

CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN
POLITICAL ECONOMY

GLOBALIZATION AND SOCIO-CULTURAL PROCESSES IN CONTEMPORARY AFRICA

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EDITED BY
EUNICE N. SAHLE

Globalization and Socio-Cultural Processes in Contemporary Africa

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In loving memory of Dr. Ann R. Dunbar (1938–2010): for supporting the teaching of African literature and visual arts throughout your career.

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments ix

1 Introduction 1
Eunice N. Sahle

Part I Sociocultural Processes

2 Globalization, Cybersexuality Among Ghanaian Youth, and Moral Panic 11
Wisdom J. Tettey

3 "Marriage is the Solution": Born-Again Christianity, American Global Health Policy, and the Ugandan Effort to Prevent HIV/AIDS 39
Lydia Boyd

4 Globalization and New Christian Geographies in Africa: A Cautionary Optimism amidst Growing Afropessimism 69
Joseph Mensah

5 Contemporary Islamic Discourses in Senegal: Between the Local and the Global 93
Mamarame Seck

6 Language Policies in East Africa 121
Esther M. Lisanza

Part II Cultural Production

7 Globalization and African Cinema: Distribution and Reception in the Anglophone Region 149
Martin R. Mhando

8 African Cultural Producers and Border Thinking: Dennis Brutus, Micere Mugo, Ousmane Sembène, and Ngugi wa Thiong'o 169
Kari Dahlgren

9 Missionaries for Capital: Brand Marketers and Music Sponsorship in Uganda 199
David G. Pier

10 Soul to Soul: Hip Hop, Globalization, and Africa 229
PerryA .H all

List of Contributors 275

Index 279

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

EuniceN. Sahle

The main objective of this edited collection is to provide a deeper understanding of sociocultural processes in various parts of the African continent in the context of mediated processes of globalization. In this introductory chapter I focus on the book's contributions to such an understanding of these processes. Further, I offer an outline of the volume. In terms of the book's contributions to a deeper understanding of the sociocultural processes in various geographies of contemporary Africa, five of them stand out and, as such, I elaborate on them briefly. To begin with, all the contributors to the volume foreground the agency of Africans. For example, in her discussion of the evolution of language education policies in East Africa, Esther Lisanza shows the agency of states in this region in shaping this process. Such foregrounding of African agency is also evident in the chapter by Wisdom Tettey, which critically examines cybersexuality activities of Ghanaian youth in the context of the emergence of Internet services and the state's adoption of neoliberal economic policies.

In addition, Kari Dahlgren's chapter, which highlights the role of African cultural producers in generating "worlds and knowledges otherwise" in the context of the making of the "modern/colonial world system"[1] challenges the notion that Africans cannot represent themselves. In a very powerful way, her decolonial perspective challenges contemporary "hegemonic representational systems"[2] of the African continent that have the markings of Karl Marx's form of "epistemic violence"[3] embodied in his declaration, "They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented."[4] Such systems and forms of violence underpin projects and practices of the "colonial present,"[5] examples of which have been examined by Derek Gregory and other scholars.[6] Overall, the focus on local agency by the preceding authors and other contributors in this volume is a welcome departure from hegemonic studies of African geographies in an era in which the "Africa continent has become…the El Dorado of wild thought, the best place for daring intellectual safaris, the unregulated space in which to engage in theoretical incest, to violate the fundamentals of logic…with impunity and in good conscience."[7]

The book's second contribution is its demonstration of the mediated nature of globalizing processes. Lydia Boyd's chapter, for example, shows how urban born-again Christian youth in Uganda transform core ideas marking what Joseph Mensah (in this volume) calls "new Christian geographies" in contemporary Africa. For Boyd, "ideas about marital 'faithfulness,'" which are central to these new Christian geographies "are interpreted and repurposed by Ugandan Christian youth in ways that both reproduce and diverge from the Western ideals of companionate Christian marriage." Further, the mediated nature of sociocultural globalization processes underlies Perry Hall's examination of the ways in which hip hop has translated in Senegal and Tanzania. As he states:

> Despite the influence of the global (African American style), it is obvious that the cultural field into which hip hop is penetrating in any given instance is never a vacuum. Thus, the development of Senegalese hip hop, like that in other African countries, was mediated by the presence of local forms, which themselves often previously mediated with other forms in their formation. In Senegal, the most important local indigenous form was *mbalax,* a form that incorporated Cuban dance music with percussion from Senegalese *sabar* drumming and Wolof lyrics.[8]

Overall, in different but complementary ways, the authors in this volume incorporate a local-global lens in their exploration of the central concerns of their chapters. As such, their work provides a deeper understanding of sociocultural processes in contemporary Africa for it shows how local socio-actors and historical and contemporary conditions influence globalizing processes such as "global Salafism" as Mamarame Seck's chapter demonstrates in the case of Islamic discourses and movements in contemporary Senegal. Such an approach to sociocultural processes in the context of globalizing trends significantly shows the limitations of perspectives that tend to represent such trends as being one way forms of economic or cultural transfers that lead to sociocultural homogenization. The latter perspective (and its attendant conceptual weaknesses), which in contemporary discourses of cultural globalization is conceptualized as "McDonaldization," fits well "within the general framework of evolutionism, a single-track universal process of evolution through which all societies, some faster than others, are progressing."[9]

The empirical insights emerging from the chapters in this volume mark its third contribution to debates pertaining to sociocultural processes in various parts of the African continent in the midst of political, sociocultural and other forms of globalization. From Tettey's discussion of cybersexuality activities among Ghanaian youth to an examination of how global discourses of brand marketing in the beer industry have translated in Uganda by David Pier, the book contributes to place-based understanding of sociocultural processes in the context of historical and contemporary globalizing strategies and trends. Consequently, given the dominance of the previously mentioned "intellectual safaris" in studies concerning political, economic, and sociocultural processes in the African continent, the case study approach of the chapters presented in this volume provides rich empirical and nuanced insights that enrich our understanding of these processes.

Fourth, the book's focus on sociocultural processes fills an important gap in studies of globalization processes in contemporary Africa. As Mensah and Seck in this volume contend, most studies of globalization tend to focus on economic and political issues. The neglect of the sociocultural realm in globalization studies pertaining to the African continent has resulted in limited understanding of the complex developments and practices that have occurred historically and in the current era of multiple forms of globalization. Take for instance, the current phase in the globalization of world religions on the continent. One cannot understand contemporary political, sociocultural, and economic developments in various parts of the African continent without an engagement with this social reality. As Seck demonstrates in his chapter, to understand Islamic discourses and movements, and politics in contemporary Senegal, an exploration of what he conceptualizes as global Salafism is as important as an understanding of economic and political forms of globalization that have been taking root in the country; albeit all in mediated forms.

Fifth, the interdisciplinary nature of the chapters in the volume is another contribution that it makes to our understanding of sociocultural processes in contemporary Africa. The contributors are drawn from a range of fields, leading among them, Anthropology, Communication Studies, Development Studies, Education, Film, Geography, Linguistics, Music, and Political Science. Moreover, in their analyses, contributors not only draw insights from debates in their fields but also from others. Moreover, while the main thrust of the volume is interdisciplinary in nature, as clearly evidenced in the different starting points and concerns of the authors, the approach of the various contributors converge in crucial ways. For example and as mentioned earlier, all the contributors utilize a local and global lens and foreground African agency in their analysis. In addition, in overt and covert ways, questions of materiality that are central to the field of political economy inform the concerns of most of the chapters in the collection. To sum up here, the preceding introductory comments demonstrate the important contributions that the volume makes to debates concerning sociocultural processes in the context of a globalizing world. In what follows, I offer brief comments on the structure of the book.

Structure of the Book

The volume is divided into two parts with the first one focusing on sociocultural processes pertaining to sexuality, marriage, religion, and language. Tettey's chapter interrogates how economies of desire intertwine with desperate economic activities in Ghana in the age of neoliberal globalization. He argues that in this context, Ghanaian youth have turned into objects and seekers of desire in the spaces created by the Internet and sex tourism. Further, his chapter examines how these spaces are reproducing patterns of domination and inequality in the global system. Nonetheless, Tettey's analysis demonstrates the human agency of Ghanaian youth in this process and as such moves us away from what he terms "victimology narratives," for he shows the "creative subversion of the social order by the youth in these relationships, as they negotiate multiple and, sometimes, contradictory spaces."

Drawing on her growing body of work on the born-again Christianity movement in contemporary Uganda, Boyd's chapter examines the prominence of the "abstain and be faithful" message in Kampala. She argues that programs such as the 2003 President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), that was promoted by President George W. Bush, have influenced this development. However, she contends that a focus on PEPFAR funding offers only a partial explanation of this process for "Ugandans themselves are heavily involved in the development and support of abstinence programs—from the First Lady's office (which has a desk devoted to the issue) to community and church groups energized by what they perceive as international affirmation of their own 'moral' agenda." The chapter demonstrates that, "the abstinence movement is strongly supported by, and closely associated with, the born-again community in Kampala." In addition, it suggests that like in other parts of Africa and the global South, "born-again Christians form an increasingly influential constituency." Mensah's chapter makes an important contribution to the emerging literature on the interplay of globalizing cultural forces and practices and contemporary religious trends in Africa. With a focus on Christianity in the current era of globalization, he contends that "African religions do not only respond to the opportunities and challenges of globalization, but they also influence globalization proactively, through such processes as international migration and the transnational flow of remittance." Through his analysis of these trends he argues that "religion is poised to be a constructive conduit for the incorporation of Africa(ns) into contemporary globalization and thus help alleviate some of the growing sense of pessimism surrounding the continent in the new world order." While articulating a positive outlook on the interplay of globalization and Christianity, Mensah also offers a critique of this development. Overall, his chapter offers a non-reductionist approach to the exploration of the intersection of Christianity and current processes of globalization.

Seck's chapter analyzes Islamic discourses in contemporary Senegal with a focus on global Salafism and Sufi Islamic movements' response to what he calls "the West in general and western cultural globalization in particular." In the main, this chapter examines "opposing views about Islam in the era of globalization" and provides a historical understanding of the globalization of Islam historically and in the contemporary era in Senegal. Consequently, the chapter provides a deeper understanding of Islamic discourses in a globalizing world. The last chapter in Part I of this volume offers a detailed examination of language education policies in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. Lisanza's discussion situates the evolution of these policies in a historical context and demonstrates the role of states in this region in this process. In addition, she reminds us that the evolution of these policies has been influenced by the pivotal positioning of the English language in a globalizing world.

The four chapters comprising the second part of the book focus on issues of cultural production. With a focus on the intersection of globalization and video production and distribution in various parts of Anglophone Africa, Martin Mhando's chapter contends that while dominant sites of the global film industry shaped the modalities of African cinema, "local film-makers" have mediated this process "through their texts and local structures of production and exhibition" as demonstrated by African filmmakers such as "the late Sembène Ousmane [sic]—when he decided in 1974 that he would only film in Wolof, because he wanted to reach what he regarded as 'his audience'"[10]—and others. As such, this chapter shows the agency of African filmmakers in the context of the neo-colonizing tendencies of globalization processes. Drawing on the works of cultural producers in Africa, leading among them, Micere Mugo, Dennis Brutus, Ousmane Sembène and Ngugi wa Thiong'o, Dahlgren demonstrates how their artistic practices bring forth a history of resistance. Using the work of Walter Mignolo on "border thinking" as a starting point, her chapter shows how the work of these cultural producers challenges, for example, the colonial and neocolonial erasing of African history. For Dahlgren, their works present a liberating history. As she states, "through the 'cracks' in the modern world system, knowledges otherwise arise through the rearticulation of history as emancipatory local histories emerging from the colonial difference." This chapter makes significant contributions to, among other things, debates concerning politics of knowledge production and decolonial struggles.

David Pier offers critical insights on the global discourse of brand marketing. Focusing on a detailed case study from Uganda, *The Senator National Cultural Extravaganza,* a promotional campaign for Senator Extra Lager beer, a brand produced by East African Breweries Ltd (EABL) for poor rural markets in Kenya and Uganda, he demonstrates the local and global dynamics characterizing this discourse. Critical scholars of globalization processes argue that the latter are complex and multifaceted. Arguing along these lines and focusing on the globalization of hip hop, Hall contributes to critical studies of globalization by examining the emergence of hip hop culture in the United States to its rise as a mediated global cultural phenomenon in Africa. Further, his chapter demonstrates how, "hip hop has maintained its role as a vehicle of social agency for displaced, generally youthful groups, although the parameters of this phenomenon show variations that reflect the unique postcolonial and neoliberal landscapes with which African countries currently contend."

NOTES

1. Mignolo2 000.
2. Sahle2 010.
3. Mignolo 2007, 462.
4. Marx 1869, quoted in Said 1978.
5. Gregory 2004.
6. Tully 2008; Sahle 2010.
7. Monga 1996, 39 quoted in Soyinka-Airewele and Edozie 2010, 16.
8. Hall 2015, 250.
9. Pieterse 2004, 49.
10. Ashbury 1998, 82 quoted in Mhando (see chapter 7 in this volume, p.3).

