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Transnationalization of Public Spheres

Hartmut Wessler, Bernhard Peters, Michael Brüggemann, Katharina Kleinen-von Königslöw and Stefanie Sifft



Transformations of the State

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Transformations of the State
Series Standing Order ISBN 978–1–4039–8544–6 (hardback) 978-1-4039-8545-3 (paperback)

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

This illustration is taken from the original etching in Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan* of 1651. Palgrave Macmillan and the editors are grateful to Lucila Muñoz-Sanchez and Monika Sniegs for their help in redesigning the original to illustrate what 'transformations of the state' might mean. The inscription at the top of the original frontispiece reads '*non est potestas Super Terram quae Comparetur ei*' (Job 41-33): 'there is no power on earth which can be compared to him'. In the Bible, this refers to the sea-monster, Leviathan. (Original Leviathan image reprinted courtesy of the British Library.)

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



Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2008 978-0-230-00837-3

First published 2008 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010
Companies and representatives throughout the world

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ISBN 978-1-349-28399-6 ISBN 978-0-230-22983-9 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9780230229839

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Transnationalization of public spheres / Hartmut Wessler ... [et al.].
p. cm. — (Transformations of the state)
Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Mass media—Political aspects—Europe. 2. Mass media—Social aspects—Europe. 3. Public opinion—Europe. 4. Political participation—Europe. I. Wessler, Hartmut, 1965–
P95.82.E85T695 2008
302.23094—dc22

2008015922

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 09 08

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Preface and Acknowledgements

> Over the last two decades, the European Union has been transformed. It has taken on a wide range of tasks touching citizens' lives in many different ways. But Europe's communication with its citizens has not kept pace [. . .] Communication is essential to a healthy democracy. It is a two-way street. Democracy can flourish only if citizens know what is going on, and are able to participate fully.
>
> (Commission of the European Communities 2006)

Europe has come a long way to arrive at this statement. It is the opening paragraph of the 'White Paper on a European Communication Policy' presented by the Commission of the European Communities on 1 February 2006. Since the early days of arcane specialist politics bolstered by a 'permissive consensus' on the part of citizens, through periods of Eurosclerosis and of heightened debate and conflict, through increased integration, manifested in the introduction of the euro and eastward enlargement, right up to the stalemate following the 'No' votes on the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 in both France and the Netherlands, an awareness has grown outside and within the EU institutions that a gap needs to be bridged. Governance structures and citizens are further apart in the EU than in any other form of democratic rule, feedback mechanisms are weaker, and bottom-up channels of influence are scarce. In particular, the vast field opening up between those high up in decision-making positions and those 'below' in the local communities seems to resemble a void more than anything else. There is, as yet, not a public sphere in Europe.

Or so many thought at the beginning of the scholarly and political debate on the necessity and reality of a European public sphere – a debate that meanwhile has spanned more than one and a half decades. In the literature on the European public sphere we find both theoretical debates and empirical studies, large-scale collaborative projects, small individual studies and a number of doctoral dissertations; we find both case studies and broad cross-sectional analyses. Many arguments have been made, but no consensus has emerged. The Commission's observation cited

above is but one position in a prolonged discussion, and it remains to be seen to what extent the communicative behaviour of EU institutions and communicative structures in Europe at large will actually change.

Most notably, however, empirical results concerning the present state of public, mediated contestation in and about Europe are contradictory and inconclusive. There is an excessive focus on case studies and a clear lack of longitudinal data. Studies with one point or period of investigation have difficulty evaluating their results: Is the scale of Europeanization found to be large or small, is it 'remarkably high' or 'astonishingly low'? Too often still the standards for such judgements are left unclear or implicit. They should be derived either from historical comparison or from explicit and specific normative theorizing. In both respects our study endeavours to advance the discussion. Moreover, the empirical literature on the Europeanization of public spheres is often rather descriptive. Explanatory factors for national differences or for the development over time in levels and patterns of Europeanization are often suggested, but rarely tested. We take a first step in addressing this shortcoming here as well.

It is high time, we contend, to advance the debate with a more thorough look at, and a more integrative approach to, what might be considered the core features of a Europeanized public sphere: namely, the monitoring of EU governance in the news media, the convergence of hitherto nationally confined public discourses, the integration of media and speakers from various European countries into a common discourse, and the emergence of elements of European identity in public debates. The (sparse) development of cross-border media in Europe is an additional element worth looking at.

Our objective with this book is thus to provide a comprehensive, multi-dimensional, long-term assessment of the Europeanization of national public spheres with a focus on news media content. Contradictions between previous studies can largely be resolved by our more encompassing methodology. Consequently, we do not 'prove' or 'disprove' the existence of a European public sphere but find rather a complex pattern of *segmented Europeanization* and a contingent, open-ended process that deserves further scrutiny in the years to come.

We are indebted to a number of institutions and individuals without whom this book would not have been possible. The German Research Foundation has funded our research since 2003, and continues to do so, in the context of the Collaborative Research Center 'Transformations of the State' (TranState) at the University of Bremen and at Jacobs University Bremen. We are grateful to both universities for their successive

support in hosting our project entitled 'The Transnationalization of Public Spheres in Europe'. And we owe a lot to the leadership of and all colleagues at the TranState Research Center for providing a reliable organizational structure and a truly stimulating working environment over the years. Our thanks also go to Blackwell Publishing for allowing us to reprint in this volume parts of the paper 'Segmented Europeanization' that was published in the *Journal of Common Market Studies* in 2007 (Sifft et al. 2007).

We would also like to thank several collaborators who have made important contributions to our study. Andreas Wimmel, who was a member of the research team from 2003 to 2005, contributed to the development and execution of the cross-issue content analysis. Chapter 3 of this volume builds on publications jointly authored with him.[1] He also participated in the qualitative part of the case study on military interventions (Chapter 6). Hans-Gerhard Schmidt contributed to both the qualitative and the quantitative analysis of military interventions and participated in the coding for the cross-issue study and the case study on genetically modified food. He also helped finalize the manuscript for this volume. We would also like to thank Thorben Köhn, Dennis Niemann, Sandra de Silva and Anne Veghte-Quatravaux for their dedicated work in coding articles, as well as Albrecht Lüter for his initial work on transnational media in Europe. Vicki May has done an outstanding job in making our English sound less German. Finally, our thanks go to Philippa Grand and Hazel Woodbridge of Palgrave Macmillan for their flexibility and patience in seeing the manuscript through to publication.

One member of the research team and its early *spiritus rector*, Bernhard Peters, cannot see the final product in print. His untimely death in 2005 marked a great loss for all of us. But it also stimulated us to strive for the high standards he always set for our collective endeavour. We dedicate this volume to his memory.

List of Authors

Michael Brüggemann is postdoctoral fellow at Jacobs University Bremen and coordinates the project 'The Transnationalization of Public Spheres in Europe' at the Collaborative Research Center 'Transformations of the State' in Bremen. Prior to this he worked as a researcher and lecturer at the Institute for Communication Research at the University of Munich. In his doctoral thesis, he analysed the information and communication policy of the European Union and explored the nexus between public relations and the public sphere. His research and publications focus on issues of political communication, international communication, political PR and journalism.

Katharina Kleinen-von Königslöw is research associate at Jacobs University Bremen and is currently working on the project 'The Transnationalization of Public Spheres in Europe' at the Collaborative Research Center 'Transformations of the State' in Bremen. She studied communication science in Munich and Paris, specializing in statistics and methods of text analysis, which she has taught both at the University of Munich and as a professional media and market researcher in Munich. Her diploma thesis explored escalation effects of media reports on right-wing extremist violence through ARIMA time series analysis. She is currently pursuing a PhD in communication science on the integration of the German national public sphere.

Bernhard Peters (1949–2005) was Professor for Political Theory at the University of Bremen, Germany, and co-director of the Collaborative Research Center 'Transformations of the State' in Bremen. He initiated and headed the project 'The Transnationalization of Public Spheres in Europe' from 2003 to 2005. He had a long-standing research interest in the public sphere and more generally in structures and mechanisms that regulate the development of modern societies.

Steffen Schneider is research associate at the Collaborative Research Center 'Transformations of the State' in Bremen. He received his education in Munich, Quebec City (Laval University), and Vancouver (UBC) and holds a PhD in political science from the University of Augsburg.

His work at the TranState Centre is concerned with the legitimation of Western democracies. Other research interests include the political economy of labour market policy reforms in advanced industrial economies and the phenomenon of single-party dominance in the OECD world.

Hagen Schulz-Forberg is Assistant Professor in International History at the University of Aarhus, Denmark. From 2004 to 2007 he was Researcher and Coordinator in the EU-funded research consortium 'Media and Ethics in a European Public Sphere from the Treaties of Rome to the "War on Terror" (EMEDIATE)'. Within the project 'The Transnationalization of Public Spheres in Europe' at the Collaborative Research Center 'Transformations of the State', he worked as an associate researcher on the development of transnational media in Europe.

Stefanie Sifft was research associate at Jacobs University Bremen and worked on the project 'The Transnationalization of Public Spheres in Europe' at the Collaborative Research Center 'Transformations of the State' in Bremen. She has worked on the Europeanization of public spheres since her diploma thesis in political science, and collaborated in the project 'The Public, Gender Equality Policy, and European Governance' at the Bremen Jean Monnet Centre (funded by the German Research Foundation). She is an instructor at the University of Applied Sciences in Bremen, Germany.

Hartmut Wessler is Professor of Media and Communication Studies at the University of Mannheim and has directed the project 'The Transnationalization of Public Spheres in Europe' at the Collaborative Research Center 'Transformations of the State' in Bremen since 2005. His work focuses on comparative and transnational perspectives in communication research with a special emphasis on the empirical analysis of media discourses and their deliberative functions both at the national and the international level.

For more information on the research project 'The Transnationalization of Public Spheres in Europe' please check our website at: http://www.jacobs-university.de/publicsphere.

1
The Transnationalization of Public Spheres: Theoretical Considerations

Transformations of the state

The transnationalization of public spheres can best be understood within the context of more encompassing transformations of the state. Since the late 1960s and early 1970s the nation-states of the OECD world – among them, of course, the growing number of member states of the European Union – have been in a process of continuous transformation (Zürn and Leibfried 2005; Hurrelmann et al. 2007). It is unclear as of now whether this incremental change will develop into a new, relatively stable constellation of statehood in the twenty-first century, or whether change will be perpetual. What we do know at present, however, is that there are two main directions of transformation: internationalization and privatization. The four most basic normative goods that the OECD state has provided for so long – monopoly of force and taxation (resources), rule of law, democratic legitimacy and welfare – are today partly co-produced by international bodies and private agencies, or both. Of course, transformation in these four realms is uneven. While on the whole internationalization is more pronounced in the resources and legal dimensions, privatization is somewhat stronger, though not universal, in welfare production.

But what about democratic legitimacy? Are we witnessing the emergence of internationalized democracy? If so, to what extent and in what forms?[1] It is obvious that the development of the European Union and its legitimation processes offer a case in point here. The EU is by far the most likely candidate for democratic legitimation beyond the nation-state. And this is where the emergence of a corresponding *transnational public sphere* comes into play. The legitimacy of the EU (like any other body of international governance) not only depends on its institutional

arrangements but also on the degree to which, and the forms in which, it is discussed publicly. Public debate connects citizens and political institutions by involving them in a process by which common problems are identified, possible solutions are discussed, ideas are exchanged, decisions are justified, and support or opposition is signalled. Therefore, the emergence of a transnational sphere of public contestation has always been regarded as either an indicator or a normative prerequisite of democratic legitimacy both in the national and the international realm. Is such a sphere developing in Europe and if so, how and why? These are the questions we seek to answer in this book.

Apart from the direction of change, the extent and depth of transformation is important for assessing the degree to which states have changed in a globalized world. The nation-state has never been completely substituted by other bodies in guaranteeing the normative goods mentioned above. The transformation that has taken place complements rather than substitutes traditional forms of statehood. This is particularly true for the dimension of democratic legitimation, where internationalization has been more limited than in the other dimensions of statehood. The nation-state remains the central focal point and anchor of democratic legitimation (Schneider et al. 2006; Hurrelmann et al. 2005) but it is complemented to some degree by international bodies such as the EU. Legitimacy claims are increasingly addressed to the EU, and the EU responds to such claims at least on the level of public pronouncements and political strategy, if not yet in practice (Commission of the European Communities 2006; Brüggemann 2008). The political and academic debate about the EU is characterized by a widespread (but not wholesale) perception of a lack or deficit of legitimacy. Whatever the merits and justifications of this perception, it can serve at least to indicate that the internationalization of governance functions can be out of sync with the internationalization of societal legitimation processes.

Empirical and normative questions intersect here. Whereas the EU's need for democratic legitimation must be determined primarily on the level of normative institutional analysis and normative theory, the synchronicity or asynchronicity of governance and legitimation processes pose an empirical question. Thus, if we strive to understand the transformations of the state with respect to its democratic legitimation we must also seek empirically to understand the transformations of public communication. This is because, from an empirical perspective, legitimation is a communicative process between society and state or, to be more precise, between actors and collectives in both realms.

Beyond the direction and the extent of change we must also identify the actual object of transformation. Legitimation processes comprise at least three different basic elements. First, legitimation (or delegitimation) is achieved by *legitimacy judgements*, that is, convictions as to the legitimacy of political decisions, actors and orders circulated in public debate and held by citizens. Second, democratic legitimation depends on certain forms of *participatory procedures and behaviours*. Democratic elections and referenda, citizen or expert participation in decision-making, civil society mobilization for or against a certain cause are all examples of participatory processes that bear on the democratic legitimacy of decisions, actors and orders. Third, both political participation and legitimacy judgements depend on *socio-cultural conditions,* an infrastructure that ensures the free exchange of opinions and claims. This infrastructure is commonly called the public sphere and it constitutes the central focus of this book. All three basic elements of democratic legitimation processes change to some degree in the course of the dual transformation of state and society. In comparison, a possible transnationalization of the socio-cultural conditions of legitimation, that is of public spheres, constitutes a profound, structural type of transformation. If the socio-cultural infrastructure of democratic legitimation were to become more internationalized, we would witness a far-reaching transformation of one of the central pillars of modern statehood. Public sphere research therefore speaks to the larger debates about transformations of the state.

Before we can assess the extent of such structural change, however, we have to spell out exactly what we mean by the term 'public sphere' – a concept that has indeed been used in many different ways, again involving both empirical and normative connotations. Consequently, we follow a two-pronged approach here. In the following section we introduce an analytical model of the public sphere and sketch the empirical complexity of contemporary public spheres. We then extend this empirical-analytical perspective to the main topic of this book: the transnationalization of public spheres: What are the most important dimensions of transnationalization, and how can the degree of transnationalization of public spheres be assessed? At this point we introduce the indicators that we use in our empirical analysis and that are analysed in the following chapters. In the final section of this chapter we turn to a normative consideration of transnationalization by discussing the normative standards for a Europeanized public sphere that have been proposed in the literature and condensing them into distinct normative approaches towards a Europeanized public sphere.

The public sphere, news media and public discourse

Among the many metaphors that have been used to describe the public sphere the most useful seem to be the metaphors of the 'forum' and the 'arena' as developed by Ferree et al. (2002). In an *arena* a number of *speakers* communicate with each other, observed by an *audience* seated in the gallery. Apart from speakers and members of the audience there are *mediators* (that is, journalists) who organize the exchange between speakers and at times inject their own opinions and interpretations, thereby partly acting as speakers themselves. In the catacombs below the arena is a *backstage area* in which speakers and mediators prepare their communications and seek advice, for example, from public relations coaches. The entire complex of arena, gallery and backstage area can be called a *forum*.

Contemporary societies display a multiplicity of forums, of which the mass media forum (that is, the forum constituted by the mass news media) is the least specialized and the most far-reaching. This is why the news media dominate public spheres in modern societies, and why media-related research dominates the academic study of public spheres. Topics and opinions from other, more specialized forums, such as the political party forum, the social movement forum, the scientific or legal forum and so on are continually fed into the media forum. Of course, the mass media forum is internally differentiated into smaller forums revolving around more specific media offerings, lifestyle groups or interest communities. Today, however, the mass media forum is still dominated by a small set of leading news media such as national newspapers and news magazines and television news and discussion programmes. These media outlets constantly observe each other, partly converge in their choice of topics and are, in turn, observed by other, less dominant news media (for example regional or special interest media) that pick up cues from them. The mass media forum must therefore be seen as a network of smaller or more specialized forums that are interpermeable to some degree.

In the mass media forum speakers bring up issues and express opinions in the framework of public discourses or debates about topics of more or less interest to the audience (agenda-building). The mass news media structure these debates through their own particular mechanisms of selection and construction (news factors and framing) as well as through their own contributions to the debate (commentaries, interpretations). The audience informs itself about relevant issues by observing the debates (agenda-setting) and forms opinions by listening to the opinions

expressed (Neidhardt 1994; Hilgartner and Bosk 1988; Ferree et al. 2002).

The mass media forum constitutes an *integrated* network precisely because issues and opinions constantly circulate between various subforums and because the leading media exert a structuring effect on public debates. But integration is not tantamount to homogeneity. In fact, a good degree of variety in issues, opinions and ideas expressed throughout the mass media forum is vital for democratic public debate, as can easily be demonstrated by contrast with autocratic media systems. Finally, public communication also occurs outside the mass media, for example, in informal encounters or public meetings, in public protest or online discussion forums (see Gerhards and Neidhardt 1990). For the time being, however, the print and electronic mass media are the most important and the most consequential pillars of public spheres because entry thresholds for audience members are particularly low and societal reach is exceptionally large.

Beyond this fairly standard description of the elements and processes of mediated political communication, public spheres and public discourses are characterized by a number of less obvious and less well researched features.

(1) Each mass media forum has a specific *socio-spatial scope* that distinguishes it not only from other more specialized forums, as mentioned above, but also from mass media forums in other countries (see Peters and Wessler 2006). Historically, the nation-state has evolved as the dominant point of reference for mass media forums and, thus, for public discourse. Karl W. Deutsch, in his classic work, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Deutsch 1953), has pointed to the foundation of nations in communicative patterns. In this view, a nation is a political community sustained by intensified communicative interaction. For Deutsch the defining feature of a nation is neither a common language nor shared memories or history, but the ability of its members 'to communicate more effectively, and over a wider range of subjects with members of one large group than with outsiders' (Deutsch 1953: 97).

National public spheres, sustained by national news media, constitute the social sphere in which such communicative exchange takes place. The topics addressed originate more often from within a national forum than from the outside; and the exchange of opinions is denser within the national forum than between it and the outside. The contributions of speakers in a national public sphere relate to an

implied audience that is socio-spatially defined as a national audience (although, of course, in practice not all members of a national society will be reached by a particular contribution). Members of the audience are implicitly or explicitly addressed in their role as citizens of a nation-state because traditionally the nation-state is the dominant place of political decision and legitimation. All of these features are usually taken for granted and not explicitly acknowledged. But they come to the fore when the question of transnationalization is posed and the established socio-spatial scope of topics and communicative exchange patterns, of media reach and implied audiences is at stake.

(2) Public discourses are internally subdivided into *camps* or *discourse coalitions*. Speakers not only hold a spectrum of different opinions, they also align themselves according to these views. Discourse coalitions can form around a specific issue, but they also have a more general dimension with speakers aligning themselves according to their general ideology or 'Weltanschauung' (Peters 2007). Empirically, such alignments can be captured by analysing the preferences that speakers voice with respect to basic principles of action in a number of fundamental conflict dimensions (Eilders et al. 2004: 135; see also Voltmer 1998) or with respect to a combination of ideas and policy preferences (Wessler 1999), or with respect to the justifications that speakers give for their positions (see Chapters 6 and 7 in this book). The degree to which speakers' frames of interpretation and policy positions are actually rooted in deeper ideologies is an empirical question that cannot be answered at this point. What we can say, however, is that the members of a discourse coalition generally know of each other and share some degree of common self-identification as well as identification of the opposing camp. Discourse coalitions share a history of conflict; their contributions to public discourse are made with respect to the opposing camp and acquire meaning in the horizon of the conflict as a whole. It is an open empirical question to what degree such conflictual discourse actually serves to integrate the community as a whole (Wessler 2002). But in any case cleavages in public discourses are not just objective divisions but constellations actively produced by self- and other-identification.

(3) Most recent empirical studies (including our own) work with media content analysis in order to grasp the structures and functions of public spheres. But public discourses are not free-floating; they have socio-cultural foundations that lie behind or below observable media discourse and exert a structural influence upon it (Wessler 2007).

To characterize these foundations we distinguish between production structures on the one hand and discourse cultures on the other. The *production structures* of public spheres comprise the structures of the respective media and political system (Hallin and Mancini 2004), the deeper social and political cleavages that manifest themselves in specific constellations of speakers and discourse coalitions, as well as the system of 'idea generation' including educational and research facilities, professional and intellectual circles and networks. These structural conditions produce differential 'discursive opportunity structures' (Ferree et al. 2002) for the various types of speakers (such as governmental and party representatives, civil society and social movement actors, experts, intellectuals and ordinary citizens), which give the different types of speakers different chances of being heard in public debate. *Discourse cultures* on the other hand comprise the dominant forms of public deliberation in the news media – with more commentary and advocacy-oriented forms in some countries and a stronger tradition of neutral, balanced reporting in others (Wessler 2007; Benson and Hallin 2007) – and national cultural traditions including particular affinities and animosities between different countries.

Many of these elements still await more systematic empirical study, particularly in a comparative perspective. For a theory of the public sphere it is important, however, to ascertain the degree to which structural and cultural foundations of public discourse serve as interlocking or synergetic infrastructures. While this question cannot be answered empirically at present, in this book we start out on the assumption that the interlocking nature of these components does create considerable inertia for any transformation of public spheres, particularly for their transnationalization. Production structures and discourse cultures of national public spheres are not easily and consciously produced on a transnational level and therefore act as structural constraints to any process of transnationalization. We will come back to this aspect in our concluding chapter.

(4) Finally, media debates comprise a large quantity of factual information: reports about events and happenings on the one hand and a smaller amount of actual discussion and argumentation on the other (Peters et al. 2007a; Wessler and Schultz 2007). It is this latter element of media debates that captures most clearly the original intuition of the arena metaphor, namely, that speakers interact and exchange opinions and arguments in front of an audience. In the print media such exchange is found, for example, in commentaries,

interviews, some news analysis and background pieces, in guest contributions and letters to the editor. Some newspapers also feature special debate pages. Likewise, on the radio and television specific formats are exclusively devoted to political discussions; talk shows (some including the possibility of audience participation) being the most salient example. From the perspective of the arena model there is a lot of plausibility, therefore, in the notion of reconstructing public discourse through the analysis of discussion and opinion-oriented forms of mass media content (see, for example, Eilders et al. 2004 as well as this volume). This focus on media debate in the literal sense is not, however, tantamount to an investigation of the actual degree of deliberativeness in such debates. Deliberativeness is a feature of mediated or non-mediated debates that tells us something about the level of openness, rationality and civility of such debates (Wessler 2007). But this is not the focus of this book. When we talk about 'public *discourse*' here, we refer to the opinion and argumentation-oriented layer of political media content, irrespective of its degree of deliberativeness. A discursive public sphere in this sense generates debate by constantly drawing on new ideas from a large set of different speakers. It thereby serves an innovative function for public communication to a higher degree than the mere reporting of facts.

The transnationalization of public spheres: empirical dimensions

If national public spheres are characterized by denser interaction within the sphere than between inside and outside, as Karl W. Deutsch has suggested, how must we conceive the transnationalization of national public spheres? A natural starting point would be to look for the respective mass media forum on the transnational level. Where in Europe, for example, do we find media that address a European audience with specifically European content? We address these questions in more detail in Chapter 5 below. It is clear from the outset, however, and this has repeatedly been pointed out in the literature, that there is no European media forum comparable to the national media forums with which we are familiar. Research has instead directed its attention to detecting trends towards Europeanization – or other forms of transnationalization – in the national media forums. Instead of a truly European public sphere (EPS), researchers have been studying the Europeanization of national public spheres (ENPS). With this book we also strive to contribute to

ENPS research.[2] On a basic conceptual level our contribution is threefold. We analyse the transnationalization of public spheres as (a) a long-term process with (b) different possible socio-spatial scopes – European, transatlantic, global and so on – and (c) on a number of different dimensions.

Like all 'izations' the transnationalization of public spheres is a process – in this case a process in which national public spheres increasingly transcend national borders. Given the complexity of public spheres (described above), with a structured set of actors communicating in the foreground and production structures working from the background, the transnationalization of public spheres must be conceived as a process of *structural transformation* rather than episodic fluctuation. Of course, individual elements of a public sphere, such as media organizations or speakers or the composition or preferences of audiences, may also change independently, but public spheres as bounded wholes only change if the synergetic interplay between these elements also reaches a new state. While it is relatively easy to identify the two ideal types – the national and the transnational public sphere – the development from one to the other may be complex and uneven. Nor is it easy to decide when a new transnational constellation has been reached. However, it is obvious that the structural transformation of public spheres in the direction of transnationalization will be a long-term process. It will at best be in sync with (or it will be lagging behind) the broader internationalization of governance functions and legitimation processes that must themselves be traced over several decades. All of this suggests a rather long period of observation for any study of the transnationalization of public spheres. Most studies so far do not follow such a long-term perspective and therefore only offer snapshots of the longer process.[3]

Apart from a long time horizon and a view to structural transformations it is essential to take a third empirical element into consideration: the fact that the transnationalization of public spheres can have different *scopes*. Elements of a transnational public sphere may develop first in Europe, between the members of the European Union. And it is the Europeanization of national public spheres that has triggered the entire research field. But it is also possible that the emerging communicative space covers both Western Europe and North America, thus constituting a transatlantic public sphere of some sort. The development in this direction can then be called Westernization. Of course, other regional scopes are conceivable as well. For example, there has been much talk about the emergence of a pan-Arabic public sphere supported by the appearance of Arab satellite broadcasting in the 1990s (for example, Zayani and Ayish

2006). Finally, a further theoretical possibility lies in the emergence of a truly global public sphere, extending communication more or less over the entire globe (see Wessler 2004; Volkmer 1999; critical remarks in Sparks 1998 and 2001). Again, most of the studies in the field so far only look at Europeanization and are thus not able by way of comparison to disentangle the emergence of a Europeanized public sphere from other forms of transnationalization, particularly Westernization.[4]

A further analytical benefit can finally be reaped from the use of a comprehensive set of *dimensions* on which a possible transnationalization of public spheres can be observed. It is highly conceivable for national public spheres to transnationalize on one or a few dimensions while other dimensions lag behind or don't change at all.[5] This may lead to the detection of complex patterns of transnationalization rather than seemingly straightforward, one-dimensional trends that may actually be misleading in a wider perspective. It is fortunate that ENPS research has produced a series of different indicators in recent years, which we synthesize and complement here. The transnationalization of public spheres can thus be captured on four dimensions comprising ten sub-dimensions (see Table 1.1). They will be defined in descriptive terms here and problematized normatively in the following section.[6] Incidentally, the four dimensions capture all possible ways in which a national entity of any kind can be situated in relation to its environment. Thus, a national entity can be:

(a) related to a supranational entity (vertical-relational);
(b) compared to other national entities for similarities and differences (horizontal-comparitive);
(c) be enmeshed with those other national entities (horizontal-relational); or
(d) become part of and be absorbed into a larger whole (integrative-communal).

By including all four forms of relation in our study we avoid the pitfalls of 'methodological nationalism' (see Beck 2000b).

(1) National public spheres transnationalize, first, when European or other international *governance* processes become visible on the national level and can thus be *monitored* by citizens. This is achieved mostly through coverage and discussion in the national news media of decision-making processes in, for example, the European Union, the World Trade Organization or the United Nations. Visibility can be conferred upon the institutions and their representatives

Table 1.1 Four dimensions of the transnationalization of public spheres

Dimensions	Sub-dimensions
1. Monitoring governance	1.1 Visibility of political institutions
	1.2 Attention to policymaking
2. Discourse convergence	2.1 Convergence of relevance and problem definition
	2.2 Convergence of discourse coalitions
	2.3 Convergence of repertoires of justifications
3. Discursive integration	3.1 Mutual observation
	3.2 Discursive exchange
4. Collective identification	4.1 Acknowledgement of collectives
	4.2 Expression of belonging
	4.3 Expression of historical/cultural commonalities

(sub-dimension 1.1) and on the policies and the processes by which they are made (sub-dimension 1.2).

(2) While transnationalization in the monitoring governance dimension only provides a common supranational or transnational object or reference point for public debate, the second dimension, *discourse convergence*, also grasps whether national discourses grow more similar over time.[7] It sheds light on whether speakers in different national public spheres identify the same issues as important, accord them similar relevance and employ similar problem definitions (sub-dimension 2.1). National discourses also converge to the extent that discourse constellations become more similar over time. As we have seen above, discourses are commonly divided into two opposing discourse coalitions each made up of a particular set of actors who use specific justifications to bolster their positions. Convergence may involve either the membership of such discourse coalitions and thereby the nature and position of the cleavage line between them (sub-dimension 2.2) or it may concern the central justifications used by these coalitions (sub-dimension 2.3), or both. In the context of transnationalization processes, the discourse convergence dimension therefore enables us to ascertain whether certain overarching political cleavages (such as the left-right dividing line) become more relevant over time than national differences in discourse constellations.

(3) While the convergence dimension is about the question of growing similarity, it does not entail speakers from different

national public spheres actually talking to each other. This is captured by the *discursive integration* dimension. An integrated discourse across national borders presupposes, first, attention to political developments in other countries (mutual observation, sub-dimension 3.1) and, second, the circulation of ideas between speakers in various countries (discursive exchange, sub-dimension 3.2). At the core of discursive integration is the 'osmotic diffusion' of opinions and justifications between countries (Peters 1999: 662f.; Habermas 2001a: 120).

(4) We have seen above that communication in a public sphere always has an implied audience and thereby constructs a 'community of communication' (Habermas 2001a). Public spheres, therefore, also transnationalize to the degree that this community is a transnational one. The dimension of *collective identification* grasps different aspects of this process. Transnational collectives can simply be acknowledged (sub-dimension 4.1), speakers can express their belonging to such a collective by, for example, including themselves in a collective 'we' (sub-dimension 4.2), and they can, finally, characterize this community more elaborately by pointing to (or inventing) historical and cultural commonalities or by setting it apart from other communities, which are often devalued in the process (sub-dimension 4.3).

A Europeanized public sphere? Four normative approaches

A multi-dimensional description of transnationalization such as the one given above is something very different from a normative appraisal of these dimensions. A naive observer might think that the more, the better, that is, that the empirical values found on each of these dimensions and sub-dimensions should always be maximized in order to approach the ideal of a transnational public sphere. Some qualifications, however, are necessary and we will see that a logic of maximization is generally not appropriate. The discussion will lead to some revision of normative criteria and some prioritizing between dimensions and thus to the formulation of a set of four more complex normative approaches that help assess the normative desirability of transnationalization processes in European public spheres.[8]

The monitoring governance approach

The first of these normative approaches focuses on the democratic value of 'monitoring governance' for citizens. In order to develop legitimacy beliefs about the European Union and its decisions, citizens must be able

to inform themselves, reason about, and scrutinize EU institutions and EU policies, and thus acquire 'communicative power' (Habermas 1996) in the European multi-level system. The monitoring governance approach draws on the widespread assumption that European policymaking tends to diminish societal sources of influence while privileging national executives. Their privileged access to European information opens the way to strategically manipulating domestic policy debates (Moravcsik 1994; Zürn 2000). The monitoring governance approach therefore demands that the news media make such information accessible to citizens by discussing European institutions and their policymaking as part of their political news and commentary.

While at first sight this appears to be a straightforward demand, things become more complicated when we endeavour to determine the necessary level, development and qualitative features of such discussion. Just how much EU debate counts as an appropriate representation of EU institutions and EU policies in national public spheres? Is there an absolute quantitative threshold that public discussion about the EU must consistently exceed? Or is it enough if such a threshold is reached episodically in relation to important events such as EU summit meetings? Should EU debate increase continually over time? And if so, should it grow parallel to EU policy output or the increasing intrusion of EU decisions into citizens' lives? Finally, on which phases of the policymaking process should EU debate focus? Is it enough if it covers the implications of policy decisions after these have been taken? The existing literature has not always been clear on these points. We therefore propose a normative approach that combines the following three aspects.

First, in some parts of the literature there is a tendency to overstate demands for publicity with respect to the EU (for a similar argument, see Neidhardt 2006). While transparency of governance processes is an important normative requirement for democratic rule, not everything should be publicized at any point in time. Bargaining and decision-making processes sometimes require an element of invisibility to the outside. By this we do not mean active concealment or secrecy but functional opaqueness. In addition, Moravcsik (2002: 615) has pointed out that 'of the five most salient issues in most West European democracies – health care provision, education, law and order, pension and social security policy, and taxation – none is primarily an EU competence'. Majone (1998: 10) has also pointed to the legal and material limitations of EU policymaking: 'The Community has no general taxing and spending powers similar to those held by national governments; and with a budget of less than 1.3 per cent of Union GDP which, moreover, must always be

balanced, it can only undertake a limited range of policies.' All of this suggests that it would be inappropriate to expect a level of media attention for the EU that equals that of national governments. It would also be acceptable if media attention were lower for those policy fields in which the EU enjoys fewer decision-making powers. In fact, Koopmans and Erbe (2003) as well as Pfetsch (2004) record such a match between EU competencies in a specific policy field and the level of media attention, which seems normatively unproblematic. In any case, the normative standard for the level of monitoring EU governance should be lower than for the nation-state in order to account for the still somewhat limited scope of its policymaking powers.

Second, public discourse should not only reflect the peculiarities of the polity but also its development over time. The monitoring governance approach suggests that we should expect an increase over time in the level of EU debate because the competencies of the EU have been successively expanded. Several standards of comparison may qualify here, including the quantitative development of the legal output of the EU, the adoption of more conflict-inducing institutional arrangements (such as the strengthening of the European Parliament or the expansion of qualified majority decisions), and the adoption of more controversial policies, such as Eastern enlargement, that are likely to exacerbate distributional conflicts and trigger identity debates. All these developments encourage the normative expectation that the level of monitoring EU governance in national media should rise over time. Otherwise monitoring will fall (or has fallen) out of sync with the growing importance and impact of EU governance.

Finally, the monitoring governance approach will have to take into consideration the extent of domestication of EU issues, that is, the degree to which EU policies are reported with respect to their domestic effects only. In normative terms, monitoring governance implies that EU policymaking and decision-making processes are publicly discussed, rather than simply reported ex post facto. Otherwise no input legitimacy is conferred from public discourse on decisions taken at the EU level. While this may not be considered necessary for all decisions in all policy areas, a complete absence of the policy formulation and contestation from monitoring by the media would indeed pose a problem.

Once the national news media's discussion of the European Union is normatively evaluated in such complex terms, empirical analysis is unlikely to produce clear-cut results concerning the existence or nonexistence of a European public sphere and a more nuanced appraisal becomes possible.

The discourse convergence approach

The second normative approach supplements the monitoring governance function of the national news media with different aspects of *discourse convergence*. It is not enough for the national media to discuss EU issues; rather, the same issues should be discussed simultaneously in several or all EU countries (see Eder and Kantner 2000: 315). According to the discourse convergence approach, national debates should thus be synchronized and homogenized with respect to the relevance criteria employed. The meaning of 'relevance' or 'relevance criteria' is, however, ambiguous. Habermas's original formulation, to which Eder and Kantner refer, reads: 'The core [of a European communicative context] is formed by a political public sphere which enables citizens to take positions at the same time on the same topics of the same relevance' (Habermas 1998: 160).[9] Here the relevance of topics, that is, the level of attention they arouse, is supposed to be equal or similar in the various national public spheres. Yet Eder and Kantner (2000) as well as Risse (2002), Tobler (2006) and others go a decisive step further: they require public discourses to look at such topics with similar *criteria* of relevance, that is a similar or identical framing or problem definition. For instance, in 1999, debates over the European Commission's corruption scandals were equally intense but framed differently in Germany and Spain. Trenz (2000) finds that Germans framed the issue predominantly as a moral problem, indicating the democratic deficit in the EU, whereas in Spain the issue was linked to the conflict between northern and southern member states over restructuring EU structural funds in the course of the enlargement process (also see the case studies in van de Steeg 2005). Such contradictory framing, it is argued, points to the absence of discourse convergence.

As with monitoring governance, these normative standards are ambiguous. The concepts of 'relevance criteria' or 'frames' carry an element of indeterminacy: the more specifically and concretely frames are defined, the harder it will be to find convergence; the more abstractly the frames are conceived, the more similarities will emerge, attended by the danger of overrating homogeneity. Furthermore, it is not entirely obvious why the same frames must underlie debates in different European countries at all. Is it not natural for public discourse on the same issue to take on different perspectives across countries, reflecting particular circumstances and historical experiences? To avoid applying an unnecessarily demanding standard, the possibility that individual countries diverge from the mainstream in their framing of an issue should be acknowledged as consistent with the discourse convergence approach.

A more realistic version of the approach should put stronger emphasis on the structural rather than on the deeply substantive aspects of national public discourses, evoking a standard of *completeness*: all frames that exist in national public spheres should be present in the other national public spheres as well (Peters and Wessler 2006). Frames may enjoy different prominence in different national contexts, but national media should take note of frames used in other countries.[10]

A similar argument applies to the similarity or dissimilarity of the national *discourse constellations*. As we have seen above, discourses are commonly divided into two opposing discourse coalitions, each made up of a particular set of actors who share the same general interpretation or ideology, or use the same sets of arguments to justify their positions vis-à-vis the opposing camp. If such constellations of national discourses become more similar across countries, discourse convergence increases. This convergence may involve either the membership of discourse coalitions or the central frames or justifications used by them, or both. Again, however, the normative question is whether and why national discourse constellations should be maximally similar in the first place. Of course, given a certain similarity in the cleavage structure and in the arguments used by the coalitions, speakers are more likely to understand each other well across borders and engage in a truly common discourse. But an overdose of homogeneity also reduces the necessary variety of arguments available to the same coalitions in different countries. In normative terms it would seem more desirable for speakers from one discourse coalition to learn about new or additional justifications from their colleagues in other countries than that coalitions in various countries use an identical, limited set of justifications. Or for speakers to learn that in another country an identical issue is discussed with a different cleavage structure, thus learning about additional ways of looking at their issue. The normative merits of homogeneity are thus more limited than those of variety, innovation and learning, although, of course, discourse convergence and cross-border learning are not mutually exclusive or contradictory processes. But our emphasis on learning redirects attention to mutual observation and discursive exchange between discourse coalitions from different countries. This brings us to the third normative approach, which places the dimension of discursive integration centre stage.

The discursive integration approach

The discursive integration approach takes account of the socio-spatial scope that characterizes every public sphere. If a European public sphere

is to emerge, it must span the entire continent, or at least major parts of it (see Wimmel 2005; Peters and Wessler 2006; Peters et al. 2005b; Tobler 2006). In principle, monitoring governance can take place in 'separate compartments', constituting a segmented form of Europeanization, but truly European public discourses and the emergence of a common European process of opinion formation presuppose mutual observation between European countries, as well as actual discursive exchange across borders. Discursive integration includes opinions and justifications from other European discourses in domestic discourses, where they can serve as reference points for the formulation of one's own positions. This is normatively desirable for several reasons. First, Koopmans and Erbe (2003: 4) rightly point out that 'in an intergovernmental polity, it may matter a great deal who wins the elections in another member state, or what kind of new policy another member state develops in a particular policy field'. Thus, opinions expressed and decisions taken in one European country can become consequential for other countries and for the EU as a whole, as was amply demonstrated by the French and Dutch rejections of the European Constitution in 2005. Second, ideas and arguments from other countries can enrich public discourse by injecting 'fresh blood' into sometimes rather predictable national debates, thus supporting discourse innovation. Third, knowing about opinions and arguments from other member states can, under favourable conditions, foster mutual understanding, a reconciliation of interests, the willingness to compromise, and cross-border solidarity. Thus, discursive integration helps overcome national solipsism and self-centredness (compare Scharpf 1999: 688).

But, again, the normative standard of discursive integration need not and should not be taken to its logical extreme. An extreme criterion would entail that, regardless of where a particular media outlet is located in the transnational sphere, the distribution of countries observed and speakers quoted in its content would not differ from those in other media located elsewhere. Obviously, such a standard is not only entirely unrealistic but would also disregard the normative merits of diversity already identified above in the context of the discourse convergence approach. We therefore settle for a standard of scope, namely that the countries observed and speakers quoted in each country span the entire sphere – in our case the EU member states – or at least major parts of it. In addition, we normatively expect that discursive integration increases over time because the political and economic interdependence between the countries of the European Union has intensified and expanded to more and more policy areas during the past decades. In order to keep up with this growing interdependence national media should increasingly

construct transnational discourses that are not restricted to speakers from two or three EU countries but tend to include all or most of them.

The collective identification approach

Common European identity elements are often considered a fundamental building block of democratic legitimacy. The fourth normative approach builds on this idea, supplementing mutual observation and discursive exchange with some degree of collective identification with Europe.[11] In doing so, the collective identification approach is not concerned with prescribing one particular substance of European identity as preferable to others but rather with the process of publicly identifying with Europe as such. Collective identities cannot emerge, persist and gradually change if they are not publicly displayed and discussed. They are, in part, constructed and reproduced through discourse about the 'collective self-understandings' that constitute an integral part of public culture (see Peters 2005: 92). As discussed above, the formation of collective identity has several aspects: Which community is addressed by communications? Which collectivity is invoked as the 'owner' of a problem and called upon to solve or handle it? And which values, historical experiences and traditions are evoked in public discourse?

Theorists disagree about the normative significance of the third aspect, and in particular on the degree to which the EU's legitimacy depends on a 'thick' collective identity with a strong sense of common history and a common purpose (see, for example, Kielmansegg 2003). Is an 'identity light', namely 'some minimum sense of belonging to the same community', adequate to the job, as Risse (2003: 8) has suggested? If transnational identity constructs develop, they do so under somewhat aggravated conditions because their historical depth has to be constructed with greater conscious effort. It is therefore unrealistic to demand historically rich identities from transnational public discourses; it is more sensible to expect a restricted sense of transnational identity related to a discourse community faced with common problems. Ultimately, however, the question of a normatively adequate European identity will depend on the extent and character of political competencies entrusted to the EU:

> What kind of shared identity would suffice to support a European political community with vastly extended political competencies depends on somewhat uncertain empirical estimates. This question cannot be settled by normative arguments. Probably only some

> process of trial and error with a close watch on errors and more positive experiences and an open mind towards both possibilities and limitations can be helpful here. The same is true for the relationship between national identities and a common European identity. (Peters 2005: 114)

At the present stage of development, we settle for a more moderate standard of collective identification as our normative yardstick, focusing on notions of a problem-solving community rather than on a community engendering deep forms of solidarity across national borders.

Of course, our discussion and partial revision of the normative standards found in the literature does not yield clear, quantifiable standards in all cases. In normatively evaluating our empirical results, there is still some room for interpretation and argumentation, and we will return to this endeavour in the concluding chapter. However, we wish to emphasize two things here. First, all four normative approaches presented here point to important normative elements. We do not see any good reasons why normative debate about the Europeanization or transnationalization of public spheres should be restricted to monitoring governance only, or to monitoring governance and discourse convergence. Discursive integration and (modest) collective identification touch on important normative merits of public discourses that should not be discarded lightly. Second, the normative standards for all four dimensions need not – and should not – be taken to their logical extremes. There are good reasons why less-than-maximum levels of Europeanization or transnationalization on these dimensions are normatively justified. If one accepts this, one can indeed avoid creating deficit statements by default. Some seemingly incomplete forms of transnationalization may indeed do the job in a specific historical situation.

The road ahead: the chapters of this book

In the following chapters we will build on the theoretical outline presented here and develop our empirical study step by step. Chapter 2 details how we empirically measure the transnationalization of public debates across the four dimensions and 10 sub-dimensions distinguished above. It describes the methods used in our study – the cross-issue content analysis and the issue-specific case studies – and details our choice of countries and issues, the periods of investigation, and the sampling methods used.

Chapters 3 and 4 then present the results of our long-term, cross-issue content analysis of leading newspapers in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany and Great Britain. Chapter 3 looks at the Europeanization process diachronically, identifying as our main result a complex pattern of nationally segmented Europeanization with increases on some of our dimensions but not on others. In Chapter 4, the perspective is reversed from diachronic to synchronic and country differences in the levels of Europeanization are identified and explained by a complex set of both political and media variables. This results in a clearer picture of the leverage that media outlets have in determining their respective levels of Europeanization.

Chapter 5 provides a typology of transnational media in Europe – national media with a transnational mission, international, pan-regional and global media – and assesses the degree to which these media contribute to the construction of a European public sphere.

In Chapters 6 and 7 we present the results of our issue-specific case studies. Analysis focuses on the Europeanization of national discourses about military interventions from the Gulf war 1990/1991 through the Balkan conflicts in the mid-1990s to the Iraq war in 2003 (Chapter 6) as well as the debates about genetically modified food in Europe since the early 1990s (Chapter 7). These case studies provide an in-depth understanding of the similarity and (partial) convergence of national public debates, but also shed additional light on the dimensions of discursive integration and collective identification already analysed in the cross-issue study.

In Chapter 8 we summarize our empirical results and assess the pattern and process of the Europeanization of national public spheres in the light of the normative considerations presented above. In doing so we identify both progress made and persisting deficits in the Europeanization of national media. In conclusion, we position our own study vis-à-vis other approaches in the field and present an integrative heuristic model for the further study of the way in which public spheres transnationalize.

2
Analysing Europeanization: the Research Framework

In the previous chapter we developed a complex and multifarious model of the transnationalization of public spheres from both an empirical and a normative viewpoint. But how can such an ambitious model be translated into empirical research? The following chapter answers this question by describing and explaining the research design we employed to measure the transnationalization of public spheres. The first part of the chapter shows how the overall design of our research scheme addressed the three main conceptual challenges inherent in our model. This research scheme consisted of two separate but closely related empirical studies – a major cross-issue, quantitative content analysis of media debates, and two issue-specific qualitative and quantitative case-studies – which will be described in detail in the second part of the chapter.

Three methodological challenges

We consider the transnationalization of public spheres as (a) a long-term process with (b) different possible socio-spatial extensions – European, transatlantic, global and so on – that (c) takes place on a number of different dimensions. Any empirical analysis of the transnationalization of public spheres therefore needs to address these three theoretical considerations systematically.

Transnationalization as a long-term process

As discussed in the previous chapter, we conceive the transnationalization of public spheres as a gradual, long-term process. It develops over time rather than just at certain instances in time. It might be spurred by media events, political scandals or topical issues (Trenz 2002), but the effects of such events on Europeanization might equally die down

soon afterwards without leaving an imprint on the long-term development of public spheres. In the case of Europeanization, we know from previous research that there were indeed relatively high levels of Europeanized media discussion in certain EU-focused debates, such as the discussion about the participation of Jörg Haider's populist party in the Austrian government (Risse and van de Steeg 2003), the introduction of the euro (Law et al. 2000; de Vreese et al. 2001), EU enlargement (van de Steeg 2002) and the 'corruption scandal' of the Commission in 1999 (Trenz 2002; Meyer 1999). However, what we have not yet established is whether these peaks in Europeanized debate were simply ephemeral phenomena or whether they had a more permanent impact on the structure of public spheres and possibly led to a general Europeanization of public debates.[1] In contrast to most other studies, we will analyse the process of Europeanization in a longitudinal perspective, starting as early as 1982. This enables us to analyse whether relatively high degrees of Europeanism, as they have been found for instance for the year 2000 by Trenz (2004), are the result of a temporary transformation of public debates, or represent a permanent feature of public discourse. Furthermore, the long-term perspective helps us to assess whether the development of public spheres is indeed out of sync with the increasing transfer of political decision-making to the EU level as the 'publicity lag' hypothesis suggests (Gerhards 2001). To what degree does the Europeanization of public spheres go hand in hand with European integration as it has developed with the common market, the Maastricht Treaty and the common currency? This question can only be addressed through a longitudinal research design.[2]

Three qualities of the transnationalization process: scope, trend and level

We understand Europeanization as only one of several possible forms of transnationalization of public spheres. The scope of the transformed public spheres may turn out to be European, but it could also include the entire Western world. Based on these considerations, a research design for an empirical analysis of the transnationalization process has to fulfil two main requirements: (a) its basic set-up should have no systematic impact on the possible scope of transnationalization to be observed in the study and (b) the results for the different scopes should be compared systematically.

(a) To satisfy the first requirement, the design of our study encompasses all possible issues and topics of political discourse. Unlike most other

studies in the ENPS research field, we have not chosen specific EU issues or policies as the material for our research. This enables us not only to study transnationalization as a long-term process (which would have been impossible when focusing, say, on the launch of the euro or other isolated issues), but also ensures that the scope of the process is not already determined by the selected cases. Choosing EU integration as a case study would have made the Europeanization of the public debates a far more likely result than Westernization. Therefore our first study – the cross-issue content analysis of public discourses – includes articles on all political topics in order to give us a more comprehensive picture of the development of public debates. The two issue-specific case studies that form the second part of our research design also follow this logic. They cover issues in which the EU plays a certain role, but not an exclusive one. This allows us to put the Europeanization of public spheres into perspective by comparing it with other forms of transnationalization such as, for instance, Westernization.

(b) In order to facilitate a systematic comparison we distinguish three different qualities of transnationalization: scope, trend and level. In their work on 'Global Transformations', Held et al. (1999: 14–21) proposed analysing processes of global transformations along four spatio-temporal dimensions, two of which are particularly useful for our purpose: the geographical extent and the intensity of transnationalization. We refer to the first as the socio-spatial scope of transnationalization and to the second as its trend. As a further relevant aspect for measuring Europeanization we include the level of transnational communication achieved.

The first quality of transnationalization refers to the *scope* of cross-border interconnectedness. It answers the question as to the geographical expansion of transnationalization. Are we really witnessing the Europeanization of public spheres, or are public attention and transnational communicative exchange actually extending beyond Europe into a Western or possibly even global public sphere? Measuring the scope of transnationalization helps us avoid overestimating the effects of the EU on the transformation of public spheres by taking into account the fact that European integration might not be the only possible trigger for the transformation of public spheres. International communication studies show that new communication technologies, international news agencies, and the growing importance of international, often US-based, media corporations might also generate transnational communicative

flows, albeit with a global, or rather Western, scope (Held et al. 1999; Beisheim et al. 1999; Boyd-Barrett and Rantanen 1998). Geopolitical developments such as the end of the Cold War and US hegemony, as well as the threat of international terrorism, might further contribute to a growing attention to public discourse beyond the narrower confines of EU-Europe.

In our analyses, we systematically search for indications of two alternative patterns of transnationalization, namely Europeanization and Westernization. If communication within Europe alone increases, then we are witnessing the Europeanization of public spheres. If we find a parallel increase in transatlantic communicative exchange, then we have a case of Westernization. We take the US as a rough indicator for the latter. Discursive articles focusing on the US, quotations from US speakers and references to 'the West' as a collective identity are interpreted as instances of Westernization. We further have to take into account the prospect of wider or even global processes of transnationalization (for example by references to 'the World' as a collective identity) as well as the possibility that there might be no transnationalization at all.

The *trend* towards transnationalization refers to the processual character of Europeanization and its supposedly growing amplitude. It answers the question as to the strength of the development towards an EPS. Following a suggestion by Michael Zürn, we assess the trend towards Europeanization in relative terms, 'as the extent of cross-border transactions relative to transactions taking place within national borders' (Zürn 2000: 187; see also Zürn 1998: 76). In this way we systematically compare the trend towards Europeanization with national developments in the same dimension of transnationalization and during the same period. This allows us to evaluate whether we are actually witnessing a process of Europeanization or some other kind of transformation. For example, the increasing attention of the media to EU policymaking might not just be an outcome of Europeanization; it could also be a consequence of politicization if the media generally report more on (domestic, European or international) politics. Only if the proportion of articles focusing on the EU (more or less) steadily increases over time will we observe a (more or less) robust process of Europeanization. In technical terms, the trend towards Europeanization is represented by the slope of the Europeanization curve.

The third quality of transnationalization refers to the *level* of Europeanization already achieved. In contrast to the trend, it does not refer to the process of Europeanization, but to its outcome. It answers the question of how relevant the Europeanization of public spheres actually

is. We might find an intensive trend towards transnationalization; if it remains at a low level, however, it will hardly amount to a noticeable transformation of public spheres, although this might happen in the future. The level tells us whether, say, the emergence of a European public identity is in a nascent stage (if it has remained at a low level) or whether it is already a relevant factor for the transformation of public spheres in Europe. As with the trend towards Europeanization, we assess the level in relative terms. In Chapter 3, which discusses 'Segmented Europeanization', we compare the overall level of Europeanization to the level of domestic references. For instance, we put the degree of identification with Europe or public attention to EU policymaking into perspective by comparing each with the respective domestic levels of national identification and public attention to domestic politics. We do not assume that the Europeanization of public spheres necessarily requires the same intensity of cross-border communication as domestic communication. But comparing the two helps us to evaluate the relevance of achieved levels of transnationalization.

