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Crisis, Identity and Migration in Post-Colonial Southern Africa

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Foreword

Due to regional inequalities bequeathed to the continent by colonists at the time of independence, there have been consistent movements on the continent from economically deprived areas to areas that are economically more stable or better off. Postcolonial Africa and post-apartheid Southern Africa is replete with vast inter- and intra-country economic disparities, making constant movement one of the most viable options for poorer regions to survive. Regrettably, as time passes, spatial inequalities that existed at the time of independence have tended to be more pronounced over time. Within countries, movements are typically from rural areas, which usually lack basic infrastructure and have low economic activity, to smaller towns and finally to metropolitan areas. In most African countries, this means that the major movement stream is towards capital cities or seaport cities. As these hosting areas are brought to the brink due to expanding population that is not matched by a similar expansion in hard and soft infrastructure, movements have tended to look for greener pastures across political boundaries. Although the majority of African migrants straddle host areas and the donor areas, the trend is that migration movements are mainly from economically deprived areas to areas that are economically well endowed. As demonstrated in this book, South Africa has, by far, been a host to the largest recipients of the intercontinental movements.

This volume is significant in many respects. It has managed to put these movements in a historical context. Pan-African movements existed in pre-colonial era. For example, the first great migration of the Bantu-speaking peoples to the south began about 3500 years ago or about 1500 BC. The movements continued during the colonial and apartheid eras, with a large contingent of workers from other Southern African countries—especially Mozambique and Zimbabwe—coming to South Africa as contract workers on the mines. Thus, to a certain extent the South African economy was built on the sweat of cheap labour from South African Black workers and that of workers from neighbouring countries. Many of these workers were on temporary contracts that were made a condition for them to work in South Africa by the apartheid government. Later, professionals from the rest of the African continent began to come to South Africa, mainly to the

nominally independent homelands. The flow to the South accelerated after the first democratic elections in 1994, with many people moving from the rest of sub-Saharan Africa to South Africa, including Congo, Mali, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Zaire, Kenya and Uganda. The new immigrants included professionals, business people and people with low skill levels, including informal traders and vendors.

Current migration streams do pose more challenges than those experienced before. The fragile international economy has tended to exact frequent economic meltdown or common social strife that results in massive movements at a rapid pace. Southern Africa has experienced a fair number of these catastrophic events, which have been well documented in the volume. The economic downturn in Zimbabwe and proxy wars experienced in Mozambique are some of the most recent epochs which triggered massive population shifts in the region.

The demographic transition being experienced in the region is another epoch that elicited massive movements in the region. Regions experiencing demographic transition experience a youth bulge. In turn, youth is characterised by a high degree of mobility in any society. As young people move out of family homes, they are also likely to leave their childhood areas. Another factor which results in the increase in the population of migrants is the increase in the number of women who recently joined migration streams. This has been well articulated in the volume, together with its implications in the very nature of migration patterns.

Incidentally, Southern African governments have been slower than other regions in officially opening political borders than other African regions. Currently, most people in Southern Africa have freedom of movement within their own countries, although movements between countries remain a politically sensitive issue. The ECOWAS regional blocks have moved ahead to facilitate free movements between countries of their regions. The ECOWAS Treaty formulated in 1975 has an objective of abolishing all obstacles to free movement of people between member states and the goal of granting automatic citizenship for all nationals of member states. Although some progress has been made, the goal of integrating the region is far from being achieved. In 1995, SADC started its own process of integrating the region. The 1995 Protocol was signed by some countries in the region, with the aim of easing movements in the region although its implementation has been sluggish. The main problem, expressed by host countries in SADC, is the one-way stream of most movements.

The migration transition is an important concept in understanding changes in the migration pattern societies that are experiencing industrialisation, population growth and other social and economic changes. Migration in pre-transition is usually dominated by one-way movement from underdeveloped areas to more developed areas, whereas post-transition migration streams are much more diversified. Many regions of Africa are catching up to the rest of the world in having a much diversified migration stream. Yet Southern Africa lags behind other parts of the continent in its progression of migration transition.

This is a seminal work in a number of respects. Magidimisha and Khalema et al. have understood the complexity behind migration patterns experienced in the

region. By dedicating space in explaining global political economy and its influence in the region with a decolonial gaze, it has laid foundation for a movement away from current simplistic explanations that are not helpful. Most importantly, the volume has moved away from the dominant narratives that have tended to mainly based in host areas; instead, it has carefully weaved the narrative host and donor areas.

Human Sciences Research Council   Monde Blessing Makiwane, PhD
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About Editors and Authors

Tinashe Lukas Chimedza has a keen interest in the political economy of development especially in Southern Africa and is currently engaged in research around the possibility of 'democratic developmental states' in Southern Africa. His areas of interest also include the history and contemporary patterns of migration in Southern Africa and how this has been shaped and continues to shape the development trajectory of Southern Africa. As a Research Associate of the Institute of Public Affairs in Zimbabwe (IPAZ), he has the responsibility of developing, managing and directing the research programme for the Institute. He sits on several Boards of NGOs in Zimbabwe, and he is the co-founder of the Student Solidarity Trust (SST). Mr. Chimedza has given lectures and presentations on Educational Rights Campaigns and Democratisation in Zimbabwe.

Lovemore Chipungu holds a PhD in Town and Regional Planning, a Master's Degree in Rural and Urban Planning as well as a Bachelor of Science Degree (Honours) in Rural and Urban Planning. He is an active member of the Zimbabwe Institute of Regional and Urban Planners as well as a Corporate Member of the South African Planning Institute. He is currently a lecturer in the School of the Built Environment and Development Studies, at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. He has published widely in peer-reviewed journals and books, and his areas of interest are in housing policy, urban land and housing and urban design.

Tamuka C. Chirimambowa is studying for a DLitt. Et Phil in Development Studies with the University of Johannesburg. He has worked extensively with civil society in SADC on human rights, governance and democracy, economic policy and social justice. He has presented at several academic and civil society forums especially on Zimbabwe and co-authored the article 'Civil Society's Contested Role in the 2013 Elections in Zimbabwe: A Historical Perspective' in the Journal of African Elections (2014). Tamuka is also a columnist for various media houses in Zimbabwe and South Africa on the subjects of democracy, governance, elections, black economic empowerment, business state relations,

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Modimowabarwa Kanyane is a research director in the Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery Research Programme of the Human Sciences Research Council, HSRC. He has established himself over years as a renowned researcher in the field of Public Administration and Management. He obtained his doctoral degree in Public Administration from the University of Pretoria and took a short course in Economic and Financial Negotiations at International Institute of Public Administration in France. He is leading large volume research projects and amongst those which are completed include normative framework for effective and efficient social security provisioning, service delivery optimisation, review of state-owned entities performance and impact of the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court of Appeal decisions on the transformation of society. Prof. Kanyane is linked to a number of universities, as extraordinaire professor at the Tshwane University of

Technology and Alumni at the University of Pretoria and provides academic support to Midlands State University in Zimbabwe as well as the University of Fort Hare. *As a scholar, Prof Kanyane is well published and his publication record spans the authoring of over 30 peer-reviewed publications, books and book chapters.* He is a recipient of the 2015 HSRC Excellence Award.

Nene Ernest Khalema is a former Chief Research Specialist (CRS) of the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) and currently an Associate Professor and academic leader of the discipline of Community Development within the School of Built Environment and Development Studies (BEDS) at the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN). Before joining UKZN, he served as Assistant Professor of Social Work at the University of Calgary in Canada where he spearheaded work on migrant integration, minority health, youth development and anti-racism praxis. Professor Khalema has also taught liberal arts and public health courses at numerous institutions in Canada since 2001. He is a co-editor of several books entitled *'Children in South African Families: Lives and Times'* (Cambridge Scholars Publishers, 2016), *'Millennium Development Goals in Retrospect: Africa's Development Beyond 2015'* (Springer, 2015) and *'Africa Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow: Exploring the Multidimensional Discourses on Development'* (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013). His numerous publications appear widely in local and international journals, edited books and technical research reports.

Hangwelani Hope Magidimisha, Dr. holds a PhD in Town and Regional Planning from University of Kwazulu-Natal. Dr. Magidimisha made a history when she became the first black South African born women to be awarded PhD in Town and Regional Planning by the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Dr. Magidimisha is a senior lecturer and programme co-ordinator in Planning at the School of Built Environment and Development Studies (BEDS) at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Before joining University of Kwazulu-Natal, she worked in various portfolios as a practitioner in town planning, a researcher and now as an academic. She is specialist on Spatial Planning, Housing, Service Delivery Inequalities, and Migration.

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acclaimed book entitled '*Apartheid Vertigo: The Rise of Discrimination Against Africans in South Africa*' *(Ashgate)*, he has written widely on issues unpacking migrant identities, African Masculinities and a quest for alternate methodologies, approaches and world views when researching transitioning societies of the South. His latest forthcoming book entitled *Tales of African Manhood: A History of Biographies* and *Fragments of African Memory (2017)* aims to challenge our thoughts and stimulate our minds about how we talk, cognise, and think of a new world order that intersects our identities and realities as Africans in the context of change.

Inocent Moyo is a Lecturer in the Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Zululand, Richards Bay, South Africa. He is a seasoned researcher on issues of migration and development, migration and immigration politics, cross-border traders, regional integration in the SADC, transnationalism, borders and borderlands and urban informality and governance. He has published and done international presentations on these topics. He is passionate about the political economy of reform and non-state actors or grass-roots forms of economic activities which could possibly provide an alternative paradigm and/or trajectory of progressive politics, the outcome of which may improve the human condition. As a Human Geographer, Dr. Moyo has a deep attachment to critical emancipatory research, which he believes should challenge traditional ways of knowing and attending to the myriad problems which affect humanity today and in the future.

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Part I
Conceptualisation and Overview of Migration Patterns in Southern Africa

Crisis, Identity and (Be)longing: A Thematic Introduction of the Vestiges of Migration in Post-independent Southern Africa

**Nene Ernest Khalema, Hangwelani Hope Magidimisha,
Lovemore Chipungu, Tamuka C. Chirimambowa,
and Tinashe Lukas Chimedza**

1 Introduction

This volume is a tapestry weaved by scholars from a variety of disciplines (political economy, development studies, planning, history, sociology, anthropology, policy studies, cultural studies and population studies) to unpack the political economy of crisis, identity and migration in post-independence Southern Africa.[1] The end of colonialism where African states triumphed and set up various forms of resistance against centuries of European imperialist aggression, diplomatic pressures, military invasions, eventual colonial conquest through migrant settlements and subsequent (in)direct rule ushered in new forms of mobility and movement for thousands of people motivated by postcolonial promises of freedom and better economic, political and social emancipation. In essence, the post-independence epoch sparked a euphoria in the immediate postcolonial period as people imagined that they 'will

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[1]By southern Africa we mean the SADC region comprising 13 countries of the Southern region [i.e. South Africa, Angola, Lesotho, Swaziland, Tanzania, Botswana, Mozambique, Malawi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Seychelles Zambia and Zimbabwe and Namibia (Arango 2004)].

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govern', that 'the land will be shared amongst those work it' and that the 'people will share in the country's wealth' (Freedom Charter 1955[2]). Across Southern Africa as the twentieth century turned into the twenty-first century, questions of development, equity, inclusion and the creation of opportunities for what Franz Fanon (1963) described as 'the wretched of the earth' remained elusive; Anderson (2010) described it as a 'development impasse' and Saul (2014) has called it Southern Africa's 'flawed freedom', and Turshen Melber (2004) called it a 'limited liberation'.[3] In some cases, the internal and global pressures within these '*nation-states in formation*' burst into intensely brutally contested political conflict as other excluded social groups contested for greater inclusion.

Having said that, the post-independence context also affected patterns of regional and trans-regional human movements. In the aftermath of independence, for instance, several countries (frontline states of Zambia, Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Angola and Swaziland) hosted political activists from the region and beyond, most noticeably within the socialist block. Whether moving by force or choice, millions crossed borders as refugees, asylum seekers or labour migrants and joined desperate massive population movements in search of better economic security and social opportunities. In Zimbabwe beginning in the mid-1990s, the economic meltdown and contestation for state power between the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDCs) generated a mass exodus. Further afield, Zambia's experimentation with structural adjustment proved catastrophic and led to the demise of the Kaunda-led government; to the east the Mozambique liberation 'moment' was soon engulfed by a proxy civil war sending hundreds of thousands across its border into Zimbabwe and South Africa; further to the South West Angola was engulfed in a brutal civil war which lasted almost a generation; and closer to South Africa the economies of Swaziland and Lesotho have remained almost enclosed into the South African development pattern with little room for independent development.

Similarly, the *end* of apartheid in South Africa in 1994 completed what the Ghanaian revolutionary Kwame Nkrumah's clarion call had framed as 'seek yee first the political kingdom'.[4] Apartheid's demise at least politically and legally therefore marked an important milestone in Africa's project to decolonise and build polities defined by more inclusion and less by racial domination, dispossession and exploitation. Decolonisation placed into the hands of the black majority governments the political power to lead the transformation of political economies,

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[2]Freedom Charter as adopted at the Congress of the People, Kliptown 1955. http://www.anc.org. za/show.php?is=72 (retrieved 20 May, 2015).

[3]Fanon, Frantz (1963) The Wretched of The Earth, Grove Press; Andreasson, Stefan (2010) Africa's Development Impasse: Rethinking The Political Economy of Transformation, Zed Books; Saul, John (2014) A Flawed Freedom: Rethinking Southern African Liberation: UCT Press; Melber, Henning (2004) Limits to Liberation in Southern Africa: The Unfinished Business of Democratic Consolidation, HSRC Press: Cape Town.

[4]Cited in Landau (2014, p. 229).

which had been shaped structurally to benefit white minorities. The defining feature of that colonial political economy, including apartheid in South Africa and Zimbabwe's colonial-settlerism, was entrenched poverty, exclusion and social disaffection especially within the black majority. As the twentieth century turned into the twenty-first century, questions of migration, belonging and labour became highly contested especially in Southern Africa as the political economy got exposed to a series of crisis-driven migration. The situation seemed to be exacerbated by a regional political economy which has not transformed or grown quickly enough to resolve historic questions of dual enclavity of the economies of Southern Africa,[5] colonial and apartheid dispossession and contemporary challenges of entrenched poverty and intense globalisation-related migration.[6]

Whilst the liberation phase seemed to have hemmed a regional solidarity forged by the presence of an easily identifiable 'enemy' (apartheid, colonialism, settlerism, racism etc.), the postcolonial period seems to have re-ignited either some vaguely defined pre-colonial or contemporary suspicions as different social groups compete for belonging and material improvement. In the extreme, this crisis has fermented social crisis and once in a while foreigners even when they are 'African' and are supposed to have been receiving 'pan-African' solidarity become a target. In South Africa, the increased ruptures from the African National Congress [i.e. the emergence of two new political parties: *Congress of the People* (COPE) and the *Economic Freedom Fighters* (EFF)], the expansive social delivery services protests, the intra-contradictions within the tripartite alliance within COSATU and the slow but steady evolution of the Democratic Alliance (DA) and other fringe parties demonstrate a shifting political terrain. It is within that changing political terrain that xenophobic violence has become intermittent. Thus, the legacies of colonial domination coupled with postcolonial patriarchal state practices and contemporary global patterns of capitalism in the African political economy impact women and children more negatively (Turshen 2000).[7]

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[5]Mhone, G. C. (2001, September). Enclavity and constrained labour absorptive capacity in Southern African economies. In *Draft paper prepared for the discussion at the UNRISD meeting on 'The Need to Rethink Development Economics'* (pp. 7–8).

[6]There has been increased South–South migration in contrast to the usual South–North Migration. See Crush, J., & Ramachandran, S. (2010). Xenophobia, international migration and development. *Journal of Human Development and Capabilities*, 11(2), 209–228.

[7]Trushen, Merideth (ed) (2010) African Women: A Political Economy, Palgrave: London.

2 The Political Economy of Crisis, Identity and Dis (placement): Migration Trends and Flows

Contrary to predominant discourse that large numbers of migrants from African countries aspire to relocate to host countries in the developed world of the north (i.e. North America or Europe), current data have shown that this is not the case. Global data from the United Nations[8] (2016) estimate that at the end of 2015 more than 244 million people worldwide were migrants living outside their country of origin, of which an estimated 19 million are in the continent of Africa. This number rose from 175 million people in the year 2000 to 232 million in 2013, respectively, up to the above-mentioned 2015 figures making an increase of 41% since 2000. Of the current 244 million migrants globally, women accounted for close to half of the international migrants at 48% (United Nations 2016). Additionally, the number of refugees globally has increased from 39 million in 2000 to 59.5 million in 2015. Moreover, internally displaced persons who had been forced to flee their homes by armed conflict, political violence and natural disasters (i.e. those living in displacement within borders of their own and surrounding countries) increased from 21 million in the year 2000 to 38.2 million in 2015 (United Nations 2016).

Africa remains a world region with complex migration dynamics that have a long history of intra-regional as well as inter-regional migration flows. According to the United Nations (2016), more than two-thirds of all migrants from the continent of Africa (approximately 16.3 million) migrate to other African countries and the Southern African region is no exception. Consequently, current trends indicate that nearly 2.7 million refugees were in Africa, which is roughly 25% of the world's refugee population. Most refugees are 'pushed out' as a result of internal, usually ethnic, conflicts exacerbated by international alliances and/or capitalist development. Africa's leading economies and industrial hubs (i.e. South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, and Egypt) inherit the brunt of the casualties of political conflict and violence, influencing further movement of people. Moreover, these major migrant-receiving countries are seen as loftier only in terms of employment, educational and economic opportunities, overall livelihood and well-being, and safety and security. According to the UN's (2015) assessment of migration trends by country of destination in Africa, South Africa remains a destination and host country for most migrant-receiving countries in the continent. Even though the Southern African region experiences all types of migrations (including displacement due to conflict and natural disasters, mixed and irregular migration and most importantly labour migration), Southern Africa has a long history of inter/intra-country migration that has evolved and involved labour dating back to the mid-nineteenth century. Intra-regional migration has long been an important aspect of Southern Africa dating back to the mid-nineteenth century when extensive migration systems were created by the colonial and apartheid state

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[8]Data derived from the new UN dataset: Trends in International Migrant Stock The 2015 Revision.

to serve the mining and agricultural sectors (Segatti and Landau 2011; Neocosmos 2010; Posel 2006). Contemporary migration flows originate mostly from conflicts in central and the Great Lakes region, Eastern and North-western Africa, and consist of refugees, asylum-seekers and economic migrants seeking refuge in 'peaceful states' of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

Migration trends from the United Nations (2016) indicate that in 2015 the Southern African region recorded over four million migrants, excluding irregular migrants, of which 44% were female and 20% were under 19 years of age. Amongst the four million migrants approximately 200,000 were refugees spread around countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (447,000), Zimbabwe (361,000) and South Africa (2.4 million), respectively. Research conducted by the Southern Africa Migration Project (SAMP) shows that the majority of cross-border migrants in Southern Africa remain circular migrants. Thus, although many stay for longer than initially intended, their visits are generally seen as temporary not permanent. Cross-border migration in the region, however, points to patterns of regional economic inequality that echoes a Wallensteinian'[9] world systems model of the 'core' and 'periphery'. Thus, by virtue of its strong economic position in the region, the republic of South Africa has emerged as the 'core', the 'hub', the 'host', the 'destination' and the 'receiver' of African migrants from the 'rest of Africa'.

Following the democratic transition, however new forms of labour migration to and from South Africa were observed. The spatial concentration of economic activities to the country of South Africa and the historical process of industrialisation left most countries in the region with a geographically unbalanced pattern of economic activities. With its relatively advanced industrial infrastructure, as well as perceived new opportunities made available as a consequence of the colonial situation and the post-apartheid euphoria and liberation promise, South Africa attracted large numbers of migrants from the Southern Africa region particularly from neighbouring frontline states of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as well as migrants from the north, west and central Africa that played an instrumental role in the nurturing of the liberation movements responsible for the defeat of apartheid.

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[9]The assertion here is that even though the notions of 'core' and 'periphery' are conceptually and heuristically objectionable on the grounds that they are rooted in dichotomous language that reproduces power differentials between diverse actors and sites around the world, terms like logics similar to those described by world system and dependency theory in the 1960s and 1970s are useful operational concepts in explaining the multiple spheres of human activity in the region of Southern Africa. The idea of world system (WS) is advanced by Immanuel Wallerstein as a study of neo-mercantilism in a global context that organises itself in the form of centre–periphery relations between economically and politically powerful and hinterland nations of capitalist world system. The concept of WS, however, emulates Wallerstein's concept of knowledge in the framework of unity in space and time context, which is his idea of historicism. Our reading of the WS exposes the economic, social and political agency of South Africa as a codified economic hub in Southern Africa. Our take on the position South Africa occupies in the region acknowledges that on average most Southern Africans move to the country of South Africa in search of economic and social opportunities.

As such, industrial development with its social, political and economic promise has been a driver for the migration of both skilled and unskilled labourers seeking opportunities for improved livelihoods. For example, as early as the 1950s the South African gold and platinum mines continued to employ large numbers of domestic and foreign migrants. This continued during the 1990s where South African mines experienced major downsizing and retrenchments creating considerable social disruption and increased poverty in supplier areas. Consequently, the proportion of foreign workers rose as 'externalisation' of the workforce increased. Countries such as Swaziland, Lesotho and Mozambique benefited from this externalisation making them over 25% of the mine workforce.

South Africa's inheritance of the 'core' emerges from its industrial pre-eminence where it absorbed a pool of skilled labour from neighbouring countries. This recognition remains central to unpacking the political economy of crisis, identity and belonging in migration debates in Southern Africa. Thus, the uneven levels of development and economic within and between countries and the variation in the distribution of economic activities and levels of socio-economic development have had an impact for migration and human movement from the context of the globalisation of the economy within the world system.

3   Scope of the Book

Conceptually, the book unpacks the political economy of crisis, identity and belonging within the migration debate in Southern Africa. Multiple migratory intricacies and complex maps of connectivity, beyond and across borders in Southern Africa, require an analysis that unpacks patterns and impact of migration at the *regional level*. By offering a regional synthesis, the book engages the migration debate by advancing a decentred approach that unpacks the complex dynamics of 'core' and 'periphery' dichotomy in regional socio-economic contexts and the policy directives that have facilitated mobility in the region. Much of the literature unapologetically advances a body of knowledge that positions the country of South Africa as 'core' or the 'centre' whilst the rest of the regional players are the 'periphery'. The hegemony of South African discourse on regional discussions and responses to the migration crisis decontextualises its regional legacies of colonialism, economic domination and hegemony.[10]

Our analysis deepens the debate about these crucial issues and situates it in the debate a decolonial critique that unsettles the simplistic notion of a 'core–periphery dichotomy' in regional relations and moves the debate into transnational, complex, shared and entwined regional histories of all sorts. Unpacking the regional

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[10]For example, the discourse makes hardly any mention of South Africa's de facto 75-year-long colonial rule of Namibia which experienced colonialism from South Africa and the regional implications of that empire building within the migration debate.

complexities, therefore, allows for a more nuanced migration debate that exposes the complexities born of a past dominated by notions of colonial empire building and impositions of multiple nationalisms. Our approach, therefore, is to decentre the analysis by focusing instead on unpacking how regional political processes and individual state practices have enforced and reinforced responses (policy or otherwise) with regional implications.[11] Ferguson and McNally (2015, p. 3) have pointed out that there is need to avoid 'methodological nationalism' in studying the movement of labour and capital,[12] and in the case of South Africa, Landau (2004) warned about the limitations of 'national' migration policies.[13] There are particular processes, especially the movement of capital, labour, or even the movement of refugees/asylum seekers that has become intensely transnational, and borders have become very fluid and harder and harder to manage in this 'age of migration'[14] as Castles et al. (2013) assert. Therefore, by focusing the impact of migration at the regional level we intend to offer some understanding of the factors that drive and determine the migration of labour within the Southern African region. Understanding the factors that determine the migration of labour between regions is crucial for assessing the response of the economy to macroeconomic shocks and identifying policies that may encourage an efficient reallocation of labour. The Southern African region is complex enough to capture how intra- and inter-migration flows (including rural-to-urban) are affected by social, political and economic factors. This is important because differences in economic productivity may have a greater impact on intra-migration than on inter-migration, owing to diverse economic situations within the region. Thus, the regional analysis provides explanations about how colonial borders might act as barriers to movement and how in turn labour migration impacts regional differences.

A critical political economy and decolonial approach is adopted in the volume to offer both a *historical* peeling of the process of 'development' (in this case, this implies revealing the historical and geographical penetration of capital accumulation in Southern Africa) and *contemporary* glazes associated with multistate practices and responses to crisis and how this has shaped particularised political, cultural and social construction of citizenship and identity. Neocosmos (2010), Koltz (2012), Matsinhe (2014) and Landau (2011) identified the role of *state practice* and *ideologies*[15] in the construction of an exclusionary citizenship.

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[11]Business Day Live, '*Uhuru Kenyatta Appeals for The Opening of Borders*' (May 19 2015).

[12]16 Ferguson, Susan and Mcnally, David (2015) 'Precarious Migrants: Gender, Race and the Social Reproduction of a Global Working Class', *Socialist Register*, Volume 5.

[13]17 Landau, Loren B, (2004) 'Myths and Decision in South African Migration and Research', Paper Presented at the African Migration Alliance Workshop, 10–11 March 2005, Pretoria, South Africa. http://sarpn.org/documents/d0001305/P1543-Migration-Myth_Wits_Nov2004.pdf

[14]Castles, Stephen., Hass De, Hein and Miller, J Mark (2013) *The Age of Migration: Internal Population Movements in the Modern World*: Palgrave McMillan.

[15]Neocosmos, Michael (2010) From 'Foreign Natives' to 'Native Foreigners': Explaining Xenophobia in Post-Apartheid South Africa, CODESRIA: Dakar; Koltz, Audie (2013) *Migration and Identity in South Africa, 1890–2010*, Cambridge University Press; Loren Landau (ed.) (2011)

A quick example here is how the colonial (and postcolonial) states penetrated, entrenched and attempted to develop an omnipotent hegemony through what Mamdani (2001) would call the 'bifurcation of the state into "citizens" and "subjects"'. That same process of colonial imposition and domination instantaneously cultivated ethno-nationalism, which functioned to generate notions of 'otherness' and suspicions amidst the 'natives'. We argue that the colonial effect still lingers on leading some questions of what identity, citizenship and belonging mean in contemporary Southern Africa. And as Chipkin (2007), Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2007) and Raftopoulos and Mlambo (2009) ponder in their respective texts whether 'being Zimbabwean really exist' or whether 'being and becoming South African truly exist'.[16] Ultimately, questions of identity and belonging amidst ethno-national states where colonial borders mark citizenship linger on in the postcolonial situation.

The third approach that the volume adopts is the discussion of the processes of *capital accumulation* in its national and global forms that have intensified the flow of labour and its reproduction and the accumulation and penetration of capital within the region. As such our approach had to take into cognizance the reality of the national and globalised nature of accumulation especially in the period which Stiglitz (2002) and Harvey (2005)[17] frame as the 'neoliberal turn'. Fourth, the approach that the volume adopts discusses the notion of 'illegality of movement' characterised by *informality* and its *intensely feminised* nature in the region, bringing to the foreground questions of gender relations and what scholars frame the 'feminisation of migration'. Scholars have declared feminisation to be a core dimension of migration and globalisation (Donato et al. 2011; Donato and Gabaccia 2015; Zlotnik 2004; Adepoju 2003). An examination of gender patterns of migration (i.e. female migration flows) has led to a more nuanced understanding of the meaning of feminisation, and has demonstrated that women have always migrated,

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Exorcising the Demons Within: Xenophobia, Violence and Statecraft in Contemporary South Africa, Wits University Press: Johannesburg (especially the introductory chapter).

[16]Chipkin, Ivor (2007) *Do South Africans Exist?: Nationalism, Democracy and the 'identity of the People'*: Wits University Press: Johannesburg, also see Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo J (2007) *Do 'Zimbabweans' Exist?: Trajectories of Nationalism, National Identity Formation and Crisis in a Post-Colonial State*, Peter Lang: London and also Raftopoulos, Brian and Mlambo, Alois (eds.) (2009) *Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-Colonial to 2008*, Weaver Press: Harare.

[17]See for example Harvey David (2005), *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, Oxford University Press, and also Stiglitz, Joseph (2002) Globalisation and Its Discontents, New York. Harvey's (2005) work is attentive to the spatial diversity of neoliberalism, emphasising its variegated forms from a materialist analysis that locates the shifts in capitalist social relations and the crisis of accumulation (i.e. accumulation by dispossession) marked by the perpetuation of inequality, to the class critique of the neoliberal project that is meant to 'restore' class power at both the global and national arenas. Harvey (2005) argues that 'accumulation by dispossession entails a very different set of practices from accumulation through the expansion of wage labour in industry and agriculture. Dispossession entails the loss of rights, dignity, sustainable ecological practices, environmental rights, and the life, as the basis for a unified oppositional politics' (Harvey, p. 178).

often in substantial numbers. Nevertheless, the real contribution in this analysis is unpacking the way women migrate (i.e. women are now migrating independently in search of jobs, rather than as family dependents) and differences in the circumstances of movement and the opportunities available to women in the migration process. For example, within the region of Southern Africa labour practices have changed to intensify the movement (and some have argued the exploitation) of women. The greater challenge is to understand the causes and consequences of the migration gender balance, which shifts over time and varies considerably across cultures and nations. There is growing evidence that in the informal sector, 'maids' and 'farm workers' are female dominated. This domination, however, does not mean that equity persists. Women migrants are paid less, work long hours, have no health care and stay in a condition of what Ferguson and Mcnally (2015) call 'hyper-precarity'.[18]

Fifth, the approach in this book also brings into debate the fate of the '*national project*'. Here, we are concerned with the process, contestations and trajectory of the postcolonial in state formation. The tensions, conflagrations and in certain cases murder (Moore 2015) of the 'other' implicate the 'birth pangs' of the nation—indeed theorising on the 'Zimbabwe crisis'. Moore (2003) argued that *nation-state formation* is an ensuing process into the *longue duree*.[19] In Mozambique and Angola, 'civil wars' erupted and the aftermath is still present; in Zambia, *Barotseland* demands independence and thus separate citizenship; in Zimbabwe, radical groups demand a separate—these contestations have to be pulled into the picture because they have implications on the *concreteness* and legitimacy, for example, of the 'rainbow nation'. There is also a 'revival' of a particular 'virulent' nationalism/ nativism which is competing to dominate state ideologies and state practices—it is important to 'deconstruct' this nativism and ask questions about its stability, interpretation of history and project—in Zimbabwe, the 'indigenisation' discourse is dominated by this discourse; in South Africa, the 'native club' politics can also be analysed to try and reveal how it conceptualises the 'native'[20]—question how does this virulent nationalism express itself: here is a Fanon (1963, p. 156) warning about its excesses—the post-independence period can easily be characterised by a descent from 'nationalism' to 'ultra-nationalism', to 'chauvinism' and finally to 'racism'.[21] Writing on 'The Political Economy of Migration in an Era of Globalization', Masey

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[18]Ferguson, Susan and Mcnally, David (2015) 'Precarious Migrants: Gender, Race and the Social Reproduction of a Global Working Class', *Socialist Register*, Volume 51.

[19]Moore, David (2003) 'Zimbabwe's Triple Crisis: Primitive Accumulation, Nation-State Formation and Democratisation in the Age of Neo-liberalism', African *Studies Quarterly*¸ Volume 7, Issues 2&3.

[20]Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo J. (2009), Africa for Africans or Africa for "Natives" Only? "New Nationalism" and Nativism in Zimbabwe and South Africa, in*: Africa Spectrum*, 44, 1, 61–78.

[21]Fanon, Frantz (1963) *The Wretched of the Earth,* Grove Press: New York.

([2010](#)) pointed that 'enlightened immigration policy' can only be a consequence of an 'objective understanding of the social and economic forces behind,'[22] so by analysing these broad historical and contemporary factors, scholars, students and policy-makers can begin to take a less parochial view when approaching questions of *governing* migration.

It is clear that migration in Southern Africa involves not only decisions about individual movement from one country to another but also the socio-legal, socio-economic and sociocultural conditions people respond to both in their countries of origin and receiving countries. The book therefore is divided into three parts each supported by several contributions. The first part entitled '*Conceptualisation and Overview of Migration Patterns in Southern Africa*' consists of four contributions excluding this introductory article. The second article entitled '*Decolonising Borders, Decriminalising Migration and Rethinking Citizenship*' by Sabelo Ndlovu-Gasheni gives a commentary of the political economy of migration in Southern Africa and critically unpacks how borders have been conceptualised and compartmentalised historically. Having done this, the article then moves to analyse postcolonial modes of citizenship and nation-*state formation*[23] and political ideologies (nationalism,[24] indigenisation, etc.[25]) especially how current patterns of development are still spatially aggregated in particular areas resulting in the proverbial enclave economy—attempts to decolonise the economy have been controversial as there seems to have emerged an elite state capture laying bare

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[22]Massey, Douglas S (2010) 'The Political Economy of Migration in an Era of Globalization'. pp. 25–43 in Samuel Martinez, ed., *International Migration and Human Rights: The Global Repercussions of US Policy.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

[23]Bond, Patrick and Manyanya, Masimba (2002) *Zimbabwe's Plunge: Exhausted Nationalism, Neoliberalism and The Search for Social Justice*: UKZN Press; also Bond, Patrick (1989) Uneven Zimbabwe: *A Study of Finance, Development and Underdevelopment* , Africa World Press; on the question of 'nation-state' formation see Moore, David (2003) 'Zimbabwe's Triple Crisis: Primitive Accumulation, Nation-State Formation and Democratisation in the Age of Neo-liberalism', African Studies Quarterly, Volume 7, Issues 2&3; on the question of the 'instability' Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo J (2007) *Do 'Zimbabweans' Exist?: Trajectories of Nationalism, National Identity Formation and Crisis in a Post-Colonial State*, Peter Lang: London and also Raftopoulos, Brian and Mlambo, Alois (eds.) (2009) *Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-Colonial to 2008*, Weaver Press: Harare.

[24]Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo J. (2009), Africa for Africans or Africa for "Natives" Only? "New Nationalism" and Nativism in Zimbabwe and South Africa, in: Africa Spectrum, 44, 1, 61–78 and also Ndlovu-Gastheni, Sabelo J (2009) *The Ndebele Nation: Memory, Hegemony and Historiography,* UNISA: South Africa.

[25]Contestations over citizenship—Chimedza, Tinashe (2008) 'Bulldozers Always Come: 'Maggots', Citizens and Governance in Contemporary Zimbabwe' in Vambe, Maurice (2008) (ed) *The Hidden Dimension of Operation Murambatsvina*, Weaver Press; Hammar, Amanda., Raftopoulos, Brian and Jensen, Stig (2003) *Zimbabwe's Unfinished: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis*, Weaver Press; Dashwood, Hevina (1999) Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transformation: Toronto; also see Phimster, Ian (1994) Wangi Colia: Coal, Capital and Labour in Colonial Zimbabwe: Baobab Books; Rutherford, Blair (2001) *Working on Margins: Black Farmers, White Farmers in Postcolonial Zimbabwe*, Weaver Press.

some of the tensions, contradictions, contestations and re-configurations related to the penetration of capital and how this relates to mobility and border making. This article argues from an Afrocentric perspective about the failure of contemporary migration discourse in Southern Africa to capture the complexity of human mobility in its various forms. The main argument put forward is that any contemporary intervention on migrant integration in the region must bear in mind that people have co-existed and interacted for centuries creating a myriad of new identities based on cultural and social resources and thus regenerating the region. Building on these premises, this chapter addresses how critical border-crossing and border-making processes have been, and still are, shaping the trajectories of migrants to occupy various social spaces, particularly in the era of overt xenophobia currently being popularised in the region.

The next contribution entitled '*Uneven Development and Conflict in Southern Africa: Interrogating the Patterns and Accumulation Processes*' by Nengomashe and Magidimisha discusses development dynamics in the region whereby remarkable economic growth powered by relative political stability, comparative advantage and a reversal of the 'brain drain' still produces uneven development and regional disparities. According to Nengomashe and Magidimisha, regional levels of economic growth were not synonymous with human development and development varied due to unequal share of resources, opportunities and benefits. This article further interrogates patterns and accumulation processes with the view to lessen inequalities and conflicts associated with development. The postcolonial moment, for example, further exacerbated regional inequality as the politically and economically privileged elites benefited from the vacuum left by their colonial masters, whilst at the same time ruthlessly exploiting and excluding millions of disenfranchised poor citizens and denying them the prospect of a dignified and productive life. As a result, according to Nengomashe and Magidimisha, more and more people were forced to migrate as a sheer survival strategy.

The contribution by Mubangizi and Mwesigwa entitled '*Migration and Public Service Delivery: The Status Quo and Policy Responses in the Sending and Receiving Countries*' explores the effect of migration on public service delivery from both the receiving and sending countries. It does so by firstly defining public service delivery with specific regard to migration. It then explores specific challenges in the public service sector of both the sending countries and the receiving countries. Lastly, the discussion shifts to a focus on the need to better manage the interface between migration and public service delivery through, amongst other things, better policy responses. Thus, whilst national level policies are expected to be effective in reducing the rate of emigration, domestic conditions must be adequately matched along global trends. The discussion in this article shows that both emigration and immigration have a great impact on service delivery in the region and beyond. Thus, trade-offs between domestic policy frameworks on migration and attitudes to migrants are argued as a necessary step to correct the existing challenges and constraints (i.e. regulatory, policy, financial or capacity) in both the sending and the receiving countries.

The contribution on '*Gender, Migration and Crisis in Southern Africa: Contestations and Tensions in the Informal Spaces and "Illegal Labour" Market*' by Magidimisha unpacks gender dimensions in the patterns of the migration and how particular gender norms are maintained in the social, political and cultural structures in the region. Increasingly, migration has become extensively *feminised* (Crush et al.), and the question is how does the accumulation patterns in the region influence this change in migration and how does this affect the nature of *citizenship particularly* as women contest for belonging across the region. Magidimisha contends that although the region has a long history of migration the discourse about the 'feminisation of migration' is limited. Thus, beyond detailed discussions about migration patterns, limited work is done on what Ferguson and Mcnally (2015) call 'hyper-precarity'[26] and informality of gender issues in the migration debate. Migrant women are seen concentrated in the informal sectors of the economy, engaged in informal activities such as sex work and or in worst cases involved in sex work practices to make ends meat. It is within the foundations of this background that a gendered analysis of integration is given prominence in the volume, particularly in Magidimisha' chapter. Magidimisha further argues that gender aspects of migration are particularly important when it comes to citizenship. Women's issues are often on the back burner in serious debates about economic integration and often women bear the brunt of the violence as a result of migration. Because migrants who are not considered citizens with full rights may be denied access to services and care, they are often scapegoated, are trafficked and may face both subtle and overt forms of violence, including domestic violence and xenophobic attacks when economic and political conditions deteriorate in host countries.

The second part of the book entitled '*The Post-Colonial Political Economy of Development, Governance and Nation-State Formation*' pivots away from issues of conceptualisation and presents four contributions that unpack the political economy of development, governance and nation-state formation. This part presents evidence on particular countries and how sociocultural and political tensions have maintained, sanitised and idealised difference post-colonially. These key questions drive the analysis in the seven chapters and include current contestations around citizenship, belonging and identity formation in Southern Africa. Case studies of South Africa, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Swaziland, Lesotho and Zambia are discussed at length with regard to citizenship formation, marginalisation and xenophobia, migrant labour and development and the nexus between development conundrums and contested citizenship as a result of migration. Thus, how state practices and ideological constructions of belonging, (dis)placement and identity influence migration patterns and notions of social cohesion in the region.

The contribution by Moyo, Nshimbi and Gumbo entitled '*Migration, Logics of Inclusion and Exclusion, and Xenophobia: The Case of African Migrants in Post-apartheid South Africa*' brings to the foreground xenophobic tendencies and conditions in post-apartheid South Africa through a historical sketch and illumination

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[26]Ferguson and Mcnally (2015).

of the centrality of migration and debates on the logics of belonging, inclusion and exclusion. Such a historicity has not only bequeathed on post-apartheid South Africa a legacy of suspicion and stigmatisation of migrants from within and without the country but also suggests that South African society is in its own right fractured, with some implicit or explicit 'othering' on the basis of suspicion and fear of people who migrate. In the authors' view, this has provided a template for the exclusion of African migrants through the promotion of indigeneity and/or the reconfiguration of an exclusivist South African identity, which has elevated South Africanness and relegated migrants from other African countries to the subaltern, second and third classiness—a site for xenophobia. The African migrant is thus portrayed as a non-valuable member of the South African society who deserves interpellation and evisceration. On the other hand, South African authorities are faced with a dilemma: they find it difficult to acknowledge the reality of xenophobic hostilities against African migrants. Doing so would force them to accept that an underlying and continuing exclusivist narrative exists that runs contrary to South Africa's subscription and commitment to regional and continental bodies such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU), and the principles and ideals of these bodies on African peace and security, as well as to the African Renaissance project promoted by President Thabo Mbeki. According to Moyo et al., xenophobia contributes to the promotion of an exclusivist South African identity, which constructs African migrants as a threat, we question the approaches that have been adopted to try and resolve the xenophobic challenge and argue that the first real step towards dealing with xenophobia in South Africa does not so much rest in denouncing xenophobia in the strongest possible terms and engaging in marches that include ministers and top civil servants. Rather, the solution lies in engaging and investing in concerted efforts that 'clean up' the image of the African migrant.

Chipungu's contribution entitled '*Migrant Labour and Social Construction of Citizenship in Lesotho and Swaziland*' focuses on the relationship between South Africa, Swaziland and Lesotho, especially how migrant labour has contributed to economic development in South Africa.[27] The chapter argues that even though peripheral countries to South Africa served as labour reserves of various industries, colonial capitalism facilitated uneven development, through the establishment of economic nodes acting as the key locus of capital accumulation in a few countries. There has been increasing recognition during the last few decades that migration can be a factor in the promotion of international development with regard to an imperative exchange of money, knowledge and ideas between receiving and sending countries through migrants. In some countries, more than half of the local GDP come from remittances from migrants. In case of increase in unemployment rate or economic recession in the migrant-receiving country, the migrant-sending country's economy is directly affected. It also analyses the role of South African

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[27]AMP, (1997) Riding the Tiger: Lesotho Miners and Attitudes towards Permanent Residence in South Africa, May 1997.

capital interests in shaping the patterns of between South Africa and Lesotho and Swaziland. Thus, by analysing these historical relationships, it also contributes to a more transnational movement of labour and capital and how this is shaping development patterns.

Matsinhe, Khalema and Costumado's chapter entitled *'From Reservoir to Corridor: Changing Patterns of Migration in Mozambique'* advances an argument against the anachronistic notions of place and space in discussing cross-border movements of Mozambique nationals to South Africa. The argument put forward unpacks the manner in which the use of colonial identifications to describe migrants from Mozambique to South Africa by South Africans cements artificial notions of the "other" in official discourses. The first is the usual historical migration patterns of people, predominantly men, living in the land we now call 'Mozambique' to the land we now call 'South Africa'. Here, authors remind us of the blurred or hybrid identifications as a result of labour migration between South Africa and Mozambique. It maintains that Mozambique has been almost a 'labour reservoir' for South Africa; this changed during civil war in Mozambique and further subsequently shifted with the stability in Mozambique as South African capital marched into Mozambique.[28] Thus on one hand is the expansive penetration, almost unrestrained, of South African capital into Mozambique and at the same time there are deportations, detentions and exclusion of the Mozambique migrants in South Africa.

The contribution by Thulisile N. Mphambukeli and Nel Verna entitled *'Migration Marginalisation and Oppression in Mangaung, South Africa'* offers a case study of several areas of contestation around belonging and identity for migrants in the Grassland township in Mangaung in the Free State Province of South Africa. This last chapter in part two of the volume outlines how symbolic marginalisation and victimisation through symbolic citizenship and legitimate belonging (i.e. possession of a South African ID) leads to material exclusion and impacts the livelihoods of undocumented migrants from Lesotho and how this in turn perpetuates further marginalisation and xenophobic sentiments expressed both subtly through denial of access to basic social services and overtly through xenophobic violence and blatant discrimination. South African migrant policies do not favour or facilitate integration and assimilation since an identity document is the key to unlock success if you are a migrant; however, the process is very cumbersome. This makes it hard for migrants to fully participate in socio-economic activities. The chapter, therefore, directly deals with the question of *belonging and material improvement*—Matsinhe (2014), Neocosmos (2010), Landau (2015) and Koltz (2013)—they have systematically dealt with the question of the use of 'state apparatus' such as citizenship of the 'othering' of migrants. Viewing the systematic violence inflicted on the Basotho migrants as 'apartheid vertigo' or finding the roots of exclusion in 'xenophobic sentiments' has explanatory

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[28]SAMP (1998), 'Sons of Mozambique: Mozambican Miners and Post-Apartheid South Africa', July.

power.[29] It concludes by cautioning that the significant swelling number of African migrants in South African cities offers new challenges in access to resources as competition with locals leads to new forms of exclusion. In addition, it proposes attitudinal and policy change to address and redressing discrimination and promoter integration and belonging.

The third and final part of the book entitled '*Re-Imagining Migration, Citizenship, Identity Formation and Development*' centres the discussion on reimagining migration, citizenship and identity in the region understanding the complexities of the global development agenda. The penetration of the global capitalist mode of production on a world scale has hastened the process of globalisation that intensifies the flow of people, capital, information, goods and services across national boundaries. Globalisation further makes it (im)possible to economise the cost of production and distribution of capital by localising economic activities in different countries and taking full advantage of local labour and market conditions. The four contributions in this section focus on possibilities and new approaches in rethinking citizenship in the region and 'what must be done' by key players in the development quagmire.

The opening contribution in part three of the volume by Moyo and Nshimbi entitled '*Between Neoliberal Orthodoxy and Securitisation: Prospects and Challenges for a Borderless Southern African Community*' considers the possibility of a borderless Southern Africa—under the auspices of the Southern African Development Community (SADC)—by weighing SADC legislations and policies. Special attention is given to migration and corresponding legislations and policies of selected SADC member states. This is done against the realities and understandings of migration and contested notions of citizenship and development in Southern Africa. A thorough review of legislative and policy frameworks of different types of migration at the regional and national levels in Southern Africa (in view of the global and continental levels) is given and it posits that Southern Africa is characterised by open borders, with substantial formal and informal cross-border movements that have political and socio-economic costs. However, the most preferred destinations by migrants in the region have systematically opposed the establishment of a formal free-movement-of-people regime across the region for over 20 years. However, it cautions the orthodoxy of regional legislation and the realities of formal and informal movement across national borders in the SADC region, necessitating an establishment of a migration management regime devoid of borders. This, however, will have to be carefully crafted, fully considering the region's history, the challenges associated with migration to sending and receiving countries—brain drain, downward pressures on wages, frictions between migrants and locals, and benefits—remittances, satisfying skills shortages, a cohesive, integrated and developed region.

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[29]Matsinhe, David M, (2014) *Apartheid Vertigo*: *Unpacking Migration Discourses in South Africa*, Ashgate.

Magidimisha's contribution entitled '*Migration Policies in the Region: Thinking Beyond the Enclaved Political Economy*' assesses how SADC/Africa ought to deal with the current complexity of 'human mobility'. It specifically deals with the intractable question of how do countries and regional transnational bodies (SADC, etc.) craft migration policies which are related to the need for further integration. Thus, how do such policies look like? Additionally, it questions the extent Southern African 'states' can re-conceptualise and restructure the regional political economy in order to address questions of poverty and underdevelopment in the light of proposed controversial regional migration policies that centre around borderlessness and the possibilities of developing and implementing such policies in the region. Acknowledging a growing realisation in policy circles that the region (including South Africa) needs the continent (Murisa 2015), it also postulates on what states (institutionally) can do to sustain effective policies across the region. Thus, rethinking, re-interpreting and realigning triumphant 'liberation solidarities' that defeated colonialism as possible frameworks for regional citizenship and integration as well as tools to combat xenophobia and Afrophobia are discussed.

The contribution by Kanyane entitled '*Disaggregated Development: Between 'Trade Industrialisation and Migration'*' addresses a number of issues including regional industrialisation, regional integration and possibilities for disaggregated enclave economies in the region. According to Kanyane, development directives must address regional realities of unemployment, poverty and inequalities. Trade, migration and industrialisation should inform regional integration in his view. Diasporan entrepreneurial programmes are also needed to reinvest and channel innovative skills back into regional economies. This according to Kanyane requires regional political will and an economic system that is void of corruption and patronage but that nurtures, peace, security, economic and political stability and good governance.

The concluding contribution by Khalema et al. entitled '*In Pursuit of Regeneration and Integration in Southern Africa: Concluding Comments on Contemporary Challenges and Possibilities*' summarises seminal arguments discussed in all 13 contributions and offers concluding comments about the possibilities of regional regeneration and integration. This concluding contribution further builds an ambitious *imagining* framework, which re-inspires how the region can re-imagine citizenship moving forward. By focusing on citizen integration across borders, this contribution challenges the idea of the inside and the outside (of a nation, a society or a group) as an oversight in contemporary discussions on xenophobia and proposes instead a discourse which affirms historical examples of integration as a wellspring to addressing exclusion in the region. This overview is important because it posits that 'xenophobia' or what others have started calling 'Afrophobia' is not necessarily a South African invention. Key to this discussion is to unpack the contested nature of citizenship and the historical penetration of capital (human or otherwise) in Southern Africa. This chapter deepens the discussion on contested citizenship by highlighting how global forces of accumulation and in particular the *neoliberal turn* (Harvey 2005) entrenched patterns of inequality, dispossession to

(re)produce inequality in Southern Africa. It further problematises the notions of citizenship, identity and (dis)placement historically and in the contemporary particularly with the 'global' challenge of capital accumulation and its impact on human mobility, citizenship, identity formation and the tension generated in social relations. Broadly, this contribution offers a regional perspective on how the migration question could be understood and re-conceptualised.

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Decolonising Borders, Decriminalising Migration and Rethinking Citizenship

Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni

1 Introduction

Africa continues to be closed to itself and open to the rest of the world. This situation constitutes a major challenge to African mobilities. The challenge of African mobilities is in fact a product of a crisis of ideas about borders, nation, state, belonging and citizenship. The crisis emanates from reproduction of colonial thought by African political elites who inherited the colonial state. The very adoption of the principle of inviolability of colonially inherited borders at the time of formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 whilst accepted as pragmatic marked the beginning of reproduction of coloniality. This constituted the beginning of the problem of repetition without change born out of pitfalls of consciousness. Pitfalls of consciousness compromised political creativity and imagination by African leaders. The consequence of this was inheritance of Westphalian template of the nation-state and its imposition on an otherwise heterogeneous African socio-political context. This book is a most welcomed scholarly intervention on the fundamental question facing us as Africans today: that of what kind of Africa have we created since the dawn of political independence in which African mobility, belonging and citizenship remain a challenge. The unprecedented phenomenon of migration/mobility across postcolonial African borders implores us to rethink the very ideas of borders, nation, identity, state, belonging and citizenship in more flexible ways than colonialists and nationalists understood them in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.[1] The reality of an emerging

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[1]Laremont, Ricardo Rene. 2005. 'Borders, States, and Nationalism'. In Ricardo Rene Laremont (ed.). *Borders, Nationalism, and the African State*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 7.

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transnational Africanity (pan-African citizenship) must be taken seriously in African people's rethinking/decolonising colonially imposed boundaries. This will entail resolution of the tensions between narrow territorial nationalism and broader pan-Africanism. This is important because pan-Africanism is always undercut by realities of territorial nationalism and its state-centric and elite notions of security that criminalise African migration. But it is clear that pan-Africanism remains the only idea and template amenable to the African dream of creating a common pan-African identity. Therefore, what needs to be escalated today is African people's demands and claims for continental citizenship on the basis of pan-Africanism. There is urgent need to banish such colonially sounding, exclusionary and degrading terms like 'undesirable', 'alien', 'foreign' and 'illegal' Africans from our postcolonial vocabulary and from our dealings with fellow African people. In short, to deal effectively with the realities of African mobility, there is urgent need to transcend notions of narrow nationalism in our understanding of borders, nation, state, belonging and citizenship.

Africans have a clear precedent to follow. Apart from freedom of mobility and association in the pre-colonial era where the ideas of dodders and belonging were flexible and through the institution of the European Union (EU), Europeans have broken out of 'agoraphobia' (intense fear to open up borders). Europeans have practically opened up their borders to enable Europeans free movement. However, Europeans still maintain 'fortress Europe' for outsiders especially from the Global South. In Africa, the situation is the reverse. The continent is largely closed to itself, and open to the Europeans and North Americans as tourists, investors and experts.[2] Elaborating on this awkward African situation, the African anthropologist Francis B. Nyamnjoh noted that:

> Africans, the educated and skilled elite included, face stiff financial and bureaucratic hurdles in procuring visas to travel to other African countries. But the same visas are made readily available, at little to no cost, to Europeans and North Americans, who often deplete more than enhance the economies of the states they visit. Only the cream of the elite few, white and black, armed with additional hard passports from Western countries, can penetrate Africa with the privilege and ease of outsiders, much to the envy of colleagues and friends with only soft passports to show, and hardly any ill-gotten wealth to invest or launder.[3]

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[2]In various recent interviews on the African future, Achille has emphasised the need to Africa to open up to itself and allow movement of people across Africa and into Africa in a context where Europe was 'provincialising' itself. In one of the interviews, Mbembe had this to say: 'What strikes me is that Europe is also "provincializing." She makes things easier for us. We don't need to turn our back her, she turns her back on us herself. I have the impression that it is a profound movement that feeds on the myth of the community without foreigners. A desire for apartheid at a global scale. Europe is about to turn her back to the Kantian moment that will have founded her modernity and attractiveness. Africa mustn't turn her back to no one. She must open herself, open her borders and become a land of migration. We need to reflect at this point on how to include Chinese migrants among us. We have to open Africa. Welcome all those that come, integrate them. Retake the role Europe has played. Those educated people who don't find jobs in the United States or in Europe, those floating brains, they should come to Africa. Come to us.'

[3]Francis B. Nyamnjoh. 2006. *Insiders and Outsiders: Citizenship and Xenophobia in Contemporary Southern Africa*. Dakar and London: CODESRIA Books and ZED Books, p. 16.

This argument is not meant to dismiss the efforts that have been made by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) which has moved ahead by introducing a regional passport that enables West Africans to travel easily across the West African region. It is rather meant to highlight how resilient racial-colonial thought predicated on racial hierarchisation and classification of human population has been embraced by African people to the extent that it influences how postcolonial governments open and close borders for particular people in terms of migration. It also emphasises the fact that for the rest of Africa, the ideals of pan-Africanism remain part of political rhetoric, as African governments practically remain fixated with maintaining colonially inherited boundaries under the pretext of defence of hard-won national sovereignty and territorial integrity at one level and peace and security challenges on the other.[4] The irony, as noted by Nyamnjoh, is: 'Stiff visa regulations for fellow Africans are easily dropped for Westerners by African states that behave as though every mobile African is a political subversive or economic refugee.'[5]

It would seem hierarchies of humanity in accordance with race, nationality, class, culture and gender inform the practices at the borders of African postcolonial states. On the ground, the rising tide of terrorism in the form of Boko Haram in West Africa and Al-Shabab in North and East Africa; the fear of the spread of such diseases like Ebola, HIV/AIDS and yellow fever; and the perennial challenges of criminality, drug trafficking, piracy and cross-border conflicts such as the one bedevilling the Great Lakes region have been used as justification for tightening of borders rather than their relaxation.[6] Even the African Union (AU)'s article 4 (b) of its Constitutive Act upholds the old Organisation of African Unity (OAU) idea of inviolability of African borders. Even the African Union Border Programme (AUBP) was crafted within a context in which African borders were identified as 'a potent source of conflict and dispute, partly because of poor demarcation and the occurrence of strategic natural resources in border areas'.[7] It does not call for decolonisation of borders but for their effective management.

