sets of elections. Overall, this suggests that, when the proportionality effects of mixed systems are comparable to those in closed-list PR, the change of the electoral system has little effect on women's descriptive representation, and does not decrease male over-representation.

Finally, the case of Hungary is particularly edifying because of the fact that the 2011 reform of the electoral system reduced the size of the legislature by almost half, from 386 to 199 seats. Once again, the proportion of women elected to the National Assembly is comparable to that under the previous electoral system: 9.1 per cent in 2010 versus 9.6 per cent in 2014. However, it should also be noted that the change of the electoral system has resulted in a rather spectacular increase in incumbency rates, from 54.4 in 2010 to 83.4 in 2014 (see Table 4.1 in the previous chapter). Within this context, 12 of the 19 women elected in 2014 were incumbent MPs (63.2 per cent), while 154 of the 180 male MPs were re-elected

(85.6 per cent). Thus, the data suggests that electoral system reform has particularly disadvantaged female incumbents, due to the high levels of competition for reselection and re-election in a legislature whose size had been much reduced. Thus, the case of Hungary in 2014 confirms Ilonszki's (2012) findings that women candidates tend to be increasingly deselected by political parties.

As this section has shown, the effects of electoral system change depend on the particular circumstances of the reform being undertaken. Where the electoral system continued to have a sizeable PR element, the descriptive under-representation of women was unaffected (and thus male over-representation also remained in place). Where the electoral system was changed in the direction of a reduction in the size of the legislature, female incumbents were particularly likely to lose out, while men's 'incumbency advantage' reasserted itself with renewed strength.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the extent to which electoral systems have sustained or, alternatively, challenged male over-representation in politics in post-communist Europe. I looked at three potential sources of variation in the effects of electoral systems in Central and Eastern Europe. First, the type of electoral system matters, with proportional representation systems marginally less effective in sustaining male dominance over time than mixed systems. The exception is Romania, where there are supply-side issues in terms of women's willingness to run as candidates, owing to the specific legacies of the communist regime (the so-called Elena Ceaușescu effect). Second, ballot structure also matters, but not in the direction that would have been expected given that post-communist electorates are rather conservative in their views of gender roles. Instead, it is clear that open-list systems can challenge, rather than reproduce male dominance. This was the case of the Czech Republic in 2010, when a national campaign to displace (predominantly male) incumbent MPs resulted in the increase in women's descriptive representation in the Chamber of Deputies. The exception here is the situation where legislated quotas are in place, as was the case in Poland in 2011. In this situation, the open-list system enabled voters for conservative parties such as Law and Justice (PiS) to vote against 'quota women'. Finally, the reform of electoral system from proportional to mixed systems does not increase the levels of men's over-representation in politics, but a reduction in the size of the legislature can trigger a re-assertion of men's 'incumbency advantage'.

Notes

1. In 2012, 79 of the 394 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 39 of the 176 seats in the Senate were surplus seats. By comparison, in 2008 only one surplus seat was allocated.
2. The data are as follows: 15 of the 15 women elected in individual constituencies in 1994, 5 of the 12 women elected in individual constituencies in 1998, 10 of the 13 women elected in individual constituencies in 2002 and 12 of the 15 women elected in individual constituencies in 2006 were from MSZP. The source for the data is my own database, compiled on the basis of the information from the website of the Hungarian National Assembly (www.parlament.hu) and the Central Electoral Office (www.valasztas.hu).

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CHAPTER 6

Reproducing Male Dominance: Asymmetric Institutionalisation in New Democracies

The persistent weakness of organised women's movements in Central and Eastern Europe has been one of the central puzzles of feminist scholarship seeking to explain the impact of democratisation in the region. This puzzle has two key elements, both of which highlight the importance of substantive representation for gender outcomes in Central and Eastern Europe since 1990. The first element concerns the relative absence of women organising as women at the crucial moment of the transitions from communist rule; the second concerns the conditions shaping feminist activism during the process of democratic consolidation in the region.

The causes and consequences of the apparent weakness of women's organisations in post-communist Europe are well known. On the one hand, the lack of societal support for notions of gender equality in the region in the early 1990s stemmed from a combination of patriarchal attitudes among the population, the negative legacies of 'forced' participation during state socialism and the association of 'women's issues' with the discredited communist regimes. This, in turn, delegitimised women's movements seeking to represent women's interests during the transitions from communist rule (Einhorn 1993, 2006; Sloat 2005; Galligan *et al.* 2007; Waylen 2007). On the other hand, we also know that the initial weakness of women's movements made it considerably more difficult for the demands of feminist movements and activists to gain traction when seeking to engage in the substantive representation of women later on.

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However, we know very little about the mechanisms that have sustained these gender outcomes over time. When viewed from the perspective of male dominance, the question is to identify the processes of path dependence responsible for sustaining the marginalisation of women's issues and women's advocates in post-communist politics. While often discussed in feminist scholarship, this issue has never been conceptualised in precisely these terms, and certainly not in relation to male dominance. Yet, as this chapter shows, there is much to be gained not only from identifying the precise patterns characterising the marginalisation of women's issues and interests in 'mainstream' politics, but also from specifying the precise mechanisms that sustain the low levels of substantive representation for women in particular polities. In brief, this chapter argues that we cannot simply assume that the initial outcomes are path dependent just because of their sheer inertia over long periods of time. Instead, we must uncover the precise mechanisms that reproduce male dominance in substantive representation by marginalising women's issues and interests in democratising polities.

This chapter argues that *asymmetric institutionalisation* represents the key mechanism responsible for reproducing male dominance vis-à-vis substantive representation in Central and Eastern Europe. As conceptualised here, asymmetric institutionalisation refers to the process where consolidating democracies privilege certain areas of democracy-building over others, and therefore marginalise certain areas of political activity over others. Over time, this leads to a situation where some arenas of a consolidated democracy, such as the rule of law and competitive politics, become embedded earlier, as well as more deeply, into the functioning of the new political system. In contrast, other arenas, most notably civil societies and state bureaucracies, are more weakly institutionalised, and therefore less likely to provide actors within with the opportunity to take full advantage of the opening of new avenues to influence politics.

In Central and Eastern Europe, asymmetric institutionalisation reproduced male dominance vis-à-vis substantive representation in two ways. First, the asymmetric institutionalisation of the different arenas of a consolidated democracy ensured the marginalisation of women's advocates outside the state (in civil society) and inside the state (within state bureaucracies). Second, asymmetric institutionalisation reinforced the advantage of 'political society' vis-à-vis civil society in post-communist Europe, enabling political parties to embed the symbolic repertoires developed at the beginning of the transition into dominant patterns of party competition. In the

long run, this translated into the marginalisation of 'women's issues' and gender equality in the new political order. After outlining the concept of asymmetric institutionalisation in greater detail, this chapter considers these aspects in turn.

6.1 Conceptualising Asymmetric Institutionalisation

The issue of women's substantive representation in post-communist Europe raises two central questions. First, why were post-communist women so reluctant to organise in order to influence the gender outcomes of the transitions from communist rule, given that crucial decisions were being made concerning their role and status as citizens in the newly democratised polities of the region? This is a question that has received much attention in the scholarship on the region. Early explanations emphasise factors such as state socialist legacies of 'forced participation' and overwhelming societal support for traditional gender roles, both of which may have discouraged women from becoming involved in politics or civil society after communism (Einhorn 1993; Funk and Mueller 1993). More recently, Waylen focuses on the fact that, unlike in Latin America, in East Central Europe there was a distinctive absence of organised women's movements at the point of the transition (2007, 202). The presence of such actors, Waylen argues, ensures that, once articulated, gender issues 'make it on to the agenda of the transition'; conversely, their absence in Central and Eastern Europe is largely responsible for the negative gender outcomes of the transitions from communist rule (2007, 202–203). Furthermore, Waylen notes, post-communist institutional environments at the time of the transition were relatively closed to women actors in Central and Eastern Europe (2007, 203).

Second, why have we seen so few instances of successful feminist mobilisation in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe over the decades that have elapsed since the collapse of communism? The answer, existing scholarship suggests, has to do with post-communist electorates' and politicians' attitudes towards women's emancipation. For instance, Sloat (2005) argues that negative public perceptions of feminism have not only affected the organisational strength of women's movements by hindering efforts to develop a unified and coherent agenda among women's non-governmental organisations (NGOs), but have also had a negative impact

on the relationship between women politicians and women's organisations. In the conclusions to their comparative study of gender in the post-communist region, Galligan *et al.* argue that democracies in post-communist societies are 'actively exclusive rather than inclusive' as far as gender politics is concerned, due to the dominance of gender role stereotypes inherited from the past and the limited opportunities provided by the new political institutions (2007, 146). Both Sloat and Galligan *et al.* draw attention to the consequences of male dominance in politics, suggesting that the exclusion of women's movements is deeply rooted in societal norms and practices that privilege masculinity in relation to politics. Nonetheless, as we have seen in Chap. 3, support for the institutions (norms, values, practices) of male dominance has declined sharply in the region over the post-communist period. Yet, the women's movements have continued being rather weak, particularly during the first decade of post-communism.

This chapter starts with the observation that, while clearly linked, the two elements of the puzzle described above are also analytically distinct. In conceptual terms, the issue is that of the distinction between institutional creation and institutional reproduction (Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2000). On the one hand, focusing on the absence of organised women's movements, as well as on the absence of critical actors seeking to engage in the substantive representation of women in Central and Eastern Europe, yields a persuasive explanation of the initial outcomes of the transitions from communist rule. For instance, restrictions on abortion introduced in Hungary and Poland in 1992–1993 were a result of at least two main factors: political elites' determination to embed traditional gender roles into the new democratic order, together with the relative ineffectiveness of nascent feminist mobilisation in the region. On the other hand, we have very little in the way of a persuasive account as to the precise mechanisms that have sustained these gender outcomes over time. As this chapter argues, the mere presumption of the path dependence of historical legacies or societal values is not in itself evidence of the mechanisms that sustain particular outcomes over relatively long periods of time. Instead, we need to investigate and conceptualise path dependence, and identify the causal mechanisms involved.

Let us take Mahoney's influential discussion of path dependence as our starting point for developing the concept of asymmetric institutionalisation (Mahoney 2000). The mechanism of reproduction that we are concerned with in relation to substantive representation is described by Mahoney as 'legitimacy-based' (2000, 517). In these circumstances, he

argues, an institution is reproduced because 'actors believe it is morally just or appropriate' (Mahoney 2000, 517), with such beliefs ranging 'from active moral approval to passive acquiescence in the face of the status quo' (Mahoney 2000, 523). Thus, 'once a given institution is contingently selected, the institution will be reinforced through processes of increasing legitimation' (Mahoney 2000, 523). In turn, the process of increasing legitimation is 'marked by a positive feedback cycle in which an initial precedent about what is appropriate forms a basis for making future decisions about what is appropriate' (Mahoney 200, 523).

For the purposes of this discussion, liberal democracy is the (set of) institutions contingently selected in Central and Eastern Europe. Specifically, at the point when the transition from communist rule became imminent, political elites in the region were faced with a series of choices concerning institutional frameworks for future collective decision-making. Democracy was one of the available options, but its selection depended on a variety of factors, including the strength of the anti-communist opposition and the willingness of the then-communist parties to enter negotiations or otherwise give in to the demands of the opposition. Another important factor concerned a country's place in the sequence of transitions from communist rule, and its geographical positioning relative to Western Europe. Thus, countries with an active anti-communist opposition, a reform-oriented communist party and in proximity to established democracies were more likely to democratise, while countries not meeting one or all of these conditions were less likely to do so. All our case studies eventually became democracies, but this outcome was certainly not guaranteed from the beginning, as Bulgaria, Romania and, to a lesser extent, Slovakia amply demonstrate.

The consolidation of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe depended, in large part, on domestic political elites' continued belief in the legitimacy of democracy as a political system, together with the incipient support for democratic institutions among the population. As Linz and Stepan (1996) argue in their influential articulation of the concept of 'consolidated democracy', a democratic regime is consolidated (1) behaviourally, when 'no significant national social, economic, political or institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a non-democratic regime or by resorting to violence'; (2) attitudinally, when 'a strong majority of public opinion hold the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life in a society'; and (3) constitutionally,

when 'governmental and non-governmental forces alike (…) become subjected to and habituated to the resolution of conflict within the specific law, procedures and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process' (Linz and Stepan 1996, 6). All three facets identified by Linz and Stepan, therefore, presuppose, at some level, a belief in the legitimacy of liberal democracy as a political system. Indeed, the entire process of democratic consolidation in post-communist Europe was essentially an elite-driven exercise in re-building political and economic systems on new foundations. Although popular support mattered quite a lot, it was in practice elite support for democracy that sustained the process of democratic consolidation.

During the process of democratic consolidation, elite beliefs in the legitimacy of democracy play a fundamental role in making it possible for the new democracies to take root. As Vachudova (2005) influentially argued, elite commitment to the notion of democracy made an enormous difference to the democratisation paths of the countries in the region. Thus, in countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, where the anti-communist opposition won the first elections, democracy took hold earlier and more thoroughly than in countries, such as Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia, where communist successor parties or 'political opportunists' came to power in 1990 (Vachudova 2005). In practice, however, democratic consolidation is such a complex exercise that political elites will inevitably prioritise building certain arenas of democracy before others.

Within this context, *asymmetric institutionalisation* refers to a process whereby political elites in emerging democracies prioritise particular aspects of democracy-building during democratic consolidation. Let us take, for example, Linz and Stepan's influential definition of consolidated democracies as consisting in five 'interacting arenas': a 'free and lively' civil society; a 'relatively autonomous and valued political society'; the rule of law, ensuring 'legal guarantees for citizens' freedoms and independent associational life'; a state bureaucracy; and 'an institutionalised economic society' (1996, 7). Although in principle equally important for the functioning of a consolidated democracy, in practice political actors in Central and Eastern Europe prioritised economic reform, the rule of law and competitive politics ('political society') over the nascent civil societies or reforming state bureaucracies. This had significant consequences for women's advocates ability to engage in substantive representation.

In representational terms, asymmetric institutionalisation means that political actors in consolidating democracies tended to privilege formalistic

forms of representation over substantive representation. This is because notions of accountability and authorisation lie at the core of the legitimation and continued functioning of new democracies. Thus, the rule of law and political society were central concerns for post-communist elites seeking to build democracies in their countries, while civil society and reform of the state bureaucracy took second place in the list of priorities. These effects were reinforced by international monitoring of democratic developments in the region, which focused, at least in the initial stages, on elections standards and constitutional change, and only addressed the issue of the representation of disadvantaged groups to the extent that inter-group conflict posed a danger to the nascent political order (as was the case with inter-ethnic relations in the region).

Asymmetric institutionalisation was embedded in the sequencing of institutional innovation in the region after communism. For instance, a large proportion of political elites' time and effort at the beginning of the transition was dedicated to the adoption of new constitutional provisions guaranteeing citizens' rights, to new legislation and other incentives designed to encourage the formation and continued survival of multi-party systems, and to reshaping former command economies into full-blown capitalist systems. In contrast, policies regulating the formation of non-governmental organisations, or reforms of the state apparatus, were only dealt with once the bulk of the work on the former three arenas had been concluded.