Transnationalization as a multi-dimensional phenomenon

Finally, and equally important, we use a multi-dimensional framework for analysing public spheres and their transformations. While it is now widely accepted among scholars that we should conceive of the European public sphere not as a unified public sphere but as a transnational communication compound that emerges out of the Europeanization of various national public spheres, there is still disagreement on how to conceptualize Europeanization. Is the orientation of public discourses towards the EU the crucial indicator, as Gerhards (2001) suggests? Are Eder and Kantner (2000) right when they claim that a common European 'frame of reference' in domestic EU debates is the benchmark for Europeanization? Or should we instead conceive of Europeanization in terms of intensified 'discursive interaction' between different countries (van de Steeg 2002, 2005), or the emergence of a European 'identity light' (Risse 2003)? Our approach does not attempt to resolve this dispute, but acknowledges that Europeanization and transnationalization in general can take on different patterns and qualities. As elaborated in detail in the previous chapter, we conceptualize transnationalization as a multi-dimensional process that in one way or another extends public discourse beyond national borders. These dimensions are *monitoring governance*, *discourse convergence*, *discursive integration* and *collective identification*. Public discourses might gradually extend into a European sphere in some dimensions, but remain bound to the 'national

constellation' (Habermas 2001b) in others. In contrast to the selectivity of other studies, the multi-dimensional approach thus provides a valuable bonus in that it offers a comprehensive account of the transformation of public spheres in Europe while avoiding the pitfalls of exaggeration or downplaying the current form and degree of Europeanization.

The measurement of each of our four dimensions of the transnationalization of public spheres requires specific tools and methods. While the visibility of EU (or other international) institutions can be ascertained by counting the number of references to any of these institutions, the convergence of discourse coalitions cannot be measured by a simple word count. We therefore carried out two discrete but interrelated empirical studies each of which is tailored to analyse a specific set of dimensions or aspects of these dimensions. The two studies were conducted separately and their results are presented in different chapters (for the first study see Chapters 3 and 4, for the second study see Chapters 6 and 7). However, their design is built on the same conceptual foundations, so that all results contribute to the same general picture provided in the synopsis in the conclusion. It is here that the multi-dimensionality of our research framework unfolds into a comprehensive account of the transformation of public spheres in Europe.

A complex design for a complex question: a close-up of the two studies

The overall research design for our analysis of the transnationalization of public spheres is composed of two empirical studies. The first is a longitudinal cross-issue, quantitative content analysis of political debate in quality newspapers. The second study consists of two issue-centred, qualitative and quantitative case studies, one on the legitimacy of military interventions, the other on genetically modified food. The design of both projects is presented in greater detail below.

Cross-issue quantitative content analysis

The first study, the quantitative cross-issue analysis, seeks to assess the overall development and transformation of media discourses in Europe. In line with the conceptual challenges inherent in our theoretical model, the project has a long-term perspective. Starting in 1982, it proceeds in seven-year steps up to 2003. Our dates of inquiry thus follow the integration steps of the EU: 1982 was a time of standstill and 'Eurosclerosis'; in 1989 the Single European Act (1987) establishing the common market

gave a fresh impetus to integration; in 1996 the Maastricht Treaty (1992) brought the EU into being as a political union; finally, in 2003, the euro, common currency and everyday symbol of European integration, made its way into the pockets of most Europeans.

Furthermore, while most ENPS studies narrow down their sample to EU articles, our data set has a broader scope. It includes all articles in the political sections of newspapers, covering not just European topics, but all areas of political discourse. Since we are specifically interested in the transnationalization of public *discourses*, however, our sample encompasses only discursive articles, that is, articles with a high discursive content, as explained in the previous chapter. Instead of analysing the degree of discursiveness of each article, we developed general criteria for sampling discursive articles (for a detailed description see Appendix 2). Discursive articles include editorials and editorial page opinion articles, political columns, interviews, and contributions from external authors such as intellectuals, politicians or experts, as well as a range of other non op-ed articles and pieces which analyse, interpret, argue or justify topics rather than simply reporting news. For sampling the articles we used the method of constructed weeks, in which sample dates are stratified by day of the week: that is for each year we sampled all newspaper articles of two randomly selected Mondays, two Tuesdays, and so on. In contrast to natural weeks, constructed weeks are less prone to distortions arising out of specific events such as political scandals and topical issues. They thus provide us with representative data on the overall development of public discourses rather than on single events. Riffe et al. (1993) furthermore have shown that two constructed weeks per year are most efficient for obtaining a representative sample of a year's media content.

All empirical analysis faces the problem of resource limitation. Rather than examining all media in all European countries, we have to rely on a representative selection. Our sample includes a broad range of countries, but the cross-issue analysis narrows the sample down to one quality newspaper per country. The five countries in our sample are Austria, Denmark, France, Germany and Great Britain. This selection ensures that we have enough variance for explaining differences between countries and identifying the factors that contribute to a Europeanization of public spheres (Chapter 4). We include small and large countries (Austria/Denmark vs Germany), founder members of the EU and latecomers (France/Germany vs Austria) and countries whose populations identify to varying degrees with Europe (Great Britain/Denmark vs France/Germany). Our focus on quality newspapers

is based on the assumption that quality papers generally tend to be more outward-oriented than regional papers and tabloids (Pfetsch 2005). Their readership tends to be more interested in international news, and quality newspapers therefore have a greater interest and more resources to invest in obtaining news and opinions from other countries. Thus one can assume that the transnationalization of discourses of any kind is likelier to evolve here than in the tabloid press or in regional papers. We therefore suggest that if we find no evidence of a significant trend towards transnationalization in quality papers, we are even less likely to find any such evidence in the other media.[3]

Analysing just one newspaper per country is certainly an uncommon step. Usually, media analyses include at least two newspapers which roughly represent the political spectrum of a country's media system, that is one centre-left newspaper and one centre-right paper, and for our second study we shall follow this established approach (see below). For the quantitative cross-issue study however, we performed a pre-test to determine how the political orientation of newspapers might affect the dimensions to be analysed. We sampled two newspapers per country for one constructed week in 1996 and compared the results for all our indicators. It turned out that the respective political orientation of the newspapers had no systematic impact on the indicators used in the cross-issue study; the differences were rather small and mostly not significant. Therefore the sample was reduced to one quality newspaper per country regardless of its political orientation. In the few instances in which the differences were significant we chose the more transnationalized or Europeanized newspaper, for example *Le Monde* in France rather than *Le Figaro*. This decision was based on the rationale of beginning our research with the parts of the public sphere where transnationalization was most likely to occur (that is in the quality press).[4]

Table 2.1 summarizes the design of the quantitative cross-issue analysis and gives an account of our sample size. Through the method of constructed weeks, we obtained an overall number of 3059 articles, which were then coded by eight coders. A reliability test on the basis of 100 randomly selected articles from the *FAZ*, *Die Presse* and *The Times* showed satisfying results for all variables.[5] The results of the cross-issue analysis are presented in Chapters 3 and 4.

The quantitative cross-issue study is used to generate data on indicators for three of our four dimensions, monitoring governance, discursive integration and collective identification. The dimensions and sub-dimensions have already been introduced in Chapter 1; however, the specific indicators will be discussed in more detail in the following

Table 2.1 Design of the quantitative cross-issue study

Countries/newspapers	Germany (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, FAZ*) France (*Le Monde*) Great Britain (*The Times*) Denmark (*Politiken*) Austria (*Die Presse*)
Period of analysis	Two constructed weeks in the years 1982 1989 1996 2003
Articles	All discursive articles in the political section, including: editorials/commentaries analyses and background articles interviews contributions by external authors further discursive articles
Sample size	3059 articles (*FAZ*: 769, *Le Monde*: 534, *The Times*: 598, *Die Presse*: 604 and *Politiken*: 554)
Indicators and their reliability (Cohen's kappa)	Institutions mentioned (0.79) Policy focus (0.75) Geographical focus (0.80) Discursive references (0.70) Collectives mentioned (0.71) 'We' references (0.67)

paragraphs. Table 2.2 provides an overview of the dimensions, as well as the corresponding research questions and indicators for both empirical projects.[6]

The dimension of monitoring EU governance is measured by the share of discursive articles in which the EU or one of its institutions (for example the Commission or the European Parliament) is mentioned, as well as by the share of articles that focus on EU policymaking as their major subject, that is in the headline or first paragraph. While the first indicator gives us an idea of the relevance of the EU and its institutions in public debates, the second indicator captures the degree to which EU governance and policymaking are actually in the focus of public attention and thus subject to public scrutiny. In that way, we measure not just the size, but also the quality of the EU's 'publicity gap'. High levels of monitoring EU governance on the first indicator might only be a manifestation of 'banal Europeanism' (Cram 2001; Trenz 2004, 2006),

Table 2.2 Measuring the transnationalization of public spheres

Dimensions	Sub-dimensions	Indicators (and descriptions/examples)	Chapters
1. Monitoring governance (→ cross-issue study)	Visibility of political institutions	Institutions mentioned (for example the EU and its institutions)	3, 4
	Attention to policymaking	Policy focus (for example EU policymaking as main subject of an article)	3, 4
2. Discourse convergence (→ issue-specific case studies)	Convergence of relevance and problem definition	Issue attention (relative number of articles on the respective issue)	6, 7
		Frames (main frames referred to in public debates)	
	Convergence of discourse coalitions	Cleavage structure (strength of pro and contra coalitions)	
		Types of speakers (membership structure of pro and contra coalitions)	6, 7
	Convergence of repertoires of justifications	Justifications (given by speakers for their position on the respective issue)	6, 7
3. Discursive integration (→ cross-issue study)	Mutual observation	Geographical focus (for example other European countries as main subject of an article)	3, 4
	Discursive exchange	Discursive references (direct and indirect quotations from foreign actors)	3, 4
		Discursive contributions (foreign actors in interviews or as guest authors)	
4. Collective identification (→ cross-issue study and issue-specific case studies)	Acknowledgement of collective	Collectives mentioned (for example references to 'the Europeans')	3, 4
	Expressions of belonging	'We' references (such as 'we Europeans')	3, 4 6, 7
	Expressions of historical/cultural commonalities	Markers of collective identities (such as 'European values' and 'history')	6, 7

where EU institutions are frequently mentioned, but do not come under closer scrutiny. Normative criteria of public debates specified in democratic theory would only be fulfilled if Europeanization not only grew in the background of public debates but actually moved to the centre of attention. However, our indicators are sensitive enough to register even such 'trace elements of new developments' as well as to distinguish them from transformations at the core of public spheres (Neidhardt 2006: 48). The indicators for other possible scopes of transnationalization in the dimension of monitoring governance were also used, for example the mentioning of Western institutions such as NATO or the OECD was coded as an indicator of Westernization.

Our third dimension of discursive integration is characterized on the one hand by the mutual observation of EU countries, and on the other by the exchange of opinions, arguments and ideas among them. The first aspect is measured by counting the share of articles focusing on (that is introducing in the headline or first paragraph) the affairs of other EU countries. By establishing how often media discuss the domestic politics of other EU countries, we can ascertain whether Europe as a community of countries rather than the EU as an institution has become a unit of public attention.

While most scholars agree that some kind of communicative linkage between national public spheres is an important feature of the Europeanization of public spheres, there is widespread dissent on how to conceptualize this dimension. Eder and Kantner (2000: 315) argue that national public spheres are already integrated transnationally if 'the same issues are debated at the same time with the same criteria of relevance'. We certainly agree that this kind of similarity of public debates facilitates mutual understanding (see the dimension of discourse convergence below), but we hold that it measures the 'connectivability' of public spheres rather than their actual 'connectivity' (Trenz 2004: 292). The Europub project, by contrast, operationalizes discursive exchange as cross-border claims-making (Koopmans 2004: 6 passim). From this angle, the more domestic actors explicitly address or refer to actors or policies in another member state or the EU, the more Europeanized public spheres are. However, if, say, a German politician addresses the British Prime Minister we cannot be sure that the German statement really gets through to the British Prime Minister. Thus, we do not know whether a transnational flow of communication actually takes place. To avoid this lacuna, our method of measurement focuses on listening rather than speaking, and on receiving rather than sending opinions and judgements across national borders. We assume that the more the media circulate

opinions and arguments from external actors, the more transnationalized national public spheres are. An elementary form of transnational circulation is the reception of arguments from foreign actors and reference to them in newspaper articles by quotation or otherwise, be it in agreement or opposition. As quotations were only coded if they were part of a debate (and not if speakers were quoted as part of mere news items) we termed them 'discursive references'.

Another important form of communication beyond national borders is the wholesale importation of cultural products or contributions, such as media contributions by foreign authors or interviews with actors from other countries. Hence, Europeanization was measured here as the share of citations or complete contributions from speakers from other European countries in the overall context of political discussion.

Our fourth dimension, collective identification, is by far the most difficult to operationalize. The problem here is how to transform a complex and heuristic concept such as collective identification into a research design that strives to draw up a reliable, systematic comparison between countries. How can we narrow down the interpretative leeway of individual coders to a reliable level without reducing the concept to an empty shell? On the one hand, we borrowed from linguists and used signifiers of collective identities as well as pronouns as indicators (see for example Wodak et al. 1998; de Cillia et al. 1999; Íñigo-Mora 2004). Signifiers are references to 'the Europeans' or, say, 'the Germans', and indicate to what degree the collective identity of Europe is acknowledged. The use of pronouns such as 'we' Europeans, by contrast, is a stronger indicator. It captures whether and to what degree a sense of belonging to the same community of communication is emerging. If somebody says 'we', she not only acknowledges that a collective entity exists, but also identifies with it. 'We' references do not necessarily indicate a deep form of collective identification, but rather some kind of 'identity light' (Risse 2003), as discussed in the previous chapter. They indicate that actors in public discourse argue from a participant's perspective rather than merely as uninvolved observers (Eder and Kantner 2000). If a speaker says 'we' he acknowledges that the issue discussed concerns 'us' as members of a common community (Trenz 2004: 308).

Issue-specific qualitative and quantitative case studies

The second empirical study of our research scheme consists of two issue-centred case studies: one on the legitimacy of military interventions and the other on genetically modified food. These case studies were developed on the one hand to analyse the dimension of discourse

convergence, measuring the similarity of issue relevance, of problem definitions, cleavage structures and repertoires of justification. On the other hand they also provide more information on the dimension of collective identification, delving deeper into the expressions of belonging and of historical or cultural commonalities than the cross-issue study can. In order to analyse these two cases we draw on qualitative as well as quantitative methods of text analysis and combine them into what we call a systematic comparative text analysis. Before we elaborate the method in detail, we shall first describe the principal outline of the two case studies.

In order to keep our analyses of the transformation of public spheres comparable, the design of the case studies follows the same logic as the cross-issue study: it is long-term, and includes the same countries and newspapers. However, while we found that the political orientation of newspapers had no significant effect on the indicators of the first study – it neither made a difference for monitoring EU governance and discursive integration nor for the degree of collective identification with Europe – it does have an effect on the normative structure of public discourses and their convergences. For the two issue-specific case studies, which focus on this dimension of transnationalization, we therefore include two newspapers per country, each representing one side of the political spectrum.

As already explained above, it was central to the purpose of our research to choose issues that are not 'European' per se. In contrast to topics such as, for instance, the European Constitution or the common currency, which suggest a European focus almost by definition, military interventions and genetic engineering can be discussed from a national, a European or a broader transnational perspective. The EU has some say, but domestic politics as well as international organizations such as the UN, NATO, and WTO also play a role. Both issues therefore allowed us to maintain our research focus on the question of whether media debates display a pattern of Europeanization, national self-centredness or of a broader transnationalization and Westernization. Moreover, in contrast to short-lived events such as the European Commission's 'corruption scandal' or the debate over the participation of a right-wing populist party in Austrian government, both issues have been on the public agenda for years and can hence be analysed over time. The debate over the legitimacy of military interventions gained a fresh impetus in the 1990s with the breakdown of the Soviet Union, which changed the situation in which interventions were mainly debated in terms of East-West conflict and paved the way for new justifications for the use of

force in shaping world politics. The two interventions in Iraq in 1991 and 2003, as well as the interventions in the Balkans in 1995 (Bosnia) and 1999 (Kosovo), added further fuel to the debate over the use of force, its legitimacy, and the role of Europe as a military power in world politics. Genetically modified food also gained prominence on the public agenda in the course of the 1990s, as the result of a series of conflicts between the United States, the WTO and the EU on the regulation of biotechnology, and in response to growing consumer awareness and protests.

While both case studies thus fit into our overall long-term, broad issue framework, their particularities reveal important insights into a core question of EPS research: What difference does EU integration make for the Europeanization of public spheres? From this angle, military interventions are a particularly 'hard case' for studying processes of Europeanization. A common European security and defence strategy has only existed since 2000. Moreover, as an intergovernmental policy area it is located in the second pillar of the EU. European security policy is thus basically a matter of cooperation between sovereign nation-states. Supranational institutions such as the European Commission and the Parliament have only very limited competencies. In the area of military interventions, Europe as a point of reference, for example, for collective identification, therefore competes with the concept of national sovereignty on the one hand, and with the transatlantic security community with the United States and NATO on the other.

By contrast, the regulation of genetically modified food belongs to the first pillar of the EU, which is characterized by a strong role of supranational institutions and the pooled sovereignty of member states. In this area, the EU also acts as a unitary actor at a global level, representing its member states, for instance, in trade disputes with the US in the World Trade Organization. If Koopmans and Erbe (2004) are correct in stating that the more the respective policy area is institutionalized at the EU level, the more Europeanized are the media coverage and debate, we should find a higher degree of discursive convergence, integration and collective identification with Europe in public debates over genetically modified food than in debates over military interventions.

Our two case studies also differ considerably in the degree of integration of civil society and non-state actors into common policymaking. The EU Common Security and Defence Policy is virtually a no-go area for civil society actors and non-governmental organizations. Its advisory committees are staffed by national officials and military experts.[7] Non-state actors are neither involved in formal consultation nor in informal lobbying to a significant extent. By sharp contrast, non-state

actors, experts and NGOs are ubiquitous in the area of food safety. The Commission held numerous 'stakeholder' forums on GMO-related issues, involving industrial organizations as well as consumer protection groups and ecologists. It repeatedly declared that decision-making in this area must be transparent to the public, who must be informed by the views of stakeholders (Pollack and Shaffer 2005). Although scholars agree that the openness of the EU for participatory forms of biopolicy-making is more limited in practice than in rhetoric (see also Abels 2002), there is no doubt that stakeholders and civil society actors have far greater access to this EU policy area than to security and defence policies.

Overall, the two issue-specific case studies thus address three important research questions. First, they shed light on Europeanization as a process of convergence in terms of problem definitions, discursive cleavage structures and the normative foundations of public debates. Equally importantly, they give us deeper insight into the factors that contribute to the emergence of a European public sphere. In particular, they help us to explore whether (a) high degrees of supranationalism and (b) the participation of civil society actors in EU governance signal a common European discourse (or at least the convergence of national discourses) – as frequently assumed but hardly explored in EPS research so far. The results for these two case-studies are presented separately in Chapters 6 and 7.

As already mentioned, our method for analysing the convergence of issue-specific debates draws on both qualitative and quantitative text analysis methods. The combination of both into a systematic comparative text analysis proved to be most fruitful for exploring such complex phenomena as discourse constellations, normative contexts and collective identities. Whereas quantitative content analysis often works with a priori categories, the two case studies are based on categories which were carefully developed in previous in-depth qualitative analyses, thus greatly increasing their validity. This is how we proceeded in detail: each researcher was responsible for a specific country and read through all articles on the issue in question in the respective newspapers. From these they constructed a deliberate sample of 30 to 40 articles per country in the GMO case and 120 to 150 articles in the case of military interventions,[8] covering the range of opinions and speakers as well as the time period as comprehensively as possible. This sample was then submitted to an in-depth text analysis. In order to ensure the comparability of our findings we developed a set of research questions to be applied systematically to the sample by all researchers. The research scheme sample also contained certain keywords and examples to help identify statements describing

collective identification, as well as a list of possible justifications for or against military interventions or genetically modified food which was continuously discussed and updated during the coding process. For each country (and intervention) the researchers wrote a report on the debate in their country of analysis. These country reports were then discussed and compared to tease out the similarities and differences between the debates.

However, in contrast to qualitative text and discourse analysis we did not stop here, but developed a quantitative coding scheme based on the insights gained from the qualitative analysis, which we then applied to a representative sample of the articles on the respective issues. In that way, we increase the reliability and representativeness of our results. As an additional measure to heighten transparency and reliability, all material for the qualitative as well as the quantitative analysis was analysed with the software program atlas.ti so that every interpretation of the material could easily be traced back to actual quotations. In addition, rigorous reliability checks were employed among the five researchers involved in the study: code definitions and coding problems were discussed at regular meetings. An additional inter-coder reliability test yielded satisfactory results (see Table 2.3).

The coding scheme for the broader quantitative analysis contains categories for two of our four dimensions of the transnationalization of public spheres: discourse convergence and collective identification (see also Table 2.2 above).

For the dimension of discourse convergence, the sub-dimensions are analysed as follows. The first sub-dimension concerns the convergence of issue relevance and problem definitions. Convergence of issue relevance is measured by comparing the relative number of articles on the issue across countries and points of analysis. If the share of articles discussing genetically modified food in the different countries becomes more similar from year to year, that is, if the relevance of the issue becomes increasingly similar in each public sphere, then we can interpret this as a sign of convergence, and hence Europeanization. In this dimension we did not observe the second principle of our research design: since our sample does not include non-European countries, we did not test whether the scope of this convergence is limited to Europe or not.

To measure the convergence of problem definitions we analysed the main frames dominating the public debates over the two issues. These frames were distilled in the qualitative analysis and enriched in the coding scheme by anchor examples and keywords from the qualitative text sample. The frames distilled for each particular issue will be discussed in

Table 2.3 Design of the issue-specific case studies

	Military interventions		**Genetically modified food**
Periods of analysis	Iraq 1991: 16/11/90–16/03/91 Bosnia 1995: 30/06/95–30/10/95 Kosovo 1999: 24/01/99–24/05/99 Iraq 2003: 20/12/02–20/05/03[a]		01/01/1993–31/12/2005
Countries and newspapers		Centre-left paper	Centre-right paper
	Germany	*Süddeutsche Zeitung*	*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*
	France	*Le Monde*	*Le Figaro*
	Great Britain	*The Guardian*	*The Times*
	Denmark	*Politiken*	*Berlingske Tidende*
	Austria	*Der Standard*	*Die Presse*
Articles	All discursive articles concerning the issue: editorials/commentaries interviews contributions from external authors news analysis and background articles further discursive articles		
Sample size	Main sample: 5054 articles Qualitative sub-sample: 30–40 articles per country and intervention Representative quantitative sub-sample: 1949 articles		Main sample: 2127 articles Qualitative sub-sample: 30–40 articles per country Representative quantitative sub-sample: 1355 articles
Indicators and reliability (Krippendorff's alpha)	Justifications/frames (0.73) Markers of collective identification (0.77) and 'we' references (0.87)		Justifications/frames (0.84) Markers of collective identification (1.00) and 'we' references (1.00)

Note: a. For each intervention the sampling period was limited to four months, two months before and after the start of the intervention respectively. Only for Iraq II (2002/03) was the sampling period extended to three months before and two months after the start of military action as the discussion on legitimacy had intensified earlier in this case (for details see Appendix 2).

detail in the respective chapters on the two case studies (Chapters 6 and 7). In general terms, we compared the shares of the main frames referred to in the media across countries and points in time. For example, do ethical issues play a similar role in the debate over genetically modified food in all countries under analysis? Or were the ethics of green biotechnology initially only discussed in some public spheres, permeating to the other arenas at a later stage? Again, a growing similarity in the shares of frames would be seen as an indicator of convergence, and thus Europeanization.

The second sub-dimension, convergence of discourse coalitions, gives us deeper insight into the cleavage structure of public debates. Are the discourse coalitions that promote the use of military force (or green biotechnology) made up of similar people in the different public arenas? Are biotechnology researchers and the manufacturers of genetically-modified products in all countries the only advocates of green biotechnology, or are they joined in some public debates by the parties in government (which in other countries might oppose them)? And does the membership structure of these coalitions become more similar over time? Does the share of civil society actors among the opponents of military interventions increase in all public discourses under analysis? In addition to their membership structure, the overall size of the discourse coalitions serves as an indicator of their similarity or dissimilarity, as well as their convergence (or divergence) from one point of analysis to the next. Do the proponents of military interventions have the strongest voice in all countries? And how does this change when we compare the 1991 intervention in Iraq with the crisis in Bosnia and Kosovo and the Iraq war of 2003?

The third sub-dimension, the convergence of repertoires of justification, is certainly the strongest indicator for the convergence of public discourses. Justifications point to the underlying structure of norms and meanings anchored in the national constellation. Following the line of argument developed by Finnemore (1996: 159) we consider justifications as attempts to connect one's own position to general normative standards of appropriate behaviour. They therefore draw directly on the normative structure of public spheres. So, how often do speakers use a certain type of justification (for example legal arguments) for their position on a particular issue? And is this type of justification paralleled in all countries under analysis? Do the advocates of military interventions use, for example, the protection of human rights to justify intervention in all public arenas? Or is this justification used only in a particular country?

Finally, in our cross-issue study described above, collective identification could only be measured by two rather crude indicators, namely collective labels (such as 'the Germans') and 'we' references (for example 'we Germans'). The focus of the case studies on two single issues allowed us to develop more specific indicators of collective identification: general markers are keywords such as 'history', 'tradition' and 'value' that evoke cultural and historical commonalities and are used in all kinds of identity statements. By contrast, specific markers are more context-bound and tied to specific discourses. For instance, in public debates over the legitimacy of military interventions actors frequently

refer to the Second World War as a common historical fate, whereas in debates over genetically modified food the European BSE experience plays a certain role. Using lists of keywords and anchor examples, the coding scheme allowed coders first to identify such markers of collective identification and then to attribute the respective scope of the community that was evoked through the markers: When the speaker refers to a common history, does he/she promote the image of a national, European or transnational community?

Thanks to their richness the case studies add important insights into processes of Europeanization. Whereas the quantitative cross-issue analysis gives us a broad overview on the transformation of public spheres, the two case studies provide a more detailed account of how European integration plays out in public discourses. They explore the normative and ideational foundations of Europeanization as well as the driving forces behind it.

3
Segmented Europeanization

This chapter explores the structural transformation of national public spheres in Europe since the beginning of the 1980s by drawing on our long-term, cross-issue content analysis. We seek to answer three questions: (1) Is there a trend towards transnationalization of national public spheres in Europe? Here we will look at three of our four dimensions of transnationalization over time: monitoring governance, discursive integration and collective identification.[1] (2) What is the geographical scope of transnationalization? Is it a European phenomenon or does it comprise the Western hemisphere including increasing communication with the US? (3) What about the level of transnationalization reached: How does transnational communication perform as compared to national communication, and how does the level of European references compare to other transnational references? Our findings will allow us to tackle the difficult question of whether there is still a communication deficit with respect to the European Union. Has political communication caught up with the transfer of decision-making powers to the EU, or is it still lagging behind?

We will first examine each dimension individually and discuss the trend, scope and level of transnationalization. Taking the results on the different dimensions together, we can then identify a specific pattern of transnationalization in the national quality dailies, which we shall call segmented Europeanization. In the final section of this chapter we discuss whether this pattern of segmented Europeanization is sufficient to close the alleged communication gap between the EU institutions and the European population.

Monitoring governance: a common trend of 'EU-ization'

Monitoring international governance as the most basic dimension of the transnationalization of public spheres is measured by looking at the

visibility of international institutions in newspaper discourse as well as by the more demanding indicator of articles actually focusing on international policymaking. We measure the visibility of international institutions by coding all articles that mention political institutions and by contrasting national, EU and other international institutions. A focus on international policymaking in an article is, in turn, established by looking at the headline and the lead of the respective article.

A robust trend towards Europeanization

Looking at the data, we find a robust trend towards Europeanization in the dimensions related to more discussion of the EU. We might call this trend 'EU-ization'. The increasing political importance of the EU is reflected in a growing visibility of European institutions in public debates, and the share of EU institutions mentioned more than doubles from 1982 to 2003, reaching a level of 29 per cent of all discursive articles (Figure 3.1). The second and more demanding indicator of monitoring governance also shows a strong and statistically significant trend towards Europeanization. Whereas EU policies are the focus of only 2 per cent of all articles in 1982, this figure has more than quadrupled to 9 per cent by 2003 (see Figure 3.2).[2]

In contrast to the EU, references to other international institutions remain relatively stable (Figure 3.1). Since 1989 attention paid to EU institutions has overtaken all other international institutions put together. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – the exemplary transatlantic institution – serves as a good indicator of the non-existence of the Westernization of public spheres. It gradually loses



Figure 3.1 Mentioning political institutions

Notes: Representative sample of discursive articles in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Le Monde*, *The Times*, *Die Presse* and *Politiken* for the years 1982, 1989, 1996 and 2003 (N=2964).



Figure 3.2 Policies in the focus of newspaper articles
Notes: Representative sample of discursive articles in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Le Monde, The Times, Die Presse* and *Politiken* for the years 1982, 1989, 1996 and 2003 (N = 2964).

public attention, but still reaches 5 per cent of all institutions mentioned on average. Other international institutions, such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) are far less visible. Only the United Nations (UN) (8 per cent on average), nearly forgotten in 1989, experiences growing attention in 2003. This is a result to the US-led intervention in Iraq which raised questions about the UN Charter and Security Council resolutions. Overall, the growing visibility of the EU combined with the unchanging level of attention paid to other international organizations shows that the scope of this trend is clearly neither Western nor global, but European.

Even major issues in world politics, such as the so-called 'war on terror' in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, did not permanently distract attention from the EU. On the contrary, articles on EU policies have continued to catch up with other foreign policy issues (Figure 3.2). The trend towards Europeanization is thus remarkably robust even in the light of major international developments such as new threats to international peace and security.

The communication deficit persists

It cannot go unnoticed, however, that the level of Europeanization is still relatively low – only 5 per cent of all articles on average focus on EU policies as compared to 33 per cent on national policies. Moreover, national institutions are mentioned far more frequently (63 per cent on average) than all international institutions taken together. Clearly, the national perspective has not been abandoned, as supranationalists might

expect or hope. Rather, it is complemented by a European spin. Moreover, the trend towards Europeanization is put into perspective by the fact that even the quality press often does not differentiate between the Commission, the European Parliament (EP) and the Council, but rather talks about the EU in general or about the Commission, leaving aside the other institutions.

Our findings help to resolve some contradictions in the existing empirical studies on this issue. For example, we have Gerhards' study on the political coverage of German newspapers from 1950 until 1995. He observed a slight increase in the coverage of the EU in the early 1990s, but at a very low level, which led him to dismiss the existence of a Europeanization trend in the German public sphere (Gerhards 2001: 153). Our data show, however, that the growing attention paid to the EU from the 1990s was the beginning of a clear trend towards Europeanization. In terms of the level of Europeanization achieved, there is a striking discrepancy between studies that find a very low level of focus on Europe (compare Eilders and Voltmer 2003; Gerhards 2001) and the more optimistic findings of Sievert (1998) and particularly Trenz (2004: 311), who sees a 'highly Europeanised' quality press. This discrepancy is partly the result of 'artefacts' produced by the design of the respective empirical studies (Neidhardt 2004: 3). Trenz (2004: 311), for example, takes 'all political references to Europe' as an indicator, thereby finding a relatively high level. This corresponds roughly to the results of our first aspect (simple mentioning of EU institutions). If we take our somewhat more demanding criterion requiring EU policies to be the main subject of an article, we find that fewer than one-tenth of the articles focus on EU policies. We suggest that these findings can only be interpreted together, establishing a moderate level of Europeanization that has not yet revolutionized the routine coverage of the national quality press.

More specifically, our findings suggest that the communication deficit still exists, although the media do pay increasing attention to the EU. Like EU institutions, EU policies are frequently mentioned – in more than every fifth article in 2003. Yet, it is not just quantity that counts, but also quality. We find that EU policies are mostly referred to as intervening factors in domestic matters or represented as marginal topics rather than representing discussion of issues of EU politics and policymaking.[3] For instance, an article about the euro might focus on the impact of the common currency on domestic spending or touch upon its effects on the national economy without referring to political developments at the EU level. Such Europeanized articles are certainly an indicator for the increasing relevance of Europe in domestic discourses. Since they remain

predominantly domestically oriented, however, they do not contribute much to reducing the lack of public information about political decision-making at the European level and hence the 'publicity deficit' of the EU.

As for articles focusing explicitly on European policymaking and 'politymaking' (that is, institutional reforms and the constitutional process) the level of monitoring EU governance displayed in Figure 3.2 remains much lower than the degree of public scrutiny at the domestic level. Compared to the legislative output of the EU, which is on average higher than the number of acts passed by the British parliament and about half as high as the number of German acts, public attention to EU policymaking still lags behind the transfer of decision-making power to the European level.[4] As a rough indicator for the degree of public scrutiny, we compared the (annualized) number of EU articles to the annual number of European directives and British and German acts. The results show that European legislation is increasingly observed by the media, but still much less exposed to public scrutiny than domestic legislation. In the 1980s, each EU directive corresponded to fewer than two articles per newspaper on average and public attention just kept pace with the growing number of directives. In the post-Maastricht era, by contrast, EU legal activities have slowed down and fluctuated, while the Europeanization of public discourses has further increased. Consequently, by 2003, the number of EU articles per directive had increased to more than six per newspaper. However, public scrutiny of EU policymaking across all the countries surveyed is still significantly lower than public scrutiny of domestic governance.

Likewise, the much greater and further-reaching competencies of the EU compared to other international institutions have so far not resulted in a more pronounced focus on the EU as compared to these other institutions of international governance. Instead, the media still pay somewhat less attention to EU policies than to international affairs (Figure 3.2).

When considering different policy areas, we also find that the public monitoring of EU governance only partly reflects the degree of centralization achieved in the European integration process. As early as the beginning of the 1990s, there was hardly any policy area in which the EU did not have at least some competences (Schmitter 1996). The Data Handbook on the German *Bundestag* shows that between 1998 and 2002 between 19 per cent (home affairs) and 69 per cent (agriculture and consumer protection) of all acts were designed exclusively or partly to implement EU legislation (Feldkamp and Ströbel 2005: 601).[5] Yet, even if we include those articles just mentioning the EU, public debate reflects the decision-making powers and influence of the EU only to a small

extent. Of the overall low number of articles on agriculture and consumer protection, about a fifth refer in one way or another to the EU. In the area of economic and financial policies, 29 per cent of all articles mention the EU, although 43 per cent of all German acts in this policy field implement European legislation.

Thus, the lack of public attention dedicated to the EU has lessened since the 1990s, but it has certainly not disappeared. Instead, the transfer of competencies to the European level still tends to remove policy-making from public view, though to a considerably lesser degree than 20 years ago. Overall, the discrepancy between the high share of articles mentioning the EU and the much lower share of articles focusing explicitly on European governance suggests that EU policies mostly receive public attention when EU decisions have already been taken and their domestic consequences are evident. The communication deficit of the EU is therefore not characterized by a general lack of attention to the EU, but by the predominantly domestic orientation of public discourses. In most cases, EU policies become an issue when they 'hit home'. They are embedded in domestic structures of political contestation, while their formulation, negotiation, and adoption at the European level is far less subject to public scrutiny.

Discursive integration: stagnation at a relatively high level

In contrast to the 'vertical' orientation towards Brussels entailed in the monitoring of EU governance, the dimension of discursive integration highlights the 'horizontal' development of the EPS. It focuses on the cross-border flow of opinions and arguments and tells us to what extent public debates in the member states are integrated into a common discourse. We look at two indicators. The first one is 'mutual observation' between newspapers in different EU member states. The second, more demanding indicator requires actual 'discursive exchange' in the form of direct and indirect quotations and contributions from foreign authors. We do not find a trend towards Europeanization or Westernization for either of the two indicators.

Mutual observation: high levels of transnationalization

Are European countries observing each other more intensively now than in the 1980s? Our data show that attention towards the outside world in national quality newspapers is relatively stable and remains at a level that was already quite high two decades ago.

Figure 3.3 contrasts all articles focusing on other European countries with the number of articles focusing on each newspaper's respective



Figure 3.3 Geographical focus of articles
Notes: Representative sample of discursive articles (including press reviews) in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Le Monde*, *The Times*, *Die Presse* and *Politiken* for the years 1982, 1989, 1996 and 2003 (N = 3059).

home country and those focusing on the US. This helps us to define the scope of the potential process of transnationalization. As Figure 3.3 clearly shows, there are no consistent trends toward either Europeanization or Westernization. European countries receive most attention in 1996 and least in 2003. Attention to one's own nation also peaks in 1996 and drops slightly in 2003. Attention to the US, in contrast, increases from 9 per cent in 1996 to 17 per cent in 2003.

In order to explain these figures we might look at the agenda of world politics rather than at the continuous development of EU integration. In 1982, 1989 and 2003, major international events dominated the scene: the Falklands war, the fall of Communism, terrorist attacks and the US-led intervention in Iraq. The latter means that the US and Iraq are the countries most often discussed in all newspapers in 2003. While these major world political events trigger the ups and downs of public discourse, the political agenda of the EU does not influence the geographical focus of articles. For instance, the accession of Spain, Portugal, Finland or Austria to the EU has no effect on the public spheres of the other countries; the newcomers are not included more often in the public discussion in any of our newspapers.

The levels of transnationalization are remarkable. Every second discursive article in our national dailies has a transnational focus and this level has remained relatively stable over the last 20 years. This shows that at least the leading quality newspapers pay considerable attention to what happens abroad. However, the focus is not specifically on European countries, which constitute only 18 per cent of all articles on average. These articles mostly deal with the more powerful European players such

as Great Britain, France and Germany. The fact that the US alone receives about 12 per cent of the attention shows that it is the powerful rather than the European countries that grab the attention of public debates.

Discursive exchange: the lack of influence of European integration

Going beyond mere attention paid to other countries, the discursive exchange criterion encompasses explicit references to speakers from abroad. As newspapers offer different forums for external speakers, we differentiate between two major forms: discursive contributions and discursive references. Discursive contributions are interviews with or opinion articles written by actors from abroad – two formats which allow extensive opinion-giving. The somewhat more frequent alternative is discursive references (that is, direct or indirect quotations of at least two consecutive sentences). This type of reference offers speakers the chance to express their opinions and to give at least some kind of basic justification for them.

We first take a look at the role of the EU institutions in public discourse. As indicated above, EU institutions are mentioned quite frequently, while EU policies are less often at the centre of attention. The role of the EU is even smaller in terms of discursive exchange. EU institutions may have managed to establish themselves as a frequent point of reference in media discourse, but they tend to play a passive role as objects, rather than being the subjects of discourse, as they have not become powerful speakers in public debate. A constant proportion of fewer than 5 per cent of all speakers quoted represent EU institutions (for example Commissioners, officials, spokespersons). This would be less surprising if foreign speakers did not generally have a say in national discussions, but this is not the case, as Figure 3.4 shows: roughly every second discursive reference relates to national speakers, which in turn implies that half of all references come from foreign speakers.

This high level of transnationalization is not accompanied by a trend towards more discursive references from European countries, however. Rather, the overall picture shows a relatively stable level of European speakers at 17 per cent on average. There is some deviation from this level in 1989 and 2003 due to developments in world politics. Specifically, the focus on international terrorism after 9/11 drew attention away from Europe. However, this does not support the broadly plausible hypothesis that more speakers from the US are quoted as a consequence of 9/11. The frequency of American speakers in our newspapers has remained stable at below 10 per cent. This is striking since we observed a much stronger



Figure 3.4 Discursive exchange: quoting national and foreign speakers
Notes: Discursive references in representative sample of discursive articles in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Le Monde*, *The Times*, *Die Presse* and *Politiken* for the years 1982, 1989, 1996 and 2003 (N = 2640).

focus in 2003 on the US as a country (see Figure 3.3). However, while the interventionist US foreign policy is covered by newspapers, leading to more frequent focus on the US, this does not go hand in hand with an intensified transatlantic discourse. In 1989 and 2003, major international events, including the fall of Communism and the US-led attack against Iraq dominated the scene. The latter in particular drew attention away temporarily from European speakers to actors in the Middle East – mainly Iraq and Israel – but it did not result in a Westernization of public discourses. Rather, the US, as the leader of the 'coalition of the willing', was mostly an object of debate in Europe rather than a participant in a deepening transatlantic discourse.

Considering the overall level of discursive references from European countries, we find no strong indications for a distinctly European discourse. Public discourses tend to expand into the wider world rather than limiting themselves to Europe. Only in the small segment of public debates on EU governance did actors from other European countries frequently contribute to the public opinion exchange in their neighbouring countries. Their opinions and arguments are referred to in more than one in three EU articles. Not surprisingly, in debates on EU issues actors from European institutions, mainly the Commission, also have a chance to express their point of view. Though largely neglected as speakers otherwise, they are quoted in 12 per cent of all EU articles. Thus, on average, a distinctly European opinion exchange is found in only those 5.5 per cent of articles that focus on EU policymaking.

In addition, it should be noted that although frequently quoted (discursive references), international speakers as well as fellow Europeans are

rarely given the chance to express their opinion more fully in interviews and guest contributions (discursive contributions). Discursive contributions form a substantial share of our sample, as every fourth article is an interview or a guest contribution. Transnational discursive contributions are rare, however: 82 per cent of guest contributions are of national origin. A slight trend towards Europeanization can be observed in our sample as the proportion of contributions from other European countries increased from 2 to 9 per cent between 1982 and 2003. This increase starts from a minimal level, however, and it would be premature to conclude that this shows a transformation of public discourse. Our findings coincide with Diez Medrano's (2003a) analysis of editorials between 1946 and 1997 in which he finds only weak horizontal connections between national public spheres but a high thematic and cognitive frame convergence in the debate on Europe. Medrano calls this a 'pillarized' public sphere. While the very low level of discursive contributions from abroad confirms this finding, discursive references – our more subtle indicator – help to differentiate the picture. They reveal a substantial amount of transnational interaction, albeit not in the form of articles written by guest authors or interviews with foreigners.

Mutual observation and discursive exchange between national quality dailies in Europe seem to be consolidated on a relatively high level, but without displaying a tendency towards Europeanization or Westernization. A distinctly European discourse involving speakers from the EU institutions and from other European countries only takes place in the small number of articles which actually focus on EU policymaking. Thus, the process of increasing European integration has not triggered stronger discursive integration.

Collective identification with Europe: nascent trend at best

A precondition for the self-perception of Europeans as members of a common community of communication is that 'the Europeans' as a topos exists in public discourse. Even when using the term in a negative sense it still implies an acknowledgement of the existence of this collective. Therefore, we first analyse the occurrence of the term 'the Europeans' in discourse. Second, we look at the explicit identification with Europe by the use of a European 'we' in public discourse ('we Europeans'). We find that the level of salience of the term 'the Europeans' is very low and 'we Europeans' hardly occurs at all. Nevertheless, indications of a slowly

developing and still very weak European identity can be detected on the horizon.

The Europeans: a nascent topos in public discourse

'The Europeans' exists as a topos in public discourse and gradually gains more importance, recorded as constituting 6 per cent of all collectives mentioned in 1982 and rising to slightly above 10 per cent in 2003. 'The West' (12 per cent on average) is more common than 'the Europeans' (8 per cent on average), but has declined since 1989. In general we find that unlike the increasing European trend, the demand for other transnational collectives such as 'the Communists' or 'the Muslims' rises and falls according to the agenda of world politics.

'We Europeans': words rarely used

Figure 3.5, showing the explicit use of 'we Europeans', hints at a nascent trend towards the Europeanization of public identities. While 'we' references to the West stagnate and identification with individual nations drops between 1996 and 2003, 'we Europeans' increases slightly, from below 1 per cent in 1982 to 5 per cent in 2003. Looking at the level of identification, however, the nation is still the most frequent point of reference (40 per cent of all 'we' references) together with a broad range of very specific collective identities such as 'we, the government' or 'we, the farmers'. Identification with Europe stands at 3 per cent on average; identification with 'the West' is even weaker. Thus, the words representing 'we, the transnational collective' are still hard to pronounce for speakers in the elite's public discourse in quality newspapers. It should therefore



Figure 3.5 Expressions of belonging: 'We, the…'
Notes: 'We' references in representative sample of discursive articles in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Le Monde*, *The Times*, *Die Presse* and *Politiken* for the years 1982, 1989, 1996 and 2003 (N = 1510).

come as no surprise that European citizens also tend to identify with other collectives rather than with being European.

Our findings thus re-affirm the presuppositions of scholars who state that Europe has so far suffered from not being a real 'Gemeinschaft' (community) and not having a demos (see, for example, Kielmansegg 2003; Grimm 1995). Risse and van de Steeg (2003: 22) found indications of a common European identity in an admittedly 'easy case' (the debate about the racist right-wing extremist Jörg Haider joining the Austrian government) and claimed that '[t]he higher the salience of European issues in people's daily lives, the more people tend to identify with Europe'. Our results suggest a more cautious conclusion: on the one hand, the nascent trend towards a European public identity certainly sheds doubt on the orthodox pessimism of some scholars who maintain that an identification with Europe will never develop. On the other hand, the level of European identification is still much too low to indicate a substantive transformation of public identities.

Segmented Europeanization is not enough

Is a transnationalization of public discourse in Europe taking place? In order to respond to this question, we have re-aggregated the three dimensions of our analysis in Table 3.1. It contrasts the trend and level of the Europeanization and Westernization of public spheres. For each dimension we calculated the strength and direction (positive/negative) of the trend relative to the domestic development. The level of transnationalization is to be understood as the proportion of transnational to national values of a variable.[6] The Europeanization column enables us to decide for each dimension and related indicator whether Europeanization has occurred. The last pair of columns shows whether this process is embedded within a larger process of Westernization.

A substantial, statistically significant trend towards the transnationalization of national public spheres occurs only in the first dimension, namely monitoring governance. Here we clearly find a Europeanization process that is not part of a general Westernization trend. This trend occurs in all newspapers in our sample (see a discussion of the differences between the newspapers in the following chapter). For the two aspects of discursive integration, however, we even find negative developments. While this should not be over-interpreted, we can at least state that there is no positive trend either towards Europeanization or towards Westernization. On the collective identification dimension, we find a weak trend towards a Europeanization of collective identities

Table 3.1 Trends and levels of transnationalization

Dimension	Indicator	Europeanization		Westernization	
		Trend	Level (%)	Trend	Level (%)
Monitoring governance	Institutions mentioned	8.2*	33	0.4	13
	Policy focus	7.0*	16	−2.8	33
Discursive integration	Geographical focus	−1.8	37	3.8	24
	Discursive references	−3.7	34	−2.0	16
Collective identification	Collectives mentioned	5.8	67	6.0	55
	'We' references	3.8*	7	−0.1	3
Mean		3.2	33	0.9	26

Notes: Europeanization: values refer to the European policies and references in comparison to the national ones; Westernization: values refer to the Western/international, but not European policies and references in comparison to the national ones (because Westernization only occurs when Europeanization is accompanied by an increase in American or transatlantic references); Trend: slope parameter of regression line (OLS regression) in comparison to national development with * $p < 0.05$; Level: share relative to national policies and references.

on a very low level. Therefore, as already stated, while it would be premature to conclude from our data that a process of Europeanization of identities has occurred, it can be said at this stage that these data suggest a trend towards Europeanization rather than Westernization.

To sum up these results, one can say that the overall pattern of transnationalization that we can identify for European public spheres over the last 20 years is one of *segmented Europeanization*. European governance is increasingly subject to public scrutiny, but there is no sign of either a common discourse or a significant sense of belonging to the same community of communication developing in Europe.

What accounts for the pattern of segmented Europeanization? Our findings suggest that it has developed out of the different impact that European integration has had on the dimension of monitoring governance as against discursive integration and collective identification. The increased monitoring of EU policymaking is fuelled by the generally growing importance of the EU and, more particularly, the increasing obtrusiveness of EU policies (see also Gerhards 2001). As a result of a corps of now more than 1000 journalists accredited in Brussels (Bastin 2004: 18) – more than at the White House or the UN (Meyer 2003: 240) – the EU is increasingly visible in public debates.

On the other hand, our findings on discursive integration suggest that the role that European integration plays in the transformation of public

spheres should not be overstated. The absence of positive trends towards more intensive mutual observation and discursive exchange indicate that the EU has made no difference here. Rather, mutual observation is influenced by broader geopolitical developments, such as international terrorism and the '9/11 effect', which in the 2000s have tended to draw attention away from Europe to the larger world. In a similar vein, the constantly high level of transnational discursive exchange since the 1980s seems to reflect broader developments already described in international communication studies (Thompson 1995; Boyd-Barrett and Rantanen 1998) and by scholars studying processes of cultural globalization (Held et al. 1999; Beisheim et al. 1999). They suggest that as early as the 1980s international news agencies, new communication and information technologies as well as the growing importance of international media corporations had already generated a dense exchange of cultural products across national borders (for figures, see in particular, Beisheim et al. 1999). European public spheres are influenced by these developments at least as much as by European integration.

Only the first of our normative models – monitoring governance (see Chapter 1) – is partly consistent with empirical reality to date. Moreover, even for this model, analysis shows that while the lag between the growing decision-making powers at the European level and their public monitoring has narrowed, it has certainly not disappeared. Public discourses only partly reflect the far-reaching competencies of the EU and have not fully caught up with the increasing legislative output of European governance. The media predominantly pay attention to EU policies when they hit home and their domestic consequences are at issue, while their formulation and negotiation at the European level is often neglected. Furthermore, research by Pfetsch (2005) suggests that the communication lag is even greater in tabloids and the regional press than in the quality newspapers analysed in this study. From a democratic theory angle, therefore, the current pattern of Europeanization severely limits the legitimation potential of the EPS.

If European policymaking is only rarely exposed to processes of public scrutiny and justification, then the EU not only appears 'undemocratic' but also lacks its own resources for justifying its decisions. Instead of having its own voice in public discourses, it still largely depends on domestic actors for its legitimation – and is, hence, also vulnerable to delegitimation. Domestic actors might justify EU policies, but they might also heighten public discontent by directing protest against European institutions (compare Scharpf 2004: 19). The EU still largely depends on domestic legitimation mechanisms, which have their limits where

domestic governments are not willing to act on behalf of the EU and legitimize such policies. Thus, thanks to the domestic orientation of public debates, the EU has not undermined the legitimation of the European nation-states (see also Hurrelmann et al. 2005), but the lack of a European discourse hampers the legitimation potential of the EU. Only if the segmented character of Europeanization can be overcome will a comprehensive European discourse develop which can fully live up to the normative expectations with which the term public sphere is associated. The lack of a European public sphere in the full sense of the word has strongly inhibited the legitimacy of the EU so far.

4

Differential Europeanization: Explaining Vertical and Horizontal Europeanization in the Quality Press

In the preceding chapter we concluded from the results of our quantitative long-term cross-sectional content analysis that the Europeanization of public spheres has hitherto remained limited to a single dimension: the monitoring of EU governance. A truly integrated European public sphere in which public debate actually transcends national borders has not yet developed. However, while the overall result is similar for all newspapers, a detailed analysis reveals a surprisingly wide range of patterns of Europeanization, as the level of Europeanization reached in each dimension can differ from paper to paper, some scoring relatively low on all dimensions, others achieving high levels on some dimensions, but falling behind on others. In this chapter, we shall first develop a theoretical model for explaining these different patterns of Europeanization of newspaper content. We shall then proceed to test this model on the data of our cross-sectional content analysis. Besides offering an analytical framework suited to identifying different ways of talking about Europe, that is, different patterns of Europeanization, we also venture a tentative explanation of how these different paths emerge and why they do not converge over time.

Towards a theoretical explanation of differential Europeanization of public spheres

For identifying the different patterns of Europeanization we concentrate on the two dimensions of the process for which we were able to collect comprehensive data in the quantitative long-term cross-sectional content analysis: monitoring governance and discursive integration. The other dimensions could either not be meaningfully measured as a part of the cross-sectional analysis (convergence of discourse, see Chapters 6

and 7) or the number of cases obtained was too low to be useful for further analysis (collective identification). However, as we will show, focusing on the two remaining dimensions allows us to develop a theoretical model of differential Europeanization whose two-dimensional set-up facilitates its empirical analysis and intuitive understanding.

Following Koopmans and Erbe (2004) the dimension of monitoring (EU) governance could also be described as *vertical* Europeanization: Each country increasingly 'looks up' towards the EU level. This is what we have called monitoring governance throughout this book. Our dimension of discursive integration, on the other hand, can also be understood as *horizontal* Europeanization, as each country more and more 'looks across' to other countries. While the occurrence of vertical and horizontal processes of Europeanization is plausible, analytically we have to take into account the possibility of intervening variables which filter or slow down these trends. Differences between specific media in different political contexts are likely to cause different ways of talking about Europe. And it is highly conceivable that these intervening factors might actually be stronger than the forces of Europeanization set off by the process of political integration.