African leaders' understandable concerns about issues of conflict and security tend to always override ordinary people's popular demands for free movement across borders. The AUBP is still informed by the logic of state-centric and elite-driven notions of security and peace that demands consolidation of borders rather than rethinking them in a decolonial manner in which they become 'conduits and opportunities' rather than barriers to African mobility.[8] Inevitably, AUBP's

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[4]Even some of those celebrated anti-colonialists like President Robert Gabriel Mugabe of Zimbabwe who ascended to the African Union Chairmanship in 2014 are strong advocates of safeguarding national sovereignty that corresponds to colonially crafted boundaries.

[5]Nyamnjoh, *Insiders and Outsiders*, p. 33.

[6]Ikome, Francis Nguendi, 2012. 'Africa's International Borders as Potential Sources of Conflict and Future Threats to Peace and Security'. *Institute for Security Studies Paper No. 233*, pp. 1–14.

[7]Ikome, 'Africa's international Borders', p. 11.

[8]Paul Nugent and Anthony I. Asiwaju. eds. 1996. *African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits and Opportunities*. New York: Pinter.

emphasis is on the issues of border delimitation and demarcation and effective monitoring of borders in order to contain armed insurgents and terrorist organisations. At the centre of AUBP is the long-standing tension over the imperative of containment of conflict on the one hand and aspiration of deepening integration of the continent on the other.[9]

The crisis is today compounded by the absence of a visionary leadership driven by deep pan-African thought and the emergence of timid and narrow neoliberal managerialism, which emphasises effective management of borders rather than finding lasting solutions to the phenomenon of African migration within their continent. The foreword begins by articulating what it means to decolonise African postcolonial borders in its endeavour to highlight the ideational crisis, which makes it difficult for the postcolonial African leaders to think creatively and innovatively on how to deal with the challenge of African mobilities within the continent. It ends with a critical reflection on the current initiatives spearheaded by the AU in dealing with the challenges of African migration.

2   A Case for Decolonising African Borders

Decolonising African borders begins and entails asking hard questions capable of provoking a paradigm shift in understanding the purpose of postcolonial borders as well as new meanings of belonging and citizenship. The Nigerian Nobel Prize Laureate Wole Soyinka is one of the leading advocates of decolonisation of postcolonial borders as a solution to exclusivity. He described the borders as 'another bugbear of a continent'.[10] He pointed to the infamous Berlin Conference of 1884–1884 as the source of the problem, arguing that: 'It was there that Africa, a continent of so many cultures, precolonial trade patterns, and development traditions, was shared piecemeal among western powers, with no consideration for their histories, languages, and economic linkages.'[11] Soyinka blamed postcolonial African leaders for failing 'to tackle in a systematic way' the 'consequences of this quilt work'.[12]

Soyinka then posed hard questions of rootedness of some postcolonial conflicts in imposed colonial borders and viability of postcolonial national entities in the context of present realities as part of his motivation for re-examination of postcolonial borders. His logic is that borders should be 'revisited with a view to ascertain where precisely lies the will of the people themselves, acting in

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[9]See statement of the African Union Executive Council 14th Ordinary Session, 'Report on the Commission on the Implementation of Africa Border Programme'. Addis Ababa: African Union, 29–30 January, p. 12.

[10]Wole Soyinka. 2012. *Of Africa*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, p. 10.

[11]Soyinka, *Of Africa*, p. 10.

[12]Soyinka, *Of Africa*, p. 10.

freedom'.[13] Soyinka questioned whether consolidation of borders and clinging to the notion of their inviolability served African popular interests, concluding that a radical decolonisation of borders 'will surely lead to a reexamination of the problem of exclusivity'.[14]

Building on the ideas posed by Soyinka, it is clear that it is no longer possible in the context of the challenges of migration/mobility for African governments to continue clinging to the OAU (now AU) principle of inviolability of colonially crafted boundaries. The increasing migration of Africans across borders is a clear indication to the African leaders that they have remained behind in their thinking about borders. Accelerated mobility also challenges the ill-conceived notions of bounded citizenship. The challenge is how to re-conceptualise borders, nation, state, citizenship and belonging in the context of a mobile African population.

This means that decolonisation of borders must entail a deeper rethinking about what Nyamnjoh terms 'a flexible citizenship unbounded by race, ethnicity, class, gender or geography, and that is both conscious and critical of hierarchies that make a mockery of the juridico-political regime provided by the coercive illusion of the nation-state'.[15] This new thinking is very urgent in a context where ideas of homogenous nation-state and bounded citizenship have proven to easily degenerate into ultra-nationalism, chauvinism, racism, tribalism, nativism and xenophobia.[16] For Africa, this means that African leaders must hark back to what Crawford Young described as 'the first form of ideological expression of African identity' which is 'pan-Africanism'.[17] It is a transnational ideology of solidarity amenable to pan-African citizenship as a form of horizontal African comradeship.

At the moment, decolonisation of African borders has generally taken two forms. Decolonisation of borders begins with rethinking the purpose of postcolonial borders but proceeds to challenge the very notions of the nation-state and its ideas of bounded citizenship (rigid juridical-political regimes of rights and entitlements limited to those considered to be insiders only). Decolonisation of postcolonial borders must begin with an 'epistemological disobedience' to borrow Walter Mignolo's terminology towards seamless importation and imposition of Western ideas of nation, citizenship and the very conceptions of modern community on Africa.[18]

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[13]Soyinka, *Of Africa*, p. 12.

[14]Soyinka, *Of Africa*, p. 12.

[15]Nyamnjoh, *Insiders and Outsiders,* p. 240.

[16]Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni. 2013. 'Is Nativism a National Question in Postcolonial Africa?' In Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Finex Ndhlovu (eds.). *Nationalism and National Projects in Southern Africa: New Critical Reflections*. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, pp.60–83. See also Nyamnjoh, *Insiders and Outsiders*, pp. 240–241.

[17]Crawford Young. 2012. *The Postcolonial State in Africa: Fifty Years of Independence, 1960–2010*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, p. 293.

[18]Walter D. Mignolo, 2013. 'Geopolitics of Sensing and Knowing: On (De)coloniality, Border Thinking, and Epistemic Disobedience'. *Confero*, 1(1), pp. 129–150. See also Parther Chatterjee. 1993. *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 13.

Ali A Mazrui identified two forms of revision of postcolonial borders in Africa. The first form is that of intensification of ethnic self-determination resulting in creation of new smaller states like Eritrea and South Sudan.[19] This form of 'decolonisation' seems to gesture towards what John L. Comaroff and Jean Comaroff termed 'ethno-futures' born out of what Peter Geschiere depicted as 'perils of belonging' producing autochthonous and exclusivist notions of belonging and citizenship.[20] But the popularly cited example of Eritrea reveals the limits of ethnic self-determination as a form of decolonisation of colonially imposed borders because 'the act of secession amounted to a return to an alternative set of colonial boundaries, namely those of the former Italian possession'.[21] This form of 'decolonising' of boundaries seems not to help in alleviating the problem of migration/mobility simply because it is not informed by any new decolonial thought.

The second form is in the direction of regional integration in the process creating larger political and economic unions such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Inter-Governmental Authority (IGAD), East African Community (EAC) and other regional economic communities.[22] This form of decolonising borders sounds progressive but is entangled with resilient territorial nationalism, which constantly undercuts efforts aimed at implementing pan-Africanism. The consequences of this have been a painstakingly slow pace of regional integration compounded by high levels of cynicism and reluctance by some members of economic communities to ratify and implement such protocols as one on free movement of people. In the SADC region, for example, uneven development makes South Africa as the most preferred destiny of migration to continue tightening its visa regime making entry into the country more cumbersome particularly for African people.[23]

These two forms of decolonising borders identified by Mazrui are not informed by any paradigm shift on borders, nationalism, nation, state, belonging, sovereignty and citizenship. European cognitive systems and models of ordering political spaces are still upheld by African leaders and policy-makers.[24] This is simply

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[19]Mazrui, Ali. A. 1994. 'The Bondage of Boundaries'. *IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin*, April, pp. 60–63. See also Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. and Mhlanga, Brilliant. (eds.). 2013. *Bondage of Boundaries and Identity Politics in Postcolonial Africa: The 'Northern Problem' and Ethno-Futures*. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa.

[20]Comaroff, John. L. and Comaroff, Jean. 2009. *Ethnicity, Inc*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; and Geschiere, Peter. 2009. *The Perils of Belonging: Autochthony, Citizenship and Exclusion in Africa and Europe*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

[21]Nugent, Paul and Asiwaju, Anthony I. 1996. 'Conclusion: The Future of African Boundaries'. In Paul Nugent and Anthony I. Asiwaju (eds.). *African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits and Opportunities*. New York: Printer, p. 286.

[22]Mazrui, Ali. A. 1994. 'The Bondage of Boundaries'. *IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin*, April, pp. 60–63.

[23]In 2014, the South African government revised its visa regimes making it more difficult to obtain them even for the skilled professionals.

[24]Nugent, Paul and Asiwaju, Anthony I. 1996. 'Introduction: The Paradox of African Boundaries'. In Paul Nugent and Anthony I. Asiwaju (eds.), *African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits and Opportunities*. New York: Pinter, p. 2.

because they are benefiting politically from retention of colonially inherited borders within which they often act as monarchs who own and control territory and people within a clearly defined space. Postcolonial African leaders also use colonially inherited borders in accordance with what Frederick Cooper (2000) termed 'gate-keeping' involving collection of revenue.[25]

A paradigm shift is desperately needed because colonial borders were informed by the imperial/colonial logic of avoiding conflict amongst imperial/colonial powers as well as demarcation of competing spheres of colonial authority as demanded by the context of the scramble and partition of Africa and the Berlin consensus cascading from the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885. Paul Nugent and Anthony I. Asiwaju elaborated that: 'The objective was to classify populations in order to govern them. The frontier mattered because it defined which peoples belonged to which colonial state.'[26] Added to this, borders became 'an instrument for the enforcement of colonial policy'.

The logic behind the demarcation of borders under colonial rule was 'quasi-mercantilist'.[27] Colonial African borders were designed to meet colonial economic and strategic objectives. It was within the demarcated and delimited colonial borders that colonial ideologues such as Lord Lugard and others engaged in what Mahmood Mamdani rendered in terms of 'define and rule' as part of imperial/colonial mission of producing 'subjects' and 'citizens'.[28] What is not clear is whether African leaders sitting at a meeting in Addis Ababa in 1963 deliberated on the new purpose of borders before agreeing on the principle of their inviolability. It is clear from the historical record that by 1963 Kwame Nkrumah and the Casablanca Bloc were pushing for radical decolonisation of borders so as to produce pan-African unity whereas the Monrovia and Brazzaville Blocs remained steeped in defence of territorial nationalism and arguing for a gradualist approach towards pan-African unity.[29] To Nkrumah, political union of Africa had to be the first step taken by African leaders as he strongly believed that:

> A loose confederation of economic co-operation is deceptively time delaying. It is only a political union that will ensure uniformity in our foreign policy projecting the African personality and presenting Africa as a force important to reckon with. I repeat, a loose economic co-operation means a screen behind which detractors, imperialist and colonialist

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[25]Cooper, Frederick. 2002. *Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[26]Nugent and Asiwaju, 'Introduction', p. 2.

[27]Nugent and Asiwaju, 'Introduction', p. 3.

[28]Mamdani, Mahmood. 2013. *Define and Rule: Native as Political Identity*. Johannesburg: Wits University Press. See also Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

[29]Kwesi Kwaa Prah. 2006. *The African Nation: The State of the Nation*. Cape Town: The Centre for Advanced Studies of African Society.

protagonists and African puppet leaders hide behind to operate and weaken the concept of any effort to realize African unity and independence.[30]

To Nkrumah, African union was not an impossibility; rather, it was 'not only an opportunity but a historic duty'.[31] But others like Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria countered Nkrumah's ideas of creating a political union as the first priority and argued for economic and social integration as the essential prerequisites for political union (United States of Africa). Azikiwe posited that:

> It would be capital folly to assume that hard-bargaining politicians who passed through the ordeal of victimization and the crucible of persecution to win their political independence will easily surrender their newly won political power in the interest of a political leviathan which is populated by people who are alien to one another in their social and economic relations. [. . .]. I reiterate that I firmly believe in the attainment of an association or union of African states either on a regional or continental basis in the future. I would regard such a future as not within the life-time of the heroes and heroines who have spearheaded the struggle for freedom in Africa, these four decades [. . .]. In other words, the pre-requisite of political integration in Africa are the economic and social integration of African peoples.[32]

Due to these disagreements amongst African leaders, a great opportunity to redesign African political future was lost. This is why Kwesi Kwaa Prah posited that: 'Nationalist concerns had by the 1960s and 1970s been reduced to parochial interests and limited *etatiste* preoccupations. The larger and wider, earlier African frames of reference were geographically and politically scaled down.'[33] The colonial design of Africa that was imposed violently by colonial powers survived with very slight changes. African leaders' thinking about African future became entrapped in shallow anti-colonial discourse which did not translate into deep decolonisation of cognitive systems, institutions and structures of power to produce a new humanity with rights of free movement on the continent. This awkward situation emerged largely because:

> African nationalism as a manifestation of African assertiveness and political awakening in the era of colonialism tended to be organizationally captured within the specific colonial territories and borders as determined by the colonial powers. Thus when we make reference to Congolese nationalism, Nigerian nationalism, Kenyan nationalism or Zambian nationalism we are historically referring to the specific exposition of this self-assertiveness for political independence within the context of a given colonial state.[34]

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[30]Quoted in Hans Kohn and Wallace Sokolsky. 1965. *African Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Van Nostrand Company, Inc., p. 179. See also Kwesi Kwaa Prah. 2003. 'The Wish to Unite: The Historical and Political Context of the Pan-African Movement'. In Mammo Muchie (ed.), *The Making of the Africa-Nation: Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance*. London: Adonis and Abbey Publishers Ltd, pp. 13–39.

[31]Kwame Nkrumah. 1963. *Africa Must Unite*. London: PANAF, p. 231.

[32]Nnamdi Azikiwe. 1961. *Selected Speeches of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[33]Prah, 'The Wish to Unite: The Historical and Political Context of the Pan-African Movement', p. 16.

[34]Prah, 'The Wish to Unite: The Historical and Political Context of the Pan-African Movement', pp. 13–14.

The fathers of postcolonial African states as noted by Prah were 'a carefully groomed elite, faithful to "his master's voice", beliefs and tastes'.[35] In short, this situation opened space for the immanent logic of colonialism to interpellate African nationalism to the extent that it gradually became antagonist to pan-Africanism. This reality led cultural theorist Kuan-Hsing Chen to posit that:

> Shaped by the immanent logic of colonialism, Third World nationalism could not escape from reproducing racial and ethnic discrimination; a price to be paid by the colonizer as well as the colonized selves.[36]

In a postcolonial context that remained shaped by the immanent logic of colonialism, Africanity as a form of pan-African citizenship failed to emerge. For example, the African elites of the former French empire, as noted by Prah, 'were severely smitten by francophilia, and were still too happy to sing the *Marseillaise* and hang on to the political apron-strings of France'.[37] These disappointing realities provoke one to delve even deeper into African nationalism and anti-colonialism as the discursive terrain within which postcolonial troubles including that of African mobilities are rooted. This point was raised by Basil Davidson in his celebrated work *The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State*:

> So an analysis of Africa's troubles has also to be an enquiry into the process—the process, largely, of nationalism—that has crystallized the division of Africa's many hundreds of peoples and cultures into a few dozen nation-states, each claiming sovereignty against the others, and all of them sorely in trouble.[38]

The 'black man's burden' according to Davidson was that of thoughtless borrowing of Western ideas, institutions and templates in the design of postcolonial Africa, particularly the importation of the Westphalian nation-state template. He lamented how Africans ignored their own history, values and cultures in the design of postcolonial Africa. If African leaders had grounded their postcolonial institutional designs and political practices on African heritage, values and cultures, they would have restored the dignity and ontology of African people. Mimicry as defined by Homi Bhabha became the order of postcolonial institution-building and political practice in Africa.[39] The design of postcolonial Africa and political practice commenced in accordance with what Frantz Fanon termed 'repetition without change'.[40] The postcolonial state became an imposition on society. As noted by Liisa Laakso and Adebayo Olukoshi, there was a fatal flaw in the conception of both the state and the nation:

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[35]Prah, 'The Wish to Unite: The Historical and Political Context of the Pan-African Movement', p. 17.

[36]Kuan-Hsing Chen. 1988. 'Introduction: The Decolonization Question'. In Kuan-Hsing Chen (ed.). *Trajectories: Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*. London: Routledge, p. 14.

[37]Prah, *The African Nation*, p. 7.

[38]Basil Davidson. 1992. *The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation State*. Oxford: James Currey, p. 13.

[39]Homi Bhabha. 1994. *The Location of Culture*. London: Routledge.

[40]Frantz Fanon. 1968. *The Wretched of the Earth*. New York: Groove Press.

However, at the heart of the modern nation-state project was the idea, flawed from the outset, of tight correspondence between the nation and the state whereby each sovereign state was seen as a nation-state of people who shared a common language or culture [...]. This notion of the nation-state stood in direct contradiction to the reality that most states were, in fact, multi-cultural, multi-lingual and multi-religious and that not all ethnic groups (however defined) were sufficiently large or powerful or even willing to achieve a state of their own.[41]

At the centre of this conception of the state and the nation is what Francis B. Nyamnjoh rendered as 'insiders' and 'outsiders' in the articulation of citizenship and belonging.[42] The generous and inclusive notions of citizenship that were forming during the halcyon years of anti-colonial struggles where citizenship was perceived as a unifying notion underpinned by deeper liberatory and pan-African ethos have been replaced by what Michael Neocosmos termed 'citizenship in the post-colony which is now founded on a notion of indigeneity and is essentially exclusive'.[43] It is not a citizenship that is popular but one enforced by the postcolonial state. Migration/mobility in this state-centric conception of citizenship is criminalised.[44] This is why we are facing the challenge of African mobility, which is supposed to have been solved long ago if the founding fathers and mothers of the postcolonial states had creatively and imaginatively rethought the purpose of borders, nation, state, citizenship and belonging.

3   A Case for Free Movement of Africans

Whilst it is true that there are no ready-made and easy ways of imagining a postcolonial future unencumbered by the legacy of colonialism and reality of global coloniality, African leaders cannot be forgiven for choosing timidity, which entails embracing the status quo of colonially crafted borders together with its logics of exclusion and fragmenting African people. For a people emerging from brutal colonial rule and its epistemological as well as ideological logics, the best path for African leaders was to engage in radical liberatory experimentation aimed at re-creating Africans as new human beings endowed with freedom of movement within their continent. This requires a paradigm shift in ideas of borders, nation,

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[41]Liisa Laakso and Adebayo Olukoshi. 1996. 'The Crisis of the Post-Colonial Nation-State Project in Africa'. In Adebayo A. Olukoshi and Liisa Laakso (eds.), *Challenges to the Nation-State in Africa*. Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, pp. 11–12.

[42]Nyamnjoh, *Insiders and Outsiders*.

[43]Michael Neocosmos. 2010. *From 'Foreign Natives' to 'Native Foreigners': Explaining Xenophobia in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Citizenship and Nationalism, Identity and Politics*. Dakar: CODESRIA Books, p. 10.

[44]Neocosmos, From 'Foreign Natives' to 'Native Foreigners', p. 66. He made reference to how the post-apartheid state criminalised migrant labour and preserved jobs for nationals.

state, citizenship and belonging free from easy borrowings from the West and free from invisible matrices of coloniality.

A decolonial appreciation of African history and heritage provides answers on how to decriminalise migration as well as how to move forward towards free movement of Africans within the continent. As noted by Achille Mbembe, African conceptions of humanity such as *Ubuntu* offer possibilities out of the *cul-de-sac* of rigid nation-states and notions of bounded citizenship which result in criminalisation of migration creating the challenge of mobility in postcolonial Africa.[45] Mbembe meticulously identified and distilled three core components of life cascading from pre-colonial African cultural history that are different from Western ideas of borders, nation, state, citizenship and belonging. The first one is the logic of *multiplicity* as a dynamo of pre-colonial life.[46] This logic and way of life was destroyed by what Mbembe rendered as colonial 'monotheistic paradigm'/ 'paradigm of "the one"' exemplified by the notion of one God.[47] Mbembe elaborated that 'One of the tragedies of colonialism has been to erase that element of multiplicity which was a resource of social development in pre-colonial Africa.'[48]

The long-term consequence of this paradigm of 'the one' has been the notorious idea of correspondence between one nation and one state in a postcolonial African context of heterogeneity and multiplicity. If Mbembe's concept of multiplicity is taken seriously, it enables Africans to leverage values from their past and utilise those to re-imagine plurinational nations founded on interculturality. Such plurinational formations would be amenable to inclusion of migrants as citizens. In a plurinational state, individuals would be rights-bearing beings 'not only in virtue of their citizenship within the state, but in the first place in virtue of their humanity'.[49] The principle of multiplicity made pre-colonial societies to be 'historically well equipped to embrace and absorb strangers' which in the present case would be migrants.[50] The historian Paul S. Landau argued that:

> Hybridity lay at the core of their subcontinental political traditions. Nineteenth-century European newcomers were different and attempted to repudiate mixing, politically and otherwise, albeit with partial success. It was they who characterized, or mis-characterized, Africans as perennial *tribesmen*.[51]

It would seem, therefore, that the racist, tribalistic and xenophobic postcolonial African who is not accommodative of fellow African migrants is a product of

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[45]Achille Mbembe. 2013. 'Africa and the Future: An Interview with Achille Mbembe' in http://africaasacountry.com/africa-and-the-future-an-interview-with-achille-mbembe/ (accessed 10/03/2015).

[46]Achille Mbembe. 'Africa and the Future', p. 10.

[47]Achille Mbembe. 'Africa and the Future', p. 10.

[48]Mbembe, 'Africa and the Future', p. 10.

[49]Seyla Benhabib. 2011. *Dignity in Diversity*. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 23.

[50]Paul S. Landau. 2010. *Popular Politics in the History of South Africa, 1400–1948*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. xi.

[51]Landau, *Popular Politics in the South African History*, p. xi.

colonialism rather than African pre-colonial history. The making of this rather dangerous postcolonial African is well articulated by Mahmood Mamdani: 'the native is the creation of the colonial state: colonized, the native is pinned down, localized, thrown out of civilization as an outcast, confined to custom, and then defined as its product.'[52]

The second important element identified by Mbembe is that of *circulation and mobility*.[53] The implication of this is that Africa was never static and closed, it was mobile. Mbembe elaborated that 'Almost everything was on the move'.[54] One good example of circulation and migration in pre-colonial Africa is that of the so-called Bantu peoples from Western-Central Africa towards the South resulting in creations of new socio-political formations. It was colonialism that enclosed African people into their individual colonial possessions that became known as colonies.

Mbembe is correct to say: 'so that concept of circulation is something that can also be mobilized to show what it was that came from this experience.'[55] Criminalisation of migration is not rooted in pre-colonial African history and culture. If postcolonial Africa would hark back to this noble principle of circulation and mobility as a long-standing African characteristic that was only disturbed by colonial impositions and its logics of power, then current African mobilities would not be viewed as a new problem that require consolidation of postcolonial borders rather than integration of migrants into host countries.

The last element distilled by Mbembe is that of *composition*.[56] The concept highlights the African agency of self-creation, designing institutions and formulation of ideas in the context of working with others. It also highlights community-making beginning with the very idea of being (ubuntu) which was always rendered in relation to others in a context of ethical interaction with others. Mbembe elaborates that in the principle of composition in Africa 'the other is not outside of myself.'[57] These three elements if taken seriously provide an opportunity to rethink the purpose of borders, nation, state, citizenship and belonging, since they contradict the principles of multiplicity, mobility and composition as constituent elements of Africanity.

Africanity as a pan-African citizenship is possible in a postcolonial Africa where multiplicity, mobility and composition are taken as a departure point in institutional design and political practice. Africanity as a pan-African citizenship has to be invented not along the epistemological and intellectual resources borrowed from

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[52]Mahmood Mamdani. 2013. *Define and Rule: Native as Political Identity*. Johannesburg: Wits University Press, pp. 2–3.

[53]Mbembe, 'Africa and the Future', p. 15.

[54]Mbembe, 'Africa and the Future', p. 15.

[55]Mbembe, 'Africa and the Future', p. 15.

[56]Mbembe, 'Africa and the Future', p. 15.

[57]Mbembe, 'Africa and the Future', p. 15.

the West but based on those values that made Africa tick. This is why Prah emphasised that:

> Becoming African, in effect, requires an acceptance of a cultural stake in the cultural world of Africans. In other words, one cannot become African while rejecting the cultural and historical baggage of Africans. One cannot become African while despising Africans. One cannot become African while rebuffing and denying the African identity. [. . .]. Being an African is therefore an inclusive idea and process. Africans exist and are also in the making.[58]

Having defined becoming African, Prah went on to raise two important ways in which the question of borders could be dealt with. The first is that since African ethnocultural groups straddled several borders, there was a need to create 'democratic, institutional forms which allow the expression of interest across borders without negating or colliding headlong with the realities of existing states'.[59] The second point from Prah is that 'we would need to allow the development of Pan-African institutions and understanding which allow the people of Africa to relate more freely and democratically across existing borders without necessarily denying the realities of the present map of Africa'.[60]

4   Re-membering Africa

Colonialism and its logics of power resulted in a process that the novelist Ngugi wa Thiong'o described as *dismembering* of Africa.[61] Fragmentation of Africa through partitioning and creating of colonies was one of the most visible forms of dismembering of Africa. But dismembering was also carried through epistemicides (destruction and appropriation of African knowledge as well as whitewashing of African memory). *Re-membering* is, therefore, a core aspect of decolonisation predicated on revitalisation of African memory and Renaissance after a long process of *dismembering* in which African past and memory was distorted, disfigured and destroyed as part of a broader imperial/colonial designs to submit the rest of the world to European memory.[62]

In short, the concepts of *dismembering* and *re-membering* speak to the challenge of *fragmentation* and the quest for *wholeness* in postcolonial Africa.[63] The suffering African migrant is a signifier of the legacy of fragmentation. To deal effectively

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[58]Prah, *The African Nation*, pp. 17–18.

[59]Prah, *The African Nation*, p. 21.

[60]Prah, *The African Nation*, p. 21.

[61]Ngugi wa Thiong'o 2009. *Re-Membering Africa*. Nairobi/Kampala/Dar es Salaam: East African Educational Publishers Ltd.

[62]Ngugi wa Thiong'o, *Re-Membering Africa,* p. 4. See also Valentine Y. Mudimbe. 1994. *The Idea of Africa*. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, p. xii.

[63]Ngugi wa Thiongo, *Re-Membering Africa*, p. 22.

with the challenge of mobility, Africa needs to hark back to the various African initiatives that Ngugi wa Thiong'o has termed as 're-membering visions'.[64] These range from Ethiopianism, Garveyism, Negritude, African Personality, African Humanism, Black Consciousness, Pan-Africanism and Afrocentricity to the African Renaissance. According to Ngugi wa Thiong'o, all these initiatives were concerned with the quest for wholeness—'a quest that has underlain African struggles since the Atlantic slave trade'.[65]

At the centre of these 're-membering visions' is the composition and articulation of 'the idea of Africa' as a form of 'self-representation' and a 'quest for freedom on a Pan-African scale extended from the diaspora to the continent and back again'[66] Re-membering visions and their ideas of Africa gestured towards what Ngugi wa Thiong'o termed 'Afro-modernity' predicated on decolonisation (leading Africa out of the dark ages of colonial empire and into the era of African enlightenment).[67] In line with the quest for Afro-modernity and deepening of re-membering vision, Mbembe posited that:

> The ultimate challenge, however, is for Africa to become its own centre. In order for Africa to become its own centre, it will need, [. . .] to demilitarize its politics as a precondition for the democratization of its economy. The continent will have to become a vast regional space of circulation which means that it will have to dismantle its own internal boundaries, open itself up to the new forms of migration, internal as well as external, as we see happening, to a certain extent in Mozambique and Angola where some Portuguese are coming back. As Europe closes its borders, Africa will have to open its borders. So it seems to me that only in becoming that vast space of circulation that Africa might benefit positively from current geopolitical reconfiguration of the world that is going on.[68]

The challenge is that this vision of Africa as a vast centre is proposed at a time when the forces of 're-membering Africa' have suffered a major blow. This blow is well-articulated by Ngugi wa Thiongo in the following revealing words: 'The Pan-Africanism that envisaged the ideal of wholeness was gradually cut down to the size of the continent, then a nation, a region, an ethnos, a clan, and even a village in some instances.'[69] It is within this context that an African migrant becomes a problem within the African continent. The urgent task is therefore to escalate the 're-membering visions' to the pan-African level once more with a view to create a new African who is will never be 'foreigner', 'alien' or 'undesirable' person within the African continent. Africa is far from this reality of creating a new Africanity that is enjoying pan-African citizenship.

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[64]Ngugi wa Thiongo, *Re-Membering Africa*, p. 23.

[65]Ngugi wa Thiongo, *Re-Membering Africa*, p. 25.

[66]Mudimbe rendered 'the idea of Africa' as a product of Europe's system of self-representation through creation of otherness. I am using 'the idea of Africa' in the way Ngugi wa Thiong'o rendered it as 'African representation' cascading from the diaspora and travelling back into the continent. See Ngugi wa Thiongo, *Re-Membering Africa*, p. 54.

[67]Ngugi wa Thiongo, *Re-Membering Africa*, p. 57.

[68]Mbembe, 'Africa and the Future', p. 8.

[69]Ngugi wa Thiongo, *Re-Membering Africa*, p. 61.

Magidimisha et al.'s book speaks directly to how the AU and the regional economic communities like SADC and ECOWAS carry the burden of continuing with the 're-membering visions' including dealing with the topical question of postcolonial African mobilities within a context where territorial nationalism is still strong and is still propping up the colonially crafted borders. Inevitably, mobility of Africans is still part of criminalised activities. The criminalisation has heightened in the context of concerns about stability, peace and security. These concerns continue to undercut the ideas of free movement of African people within the continent. The very fact that the AU as a successor to the OAU upheld the principle of inviolability of African borders indicates that there is very slow movement in terms of implementation of a pan-Africanism that is capable of producing Africanity that enjoys pan-African citizenship and transnational horizontal comradeship.

The AUBP also seems to be bifurcated by the spirit of containment of conflicts and reduction of the burden imposed on the people by borders. Consequently, the postcolonial borders have not yet been transformed from obstacles to people's movement to bridges facilitating movement of people. Uneven economic development is another obstacle to the implementation of the protocols on free movement of people. The relatively developed and economically advanced states like South Africa in the SADC region are nervous of being overwhelmed my migrants from poor African states if it relaxed its border regime. The thinking about borders in postcolonial Africa seems to be also informed more by economic imperatives than humanistic ethos. This is why it is easy for capital and goods to move across borders than people. This same thinking rooted in mercantilist colonial thought is one that makes Africa open to people coming from Western capitals whilst remaining closed to its own inhabitants.

An epistemological paradigm shift from colonial thought, and from importation of ideas from the West as part of a move towards decolonisation of borders. It demonstrated that there are African values cascading from pre-colonial Africa that are more suited to anchor postcolonial 're-membering visions.' The principles of multiplicity, mobility and composition are more amenable to pan-Africanism than Westphalian notions of nation-state and its conceptions of bounded citizenship. It is only after this paradigm shift that African leaders would develop a less negative rendition of migration and see it as an opportunity. The paradigm shift proposed is described as a form of decolonisation because it entails rethinking the purpose of borders, meaning of nation and state as well as criteria of citizenship and belonging in the context of African mobility. Africans have to outgrow the habit of repetition without change and engage in radical experimentation as part of creating their future.

Uneven Development and Conflict in Southern Africa: Interrogating the Patterns and Accumulation Processes

Calvin Nengomasha and Hangwelani Hope Magidimisha

1 Introduction

In human history, cities have always been the centre of commerce. Historic improvements in food security, transport, communication and technology have rapidly transformed cities into drivers of national economies. Cities are witnessing remarkable economic growth powered by relative political stability, comparative advantage and ambitious capitalist ideas. Unfortunately, the high levels of economic growth did not result in human development. Any attempts to address the resulting inequalities were cosmetic. In reality, what they were proposing were two faces of the same coin. The strategies driving such levels of economic growth were not discarded but were fine-tuned to allow the gradual integration of economic, political and social space across national borders.

Development has occurred at varying pace in different regions on the foundation of unequal share of resources, opportunities and benefits. As a result, the processes of accumulation, production, distribution and consumption of resources have been altered to allow easy and free movement of labour, goods and services, information and technology across borders. Such changes only benefited politically and economically privileged elites who are reaping the benefits of economic growth whilst ruthlessly exploiting and excluding millions of the disenfranchised urban poor and denying them the prospect of a dignified and productive life. More and more poor Africans are forced to migrate to better performing economies as a sheer survival strategy or because their living environments are defined by civil conflicts over land, minerals and energy resources. Unfortunately, the countries they immigrate to are struggling to create opportunities and resolve increasing inequalities. Out of

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frustration with the slow pace of economic and land reforms, native Africans are increasingly resorting to riots over poor service delivery, labour strikes over low wages, land invasions to gain access to well-located affordable urban land and xenophobic attacks on foreigners.

Considering the way in which resources are being allocated in South Africa and Zimbabwe, it is unquestionable that the war for survival has only got more intense momentum in the last two decades. This chapter argues that persisting inequalities in urban welfare are likely to intensify conflicts over resource allocation, accumulation and authority. Some may find fault in the way resources are allocated in a market especially since the market presents more challenges than opportunities. Nearly all private actions or public policies can be justified in some way as a response to the effects of development, be they positive or negative, real or perceived (Veseth 1998). A plethora of scholars, political analysts and other gurus in the development discourse have expressed divergent and dissenting views regarding the effects of unequal allocation of resources at individual, national and regional level. Hence, this chapter predominantly takes a critical look at the capitalist view on resource allocation.

2 The Development Debate

Different scholars define development in several ways depending on whether they view it as a state, a condition or a process of change. Scholarly views of what is development differ largely because the economic or social forces shaping this process of change are influenced by varying local conditions and contexts. Smith (2010) is of the view that variations in local conditions everywhere have ensured that development occurs at different levels, and therefore, what people perceive as development differs from place to place and with time. Hence, the chapter tries to represent different views and perspectives of development in a balanced fashion. Further, the chapter provides an overview of trends in thinking about development issues since the end of World War II. We begin by generally defining development as the outcome of any human activity on, above or under any piece of land. These human activities in the modern era have been motivated largely by economic gain; hence, perceptions on development initially had an economic bias.

During the late 1940s to the early 1960s, modernisation theorists such as Myrdal (1958), Friedmann (1967), Hirschman (1958) and Perroux (1955) considered development to be synonymous with economic growth. Their perception of development was based on the level of economic growth measured by GDP or GNP per capita (Sen 1988). These scholars believed that economic 'development' would occur in stages with some regions developing first, but only if individuals in society changed their social, psychological and political behaviour and values to become wealth oriented and profit seeking. They also believed that development would only occur if individuals in society modernised and abandoned their subsistence lifestyle

(Sachs 2008). However, the success of this approach to development was judged ultimately in terms of how it advanced the lives of the majority of people.

During the 1970s, perceptions of development based on economic growth indicators were criticised by dependency theorists such as Frank (1967), Cardoso (1972), Rodney (1972) and others who disagreed with both the stages and structural change models. They offered a broader interpretation of development arguing that it should be humane, endogenous and focusing more on promoting self-reliance and meeting basic needs. Todaro (1983) argued that development is not purely an economic phenomenon but rather a multidimensional process of reorganising and reorienting the entire economic, social and political system to improve the quality of all human lives. Relatively high levels of urban poverty and inequality were persistently affecting those who are highly marginalised in cities experiencing remarkable levels of economic growth. According to Claessens and Perotti (2007), access to natural and financial resources, economic opportunities and benefits were distributed on unequal terms. Those without access to capital were being left behind by the train of economic growth. Hence, the perception that economic growth is synonymous with development was strongly refuted. There was no tangible evidence proving that economic benefits were indeed trickling down to those marginalised and poverty stricken. Scholars such as Todaro and Smith (2006) provided evidence that crystallised the view that economic growth was not synonymous with human development. Todaro and Smith (2003) considered economic growth to be part of development if it leads to a fair increase in average income and political freedom and meets basic needs. Supporters of the basic needs approach argued that development should be measured[1] by the level of access people had to employment, education and skill training, housing, nutrition, health and sanitation. Todaro and Smith (2006) believed development strategies were not focusing more on addressing these 'old-fashioned' problems.

The process of distributing economic, land and housing opportunities was unfair and it denied the poor a chance to advance in life. Even though focus on development had turned towards meeting basic needs, dependency theorists argued that focus should be instead on the mode of production that would redistribute wealth to meet basic needs of the majority. Todaro and Smith (2006) believed all human lives could be advanced by creating social, political and economic conditions that distribute fairly the benefits of development between individuals and social groups. Mabogunje (2015) argued that elements and activities necessary to produce and reproduce wealth remained in the hands of the rich few. Rodney (1972) pointed out that the surplus of labour was accumulated and appropriated by the rich creating dependency, exploitative labour relations and class struggle. Hence, Cardoso (1972) and Dos Santos (1973) believed these exploitative relations existing between core and peripheral regions and held them responsible for the underdevelopment of the latter. Cardoso (1972) argues that attempts to become self-reliant and

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[1]Supporters of the basic needs approach argued that development should be measured using the Human Development Index (HDI).

progressive are suppressed by this relationship. Scholars had realised that the gap between the rich and the poor was increasingly widening. In the early 1990s, the discourse on development began to focus on sustainable use of resources and mitigation of environmental issues. Scholars such as Hopwood et al. (2005) and Mebratu (1998) believed development had to satisfy current basic needs and improve the quality of life without compromising the needs of future generations. The 'sustainable' approach to development was viewed as a 'solution' to competing economic, social, environmental and institutional interests. However, Beckerman (1994) views this approach as a ruse by development scholars to diffuse criticism of their ideas influencing regional development policies and strategies associated with uneven patterns of development.

2.1   Uneven Regional Development Strategy

Since the late 1940s, regional development strategies of developing countries have been influenced by two schools of thought, either liberalism or socialism. The liberalism school of thought has inspired the ideas of modernisation theorists and regional development policy. Policy-makers were convinced that developing countries could modernise in step with economic growth. Their strategy to promote economic growth was designed to exploit regional 'comparative advantage' by prioritising regions to invest based on differentials in regional endowment (Hausmann and Klinger 2006; D'emurger, 2001). On this basis, policy-makers prioritised economic efficiency over equity by sidelining redistributive priorities. They reasoned that some people and regions who contribute most to the creation of wealth in society should get rich first so that they can be 'models' for other people and regions to follow (Fan 2006, 1997). The notion that economic efficiency should be prioritised over equity is widely repeated in the regional development literature (Fan 1997). Scholars such as Myrdal (1958), Hirschman (1958), Friedmann (1967) and Richardson (1976) supported this notion in their discussion of backwash effects and spread effects between core and periphery regions and between growth poles and hinterlands on the basis of projected diffusion of labour and capital from the core to the periphery. They hoped that by prioritising development in regions with 'comparative advantage', the resulting economic growth will trickle down from the more developed to less developed regions. Inequality across regions was clearly expected by policy-makers as a consequence of uneven regional development policy and an acceptable price worth paying in exchange for economic growth.

Across all countries or cities, development is uneven primarily as a result of differential rates of return on investment that are attributable to differences of natural resource endowments and factors of production. A region with a 'comparative advantage' over any other region in terms of natural resources, capital, skilled labour and technology will quickly outgrow and dominate the latter regions. Moreover, regions with such 'comparative advantage' and that are fairly politically stable, are relatively capital friendly, have good infrastructure and offer less risk of

irreversible capital expenditure tend to attract most investment (Alemayehu and Haile 2008). Such regions are very attractive to secondary sector firms who are often selective when deciding where to invest. Despite witnessing an exponential rate of economic growth due to their comparative advantage, these regions are yet to experience a fair distribution of wealth especially in South Africa (Roberts 2015; Jenkins and Thomas 2002).

The socialism school of thought has inspired the ideas of dependency theorists and development policy centred on social redistribution and basic needs. Policymakers adopted development strategies that were human centred and intended to improve the well-being of all people through poverty reduction, meeting basic needs, providing public services and promoting self-reliance. The idea that humanism is part of the development agenda has influenced social redistributive strategies of nationalisation and expropriation with or without compensation. These strategies were intended to address unequal distribution of benefits of development between individuals and social groups. However, the challenge of uneven development is yet to be addressed especially in Southern Africa.

3 Uneven Development in Southern Africa

Our analysis of development patterns and wealth accumulation processes in Southern Africa relies exclusively on secondary data on economic and social development between 2000 and 2015 in South Africa and Zimbabwe. Even though these countries have close political, economic and developmental features, their capacity to plan and invest for economic growth and job creation is uneven and continues to diminish. Since 2000, South Africa and Zimbabwe have adopted different development policies, the former enabling greater market liberalism whilst the latter expropriated land without compensation and reduced foreign shareholding of businesses. As a result, these nations are witnessing development outcomes that are uneven. The unequal patterns of development across these countries are influenced by the colonial space economy, global factors and processes of wealth accumulation that are closely associated with race, class and gender (Bond 1998, 2008). It is disappointing that governments in South Africa and Zimbabwe have failed to shape urban forms or manage competing urban interests that are major sources of economic, political and social difference. Is there any evidence that this trend of uneven development may be reversed? In order to gain some insight into these issues and maybe answer this question, it would be ideal to look at the mechanism of resource allocation.

3.1 Mechanism of Resource Allocation

In Southern Africa, the traditional mechanisms of resource allocation were changed by European settlers during the colonial period. They gained control of land and land-related resources from native Africans using a mechanism of 'accumulation by dispossession' (Bush et al. 2011; Arrighi et al. 2010; Bond 2008). This mechanism allowed settlers to gain control over land through 'agreements', conquests and appropriation (African Union et al. 2010; Andreasson 2006). Such theft was 'legitimised' through commodification and privatisation of land, commodification of labour power and suppression of traditional forms of production and consumption (Harvey 2003). Commodification and privatisation enabled the exchange of land and land-related resources using the market price mechanism. Unfortunately, the finite quantity of natural resources cannot meet the infinite demands of man. Thus, scarcity is inevitable, and as each individual tries to accumulate and consume as many resources as possible to maximise utility or gain satisfaction, it creates intense competition in the market. In such a market, the price and quantity of the good supplied will adjust to meet the demand. Thus, when demand increases, the price also increases. Unfortunately, this mechanism led to unequal exchange where those who cannot afford to pay for a good or service are excluded from the market (Hall 2013; Bond 2008; Glassman 2006). Hence, market-led mechanisms of accumulation are responsible for the outcomes in struggles over resources.

Inequalities between individuals and social groups that resulted from dispossession and commodification of natural resources led to exploitative labour relations (Glassman 2006). Labour was commodified and subjected to exploitative working conditions such as long working hours at low remuneration and no benefits (ibid). Labour policies were engineered to suppress traditional forms of production and consumption that could have offered the poor some form of respite from vicious exploitation. The exploitative relationship guaranteed that profit repatriation would always benefit the rich in developed regions and their representatives in exploited lagging regions (Badcock 2014). Inequalities in the allocation land, finance, housing and services between individuals and social groups justify the need for changes in the way resources are allocated and controlled.

Governments of South Africa and Zimbabwe have not succeeded in resolving the income inequalities resulting from the exploitative relationship of capitalist accumulation. The provision of social welfare grants offers a politically and administratively feasible means of redistributing welfare (Lund 2015). However, such grants are only a palliative that could not break the intergenerational transmission of poverty (ibid). Social redistributive mechanisms of nationalisation and expropriation with or without compensation allow the state to directly provide access to land, housing and business to the poor at a discount. Frustration with the slow pace of economic and land reforms led the poor to access resources using the mechanism of 'appropriation by confrontation' (Glassman 2006; Harvey 2003). Such insurgency by the poor ignores tenure regimes and the rule of law that guide

the exchange of goods and services in a market. This has created overlapping regimes of ownership and control, and in turn, conflicts.

3.2 Conflicts

The transformation of economic structures that was anticipated by the majority who are poor has not occurred in South Africa and Zimbabwe. Democracy has ushered in political freedom but not economic empowerment for the majority poor. Economic 'adjustments' have been cosmetic and not systematic to benefit those previously marginalised. It is evident these 'changes' have protected the interests of the minority who dominate the formal economy whilst isolating and relegating the majority to the poverty-stricken informal economy (Allan and Thomas 2000). Economic growth can contribute to economic development only when supported by adequate redistributive policies. Those who remain marginalised from economic opportunities and landed resources argue that their lack can only be addressed if they gain access to land. In their view, land is a ubiquitous resource that should be available to everyone.

3.2.1 Land Disputes

Disputes over land resources arise as the poor contest the distribution of landholding, land tenure rights and land utilisation. The colonisation of South Africa and Zimbabwe left the majority natives occupying very small plots that were mostly unproductive or difficult to develop (African Union et al. 2010). Scoones et al. (2014) summit that colonial land dispossessions laid the foundation for the greedy exploitation of majority natives in South Africa and Zimbabwe. In the 1980s, market-enablement policies and foreign direct investment intensified the commercialisation of land allocation and the privatisation and concentration of landholding in the hands of a few. The minority who have a monopoly over landholding enjoy the economic benefits of building, growing, producing, running a business and other activities that access to land confers (Andreasson 2006; Wallace and Williamson 2006; Wade 2003). The landless natives dispute the unfair distribution of landholding arguing that land exchange should not be market led. In South Africa, more than 60% of the poor cannot afford to buy land on the market due to their limited financial capacity (Satterthwaite and Mitlin 2014). As a result, the poor refuse to legalise colonial land theft and often acquire land through brazen land invasions, encroachments and illicit transactions as they believe the government is 'leading from behind'. Unfortunately, it is difficult for the poor to obtain title to land 'acquired illegally' since the land administration system only recognises and registers a land transaction where land title is exchanged at an agreed market price. However, victims of historical land dispossession disagree that land exchange should be based on a system whose legitimacy is questionable and lacks

local meaning. The dispossessed and policy-makers do not share a common understanding of inequalities in landownership, mechanisms of land redistribution and the relevance of the informal economy. The insensitive attitude of state officials towards the informal economy is misplaced and unnecessary if one understands how the market marginalises the poor.

In the late 1990s, Zimbabweans utilised mechanisms of 'appropriation by confrontation' to gain access to land (Cliffe et al. 2011). In the early 2000s, the government embarked on a large-scale, state sanctioned land redistribution to economically empower its citizens (Rutherford 2003; Sachikonye 2003; Moyo 2000). Regrettably, land reform was undertaken without complete understanding and commitment to all the tools that built successful economies. The government failed to reconstruct and enhance legal tenure and clearly define and formalise land rights to allow the market to stabilise and evolve or prevent overlapping claims of landownership (Cliffe et al. 2011). Nepotism and factionalism has fuelled intense contestation over land resources following land reform.

Land reform in Zimbabwe created an economic and political crisis that has had a direct spillover effect on neighbouring countries in the region. The crisis has created general perceptions of instability that make it difficult to win support for social redistribution of resources in South Africa. This has damaged prospects for expropriation of land without compensation in South Africa where inequalities in landholding, housing and income are considered more acute. The Zimbabwean crisis may have made South Africa more hesitant to commit to expropriation without compensation in the hope that through a market-led land reform process inequalities will eventually lessen in tandem with economic growth. However, land reform in South Africa has failed to resolve historical land claims and inequalities in landholding and prevent land conflicts (African Union et al. 2010). Conflicts over land in urban South Africa are intense as squatters learn that they too can influence political decisions on land resources if they act forcefully and in unison to achieve social redistribution of land resources. Sometimes they invade urban land that they know they would be evicted from as a strategy to engage with the government and negotiate for another site (Satterthwaite and Mitlin 2014).

3.2.2 Economic Disputes

Lack of strategic planning foresight amongst policy-makers in South Africa and Zimbabwe has resulted in acute shortages of employment, housing and infrastructure services. The majority poor in these countries find themselves trapped in endemic poverty resulting from being marginalised from economic and employment opportunities. The poor are frustrated that local politicians are more interested in personal gain than creating economic opportunities that increase their prospect of a dignified and productive life. These socio-economic conditions have triggered a cycle of political unrest, township revolts and labour protests in these countries. Those who seek better employment possibilities (real or perceived) are forced to migrate to a 'better' performing economy (Hess 2012; Hagen-Zanker 2008, 2010).

This form of cross-border skills transfer has left sending countries suffering from 'brain drain' effects, which in turn perpetuate uneven patterns of development. Some who protest against inaction by their government to address these socio-economic conditions are subjected to political persecution. In both cases, unfortunately, the migrants become economic and political refugees in neighbouring countries (Hess 2012). They view migration as a solution to the existential distress of uneven development and its associated inequalities.

Peters (2015) summits that migration patterns reflect regional economic trends. From 2000 to 2012, the economy in South Africa has grown by 4% (Roberts 2015) whilst in Zimbabwe it has contracted by 86 and 54% in the agriculture and mining sectors, respectively (Magure 2012). Emigration is on the surge in these declining small economies, with manufacturing business and skilled labour departing to bigger and better performing economies (Kok and Gelderblom 2006). Immigration in South Africa is largely labour driven and its economy has accrued positive economic gains from immigration largely caused by the infusion of two million labourers into the economy (Padyachee 2006). At least 60% of these labourers are hard-working, highly educated and skilled legal immigrants (Adepoju 2000). Even though information on 'clandestine and illegal immigration' in South Africa is rather sporadic, undocumented or incomplete if documented (Mosselson 2010; Danso and McDonald 2001), some tentative conclusions can be drawn.

Most of the highly skilled expatriates who are fortunate to gain employment in secondary sector firms in South Africa are often exploited and paid very low wages (Altman 2015). Such exploitation has not been well received by locals who accuse expatriates of undermining wage negotiations by 'agreeing' to work for long hours at low wages and no benefits (Maharaj 2010). The labour impasse remains unresolved despite the numerous labour strikes over the dual wage system. In 2012, the labour strike at Lonmin Mine in Marikana degenerated into a violent confrontation between mine workers and the police leading to the death of 34 workers (Duncan 2014; Chinguno 2013). The labour crisis across the country is compounded by a shortage of jobs for the non-skilled (Neocosmos 2008). Locals perceive that most of the limited jobs for the non-skilled are increasingly being taken up by foreigners (Crush 2000). Unfortunately, locals who are uneducated and unskilled and depend on such jobs for survival are sinking deeper into poverty.

Frustrations with the slow pace of economic reform and resolution of unfair labour practices have fuelled the violent attacks on foreign nationals and businesses by native South Africans. Whilst it cannot be denied that socio-economic conditions contributed significantly to the hostility, bitterness and violence that lurks within South African society (Mosselson 2010), HSRC (2008) attributed the violence to the slow pace of service delivery, perceived corruption and impropriety of public officials, ineffectual communication with citizens and foreigners perceived to have cash, skills and tolerance of low wages and hard work. In 2008, Afrophobia, intolerance and criminality were behind the violence that resulted in the death of 41 foreigners and 21 South Africans and displaced about 43,000 foreigners (Maharaj 2010; Mosselson 2010; McKnight 2008). Xenophobic violence seems

to be a misguided attempt to assert control over a political economy that historically disadvantaged native South Africans.

The dispute over socio-economic conditions in South Africa is having a spillover effect on the education sector. In 2015 and 2016, poor students are demanding for free higher tertiary education through the '#FeesMustFall campaign'. The cycle of unrest on campuses persists as universities are adamant on increasing fees. There are a few African students with the economic wherewithal to pay the high cost of fees in 'preferred universities'. As a result, many of them fail to enrol or complete their university education on the basis of financial exclusion. Hence, socio-economic conditions in South Africa have significantly limited opportunities for higher tertiary education for poor students. The poor continuously struggle to better themselves due to limited opportunities to education (Roberts 2015). Their ability to accumulate wealth or consume resources privately remains limited and their need of social welfare remains high. The land and economic disputes discussed above have demonstrated the need for reform strategies targeted at the poor.

4   Reform Strategies

The reform strategies adopted in South Africa and Zimbabwe to resolve unprecedented socio-economic inequalities were influenced by two different approaches. South Africa retained a neoliberal economic approach that was very friendly to local and international investors. The government maintained a market-enablement strategy where the private sector has a carte blanch role in the economy. The ANC government has so far been reluctant to initiate economic reforms for fear of a market backlash. The liberalisation of political, social and economic space in South Africa managed to preserve and perpetuate the dominance of capital over structures of power resulting in uneven distribution of resources, income inequality and continual and uninterrupted exploitation. Hence, their land reform strategy has been very conservative. They opted to pursue a market-led land reform programme guided by the 'willing seller willing buyer' principle. These strategies did not genuinely address the socio-economic challenges resulting from colonial dispossession and exploitation. The outcome of land reform was not in accord with the underlying principles of restitution supported by the marginalised majority natives.

In Zimbabwe, aspirations for restitution helped direct the social redistributive approach to land and economic reforms. The reform agenda attempted to expropriate land and land-related resources without compensation to beneficiaries of colonial theft. The state expropriated without compensation 11 million hectares of mainly commercial farmland and redistributed it to native Zimbabweans (Cliffe et al. 2011). Redistribution reduced landholding by whites from 29 to 1% (Derman 2006). Instead, attempts to implement land and economic reforms triggered unintended negative effects including violent reshuffling of ownership and re-establishing systems of economic and social exploitation. Economic reform was formulated on the accumulation model based on agriculture and mining

industry that is crumbling. Foreign companies were expected to cede 51% of their shareholding to locals without compensation (Matyszak 2011). Unfortunately, the fight to define and chart its own development path like every other nation is being assaulted by economic sanctions imposed by USA and the European Union.

Economic and land reforms could have been effective if implemented by competent public officials and effective public institutions. In both countries, the governments are struggling to overcome administrative inefficiencies, and a lack of political will and leadership has not helped. Discussions were held to formulate administrative reforms, but the reform proposals intended to improve the organisational and functional operations of government across local, provincial and national spheres are never implemented (Tendi 2010; Alexander 2006). A dysfunctional administrative system is a good cover for public officials who seek economic gain through misuse of resources, rampant corruption and maladministration.

When one considers how ineffective most of these strategies have been, it would be unfair to blame the poor for their lack if their government is failing to step in with the right palliatives. Solutions formulated and implemented to address unfair processes of accumulation and uneven development have not been convincing. Most of these solutions that have been copied from developed countries have not been designed, owned and mastered by local communities from conception to implementation. As a result, these solutions were aimed at making economic, financial and political gains for developed countries at the expense of advancing human development locally. Hence, the reform strategies adopted since 2000 have exacerbated the levels of uneven development, inequality and socio-economic marginalisation.

5   Conclusion

Based on the discussion presented above, one can conclude that the market is not a solution to the problem of unequal allocation of resources but lies at the root of it. Resources shortage and increasing competition potentially lead to processes of exclusion, conflict and the undermining of development. When development is uneven in a region or country, it will force people to migrate from areas with less resources and services to areas with more resources and better services. The solution to the problem lies in implementing development strategies that strengthen the restitution of historical rights to land and land-related resources in favour of the native majority.