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PART I

Sociocultural Processes

CHAPTER 2

Globalization, Cybersexuality Among Ghanaian Youth, and Moral Panic

WisdomJ. Tettey

Introduction

Irrespective of where one stands with regard to the benefits or otherwise of the processes of globalization, there is no denying the fact that they have had tremendous transformative impacts on socioeconomic, cultural, and political dynamics around the world.[1] These transformations have produced qualitative shifts in how transnational interactions are organized, as they reconfigure the spatiotemporal environment within which those interactions occur.[2] Part of the reason behind the developments noted above are technological innovations that allow the flow of capital and information to traverse physical boundaries with alacrity and to be integrated at an unprecedented level. As we witness what Giddens describes as the emptying of time and space,[3] there have emerged new challenges that are raising widespread concern. O'Grady, for example, contends that:

> Two of the key contributors to *globalization* – tourism and the Internet – have provided an unexpected bonus to child abusers, making the opportunity for child abuse more accessible. One could draw a partial causal relationship between the rapid expansion of *globalization* and the growth of child sex trade. Tourism has become the world's largest industry and its long arms reach out into ever more obscure parts of the planet.[4]

Hughes argues that, as part of the process of globalization, women and children have become commoditized on the global market for various interests, including organized crime, tourists, and military personnel seeking to satisfy concupiscent desires of one form or another. She opines further that "through financial and technological independence, the sex industry and the Internet industry have become partners in the global sexual exploitation of women and children."[5] While sexual exploitation is not new, the emergence of new technologies has expanded the coterie of actors involved (both victims and beneficiaries), and the sophistication and geographical scope of such activities.[6] As Chow-White observes, "increasingly, information and communication technologies, such as the Internet, are playing a particularly significant role, not only in the promotion and packaging of sex tourism but also of a new type of global surveillance of bodies, race and desire."[7] Bernstein also explicates the connection between globalization and the commodification of the body, arguing that capitalist restructuring of the international political economy that we have experienced over the last three decades has manifested itself at the most intimate levels.[8]

Studies from various parts of the world have contributed to these fears as the Janus-faced nature of the Internet leads to the conclusion that it is not only a useful resource, but also "a 'Pandora's Box' of criminal opportunity."[9] O'Grady argues that "for all the benefits the Internet provides, it also has its drawbacks, especially providing a vehicle to spread child *pornography* quickly…Increasing ties among nations provides the pedophile with the opportunity to hide from the immediate community, to operate within residence, to encounter a global network of like-minded individuals and worst of all, to discover an endless supply of victims."[10] Some researchers reveal potentials for "cybersexual compulsivity" among Internet users and the erosion of other areas of youth activity and responsibility that result from social pathologies referred to as technological addictions.[11] A study by the Pew Internet Research Center shows that 57 percent of parents worry that strangers will contact their children online; close to 60 percent of teens have received a message from a stranger; and 50 percent report communicating with someone they have never met.[12] A national survey of youth, aged 10–17, in the United Kingdom suggests that about a quarter of respondents had had unwanted exposure to sexual material on the Internet.[13] What makes the situation even more worrisome is the fact that most teens acknowledge that they do not tell their parents when a stranger contacts them online. One said, "I wouldn't tell about it to my parents, they'd flip out and probably restrict my access to the Internet."[14]

There is a growing concern that Internet use in Ghana may reflect Cooper et al.'s study that sexual pursuits, ranging from visiting web sites with sexual themes to intense online sexual interactions may be the most common use of the Internet.[15] The Ghana Health Survey in 2002 revealed the "disturbing . . . rate at which kids are watching porno via the Internet. Some of these kids are so smart that they have obtained addresses of web sites of porno all over the world and after classes they dash to the nearest Internet café to watch nude pictures on the Internet."[16] My own observations indicate that it is not unusual to find young adult males in Internet cafes trying to discreetly browse through sexually explicit web sites or engage in cybersex, which involves the textual exchange of erotic material. Several respondents, who were surveyed or interviewed during field research for a larger study on cybersexual activity in Ghana that I am working on, intimated that they use, and/or know others who use, the Internet for these purposes. One interviewee disclosed thus: "The Internet allows me to entertain myself in ways that will not lead to trouble . . . such as STDs or pregnancy." There is concern among the public that too much engagement with the Internet may lead to addiction to the lascivious world of Internet sex that could significantly distract the youth from more 'productive endeavors' such as school, community service, and the like. As the World Youth Report 2003 notes,

> the impact of the global media on young people is perhaps a metaphor for the broader impact of globalization, in so far as the apparently liberating technologies such as mobile phones and Internet computer games actually alienate young people by creating a world of individualistic hyperstimulation in which more mundane activities such as school simply cannot compete.[17]

It is in the context of the preceding developments that this chapter examines cybersexual activity among the youth in Ghana. In this study, I adopt the United Nations' definition of "youth," meaning those between 15 and 24 years of age.[18] With the expansion in the number of Internet cafes, and the subsequent access that youth have to the technology, there is anxiety about the negative moral, social, and psychological impacts that it can have. These concerns are predicated on the relatively free access that the youth have to adult web sites; the potential risks that they face, vis-à-vis solicitations in chatrooms and relationships that they develop with cyber pen pals; and their vulnerability to sexual marketing on the World Wide Web. It is important to note that some of the individuals who lure these youth pretend to be online pen pals and then demand nude pictures with promises of financial reward, helping to bring the girls abroad, or finding them partners for marriage.[19] These developments have resulted in a moral panic among the public at large, leading to calls for action by legislators, religious leaders, and various civic groups.[20] One senior Christian cleric intimated that "something grave is going to happen to this country if steps are not taken to fight this abomination [which is] undermining efforts to control the HIV/AIDS scourge." The government has responded by cautioning "Ghanaian women against participation in such obscenities and pornographies which go against the very grain of the culture and training of the Ghanaian."[21]

Having provided an insight into the moral panic that the intersection of the Internet and sexual activity has generated, through the social construction of this online danger,[22] the next section provides an analysis of the theoretical framework within which the study is situated, followed by a discussion of the methodology that guided the research. The chapter then proceeds to analyze the socioeconomic situation confronting Ghanaians, and the youth in particular, after which it focuses on how Ghanaian youth are negotiating their participation and survival in the context of the economy of desire that has resulted from processes of globalization and the information technology revolution that facilitates them. It specifically explores the involvement of youth in the transnational space of Internet-related sex and sexuality. It interrogates how economies of desire intertwine with desperate economic circumstances in Ghana to turn Ghanaian youth into objects and seekers of desire in the spaces created by the Internet. It examines how these spaces facilitate ethno-sexual consumption through "racial, ethnic, and national self-imaginings and constructions,"[23] and reproduce patterns of domination and inequality in the global system.

Economy of Desire, the Internet, and Transnationalization of Sexual Commerce

I use a political economy of desire framework to engage with the issues that are the object of this project. "Lack and scarcity are the main characteristics of the economy of desire…This scarcity is not restricted to economic resources. It also applies to the gratification, bodily well-being, sexual desire and body commitment."[24] It draws from political economy,[25] critical race theory,[26] and gender and class analyses[27] to examine the relationships among global forces, technological advances, and the transnational manifestations of cybersexual activities and their off-line impacts.

Over the last few decades, neoliberal economic policies have defined the socioeconomic trajectories of many countries in the world. Among those who have been significantly affected by these policies are developing societies that have been compelled by circumstances to adopt policy prescriptions whose repercussions on their populations have been very harsh.[28] The neoliberal policies have also significantly eroded access to public goods, exacerbated unemployment, and resulted in the creation of despondent populations. These circumstances, combined with Internet-facilitated sexual commerce, have produced conditions, which reveal

> [t]he relationship among capitalism's disruptive, restructuring activities: powerful images, fantasies, and desires (produced both locally and globally) that are inextricably tied up with race and gender; the emergence of young, poor black single mothers, married women and single young women, who are willing to engage in the sex trade; and a strong demand for these women's services on the part of white, foreign male tourists.[29]

Related to this is Nagel's observation that "the Internet is a symbolically rich domain for cruising sites of ethno-sexual desire."[30] The expression of this desire is shaped by structural inequalities in the global political economy, which, in turn, influence access to exotic bodies, or compel a search for "opportunities" presented by the privileged. An interesting dimension of Internet-facilitated sexuality, therefore, is the extent to which it has expanded possibilities for sex to be racialized and for race to be sexualized. The Internet not only combines with a competitive global market of sexual desire[31] to make access to the cheapest bodies very easy, but it also reflects how racialization of those bodies feeds the desires of privileged groups.[32] It is significant to note, for example, that one area of global sexual exchanges (i.e., sex tourism) involves mostly economically better-to-do white men as the seekers of desire and poor women, mostly of color, as the objects of desire.[33] For the women involved in this market, the feminization of poverty makes the transnational sex trade more enticing. Entering a relationship with men from the developed world presumably provides an opportunity for them to escape the economic hardships of their homeland—what Brennan calls the "opportunity myth."[34] Thus, interactions among actors in this transnational sexual space are premised on culturally and racially-based imaginings that stem from essentialized representations of "the other."[35]

The active way in which some Third World women seek Western men, or "play along" in pursuit of the "opportunity myth," poses a challenge to feminist theory. There is a tendency by some feminist scholars and other women's rights activists seeking to address "Third World" women's engagement in the commercial sex industry to frame such involvement exclusively in terms of patriarchal systems of oppression and subordination.[36] However, as the narratives by some Ghanaian women in the ensuing discussion, and those of some "Third World" prostitutes, reveal, the concept of the "sex worker," which suggests entrepreneurship within a capitalist economy, aptly describes their motivations.[37] These motivations, and the actions pursued to actualize them, reflect active agency on the part of the women. There is the need, therefore, to move beyond the discourse of victimology that exclusively characterizes many feminist analyses of "Third World" women's engagement in sex-related activities—both in the public and domestic spheres.[38] A more apposite approach should recognize women's agency as an intrinsic part of the commodification of sex in the era of globalization, as actors make various choices, even as they are constrained by systemic structures of one kind or another.[39]

The preceding argument is not to diminish the reality of power inequalities in the relationships described above. Indeed, the location of the interactants, and their societies, in the global capitalist structure shapes the power that they exert or exude, and hence their bargaining power. There are clearly different degrees of power between Third World women and their clients from the industrialized world whose privileged location in the global capitalist structure gives them an upper hand in fulfilling their objectives within the economy of desire.

The theoretical framework adopted for this study, thus, allows us to approach the sexual uses of the Internet from a perspective that is not encumbered by an exclusively patriarchal and dichotomized problematization of women's position in the global sex trade but rather recognizes the multiple spaces occupied by various actors in these contexts, as they negotiate a plurality of, sometimes contradictory, locations. It facilitates analyses not only of the class-based exploitation of the economically vulnerable, but also the racialization that characterizes the myth of the sexualized "other," and the agency that

African actors exhibit even as they are constrained by systemic structures of one kind or another. As Zook points out,

> The roles of these actors . . . are not simply determined by a spaceless logic of cyber-interaction but by histories and economies of the physical places they inhabit. In short, the 'space of flows' cannot be understood without reference to the 'space of places' to which it connects. This geography also provides a valuable counterpoint to mainstream electronic commerce and highlights the ability of socially marginal and underground interests to use the Internet to form and connect in global networks.[40]

It is worth noting that while much of the literature tends to focus on the eroticization of the female body and the satisfaction of male desire, the objects of desire, in Ghana as in other places, are sometimes males and the exploiters/beneficiaries female.[41] The relationships are both homo- and heterosexual in nature. This chapter will, nevertheless, focus on the latter types of relationship, because they are the most dominant. Moreover, the former type tends to be more difficult to assess because it is culturally unacceptable and could attract stringent social and legal sanctions when it is detected.

Methodology

The study is mainly qualitative and, as alluded to above, is part of a larger study on cybersexual activity in Ghana. Our interest was not in churning out statistical data about the number of respondents, frequency distributions, and the like, that can be generalized across all Ghanaian youth or sex tourists, but to get insights into the lived experiences of our subjects, their mindsets, and the motivations that drive them as they engage with the Internet. These insights provide a basis for more extensive research on the issues addressed in the study, and for rethinking theoretical, conceptual, and analytical approaches to understanding them.

We employ the "global ethnography" methodology put forward by Burawoy et al.,[42] which allows us to transcend the local focus of traditional ethnography to embrace analyses that incorporate broader geographical and historical processes that influence and elicit responses from the local. In the context of the time-space compression that defines the information and communication technologies(ICT)–globalization nexus, it is important that the ethnographic scope of the study be global even as it focuses on the study of specific locales.

This requires engaging not only with those in Ghana who are agents and victims of the economy of desire, but also those who are implicated in those processes in places beyond the country. For this latter purpose, the research draws on Ghana-focused sexually-oriented web sites and sexual activities by tourists who are drawn to Ghana by narratives that they have accessed on the Internet.

Narratives of reality are socially constructed.[43] We, therefore, adopted methodologies and forms of evidence and interpretation that allowed for "storytelling, counterstory telling, and the analysis of narrative . . . [because they enable one to contest] myths, presuppositions, and received wisdoms that make up the common culture" in one locale or another.[44] In a global context where the dominant narratives reflect the positions of the powerful, this method also gives subalterns the opportunity to voice their interpretation of realities, their location within them, how they negotiate them, and why they relate to them the way they do.

To get at the various narratives, we purposively sampled sex-related web sites/forums/chatrooms, which contained information on Ghana, to gain perspectives on the global ethnography of cybersexual activities.[45] This was done between January 2003 and August 2004, and involved content analyzing discussions on the sites.[46] We also conducted field research in Ghana, between May 2003 and August 2003, and during the same period in 2004. During the fieldwork, we analyzed secondary data on cybersexual activity such as police, court, and news reports. Interviews were conducted with representatives of various organizations interested in cybersexuality (e.g., law enforcement, religious, educational, community-based, and human rights/advocacy) to gain an understanding of their knowledge of the issues, as well as the nature and extent of the problem and responses to it. A sample of Internet café operators and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) were interviewed for the same reason. Two clubs identified on the web sites referred to above, as locations where sex tourists can meet potential clients, were visited. The research team had conversations with tourists at the clubs. Through this method, key informant contacts, and a process of snowball sampling, we identified those who had used the Internet to facilitate or inform their trip to Ghana. We interviewed ten of them and nine of their clients. The interviews helped to understand why they engage in these activities and to give voice to their personal experiences.

In addition to the above methods, an in-depth ethnographic case study of cybersexual activity was conducted in Swedru, a commercial town in the Central Region of Ghana, between May and August 2004. The region is one of the most deprived in the country, and certain towns there (particularly Swedru) gained notoriety as physical locations where virtual actors arrange in-person rendezvous to fulfill their desires.[47] Swedru, thus, became a transnational meeting ground, both in a physical sense and in the context of the boundlessness of cyberspace. The case study, thus, provides insights as to why the town is a destination of choice and the impact that cybersexual activity has had on the community and individuals. We organized two focus group discussions with a representative sample of community members (including the youth, parents, and community leaders) to elicit their views on these matters. We also interviewed some women who were advertently or inadvertently involved with cybersexual activities, family members of the women who were involved, key informants, and some young men who served as mediators in the transnational spaces facilitated by the Internet.