When concentrating on these two dimensions, four patterns of transnationalization of national public spheres can be distinguished analytically (see Figure 4.1):

1. *Comprehensive Europeanization*. This pattern combines high levels of vertical and horizontal Europeanization, that is, close monitoring of



Figure 4.1 Four patterns of Europeanization

EU governance and intensive discursive integration between European countries.
2. *Segmented Europeanization*. This means vertical, but not much horizontal Europeanization. Nationally segmented public spheres pay more attention to Brussels but not to each other.
3. *Europeanization aloof from the EU*. This would mean horizontal without vertical Europeanization. Here, an increasingly intensive communicative exchange takes place between European neighbours but no more attention is paid to the EU as such.
4. *A parochial public sphere*. There is neither vertical, nor horizontal Europeanization, and national media do not adapt in any way to the fact that political competencies have been shifted away from national governments and capitals.[1]

In contrast to Chapter 3, which mostly paid attention to *trends*, these patterns refer to the average *levels* of Europeanization, so that the word Europeanization does not refer to the process here but to the results of the process, that is, to a certain level of Europeanization achieved over time on the two dimensions under analysis in this chapter.

What kind of development of the public sphere is likely to occur in different newspapers? An all-encompassing theory yielding hypotheses that predict patterns of Europeanization is not yet available and probably never will be. The number of factors that influence the focus and shape of debates in the media is enormous and leads to a large degree of contingency. Any theory consisting of a limited set of hypotheses will therefore only be able to explain a limited amount of variance.

Drawing on the relatively scarce literature on this topic[2] and theories about news selection, we identified two bundles of factors which can plausibly be expected to explain differences in levels of horizontal and vertical Europeanization between newspapers. The first bundle comprises political factors related to characteristics of the country in which the respective newspaper is distributed. The second bundle concerns media factors related to the profile of the individual newspaper under analysis. While European integration has been mentioned above as the main driving force behind the Europeanization of national public spheres as a process, in this chapter we will concentrate on factors which might explain differences in the level of Europeanization between countries and media outlets. Some explanatory factors relate more to the level of vertical Europeanization, while others are more likely to affect horizontal Europeanization. From these factors we derive the hypotheses presented below.

Political factors

H1: The more sceptical the public is about European integration in general the more media coverage will be given to the contested issue of EU politics (monitoring governance/vertical Europeanization). This hypothesis is derived from news value theory. The theory, dating back to Östgaard (1965) and Galtung/Ruge (1965), assumes that there is a set of criteria (news factors) which guides the selection of topics by journalists. In line with the popular wisdom that 'only bad news is good news', negativism is identified as one important news factor (for more extensive research on negativism see for example Bohle 1986). We assume that in countries in which the EU is seen as something threatening or negative, news about the EU will arouse more attention as it constitutes 'bad news'. Consequently, public scepticism may actually enhance vertical Europeanization.

H2: The earlier the accession of a country to the EU, the more established is reporting and debating EU policy (monitoring governance/vertical Europeanization). Theories of path-dependence (Pierson 2000) stress self-enforcing cycles of positive feedback mechanisms which develop over time and which constitute the framework for future action. This idea can easily be applied to media production and consumption. Journalists' working routines take time to develop, and audiences only slowly get used to new topics of discussion. Over time, audience expectations and journalistic selection criteria might converge towards accepting that the EU is a topic suited for continuous in-depth discussion in newspapers. Thus, 'old' member states might have a more elaborated coverage of EU affairs than new member states. This hypothesis has to take into account the fact that around the accession date itself, the EU is inevitably a prominent topic on the national news agenda. Following our hypothesis, we would nevertheless assume that there is only a temporary peak in the attention paid to the EU and that it will take much longer to make the EU a genuine part of national debates.

H3: The smaller and less powerful a country is, the more attention it will pay to its neighbouring countries (discursive integration/horizontal Europeanization). Here the line of reasoning is that weaker countries depend more heavily on their neighbours both politically and economically, so that their media outlets will pay more attention to what is going on abroad as well (see also Berkel 2006: 64 for a related line of thought). Furthermore, it is possible that in small countries there is a perceived lack of cultural resources: journalists might feel that a discourse is incomplete if there is only a small ensemble of national speakers involved. For specific

questions there might even be no national expert, so one would have to bring in a foreign speaker.

H4: The more open citizens of a country are to identifying with communities beyond the nation-state, the more the national media will be interested in coverage and discussion of the affairs of other European countries (discursive integration/horizontal Europeanization). Here again we might fall back on the theory of news values, which states that identification is an important news factor. Journalists assume that people will be more interested in news about issues and countries with which they can identify (Östgaard 1965). Furthermore, theories and research on collective identity formation have identified national differences in the construction of nationalism, distinguishing a more exclusive form of nationalism in some European countries from a more open kind of nationalism that allows the incorporation of transnational identification in others. Thus, European integration resonates better with some national identity traditions than with others (Marcussen et al. 1999; Laffan 2001). We therefore assume that people who are more likely to be able to incorporate the idea of European integration into their own collective identity construction will tend to pay more attention to other European countries.

Media factors

Following the theory of structuration (Giddens 1986), the hypotheses related to media factors distinguish between actors, resources and rules. Editors (actors) engage in reporting practices such as referring to EU institutions, quoting speakers from abroad, debating EU issues or reporting other European countries' affairs. Two kinds of resources can plausibly be identified as enabling such reporting practices: the number of journalists available for EU coverage or the coverage of foreign countries, and the editorial space designated for such coverage. Among the rules that shape reporting, there are of course news values, which we have discussed above. Often, there is also a more or less explicit editorial mission of the individual paper which influences the daily work routines of those in charge of selecting the content for the paper. This line of thought leads us to the following four hypotheses.

H5: A higher share of correspondents in Brussels makes coverage of EU affairs more likely (monitoring governance/vertical Europeanization). If there are more people available to cover EU topics, it should be more likely that there is more coverage. The only journalists who are usually able to devote all their time to EU issues are, of course, the correspondents in Brussels (as Belgian affairs and NATO will usually not demand that much

of their time). So the number of Brussels correspondents in proportion to the entire journalistic staff of a paper might determine the degree of vertical Europeanization.

H6: A higher share of correspondents in other European capitals makes coverage of other European countries' affairs more likely (discursive integration/horizontal Europeanization). The equivalent reasoning applies to the influence of correspondents in other European capitals on the level of horizontal Europeanization.

H7: The more editorial space is reserved for the coverage of EU affairs, the more coverage will deal with such topics (monitoring governance/vertical Europeanization). Editorial space, understood for example as a daily page for EU coverage, may be regarded as another resource which enables editors to provide intensive coverage of the EU. The idea is that editorial space reserved on a permanent basis for EU affairs will attract coverage independently of other competing topics of the day.

H8: The more explicitly a commitment to Europe is articulated in a newspaper's mission statement, the more extensive the coverage of EU affairs will be (monitoring governance/vertical Europeanization). Formal or informal rules in a newspaper organization influence the choices that journalists make. One way of finding explicit evidence of these rules is by looking at mission statements. Do they mention EU coverage, or stress that national debates should be aware that a large degree of political power has been shifted to the decision-making machinery in Brussels and Strasbourg? If this is the case, or if there are other clear signs of a paper's commitment to Europe, one can assume a higher level of vertical Europeanization as a consequence.

Methodology: testing our hypotheses

In order to test our hypotheses concerning the factors that potentially influence the level of vertical and horizontal Europeanization, we first had to establish comparative index values for all independent variables for each newspaper. To determine these values, we conducted short telephone interviews with journalists from all the newspapers in our sample. In addition, we used data gathered from the existing literature and from Eurobarometer surveys[3] (see Table 4.1).

A regression analysis was used to test the explanatory power of the different potential influence factors on each of our indicators of Europeanization. As our dependent variables are dichotomous variables (for example an article either focuses on EU politics or it does not), we had to

Table 4.1 Possible influence factors

Type	Factor	Comparative index value based on	Europeanization
Political	Popular EU scepticism (H1)	Average net support for EU membership (Eurobarometer)	Vertical
	Date of accession (H2)	Date of accession	Vertical
	Power/size (H3)	GDP and population[a]	Horizontal
	Europeanized identity (H4)	Average percentage of people identifying not with 'nation only', but at least partly with Europe (Eurobarometer)	Horizontal
Media	Brussels correspondents (H5)	Share of Brussels correspondents in proportion to the number of full-time journalists (interviews)	Vertical
	Foreign correspondents (H6)	Share of foreign correspondents in EU countries in proportion to full-time journalist staff (interviews)	Horizontal
	Editorial mission to cover EU (H7)	Whether the newspaper sees itself as only national, or also claims to have a European mission (information from newspapers, newspaper design, interviews, secondary analysis of the literature)	Vertical
	Editorial space reserved for EU coverage (H8)	Whether (and since when) regular sections of the newspaper are devoted to EU coverage (information from newspapers, interviews, secondary analysis of the literature)	Vertical

Notes: a. The figures are taken from Weidenfeld/Wessels (2006: 458) and are based on data provided by the Federal Statistical Office in Germany.

employ logistic regression analysis. Whereas a linear regression model would predict how an independent variable influences, for example, the *number* of articles on European politics, a logistic regression model predicts how the independent variables influence the *chances* of the article being on European politics or not.

The results of our analysis will be presented in two steps. First we offer a detailed description of the findings of our content analysis both in general and for each newspaper, as well as a more qualitative discussion of the influence the different factors may have had on the particular pattern of Europeanization. We then discuss the results of the systematic test of our hypotheses across all the newspapers in our sample.

Findings I: discerning four patterns of Europeanization

As shown in Chapter 3, our content analysis finds a common trend towards an increased monitoring of EU governance in all newspapers. But this common trend towards vertical Europeanization should not be mistaken for convergence. In fact, the trend towards vertical Europeanization serves as a source of divergence instead of convergence, since it is much stronger in *Le Monde* than in all other newspapers. This uneven increase in attention paid to the EU actually increases the variance between newspapers in 2003 as compared to 1982. Apart from *Le Monde*, the differences in the level of vertical and horizontal Europeanization between the different countries remain about the same. A distinct pattern of Europeanization has evolved for each newspaper, and there is no evidence that these patterns are converging over time.

Different patterns of Europeanization

At the beginning of this chapter we established four patterns of Europeanization (comprehensive Europeanization, segmented Europeanization, Europeanization aloof from the EU, and parochial public spheres).

Figure 4.2 shows where the surveyed newspapers of the five countries are located in our analytical framework. The deviation of each newspaper from the mean level of Europeanization in all papers determines its place in the framework. We can see that *Le Monde* is positioned far away from the other papers in the quadrant labelled 'segmented Europeanization'. The *FAZ* and *Die Presse* reveal a pattern of 'Europeanization aloof from the EU'. *The Times* and *Politiken* are in the quadrant labelled 'parochial public sphere' with *Politiken* tending more towards a middle ground. The only pattern for which there is no incidence is 'comprehensive Europeanization', though *Die Presse* comes quite close to this pattern. The wide spread of the different papers over Figure 4.2 and Table 4.2 also shows that it is worthwhile to look at each newspaper individually in more detail. These qualitative, case-specific attempts to providing explanations will still have to prove their validity for all countries in the regression analysis.



Figure 4.2 Different levels of Europeanization

Note: Average deviation from mean for indicators of vertical Europeanization (visibility of EU institutions/focus on EU politics) or horizontal Europeanization (focus on other EU countries/extended quotations of speakers from other EU countries).

Table 4.2 Levels of Europeanization: deviations from mean (%)

Measuring Europeanization	***LM***	***FAZ***	***Presse***	***Times***	***Politiken***
Visibility of EU institutions[a]	11.4	−5.2	1.7	−2.8	−2.3
Focus on EU politics[a]	6.0	−1.4	−2.1	−0.3	−1.1
Mean vertical Europeanization	8.7	−3.3	−0.2	−1.5	−1.7
Focus on other EU countries[b]	−2.4	7.5	6.9	−8.9	−5.9
Extended quotations of speakers from other EU countries[c]	−4.2	0.7	11.9	−8.2	2.5
Mean horizontal Europeanization	−3.3	4.1	9.4	−8.6	−1.7

Notes: a. All articles in the sample (n = 2964); b. all articles including press reviews (n = 3059); c. all extensive quotations (n = 2640).

Le Monde: segmented Europeanization[4]

The European coverage of *Le Monde* is a clear-cut example of the pattern that we have called 'segmented Europeanization'. It has an outstanding level of vertical monitoring of EU governance (8.7 percentage points above average) and a relatively low level of attention paid and editorial space dedicated to speakers and politics in other EU countries (3.3 percentage points below average). The high level of vertical Europeanization concerns the mere mentioning of EU institutions as well as devoting whole articles to the EU. On average, a third of all articles selected from

Le Monde mention the EU and more than 10 per cent actually focus on EU issues. The paper's role as a front-runner in monitoring EU governance is only achieved, however, through the outstanding level of Europeanization achieved in 2003. While *Le Monde* always published the largest share of articles mentioning EU institutions, it was not until 2003 that the paper dedicated so much more in-depth coverage to the EU than any other newspaper. In 2003, every fifth article focused on EU affairs. In almost every second article an EU institution was mentioned. This finding that the French discourse is exceptionally Europeanized is confirmed by other research (Koopmans 2004; Trenz 2004).

This change is related to the French debate surrounding the Convention for a European Constitutional Treaty, which began in 2003. In the French case, Habermas' (2001c) hope that the constitution-making process would become a catalyst for a livelier European public sphere seems to have been fulfilled. The fact that the Convention was held under the auspices of such a prominent French political figure as Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, might partly explain the exceptional position of the French newspaper found in our sample. It is also worth noting that until 2001 *Le Monde* had only one correspondent in Brussels, whereas it now has an office of four correspondents. In Paris there is a European editor responsible for channelling the input from Brussels into the newspaper (Guiraudon et al. 2004: 2). In 2002 an EU page was introduced which appears several times a week. All these measures have apparently contributed to the establishment of a routine coverage of EU events which ranks solidly above the levels reached by other European newspapers. Furthermore, EU coverage is also part of *Le Monde*'s editorial mission. In its self-portrait the newspaper stresses: 'La plupart des événements, ne peuvent se comprendre à l'intérieur du seul cadre national' (*Le Monde* 2003). In research interviews, journalists from *Le Monde* acknowledge that: 'The newspaper is pro-European' (Baisnée and Frinault 2006: 49). In the case of *Le Monde*, then, resources (correspondents in Brussels), editorial space reserved for EU coverage and an explicit transnational editorial mission are likely to have an effect on media coverage. While apparently the EU is not doomed to neglect by national public discussions, as some political scientists have argued (Moravcsik 2002: 615), a specific constellation of factors seems to be required to open the door for discussions on EU issues.

Le Monde's mission not only stresses the importance of the coverage of EU affairs but also of international coverage in general. Nevertheless, the newspaper provides little evidence of discursive integration (horizontal Europeanization). Other EU countries play an important

role in 16 per cent of all articles, and 13 per cent of extended quotations emanate from fellow Europeans. Both indicators remain relatively stable over time. This must be seen in the context of a moderately internationalized debate: compared to the other countries, there is an average focus on international affairs and international speakers. This finding might be explained by the political factors we have identified as possibly explaining horizontal Europeanization. France is one of the larger and more powerful member states of the EU. Moreover, the country's self-perception is still haunted by the idea of being 'la grande nation'. This makes it more prone to focusing on itself than on the neighbouring European states. The case of the *FAZ* will show that this subjective dimension of national self-perception of power is indeed relevant.

FAZ: Europeanization aloof from the EU[5]

While *Le Monde* showed a large degree of vertical Europeanization and a much smaller degree of horizontal Europeanization, the German *FAZ* shows the opposite pattern: relatively low levels of monitoring EU governance and relatively high levels of discursive integration with other European countries.

Vertical Europeanization is 3.3 percentage points below average: the EU is mentioned less frequently than in other newspapers (in 16 per cent of the articles from *FAZ*) and there is a lower average number of articles focusing on the EU (4 per cent). Compared to the other papers, the *FAZ* contains fewer references to the EU but rather more in-depth coverage of the EU. There is a continuous increase in both over time. The relatively low level is at odds with the total of six correspondents employed in Brussels: the *FAZ* has more correspondents in Brussels than any other newspaper in our sample but this does not lead to more EU coverage in the newspaper. A possible intervening variable that might explain this specific case is the *FAZ* editorial mission. In contrast to *Le Monde*, the objective that the *FAZ* has undertaken to fulfil, as declared in its mission statement on the newspaper's website, is reflected in the motto 'Zeitung für Deutschland', which has been on the front page since its foundation in 1949. The *FAZ* claims that this commitment to being the 'newspaper for Germany' is still valid today and that its main purpose remains to 'mirror' Germany.[6] There is no mention of the importance, for example, of covering affairs in Brussels.

In the horizontal dimension the *FAZ* is way above average in covering other EU countries (by 7.5 percentage points) and has defended this position persistently since 1982. It is striking, however, that speakers from these countries are seldom quoted; here the rating of the *FAZ* is only

average. The specific pattern of Europeanization in the *FAZ*, therefore, is more one of intensive observation of foreign affairs than a model which makes foreign speakers part of the national debates by quoting them or providing room for guest contributions.

The *FAZ*'s coverage is generally speaking the most transnationalized of all papers under analysis, with high attention paid to international affairs and foreign countries. So, in the case of the *FAZ*, we find a high degree of transnationalization, in which Europeanization is embedded. This might explain the somewhat puzzling pattern of high levels of 'Europeanization' aloof from the EU.

This high level of transnationalization is reflected in the large number of foreign correspondents reporting for *FAZ*: a total of 46 correspondents, twice as many as *Le Monde*. The relatively high share of foreign coverage seems to contradict our hypothesis that the larger, more powerful countries pay less attention to what is going on abroad, though Germany might be a special case in this respect – demonstrating that 'perceived' size and power matter as much as 'real' size and power. Germany has rightly been called a 'tamed power' (Katzenstein 1997); and 'German political elites have shared a consensual and thoroughly Europeanized version of German national state identity since the end of the 1950s as a way of overcoming the country's past' (Marcussen et al. 1999: 614; also see Laffan 2001: 720). Germany's self-perception is not that of being the largest and most powerful country in the EU, but rather of being an equal partner to the other EU member states. So 'feeling big' might be more important than actual size (in terms of population and GDP) for determining the degree of transnational observation in media discourse.

Die Presse: almost comprehensive Europeanization[7]

Die Presse shows a pattern of Europeanization similar to that of the *FAZ*. We find a much higher level of horizontal than vertical Europeanization relative to the other newspapers. Again, this high level of discursive integration, that is the observation of other countries and discursive exchange with other EU member states, is embedded in a highly transnationalized coverage. As the level on both dimensions of Europeanization is higher than in the *FAZ*, *Die Presse* comes closest to what we called a comprehensive pattern of Europeanization in our analytical framework. A closer look reveals, however, that '*almost* comprehensive Europeanization' would be a more appropriate categorization.

This is because of a specific pattern of Europeanization on the vertical dimension. *Die Presse* is just above average (by 1.7 percentage points) in mentioning EU institutions but it does not perform well on the more

demanding criterion of focusing on EU politics (2.1 percentage points below average). This indicates a rather superficial treatment of the EU. It is mentioned, but does not become an important topic in the national discourse: on average, only 3.4 per cent of all articles focus on the EU. It is interesting to note that this level did not increase in 1996 after Austria's accession to the EU. However, Austria's membership did have a major effect on the number of mentions given to the EU, which rose from 19 per cent of all articles in 1989 to 31 per cent in 1996. This seems to corroborate our hypothesis that it takes a long time for a public sphere to become Europeanized. Newspapers of countries that joined the EU earlier will consequently engage in more in-depth discussion of EU issues.

Taking all indicators together, *Die Presse* is still the most Europeanized of all newspapers. This is because of the outstanding level of horizontal Europeanization (9.4 percentage points above average). In nearly every third article a fellow European is quoted extensively. The affairs of other European countries are the focus of every fourth article, although there are enormous fluctuations on these variables from year to year following the drift of world politics.

An easy explanation for the high level of horizontal Europeanization in *Die Presse* is the language shared with Germany and the geographical and cultural proximity of Germany and Austria. Many extended quotations are from German speakers. *Die Presse* refers to Germany or quotes Germans more often than it does with respect to any other nation. In all other newspapers, the US is the country which is referred to most often and whose speakers are quoted the most in national discourse. However, even without the German contributions, *Die Presse* retains the highest share of European quotations (21 per cent on average). It should also be noted that the importance of German discussants in the Austrian debate has declined continuously during our period of analysis: from 13 per cent in 1982 to 9 per cent in 2003, while other European countries have increasingly been referred to in public discourse.

The Times: a relatively parochial public sphere[8]

Great Britain is an island – not only geographically but also in terms of its communicative linkages with the European continent. *The Times* is more self-centred than any other newspaper under analysis and pays little attention to what is going on abroad – no matter where. Following our definition, however, it does not represent a completely parochial public sphere, as the coverage and discussion of the EU and its policies are not much weaker in comparison to the other newspapers in our sample.

The level of vertical Europeanization is above that of the *FAZ* but still 1.5 percentage points below average. While *The Times* is not very good at mentioning the EU, the paper is just about average in focusing on EU politics (5 per cent of all articles). This focus on EU politics is partly due to the BSE crisis, which triggered a good deal of discussion about the EU in 1996 (11 per cent of all articles) with a lower level before and after the height of the crisis. The number of articles merely mentioning the EU has gradually but continually increased over time. Since we know from other research that the British press is the 'most parochial voice' in Europe (Pfetsch 2004: 25), it is actually quite surprising to see at least moderate levels of attention paid to EU politics, and even more so since *The Times* does not have a single full-time correspondent in Brussels (only a 'super stringer') and there is no editorial space reserved for EU coverage in the form of a regular EU page. By contrast, the *FAZ*, one should recall, has six full-time correspondents in Brussels and a regular Europe page – but lower levels of Europeanization. The resources available to newspapers therefore do not automatically determine their editorial profile. News values might be a powerful intervening variable. For *The Times* the EU is a subject that might be interesting precisely because the British public is more sceptical towards the EU than on the continent. The EU constitutes a good source for bad news.

On the horizontal dimension of Europeanization our data fully support the findings of other researchers that British discourse is 'to a large extent an internal debate among British actors about Europe, rather than a genuinely Europeanized debate among European actors' (Koopmans 2004: 20). In terms of both variables used to measure horizontal Europeanization, *The Times* is more than 8 percentage points below average. Only every tenth article focuses on other European countries or quotes foreign actors extensively.

We might speculate that *The Times* focuses on other foreign countries (for example the US) instead of Europe, but this is not the case. In order to measure the degree of self-centredness, we calculated the share of articles focusing on domestic issues. *The Times* devotes 12 percentage points more articles to exclusively British affairs than the average newspaper in our sample devotes to its home affairs. Apparently, the geographical insularity, which traditionally set Britain apart from the rest of the world, has also fostered cultural insularity. Modern communication technology and logistics have reduced the relevance of being an island for the 'objective' degree of interdependency with other countries, but the national discourse is slow to catch up. Wallace's description of the British identity as 'a free England defying an unfree continent' (Wallace 1991: 70) might

still be relevant for explaining the low levels of discursive interaction across the Channel (see also Diez Medrano (2003b: 215) for a depiction of the British 'myth of difference' that prevents close interaction with its European neighbours).

Politiken: a modestly Europeanized middle-ground[9]

Even though *Politiken* is in the same quadrant of our framework as *The Times*, it is located much further towards the centre of the graph (Figure 4.2). This implies that the pattern of Europeanization found in *Politiken* forms some kind of middle-ground. However, this middle-ground is only very modestly Europeanized.

On the vertical axis *Politiken* shows a level of Europeanization a little below average (1.7 percentage points). The place of the EU in *Politiken's* coverage has nevertheless increased over time. This rise is reflected in the introduction of a weekly Europe page in 2002 and the introduction of a rotation system in which journalists from the national newsroom spend a couple of months at a time in Brussels.

In terms of horizontal Europeanization, *Politiken* shows little interest in the coverage of other EU countries (5.9 percentage points below average), which is in line with other findings that Danish political discourse is generally not very outward-oriented (Branner 2000). Bearing this in mind, *Politiken* performs surprisingly well in quoting speakers from other EU countries (2.5 percentage points above average). What factors might help explain this apparent paradox? Why does the 'small-country' effect that we have already observed in *Die Presse* not consistently come into play for both indicators of horizontal Europeanization in *Politiken*?

One explanation might be that its national identity stresses that Denmark is a small, but strong state (Östergaard 2000: 140), just as Germany's identity conception downplays the country's size and power. Denmark's small size in terms of GDP and population may in fact be counterbalanced by its specific national culture and construction of identity, at least as far as its interest in other countries' affairs is concerned. Nevertheless, when it comes to public debate the rather small ensemble of national speakers might appear inadequate for discussing all questions of interest. Denmark may not have enough experts of its own, and *Politiken* may therefore be obliged to resort to foreign European speakers.

As we have seen, each newspaper reveals its own peculiarities with respect to Europeanization. The case studies have pointed to the relevance of some of the explanatory factors which we hypothesized to determine Europeanization. It remains to be seen, however, whether the

connections found in specific cases prove to be valid as general influence factors on Europeanization across different newspapers. We shall, therefore, attempt to go beyond unique cases and test our hypotheses in a more quantitative design.

Findings II: explaining differential Europeanization

In this section we test the validity of our hypotheses systematically across all the newspapers in our sample using comparative index values as independent variables and our indicators of Europeanization as dependent variables in a regression analysis. As the purpose of the analysis is to test the validity of our hypotheses concerning the influence of political and media factors on the *level* of Europeanization, the year of analysis is included as a control variable in all regression models. In order to control for the influence of the subject of the article on the dependent variables, EU politics as the focus of the articles was also used as a control variable in three of the models (except for the model where it was the dependent variable). We first discuss the results of the logistic regression analysis for the indicators of vertical Europeanization and then proceed to the models explaining horizontal Europeanization.

Monitoring governance: vertical Europeanization

In the vertical dimension two indicators of Europeanization (articles referring to EU institutions and articles with EU politics as the focus of the article) were regressed on four possible influence factors: popular EU scepticism (H1), date of accession (H2), correspondents in Brussels (H5), and an index combining the editorial mission to cover the EU and the editorial space reserved for EU coverage (H7 and H8) (see Table 4.3).[10]

As common sense would suggest, the control variable 'EU politics as focus of the article' had by far the strongest impact on the chances of an article referring to EU institutions. As noted above in the discussion of the results of the general content analysis in Chapter 3, the odds of an article referring to EU institutions also increase with each year of analysis (by a factor of 1.30).

Apart from the control variables, only two factors have a positive impact on the level of vertical Europeanization. (1) The more a newspaper defines its mission as 'European' and the more editorial space it routinely dedicates to the coverage of the EU, the more likely it is to mention EU institutions in any of its articles. (2) Newspapers in countries with an EU-sceptical population also appear to discuss EU institutions more often. However, this effect is weaker than the impact of the EU

Table 4.3 Logistic regression of influence factors on articles referring to EU institutions (N = 2964)

Potential influence factors	e^{β}	$e^{\beta}_{standardized}$
Year of analysis	1.30***	1.35***
EU politics as focus of the article	177.62***	3.25***
Index EU mission and space	1.63***	1.80***
Popular EU scepticism	1.65***	1.56***
Date of accession	–	–
Correspondents in Brussels	–	–
Constant	0.01***	0.25***

Notes: Logistic regression: Nagelkerke R^2 adj. = 0.27; e^{β}: logistic effect coefficient; $e^{\beta}_{standardized}$: standardized logistic effect coefficient; * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$ (Wald); Nagelkerke's R^2 is comparable to the R^2 in a linear regression. It can be interpreted as the percentage of explained variance of the dependent variable: that is a Nagelkerke R^2 of 0.054 means that 5 per cent of the variance of (or changes in) the variable 'articles on EU politics (yes/no)' can be explained by the specified regression model. It should be noted that in general the explained variance in logistic regression models is far lower than for linear models. The logistic effect coefficient (e^{β}) should be understood in the following way. If the independent variable (for example the year) changes by one unit, the odds of the article being on European politics change by the value of the coefficient (for example by 1.61 for each year of analysis). A coefficient below 1 therefore denotes a decrease in odds, a coefficient above 1 an increase in odds. An effect coefficient of 1 indicates zero effect. When comparing the impact of different influence factors (with differing range and variance), the standardized effect coefficient ($e^{\beta}_{standardized}$) should be used.

mission/space, with a slightly lower standardized effect coefficient of 1.56 as compared to 1.80.

Neither the date of accession of a country nor its share of Brussels correspondents has an impact on the odds of articles referring to EU institutions. The mere mentioning of EU institutions does not appear to require long-standing EU membership; nor is it related to the number of EU correspondents. Apparently, the total number of references to the EU depends much more on the attitudes of all political journalists employed by a paper. Whether they incorporate some references to the EU in their articles, for instance, on national politics may depend much more on the editorial mission of the respective paper.

In the model of our second indicator of vertical Europeanization, 'articles focusing on European politics' (Table 4.4), the year of analysis has the strongest impact of all potential influence factors (and also compared to the first regression model concerning articles mentioning EU institutions). Apparently the trend of vertical Europeanization is stronger for the discussion of EU politics than for references to EU institutions.

Table 4.4 Logistic regression of influence factors on articles focusing on EU politics (N = 2964)

Influence factors	e^{β}	e^{β}_{stand}
Year of analysis	1.61***	1.72***
Date of accession	1.52**	1.37**
Index of EU mission and space	1.28**	1.34**
Correspondents in Brussels	0.56***	0.69***
Popular EU scepticism	–	–
Constant	0.01***	0.05***

Notes: Logistic regression: Nagelkerke R^2 adj. = 0.07; e^{β}: logistic effect coefficient; e^{β}_{stand} standardized logistic effect coefficient; * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$ (Wald).

Another significant influence factor on the *level* of vertical Europeanization is the date of accession. Newspapers in countries that have long been assimilated in the EU tend to discuss EU politics more often, as both journalists and readers have become more accustomed to this subject. It is striking that the duration of membership has no influence on the weak criterion of mentioning EU institutions, but it does shape stronger forms of Europeanization, shifting EU politics into the centre of attention. The odds of an article focusing on EU politics also increase for newspapers that proclaim their commitment to report on the EU or devote more regular pages to the coverage of EU affairs.

It is surprising, however, that the share of Brussels correspondents relative to the overall number of full-time journalists does not have the expected positive influence. On the contrary, it actually appears to diminish the chances of EU politics being the main subject of articles with a standardized effect coefficient lower than 1 ($e^{\beta}_{\text{stand}} = 0.69$). A positive contribution by the number of Brussels correspondents (H5) can clearly be ruled out by the results of our analysis; other factors such as the self-image of the newspaper, the news priorities of the editors and so on seem to intervene. The key question seems to be whether the Brussels correspondents are successful in placing their pieces in the paper. It might also be relevant, as in the case of *Le Monde*, whether there is someone at the headquarters who is responsible for and promotes the placement of EU topics in the paper.

In contrast to the findings on mentioning EU institutions discussed above, EU politics as a main subject of articles does not seem to be affected positively by Euroscepticism. While newspapers in countries with a Eurosceptical population appear to mention EU institutions more

frequently, they do not focus on EU politics more often. In other words: the EU is used as a rhetorical reference but there is no in-depth discussion of EU issues. Austria provides a good example of this phenomenon. Its population is highly Eurosceptical and *Die Presse* mentions the EU more often than the newspapers in the other countries, but its treatment of the EU as the main topic is way below average.

Discursive integration: horizontal Europeanization

The results for both of our indicators of horizontal Europeanization (articles focusing on other EU countries and extensive quotations from European speakers) are very similar, as Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show. For our first control variable, the year, we observe no increase in horizontal Europeanization over time, in line with the findings discussed in Chapter 3. The second control variable has a positive impact on both indicators: articles that discuss EU politics are also more likely to focus on other

Table 4.5 Logistic regression of influence factors on articles on other EU countries (N = 3059)

Influence factors	e^{β}	$e^{\beta}_{standardized}$
Year of analysis	0.89*	0.88*
EU politics as focus of the article	5.80***	1.49***
Size/power of a country	1.15**	1.27**
Correspondents in EU nations	1.88***	1.43***
Europeanized identity	–	–
Constant	0.06***	0.18***

Notes: Logistic regression: Nagelkerke R^2 adj. = 0.07; e^{β}: logistic effect coefficient; $e^{\beta}_{standardized}$: standardized logistic effect coefficient; * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$ (Wald).

Table 4.6 Logistic regression of influence factors on extended quotations from European speakers (N = 2640)

Influence factors	e^{β}	$e^{\beta}_{standardized}$
Year of analysis	0.84**	0.83**
EU politics as focus of the article	9.67***	1.78***
Size/power of a country	1.38***	1.61***
Correspondents in EU nations	1.82***	1.40***
Europeanized identity	–	–
Constant	0.04***	0.18***

Notes: Logistic regression: Nagelkerke R^2 adj. = 0.14; e^{β}: logistic effect coefficient; $e^{\beta}_{standardized}$: standardized logistic effect coefficient; * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$ (Wald).

EU countries or quote European speakers extensively. The discussion of EU affairs offers much greater opportunities for speakers from other EU countries to be included than other topics. This reveals an interesting link between vertical and horizontal Europeanization: the former tends to promote the latter, but as we have observed above this does not mean that they automatically go hand in hand.

The regression models for the levels of horizontal Europeanization tested three potential influence factors (H3: 'power/size', H4: 'Europeanized identity' and H6: 'foreign correspondents'). Both models (Tables 4.5 and 4.6) confirm the influence of the size/power of the country, as predicted by H3: newspapers in smaller and less powerful countries appear to discuss the affairs of neighbouring European countries more often and especially tend to include more European speakers in the national discussion (e^{β}_{stand} of 1.27 and 1.61 respectively). This difference in the standardized effect coefficient shows that newspapers in small countries may actually cover other EU countries a little more often than those in large countries, but the more powerful effect of their 'small-ness' is that they integrate foreign speakers into their debates. A good example of this pattern is *Politiken*. Actually, *Politiken* lies below the average percentage of articles focusing on other EU countries, but above average in the inclusion of speakers from other EU countries.

The level of horizontal Europeanization is higher for those newspapers that employ a large number of correspondents in other European countries (relative to their overall number of full-time journalistic staff). Compared to their colleagues in Brussels, these correspondents seem to be more successful in getting their articles placed in their respective newspapers; if they were not there to cover their respective countries, the overall coverage of these countries would actually diminish.

The willingness of the public to identify with a European community beyond their own nation (H4) has no impact on the frequency of articles discussing other European countries or on the origins of extensive quotations. In neither model that we tested did this factor have a significant effect coefficient. This implies that identifying exclusively with one's own nation does not automatically translate into a lesser interest for other countries or a less integrative discourse.

Conclusion

This chapter pursued two aims: (1) to develop a framework suited to identifying and explaining different patterns of Europeanization, (2) to test the influence factors put forward in our theory in order to seek a better

explanation of the Europeanization of public debate in the national quality press of five countries.

In line with other research, the newspapers under analysis (*Le Monde*, *FAZ*, *The Times*, *Politiken*, *Die Presse*) showed different patterns of Europeanization. While it was plausible to expect the existence of differences, our analysis showed that over time, contrary to expectations, these differences do not diminish. Each newspaper has developed its own unique pattern of Europeanization that remains relatively stable over time.

Le Monde shows a pattern of segmented Europeanization. It is the forerunner in monitoring EU governance but shows below-average levels of discursive integration with other European countries. At the other end of the analytical spectrum the *FAZ* revealed a pattern of Europeanization aloof from the EU, with high levels of attention paid to other EU countries and below-average levels of attention to the EU as such. The Austrian case is similar to the German one, albeit with much higher levels of horizontal Europeanization. Taking all indicators together, this earns *Die Presse* the highest Europeanization score – in spite of the no more than average level of attention paid to the EU. As it mentions the EU rather than really focusing on EU politics, *Die Presse* is not quite a case for a comprehensive pattern of Europeanization. *The Times* and *Politiken* on the other hand are below average on both dimensions of Europeanization and therefore represent relatively parochial public spheres. Having said that, one should also note that both newspapers show different manifestations of parochialism. *Politiken* neglects the EU and the coverage of other countries, but offers foreign speakers discursive space in the form of extended quotations. *The Times* tends to ignore what is going on and who is saying what on the European continent, but the coverage of the EU is only just below average. So there is no case of either plain parochialism or comprehensive Europeanization.

How do the influence factors which we hypothesized help us to explain the different patterns of Europeanization? We have tested our hypotheses on two indicators for each dimension. Table 4.7 shows an overview of the results. Four of our eight factors have proved to have a significant explanatory power on both indicators tested. The editorial mission statements as well as the editorial space reserved for EU coverage explain high levels of vertical Europeanization. The size of a country and the number of foreign correspondents sent to other EU countries result in high levels of horizontal Europeanization.

Two influence factors for vertical Europeanization have a significant impact only on one indicator tested. These are a large degree of popular Euroscepticism and an early date of accession. If public opinion shows

Table 4.7 Explaining Europeanization: overview of tested hypotheses

Monitoring governance: vertical Europeanization

Type	Hypotheses	Indicator 1 (Visibility of EU institutions)	Indicator 2 (Focus on EU politics)
Political	Popular EU scepticism (H1)	True	False
	Date of accession (H2)	False	True
Media	Brussels correspondents (H5)	False	False
	Editorial mission to cover EU (H7)	True	True
	Editorial space reserved for EU coverage (H8)	True	True

Discursive integration: horizontal Europeanization

Type	Hypotheses	Indicator 1 (Focus on other European countries)	Indicator 2 (Ext. quotations from other Eur. countries)
Political	Power/size (H3)	True	True
	Europeanized identity (H4)	False	False
Media	Foreign correspondents (H6)	True	True

scepticism towards the EU, the likelihood of articles mentioning the EU is greater, but not the likelihood of articles focusing on the EU. Scepticism therefore goes hand in hand only with a superficial interest in the EU. Long-standing EU membership has just the opposite effect: the longer a country is member of the EU, the greater are the chances of finding articles that focus on the EU, though there is no higher frequency of mentioning EU institutions.

Just as important in this process is the falsification of two other hypotheses which had hitherto seemed perfectly plausible. The share of Brussels correspondents relative to all full-time journalists working for a newspaper neither translates into more frequent mentioning of the EU, nor into more in-depth coverage of the EU. Other factors intervene here and determine whether more correspondents in Brussels actually lead to more EU coverage. A Europeanized editorial mission or the presence of a regular EU page in a newspaper has a much more direct influence on vertical Europeanization. Also, the role of identity has to be reviewed. There is no direct correlation between a greater identification with Europe and a greater coverage of other European countries in a newspaper. Again,

there are two factors which might intervene and prove more powerful in predicting the degree of horizontal Europeanization: these are the size of a country and the number of foreign correspondents in other EU member states.

The stable factors which determine the degree of Europeanization, such as the size and power of a country and its date of accession, explain why the coverage of Europe does not converge over time. Nevertheless, other factors, such as the editorial culture of a newspaper and the presence of editorial space reserved for EU coverage are variable. So under what circumstances could we expect a convergence of the patterns of Europeanization in our newspapers?

The four factors which proved to have a significant impact on both indicators tested are decisive in responding to this question. In the case of vertical Europeanization, only two significant influence factors could be expected to change and thereby cause an increase in Europeanization in the newspapers that are lagging behind. These are the editorial mission and – closely linked with this – the editorial space reserved for EU coverage. Only a change in the editorial stance and policy of newspapers might lead to a closure of the gap between highly Europeanized newspapers such as *Le Monde* and parochial papers like *The Times*. As far as horizontal Europeanization is concerned, the power/size of the newspaper's home country proved to be significant, but this is obviously a stable factor. The only significant alterable influence factor is the number of foreign correspondents in other European capitals. However, as we have learnt from the case of the Brussels correspondents, it does not appear to be the number of correspondents alone that has an impact on the level of Europeanization, but also how they are integrated into the editorial culture of the newspaper. Foreign correspondents have in the main been an established part of the newspaper structure for a long time. Reporting about other European countries has a long-standing tradition which allowed routine levels of coverage of other European countries to develop.

The impact of vertical Europeanization on the level of horizontal Europeanization should not be forgotten. We have shown above that the coverage of EU topics also includes more references to other European countries. This suggests that if the trend of vertical Europeanization continues, it is plausible that horizontal Europeanization will catch up. As increasing vertical Europeanization is driven by changes in the editorial mission of a paper, this would probably also be the factor that stands chances of provoking a convergence of the patterns of Europeanization of quality newspapers in the EU.

5

Towards a Pan-European Public Sphere? A Typology of Transnational Media in Europe

Michael Brüggemann and Hagen Schulz-Forberg

The quest for a European public sphere focuses on the Europeanization of national public spheres as opposed to truly transnational spaces of communication. There are two good reasons for this approach, as pointed out in Chapter 1: transnational media are rare, and transnational media do not reach broad audiences in the same way that national media do. Nevertheless, transnational media do deserve closer scrutiny. This chapter will show that a multitude of transnational media have evolved over the last 20 years and that they do have a small, but significant and growing audience. Research on transnational media is underdeveloped, however, owing to the 'methodological nationalism' (Beck 2000a) inherent in much of the research on communication.

Transnational media are understood as media that address audiences across national borders. We will develop a typology of four different types of transnational media: national media with a transnational mission, international media, pan-regional media and global media. For each ideal type, examples of transnational media outlets will be discussed as case studies.

We thereby follow the approach of Chalaby (2002, 2005) who has stressed the need for a cosmopolitan perspective when analysing transnational television stations. The following framework draws on Chalaby's typology of transnational TV but it also goes beyond the focus on a certain technical platform such as TV or print.[1] In an era in which every print or broadcasting outlet has its digital counterpart on the internet, and where web editions are much more than just an appendix to offline media, the focus on specific publishing platforms appears to be too narrow. Transnational media exist on different technological platforms and the different types of transnational media that we will present below are in no way bound to one platform.

Looking back in history, we find that cross-border communication in Europe is by no means a new phenomenon (Requate and Schulze Wessel 2002; Kleinsteuber 2004). In the eighteenth century, a European publication network was established, making international newspapers available in salons and cafés across the continent (Darnton 1995). The nineteenth and early twentieth century saw a thriving publication exchange in Europe, for example in relation to travel writing and information (Schulz-Forberg 2006). As a form of mass media expressly intended to bridge national frontiers, transnational media have proliferated since the Second World War. The breakthrough for transnational media, however, was in the 1980s.

Three developments paved the way for the evolution of a significant number of transnational media in Europe. The first development was the introduction of private TV stations, which also boosted the development of transnational TV programming. Second, the political will of the European Union and its member states has facilitated the opening of the European market for cross-border media ownership, production and consumption with a view to promoting the emergence of a European media market with European players who can compete on a global scale. Media corporations and the European Union are pursuing a common interest, namely the creation of a common European media market (Baisnée and Marchetti 2004: 34). Apart from economic interests, this policy was intended to promote a European public sphere constituted by a diversity of European media in order to generate a general civic identification with the European Union (Council of Europe 2005a; 2005b; European Commission and Bernat 2005). A third development concerns technological innovation. Here, the first quantum leap came with the introduction of satellite broadcasting. The launch of CNN International in 1985 inaugurated a new era of transnational communication. This technological innovation was complemented by the rise of the World Wide Web in the 1990s. The web is not a medium in itself, but a 'media carrier' (Brüggemann 2002: 14) – a technical platform for national as well as transnational media products. The most recent technological development relevant to our topic is digital broadcasting, which eliminates the limitations in the number of frequencies, most of which are already occupied by national media. Thanks to web publishing and digital broadcasting facilities, the costs of creating media products for a global audience have fallen dramatically. Even individuals may reach a global audience with their blogs or websites – if the global audience becomes aware of and is interested in their content.

Transnationalization processes affect media ownership, media content and media audiences in different ways and at different paces. The one thing that has clearly transnationalized but will not be in the centre of this analysis is media ownership. Media corporations have become transnational or global enterprises offering national as well as transnational media products. Transnational ownership facilitates the establishment of transnational or even global media, which requires resources such as personnel and technical equipment for deployment in different countries. Most well-known transnational media belong to large, well-resourced media corporations who own media in different countries; CNN, for example, belongs to Time Warner and Sky News is part of Murdoch's News Corporation.

Since the beginning of the 1990s transnational television channels have developed steadily, their numbers growing from 15 in 1991 to more than 120 in 2003 (Vissol 2006: 53).[2] Most of them are not carriers of transnational political debates, however, as they focus on special interests such as sports (Eurosport), music (MTV) or children's entertainment (Cartoon Network). Nevertheless, nine stations have a significant audience in Europe and are dedicated to general political content: BBC World, CNN International, Euronews, Sky News, CNBC-Europe, Deutsche Welle TV, TV 5 and the two newcomers, France 24 and Al Jazeera English, for which audience figures are not yet available. The reach of some of these stations is impressive: taking together the different services under the CNN brand, this network reaches a billion people worldwide (Vissol 2006: 58). The full-time distribution in Europe of nearly all of the transnational TV stations mentioned above has doubled since 1997 (Vissol 2006: 53).

Of course, access should not be confounded with actual usage. Transnational television channels in Europe have so far acquired no more than 2 per cent of the cumulated audience share in national markets. Euronews, for example, reaches only 3.5 million viewers in Europe per day, although this is more than CNN International and BBC World combined (Euronews 2007). So even the biggest transnational media audiences remain small in absolute terms, but they are growing – in contrast to the audience of general interest channels. More generally speaking, the public sphere is increasingly fragmented: large, general interest media outlets are losing audience shares. Along with many other special-interest media products, transnational media benefit from this trend. The net reach of transnational TV (the exposure of a household to transnational TV in Europe in the course of the day) grew from 18 per cent in 1996 to nearly 30 per cent in 2003 (Vissol 2006: 15).

The transnational audience is located at the top end of the socio-economic scale – no wonder, then, that the advertising revenue of transnational television channels soared from 31 million euros in 1988 to 628 million euros in 2002, a 20-fold increase that compares well with the 2.5-fold increase in total television advertising revenue during the same period (Vissol 2006: 53).

Existing data on cross-border media consumption show that Europeans relate to them in different ways. In large countries that boast a highly integrated national media market, for example in the UK, they have less than 1 per cent audience share, whereas in smaller countries cross-border media score a higher share of cross-border TV consumption. Luxembourg has an audience share of 84 per cent for transnational TV channels, and Ireland scores an impressive 46 per cent (European Audiovisual Observatory 2004: 1). This corresponds very neatly to our findings on country differences presented in Chapter 4 of this volume: newspapers in smaller countries seem to have higher levels of horizontal Europeanization than the press in larger member states.

Four types of transnational media

We will distinguish four types of transnational media: national media with a transnational mission, international, pan-regional and global media. All these media differ from national media in terms of their primary target audience, although national media might also have some degree of transnational outreach. Thus, a national newspaper is a national newspaper not because you can only buy it in a specific country, but because it addresses a national audience. For example, being able to buy the *Guardian* outside Britain does not turn the paper into a transnational one. Although this reasoning might be challenged – the *Guardian* deliberately distributes throughout Europe and even beyond the confines of the continent – while everybody is invited to read the paper, it is nonetheless written and produced with the domestic British audience in mind. The four types of transnational media below, by contrast, deliberately cater for an audience beyond national borders.

(1) National media with a transnational mission. The first category of transnational media basically tries to reach an audience beyond the national territory. Chalaby (2005) calls these 'ethnic media' – a slightly misleading label as a nation-state may well represent a multi-ethnic population, as in fact most nation-states do. Governments may decide

to finance a public TV or radio channel to represent the nation and its values abroad. Such politically-defined missions characterize this kind of media. Democracies as well as authoritarian states may sponsor media for purposes that might range from enhancing multicultural dialogue to spreading propaganda, allowing journalists a greater or lesser degree of independence.

(2) International media. International media are all those media characterized by some form of cooperation between media organizations from two or more countries. Often, international media merge or cooperate for the sake of promoting mutual understanding between the participating countries. International media are designed for and produced by media organizations in two or more nations working together. International media formats are deliberately designed for two or more national audiences.[3]

Types one and two, therefore, are still preoccupied with the idea of the nation – unlike the two following types of media which are clearly post-national and characterized by a target audience spanning across national borders, while the content production and organizational structure does not emanate from cooperation between individual countries. Potentially, these media cater for a global audience.

(3) Pan-regional media. This category comprises transnational media which address a specific world region, for example Europe. Their commitment to cater for, say, a European audience would make them pan-European media. Pan-European media can be distinguished from other transnational media by their scope and intention. A pan-European medium caters for a European public. It is important to remember that when defining pan-European, the geographical reference to Europe is a semantic shifter in so far as Europe's geographical borders are not clearly defined. However, all media subsumed under this category deliberately cater for a Europe as they understand it. Pan-European media are not necessarily confined to Europe in terms of reach, however. While they may reach a global audience, they are distinguished by their deliberately European perspective.

(4) Global media. Some media do not restrict their mission to a specific world region, but target a broad transnational audience. For very few media this may be the general public. Mostly, global media cater for a global, but issue-specific audience such as people interested in the economy or pop music. So while these media might have their major audience

in Europe they are not targeting a European audience. Nor does the term global media imply that the audience is genuinely global. In countries in which sections of the population cannot read and have neither electricity nor internet access, there will be no audience for global media.

The scope covered by these four types of transnational media can be depicted in a quadrangle (see Figure 5.1). Different media outlets, be they TV stations, newspapers or websites, can be placed in this framework in relative proximity to the type of media they most closely represent. They need not necessarily be placed in a specific corner of the framework, and over time they might move away from one ideal type of transnational media and closer to another.

This framework will be further elaborated below in a discussion of different cases of transnational media and their specific positions in the field spanned by the four ideal types presented above. The positioning of real media within this abstract framework is of course a qualitative exercise that requires an in-depth study of each case. The following overview has to remain somewhat superficial in this respect, as we intend to cover all different sorts of media outlets in order to get the broader picture.



Figure 5.1 Typology of transnational media

Case studies: a multitude of transnational media in Europe

National media with a transnational mission

Many states have these kinds of media, most of which are government-funded TV and radio stations broadcast in different languages. One interesting case in Europe is Deutsche Welle. The first Deutsche Welle programme was broadcast in 1953 in German. Today, it defines itself as a tri-media organization combining TV, broadcast mainly in German, English and Spanish, radio programmes in more than 30 languages and a multilingual internet site. Communicating with expatriates abroad is no longer the prime purpose of Deutsche Welle (DW). DW aspires to be 'Germany's media visiting card throughout the world' (Deutsche Welle 2007). The Deutsche Welle Act – the legislation constituting the legal basis of DW – states that the offerings of Deutsche Welle are intended 'to convey the image of Germany as a cultural state in the European tradition and as a free and democratic constitutional state. They should provide a forum in Europe and on other continents for German (and other) points of view . . . with the aim of promoting understanding and the exchange of ideas among different cultures and peoples' (Deutsche Welle 2004). In 2005 DW-TV launched its Arabic service, which presents news in Arabic, anchored by Arabic speakers. Such endeavours to adapt to the target audiences and to promote cultural exchange have weakened the solely national perspective. The idea of making DW a forum to promote a European public sphere was put forward by Kleinsteuber (2003) and received some resonance in the establishment of an editorial department for European issues. The explicit aim to be a 'forum in Europe' and the idea of enhancing intercultural dialogue were added when the Deutsche Welle Act was amended in 2004. DW has thus moved from the very corner of our framework depicted in Figure 5.1 more towards the middle: the former German national broadcaster ('Auslandsrundfunk') is showing a tendency to develop into a global media organization funded by the German state, thus resembling BBC World rather than Voice of America. While the latter is chiefly a US government mouthpiece for public diplomacy, the BBC is proud of its independence. Deutsche Welle lies somewhere in between; it is not directly controlled by the government, but because of the large percentage of national politicians in the broadcasting council that oversees the broadcaster,[4] its autonomy is more limited than the editorial independence of the BBC.

International media

The best example of an international media format is without a doubt the Franco-German TV-channel Arte. This channel, based in Strasbourg and Baden-Baden, went into service as a Franco-German cultural channel in 1991, and was thus born out of an international idea and designed as a communication platform between France and Germany. The name Arte suggests that the channel is solely concerned with arts and culture, but this is not the case. Arte is an acronym from Association Relative à la Télévision Européenne. Its chief executive officer, Jérôme Clément, has been honoured with highly prestigious national awards. He is member of the Ordre national pour la Mérite in France and carries the Großes Verdienstkreuz of the German Federal Republic. This illustrates Arte's political importance and also the expectations placed on it. From its beginning, Arte has constantly broadened its reach and brought in associated members from countries other than Germany and France. Arte states that it is based on Franco-German cooperation and involved in associated partnerships with numerous other public service broadcasting stations in Europe: RTBF in Belgium (since 1993), SRG SSR idée Suisse in Switzerland (1995), TVE in Spain (1995), TVP in Poland (1996), ORF in Austria (1998), YLE in Finland (1999), NPS in the Netherlands (2001), the BBC in the UK and SVT in Sweden (both in 2002). It is, therefore, multinational at present and on its way to becoming a pan-European channel should the national partnerships expand. In the last two years alone, Arte has expanded to cover Italy, Israel and Romania. Since 2002, furthermore, it can be viewed on 13 TV stations in the Balkan region, in Central Asia and in 20 French-speaking African countries (Arte 2004–2005: 13). The main obstacles that Arte faces are related to broadcasting frequencies within the European national media landscape, the interests of other countries' public broadcasting services, and the acceptance of Arte by the viewer. Arte has expanded its satellite distribution by using not only the satellite ASTRA 1 but also Atlantic Bird 3 and Hot Bird. Furthermore, Arte is expanding its terrestrial and cable reach on a continuous basis. As a consequence, Arte was accessible to a total audience of 190 million people by 2003, representing about 80 million households, compared to only 36 million households in 1994 (Arte 2007).