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Migration and Public Service Delivery: The Status Quo and Policy Responses in Sending and Receiving Countries

Betty Mubangizi and David Mwesigwa

1 Introduction

The recent wave of migration from the Middle East to Europe has brought the complexities of global migration into sharp focus. Images of human suffering, of determination and of triumph have dominated the media in the recent past. During this media hype, the tendency is to focus on the receiving and usually richer countries—and the severe impact this tends to have on their public services. Little attention, if ever, is paid to the sending countries, and, equally, the effect on their public services. Yet migration has significant effects on public service delivery in both the sending and receiving countries. This contribution explores the relationship between migration and public service delivery from both ends of the spectrum. It does so by firstly establishing a conceptual framework that places the discourse on public service delivery and migration in context. It then explores specific challenges in the public service sector—of both the sending and receiving countries. Lastly, the discussion shifts to a focus on the need to better manage the interface between migration and public service delivery through, amongst other things, better policy responses and further research.

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2 Public Service Delivery and Migration: A Conceptual Framework

A World Bank report notes that South Africa's population has increased with immigration and that a new governance and administrative framework for racially diverse provinces and municipalities had to be built (World Bank 2011). This new structure, the report suggests, had to progress quickly in delivering the improved services expected by the people. In the U K, Migration Watch UK suggests that population growth, fuelled by immigration, has placed considerable strain on the country's public services—especially primary school places in England and NHS maternity services (Migration Watch UK 2016). On the other hand, Ruhs and Anderson (2010) document a range of benefits relating to migrants in their countries of origin—as well as in their host communities. There is no denying, therefore, that there is a correlation between migration and public service delivery. What is probably not clear, however, is what this relationship is and how it plays out in time and space. Before delving into that discussion, however, it is useful to clarify the concepts of migration and service public delivery—starting with the latter.

2.1 Public Service Delivery

Before World War II, the growth of non-democratic movements such as fascism created fears that excess poverty and disorder would create an environment ripe for totalitarian takeovers. In response to this consensus, there developed the need for more government intervention—to fulfil Keynesian prescriptions for growth and to offer services through the welfare state to create more equity and order. In this regard, and as argued by Reus-Smit (1999) the ultimate purpose of the state is to promote the common good and to deliver services because citizens cannot satisfy all their own needs, and the activities of public administration are the logical consequences of the practice of service delivery since the earliest times. As observed elsewhere (Mubangizi, 2016), public service delivery refers to a series of activities by various (mainly) public institutions that mobilise and process resources into needed services—and present them to a target group of people in a manner that is sufficient and effective and which adds value to the lives of the recipients. In this definition, three issues stand out: services provided by the state (water, transport, education); recipients of public service; and the mechanisms available to deliver public services. Public services thus delivered by the public sector, are funded from the public budget and are availed to members of the public without fear or favour. In South Africa, the term is used to describe the distribution of basic resources which citizens depend on—like water, electricity, sanitation, infrastructure, education and health care (Public Service Act 1994). The strength of a country's socio-economic status is judged by how the public service set-up responds to the needs of the citizens, and, through this, the extent to which the

state plays its guiding and decisive role in the growth and development of the country.

Whilst public services are delivered by the state, it is not uncommon that voluntary and community organisations or private sector companies (Le Grand 2010, p. 57) deliver services like water, education and healthcare services to the public. Presently, there is an accepted trend of public–private partnerships, where both sectors work in a complementary relationship, as defined in the enabling legal framework of the country or state (Bel et al. 2013, p. 304; Loxley 2013). In such cases, the private or civic sectors deliver public services on behalf of, or in partnership with, the state. However, the choice of the mode of delivery is determined by state parties who choose the best mechanisms that yield the highest benefits, with lower cost implications. Hence, efficiency and effectiveness are vital considerations in public service delivery (Ojjako et al. 2013, p. 538).

Public services are expected—under most country's legal frameworks—to be delivered by the public sector, which although often perceived as a single entity, is not a homogenous body but a series of sub-sectors and levels varying from one country to another (Oh and Bush 2015). These include the central government and other government agencies, local government and a range of government departments operating at local, regional, provincial or central level. What is thus clear is that a multiplicity of institutions operating within various spheres of the state are involved in the delivery of public services. These institutions do so within the prescripts of a constrained resource environment, where finance, personnel and political will intertwine to impact on the quantity and quality of services that can be delivered to the public. Wild et al. (2012) have observed that despite clear, distinct plans and massive injections of international and domestic resources, public service delivery is still failing in many areas, and poor developing countries are most affected. Wild et al. (2012) observed that such failure falls into three broad categories of characteristics. The first is characterised by poor access to services like water supply and closure of community water taps; second is service delivery failures characterised by poor quality of services as in, for example, shortages in medical supplies, substandard essential equipment or absenteeism of staff at healthcare facilities. Last, public service delivery failures are also characterised by persistent exclusion of some groups and regions from access to services. The groups could be those rural people that are far removed from the centres of capital or they could be a minority group in society or, as advanced in this discussion— migrants with little or no recourse of entitlement to public services. Whilst several challenges are responsible for this phenomenon, Wild et al. (2012) have suggested a typology of common governance constraints that are inherent to the political system, and which appear to repeat themselves in similar ways across sectors and countries. The typology is fourfold:

1. Political-market imperfections, in terms of disruptions in the relationships between politicians and citizens.
2. Policy incoherence or contradictions in policy design, structure and roles— causing some part or the entire policy design to become unimplementable.

3. Lack of effective performance oversight, where formal processes for monitoring and supervision are not followed or enforced, and informal processes are insufficient.
4. Collective action challenges, which result in groups failing to act in their collective self-interest—even where individual members stand to benefit if the group achieves its objectives.
5. Moral hazard, in which actors are protected in some way from the risks associated with their actions or inaction.

These causes notwithstanding, we advance in this discussion that migration could impact on service delivery in subtle and/or significant ways and that this impact can be felt both in the sending countries and in the receiving countries—albeit at varying levels. A discussion of the concept of migration is necessary at this stage.

2.2 *Migration*

Human migration denotes any movement by human beings from one locality to another; therefore, 'occasion and area' become significant variables in migration (Niedomysl and Fransson 2014, p. 357). Humans are known to have migrated extensively throughout prehistory and human history. According to Harttgen and Klassen (2011, p. 395), the movement of populations in modern times has continued under the form of both voluntary migration within one's region, country or beyond and involuntary migration (which includes trafficking in human beings and ethnic cleansing).

A sending country is one whose citizens leave to migrate to other countries (receiving countries)—generally to find employment (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). The migration may be temporary or permanent. Generally, studies of immigration focus on the country receiving the migrants. However, there is also an impact on the sending country and it is important to explore both ends of the spectrum, so as to come up with solutions that yield positive spin-offs for both sending and receiving countries.

In this context, migrants are primarily described in terms of internal and cross-border movements of human beings that are influenced by many factors—ranging from social to economic (Huber and Nowotny 2013, p. 1463). Whilst humans have migrated widely throughout human history, recent studies show that economic factors are the most significant reason why a huge number of professionals such as health workers move from one health sector to another and are the leading aspects indicating the flight of health workers to more developed countries (George et al. 2013, p. 1). In the case of South Africa, monetary grounds such as salaries in particular appear to be one of the core reasons why health workers migrated between 2002 and 2006, as many countries insistently sought South African health workers (HWs). George et al. (2013) document other factors that predisposed the

departure of South African HWs to other countries: age, intensity of work-related stress and the degree to which they experienced pleasure in their jobs.

Over the past two decades, some African governments have had difficulty retaining professionals in the public service, due to the often poor conditions of employment. Outmigration will thus continue to beleaguer the continent's critical public services—as it loses vital personnel, including scarce and critical skills like doctors, engineers and academics. Interestingly, some of the African governments appear to support outmigration; for example, the government of Uganda was sued by the Institute of Public Policy and Research (IPPR) (a UK-based think tank), because it had agreed to export 283 health workers to Trinidad and Tobago in spite of Uganda's well-documented domestic deficiencies in the health sector (Horner 2015). Uganda's doctor–patient ratio (1:24725) and nurse–patient ratio (1:11000) fall below the World Health Organization's minimum requirement (1:1000)—which is the physician–person ratio (Mwesigwa 2015). Whilst one cannot stop outmigration of professionals when they decide to move on their own accord, the official export of scarce and critical human resources by the Uganda government could no doubt set an undesirable if not dangerous precedent.

Deciding to work in other countries revolves around several push factors and pull factors (see Bezuidenhout et al. 2009, p. 212). The former consists of such aspects that render other locations better than one's present job—such as better remuneration, superior conditions of work and improved prospects for specialised progression. Several factors push professionals out of the public sector, including shortage of management support, poor supervision, poor conditions at work, work overload, emotional exhaustion, shortage of suitable resources and scarce infrastructure (Hansen 2014, p. 602). Consequently, this maintains shortages in the numbers of key personnel in the public service delivery system. For example, studies in South Africa suggest that there is a deficit of about 80,000 health workers in the country's healthcare system and that the existing workforce can only efficiently serve about 85% of the target population (George et al. 2013, p. 1). The study highlights that the production rates of health workers have not kept pace with growing demand, and it is expected that they may be unable to compensate for the deficit resulting from outmigration. This situation is exacerbated if, in addition to the insufficiently serviced populace, the country experiences an increased inflow of migrants, as this increases the number of people requiring healthcare services.

Thus, whilst the quality of service delivery is often hampered by several hurdles relating to resources, political will and access, the migrant crisis usually tends to exacerbate an already bad scenario. This is because most problems faced by municipalities and other government agencies are closely linked to prior crises in the host communities such as bureaucratic hiccups, low staff capacity and, in most cases, insufficient funds to meet the growing number of migrants (Lee 2014, p. 463). It is thus not surprising that host communities tend to view migrants as coming to draw on their meagre resources, and it is such sentiments that foment prejudice against migrants.

Against this conceptual framework, several questions arise. How might migration impact public service delivery in sending countries? How might migration

impact public service delivery in receiving countries? And, finally, how can the impact be managed to produce positive spin-offs for both host and receiving countries? These questions relate to an elucidation of issues, to be explored in this chapter.

3   Perceptions of Migrants and Public Services

Migration is a factor of society, as since prehistoric days people have moved from various places in time and space. Mellars (2006) documents a northern route of migration from Africa via North Africa and the Nile Valley into the Levant—with subsequent dispersal into both Europe and Asia. Our knowledge of prehistoric migration in Africa, across Europe, America and Asia, has been bolstered by the study of human fossils, occasionally by stone-age artefacts, and more recently has been affirmed by archaeogenetics (Krishna and Hammer 2014). Modern migration evokes numerous responses ranging from hostility to hospitality, and various receiving countries have varying tolerance to migrants. For example, in responding to a question on what underlies prejudice against foreign immigrants, Neuberg stated that:

> Outsiders aren't going to have that same built-up investment in us or our group. Because of this, we tend to believe that people who are foreign to us are more likely to pose certain kinds of threats: We believe they may be more interested in taking our resources, more likely to cheat us in exchanges, to violate our norms and values, to take more than their fair share, and the like. These perceptions of threats are linked to negative emotions such as anger and moral disgust that contribute to anti-immigrant prejudices (Bushwick 2011).

At the heart of this misconception is the failure to differentiate between legal immigrants (documented through formal processes) and illegal immigrants. The failure to make the distinction—particularly by host communities—has cast a shadow on immigrants in general. Passel and Fix. (1994) argue that the focus on undocumented immigration has blurred the 'bright line' between legal and illegal policy and eroded the legitimacy of legal and humanitarian admissions (1994, p.9). There is for example, in South Africa, a debate on whether immigrants use more public services than they pay taxes for. Indeed, many xenophobic attacks have been linked to the perception that migrants derive more public services in the form of housing and other amenities than the host community—an issue somewhat entrenched in the caution echoed by the then Minister of Home Affairs. In 1994, South Africa's first Minister of Home Affairs warned that 'aliens who are pouring into South Africa' will compete for scarce resources, a discourse widely circulated in society and shared amongst policymakers across party lines (Klotz 2016, p. 192). Whilst this notion may be the case in some developing countries with advanced economies which receive many public service needy immigrants, the situation may not be so in the more developing countries which receive skilled immigrants—at least in the long run. Passel and Fix(1994, p. 14) established that all immigrants arriving in the USA after 1970 paid a total of $70 billion in taxes to all levels of

government, thereby generating \$25–\$30 billion more than they use in public services. In South Africa, foreign medical staff have undoubtedly helped bolster the country's healthcare system. Equally, teachers and academics have helped to bolster the scarcity of skilled professionals in areas like maths and science.

According to Passel and Fix. (1994, p.14), skilled immigrants often represent a net fiscal plus. The same study suggests that from a fiscal standpoint, most surplus revenue accrues from legal immigrants—but illegal immigrants seem to generate more expenses than revenue across levels of government. However, the above study concluded that measures undertaken to control illegal immigration have been largely unsuccessful, leading to a drain on the public services. In most countries, immigrants are disproportionately poorly educated and low skilled, tend to have low incomes and generate net fiscal costs—particularly for local governments. According to Hakak and Al Ariss (2013, p. 4117), discrimination is ever increasing in areas where migration is intense: the poorer, sometimes illegal immigrants have always been the hardest hit, often resorting to crude survival strategies. Consequently, the migrant-receiving communities are often concerned about a considerable rise in health hazards and criminality, predominantly amongst the youth—including a further explosion of weapons and drug use, resulting in a migrant-security correlation (Frönhlich 2016, p. 39). It appears that despite attempts by donors and aid organisations to implement conflict-sensitive programming, there is always a perception amongst some locals that several programmes are not conflict sensitive enough and that donor support unjustly prioritised immigrants over host communities in the similar condition.

Prejudices against migrants are real and widespread amongst some communities. For example, there is a growing concern that social tensions will increase in Europe, given the presence of migrants from war-torn countries like Syria and Libya (Nachmani 2016, p. 340). In the meantime, the European Union has been extending their efforts to guard its international borders and maintain security in the region to prevent Islamic extremism from gaining ground. According to Scuzzarello (2015), there is a general consensus that social relations between migrants and host communities such as Greece and Turkey will become considerably tenser in the coming years, as the status of employment, education and resource usage worsens, or is perceived to worsen in the process (Scuzzarello 2015, p. 60). The increased presence of Middle Easterners (mainly Syrians, Iraqis and Palestinians), East Africans such as Burundians, south Sudanese and Somalis, those from different sects in the Central African Republic as well as Southern Africans is perceived to contribute to worsening the social and security crises in Europe (Nachmani 2016, p. 341).

Local authorities can play a superior role in dealing with some of the above challenges and in gaining from the constructive socio-economic impact of the migrant surge (Scuzzarello 2015, p. 63). Therefore, better provision of services to host communities and migrants, as well as improved dialogue with the two groups, would advance social unity. Nevertheless, it is argued that communities whose public services have always been affected by migrants no longer have any confidence in their local authorities (Kofi and Agblorti 2011, p. 76). In some cases,

migrants are expected to remain and work in some area for as long as an additional 5–10 years; this is not only restrictive, but untenable under human freedom of movement and association. Without a change in attitude and approach as to how the migrant-concentrated areas are managed, it is probable that quality of life and state society relations in these areas will depreciate in future, and the consequences may not be welcome to many communities. For example, Lurie and Williams (2014, p. 35) indicate that migration can speed up the transmission of an infectious disease between different geographical areas connecting high and lower prevalence areas. Lurie and Williams cite the cases of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003–2004 and multidrug-resistant tuberculosis in 2007 and proceed to caution about migration-induced diseases and the additional health risks that migrants are exposed to as a result of their migration (Lurie and Williams 2014, p. 40).

Studies indicate that there is need to improve the capacity of local authorities to appreciate the contribution of migrants in terms of socio-economic activities of the host community zones (Scuzzarello 2015, p. 64). This is a sensitive move, which suggests that focus can be put on ways that allow local municipalities on the 'front line' of providing for host communities and migrants, to open up potential job opportunities to professional and semi-professional but able migrants (Halvorsen et al. 2015, p. 1300). On the one hand, it appears that almost all of the constraints preventing municipalities from addressing the impact of migrants are related to problems that existed prior to the migrants' arrival—such as bureaucratic hurdles, lack of capacity amongst public officials and insufficient means of obtaining financial resources. Put differently, the migrant crisis aggravates what was previously a bad situation, rather than creating peculiar challenges. On the other hand, host governments' positive response to the migrant crisis, such as integration or assimilation, can enable them to solicit more resources and capacity-building opportunities, than ever before (Anghel 2012, p. 320). A case in point is the 6 billion euros deal signed between the European Union and Turkey to facilitate the transfer and settlement of Middle-Eastern and North-African migrants from Greece to Turkey (Pamuk and Baczynska 2016). There is, at this time, a lack of consensus in several countries on whether public officials' sole mandate should be to deliver basic services to migrants, or if—given the right circumstances—they should be involved in promoting local economic development and social cohesion between migrants and host communities.

Rensaho and Vignjevic (2011) established that working groups tend to focus on ways to overcome constraints faced by local authorities when they attempt to support community-based efforts in dealing with the migrants' cause (Rensaho and Vignjevic 2011, p. 73). Whilst this opinion is informed by the outcomes, Rensaho and Vignjevic's study—which sought to analyse an Australian community intervention to support migrants from the four sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Congo and Burundi—it appears that personal leadership is an important factor. For example, individual mayors with vision, initiative and perseverance can become more effective at maintaining good service delivery and in engaging with migrants and host communities. It can be stated that the perception of migrants and public services is skewed to host communities' prejudices and

misconceptions—which translate into isolated incidences of discrimination by some members who cannot recognise or appreciate the contribution of skilled and professional migrants to the service delivery system.

4   Challenges Faced by Migrants in Accessing Public Services

The protection of basic socio-economic rights and access to public services is important for migrants in several countries, including South Africa, where legally recognised migrants do not receive dedicated shelter, food, health care or education—in accordance with the provisions of the law (Alberti et al. 2013, p. 4134). Rather, migrants are expected to find work, source accommodation on the open market and access education and healthcare services from mainstream public or private institutions. Migrants in several countries face numerous challenges in accessing public services, including entering the job market (Andermariam 2007, p. 112). This is true, despite constitutions which guarantee socio-economic rights to all who live in the countries concerned. For example, South Africa's legal responsibility towards migrants is founded in a network of historical and contemporary, global and regional connections (Holsher et al. 2014, p. 190). Consequently, with the long-standing political and economic constellations and established strategies of survival—many of which are rooted in injustices of historical and global dimensions—South Africa finds itself in a position where it has to meet several obligations.

Host communities have to contend with migrants who are coming into the country but who have to experience additional forms of structural exclusion and interpersonal violence—some being xenophobic in nature (Gordon 2015, p. 495). For example, some migrants face challenges of poor access to public services since they are prone to lack of both legal protection and social protection—thus rendering them vulnerable to health risks. Whilst migration is not synonymous with poor health, Appave and Laczko (2005) have observed that it can increase the scale of vulnerability to health risks of people who may be exposed to poor working conditions, overcrowding, poor access to health care and risky sexual behaviour (Appave and Laczko 2005, p. 252). In South Africa, the Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa (CoRMSA) found that international migrants continue to report that government is required to make sure that refugees and asylum seekers can access the public health system. The same study further established that immigrants often confronted the same understaffing, lack of medication and long waiting times at public healthcare providers, as many South Africans do (CoRMSA 2008, p. 25). But often, international migrants face discrimination and ignorance of their rights when they attempt to access medical services; for example, 80% of migrants in the UK face the challenge of sustaining quality health (Whyte et al. 2015, p. 703). In South Africa, the challenge has been justified by the fact that some

migrants do not have a green bar-coded identity booklet that indicates they are born in the country. Consequently, local government clinics transfer migrants from the public sector to the NGO sector—in order for them to access life-saving medication.

Migrants' access to public services is well documented and research has consistently revealed unpleasant experiences. When studying Central African refugees and asylum seekers' access to health services in Durban, Kaplan (2011) established that the attitudes of individual service providers have the power to determine the provision and quality of services guaranteed by national and international law to migrants. Barriers to health services, and even refusal of the Professional Health Council (PHC) altogether, are a result of health staff's demands to produce legal documentation, refusal to converse with foreign patients in a common language, denying the use of interpreters, verbal abuse and discriminatory remarks, prioritising South African nationals in the quality and wait time for care and lack of confidentiality and privacy protections for refugees and asylum seekers seeking HIV treatment at public PHC facilities. Furthermore, Crush and Tawodzera (2014) have argued that medical xenophobia is deeply entrenched in the South African public health system—despite being a fundamental breach of the country's Constitution and Bill of Rights, international human rights obligations and despite the existence of professional codes of ethics governing the treatment of patients.

In addition, Rugunanan and Smit (2011) showed that some of the migrants experienced challenges in accessing employment opportunities in South Africa. This is compounded by a lack of identity documents, employers' ignorance about accepting non-national identity papers, lack of accessible banking services and failure to recognise non-south African academic qualifications (Rugunanan and Smit 2011, p. 709). By failing to access the available employment openings, government agencies and departments have to shoulder an additional responsibility of providing basic services such as water and health care to a growing segment of the unemployed population in the country's borders. In some cases, these immigrants are, in fact, skilled enough to be absorbed into the system's labour force. Indeed, this would be a countermeasure to fill the vacuum created by citizens who are outmigrating and, in addition, also take care of the additional demands in the service sector. The existing personnel and facilities are too stretched to meet basic public service needs (World Bank 2011). This not only exacerbates service delivery deficiencies or creates new challenges—but also renders the citizenry vulnerable to inefficient and inequitable response mechanisms.

The access of migrant children to education is one of the challenges and impediments towards the achievement of universal primary education in South Africa (Meda et al. 2012). It appears that children of migrants are yet to be accorded equal opportunity with those of host communities. This perpetuates a separate group of inferior citizens who are less confident in the country's future demographic landscape. In other countries, this class of citizens is vulnerable to more challenges when searching for opportunities to join the formal employment system, and they resort to joining the informal sector which exposes them to becoming a security threat to society (Davis 2008, p. 34). Some critics emphasise

that issues of migrants should be the concern of a particular country—as long as those migrants are formally in the country's borders (Gordon 2016, p. 3). From this, it can be stated that unofficial migrants are not any country's concern, even if those migrants are formally in that country but only waiting to be formalised. Chisari, for example, is against the tendency of denuding migrants of their uniqueness, experiences, skills and talents against the values of host communities (Chisari 2015, p. 574). Chisari also points out the injustice in the requirement that unprotected immigrants are required to prove their migrant status in order to qualify for a welcome into a political state. This, he argues, confirms the state in a position of authority and the migrant in a position of vulnerability, subservience and subjugation. In this scenario, and as noted by Ruhs (2010, p. 2600, the rights of the state and of individuals are invariably framed hierarchically and vertically—thus constructing an inevitable hostile relationship between the state and the migrants.

This above configuration of the relationship between the state and individuals tends to ignore the changing identities and responsibilities of states and individuals. It also tends to exclude recognition of the role that non-state actors play in global regimes—both as sources of protection and as fighters against migrant persecution (Perumal 2015, pp. 67–68). Some countries recognise the rights of migrants, although they fall short in a few areas. For example, the South African government acknowledges that migrants have the right to work, but:

(a) Government fails to overtly enforce that right, which is exacerbated by the cumulative constraining effects of the difficulties experienced when applying for migrant status, and the negative perceptions cast on the individual remain visible (Smit and Rugunanan 2014).
(b) There is lack of a coordinated response for both migrants and the country's own citizens and institutions, and this poses regional and domestic challenges in the political realm, cost and institutional capacity, economic concerns, the welfare system, public health and security and regional and international reputation (Polzer 2008, p. 2).
(c) Government is faced with several gaps in its current migrant response framework, including (Polzer 2008, p. 12):

    1. Lack of humanitarian response
    2. Legal options do not address mixed migration
    3. Lack of coordination between actors and responses
    4. Non-governmental responses are fragmented
    5. Inability to use the regional mechanisms or long-term regional impact planning.

(d) Feelings of distress are often fuelled by lack of a regular income, with fear of frequent incidences of police harassment and eviction by landlords, especially for the migrants from Burundi and Congo (Smit and Rugunanan 2015, p. 190).

In all the above incidences, South Africa has faced reputational factors where migrants have sometimes been treated badly by the public sector. It is for this reason that no governmental organisations have moved in to fill the gap and provide

basic services. Indeed, church organisations like the Diakonian Council, Denis Hurley Centre in Durban and the Methodist Church in Johannesburg—to mention a few—have been instrumental in providing public services where the public sector has been unable to do so.

The challenges of service provision to migrants in their host countries relate to legislation issues that by law and policy prevent them from accessing the full benefits offered through the public service. The challenges also relate to the attitude of staff in the service delivery system that—out of ignorance and their own perceptions—are prejudiced against migrants.

5   Migration and Public Service Delivery: Practical Strategies Applied by South Africa

South Africa is a decentralised state where human and social services are delivered by local governments (Muriaas and Svåsand 2015, p. 475). It appears there is political will by the South African government to disperse both human and financial resources to local municipalities, whilst dealing with the centralised oversight on the treatment of and response to migration. This is, to a certain extent, due to central government's fears regarding capacity in some local municipalities in terms of dealing with the influx of migrants into South Africa over recent years. Whilst receptive to migrants, one cannot overlook the insecurity from potential spillover into South Africa of the governance crisis in Zimbabwe and other SSA countries and the possibility of immigrants harbouring political radicals and rebels from central African countries like Burundi, Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo. It can be stated that these concerns have led to a political atmosphere in which the South African government requires considerable oversight over all activities executed by the local authorities with regard to migrants. Polzer's (2008) study established that the highest number of migrants in South Africa come from Zimbabwe—an issue which calls for deliberate responses to be focused on this group. Polzer (2008, pp. 7–12) evaluates South Africa's options (such as departmental, municipal and NGO responses) at the different levels and found gaps in addressing immigration trends.

Issues of confidence and trust between various stakeholders dealing with migrants are likely to hamper effective collaboration in dealing with the consequences of refugees in South Africa. Peterson (2015, p. 10) explains that lack of confidence implies that strategic decisions that local municipalities consider to facilitate their endeavours in dealing with migration are implausible. Studies indicate that absence of confidence and trust between local municipalities and central government departments—on top of absence of trust between civil society and local municipalities—affects their success in responding to humanitarian crises like migration. This calls for sufficient legal amendments connected to migration in South Africa. For example, Polzer (2008, p. 12) notes that the existing law is

missing significant undertakings on specific issues such as humanitarian response, mixed migration as well as the coordination between actors and responses. In order to effectively deal with this gap, the current legislation must be fine-tuned to spell out the legal status of different migrants in South Africa. This would not only facilitate the observation of migrants' rights—but also help dispel concerns that African migrants will ultimately be naturalised as citizens of South Africa. Several options have been outlined by the South African government as a strategy to avert or absorb the challenge of migrants in the country:

First, the transformational political order of South Africa ratified a variety of United Nations and African Union statutes, including the 1951 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Convention relating to the status of refugees and the 1969 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa. National legislation aligned with such conventions followed, prominently amongst such being the South African Refugees Act no 130 of 1998 (Holsher et al. 2014, p. 190).

Second, South Africa's foreign policy containing six pillars was developed, which embodies (Moore 2014, p. 377) the:

(a) Centrality of human rights to international relations
(b) Value of promoting democracy
(c) Centrality of justice and international law in the relations between nations
(d) Internationally agreed, peaceful conflict-resolution instruments
(e) Importance of Africa to South Africa's foreign policy concerns
(f) Reliance of economic development on international cooperation in an inter-reliant world.

The above pillars seek an equilibrium between state rights and human rights, as well as economic rights and political rights, by putting South Africa within the existing international platform on a new world order—one symbolised by the rule of international law, the pre-eminence of human rights and great power peace.

Third, much attention has been directed at establishing the actual number of immigrants, especially those from Zimbabwe, and treating their humanitarian needs as being of the utmost importance (Polzer 2008, p. 3). In addition, it is hoped that building a regional legal framework and culture of good neighbourliness and mutual respect would go a long way in responding to the migration crisis, although critics such as Stern and Szalontai (2006, p. 124) doubt its long-term sufficiency. Government's response is perceived to be cognizant of the fact that different protocols covering the Southern African Development Cooperation (SADC) envisage a progressive development to regional integration (Kneebone 2016, p. 164). Furthermore, the response by the South African government aids movement and employment of labour force within the region—a matter that can be construed as a developmental response to migration. As a result, the South African government adopted a temporal prohibition on the deportation of Zimbabweans in 2009, though it was lifted after 2 years and over 10,000 Zimbabweans were sent back to Zimbabwe in 2012 (De Jager and Musuva 2016, p. 27).

South Africa has put in place several tenable strategies to address the immigrant crisis, including adoption of decentralisation which seeks to distribute authority amongst stakeholders at different levels of government, amending the legal provisions on migration in order to streamline them depending on the changing global migrant conditions, ratifying the different international and regional statutes as a global obligation towards the migrant surge, adopting a robust foreign policy which includes the six comprehensive pillars and establishing, through documentation, the actual number of migrants entering the country. In practice, however, challenges relating to the capacity and willingness of public officials mean that the ideals rarely, if ever, translate into practice.

6   Migration and Public Service Delivery: The Sending Countries

Whilst the receiving countries no doubt face heightened pressures on their public services, there is, equally, pressure on the public services of sending countries—albeit of a different but equally significant kind. According to Katseli et al. (2006, p. 18), brain drain from SSA to North America has reached a record high. They argue that the huge exodus of the workforce has worsened the already unfavourable effects on the stock of human capital in critical sectors like education and health—thus affecting the region's long-term development prospects. The education and health sectors are significantly affected when professionals leave their home countries in search of better opportunities. This discussion will focus on the short-term and negative impacts of migration on the sending countries. It will do so with specific regard to the *education* and *health sectors*.

6.1   The Health Sector

For the health sector, the international migration of doctors has been an explicit means of adjusting healthcare human resources for rich countries. Poor countries thus end up, unknowingly, providing richer countries with health personnel on whom they have spent so much in terms of training. According to Bezuidenhout et al. (2009, p. 212), several healthcare professionals have left South Africa since the 1970s. By 1998, about 45% of the country's physicians had left and the number grew to 60% between 1996 and 2006, whilst by 2004 about 86% of African healthcare professionals from Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa were working in the USA. These statistics compare with the Caribbean Islands which face a similar exodus of health workers to the UK, Canada and USA (Adeberge et al. 2011, p. 739). These authors argue that whilst the government of South Africa proposed to reduce the government subsidy for medical training, it appears this would reduce

the health workers' output per capita and increase the degree of demand for those medical workers—due to a reduced production of new doctors going into the market.

Besides the financial loss, the fragile health systems of the sending countries bring the whole system close to collapse—due to an inadequate quantity and quality of health personnel. Agbiboa (2012, p. 1673) suggests that the number of Southern African doctors and nurses in Canada made up to about 10% of the medical personnel in the country. He argues that the migration of health workers from the region has not only increased the length of queues for patients at both hospitals and clinics—but has created more losses, given the quantity of resources spent on training migrated and migrating health workers. For example, between 1994 and 2000, South Africa lost about one-third of all development aid received by the country to the training of migrated health workers. Consequently, Agbiboa established that the Southern African region and other SSA countries have increased expenditure (to about US$4 billion per annum) and the actual number of Western expatriates (to about 100,000)—in order to fill the gap created by migrated and migrating health workers.

According to Prince and Otieno (2014, p. 937), health workers' flight due to the unfavourable nurse–patient ratio and doctor–patient ratio in Uganda was responsible for the declining quality of patient care. In addition, Bakewell (2008, p. 1345) argues that outmigration expands the degree of inter-country inequalities in the quality of the health sector and slows down the level of investment—since remittances are often channelled to sustaining consumerism and seeking expert treatment in the migrant-receiving countries of the UK, Canada, the USA and Germany. With regard to Zimbabwe, Chikanda (2006) notes how the migration of health professionals has negatively impacted on health service delivery. In his study on the impact of skilled health professionals' migration on health delivery in Zimbabwe, the community respondents complained of declining quality of care in health institutions and uncaring attitudes of healthcare professionals. Chikanda reveals that the shortage of health professionals was most critical in rural areas where most health centres were being served by unqualified health staff. Whilst it appears that, in the long run, the poor countries become more vulnerable and unable to provide healthcare public services at any acceptable level of standard—remittances sent by migrants to families and relatives who remain in their country of origin have reduced poverty in several parts of Southern Africa (Katseli et al. 2006, p. 25). This is justified by recent statistics of remittances to the region since 1990, which grew to US$40 billion by 2010—and were expected to grow further in the coming years (Agbiboa 2012, p. 1677).

Emigration of health personnel from SSA has benefited North American countries like the USA and Canada, and also the UK—whilst affecting health service delivery in the region in several ways. Rural areas are served by either unqualified health workers or lack health services, inter-country inequalities are higher, there are over-bloated hospitals and clinics with irregular nurse–patient and doctor–patient ratios and an increased cost of training health personnel to meet increased

demand—in addition to increased queues of patients at hospitals and clinics. All these factors have led to a near collapse of the health system in SSA.

6.2 The Education Sector

International migration has manifested in the education sector, and since the level of a country's civilisation is measured by its quality of education, the sector faces numerous imbalances. Studies show that the poor countries where teachers' wages are often below the international poverty threshold appear to be vulnerable under the increasing teachers' exodus. According to Ranga (2015, p. 258), half the primary and post-primary teachers in Zimbabwe left the country in 1997 because of the political and economic disasters. In effect, Hurst (2014, p. 3) suggests that SSA is prone to losing its skilled talent to the more resourced countries like China, Canada, Qatar or the UK—because those countries have better economic and social security compared to SSA. It appears that the notion of teachers' exodus is not an isolated case—but rather a regional challenge for SSA. Whilst Hurst raises the social and economic security concerns as key push factors, recent studies reveal that teachers' decision to move, in some countries like South Africa, is motivated by several non-monetary factors—including the school curriculum, deprivation and systemic encumbrances (Manik 2014, p. 156). This appears to show that the push factors for teachers' exodus from the less-developing countries are multifaceted.

Studies suggest that when teachers migrate from a poor underresourced country, the education system of that country is weakened due to inadequacies in the number and quality of teaching staff. Crush et al. (2015, p. 364) reveal that most migrants to Canada, the USA and Australia are usually educated with comparatively high skills which are essential for the education system in Southern Africa. Once a huge wave of the skilled workforce such as teachers migrate from a country, not only does the country's education system weaken but the quality of scientific innovation and research are compromised in the long run. For example, several tertiary institutions in SSA have lost many scientists and upcoming scientists—who could lead the region to a better status if they had stayed behind. According to John (2015), South Africa needs 20,000–30,000 teachers per annum, but it is only able to recruit about 17,000 teachers—thus leaving an outright teacher deficit of 3000–13,000 per annum. This condition has caused Southern Africa's pupil–teacher ratio to increase from 10–19 in Swaziland to 30–39 in Mozambique, Zambia and South Africa (Huebler 2008).

It is hard to estimate the consequences of the emigration of the workforce on SSA's education system. Whilst the push factors for teachers' flight are multifaceted in terms of social and economic insecurity, school curriculum, deprivation and systematic encumbrances, the effects are massive. This includes weakening of the education system due to a huge student–teacher ratio and a shortage of scientific innovation and research.

7 A Framework for Responding to Service Delivery Challenges

Regulatory and policy concerns are often seen to be amongst the main hindrances to authorities providing services to migrants. Improving the quality of services offered by countries calls for a handy policy that is flexible in its application and one that embeds the humane response to migrants' needs as reflected in the country's Constitution. The discussion has, however, shown that often it is not a lack of supporting policy and/or legislation that prevents access to public services by migrants. This can be mainly due to a lack of resources in public entities—but also due to prejudice and bias against migrants.

Authorities, predominantly those in areas where migrants are settled, face very high levels of financial and capacity constraints—and most services are often run at deficit. Adopting public–private partnerships for investment projects that directly benefit the migrants and allow them to become self-reliant in the medium-term term is by far the most sustainable step to sustainable management of refugees (Holsher et al. 2014, p. 190). Indeed, this discussion has shown how Faith-based organisations, Community-based organisations and national and international NGOs have often assisted in ensuring service provision to migrants.

8 Conclusion

Existing literature and practices concerning the effects of migration on service delivery demonstrate a muddling of policies on one hand and meddling by both the sending and receiving countries on the other hand. It should be noted that international and national instruments, though often well developed, lack sufficient implementation at the appropriate levels. This is due to, amongst others, a lack of capacity and resources coupled with a lack of enthusiasm by relevant government personnel to execute the policies. Domestic practices confirm that some governments in SSA have muddled up policies regarding regulation of emigration and immigration leading to the noticeable incidences of service delivery deficiencies. Governments spend enormous resources on skilling the personnel needed to provide services—but fail to shield them from external inducements—the pull factors. A related factor is that continental politics have dogged the development of strategies; condoned poor governance in some countries; pledged to enhance the working conditions for domestic personnel as an alternative to putting into action the good practices; and, to some extent, have used many resources in an attempt to control emigration. This is often done instead of tackling the actual problems regarding push factors such as poor governance, maladministration and low salaries.

The discussion in this contribution shows that both emigration and immigration significantly impact service delivery in the SSA region and beyond. Whilst national

policies were expected to be effective in reducing the rate of emigration from SSA, domestic conditions continue to create push factors that contribute to global trends of migration. The implication of this is that domestic conditions have to be approached from the global perspectives on migration. The Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa (CoRMSA 2008, p. 6), for example, advocates a paradigm shift in the policy framework and suggests a shift from controlling migration to managing it. This would imply embracing a trade-off between domestic policy frameworks on migration and attitudes to migrants—as a necessary step to correcting some of the existing challenges. In essence, this would involve adopting appropriate regulatory measures and policy frameworks. It would also require a commitment to address the financial or capacity constraints in both the migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries. Most importantly, however, is the need for awareness campaigns that respond to the, often, erroneous perceptions on migrants. Such campaigns should endeavour to nurture the view that all people, including migrants, are not only as recipients of service delivery development but also as would-be drivers of development that contributes to improved public services.

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Gender, Migration and Crisis in Southern Africa: Contestations and Tensions in the Informal Spaces and 'Illegal Labour' Market

Hangwelani Hope Magidimisha

1 Introduction

Southern Africa has a long history of cross-border migration. So much 'more' has been written and so much 'less' has been said about the feminisation of this phenomenon. Using gendered lens, globally, there is evidence of the feminisation of migrant flows, with women increasingly migrating as independent migrants in their own rights and not merely as dependents or trailing spouses (Crush 2008). Although Southern Africa's long history of cross-border migration has been coloured by dominance of male migrant labour to the South African mining industry, women have also engaged in movement across the region's borders for purposes of seeking work. Evidence suggests that female migration in the region, especially to South Africa, has increased significantly over the past 10–20 years, but little is known about the nature of migrant women's situation and their impact on the host countries, nor about the changing patterns of male and female migration over the past decades (ibid).

Internal, intra-regional and international migration in Southern Africa takes place within diverse socio-ethnic, political and economic contexts. Unstable politics, ethno-religious conflicts, poverty and rapidly growing populations fuel migration pressure. Distinctive forms of migration characterise different regions, but unlike in other world regions, Southern Africa is largely characterised by intra-regional migration. These intricate configurations are changing dynamically and are reflected in increasing female migration, diversification of migration destinations, transformation of labour flows into commercial migration, emigration of skilled professionals from the region, migration of non-professional personnel and the

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illegal perspective and/or the informality, which comes with migration (Crush et al. 2005b).

In spite of its rich and diversified resources, Southern Africa is amongst the world's poorer sub-regions, and most of the component countries are ranked low in terms of human development indicators. The standards of living continue to deteriorate with the exception of fewer countries within the region. There are not yet as encouraging signs of improvements in social conditions as many countries have failed to create jobs, despite pursuing stringent structural adjustment policies. In reality, the already poor social conditions of individuals and families are rendered poorer by the governments' approach to the social welfare issues of the people, and families have withstood the worst of governments malfunctioning. Whether by default or by design, be it globalisation or other driving circumstances, women are on the move, and more than ever, the region has seen a surge in the number of women involved in migration over the past decades.

As much as people are more involved in migration now than any other epoch in history, migrants are not immune to the difficulties of migration. Immigrants usually experience greater difficulties than other groups in accessing services and hence in exercising their rights, because of cultural problems and discriminatory policies and practices in host countries. Migrants and refugees who are not considered citizens with full rights may be denied access; they are often scapegoats, face xenophobic reactions by the local population and may be expelled when economic and political conditions deteriorate. With that being said, the situation of a woman can be precarious, and worse off that of a migrant woman, it can be more traumatic. It is at this juncture that this chapter focuses on 'feminisation of migration' in pursuit of a deeper understanding of female migrants' situation. A field that has been relatively silent yet salient in the migration research field for so long.

2   Involvement of Women in International Migration

It is commonplace to find women migrating with their husbands or under the surveillance and protection of menfolk. As far as gender differences in individual migration are concerned, it is probably true to say that independent movement is more likely amongst men than women, especially where there is strong cultural pressure for women to remain under the protection of menfolk. It is important to note that whilst women might migrate as individuals, decisions on their movement may be strongly defined by other members of the family unit or kin group (Chant 1992).

The migration of women has always been an important component of international migration. As of the beginning of this century, the United Nations Population Division estimates that 49% of all international migrants were women or girls and that the proportion of women amongst international migrants had reached 51% in more developed regions. Women often migrate officially as dependent family members of other migrants or migrate to marry someone in another country. Female

migrants are, however, increasingly part of flows of migrant workers, moving on their own to become the principal wage earners for their families. Most migrant women move voluntarily, but women and girls are also forced migrants leaving their countries in order to flee conflict, persecution, environmental degradation, natural disasters or other situations that affect their security, livelihood or habitat (Crush et al. 2015).

As a key organising principle of society, gender is central to any discussion of the causes and consequences of international migration, including the process of decision-making involved and the mechanisms leading to migration. Previous approaches to documenting and understanding international migration have often disregarded the migration of women. Analytical frameworks either ignored the participation of women in international migration and their contributions or assumed that the causes and consequences of international migration were similar for migrant women and migrant men, thus avoiding an investigation of how migration and its outcomes differ by gender.

2.1 Trends in Women Migration

In Southern Africa, the trends in migration have changed and of recent interest is the migration of women. There are also those who migrate illegally on a seasonal basis for trading purposes to sell arts and crafts in countries of their preference like South Africa and to buy commodities for resale back in their countries of origin. Due to political unrest in some countries in the SADC region, some have migrated to seek asylum whilst some people are trafficked into the country by human trafficking rings (Cross 2006).

The migration of women across borders is not a new phenomenon. Most women who migrated were employed in the agricultural and domestic sectors. Much of the movement was concealed as migration laws were strict on women and they were only allowed entry into the country as dependents. Most women who migrate are said to do so for informal trading; as mentioned above, they enter to buy goods for resale back in their country of origin (Cross 2006). Women are said to be staying for shorter periods than men (Tevera and Zinyama 2002). That is because due to gender inequality women have limited education and hence their confinement to unregulated sectors of the economy like informal trade, domestic work and prostitution (Roberts 2007). Another trend that has been identified in the migration of women is that due to the difficulty of migration channels they resort to illegal migration channels. Although they have higher education, they are employed in low-skilled labour settings (Crush et al. 2005a).

3 Gender and Migration in the Development Context

Granting that migration only now emerging as a development issue, migration may lead to development in receiving communities through the contribution of labour and skills. On the other hand, remittances and diaspora investment can provide much-needed economic support to sending communities. However, the labour and skills that are brought in, and in turn who benefits from it, depend on gender segregated labour markets and gendered migration policies which provide differential opportunities for women and men. Sometimes immigration policies push 'unskilled' women workers into irregular and more risky migration channels. Migration may also hinder development through the social disruption of displacement due to conflict, or through 'brain drain' and possible increases in HIV/AIDS rates, to which women and men are at different risks.

Migrant women display considerable agency. They contribute to the economic development of their countries of destination through their competencies and skills and to that of their countries of origin through their remittances and their increased experience when they return to those countries. Often, migrant women help other family members to migrate by paying for the costs of the move. As migrants, women are sources of remittances that might be used to improve the well-being of other family members and foster economic growth. In countries of destination, migrant women work to improve their own and their family's standards of living, and they often press for changed gender relations within their families. The Southern African region has a long history of cross-border migration and associated flows of remittances. Cross-border economic migration in the region has been dominated by male migrant labour (Crush 2008), although apparently migrant women's number in the region has stated to hike at an alarming rate.

3.1 Gender in Changing Migration Patterns and Processes of Migration

There are common prevailing stereotypes of Southern African migration to South Africa, for example, an image of highly formalised system of male migrant labour to the South African labour market and the perception that all migrants are male. Some are an accurate representation of reality, although there are a number of myths and misconceptions about how the system operates, as well as about the migrants themselves (Van Onselen 2001). Nonetheless, the changing patterns of migration in response to increased urban livelihood insecurities affect gender relations and rural land and natural resource management. Increased mobility in southern Africa has translated to increased migration by women, even though it is important to note that in terms of numbers, the balance of migration still weighs more towards men than women.

The participation of women in migration depends on the social roles of women, their autonomy and capacity to make decisions, their access to resources and the existing gender stratification in countries of origin and destination. Gender inequality can be a powerful factor leading to migration when women have economic, political and social expectations that cannot be realised in the country of origin. As with any migrant, the migration outcomes for women vary depending on whether their movement is voluntary or forced, and on whether their presence in the receiving country is legal or not.

Women migrate to work abroad in response to gender-specific labour demand in countries of destination that reflects existing values, norms, stereotypes and hierarchies based on gender. Thus, although laws regarding the admission of migrant workers are generally gender neutral, the demand for domestic workers, nurses and entertainers focuses on the recruitment of migrant women.

Women participate in the informal sector, trading in agricultural produce and other goods obtained from urban areas and sold in their home areas. Hughes (2007) notes that at border posts between South Africa and Zimbabwe, 70% of traders are women. The increased mobility of women, as a result, should be seen in terms of filling occupational niches that have thus far not been taken up by men. Whilst women have filled some occupational niches on the rural–urban continuum, their influence on how the income generated should be used is little understood. Most migrant women, employed in the informal sector with low incomes, have few prospects of settling and integrating in destination countries.

3.2 Gendered Occupational Changes and Demographic of Mobility and Migration

Increased mobility and migration in southern Africa is characterised by changes in the composition, direction and duration of migration. 'Feminisation' of migration in terms of 'shifts in the character of women's movements' and occupation as compared to an actual increase in their numbers is evident (Crush et al. 2007). Women's migration patterns are part of occupational diversification, which is different from the labour-intensive diversification for men predominant in the past. Women are mostly involved in the informal sector, participating in cross-border trading (Mutopo 2014; Dodson 2000) and working in the service industry, in hotels and tourists resorts (Tacoli 2002). Ironically, the mobility and occupational shifts for women reflect the limited home employment opportunities and declining migrant labour employment opportunities for men than a desire on the part of women to endure the hardships involved in migration and informal trading.

The male domination of rural–urban migration to work on the mines and farms still endures, but women are also more mobile and filling occupational niches largely related to the informal sector. Posel (2004) also notes employment statistics for women increasing in urban jobs compared to men. According to Dodson (2000),

the changing gender face of migration is due to women's responses to increasing hardships whilst on the other hand Bryceson (2002) sees this from a social transformation perspective, with women migrants becoming more independent and escaping social and family constraints. However, women also endure hardships in migration, such as the prospects for abuse and the pressures of maintaining activities in the rural homes whilst at the same time generating an income. The shift in migration patterns raises important questions for rural land uses and the management of natural resources. Women in southern Africa and elsewhere on the continent are recognised as the main workers of the land and collectors of natural resources, accounting for up to 70–80% of household food production in sub-Saharan Africa (Quisumbing et al. 1995). Thomas-Slayter and Sodikoff (2001) not only show the centrality of women to food production but indicate that women can also increase environmental sustainability and economic productivity if they are vested with land use management decisions.

3.3   Impact of Women Migration to the Host Community, Sending Countries and Themselves

In the societies of destination, gender relations and hierarchies as well as policies or practices leading to gender inequities condition the effects of migration for migrant women. The legal status of migrant women, the gender norms implicit in admission regulations and general attitudes to migrants are also important factors influencing the subsequent experiences of migrant women and the impact of their migration on countries of destination.

Conventions, laws and practices governing the rights of women and migrants in receiving countries affect migrant women. Women who are recruited as domestic workers or those who are unauthorised workers in the country of destination are particularly vulnerable. Depending on the receiving country, they may have no protection or recourse in case of abuse. Migrant women are also affected by gender inequality in the society of destination.

Given the centrality of women in food production and their increased migration, it is significant to look at the potential impacts of this mobility in terms of changing land uses and natural resource management. A couple of issues are important in considering these linkages. The first is that, generally in southern Africa, migrant women who enter the job market in urban areas tend to have a broader range of social and economic links with their rural relatives (Smit 1998). Their ties with relatives and places of origin tend to be more enduring that those of migrant men. Secondly, the work and activities that women undertake during migrations, trading and the informal sector, allow them to spend some time at their rural homes. Mutopo (2014) notes Zimbabwean women engaging in temporary migration between Zimbabwe and South Africa often sell agricultural produce from their own gardens and fields and return home to sell goods sourced from the urban areas.

The evolving role of men is less clear and questions need to be raised if this translates into men's increased roles in food production.

The structural mechanisms and social setting of female migration are highly dependent on the line of work being pursued (Dodson 2000). Whilst women move in order to escape economic deprivation, lack of education often restricts them to unskilled jobs such as commercial sex work, informal trading, agricultural labour or domestic work. Studies in Lesotho have shown how increasing retrenchments on the gold mines in particular have led to an increase in migration by Basotho women seeking work on South African farms (Brummer 2002). Henceforth, this puts migrant women on vulnerable grounds.

3.4 Vulnerability of Migrant Women

The main concern is that whilst the overall feminisation of international migration is increasing, the vulnerability of women migrants to discrimination, exploitation and abuse is also likely to increase (Kawar 2004). Refugee women and girls or those who are displaced are particularly vulnerable when they find themselves in situations where their security cannot be ensured and where they may be subject to sexual violence or exploitation. Providing women and children who are refugees or displaced access to food and other essential items is critical, as is their participation in decisions regarding their future and that of their families.

The trafficking of women and girls for prostitution and forced labour is one of the fastest growing areas of international criminal activity. Women who are trafficked are the most vulnerable of all migrants as the process of trafficking involves exploitation, coercion and the abuse of power. Trafficking builds on existing gender inequalities. Trafficked women frequently originate from regions where there are few employment opportunities for women and where women are dependent on others and lack access to resources to change their situation. Trafficked women and girls often believe they will work in legitimate occupations but find themselves trapped into forced prostitution, marriage, domestic work, sweatshops and other forms of exploitation that are similar to slavery (Kropiwnicki 2010).

Whatever their diverse reasons for travel, migrants often find themselves separated from their spouses, families and familiar social and cultural norms. They may experience language barriers, substandard living conditions, exploitative working conditions and a lack of social protection, such as health insurance and other social security benefits. The resulting isolation and stress may lead migrant workers to engage in risky behaviours, such as unsafe sex or drug use, and they may face sexual violence and other human rights abuses (Collinson 2010).

Spouses separated for longer periods of time for economic and social reasons can find themselves in situations of increased vulnerability. For women who now migrate and leave their spouses, the economic challenges and food insecurity that precipitated their migration may continue. Thus, they may be forced to exchange

sex for food or money. In some cases, they end up being involved in illegal adventures to make ends meet (ibid).

In principle, regular labour migration for jobs which are in demand should stimulate economic growth and promote cultural diversity or integration. However, most of the times migrant workers face negative reactions, sometimes taking the form of open racism. Migrants are perceived as taking away jobs from the native population despite the fact that migrant workers, especially women, usually perform the jobs that the native population shun. Governments lack effective enforcement mechanisms with regard to management of migration, especially with regard to illegal recruiters and employers who violate rights of migrant workers (Crush 2008).

The irregular migration of women and children in the region sometimes takes the form of trafficking and smuggling, sometimes because of political instability or conflict. The majority of women caught in a trafficking scheme become indentured to the sex industry and are forced to pay off an inordinate debt. Research done by IOM in 2003 found that the human trafficking routes in Southern Africa occur between neighbouring countries, within countries themselves and from countries in this region to other areas of the world (Martens et al. 2003). Furthermore, South Africa was found to be a frequent destination for victims of trafficking because of its relative wealth and therefore market for sex workers. For example, an estimated 1000 Mozambican women are trafficked into the Johannesburg sex industry every year.

Promises of work and educational opportunities in South Africa lure impoverished women not only from countries in Southern Africa but also from other countries such as China, Thailand and Eastern Europe. In all of these arrangements, the women are coerced into debts that must be paid off through sex work. The IOM study also reported that there have been cases where male refugees in Cape Town, South Africa, have recruited female family members (girlfriends, nieces, cousins) by deception (false offers of employment) from their home countries (Burundi, DRC, Angola, Rwanda and Ethiopia) to be sexually exploited in South Africa (Martens et al. 2003). Desperation makes women from refugee-producing countries highly vulnerable to the deceptive recruitment tactics of traffickers, particularly male family relations. The sexual exploitation of these women compromises their health and makes them highly vulnerable to sexually transmitted infection, including HIV (Brummer 2002).

Some evidence suggests that migrant women who work as traders or agricultural labourers supplement their incomes with transactional sex (IOM and JICA 2004). It is important to note that migrant women who engage in transactional sex to supplement their incomes do not necessarily identify themselves as sex workers (Preston-White 1996). Informal traders, for example, have been exposed to sexual harassment and rape by officials when crossing borders and by truckers or taxi drivers whilst travelling to and from markets and other sales sites. In fact, migrant women regularly use sex as a tool to obtain food, transport, tolerance or sometimes employment opportunities if there are available (Campbell et al. 1998).

4 Informal Labour Market

Informal employment in developing regions such as Africa is characterised by a number of traits (Avirgan et al. 2005). Besides the high proportion of women and self-employment, there are also a number of other defining characteristics of informal workers in terms of education levels, wages (and hence, poverty), hours worked and overall employment conditions. In particular, informal employment is characterised by the lack of decent work or deficits in comparison with employment in the formal segment of the economy (Verick 2006).

South Africa has a relatively small informal sector compared to other sub-Saharan African countries. The percentage of foreign-born migrants working in the informal sector is almost twice as high as that of locally born non-migrants, whilst there is no difference between locally born non-migrants and locally born migrants in this respect. There are several possible explanations for this. One is that the informal sector has the lowest entry cost into the labour market. Another is that foreign-born migrants overwhelmingly come from African countries with large informal sectors. They may therefore be importing types of activities that are prevalent in their countries of origin (McDonald 2000).

Foreign-born migrants are much more frequently in precarious employment than locally born non-migrants and locally born migrants. They share this situation with most migrants around the world. Foreign-born migrants are more likely to have poor working conditions and to occupy positions that locally born workers are not ready to accept.

4.1 Migrant Women in the Informal Economy

With the intensification of globalisation and migration, women started entering urban areas in large numbers, as the migrant labour system began taking its toll on family life and subsistence cultivation in rural areas was put under severe strain. Largely unable to find domestic work because the profession was monopolised by men (Van Onselen 2001), women sought alternative ways to ensure financial security. At the same time, the state was attempting to control black urbanisation, particularly the brewing of beer (Bryceson 2002). For the most part, however, women successfully resisted police attempts at controlling their presence (Crush et al. 2015). The state being then unable to control women's movements in urban areas, the regulation of women's presence and their informal activities in urban areas was equally difficult.