How does asymmetric institutionalisation sustain male dominance in relation to substantive representation? This chapter argues that it shaped substantive representation in Central and Eastern Europe in two far-reaching ways, all of which had significant gendered effects. First, asymmetric institutionalisation reduced the likelihood that state feminism would emerge in the region, especially during the first decade of democratic consolidation. As McBride and Mazur influentially argue, transformative state feminism results from the forging of strategic alliances between women's advocates inside and outside the state (McBride and Mazur 2010). In Central and Eastern Europe, the asymmetric institutionalisation of the different arenas of a consolidated democracy ensured the marginalisation of women's advocates outside the state (in civil society) and inside the state (within state bureaucracies). Second, asymmetric institutionalisation reinforced the advantage of 'political society' vis-à-vis civil society in post-communist Europe. In practice, this means that asymmetric institutionalisation enabled political parties to incorporate the repertoires of symbolic representation developed at the beginning of the

transition into patterns of party competition. Women's advocates were at a distinct disadvantage in this process, because the nascent civil society had not yet had the time to organise and challenge these discourses effectively.

6.2 Asymmetric Institutionalisation and the Opportunities for State Feminism

The asymmetric institutionalisation of the different arenas of consolidated democracies in Central and Eastern Europe sustained male dominance by limiting the opportunities for the emergence of state feminism in the region in two main ways. First, asymmetric institutionalisation had a direct impact on the creation of institutions for the substantive representation of social groups, such as women's policy agencies, throughout the region. Second, it marginalised civil societies in the process of democratic consolidation. Altogether, then, asymmetric institutionalisation precluded successful alliance-building between actors seeking to engage in the substantive representation of social groups inside and outside the state. This had, in turn, limited the opportunities for the emergence of state feminism in Central and Eastern Europe during the early years of the transition.

Let us begin with state institutions. As Grzymala-Busse argues, the issue of the (re)building of the state during the early post-communist era was largely neglected not only by the academic literature, but also by domestic policymakers and their international advisers (2007, 8–10). 'If anything', she notes, 'the prevalent but vague assumption was that the state would now shed employees and functions, encouraging both democracy and markets to flourish' (Grzymala-Busse 2007, 9). Thus, the reform of the state's institutions received considerably less attention than, say, building the institutions of 'fair' competition between political parties, or the institutions necessary for the rule of law. Where new state institutions were established during the early transition period, policymakers' attention focused primarily on formal institutions of monitoring and oversight, such as national auditing offices, anti-corruption laws, civil ombudsmen and civil service regulations (Grzymala-Busse 2007, 83–84).

Post-communist elites' low prioritisation of the necessity to reform state institutions was also reflected in decisions concerning pre-existing institutional mechanisms for the substantive representation of women.

During the initial stage of the transition, most of the communist-era institutions for the representation of women or other groups were dismantled, but were not replaced with new institutions for quite a few years. Women's advocates were among the first to highlight this problem. In the late 1990s, women's organisations in the region produced one of the first comprehensive reports on 'institutional mechanisms for the advancement of women', seeking to identify whether there were any women's policy agencies in the region (Karat Coalition 1999). The report makes for grim reading: with the exception of Poland, which had retained the government's Plenipotentiary for Women, none of the countries in region (a larger sample than included in this study) had anything resembling a women's policy agency at the time. The detailed case histories taken by the participants in the Quality in Gender+ Equality Policies (QUING) project support these findings. For instance, Röder notes that the first institutions dealing with gender equality in the Czech Republic were established in 1998 (2007, 4), while Dombos et al. show that, in Hungary, the first such institution (the Secretariat for Women's Policy in the Ministry of Labour) was created in 1995. Similarly, in Slovakia, the first such institution was established in 1996 (Repar 2007, 6), while in Romania similar mechanisms came into being in 1995 (Popa 2007, 15) Furthermore, as the QUING analyses of the countries covered in this study show, the first institutional mechanisms established in the post-communist region hardly resembled the well-resourced, autonomous women's policy agencies that would be needed to engage in women's substantive representation effectively. Instead, the new institutions were beset by frequent re-allocation to different ministries, scant resources, and very low levels of prioritisation by national governments. Even where, as in Poland, women's policy agencies survived into the post-communist era, there were sustained efforts on the part of conservative politicians to shut them down or at least to shift their focus away from women and towards 'the family' rather than 'women' (Dabrowska 2007).

If the re-building of the state administration represented a low priority for post-communist policymakers, so did 'civil society'. Indeed, the general weakness of 'civil society' in post-communist Europe has attracted much scholarly interest. For instance, Howard argues that, in the post-communist context, 'the state has all too frequently *not* provided the necessary resources and support for the organisations of civil society' (2003, 17, original emphasis). He identifies three factors that have had 'a mutually reinforcing negative effect' on participation in voluntary organisations in Central and Eastern Europe: the legacy of mistrust of all formal

organisations due to communist-era experiences of forced participation; the persistence of informal friendship networks, which function as substitutes for, or alternatives to, formal and public organisations, and disappointment with capitalism and democracy due to the enormous economic costs and political turmoil caused by the transitions from non-democratic rule (2003, 18–30). Jacobsson and Saxonberg identify two sets of explanations for the weakness of civil society in post-communist Europe: economic opportunities, such as 'the availability of funding and the often detrimental side-effects of Western assistance', and the negative effects of the totalitarian or authoritarian state in relations between people in society (2013, 6–7). Thus, they argue, engaging in other types of strategies than 'classical contentious politics' may be more appropriate for people living in countries that yet have to institutionalise strong states and strong societies (Jacobsson and Saxonberg 2013, 2).

Civil societies in Central and Eastern Europe were 'born weak' due to a combination of factors. First, post-communist policymakers were reluctant to over-regulate associational life, because that would have been a negative reminder of the extent to which communist states restricted grassroots society initiatives. Second, the populations in the region were not particularly enthusiastic about building formal organisations, preferring informal networks or groups, at least in the initial stages of the transition. Altogether, these factors resulted in the low priority of building civil societies for political elites, and in very low rates of participation in the non-governmental sector in Central and Eastern Europe. For example, in one of the first comparative studies of civil society engagement across the world, Salamon, Anheier et al. (1999) show that levels of employment in the non-governmental sector in Europe's new democracies were much lower than in Europe's established democracies. In 1995, the non-profit share of total paid employment in the Netherlands was 12.8 per cent, in Belgium it was 10.5 per cent, in the US 7.8 per cent and in the UK 6.2 per cent (Salamon, Anheier et al. 1999, 14). In contrast, the non-profit share of paid employment in the Czech Republic in the same year was 1.7 per cent, in Hungary 1.3 per cent, in Slovakia 0.9 per cent and in Romania 0.8 per cent (Salamon, Anheier et al. 1999, 14). Furthermore, people in Central and Eastern Europe were much more likely to be employed in NGOs focusing on recreation and culture, as well as on the environment, than their counterparts in the West (Salamon, Anheier et al. 1999, 18).

In Central and Eastern Europe, legal regulation of the non-profit sector was still incomplete as late as the mid-1990s. For instance, Frič *et al.* (1999)

note that, despite the relative strength of the non-profit sector in the Czech Republic by comparison to the post-communist average, the legal framework for the non-profit sector was 'incomplete', 'at times unnecessarily complicated' and did not 'provide sufficient protection against misuse of the non-profit status, with similar criticisms made of the financing system for non-governmental organisations' (1999, 301). Discussing the case of Hungary, Sebestény et al. identify several issues that undermined the sector's effectiveness, including 'a lack of consistent and comprehensive regulation' and financial vulnerability (1999, 321–322). In their study of the development of the non-profit sector in Poland, Leś *et al.* note that, despite a 'firm consensus' among all political elites that 'voluntary organisations [were] an indispensable element of a democratic system', legal regulation had focused primarily on guaranteeing the principles that underpin voluntary associations, such as freedom of expression and freedom of association; thus, 'there was considerably less eagerness on the part of subsequent governments to establish a sound legal financial basis for nonprofit organisations' (1999, 333). In Romania, there was distinctive lack of regulation well into the post-communist era: a 1924 law on non-governmental organisations was the only legal basis for the operation of the non-profit sector as late as 1995 (Saulean et al. 1999, 352).

The weakness of civil society, underpinned as it was by both societal attitudes towards participation and the lack of regulatory frameworks for quite a few years into the post-communist era, created an environment where the substantive representation of social groups, including women, was, at best, marginal to the new political order. In turn, this process rendered feminist mobilisation not only highly marginal, but affected its effectiveness. Indeed, women's organisations were relatively quick to mobilise on highly salient issues, such as abortion. For instance, Fábián (2009) shows that, in Hungary, both conservative women and feminist advocates mobilised around the two legislative initiatives on abortion under discussion in 1992. She argues that, for many groups, this was subsequently remembered as the example of the highest instance of societal mobilisation that they were successful in achieving. Similarly, Zielinska (2000, 28–38) argues that both pro-choice and pro-life groups mobilised around both the initial adoption of the anti-abortion law in 1993 and when the government, led by the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), introduced the liberalisation amendments in 1996. In contrast, in countries where there were less salient issues at stake, women's mobilisation was less visible. For example, in the Czech Republic, approximately 70 women's organisations had been formed by

the mid-1990s (Hasková 2005), while in Romania around 25 women's organisations had formally registered by 1994 (Grünberg 2000, 311).

In all cases, however, women's advocates were unable to achieve substantive gender outcomes during the first decade of post-communism (Zielinska 2000; Grünberg 2000; Hasková 2005; Fábián 2009; Sloat 2005). As this section showed, this had as much to do with the weakness of civil society, as it had to do with the lack of potential allies within the state. In sum, the opportunities for state feminism were greatly reduced by the asymmetric institutionalisation of the different arenas of a consolidated democracy emerging in Central and Eastern Europe. As the next section shows, these effects were further reinforced by the fact that asymmetric institutionalisation enabled political parties to embed their particular views on women's contribution to the new political order into the functioning of the new democratic order.

6.3 Asymmetric Institutionalisation and Competitive Politics

This section argues that the asymmetric institutionalisation of the different arenas of a consolidated democracy in Central and Eastern Europe entrenched the 'institutionalisation advantage' of political society vis-à-vis civil society in the region. Specifically, I argue that the process of party system consolidation—which involved the development of the former communist parties' and the former anti-communist opposition's programmatic identities, and the drawing of the lines of competition between them—reproduced the institutions of male dominance in two important ways: first, it led to the 'freezing in' of actors' symbolic repertoires within the logic of competition within the party system; second, it 'froze out' or excluded actors with potential counter-claims, such as women politicians (and, indirectly, women's movements). Thus, the 'institutional lock in' of the dominant frames of symbolic representation of the early 1990s limited the ability of women's advocates to make substantive claims on behalf of women.

The political processes that ensured the survival of the symbolic repertoires of the early post-communist years well into the post-communist era varied across our case studies. For instance, in Poland, the powerful alliance between national conservative, post-Solidarity, formations on the one side, and the Catholic church, on the other hand, ensured the

continued resonance of discourses linking women's reproductive roles with Polish national identity for the past two and a half decades (Kramer 2003; Grabowska 2012). State actors, such as the Constitutional Tribunal in its 1996 decision to declare the law legalising abortion unconstitutional on grounds that it breached the principle of the right to life (which, in fact, was not enshrined in the 1992 Constitution), have sometimes joined the alliance between political parties and the church (Zielinska 2000). Indeed, the issue of abortion continued to occupy such a central place in political elites' perceptions of Polish national identity that Poland negotiated the inclusion of a 'declaration concerning public morality' to its Treaty of Accession to the European Union (EU). The declaration states that 'nothing in the provisions [of the EU's treaties] prevents the Polish state in regulating questions of moral significance, as well as those related to the protection of human life' (East European Constitutional Review 2003, 39).

In contrast, in Hungary, a Catholic country where the influence of the church has been significantly less marked than in Poland, the political processes that sustained the symbolic repertoires of the early post-communist years had to do with shifts in the patterns of party competition rather than, as was the case in Poland, the ability of the Catholic church to form powerful alliances with state actors. By the early 1990s, it had become increasingly apparent that the electoral strength of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) was on the wane: indeed, the party won only 38 seats in the 1994 elections, by comparison to 164 in 1990 (Appendix B). Within this context, the Young Democrats (FIDESZ), which had hitherto adopted a liberal identity, redefined themselves as a national conservative party, seeking to occupy the position on the political spectrum that had been occupied by the Forum (Kiss 2002). The move was spectacularly successful: FIDESZ won 148 seats in the 1998 elections—that is, seven times the number of seats it had won in 1994. FIDESZ's conversion to national conservatism entailed the wholesale adoption of MDF's position on reproductive rights. Thus, soon after it came to power, FIDESZ introduced further restrictions to the law on abortion through a series of amendments passed in 2000. More recently, Article II of Hungary's 2011 Constitution, which was drafted and adopted by a parliamentary majority consisting in FIDESZ and the Christian democrats, states that 'the life of the foetus shall be protected from the moment of conception' (Constitution of Hungary 2011).

In the secular Czech Republic, the dominant symbolic repertoire of the Civic democrats (ODS) in the early 1990s concerned the extent to which the collapse of communism had enabled not only women but 'people' to regain their personal freedom. The repertoire drew on the Civic Forum's core identity, which emphasised the importance of liberty, human rights and authentic self-expression (Havel 1988). By 1995, this discourse was clearly apparent at the level of state policy. For instance, in her speech at the Beijing UN World Conference on Women in 1995, Jirina Vonkova, then deputy minister for Labour and Social Affairs, re-stated the Czech Republic's commitment towards the fulfilment of its international treaty obligations on human rights, adding that '[women's] freedom and self-realisation is an issue of freedom and self-realisation of all citizens in society' and that society's responsibility is primarily to enable women to combine their roles in the family with their professional responsibilities (United Nations 1995). In an almost eerie echo of this statement, the Czech Senate officially expressed its opposition to the anti-discrimination bill in 2008 on the grounds that 'the principle of equality overrides the principle of free choice' (Koldinská 2009, 39). As Weiner (2010) found in her interviews with Czech politicians, lawyers and employers, opposition to equal opportunities legislation was linked almost invariably to the idea of 'free choice' and concepts of gender neutrality. Even the process of law-making has largely excluded women as gendered subjects of concern, a process which Havelková (2010) describes as 'gender neutralization'.

An important additional question is whether the symbolic repertoires of the political parties concerned were directly challenged by other formations and, if so, whether the latter sought to substantively represent women. The evidence for Poland seems to suggest that, where present, the terms of the debate marginalised women and reduced the potential for substantive representation. Kramer (2009) analyses the ways in which political parties constructed reproductive rights during the 1996 parliamentary debates on liberalising abortion, arguing that the principal dividing lines between the actors concerned were left versus right, modernity versus tradition, secularism versus church affiliations, but that women were seldom made present in these discourses, either by the supporters of the liberalisation amendment or by their opponents. The overall effect, Kramer argues, was to 'displace women' as subjects of abortion law (2009, 97). Kramer's argument illustrates precisely how dominant discursive frames can 'freeze women out' of debates that concern them directly. What was indeed striking about the 1996 debates, as reconstructed by

Kramer (2009), is the extent to which political actors sought to frame their claims with similar logics. For instance, both camps used arguments about 'Europe', framing the continent symbolically either as the land of modernity that considers Poland to be relatively 'backward because of its restrictive law on abortion, or as characterised by too much consumption, a lack of moral standards, and a lack of knowledge of the 'purpose of life' (Kramer 2009, 92–93). This fits well with Lombardo and Meier's (2014) insight that actors often seek to maximise their chances of success by formulating arguments that resonate best with dominant frames.