In 2005, after well over ten years of existence, Arte scored up to 3.8 per cent of the market share in France. Competition is much tougher in Germany where similar channels exist – notably 3Sat, another international, albeit exclusively German-language television channel, with a strong focus on culture – although Arte's audience is on the rise.

In 2006, 4.2 million viewers in Germany watched Arte at least once a week for 15 minutes continuously. In France, weekly audience figures reached 9.4 million (Arte 2007). Even with an audience share of less than 5 per cent, Arte, with its commitment to being or becoming 'the European culture channel' (Arte 2007) is one of the flagships of the European media landscape.

As a subgroup of this type of cooperative media, interregional media should be mentioned briefly. These are media that share certain frequencies or formats, or cater for two or more regions in two or more countries. For our purposes, a region is defined here as a district within a national territory, such as Bavaria in Germany or Tuscany in Italy. For example, the German public broadcasting channel for the Polish border region of Brandenburg, Rundfunk Berlin Brandenburg, produces a bilingual programme with the Polish public broadcasting service called 'Kowalski trifft Schmidt' [Kowalski meets Schmidt], which is clearly designed to promote a better understanding between the Polish and the German public. The largest interregional network in Europe, which is also mainly driven by political interest and the ambition to fulfil the European motto 'united in diversity', is Circom-regional, the European Association of Regional Television. Circom was founded in 1973 by a small group of media professionals from public television who agreed that cross-border cooperation is imperative for fostering European integration. Today, Circom is made up of 378 public service television stations in 38 countries and has completed over 250 co-productions, including news magazines, cross-border programmes, programmes for young people and documentaries.

The case of Arte and the development of Circom show the same tendency. Initial bilateral cooperation within the EU tends to expand into EU-wide cooperation, thus moving international media in the direction of pan-European media. This draws them into the middle of the framework depicted in Figure 5.1 above. While Arte began as an international enterprise designed to encourage dialogue and understanding between France and Germany, it is now striving to be pan-European.

Pan-European media

Pan-European media are characterized by their specifically European focus. In most cases, this is not confined to the EU but comes closer to the geographical scope of the Council of Europe. Some media have a deliberate EU focus, however, and understand their European audience as the audience constituted by the EU citizenry. Certain pan-European television channels and print media have been conceived with a view to

identity-building, for example: Euronews, the *European* and the *European Voice*. While the *European*, 'Europe's first national newspaper' as it defined itself, only survived from 1991 to 1999, Euronews and the weekly *European Voice*, published by *The Economist* Group since 1995, are still alive and well. *European Voice* claims to be the only independent newspaper reporting on European affairs: it is 'not – and never will be – tied in any way to a member state, party or point of view'. Nevertheless, *European Voice*, with a distribution of 15,600 copies every week, has only a modest reach (*European Voice* 2007). In the small universe of the EU administration in Brussels, however, *European Voice* is widely read and a powerful voice, integrating the communicative microcosm of EU officials, lobbyists, Brussels correspondents and policy experts.

Euronews is the most ambitious pan-European broadcasting project. While it can be received worldwide, it is tailor-made for a European audience. The seed for the idea of Euronews was planted by the European Commission in the mid-1980s following the disappointing turnout at the second European parliamentary elections in 1984. A common European identity, fostered by a common, multilingual, audiovisual image-generator was regarded as the solution to this problem (Shore 2000). After long debates and some resistance by several member states, Euronews was finally launched on 1 January 1993, hastened by the experiences of the First Gulf War. It was not the war as such that triggered the decision, but the fact that all media companies had to order their images from CNN. Another *raison d'être* of Euronews is to foster a European identity among European citizens (Baisnée and Marchetti 2000, 2004; Machill 1998). It was intended to present news and European culture in order to encourage a better appreciation of Europe's uniqueness and cultural wealth. In stark contrast to these ambitions, however, Euronews merely filters images and newsreels from associated European and Mediterranean channels as well as two global agencies, dubs them in seven European languages[5] and broadcasts them simultaneously in all European countries. Euronews does not produce any original material of its own (Marchetti 2004). However, on its website (www.euronews.net), in a section entitled 'No Comment', the channel has developed quite an innovative way of presenting its stories. Images are presented without any verbal explanations, neither audio nor written. By doing this, Euronews draws heavily on the notion of a common visual understanding throughout Europe. The visual language is intended to overcome the multilingual fragmentation of the pan-European audience.

Euronews has expanded continuously both in terms of audience figures and technologically in terms of audience reach. Over the past five

years, Euronews has nearly doubled its world distribution; today it can be received in 189 million households in 121 countries throughout Europe, the Middle East, Asia, Africa and the Americas via cable, digital satellite and terrestrial channels. Among the top 20 per cent households (in terms of income) in Europe, Euronews is confirmed as a leading news channel in the five leading media markets, namely the UK, Germany, France, Italy and Spain. In the last eight years, Euronews' daily audience almost doubled and now stands at 3.5 million cable and satellite viewers every day plus more than 3 million viewers through broadcast windows for Euronews on other public television stations (Euronews 2007). Thus, whether at an airport in Belgrade or in a Finnish bar, Euronews can be received and is effectively a genuinely pan-European news channel. Euronews belongs to 21 shareholders – public broadcasters from a number of European countries but also from Russia and Algeria. It should be noted that Euronews received millions in subsidies from the European Commission in the past few years. In 2004, four out of 24 hours of Euronews coverage was subsidized by the EU (European Commission 2004). So it is fair to say that the channel depends heavily on this funding.

As noted above, the internet was a technological innovation which lifted some barriers to transnational communication. However, it has not given rise to pan-European online mass media. There are quite a few websites which constitute fora for pan-European debate, but they are neither highly frequented nor well known. Café Babel is one example of this kind of non-commercial site designed to host the discussion of European issues. Then there are sites such as Europa-digital.de (since Spring 2001), EurActiv.com (since 1999), and EUpolitix.com (since 2003), whose primary aim is to explain the EU and its policies. EurActiv is well-known among a small audience of EU policy experts, and Europa Digital is a popular source for students of the European integration process. However, these groups do not constitute mass audiences.

Theoretically, by its very nature, the web could be a pan-European network, linking web pages across borders. Zimmermann's (2006) study on possible Europeanization effects of the internet looked at link structures and search engine results in seven European countries. The study has brought to light alarmingly unenthusiastic results in relation to the internet's influence on the Europeanization process. Internet communication is highly language-bound, and cross-border communication and linkages take place mainly between actors of the same mother tongue. Links are mainly vertical: between national online media and the EU

institutions. There is just as much a lack of horizontal Europeanization on the internet as there is in the quality newspapers analysed in this book.

Global media

Global media cater for a potentially global audience. Examples of this media type are CNN International, Al Jazeera English or the *Financial Times*. BBC World and France 24 fall within this category, but they are also close to the ideal type of national media with a transnational mission. CNN International, BBC World, the *Financial Times* and the respective version of Al Jazeera target an English-speaking global audience. France 24 is a French news channel that was launched, after a long planning period, in December 2006 and broadcasts in English and French. France 24 and Al Jazeera English try to provide an alternative perspective to CNN International, which is perceived as reporting mainly from a US perspective. France 24, with its mission of bringing in a 'French perspective', lies somewhere between CNN and Deutsche Welle – it does not pretend to have a neutral global outlook on news, but neither is it a purely state-owned organization. It is a public-private partnership between the private channel *TV1* and the French state, which subsidizes the channel.

Global media face the challenge that the world is globalized on the surface but deeply diversified in cultural terms. Consequently, audiences in different world regions and countries expect different programmes. Due to dwindling audience ratings CNN International and MTV have had to change their strategy from delivering a homogeneous global feed to drawing up a diversified programme schedule adapted to the various needs of national or regional audiences (Chalaby 2002, 2005). Even within Europe 'transnational feeds are notoriously complex to schedule because lifestyles and viewing habits vary enormously . . . TV prime-time is at 7 p.m. in Scandinavia, 8 p.m. in France and 9 p.m. in Spain' (Chalaby 2005: 166). Thus, even global media have to cater for their audiences in regional, national and local ways if they do not want to lose them.

Although it grew out of a national market, the *Financial Times* is nevertheless a good example of a potentially global newspaper. It is not designed for any particular national audience but for the global business elite. Other examples of global print products are the *National Geographic* and the British *Economist*. A French paper also deserves mention in this context. *Le Monde diplomatique* is a monthly magazine that can be read in Russian, Chinese, Arabic, Spanish, Portuguese, Japanese, and a

considerable number of European languages (German, Greek, English, French, Italian, Norwegian, Serbo-Croatian) and even in Esperanto. With its clear left-wing political affiliation, *Le Monde diplomatique* caters for a global intellectual audience. The magazine is innovative both in its transnational scope and the link between its web edition and the print version. In 2007, it produced over 68 international editions – including 33 web editions. *Le Monde diplomatique* has a remarkable circulation of 1.5 million each month, of which 300,000 appear in French and 250,000 are distributed in France itself while the remaining French issues are distributed in other countries. Transnational print media that cater for a global market are therefore not abundant, but most of them are well-established points of reference within the global media network. The *Financial Times*, *Le Monde diplomatique* and *The Economist* all have a larger audience outside their home countries than at home (see Table 5.1).

The internet should also be mentioned in this context. Internet enthusiasts hope that the new communication platform could become the backbone of a potentially global, truly democratic public sphere as an alternative to the traditional mass media. New features, such as blogs and wikis allow more and more independent forms of global many-to-many communication.

Indymedia is among the best-known independent online media. Founded in 1999 to report on the protests against the World Trade

Table 5.1 Global print media

	***Financial Times*[a] (daily)**	***The Economist*[b] (weekly)**	***Le Monde diplomatique*[c] (monthly)**
International editions	1	1	68 (35 print editions)
Languages	English	English	26
Distribution (2006)			
Home country	133,445	170,038	270,000
Europe	249,671	396,932	–
Abroad	297,024	1,027,674	1,230,001
Total	430,469	1,197,712	1,500,000

Notes: a. Pearson (2007). In addition to the global English edition there is also the *Financial Times Deutschland* published in German, which is not a German edition of the English paper but an autonomous paper with its own editorial department. The German publishing house Gruner&Jahr owns 50 per cent of the *Financial Times Deutschland*. b. *The Economist* (2007); c. *Le Monde diplomatique* (2007).

Organization's meeting in Seattle, it has meanwhile become a global reference point for 'alternative' news presented in eight languages.[6] It is a good example of an issue-based global medium that truly and effectively exploits internet technology both as a means of communication and for the transnational distribution of information. While it is not a clearly-defined journalistic medium, it nevertheless adheres to a minimum of journalistic standards and editorial ethics in relation to fact-finding and truthful reporting: 'The Independent Media Center is a network of collectively run media outlets for the creation of radical, accurate, and passionate tellings of the truth' (Indymedia 2007). However, due to its clear protest orientation and political points of view, objectivity and a variety of opinions that allow the reader to form his or her own opinion are not available on Indymedia. To be sure, the same holds true for some pro-EU websites that promote European news without giving space to critical opinions about the EU. When it comes to measuring the hits on the Indymedia pages, however, many difficulties arise. Since it is networked and not based on one server, the different national sites, for example Indymedia Italy or Indymedia Germany, receive different traffic, and Indymedia does not strive to keep exact statistics, claiming that they 'are not a dot.com' (Indymedia 2007).[7]

In effect, most 'global' media organizations, be they purely commercial like CNN or the *Financial Times*, state-funded like France 24, or civil-society driven like Indymedia, are Western media; even if their ambitions are global, they effectively give a Western perspective on international news. Criticism of the label 'global' media might therefore be justified on this ground. Then again, the same kind of criticism might be applied to the whole concept of globalization, which essentially has a Western slant.

In the context of our research one further observation is noteworthy: large, pan-European media are less common in Europe than transnational media that look beyond the borders of the European continent (Table 5.2).

One reason for this is the distinctly cosmopolitan character of some of the issue-specific audiences that many transnational media cater for. The business elite in particular constitutes an audience with a global rather than European scope.

Conclusion

The pan-European audience is a highly complex and heterogeneous agglomeration of hundreds of millions of people of different languages,

Table 5.2 Different media and their European audiences

	Audience in Europe
Deutsche Welle TV	5.3 million viewers per week[a]
BBC World	0.8 million viewers per day[b]
Arte	4.9 million viewers in Germany 9.3 million viewers in France approx. 15 million viewers in Europe; all figures per day[a]
Euronews	3.6 million viewers per day[b]
European Voice	15,600 copies[c]
Financial Times	0.2 million daily distribution[d]
The Economist	0.4 million weekly distribution[e]
Time	0.4 million weekly distribution[f]
CNN International	1.6 million viewers per day[b]
MTV	–
Eurosport	22 million viewers per day[a]

Notes: a. This data was obtained by request from the respective media organization; b. daily reach 'people meters' Q3 2006 according to Euronews (Euronews 2007); c. according to *European Voice* (2007); d. Pearson (2007); e. *The Economist* (2007); f. *Time Magazine* (2007).

interests and cultures. Pan-European media targeting EU citizens as an audience have to create content that is transnational in the sense of transgressing the national code. The dominance of long-established national media and different editorial cultures hamper this process. National tastes and variations in political language and rituals add to these obstacles. In this difficult setting, cross-border media occupy a difficult ground.

This chapter has shown that, nevertheless, since the 1980s, cross-border media have been growing within Europe. While the global visions of the first cross-border media such as MTV and CNN have given way to adapting content to local and regional needs, and while some of the early enthusiasm waned after setbacks such as the failure of the *European* in 1999, the 1990s still saw the establishment of both major and less significant cross-border media in Europe, such as Arte, Euronews, or the *European Voice*.

Cross-border media have multiplied and gained audiences in Europe for three reasons: (1) the television boom instigated by the opening up of this state-dominated domain to private channels; (2) the creation of a transnational market for media products in Europe; and (3) technological innovations such as satellite broadcasting, digital publishing on the web and digital broadcasting. As legal, economic and technological opportunities for transnational communication multiplied, media companies rose to the occasion.

Undoubtedly, the European transnational communication space is growing and attracting influential elite audiences. As media organizations undergo a process of transnationalization, however, Europeanization occupies a difficult ground. With the exception of Euronews, with its relatively good audience rating (see Table 5.2), the role of pan-European media within the European public sphere is still very modest. This channel, as well as other pan-European media, has mainly been created with the help and support of national or EU authorities. Euronews still receives millions of euros in subsidies from the European Commission. Ultimately, the reasoning behind the European Union and its member states' policy decisions in relation to media revolve around the endeavour to create a common European space of communication, experience and consumption.

So far, pan-European media are not the dominant type of transnational media in Europe, but we do observe continuous developments within our framework of analysis. We have seen how some media develop from national media with a transnational mission into global media, or from being international to pan-European media. Global media, by contrast, have had to regionalize their content. It is hard to predict future developments, but it is entirely conceivable that Europe may indeed become more important in the field of transnational media in the future.

The framework of the four ideal types of transnational media advanced in this chapter is a first step towards a more systematic approach to the study of cross-border communication, and our four types will be useful for future studies. Further research is undoubtedly necessary, as there is a profound lack of robust, comparable data on transnational media. Commercial media research is preoccupied with mapping the business audience and the top income households, and neglects the broader European audience. This audience grew immensely with the accession of twelve new member states to the European Union in 2004 and 2007. Media ownership, media plurality and the whole media landscape in these countries are experiencing profound changes and producing new challenges to research on the pan-European media sphere.

While cross-border media in Europe do create European content and a European perspective, their actual audience comes nowhere near to the almost 500 million people living in the EU's 27 member states. Transnational media are still phenomena at the fringes of the European public sphere. The first slim contours of a future pan-European public sphere are nevertheless visible and constitute a relevant topic for future research.

6
Together We Fight? Europe's Debate over the Legitimacy of Military Interventions

This chapter explores the Europeanization of public spheres in a highly contested area of European integration: the use of military force. It probes into the emergence of a common European security discourse as a 'hard case' of Europeanization and analyses the ways in which speakers in the media have legitimized the use of force, changed domestic norms regarding the deployment of troops, and shifted national security identities in the wake of a new international 'humanitarianism' and interventionism.

In both political science and communication studies much has been written on military interventions and the Europeanization of security policies. Whereas in political science a vast body of literature exists on the institutionalization of security and defence policies in the EU (see for example Smith 2003; Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Carlsnaes et al. 2004), communication studies have frequently examined the role of journalists and the media in wartime (for example Allan and Zelizer 2004; Gilboa 2005; Taylor 1992; Hudson and Stanier 1997; Tumber and Palmer 2004; Wolfsfeld 2004; for a synthesis of the literature see Brüggemann and Wessler 2008). Our analysis, however, takes a different perspective. Rather than focusing on policy developments or the way in which the media contribute to military interventions, we take the legitimacy of military interventions as one possible issue on which the transnationalization of public spheres may (or may not) be observed. Is the development of joint EU policies in this area matched by a Europeanization of media discourses on military interventions in EU member states? Do we observe the convergence of European public spheres in the sense that they increasingly share a similar perception of issue relevance, of problem definitions, cleavage structures, norms, and collective identifications related to military interventions? And if so, what is the scope of this transnationalization? That is, do speakers in

the media increasingly identify with Europe as an emerging intervention community, or rather with the West or the 'civilized world'? Or do we find a prevalence of national cultures and norms on the use of force?

Outline of the case study

Below we first outline the case study and elaborate on the reasons why we consider media discourses on military interventions to be a particularly promising test for the transnationalization of public spheres. The outline furthermore introduces the reader to the interventions examined in this chapter – in Iraq in 1991, Bosnia in 1995, Kosovo in 1999 and Iraq in 2003 – and gives a brief overview of the military and strategic cultures of the countries examined in this book, namely Austria, Germany, Denmark, France and Great Britain. We then analyse the intervention debates in the five countries for two of the four dimensions of transnationalization developed in Chapter 1: discourse convergence and collective identification.

Intervention discourses as a 'hard case' of Europeanization

Media debates on the legitimacy of military interventions offer a 'hard case' for the Europeanization of public discourses. They directly address the sovereignty of European nation-states, which is a highly sensitive area. European nation-states essentially developed out of the monopolization of force and its legitimate use, and their sovereignty remains closely tied to the legitimate monopoly of force (Weber 1980). Security policies are therefore a particularly sensitive area for the development of common norms and identities. Like other policy areas, they are characterized by distinct historical experiences and national legacies. Studies on the convergence of security cultures in Europe indicate, however, that they might be more resistant to change than other policy areas. Heiselberg (2003), for instance, finds that the persistence of national strategic cultures is a major obstacle for the emergence of a common European approach to military interventions. From the analysis by Meyer we learn that although some shifts have occurred, such as an emerging consensus on humanitarian interventions, the normative incomparability among EU member states still remains immense (Meyer 2006: 155–64). We thus expect that discourses on military interventions will generally be less open to processes of 'de-nationalization' (Zürn 2000; 1998) than debates on less sensitive policy areas, such as biotechnology.

Furthermore, intervention discourses largely lack the 'discursive opportunity structures' (Ferree et al. 2002) for Europeanization that characterize many joint policies in the first, supranational pillar of the EU. The institutionalization of security policies at the EU level is a relatively recent phenomenon. Although EU security cooperation was possible under the Maastricht Treaty, it was not until the watershed of the Balkan wars in the 1990s that the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) came into being. In Bosnia and Kosovo, EU countries had to learn that they could not intervene in wars taking place on their doorsteps without the support of NATO forces and hence the approval of the US administration. As late as 2003 the EU also adopted a joint security strategy that identified key threats, such as international terrorism and regional conflicts, as well as defining the strategic objectives of the EU, namely to 'develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention'.[1] In other words, the EU now leads not just on peacekeeping missions, but also on peace-enforcing military operations.[2] It meanwhile has its own rapid reaction force, which operates separately from NATO but has access to NATO resources, as well as an institutional structure for common security decision-making. Despite the common deployment of troops under the European banner, however, the ESDP is still a matter of cooperation between sovereign nation-states. In contrast to supranational policymaking under the first pillar, in the area of security policies EU institutions have only very limited competencies and essential authority remains with the member states.

Interest groups and civil society actors, moreover, hardly play any role at all in European security policymaking. They are involved neither in formal consultations nor to a significant degree in informal lobbying. Instead, advisory committees under the ESDP are staffed with national officials and military experts.[3] Thus, public debates on joint security policies lack both the backbone of strong EU competencies in this area and a 'strong public' at the EU level that might facilitate common security discourses and expand them into the wider space of public debates (Eriksen 2004). If, therefore, institutionalization and European policy networks matter for discursive Europeanization (compare Koopmans 2004; Trenz and Eder 2004), indications are that media discourses on military interventions are Europeanized to a much lesser degree than debates on supranational policies, such as environmental or biotechnological policies, which are embedded within broad policy networks.

Finally, the development of common European security norms and identifications competes with other more established security communities, in particular the transatlantic security community with the US

in NATO and the highly developed normative framework on the use of force by the United Nations. We therefore assume that media debates on military interventions are characterized by multiple transnational references rather than by a unique European perspective. More specifically, in terms of collective identification and the question as to where 'we' belong, close ties with the US and identification with 'the West' might still play an important role and dominate over identification with the emerging European intervention community.

Presumably therefore, public discourses on military interventions are neither open to de-nationalization processes nor subject to a distinct trend towards Europeanization. Instead of converging patterns of issue attention, cleavage structures, norms, and collective identifications among European countries we would expect national differences to prevail. We therefore consider public debates on military interventions as a litmus test for the emergence of a European public sphere. They inform us on the robustness of public transformation processes. If we find at least some indications of Europeanization in this 'hard case', we can safely conclude that the transformation of public spheres in Europe continues even under unfavourable conditions.

Wars as 'formative moments'

If security policies are such a sensitive and persistent policy area, why would we expect any shift at all in deeply-rooted norms and ideas among member states about the appropriate use of force? Drawing on a body of literature focusing on the experience of war as a source of social learning, Meyer suggests that the indirect experience of military conflicts via the media can become a strong impetus for norm change even in countries not directly involved in warfare. If humanitarian and security crises are 'publicized and framed appropriately by the news media to overcome public awareness thresholds and to create empathy for the victims of such violence', they can effectively challenge existing norms on the legitimate use of force (Meyer 2005: 539; see also Meyer 2006: 34). Mediatized crises such as the broadcasting and communication of the tragedies of civilian casualties and the brutality of war can thus become a powerful means for eliciting a redefinition of the legitimate use of force. They might destabilize existing norms and offer an opportunity for norm entrepreneurs such as journalists, politicians and intellectuals to challenge them and to advance new interpretations and standards of the appropriate measure to take (Meyer 2006: 25–6). In a similar vein, Heiselberg argues that humanitarian or security crises can become 'formative moments' for collective identities (Heiselberg 2003). They can

change the narratives and meanings attached to a community, and even create a new community.

Based on these considerations, we concentrate our analysis on the four most intensely debated military interventions since the beginning of the 1990s:

- The intervention against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991 ('Operation Desert Storm') by a coalition force of 34 nations, which was mandated by the United Nations and led by the United States.
- The NATO air strikes in Bosnia in 1995 ('Operation Deliberate Force'), executed after UN peacekeeping missions failed to prevent the Bosnian Serbs from attacking the so-called safe havens of Sarajevo, Srebrenica and Zepa and killing thousands of Muslims.
- The NATO air strikes in Kosovo in 1999 ('Operation Allied Force') to contain the Serbian attacks and displacement policy against Kosovo Albanians. The intervention resulted in a mass exodus of Albanian and Serbian refugees from Kosovo. Moreover, unlike the air strikes in Bosnia, this intervention lacked a formal mandate by the UN since both Russia and China vetoed the operation in the UN Security Council.
- Finally, the war against Iraq launched by the United States and the United Kingdom in 2003, with assistance from a loosely defined 'coalition of the willing'. In this case, the legal basis for the use of force was fragile and contested. While a UN resolution that explicitly sanctioned the use of force failed due to opposition by Russia, France and China, supporters of the war argued that military intervention was legitimized by existing resolutions threatening 'serious consequences' to Iraq should it not comply with the required disarmament obligations.

All interventions took place after the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact had precipitated a dramatic change in world politics and the security environment of European states. While the collapse of the Soviet Union has often been described as a 'critical juncture' for national and international security policies, our analysis probes into the end of the Cold War as an opportunity for the Europeanization of security norms and identities. In the aftermath of the Second World War, Western European countries had already developed into a Deutschian security community, in which interstate wars are unthinkable and stable expectations of peaceful change prevail (Deutsch 1961; Adler and Barnett 1998). Whether, in the circumstances of the new world order,

Europe is also perceived as a community that should intervene in third countries to protect common values and ensure regional security is less clear. Do speakers in the media increasingly identify with Europe not just as a peaceful security community, but also as an *intervention community* that ultimately uses military force to achieve its political objectives? And if so, to what extent is this identity shift sustained by common European norms on the use of force? While territorial self-defence was the primary issue during the Cold War, the humanitarian and security crises of the 1990s confronted Europeans with questions on whether to deploy their troops 'out-of-area', that is, outside their own territories, and also whether to use force to protect humanitarian values rather than just to restore security. Specifically, the Balkan interventions were watershed events for Europe in this respect. After the collapse of the bipolar world order and the rise of US hegemony, European countries moreover had to find new answers on their preferred mode of cooperation and the role of UN multilateralism as a legitimate basis for interventions.

Our selection of intervention debates allows us to examine the 'formative' effects of wars and interventions as well as their robustness. On the one hand, we contrast the intervention against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991 with the subsequent interventions in the Balkans in an endeavour to ascertain whether European intervention discourses and their normative foundations became more assimilated in the course of the 1990s. On the other hand, we compare the Balkan debates to the operation against Iraq in 2003 and analyse whether the possible convergence of intervention discourses has continued beyond the interventions in the European neighbourhood or remained an isolated phenomenon.

The country sample: three ideal types

Since we assume that country differences play an important role in the area of security policies and military interventions, our country sample covers a broad range of cases. It includes three out of four ideal types of armed forces identified by Forster (2006) for Western Europe.[4] We thereby not only increase the representativeness of our analysis, but also ensure that indications of convergence are related to processes of Europeanization rather than prompted by already existing similarities between national intervention discourses.

Our sample includes Austria as a 'post-neutral' country, which is not a NATO member and has 'a basic predisposition against participation in combat operations' (Forster 2006: 65). Austria did not participate in any of the four interventions under inspection in this chapter (see Table 6.1). As a *post*-neutral country, however, Austria has been a member

Table 6.1 Country sample

Country	Ideal type	NATO/ESDP membership	Participation in military interventions
Austria	Post-neutral	Since 1995 ESDP; not NATO member, but participation in the NATO Partnership for Peace Programme	None
Germany	Late modern	NATO and ESDP	Kosovo 1999
Denmark	Late modern	Founding member of NATO, but opt-out from the ESDP	Kosovo 1999 Iraq 2003
France	Expeditionary warfare	ESDP and NATO member (1966–95 solely a member of NATO's political structure)	Iraq 1991 Bosnia 1995 Kosovo 1999
Great Britain	Expeditionary warfare	NATO and ESDP	Iraq 1991 Bosnia 1995 Kosovo 1999 Iraq 2003

Notes: Our media sample includes two newspapers for each country. For Austria: *Standard* and *Presse*; Germany: *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (*FAZ*); Denmark: *Politiken* and *Berlinske Tidende*; France: *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*; Great Britain: *Guardian* and *The Times*. For a detailed account of the sample and our method of analysis see Chapter 2 and Appendix 2.

of NATO's Partnership for Peace Programme since February 1995 and is now willing to participate in low-conflict peacekeeping actions as well as civilian humanitarian tasks. Despite its declared 'everlasting neutrality' ('immerwährende Neutralität'), Austria also has participated in all steps towards the common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) since its accession to the EU in 1995.

At the other end of the spectrum are France and Britain, countries with a strong interventionist tradition. They belong to Forster's ideal type of countries that traditionally espouse 'expeditionary warfare' and are oriented towards the rapid deployment of troops for joint and combined combat operations outside their national territories (Forster 2006: 44). British troops participated in all four interventions analysed in this chapter. French troops were involved in the first three interventions, but did not take part in the war against Iraq in 2003, as the latter was strongly opposed by French decision-makers.

Finally, Germany and Denmark take an intermediate position and belong to the 'late modern' group of European countries. As traditional

'civilian powers', the main task of their armed forces is national defence. In the course of the 1990s, however, they increasingly participated in peacekeeping and military operations. For both, the NATO intervention in Kosovo marked an important turn towards engagement in international warfare. For Germany, it was the first time since the end of the Second World War that its soldiers actively participated in a military operation. The Danish military, moreover, was (and still is) engaged in the war against Iraq beginning in 2003, whereas Germany in this case was more reserved and abstained from sending troops. Yet, despite its increasing support for international military operations Denmark has been reluctant to join the common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and opted out completely after the dramatic failure of the first Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.

Debates on the legitimacy of military interventions: empirical findings

As we have seen, each of the countries in our sample has a different tradition, mindset and experience regarding the use of military force. But does this also result in major differences in the way the legitimacy of military interventions is debated in their media? Or, now that the countries are more integrated in the European Union, have they also begun to see this issue from a similar point of view? In our discussion of the results for our analysis of the media debates we shall first focus on the question of whether a discourse convergence has occurred through a growing similarity in issue attention, in discourse coalitions or repertoires of justification. In a second step, we will focus on changes in the way that collective identities are constructed and evoked in the discourse on military intervention and whether Europe has started to emerge as a relevant object of collective identification.[5]

Issue attention: the relevance of military interventions in the media

We begin our analysis by examining whether the media in the various public spheres have accorded a similar degree of importance to military interventions. As elaborated above, 'mediatized crises' (Meyer 2005: 539), such as articles on civilian casualties and persecution, become powerful triggers for redefining norms on the legitimate use of force. We therefore consider the similarity and convergence of intervention debates in terms of their intensity, a crucial prerequisite for



Figure 6.1 Attention to the issue of military interventions
Notes: Average share of articles on the military intervention per country compared to estimated number of all articles published during the periods of analysis in the newspapers of our sample (N military intervention/N all: 931/13,260 Austria; 1239/22,100 Denmark; 1021/22,100 Germany; 2263/17,680 France; 2229/26,520 Great Britain).

the Europeanization of public spheres. To measure the convergence of issue relevance we look at (1) the overall level of issue attention, (2) the patterns of attention related to the four interventions, and (3) their development over time.

Figure 6.1 allows us to compare the prominence of the issue of military interventions in the public debates of the countries under analysis. It shows for each intervention and country the share of articles with a clear focus on the respective intervention (as indicated by keywords such as 'Kosovo', 'Saddam', or 'Iraq' in the headline or first paragraph of an article) compared to all articles published in the corresponding period of analysis.[6] We find that overall the relevance of military interventions as a subject of public debate varies among the five countries. The legitimacy of military interventions is discussed by far the most intensively in French newspapers, which on average devoted more than every tenth article to this issue. In contrast, newspapers in the second country with an interventionist tradition, Great Britain, only focused on military interventions in 8 per cent of all articles during the periods of

analysis. In the Austrian, German and Danish publications, the debate on the legitimacy of the use of force was only slightly less intense.

If we take a look at the distribution of articles across the four interventions, we find a relatively similar pattern of attention among all countries, though there is no clear-cut convergence. Figure 6.1 shows that the two interventions against Iraq generally received more public attention than the Balkan wars. Despite these similarities, however, crucial differences between the countries remain – and do not continuously narrow over time. Instead, the attention to military interventions among the five countries fluctuates without amounting to a clear trend towards convergence. The Gulf War in 1991 is characterized by the highest attention differential, as indicated by a variation coefficient of 0.7.[7] With almost a quarter of all published newspaper articles focusing on operation 'Desert Storm', the intervention triggered more than twice as much attention in France than in the other countries of our sample. In Austria the debate was fuelled by a request from the allied forces for permission to fly over Austrian territory and was also comparatively intense and thus closely linked to the identity of Austria as a 'neutral' country. In France, the large share of articles probably results from the country's close cultural and political ties to the Middle East.

Similarly, while the crisis in Bosnia triggered a comparatively low level of interest overall in the legitimacy of the NATO intervention, some differences between countries remain. This intervention was more intensely debated in Germany and Austria, both neutral countries that were slowly beginning to redefine their role in the international arena. Even though Great Britain and France had both sent troops to Bosnia, this participation did not stimulate a strong debate during our period of analysis – especially in France the use of military force had already been on the public agenda prior to our sampling period. While European debates over the conflict in Bosnia are therefore marked by a low variation coefficient of 0.3, the attention gap again increased somewhat during the subsequent crisis in Kosovo, when Danish newspapers reported nearly as intensely on the intervention as on 'Desert Storm', while in Austria the debate hit rock bottom.

Finally, the debate on the legitimacy of the use of force intensified in all our countries during the war on Iraq in 2003, when on average 12 per cent of all published articles discussed this issue. The intensity of the debate was the highest in Britain, where the war deeply split the governing Labour Party into a pro-interventionist and a non-interventionist camp, resulting in one of the most serious political crises of the Blair government with a massive rebellion of Labour MPs against their own

government and the resignation of two secretaries of state. The exceptionally high salience of the intervention in the British press was thus closely linked to its relevance for domestic politics and the crisis of the Blair government in garnering partisan support for its interventionist stance.

Thus, no clear trend towards convergence can be identified. The importance of the issue of military interventions differs from one conflict to the next and from country to country according to the dominant type of armed forces in each country as well as country-specific particularities such as cultural and political ties with the target country and the degree of contestation among domestic political actors at the time in question. However, it is important to note that these national particularities do not result in completely different degrees of relevance attached to military interventions. Even in the most deviant cases, country-specific shares of articles diverge by only about 10 percentage points from the average, and the variation coefficient is never higher than 0.7 (for the debates on Iraq in 1991). Taking issue relevance as a possible indicator of the convergence of public discourses, therefore, we found medium similarity in the overall level of attention paid to the issue of military interventions as well as in the patterns of attention, but no convergence over time.

Types of speakers

The concept of discourse coalitions is based on the assumption that public discourses are characterized by contestation and dissent rather than consensus. Particularly in formative moments military operations are far from uncontested. Rather than presupposing an emerging consensus among Europeans, our concept of discourse coalitions therefore suggests that intervention debates might instead become similar in the sense of a 'coordinated dissent' (Eder and Kantner 2000: 308). Discourse coalitions consist of speakers taking the same 'pro' or 'contra' position on the use of force. They thus delineate how public debates are structured by proponents and opponents of military interventions and shed light on the cleavage lines of national discourses and their convergence. We measure the convergence of discourse coalitions by two indicators: (a) the membership of discourse coalitions as indicated by types of speakers and (b) the strength of discourse coalitions as indicated by the distribution of 'pro' and 'contra' positions on military interventions in media debates. As before, we shall analyse these indicators in terms of their similarity across countries and possible signs of convergence.



Figure 6.2 Types of speakers in the debate on military interventions
Notes: Share of types of speakers in all statements on the legitimacy of military interventions in the four periods of analysis (N: 744 Austria; 617 Denmark; 714 Germany; 781 France; 822 Great Britain).

Our first indicator – types of speakers – reveals a highly similar pattern across countries. In all five public spheres, media discourses on military interventions reflect the 'high-politics' character of military operations. They are state-centred and dominated by representatives of the political and administrative system, who account for nearly half of all statements (Figure 6.2). As expected, journalists, too, play an important role in media debates. Actors from civil society, however, are under-represented. Although the Gulf wars triggered a multitude of protest actions by peace activists and massive demonstrations in all countries – with about one million people protesting against the war on Iraq, London in 2003 even experienced the biggest demonstration ever – they account for an average of just 13 per cent of all statements. Most speakers are intellectuals and academic researchers, whereas churches, NGOs and peace activists have a say in merely 4 per cent of all statements.[8] Neither do representatives of the military nor international organizations have much of a voice in intervention debates. Strikingly, EU representatives are often completely ignored by domestic media and on average account for just 1 per cent of all statements. Even during the watershed intervention in Bosnia, they were quoted in only 2 per cent of all cases. Furthermore, despite the growing importance of the EU in foreign and security policies, we find

no development over time among the types of speakers. Instead, with variation coefficients ranging between 0.2 and 0.3 intervention debates show a continuously high degree of similarity in all countries.[9]

Besides their strong bias towards national-level political-administrative elites, media debates are characterized by a high degree of transnationalization. On average, 43 per cent of all speakers quoted in the media are non-nationals, in particular members of the US administration and politicians from other European countries. In Austria they make up more than half of all speakers (Figure 6.2).

Overall, the media thus report on military interventions predominantly as a matter of international diplomacy. They reflect the intergovernmental structure of decision-making on security policies in the EU and other international organizations as well as the weakness of transnational policy networks and issue-specific publics at the European level. Intervention debates therefore largely lack the type of speakers who are considered by many scholars as the driving forces of Europeanization (see for example Trenz and Eder 2004).

These general findings do not change if we take a look at each discourse coalition separately. Be they proponents or opponents, politicians always have the strongest voice during any debate on the use of military force, followed by the voice of the media themselves. The main difference between the two coalitions is the role of civil society, which is much larger among those opposing military interventions, regardless of whether the troops are sent to the Balkans or to the Middle East. Not only church officials but also experts and intellectuals tend to oppose the use of force in all countries under analysis. The similarity in membership structure is therefore fairly high for both coalitions during all four interventions (with variation coefficients lower than 0.5). In the case of the opponents, there is even a small convergence trend as the membership structure becomes increasingly similar from the debate on Bosnia to the discussion of an intervention in Iraq 2003 (moving from a variation coefficient of 0.5 for Bosnia to 0.2 for Iraq 2003).

Cleavage structures

Similar to the salience of military interventions in the media, the strength of 'pro' and 'contra' coalitions indicates a conflict-specific pattern of intervention discourses rather than convergence over time. Europeans are by and large united in their support for interventions on their doorstep. Interventions in the Gulf region, however, are more contested, and the war on Iraq in 2003 was mostly opposed by domestic speakers (see Figure 6.3).[10] These similarities notwithstanding, we find



Figure 6.3 Cleavage structure for domestic speakers in the debates on military interventions

Notes: Share of pro/contra statements by domestic speakers in all statements on the legitimacy of military interventions in the four periods of analysis (N: 744 Austria; 617 Denmark; 714 Germany; 781 France; 822 Great Britain).

no evidence that the cleavage structures of public debates have converged since the 1990s. Instead, the range between the lowest and the highest share of contra-statements in the debates is the smallest for the discussion of the first Iraq intervention in 1991 (21 percentage points). The gap then increases during the crises in Bosnia, diminishes slightly for the Kosovo debate but reaches its peak during the second Iraq intervention. Here the share of domestic speakers opposing the use of military force differs by 37 percentage points: while in Germany no fewer than 91 per cent of speakers argue against the intervention, their role in Denmark is limited to 54 per cent.[11]

However, if we take into account not just domestic speakers but also foreign speakers quoted in domestic media, the gap closes for all four interventions (Figure 6.4). In the case of the German debate on Iraq in 2003, for instance, foreign speakers compensated for the shortfall of domestic proponents by largely voicing support for sending troops. They counterbalanced the quasi-hegemony of domestic opponents of the war and in that way moved the German debate closer to the media discourses of its European neighbours. The relatively high degree of transnationalization which characterizes public debates on military interventions



Figure 6.4 Cleavage structure for all speakers in the debates on military interventions

Notes: Share of pro/contra statements by all speakers in all statements on the legitimacy of military interventions in the four periods of analysis (N: 744 Austria; 617 Denmark; 714 Germany; 781 France; 822 Great Britain).

thus leads to a minor harmonization effect. It levels out the differences between domestic discourse coalitions and contributes to a more similar cleavage structure of public debates in the media. This is particularly true for the debate on the second Iraq intervention, where the range is reduced from 37 to 22 percentage points.

We observe the same effect in other intervention debates as well. For instance, in the case of the NATO air strikes in Bosnia, the international orientation of domestic media again partly ironed out differences between domestic discourse coalitions. In contrast to the overall sceptical stance against the war on Iraq, the use of force in the Balkans was largely supported by domestic actors in the media. The level of support varied considerably, however. It was very high among German and Danish actors, where advocates of the air strikes succeeded in dominating the debate to such an extent that opponents hardly had a voice in public discourse (Figure 6.3). As the example of Austria shows, even in a country with a strong non-interventionist tradition, the debate over intervention in Bosnia was characterized by a discourse strongly in favour of military force. To be sure, as a neutral country, Austria did not consider sending its own troops. But there was obviously a strong

discursive backing of the intervention by NATO forces among domestic actors. By contrast, in the expeditionary warfare country Britain the contra coalition was bolstered up by the 'realism' of the Conservative government, which was afraid that military operations would escalate rather than settle the conflict and in the end agreed to the intervention only under the condition that no ground troops would be sent. While variations between domestic discourse coalitions were therefore as high in the case of the Iraq debate, foreign speakers again contributed to harmonizing the differences. They strengthened the contra coalitions in all countries except Britain, and thereby made public debates both more balanced and more similar (Figure 6.4). For instance, in Denmark, the small share of opponents increased by 50 per cent due to the import of statements by UN Security Council members, in particular British and Russian representatives.

Mainly due to the growing opposition in Germany and Denmark, the Kosovo intervention witnessed a generally greater similarity among the countries. For Germany, it was the first time since the Second World War that the *Bundeswehr* participated in a combat mission. Although the opponents of the use of force therefore enjoyed a somewhat greater popularity than during the crisis in Bosnia, they were far from dominating the debate in the media. On the contrary, together with their British counterparts, the German 'pro' coalition was actually among the strongest in our sample. In both countries, the governments – Labour in Britain and the newly elected coalition of Social Democrats and the Green Party in Germany – as well as large sections of the opposition were strongly in favour of the intervention. While in Austria and Denmark as well the 'pro' coalitions were clearly stronger than the opponents of intervention, the more sceptical stance of the French debate constitutes an exception. Here, the initial support for the NATO intervention in Kosovo broke down when the Serbs reacted to the air strikes with an intensified 'ethnic cleansing' of the region. Again, however, the international orientation of the media partly irons out the differences. External quotations strengthened the opposition against the use of force in all countries except for France, where they reduced the high share of contra statements. As a consequence, we find relatively similar cleavage structures in the media, with a range as low as 12 percentage points (Figure 6.4).

Our analysis furthermore shows that external quotations can even compensate for the elite bias of domestic newspapers. This takes effect specifically in the German and Austrian debates on operation 'Desert Storm' against Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Although in both countries the pro-interventionist stance of the political elites was counteracted by

a high degree of societal mobilization against the US-led intervention, the latter hardly found its way into the quality newspapers analysed. The relatively high degree of support for the intervention among German and Austrian speakers was therefore partly an outcome of the elite versus mass structure of the debates in both countries.[12] Particularly in Austria, however, this was partly compensated by the transnational orientation of the media, which contributed to a more balanced account of the intervention and considerably reduced differences between the five countries.

Frames and patterns of justification

Frames and patterns of justification shed light on the normative basis of public discourses on the legitimacy of military interventions. They tell us whether European discourses increasingly share the same repertoires of justifications and norms on the use of force. In contrast to the previous sections on structural (dis)similarities of intervention discourses, this part thus creates a direct link to the debate on norms convergence in Europe. It is based on the assumption that speakers in the five public spheres increasingly draw on the same standards of appropriate behaviour, even though they hold different positions on the use of force and accord different levels of importance to the topic. In what follows, we examine first which normative frames prevail in intervention discourses in the media and whether they converge among the five countries. We then shed light on patterns of justifications, that is, on the way in which speakers draw upon frames in legitimizing or delegitimizing the use of force.

Frames give us the broad picture of a debate. In contrast to justifications, they do not relate to particular positions, but give us an idea about the norms that are dominant in public debates and how the problem under discussion is defined by the public speakers. In our preliminary qualitative analysis we distilled five different frames that play an important role in media discourses on military interventions. Table 6.2 gives an overview of our frames and the possible justifications that can be derived from them.

While reasons for the use of force can range from defence against attacks on the home territory to territorial aggrandizement, in the debate on the legitimacy of Western military interventions the dominant reasons put forward for the use of force are international security or regional stability and the promotion or protection of humanitarian values. Hence, we assume that actors legitimize or delegitimize military interventions by

Table 6.2 Frames and justifications on the use of force

Frames	Justifications	
	Pro	**Contra**
Security	Military intervention is necessary to stabilize the region/to ensure international security	Military intervention destabilizes the region/ threatens international security
Human rights	Military intervention is necessary to stop human rights violations and/or install democracy	Innocent people will die in the course of military intervention. Therefore we should not intervene
Credibility	If we do not intervene now, the UN/NATO/the West will lose their credibility	The arguments of the supporters of an intervention are not credible. Therefore the use of force is illegitimate
Force as last resort (*ultima ratio*)	All other attempts to solve the conflict have failed/are bound to fail. Therefore military intervention as a last resort is unavoidable and legitimate	The use of force is neither the last resort nor unavoidable. More peaceful means are a better way out
International law	International law is violated, therefore we need to intervene	Military intervention breaches international law and is hence illegitimate

framing them in 'realist' terms – as issues of international security and/or regional stability – or in 'liberal' terms of humanitarian values. They might justify the use of force as necessary for stabilizing the region and reinstalling security, or they might oppose intervention on the grounds that it might result in more regional instability. Likewise, actors might press for intervention to stop human rights violations and/or install democracy, or they might delegitimize human rights justifications by pointing out that intervention would increase the suffering of innocent people. Related to the debate over the legitimate ends of military interventions is the credibility of those institutions that stand for common values, for example the credibility of the UN, or of the actors urging the use of force, such as the US in the case of the intervention against Iraq.

Another important frame in the debate over the legitimacy of military interventions is force as a last resort (*ultima ratio*). The question at issue here is whether all other peaceful means such as international diplomacy and sanctions have been exhausted and failed, or whether 'more

time for sanctions' is needed, as claimed frequently by the opponents of the war on Iraq. Should we take action to defend human rights and/or restore security by military means, or should we take a more cautious approach?

Finally, frames on the legitimate mode of international cooperation span from neutrality through multilateralism to unilateralism. UN multilateralism in particular has been frequently at issue in debates over military interventions since the 1990s. Are military interventions only legitimate if they are based on international law and a mandate by the UN Security Council, or should we restore international peace even without a UN mandate? Only in the latter case would cooperation between preferred partners, such as a 'coalition of the willing', be considered legitimate.

In all cases, actors can refer to the respective frame by taking either a 'pro' position or a 'contra' position. For instance, they might evoke the security frame by arguing that an intervention is necessary in order to stabilize the Middle East or the Balkans. Likewise, they might refer to the frame in a delegitimatory manner, claiming that the use of force would destabilize the region even further.

Figure 6.5 sheds light on the distribution of frames across the five public spheres. It shows that in all conflicts the way in which force is used (*ultima ratio*) was the prevailing issue in debates over military interventions. On average, 44 per cent of all statements justifying or delegitimizing the use of force referred to force as a last resort. Even during the Gulf war in 1991, when Iraq ignored all demands to withdraw its troops from Kuwait and defied all resolutions and ultimatums of the UN Security Council, on average every second statement entailed an *ultima ratio* logic. The big picture thus suggests that the legitimacy of military interventions is not primarily an issue of what to fight for or not. Rather, the hotly debated question in Europe is whether and when to use force. Europeans mainly wrangle over whether the military should intervene as soon as possible or whether there is still a chance of solving the conflict by peaceful means such as sanctions and peace talks. This holds true for all countries in the sample. Even in Britain and France, the two countries with a tradition of expeditionary warfare, military interventions are primarily a matter of whether to use force at all at a given time.[13] Hence, European policymakers might send troops and wage wars. In all cases, however, they face strong public pressure to justify why the use of force is unavoidable.

While the norm that force is only legitimate as a last resort is relatively stable across all conflicts and countries, the prominence of other



Figure 6.5 Frames in the debate on military interventions

Notes: Share of frames in all statements on the legitimacy of military interventions in the four periods of analysis (N: 744 Austria; 617 Denmark; 714 Germany; 781 France; 822 Great Britain).

frames has changed. In 1991 the violation of international law by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was frequently at issue, mainly as a justification for intervention (Figure 6.5). In Bosnia, by contrast, and even more so in the case of intervention in Kosovo, human rights justifications played a

major role. With the notable exception of France, 'hawkish humanitarians' so successfully framed the Kosovo intervention as a moral obligation to protect human rights that the question whether force should be used at all became a secondary issue in most countries. During the war on Iraq in 2003, however, the human rights frame lost salience as well as persuasive power. Although the New Right in the US promoted the intervention as a matter of establishing democracy, freedom and human rights in Iraq, their framing resonated only faintly in Europe, where the normative basis of the intervention was more divergent. While force as a last resort played the most crucial role, mainly in terms of 'more time for sanctions', the legal basis of the intervention, the credibility of those advocating the use of force, and to a lesser degree regional security issues were also more salient in most countries than the human rights frame.

Figure 6.5 shows a relatively similar distribution of frames among the five countries, but again we find no convergence over time. Instead, variation coefficients fluctuate marginally and remain stable only for the *ultima ratio* frame (at a value of 0.2).[14] If we take as a basis the bivariate correlations among the countries as measured by Pearson's *r* (Figure 6.6) we even find that the normative foundations of intervention debates tend to become more dissimilar rather than more similar over time.[15] The distribution of frames was very similar during the first three interventions, when all countries reached high correlation values of at least 0.7. Only the French Kosovo debate stands out, mainly due to the low importance given to the human rights frame (see below for further details). In contrast, the discourses on the latest intervention in Iraq are marked by just moderate levels of bivariate correlations (0.5 on average). In particular the Danish and French debates were at quite a distance from the normative framework of debates in the other countries. Danish speakers put more emphasis on the credibility of the US administration and its justifications for the war as well as on the threats by Iraq – be it through weapons of mass destruction and terrorism or the repression of the Iraqi people. In France, by contrast, security issues hardly played a role as compared to other national discourses. The war on Iraq has thus contributed to a pluralization of frames used in public debates, rather than their convergence.

If we take a look at justifications rather than the overall frames referred to by proponents and opponents of military interventions, we again observe no general trend towards convergence (Figure 6.7). Yet, as in the case of discourse coalitions, we find that the import of opinions from abroad tends to even out country differences. To pick out one example, during the second Iraq intervention domestic speakers varied



Figure 6.6 Convergence in the use of frames in the debates on military interventions

Notes: Average bivariate correlations of the shares of frames in all statements on the legitimacy of military interventions in the four periods of analysis (N: 744 Austria; 617 Denmark; 714 Germany; 781 France; 822 Great Britain).

widely in their assessments of whether the use of force would improve international security. Foreign voices, however, helped to at least neutralize the German and Austrian debate where the majority of domestic speakers voiced the opinion that an intervention would only destabilize the region further. While this view might in hindsight seem somewhat prophetic, it differed strongly from the opinions voiced in the other European public arenas. Including foreign speakers therefore lowers the variation coefficient from 0.5 to a more moderate value of 0.3. Particularly in the case of the Iraq debate, we observe a similar effect for a number of justifications, among them the use of human rights as an argument against intervention, as well as the *ultima ratio* argument that there was no more time for sanctions. External speakers thus contribute not just to an alignment of public discourse cleavage structures on military interventions, they also tend to level out different national patterns of justification with respect to the use of military force.

For most justifications the variation coefficients vary only slightly from one intervention to another without displaying any clear patterns or trends. However, we find one notable exception: in all countries, media discourses more or less converge on the absence of a mandate by the UN Security Council as the prime argument against the use of force



Figure 6.7 Convergence of justifications in debates on military interventions
Notes: Pro/contra bias of frames in percentage points (that is share of statements using the frames as a justification for the intervention less the share of statements using them against) in all statements on the legitimacy of military interventions in the four periods of analysis (N: 744 Austria; 617 Denmark; 714 Germany; 781 France; 822 Great Britain).

(that is the variation coefficient for this justification diminishes continuously from 0.4 to 0.2). UN multilateralism has been frequently at issue in debates over military interventions since the 1990s, and while there is no clear pattern of convergence concerning international law

as a positive legitimation for military operations, Europeans are increasingly united in their opposition to interventions that are not backed by a UN mandate. Even in Britain, the decision to conduct a war against Iraq in 2003 without a UN mandate was highly contested, although the country played a leading role in the 'coalition of the willing'.