The extent and nature of mobile entrepreneurship and the opportunities and challenges confronting migrant entrepreneurs are under-researched in Africa in general and Southern Africa in particular. Policy-makers similarly undervalue their contribution to the informal economy and employment generation in countries of destination and origin. Citizens and officials often view informal migrant

entrepreneurs with suspicion, if not hostility. In part, this is because central and municipal governments see them as increasing the growth of an informal sector that they want tamed, if not eradicated. In addition, it is because they are mistakenly seen as all 'illegal immigrants' in regular times and, by definition, engaged in illicit activities (Crush et al. 2015).

In sub-Saharan urban setting, women have historically dominated much of the informal economy; as noted by Magidimisha and Gordon (2015) women dominated informal manufacturing and the retail trade. From an early period in the evolution of migrant labour, many African women first came to the cities to work in the informal sector. State officials were mainly concerned about beer brewers and prostitutes, but migrant women's informal sector activities have now widened their horizon of influence in the informal sector to include hawking, laundry, dressmaking, sewing, gambling, traditional medicine and trading. The experience of earning an income outside of the formal structures that sanctioned black women's presence in urban areas did, however, unite these experiences in some ways (Phillips and James 2014).

5 Informal Traders

Informal trade has grown significantly since the end of Apartheid in South Africa, both within South Africa and between South Africa and other countries in the region (Peberdy 2000). Traders include people who travel for short periods to buy goods to take back to their home country; people who are involved in two-way trade; people who only sell in another country; and people who buy and sell across more than two countries.

Informal cross-border traders are better described as small entrepreneurs who carry goods across one or more of the borders in the region. They are called informal because generally they travel with their goods, operate on a relatively small scale, do not access preferential tariff agreements, often buy and/or sell in informal sector markets, do not always pass through formal import and export channels and may be involved in smuggling. Most goods traded include fruit, vegetables, mattresses, stereos, household goods, fish, shellfish, handicrafts, curios, wire, crochet work and coal (Peberdy 2002).

Although cross-border traders are informal, they are not necessarily illegal (ibid). In general, the majority of informal cross-border traders are female, relatively young and single. One study indicated that 80% of traders going to South Africa from Zimbabwe were women (Nyatanga et al. 2000), whilst another found that over 70% of traders between Mozambique and South Africa were women (Peberdy 2002). The same study found that of the women respondents, 36% were married, 42% were single parents and 22% widowed (Nyatanga et al. 2000), which denotes that informal trade is a backbone of their livelihood.

Participation in informal trade provides opportunities for women's economic empowerment. However, legislative and regulatory frameworks may intentionally

or inadvertently create conditions that favour male over female traders. For example, in Botswana, married women cannot open a bank account or obtain credit without their husband's support. Concerns for personal safety and their goods may lead to different patterns of travel and forms of transport for male and female traders. Women may also be particularly vulnerable to sexual assault and extortion, including demands for sexual favours from officials at border crossings or truck drivers. A study conducted in towns along the Namibia/Angola border revealed that immigration and customs officials sometimes demanded sex from informal traders in exchange for not having their goods seized or being charged high fees to import their goods (Nduru 2004).

In order to avoid paying customs duties, some informal cross-border traders negotiate with truckers to cross with their goods, and wait for all the trucks to cross the border before they can continue with their journey. If one of the trucks is delayed, the trader may have to stay at the border post until the truck is cleared. In some cases, traders are turned back by immigration officials because of insufficient foreign currency, which leads some traders to spend up to 2 weeks at the border post trying to raise the required money. As a result, some female traders may engage in transactional sex with moneychangers, uniformed personnel, truck drivers or other local men in order to raise the required foreign currency and secure decent overnight accommodation for the duration of their stay. However, women are seen as more involved when it comes to informal trading than men (Crush et al. 2005a).

6 Domestic Workers

Domestic work has become a major employment absorber for migrant women. However, this group represents a vulnerable group because they often work in social isolation, have low levels of education and are exposed to poor working conditions, which include lack of privacy and low wages. Domestic work includes cleaning, cooking and caring for the young and elderly. Domestic work is generally considered an undervalued activity and therefore mostly done by people from disadvantaged social groups. Few domestic workers have any kind of written contract, paid leave or benefits, which equally qualifies them to fit into the informal sector category. A significant proportion of domestic workers are migrant workers. Their vulnerability also lies in their social isolation and vulnerability in the workplace. Employers often place restrictions on domestic workers having visitors and prevent husbands, partners and children from living with them.

In more recent times, domestic work has similarly shaped the way young migrant black women think about themselves and their urban presence in the face of the criminalising discourse of 'loose women' propagated by both black and white patriarchs. Domestic workers have aligned themselves robustly with ideas of hardworking Christian virtue (Kawar 2004). However, in the more recent literature on domestic and female respectability, there is also mention, albeit, of the difficulties of maintaining 'the good Christian life' (Tacoli 2002). Many domestic workers

have needed, for example, to supplement their incomes through other activities, morally or immorally. Despite these inconsistencies, domestic work nonetheless gives them a certain defensive identity in the face of the range of experiences they have had whilst working in the cities (Kawar 2004).

7   Conclusion

The trends in migration have changed and of recent interest to this article was the migration of women in Southern African region. There is evidence of the feminisation of migrant flows, with women increasingly migrating as independent migrants in their own rights, unlike before where they had to travel as dependents of their spouse. Amongst other causes of migration in Southern Africa, unstable politics, ethno-religious conflicts, poverty and rapidly growing populations fuel migration pressure.

Owing to the emerging migration discourse as a development issue, migration is like a double-edged sword; it cuts on both sides; in other words, it present, opportunities and threats to both migrant sending and receiving countries: migration brain drain whilst providing remittance to the sending countries. It provides skills and economic development whilst increasing pressure on the limited resources and grooms criminal and/or immoral activities in the receiving countries.

The impact of migration to women is like two sides of the same coin; it can provide a vital source of income for migrant women and their families and earn them greater autonomy, self-confidence and social status. At the same time, women migrants, especially if they are irregular migrants, can face stigma and discrimination at every stage of the migration cycle. Before departure, women can be faced with gender-biased procedures and corrupt agents. In fact, gender discrimination, poverty and violence can provide the impetus for women to migrate or enable women to be trafficked in the first place. During transit and at their destination women can be faced with verbal, physical and sexual abuse, poor housing and encampments, sex-segregated labour markets, low wages, long working hours, insecure contracts and precarious legal status. Moreover, upon return to the source country they may be faced with broken families, illness and poverty (Jolly and Reeves 2005).

With the intensification of globalisation and migration, women started entering urban areas in large numbers and basically occupy the informal sector. Largely, due to the inability to find formal work or domestic work because the profession was monopolised by men, women sought alternative ways to ensure financial security and thereafter finding themselves in very vulnerable circumstances. Thus, they may be forced to exchange sex for food or money. In some cases, they end up being involved in illegal activities to make ends meet. The same goes with migrant women who are involved in informal trade. However, despite the precarious character of informal work, migrant women are able to achieve some permanence in the destination countries.

In trying to encapsulate femanisation of migration, it is important to understand the causes and consequences of international migration from a gender perspective because hierarchical social relations related to gender shape the migration experiences of migrants, whether male or female. Understanding whether migration occurs because of gender inequality or whether migration itself helps to perpetuate gender disparities is important to guide the formulation of policy and measures to address the specific needs of women who migrate.

In addition to research that fully examines the factors that propel women into migration, more studies should be done on migrant women's involvement in the informal sector and their dependence on sex to survive. Finally, it is imperative to explore inequalities at the structural level, including lack of economic opportunity, political and legal inequities and injustices suffered by women. Research that examines structural, social and community issues is vital to addressing the current condition of migrant women and migrants in general. Clearly, it is necessary to review gender differences in order to articulate the problem, identify solutions and promote state action (Magidimisha and Gordon 2015).

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Part II
The Post-colonial Political Economy of Development, Governance and Nation-State Formation

Migration, Logics of Inclusion and Exclusion and Xenophobia: The Case of African Migrants in Post-apartheid South Africa

Inocent Moyo, Christopher Changwe Nshimbi, and Trynos Gumbo

1 Introduction

In April 2015, large-scale xenophobic attacks broke out in the South African province of KwaZulu-Natal and soon spread to other provinces, such as Gauteng. (Sowetan 2015a, b, c; Sunday Times 2015a, b, c).

The consequent xenophobic attacks left a 22-year-old Ethiopian shop owner dead on 10 April 2015 from burn wounds suffered after their shop in Umlazi, Durban, was torched (Sunday Times 2015a, b, c). In the Durban Central Business District (CBD), there were violent and bloody confrontations between South Africans and African migrants (Sowetan 2015a, b, c; The Citizen 2015). As these attacks spread to Johannesburg in Gauteng Province, there was mayhem and destruction. African migrants were attacked and displaced in areas near Germiston in the East Rand (Sowetan 2015a, b, c). Shops owned by African migrants were looted in Jeppestown (De Klerk 2015; Hawker 2015). Similar incidents were reported in Alexandra, Johannesburg (Aboobaker 2015), which led to the brutal murder of a 35-year-old Mozambican vendor on 18 April 2015, by four South African men.

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The April 2015 xenophobic attacks prompted the President of the Republic of South Africa, Mr. Jacob Zuma, to convene a stakeholders meeting and another with representatives of African migrants. The Zulu King also called *an Indaba*[1] on 20 April 2015, in which he condemned the xenophobic attacks. He stated that his speech the month before had been misunderstood and misinterpreted by the media. The Zulu King[2] suggested that the media was to blame for the violent xenophobic rage and asserted that his comments only referred to the deportation of illegal immigrants (The Guardian 2015).

Violent and brutal attacks of African migrants are not new to South Africa. In 2008, xenophobic conflict in the country left over 60 people dead (Landau 2012). The horrific highlight of the 2008 attacks was the beating, stabbing and setting alight of a Mozambican immigrant, Ernesto Alfabeto Nhamuave, in Ramaphosa informal settlement in the East Rand, Gauteng Province. His murder was followed by a strong denouncement of xenophobia by the South African government. However, brutal and gruesome attacks on African migrants resurfaced in 2015, suggesting that decrying xenophobia in the strongest possible terms is not enough.

In our discussion of xenophobia in this chapter, there is no attempt to reduce it to a South African exceptionalism. Other countries in Southern Africa such as Namibia and Botswana are also said to show intolerance towards African migrants (Campbell 2010). In fact, studies suggest that globally, there is a generally xenophobic attitude against people who are assumed to have transgressed 'national territory and sovereignty or are poised to do so' (Mawadza and Crush 2010, p. 364). A case in point relates to migrants from outside the European Union (EU). They face stricter immigration regimes, because 'European countries display negative attitudes towards immigrants in general and immigration in particular' (Davidov and Meuleman 2012, p. 770). In addition, immigration policies against migrants from other African countries have been generally tightened in Britain (Barou et al. 2012). A United Kingdom (UK) study of asylum and refugee regimes by Stewart and Mulvey (2014) suggests a generally exclusivist tendency. In France, immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa 'cannot enjoy the benefits of the French welfare system and instead depend on the solidarity of their countrymen' (Barou 2012, p. 89). In Britain, other African migrants 'had experienced discrimination and prejudice in employment, education and everyday neighbourhood spaces' (Waite and Aigner 2012, p. 121). In the wake of Brexit, there are indications that Britain

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[1]An important consultation, council or conference called by Zulu or Xhosa izinDuna (headmen) or King in South Africa.

[2]Following complaints that the statements by the Zulu King on 15 March 2015 incited xenophobic attacks, the South African Human Rights Commission investigated the King. In a statement on 30 September 2016, the Human Rights Commission cleared the Zulu King of hate speech (https://www.enca.com/south-africa/sahrc-clears-zulu-king-of-hate-speech).The Commission stated that although the statements by the King "were hurtful and harmful" to the migrants, "there was no causal link between them and the xenophobia attacks, which left seven people dead" (http://ewn.co.za/2016/09/30/SAHRC-clears-King-Zwelithini-of-hate-speech-after-migrant-comments) (Accessed 30 September 2016).

will tighten even further its immigration regime. This is because the concern over free movement was one of the reasons the British voted for Brexit (Helm 2016; Mason and Smith 2016), that is, for Britain to leave the EU.

However, xenophobia in South Africa is unique in its selection of African migrants. For this reason, the issue of African migrants in South Africa appears to be compelling in terms of their being targeted and blamed for problems afflicting South Africa. This is indeed despite the fact that South Africa receives migrants from not only other African countries but other parts of the world too. For example, with the only exception of Zimbabwe and Nigeria, non-African countries including India, China, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the United Kingdom (UK) recorded higher numbers of temporary residence permits (TRPs) issued by South Africa's Department of Home Affairs (DHA) to their respective nationals than to those of African countries (Statistics South Africa 2014, p. 17). Out of all TRPs issued to foreigners by DHA in 2013, 18.5% were issued to Zimbabweans and 10.1% to Nigerians, representing the top two recipients of this type of permits. India, China, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the UK ranked third to seventh representing 7.7%, 6.7%, 5.6%, 4.0%, and 3.8%, respectively, of the total TRPs issued. These were ahead of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Lesotho, which were issued 2.7%, respectively, and Angola, 2.5% of all TRPs. Amongst the top ten recipients of TRPs, African and overseas countries have more or less the same number of documented nationals on TRPs in South Africa. The actual figures were 37,324 and 35,851, respectively, reflecting a difference of only 1473 more TRPs issued to African migrants (Statistics South Africa 2014).

Against this background, this chapter contributes to debates on xenophobia in South Africa and argues that a factor that contributes towards xenophobic tendencies in the country lies in the historical stigmatisation and suspicion of migrants and migration. This has provided a basis for the way in which African migrants in South Africa are constructed and (mis)represented. The construction and (mis) representation of the African migrant establishes the underlying conditions for a xenophobic discourse: one that exists even before xenophobic violence erupts. Because of this, the following questions arise: how does the historical debate around migration inform the exclusivist South African identity, and how/in what ways does it marginalise African migrants in the country, leading to xenophobia or xenophobic attacks?

After this introduction, the rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 frames the theoretical context within which xenophobia and xenophobic violence against African migrants in South Africa can be understood. It adopts the *Othering* theory and specifically places the African migrants in Michlic's (2006) notion of the 'threatening other', to demonstrate the way in which the African migrant is perceived and constructed as a problem that should be excluded and eliminated from South Africa. Section 3 briefly reviews the literature on the historical construction of the other in South Africa and the broader context of 'othering'. The next section considers the construction of xenophobia by the state, based on the othering of African migrants. The last section concludes by highlighting the need for inclusive

identity debates and logics of belonging in South Africa in the context of the wider Southern Africa and the SADC.

2   The African Migrant as the 'Threatening Other' in South Africa: Some Theoretical Considerations

International migration towards South Africa has been on the increase since 1994. Census data, for example, indicate that in 2001 South Africa hosted 687,679 migrants from the SADC region and 41,918 from the rest of Africa (Statistics South Africa 2003). Nshimbi and Fioramonti (2014, p. 57), for instance, point out, as Table 1 shows, that except for the year 2000, 2004 and 2010, the issuance of new work permits to foreign nationals by South Africa's DHA generally trended upwards from 1990 to 2011.

Projections of the number of migrants for 2011–2015 show similar upward patterns (Statistics South Africa 2013). South Africa will continue to be a destination of choice in Africa for the foreseeable future, for people seeking economic opportunities and those fleeing war and conflict, and social injustices, etc., from their home countries (Comaroff and Comaroff 2001; Adepoju 2003, 2010). The increasing numbers of African migrants in South Africa have also raised tensions between South African citizens and the migrants, as the latter are accused of

Table 1 New work permits issued by the Department of Home Affairs (DHA), South Africa, 1990–2011

Year	Number of permits
1990	7657
1991	4117
1992	5581
1993	5741
1994	8714
1995	11,053
1996	19,498
1997	11,361
1998	10,828
1999	13,163
2000	6643
2004	4185
2006	17,205
2007	19,601
2008	32,344
2009	–
2010	5926
2011	132,577

Source: Peberdy in Budlender (2013), as cited in Nshimbi and Fioramonti (2014), modified

increasing pressure on resources meant for South African citizens (Mawadza and Crush 2010).

We deploy the concept of *othering* and specifically the 'threatening other' in order to attempt to explore the context in which a xenophobic discourse against African migrants in contemporary South Africa occurs. We argue that the African migrant is perceived and portrayed as *the* problem in contemporary South Africa because of anti-African migrant tropes and imagery that exist in the country (Laher 2010; Mawadza and Crush 2010). These views can be theoretically framed in Michlic's (2006) notion of the threatening other, in which African migrants represent the problem that must be eliminated and excluded from South Africa. We relate this to the way in which Michlic explored the manner in which Poles in the different stages of the development of the Polish nation-state constructed and came to perceive Jews (with whom they had lived for many years) as the threatening other. This was accomplished by projecting the 'Jew as the chief harmful alien' (Michlic 2006, p. 76).

We thus conceptually frame the perceptions of African migrants in South Africa, in the same way Jews were always blamed for Poland's economic, political and social problems, leading to their exclusion and murder. In general, 'othering' constitutes a process of marking and naming those that are thought to be different from oneself (Grove and Zwi 2006, p. 1933). According to Grove and Zwi, 'the person or group being 'othered' experiences this as a process of marginalization, disempowerment and social exclusion', and the process itself effectively creates a binary distinction or separation between 'us' and 'them'. The 'otherness' thus constructed is maintained, according to Grove and Zwi, by ensuring that the migrants and their stories 'remain distant and strange' and enables citizens to remain unconnected to them and only exercise 'empathy without understanding' towards them. The construction of the 'other', which has its origins in the historical stigmatisation of African migrants (discussed in the next section), justifies, amongst other things, hostilities towards them, government indifference and lack of support of them, etc., as we attempt to show in the proceeding section of this chapter.

The anti-immigration debate in South Africa often resulted in negative perceptions of African migrants (Muzondidya 2010). The negativity of the debate increases the perception that these immigrants are not valuable members of the South African society (Geschiere 2010; Laher 2010; Mawadza and Crush 2010; Nyamnjoh 2010). Their presence is associated with several socio-economic challenges faced in the host country (Neocosmos 2006, 2008; Crush 2008; Daily Sun 2008a, b, p. 8, c, d, p. 2; Nyamnjoh 2006, 2007, 2010; Crush 2008; Campbell 2010; Sowetan 2010, 2012, 2011, p. 9; Sunday Times 2008, 2011, p. 21; Crush and Tawodzera 2014).

3 The Stigmatisation of Migrants in South Africa in a Historical Context

A brief historical background on migration and belonging provides a necessary foundation for a discussion on the abiding presence of xenophobic conditions in post-apartheid South Africa. Such a historicity illuminates the centrality of migration in debates on the logics of belonging, inclusion and exclusion. From the early 1900s, the South African government (then Union of South Africa) crafted various immigration laws which were designed to manage and control immigration into and protect the Union from the inflow of migrants. Some of these laws are listed in Table 2. The laws listed as 1–5 in Table 2 would, particularly, form the foundation for immigration policy exercised during the apartheid years (Peberdy 1998).

The immigration trend in South Africa was thus selective and racist up to the 1940s. Peberdy and Crush (1998, p. 29) state that, 'Immigration was a "white issue"…immigrants were by definition white…the government distinguished between desirable and undesirable whites in formulating its policies'. Those who were admitted into South Africa were strictly followed and monitored (Peberdy and Crush 1998), and people were required to carry identity documents wherever they went. For black South Africans in particular, passbooks were a must (Peberdy and Crush 1998). For this reason, during the Union of South Africa and apartheid years, people from other countries were carefully selected so that the appropriate immigration population was attained (Peberdy 1998). Domestic migration involving black South Africans was also monitored, in order to ensure that they did not pose a threat to 'white' South Africa.

The requirement for black South Africans to carry passbooks enforced the apartheid government's policy of separate development. This was enshrined in, amongst others, the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 (Act 46 of 1959); Third Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1970 (Act 49 of 1970); and Bantu Homelands Constitution of 1971 (Act 21 of 1971), which clearly outlined the creation of 'white' and 'black' South Africa. The Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 and the successive legislations were a systematic and

Table 2 Selected immigration laws, early to mid-1900s

Item	Legislation
1	Immigrants Regulation Act of 1913 (Act No.22 of 1913)
2	Immigration Quota Act of 1930 (Act No.8 of 1930)
3	Immigration Amendment Act of 1937 (Act No.27 of 1937)
4	Aliens Act of 1937 (Act No.1 of 1937)
5	Aliens Registration Act of 1939 (Act No.12 of 1939)
6	Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 (Act No.46 of 1959)
7	Third Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1970 (Act No.49 of 1970)
8	Bantu Homelands Constitution of 1971 (Act No.21 of 1971)

Source: compiled by authors from various sources

calculated way of stripping black people of their South African citizenship (O'Malley 2007), thus relegating them to second-class citizenship.

Black people could only enter 'white' South Africa as migrant labourers. This meant that they were regarded as temporary sojourners who would finally go back to the homelands (Landau 2014a). To control and regulate their movement to and within 'white' South Africa, the pass system was vigorously enforced. In essence, the strict monitoring and regulation of the movement of black people to and within 'white' South Africa 'converted' them to native foreigners and the white people became foreign natives (Neocosmos 2006) or outsiders and insiders, respectively (Nyamnjoh 2006). As native foreigners, black people were the suspicious outsiders, whenever they migrated to and within 'white' South Africa, and its privileged insiders (Neocosmos 2006). The effect of the construction of suspicious native foreigners and outsiders and privileged 'white insiders' and foreign natives increased the concern by the apartheid state to protect the latter against the former, by monitoring and regulating migration.

Migration in general, and that of blacks, was thus perceived as a threat to the apartheid regime (Landau 2014a, p. 297). This has created a continuing legacy in post-apartheid South Africa that constitutes a 'deep suspicion of those who move—particularly to urban areas—[that] continues to infuse official and popular discourses' (Landau 2014a, p. 297). The suspicion of those who migrate is not limited to South African citizens alone but extends to those from outside the country and especially other African countries. On these premises, it appears as if the South African society in its own right is fractured, with some implicit or explicit othering on the basis of suspicion and fear of those who migrate, whether from within or outside South Africa. We consider this next.

4   The Broader Context of Othering in Post-apartheid South Africa

The negative perception of internal migration in South Africa finds expression in official discourses. In a 2012 State of the Province address, the Premier of Gauteng Province declared that migrants from other provinces in South Africa were overburdening the hospitals in Gauteng (Mkhabela 2012 cited in Landau 2014a). Similarly, the Premier of the Western Cape Helen Zille expressed fears that people from the Eastern Cape were flooding the Western Cape. She labelled them refugees (Pietersen 2012 cited in Landau 2014a). Several municipalities in South Africa, thus, generally perceive internal migrants or migrants from other parts of the country negatively, as such migrants are considered to put pressure on social and physical infrastructure in host provinces (Landau et al. 2013). A study of four municipalities (including Nelson Mandela Bay, Mossel Bay, Tshwane and Merafong) revealed that municipal authorities believe that 'mobility heightens inequality and undermines counter poverty measures' and that if the municipalities

provided more houses, this would attract more migrants from other provinces (Landau et al. 2013, pp. 118–119). Internal migration is thus apparently officially perceived as a problem, despite the fact that the migrants concerned are South Africans moving from one municipality and/or province to another. This is a clear indication of the official 'othering' of South African citizens on the basis of place and/or space.

Apart from the official 'othering' of internal migrants in post-apartheid South Africa, South African citizens themselves seem fragmented and to 'other' each other. Urban populations are not a monolithic unit but divided by inter *alia* language, religion and culture (Landau 2013). Trust is thus low between different ethnic groups in places such as Johannesburg, as these groups do not present 'a community or set of overlapping institutions that are engaged in a collective project' (Landau 2014b, p. 369). This suggests that in some contexts, the South African population may display characteristics of implicit and explicit 'othering'. This perpetuates a 'cycle of antagonism and exclusion' (Landau 2011, p. 480). If urban populations in some South African cities as illustrated by the example of Johannesburg are splintered (Sangeetha and Landau 2011; Landau 2013, 2014a, b), and there is implicit or explicit 'othering', the arrival of African migrants complicates this set-up. For this reason, the history of migration and immigration has indeed bequeathed to South Africa a legacy of division and antagonism towards migrants, whether they are South African citizens or not. We turn to this by showing that the South African state intentionally or otherwise constructed the African migrant as the threatening other, based on the historical othering of those who migrate; only this time, the migrants happen to be African migrants.

5   The Sate, State Institutions and the Construction of African Migrants: A Xenophobic Metanarrative of South Africa

In common South African parlance, some South Africans refer to African migrants as hailing from Africa. This implies that the South Africans do not consider South Africa to be part of Africa. In this view, Africa is some remote part of the world from which South Africans are disconnected. This has catalysed a discourse of exceptionalism based on the perception that South Africa is an exception on the African continent due to its level of development and the rest of the continent is backward, rural and economically unstable (Mamdani 1996). The view is projected that 'Africa is in chaos and South Africa represents a haven of freedom, peace and prosperity for the continent's destitute masses' (Crush and Williams 2001, p. 1). When migrants from other parts of Africa come to South Africa, they are held to bring competition for resources and thus create a site for xenophobia and xenophobic violence. Such a view is validated by xenophobic violence such as that of 2008,

which occurred in 'marginal urban areas' (Crush and Ramachandran 2014, p. 2). This reinforces a Marxist and or neo-Marxist perception and explanation of xenophobic violence, in that there is the implication that African migrants are at 'fault' by coming to South Africa to cause more problems (Crush and Ramachandran 2014). On this point, Crush and Ramachandran (2014) argue that, whilst it is true that there is a strong correlation between xenophobic violence and 'the geography of poverty', a Marxist and neo-Marxist explanation of xenophobia seems to miss the point on several fronts.

It fails to explain why specific African migrants were targeted and why 'not all poor areas' experienced xenophobic violence, or why if poverty and competition for resources is the source of anger, 'poor South Africans were not attacking each other [. . .] it does not explain why wealthy and privileged South Africans, who do not face direct or even indirect competition from these migrants, also espouse these prejudices'. Notwithstanding the fact that African migrants constitute a small proportion of the population in South African, a Marxist and/or neo-Marxist interpretation of xenophobia reduces the relationship between the foreign migrants and South African citizens to 'economic competition between [the] citizens and "foreigners". . .[thus] resentment and antipathy towards migrants and other outsiders become inevitable aspects of the social landscape, justifying stringent controls over immigration, and exclusion (or at best very limited inclusion) of migrants. This distinction invigorates the very idea that, the presence of migrants and refugees poses a perpetual threat to 'legitimate insiders' (Crush and Ramachandran 2014, p. 2).

The increase in tension between South Africans and African migrants should not be limited to an explanation that reduces everything to mere increases in the numbers of African migrants. Although the increased numbers of these African migrants may play a role, conditions for the construction of the 'other' amongst and between different ethnic and racial groups in South Africa exist even before African migrants arrive. The implication is that in some cases there may be no 'evidence' of pressure on resources, but the mere presence of African migrants, even if they may not be many, is itself a problem. Besides, 'migrants represent a very small minority in terms of South Africa's total population, and the detrimental effects of this economic competition have been seriously overstated' (Crush and Ramachandran 2014, p. 2). For this cause, a Marxist and/or neo-Marxist explanation of xenophobia in South Africa downplays, trivialises and minimalises it to a contest over resources and hides the targeting of African migrants. This antagonistic behaviour explains the inherent xenophobic tendencies of rich South Africans against African immigrants. Such tendencies can never be justified by resource shortages.

Further, it hides the long history of migration and existence of xenophobia in South Africa. The long history of xenophobia in South Africa can be traced to the 1800s, due to the arrival of Indian indentured labourers when 'white settlers institutionalised fear of Asians' (Klotz 2013, p. 10). With this long history of xenophobia, 'overturning a century of racism reinforced xenophobia' against and redirected it towards the African migrant (Klotz 2013, p. 6), who became *the* problematic migrant after 1994. When considered thus, xenophobia is actually

not a senseless act but rather organised around what Mbembe (2015) calls an "ideology" that amounts to the negative construction of African migrants. As an organised ideology, it targets and negatively constructs some African migrants. Those from countries like 'Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are tolerated to a degree, but those from most other African countries are loathed by the majority of South Africans, with particular opprobrium reserved for Zimbabweans, Nigerians and Somalis [. . ..] the presence of migrants and their presumed negative social and economic effects on the citizenry; asserts the superiority of South Africans and inferiority of migrant groups; and manifests in acts of violence and wanton brutality against migrants and refugees' (Crush and Ramachandran 2014, p. 7). The tolerance of African migrants from small democratic nations/'Kingdoms' that are closely related to tribes in South Africa can be explained by the historical formation of such nation states.

The targeting of migrants from other African countries indicates and suggests that past migrations are no longer recognised, and indigeneity is now the condition for belonging (Neocosmos 2006). The African migrants have become the target of xenophobia as they 'have become threatening because also for the first time, they can become part of the nation (legally or otherwise) and therefore can be seen to have the potential to deprive entitled citizens of their hard won rights and access to state resources that they are entitled to as members of the nation' (Peberdy 2009, p. 168). It thus 'seems that Africans from the rest of the continent can threaten the nation and its resources' (Peberdy 2009, p. 168). This targeting of African migrants and the promotion of an exclusivist South African identity has taken place within state institutions (Neocosmos 2006). A classic example of this was the former Minister of Home Affairs Mangosuthu Buthelezi who spread xenophobic discourse to the DHA (Landau 2005).

We provide this background, in order to situate the argument that xenophobia against African migrants is 'entrenched and systemic [. . .] in South African society' (Dodson 2010, p. 8). This is diametrically opposed to the claims by former state President, Mr. Thabo Mbeki, in the wake of the 2008 xenophobic attacks, that such were acts of criminality (Crush and Ramachandran 2014). We thus argue that the ideology around the construction of African migrants as undesirable members of South Africa feeds into, nurtures and sustains an 'exclusivist South Africa' identity (Peberdy 2009) and the desire to remove and/or murder those who do not or are perceived not to belong to the post colony. Such a construction of African migrants contradicts regional and continental principles and aspirations, to which South Africa has committed.

These principles seek social cohesion amongst the peoples of member countries and to economically integrate Africa via regional economic communities into an African Economic Community (AEC) (Treaty for the Establishment of the African Economic Community 1991; SADC Treaty 1992). The construction further dampens Thabo Mbeki's promotional campaign for an African Renaissance. Apart from its history and relation to the AU founding fathers' pan-African vision for the continent, we are cognizant of the social, economic and political broadness of the 'African Renaissance' as notion. We, therefore, see a full discussion of the

notion to be beyond the scope of this chapter. In relation to the notion, however, we zero in on xenophobia and the way in which xenophobia threatens regional and continental integration, peace and unity.

This is the context within which we reflect on the underlying xenophobic narrative in South Africa, which is based on that African migrants are a threat. For instance, in the wake of the 2015 xenophobic attacks, the state President, Mr. Jacob Zuma, transmitted what could be considered a mixed if not contradictory message. While condemning xenophobic attacks, he went on to blame African countries for 'sending' their citizens to South Africa (Hunter 2015). This shifting of the blame to sending countries reflects 'denialism' of xenophobia (Crush and Ramachandran 2014, p. 1) and points to a Marxist and neo-Marxist explanation of why South African people only attacked African migrants. By arguing that African countries sent their people to South Africa, the South African president implied that those who attacked such migrants should not be blamed per se but the migrant sending countries were to blame. Further, by focusing more on and suggesting that African migrants were problematic (as they ran away from problems in their countries of origin to South Africa), the president's sentiments and attitude could be easily considered xenophobic. All this seems to fit in with the idea that the African migrant *is* the problematic other in South Africa. Moreover, and even more interesting, national leaders in South Africa deny the existence of xenophobia. For one, government has from as far back as 2008 generally delayed and been reluctant to acknowledge attacks on African migrants. Whenever authorities have issued statements on this, however, they have firstly branded such attacks on African migrants as acts of criminality.

6   Xenophobia or *Afrophobia*?

Following the 2015 attacks on African migrants, state authorities vehemently denied that South Africa was xenophobic and rather branded the occurrences as '*Afrophobia*'. In the context of this chapter, Afrophobia is viewed as the hatred of black people from African countries (Mathivha 2015). This could actually mean that the so-called Afrophobia is actually xenophobia in another form or viewed in a different way, because attacks on African migrants are not only based on their being black, but are also from African countries. Understandably, acknowledging xenophobia would imply that an underlying and continuing exclusivism exists in South Africa. This, again, runs contrary to the country's regional and international standing and commitment to regional and continental bodies. Not only does the term Afrophobia beg scientific research for a proper understanding and definition, (more seriously) the use of euphemism to describe xenophobia clearly dilutes South African authorities' own anti-xenophobia messages, aside from suggesting a tacit approval of the xenophobic statements uttered by prominent figures, who seem to enjoy a measure of impunity over these matters. Authorities in South Africa thus promote a discourse that borders on the xenophobic or at least tacitly approve

such a discourse. This keeps the anti-African migrant sentiment alive, waiting for a virulent and violent eruption. State institutions have thus provided conditions for a hegemonic discourse on xenophobia by conceiving the idea of a 'Fortress South Africa', where South Africa has to be defended against a flood of immigrants entering the country (Neocosmos 2006). The promotion of an exclusively South African identity has helped the materialisation of xenophobia in South Africa in many ways. For example, statements made by civil servants and politicians could be taken by ordinary citizens to mean that the state directly or indirectly approves of xenophobia (Landau 2005).

The foregoing suggests a couple of things about immigration in South Africa. Firstly, the African migrant is or represents the immigration problem in contemporary South Africa. This is based on the negative portrayal and positioning of migrant-sending African countries (Mamdani 1996). Accordingly, African migrants originating from these poor countries bear a negative label (even before they reach the host country), which could explain attempts to restrict their immigration to South Africa (Peberdy 2009). Furthermore, the denial of past migrations (Neocosmos 2006) by the South African state could have led, firstly, to 'a belief in bounded identity: where South Africans, however diverse, are identified by their citizenship, history, relationship to the state and entitlements' (Peberdy 2009, p. 167).

Secondly, the imagined community suggests that African migrants are not only undesirables but that the South African state should disassociate itself from them as much as possible. According to Peberdy (2009, p. 168), 'as the South African state has moved to construct a diverse, but inclusive nation, its immigration anxieties have become similarly inclusive. South Africa's new national identity as constructed by the state while supposedly African, is actually firmly South African'. This is perhaps due to the fact that such migrants are capable of becoming members of this state and thus deprive the authentic citizens of their resources.

These anxieties seem to be similar to those of the apartheid state regarding migration. They are apparently playing out again, only this time against African migrants. The anxieties resulted in the stigmatisation of migrants and their classification as 'suspects', capable of destroying 'white' South Africa. Consequently, 'immigration legislation effectively portrays immigrants, especially immigrants from African countries, as a threat to the economic and social goals of the post-apartheid state' (Gordon 2011, p. 51). This provides grounds for xenophobia, based on the view that the state sees African migrants as 'contaminators of the nation' (Peberdy 2009, p. 158) and 'both competitors and consumers for scarce resources and opportunities' (Gordon 2011, p. 47). Gordon asserts that 'black foreign nationals from Africa are not subject to the normal protections of constitutional democracy and human rights obligations. Instead, migrants are treated as an exception and as such relegated to a space outside the workings of the law' (2011, p. 45).

Further, 'by envisioning South Africa as being threatened by parasitical foreigners, the authorities are able to invoke notions of a state of siege' (Gordon 2011,

p. 55) which necessitates a state of exception (Agamben 1998). Appadurai (1996) refers to this as the construction of second classiness and third classiness and the need to murder or expel those who do not belong. Peberdy hints at the possibility of xenophobia becoming a construct of the state, as the state defines 'South Africans as who they are, the state has clearly defined who South Africans are not and so who does not belong to the nation' (Peberdy 2009, p. 181). In fact, 'seemingly contradictory, the state's commitment to building its relationship with the rest of Africa, African migrants and immigrants, both documented and undocumented, seems to be the target of those new immigration anxieties' (Peberdy 2009, p. 178).

The state seems to have promoted xenophobia by promoting indigeneity or the reconfiguration of the South African identity, by the intensification of immigration policing and by defining those who are not South African—especially African migrants—and classifying them as a threat to South Africa. The same cannot be said about migrants from other regions of the world, despite their significant numbers in the country. Thus, xenophobia in South Africa follows a pattern. African migrants are constructed as undesirable migrants, which is why they constitute a group of migrants that is attacked more than any other in the country. Hence, it might be logical to link the attacks on African migrants to the xenophobia discourse. This also dismisses the view that xenophobia falls under the general rubric of acts of criminality. Many examples can be cited of attacks targeting migrants from other African countries to the exclusion of those from other continents, as discussed in the next section.

7 Xenophobic Attacks on African Migrants

From May/June 2011 through to September 2013, South Africans attacked foreign business owners in Reiger Park (Ekurhuleni in Gauteng Province) and other townships around Johannesburg (Ivier 2013a; The Star 2011a, b). Some of these cases involved attacks on Somali business owners in the Ramaphosa informal settlement in Gauteng province (The Star 2011a, b). Another incident involved a Congolese migrant who 'was attacked by a black South African thief' whilst other South Africans looked on and did not rescue the man. After the attack, the South Africans told him that they did not help because he was 'crying in English. If you were crying in Zulu, we would have helped you'. The police on the other hand told the man that 'you are not our brother, we can't help you' (Harris 2002 cited in Kalule-Sabiti et al. 2012, p. 145). The declaration that the Congolese migrant was not the brother of the cited police persons is significant. Police officers charged with upholding the law with impartiality acted lawlessly just because the victim they were supposed to protect was an African migrant. Only those who belong are brothers and apparently deserving of help.

Government departments too seem to selectively target African migrants. For example in 2012 and 2013, the Limpopo government together with the provincial DHA only closed down informal businesses belonging to Ethiopian and Somali

asylum seekers in a crackdown called Operation Hardstick (The New Age 2014a, b). However, the non-governmental organisation (NGO) Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) challenged the unlawful closure of these African migrant traders' businesses. The South African Supreme Court of Appeal ruled in favour of LHR and 'made it clear that the attitude of the police and provincial Department of Home Affairs was unacceptable and contrary to the constitutional values' (The New Age 2014a, b).

Another incident involved the burning down of four Somali shops in Johannesburg in 2011. The South African arsonists told the shop owners to go back to Somalia (Pillai 2011). In Johannesburg, Somalis suffer daily harassment, especially from the police (The Star 2012). Immigrant shop owners continue to be harassed (The Star 2013), and this is not confined to Johannesburg. In March 2013, shops owned by Somalis and others were looted in Delmas, Mpumalanga Province (Brooke 2013), and in other parts of the country during September 2013 (Ivier 2013b). Thus, it may not be surprising that in April 2015 starting in Durban and spreading to other parts of the country, African migrants were targeted. Apparently, these attacks are fulfilling the script—getting rid of African migrants, but leaving immigrants from other parts of the world unharmed, if not protected.

8 Regarding Xenophobic Violence

But why does prejudice against African migrants always turn to violence? A full response to this question is beyond the scope of this chapter, as it rather focuses on a reflection of the general contributory factors towards xenophobia. Suffice it to say, however, that just like the historical origins of *othering* and suspicion of migrants, violence can be traced to the apartheid state's 'logic' of violence. During apartheid, violence was used to suppress black people; it was an instrument of power, control and 'restoring order'. It thus became an accepted way of dealing with 'problems'. For this reason, xenophobic 'violence must be seen within this history, characterised as it is by years of social and economic disadvantage, repressive policing, criminal predation and a consequent recourse to vigilantism' (Misago et al. 2009, p. 10).

A study of Alexandra Sector V (Setswetla, Gauteng Province) in the aftermath of the 2008 xenophobic attacks revealed that when 'Zulus from hostels attempted to attack foreigners in Setswetla…the community leaders negotiated a 'deal' with these Zulu attackers. The terms of the deal stipulated that the Zulu organisers would not attack foreigners in the area, but 'comrades' or community leaders would remove foreigners themselves. It was agreed that the Zulu organisers would come a few days later to check whether the 'comrades' had kept their promise and all foreigners had been removed from the area' (Misago et al. 2009, p. 45). This is akin to how the apartheid state and its functionaries dealt with those migrants who threatened 'white' South Africa by, amongst others, transgressing the pass system.

However, Monson (2015) argues that the local politics of struggle, survival and belonging explains why prejudice against African migrants translates into xenophobic violence. Based on a case study of the squatter settlements (Jeffsville and Brazzaville near Atteridgeville, Pretoria), Monson (2015) shows that xenophobic violence is the product of local politics informed by struggles at the level of a shack. Monson further argues that violence erupts because foreigners are seen as unconcerned about the daily struggles of shack dwellers. Such foreigners are seen as exploiting the opportunities at the shacks. In other words, the foreigners are seen as not attempting to contribute to the community. For this reason, the perception that:

> Foreigners are often seen as convenient soft targets for popular anger...obscures a deeper politics behind the violence: a solidarity born of politicized suffering polarizes the committed and uncommitted. There is a politics of proximity intrinsic to the collective experience of suffering and resisting together, which increases social distance from non-participants. Beyond this, protest mobilization relies on similar repertoires and evokes the insurgent subjectivity of the struggle years, with the same coercive strategies to build solidarity, the same iconography of revolt and the same tradition of singing revolutionary songs (Monson 2015, p. 147).

This is an excellent analysis of the sociology of xenophobic violence, which can be taken to illustrate that 'civic autochthony is articulated more as a claim for inclusion by the structurally excluded than exclusionary claims by those who already belong' (Monson 2015, p. 149). Apparently, if migrants participated in the community collective, they would not be attacked. The question why South Africans even at a local level and in pursuit of 'civic autochthony' resort to violence in the first instance still lingers. Even if the foreigners at the shacks are seen to be uncommitted, why engage in violence? Hence, we argue that the state and media have intentionally or unintentionally created a xenophobic mood in which violence as a logic bequeathed by the apartheid state manifests and unfolds in different ways in different localities.

9   Conclusion

Xenophobia is not a South African exceptionalism. However, the targeting of African migrants in a xenophobic rage provides a compelling case. This is because South Africa is home to immigrants from different parts of the world who do not seem to suffer the same condemnation and virulent attacks as do migrants from other parts of Africa. Hence, by deploying the concept of the threatening other, we have attempted in this chapter to demonstrate that African migrants in contemporary South Africa are portrayed as *a* problem and threat that must be excluded, if not eliminated. By focusing on African migrants who have been coded as the problem—or the threatening other, we are intimately aware that the South African society itself is not a monolithic entity—but splintered. The construction of the other on the basis of *inter alia*, race, place and space exists in South Africa. Our focus in this chapter, however, has been on the construction of the other, as it

specifically relates to the African migrant and how this provides a xenophobic discourse on and within which xenophobic acts and attitudes flourish. Still, the splintered nature of South African society on the bases of race, place and space would benefit from research that would look into understanding better the ways in which society-cum-nation building measures could be promoted.

Based on apartheid's legacy relating to the stigmatisation of migrants, which manifested in the pass system, post-apartheid South Africa has not escaped the grip of this 'othering' of migrants. This is why South African citizens who, for example, migrate from one province to another are 'othered'. This seems to conform to the apartheid state's logic of confining people according to race, place and space. Those who violated the confinement and control were not only victimised, but also arrested and in some cases violently dealt with, and reminded that they were not of 'white' South Africa. In this view, we have contended that a contributory factor to xenophobia in contemporary South Africa relates to the construction and 'othering' of African migrants. We have further asserted that the discourse of exceptionalism based on the perception that South Africa is an exception on the African continent has elevated South Africanness and relegated immigrants from other African countries to the subaltern, second classiness and third classiness. Through the propagation of anti-African migrant tropes and imagery, the African migrant has been framed as the threatening other and the 'suspect'—the problem which must be gotten rid of. Excluding these African migrants may include hostility, discrimination xenophobia and murder. Events relating to migration in post-apartheid South Africa up to April 2015 seem to be in tandem with how African migrants have been constructed and 'othered' and thus attacked in xenophobic outbursts. Way before they arrive in South Africa, African migrants already carry a negative label of primitive, very dark people who are only capable of bringing problems. Thus, a contributory cause of xenophobia in South Africa relates to how African migrants have been constructed as the 'suspicious' other.

Much as it is necessary, the first real step towards dealing with xenophobia does not so much rest in denouncing it in the strongest possible terms and engaging in marches which include top civil ministers and servants, than in 'cleaning' the image of the African migrant in South Africa. In the wake of the April 2015 xenophobic attacks on African migrants, some sectors of the South African population including the electronic media such as the national broadcaster, the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC 1), campaigned against xenophobia by, amongst other things, playing music artist Hugh Masekela's song that encourages inclusivity after each episode of a popular television soap opera, Generations. Other television stations like e-TV too openly campaign against xenophobia. These are positive steps. The print media and different arms of government too need to play a role in showing that African migrants are valuable members of the South African society. The observation by Neocosmos (2006) that during liberation struggle there was a discourse of inclusivity—citizenship was not based on indigeneity, but on popular democratic activity—should ring a bell on what the government needs to fix about the projection of African migrants in contemporary South Africa. If the negative image of African migrants can be constructed albeit intentionally or unintentionally

and successfully to incite xenophobia, similarly, a good image can also be decidedly and intentionally constructed, successfully, to inspire unity and a pan-African identity in the post colony. This can augur well with and promote the project of African Renaissance, which was initiated by the former President of the Republic of South Africa, Mr. Thabo Mbeki.

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Migrant Labour and Social Construction of Citizenship in Lesotho and Swaziland

Lovemore Chipungu

1 Introduction

Migration is as old as humanity itself and with that being said it is by no means a new phenomenon in the southern African region. It has been an intrinsic component of the developmental process of Southern Africa, importantly marked by the history of labour migration in the region since the nineteenth century. Historically, labour migration dominated the population movements in Southern Africa, and these flows were largely made up of unskilled or semi-skilled male workers recruited mainly by the South African mining companies. Issues surrounding migration from outside South Africa have had a long standing in the building of South Africa as a nation. Peripheral countries to South Africa such as Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Botswana and Malawi served as labour reserves for the mining industry. This was facilitated by colonial capitalism, with its uneven development, through the establishment of economic nodes acting as the key locus of capital accumulation in South Africa and Zimbabwe.

The aim of this chapter is to investigate migrant labour practices in Lesotho and Swaziland and establish the effect this trend had on building citizenship in these countries. This interrogation is based on the assumption that individuals and families that migrate in search of better living opportunities find it difficult to easily assimilate in their former areas resulting in citizenship crisis and development where necessary. What is referred to as a citizenship crisis in this context is a situation, practice and experience where bona fide citizens are subjected to discrimination and other forms of exclusion from certain rights, privileges and opportunities enjoyed by others (Akanji 2016). But it must be emphasised that this is a

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practice that can be experienced by both returning migrants and those who never migrated, thereby creating space for the need to redevelop citizenship. This is simply because migration practices create labels amongst communities, and if not guarded, these are stuck to people and at times without any rational basis. Then the question is: to what extent are such labels accepted or used to maintain the status quo? In order to deconstruct these and other assumptions, the author undertook a desktop research where existing evidence in the form of journal articles, books and other Internet sources was used. These were analysed in line with the focus of this chapter.

In pursuing the objectives of this study, this chapter is divided into six sections which are as follows: the introduction, the analytical framework, an interrogation of labour migrants in Lesotho and Swaziland, a discussion on the construction of citizenship and the concluding section.

2 An Analytical Framework for Migration and Citizenship

Issues of migration are theoretically explained from many perspectives. Amongst such competing theories is the dependency theory which in itself has various strains. However, amongst the core propositions that seem to underline the dependency theory is its definition where Sunkel (1969, p. 23) explicitly articulated that:

> It is an explanation of the economic development of a state in terms of the external influences. . . . . . political, economic and cultural. . . . . . on national development policies.

However, Dos Sontos expands this definition by taking a global perspective where he argues that this is a:

> historical condition which shapes a certain structure of the world economy such that it favours some countries to the detriment of others and limits the development possibilities of the subordinate economies. . . . . a situation in which the economy of a certain group of countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which their own is subjected (1971, p. 226).

This historical retreat into the definition of the dependency theory as provided above is synonymous with the labour migrations under discussion simply to illustrate the fact that this is an old-age discourse whose historical content is still relevant to date. Indeed in this retreat, cognizance have to be taken of the fact that the centre/periphery (or dominant/dependent) characteristic is very glaring and can be equated easily to the labour migrations in the context of South Africa and the neighbouring countries of Lesotho and Swaziland. As expounded in one of the definitions above, this indeed was an economic type of venture driven by the search for capital in mineral-rich gold mines and farms in South Africa. However, it was also a symbiotic relationship (though one-sided in favour of the centre) in the sense that the periphery (in the form of labour reserves in Lesotho and Swaziland) solely dependent on the remittances of migrant labourers who did not only send money but also brought manufactured goods. In essence, the only feasible explanation in the

context of these definitions and the experiences notable is comparative advantage which the core has over the periphery. It is this situation which over the years Lesotho and Swaziland has experienced in their economic relations with South Africa.

Ferra (2008) further argues that one aspect associated with core-periphery dynamics is the underdevelopment of the periphery which can be very destructive. The dependency theory was seen as one of the avenues through which the perpetuation of poverty in developing countries could be explained since the level of development in these countries could not live up to the capacity and expectation of the developed state (e.g. lack of supportive policies to level the playing field). Reference to policy literally translates to power relations necessary to intervene and bring about change.

How does the dependency theory explain the issue of citizenship and development especially in the periphery? The starting point is to understand the concept of citizenship. The United Nations (1948), through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, associates citizenship with rights and privileges accorded by the state, and these include political and civil rights, economic and social rights. The state in this regard emerges as the legal entity with territorial boundaries, a population, an economic system and powers to enforce authoritative decisions within its internal and external dealings (Akokpari 2005). Therefore, individuals recognised by the state in this territorial expression are regarded as citizens who enjoy these rights and entitlements accorded by the state. However, Akokpari (2006) further observes that citizenship is not an automatic civil status especially amongst the marginalised members of society who have to go through painful and prolonged struggles in order to enjoy these privileges. It is from this perspective that it is essential to observe that the demand for economic freedom traceable through labour migrations is part of the larger package of citizenship created out of the political economy of capitalism.

However, citizenship created out of these capitalist dynamics can only be understood from a dual perspective, i.e. on one hand are social relations in the core where the need to stabilise labour warrants policy interventions on the part of the receiving country. On the other hand, mixed development is experienced on the part of the periphery where the original social system disintegrates partly because of the endless departure of the active population in search of greener pastures in the core as well as through the importation of new cultures from the same. Unfortunately, this puts the burden on the sending countries to build citizenship in the aftermath of these developments. This echoes Turner's (2016) diagnosis where he argues that the development of citizenship is bound with the changing character of social struggles and social movements in capitalism. But he further contends that it is essential to posture this discourse within the context of national conflicts and colonial development. This in essence is also in line with Marx's critique of the dependency theory which he argues that it allows accumulation of wealth in the core but at the cost of underdevelopment at the periphery (Marx cited in Turner (2016), p. 47). It is from this perspective that the discussion of migrant labourers and citizenship development in the southern region of Africa should be understood.

However, it is essential to emphasise that insight into the core-periphery theory discussed in this section applies to different geopolitical spaces (i.e. Lesotho, Swaziland and South Africa) which are united by the same core in the region (South Africa). Therefore, the search for citizenship building and identity in this context is experienced in the periphery (i.e. Lesotho and Swaziland) where it is assumed that labour migrations over the years have led to social changes. In this regard, national citizenship involves a contradictory relationship involving principles of inclusion and exclusion largely determined by access to economic and political resources.

3   Exploring the Dynamics of Labour Migrations in Lesotho and Swaziland

The history of labour migration in the southern African region and more specifically in South Africa cannot be simply understood as foreign labourers crossing demarcated borders officially. Labour migration predates the colonial period into the new democratic South Africa. This can also be partly explained by the spatial nature of Lesotho and Swaziland (whose small sizes make them mere enclaves within the boundaries of South Africa) and the cultural links these people have in common.

The preamble to labour migrations in both countries can be traced back to the land question. Like many other African countries that succumbed to the partition of Africa by European powers (in 1888), the process of colonial penetration created land shortages largely arising out of the way it was distributed and administered. Kowet (1978) observes that when the British declared Lesotho and Swaziland as 'protectorates' (in 1868 and 10,903, respectively) they automatically changed the internal political, social and economic structures. Land was seen as the major asset both to the colonial government and to the indigenous traditional leadership. In essence, it became a contested asset whose administration and control was at the centre of conflict. In Swaziland for instance, land was divided between Europeans and Africans, whilst in Lesotho, there were no clear-cut divisions along race. But in both cases, mechanisms were put in place that gave advantage to the Europeans as opposed to the indigenous people. The creation of European plantations coupled with few mineral deposits discovered in European areas attracted migrations from tribal areas. Unfortunately, as Kowet (1978) observes, these were not effective enough to absorb all the 'free' labour which was created by unequal land appropriations, distributions and taxations. Hence, the discovery of diamonds, gold and other minerals on the Rand (in South Africa) created a natural outlet for this surplus labour—thus signalling the beginning of migrant labour movements and the creation of labour reserves in Lesotho and Swaziland. Following the discovery of gold in Witwatersrand in 1886, the mining industry required much larger numbers of migrant workers and the short-term contract model was expanded (Crush 2008).

The discovery of major gold reefs in the Witwatersrand made South Africa the largest gold producer in the world, by then (Davenport 2000). However, even though South Africa became the largest supplier of gold in the world it has only 'low-grade gold-bearing ore' (Rabe 2009). The profitable mining of such low-quality gold deposits was made possible by vast numbers of poorly paid, unskilled workers (Roth 1995), the majority of whom were black.[1] Without these workers, South Africa would have been only a minor supplier of gold. The historian remarked that modern South Africa is built not on gold and diamonds alone but on the availability of cheap black labour. These workers built the wealth of South Africa without detracting significantly from its profits.

The recruitment of these workers was made easier through the operation of a centralised recruitment agency, the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA, popularly known as 'Wenela'), operated by the Chamber of Mines beyond South African boarders (Lang 1986). This agency recruited extensively in neighbouring countries, where workers had fewer opportunities and were willing to work for lower wages than South African labourers. The government supported the mine companies' insistence on the necessity of migrant labour as did neighbouring governments, signing bilateral agreements that entrenched the contract labour system for decades Between 1920 and 1990, migrant workers came to work in the mines from every country in the region, especially Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (Trimikliniotis et al. 2008). Up to the present time, there are more precious metal mineworkers in South Africa than there were a century ago, when it was dominantly gold. The majority of mineworkers in South Africa are migrant workers—they live most of the year on or near the mine, but they have homesteads and families elsewhere, mainly in the rural areas of South Africa, Swaziland, Lesotho or Mozambique (Nicol 2013).

There has been increasing recognition during the last few decades that migration can be a factor in the promotion of international development (Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 2010). Several research studies have revealed that there can be an imperative exchange of money, knowledge and ideas between receiving and home countries through migrants (Sternberg et al. 2016; Rrezvani et al. 2015; Hollifield et al. 2014). The regulation of the influx of Lesotho and Swaziland migrants into South Africa for employment and better education prospects has proven to be a controversial socio-economic phenomena since the past few decades. The influx of migrants from the aforementioned countries has significantly improved South African economic development through supply of both skilled and unskilled labour. Whilst economic migrants into South Africa are generally good for economic growth in terms of increased production and productivity, the developing destination country faces challenges as well in integrating the immigrants and combating xenophobia, job competition between migrant and native workers as well as the fiscal costs associated with provision of social services to the migrants. On the positive side,

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[1]'In 1982, for instance, of the 484,888 people employed on the goldmines approximately 92% were black' (Allen 2003: xxi).

immigration has stimulated local skills development and ultimate transmission of experience which can be integrated in a globalised economy. The cross-immigration between South Africa and emerging economies such as Lesotho and Swaziland has strengthened cultural understanding and development in foreign relations (Fakir 2009). South Africa's mining and agricultural sectors have benefited from migrant labourers from Lesotho and Swaziland (Byrnes 1996).