In sum, there is evidence that the symbolic repertoires developed during the transitions from communist rule remained in place for the best part of the first decade after 1989. Thus, the key lines dividing the party system included abortion in Poland and Hungary, and neoliberalism and equality of opportunity in the Czech Republic. Furthermore, the policy outcomes of the early 1990s are still in place and, despite systematic feminist mobilisation in Poland, are yet to be reversed.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter has argued that 'asymmetric institutionalisation' has been the key mechanism sustaining the marginalisation of actors seeking to engage in the substantive representation of women in post-communist Europe. Thus, political actors in Central and Eastern Europe prioritised economic reform, the rule of law and competitive politics ('political society') over the nascent civil societies or reforming state bureaucracies. In representational terms, asymmetric institutionalisation means that political actors in consolidating democracies tended to privilege formalistic forms of representation over substantive representation. This is because notions of accountability and authorisation lie at the core of the legitimation and continued functioning of new democracies. Thus, the rule of law and political society were central concerns for post-communist elites seeking to build democracies in their countries, while civil society and reform of the state bureaucracy took second place in the list of priorities.

Asymmetric institutionalisation shaped substantive representation in Central and Eastern Europe in two far-reaching ways, all of which had significant gendered effects. First, asymmetric institutionalisation reduced the likelihood that state feminism would emerge in the region, especially during the first decade of democratic consolidation. As McBride and Mazur influentially argue, transformative state feminism results from the forging

of strategic alliances between women's advocates inside and outside the state (McBride and Mazur 2010). In Central and Eastern Europe, the asymmetric institutionalisation of the different arenas of a consolidated democracy ensured the marginalisation of women's advocates outside the state (in civil society) and women's advocates inside the state (within state bureaucracies). Second, asymmetric institutionalisation reinforced the advantage of 'political society' vis-à-vis civil society in post-communist Europe. In practice, this means that asymmetric institutionalisation enabled political parties to incorporate the repertoires of symbolic representation developed at the beginning of the transition into patterns of party competition. This placed actors seeking to engage in the substantive representation of women at a distinct disadvantage in terms of having their voices heard in the newly democratising polities of Central and Eastern Europe.

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CHAPTER 7

Breaking Male Dominance: Institutional Change in New Democracies

This study has examined male dominance in post-communist Europe principally with a view to identifying the mechanisms responsible for its reproduction in politics since the early 1990s. This chapter concludes the analysis by focusing on mechanisms of change for male dominance. As Dahlerup and Leyenaar (2013b) argue, in established democracies, the process of breaking male dominance has been long and incremental, and is far from finished. In contrast, in Central and Eastern Europe, changing the institutions of male dominance has been considerably more difficult, not in the least because of the much shorter time period that has elapsed since the collapse of communism.

This chapter argues that, despite the relatively short interval, and despite the formidable resilience of men's over-representation in politics of the past decades, the process of breaking male dominance is well under way in Central and Eastern Europe. I identify five mechanisms of change, all of which have been at play in the region: gender quotas, party contagion, party system change, the diffusion of international norms and an increase in women's activism in some countries, coupled with the emergence of a whole array of women's policy machineries and other state institutions dedicated to promoting gender equality.

Each of these mechanisms operates differently. Thus, gender quotas challenge male dominance by displacing incumbents from their entrenched positions, while also changing the environment of the national electoral

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systems in ways that oblige political actors to re-consider their candidate selection processes. Party contagion can generate positive shifts in political parties' commitment to higher levels of descriptive representation for women (Matland and Studlar 1996). Party system change can result in the emergence of new political parties where women are better represented and/or there is greater willingness to 'act for' women. International norm diffusion has been particularly important in Central and Eastern Europe, because of the central role played by the European Union (EU) in shaping democratic consolidation in post-communist countries (Vachudova 2005; Grabbe 2006). Finally, the establishment of women's policy machineries and the emergence of 'critical actors' within the state have enhanced the ability of women's movements to form successful alliances with actors within the state in order to achieve gender-equitable change. We examine each of these factors in turn.

7.1 Gender Quotas

Since the early 1990s, gender quotas have been adopted by an increasing number of countries. According to Hughes et al. (2015, 1), quotas have so far altered processes of candidate selection in more than 130 countries. Within this context of rapid diffusion, the literature on gender quotas has grown exponentially. Initially, scholars were principally concerned with quota adoption, implementation and effectiveness (Caul 2001; Dahlerup 2006; Tremblay 2008; Krook 2009; Paxton et al. 2010). More recently, scholars have begun to shift their focus to new areas of inquiry, such as the impact of quotas on the descriptive, substantive and symbolic representation of women (Franceschet et al. 2012), the relationship between gender quotas and ethnic minority quotas (Hughes 2011; Bjarnegård and Zetterberg 2014), and non-quota strategies for increasing women's representation (Krook and Norris 2014; Krook and Zetterberg 2014).

Yet, the adoption and impact of gender quotas in Central and Eastern Europe have received surprisingly little attention in the literature. With few exceptions (Antić Gaber 2005), comparative surveys of quotas in the region are rare. Instead, quotas are usually briefly discussed as part of country case studies on women's descriptive or substantive representation (Ilonszki and Montgomery 2003, 120–121; Saxonberg 2003, 261–263; Siemienska 2003, 240–242; Ghodsee 2009, 173; Siemienska 2009, 70). One of the reasons for this situation is that, as virtually all regional experts argue, quotas have been only reluctantly adopted and implemented in

post-communist Europe, so that, overall, they have not had a significant impact on women's representation. Another reason is that, with the exception of Poland (together with Slovenia and Croatia from the former Yugoslav federation), attempts to pass legislated gender quotas have been generally unsuccessful—see, for instance, in Hungary in 2007 and 2011 (Várnagy 2013, 8–9). Thus, there has been little incentive for scholars to delve into the politics of quotas in the post-communist region more systematically.

If, as I argued in Chaps. 4 and 5, electoral systems and incumbency act as mechanisms of reproduction for male dominance, then quotas 'break' male dominance, to use Dahlerup and Leyenaar's (2013a) memorable formulation. Quotas can act as mechanisms of change in two ways. First, they can constrain political parties' choice of candidates in elections by tipping the balance towards the recruitment of more women (Dahlerup 2006). Second, effective quotas break the incumbency cycle by displacing male incumbents from winnable seats and allowing women to gain sufficient political experience to become desirable candidates in future elections.

Classifications of quotas typically distinguish between several types of quotas: reserved seats, party quotas and legislated quotas (Dahlerup 2006; Krook 2009). In Central and Eastern Europe, reserved seats are usually allocated to ethnic minorities. For instance, Romania's Chamber of Deputies currently has 18 seats reserved for ethnic minority groups other than the Hungarian minority (the latter has traditionally entered parliament by winning a proportion of the contested seats in the lower chamber) (Appendix B). Party quotas for women are significantly more widespread, while legislative quotas, as noted above, remain somewhat of a rarity. Thus, I look at the adoption and effectiveness of party quotas and then focus on legislative quotas via an exploration of Poland's 2011 elections to the Sejm.

To what extent have party quotas acted as mechanisms of change for women's descriptive representation in Central and Eastern Europe? Although political parties' lack of enthusiasm for gender quotas in post-communist Europe is well-documented, factual data on the actual proportion of women candidates on the lists of those parties that have a quota has not yet been systematically collected for the region. Table 7.1 thus provides an overview of party quotas in our six case studies with the aim of uncovering to what extent political parties have (a) adopted quotas for women's representation and (b) implemented the quotas in subsequent elections.

Table 7.1 Party quotas in Central and Eastern Europe

Party (country)	*Quota*	*Year*	*Women candidates*		*Women MPs*	
			N	*%*	*N*	*%*
BSP (BG)	30% candidate quota	2005	114/453	25.2	16/82	19.5
		2009[a]	126/423	29.8	7/40	17.5
		2013	142/436	32.6	18/84	21.4
		2014	151/475	31.8	5/39	12.8
ČSSD (CZ)	25% candidate quota	2002	86/342	25.1	10/70	14.3
		2006	79/341	23.2	9/74	12.2
		2010	86/340	25.3	5/56	8.9
		2013	84/343	24.5	6/50	12.0
MSZP (HU)[b]	20% candidate quota in the proportional tier(s) of the electoral system	2002	121/517	23.4	23/178	12.9
		2006	116/526	22.1	24/186	12.9
		2010	124/521	23.8	5/59	8.5
		2014	45/244	18.4	6/38	15.8
LMP (HU)[b]	Zipper system—maximum two consecutive candidates of the same gender, PR tier(s) only	2010	n/a		5/16	31.2
		2014	54/238	22.7	2/5	40.0
SLD (PL)	30% candidate quota	2001	329/908	36.2	55/216	25.5
		2005	205/742	27.6	11/55	20.0
		2007	197/889	22.2	11/53	20.7
PSD (RO)	30% candidate quota	2004	94/415	22.6	19/132	14.4
		2008	49/315	15.2	14/114	12.3
		2012	22/166	13.2	20/151	13.2
PDL (RO)	30% candidate quota	2004	82/415	19.8	10/112	8.9
		2008	39/314	12.4	13/115	11.3
		2012	45/280	16.1	9/52	17.3
HZDS (SK)	Parity target	2002	50/150	33.3	5/36	13.9
		2006	45/150	30.0	4/15	26.7

Sources: For the quota information, the Quota Project, Ghodsee (2009) for Bulgaria; for the candidate data, the Elections Server of the Czech Statistical Office (http://www.volby.cz/index_en.htm), the National Elections Office of Hungary (www.valasztas.hu), the Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Poland (www.pkw.gov.pl); the Central Electoral Office of Romania; and the Slovak Statistical Office (slovak.statistics.sk), last accessed 8 May 2015. For the data on women MPs, the sources are the same as for Appendix B

[a]The data are the total for the candidates in the SMD and the PR tiers of the electoral system

[b]The candidate data for Hungary are the average across the SMD and PR tiers of the electoral system

As Table 7.1 shows, quotas are much more widespread among the parties of the left in Central and Eastern Europe. This is consistent with the expectations in the literature, which often notes that quotas are more likely to be adopted by socialist or social democratic parties (Caul 2001; Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005; Dahlerup 2006). Thus, the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), the Czech Social Democrats (ČSSD), the Hungarian Socialists (MSZP), Poland's Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the Romanian Social Democratic Party (PSD) have all adopted quotas. In contrast, only two parties that are ideologically on the right of the political spectrum have done so: Romania's Democratic Liberal Party (PDL), which has a 30 per cent quota, and the once powerful but now defunct Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), which had a 'parity target' (Quota Project). The precise timing of the adoption of these quotas is unclear, although the information available suggests that the crucial period was the late 1990s and the early 2000s. For instance, MSZP has had a 20 per cent quota in place since the late 1990s (Gurmai and Bonifert 2004, 3) and SLD has had a 30 per cent quota since 2001 (Siemienska 2003). In other cases, parties have only recently adopted quotas: in Romania, both the PSD and the PDL quotas came into force in 2010 (Mihai 2011).[1]

Table 7.1 demonstrates that the implementation of quotas has been, at best, uneven across the region. There are two observations to be made here. First, as regional experts have already noted, many parties, whether on the left or on the right of the political spectrum, simply do not implement their quotas. This was the case in Poland in 2005 and 2007 and in Romania and Slovakia throughout the elections covered in Table 7.1. Second, some parties such as the Bulgarian socialists, the Czech social democrats and the Hungarian socialists do implement the quotas at the candidate level but elect much fewer women than prescribed by the quotas. This indicates that candidates are deliberately selected as candidates in constituencies where they have little chance of succeeding, or, alternatively, that they are placed towards the bottom of the lists. In order to elucidate this issue, it is useful to look briefly at how party quotas interact with the electoral systems in the countries concerned.

For instance, the case of Bulgaria's BSP suggests that the impact of quotas has been mitigated by the closed-list electoral system: as Ghodsee argues, the party tends to place the majority of its women candidates towards the bottom of the lists (2009, 169). Thus, this is why a greater proportion of women were elected in 2005 and 2013, when the party won

considerably more seats, and was therefore able to elect women MPs from much further down the list than in 2009 or 2014. In the Czech Republic, the social democrats have largely abided by the 25 per cent quota, but in practice the proportion of women elected is about half that of the proportion of women candidates. The problem appears to reside with the fact that, although the Czech Republic has an open-list system, the candidates are ranked by number on the ballot, so that voters may take this as a cue as to who to vote for. Thus, for instance, in 2013 ČSSD placed 7 women and 35 men in the top three positions on the lists; in contrast KSČM placed 15 women and 27 men in the top three positions. Unsurprisingly, ČSSD elected a much lower number of women MPs (6) than KSČM (11) (Appendix B). Finally, in Hungary in 2002, 2006 and 2010, the socialists implemented their candidate quotas in the proportional tier of the electoral system, but the results suggest that the women were not placed high enough on the lists. For instance, in 2010 MSZP won 57 of its 59 seats in the regional and national list tiers of the system; however, all of the five MSZP women were elected from the PR segment, constituting 8.8 per cent of MSZP MPs elected under PR, hardly an indication of the party's inclination to place women at the top of the lists.

As this overview of party quotas has shown, in about half of our case studies political parties do not implement the quotas, and in the other half they do implement it, but they place women in disadvantageous positions on the lists or in seats that are difficult to win. Thus, party quotas have had only a marginal effect in increasing women's descriptive representation in post-communist Europe.

Poland introduced a 35 per cent quota for women in January 2011, and the provision was first applied to the 2011 elections to the Sejm. The adoption of the quotas demonstrated just how successful women's mobilisation can be when it takes advantage of the full range of alliances with state and non-state actors (Sledzinska-Simon and Bodnar 2013; Millard 2014; Górecki and Kukolowicz 2014). When thus implemented for the first time, the quota was only partially successful in increasing the proportion of women in Poland's lower chamber, by about 3 per cent in comparison with the 2007 elections. A detailed party-by-party analysis of the quota shows that part of the problem was with the open-list electoral system: Law and Justice (PiS) would have elected an additional 13 women under closed-list PR, while Civic Platform (PO) would have elected an additional 6 women. Thus, the effects of the quota law in Poland have been mitigated by the electoral system.

Overall, the impact of party and legislated quotas in Central and Eastern Europe has been mixed. On the one hand, they have certainly led to an increase in the number of women candidates in elections. In the long run, the presence of increasing numbers of women candidates in elections may well have a positive effect on any supply-side issues having to do with women's willingness to run for office. On the other hand, quotas—whether party-based or legislated—have yet to lead to a major increase in the number of women elected to the national legislatures of the region.