Political Economy of Deprivation and the Socioeconomic Context for Cybersexual Activity

Ghana went through intense economic crisis over the course of the 1970s and early 1980s. The crisis was precipitated by both internal and external factors. Among the internal triggers were economic mismanagement, political corruption, severe drought, and the deportation of about a million Ghanaians from Nigeria. Externally, the country had to contend with deteriorating terms of trade, falling export prices for its primary commodities, and consequent balance of payment problems. The implications of these developments were far-reaching. By the early 1980s, inflation was hovering at over 100 percent, per capita GDP had plummeted to US$739 from its 1960 level of US$1009, real export earnings stood at only half of 1970 values, and import volumes had shrunk by over 33 percent.[48]

In response to this economic morass, the country underwent International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank dictated Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), which involved reductions in government expenditure, devaluation of the currency, retrenchment of workers, privatization of state enterprises, and removal of price controls. Consequently, 300,000 workers in the public service were laid off and deep cuts were made to government support to social services, such as health care and education.

While these policies have helped address some of the macroeconomic problems that the country was facing, they have not extricated the country from its economic doldrums. Inflation continues to be high “with wild fluctuations that over the course of [the 1990s] saw prices increase more than ten times,” eventually settling at 50 percent in 2000.[49] Total debt has continued to rise from US$1.39 billion in 1980 to US$5.87 billion in 1995, to its current level of over US$6 billion. The country, thus, spends over 60 percent of its export earnings on debt-servicing, thereby redirecting resources away from sectors and groups in desperate need.[50] The result of the economic crisis, and the policies implemented to deal with it, was extreme deprivation for large segments of the population. By 1999, about 40 percent of Ghanaians were living below the poverty line, while 27 percent faced extreme poverty.[51] The situation in Ghana reflects the trend in much of Africa, where “around 55% of all people employed are not earning enough to lift themselves and their families above the US$1 a day poverty line.”[52]

The failure of the SAP to alleviate Ghanaians’ economic privation is borne out by the fact that the country is now implementing the Highly Indebted Poor Countries’ (HIPC) Initiative under the guidance of the IMF and World Bank. Konadu-Agyemang notes the increased regional, class, and gender disparities that have resulted from the deplorable economic conditions that many Ghanaians live under.[53] Many citizens have responded in a variety of ways, including the exodus of both skilled and unskilled workers to other countries, mainly in the industrialized world.[54] The country’s agricultural sector, which constitutes the mainstay of the economy, has seen the greatest reduction in productivity registered by any African country between 1980 and 2001.[55] Total expenditure on education, between 1992 and 1998, dropped significantly by about 10 percent.[56] The overall prognosis for Ghana does not seem different from the following bleak assessment for the African continent as a whole: “The high share of working poor and total poverty is likely to persist given the region’s high unemployment rates, insufficient capacity for job creation, rapidly expanding labor force and huge overall decent work deficit.”[57]

This portentous picture has severe implications for the country’s youth who constitute 21.4 percent of the population.[58] Generally, the youth tend to be poorer than the older generation, thereby compounding their susceptibility to other socioeconomic problems, which leads to disillusionment and/or risky behavior aimed at extricating themselves from poverty.[59] The World Bank notes that

> African youngsters are growing up in a time of both heightened peril and unprecedented opportunity. More than ever before, adolescents—particularly those in cities—are connected to the world at large through communication, information, and transportation technologies. Yet, the cycle of poverty, inadequate education and work opportunities, and civil unrest stunts the development of too many millions of young people.[60]

The gendered nature of poverty means that the situation is even worse for young women, thereby increasing their vulnerability to exploitation.[61] It is clear that at the same time as globalization is bringing the world together, in a variety of ways, we are also witnessing significant disparities in the circumstances of people in different regions of the world. It is in this respect that the UN observes that

> the global culture has become a fundamental building block in many young people's lives. However, their relationship with it is very fragile because youth, more than any other, are exposed to and have come to rely on the global consumer culture but probably have the fewest resources and the most to lose should global culture not provide the satisfaction they demand of it.[62]

In the midst of the deprivation discussed above, and the disparities that define the global political economy, globalization and information technology are teasing Ghanaian youth with images of the consumerist lifestyle that characterizes the industrialized world. Unfortunately, however, most of them do not have the wherewithal to replicate that lifestyle. Consequently, many young people are compelled to be ingenious, through processes of "globalization from below,"[63] to survive within the new reality. For female youth, some unpleasant, yet compelling, options include prostitution, both at home and abroad.[64] As Chapkis observes, in the context of sex workers,

> practices of prostitution, like other forms of commodification and consumption, can be read [in] more complex ways than simply as a confirmation of male domination. They may also be sites of ingenious resistance and cultural subversion . . . the prostitute cannot be reduced to . . . a passive object used in male sexual practice, but instead it can be

> understood as a place of agency where the sex worker makes active use of the existing sexual order.[65]

The Internet has also become one of the mechanisms by which African youth are exploring opportunities for personal advancement.[66]

Consumption of the Virtual Human Corpus, Sex-Tourism, and Sexual Commerce

In the new transnational social space made possible by ICTs, one does not have to cross physical boundaries to engage directly with the center or periphery of the world capitalist system. Developments in Internet-enabled sexual commerce, and the concerns that they have engendered, are complicated by processes of globalization with which they are intricately intertwined. The consumerism that is characteristic of globalization, and of the capitalist economic system that undergirds it, is not limited to material goods but has been extended to the consumption of people as well.[67] This latter consumption pattern involves deriving satisfaction from the human body itself as opposed to concrete products of human endeavor. The Internet facilitates the practice in a variety of forms, including viewing sexually explicit material and fostering on-line, and subsequently, off-line amorous or sexual relationships.

Beyond just accessing lewd material, which was referred to earlier, some Ghanaian youth, principally female, have become recruiting targets for advertising on sexually explicit web sites. Interviews with some young women at nightclubs noted for sex-tourism in Accra, revealed that they make contact with their clients via the Internet. These women, some of whom are secondary school and university students, are registered with online services located abroad.[68] Prospective clients obtain contact numbers from dating services online and make contact with the women when they arrive in the country. In other cases, the men contact the women prior to leaving their home countries, and arrangements are made for different kinds of romantic or sexual activity when the men arrive in Ghana. One man claimed that he bought a list from "africonnections," a dating service, for US$17.50 that had 25 phone numbers with photographs of the girls.

While some young women, especially urban and secondary school/university educated, engage with the technology directly, this is not the case with all the women who appear on the Internet by way of texts or images. Most of the women outside the major cities, who are involved in cyber-facilitated sexual activity, are not conversant with the Internet, and hence do not directly engage with the technology. This became clear during the ethnographic research in Swedru when it was revealed that the encounter between young women from the area who appear on the Internet and their prospective clients is mediated not only by the technology, but by an organized group of local young men. The young men's modus operandi is captured by one of them in the following statement:

> We normally approach the beautiful girls in town and tell them that we can find them pen pals abroad who can help them leave the country. We ask them for their pictures to accompany their profile. Sometimes the girls are not interested, but after we give them money, they agree. About one month later, we tell them that some men abroad are interested in marrying them, but want to see them naked so that they can be sure . . . that they meet their standards . . . Many of the girls are not comfortable with this, but we tell them that they will receive between $100 and $300 for doing that. After they take the pictures, we send them to our contact people who use them on their web sites.

Based on interviews with key informants in the community, it looks like the money that the young women receive for taking the nude photographs is a very small percentage of what the gendered agents get from the web site operators. This mirrors inequities in resource distribution evident in economic transactions between men and women within the larger society. Nevertheless, in a community characterized by high levels of poverty, unemployment, and little prospects, the offer of a couple of hundred dollars can be a very enticing proposition. The gendered agents for the transnational cybersex networks also serve as go-betweens, when the men who respond to the ads arrive in Ghana, and get paid for their services. The revulsion toward these cyber and real-life pimps is vividly illustrated by the following criticism from one key informant: "some young men in our own community are assisting these sex maniacs to destroy our daughters and our community."

What the above discussion makes clear is that the Internet has significantly facilitated the expanding sex tourism network. As Wonders and Michalowski point out, "'sex tourism highlights the convergence between prostitution and tourism, links the global with the local, and draws attention to both the production and consumption of sexual services."[69] There are networks on the Internet where people exchange experiences about sexual exploits in Ghana and offer advice about how to satisfy members' concupiscence. A 61-year old from Australia wrote:

> Ghanaian babes are uninhibited, eg., some [write in online ads] openly seeking 'broad-minded, sexy men; [saying] I am interested in erotic pictures...making love"...Well, after $2500 for a round-trip 38-hour flight...I arrived inn [*sic*] Accra the capital. I found my way to Swedru...the workd [*sic*]soon got around that an eligible 'obroni' [white man] had arrived;...I had to schedule them...Each was gorgeous, like the best coffee: hot, strong, black and full of flavour.

The operation of these networks confirms Chow-White's observation that "cyberspace enables sex tourists to build deeper connections between the racialization, sexualization and commodification of sex workers' bodies and Western masculinity."[70]

Some sex tourists target young teenage girls. Not only do they have sex with them; they also take nude photographs of them, presumably for child pornography web sites, listservs, chatrooms, and other exchange networks. The case of Morgens Riber Nielsen, a Danish man based in Norway, helps to put the issue of Internet-facilitated pedophilia into perspective. The Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Ghana Police Service worked in collaboration with the Norwegian Police to arrest Nielsen. At the time of his arrest in Norway, he had in his possession pictures of 12 teenage girls among 3000 films that he had produced.[71]

It is not inaccurate to say that the economic hardships that a lot of Ghanaians face turn these young women into vulnerable prey for marauding sexual predators, whose egos are presumably fanned by the Ghanaian women whom they encounter. As one sex tourist said: "Oh, how nice to be a big slob of an American and be fawned over by the wayward college females that would just do anything for a few dollars!" Another intimated that "every Ghanaian girl's dream is to catch a white man from the western world."[72] Nevertheless, the sweeping generalizations presented by the sex tourists, in the foregoing narratives about Ghanaian women's ambitions, reflect the condescending attitudes of these privileged Westerners toward the subaltern "other" that they exploit. It is also an insult to Ghanaian womanhood as a whole to have the ambitions of all the country's women reduced to the perceptions contained in these inflammatory and egotistical, self-gratifying discourses of white men. The views expressed by these sex tourists corroborate the observation that

> most global sex tourism . . . arises from the linkage between the political economic advantage enjoyed by affluent men from developed countries and the widespread cultural fantasy in those nations that dusky-skinned "others" from exotic southern lands are liberated from the sexual/emotional inhibitions characteristic of women (and/or men) in their own societies.[73]

By and large, white men are the targets of those women who engage in cybersexual activities, whether directly or mediated, as well as their off-line manifestations. This preference is based on a general, and sometimes erroneous, impression that white men are wealthy and generous. For these women, a relationship with a white man provides an opportunity to overcome the vicissitudes of life in Ghana and an avenue to lift their families out of poverty and squalor. A relationship with a white man could also mean an opportunity to migrate to Europe or America, the dream destination of many a Ghanaian youth. They are suffused with the "opportunity myth" and crave the glamorous images of these places that are painted in the media, or peddled by certain compatriots returning from there. Furthermore, the economic success of some Ghanaian residents abroad, which is reflected in buildings, cars, and conspicuous consumption, fuel these perceptions of the metropole. The social status that comes with conspicuous consumption of foreign goods is another motivation for seeking links to foreigners who can provide such symbols of perceived upward mobility. This status then gives them the power to upset the existing dominant structures of power.[74] Nyamnjoh and Page outline similar motivations in the Cameroonian context where "young ladies . . . [who] comb the beaches in search of whiteness are interested in more than prostitution; they are interested in a gateway to fulfilling their fantasies, thus making sense of the promises of modernization in a context where the reality of its implementation has failed woefully."[75]

The narratives above also illustrate how interactions among actors in this transnational sexual space created by the Internet and its off-line relative derive from culturally and racially based and essentialized imaginings of "the other." It is, moreover, clear that the relative power of the interactants in these relationships is dependent on their own, and their countries', location within the global capitalist structure.

The sex tourists are driven by a desire for the cheap and the exotic, while the women are motivated by the need to escape economic despondency by becoming entrepreneurs in the global marketplace of sexual consumerism and/or by hopes of a fantasy marriage and relocation to the metropole.

Another dimension of cybersexual activity that needs to be highlighted is the way in which its organizers exploit victims without their consent, whether latent or manifest. Some of the Ghanaian women on the Internet claim that they did not consciously choose to be there. One woman in Swedru whose seminude picture appeared on the Internet asserted that she was unaware that it would end up there when a photographer offered to take a picture of her at a nearby beach. Some women the research team talked to at a popular beach in Accra expressed concern about people at the beach with cameras. They were concerned that these individuals may take pictures of them in compromising situations that may end up in one medium or another, thereby creating the impression that they are selling their bodies. What the Swedru woman's assertion and the concerns of others in Accra show is the emergence of a group of savvy local entrepreneurs who are responding to the market for exotic images by exploiting unsuspecting women and their bodies for their own pecuniary gain.

There is no gainsaying the exploitation that characterizes the women's relationship with local, Ghanaian, male agents who manipulate them, and are complicit in the exploitation and violation of their bodies. As processes of globalization and their intersection with advances in information technology facilitate the fulfillment of needs and desires for different actors, these young men in Ghana are taking advantage of the situation by acting as agents within the interstices of ethno-sexual desire, sex tourism, and economic deprivation. This is their own way of addressing the socioeconomic deprivation that they face, by taking advantage of the opportunities that the economy of desire and the Internet present. There were suggestions in the Swedru area that the local agents had gained financially from their involvement in these activities and some of them are said to have built houses and bought cars with the monies that they made from their activities.

Socioeconomic Impacts of Cybersexual Activity

The activities described above have affected individuals, families, and communities in a variety of ways. One of the biggest impacts on Swedru, as a result of the cybersex related stories, is the stigma that has engulfed the town. It has assumed a reputation among many

Ghanaians and Internet chatroom participants as a haven for immorality and promiscuity. The reputation goes back to 1998 when, out of the 77 women showcased in Ghanaian newspapers as unashamedly selling their naked bodies on the Internet, 54 came from the town. This stigmatization of a whole community angers many residents of the town and makes them uncomfortable. The reaction has created resentment and strong antagonism not only toward those women and men who are accused of bringing the name of the town into disrepute, but their relatives as well. Consequently, fissures have emerged within the town's social structure, thereby upsetting the hitherto existing social balance. According to the parents of some of the young women whose pictures were featured on the Internet site in 1998, their families have had to face untold hardships, including social isolation, as a result of the social stigmatization that comes with engagement in what most Ghanaians consider to be shameful, indecent, and immoral activities. One mother lamented that right after the story broke, others thought of them as "an *ashawo* family [that is, a family of prostitutes]. People pointed at us wherever we went, scorned us, and called us all sorts of names."

