KAMIL ZWOLSKI

EUROPEAN SECURITY IN INTEGRATION THEORY

Contested Boundaries

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To my gorgeous wife Roxi and my handsome son Dorian.
They have created the most lovely and supportive
home environment, allowing me space
to write this book (on time!).

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List of Abbreviations

CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
CEE	Central and Eastern European
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CoE	Centres of Excellence
CoP	communities of practice
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDC	European Defence Community
EEC	European Economic Community
ENVSEC	Environment and Security Initiative
EPC	European political cooperation
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EUF	European Union of Federalists
IfS	Instrument for Stability
IGO	inter-governmental organisations
INGO	international non-governmental organisations
MAD	Mutual assured destruction
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
UACES	Academic Association for Contemporary European Studies
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II

CHAPTER 1

European Security, Integration Theory and Boundaries

Following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2014, policy practitioners and scholars have been in search of a deeper understanding of the likely causes of the conflict and its consequences for the European security architecture. Various theories have been deployed to this end, but international/European integration theory remains conspicuously absent. Perhaps it is irrelevant? This book re-examines federalism and functionalism – two fundamental, yet largely forgotten, theories of international integration – in order to demonstrate that the dilemmas facing Europe are not new and were already theorised after World War I (WWI). The book subsequently shows how the core tenets of these early theories, particularly how they viewed boundaries, remain as relevant today as they were almost 100 years ago. To this end, the book demonstrates intellectual continuity between federalism and the contemporary research programme on the European Union (EU) as a global power, and between functionalism and the contemporary research programme on European security governance. The first of these programmes is often considered to have suddenly emerged in the 1970s, inspired by the external activities of the European Economic Community (EEC). The second one emerged in the 1990s, inspired by the 'governance turn' in Politics and International Relations. In reality, the heritage of both research programmes, even if indirectly, is much longer and richer.

The book aims to accomplish three objectives. The empirical objective is to demonstrate that some of the fundamental security dilemmas facing

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Europe in the 1920s–1950s were not that different from the challenges we currently experience. As soon as the first ideas for international integration in Europe were formulated after WWI, it became clear that there was no consensus on the boundaries of the envisaged European integration project. Most importantly, there was no agreement among European political thinkers and policy makers on the eastern frontier of the future European federation, specifically the place of Soviet Russia. Beginning with Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, the place of Russia in Europe continued to dominate the debates, with arguments ranging from those urging Europe to unite against the imminent Russia's invasion, to those urging peaceful coexistence of united Europe and Soviet Russia. David Mitrany represented a completely different take on the problem. He wanted to circumvent the problem of boundaries all together through his functionalist approach. He rejected the idea of closed, continental unions. Today, Europe is in a different place. The Soviet Union is long gone. Yet, many of the important arguments on European security order mirror the arguments raised in the past. In the debates concerning EU-Russia relations following the conflict in Ukraine, at the risk of slight simplification, two competing positions can be clearly distinguished. One considers Europe to be, once again, threatened by expansionist Russia and advocates a more coherent and more assertive EU response to this threat (McFaul et al. 2014; Snyder 2015). The other position calls upon the EU to become more inclusive towards Russia, recognising it as an equal partner rather than a disobedient recipient of European norms and values (Kissinger 2014; Mearsheimer 2014; Milne 2014). It is thus important that we recognise this continuity. By understanding the arguments, which shaped the debates on the boundaries of European integration in the past, we are better equipped to understand and contribute to the discussions in the present.

The theoretical objective is to demonstrate that early integration theories remain fundamentally relevant and important (a) to understand the contemporary European security predicament; and (b) as intellectual heritage informing, even if indirectly, contemporary research programmes on Europe as a global power and European security governance. Both federalism and functionalism, as two of the major early integration theories, remain relevant and important for the understanding of the dilemmas facing Europe today. The book also re-examines two contemporary research programmes: Europe as a global power and European security governance. The main purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate that some of the key differences between these programmes resemble the differences,

which distinguished the functionalist and federalist approaches. The question of boundaries is, again, at the centre. On the one hand, the contemporary 'Europe as power' research programme can be traced back to Coudenhove-Kalergi. It is mostly concerned with the EU as an international/global actor/power. It conceptualises, explains and prescribes the EU's role in the world, often advocating a more coherent, capable and effective policy at the EU level. On the other hand, the contemporary 'European security governance' research programme displays a more flexible approach to the problem of territoriality and boundaries. While both research programmes appreciate the unique, multi-dimensional nature of the EU's institutional structure, the 'governance' approach is more focused on decentralised, often informal networks of actors and processes, typically operating across formal boundaries. For its problem-oriented, rather than territory-based focus, the governance approach can be fruitfully compared to Mitrany's functionalism. Chapter 6 demonstrates how practitioners, scholars and students of European security can gain a deeper understanding of the dilemmas facing the EU vis-à-vis its eastern neighbourhood by drawing on two competing theoretical traditions: federalism/EU as a global power on the one hand, and functionalism/European security governance on the other hand.

The meta-theoretical objective is to demonstrate the importance of empirical-normative theories for generating policy-relevant, practical knowledge, urgently required by policy practitioners and experts in Europe today. Granted, all theories of integration contain normative dimension, but the difference between empirical-explanatory and empirical-normative theories can be explained by comparing functionalism with neo-functionalism. Ernst Haas rightly observed that functionalism was embedded in political theory, and thus engaged in both analysing and prescribing. Functionalists not only analysed the existing society but also claimed 'to know the way in which a normatively superior state of affairs can be created' (Haas 1964, p. 7). Hass explicitly rejected this approach and instead opted for the functional theory as a way to 'map out the problem area' so that it can be rigorously studied using appropriate methods. He aimed at description, explanation and prediction. In turn, Mitrany complained that the majority of international theorists were busy attempting to uncover '"scientific" ways and laws', using tools which 'would have stunned all the policy makers from Bismarck to Bevin' (Mitrany 1975, p. 26).

This book challenges the popular perception of early integration thought as 'pre-theories' or 'normative visions', which merely paved the

way for the post-World War II (WWII) theories 'proper'. It argues that the eclectic, empirical-normative character underpinning early international integration theories makes them more practical and policy-relevant. In other words, the theories of this kind are more suitable for providing a valuable contribution for those who are concerned with the practical aspects of politics and international relations (policy practitioners). The most pressing questions concerning international security order require an empirical-normative mode of theorising. In the context of the war in Ukraine, it is not only important to know why exactly the conflict erupted, but also how the international community *should* react. The empirical-normative kind of theory also informs, to an extent, the contemporary research programmes on Europe as power and European security governance. This is sometimes obvious already in the publication titles, such as 'Wake Up, Europe!' by Menon and Howorth (2015). By explicitly engaging with meta-theoretical assumptions informing discussions on European security order, the book demonstrates that empirical-normative theorising does not only constitute a legitimate form of scholarship but can lead to generating policy-relevant knowledge so urgently needed.

European Security Order and European Integration

The popular narrative, which the British right-wing press perpetuates in order to justify Britain's withdrawal from the EU (so-called Brexit), is that the European integration project today is drastically different from the one the United Kingdom (UK) joined in 1973. Among others, Andrew Gilligan (2012) voiced this sentiment succinctly in The Telegraph: 'It could be said that Britain did not move away from Europe, but that it moved away from us. The British people joined, and were happy to join, a common market. They did not sign up to a social chapter, a single currency or any moves down the road to a superstate.' Undoubtedly, European integration is deeper and broader today, than it was in the 1970s. The Treaty of Maastricht, followed by Amsterdam and Lisbon Treaties, have all moved the EU further in the federal direction, short of actually making the EU a federal organisation. At the same time, however, this popular British narrative is not entirely accurate. It creates the impression that, prior to the 1990s, European integration represented nothing more than a free trade area with some additional economic regulations, but without the ever-increasing political baggage, which unveiled in front of the eyes of the unsuspecting British public much later. In reality, political

considerations of the highest calibre are at the very roots of the post-WWII European integration and they continued to resurface regularly in national and European debates. If we take a longer-term view of European integration and include the interwar federalist efforts, the high-political context of European integration becomes even clearer. There are broadly four stages to the political and security dimension of European integration, all of which were obvious before the UK joined the EEC. Consequently, the political dimension of European integration should not have been a surprise to the British public.

European Integration Before 1945

The first stage of European integration involved the advocacy movement led by Austrian Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi (1926), whose ideas went as far as being formally introduced as policy by French Prime Minister Aristide Briand to the League of Nations. Using today's terminology, we could describe Coudenhove-Kalergi as a norm entrepreneur. Through his policy-oriented Pan-Europe movement, he spent his adult life influencing the political class across European countries, arguing that Europe divided up into fully sovereign states must inevitably lead to another major conflict within Europe. He urged Europeans to create the United States of Europe if they want to save Europe from becoming geopolitically and economically irrelevant. The old system of European great powers was gone in the aftermath of WWI, superseded by the emerging system of world powers. Europe had no chance to become a member of this exclusive club *on par* with the United States and Soviet Russia, unless it federates. Not only was unification important to preserve Europe's relative strength, but, even more urgently, to save it from the existential Soviet military threat. Coudenhove-Kalergi (1926) distrusted Soviet Bolshevism as soon as he saw it. Coudenhove-Kalergi did not manage to turn his vision into reality. Further, he was either ignored or seen with suspicion by the British international federalists, because he excluded the UK from his envisaged European federation. He thought the British Empire would not be ready to make the necessary commitment to Europe. Although unsuccessful, his vision became widely recognised and discussed throughout Europe, when Briand proposed a similar scheme in the form of a concrete policy proposal in 1929. It too did not materialise, and soon the war broke out. Shortly before the outbreak of the war, and during its course, a number of voices in the UK argued the urgency of federating Europe, even if, from the

British liberal perspective, the ultimate outcome should be the federation of the world (e.g. Davies 1940; MacKay 1940; Robbins 1937).

It is easy to dismiss those early international integration efforts as irrelevant to the post-WWII European integration. Indeed, there is no clear continuity between the two, and Monnet explicitly rejected federalism as an integration method. As Chap. 2 demonstrates, however, there is at least some continuity. On a personal level, the interwar mayor of Cologne, Konrad Adenauer, supported the Pan-European movement (Heater 1992, p. 128). Symbolically, Coudenhove-Kalergi was the first recipient of the City of Aachen's Charlemagne Prize. The most fundamental element of continuity, however, is more subtle. As Chap. 4 demonstrates, neither Monnet himself nor the Schuman Declaration of 1950 rejected federation as the ultimate destination for European integration. It is unquestionable that the main purpose of those early integration efforts was political, not economic. The tragic experience of WWI, together with the increasingly worrying peace prospects during the following two decades, convinced individuals across Europe that the system of sovereign states did not work. The exact perspectives on how it should have been fixed differed, but most thinkers and activists supported a political union among European states.

European Federalism 1945–1950

Immediately following the end of WWII, various national and transnational political movements, alongside influential individuals, pressed for the unification of Europe, as the only hope to prevent another European war. Among those individuals was, again, Coudenhove-Kalergi. He continued his 'policy entrepreneurial' work, this time approaching the world's most influential 'private citizen', Winston Churchill. The tides of history have shifted, and Coudenhove-Kalergi had more luck advocating European unity this time, compared to his interwar efforts. He did not have to convince Churchill, who was already committed to the unification of Europe. He famously expressed this commitment in September 1946 during his speech in Zurich, calling for the 're-creation of the European family' based on the reconciliation and partnership between Germany and France. This 'delegating' of European integration to the continental Europe came as an unpleasant surprise to many on the Continent, who had hoped for a more active British leadership. Britain's reservation was hardly surprising for people like Coudenhove-Kalergi, however, who had been cautioning against including this country in the envisaged European federation already

in the 1920s. Indeed, the years 1945–1950 marked the emergence of two integration models. One, advocated by Great Britain, confined possible integration to inter-governmental cooperation, mainly in the economic sphere. The other one, advocated by most continental countries, preferred a more ambitious arrangement, moving Europe closer to a federal system. Harold Macmillan explained this divergence of approaches at the Council of Europe, in 1950. He observed that

> The continental tradition seeks to reason *a priori* and descends, as it were from the summit to the plan; it proceeds from general principles, which it then applies to practical issues (…). The British, on the other hand, prefer to discuss problems *a posteriori*, ascending from practical experience towards the summit. (quoted in Heater 1992, p. 151)

The European federal movement between 1945 and 1950 certainly seemed to confirm this divergence of outlooks, insisting on creating the European constitution, federal institutions and simply announcing the European federation, as a brand-new entity, to the world. Carried out by the enthusiasm sparked by the Churchill's Zurich speech, federalist advocacy movements and prominent individuals met at The Hague in 1948, subsequently forming the European Movement. Its efforts were rewarded with the creation of the Council of Europe in 1949, but at this point, the early post-WWII enthusiasm was long gone, as the new organisation fell short of anybody's expectations. Coudenhove-Kalergi's own experience reflects well this emotional journey. Concerned that European governments did not explicitly endorse Churchill's plan for Europe, he thought it would be best to approach national parliaments directly. Out of this parliamentary work emerged the European Parliamentary Union, lobbying national governments to endorse the European idea (Coudenhove-Kalergi 1962). Its recommendations were not taken into account in the design of the Council of Europe, however, which emerged as an organisation concerned primarily with cultural and human rights issues (Heater 1992, p. 149). Coudenhove-Kalergi had no doubts about the main reason behind this setback: the participation of sceptical England, which wanted the Council to perform a merely advisory function. As a result, the more ambitious proposals had no chance in the Council's Committee of Ministers, which rejected any ideas mentioning the creation of supranational bodies with decision-making powers (Monnet 1978, pp. 281–82). This way, for the second time, European governments failed to transform the political conception of Europe into a viable policy action.

The Jean Monnet Method and the EEC

Compared to the interwar federalist ideals and the post-WWII advocacy of the United States of Europe, the Schuman plan for the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) promised to be everything that the European Movement and the Council of Europe were not. Returning to the comparison drawn by Macmillan, the Schuman plan was much more in line with the alleged British approach to solving international problems. It focused on the narrowly delineated problems hampering the reconciliation and integration between Germany and France, and not on the grand vision of transforming the European political system. The attitude of Monnet towards the European Movement and the Council of Europe was telling:

> I am sure that despite many vain aspirations there were also some fruitful lines of action. But I confess I paid little attention to the Hague Congress; and the fate of its enthusiastic resolutions, which a year later led to the founding of the Council of Europe, confirmed my belief that this approach would lead nowhere. (Monnet 1978, p. 273)

Perhaps when the British right-wing press reminisces about the EEC at the time of the UK joining the organisation, it sees it as this functional, purely economic bloc of countries who wanted nothing more than to trade and become wealthy. It was only later, once the UK was stuck inside, when the EEC/EU, for some reason, evolved into a more comprehensive, political organisation. It is true that Monnet disliked the federal method of European integration, but it does not mean that he rejected European federalism as Europe's final destination. As Chap. 4 elaborates, Monnet was not a Mitrany-style functionalist, in that their conceptions of international integration were different. While Mitrany opposed the idea of exclusive regional blocks, Monnet wanted Europe to become a federation, only not by the means of inter-governmental agreements and grand declarations. Furthermore, those federalist objectives were explicitly embedded in the Schuman Declaration. The fact that the scope of European integration was confined to economic matters in the first few decades does not change the fact that the original intention underpinning European communities was to add political, social, cultural and perhaps even military layers in the unspecified future.

All the signs were, from the very beginning, pointing to the conclusion that the ECSC/EEC was never going to be a purely free trade block.

There was the Schuman Declaration, the historical context, the initial focus on coal and steel, and the *sui generis* nature of the EEC. One would not expect government officials to routinely read academic publications, but Mitrany (1965) expressed his disapproval of European integration already in the 1960s, arguing precisely that its character was no longer functional. While there was nothing stopping the ECSC from forging functional links with the outside world, the EEC was already a much more territorially-bound, bureaucratic and exclusive organisation. That was even before direct elections to the European Parliament and the creation of the EU. The direction of European integration, however, was clearly set in 1950. Consequently, the difference between the European Movement/Council of Europe and the ECSC/EEC was mainly in the method, not in purpose. The European founding fathers envisaged a federation as the final destination, but without setting any time frames. Even without a specific schedule, however, European integration was a deeply political project from its very inception.

European Political and Security Integration

In addition to the highly political character of the EEC, there was a regular influx of political efforts and initiatives directed at expanding the scope of European integration to include foreign and security policy. Granted, some of them were spectacularly unsuccessful, but others were successful and even the unsuccessful ones were indicative of the possible direction the European integration project was about to take in the future. The unsuccessful attempt was the idea of the European Defence Community (EDC), which aimed to embed the envisaged West German army within the European framework, in order to prevent the revival of the German military power. The pressure for restoring the West German force came from Washington. The ECSC Six signed the treaty in Paris in 1952, setting the stage for the supranational European army. In 1954, however, the French National Assembly failed to ratify the treaty, allowing the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to emerge as the primary framework for European military cooperation. The spectacular character of the rise and fall of the EDC may have convinced some observers that the members of the ECSC/EEC would not re-attempt expanding the scope of integration beyond economic cooperation. That was not the case, however, and another, albeit less ambitious plan emerged in 1970 with the Luxemburg Report. In this report, the EEC Six undertook a

cautious attempt to coordinate their international policies through an informal political framework called European political cooperation (EPC). The EPC was nonbinding because the report was not ratified by national legislation (Smith 2002). Yet, this document 'marked the first successful attempt at foreign policy cooperation by the member states of the European Community' (Smith 2002, p. 68). The EPC framework allowed EEC foreign ministers to meet twice a year in a country holding the Presidency, but not in Brussels. The so-called Political Committee, further divided up into working groups, prepared the work for the ministers.

While different in character, all four stages outlined here underscore that the post-WWII European integration was never confined to trade and economic recovery. Political and security considerations were always of fundamental importance. Admittedly, it is easy to overlook the intricacies of European integration when studying the subject from today's perspective. As such, the pre-1950 efforts involving the advocacy of Coudenhove-Kalergi, Briand Memorandum, Mitrany's critique and European Movement leading to the Council of Europe, may all seem relatively insignificant compared to the European integration 'proper', which started off with the Schuman Plan. After all, it is much easier to remember the policies and ideas, which proved spectacularly successful and forget those which did not work out as originally intended or those which were hidden below the surface. The 'surface', in this case, is the unambiguous brand 'European *Economic* Community'. What is hidden underneath were the slightly more ambiguous, but visible signs that European integration was fundamentally concerned with establishing a working European security order.

Re-telling the Story of European Integration Theory

The turbulent story of European integration, including its political and security dimensions, has been the central focus of international integration theories, later known as European integration theories. The manner in which those theories flourished, and the circumstances in which they were subsequently disposed of or 'improved' by new theories, has become a fascinating story in itself. As Ben Rosamond notes in an edited volume which is the foremost tale of European integration theory, this story tends to be told in a chronological order (Rosamond 2006). As a result, some theories are depicted as 'old', others as 'new', and there is even a category

of 'pre-theories'. In some instances, 'old' theories are 'revamped' and the 'improved' versions come with a prefix 'neo-', indicating that whilst the old theory contained some useful insights and those were rescued, the new theory is free from the fundamental shortcomings of the old version. Such is the cultural and institutional context of the Western academia, that the theories developed more recently are typically considered more accurate, more insightful, or otherwise better than the older ones. We accept the labels such as 'old' and 'new' because they are explicit indicators of scientific progress understood in the Kuhnian terms of shifting paradigms and scientific revolutions. Further, to be recognised among the founders of the 'new' theoretical approaches is a sign of scientific excellence. The story of international/European integration theory is, therefore, likely to be retold in this chronological manner, with new theoretical approaches regularly populating the panels of academic conferences and journal articles.

There is a clear logic underpinning the chronological narrative of international/European integration theory. At the same time, however, this mode of storytelling risks distorting our understanding of the subject in two ways. First, as noted by Rosamond (2006), we risk misinterpreting the older theories by relying not on original sources, but rather on others' interpretations of original sources. He was particularly concerned with the treatment of neo-functionalism in some recent textbooks, noting that the contemporary accounts tend to strip this complex theory of its nuances and depict it as merely offering us the notion of 'spillover', which was not even applicable beyond a short European integration moment. This is just one type of misinterpretation, however. Another one can occur when a founder of a new theoretical approach undertakes to improve an older theory but misrepresents its intricacies in the process. In this context, Ernst Hass can be considered to be misinterpreted by some of the current accounts of neo-functionalism, but also one who misinterpreted the functionalist approach of David Mitrany. For example, Haas interpreted the functionalist approach as assuming international integration around voluntary transnational agencies – a proposition that he questioned. Even the cursory reading of Mitrany, however, allows concluding that his interests and examples typically revolved around government-founded organisations, such as the League of Nations or the ECSC. Chapter 4 offers more examples of discrepancies between the Mitrany's take on functionalism and Haas' interpretation.

The second, and even more important potential problem with operating with the labels such as 'new', 'old' and 'pre-' theories is that instead of

understanding those labels as simply depicting the chronology in which the theories were developed, we will take them to denote the relative value, accuracy and utility of those theories. In that case, particularly if we do not make an effort to access original texts, we risk missing on valuable insights, which those theories offer. Take the Mitrany's functionalist approach, for example. It is a theory of international integration largely forgotten today, overshadowed by Haas' neo-functionalism, even though the latter was a completely different kind of theory, developed for a different purpose. David Mitrany was concerned with advancing international peace and security. His functional system was not to be contained to any geographical region, but instead, its boundaries were to be delineated by the functional tasks facilitated by transnational agencies. Further, his theory was not of the explanatory kind, but it was more eclectic, encompassing both explanatory and normative elements. Haas, in contrast, was an American political scientist concerned with explaining the Common Market, which involved states already enjoying peaceful relations. The two theoretical propositions, therefore, represent different kinds of theoretical endeavours, developed in different historical periods for very different purposes. As a result, they should be treated as two distinct theoretical contributions to knowledge and studied on their own terms. In particular, there is no reason to treat Haas' neo-functionalism as an improvement on the Mitrany's functional approach.

If we take a step back and ask 'What is European integration theory?', the answer appears straightforward: it is a body of theoretical propositions aiming to conceptualise, explain or even predict various aspects of European integration. Of course, what we talk about here is not any form of European integration. European integration theories are specifically concerned with integration institutionalised in the form the ECSC, EEC and eventually the EU. By extension, the beginnings of European integration theory date back to the 1950s and are associated with the scholarship of Ernst Haas. Today, early exchanges between neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism are considered old theories, in contrast to a variety of new theoretical approaches advanced since the 1990s. One can, therefore, easily imagine the exemplary structure of a university course teaching European integration theory. It would have to begin with the 'old' theories, neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism, followed by the proliferation of theoretical approaches deriving from comparative politics, public policy, legal studies, political economy, sociology, etc. Here is a question though: How to treat David Mitrany's functionalism and

international federalism? In all likelihood, those two approaches would have to be treated in a similar fashion as they are treated in textbooks: included at the very beginning as 'pre-theories', or 'normative visions', which paved the way for the post-WWII theories 'proper'. In one sense, there is nothing wrong with that. Chronologically, they were the first large theoretical programmes intended to unite countries and societies. They were also, in a different form, taken up and integrated into the post-WWII theories of European integration. In a more fundamental sense, however, it is deeply problematic to give those two theoretical approaches the mere status of precursors to the actual, legitimate theories of European integration.

International, Not European Integration Theories

It would be inaccurate to characterise functionalism and federalism as theories of *European* integration. Granted, a large body of international federalist writing was, in fact, focused on Europe, with most students familiar with the names of Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rosi. As Chap. 2 demonstrates, however, the international federalist thought enjoys a more diverse tradition. The European and broader, international paths were discussed and promoted in parallel and often were forced to interact with one another, such as within the Federal Union – a British advocacy organisation (Mayne et al. 1990). Among the most prominent advocates of international federalism was Coudenhove-Kalergi, whose idea of Pan-Europe strictly delineated the boundaries of his envisaged political integration project to the Old Continent. At the same time, however, there were influential writers such as Clarence Streit, who in his pamphlet *Union Now* rejected the principle of geography as the basis for international integration, because a federation of this kind would have to include European democracies and dictatorships alike. Instead, he advocated a union of North-Atlantic democracies.

If there is a degree of ambiguity whether international federalism should be classified as a theory of *European* integration, no such doubts exist in case of the Mitrany's functionalist approach. In fact, one can imagine him vividly protesting if assigned such a label. Mitrany developed his framework partly in opposition to the international integration schemes confined to the imagined geopolitical regions, such as Europe. The only way he could have supported European integration was through the parallel support of integration in other world regions, and only under the

condition that an overarching political framework, such as the League of Nations, would have brought all those integrated regions together. In other words, he supported regional integration in the form of devolution of the international authority to the regional level so that regional problems can be resolved more efficiently (Mitrany 1933). While he disliked the notion of international federalism in general, he was particularly keen to criticise federalism in the form of regional, closed unions, such as the EEC. As Chap. 4 discusses, he did not hide his disappointment with the way in which the arguably functional ECSC transformed into the allegedly exclusive EEC, depicted as 'diffuse and subject to a continuous temptation to self-inflation' (Mitrany 1965, pp. 141–142). It would, therefore, be not only inaccurate but also ironic to include Mitrany's functionalism as a European integration theory when it clearly was not.

Theories, Which Are Relevant Today

Another problem with treating early international federalism and functionalism as mere precursors to post-WWII European integration theory is that a narrative of this kind suggests those early theoretical approaches are somehow irrelevant today. Perhaps they had something interesting to say at one point, in a particular set of historical circumstances, but the advent of European integration and no threat of another European war called for theories of integration to serve a different purpose. This may be a compelling argument, but, as this volume demonstrates, it is inaccurate. International federalism, and especially Mitrany's functionalism, offer valuable insights into our understanding of the dilemmas permeating European security order. Precisely because they were developed before the actual project of European integration began, they offer a unique, broader perspective on some of the fundamental questions concerning wider-European security cooperation.

One fundamental way in which those theories are still applicable today is that they are concerned with the timeless questions of international war and peace. Their concern is unsurprising, considering the historical context, which can also mean it can be tempting to dismiss them in the present, relatively peaceful times. As Chap. 6 demonstrates, however, international security environment following the conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine signals that it would be premature to dispose of those theories, relying instead on European integration theories. In fact, the latter have been conspicuously silent from the debates on Russia and the conflict in

Ukraine. This can be surprising, considering the fact that the causes and nature of the conflict are directly connected to European integration. The only exception here is the proliferating scholarship on the EU's role as an international security 'actor', which has traditionally been concerned with the performance of the EU as an entity in world politics. The conflict with Russia over Ukraine serves here as another case study and a test of European coherence and capabilities (see *JCMS* Special Issue from January 2017 and Gehring et al. 2017). Other than the 'EU actorness' scholarship, the only debate with some theoretical underpinnings on the current European security predicament has taken place between realists and liberalists. Why has the bulk of European integration theory been absent from discussing the problem which is clearly related to European integration? It is because this theory was developed for a different purpose and with certain assumptions.

Most importantly, European integration theory assumes peace in Europe. It is concerned with European integration among states enjoying peaceful relations. It is already the case for so-called old theories of neofunctionalism and inter-governmentalism, and it is even more of the case for more recent 'EU as polity' approaches. European integration theory also serves a different purpose. It is concerned with studying the peaceful process of European integration embedded within a specific institutional and legal framework. In contrast, international federalism and the functionalist approach are well suited to engage with the problems of international security, especially when security is interconnected with international integration. Another way in which federalist and functionalist approaches are relevant today is that they are not concerned exclusively with any particular institutional framework. Unlike EU-focused European integration theories, those two older approaches are more inclusive. As noted, international federalism involved different strands, some of which went beyond Europe. Mitrany's functionalism, on the other hand, explicitly questioned the feasibility of regional blocks. As a result, those integration approaches can shed a unique light on integration-related problems of international security, when a wider variety of actors is involved.

For these reasons, international federalism and functionalism deserve separate treatment, unrelated to the chronological story of European integration theory. It is not to say that they had no impact on early theoretical thinking about the Common Market. On the contrary, their impact was significant. We must recognise, however, that their utility spans far beyond whatever components of those theories were 'rescued' and subsequently

incorporated into the political-scientific agenda of European integration studies. Early international integration writings invite us to ask broader questions about the most desirable model of international integration and to consider the consequences of our choices for international security and cooperation. We cannot reduce those questions to the study of the EU as an international security actor. While offering valuable insights, this strand of the European studies scholarship is too embedded in the existing political and institutional structure of the EU. It takes the EU as it is, and investigates how much it is capable of a state-like behaviour in international politics. As such, as Chap. 3 demonstrates, it can be usefully considered an extension of the early federalist writing. Similarly, we cannot reduce the discussion of international integration and international security to the study of security governance. This strand of research, as Chap. 5 demonstrates, incorporates some of the key principles of international functionalism. It is, therefore, the argument of this book that our understanding of the relationship between international integration and security can benefit from a more holistic approach to international integration theory, moving beyond the confines of the post-WWII European integration theorising.

Integration Theory as Theory

This book refers to both international federalism and the functionalist approach as early *theories* of international integration, which is not out of line with the scholarship on the theories of European integration. For example, Michael Burgess (2009) contributes with his chapter on federalism to an edited volume *European Integration Theory*. Both federalism and functionalism are included in the *Debates on European Integration*, edited by Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2006). Similarly, those early theoretical approaches to integration are discussed at length in earlier surveys, such Pentland (1973); Harrison (1974) or Groom and Taylor (1990). When looking closer at how early integration theories are depicted in this literature, however, it appears that they are treated somehow differently from, for example, neo-functionalism. The latter is offered a status of the 'proper' integration theory – its 'scientific' status and credentials are unquestioned. After all, it was developed by a political *scientist* in the context of the American professionalisation of the discipline, when new, rigorous methods of theoretical enquiry were adopted (Rosamond 2000, p. 187). International federalism and the functionalist approach, in contrast, are

'normative visions', and they are 'not "functionally-equivalent" to latter day theories' (Rosamond 2000, p. 186). They are also 'pre-theories', with prominent federalist writers more often interested in prescribing integration and drafting international constitutions than with description and explanation of international federations (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2006, p. 18). The bottom line is that neither functionalism nor federalism neatly fit within this body of scholarship, which Harrison (1974, p. 9) depicts as describing and explaining 'every step in the European process' and offering 'general explanations why regional integration takes place and why its pace varies'.

The theoretical status of early international integration theory is important, because theory as such enjoys eminent status within the International Relations scholarship. If a work does not offer any theoretical contribution, it is less likely to pass the test of time and, as a result, less likely to be recognised as a valuable contribution to the discipline. Mearsheimer and Walt, influential theoreticians themselves, make this point clear in their defence of theory in International Relations, observing that theorists 'are the field's most famous and prestigious scholars' (Mearsheimer and Walt 2013, p. 428). Wæver (1998, p. 718) candidly admits that '[y]ou only become a star by doing theory'. It is thus fair to say that the stakes are high. As noted, neither international federalism nor Mitrany's functionalism represents the kinds of theories which have come to dominate the field of International Relations, particularly in the United States (representing the dominant strand). This is partially due to the sociology of the discipline, and a particular manner in which American International Relations developed after WWII.

In contrast to Europe, with its tradition of historicism, rich description and dependency on local particularities, the field in the United States has become methodology-oriented, concerned with advancing all-round general theories, not afraid of simplifying empirical reality for the sake of theoretical innovations which are well-suited to travel across continents (Wæver 1998). A prominent example of theorising in this tradition is Haas' neofunctionalism. Even though the theory itself proved of little value outside of a particular moment of European integration, it still easily carved for itself a hegemonic position in the newly-founded, post-WWII EU studies. When Europeans were busy revisiting the old debate between neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism in the context of the 1980s revival of European integration, Andrew Moravcsik (1991) dropped a new bombshell in the form of his article in *International Organization*, stirring

European discussions once again (Wæver 1998). The takeaway point is that the way in which the International Relations evolved after WWII made it impossible for either international federalism or, to a lesser extent, Mitrany's functionalism, to be taken seriously. Both approaches lacked the methodological rigour and they were also developed in the wrong place (Europe) and the wrong time (before or during WWII). Whilst theories developed in the United States (mostly by European-born scholars) travel well to Europe, traffic in the opposite direction is almost non-existent (Wæver 1998).

The overall outcome of the processes described here is the familiar pattern of the discipline dominated by the American-established paradigms of realism, liberalism and constructivism, and a plethora of European approaches defined by their opposition to those paradigms. Some American scholars seem to have recognised the intellectual limitations stemming from this paradigm-driven agenda in International Relations, and they have ventured to propose solutions. Among those, the eclectic approach proposed by Sil and Katzenstein (2010) appears most promising for accommodating early international integration theories. Three characteristics distinguish it from the traditional, paradigm-driven research agenda. First, it prioritises the pragmatic focus on researching real-world problems and downplays unresolvable, metaphysical discussions. This feature of the eclectic approach appears to fit perfectly the agenda of early international integration theories. Both international federalism and functionalism were advanced precisely to resolve real-world problems – those of war and economic underdevelopment. In that sense, both approaches are pragmatic to the bone. In light of the devastating effects of WWI, followed up by the economic depression, American unwillingness to commit to the League of Nations and the militaristic aspirations of Soviet Russia, thinkers like Coudenhove-Kalergi, Mitrany and others proposed to reorganise international relations along the lines, which they envisaged, would best suit the cause of peace and prosperity.

The second characteristic of the eclectic approach is that it tackles problems of a wider scope than the traditional research intended to test or fill the gaps in individual theories. The eclectic approach takes fuller account of the messiness of the real-world problems and does not shy away from appreciating their full complexity. This feature also appears to fit well with early international integration theories. They were advanced precisely to tackle the broad and extremely messy problems of war and poverty. As a result, scholars researching the conditions for international peace or the

peculiarities of military conflicts, if they want to draw on the eclectic tradition, may find it valuable to engage with both international federalism and the functionalist approaches, as they both offer some timeless insights on those issues. The third characteristic of the eclectic approach is that in researching those messy and broad problems, it enables generating multiple causal stories, with the intention of exploring interactions between those stories. This is where the eclectic approach draws on different ontologies of the major paradigms in International Relations, allowing them to fill each other's gaps in order to obtain a complete explanation of a problem. It thus breaks with the tradition of parcelling problems into smaller chunks in order to produce some isolated, within-paradigm insights, which are then bound to be ignored or rejected by competing paradigms.

This third characteristic of the eclectic approach is, however, problematic for early integration theories, as neither international federalism nor functionalism offer systematic causal stories *on par* with the mainstream theories of International Relations. Their value, therefore, would be limited within the eclectic framework outlined by Sil and Katzenstein, in that they were not primarily developed for explaining international problems, but rather to explain *and* prescribe policy solutions. Christian Reus-Smit (2013) identified the limitations embedded in analytical eclecticism, noting that although its authors intended to surpass the meta-theoretical considerations in their approach, they nonetheless adopted particular epistemological and ontological positions, 'making it one kind of project and not another' (Reus-Smit 2013, p. 591). Epistemologically, analytical eclecticism is an empirical-theoretic approach, in that it does not include normative theories in its allegedly inclusive theoretical spectrum. Ontologically, it is *de facto* limited to drawing from the causal stories represented by three dominant paradigms: realism (with its emphasis on material power), liberalism (with its emphasis on cooperation between rational egoists) and constructivism, with its emphasis on norms (Reus-Smit 2013). These meta-theoretical limitations are perhaps natural and not even seen as limitations from the perspective of the American International Relations scholarship. They are, however, problematic, in that they close research avenues for potentially fruitful projects involving theories with the significant normative component.

As noted, neither international federalism nor Mitrany's functionalism can be considered explanatory theories in the same sense as the three major paradigms. It does not mean, however, that they refrained from explaining important aspects of international relations. Notably, both

theoretical approaches identified the system of competing, sovereign states as the cause of military conflicts. Norman Angell offered an impressively in-depth criticism of international anarchy in his contribution to Leonard Woolf's *The Intelligent Man's Way to Prevent War* (Angell 1934). He compared the anarchic condition of the international system to that of the road traffic if no traffic rules applied. Obviously, without rules, vehicles would be bound to collide all the time. While rules cannot eliminate accidents altogether, they at least provide the framework for orderly conduct and they can also help to assign blame when accidents happen. Angell traced the roots of international competition to the sentiments and desires of John Smith – a fictional character epitomising 'common men': 'Men love power and domination so much that they never abandon it so long as they believe that they can achieve desired ends by its means' (Angell 1933, p. 298). We should, therefore, credit Angell for his 'human nature' explanation of international anarchy and conflict as much as we credit Hans Morgenthau. David Mitrany also considered the state-centric system of international relations as prone to generate conflict, arguing for a functional alternative. One avenue to outline his ideal model of international relations was through his analysis of the impact of sanctions on states, which he produced for the American Advisory Group on Disarmament and Security. The Group aimed to associate the United States closer with the League of Nations. Mitrany's contribution was, in fact, the first analysis of this kind. He explained how the system of generalised sanctions is bound to have a drastically different impact on participating states, negatively affecting smaller and weaker states if they are on the border with a stronger, target state (Navari 1995). The point here is that early international integration theories generated insightful empirical-theoretic knowledge, even if their style was not as 'rigorous' as we have become socialised to expect in the academic scholarship.

Explaining various aspects of world politics is not, however, the primary legacy of early international integration theories. Their fundamental input was to offer comprehensive policy prescriptions. In that sense, both international federalism and functionalism were normative-theoretic, vigorously arguing for how international politics *should* be organised. Their visions were famously contrasting. Federalists called for the abolition of international anarchy through creating supranational authority, be it at the regional or global level. They argued about the optimal institutional arrangements, power divisions between different levels of government, and – crucially – about the membership of their envisaged federal unions.

Mitrany thought the federal route was unfeasible because it would require states and citizens to voluntarily give up sovereignty – a task impossible to achieve. The federal plans, particularly those calling for regional unions, were also dangerous, in that they would have reinforced familiar competitive dynamics, only at the higher level. The bottom line for Mitrany was that fixed, constitutional arrangements could not create a peaceful and prosperous world order. What is needed instead is a flexible, process-oriented and needs-driven system of functional links and non-political agencies, one which is geographically unconstrained and can win people's hearts by fulfilling their direct needs better than states.

While it is indeed easy, from today's perspective, to dismiss the prescription-driven writing of Mitrany and others as 'unscientific', it is interesting to note that Mitrany himself was concerned precisely with advancing the 'academic' and 'scientific' approach to studying international relations. What Mitrany took for granted, however, was that the sole purpose of applying the scientific method to studying international relations was to prevent another major war and to overcome economic depression (Mitrany 1931). It is thus noteworthy that while it may be obvious to us that early international integration theorising was not 'properly' theoretical, scientific and academic, Mitrany was equally confused with the increasing complexity of the post-WWII political scientific reasoning. He found it understandable that international relations scholarship proliferated after WWII, given the tragic experience of the two world wars and the new challenge posed by nuclear weapons. He was astonished, however, by the fact that this new generation of scholarship did not actually seek solutions for a more peaceful and prosperous society. Instead, he complained, while some scholars returned to advocating regional federations, the majority 'set out to uncover "scientific" ways and laws for the making of an international system, using ingenious tools that (…) would have stunned all the policy makers from Bismarck to Bevin' (Mitrany 1975, p. 26).

This brings us back to analytical eclecticism: can it accommodate theories, which are both explanatory and normative? Reus-Smit certainly thinks so, but not within the epistemological boundaries imposed on analytical eclecticism by Sil and Katzenstein. The key problem with analytical eclecticism in the current form, according to Reus-Smit, is its misconception of what constitutes practical knowledge. Citing thinkers like Aristotle, Kant and Carr, Reus-Smit argues that the kind of practical knowledge which is most relevant to 'research users' is the knowledge which combines

the study of causes (what is) with the study of values and ideas (what should be). What the production of this kind of knowledge requires, however, is not just the transcending of paradigm boundaries, including ambitious combinations of positivist and interpretivist approaches. An even more ambitious move is necessary, one which combines causal and normative theorising. An approach is necessary which helps to address the most pressing international questions, that is questions of 'what should be done' kind. Reus-Smit finds the essays by Buchanan and Keohane (2006) to be exemplary of the empirical-normative tradition he advocates, as they combine a comprehensive understanding of international institutions with the normative questions of legitimacy. We can make a similar argument about early international integration theories. Granted, their empirical component may not be sufficiently rigorous by today's standards of academic research, but those theories were developed in a particular set of historical circumstances and for a very specific purpose. Above all, early integration thinkers aimed to present the most convincing case for a particular model of international organisation they advocated while being pressed by the increasingly worrying international environment. Consequently, we should consider early integration theories of international federalism and functionalism as eclectic approaches. By combining empirical and normative epistemologies, those theories intrinsically linked their (rather similar) understanding of the causes of conflicts, with competing normative visions of the best model of international organisation to ensure a more secure and more prosperous future.

Boundaries in Integration Theory

The historical context of European integration forced the questions of security order and cooperation to the centre of any attempts at theorising this unprecedented political process. The problem of European security, in turn, has always been intrinsically linked to the questions of boundaries: Where should the system of European security end? Where does 'Europe' end? Should a boundary be delineated separating European from non-European countries? Finally, how should relations be organised with states/regions outside of the system of European security? Considering the centrality of these questions to European integration, it is peculiar that they were almost exclusively addressed by early international integration theories, while post-WWII European integration theory remained relatively silent in this respect. Indeed, both international federalism and the

Mitrany's functionalist approach were concerned with the problem of boundaries. For federalists, this was a necessity. One cannot envisage an international federation without confronting the issue of its boundaries. It is true that some federalist thinkers and advocates opted for the federation of all states. However, even they had to acknowledge that while the world federation may be a long-term aspiration, an immediate unification was urgently needed in Europe. Mitrany engaged with the problem of geopolitical boundaries specifically in response to Coudenhove-Kalergi and Aristide Briand's proposal for the pan-European union.

The point is that the boundaries of the envisaged European integration were vividly discussed during the interwar and WWII periods. In contrast, similar discussions were scarce in the European integration scholarship theorising the ECSC/EEC. Here, the boundaries of Europe were largely taken as given based on the membership in the Common Market. Further, the advocates and implicit supporters of a European federation, when confronted with the empirical reality of the actual European integration project, shifted their interest to the question of the EEC's role in European and international security, thus giving birth to a new strand of European integration theory. In the current research on European and integrational integration, the debates over the boundaries of European integration and European security order are less pronounced than in the early integration scholarship. The historical context is different, and the role of professional academics has also evolved. Today, the discussion on European security and its boundaries is, to an extent, continued by two contrasting research programmes. On the one hand, a body of scholars study unified European power, presence, or 'actorness' in international security, implicitly drawing on the old European federalist principles of advocating a strong and coherent European Union. On the other hand, a separate strand of scholarship frames the question of European security as that of governance, prioritising security challenges over geopolitical entities, in line with the functionalist approach. While there may only be an indirect continuity between early international integration theories and current research debates on European security, the question of boundaries remains relevant. In fact, the complexity of relations between the EU and its neighbours, and especially Russia's conflict with Ukraine, have made the problem of boundaries in Europe more pressing than ever in the post-Cold War history.

'Boundaries' is the preferred term in the book over the related term of frontiers, based on an insightful and elegant distinction drawn between the two concepts by Ladis Kristof (1959). Kristof boils down the difference

between 'boundaries' and 'frontiers' to the fact that the latter is outer-oriented and the former is inner-oriented. Frontiers denote opportunities and dangers for communities inhabiting remote areas of a state or an empire, enjoying the relatively limited authority of the central government. Frontiers also denote the meeting place of different cultures involving constant negotiation of meaning and practices. Boundaries, in contrast, are inner-oriented. They are not inhabited and, as such, do not even have physical presence. The actual objects such as stones and fences, which represent a border separating one political unit from another, are visible symbols of boundaries. Without semi-autonomous community life, boundaries passively express the will of a government asserting its authority over territories inside boundaries. While frontiers perform an integrative role, boundaries always separate one political unit from another.