7.2 Contagion Effects

Bulgaria is the only country among our case studies where, despite the fact that none of the major parties except for the communist-successor Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) have gender quotas, and legislated quotas have yet to be introduced, there has been somewhat of a leap in women's descriptive representation during the post-communist period. This leap occurred in the 2001 elections, when the proportion of women elected to the Bulgarian National Assembly more than doubled by comparison to the 1997 elections, from 10.8 per cent to 26.7 per cent (see Appendix B). This marked the beginning of a long-term trend, rather than a reversal to the *status quo ante*: women have constituted more than 20 per cent of MPs in every legislature since 2001, making Bulgaria one of the countries with the highest levels of women's descriptive representation in the post-communist region. Finally, it should also be noted that, as Kostadinova (2003) and Ghodsee (2009) show, the gains in women's descriptive representation occurred in a context where political parties were, at best, only nominally committed to the principle of gender equality.

Given the virtual lack of gender quotas, and political parties' unenthusiastic stance towards gender equality, how can we explain the relatively high levels of women's descriptive representation in Bulgaria since 2001? It is clearly not the case that left-wing parties are the main drivers behind this trend: the proportion of women MPs elected from within the ranks of the socialists (BSP) has, at best, been around the average of the legislature overall (Appendix B). Instead, centre-right parties have been primarily responsible for the gain in women's representation. As the data in Appendix B show, a significant proportion of women MPs elected since 2001 came from one of two parties: the National Movement Simeon II (NDSV) or Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria (GERB). Overall, the evidence available suggests that the explanation for the apparent paradox

of the Bulgarian case can be found the combination of two separate factors: the initial increase in 2001 was primarily driven by NDSV's meteoric rise; subsequently, as NDSV became weaker, party contagion ensured that GERB, the new major party the centre-right of the political spectrum, continued to recruit women candidates in significantly larger numbers that parties on the left. In institutionalist terms, Bulgaria is a case of 'unintended consequences' where contingent initial outcomes become locked in over time by the functioning of the political system.

Between 1990 and 2001, the Bulgarian party system was remarkably stable, with three major players (the communist-successor BSP, the centre-right ODS and DPS, the party representing the Turkish ethnic minority) and a handful of largely inconsequential players such as the Bulgarian Business Bloc and the Euroleft (see Appendix B). In 2001, the party system entered a lengthy, and still ongoing, period of instability, with several new important players entering the political scene. The first party to disrupt the precarious equilibrium of the party system was the National Movement Simeon II, which emerged virtually out of nowhere just before the 2001 elections, and proceeded to win half of the seats in the National Assembly. The movement was essentially a vehicle for the former tsar, Simeon II, to contest the 2001 elections (Kostadinova 2003). As his first attempt to form a political party was denied by the courts, Simeon sought an alliance with two smaller parties—the Bulgarian Women's Party and the Movement for National Revival, thus forming NDSV. As Kostadinova shows, the Women's Party—previously an insignificant political force, which had run for the first time in the 1997 elections, obtaining just over 16,000 votes—was able to pressure Simeon to include a significant proportion of women as candidates (Kostadinova 2003, 314). In the event, women constituted 48.4 per cent of the candidates at the top of NDSV's lists, 38.7 per cent of the candidates in second place, and 54.8 per cent of the candidates in third place. Given Bulgaria's closed-list electoral system at the time, and the magnitude of NDSV's victory, which generated fairly high party magnitudes in the 31 electoral districts, it is unsurprising that, in the event, women constituted 40 per cent of NDSV's parliamentary group. The alliance with the Women's Party remained in place for the 2005 elections, when women represented 42 per cent of NDSV candidates and 39 per cent of NDSV MPs (in contrast, the Bulgarian Socialist Party had only 25 per cent women candidates and 19 per cent women MPs in

2005).[2] In the 2009 elections, 43 per cent of NDSV candidates were women, but the party failed to win any seats in parliament.[3]

After two electoral cycles, NDSV's appeal to voters was largely exhausted, and a new contender emerged on the scene: Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria (GERB). The new party, established in 2006 by Sofia mayor Boyko Borisov, was eventually successful in replacing NDSV on the centre-right of the political spectrum, winning almost half of the seats in the National Assembly in the 2009 elections and remaining a redoubtable force in Bulgarian politics since. According to party chairman Boyko Borisov, the reason why GERB tends to recruit more women in local and national politics is that 'women work harder, are more disciplined and less corrupt than men' (Novinite, 13 July 2008). The party has been consistent in its recruitment of women over the three parliamentary elections that have taken place since its establishment: in 2009, women constituted 32 per cent of GERB candidates and 27 per cent of GERB MPs; in 2013, the corresponding percentages were 31.3 and 32 per cent respectively, while, in 2014, there were 32.5 per cent women candidates and 33.3 per cent women MPs among GERB's ranks.

The effects of party contagion are clearly discernible in Bulgaria. As Matland and Studlar (1996) argue, contagion (1) occurs when one party induces other parties to nominate more women candidates, (2) is more likely to operate effectively in an electoral system based on proportional representation. Both of these conditions are met in the case of Bulgaria, where GERB had a strong incentive to draw on the same sources of legitimacy as NDSV in its quest for an important place in politics. As Forest suggests, 'feminization has been used as an electoral argument by … [NDSV] in 2001 and later promoted as a mean to overcome widespread corruption and meet European values by … [GERB] (Forest 2011, 6).[4] Second, Bulgaria's closed-list electoral system, which has been in place in most elections held since 1991, enabled both NDSV and GERB to recruit more women candidates and MPs much more easily than would have been under a plurality or majoritarian system. Interestingly, however, Matland and Studlar's (1996) expectation that small leftist parties usually start the process that eventually results in contagion is not met by the Bulgarian case: NDSV is of a liberal orientation, while GERB is more on the right of centre. This is consistent with the fact that Central and East European parties of the right have been at least as likely to promote women than 'reformed' communist-successor parties.

7.3 Party System Change

The party systems of Central and Eastern Europe have been notoriously unstable and fragmented, so that high levels of electoral volatility have continued to characterise the post-communist region since 1990. Recently, even the party systems of Hungary and the Czech Republic, traditionally the most stable due to early party system consolidation, have experienced a significant amount of upheaval in the form of the disappearance of several established parties, and the emergence of new competitors in the political arena. The question that I seek to answer in this section is 'to what extent has party system change contributed to breaking male dominance in post-communist Europe?' As this section shows, the evidence is mixed: certain instances of party system change appear to benefit women, while others do not.

Party system changes that have, at the very least, challenged male dominance in Europe's new democracies can be clearly identified in Bulgaria and Poland. The Bulgarian case, which I discussed in greater detail above, demonstrates that the emergence of a new major party, such as NDSV, can have positive, if largely unintended, consequences for breaking male dominance over parliamentary representation. There is also evidence that further changes in the party system, such as the appearance of GERB on the political scene, can result in the preservation of gains made in women's descriptive representation, rather than a return to the *status quo ante*. The case of Poland also demonstrates that party system change can have a positive effect on women's representation. This was the case with the emergence of Civic Platform in the late 1990s, and the subsequent change in the main axis of competition from the social democratic/post-Solidarity divide to competition between two post-Solidarity formations, PO and PiS respectively. In the long run, this has benefited women because it allowed for the introduction of new frames of debate, such as those related to the introduction of quotas, into a party system where it appeared for a very long time that the single most important line of battle on gender equality concerned abortion. It should also be noted that PO's strategy, motivated as it was by the need to attract female votes, eventually led to an opening of the party's policy environment to the idea of quotas. Finally, in Romania the increased electoral performance of the National Liberal Party (PNL) and of the Democratic Liberal Party (PDL) has had a discernible effect on the proportion of women within the parliamentary groups of the two parties, although the increase in women's representation overall has

been minimal. Nevertheless, the increased presence of women in two parties that have had some of the lowest proportions of women MPs in Romania's post-communist period (for instance, 3.3 and 6.4 per cent respectively in 2000) may well enhance the possibility of the emergence of critical actors at party level.

Nevertheless, party system change can reproduce, rather than break, male dominance. In Hungary, FIDESZ's meteoric rise as the most important national conservative formation was predicated in part on 'taking over' the Hungarian democratic Forum's position on abortion. In the event, the 'spillover' resulted in the introduction of further restrictions to reproductive rights. Since then, FIDESZ has shifted even further in the direction of a national conservative ideology, initiating the adoption of a new Hungarian Constitution which has had, at the very least, mixed consequences for women. For instance, at the time of writing, the constitutional guarantee of a right to life for the foetus has not been implemented in secondary legislation, but further shifts to the right among the main parliamentary parties may well ensure that this becomes a reality. Yet another example is the fact that, taking advantage of its parliamentary strength, FIDESZ, together with the Christian democrats, was able to veto a proposal for the adoption of a gender quota in 2011.

The overview of party system change above demonstrates that, overall, party system shifts that result in the gains for liberal parties such as NDSV, PO or PNL are generally beneficial for women, while shifts in a more conservative direction can prompt a re-consolidation of the institutions of male dominance.

7.4 International Norm Diffusion

In Central and Eastern Europe, the strongest effects of international norm diffusion have occurred in relation to the process whereby post-communist countries eventually joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. As feminist scholars of post-communist politics almost invariable note, joining the EU has had a tremendous impact in the region (Popa 2007; Stoykova 2007; Krizsan 2012). One reason for this situation is the body of EU legislation on gender equality, which had to be adopted and implemented by candidate countries prior to EU accession. Although compliance generally varied between countries (Bego 2015; Avdeyeva 2015), one of the most important effects of the 'exogenous shock' of joining the EU has consisted in the fact that post-communist countries began to establish women's policy

	Year established	Name
Bulgaria	2003	Consultative Commission on Equal Opportunities for Menand Women, Ministry of Labour and Social Policy
	2004	Equal Opportunities for Women and Men Unit of the Policy of Labour Market Directorate, Ministry of Labour and Social Policy
	2004	Government Council on Gender Equality
	2005	Equal Opportunities Department, Ministry of Labour and Social Policy
Czech Republic	1998	Unit for Equal Opportunities, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
	2002	Government Council for Equal Opportunities
	2002	Gender Focal Points in each ministryt
Hungary	1995	Secretariat for Women's Policy, Ministry of Labour
	1998	Secretariat for the Representation of Women, Ministry of Labour (at a lower level)
	2002	Directorate for Equal Opportunities, Ministry of Employment Policy and Labour
	2004	Equal Opportunity Minister
	2005	State Secretary in Charge of Equal Opportunities, Ministry of Labour

Fig. 7.1 The establishment of women's policy agencies in Central and Eastern Europe. Sources: Stoykova (2007), Röder (2007), Dombos et al. (2007), Dabrowska (2007), Popa (2007), Repar (2007)

	1991–1992	Office of the Plenipotentiary for Women and the Family, Prime Minister's Chancellery
Poland	1994	Office of the Plenipotentiary for Women and the Family
	2002	Governmental Plenipotentiary for the Equal Status of Women and Men
	1995	Department for Strategies for Promoting Women's Rights and Family Policies
Romania	1998	Department for Child, Women and Families, Ombudsperson's Office
	2000	Commission for Equal Opportunities, Economic and Social Council
	1996	Coordination Committee on Women's Issues, chaired by the Minister of Labour, Social Affairs and the Family
	1999	Department for Equal Opportunities between Women and Men
Slovakia	2001	Coorssssdination Committee on Women's Issues at ministerial level
	2005	Department of Family and Gender Policies, Ministry of Labour
	2007	Department of Gender Policies and Equal Opportunities, Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and the Family

Fig. 7.1 (continued)

agencies for the first time since the collapse of communism, with potentially momentous consequences for the success of initiatives aiming to increase the substantive representation of women.

Figure 7.1 provides an overview of the establishment of women's policy agencies in post-communist Europe. The data indicate several important region-wide features. First, with the exception of Poland, none of our country case studies had anything resembling women's policy machineries until the conclusion of the 1995 United Nations (UN) Beijing Conference

on Women. This suggests that the primary impetus for the establishment of these bodies did not come, as one might suspect, the EU, but from the UN. Thus, as Krizsan and Zentai argue, the UN strongly determined the development of the first equality machineries in Hungary, Romania, and Poland (2012, 184). A second observation is that these bodies have been characterised by a great deal of fluidity in terms of roles and responsibilities, with frequent 'downgrades' and 'upgrades' taking place in accordance with the wishes of the government of the day. Additionally, as Falkner et al. found, in some cases the machineries were little more than empty gestures: as they note, there is 'no specific strategy or concept beyond [the] creation' of Gender Focal Points in each ministry' in the Czech Republic (2008, 57). Furthermore, women's organisations had only 'uneven access' to WPAs (Krizsan and Zentai 2012, 185), so the possibility of state feminism seemed, at best, remote. Nevertheless, the very fact that women's policy agencies were established was in itself somewhat of a victory, especially in comparison to the institutional vacuum that had preceded them.

7.5 Women's Activism

The final area where we can identify change concerns women's activism. Since so much of the changes in Central and Eastern Europe during the past two and a half decades are related to international norm diffusion, it is somewhat difficult to identify cases where domestic forces are primarily responsible for change. Nevertheless, I was able to identify two examples where pressures from international organisations were very low. The first example concerns women MPs' activism vis-à-vis the establishment of gender-focused parliamentary structures, while the second example relates to the successful mobilisation of civil society actors to press for change, as was the case with Poland's quota law.

Turning to the activities of women parliamentarians first, the late 1990s and the early 2000s witnessed increased mobilisation around the creation of parliamentary bodies dedicated to women's rights and/or equal opportunities. Figure 7.2 summarises the information on these bodies for our six case studies. In all our case studies, the evidence available suggests that these structures were set up as a result of pressure from women MPs. For instance, in the case of Romania, in 2001, women MPs pressured the Parliament's Joint Committee on European Integration to set up a special-

	Legislature	Name
Bulgaria	2005–2009	Subcommittee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality, Committee on Human Rights and Religious Affairs
Czech Republic	1998–2002	Subcommittee on Equal Opportunities and Family Issues, Committee on Social Policy and Health
	2002–2006	Permanent Commission on the Family and Equal Opportunities
	2006–2010	Permanent Commission on Equal Opportunities
	2010–2013	Permanent Commission on the Family and Equal Opportunities
Hungary	1998–2002	Subcommittee on Women's Rights, Committee on Human Rights, Minorities and Religious Affairs
	2002–2006	Subcommittee on Equal Opportunities, Committee on Human Rights, Minorities and Religious Affairs
	2006–2010	Subcommittee on Equal Opportunities between Men and Women, Committee on Human Rights, Minorities, Civil and Religious Affairs
Poland	Since 1991	Women's Parliamentary Group in the Sejm
	2001–2005	Standing Committee on the Equal Status of Men and Women
	2005–2007	Standing Committee on the Family and Women's Rights
	2007–2011	Subcommittee on the Family and Women's Rights, ommittee on Social Policy and the Family

Fig. 7.2 The establishment of gender-focused parliamentary bodies in Central and Eastern Europe. Sources: Stoykova (2007) for Bulgaria; websites of the Czech Chamber of Deputies (www.psp.cz), Hungarian National Assembly (www.parlament.hu), Polish Sejm (www.sejm.gov.pl), Romanian Chamber of Deputies (www.cdep.ro), and Slovak National Council (www.nrsr.sk)

Romania	2000–2004	Joint Subcommittee on Equal Opportunities between Men and Women, Joint Parliamentary Committee on European Integration
	2000–2004	Standing Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men
	2004–2008	Standing Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men
	2008–2012	Standing Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men
	2012-present	Standing Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men
Slovakia	1998–2002	Standing Committee on Human Rights, Minorities and the Status of Women
	2002–2006	Standing Committee on Human Rights, Minorities and the Status of Women
	2006–2010	Standing Committee on Human Rights, Minorities and the Status of Women
	2012-present	Standing Committee on Human Rights and Minorities

Fig. 7.2 (continued)

ised body, whose remit explicitly linked to the issue of EU accession. By November 2003, following significant pressure from women MPs, the subcommittee had been upgraded to two standing committees, each of which was incorporated in the institutional structure of each of the two chambers. The scope of activity of the lower chamber's committee was, as outlined in greater detail above, no longer limited to issues related to joining the EU and included, for instance, the monitoring of Romania's compliance with international treaty obligations in the field of gender equality.