Despite this lack of convergence, in general the level of similarity in the use of justifications is strikingly high. In almost all interventions a consensus is reached on the overall bias for most of the frames (see Figure 6.7). In all analysed media debates, the majority of speakers agree on the question of whether international law can be used to justify the intervention: during the first intervention against Iraq and the Bosnia crisis international law is predominantly used as an argument for the use of force, while during Kosovo and Iraq 2003 the majority of speakers in all countries use international law as an argument against the intervention. The human rights frame is also employed identically by the majority of speakers in all countries in all interventions, with two exceptions. Only the Danish do not predominantly use human rights to call for a military intervention against the Iraqis in 1991, and the French speakers are strikingly reluctant in the use of human rights as a reason to intervene in Kosovo. With few exceptions, the bias of the frame of international security and regional stability is also quite similar in all analysed debates. Only the British predominantly use regional stability as an argument against the use of force in Bosnia, while the Austrians are most sceptical in the debate over the Kosovo intervention. For Iraq 2003, the use of this frame is almost balanced in Austria, Germany and France, while speakers in Britain and Denmark mostly argue that the intervention is needed to ensure international security. As far as credibility justifications are concerned, similarity is noticeably less. In every intervention at least one country disagrees with the others over whether credibility is an argument for or against the use of force. Finally, the *ultima ratio* frame is not only the dominant frame in all public discussions over the legitimacy of military interventions, it also appears to be the most controversial: only during the crisis in Bosnia do the majority of speakers in all arenas agree that no other options to a military intervention remain – and even here the bias is considerably weaker in Austria and Great Britain. In all other cases, the public debates differ in their overall opinion on whether the *ultima ratio* logic should be applied as an argument for or against the use of force.

Apart from the growing opposition against interventions that are not backed by a UN mandate, we find no normative convergence among European countries. In fact, overall differences in the problem

definitions between the countries have increased rather than decreased. Thus, rather than identifying the emergence of a common strategic culture in Europe we find that national differences still colour public discourses on the legitimacy of military interventions.

Collective identification in debates on military interventions

In contrast to the cross-issue quantitative content analysis the results of which were discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the case studies allowed us to delve deeper into the phenomenon of collective identification as expressed in public deliberation. The debate on the legitimacy of military interventions seemed especially promising in this respect, as the use of military force is not only one of the core pillars of national sovereignty, but is also a very emotionally charged issue which is strongly affected by and in turn affects national self-conceptions and experiences concerning war, violence, destruction and self-preservation.

The issue-specific indicators developed as part of the preliminary qualitative study (as described in detail in Chapter 2 and Appendix 2) allowed us to capture not only a great variety of forms of expression of collective identification – expressions of belonging and of historical and cultural commonalities – but also the scope of the collective identity evoked. Is it national identities that are strengthened in the debate over military interventions by references to the respective national experience of the Second World War? Or is it instead the collective suffering of all European countries under the Nazi yoke that is invoked, thereby creating a sense of European identity?

According to our multidimensional concept of the transnationalization of public spheres, the Europeanization of collective identification may occur in two forms. Either all European countries may use increasingly similar expressions of collective identification, that is, *convergence* occurs in this dimension, or there may be an increase in references to a collective identity on a European scale, for example the European 'we' may increasingly become part of national security identities when Western military interventions are debated. The latter question will therefore also afford us an opportunity to contrast any possible signs of Europeanization with other transnationalization patterns of public spheres, such as Westernization – as already systematically carried out for all other dimensions.

To discuss our results concerning these two possible forms of Europeanization of collective identification, the next section will give an



Figure 6.8 Collective identification in debates on military interventions
Notes: Share of identity references in all statements on the legitimacy of military interventions in the four periods of analysis (N: 744 Austria; 617 Denmark; 714 Germany; 781 France; 822 Great Britain).

overview on the general salience of collective identities in intervention discourses as well as on general patterns of identification. In a second step we then concentrate on processes of Europeanization that have emerged despite continuing national differences.

Figure 6.8 gives an overview of the percentage of statements referring to the home country, Europe, the West or the world for each country as well as overall. It shows, first of all, that collective identification plays quite an important role in media discourses on military interventions. Of all coded statements, utterances referring to collective identities account for 28 per cent on average. Speakers in public discourses thus frequently refer to both the legitimate use of force and its constitutive role for state identities. They consider military interventions not just as a question of 'what shall we do', but also of 'who we are'.

The share of identity statements varies considerably between the countries, however (Figure 6.8). Whereas in Austria collective identities are touched upon in only a fifth of all statements concerning military interventions, they are significantly more salient in Denmark, where 37 per cent of all statements refer in one way or another to collective identities. In France, identities are discussed in almost a third of all statements, while in Great Britain and Germany the question of collective identity is also touched upon in at least a quarter of the debate content.



Figure 6.9 The divergence of collective identifications
Notes: Variation coefficients based on shares of identity references in all statements on the legitimacy of military interventions in the four periods of analysis (N: 744 Austria; 617 Denmark; 714 Germany; 781 France; 822 Great Britain).

Wide variations also characterize the salience of specific security communities in public debates. Whereas in France and to a lesser extent in Britain the nation is by far the most important point of reference, in Germany and particularly in Denmark conceptions of an intervention community reach beyond the nation-state into Europe, the West and/or the 'civilized world' (Figure 6.8). In terms of variation coefficients, we actually find the highest variation between the countries in this dimension. On average, variation coefficients range between 0.4 in the case of the first Iraq debate and 0.6 in the case of the Kosovo debate and the second Iraq debate (Figure 6.9). Their steady increase moreover indicates that country differences have widened rather than narrowed since the 1990s. Collective identifications are thus the only dimension where we find a relatively stable trend over time in intervention discourses, albeit a trend towards divergence rather than convergence.[16]

Despite the overall divergence of collective identifications, our analysis reveals a nascent trend towards Europeanization. We find that overall, speakers in the media increasingly identify with Europe – even if the debate concerns the Gulf region rather than the Balkans (Figure 6.10). While identification with Europe was virtually absent during the first intervention in Iraq, in the course of the Balkan interventions up to



Figure 6.10 Identity references per intervention
Notes: Share of identity references in all statements on the legitimacy of military interventions in the four periods of analysis (N: 744 Austria; 617 Denmark; 714 Germany; 781 France; 822 Great Britain).

9 per cent of all statements referred to Europe as a community. European identification became somewhat weaker again during the latest war on Iraq as compared to the intervention in Kosovo, but still remained at a higher level than at the time of the Bosnian crisis. Despite European disunity over the war on Iraq, in public debates the trend towards identification with Europe has thus by and large continued and seems to be robust against political struggles and especially in the light of the actual decision-making powers of the EU. Although identification with Europe is still only nascent, our analysis suggests that Europe as a security community increasingly plays a role in intervention discourses. By contrast, identification with the West and the civilized world fluctuates and shows no clear trend whatsoever, and a sense of national identity appears to have decreased (Figure 6.10).

If we take a look at how patterns of identification are distributed over time in each country, we find that the trend towards Europeanization is most pronounced in Austria (Figure 6.11).[17] Here, identification with Europe as a security community has both continuously increased and superseded the nation as a reference point for collective identification. Besides the trend towards Europeanization, Western values and references to the NATO as an intervention community have also become more prominent. Both trends are closely related to the country's departure from its neutrality in foreign policy. While historically, Austria had



Figure 6.11 Collective identification per intervention for each country
Notes: Ratio of identity references to all references to collective identities in statements on the legitimacy of military interventions in the four periods of analysis (N: 174 Austria; 364 Denmark; 247 Germany; 285 France; 279 Great Britain).

long refrained from participating in any military cooperation and understood itself as a neutral mediator in international politics, it gradually redefined its role and in 1995 became a member of the EU as well as the NATO Partnership for Peace. Our analysis shows that this shift in foreign policy had strong backing from speakers in the media. Whereas national



Figure 6.11 (*Continued*)

self-perceptions, besides conceptions of the civilized world, still dominated the debate in 1991, all subsequent intervention discourses were characterized by the prevalence of identifications with Europe and the West. Even in the controversies over the war in Iraq in 2003, Europe and the West were more often the subject of collective identifications than the nation and the world. For the first time, opponents of the use of force now also referred to the EU as the guardian of both Austrian and European values. While they had formerly emphasized national



Figure 6.11 (*Continued*)

self-perceptions of Austria as a neutral country, they now considered Austria as part of the European community of values. To be sure, the neutrality of the country still plays an important role in Austrian identity discourses. But it is increasingly considered as reconcilable with Austria's membership in the common European foreign and defence policy and the transatlantic Partnership for Peace.

In Germany and Denmark we observe a similar trend towards Europeanization. Notwithstanding their 'civilian' stance in foreign policy, during the Balkan crises they both – for the first time since the Second World War – sent their own troops into combat, or so-called 'robust' peacekeeping missions. At the discursive level, they thereby partly redefined their security identities. In Germany a discursive shift from 'no more war' to 'no more Auschwitz' among left-wingers occurred in the course of the Balkan interventions (see in more detail Schwab-Trapp 2002). In Denmark, the crisis in Bosnia marked a similar turning point, when the then foreign minister, Helveg Petersen, supported the deployment of NATO troops – against the long-standing pacifist tradition of his own party, the left-liberal Radikale Venstre. Petersen thereby played a similar role in Denmark as the German Green foreign minister, Joschka Fischer. Both radically broke the mould of the pacifist left and became symbols of a new, leftist interventionism in the name of morality and human rights.

Although identity questions were therefore highly relevant in both countries, they played out differently. In the German discourse 'the ugly head of our own past'[18] (as the then minister of defence, Rudolph Scharping, put it; quoted in *Süddeutsche Zeitung* of 26 March 1999) was at issue, as were the lessons of the Third Reich for the country's role in the new global security community. In a widely quoted speech in the German Bundestag, Joschka Fischer justified the involvement of German soldiers in NATO air strikes in Kosovo by the historical responsibility of Germany to prevent the bloody past from reoccurring. He said, 'If we have learnt from our own past and from the bloody first half of the twentieth century, there must be no warmongering any more in Europe by anybody and for any reason whatsoever'[19] (Plenarprotokoll of 16 October 1998, quoted in Schwab-Trapp 2002: 257). Particularly during the Balkan interventions the German discourse was thus marked by a preoccupation with its own history. It was only during the second Iraq debate that identification with Europe became more important than national identity, when opposition to the intervention was no longer predominantly grounded in the German Nazi past, but in European values, traditions and historical experiences against those of the US. Despite the country's preoccupation with the legacy of the Second World War, German identity constructions thus became less self-centred in the course of the four interventions. Instead, the process of redefining Germany's security role in the world went hand in hand with the Europeanization of collective identities.

In contrast to the initial preoccupation of German speakers with their own history, we find a highly transnationalized identity discourse in Denmark right from the start. Here, identity statements referring to Europe, the West and the world are all far above average, whereas references to Danish identity are only marginal. For Danish speakers, therefore, the question of 'who we are' did not predominantly pertain to their own national identity, but to the European and Western community of values as well as the civilized world. Also, when the commitment of Denmark to the 'coalition of the willing' against Iraq was at issue, speakers rarely referred to the Danish nation-state as a focal point for identity constructions. Instead, political quarrels between European and Western countries over the intervention fuelled reflections on the (dis)unity of the Western and global community of values as well as on the role of Denmark in the EU as a security community.

Most remarkably, in Denmark, a country that had opted out of the common European Security and Defence Policy, the trend towards Europeanization is more pronounced than in any other country in our

sample. Here, identification with Europe constantly increased, from 12 per cent during the 1991 intervention against Iraq to more than a third of all identity references during the war in 2003. Opponents of the war in 2003, in particular, frequently referred to 'old', traditional European values such as solidarity, negotiations and consensus and emphasized their resonance with the social-democratic Danish identity. In the course of the humanitarian crises in the Balkans and the war against Iraq in 2003, however, Danish reservations against the EU common foreign and security policy lost more ground and even Eurosceptics recognized the EU as a guardian of international law and humanitarian values in world politics. For instance, during the Gulf war in 2003 Pernille Frahm, a well-known Eurosceptic and member of the European Parliament for the Socialist People's Party, advocated the participation of Denmark in the common European foreign and security policy. 'Since the [Second World] War, the [Danish] sovereignty has been, in my opinion, just a pawn in the game of the respective American president. Do we really prefer this to a common European security and foreign policy?'[20] Danish Europeanization is thus not just a matter of quantitative change, but also of qualitative modifications. In the course of the intervention debates, speakers in the media partly redefined the role of Denmark vis-à-vis the common European foreign and security policy and prepared the discursive ground for Danish membership of the club. While in the first Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which resulted in the country's opt-out from the CFSP, the European security community had been rejected as a step towards a European army and a threat to national sovereignty, it has become increasingly advocated as a guardian of Danish values.

Finally, in France and Britain the trend towards Europeanization is less stable than in the other countries of our sample. Although in both countries identification with Europe increased in the course of the Balkan interventions, during the war against Iraq in 2003 national identifications became more prominent again. Particularly in Britain, the share of identity statements referring to the British nation-state increased dramatically. Yet, this should not mislead us into concluding that in Britain a trend towards national self-centredness has taken hold. Rather, British speakers have increasingly scrutinized Britain's place in the world. Specifically during the highly contested war in Iraq in 2003, Britain's relationship to the US and countries of the European Union was frequently at issue. As in preceding intervention debates, the cleavage line of the British discourse ran right along the left-right divide. While for most Conservatives Britain's 'special relationship' to the US remained beyond

question, the left frequently referred to European values and the EU as the better alternative. As then Prime Minister Tony Blair, who otherwise closely followed the policy of the US administration, put it, 'Britain's place lies at the heart of Europe' (quoted in the *Guardian*, 10 February 2003). Rather than showing a robust trend towards Europeanization, the British discourse is thus characterized by a stalemate between an Atlanticist right and a more European-oriented left.

In France, identification with *la Grande Nation* is generally stronger than national identifications in other countries. Yet, even here, we observe that European values and historical reference as well as expressions about 'we Europeans' have increasingly played a role in intervention discourses. During the Kosovo debate, European identity even became a leitmotif for both proponents and opponents of the intervention. 'Europe is born in Kosovo' proclaimed the advocates and praised the newly-won unity of European powers in their fight against a dictator. In the view of the opponents, 'Europe dies in Kosovo', as Europeans bombarded a fellow European country blindly following the American ideology of 'Good' versus 'Evil'. Growing European identification nevertheless remained the common denominator of both camps. During the war on Iraq in 2003, however, identification with Europe dwindled; apparently the controversies between 'old' and 'new' Europe in this matter had taken their toll.

Overall, our analysis of collective identifications has revealed insights into some of the most remarkable developments in European intervention debates. We find, first, that the countries with a traditionally non-interventionist stance in security policy – in particular Germany and Denmark – have partly redefined their collective identities in a way that moves them closer to countries with an expeditionary warfare tradition. Backed by identity discourses on their own past or their role in Europe, they now accept the use of force as an ultimate means for protecting humanitarian values. Notwithstanding a lack of overall convergence, our analysis furthermore shows that identification with Europe increasingly plays a role in intervention discourses. Even in countries with a neutral stance in security policy such as Austria, or with a strong domestic divide between proponents and opponents of further EU integration, as in the case of Denmark, references to common European values, traditions and experiences have gained ground. European intervention debates are hence characterized by a clear, albeit nascent trend to Europeanization. Exceptions are Britain and France, where identification with Europe diminished during the most recent intervention against Iraq.

Summary and discussion

This chapter has focused on the convergence of media debates on military interventions. It analysed how speakers in public debates have legitimized the use of force, changed their norms regarding the deployment of troops, and shifted their security identities in the wake of a new international 'humanitarianism' and interventionism.

Table 6.3 summarizes our findings. It shows that media discourses on military interventions are by and large a hard case of Europeanization. Convergence occurs only rarely and when it does, it is only in certain aspects. However, in most cases we already find a high degree of similarity among the countries. National peculiarities hence continue to colour European debates over the legitimacy of military interventions, but they do not lead to different universes of discourse. For the most part, Europeans share similar patterns of attention to the respective issue as well as broadly similar cleavage structures. Furthermore, although

Table 6.3 Summary of findings

Dimension	Similarity at t_1	Overall similarity	Convergence	Outliers
Issue attention	Moderate	Moderate to high	No convergence	–
Types of speakers	High	High	Weak convergence for contra coalition	–
Cleavage structure	Moderate degree of similarity for domestic speakers, mostly high for all speakers	As in t_1	No convergence	–
Frames	High	High	No general trend, but greater divergence during the intervention against Iraq in 2003	–
Justifications	Mostly high	Moderate to high for all speakers; mostly moderate for domestic speakers	No general trend, but convergence on one point: the absence of a UN mandate as a delegitimation of interventions	–
Collective identification	High	Moderate	Weak trend towards divergence, but rise in identification with Europe	Less stable trend towards Europeanization in Britain and France

country-specific narratives and norms about the appropriate use of force create a differential need for legitimation, they do not trigger completely divergent justificatory patterns. Rather, we find that overall the same set of justifications is referred to for legitimating or delegitimating the use of force. The most prevalent issues refer to the way in which force is used. Moreover, in all countries, media discourses converge towards interpreting the absence of a mandate by the UN Security Council as a delegitimation for the use of force. Our analysis of collective identifications, too, reveals a partial trend towards Europeanization. In all public spheres, except for the British, identification with Europe has clearly increased, whereas national identification has generally become less important.

Thus, although public discourses on military interventions are not very conducive to Europeanization overall, they are not resistant to change. Rather, our analysis suggests that even in a hard case incidences of transformation can be identified, albeit in a more cautious manner than in our 'easy case' of green biotechnology, which will be elaborated in the next chapter.

7

United in Protest? The European Struggle over Genetically Modified Food

Steffen Schneider

This chapter probes the structural transformation and convergence of public discourses in Europe against the backdrop of debates on the legitimacy of 'green' biotechnology and its uses in the agrifood sector. The findings of our second case study will be contrasted with those reported in the previous chapter to validate the claim that the Europeanization of national discourses is no uniform process but may be expected to vary across policy fields and issue areas. Like the military interventions examined above, the development and commercialization of genetically modified (GM) seeds and crops, fodder, and food products has received much political and media attention since the early 1990s.

Such attention is hardly surprising given that biotechnology and genetic engineering are, without any doubt, among the key innovations of the late twentieth century. The potential impact of green biotechnology on ecosystems and the health of consumers, economic growth and trade relations, social development and cultural identities makes it a particularly complex and demanding, multi-sectoral and multi-level regulatory issue that, moreover, remains highly politicized and contested: no agreement on the risks and opportunities of green or any other applications of biotechnology, on their moral status, and hence on their legitimacy is in sight (Patterson 2000: 318–19; Gaskell and Bauer 2001b: 3–4; Pollack and Shaffer 2005: 329–30).

While the wars in the Balkans and Iraq were distant if important events for most Europeans, the quality and safety of our food, a sustainable environment, and health hazards are everyday concerns – like the economic and labour market developments that might be fostered by the (non-)commercialization of green biotechnology, they directly affect our lives. At the same time, however, it may be argued that our 'experience' with GM products and organisms (GMOs), just like our experience with

war and its consequences (Meyer 2005: 539), is largely mediated, at least for the time being; we depend on the media, or on the voices of experts and stakeholders raised in them, for pertinent information and risk assessments (Görke et al. 2000: 20). In short, the need for and volume of public deliberation should, again, be considerable in the field of green biotechnology (Gutteling et al. 2002: 95–7).

Yet two of the variables that helped us explain why the four debates on military interventions might have resisted stronger Europeanization point in the opposite direction in our second case study. First is the fact that foreign and defence policy continues to be a domain of the nation-state. By contrast, the regulatory questions surrounding green biotechnology are now predominantly dealt with at the EU level (Pollack and Shaffer 2005: 342–7) – an authority shift to the first, supranational pillar of EU governance that reflects their inherently transnational character, and the existence of a (latent) transnational risk community. At the same time, the presumptive transatlantic divide over biotechnology (Gaskell et al. 2001c), with pronounced scepticism on this side of the ocean and enthusiasm or indifference on the other, would seem to make the *Europeanization* of discourses more likely than some other form of transnationalization.

Second, a broad range of non-state actors have participated as increasingly vocal stakeholders in the debates on GM food and its regulation. While the number, organizational resources, and activities of biotechnology opponents may not equal those of the peace and anti-nuclear energy movements during the 1970s and 1980s (Bauer 1995; Radkau 1988), social mobilization around the issue of GM food has certainly been more intense and sustained than in the context of our four military interventions. And stakeholder groups both on the affirmative and on the critical side of the issue often have a genuinely transnational character (many biotech corporations, environmental NGOs such as Greenpeace and so on) or are at least integrated into transnational networks (biotechnology researchers). Thus one should indeed expect a 'dynamic and transnational exchange of potentially conflicting information' (Gutteling et al. 2002: 95) in debates on green biotechnology.

Overall, then, there is reason to believe that the debates on green biotechnology represent less of a 'hard' case for the Europeanization of public discourses than those concerning foreign and defence policy. If this is the case, then we should find more similarity and convergence between national discourses than in the previous chapter. It should also be noted that an additional methodological rationale underpins our second case study. Whereas we examined discussions on military

interventions in four distinct time windows, reflecting their pronounced event character, a 'time-series' approach will be used in the subsequent analysis of debates on GM food. This approach will enable us to distinguish between short-term fluctuations and long-term developments, and to capture the gradual nature of change in discursive structures more explicitly than in the first case study.

Otherwise, however, the same multi-dimensional analytical framework as in the previous chapter and the same kind of indicators will be employed. The convergence of national discourses in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany and Britain will, once again, be gauged with reference to the sub-dimensions of discourse convergence (issue attention, cleavage structures and speaker types, the framing of green biotechnology) and to collective identifications. We proceed as follows: the next section outlines the research design of our case study and briefly indicates what distinguishes it from extant work on biotechnology-related media debates. Following this, the bulk of the chapter is devoted to the analysis of our own empirical data, considering each sub-dimension in turn. A summary and discussion of our findings concludes the chapter.

Outline of the case study

Ours is not the first content-analytical study that draws on the case of biotechnology to gauge the structures and transformation of public discourses. Much of this extant work is, however, more concerned with the nature of communication on science, technology and risk as such, and in its impact on national or European trajectories of policymaking and regulation (Dunwoody and Peters 1992; Gottweis 1998; Levidow and Marris 2001) than in the more specific research question that concerns us here, namely, the degree to which public deliberation on biotechnology has converged – and become Europeanized – over time.[1]

First, unlike much other work in the area, our own case study has an exclusive focus on *green* biotechnology and its applications, and hence considers debates on experimental releases or the actual marketing, distribution, and consumption of GM seeds and crops (or livestock), fodder, and food products.[2] Excluded from our analysis are debates on 'red' biotechnology, that is, the cloning of human beings and biomedical applications of genetic research, or on issues like the use of genetic fingerprinting and diagnostics by law enforcement agencies and the insurance sector. We will, on the other hand, pay some attention to the wider context of the examined debates, that is, media communication on food quality and safety, as the discursive connection between green and red

biotechnology debates often appears to be looser than the one between green biotechnology and food safety debates, including the considerable volume of public communication surrounding so-called mad cow disease (BSE) and its ramifications (Kitzinger and Reilly 1997; Vos 2001; Ansell et al. 2006).

Second, the study examines the country sample used throughout this book – Austria, Denmark, France, Germany and Britain – in order to ensure the overall comparability and representativeness of our findings. This sample not only exhibits considerable variation with regard to those general background variables – country size, language, the 'openness' of national media systems, length of EU membership, degree of EU scepticism and so on – that we expect to have an impact on the structures and development of public spheres at large. The five countries also differ with regard to more specific factors that might be hypothesized to affect the scope and nature of debates on green biotechnology in particular; national economic structures, research landscapes and broader 'science cultures', more or less established traditions of academic and industrial self-regulation, and more or less experience with public involvement and deliberative forums in the biotechnology field are among these factors, as are differences in the positions and 'voice' of major stakeholders. Against this backdrop, the convergence of discursive structures is by no means a foregone conclusion and would have to count as strong evidence for a (partial) transnationalization of public spheres in Europe.[3]

Third, the study focuses on the 13-year period between 1993 and 2005. This time frame was chosen to ensure comparability with the discussion in the previous chapter, but it also coincides with particularly important media events and policy developments in the field of green biotechnology. Although the patenting of recombinant DNA technology in 1973 is often viewed as the starting point of biotechnology-related public communication, the Life Sciences in European Society (LSES) project (see note 1) has been able to show that issue attention and the intensity of public debates remained low throughout the 1970s and 1980s, that debates were largely confined to scientific experts and representatives of the emerging biotech industry, with no more than brief surges in wider public interest, and that issue attention cycles in Europe tended to be driven by nationally specific events (Bauer et al. 2001: 37–8). This finding, of course, reflects the overall embryonic state of biotechnology regulation – industrial self-regulation continued to prevail in many countries, and some even had no regulation whatsoever in place – and the lack of harmonization across national boundaries. In the 1990s and early 2000s, by contrast, the issue gradually received more political and media

attention at the national and European levels; in the wake of intense conflicts with member states, the United States and the WTO, the EU and its institutions developed a comprehensive approach and became 'the primary regulators' (Pollack and Shaffer 2005: 329) of GM products in Europe (see also Cantley 1995; Patterson 2000).

Fourth, the study is based on the same newspaper sample as the chapter on military interventions.[4] Finally, for both discourse structures and collective identifications, the overall similarity and convergence of national debates – the extent to which differences peter out and levels of similarity increase – will be gauged. This enables us to ascertain the overall number of sub-dimensions and countries affected by convergence trends. Where applicable, the upward or downward *direction* of trends will also be considered.[5]

Debates on green biotechnology in five European countries: empirical findings

In the analysis of our data, we first zero in on the relevance of green biotechnology as an issue area. Next, we proceed to the cleavage structures of discourse coalitions, to the speaker types participating in biotechnology-related debates, and to the framing of the issue on its 'pro' and 'contra' sides. In a final step, we examine the scope and nature of collective identifications expressed in these debates.

Issue attention: the relevance of green biotechnology in the media

Have speakers in the five national public spheres accorded the same overall importance to green biotechnology in the 13-year period between 1993 and 2005, and do issue attention cycles (Downs 1972) show a pattern of increased synchronization or not? As illustrated by Figure 7.1, the period examined here was characterized by often considerable and even slightly growing public interest in GM food and related topics. In line with the rising economic weight or potential of the biotech industry, and in the wake of more sustained regulatory efforts at the national and European levels, the focus of public debates has visibly shifted from the arenas of scientific experts and industrial self-regulation to the media.[6]

Roughly comparable numbers of discursive articles were identified in the Austrian, Danish, French and German newspapers. The number of articles was lowest in the German papers and considerably higher than everywhere else in the British ones.[7] Yet despite a much higher overall level of salience than in the previous two decades, issue attention has waxed and waned since 1993. In our diagram, data points above and



Figure 7.1 Issue attention, green biotechnology
Notes: Data points represent articles per year and country (z-transformed). A z-score is the difference between a value (here: the number of discursive articles on green biotechnology per year and country) and the corresponding mean (here: the 13-year average of articles per year for each country), divided by the corresponding standard deviation. Also note that the number of *articles* per year and country and the related number of discursive *statements* are strongly correlated ($r^2 = 0.97$), and hence the examination of issue attention cycles on the basis of statements would have yielded essentially the same result. All articles in the green biotechnology text corpus (N: Austria = 323; Germany = 287; Denmark = 354; France = 391; Great Britain = 772; total 2127).

below the zero line respectively indicate years with comparatively high or low attention to green biotechnology, and data points more than one or even two standard deviations above or below the 13-year average are of particular interest. A glance at the overall and national trend lines, then, reveals five distinct phases.

The 'pre-take-off phase' between 1993 and 1995 was characterized by very low salience. The European Council's first two binding directives in the green biotechnology field – 90/219 on the contained use of GMO and 90/220 on their deliberate release into the environment – had preserved a substantial role for national governments in the market authorization of GM products (Pollack and Shaffer 2005: 335–8). And while the directives were criticized as too lax by the European Parliament and as too strict by the United States, they clearly did not trigger major public debates. Only Denmark – where the parliamentary decision in 1994 to label GM products had triggered some degree of public communication (Jelsøe et al. 1998, 2001) – and, to a much lesser extent, Austria – where biotechnology legislation initiated prior to the country's accession to

EU membership was entrenched in 1995 (Torgersen et al. 2001; Wagner et al. 1998) – experienced brief surges of attention. By contrast, interest remained particularly low in France.

The 'take-off phase' between 1995 and 1998 brought a real explosion of attention to green biotechnology, with the highest overall z-score, in Austria (1998) (see also Torgersen et al. 2001: 134). There was a marked upward trend elsewhere, too, but attention climaxed a year later in Denmark and Britain, and still later in Germany (2000) and France (2001). The quickly rising attention levels manifest in our data are very much in line with the LSES project's finding that the 'watershed years' of 1996 and 1997 (Bauer et al. 2001: 37–8), or the 1996 to 2000 'years of controversy' as a whole (Gaskell and Bauer 2001a), represent a genuine turning point in European public deliberation on GM food and related topics.

A number of media events and policy developments increased the salience of green biotechnology in this phase. In March 1996, the outbreak of the BSE scandal visibly 'generat[ed] extraordinary public awareness of food safety issues and widespread public distrust of regulators and scientific assessments' (Pollack and Shaffer 2005: 339) throughout Europe. Also in 1996 and 1997, the Commission's market authorization of GM soy and maize, and first attempts to import these products, met with the objection of a number of member state governments and led to the intense mobilization of biotechnology opponents, with protest and lobbying activities by Greenpeace and others in several European countries, including Germany (Hampel et al. 1998, 2001). January 1997, moreover, brought the Novel Food Regulation with labelling requirements for GM products (Pollack and Shaffer 2005: 338–9).

Austria reacted to these developments early on, prohibiting the marketing and cultivation of GM maize in February 1997 and holding a referendum on green biotechnology in April the same year. Other countries followed suit and invoked the 'safeguard clause' of Directive 90/220 to block the approval of maize and other GM products. In Britain, issue attention climaxed with the affair surrounding Arpad Pusztai, a Scottish researcher who had been sacked after warning against the health risks of GM food in an interview televised in August 1998. An open letter by an international group of experts in support of Pusztai and his claims was published by the *Guardian* in February 1999, and Prime Minister Blair, whose government went on to announce a policy review in May, was accused of covering up a report on the environmental risks of GM crops (Bauer et al. 1998; Gaskell et al. 2001b). In Germany, a cabinet restructuring in the wake of the country's BSE scandal and a Greenpeace campaign against McDonald's brought public debates to a climax

in 2000. In Denmark and France, too, the public had been slower than the Austrian media in discovering the issue of green biotechnology.

These national and European developments ushered in a de facto moratorium on the authorization and marketing of new or previously approved GM varieties between October 1998 and May 2004. Between 1998 and 2002, overall media interest in green biotechnology almost returned to the levels of the pre-take-off phase. All countries but Britain – with a trough in 2001 that nevertheless exceeded the salience values of 1993 to 1995 – reached the local minimum of this third phase in 2002. This cyclical low may be explained by the genuine or perceived responsiveness of national and European governments to public concerns and social mobilization. Few GM products had been commercialized by the end of the moratorium, and the policy shift in Brussels towards more stakeholder involvement and a precautionary approach, with strict and detailed rules for market authorization, labelling and traceability, appeared to signal the responsiveness of national and European actors and institutions. With Directive 2001/18/EC, adopted in March 2001 and 'touted by the EP's rapporteur David Bowe as "the toughest laws on GMOs in the whole world"' (quoted in Pollack and Shaffer 2005: 343), the EU introduced another set of rules that was to ensure strict risk assessments for all GM crop, fodder and food products.

Between 2001 and 2004, there was another brief surge of attention that, however, remained less pronounced than the first. All countries but Germany – which reached a peak in 2004 – experienced the local maximum of this fourth phase in 2003 (note that Germany is the only case in which this second maximum reached a higher salience value than the first). As a policy issue, green biotechnology was also taken off the back-burner in 2003 (Pollack and Shaffer 2005: 342–7). Two Council regulations (1829/2003 and 1830/2003) amended or replaced the provisions of Directive 2001/18 and the Novel Food Regulation on market authorization, labelling and traceability. A centralized authorization procedure for the experimental release and commercialization of GM products was introduced (the European Food Safety Agency had been established the year before). The Commission also organized a round table with stakeholders in April 2003. At the same time, it attempted, together with the biotech industry, to step up enforcement against non-compliant member states.

Most importantly, the temporary suspension of approvals by the EU sparked a trade war with the United States, which claimed that the national and EU import bans violated WTO agreements and threatened to impose a trade embargo. The transatlantic conflict escalated when the

United States filed a WTO legal dispute against the EU in May 2003. In Europe, this 'prompted a backlash from environmental, consumer, and agricultural groups, and from some member governments, further politicizing an already sensitive issue' (Pollack and Shaffer 2005: 333). In 2004, however, the EU resumed the approval of GM varieties and brought its moratorium to an official end, even though the legal situation remains complicated and disputed (Christoforou 2004; Seifert 2006: 28).

The events in this phase again coincided with, or triggered, a series of national events and developments in the five countries of our sample. In Austria, several regions (*Länder*) passed by-laws declaring themselves GMO-free after 1999, and also joined an emerging international network of such regions. A 'gene summit' took place in the spring of 2000. In October 2005, the European Court of Justice declared the legislation creating GMO-free zones and national import restrictions void. The Austrian government reacted with strict regulations for the permission of GMOs. In November 2003, some French regions had also joined the network of GMO-free regions. In 2004, half of France's GM crops were destroyed by the group *Faucheurs volontiers* ('voluntary mowers'), and in June, the European Court of Justice condemned France for not implementing Directive 2001/18. In April 2005, a parliamentary commission recommended a temporary stop of experimental releases, and in the same year, a *Journée d'opposition aux OGM* ('day of opposition to GMO') kept the issue on the agenda.

While no clear national trigger for the Danish peak in 2003 seems to exist, the British government started a broad deliberation process that year. The process, with 675 discussion events across the country, ushered in a number of scientific studies examining the risks associated with GMO releases. Whereas most participants continued to object to the cultivation of GM plants, the government essentially accommodated the demands of the United States and largely encouraged green biotechnology. In Germany the Greens clearly distanced themselves from green biotechnology in their 2002 electoral programme. Minister Künast stopped a couple of GMO-related and publicly funded research projects after the Red-Green coalition's re-election but had to preside over the entrenchment of a new Biotechnology Act in early 2004 that reflected the biotechnology friendliness of Chancellor Schröder. And while the law was, like its predecessor, greeted with little enthusiasm by proponents and opponents of biotechnology alike, it paved the way for experimental releases in Germany.

Finally, issue attention to green biotechnology once again slumped to below-average levels in the last year of our observation period. But

while the salience of the issue reached its latest cyclical trough, a mild ratchet effect appears to be at work – the issue has not completely fallen into oblivion, and overall attention grew between 1993 and 2005, however modestly, instead of returning to pre-1996 levels. Yet to what extent has a genuine synchronization of issue attention cycles occurred? Have national developments become increasingly parallel, or do nationally specific patterns continue to dominate? As suggested above, and despite a couple of phase shifts, the overall synchronicity of the five issue attention cycles is quite pronounced for the whole period examined here. In eleven out of 13 years, three or more country values fall into the same one-unit band (smaller than −1, between −1 and 0, between 0 and 1, bigger than 1). The largely parallel national trajectories do not amount to strong convergence, though, because the spread between the highest and the lowest salience values for any given year does not decrease but rather hovers between a minimum of 0.4 (in 1995) and a maximum of 2.7 (in 1998), with values of 0.5 in 1993 and 0.7 in 2003 respectively. Moreover, the underlying volume of public deliberation in the five national environments – with Germany at one end and Britain at the other – continues to differ markedly between Britain and all others. Thus we qualify the levels of similarity and convergence in this dimension as moderate.[8]

Cleavage structures

Moving from the temporal synchronization of issue attention to the question of similarity and homogenization in the actual structures of public communication, one might ask, first, how similar our five countries are in terms of the relative strength and nature of discursive coalitions favouring and opposing GM products. In other words, are the underlying cleavage structures similar and converging or not? Figure 7.2 summarizes the net support for biotechnology in each country and over the entire 13-year period examined. As our data indicate, the pro and contra statements are overall fairly balanced (47.3 per cent and 52.3 per cent respectively), with a slight preponderance of critical ones.[9]

Among the five countries in our sample, scepticism prevails in Austria (57.3 per cent), France (59.2 per cent), and Britain (59 per cent). By contrast, proponents have an edge over opponents (36.8 per cent and 40.5 per cent respectively) in Denmark and Germany. The left-wing papers carry more – sometimes, as in Germany (*SZ* 58.7 per cent versus *FAZ* 27.9 per cent), even considerably more – negative assessments of green biotechnology than the right-wing papers. However, national and overall trends (shown in Figure 7.3) are of even greater interest. Two major



Figure 7.2 Cleavage structures by country
Notes: Bars represent the difference between the percentage shares of affirmative and critical evaluations of green biotechnology by country (all speakers, domestic speakers only). All statements on the legitimacy of green biotechnology (N: 599 Austria; 717 Denmark; 723 France; 605 Germany; 1999 Great Britain; total 4643).

findings readily emerge. First, the share of contra positions has risen overall, in every single country, and sometimes markedly. With the exception of Austria, the critical evaluations were marginal in the initial phase of low attention but have achieved greater proportions, often constituting a majority of statements, ever since. At the same time, the spread between the country with the lowest and that with the highest share of negative – and likewise, positive – evaluations fell from roughly 44 to less than 25 percentage points between 1993 and 2005.

These findings, too, are largely in line with the survey and content analytical results of the LSES project, which indicate that Austrians developed one of the most negative attitudes in the European context (Bauer et al. 2001: 48–50). In fact, our results show that Austrian public communication was already characterized by a high degree of contention in the early 1990s. Similarly, a steady trend towards a more negative attitude is reported for France, pushing the French public and media, in quite a remarkable shift (Gutteling et al. 2002: 104; Boy and de Cheveigné 2001: 181), from initially more positive views reflecting 'technological Jacobinism' into the group of the most sceptical countries. Our data, however, indicate a slight 'recovery' on the pro side after 2000. Britain is also among the more critical nations with regard to the issue of GM food.

Our data for Germany very much corroborate the LSES project's findings in raising doubts about the allegedly fundamental hostility of Germans towards science, technology, or 'progress' (but see Kepplinger 1989, 1991, 1995; Hampel et al. 2001: 192, 199). The undifferentiated claim that Germans are unequivocally sceptical vis-à-vis green

biotechnology and other innovations is, once again, not supported. The overall thrust of debates remains positive, with the exception of the year 1999. The annual shares of critical positions are usually the lowest or second lowest in our five-country sample, and even declined in the early 2000s – an overall trend that makes Germany, together with Denmark (but see Jelsøe et al. 2001: 165–6), one of the two more positively oriented countries in our sample.

To be sure, the national trends shown here are the aggregate of developments at the level of the two (left-wing and right-wing) newspapers examined for each country. If we take the leanings of these papers as a rough proxy for the developments on the two sides of the ideological divide, we may use the individual newspaper trajectories to briefly examine the 'robustness' of our findings. An inspection of these trajectories (not shown) confirms the findings reported above for the overall distributions of critical and affirmative statements. The levels of scepticism with regard to green biotechnology consistently vary according to ideological orientation, and in the expected direction: there is more scepticism in the left-wing media. Despite more or less pronounced annual fluctuations, the overall trend towards increased scepticism holds for all papers, with the exception of the *Standard* in Austria. The cyclical trends are remarkably parallel in the two groups of papers, which suggests that in most cases they were driven by events and developments that influenced national public spheres as a whole rather than just one side of the ideological divide.

The data presented so far thus indicate a modicum of similarity, namely, in the overall trend of growing scepticism. One should not overstate the actual degree of convergence, however. Further scrutiny of Figure 7.3 and the underlying data tells us that the shift towards more critical attitudes largely occurred during the (early) 1990s and thus coincided with growing attention to the issue; after the 'watershed years', the proponents of green biotechnology were able more or less to regain ground in the five countries under examination. We also need to take the overall *thrust* of discourses – the majority status of biotechnology proponents or sceptics – into account as a key qualitative criterion. As it turns out, the five national public spheres agreed in their overall tendency – a majority of positive evaluations of green biotechnology – only once, in 1993. In eight of the subsequent years, we encounter a majority of critical statements in three countries and a predominance of affirmative ones elsewhere; the remaining five years are characterized by agreement in four countries and one outlier. And although the range of percentage shares on the pro and contra side shrank between 1993 and 2005, it is



Figure 7.3 Cleavage structures over time

Notes: Data points represent the difference between the percentage shares of affirmative and critical evaluations of green biotechnology by country and year. The figure shows 3-year moving averages in order to highlight long-term developments and to downplay mere short-term fluctuations; data points for 1993 are the actual values for that year, data points for 1994 are two-year averages, and all others were calculated as $(t_{t-2}+t_{t-1}+t_t)/3$. All statements on the legitimacy of green biotechnology (N: 599 Austria; 717 Denmark; 723 France; 605 Germany; 1999 Great Britain; total 4643).

also readily apparent that there continue to be two groups of countries: Austria, France and Britain, where the overall thrust of public discourses remains critical, as opposed to Denmark and Germany, where this is not the case. Hence there is less convergence, and even less overall similarity, in this dimension than first meets the eye.

Types of speakers

The issue attention cycles described above and the shift towards criticism in evaluations of green biotechnology may, of course, be linked with changes in the role played by different speaker types. Which types of collective or individual actors have dominated the communication process, and which are marginal in public debates? Can we substantiate the hypothesis that the identified peaks in issue attention and growing scepticism coincide with, or are driven by, changes in the composition of discourse coalitions on the pro and contra side, or more precisely, with changes in the 'voice' given to different speaker types by the media? How much similarity and convergence do we find in this sub-dimension?

A variety of actors have a stake in the field of biotechnology.[10] On the side of its proponents, one should, of course, expect to encounter the biotechnology R&D community and the biotech industry with their

professional organizations, sectoral associations and lobbyists. On the contra side, we may safely expect consumer protection and environmental groups, organized as national or transnational NGOs more or less tied into the anti-globalization movement, as well as Green parties. For a number of stakeholders and participants in biotechnology debates, hypotheses on their likely issue position are more difficult to formulate a priori. Besides journalists, these include the representatives of national political-administrative systems, the EU, or other international organizations (whose position may depend on their ideological orientation, electoral considerations and so on), farmers' associations (whose stances may be influenced by the relative weight of 'conventional' and 'organic' agriculture within them), and various other civil-society or religious organizations.

One might also hypothesize that differences in national economic structures, political and media systems, or 'science cultures' facilitate or impede the participation of these stakeholder groups in green biotechnology debates, giving different types of speakers and their utterances more or less 'voice' and credibility. Relevant factors would thus for instance be whether a country has a tradition of academic and industrial self-regulation, or of corporatism, and whether it has experimented with forms of public deliberation in the biotechnology field or not. Various national governments and the EU have organized deliberative forums or consensus conferences on GMO-related topics with consumer protection and environmental groups, industrial organizations, and other stakeholders in recent years. There is, however, much agreement in the literature on the usually marginal impact of such 'new governance' arrangements and their participants on the decision-making process (Pollack and Shaffer 2005: 349; Seifert 2006: 29). Finally, and together with the expansion of social mobilization over GM food and related topics, the shift of regulatory authority to the EU and the emerging role of the WTO in biotechnology-related trade litigation might also lead one to expect more 'voice' for international speakers, including the representatives of transnational NGOs, and some convergence across national boundaries in the speaker-type dimension.

Figure 7.4 illustrates the distribution of speakers by country.[11] A few observations are of relevance here. To begin with, the varying degrees of prominence or 'voice' of the different stakeholder groups are reflected quite well in the ten newspapers – journalists' own statements and positions represent only about a quarter of all utterances in our French and German data sets, and even lower percentages in the other three countries, especially Britain. Speakers associated with the five national



Figure 7.4 Speaker types and origins by country

Notes: Percentage shares of statements made by the different speaker types in each country. All statements on the legitimacy of green biotechnology (N: 615 Austria; 769 Denmark; 755 France; 635 Germany; 2081 Great Britain; total 4855).

political-administrative systems (executives and legislatures, regulatory agencies, parties and so on) are particularly well represented with roughly comparable shares of between 20 and 26 per cent. Speakers associated with the biotechnology R&D community (academic experts and other researchers in the field) have the same overall share. The national percentages are, again, broadly similar, with the lowest share in France and the highest in Britain. The group of economic actors (individual corporations, sectoral employers' and farmers' associations, trade unions and so on) comes next, with the highest percentages in Germany and Denmark, and the lowest in France. The discursive 'weight' of economic actors is greater than that of NGOs (consumer protection and environmental groups, as well as other civil-society and religious organizations) in Austria, and especially in Denmark and Germany. NGOs are more important in France and Britain. Finally, public intellectuals – a 'narrow' category to begin with – and representatives of international organizations play only a marginal role.

Figure 7.5 highlights the pro or contra 'bias' of these speaker types, and here we find marked differences both between stakeholder groups and the five countries. There is no pronounced scepticism overall and among Austrian journalists, and even less so in Denmark and Germany,



Figure 7.5 Cleavage structures by types of speakers
Notes: The values in this diagram were calculated by subtracting the percentage share of contra positions in each speaker category from 50 per cent. Columns pointing upwards represent a positive 'bias' of the various types of speakers, columns pointing downwards a negative one. All statements on the legitimacy of green biotechnology (N: 599 Austria; 717 Denmark; 723 France; 605 Germany; 1999 Great Britain; total 4643).

the two countries with a preponderance of biotechnology supporters; more critical stances prevail among British and French journalists. As for speakers of the political-administrative systems, there is, again, an overall balanced picture. Austria, where criticism is dominant, and Britain, where despite much scepticism in the population, Tory and Labour governments alike have been rather biotechnology-friendly, both stand out. The finding that economic actors and researchers in the biotechnology sector tend to evaluate it much more favourably than almost anybody else comes as no surprise. A glance at the percentages of our finer sub-categories in France and Britain, moreover, reveals that farmers' associations, such as José Bové's *Confédération paysanne*, whose stances on green biotechnology are critical or, at best, ambivalent, have more 'voice' than biotechnology corporations or sectoral associations in France (see also Boy and de Cheveigné 2001: 185; Martin 2005), and almost as much in Britain. This largely explains the surprising negative bias of economic actors in the two countries. Likewise, we may surmise that the media in France and Britain privilege maverick positions in the R&D community – for instance, Arpad Pusztai's – to a considerable extent, resulting in a comparatively unimpressive positive bias in that speaker category.



Figure 7.6 Speaker types over time

Notes: Percentage shares of statements made by the different speaker types in each year. The figure shows 3-year moving averages; data points for 1993 are the actual values for that year, data points for 1994 are two-year averages, and all others were calculated as $(t_{t\ 2}+t_{t\ 1}+t_t)/3$. All statements on the legitimacy of green biotechnology (N: 615 Austria; 769 Denmark; 755 France; 635 Germany; 2081 Great Britain; total 4855).

By comparison, public intellectuals and, especially, NGOs are among the strongest pillars of the contra coalition in most or all countries, including Denmark and Germany, where, however, NGOs are under-represented as speakers (Jelsøe et al. 2001: 161). The importance of NGO speakers as the flag-bearers of growing biotechnology scepticism across Europe is thus particularly highlighted when their over- or under-representation is considered against the national shares of contra positions. Finally, again with the exception of France and Britain, the representatives of international organizations tend to speak out in favour of green biotechnology.

But what about changes over time? Turning to Figure 7.6, we see, first, that the role of public intellectuals and IO representatives has been both marginal and essentially unchanged throughout the period examined here. The discursive weight of political actors and of researchers has waxed and waned, and there is a slight downward trend with regard to journalists. More interestingly, however, the role of economic actors has declined, and conversely, the voice of NGOs has grown



Figure 7.7 Convergence of speaker types

Notes: Data points represent variation coefficients based on the percentage shares of speaker types in each country and year (variation coefficients are calculated by dividing standard deviations – here, of the five national percentage shares for each speaker type and year – by the corresponding mean). All statements on the legitimacy of green biotechnology (N: 615 Austria; 769 Denmark; 755 France; 635 Germany; 2081 Great Britain; total 4855).

stronger overall since the 'years of controversy'. One may thus conclude that a 'widespread cross-sectoral movement organized to oppose GMOs in Europe, bringing together environmentalists, consumers, and small farmers ... operat[ing] at multiple levels, working the media and local and national political processes, coordinating transnationally, and lobbying the Commission and EP' (Ansell et al. 2003, as quoted in Pollack and Shaffer 2005: 340) has indeed played a role in the diffusion of both scepticism and policy change in the direction of a more cautious regulatory approach. An examination of national trend lines for each speaker type (not shown) and of the variation coefficients in Figure 7.7 suggests that this sub-dimension, which was characterized by greater variance in 1993, has indeed experienced pronounced convergence, with a range of approximately 10 percentage points for each of the key speaker categories in 2005.

Moreover, a separate analysis of trends relating to the discursive roles of the various speaker types in the pro and contra coalitions suggests a considerable robustness of these findings. While the overall similarity and convergence does not appear to be quite as strong when the two coalitions are examined individually, and the pro coalition appears slightly

more disparate in terms of the speaker type variable than the camp of green biotechnology opponents, the general trend holds up: a shift from low to moderate or even high similarity between 1993 and 2003, and hence moderate to strong convergence. And given the trend of growing scepticism and increasing voice for biotechnology-critical NGOs, the finding that the contra coalition has experienced more convergence than the pro coalition appears consistent with our other results as well.

Frames and patterns of justification

The prominence or marginality of various discourse coalitions, and of the speaker types raising their voice in each of them, are important structural features of discourses. In addition, we probed the extent to which speakers based their statements on increasingly similar normative foundations and horizons of meaning. Are the repertoires of justification on which discourse participants in each of the national public spheres draw to underpin their support or criticism of green biotechnology similar and convergent? Have new justifications appeared and others vanished, and have such developments spread across national boundaries over the 13-year period examined in this chapter?

As in the case study on military interventions, we call these repertoires and horizons of meaning *frames* – and, once again, each frame in our coding scheme may be used by both opponents and supporters of green biotechnology, even though certain 'elective affinities' between the pro and contra discourse coalitions on the one hand and particular frames on the other may, of course, be expected. A highly differentiated set of eight frames and a number of sub-frames was established by way of a preliminary qualitative examination of selected articles (in addition, a category of unspecific cost-benefit evaluations and one for 'other justifications' were also provided for). The coding scheme for this variable is thus more differentiated than the one employed in our case study on military interventions. If public deliberation on green biotechnology is a relatively 'easy' case for the Europeanization of public discourses – an expectation that appears to be at least partly borne out by the analysis so far – then our scheme should raise the bar, as it were, and prevent us from diagnosing full-scale Europeanization too quickly (Table 7.1; see Appendix 2 for further details).[12]

Again, we begin with a glance at the distribution of frames by country, as shown in Table 7.2. An inspection of the table reveals, first, that our coding scheme does indeed capture the relevant problem definitions and related justifications. The 'other' category is negligible and so is the category of 'unspecific costs and benefits of green biotechnology'. In other

Table 7.1 Frames and justifications used in green biotechnology debates

Frame		(Typical) Argumentation
(1a) Costs/benefits for consumers	Pro	Green biotechnology is beneficial for consumers because it increases consumer choice (the range of available products), etc.
	Contra	Green biotechnology is not beneficial (is harmful) for consumers because it does not increase consumer choice (reduces it), etc.
(1b) Costs/benefits for producers	Pro	The commercialization of green biotechnology enables the start-up and growth of new and promising firms and sectors.
	Contra	The commercialization of green biotechnology does not enable the start-up and growth of new and promising firms and sectors.
(1c) Costs/benefits for farmers	Pro	Green biotechnology enables farmers to raise their efficiency/productivity/profits.
	Contra	Green biotechnology does not enable farmers to raise their efficiency/ productivity/profits.
(1d) Globalization and international competitiveness; other costs/benefits for national economies	Pro	Green biotechnology is a key technology; mastering it ensures advantages in terms of international economic competitiveness. Those who do not engage in green biotechnology risk serious economic damage in a globalized world.
	Contra	Green biotechnology is a dispensable technology; mastering it does not ensure competitive advantages, and abstention from it causes no damage.
(2) Health/medicine	Pro	Genetically manipulated crops and livestock do not pose health risks for human beings; there are no known examples of health damage caused by them.
	Contra	Genetically manipulated crops and livestock pose health risks; there are known examples of health damage caused by them.
(3) Nature/environment	Pro	Green biotechnology enables farmers and the (animal) food industry to use smaller quantities of chemical products (fertilizer, pesticides, preservatives), to save water, etc., and thus to produce in an ecologically sensitive fashion.

	Contra	Green biotechnology enables farmers to make crops and livestock resistant against the negative effects of chemical substances (pesticides, etc.), and hence to increase the quantities used; the damage to the environment is increased rather than reduced by green biotechnology.
(4) Third World/development/ famine	Pro	Green biotechnology represents an economic opportunity for the countries of the Third World and fosters their development.
	Contra	Green biotechnology threatens to exacerbate the poverty and economic deprivation of Third World countries (for instance, through the impact of patented and licensed seeds, biopiracy, or the contamination of conventional crops with genetically manipulated products, resulting in their exclusion from EU and other export markets).
(5a) Democracy and (il)legality within the nation-state	Pro	The authorization and regulation of green biotechnology is not a question of democracy (popular sovereignty, responsiveness, accountability, etc.); a (restrictive) political regulation of green biotechnology in line with public opinion, or one that involves citizen participation and lengthy deliberation processes, is neither necessary nor appropriate; these decisions should be made by researchers and economic actors, and in line with the economic and property rights entrenched in national law.
	Contra	The authorization and regulation of green biotechnology is a question of democracy; green biotechnology is to be rejected because it is being imposed on citizens against public opinion, without (genuine) citizen participation or debate; the (restrictive) political regulation of green biotechnology in line with the (sceptical) majority of the population is in order, or stipulated by national law, even against the preferences and interests of researchers and economic actors.
(5b) Democracy and (il)legality at European Union or international levels	Pro	Green biotechnology-related decisions are no longer the domain of nation-states and their democratic institutions in the age of globalization and European integration, but rather of the EU and other international organizations and regimes; decisions on the testing and marketization of GM products made at these levels are acceptable, or stipulated by European and international trade law.