Even with an established pattern of cross-border contacts and exchanges, boundaries are always obstacles. Kristof rejects the idea that boundaries can be drawn in such a way as to enable integration of communities on two opposite sides. Whenever a line is drawn separating political units, the integration and assimilation of those units must always be more difficult than if no such line exists. Consequently, '[e]very confederation, federation, or merger of states must always begin with a (total, or at least partial) elimination of the limiting and separating factors inherent in the boundary, and thus a withering away of the boundary itself' (Kristof 1959, p. 273). Boundaries not only separate, but they do so in a subjective manner. In contrast to natural boundaries, which can occasionally be fixed by humans, political boundaries are always created by human will based on preferred criteria, such as standards of civilisation, language, customs, race, religion, or other. Boundaries in the political world '[e]ach generates loyalties and also imposes duties and constraints for the sake of internal harmony and compactness and of external separateness and individuality' (Kristof 1959, p. 277). In other words, boundaries serve two interconnected functions. Internally, they reinforce the 'we-feeling' among people, creating bonds and identities. Externally, they help inhabitants to interpret and make sense of the differences between their own political community and others. Those internal/external characteristics make the concept of boundaries particularly suitable to capture two competing visions of international integration as represented by early international integration theories as well as subsequent strands in European integration theory.

The internally integrating and externally separating function of boundaries features most prominently in the federalist writings of the interwar

and WWII periods, and especially in Coudenhove-Kalergi's vision of Pan-Europe. For this European Count, Europe is defined by its historical and cultural heritage embedded in the Christian-Hellenic tradition. In a cosmopolitan spirit, Coudenhove-Kalergi (1926) called upon Europeans to learn the history and culture of other European countries as a means to overcome national chauvinisms. He considered inter-state boundaries an obstacle to pan-European integration, and thus he recommended abolishing them. The external function of the Pan-European boundary, as discussed in Chap. 2, was to restore Europe's greatness vis-à-vis other regions and protect Europe against Russian threat. The union of North-Atlantic liberal democracies, as envisaged by Clarence Streit (1940), was, in contrast to Pan-Europe, bounded by the commitment of its members to democratic values, rather than by geography. Streit insisted at the outset of WWII that the democratic world urgently needed to unify in order to preserve and protect its cherished principles (an internal function) and to protect Western democracies against nationalistic and Communist dictatorships (external function). He clearly delineated the boundaries of his envisaged democratic union, naming fifteen states as the optimal founding members, even though his ultimate objective was the federation of all states. That would only have been possible, however, when excluded states assimilate to the democratic norms upholding the union.

Other federalist thinkers and advocates approached the function of boundaries in the same manner, emphasising what they thought were elements linking the members of their envisaged groupings, and drawing distinctions with states, which did not belong inside. Lionel Robbins, associated with the British Federal Union, urged European states to unite based on their shared 'consciousness' but excluded Soviet Russia as incompatible (Robbins 1939[1968]). R.W.G. MacKay (1940), also associated with the Federal Union, drew the boundary separating his proposed European federation from Russia on the grounds of the size of the latter. As Kristof notes, however, even those seemingly neutral criteria for creating boundaries one way or another are inherently political. After all, it is the choice of those who create them to favour one criterion over another. The final example of how the internal/external function of boundaries has informed the thinking of international federalists comes from the famous idealist David Davies. The 'internal harmony' of his envisaged federation should stem from Europe's shared history, civilisation and territory. The boundary needs to be drawn, however, to protect the 'compactness' of the federation and distinguish it from countries like Soviet Russia, which

represented an Asiatic power. Interestingly, however, Davies included Turkey, which although being partially Asian, was also strategically important to Europe. This reaffirms how very subjective the process of boundary drawing was for international federalists.

Those who were critical of regional unions, including Ludwig von Mises and David Mitrany, also engaged with the internal/external aspect of boundaries, as outlined by Kristof. They did so in order to criticise the feasibility and desirability of creating regional federal unions and artificially separating those entities from the outside world. The internal function of boundaries, as noted, is to create loyalties and reinforce the 'we-feeling' among inhabitants of a bounded political entity by serving as a meeting place with a different 'socio-political body' (Kristof 1959, p. 277). Is it possible, however, to establish an effective boundary including nations of diverse histories, languages, cultures and religions? Von Mises thought this was not possible, simply because Europe could not evoke the same emotional response among Germans as Germany, for example. In fact, German nationalism existed long before the creation of the German state. Another telling example concerns Poland, which did not exist as a state between its partition in the late 18th century and 1918 when it was restored. Yet, the idea of Poland and Polishness permeated all aspects of the Poles' life throughout the partition period.

For the critics of federating Europe, the idea that a pan-European boundary could perform internally a similar function to the boundaries of well-established nation states was not only unlikely but also undesirable. If chauvinism is bad in principle, asked von Mises, why should it be replicated at the European level? He had no doubt that nurturing European chauvinism was the inevitable outcome of implementing the Pan-European idea à la Coudenhove-Kalergi. Mitrany seconded those concerns, questioning the need for 'inventing' a European culture, which did not naturally exist. If Europe was built on the tradition of cultural openness, why should it attempt to isolate itself by establishing an artificial boundary separating Europeans from 'others'? It was the external function of boundaries, however, which worried Mitrany the most. As noted, boundaries help to establish 'external separateness and individuality' (Kristof 1959, p. 277). Those are the very features of boundaries, however, which were blamed by liberally-minded thinkers for all things tragic in 20th-century international politics. As Mitrany famously remarked, '[i]n international relations, individualism leads, with the fatality of cosmic law, to alliances, and alliance to a struggle for the balance of power' (Mitrany 1930, p. 468).

The passionate engagement with the internal/external function of boundaries, so prevalent in early international integration theory, is largely muted in the contemporary research programmes discussed in this book. Granted, as Chaps. 3 and 5 argue, intellectual continuity exists between international federalism and the 'Europe as power' research programme, as well as international functionalism and the 'security governance' research programme. In other words, the differences between the two contemporary research programmes are of a similar kind as the differences between the two strands of early international integration theory. At the same time, however, the question of boundaries as such is less prominent in the contemporary European integration scholarship. On the one hand, the 'Europe as power' research programme is mainly concerned with analysing the institutional mechanisms, coherence, effectiveness and values of the EU as an actor/presence/power in international politics. Similar to the Europe-focused strand of international federalism, the 'Europe as power' research programme is concerned with studying Europe as a bounded, political entity, but EU boundaries are taken for granted in the contemporary discussions. On the other hand, the 'security governance' research programme is mainly concerned with studying the fragmented and multi-level authority of international institutions in response to the evolving international security agenda. Similar to the Mitrany's functionalist approach, the 'security governance' research programme is concerned with security problems and functions of international institutions to address them, but it lacks direct engagement with the problem of boundaries, including the criticism of how it is approached in the 'Europe as power' research programme.

Why are those research programmes lukewarm about boundaries? First, they are a different kind of theory. While most contemporary European integration theories contain normative components, the normative dimension of those theories is nowhere near as prominent as in early integration theory. The proportions became reversed. While the primary purpose of early international integration theory was to deliver a strong normative message with the supporting role of causal analysis, the purpose of today's research programmes is to conceptualise, describe and explain, with an often implicit normative message in the background. Second, European unification was merely a political idea and aspiration for international federalists, with no European boundaries to speak of. In contrast, contemporary research programmes study a clearly delineated supranational entity. Is this relative neglect of the boundary question a problem? It can be

because it limits the usefulness of contemporary research programmes in discussions on European security order. As Reus-Smit (2013) notes, normative questions are most practical because they give 'research users' information they seek, i.e. what should be done in a given situation. For example, how should the EU's presence in international relations be organised to optimise the chances of international peace and security? Should the EU prioritise promoting its values, even when confronted with the opposition of countries like Russia? Those are empirical-normative questions and neither the 'Europe as power' nor 'security governance' research programmes are well equipped to address them.

Europe, Russia and Integration Theory

The outbreak of the conflicts in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 took many by surprise. Particularly the conflict in eastern Ukraine could have been shocking for those who thought the confrontation between the West and Russia was a relic of the Cold War. Soon after the conflict broke out, discussions proliferated on its causes, as well as most feasible solutions. International Relations theories were evoked, even if only implicitly. In essence, and rather expectedly, two camps emerged in those debates. Realist-minded commentators accuse the United States, NATO and the EU for expanding their institutional outreach and influence to the very borders of Russia, encroaching on Russia's legitimate interests in countries like Ukraine (Mearsheimer 2014). Liberal-minded commentators, on the other hand, accuse Russian leadership of autocratic and imperialist tendencies, emphasising that each country is free to associate with institutions they want (McFaul et al. 2014). Do theories of European integration have anything to add to this discussion? After all, the causes of the conflict are linked to the EU's Eastern Partnership policy framework and long-lasting association negotiations between the EU and Ukraine. European integration was also at the heart of the protests in Kiev in late 2013/early 2014, which soon spiralled into an open conflict.

Arguably, the contribution of European integration theories has been rather modest. Predictably, it is centred on assessing EU's international 'actorness', with the conflict in Ukraine serving as the latest security problem the EU must confront. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* published a special issue on this topic (January 2017), offering a comprehensive assessment of the EU's performance in the crisis in Ukraine (see also Gehring et al. 2017). The contribution of the 'Europe as power'

strand of European integration theory to the discussion is indeed important and valuable. The EU has been both a key factor in the events, which led to the outbreak of the conflict, as well as the international organisation most affected by the conflict. Its efforts at fostering a coherent response deserve scholarly attention. Admittedly, this kind of analysis is also exciting, considering the long tradition of studying the EU's role in the world and the severity of the problem at hand. At the same time, however, there are fundamental questions concerning European integration, the conflict in Ukraine and the role of Russia in European security order, which the contemporary debates in European integration theory cannot address. Many of them were asked during the House of Lords hearing on the future of EU-Russia relations (House of Lords 2015). Here is a sample of those questions:

- How should the EU respond to the alleged President Putin's treatment of the relationship with the EU as 'a struggle to control the post-Soviet space, not a partnership'?
- In the current state of EU-Russia relations, should the EU continue to raise values such as human rights?
- How should the EU respond to Sweden and Finland's interest in joining NATO?
- How the EU and Russia's competing priorities regarding Ukraine should be resolved?
- How should the EU prepare for the post-Putin era?
- Should there be some form of dialogue that requires all sides to participate?

The reason why European integration theories are ill equipped to address those questions is that they are normative in nature. They thus require normative or empirical-normative theorising. As noted, the two contemporary research programmes discussed in this book aim mainly at description and explanation, not prescription. Of course, the aforementioned International Relations theories both contain strong normative elements, one prescribing maintaining the balance of power in Europe, and the other one the promotion of democracy, human rights and market economy in countries like Russia and Ukraine. Consequently, each of them can serve as the general guideline for approaching the 'Russian problem'.

In addition to those two mainstream International Relations paradigms, however, early international integration theories can also offer useful

insights into the problem. As noted, both international federalism and the Mitrany's functionalist approach represent empirical-normative theoretical traditions, in that they attempt to offer the most accurate explanation of the problem of war, but they also offer solutions. This normative component makes them suitable to answer the 'should' kinds of questions, such as the ones asked during the aforementioned House of Lords discussion. Those two early international integration theories are not only suitable to answer normative questions, but they, due to the geopolitical circumstances of their time, were concerned with the very questions of European security order and the place of Russia in that order. In fact, the eminence of those questions during the interwar and WWII periods explain why those theoretical discussions began in the first place. It is, therefore, reasonable to expect that those early international integration theories should be able to offer policy guidelines on the current European security predicament *on par* with the International Relations theories. Interestingly, some evidence presented during the House of Lords debate on the future of EU-Russia relations came close to resemble the arguments of international federalism and functionalism. This is how one witness captured the dilemma facing Western Europe: 'is it more important for the European Union to expand its political and economic influence in the former Eastern bloc countries, or is it more important to have a functional, stable and growing relationship with Russia?' (House of Lords 2015, p. 23). This dilemma expresses two competing visions of European security order, represented by the two early international integration theories.

For international federalism, the place of Russia in European security order was of fundamental importance, and it featured most prominently in the writings of Coudenhove-Kalergi. He was determined to convince European states to form a federal union, but he was also aware that Europe's borders are unfixed in the east. Delineating the boundaries of his envisaged Pan-European union was, therefore, a value-driven, political exercise. Rather than asking about the geographical limits of Europe, it required deciding on the political and normative nature of the European federation, which then helped to establish whether countries like Russia meet these criteria for membership. It is a separate question, of course, whether Soviet Russia was at all interested in becoming a member of this potential European grouping, but this is irrelevant. What matters in the case of Coudenhove-Kalergi's argument is his particular vision of the European security order. More specifically, as explained in Chap. 3, it is

notable that he represented one of the two competing visions of organising European affairs after WWI, and that his vision informs, if only implicitly, the assumptions and normative aspirations of the contemporary 'Europe as power' programme. Coudenhove-Kalergi was not, of course, the only thinker and advocate of international federalism. Chapter 2 introduces a whole range of federalist arguments, also those, which distanced themselves from the Pan-Europe idea. In short, international federalists ranged from those who opted for the federation of all states and nothing less, to those who preferred narrow federal unions, underpinned by liberal democratic values. As WWII approached, and soon after its outbreak, a group of federalist advocates, many of whom were associated with the British Federal Union, urged Europe to unify first, even if the federation of the rest of the world remained a longer-term objective. At this point, the question of the place of Russia returned. Inevitably, it required value-based justifications for treating Russia either as an external threat or as a potential partner for the envisaged European Union (no one seemed to consider Soviet Russia a potential member state of the European federation).

Mitrany was less concerned with the place of Russia in European security order because his vision of international functional order aspired to be universal and anti-statist. He insisted that it should be less important who exercises power (e.g. European states or a European federation of states), and instead we should be concerned with the question where it is best to exercise power in order to secure the universal values of peace and economic welfare. Applying today's vocabulary, we could say that Mitrany was concerned with problems to be solved more than with actors and their power – a feature which distinguishes his approach from international federalism, and, at the same time, provides a significant element of continuity with the contemporary 'security governance' research programme. While advocating his own vision of international functional order, Mitrany felt he could not ignore calls for a European federal union, which even gained the status of an official policy proposal in form of the Briand Memorandum.

In response to those calls, Mitrany (1930) advanced a fierce criticism of regional federal arrangements, arguing that they would not resolve problems, which they intended to address. As Chap. 4 elaborates, Mitrany rejected the principle of fixed, constitutional arrangements underpinning the ideas for such unions, and criticised them for shifting the balance of power dynamic to the regional level, rather than eliminating it all together. If Europe federates, he argued, countries like Russia would be hard pressed

to counterbalance the European power by forming its own alliances, reviving the old-style power competition. He remained consistent with his argument and after WWII he dismissed calls for responding to the unfolding Cold War and the development of nuclear weapons by establishing an international federation (Mitrany 1975, p. 26). He also disliked the direction, which European integration took following the creation of the EEC (Mitrany 1965). While the ECSC was functional in principle, the EEC was arguably territorial and exclusive. If we now return to the aforementioned dilemma – 'is it more important for the European Union to expand its political and economic influence in the former Eastern bloc countries, or is it more important to have a functional, stable and growing relationship with Russia?' – it is clear that Mitrany would have chosen the latter.

Structure of the Book

The book is structured in such a way as to underline a degree of continuity between some theoretical approaches and distinction between the others. Chapter 2 discusses the early international integration theory of federalism. The reader may be surprised by the degree of attention dedicated to this integration theory in the book, but the intention is not to treat federalism as a mere 'precursor' or 'pre-theory', but rather as a fundamental theoretical contribution in its own right, independent of post-WWII European integration theory. In fact, the discussion here is far from comprehensive, omitting almost completely the institutional, economic and social designs of the proposed federal integration projects. Instead, the chapter primarily focuses on one particular aspect of the federalist theorising, that is the problem of external boundaries. Each federalist advocate was forced to decide on, and justify the geopolitical scope of their envisaged unions, which required explicit arguments for and against the membership of particular countries. As the reader will quickly discover, Russia was most problematic in this regard. Chapter 3 moves the discussion of integration theories to more recent times, focusing on the 'Europe as power' research programme. This chapter is as much about the 'content' of the research produced under this label, as it is about the sociology of this strand of European integration theory. Of particular interest for the argument of the book is a degree of continuity between early international federalism and the 'Europe as power' scholarship, as both revolved around prescribing/studying a particular geopolitical entity. Most thinkers in the two research traditions also seem to share certain assumptions

about European integration, including that it is safer for Europe to unify because the 'world outside' remains dangerous or that European integration is simply desirable.

In Chap. 4, the federalist vision of international integration is contrasted with the functional approach, as advanced by David Mitrany. Again, the discussion in the chapter is far from comprehensive, focusing mainly on one particular aspect – Mitrany's take on boundaries, territoriality and regional integration. He had well-established views on those questions stemming from his universal vision of function-driven, rather than territory-driven integration. Before proceeding to these substantive problems, however, the chapter first sets the record straight in arguing that Mitrany's functionalism must be considered a theoretical approach in its own right and not as a precursor to Ernst Haas' neo-functionalism. In fact, as the chapter argues, the two approaches had little in common. Chapter 5 discusses the contemporary research programme known as 'security governance'. The argument in the chapter unveils in a way to demonstrate similarities with functionalism, which are of two kinds. First, and this is an empirical and a normative statement, both approaches reject strictly-bounded territory as a basis for international security cooperation. Second, both approaches emphasise problems and how international institutions can be best organised to solve them. In that sense, they are oriented towards function and service, not the territory. Chapter 6 reverses the narrative of the book. Rather than discussing the perspective of integration theories on boundaries and the inclusion/exclusion of Russia, the chapter first examines competing narratives concerning European – Russian relations in the context of the war in Ukraine. Only then, it returns to integration theories, in order to re-examine their contribution to understanding the conflict and prescribing solutions.

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CHAPTER 2

Federalism and Security Through Boundaries

It is a truly exciting activity to revisit early scholarship on European and international integration, produced long before and shortly after the European integration project was launched with the Schuman Declaration in 1950 (Sutton 2007). Over the subsequent decades, studying integration at the international level became synonymous with exploring the nature of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC) and eventually the European Union (EU) (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2006; Wiener and Diez 2009). As the European integration project was growing in its level of institutionalisation, its scope and its geographical size, it became almost intuitive to focus on what *was* happening, rather than on what *should* have been happening. Empirical theorising in European integration studies was further reinforced by the behavioural revolution in North-American political science (Wæver 1998). Its timing coincided with the formative years of the European integration programme and inevitably influenced its study (Rosamond 2000). In contrast, integration thinkers of the 1920s until early 1950s could not have studied any concrete instance of European integration, because nothing substantial yet existed. Instead, recognising the importance and urgency of international integration, they focused on advancing elaborate arguments in support of their visions of a European, Atlantic or world union.

Three questions dominate the post-World War I (WWI) international federalist literature: Why do we need an international federation? How should it be organised? Which states should be included? The 'why'

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question was easy to answer. Europe had just experienced the largest war in history, it was quickly marching towards a new one, the Soviet threat was looming and Europe was losing its economic advantage to America. The need to overcome anarchy through integration appeared as natural at the international level, as it was within states (e.g. Angell 1934; Kerr and Curtis 1923). The 'how' question was more difficult to answer, because it involved the problem of organising federation at the level where it had never existed before. Austrian Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi experienced this difficulty first-hand, when the increasingly hostile international environment shattered his ambition to establish the United States of Europe (Coudenhove-Kalergi 1962). The last question was no less tricky. Which countries should be inside the envisaged federation, and which ones should be excluded? The idea of international federation inevitably raised the problem of boundaries. Every political community must end somewhere unless the whole world is included. For most federalist thinkers, that 'somewhere' was along the western border of the Soviet Union (e.g. Coudenhove-Kalergi 1926; Davies 1940; MacKay 1940; Robbins 1937). The membership of the United Kingdom was also contested, but for different reasons. Indeed, the envisaged federation's eastern frontier appeared most important for international peace and security. It was also most problematic due to the absence of clear geographical demarcation separating Europe from non-Europe. Arguments ranged from those envisaging peaceful European-Soviet coexistence, to those urging Europe to unify against the inevitable Soviet invasion.

In contrast to the general surveys of European integration theory, this chapter does not offer an exhaustive overview of federalism as an approach to European integration. This is a task, which would go far beyond the theme of this book, but one which would also be unnecessary, as there are numerous excellent contributions on this topic (e.g. Burgess 2000; Harrison 1974; Pentland 1973). Instead, the focus of this chapter is on that aspect of federalism as an approach to international and European integration, which deals specifically with the question of boundaries, focusing on the rationale for identifying prospective members, and for excluding important 'others'. As the correlation between geopolitical exclusion and European security gained in significance with the expansion of the EU in recent decades, it should be enriching for the contemporary debates to revisit the original, often forgotten arguments of early international federalists. In a similar vein, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to address the general problem of boundaries of Europe. Boundaries can be understood in a comprehensive sense and include political, ideological and

cultural dimensions. By extension, they may or may not overlap with the boundaries of the EU (Mikkeli 1998; Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2015). The focus of this chapter is narrower, as it only includes the considerations of geopolitical boundaries as advanced by the federalist proponents of international and European integration.

The discussion begins with Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi and his programme of creating a Pan-European Union covering most of Europe, but excluding the United Kingdom and Soviet Russia. Although never fully realised, his vision captured the imagination of some of the leading political figures of the interwar period. As the subsequent section demonstrates, however, Coudenhove-Kalergi's vision never gained wide acceptance among British idealist internationalists, who mostly strived for a much wider federation, eventually encompassing the whole world. Their ambitious vision, as the third section discusses, became increasingly overshadowed by political events throughout the 1930s, with a European federation quickly emerging as an urgent necessity of the time. Even if world unity was still a desired outcome for most liberalist thinkers, it was increasingly obvious that Europe, yet again, was the main source of international instability. The fourth section sheds light on the problem of boundaries in international federalism in the post-World War II (WWII) period. At that point, two empirical developments 'changed the game' for the federalist thought: the unveiling of the Cold War and the launching of the European integration project in Western Europe. Federalist thinkers and activists were faced with the dilemma: to nurture their original federation visions or to 'go with the flow' of the actual developments in Europe. As a result, international federalism became increasingly 'Europeanised' and the problem of safeguarding security in Europe began to give way to the fascinating question of Europe as an emerging power in the world. Europe, in this narrative, was associated with the EEC and the question of its eastern boundaries was effectively 'resolved' by Moscow. The final section reflects on the criteria adopted by federalist thinkers to draw the boundaries of their envisaged federation projects, including the role of power in this process.

Coudenhove-Kalergi and the Boundaries of Pan-Europe

Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi was born in 1894 in Tokyo. The child of a European father and a Japanese mother, it seems that from early childhood he was destined to conceive of his identity as trespassing the national boundaries of nation states. Indeed, just like his father,

Coudenhove-Kalergi viewed himself as a true cosmopolitan. He was coming from a long line of European aristocrats dating back to the 11th century. Two of his ancestors – North Brabantian (modern Holland) brothers Coudenhove – participated in the first crusade of European Christian knights in 1099 (Coudenhove-Kalergi 1953, p 3). Did this rich, aristocratic ancestry influence Coudenhove-Kalergi's approach to European unity in the 1920s? Interestingly, for a symbol of his Pan-Europe movement, he chose a red cross on a golden sun, with the red cross – the flag of the medieval crusaders – representing 'the oldest known symbol of supra-national European brotherhood' (Coudenhove-Kalergi 1953, p. 98). WWI, with its political and economic outcomes, determined the ultimate shape of Coudenhove-Kalergi's legacy. Interestingly, however, he did not concern himself with the conflict for the most of its part. In 1917, however, at the time when he finished his doctoral studies at the University of Vienna, two events attracted his attention to the war: involvement of the United States and the Communist revolution in Russia (Coudenhove-Kalergi 1953, pp. 64–65).

From the start, he was a strong supporter of Woodrow Wilson, as he found his own ideas reflected in the approach of the American President. At the same time, he was deeply suspicious of Russian Bolshevism, as it appeared that this new eastern semi-religion could have achieved its objectives only through bringing more conflict and bloodshed. While Coudenhove-Kalergi's upbringing and values undoubtedly nourished his growing opposition towards Soviet Russia, his personal encounter with some of its methods must have further reinforced his views and affected his design for a European unity, and most importantly its boundaries. In April 1919, Coudenhove-Kalergi came to Munich, where his wife – a famous actor – was playing a role. Munich at the time was torn by strong revolutionary and separatist sentiments. Following the assassination of the relatively moderate idealist leader Kurt Eisner, who proclaimed Munich the Bavarian Republic, Bavaria was, overnight, declared a Soviet republic. Because of the revolution, some more radical Communists took over the leadership of the city, bringing chaos and terror. In Coudenhove-Kalergi's own words, '[s]hops were looted; hundreds of innocent citizens were imprisoned; hostages were taken (…)' (1953, p. 72). One night Soviet Bolshevism literally knocked on Coudenhove-Kalergi's door, when the Communist militia woke up him and his wife and their hotel room was searched. While they both managed to survive this incident, Coudenhove-Kalergi remembers the killing of one of his hotel neighbours, a young

price von Thurn and Taxis. Interestingly, even this horrific personal encounter with Bolshevist methods prompted the young Count to conclude that 'the Munich Commune was a good deal less violent than other Soviet revolutions' (Coudenhove-Kalergi 1953, p. 74). This observation informed Coudenhove-Kalergi's subsequent ideas about the optimal design for a European federation.

These ideas were most comprehensively spelt out in the book *Pan-Europe* published in 1923, although Coudenhove-Kalergi made his views widely known for the first time when he published a newspaper article 'The European question' in Vienna and Berlin (Coudenhove-Kalergi 1962, pp. 30–35). In essence, Pan-Europe meant 'the political and economic consolidation of all the states from Poland to Portugal into a federal union' (Coudenhove-Kalergi 1926, p. 21). Political geography, therefore, played a prominent role in this scheme. Deciding which countries could belong to the union was as important for Coudenhove-Kalergi as designing the institutional system for the federation. From this geopolitical perspective, the key rationale for Pan-Europe was the disappointing position Europe found itself in following WWI. While other regions were expanding, Europe was in decline:

> The world hegemony of Europe is overthrown for all time. Once feared, Europe is now pitied. From its dominating position, it has been thrown back upon the defensive. Threatened in a military way by a Russian invasion; threatened economically by American competition (…). (Coudenhove-Kalergi 1926, p. 8)

Indeed, Pan-Europe was to become 'a politico-military defensive alliance against Russia and an economic defensive alliance against America' (Coudenhove-Kalergi 1962, p. 32). Russia was, therefore, the key 'other' against which Europe had to unite. For Coudenhove-Kalergi, history offered ample evidence that unification was the only option if Europe was about to survive. In fact, Europe in the 1920s resembled the position of ancient Greece, with the Peloponnesian War representing the shortsightedness of the political leaders of the time, who did not anticipate the real danger from the north: Macedonia. In a similar vein, WWI was a 'civil war between Europeans' (Coudenhove-Kalergi 1962, p. 5) who were not recognising the existential military threat coming from Soviet Russia. Could Russia ever join Pan-Europe? For Coudenhove-Kalergi, it would only be possible to *consider* Russia's membership if the country became

democratic. He was doubtful, however, whether Russia would actually want to join a European federation. As the old system of Great Powers vanished, Russia was consolidating its hegemonic position as a Eurasian world power. Coudenhove-Kalergi reinforced this message in his Chatham House lecture in 1931, in which he presented Pan-Europe as a wall, which would separate Great Britain from Russia (Coudenhove-Kalergi 1931). Soviet Russia continued to be the gravest threat to European security. As a result, 'Europe was far more closely connected with Australia than with Russia, and the barriers that did not exist geographically were deeper than the Atlantic Ocean between Europe and the United States of America' (Coudenhove-Kalergi 1931, p. 649). Thus, while Coudenhove-Kalergi aimed to make the boundaries inside Pan-Europe invisible (1931, p. 639), it was clear that the federation needed impenetrable outer boundaries if it wanted to remain free and secure.

Interestingly, Coudenhove-Kalergi also saw Great Britain and Ireland outside the Pan-Europe's borders. This was not due to the fundamental political and ideological differences between these countries and the rest of Europe, like in the case of Russia, but merely due to the fact that the British world empire was arguably too vast to confine itself to European boundaries (Coudenhove-Kalergi 1926, p. 37). Coudenhove-Kalergi went out of his way during his Chatham House lecture, however, to reassure the audience that the door would remain open for England and it would only be up to her to decide on her membership (1931, p. 646). As the international situation looked in the early 1930s, however, Coudenhove-Kalergi viewed British membership as impractical and British role as potentially hampering European unity rather than fostering it. It would undoubtedly equip Pan-Europe with greater power, but at the same time deprive it of cohesion. In fact, Pan-Europe with Australia, Canada and South Africa would be Europe no longer, but rather a world empire, which would, eventually, divide itself into the English-speaking part and the continental (European 'proper') part. At the same time, Coudenhove-Kalergi stressed the need for as close cooperation between Pan-Europe and Great Britain as possible, if only to contain Russia.

Coudenhove-Kalergi did not succeed in establishing Pan-Europe. Furthermore, the growing hostilities of the late 1930s, culminating with the outbreak of WWII in 1939, shifted the idea of united Europe still further away from reality. It would be inaccurate, however, to dismiss the legacy of this aristocratic idealist as irrelevant for the theory and practice of European unification. Coudenhove-Kalergi's most immediate impact was

through influencing the most prominent politicians and intellectuals of his time, even if they did not immediately act in line with the Count's prescriptions (Heater 1992, pp. 127–129). Among them were Thomas G. Masaryk, Winston Churchill and Aristide Briand. The latter, as a French Prime Minister, announced a formal proposal for a European Union in 1929 – the so-called Briand's Memorandum (Salmon and Nicoll 1997). Although the actual impact of Coudenhove-Kalergi on Briand's initiative is a matter of speculation, the fact is that the French Prime Minister and the Count knew each other well (Albrecht-Carrié 1966; Heater 1992). Briand's colleague, Édouard Herriot (1930), also acknowledged Coudenhove-Kalergi's movement in his defence of the Briand's Memorandum. In addition to this immediate influence on the European interwar political and intellectual agenda, it is fair to say that Coudenhove-Kalergi also influenced political leaders involved in launching the European integration project in the 1950s. In particular, the interwar mayor of Cologne, Konrad Adenauer, was a vivid supporter of the Pan-European movement (Heater 1992, p. 128). His views on the urgency of European integration during his term as the first post-WWII German Chancellor resembled in important parts the underpinning motives driving the agenda of Coudenhove-Kalergi. In a Brussels speech in 1956, Adenauer called upon Europeans to unite against the Soviet threat:

> Thanks to lack of unity in the West, Soviet Russia is becoming more and more consolidated as a world Power founded on the principles of Communism and dictatorship. Throughout history, Russia has shown a tendency to expand, that is, to be a threat to her neighbours; a Communist Russia is bound to have this tendency in even greater measure than the Russia of the Czars. (Schwarz 1997, p. 237)

Further, Adenauer's recognition of the growing role of 'non-white peoples upon the scene of world event', signified by the rise of China and India, resembled Coudenhove-Kalergi's insistence that Europe was being left behind by the rest of the world which 'emancipated itself from Europe' (Coudenhove-Kalergi 1926, p. 4). Incidentally, Coudenhove-Kalergi was the first recipient of the City of Aachen's Charlemagne Prize and Adenauer received one in 1954 – a year after Jean Monnet and a year before Winston Churchill. Of course, the position of Europe vis-à-vis Soviet Russia after WWII was even more hopeless than in the interwar period, thus it was easy to argue the relevance of Coudenhove-Kalergi's observations concerning

the Soviet threat. What is notable, however, is that already in the 1920s, almost 30 years before the launching of European integration, the need for European unity (or, in today's terms, coherence) was justified by the reference to an external threat. Russia constituted an important 'other' against which Europe must unite. For Coudenhove-Kalergi, therefore, only a federation could ensure European security, by establishing peace within the European family. An essential component of this federation, however, would also include strong external boundaries, intended to deter Europe's external threats. Like a fortress with thriving internal life, Europe would ensure peace and welfare to its inhabitants and discourage any external wrongdoers at the same time.

Uniting the (Democratic) World: British Interwar Idealism

It is fair to contend that the programme of Coudenhove-Kalergi was not particularly popular among British interwar liberal thinkers (Rich 1996, p. 26). A subtle testimony to this fact constitutes the treatment, which he received in *Federal Union: The Pioneers* (Mayne et al. 1990). The book, documenting the history of European and international federal ideas, only mentions Coudenhove-Kalergi and his Pan-European movement in one short paragraph, observing that '[s]ome were attracted – and others rather disturbed' by his ideas (Mayne et al. 1990, p. 14). A more explicit criticism came from J.A. Hobson, a famous opponent of imperialism and a strong advocate of free trade internationalism (Long 1995). In a short contribution published in 1929, Hobson rejected 'The United States of Europe' as 'ridiculous' and 'chimerical' (Hobson 1929). In fact, he would not have even found it worth to comment on Coudenhove-Kalergi's scheme, as it did not make 'any deep impression upon practical politicians' if it was not for Briand's Memorandum. Hobson criticised the exclusion of Russia and Great Britain, as well as the goal of protecting European markets from the American capital. He did not find any good reason to confine economic integration to a particular geographical area, particularly one as politically and economically diverse as Europe. In a similar fashion, one of the participants at the aforementioned Chatham House discussion pointed out that the exclusion of Great Britain and Russia from a European federation would be a mistake. Mr A. Yusuf Ali argued that without Great Britain's power, Europe would be inert and that Russia had economically more in common with European states than with Asia (Coudenhove-Kalergi 1931, p. 647).

If a European federation *à la* Coudenhove-Kalergi was not to the liking of the internationalist thinkers in interwar Britain, what was their preference then? How did they envisage the boundaries of the future international federation? First, it is important to shed some light on the prominence of the federalist ideas in interwar Britain. As such, federalist ideas became influential in Britain already in the 19th century, and particularly towards the end of it (Bosco 1995). This was partially due to the success of Canadian and Australian federations, but it was also a reaction to the upsurge of nationalism in Europe. Those interested in war, peace and the future of Europe found an important inspiration in the writings of J. R. Seeley, whose book *The Expansion of England* envisaged the processes initiated later by the British government aiming to unify its South African colonies. Involved in this process was Philip Kerr, Marquess of Lothian – the most prominent and well-known advocate of international federation in interwar Britain (Bosco 1995, p. 271). Kerr enjoyed a long and distinguished career including high-level positions in British government, but his contribution to the theory of international integration is of key interest here. Separating his political and intellectual activity is not easy, however. Already in his twenties, as a young Oxford graduate, Kerr was appointed to promote the idea of a South African federation as part of the so-called Milner's Kindergarten (Bosco 1995, p. 248). Upon returning to Britain, together with some colleagues, he founded The Round Table – an organisation promoting the idea of the federated British Commonwealth of Nations (Bosco 1995; Rich 1996).

How could one define federalism in the context of British imperialism? Kerr developed his ideas into a series of lectures at the Institute of Politics, Williamstown, which were subsequently published as *The Prevention of War* (Kerr and Curtis 1923). Kerr identified the main cause of war, similarly to his fellow idealist internationalists, to be the separation of the world into independent states. This leads to nationalism which prevents societies from recognising that they belong to 'the larger community of all nations' (1923, p. 29). Just like '[n]o musician can make progress until he obeys the law of harmony', international peace is impossible until a set of common rules is created at the global level. It was characteristic of the interwar international idealists to illustrate the importance of overcoming international anarchy with reference to other contexts, where rules enable orderly conduct. The common theme among them was this: if rules enable orderly relations within states, empires, or in road traffic, why not apply common rules at the global level to make war impossible. Kerr did not

want to be perceived as naïve, however, and cautioned his audience that he was speaking as a political theorist and not a policy practitioner. He nonetheless made a strong case for international relations to be 'constitutionally controlled by some body whose business it was to act as trustee for human welfare as a whole' (Kerr and Curtis 1923, p. 66). The British Commonwealth, in his vision, would serve as a nucleus of the world organisation, as it demonstrates that 'the idea of world unity is not so far-fetched as at first appears, and involves far less interference and change in the existing international system, as people believe' (Kerr and Curtis 1923, p. 71). Indeed, Kerr argued that in the system of unconstrained national sovereignty, states were in fact not very sovereign at the international level, with war being the only instrument of protection. Kerr further reinforced his message in the Burge Memorial Lecture given in 1935, arguing that

> [t]here is only one way of ending war and of establishing peace, in the political sense of the word, and that is by introducing into the international sphere the principle of the state, that is, by creating a federation of nations with a government which can wield the taxing, executive, legislative, and judicial power, and command the exclusive allegiance of the individual in the super-national sphere. (Kerr 1935, p. 16)

Kerr stressed this time the inevitability of world integration, observing (or, perhaps, hoping) that 'an anarchy of twenty-six states in Europe and over sixty states in the world' cannot last much longer. The road to integration can be either through the world empire or – preferably – through a voluntary federation of states. Again, Kerr observed that international integration along the lines he suggested might be difficult. This time, however, probably influenced by the drastic change in international politics since his lectures of the early 1920s, Kerr argued idealistically that it was anarchy itself, which was pushing states towards integration. What would be the boundaries of such federation? According to Kerr, it will 'begin small and grow through the adhesion of those who accept the principles of its constitution' (1935, p. 20). What was interesting in the way Kerr presented his vision was that he indeed saw the coming of the world federation as unavoidable. The only question concerned its origin, which would either be in the form of a political programme, like in some of the existing federations, or result from another world war, or from some form of transnational advocacy movement.

On the left side of the political and intellectual spectrum, Harold Laski was one of the most prominent proponents of federation at the global

level. An early, and relatively cautious statement of his views on this topic can be found in *A Grammar of Politics*, where he observed that 'society is essentially federal in nature' (1929[1938], p. 270). A more radical expression of his views, which evolved further to the left over the 1930s, is in his contribution to Leonard Woolf's *The Intelligent Man's Way to Prevent War* (Laski 1934). Indeed, international developments were the cause of a growing anxiety among pacifists, as the alarmist tone of the 1936 edition of the book's cover leaves no doubt about: 'Still cheaper edition of a famous book, now even more urgent than when first published.' Unsurprisingly for a socialist intellectual of the time, Laski found the main cause of war to be economic imperialism. The international capitalist system of exploitation and inequality makes war inevitable, and thus any reforms of the League of Nations will only be partial unless the world economic system is transformed. Laski's diagnosis allows only one conclusion: to eliminate war, the world must transform into 'a world-community of Socialist states' as a means to make states concentrate on the domestic pursuit of the welfare of their citizens (1934, p. 537). Economic anarchy has become anachronistic, as the world has become more interdependent. It must be replaced with economic planning at the international level. What is particularly interesting here is Laski's view of Soviet Russia. Being a 'military Communist state', Russia would become pacifist if it 'encounters the opportunity of economic success' (Laski 1934, p. 546). And what if it remains militarist? That would (naturally) be a result of the capitalist international system in which it is embedded, rather than the fault of its own design. It is worth noting the stark contrast between Laski and Coudenhove-Kalergi on this point, with the Count being suspicious of Soviet Bolshevism from its beginning and accusing the Soviet system of military expansionism.

Another famous proponent of some form of international federation, Norman Angell, developed his argument based on a very thorough critique of international anarchy (Miller 1995). In his contribution to the aforementioned Woolf's volume, Angell (1934) offered examples from history when unification at the international level contributed to peace between states and societies. The alternative to international unification is the same as the hypothetical situation where the road traffic operates without any rules. Angell pre-empted potential criticism that international federation would threaten national sovereignty, arguing that this model of integration does not have to be as centralist as that of the United States, and instead can be 'bearing very lightly upon national independence and

sovereignty' (Angell 1934, p. 27). If the problem of overcoming international anarchy seemed urgent in 1934, the calls for Federal Union appeared desperate in 1939, when Clarence Streit's *Union Now* was published, and hopeless in 1940, when a shorter version of the book appeared as a more practical guide.

If desperate times call for desperate measures, Streit could not afford to conceal his key message behind lengthy analysis. He articulated his argument loud and clear: a Federal Union of the North-Atlantic democracies is needed as soon as possible, entailing integration in government and citizenship, defence, trade, money, postal and communication services (Streit 1940, p. 4). The Union would start with 15 founding, most established democracies and quickly admit more so that 'absolutist powers would constantly become weaker and more isolated' (1940, p. 10). The Union would not include dictatorships like Germany and Soviet Russia. Streit rejected the principle of geography as the basis for international integration, precisely because a federation of this kind would have to include European democracies and dictatorships alike. He also objected on the grounds that if countries like Soviet Russia or Great Britain are included, it would immediately move the federation's frontiers far beyond Europe. Consequently, the political system of states could serve as a much more solid basis for a federation than geography. Again, it is interesting to compare Streit's approach with that of Coudenhove-Kalergi, who recognised a similar difficulty about Great Britain. In contrast to Streit, however, the Count chose to prioritise the European character of the federation. The difference between the two approaches comes down to the question what binds societies more: geographical proximity or similar political systems. They differed less about Soviet Russia, both noting that it effectively excluded itself from the international community.

The problem of including Soviet Russia in the Federal Union of liberal democracies was further elaborated in W. B. Curry's *The Case for Federal Union*, which reinforced Streit's message. It aimed to clarify the need for and the nature of the proposed federation. Curry wrote his book in 1939, right before the German-Russian nonaggression agreement, but he noted in a footnote that the evolving international situation did not affect his arguments (Curry 1939, p. 187). There were two fundamental reasons why Russia could not be included in the envisaged Federal Union. First, the economic systems of Russia and Western democracies were incompatible. It is the testimony to the influence of the Soviet ideology in interwar Europe, however, that Curry, not wanting to offend his 'communist

friends', suggested that it was indeed possible that Soviet Russia was already *ahead* of liberal Western states in economic development. Nonetheless, the two models could not work together. Second, and perhaps even more importantly, the Federal Union's constitution was about to be founded on the principles of democracy, free speech and political freedom, neither of which existed in Soviet Russia. Again, Curry cautiously observed that 'the restriction on free speech and free publication in Russia' may be temporary, 'an essential part of the revolutionary period', but they nonetheless existed in 1939, when the task of establishing the federation was urgent. Consequently, Russia could not participate in the envisaged liberal-democratic integration project, but the Federal Union would collaborate with Soviet Russia to the extent possible. A constitutional lawyer W. Ivor Jennings drew similar conclusions in his *A Federation for Western Europe*. Jennings, with references to Streit and Curry, developed a proposal for the federation of democracies, which initially would include countries in Western Europe. He considered Russia more of a threat than a potential candidate country at the time of writing, a threat against which Western Europe should unite. He did not exclude the possibility of Russia's membership in the future, however, if it becomes a Western-style democracy and implements an effective education programme (Jennings 1940, p. 30). The inclusion of the United States would arguably make the admission of Russia easier by counterbalancing the latter's vast population.

The World Must Wait: The Urgency of Federating Europe

It was not common for British federalists to argue for the federation of Europe because they considered themselves citizens of a much wider empire. Great Britain found itself integrated with its Dominions through the British Commonwealth of Nations, so the project of European integration seemed unnatural to them. Besides, international peace, according to the majority of the British interwar internationalist idealists, could only be ensured through pursuing integration at the global level. Overcoming anarchy globally would be the only long-term solution to change the war-enabling fundamental structure of international relations and it was, therefore, superior to the approach, which would only address immediate European problems (Anta 2014; see also Wells 1940). As the political situation in Europe was deteriorating towards the late 1930s, however,

federalists faced the dilemma. While a world federation was still the ultimate objective, some of them began insisting that the integration of Europe must take priority. This shift in emphasis was also logical considering that the two world wars originated from conflicts between European states, and that the League of Nations disappointed its supporters. This dilemma of British federalists, who tried to reconcile what was needed to fundamentally transform international relations with the more urgent need of extinguishing European fire, was reflected in an organisation founded in 1938 called Federal Union (Anta 2014). Among the founders were Charles Kimber, Patrick Ransome, and Derek Rawnsley. While they initially agreed that the primary purpose of the Federal Union was to promote 'European organisation with some degree of power over nation-states' (Mayne et al. 1990, p. 7), it soon became clear that there were indeed at least three broad visions within the organisation: for a federal Western Europe, for a federal world and for some kind of a federation between Anglo-American states. The Federal Union, with more or less success, managed to reconcile the differences between these visions, although they did have a significant impact on the organisation (Mayne et al. 1990).