Among some of the microlevel effects is "virtual infidelity," which is impairing or devastating real life relationships. Marriages have also fallen apart as a result of the revelations. One woman was reported to have had a miscarriage when pictures of her on the Internet were published by the local media.[76] Further investigations, in the course of this study, revealed that her shock was due to the fact that she was unaware that the picture, which was ostensibly meant for a potential suitor abroad, had ended up on the Internet, in the full glare of the world. One woman disclosed that her planned marriage to her fiancé was ruined because of the ridicule that the publication of the pictures in the newspapers brought him. He was pressured by friends and family not to go ahead with the marriage. According to her, "they said they did not want to bring into their family a girl who had exposed herself to the whole world."

It is interesting to note that despite the widespread condemnation, among the Ghanaian public, of cybersexual activities, their offline corollaries, as well as sexual commerce in general, many of the female youth interviewed intimated that they understood why their peers would engage in such activities. They contended that the socioeconomic challenges they face make their bodies the only asset they could use as a means of survival. A young woman, operating at one of the clubs frequented by sex tourists, confided thus: "If I am hungry and a white man is willing to take me abroad for sex, what is wrong with that? After all, I will not be the first to do that. I know girls who have met foreign men through the Internet and are enjoying life abroad now, or getting money sent to them from there." This disclosure corroborates Freeman-Longo's observation that "it is easy for young people to recognize that many of these 'models' are close to their age, thus legitimizing in the minds of the youth online that people their age are also involved in real life and online sexual activities. It normalizes the experience."[77] Thus, while various individuals and organizations have appealed to moral values as a means of curbing the youth's involvement in cybersexual and other forms of sexual commerce, these appeals do not seem to be an easy sell. The clash between the "feel good" appeal of moral rectitude and the expedience of engaging in the economy of desire, however risky, is a difficult dilemma for a lot of youth tethering on the brink of economic survival, but the likelihood that they will resolve it in favor of expedience is very high.

Unfortunately, however, while sex tourists and those who feed on the exoticized bodies of these Ghanaian women and girls are, by and large, able to fulfill their desires, a vast majority of the latter tends to be disappointed in the long run. This is because they are hardly able to realize the dreams that have been promised by the "opportunity myth." There are reports of girls and young women who have been impregnated by sex tourists and left to fend for themselves. This fate is vividly illustrated by the case of a young teenage single mother who was taken from Swedru and abandoned in Accra by a sex tourist after she got pregnant. Narrating the story, her mother recalled that

> she was only 13 years old and in JSS-1 [Junior Secondary School – grade 1]. She was introduced to Morgens Riber [the Danish man referred to earlier] by boys in the town. After that she left Swedru with him and she did not come back again. After she got pregnant, he left the country and now she is struggling to look after the child in Accra.

Stories like this mirror Brennan's accounts of women in the Dominican Republic who have fallen victim to the ephemeral world of sex tourism.[78]

CONCLUSION

The neoliberal economic agenda that underpins economic globalization holds sway over the economies of developing countries, and the prescriptions of that agenda impose tremendous hardships on many young people in those locations. Neoliberal prescriptions also claw back, to a significant degree, the public goods that citizens had enjoyed in the past. Consequently, the youth are compelled to be ingenious to survive within the new reality. That ingenuity takes a variety of forms, including forays into the Internet-enabled global sex market, which can be described as part of the process of "globalization from below."[79]

This chapter argues that the interaction of Ghanaian youth with the global, as an avenue for economic redress, has been facilitated in unprecedented ways by the new information technologies. In the new transnational social space made possible by these technologies' capacity for time-space compression, one does not have to cross physical boundaries to engage directly with the center or periphery of the world capitalist system. Processes of globalization intricately intertwine with developments in Internet-enabled sexual commerce to introduce a sophistication to transnational sexual engagement that has created a moral panic in Ghana.

The nexus of interactions that have been enabled by the Internet help to extend the reach and scope of processes that intensify consumerism as well as the commodification of women's bodies and male desire.[80] The Internet combines with a competitive global market of sexual desire to target the cheapest bodies and to facilitate access to them. Moreover, it has provided a mechanism for ingenuity among Ghanaian youth who take advantage of innovations in the global capitalist market, a market which, ironically, simultaneously perpetuates their economic peripheralization and/or sexual exploitation. The Ghanaian case also points to the racialization that characterizes the myth of the sexualized "other" and the consciously class- and gender-based exploitation of the economically vulnerable.

For the Ghanaian women involved in this market, the feminization of poverty intensifies the allure of the transnational sex trade, and increases their vulnerability to exploitation in the context of the exchange relations that characterize the market. Their engagement with the market is, however, not bereft of agency, and calls for analytical frameworks that transcend the victimology of an exclusively patriarchal and dichotomized problematization of women's position in the global sex trade. More appropriate approaches must recognize the ingenuity and activism of women in these exchange relationships, as they negotiate their locations within multiple, and sometimes contradictory spaces. The foregoing analysis of the

Ghanaian experience supports Chapkis's observation, in the context of sex workers, that

> practices of prostitution, like other forms of commodification and consumption, can be read [in] more complex ways than simply as a confirmation of male domination. They may also be sites of ingenious resistance and cultural subversion . . . the prostitute cannot be reduced to . . . a passive object used in male sexual practice, but instead it can be understood as a place of agency where the sex worker makes active use of the existing sexual order.[81]

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39. see also Kempadoo 1999, 226.
40. Zook 2002, 1261.
41. Nagel 2003, 204–9; Schaeffer-Grabiel 2004; Daily Graphic 2002.
42. Burawoy et al 2000; see also Gottfried 2001.
43. Esposito and Murphy 2000.
44. Wing 2000; see also Delgado 1995, xiv.
45. see McClelland 2002.
46. see Phua and Kaufman 2003; Phua 2002.
47. Ghanaweb October 24, 2002.
48. Konadu-Agyemang 2000, 473.
49. Canagarajah and Pörtner 2003, 5.
50. Tsikata 2000.
51. Government of Ghana 2003a, 13.
52. International Labor Organization 2005, 60; see also Teale 2000.
53. Konadu-Agyemang 2000.
54. see Tettey 2002.
55. International Labor Organization 2005, 61.
56. Canagarajah and Pörtner 2003, 8.
57. International Labor Organization 2005, 64; See also International Labor Organization 2004; see also Government of Ghana 2003b, 6.
58. United Nations 2002.
59. World Bank 2002; see also African Development Forum 2004, 3; Mufune, 2000.
60. World Bank 2002; see also Government of Ghana 2003a, 28.
61. Government of Ghana 2003a, 25; Glover et al. 2003, 35–6; Okojie 2003.
62. UN 2004, 302.
63. Falk 1993.
64. Taylor 2002; Aghatise 2002.
65. Chapkis 1997, 29–30; see also Schaeffer-Grabiel 2004.
66. see World Bank 2002.

67. Firat and Dholakia 1998.
68. see, e.g., Africanprincess.com 2004; One-and-only 2004a; One-and-only 2004b.
69. Wonders and Michalowski 2001, 545.
70. Chow-White 2006, 884.
71. Ghanaweb, October 24, 2002.
72. World Sex Guide Forum 2004.
73. Wonders and Michalowski 2001, 549–50.
74. Friedman 1990; see also United Nations, 2004, 302.
75. Nyamnjoh and Page 2002, 612–13.
76. Attah 1998.
77. Freeman-Longo 2000, 79.
78. Brennan 2001.
79. Eaton et al. 2003; Falk 1993.
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CHAPTER 3

“Marriage is the Solution”: Born-Again Christianity, American Global Health Policy, and the Ugandan Effort to Prevent HIV/AIDS

Lydia Boyd

Introduction

Over the past ten years the promotion of abstinence and “faithful marriage” has become a popular cause among a certain subset of Uganda’s urban youth. Makerere University, Uganda’s flagship public university located in its capital city, has for the past decade hosted a weekly abstinence rally, organized by students affiliated with a local church, that features skits, songs, and participatory games that encourage youth to abstain, often by presenting positive images of marriage and romantic renditions of mock wedding ceremonies. This emphasis on abstinence and marriage as primary methods of AIDS prevention is relatively recent, and represents a shift from an earlier, and successful, Ugandan approach to prevention that had utilized a wide range of culturally grounded interventions to help stem the epidemic.[1] In the wake of an influx of US. funding supporting the dual message of “abstain and be faithful,” abstinence and faithful marriage became popular and prominent messages featured on city billboards, woven into elementary school curricula, and promoted on flyers written and disseminated by Ugandan activists. Uganda’s born-again Christian community was especially invigorated by these shifts. If abstinence was touted as a behavioral standard in this community, faithful marriage emerged as a powerful social model. In churches and born-again Christian youth groups, a faithful marriage was described as a fortress against disease, a social and moral ideal that could protect youth from the ravages of a devastating epidemic. Through public debates, intense group workshops, and private prayer, Uganda's Christian AIDS activists sought to discursively construct marriage as an ideal "solution" to the epidemic, a haven for safe sex and safe families.

This chapter considers how and why religious, urban Ugandan youth have involved themselves in the support and promotion of what is often glossed as an American-sponsored AIDS prevention strategy—"be faithful"—that on its surface seems to conflict with other models of sexual morality and ideal personhood in Uganda. President Bush's 2003 President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) program transformed international funding for AIDS treatment and education, especially in targeted countries like Uganda. In its wake, religious communities in Uganda and elsewhere have embraced the program's emphasis on behavior change as a primary prevention method, especially its stipulation that one-third of prevention programming be devoted to the message of sexual abstinence until single-partner faithfulness. This chapter draws on over 19 months of ethnographic fieldwork in one such community: born-again Christian university students in Kampala, Uganda. It traces how ideas about marital faithfulness were interpreted and repurposed by Ugandan Christian youth in ways that both reproduced and diverged from the Western ideal of companionate Christian marriage that underlies PEPFAR's funding stipulations. In so doing it contributes an analysis of how two dominant channels of globalization in the neoliberal era—a development-oriented international health program and born-again Christianity—intersect, overlap, and help to reconfigure local experiences of sexuality, family life, and ideal models of gendered personhood in the wake of one of Africa's worst HIV/AIDS epidemics.[2]

One of the main criticisms of "faithfulness" as an HIV-prevention tool, especially as it has been advocated under the PEPFAR program, has been its seeming disconnect from the culturally specific realities of infection risk in Africa and other parts of the world. Messages that focus on individual agency in sexual partner choice (most especially the "just say no" emphasis of "abstain or be faithful") have been faulted for not acknowledging the structural factors (e.g., economic inequality) that shape the perception of sexual choice within the context of diverse gender, family, and kinship norms. More troublingly, other critiques have emphasized the ways in which the message of "faithfulness" is deeply entrenched in a Western orientation to sexual intimacy that idealizes the affective bonds at the center of companionate marriage.[3] Such a message fails to recognize the diversity of ideal models for sexual behavior and family life that exist cross-culturally. For instance, the message of marital faithfulness has been highlighted as especially problematic in societies where monogamous partnerships are not the norm. In Uganda ideal masculine behavior is strongly associated with the support of multiple sexual partners, and studies have directly linked the prevalence of long-term concurrent sexual partnerships to high rates of HIV prevalence in the region.[4] In a society where, as I will discuss, marriage is understood to be a bond not only between individuals but also between families, where financial constraints may delay marriage indefinitely, and where men's infidelity is rarely socially penalized, what does the message of "faithfulness" mean? How is it interpreted, and what kinds of relationships is it understood to mark off?

Such questions highlight the need to contextualize how international health policies are taken up by Africans themselves, often being repurposed to address culturally and historically specific experiences of gender, sexuality, and kinship. With this need in mind, I interpret the embrace of faithfulness by a community of Ugandan Christian youth through the lens of their own anxieties about gender relations and family life. PEPFAR's critics have focused on the ways this American health policy served as a de-facto channel for the globalization of American religious and social values. In its emphasis on marital faithfulness, it was seen as favoring one (Christian, Western) model for family life and affective intimacy over others. Despite this dominant reading of the globalizing cultural force of PEPFAR's religious and social message about marriage, in Uganda I found that the actual debates over "faithfulness" were in fact deeply rooted in Ugandan, rather than American, concerns about the nature of family life, sexuality, and gender. Far from simply the imposition of Western values, the discourse surrounding faithfulness became a way for youth to engage, comment on, and critique a variety of ways of thinking about family obligation and emotional intimacy, both "traditional" Ugandan models and Western, modern ones. These debates were also shaped by a changing social and economic context—high levels of unemployment, the impact of a sustained HIV/AIDS epidemic—that has influenced young adults' experiences of sexuality and family intimacy. If we are to understand the potential efficacy, and the limitations, associated with the message of "be faithful" we need also to recognize this more grounded, ethnographically situated perspective on global health policy. Far from a straightforward adoption of an American message, the struggle over "faithfulness" among Ugandan youth reveals the ways in which decisions about sexual relationships are shaped by specific social and historical contexts that color young people's perceptions of ideal sexual behavior.

The following section provides context for the current tensions that motivate youth attitudes toward faithful marriage, in particular the changing dynamics of HIV/AIDS funding in sub-Saharan Africa, and the proliferation of new religious discourses concerning sexuality. I situate the social activism of Ugandan born-again Christians in terms of a broader concern with the intersection of economic globalization and Pentecostal and charismatic Christianity in Africa. The chapter then turns to the ethnographic data to assess how and why young people have embraced faithfulness as a response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The data reveal that faithfulness provides a discourse that enables youth to reflect upon and repurpose two competing models of sexual relationships that coexist in Uganda: traditional Ugandan models for marriage and modern romantic partnerships. Youth, in turn, embrace neither in full, choosing instead to cultivate an intermediate construction of religiously inflected "faithful" love that allows them to manage both traditional kin obligations and cosmopolitan aspirations aligned with other modern ideals. Their experiences expose the challenges inherent in implementing a unilateral global health strategy to cope with HIV/AIDS, and the necessity for more fully understanding the cultural frameworks that shape sexuality in diverse social contexts.