(*Continued*)

Table 7.1 (Continued)

Frame		(Typical) Argumentation
	Contra	The making of green biotechnology-related decisions by global players, the EU, or international organizations and regimes erodes democracy and national self-determination.
(6) Culture/tradition/identity	Pro	Openness with regard to new, innovative products, including those made possible by green biotechnology, corresponds to our culture, tradition, or identity.
	Contra	Our culture, tradition, or identity thrives not least in the products of our agriculture and culinary specialities; they are threatened by green biotechnology.
(7) Progress/(ir)rationality	Pro	Any restriction of green biotechnology is irrational, an attack on the freedom of science, or unwarranted opposition to scientific progress.
	Contra	As scientific knowledge and progress are at best ambivalent, and different forms of knowledge are equally legitimate, calls for a restriction of green biotechnology may not be equated with an attack on science, or with irrationality.
(8) Respect for the dignity of living creatures, nature/Creation, morality/religion	Pro	Green biotechnology is nothing but a (more efficient) simulation of natural processes, or of traditional breeding techniques; green biotechnology is therefore no morally or religiously objectionable transgression of boundaries set by nature.
	Contra	Green biotechnology is a morally or religiously suspect transgression, and not comparable to traditional breeding techniques; it implies disrespect for living creatures and for the inviolability/sanctity of Creation, the natural or divine order.
(9) Unspecific cost and benefit arguments	Pro	Green biotechnology is good/legitimate because it is useful/not dangerous/innocuous.
	Contra	The potential of green biotechnology is grossly overestimated.

Table 7.2 Frames by country

(Sub-)frames	Austria	Denmark	France	Germany	UK	Total
(1) Economic frames						
(1a) Consumers	8.5	15.6	14.6	14.6	10.2	12.1
(1b) Producers	6.3	6.2	5.4	6.6	3.9	5.2
(1c) Farmers	18.2	22.6	9.9	24.9	16.0	17.5
(1d) Globalization (etc.)	27.0	12.9	9.7	14.0	14.5	15.0
(2) Health	18.2	26.5	17.9	26.1	24.7	23.3
(3) Environment	24.6	40.8	23.0	35.9	31.4	31.3
(4) Development	7.0	18.6	4.9	18.0	9.3	10.9
(5) Political and legal frames						
(5a) Democracy/law (national)	20.7	6.0	33.2	8.7	20.5	18.6
(5b) Democracy/law (EU)	17.1	4.2	6.8	3.3	13.5	10.1
(6) Culture	2.3	2.3	3.2	1.1	1.0	1.7
(7) Science/progress/ knowledge	32.4	36.9	9.9	23.5	26.7	26.0
(8) Morality/religion	3.4	13.9	1.5	6.1	2.5	4.7
Unspecific evaluations	2.0	4.0	6.4	2.8	2.4	3.3
Other justifications	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.5	0.3

Notes: Percentage shares of (sub-)frames by country. Percentages do not add up to 100 per cent because each statement may draw on more than one frame. In the wake of our reliability test (see Appendix 2) and for ease of presentation, we condensed the globalization frame with 'other costs and benefits for whole national economies', as well as the politics/democracy and the rule-of-law frames of the initial coding scheme; the distinction between national and EU-level justifications of this sort was, however, maintained. All statements on the legitimacy of green biotechnology (N: 615 Austria; 769 Denmark; 755 France; 635 Germany; 2081 Great Britain; total 4855).

words, speakers in the five national public spheres draw on essentially the same highly differentiated repertoire of justifications; there is considerable *prima facie* similarity in the weight and ranking of the more important frames as well, even though a couple of marked differences in the use of individual frames are readily apparent.

Frames 1 to 4 may be characterized as 'pragmatic' or 'rational' in the sense that they are grounded in cost and benefit evaluations, or risk assessments; unlike frames 5 to 8 they are, in other words, not based on some kind of normative, 'principled', or – in the eyes of many biotechnology proponents – 'irrational' assessment of biotechnology.[13] Our data indicate that both categories of frames and justifications play a roughly balanced role, in each national case, and even in the contra coalition (not shown). If anything, the justifications related to costs and benefits of various sorts are *more* frequent than the other group of frames. Explaining the growing scepticism towards green biotechnology

by referring to the presumptive neglect of 'rational' benchmarks in the European media *alone* (as in the knowledge deficit model, Gaskell and Bauer 2001b: 4–6) is thus hardly convincing, all the more so as purely economic considerations are not visibly under-represented either.

On the other hand, it is necessary to distinguish between different kinds of economic justifications: green biotechnology may be evaluated and legitimized or delegitimized on the basis of costs and benefits for consumers, for the biotech industry (producers of GM seeds and crops, fodder and food), or for national economies as a whole, and it makes an obvious difference which group of beneficiaries speakers have in mind. A typical statement in favour of green biotechnology might thus claim that it is beneficial for consumers (giving them lower prices, more choice or better products), that it enables a hitherto fledgling sector (the biotech industry) to grow and prosper, or that support for biotechnology is necessary to ensure a country's technological and economic competitiveness in world markets. Likewise, biotechnology opponents might deny that these benefits exist, or suggest that the technology and its applications are linked with genuine costs and disadvantages for national economies, producer groups and consumers (for instance, higher prices, less choice and products of lower quality). We separated out justifications related to biotechnology's (dis-)advantages for farmers because justifications of this sort very much depend on whether speakers have 'conventional' or 'organic' agriculture in mind. Whereas justifications related to costs or benefits for the biotech industry proper may, of course, be expected to be highly correlated with positive evaluations of GM food, the agriculture frame should be relevant for both pro and contra coalitions. Finally, arguments related to globalization now make up the bulk of justifications linked to national economies as a whole.

Table 7.2 indicates some national differences in the use of the four economic sub-frames. Consumer-related justifications are most frequent in Denmark and least frequent in Austria. Producer-related ones are generally rare, which is hardly surprising since the advantages of a biotechnology-friendly policy for the industry itself are both fairly obvious and unlikely to win over the opponents of GM products: references to benefits for individual corporations and sectors with their narrow economic self-interests are, in other words, of no great use as discursive resources. Nevertheless, these justifications are not completely irrelevant, and they are most and least prominent in Germany and Britain respectively. The contrasts in percentage shares are, however, more pronounced and interesting for justifications related to farmers and globalization, the two economic sub-frames employed most frequently overall.



Figure 7.8 Pro and contra bias of frames

Notes: The values in this diagram were calculated by subtracting the percentage share of contra positions in each frame category from 50.0 per cent. Columns pointing upwards represent a positive 'bias' of the various frames, columns pointing downwards a negative one. All statements on the legitimacy of green biotechnology (N: 599 Austria; 717 Denmark; 723 France; 605 Germany; 1999 Great Britain; total 4643).

Their low share in France is surprising, given the highly visible anti-GMO and anti-globalization protests of farmer activists such as José Bové and the *Confédération paysanne* (Agrikolianksy et al. 2005). In Germany and elsewhere, the agriculture frame is remarkably prominent. The globalization frame plays a large role in one of the small, open economies in our sample, Austria, but less so in Denmark; it is least prominent in France.

Figure 7.8 illustrates, as might be expected, that economic justifications are particularly important discursive resources for biotechnology proponents, even though this is less true for the consumer and agriculture frames with their overall negative bias. Each of the sub-frames in this category has a negative bias in at least one country. Austrian, French and British speakers, for instance, remain unconvinced of the consumer advantages of GM food, and of the presumptive opportunities that green biotechnology creates for farmers. In Britain, the other two sub-frames tilt towards the negative side as well.

As for frames 2 to 4, they are linked with 'other' – medical, environmental and Third World or development-related – costs and benefits, risks and opportunities. A green biotechnology opponent may, for instance, warn against the dangers of GM food for the health of human

beings or their negative impact on ecosystems. A proponent, by contrast, could point to the medical uses of 'golden rice' or suggest that insect-resistant crops enable farmers to use less pesticide. The alleged costs and benefits for farmers and entire societies in the Third World represent a distinct frame that we separated out, despite its partial overlap with both economic and moral considerations (with respect to global justice and so on), due to its high popularity among biotechnology supporters and critics alike. On the pro side, the hope that GM products are means to fight disease and malnourishment in the Third World are most prominent, whereas the contra side expresses the fear that they will make the developing countries even more dependent on (multinational corporations based in) the First World.

Returning to the data in Table 7.2 and Figure 7.8, we see that there appears to be some disagreement among Europeans as to the health and environmental risks and opportunities of green biotechnology. Health and environmental considerations are mentioned most frequently in Denmark and least frequently in France. The health frame has a modestly positive bias, although there is more scepticism in Austria and, especially, in France. The environmental frame has a negative bias, with the rather surprising exceptions of Germany and Denmark (but remember that these are also the two countries with a generally more sanguine outlook on the green biotechnology issue). The development frame, on the other hand, is clearly a major discursive resource for biotechnology proponents in all five countries.

Finally, as suggested above, frames 5 to 8 represent normative, principled or moral justifications, and as such, need not be affected by new information on the benefits of green biotechnology, a speaker's changing risk assessment and the like. One could, in other words, use one of these frames to express one's objection to green biotechnology while acknowledging that it has some benefits and negligible risks, or vice versa. These frames are interesting for us precisely because they are rooted in normative considerations and values – whether they relate to democracy and the rule of law, to cultural identities or to morality and religion; whereas cost and benefit assessments are, arguably, made along more or less similar lines in all societies and cultures (if not necessarily with the same result), differences in value orientations are pronounced in many cases and tend to be deeply rooted in national cultures. Any *normative* convergence between public spheres in Europe should thus be given a particularly high weight in our interpretation of national trends.

Here, justifications related to democratic or legal norms and principles – benchmarks related to input legitimacy, the rule of law

and the like – are surprisingly frequent. We further distinguish between democratic or legal justifications formulated against the backdrop of national political orders and institutions, or with reference to the EU and other international regimes. An opponent of green biotechnology might, for instance, observe that a majority of citizens in his or her country, or at the European level, is opposed to the commercialization of GM products, and hence that democratically legitimized and responsive governments should pursue a strict regulatory approach. A proponent, by contrast, could suggest that property and other economic rights, or trade regulations entrenched at the national or European levels, imply the right freely to develop and market these products. Together with the science frame, discussed below, the democracy frame taps right into the normative issues that are at stake in 'highly contested decisions about the role of science and politics in the assessment and management of risk' (Pollack and Shaffer 2005: 331). The European Commission itself makes the point when it talks about the need to 'democratize expertise' and 'expertise democracy' (as quoted in Pollack and Shaffer 2005: 349; see also Gill 1991; Irwin 2001; Jasanoff 2005).

We observe, first, that the democracy frame is still more frequently used with reference to national political orders than with reference to the EU in each of the five countries. France, Austria and Britain stand out in this regard, while the sub-frame is more marginal in Denmark and Germany. In Austria and Britain, even the European variant of the frame plays an important role. The national variant, on the other hand, has one of the most pronounced negative biases in all five countries. The bias is almost as strong for the cultural or identity frame, which is, however, used only infrequently. In the light of this book's normative preoccupations, the prominence and unequivocally negative bias of the democracy and identity frames – and their predominantly *national* orientation – are, of course, an important finding.

Turning now to the science frame, we see that it remains one of the key types of justifications, with the surprising exception of France. Moreover, it is readily apparent that this frame continues to be a major resource of green biotechnology proponents, even though we operationalized it in an 'open' fashion, including both affirmative and critical evaluations of green biotechnology that point in one way or another to the credibility and accuracy of scientists versus laypersons and their respective 'knowledge base', or to the desirability of 'progress'. Hence the claim of a supporter of GM products that the risk assessments of laypersons are flawed, and that expert judgements are preferable as a matter of principle, may be subsumed under this category. A critical speaker, on the



Figure 7.9 Use of selected frames over time

Notes: Percentage shares of statements drawing on the different frames in each year. The figure shows 3-year moving averages; data points for 1993 are the actual values for that year, data points for 1994 are two-year averages, and all others were calculated as $(t_{t-2}+t_{t-1}+t_t)/3$. All statements on the legitimacy of green biotechnology (N: 615 Austria; 769 Denmark; 755 France; 635 Germany; 2081 Great Britain; total 4855).

other hand, may suggest that there is no intrinsic difference (and no hierarchy) between scientific and everyday knowledge, or that a so-called 'Frankenstein' science's notion of 'progress' in itself is questionable.

Finally, speakers may draw on moral and religious values and norms in their evaluations of green biotechnology. Thus, an opponent of its uses may consider them a challenge to Creation, to the natural or divine order of things, instead of viewing them as a mere risk. A last glance at Table 7.2, however, indicates that these frames, which are fairly prominent in laments about the 'irrationality' of biotechnology opponents, do not occur very frequently in actual discourses, with the exception of Denmark. It is, however, true that they have a marked negative bias, again with the Danish exception.

But what about developments over time? Figure 7.9 presents the trend lines for the six key frames, that is, justifications that tend to play a major role in all countries, and usually in both pro and contra coalitions. We see that the shares of the science frame have waxed and waned. The agriculture, globalization and health frames have declined in importance, the latter markedly, which might be surprising, given that health is among the five most salient policy issues in most European democracies (Moravcsik 2002). Likewise, it may come as rather a surprise that framings in terms of globalization have not become more frequent over time. The prominence of the environmental frame, by contrast, has



Figure 7.10a Convergence of selected frames overall

Notes: Data points represent variation coefficients based on the percentage shares of frames in each country and year (variation coefficients are calculated by dividing standard deviations – here: of the five national percentage shares for each frame and year – by the corresponding mean). All statements on the legitimacy of green biotechnology (N: 615 Austria; 769 Denmark; 755 France; 635 Germany; 2081 Great Britain; total 4855).

grown considerably, with local peaks in the 'watershed years' and the early 2000s. The rise of the democratic frame has also been steep, but climaxed in 2001 before returning to relative marginality.

Figure 7.10a, which is based on coefficients of variation for the annual national percentage shares of the six major frames, suggests that, once again, these aggregate trend lines reflect national trends increasingly well. The coefficients for the democracy frame remain highest, indicating that it remains more prominent in Austria, Great Britain and especially France than in the rest of the sample. Overall, then, this sub-dimension is also characterized by a high degree of convergence – a finding that largely holds when the major justifications employed by speakers on the pro and contra side of the green biotechnology issue are considered separately, although the range of arguments on the contra side appears to be somewhat more disparate (Figures 7.10b and 7.10c) (see also Seifert 2006).

Collective identifications

The fifth and final sub-dimension to be examined here concerns types of collective identifications – references to 'imagined communities' – and their relative frequency in the media debates on green biotechnology (Anderson 1983; Grabner and Kronberger 2003). Again, we look



Figure 7.10b Convergence of selected frames, pro coalition
Notes: Variation coefficients based on all pro statements (N: 256 Austria; 453 Denmark; 295 France; 360 Germany; 820 Great Britain; 2184 total).



Figure 7.10c Convergence of selected frames, contra coalition
Notes: Variation coefficients based on all contra statements (N: 343 Austria; 264 Denmark; 428 France; 245 Germany; 1184 Great Britain; 2464 total).

for evidence of overall similarity and convergence over time. Do speakers express a growing sense of belonging to a shared European public sphere and political community, as opposed to identifying with their own national political community, or with broader transnational (risk) communities? And are there marked differences between our five countries in the scope or nature of any such increase in the frequency of transnational collective identifications?



Figure 7.11 Identity references

Notes: Percentage shares of different types of identity references by country (and in the total five-country sample). The two forms of identity references were considered as alternative measures of identification with one of the four political communities, and hence were counted only once where they occurred together in individual statements, referring to the same political community. All statements on the legitimacy of green biotechnology (N: 615 Austria; 769 Denmark; 755 France; 635 Germany; 2081 Great Britain; total 4855).

As in the previous chapter, two sets of indicators were initially used to gauge this sub-dimension: first, 'we' references to national, European, Western or global political or risk communities, and second, references to shared historical experiences, cultural traits or values as 'markers' of such collective identifications (the operationalization of these indicators is, again, detailed and coding examples are given in Appendix 2).

Figure 7.11 shows that the two forms of identity references combined, and all four types (geographical scopes) of collective identifications, are much less frequent in the green biotechnology corpus than in the articles debating military interventions. Only 12.9 per cent of all discursive statements (N = 626) proffer one or the other form and one or more types of identity references. Only cautious inferences on the similarity and, especially, the convergence of national discourses in this sub-dimension will therefore be made.

There are, however, a few inferences that can be made with a reasonable degree of confidence. We see, first, that national identifications dominate in four of the examined countries. Only in Germany does the share of transnational identifications combined, and even of global ones alone, exceed the percentage of national ones. The national orientation of identity references is slightly more pronounced in Britain. Austria is

close to the overall value of roughly 9 per cent; France and Denmark have much higher shares. Second, the relative frequency of European identifications is much lower than the corresponding percentage for national ones in four countries, but slightly above the frequency of national identifications in Germany. Austria, once again, is close to the overall value and so is France. The share of European identifications is, somewhat unsurprisingly, minimal in Britain. By contrast, the other Eurosceptical nation in our sample, Denmark, has the highest share of European and the second highest percentage of global identifications, although both percentages are greatly exceeded by the share of national ones. Third, identifications with the OECD world at large, and hence across the transatlantic divide, are scarce in the entire sample, with Denmark the only country where they seem to play a role. Fourth, Germany has the highest and France the lowest percentage of global identifications, while Austria and Britain are close to the overall value in this respect.

To the extent that biotechnology debates foster collective identifications at all, then, references to one's own country, Europe, or a global risk community prevail over Western identifications. The transatlantic divide appears to be significant here. In terms of biotechnology regulation, the United States and EU member states have been described as 'ships passing in the night' (Vogel 2001), with the former moving from a stricter to a more permissive approach and the latter going the other way (see also Christoforou 2004). Likewise, the indifference of American consumers stands in sharp contrast to biotechnology-related doubts and fears in Europe. Against this backdrop, references to a Western risk community, as opposed to a European or global one, seem to have little discursive plausibility.

The data also suggest that our sample is characterized by considerable variation between more parochial discourses and more open ones. Whereas the historical, cultural and linguistic barriers to a genuine identification with Europe appear to remain high overall (Gerhards 2000b; Kielmansegg 1994; Seifert 2006), and notably in France (see also Boy and de Cheveigné 2001: 182, 185), the marginality of national identifications in the German case stands out. And while – for the reasons given above – this particular finding should also be taken with a pinch of salt, it is worth noting that it is consistent with a much-described tendency of the German media to avoid the national(istic) framing of issues, arguably for historical reasons (Görke et al. 2000: 29).[14]

Regarding developments over time, a glance at Figure 7.12 suggests that the five-country annual percentages of national identifications shrank until 1996, briefly recovered in 1998, and dwindled



Figure 7.12 Identity references over time
Notes: Data points represent annual percentage shares of the four types of identity references in the five-country sample. All statements on the legitimacy of green biotechnology (N: 615 Austria; 769 Denmark; 755 France; 635 Germany; 2081 Great Britain; total 4855).

thereafter – an overall trend that holds for Germany, Austria and Britain (with percentage shares of 3.4 per cent, 4.7 per cent, and 6.4 per cent respectively in 2005) but is somewhat less pronounced for Denmark (11.9 per cent). In France, the prominence of national identifications has even grown (10 per cent). The spread of this variable dwindled from 33.3 to 8.5 percentage points between 1993 and 2005, however, which suggests that the downward trend in national identifications captured by our data is genuine, even if it has not yet reached two of our five countries.

Yet none of the transnational communities appear to have profited much from this trend. Despite its conspicuously transnational character, it is manifestly clear that the biotechnology issue has not triggered a marked shift towards European, Western or global identifications. The overall Europeanization trend is weak and uneven at best, and largely due to a massive surge of European identifications in Denmark (!) from 1996 to 2002, with somewhat less pronounced surges in Germany and Austria. The Europeanization trend, moreover, seems to have peaked in 2002, with the exception of Great Britain. Four countries had European identification shares between 1 and 3 per cent in 2005, with Denmark at 5.7 per cent. And while the trend line for Western identifications has essentially remained flat, the overall frequency of global identifications dwindled and fell below European ones in 2003. An examination

of national trend lines for the early 2000s shows convergence at very low percentage shares ranging from 0.5 per cent (Austria) to 4 per cent (Denmark). The spread of this variable has diminished from 16.7 to 3.5 percentage points. Overall, then, a picture of moderate convergence emerges, with fewer national and global identifications and slightly more European ones over time. We qualify the scope of convergence in this sub-dimension as moderate because the denationalization trend and Europeanization do not affect each of the five countries to the same extent, and because of the caution that the low number of collective identifications in our text corpus suggests.

Summary and discussion

What, then, does our case study on green biotechnology tell us about the Europeanization and other structural changes of national discourses? This summary recapitulates our findings, puts them in the context of our first case study and other extant work in the area, and briefly speculates on the factors and mechanisms behind the established regularities and trends.

Taken together, the figures and trajectories presented above undoubtedly indicate a considerable degree of overall similarity and convergence. A modicum of similarity and convergence may be diagnosed in all sub-dimensions, its extent is remarkably pronounced in two (types of speakers, frames and justifications), and the trend of convergence usually affects each or most of the five countries in our sample. There is no doubt, then, that public debates on green biotechnology have become increasingly similar over time, a finding whose robustness is underlined by the fact that it holds up when the pro and contra coalitions in biotechnology debates – or deliberation in left-wing and right-wing newspapers – are considered separately. It is, of course, true that the long-term trajectories are visibly superimposed by cyclical fluctuations and media events of a singular character in these debates. The latter tend to drive figures for similarity and convergence up whenever the volume of public deliberation is on the rise and down when issue attention wanes. Still, we were able to demonstrate the existence of at least a mild ratchet effect, following the critical juncture of the 'watershed years', in most or all of the examined dimensions.

Table 7.3 gives an overview of our findings, considering the extent and direction of similarity and convergence at the beginning of and across the period examined, as well as any national outliers. As suggested above, we see only moderate levels of similarity and convergence with

respect to issue attention, cleavage structures and identity references. In the first case, there was little room for convergence because issue attention cycles were largely parallel throughout the observation period, and, moreover, a number of phase shifts had to be factored in. In the second case, the convergence is largely restricted to an overall trend towards growing scepticism that nonetheless remained much less pronounced in two countries. In the third case, the identified trends are not very pronounced either, and once again, they do not affect each of the five countries to the same extent. The degree of convergence in the other sub-dimensions is much stronger.

Perhaps the most interesting outliers are Great Britain, where green biotechnology was considerably more salient than in the other four countries, and Denmark and Germany, where scepticism towards GM products has not grown as much as elsewhere. This rising scepticism, in turn, appears to be based on a remarkably differentiated but overall comparable set of frames and justifications throughout Europe. France stands out as the country where democratic considerations are most important. The sheer number of both 'rational' and normative justifications that have come to play a role over the years belie the claim that the critical attitudes of Europeans can be attributed to a mere lack of knowledge about green biotechnology and its uses, or their refusal to deal with the issue in anything but an emotional fashion. Instead, our data may well be interpreted as evidence of genuine public deliberation on the related topics.

As we have noted throughout the chapter, to the extent that the research designs are comparable our data are remarkably consistent with both the findings of the LSES project and other extant work. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the examination of issue attention and of discourse coalitions. Moreover, our expectation that debates on green biotechnology might constitute less of a hard case for the convergence and Europeanization of public spheres than debates on military interventions by and large seems to be confirmed. There can hardly be any doubt that media and policy events with at least some degree of EU-wide resonance, including the events and developments surrounding BSE and other food scandals, as well as the shift of regulatory authority to Brussels, have fostered a synchronization of issue attention and at least some transnational discursive exchange on the risks and opportunities of green biotechnology (just as Koopmans and Erbe 2004 hypothesize). In fact, there is some evidence for the claim that policy change in Brussels was *triggered* by shifts at the level of national public spheres and discourses, and hence, arguably, for the manifestation of a vocal

Table 7.3 Summary of findings

Dimension	Similarity at t1	Similarity overall	Extent and direction of convergence	Outliers
Issue attention	High	Moderate	Moderate – no convergence but largely parallel issue attention cycles (with some phase shifts) and slight overall increase in attention	Particularly high issue attention (volume of deliberation) in Britain; attention returns to 1993 level in Denmark
Cleavage structures	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate – no cross-national agreement on legitimacy of green biotechnology but overall growing scepticism and diminished range of percentage shares on the pro and contra side	Proponents continue to outweigh sceptics in Denmark and Germany
Types of speakers	Low	High	Strong – economic actors become less prominent, NGOs more so	–
Frames	Low	High	Strong – farmers, globalization and health become less prominent, the environment and democracy (up to 2001–03) more so	Democracy frame considerably more important and science frame much less so in France than elsewhere
Justifications	Low	Moderate–high	Moderate–strong	Less similarity and convergence on the contra side
Identity references	Low	Moderate	Moderate – national and global identifications become less important, European ones more so	Denmark and France remain more nationally oriented than other countries; less Europeanization than elsewhere in Britain and France

and functional European public sphere in the making. Our analysis further suggests, in line with Trenz and Eder (2004) or Marks and McAdam (1996), that the evolving discursive opportunity structures and activities of national and transnational NGOs – whose extremely critical voice has grown while economic actors have, to some extent, been sidelined – and their increasing prominence in the field of green biotechnology may have been particularly instrumental in this synchronization and in the convergence towards scepticism.[15]

A number of variables that might have served as obstacles in this respect – linguistic and cultural diversity, more or less open media systems, a history of more or less state intervention and deliberative experiences in the biotechnology field, the greater or lesser economic weight of the biotech industry, or the varying degree of EU scepticism in the five countries under analysis – have obviously not prevented this convergence. Turning to the normative concern with the link between democracy and public spheres that motivates the empirical research of this book, we may, then, take some comfort in our findings. Whereas policy developments in the early 1990s preceded the growth of public interest, the debates of the 'watershed years' seem to have resonated, to some extent at least, with national and European policymakers, as the more precautionary approach to biotechnology regulation developed by Brussels in the early 2000s suggests. And while this is not the place to discuss just how far-reaching or sustainable this turn is, the link between discursive and policy developments in the last decade and a half certainly illustrates the role of public deliberation in securing accountability and responsiveness, whether at the national or European level.

8
Conclusion

What we have learned: empirical insights

The empirical insights gained from our study move the research frontier forward in a number of ways. In this chapter we condense and highlight the most important findings before evaluating them in the light of our normative considerations. We begin by reviewing the trend results that mostly come out of the cross-issue content analysis; these cover the analytical dimensions monitoring governance, discursive integration and collective identification. In a second step we then summarize the results concerning discourse convergence that we derive primarily from our two case studies on military interventions and genetically modified food. At the end of this chapter we point to some general theoretical conclusions concerning the transnationalization of public spheres, and reflect on perspectives for future research.

Cross-issue trend results: segmented Europeanization

(1) Our longitudinal design has brought to light a significant and steady, albeit modest process of increasing Europeanization over the past two decades in one dimension, namely monitoring EU governance. EU institutions and EU policies are clearly mentioned and discussed more frequently now than in the early 1980s. In this dimension, therefore, we do find a structural transformation of public discourses in national quality media.

A second nascent trend towards Europeanization exists in the dimension of collective identification. 'The Europeans' is used slightly more often as a topos in public debate now than before, and speakers identify themselves slightly more often as 'we Europeans'. Here the increase is small, but significant for the 'we' references to Europe. The nascent trend

towards more identification with Europe in public debate emerged in both the cross-issue content analysis and our case studies of the debates about military interventions and genetically modified food. In these cases the trend towards a somewhat stronger identification with Europe exists irrespective of whether the overall patterns of collective identification tend to diverge (military interventions) or converge (genetically modified food) between the five countries over time. In addition, the nascent Europeanization trend in collective identification is not equally strong in all five countries, but varies in degree. Nevertheless it is safe to say that collective identifications in public debates have started to Europeanize to some degree at a low level.

Our long-term design also allows us to identify in which historical phase the trend towards Europeanization in monitoring governance and collective identification actually picked up (see Table 8.1). For mentions of EU institutions and for references to 'the Europeans' the point of departure seems to lie in the time before our period of investigation, that is, prior to the 1980s (see Chapter 3), although our data do not reveal whether these two indicators actually started from zero at some point or whether they have been at some level above zero all along. For in-depth debate on EU policies the trend starts in the early 1980s

Table 8.1 Overview of cross-issue trend results

Dimension	Sub-dimension	Trend	Take-off phase	Level achieved today
Monitoring governance	EU institutions mentioned	Europeanization	Pre-1980s	Moderate
	Focus on EU policies	Europeanization	1980s	Low
Discursive integration	Focus on other EU countries	Stagnation	Pre-1980s	Moderate
	Discursive references to speakers from other European countries	Stagnation	Pre-1980s	Moderate
Collective identification	Mentions of 'the Europeans'	Nascent Europeanization	Pre-1980s	Moderate
	Reference to 'we Europeans'	Nascent Europeanization	1990s	Low

(Figure 3.2); and collective identification as 'we Europeans' hesitantly picks up in the 1990s (Figure 3.5). Thus, we find a staggered sequence of take-offs – starting with more superficial mentions and progressing through an enhanced policy focus to a (weak) upward trend in collective identification. This deepening of the public representation of Europe seems roughly to correspond to the deepening of European integration during the past decades.

(2) In this context it is curious to note that discursive integration between the national dailies in our five countries does not increase. Of course, the observation of other European countries and quotations from speakers of those countries are by no means negligible. On both measures Europe fluctuates between 15 and 20 per cent while the home country of the respective newspaper scores about 50 per cent, and the US claims 10 per cent. The interesting thing, however, is that there is no identifiable shift towards Europe in either the geographical focus of articles or the origin of discursive references. Again, our data do not reach back far enough to ascertain whether there was an earlier take-off phase for observing other European countries and quoting speakers from those countries, or whether these forms of discursive integration have been equally strong ever since World War II. Both speculations seem plausible at first sight. In any case, the combination of rising trends in monitoring governance and (to some degree) collective identification with stagnant discursive integration leads to an overall pattern of (nationally) segmented Europeanization of public spheres in Europe that had not been identified in previous studies.

(3) It remains to be seen whether the (nascent) trend towards Europeanization in monitoring governance and collective identification will continue in the future – and whether it will continue to rise steadily and modestly as it has done in the past or whether there will be a more marked upswing at some point. Of more importance for the emergence of a more unified European public sphere, however, is whether discursive integration among European public spheres will continue to stagnate, or whether we will see a take-off here as well at some point in the future. It is not entirely implausible to expect an upswing in horizontal Europeanization in the aftermath of the failed referenda on the European Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands in 2005. These referenda and the whole process of ratification, as well as the subsequent partial reformulation of the treaty, have made the dependence of European integration on developments and decisions in individual

member states even clearer than before. Poland's use of the veto threat in negotiations over the treaty during the German presidency in the first half of 2007 is a particularly strong case in point. But other countries, such as Britain, France and the Netherlands, have also used their veto powers to alter the treaty. Why should this heightened awareness of the 'horizontal dependence' of European integration not be mirrored in an intensified public debate across borders? And why should national media in this context refrain from making voices from those other European countries heard in national debates more intensely than hitherto? In addition, our data show that articles focusing on EU policies also tend to feature more references to other European countries and more quotations of speakers from those countries (see Chapter 4). Thus, if the proportion of articles that closely monitor EU governance continues to grow as it has done over the past decades, it can be expected that discursive integration will also increase, almost by default. It is therefore clearly worth continuing to monitor the development of discourses beyond our period of observation in this book.

(4) Apart from trend analysis, our research design also allows us to compare different scopes of transnationalization. In the cross-issue content analysis we systematically compared the European scopes of public discourse to both national and other transnational, for example Western, scopes. What emerges from this comparison is a marked absence of any other form of transnationalization but Europeanization. While non-European institutions, policies, countries, speakers and collective identities play a consistent role in public debates in European national media, they show no upward or downward trend. Even fluctuations over time are relatively small. And this finding, again, is corroborated by both the cross-issue content analysis and the two case studies. Segmented Europeanization is thus the only pattern of transnationalization that we observe. The (limited) structural change that we do see in European public spheres can therefore clearly be attributed to Europe or, to be more precise, to the supranational aspects of European politics and identification, not to the horizontal linkages between European countries.

Furthermore, segmented Europeanization is not accompanied by a dwindling importance of national affairs in public discourse. National institutions, policies, speakers and collectives clearly dominate public debate in national dailies to the same strong degree today as they did two decades ago – with the possible exception of national 'we' references that have gone down somewhat in our last interval (Figure 3.5). Conversely, we also find no indication of re-nationalization. The most striking feature

of national scopes in public debates is their marked stability over time, despite much talk about the alleged demise – or resurgence – of the nation-state. Whatever the truth of such diagnoses, they certainly are not mirrored in public discourse during the past two decades.

(5) While all trends described so far hold true across all five countries studied here, we also find clear country differences in their intensity. The upward trend of Europeanization in monitoring governance is steepest in *Le Monde*, followed by the Austrian *Die Presse*. The slopes for *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, The Times* and *Politiken* are somewhat less impressive, but there is still a clear increase. *Le Monde* has developed into a clear forerunner in monitoring EU governance among European quality newspapers. It introduced a regular EU page in 2002 that is published almost daily while the other newspapers have Europe pages less frequently or none at all. In 2003, a fifth of *Le Monde*'s discursive articles focused on EU policies while roughly two-fifths mentioned EU institutions. Other studies, too, show that French media are among the most Europeanized (Pfetsch 2005; Trenz 2004; Koopmans 2004). With respect to discursive integration it is the German-language papers *Die Presse* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* that lead the field. *Le Monde* and *Politiken* are close to the average while *The Times* turns out lowest here.

We thus find that while the general direction of the curves and lines is the same for all five countries, the differences in the level of monitoring EU governance and discursive integration between the newspapers are big enough to warrant a typology of four different Europeanization patterns (see Chapter 4, Figure 4.2). While *Politiken* holds the middle ground with roughly average scores on both monitoring EU governance and discursive integration, the other four newspapers more clearly represent distinct types. *Le Monde* best exemplifies the pattern of segmented Europeanization (high monitoring and below-average discursive integration scores); *The Times* turns out to be the most parochial (weak discursive integration and slightly below-average monitoring scores); the *FAZ* exhibits a pattern of Europeanization aloof from the EU with strong discursive integration but below-average monitoring scores; while *Die Presse* almost tends towards comprehensive Europeanization due to its very high discursive integration and average monitoring scores.

This four-fold typology offers a useful description of different patterns of Europeanization. The interesting question, of course, is *why* a particular newspaper finds itself in a particular quadrant of the typology. We addressed this question by carrying out a multivariate analysis of possible explanatory factors related both to the political environment in the

country in question and to the characteristics of the respective newspaper (see Table 4.7). There are stable as well as variable factors that serve to enhance levels of either monitoring EU governance or discursive integration. The mentioning of EU institutions is promoted by a comparatively high level of EU scepticism (not EU support!) in a country, and more in-depth scrutiny of EU policies is found in countries that joined the EU early. EU scepticism and accession date are relatively stable factors. However, both sub-dimensions of monitoring governance are also supported by two more variable, media-related factors: the existence of an editorial mission to cover the EU and the amount of editorial space reserved for EU coverage and debate.

As for discursive integration, it is again promoted by both a stable and a variable factor. Newspapers from smaller, less powerful countries tend to observe other European countries more often and, particularly, include more quotations of speakers from those countries. While size and power do not change much, the number of correspondents despatched to other European capitals might. This thus constitutes a variable factor: a greater number of correspondents in European capitals will increase both sub-dimensions of discursive integration.

Apart from the stable factors, therefore, newspapers do possess a certain degree of leverage over where they find themselves in the four-fold typology of Europeanization. With an appropriate editorial mission and enough space reserved for EU matters they will boost their position on the vertical axis, and with a higher number of correspondents in European capitals they will push themselves to the right on the horizontal line. A combination of both would lead to a pattern of comprehensive Europeanization, which none of the newspapers we have studied exhibits so far.

(6) Apart from national quality dailies, which exhibit a pattern of segmented Europeanization, we have identified a number of transnational media in Europe that address themselves to audiences beyond the borders of individual nation-states (see Chapter 5). In this market segment, which has grown continuously since the 1980s, we find four different types of media outlets: national media with a transnational mission or outreach (such as Deutsche Welle), international cooperation between two or more countries (such as ARTE), pan-regional media aiming at a European audience (as in the case of Euronews), and global media that draw transnational audiences in Europe (such as CNN International or, on a different scale, *Le Monde diplomatique*). There are also hybrids of these four ideal types (such as BBC World, the *Financial Times* or

The Economist). Several cases have also seen changes in their profile: BBC World has developed from a national media outlet with a transnational mission in the direction of a global news provider, and ARTE has moved away somewhat from its roots as a Franco-German cooperation towards a more pan-regional provider of quality programming in Europe.

What unites these different kinds of transnational media is the fact that they draw relatively small but sometimes quite influential and/or affluent audiences across European countries. These media make up only a small part of the media menu of the average European, which is clearly dominated by national media. And pan-European media outlets targeting a pan-European audience with decidedly European content are by no means the dominant type of transnational media in Europe. The contribution of the transnational media segment to the overall Europeanization of public discourse in Europe is on the rise, albeit to a limited extent.

Issue-specific convergence results: European integration as a catalyst

Do public discourses in different European countries grow more similar over time? We devoted two in-depth case studies to this complicated, yet decisive question, and developed a complex operationalization of discourse convergence that comprises four sub-dimensions with six indicators (see Table 8.2): from the level of issue attention in different countries and the basic frames used in public debate, through the structure of cleavages and the types of speakers making up the membership of discourse coalitions, to the justifications and markers of collective identity used by these speakers.

In analysing these indicators we contrasted two issues that systematically vary in several respects. Debates about the legitimacy of military interventions constitute a hard case for discourse convergence because they relate to the second pillar of EU policies (common foreign and security policy), in which EU institutions have only very limited competencies as yet and essential authority remains with the member states. Consequently, such debates are dominated by representatives of national governments (with relatively little involvement of civil society) and distinct national security traditions can be expected to play out clearly in public debates, thus presumably reducing the chances of substantive convergence. In contrast, public discourse about genetically modified food concerns a policy field in the first, supranational pillar of EU governance, with strong competencies at the EU level and strong elements

Table 8.2 Overview of issue-specific similarity and convergence results

Sub-dimension	Indicator	Hard case: military interventions	Easy case: genetically modified food
Convergence of relevance and problem definition	Issue attention	+ Moderate similarity, no convergence	++ High similarity, no convergence
	Frames	0 High similarity, no general trend but some divergence	++ Low similarity, strong convergence
Convergence of discourse coalitions	Cleavage structure	+ Moderate similarity, no convergence	+ Moderate similarity, moderate convergence
	Types of speakers	++ High similarity, no convergence	++ Low similarity, strong convergence
Convergence of repertoires of justification	Justifications	+ Moderate similarity, no general trend (convergence limited to one case)	++ Low similarity, strong convergence
Convergence of expressions of historical/cultural commonalities	Markers of collective identity	− Moderate similarity, weak divergence	+ Low similarity, moderate convergence
Total score		4	10

Notes: Ratings represent a composite measure of initial similarity and convergence. ++ = initial similarity high with no convergence *or* initial similarity low with strong convergence; + = initial similarity moderate with no convergence *or* initial similarity low or moderate with moderate convergence; 0 = no clear trend/mixed indications; − = initial similarity moderate and divergence; for total score, pluses are added up and minuses are subtracted from that sum.

of pluralistic interest group and NGO participation in consultation and decision-making processes. The 'discursive opportunity structures' (Ferree et al. 2002: 61) for convergence are thus much more pronounced here, making genetically modified food an easy case in the context of our study. Both issues were studied over a period of twelve to fifteen years, covering the 1990s and early 2000s. We expected to find that national debates on military interventions (MI) remain more distinct over time

and, conversely, that discourses on genetically modified (GM) food show more convergence.

Before we turn to the case study results on convergence, however, it is worth mentioning that our cross-issue study also gave one hint concerning the convergence question. Technically speaking, if the monitoring EU governance curves are all bent upwards but show different gradients in different countries, the result is a wider range of values at the end of the process than in the beginning, or in other words: divergence. National newspapers have clearly not converged, but rather have diverged in their *levels* of vertical Europeanization despite the common upward trend. In the horizontal dimension, differences in levels have stayed roughly the same, with some fluctuations in between, indicating neither convergence nor divergence in discursive integration. These results clearly show that common trends and convergence are not the same but that historical developments and national differences have to be distinguished analytically.

If there is no convergence in the level of vertical and horizontal Europeanization between the newspapers in our five countries, what about convergence in the content and structure of media debates? Table 8.2 contrasts the results from both case studies in a simplified way (for more elaborate results see Tables 6.3 and 7.3 in the case study chapters).

(1) Discourse similarity and convergence is clearly stronger in the debate on GM food than in MI discourse. This is visible in the higher total score for GM food as well as in the fact that the only two instances of partial *di*vergence are to be found in the MI case: both the structure of collective identification and the frames used by speakers in MI discourse diverge weakly over time, that is, they become less similar from one intervention to the next. Such a developmental pattern is not found in the GM food case at all, where we generally identify moderate to strong developments of convergence. As we hypothesized, the higher level of EU competencies and the consequent greater propensity to arrive at common European regulations in the GM food field keep national discourses from strongly playing out their peculiarities or even growing apart over time. Conversely, the as yet weak institutionalization of a common foreign and security policy in the EU promotes stronger differences, or even weak forms of divergence between national public discourses. The systematic case comparison thus very neatly brings out the significance of European integration as a catalyst for discourse convergence. The GM food debate is an impressive example of such convergence, and the MI

discourse shows that convergence cannot simply be assumed for policy fields and issues with weaker EU competencies.

(2) The differences between the two cases are not equally impressive on all sub-dimensions and indicators. They prove particularly strong with respect to the basic framing of the issue at hand as well as the structure of collective identification, and are still quite noticeable in relation to issue attention and repertoires of justification (see Table 8.2). With respect to convergence of discourse coalitions, by contrast, there is no difference in our composite scores, although on closer inspection the two debates display two different patterns. While in the MI case cleavage structures and types of speakers are relatively similar at the outset and no development is visible over time, in the GM food case low levels of similarity at the beginning are compensated by more pronounced convergence.

What do these findings on different sub-dimensions of discourse convergence tell us? They show, first, that to some degree strong EU competencies in a policy field (such as in the GM food case) tend to harmonize the levels of attention given to an issue. Where national policymaking still plays the dominant role (as in the case of military interventions) national public spheres differ more strongly in their attention levels.

Second, differences between the two cases are most significant where they pertain to the deeper meaning structures of the debates, that is, in the convergence of frames, justifications and markers of collective identity. It seems quite plausible that institutional arrangements that lead to common decision-making will also produce a more similar set of frames and justifications on both sides of the opinion spectrum, whereas a lack of such mechanisms allows national speakers to employ justifications that may resonate in their specific national arena but not necessarily across arenas. So the institutional explanation may very well carry here, too.

Third, such an argument is somewhat more difficult to make with respect to collective identification. On the whole, markers of collective identity seem to depend more on the substance of an issue than on the institutional structure developed for dealing with it. The question would rather be whether the issue poses challenges to collective self-understandings in a particular country, or whether it involves somewhat more pragmatic or material points of contention. The MI debates have indeed challenged the traditional security identities of several of the countries we studied (particularly Austria and Germany) and it is therefore not surprising that we find many more identity-related statements

in the MI than in the GM food case. The higher intensity of collective identification with respect to military interventions does not lead to more similar patterns between countries, however. Despite a weak trend towards more European identifications (as pointed out above) the general patterns of collective identification diverge somewhat in the MI case. In the GM food case, by contrast, the weaker opportunities for identity construction revolving around this issue are used by speakers in a more unifying fashion that leads to somewhat greater similarity over time.

Fourth, our findings on the convergence of discourse coalitions suggest that the social structures of public discourses (that is, cleavage structures and types of speakers) do not explain meaning structures in a simple and straightforward way. Even high levels of similarity in the relative weight of the pro and contra coalitions and the types of speakers that fill their ranks do not necessarily lead to continuously high levels of similarity in framing and collective identification. In the MI case at least, framing and collective identification have shown some measure of divergence despite persistently high similarity in social structures. Meaning structures, therefore, seem partly to have a life of their own that may reflect the 'software' of national traditions and ideologies more strongly than the composition of the 'hardware', namely, which types of speakers make up the discourse coalitions. And this seems to be particularly likely in a policy area like MI where decision-making is not centralized supranationally and consequently national policymaking traditions play out more intensely despite roughly similar actor constellations.

(3) Up to this point we have mainly argued that it is institutional structures at the European level that foster or inhibit discourse convergence on the national level – with more supranational decision-making encouraging convergence and more intergovernmental structures inhibiting it. Apart from this well-documented vertical effect of European integration on national discourses, our case study on military interventions has also produced evidence for an influence of horizontal transnationalization on the similarity of national debates (see Chapter 6, Figures 6.3 and 6.4). In a debate that is as thoroughly transnationalized as the MI debate proved to be – with 43 per cent of all speakers not nationals of the respective newspaper's home country – foreign speakers play a special role. Their statements tend to counterbalance strong biases in domestic debates by offering minority views, thereby strengthening minority coalitions. The same is true of the use of particular justifications for or against an intervention. If domestic speakers exhibit a strong bias in using a particular justification at the expense of others, foreign speakers in that country's

national debate tend to even out that bias by focusing on alternative justifications.

By levelling out domestic biases in both the strength of discourse coalitions and the use of individual justifications, foreign speakers fill the blind spots of national discourses and thus contribute to greater similarity. This effect, however, is not limited to speakers from other European countries but also includes other foreign speakers such as those from the US or the United Nations. While the discursive exchange within as well as beyond Europe thus evens out differences in public debate on each particular military intervention, this does not result in an overall convergence over time.

Summary: European integration's limited impact

Taking the results of our cross-issue trend analysis and our issue-specific convergence analysis together, we find clear indications of an influence of European integration on national public discourses. There is a clear Europeanization trend in monitoring governance and a nascent trend towards more identification with Europe in public debate. Both curves seem to reflect the increasing intensity of European integration over time. Moreover, in a policy field with strong EU competencies, national discourses converge more clearly both in social and in meaning structures, and traces of divergence are absent.

But the media are not merely mirrors of European integration; they also act semi-independently in relation to their sources and their audiences. Thus, if national media respond to European integration by modifying their editorial mission accordingly and becoming vehicles for EU news and debate, they can boost the vertical Europeanization of public debate and thus exert an influence of their own.

Furthermore, there are clear limits to the influence of European integration in the horizontal dimension. It has not as yet given rise to growing discursive integration between national public spheres. And the stronger similarity that foreign speakers create between national debates is not limited to European speakers but also includes foreign speakers from outside Europe. Overall, national public discourses in Europe thus exhibit a pattern of segmented Europeanization and show a certain degree of resilience against wholesale integration into a unified and clearly demarcated European space of communication.

Only time can tell whether the Europeanization of public debates will eventually expand to the horizontal dimension of discursive integration and whether discourse convergence between countries will extend to policy fields with less centralized institutional structures at the European

level. For the time being, however, we will have to make do with segmented Europeanization, and it is important to arrive at a normative appraisal of this particular pattern.

What our results mean: normative appraisal

In Chapter 1 we problematized the normative expectations that are commonly directed at national media debates in the discussions about the possible emergence of a European public sphere. In doing so, we distinguished four normative approaches: (1) the monitoring governance approach, (2) the discourse convergence approach, (3) the discursive integration approach, and (4) the collective identification approach. While these approaches correspond to our four empirical dimensions, their purpose is not to facilitate description but to specify normative demands. Each approach points to important normative elements that should neither be neglected nor discarded. We argued in Chapter 1 that the approaches need not, and indeed should not, be taken to their logical extremes, that is, that they do not follow a logic of maximization but rather a logic of appropriateness in defining the normative standards. How, then, do the national public discourses we have analysed fare in relation to the normative demands posited by each approach?

The monitoring governance approach: demands increasingly met, but communication deficit persists

With respect to monitoring EU governance we have argued that national public discourses should increasingly discuss European institutions and policies in order to match the increasing transfer of decision-making powers to the EU over time. But the EU need not be monitored to the same extent as national institutions and policies are, because compared to its member states the EU still has limited competencies, and nation-states are thus in even greater need of public debate for their communicative legitimation. Finally, monitoring governance should include the policy formulation stage and should not only focus on the domestic effects of decisions already taken at the EU level.

Our findings show that while national quality dailies increasingly meet the normative demands of the monitoring governance approach, on the whole a communication deficit still persists. EU institutions and policies are indeed increasingly discussed so that the upward slopes of the respective curves roughly correspond to the deepening of European integration in the past decades. As shown in Chapter 3, national quality dailies have also begun to close the quantitative gap between the (weaker)

monitoring of EU legislative output and the (stronger) monitoring of legislative output at the national level. However, public scrutiny of the EU still remains much lower proportionally than scrutiny of national politics. In the light of the more restricted competencies of the EU as compared to nation-states this does not seem to be normatively problematic at first sight. But a number of additional findings prevent us from giving the normative all-clear here. First, if we compare the EU with other international institutions, the further-reaching competencies of the EU are not mirrored in a more pronounced focus on its policies as compared to other fields of foreign or international policy. Second, different EU institutions are often not distinguished so that a clear picture of the respective policymaking processes does not always emerge. Finally, and most importantly, the EU is often mentioned in passing, while articles explicitly focusing on EU policies are relatively rare. This suggests that EU policies mostly receive media attention when decisions have already been taken and their domestic consequences are at issue, and that policy formulation, negotiation and adoption at the European level are far less subject to public scrutiny. In addition, compared to newspapers with a remarkably steep increase (particularly *Le Monde*) other countries' newspapers (such as *Politiken, The Times* and the *FAZ*) fall behind in the process of vertical Europeanization.

In sum, the monitoring of EU governance in the national quality dailies is no longer characterized by a general quantitative lack of attention, but rather by a selective focus on the output side and on domestic repercussions and a corresponding lack of focus on the early stages of policymaking. The communication deficit is thus of a more specific and restricted kind, but it persists even in the case of quality newspapers. While we have no long-term data on tabloid and regional media or television, we know from other studies that quality dailies generally show the highest levels of vertical Europeanization (see Pfetsch 2004). This suggests that the communication deficit will be still more pronounced in those other media types, thus posing more severe normative problems in these quarters. However, this should not distract us from the significant progress that national quality newspapers have made in their monitoring of EU governance during the past decades.

The discourse convergence approach: no major deficit

The main idea behind the discourse convergence approach is that national public spheres increasingly discuss the same issues at the same time with similar levels of attention. Such a convergence is taken by some as a substitute for genuine transnational debate (see, for example,

Eder and Kantner 2000). While we argue against such a 'shortcut' to a European public sphere and highlight the importance of genuine discursive integration, the increasing similarity of national public discourses in Europe is certainly an important element of Europeanization and normatively desirable in its own right. But, as we argued in Chapter 1, demands for homogeneity should not be exaggerated and a standard of completeness seems more appropriate. Individual countries should be allowed to deviate from the mainstream of framing as long as all existing frames and justifications are acknowledged in all countries. And discourse constellations should be allowed to differ somewhat between countries as long as speakers are aware of justifications from their sister coalitions abroad as well as of the different possible cleavage structures of an issue.

Measured against these standards our case studies on military interventions and genetically modified food do not indicate major normative problems. Of course, in order to facilitate empirical analysis we have chosen topics that were indeed discussed in all five countries under scrutiny at roughly the same time. So we do not have comparative cases that would allow us to assess whether topics are generally more often discussed at the same time across Europe. While no other study has produced such data so far, this general shortcoming does complicate normative appraisal.

Focusing on our two cases, we observe marked similarities and/or convergence on many of the dimensions studied. To be sure, the debates about genetically modified food converge more strongly due to the supranational nature of decision-making in this field. But even in the case of military interventions we found relatively high levels of initial similarity between national debates. And we were able to identify a (weak) homogenizing effect of foreign speakers on national discourses. Such speakers tend to fill some of the blind spots of national debates by advancing those justifications and strengthening those discourse coalitions that are in the minority in a particular country. This effect, although weak, seems to exactly correspond to our standard of completeness, with actual discursive exchange between national public spheres enriching domestic discourses and making them more similar. It should be noted again, however, that it is not only European speakers but foreign speakers in general who contribute to this effect.