Among the Federal Union's supporters was Lionel Robbins – a London School of Economics economist who joined the economists' committee within the organisation's research department (Howson 2011, p. 346). Robbins hinted at the need to overcome the fragmentation of the international system and create 'some kind of federation' already in his 1937 book *Economic Planning and International Order* (Robbins 1937). His vision further crystallised in *The Economic Causes of War*, published in 1939, right after the outbreak of WWII. To start with, in order to identify the conditions for peace, one must first define the most fundamental cause of war. In contrast to many of his contemporaries who blamed capitalism, for Robbins, wars stemmed from the existence of sovereign nation states: '[n]ot capitalism, but the anarchic political organization of the world is the root disease of our civilization' (Robbins 1939[1968], p. 99). To overcome conflict, we need 'an international framework of law and order, supported by solid sanctions'. He specified the idea further:

> We do not need a unitary world state; such an organization would be neither practicable nor desirable. But we do need a federal organization; not a mere confederation of sovereign states as was the League of Nations, but a genuine federation which takes over from the states of which it is composed, those powers which engender conflict. (Robbins 1939[1968], p. 105)

Just when one would expect Robbins to repeat the traditional interwar liberalist plea for a world federation, he concluded that such a scheme, at present time, would be 'utopian' and 'doomed to disaster'. Considering the high impact of Streit's *Union Now*, Robbins also felt the need to distinguish his proposal from that of Streit. To this end, Robbins admitted that it would certainly be desirable for international peace if liberal democracies, including the United States and British Empire, could unite into a federation. He rejected this idea, however, because the Americans were unlikely to agree to such an arrangement, and because a federation in Europe was most urgent. Consequently, Robbins proposed the United States of Europe. This geographically-limited project should have a higher chance of success, because '[a]fter all there is a common European consciousness; and it is surely in the logic of history that sooner or later this should be enshrined in common political institutions' (Robbins 1939[1968], p. 106). Contrary to Coudenhove-Kalergi, Robbins found no problems with the membership of the British Empire. Its colonies could either join as full members or remain loosely associated. Soviet Russia, on the other hand, again proved to be a step too far: 'For Russia is not European in spirit; and totalitarian dictatorship is incompatible with the federation of free peoples' (Robbins 1939[1968], p. 106). According to Robbins, the system of European sovereign states outlived its usefulness and rather than serving the purpose of nourishing European civilization, it became the very cause of its destruction. Similarly to Kerr, Robbins argued that in light of the obsolescence of the state system, international integration was inevitable – either through an empire or federation. In 1939, however, there was no time to wait for the emergence of a world federation. Rather, the ongoing conflict made it crucial to take the first steps towards the unification in Europe.

In 1944, at the Annual General Meeting of the Federal Union, a number of activists proposed that while 'the long term aim of Federal Union remains the establishment of a World Federation (…) the immediate aim (…) shall be the promotion of a democratic Federation of Europe as part of the post-war settlement' (quoted in Mayne et al. 1990, p. 86). This had led to a split in the organisation, but eventually, the motion was accepted. Among those who put it forward was an Australian-born lawyer, British Labour activist and an intellectual R.W.G. MacKay. His federalist ideas found the most comprehensive expression in his 1940 book *Federal Europe*, bearing the subtitle 'being the case for a European federation together with a Draft Constitution of a United States of Europe'. MacKay's

approach, while strongly normative, was also analytical. Before making an argument for a post-WWII European federation, he first discussed other visions popular at the time: that of the world federation and that of the federation of democracies. He rejected the first one as too ambitious, drawing on the experience of the League of Nations. He rejected the second vision, as proposed by Streit (1940), on a similar basis, but also warned that any such union may prompt excluded powers (Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia) to ally, leading to the replication of the balance of power politics at the global level.

MacKay left no ambiguity in drawing the boundaries of the envisaged European federation. In the first place, it would consist of Great Britain, France and Germany, as 'three of the four Great Powers of Europe' (MacKay 1940, p. 100). We can already note a contrast with the Pan-European idea of Coudenhove-Kalergi. The key difference is obvious: the Count did not find it practical or likely for Great Britain to join the European federation. Britain's position was at the centre of the Commonwealth of Nations, and as a world empire, it was unlikely to confine its loyalties to Europe. MacKay, in contrast, not only saw Britain as a nucleus of the federation, but he also found it desirable to admit British Dominions; they included Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand (MacKay 1940, p. 103). The second difference is more subtle. While MacKay was still, in 1940, referring to the three largest European states as great powers, Coudenhove-Kalergi, already in 1923, argued that WWI buried the system of great powers and a new system of world powers emerged. MacKay acknowledged the existence of the Pan-European movement in a very short passage: 'At least since 1923 it [a European federation] has been the subject of discussion. In that year a Pan-European Union was founded' (1940, p. 95). Coundehove-Kalergi's name is not mentioned.

Following the political union between Great Britain, France and Germany, three conquered powers would join the federation: Czechoslovakia, Austria and Poland. Subsequently, twenty-one neutral countries would be invited. Russia, once again, is excluded. This time, however, it is not excluded on ideological or political grounds, but rather for practical reasons. The country is too big and would roughly double the population of the federation. It is also too large; with Russia, the federation would span from the North Sea to the Pacific. Consequently, MacKay advised the creation of two federations: one centred in Europe and another one organised by Russia. The two federations would likely co-exist peacefully,

each concerned with solving its own political problems. The conflict between them, according to MacKay, could arise only when one would attempt to interfere in the development of the other. Obviously, in such an elegantly-designed integration scheme, there was no place for countries which did not belong to any of the federation blocs and which, due to their location, would encourage external interference. The hopes of peaceful coexistence between the future European federation and Soviet Russia also appeared in some of the wartime writings of the Continental resistance. Hans-Dieter Salinger, a Dutch federalist, envisioned that integrated Europe could act as a mediator between America and the Soviet Union, which 'contains in itself elements of East and West' (Lipgens 1985, p. 595). Others even speculated that part of the Soviet Union could peacefully join the future European federation (Lipgens 1986, p. 298). Joseph Hours from Lyons University was also optimistic:

> Naturally, there would be no question of this [European] union being hostile towards America and less still towards Russia. Indeed, we believe that the creation of a federal Europe will give Russia every reassurance, first by preventing any plutocracy from dominating the continent, and secondly by bringing about lasting peace on Russia's western frontiers (…). (Lipgens 1985, p. 338)

The foremost interwar idealist David Davies, in his 1940 book *A Federated Europe*, advanced a somehow similar proposal for a European federation to that of MacKay. Lord Davies was indeed 'a remarkable man who achieved some remarkable things' (Porter 1995, p. 58). While his ambition was to secure international peace, Davies achieved more tangible and long-lasting results in academia, as a founder of the Chair and Department of International Politics at Aberystwyth. The outbreak of WWII proved the ultimate failure of the League of Nations and for Davies this meant that the system of global inter-governmental relations must be replaced with less ambitious 'conception of Europe as a moral and geographical entity' (Davies 1940, p. 38). However, what exactly is Europe? As we have seen, all the visions of European federation must have confronted the question of boundaries. For Davies, Europe meant two things: a shared historical background and a common civilisation, together with a certain territory. Based on these two criteria, Davies delineated the boundaries of the future United States of Europe. Therefore, geographically, all European states should be included, except for Soviet Russia, which is a

vast Asiatic power. The argument here is therefore similar to that of MacKay. As for Turkey, while it is part European – part Asiatic, it should be included due to its peaceful character and strategic importance. This leaves the consideration of Russia from the civilizational perspective. Here, Davies reinforced the narrative popular among early proponents of European integration, arguing that Russia indeed belongs to a 'different brand of civilization' (Davies 1940, p. 85). The Communist revolution may have changed Russia's political system, but the country remained autocratic.

As noted, there are similarities in how MacKay and Davies drew the boundaries of the envisaged European federation, but at least one interesting difference is noteworthy. While MacKay did not see a problem with the peaceful coexistence of European and Russian federations, Davies refused to call the Soviet Union a federation. Instead, he labelled the new entity 'bureaucratic imperialism', because the citizens of the Soviet Republics did not exercise any real rights. Rather, the Republics were controlled by the Communist bureaucracies, which were in turn controlled by the 'manipulated pseudo-democratic and paper Constitution, by the Dictator and his functionaries in the Kremlin' (Davies 1940, p. 87; see also Lipgens and Loth 1988, pp. 184–85). Moreover, peaceful coexistence with a European federation would also be prevented by the Soviet Russia's intolerance towards other economic and political systems, demonstrated by its constant efforts to undermine and transform them. In other words, where MacKay saw a potential danger stemming from the mutual (European and Russian) interference in each other's affairs, Davies recognised the Soviet Union as a dictatorship unwilling to co-exist peacefully with Western Europe. Soviet's real foreign policy intentions became particularly clear after it invaded Finland, although it was only one of its aggressive acts initiated with the invasion of Poland in September 1939. Still, like many of his contemporaries, Davies hoped that Soviet Russia could have been admitted to the League of Nations if it abandoned its imperialistic policy. At the same time, however, he envisaged no place for the country in the United States of Europe.

Federalism and European Power

After WWII, the empirical context for the theories of international integration changed substantially. Unsurprisingly, this change affected the theories. The first of these changes was the rapid acceleration of international

integration in Western Europe, which, from now on, could be called European integration. It proceeded, first, in the form of establishing the Council of Europe in 1949, and subsequently through an even more important process of regional integration, which eventually had led to the creation of the EU. This latter process began with the Shuman Declaration in 1950, followed by the first concrete expression in the ECSC (1951), and further expanded in 1957 through the creation of the EEC. Considering the fact that the intellectual tradition of federalism preceded these empirical developments, as well as the prominence of federalist advocacy organisations active in the aftermath of the war, the influence of federalists on European integration became an interesting topic of enquiry (Burgess 1989, 2000). What is equally interesting from the integration theory perspective, however, is the reverse, i.e. the impact of European integration on the federalist theory of international integration. When interwar and wartime federalists were promoting the visions of European unity, their propositions were precisely that – visions. Some of them were more theoretically and empirically grounded than others, but there was no concrete European integration project to speak of, thus the federalist thinkers were free to draw the shape and boundaries of the envisaged European Union as they pleased. As we could see, many of them did not even confine their projects to Europe, and instead proposed a federation involving all liberal democracies or the whole world. Consequently, the launching of a concrete transnational integration project, originally involving only six Western European countries, presented federalist thinkers with a challenge, which they could not ignore.

The second change which affected the federalist theory of integration, and which directly relates to the first one, was the rapidly decreasing likelihood of another major war among Western European countries. Directly after WWII, but especially after the outbreak of the Cold War and the American insistence on rearming the Federal Republic of Germany, France was still wary of the potential German threat. This fear, however, was soon alleviated following the transnationalisation of the market for coal and steel, and by the American involvement in protecting European security. Fear of Germany gave way to the looming threat of the Soviet expansion. As a result, federalist thinkers had to adjust their perspective to account for this change. Prior to 1945, the visions of transnational federation were motivated by both – an 'internal' threat of war among European states, and an 'external' threat of the Soviet Union. Naturally, the feeling of urgency was growing proportionally to the expansion of Fascism, Nazism

and Stalinism. The Western or European federation was seen as a remedy to the threat of another major war and as the only way to contain Soviet expansionism. In these visions, Hitler's Germany was increasingly as much an 'external' threat as the Soviet Union, and there was no place for Nazi Germany in the envisaged federation projects. The transnational federation was considered a 'bargain' against the military threat (Riker 1964, p. 12). If the threat of another European war between Germany, France and other Western European countries effectively vanished after 1945, what should be the purpose of European integration? One take at addressing this question came from Murray Forsyth (1967), who distinguished between four political motives for European integration. Among these, the search for European power was the most important one, followed by the federalist and functionalist ideas, and the 'cultural impulse'.

Before discussing these motives in more detail, however, it is worthwhile to note a new theoretical trend in the federalist literature in the 1950s. Reflecting the growing professionalisation of International Relations, and responding to the political reality in Western Europe, some contributions undertook to describe and explain European integration processes, rather than prescribe any particular federalist vision. The most notable early example of this trend was an extensive volume *Federalism: Mature and Emergent* edited by Arthur MacMahon. In this substantial volume, contributors took an early attempt to theorise what was happening in Western Europe, concluding that '[s]upranational union in Western Europe belongs essentially in the stream of national federalism' (MacMahon 1955, p. 409). At that point, it could have appeared that the Soviet Union was growing economically and militarily faster than Western Europe. Consequently, only federated Europe could have hoped to match the new Soviet power (Bowie 1955, p. 497). In a similar fashion, Forsyth argued in the 1990s that the question was not whether the EEC was a federation, but only how deep and extensive a federation it was (Forsyth 1994). The separation of prescription from description and explanation was difficult, however, as MacMahon's volume also demonstrates. The project of European integration was in its earliest stages, it was unprecedented, its future was uncertain and it was developing in a highly-charged international security context. As a result, federalism in the context of European integration remained more closely associated with authors and advocacy groups promoting the idea of European federation, and less associated with social scientists applying the concept of federalism to describe and explain European integration.

Returning to Forsyth's classification, he distinguished those who promoted European integration to advance European power, from those who worked towards the federalist ideal. The first group was simply interested in Europe regaining its position as an important actor in global politics, whilst the second group viewed integrated Europe merely as the first step towards a world federation. In fact, some considered the project of European integration detrimental to the idea of a world federation. While Coudenhove-Kalergi was famous for his efforts to integrate geographically-delineated Europe against the threat of the Soviet Union, British idealist internationalists generally hoped for a much wider federation, at the minimum encompassing all liberal democracies. Immediately after WWII, there were calls to 'reject as senseless any idea of a closed, self-sufficient Europe, a kind of beleaguered fortress *à la* Goebbels' (Lipgens and Loth 1988, p. 29; see also pp. 100–102 for the Communist critique of European integration). In the 1950s, the distinction between the two positions became more blurred. In Forsyth's words, federalism became 'nationalised', or – using today's terminology – 'Europeanised' (Forsyth 1967, p. 491). In Britain, this was not least due to the reaction to the political events as they unfolded. In 1950, after the Labour Party formulated a harsh criticism of establishing a political and economic union in Europe, members of the Federal Union responded that European federation was the only possible alternative to the failures of the League of Nations and the United Nations (Lipgens and Loth 1988, p. 753). Federalism in a European context became associated with the ongoing integration project and it was increasingly difficult to imagine how the European experiment could be applied globally.

Nowhere was this shift observable more than in the evolution of the transnational pro-European advocacy group the European Union of Federalists (EUF), and the views of its foremost activist Hendrik Brugmans (Pistone 2008). Established in 1946 with the support of national federalist movements, EUF started as a firm advocate of creating a European federation as a third force between the East and the West. As EUF's first President, Brugmans opposed the idea of Europe choosing either the 'anarchic capitalism' of the United States or 'totalitarian socialism' of the Soviet Union. Instead, he proposed that Europe becomes the 'middle ground', resisting being engaged in power politics unveiling between the two superpowers (Lipgens and Loth 1991, pp. 15–16). That was his and EUF's position as late as in January 1947. Already in August that year, however, at the EUF's First Annual Congress in Montreaux, Brugmans

decided to come to terms with the crystallising reality of the Cold War. Faced with the Soviet Union's aggression in Central and Eastern Europe on the one hand, and with the Marshall Plan, on the other hand, Brugmans called upon European federalists to 'face the facts':

> What conclusion are we to draw from all this? That we must create federalism where we can. (…) To neglect any opportunities that may occur is to condemn ourselves to a sterile policy, to turn our backs on reality and to abandon Europe to impotence and despair. (Lipgens and Loth 1991, pp. 15–16)

In essence, this meant excluding Central and Eastern Europe from the envisaged European federation, while keeping the door open until the circumstances are more favourable. The ultimate goal of a world federation was preserved, although its realisation seemed more distant than ever. While the majority of the EUF accepted the new narrative, there was still a group who believed that focusing on Western Europe would be detrimental to the goal of the international peace. They, also in Montreaux, held a Congress of the Movement for World Federal Government (Mayne et al. 1990, pp. 59–61).

This shift in accent, from the idealistic vision of a widely-construed European 'third force', to a more modest, but also more realistic vision of Western European federation supported by the United States, constituted the first instance of European federalists undergoing the process of 'Europeanisation'. While the idea of a world federation as the ultimate objective was still formally acknowledged, the empirical reality forced the 'realistic' majority to focus on the part of the world where any form of transnational federation seemed feasible at the time – Western Europe. The second time that European federalists were confronted with the difficult reality, and the second time the reality had a defining impact on the future of the federalist movement, was the collapse of the plans for the European Defence Community (EDC) in 1954. The rejection of the EDC by the French National Assembly at once destroyed the visions of a true European federation and presented European federalists with two possible courses of action: to deny the reality of the time and continue working towards a 'genuine', constitutional federation, or to adopt a more pragmatic approach and support European integration as it developed. The first group was represented, among others, by Altiero Spinelli, and gained most of its support in Italy and France. The second group was led

by the German activist Ernst Friedländer and Brugmans, who, for the second time, emerged as the 'realistic' supporter of a European federation (Pistone 2008, p. 101). These distinctions, however, were increasingly irrelevant from the perspective of the federation's geopolitical scope. No one could deny the reality that the federation had to develop in Western Europe, as the unveiling Cold War divisions were making any world integration the most unlikely prospect. In that sense, all strands of the European federalism movement were increasingly 'Europeanised', with Spinelli eventually elected to the European Parliament in the first direct elections held in 1979.

Consequently, it is fair to conclude that federalism as a school of international integration turned into federalism as a school of European integration in the 1950s, reflecting the reality of the Cold War, as well as the fact that the most promising attempt at transnational integration was launched in Western Europe. In this sense, the representatives of the first two positions identified by Forsyth ('Europe as power' and federalism) were increasingly speaking with the same voice, with European federalists progressively focusing on the integration of Western Europe against external threats. One of the foremost representatives of those voices was John Pinder, a long-time advocate of Britain's membership in the EEC and a vivid supporter of a European federation. In his book *Europe After De Gaulle*, co-authored by Roy Pryce, the authors went to great lengths to express their disappointment with the state of European integration in the second half of the 1960s, and to explain why it was vital for Europe to federate. In that sense, the book represented a continuation of the intellectual tradition initiated in the interwar period, discussed earlier in this chapter. The arguments for federating Europe were predictable: developing an equal relationship with America and counterweighing Soviet Russia (for a similar argument, see Lipgens and Loth 1988, pp. 383–387). In line with the British school of liberal federalism, however, and in contrast to Coudenhove-Kalergi, the book was also optimistic about federal Europe becoming 'a catalyst for a federal world' (Pinder and Pryce 1969, p. 157). Pinder looked back at the development of the EEC, and subsequently the EU, in the 1990s, but this time his aim was to *explain* how 'the European Community has become the European Union of today' (Pinder 1998, p. vii). Interestingly, however, Pinder also proposed 'new federalism' as an approach to European integration, which would be 'more conscious than neofunctionalism of federalist motives', but also 'more explicit than classical federalism about the process' (Pinder 1998, p. 263). In other words,

new federalism would combine the elements of classical federalism with neofunctionalism, and thus make the case for a European federation more explicit and more realistic at the same time.

Boundaries and Power in European Federalism

One key observation stemming from the discussion of the federalist visions of international integration is that unless they called for the integration of the whole world, they could not avoid the challenge of drawing the geopolitical boundaries of their envisaged project. Inclusion and exclusion were always at the centre of these visions. Essentially, every discussion of a federation in international relations had to offer some justification of including certain countries and excluding others. Rudolf Hilferding, an economist in exile from wartime Germany, identified in 1940 a number of challenges associated with a future European federation, including the question of membership: 'What about Russia? Soviet Russia with its present constitution and economic policy would make its participation in a federal system one of enormous difficulty. The same is true for Great Britain' (Lipgens 1986, p. 567). Among the criteria adopted in the exercise of drawing the boundaries of an international federation, two stand out as the most common: geography and the political system of prospective members. Typically, they were adopted simultaneously to strengthen the argument.

Applying the criterion of geography to the project of a European federation essentially meant answering the question, which does not lend itself to a straightforward answer: where is Europe? The shared idea of where Europe actually is has been evolving over centuries, as Triandafyllidou and Gropas (2015) amply demonstrate. Beginning in ancient Greece, the earliest conceptions of Europe referred to the territory located in the southeastern part of the Mediterranean basin. Subsequently overshadowed by the Roman Empire, the idea of Europe re-emerged along with that of Christendom, developing in opposition to the Islamic world. It was only during modern times, marked by colonial expansion and exploration when Europe became associated with the West. The fact that Central and Eastern Europe found itself outside of this Western identity remains fundamental for the discussions of Europe even today, and it certainly informed the ideas of a European federation. Already Coudenhove-Kalergi recognised the ambiguity of Europe's geographical boundaries, noting that seas and oceans delineate all European frontiers except for the one in the east,

which 'has always fluctuated' (1926, p. 23). Subsequently, those thinkers who, like the Austrian Count, promoted the idea of a *European* federation, found themselves confronted with the same question: which Eastern European countries should be included, and particularly whether Russia even belonged to this category. Hardly any conclusion could have been reached, however, with reference to geography alone. It is unsurprising. While we can argue that geography indeed delineates the western, eastern and southern frontiers of Europe, the eastern boundary has always been socially constructed and therefore requires additional, non-geographical criteria.

Considering the objectives of the envisaged European federation, that is the promotion of international peace, the political system of prospective member states proved to be deciding for most thinkers. In this light, if geography left any ambiguity as to the prospect of including Russia into the federation, the Soviet political system convinced most advocates that Russia was the perfect 'other', epitomising everything that Europe was thought to be not. While the political system in Europe, either already existing or imagined following the establishment of the federation, was liberal, democratic, open and pluralistic, the one, which emerged in Soviet Russia, was illiberal and undemocratic. As a dictatorship, Russia had no place in a European federation. Soviet Russia was even more than that, however. Starting with Coudenhove-Kalergi, for most federalists Russia was the main threat against which Europe had to integrate. The Austrian Count, who personally experienced the terror of Soviet Bolshevism, went to great lengths arguing why Russia was a mortal danger to Europe, even drawing parallels with the politics of ancient Greece and Macedonia. Perhaps with less passion, but with no less conviction, many other Western liberalist thinkers did not see how Soviet Russia would fit within the family of European democracies. If immediately after WWII the perspective of accommodating Soviet Russia seemed realistic to some federalists, the subsequent unfolding of the Cold War, followed by international integration confined to Western Europe, proved to have a defining effect on the European federalist thought. Soviet aggressive imperialism could no longer be disputed, just like the fact that the European integration project, while finally taking concrete steps, was far from a genuine federation. The empirical reality effectively ended an era of empirical-normative federalist theorising in Europe, and the majority of those engaged in federalist advocacy settled for what was on the European table, instead of what they had originally envisaged.

Drawing imagined boundaries is an exercise in power, even though it has rarely been approached in this way in the context of European integration (Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2015, pp. 4–5). In the theoretically-oriented literature on the international dimension of European integration, the question of power is mainly considered in the context of the EU's role as an international actor (Duchêne 1972; Manners 2002; Whitman, 1998). Is the EU a power and if so, what kind of power is it? What is the nature of its power? Applying Barnett and Duvall's (2005) taxonomy of power, most discussions focus on the EU's institutional power. Indeed, it is impossible to discuss power in the EU context without incorporating the analysis of central EU institutions: European Council, the Council of Ministers, European Commission, and increasingly European Parliament. It would be inaccurate, however, to limit the role of EU institutions to that of mediators between member states and the outside world. In certain policy areas, such as internal security, trade, the environment or EU enlargement, the European Commission and the Parliament do in fact exercise a significant degree of autonomy (Kaunert 2010; Kaunert and Zwolski 2013), which puts their activities in the remit of compulsory power – the second type of power identified by Barnett and Duvall. Compulsory power involves the process of directly affecting the circumstances of other actors. If the EU is indeed a power, it is at least partially due to the autonomous actions (or nonactions) of central EU institutions, which makes compulsory power as relevant as institutional power.

What about the period, however, before the European integration project even began? The literature on European integration theory leaves no doubt that studying European integration must precede the actual establishing of the ECSC (e.g. Harrison 1974; Rosamond 2000). In fact, as this chapter demonstrates, the liveliest discussion about how European integration *should* look like occurred even before France announced the Schuman Plan. How is the problem of power relevant for the theory and ideology of early European federalism? Triandafyllidou and Gropas (2015) offer a hint, asking 'who has the power to decide what Europe is and who belongs to it?' (2015, p. 4). Their response is that it is the EU institutions and the countries currently comprising the EU who own 'brand Europe', and thus who exercise power in relation to non-members. It is not a compulsory or institutional power, however, which they talk about. Rather, it is a symbolic power 'to assign the European label as a brand name' (2015, p. 5). This kind of power corresponds with Barnett and Duvall's productive type of power, which is more elusive than the more crude compulsory

and institutional types of power. It involves 'discourse, the social processes and the systems of knowledge through which meaning is produced, fixed, lived, experienced, and transformed' (Barnett and Duvall 2005, p. 55).

In the context of early integration theory, one manifestation of productive power concerns the process of socially constructing countries and regions as more or less meeting the criterion of 'Europeanness'. As discussed, many federalists sought to design international federation along other, non-geographical criteria, such as the existence of liberal democracy in a prospective member state. The productive power mechanism is similar in all cases, in that federalist thinkers essentially made the case for advancing a more or less exclusionary territorial community based on criteria, which they deemed most appropriate. Dannreuther (2013) captured the dilemmas involved in this exercise by distinguishing between (a) the security analyst as a scientist (implicating an alleged access to value-free, 'true' knowledge); (b) the security analyst as an internationalist (pointing to the need to recognise and transcend one's cultural, historical and geographical limitations); and (c) the security analyst as a moralist (prompting thinkers to recognise that security is just one among many values important for societies). How 'scientific' were federalist thinkers discussed in this chapter? According to today's criteria, the 'scientific' basis of their analyses was not very robust. There were two reasons for this. First, they were mostly writing in the period preceding the post-WWII professionalisation of International Relations as an academic discipline. Second, many of them were not fully-fledged academics; they worked in different professions. When reading European federalist thinkers we must also appreciate the fact that they mostly lived in Western Europe, which inevitably influenced their outlook. Thus, they were 'European' in terms of both their heritage, as well as the political community they sought to establish. Finally, it is important to recognise that European federalists prioritised the value of peace in Europe, which of course is more limited from world peace, but may also not correspond with other values, such as justice (O'Neill 1994).

What stems from this discussion is that productive power worked on both 'ends' of the European federalist thought. On the one hand, European federalists, as individuals and as part of their intellectual community, were products of a particular process of socialisation. They were mostly Western European, middle-class white men. They often worked at respected Western institutions and socialised professionally with people of similar profile. British Chatham House played an important role in this respect. The case of Coudenhove-Kalergi is interesting in this context, as

not only was he a truly international aristocrat but he also, through his autobiography (1953), made it easier for us to reflect on the way his background and his Munich experience with Soviet Bolshevism influenced his views on the boundaries of Pan-Europe. On the other hand, European federalists exercised productive power through drawing the boundaries of their imagined federations, thus pronouncing certain countries as more European than others and some ways of organising societies as more appropriate than others. Expectedly, Russia proved the most controversial, with its uncertain, part–European, part–Asiatic identity. We can speculate, however, that if there were as many states in Central and Eastern Europe during the interwar and WWII periods as there are following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the controversy would have extended to those countries, whose identity remains contested even today. Naturally, it is impossible to pin down the precise effects of productive power on societies and states. In case of European federalism, however, what matters is the production and reproduction of the narratives about what qualifies a country as European and worthy of becoming a member of an envisaged European federation. The combination of these narratives constitutes a concrete effort to produce, influence, and fix social reality in a particular fashion.

Conclusion

Geopolitical boundaries played a key role in early European and international federalist thought. If the solution to international security was eliminating anarchy through establishing a state-like political community, it was only natural to ask how big such a community should be. The answer to this question depended on the perceived source of the international threat. If the main problem was the capitalist international system, the answer was the world community of socialist states, including the Soviet Union. If, on the other hand, the main source of international instability was the system of anarchy, then the answer was an international federation, ideally at the global level. The main problem with this vision, however, was the recognition of a simple fact that not all states were the same, and some states may, in fact, be unfit or unwilling to become members of a federation. At this point, federalist thinkers had to decide on the criteria for including certain states and excluding others. Considering that it was the rise of totalitarian systems in Western Europe and the Soviet Union which often prompted those thinkers to argue for international federation, it comes as no surprise that they envisaged the union as liberal, democratic,

open and tolerant. Consequently, they depicted countries with totalitarian systems as important 'others', who may be admitted at the later stage, following the change in their political system. Nazi Germany in the late 1930s belonged to this category, but due to its location in the heart of Europe, its place in the federation after the overthrow of the Nazi regime was uncontested. The same was not true for Soviet Russia, which was too large, too far away and its political and economic system often viewed as too incompatible with the West for most thinkers to imagine its membership in the future international federation. There was, finally, the third category of international federalists, represented by Coudenhove-Kalergi, who were interested in restoring the old power of Europe in the world. Europe's demise vis-à-vis the United States, combined with the existential threat represented by the Soviet Union, required precisely-delineated Europe ('from Poland to Portugal') to federate and form the United States of Europe.

We could draw the distinction, as Forsyth (1967) did, between these different strands of international integrationists. We could call those whose ultimate objective was the union of the whole world 'federalists', and contrast them with Coudenhove-Kalergi, who argued for Europe to become a world power. Admittedly, the arguments of the two groups departed from different intellectual positions. The 'true' federalists grounded their projects in the rejection of international anarchy. Drawing comparisons with domestic politics, they envisaged that the only remedy for war was a global federation. If they excluded certain countries, it was only temporary, until the conditions in that country improve to the point when it can be admitted. In contrast, Coudenhove-Kalergi was not as concerned with the liberal objective of overcoming international anarchy, as he was with improving the relative position of Europe in the world, and with ensuring that Europe is able to defend itself against the looming Soviet threat. In the 1950s, however, international federalists largely underwent the process of 'Europeanisation', appreciating the fact that the surest way to international unification led through the EEC. At the same time, early European and international federalism appeared increasingly 'unscientific' in light of the emerging field of European integration studies, and particularly more formal approaches represented by Ernst Haas and Karl Deutsch. Those still interested in the correlation between regional integration and international security turned to studying the role of Europe as an actor/power in international relations. This turn had, of course, consequences for how the boundaries of Europe were imagined.

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CHAPTER 3

Europe as a Power: Boundaries Solidified

The school of international federalism has long been absent from the discussions on European integration. Does it mean that international federalists are also gone? As noted in Chap. 2, the empirical developments initiated in the 1950s prompted international federalists in Europe to decide whether they would remain committed to promoting their original, more ambitious idea, or whether they would turn their focus to studying the newly-launched European integration project, and promote its deepening. Many have chosen the latter route – a prospect which also appeared more realistic in the Cold War context. At the same time, those who sympathised with moving Europe towards a federal destination represented a different approach from that of Coudenhove-Kalergi, Clarence Streit or R.W.G. MacKay. They were students of European integration first, and federalists second. In the increasingly-disciplined academic environment, promoting a particular form of international organisation had become less legitimate an activity than analysing and explaining social reality. This does not mean, of course, that the normative component disappeared completely. Rather, it was tailored to fit the institutional structure of the European Economic Community (EEC) and subsequently the European Union (EU), leading to a new strand of scholarship on the nature of European integration.

As it became clear early in the 1970s, one of the most important aspects of this new scholarship was the study of Europe's role in international relations. 'Europe', in this case, was a shortcut denoting a small part of the

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Continent participating in the EEC experiment. When, after the period of post-World War II (WWII) devastation, integrated Europe's economy recovered some of its strength, one question which was raised and continues to inhabit the scholarship to this day concerned the specific nature of Europe's *power*. What exactly is 'Europe' in international relations? Simultaneously, a more pragmatic or 'technical' research strand emerged, analysing the various aspects of 'Europe' as an international *actor*. Where is federalism in all this? With a few exceptions, the majority of those most committed to studying the EEC/EU's role as an international power/actor are clearly sympathetic towards the idea of further integration and would clearly like to see a more coherent, autonomous and impactful Europe in international politics and security. Consequently, the argument of this chapter is that while international federalism as a distinct approach to European integration does not feature prominently in current debates, federalist ideas continue to permeate scholarship on the EU's international role.

From Federalism to the 'Europe as a Power/Actor' Programme

As noted in Chap. 2, the school of international federalism in Europe, with all its currents, underwent significant evolution between its birth immediately following the end of World War I (WWI) and the launching of the Western-European integration project in the 1950s. It started resting mainly on two separate pillars: one represented by the Pan-Europe movement of Coudenhove-Kalergi, and another one represented by British idealist internationalists. While the former's primary objective was to re-establish Europe as a global power vis-à-vis the United States and Soviet Russia, the latter's purpose was to overcome international anarchy and introduce some kind of order to international relations, eliminating inter-state war as a result. None of them was successful. The failure of the Briand Memorandum, followed less than a decade later by the outbreak of WWII, shattered European federalists' hopes for European revival and peaceful order. Post-WWII developments radically changed the context for European federalists, with the fear of another major European conflict quickly giving way to the fear of devastated Europe's place in the Cold War-driven world. Further, the concrete instance of European integration challenged European federalists to not only *advocate* their preferred

political programme but also to *study* European integration as it unveiled. European federation as an idealistic political aspiration gradually turned into European integration as the most prominent and unique case study of regional cooperation. Correspondingly, the *de facto* defeat of anarchy in Western Europe turned federalist focus towards assessing and advocating a distinctive Western Europe's role in international security. All of this had consequences for the construction and reconstruction, through academic discourse, of geopolitical boundaries in Europe. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the EEC and Euratom were formal institutions with clearly-defined membership and relatively unambiguous territorial delineation. By taking these institutions as the empirical point of departure, academic studies *de facto* contributed to reinforcing the construction of 'Europe' as a geopolitical territory confined to the western part of the continent and excluding Soviet-dominated Central and Eastern European countries, as well as Soviet Russia itself.

The links between the school of European federalism and the subsequent scholarship on the integrating Europe's role in international security, as documented in *Federal Union: The Pioneers*, are both direct (personal/institutional) and indirect (analytical) (Mayne et al. 1990). The Federal Trust for Education and Research, established in 1945 in the United Kingdom (UK), facilitated these links through academic research and educational role complementing the political aims of the Federal Union (Mayne et al. 1990, p. 109). Not discarding the ultimate objective of a world federation, the Federal Trust increasingly approached its global interest through studying Europe's role in the world. Among its study groups was notably one on European foreign and defence policy, and at the centre of this research programme was diplomat Bernard Burrows (Mayne et al. 1990, p. 209). In his first book, *The Security of Western Europe*, co-authored by Christopher Irwin, the authors clearly define their geopolitical focus by examining Western Europe's defence environment, looking at the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the European Community and the Western European Union. In one sense, the book comes full circle by echoing Coudenhove-Kalergi in calling upon Europe to unify and take greater charge of its security, pointing to the same source of threat in the east. At the same time, however, the book is fundamentally different from the interwar writing. It is more in-depth, systematic, disciplined and intended for informed and expert readers rather than general audience – all the markers of the modern academic scholarship.

Burrows and Irwin's agenda is representative of the majority of scholarship on Europe's role in international relations and regional/global security, as will be demonstrated in the remainder of this chapter. This strand of scholarship takes the current state of European integration as the point of departure, analyses threats, problems and opportunities (the analytical part), and more or less explicitly advances an argument for further integration of the Communities, and subsequently the EU (the normative part). In this particular case, the authors did not believe their recommendations would make Europe equal to world powers (which does not mean they would not welcome such an outcome). Instead, they hoped for more consultation and harmonisation, leading to the better promotion of Western-European interests globally, and to the 'habit of unified political action' (Burrows and Irwin 1972, p. 144; see also Burrows 1973). Burrows' subsequent book, co-authored by Geoffrey Edwards, contains a similar message. In *The Defence of Western Europe*, the authors offered a thorough assessment of Western-European efforts at security and defence integration, complaining that it was too fragmented and inefficient.

Forcefully arguing for stronger Western-European security policy, the authors noted that it would allow Europe to (a) become a more attractive partner for the United States; (b) give Europe stronger voice vis-à-vis the United States, and also more flexibility when Europe's interests would differ from those of Washington; and (c) contribute to a more general notion of European distinct identity, supporting European integration in other policy fields (Burrows and Edwards 1982, p. 140). Amongst even earlier calls for the European Community to develop foreign and defence capabilities was Max Kohnstamm's lecture published in 1963. If the Community was a political organisation whose aim was the political unity of Europe, then, according to Kohnstamm, it is only natural that it should possess foreign and defence policy. Interestingly, for the author, this new policy should be even more supranational than that of the European Community, and thus the delegation of powers from the member states to the central authority must be more complete. Only if the methods applied to the common foreign and defence policy are democratic and *federal*, the argument goes, can the states and citizens believe that the decisions made at the European level are right and legitimate (Kohnstamm 1963, pp. 75–78). The volume thus allows for the old European federalism and the new 'Europe in the world' research programme to meet face to face. Incidentally, Kohnstamm served as the Vice-President of the Jean Monnet's Action Committee for the United States of Europe (Monnet 1978).

If Bernard Burrows played a leading role in facilitating the Federal Trust's research on Western-European security and defence policy, former European Commission official Christopher Layton directed the Federal Trust's research towards exploring the Community's contribution to world order (for other early contributions see Feld 1976 and Twitchett 1976). He laid out the normative underpinning of his first major report *One Europe: One World* at the outset: '(…) the time has come for united Europe to take up its responsibilities for working for a more united world' (Layton 1986, preface). Echoing the old federalist-functionalist divide, Layton rejects functionalism as a sole basis for a united Europe, urging that it is 'dangerously misleading' to conceive of Monnet's functionalist engine without appreciating the political goals underpinning the whole integration project (Layton 1986, p. 10–11). Again, the report thus links European federalism with 'Europe in the world' scholarship. As for the united Western Europe's contribution to the world, it must be comprehensive. Europe must match its wealth with political unification, the lack of which seriously hinders Europe's potential. This is problematic because only by becoming a genuine international security actor, Layton believes, Western Europe could engage in a more substantial dialogue with the Soviet Union.

Here, Layton's prescriptions are reminiscent of the idea of Europe as a third force, popular among European federalist movements immediately after WWII, but largely abandoned after the reality of the Cold War settled in (see Chap. 2). In this vision, Western Europe was encouraged to take charge of its relations with the Soviet Union and actively contribute to shaping the pan-European security order, even if this newly-found assertiveness would make Americans uncomfortable. In his other report, *A Step Beyond Fear: Building a European Security Community*, Layton urged Community leaders to pool defence resources. He insisted that only as a unified international security and defence actor Europe will be able to influence Washington, negotiate with Moscow and rationalise its defence industries (Layton 1989, p. 23). Once the unified and disciplined Europe is integrated militarily and in its international security outlook, it will, in particular, be in a solid position to create peaceful order in the east. This could include forging functional links with the Soviet Union where possible but also inviting Central and Eastern European countries to join the European Community at some point. Russia, as Layton notes, is only partially European, thus its membership in the Community would be 'inappropriate' even if the Soviet Union undergoes a radical democratic

change. A 'strong and growing collaborative relationship' is the best viable route for the Russia's association with Western Europe (Layton 1989, p. 45–46).

The early scholarship on the Community's role in international security and international relations more broadly varies in how it balanced description with prescription, and in the preferred direction of the further Community development. While some authors wanted to see the Community acquiring a stronger foreign and defence policy profile, others focused more on the impact of the Community on world order. At the same time, however, there are meaningful similarities shared by most of this newly-emerging strand of scholarship, and its analytical connections with the earlier school of European federalism are notable. The first commonly shared assumption is that while the Community cemented peace in Western Europe, the world outside was still anarchic and dangerous. Consequently, due to the weakness of individual states, only unified Western Europe could offer a positive contribution to both preserving its own security against external forces, and towards making the world more orderly and peaceful. This external aspect of the Community become particularly interesting for those federalists, as noted by Mayne et al. (1990), who combined their interest in European integration with studying the prospects for a world federation. The Community, in that sense, could be considered the first step towards greater integration at the global level. While interwar and wartime European federalists were necessarily interested in European 'internal' security as well as protecting Europe against external threats and challenges, the authors discussed in this chapter prompted Europe to unify primarily in response to the threatening external environment.

The second assumption shared by the majority of the 'Europe as a power' scholarship is that the greater Community's role in international security is good and desirable (with one notable early exception of Johan Galtung's (1973) volume accusing the Community of becoming a superpower attempting to recreate a Eurocentric world). This normative component is not always stated explicitly, but it clearly prevails in this strand of scholarship. The Community makes a significant contribution to Western Europe's welfare and security, and it should not shy away from deploying its unique capacities in the service of furthering its own security, developing an equal relationship with the superpowers, and offering its experience in integration to the rest of the world. We can consider this characteristic of the 'Europe as a power' scholarship an extension of the argument

advanced by earlier-generation European federalists, who advocated an international federation of some kind. Granted, they differed as to which countries should be included and on what basis, but Western Europe was always at the centre of those schemes. Consequently, now that the Community represented the closest structure there was to what European federalists had hoped for, they cheered for it to (a) acquire the qualities typically associated with federations, including common foreign and defence policy, and (b) promote its successful model of integration in other parts of the world.

The third shared assumption concerns the subject of study, which bears consequences for the approach to the questions of territoriality and boundaries. The interwar and wartime European federalists studied 'the reality' as they found it, and it did not look anything like they would envisage. Anarchy-driven Europe was either moving towards another major war, or was already in the midst of it, when they desperately called upon states to federate and solve their political problems peacefully, just like they do internally. When devising their schemes, international federalists inevitably had to make difficult choices concerning the composition of membership, which, in the end, always involved a defined territory and geopolitical boundaries separating federated states from the outside world. Scholars interested in the Community's role in international security had a much easier task. They did not need to make those choices, because international treaties clearly defined the territory and geopolitical boundaries of the Community. As already noted, focusing research on the Community was compelling because the organisation already existed and was unlikely to be superseded by an even more federal structure. Choosing the subject of study was also about credibility of the research programme: advocating something that had very little chances of implementation, rather than studying something, which existed empirically, was uneasy in an increasingly professionalised academic environment. At the same time, however, taking the Community as a point of departure for empirical and normative investigation imposed certain intellectual constraints. While early European federalists were free to shape the composition of their envisaged federations according to the criteria they deemed most important, the bulk of the 'Europe as a power' scholarship takes the European Community/EU territory and geopolitical boundaries as given, focusing instead on its capacity to interact with the outside environment. What constitutes 'the inside' and 'the outside' is rarely problematised.

Europe as a Different Kind of Power

All three assumptions shared by the new 'Europe as a power' research programme – that the outside world remains dangerous even if Western Europe has become relatively safe, that a growing Community's external role is desirable, and that the Community constitutes the most appropriate subject of study – continued to be reinforced throughout the 1970s. By this time, the understanding that the Community was as close as possible to a working international integration project was widely-shared and increasingly institutionalised, for example in the form of a prominent European integration publication *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*. This did not mean, of course, that the Community simply turned into a case study to be described, analysed and/or explained, even though empirical-explanatory approaches abounded – an inevitable outcome of the professionalisation of academic disciplines. At the same time, however, due to the perceived stakes involved (European peace and prosperity, international order), studying the Community also included a fair share of prescription involving the promotion of certain norms and values. Among influential public figures who shared all the assumptions underpinning research on Europe as power was British/Swiss national François Duchêne. One of the key advisers to Jean Monnet, Duchêne was involved in launching the ECSC and later supported Monnet in his Action Committee (Monnet 1978). He was also involved in supporting the Federal Trust (Mayne et al. 1990; Gilbert 2004, p. 27). Consequently, Duchêne was among European federalists who not only promoted the idea of European integration but also were actively involved in making it happen. An experienced Community practitioner and an ardent European federalist activist, Duchêne was well-placed to develop new ideas about the Community's position in the world and to make his voice heard.