Globalization, Christianity, and Social Activism: Religious Piety as Modern Subject-Making in Uganda

The growing prominence of the "abstain and be faithful" message in the late 2000s in Kampala can be most directly attributed to the massive influx of donor funds made available by the American PEPFAR program under President George W. Bush. The financial scope of PEPFAR—which in its initial phase (2003–2007) consisted of a fifteen billion dollar commitment worldwide—enabled a proliferation of all types of HIV/AIDS programming in Uganda. But its stipulation guaranteeing one-third of prevention monies (one billion dollars globally) for "abstinence and faithfulness" insured a new prominence to this message in particular. This emphasis on abstinence and marital faithfulness as primary prevention methods was criticized by sectors of the AIDS research community because it was seen as a political move made to appeal to President Bush's American evangelical Christian base.[5] The program's mandate to promote what many religious Americans viewed as a social message about "family values" made the massive and expensive PEPFAR program broadly appealing to a diverse domestic audience. But, as I highlighted above, for those in the international AIDS community the program was intensely controversial, raising questions about the efficacy of promoting one form of prevention (abstinence and marital faithfulness) over others (such as condom distribution, serostatus testing, or vaccine development). Despite this controversy Ugandans themselves were heavily involved in the development and support of abstinence and faithfulness programs—from the First Lady's office (which had a desk devoted to the issue) to community and church groups energized by what they perceived as international affirmation of their own religious agenda. In particular, the abstinence movement was strongly supported by, and closely associated with, the born-again community in Kampala.

Over the last twenty years, in Uganda and throughout the Global South, born-again Christianity—sometimes referred to as Pentecostal or charismatic Christianity (PCC)—has become an increasingly important, and politically influential, mode of religious belonging.[6] In Uganda born-again Christians are associated with newer, nondenominational churches that are viewed in contrast to the mainline churches (Anglican and Catholic) that dominated during the colonial and Independence eras. For youth today, these new churches are appealing in part because of their expressly global outlook. The churches I researched openly embraced an international identity and promoted the usefulness of such a stance for social action at home and abroad. Church members called themselves "global leaders" in a worldwide struggle for "sexual purity." Connections between these Kampala communities and others across Africa and in the West were emphasized and encouraged. Youth viewed their public activism in support of abstinence as a way of contributing to what they considered a worldwide Christian social movement.

Moreover, born-again Christianity was a religiosity deeply enmeshed in neoliberal development messages that emphasized personal "empowerment" and self-control, the focus on individual accountability that animated PEPFAR's support of abstinence and faithfulness. This was a religious movement that stood not as a counterpoint to a parallel force of economic globalization, but a religiosity that was in part defined by, and which helped to define, neoliberal policy in Kampala. Born-again Christians were considered to be more accountable for their actions, more productive, and better self-controlled. These were practices that helped to cultivate new kinds of ethical dispositions that were believed to be especially amenable to the success of neoliberal approaches to development that focused not on communities and states, but on the transformation of individual behaviors, and which emphasized personal responsibility over structural transformations and investments.[7]

For these reasons this community appeared to be a natural partner for PEPFAR's prevention programs. In the years following PEPFAR's implementation in 2004 several Ugandan church groups founded their own NGOs to apply for and administer PEPFAR grants. Other churches hosted visiting American youth who travelled to Ugandan schools to teach children about the benefits of abstinence. Born-again university students regularly participated in rallies, marches, and concerts that promoted the message of sexual abstinence and marital faithfulness. Non-denominational Pentecostal and charismatic churches, which were already deeply invested in a religiosity that emphasized personal asceticism, considered the message of sexual abstinence and marital faithfulness extensions of their broader concerns about the spiritual and social costs of secular modern culture on Ugandan family life.

From another perspective, the support of sexual abstinence and marital faithfulness by a large cohort of Ugandan young men was surprising in a country where masculinity is closely associated with the pursuit and support of multiple sexual partners, and where men are rarely publicly sanctioned for premarital and extramarital sex. Models for successful masculine behavior have long highlighted the expectation that a man with the means to do so will have more than one intimate partner with whom he sustains a long-term relationship.[8] While Ugandan males have on average fewer sexual partners in their lifetime than American males, Ugandans are far more likely to have multiple long-term sexual relationships at the same time.[9] And as the age of marriage has been delayed throughout the twentieth century, especially for urban men and women, sexual relationships and even parenthood are often pursued before a relationship is fully recognized as a formal marriage by one's family and community. This is to say that many Ugandans would argue that monogamy, at least as it is defined as the sexual "faithfulness" of husband and wife, is not a cultural ideal, nor is it a relationship that many young Ugandans find to be structurally supported by the economic and social realities that shape their experiences of marriage. Furthermore, Ugandan experiences of family and moral personhood do not always easily align with a new spiritual focus on personal autonomy and self-control. Moral behavior for youth had long been, and in many ways continues to be, defined by spiritual and material investment in the intimate relationships of family, practices that run counter to a new born-again focus on the autonomy of the individual, and the self-sufficiency of a newly married couple. It was for these and other reasons, as I will discuss, that the concerns of Ugandan religious youth were not interchangeable with those of American policy-makers, and that the embrace of "faithful" marriage by Ugandans was not as predictable as at first glance.

Uganda's born-again activists are part of a larger trend throughout Africa and the Islamic world, where religious movements are at the forefront of struggles over what it means to be both religious and modern. Religious revivals, especially those that advocate for a more pious lifestyle, have long been characterized as reactionary, in opposition to social changes that seek to "modernize." But more recently this line of analysis has been complicated by scholars who seek to understand the proliferation of movements advocating for particular expressions of religious piety as integral parts of the experience of modern life itself.[10] Such analysis has been in line with broader anthropological concerns with the study of globalization and modernity, recognizing the ways that transnational forces of cultural change, from capitalism to Christianity, take different shape in different localities. For anthropologists of religion, such work has emphasized how religion has become an important way for Africans and others to directly engage with what modern life should be, challenging arguments about the culturally homogenizing influence of global Christianity or Islam.[11] In Africa and elsewhere, where traditional culture has since the colonial era been placed in opposition to the modern (Western) world, new religious movements, perhaps especially Pentecostal and charismatic Christianities, have become important channels through which people engage the long-standing and problematic dichotomy established between traditional culture and modern life. Rather than replicate Western moral visions of the world, Pentecostal-charismatic and other religious movements in Africa have become ways to reimagine the intersection of culture, spirituality, and modernity.

In this vein, Ugandan born-again youth embrace public piety—the disavowal of alcohol and premarital sex, the embrace of conservative forms of dress, the promise of a faithful marriage—as a way of commenting on the spiritually and morally problematic aspects of both secular modern and so-called traditional life. Ugandan youth view their public and private struggles over faithful marriage as creating spaces where traditional gender and kinship norms are not discarded in favor of an American modernity, but rather are reshaped, altered, and inserted into a new experience of modern, moral personhood. The message of faithfulness became appealing to some Ugandan youth not simply because it represented an especially "global" or "Christian" view of family life. Rather the message's popularity was rooted in the ways it spoke to young people's deep ambivalence about social changes that have challenged their experiences of, and access to, traditional models of gender and kinship, and the place of such models in the modern world. Their arguments build on others throughout the twentieth century that sought to redefine Ugandan customs as part of, rather than antithetical to, modern life.[12] For youth, these debates open up opportunities to make their own claims to proper personhood during a time when they feel that other routes to a morally and socially successful adulthood have been closed. As I discuss below, their embrace of faithfulness is being shaped by a broader social and economic context that has for at least a generation been defined by uncertainty surrounding young adults' sense of their own futures.

Born-Again Christianity in Neoliberal Kampala

The youth with whom I spent time in Kampala nearly all belonged to one of two born-again churches near to Makerere University's campus. Both churches conducted all of their services and programs in English, a policy framed as an effort to avoid ethnic favoritism, which in practice resulted in educated, relatively elite, congregations. While their educational status marked these youth as part of a highly privileged cohort in Ugandan society, they were by no means universally wealthy. In fact almost none of my informants, when I initially interviewed them in 2006 and 2007, had a steady income, and nearly all were still dependent on parents and extended kin who were themselves from a wide range of economic backgrounds. They were ethnically diverse, though a large majority of their families were from the south and southwest of the country.[13] University Hill Church[14] was the smaller of the two churches, but was the more active on the university campus. It expressly targeted university students with campus outreaches and bible study classes. Central Kampala Church, located near downtown, was larger and more age-diverse though still highly popular with students. I interviewed youth who were mostly unmarried during my initial fieldwork from 2006 to 2007, following up with some of these same young adults three years later, when many of them had by this time become married and had their own children. The great majority of my informants were between the ages of nineteen and twenty-four when I initiated my research, ages that roughly correspond with the typical age range for university students in Uganda. I attended public events and workshops organized by the churches, services and prayer meetings, and women's group meetings on a regular basis. I also interviewed pastors at these and other churches in Kampala, as well as scholars and activists involved in AIDS prevention and care throughout Uganda.

Churches in Kampala often focused on the topics of marriage, courtship, and family life, not only because of the effort to promote abstinence among youth, but because for most Ugandans the management of family relationships often resulted in opportunities for reflection, sometimes resulting in conflicts, about what types of persons and what types of relationships should be valued in contemporary society. In Uganda urban adults still travel home at the holidays "to the village," and are expected to distribute material support to an array of more needy relatives. Weddings, no matter how "modern" and Christian, nearly always also include traditional bridewealth ceremonies (discussed below) involving scores of relatives. Discussions about family and obligation often expose conflicted feelings about "culture," "tradition," and identity. Mark Kigezi, a pastor at another Kampala church founded in 2010 to appeal to the young, urban population I studied, emphasized the central place that family held in concerns about larger social changes:

> You are dependent on your parents so you don't break your relationship with them. But you start to have independent ideas from them. You have an idea of how to lead your life differently. So we have the Christian culture, and that is associated with globalization, with English language, with the West. But what does that mean for us when we are not Western? And what happens when we embrace that [Western] culture but we remain somehow different, with different problems?

Pastor Mark points to one of the main areas of conflict for youth. As they imagined new possibilities for their own lives, they were faced with drawing distinctions between themselves and their elders. For young people, however, the embrace of a Western identity, even a Christian one, was not entirely satisfactory. As Pastor Mark emphasized, youth faced different sets of problems from their Western counterparts, problems that shaped their ideas about faithful marriage in distinct ways.

One of the most significant factors shaping attitudes about intimate relationships was the broader economic context in which this generation has come of age. Throughout Africa, the narrowed economic horizons that have followed the structural adjustment policies adopted by governments during the 1980s and 1990s have inordinately impacted today's young adults. Scholars have highlighted the growing anxieties of and about "youth" as neoliberal economies generate new desires without providing corresponding means of fulfilling them.[15] Young people have been often characterized as a "problem" by African governments who see their lack of employment and abundance of idle time as a nuisance or a serious threat.[16] Youth themselves have been particularly affected by the growing sense of stagnancy and marginalization that has accompanied the global economic changes that have largely sidelined African economies.[17] Other anxieties arise from the "fast wealth," available to a select few, that has upended traditional generational hierarchies, leading to a backlash against successful youth who are seen in many African societies to be challenging the delicate intersection of age and class, and the deference traditionally given to seniority.[18] Economic anxieties have placed new forms of stress on family relationships, as young adults without the means to support themselves exist in limbo, dependent on elders for financial upkeep and, because of their uncertain financial futures, viewed as unsuitable for marriages and families of their own. This is certainly not the first generation in Africa to express anxiety about their relationships to their elders, but for young people today there is a growing sense that both newer pathways to status and independence (particularly education leading to a stable job), as well as older routes to adulthood (through family, parenthood, and seniority) seem out of reach.

Current economic conditions have also sparked renewed tensions between men and women in Kampala that have profoundly shaped youth experiences of romantic love and relationships. Young men felt marginalized by the financial demands of what Christians derisively referred to as the "dating culture," where a man's affections were supposedly expressed and measured through carefully chosen and deployed gifts. Expectations that men should bring financial resources to a marriage, both in the traditional form of formal bridewealth payments, and in the modern sense of a house and steady income, created age disparities in the perceived "readiness" of men and women for marriage. Women expressed hope that a suitable partnership could be found soon after one's university graduation (or sooner, if one left school before then); urban, educated men were strongly encouraged to delay marriage into their thirties. These divergent interests and orientations toward romance and marriage contributed to a sense of distrust between men and women, which, although certainly not a new development in Ugandan gender relations, has in recent years been reshaped by a new set of economic and social pressures. Tensions over marital readiness also highlighted the ways marriage was increasingly viewed as a status out of reach for many youth. As a significant marker of full adulthood, the delay of marriage was perceived as a problem by both genders. For women it stoked resentment of male partners who were seen as unserious about their intentions. For young men, who needed to acquire financial and social independence to be deemed ready for marriage, the delay of marriage was also experienced as the foreclosure of a social status that had been all but automatic for an older generation.

It was to this set of anxieties and tensions that born-again churches pitched their discussions of ideal families and marriages. The American health dictate to "be faithful" in marriage was translated within church as a moral message about the kinds of generational and gendered relationships that were healthiest, safest, and happiest. For young adults this model of marriage and family was favorably compared to two other models for intimacy that coexisted in Kampala: traditional extended families, and the dating relationships of young adults. I discuss both below, beginning with the ways relationships with their parents shaped young people's ideas about faithfulness.

Tradition, Obligation, and the Constraints of Family

The Christian ideal of "faithfulness" was on its surface a discourse about the love and trust between a husband and wife. But, as is apparent from my discussion above, it was also deeply influenced by young people's concerns about their relationships between themselves and their parents and extended kin. In this way, "faithful" love was in part constructed in contrast to what youth and their pastors called tradition. Traditional culture does not in itself have necessarily negative connotations in Uganda.[19] But many youth expressed deep ambivalence about many of the practices and ideas associated with the traditional realm, particularly as those ideas shaped their interactions with parents and other elders. Traditional extended families presented a paradox for youth who relied on these relationships as means of financial support throughout their school years and afterward, but who also resented the demands and obligations that such relationships imposed. Traditional families could be helpful, providing the connections one needed to survive in Kampala, but they were also constraining, limiting young people's sense that they could freely determine their own futures.