The homogenizing forces have to be weighed against those instances of limited discourse divergence that we encountered in the military interventions case only. Whether divergence and, more generally, dissimilarity in certain dimensions of discourse pose a normative problem

depends very much on their extent and on the specifics of the case. If they are counteracted by discursive exchange we allow for a certain degree of difference between national discourses. And in the light of such a reduced homogeneity standard, we at least find no strong indications for normative problems in our cases. All in all, therefore, our results seem least problematic in terms of the discourse convergence approach.

The discursive integration approach: stagnation and stratification

Discursive integration, that is, mutual observation and discursive exchange across national borders, is not only important in keeping existing dissimilarities in national discourses at bay, it is also normatively desirable in its own right. In Chapter 1 we argued that discursive integration is valuable for introducing new ideas into national debates (discourse innovation) and for overcoming national solipsism and self-centredness. To be sure, a logic of maximization according to which the country in which a particular newspaper appears would be irrelevant for the distribution of countries observed and speakers quoted is not an appropriate normative standard. We have settled instead for a standard of scope, namely that the countries observed and speakers quoted should span the entire sphere – in our case the area represented by the EU member states – or at least major parts of it. In addition, we argued that discursive integration should help national public spheres keep up with the increasing political and economic interdependence between EU member states. We therefore also expect a long-term increase, however slight, in mutual observation and discursive exchange. Both criteria – scope and increase – should ensure that a truly transnational public sphere emerges out of the exchange of national media.

However, our cross-issue content analysis shows that it is the powerful countries rather than European countries per se that play a role in national discourses. Thus, the US receives the highest proportion of media attention, followed by the powerful three in Europe, Great Britain, France and Germany. Smaller European countries are practically invisible in national debates in our five countries. This finding is highly compatible with news value theory (Galtung and Ruge 1965; Schulz 1990), in which 'elite nation' features as one of the important news factors triggering more extensive coverage. It seems, therefore, that it is the media's news selection routines that explain the scope of discursive integration, not a particular European focus or commitment. National discourses in European quality newspapers seem to mirror the stratified nature of the

global political and economic system just as much as news outlets around the world, thus confirming long-standing results of international news flow research (see Wu 2000).

In terms of growth, we have noted repeatedly the generally stagnant character of discursive integration within Europe with respect to both observing countries and quoting speakers. There is no general trend towards Europeanization (or Westernization) in this dimension. Increased real-world interdependence is not mirrored in an upward trend in discursive integration in our period of investigation. Whether this has changed since the failure of the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands in 2005 remains to be studied. At all events, for the period ending 2003, the stagnant level of discursive integration in Europe does indicate a normative shortcoming.

To sum up, horizontal Europeanization is characterized by stagnation and stratification. Discursive integration, to the extent that it exists, seems to be a by-product of media selection routines rather than of a heightened focus on Europe on the part of journalists or an increased awareness of real-life interdependencies. These routines are relatively stable and may therefore be a major explanatory factor for the absence of change in discursive integration – be it in the direction of an increase or a more inclusive scope. Thus, even national quality newspapers do not meet the normative standards on the horizontal dimension, making discursive integration the Achilles heel in the emergence of a Europeanized public sphere.

The collective identification approach: slight increases – and a lot of questions and uncertainties

Elements of collective identity surface in public debates because addressing an individual or a group in public communication invariably presupposes and constitutes a particular relationship with that individual or group. Public debates are therefore shaped by particular collective identifications, and public spheres cannot exist and persist over time without some sense of togetherness. We refrained in Chapter 1 from normatively positing a particular substance of collective identity for an emerging European public sphere and opted instead for a procedural criterion at the present stage of development, namely that public discourses should produce a shared understanding of belonging to a European discourse community faced with common problems (see also Risse 2002).

From our data we can tentatively conclude that such a modest 'problem-solving' identity is hesitantly emerging in public discourses

across Europe. As we have seen above, 'we' references to Europe have slightly increased from almost nothing to around 5 per cent of all collective identifications. Our case studies on military interventions and genetically modified food also show that European identity elements increased slightly during the 1990s and early 2000s. However, very low-level increases should not be over-interpreted because they may prove less robust in the future than they appear now. For collective identification particularly, sustained observation in the future is necessary in order to corroborate the nascent trend.

In addition, counting instances of collective identification of varying scopes does not elucidate the relationships that exist between these alternative identities. Are national and European identifications mutually reinforcing or are they pitched against each other by speakers in national debates? It is conceivable that a rising trend in identification with Europe such as we have noted in our study may to some degree disguise other, more complex relationships in collective identification.

Finally, normative appraisal on the collective identification dimension is complicated by the fact that in our view normative reasoning alone cannot serve to identify the level and depth of collective identification needed to adequately support European governance in its present and possible future forms. We have refrained from defining exact levels and substances precisely because we know too little about the actual functional mechanisms connecting elements of collective identity in public discourse, collective identifications at the citizen level and new forms of supranational governance. Under what conditions does the public display of identities translate into citizen convictions? And how do weaker forms of identification evolve into stronger feelings of solidarity capable, say, of supporting majority decisions that violate the interests of some member states to the benefit of others? More empirical work needs to be done before meaningful and complex normative standards can be specified on this dimension.

In conclusion, our findings concerning collective identification with Europe give grounds for some limited normative optimism, while at the same time raising empirical doubts and posing analytical questions that cannot be answered at the present stage. We therefore have to conclude this final part of our normative appraisal without a clear judgement as to the normative adequacy of our findings.

Summary: progress, deficits and remaining uncertainties

If we review the normative appraisal of our findings in respect of the four dimensions of transnationalization, it becomes clear that national

Table 8.3 Overview of normative appraisal

Dimension	Short summary of normative appraisal	Score
Monitoring governance	No general lack of attention but neglect of input side in EU policymaking and very unequal levels in different newspapers	+/−
Discourse convergence	No major deficit; dissimilarities between national debates seem to be counterbalanced by discursive exchange	+
Discursive integration	Normatively problematic stagnation and stratification of horizontal discursive integration	−
Collective identification	Slight, low-level increases for identifications with Europe, but doubts and uncertainties remain as to their functional role and normative adequacy	(+/−)

quality newspapers score best on the dimension of discourse convergence while presenting a mixed picture on the monitoring governance dimension, and discursive integration is characterized by the strongest normative shortcomings. The dimension of collective identification, while justifying some measure of normative optimism, remains plagued by empirical and normative uncertainties (Table 8.3).

This complex outcome of the normative appraisal also explains why others (see, for example, Eder and Kantner 2000; Pfetsch and Koopmanns 2006) have come to deny normative deficits in the Europeanization of national public spheres. They have tended to restrict their concepts of Europeanization of public discourses to the less problematic dimensions of transnationalization, notably monitoring governance and discourse convergence. By contrast, our multidimensional model of transnationalization reveals that the persisting communication deficit in the monitoring governance dimension, the as yet nascent character of European collective identifications and the stagnation and stratification in the discursive integration dimension do pose normative problems that deserve attention. The transfer of decision-making powers to the EU and the increased interdependence between EU member states is not yet matched by adequate forms of vertical and – particularly – horizontal Europeanization and collective identification in public debates, despite substantial increases particularly in the vertical dimension and grounds for optimism concerning collective identification with Europe. The internationalization of state functions that we have witnessed in Europe

during the past decades has not found an appropriate societal correlate. European governance can derive democratic legitimacy only in part from Europeanizing public debates. A considerable communication deficit persists, and national public spheres exhibit a degree of persistence that holds their Europeanization back. In normative terms, therefore, we see progress *and* deficits, as well as some uncertainty as to the adequacy of particular standards and judgements.

How public spheres transnationalize: theoretical conclusions

Apart from informing a normative appraisal, our findings also pave the way to a more thorough clarification of some fundamental theoretical issues in understanding public spheres and their transnationalization. In the scholarly debate over the emergence of a European public sphere, two theoretical arguments mark the endpoints of a continuum of positions. At one end, Gerhards (2000a, 2001) has repeatedly argued that a European public sphere is highly unlikely to emerge as long as citizens have no substantial rights of political participation along the lines of national polities, that is, the right to elect representatives with genuine executive powers. In the absence of such rights in the European Union (and despite a somewhat stronger role for the European Parliament in more recent times), citizens have little incentive to seek information about the EU because such information is secondary to their political participation. Thus, Gerhards argues, it is not surprising that the news media refrain from providing such information on a large scale. Conversely, collective actors, particularly those at the EU level, also have weak incentives to address citizens via the news media because they do not depend on the citizens' support in the same way as national political actors do. This lack of interest reinforces the news media's reluctance to discuss Europe. The form and structure of political participation, so the argument goes, thus provide general constraints for the emergence of more Europeanized communication in the media. Concerning the prospects for an EPS this line of thinking can be dubbed the 'impossibility school' (for a slightly different use of the term, see Brüggemann 2005).

At the other end of the spectrum, Trenz and Eder (2004) paint a thoroughly optimistic picture. They see 'a self-constituting dynamic of a European public sphere which abets the coupling of transnational spaces of communication with the institutional integration of the EU'. Political actors, particularly those at the EU level, anticipate the (contingent)

reactions of the general public and incorporate them into their own actions and communications accordingly. In this way, the shortcomings of European governance in terms of transparency and participation enter the self-descriptions of European institutions and democratize their programmes and strategies from within. This process of anticipatory self-democratization of the EU, Trenz and Eder argue in their theory of 'democratic functionalism', is self-constituting or self-reinforcing because the outcome of one stage feeds into the conditions for the next: the presence of an unpredictable but attentive public leads to institutional adaptations in the EU that, in turn, strengthen those public demands by, for example, calling for more public attention and participation – 'a self-help therapy that remedies the deficits it deplores' (Trenz and Eder 2004: 19). The positive feedback mechanism between European governments and institutions on one side and the public on the other automatically creates a public sphere of contestation in which opinions and a collective will can be formed. With respect to the prospects for an EPS, therefore, this line of argument constitutes the 'automatism school'.

What are the respective merits and problems of these schools? The 'impossibility school' has difficulty accounting for the increases in vertical Europeanization of national public debates. Although European citizens can still not elect a European executive, media attention and, by implication, also public attention for the EU have risen somewhat over the past decades. To be sure, the relatively weak forms of political participation in the EU will restrict Europeanized public discourse to a secondary, ancillary position vis-à-vis national public debates. But Europeanized discourses have emerged and may continue to expand if the present trajectories persist.

On the other hand, the 'automatism school', while proposing a highly interesting idea, offers little in the way of empirical proof for the existence of a self-reinforcing mechanism. In fact, the example that Trenz and Eder choose to illustrate their idea, the EU's constitutional reform, proves that unpredictable publics have the potential of stifling further integration, but not necessarily of inducing further democratization. There is clearly no automatic positive feedback loop between institutions and publics, which could create an ever-expanding European public sphere of democratic contestation. Of course, contestation did emerge before and after the failed referenda in France and the Netherlands, but feedback from the public can be negative and public discourses can remain nationally confined or might even renationalize in response to certain proposals from Brussels.

If both schools have empirical difficulties, how, then, should we conceptualize the emergence of a Europeanized public sphere? Drawing on our own results (particularly from Chapter 4) as well as on ideas from both schools, we propose an integrative, heuristic model. The emergence of a Europeanized public sphere, we contend, is neither impossible nor automatic, but constitutes instead a highly contingent, synergetic process, in which several elements must work together in order to set off an upward spiral of increasing consolidation.

At the centre of this process is the provision of information and deliberation supply by the news media (see Figure 8.1). Without this provision, transnational communication cannot exist over time. The provision of information and deliberation by the news media is a complex product of three different factors:

- the demand for information and deliberation on the part of the citizens, as perceived by the news media;
- information and deliberations supplied by political actors and institutions; and
- the material and ideational commitment of the news media themselves.

The quantity and form of the information and deliberation provided by the news media are further structured by political context variables that vary from country to country (date of accession, size and power of the country, general level of EU scepticism and so on).

While centring around news media content our model acknowledges that citizens' objective opportunities for political participation and, subsequently, their subjective need for participation has a constraining effect on the emergence of Europeanized public discourses. This is so because such opportunities and needs condition citizens' information and deliberation demands and news media must cater to these demands in order to secure attention and income. Likewise, in designing their communication activities, political actors must align their interests and goals with the perceived information and deliberation demands of the public in order to gain attention and, ultimately, support. The origins of these interests and goals of political actors are not represented in the model and are treated as givens here. However, as posited by Trenz and Eder (2004), these interests and goals may well include a desire to further democratize the EU. In fact, European institutions increasingly seem to combine two different logics: the logic of a strategic actor in search of political



Figure 8.1 Heuristic model of the synergies between citizens, news media and political actors in building a Europeanized public sphere

support, and the logic of a democratic broker organizing public contestation. The relative weight of these logics may vary over time and across institutions. In any case, political actors do register feedback from citizens concerning their information and deliberation needs as well as their actual political participation. But the extent of their adaptation to such feedbacks is influenced by the degree to which they are dependent on public support. The model could be developed further by systematically distinguishing between national and European actors (the latter being more independent of public support) and between mediated and non-mediated forms of communication between political actors and citizens. For our purposes here, however, it may suffice to stress the dynamic and synergetic character of the process. Europeanized public discourses will only develop

(a) if the information and deliberation demands by the public are strong enough,
(b) if at least some political actors feel compelled to invest in political communication activities directed at such Europeanized discourses by a need for public support, and
(c) if the news media commit enough material and ideational resources to facilitate such discourses.

Of course, the communication activities of political actors and the provision of information and deliberation by the media also exert an influence on citizens' subjective needs for political participation (see feedback loops in Figure 8.1). By informing citizens about their rights in terms of political participation, and by pointing to the political consequences of citizen input, media and political actors may partly enhance citizens' inclination to seek out and use information and deliberation, to form opinions about Europe and, ultimately, to engage in political participation. Such an inducement of Europeanized public debate from the supply side may thus contribute to a spiral of increasing Europeanization – but it can by no means create a European public sphere on its own.

On the level of national quality newspapers a synergetic process of mutually reinforcing feedbacks seems to have taken root in the vertical dimension; the remaining deficits on the input side that we have described above may well be attributed to the limitations in direct political participation cited by Gerhards (2001), which render discussions in the early phases of the policy process less consequential for citizens. In the horizontal dimension an increasing and more inclusive discursive

integration may be prevented by a 'negative synergy' of factors on all sides of the model. But, as we have seen, media selection routines certainly play an important role here. The development of stronger and deeper identifications with Europe in public debate may also be retarded by weak editorial commitments on the part of some media, but also by presumptions on the part of political actors that national identifications will pay off more with citizens. The strength of both of these factors may of course vary across countries. Discourse convergence, finally, may be facilitated by the unifying force of common events triggering debates (again a factor not depicted in the model) as well as by quality journalism that seeks out statements and opinions across borders and thus subtly makes them more similar. Of course, most of these conjectures have the status of hypotheses. But they may serve to give EPS research a more explanatory twist in the future than it has had so far.

Where we should go from here: research perspectives

We have offered in this book a multidimensional, longitudinal and gradual assessment of the transnationalization, particularly the Europeanization, of national quality newspapers. For all its merits, this approach offers at least three directions for future research in the field.

(1) The *descriptive* element of our study can and should be expanded. First, we are at present lacking long-term data relating to the transnationalization of popular media such as tabloid newspapers and television. Is the pattern of segmented Europeanization also visible in the media that draw larger audiences, or is it specific to the quality media? A second major desideratum of EPS research to date concerns the inclusion of the Eastern European member states in longitudinal analysis. We know nothing about the long-term development of European topics, references, identifications and so on in Eastern European media. And we only have anecdotal evidence concerning the mutual observation and discursive exchange between Eastern and Western European countries. Such discursive integration may be a particularly interesting topic given the history of official separation and subcutaneous connections between public discourses during the time of the Cold War. Third, at various points in our study we have stressed the necessity to extend our investigation into the future. This seems all the more promising because since 2003 (the last period of observation in our study) the EU has witnessed important developments in the context of constitutional reform which have highlighted interdependencies between member states and

which therefore make an upswing in discursive integration since 2005 not inconceivable. Also, more generally, the Europeanization of public debate is a dynamic, open-ended process characterized by a number of remaining normative deficits that clearly deserve further scrutiny. Finally, it would be most informative to be able to compare the structures of public debate in Europe with those in segmented national public spheres. There is a possibility that our demands concerning the homogeneity and discursive integration of the emerging European public sphere may still be exaggerated, if we look at how integrated or segmented public spheres in culturally or politically divided national societies are. Apart from countries like Switzerland, Belgium and Canada, Germany seems to be an obvious candidate for comparison, particularly in the context of the East-West divide that is an issue for Europe as a whole as well (see Kleinen-von Königslöw 2007).

(2) Apart from refining and extending description, future EPS research should engage in more sophisticated *explanatory* investigation. Why do we find a pattern of segmented Europeanization? What are the factors that have so far prohibited a growth and expansion of discursive integration in Europe? How can the apparent resilience of national public spheres and nationally dominated public debates be accounted for? How are they rooted in nationally specific traditions and discourse cultures? And how are these traditions and cultures connected to nationally specific production structures of public debate, that is, to the institutions, associations and networks of idea generation and interest articulation as well as to the structures of national media systems? Answers to these questions may give public sphere research more historical depth and sociological anchorage.

But we should also ask in the opposite direction: how do citizens, political actors and media synergize in extending the public monitoring of EU governance? What role does the strategic shift in the EU's information policy – with which Commissioner Margot Wallström is particularly associated – play in this process (for an in-depth study of the information policy of the EU, see Brüggemann 2008)? Does this shift lead to substantial changes in communicative behaviour, and does it actually have discernible effects on mediated public debates? Do EU institutions play an increasing role in initiating EU-related coverage and debate? What triggers such coverage and debate in the first place?

(3) Finally, what are the *effects* of the segmented Europeanization of national public debates? Such effects should be studied in at least two

directions. First, how are citizens' perceptions of Europe and other European countries affected by Europeanizing public discourses? And does this change – and if so, how – the legitimacy beliefs that citizens hold with respect to the EU, particularly the criteria that citizens employ to judge the EU's legitimacy? This question is paramount in assessing the impact of Europeanizing debates on the future of democratic legitimacy beyond the nation-state in general. Second and less obvious but equally important: how do Europeanizing debates affect political decision-makers? Do such debates exert a pressure for enhanced justificatory communication on the part of political elites, as would be expected from the angle of deliberative democratic theory? Do such debates trigger a self-democratization process of the EU that might eventually even change institutional structures and processes, as Trenz and Eder have contended?

Not all of these questions can be answered by simple and straightforward research designs. Some of them indicate broader directions for future research. But all of them show that the transnationalization of public spheres lies at the heart of those transformations by which modern societies and states adapt to the challenges of internationalization.

Appendix 1: Additional Tables for Chapter 4

Table A1.1 Overview of results for *Le Monde*

Measuring Europeanization	**1982**	**1989**	**1996**	**2003**	**Mean**
Visibility of EU institutions[a]	15.9	32.0	32.7	45.2	32.5
Focus on EU politics[a]	3.2	9.7	6.4	22.0	11.4
Focus on other EU countries[b]	15.0	11.7	21.2	14.5	15.5
Extended quotations of speakers from other EU countries[c]	14.0	12.0	13.0	13.5	13.2

Notes: All values are percentages. a. All articles in *Le Monde* (n = 507); b. all articles including press reviews (n = 534); c. all extensive quotations (n = 438). The table shows that for instance in 2003, 45.2 per cent of all articles mentioned EU institutions and 22.0 per cent focused on EU politics.

Explaining Europeanization	
Popular EU scepticism/support (Eurobarometer 1982–2002, average, per cent)	Net support for EU membership: 46.5 Deviation from mean: +18
Date of EU/EG accession	Founding member, 1958
Power/size (2002)	GDP in billion EUR: 1500 Population in millions: 60
Exclusive nationalism/Europeanized identity (Eurobarometer 1992–2002, average, per cent)	Citizens identifying with 'nation only': 31 Deviation from mean: −14
Brussels correspondents (full-time, excluding freelancers)	Correspondents in Brussels: 4 Total number of full-time journalists: 320 Share: 1.3 per cent
Foreign correspondents	Correspondents in Europe (without Brussels): 5 Total number of correspondents: 20 Share of correspondents in Europe relative to all journalists: 1.6 per cent
Europeanized editorial space	(Almost) daily EU page introduced in 2002
Europeanized editorial mission	Yes. To be found in self-description and confirmed in interviews with journalists from *LM*.

Table A1.2 Overview of results for *FAZ*

Measuring Europeanization	**1982**	**1989**	**1996**	**2003**	**Mean**
Visibility of EU institutions[a]	8.3	14.5	18.7	23.3	16.0
Focus on EU politics[a]	2.5	3.5	3.9	6.3	4.0
Focus on other EU countries[b]	27.1	27.6	25.5	21.9	25.5
Extended quotations of speakers from other EU countries[c]	20.3	18.2	18.9	14.6	18.2

Notes: All values are percentages. a. All articles in *FAZ* (n = 721); b. all articles including press reviews (n = 769); c. all extensive quotations (n = 672). The table shows that for instance in 2003, 23.3 per cent of all articles mentioned EU institutions and 6.3 per cent focused on EU politics.

Explaining Europeanization	
Popular EU scepticism (Eurobarometer 1982–2002, average, per cent)	Net support for EU membership: 42.5 Deviation from mean: +14
Date of EU/EG accession	Founding member, 1958
Power/size (2002)	GDP in billion EUR: 2100 Population in millions: 82.5
Exclusive nationalism/Europeanized identity (Eurobarometer 1992–2002, average, per cent)	Citizens identifying with 'nation only': 41 Deviation from mean: −4
Brussels correspondents (full-time, excluding freelancers)	Correspondents in Brussels: 6 Total number of full-time journalists: 286 Share: 2.1 per cent
Foreign correspondents	Correspondents in Europe (without Brussels): 7 Total number of correspondents: 46 Share of correspondents in Europe relative to all journalists: 2.4 per cent
Europeanized editorial space	Weekly 'Europe' page
Europeanized editorial mission	No explicit mission statement but journalists claim European mission in interviews.

Table A1.3 Overview of results for *Die Presse*

Measuring Europeanization	**1982**	**1989**	**1996**	**2003**	**Mean**
Visibility of EU institutions[a]	9.2	18.5	30.5	30.1	22.9
Focus on EU politics[a]	0.8	4.5	3.2	4.5	3.4
Focus on other EU countries[b]	27.5	21.0	32.3	18.8	24.8
Extended quotations of speakers from other EU countries[c]	31.0	20.9	42.7	22.5	29.3

Notes: All values are percentages. a. All articles in *Die Presse* (n = 586); b. all articles including press reviews (n = 604); c. extensive quotations (n = 368). The table shows that for instance in 2003, 30.1 per cent of all articles mentioned EU institutions and 4.5 per cent focused on EU politics.

Explaining Europeanization	
Popular EU scepticism (Eurobarometer 1995–2002, average, per cent)	Net support for EU membership: 10.8 Deviation from mean: −18
Date of EU/EG accession	1995
Power/size (2002)	GDP in billion EUR: 223 Population in millions: 8.1
Exclusive nationalism/Europeanized identity (Eurobarometer 1995–2002, average, per cent)	Citizens identifying with 'nation only': 49 Deviation from mean: +/−0
Brussels correspondents (full-time, excluding freelancers)	Correspondents in Brussels: 1 Total number of full-time journalists: 87 Share: 1.1 per cent
Foreign correspondents	Correspondents in Europe (without Brussels): 1 Total number of correspondents: 3 Share of correspondents in Europe relative to all journalists: 1.1 per cent
Europeanized editorial space	EU page several times a week, but not daily
Europeanized editorial mission	EU flag printed on the cover but no explicit commitment to Europe

Table A1.4 Overview of results for *The Times*

Measuring Europeanization	**1982**	**1989**	**1996**	**2003**	**Mean**
Visibility of EU institutions[a]	11.1	19.8	21.0	21.4	18.4
Focus on EU politics[a]	1.4	4.3	10.9	4.5	5.2
Focus on other EU countries[b]	6.3	8.0	13.0	9.1	9.0
Extended quotations of speakers from other EU countries[c]	4.2	9.8	10.8	9.3	9.2

Notes: All values are percentages. a. All articles in *The Times* (n = 552); b. all articles including press reviews (n = 598); c. all extensive quotations (n = 554). The table shows that for instance in 2003, 23.3 per cent of all articles mentioned EU institutions and 6.3 per cent focused on EU politics.

Explaining Europeanization	
Popular EU scepticism (Eurobarometer 1982–2002, average, per cent)	Net support for EU membership: 16.5 Deviation from mean: −12
Date of EU/EG accession	1973
Power/size (2002)	GDP in billion EUR: 1600 Population in millions: 59.3
Exclusive nationalism/Europeanized identity (Eurobarometer 1992–2002, average, per cent)	Citizens identifying with 'nation only': 60 Deviation from mean: +15
Brussels correspondents (full-time, excluding freelancers)	Correspondents in Brussels: 1 Total number of full-time journalists: 445 Share: 0.2 per cent
Foreign correspondents	Correspondents in Europe (without Brussels): 4 Total number of correspondents: 17 Share of correspondents in Europe relative to all journalists: 0.9 per cent
Europeanized editorial space	No
Europeanized editorial mission	No

Table A1.5 Overview of results for *Politiken*

Measuring Europeanization	**1982**	**1989**	**1996**	**2003**	**Mean**
Visibility of EU institutions[a]	13.4	23.6	14.9	21.9	18.8
Focus on EU politics[a]	1.7	1.4	5.2	8.4	4.3
Focus on other EU countries[b]	14.3	11.8	9.7	12.7	12.1
Extended quotations of speakers from other EU countries[c]	21.9	23.3	19.5	15.2	19.9

Notes: All values are percentages. a. All articles in *Politiken* (n = 552); b. all articles including press reviews (n = 554); c. all extensive quotations (n = 608). The table shows that for instance in 2003 23.3 per cent of all articles mentioned EU institutions and 6.3 per cent focused on EU politics.

Explaining Europeanization	
Popular EU scepticism (Eurobarometer 1982–2002, average, per cent)	Net support for EU membership: 25.6 Deviation from mean: −3
Date of EU/EG accession	1973
Power/size (2002)	GDP in billion EUR: 189 Population in millions: 5.4
Exclusive nationalism/Europeanized identity (Eurobarometer 1992–2002, average, per cent)	Citizens identifying with 'nation only': 47 Deviation from mean: +4
Brussels correspondents (full-time, excluding freelancers)	Correspondents in Brussels: 2 Total number of full-time journalists: 140 Share: 1.4 per cent
Foreign correspondents	Correspondents in Europe (without Brussels): 2 Total number of correspondents: 8 Share of correspondents in Europe relative to all journalists: 1.4 per cent
Europeanized editorial space	Weekly Europe page since 2002
Europeanized editorial mission	No

Appendix 2: Methodological Appendix

This appendix summarizes all relevant methodological information for the cross-issue study and the issue-specific case studies. It describes the samples, the coding processes (including reliability checks) and the coding schemes. For some parts our website can be consulted for additional information.

A2.1 Cross-issue study

A2.1.1 The sample

The sample consisted of a random sample of discursive articles in the political sections of the newspapers *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Le Monde*, *The Times*, *Die Presse* and *Politiken* from the years 1982, 1989, 1996 and 2003.

Table A2.1 Sample dates

1982	1989	1996	2003
Mon. January 11	Mon. January 9	Mon. January 8	Mon. January 6
Thur. February 25	Thur. February 23	Thur. February 22	Thur. February 20
Tue. March 2	Tue. February 28	Tue. February 27	Tue. February 25
Thur. May 6	Thur. May 4	Thur. May 2	Thur. May 1
Tue. May 11	Tue. May 9	Tue. May 7	Tue. May 6
Sat. June 26	Sat. June 24	Sat. June 22	Sat. June 21
Fri. August 6	Fri. August 4	Fri. August 2	Fri. August 1
Mon. Sept. 13	Mon. Sept. 11	Mon. Sept. 9	Mon. Sept. 8
Wed. October 13	Wed. October 11	Wed. October 9	Wed. October 8
Fri. October 29	Fri. October 27	Fri. October 25	Fri. October 24
Wed. December 1	Wed. Nov. 29	Wed. Nov. 27	Wed. Nov. 26
Sat. December 18	Sat. December 16	Sat. December 14	Sat. December 13

The sample was drawn in two steps, first by choosing the sample dates, then by selecting the discursive articles in the issues of each sample date. These two steps will be explained in further detail below.

By this method a sample of 3059 articles was obtained (*FAZ*: 769; *Le Monde*: 534; *The Times*: 598; *Die Presse*: 604; and *Politiken*: 554).

A2.1.1.1 Selecting the sample dates

Two constructed weeks were selected for each year of analysis. For each weekday, a random week of the year was drawn, for example for the first 'Monday' the 37th week of the year. By this logic, for the year 1982 the first 'Monday' was 13 September, for the year 1989 it was 11 September and so on. Table A2.1 contains all dates sampled by this procedure.

A2.1.1.2 Selecting the articles

For each newspaper issue, the articles were selected in two steps:

(1) Only the political section of the newspaper was coded, with two exceptions: (i) *FAZ*: the first page of the feuilleton was included as it often contains long commentaries on political or social issues; (ii) *Politiken*: the 'debat' section was also included in the sample as it contains articles debating political or social issues.
(2) Only discursive articles, that is, articles containing empirical statements, descriptions or reports, explanations, interpretations, proposals, prescriptions, normative judgements, or evaluations that

> are supported by some kind of justification, by some argumentative backing, or by some presentation of evidence . . . Mere factual statements or reports, which are just given as such, without argumentative support, without reaction to anticipated or real questions, are not deliberation . . . neither are unsupported judgements, evaluations or proposals, nor expressions of personal sentiments, feelings or experiences.

The selection of discursive articles was based on formal criteria to facilitate coding. Non-discursive articles that fulfilled the formal criteria but contained no argumentation were removed from the sample in the initial stages of the coding process.

Formal criteria for the selection of discursive articles

- All articles marked 'editorial', 'comment', 'opinion', 'Meinung', 'Debat' and so on, or those preceded by the logo/emblem of the newspaper in question; *FAZ*: all articles with a headline in gothic type.
- All interviews, presented either in a question-answer structure or as a continuous text in indirect speech. These articles often have a headline in quotation marks. Debates between several people moderated by a journalist were also selected.
- All contributions by external authors, identifiable through the biographical note on the author at the beginning or the end of the article.
- All press reviews, that is, short extracts from opinion articles in other media.
- All portrait articles describing the life/work of one person, usually accompanied by a picture.
- All speeches, open letters and so on, articles labelled 'Verbatim'; *The Times*: reports on parliamentary debates.
- All articles labelled 'Background' or 'Analysis'.
- All other articles marked with the full name of the author exceptions: (i) *The Times*: only articles with an *atypical* format for the author name were selected; typical = author name in bold at the beginning of the article, atypical = author mentioned in a by-line directly below the headline, marked in bold, or author name at the end of the article (not: articles headed 'medical briefing'); (ii) *Le Monde*: almost all other articles are discursive articles, therefore only every fourth article was selected.

A2.1.1.3 The newspaper comparison

In order to test whether our selection of only one quality newspaper per country resulted in any significant bias on our research dimensions, we also conducted a newspaper comparison.

For each country we sampled a second quality newspaper with a different political orientation for the first artificial week in 1996: *Süddeutsche Zeitung* in Germany, the *Guardian* in Great Britain, *Le Figaro* in France, *Der Standard* in Austria and *Berlingske Tidende* in Denmark. The articles were coded by the same coders using the identical coding scheme and the results then compared to those from the newspapers in our main sample.

Table A2.2 shows the share of articles containing the indicators of Europeanization/transnationalization in the sample newspapers compared to the newspapers with the opposing political orientation.

Table A2.2 Differences between the share of indicators in the sample newspapers and in newspapers of the opposing political orientation

	France	**Germany**	**Austria**	**Great Britain**	**Denmark**
Mentioning of EU institutions	+4.7	+6.0	+6.2	+3.2	+4.3
Foreign policies/international relations as subject of article	+0.3	+9.0	−5.9	−2.1	+3.2
Mentioning of EU policy fields	+6.8	+5.3	**+11.9**[a]	+5.8	+0.8
Focus on other European countries	+14.9	+6.2	**+14.5**[b]	−5.8	+2.2
Focus on other foreign countries	**+33.1**[c]	+6.3	+3.5	+2.6	−3.5
European speakers	−11.0	+2.8	**+16.6**[d]	−5.0	+4.4
Other foreign speakers	−1.1	+6.7	+3.5	−2.1	+1.5
Mentioning of transnational collectives	–	–	+1.5	+8.8	+8.2

Notes: All discursive articles in one artificial week in 1996 of *Le Monde* (n = 53), *Le Figaro* (63), *FAZ* (35), *SZ* (108), *Die Presse* (76), *Der Standard* (85), *The Times* (54), *The Guardian* (90), *Politiken* (74), *Berlingske Tidende* (103). Values represent the share of articles containing the indicator in the sample newspaper minus the share of articles containing the indicator in the other newspaper from the same country (for example per cent in *Le Monde* – per cent in *Le Figaro*). Positive values denote that the sample newspaper is more European or transnational, negative values that the other newspaper is more European or transnational. Values in bold represent significant differences. a. chi^2: 4.26, $p < 0.05$; b. chi^2: 4.68, $p < 0.05$; c. chi^2: 9.59, $p < 0.01$; d. chi^2: 9.80, $p < 0.01$.

The newspapers chosen for our sample tend to be a bit more Europeanized/transnational than their counterparts, even though they are comprised of both more conservative (*FAZ*, *The Times*, *Politiken* and *Die Presse*) and more leftist (*Le Monde*) papers. Apparently, the political orientation of the paper has no systematic impact on these indicators.

A2.1.2 The coding process

The material was coded by eight coders over a period of two months in autumn 2003. Prior to the coding, the coders were trained for a week both on the identification of discursive articles and on the application of the coding scheme. As some of the authors were part of the coding team in addition to student coders, the quality of the coding could be controlled continuously and problematic categories could be discussed directly with the research team. The newspapers were distributed on the basis of the language competencies of the coders, and each paper had at least two different coders.

A2.1.2.1 The reliability test

A reliability test was performed at the beginning of the coding period to check whether any revisions of the coding schemes were necessary and to improve the consistency of the coding. As advised by Riffe et al. (1998: 124), a random sample of articles was chosen for the reliability test. However, the random sample was stratified for the different years of analysis and the newspapers in order to ensure that a similar number of articles was chosen for each year and newspaper. As German and English were the only languages spoken by all coders, the sample could only be drawn from *The Times*, *FAZ* and *Die Presse*. The resulting sample of 100 articles was coded by all eight coders.

In recent years Cohen's kappa has established itself as the preferred coefficient for rater agreement (Di Eugenio 2000: 1). According to Neuendorf (2002: 150), its main advantages are that it corrects for agreement by chance, the number of categories per variable and possible variations in the distribution of categories among the different coders. Compared to Holsti's coefficient of rater agreement, the values for kappa tend to be lower (on a scale between zero and 1) because of the correction for agreement by chance.

Even though a standardized interpretation of kappa values is not advisable, as a guideline a kappa higher than .67 is deemed acceptable and a kappa above .80 is considered very good. Rietveld and van Hout (1993), however, interpret even variables with a kappa $>.41$ and consider everything above .61 as good. The freeware PRAM ('Program for Reliability

Assessment with Multiple Coders') was used to calculate kappa.[1] As the distinction between discursive and non-discursive articles was central for this study, the variable *article format* was tested on an even larger sample of 246 articles. The good kappa value of 0.86 confirmed that the coders all shared a similar understanding of the content selection criteria for discursive articles. The favourable results for this variable at least in part compensate for the fact that it was not possible to perform a reliability test for the article selection in general.

For the coding of references to institutions high reliability was achieved (primary or secondary: 0.79; primary: 0.67; secondary: 0.70). The average kappa for the major subject of the articles was slightly lower at 0.75, and the variable EU policy fields obtained a kappa of 0.70. The coding of country references was quite successful with an average kappa of 0.80 for primary references (secondary: 0.79; primary or secondary: 0.82). The authors/speakers of the articles achieved an average kappa of 0.81, which is quite good considering the fact that coders had to agree on the coding of two variables (profile and origin of the author/speaker). For the discursive references, agreement was noticeably lower, with a kappa of 0.70 for the combination of two variables (profile and origin of discursive references). For the coding of collective identity labels a satisfactory kappa of 0.71 could only be achieved by limiting the evaluation to the combination of type of label with the profile and origin of the respective speaker. When the evaluation of collective identities was included in the calculation, the kappa was only 0.57. The coding of 'we' references was also not that satisfactory, with the combination of type of 'we' reference, profile and origin of the respective speaker only achieving a kappa of 0.67. The results for 'we' references were therefore interpreted with some degree of caution.

A2.1.3 The coding scheme

The coding scheme was developed by the researchers in the summer of 2003. It consists of a set of formal variables and a set of content variables which will be explained in greater detail below. In the coding process the unit of analysis was the article. Some categories could be coded several times per article, and for this reason in the data analysis the basis was sometimes changed to all coded speakers or all coded 'we' references.

A2.1.3.1 Formal variables

The detailed list of categories for the formal variables is available on our website.

The formal variables were:
ID-Article
Title
Coder-ID
Date
Newspaper
Length

Format

1 *Editorials*
Editorials represent the opinion of the whole paper, not only of the author. All articles with the headers 'Editorial' or 'Leading Article' or those preceded by the logo/emblem of the newspaper. Short articles containing strongly voiced opinions but with no indication of the author (not even through his initials).

2 *Comment*
All articles with the header 'Comment', 'Opinion' or 'Meinungsseite'. All articles for which the full name of the author is mentioned with the following exceptions:
- editorials (see above)
- contributions by an external author (see below)
- interviews
- articles with the header 'analysis' or 'background' are to be coded as 'other discursive articles', also articles that primarily report the positions and opinions of others
- articles that report on parliamentary debates are to be coded as 'parliamentary debates'
- *FAZ*: comments are short articles typically with a short headline in a specific type (Sütterlin) and only the initials of the author.

3/4 *Interview (transcribed/text)*
Articles with a question-answer structure, but also interviews presented as a continuous text in indirect speech. These articles often have a headline in quotation marks. Debates between several people moderated by a journalist are also coded as interviews.

5 *Contribution by external authors*
Contributions by external authors are articles written by authors not employed by the newspaper. They can usually be recognized by a brief description of the author at the beginning or the end of the article. They also comprise (mostly) uncommented reprints of speeches by external authors (completely or in extracts) (for example, extracts

from a television speech by Chirac to the French people reprinted in *Le Monde*).

FAZ: sections headed 'Fremde Feder', 'Die Gegenwart'; *The Times*: marked as such in biographical notes on the authors; *Le Monde*: often on page headed 'Idées' or 'Horizons/Débats', on page 1 articles headed 'Point de Vue', also articles headed 'correspondence' and those containing a Gegendarstellung; *Die Presse*: sections headed 'Die Meinung von außen' or 'Quergeschrieben', those articles in the section 'Perspektiven' whose authors are identified as external in the biographical notes; *Politiken*: all articles in the section 'debat' are marked as such.

6 *Press review*
Sections containing shorts extracts from opinion articles in other media. For press reviews only primary country references are coded.

7 *Portrait*
Article describing the life/work of an individual person, usually accompanied by a picture.

8 *Documentation*
Speeches, open letters, also in *The Times*, reports on parliamentary debates.

9 *Political sketch*
A political column published regularly by the same author; *The Times*: 'Parliamentary Sketch' or 'Political Sketch'.

10 *Glosse*
Only on page 1 of *Die Presse*: journalistic comment characterized by irony and polemic wording.

11 *Other discursive articles (features, background reports, analyses)*
Le Monde: articles on the page 'Horizons', articles labelled 'Analyse' in the political section, articles chosen from the section headed 'Dossier' on a specific subject; *FAZ*/*Presse*/*SZ*: all articles marked with the complete name of the author but not already coded in one of the above categories; *Politiken*: all articles labelled 'analyse', 'nyhedsanalyse' or 'baggrund'; *The Times*: all articles with an atypical format for the author's name. Typical = author's name in bold type at the beginning of the article, atypical = author's name in bold type in a byline directly below the headline, also author's name at the end of the article. Exception: articles headed 'medical briefing'.

12 *Non-discursive articles*
These are articles that fulfil the formal criteria for discursive articles (see above) but whose authors do not express their own opinions or whose subject matter is not relevant to the societal debate. These

include (a) reports that include colourful descriptions of personal experiences, they often contain descriptions of sensual experiences; (b) reports on police or court proceedings; (c) non-discursive reports by foreign correspondents in which the authors describes their personal experiences but do not voice their own opinions.
998 *Unclear*

A2.1.3.2 Content variables

Authors and speakers

The following two variables were only coded for interviews, portraits, documentations or contributions by external authors.

Profile of the authors/speakers (that is, the person interviewed or whose portrait is presented)
Individuals

3 Politician from governing party
4 Politician from opposition party
5 Politician whose party affiliation is unclear
6 Former politician (for example Ex-Chancellor Kohl)
9 Member of the EU Commission
10 Member of the EU Parliament
11 Current president of the EU Council
12 Member of the EU Convention
13 Member of the Council of the European Union
14 Member of the European Court of Justice
15 Representative of the European Central Bank
16 Member/representative of other EU institutions → please specify
17 NATO Representative
18 OECD Representative
19 GATT/WTO Representative
20 UN Representative
21 Representative of the UN Security Council
22 Representative of a Bretton Woods institution (World Bank, IMF)
23 Representative of any other international institution → please specify
24 Member of administration (only to be coded if no other category is suitable)
25 Representative of the judiciary
26 Representative of the military
27 Scientist, including philosophers (from universities, research institutes), intellectuals (for example Habermas)
28 Journalist

29 Other artists: writer, artist, musician, actor, entertainer
30 Businessman, entrepreneur
31 Representative of a religious community
33 Representative of a national trade association
34 Representative of a European trade association
35 Representative of a transnational trade association
36 Representative of a national union
37 Representative of a European union
38 Representative of a transnational union
39 Representative of another national interest/civil society group
40 Representative of another European interest/civil society group
41 Representative of another transnational interest/civil society group
For the coding of interest groups their specific names must be mentioned, for example 'Greenpeace' = interest group, 'environmentalist' = camp
42 Representative of a regional/national ideological, political, functional or territorial camp → please specify!
43 Representative of a European ideological, political, functional or territorial camp → please specify!
44 Representative of a transnational ideological, political, functional or territorial camp → please specify!
'Camp' can be either ideological or political (for example 'the Left', 'the Eurosceptic Hans so-and-so'), functional (for example 'the miners') or territorial (for example 'The Northern Germans'). Camps should always be coded regional/national unless the article points out the transnational scope of the camp (for example 'The European Eurosceptics')
45 Ordinary individuals representing only themselves
46 Member of the European Council

Organizations/institutions

101 Government
102 Ministry
103 Government party
104 Opposition party
105 Group of politicians whose party affiliation is either unclear or mixed (for example a commission composed of members of different parties)
107 Other national institutions: courts, parliaments and so on
108 European Union in general (EU)
109 European Commission

110 European Parliament
111 European Council
112 EU Convention
113 Council of the European Union
114 European Court of Justice
115 European Central Bank
116 other EU institution → please specify!
117 NATO
118 OECD
119 GATT/WTO
120 UN
121 UN Security Council
122 Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank, IMF)
123 Other international institution→ please specify!
126 Armed forces
127 Research institute, scientific expert commission and so on
128 Media
130 Businesses
131 Churches/religious communities
133 National trade associations
134 European trade associations
135 Transnational trade associations
136 National trade unions
137 European trade unions
138 Transnational trade unions
139 Other national interest/civil society group
140 Other European interest/civil society group
141 Other transnational interest/civil society group
For the coding of interest groups their specific name must be mentioned, for example 'Greenpeace' = interest group, 'environmentalist' = camp
142 Regional/national ideological, political, functional or territorial camp→ please specify!
143 European ideological, political, functional or territorial camp→ please specify!
144 Transnational ideological, political, functional or territorial camp→ please specify!
'Camp' can be either ideological or political (for example 'the Left', 'the Eurosceptic Hans so-and-so'), functional (for example 'the miners') or territorial (for example 'The Northern Germans'). Camps should always be coded regional/national unless the article points

out the transnational scope of the camp (for example 'The European Eurosceptics')

145 Debates
Code only if the article refers to a debate without any specific discursive reference or citation (for example 'the abortion debate in the US')

997 Others → please specify!
998 Unclear
999 Not applicable

Origin of the author/speaker (that is the person interviewed or whose portrait is presented)

Codes 1 to 189: list of countries

190 Europe
191 Western Europe
192 Eastern Europe
201 Southern Europe
202 Northern Europe/Scandinavia
211 Central Europe
193 Balkans
194 Middle East/Gulf region/Arab countries
195 North America
196 South America
197 Asia
199 Africa (Central and Sub-Saharan Africa) but not
200 Maghreb countries
310 Transnational
311 Stateless
997 Others → please specify!
998 Unclear
999 Not applicable

Country references

Which countries, cities or actors of specific countries were mentioned in the article? Country references were coded both if the country is explicitly referred to and also if the country reference can be clearly deduced from the content of the article (for example in the case of articles on domestic politics). One primary country reference was coded for every article. If cities like 'Brussels' or 'New York' were mentioned but the

article clearly did not address Belgian or US American politics, only the corresponding institutions were coded (for example 'EU' and 'UN').

If the reference occured in the header or the first paragraph of the article, it was coded as a *primary country reference*. Up to five primary country references could be coded per article.

All countries that were mentioned in articles but had not already been coded as primary country references were coded as *secondary country references*. Up to ten secondary country references could be coded per article.

Codes 1 to 189: list of countries
997 Others → please specify!
998 Unclear
999 Not applicable

Institutional references

What international institutions were mentioned in the article? Institutions were coded, but concepts were not; for example the euro is not an institution.

If the reference occured in the header or the first paragraph of the article, it was coded as a *primary institutional reference*. Up to three primary institutional references could be coded per article.

All international institutions that were mentioned in an article but had not already been coded as primary institutional references were coded as *secondary institutional references*. Up to five secondary institutional references could be coded per article.

01 European Union in general (EU)
02 European Commission
03 European Council
04 Council of the European Union
05 European Parliament
06 European Court of Justice
07 European Central Bank
08 other EU institutions
09 EU Intergovernmental Conference
10 EU Convention
11 NATO
12 OECD
13 GATT/WTO
14 UN

15 UN Security Council
16 UN World Conference
17 Bretton Woods Institutions (World Bank, IMF)
18 Commonwealth
19 West European Union (WEU)
20 CSCE/OSCE (Conference/Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe)
21 European Court of Human Rights
22 EFTA
23 EEC
25 Warsaw Pact
997 Other institution → please specify!
998 Unclear
999 Not applicable

Main subject of article

This variable captured the main issue discussed in the article. Even if the article touched upon several issues, only the main issue was be coded here. The headline and the first paragraph of the article were be used as an indicator to determine the most important issue in the article. Only if no dominant issue could be identified was a second or third main subject to be coded.

Politics

01 Constitution, constitutional structure, political and legal basic order (including electoral system)
02 Human rights
03 Elections (election campaigns, election results), formation of governments, political parties, political associations, politicians, appointments and departures, abuse of political power
04 Changes in political systems (German reunification, regime change, for example in Eastern Europe)

Code 3: Code 3 was used if the article mainly refered to the principles, programme, programmatic developments, strategies and so on of one or several parties or politicians, even if a specific policy was discussed, for example a statement concerning the socio-political positioning of the Liberals (including the content of internal party discussions, former Liberal attitudes to a topic and so on). If, in contrast, the social policy itself or specific procedures were the focus of the article

and the position of a party or politician were only reported in this context the Code 'Social policy' was used.

Policy areas
Policy areas were coded only if the main focus of an article lay on political initiatives/reactions to this topic (for example draft bills, official statements). If, for example, the description of a social problem was placed in the foreground the article was coded as 59 'Social problems'.

10 Economic and financial policy
11 Domestic, security and legal policy (including immigration)
12 Social policy (including family, employment, women, senior citizens, youth)
13 Environmental policy
14 Education, science and research policy
15 Bio policy (including health, food, agriculture)
16 Development policy
17 Infrastructure policy (including communication, traffic, housing and construction policy
18 Federalism, devolution
19 Cultural, media, sports policy (including monuments and historic sites, accounting for the past, buildings of national and historic interest)

International policy
20 Foreign policy, international relationships/organizations (both in a closer sense; not every article dealing for example with the peace negotiations in the Middle East is automatically coded as foreign policy)
21 European policy (EU)
Only those articles primarily concerning EU 'policymaking' or 'polity-making' (treaty negotiations, institutional reforms and so on) were coded as such. For example, not every article discussing the euro was automatically coded as European policy, but according to its specific framing it was coded either as financial or monetary policy (10), or elections, parties (03) and so on.
22 Globalization

Military/conflict
30 Military, defence policy, war-like conflicts, interventions
31 Terrorist attacks, terrorism

Justice and administration
41 Law, justice
42 Administration, institutions for internal affairs

Society
50 Protests, demonstrations
51 Migration, minority groups, refugees
52 Religion, church
53 Health
54 'Isms' and the '-ization' endings (nationalism, individualism, liberalism, modernization)
55 'Manners and morals'
59 Social problems (coded solely as such if no other 'society' code (50–5) could be used)

Economy
60 Economy, finance, business
61 Work environment, trade unions, employers' associations, collective bargaining

Science, technology, environment
70 Science, technology
71 Nature, the cosmos, environment

Delinquency/catastrophes
80 Deviance/delinquency
81 Disasters/catastrophes

Leisure
90 Travel/traffic/holidays
91 Private life/sexuality
92 Sports (sports policy see code 19)
93 Fashion/lifestyle
94 Celebrities/VIPs
95 Miscellaneous

Culture, art, media
100 Mass media
101 Arts (music, literature, theatre and so on)

102 Architecture
103 History
105 Intellectuals
997 Others
998 Unclear

EU policy fields

What policy fields were mentioned in the article in the context of the EU? Up to 15 policy fields could be coded per article.

01 Foreign affairs: trade policy
02 Foreign affairs: common European Foreign, Security and Defence Policy
03 Industry, competition and the Single Market
04 Monetary and financial policy (euro)
05 Employment, industrial relations and social affairs
06 Agriculture
07 Traffic
08 Development and humanitarian aid
09 Personnel and administration
10 Information, communication, culture
11 Environment, nuclear safety and disaster prevention
12 Science, research, development
13 Telecommunication, information market, use of research results
14 Fisheries
15 Regional and cohesion policy
16 Energy
17 Budget and budgetary control
18 Taxes and customs union
19 General education and vocational training, youth
20 Tourism
21 Consumer protection policy and health protection
22 Domestic and legal policy
23 Immigration and asylum policy
24 Institutions/constitutional reform
25 Enlargement
997 Others
998 Unclear
999 Not applicable

Discursive references and citations

All references by article authors or speakers to the opinions of other speakers were be coded as discursive references. As we were only interested in public *discourse*, the coding was limited to references to the opinions of other speakers which were supported by some sort of justification or argumentation. To give an example: if the German Minister of Finance Hans Eichel was cited as rejecting the French desire to ease the EU Stability and Growth Pact ('We need no discussion about easing and changing the Pact'), this would not be coded as an discursive reference. But if the article reported in addition Mr Eichel's rationale for his statement then the reference would be coded. In this case it should read as follows: 'The Stability and Growth Pact will meet all requirements – among other things the stimulation of economic growth.'

To facilitate coding, the following formal criteria were used to identify discursive statements. All directly and indirectly quoted statements were coded as discursive references *if they were longer than two sentences*. This 'two-sentences' criteria was employed generously, that is if in one article a statement by somebody was quoted several times, but each time only in one sentence, then this was still coded as a discursive reference. However, each individual speaker was coded only once per article, even if his her position was referred to several times.

In interviews and portraits the discursive statements of the interview partner or the person described were not coded as discursive references. Only if the interviewee cited the opinion of another person (in more than two sentences) was this coded as a discursive reference.

For each discursive reference both the profile of the cited speaker and their origin was be coded. Up to ten possible discursive references could be coded per article.

Profile of the discursive reference

For the list of codes see 'profile of the speaker/author'.

Origin of the discursive reference

For the list of codes see 'origin of the speaker/author'.

Collective identity labels

Collective identity labels are labels given to national, ideological, religious or cultural communities such as 'the Germans', 'the Muslims' or 'the West'. 'The Germans', for example, were only coded as a collective identity label if the article referred to the German population or

people and not only the German government. These collective identity labels could refer either to the collective to which the respective author/article belonged or an external collective. Where possible, the speaker's evaluation of the collective was also coded.

For each collective identity label the type of collective identity and the evaluation of that collective, as well as the profile and origin of the respective speaker were coded. Up to ten possible collective identity labels were coded per article.