Having thus established the Standing Committee on Equal Opportunities between Women and Men, the Chamber of Deputies proceeded to do absolutely nothing further about it. This prompted UDMR deputy Iulia Pataki to note with some bitterness that no progress had been made with respect to the committee and to urge the legislature in no uncertain terms to abide by its commitments in this area. By the end of the legislature in late 2004, the committee had a list of members but no chairperson. In fact, it took another few months, until early February 2005, for the first meeting to be convened. By that point, it had taken one and a half years since its establishment for the committee to pass its first organisa-

tional hurdles. Thus, the story of Romania's Committee on Equal Opportunities illustrates not only the determination of women activists but also the degree of institutional inertia that they encountered in achieving their goals.

As Fig. 7.2 shows, women parliamentarians in most of our country case studies have been remarkably active in seeking to set up institutions specifically dedicated to the representation of women's interests. This has resulted in the emergence of gender-focused parliamentary bodies in all six countries. The effectiveness of these bodies has varied widely, with the Parliamentary Group of Women in the Polish Sejm and the Commission on Equal Opportunities of the Romanian Chamber of Deputies being the most stable, as well as the most active on women's issues. Overall, it is clear that some women MPs are increasingly likely to seek to 'act for' women, although important differences persist between MPs from conservative, liberal and social democratic parties.

The successful mobilisation of women's movements has been rare in post-communist Europe. This is why the adoption of Poland's quota law is an excellent example of how, when women's movements, women's policy agencies and political parties work together, positive gender outcomes can and do occur despite an otherwise conservative environment. In Poland, the key player in this process was the Women's Congress, established in 2009 with the explicit aim of demanding, among others, the introduction of quotas for women in electoral law (Sledzinska-Simon and Bodnar 2013; Millard 2014). The Congress brought together a wide range of influential women and men from different walks of life, and established a women-only 'shadow cabinet'. In 2009–2010, the Congress collected 150,000 signatures from citizens in support of the quota bill (50,000 more than was constitutionally required for a citizens' initiative), reached a compromise with Prime Minister Donald Tusk on a 35 per cent quota, rather than the 50 per cent in the legislative draft, presented the bill to the Sejm, saw it entrusted to a special committee on reforming the electoral law and finally saw it adopted by 241 votes for, 154 votes against and 9 abstentions. Since then, the Congress has spearheaded the adoption of legislation on domestic violence and increased its membership by tens of thousands.

The case of the Polish quota law is remarkable in that it involved a deliberate strategy on the part of the Congress to build as many alliances as possible with women and men politicians past and present, government actors such as the prime minister, other state actors such as the Plenipotentiary for

Women's Rights and parliamentary actors such as the Women's Parliamentary Group. This is precisely what the scholarship on state feminism predicts would happen in cases of successful mobilisation for transformative goals (Lovenduski 2005; McBride and Mazur 2010). That the level of mobilisation and the degree of success would be so high is something that the literature on post-communist Europe would have found difficult to predict two decades ago.

7.6 Conclusion

This chapter has examined five distinct mechanisms of change for women's representation in post-communist Europe. Mechanisms for domestic-driven change include gender quotas, party contagion, party system change and increased activism by women and women's organisations, while mechanisms for international-driven change are principally driven by norm diffusion. Overall, the evidence is mixed: while quotas have a limited impact, and party system change can be beneficial or, alternatively, detrimental to the substantive representation of women, party contagion can result in gains in the levels of women's descriptive representation, and women's activism has brought about remarkable change in some cases. On the international side, norm diffusion has been beneficial for women insofar as international organisations such as the UN and the EU have prompted the emergence of new frames and organisational structures for the substantive representation of women.

Notes

1. Mihai (2011, 54) notes that PSD's women's section sought to table a proposal for a 40 per cent quota just before the party's 2010 Congress, but that the proposal was rejected (2010, 54).
2. The candidate data for 2005 are my own calculations on the basis of the candidate lists published by the Central Electoral Commission at http://pi2005.cik.bg/candidates/index.html, last accessed 8 May 2015.
3. The candidate data for 2009 are my own calculations on the basis of the candidate lists published by the Central Electoral Commission, http://pi2009.cik.bg/?page=6, last accessed 8 May 2015.
4. Rashkova and Zankina (2013, 432) suggest that NDSV's and GERB's performance vis-à-vis recruiting women candidates is part of a more general trend in Bulgaria, where the governing party has traditionally had the highest percentage of women. One explanation is that governing parties have the

largest number of seats in parliament (and therefore the highest party magnitude, which mean that they can recruit from further down the party list than other parties). As Appendix A2 shows, their observation is certainly correct. Nevertheless, both NDSV and GERB have been considerably more likely to recruit more women that other governing parties.

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CHAPTER 8

Conclusions

In 1990, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe embarked on the most far-reaching process of social, political and economic transformation in several generations. The transitions from communist rule were, in fact, threefold: first, the shift from the command economies of the state socialist era to fully-fledged capitalist economies; second, the process of building the institutions of consolidated democracies; third, the integration of post-communist states into the Western political order, best exemplified by the successful bids for EU membership. Given the sheer scope and pace of change in the region, the continued survival of the institutions of male dominance was, at least initially, surprising for many observers. After all, the early 1990s were a time of hope, when the promise of democracy seemed to usher in new opportunities for participation for a wide range of social groups, including women. Yet, the opposite happened: women suddenly 'disappeared' from the top levels of politics, while women's interests' advocates were consistently sidelined when it came to decisions that concerned women directly.

This study has shown that the institutions of male dominance remain in place over long periods, even under circumstances of momentous social, economic and political changes. As the case of Central and Eastern Europe amply demonstrates, processes of democratic consolidation can be (and have been) underpinned by significant gender inequalities in political representation. Within this context, the study has demonstrated the importance

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and validity of the two strategies it proposes for analysing gender and political representation. First, there is significant conceptual and empirical mileage in shifting the analytical focus from women's under-representation in politics to male dominance. This shift not only enables us to highlight the persistence of male privilege in political representation, but it also makes it possible to move forward and ask fruitful questions about the mechanisms that underpin the patterns of male dominance discernible in Europe's new democracies. Second, there is significant added value in identifying longitudinal trends in male dominance in a particular region of the world, as well as in explaining the underlying causes and consequences of these trends for men's and women's access to political power.

In seeking to understand the precise enabling conditions for the reproduction and change of the institutions of male dominance in Central and Eastern Europe since 1990, this study has sought to develop a conceptual toolkit for analysing gender and political representation from a comparative perspective. I thus began by building a model for analysing male dominance in light of two recent advances in the literature on gender and politics: the emerging feminist institutionalist research agenda, and the research agenda on women's descriptive, substantive and symbolic representation. Bringing together these two distinct bodies of literature resulted in a two-dimensional model or map for analysing male dominance: on the one side, the origins, reproduction and change of the institutions of male dominance; on the other side, the descriptive and substantive representation of men and women. This approach has helped shed light onto three key areas: (1) the historical and social processes whereby male dominance becomes an established feature of political representation in a particular country or region, (2) the causal mechanisms that reproduce male dominance over time, (3) the processes whereby the institutions of male dominance are challenged and eventually displaced.

We thus started our analytical journey with an exploration of the establishment of the institutions of male dominance during the transitions from communist rule. As argued in greater detail in Chap. 2, the widespread conceptualisation of post-communist transitions as moments of great rupture with the state socialist past has obscured the remarkable degree of continuity underpinning some elements determining women's and men's differentiated access to political power during and after state socialism. Thus, the root causes of the numerical over-representation of men in Europe's new democracies can be traced back to the decisions made by influential political actors—whether communist successor parties or the

anti-communist opposition—to make use of pre-existing male networks in their bid for power in the new political landscape of post-communism. Furthermore, the development of a variety of repertoires of symbolic representation viewing traditional gender relations as essential to the new political order, especially among the anti-communist opposition, limited women's advocates ability to engage in the substantive representation of women at the time of the transitions from communist rule. Starting in the late 1980s, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe thus began to institutionalise a new gender order where men and masculinity were overrepresented in descriptive, substantive and symbolic terms alike.

The overarching emphasis of the study has been on the mechanisms that sustain male dominance in Europe's new democracies. This emphasis was originally motivated by the observation, highlighted in the overwhelming majority of studies of Central and Eastern Europe, that women's presence in politics in the region has been far less prominent than one would expect within the context of otherwise successful paths towards democratisation. The data on descriptive representation collected for this study, together with the extensive literature on gender and civil society, lent additional support to the idea that the key to understanding Central and Eastern Europe lies with tracing the precise mechanisms reproducing male dominance over the post-communist period. Within this context, it should be noted that it has certainly not been the intention of this study to strengthen conventional portrayals of post-communist Europe by overemphasising the degree to which the region is still a bastion of traditionalist values. In fact, such a conclusion would be inconsistent with the actual findings of the study. Clearly, the interplay between societal values and political actor behaviour is more complex than linear causation (actors acting automatically on the basis of the values that they hold). For instance, despite the existence of somewhat higher (albeit declining) levels of support for patriarchal values than in established democracies, in practice post-communist electorates are not particularly likely to vote against female candidates when given the opportunity to cast a preferential vote (Chap. 3). Similarly, despite a consistent tendency to recruit much greater numbers of male candidates than female candidates, the majority of party selectors in new democracies are not systematically inclined to de-select female incumbents when new elections are held (Chap. 4).

What are the precise mechanisms that have sustained male dominance in Central and Eastern Europe during the post-communist period? At a conceptual level, this study drew on Mahoney's influential discussion of

path dependence in historical sociology (Mahoney 2000). Of the four mechanisms for institutional reproduction that he identifies, two were especially relevant for understanding the processes that sustain male dominance: power-based explanations, which emphasise how the unequal distribution of power between different social groups persists for as long as the group benefiting from this arrangement has sufficient strength to promote its reproduction; and legitimacy-based explanations, which link institutional reproduction with actors' beliefs that the institution is legitimate, resulting in a process where actors voluntarily reproduce institutions which they think of as legitimate (Mahoney 2000). As this study shows, the reproduction of men's descriptive over-representation in politics can be largely explained in terms of the power-based model, while the mechanisms marginalising actors seeking to engage in the substantive representation of women can be best understood from a legitimacy-based perspective. Within this context, it should be noted that, as employed here, the distinction between legitimacy-based and power-based approaches is largely a heuristic device adopted for purposes of analytical clarity. In fact, gender, power and legitimacy are profoundly intertwined in normative standards of behaviour, as well as in actual social practice.

In order to identify the mechanisms of reproduction underpinning men's descriptive over-representation in post-communist politics, Chap. 2 of this study undertook a systematic survey of the evidence concerning the supply and demand of male and female candidates in Europe's new democracies since 1990. The principal aim was to build a prima facie case as to where we might look most plausibly for explanations as to why men have been over-represented in post-communist politics. In sum, has the problem been primarily on the supply side, does it lie primarily with party gatekeepers, or, alternatively, does it have something to do with the way in which post-communist electorates view women candidates? There is clearly no evidence supporting the latter, at least in those cases (the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia) where it is possible to test whether electorates actively vote against women. Instead, the evidence suggested that some of the evidence clearly lies with the supply of male and female candidates, as well as, most importantly, with the role of party gatekeepers in candidate selection. Let us look at each in turn.

Perhaps surprisingly in light of the existing literature on Central and Eastern Europe, which has long argued that women in post-communist Europe are more traditionalist and therefore more inclined to leave political participation to men than their counterparts in the West, the issue on the

supply side does not appear to be motivation. As the comparison between our case studies and several established democracies in the West showed, the values gap between Europe's new and old democracies has been narrowing systematically since 1990. For instance, post-communist men and women are only marginally more likely than their Western counterparts to subscribe to the idea that men make better political leaders than women do. Instead, the evidence suggests that the problem on the supply side has something to do with resources, most notably time. Indeed, in what is perhaps one of the most striking legacies of the state socialist era, the double burden of full-time employment and household duties for women in post-communist Europe has been much higher than that in Western Europe ever since the fall of communism. In sum, women in the East simply have much less time to dedicate to activities other than paid work and housework than do women in established democracies. In turn, this is likely to depress the potential supply of women candidates across the region.

As Chaps. 4 and 5 show, the descriptive over-representation of men in post-communist politics has been sustained over time by two key mechanisms, both of which highlight the role of party gatekeepers in candidate selection. The first mechanism is incumbency, which 'freezes' the distribution of men and women among elected representatives over time, so that male over-representation is sustained through reselection and re-election (Chap. 4). As the political elites of Central and Eastern Europe have become increasingly adept at navigating electoral politics, and as the national party systems have become increasingly stable, the rise of a group of professional politicians has led to a corresponding increase in incumbency rates in the region. Growing incumbency rates have thus preserved men's privileged access to power by embedding sitting politicians 'incumbency advantage' into candidate selection, while also limiting (male and female) newcomers' ability to run for political office. Within this context, it should be noted that there is quite a significant degree of variation between our country case studies, with high-incumbency Hungary at one end of the spectrum, and low-incumbency Romania (and, partially, the Czech Republic in recent elections) at the other end of the spectrum.

The second mechanism responsible for the reproduction of male over-representation in post-communist politics concerns the ways in which party selectors use the existing rules of the electoral system in privileging male over female candidates (Chap. 5). In this respect, Central and Eastern Europe is somewhat an anomaly: the majority of the electoral systems used for national parliamentary elections in the region tend to be

based on proportional representation, but there have been very few representational gains for women since the collapse of communism. On the whole, the mixed electoral systems of the post-communist countries have been more efficient at sustaining male over-representation in politics than proportional representation. Hungary's mixed electoral system is particularly notable in this respect, as it has placed severe constraints on the recruitment of women candidates for virtually the entire post-communist period. However, the chapter also makes a strong case that proportional representation systems have been quite successful in terms of sustaining male dominance in Central and Eastern Europe. For instance, Romania's closed-list PR, employed between 1990 and 2004, and the Czech Republic's and Slovakia's open-list PR, used ever since 1990, have led to only the most marginal decreases in male over-representation in the post-communist period. This finding, it should be noted, is largely in line with recent scholarship on the relationship between PR and women's descriptive representation, which has found that the assumption that PR promotes better descriptive representation for women is not always supported by the evidence.