At no other time was this experience of family life more troubling for youth than when they themselves wished to marry. In Uganda, the logistics of when and how a wedding will take place is usually determined after protracted negotiations between a couple and their extended families. Families have a great deal of influence over such decisions in large part because both families are obligated to fund the various ceremonies that constitute a formal wedding, but also because marriages, even of urban young adults, are still viewed in part as the joining not only of two individuals, but also of their larger families. Marriages are critical points in one's life when one's position within one's extended family is made patently clear, when the obligations one has to one's elders, and their obligations in return, are tangibly felt. Because of this, bridewealth exchange is an especially important component of the wedding festivities. More so than a church wedding, such ceremonies are where an individual's ties to her family are recognized, and her new relationship to her spouse is socially and culturally legitimized. Today bridewealth is still practiced in part because it is believed to be a more socially meaningful method of marriage, one that is not based on individual whim (the consent, "I do," of two lovers) but on the public recognition and integration of a new marriage into a broader network of kin and clan relationships.[20] However, because bridewealth demands the participation of a large network of family members such ceremonies are also the moments in wedding festivities that generate the most tension between young people and their families.

Bridewealth ceremonies necessitate that a groom's family travel to a bride's family home to present her family with gifts, often including livestock and, today, money. The form and size of such gifts are negotiated between the two families, sometimes during the public ceremonies that constitute the bridewealth celebration itself. A woman's senior male relatives thus hold a great deal of power in the decisions about her marriage because they will eventually be the ones to demand the amount and type of bridewealth payment. Young adults would trade ominous stories they had heard of elder male relatives who had had little involvement in a young woman's upbringing but who nevertheless became actively involved at this stage of the planning, to the consternation of the bride and groom who viewed such meddling as a potential obstacle to the swift and painless conclusion to bridewealth negotiations. While most bridewealth ceremonies I witnessed were celebratory in nature, with little hint of family tension, nearly every young couple I interviewed approached such ceremonies cautiously, aware of the complicated relationships they needed to navigate, and the broad support they needed to acquire from senior relatives, in order for celebrations to proceed smoothly.

Parents' influence over the weddings of their children was not limited to bridewealth ceremonies. The parents of young men usually resisted supporting a marriage until a time when the young man seemed "established." Often, particularly for non-Christians, this would mean that he had reached a certain age, perhaps settled down with a partner, and even fathered a child. Christian youth sought to counter the prevailing wisdom that men had to be financially and socially established to marry. Martin, a university graduate I first met when he was planning his wedding in 2007, recounted to me how difficult the months before his wedding had been. His father had no objections to Martin's choice of wife, only his timing of the wedding, which the father felt was far too ambitious.

> When I mentioned marriage, which I did at the beginning of 2007, he said "oh, you want to get married, good." He assumed I was thinking of something two or even three years away. When I told him I actually wanted to get married in June, he said "no Martin, you are out of your mind." Because he had expectations of me at that time. At least you needed to have a job, a big house, have bought a car, something at least substantial, of which I had none at that time. So no, it never crossed their minds. He thought, "He has now lost it now, this [Christian] radicalism has gone too far!" Up until the time of the wedding, it was quitea b attle.

Martin and his wife did marry, on the date they wished, but not without stiff resistance from his family who felt Martin was not mature enough, especially financially, to manage his own household.

Christian youth viewed their own marriages in contrast to those of the "traditional" realm of kinship and family, where they characterized relationships as being focused less on the love between individuals, and driven more often by attempts to "control," rather than care for, others. These descriptions of family life are, of course, not to say that all youth felt that their parents did not love them, or that love was never the basis for traditional marriages. But youth discourses about tradition point to the ways in which they sought to construct their own ideals of marriage and family differently. Faithful marriages represented a modern, companionate ideal, whereby two people, drawn by mutual attraction, shared a newfound intimacy and trust that was independent of larger family ties. For youth who were dependent on elders for social and financial support, this was a profoundly desirable way of thinking about marriage. This discourse of love was appealing for the way it emphasized the assertion of a young person's freedom to decide their own life course, often resisting the influence of extended kin. But just as this idea of love is tied to a new experience of the individual, it has also emerged in conjunction with larger economic changes, particularly the proliferation of opportunities for commodity consumption, that youth were far more ambivalent about. If faithful love was one that emphasized youth agency in the face of an older model of emotional intimacy that privileged the obligations and social interdependence between parents and children, faithfulness was also set in contrast to a newer model of romantic love that young Christians characterized as being overly beholden to individualistic desires.

Young Love and the Problems with Modern Romance

A number of scholars, from Friedrich Engels onward, have described the ways by which capitalism transforms intimate relationships, allowing for a newfound economic independence from the obligations of extended kin, and thereby permitting the possibility of "love" unfettered by the larger economic concerns of one's family.[21] But as much as capitalism helps to articulate a more individualistic version of love and intimacy, it also introduces its own complications and tensions. Scholars throughout Africa have pointed to the ways in which changing ideals of love have in turn been linked to a variety of practices associated with commodity exchange, from gift giving and "dating," to more substantial forms of material support for lovers.[22] Among Ugandan born-again Christians the emphasis on consumption complicates this ideal of modern love, especially for young men who feel that this new burden of financial investment puts such relationships out of their reach. Romantic love thus presented its own paradox for Ugandan youth. It was at once highly desirable and emblematic of "modern" values, yet also deeply enmeshed in an economic system that they felt had marginalized them. Further, the different orientations of men and women toward commodity consumption—namely that men gave gifts, and women received them—introduced new complications in the relationships between men and women. These contradictions were apparent in youth discussion of the problems with romance and dating. Faithful marriage was set against not only the meddling influence of traditional elders, but also against the problematic "romantic" versions of love that permeated youth popular culture in Kampala.

Many of the young people active in the promotion of abstinence as an HIV/AIDS prevention strategy became involved during their years at university, usually when they joined one of the many Kampala church congregations that actively pursued the student population. Their introduction to university life was often the first time they had spent time away from the regimented control of either their parent's watchful eyes or the highly disciplined space of boarding school. Many youth, especially those who came from upcountry villages, were overwhelmed by the new stimuli and newfound freedom that characterized the capital city. Others came with the warnings of their parents still ringing in their ears: "Beware of the thieves in Kampala; you cannot trust anyone there; watch out for deceitful men/women, they will use sweet words to trick you!" Yet in spite of these fears, most students embraced campus life, especially the new opportunities to socialize with members of the opposite sex.

Young people, some for nearly the first times in their lives, contemplated the possibilities of romantic relationships at university. But for many, these relationships quickly become unsatisfactory. Church narratives of campus romance often focused on the theme of "heartache," the ways that unfettered pursuit of love could result not in emotional fulfilment but in emotional scars that, pastors warned, could take years to heal. Robert, a man in his mid-20s who held an administrative position at University Hill Church, told me about his first relationship on campus:

> I tried it out and I got myself a girlfriend. Little did I know it would bring problems to me. The relationship never lasted a long time. It quickly manifested its fruits of demonism…I became a parent,

> a boyfriend. I became a brother. I became almost everything—a supplier—to this lady. And this affected me academically . . . And in the end of it all she left me, she jacked [dumped] me, and that was the end of the relationships.

Robert told a narrative typical of many young men. He had grown up in a rural area and gone to strict Christian boarding schools, eventually earning a prestigious scholarship to the university. Once on campus, he sought out the ideal that he said was much talked about: a "love" relationship with another student. But for Robert this relationship quickly unraveled, souring him on the possibility of finding love through campus dating. He describes how his girlfriend began to make many requests, demanding that he become her "supplier," supporting her financially to the point of his own ruin.

Two common phrases associated with campus relationships, "de-toothing," which refers to women who extract (like teeth) favors and gifts from suitors while withholding (but promising) sex, and "benching," which refers to the male practice of hanging around a woman's room without being clear about his intentions, reveal the pervasive tension between men and women concerning relationships.[23] Men frequently expressed frustration about women's demands for material goods and often spoke of women as constantly trying to exploit men for material support. In a conversation with two recent Makerere graduates, I asked for their own definition of de-toothing. They laughed and one of them continued, "You know, women will even have a boyfriend just for one thing, like airtime [cell phone usage fees], and another who will buy her clothing, then one for his *Prado* [SUV], and none of them will know the other is there!" A skit at a church event emphasized the level of mutual deception that most youth felt was a common part of dating. In the scene a male student is portrayed making attempts to look wealthier than he is by borrowing a friend's TV to place prominently in his room before a date arrives. After arriving, the date pleads that she is "too young" for sex but eventually gives in. His friends stop by later and mock him, revealing that this woman is well-known at the local bar and that she is a "post-graduate" and certainly not the young innocent she claims to be. Both parties are presented as deceitful, untrustworthy, and at risk for HIV because of this behavior (it is insinuated that the young woman is HIV-positive).

Men felt that dating culture unfairly sidelined them, giving women a degree of control that they could potentially use to support an upwardly mobile city lifestyle independent of male surveillance. Women expressed a different perspective. For most women, especially the relatively privileged population on the university campus, dating was not an end in itself, but was part of a larger effort to secure a spouse. Marriage, for both men and women, remains a profoundly important social achievement. Even highly educated and successful adults are not considered fully mature until they marry and have children. Many young people expressed this expectation clearly, often forcefully to me. Sarah, an unmarried university graduate in her 30s, poignantly described the pressures placed on her to marry:

> [Marriage] is achievement number one. You have done it. People will be in a very bad relationship but they will stay because they are married. You have achieved. Myself, even if I work hard, to the day I die there will be people despising me. Nothing else will matter. It is the only thing. My mummy starts to talk to me this way, "Sarah, what will people think?"

The pressure to marry is heightened for women because men and women are believed to be prepared for marriage at different life stages. Men, as I noted earlier, are not expected to marry until they are older and financially secure. Women ideally marry soon after they leave school. These divergent expectations regarding ideal age at marriage create tension in campus relationships. Andrew, a twenty-eight-year-old university graduate explained how this tension typically played out:

> Women demand a promise of marriage. They want to know that marriage is possible from the start. Their parents question boyfriends about employment, money, ethnicity. They want men who can provide, full stop.

For men, these demands only point to the ways they cannot measure up to the expectations of women and their extended families. For women, men's attitudes reflect how they are "not serious" about love and commitment.

Both men and women criticize campus romance as devoid of "true love." For different reasons, women and men feel that they are being "used" by their partner, easily discarded for someone who can better provide what is desired. For men, this is evident in the way they characterize women as too demanding of financial support, both in the sense of the gift-giving typical of dating relationships, and in the larger expectations of marriage and the monetary investment that it requires. Women similarly feel objectified in their relationships with men, not taken seriously as long-term partners, only worth pursuing as sexual conquests. It is in this environment that a discourse of "faithfulness" has taken hold.

"Faithful" Love and the Ideal of Christian Marriage

At a secondary school conference I attended, organized to educate youth about premarital abstinence, marriage was represented as a cardboard circle on the ground marked off by the words "boundary, security fence, legal limit, covenant." Youth were told to take turns standing inside the circle to experience the "protection" that marriage would provide a couple. For the organizers of the conference the display was meant to emphasize the ways that "faithful" marriage would protect a couple from HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases. But the imagery of a couple "cut off," separated (and protected) from the financial and social demands that extended beyond their union, was an interpretation that few youth missed. A faithful Christian marriage was not only a "fortress" against disease, but was also a sanctuary for "true love" that superseded other types of relationships, especially those between a couple and their elder relatives. Faithful love was also, importantly, a love that was free of the worldly concerns of money and status that youth felt so easily soured campus romance. It was a bond between two individuals regardless of (even in spite of) the concerns of family or the demands for money that characterized other, more problematical, partnerships.

In church, youth were given advice about how to pursue faithfulness in a relationship. Faithful relationships were ideally begun in church, and cultivated under the watchful eyes of pastors. Instead of "dating," couples were taught that they should "court" each other. Implicit in a man's request to court a woman was the promise that marriage was his ultimate intention. Such relationships usually lasted one to two years, a time when the couple was expected to receive pastoral counseling, and work to develop a degree of emotional intimacy (physical intimacy was forbidden). When their pastoral advisor thought they were ready, they would begin preparing for a wedding. The explicit expectation of marriage inherent in the courtship relationship addressed both men's and women's concerns about modern relationships. A young woman could be sure her partner was serious, and invested in her future. A young man could expect that he would not have to compete for his intended's attention. Courtship generally did not involve much in the way of gift giving, or any of the expenses generally associated with dating.

If the church attempted to shield young courting couples from the financial demands of dating, the community also worked to address the financial and social complexities of weddings themselves. As I noted above, weddings, both the bridewealth ceremony that preceded a church ceremony and the church ceremony and reception itself, demanded a great deal of family support. The church community responded by providing support for young couples that would help them to marry even in the absence of the approval of their extended kin. A young couple's peers would provide organizational support, and much of the labor associated with the wedding—from making bridal gowns to baking wedding cakes—was donated by a couple's friends.

Unsurprisingly, the most contentious issue for Christian youth wanting to get married was that of bridewealth. It was rare that even born-again Ugandan youth would choose to forgo a bridewealth ceremony entirely. Despite the strong criticism such ceremonies received in church, most Ugandans feel that bridewealth ceremonies are too culturally and morally significant to be disregarded completely. A bridewealth ceremony marked a family's and society's approval of a marriage. It was seen to complement the focus on individual consent that defined Christian weddings. Instead of rejecting such ceremonies, young women were given advice on how to speak with their parents about bridewealth in ways that emphasized the cultural importance of the ceremony over its financial demands. Many of these women worked with varying success to convince their parents to accept lower than expected bridewealth payments. Such negotiations were efforts to ensure that weddings could proceed in a timely way, rather than be derailed by the demands of interfering relatives.

Such negotiations over bridewealth demonstrate how faithful love was an appealing model for youth because of the ways in which it provided a pathway to marriage. I have noted the ways women felt pressure to find an appropriate spouse soon after graduation. For men, a different set of constraints presented themselves. There was usually no pressure placed on a young man by his family to marry. For men, marriage was a status deserving of someone who had already achieved financial success, who had proved that he could support his own household. I asked Martin, whose family's resistance to his marriage I described above, to define marriage for me:

> It means you are a man. You've crossed from being a boy to being a man. Because they assume that the responsibilities of being a married man are greater than those of a single man. And if he can fulfil those responsibilities, he is due honor and respect. If you introduce yourself and you say, "I am Martin, and I am married." You turn heads. It is a statement, an honor.

Christian faithfulness was appealing to young men for the ways it provided access to a deeply meaningful and previously out of reach married social status, one that would transform their position in the community and their family.

Martin's ability to stay married, to succeed in his marriage despite his family's doubts and resistance, changed their opinions about him and his faith (which his extended family does not share):

> I am a hero. I am a superstar. Honestly. I couldn't emphasize it more. They are like, "this guy is doing things in a way we've never seen and it works!" And as much as they don't approve of my belief, more and more they are beginning to see the fruits.