The existing migrant labour system in South Africa, still present in Southern Africa, although under different conditions, originated in the mining sector. Migrant workers were cheaper to employ than workers who lived with their families (Nicol and Act 2013). Controlling costs, then as now, was critical for mining and particularly difficult for hard rock mining where the work—even with improved technology—always remained highly labour intensive. Cheap labour, available because of South Africa's colonial history, was the essential condition for the establishment of the country's huge mining industry. Had such deep-level and low-grade deposits as those in southern Africa been discovered in a context in which labour could not be obtained so cheaply, it would have been 'uneconomic' to mine (McClendon et al. 2011).

Lesotho is a labour reserve society. The majority of the population have long been in contact with wage employment in South Africa. Prevailing habits are shaped to a large extent by industrial work and consumption values in South Africa. In spite of this industrialised society, the poverty and underdevelopment of Lesotho resembles that of other Third-World countries (Winai-Ström 1986). Lesotho is one of the most migration-dependent counties in the world as shown in Table 1. Migrant remittances are the country's major source of foreign exchange, for example in 1980, remittance from Basotho labourers working in South Africa accounted for about half of the country's gross national product (GNP), and were equivalent to 100% of its gross domestic product (GDP)

Table 1 Labour migrants from Lesotho and Swaziland in South African gold, platinum and coal mines 1996–2007

Year	Swaziland	Lesotho
1996	14,371	81,357
1997	12,960	76,360
1998	10,338	60,450
1999	9307	52,436
2000	8160	51,351
2001	7794	49,599
2002	8587	54,390
2003	7885	54,202
2004	7521	48,437
2005	6878	43,693
2006	7124	46,082
2007	7099	45,608
2008–2010	Missing data	Missing data
2011	7567	52,696

Source: Truen and Chisadza (2012, p. 7)

(Anon 1995). In addition, it is one of the poorest counties in the world due to high domestic unemployment, declining agricultural production, falling life expectancy, rising child mortality and half the population living below the poverty line. The majority of households and rural communities are dependent on remittances as significantly worse off than those that do have such access. For most of the twentieth century, the vast majority from Lesotho were single young men who went to work on the South African gold mines and remitted funds to their parent's households (SAMP 1997).

Like Lesotho, labour migrations from Swaziland to South Africa are not a new phenomenon since they date back to the colonial period. Initially triggered by the need to pay colonial taxes and lobola, male migration for employment especially in South African mines was further facilitated by the setting up of the Native Recruiting Corporation (NRC). The number of migrant labourers to South Africa increased to 20,000 in the 1980s when Swaziland became the favourite source of mine labourers (Simelani and Crush 2004). This situation, however, is inevitable given that over the years, more than 90% of the country's entire economy was controlled and owned by local and foreign Europeans linked to Britain and to South Africa. Hence like their Basotho counterparts, the only asset which local Swazis own is labour and limited land (Kowet 1978). It is therefore not surprising that close to 40% of the adult Swazis interviewed by Simelani and Crush (2004, p. 6) had parents who at one time worked in South Africa.

Apart from their significant contribution in the mining sector, migrants from Lesotho and Swaziland are also employed in the agricultural sector. The agricultural industry contributes around 10% of formal employment, relatively low compared to other parts of Africa, as well as providing work for casual labourers and contributing around 2.6% of GDP for the nation (Watch and America 2001). The most important agricultural exports of South Africa include edible fruit and nuts, beverages, preserved food, tobacco, cereals, wool not carded or combed, miscellaneous food, sugar, meat, milling products, malt and starch (Leshoro and Leshoro 2013). These products accounted for over 80% of agricultural export revenue in the first quarter of 2010 (Esterhuizen and Van Rooyen 1999). The most important agricultural imports, which accounted for over 60% of agricultural import value during the same period, include cereals, meat, soya-bean oil cake, beverages, soya-bean oil and its fractions, tobacco, palm oil and its fractions, miscellaneous food, spices, coffee, tea and preserved food (Esterhuizen and Van Rooyen 1999).

The demand for labour in these plantations which plays an important role in the sector of South African economy has led to increase in the importance of migrants from Lesotho and Swaziland. In most cases, local citizens do not prefer to work in these manual jobs due to hard labour and lower wages. Foreign nationals from the aforementioned countries sometimes are left with no choice except to work in these plantations and farms.

Immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa are visible in a narrow band of activities of SMMEs, mostly in retail or service rather than in production (Kalitanyi and Visser 2010). Lesotho and Swaziland have also been key players in supplying South Africa with migrant entrepreneurs. The migration of entrepreneurs into a

multiracial society like South Africa apart from creating employment improves knowledge and skills exchange. Their activities encompass selling curios, retailing ethnic clothes and foods, motor car repairs/panel beating and operating hairdressing salons. Other income generating activities include operation of restaurants, night-clubs, cafes, music shops, several import–export businesses and traditional healing practices. Serrie (1998) postulated that entrepreneurship is a strong tool for immi-grants' economic and social integration and is a means by which immigrants without education or technical skills can escape poverty. Within the group of production SMMEs, many immigrants are clustered in the clothing sector, where they are involved in making traditional African clothes, wedding dresses and carrying out general tailoring activities.

In 1980, countries of Southern Africa came together to form the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) which came out of the idea to resist the South African domination in the region. It comprised Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique and Tanzania. These states intended to reduce economic dependence on South Africa and hoped to promote the goal of economic self-sufficiency amongst member states. In 1992, the SADCC was transformed into the Southern African Develop-ment Community (SADC) (Mutambara 2001). Thus, the organisation expanded to include new members such as South Africa, which joined in 1994; Mauritius, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Seychelles joined later in 1997.

Whilst SADCC was primarily focused on the politically oriented issue of liberation of Southern Africa, SADC on the other hand was established primarily as an economic organisation. Though SADCC on its inception was established to reduce dependence on South Africa, paradoxically the states became perpetually dependent on South Africa. To date, the Republic of South Africa is often looked upon as a nation dominating its neighbours in trade and investment relations. The examination of development trajectories of the relations between South Africa and Lesotho and/or Swaziland shows the possibility of extreme and growing domi-nance. It has now become almost impossible to talk of development in Lesotho and Swaziland without mentioning South Africa (Ajulu and Molefi 2003).

South Africa's relatively industrialised economy makes it difficult for its neigh-bours to isolate themselves from her economy. This is due to the fact that Lesotho and Swaziland are landlocked, with Lesotho sharing its entire boarders with South Africa and Swaziland sharing the largest proportion of its border with South Africa and a little portion with Mozambique. These states were forced to rely on South Africa's infrastructure in order to facilitate their trade and investment. Ferguson and Lohmann (1994) observe that the development of Lesotho as a self-contained geographical entity is one of accidental geographic juxtaposition rather than structural economic integration or political subordination, and whose poverty can be explained largely by the death of natural resource within its boundaries, together with the incompleteness with which they have been 'developed'. They further argue that if the country is resource poor, it is because most of the good Sotho land was taken by South Africa (Ferguson and Lohmann 1994).

South Africa's infrastructure is vital to the economic well-being of Lesotho and Swaziland and the region at large. Geographically speaking, South Africa is well positioned to be the catalyst of economic development in the region. The participation of South Africa in the economic development of the above-mentioned countries is crucial since it continues to secure lucrative deals through partnerships, and this, however, has the potential to shape regional development. For instance, South Africa has acquired a 40% stake in the Lesotho Water Highlands project, which is a venture to channel water into the heartland of Gauteng through hydro-electricity generating dams (Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan 1998).

4 Social (de)Construction of Citizenship

It should be acknowledged from the onset that the penetration of colonialism in Lesotho and Swaziland created centre-periphery social, political and economic relationships—which in essence intensified push and pull factors as well as supply and demand factors. This, as already noted above, was influenced by the context of capital accumulation in South Africa supported by poor conditions of production and reproduction experienced in Lesotho and Swaziland. But in essence, as Konczacki et al. (2013) observe in the case of Lesotho, sending countries only provide a permissive or facilitating environment whilst the dominant factors remain with capitalist South Africa which penetrated pre-capitalist social formations and established labour controls. In this regard, to what extent has labour migration been an issue in the development and construction of citizenship in Lesotho and Swaziland? A number of issues are worth interrogating in the light of this question and these revolve around the interconnectedness of these countries under discussion and contextual dynamics that prevail in individual countries which impact positively and negatively in citizenship development.

The spatial configuration of Lesotho and Swaziland which makes them mere enclaves of South Africa has over the years provided an easy interaction zone between South Africa and these countries. This, coupled with the social and cultural connectedness of residents of these countries, created a continuum that made it difficult to separate privileges that befit each state citizenry despite political sovereignty. For instance, Tim (2016) postulates that 'dependency' has been central to the iconography of Lesotho in every description and analysis of the society. This in essence was in reference to the fact that the common person cannot escape the trap of continuous dependency from external economic benefits in South Africa since it is woven in the social and cultural fabric of Lesotho. It is therefore not surprising that even the South African authorities, prior to 1994, allowed free access to privileges and opportunities without questioning national identity. Indeed as labour reserves, the dependent states have to struggle (though to a lesser extent in Swaziland) to change the attitude of people who see their countries as mere homes whilst they access state privileges in another country. This is more pronounced in rural areas where economic opportunities are almost non-existent.

One profound impact of labour migrations is the inability of sending states to implement essential reforms that benefit its citizens—a factor which accordingly affects the development and construction of citizenship. This negation on the part of the governments of Lesotho and Swaziland has contributed to brain drain (amongst the educated class) but also created an attitude amongst the poor where they believe that they can work temporarily outside the country where incentives are much better. Ashton (1:177 quoted in Konczacki et al. 2013) argues that this is disastrous for a country since it leads to lack of initiatives on the part of the government to develop appropriate structures to support its citizenry. Historically, Lesotho and Swaziland used labour migrations as 'safety valves' to reduce heavy surplus of labour and excessive pressure on land (Kowet 1978, p. 100). In this regard, labour migration is part of the governments' 'silent foreign policies' used to deal with their internal problems—especially failures to implement strategies to arrest poverty (Simelani and Crush 2004).

In this regard, there are many ethnic Basotho and Swazi who are South African citizens—a situation which stems from a long history of cross-border movements in both directions. This in turn has created an ambiguous situation which largely contributes to the complexity of constructing citizenship in these countries (Cobbe 2004). This situation has been exacerbated by relative economic stagnation and political upheavals which indirectly provide opportunities for even the unskilled to seek opportunities in less regulated parts of the South African economy such as farming and domestic services (Cobbe 2004). However, it have to be noted that for some migrants, high levels of violence in South Africa make them feel that it is not a safe place to permanently stay.

Trending on cultural lines, labour migrations impact negatively on household roles especially responsibilities that are gender based. This stems from the general drift by successive generations away from their mainstream culture. Commenting on this aspect, Attias-Donfut et al. (2012) argue that this phenomenon is accentuated by opportunities in almost all social domains thereby creating radical discontinuity between generations resulting in identity crisis. In the case of Lesotho and Swaziland, children of labour migrants attain higher education in South Africa which immensely changes their values and their ways of life. This dilemma of identity crisis is further observed in intermarriages where it further complicates the development of citizenship. Amongst the Swazis, only men can confer citizenship to their children—a major discrimination against women who either get married to foreigners during labour migrations. Hence, such women are frustrated since they cannot access certain state resources and rights such as government scholarships and travel documents (Macdonald 2016; Virahsawmy 2015; Tsododo 2014). Women even lack legal rights to administer their own assets in the absence of their husbands (Macdonald 2016). This is so despite Section 28(1) read together with section 14(f), which prohibits discrimination on the grounds of sex and gender in the political, economic and social spheres. On the other hand, amongst the Basotho is the feeling that immigrants may compromise the homogenous character of the Basotho nation. These concerns about tarnishing the peculiar identity of a nation are universal and are expressed even by nationals of developed countries.

The fear also includes access to resources and opportunities by children born out of intermarriages who in most cases are better off in terms of educational qualifications (Akokpari 2005). This in essence further erodes chances of building citizenship due to these glaring contradictions, hence the observation by Akokpari (2005) that globalisation (under which labour migration also fall) undermines the identity of states and nations and dual citizenship thereby rendering traditional homogeneity of nations obsolete.

In the face of these circumstances, quite outside the influence or the understanding of individual miners, what do the disastrously falling employment prospects now mean in the villages of traditional recruitment? In many rural areas in the Lesotho or Swaziland, more than half of the local GDP came from remittances from absentee miners. Young men grew up confident of being able to earn cash and to support families at home by going to the mines, and, as a result, the home villages had populations markedly lacking in adult males. In addition to child care, women did all the farm and domestic labour in an environment usually lacking water, electricity and educational and health services. The 1980s especially saw an increased reliance on labour migration from rural areas to the mines, even to provide for money to plant the appallingly unproductive crops. In fact, a general shortage of money made improved modes of land use impossible, even in areas where the government introduced 'betterment' schemes (De Wet and McAllister 1985). Thus, migration has a strong relationship to poverty and social exclusion.

5   Conclusion and Recommendations

Indeed, it can be noted that there are a lot of dynamics that surround labour migrations and their impact requires an in-depth analysis especially for those countries whose status is peripheral and has remained as labour reserves. In reality, we cannot escape from the realisation that the status quo between South Africa and the other two countries (Lesotho and Swaziland) will remain as it is as long as the core continues being the centre of capital accumulation. Unfortunately, this core-periphery relationship has created an 'Ostrich Scenario' (as Matlosa 2006, labels it), since all governments involved are aware that it is one-sided and it will never bring prosperity to the two small landlocked nations.

However, it should also be recalled that the core-periphery existence in its current state has a lot of socio-economic benefits for households. In all honesty, the current status of labour migration can be viewed from a developmental perspective where it has and still is benefiting households socially and economically. Whilst not oblivious of the negativity of the relationship, one would still argue that there is need to move towards socio-economic integration which can be beneficial to all countries concerned. Recognition of free movement of labour could be the harbinger to such harmonisation of relationships along socio-economic lines. The commonalities that are already in existence in terms of cultural links (such as

language arising out of historical origin) can be nurtured in order to allow for such smooth integration.

In line with Cobbe's (2004) observation, it is difficult to envisage positive policy proposals that could have lasting solutions to the current labour migrations and which would greatly benefit the efforts to build citizenship. The prevailing poverty levels in these countries have condemned them to being peripheral appendages to South Africa from which the talented, skilled, industrious and desperate will always migrate to prosperous places in South Africa. The worst scenario is to envisage rapid depopulation with the hope that the less the population, the more likely positive intervention measures could be implemented to benefit the population. This is not a far-fetched idea given the fact that a remarkable number of migrants from Lesotho and Swaziland hold dual citizenship.

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From Reservoir to Corridor: Changing Patterns of Migration in Mozambique

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and Maximino S.G. Constumado**

1 Introduction

For the reasons discussed in the following pages, the strip of land we now call 'Mozambique', with the coastline of 2300 km along the Indian Ocean, has been the harbinger for explorers, traders and tourists seeking work, business and leisure opportunities in Southern Africa. For centuries, this strip has brought together migrants and traders from Africa, Asia and Europe. With European occupation, the strip became the source of forced migration to the colonial industries in the Americas. In a much recent colonial history, the strip became a source of cheap labour desperately wanted by colonial industrialists in South Africa. As European colonisation ended, the strip became increasingly a corridor, notably with the discovery of mineral resources which attracted foreign investment and informal miners. In the south, the Maputo corridor connects migrants to Gauteng, South Africa's largest business and industrial powerhouse. In the centre, the Beira corridor connects migrants to Zimbabwe and Zambia. In the north, the Nacala Corridor links migrants to Zambia and Malawi. To its landlocked neighbours, Mozambique gives access to international transportation networks in the Indian Ocean. These three corridors—Maputo, Beira and Nacala—are entry points for transnational migrants and traders seeking access to Southern Africa.

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This chapter discusses the modern (colonial to the present) significance of this land strip in the evolution of labour migration patterns in Southern Africa. Its geographical location, historical chance as well as political and institutional features have assured the preponderance of this place in the development of regional labour migration. From our perspective, the inclusion of Mozambique in this collection should consider at least four structural aspects, of which three have received scant attention in the regional migration debates. The first is the usual historical migration patterns of people, predominantly men, living in the land we now call 'Mozambique' to the area we now call 'South Africa'. Here, we remind the reader that to call these migrants 'Mozambicans' and their hosts 'South Africans' is anachronistic. In so doing, we take the reader through a line of flight from the free use of colonial identifications to describe both the migrants and their hosts to a more reality congruent use of language. The second is the significance of Mozambique's geographical location in Southern Africa as the passage to the Promised Land, South Africa, for migrants from all across this continent and Asia; this consideration includes the plague of corruption and institutional weakness. From here, they begin to see the samples of the milk and honey from the other side, gather their last intelligence and prepare to launch their final 'border assault'. The third is the functional democratisation of gender differentials, the diminishing gender contrasts, to a greater or lesser extent, in the long-term regional evolutionary transformation of Mozambique from the reservoir to the corridor. Colonial migration was intensely gendered in the sense that it was an exclusive male preserve. Even the colonisers were predominantly men. Nowadays, this is no longer the case; the migration glass ceiling has been shattered, and women migrate alongside men. This transformation not only diversifies the gender configuration of people's movements but also increases the volume of migrants.

2   Review of Migration Trends

Diamond and gold mines in Kimberly and on the Witwatersrand in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries attracted thousands of workers from different neighbouring countries such as Mozambique, Lesotho and Zimbabwe (Dinbabo and Nyasulu 2015). In Zimbabwe, the mines recruited workers for the gold, coal and asbestos mines from Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia. The majority of migrants have originated from the sub-Saharan African countries in search of employment opportunities to improve their social and economic conditions (Adepoju 1998). However, mining was not the only sector that employed migrants. Commercial farms, factories, domestic service, transportation and construction also hired migrants (Crush et al. 2006). In Southern Africa, these industries often employed scores of migrants more than locals. Thus, male labour migration to the mines (South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe) and commercial farms and plantations (South Africa, Zimbabwe and Swaziland) are the most persistent form of legal cross-border labour migration within the region (Crush et al. 1992, 2006;

Jeeves and Crush 1997). Interestingly, South Africans who are most likely to be the hosts also migrate in the region, albeit in smaller numbers. The 1997 second national census of population and housing showed that there were about 3000 South Africans in Niassa province, in the north of Mozambique (Raimundo 2007). Facchini et al. (2013) found that Zimbabwean and Mozambican migrants migrated to South Africa in search of higher living standards they could not find at home.

The literature on migration in Southern Africa also makes it clear that economic inequalities between states in the region have propelled the movement of people from the poorer countries—i.e. Lesotho, Mozambique and Malawi—to the most affluent ones—i.e. Botswana, Namibia and South Africa (Adepoju 2000; Dodson and Crush 2013). There are indications that in 2010, South Africa, Botswana and Namibia were host to approximately 1.2 million, 76,000 and 76,000 migrants, respectively (Nshimbi and Fioramonti 2013). More recently, there has been the movement of Zimbabweans to Botswana, Mozambique and South Africa, driven by political persecution, economic pressure and severe drought (Mcgregor et al. 2011). Wentzel and Bosman (2001) found that financial reasons pushed Mozambicans and Zimbabweans to migrate to South Africa, adding that these migrants were searching for work, better pay, affordable prices for goods and better stability than in their countries of origin.

This means, to a greater or lesser extent, the economies of the sending countries depend on the remittances sent home by the migrants in South Africa. Thus, to a large extent, Mozambique, Botswana and Swaziland have depended on remittances from their citizens labouring in South Africa (Crush 1997). A study of households with a migrant family member conducted in southern Mozambique in 2004 found that 76% of those households received cash remittances and 46% of goods payments from that migrant (Finmark Trust 2012).

It is worth mentioning that the migration of Mozambicans to South Africa has become a normalised cultural phenomenon wherein young people abandon school, leave their communities, cross the border to make a living and improve their lives (OSF-CVP and OSISA 2012). Historically, hunting, opening new trade routes and the unbearable weight of colonialism were strong reasons for the Tsonga to migrate within and without borders. Labour wages improved men's status in their kinship and provided resources to pay lobola and money to buy goods (Turrell 1987 cited in Wentzel 2003).

Structural features of Southern Africa have shaped the nature and patterns of migration in the region in a specific way. Colonial boundaries separated communities and families, giving them only the 'illegal' option to stay connected with family. Borders were barely policed, to say nothing about the inexistence of border controls between Southern African countries before the 1960s. The mining industry, which dominated the labour market, tended to privilege legal contracts for men, whilst agriculture and domestic services hired migrants outside the law. By norm, colonial regulations and formal agreements excluded women, making female migration 'illegal' (Crush et al. 2005). All these factors shaped the evolution of migration patterns in Southern Africa.

Another trend in labour migration has been human trafficking between borders, led by local smugglers operating in an expansive network of transnational criminal syndicates (IOM 2005). In 2003, IOM identified Lesotho, Mozambique and Malawi as countries with more children and women victims of human trafficking for sexual exploitation. Moreover, in 2004, IOM indicated that international criminal syndicates have trafficked Southern African women to East Asia to work as sex slaves (IOM 2005). According to Lazarus Saraiva, head of Ressano Garcia Migration Office, 'there is human trafficking, illegal migration, and there are immigration officers involved in corruption schemes, and they facilitate the irregular crossing of people to South African territory' (VOA 2014). The Mozambique immigration authorities sent back to their countries of origin at least 5618 people of different nationalities in 2012 for not meeting conditions to enter and remain in the country. However, in 2011 the numbers of illegal migrants sent back to their countries of origin were at least 4993, showing an increase of irregular migrants during the two periods (Folha de Portugal 2012).

3   Portuguese Conquest in Mozambique and the Genesis of Labour Migration to the Southern African Region

Modern[1] migration of 'Mozambicans', for lack of a better term, in the region, at least to 'South Africa', also for lack of a better term, appears to date from the early 1800s and is well documented (First 1983; Head 1995; Junod 1935; Katzenellenbogen 1982; Moodie and Ndatse 1994). In our view, these are not reality congruent terms, because 'Mozambique' as we know it did not exist as a European invention. The people who lived in this region did not think of their land as 'Mozambique' and did not identify themselves as 'Mozambicans'. These terms, 'Mozambique' and 'Mozambicans', are concrete examples of what Mudimbe calls Europe's 'invention of Africa' (Mudimbe 1988). In our view, 'Mozambicans' or 'South Africans' are modern subjects invented in the modern political imaginary, first, by the colonial administrations, and second, by colonial-master-mimicking African governments. The coloniser created both the Oriental (Said 1978) and the African (Mudimbe 1988) with their bounded identifications. It is also telling that when Junod (1935) wrote his seminal anthropological work about the inhabitants of this region, he did not describe them as 'Mozambicans' but as the 'Tonga of South Africa'. This implies that the 'South Africa' was a loose concept used to refer to a region larger than what we know today as 'South Africa'. The presence of the Tsongas in the region we now call 'South Africa' goes back, at least, to the

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[1]Our use of the term 'modern'. The term in this chapter refers to transformations that give birth to the discipline of sociology. The term modernity refers to a social condition that emerged more or less five centuries ago. In Africa, these five centuries are characterised by colonialism. The meaning of modern in this chapter is not limited to our current times.

beginning of gold and diamond mining in Transvaal, Free State and Kimberly. To put it bluntly, in the early stages of these migrations, there were neither 'Mozambicans' nor 'South Africans', and to refer to the migrants of this time in history as 'Mozambicans' and 'South Africans' is anachronistic and is to impose today's prejudices on yesterday.

African and European ivory hunters travelling extensively throughout the region—going as far as Kenya—created longer and longer gossip channels through which tales about mine, plantation and industrial work in the Dutch and British colonies of the south were transmitted. According to one account, rumours of wage labour in the Cape and Natal reached Mozambique in the early 1860s through these ivory hunter gossip channels. Men desperate for *lobola* money found the idea of working for money in the south hard to resist (Junod 1935: 276). The emergence of temporary migrant work to earn money for *lobola*, which gradually became institutionalised, is interwoven with the intensification of Portuguese colonial occupation. In the 1880s, the Portuguese intensified and expanded colonial grip, almost four centuries after Vasco da Gama and his crew reached the Mozambican coast in 1498 on his way to India looking for spices. In their contact with the people of the East African coast, the Portuguese envied the power and vibrant trade in ivory, gold and other precious metals controlled by Arab lords. Driven by this envy and greed, they became locked in elimination contests in which they connived, plotted and schemed to control this trade, taking advantage of rivalries between city-state Lords of Pate, Kilwa, Malindi, Zanzibar, Mozambique, Sofala and Mombasa. Having monopolised this trade, the Portuguese were satisfied to confine themselves to Mozambique Island, building their capital there, thus maintaining a theoretical colonial rule in Mozambique for three centuries. In the interior and in the southern region, the Portuguese presence and influence remained weak until the late 1880s (Mondlane 1972a; Newitt 1995).

Until that time, southern and interior chiefs maintained their independence, refusing to enter into treaties with the Portuguese, who perceived this autonomy as a serious threat to their monopoly aspirations only during the Scramble for Africa, which culminated with the Berlin Conference of October 1884, when Portugal, the weakest and poorest amongst the colonial powers, felt pressured to demonstrate to its peers the ability to control 'what had been dished out to her' (Mondlane 1972a: 143). Under peer pressure to prove their capacity to subdue and control the natives, the feelings of inferiority before their more affluent, influential, successful and organised peers—i.e. the British, the Dutch, the French, the Germans and the Spanish—drove the Portuguese over the edge. Under the leadership of A. J. Enes[2] and J. M. de Albuquerque, they went on wars of conquest and occupation in the south in the 1890s (Honwana 1988; Junod 1935: 511–512). In their bid to control the south, they eventually transferred their capital from

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[2]A. J. Enes was the governor-general of Moçambique in the mid-1890s. He is known in Mozambican history as the architect of the law of forced labour.

Mozambique Island to Lourenço Marques, introduced an indirect rule and substituted puppet chiefs for rebel leaders whom they either executed or exiled.

As a direct consequence of the demise of traditional chieftaincy, land ownership was automatically transferred to the newly established colonial state. As state agents, the Portuguese not only became the owners of the land but also of anything and anybody found on it. As Ingwane recalled:

> [A]ll that the Portuguese did was to buy huge tracts of land. Any African who wanted to build his home on such land was allowed to do so on payment of monthly or quarterly or annual rent in cash or in kind. But what is even more serious. . . is that when they bought the land, they also bought with it all the trees, wild fruit and wild animals alive and to be born. They bought all the birds, their eggs and the eggs to be laid in time to come. They bought all the water that passed through their farms. They bought all the fish in the rivers. This was greediness. They couldn't drink all that water! They couldn't use all that land! (Sithole 1977: 147–148)

4 Indigenous Work Ethic

Having established a precarious monopoly over the land and the means of violence and taxation through the centralisation of political power in Lourenço Marques, the Portuguese faced another 'problem'. The Protestant work ethic, which had become ingrained in Western society and psyche, had not penetrated the social and psychic structures in this part of Africa. Able-bodied African men just did not conform to European work standards. The habit of perpetual toil for money was completely alien. Black men took up migrant work on a temporary basis, terminating it after earning *lobola* money. This independence from wage labour sharply contradicted the interests of colonial capital, which required a constant supply of cheap labour. Hence, A. J. Enes, then the Governor-General of Mozambique, lamented in the Lourenço Marques Government Joint Commission Report:

> Our tropical Africa will not grow without the African. The capital needed to exploit it, as it so needs to be exploited, lies in the procurement of labour for exploitation: abundant, cheap and solid labour. . .and this labour, given the circumstances, will never be supplied by European immigrants (quoted in Penvenne 1979a: 11; see also Isaacman's introduction to Honwana 1988: 18).

By contrasting Africans to Europeans, the Joint Consultation Commission found deplorable the former's non-dependency on the latter, their non-dependency on wage labour, their indigenous work ethics and their lack of interest in permanent toil. Men, in particular, were singled out as irresponsible, indolent, careless and alcoholics:

> The European worker works in order to eat, and in nearly all countries there are more hands available than local industry requires, thus develops the enslavement of labour by capital— of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie. In Lourenço Marques, as soon as the native has [earned] enough to marry one or more women, he then has his sustenance guaranteed by the labour of his wives and the product of his own labour then goes to buy more women, several heads of cattle or to get drunk on alcohol. The result is that if in Europe the worker is in

> reality more dependent upon the capitalist than vice versa, ... in Lourenço Marques, the Europeans ... are dependent upon black (labourers) who in their turn barely depend, or do not at all depend, upon whites (quoted in Penvenne 1979a: 12).

This report also stated that, whilst in Europe the state had the duty to protect the workers from capitalist abuses, in Lourenço Marques the state and the capitalist had the same and mutually beneficial interests. Therefore, the state had the duty to protect the investor from 'unreliable' workforce (cited in Penvenne 1979a: 12).

For the Portuguese capital and industry, the lack of cheap labour was accentuated by the developments in the colony of Transvaal where the construction of the Transvaal-Lourenço Marques railroad and the growing Transvaal mining industry fuelled the trade between Mozambique and Transvaal. Just as the demand for South African gold, diamonds and coal in the international markets increased, so too did the South African demand for cheap labour. In the eyes of the Portuguese coloniser, it simply did not make sense to be short of labour when there were so many 'lazy, idle and wickedly indulgent black men around' (J. A. Enes quoted in Mondlane 1969: 37). There was no invisible hand to herd men into the claws and jaws of colonial capital and industry.

5 Shibalo and Taxation

The threat against the interests of imperial capital and industry posed by the provisional nature of black labour led both the Portuguese and the British to devise incentives to attract able-bodied black men to migrant work. The Portuguese, however, who lacked financial resources, depended entirely on the crudest exploitation of black labour. Thus, in addition to monopolising fertile land, taxation was monopolised and its base extended to force men to work for money. Now men, women and their huts were taxed. Under the hut tax, a person (usually a man) was required to pay tax for each hut in his/her compound. Under the head tax, all natives aged 18 or older were required to pay tax whether they were employed or not. Under the head tax, a married man, for example, was taxed for each hut on his compound, for each wife if he had multiple wives and for each unmarried daughter aged 18 or older (Honwana 1988).

Further, the imposition of *Shibalo*[3] (slave labour) accompanied land and tax monopolisations. Thus, by the turn of the twentieth century, forced labour had become widespread and institutionalised. Speaking in the early 1880s, Antonio Enes, the Governor General of Mozambique, spoke in favour of enslaving Africans and Asians in the service of Portuguese colonial capital and industry. In his own words:

> The state not only as a sovereign of semi-barbaric populations but also as a depository of social authority should have no scruples in obliging and if necessary forcing these rude

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[3]Derived from the Portuguese term *trabalho*, which means work, *shibalo* is colonial forced labour.

Negroes in Africa, these ignorant Pariahs in Asia, these half-witted savages from Oceania, to work... (quoted in Mondlane 1969: 37).

Forced labour was eventually legalised through the Native Labour Code of September 6, 1928. As Penvenne's vivid explanation shows:

> Under the Shibalo system, Mozambicans were quite literally rounded up and marched off to work by the police and collaborators of the powerful native affairs bureaucracy.... The shibalo system... was integral to the overall design to attract, introduce and support capital investment—preferably Portuguese—which would in turn support the state bureaucracy and ensure continued sovereignty in Mozambique (1979b: 2).

Forced labour included compulsory production of cash crops whereby African peasants were required to dedicate a hectare of their productive land to cash crops such as cotton, sisal or rice, which the Portuguese bought at the lowest possible prices. Honwana, who in the 1930s worked as an interpreter for the colonial administration, recalled the scenes of this inhumanity. He explains:

> When the cotton was ready for harvesting, the administrator supplied the sacks, and both the peasants and the settlers brought their cotton to the administration to be classified, weighed, and paid for before a designated agricultural official.... Then what happened was that the settlers' cotton was given a first-class designation, but the peasants' cotton was nearly always given third-class designation and only rarely a second-class one. The price for third-class cotton was twenty centavos per kilo (about $0.006) (Honwana 1988: 87–88).

In contrast, the British capitalists in South Africa had resources to pay relatively higher exploitative wages than the Portuguese could. This ability to pay relatively higher exploitative wages made the British capitalists appear in the eyes of Africans as somewhat lesser evil. In other words, the British 'were seen to hire their labour', whereas the Portuguese were seen 'to conscript theirs' (Penvenne 1979a: 22). Due to the inability to pay, or to pay as much as the British did, and reliance on forced labour and taxation, the Portuguese were deplorable slave masters to be avoided by all means. Whilst British exploitative wages functioned as centripetal forces that attracted desperate Mozambican men to Natal, Transvaal and the Cape, the imposition of forced labour and head and hut taxes functioned as centrifugal forces that pushed men out of Mozambique. This widespread aversion towards the Portuguese which Penvenne refers to was directly related to the Portuguese inferiority complex and group disgrace directly related to, and reflecting, Portuguese political and economic impotency which had to be compensated for by brutality:

> Clearly the Portuguese in general were not respected by the majority of the African population. African attitudes toward the Portuguese in the press, in their songs and in their interview testimony reflect their conviction that the Portuguese were petty, niggardly, jealous, inept and often tyrannical at the workplace and the business place.... [T]he strong British-South African presence in the city and the area provided an obvious foil to the Portuguese. The two were often compared as employers and administrators (Penvenne 1979a: 22).

To sum up, the monopolisation of fertile land aggravated the scarcity of cattle for *lobola*, which made it increasingly difficult for young people to marry; the monopolisation and expansion of taxation and the imposition of forced labour

made Mozambican men increasingly dependent on migrant work. These changes triggered flight for refuge of men into the belly of the southern beast. Kenya, Nyasaland, Rhodesia (north and south) and Tanganyika were also destination of this exodus. According to Rocha et al. (2000: 388), South African statistics in 1920 showed that in 8 years—between 1905 and 1912—about 10,000 men left for South Africa for good. According to the Portuguese population census, the population in the southern province of Inhambane fell by 43%—from 415,000 to 198,000—between 1908 and 1923 (Ibid.). This led Mondlane to note: 'Mozambicans. . . have the largest number of people working outside of their national boundaries in the whole continent of Africa. We are persecuted and exploited at home and used as slave labour abroad' (Mondlane 1972b: 154). According to his estimates,

> [e]very year. . . over 100,000 Mozambican men. . . take up employment in the gold mines of Transvaal and Orange Free State alone. More than 200,000 other Mozambican workers are also employed in South African plantations, farms, homes and secondary industries. Estimates for Northern and Southern Rhodesia run to 150,000, mostly employed in copper mining, farming and white homes. More than 100,000 northern Mozambicans are forced by the same law to seek employment in Tanganyika, Zanzibar and Kenya, mostly in sisal plantations, railways and harbours and as servants in European and Asian homes and as night watchmen (Mondlane 1972b: 154).

Rocha et al. also note that '[t]he desertions characteristic of 1885 to 1900 continued with an intensity incremented during the institutionalisation of *chibalo*' (2000: 388). This massive exodus was a meaningful human (re)action when read in context. As Penvenne states:

> [I]t is certain that the option to work in South Africa acted as a safety valve for African discontent throughout the [twentieth] century. When mobility, security and prosperity seemed hopelessly circumscribed at home, Mozambicans, with some sacrifice, could still acquire bride-wealth, instruments of production, necessary tax, education and consumer money by working legally or clandestinely in South Africa (Penvenne 1979a: 15).

Whilst scholars (Penvenne 1979a, b; Rocha et al. 2000) attribute the exodus in this period to the fall of real wages, the most significant figurational change was the extent to which the money economy had replaced the barter economy in Africans' lives. Only when the totalising forces of modernity/colonialism had co-opted Africans—only when the 'iron cage' of the money economy had locked them in—did falling real wages become an issue. Only then did Africans flock in masses to British colonies searching for money to improve their lives.

6 The Geography, Corruption and Weak Institutions

A combination of three factors—geographical positioning, corruption and weak institutions—positions Mozambique as the transit of choice for migrants from far afield journeying to South Africa as their final destination. In the region, Mozambique boasts six bordering countries, including Malawi, South Africa, Swaziland,

Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. This means Mozambique is really the harbinger to most countries in the region. South Africa has the second highest number (five in total) of bordering countries including Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. All these borders are porous at best. Mozambique also boasts the second longest coastline with 2300 km along the Indian Ocean. This coastline is either unpoliced or poorly policed, which in principle allows anyone with the will and means to enter the region by sea through Mozambique. Thanks to the lack of technology, skills and corruption, there are vast wooded territories outside government surveillance.

Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranks countries based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be. A country's score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). The scale 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean) has been used since the year 2012. However, before 2012, the scores were assigned on a scale of 0 (Highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean). Additionally, a country's rank indicates its position relative to its peers in the index. Thus, a poor score is likely a sign of widespread bribery, lack of punishment for corruption and public institutions that don't respond to citizens' needs.

From 2006 to 2015, Botswana was ranked the least corrupt country in Southern Africa, followed by Seychelles, Namibia and Mauritius in second, third and fourth places, respectively. Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zimbabwe were amongst the highly corrupt countries in the region. The evolution of Mozambique's ranking in the same period is abysmal by any standards: 2.8 (2006)—2.8 (2007)—2.6 (2008)—2.5 (2009)—2.7 (2010)—2.7(2011)—31 (2012)—30 (2013)—31 (2014, 2015). Mozambique scored 31 points similar to Malawi and stood as the fifth most corrupt country in the region. For 2014, the score was the same as 2015 with no changes in the rank. For the previous years 2013–2012, the rank did not change which means Mozambique has not improved its position in reducing corruption in the public sector. However, countries like DRC, Angola, Madagascar and Zimbabwe were considered the most corrupted countries in the Southern Africa, scoring fewer points than Mozambique in the CPI from 2015 to 2012. CPI results from 2006 to 2011 indicated that countries like Angola, Zimbabwe, DRC, Tanzania, Malawi and Mozambique were amongst the most corrupt countries in the Southern Africa region. However, Mozambique was ranked tenth amongst the fourteen Southern African countries with scores between 2.5 and 2.8 points, considered a highly corrupt country (Transparency International 2016).

A recent study by the Center for Public Integrity (CPI) indicates that the cost of corruption in Mozambique for the last 10 years is close to $4.9 billion. This price tag is equivalent to 30% of the country's GDP in 2014 and 60% of the government budget for 2015 (CIP 2016). Also, the Mo Ibrahim Governance Index, which measures corruption in Africa, gives Mozambique 52 points out of 100, thus ranking the country at 22nd place out of 52 African countries evaluated. Again, Mozambique was put amongst the most corrupt in the Southern African region. On the index of accountability, the country fell by 3.3 points from 2009 to 2014.

One must keep in mind what all this means in relation to movements of people entering and leaving Mozambique. The limited resources, limited skills and inefficiency of public servants at the borders fuel the corruption which is endemic in many border posts. Travellers take advantage of the weak borders to enter the countries illegally through bribe (Crush et al. 2005). According to a CPI report on corruption at the Immigration Services of Mozambique, due to the economic growth and political stability of the country, migrants from the region of Great Lakes are attracted to migrate to Mozambique. Moreover, some of those migrants enter the country illegally taking advantage of the weak control of the national borders and the corruption that is undermining the immigration service and its agents. The corruption practices begin at the frontier posts with the agents from the Immigration Service, Border Guard Force and Police of the Republic of Mozambique. Once in Mozambique, illegal migrants from countries such as Somalia, Burundi, DRC, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Guiné Conakry, Mali and others obtain fake identity documents and later on fake passports by bribing the immigration service agents to that purpose (CIP 2011).

Mozambique is amongst the most corrupt countries with the weakest institutions in Southern Africa, making the country an attractive route to South Africa. Asians, mainly Chinese and Pakistanis, have used Mozambique as a corridor to enter South Africa. Somalis have also used Mozambique to gain entry to South Africa. Since Mozambique and South Africa signed the visa-free agreement, the Mozambican passport has enjoyed popularity amongst migrants from farther afield as it permits them to enter South Africa without visas. The visa-free entry arrangement between the two countries brings huge economic benefits to South Africa, especially to the Mpumalanga Province. The South African government, despite its draconian immigration laws, can only turn a blind eye to this illegality. Conveniently, we might add.

7   Gender and Labour Politics

Under the colonial administration, women remained in the villages as relics of tradition, whilst men went to the metropolis. Migration was par excellence a male preserve, and it remained so for at least two centuries. Patriarchy and misogyny were perhaps the most salient structural features of the labour reservoir in which only men were worthy of legal immigration and work. Men could travel legally to Transvaal, Natal, Free State and Cape colonies and later to South Africa, whereas women could not. In fact, women could not even migrate to the cities within Mozambique. This misogynistic temperament became inscribed in the immigration culture and discourse. The border town of Ressano Garcia, for instance, became known amongst migrant mine workers as *Xitlhela Vasati*, that is, the point beyond which women are prohibited. If they accompanied their men, this was where their journey ended. They returned home, back to the north, whilst their men continued the journey to the south.

The transformation of Mozambique from the labour reservoir to migration corridor means that, in the context of the gendered nature of migration, to borrow from Karl Marx and Chinua Achebe, 'all that is solid melts into air', 'things fall apart' and 'the centre can no longer hold'. The super- and infrastructure under which Mozambique fulfilled the function of labour reservoir disintegrated. The political transformations in Mozambique and South Africa ended the pimping of Mozambican male labour to the South African colonial industrialists by the Portuguese. On the one hand, the liberation movement in Mozambique viewed the export of men as cheap labour to South Africa with contempt as a quintessential form of colonial oppression, a tendency which continued after independence. In fact, after the declaration of independence, there was a sharp decline of labour migration from Mozambique to South Africa. On the other hand, in South Africa, after independence, the new black government was preoccupied with guaranteeing employment to its citizens, which led to policies and practices antithetical to cheap labour inflows from the neighbouring countries, including Mozambique. Meanwhile, South Africa was gradually relaxing entry requirements for short-term visits for shopping, medical treatment and tourism, as long as the visitors declared not to seek employment.

These transformations signalled the transition of Mozambique from reservoir to corridor. How so? The volume of migration flows increased. More and more people could enter South Africa on a short-terms basis. One could enter South Africa multiple times within a year, as long as one had money to do so. Being an able-bodied man was no longer a requirement. This rule of the game came to an end. Further, and most importantly, the gender profile of this ever-increasing volume of migration flows changed. More and more women became dis-embedded from their traditional positioning in order of things and were sucked into the immigration stream. Now with Mozambique transformed from labour reservoir to migration corridor, this stagnant section of the population now travels through this cluster of passages; the global economic forces that transformed Mozambique from a cheap male workforce reservoir into migration corridor also enabled women's movements.

The 1990s witnessed growing numbers of women taking financial matters into their own hands instead of relying on their menfolk, many of whom had been made economically impotent through dwindling mine jobs south of the border, massive layoffs and decline of real wages. Many of these women—known since then as *muqueristas*—began to cross the border to Swaziland and South Africa to buy commodities and resell them in Mozambique. A man by the name of Zavala, interviewed by one of the authors in 2003, was vocal about this trend: 'Back then it was forbidden for a woman to go to Jo'burg. But today the woman also wears the overall and goes into the mine. Long ago that was prohibited. It was a taboo even for a female to pass near the mine compound' (July 6, 2003). When one of the authors commented to Zavala that he had seen women travelling in the Vaal Maseru (the buses traditionally known to transport mine workers to and from South Africa), he replied:

> Now they own the Vaal Maseru. Now women are the owners of Jo'burg. If a woman says, "Today I want to go Jo'burg," she takes off and goes. Just like that. Where does she get the money to do that? But it's hard for a man to do the same. Long ago this didn't happen. That is why things are falling apart. Valuing the woman is a good thing. But she must be valued while she's at home. Once you value her to the extent of allowing her to go to Jo'burg, things get screwed up for good (July 6, 2003).

As a student in Johannesburg in the 1990s, one of the authors travelled to and from Mozambique with hundreds of Mozambican women involved in informal cross-border trading. The informal economy in southern Mozambique, without which the region would descend into chaos, is for the most part based on the trade of South African goods imported to the country by these women. Men on the fringes of the labour market work side by side with these women as vendors (Agadjanian 2002). These women's economic power extends to the South African side of the border, where they have become a sizable market force to reckon with. This became evident in 2003 when South Africa introduced stricter entry visa requirements, which reduced the number of Mozambican visitors to South Africa. The draconian decision had a devastating economic impact in South Africa. Published in *Business Day,* Shezi's article, 'South Africa: Visa Regulations Stifle Nelspruit Trade', gets to the heart of the matter:

> Nelspruit was considered a high-growth area, with the retail and hospitality sectors showing steady increases in revenue. The town, the first major business centre travelers encounter on the N4 highway from Mozambique into SA, has suffered considerable losses in business revenue due to the visa requirements implemented in accordance with the Immigration Act in April. Mozambicans were spending between R70m and R90m a month in Nelspruit before the visa regulations were imposed. The number of Mozambican shoppers visiting the town has declined considerably since (Shezi 2003).

Many of those denied entry visas were the women engaged in informal trade on both sides of the border. Coincidentally, the only Mozambican shopper interviewed in this article was a woman, who said: 'Coming to South Africa is no longer worthwhile. Along with the visa issue and duty controls, the price of petrol has gone up, and with the stronger SA currency, nothing is cheap anymore. We do not feel that we are compensated any longer, and so we are looking at other options.' We have seen many standing in the humiliating visa queues at the South African embassy in Maputo; selling Mozambican commodities in Johannesburg; exchanging money on both sides of the border; shopping for their families in the South African malls; patronising South African restaurants and hotels; harassed by customs officers at the Ressano Garcia border gate (Mozambican side of the border).

These developments represent an end to a social order which for more than a century constructed masculinity around 'seeing the world' (migrant work) and the monetary gains thereof. The advances of the female factor are not only felt in Mozambique. They are also felt in other countries in the region, for example in Namibia where 'male wage labour outside the region dramatically and conclusively defined the external world as male, [where women] rarely accompanied men, and [where] there were almost no wage labor opportunities for them' (McKittrick 2003:

40). With women now doing the same thing, trips to South Africa (and abroad generally) are no longer a male preserve.

8 Conclusion

Our main argument in this chapter has been that the global economic and political transformations have precipitated changes in the positioning of Mozambique as a reservoir of cheap labour for the region, notably South Africa, to migration corridor. First, we have argued that one of the characteristic features of the corridor is the increasing migration flows from non-traditional migration sources—notably East Africa, West Africa and Asia—whereby Mozambique functions as a gateway to its more prosperous neighbours, most notably South Africa. Second, we have pointed out that this transformation from reservoir to corridor is connected to weak government institutions and unbridled corruption. The ministry of the interior which is responsible for immigration and police service and the ministry of justice which is responsible for issuing and authenticating documents are hotbeds of corruption in which bribery and issuance of false documents are common practice. *The goat eats where it has been tethered* is the quintessential motto of corruption, an article of faith recited and repeated shamelessly in public institutions—Mozambican citizenship and passports are for sale, nay, Mozambique is for sale! Third, we have argued that gender was perhaps one of the most visible features of the old social order of the labour reservoir. Dating from the colonial times to the early 1990s, the reservoir was extremely male centred, privileging the movement of men at the exclusion of women. Because gender was, in our view, perhaps the most grotesque and in-your-face fallacy of the reservoir, it had to be gender transformations that gave the emergent social order of the corridor one of its distinct character. In the corridor, not only has volume of migrants increased, but their gender profiles have also changed as more and more women joined the stream.

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Migration, Marginalisation and Oppression in Mangaung, South Africa

Thulisile N. Mphambukeli and Verna Nel

1 Introduction

Migration is an international phenomenon. Millions of people are known to be living outside their country of birth (UN 2013). People migrate to seek better socio-economic opportunities or they are fleeing from conflict and oppression, and, increasingly, they are becoming climate change refugees. Dumont and Lemaître (2005, p. 3) argue that the data generally available on migration flows do not provide a clear idea of the relative scale of movements across countries because only 'permanent' migrants are counted as immigrants, that is, 'persons who are admitted to the country and granted the right of permanent residence upon entry' (Dumont and Lemaître 2005, p. 3). Consequently, the people approved for provisional permits or enrolled onto a population register may not feature in the official migration statistical data (Dumont and Lemaître 2005, p. 5), let alone 'illegal' immigrants without documents.

In South Africa, the movement of people, mainly from rural areas to cities in search of better opportunities, has been ongoing since the discovery of precious minerals in the late 1800s. However, colonial-apartheid policies sought to prevent migration of black people to the city (Lee 2009; Barou et al. 2012, p. 13). Post-1994, crumbling of these colonial-apartheid barricades released the pent-up flood of migrants to the city. These migrations, along other factors such as decongestion of overcrowded houses and increased demand from smaller households (Van Niekerk et al. 2014; Le Roux Augustijn 2015), fuel extensive sprawling of informal settlements that now surround and even penetrate the former white cities.

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In addition to rural–urban migration, the image of a 'New South Africa' as well as its growing economy has attracted migrants from across Africa, particularly from neighbouring countries such as Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Somalia (Bernstein 2011, p. 3). Thus, South African cities have become a primary destination for many immigrants. For instance, Mangaung is the choice destination for immigrants from Lesotho[1], a country completely surrounded by South Africa.

Whilst many of these immigrants intend to settle permanently in particular localities, not all have the official documentation nor do they possess the South African Identity Document (ID) that guarantees them access to basic social services such as housing or land (Mphambukeli 2014). Consequently, such 'illegal' immigrants are forced to rent backyard shacks or set up shanties in informal settlements. However, they still congregate in specific localities in order to forge a sense of belonging and engage with the settlement processes in those particular contexts (Lee 2009). In doing so, these immigrants engage in the politics of belonging and entitlement. This, in the context of postcolonial-apartheid South Africa, is forged on the anvil of bureaucratic documentation and is fraught with identity switching that collectively gives room to contestations at multiple scales (Bekker and Leildé 2003). The contestations about 'belonging' and 'not belonging', 'entitlement' and 'non-entitlement' are deeply entrenched in (il)legalities of citizenship (Peberdy 2001). The fact that people do not legally belong or have any formal claim to a particular space reveals challenges about the criteria for belonging and their subsequent application in the space. Thus, contestations are rooted in notions that some people do, or do not, belong: around who has rights to basic services or not, and who may, or may not, be acknowledged. Consequently, access to basic services is closely linked to concepts around citizenship rights that are here reduced to mean entitlement, not only to the right to vote but other rights such as welfare, ownership and disposal of property and legal redress in the case of any infringement of these rights (Dunne 2006, p. 7). Access to adequate basic services is therefore generally a contested issue in postcolonial Southern Africa.

In the Grasland township of Mangaung in the Free State Province of South Africa, contestation around access to basic services such as housing and water exposes complex relationships. Consequently, those who are considered 'illegal' immigrants without rights, or the poor who are then subjected to oppression (marginalisation, exploitation, violence, cultural imperialism and powerlessness) (Young 1990). Whilst the South African Constitution and state policy promotes the ideals of social and spatial justice and human rights,[2] in reality only those whom officials and politicians view as 'belonging' merit attention (Mphambukeli 2015).

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[1]Note that the people of Lesotho and most residents of the Free State share a common culture and language SeSotho, which contributes to the appeal of Mangaung as a destination.

[2]See the Preamble to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights (Republic of South Africa, 1996, The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act no. 108 of 1996). Pretoria: Government Printer, the Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act, 2013, and the National Development Plan, 2012.

Furthermore, contestations produce intricacies around bureaucrats' planning to provide basic services in the area. This chapter demonstrates that belonging is contested in Mangaung not only through the application of the criteria of 'belonging' but also around the construction of the criteria, which produces other forms of contested belonging with a number of implications for planning in postcolonial Southern Africa. The chapter interrogates conditions under which the criteria are constructed and applied along with the consequences of such application, particularly taking into account the number of people affected. The chapter also asks what alternative interpretations of belonging or merit should be applied and how?

There are three areas of contestation of belonging where varying degrees of implications for planning in Southern Africa arise: (1) the need for a South African identity document (ID) to 'legitimise belonging' and to defend the allocation of basic services; (2) those who recognise the application of the first criterion, but believe that the 'application of this criterion' has implications that are neither reasonable nor just; and (3) those who do not even accept possession of a South African ID as a criterion and perceive 'boundaries as insignificant' or inconsequential.

One crucial point of contested belonging is when people are alienated or denied access to basic services because of their nationality, as in the case of Lesotho immigrants in Grasland. The 'unofficial' denial of access to basic services by the municipal bureaucrats increases the vulnerability of emerging communities, rendering their existence tenuous (Landau 2012; Mphambukeli 2014). It is deeply unsettling to community members, activists, academics and others committed to the notion of a just and inclusive post-apartheid city, particularly in light of the many deleterious social, economic, spatial and health consequences of segregationist planning (Mphambukeli 2015). This situation is aggravated when citizenship status is a major determinant of provision of basic services. The manner in which local governments openly advocate for the provision of services may make this explicit, but it is sometimes veiled when the local government dehumanises and oppresses those whom they consider 'non-citizens' simply by denying the right to basic services such as housing, sanitation and water. In addition, these contestations of belonging happen against the background of inadequate basic service delivery and in an area occupied by large numbers of people from Lesotho, many of them having lived there for a long time, but are nonetheless viewed as 'illegal immigrants'.

In this contribution, we therefore situate social justice—defined in terms of values, processes and practices for empowerment to disallow oneself to be oppressed, the promotion of values that disincline one to oppress others and practices that enable equality and justice (Mphambukeli 2012)—as a useful concept or way to explain the contestation of belonging as lived experiences for the Lesotho immigrants (Basotho) in Grasland.

The types of exclusionary power that contribute to poor and unequal access to basic resources and rights such as water are reproduced by those who are responsible for providing basic services and control particular forms of knowledge (Landau 2012). Therefore, conventional knowledge about planning has resided in

the hands of middle class bureaucrats and professionals—once largely white but now largely black—who claim knowledge about the processes which shape the city (Oranje 2014). As this chapter argues, the implications are that planning through apartheid and post-apartheid years has been refracted through the eyes of bureaucrats (Watson 2009). We therefore suggest that a more flexible criterion for allocation of resources be adopted—a criterion that takes into account the complexities associated with what migration processes have and continue to produce in Southern African contexts. We draw empirical evidence from three groups of people, namely: (1) the municipal technocrats (including ward committee leaders); (2) Lesotho immigrants; and (3) migrants from other parts of South Africa, in order to illustrate the above-mentioned three categories of contestation about belonging in Grasland.

This chapter first presents the case study area, Grasland, and briefly narrates how the settlement came to being and ended up with a high presence of Lesotho immigrants. Thereafter, the methodology is outlined, followed by the theoretical lens on which our discussion is based including South African urbanisation discourses and a brief discussion on migration and contested citizenship in the post-1994 South African city then moving on to the concept of oppression, in particular the levels, features and faces of oppression. We then present the findings of the study that highlights the forms of contestations of belonging in Grasland. Lastly, a discussion is generated with an aim of situating our claims and proposals on the basis of what the empirical evidence suggests.