Duchêne's original contribution to the 'Europe as a power' scholarship was as ground-breaking as it was strikingly vague and underdeveloped. We can consider him a founding father of the entire strand of scholarship on the European Community/EU's role in international relations and international security. Granted, he was not the first one to suggest that Western Europe has a role to play outside its boundaries, but the way he defined this role proved irresistible for the future generations of thinkers. He rejected any notions of Western Europe becoming a superpower in the traditional, military sense, simply because capabilities were relatively too small as compared to other major actors. He also rejected the idea of

Western Europe becoming strictly neutral. What he proposed instead was for the Community to draw on its own unique identity (he used the phrase 'inner characteristics') which included 'civilian ends and means, and a built-in sense of collective action, which in turn express, however imperfectly, social values of equality, justice and tolerance' (Duchêne 1973, p. 20). In short, the Community should become a civilian power, utilising its impressive economic strengths rather than flexing its non-existent military muscles, and it should utilise these assets in order to 'domesticate' international relations in the same way as it domesticated relations between its member states. The international climate of the early 1970s appeared to offer unique advantages for an unconventional international power such as the European Community, and Western Europe should make the best of it (Duchêne 1972, 1973).

Duchêne's statement has since captured the imagination of scholars and even EU policy practitioners, who at various points have been stressing the civilian nature of the European Community/EU's international power (Prodi 2000, p. 3). At the same time, it has become the source of confusion due to the mismatch between the way Duchêne presented his idea and the requirements of modern academia. Duchêne was rather vague and unsystematic (Orbie 2006), reminiscent more of the interwar political writing than of the systematic and disciplined approaches modern scholars are accustomed to. The idea of civilian power Europe was therefore in a dire need of further conceptualisation, a task undertaken, for example, by Kenneth Twitchett (1976, pp. 1–2) and Ian Manners (2002). The latter, famously, took the whole notion of Europe as a 'different kind of power' to the next level, by introducing the idea of Europe as a normative power. Manners' point of departure was his return to the first major academic disagreement about the nature of Europe's international power, expressed in Hedley Bull's (1982) criticism of the 'civilian power' idea, in order to suggest that, in fact, Duchêne and Bull held a number of assumptions in common. Most notably, they were both state-centric and emphasised direct, physical power (whether economic or military) over the indirect influence of norms and values. In contrast, Manners identified the EU to be based on a number of norms including peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and human rights. He also pointed to a variety of direct and indirect means through which the EU diffuses these norms outside.

The empirical-normative approach is explicit in Manners' discussion, in that he considers the EU to *be* a different (normative) kind of power, to *act* as a normative kind of power and he argues that the EU *should* act as a

normative power in world politics (Manners 2002, p. 252; see also Manners 2006, p. 168). The normative component in the argument is as unsurprising as it is significant. It is unsurprising because all the core norms which arguably distinguish the EU from other international actors have reached the last stage in Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) 'life cycle of norms', i.e. they have all become internalised at the international level. Even the regimes, which are commonly known for autocratic tendencies, feel obliged to pay the lip service to the values such as democracy and human rights. If all these norms are widely accepted as desirable, it is only natural to support international actors actively promoting these norms. Manners' normative commitment is also significant because to say that an international actor should pursue a certain type of international behaviour means that, at the same time, one should accept intended and unintended consequences resulting from a given policy. In the case of the EU's international value diffusion, one potentially-unintended consequence is that while the EU may be committed to promoting certain standards in other parts of the world, its normative credentials may be undermined by inconsistencies in its own observance of these very standards (Whitman 2011).

Another and potentially more serious unintended consequence of the EU's normative agenda can stem from the fact that other international actors may be unwilling to accept the EU's interpretation of norms or even consider these norms as threatening to their domestic political order. When thinking about the 'core norms' which Manners identified as underpinning the identity of the EU, it is easy to note that peace is qualitatively different from the other four. It entails the absence of an armed conflict between (state) actors in international relations. In contrast, values such as democracy, human rights and rule of law are positive and require appropriate adjustments in domestic political systems. One of the first thinkers who recognised this distinction was David Mitrany, who, on the one hand, promoted universal adherence to the principles of peace and economic cooperation, but, on the other hand, he did not seem to understand these universal rules to imply the principled homogeneity of domestic political and economic systems. He made it clear in *A Working Peace System*, stressing that what matters in international relations is the performance of states which directly affects the sphere of international relations (1966, p. 49). For Mitrany, states should not be excluded from what they are willing to do internationally because they are not willing to do everything else domestically. Consequently, 'what matters is a readiness to co-operate for avoiding conflict and for advancing the task of common well-being' (1966,

p. 50). There are already significant differences within states and federations, so there are no grounds to expect homogeneity in international society. As a result, Mitrany rejected 'the ideological criterion of selection' as 'invidious in operation' and 'irrelevant in principle' (1966, p. 51).

Manners seems to have implicitly acknowledged the difference between international peace and other norms when he contrasted his approach aiming at strengthening civil society (entailing 'thick' international order) with that of Duchêne, which was arguably limited to supporting international society (i.e. 'thin' international order). He aligned his 'normative power' argument with the former, suggesting that what the EU does (and should do) internationally essentially emanates from what it is. The two assumptions which underpin Manners' argument are that the EU can successfully diffuse norms constituting its normative basis, and also that the result of this process must be either neutral or progressive, which means that other actors will either refuse to adopt the norms, resulting in *status quo*, or will accept them as attractive enough to gradually integrate them. It is rather uncontroversial to suggest that the EU has been actively diffusing its basic norms and that, on some occasions, it has had some success in the process. Manners (2002) points to the EU's efforts to pursue the abolition of the death penalty, and other examples abound in a dedicated volume *Normative Power Europe* edited by Richard Whitman. At the same time, however, Manners associates the EU's normative international identity with its unprecedented character, suggesting that 'the EU represents a new and different political form' (Manners 2002, p. 240). If the EU's exceptional international identity is based on its unique historical experience, however, this may severely limit the EU's normative power capacity. Duchêne recognised this challenge when he suggested that it would be naïve for Europe to think that it can legitimately set norms for the world, just like it was naïve for Britons to think so after WWII, only because both Europe and Great Britain were stripped of their imperial capacities by their recent historical experience. Duchêne further noted that '[s]tability has come to Europe in very peculiar circumstances (…) It is clearly no precedent for anyone else' (Duchêne 1972, p. 43).

All this does not mean that the EU should not *try* to diffuse its core norms, if one believes, like Manners, that normative power Europe is 'a statement of what is believed to be good about the EU' (Manners 2006, p. 168). Another problem arises, however, when the diffusion of EU's norms does not result in either *status quo* because the process has no effect, or in the adoption of norms by other actors, but in active resistance by actors who perceive that the EU's norms directly threaten their domestic

political and economic orders. Those actors may either consider the EU's interpretation of the norms as not entirely consistent with their own political traditions, or the EU's motivation as not exclusively driven by the norms it claims to promote. It is possible, of course, that those claims will merely serve as convenient excuses not to undertake positive reforms, but it does not change the fact that normative power Europe is open for contestation. In extreme cases, the promotion of values such as democracy and human rights by the EU may, in fact, undermine another value arguably constituting the EU's international identity – that of international peace. If faced with the dilemma of this kind, the EU would be put in an extremely difficult position of having to prioritise either the values underpinning its entire identity or undertaking actions (or inactions) aiming at preserving international peace. In most cases, however, the EU's international behaviour is full of contradictions and inconsistencies stemming from both the diverging priorities of the member states (e.g. the prospects of Ukraine's EU membership) and from the perceived necessities (e.g. the policy towards Russia before the conflict with Ukraine) (Tocci 2008).

For the EU and its supporters, the stakes are high in demonstrating that it is a different kind of power – different from other powers and different from Europe's own imperial, conflict-driven past. It is not an easy task, however. First, the EU is a territorial entity with clearly demarcated geopolitical boundaries separating insiders from the outsiders, 'EU citizens' from 'others'. Second, the EU is composed of sovereign nation states, each with historically-conditioned geopolitical interests and spheres of particular concern, to avoid the phrase 'spheres of (intended) influence' (e.g. Poland–Ukraine, see Chap. 6). Third, through enlarging its membership and therefore geopolitical scope over the decades, the EU is currently exposed more than ever to the challenges of the difficult external environment, which constantly tests the EU's commitment to its core values. A similar challenge is posed by the EU's dependency on external energy resources, particularly from Russia. It is thus hardly surprising that soon after it became clear that the Community was developing its international profile, its external role was conceptualised as that of civilian power. Not without significance was also the fact that Community member states did in fact attempt to equip the Community with the military component, but, by the 1970s, it was clear that this effort was fruitless. A new and bolder attempt towards this goal was undertaken in the 1990s, however, challenging the EU's 'different kind of power' status and further raising questions concerning the EU's territoriality and geopolitical boundaries.

Maastricht and Beyond: Not So Different After All?

This process of redefining the EU's identity anew was described by James Rogers (2009) who observed that the idea of the EU as a different kind of power came under increasing stress in the 1990s, in response to its arguable failure to prevent the Yugoslav Wars. Shocked by the EU's incapacity to act in its own backyard, an informal coalition of 'Euro-strategists' emerged, encompassing EU officials, policy experts and academics, who consistently argued in favour of equipping the EU with effective military capacities, and *de facto* replacing the EU's status as a civilian power with that of a global power. In contrast to the EU's old identity, which was inwardly focused on preventing Europe from another conflict (hence the definition of the EU's opponent as 'chronopolitical' – Europe's own past), the new identity turns the EU's attention against geopolitical competitors. In this image, the EU's 'unified territorial, political and economic space' must be secured against a range of internal and external threats (Rogers 2009, p. 846). Boundaries are thus of utmost importance in this discussion. What is at stake is a fundamental choice concerning the very purpose of the European integration project. Should it remain faithful to its mostly civilian character, when Europe's 'significant other' was defined in terms of its own war-driven and colonial past, or is it time to adopt a geopolitical rather than temporal dimension, and define Europe's other as Russia, the United States, Turkey, etc.?

The most recent European security strategy, adopted by the European Council in June 2016, represents a symbolic indication that the narrative of 'Euro-strategists' has gained an upper hand in defining the EU's international identity. The document entitled *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe* is filled with language signalling the EU's territorial and exclusive nature as well as a geopolitical, outward-oriented approach to defining its own security. The document announces that '[w]e need a stronger Europe. This is what *our* citizens deserve (…) [this and subsequent emphases added]'. By 'we', the document, of course, means those living inside the EU, and by 'Europe' the document means a certain part of it, namely the EU. The first section of the Strategy is called 'A Global Strategy to Promote *our* Citizens' Interests'. In it, the EU promises to 'promote peace and guarantee the security of *its citizens* and *territory*' and to 'advance the prosperity of *its* people'. As for the geopolitical outlook of the document, it states upfront that '[w]e live in times of existential crisis'

and that '[o]ur Union is under threat'. Consequently, '[a]s *Europeans* we must take greater responsibility for *our* security. We must be ready and able to deter, respond to, and protect *ourselves* against *external threats*'. Again, even though the Strategy talks about European security, it is clear that what it means is the internal security of the EU against external threats, including the perceived threats emanating from other parts of Europe. The document also refers to the EU's internal security, but not in the context of Europe's war-driven past. Rather, the main source of internal danger is terrorism, organised crime, cyber-crime and energy insecurity. The Strategy represents the ultimate breakup with the notion of civilian power Europe when it states that 'soft power is not enough: we must enhance our credibility in security and defence'.

What we said about the Strategy so far may indicate that the EU is simply turning into a 'normal' Westphalian entity with delineated geopolitical boundaries, a defined territory, internal and foreign security policy and other attributes associated with modern nation states. Indeed, this was the argument of Rogers (2009, p. 847), who associated the 'different kind of power' status of the EU primarily with the notion of civilian power Europe, and contrasted it with the emerging narrative of the EU as a strategically-driven global power. To this end, he focused on threat assessment (internally-oriented vs. externally-oriented), geographical interests (regional vs. global) and instruments of power (civilian vs. comprehensive). At the same time, Rogers dismissed 'normative power' Europe as confined to academic discussions and think tanks, and not having a defining effect on the EU's international identity (2009, p. 846). A more complex picture emerges from the 2016 EU Strategy, however. While the document seems to reinforce the image of the EU as a global power concerned first with protecting its own security and prosperity, it also commits the EU to promote its values in the world. The laboured way in which the protection of the EU's interests and value promotion are reconciled in the text demonstrates how difficult of a task it is. The document suggests that there is no conflict between interests and values: 'Our interests and values go hand in hand. We have an interest in promoting our values in the world. At the same time, our fundamental values are embedded in our interests.' In a different part, however, the document announces that 'principled pragmatism' will guide the EU, acknowledging the complexity of the 'current strategic environment' and the EU's desire to reconcile it with the EU's values. It is possible, therefore, that the requirements of the 'strategic environment' may be in conflict with the EU's value-driven agenda, and 'principled pragmatism' is the EU's answer.

It is difficult to imagine how such policy could work in practice, however. For example, the notion of 'multitasking' does not mean being effectively focused on two tasks simultaneously, but rather signifies the ability to seamlessly switch attention between the tasks. Similarly, 'principled pragmatism' is more likely to entail the ability of the EU to recognise when it is possible to promote its values without undermining its interests, and when interests should take precedence. Sometimes value promotion and interest pursuit can take place in close temporal proximity, but they are likely to be practised separately nonetheless. The EU's response to the massive migration and refugee crisis demonstrates this challenge, as does the history of EU-Russia relations. Regardless of these limitations, however, it would be inappropriate to dismiss the EU as a self-appointed normative international actor. In fact, the 2016 Strategy paints the picture of the EU as an aspiring *hybrid* power, skilfully combining what appears necessary with what seems noble. Treated symbolically, the document certainly signals the next step in the EU's move away from geographically-limited, civilian power Europe towards a more assertive global security actor, as envisaged by Rogers (2009). At the same time, however, the EU's Westphalian image is complemented by a normative image – that of the EU as a 'force for good' in global politics.

The 2016 Strategy constitutes the most recent reification of the EU's evolving identity as an actor in global politics and security – the process which has been intricately linked with the progress of European integration from the start, but which had a clear turning point in the early 1990s, with the Maastricht Treaty establishing the three-pillar structure of the EU. As with all the previous stages of European integration, also the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) had a significant impact on international and European integration theorising. A group of scholars quickly emerged who became the leading figures defining the terms of academic debate on the CFSP, identifying the main problems and delineating the boundaries of the empirical phenomena to be studied. Among them were Christopher Hill, John Peterson, Helen Sjursen, David Allen and Michael Smith. At this point, the norms of academic research and writing were clearly established. Academics who were European federalists at heart, and many of those committed to the 'EU as a power' research programme likely were, understood that promoting European federalism as a political goal was fundamentally different from writing for academic research outlets. This is not to say that value-driven prescription evaporated completely from the studies of the EU's

international role. Rather, the normative element became more subtle, subordinated to the requirements of modern academic research.

Some of the early reactions to the CFSP were enthusiastic, arguing that '[t]he Maastricht Treaty introduces an authentic qualitative change in the Community's handling of foreign and security policy questions' (Petersen 1993, p. 27). These voices did not define the tone of the debate, however. Instead, it was Hill's (1993) observation of a discrepancy between the expectations of the EU's international conduct, and what the EU is actually capable of delivering, which set the tone for subsequent inputs. His contribution's true significance lies in the fact that he effectively initiated a new strand of scholarship correlating with, but also distinct from, the 'Europe as a civilian/normative power' research. Instead of assessing and prescribing a unique role for the EU in international security, Hill focused on evaluating the *capabilities* of the EU as an international security *actor* – an exercise which soon attracted a plethora of academic voices concerned with the EU's *performance* on the international stage. The general premise of this scholarship is that (a) the challenges associated with the new, post-Cold War environment clearly surpass the capabilities of individual European states, so only when working together can Europe hope to generate actorness that matters and (b) EU member states have clearly recognised this fact by creating the CFSP. However, is the EU an international security actor? The answer to this question is rarely a straight 'no' or an unconditional 'yes'. Most often, it falls somewhere in between, such as when the EU is conceptualised as a *sui generis* international actor, lifting the pressure to compare it with nation-states.

Peterson (1998) expressed the concerns of this strand of research in an influential volume summarising the performance of the CFSP in the 1990s, *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe?* The CFSP is a promising development, but it is affected by three defects. First, it is not underpinned by a common European identity. There is no European public or consciousness. Interestingly, this issue of a shared European identity constitutes a direct link between early European federalism and the contemporary research programme on the EU in international security. Already Coudenhove-Kalergi found it necessary for his ideal of Pan-Europe to be reinforced with the notion of a European nation. Since modern nations are not the communities of blood but rather the communities of spirit, shaped by literature, religion, language and history, the solution is 'deepening and broadening national cultures into a general European culture' through teaching people not just their own cultures, but also those of

their neighbours (Coudenhove-Kalergi 1926, p. 161). Coudenhove-Kalergi's approach may seem immature if compared with more recent discussions of European identity, in which the concept is more thoroughly deconstructed and problematised (Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2015). The fact remains, nonetheless, that regardless of how we define the European identity, its deficiency has always been perceived as fatal to integrated Europe with a coherent international profile. Second, diverging national interests affect the CFSP. While it was relatively easier for European states to unite against the Soviet Union, the collapse of a common enemy exposed often-conflicting political interests on all major international issues. This concern, again, was at the centre of the early European federalist scholarship, insisting that 'nations must learn to feel their common interests exceed their differences' (Jennings 1940, p. 129). Third, the CFSP suffers from a weak institutional structure, which results from suboptimal compromises codified in the Maastricht Treaty. European federalists understood the importance of central institutions for European unity. There cannot be a working European federation without a central authority to which member states would have to cede competencies in agreed policy areas. Most visions of federated Europe contained detailed blueprints for the envisaged institutional setup, which would allow European states to solve their problems peacefully and to reinforce European position in world politics (Davies 1940; Jennings 1940).

Since the 1990s, the 'Europe as a power' research programme has developed mostly along the two lines outlined in this section. On the one hand, there is an ongoing discussion about the kind of power the EU is. Karen Smith noted that among other labels, the EU has been characterised as a superpower, quiet superpower, normative power, post-modern power and civilian power (2008, p. 1). Asle Toje (2010) described the EU as a small power, Rogers (2009) argued that the EU is turning into a global power, and even this chapter could not escape the temptation of assigning a 'hybrid power' label to the EU's international dimension, demonstrating that the 2016 Strategy combines the narratives of the EU as a global and normative power. This discussion is likely to continue partly because the EU itself has started using some of these labels, and partly because even with the changes documented by Rogers (2009), the EU continues to represent a unique experiment in mixed intergovernmental/supranational governance, escaping traditional classifications and emphasising its commitment to values most of us cherish. On the other hand, the discussion is likely to continue on the specific nature of the EU's

international security actorness. The key questions for this research programme include: Is the EU a coherent international actor? What are the CFSP's institutional dynamics? Does the EU have sufficient capabilities? Does its policy have an impact? The Amsterdam Treaty, the European Security and Defence Policy, the Lisbon Treaty and the European External Action Service have all attracted scrutiny by new generations of scholars and there is no reason why future reforms will be less important (and thus attractive) than those of the past.

Power and Actorness

Up to this point, the chapter has referred to the notions of 'Europe as power' and 'the EU as an international actor' almost interchangeably. This is not inaccurate, at least as far as the discussions in the literature are concerned. Bull (1982), for example, famously asserted that '"Europe" is not an *actor* in international relations, and does not seem likely to become one [emphasis added]', even though his argument actually concerned Europe as a civilian *power*. At the same time, however, some scholars do seem to notice the distinction between 'power' and 'actorness'. Toje in his conceptualisation of the EU as a 'small power' preferred the term which in most languages means 'states that matter', rather than the 'less laden term of actorness' (Toje 2010, p. 44). Why does it matter what concepts we use to describe the EU? At the most basic level it matters because concepts do not only describe but also *explain* empirical reality. 'Explanation what', 'property theory' or 'explanation by concept' all refer to the constitutive theory in the philosophy of science. The constitutive theory can be summarised as answering two kinds of questions: 'what' and 'how possible' (Wendt 1998). Dray (1959, p. 404) notes that 'explaining what a thing is, where this means explaining it as a so-and-so, might be characterised in a preliminary way as an explanation by means of a general concept rather than general law'. As a result, explanatory generalisations will also be different compared to causal theories of explanation. Whereas in the latter the analyst claims that a collection of 'Cs' leads to an 'E', the explanation by concept generalises that actions or phenomena X_1, X_2 and X_3 *amount* to Z. Rappaport (1995, p. 425), building on the reasoning advanced by Dray, further underlines that subsuming events or phenomena under a concept enables them to be seen as a unified or connected whole. In other words, the explanation by concept is more than the mere grouping together of random events or phenomena under a more general term.

Instead, it entails that each of these events or phenomena is a part of a larger whole and the concept can subsume them. Conversely, Wendt (1998, p. 111) observes that concepts provide insights into properties and dispositions of that which they seek to explain. People would not care so much about what kind of a political system the EU is, he argues, if the concepts like 'federation' or 'post-modern state' did not explain the social reality. The type of explanation, in this case, is constitutive, rather than causal, however. We want to know which concept (Z) best explains the EU because each offers a unique insight into the EU's particular properties (X_1, X_2, X_3).

Consequently, when we claim that there is a difference between 'actorness' and 'power', we suggest that each concept has its own, distinct properties. The notion of actorness is indeed less laden because it merely entails an entity with some degree of agency in international relations, whilst the idea of power is limited to the actors of a special kind. In that sense, every power is an actor in international relations, but not every actor is a power. In the literature, however, the notion of actorness has gone far beyond this simple definition, mainly in response to the challenge posed by the emergence of entities, which clearly mattered but weren't states. Cosgrove and Twitchett (1970) were among the first ones to recognise the potential significance of these entities and to develop a theoretical framework to assess the degree of their actorness. They proposed what they called '[t]hree mutually interdependent tests' which included autonomy, impact and external recognition – also the properties comprising the notion of an international actor. If an entity can act autonomously, has an impact and is recognised as an actor by states, it is an actor. Sjöstedt (1977) was dissatisfied with this framework. He argued that attempting to establish whether the European Community is or is not an actor is an incorrect exercise. Instead, he suggested that 'the capacity of being an actor is most appropriately conceived of as a variable property which the Community may possess to a greater or lesser extent' (Sjöstedt 1977, p. 14). In other words, after determining that an entity is, in fact, an actor (it must be autonomous), we should study the *degree* of actorness. Even more properties were included at this point. As already noted, the discussion on the European Community/EU's actorness has evolved into a booming research topic, with each author readjusting the 'criteria of actorness' to meet their preferred research framework (Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Kaunert and Zwolski 2013). The discussion on the EU's international security actorness represents what Jørgensen (2015, p. 19) calls a more

pragmatic strand of scholarship on the EU's international role, accepting that the EU *does* policies pertaining to international security and focusing on assessing these policies.

A number of key concepts are intrinsically associated with the notion of actorness in international relations. Firstly, there is *coherence*, sometimes used separately, and sometimes interchangeably with *consistency*. Simon Nuttall (2005) distinguishes between horizontal consistency (consistency between different types of EU policy), vertical consistency (consistency between the policies of member states and the outcomes that they have agreed upon within the CFSP) and institutional consistency (consistency between two different bureaucratic apparatuses, e.g. the Council and the Commission). However conceptualised, the ideas of coherence/consistency entail that the EU, in order to be an international security actor, must be less fragmented and less divided; the often-implicit message here is that the EU must function more like a federation in order to be effective. Second, there is *autonomy*. Simply put, as Jupille and Caporaso (1998) did, it implies a degree of distinctiveness (or independence) of the EU from its member states. Again, the message here is that the EU must become more like a federation, with member states willingly ceding parts of their foreign and security policy prerogatives to the EU's central authority. Third, actorness entails the possession of *capabilities*. These, following Hill (1998), can be broadly divided into the classical instruments of foreign policy, such as the use and threat of force, diplomacy, economic carrots and sticks, and the underlying resources such as population, technology, wealth, political stability. Expectedly, the EU will be as effective an international security actor as its capabilities permit. Finally, there is *recognition* implying that in order to be an international security actor, the EU must be seen as such by other states and non-state actors. One indication of the EU being recognised is whenever other international actors work through the EU's central institutions rather than with member state capitals. Like in previous cases, the more recognition the EU enjoys, the better for its actorness.

We can contrast this more pragmatic, policy-oriented approach with the ontological discussions on the nature of the EU's international power. The debate here is obscured by the vagueness of the concept of power itself, but also by the fact that the scholarship on civilian/normative power tends to focus on the adjectives describing the EU, rather than the notion of power as such. It is indeed rather ironic that while 'power' is one of the key concepts in the realist tradition of International Relations, it has also

been adopted to indicate that the EU is the very opposite of what this concept has traditionally been used to signify. It was thus unsurprising that Bull (1982) thought that 'civilian' and 'power' were contradicting terms. The realists, however, have long lost the monopoly on studying power in international relations. Of particular importance here has been a shift from power as a property to be possessed, to power as a type of relations (Baldwin 2012, pp. 274–75). Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (2005), in this new tradition, contrasted the relations in which participating social actors are already constituted, with the situation where social actors become constituted because of power relations. They also contrasted power relations which are direct and specific with relations that are indirect and diffused (2005, p. 45).

Power as a property (to be a power, to have power) and social relation (to exercise power) have both been crucial in the discussions on European integration even before the successful European integration project was launched in the 1950s. Already in the 1920s, Coudenhove-Kalergi was concerned that Europe had lost power and was thus vulnerable to the new forces driving international politics after WWI. Great powers, many of which were European, gave place to world powers, all of which were outside Europe; these included the Russian Empire, the British Empire, Pan-America and the Chinese Federal Republic. The general trend in the world was that 'petty states' chose to align with stronger states in order to become world powers, so that – together – they could secure access to the best markets and raw materials. Europe, meanwhile, was marching in the opposite direction, obsessed with self-determination of nations, which inevitably led to the further 'atomization' of the continent. Power, in this narrative, was, therefore, something European states once possessed, but after WWI they could not hope to recover individually. Instead, they could only regain it through unification at the pan-European level. Following WWII, the European Union of Federalists (EUF) insisted that, in the new geopolitical context of the accelerating Cold War, Europe should become a 'third force' – a neutral power promoting international peace and cooperation, aligned with neither the United States nor the Soviet Union (see Chap. 2). It soon became obvious, however, that Europe did not possess enough power to perform this ambitious role. It was both a military and an economic dwarf. International conditions changed again early in the 1970s when the crude military power seemed to be less relevant and the significance of economic cooperation to be on the rise. This trend, according to Duchêne, provided Europe with a unique opportunity. Still a

military dwarf, Europe could utilise its growing economic power and its trade links to influence the international agenda, including in security matters. It was not until Manners conceptualised the EU as a normative power, however, that the relational notion of power was brought to the fore so explicitly in the study of the EU's international role. According to Manners (2002), the EU diffuses its values mainly utilising institutional and productive types of power, through the means such as contagion (unintentional, leading by example) or information (strategic communication).

Both 'power' and 'actorness', as fundamental concepts in the discipline of International Relations, became applied to European integration early in the 1970s. As Pryce noted in 1972, '[u]ntil recently, relatively little attention has been paid to the political aspects of the Community's external relations (…)' (Pryce 1972, p. 194). Marsh and Mackenstein (2004) explain that a number of factors coincided around that time, including: (a) liberal institutionalism, which allowed the European Community to play a growing economic role, but also supported the Community's potential to strengthen its influence in security policy; (b) the doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD) and other technological advancements, which diminished the role of conventional military capabilities; (c) the emergence of new economic centres of power and the relative decline of the United States, as evidenced by the Vietnam War and the collapse of the Breton Woods system; (d) the period of détente, which allowed China, Western Europe and Japan to become more prominent powers. The two concepts have since the 1970s experienced periods of growing and declining popularity, depending on international developments and the perceived progress of European integration. The revived Cold War competition early in the 1980s enabled Bull to dismiss the European Community's international role. The hopes were lifted again early in the 1990s, however, when the notions of power and actorness became firmly embedded in the lexicon of European integration studies. The EU continues to *do* things internationally, including in the field of a broadly-defined security policy, so it must be some kind of an actor. Equally, the EU systematically attempts to develop policy instruments and strategic documents to assert its position *vis-à-vis* international powers, so it must be some kind of power itself, even if only a small one. Alternatively, even if those attempts have minuscule effects on the tangible capabilities of the EU, there is always the possibility that the military weakness still allows the EU to be a power, only of a different kind.

The Boundaries of Europe as Power

The boundaries of Europe as a political project had featured prominently in the debates long before European integration began after WWII. In fact, Europe's geopolitical boundaries were contested most fervently during the interwar and WWII periods, when European integration was nothing more than an intellectual project envisaged in the heads of the most committed European federalists. Since the ECSC, the boundaries of political Europe have become increasingly solidified. The discussion has become formalised through the language of 'European Community/EU enlargement', 'member states', 'accession countries' and 'EU neighbourhood'. The supporters of European integration contributed to reinforcing the salience of Europe's boundaries by arguing that European integration must include an external dimension. Europe should become an international security actor, or a power, which inevitably imposes the language of 'internal' and 'external' dimension of European integration, and raises the question of Europe's 'other'. While in 1998 Ole Wæver was still certain that 'Europe's other is Europe's own past which should not be allowed to become its future' (Wæver 1998, p. 90), Thomas Diez (2004), a few years later, was not so certain about it anymore. As noted, Rogers proclaimed in 2009 that the process of redefinition of the EU's identity was successful. Diez was already concerned about the direction of European integration in the 1990s, when he contrasted the federalist tendencies in the EU associated with territoriality, exclusivity and the reification of geopolitical borders, with a functional, 'network horizon' integration model (Diez 1997).

Both 'federal' and 'networked' Europe represent two distinct images of European integration, each containing a particular vision of boundaries. We can call these images, following, Mamadouh (1999), visions of European supranationalism. The term 'supranationalism' refers to the structure whereby some devolution of competencies takes place from states to international authority. It also refers to the process of decision-making, in which case we can contrast 'supranational' with 'intergovernmental'. When utilising the concept to describe international politics, it is most often applied in the context of European integration (Mason 1955). European supranationalism thus entails a new structure of international relations in Europe and a particular process of decision-making involving common institutions. Within the single idea of supranationalism, however, at least three images of European integration can be distinguished (Mamadouh 1999, pp. 136–137). First, there is a minimalist notion of

supranationalism as 'pacified nationalism', essentially entailing a de Gaullist vision of Europe of the nation states. Symbolically represented by the intergovernmental institutions of the European Council and the EU Council, this image signifies the continued salience of the member states, holding a tight control over the competencies of the EU (Hoffmann 1982). Second, there is a maximalist image of supranationalism as 'neo-nationalism', with the EU conceived of as a nation in the making. In this European-federalist image, the particularistic nationalisms of the member states are being replaced by the nationalism at the EU level (Cederman 2001). This image is best represented by the directly-elected European Parliament, which has always been dear to European federalists (Pistone 2008). Third, there is the image of supranationalism as the rejection of nationalism all together, associated with the notions such as policy networks and multi-level governance (Hooghe and Marks 2001). Historically identified with the Monnet method, this post-nationalist image is symbolically represented by the *sui generis* and complex structure of the European Commission. Each of the images represents a coherent analytical category suitable for describing and prescribing both the structure and process of European integration in a particular time period or policy area. At the same time, each entails a particular vision of boundaries, both national and EU-wide. What follows is a brief discussion of boundaries entailed in each of the three images of European supranationalism. The boundaries are depicted as either thick or thin, depending on how important they are for each image.

Thick national, thin EU boundaries. In the first, intergovernmental image, nation states remain key actors maintaining control over the scope of European supranationalism. The significance of national sovereignty and national boundaries is therefore constantly reconstructed in national public discourse (Smith 1992). Historically, this vision can be associated with Charles De Gaulle's 'Europe of the nation states'. At the heart of De Gaulle's international agenda was his commitment to the idea of nationalism, justified by the notions of legitimacy and effectiveness (Gordon 1993). Nation-states were the only, historically-conditioned and fundamentally legitimate units of social organisation. People feel attachment, first and foremost, to the states, rather than supranational organisations, and they look to the state to provide them with basic needs, such as defence against external enemies. In contrast, multinational entities are unlikely to thrive simply because of the historical differences between the nation states forming them. Nation-states are also the only units, which

can hope to achieve the effectiveness of their policies, because 'the state was the only unit that could act with sufficient power, authority, and skill' (Gordon 1993, p. 11). According to De Gaulle, supranational organisations 'have their technical value, but they do not have, they cannot have, political authority, and consequently, political efficacy' (quoted in Gordon 1993, p. 11). Following this state-centric tradition, the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR) makes the point of distinguishing itself from the allegedly 'federalist groups' in the European Parliament. The group emphasises the primacy of sovereign states, which relegates the significance of the external EU boundary to the background. The treatment of the external EU boundary is instrumental, however, as demonstrated by the response to the migrant crisis. In order to improve the EU's control over immigration, the ECR called for '[a] stronger emphasis on border management, including a swift adoption of an effective FRONTEX Border Agency, with better border check facilities at the EU's external border' (ECR 2016).

Thin national, thick EU boundaries. In the second, neo-nationalist image, the boundaries between EU member states are not as important as the external boundary of the EU, which is a direct result of national loyalties shifting towards the European level. Coudenhove-Kalergi formulated early postulates to that end during the interwar period. His specific position on European supranationalism after WWII is, however, difficult to discern. As noted in Chap. 2, Coudenhove-Kalergi was the first and one of the greatest supporters of European unification. After WWII, he promoted the Pan-European idea among European parliaments in line with Churchill's Zurich speech on the United States of Europe in September 1946. Inspired by this speech (Churchill explicitly acknowledged Coudenhove-Kalergi's role in supporting European unification), Coudenhove-Kalergi promoted initiatives which eventually led to the creation of the Council of Europe. The enthusiasm about this 'stepping stone in the history of Europe', however, was heavily constrained by the Council's weakness, which Coudenhove-Kalergi ascribed to 'the stubborn English determination not to allow the Council of Europe to hold any legal power' (Coudenhove-Kalergi 1962, p. 18). What did he think about the European Community? He appeared enthusiastic about it largely because it proceeded without England's participation. At the same time, he stressed its intergovernmental character, emphasising the role of the so-called founding fathers, and underplaying the role of the supranational institutions (Coudenhove-Kalergi 1962, pp. 18–19). The impression that he was

uneasy about the supranational character of European integration was later reinforced by his embracement of the De Gaulle's plan for European confederation (Coudenhove-Kalergi 1962, pp. 20–21).

What does it all mean for Europe's boundaries? In spite of the later dilemmas and perhaps even contradictions, Coudenhove-Kalergi declared already in the 1920s that '[t]here is but one radical way to a permanent and just solution of the European frontier question (…): the abolition, of those frontiers' (Coudenhove-Kalergi 1926, pp.169–170). In contemporary debates, the idea of thin national and thick EU boundaries can be identified whenever Europeans are called upon to shed their 'outdated' attachment to national sovereignty and to unite under the EU banner in response to the numerous internal and external challenges, which only the coherent and resolute EU can address (e.g. Howorth and Menon 2015). To be an effective international security actor means eliminating the obstacles to coherence at the EU level, and most of these obstacles have a common root in nationalism. European states and citizens will be best served, according to this narrative, if they fully embrace the European identity in addition to their national and subnational identities, and thus think in terms of protecting the interests of the whole EU. In the EU as an international security actor/power, therefore, as demonstrated by the 2016 EU Strategy, it is the external boundary of the EU, which is emphasised.

Thin national, thin EU boundaries. In the third, post-nationalist image, the idea of nationalism – either state or EU – gives place to the alternative vision of the EU as a system of multi-level governance or a network state. Neither national nor EU boundaries are constructed as symbolically important in this image, and instead, the focus is on the complex processes of socialisation and decision-making involving the multitude of non-governmental actors (Christiansen and Piattoni 2004). There is, however, a degree of ambiguity concerning boundaries in this vision, which is best exemplified by the functionalist-federalist approach of Jean Monnet – a precursor of European post-nationalism (Burgess 1989). On the one hand, Monnet certainly disliked the abstract, grand political ideas associated with European federalism. Notably, he did not sympathise with the post-WWII transnational movements advocating European unity, because 'they had nothing to do with action' (Monnet 1978, p, 283). Similarly, Monnet did not like the idea of German Chancellor Adenauer, who in March 1950 proposed that France and Germany are united in a complete union involving the merger of economies, citizenship and parliaments (Monnet 1978, p. 285). On the other hand, Monnet wanted to see a

European federation as an end-product of functional integration in Europe. He wanted to reach the federal destination via the 'concrete actions' route rather than via the 'grand constitutional settlement' route, but his final stop was European federation nonetheless. The ambiguity involved in this post-nationalist image of European supranationalism becomes more evident when contrasted with the international supranationalism of David Mitrany, discussed in Chap. 4.

If Europe as a geopolitical and cultural entity is an essentially contested concept, so is the core purpose of European integration project. When the narrative of European integration shifted from inward-looking, civilian power Europe to outward-looking Europe as a global power, it does not mean that Europe entered an uncharted territory. The shift may be new for the EU as an institutional embodiment of European integration, but it is not new for the European integration process as such, or for the ideas of European integration. Just like the 2016 European Security Strategy calls upon the EU to stay united and be prepared to defend itself against the dangerous outside world, so did Coudenhove-Kalergi, as early as the 1920s, called upon Europe to urgently unify against the military threat of Soviet Russia and economic challenges stemming from the competition of the United States. Long before the EU was created, he defined the territory of his envisaged Pan-Europe and drew geopolitical boundaries delineating it from 'others' in the east. His vision naturally did not attract the sympathy of British idealist internationalists, who promoted international federation to prevent another European war, rather than to restore Europe as an empire.

WWII, naturally, verified those reservations, in that some British federalists acknowledged the urgency of integrating Europe before drawing more ambitious plans for the rest of the world. The post-WWII launching of European integration in Western Europe was a 'game changer' for European federalists. They could either insist that the European Community was not what they had hoped for or accept that, in face of the weakness of the Council of Europe, the Community represented the most advanced effort towards their preferred destination. Regardless of which route they chose, the question of geopolitical boundaries was *de facto* settled by the Cold War dynamics. The collapse of the Soviet Union opened up the debate on Europe's eastern frontiers once again, but this time the discussion was structured and institutionalised through the EU enlargement procedures codified in the treaties. The EU acquired a hegemonic position as the most advanced and the only point of reference

representing aspirations and visions of European federalists and students of international integration in Europe. Many of them, as this chapter has demonstrated, turned their focus towards studying the EU's international role, thus further contributing to the solidification of geopolitical boundaries separating 'Europe' from 'others'.

Conclusion

The chapter has demonstrated a degree of continuity between the school of international federalism, representing one of the two early international integration theoretical approaches, and the research programme on the EU as a power/actor in international security. While in some instances this continuity was institutional, as in the case of the Federal Trust, the most interesting aspects of this continuity are in fact analytical and concern shared assumptions about territoriality and geopolitical boundaries. Early international federalists in Europe, including thinkers as different as Coudenhove-Kalergi, R.W.G. MacKay or David Davies, committed significant portions of their life to see the *European territory* unified against internal and external threats. They found the solution to European problems in an agreement between European *states*, which essentially required those states to relinquish parts of their sovereignty towards creating another authority at the 'European' level. Just like states are governed in a relatively orderly fashion by governments domestically, so Europe should entrust some of its crucial matters to a higher level of authority. With this minimal price to be paid, the gains for Europe would be enormous: peace and economic prosperity for European citizens, and a much stronger European position *vis-à-vis* other centres of power. If a new, European structure was about to be organised on a territorial basis, however, any such project inevitably triggered the problem of boundaries: which countries should be included in the federation? This question continued to preoccupy early international federalists in Europe no less than the institutional structure of their envisaged federations. The 'EU as a power/actor' research programme, which emerged in the early 1970s, shares with the early European federalist approaches its empirical focus on the integration processes in Europe, and especially its assumption that the EU *should* integrate in order to better handle the dangerous world *outside*. At the same time, students of the EU's role in the world do not need to engage in lengthy discussions on the nature of European integration's boundaries. The external EU

boundaries have become fixed through the institutionalisation of European integration and are largely taken as given in contemporary discussions.

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CHAPTER 4

Functionalism and Security Without Boundaries

The fate of functionalism in the study of international order and security governance has been most peculiar. David Mitrany firmly established the approach during the interwar and World War II (WWII) periods as a political theory for 'positive peace', linking international security with solving the most pressing societal problems and building welfare across borders (Mitrany 1933, 1966). Over time, functionalists envisioned, the geopolitical boundaries would lose most of their meaning, as people's loyalties would shift towards supranational, task-oriented agencies. The process would be uncontested, because the functions performed by these agencies would be tightly delineated, focusing on the very problems that societies deem important. The progressive view of the human development, together with the explicit rejection of the system of traditional diplomacy, the balance of power and other 'relicts of the past', place functionalism *on par* with interwar idealists. And yet, the functionalist approach proved resilient enough to survive, relatively unharmed, the storm caused by E.H. Carr's *The Twenty Years' Crisis*. In fact, the most famous statement of international functionalism, Mitrany's *A Working Peace System*, was published in 1943. Not only did functionalism emerge as the only international progressivist alternative to federalism, but it was actually endorsed by the father of post-WWII realism, Hans Morgenthau. In the introduction to *A Working Peace System*, Morgenthau discarded nationalism as obsolete (*sic*) and linked the future of civilisation to the progress of

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international functionalism (Mitrany 1966, p. 11). If that was not enough, soon after WWII it became apparent that functionalism, not federalism, would have to be the method of choice for building peace between two archenemies, Germany and France. European states pooled control over coal and steel in what has become the first step towards a 'working peace system' in Europe.

In light of the widespread intellectual interest, combined with the proven empirical relevance in the toughest security environment, was there anything to stop functionalism from becoming one of the leading theoretical approaches to international order and security governance? As the virtual absence of functionalism in International Relations and Security Studies indicates, there was. Two factors, in particular, are likely to have determined the fate of functionalism. Empirically, it was the nature of international integration in Western Europe. Whilst the method pursued, at least initially, was indeed functional, the overall objective was federal – to create a *European* unity (Monnet 1978). The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and Euratom, praised by Mitrany as hallmarks of functional integration, turned out to be the first steps in an increasingly centralised *European* integration process. The European Economic Community's (EEC) territorial delineation and exclusivity were the very features associated with regional integration, which Mitrany opposed as *un*-functionalist (Mitrany 1930). Theoretically, the functionalist approach was stripped of its primary concern with international order and security after it was reformulated by Ernst Haas into a regional integration theory (Haas 1964). Haas' narrative has become dominant to the extent that functionalism is no longer associated with the empirical-normative aspects of building international order and security. Instead, it is mainly associated with the empirical-explanatory focus on regional integration among actors who already enjoy peaceful relations (Long and Ashworth 1999, pp. 23–24).

This reduction of functionalism to an explanatory regional integration theory is problematic, even if it had led to a body of knowledge valuable in its own right. It is problematic because neofunctionalism differs from functionalism more than may be realised, especially if one relies on Haas' interpretation of what functionalism is (Haas 1964). In his interpretation, Haas did not manage to fully capture the spirit of the functionalist approach, instead emphasising the elements, which were most suitable for his subsequent reformulation. Even more importantly, it is also problematic because functionalism remains relevant as a theoretical approach to international order and security governance. As Chap. 6 elaborates, the

expansion of the European Union (EU) and Russia's aggression in Ukraine prompted some experts to suggest possible solutions along the functionalist lines, even if they stopped short of putting the theoretical label on their ideas. It is thus the purpose of this chapter to re-integrate functionalism into the body of scholarship on international order and security governance. The discussion of the functionalist approach, however, will not be exhaustive. Similarly to Chap. 2, it will primarily focus on the problems of territoriality and geopolitical boundaries. These aspects clearly distinguish functionalism from neofunctionalism, and they are most interesting for this study. They allow for a more focused comparison with the international federalist approach, and they are inevitably at the centre of functionalism as an approach in International Relations and Security Studies.