Having thus shown that incumbency and electoral systems have been the key mechanisms sustaining men's privileged access to power in post-communist Europe, it is useful to note that, with the exception of Hungary, these effects are weaker in the post-communist region than in some established democracies. For instance, the relatively high degree of instability of post-communist party systems has allowed for new parties to cross the electoral threshold on a regular basis, leading to a decrease in incumbency rates in countries such as the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia during the past decade. However, only some of the new parties making it into national politics appear to be especially sympathetic to women candidates, while others, especially on the Christian right and the radical right, have tended to recruit male candidates in significant numbers (Chap. 4).

This study has also explored the mechanisms that have sustained the marginalisation of political actors seeking to represent women in post-communist politics (Chap. 6). These are mechanisms of male dominance to the extent that they silence or otherwise delegitimise women, or other political actors, seeking to act on behalf of women. Within this context, I started from the literature on state feminism, which argues persuasively that positive gender outcomes depend on the formation of successful alliances between two types of actors seeking to represent women: women's

movements outside the state and women's policy agencies inside the state (McBride and Mazur 2010). The scholarship on post-communist Europe had documented the many instances in which such actors were either absent at the time of the transition from state socialism or, alternatively, very much marginalised in policy debates, such as in debates on abortion and contraception. The question, however, is to uncover the precise mechanisms that have enabled this initial outcome of the transition to become path-dependent over the first decade of post-communism. In sum, how can we account for the sustained marginalisation of actors seeking to represent women in Central and Eastern Europe?

This study has introduced the concept of 'asymmetric institutionalisation' in order to explain the mechanisms that have sustained the apparent weakness of actors seeking to engage in the substantive representation of women (Chap. 6). Unlike the two mechanisms of reproduction identified in relation to descriptive representation, which are generally applicable to other case studies and political contexts, asymmetric institutionalisation is a distinctive feature of the post-communist context, and in particular of the process of democratic consolidation after state socialism. Asymmetric institutionalisation is reflected in the fact that political actors in Central and Eastern Europe prioritised economic reform, the rule of law and competitive politics ('political society') over the nascent civil societies or reforming state bureaucracies.

Asymmetric institutionalisation shaped substantive representation in Central and Eastern Europe in two far-reaching ways, all of which had significant gendered effects. First, asymmetric institutionalisation reduced the likelihood that state feminism would emerge in the region, especially during the first decade of democratic consolidation. In Central and Eastern Europe, the asymmetric institutionalisation of the different arenas of a consolidated democracy ensured the marginalisation of women's advocates outside the state (in civil society) and women's advocates inside the state (within state bureaucracies). Second, asymmetric institutionalisation reinforced the advantage of 'political society' vis-à-vis civil society in post-communist Europe. In practice, this means that asymmetric institutionalisation enabled political parties to incorporate the repertoires of symbolic representation developed at the beginning of the transition into patterns of party competition. Women's advocates were at a distinct disadvantage in this process, because the nascent civil society had not yet had the time to organise and challenge these discourses effectively.

The final chapter of this study sought to complete the operationalisation of the theoretical model outlined above by identifying several mechanisms of change associated with 'breaking male dominance' in Europe's new democracies. Mechanisms for change include gender quotas, party contagion, party system change, increased activism by women and women's organisations, as well as international norm diffusion. Overall, the evidence is mixed: while quotas have a limited impact, and party system change can be beneficial or, alternatively, detrimental to the substantive representation of women, party contagion can result in gains in the levels of women's descriptive representation, and women's activism has brought about remarkable change in some cases. Furthernore, international norm diffusion has been beneficial for women insofar as international organisations such as the UN and the EU have prompted the emergence of new frames and organisational structures for the substantive representation of women.

To what extent are the findings of this study relevant for scholars interested in how male dominance operates outside the post-communist region, whether in new or established democracies? Some of the findings of this study—in particular those on male dominance and descriptive representation—are generalisable across a wide range of countries and regions. For instance, the male incumbency advantage has already been identified as an obstacle to increasing women's representation in politics in the US and the UK, although it has never been conceptualised as a mechanism of reproduction of male dominance. Similarly, it has also been demonstrated, again and again, that electoral systems do constrain political parties' choice of candidates in ways that disadvantage women; the extent to which different electoral systems reproduce male over-representation in politics could be usefully explored comparatively beyond the post-communist region as well. Other findings—most notably the idea of 'asymmetric institutionalisation' as a mechanism of reproduction of male dominance as far as substantive representation is concerned—are more easily extended to new democracies, where the relationship between the different arenas that make up a consolidated democracy tends to remain fluid during the process of democratic consolidation. In any case, the findings of this study could conceivably be fruitfully extended beyond the region of Europe's new democracies.

Finally, in the broadest terms, this study has shown that the choices made by political elites matter. In fact, in new democracies, the role of

political elites may matter even more than in established democracies, due to the structural effects induced by elite decisions on wide-ranging political change. It has also shown that it is important not to presume path dependence, whether at the societal or institutional level. Instead, we must investigate path dependence and conceptualise the mechanisms that reproduce the gender orders of new and established democracies alike. Finally, this study demonstrates the importance of studying gender and political representation across time, and the value of a comparative approach in understanding the creation, reproduction and change of the institutions of political representation.

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Appendix A: Party Acronyms, Central and Eastern Europe, 1990–2016

Bulgaria: Party Acronyms

ABV	Alternativa za Bulgarsko Vuzrazhdane	Alternative for Bulgarian Revival
Ataka	Koalitsiya Ataka	Attack Coalition
BBB	Bulgarska Biznes Blok	Bulgarian Business Bloc
BBT	Bulgarija bez Tsenzura	Bulgaria without Censorship
BNP	Bulgarski Naroden Suyuz	Bulgarian People's Union
BSP	Bulgarska Sotsialisticheska Partiya	Bulgarian Socialist Party
BZNS (NS)	Bulgarski Zemedelski Naroden Suyuz (Naroden Suyuz)	Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union (People's Union)
DPS	Dvizhenie za Prava i Svobodi	Movement for Rights and Freedoms
DSB	Demokrati za Silna Bulgarija	Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria
Evrolevitsa	Bulgarska Evrolevista	Bulgarian Euroleft
GERB	Grazhdani za Evropeisko Razvitie na Bulgariya	Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria
KB	Koalitsiya za Bulgariya	Coalition for Bulgaria
NDSV	Natsionalno Dvizhenie Simeon II/ Natsionalno Dvizhenie za Stabilnost i Vuzhod	National Movement Simeon II/ National Movement for Stability and Progress
ODS	Obedineni Demokratichni Sili	United Democratic Forces
PF	Patriotichen Front	Patriotic Front
RB	Reformatorski Blok	Reform Bloc
RZS	Red, Zakonnost i Spravedlivost	Order, Law and Justice
SDS	Suyuz na Demokratichnite Sili	Union of Democratic Forces
SK	Sinyiata Koalitsiya	The Blue Coalition

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Czech Republic: Party Acronyms

ANO-2011	Akce Nespokojených Občanu	Action of Dissatisfied Citizens
ČSSD	Česká Strana Sociálně Demokratická	Czech Social Democratic Party
HSD-SMS	Hnutí za samosprávnou demokracii – Společnost pro Moravu a Slezsko	Movement for Self-Governing Democracy – Society for Moravia and Silesia
KDS	Křesťanskodemokratická Strana	Christian Democratic Party
KDU-ČSL	Křesťanská a Demokratická Unie – Československá Strana Lidová	Christian Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party
KSČM	Komunistická Strana Čech a Moravy	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia
LSU	Liberálně sociální unie	Liberal Social Union
ODA	Občanská Demokratická Aliance	Civic Democratic Alliance
ODS	Občanská Demokratická Strana	Civic Democratic Party
OF	Občanské Fórum	Civic Forum
SPR-RSC	Sdružení Pro Republiku – Republikánská Strana Československa	Coalition for the Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia
SZ	Strana Zelených	Green Party
TOP09	Tradice Odpovědnost Prosperita 09	Tradition, Prosperity, Responsibility 09
US-DEU	Unie Svobody–Demokratická Unie	Freedom Union – Democratic Union
Usvit	Úsvit prímé demokracie	Dawn of Direct Democracy
VV	Věci Veřejné	Public Affairs

Hungary: Party Acronyms

ASZ	Agrárszövetség	Agrarian Alliance
FIDESZ	Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége	Alliance of Young Democrats
FIDESZ-MPP	Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Párt	FIDESZ – Hungarian Civic Party
FKgP	Független Kisgazda-, Földmunkás és Polgári Párt	Independent Smallholders', Agrarian Workers' and Civic Party
Jobbik	Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom	Movement for a Better Hungary
KDNP	Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt	Christian Democratic People's Party
LMP	Lehet Más a Politika	Politics Can Be Different
MDF	Magyar Demokrata Fórum	Hungarian Democratic Forum
MIÉP	Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja	Hungarian Justice and Life Party
MSZP	Magyar Szocialista Párt	Hungarian Socialist Party
SZDSZ	Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége	Alliance of Free Democrats

Poland: Party Acronyms

AWS	Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność	Solidarity Electoral Action
KLD	Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny	Liberal Democratic Congress
KPN	Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej	Confederation of Independent Poland
Kukiz'15	Kukiz'15	Kukiz'15
LPR	Liga Polskich Rodzin	League of Polish Families
Nowoczesna	Nowoczesna	Modern
PiS	Prawo i Sprawiedliwość	Law and Justice
PL	Porozumienie Ludowe	Peasants' Agreement
PO	Platforma Obywatelska	Civic Platform
POC	Porozumienie Obywatelskie Centrum	Centre Civic Alliance
PSL	Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe	Polish Peasants' Party
RP	Ruch Palikota	Palikota Movement
SLD	Sojusz Lewicy Demokratyczne	Democratic Left Alliance
Solidarność	Solidarność	Solidarity
SRP	Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej	Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland
UD	Unia Demokratyczna	Democratic Union
UP	Unia Pracy	Labour Union
UW	Unia Wolności	Freedom Union
WAK	Wyborcza Akcja Katolicka	Catholic Election Action

Romania: Party Acronyms

ALDE	Alianţa Liberalilor şi Democraţilor	Alliance of Liberals and Democrats
CDR	Convenţia Democrată Română	Romanian Democratic Convention
CPUN	Consiliul Provizoriu de Unitate Naţională	Provisional Council of National Unity
FC	Forţa Civică	Civic Force
FER	Federaţia Ecologistă din România	Romanian Ecologist Federation
FSN	Frontul Salvării Nationale	National Salvation Front
MER	Mişcarea Ecologistă din România	Romanian Ecologist Movement
PAC	Partidul Alianţei Civice	Civic Alliance Party
PAR	Partidul Alternativa României	'Alternative for Romania' Party
PC	Partidul Conservator	Conservative Party
PD	Partidul Democrat	Democratic Party
PDAR	Partidul Democrat Agrar din România	The Romanian Agrarian Party
PDL	Partidul Democrat Liberal	Liberal Democratic Party
PDSR	Partidul Democraţiei Sociale din România	Romanian Party of Social Democracy
PER	Partidul Ecologist Român	Romanian Ecologist Party
PNL	Partidul Naţional Liberal	National Liberal Party
PNL-CD	Partidul Naţional Liberal – Convenţia Democrată	National Liberal Party – Democratic Convention
PNT-cd	Partidul Naţional Tărănesc – Crestin Democrat	National Peasants' Party – Christian Democratic
PMP	Partidul Mişcarea Populară	People's Movement Party
PP-DD	Partidul Popular – Dan Diaconescu	People's Party – Dan Diaconescu
PRM	Partidul România Mare	Greater Romania Party
PSDR	Partidul Social Democrat din România	Romanian Social Democratic Party
PSD	Partidul Social Democrat	Social Democratic Party
PSM	Partidul Socialist al Muncii	Muncii Socialist Party of Labour
PSocDR	Partidul Socialist Democratic din România	Romanian Socialist Democratic Party (NB: author's abbreviation)
PUNR	Partidul Unităţii Naţionale Române	Party of Romanian National Unity
PUR	Partidul Umanist Român	Romanian Humanist Party
UDMR	Uniunea Democrata Maghiara din România	Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania
UNPR	Uniunea Naţională pentru Progresul României	National Union for Romania's Progress
USL	Uniunea Social Liberală	Social Liberal Union
USalvRo	Uniunea Salvaţi România	'Save Romania' Union

Slovakia: Party Acronyms

ANO	Aliancia Nového Občana	Alliance of the New Citizen
DS	Demokratiská Strana	Democratic Party
DÚ	Demokratická Únia Slovenska	Democratic Union of Slovakia
ESWMK	Együttélés-Spolužitie-Wspólnota-Soužití, Maďarské Kresťansko-Demokratické Hnutie	Coexistence and Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement
HZDS	Hnutie Za Demokratické Slovensko	Movement for a Democratic Slovakia
KDH	Kresťanskodemokratické Hnutie	Christian Democratic Movement
KSČ	Komunistická Strana Československa	Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
KSS	Komunistická Strana Slovenska	Communist Party of Slovakia
ĽS-HZDS	Ľudová Strana – Hnutie Za Demokratické Slovensko	People's Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia
ĽSNS	Ľudová strana – Naše Slovensko	People's Party – Our Slovakia
MK	Magyar Koalíció – Maďarská Koalícia	Hungarian Coalition
MKM-EGY	Maďarské Kresťansko-Demokratické Hnutie, Együttélés-Spolužitie-Wspólnota-Soužití	Coalition of the Hungarian Democratic Movement and Coexistence
MOST-HÍD	MOST – HÍD	Bridge
OĽaNO	Obyčajní Ľudia A Nezávislé Osobnosti	Ordinary People and Independent Personalities
SaS	Sloboda A Solidarita	Freedom and Solidarity
SDK	Slovenská Demokratická Koalícia	Slovak Democratic Coalition
SDKÚ	Slovenská Demokratická A Kresťanská Únia	Slovak Democratic and Christian Union
SDKÚ-DS	Slovenská Demokratická A Kresťanská Únia – Demokratická Strana	Slovak Democratic and Christian Union – Democratic Party
SDĽ	Strana Demokratickej Ľavice	Party of the Democratic Left
#SIEŤ	SIEŤ	Network
SMER-sd	SMER – Sociálna Demokracia	Direction – Social democracy
Sme Rodina	Sme Rodina	We Are Family

SMK-MKP	Strana Maďarskej Koalície – Magyar Koalíció Pártja	Party of the Hungarian Coalition
SNS	Slovenská Národná Strana	Slovak National Party
SOP	Strana Občianskeho Porozumenia	Party of Civic Understanding
SP VOĽBA	Spoločná Voľba	Common Choice
SZ	Strana Zelených	Green Party
VPN	Verejnosť Proti Násiliu	Public against Violence
ZRS	Združenie Robotníkov Slovenska	Association of Workers in Slovakia

Appendix B: Women's Representation in the Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe, 1990–2016

C. Chiva, *Gender, Institutions and Political Representation*, Gender and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-01177-0

Women's Representation in the Bulgarian National Assembly, 1990–2014

	1990		*1991*		*1994*		*1997*		*2001*		*2005*		*2009*		*2013*		*2014*	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
BSP/KB	n/a	–	20/106	18.9	18/125	14.4	5/58	8.6	5/48	10.4	16/82	19.5	7/40	17.5	18/84	21.4	5/39	12.8
SDS/ODS	n/a	–	10/110	9.1	6/69	8.7	18/137	13.1	9/51	17.7	4/20	20.0	–	–	–	–	See RB	
DPS	n/a	–	3/24	12.5	2/15	13.3	1/19	5.3	2/21	9.5	3/34	8.8	4/38	10.5	6/36	16.7	4/38	10.5
BZNS (NS)	–	–	–	–	1/18	5.6	–	–	See ODS		–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
BBB	–	–	–	–	1/13	7.7	0/12	0.0	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Evrolevitsa	–	–	–	–	–	–	2/14	14.3	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
NDSV	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	48/120	40.0	21/53	39.6	–	–	–	–	–	–
Ataka	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1/21	4.8	3/21	14.3	5/23	21.7	3/11	27.3
DSB	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	4/17	23.5	–	–	–	–	See RB	
BNS	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1/13	7.7	–	–	–	–	–	–
GERB	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	32/116	27.6	32/97	33.0	28/84	33.3
RZS	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	2/10	20.0	–	–	–	–
SK	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	2/15	13.3	–	–	–	–
RB	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	2/23	8.7
PF	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	3/19	15.8
BBT	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	2/15	13.3
ABV	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1/11	9.1
Total	n/a	8.5	33/240	13.7	28/240	11.7	26/240	10.8	64/240	26.7	50/240	20.8	50/240	20.8	61/240	25.4	48/240	20.0

Sources: As detailed in Appendix C. Party acronyms as in Appendix A.