2 The Case Study: The Greater Grasland Area

Grasland[3] is situated in the city of Bloemfontein in the Free State Province (now part of the Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality). It developed in the late 1990s through land invasion of a small-holding located in the south-eastern part of the city (Mphambukeli 2014). Although the private land owners were granted an interdict to remove the 'squatters', political pressure from the new voters (now Grasland residents) was instrumental in the purchase of the land by the government and the initial development of the settlement (FS Pilot Project 2005). Consequently, as soon as the land became publically owned, the settlement grew rapidly. The conversion of the land from private to public property demonstrates a struggle for justice, dominion and power as well as an attempt to make a particular regime accountable to the yearning of the people it claims to govern (Mphambukeli 2014). History has shown that a significant number of Lesotho immigrants (Basotho) settled in South Africa due to labour migration processes during the colonial-apartheid times, and that this movement has subsequently continued in South Africa. The

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[3]In this chapter, we use Grasland an original Afrikaans word and not 'Grasland' a translated English word. Grasland is the correct word because the area was an agricultural smallholding.

culture of many urban townships in South Africa was and is still dominated by significant numbers of Basotho immigrants (Aerni-Flessner 2016), particularly in the Free State Province.

Lesotho is about 138 km from Mangaung, South Africa. The border crossing between Lesotho and South Africa sees a huge movement of Basotho on a daily basis (Aerni-Flessner 2016). Although South Africa has tackled the problem by deporting undocumented Basotho immigrants, it has failed to curtail the flow of immigrants (Aerni-Flessner 2016; SABC News 2014; Shale 2013) who have sought alternative employment opportunities in South Africa (Shale 2013) due to lack of employment and economic opportunities in Lesotho.

Grasland has many Basotho residents: immigrants who have for many years been seeking access to South African IDs, which they believe would grant them an entry into the labour market as well as access to housing, although they lack legal travel documents and work permits (Mphambukeli 2014; Shale 2013). The growing number of Basotho immigrants has now created crucial points of contestations of belonging as these immigrants have occupied spaces such as Grasland and over time married South African citizens and settled in the city of Bloemfontein (Mphambukeli 2014). Consequently, the area has expanded with the Basotho largely residing in informal settlements on the fringes.

2.1   Methodological Considerations

The study adopted a qualitative research design in the form of a descriptive phenomenological approach. Phenomenological research design approaches are less commonly used in urban and regional planning practice as urban and regional planning discipline tends to be perceived as contributing more to a physical layout and subdivision to the neglect of the human experiences (Mphambukeli 2015). According to Creswell (2013, p. 76), a phenomenological study describes the common meaning for several individuals of their lived experiences with the basic purpose of reducing individual experiences within a phenomenon to a description of the universal essence. It acknowledges socially constructed forms of knowledge and enables a researcher to identify patterns or relationships of understanding.

A total of 24 unstructured interviews with an average duration of an hour each were conducted over a period of ten months. Two of these interviews were conducted with the relevant ward councillors of the area that provided a balance of views between the residents and the councillors. Through this approach the essential meanings of the phenomena of interest could be understood from the immigrants' perspectives. Thus, the lived experiences of the respondents—those directly involved in the situation—are at the heart of this research. Ethical clearance was obtained from the University of the Free State for the research.

3   Urbanisation, Migration, Citizenship and Oppression

This section of the chapter provides a theoretical lens through which the critical discussions on contested belonging in Grasland are situated. Firstly, the South African landscape that situates the concept of urbanisation is provided. Secondly, a brief discussion on migration and contested citizenship in South African cities post-1994 is provided. Finally, the concept of oppression, the levels in which oppression operates, its features and faces is presented.

Theoretically speaking, there are many concepts that have no agreed upon definitions, including some relating to migration. Fleras (2015) argues that the concepts, theories and assumptions informing the study of migration, immigration and migrants are still in flux as the reasons for migrants for leaving, returning or circulating are yet to be categorised, although presumably they range from the social to the personal. These struggles occur against a backdrop of processes such as urbanisation with various interpretations.

3.1   Urbanisation

The concept of urbanisation is defined by Mabin (1992, p. 12) as a process of population movement towards densely populated and mainly non-agricultural settlements, whilst Beall (2000, p. 428) describes urbanisation as a transformation in the quantity of urban residents and as a conversion from a rural society to one in which a rising percentage of the population resides in metropolises. Most of these definitions are mainly based on the size of the population that has grown over time due to movement of people from one locality to the other.

Urbanisation can be understood in various other ways: as a destruction of the landscape or as a route towards freedom from rural constrictions (Fiedler 2014, p. ix). Some define urbanisation as the method or process through which rural societies develop to form cities, or towns (Mark 2014, p. 1). Hence, today some countries regard any town with a population of more than 2500 as urban, and others set a minimum of 20,000 (Mark 2014).

However, descriptions grounded on population sizes do not sufficiently register the real and significant dynamics that affect urban residents, such as their concentration, their accessibility of health care or the quality of the infrastructure which are vital factors that are more critical than mere population statistics. Thus, whilst urbanisation is mostly described from a population size perspective and normalised as a universally all-encompassing concept—granting that it is unable to categorise movements of people within towns and cities other than in terms of population size—such a concept is problematic. It neglects the fact that the movement of people is very fluid globally and South Africa is no exception (Balbo and Marconi 2006).

3.1.1 Urbanisation: The South African Landscape

Even though rapid population growth is taking place within the context of the Global South, urbanisation in these less developed nations is happening at lower levels of *per capita income* and within an economic context that is quite dissimilar to that which occurred in the Global North, especially the levels of urbanisation. Furthermore, urbanisation rates in developing states are often characterised by the unprecedented scale of service demands, whilst the direction of urban change is more strongly affected by the global economy than ever before (UN-Habitat 2014). The form of cities arising from urbanisation also differs from that of the West (Mbiba and Huchzermeyer 2002). Hence, in many ways the traditional rural–urban distinction made by scholars is becoming redundant as a result of the emergence of new globalising processes (Cohen 2004, p. 35).

In South Africa, urbanisation was mainly influenced by the movement of people from rural (countryside) to urban areas in search of income security. However, as claimed by Mabin (1992, p. 19), African people in particular all over South Africa struggled to live and gain greater access to the accretions of prosperity characterised by the cities, and thus, whether through singular or through joint movements, they began to remake the nature of urbanism in the country. Such urbanisation happened against a backdrop where the government of the time tried to prevent the movement of people through its draconian measures such as pass laws (Davies 1981).

It can be posited that South African urbanisation was and is still highly influenced by the movement of people both across international borders and inside South Africa. This movement was originally influenced by the discovery of minerals such as gold and diamonds, closely followed by the process of industrialisation as the following quote illustrates:

> Diamonds were found in the Orange and Vaal Rivers in Griqualand in 1867-68. The land was at that time under the control of the Orange Free State, but Britain was able to re-possess it in 1871. Europeans, Coloureds and Africans poured into the area, the Africans generally becoming labourers and the Europeans prospectors or 'diggers'.

The above quotation highlights the fact that with the discovery of minerals, there was a need for labour, which influenced the avoidance of the social costs of labour by recruiting migrant labour from neighbouring countries such as Lesotho. According to Smit and Booysen (1981), people from all over the world, including neighbouring countries, streamed to the new mining areas. The apartheid era of South Africa was characterised by anti-urbanisation and segregation policies and actions: by Bantustans, also called the Homelands, pass laws and influx control (Mabin 1992; Murray 1988).

Post-apartheid, the continued flow of people to urban areas has put pressure on the ANC-led government to provide adequate basic services such as water, sanitation and shelter (SACN 2014). What makes things difficult for the current government is that it views migrant labour as temporary (Landau 2012). In addition, it directs the blame to the Afrikaner Nationalist government policies of separate

development, as the sole perpetrator of current migration challenges, entrenching the notion that immigrants will eventually migrate back to their places of birth (Garau, Sclar et al. 2005 cited in SACN 2014, p. 20). These views by the government have prevented it from putting in place a 'sound and realistic' immigration policy (Landau 2012, p. 226) as a means to move towards providing adequate basic services that caters for all urban dwellers in South Africa (including immigrants) (Crankshaw and Parnell 1996, p. 233).

3.1.2   Migration and Contested Citizenship in South African Cities Post-1994

Human rights should apply to all people, not withstanding their citizenship. Thus, both citizens and those considered 'non-citizens' should have access to basic human rights which must be protected in terms of section 7(2) of the South African Constitution, even within urbanising cities. More so, since cities are now home to an increasing proportion of the world; South Africa is no exception. Lefebvre (1996, p. 34) argues that 'the right to the city, complemented by the right to difference and the right to information, should modify, concretise and make more practical the rights of the citizen as an urban dweller and user of multiple services'. Barber (2014, p. 1) supports this assertion and states that citizens have a right to transparent, accountable government and to engagement and participation in the business of the city. But, what happens when basic service provision is denied through the withholding of the rights in the city because of assumptions about people's citizenship status? Or when people are discriminated against because they are perceived as 'indigent' and 'illegal immigrants'?

So, as cities continue to experience rapid population growth, access to basic needs such as housing, water and sanitation which are fundamental human rights becomes critical (Phillips 2014). This is particularly crucial within a global context where the use of 'human rights' seem to be a 'buzzword' that justifies the power to facilitate access to basic services to (only) those considered 'citizens'. These justifications determine who has access to what and at what point in the city. Benhabib (2011) argues that we live in a world where the concept of human rights has been used and abused to justify all sorts of political actions and interventions. Hence, he cautions that rights are not simply about strong moral entitlements which accrue to individuals; they are also claims to justice and legitimacy. We cannot simply reduce rights to the language of moral correctness.

Consequently, the need to provide and sustain basic service delivery within urban contexts characterised, for instance, by political interference (Marcuse 1976) speaks directly to the debate about the right 'to' the city *versus* the right 'of' the city. Whilst the city should enable, create and provide job opportunities, housing and many other basic services, city dwellers are attempting to access these opportunities (Balbo and Marconi 2006). Yet some city dwellers might be perceived as 'illegal immigrants' with no right to the city (SACN 2014). All of this happens within a context where 'a lot of political energy is put into promoting,

protecting and articulating their [the city dwellers] significance in the construction of a better world' (Harvey 2008, p. 23). As Harvey (2008, p. 1) posits, we live in an era where the ideals of human rights have taken centre stage, both politically and ethically. However, when these human rights are uttered within the conflicting perceived processes of rapid urbanisation, they give birth to oppressive practices (Balbo and Marconi 2006).

Unfortunately, in South Africa, a number of factors, including high unemployment rates and poverty, have sparked episodes of intense xenophobia where foreigners have been attacked, assaulted or murdered, and their businesses and homes ransacked and razed (Mosselson 2010; Matsinhe 2011). These attacks are by those who claimed to be 'legal' South Africans. South Africans were motivated by anger and fear that foreigners are 'stealing' citizens' jobs and opportunities (McKnight 2008; Hickel 2014). Accordingly, it may be argued that the complex migration processes further exacerbate the processes of contested citizenship and subsequently belonging in South Africa (Landau 2005). These episodes of xenophobia also expose other 'crises' such as the inadequate basic service provision, which trigger basic service protests (see Powell et al. 2015) and decisions born out of political power relations which undermine the violation of basic human rights, mostly directed to those perceived as 'illegal immigrants' in South Africa. The political economy of crisis takes place at personal, institutional and societal levels (Mosselson 2010). For the purposes of this chapter, we focus on what is at play at personal and societal levels by highlighting how the discriminatory practices around basic service provision further entrenches oppression.

3.2 Oppression

Oppression shakes the very core of being human and it crushes visions, dreams, purpose, drive and enthusiasm, particularly within a politically charged context like South Africa (Munroe 2014). Unpacking the concept of oppression is therefore very relevant to our work, as it provides a conceptual framework for analysis of the construction and maintenance of social inequality upon which injustice is predicated. At the same time, it provides concepts for arguments of ways and means of contributing to the construction of just spaces. Young (2000, p. 41) defines oppression as systemic. . .

> . . .constraints on social groups that are not necessarily the result of the intentions of the tyrant. Hence, oppression in this sense is structural, rather than the result of a few people's choices or policies and its causes are embedded in unquestioned norms, habits and symbols, in the assumptions underlying institutional rules and the collective consequences of following those rules.

Additionally, oppression, as Young (2000, p. 41) asserts, refers to the immense and profound prejudices members of certain structural social groups endure as a result of often unconscious expectations and responses of well-intentioned

individuals in everyday relations, media and traditional generalisations and structural features of administrative orders and market apparatuses—in short, usual practices of daily life. Young contends that we cannot therefore eliminate this systematic oppression by getting rid of the rulers or making some new laws, because oppression is systematically reproduced in major economic, political and cultural institutions.

The systematic character of oppression implies that an oppressed group need not have a correlate oppressing group. For instance, whilst structural oppression involves relations amongst groups, these relations do not always fit into the paradigm of conscious and intentional oppression of one group by another (Young 1990, p. 4). Therefore:

> [T]o understand the meaning and operation of power in modern society we must look beyond the model of power as 'sovereignty', a dyadic relation of ruler and subject, and instead analyse the exercise of power as the effect of often liberal and 'human' practices of education, bureaucratic administration, production and distribution of consumer goods, medicine, and so on. Hence, the conscious actions of many individuals daily contribute to maintaining and reproducing oppression, but those people are usually simply doing their jobs or living their lives, and do not understand themselves as agents of oppression (Foucault cited by Young 1990, pp. 41–42).

However, Foucault does not propose that within a structure of subjugation, singular individuals do not deliberately hurt others in dominated structural social groups. For example, a sexually assaulted woman, the battered black youth, the locked-out employee and the homosexual man hassled on the street are preys of deliberate actions by recognisable oppressing structural social groups (Young 1990, p. 5).

One useful model that helps us understand how oppression operates is Harro's (2000) Cycle of Socialisation which explains how we are conditioned to think and act in ways that promote oppression. Thus, in attempting to understand what roles we have been socialised to play, how we are affected by issues of oppression in our lives and how we participate in maintaining them, we must understand that we get systematic training on how to be each of our social identities during our lifespan (Harro 2000, p. 15). This implies that the systematic nature of oppression calls for an understanding of its structural nature and not just what individuals do.

3.2.1 Levels of Oppression

What the cycle of socialisation exposes is the fact that oppression exists when one social group knowingly or unconsciously exploits another social group for its own benefit during the process of socialisation; hence oppression = power + privilege and occurs at the following three levels (Hardiman et al. 2007, pp. 39–40):

1. ***Individual level:*** *Beliefs or behaviours of an individual person, conscious or unconscious actions or attitude that maintains oppression.*

2. ***Institutional level:*** *Institutions such as family, government, industry, education and religion shape, and are shaped by, the other two levels. The application of institutional policies and procedures in an oppressive society run by individuals or groups who advocate or collude with social oppression produces oppressive consequences.*
3. ***Societal/Cultural level:*** *Society's cultural norms perpetuate implicit and explicit values that bind institutions and individuals; cultural guidelines, such as philosophies of life, definitions of the good, normal, health, deviance and sickness, often serve the primary function of providing individuals and institutions with the justification for social oppression.*

3.2.2 Features of Oppression

Oppression is not a straightforward philosophy or a set of principles that emphasises dominance of one structural social group over another, nor is it merely random violence, harassment or discrimination towards members of a target social groups; it is more than that as Hardiman et al. (2007, p. 36) argue. Oppression has five features as highlighted by Hardiman et al. (2007, pp. 36–37) which include:

1. ***Pervasive:*** *oppression fuses institutional and systematic discrimination, personal bias, bigotry and social prejudice in a complex web of relationships and structures that saturate most aspects of life in our society.*
2. ***Restrictive:*** *Oppression denotes structural and material constraints that significantly shape a person's life chances and sense of possibility.*
3. ***Hierarchical:*** *Oppression also signifies a hierarchical relationship in which dominant or privileged groups benefit, often in unconscious ways, from the disempowerment of subordinated structural social groups.*
4. ***Complex, multiple, cross-cutting relationships:*** *Power and privilege are relative, however, since individuals hold multiple and cross-cutting social group memberships. For instance, immigrants who are perceived as 'non-citizens' might be valued in a university environment where they offer scarce skills as academics.*
5. ***Internalised:*** *Oppressive beliefs are internalised by victims as well as benefactors. Oppressor doesn't have to exert any more pressure, because we now do it to ourselves and each other. Thus, divide and conquer now works.*

This chapter argues that all the five features were very much evident in Grasland and will be discussed in some detail below.

3.2.3 Five Faces of Oppression

How does one come to know that the situation in a particular context, like Grasland, is oppressive towards the Basotho immigrants? Young (1990, pp. 48–63) argues that in order for one to know whether a situation is oppressive, there must be a

presence of any of the following five faces of oppression: exploitation, marginalisation, violence, cultural imperialism and powerlessness. The characteristic of each face of oppression is briefly explained as follows:

Marginalisation

When a group of people is relegated to a lower social standing, the outer limit or edge of society, they are marginalised (Young 1990, p. 53). Generally, marginalisation is a system of exclusion and the lack of power, participation and integration by a group or a territory.

Powerlessness

According to Young (1990), powerlessness as a face of oppression is mainly a negative treatment of people according to how they are viewed by those in power. The powerless are those who lack authority or power to make or influence decisions. Young's (1990) idea of powerlessness links to Marx's theory of socialism which states that some people 'have' power whilst others 'have-not'. Hence, the powerless are controlled by the dominant class and are positioned to take orders and seldom have the right to give them. Some of the fundamental injustices associated with powerlessness are inhibition to develop one's capacities, lack of decision-making power and exposure to disrespectful treatment because of the lowered status. Powerlessness, therefore, predisposes one to produce values of silence as people end up accepting negative ways in which they are treated and subsequently mistreat themselves.

Exploitation

Exploitation is the act of using people's labour to produce profit whilst not compensating them fairly. Also, exploitation uses capitalism to oppress. For instance, exploitation can be seen by the difference between the wealth that workers create through their labour power and the actual wages that workers get paid (Hinson 2008). Furthermore, exploitation is built into the market economy where bosses want to increase profits by lowering wages—whilst the wage and wealth gap between the wealthy owners and managers is significantly high compared to the masses of working people (Young 1990).

Cultural Imperialism

Cultural imperialism involves taking the culture of the ruling class and establishing it as the norm. The groups that have power in society control how the people in that society interpret and communicate information. Therefore, the beliefs of that society are the most widely disseminated and express the experience, values, goals and achievements of these groups.

Violence

This face of oppression is probably the most obvious and visible form of oppression. Members of some groups live with the knowledge that they must fear random, unprovoked attacks on their persons or property (Vromans et al. 2011). These attacks do not necessarily need a motive, but are intended to damage, humiliate or destroy the person. Violent oppression is the direct result of xenophobia (an intense and irrational fear of people, ideas or customs that seem strange or foreign) (Crush 2001).

At least three faces of oppression were evident in Grasland: marginalisation, exploitation and powerlessness. Because of the Basotho's ethical ties or bond that exists between South African Basotho and Lesotho immigrants, violence in the form of xenophobic attacks was not visible.

3.3   Contested Belonging

This section presents the findings of the study by first describing the contestation of the criteria used through its application by the Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality (MMM) to allocate basic services in Grasland; contestations of criteria applied by the local South African residents or citizens; Lesotho immigrants; and also South African citizens with strong ties with Lesotho. The section highlights three areas of contestation of belonging that were evident in the study area, namely:

1. The possession of a South African ID to legitimise belonging.
2. Recognition of the first criterion, but belief that the application of this criterion has implications that are neither fair nor just.
3. Rejection of the possession of a South African ID as a determining criterion and perceive international boundaries as insignificant/inconsequential.

3.3.1   First Area of Contestation

The use of a South African ID to legitimise belonging and defend the allocation of basic services

The study revealed that the possession of a South African ID is used by the municipal technocrats to legitimise belonging when allocating basic services in the greater Grasland area. Hence, the application of this criteria drives a number of contestations of belonging. The first is the denial of access to basic services such as water, housing, sanitation and security, because the Lesotho immigrants residing in Grasland are excluded from belonging to South Africa without a South African ID. The following quotes from a municipal bureaucrat and a community leader illustrate this:

Municipal bureaucrat:	The law says you cannot get a house without an ID.
Community leaders:	There are those people who come to South Africa without IDs. If you are a Lesotho citizen, how will you qualify for a subsidy? You don't have an ID, you can't qualify for a site. How do you bring services on the site where the Lesotho citizens are staying because he doesn't have an ID? How are you going to identify him in your system, to say this person must pay the services? How will you send letters to him if he doesn't have an ID? How do you send a sheriff to remove him

from that house? So people of Lesotho don't have IDs. Whenever you see a Lesotho person in an RDP there is an owner of the RDP, it's just a cover.

If you are looking for a job you should be having your South African ID with you. Let me tell you, to be hired here you need an ID that's all. We need an SA ID and not an ID from Zimbabwe. If you have one, you are wasting your time.

Obviously, if you're not a citizen of South Africa, it's unfortunate that we can't give you space, you only get space when you have and ID, or you just have to go home. That is what basically is going to happen.

We interviewed them and said we know you are Lesotho people; then we said bye-bye Lesotho people, then Phase 3 was formalised.

These comments indicate a clear distinction between those who have a right to 'belong', to access the city and hence services provided by government and those who—by virtue of South African citizenship. This distinction is also recognised by Lesotho immigrants:

Lesotho immigrant:	If you don't have a wife you will just suffer like that, because you are a Lesotho citizen, so you don't get any services. No identity document, no services, unless if you get married to a South African.
Interviewer:	And are you hoping that you are going to get a house if you stay there?
Lesotho immigrant:	Yes
Interviewer:	How though?
Lesotho immigrant:	I don't know but I would like to have a house there but I will never get it because I have no identity document. Maybe I can use my sister's husband's identity document in order to get a house.

Firstly, the application of this criteria is inflexible, as it suggests that one cannot be identified as belonging to South Africa without the relevant paper work or 'acceptable' documentation. What the above quotes also indicate is a withholding of basic human rights, the right to adequate housing including basic services and employment on the grounds of one form of national identity, in this case a South African ID, by community leaders and municipal bureaucrats (SACN 2014). It ignores the fact that there are people who have been born across state boundaries without South African IDs but living in South Africa for many years now and who may have some claim to South African residence or citizenship (through traditional marriages, children born in Lesotho from South African fathers or mothers, children born in South Africa but moved to stay in Lesotho and were issued with Lesotho citizenship papers, etc.). Hence, this simplistic approach fails to acknowledge these social relationships (Mphambukeli 2014).

The study also revealed that municipal bureaucrats and those who claim to be South African ID holders are usually on the same side; hence, the contestation comes from people who support the formal, legal criterion of belonging—irrespective of citizenship or not, legal occupancy or not. In other words, they have a binary view about issues of citizenship and belonging and anything outside that frame of reference is considered the 'other'. These claims to belonging influence the notion of 'appropriate' service delivery and access to employment in Grasland and perpetuates the denial and access to basic services. Some of the contestations also perpetuate the perceptions about and reactions to Lesotho immigrants as 'invaders' who must be 'expelled' because they do not belong to, or in, South Africa.

Moreover, the study revealed that this denial of access to basic services is further internalised and accepted by the Lesotho immigrants as normal and natural (also see Vromans et al. 2011).

3.3.2 Second Area of Contestation

Those who recognise the application of the first criterion but believe that the application of this criterion has implications that are neither fair nor are just

The second area of contestation arises from those who witness the exploitation of Lesotho immigrants in Mangaung. For instance, the construction or sub-contracted employers, who were awarded tenders by the municipality to build the 'Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)' houses, specifically want to employ Lesotho immigrants so that they could pay lower wages than the legal minimum wage. This reveals another oppressive face—that of exploitation (Young 2000). For instance, the construction or sub-contracted employers, who were awarded tenders by the municipality to build the 'Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)' houses, specifically want to employ Lesotho immigrants (knowing that they do not have South African citizenship).

Not being in possession of a South African ID or employment permits means the Lesotho immigrants have no legal right to protected employment and thus little legal recourse. This knowledge formed the basis for exploitation of the immigrants (Taran 2001), as reflected in the comments of one respondent:

Grasland resident: The thing is, they use people that come from Lesotho, and people who are sub-contractors hire people from Lesotho and people who come from far. They are just using them. They are just looking for people who want little pay.

Not only is contestation about 'belonging in a particular space', but for Lesotho immigrants it was about survival even if it meant being exploited. The experience of a Lesotho immigrant family explains their predicament with both the daughter and parent forced to accept low paid (and presumably precarious) employment.

Lesotho immigrant:	They refused to give my daughter a National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NASFAS) bursary because they said she's an immigrant and doesn't have an ID. The university refused to take her so she looked for a job. She works at an Indian shop which doesn't require an ID and she earns R50 per day.
Interviewer:	How did you get [your own] job without an ID?
Lesotho immigrant:	It's because it's not a decent job, its construction.

Other immigrants experienced the marginalisation of Lesotho immigrants and viewed their treatment as unjust:

| Lesotho immigrant: | She was accepted at the university in 2014 but they stopped her—told her the university is now strict and that she needed a study permit and medical insurance. |

As a process of exclusion, Young (1990, p. 53) argues that marginalisation is worse than exploitation because society has decided that it cannot or will not use such people even for labour, hence confining them to a lower social standing or expelling them to the outer limits or edge of society. This face of oppression (marginalisation) was rife in the greater Grasland community. Furthermore, the interconnection between marginalisation and powerlessness was visible, in this area where many Lesotho immigrants had been residing for up to fifteen years or so. People had put down roots, had families, children and jobs—although these were exploitative—they were prepared to accept the situation, to keep quiet and not make waves, lest they be deported to Lesotho (Peberdy 2001; Taran 2001).

3.3.3 Third Area of Contestation

Those who don't even accept possession of a South African ID as a criterion and perceive boundaries as insignificant/inconsequential.

The third area of contestation is characterised by the argument that people may stay together across such borders. Whilst they implicitly acknowledge the criterion, they question whether the application thereof is reasonable. Borders—particularly between one ethnic and language group—are viewed as artificial. Thus, the application of the criterion of citizenship to access services and housing in a particular space—or not—because it is occupied by non-document holders—reveals a form of contestation of belonging that sees state borders as an 'artificial distinction'. The following quote illustrates this:

| Community leader: | There is this 'fake border'; people can come in and cross without passports. They call it 'Van Rooyen' and in Sotho they call it 'Van Royi'. It's a 'fake boarder', why am I saying it's a 'fake boarder' because its crosses just a fence at somebody's house. People are just going in and out. So people are just taking that advantage coming in and out of South Africa to Lesotho. |

The rejection of the South African ID as a criterion to legitimise belonging was further influenced by the perceived formal ties that Lesotho immigrants have with South Africa based on a number of arguments.

The first one is the ushering in of the 'new democracy' in 1994 after voting. The following quotes illustrates this:

Community leader:	Remember people who worked in South Africa before most of them in the mines, were Lesotho citizens. Remember in 1994 we gave everybody who was working in the mines IDs. We automatically naturalised them, for them to vote. So they voted.

Secondly, this research revealed that because of strong ties with Lesotho, a certain level of internalised oppression is at play. Lesotho immigrants who are holders of South African IDs have rejected the first and second areas of contestation discussed above by facilitating access to government-subsidised housing for low-income earners (though considered illegal access) for the Lesotho immigrants who have no formal paper work. A resident recalls:

Lesotho people when they come in South Africa, they don't just come to South Africa while they don't know anybody. In South Africa and in Bloemfontein we are Basotho and also we are Bashoeshoe. Related to Basotho and we are marrying Basotho.

When they come to South Africa they come to their relatives. Some relatives own houses in Kimberley, for example, but after this guy gets a site and a house, the one of South Africa; he brings his uncle or his cousin in his house. He will say to him 'stay here I am going out to work' knowing that this person will never rob him because he doesn't have an ID.

The above is uttered against a backdrop where those areas predominantly occupied by the Lesotho immigrants, like Grasland, are deprived of adequate basic service provision by the municipal bureaucrats. Hence, marginalisation manifests interconnected with exploitation and powerlessness faces of oppression. What the empirical evidence also suggests is all those interviewed were engaged in various forms of contestations about the theme of belonging. It underscores the issue that with documentation comes identity: in other words, even those South Africans who do not have IDs have no real identity; they do not count as belonging to South Africa. This observation introduces a complexity borne out by the contestations of belonging outlined in this section.

Whilst the South African government endorses universal human rights as contained in the Bill of Rights in the Constitution (South Africa 1996), yet it simultaneously overtly denies these rights on the basis of citizenship (Peberdy 2001), and implicitly on financial criteria based on a neoliberal agenda (Bond 2010). The Freedom Charter states that South Africa belongs to all those who live in it, but the state discourse is that its services are being overwhelmed by foreigners (Neocosmos 2008; Peberdy 2001, p. 19). In the next section, a discussion which stresses the implications for postcolonial Southern Africa is provided.

3.3.4   Complexities Borne Out of Contestations of Belonging in Grasland and the Implications for Postcolonial South Africa

To properly situate the findings into a discussion, we draw from the three areas of contestation of belonging. We frame the discussion by drawing on the five features of oppression: pervasive; restrictive; hierarchical; complex, multiple, cross-cutting relationships; and internalised (Hardiman et al. 2007, pp. 36–37).

The Possession of a South African ID to Legitimise Belonging

> The state constructs most post-1994 immigrants as "illegals," as if most non-South Africans and all undocumented migrants [and South Africans] are criminals (Peberdy 2001, p. 24).

Peberdy's quotation above reveals a government that contradicts itself by criminalising people whom it perceives as undocumented. On the one hand, the state enforces influx control mechanisms such as repatriation against the backdrop of decades of undocumented fluid movements of people across border lines (Peberdy 2001). But on the other hand, the state automatically naturalised Lesotho miners in order to ensure that they voted in the 1994 elections.

The actions employed by the state regarding the exclusion of those who do not possess IDs in accessing basic services are structural or systematic in nature, meaning they reveal a pervasive feature of oppression. Whilst at face value the government appears to conduct its legal duty of upholding the law by legitimising belonging through possession of an ID, yet the same government withholds human rights (access to water, sanitation and housing, to mention but a few) based on the absence of an ID. Hence, the first criterion is pervasive because as Hardiman et al. (2007) argue, it fuses institutional and systematic discrimination, personal bigotry and social prejudice in a complex web of relationships and structures that saturate most aspects of life in our society. In other words, the application of the first criterion is not only applied in Grasland where Lesotho immigrants are concerned but it is seen everywhere in South Africa.

The government's argument that to be ensured of access to basic human rights one must possess an ID is restrictive not only for the Lesotho immigrants but for undocumented South Africans without IDs. According to Hardiman et al. (2007), oppression symbolises structural and material constraints that significantly shape a person's life on our society. Most Lesotho immigrants keep quiet about the criminalisation they suffer at the hands of the state. Some are forced and exposed to precarious work conditions (where an ID is not required) that exploit and marginalise them (Landau 2005, 2012).

Whereas the undocumented immigrants' sense of life chances is violated by the application of the first criterion, which clearly perpetuates oppression, oppressive beliefs are internalised by the victims as well as benefactors. Where the oppressor doesn't have to exert any more pressure, because we now do it to ourselves and each other. Thus, divide and conquer now works (Hardiman et al. 2007). Those

documented Lesotho immigrants or South Africans who have ethnic ties with Lesotho demonstrate the internalised patterns of oppression when they bring relatives from Lesotho who are not South African ID holders to occupy their RDP houses. They consciously or unconsciously perpetuate the notion that those perceived as immigrants in South Africa have no legal rights to the house, or any recourse to justice, without the government telling them to do so (SACN 2014).

Legitimising belonging through the possession of an ID privileges some and subordinates other structural social groups, who in this case are not just undocumented Lesotho immigrants, but may also be undocumented South Africans. This observation exposes a 'hierarchical' feature of oppression, which signifies a relationship in which dominant or privileged groups benefit, often in unconscious ways, from the disempowerment of subordinated structural social groups (Hardiman et al. 2007). This oppressive feature is evident when access to housing caters for and privileges only those South Africans who are ID holders.

However, oppression has consequences for everyone because, whilst immigrants are deprived of access to basic human rights, they employ strategies to survive, which are outside formal technocratic strategies. For instance, in the Grasland area, the Lesotho immigrant informal settlement dwellers have improvised in providing sanitation, housing, security and access to water (Mphambukeli 2014). Furthermore, the disempowerment of Lesotho immigrants dehumanises technocrats who appear to be overwhelmed and reactive towards service provision. Freire (1970/1994) posits that in the structure of social repression, oppressor or dominant groups are also dehumanised because they have employed the process of stealing the humanity of others, particularly since the application of the first criterion also happens against a backdrop of inadequately provided basic services in Grasland.

Recognition of the First Criterion but Belief that the Application of this Criterion Has Implications That Are Neither Fair Nor Just

We argue that legitimising belonging through possession of a South African ID is problematic on many levels. For instance, an official's judgment might be in conflict, where s/he might argue that to develop RDP houses on a place not 'officially' demarcated and characterised by a high presence of Lesotho immigrants who are not in possession of IDs is 'illegal'. So others are not necessarily contesting the criteria itself, but may use a relation to the criteria as a way of allocating services.

Rejection of the Possession of a South African ID as a Determining Criterion and Perceive International Boundaries as Insignificant/Inconsequential

The fact that some people do not identify with the international borders as a significant determinant of who belongs where, but considered belonging as informed by cultural ties, might suggest that some people would support an idea

of a 'federal state'. On the basis of a shared language and ethnicity, the Lesotho immigrants, who share cultural and language ties with South African Basotho, avoid the discrimination and violence that other immigrants face from the community (Neocosmos 2008), but it does not limit the state's discrimination, through police action to repatriate 'aliens' (Peberdy 2001), or municipal indifference to their plight. The contestation about belonging in this criterion reveals complex, multiple, cross-cutting relationships, where power and privilege are relative, since individuals hold multiple and cross-cutting social group memberships.

The application of the first criterion justifies what bureaucrats regard as 'just' practices in the city; it distinguishes those who belong and not belong in a structural and rigid way. We therefore reject this criterion. The right to housing, including basic services, is entrenched in international human rights, as well as the South African Constitution, and should not be determined by an ID document. The allocation of basic services is a fundamental human right and our contestation is with regard to the increasing complexities presented by a context such as that of South Africa, where not only are some Lesotho immigrants without IDs but also some South Africans.

How then can this criterion be improved in order to cater for Lesotho immigrants in South Africa? There are several avenues that can be explored. Improved systems in registering South Africans and naturalising those who clearly are part of the South African economy will alleviate the oppression experienced by immigrants. The provision of basic services and access to housing—not necessarily for free but, for instance, housing to rent—will enable the state to meet its obligations regarding human rights.

4   Conclusion

In this chapter, three areas of contestation around belonging, or not belonging, determined solely by the possession of a South African ID, were outlined. It was argued that conceptualising belonging on possession of a South African ID leads to exclusion that manifests itself physically (as in informal settlements occupied predominantly by 'non-documented' Basotho immigrants), socially through denial of access to basic and social services and housing and economically through restrictions to legally protected employment. Thus, excluding those defined as 'not belonging' or 'illegal' results in marginalisation, oppression and the denial of basic rights. In this, the South African State acts against its own principles and discriminates against not only immigrants but undocumented South African citizens as well. The largely tacit acceptance of the possession of an ID as qualification to belong, notwithstanding the marginalisation associated with it, entrenches pervasive oppression and, at its most extreme, provokes xenophobia. However, violent acts of xenophobia are seldom committed against the Basotho due to the acceptance of the third criterion—acknowledgement of common ethnicity and language. Nevertheless, other nationalities have not been so fortunate. The third criterion rejects

colonial borders as 'fake'. It demands acceptance, not based on an ID, but a common humanity.

Redressing such discrimination requires a change of policy—and attitude—to one more accepting and accommodative of people living and working in the country, an attitude better aligned to the government's human rights agenda. Such change should not be limited to policy, but also at the local, technical level where decisions are made regarding to who may reside within the community and receive basic services. South Africa can also learn from immigrants who have been able to construct livelihoods and a form of belonging despite the structural exclusion, imposed legally by the state or socially by the community. Consequently, ignoring the contestations surrounding belonging discussed in this chapter will produce further contestations around belonging with implications for planning and service delivery in South Africa. These should include the broader concepts of sustainable settlements that incorporate diversity of people, housing types and tenure and livelihood opportunities. What is required is a greater acknowledgement of those who have become intrinsically part of the nation and that 'South Africa belongs to all those who live in it'.

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Part III
Re-magining Migration, Citizenship, Identity, Formation and Development

Between Neoliberal Orthodoxy and Securitisation: Prospects and Challenges for a Borderless Southern African Community

Christopher C. Nshimbi, Inocent Moyo, and Trynos Gumbo

1 Introduction

This chapter considers the possibility of establishing a borderless region in Southern Africa. It does this by weighing the migration and related legislations and policies of the Southern African Development Community (SADC)[1] and those of selected member states against the reality and understanding of migration and the contested notions of citizenship and development in the region. Southern Africa hosts two of the eight key regional economic communities (RECs) identified by the African Union (AU) to serve as building blocks of the African Economic Community (AEC).[2] Most countries in the region subscribe to both SADC and the Common

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[1]SADC member states are Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo (D.R. Congo), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

[2]The eight RECs include the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),

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e-mail: tgumbo2@gmail.com

Fig. 1 Map of Southern African showing SACU and SADC regions

Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).[3] Figure 1 shows that others also subscribe to a third and the oldest customs union in the world—Southern African Customs Union (SACU).[4]

Specifically, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland and South Africa are members of both SACU and SADC. SADC started out with nine members in 1980 as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).[5] The Front Line States (FLS) movement founded SADCC to reduce economic dependence on apartheid South Africa and provide coordinated support for the liberation of countries that were under minority rule in the region.[6] After most countries in the region achieved independence, and with the end of apartheid in South Africa in sight, SADCC member states signed the Declaration and Treaty

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Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA).

[3]COMESA member states include Burundi, Comoros, Congo DR, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

[4]Current SACU membership includes Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland.

[5]The founding members included Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland. SADC Member States are Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

[6]FLS members included Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia.

that transformed SADCC into SADC in August 1992. SADC thus reoriented itself from pursuing development designed to counter colonial and minority rule and reduce member states' dependency on South Africa.

Through the 1992 Declaration and Treaty, SADC aims to inter alia strengthen and consolidate the long-standing historical, social and cultural affinities and links amongst the people of Southern Africa (SADC 2015 Article 5.1(h)). It also seeks to develop policies for progressively eliminating obstacles to the free movement of labour, capital, goods and services and of people, between member states (SADC 2015 Article 5.2(d)). In order to achieve these objectives, SADC encourages initiatives that will develop socio-economic and cultural ties amongst the people of Southern Africa (SADC 2015 Article 5.2(b)). However, the SADC instrument designed to fulfil the cited objectives—the Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons (hereafter Facilitation of Movement protocol)—has remained unenforced since it was first adopted by member states in 2005. The protocol is not yet in force because only 6 out of the 15 member states have ratified it. The six ratifications are short of the requisite two-thirds majority for enforcement.

The drafting and process leading to the finalisation of the Facilitation of Movement protocol was fraught with innuendos, reflecting objections to the establishment of free movement in Southern Africa. Southern African countries generally regard international migration as an issue that threatens national security. The importance of the sovereignty of national over regional interests on migration emphasises the policing and control of national borders (Nshimbi and Fioramonti 2013). This is clearly reflected in the SADC member states' respective immigration legislations and policies. As this chapter will show, Nshimbi and Fioramonti (2013, p. 59), for instance, cite the respective immigration acts of Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe to make the point that immigration laws of SADC countries are designed to protect national interests and help bar unwanted immigrants from entry.

Despite this, SADC states espouse free movement of labour, capital, goods and services, in the spirit of regional integration. This is paradoxical, especially insofar as concerns labour. Free movement of labour is an essential prerequisite to integration, as the experience of the European Union (EU) shows. According to Nshimbi and Fioramonti (2014, p. 54), the use and application of free movement in the European integration project gradually evolved from fundamentally connoting the free movement of workers to the free movement of people in general. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty would eventually introduce European citizenship and lift most internal border controls between members of the EU, bringing with it the right for all citizens of member states to move freely and live within the EU (Nshimbi and Fioramonti 2014, p. 54).

Likewise, the Schengen Agreement and Schengen Convention of 1990 (whose basic instruments date back to the 1984 Fontainebleau Council of European Communities seeking to eliminate intra-community customs formalities) establishes and controls border regulations on the outer boundaries of participating states. Starting with Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg (or the Benelux states), France and

Germany, the Schengen area enlarged to include 22 EU member states and three associated non-members (Nshimbi and Fioramonti 2013). The Schengen agreement eliminates border checks and simultaneously allows free circulation of the citizens of participating states within the Schengen area. As Nshimbi and Fioramonti (2013, p. 32) note, the Schengen operated independently as an authoritative regime outside EU treaties until it was integrated into the EU framework through the Amsterdam Treaty, enforced in 1999.

Free labour mobility goes together with the liberalisation of trade and a borderless world established through heightened globalisation. The securitisation of cross-border labour migration in Southern African is thus a wonder, considering the neoliberal policies and approaches to economic management that most Southern African countries adopted in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Indeed, Castells (1996) posits that with globalisation, the 'space of places' is usurped by the 'space of flows'. The proliferation of processes associated with globalisation erodes the territorial borders of the Westphalian state, blurring the function and significance of borders. Globalisation dissolves territoriality insofar as globalisation is a dimension of social relations and represents the emergence and spread of a supraterritorial dimension of such relations (Scholte 1996). The territorialist-focused governance of the past, when the statist mode of regulation was most prominent, can no longer contain many social relations that hitherto unfolded exclusively in sovereign territorial state frameworks but now make governance over such spatial areas impracticable (Scholte 2001, p. 10). According to Scholte, this is because the social relations transcend territorial geography.

2 Regarding Human Mobility, Belonging and Contested Citizenship

An issue which accompanies such geographically transcendent social relations relates to belonging and, specifically, citizenship. Given the different meanings, institutional designs and the way in which citizenship is patterned cross-nationally (Siim and Squires 2007, p. 404), this chapter employs the concept with a focus on inclusion and exclusion in relation to nationals of Southern African countries residing in or migrating to a member state of the SADC. The chapter focuses on the 'belongings to nation state' and 'transnational' (Siim and Squires 2007, p. 404) dimensions and conceptualises citizenship 'as a mode of belonging' (McNevin 2009, p. 164). According to McNevin, citizenship is conventionally tied to the system of sovereign states—in the sense defined by the Westphalian state. However, the many social relationships that transcend borders and challenge state governance indicated by Scholte (2001) have significantly changed the ways in which citizenship is conceived, secured and perceived. These relationships highlight the significance of local, regional and global levels of citizenship practices (Siim and Squires 2007, p. 403).

Still, citizenship representations within a state territory are largely deduced from state legislations and policies on migration (Reijerse et al. 2015). Because of this, several conceptual formulations regarding national migration legislations or policies vis-à-vis contested citizenship are worth highlighting. For example, McNevin (2009, p. 166) suggests that the claims of irregular migrants can be understood as contestations of citizenship in two senses: the formal legal status implied by citizenship and the representational dimension of citizenship. In the first sense, citizenship is understood to be a static possession controlled by state authorities who wield power to transfer citizenship to non-citizens who are thus approved. Contestation in this formulation calls attention to regularising irregular migrants. In the second sense, contestation of citizenship concerns 'naturalised legitimacy' about *belonging* to political communities, the implications of citizenship and discourses that take on gendered and racialised dimensions. All of this links citizenship to 'an ontological level to being part of a nation-state', and, because this is far from being static, citizenship in this sense is 'always "in the process of becoming"' (McNevin 2009, p. 166). Ethnic, cultural and civic conceptualisations of citizenship can help understand citizenship representations (Reijerse et al. 2015).

The foregoing has implications for migration legislations and policies because the development of migration governance mechanisms takes social and economic concerns into account. An ethnic representation of citizenship defines the national in-group as a community of people who share a common ancestry. The people of such an ethnic group are recognised as citizens when they comprise the majority in a country. According to Reijerse et al. (2015), a positive correlation exists between an ethnic citizenship representation and anti-immigrant attitudes. A cultural representation of citizenship defines the national in-group on the basis of a common culture. The preservation of the culture is paramount here, wherein those who protect and maintain the culture get the recognition as citizens. Here too, Reijerse et al. (2015, p. 702) find a cultural representation of citizenship to be positively correlated with negative attitudes towards immigrants. This is despite the observation that this type of citizenship representation suggests openness towards those immigrants who adopt national culture. Thus, in relation to these representations of citizenship, and as far as concerns countries in the SADC region, some (see, e.g., Mamdani 1996; Nyamnjoh 2006; Mbembe 2015) have argued that migrants to countries such as Botswana and South Africa are presented as the *other* who are culturally and economically backward and originate from poor and backward countries to steal jobs and corrupt host countries. Civically represented citizenship defines the in-group as people adhering to a social contract of basic principles that facilitate community life. Those who adhere to these principles obtain citizenship recognition. Unlike the first two representations, civic citizenship is generally negatively related to anti-immigrant attitudes (Reijerse et al. 2015, p. 703).

The foregoing clearly shows that migration is both a complex and topical conceptual issue. It affects sending and receiving countries and can restrain or propel development. Migration can facilitate the supply of qualified and skilled labour whilst strengthening the economic ties amongst regionally adjacent countries (Crush and Williams 2003). Historically, these have been important preconditions

for the establishment of common markets and free movement of people and capital, as happened in Europe. However, migration can also strain social safety nets in receiving countries because immigrants stretch that country's socio-economic and political infrastructure. Sending countries too may suffer the brain drain and separation of family members, amongst other things. That migration pressures are a fundamental and inevitable component of social life complicates this migration conundrum. Lately, the link is being made between the environment and migration to forecast the migratory consequences of global warming.

Clearly, the governance of migration is extremely crucial. As migration is unavoidable, the question becomes how it can be more successfully governed. It is for this purpose that this chapter considers the possibility of establishing a borderless region in Southern Africa, in the context of neoliberal globalisation and the influence of globalisation on the policies of Southern African countries. The chapter also draws examples from the European integration project and the way in which free movement of people in the EU and European citizenship progressively evolved from initially relating to the movement of labour. Accordingly, the chapter suggests that the establishment of a successful framework for migration governance amongst member states of an African regional economic community (REC) such as the SADC is feasible, although requiring a rethink of what constitutes the national interest and security in view of globalisation. This entails hard work and a reorientation of immigration policy in view of what currently prevails and defines the most relevant migration governance frameworks in the SADC region and its respective member states. As they currently stand, such frameworks do not really allow for the free movement of regional citizens across the SADC region.

In considering the possibility of establishing a borderless region in Southern Africa, this chapter weighs the regional migration and related legislations and policies of the SADC and the corresponding legislations and policies of selected member states against the regional reality and understanding of migration and contested notions of citizenship and development. The objectives of the chapter were achieved through a thorough review of legislative and policy frameworks regarding different types of migration at the regional and national levels in Southern Africa (in view of those at the global and continental levels). Personal interviews with policy-makers who were selected on the basis of their policy portfolio, migrants, other non-state actors and participant observations at border posts/crossings, immigration offices and refugee or asylum application centres in departments of home affairs were conducted.

Following this introduction, Sect. 2 contextualises the migration conundrum by briefly discussing governance at regional level and frames the chapter in the context of contested notions of citizenship and the view that migration in Southern Africa is symptomatic of uneven development between countries there. This also provides the theoretical context in which legislations, policies and practices regarding migration in Southern Africa occur. Section 3 introduces the SACU, whose members are simultaneously SADC members, as a policy laboratory in which can be attempted a borderless region with opt-in options for all SADC states. Section 4

summarises the implications of regional experiences for migration governance in Southern Africa and concludes by pointing out that patterns of migration are asymmetrical per given region in view of disparate levels of development within a region. Because the responses to this reality differ, and given that mixed migration co-exists with claims of asylum and informal cross-border flows within the SADC region, operationalising such a distinction is likely to be harder. The chapter thus ends by suggesting that SACU the 'sub-region' should be turned into a regional space where the policy of open borders could be experimented with, before extending this to the SADC level.

3 Regions, Migration Governance and Notions of Citizenship in Southern Africa: Neoliberal Transnationalism Versus Securitisation

A rallying argument of the group that campaigned for Britain to leave the EU in the 2016 Brexit referendum was that leaving would enable Britain reclaim the right to self-determination by stemming immigration.[7] The group argued that immigration would spiral out of control and thus put public services such as the National Health Service (NHS) under strain. Tensions involving such views and attitudes towards migrants were evident even in the 1980s, when the EU member states deregulated and liberalised migration policies to attract skilled, flexible and mobile workers and remain competitive in the global economy (van Riemsdijk 2012). However, van Riemsdijk (2012, p. 355) notes that the global financial and economic crisis in 2008 would later contribute to increased unemployment rates and spurred European governments to tighten their migration policies and deploy strategies to protect their labour markets from unemployed migrants. Aside from governments tightening migration policies to particularly filter out semi- and unskilled migrants, some in Europe's general populace increasingly exhibit negative attitudes towards such migrants. In this respect, European countries have seen the rise of far-right populists and right-wing political parties who have intervened in the immigration debate and presented immigration as a cultural [and economic] threat to Europe's future (Yilmaz 2012). 'The mean share of the vote for Populist Right parties rose from 6.7% in the 1960s to 13.4% in 2010s. . .[and]. . .their average share of seats rose in parallel from 5.9% to 13.7%' (Inglehart and Norris 2016, p. 23). Muslim immigrants, in particular refugees and asylum seekers from Syria, are being regarded as an imminent threat to Europe's common achievements because their values are incompatible with European values. In this way, Europe has erected and continues to erect a 'Fortress' against migrants and immigrants, especially those from Africa and the Middle East (Nshimbi and Moyo 2016). In South Africa, anti-immigration

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[7]See, for example, the Vote Leave campaign website: http://voteleavetakecontrol.org/why_vote_ leave.html (accessed 18 September 2016).

debates portray immigrants from other African countries in a negative light (Muzondidya 2010). The immigrants are thus negatively perceived as being of no value to South African society (Nyamnjoh 2010) and also responsible for the various socio-economic challenges and ills facing South Africa (Nyamnjoh 2006, 2007; Crush and Ramachandran 2014).

International migration thus invokes feelings/notions of belonging and tension between immigrants and their hosts (Mawadza and Crush 2010). This, because people in the host country are 'united' by belonging to a defined territorial state, against immigrants, who may be regarded as bringing *inter alia* competition for resources and other economic costs. Whilst immigrants may bring problems to the host country, they may also bring in positives ranging from economic development to the positive transformation of societies. Whether migration may be regarded as negative or beneficial, there is always the need to manage and/or govern it. Three factors make governing migration at the regional level favourable. First, most cross-border movements of people occur within regions. Intra-regional flows account for over 60% of all global migration (Nshimbi and Fioramonti 2013). Second, proximate states also tend to view regional agreements more favourably. Third, shared interests on migration-related issues, the smaller number of states involved and similarities in levels of economic development make it easier to reach comprehensive agreements within a region. Betts' (2011, p. 322) conclusion that regions are an important focus of much intergovernmental cooperation in migration management echoes these arguments.

Cross-border migration is beneficial, according to neoliberalism. Some studies on this migration–development nexus indicate that migrant remittances have a developmental impact on migrant-sending communities/economies (see, e.g., Maimbo and Ratha 2005; Pendleton et al. 2006; Moyo and Nicolau 2016; Mercandalli and Nshimbi 2016). According to Von Burgsdorff (2010, p. 3), approximately between 5.1 billion rand and 6.8 billion rand was remitted from South Africa to Zimbabwe in 2011. Migration, as regards regional integration, can facilitate the supply of skilled human resources for a region's development whilst strengthening the economic ties amongst neighbouring countries. Against this background, and given calls to deepen economic integration in the SADC (Chipeta 2003; SADC 2003; 1992 SADC Declaration and Treaty, Preamble and Article 5; SADC 1996, Preamble and Article 2), a comment on policy frameworks to migration management and/or regulation, or lack of it, in the Southern African region and how this reflects on a borderless SADC region arises.

That is, this chapter posits that migration policy frameworks in Southern Africa reflect two things: firstly, a neoliberal policy framework that speaks to the unquestioned 'benefits of migration' or labour market liberalisation. However, formulation of Southern African migration legislations and policies generally ignores the cited neoliberal ideological postulations, as shown in this chapter. Secondly, and somewhat contradictorily, there is the prominence and promotion of the securitisation paradigm on issues of cross-border movement of people in Southern Africa. The neoliberal policy framework is best illustratable by the historical patterns of migration, which were predicated on labour shortages in the

Southern African region. The chronic regional shortage of labour experienced in Southern Africa—'[s]tretching from South Africa, through Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique and Malawi, to Tanzania and Kenya. . . [a] region. . .characterized by a combination of great mineral wealth, a white settler agriculture with no parallel elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa'—enabled the colonialists to create 'unlimited' supplies of cheap permanent and temporary labour for mines and farms and, later, the manufacturing industries in South Africa especially (Arrighi et al. 2010, p. 412).

When the colonialists dispossessed rural African communities and drove them into poor regions, they did not provide the Africans with any means of modernising farming. South Africa and Zimbabwe were the greatest beneficiaries of Southern African labour, according to Arrighi et al. (2010). These countries also generated and reproduced the transnational labour migration system in Southern Africa. Arrighi et al. (2010) are not isolated in holding this view. Thus, Burawoy (1981, pp. 296–297) intersects South Africa's capitalist system with the Apartheid state, which, he argues, designed, organised and adopted strategies 'to reproduce a system of cheap black labor' to protect capitalist interests. Burawoy cites Harold Wolpe (1972) to show two distinct policies that highlight the role of the state in ensuring a supply of cheap black migrant labour for capital: 'segregation' (legislated to maintain African economies in order to subsidise the wage economy of the capitalists), which subsequently translated into 'apartheid', a mechanism of capitalist exploitation which made sure that cheap and controlled labour was reproduced and redistributed from or through the African economy in 'tribal' Bantustans or Reserves.

Burawoy's (1976) earlier comparative study of Southern Africa and the USA underscores the role of the state in regulating migrant labour and shows how this labour subsidised states and capital. Accordingly, migrant labour pushed the costs of social services like education and retirement across borders, thereby subsidising the state and capital. Arrighi (1970) similarly suggests that Zimbabwean (then Southern Rhodesia) subsistence agriculture, which supplemented migrant workers' wages, subsidised capital in that state. The apartheid regime, however, established itself as a system that regarded migrant workers as temporary sojourners (Arrighi et al. 2010). These 'sojourners' were accommodated in strictly controlled single-sex hostels and were only allowed to return to their rural homes once a year in order to renew their contracts (von Holdt 2005).

Labour migration in Southern Africa (and especially from the region towards South Africa) was, further, institutionalised and orchestrated by the South African Chamber of Mines (SACM) through the establishment of the Rand Native Labour Association (RNLA), the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) and similar organisations. Again, most of the unskilled labour in South African mines was supplied by Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland, amongst others. The migrant labour system established in this way defined patterns of migration in Southern Africa, into the post-independence era. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Southern Africa became exposed to neoliberal ideological

influences and accompanying structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), advocated by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The SADC as a region seeks deeper economic integration, having established a free trade area (FTA) and conditions conducive to regional free movement of capital, goods and services between member states in 2008. Actually, the SADC and respective member states' policy frameworks and those of the African Union (AU) are influenced by neo-classical economics and the neoliberal approach to the unquestioned 'benefits' of migration liberalisation (read, labour market liberalisation). Thus, Southern and African states have since the late 1980s and early 1990s embraced free market policies and accommodated attendant firm behaviours. However, free movement of people across the SADC remains contentious.

Contrary to neoliberalism, the security approach to cross-border movement of people in the SADC explains some of the challenges encountered in fully freeing movement and associated benefits of migration. Southern African states consider migration as threatening receiving countries. This perception in South Africa, for example, apparently guides responses towards migrants from other African countries. As Segatti (2008, pp. 75–76) argues, despite the acute brain drain that South Africa is experiencing, it officially resists employing skills from Southern Africa because migration from the rest of Africa is considered a threat and due to security arguments in South Africa's immigration policy that prevail over economic interests. Gordon (2010, p. 51) too says that 'immigration legislation effectively portrays immigrants, especially those from African countries, as a threat to the economic and social goals of the post-apartheid state'. Landau (2012, p. 14) also argues that notions that South Africa is under threat from immigrants drive the country's immigration system and policy towards thwarting 'threats to national security and stability'.