Type of collective identity

Codes 1 to 189: list of countries
190 The Europeans
191 The Western Europeans
192 The Eastern Europeans
193 The Southern Europeans
194 The Northern Europeans/Scandinavians
195 The West
196 The East
197 The South
198 The North
199 The Communists
200 The Balkans
201 The Arabs
202 The Maghrebians
203 The South and Central Americans
204 The Asians
206 The Africans
207 The Muslims/Islamic World
208 The Jews
209 The Catholics
210 Other transnational religious communities
211 The Middle/Central Europeans
997 Others → please specify!
998 Unclear
999 Not applicable

Evaluation of the collective

Collective identities can be referred to positively, neutrally or negatively. The category 'neutral' was only used if no tendency could be identified at all.

Example for a positive evaluation (expressing solidarity): 'I hope, for those people who had some doubt about the wisdom of removing Saddam Hussein, these reports of these mass graves are an indication of just how brutal, tyrannical and appalling that regime was and what a blessing it is for the *Iraqi people* and humankind that he is gone from power' (Tony Blair in *The Times*, 15 May 2003).

1 Positive (solidarity)
2 Neutral
3 Negative
998 Unclear
999 Not applicable

Profile of the speaker of the collective identity label

For the list of codes see 'profile of the speaker/author'.

Origin of the speaker of the collective identity label

For the list of codes see 'origin of the speaker/author'.

'We' references

What community does the author/speaker identify with? A 'we' reference was coded whenever pronouns such as 'we', 'us' or 'our' were used in the text. From the viewpoint of the newspaper readers, these pronouns could be used either as inclusive or exclusive. An inclusive 'we' reference would include the audience in the 'we', for example 'we the British people' in a British newspaper. For an exclusive 'we' reference it cannot be expected that the majority of the audience feels included in the 'we', for example 'we, the Conservative Party' or 'we, the Siemens management' (see also Fairclough 1995: 181).

For each 'we' reference the type of reference as well as the profile and origin of the respective speaker were coded. Up to ten possible 'we' references were coded per article.

Type of 'we' reference

1 National 'we' (for example 'we Germans')
2 We Europeans
3 We Western Europeans
4 We Westerners
5 We, the world/we, the observers/we, humankind
6 Exclusive 'we' reference (for example 'we, the trade union' or 'we, the gay community')

997 Other inclusive 'we' references → please specify!
998 Unclear
999 Not applicable

Profile of the speaker of the 'we' reference

For the list of codes see 'profile of the speaker/author'.

Origin of the speaker of the 'we' reference

For the list of codes see 'origin of the speaker/author'.

A2.2 Issue-specific case studies

A2.2.1 The sampling process

A2.2.1.1 Legitimacy of military intervention

The main sample consisted of all discursive articles on military interventions in the newspapers *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, *Le Monde*, *Le Figaro, The Times*, the *Guardian, Die Presse*, *Der Standard, Politiken* and *Berlingske Tidende* in the respective sampling periods.

For each intervention the sampling period was limited to four months, two months before and after the start of the intervention respectively. According to our extensive preliminary research debates on the legitimacy of military interventions peaked during these time periods.

The time periods were:

Iraq I: 16 November 1990–16 March 1991
Bosnia: 30 June 1995–30 October 1995
Kosovo: 24 January 1999–24 May 1999
Iraq II: 20 December 2002–20 May 2003

For Iraq II (2002/03) the sampling period was extended to three months before and two months after the start of military action as in this case the discussion on legitimacy had intensified earlier. For Bosnia the start of the intervention was difficult to determine as the mandate of the NATO military mission to aid the UN peacekeeping troops was continuously expanded. We define the first *offensive* military action against Serbian positions and supply lines on 30 August 1995 as the start of the intervention because it represented a major strategic turning point and because the legitimacy of this step had been widely discussed in all our countries of analysis.

In these time periods all articles pertaining to the interventions were selected digitally using keywords in the databases Factiva, Lexis-Nexis, infomedia (a Danish newspaper database) or from the CD-Rom editions,[2] with the exception of certain papers and time periods where the articles had to be obtained by searching manually through the newspaper on microfiche.[3]

The formal criteria developed in the cross-issue study (see section *Formal variables*) were employed to filter out all non-discursive articles. In addition, all articles shorter than 80 words were automatically thrown out of the digitally selected sample as we expected these to contain only a limited amount of argumentation.

From this overall sample of 5054 articles two different sub-samples were drawn:

For the qualitative study, we constructed a deliberate sample of 30 to 40 articles per country and intervention that (a) focused on the legitimacy of the intervention and (b) covered the range of opinions and speakers as well as the time period as comprehensively as possible. To achieve the intended level of detail the method required such a relatively small sample of articles.

For the quantitative study, the material was reduced to 50 articles per intervention and newspaper through random selection processes (choosing only articles from even-numbered days; then, if necessary, reducing the sample further by selecting only every third article). This sample allowed us to compare the share of certain arguments or speakers in the debates of different countries, however, the total number of articles were not used to draw cross-country conclusions.

A2.2.1.2 Green biotechnology

The main sample consisted of all discursive articles on green biotechnology in the newspapers *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, *Le Monde*, *Le Figaro, The Times*, the *Guardian, Die Presse*, *Der Standard, Politiken* and *Berlingske Tidende* from 1993 to 2005. The articles were selected digitally using keywords in the databases Factiva, Lexis-Nexis and infomedia, or from the CD-Rom editions.[4] From 1998 onwards only articles from even-numbered days were included in the sample.

The formal criteria developed in the cross-issue study (see section *Formal variables*) were employed to filter out all non-discursive articles. In addition, all articles shorter than 80 words were automatically thrown out of the digitally selected sample as we expected these to contain only a limited amount of argumentation.

In another selection step, all articles that did not pertain to the so-called 'green' applications of biotechnology and genetics were excluded from the sample. These 'green' applications, and hence the texts in our corpus, relate to outdoor tests with – or the actual production, distribution, and consumption of – genetically manipulated seeds, agricultural crops, and livestock by the agrofood sector (farmers, the seed and [animal] food industry) and consumers.

Thus articles are notably relevant if they discuss the opportunities and risks, advantages and disadvantages of these 'green' applications, the commercialization of the resulting products, the security of outdoor

tests, and so on. Issues related to these applications, their distribution and consumption were also often at the centre of relevant articles – for example, the labelling of genetically manipulated products, and so on.

Texts were not included in the corpus if 'green' applications were not mentioned *explicitly* at least once. Articles are thus, for example, irrelevant if they *only* deal with basic research in biotechnology and genetics, with 'red' (biomedical) applications, with the implications of genetic tests in the fight against crime and by the insurance industry, and so on.

However, articles did not have to deal exclusively with 'green' applications – texts presenting different ('green' and 'red' and so on) applications of biotechnology and genetics were also included in the corpus. In a similar vein, articles related to cloning (for instance, Dolly the sheep) were considered relevant if applications of cloning in the agrofood sector were at least tangentially discussed, and conversely, treated as irrelevant if only biomedical or human implications of cloning were debated.

By this process an overall sample of 2127 articles was obtained. From this main sample a sub-sample of 30–40 articles per country was selected for the qualitative study. For the quantitative analysis, all articles from the main sample were used except in the case of Great Britain, where the discussion of biotechnology had been particularly intense. Here the number of articles was reduced by random sampling from the years 1998 to 2004 for the *Guardian* and from 1999, 2000 and 2003 for *The Times* to ensure that the overall sample for Great Britain did not exceed 400 articles.

A2.2.2 The coding process

The quantitative coding of the material for military interventions was performed by a team of three coders in autumn 2005, the coding of the material on green biotechnology in spring 2006 using the programme Atlas.ti.[5] For each case study, the coding was preceded by a week of intense coder training conducted by the authors of this volume with the support of Steffen Schneider for the study on green biotechnology.

Reliability test

A separate reliability test was performed for both case studies. For each test a random sample of 40 articles was drawn from the British newspaper articles as English was the only language spoken by all coders. This sample size represents approximately 10 per cent of the complete material analysed in the studies on military interventions (MI) and on green biotechnology (GBT). In the MI case, a stratified random sample

was used to ensure that enough articles on each of the four military interventions were included in the reliability test.

An intercoder reliability test was carried out on all three coders involved in the coding of the whole material. A first reliability test was performed directly after completion of the coding. When the first test revealed unsatisfactory results for the identity variables, the coding instructions for these variables were changed and the coders were given another three days of training on these new identity variables. When a second reliability test after this training period yielded good results, the identity variables were recoded for the complete material.

For the two case studies, Krippendorff's alpha was used as a measure of reliability. Kripppendorff's alpha is considered to be an even better index than Cohen's kappa (see for example Lombard et al. 2003). However, an SPSS macro for calculating Krippendorff's alpha has only recently become available,[6] and therefore Cohen's kappa was used to test the reliability of the cross-issue analysis. However, results for both indices differ only marginally, so the reliability values for the cross-issue analysis and the case studies can still be compared.

Krippendorff's alpha is a very conservative index that accounts for agreement that could be expected to occur by chance. It can be calculated for any number of coders and for all variables independent of their level of measurement, and compensates for different sample sizes and missing data. The values for Krippendorff's alpha range between 0 and 1.00; alpha = 0 would mean that the agreement between coders may result purely from chance, while alpha = 1 would indicate perfect agreement. For the interpretation of the values in between no general rules have been agreed on and, according to Krippendorff himself, should not be defined (Krippendorff 1980: chapter 12). As alpha is strongly influenced by factors such as the number of categories and the distributions of values these should therefore also be considered when interpreting alpha. Krippendorff (1980) only accepts variables with an alpha > .67 and considers variables with an alpha > .80 as very good.

Results for the case study on the legitimacy of military interventions

For almost all coded arguments, acceptable reliability values were achieved, ranging between .50 and .85 with a mean of .73. However, any analysis of the arguments 'WW2contra' and 'credibility contra' should be interpreted with extreme caution as the alpha for both of them is below the threshold of .67 recommended by Krippendorff.

For the general markers of collective identities reliability was greatly improved from a mean of .55 to an acceptable mean alpha of .77 by the

changes in the codebook. The coding of the collective identity 'world' remains the most precarious with a barely acceptable alpha value of .66 (but only .42 in the first test) and its analysis should be treated with caution.

The coding of references to World War II achieved excellent results (.93 on average) in terms of reliability for most categories except for the references with no explicit link to any community where the alpha is below .67. The coding of 'we' identities worked very well, with alphas ranging between .76 and 1.00 and a mean of .87.

In the coding of profiles of speakers the journalists were apparently easily identified (with alphas between .74 and .95). The reliability value for politicians was improved by merging the different sub-categories together (.74 for all politicians instead of values between .00 to .76), this was also done to improve the results for civil society (alpha of .89). International speakers (alpha = .54) and especially military speakers (alpha = .23), however, are critical and should be analysed very cautiously. On average, the profile of the speakers achieved an alpha of .74.

Most origins of speakers were coded with great consistency (with alphas ranging between .36 and .87 with a mean of .77). One important exception is international speakers with an alpha of only .36 – all codings of this code were therefore checked carefully before proceeding with the analysis.

Results for the case study on green biotechnology

The reliability values were good for most arguments, ranging between .66 and 1.00, with a mean of .83, although for moral/religious arguments in favour of green biotechnology an alpha of only .00 was achieved. This value, however, was coded only once, making high reliability values fairly improbable.

Furthermore, the corresponding contra-argument had been coded with a high degree of reliability, and it was therefore decided to retain this argument in the analysis, but with the additional precaution of examining all codings of this variable in the main material.

The distinction between political and legal arguments also did not work well. Even though for most legal arguments reliability is very high, the pro-legal argument on the national level had to be excluded from analysis with an alpha of .13. The political contra-arguments on the national and on the international level also have a critically low alpha which it was possible to improve somewhat by combining the political and the legal arguments for or against GBT on the regional/national

level on the one hand and the international level on the other. The reliability values for the combined arguments range between .70 and 1.00, improving the overall mean for the coding of arguments to .84.

In articles on green biotechnology only a few general collective identity markers could be found (N = 12), however for these, perfect reliability was achieved. By comparison, in the first round of coding, even fewer collective identity markers were identified by the coders (N = 3) with a reliability of .25. In the articles of our reliability sample only one reference to BSE was found, but for this the coding of all coders was identical. Reference to nuclear power also only occurred once, but this case was consistently coded by all three coders.

'We' identities were coded 26 times (19 times in the first round), referring either to 'we, the nation' or 'we, the international community' with perfect reliability (.13 in the first round).

The coding of the speaker profiles was fairly reliable with a mean alpha of .81 and most values within the acceptable range of .65 and 1.00. Critical categories appear to be 'party leadership' and 'other politicians' (with alphas of .38 and .23), however, the merging of all sub-categories to an 'all politicians' category results in an excellent alpha of .90, improving the overall mean for speaker profiles to .89. In the coding of GBT debates, the origin of speakers was coded with a high reliability of alpha .88. Even the 'international speaker' category, which only yielded an alpha of .50 in the coding of military interventions, achieved a good alpha here of .83.

A2.2.3 The coding scheme

In general, our unit of analysis was the complete statement of a speaker in an article on the legitimacy of military interventions or on green biotechnology, *but only if the statement contained either an argument relevant for our purposes or a reference to collective identities as defined below*. Thus, we were not interested in every statement that might occur in an article.

A statement consists of everything a speaker says concerning the legitimacy of military interventions or green biotechnology in one article. The statement could be distributed across the whole article (one sentence in the lead, one in the middle and so on), but for each speaker only one statement per article could be coded.

However, each statement could contain several arguments and/or identity statements and/or references to scientific studies and could therefore be assigned several codes for each of these arguments, identity statements or references.

In general, statements might either be direct or indirect quotations of actors (for example politicians and representatives of civil society

organizations) or statements written by actors themselves such as editorials, comments and opinion pieces by intellectuals, politicians and foreign authors. In the latter case the statement would typically comprise the whole article and would therefore be coded in Altas.ti with only one speaker code. In practical terms this meant that speakers were not coded for each argument or each reference to collective identities, but for their statement as a whole, which then might contain different arguments and identity references.

For more information on the coding of statements, please download the codebook from our website.

A2.2.3.1 Formal variables

Most formal variables (such as date, newspaper and so on) were automatically coded when the articles were put in the database of Atlas.ti. Only the format was coded by the different coders.

Format

1 *Editorials*
All articles with the headers 'Editorial' or 'Leading Article' or those preceded by the logo/emblem of the newspaper. Short articles containing strongly voiced opinions but with no indication of the author (not even through his/her initials).

2 *Comments*
All articles with the header 'Comment', 'Opinion' or 'Meinungsseite'
All articles in which the full name of the author is given with the following exceptions:
- editorials (see above)
- contributions by an external author (see below)
- interviews
- articles with the header 'analysis' or 'background' were coded as 'other discursive articles', also articles that primarily reported the positions and opinions of others
- articles that report on parliamentary debates were coded as 'parliamentary debates'
- *FAZ*: Comments are short articles typically with a short headline and only the initials of the author.

3 *Interviews*
Articles with a question-answer structure, but also interviews presented in a continuous text in indirect speech. These articles often have a headline in quotation marks.

4 *Contributions by an external author*
Contributions by external authors are articles written by authors not employed by the newspaper. They can usually be recognized by a brief description of the author at the beginning or end of the article. They also comprise the (mostly) uncommented reprint of speeches by external authors (complete or in extracts) (for example extracts of a television speech by Chirac to the French people reprinted in *Le Monde*).
5 *Parliamentary debates*
Articles that report on parliamentary debates.
6 *Other discursive articles*
Articles with the header 'analysis' or 'background' or that primarily report the positions and opinions of others (except if they report on parliamentary debates).

A2.2.3.2 Content variables I: frames and arguments

For the case study on the legitimacy of military interventions (MI)

We distinguished five major 'frames' (Table A2.3) which structure the debate on the legitimacy of all four interventions. These frames were generated inductively through a thorough qualitative content analysis of a sub-sample of our articles.

These frames can be used to argue for or against military intervention, for example, *international law* may be invoked to justify a Western intervention by saying: 'Saddam Hussein has invaded Kuwait. This kind of aggression is against international law. Therefore the West will intervene, if the UN Security Council authorizes an intervention.' The opponents of intervention by the West might interpret international law differently and argue: 'The resolutions of the UN Security Council do not really justify this kind of military intervention. It is intervention by the West that violates international law.'

The same type of argument occurred in different conflicts in slightly different forms. The codebook therefore included a separate table for each conflict, listing the main arguments used in the specific debate for each frame as well as lists of keywords. These tables can be found in the complete codebook on our website.

For the case study on green biotechnology (GBT)

Nine frames – some with subcategories – were distinguished; each of them contained a range of similar pro and counter-arguments. Moreover, there were two categories for unspecific and 'other' arguments.

Table A2.3 List of frames for the coding of military interventions

Frame		Argument
International law	Pro	International law is violated; therefore we need to intervene.
	Contra	Military intervention is in breach of international law and hence illegitimate.
Regional stability/ international security	Pro	Military intervention is necessary to stabilize the region/to ensure international security. Therefore we have to intervene.
	Contra	Military intervention destabilizes the region/threatens international security. Therefore we should not intervene.
Ultima ratio/war as last resort	Pro	All other attempts to solve the conflict have failed/are bound to fail. Therefore military intervention is unavoidable and legitimate as a last resort.
	Contra	The use of force is neither the last resort nor unavoidable. More peaceful means are a better way out. Therefore we should not intervene now.
Protection of human rights/lives	Pro	Military intervention is necessary to stop human rights violations and/or install democracy.
	Contra	Innocent people will die in the course of military intervention. Therefore we should not intervene.
Credibility	Pro	If we do not intervene now, the UN/NATO/the West will lose their credibility. We therefore have to intervene.
	Contra	The arguments of the supporters of an intervention are not credible. Therefore the use of force is illegitimate.

Table A2.4 gives an overview of the frames, including one possible pro and one possible contra argument per frame. Please note that the original codebook contained several possible pro or contra arguments for each frame, as well as a list of typical keywords to help identify the correct frame. The whole codebook can be downloaded from our website.

Complex positions
If the statement of a speaker contains arguments pro *and* contra GBT, the general position of the speaker (in favour or against GBT) was coded.

A2.2.3.3 Content variables II: identity variables

Markers of collective identities

Markers of collective identities are keywords such as 'history', 'tradition', and 'value', which evoke a common experience and understanding and are frequently referred to in the context of identity statements. Accordingly, we define collective identities as explicit references to clues/markers for national or transnational collective identities.

This implies that we coded references to collective identity markers rather than references to collective identities as such. Thus, if a speaker mentioned common values they were coded as 'markers of collective identities', even though they might not be embedded within a 'typical' identity statement (see below for examples).

For the sake of higher inter-coder reliability we ignored all references to collective identities that were not included in the keywords listed below. Search words (MI and GBT):

cultur|tradition|histor|identit|heritage|religi|christian|colonial|value|normat|mentalit|vision|fundament|principle|idea|peculiar|typical
Additional search words (MI): civilis|occident|islam

1 *One's own nation* (national identity). Note that 'one's own nation' is defined as the country of origin of the newspaper analysed. Thus, it is coded if a *British* speaker quoted in a *British* newspaper refers to the *British* collective identity. In contrast, it is not coded if a French speaker in a British newspaper refers to French identity. Likewise, if the French speaker refers to British identity, it is not an instance of one's own nation and hence must not be coded.
2 *European identity*. Speakers of any origin using markers that refer to a European identity
3 *Western identity*. Speakers of any origin using markers that refer to a Western identity or transatlantic community

Table A2.4 List of frames for the coding of green biotechnology

Frame		Argument
1.1 Costs/benefits for consumers	Pro	GBT is beneficial to consumers because it increases consumer choice (the range of available products).
	Contra	GBT is not beneficial to consumers (is harmful) because it does not increase (reduces) consumer choice.
1.2 Costs/benefits for producers	Pro	The commercialization of GBT enables the start-up of new, promising businesses and sectors.
	Contra	The commercialization of GBT does not enable the start-up of new, promising businesses and sectors.
1.3 Costs/benefits for farmers	Pro	GBT enables farmers to enhance their efficiency/productivity/profits.
	Contra	GBT does not enable farmers to enhance their efficiency/productivity/profits.
1.4 Globalization, international competition/ competitiveness	Pro	GBT is a key technology; mastering it ensures competitive advantages (on world markets). Those who do not engage in GBT risk serious financial losses in a globalized world, and so on.
	Contra	GBT is a dispensable technology; mastering it does not ensure any competitive advantages (on world markets), and abstention from its use causes no damage.
1.5 Other costs/benefits for national economies (but *not* globalization arguments)	Pro	GBT (like a positive-sum game) ensures the increased efficiency/productivity of entire national economies and fosters their growth.
	Contra	GBT (like a zero- or negative-sum game) does not ensure an increase in the efficiency/productivity of entire national economies and does not foster (or even slows down) their growth.
2 Health/ medicine	Pro	Genetically manipulated crops and livestock do not pose health risks (caused by new toxic substances, allergic reactions, changes in the metabolism of humans, or resistance to antibiotics); there are no known examples of health damage caused by them.
	Contra	Genetically manipulated crops and livestock pose health risks (caused by new toxic substances, allergic reactions, changes in the metabolism of humans, or resistance to antibiotics); there are known examples of health damage caused by them.

(*Continued*)

Table A2.4 (Continued)

Frame		Argument
3 Nature/environment	Pro	GBT enables farmers and the (animal) food industry to use lesser quantities of chemical products (fertilizers, pesticides, preservatives), to save water, and so on – and thus fosters ecologically sensitive production.
	Contra	GBT enables farmers to make crops and livestock resistant to the negative effects of chemical substances (pesticides, and so on), and thus allows them to use greater quantities (especially in monocultures) – the damage to the environment is increased rather than reduced by GBT.
4 Third World/ development/ famine	Pro	GBT represents an economic opportunity for the countries of the Third World and fosters their development.
	Contra	GBT threatens to exacerbate the poverty and economic deprivation of Third World countries (through the impact of patented and licensed seeds, biopiracy, or the contamination of conventional with genetically manipulated products, resulting in their exclusion from EU and other export markets).
5.1 Politics/ democracy within the nation-state	Pro	The authorization and regulation of GBT is not a question of democracy (popular sovereignty, responsiveness, accountability, and so on); a (restrictive) political regulation of GBT in line with public opinion ('policy by public opinion'), or one that involves citizen participation or lengthy deliberation processes is neither necessary nor appropriate; these decisions should be made by researchers and economic actors.
	Contra	The authorization and regulation of GBT is a question of democracy; GBT is to be rejected because it is being imposed on citizens against public opinion, without (genuine) citizen participation or debate; the (restrictive) political regulation of GBT in line with the (sceptical) majority of the population is in order even against the preferences and interests of researchers and economic actors.
5.2 Politics/democracy with regard to European integration or political internationalization	Pro	In the age of globalization and European integration GBT-related decisions are no longer the domain of nation-states and their democratic institutions, but rather of the EU and other international organizations and regimes.
	Contra	The making of GBT-related decisions by global players, the EU, or international organizations and regimes erodes democracy and national self-determination.

6.1 Law/(il)legality within the nation-state	Pro	The introduction and free use of GBT is legitimate because it is legal – that is, because (intellectual) property rights of researchers and corporations (as codified in national law) allow or require it.
	Contra	The introduction and use of GBT breaches core legal and constitutional norms (at the national level) and is therefore illegal.
6.2 Law/(il)legality with regard to European integration or internationalization	Pro	The introduction and free use of GBT is legitimate because EU law (rulings of the European Court of Justice) or international (trade) law (rulings) allow or require it.
	Contra	The introduction and use of GBT breaches core legal and constitutional norms at the EU or international level and is therefore illegal.
7 Culture/ tradition/identity	Pro	Openness to new, innovative products, including those made possible by GBT, is compatible with our culture, tradition, or identity.
	Contra	Our culture, tradition, or identity lives not least in the products of our agriculture, culinary specialties, and so on; all this is threatened by GBT.
8 Progress/ (ir)rationality	Pro	Any restriction of GBT is an attack on the freedom of science and on scientific progress.
	Contra	As knowledge and progress are ambivalent categories, calls for a restriction of GBT may not be equated with an attack on science.
9 Respect for the dignity of living creatures and Creation/morality/ religion	Pro	GBT is nothing but a (more efficient) simulation of natural processes, or of traditional breeding techniques; GBT is therefore no morally or religiously objectionable transgression of boundaries set by nature.
	Contra	GBT is a morally or religiously suspect transgression, and not comparable to traditional breeding techniques; it implies disrespect for living creatures and for the inviolability/sanctity of Creation.
10 Unspecific cost and benefit arguments	Pro	GBT is good/legitimate because it is useful/not dangerous/innocuous.
	Contra	The opportunities of GBT are grossly overestimated.

4 *Global community*. Speakers of any origin using markers that refer to the 'civilized world' or 'the democratic world' as frequently occurs in the case of military interventions, or to solidarity with Third World countries as often occurs in the case of biotechnology.
99 *Don't know*. Code in case of uncertainty.

References to World War II (MI) or BSE/nuclear power (GBT)

References to World War II (WWII) and BSE/nuclear power are closely related to collective identities since they point to a common history and experience. Therefore references to WWII and BSE/nuclear power were treated as sub-categories of collective identities. As for collective identities in general, they were identified by specific search words. In order to make them more comparable with other forms of collective identities we furthermore coded whether they were used as indicators for a national, European, or broader Western collective identity.

Search words WWII: Auschwitz|world war|Hitler|appeasement|Nazi|Fascis|(Third) Reich
Special terms: D: Münchner Abkommen| F: munichois; vichysois|GB: aggrandisement, Chamberlain
Search words for BSE: BSE|bovine|mad cow
Search words for nuclear power: nuclear|atomic|Chernobyl

'We' references

Do speakers identify themselves explicitly by saying 'we, the Europeans,' 'we, the Austrians, Danes', and so on?

Occurrences of 'we' (and so on) were relevant if they *unequivocally* referred to one of the political communities in the category system: nations, the citizenry of Europe, the Western countries and their people, or the international community. It was not necessary to find the exact wordings given above ('we, the Germans . . .'). However, if occurrences of 'we' indeed referred to relevant political communities, words like 'German (. . .), nation, people, Europe, (. . .)' could be found in close proximity to them (for example in the same line or paragraph).

Occurrences were *irrelevant* if they:

- were unspecific ('as we can see here': this is a mere stylistic device, no concrete or identifiable community is referred to);
- referred to political communities other than those specified above ('we, the trade unions', 'we, the members of party x');

- Moreover, the 'national' category was only coded when 'we' refers to the nation of the respective newspaper – 'we, the Americans' in French papers, and so on, was not coded.

1 We, the (respective) nation
(For example 'we, the Germans/German people/citizens of the Federal Republic',)
2 We, the Europeans
(For example 'we, the people/citizens of Europe',)
3 We, the West/advanced industrial economies, OECD countries/First World
(For example 'we, the people of the Western/developed world', 'we, the OECD countries')
4 We, the international community
(For example, 'we, the members of the civilized world', 'we, the UN',)
99 Don't know

Speakers

Speakers could be individuals, that is natural persons, such as for instance the (then) German Chancellor Schröder, or collective actors such as the German government, the Social Democrats, NATO. Thus, if an argument of NATO was quoted in an article, this was coded with NATO as the speaker of the argument.

Only identifiable speakers were coded: In the phrase 'One could argue . . .' no speaker could be identified. However, in the phrase 'Many Austrians believe . . .' 'Many Austrians' could be identified and coded as '97 Other speaker'.

Profile of the speaker (MI and GBT)

A speaker was coded only once; multiple coding for types of speakers was not allowed. If a speaker had multiple functions, only the function mentioned first in an article was coded.

1 Journalists, left-wing
2 Journalists, right-wing
3 Journalists, other
11 Member of government/ the executive at national level
12 Party leadership/frontbencher
13 Backbenchers
14 Former head of state or secretary of state
15 Other politicians

(MI)

21 Intellectuals and experts
22 Other members of civil society
23 Military personnel
31 EC/EU
32 NATO
33 UN (including UN sub-organizations such as UNHCR)
34 Other speakers of international organizations
97 Other speaker

(GBT)

21 Individual corporations, sectoral or employers' associations, lobby groups in the field of GBT
22 Farmers and farmers' associations
23 Trade unions and their representatives
24 Academic experts and researchers in the GBT field, the 'relevant' hard sciences
25 Intellectuals, authors and so on
26 NGOs in the fields of consumer and environmental protection and so on
27 Other members of civil society (particularly speakers of religious communities)
31 EC/EU
32 OECD
33 UN (including sub-organizations such as the FAO, WHO, and so on)
34 GATT/WTO
35 Other speakers of international organizations
97 Other speaker

Party membership of speaker (MI and GBT)

Party membership was coded only for the countries in our sample and only if it was mentioned in the article. For a detailed list of codes please refer to our website.

Origin of the speaker (MI and GBT)

For speakers of international organizations the national origin was coded if it was explicitly mentioned, otherwise 'international speaker' was coded.

01 Germany
02 France

03 Great Britain
04 Austria
05 Denmark
06 Other European countries

(MI)
11 United States
12 Soviet Union/Russia
13 China
21 Iraq
22 Kuwait
23 Other Arab countries (including Palestine)
24 Israel
31 Serbs / Bosnian Serbs
32 Bosnian Muslims
33 Croats/ Bosnian Croats
34 Kosovo Albanians

(GBT)
11 United States
12 Other advanced industrial economies, OECD countries/First World
13 Developing countries/Third World (for example Argentina, India, and so on)

(MI and GBT)
40 International speaker
97 Other origin
98 not identifiable

Notes

Preface and acknowledgements

1. See Peters et al. (2005a), Sifft et al. (2007), Wessler et al. (2007), Brüggemann et al. (2006) and Peters et al. (2006).

1. The transnationalization of public spheres: theoretical considerations

1. Instances of privatization of democratic legitimation are not pursued here because they have hardly ever been observed. For an exception, see Hofmann (2005) and Bendrath et al. (2007).
2. For earlier publications of our empirical results, see Peters at al. (2005a), Peters et al. (2006), Brüggemann et al. (2006), Sifft et al. (2007), Wessler et al. (2007). For the wider context of the project, see also Peters (2005), Peters and Wessler (2006), Peters (2007), Wessler (2004), Wessler (2008), as well as Wimmel (2004, 2005, 2006), Brüggemann (2005).
3. A notable exception here – apart from the study in this volume, which covers the period from 1982 to the present – is the Europub project, see Koopmans and Erbe (2003), Della Porta and Caiani (2006).
4. Apart from our own study, van de Steeg (2005), Knorr (2006), and Trenz (2004) have introduced such a comparative element in their studies.
5. Theoretically, it is even possible that different dimensions develop in opposite directions; however, given the synergetic nature of public spheres this does not seem to be very likely.
6. For a similar collection of dimensions or indicators, see Risse (2002). A more detailed account of our operationalization of all 10 sub-dimensions can be found in Chapter 2.
7. Convergence of discourse can apply to common supranational/transnational issues, but also to issues manifesting themselves on the national level but deemed important by speakers in various national public spheres at the same time (such as unemployment, drug abuse, low birth rates and so on).
8. The following sections build on arguments first developed in Wessler et al. (2007).
9. On pages 153 and 177 of the same volume we find almost identical formulations that also aim at the relevance level of issues rather than at relevance criteria.
10. Of course, this kind of transnational frame dissemination is most likely to occur if there is actual discursive exchange between national public spheres, that is if journalists observe discussions in other countries, report on interesting and diverging debates abroad, and thereby infuse them into their national debates. Discourse convergence rooted in a criterion of completeness builds on mutual observation and discursive exchange – criteria that emphasize

innovation in discourse and constitute in themselves an alternative normative approach that will be detailed below.

11. While a collective identification with Europe is hardly conceivable without some degree of mutual observation and discursive exchange between European countries and speakers, it is uncertain whether discursive integration actually *leads to* the emergence of common European identity elements. Our own data presented in Chapter 3 below suggest that these dimensions may be empirically independent. Therefore, we treat them as conceptually separate here.

2. Analysing Europeanization: the research framework

1. On the lack of long-term studies see also Latzer and Sauerwein (2006). Exceptions are the Europub project (Koopmans 2004), (Pfetsch 2005) and the book by Juan Diez Medrano on 'Framing Europe' (2003a). However, the Europub project covers only the 1990s and 2000s and, in contrast to this book, does not include detailed case studies; the book by Medrano is broader in scope but takes into account just a narrow selection of op-ed pieces, alongside other kinds of material, such as class textbooks.
2. In addition, conceptually, an empirical analysis of the dimension *convergence of discourse* requires the comparison of data from several points in time; otherwise the analysis would be limited to the question of *similarity* of discourse. Unfortunately, these two concepts are often used interchangeably in empirical research despite their conceptual difference.
3. Currently we are preparing a further study on the Europeanization of tabloids in order to verify our hypothesis. Unfortunately, the Europub project, whose sample included quality as well as regional and tabloid newspapers, has not yet published any systematic results concerning the influence of newspaper type on the level of Europeanization (only on the evaluation of EU actors where quality papers tend to be more positive (Pfetsch et al. 2004)). The results presented by Koopmans and Pfetsch (2006) for Germany seem to suggest that the differences between quality and regional press are marginal, while no clear picture emerges for the position of the tabloid press.
4. The detailed results of the pre-test are described in Appendix 2.
5. An extensive report on the reliability test can be found in Appendix 2.
6. Note that for illustrative purposes and to reduce complexity, Table 2.2 focuses on the Europeanization of public spheres rather than transnationalization in general. However, all dimensions and sub-dimensions were also coded for the other possible scopes of transnationalization such as, for instance, Westernization, as outlined above.
7. For an overview of committees in this area see http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/dfsp/intro/index.htm.
8. For the GMO debate we were able to draw on the findings and frames developed by a large comparative research project managed by Martin Bauer and George Gaskell (Gaskell and Bauer 2001a; Bauer and Gaskell 2002a). For the debate on military interventions we had to start from scratch, however. Therefore the sample included 30 to 40 articles per intervention and per country.

3. Segmented Europeanization

1. For the dimension, *convergence of discourse*, see Chapters 6 and 7.
2. Articles on European governance include contributions that refer to policies and policymaking at the EU level in the headline or first paragraph, but not articles that deal predominantly with domestic issues and mention EU policies. Articles on 'international policymaking' focus on international relations and foreign policies, such as debates in the UN Security Council and similar topics, but not all kinds of coverage of other countries.
3. Technically, the coders were instructed to code the major subject of an article strictly according to the way in which the issue was framed. Thus, the code 'EU politics' was only used for articles in which EU policymaking and 'polity-making' were the main issues. If the article instead focused on the impact of the EU on domestic policies, it was marked with the respective thematic code. Regardless of the major subject, the coders furthermore coded all instances in which a specific EU policy field was mentioned.
4. Between 1988 and 2002 the Council adopted 64 directives per year on average. During the same period, the British House of Commons passed 50 acts per year on average and the German parliament 130. We are very grateful to Andreas Maurer for making available his data on the EU legal output to us and updating them for our purposes; see also Maurer and Wessels (2003). For the number of British acts see http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts.htm. The number of German acts is calculated from Feldkamp and Ströbel (2005: 860–1).
5. The figures refer to the election period 1998 to 2002. It should be noted, however, that not all subject areas are listed in the handbook; for instance, education and defence are lacking. To our knowledge, reliable data for other countries are not available.
6. In the case of EU policies, these are mentioned in about 5 per cent of all articles; national policies are mentioned in 33 per cent of all articles, therefore the level has a value of 16 per cent.

4. Differential Europeanization: explaining vertical and horizontal Europeanization in the quality press

1. While this chapter focuses on Europeanization, one also has to control for the possibility that Europeanization might be embedded in a more general trend towards Westernization (encompassing Europe and North America) or globalization, which is elaborated in more depth in Chapter 3 of this volume.
2. Of the rapidly growing number of publications on the European public sphere only very few are concerned with possible explanations for differences between newspapers in different national contexts. The Europub report by della Porta (2003) assembles an impressive list of hypotheses but then fails to test any of them. Other studies discussing possible explanations are mostly the work of other members of Europub, such as Berkel (2006), Adam and Berkel (2004), Firmstone (2004), Guiradon et al. (2004).
3. We use the 'Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File', which covers the years 1973–2002. We would like to thank the GESIS/ZA (Central Archive for Empirical Social Research) for preparing and providing the data.

4. Please see Table A1.1 in Appendix 1 with all details for this newspaper.
5. Please see Table A1.2 in Appendix 1 with all details for this newspaper.
6. The original wording of the text is: '. . . An der Absicht, das ganze Deutschland zu spiegeln, hat sich bis heute nichts geändert': http://www.FAZ.net.
7. Please see Table A1.3 in Appendix 1 with all details for this newspaper.
8. Please see Table A1.4 in Appendix 1 with all details for this newspaper.
9. Please see Table A1.5 in Appendix 1 with all details for this newspaper.
10. The original index values for these variables correlated too strongly ($r = 0.86$) for both of them to be included in the same regression model.

5. Towards a pan-European public sphere? A typology of transnational media in Europe

1. Chalaby (2002, 2005) analyses TV stations only. He identifies ethnic channels which cater for expatriates abroad, multi-territory channels which set up separate platforms in different countries, pan-European channels with a unique feed for all countries and pan-European networks with a unique brand and concept adapted to different national settings.
2. This section draws heavily on the figures and facts collated in Vissol (2006), who has analysed an impressive amount of data in his study for the European Commission on transnational television in Europe. The data on which his report is based is mostly commercial, however, and unfortunately not readily available for research.
3. 'Infranational media' are not included in this typology since they do not cut across any national borders. The term 'infranational' is used by Marchetti (2004) and refers to media reach and linkages between media within a nation, for example French regional newspapers or TV channels and their inter-linkages.
4. Seven out of 17 members of the 'Rundfunkrat' are national politicians (Kleinsteuber 2007: 5).
5. German, English, French, Italian, Portuguese, Russian and Spanish.
6. The languages include only Western European languages, however. No Central or Eastern European language is represented, still less any Asian or African language.
7. Taken together, all Indymedia sites receive an estimated 500,000 to 2 million page views a day. This figure was measured on 23 April 2003. See http://docs.indymedia.org/view/Global/FrequentlyAskedQuestionEn#hits.

6. Together we fight? Europe's debate over the legitimacy of military interventions

1. European Council 2003, A Secure Europe in a Better World – the European Security Strategy, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.ASP?id=266&lang=EN&mode=g.
2. In an interview on the fiftieth anniversary of the EU, the German chancellor Angela Merkel even identified the development of a European army as a core future task of the EU, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/ausland/artikel/933/106827/.

3. Institutions and committees related to the ESDP include the Office of the High Representative, set up under the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) and currently held by Javier Solana, as well as a number of committees such as the Political and Security Committee and the European Union Military Committee. For an overview see http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/dfsp/intro/index.htm.
4. A fourth ideal type, 'territorial defence', refers mainly to Eastern European countries.
5. This chapter mainly presents the results of our quantitative content analysis of the debates on the legitimacy of military interventions. Insights from the preliminary qualitative study will serve to illustrate the quantitative results. A detailed description of our methodology can be found in Chapter 2 and Appendix 2.
6. The absolute number of articles cannot be compared across countries as newspapers differ systematically in size (that is the number of articles per issue). Figure 6.1 therefore sets the total number of articles focusing on the respective intervention in relation to an estimate of the total number of articles published in the newspapers in general. Please note that the number of articles in this figure is not identical with our body of discursive articles that form the sample for the quantitative content analysis, since we additionally reduced the original sample by random criteria to 50 articles per newspaper and intervention. See Appendix 2, Section A2.1.1 The sample for a more detailed account of the sampling process.
7. Variation coefficients are calculated by dividing standard deviations by the respective means. In this case we calculated for each intervention the mean share of articles on military interventions in the five countries and the corresponding standard deviation which we then divided by the mean to obtain the variation coefficient. The minimum of this indicator, zero, indicates perfect similarity. And while there is no absolute maximum, values above 1 signal that the standard deviation is larger than the mean, thus pointing to a marked lack of similarity.
8. We furthermore find that civil society actors are generally much more sceptical towards military interventions than politicians, journalists, or representatives of the military and international organizations. While the latter mostly advocate the use of force (only Austrian politicians are somewhat more reluctant), civil society actors are in all countries characterized by a negative bias against military interventions.
9. Due to the low number of statements from representatives of the military and international organizations, we left them out when calculating variation coefficients. They were often quoted just once or twice per intervention debate and country.
10. Rather surprisingly, political orientations do not play an important role here. If we take the leanings of the two newspapers examined in each country as a rough proxy, we find no notable differences in the share of 'pro' and 'contra' positions between left-wing and right-wing newspapers. On average, they differ by just 8 percentage points at the most. Notable exceptions are France and to a lesser extent Britain where the left-wing papers generally tend to be more sceptical of the use of force than the right-wing papers. Yet, in Germany and Austria differences between the newspapers

are generally negligible; in Denmark we even find that the right-wing *Berlinske Tidende* has a more sceptical stance than the centre-left *Politiken*. Our analysis thus shows no general pattern or trend related to political orientations.

11. Note that we calculated variation coefficients for the net difference between 'pro' and 'contra' positions. In that way we measure the *relation* between 'pro' and 'contra' coalitions rather than the strength of just either 'pro' or 'contra' coalitions.
12. By contrast, in the other countries of our sample, opposition against the US-led operation was also voiced by sections of the elite. In France, the 'no' coalition was joined by Defence Minister Jean-Pierre Chevènement and other prominent members of the Socialist Party. In Denmark all parties of the political left-wing, and in particular the Social Democrats, opposed the intervention or were at least reluctant to advocate it. Finally, in Britain the Labour party also took a 'soft-line' position and advocated more time for sanctions rather than the immediate use of force.
13. A notable exception is the British Kosovo debate; see below for details.
14. Somewhat surprisingly, foreign speakers hardly make a difference to the salience of frames and their similarity. There are only two notable exceptions: during the Kosovo intervention foreign speakers reduced the variation of the credibility frame from a value of 0.7 to 0.4, and during the war on Iraq in 2003 the variation of the human rights frame dropped from 0.5 to 0.3. In all other cases, variation coefficients between domestic speakers and all speakers (including non-nationals) differ by just 0.1 and show no clear pattern of greater similarity of either group of speakers.
15. Pearson's r can range from +1, indicating a perfect positive correlation to −1, indicating a perfect negative correlation; 0 indicates no correlation at all.
16. In contrast to the results regarding frames and justifications, the inclusion of foreign speakers does not lead to a homogenization of the discourse on collective identifications. The patterns in the use of collective identifications are similar for domestic speakers and the foreign speakers included in the national debates even though the latter were only coded if they referred to a community that could potentially incorporate the readers (that is a US speaker quoted in a French newspaper would only be coded if he referred to the French (or European or Western or world) collective identity, not if he referred to his own national identity).
17. Note that Figure 6.11 shows the distribution of patterns of identification among *identity* references. The figures are therefore different from the above figures, which show the relevance of identity references among *all* statements.
18. '. . . die Fratze unserer eigenen Vergangenheit'.
19. 'Wenn wir die Lehre aus unserer Geschichte und aus der blutigen ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts gelernt haben, dann darf es in Europa keine Kriegstreiberei mehr geben: von niemandem und aus welchen Gründen auch immer.'
20. 'Efter min opfattelse har denne suverænitet siden krigen været solidt placeret i lommen på den til enhver tid siddende amerikanske præsident. Foretrækker vi det frem for en europæisk fælles sikkerheds-og udenrigspolitik?' Pernille Frahm, as quoted in *Politiken*, 30 March 2003.

7. United in protest? The European struggle over genetically modified food

1. The Life Sciences in European Society (LSES) project, an international endeavour funded by the EU, directed by George Gaskell and Martin W. Bauer, and involving teams from no less than 15 countries, including the ones in our own sample, is the major reference point in this literature on biotechnology and risk communication (Durant 1992; Durant et al. 1998; Bauer 1995; Gaskell and Bauer 2001a, 2001b; Gaskell et al. 1998b; Bauer and Gaskell 2002a, 2002b). The project examined the development of national public opinion and media coverage over almost three decades (1973 to 2000), using a mix of interviews and focus groups (Wagner et al. 2001), surveys (Gaskell et al. 1998a; Gaskell et al. 2001a; Midden et al. 2002), and content-analytical methods (Schanne and Meier 1992; Bauer et al. 2001; Gutteling et al. 2002). Its fine-grained examination of media coverage played an important role in the overall research design, and besides offering a wealth of empirical findings on biotechnology discourses, the LSES volumes and their spin-off products contain rich background information on related scientific, technological and policy developments (Grabner et al. 2001; Torgersen et al. 2002). There is considerable overlap – in terms of research questions and designs, participating scholars and so on – between the LSES project and other work in the area. Jürgen Hampel (Hampel 1999, 2000; Hampel and Renn 2001; Hampel et al. 1998), for instance, participated in the research documented in Schell and Seltz (2000); Georg Ruhrmann (1991, 1992, 1993) has contributed to the latter volume and the LSES project (see also Görke et al. 2000; Kohring and Görke 2000; Kohring et al. 2001; Kohring 2002; Wagner et al. 2002). With a few exceptions (Seifert 2002, 2003, 2004, 2006), the Europeanization of public spheres and related aspects of democratic theory have not been the explicit focus of this body of work, however. Other research comparable to but not linked with the LSES project tends to be, in one way or another, more restricted in scope or even more remote from our own research interests (for instance Baark and Jamison 1990; Brodde 1992; Hornig 1994; Frewer et al. 1997; Hagedorn and Allender-Hagedorn 1997; Jäger and Jäger 2000; Merten 2001).
2. This definition largely corresponds to the 'animal and agricultural' category of biotechnology topics in the LSES project (Gutteling et al. 2002: 100). Our focus on green biotechnology is, in fact, motivated by a major finding of that project, namely, that debates on green and red biotechnology are quite distinct and have increasingly become so over the course of the 1990s. This divide exists in most European countries: interest in green biotechnology appears to have grown while interest in red biotechnology has diminished, the particular issues and frames linked with each are often quite different, and green biotechnology tends to face considerably more scepticism than red biotechnology (Bauer et al. 2001: 41, 46–7; Gutteling et al. 2002: 105, 118). On red biotechnology debates, see also Kitzinger and Reilly (1997) and Peters et al. (2007b).
3. The LSES project qualifies the countries in our sample as examples of four different types of biotechnology communication: Austria (Wagner et al. 1998; Torgersen et al. 2001) and Britain (Bauer et al. 1998; Gaskell et al. 2001b) exemplify the 'forget green, run red with caution' thrust, Denmark (Jelsøe et

al. 1998, 2001) 'biotechnology – a risky business', France (de Cheveigné et al. 1998; Boy and de Cheveigné 2001) 'biotechnology – prospects and concerns', and Germany (Hampel et al. 1998, 2001) 'biotechnology – all prospects, few concerns'. On Austria, see also Grabner and Torgensen (1998), Seifert (2002, 2003); on Denmark, Baark and Jamison (1990); on France, Heller (2002), Joly and Marris (2003a, 2003b); on Germany, Brodde (1992); on Britain, Frewer et al. (1997).

4. We share our focus on the opinion-leading press with the LSES project, and there is a partial overlap in the papers chosen (*FAZ*, *Die Presse*, *Le Monde*, *Politiken*, *The Times*). However, the LSES project examines both weekly papers and magazines, and no uniform data collection or sampling procedure has been applied across countries and papers (Bauer et al. 2001: 36–7; Gutteling et al. 2002: 117). Although there is enough similarity between that project and our own case study to permit the mutual validation of several key results, comparability is limited by the fact that unlike the team around Gaskell and Bauer, we are exclusively concerned with the analysis of *discursive* articles on the green biotechnology issue, and by differences in the operationalization of several variables (see Appendix 2 for more details on the compilation of our biotechnology text corpus and on the coding of discursive statements).
5. For the technically inclined, this amounts to the analysis of sigma convergence, with coefficients of variation and means as key indicators for the scope and direction of convergence (Heichel et al. 2005: 831; Knill 2005: 768).
6. A finding that echoes the results of the LSES project, according to which public attention – the overall volume of communication related to green biotechnology – has grown massively since the early 1990s, combined with a clear shift from news to opinion pieces, which are, of course, more likely to be discursive in our sense (Gutteling et al. 2002: 101, 117).
7. See also Bauer et al. (2001: 38) on what appears to be the extraordinary salience of articles on green biotechnology in Britain. Note, however, that the number of articles per year is, in general, much higher, and so there tend to be more articles on any given topic in the *Guardian* and *The Times* than in the other six newspapers examined. Hence the differences in the volume or journalistic style of the British and continental European papers may, at least in part, be responsible for this particular finding.
8. As the LSES project and related work (Hampel 1999: 33) have shown, the low volume of biotechnology-related communication in Germany is mirrored by a comparative lack of knowledge.
9. Figure 7.2 also illustrates that essentially the same picture emerges when only the positions of domestic speakers in each of the five national arenas are considered. Our findings on the other dimensions of national discourses also proved to be robust when only domestic speakers were considered. Therefore, in this chapter, we refrain from offering a systematic analysis of the speaker origin variable, which was shown to play a more important role in discourses on military interventions.
10. As with debates on military interventions, both domestic and foreign speakers – notably from other European countries or the US – participated in the mediated debates on green biotechnology in each country.

Austria – a small country with a dominant neighbour (Germany) speaking the same language – has the highest share of foreign speakers (37.4 per cent) while France has the lowest (21.1 per cent); see also Figure 7.4.

11. It is important to note that unlike the LSES project, we coded speakers, that is, the *authors* of discursive statements, and not the actors or actor groups *referred to* in the examined newspaper articles (Bauer et al. 2001: 42–4). Our variable thus captures the 'motors' of public deliberation, as it were, and enables us to gauge the association of specific positions and frames with speaker types. The fact that the LSES project, by comparison, identifies few clear relationships between actor groups and frames may be due to its coding scheme, which merely captures the co-occurrence of actor groups and frames in the texts. Also note that our initial coding scheme was somewhat more fine-grained than indicated in Figure 7.4, and some of these more fine-grained categories (see Appendix 2) are briefly considered in the text.
12. As much as we would have liked to use the coding scheme of the LSES project in order to enhance comparability, we ultimately chose not to do so, although some of our respective categories overlap. For us, a risk (an opportunity) is nothing but an anticipated cost (benefit), with some probability attached (Pollack and Shaffer 2005: 333). Likewise, only the (negative or positive) sign distinguishes a cost from a benefit (or a risk from an opportunity). A reliable distinction between 'present-oriented' *cost evaluations* and 'future-oriented' *risk assessments* in the coding process seemed both difficult to achieve and unnecessary. Even more importantly, though, some of the LSES project's frames seem to overlap with each other or with the project's risk and benefit variables, and to be linked with pro or contra assessments of green biotechnology (that is, with presumptive benefits or risks) in an a priori fashion: the way they are defined, some of these frames could not possibly be drawn on by both camps, and hence the documented empirical relationships between frames and speaker positions are hardly surprising (Bauer et al. 2001: 40–2, 46–8). By contrast, our own coding scheme does not distinguish between a statement claiming that 'biotechnology is costly', that it is 'risky', or that it 'has no benefits'. It does, however, take the existence of different *kinds* of cost (risk) or benefit (opportunity) into account, it includes justifications that are not based on cost or benefit evaluations at all, and it turns the question of 'elective affinities' between speaker positions and frames into an empirical one.
13. Of course, 'rational' and normative considerations may be combined, or difficult to separate. Our coding scheme allows for this by including multiple coding.
14. Germany also has the second highest percentage of foreign speakers in our sample (34.8 per cent).
15. Our data also indicate a slight, if somewhat erratic, upward trend in the share of foreign speakers in each of the five national public spheres.

Appendix 2: methodological appendix

1. This programme is available at http://www.geocities.com/skymegsoftware/pram.html.

2. The search was limited to the headline and first paragraph (except for infomedia which allows only full-text searches). Keywords were for Iraq I: irak* or golfkrieg* or persisch* or bagdad* or saddam; Bosna: Bosn* or jugos* or serb*; Kosovo: Kosov*; Iraq II: irak* or golfkrieg* or persisch* or bagdad* or saddam; where necessary these keywords were translated into the respective newspaper languages.
3. Factiva: *The Times*, *Guardian*, *FAZ* (Iraq II), *SZ* (all except Iraq I), *Presse* and *Standard* (all except Iraq I), *Politiken* (Kosovo and Iraq II), *Le Monde* (Kosovo and Iraq II); Lexis-Nexis: *Le Figaro* (Kosovo and Iraq II); infomedia: *Politiken* (Iraq I and Bosnia), *Berlingske*; CD-Rom: *Le Monde* (Bosnia), *FAZ* (Bosnia, Kosovo); microfiche: *Le Monde* (Iraq I), *Le Figaro* (Iraq I and Bosnia), *FAZ*, *SZ*, *Presse* and *Standard* (all only Iraq I).
4. The search was limited to the headline and first paragraph (except for infomedia which allows only full-text searches). Keywords were: geneti* or genforschung* or gentechnolo* or biomedizin* or biotechnolo* or gentechni* or gen-food or klonen* or dolly* or DNA; where necessary these keywords were translated into the respective newspaper languages.
5. The coders were Hans-Gerhard Schmidt, Thorben Koehn and Sandra de Silva.
6. The SPSS macro was made available by Andrew F. Hayes, School of Communication, The Ohio State University, hayes.338@osu.edu. See, http://www.comm.ohio-state.edu/ahayes/SPSS%20programs/kalpha.htm.

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