The argument commences with explaining key differences between Haas' neofunctionalism and Mitrany's functionalism, reminding that Haas's interpretation of functionalism is not entirely accurate, and also that both approaches represent different *kinds* of theory; the epistemology of one is empirical-explanatory and of the other one empirical-normative. These elements of the Mitrany's functionalist approach, which differ from Haas' reformulation, it is subsequently argued, are the very elements, which are most important for re-introducing functionalism as an approach to studying international order and security governance. After clarifying the differences between the two interpretations of functionalism, the chapter returns to the discussion of early European federalism, this time to shed more light on the criticism formulated in response to the Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-Europe and Briand Memorandum. Drawing on this criticism, the chapter then restates the main functionalist argument for a 'working peace system', focusing on these aspects of functionalism, which distinguish it from federalism as an alternative approach to building order and international security. The last two sections confront the functionalist approach with the process of European integration. The Schuman Declaration and its consequences for Europe affected both functionalism and federalism, speaking directly to the core tenets of both theories.

Functionalism, Neofunctionalism and International Security

Unlike international federalism, whose attraction waned after it became clear that the most promising European integration project would not follow the federalist route, functionalism was hailed as both the most accurate

theory explaining integration and indeed, as the very method applied to the process. More accurately, it is the version of functionalism developed by Ernst Haas, known as neofunctionalism, which has virtually become synonymous with integration theory as such (Rosamond 2000, p. 50). Even though neofunctionalism was in decline already in the 1960s and announced obsolete in the 1970s (Pentland 1975; Haas 1976a, b), it continues to attract both as an explanatory model for the most pressing problems facing the EU, as well as the integration method blamed for the alleged democratic deficit in the EU (Kiss 2015; Niemann and Ioannou 2015). Hass, by his own admission, developed his theory based on an earlier functionalist approach, associated primarily with David Mitrany. In his seminal volume *Beyond the Nation-State*, Haas offered his own interpretation of what international functionalism was, followed by his revision (Haas 1964). There are, however, three problems with his narrative. First, Haas was not entirely accurate in his depiction of the functionalist approach. Second, Haas' was a different *kind* of theory – it served different purposes, and thus we cannot interpret his neofunctionalism as a simple matter of improvement on the Mitrany's functionalist approach. Third, by dominating the theoretical discourse, Haas' neofunctionalism overshadowed the unique value of the Mitrany's functionalist approach to the study of international security. This is indeed where the most significant difference between the two approaches lies: while one represented a relatively narrow, empirically-focused, explanatory approach to the study of regional integration, the other one represented a much broader empirical-normative theoretical vision, or in fact a philosophy of thinking about international integration, with the primary purpose of creating a global 'working peace' system.

Haas, Mitrany and Functionalism

Considering an enormous impact of Haas on the understanding of functionalism in International Relations, it is important to begin with Haas's own interpretation of the functionalist approach. This interpretation did not always accurately reflect the actual approach of Mitrany – the discrepancy that may have contributed to the fact that after Haas' reformulation, functionalism has seldom been associated with the study of international security, governance and order, and instead has been almost exclusively associated with the study of regional integration, primarily its economic

aspects. Long and Ashworth (1999) elucidated various differences in interpretation of what functionalism is, three of which are particularly relevant here. First, Haas criticised functionalists for separating technical issues from political issues, clearly favouring the former. Indeed, Mitrany did make a distinction of such nature, but in a private note to Haas he clarified that he did not consider the political/technical distinction a basis for his approach. Rather, his functionalist approach made a point of contrasting a relatively rigid and fixed constitutional system, exemplified by international federations, with a more pragmatic and adaptive functional system (Mitrany 1963a). Long and Ashworth (1999) further note that the criticism of the 'separability thesis' rests on the misunderstanding of the way in which Mitrany understood politics. In contrast to his critics, who operated with a power-political definition, Mitrany preferred a service-oriented view.

Second, Haas argued that the functional system is composed of voluntary bodies – a view which he questioned. His depiction of functionalism as making a distinction between 'a wholesome work of the voluntary group and the suspect activities of the government' (Haas 1964, p. 21) was, again, rejected by Mitrany (1963a). Indeed, the utility of the functionalist approach for international security would be severely limited if it only recognised voluntary associations and non-governmental agencies. In his writing, Mitrany often referred to real-life examples of functional organisations, and they are mostly bodies created by governments. This *de facto* focus on governmental functional organisations, such as the ECSC or the agencies of the League of Nations, is unsurprising, considering Mitrany's main concern with international peace. Third, Haas depicted the functional system as ultimately leading to a world federation, but Mitrany was more restrained in this matter. It is true that Mitrany envisaged that some form of federation was possible as the ultimate outcome of the spontaneous, organic functional integration, but this was certainly not an integral part of his functionalist approach. In fact, often times when Mitrany did talk about the possibility of the international federation, it was in response to the questions from federalists who insisted that federation was the only hope to avoid another major war (Mitrany 1948). While these remarks appear on the margins of his theorising, at the centre of the Mitrany's approach is the contrast between flexible functional arrangements not requiring a fixed constitutional setup, and the relatively rigid structure embedded in international federations.

Haas, Mitrany and Theory

An even more serious problem with accepting Haas' interpretation of functionalism and viewing his neofunctionalism simply as an improvement on the Mitrany's approach is the fact that both thinkers developed their ideas in radically different historical circumstances and for different purposes. Mitrany was born in 1888 in Romania and came to London before World War I (WWI) to study agricultural problems in Eastern Europe. The outbreak of the war made him and his contemporaries aware that international peace must precede any successful social reform. During the war, Mitrany campaigned for the League of Nations and after the war he was involved in efforts to bring the United States into the League (Navari 1995). Mitrany's main concern, combined with the time when his ideas were mostly developed, places him among the foremost interwar idealists (even though his ideas actually survived WWII and even received, as noted, a favourable reception by Hans Morgenthau).

Haas, in contrast, represented a newly-emerging, much more rigid and formal approach to social science theory, which dominated American academia after WWII. His purpose was not to analyse and *prescribe* the functional system as a solution to war and poverty, but rather to utilise functionalist principles in an effort to *explain* and *predict* early European integration, and thus to develop a coherent regional integration theory. Yet, as Groom (1978, p. 20) suggests, it would be inaccurate to see European integration as preceding the development of the theory. Rather, the federalist end-goal was combined with the ideology of pragmatic integration, which, for Jean Monnet, was a much more realistic approach than the constitutional one advocated by the then very strong federalist movements (Lipgens and Loth 1991). Taking shape first as a practical strategy to secure French-German reconciliation and launch European integration, neofunctionalism was subsequently conceptualised as an academic, explanatory regional integration theory. Of course, the federalist end-goal of regional integration in neofunctionalism is fundamentally different from the open-ended, territorially-unrestricted functional system in the Mitrany's functionalist approach. A number of circumstances coincided in the United States, which supported the formulation of neofunctionalism in this form. The country was safe, free and rich – the qualities considered to owe much to the American version of democratic pluralism and market economy, but also to the fact that it was a successful federation. It was also in the United States where the behavioural and scientific turn in academia

became the strongest. When European integration was launched, functionalism was identified as an approach fitting the American experience. It only had to be made more precise, testable and scientific in order to theoretically explain what was empirically happening in Western Europe (Groom 1978, pp. 20–21). Naturally, the result was a theory valuable in its own right, only it had very little in common with the Mitrany's functionalist approach.

The difference between the two was well understood by both Haas and Mitrany. Haas rightly observed that functionalism was embedded in political theory, and thus engaged in both analysing and prescribing. Functionalists not only analysed the existing society but also claimed 'to know the way in which a normatively superior state of affairs can be created' (Haas 1964, p. 7). Hass explicitly rejected this approach and instead opted for the functional theory as a way to 'map out the problem area' so that it can be rigorously studied using appropriate methods. He aimed at description, explanation and prediction. Where does it leave Mitrany's approach? If we fast-forward to contemporary discussions, it can be most closely associated with the eclectic approach to the study of International Relations. As noted in Chap. 1, eclecticism, in its original formulation proposed by Sil and Katzenstein (2010), advocates researching real-world problems through combining the explanatory power of realism, liberalism and constructivism, which are the three major research paradigms in American academia. Its intended purpose is to offer a solution to the problem of competing paradigms and fragmentation in the field. It is not the original formulation which is most helpful here, however, as it does not venture beyond the empirical-explanatory mode of theorising. Reus-Smit's (2013) reformulation appears more suitable in this context, allowing accommodating the empirical and normative elements, both prevalent in the Mitrany's approach. For Reus-Smit, analytical eclecticism involves more than simply integrating competing explanatory theories of International Relations. Rather, the unique epistemological value of the eclectic approach is activated when we combine the empirical-explanatory mode of theorising with the normative approach, assuming that we treat both as legitimate forms of theory. Only through this 'deeper' eclecticism, furthermore, can we hope to generate practical knowledge as understood by thinkers from Aristotle to E.H. Carr.

The Mitrany's functionalist approach was, in this sense, eclectic. On the one hand, it involved empirical-explanatory theorising, discernible already in his early writing. For example, his analysis of the variable economic

impact of international sanctions on states in *The Problem of International Sanctions* was the first of this kind (Navari 1995, p. 228). On the other hand, Mitrany's approach was normative throughout. Indeed, serving the most pressing human needs, which included economic recovery and international peace at the time, was how Mitrany envisaged the purpose of research in International Relations (Mitrany 1931). Not only was Mitrany explicit about the need for the normative element in the scientific approach to International Relations, but he was also critical of the empirical-explanatory theorising mode dominant in the post-WWII American academia. The ideological context of the Cold War, for Mitrany, required greater engagement of the International Relations discipline with political theory, i.e. to explain *and* prescribe. Instead, he complained, the majority of international theorists were busy attempting to uncover '"scientific" ways and laws', using tools which 'would have stunned all the policy-makers from Bismarck to Bevin' (Mitrany 1975a, p. 26; see also Mitrany 1971, pp. 541–543). There is an interesting paradox here. Mitrany advocated the normative component as necessary for producing practical, policy-relevant knowledge (as does Reus-Smit). Sil and Katzenstein had the same objective of promoting practical, problem-oriented knowledge, and yet they confined their eclectic approach to empirical-theoretic epistemology – the very limitation that Mitrany rejected as too narrow.

A Functionalist Approach to International Security

Haas' inaccurate interpretation of the Mitrany's functionalist approach, combined with the diverging approaches to theory by both thinkers, constitute sufficient rationale for treating functionalism and neofunctionalism as two, separate theoretical propositions, each valuable in their own right. The third reason for reading Mitrany independently of the subsequent neofunctionalist reformulation is its potential contribution to the study of international security governance. The contribution is only potential because it has never been fully realised. Because of Haas' dominant narrative, functionalism has been traditionally associated with analysing and explaining regional integration among actors who already established peaceful relations. Functionalism has been absent, however, from the discussions of international security governance, including the prevention of conflict and reconstruction of politics – the very problems that have been central to the Mitrany's functionalist approach (Long and Ashworth 1999, pp. 23–24). The potential for the functionalist approach to contribute to

the study of international security governance appears to be most potent precisely where it parts ways with neofunctionalism: in its eclectic epistemology and in its open-ended, evolutionary and aterritorial functional system.

The eclectic, empirical-normative nature of theory underpinning the functionalist approach makes it more practical and policy-relevant than empirical-explanatory theories. In other words, it is more suitable for providing a valuable contribution to those who are concerned with the practical aspects of politics and international relations (policy practitioners). International Relations is an academic discipline, which, Mitrany would have argued, should be highly relevant for policy practitioners, but for some reason, it is not. In his *Washington Post* opinion 'Scholars on the Sidelines', Joseph Nye complained that

> [s]cholars are paying less attention to questions about how their work relates to the policy world (…). Advancement comes faster for those who develop mathematical models, new methodologies or theories expressed in jargon that is unintelligible to policymakers. (Nye 2009)

It seems that not much has changed since the mid-1970s when Mitrany already raised a similar complaint (1975a). Yet, the most pressing questions concerning international security governance require an empirical-normative mode of theorising. In the context of the war in Ukraine, it is not only important to know why exactly the conflict erupted, but also how the international community *should* react. Or, how the EU *should* behave towards Russia in this context. Indeed, in the 2015 assessment of the conflict by the United Kingdom (UK) House of Lords, the witnesses were asked to analyse the causes and likely consequences of the dispute, but also to offer expert advice on the best plan of action (House of Lords 2015). This second aspect is where empirical-explanatory theories fall short, and where eclectic approaches, such as Mitrany's functionalism, are more appropriate.

In addition to its eclectic character, the functionalist approach also offers an alternative philosophy of building international order and security governance. The most striking contrast here is, of course, with international federalism. Nonetheless, as noted, this is also an aspect of functionalism, which distinguishes it from the subsequent Haas' reformulation. Neofunctionalism was both federalist and functionalist in character. It envisaged regional federation as a goal to be achieved by functionalist

means – a strategy also pursued by Jean Monnet in Western Europe (Niemann 2006, p. 12). Thus, although the process in neofunctionalism was functional, the envisaged end-goal was territorial – a regional integration structure. The unit of analysis, therefore, remains the state, with no intention of transcending it, as in the Mitrany's functionalist approach, through 'aterritorial systems of transactions with no fixed conception of a final goal' (Groom 1978, p. 21). Not without significance is the fact that Mitrany associated neofunctionalism more closely with federalism, referring to it 'federal functionalism' or 'semi-functionalism' (Navari 1995, p. 233). Indeed, from the perspective of territoriality and boundaries, neofunctionalism is closer to international (particularly European) federalism than to the Mitrany's functionalist approach, as the first two approaches share the vision of international integration as essentially encompassing a group of states; they merely differ about the method of achieving the unity. Mitrany's functional system is unique in this context, as it attempts to break with the territorial focus of the other approaches, and envisions transnational functions to transcend states as well as regions. This distinction, largely, informed the criticism of the interwar schemes for European integration.

Early Critique of the European Integration Idea

The idea of international integration confined to 'Europe' was easier to criticise when it existed only in the imagination of internationalist thinkers, and more difficult when it started materialising in the 1950s. It was also easier to challenge the idea of European integration before the outbreak of the Cold War. The combination of the two processes – the post-WWII aggressive imperialism of the Soviet Union, and the launching of international integration confined to a few countries of Western Europe – seemed to have rendered any geopolitically-unrestricted integration ideals utopian and unworthy of discussion. It does not mean that such criticism disappeared completely. As this chapter demonstrates, critical voices continued even as the ECSC evolved into the EEC, and later the EU. Nonetheless, what appeared *realistic* changed in the 1950s. This change, combined with the increasingly dominant aspiration of thinkers to be 'scientific' and 'empirical', affected the way international integration was approached in the literature. For these reasons, it is refreshing for students of European integration to revisit the pre-1950s scholarship, if only to discover how some of the arguments raised in contemporary discussions on European and international security resemble the argu-

ments advanced during the interwar and WWII periods. At the time when European integration was but one among many competing visions of international cooperation, a number of thinkers engaged in the criticism of the scheme for establishing transnational federation confined to the European continent. While Chap. 2 has already hinted at the criticism advanced by the advocates of the world federation, this chapter explores these and related arguments in greater depth.

Admittedly, it was not until French Prime Minister Aristide Briand announced his proposal for a European federal union in 1929 when some of the critics found it worthy to evaluate the idea of a European federation. For J.A. Hobson (1929), for example, the Pan-European campaign itself, conducted by Coudenhove-Kalergi throughout the 1920s, was insignificant, until it actually had led to the political action by Briand. There was at least one influential thinker, however, who considered the idea of Pan-Europe before it reached mainstream international politics. Ludwig von Mises, an Austrian classical economist and ardent anti-socialist, discussed 'The United States of Europe' in his *Liberalism in the Classical Tradition*, originally published in 1927. Mises began his argument by praising the economic system of the United States, granting capitalism with making the country 'the mightiest and richest nation in the world' (1927[1985], p. 142). He found it understandable that Europeans would like to emulate American economic success, especially by removing destructive barriers to free trade. Similar to the proponents of a European federation, Mises rejected narrowly-minded nationalist policies, 'which always begin by aiming at the ruination of one's neighbor, [but] must, in the final analysis, lead to the ruination of all' (1927[1985], p. 144). Misses found it commendable if European states would like to enable tariff-free international trade, but limiting such an arrangement to a confined territory would require to 'demonstrate that the interests of the Portuguese and the Rumanians, although in harmony with each other, both collide with those of Brazil and Russia' (1927[1985], p. 147). Consequently, he cautioned that national chauvinism should not be replaced with chauvinism operating on a geopolitically-larger, European scale, which was the main problem for him with the Pan-European project:

> A European chauvinism is to take the place of the French, the German, or the Hungarian variety; a united front formed of all the European nations is to be directed against "foreigners": Britons, Americans, Russians, Chinese, and Japanese. (Mises 1927[1985], p. 145)

Mises did not believe that a European federation was possible, however, simply because no European nationalism exists. European nations feel an emotional attachment to their national communities, and they could not feel a similar attachment to an arbitrarily-drawn regional grouping. Even if Pan-Europe was possible, however, it would still be undesirable, because it would not contribute to the cause of world peace. Instead of European states fighting each other, Europe, as a militaristic block, would compete with other powers. As a result, military conflicts would continue, but on a different level. Interestingly, while Mises did not want Europe to unify against Russia, he himself was very critical of Russia's foreign policy, accusing it of robbing other countries whenever the opportunity arises. This is when his argument runs into trouble. Mises calls it a 'fortunate circumstance' that Russia had not managed to conquer Europe in the battles of the past, which was mainly due to the strength of European powers. WWI, however, shattered the old system of great powers, leaving European states weakened and vulnerable. The circumstances for Europe were certainly less fortunate in the 1920s than in the past. Thus, if Soviet Russia posed such a great danger for Europe, wouldn't it have helped if Europe had joined forces through some form of federation? Mises concluded with the following advice: 'Let the Russians be Russians. Let them do what they want in their own country. But do not let them pass beyond the boundaries of their own land to destroy European civilization' (1927[1985], p. 153). The problem with this argument concerns the capability of European nation-states to prevent the potential Russian invasion. Consequently, it appears that Mises reached similar conclusions about Russia's threat to Coudenhove-Kalergi, but at the same time, he remained critical of the latter's prescription for the federal European response, without actually formulating an alternative policy vision of his own.

The Briand Memorandum of 1929, bringing the Pan-European idea to the forefront of international politics, attracted further critical reactions. One came from J.A. Hobson (1929). To start with, Hobson struggled to interpret Briand's proposal. On the one hand, if the proposal was for a true European federation, the United States of Europe, then he did not see how Russia and Great Britain could have been excluded. If they were to be included, however, the organisation would have lost its European character. Furthermore, the political character of the federation would have likely undermined the authority of the League of Nations, with the hopes still high among liberal internationalists for the League to contribute to world peace. On the other hand, if the ambition was merely to enhance

economic cooperation among European members of the League, then Hobson, similar to Mises, did not find the idea realistic. European markets were too fragmented, there was too much mistrust and hostility among European states, and Europe was too dependent on non-European resources to create an effective, self-contained economic system.

The most comprehensive critique of the Briand Memorandum and the idea of Pan-Europe came from David Mitrany in his paper *Pan-Europa: A Hope or a Danger?* His argument proceeded in three stages. First, like Hobson, Mitrany attempted to interpret Briand's proposal. As he considered it merely an extension of the Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-Europe idea, his criticism concentrated on the latter. He saw the prospective United States of Europe as an attempt to create a closed-door system of preferential economic relations, which would have only hampered economic integration globally. Second, Mitrany assessed the feasibility of continental integration for world peace. He advanced a familiar argument that regional unions would operate on the same territorial basis as nation-states. Thus, while promising to establish peace within such unions, they would not contribute one bit to peaceful relations with other parts of the world. In fact, they would reinforce the old system of alliances, only at a different level:

> Here is the undiluted spirit of the thing [Pan-European union]. It is the policy of the balance of power which, happily shelved in politics, for the time being, the Pan-Europeans and their kin would apply to economics. In international relations, individualism leads, with the fatality of cosmic law, to alliances, and alliance to a struggle for the balance of power. (Mitrany 1930, p. 468)

In order to support his argument, Mitrany resorted to a risky strategy of making bold historical comparisons, linking the idea of the Pan-European union with political structures and ideas of the past. The most recent comparison he drew was with the Friedrich Naumann's concept of Mitteleuropa advanced in 1915 aimed to encourage European integration under the German leadership (Bugge 1993, pp. 90–92). Mitrany also tried to emphasise the German spirit in the Pan-European proposal by using the term Zollverein, referring to the 1833 customs union between German states (Albrecht-Carrié 1966, pp. 114–115). Concerning the Pan-Europe's external policy objectives, Mitrany recalled that already in 1856, a liberal thinker Richard Cobden called for a European federation

against Russia, noting that Russia became even more of a threat following the Bolshevik revolution. In response to this threat, Europeans are urged to unite, reviving the spirit of the Holy Alliance – 'A Holly Alliance in defence of the divine rights not of kings, but of the bourgeoisie' (Mitrany 1930, p. 471). The third part of the Mitrany's argument contrasted the Pan-European idea with the functionalist alternative – an alternative embodied by the League of Nations. Mitrany rejected the argument that regional integration initiatives, such as Pan-European union, are a necessary step towards a more ambitious world integration. For him, the difference between the two was not one of degree, but one of the essence:

> The one would proceed in the old way by a definition of territory, the other by a definition of functions; and while the unions would define their *territory* as a means of *differentiating* between members and outsiders, a league would select and define *functions* for the contrary purpose of integrating with regard to them the interests of all. (Mitrany 1930, p. 476)

What was so attractive to Mitrany about the League was its invitation to all the countries in the world to abide by certain universal principles, like peace, thus bringing countries together rather than dividing them according to a 'sectional code' and guided by the motto 'Pan-Europa, right or wrong!' (Mitrany 1930, p. 477). Mitrany further developed his functionalist ideas in *The Progress of International Government*, in which he reiterated his criticism of territorial individualism embedded in the system of sovereign states as well as the 'system of self-contained continental units' (Mitrany 1933. p. 114). He called upon the 'world society' to reject the 'pagan worship of political frontiers', and to embrace the principle that 'the law and its reign must be universal' (Mitrany 1933. p. 118). There were subsequently various opportunities for Mitrany to defend his functionalist approach against the federalist alternative, like during the Chatham House discussion in 1948, in which Lionel Curtis challenged Mitrany by arguing that the functionalist approach had not worked in America, Germany and South Africa until some form of constitutional settlement was agreed to enable and protect the functionalist arrangements. Mitrany responded that these three cases, in fact, prove his thesis, showing that federation is only possible between 'a few kindred groups' and it was, in the foreseeable future, impossible on the Western-European scale, not to mention worldwide (Mitrany 1948, p. 363; see also Joyce 1945, for the round-table discussion of Mitrany's ideas). The problem of

boundaries, therefore, constitutes the common denominator linking all three criticisms of the Pan-European idea. While the viable alternative was not always obvious and certainly uneasy to attain, international integration based on the principle of territorial differentiation between included and excluded states seemed unfit for the purpose of building world peace. In the era of conflicts spanning across continents, the critics found political projects limited to regions unsatisfactory, if not harmful to universal peace.

The World Without War: Boundaries in Functionalism

The school of European federalism cannot be associated with any single name to grant with developing a coherent set of propositions, which then would serve as the point of reference for others engaging with the approach. The opposite is true for international functionalism – an approach unambiguously associated with Romanian-born David Mitrany (Navari 1995). Mitrany did not develop his ideas in an intellectual vacuum, however, even though he was enigmatic about his influences. In his *Memoirs*, he recalled that his approach was 'simply a matter of growth', a result of studying and observing the world (Mitrany 1975b, p. 3). In reality, Mitrany was deeply influenced by the theory of English pluralism, and particularly by Leonard T. Hobhouse. Pluralists believed that 'the basic elements of social life, and the source of its vitality, were self-governing associations which possessed a legitimacy in their own right and whose autonomy ought to be respected' (Navari 1995, p. 218). Hobhouse was one of the early proponents of social liberalism in Britain. In his *Social Evolution and Political Theory*, he rejected the idea that the authority of the ruler is the only way to organise a society. Instead, he argued that evolved societies can organise themselves around the idea of citizenship, embedded in 'reciprocity of obligation', and thus giving individuals and groups elasticity and freedom of organisation. Naturally, the organisation of this kind would not have to be confined to any state territory, and, as such, it 'reveals the possibility of a world state in which the constituent groups, as well the constituent individuals, would have legitimate scope of self-development' (Hobhouse 1911, p. 148).

Leonard Woolf was another important influence on Mitrany. According to Wilson (2002, pp. 58–60), Mitrany himself did not even realise how much he drew on Woolf's ideas. Woolf's influence was also unique, as he

was the pioneer of applying functionalist principles to international relations, rather than domestic politics. In his *International Government*, Woolf anticipated many different aspects of Mitrany's functionalism, such as the commitment to pluralism. He saw state government everywhere, including 'voluntary associations, such as churches, trade unions, associations of employers, joint stock companies, clubs, etc.' (Woolf 1916, p. 312). The war could be prevented if only the multiplicity of similar bodies are regulated at the international level, contributing to the creation of world government. Finally, it is also important to mention G.D.H. Cole. He was a socialist thinker who, in his *Social Theory*, advanced the idea of associations, which are simply groups of people working together towards a common purpose (Cole 1920, p. 37). Associations exist within states, but also internationally, contributing to the development of international community: 'International associations for specific purposes is the forerunner of a closer-knit international community, and can only exist because, in a rudimentary form, international community is already a fact' (Cole 1920, p. 46).

This brief overview already points to fundamental differences between international federalism and early functionalist approaches, specifically regarding the question of boundaries, and their association with international security. Borrowing terminology from contemporary International Relations, federalism and functionalism each emphasise different units of analysis. The former starts with nation states and associates the prospects for international security with both the internal structure of the federation, as well as its outer boundaries. The boundaries, by their nature, perform the role of delineating a given territorially-defined community from its external environment, which also consists of nation states. International functionalists do not disregard states. Woolf was even criticised by Mitrany for being too state-centric in his approach (Wilson 2002, p. 58). Nonetheless, functionalists prioritise functions over territorially-defined entities – functions, which are performed by a variety of non-state structures. They also associate the development of such structures across state boundaries with higher prospects for international order and security. Hobhouse's citizenship, as well as Woolf's and Cole's associations, are important phenomena which we can more often observe within states, but which can also operate internationally. While there are significant differences between them, these non-state structures can perform an important function of contributing to international peace. This function comes in addition to their immediate objectives, depending on their purpose.

Turning to Mitrany, it is unnecessary to comprehensively recite all the principles of the 'working peace system', as there are numerous volumes, which do that (e.g. Ashworth and Long 1999). The focus here is on that aspect of the Mitrany's approach to international functionalism, which directly engages with the problems of territoriality, boundaries and international security. This narrower take will allow for an easier comparison with the similar aspects of federalism discussed in Chap. 2 and will offer a more in-depth basis for the discussion of security governance in Chap. 5. As Navari notes (1995, 1996), the functionalist-federalist 'quarrel' goes back to the early interwar period and took shape in the context of the discussions on the League of Nations. The struggle to make the League acceptable for the United States' Congress offered Mitrany the first opportunity to suggest the reform of the institution along the 'facultative' lines – an early statement of functionalism in international relations. In *The Problem of International Sanctions*, Mitrany argued that the League should have avoided creating a single order of commitments and responsibilities for all its members, and instead, it should have offered states an option of joining specific commitments on a voluntary basis (Mitrany 1925). This way, the United States would not have had to worry about compromising its sovereignty, as it could have only gone as far as it desired, with the minimum being a simple declaration that it would not help a member of the League declared as the aggressor. In this proposition, the idea of boundaries can be applied to functions as much as territories, with states being able to join only some international commitments. The boundaries of any individual commitment delineate the involvement of a state internationally in a given issue area. That way, following Mitrany's logic, countries may be more willing to join some negative commitments, which are vital for international peace, such as not helping aggressor states, whilst being able to refrain from other, more ambitious (positive) commitments, like mutual defence, which may be too controversial domestically.

The best-known account of functionalism in international relations Mitrany developed in *A Working Peace System* – an essay published in 1943 by the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Unsurprisingly, at this point, he became disillusioned with the League of Nations. In his taxonomy of different forms of international organisation, he categorised the League as a loose association with mere advisory capacities. He contrasted it with a federal system, which is more coherent but ineffective for achieving international security, for the reasons already outlined. The third form and the one he advocated is functionalism, which can be summarised as linking

authority to a specific activity, rather than territory (Mitrany 1966, p. 27). These activities would be administered by executive agencies with autonomous authority, in contrast to the League system, which only comprised modest secretariats. The activities selected for transnational administration would be specific, addressing some of the most pressing economic and social problems of ordinary people in different countries. They would also be organised separately, reflecting their specific nature. It is the very needs and activities required to address these needs, which would inform the form of international organisation. Power would not be attached to territorially-defined units, such as states or continental unions, but to specific tasks, or functions. The question would thus be where power should be exercised, based on the specific requirements of the task, rather than who should exercise it, i.e. who the authorities are (Mitrany 1966, p. 84). Mitrany envisaged the international system as gradually, yet spontaneously evolving towards a thick web of transnational practices of cooperation without any conscious effort to formally codify it.

How would this process contribute to international security? In a distant future, Mitrany did not discard the idea that such functional cooperation could lead to a world federation. This was a completely different vision, however, to that proposed by international and European federalists. For Mitrany, the international federation would be 'the solid growth of a natural selection and evolution, tested and accepted by experience', rather than an outcome of political decisions, and thus vulnerable to changing political preferences (Mitrany 1966, p. 83). More immediately, Mitrany suggested transforming the perception of security from a negative one, as the lack of conflict, to a positive one, involving 'active regular life of the people' (Mitrany 1966, p. 40). A functional approach to the international organisation would organically lead to the emergence of such active life internationally. It would not make states obsolete, but it would make geopolitical boundaries meaningless over time:

> It would help the expansion of such positive and constructive common work, of common habits and interests, making frontier lines meaningless by overlaying them with a natural growth of common activities and common administrative agencies. (Mitrany 1966, pp. 62–63)

Mitrany further operationalised his ideas during a conference held in 1944, in parallel to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, which negotiated the creation of the United Nations. He was sceptical that another

international organisation, although different from the League of Nations in some respects, could ensure international peace if it was essentially a political agreement without practical mechanisms for fostering international economic integration. Permanent international peace is impossible without effective instruments, which can prevent preparation for conflict at an early stage. Only transnational technical and economic agencies can do that by providing the services as needed, but also by withholding them when necessary. From this perspective, any action by the Security Council, undertaken however early in the conflict cycle, could never be truly preventive (Mitrany 1944, p. 16). Somehow anticipating the ECSC, Mitrany insisted, for example, that disarming Germany would not have been sufficient for preventing future aggression. To this end, some form of joint control was necessary over not only armament industries but also involving other industries critical to any war effort, such as chemicals and heavy industries. This way the responsible transnational agencies, 'penetrating deep into German economic life', would have provided useful services to the Germans, while at the same time effectively preventing the German government from misusing these resources.

Returning to the problem of boundaries, it may be tempting to conclude that Mitrany rejected boundaries altogether, associating them with the anachronistic system of sovereign nation states. This would not be entirely true, however, as boundaries are still important in international functionalism. It is just that they are not geopolitical boundaries delineating the territory of one political unit from another, but rather functional boundaries, delineating one function from another. This is precisely why he opposed creating a single, compulsory system of sanctions by the League of Nations, obliging states to undertake a range of positive actions countering the aggression against one or more members. He argued that creating such a single order would be both unrealistic and unfair to some of the states, which may suffer from retaliation (Mitrany 1925). Instead, Mitrany opted for a facultative system, in which boundaries would have separated different degrees of commitments, ranging from the principle of not helping the aggressor (at the minimum), all the way to the military assistance. Maintaining the boundaries between the League functions would have offered a number of benefits, one of which was making it easier for the United States Congress to ratify the Covenant. At the same time, as noted, Mitrany did not exclude the possibility that after a certain threshold of functional arrangements is established, some form of an international federation would be possible, thus leading to the gradual blurring

of boundaries between functions. This could only have happened, however, because of the organic evolution in response to people's actual needs. Consequently, it is fair to say that gradually eliminating territorial distinctions and geopolitical boundaries constitutes the core of Mitrany's functionalism (he liked to repeat that whatever makes a distinction creates rivalry). At the same time, however, he opted for the pluralist international system of multiple functional arrangements, where governments and people have the option of choosing the ones, which they find beneficial, without being forced to accept all.

Functionalism and the Monnet Method

Both federalists and functionalists had specified ideas about their ideal world order. For most international federalists, even those focusing on the integration of Europe, the ultimate objective was nothing less than a world federation. Functionalists, on the other hand, promoted the vision of transnational technical and economic agencies with authority and power crossing the boundaries of all countries and responding to the direct needs of people, thus bringing them closer together and making the prospect of war more remote. Both groups, however, also wanted to be viewed as relevant and realistic. Mitrany, for example, was careful to demonstrate that what he proposed was not an abstract vision, but rather an empirical reality, which had to be recognised, nourished and promoted on a wider and deeper scale. In this light, both federalists and functionalists had to come to terms with the fact that the most ambitious and most promising instance of international integration was taking place in Western Europe in the 1950s. As we could see in Chap. 2, the acceptance of this reality did not come easy for federalists, many of whom invested their hopes in the European Defence Community (EDC), and who were later disappointed that the slow-paced European integration process looked nothing like their envisaged federalist ideal. Those among the European federalists who supported the ECSC and the EEC did it mainly out of a desire not to deny the reality. Did early European integration appear more attractive to Mitrany? After all, Europe was meant to be built 'through concrete achievements', and Jean Monnet was an advocate of sectoral functional integration (Rosamond 2000, p. 52).

When Monnet is described as 'the father' of modern European integration, it is not meant that he was the leader of a government, a political party or even that he was among the political decision makers who launched the European integration process in the early 1950s. Rather, it means that

his role was that of a 'catalyst and initiator' (Holland 1996, p. 94) as well as an 'architect of a revolutionary approach to international relations' (Fontaine 1988, p. 18; see also Mayne 1967). Instead of discussing Monnet's approach to integration in general, it is best to move directly to the key question. In light of the fact that Monnet had a profound impact on the French Declaration of May 9, 1950, and the subsequent launching of European integration, and that his 'method' is often associated with a form of functionalism, how well does he sit with the Mitrany's version of functionalism, specifically regarding the problems of territoriality and boundaries? Monnet certainly disliked abstract, grand political ideas associated with the notion of the European federalism. Notably, he did not sympathise with the post-WWII transnational movements advocating European unity, because 'they had nothing to do with action' (Monnet 1978, p. 283). Similarly, Monnet disliked the idea of German Chancellor Adenauer, who in March 1950 proposed that France and Germany are united in a complete union involving the merger of economies, citizenship and parliaments (Monnet 1978, p. 285). While Monnet sympathised with Adenauer's reasoning behind the union, he rejected the method as inappropriate:

> Experience had taught me that one cannot act in general terms, starting from a vague concept, but that anything becomes possible as soon as one can concentrate on one precise point which leads to everything else. (…) This idea of a prior global union, intended to envelop and remove a particular difficulty, was not in my view realistic. On the contrary, (…) we should start with the difficulty itself, using it as a lever to initiate a more general solution. (Monnet 1978, p. 286)

Mitrany shared this view. He made it clear, for example, in his response to the criticism of functionalism by Andrea Chiti-Batelli – a prominent European federalist. Chiti-Batelli accused Mitrany and functionalists of getting the order of international integration wrong. In order for international functionalism to have 'something of interest to say' according to Chiti-Batelli, an international federation must first be established, to provide an overarching political framework for economic cooperation (Chiti-Batelli 1950, pp. 476–77). Mitrany responded that if it was already difficult to implement the Schuman Plan, which did not make any up-front calls for countries to surrender substantial portions of their sovereignty, how much more difficult would it have been if the French Foreign Minister called upon states to federate first? (Mitrany 1950, p. 197). He also sug-

gested that it was unfruitful, when discussing international integration at the time, to refer to the experience of the United States 160 years earlier. Instead, it was more appropriate to think how well-established states with different cultures, economies and political systems can realistically engage in international integration (Mitrany 1950, p. 198; for the differences between the two historical contexts see also Lange 1950).

In order to address this very problem, Monnet thought it was important to focus on the most pressing and most specific challenge at the time. For him, the key roadblock to securing peace in Europe was, on the one hand, the Allied control in Germany, which risked humiliating the Germans, and, on the other hand, no control at all, which was a frightening perspective for France. From the French perspective, the traditional way of addressing the 'German problem' was to avert German rearmament, maintain tight Allied control and prevent German industrial domination. Monnet feared this was exactly the path France was entering after the war, risking the return to the traditional cycle of confrontation, whereby one country cannot feel secure unless it controls all the strategic resources at the expense of the other country. For France and Germany, the strategic resources were coal and steel, and they were distributed over the area divided by the Franco-German border. For Monnet, they constituted 'a thread to pull so as to unravel some of the knots and gradually sort everything out' (Monnet 1978, p. 292). The only hope to alleviate French concerns, avoid German humiliation and build a 'working peace' in Europe was to establish joint French-German control over coal and steel, and open the framework for other countries to join in. Drawing on his experience in the League of Nations, Monnet knew he did not want to achieve this goal through traditional international cooperation. He thought creating 'a joint sovereign authority' was required, but there was no reference in the history of international relations. Consequently, he needed help with translating his ideas into a viable arrangement. Together with a small group of advisers, between April 16 and May 6, Monnet prepared a draft version of the document, which eventually became the French Declaration of May 9, 1950 (Monnet 1978, pp. 296–297). His functionalist, problem-focused approach was evident in the document, of which an earlier version was finished with the following statement:

> This proposal has an essential political objective: to make a breach in the ramparts of national sovereignty which will be narrow enough to secure consent, but deep enough to open the way towards the unity that is essential to peace. (Monnet 1978, p. 296)

All the functionalist ingredients are there. Integration has a political end-goal. State sovereignty is not tackled head-on, through bold political declarations and grand integration schemes. Instead, it is addressed through integration in a single, narrow field, which, at the same time, is significant enough to remove some other roadblocks and pave the way to integration in other areas. Monnet called it 'lateral thinking': instead of wasting time on 'the hard core of the resistance', he thought it more effective to try to 'change whatever element in its environment was causing the block' (Monnet 1978, p. 291). Interestingly, Monnet was later criticised by Spinelli in a similar fashion that Mitrany was criticised by Chiti-Batelli. Spinelli accused Monnet of neglecting the importance of organising power at the European level, thus making the political centre 'weak and impotent' (quoted in Burgess 1989, p. 58). Further, Spinelli attributed this neglect to the distinctively French experience of public administration to which Monnet was exposed. According to Spinelli, Monnet believed that because French bureaucrats (*commis*) played a role in establishing the French state, in a similar fashion, the Commissioners and the Council could play a deciding role in driving European integration (Spinelli 1978). The problem in this thinking, according to Spinelli, is that kings in France provided a much-needed political direction – a vital component missing from the design of the European institutional architecture. Again, in this chicken-and-egg exchange, Mitrany (or Monnet) could have argued that the project of European integration could not have started with pooling sovereignty and distributing power because the divisions between European nation states are much deeper and more comprehensive than those between the old French provinces.

Returning to the original question, it may now seem that Monnet's method was indeed functionalist and that it sits well with the Mitrany's approach to international organisation. This conclusion, however, would be inaccurate. For all the similarities between Mitrany and Monnet, one fundamental difference places the approaches, which they represented in stark contrast to each other. The difference concerns the problem of territoriality and geopolitical boundaries: Monnet wanted to see a European federation as an end-product of functional integration in Europe. He was very direct about it in his *Memoirs*. He argued, for example, that '[t]here could be no truly European effort without a federation of the West, but there could be no federation unless it were backed by such an effort' (Monnet 1978, p. 273). As already noted, however, he dismissed European federalist movements, and rather frankly admitted that he 'paid little attention' to the Hague Congress. He thought a different route was necessary

to secure European unity, of which, nonetheless, the final objective was the European federation. He also made it clear in one of his early drafts of the French Declaration:

> Europe must be organized on a federal basis. A Franco-German union is an essential element in it (…) Obstacles accommodated from the past make it impossible to achieve immediately the close association which the French Government has taken as its aim. (Monnet 1978, p. 295)

It is worth noting that the final version of the document reiterates that the pooling of coal and steel production is the first step, or 'the first concrete foundation', in the 'federation of Europe'. This federalist objective, naturally, places Monnet at odds with Mitrany. While the latter did not exclude the possibility of the international federation as an end-product of international functional cooperation, he unequivocally rejected the idea of federations confined to particular geopolitical regions. Such regional groupings may well be able to bring peace to its members, but they are bound to replicate, at the larger geopolitical scale, the same dynamics, which used to drive their members to war with each other before unification. Indeed, Mitrany criticised Monnet along these lines in a footnote to the 1975 reprint of his interwar article commenting on Pan-Europe and the Briand Plan, noting:

> It was distressing to hear even the civilised voice of Jean Monnet dismiss all economic doubt about the EEC with the blunt assertion that "European Union is a matter of *civilisation*" (BBC interview, 10 July, 1969). No mention of the rest of Europe, none of North America, none of the world at large. (Mitrany 1975b, p. 153)

The reason why Mitrany appears to have been somehow surprised by this statement by Monnet is the fact that it was never easy to label Monnet as a federalist, functionalist or both. There were certainly grounds for Mitrany to consider Monnet a functionalist. As already mentioned, Monnet did not support European federalist movements and he objected to the German plan for the Franco-German union. He did get involved in the plans for the EDC, but he felt the EDC was forced by the circumstances and the alternative was unacceptable. France could not keep resisting American pressure for rearming Germany because American government tied its European security guarantees to raising European (including German) contribution. Consequently, Monnet felt the

European integration project was 'forced to take short cuts' (Monnet 1978, p. 343). Rosamond (2000, p. 52) also speculates that Monnet must have felt most favourable towards the instances of sectoral integration, institutionalised through the ECSC and Euratom, and less enthusiastic about the subsequently dominant role of the EEC. This may well have been the case, but in the end, the available evidence suggests that Monnet was a firm believer in *European* integration, eventually transforming 'European administrations' into 'a fully-fledged political power' (Spinelli 1978, p. 79). Considering the fundamental role of Monnet as an intellectual founder of the international integration project in Western Europe, it was to be expected that Mitrany would become increasingly critical towards the way in which the integration was progressing.

Functionalism and the Boundaries of the EEC/EU

It may come as a surprise after what has been said about Mitrany's views on regional integration that he, in fact, did not oppose continental unions. On the contrary, he thought there were numerous advantages to such groupings: regional organisations can deal with regional issues quicker than central bodies; states may be more active within regional organisations than in the central ones; the rule of unanimity is likely to be less destructive if fewer states are involved in addressing a problem at the regional level (Mitrany 1933, pp. 111–114). What Mitrany meant, however, was regional devolution within the legal and organisational context of the League of Nations. The League's Covenant stated that it did not 'affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings (…)'. Consequently, it was possible to devolve certain competencies and responsibilities of the League to the regional level, in order to make the overall system more effective. The United Nations Charter further expands this provision under Chapter VIII. If someone had thought, however, that regional integration schemes, such as Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-Europe, could be considered examples of regional devolution, for Mitrany they could not have been further apart:

> What has been urged above is a system of devolution within a world constitution. What most projects such as that for a Pan-European union contemplate is a system of self-contained continental or imperial units, linked at best to each other in the same unstable and unfruitful way in which individual States are now mutually interrelated. (Mitrany 1933, p. 114)

Organisations such as the League were created to enforce certain universal principles, most importantly international peace. Nothing states do internationally should undermine these principles. Whether they are best implemented centrally or through powers delegated to regional unions can be discussed, but the principles always come first. What Mitrany, therefore, opposed in regional integration schemes was the prioritisation of territories and boundaries at the expense of universal principles. When the focal point of international integration is the European continent, rather than international peace, the latter is doomed to suffer. It is in the context of this distinction that we should read Mitrany's assessment of the EEC.