Presenting migration as a threat to national security feeds into notions of citizenship that justify the exclusion of immigrants. The increasing international mobility of people indeed raises questions concerning the bases upon which claims for belonging to the nation-state can be made (Castles and Davidson 2000). For one, government control over the national economy, welfare systems and national culture is increasingly eroding with rising international mobility (Castles and Davidson 2000). The challenge for the migrant on the other hand is whether or not they are certified as members of the host nation-state and, accordingly, possess the variety of civil, socio-economic and political rights enjoyed by locals. The discourse of borders on belonging or inclusion versus exclusion from the nation-state thus comes to the fore. The discrimination that emanates from this dualistic view informs legislations, policies and attitudes that project the immigrant as a security threat, calling for their rejection or removal. The state exists and is thus obliged to secure its citizens and territory from external danger. Huysmans (2000) for instance considers how migration in Western Europe has developed into a security issue. He argues that migration has since the 1980s been increasingly politically constructed as destabilising European integration and a danger to public order.

Thus, Europe—the regional bloc—has been engaged in the development of a restrictive migration policy (against non-Europeans) and the social construction of

migration into a security question. Nowhere is this most visible than in the Dublin Convention, the Schengen Agreements and The Third Pillar on Justice and Home Affairs (Huysmans 2000). Immigrants and asylum seekers present a challenge to the protection of European national identity and welfare provisions. The construction of migration as a security issue in this way is embedded in the politics of belonging in which the migrant is an outsider who is different from those who belong to the migrant's host territory and is, therefore, 'othered', excluded from the legal status enjoyed by those who belong and could even be banned from the territory.[8]

The migrant could also be a criminal, threatening the peace and state security, as suggested by the Namibian legislator who argued for the tightening of Namibia's immigration legislation 'to keep criminal elements out' (Nshimbi and Fioramonti 2013). Worse for the so-called undocumented, informal and economic migrants is that they 'have no such access to status and are frequently positioned not only as a threat to the state, but also as a threat to refugee protection by their 'efforts' to exploit the system' (Innes 2015). This exclusivism towards immigrants is highlighted further, through a review of a select SADC countries' legislations, in the next section, which discusses migration governance in the SADC.

The exclusivist legislative and policy stances towards immigrants and free movement of people are not unique to South Africa but common to several SADC member states. These attitudes not only ignore the reality of regional cross-border movement of people but also fail to arrest the movements and international migration, generally. Two hundred and thirty-two million international migrants were recorded in 2013 (UN General Assembly 2014) whilst over 100 million were economically active in 2010 (ILO 2010).

Migration management in Southern Africa seems to be informed by two contradictory logics. The one is neoliberalism, which promotes the loosening of border controls, leading to the unfettered movement of capital, goods, labour and services. This neoliberalist agenda in the SADC region seems to co-exist with the second and contradictory logic, the securitisation of borders. That is, integration co-exists with the corresponding and concomitant tightening of borders. This demonstrates 'a notably *neo*liberal nexus of *securitized nationalism* and *free market transnationalism*' (Sparke 2006, p. 153). It is within this context of migration management and/or regulation (or the lack thereof) in the SADC that this chapter considers whether a borderless region is possible. Southern Africa has experienced a long history of migration; hence, the next subsection explores the historical reality of movement across the SADC region, in the context of and legislations on/and the governance of regional migration.

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[8]See, for instance, Identity politics keep feeding Europe's far-right, *Politico*: http://www.politico. eu/article/identity-politics-keeps-feeding-europes-far-right-jerome-boateng-immigration-refugees-afd-austria-norbert-hofer-populism/ (Accessed 18 September 2016); Yilmaz (2012).

4 The Southern African Development Community and Migration Governance

People have long migrated across Southern Africa for various reasons such as the search for work opportunities, to conduct trade or as a consequence of war and conflict. Mozambicans seasonally worked on South African farms in Western Cape in the late 1800s (Wentzel and Tlabela 2006). Large-scale migration occurred from the rest of Southern Africa to the Kimberly mines in the 1860s and the gold mines in Johannesburg in the 1880s. These movements contributed to an organised regional labour migration system. Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland too supplied unskilled labour to South Africa. These types of movements continue across Southern Africa to date, including some that occur due to conflict, natural disasters as well as for purposes of trade. For example, being the most preferred destinations by migrants from Southern Africa, South Africa, Botswana and Namibia witnessed an increase in the number of immigrants that they respectively hosted between 1990 and 2010. Estimated increases in numbers of these migrants were 501,000–1.2 million in South Africa, 10,000–76,000 in Botswana and 35,000–76,000 in Namibia (Nshimbi and Fioramonti 2013, p. 62, 2014, p. 57). The establishment of the SADC has further somewhat contributed to some forms of migration in the region.

The 2005 Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons in SADC implements the SADC Treaty provisions for regional movement of people and commits to support the efforts of the African Union (AU) on free movement of the continent's people (Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons in SADC 2012, p. 1).

SADC initiatives on free movement precede the Facilitation Protocol. A 1993 SADC Secretariat-sponsored workshop produced the 1995 Draft Protocol on Free Movement of Persons in SADC, which would achieve free movement for regional citizens within a 10-year period, with visa-free entry rights into other member states for short visits, residence, establishment and work (1995, p. 6). However, the prospect of open intra-regional borders did not bode well with some members. Botswana, Namibia and South Africa, in particular, are said to have opposed the establishment of a free movement of persons regime in the SADC region (Oucho and Crush 2001). The economic disparities within SADC meant it was not ready for free movement (Williams and Carr 2006). Free movement would also compromise respective national immigration policies (Oucho and Crush 2001) and strain the socio-economic infrastructure and, therefore, affect the politics of migrant-receiving countries (Solomon 2003, p. 130).

Consequently, South Africa, Botswana and Namibia rejected the 1995 Draft Protocol on Free Movement, and SADC subsequently dropped it. Instead, South Africa later produced a watered-down version, which SADC Secretariat refused and produced one that accommodated the concerns of all members over the 1995 Draft rejected earlier. Overall, the Facilitation Protocol progressively eliminates obstacles to intra-regional movement, allowing regional citizens visa-free

entry for lawful purposes and visits of up to 3 months, maximum (SADC 2012, p. 3). Only six SADC States—Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland and Zambia—had ratified the Facilitation Protocol as of September 2015 (Nshimbi and Fioramonti 2014). The protocol thus remains unenforced because the required minimum ratifications (two-thirds) have not done so.

As the Facilitation Protocol remains unenforced, national immigration laws of individual SADC states, bilateral agreements, national policies and other SADC protocols regulate labour migration in the region. Reference has been made to the way in which countries in the SADC region emphasise the sovereignty of national over regional interests on migration, and how these are reflected in the emphasis on policing and the control of national borders. The national immigration laws' preoccupation with national and security interests is evident in the claim made by the laws to, amongst other things, help keep out unwanted elements. A Namibian government spokesperson is actually cited as once defending that country's Immigration Act 1993 (Act 7 of 1993) 'as assisting, inter alia, to keep criminals out of the country or to expel them' (Hough 1996, p. 53). The Immigration Act of Namibia allows for granting a permanent residence (PR) permit to a foreign national who has or is likely to earn sufficient means to maintain themselves and dependants. However, the act also stipulates that such persons should not be likely to pursue any employment, business, profession or occupation in which a sufficient number of persons are already engaged in the country to meet the requirements of Namibians (Part IV, Article 26 (3)(d) and (e)). For employment permits, such a permit shall be provided as long as the employment, business, profession or occupation which the foreign national wishes to take up is not or is unlikely to be any employment, business, profession or occupation in which a sufficient number of persons are already engaged in Namibia to meet the requirements of Namibians, amongst other things (Immigration Act, Part IV, Article 27 (2) (b)).

In Botswana, Article 23(7), Part IV of the Immigration Act, 2010 (No. 3 of 2011) states, 'in determining an application for a resident permit, the Board shall have primary regard to the interests of Botswana.' Regard shall also be taken whether the issuance of such permit to a foreign national affects the opportunities for employment or for other engagement for reward or profit in the occupation in question, open to citizens of Botswana (Article 23(7)(c)). The act states further that where a foreign national's application relates to employment, the employer should arrange to train a citizen of Botswana to replace the foreign national applying for a work permit (Article 23(7)(d)). The Immigration (Amendment) Act 1999 (No. 8 of 2000) of Zimbabwe empowers the Minister responsible to control, restrict or prohibit entry into Zimbabwe of foreign nationals. Such foreign nationals must, amongst other things, actually secure employment before arriving in Zimbabwe (Immigration (Amendment) Act 1999, Part VIII, 41.3(a)(iii)). The act further empowers the minister to prohibit the entry of persons seeking employment in Zimbabwe except in prescribed occupations (41.3(d)).

South Africa's Immigration Amendment Act 2011 (Act No. 13 of 2011, Section 27(a)(i)) provides for the issuance of permanent residence to a foreign national upon receipt of an offer of permanent employment in which no suitably

qualified citizen or permanent resident is available to fill it, amongst other things. Provision also exists for issuance of a general work visa to foreign nationals who do not qualify for a critical skills visa (Section 12(b), Act 13 of 2011). A critical skills work visa is issued by the Director-General of the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) to individuals who possess skills or qualifications which may from time to time be determined as critical for South Africa by the Minister of Home Affairs (Section 12(d), Act 13 of 2011). South Africa is more elaborate in specifying the kinds of foreign nationals accepted as immigrants in that country. Like the other cited countries, however, it is clear that preference is given to immigrants who have certain skills and qualifications, with little or no room given to semi- and unskilled migrants.

As it is, therefore, the migration legislations cited here suggest a general restrictiveness towards entry of foreign nationals into their respective labour markets whilst seeking to maintain a nationalist interest through the protection of their citizens. Apart from being less restrictive towards skilled and qualified persons, no positive lessons seem to emanate from most member states regarding free movement of persons in general into their respective territories. Respective SADC members also design migration legislations with the aim of keeping criminals out or expelling undesirable elements from the countries. Where employers in a given SADC country offer the opportunity to employ foreign nationals, or foreign nations have the opportunity of being granted permanent residence, the foreign nationals would only be considered for such if they secured the job before arriving in the country of employment. Permanent residence on the other hand may only be granted if the foreign nationals are unlikely to pursue endeavours in which sufficient numbers of nationals in a host country are already engaged or against the host country's 'primary regard' to the national interest (Nshimbi and Fioramonti 2013, p. 84).

Nevertheless, members endorsed the SADC Regional Labour Migration Action Plan 2013–2015 in April and July 2013, a first on regional action on migration. The Action Plan seeks to harmonise labour data collection systems, immigration policies and legislation and address regional migrants' health vulnerabilities amongst SADC states. Further, the 34th Summit of the SADC Heads of State and Government in Victoria Falls (17–18 August, 2014), Zimbabwe, signed two significant documents for regional migration: the Draft SADC Labour Migration Policy Framework, which promotes sound management of intra-regional labour migration (2014: Article 3.1), and the SADC Protocol on Employment and Labour crafted to strategically guide employment, labour and social security policies and promote policies that facilitate regional labour mobility. The instruments are not yet ratified, and experience with the Facilitation Protocol suggests that ratification will be a protracted process. This means that in the absence of a regional migration management system, national policy also regulates general migration and during crises in Southern Africa.

For example, the 2010 Documentation of Zimbabweans Project (DZP) in South Africa notably reflects the latest South African amnesty (to regional citizens) that regulates migration during crises in the SADC.[9] The Zimbabweans regularised by the DZP included many (unskilled, highly skilled and educated professionals) who left Zimbabwe in the early 1990s following the economic and political crisis there. The apparent reluctance to establish a formal regional framework for governing migration in the SADC leads us to postulate that perhaps the region is too broad for a 'sudden' opening up of borders by member states. In view of the factors (Sect. 2) that make governing migration at the regional level favourable, a sub-region of the SADC might thus provide the basis upon which it could eventually establish itself as a region with open borders. The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) comprises a sub-region of the SADC, as all its members are also members of SADC. We detail this possibility in the next subsection.

5   The Southern African Customs Union as Policy Laboratory for a Borderless Southern Africa

The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) was established on the 30th of July 1910 and comprised the Union of South Africa and the Territories of Basutoland, Swaziland and Bechuanaland Protectorate[10] (now the Republic of Botswana, the Kingdom of Lesotho, the Republic of Namibia, the Republic of South Africa and the Kingdom of Swaziland, respectively). Based on the agreements that can be traced from 1910, 1969, 2002, 2014 and 2015, the primary objective in the establishment of SACU was to achieve a customs union characterised by free trade and economic integration. This is clearly articulated in the Free Trade Agreement entered between SACU states on the 27th of October 2014.[11] Further, many other SACU protocols are in force that seek to deepen economic integration in the region, as well as with other regions. These include SACU Agreement of 2002, the Free Trade Agreement between the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) states and the SACU States of 2006, the Agricultural Agreement between the SACU states and Iceland of 2006, Agricultural Agreement between the SACU states and Norway of 2006 and Agricultural Agreement between the SACU states and Switzerland of 2006, all of which were enforced on 1 May 2008, with the only exception of the SACU Agreement of 2002, enforced on 15 July 2004.[12]

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[9]Nshimbi and Fioramonti (2013) outline other amnesties and special bilateral migrant-recognising arrangements that some member states have concluded in the SADC.

[10]See http://www.sacu.int/show.php?id=564 (Accessed 14 March 2016).

[11]See http://www.sacu.int/docs/agreements/2014/sacu_fta_agreement.pdf (Accessed 14 March 2016).

[12]See http://www.sacu.int/docs/agreements/2015/status_register_dec.pdf (Accessed 14 March 2016).

Besides free trade, this chapter considers prospects of SACU becoming a zone in which free movement of persons occurs. The movement of persons in this region currently is not legally and institutionally easy. The region boasts of a deeper level of economic integration than SADC, having established a common external tariff (CET) towards non-members. With the only exception of Botswana, its members participate in a common currency area (CMA). Despite the deep level of economic integration, migration in the SACU region is not liberalised. Rather, SACU priorities lie in seven issue areas including regional industrial development policy, review of the revenue sharing arrangement, trade facilitation, development of SACU institutions, unified engagement in trade negotiations, trade in services and strengthening the capacity of its secretariat (SACU 2016).

The SACU Agreement has no provisions for the free movement of persons between member states. Actually, the region has no regional legislations or policies that are specifically crafted to address migration and free movement of persons across the region's member states' borders. As with the SADC, alternative instruments such as respective member states' immigration acts determine and stipulate the movement of people across SACU member states' borders. This suggests that a borderless region in SACU and by extension the SADC still faces hurdles. However, the case of SACU could be seen as a policy laboratory, where legislations, policies and practices that promote free movement could be introduced before they are considered for potential/incremental expansion to the SADC region. In this regard, SACU members should establish a policy whereby they work towards free movement of people whilst maintaining a managed migration policy outside of SACU, within SADC.

It seems, based on the 2002 SACU Agreement, that SACU member states have made significant progress in terms of the movement of goods and capital in the region, which seem to work towards achieving deeper economic integration.[13] The SACU member states are at different levels of economic development but still appear to be making progress in terms of integration. This may be taken to suggest that differences in levels of economic development do not always militate against integration, especially vis-à-vis movement of people. Although South Africa is economically developed, it still manages to integrate with other SACU member states, which are not as economically developed. Could the lower number of members of SACU improve the efficiency of the implementation of its programmes? Given that SACU is a sub-region of SADC and seems to be making better progress, a borderless region could be possible.

A common migration management instrument in SACU could help completely integrate the region, following the examples in Africa of regional communities such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which in 2008

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[13]See reports from 2007 up to 2014, such as Regional Customs Bulletin 2014, 30 Sep 2013; SACU Quarterly, 11 Sep 2013; Quarterly SACU Customs Bulletin, 18 Feb 2013; SACU Quarterly, September—December 2012; SACU Quarterly, 30 Jun 201;1 SACU Quarterly, 25 Nov 2008; SACU Quarterly, 25 Nov 2008; SACU Quarterly, 28 Oct 2008; SACU Quarterly, 01 Oct 2007. See http://www.sacu.int/list.php?type=Newsletters (Accessed 14 March 2016).

adopted an ECOWAS Common Approach on Migration.[14] In addition to being proactive in formulating policies and legislations for regional migration, which it considers to be essential to development, ECOWAS reportedly has the most advanced regional migration governance regime that encourages free movement in Africa (Nshimbi and Fioramonti 2013). ECOWAS formulated its Common Approach on Migration almost a decade after enforcing the 1979 ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Residence, and Establishment, as a policy to expedite the implementation of the free movement protocol. The common position on economic integration in the SACU suggests that a common position on human mobility is possible, especially considering the small number of member states as well as, with the only exception of South Africa, the relatively smaller sizes (in terms of population and the economies) of the members. Since SACU member states are also SADC members, the success of the former could serve as a foundation of the latter. The success of a Customs Union that allows for free movement of people in the SACU could then be extended to other SADC member states. We see the main obstacle to regional integration in the SADC to be the promotion of exclusive territorial sovereignty and the securitisation of borders over and above the logic of neoliberalism. The contradiction is that the regional integration drive is founded on the very logic of neoliberalism. However, the example of SACU and ECOWAS policies and practice seems to indicate that this could be overcome.

6 Conclusion

Each region's pattern of migration is asymmetrical, with some countries being net recipients and others net exporters of migrants. This owes to disparate levels of development within the regions. The responses to this reality, however, differ. Despite the relative homogeneity between member states in its early years, the EU, for example, has advanced to legislating regional citizenship. The level of economic development of a region and the degree of similarity of economic development of neighbouring countries within the region also shape the ease with which cross-border migration can be handled. Some regional policies clearly target complete free movement for citizens and others seek managed migration of specific categories of workers. The EU has thus managed to facilitate labour migration internally whilst acting as a regional 'fortress' against outsiders by separating out policies on free movement of citizens and formal workers from the regulations covering movements of refugees and asylum seekers. Within the SADC where mixed migration co-exists with claims of asylum and informal cross-border flows, operationalising such a distinction is likely to be harder, hence our suggestion of the

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[14]See http://www.unhcr.org/49e47c8f11.pdf

'sub-region' SACU as a regional space where the policy of open borders could be experimented with, before extending this to the SADC level.

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Migration Policies in the Region: Thinking Beyond the Enclaved Political Economy

Hangwelani Hope Magidimisha

1 Introduction

In an era of rapid globalisation, human migration has evolved into a dynamic phenomenon with respect to the plethora of influences contributing to the migration of unmatched numbers of migrants across immense geographical trajectories (Union African 2006). Throughout its history, Southern African region has experienced important migratory movements, both voluntary and forced, which have contributed to its contemporary demographic landscape (ibid). Cross-border migration in Southern Africa as well as the African region at large represents an important livelihood and coping strategy to ecological and economic downturns. For the past decades, deteriorating political, socio-economic and environmental conditions, as well as armed conflicts, insecurity, environmental degradation and poverty, are significant root causes of mass migration and forced displacement in Africa. Through regional integration, the process of globalisation is facilitating the movement of people across different regions in Africa. It is therefore unquestionable that migration is a major topic in the twenty-first century and consequently poses certain social, economic and political challenges for policy-makers in the management of migration for the betterment of societies in Africa (Union African 2006).

Migration in the Southern African region is characterised by intra-regional and inter-regional vast movement of refugees, seasonal migrants and undocumented migrants. Such flows consist of a group of millions of economically active people and an unspecified number of undocumented migrants who comprise of many vulnerable populations, for instance women and children (Crush et al. 2005). These complex and mixed patterns of migration pose a number of common

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challenges for migrants and receiving communities, including humanitarian concerns, legal and human rights implications, law enforcement capacities, national and regional security as well as strategic issues around interstate cooperation for collaborative solutions (IOM 2014). It is therefore paramount for SADC as a regional board and the countries involved to craft policies which address the complex issues in a fashion that further integrates the region and serves the best interests of both migrants and host communities within the region.

Crush et al. (2005) put forward that policy response at local, nation, regional and continental level must take into account the issue of dynamism and instability of migration forms and patterns in the region. Governments committed to legal frameworks of control and exclusion are but finding it increasingly difficult to cope. The fundamental policy challenge is to move the states of Southern Africa to a regionally harmonised and consistent set of policies that emphasise good governance, sound management and client-centered service delivery (Crush et al. 2005). Migration is a cross-cutting phenomenon; therefore, it needs to be integrated into all facets of state policy-making and planning, including programmes and strategies to alleviate poverty and reduce inequality. It is against this background that this chapter sought to analyse how SADC region and countries should deal with 'human mobility' as well as how they should craft migration policies which strengthen and enhance further regional integration.

2   Migration Realities and Trends in Southern Africa

Either by default or design, the fact is Southern Africa is a region on the move, with an increasing number of regular and irregular migrants moving within and to and from outside the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region in search of greener pastures, in both formal and informal sectors (McDonald 2000). With the invention and intensification of globalisation since the turn of the twentieth century, more people are travelling faster and more often, either in search of better opportunities or for reasons of human safety; in Africa, nonetheless this mobility affects, and often overwhelms, existing policies and systems, not only those related to migration and development but also in other policy domains such as human security and public health (IOM 2014).

The United Nations has estimated that the number of people migrating has risen twice more than the immediate past generation (Division 2002). The root causes of migration are multitude since a complex web of factors underlie the process. The push–pull basis gives insight into the different forces at work to explain migration (Union African 2006). In Southern Africa, multiple push factors incentivise migration. Poor socio-economic conditions, low wages, high levels of unemployment, poverty and lack of opportunity are the main economic factors that fuel emigration in the SADC region and the continent at large. These factors are usually brought about by a discrepancy between the rapid population growth and the available resources, low level of requisite technology and the capacity to create employment

and jobs in the countries of origin. As if economic factors are not enough, various political and social factors also assist to create fertile grounds for migration. These include poor governance, patronage and corruption, political instability, conflict, civil strife, amongst others, and these contribute to the major causes of migration for both skilled and unskilled workers (Crush and Tevera 2010).

The states of Southern Africa can be divided into migrant-sending (Mozambique, Malawi, Lesotho) and migrant-receiving states (South Africa, Namibia). A few, such as Botswana and Swaziland, fall into both categories. Others, such as Tanzania and Zambia, have experienced major refugee influxes in the last decade but do not tend to send or receive large numbers of labour migrants (Crush et al. 2006). The real or perceived opportunity for a better life, high income, greater security, better quality of education and health care at the destinations influences decision to migrate between these counties in Southern Africa. The push–pull factors are strengthened by a number of other issues which make migration an attractive option. Lower costs of migration, improved communication, greater information availability and the need to join relatives, families and friends are amongst other factors which compound with push–pull factors (Union African 2006).

Whether voluntary or forced, legal or undocumented, within or beyond borders, migration of people today constitutes a complex process presenting some of the most complex inter-relationships of policy concerns for governments (Crush and Williams 2005). Given the surging number of migration and the likelihood of this trend to persist in the foreseeable future, the management of migration has necessarily become one of the critical challenges for States in the twenty-first century. It is clearly known that well-managed migration has the potential to yield significant benefits to origin and destination States. For instance, according to Union African (2006), labour migration has played an important role in filling labour needs in agriculture, construction and other sectors, thus contributing to economic development of many destination countries in Southern Africa. On the contrary, the beneficial feedback effects of migration such as remittances, knowledge and skills transfers and return migration have in some cases made major contributions to economies of origin countries. However, mismanaged or unmanaged migration can have serious negative consequences for States' and migrants' well-being, including potentially destabilising effects on national and regional security and jeopardising interstate relations. Mismanaged migration can also lead to tensions between host communities and migrants and give rise to xenophobia, discrimination and other social pathologies.

The realities of migration in Southern African region, including its increasing importance and untapped potential, underscore the need for States to develop comprehensive policies on migration. Such efforts will require enhanced dialogue on sub-regional, regional or even continental level.

3 Bilateral Agreement and Regional Integration

Despite the formation of regional bodies such as the SADC and the idea of creating a free movement protocol, no regional policies have emerged that reflects the varied interests and needs of migrants from the region in the region (Landau and Vigneswaran 2007). Under bilateral agreements, Lesotho and Mozambican mineworkers receive part of their pay as deferred pay. A portion of their pay is compulsorily sent to their home country where it is collected. Mozambican mineworkers can also take advantage of reduced tariffs on goods ordered and sent home by a specific company. Other than these schemes, there is no evidence of government policies to encourage remittance transfer (Crush et al. 2006).

Bilateral agreements beyond labour also exist in the sub-region; for instance between Zimbabwe and Mozambique a formal transit border pass mechanism was initiated during the Mozambican Civil War to help regulate entry into Zimbabwe. Mozambique also has bilateral committees including the Sub-Committee on Defence, Security and Migration with Swaziland and a Sub-Committee on Migration, Security and Labour with Zimbabwe (Klaaren and Rutinwa 2004a).

3.1 Regional Migration Policies

Migration policy is formulated at various interlocking scales from the continental, i.e. the New Africa's Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) to the local (local government). A major challenge is how to get these different levels of governance to interface with one another to develop an integrated approach to policy development and migration management. Another challenge is to understand the institutional mechanisms and constraints operating on the development and implementation of policy.

3.1.1 Southern African Development Community

SADC countries consist of Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe (IOM 2014). The SADC aims to promote regional development through cooperation and integration. Protocols pursuing these aims have been developed. In 2000, the SADC Free Trade Protocol was ratified. Attempts to move towards the free movement of people within the SADC have not been successful (Crush et al. 2006). Increasingly, regional realities demand that national governments consider whether or not to soften their borders and/or move towards a harmonised approach to migration management. The first attempt to craft a SADC-wide protocol on free movement was strongly opposed by South Africa, Botswana and Namibia (Oucho and Crush

2001). In 1997, it was replaced by the more cautious Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of People. This Protocol was shelved in 2000 by the SADC Council of Ministers (ibid).

In 2003, the SADC Secretariat revived discussion on the Facilitation Protocol which was considered and debated by all governments. Whether the protocol will suffer a different fate second time round remains to be seen. However, the reality is that this Protocol would have major positive implications for the poor of the region, freeing up obstacles to cross-border movement and the search for a livelihood through migration (Crush et al. 2006).

Unlike in other areas such as trade, education and transportation, there has been considerable reluctance to move forward on developing a SADC-wide policy on the movement of people.[1] Cross-border migration in the region is, therefore, governed by national migration and refugee legislation. The SADC approach to migration seems to be a mimic of what is on the continental level. At the continental level, NEPAD's attitude to the migration issue is emblematic. Freer movement of people across the continent is cited as a key long-term objective of the AU (ibid).

3.1.2   Regional Integration and Collaboration in Migration Management: Migration Dialogue Southern Africa (MIDSA)

One forum working to advance the regional harmonisation of migration policy in SADC is the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (Crush and Tevera 2010). The 14-country SADC endeavoured in 1997 to make migration a regionally coordinated issue through the adoption of a Protocol on Facilitated Movement of Persons. These are informal, non-binding, interstate forums for dialogue on migration matters of mutual interest (Hansen 2010). Whilst this ambition has not yet been achieved, some SADC ministerial gatherings continue their work to address particular aspects of migration, such as Labour Migration and Migration for Development.

In the continued absence of a regional Migration Protocol, there exists no formal mechanism in the SADC to coordinate migration management. Partly in order to help fill this void, IOM initiated the informal process of a Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA)[2] in 1999 to foster regional cooperation on migration-related issues (Dodson and Crush 2015). The MIDSA initiative still provides a

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[1] However, the SADC Protocol on Education and Training has the objective of working towards the free movement of students and educators for educational purposes (see also Mamphela Ramphele, 'Immigration and Education: International Students at South African Universities and Technikons', SAMP Migration Policy Series, No. 12, SAMP: Kingston and Cape Town. And, progress is being made on the development of a Univisa to encourage overseas tourists, to develop regional tourism.

[2] The primary source for this section is Jonathan Crush and Daniel Tevera, The Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA): The First Ten Years, Presentation to Ministerial MIDSA Meeting, Windhoek, Namibia, 15 November 2010. Other material is taken from the MIDSA and SAMP websites, www.migrationdialogue.org/midsa/ and www.queensu.ca/samp/midsa/

framework for region coordination of migration challenge in SADC countries. The MIDSA initiative is a collaborative effort between IOM and its partner, the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP). IOM and SAMP are the main facilitators of the workshops and brings together relevant senior government officials, primarily from national Departments of Home Affairs Immigration and Justice (Crush et al. 2005).

3.1.3   National Migration Policy

With regard to national immigration policy, the focus of most legal instruments is enforcement, control and exclusion. The particulars vary from country to country, but the overall intent is similar (Klaaren and Rutinwa 2004a). No country, with the possible exception of Botswana, has migrant or immigrant-friendly legislation on the books (ibid). Most policies were devised in the immediate post-colonial period. The imperatives of new nation-building and Africanisation did not encourage the idea of immigration as a tool of social and economic development. Indeed, outsiders were generally viewed as a threat to citizens. Legal stays were time-limited and goal-directed. Permanent immigration is extremely difficult from one country to another within the SADC and into the region from outside.

All countries within SADC are adopting an increasingly forceful line on enforcement. In South Africa, human rights organisations, including the South African Human Rights Commission, have argued that many enforcement tactics are strongly reminiscent of the apartheid era (Klaaren and Ramji 2001). A corruption industry has sprung up as the enforcers are paid off for the right to remain (ibid). There has been a major increase in deportations in South Africa since the end of apartheid. Other countries are beginning to follow suit, particularly Botswana in regard to undocumented immigrants, i.e. Zimbabwean immigrants in the country. Arrest, detention and repatriation procedures do not always protect irregular (and regular) migrants from abuse (SAHRC and Algotsson 2000). Furthermore, they have the potential to cause conflict between neighbouring countries.

The legislation and migration policy of the region hampers the recruitment of skilled professionals to replace those who are being lost. Bilateral agreements and legislation allow the South African mining and agricultural sectors to employ contract migrant workers from neighbouring countries (Crush and Tshitereke 2001). A number of other agreements exist at bilateral levels between countries in the region to facilitate or hamper movement. As noted above, bilateral agreements exist around skilled migration.

Associated with the liberation struggle, and civil war in Mozambique, forced migration has long been a feature of the region. All countries under discussion have ratified or comply with the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the more inclusive 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (Klaaren and Rutinwa 2004a). The refugee Acts of most SADC countries incorporate both definitions of refugees (ibid).

At the national level, most of the SADC countries have made significant change to migration laws over the past years. Only the immigration legislation of South Africa and Mozambique makes any reference to complying with international conventions multi- and bilateral accords (Klaaren and Rutinwa 2004a). However, with the exception of other countries like Botswana which have different approaches to migration than other countries in the region Botswana is said to reject asylum claims from people from outside the region (Klaaren and Rutinwa, 2004a, b).

The refugee Acts of Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe protect asylum seekers from *non-refoulement*, do not require them to meet immigration legislation requirements for entry, and give recognised refugees the right to remain in the country (Klaaren and Rutinwa 2004a, b). With the exception of South Africa, by law and in practice, countries in the region require refugees and asylum seekers to live in designated areas (usually some form of camp), and Zambia allows some exceptions to this rule (ibid). With the exception of Mozambique and South Africa, refugees and asylum seekers are required to apply for work permits before they can work.[3]

3.1.4 Fundamental Issues and Policy Gaps

The principle of freer movement within the SADC region is crucial. The same applies to the idea that policies should be harmonised. Existing national migration frameworks are not really speaking to each other at a regional level and are not integrated into poverty reduction strategies. For migration to become a lever of social and economic betterment for the poor, the migration issue has to be confronted at both national and regional levels. Migration has not been systematically factored into national poverty reduction strategies throughout the region. Nor has immigration policy been integrated systematically with pro-poor policies. Most immigration and migration policy frameworks were developed before the contemporary focus on poverty reduction began to frame policy. Hence there is a profound disjuncture between immigration policies and poverty reduction strategies in most countries of the Southern African region (Crush et al. 2006).

Xenophobia and hostility to migrants is common in the region and in some countries (e.g. South Africa) can involve physical attacks on non-nationals. A SAMP study suggests that nationals of Botswana, Namibia and South Africa are particularly intolerant of non-nationals, especially African non-nationals (Crush and Pendleton 2004). These attitudes are reflected in the media and often in government policies and the rhetoric of politicians. The new South African Immigration Act commits the government to challenge xenophobia.

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[3]Under South African legislation, asylum seekers were excluded from work, study or self-employment, but court challenges have lifted this ban.

High levels of xenophobia are of concern not just because they make individual migrants' lives uncomfortable. Xenophobia allows the exclusion of non-nationals from vital services that they may be entitled to, for instance, health and education, and further marginalises and excludes vulnerable communities increasing inequalities—even for non-nationals who are in the country legally (Belvedere et al. 2003). Furthermore, whilst the regulatory regime looks relatively protective of migrants, immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers, most governments (including better off countries like South Africa) lack the resources to effectively enforce legislation (Majodina and Peberdy 2000).

Without the adoption of a formal Protocol, regional dialogue is essential. MIDSA is the only high-level, intergovernmental forum designed to catalyse policy discussion and debate on the desirability and obstacles of a regional approach to migration management. MIDSA forums and technical workshops are attended by representatives from all 14 SADC states and provide an important venue for identifying national obstacles and opportunities for a regionally coordinated approach. The hope is that MIDSA will eventually be absorbed into SADC and that the forum will have very direct impacts on the harmonisation of national immigration laws and data collection systems (Crush et al. 2006).

4 International Migration and Good Governance in Southern Africa

The debate on international migration and good governance in Southern Africa is a complex discussion that cannot provide a clear-cut or benchmark of best definition on the finest governance system as well as defining the best migration policies in the region. Instead a critical appreciation on the existing governance structures and international migration policies is necessary to map a way forward for improvements on international migration and governance in Southern Africa. To begin with, the fall of apartheid system in South Africa, a strong system that was designed to control movement and eliminate outsiders, produced new opportunities for internal and cross-border mobility and new incentives for movement of people. The ensuing integration of South Africa with SADC region brought a major increase in legal and documented cross-border flows and new forms of mobility (Crush et al. 2006). Additionally, SADC's reconnection with the global economy has opened it up to forms of migration commonly associated with globalisation (Crush and McDonald 2002). Moreover, growing rural and urban poverty and unemployment rate has influenced more people out of households in search of better living standards, which has caused significant gender reconfiguration of migration streams (Dodson 2001). The widespread HIV/AIDS pandemic has also impacted substantially on regional and international migration patterns. Not only is the rapid diffusion of the epidemic mysterious without reference to human mobility, but new forms of migration are emerging in response (Williams 2002). A number of

countries of the SADC are still struggling with the legacy of mass displacement and forced migration due to various reasons.

The concept of migration, development and good governance in Southern Africa has recently received some scholarly and research attention (Ammassari 2005; Chisholm 2008; Gundel 2002). However, initiatives to formulate policy responses to the challenges of the interconnection have been much more limited at the national level. In most SADC countries, migration and development are seen as largely separate policy spheres. Development policies and plans do not normally integrate the realities of internal and international population mobility in any substantive manner. Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers in southern Africa, for example, largely overlook migration, despite its demonstrable importance as a survival strategy for large numbers of households (Crush and Frayne 2007). Correspondingly, national immigration and migration policy is generally disengaged from development planning. Migration policy is the preserve of states and most are still focused primarily on sovereignty issues of management, enforcement and border control. Most migrant-receiving countries do not explicitly or implicitly recognise the significance of immigrants and migrants to their own potential on national, regional and local economic development. Migrants are more commonly viewed by states and citizenries as a threat to their economic and social interests. In some southern African countries—particularly South Africa, Botswana and Namibia—opposition to migration has shaded into intolerance and xenophobia (Nyamnjoh 2006).

Basing on the literature reviewed (Abella 2006; Adepoju 2000; Hansen 2010; Crush and Dodson 2007), it is recommendable that policy responses at the local, national and international level must take into account the extraordinary dynamism and instability of migration forms and patterns in the entire SADC region. Several nations that are joined to legal frameworks of control and exclusion of migrants are finding it increasingly difficult to adjust. The important policy challenge is to move the states of Southern Africa to a regionally coordinated and well-planned set of policies that underscore good governance, sound management and client-based service delivery (Klaaren and Rutinwa 2004b). Additionally, since migration is a cross-cutting phenomenon, it needs to be incorporated into all aspects of national policy-making and planning, as well as agendas and strategies to alleviate poverty and reduce inequality. For this to happen, migration's key role needs to be documented by researchers and recognised by policy-makers (Crush et al. 2006). This review also proposes the need to evaluate regional migration policies and initiatives to integrate migration to permit them to more effectively intervene to alleviate poverty and spearhead regional development.

5   Regional Cooperation on Migration

The establishment of sub-regional economic unions to a greater extent simulated the kind of homogeneous societies that once existed in the sub-regions. However, the major challenge facing regional cooperation on migration is the fact that mostly these regional economic unions are dominated by the economies of a single country, and movements of people within the member states have been directed to a limited number of countries within the unions, for example South Africa in SADC (Adepoju 2008). Historically, economic, ethnic and political links have fostered and reinforced intra-regional, inter-regional and international migration in Southern Africa (Adepoju 2000). Recently, there have been changes in migration patterns in Southern Africa; especially the intensification of irregular and undocumented migration as well as trafficking migrants can be attributed to poverty, economic hardships, political instability and worsening social and employment situations (Adepoju 2000). Moreover, these developments in fluctuation of migrants have revealed the need for regional policies, frameworks and strategies to govern the movement of people in Southern Africa. At its foundation, the SADC as an institution initially embraced a vision of intra-regional free movement, but this has not become a reality (Dodson and Crush 2015). However, there have been ongoing frameworks and dialogues with some initiatives aimed at strengthening regional migration governance in SADC, focusing on Migration Dialogue Southern Africa (MIDSA), which since its formation in 2000 has been attempting to control the regional migration governance agenda (Dodson and Crush 2015).

Regional cooperation on migration still needs to be improved. Most SADC countries tend to see immigrants more as a threat than an opportunity (Crush et al. 2006). Migrants are considered as transporters of diseases, job takers and perpetrators of crime. However, existing policies have tended to focus much on the control and marginalisation of immigrants. Unfortunately, this general attitude extends to legal immigration. Additionally, few (if any), of the SADC states have proactive immigration policies. Rights of permanent residence and settlement are extremely difficult to obtain in most SADC countries. Until the 1990s, South Africa was the only country with a proactive immigration policy (in that case to recruit white immigrants to boost the economy and shore up white rule). Afterwards, the policy tide turned against immigration and skills import. The MIDSA as mentioned earlier is one of the most significant progress made concerning regional cooperation on migration (Kok 2006). MIDSA is one of a number of Regional Consultative Processes (RCPs) on migration that have risen in many regions of the world since the mid-1990s. These are informal, non-legally binding, interstate forums for dialogue on migration matters to strengthen and develop mutual interest between member states (Hansen 2010). MIDSA was formally established in Mbabane, Swaziland, in November 2000, with the objective of facilitating the SADC Secretariat's efforts to promote the SADC Protocol on the movement of people. After extensive consultative meetings in Harare and Lusaka in July 2000, where SADC government support for the MIDSA process was finalised, a vibrant leading

committee was established, chaired by the International Office for Migration (IOM) and including the SAMP, the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (US-INS) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The committee was tasked to assemble a meeting for SADC governments to discuss issues of common concern on migration and its administration. UNHCR eventually withdrew, followed shortly afterwards by the US-INS, although the initiative continued and evolved into a ministerial-level forum of SADC member states.

In the year 2000, the main objectives of MIDSA were set out as follows (Crush and Tevera 2010):

- To facilitate cooperation amongst SADC Member States on migration-related issues, improving their capacity to manage migration within a regional context.
- To contribute to an increased awareness amongst SADC officials and policy-makers of the role of migration in the social and economic development of the region, and to ensure that orderly migration is perceived and used as a positive factor in the development process.
- To assist in developing sustainable institutional capacities to deal with the obstacles of migration management and strengthen the capacity of Governments to meet these challenges in a cooperative and knowledge-based approach.
- To enhance the understanding of public bureaucrats and policy-makers of the causes, dimensions and impacts of migration in the region.
- To create dialogue and collaboration between member states and other agencies and institutions with migration-related interests and expertise.
- To distribute progressive technical cooperation and training to create capacity for migration management and data sharing research.
- To enhance the capacity of SADC countries to collectively manage migration including substantial progress towards harmonised systems of data collection and harmonised immigration policy and legislation.

Regional bilateral and multilateral collaboration unions have a huge potential to greatly influence the movement of labour migration (Abella 2006; Arthurs 2001). Sub-regional economic unions which provide in their agreements for the free movement of skilled labour and rights of establishment in member countries could facilitate intra-regional labour mobility and promote self-reliant development in the region. Economic integration in the region offers a long-term prospect for stimulating intra-regional labour mobility. The persistent political unrest and the fragmented, fragile national economies make regional and sub-regional economic groupings most pertinent. The endorsement of the memorandum to set up an African Common Market by the year 2025 is a benchmark on the road to an all-African regional integration (Adepoju 2000). Owing to the fact that many countries are undecided on the opinion of free movement and are reluctant to adjust their domestic laws and administrative approaches, it is therefore essential to harmonise national laws which conflict with regional frameworks. Attempts to promote regional integration and cooperation must also adequately address the right of residence and establishment of migrants and obligations of the host nations.

6 Policy Recommendations

The failure to craft a regionally coordinated approach to migration in the 1990s is attributable to the concerns of migrant-receiving countries. It is certain that SADC will be forced to confront the issue again. The scale of unrecorded migration and the exploitation of migrants requires a coordinated response. As it stands, the SADC countries rely mainly on the national migration policies to address challenging issues of migration. There is no clear and conscious coordination of these policies to address the issues with a coordinated effort at a regional level and not limited to local or national level. The only moment these national migration policies speak to each other in the region, it is by default and not by design which is contrary to the idea of regional integration. On a regular basis, these national policies are designed to protect the interest of that individual country, which is not bad, but it is much better when the interests are aligned to the regional policy. Hence, there is a need for an inclusive regional migration policy framework.

For the notion of regional harmonisation to work out, there should be policies which critically regulate the movement of people at a regional level. The policies should take into account that some countries in the region are more favourable than others. Thence there should be a criteria in which free movement of people should be allowed and at the same time avoid overwhelming the systems of those deemed favourable countries, since people flock to such countries in search of a better life. Freeing up flows of goods and capital whilst simultaneously trying to shut down the movement of people makes limited, if not, no economic sense. There is much to be gained from migration than losses and challenges, especially the skilled immigrants in host countries.

SADC is not better off as region and each country within is not better off as a country if it is not taking advantage to exploit the untapped development potential which can be brought by migration. Strategic policies at regional level are at the foundation of regional development and harmonisation in SADC. Though many policies on economic integration have been drafted, there is a need to critically look into those polices. The regional economic policies should be drafted in a manner which creates mutual benefit amongst countries. If they widen imbalances between countries within the region, then they are doomed to perpetuate mass migration of people towards one centre of better economic development. This is a prevailing situation in the region, where many people flock to South Africa and see it as a safer economic haven than any other country in the region and this will put more pressure on the economy as well as government of South Africa. Therefore, policies which reduce the hegemonic nature of other countries over others in the region should be given a thought.

Migrants come in different names, economic migrants, refugees, asylum seekers and so on. Policies to define the criteria at which the migrants are defined and categorised as well as treated should be drafted at a regional level with all member states rather than drafted nationally. This will reduce tension between countries especially when there is a perceived notion that the nationals of other countries are

being mistreated in another country of refuge within the same region. Regional harmonisation comes when there is a common understanding on how certain categories of migrants should be treated. This can only be feasible through drafting of a regional migration policy which speaks to that issue and all countries are signatories to that policy and adopt it.

7 Conclusion

The Southern African region is characterised by a massive movement of people across and within national borders, as well as within and beyond the region. Whether voluntary or involuntary, migration in Southern Africa consists of a group of economically active people and an unspecified number of undocumented migrants. These complex and mixed patterns of migration pose a number of common challenges for migrants and receiving communities, including humanitarian concerns, legal and human rights implications, law enforcement capacities, national and regional security, as well as strategic issues around interstate cooperation for collaborative solutions (IOM 2014). It is therefore very important for SADC as a regional board and the countries involved to craft policies which address the complex issues in a manner that creates harmony in the region and serves the best interests of both migrants and host communities within the region. These policies' response must be crafted at local, nation, regional and continental level and must take into account the issue of dynamism and instability of migration forms and patterns in the region. In order to tackle the issue of migration, meticulously, in the region, there should be a more formal dialogue which deals with the issues of human movement and not limited to matter related to political and economic integration. The countries in the region should be guided by one legal or policy framework rather than a concoction of national policies which neither really speak to each other nor aim to harmonise the region in all sectors of interest.

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Disaggregated Development: Between 'Trade, Industrialisation and Migration'

Modimowabarwa Kanyane

1 Introduction

The study argues that SADC in particular and Africa in general require active neoliberal industrial policy encompassing effective implementation of regional trade agreements (RTAs) and protocols on trade and development as stimulus to create conducive trade environment across the regional borders and the globe with a free flow migration of human capital and goods and services. This requires collaboration of the states, business community and civil society to facilitate transformation and economic recovery in the region. Besides states' collaborative links with the business community and civil society, capabilities and technical support including road networks and information and communication technology infrastructure should be further developed and improved to respond to cope with trade, industrialisation and migration volumes. The net outcome of this regional integration agenda should quell conspicuous dualism, enclavism and subtle sub-imperialism barriers which brought about stubborn realities of unemployment, inequalities and poverty. The study therefore focuses on regional development viewed from regional integration lens informed by disaggregated trade, industrialisation and migration. The study's response to impact of regional integration agenda and hard talks about migration, industrialisation and trade initiatives in the region is long overdue. Regional integration has earned political support in African Union member states, but it is stalling at the implementation level. One

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may argue that trade and industrialisation initiatives across the continent especially in Southern Africa may only be possible if regional integration and development agenda could gain traction. Migration issues also deserve disaggregated attention to have a clear picture of why African migrants of over 16–50 million migrate as they have the potential to disrupt or strengthen the African regional integration project. Diasporan entrepreneurial-based Africans need to reinvest and channel their innovative skills back into African market, but this requires solid regional political and economic system that can deliver non-corrupt country governments safety, security and peace along with economic and political stability. To this end, employing qualitative methodologies and desktop studies, the study disaggregates regional development by exploring trade, migration and industrialisation to underscore the causal effect and dividends of regional integration.

2   Conceptual and Theoretical Exposition

Generally, regional integration is when a group of countries engage each other and develop formal bilateral and multilateral agreements about how they will conduct trade with each other and amongst themselves. Regional integration is easy to understand but complex to implement. Regional integration has its historic roots in Africa, America and Europe as a bureaucratic effort to facilitate political and economic consolidation. However, whilst Europe, ASIA and USA are examples of successful integration, regional integration project in Africa is not pragmatically close to resolve due to its fragmentation and inherent complexities, amongst others, embedded neo-colonialism, subtle sub-imperialism, conflicts and political instabilities in the parts of the African continent. AU Agenda 2063 (2015: 15) also adds that the various regional blocs in Africa are currently at different levels of development.

Constant[1] instability and conflicts are not conducive to the effective implementation of regional economic integration, and the recurring nature of these conflicts has negatively affected the ability of regional economic communities (RECs), states and the AU to implement integration programmes. This environment of insecurity defocused RECs to halt their integration agendas in order to pay attention to peace, safety and security issues instead. As a result of spillover effects, conflicts easily spread to neighbouring states. Thus, the net spillover effect retards regional stability and economic prospects for regional integration (AU 2063 2015: 19).

Since the third stage of the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) in 2008, also known as the 2008 Abuja Treaty, piecemeal progress has been observed. The Treaty is aimed at promoting continental unity through harmonised economic and security policies within Africa's RECs. The Abuja Treaty was again adopted by the African Union (AU), which considered regional

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[1]http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/african-union-and-regional-economic-integration,   accessed on 7 July 2016.

economic integration to be a flagship project in driving economic development on the continent.[2]

Integration has the potential to promote growth and reduce poverty and inequalities through the increase of exports of domestic goods and services. Consequently, several regional groupings have mushroomed in the post-war era across the globe, notably the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In Africa, several regional groups have emerged, namely Southern African Development Community (SADC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), East African Community (EAC) as well as Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA). These regional groupings have been able to demonstrate that regional integration and cooperation are possible and desirable. For effective regional integration to be achieved, there should be a reasonable consensus on the form of democracy and political economy that should prevail in the region (Mapuva and Mapuva 2014: 22–23 and 34–35).

Whilst the political commitment at the continental level is undeniable, implementation at the regional grouping level especially SADC is weak whilst at the country level it is noticeably lacking. In January 2012, for example, the African Union (AU) Summit of Heads of Governments and States endorsed both fast-tracking of the establishment of an African Continental Free Trade Area by 2017 and boosting of intra-African trade through the implementation of a comprehensive action plan, but with the 2017 deadline unmet and extremely limited progress made on the ground, one asks why Africa's regional integration process is still delaying. However, despite the delays, the importance of the regional integration agenda is more relevant today than ever before, particularly in the context of current global economic difficulties. Building resilience through regional integration and trade provides a buffer zone for most small fragmented African economies (Vakataki and Karingi 2014: 96–98).

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is a mixture hybrid of South African President Thabo Mbeki's Millennium African Plan and Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade's OMEGA plan. The initiative was strengthened further through collaboration between the heads of state of South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal, Algeria and Egypt. It was endorsed and adopted as an African comprehensive and continental strategic economic development programme to become an integral part of the structures of the AU. Apparently, African leaders have, through NEPAD, accepted, at least in principle, the importance of sound national policies and good governance as prerequisites for poverty reduction and inequalities. The G8 nation's approval in giving their full support to NEPAD, albeit without any binding promises, is a step in the right direction, but NEPAD phenomenon today raises questions about why it has taken Africa this long to come up with a comprehensive economic plan for the continent but still wrought with implementation challenges on the ground.

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[2]http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/african-union-and-regional-economic-integration,   accessed on 7 July 2016.

The vision of NEPAD phenomenon to create, amongst other things, vehicles wherein Africans will begin to trade with each other is brilliant but remains problematic due to limited prospects for self-funding as some of the member states' financial instruments are underdeveloped. Under the circumstances, the possibilities of supporting the NEPAD budget through contributions based on member states' Gross National Products (GNPs), 'own resources' or Value-Added Tax (VAT) are therefore not especially sustainable and to look for donor funding is also to invite interference of the AU sovereignty (Ilorah 2004: 234, 244). There is a catch here and it is important not to fall into the trap of dependency indictment and sub-imperialism subtly emerging from the economic superpowers whilst pursuing regional integration project.

Be that as it may, sub-Saharan Africa countries do not appear to be pursuing regional cooperation and integration with the same momentum and commitment as it is with the rest of the world despite the fact that there have been more regional integration and cooperation agreements consummated in Africa than on any other continent. Nonetheless, with the notable exception of Botswana and other *Southern African Customs Union* (SACU) membership states, these agreements have yielded disappointing results. They have not led to increased trade within the region, or between the countries of the region and the rest of the world. Except for the CFA franc-zone monetary union, they have had little success in actually integrating the economies of the member states (McCarthy 1994).

Ilorah (2004: 246, 248) still has hope in NEPAD to drive the trade and development agenda (hence the next section) but should accommodate a revised funding model to force multinationals operating in all NEPAD member countries to pay a certain percentage of their earnings to the NEPAD budget. According to Ilorah (2004), this is not too much to ask as generous multinational funds that otherwise were channelled into private accounts of the political leaders should rather be channelled into the NEPAD budget, and in this way, the benefits would be enjoyed by the entire continent. Obviously, this is an important challenge that has to be given a serious thought by African leaders if they want NEPAD to succeed as a programme.

However, whilst it is true that there are limitations of NEPAD funding model and its tendency to focus on donors, the Ilorah (2004) approach to force Multinational Companies (MNCs) to pay certain percentage of their earnings to NEPAD budget is populist and not feasible in this age of financialisation. Rather, a need to reform investment laws and empowerment of legislative, constitutional bodies and civil society oversight of investment and trade to enhance public accountability is crucial to consider. A successful NEPAD programme will require that member countries increase trade with one another especially tinkering approaches in the SADC region. This requires tackling trade issues together within the context of economic integration that is already envisaged as part of NEPAD project for deepening regional integration.

Coming closer to SADC, it can therefore be argued that the Southern African region is a candidate for regional economic integration given the fact that it is characterised by many countries with small economies, an environment which is

Table 1 Overlapping memberships in regional integration initiatives of Southern Africa States

Country	COMESA[a]	SADC	SACU	Other
Angola	X	X		
Botswana		X	X	
DR Congo	X	X		CEMAC
Lesotho		X	X	
Madagascar	X	X		IOC
Malawi	X	X		
Mauritius	X	X		IOC
Mozambique		X		
Namibia	X	X	X	
South Africa		X	X	
Swaziland	X	X	X	
Tanzania		X		EAC
Zambia	X	X		
Zimbabwe	X	X		

Source: Guilherme (2016: 8)

[a]The other member states are Burundi Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan and Uganda

ideal for interstate trade and forging of economic links (Mapuva and Mapuva 2014: 23). There are prospects and challenges of regional integration. Two challenges amongst others are overlapping membership and heterogeneity of SADC economies which needs harmonisation (Table 1).

On one hand, the aforementioned table of overlapping membership presents a clear picture of possibilities for harmonisation policies and operating protocols for regional integration and free trade across SADC, EAC and COMESA tripartite blocks through the tripartite agreement to overcome complex patchwork that complicates decision-making for states, community officials, individuals and business (Guilherme 2016: 10). According to Guilherme (2016: 10), the common market for SADC–EAC–COMESA comprises 26 countries with a combined population of nearly 600 million people and a total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of approximately US$1.3 trillion. The main objective of the SADC–EAC–COMESA tripartite is strengthening and deepening economic integration of the southern and eastern Africa regions. This is intended to be achieved through harmonisation of policies and programmes within the southern and eastern Africa regions.

However, on the other hand, the several regional integration and cooperation institutions with overlapping memberships bring about unnecessary conflicting mandates and regulations, or duplicate organs. AU Agenda 2063 (2015: 15) confirms that disparities between the blocs are further accentuated by the multiple memberships of countries in different regional blocs. Mapuva and Mapuva (2014: 27–28) argue that multiple and concurrent memberships of numerous RECs have presented the most daunting challenge to economic regional integration within the

SADC. An example is that of the SACU where South Africa is a member alongside Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland. Given that South Africa has already negotiated the Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement with the EU, and also with the SACU, any agreement that South Africa concludes includes other SACU members. Overlapping membership has also diluted regional integration efforts amongst different SADC member states. For example, when integration is shallow, a state can sign numerous bilateral or even multilateral agreements contradicting each other. Implicitly holding overlapping and/or concurrent membership weakens regional integration. SADC member states found themselves signing numerous agreements with different regional trading blocs, thereby presenting a challenge to deeper regional integration. Hope (1998: 551–552) contends that SADC members' states should therefore rationalise and mainstream their regional integration and cooperation agreements and thereby attempt to eliminate the design, structural and implementation weaknesses that currently plague such agreements.