Women's Representation in the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic, 1990–2013

	1990[a]		1992[a]		1996		1998		2002		2006		2010		2013	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
OF	18/127	14.2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–		
KSČM[b]	7/32	21.9	5/35	14.3	5/22	22.7	6/24	25.0	12/41	29.3	8/26	30.8	11/26	42.3	11/33	33.3
KDU-ČSL[c]	0/19	0.0	2/15	13.3	2/18	11.1	3/20	15.0	2/22	9.1	2/13	15.4	–	–	0/14	0.0
HSD-SMS	1/22	4.6	2/14	14.3	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–		
ODS[d]	–	–	6/76	7.9	7/68	10.3	7/63	11.1	8/58	13.8	9/81	11.1	9/53	17.0	3/16	18.8
ČSSD	–	–	2/16	12.5	11/61	18.0	11/74	14.9	10/70	14.3	9/74	12.2	5/56	8.9	6/50	12.0
SPR-RSČ	–	–	2/14	14.3	5/18	27.8	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–		
ODA	–	–	1/14	7.1	0/13	0.0	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–		
LSU	–	–	1/16	6.2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–		
US-DEU[e]	–	–	–	–	–	–	3/19	15.8	2/9	22.2	–	–	–	–		
SZ	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	3/6	50.0	–			
TOP09	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	11/41	26.8	7/26	26.9
VV	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	8/24	33.3		
ANO2011	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	10/47	21.3
USVIT	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	2/14	14.3
Total	26/200	13.0	21/200	10.5	30/200	15.0	30/200	15.0	34/200	17.0	31/200	15.5	44/200	22.0	39/200	19.5

Sources: As detailed in Appendix C. Party acronyms as in Appendix A.

[a]The data for 1990 and 1992 are for the Czech National Council
[b]The data for 1990 are for KSČ, and for 1992 for the Left Bloc (Levýblok), a KSČM-led alliance
[c]The data for 1990 are for KDU
[d]The data for 1992 are for the ODS-KDS alliance
[e]US-DEU and KDU-ČSL ran as an alliance in the 2002 elections

Women's Representation in the Hungarian National Assembly, 1990–2014

	1990		*1994*		*1998*		*2002*		*2006*		*2010*		*2014*	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
MSZP	5/33	15.2	22/209	10.5	14/134	10.4	23/178	12.9	24/186	12.9	5/59	8.5	6/38	15.8
MDF	8/164	4.9	6/38	15.8	1/17	5.9	1/24	4.2	1/11	9.1	–	–	–	–
FIDESZ (-MPP)	2/21	9.5	1/20	5.0	10/148	6.8	9/164	5.5	13/164	7.9	22/262	8.4	9/133	6.8
SZDSZ	8/92	8.7	11/69	15.9	3/24	12.5	2/19	10.5	1/18	5.6	–	–	–	–
FKgP	3/44	6.8	2/26	7.7	3/48	6.3	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
KDNP	1/21	4.8	1/22	4.6	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
MIÉP	–	–	–	–	1/14	7.1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Jobbik	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	3/47	6.4	2/23	8.7
LMP	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	5/16	31.3	2/5	40.0
ASZ	0/1	0.0	0/1	0.0	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Independent	1/6	16.7	–	–	0/1	0.0	–	–	0/1	0.0	0/1	0.0	–	–
Joint candidates	0/4	0.0	0/1	0.0	–	–	0/1	0.0	2/6	33.3	0/1	0.0	–	–
Total	28/386	7.3	43/386	11.1	32/386	8.3	35/386	9.1	41/386	10.6	35/386	9.1	19/199	9.5

Sources: As detailed in Appendix C. Party acronyms as in Appendix A

Women's Representation in Poland's Sejm, 1991–2015

	1991		*1993*		*1997*		*2001*		*2005*		*2007*		*2011*		*2015*	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
UD	12/62	19.3	16/74	21.6	see UW	see UW	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
SLD	10/60	16.7	28/171	16.4	31/164	18.9	55/216	25.5	11/55	20.0	11/53	20.8	4/27	14.8	–	–
WAK	6/49	12.2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
PSL	1/48	2.1	8/132	6.1	0/27	0.0	0/42	0.0	1/25	4.0	1/31	3.2	2/28	7.1	3/16	18.8
KPN	5/46	10.9	1/22	4.5	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
POC	1/44	2.3	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
KLD	0/37	0.0	–	–	see UW	see UW	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
PL	1/28	3.6	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Solidarność	3/27	11.1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
UP	–	–	7/41	17.1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
UW	–	–	–	–	9/60	15.0	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
AWS	–	–	–	–	20/201	9.9	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
PO	–	–	–	–	–	–	13/65	20.0	33/133	24.8	48/209	23.0	72/207	34.8	50/138	36.2
PiS	–	–	–	–	–	–	6/44	13.6	29/155	18.7	34/166	20.4	27/157	17.2	54/235	23.0
SRP	–	–	–	–	–	–	9/53	16.9	15/56	26.8	–	–	–	–	–	–
LPR	–	–	–	–	–	–	10/38	26.3	5/34	14.7	–	–	–	–	–	–
RP	–	–	–	–		–	–	–	–	–	–	–	5/40	12.5	–	–
Kukiz'15	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–		6/42	14.3
Nowoczesna	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	12/28	42.9
Others	5/52	9.6	0/16	0.0	0/6	0.0	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–		
German minority	0/7	0.0	0/4	0.0	0/2	0.0	0/2	0.0	0/2	0.0	0/1	0.0	0/1	0.0	0/1	0.0
Total	44/460	9.6	60/460	13.0	60/460	13.0	93/460	20.2	94/460	20.4	94/460	20.4	110/460	23.9	125/460	27.2

Sources: As detailed in Appendix C. Party acronyms as in Appendix A

Women's Representation in the Romanian Chamber of Deputies, 1990–2016

	1990		*1992*		*1996*		*2000*		*2004*		*2008*		*2012*		*2016*	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
FSN/PDSR/PSD	13/263	4.9	6/117	5.1	8/91	8.8	14/141	9.9	15/113	13.3	13/110	11.8	20/151	13.2	41/154	26.6
PUR/PC/ALDE	–	–	–	–	–	–	3/6	50.0	4/19	21.0	1/4	25.0	2/12	16.7	2/20	10.0
PSDR	0/2	0.0	1/10	10.0	1/10	10.0	2/8	25.0	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
PD/PDL	–	–	2/43	4.7	3/43	7.0	2/31	6.4	7/48	14.6	13/115	11.3	9/52	17.3		
PNL[a]	2/29	6.9	1/11	9.1	1/25	4.0	1/30	3.3	3/64	4.7	7/65	10.8	13/101	12.9	11/69	15.9
PNT-cd	0/12	0.0	1/41	2.4	6/83	7.2	–	–	–	–	–	–	0/1	0.0		
UDMR	0/29	0.0	0/27	0.0	1/25	4.0	2/27	7.4	0/22	0.0	2/22	9.1	0/18	0.0	4/21	19.0
PUNR	0/9	0.0	0/30	0.0	0/18	0.0	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–		
PRM	–	–	1/16	6.3	3/19	15.8	11/84	13.1	7/48	14.6	–	–	–	–		
PP-DD	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	10/47	21.3		
Others[b]	3/41	7.3	0/33	0.0	0/14	0.0	–	–	–	–	–	–	0/12	0.0	6/48	12.5
Total contested seats	18/385	4.7	12/328	3.6	23/328	7.0	35/327	10.7	36/314	11.4	36/316	11.4	54/394	13.7	64/312	20.5
Reserved seats[c]	0/11	0.0	1/13	7.7	2/15	13.3	3/18	16.7	2/18	11.1	2/18	11.1	1/18	5.6	3/17	17.6
Total	18/396	4.5	13/341	3.8	25/343	7.3	38/345	11.0	38/332	11.4	38/334	11.4	55/412	13.3	67/329	20.4

Sources: As detailed in Appendix C. Party acronyms as in Appendix A

[a]PNL-at in 1992

[b]Others include: in 1990, MER (1/12), PER (2/8), PDAR (0/9 seats), PSocDR (0/5 seats); and 7 formations with one seat each and no women MPs; in 1992, PSM (13 seats), PNl-CD (3 seats), PAC (13 seats) and PER (4 seats); in 1996, PNL-CD (5 seats), PER (5 seats), PAR (3 seats) and FER (1 seat); in 2012, FC (0/3) and UNPR (0/9); in 2016, PMP (1/18) and Uniunea Salvati Romania (5/30))

[c]These are reserved seats for national minorities, with one seat for each national minority group

Women's Representation in the Slovak National Council, 1990–2016

	1990		*1992*		*1994*		*1998*		*2002*		*2006*		*2010*		*2012*		*2016*	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
VPN[a]	2/48	4.3	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
KDH	3/31	9.7	0/18	0.0	1/17	5.9	See SDK	See SDK	2/15	13.3	2/14	14.3	2/15	13.3	2/16	12.5	–	–
SNS	4/22	18.2	1/15	6.7	2/9	22.2	3/14	21.4	–	–	3/20	15.0	1/9	11.1	–	–	3/15	20.0
HZDS/L'S-HZDS[b]	–	–	16/74	21.6	13/61	21.3	6/43	13.9	5/36	13.9	4/15	26.7	–	–	–	–	–	–
SDL'[c]	3/22	13.6	5/29	17.2	3/18	16.7	2/23	8.7	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
SDK/SDKÚ/ SDKÚ-DS[d]	–	–			–	–	2/42	4.8	6/28	21.4	6/31	19.4	6/28	21.4	2/11	18.2	–	–
SMK-MKP[e]	1/14	7.1	1/14	7.1	1/17	5.9	1/15	6.7	1/20	5.0	3/20	15.0	–	–	–	–	–	–
SMER[f]	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	5/25	20.0	6/50	12.0	10/62	16.1	15/83	18.1	4/49	8.2
SaS	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	4/22	18.2	1/11	9.1	5/21	23.8
MOST-HÍD	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0/14	0.0	0/13	0.0	1/11	9.1
OL'aNO	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	4/16	25.0	6/19	31.6
L'SNS	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	2/14	14.3
SmeRodina	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	4/11	36.4
#SIÉT	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	4/10	40.00
Others[g]	5/13	38.5	–	–	2/28	7.1	3/13	23.1	3/26	11.5	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Total	18/150	12.0	23/150	15.3	22/150	14.7	17/150	11.3	22/150	14.7	24/150	16.0	23/150	15.3	24/150	16.0	29/150	19.3

Sources: As detailed in Appendix C. Party acronyms as in Appendix A

[a]VPN split in 1991 into different factions, of which HZDS continued to obtain parliamentary representation

[b]L'S-HZDS from March 2000

[c]The data for 1994 are for *Spolocná volba* (Common Choice), which included SDL', SDSS, the Green Party and two other smaller formations

[d]SDK contested the 1998 elections as an alliance between DÚ, KDH, DS, SDSS and SZ. SDKÚ was subsequently established as a party in 2000

[e]The data are for ESWMK in 1990, MKM_EGY in 1992, MK in 1994 and SMK-MKP from 1998 onwards

[f]SMER was formed in 1999 as a splinter from SDL'

[g]For 1990, KSČ (22 seats), DS (7 seats) and SZ (6 seats); for 1994, DÚ (15 seats) and ZRS (13 seats); for 1998, SOP (13 seats); for 2002, ANO (15 seats) and KSS (11 seats); for 2012, OL'ano (16 seats)

Appendix C: A Research Note on Data Collection

This project began as an exercise in data collection, in an effort to establish the trends in women's descriptive representation in Europe's new democracies during the post-communist period. Certainly, comparative projects such as Matland and Montgomery's influential *Women's Access to Political Power* (2003) and Wolchik and Rueschemeyer's *Women in Power* (2009) made significant inroads into clarifying the precise extent that Europe's new democracies were characterised by male over-representation in politics. However, drawing conclusions on the basis of the data available in secondary literature proved to be extremely difficult, not only because different scholars covered slightly different segments of the post-communist period but also because it was not possible to analyse the data as such. Overall, a comprehensive, accurate set of data on women's descriptive representation in the region was not readily available at the time when I started this project in 2010.

In the interests of sound scientific practice, this appendix lists the precise sources for the data on women's descriptive representation discussed in this study. On the basis of the sources listed below, I compiled datasets on the gender of candidates and elected MPs for all elections where detailed candidate lists and elections results were available (see below for gaps in the availability of the data). The analysis of candidate recruitment, the effects of incumbency and the impact of national electoral systems in Chaps. 2, 3 and 4 draw on these datasets.

C. Chiva, *Gender, Institutions and Political Representation*, Gender and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-01177-0

One important finding from the collection of the data is that detailed legal requirements for transparency in terms of electoral data, strengthened by international election monitoring throughout the post-communist period, have led to a significant improvement in the quality of the data on the gender composition of candidate lists and national legislatures. Slight variations among our case studies notwithstanding, it is certainly the case that, for the past decade at least, candidate lists are both publicly available and easily accessible. However, the candidate data for the early post-communist period, and, in some cases, the election results, are considerably more difficult to access. Thus, some ingenuity was required in order to get hold of accurate data (see, for instance, the 1990 and 1992 elections in Slovakia, as detailed below).

The overarching strategy for data collection was as follows. First, in the interests of a systematic comparison across our case studies, the data refer, without exception, to the composition of the lower chamber of national legislatures (where applicable) at the time when they were elected. Changes in the gender composition of legislatures due to events such as resignations or deaths are not covered in the descriptive data or included in the analysis. For instance, incumbency rates were calculated on the basis of information on the composition of national legislatures at the beginning of the parliamentary term, and do not include MPs who took up their seats later in the term (via by-election or due to replacing a departing MP) and were re-elected at the next election. As far as the candidate data are concerned, I collected the data only for those parties that were successful in winning seats in national legislatures, rather than for all the parties running in a particular election. The one exception to this strategy of candidate data collection is Hungary, where the national-level candidate data refer to all parties in elections, as reported by the National Election Office. This is because I was unable to replicate the methodology of the Hungarian National Election Office concerning double- or triple-listing in a way that would generate party-level data. Specifically, the Office counts candidates listed twice or three times in the different tiers of the system only once, but I was unable to find an explanation as to how this was done.