For Martin and his peers, a "faithful" marriage was an ideal shaped by a desire to achieve a deeply important status in the realm of traditional kin relationships. A marriage in this church community allowed youth access to new kinds of social status, and transformed the ways they interacted with and managed their relationships with their elders. This new avenue to marriage also spoke to the ways that formal marriages increasingly mark class status in urban Uganda. As I have noted, weddings cost money and such calculations color an extended family's evaluation of a man's readiness to marry. At least since the middle of the twentieth century weddings have been delayed because of the costs associated with such ceremonies, and a host of less formal domestic arrangements have proliferated in the void caused by prolonged delays in marriage.[24] For this reason as well, "faithful" marriage was appealing to young adults. It was a pathway to both newer (class-based) and older (kin-based) models for social status that were increasingly out of reach for a generation that suffers high rates of unemployment and dependency on extended kin. To be married was the mark of "becoming someone"—culturally and economically—and the church's emphasis on faithfulness made this status newly available to youth.

"Faithful" love was also appealing for the ways in which it transformed relationships between men and women, and addressed youth concerns about the state of modern gender relations. For men, attitudes about modern romantic relationships were colored by their frustration with life in the neoliberal city—the sense of thwarted economic futures that directly shaped, and limited, their interactions with women. The material demands of intimate relationships were a near constant complaint of young men, who felt that dating relationships unfairly privileged women who sought to use men for financial support. Similarly, women complained that the men they dated were interested in intimacy without the demands of a committed relationship. Youth complained that modern society pitted men against women, and made true love difficult to achieve. Faithfulness circumvented these problems by providing both men and women access to an older form of status—marriage—while allowing them to articulate and engage with modern constructions of companionate "romantic" love that they found so appealing but also problematic.

Conclusion

As Holly Wardlow has argued in her study of young people's sexual relationships in Papua New Guinea, "a desire for companionate marriage is always about more than the marriage itself."[25] This is certainly also the case with young Ugandans, whose pursuit of "faithful marriages" reveals the underlying tensions over gender relationships, kinship, and ideal models of family that have emerged in distinct ways in contemporary Kampala. The transformation of the family, marriage, and household has long been at the center of colonial and postcolonial efforts to "civilize" and modernize Africans. In this postcolonial period, Christian arguments for companionate, "faithful," marriage are also set against the problems of a secular modern society, particularly concerns over the lack of economic opportunities available to youth, and the impact such concerns have had on young adults' experiences of gender.

The Ugandan Christian interpretation of "faithful" love highlights a particular emphasis on individual agency concerning marriage and family, making it appealing to youth who feel disempowered by both age and economic status. Along with its partner message of abstinence, "faithfulness" also engages with what might be considered "technologies of the self"[26]—self-control, self-reflection, transparency, accountability—which are perceived to be of particular value to the current neoliberal era. Abstinent youth are characterized as more focused and "ambitious," able to concentrate on work, unburdened by sexual and emotional distractions. Faithful families are supposed to be more efficient, able to redirect resources into the household, rather than to extended kin. The financial management of kinship relationships was a serious and frequent topic, especially in seminars that catered to already married couples who were dealing with the expectations that, as fully mature adults, they were now obligated to contribute back to the kin network that had raised them. In this way, "faithfulness" can be understood as part of a larger reaction to the social and intimate transformations that are occurring alongside neoliberal reform and globalization.

While the discourses of abstinence and faithfulness engage with projects that seek to cultivate a modern, Christian self, young people's own practices reflect the ways in which this Ugandan movement is also about the management and maintenance of other models of family and gender relationships. Young men feel that they have lost out on opportunities available to older generations, undermining their status in both newer regimes of gender relations where a primacy is placed on consumption, as well as in older ones where a man's status is most clearly marked by his marriage, children, and the maintenance of other kin and client relationships. Their model of "faithful" marriage dialectically engages with constructions of both "modern" and "traditional" families, neither accepting nor discarding either, but seeking out a new version that addresses the particular concerns of contemporary youth who simultaneously embrace and feel anxious about the social changes that have marked this generation. Youths' reinterpretation of what has been a widely—and, as I will discuss below, often legitimately—criticized American international health policy represents something more than the simple binary of reproduction or resistance often used to characterize the actions of subaltern subjects. Rather, their engagement with "faithfulness" is indicative of—to use the anthropologist Charles Piot's phrase—a "proliferating and multivectored agency."[27] This Ugandan Christian social movement, articulated through "global" relationships and enabled by American funding, reflects how religious discourses and practices have become a primary way by which Africans themselves shape and remodel their own distinct experiences of "modernity" and modern love.

I will close with some reflection as to how this movement and the discourse of "faithful love," while so revealing of the ways by which youth manage conflicting social demands, presents potential problems for HIV/AIDS prevention. One criticism of PEPFAR's emphasis on "abstain and be faithful" has come from women's organizations that view women's rights within marriage, especially limitations on some women's right to refuse sex, as a major challenge to the efficacy of a faithfulness strategy. In short, a focus on individual agency in the management of sexual choices obscures the role of one's partner's behavior in shaping disease risk. The particular ways in which Ugandan youth frame the meaning of faithfulness do not resolve this problem. The dynamics of gender relations are not significantly challenged by the faithfulness discourse, rather an older model of gendered norms is reinforced. Faithfulness is appealing in part because it emphasizes male agency in the relationships between genders in the face of social changes that have undermined young men's status. Women are drawn to the message because the relative control they are afforded in modern "dating" relationships does not equate to the social status and respectability associated with a formal marriage. But the promise of intimacy and trust that underlies a faithful marriage is no guarantee that such a partnership will materialize, or if it does, that it will last. In theory, "abstain and be faithful" presents a foolproof method of disease prevention, but realities can prove more complicated. Without broader social changes that address the structural limitations that many women face, it will be difficult for abstinence and faithfulness to succeed as an HIV-prevention strategy in isolation, especially for the average Ugandan.

The public emphasis on a discourse of Christian sexual morality may present other troubling consequences in the realm of AIDS prevention. As Shanti Parikh has argued in her analysis of the behavior of married men in Uganda, the new public emphasis on "faithfulness" in Uganda may do little to change sexual behaviors and habits—like the prevalence of concurrent partnerships—but it may make such habits less likely to be openly discussed.[28] An increased stigma associated with concurrent relationships would complicate efforts to encourage the open discussion of risks within such partnerships.[29] Such a development poses real problems in a community where not all adults embrace born-again sexual behavioral ideals. For Ugandan Christian youth, "faithful" love provided the means to address many of the anxieties they expressed regarding gender relations and family life, and in so doing revealed how changing economic and social contexts reshape attitudes about sex, and color the interpretation of global health messages. These (re)interpretations of faithfulness underscore the importance of taking into consideration the variable local contexts and structural constraints that shape efforts at disease prevention.

Notes

1. On Ugandan prevention programs see, for instance, Shelton et al. 2004; Epstein 2008; Green et al. 2006.
2. An expanded discussion of PEPFAR's focus on "faithfulness," and the ways the message was interpreted by Ugandan youth, can be found in Boyd 2015, Chapter 5.
3. For instance, see Parikh 2007, 2009.
4. Long-term concurrent partnerships are those where an individual maintains a sustained sexual relationship with more than one partner over a significant period of time. A married man who also has a long-term relationship with a girlfriend would be one common example of such a triad. A significant body of research has focused on the prevalence of concurrent, long-term partnerships in parts of sub-Saharan Africa and the risk they pose for HIV/AIDS transmission. See, for instance: Epstein 2008; Mah and Halperin 2010; Thornton 2008.
5. For one such critique: "Is It Churlish to Criticise Bush over His Spending on AIDS?" *Lancet* (2004).
6. See, for discussions of PCC globally and in Africa: Martin 1990; Jenkins 2002; Robbins 2004; Meyer 2004. I use the term "born-again" to refer to these churches because that is the term that is most popularly adopted by Ugandans to distinguish these churches from the mainline churches that long dominated colonial and postcolonial religious life in Uganda.
7. See Rudnyckyj 2010 for an excellent discussion of the role of new religious practices in neoliberal approaches to economic development.
8. In Buganda history see Musisi 1991; for contemporary studies of Ugandan masculinity and attitudes about ideal sexual behavior see Parikh 2007, 2009.
9. Epstein 2008, 57. To put this statistic in other words, many Ugandans would question (and have) assertions made by Bush administration officials that "faithfulness," in the form of a monogamous marriage, is a cultural norm in Uganda.
10. See, for instance: Alidou 2005; Deeb 2006; Hassett 2007; Masquelier 2009.
11. The study of PCCs in Africa has especially focused on the meaning and experience of modernity, in large part because such churches have distinguished themselves from earlier forms of Christianity popular on the continent by cultivating a discursive and material focus on "modern" life, and an antagonistic stance toward so-called traditional culture (see Meyer 2004). Ethnographies of PCCs

have addressed the management and production of this dichotomy between the traditional and the modern, and the ways that religious practice has become a way to manage and reproduce an experience of the modern, contemporary world that takes seriously the social and spiritual power of local "traditional" religious forces. See: Coleman 2000; Engelke 2004; Hunt 2002; Marshall-Fratani 1998; Meyer 1998; Van Dijk 1997.

12. See Karlström 2004, Hanson 2003 for discussions of "moral crisis" in the colonial period. See also various studies of the East African Revival, whose participants saw themselves as advocates for a more morally authentic Christianity, critical of mainline churches and their leaders who, revivalists argued, had become extensions of a colonial bureaucracy (Peterson 2001; Ward 1989). Both sets of debates were framed around the redefinition of moral behavior within varying constructs of both "modern" and "traditional" identity. They speak to the ways these terms have long been subject to negotiation, not only by colonial and missionary outsiders, but by Ugandans themselves who were deeply invested in both reinforcing, as well as challenging, different aspects of "customary" and "Christian" life.
13. Uganda is extremely diverse, with more than 30 different ethnic groups, with the most recognized cultural division being one between the south/west and the north/east. Northern and some eastern ethnic groups speak languages in the Nilotic and Sudanic-language groups; those in the south and west speak languages in the Bantu-language group. The perceived cultural distinctions between north and south are keenly felt by Ugandans.
14. The names of churches and informants have been changed in accordance with agreements to protect subjects' anonymity.
15. Comaroff and Comaroff 2005; Durham 2000; Weiss 2009.
16. Ralph 2008; Mains 2007.
17. Ferguson 2006.
18. Smith 2007, 144.
19. "Tradition" has long been recognized by social scientists as a discursive construction (see, for instance, Hobsbawm and Ranger 2012). The meanings attributed to "traditional culture" are varied, and open to historical change everywhere, but they are also imbued with hegemonic authority, i.e., "this is how it has always been," and are thus socially significant for the ways they appear never to have changed. In Uganda "tradition" is a term used widely to describe Ugandan cultural practices and ways of life. Problematically, "traditional" life is often contrasted with modern/Western culture in ways that seem to exclude Ugandan culture from the realm of modernity. The terms "tradition" and "modernity" frequently enter into everyday discussions in Uganda about family, culture, and

behavioral norms. Recognizing the problems associated with this term, I use it widely in this discussion to reference Ugandan youths' own perspectives and linguistic choices.

20. Bridewealth ceremonies and religious ceremonies are each considered legally binding forms of marriage on their own in Uganda, but most couples with the means to do so will choose to conduct both ceremonies, days or sometimes years apart, to mark a marriage.
21. Engels 1985; see also Ahearn 2001.
22. See Cole 2004; 2009; Hunter 2009; Parikh 2004.
23. See also Sadgrove 2007; Mills and Ssewakiryanga 2005.
24. Lucy Mair documented the delay of marriage as early as the 1930s in communities in southern Uganda (Mair 1940). Similarly, in their ethnography of Kampala in the 1950s, Southall and Gutkind describe a range of domestic partnerships that emerged to fill the void caused by delays in marriage, mostly due to the costs associated with bridewealth and church weddings (Southall and Gutkind 1957, 66–71).
25. Wardlow 2006, 57.
26. Foucault 1988.
27. Piot 1999, 178.
28. See Parikh 2007 for a study of this effect in eastern Uganda.
29. See Thornton 2008 and Epstein 2008 for a discussion of concurrent relationships in Uganda, and their significance for AIDS prevention policy.

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CHAPTER 4

Globalization and New Christian Geographies in Africa: A Cautionary Optimism amidst Growing Afropessimism

Joseph Mensah

Entering the Inquiry[1]

Since the mid-1990s, the term "globalization" has become an all-purpose buzzword in public and scholarly debates. It is now used in a variety of ways, "some of which are mutually reinforcing, while others are outright contradictory."[2] We thus find Friedman observing, perhaps sarcastically, that "globalization is everything and its opposite";[3] and Beyer and Beaman noting that "globalization, it almost seems, is about everything, and everything has something to do with globalization."[4] With so many interpretations of globalization, the term runs the risk of becoming a hollow "global cliché," write Lechner and Boli.[5]

Like globalization, religion too has emerged as a force to be reckoned with in both everyday narratives and scholarly debates, especially on world politics and international relations. Unquestionably, this is attributable not only to the rise of militant Islam, following the events of 9–11, but also to the resurgence of Christian Pentecostal and Charismatic movements around the world. Still, because globalization is often seen in economic and technological terms, analysts have generally steered clear of connecting it to religion in the available literature. As Beyer and Beaman point out, "[g]iven the proliferation of the concept (of globalization), it is perhaps surprising that religion has become *comparatively* neglected in the many debates in…the vast literature on the topic; at least in the sense that religion does not very often seem to be about globalization nor globalization about religion."[6] Of course there are notable exceptions as hinted by Beyer and Beaman's emphasis on "comparatively" in the preceding quote. For instance, Kurzman has written about the increased use of global technological innovations by the ever-threatening bin Laden Al Qaeda network.[7] Similarly, Tibi has discussed the challenges posed by Islamic fundamentalism under contemporary globalization,[8] in ways that are symptomatic of Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations.*[9] Also, Roy has documented how some radical Muslims have distorted Islam through various globalization-induced deterritorialized networks of militants to exacerbate global cultural conflicts.[10] With regard to Christianity, Lechner and Boli have shown how Pentecostal churches have used the innovations of globalization to forge transnational connections to become a global cultural phenomenon.[11] As well, Casanova has written on how globalization has offered unique opportunities for the spread of Catholicism;[12] and Philip Jenkins, in his *Next Christendom*, documents the shifting of Christianity's epicenter from the global North to the South.[13]

The literature on the relationship between globalization and religion has been particularly scanty for Africa. And this lacuna is both surprising and unsurprising at once. With the increasing marginalization of Africa in global time-space compression innovations,[14] in particular, and in the global economy, in general, it is hardly surprising that many analysts offer only a perfunctory coverage of Africa, if at all, in their discussions of globalization. It is equally unsurprising that the scanty literature on Africa tends to paint an unflattering image of the continent and, thus, feeds into the chorus of Afropessimism. Conversely, with the heightened global resurgence of African religiosity, it is somewhat surprising that only few studies have dealt with the conjoint analysis of globalization and religion among Africans.[15]

As a contribution to the incipient literature on the subject, this chapter examines how globalization intersects with religion in Africa. While the chapter deals with religion as a whole, it also pays particular attention to Christianity (the second largest religion in Africa), merely for the sake of variety, as the next chapter by Seck focuses on Islam, to which most Africans belong. The ensuing discussion is premised on the position that African religions not only respond to the opportunities and challenges of globalization, but also influence globalization proactively, through such processes as international migration and the transnational flow of remittances. The chapter contends that religion is poised to be a constructive conduit for the incorporation of Africa(ns) into contemporary globalization and thus help alleviate some of the growing sense of pessimism surrounding the continent in the new world order. Still, the chapter tempers this sense of optimism with caution as the potential outcome of the relationship between globalization and religion in Africa is not necessarily all-positive. For one thing, it is even doubtful whether the theologies of some of the contemporary African Christian groups chime with the protestant ethics a la Weber.[16] Freston has shown how the "prosperity gospel" commonly found among new Pentecostals in Brazil undermines hard work and investment in that country[17]—unfortunately, the situation is not much different from what prevails in many parts of Africa.