Another thorny issue according to Mapuva and Mapuva (2014: 29, 35) is the heterogeneity of SADC economies which has been viewed as a challenge to regional integration because such economies cannot be integrated, especially given that stronger economies, like South Africa, end up dictating the terms of reference and operation to poorer and weaker members of the regional grouping. For instance in the SACU regime, South Africa plays a dominant role and its voice dominates the proceedings, resulting in it having to play a domineering role and occupy a decisive position in decision-making processes within the group. Similarly, within the SADC regime, South Africa always took centre stage with a dominant voice. Seeing that South Africa has been the dominant economic hub of the regional body, the country has not shown much commitment to regional integration, given that its economy has been able to attract trading partners outside of the SADC and the continent more than other SADC and sub-Saharan member states. Consequently, given that South Africa has reaped significant long-term economic benefits that often came at the expense of both SACU and SADC member states, its attention to regional integration has been distracted as a dodgy player.

Mapuva and Mapuva (2014: 29, 35) go on to argue that the over-domineering role of South Africa in both the SADC and the SACU has tended to overshadow the voice of other smaller economies. Murisa (2015) adds that South Africa masqueraded in the form of sub-imperialism. Murisa (2015) states that South Africa did not focus on regional integration project, which was originally the hope of the frontline states largely because it is a sub-imperial formidable force and an important intermediary for international capital. It has long worked by that logic in the SADC region focused on peace and stability, intervening where its economic interests are under threat but failed to take advantage of its own advanced economy to pursue a model of regional integration that would ensure wider, equitable growth. Instead, working closely with the representatives of capital, it has pursued and defended its own economic interests over that of SADC region.

3   Trade and Development

When coming to trade and development, Africa is increasingly focusing on regional integration as a strategy for achieving sustainable economic growth. There is a general consensus that by merging African economies to create one big market and pooling its capacities together including sharing costs on public infrastructures crucial for development, the continent can overcome its daunting development challenges. This agenda has intensified in the last couple of years with over 30 regional trade agreements (RTAs) on boosting intra-African trade. These are trade blocs and bilateral and multilateral agreements forming part of the regional integration schemes illustrated on the table below.

Regional economic outlook: sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa: member countries of regional groupings						
The West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)	Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (CEMAC)	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)	East Africa Community (EAC-5)	Southern African Development Community (SADC)	Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU)	Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
Benin	Cameroon	Burundi	Burundi	Angola	Botswana	Benin
Burkina Faso	Central African Republic	Comoros	Kenya	Botswana	Lesotho	Burkina Faso
Côte d'lvoire	Chad	Eritrea	Rwanda	Lesotho	Namibia	Cabo Verde
Guinea-Bissau	Democratic Republic of Congo	Democratic Republic of Congo	Tanzania	Democratic Republic of Congo	South Africa	Côte d'lvoire
Mali	Equatorial Guinea	Ethiopia	Uganda	Madagascar	Swaziland	Gambia, The Ghana
Niger	Gabon	Kenya		Malawi		Guinea
Senegal		Madagascar		Mauritius		Guinea-Bissau
Togo		Malawi		Mozambique		Liberia
		Mauritius		Namibia		Mali
		Rwanda		Seychelles		Niger
		Seychelles		South Africa		Nigeria
		Swaziland		Swaziland		Senegal
		Uganda		Tanzania		Sierra Leone
		Zambia		Zambia		Togo
		Zimbabwe		Zimbabwe		
List of Country Abbreviations						

Source: IMF (2014: 64)

On one hand, given the relatively low level of intraregional trade in these regional groupings, countries in the region should renew their efforts to promote

greater regional integration through lower tariff and nontariff barriers and by facilitating the movement of people, goods and capital, drawing on the experience of the most advanced initiatives in the region, such as the EAC, which recently signed a Monetary Union Protocol to establish a full monetary union within a decade. The Monetary Union Protocol signed by the Heads of State of the EAC (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda) on November 30, 2013, in Kampala, Uganda, represents a major milestone in the EAC regional integration space. It outlines a 10-year roadmap towards monetary union for an economic community with a combined GDP of more than US$100 billion and a population of 145 million. This set an encouraging example. The protocol appropriately emphasises the need to carefully prepare in the years ahead to ensure a smooth transition towards, and functioning of, the single currency, but the detailed institutional setting and operational frameworks still need to be succinctly spelled out further and the relevant regional institutions will require sufficient powers to properly oversee the process, monitor, enforce the convergence criteria and conduct a unified monetary policy. As the recent experience in the Eurozone has shown, a properly designed banking union contributes to the stability of a monetary union. This requires supervision capacity, sound frameworks for bank resolution and cross-border coordination, accompanied by robust financial sector safety nets. It is anticipated that the deepening of the integration process by the single currency is expected to result in a larger regional market with reduced transaction costs, greater economies of scale, increased competition and enhanced attractiveness to foreign direct investment (FDI), thereby contributing to sustained strong economic growth, employment creation and improved economic efficiency (IMF 2014: 2–3, 18–19).

On the other hand, the SADC is presently involved in protracted and contentious negotiations to establish a free trade area for the region based on the SADC protocol on trade and development (Peberdy 2000: 201). There is therefore a need for cooperation of COMESA, ECOWAS and SADC regional groupings amongst others to make trade integration in the continent realisable. By and large, development is dependent on quality infrastructure. The levers of trade depend on the characterisation of the economic environment. The quality of the infrastructure is key. Bigsten and Soderbom (2011: 163) aver that these levers of trade are particularly critical in less developed countries. Since much of modern trade involves trading with firms being part of global production networks, one expects a stronger link between trade and well-functioning transport networks and technological infrastructure.

Good governance and civil society in sub-Saharan Africa are currently weak, fragile and need to be strengthened if regional integration dream in regional groupings phases starting with EAC monitory union in 10 years is to be realised. Widespread corruption, as practised in the continent, is symptomatic of bad governance and miscarriage of democratic development state. Ineffective states can retard and misdirect economic growth. Widespread corruption has the potential to frustrate trade and development because graft and poverty tend to go hand in hand, and particularly so where civil society is weak and good governance is lacking. Corruption risks restrain investment and employment opportunities and thereby

undermines programmes designed specifically to assist the poor. The poor falls victim of systemic corruption because they are unable to compete with those willing to pay bribes (Hope 1998: 546).

Most SADC countries except Botswana are highly prone to corruption according to Transparency International stats. The key lesson to be learned from Botswana in the attempt to remove the tumours and pervasive stench of corruption in SADC region is that corruption is made a high-risk activity with severe punitive measures. Botswana is serious about combating crime and corruption in the SADC region and has established in 1994 two agencies that specialise in the investigation and prosecution of corruption (Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime) and the investigation of administrative malpractices (Office of the Ombudsman). Also, Botswana has signed and ratified the SADC Protocol Against Corruption, ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and actively cooperates in fighting international anti-money laundering activities (ADB 2009: iii). As such, government officials, business and individuals from the society are discouraged from corrupting the state through corrupt business and illicit trading activities for their own self-enrichment. This in itself boosted investor confidence.

There is also a need to control and manage external debt to strengthen regional trading. The external debt and debt-servicing obligations of SADC continue to pose a major threat to the sustainable development of the region. Botswana, in contrast, has an external debt of US$0.7 billion which is equivalent to 32% of exports and 17% of GNP. The reverse of the debt is offset by its aggressive strategy to move away from its economic dependence on diamonds. Consequently, if SADC is to reverse its unfavourable export trends, the region must embrace trade liberalisation in order to enhance its international competitiveness as well as to permit its exporters to capitalise on opportunities in foreign markets. After all, due to an open economy, Botswana's outstanding export performance changed its large structural trade deficit in the 1960s to a visible trade surplus by the mid-1980s. With a surplus on the current account, combined with inflows of aid finance, the balance of payments has been in healthy surplus since 1982. This favourable Botswana balance of payments is reflected in the country's substantial reserves of foreign currency and provided for import cover for goods and services. In the short-to-medium term, it is quite obvious that Botswana would not face a foreign exchange constraint and that state of affairs has also enabled the country to maintain an increasingly liberal exchange control regime. As such, exchange control restrictions on current account transactions in the region should be eliminated and commercial banks should be permitted to open foreign currency accounts for both residents and non-residents (Hope 1998: 540–541, 551).

Sadly, despite Botswana's strong governance and macroeconomic good performance success story in the region, the contrast is unimaginable—poverty, inequality and unemployment are high and these challenges are not exception to any developing countries. The issues of poverty, inequality and unemployment are not new to us. We live with these stubborn realities every day. A number of studies were conducted on various thematic areas from different lenses on issues of poverty and inequality and these are: The growth, poverty and inequality nexus in

South Africa: Co-integration and causality analysis in Development Southern Africa by Akanbi (2016); Poverty and inequality—But of what—As social determinants of health in Africa? by Worku and Woldesenbet (2015); New Estimates of Global Poverty and Inequality: How much difference do price data make? by Edward and Sumner (2015); and The political economy of dual labour market in Africa: The copper industry and dependency in Zambia (1929–1969) by GCZ Mhone (1982).

As such, after 21 years of democracy in South Africa, the society along with that of the SADC region as a whole is still exposed to dualism and enclavity vulnerabilities with a gap between the rich and the poor widening due to contrasts of the two economies. Mashigo (2010: 108) confirms that the current dualistic nature of the economy—marked as it is by disenfranchisement, massive inequalities and impoverishment—means that South African society is highly unequal. Since the advent of democracy in 1994, South Africa has seen remarkable social and economic stability with a strong influence on the African continent as well as internationally. Yet, despite its success, though, South Africa is still characterised by a dual economy and experiences what former president Thabo Mbeki referred to as 'two economies': a vibrant first-world economy which has globally integrated world of production, exchange and consumption and a second and disconnected economy characterised by severe underdevelopment, inequality and abject poverty.

This Mbeki thought of dual economy is actually derived from Mhone economic dualism and enclavism in Southern Africa and how it reproduces poverty and inequality. Mhone's (2000: 5, 19) cogent argument nuances economic dualism-enclavism as a minority engaged in dynamic activities propelled by the capitalist imperative for material accumulation of wealth and a majority trapped in low-productivity non-capitalist forms of production that are static from the standpoint of accumulation—an enclave of capitalist tendencies and sub-imperialism in the sea of poverty. Put cogently, the capitalist sector exists as an enclave in a sea of underemployment, poverty and inequality in the Southern Africa. Even after four decades of autonomous colonial rule, Southern Africa is still plagued by pervasive open and hidden unemployment born out of economic dualism and enclavism.

For example, like South Africa, Botswana's economic dualism and enclavism is pronounced. Despite Botswana's stable economy, there are inadequate jobs for those seeking employment, and consequently, unemployment, poverty and inequality in the (re)distribution of income and wealth between and within the urban and rural areas are a cause for concern. More than half of the rural population and a considerable proportion of the urban population have disparity incomes which are inadequate to meet their basic needs. At the national level, 63% of the households have incomes equal to or less than US$271 per month. Poverty in Botswana can also be explained by the grossly skewed distribution of wealth and the lack of potential for wealth creation (Hope 1998: 543). Poverty restricts the development of human, social and economic potential. In Botswana, the core of poverty lies in the very heart of the rural areas. Rural poverty, in turn, is the major sprawling factor influencing urban poverty. It is because rural poverty is one of the push factors of internal migration to the urban areas which, in turn, leads to higher rates of urban

unemployment and inequalities. No country, however wealthy, is immune to poverty (Hope 1998: 543). Unemployment, poverty and inequality are therefore world's stubborn phenomena which require both aggressive global and local trading efforts as well as robust development interventions in the region to tackle them.

Another thorny issue to grapple with is the customs duties paid at borders when importing and exporting goods which are a significant cost to small business traders and thus deplete their already small stretched profit margins. As a result, customs duties limit their ability to trade across the borders. As most of these cross-border traders pass through official border posts, they are subject to customs regulations. All persons entering South Africa are allowed a single R500 duty-free allowance of personal goods. All other goods are subject to duties which are calculated according to a complex set of regulations under bilateral trade agreements. Traders also have to pay duties in their home countries on goods taken out of South Africa. This could pose double dipping on duty imposition.

In one case study, Peberdy (2000: 217) expresses one trader who vented frustration on the border:

> 'Sometimes I have problems. One time they wanted to charge me piece by piece; I negotiated but they still charged me an exorbitant price'; 'I don't like the way they search you and they overcharge'; 'There are the high prices of duties on everything and they may want bribes'; 'Duty isn't constant, it depends on the mood of the officer. And there is corruption.' Others complained about charges for transporting goods by rail: 'The railway people are the worst, they are rude. They charge R200 but write R50. If you complain then they just say do you want to pay more?'

Allegations that duties are arbitrarily imposed, or that different duties can be levied on the same amount of goods, not only cause confusion and resentment but hamstring trade and development in the region. Traders of a small business scale are in a vulnerable position when crossing the border as they lack time and money to pursue legal avenues to resolve their complaints. Customs duties also come with costs to the Department of Customs and Excise. The current tariff schedules are complex and difficult to administer (Peberdy 2000: 216–218).

Going forward, renegotiation of regional integration especially RTAs, bilateral and multilateral including the SADC protocol on free trade, should also take account of informal sector cross-border trade which is in earnest problematic. There is therefore a need to reconsolidate this cross-border trading in pursuit of effective regional integration agenda in various regional groupings both bilaterally and multilaterally by making sure that trade and customs duties are properly structured. The playfields must be equally levelled to ensure that the informal entrepreneurs are not disadvantaged at the expense of their formal sector counterparts. Agenda 2063 (2015: 19) emphasises that regional integration is only possible through increasing economic growth which would then lead to an increase in intra-Africa trade and enhancement of competitiveness. Integration and implementation of these agreements and treaties to facilitate trade would foster effective regional integration.

4   Industrialisation and Development

Industrialisation is widely seen as being central to the challenges confronting development. Put other way round, development is driven by effective industrial policy. Ineffective industrial policies have a potential to harm socio-economic development. For example, China's rapid growth and deepening global presence in Africa creates a major challenge for the conventional wisdom of industrialisation as a core component of development strategy. These challenges are expressed through a combination of direct impacts (expressed in bilateral country-to-country relations) and indirect impacts (reflected in competition in third country markets). In current structures, these impacts are predominantly harmful for Africa's industrial growth. In Zambia, the trade unions assert that imports of Chinese clothes have undermined the local clothing and electrical sector, and in Nigeria trade unions blame Chinese imports for the loss of 350,000 jobs (Kaplinsky 2008: 7, 11). The same is said of South African exported products into Zimbabwe destabilising their local production. Without growth in the industrial sector, however, Africa is likely to remain overly dependent on agriculture and the extraction of natural resources. One therefore argues that unless African firms can strengthen their foothold in international markets, accelerated industrialisation on the continent is unlikely (Bigsten and Soderbom 2011: 161).

African countries need to put the industrial policy discussion back on the top agenda of the AU to drive economic transformation, so are SADC countries too. There is a need for more active industrial policy justified on economic development grounds. Bigsten and Soderbom (2011: 167) argue that the key reason industrial policy has worked poorly in Africa is that it has failed to create enough pressure on firms to become productive and meet the standard requirements of the international market. However, this comes at huge loss if the business collapses or huge benefits if it is successful. Hence, one needs to weigh risks judiciously. Bigsten and Soderbom (2011: 167) warn that industrial policy should not attempt to favour individual firms or be too narrowly focused.

The old political economy rhetoric has not changed or shifted yet to favour Africa. Raw exports to foreign countries and later imported as finished product have not changed the landscape. In 2005, the same garden furniture product imported in South Africa at £60 could be obtained for £50 in Ghana, £38 in Vietnam and only £30 in China. By contrast, China's furniture industry is booming. Between 1993 and 2002, it moved from being the world's eighth largest to the second largest exporter. In the face of this inability to compete with Asia in general and China in particular, Africa's furniture manufacturers are moving backwards into their resource sectors, exporting raw logs, chips for the foreign paper industry and sawn timber. Consequently, Africa's sourced timber is used by Asian manufacturers to produce furniture which displaces Africa from global furniture markets (Kaplinsky 2008: 15). There is a need for a paradigm shift leaned towards radical

economic transformation within the context of an industrial policy biased to regional integration and industrial development agenda. However, Dagdeviren and Mahran (2010: 495–496) argue that in a world of increasing openness in international trade, industrial development without a competitive cutting edge is a difficult task to think about (Dagdeviren and Mahran 2010: 495–496).

Other observation of the industrial development trend is that whereas agricultural land in Africa is growing, productivity is decreasing. For example, many African countries still do not produce enough food to feed their people, and the situation has but deteriorated over the years—threatened food security sovereignty. Africa's lion's share of total world agricultural trade fell from 8% in 1965 to about 2% in 2000. Agricultural productivity per worker in the sub-Saharan region, excluding South Africa, stagnated in the 1990s at an estimated $365 per worker from a 1980 estimate at $424, measured in constant 1995 US$ showing a decrease of about 13.9% (Ilorah 2004: 247).

Another thorny issue which frustrates industrial development is capacity underutilisation. The rate of capacity underutilisation in the manufacturing sector is unusually high in Africa. For example, a study of seven African economies shows that capacity underutilisation rate in some of these economies was as high as 55–60%. In Sudan, in some sectors, over 90% of installed capacity remained idle for some years. Production of sugar and leather seems to be the only active activity where the use of capacity utilisation was 60% or more. A 2003 survey by the WB showed that capacity underutilisation was prevalent in about 85% of all factories on the largest industrial estate in Khartoum-North (Dagdeviren and Mahran 2010: 501). Bigsten and Soderbom (2011: 162–163) underscore that lack of skills has sometimes been highlighted as a key problem for Africa. Although the level of education in Africa has increased, the effects in terms of employment and growth have been a disappointment. For African economies, the bulk of new techniques still come from abroad (Bigsten and Soderbom 2011: 162–163). Dagdeviren and Mahran (2010: 508) suggest that improving the skills of the labour force would have considerable positive impact on labour productivity in the continent. There is therefore a need to maximise the production of artisans in the SADC region to cope with the demand of uninterrupted optimal regional industrial development.

In the main, there are good reasons to think seriously about industrial policy to turn regional integration and industrial development around through not only a competitive cutting edge in the global market space but also good governance and transformative development states in place. Bigsten and Soderbom (2011: 169) are of the view that with good governance in place, there should be considerable scope for effective interventions. African countries that can put in place competent and non-corrupt governments like in Botswana will have a good chance of achieving an economic take-off in manufacturing when the costs of labour increase amongst its Asian competitors. In the end, it boils down to a question of whether African political systems can deliver such competent and non-corrupt clean governments (Bigsten and Soderbom 2011: 169).

Political instability is also a consequence to industrial development. It is important to emphasise the disastrous consequences of the civil war, especially in Libya (resulted in the brutal death of Muammar Gadhafi in October 2011) and South Sudan. For example, in South Sudan, discord and hostilities between the people of African descent in the South and Arabs in the North have prevailed before and post-independence for many years, with the exception of a peaceful period during 1972–1983. Civil war has torn apart the manufacturing landscape and led to complete disappearance of manufacturing activities in the South. The Sudanese government had very limited incentives to invest in civilian infrastructure in the South, for it could benefit the rival factions or could be destroyed (Dagdeviren and Mahran 2010: 503).

The South African experience suggests that industrialisation that takes place behind protective barriers can be more robust than conventional economists admit. Industrialisation in South Africa was generated by a symbiotic relationship amongst the state, state corporations and the mining sector with the creation of huge state-owned corporations, protection of domestic industries and provision of guaranteed local market for new industries. Industries also benefited from a ready pool of funds from mining. Despite the ills of apartheid in South Africa, economic growth was phenomenal and the country remained the most industrialised in the region. However, post-1970s straddling through post-apartheid 1994 epoch, the South African economy along with the manufacturing sector has stagnated for a number of complex reasons. Whilst South Africa like many countries in the SADC region is well endowed with natural resources, in most African countries, the profits generated by primary product exports were not reinvested domestically. Instead, profits were unusually repatriated by foreign firms or seized by domestic capitalist elites; hence, the gap between the rich and the poor widened (Schneider 2000: 413–414).

As was the case in South Korea, South Africa undertook the first stage of industrial development behind a regime of import substitution, generating capital flows, by guaranteeing entrepreneurs a share of the local market. In a world dominated by multinational corporations, South Africa's method of attracting capital may be the best solution for developing economies with a substantial local market. However, South Africa's experiences also demonstrate the problems that occur when a state becomes captured by narrow special interests and when the benefits of economic development are not shared with labourers (Schneider 2000: 413–420). The 2012 Marikana massacre in South Africa is a case in point where a total of 44 labourers were killed by police shootings as a result of wildcat strike of miners demanding two-digit wage increases at Lonmin mine in the Marikana area close to Rustenburg. Similarly, the 2016 illegal mining activities which resulted in the death of miners trapped in Langlaagte shaft in Johannesburg, South Africa, are also a cause for concern.

Also of great importance here is the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) which is nonreciprocal preferential trade arrangement between the USA and sub-Saharan Africa. Whilst the act facilitates increased sub-Saharan Africa exports to the USA, it brought industrial problems to South Africa in the sense that the USA bullied South Africa to accept US chicken imports against their own

antidumping duties aimed to protect South Africa's public interest—especially against job losses and long-term health hazards.[3]

Hitherto, it becomes apparent that for development to thrive in the continent, industrial interventions are needed in countries exposed to the IMF and WB neoliberal influence and foreign debt traps. Given the extent of global competition, SADC should wake up from her slumber by expanding their industrial market to compete at length with the Asian tigers especially in the manufacturing and agricultural sectors to completely and unashamedly cut down on exports of raw material which have biting comebacks of expensive imported finished products. Maintaining these trade flows and balance of payment, there is a need to advocate liberal exchange control regime like in Botswana, but one need to be cautious of liberalisation as it is equally consequential to harm the regional economies. Neoliberal or mixed approaches to maintain a healthy balance of payment to enable the economies to flourish under clear industrial policy interventions are therefore critical.

To this end, another case in point is that majority of 54 African states have weak economies relying primarily on small margin of industries including poor infrastructure affecting intra-African trade. This includes visa requirements which do not facilitate easy travelling across the continent. Regional conflicts and political instability in many of the countries were also a serious threat to integration (AU 2063 2015: 19).

5 Migration and Development

Movements of labour are not a new phenomenon in Africa. For generations, people have migrated in response to demographic, economic, political and other push factors, such as population pressure, environmental disasters, poverty and conflicts. Despite their importance, little is known about these migrations. The information provided by census data, immigration and emigration statistics and surveys of both inter and intra-continental African migrants is unreliable. Considering the mobile nature of migrants, it is often difficult to conduct reliable and accurate quantitative

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[3]South Africa Poultry Association (SAPA) CEO Kevin Lovell believes that . . . even with the ad valorem duty of 37%, the US product will still undercut the domestic market. This is because bone-in chicken portions are not eaten in the US and are not essential for the profitability of the country's chicken producers, who can export them at very low prices. He estimates that the US has to dispose of about 3,4Mt. Lovel stresses that the concession to the US producers was made to ensure that South Africa is included in AGOA but feels it will harm the local industry by more than R800m a year and cause job losses. He says the US industry has "bullied" South Africa into reaching a deal, threatening to exclude it from AGOA if it failed to provide greater access for its chicken, beef and pork. It is for this reason that a vocal group of US senators representing chicken-producing states objected to South Africa's inclusion in AGOA if it continued to impose antidumping duties on their products—allowable tonnage of US bone-in chicken. http://www.financialmail.co.za/features/2015/04/23/agoa-the-chicken-comes-first (accessed on 31 March 2016).

studies. Also for political reasons, sometimes governments and institutions which represent migrant interests groups like refugees can choose to inflate the numbers when lobbying for financial support. Migration from and to African countries is widespread (de Vryer et al. 2013: 301, 303).

The question of neoliberal regional integration, socioeconomic transformations, poverty and inequality, as well as the political turmoil in countries of the sub-Saharan region have resulted in growth of migration to South Africa. The post-apartheid regime has made full use of the ancient regime's authoritarian legal migration instruments, while migrant workers from neighbouring countries, many undocumented, are harshly exploited by employers and treated with suspicion and repression by the police and immigration authorities (Trimikliniotis et al. 2008: 1323).

de Haas (2007: 820–821, 826, 827) writes that immigration of people in the continent from developing countries is increasingly perceived as a problem in need of control. It is seen as a threat to economic growth, social cohesion, cultural coherence and the welfare state. At face value, such prepositions appear to make more sense than policies that rely exclusively on repression. Yet the belief that policies focusing on development aid, trade and temporary migration will reduce permanent migration is more problematic and practically impossible than it might appear. It implies that migration is undesirable—the antithesis of development—and is therefore a problem that needs to be 'solved', yet in contrary, migration has been a universal feature of humanity and social capital. Migration according to UNCSD (2012: 1) is unavoidable global phenomenon which has both negative and positive repercussions.

An attempt more than a decade ago made by the then Prime Minister Rasmussen of Denmark to use the threat of immigration as an argument to increase foreign aid by stating that 'if you don't help the third world then you will have these poor people in our society' is unfortunate. This notion of superimposing aid to stop migration is unfounded—'neither here or there' for obvious reasons. The foreign aid approach never worked to scale down or eradicate migration. In Central America, for instance, it has been estimated that aid would have to amount to almost US$100 per person per year for a period of 20–30 years in order to eliminate economic incentives to emigrate. Whilst the majority of immigrants do not originate from the poorest communities and countries, in general, there is a lack of any credible coherence between aid and migration policies. Also, development assistance was often used for wrong political reasons, used as instrument leading to 'aid' in the form of weapons and other types of support to autocratic regimes, including those with a record for disregarding human rights. This has caused unintended consequences of increased insecurity, provoked armed conflict and refugee problems (de Haas 2007: 828).

In recognition of the importance of mobility, the director general at IOM William Swing remarked that 'Migration is the mega-trend of the twenty-first century'. This comes not only in the wake of growing global figures of migrants but the realisation that they are more culturally and ethnically diverse than ever before, and more women are migrating today either on their own as heads of

households. In recent years, international and internal migration has increasingly been recognised as a positive formidable force for development, as migrants deposit knowledge and skills to both receiving and origin locations, channel investments and remittances and foster economic linkages and business opportunities between countries and regions. When carefully managed, migration can stimulate economic growth and innovation in destination locations and poverty reduction in origin locations (UNCSD 2012).

Migration is not just an unwanted by-product but an integral part of broader processes of social and economic change and should therefore be embraced as an almost inevitable outgrowth of nations' incorporation into the global economy. Therefore, migration and development are functionally and reciprocally interlaced. Hence, migration and development are important in their own right because in the process of migration, development improves people's well-being and freedom. As such, advocates of stay-at-home development mentality seem to be right for the wrong reasons. At a more fundamental level, South–North migration is an outflow of the progressive incorporation of societies in wider, often global, economic, political and social outfit, as well as increases in wealth, access and exposure to education which increase both the capabilities and aspirations to migrate. In its turn, migration tends to reinforce the very processes of global integration and social cohesion. So, migration is both cause and effect of broader development processes with which it is intertwined. Assuming continued globalisation and global economic integration, there is little cause to expect a general decrease in mobility and migration. Migration will, in all likelihood, remain an intrinsic feature of our world (de Haas 2007: 832, 838).

Hence, instead of condemning migration for wrong reasons, there is a need to strike a balance between migration and development within the global space that is aspiring for global and local (glocal) economic integration. UNCSD (2012: 5) argues that if managed with forward-looking policies and mitigation strategies, both international and internal migration can contribute significantly to sustainable development—it can build social and political networks to address skills shortages and provide sources of capital, investment and transfer of knowledge.

According to IOM, two-thirds of Africans living overseas are from North Africa and a minority of the balance from West Africa. Today, about two million Egyptians live in the oil-producing Arab countries such as Libya and Saudi Arabia. Between 2000 and 2009, over 81,000 Egyptian immigrants obtained permanent residence in the USA. Historically, in Africa, educational options were often limited and restrictive for aspiring individuals. This is the reason that people migrated and explored opportunities further afield, mainly overseas, some returned and others stayed permanently. One reason given is that advanced technologies overseas made the quality of education better. Some do so because they are looking for advanced and professional skills overseas with the hope of ploughing those skills back home (Ncube 2016: 126, 129).

Africans living abroad constitute another potential source of skills transfer. The global integration of the production process puts greater demands on intense communications and interaction between firms in the production network. Modern

management and a good understanding of global business are therefore important. Returning entrepreneurs, who have received education as well as entrepreneurial experience abroad, possess such capabilities to plough them in the home continent. Their access to a network of long-distance potential collaborators is also an advantage to strengthen continental development and growth (Bigsten and Soderbom 2011: 166).

One could now see migration from a different lens than what is perceived by an average person. For example, income-earning activity by non-South Africans in South Africa is often portrayed by an average person as xenophobic and a drain on the economy. However, the information gathered from cross-border traders indicates that most of the migrants' profits are recycled into the South African formal retail and manufacturing sectors. Whilst profits from street (informal) trading in South Africa are invested in goods which are exported and sold in the migrants' home countries and spent there on education and family support, such profits are also reinvested in South Africa on the return of the migrant trader to South Africa (Peberdy 2000: 211). There is a Return On Investment (ROI) value chain on both sides of the spectrum in the whole migrants' trading activities which must be appreciated as it serves as stimulus package for the economy in the sending and receiving countries and such migration activities taking place in the region should be invigorated than banned.

A case in point are the July 2016 protests that erupted at the Zimbabwe–South Africa border post after the announcement of a ban on imports as part of the Zimbabwean government's efforts to protect its local industries from cheap imports (The Zimbabwe Standard 2016). This policy called Statutory Instrument 64 of 2016 requires a list of consumer goods which have been restricted and special import licences ranging from camphor creams to building materials. As the ban would cripple retail business in Musina and resultantly transport businesses which facilitate movement of goods across the border, protests broke out in Musina and Beit bridge towns astride the border calling for the halting of the ban on the 1st of July 2016. Whereas smuggling has been the usual response to import restrictions, traders resorted to protest and even torched a warehouse belonging to the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA). It is understood by the protestors that the ban negatively affected their business activities in Musina, South Africa. The Statutory 64 of 2016 restriction is but one proof that SADC lacks effective migration policies to strengthen regional integration to emerge a free flow of human capital and goods and services across and within the region.

An earlier study by Schmidtke et al. (2006: 3)[4] came to a conclusion that immigrants to Canada were facing a couple of challenges; top amongst them include insufficient access to qualified jobs, growing gap in income levels between

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[4]Schmidtke, O., Kovacev, M., & Marry, B. (2006). *Policy memo: Canada's immigration and integration policies: A multi-national evaluation of labour market integration of skilled immigrants*. Policy workshop: Social policy and labour market integration in Canada and the EU. Ottawa: Carleton University European Studies Centre.

immigrants and Canadian-born population and immigrant-specific poverty in urban areas. One of the reasons for such unfortunate outcomes for skilled immigrants is that countries admit immigrants without a job offer into their country (Sekyere et al. 2016: 13). There is a need for advocacy education in this area to avoid strained relationship between migrants and locals about job opportunities up for grabs which in South Africa perpetuated xenophobic attacks. The recent 2015 attacks of migrants doing small-scale business in South African townships are a case in point to be condemned in strong terms. This stereotypic, xenophobic and sectarian arrogance must stop. Peberdy (2000: 216–218) argues that if South African retailers are pushing northwards into Africa, virtually unhindered, then surely non-South African traders ought to be respected to enjoy reciprocal rights and privileges in South Africa. If not the case, why not? Why should South Africa's migrant labourers be the only ones to benefit from the retail markets in the region and the rest of Africa? Why too, should South Africa expect it all to be one-way traffic?

On one hand, from human capital point of view, one should appreciate that migration impacts on development both ways—whether it is emigrants leaving a country or immigrants entering that same country. There is reciprocal impact on the development of both home and host countries. There is increasing recognition that skilled emigrants can be considered a potential asset to their home countries, able to act as agents of development and to strengthen cooperation between their home countries and host countries (Sekyere et al. 2016: 12). On the other hand, from economic perspective, in 2005, about US$167 billion in remittances to developing countries were sent to emigrant countries through formal channels. Total remittances, including those sent through informal means, were estimated at over US$250 billion. For many developing countries, the amounts received through the diaspora and migrant remittances are greater than both FDI and Official Development Assistance (ODA). However, the bulk of remittances is spent on consumption rather than direct capital and income-generating activities, and this needs to be reversed (Ndiaye et al. 2011: 242).

Consequently, countries who seek to benefit from highly skilled migrants ensure that their policies are targeted at maximising this developmental impact of migration while minimising the negative effects. Investor-friendly policies are required to facilitate easy start-up of businesses to enhance tax revenue and employment generation opportunities. As such, African continent ought to follow Beterlsmann Stiftung's virtuous talent triangle model which pays attention to ensuring reciprocal gains accrual to all the affected parties, migrants themselves and their countries of origin as well as host countries alike (i.e. migrants, emigration and immigration countries) (Sekyere et al. 2016: 12).

To this end, the dominant view of the relationship between migration and development has changed significantly over the past three decades in the African continent. Prior to the 1990s, the view was that migration had overall negative effects on migrants' communities of origin. However, in the 1990s, the view was that the effects of migration were large and positive and already paying dividends. Currently, the consensus among researchers is that the cumulative net effects of migration on development are not invariably positive or negative but, rather, are

contingent on a set of factors that vary over time and across locales. One therefore finds it difficult to arrive to a conclusion that migration leads to more development as to do so is also to ignore the accumulated evidence pointing to the differentiated nature of the spatial, temporal, social and sector-specific impact of migration. Migration impacts are therefore highly context sensitive and therefore draw mixed reactions (Galetto 2011: 283).

Finally, the recent launch of the AU passport[5] aimed at facilitating the free movement of people on the continent is a product of Agenda 2063 action plan to maximise industrialisation and trade opportunities in the continent. Freedom of movement has been a long-standing priority among member states, as enshrined in previous Abuja 1991 agreement. Passports have already been adopted for several regions, such as the ECOWAS, but this AU new passport to be distributed in 2020 grants visa-free access to all 54 member states. Despite risks of individual states losing visa revenue generation, there are value propositions for visa-free access, especially industrial development, trade and migration opportunities.

6   Conclusion

From the start and end of discussion on disaggregating development between trade, industrialisation and migration, the discussion is underpinned by regional integration theory against poverty and inequalities in the SADC region as a result of dualism and enclavism syndrome. The criticality of the narratives points to the direction that regional integration project despite all odds is possible to pursue it to its successful completion over a longer term. It is probable if built on successful instalments of regional groupings which at the end could incrementally unleash complete regional integration. The liberation project should be foregrounded by free bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, neoliberal industrial policies and forward-looking free flow migration strategies to contribute cumulatively to economic recovery and inclusive sustainable development as a regional block and global player. In this way, stubborn realities of unemployment, poverty and inequality caused by economic dualism and enclavities not only in the SADC region but also in the continent will dissipate and thereby give way to total emancipation of the African people in the growing competitive global world. The AU Agenda 2063 action plan is not far-fetched to enhance the continent on industry, trade and migration front.

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[5]http://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/05/africa/african-union-passport/index.html

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Regeneration and Integration in Southern Africa: Concluding Comments on Contemporary Challenges and Possibilities

Nene Ernest Khalema, Hangwelani Hope Magidimisha, and Lovemore Chipungu

1   Introduction

This book is written against the backdrop of what others have dubbed the world's worst humanitarian disaster enveloping most of the world including Europe, the Middle East and North Africa since the 1940s. The current crisis facing the migrants globally has shed new light on the plight of what African migrants have experienced for decades where millions of desperate people flee poverty, oppression and unprecedented violence, giving up their livelihoods, abandoning indigenous lands and searching for peace, security and international protection. For the region of Southern Africa, migration remains a historical and contemporary rule rather than the exception of human behaviour. As illustrated throughout the book, prior to the demise of colonialism and since the emergence of new independent states of the southern tip of the African continent, inter/intra-migration manifested in many arrangements and forms. What is clear is that an overwhelming number of people have historically migrated and continue to migrate across borders in search of better economic opportunities, social security and safety.

In Southern Africa, migration is as old as humanity itself; therefore, the phenomenon has been an intrinsic component of the developmental process of Southern Africa, importantly marked by a history of labour migration in the region since the nineteenth century. As noted in the second contribution, the pre-colonial era witnessed a scattering and exodus of iron-smelting Bantu migrants across the interior to the south resulting in increased food production and new crop cultivation (Benedetta 2013). The introduction of new technologies (i.e. iron tools) allowed for a shift from hunting and gathering to agricultural cultivation throughout areas of the

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Bantu expansion. Coupled with this, Bantu migrations led to widespread cultural diffusion in terms of language use, new forms of centralised governance, building of settlements, increased trade and subsequent creation of nation-states where chiefdoms and kingships ruled densely populated populations with specialised divisions of labour, increased military power, resulting in increased conflict, re-migrations as a result of war and conflict (i.e. lifacane/mfecane), cultural diffusion and ethnic/linguistic pluralism.

Equally, as several contributions cautioned, the colonial situation propelled a dilemma of identity, belonging and (dis)placement for indigenous peoples whose lands and territories were seized violently through genocide. Colonial states[1] entrenched particular identities, which functioned to dispossess, and dominate. These states further cemented politicised citizenship as an important civilising tool for further dominance and as Mamdani (1996) posited this entrenched the dichotomy of 'citizen vs. subject', which functioned to retain colonial rule. Thus, the political construction of identity and citizenship within the colonial situations deliberately kept the indigenous communities suspicious of each other and much divided. Perhaps the sharpest expression of this was the apartheid state's promotion, nurturing and sponsoring of 'Bantustan' ethno-nationalism including the use, revival and in some cases imposition of 'traditional authorities' to administer 'customary laws' (see Footnote 1).

Migration, specifically labour migration, was seen as important contributor to colonial economic prosperity. The then resourced enclaves of Rhodesia, the Union of South Africa and others particularly benefited from the region reservoir of cheap labour. The flows of social, human capital, economic and technological advancement were seen as solutions to advance the colonial project without providing citizenship to those labour reservoirs. As critical scholar Samir Amin asserts that colonial labour migration has generally been bad for Africans, detrimental to their livelihood and ultimately incubated and reinforced the dependency of Africans on their colonial masters.

The post-independent era on the other side ushered in a new and optimistic dialogue about regeneration and renewal amidst social, economic and political challenges inherited as a result of colonialism. The opening in the post-independent era served as a symbolic turning point in the region, symbolised by a mass exodus of people within and across the region seeking better opportunities. This newfound optimism boosted an active affirmation of an African identity that drove the agenda of social, cultural and economic emancipation. The agency of liberation movements in South Africa, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe responded to pressing issues of regional unity for the newly found states. Thus, in attempting to liberate the masses from colonial impositions and using variegated theorisation, thought and political practice, a range of slogans extending from 'black

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[1]In fact according to Mamdani (1996; 219), colonial states authorised their rule through direct and indirect rule and an organising logic for citizenship was characterised by both the incorporation of 'native authorities' and/or settler colonial governments in most African states. This characterised migrants who are deemed non-citizens as 'free peasants' in an urban industrial settings without fully incorporating them into the political, social, and economic fabric of colonial states.

consciousness' through 'pan-Africanism' to 'Nationalism' and 'multiracialism' emerged. Having said that the pendulum swinging towards greater integration did not last long as new realities of post-independent governance surfaced. A dilemma the region still grapples with today.

These concluding remarks in the last contribution move beyond descriptive and policy analyses delved deeply in previous chapters by offering an *imagining* framework that re-inspires and re-imagines regional citizenship and integration moving forward. After what appears to be an accorded effort towards more policy integration and new regional citizenry, the Southern African region is far from being integrated, especially around the migration issue. In policy circles, for example, greater efforts to integrate migration policies have been proposed to harmonise various policy directives with the aim of uniformity in migration management. In addition to adherence to global and continental directives such as the *Global Commission on International Migration, the Global Forum on Migration and Development, the International Labour Migration and Development*, *the Ministerial Consultation on Overseas Employment and Contractual Labour for Countries of Origin and Destination in Asia (the Colombo Process)*, *the UN High Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development*, the Alto Diálogo Iberoamericano sobre Migraciones, la Conferencia Regional sobre Migración (the Puebla Process), *Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime* and the *Migration Dialogue for West Africa* (just to name a few), Southern African Development Community (SADC) proposed regional mechanisms to share the load in addressing migration-related challenges as a collective.

A case in point is the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA) whose mandate is to promote regional interstate dialogue and migration policy harmonisation and raising the national and regional profile of migration as a development issue. In addition to MIDSA, regional initiatives such as the SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan, the NEPAD process, the development of the Partnership on HIV/AIDS and Mobile Populations in Southern Africa (PHAMSA) and the International Organisation on Migration's Return and Reintegration of Qualified African Nationals (RQAN) as well as the Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) programmes all aim to tackle the root causes of migration in the region, taking cognizance of the extraordinary dynamism of migration forms and patterns in the region. These various initiatives have sought to improve regional cooperation migration management by 'sharing the burden' of addressing gaps in services for migrants. Others have sought to reverse the brain drain phenomenon by offering incentives for diaspora citizens to return home through job-matching programmes, and others have initiated a SADC parliamentary process and dialogue to adopt a regional legislative framework to address labour migration, good governance and human rights and xenophobic violence across the region. These policy infrastructures provide possibilities for continued regional regeneration to move the region towards integration and inclusive citizenship.

Despite all these global, continental and regional initiatives, the point remains that the region does not have a coordinated regional response to the challenge of

migration flows be it internal/external refugee movements, labour migration and so forth. Migration management remains subject to restrictive legislative frameworks, which have been influenced by the global post-911 anti-terrorism security regimens, where national security and the protection of homeland take priority. Mobility of citizens between countries in the region for example remains constrained by severely restrictive policies. Apart from regulations aimed at illicit end uses, restriction in the movement of labour negatively influences the channels or uses of financial flows associated with migration in the region. As we have seen argued throughout the book, the regulation of remittances and migrant investment has less obvious upside potential. Because remittances play a large role in connecting migrants with their places of origin and thus sustaining the lives of those who remained behind, regulating such schemes has often amounted to a distortion of returns on investment (Bracking and Sachikonye 2008).

The primarily restrictionist nature of the policies, therefore, ignores labour market needs and family ties and imposes a restrictive tone that is in dire contract to the highly flavoured neoliberal notion of capital flow, trade and free movement of goods and services. As such, an enhanced regional integration would suggest the need for greater mobility in the factors of production (including labour), but nationalist sentiments in policies restrict such innovative methods of pursuing economic livelihood across borders. The fundamental policy challenge, therefore, is for the region to harmonise policies that emphasise regional citizenship and good governance.

2   Regeneration and Integration: A Challenge

- Several contributions in this book have highlighted how migration flows vary between and within countries in the region. Several examples where movements occur between periphery countries within the region (i.e. Zimbabwe to Botswana, Angola to Mozambique, Malawi to Zambia) provide an opportunity to further explore possibilities for regional regeneration and integration that is region focused rather than South Africa focused. It is against this background that there is a growing recognition that migration can be a factor in the promotion of regional harmonisation and international development, despite some notable challenges. Probing first into the historical development of capital and resource allocation in Southern Africa, the book gave a lamp post from which light is shed on the issues of migration patterns: how and why migration is unfolding in a manner it is unfolding in Southern Africa. The unequal distribution of resources in the region which was induced by the capitalistic nature of colonial economy and recently perpetuated by poor governance is one amongst the factors behind migration of people from area of dissatisfaction or less resources area to resource-plenty area in the region. The capitalist economy in the region was and is still not a solution to the problem of unequal allocation of resources but lies at the root of it. When people migrate, they are most likely to face resources shortage (natural or constructed); increasing competition

potentially leads to processes of exclusion, conflict and the undermining of development in the migrants' destination countries. Imbalances in the resources allocation and capital accumulation in the region therefore construe disaster.

Earlier contributions trace the historiography of migration in Southern Africa highlighting shifting trends of migration and how knowledge has been produced and reproduced to cement a particular discourse in the region. Furthermore, theoretically oriented contributions that synthesise explorations of migration in Southern Africa discussing broader challenges in the migration discourse include transnationalism, post-national citizenship, xenophobia and feminisation of migration. Flashing back into the immediate history of migration in Southern Africa, the book reflects that traditionally labour migration dominated the movements of population in Southern Africa, and the flows were in majority made of unskilled or semiskilled male workers recruited mainly by the South African mines. Peripheral countries to South Africa such as Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Botswana and Malawi served as labour reserves for the mining industry. This was facilitated by the colonial capitalism, with its uneven development, through the establishment of economic nodes acting as the key locus of capital accumulation in South Africa and Zimbabwe.

Subsequent contributions of the book point to the challenges experienced by countries that receive major influxes of asylum seekers, refugees and economic/labour migrants. Additionally, chapters reflect on the complexities of citizenship, identity and belonging and unpacks policy possibilities for migrant-sending states such as Mozambique, Malawi, Lesotho and Swaziland as well as migrant-receiving states (South Africa, Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana and Namibia). The chapters point to complexities in restructuring and rethinking of traditional contract labour systems (be it male labour migration to the mines of South Africa and Zambia, or commercial farms and/or plantation economies of South Africa, Zimbabwe and Swaziland) and how such systems can be reconceptualised particularly in the era of globalisation. The contributions in the book further point to challenges presented by migration such as skills shortages due to brain drain, economic advantage for those who receive remittances, increased inequalities between countries, exploitation of migrant workers in host countries, xenophobia and violence, human trafficking and the separation of families as a result of migration.

Equally important challenges include the impact of globalization as manifested in increased labour mobility of young people and women as sources of labour for sustaining regional economies. In the colonial period, young people and women were generally prohibited from migrating, as men took the centre stage and dominated internal and cross-border migration. Today women, men and young people are differently involved in and affected by migration. Women migrants, particularly young women, are particularly vulnerable to sexual exploitation and human trafficking and are mostly likely exposed to sexual violence than their male counterparts. Such experiences often expose them to trauma, exploitation, making integration difficult and intolerable in host countries. Thus, the experiences of violence, due to their irregular status, often leave them afraid to seek help, integrate and report abuse when rights are violated. Thus, understanding these complex

dynamics in the regional socio-economic context is key to devising policy solutions that addressed this complexity in the region.

The complexity of cross-border mobility in terms of expansion in undocumented migration and human trafficking resettlement and reintegration of migrants, feminisation of cross-border migration, intra-regional, informal and cross-border trade and rapid urbanisation and reconfiguration of rural-urban has been an important issue to discuss. Placing the political economy at the centre of analysis because the processes, modes and patterns of accumulation inherited by the post-liberation state characterised by uneven development of the Wallensteinian core/periphery dichotomy and what Mhone (1997) would call 'enclavity' (see Footnote 1) was a good tool to unpack the complexity of migration. Authors of the Mozambique chapter argued that the nature of capitalist penetration in Southern Africa created what was called the 'Africa of labour reserves' (Amin 1972: 504) whereby countries such as Mozambique became reservoirs that produced spatially disaggregated accumulation patterns (see Footnote 1). This has led others like Bond (2006) to argue that Africa is being 'looted' (see Footnote 1). The march of South African capital has since intensified in the post-apartheid period; Bond and Kapuya (2007) even argued that South Africa was establishing some 'sub-imperial role'; Castles and Delgato (2008) observed the same. Gigaba (2015) observed that South Africa 'needs Africa', a view shared by Sexwale (2015) (see Footnote 1).

Contemporarily, due to a plethora of reinforced and/or changing development aspects and trends in the region, South Africa has become the major and seemly the sole locus of capital accumulation in Southern Africa, explained by the direction of migration flows in the region—all roads lead to South Africa. South Africa's relatively industrialised economy makes it difficult for its neighbours to isolate themselves from her economy. This is due to the fact that most of them are less developed than South Africa; therefore, people see it as an attractive migration destination.

Whilst the SADC primarily focuses on the politically oriented issue of liberation of Southern Africa, SADC on the other hand was established primarily as an economic organisation. Though SADC on its inception was established to reduce dependence on South Africa, paradoxically the states became perpetually dependent on South Africa. As stated above, to date the Republic of South Africa is often looked upon as a nation dominating its neighbours in trade and investment relations. The examination of development trajectories of the relations between South Africa and other regional member states shows the possibility of extreme and growing dominance to a point where it becomes almost impossible to talk of development and migration in the region without mentioning South Africa.

Migration had become an important component of regional development. Immigration has stimulated local skills development and ultimate transmission of experience which can be integrated in a globalised economy. Several research studies have revealed that there can be an imperative exchange of money, knowledge and ideas between receiving and home countries through migrants. For example, as maintained throughout the book the influx of migrants from countries within and beyond the region has significantly improved 'core' economies (i.e. South Africa)

where economic activities in the mining and agricultural sectors had a reservoir supply of both skilled and unskilled labour. Furthermore, migrant entrepreneurs in these receiving countries further played a bigger part of harnessing remittances within the region to further ignite economic activities in their countries of origin to support industries and families in the diaspora. Thus, whilst migration in Southern Africa is generally good for economic vitality, several contributions in the book cautioned of challenges in making migration work to benefit all countries, particularly those who are struggling economically as well in integrating the immigrants and combating xenophobia, crime, job competition between migrant and native workers as well as the fiscal costs associated with provision of social services to the migrants.

Challenges in destination countries can also help to understand the difficulties which migration faces in the process of migrating or in destination countries. The book clearly indicated that, as migration intensifies in the Southern African region, migrants are not immune to the difficulties of migration. Immigrants usually experience greater difficulties than other groups in accessing services and hence in exercising their rights, because of cultural problems and discriminatory policies and practices in host countries (Crush 2000; Neocosmos 2010; Crush and Williams 2002). Migrants and refugees who are not considered citizens with full rights may be denied access; they are often scapegoats, face xenophobic reactions by the local population and may be expelled when economic and political conditions deteriorate. In these circumstances, the situation of a migrant women can be more traumatic than any other groups in the communities.

3 Concluding Comments

As the global community grapples with a new boiling point how to respond to the current global migration crisis, the Southern African region migration has reached more than any other historical epoch; several observations have been illustrated in this book. First, the book states that we have seen a change into new dynamics of migration into what Yinger (2006) would like to call 'feminisation of migration' (see Footnote 1). Either by default or design, Southern Africa is a region on the move, with an increasing number of regular and irregular migrants women moving within and to or from outside the SADC region in search of greener pastures, in both formal and informal sectors. Thus, although Southern Africa's long history of cross-border migration has been decorated by dominance of male migrant labour to the South African mining industry, women have also engaged in movement across the region's borders for purposes of seeking work and most importantly they are increasingly migrating as independent migrants in their own rights and not merely as dependents or trailing spouses.

The migration discourse has been gender indifferent for far too long and thus in breaking this mould, the current volume bridged a gap in foregrounding gender dimensions in the patterns of the migration and how particular gender norms are

maintained in the social, political and cultural spheres. The feminisation of migration thesis unpacked in several chapters stressed the peculiar and gendered ways in which women become susceptible to violence, discrimination, exploitation and marginalisation in the region. Thus, whilst the overall feminisation of migration in Southern Africa intensifies, the vulnerability of migrant women is also likely to increase. Women find themselves in situations where their security cannot be ensured and where they may be subject to domestic, family, cultural, structural and sexual violence. As illustrated in several chapters, some women particularly in the informal sector and due to non-lucrativeness of the market sought it necessary or are forced to engage in transactional sex work, drug trafficking and commercial sex work as a way to supplement their income. This and other survival activities put them in desperate situations and at higher health risks.

This brings forward the second observation: informality, circularity and irregularity in the manifestation of migration in the region. The movement of people within counties (i.e. from rural to urban areas or internal migration) has also increased. As people respond to inequitable distributions of resources, services and opportunities within countries or as they flee economic decline in rural areas, they seek better opportunities in the urban centres, thus opening corridors for further movements within the region. Rapid urbanisation is largely a function of rural poverty where environmental conditions such as drought and flooding displace rural communities. The displacement of poverty then leads to rural–urban migration as people seek better opportunities in cities and towns. Research by Makiwane and Khalema (2015) on the rural–urban migration of citizens in the province of the Eastern Cape indicates that new forms of rural–urban reciprocity are created, thus guaranteeing circulatory migration where capital flow of remittances sustains both rural dwellers and urban migrants. Thus, remittances feed, clothed, educated children in the rural areas and generally improved their living standards.

Additionally as illustrated in several chapters in the book, the gender dynamics of migration indicate both informality and formality where men and women play diverse roles. For example, historically women dominated the informal economy (i.e. manufacturing and the retail trade) highlighting irregularity of migrant labour as compared to men (Magidimisha and Gordon 2015). Generally, the majority of migrants in the informal sector are female in the region, relatively young and single. Although most migrant traders are informal, they are not necessarily illegal or irregular. Domestic work has become a major employment absorber for migrant women. However, this group represents a vulnerable group because they often work in social isolation, have low levels of education and are exposed to poor working conditions, which include lack of privacy and low wages.

The third observation relates to the need for integrated migration policies and directives in the region. As motioned earlier in chapter, the intensification of migration had impacted and overwhelmed existing national policies and systems, not only those related to migration and development but also in other policy domains such as human security, public safety and public health. Although a need for better policy frameworks is necessary, integration of asylum seekers and refugees fleeing war and political unrest must be nurtured at the same time as

recognising the security aspects to migration flows. Thus, there is a critical need to prevent the over-securitisation of discourse and policy-making related to migration, particularly following xenophobic attacks against migrants in host countries such as South Africa. Some political forces are using such events to position migration as a purely national security issue, rather than a human security issue related to providing assistance to conflict-affected populations. The risk of securitising migration is that it can lead to the legitimisation of extraordinary responses mimicking responses of what is on the continental level.

At the continental level, the developmental agenda articulated by the AU (i.e. NEPAD) is emblematic when it comes to migration. Freer movement of people across the continent is cited as a key long-term objective of the AU, yet nothing is said about what this free movement means in terms of citizenship, human security, good governance and democratisation. With regard to national immigration policies adopted by countries in the continent, they vary from country to country focusing mostly on legalistic enforcement of cross-border control and citizen exclusion. Thus, across the continent and the region, policy directives and legislation mimic colonial-era policies of exclusionary citizenship (with the possible exception of Botswana) and regional integration through migration does not even enter the conversation.

In the face of these challenges, effective policies are needed to ensure good governance, rule of law, access to justice, protection of human rights and the elimination of conflict and violence. This will reduce tension between countries especially when there is a perceived notion that the nationals of another country are being mistreated in another country of refuge within the same region. Regional harmonisation comes when there is a common understanding on how certain categories of migrants should be treated. This can only be feasible through drafting of integrated regional migration policies which speaks to historically silenced but urgent issues related to xenophobia, economic and social integration, human rights, social solidarity and regional regeneration impacting the region.

Thus, policies dealing with the scourge of xenophobia and Afrophobia, brain gain, feminisation of migration, family reunification, trade and addressing the plight of refugees are necessary to address the diversity of issues posed by migration in the region. For example, most people seek better education and health care, a living and fair wage, employment, access to land and shelter (housing) that should be available to everyone without having to migrate. Thus, migration policies must also be aligned with labour market needs, so that skills match job opportunities at home. This will not only address the core/periphery nexus where a few countries in the region (i.e. South Africa, Tanzania, Botswana) are inconvenienced with an influx of migrants due to their favourable economic and political conditions, but also this will address integration issues in host countries for regional regeneration.

To summarise, integrated policy responses that address the complexity of the local, national, regional and continental context will facilitate regional harmonisation and most importantly account for the extraordinary dynamism of migration forms and patterns in the region (see Footnote 1). Migration, therefore, does not only imply movement of people but, as Castles and Miller (2009: 41) suggest, also involves movement of capital, skills, identities and culture, something the region has known and experienced for centuries.

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Erratum to: Crisis, Identity and Migration in Post-Colonial Southern Africa

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There is a spelling error in the author name (Innocent Moyo). The name must spell "Inocent" instead of "Innocent" and it has been corrected in Table of Content, About Editors and Authors, Chapter 6, Chapter 10.

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