The Grotius Conference on the 'limits and problems of European integration' in 1961 offered Mitrany an opportunity to raise some early criticism of the EEC (Mitrany 1963b). To this end, Mitrany asked two questions against which he deemed it important to assess any efforts at regional integration: Is any particular regional union to be a closed and exclusive union? Are such regional unions to be linked, at a subordinate level, to a wider common authority? (Mitrany 1963b, p. 40). The direct link of a regional union to some form of a central authority would naturally entail that the union works, above all, towards an effective implementation of universal principles, and that it does it within the same framework as other regional groupings. The conference title, therefore, for him meant reflection on the geopolitical limits of European integration, rather than integration depth among the current member states. It is worthwhile pausing here to note the Mitrany's unchanging approach to the theory as such. As discussed at the beginning of the chapter, his empirical-normative approach contrasted with the empirical-explanatory theory of Ernst Haas, who, at the same conference, delivered a political scientific analysis of the conditions for possible regional integration in other places, based on the Western-European experience (Haas 1963). It was indeed 'unscientific' of Mitrany to criticise and prescribe, with reference to abstract principles, rather than interpret and analyse what was actually happening. Mitrany's approach did not only run against the 'scientific turn' in the study of Politics and International Relations, but his vision was also far from what could have been considered realistic at the time.

Expectedly, Mitrany was suspicious of the European integration project as it progressed. Politically, he feared that because European states were historically well-established and divergent, any effort at uniting them into a continental union would require 'inventing' shared values which did not

naturally exist. The 'European soul' would have to be distinguished from the 'American soul' and the proclaimed European identity would have to be constantly reinforced by differentiating it from the outside world. Culturally, Europe would become increasingly closed and exclusive, even though openness distinguishes Europe from other civilizations (Mitrany 1963b). In a subsequent article in *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, Mitrany reiterated all of his arguments against regional, exclusive unions, but he also directed his criticism more directly against the EEC, while at the same time commending the ECSC and Euratom:

> The ECSC and Euratom are straight functional bodies and can get on with their allotted task without offending the position of other countries, while remaining open to link up with them. The scope of EEC is by comparison diffuse and subject to a continuous temptation to self-inflation (which the 'Europeans' deem a virtue); with a bureaucratic tendency because it is diffuse, and an expansionist tendency because it is bureaucratic. (Mitrany 1965, pp. 141–142)

Already at this early stage of integration, Mitrany was critical of what he called the repulsion by the 'inner Six' of some European states ('outer Seven') into forming the European Free Trade Association – a clear sign that the EEC was, in fact, a closed and exclusive initiative. He argued that while it was beneficial for the ECSC and Euratom to link with other agencies on a global scale (according to the functional logic), the EEC, by expanding its sphere of control, could only behave according to an increasingly competitive logic, triggering all the undesirable consequences which Mitrany associated with exclusive regional organisations.

The EEC, from the functionalist perspective, was already too extensive, closed and exclusive when it was launched. Yet, when we look back at the EEC from the perspective of the process of European integration that followed, it appears still limited. The Maastricht Treaty was groundbreaking not only because of the substantive policy changes, which it introduced but also because of the new vocabulary. The European integration project was 'upgraded' into a 'union', entailing an even stronger sense of Europe as a unit, delineated territorially and with clearly-defined members and non-members. If the EEC, according to Mitrany, was too expansive, performing too many tasks, it is clear that the EU has moved even further away from the functionalist ideal. Not only did the European Community further expand the scope of its activities, but also the EU became equipped

with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), firmly establishing the Union as a regional organisation with global political aspirations. Subsequent developments further built on the decades of making the Union 'ever closer', and include the creation (and strengthening in the Lisbon Treaty) of the EU High Representative post and establishing European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to give the CFSP some military teeth. Whilst it would not be difficult to identify within the EU numerous examples of policy areas organised along the functional lines, the 'external dimension' of the EU resembles the Pan-European idea of Coudenhove-Kalergi more than the functionalist model of Mitrany.

The functionalist analysis of European integration, and particularly its security aspect, has not been common in the literature, however. One reason for this is perhaps the fact that functionalism, together with integration theory in general, has become associated primarily with Haas' neofunctionalism. It was thus natural for scholars to lose interest in the theory once its founder announced its demise (Haas 1976a, b). Another reason, partially stemming from the first one, is the general decline of European *integration* theory in the 1990s and the growing popularity of *comparative* and *public policy* approaches to the EU as polity (Rosamond 2000, pp. 158–163). More broadly, the popular perception of early integration thought as 'pre-theories' or 'normative visions', which paved the way for the post-WWII theories 'proper', must also be taken into account. A book *New Perspectives on International Functionalism* constitutes one example of how we can interpret and apply Mitrany's functionalism to study modern international and European integration.

In this book, David Long (1999) undertook a rare effort of assessing the security policy of the EU through the functionalist lens. Unsurprisingly, he found the CFSP to be far from the functionalist ideal, associating the framework with the territorial exclusion of threats with the possible use of military measures. European security policy is increasingly 'traditional' in character, with policy dynamics associated with the nation states being elevated to the EU level. The outcome of this shift is easily predicted from the perspective of the functionalist approach; the territorial and exclusionary model of security will inevitably lead to a paradox, whereby the CFSP

> must look for problems and threats in order to justify itself. But, as it concentrates on security interpreted as defence against outsiders, the implied exclusiveness and territoriality jeopardizes the EU's openness and the prospects for international cooperation and thus (ironically) the EU's own security! (Long 1999, p. 127)

A distinctive contribution of an empirical-normative approach is manifested here. In contrast to the empirical-explanatory theories, Mitrany's functionalism does not begin with the existing phenomena, followed by the theorisation and (sometimes) generalisation. Instead, it begins with values, such as international peace and welfare. The analysis then concerns the extent to which the empirical phenomena and processes in question are aligned with the pursuit of these important values. For Mitrany, peace and welfare are interlinked and so they should be for the EU, according to Long. Consequently, Long proposes to revive the spirit of the ECSC in the EU's approach to international security, thus making the policy more integrative, community-oriented and focused on economic and social interaction, rather than just on high-politics matters (Long 1999, p. 132). International agencies and organisations should specialise in narrow policy-areas. The EU is best at addressing the economic aspects of security, while the military aspects are best left to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). A 'working peace' approach of this kind, if adopted by the EU, should replace the territorial and exclusionary model institutionalised through the CFSP and ESDP, and, as a result, bring Europe closer to achieving the goal of regional and global security.

Conclusions

This book refers to functionalism as one of the theoretical approaches to international integration. The idea of this chapter was to demonstrate, however, that functionalism is more than simply an alternative view on international (and certainly European) integration. As an International Relations and Security Studies theory, functionalism constitutes a separate and coherent philosophical proposition concerning the nature of international order and security governance. In contrast to the theories of *European* integration, functionalism has never been concerned with explaining regional integration in Western Europe, and thus it has never been part of the debate concerning the most important actors in the process, taking place primarily between neofunctionalists and intergovernmentalists. Similarly, functionalism has been impartial to the debate between those favouring International Relations as a 'home' discipline to study European integration, and those coming from public policy and comparative politics. Thus, the arguable demise of European integration theory and its succession by 'polity' and 'multi-level governance' approaches does not affect the standing of functionalism. It has never been

concerned with finding the 'right' questions to best understand European integration, or the 'holy grail' concept which can finally tell us of what the EEC/EU is an example. In fact, functionalism has never been particularly concerned with European integration, other than assessing whether it brings us closer to, or further away from, international peace.

If it appears that functionalism lost its relevance in the 1950s/1960s, it is mainly because two processes coincided around that time: as a result of the Cold War, any form of international integration reaching beyond Western Europe was unimaginable; and the shared understanding of what constituted legitimate theory changed, rendering functionalism 'unscientific' and 'unrigorous'. At best, it became an early attempt at international theorising, and at worst a loose set of untestable ideas about how the world should be organised. Both circumstances changed again, however. The world is no longer torn by the Cold War. The functionalist ideas are sometimes raised in the public discourse on European and international security governance, such as during the 2015 House of Lords debate on the future of EU-Russia relations (House of Lords 2015, p. 23). Of course, to say that functionalism remains relevant is not to say that functionalist prescriptions are always right or feasible. It only means that it remains a legitimate choice, both theoretically and in terms of political strategy, in the debates on European and international security order. The resurgence of international political theory further plays to the functionalism's advantage, expanding the range of theory-kinds considered legitimate. Reus-Smit's (2013) reformulation of analytical eclecticism is particularly valuable in this context, providing a new meta-theoretical 'home' to functionalism as an empirical-normative eclectic approach to international order and security governance.

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CHAPTER 5

Security Governance: Boundaries in Flux

The family of international integration theories discussed in this book requires the inclusion of one final member – the security governance approach. To continue with the metaphor, security governance 'gets along' well with some members of this theoretical family, while disagreeing with others. In fact, as the chapter demonstrates, fundamental ontological differences distinguish security governance from all three approaches discussed in the previous chapters. In line with the argument of the book, security governance embodies some of the core principles underpinning David Mitrany's international functionalist approach. While it does not relate to functionalism in any direct way, both theoretical frameworks emphasise solving specific international problems rather than drawing geopolitical boundaries. Conversely, we can contrast security governance with the 'Europe as power' research programme, although the difference between the two is perhaps not as stark as that which was painted by Mitrany between his functionalism and the more prominent at that time school of international federalism.

Still, for the 'Europe as power' research programme, the European Union (EU) is at the centre of analysis, with most discussions revolving around the specific nature of the EU's international power, or 'actorness'. Further, a normative bias characterises this strand of research, in that most scholars express preference for the thicker outer boundaries of the EU at the expense of thinner inner boundaries between the member states. One strand of the security governance scholarship, which we can call

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structure-oriented, shares some similarities with the 'Europe as power' programme, as it intends to capture the fragmentation of traditional government structures in Europe after the Cold War. Although it is also primarily concerned with policy dynamics characterising a particular geopolitical territory, it claims that European security governance is more inclusive than alternative frameworks (Kirchner 2006). The 'process-oriented' strand of security governance, in contrast, clearly differs from the 'Europe as power' programme, and it most closely relates to the functionalist approach. Here, security governance serves as a conceptual framework capturing a particular kind of transnational policy initiatives directed at solving specific problems. As the example of the EU's chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) Centres of Excellence (CoE) demonstrates, security governance in this case transcends geopolitical boundaries and works across states to solve security problems (Zwolski 2014).

The first section elaborates on the relationship between functionalism and the 'security governance' research programme, focusing on the questions concerning territoriality, geopolitical boundaries, function, and service. Subsequently, the chapter elaborates on the notions of governance and security governance, contrasting the concept with the related ideas of security community and regimes, but also explaining how security governance draws on the broadening of the notion of security after the Cold War. 'Governance' has a rich tradition outside the sphere of international security, and the second section sheds light on this tradition as well as elaborates on how the concept has become associated with the study of international security cooperation. The third section demonstrates how we can apply the security governance concept to the EU's flagship approach to CBRN proliferation, CBRN CoE. In this understanding of security governance as a special kind of policy purposefully undertaken by an international actor, geopolitical boundaries give place to the transnational problems that require solving. The fourth section brings to the fore the question of politics and values, demonstrating how and why the concept of security governance, as it has become constructed in the scholarship, fundamentally differs from the other three integration theories discussed in this book. The final section returns to the main question of this volume, reassessing security governance's take on territoriality and geopolitical boundaries.

From Functionalism to European Security Governance

As discussed in Chap. 3, the links between international federalism and the 'Europe as power' research programme were both direct and indirect. They were direct in a sense that a number of researchers/advocates of international federalism went on to study (and promote) the emerging international role of the European Economic Community (EEC). In the United Kingdom (UK), the Federal Trust institutionalised some of those research efforts by promoting European integration through education and research initiatives. The links were also indirect, in that the 'Europe as power' programme shared certain characteristics with the school of international federalism, particularly in the European context. Notably, both were concerned with international integration in Europe. In the case of functionalism and the 'European security governance' research programme, in contrast, it is more difficult to identify direct links between the two. One reason for this absence is that, as demonstrated in Chap. 4, international functionalism lost its prominence early after World War II (WWII). There were various reasons for its demise, but the outcome was that functionalism *à la* David Mitrany disappeared from academic discussions until its modest revival in recent years (see Ashworth and Long 1999; Steffek 2014; Zwolski 2016a).

Another reason is that, contrary to the 'Europe as power' programme, the governance approach to international security cooperation has only emerged in the 1990s as a result of the 'governance turn' in International Relations (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992), European Studies (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2006) and national politics (Rhodes 1997). The length of time between the demise of functionalism and the emergence of 'security governance' is therefore much longer than that between the demise of European federalism and the emergence of the 'Europe as power' programme. Consequently, the links we can draw between international functionalism and the contemporary research on European security governance is primarily of analytical nature. These links are significant, however, and they further emphasise the difference between two philosophies of thinking about international security cooperation, one represented by the federalism/'Europe as power' programme, and the other one by the functionalism/'security governance' programme. The remainder of this

section sheds light on the theoretical and conceptual similarities between the security governance research programme and the school of international functionalism.

Territoriality and Boundaries

Of particular importance to Mitrany, as noted in Chap. 4, was to distinguish his approach from the school of European federalism along the questions of territoriality and boundaries. Mitrany was, of course, highly critical of regional integration in the form of exclusive unions, such as the Pan-European union advocated by Coudenhove-Kalergi, or the European federal union proposed by French Prime Minister Aristide Briand in 1929. He saw the prospective United States of Europe as an attempt to create a closed-door system of preferential economic relations, which would have only hampered economic integration globally (Mitrany 1930). Mitrany also argued that regional unions would operate on the same territorial basis as nation-states. Thus, while promising to establish peace within such unions, they would not contribute to peaceful relations with other parts of the world. In fact, they would reinforce the old system of alliances, only at a different level. As an alternative, Mitrany proposed a 'working' peace system, not confined to any particular territory, and without formal geopolitical boundaries. In this system, international security would be an outcome of the spontaneous, organic process whereby people demand transnational integration in order to have their particular needs met. Appreciating the benefit of transnational technical agencies regulating the provision of basic needs, populations would insist on transnational integration in an ever-growing number of areas, eventually resulting in a dense network of transnational functional links, each working independently of the other. The loyalties would gradually shift, as a result, from nation-states to transnational agencies, simply because they would better serve the needs of individuals than national governments. The real-life examples of functional cooperation, as identified by Mitrany, differed from this ideal type. Most notably, they were not driven primarily by the demand of populations but rather resulted from inter-governmental agreements. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) represents a flagship post-WWII functional initiative to overcome the problem of war in Europe. Mitrany's fundamental point about territoriality remained valid, however, particularly as he starkly contrasted the functional ECSC with the territorial EEC, with the latter resembling the federal model more than the functional one.

The idea of security governance shares with international functionalism the rejection of strictly delineated territory as a basis for international security cooperation. This fact is denoted by the very notion of governance, which stands in opposition to a government, and thus 'replaces the focus on the formal institutions of states and governments with recognition of the diverse activities that often blur the boundary of the state and society' (Bevir 2011, p. 2). Elke Krahmann (2003), in her effort to conceptualise security governance, identified 'fragmentation' as the overarching theme in the scholarship. Fragmentation can be geographical, for example, in which case the relevant activities can be found 'around' the nation-state, rather than simply inside its government apparatus; they can be found upwards at the international level, downwards at the sub-state level and outwards, through the activities of private actors (Rhodes 1999). What the idea of fragmentation as a defining feature of security governance denotes is that governance is not about identifying or promoting any formally organised and territorially-delineated structure. While the concept of security governance can be, as it has often been, applied to study the EU's role in international security, it is not the EU as a formal organisation and its performance vis-à-vis other state and non-state organisations which are the points of departure in such investigations. Instead, the point of applying the notion of security governance to the study of the EU is to precisely identify those characteristics of the EU, which are associated with the notion of governance (e.g. Zwolski 2014). Emil Kirchner (2006, p. 950) emphasises this point when he contrasts the EU as 'security governance' with the EU as 'security community', noting that 'security communities are oriented towards specific in-groups that inevitably casts non-members as either unimportant or as "the other"'. Because the EU has proven to be fluid in terms of geography (through various dimensions of its expansion), it is more accurately conceptualised as security governance.

Just like functionalism, the 'security governance' research programme contains both analytical and normative components. Whilst the analytical usage depicts governance as 'the focal point for transforming our understanding of world politics and the international relations discipline altogether' (Hoffmann and Ba 2005, p. 4), the normative dimension entails a programme for political change, capturing the vision of what international relations should look like in order to address contemporary security problems. If we focus on this normative component, it becomes rather unproblematic to conclude that international functionalism and the 'security governance' research programme share the rejection of formal government institutions as the optimal vehicle for international cooperation. It is

disputable, in this context, whether the EU should be classified as primarily a territorial entity resembling the model of formal international federations more than a functional arrangement, or whether it is a fully-fledged, fragmented system of governance with fluid boundaries. Mitrany would likely insist on the first proposition (Steffek 2016). The point is that the ideal-type system of international cooperation, for both approaches, involves fragmented transnational integration focused on addressing particular societal needs (such as security) through policy actors and instruments not confined to the nation states. This feature of functionalism and the 'security governance' programme distinguishes them from European federalism and the 'Europe as power' programme. The latter two take the territorially-delineated EU as a point of analytical departure and promote an ever more coherent and state-like regional European integration model.

Function and Service

The second characteristic shared by international functionalism and the 'security governance' research programme stems logically from the previous point about territoriality and boundaries. If it is not a delineated geopolitical entity, which constitutes the point of departure for these theoretical approaches, what is it then? It is function and service. In that sense, both approaches are very much problem-driven. Rather than asking how international cooperation should be formalised or what the nature of a particular international organisation is, they ask about the most pressing problems to be solved, how to solve those problems, and what the nature of international/transnational structures already in place is to solve those problems. According to Mitrany, solving common problems unites people. In contrast, phenomena like culture and ideology are the culprits reinforcing distinctions between nations (Ashworth 1999). Culture should, therefore, be excluded from international relations and enjoyed within communities. Ideology, on the other hand, should be bypassed through the creation of new habits of cooperation forming in response to basic human needs, which come before culture and ideology. The needs-driven policy unites communities rather than divides them, because people arguably have similar basic needs wherever they happen to live. The needs, for Mitrany (1966, p. 56), always come first: '[t]he people may applaud declarations of rights, but they will call for the satisfaction of needs'. These needs may come in a different form, ranging from regulating food and work standards to international land, sea and air transportation. The

functional approach promises to address the popular needs for the provision of goods and services in the most practical, technical and depoliticised manner possible, without touching the sensitive questions of sovereignty and national identity.

In a similar fashion, 'governance' is about addressing specific local, regional or global problems. At the national level, the literature on governance has traditionally been associated with the idea of policy networks, which flourished in response to the public policy neoliberal reforms introduced in the 1980s. At the regional level, 'governance' is applied in response to the rise of transnational economic relations and the significant role of European integration institutions (Bevir and Rhodes 2011, p. 203). The main concern of this literature is how the markets and various kinds of policy networks complement and replace governments in their traditional role of public service providers. At the international level, the notion of governance has been further adopted to denote the practice of addressing a wide array of societal challenges, including counter-terrorism, climate change or financial regulation. In the policy world, the most ambitious governance-building project was undertaken by the United Nations-backed Commission on Global Governance, which in 1995 produced the report Our Global Neighbourhood. The Commission proposed a wide-ranging set of reforms in response to the security crises of the early 1990s, calling for specific actions to be undertaken globally and to include all relevant stakeholders. The philosophy underpinning this and other initiatives was well explained at a 2013 conference 'Towards a Global Network of Crisis Rooms' aimed at enhancing cooperation and coordination among European and global institutions concerned with crises (Zwolski 2016b):

> Crises and catastrophes do not respect frontiers. They do not respect spatial frontiers, temporal frontiers. They are not respecters of culture and context, of wealth, status and gender. They are genuinely international. We have got used in the last few decades to a global manufacturing industry, a global financial industry, global tourism and the like. What I submit we have not yet got used to is a global industry or practice of crisis detection, of crisis analysis, crisis monitoring and, most importantly, crisis response. (Hutchings 2013)

If we replace 'industry' with 'governance', we can appreciate the concept's problem-solving characteristic. When there is a problem and it is clear that a hierarchical, sovereign state is unable to address it in its entire

complexity, the literature on governance either promotes the notion of decentralisation and network-building to address it more effectively (the normative strand, represented by the aforementioned report), or adopts the notion of governance to describe and perhaps also explain the relevant structures and processes at work (the analytical strand). Ursula Schroeder's (2011) book is a good example of the latter. She adopts the framework of security governance in order to investigate 'what impact the changing nature of security challenges has had on the organisation of security governance in Europe' (2011, abstract). The approach here is, therefore, problem-driven. Although her empirical focus is the EU's security architecture, it is the ability of the EU's system of governance to respond to terrorism and crises, which drive the argument, and not simply the EU as an international security actor vis-à-vis the outside world. In functionalist terms, Schroeder's argument concerns specific functions, which the EU can or cannot perform, rather than what kind of an actor the EU is or is not.

Governance and Security Governance

The notion of international security governance has been growing in prominence since the 1990s when the term 'governance' became widely-utilised to denote policy challenges and reforms within states and internationally. As illustrated on the sample of European studies journals including *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, *Journal of European Public Policy*, *Journal of European Integration* and *European Security*, the usage of the phrase 'security governance' has increased meaningfully between 2000 and 2012 (Fig. 5.1).

The 'security governance' research programme is, as noted, correlated with developments in the disciplines of Politics and International Relations which, in turn, had been influenced by the public policy reforms in the UK in the 1980s, the end of the Cold War, and the progress of European integration. Bevir and Rhodes (2011) recognise three 'waves' of the governance scholarship in the national context. The first wave resulted from what was seen as the 'hollowing out' of the state and government functions at the expense of policy networks and private actors. The second wave can be summarised as 'the return of the state', as it reaffirmed the central authority of the government as a governance coordinator. The third wave was proposed by Bevir and Rhodes themselves, and it denotes governance as socially constructed 'decentralisation' (2011, p. 204). In addition to the public policy scholarship struggling to grasp the exact



Fig. 5.1 'Security governance' in European Studies Journals

nature of governance within states, the end of the Cold War prompted research on the existing and desirable forms of governance globally. James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (1992), who reflected on 'governance without government' in international relations, set the initial tone in this debate. The literature on global governance has subsequently flourished, and Rosenau remained its most important authority.

One challenge, as noted, is to distinguish security governance from the idea of security communities. The relationship between the two is ambiguous. On the one hand, Sperling (2009) recognises different types of security community *as forms of* security governance. On the other hand, Krahmann and Kirchner clearly differentiate security governance from security communities. In her conceptualisation, Krahmann (2003) acknowledges that security governance shares some qualities with Adler and Barnett's (1998) take on security community. At the same time, however, she points out that security governance differs from security community because it involves a range of formal and informal institutions; it offers a better framework to capture the changing coalitions of member states as well as increasing reliance on private actors; and it accounts for security arrangements which are more fluid and flexible. Kirchner (2006) complements this list with the observation that security communities are more exclusive than security governance systems. While the existence of a security community precludes outsiders, or 'the other', the system of security governance can include varying degrees of participation. Furthermore,

Kirchner points out that there is some tension in how the role of international institutions is perceived in the security community scholarship. Security governance, in contrast, is unambiguous in that the institutions play a central role in promoting security inside and outside of the security governance system.

Another challenge has been to differentiate security governance from the longer-established notion of regimes. The relationship between international regimes and governance is ambiguous. Rosenau (1992, pp. 8–9), drawing on the classical understanding of regimes as developed by Krasner (1983), distinguishes governance from regimes by their scope. Whilst regimes refer to converging rules, norms and procedures in a given issue-area (non-proliferation, transboundary air pollution), governance is not limited to a single area of international relations. Instead, governance refers to the principles, norms, rules and procedures 'when two or more regimes overlap, conflict, or otherwise require arrangements that facilitate accommodation among the competing interests' (Rosenau 1992, p. 9). In a similar manner, Young (2005, p. 91) defines regimes as 'suppliers of governance'. In other words, a growing collection of issue-specific regimes will contribute to the emergence of governance in an anarchical society. Thus, global governance can be conceptualised as an amalgamation of functional regimes.

Rosenau (1995, p. 13) defines governance broadly as 'systems of rule at all levels of human activity – from the family to the international organisation – in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions'. This understanding is very encompassing. Finkelstein (1995) proposes a narrower definition, which still allows taking account of the broadening variety of actors, issues and activities, but, at the same time, provides a more suitable starting point for empirical research. He suggests that governance (at the global level) means 'governing, without sovereign authority, relationships that transcend national frontiers. Governance is doing internationally what governments do at home' (Finkelstein 1995, p. 369). This conceptualisation (a) is concerned with purposive acts; (b) focuses on what has been done rather than on conditions enabling action; (c) is flexible with regards to scope; (d) can encompass governmental and non-governmental actors; and (e) can encompass processes which are institutionalised and *ad hoc*, as well as formal and informal. 'Security governance' has traditionally been approached through focusing on its properties. That was the approach undertaken by Mark Webber and others, who proposed to define security governance as

> the coordinated management and regulation of issues by multiple and separate authorities, the interventions of both public and private actors (depending upon the issue), formal and informal arrangements, in turn structured by discourse and norms, and purposefully directed toward particular policy outcomes. (Webber et al. 2004, p. 4)

The consensus is that security governance involves the multitude of actors, governmental and non-governmental, as well as public and private. In fact, the 'actor' dimension has been at the centre of governance research, with Keohane and Nye (1974) arguing as early as the 1970s for the importance of taking account of how state and non-state actors become intertwined in a range of transnational networks. The argument in the governance scholarship is not that states are unimportant. Rather, the idea is to overcome so-called methodological nationalism and thus account for formal and informal networks comprising a multitude of different actors including inter-governmental organisations (IGOs), international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) as well as elite groups, such as epistemic communities (Zürn 2013, pp. 416–417). Related to the multiplicity of actors is the argument concerning the fragmentation of authority, which transcends hierarchical decision-making by governments. This does not challenge the dominant role of governments, however. In fact, Rosenau recognises not only that the interstate system remains central to world politics, but also that it exists in parallel to 'a multicentric system of diverse types of other collectivities' (Rosenau 2002).

The aforementioned 'second wave' governance scholarship argues that instead of declining, states are merely transforming their role to adapt to new societal requirements in the globalised world. At the same time, states remain the main goal-setters, even if the implementation is delegated to non-state agents (Pierre and Peters 2000). This is certainly the case in security policy, where states' agency continues to play a pivotal role in setting agendas, either unilaterally or through multilateral institutions. At the same time, however, the subsequent section on the EU and security governance confirms Rosenau's argument about the bifurcated system of governments and non-state actors as formal and informal sources of authority. Rosenau (2005) specifies that 'steering mechanisms' can be sponsored by states, or by non-state actors, or jointly. The term 'joint sponsorship' points to the importance of regimes as sources of global governance, which allows recognition of the agency of states, NGOs, epistemic communities and other actors exercising some control over these regimes.

If 'security governance', like international functionalism, is about solving problems, what is the main problem it is concerned with? Naturally, it is the problem of international security. More specifically, the international systems of security governance (as real-world phenomena) are concerned with identifying and addressing problems which have been successfully securitised, which surpass the boundaries of a single nation state, and which – crucially – are constructed as requiring the cooperation of multiple actors. The idea of security governance stands, therefore, in direct contrast to the notion of national security and national defence. While the latter is exclusionary and concerned with the security of a narrowly-delineated political community (the nation state) against the potential aggression of other political communities, 'security governance' is inclusionary and concerned with the security of a larger international/transnational community. In addition to being more inclusionary, it is also more encompassing as to the range of problems, which are depicted as 'security'. It would be too much of a simplification to suggest that states are *only* concerned with their own national security, but the fact is that governments, because of their mandate, tend to be more conservative in their understanding of security in comparison to international/transnational actors involved in security governance. As a result, the systems of security governance typically operate with the broader notion of security, which itself remains an essentially contested concept.

It is not the place to discuss at length the evolution of the security concept after the Cold War. It will suffice, following Mutimer (2007), to distinguish between three 'broad churches' of security, which emerged over the 1990s. First, there are critical security studies, as initiated in 1994 with a conference on '*Strategies in Conflict: Critical Approaches to Security Studies*', followed by an edited volume (Krause and Williams 1997). The idea was to open up the debate on security, without excluding *a priori* any theoretical perspective. The agenda was to challenge the traditional, militaristic conception of security, by identifying referent objects other than the state, and security challenges other than military conflicts. This reconceptualisation of security also required adopting non-positivist epistemologies, which would take into account ideas, norms and values. Second, there is the so-called Copenhagen School of security, with prominent works published on migration and security (Wæver et al. 1993) and the study of security (Buzan et al. 1997). The School is primarily famous for Ole Wæver's theory of securitisation, which defined security as a speech act. Buzan's (1983) fundamental contribution consisted, among others,

of identifying five sectors of security: military, political, economic, societal and environmental. This early contribution set the tone for subsequent discussions and, indirectly, enabled the opening up of the notion of security and shaping the understanding of 'security governance' to move beyond the military aspects. Third, there is the 'Welsh School' of security, which attempted to develop a coherent, homogeneous approach (like the Copenhagen School). The Welsh School draws on post-Marxist social theory with the emancipation (or progressive change) of an individual as the ultimate test of the theory (Booth 2005).

The security governance scholarship has taken full advantage of this broadening of the notion of security. This may be because 'governance' is to 'government' precisely what the broadened notion of security is to the narrow, military-focused security concept. The idea of security governance represents both analytical and normative break up with the old system of government-led military security, represented by security dilemmas and systems of alliances. The next stage of the evolution of security governance may involve the integration of the study of security with the notions of risk, and making the study of security governance truly interdisciplinary (Petersen 2011). For Beck, the scale of modern-day risks, from environmental disasters to terrorism and conflict, reflects the triumph of modernity. The society is increasingly vulnerable to risks not *in spite of*, but as *a side effect of* modernisation. This fact challenges the basic logic of Weberian means-end rationality, because 'all attempts at rational control give rise to new "irrational", incalculable, unpredictable consequences' (Beck 2009, pp. 18–19). The Cold War rivalry arguably illustrates the distinction between security and risk. In short, the threat of the Soviet Union was quantifiable, present, finite, with recognised intentions and possible to eliminate. In contrast, the risk of the CBRN proliferation from the former Soviet Union countries is unquantifiable, transcends time and space and is infinite. Moreover, the intentions of potential proliferators are unknown and the risk requires on-going risk-mitigation measures. If 'risk' is becoming new 'security', the 'governance' approach appears ideally suited to provide the institutional framework for tackling the kinds of risks faced by modern societies. Indeed, for Beck, transnational cooperation is the key. States must admit that, as autonomous units, they are powerless *vis-à-vis* modern risks and that the only solution is the pooling of sovereignty (Beck 2009, p. 41).

Naturally, traditional military threats remain crucial in many parts of the world. This does not preclude that the societies experiencing military

conflict are not exposed to other kinds of risks at the same time. The opposite is true: conflicts tend to multiply other problems and expose those vulnerable to an even greater amount of risks. Military security has not, however, become irrelevant. Webber (2014) observes that traditional security agenda persists in three dimensions. First, wars still occur. Second, all governments and many non-state actors are still preoccupied with the control of military instruments. Third, relatively large sums of money are still spent on military equipment. The persistence of military security affects the likelihood of establishing stable systems of security governance even in seemingly less sensitive areas, such as environmental security. Mistrust of local stakeholders has been among the principal challenges faced by the officials involved in the Environment and Security Initiative (ENVSEC), which is a partnership of five international organisations to address environmental and security problems in vulnerable regions. As one ENVSEC official notes:

> In principle, the cooperation is working well. Yet when it comes to specific projects, there is often a degree of mistrust and difficulty. Certain countries in the region are often nervous when considering our initiatives because there is this security dimension to them. This is why we don't approach regional actors from a security perspective. The involvement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is often considered problematic. States in the region tend not to make the distinction between NATO as a defence organisation and NATO Science for Peace programme. They are worried that NATO is playing some sort of a game to increase its influence in the region. For these reasons, we have to be very sensitive when we approach our regional partners. (Phone interview, July 2010)

This testimony indicates that the mere involvement of an actor widely associated with traditional military defence may be detrimental to building problem-solving regional policy networks, even if that actor operates in a largely civilian and scientific capacity. As the illustration in Chap. 6 discusses, the involvement of NATO in European security has also been identified by Russia as a key obstacle preventing the creation of the Euro-Asian system of security governance.

The EU and the Security Governance Approach

It has become a custom to associate the notion of security governance with Europe and transatlantic relations. The multitude of regional organisations concerned with security, fragmented authority, the relative

openness of political systems and the unprecedented model of international integration exemplified by the EU all make Europe the default geopolitical location to look for, and analyse the instances of cooperation which can be depicted as security governance. There are at least two ways in which we can approach *European* security governance. One is to study Europe and/or North America as a potential system of security governance. It typically entails assessing the extent to which the post-Cold War institutional and policy developments in Europe and transatlantic relations conform to a set of properties associated with the notion of security governance. This approach has been firmly established with an influential article by Webber et al. (2004), analysing some fundamental security processes in Europe through the lens of the security governance concept. Typically, the analyses of this kind look at how NATO and particularly the EU have transformed the security cooperation in Europe and how they identify their role in this highly state-dominated policy field. The second way in which one can approach European security governance entails studying concrete policy initiatives of actors such as the EU, which can be conceptualised as security governance. The 'security governance' framework, in this case, is applied to what the EU does in a particular policy field, so that the policy can be conceptualised and potentially compared across different policy fields (Schroeder 2011). The remainder of this section illustrates this second approach to European security governance with the EU's policy on preventing the proliferation of CBRN weapons, material and know-how, followed by the discussion of its links with international functionalism.

Security Governance and the EU's CBRN Network-Based Approach

The EU's approach to CBRN threat mitigation is best conceptualised as building and facilitating epistemic policy networks. Epistemic policy networks can be defined as *formal, expertise-centred structures, purposefully-created by international actors, to address a specific set of security risks over the short-to-long term, through capacity-building activities.* This definition may be more restrictive than it is generally the case in the scholarship on policy network theory (Enroth 2011). It only includes policy networks, which are intentionally created to serve a particular policy purpose. Epistemic policy networks as formal structures created by international (state and non-state) actors do not have to be confined to policy areas involving the mitigation of risks or security threats. At the same time,

however, if global uncertainties and different security threats become increasingly diffused and transnational, policy networks involving experts are increasingly considered by international actors as appropriate means of addressing problems. International organisations, in particular, are keen to adopt this arguably innovative methodology. In their approach to modern security governance, international organisations intend to adopt long-term outlook, promote transnational networks of experts, emphasise the voluntary character of cooperation and encourage local ownership. Can this approach be effective? The EU develops and facilitates epistemic policy networks based on the assumption that non-compliance with international security norms and rules is often inadvertent and stems from resource constraints rather than malicious intentions. In response to these constraints, networks aim to assist participating parties with resources relevant to tackle a given set of security risks within a short and (mainly) longer term.

Since 2009, the CBRN CoE initiative has emerged as the flagship EU approach to CBRN risk mitigation. It is an innovative project launched with the purpose of 'developing comprehensive tailored training and assistance packages' in the field of CBRN risk mitigation (European Commission 2009, p. 8). These training and assistance packages are directed at the regions considered by the EU as vulnerable, including different parts of Africa, the Middle East, South East Asia and South East Europe. To that end, the EU established a number of regional secretariats, which act as focal points for coordinating national and regional project development and for establishing long-term, transnational networks of CBRN experts. CBRN CoE were originally developed within the framework of the Instrument for Stability (IfS) – one of the external assistance financial instruments of the EU, intending to bridge the gap between security and development aims in EU external policy (Zwolski 2012a, b). As such, the IfS could be considered the first attempt to 'define the Grey Zone between the Council's CFSP [Common Foreign and Security Policy], ESDP [European Security and Defence Policy] and the Commission's development policy, a step that might complete existing programmes and encourage active conflict prevention' (Beer 2006, p. 34).

Epistemic policy networks are also expertise-centred and nowhere is the need for expertise as apparent as in the field of CBRN security, involving a myriad of technical and political challenges. CBRN CoE, as a form of transnational security governance, aim to fill the need for expertise at national and regional levels. Among the key objectives of the initiative are

(a) to provide CBRN training to participating countries; (b) to support participating countries in developing legal, administrative, and technical measures; and (c) to provide a coherent package of training and assistance covering CBRN matters such as export control, illicit trafficking, crisis response and redirection of scientists (European Commission 2009). In order to accommodate this need for expertise, CBRN CoE are implemented through the system of regional secretariats. They operate as regional focal points to coordinate the implementation of CBRN-related projects and to bring together relevant regional expertise and resources.

> The regional secretariat of the Centre of Excellence established in each region is the driving force of the initiative. It coordinates administrative support provided by the EU contractor and local personnel, and the expert support from the EU, partner countries or international organizations. It also interfaces with the authorities of the hosting country, and finally with the EU delegation and EU member states embassies in the host country. (Bril 2014, p. 239)

At the national level, the CBRN CoE are developed and implemented through the cooperation of the so-called national focal points of the partner countries, which are countries outside the EU participating in the networks. They develop regional CBRN risk mitigation projects through the regional secretariats (Mignone 2013). The national focal points of the partner countries can comprise a variety of actors as diverse as first responders, police, customs, CBRN agencies, ministries, academia and intelligence (Winfield 2011, p. 50). They form teams of around 20–30 experts, representing a country at the regional level through cooperation with regional secretariats. Such teams may play important integrative roles, because 'in many cases it is the first time that many of the representatives that cover the whole of CBRN in a country have sat down and talked to each other' (Winfield 2011, p. 50).

Finally, epistemic policy networks support capacity building. The CBRN CoE embed the managerial approach to security risk governance, which is reflected in their exclusive focus on capacity-building activities over the short-to-long term. The networks offer carrots without the threat of sticks – an approach, which bears inevitable limitations. CBRN CoE are intended to offer a novel methodology to compliance through capacity building, based on a number of principles, including: (a) networking, partnerships, optimising existing capabilities; (b) addressing specific needs

through projects; (c) strengthening regional safety culture through pooling local resources and expertise. Michael Thornton, the project coordinator, confirms that CBRN CoE operate based on managerial assumptions, in which noncompliance results from insufficient resources, rather than adversity:

> In all the countries that we have been to so far, and we have been to quite a few, they have all indicated that they would like to get something out of this, and because it is voluntary, they can pick and choose. One country could say that they have no legislation in terms of biosafety or biosecurity, and can we help them with that? Ok, we can help with that. Another one could say that they have a significant problem with illicit nuclear trafficking, so therefore they want to strengthen export control and border monitoring. It is individual, there is no one size fits all. (quoted in Winfield 2011, p. 48)

In practice, the scope of the projects funded by the EU through the framework of CBRN CoE is broad. For example, one concerns improving CBRN emergency response in Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon through 'interagency, locally trusted structure for the coordination, establishment and implementation of CBRN incident response throughout the region' (CBRN CoE Newsletter 2013, p. 2). Many projects concern the development of best practice in preventing CBRN accidental and human-made disasters.

The EU, Security Governance and Functionalism

The argument of this chapter is that the research programme on international security governance shares similarities with Mitrany-style international functionalism and that we can distinguish the two programmes from the school of international federalism and the subsequent 'Europe as power' programme. The example of the CBRN CoE illustrates this argument. In the context of the current state of research on forms of international security cooperation, CBRN CoE are best theorised as examples of network-based and expert-driven transnational security governance. They do not form a security community because there may be very little ideational overlay linking all the stakeholders involved, other than their interest in improving CBRN-related capacities. Nor is there any particular regime in place underpinned by a treaty or other formal agreement. Instead, the EU's project conforms to the attributes typically associated with security governance, most notably the multiplicity of actors involved

and the multiple centres of authority. The idea of CBRN CoE as epistemic policy networks only serves to emphasise this point. What is interesting about CBRN CoE and epistemic policy networks from the theoretical perspective, however, is that they also seem to conform to the principles of international functionalism. The cooperation is problem-driven, rather than defined by territory. It is specific and functional. It brings together experts from within states and across the borders who are interested in pursuing common agenda in a relatively narrow policy domain. In addition, various actors are flexible to participate in arrangements that suit them through applying for support for particular projects. Regional secretariats are technical in nature and only entrusted with coordinating cooperation in a delineated field of CBRN risk mitigation. Within partner states, again, the nature of cooperation is functional. Stakeholders come from different organisations within states including the government, border police, atomic energy and civil protection agencies.

The model of CBRN CoE resembles, in some ways, the principles underpinning the ECSC – a functional organisation supported by Mitrany. The functional credo that whatever makes a distinction creates rivalry informs the philosophy underpinning CBRN CoE, intended to unite stakeholders around their common needs. Building trust, therefore, plays a pivotal role. Nourishing local and regional trust is the intended original contribution of the EU's CBRN CoE to the environment where different nuclear research and technical centres already exist. In fact, project coordinators argue that in such a sensitive field as CBRN, trust and confidence are pivotal for improving security in a long term: 'We will not make a real difference in threat/risk reduction on the mere substance of our projects. Something has to come first: Trust and Confidence Building Measures' (Dupré and Servais 2012, p. 2). The problem of trust and the notorious sensitivity of the security issues in the national context raise, again, the question of how effective the functional system of security governance can be outside of the policy fields such as CBRN risk mitigation. It also raises the question to what extent potentially conflicting values can be set aside in the pursuit of functional objectives.

Security Governance, Politics and Values

The chapter has already explained how the 'security governance' research programme shares with the functionalist approach its focus on function and service, and how they both advocate transcending geopolitical

boundaries in the pursuit of the societies' shared objectives and needs. The purpose of this section is to bring to the front the question which has been so far hanging in the background, but which fundamentally underpins all the integration theories discussed in this book, particularly in how they approach territoriality and geopolitical boundaries. The problem of values has been at the centre of both international federalism and functionalism, and it continues to inform what is considered possible and desirable in the contemporary research programmes on international integration. Values were most fundamental for international federalism, including the Pan-European version advanced by Coudenhove-Kalergi and the British version proposed by those associated with the Federal Trust. Chapter 2 discussed how Coudenhove-Kalergi's personal encounter with the Bolshevik methods likely shaped his approach to international federalism, in that he defined it exclusively in European terms and constructed the identity of his envisaged Pan-Europe against an important 'other', the Soviet Union. For him, like for many other federalists of that time, the internal system of Soviet Russia effectively excluded this country from any potential international integration efforts. As noted in Chap. 4, even Mises, who rejected the idea of a European federation as potentially leading to conflict, still insisted that Soviet Russia behaved like a robber *vis-à-vis* other countries. Streit, like many other federalists, rejected altogether the geographical criterion for creating an international federation, worrying that dictatorships like Nazi Germany would have to be included based on their central place in Europe. Instead, he insisted that only liberal democracies should be invited as members. The general point is that values were always at the forefront of the international federalist writing, simply because justification was always needed for including some countries in the envisaged federalist projects and excluding others.

The emphasis on the importance of certain norms and values was further reinforced in the subsequent research programme on Europe as power. Right from the beginning, the proponents of European political unification were depicting the EEC/EU as a normatively different kind of power, promising to offer a new quality of conduct to international relations. Manners took this value-focused agenda to the next level through his notion of normative power Europe. It is, therefore, often assumed in this scholarship that the EU, whilst being a 'power', is morally superior to other powers, because its external *raison d'être* is not the pursuit of its geopolitical interests, but rather the advancement of various positive norms, such as liberal democracy, human rights and 'good governance'.

As a result, the EU's engagement with the outside world is inevitably assessed not merely (or even not primarily) based on how successfully the EU secures its material interests but rather how coherently it is able to articulate and execute its normative policy agenda (Whitman 2011). Values, therefore, are of fundamental importance for both early European federalism and the subsequent 'Europe as power' research programme. For the former, they informed choices concerning membership in the envisaged federation project. For the latter, they defined expectations of the European integration's international role.