Second, I undertook extensive cross-checking of the data between official sources (for instance, candidate lists and elections results published by the national electoral authorities) and secondary literature on women's representation in post-communist Europe. Whenever possible, I used data

from the central electoral authorities and official gazettes exclusively. When necessary, I complemented these data with information from the websites of the national legislatures of the countries concerned. In the (exceptionally rare) cases where official data from national electoral authorities or databases of the national legislatures were not available, I extracted the data from secondary literature.

Third, although the data are often available in English, this is not invariably the case. Thus, it is sometimes necessary to access candidate lists and elections results in the language of the country concerned. I was able to access data directly for three of the country case studies: I am a native speaker of Romanian, have a good passive understanding of Bulgarian and have sufficient knowledge of Hungarian to access the relevant websites with a reasonable degree of confidence. For the information in Polish, Czech and Slovak, I used Google Translate in order to establish the content of the relevant website, and then collect the data. It is perhaps useful to note that accessing the data does not necessarily require in-depth knowledge of the local language. For instance, electoral bodies report candidate data in the form of lists structured in a largely self-explanatory way. In all cases, I coded the data manually for the gender of candidates and/or elected MPs.

Finally, unless otherwise stated, all the links listed below were last accessed on 29 June 2017.

Bulgaria

The candidate data for 1994, 1997 and 2001 were collated from the database of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences at http://www.math.bas.bg/izbori/index_res.html and then coded for gender in separate datasets for each election. I am grateful to Ekaterina Rashkova for her help in finding these data. Although not an official record, the data of the Academy are widely used, for instance, by Kostadinova (2003). I was unable to track down the candidate data for 1990 and 1991.

For the proportion of women among elected MPs in 1990, 1991, 1993, 1997 and 2001, the sources are Kostadinova (2003) and Ghodsee (2009).

All elections held after 2005 are archived by the Central Electoral Commission at https://portal.cik.bg/. All the websites listed below are in Bulgarian.

2005—http://pi2005.cik.bg/results/ for the results and http://pi2005.cik.bg/candidates/index.html for the candidate lists.
2009—https://pi2009.cik.bg/elected/ for the results and https://pi2009.cik.bg/?page=6 for the candidate lists.
2013—https://results.cik.bg/pi2013/rezultati/index.html for the results and https://results.cik.bg/pi2013/csv.html for the CSV candidate files.
2014—https://results.cik.bg/pi2014/rezultati/index.html for the results and https://results.cik.bg/pi2014/csv.html for the CSV files.

Election results were cross-checked for accuracy against the official results published in the Official Gazette (*Durzhaven Vestnik)*, available at dv.parliament.bg. All of the issues listed below can be found by using the search function of the *Durzhaven Vestnik* site.

2005—*Durzhaven Vestnik* No. 54/1 July 2005 and No. 55/5 July 2005.
2009—*Durzhaven Vestnik* No. 52/10 July 2009.
2013—*Durzhaven Vestnik* No. 45/18 May 2013.
2014—*Durzhaven Vestnik* No 85/14 October 2014.

In Bulgaria's closed-PR (tier of the) electoral system, candidates can run concurrently in two electoral districts. If elected in both districts, then the candidates are required to declare which of the two districts they wish to take up their seat in. On average, approximately 20 of the 240 elected MPs are in this situation after an election. Subsequently, in districts where the double-listed candidates do not take up their seats, the next candidate on the list is declared elected by the Electoral Commission. Sometimes, these decisions are published separately. For instance, the full elections results for the 2005 parliamentary elections were published in the *Durzhaven Vestnik* No. 54/1 July 2005, and the outcome of the decisions by the double-listed candidates was published in *Durzhaven Vestnik* No. 55/5 July 2005. In other cases, these decisions are published in the same issue of the Official Gazette. Starting with the 2005 elections, the data on women's descriptive representation reported here take this feature of the electoral system into account by counting double-listed MPs only once (in the seat that they chose to take up) and counting their replacements as elected (in the seats that the double-listed candidates do not take up).

Czech Republic

All the data for the descriptive representation of women in the Czech Republic were collected via the comprehensive elections database of the Czech Statistical Office (www.czso.cz). The candidate and MP data for the elections held between 1990 and 2013 are available in Czech at http://www.volby.cz/index.html, and those between 2002 and 2013 onwards are available in English at http://www.volby.cz/index_en.htm. For the purposes of the analysis, the data for 1990 and 1992 refer to the Czech National Council (*Česká národní rada*), formally the predecessor of the Chamber of Deputies. From 1996 onwards, the data are for the Chamber of Deputies.

The exact sources are as follows:

1990—http://www.volby.cz/pls/cnr1990/u0
1992—http://www.volby.cz/pls/cnr1992/u0
1996—http://www.volby.cz/pls/ps1996/u0
1998—http://www.volby.cz/pls/ps1998/u0
2002—http://www.volby.cz/pls/ps2002/psm?xjazyk=EN
2006—http://www.volby.cz/pls/ps2006/ps?xjazyk=EN
2010—http://www.volby.cz/pls/ps2010/ps?xjazyk=EN
2013—http://www.volby.cz/pls/ps2013/ps?xjazyk=EN

The Joint Czech and Slovak Digital Parliamentary Library is an excellent repository for researching the organisation and legislative activity of the two legislatures. The repository can be accessed either via the website of the Czech Chamber of Deputies (http://www.psp.cz/en/sqw/hp.sqw?k=82) or via the website of the Slovak National Council (http://www.nrsr.sk/dl/?lang=en).

Hungary

The data on the proportion of women among elected MPs between 1990 and 2014 were compiled on the basis of the archive of the Hungarian National Assembly. The archive is fully searchable by calendar date, parliamentary term, parliamentary group, electoral district, gender and committee assignment, among other criteria. The searchable archive can be accessed at http://www.parlament.hu/hu/kepviselok-elozo-ciklusbeli-adatai (in Hungarian only).

National-level candidate data for 1990 and 1994 are as reported by Ilonszki (2012, 218). For the period between 1998 and 2014, candidate data were compiled on the basis of the data provided by the Hungarian Election Office. The English-language pages of the Hungarian Elections Office do not always contain detailed information on candidates. In such cases, I used the Hungarian-language pages.

1998—http://www.valasztas.hu/ujweb/index.htm (in Hungarian).
2002—http://www.valasztas.hu/parval2002/ve02/veeng/start2_en_ind.htm (in English).
2006—http://www.valasztas.hu/parval2006/en/06/6_0.html (in English).
2010—http://www.valasztas.hu/en/parval2010/305/305_0_index.html (in English).
2014—http://www.valasztas.hu//hu/ogyv2014/769/769_0_index.html (in Hungarian)

Poland

The 1991, 1993 and 1997 candidate datasets and elections results were compiled on the basis of the datasets provided by the Project on Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe at the University of Essex (1999–2002). The web page of the project is no longer available, but previous iterations on elections in Poland can be accessed via the Wayback Machine at https://web.archive.org/web/20060326222201/http://www2.essex.ac.uk:80/elect/database/indexCountry.asp?country=Poland&opt=can. The datasets were double-checked for accuracy against the Official Gazette (*Monitor Polski*), specifically No. 41/poz. 288/31 October 1991, No. 50/poz. 470/23 September 1993 and No. 64/poz. 620/25 September 1997. The issues are available online at http://monitorpolski.gov.pl/MP/1991/288/1, http://monitorpolski.gov.pl/MP/1993/470/1 and http://monitorpolski.gov.pl/MP/1997/620/1.

The data for the elections held in 2001, 2005, 2007, 2011 and 2015 were collected on the basis of the information provided by the Central Electoral Commission (http://pkw.gov.pl/352_Wybory_i_referenda).

2001—candidate data and election results at http://wybory2001.pkw.gov.pl/sjdk1_k.html

2005—http://www.wybory2005.pkw.gov.pl/SJM/EN/WYN/M/index.htm
2007—http://wybory2007.pkw.gov.pl/SJM/EN/WYN/M/index.htm
2011—http://wybory2011.pkw.gov.pl/wsw/en/000000.html
2015—the candidate lists can be downloaded from http://parlament2015.pkw.gov.pl/kandydaci.zip and the elections results are available at http://parlament2015.pkw.gov.pl/349_Wyniki_Sejm.

Romania

1990—The candidate data for 1990 are no longer available (on this issue, see also Chiru 2016). The gender composition of the legislature after the 1990 elections was compiled on the basis of the elections results published in the Official Gazette (*Monitorul Official*) No. 81–82/June 2012 and Nos. 85–86/June 1990. There is a slight discrepancy in the data between the former and the latter issues of the Official Gazette in that some candidates initially listed as elected were not subsequently 'validated' (officially declared elected) by the Validation Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, for reasons that are unclear. The gender composition of the legislature refers to those MPs who did take up their posts (that is, were declared 'valid').

1992—The data on the representation of women among candidates in the 1992 elections to the Chamber of Deputies reported here are on the basis of the datasets made available by the Project on Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe at the University of Essex (1999–2002). The web page of the project is no longer available, but previous iterations can be accessed via the Wayback Machine at https://web.archive.org/web/20020622160042/http://www2.essex.ac.uk:80/elect/database/indexCountry.asp?country=ROMANIA&opt=can. The gender composition of the legislature after the 1992 elections was compiled on the basis of the elections results published in the Official Gazette (*Monitorul Official*) No. 257/15 October 1992, No. 268/30 October 1992. There is a slight discrepancy in the data between the former and the latter issues of the Official Gazette in that some candidates initially listed as elected were not subsequently 'validated' (officially declared elected) by the Validation Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, for reasons that are unclear. The gender composition of the legislature refers to those MPs who did take up their posts (that is, were declared 'valid').

1996—The data on the representation of women among candidates in the 1996 elections to the Chamber of Deputies reported here are on the basis of the datasets made available by the Project on Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe at the University of Essex (1999–2002). The web page of the project is no longer available, but previous iterations can be accessed via the Wayback Machine at https://web.archive.org/web/20020622160042/http://www2.essex.ac.uk:80/elect/database/indexCountry.asp?country=ROMANIA&opt=can. The gender composition of the legislature after the 1996 elections was compiled on the basis of the elections results published in the Official Gazette (*Monitorul Official*) No. 287 /13 Nov. 1996 and No. 316/29 November 1996.

2000—I was unable to track down candidate data for the parliamentary elections to the Chamber and Deputies and the Senate held in 2000. On the tribulations of trying to obtain the candidate data for 2000, see Chiru (2016). The gender composition of the legislature after the 2000 elections was compiled on the basis of the elections results published in the Official Gazette (*Monitorul Official*) No. 664/15 December 2000.

2004—Candidate data as originally collected from the site of the Central Electoral Bureau at www.bec2004.ro. The site is no longer available in full, but parts of it can be accessed via the Wayback Machine at https://web.archive.org/web/20050212153447/http://www.bec2004.ro:80/. The pdf-format candidate lists can no longer be downloaded via the Wayback Machine. However, they are available on request, in the format I originally downloaded from www.bec2004.ro in 2005. The gender composition of the legislature after the 2004 elections was compiled on the basis of the elections results published in the Official Gazette (*Monitorul Official*) No. 1162/8 December 2004.

2008—Candidate statistics and elections results published by the Central Electoral Bureau at http://www.becparlamentare2008.ro.

2012—Candidate data and elections results published by the Central Electoral Bureau at http://www.becparlamentare2012.ro. The candidate lists, in Excel format, are available at http://www.becparlamentare2012.ro/A-DOCUMENTE/Comunicate/Candidati%20Camera%20Deputatilor.xls.

2016—Candidate data and elections results published by the Central Electoral Bureau at http://parlamentare2016.bec.ro. The candidate lists, in Excel format, are available at http://parlamentare2016.bec.ro/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/candidati_loc_data_nastere.xlsx.

Slovakia

1990—I collated the list of elected MPs from the transcript of the opening session of the National Council: http://www.psp.cz/eknih/1990snr/stenprot/001schuz/index.htm (party affiliation data collected from information on committee assignments), and manually coded it for gender. I also double-checked the data on the distribution of seats against the elections results published by the Slovak Statistical Office at http://volby.statistics.sk/nrsr/snr1990/volby90_a/uvod90_a.htm.

1992—I collated the list of elected MPs from the transcript of the opening session of the National Council held by Joint Czech and Slovak Digital Parliamentary Library (http://www.nrsr.sk/dl/Browser/Document?documentId=71563) and then manually coded it by gender. I also double-checked the data on the distribution of seats against the elections results published by the Slovak Statistical Office at http://volby.statistics.sk/nrsr/snr1992/volby92a/uvod92_a.htm.

1994—Candidate dataset and elections results from the Project on Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe at the University of Essex (1999–2002). The web page of the project is no longer available, but previous iterations can be accessed via the Wayback Machine at http://web.archive.org/web/20030302194538/http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/database/candidate/sk94cand.xls. I also double-checked the data on the distribution of seats against the elections results published by the Slovak Statistical Office at http://volby.statistics.sk/nrsr/nrsr1994/slov/.

1998—Candidate dataset from the Project on Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe at the University of Essex (1999–2002). The web page of the project is no longer available, but previous iterations can be accessed via the Wayback Machine at http://web.archive.org/web/20030302194538/http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/database/candidate/sk98cand.xls. Dataset on elected MPs compiled on the basis of the list published by the Slovak Statistical Office at http://volby.statistics.sk/nrsr/nrsr1998/eng/results/tab6_s.jsp.htm.

2002—Dataset compiled on the basis of the candidate lists and elections results published by the Slovak Statistical Office at http://volby.statistics.sk/nrsr/nrsr2002/webdata/engl/tab/tab5.htm.

2006—Dataset compiled on the basis of the candidate lists and elections results published by the Slovak Statistical Office at http://volby.

statistics.sk/nrsr/nrsr2006/angl/info/regkand.jsp.htm and http://volby.statistics.sk/nrsr/nrsr2006/angl/obvod/results/tab6.jsp.htm.

2010—Dataset compiled on the basis of the candidate lists and elections results published by the Slovak Statistical Office at http://volby.statistics.sk/nrsr/nrsr2010/info/regkand.jsp@lang=en.htm and http://volby.statistics.sk/nrsr/nrsr2010/sr/tab6.jsp@lang=en.htm.

2012—Dataset compiled on the basis of the candidate lists and elections results published by the Slovak Statistical Office at http://volby.statistics.sk/nrsr/nrsr2012/info/regkand.jsp@lang=en.htm and http://volby.statistics.sk/nrsr/nrsr2012/sr/tab6.jsp@lang=en.htm.

2016—Dataset compiled on the basis of the candidate lists and elections results published by the Slovak Statistical Office at http://volby.statistics.sk/nrsr/nrsr2016/en/candidates.html and http://volby.statistics.sk/nrsr/nrsr2016/en/data04.html.

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