Expectedly, Mitrany approached values in a different way. Organisations such as the League of Nations were created to enforce certain universal principles (or values). Because of their universal nature, however, these principles must not be confined to exclusive, regional organisations, just as the Ten Commandments were not qualified territorially (Mitrany 1933, p. 116). Mitrany was not very precise in explaining these universal principles, but we can assume that the two most important ones included economic cooperation leading to improved individual welfare and international peace (Mitrany 1933, p. 116). Although it is unclear how 'thick' these principles would have to be in order to serve as effective 'fundamental rules of conduct', available evidence suggests that Mitrany rejected a 'solidarist' approach, to borrow the term from the English School. Notably, Mitrany did not seem to understand these universal rules to imply the principled homogeneity of domestic political and economic systems. He made it clear in *A Working Peace System*, stressing that what matters in international relations is the performance of states which directly affects the sphere of international relations (1966, p. 49). Consequently, states should not be excluded from what they are willing to do internationally because they are not willing to do everything else domestically. For Mitrany, 'what matters is a readiness to co-operate for avoiding conflict and for advancing the task of common well-being' (1966, p. 50). There are already significant differences within states and federations, so there are no grounds to expect homogeneity in international society. Furthermore, it is the very purpose of political institutions to allow people with diverging views to cooperate peacefully towards common ends. As a result, Mitrany explicitly rejected 'the ideological criterion of selection' as 'invidious in operation' and 'irrelevant in principle' (1966, p. 51). Finally, when it comes to the operationalisation of universal principles, Mitrany suggested a dialogue between equal parties, rather than an assumption of normative superiority of one party over the others. He hinted at this in the

context of resentments experienced by newly-born nation states after the break-up of empires: 'nothing would do more to change that atmosphere than a habit of trashing out those grievances round a table in search of a practical solution' (Mitrany 1933, p. 112). Once again, practical arrangements bringing states and societies closer in a 'working' relationship are prioritised over principled discussions about domestic systems and values.

The relationship between the functionalist approach and political values, therefore, is in line with the overall argument of the book and serves as another confirmation that there is not only a fundamental difference between international federalism and functionalism but also continuity between federalism and the 'Europe as power' research programme. Is there, however, a parallel continuity with respect to values between functionalism and the 'security governance' approach, as the reader could expect by now? The short answer is 'no'. As any student of international security governance can quickly discover, political values and norms do not feature prominently in this scholarship, and any discussions of what is morally 'right' in terms of forging security governance cooperation are scarce. For example, there is no chapter on norms or values in a substantial volume on security governance edited by Jim Sperling (2014). Why is that? The lack of norms and values in 'security governance' stems from the ontological standing of this research programme, which is distinct from the other three approaches discussed in this book: federalism, functionalism and 'Europe as power'. For them, the world is a deeply political place and international integration must explicitly engage with this political aspect of international politics.

The concept of the 'political', following Carl Schmitt, is understood here in terms of its defining categories of friend – enemy, where the 'enemy' is an existential other, an outsider posing a danger. The federalists engaged with the 'political' most explicitly, insisting that democratic, peace-loving states must unite against dictatorships. For Coudenhove-Kalergi, the existential threat posed by Soviet Russia, combined with the economic threat coming from the United States, was sufficient to call for the United States of Europe. Mitrany, in response to the federalist school, also engaged explicitly with the 'political', insisting that it was precisely the idea of regional unions *à la* Coudenhove-Kalergi which reinforces international exclusion and dangerous competition. For Mitrany, national culture and ideology are the culprits reinforcing distinctions between nations (Ashworth 1999; Mitrany 1966). Culture should, therefore, be excluded from international relations and enjoyed within communities. Ideology, in

a similar vein, should be bypassed through the creation of new habits of cooperation forming in response to basic human needs, which come before culture and ideology. The needs-driven policy unites communities rather than divides them because people arguably have similar basic needs wherever they happen to live. The 'Europe as power' research programme also engaged with the notion of the 'political', overwhelmingly arguing that integrated Europe does not, and should not approach international politics as the dichotomy between friends and enemies, and it should definitely not treat other regions as enemies. At the same time, however, the idea of European integration as a mean to defend European values against various internal and external threats is prominent in that scholarship.

This explicit engagement with the 'political' in all three theoretical approaches contrasts with the relatively de-politicised notion of governance and security governance. For Schroeder (2011), the omission of the considerations of politics and power in security governance constitutes the shortcoming of the concept. It creates the perception that the political processes of agenda-setting and decision-making can be harmonious and uncontentious, while, in reality, they are defined by conflict and contention. The same criticism applies here as the one which has been raised in relation to the idea of the so-called communities of practice (CoP) – a concept coined by Etienne Wenger (1998; see also Lave and Wenger 1991) and originating from organisation studies, management theory and learning in work places (Bueger 2012). The critiques of the 'CoP' concept in organisational studies agree that the considerations of power have largely been overlooked (Fox 2000; Marshall and Rollinson 2006; Mørk et al. 2010; Roberts 2006). While this omission is problematic for the study of any social grouping, the relations of power are especially important in the context of politics, both national and international. Without such considerations, we can never fully understand why CoPs have certain structures, and why knowledge is developed and distributed in a particular manner (Roberts 2006, p. 626). Consequently, the structural properties of CoPs should not be misinterpreted as '[b]eing excessively quiescent and consensual' (Marshall and Rollinson 2004, p. S74), because the opposite is true. The negotiation of collective meaning, common discourse and identities are essentially political processes and misunderstandings, disagreements, turf wars and mistrust are central for the dynamics of CoPs.

To explain the omission of value-based, political considerations in the scholarship on security governance by pointing to the concept's distinctive ontological standing is one task. Another one is to explain where exactly

this distinction originates. While different explanations are possible, not without significance here is the fact that 'governance' and 'security governance' in Politics and International Relations have been primarily applied in the European context, specifically to study the dense network of European and transatlantic bureaucracies. The idea that international institutions can be considered bureaucracies was put forward by Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore (2004). The key question here concerns the sources of the international organisation's authority to undertake action at the international level. Applying Weberian arguments about legitimacy to International Relations, Barnett and Finnemore (2004) identified three sources of the international organisations' authority: delegated authority, moral authority and expert authority. While the first source is important, because it refers to the authority delegated to international organisations by states, the other two are most relevant to understand the ontological distinctiveness of the security governance approach.

Moral authority refers to the intended neutral, impartial and even depoliticised behaviour of international organisations *vis-à-vis* self-interested states. As Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue, organisations gain legitimacy, resources and stability through adhering to certain myths. These myths are simply institutional rules that lead to the formalisation of organisational structures. The myths have two attributes. Firstly, they 'identify different social purposes as technical ones and specify in a rule-like way the appropriate means to pursue these technical purposes rationally' (Meyer and Rowan 1977, pp. 343–344). Arguably, building on the fact that bureaucracies draw their authority from their very nature of being impersonal, they are subsequently in a better position than states to frame even the most sensitive national security problems in more neutral, depoliticised terms. When security problems are framed by international bureaucracies mostly in technical rather than political terms, international organisations can more credibly position themselves as legitimate authorities possessing, or capable of organising, necessary resources to address such problems.

Secondly, the myths enabling the formalisation of organisations are highly institutionalised, and thus 'beyond the discretion of any individual participant or organisation' (Meyer and Rowan 1977, p. 344). For example, the myth of 'expert knowledge' is highly institutionalised by the established Western educational system. This myth is important as a source of the international organisations' authority. Max Weber observed that, essentially, bureaucracy is 'domination through knowledge' (1978[1922],

p. 225), which consists of technical knowledge – itself an important source of power, but also of knowledge stemming from experience in service. Writing his contribution between the two world wars, Weber (1978[1922], p. 975) already noted that '[t]he more complicated and specialised modern culture becomes, the more its external supporting apparatus demands the personally detached and strictly objective expert'. Weber was writing about the growing complexity of culture long before the digital age revolutionised the sources and nature of security risks, introducing new levels of complexity and technological progress (Giddens 1990; Beck 2009). The reliance on different kinds of expertise provides international organisations with a significant source of authority. It is also an important basis of their power due to the growing gap between experts and those who depend on experts' knowledge and experience (Scott 2001, p. 108).

Both moral and expert authority of international organisations, particularly of those, which are highly institutionalised, constitutes, therefore, a fundamental source of authority for those organisations to undertake action. Consequently, the EU can legitimately conduct policy because it is impartial, depoliticised and possesses expertise. That was, in fact, an explicit assumption underpinning the status of the High Authority, and subsequently the European Commission. Conversely, those who oppose European integration often attack the legitimacy of the EU by accusing it of being dominated by the interests of one or more nation states. The argument here is not that the aforementioned ontological assumptions underpinning the scholarship on security governance are distinct from the other approaches discussed in this book exclusively because security governance is about bureaucracies. Another explanation relates to the differing disciplinary traditions and the fact that the 'governance' approach was advanced outside of International Relations, and thus is concerned with different kinds of questions than the problems of war and peace between states. It is clear, however, that the empirical focus of the security governance literature on European institutions reinforces its disengagement with the notions of power and politics.

Boundaries in European Security Governance

Geopolitical boundaries have been at the forefront of international integration theories because the question of who should participate in integration is as important as how integration should look like. International federalists were most thorough about integration boundaries, advancing

lengthy arguments justifying the inclusion of some states, and even lengthier arguments against the inclusion of other states. In this second category of states, Soviet Russia figures prominently, with most thinkers unable to find a way to let Russia into their envisaged international federation schemes. This was partially due to the size of the country, but mainly due to its dictatorial political system. For some, like Coudenhove-Kalergi, the very *raison d'être* of the federation was precisely to defend Europe against the Soviet threat. The 'Europe as power' research programme, which partially builds on this federalist tradition, did not concern itself as much with the boundaries of European integration, mainly because they were already decided by the European integration project itself. The dilemmas of territoriality and boundaries still permeated this strand of scholarship, however, due to the contested nature of Europe's global role. Following Mitrany, we could place the process of European integration on a scale, ranging from a relatively open and functional model represented by the ECSC to a relatively closed and territorial model represented by the current EU. Indeed, the EU's security strategy from 2016 paints the image of the EU as a closely-integrated territorial entity capable of protecting its interests against internal failings as well as external threats, even if this narrative is mainly aspirational.

Mitrany contested this closed, territorial vision of European integration as soon as he identified it in the EEC. Applying his functionalist principles, he believed Western Europe was now heading towards the federalist destination – an ultimate objective that Jean Monnet did not hide. Contrasting the EEC with the ECSC, Mitrany thought Western Europe was about to reinforce the undesirable characteristics associated with the nation state system, prompting unnecessary competition or even hostility, albeit at the higher level of aggregation. As an alternative, he proposed international integration around specific problems shared by populations, such as food provision, transportation, or energy. This way, he argued, people's loyalties would gradually shift away from national communities and towards transnational technical agencies, simply because these agencies would address the problems most relevant to people's daily lives. Although his vision never materialised in the exact form he prescribed, Mitrany identified functional principles embedded in the ECSC. As such, the problem of boundaries was central to the Mitrany's argument, which is unsurprising considering that he advanced functionalism in direct opposition to international federalism.

In security governance, the significance of geopolitical boundaries depends on the exact nature of the governance in question. As noted, we can understand European security governance at least in two different ways: as a structure and as a process. Security governance as a structure is about what Europe has become since the end of Cold War, particularly how its security-related institutional structures and the shared understandings of security have evolved. Here, geopolitical boundaries still play significant roles, even if the aforementioned process of fragmentation makes those boundaries less meaningful. Compared to the boundaries of the nation-states, the boundaries of the EU may indeed be viewed as more malleable, offering the EU opportunities to govern outside its borders through maintaining, strengthening, blurring or moving its boundaries (Friis and Murphy 1999). As discussed in Chap. 3, this vision of European supranationalism is characterised by thin EU and thin national boundaries, because none of these are constructed as significant compared to the federalist and intergovernmental images of European supranationalism. At the same time, however, there is an inherent ambiguity in *European* security governance, because, in spite of all the arguable fragmentation of authority, the EU has developed into a territorial, rather than functional organisation, and its functional origins only served as the first step towards an ultimately federal structure. Consequently, the notion of European security governance, while more inclusive than the related idea of security community, maintains the geopolitical division between the insiders and outsiders.

The understanding of European security governance as a process is fundamentally different, resembling the principles of functionalism much more than the structural understanding. In this alternative view, European security governance is not about what Europe has become, but rather what the EU (or other actors) does that can be conceptualised as security governance. In the EU context, of particular relevance has been how the IfS, in 2014 succeeded by the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, has been utilised to support the EU's CBRN non-proliferation policies. The CBRN non-proliferation, identified at the top of the EU's international security agenda, requires instruments and policies other than those related to the military capabilities. Consequently, the aforementioned CBRN CoE initiative emerged as the flagship EU approach to CBRN risk mitigation. The way this initiative was formulated has consequences for boundaries. In essence, geopolitical boundaries are transcended in this incarnation of security governance, because it is the specific

policy objective, which defines the boundaries, rather than territorial and geopolitical considerations. Boundaries are fluid, because any given policy initiative may attract the participation of some actors and not others. Further, boundaries are not national, but rather run across states, with membership defined by specific practices people engage in. As noted in the case of CBRN CoE, professionals working in different organisations within states can cooperate on projects simply because their competencies are relevant for the task. The reader will be correct to associate this notion of security governance with Mitrany's functionalism which, in turn, helps to further distinguish the process-oriented understanding of European security governance from the school of international federalism and the 'Europe as a power' research programme.

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that the principles underpinning the security governance approach to international integration are not entirely new. While early discussions on security governance date back to the early 2000s, building on the 'governance turn' permeating Political Science and International Relations a decade earlier, the notion of structuring international cooperation for the purpose of solving specific problems is almost a century old. If governance is about getting things done (Stoker 1998), so was the idea of international functionalism. Mitrany insisted precisely that what international relations needed was to start getting things done, instead of deliberating systems of international constitution, the division of power in envisaged international institutions, and which country should belong to which integration structure. There were more urgent challenges affecting the every-day lives of people after World War I (WWI), and so international cooperation should be centred on addressing these challenges. Where functionalism differs from security governance is the 'grand plan' underpinning those two approaches. Mitrany's ultimate objective was international peace. That was the core purpose of his theoretical design, even if it was overshadowed by Ernst Haas's neofunctionalist approach. Security governance, in contrast, does not share this ambition, partially because it was advanced in the condition of relative international stability. Another reason is, as the chapter has demonstrated, the relative indifference of the 'security governance' research programme towards the heavy political questions of peace and power.

The idea of governance, in opposition to government, was precisely to overcome the inherent contentiousness of power politics at the local, national and international levels. The critiques related to power and 'high politics' have been haunting both functionalism and security governance, however. The main criticism directed at the Mitrany's approach was his alleged proposition that technical, political and economic issues can be dealt with separately, and that economic issues have priority over political ones because they affect people's daily lives more directly (Long and Ashworth 1999). Governance, in a somehow similar manner, has been criticised for omitting the considerations of power and politics, which are inherent to all human interactions when resources are limited. The practitioners of security governance have raised the problem of mistrust in two different cases highlighted in the chapter: the ENVSEC initiative and CBRN CoE. Overcoming mistrust is, therefore, one of the key tasks in the practice of security governance – a process, which requires, in Schmittian terms, transforming perceived enemies ('others', 'outsiders') into perceived friends ('insiders'). The distinction between insiders and outsiders is prominent in the discussions of European security order and the place of Russia in that order. Chapter 6, therefore, revisits the challenge of integrating Russia into the system of European security governance. Following the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine, European-Russian relations remain on top of the political and security agenda in Europe. These relations also happen to be one of the 'founding' challenges defining the content of early international federalism, providing a common empirical thread running through all the approaches to integration discussed in Chaps. 2, 3, 4 and 5.

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CHAPTER 6

The EU, Russia and the War in Ukraine

It must come as no surprise to the reader that the significance of the theories discussed in this book is illustrated with the problem of European – Russian relations following the conflict in Ukraine. After all, the theoretical approaches to international integration all focus on Europe, and Russia has always been the most significant 'other', prompting questions about the scope and geopolitical boundaries of European integration. Most representatives of the school of international federalism, as noted in Chap. 2, were forced to engage with the position of Russia in their envisaged federation schemes. More often than not, they would find it impossible to accommodate this large country in any future European federation. Other than the size, the main obstacle was the totalitarian character of Soviet Russia. For authors like Streit, it was unthinkable to create a peaceful union of liberal democracies with states like Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia included, even if they belonged to the European continent. Coudenhove-Kalergi also excluded Russia from his Pan-European scheme. For this Austrian federalist activist, Russia should not only be excluded from Pan-Europe, but it should also be considered the source of existential threat to Europe and, as a result, the main reason for European states to overcome their national egoisms.

The proponents of international federalism were most vocal in their views on the position of Russia in European integration. This is unsurprising, considering (a) that no European integration project existed at the time of the federalist writing, and (b) the geopolitically limited nature of

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most federalist ideas, combined with the existence of natural, water-based boundaries delineating Europe in the north, west and south. The eastern part is where the debate about 'Europe' has always been contentious. The position of Russia has been less prominent in the 'Europe as power' research programme. This is primarily because this strand of scholarship has been concerned with studying the empirical incarnation of the international integration idea in the form of the European Economic Community (EEC). As a result, those studying Europe's role in the world have shifted their focus away from speculating about the prospects of Russia's unlikely membership, and instead, consider Russia as one of the external actors that the EEC/European Union (EU) must engage. The recommended nature of this engagement has been influenced, as noted in Chap. 3, by the normative agenda, depicting the EU as a distinct kind of power.

David Mitrany and other functionalist critics of closed regional unions were less specific about the position of Russia in their envisaged integration schemes, and some of their arguments appear contradictory. Predictably, Mitrany did not like the idea of Europe unifying against the threat of Soviet Russia. As noted in Chap. 4, he compared such schemes to the Holy Alliance, but this time in defence of the rights of the bourgeoisie. He feared that if the Pan-European union comes to fruition, other regions would feel compelled to unify in a similar manner, which would have led to the predictable outcome of economic, political and perhaps even military competition. His functional approach, in contrast, encouraged international integration in those areas where states were willing to integrate, but without forcing them to make further adjustments in their domestic political systems. His approach is best symbolised by his constatation that the Soviet Union was, in fact, more prepared to uphold the League of Nations before the outbreak of the war than many of the Western states (Mitrany 1966, p. 49). Mises, similarly, criticised the exclusive character of the proposed Pan-European union and did not see how free trade could benefit European states but not countries like Russia. At the same time, in a rather contradictory manner, he was critical of Russia and urged against allowing this country to 'destroy European civilization' (Mises 1927[1985], p. 153).

This chapter reverses the way the argument has been structured in the previous chapters. Rather than demonstrating how integration theories have been dealing with the problems of territoriality, boundaries and the inclusion/exclusion of Russia, the chapter first examines European – Russian

relations in the context of the war in Ukraine. Only then, it returns to integration theories, in order to re-examine their contribution to understanding the conflict and prescribing solutions. The chapter begins with the competing narratives of the conflict in Ukraine. Since 2014, scholars coming from different theoretical backgrounds have presented their own take on the conflict. We can group many of those divergent voices into one of the two broad categories. On the one hand, there are those who associate the conflict with Russia's authoritarianism and imperialistic foreign policy, prescribing a resolute Euro-Atlantic response. On the other hand, there are those who ascribe most blame to the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) for expanding membership and influence closer to Russia's borders. The chapter subsequently suggests that none of these two perspectives offers a complete image of the context of the conflict. Both narratives omit the agency of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, most notably Poland, in shaping the European policy agenda on Ukraine. If all three narratives intend to explain the root causes of the conflict in Ukraine, then what is the alternative course of action, which could have prevented such drastic deterioration of relations between the West and Russia? The third section examines the idea of pan-European security governance, which former Russian President Medvedev outlined in his Berlin speech, in 2008 (President of Russia 2008). This is where international integration theory is re-introduced to the discussion. The chapter argues that the larger, pan-European security system fits well with the Mitrany's functionalist approach. Indeed, some of the points raised by Russian leaders are reminiscent of the arguments advanced by Mitrany when he contrasted his functional vision with the model of exclusive regional unions. The final section cautions against drawing simplified conclusions, however. As much as the vision of the Mitrany-style cooperation between Europe and Russia may be tempting, there are significant obstacles to this cooperation, which functionalism is unable to resolve using the theoretical toolbox at its disposal.

The Narratives and Framing of the War in Ukraine

The impact of the Ukrainian conflict on the International Relations scholarship has been significant. Of all the aspects of the conflict discussed to date, one is particularly relevant for the argument of this chapter. It concerns the normative vision of the EU's role in international security *vis-à-vis* Ukraine and Russia. At the risk of slight simplification, two competing

positions can be clearly distinguished in this debate. One considers Europe to be, once again, threatened by expansionist Russia and advocates a more coherent and more assertive EU response to this threat. Sakwa (2015) associates this position with the idea of wider Europe, involving a Brussels-focused vision of the European continent, *de facto* subsumed in a wider Atlantic community. We can further specify this vision to entail a 'wider and deeper Europe', as it is equally concerned with the coherence of member states in response to external threats. The other position calls upon the EU to become more inclusive towards Russia, recognising it as an equal partner rather than a disobedient recipient of European norms and values. This position, in contrast, can be associated with the idea of greater Europe – a more pluralistic vision, treating the EU, Russia, but also Turkey and Ukraine as concentric circles in their own right (Sakwa 2015). This story of the two competing narratives is, naturally, as elegant as it is simplified. For example, it overestimates the degree to which the West is indeed 'hermetic' in rejecting non-Western (i.e. Russian) ideas about European cooperation, and thus it underplays the actual distinctions in this regard, both geographical (between countries) and temporal (within countries) (Blockmans 2014). Nonetheless, it serves well as a general framework for categorising the two broad visions of European security order, which are now discussed in greater detail.

The First Narrative: Expansionist Russia

In the first narrative, Russia, over the years, has become dangerously expansionist. In spite of long-standing efforts by the EU and NATO to develop closer ties with this country, Moscow has chosen the path of authoritarianism domestically, and territorial revisionism in Russia's 'close neighbourhood' (McFaul et al. 2014; Snyder 2015). The EU cannot stand idle when Russia continues bullying neighbouring countries under the pretext of protecting Russian minorities. Instead, the EU must stand for its values (Ash 2014). It must not reward Russia with a 'business as usual' approach, and, at the same time, it must create the space for countries like Ukraine, which seek closer association with the EU. The arguments of this kind were expressed, for example, in the 2015 House of Lords review on the future of EU-Russia relations. Ian Bond from the Centre for European Reform offered analysis and advice along these lines, urging the EU to mirror the United States in the severity of sanctions imposed on Russia (House of Lords 2015, pp. 7–18). Tomila Lankina, in

a similar fashion, urged the EU to 'more forcefully counter Russia's security narrative with a counter-narrative of the EU's own legitimate security concerns about the kinds of political regimes it finds in its eastern neighbourhood' (House of Lords 2015, p. 191). A stream of recent publications and conference papers focusing on the EU's 'actorness' in response to the Russian aggression in Ukraine reinforces this narrative. Matthijs and Kelemen, in a tellingly-titled article 'Europe Reborn', observe that 'a resurgent Russia on Europe's doorstep has finally spurred the EU to action' (2015, p. 100). Auer (2015) advocates that the EU adopts a more 'muscular liberalism' to more effectively confront Russia. Howorth and Menon (2015) urge EU member states to 'wake up' by overcoming their anachronistic commitment to sovereignty and grasping the reality that only when unified, the EU can stand for its interests effectively.

The Second Narrative: Expansionist EU/NATO

In the second narrative, Russia is seen either as a victim of the European and Euro-Atlantic expansionism or, while its aggressive foreign policy is condemned, some of the motives behind it are met with a degree of understanding (Kissinger 2014; Mearsheimer 2014; Milne 2014). The EU, it is argued, must abandon its narrative of moral superiority, underpinned by its self-understanding as a normative power (Headley 2015). Russia does not accept the role of a passive recipient of European norms and values, and it does not accept the continuous expansion of Western institutional frontiers. The EU must become more receptive to Russia's legitimate security concerns, and respond more constructively to Russia's initiatives for an equal partnership with the EU (Sakwa 2015). In the aforementioned House of Lords discussion, for example, Tom Casier advocated the idea of two concentric circles: one revolving around the EU and the other one around Russia. While the circles would overlap in countries like Ukraine, it would not be a problem because the two integration projects would not be mutually exclusive (House of Lords 2015, pp. 56–75). Similarly, Charap and Shapiro (2014) urge the West to supplement punitive measures with new, cooperative institutional arrangements. In this context, they refer to the proposal by the former Russia's President Medvedev for a new European security framework. Sakwa takes this argument further, blaming Western Europe for systematically ignoring Russia's attempts to create a new, more inclusive institutional cooperative framework, and instead relying on the United States for protecting

the Cold War-era Euro-Atlantic structures, from which Russia remains excluded. In that sense, for Sakwa, Europe is 'dead'. The two contrasting metaphors – that of Europe being 'reborn' and that of Europe being 'dead' – serve as a symbolic illustration of the radically different perspectives represented by the two narratives.

The Third Narrative: Poland and Fear in Central Europe

According to the realist narrative, the West bears at least some responsibility for the conflict in Ukraine. Mearsheimer forcefully argues that American and European political elites were blindsided by the liberalist agenda when expanding their influence into Eastern Europe. Russian elites, in turn, felt increasingly humiliated and eventually responded. There are grounds, however, to challenge the view that the growing Western engagement in Ukraine stemmed from the naïve liberalist agenda. The evidence shows that on occasions when Europe actually took Ukraine seriously, it was mainly due to the realpolitik-driven activity of Central European countries, most notably Poland. Poland did not join the cause of the Western liberal *pushing* towards Ukraine – it created and consistently implemented the policy of *pulling* the West towards Ukraine and vice versa, often to the annoyance of the Western capitals. It has been doing so because its elites believe that only European Ukraine would ensure the security and *existence* of Poland in the long term. Consequently, this third narrative of the conflict in Ukraine draws on the elements of the two narratives discussed above. On the one hand, it points to the legitimate fear experienced among CEE political elites and societies stemming from the history of the Soviet oppression and the post-Cold War Russia's foreign policy. On the other hand, this narrative acknowledges that Poland and some other countries in the region have played a geopolitical game in Ukraine and that it was, even if indirectly, aimed against Russia. In order to understand the political agenda embedded in this CEE-focused narrative of the conflict in Ukraine, a brief look at the historical context is in order.

Ukraine in the Polish Realist Thought

After the Poles regained their statehood in 1918, one of the key questions for Poland's political elites concerned the rights of national minorities, which constituted around 40 percent of the population residing within the

state borders. The largest minority were Ukrainians, whose efforts at establishing an independent Ukrainian state were already well under way at that time (Prizel 1998; Snyder 2003). These efforts were tragic because there was no territory ethnically inhabited by Ukrainians which either Poland or Russia would not consider rightfully theirs. Furthermore, in contrast to the Poles and, for example, Lithuanians, Ukrainians had no prior state experience to draw on, which made their claims less convincing for the Entente powers (Snyder 2003). In this context, Ukrainians in Galicia, including its city of Lviv (Polish Lwów), were relatively successful in 1918, when they proclaimed the West Ukrainian Republic in Lviv. This proved to be a short-lived initiative, however, as Lviv was soon recaptured by Poland.

The Polish-Ukrainian strife was considered a nuisance by the Polish leader Józef Piłsudski, who counted on the second Ukrainian state in Kiev, and his leader Symon Petliura, to ally against Soviet Russia. While there were various unresolved problems between the Poles and Ukrainians, Soviet Russia was considered an existential threat by both nations. For Piłsudski, the priority was to 'solidify Ukraine as a buffer state' (Snyder 2003, p. 139). In this context, the Treaty of Riga (1921), which ended the Polish-Soviet war, could only be described as a betrayal of Ukrainians by the Polish state, at least from the Ukrainian perspective. Following the defeat of the Red Army, Poland and the Soviet Union effectively partitioned the territories of modern Belarus and Ukraine, with Poland acquiring most of Volhynia and all of Galicia. These territories, considered 'ethnically Polish', were thought to be the most prone to the assimilation by the Polish political elites. At the same time, Poland recognised Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Belarus.

Indeed, what followed, was the policy of assimilation of Ukrainians into the 'superior' Polish culture – a policy considered by all the major political forces in Poland 'desirable' and 'inevitable' (Prizel 1998, p. 61). There was a small group of Polish activists, however, who rejected this policy, arguing for the recognition of Ukrainian national aspirations. One Polish government official, Stanisław Łoś, argued in 1934: 'Any policy towards Ukrainians which is not based on the recognition of the separate Ukrainian national identity driving all Ukrainian actions, would not be a *realistic* policy; it would, therefore, be a wrong policy [emphasis added]' (Łoś 1934, p. 3).

In a similar vein, Polish linguist and Slavist Jan Baudouin de Courtenay condemned in 1926 'backward Polish patriots' for not recognising that

the Ukrainian national aspirations are similar to the recent Polish desires to regain the Polish state, which only happened at the end of World War I (WWI) (Baudouin de Courtenay 1926, p. 24). The key question concerns the motives of those Polish advocates of the Ukrainian emancipation. Were they under the spell of the Wilsonian idea of the self-determination of nations? Alternatively, perhaps they represented a romantic group of Ukrainophiles who were in love with Ukrainian culture. A Polish intellectual Włodzimierz Bączkowski, the editor-in-chief of the Polish-Ukrainian Bulletin, offered the answer to this question in his seminal article 'We are not Ukrainophiles' (Bączkowski 1935). In that article, Bączkowski presented an unambiguous *realpolitik* argument for recognising and welcoming Ukrainian national aspirations:

> Who are we? What links us with the Ukrainian issue? What helps us, or enable, a common understanding with Ukrainians? Let us answer in short – *modernity*. The modernity which allowed Hitler's Germany, and not pre-Hitler socialists and democrats, to reach an agreement with the young Poland of Piłsudski; the modernity, which makes numerous bankrupt notions of international interconnectedness based on the League of Nation's principle of internationalism, justice, class or Reason with capital 'R', backward attributes of the 19th century and the pre-war period. Finally, the modernity which puts a special premium on the doctrine of *practicality*, instead of the doctrine of the *abstract*, favouring political agreements based purely on the real interest and egoism (…). The only source of our activity regarding the minority issue in Poland is the Wellbeing and Honour of Poland. *And, essentially, nothing more* [original emphasis]. (Bączkowski 1935, p. 24)

After World War II (WWII), the debate about Polish policy towards Ukraine resumed, but this time it took place in the Western capitals, primarily between the unofficial Poland's exile government in London and the community of intellectuals organised around Jerzy Giedroyc and his *Kultura* journal published in Paris.

Polish Realism of Jerzy Giedroyc 1945–1989

After the joint German-Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939, the Polish government in exile was first organised in France, and subsequently in London in 1940. Its last President, Ryszard Kaczorowski, officially transferred his authority to the first freely-elected Polish President Lech Wałęsa in 1990.

The London government considered itself a continuation of the Second Republic of Poland of the interwar period, which must have entailed the non-recognition of the post-1945 borders. Poland lost its 'traditionally Polish' eastern territories, including the cities of Vilnius and Lviv, and was compensated by moving its border to the west at the expense of defeated Germany. This outcome was considered unacceptable for the majority of Polish émigrés from the moral standpoint. If Poland was a victim of WWII, then it deserves justice, i.e. the reversal of the post-WWII border agreements. There was perhaps nothing surprising in this idealistic position, even if it was out of tune with geopolitical realities.

It was not the only position, however. The alternative voice of Polish émigrés was organised around Jerzy Giedroyc and his Literary Institute founded close to Paris in 1947. The most important publication of the institute, and indeed, the most important outlet of the Polish emigration, was a journal *Kultura* (Culture). In contrast to the programme and activities of the Poles organised around the exile government in London, there was nothing *usual* about *Kultura*. Firstly, instead of organising and influencing the alternative Polish state abroad, *Kultura* aimed to influence the communist government in Poland. One of the journal's key aims was to prepare the programme for independent Poland after the Soviet Union collapses, which the authors of *Kultura* envisaged already in the 1970s (Mieroszewski 1973, 1974). Secondly, the scope of its publications went beyond the problems of culture, immigration and the Soviet occupation of CEE. *Kultura* was also concerned with regional and global political theory. It regularly published Raymond Aron and provided an outlet for a number of Polish political theorists. In this sense, *Kultura* can be considered one of the major non-English international relations journals of the Cold War period. It certainly proved to be one of the most impactful ones.

Concerning the question of Ukraine, *Kultura* advocated that Poland accepts the post-WWII border and focuses on developing friendly relations with so-called ULB countries, including Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus. It, therefore, continued the pro-Ukrainian narrative initiated in the interwar period, sometimes by the same people who after the war published in *Kultura*. As Snyder (2003, p. 225) notes:

> It was Giedroyc's and Mieroszewski's great intellectual achievement to unite this acceptance of state borders with the prediction that the communist [*sic*] would collapse, and to imagine that such a situation would require a new

> Polish grand strategy. It was their great theoretical achievement to articulate the justification for such a strategy and to sketch its outline. It was their great political achievement to communicate their programme in such a way that it was taken for granted before the revolution of 1989 by the Poles who would matter thereafter.

The discussion started with the highly polemical article by Józef Łobodowski (1952) entitled 'Against the nightmares of the past', in which he passionately criticised the official line of the Polish government in London. In short, he argued that Poland must adopt an active policy towards its eastern neighbourhood, it must recognise Ukraine as a separate state and accept the postwar borders. The proposal was based on the assumption that 'independent Ukraine will neutralise Russian threat. At the same time, it will weaken the effectiveness of potential Moscow-Berlin partnership' (Łobodowski 1952, pp. 31–32). Interestingly, and similarly to Bączkowski (1935), Łobodowski assured that his arguments had 'rational basis' and had nothing to do with his Ukrainophilia, which was his private matter. The publication set the tone for *Kultura's* narrative concerning Poland's eastern policy, and the official Polish eastern policy after 1989.

The programme was further developed, in a more systematic and theoretical manner, by Juliusz Mieroszewski in the 1970s. He reiterated that Poland must recognise and support the right to self-determination of all nations occupied by the Soviet Union, particularly Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania. While this policy may have appeared utopian in the middle of the Cold War, he believed there was no other option. For him, it is the necessity, which makes the policy realist:

> Not everything which is noble and romantic must be unrealistic. The test and the main criterion of realism is a necessity. The necessity to save a life, necessity to save state sovereignty. (…) Necessity can be defined as the lack of choice. The only way is the necessary way, which makes it realist – because there is no other way. (Mieroszewski 1973, p. 70)

For Poland, it was necessary to support independent states in Eastern Europe – not against Russia, but against Russian imperialism. According to Mieroszewski, Poland should seek close and friendly relations with Russia: 'There is no contradiction between a pro-Russian attitude and an anti-Soviet one. In fact, genuine friendliness towards the Russians must by definition be equated with the negative attitude towards the Soviet system'

(Mieroszewski 1974, pp. 76–77). For this policy to be effective, however, he urged the Poles to also eschew any sentiments, which could be considered imperialistic by Eastern European countries or Russia. He called upon the Poles to 'resign, once and for all, from Wilno and Lwów, and from any policy or plans, which would aim to establish, in favourable circumstances, our advantage in the East at the expense of the aforementioned nations [Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania]' (Mieroszewski 1974, p. 12). This last argument presented a particular challenge for an independent Poland's foreign policy. It proved extremely difficult to support Ukraine's independence, later followed by the consistent encouragement of Ukraine to adopt European norms, without simultaneously raising objections in Russia.

European Ukraine: Poland's Raison d'Ètat

In August 1989, the first non-communist government in CEE was approved by the Parliament in Poland. At this point, the direction of its policy towards the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic could have taken any direction. In fact, it would have been easy to treat Ukraine as a potential enemy. The memory of the massacres of the Poles in Volhynia and eastern Galicia in 1943 and 1944 by the Ukrainian nationalists was very vivid within the Polish society. The ethnic cleansing cost tens of thousands of Polish lives. For Ukrainians, an important problem in bilateral relations was the so-called Operation Vistula, which involved forced resettlement of Ukrainians by the communist Polish government in 1947, following the change of Poland's borders. Had the Polish policy acted on these tragic historical sentiments, it would have been much more difficult for Ukraine to opt for independence in 1991. If Poland had acted hostile towards Ukraine, the Ukrainian independence movement *Rukh* would have struggled to gain sufficient popular support within the population, which traditionally feared Russian-Polish encirclement. In fact, historically, anti-Polish propaganda played an enormous role in cementing Ukraine's loyalty to imperial Russia and the Soviet Union (Wilson 2005). Ukraine could have opted for the protection of Moscow. In any case, the hopes for the security of CEE were gloomy (e.g. Mearsheimer 1990). According to one prediction, 'Polish nationalists are unlikely to rest quietly through the 1990s over the territories Poland lost after World War II' (Nelson 1991).

One important reason why CEE emerged predominantly as the world of reason, rather than the world of fear (to use Richard N. Lebow's (2008)

terminology), was the strategy of Poland's first foreign minister, Krzysztof Skubiszewski. In Snyder's (2003, p. 217) words, Poland created order in the region, rather than inherited it. This order was based on the principles developed in *Kultura*. Skubiszewski, in 1989–1993, pursued the following strategy in Poland's eastern neighbourhood: (1) unequivocally supporting Ukrainian, Belarussian and Lithuanian independence; Poland was the first country to recognise Ukrainian independence, to the dissatisfaction of some Western powers, which preferred Ukraine to stay within the Soviet Union (Safire 2004); (2) defending the post-WWII territorial *status quo*; (3) pursuing the policy of 'European standards' with regards to minority rights, even though hardly any standards existed in Western Europe at that time; (4) supporting economic and political transition in the countries to the east of Poland. An original element in Skubiszewski's strategy, largely omitted in the *Kultura's* programme, was moving Poland towards integration with Western institutions, most notably NATO and the EU.

In the official discourse, Polish officials treated Soviet republics, including the Russian Federation, as if they were separate from the Soviet centre. During the official visit of Foreign Minister Skubiszewski to Kiev in 1990, Polish delegation brought Ukrainian rather than Russian translators – a gesture, which Ukrainians appreciated (Snyder 2003, p. 243). This policy represented the second track of Polish eastern policy, in addition to the first track – the relationship with the Soviet Union. There was an unofficial third track, however, throughout 1989 and 1990, which involved supporting pro-independence opposition movements in the Soviet republics. Inspired by the legacy of *Kultura*, Polish Solidarity (*Solidarność*) activists travelled to Ukraine to support *Rukh*, and to reassure Ukrainians that they can count on Poland as a friendly country (Snyder 2003, pp. 242–243; see also Pospieszna 2014). What seemed like a reasonable strategy for the country like Poland at the time of the existential crisis in the Soviet Union, in subsequent decades turned into a fundamental policy dilemma. Was the testament of Jerzy Giedroyc and *Kultura* fulfilled when Ukraine became independent? If so, there was nothing left for Poland but to maintain official relations with independent Ukraine and to make sure that Russia's preferences are taken into account.

There was a second, more ambitious policy alternative, however. In this alternative vision, just like Germany was interested in Poland becoming 'Westernised', also Poland must actively support political forces and processes in Ukraine, which would bring this country closer to the EU and NATO. After Poland had joined NATO in 1999 and the EU in 2004, it

considered itself no longer a buffer state between the West and Russia. Instead of a buffer state, however, Poland became the NATO and EU's eastern frontier – a status also considered unfavourable. Just like Germany wanted to have a country more 'like itself' on its eastern border in the 1990s, also Poland increasingly started lobbying for recognising Ukraine as a European country, which may not as yet be ready to formally join the relevant institutions, but it is only a matter of time before it does. Over time, this alternative vision dominated Polish thinking about its role in the East. What were the sources of this policy agenda? Poland's policy has been motivated, in the first instance, by *realpolitik* considerations – its perceived vital national security interest. Deeply ingrained in the Polish thinking is the conviction that there will not be independent Poland without independent Ukraine. Considering Poland's own strongly pro-Western orientation after 1989, independent Ukraine has become associated with European Ukraine. Eventually, by becoming a full member of the EU and NATO, Ukraine would become the West's eastern frontier, taking over this uncomfortable status away from Poland. Poland developed the same strategy towards Ukraine as Germany developed towards Poland in the 1990s: to move the 'borders of Europe' further eastwards.

The Orange Revolution and the 'Kwaśniewski Doctrine'

The so-called Orange Revolution was a series of mass protests in Kiev and other Ukrainian cities in response to forged presidential elections in 2004. The protests were directly triggered by the second round of elections on November 21, when the pro-Russian candidate, and Prime Minister at the time, Victor Yanukovych, was declared the winner against the pro-European candidate Viktor Yushchenko. The vast evidence of political intimidation, corruption and fraud prompted Yushchenko to call upon his supporters to come to the Independence Square (Maidan Nezalezhnosti) in the morning of November 22, which started the largest demonstrations independent Ukraine had seen to date. The situation was enormously tense. Yanukovych kept insisting that he was the rightful winner of the elections, and he even received congratulations from President Putin. Yushchenko, on the other hand, enjoyed massive public support and foreign observers confirmed his claims of fraud. Against this background, on November 23, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma called his most trusted foreign partner, Poland's President Aleksander Kwaśniewski, and asked for help. Yushchenko called Kwaśniewski the same day, asking for

mediation. Poland's President agreed under one condition: rather than representing Poland, which would have further disturbed already poor relations with Russia, he insisted that the mediation must be undertaken by the EU (Krzemiński and Ostrowski 2004).

To this end, Kwaśniewski contacted Javier Solana, then the EU's High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. Polish members of the European Parliament also pressed Solana. Initially hesitant, Solana agreed to participate if supported by other EU member states. Kwaśniewski then contacted other European leaders, including Chancellor Schröder and President Chirac (Krzemiński and Ostrowski 2004). While he managed to secure their reluctant support for the European mediation mission, most European capitals were far from enthusiastic about involving the EU in the crisis. Kwaśniewski also requested the support of President Bush, and indeed, American President endorsed Kwaśniewski's efforts (Krzemiński and Ostrowski 2004), accepting European leadership on this ussie (Pifer 2007). Eventually, Poland's President led a three-person mission, which also included Javier Solana and Lithuania's President Valdas Adamkus (McFaul 2007; Pifer 2007). President Putin's representative was also present during the talks. The purpose of the EU mission was to assist Ukraine in resolving the crisis before the government uses force and to secure repeated presidential elections. Officially, the mission did not endorse anyone, but it was obvious that free and fair elections would favour a pro-European candidate.

For Poland, there was a fine line between performing the role of the impartial mediator (consistent with the old second track policy) and that of an active supporter of the Orange Revolution (reminiscent of the third track). In practice, other than the official mission of President Kwaśniewski, Poland's politicians (including Lech Wałęsa), intellectuals, the media and the population at large vastly supported the Orange Revolution. Poland's activism during the Orange Revolution was observed in Moscow with concern; one of Putin's advisers referred in this context to the alleged 'Kwaśniewski doctrine':

> His [Kwaśniewski's] formula is as follows: it is better Ukraine without Russia than Ukraine with Russia. This concept is as anti-Russian as it is anti-European. This concept is based on the assumption that Europe will build a wall, a new line of confrontation, and countries will be asked to take sides. (quoted from McDuff 2005; see also Wilson 2005, p. 193)

No matter how much Kwaśniewski wanted his mission to be considered European, it was Poland, which was most enthusiastically involved. As Pifer (2007, p. 36) notes:

> By virtually all accounts, Kwaśniewski made the most creative contributions. As one person present at the roundtable described it, Kwaśniewski understood what was going on and was the mediator most inclined to get into discussions on substance. He spoke Russian, was more attuned to the politics of the situation, and could draw upon his own experience as a participant in the 1989 Polish roundtable negotiations. Moreover, among the mediators, Kwaśniewski had the closest personal relationship with Kuchma, whom he had known since 1996 and with whom he could deal on an equal basis (president-to-president). As a Ukrainian involved in the process commented, Kwaśniewski was a political equal who could pull Kuchma aside and say, "C'mon Leonid, you can't mean that," and Kuchma would listen. Kwasniewski had also dealt previously with both Yushchenko and Yanukovych.

The rest of Europe was much more reserved. Interestingly, this cool attitude remained strong after Yushchenko became the president (Barburska 2006; Roth 2007). Countries were wary of antagonising Russia, but also did not want to create the impression that the EU's door would open up for a more democratic Ukraine. Luxembourg's Prime Minister at the time, Jean-Claude Juncker stated that he '[could] only warn against offering Ukraine the prospect of full membership' (quoted in Roth 2007, p. 511). Roth (2007), in this context, grouped EU states into four groups, with CEE countries most actively supporting the European integration of Ukraine, and France, Benelux, Italy and Greece as the strongest opponents. Contrary to its popular image, also the European Commission played a very conservative role, publically discouraging Ukraine from European aspirations (Barburska 2006; Roth 2007). The Commission rejected the possibility of revisiting the so-called Action Plan for Ukraine, which was an agreement negotiated before the elections in 2004 within the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy. In the new, post-revolutionary context, Poland and other countries of the region insisted that a new, bolder agreement should be negotiated, endorsing the European aspirations of the new administration. Eventually, the Commission settled for a modest addendum, which reflected the overall climate in Western Europe – Ukraine's EU membership must remain off the table and Russia must take priority.

Eastern Partnership and Radek Sikorski's Gamble

According to the popular realist narrative, the Orange Revolution, exemplifying 'the West's backing of the pro-democracy movement in Ukraine', coupled with 'the EU's expansion eastward', constituted 'critical elements' in the run-up to the conflict in Ukraine (Mearsheimer 2014, p. 77). In this narrative, the EU's policy towards Ukraine is primarily responsible for the conflict. Indeed, 'NATO enlargement did not directly cause the crisis, which began in November 2013 and continues to this day. It was EU expansion coupled with the February 22, 2014, coup that ignited the fire' (McFaul et al. 2014, p. 175). The 'EU expansion', as discussed in the previous section, certainly did not mean the prospect of Ukrainian membership in the EU; the membership perspective was strongly opposed by most Western-European states, even after the Orange Revolution. Instead, it entailed the tightening of EU-Ukraine relations – the process with the intended result of signing the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine in November 2013 within the framework of the EU's Eastern Partnership. Again, to perceive this process as an indication of the EU's delusional ambition to push its liberal values to Ukraine is, to a significant extent, inaccurate. To understand why, it is important to explain the origins of the Eastern Partnership initiative.

In short, the initiative, although formally presented jointly by Poland and Sweden in 2008, was a project envisaged and developed by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, led by Radek Sikorski (Copsey and Pomorska 2014; Iordache 2015). The initiative was yet another example of the consistent Polish policy of making Ukraine 'more like Poland', pulling it towards the West and – at the same time – pulling the West towards Ukraine. The policy was predicated on the principles advanced in *Kultura* by Giedroyc and Mieroszewski; the principles which, after 1989, permeated Poland's thinking about its eastern policy. These principles, as the policies stemming from it, were never primarily concerned with the promotion of liberal values for the sake of it. Instead, they reflected the consensus among Poland's intellectual and political elite about how to understand Poland's security and survival in the long term. The Eastern Partnership was the first and most successful major political initiative of Poland in the EU. In the language of the 'Europeanisation' literature, Poland managed to 'upload' its policy preferences to the EU and make them official EU policy (Börzel 2002). Although formally involving six countries, Ukraine was at the centre of the initiative.

Poland attempted to signal its foreign policy priorities within the EU right after it became a member, or even before. For example, since 2003, the country had promoted the idea of a European Democracy Fund. It was, however, only when Poland held the rotating Presidency of the EU in the second half of 2011, when the Council of Ministers established the European Endowment for Democracy, aiming to support civil society and democratisation among the eastern and southern neighbours of the EU (Shapovalova and Stępniewski 2013). The biggest success for Poland came in May 2008, when Radek Sikorski, together with his Swedish counterpart, presented their Eastern Partnership initiative to the EU's Council of Ministers; the European Council in June 2008 approved the initiative. It proved to be the right move on the part of Minister Sikorski to approach Sweden to co-sponsor the initiative. While Poland could offer a deeper understanding of the region to which Eastern Partnership applied, Sweden understood the dynamics of the EU much better and enjoyed the reputation of a stable and responsible country (Iordache 2015). Sweden's support, therefore, boosted the credibility of the Polish initiative and, as a result, its chances of success. More was needed, however, for the EU as a whole to accept Eastern Partnership, considering the fear of provoking Russia among many European capitals. Research interviews conducted by Copsey and Pomorska (2014) point to three factors explaining why the EU accepted Eastern Partnership – none of them confirms Mearsheimer's argument about the misguided promotion of liberal values.

Firstly, Russia's military intervention in Georgia in August 2008 convinced EU member states and the European Commission that the EU should become more active in Eastern Europe. Prior to the outbreak of the conflict, there was very little sympathy in the Commission for the Polish-Swedish initiative, mainly because there was scepticism about its added value. Secondly, Western-European countries sceptical towards the EU's engagement in the East could not block the initiative because they needed the support of central-eastern EU member states for the Mediterranean Union. Finally, the election of Nicolas Sarkozy as the French President, who succeeded Jacques Chirac in 2007, made the French policy more sympathetic towards Eastern European countries, although any discussion of future membership was still off the table. The European Commission presented the work on the actual content of the Eastern Partnership initiative in December 2008, 'responding to the need for a clearer signal of EU commitment following the conflict in Georgia and its broader repercussions' (European Commission 2008, p. 2). It was

approved during the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit in May 2009. Formally, the initiative constituted an enhanced, eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy. It proposed a number of policy instruments for greater integration with the EU, most notably Association Agreements, aiming to 'create a strong political bond and promote further convergence by establishing a closer link to EU legislation and standards'. Notably, those links also aimed to 'advance cooperation on Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and Defence Policy' (European Commission 2008, p. 4; see also Šišková 2014).

The negotiation with Ukraine started in November 2009 and concluded in March 2012, when the Association Agreement was initialled. It still needed to be signed. The main problem for the EU was so-called selective justice in Ukraine, exemplified by the imprisonment of the former leader of the Orange Revolution, Yulia Tymoshenko. To address this strain in EU-Ukraine relations, the European Parliament launched a Monitoring Mission in June 2012, involving former European Parliament President Pat Cox and Alexander Kwaśniewski. Their initial mandate was to observe Tymoshenko's trial but, over time, they broadened their activities to also include campaigning for judicial and electoral reform in Ukraine. The mission lasted until November 2013 and consisted of 27 visits to Ukraine. It did not achieve its objectives.

Towards Pan-European Security Governance?

The course of events, which had led to the outbreak of the conflict between Russia and the West, could suggest that a particular model of international integration has emerged as dominant. This is the model associated with the school of international federalism and the notion of Europe as power. This observation does automatically entail, however, that the EU and NATO are solely responsible for the conflict. It was precisely the purpose of outlining the three conflict narratives to caution against drawing those simplified conclusions. Instead, this observation merely reaffirms an obvious fact, which is that political elites on both sides failed to construct a more inclusive European security order. In that sense, Coudenhove-Kalergi got an upper hand over Mitrany, because the more inclusive European security order is reminiscent of the Mitrany's preferred model of regional integration, taking the form of regional devolution. This model of international integration, as explained in Chap. 4, entails the existence of a universal system of rules, norms and legal frameworks, safeguarding

values such as peace and economic cooperation. In order to make the system more effective and practical, however, Mitrany encouraged devolving certain powers to the regional level, so that regional problems can be dealt with more efficiently. At the time, the League of Nations offered the most advanced system intended to ensure universal peace and to support economic cooperation. Mitrany, therefore, opposed any regional grouping that would undermine the authority of the League, and instead proposed to make the League more effective by devolving some of its powers to regions.

In the present context, it is, therefore, reasonable to ask how the pluralist system of 'greater European' security governance could look like. The United Nations (UN) system offers a more advanced universal framework than the League did, and its Charter devotes an entire Chapter VIII to regulate the functioning of regional arrangements 'for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action'. The UN itself, therefore, encourages regional devolution along the functional lines. The remainder of this chapter is thus divided into two parts. The first part outlines policy proposals related to constructing a more inclusive post-Cold War European security order. Those proposals are rare and are primarily associated with Russia's former President Dmitry Medvedev. Based on those proposals, one can be tempted to conclude that a 'devolution' integration model would indeed have been superior, by diminishing the role of the Euro-Atlantic organisations and by fully integrating Russia into the new European security architecture, more directly embedded in the UN system.

In the second part the chapter, however, cautions against drawing simplified conclusions based on the parallels between Mitrany's ideal types of regional integration and contemporary arguments about the place of Russia in European security governance. Indeed, a more inclusive approach to Russia can potentially be beneficial for European security order, but there are more problems with this vision than simply the short-sightedness of Western institutions. The first problem concerns the required separation, both in method and in time, of measures intended to end hostilities from those intended to build lasting peace. In order to move from the first step to another, some form of reconciliation is necessary between the aggressor and the victim. As the third narrative of the conflict in Ukraine has amply demonstrated, the reconciliation process has not yet taken place between CEE countries and Russia. The second problem concerns the exact nature of the universal principles underpinning a more inclusive model of regional

integration. For Mitrany, states must not allow their ideological differences prevent them from seeking practical solutions for economic cooperation and peaceful order, but this raises the problem of reconciling a normatively dense European integration project with the requirements of a thinner greater-European security order involving states like Russia. Unfortunately, Mitrany's functional approach does not offer immediate solutions to either of these problems.

In drawing comparisons between the Mitrany's vision of international functional cooperation, and the idea of a more inclusive, 'greater European' security order, two similarities stand out. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev highlighted them in his Berlin speech in 2008 (President of Russia 2008). This speech represents one of the rare occasions when the 'greater Europe' proposal was spelt out in some detail. First, the idea of greater Europe envisages that the whole of the European continent is unified in the pursuit of peace and economic cooperation. In this narrative, the commitment to protect these fundamental principles unifies states and societies, bringing them closer together. Mikhail Gorbachev first put this idea forward in his 'Europe as a Common Home' manifesto, presented to the Council of Europe in 1989. In it, he called upon European states (to which he naturally included Russia) to transform the competitive security dynamic, with the embedded notion of the spheres of influence, into a cooperative one. At the same time, he reassured Europeans that the Soviet Union did not aim to limit American influence in Europe. He stressed that both powers have an equal place on the Continent. He tempted Europeans with 'a truly unique chance – to play a role in building a new world, one that would be worthy of their past, of their economic and spiritual potential'. This vision was certainly closer to the Mitrany's ideal as far as the European continent was concerned. It offered a more inclusive framework than that of NATO and the EU. It could also prevent the competitive logic, which subsequently re-emerged between Europe and Russia.

At the same time, however, it raised the question of the relationship between the pan-European security order and the rest of the world. Indeed, the vision of a common home or a house could be compelling, but as Petrov (2013, p. 331) notes, the purpose of the house is also to 'keep out unwanted strangers'. Medvedev proposed to fundamentally reform the philosophy underpinning the European security order. Rejecting Euro-Atlanticism as a geopolitical strategy, he proposed the unity of countries stretching 'from Vancouver to Vladivostok'. He accused Western countries of entrusting their security to the exclusive, Cold-War-era organisations

reproducing 'bloc' dynamics, rather than to more inclusive organisations, such as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). As an alternative, Medvedev proposed a European security treaty for the whole continent. He stressed that all countries should participate, but not as members of NATO or the EU, but as individual states. Putin took up these ideas on a few occasions, even as late as July 2014. In the midst of the Ukrainian conflict, he called for the 'single economic and humanitarian space from Lisbon to Vladivostok' (quoted in Sakwa 2015).

The second similarity between the Mitrany's functionalist approach and the actual proposals for the pan-European security governance concerns the central role of the UN system. In this context, Medvedev observed that

> [t]he founders of this system, the founders of the UN, showed great foresight and established the UN as an organisation in which countries would cooperate on an equal basis. There is no other such organisation in the world and the coming years are not likely to produce one. Attempts to replace the UN with 'exclusive format' groups (such as is sometimes proposed) would have a totally destructive effect on the current world order. (President of Russia 2008)

If we replace 'the UN' with 'the League of Nations', this quote will sound as if it was literally taken from the Mitrany's 1930 paper 'Pan-Europa: a hope or a danger?' In this vision, none of the states or international organisations is superior to another. The loyalty to any sub-continental groupings, such as the EU or NATO, cannot come before the loyalty to the institutional structures entrusted with protecting and pursuing peace and economic cooperation for the entire European continent. Of course, there is a spectrum of possibilities related to the 'greater Europe' idea. On one end is the Mitrany's ideal type, whereby all European organisations are legally and organisationally subordinate to the global authority (the UN system). The main purpose of regional integration, in this case, is to apply universal rules more effectively and without the unnecessary involvement of countries less concerned with European matters (Mitrany 1933, pp. 111–114). The EU, in this vision, is reversed back to its original, purely functional form, so that it becomes a collection of functional supranational agencies open for countries to participate in as they please (Majone 2016). The Russian proposals have never gone as far, at least officially. At the same time, however, it is difficult to understand the details

of those proposals, because none of the Russian leaders have fully spelt them out.

This lack of detail is, for some, sufficient to see those proposals with utmost suspicion. Bobo Lo (2009), representing the Centre for European Reform, recommends no change in European approach to security. The EU and NATO should maintain unity, pressuring Russians for more details on the proposals. Any proposals, however, must not minimise the central role of Euro-Atlantic institutions. Further, security must not be limited to military matters, and include political and human dimensions such as democratisation, the development of civil society, and respect for human rights. This comment hints at the fundamental dilemma faced by the EU, which the chapter will elaborate on further in the next section. It concerns reconciling the EU's commitment to promoting a thick normative order, which is in a direct conflict with the principles of international functionalism. As noted in Chap. 4, Mitrany insisted that states must not be prevented from cooperating on international peace based on their domestic incompatibility with liberal norms and values.

For the advocates of the 'greater Europe' idea, such as Sakwa, it is regrettable that Western leaders have never taken Russian proposals seriously, reacting with 'polite condescension' (Sakwa 2015, p. 560) and continuing to rely on the organisations which exclude Russia. Institutions such as NATO and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), in their view, only reinforce the undesirable dynamics, which have always led to conflicts in the past; they also obscure the opportunities for reforming European relations enabled by the end of the Cold War. 'Polite condescension' is, in fact, a strategy recommended by the commentators like Lo (2009). He argues that Russian proposals, unless specific enough, should be 'gently rebuffed'. Returning to the Mitrany's criteria for a functional international order, we can thus conclude that the alternative vision of the European security order, as proposed on various occasions by Russian leaders, is closer to the 'devolution' ideal type of integration. It identifies the UN system as the ultimate authority for maintaining international security and it prioritises the principles of universal peace and economic cooperation over regional allegiances. At the same time, among other things that remain vague in these proposals, it is unclear whether the fully functioning system of pan-European security governance would not be destined to engage in geopolitical competition with other regions. In other words, it is unclear how 'universal' the proposed system should be.

On the one hand, what Russians propose could entail a genuine devolution of the UN competencies to the regional level, in which case the system would be identical to the functional approach. In that case, the sole purpose of the pan-European security system would be to effectively implement the principles enshrined in the UN Charter. The reference to the UN in the Medvedev's speech would point in this direction, as would the fact that Russia holds a permanent Security Council seat. There is an alternative possibility, however, and it has to do with Petrov's (2013) observation that Gorbachev's metaphor of the common house still entails insiders and outsiders. Only in this vision, aggregation would take place at an even higher, Eurasian level. The undesirable dynamics associated with competition between Western Europe and Russia would be overcome, but they would be replicated at the global level, where the pan-European security complex would compete with China, for example. From the perspective of the international integration theory, the question of Russia's intention is therefore legitimate. Is the Russian proposal underpinned by a genuine concern about the 'exclusive format' arrangements, as represented by the EU and NATO? Alternatively, is Russia more concerned with elevating its own position as a global actor through neutralising the competition of Euro-Atlantic institutions?

The Limits of Functional Governance as a Strategy

When Mitrany contrasted the two models of regional integration – one in the form of closed regional unions and the other one in the form of regional devolution – he, of course, preferred the latter. Its geographically-unrestricted character promised to break with the centuries-old pattern of disputes over contested spheres of influence. Modern-day advocates of the 'greater Europe' idea echo these sentiments. The cause of international security will be much better served, they argue, when the Euro-Atlantic organisations abandon their expansionist logic and instead take seriously Russia's proposals for building a truly pan-European zone of international security and economic cooperation. Mitrany's functional approach offers a helpful theoretical framework for grounding these contemporary discussions in early international integration theory. Its empirical-normative epistemology allows developing precisely the kind of theoretical propositions, which can combine explaining causes with prescribing solutions. There is a problem, however. While the functional approach offers a useful

framework for distinguishing between two contrasting forms of regional integration, it proves less helpful when adopted as a guideline for moving towards a more inclusive European security order in the current context. The challenges associated with the 'greater Europe' idea, together with the corresponding limitations of the functional approach, are discussed in the remainder of the chapter.

Closing History in a Black Box

Functionalism calls for separating measures necessary for ending hostilities from measures intended to building lasting peace. Carr underlined the importance of this principle in his *Conditions for Peace* published in 1942, recalling the experience of legally linking the League of Nations with the Versailles Treaty, which eventually had led to the collapse of both. Mitrany expressed similar views in *The Road to Security*, praising the UN Charter for 'wisely separating' war settlement from peace-building measures (Mitrany 1944). The two processes should be separated in method and in time. The measures necessary for ending hostilities must be implemented quickly and, inevitably, involve some form of compensation to the victors. The measures intended to build long-term peace, on the other hand, must be developed over time, with great care, and – most importantly – not carry a baggage of the past conflict.

From this (functionalist) perspective, a fundamental caveat needs to be added to the narrative in which Euro-Atlantic institutions are blamed for expanding their membership and 'spheres of influence' eastwards. Notably, the agency of CEE countries is often underestimated in this narrative. Sakwa (2015), for example, rightly observes that some of the CEE countries, particularly Poland and the Baltic states, have been utilising the Euro-Atlantic institutions in an effort to undermine Russia's position in Europe. He blames this 'obstructive' behaviour on an insufficient EU effort to 'socialise' these countries into the post-Cold War peace project. The EU's neglect or ineffectiveness may be a factor here, and in that case, we have to ask about the EU's capacity for conflict transformation, the EU as a peace project and indeed, the EU's normative foundations. Regardless of these considerations, however, there is also the question of the time separating the end of the Cold War and the launching of the 'greater Europe' integration project. While not experienced as the actual war by the Western societies, the Cold War felt much more 'physical' in the CEE countries, occupied and terrorised by the Soviet communist regime. The

end of the conflict had thus profound geopolitical, political, economic and psychological implications to those countries, in many ways comparable to the end of a war.

Geopolitically, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, most of the CEE countries interpreted their position as that of suddenly being located in a power vacuum, or, to use Brzezinski's metaphor, a black hole (Brzezinski 1997). Neither the EU nor NATO was keen to expand membership to include these countries early in the 1990s, so to say that Euro-Atlantic organisations simply *pushed* into the former territory of the Soviet Union is not entirely accurate. A more accurate image, as explained in the third narrative of the Ukrainian conflict, would be that of CEE countries *pulling* the EU and NATO to gain the security guarantees and economic cooperation associated with the membership in the Western organisations (Kirschten 1995; Rudolf 1996; Goldgeier 1998). In a similar manner, it is important to understand how countries like Poland have been *pulling* the West towards Ukraine, as well as Ukraine towards the West. Most of the time, Polish political elites have in fact been frustrated with the perceived indifference of the EU towards Ukraine and the priority given to Russia (Roth 2007). When the EU eventually developed a more ambitious programme for Ukraine through its Eastern Partnership initiative, it was only because Poland's pro-Atlanticist Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski was persistent and successful in introducing this idea to the EU in the first place (Copsey and Pomorska 2014; Iordache 2015). Conversely, the success of the consistent Polish diplomacy in Eastern Europe may have contributed to the Russia's perception of being excluded from discussing the issues of significant concern to it (House of Lords 2015, pp. 228–238).

If only the EU can socialise countries like Poland into the 'greater Europe' peace project, we could argue, they will adjust their foreign policy priorities. Possibly, although CEE countries have had the most tragic and complicated histories on the European continent (Snyder 2003). Possessing sovereign statehood is still a newfound luxury for many of those countries, and democratic processes there are not yet fully formed. Economically, the hegemonic narrative in countries such as Poland is that their lagging behind the West stems directly from the decades of Soviet occupation and enforced centrally planned economy. Psychological considerations were 'extremely cogent' for Carr, and they also appear important in the current context. Based on their centuries-long historical experience, CEE societies remain suspicious about Russia's foreign policy intentions. Reconciliation, which was possible among CEE countries and

Germany, is much harder with Russia because its leadership is not always consistent in its condemnation of the Soviet legacy and because of Russia's aggressive behaviour towards its neighbours, including its annexation of Crimea.

The argument here is not that the 'greater Europe' idea will not be possible because of the historical grievances of the CEE countries. It must be noted, however, that the length of time between the end of hostilities, marked by the withdrawal of the Soviet army for CEE countries, and the possible launching of the 'greater Europe' peace project, will depend not just on the policies of the EU and NATO. It will, equally importantly, depend on historical reconciliation between CEE countries and Russia. Russian leadership and political class have an important, yet still unfulfilled role to play in this process. They should first become consistent in acknowledging that while the Soviet Union elevated Russia to a superpower status, its political system was built on oppression and exploitation, and then – looking forward – they should persistently seek ways to establish new and positive ways of bringing Russian and CEE societies closer, but without implying zero-sum choices against the West.

In his functional design for the post-WWII reconstruction, Carr argued that historical experience must be relegated to the background in the interest of building lasting peace. Mitrany also called upon European states to separate ending the war and building positive peace through the joint control of strategic resources. Closing history in a metaphorical black box was possible for France and Germany, however, not only because of the ingenious vision of Jean Monnet but also because Germany, under the leadership of Konrad Adenauer, was ready for reconciliation and integration. Consequently, while the temporal separation argument can explain the forging of functional links when there is mutual political will and determination for post-conflict reconciliation, it seems to be less applicable when historical grievances persist and no genuine efforts at reconciliation are undertaken.

Opening the Black Box of Principles

The second problem, which affects the implementation of the 'greater Europe' idea, stems from the functionalist principle-oriented vision of international relations. For Mitrany, the fundamental difference separating regional integration in the form of closed unions from regional integration in the form of regional devolution lies in their approach to the principles

of international peace and economic cooperation. While both forms of regional integration appear to work towards the achievement of these principles, only one is true to their universal nature. Closed unions, by their very nature, must prioritise peace and economic cooperation within the union's frontiers. Critics of the 'wider and deeper Europe' idea point to this very problem when they stress the exclusive character of the EU and NATO, arguing that peace in Europe is impossible without Russia. If Euro-Atlantic organisations are honest in their pursuit of international peace and economic cooperation, the argument goes, they must give place to a more inclusive, pan-European security governance structure.

This postulate, however, inevitably raises the question of principles on which the greater-European security architecture could be based. For Mitrany, devolution-oriented regional integration was superior because it promoted the two most important universal principles for international order: economic cooperation and international peace. He took the differences in domestic political and economic systems as given and insisted that they should not prevent common international work towards peaceful order and economic well-being. When applying these functionalist principles to the post-Cold War European security order, both cooperative and confrontational tendencies can be easily identified. Andrei Tsygankov divides this period into a number of stages and explains the change in Russia's international behaviour by applying the Mitrany-style approach to the principles of international cooperation.

The first stage marked the period immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, during which President Boris Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev were fully committed to a pro-Western course, including ambition to join the key Euro-Atlantic organisations. Kozyrev's own experience in the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Directorate of International Organisations arguably influenced his view about the utility of international organisations for resolving conflicts (Tsygankov 2016, p. 64). This course came under increasing domestic pressure when the Western-recommended 'shock therapy' contributed to new poverty and when it became clear that Russia would not be granted access to the Western institutions anytime soon. At the same time, 'Westernisers' were criticised for neglecting Russia's interests in the former Soviet space. While all these issues contributed to the shift in Russia's foreign policy, symbolically marked by the appointment of Yevgeny Primakov as Foreign Minister in 1996, it was the decision to expand NATO eastwards and exclude Russia from the process, which mostly prompted the second stage in Russia's foreign behaviour, affecting the

prospect for the new, pan-European security order. Tsygankov (2014) calls this stage 'defensiveness'.

The third stage, when defensiveness turned into cooperation again, followed the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and President Putin's decision to offer the United States pragmatic help in the war against terror. Russia and NATO developed new functional links, including the NATO-Russia Council in 2002. While Putin did not subscribe to the Western model of liberal governance, he did not consider it an obstacle to cooperate on issues of mutual concern. Nonetheless, cooperation soon turned into assertiveness in Russia's foreign policy, marking the fourth stage in an evolving European security order. Among the contributing factors, Tsygankov (2016) lists the coloured revolutions in the former Soviet countries, the invasion of Iraq, the prospect of further NATO enlargements and – most recently – the attempt by Russia, the EU and the United States to pull Ukraine in opposing geopolitical directions. An important exception to this otherwise tension-filled period constituted some attempts at reconciliation undertaken during the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev. The most significant was the aforementioned proposal of the Russian President for the new European security governance structure. Medvedev's proposal did not lead to any significant initiatives, not least because of Russia's military intervention in Georgia only two months after the Berlin speech. It does, however, provide an important point of reference for the advocates of a more inclusive European security governance system.

Naturally, Tsygankov's narrative, although based on solid historical research, is bound to raise objections among those who see the primary source of Russian conduct in the country's inability and/or unwillingness to eschew its arguably 'imperial identity'. The discussion is likely to continue on why the prospect of a more inclusive European security order evolved from promising early in the 1990s to highly unlikely in the years following the Ukrainian crisis. If we return to the Mitrany's perspective on the role of universal values in forging a more peaceful and prosperous regional order, however, some tentative observations can be drawn. The first one is that the West, including the United States and particularly the EU, have not been able to accept Russia's initiatives for cooperation without simultaneously raising questions about Russia's domestic politics and its behaviour in the former Soviet space. The disciples of Mitrany would likely respond that Western policymakers have displayed unrealistic expectations about the universal adherence to the Western-style liberal democratic values, which led them to exclude Russia from what it was willing to

do because it was 'not doing everything else' (Mitrany 1966, p. 50). The second observation, related to the first one, is that the EU and Russia have struggled to focus on practical and 'working' solutions to the problems of European order because, to the frustration of Moscow, the cooperation has never been based on the principle of full equality. There may be justified reasons for this fact, most notably the historically conditioned, fundamentally normative character of the European integration project. Nonetheless, Mitrany-style functionalists can argue that without the assumption of the equality of parties it is impossible to advance towards working out practical solutions, which can contribute to a peaceful and more prosperous European security order. This, again, points to a limitation of the functionalist argument, as Mitrany did not (and could not) offer much guidance on how to reconcile the inherently thick normative European integration project with a considerably thinner, more pluralist vision of greater Europe.

Conclusion

The argument of the chapter began with an uncontroversial assumption that the Western institutions and Russia have failed to develop a stable, working relationship. The conflict in Ukraine merely exposed some fundamental pre-existing tensions, which only grew stronger in the years following the end of the Cold War. While one does not have to be an expert to accept this observation as rather obvious, what is far less obvious is the 'real' reasons behind this state of affairs. Who is to blame for the conflict in Ukraine and the pitiful state of the European security order? Expectedly, competing narratives of the conflict emerged soon after its breakout, and these align closely with the two major International Relations theories. Realist critics of the West blame the EU and NATO for disrespecting Russia's legitimate security concerns in its neighbourhood. Liberal critics of Russia blame President Putin for perpetuating nationalist and expansionist sentiments, including the illegal annexation of Crimea. The third narrative, as the chapter has demonstrated, is also possible. It does not reject the assumptions of either of the first two narratives; the West may indeed have been attempting to attract Ukraine to its sphere of influence, and Russian political leadership has been inflicting fear among its neighbours.

What the two narratives omit, however, is the active role of the countries like Poland, which have been working hard to compel the EU to take

Ukraine seriously as an independent country. The Eastern Partnership programme, which established a political framework for negotiating a comprehensive economic deal with Ukraine, was the initiative authored by Poland's hawkish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski. Of course, Russia itself, through its military intervention in Georgia, convinced Brussels that a more assertive European stance towards Moscow and in Eastern Europe was in order. Regardless of the relative accuracy of each narrative, however, the overarching fact remains that, from the international integration theory perspective, a more exclusive European security order has prevailed. Was there an alternative vision available, one in which Russia would have been included as an equal partner? Following the discussion of the narratives, the chapter has outlined an alternative, more inclusive vision of European security governance. President Medvedev outlined it in some detail in 2008, when he called for rethinking the entire Euro-Atlantic security architecture.

Interestingly, Medvedev's criticism of the existing order structured around the EU and NATO is almost identical with the Mitrany's criticism of the Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan Europe initiative. The chapter has illuminated those similarities, arguing that the idea of a more inclusive, 'greater European' security governance resembles Mitrany's functional vision of international politics. As a result, the chapter has demonstrated that the Mitrany's functional approach, representing one of the major early international integration theories, can offer an original perspective on the dilemmas associated with the contemporary European security predicament. The distinction Mitrany made between regional integration in the form of closed and exclusive unions, and regional integration in the form of inclusive groupings of states unified by the fundamental universal principles, represented certain ideal types. His taxonomy was simplified and can hardly be considered to accurately reflect a variety of forms of international integration. By deliberately making such a stark contrast between the two forms, however, Mitrany's framework can serve as a useful starting point for a more insightful perspective on the competing visions of EU-Russia relations following the conflict in Ukraine.

It is only a starting point, though. It should not lead straight to the conclusion that a particular narrative of European security order is superior simply because it corresponds more closely with the Mitrany's preferred integration form. Granted, more inclusive arrangements in politics are generally more desirable than exclusive ones, and principles such as international peace and economic cooperation, ideally, should not be

territorially-delineated. There are some complex challenges, which shed a different light on this seemingly clear-cut dichotomy, however, and the Mitrany's functional approach cannot offer immediate solutions. One concerns the problem of reconciliation between CEE countries and Russia, required for closing their tragic history in a metaphorical black box and focusing on forging mutually beneficial functional links, which could then potentially lessen the CEE countries' opposition to involving Russia more closely in a European security order. The other challenge concerns the discrepancy between the degree to which the European integration project has become underpinned by norms like liberal democracy and human rights, and the requirement for a much thinner, pluralist normative order to suit a greater variety of states involved in a 'greater Europe' system.

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CHAPTER 7

Integrating Integration Theories: Towards the Future Research Agenda

Rediscovering the value of early integration theory to the study of contemporary European security situation is an exciting challenge, which this book has undertaken in three stages. First, it went back to the interwar and World War II (WWII) periods in order to let the actual theorists and their original sources explain what international federalism and the functionalist approach were all about. I was thrilled to discover that the highest floor of the library at my own University of Southampton contains many of those original sources. Picking them up from the shelf, brushing off the dust and telling their story in Chaps. 2 and 4 was one of a kind experience. The second stage involved connecting those early integration theories with two popular contemporary research programmes in European Studies: 'Europe as power' and 'European security governance'. The idea was to demonstrate that those two programmes, while developed relatively recently, each shares some fundamental assumptions with either international federalism or functionalism. As a result, each represents a particular perspective on inclusion, exclusion and boundaries in Europe.

The 'Europe as power' programme is similar to early international federalism in that both view the 'outside world' as dangerous – an assumption, which constitutes an important reason for European integration. Both, therefore, see European integration as positive and worthy of advocating even if implicitly. Most importantly, however, both focus their normative and analytical theorising on Europe, conceptualised as a delineated geopolitical entity with boundaries, insiders and outsiders. The 'European

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security governance' programme, in turn, is similar to the David Mitrany's functionalist approach in that both focus on problems rather than geopolitical entities. In particular, they both reject formal government institutions as the vehicle for international cooperation. As noted in Chap. 5, they are problem-driven, asking how international security problems can be solved and what the nature of international/transnational structures already in place is to solve those problems.

The third stage involved applying those theories of international and European integration to the most serious 'traditional' security problem in Europe since the end of Cold War – the conflict in Ukraine. As most scholars of International Relations can attest, theorising the causes of conflicts is irresistible. In this case, some leading names in the field took their shot at explaining the underlying reasons for the Russia's intervention in Ukraine, drawing mainly on the realist and liberalist arguments (Kissinger 2014; McFaul et al. 2014; Mearsheimer 2014). This exchange has been valuable if only to put the terms of the debate in order. As Chap. 6 demonstrated, however, theories of international and European integration offer untapped opportunities for advancing our understanding of the conflict. In particular, international federalism and functionalism represent alternative empirical-normative perspectives on the European-Russian security order. International federalists advocated the unification of Europe in order to tackle the internal and external security threats to its security. This normative component is often less pronounced in contemporary scholarship on the European Union (EU) as an international security actor, but the implicit message remains unchanged: closer European integration in foreign and security policy is desirable for Europe as a region and for European states. Mitrany, in contrast, advocated international integration alongside functional, not territorial lines. He insisted that states should be included in cooperation on any issue they are ready to cooperate on for the cause of international peace and economic welfare, even if those same states are unwilling to cooperate on a range of other issues (Mitrany 1966, pp. 49–50). The 'security governance' scholarship echoes this problem-driven take on international integration, applying the framework to a diverse range of contemporary security challenges.

Exciting as it is, we can consider rediscovering early international integration theory for the study of European security as merely the first step towards a more comprehensive research agenda. In order to 'bring back' international federalism and functionalism to International Relations and European Studies, two additional steps appear necessary. The first one

involves opening up those early integration theories to collaboration with other, more contemporary approaches. In other words, both international federalism and the Mitrany's functionalist approach may prove more suitable to the study of international relations if they are considered as building blocks of a particular kind. The fundamental value of those theories lies in their empirically grounded advocacy for a particular model of international integration, which makes them empirical-normative theories. If we, therefore, take seriously the call for analytical eclecticism, our understanding of international problems, including ways to address those problems, could be greatly enhanced if we combine the strengths of early integration theories with the strengths of other approaches in International Relations. The second step towards advancing a more comprehensive research agenda around international federalism and functionalism involves exploring their suitability to address problems other than European, or Euro-Russian cooperation. This, in principle, should not be a problem. Except for Coudenhove-Kalergi, the ultimate goal of international federalists was the unification of all states, even if they advocated a European federation as urgent in light of WWII. Similarly, Mitrany meant his approach as a universal integration model. His focus on Europe stemmed from his own background, from the central role of Europe in international security, and from his criticism of the Pan-European idea.

Integration Theories and the Eclectic Approach

As Chap. 1 explains, Sil and Katzenstein (2010) developed analytical eclecticism in a particular form – the form, which comes as more obvious and appropriate for American International Relations, but less so for the European tradition. Epistemologically, analytical eclecticism in its original formulation is an empirical-theoretic approach, interested exclusively in how causal stories can help us better explain problems of international relations. Ontologically, it is an approach, which *de facto* draws exclusively on three paradigms mainstream in the American academia – realism, liberalism and constructivism. Reus-Smit (2013) identified those limitations and suggested reformulation in a way, which would make eclecticism truly eclectic. He proposed to open up eclecticism to normative theories alongside empirical ones, arguing that only then can we hope to generate practical, policy-relevant knowledge – the kind of knowledge sought by Sil and Katzenstein. The case of European-Russian relations following the conflict in Ukraine confirms that indeed, normative questions are crucial for those

involved in policy practice (see Chap. 1). Decision makers, as the House of Lords (2015) report indicates, want to know what decisions are right to take in given circumstances. Causal stories cannot generate this kind of practical knowledge. They can only explain the circumstances of a problem.

We can view both international federalism and the Mitrany's functionalist approach as eclectic theories in their own right. Although their primary task is to prescribe a certain model of international integration, they also seek to explain the causes of war or, in case of Mitrany, the differentiated impact of international sanctions (Mitrany 1925; see also Navari 1995). The fact that they are to some extent eclectic, however, should not prevent us from seeking input from other approaches when studying problems of international relations. One natural companion for international federalism appears to be neoliberal institutionalism, as exemplified by Robert Keohane's (2001) address to the American Political Science Association. Keohane advanced a normative argument for 'effective governance' to manage the negative consequences of globalisation, such as discord among people, which can lead to war, and the sometimes-abusive role of institutions. Effective governance requires 'right institutions', and this is where Keohane draws on a range of sub-disciplines of Political Science, including 'game theory, rational-choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism, and democratic theory' (Keohane 2001, p. 1). In this way, he combines his ideal vision of liberal and democratic world order in the form of effective institutions managing globalisation, with the empirical analysis drawing on analytical tools of Political Science. In a similar fashion, the advocates and students of international federalism can integrate the tools of Political Science and International Relations, such as the Constructivist idea of the life cycle of norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), in order to generate practical knowledge combining normative zest with analytical rigour.

Another possibility for an eclectic approach to international federalism is to combine it with a more systematic study of what the concept of 'federalism' actually entails. In the context of the EU, federalism is often associated with some vague notion of abuse originating from remote Brussels – a theme particularly prevalent in the British political discourse (Sutherland 2008, p. 39). Describing the concept of a federalism may seem a trivial task, not worthy of a serious researcher. Yet, as noted by Wendt (1998), concepts do not only describe reality – they also explain it (see also Chap. 3). In essence, concepts allow grouping a number of

properties of a phenomenon, explaining what a thing is, before explaining why it is. If one goes to the streets in European cities and asks random people whether the EU should become a federation, what a federation is and whether they know what the principle of subsidiarity is, it would likely become apparent that it is of fundamental importance what we mean by the concept of a federation. This is just one aspect of systematically engaging with the concept of a federation. Another one involves defining federation for the modern age. What innovations to the concept are desirable or necessary in the age of the Internet and social media? Insights from the democratic theory, governance and public policy may be particularly valuable in this context.

Admittedly, David Mitrany was more self-aware as a practitioner of the emerging discipline of International Relations from his federalist contemporaries. His functional vision of international integration was highly normative and – some would say – idealistic, but he was concerned with the 'scientific grounding' of his theory much more than international federalists. It is a testimony to how well he developed and justified his functional argument that Hans Morgenthau endorsed it in his foreword to the Mitrany's book (Mitrany 1966). The most obvious avenue for incorporating the Mitrany's functionalist approach into a more eclectic research agenda is to combine its normative aspiration with the more 'scientific' neofunctionalism. This book has criticised the tendency to consider neofunctionalism as an improvement on the 'old' functionalism, arguing instead that they are different kinds of theory developed in different contexts and for different purposes. This does not change the fact, however, that the tools developed by Haas and others to study regional integration among actors who already enjoy peaceful relations could be adopted in the study of functional integration among actors who do not yet enjoy such relations. In other words, Mitrany's normative model of functional integration could potentially be combined with a set of positive tools – 'spillover' being the most obvious one – in order to study if and under what circumstances functional integration can advance international peace, stability and prosperity.

The recent so-called 'practice turn' in International Relations constitutes another potential 'partner theory' to the Mitrany's functionalist approach. What is functional cooperation if not a set of established practices? The idea, and arguably benefit, of studying practices is looking at actors' local, or background knowledge. It is about asking what actors think from, rather than what they think about when they do things

(Pouliot 2008). In case of the EU's chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) Centres of Excellence (CoE), discussed in Chap. 5, we can apply the practice framework to understand and compare practices of the officials involved in CBRN-related projects across different regions and working organisations. For example, are practices of staff working in CBRN CoE regional secretariats the same across all regions, or do they vary? If they vary, what can explain this variation? One purpose of CBRN CoE is to bring together officials from within state bureaucracies who routinely do not work with each other and ask them to cooperate on CBRN-related projects. Does this help to create new communities of practice revolving around CoE-sponsored initiatives? If so, can we identify power dynamics within and across communities, which affect their practices (Zwolski 2016)? Another aspect of studying practices in functional integration concerns situations where, from the normative standpoint, one believes that functional cooperation would be desirable, but it does not exist because of political or ideological differences. Such is the situation between the EU/North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Russia, as discussed in Chap. 6, where it appears nearly impossible for the parties to develop 'a habit of trashing out those grievances round a table in search of a practical solution' (Mitrany 1933, p. 112). Is there something specific about how practices and communities of practice emerge, particularly in unlikely scenarios, which could be applied to the area of (high) politics? Eclecticism of this kind, involving both empirical and normative theorising, opens the potential for early integration theories to return as part of a more comprehensive research agenda, in turn leading to knowledge that is more practical.

Integration Theories Beyond Euro-Russian Security Predicament

It comes as no surprise that the theories of international integration in this book were applied to EU/NATO-Russia relations following the war in Ukraine. After all, the geopolitical shape of Europe, which always included the Russian question, was of great importance between the two World Wars and during WWII, when those theories were advanced. They thus remain relevant in the contemporary context, because the place of Russia in the wider European security order remains contested. Just like in the past, the West faces the dilemma whether to treat Russia as a political,

ideological and cultural 'other' and formulate its policies accordingly, or whether to turn the blind eye on Russia's illiberal practices and cooperate on issues of mutual interest, provided that Russia would not attack its neighbours. Chapter 6 elaborated on this dilemma. While the problem of integrating Russia into the wider European security order will not disappear, the value of early integration theories for contemporary research agenda will depend on their applicability to other problems of international relations. In principle, broadening the empirical scope of those theories should not be problematic, if only because they were already more inclusive in their scope when originally formulated.

Notably, both international federalism and the functionalist approach were interested in the attempt to overcome the system of anarchy through the institutionalisation of international relations in the form of the League of Nations. David Davies was among the most ardent advocates and students of the League, personally involved in ensuring its success (Porter 1995, pp. 59–60). He advocated a far-reaching union of the societies, rather than just governments, but he insisted that the institution must have coercive powers in order to enforce its rule if necessary. Disappointed with the actual shape of the League, Davies devoted his energy to promote the idea of the international police force, to which he devoted a book *The Problem of the Twentieth Century*. Following the outbreak of WWII, Davies did not give up on his international integration ideas, this time shifting his focus to Europe, and arguing for a European federation (Davies 1940). After WWII, federalists and federalist organisations shifted their focus to the United Nations, which remains one of the most important themes in the federalist writings. As early as in 1953, the Federal Union established a study group to explore possibilities for turning the United Nations into a world federation organisation. Another study group set up by this organisation followed the Suez Crisis, when the organisation resolved to design the scheme for creating the United Nations police force in order to prevent any future governments from taking law into their own hands (Mayne et al. 1990).

Today, the federalist focus on the United Nations revolves primarily around the problem of democratising the organisation, which means giving people a more direct control over its functioning (which indicates continuity with interwar federalism). A non-governmental organisation Democracy without Borders, through its Campaign for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly, drives much of the research in this

area. On a regional level, European integration remains as relevant for the federalist scholarship as it was during the interwar period. Famously, Coudenhove-Kalergi opposed British membership in his envisaged Pan-Europe, which likely contributed to his unpopularity among British federalists associated with the Federal Trust. We may be tempted to revisit those old debates today for historical insights on the relationship between the UK and the rest of Europe. The Academic Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES) supports much of the research on contemporary European integration, including EU foreign and security policy after Brexit.

David Mitrany was equally interested in the functioning and effectiveness of the League of Nations. He actually supported the League as much as the federalists did, but he wanted the organisation to be based on functional, not federal principles. This entailed 'de-centralising' the League into an array of facultative commitments, potentially making the membership easier to digest for countries such as the United States, which feared to take too much of a burden through generalised security commitments. He, therefore, welcomed the legal separation of the Geneva protocols from the League Covenant, as he welcomed the separation of the WWII settlement (looking backwards) from the United Nations Charter (looking forward) (Mitrany 1944). Today, the United Nations remains at the forefront of the functionalist analysis, which is unsurprising considering that its organisational structure resembles, to some extent, functional principles (Sewell 1999).

In the study of European integration, neofunctionalism remains more popular in the contemporary scholarship than Mitrany's functionalism. This is unsurprising, considering that the former was advanced specifically to study European integration after WWII. A contribution by Long (1999), as noted in Chap. 4, constitutes one example of applying Mitrany's functionalism to the EU's foreign and security policy. Another one is Majone's (2016) advocacy of the 'agencification' of the EU, which would involve shifting the focus of European integration away from the process-oriented policy harmonisation, towards the results-oriented separation of tasks into distinctive policy areas and managed by autonomous agencies. Majone's engagement with Mitrany's functionalism is rather arbitrary, however, as he advocates a genuine EU's common foreign and security policy as an end-result of European integration. These and other examples (e.g. Steele 2011; Steffek 2015) indicate that there is still interest in, and the potential to revive early integration theories of international federalism

and functionalism in the study of international relations and security policy. Their relevance clearly goes beyond the problematic EU/NATO-Russia relations, and their empirical-normative character means they are particularly suitable to contribute to a more comprehensive, eclectic research agenda.

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