The rest of the chapter is organized under four substantive sections. The first deals with the growing sense of pessimism surrounding Africa in the *order of things* under contemporary globalization. This is followed by a brief historiography of religion in Africa, and then, a discussion of the resurgence of religion in Africa. We tackle the core issue of the chapter—that is, the role of Christian religion under contemporary globalization in Africa—in the next section, before exiting the inquiry with some general comments on the need for caution in examining the interconnections between religion and globalization in Africa.

A Chorus of Afropessimism under Contemporary Globalization

Used in this inquiry to connote the negative perceptions, sentiments, and commentaries commonly espoused on Africa(ns) by both foreigners and Africans themselves, *Afropessimism* is, indeed, nothing new. However, like globalization, it has intensified in recent years thanks to innovations in electronic mediation and their attendant intensification of global consciousness. Afropessimism is a complex phenomenon, with different versions and espousers. At the very extreme are the doomsday Afropessimists who project the present predicaments of Africa into the foreseeable future, and see no hope whatsoever for the continent. To these extremists, including the likes of a 2000 issue of *The Economist*, Hitchens,[18] Michaels,[19] and Johnson,[20] there is no need for the West to bother so much about Africa, except perhaps with efforts to recolonize the continent. These extremists often paint a bleak picture of the continent as a whole, paying no attention to the advances made in individual countries. Some even believe that Africa has not given anything worthwhile to the world, except, perhaps, HIV/AIDS and kindred scourges, which are routinely, and quite mysteriously, traced to Africa through self-serving pseudoscience.

At the other end of the Afropessimism continuum are those who present Africa in perhaps no less negative terms, but still see some hope for the continent. To the extent that scholars in this latter camp are somewhat optimistic about the continent's future and do not engage in the reductionism and totalizing discourse of the extremist, it is not totally accurate to describe them as Afropessimists. In fact, there are many renowned African and non-African scholars, including Caplan,[21] Collier,[22] Mbembe,[23] Bayart,[24] Kaplan,[25] and George,[26] whose writings consistently point to empirically verifiable unappealing facts about Africa, without the added reductionism or the racism-laced doomsday prophesies so common in much of the Afropessimistic literature on the "embattled continent."[27] Thus, it is reasoned that, despite their somewhat alarmist tone, it would be problematic, if not erroneous, to brand these latter authors as Afropessimists.

Paralleling the continuum of Afropessimism is a range of explanations for the "African tragedy," to borrow Giovanni Arrighi's phrase for a moment.[28] While some accord culpability mainly to external factors, including (neo)colonization, the IMF and World Bank-sponsored structural adjustment programs (SAPs), unequal terms of trade, and so on, others are quick to blame endogenous factors such as the post-colonial kleptocracy, corruption, nepotism, and the culture of greed and conspicuous consumption exhibited by the African elite. Still others give almost equal responsibility to external and internal factors. Regardless of the typology one uses to analyze Afropessimism, there is no denying that it has reached its apogee in recent years under contemporary globalization. Not surprisingly, Achille Mbembe opened his *On the Postcolony* with the observation that "[s]peaking rationally about Africa is not something that has ever come naturally. Doing so, at this *cusp between millennia*, comes even less so."[29] Still, as to whether the link between globalization and Afropessimism is a causal one, or merely coincidental, is hard to tell.

While several African economies (e.g., those of Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, etc.) did relatively well in their immediate postindependence era, many of them went into a tailspin by the mid-1980s. The living conditions across the continent deteriorated to the point of prompting some analysts to dub the 1980s, "Africa's lost decade."[30] It is this same realization that ushered in the infamous SAPs, with which the IMF and the World Bank compelled African countries (and many others in the global South) to accept stringent free-market conditionalities, or the Washington Consensus, in return for development loans.

Oddly, after more than a decade of "structural adjustment," African economies remain structurally unchanged; most of them are still predominantly primary producers. Also, economic growth rates remain low or nonexistent, with poverty, inequality, unemployment, and foreign debt still climbing. The negative statistics on Africa are virtually endless. For instance, estimates by Arrighi indicate that the average GNP per capita in sub-Saharan Africa declined between 1970 and 1998.[31] In a similar vein, the UNDP noted in its *2006 Human Development Report* that "since the mid-1970s almost all regions have been progressively increasing their HDI [Human Development Index] score . . . the major exception is sub-Saharan Africa."[32] In fact, 28 of the 31 low human development countries of the world are in sub-Saharan Africa.[33] It is against the backdrop of such empirical facts that Zygmunt Bauman, for one, talks of Africa as a continent with "wasted lives," with little or no use to global capitalism.[34] Also, Neil Smith sees the continent as a "global ghetto," effectively abandoned by global capitalism, while Manuel Castells in his *End of Millennium* describes Africa as a "black hole" and the "switched-off region" of the information society.[35] Susan George was even more dramatic years ago with her observation that "One can almost hear the sound of sub-Saharan Africa sliding off the world map."[36] The deplorable political situation across the continent has elicited similar ominous descriptions in both everyday narratives and scholarly writings: Castells talks of the "predatory state" and "the political economy of begging in Africa,"[37] just as Bayart, Reno, and Frimpong-Ansah write about the "politics of the belly," [38] "warlord politics," [39] and the "vampire state"[40] in Africa, respectively.

Even though Africa is not totally cut off from contemporary economic globalization, the nexus has long been one of selective incorporation, rather than ubiquity. As Ferguson points out, global economic networks do not cover Africa, but they "hop over the territories inhabited by the vast majority of the African population. This leaves most Africans with only a tenuous and indirect connection to 'the global economy.'"[41] It is not surprising, therefore, to hear of Africa's marginalization in the prevailing discourse on globalization.[42] At the same time, as feminist scholars have long reminded us—through such terms as *situated knowledge* and *God-trick*[43]—"what we see depends on where we are looking from."[44] In what follows, it will be demonstrated that when one looks at Africa's ties with globalization from the standpoint of religion, in particular, the picture that emerges is different. It is a picture of increasing incorporation rather than one of marginalization.

Religion in Africa: Historical Context

Africa has long been a hub of religious diversity and vitality. Until the colonial era, traditional African religions were so intertwined with African cultures that it was almost impossible to de-link the two in any serious sociocultural analysis of the continent. As Ali Mazrui puts it, "long before the religion of the crescent or the religion of the cross arrived on the African continent, Africa was at worship, its sons and daughters were at prayers."[45] While there are many different traditional religions across the continent, most of them share a common belief in transcendental reality—including beliefs in a Supreme Being, animism, witchcraft, spirits, and ancestral worship.[46] Even with the introduction of Christianity and Islam centuries ago, traditional African religions have retained their resiliency and adaptability, infiltrating some of these foreign religions with Afrocentric worldviews.

Of the two major non-African religions now common on the continent, namely Islam and Christianity, the latter was the first to make contact with Africa in as far back as the first century when the Christian Orthodox Church was established in Alexandria. By the fourth century, Christianity had spread across Egypt and Ethiopia in the Northeast to the Maghreb lands of the Northwest. However, as Adogame points out, Christianity was unable to permeate the life of the indigenous people in these early years, and it fell on even harder times when it subsequently encountered the expansion of Islam in Northern Africa.[47] A second, and relatively more successful, phase of Christianization in Africa occurred in the sub-Saharan region during the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, with the exploration of the continent by Europeans, including the Portuguese, British, French, and the Dutch.[48]

The infamous partition of Africa among the imperial powers, following the Berlin Conference of 1884–85, brought a dramatic expansion of missionary activities across the continent, as colonialism, missionary activities, and slavery became mutually supportive components of the Euro-imperialist adventure on the continent. Meanwhile, efforts by the colonialists to obliterate African cultures and to impose Eurocentric beliefs were met with varying degrees of resistance, adaptations, and hybridization from many Africans. These cultural engagements culminated in the formation of African Initiated (or Indigenous) Churches (AICs), especially from the 1920s onwards. Formed by African religious leaders outside the immediate purview of the mission churches, these AICs managed to develop brands of Christianity whose practical approach to life and religiosity became very attractive to many Africans.[49] Noteworthy examples of the early AICs include the Zionist Church in South Africa, the Aladura movement in Nigeria, the Arathi churches in East Africa, as well as the many Spiritualist churches that emerged in West Africa then.[50]

As with Christianity, the influence of Islam in Africa is a longstanding one, as the chapter by Seck will show. Islam in Africa goes back to the seventh century when many Muslims fled to North Africa to escape religious persecution by pre-Islamic inhabitants of the Arabian Peninsula; this constitutes the first *Hijrah*, or migration, in the Islamic tradition. Until about 1450, religious, educational, and commercial networks of Muslims were the main conduits between the sub-Saharan African empires (e.g., those of Ghana, Mali, Songhai, and Sudan) and the outside world. While the spatial diffusion of Islam to West Africa came from the North, across the Sahara, that of East Africa emanated primarily from places such as Arabia, Persia, and India, across the Red and Arabian seas. As the influence of Islam from regions of the Arabian Peninsula became more entrenched, new languages such as Swahili emerged out of the admixtures between various Bantu dialects of East Africa and Arabic.[51] African Muslims hold a wide variety of beliefs and theologies, although the vast majority of them are Sunni. Even the extent of their adherence to Shar'ia law varies widely. Adding to the diversity of Islamic identity in Africa is the proliferation of African-grown Sufi orders, such as the Ahmadiyya, Muridiyya, Yan Izala, Qadiriyya, and Tijaniyya—all of which are in complex permutations with both Shia and Sunni Islam.

Naturally, Africans' encounter with Islam, Christianity, and other religions has undermined some of their traditional religious beliefs, and at the same time reinforced others. The encounter has not only yielded African converts for Christianity and Islam, but has also resulted in new religious movements through flexible acculturation and the appropriation of foreign theologies and rituals into new religious movements across the continent. Over time, though, as more and more Africans became connected to the world system through various regimes of domination and internationalization (e.g., neo/colonization, globalization, SAPs, etc.), many of them shifted their faith allegiance to non-African religions, with Christianity and Islam being the main beneficiaries in the process.

Today, the vast majority of Africa's population of more than 800 million belongs to either the religion of the crescent or that of the cross. Estimates by Kaba show that by 2001, some 45.1 percent of Africans were Muslim; 36.9 percent were Christians; 16.7 percent belonged to indigenous African religions, with some 1.3 percent belonging to other religious faiths or having no religion whatsoever.[52] On the whole, Northern Africa is dominated by Islamic religion (see Table 4.1), with most of the countries there—e.g., Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Western Sahara—having 90 percent or more of their populations belonging to the Islamic faith.[53] Western Africa is also home to a sizeable proportion of Africa's Muslims, especially in countries such as the Gambia, Senegal, Guinea, Chad, Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria, where there are 50 percent or more of their respective populations professing the Islamic faith.[54]

Table 4.1 Religious affiliation in Africa, July 2001

Region of Africa	*Indigenous Religion (%)*	*Islam (%)*	*Christianity (%)*	*Others& No Religion (%)*	*Total (in millions) N=823.4mil*
Eastern[1]	20.6	23.4	53.6	2.4	252.4
Middle[2]	22.0	13.5	63.5	0.5	96.8
Northern[3]	4.9	91.0	3.3	0.3	183.2
Southern[4]	28.0	1.7	68.0	2.2	50.2
Western[5]	17.0	54.0	27.5	0.7	240.7

Source: Kaba (2005, 561).

Notes

[1] *Eastern Africa includes 19 countries: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Réunion, Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Mayotte.*

[2] *Middle Africa includes 9 countries: Angola, Cameroon, Central Africa Rep., Chad, Congo Rep., Congo Democratic Rep., Gabon, São Toméand Principe, and Equatorial Guinea.*

[3] *Northern Africa includes 7 countries: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, and Western Sahara.*

[4] *Southern Africa includes 5 countries: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland.*

[5] *Western Africa includes 17 countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Mauritania, and Saint Helena.*

Christianity—and to some extent Indigenous African religions—is relatively common in Southern, Eastern, and Middle Africa;[55] clearly, Christianity is the main religion in sub-Saharan Africa.

Religious Resurgence in Africa

Thomas writes: "We live in a world that is not supposed to exist."[56] Why? Because, contrary to the secularization thesis, which posits that the influence of religion will decline with time as societies modernize, there has been a dramatic resurgence of religion, especially in the global South where the bulk of the world's population now lives. Estimates by Philip Jenkins indicate that:

> If we combine the figures for Europe, North America, and the lands of the former Soviet Union, then in 1900, these Northern regions (or advanced nations) accounted for 32 percent of the world population...By 1950, the share (of the advanced nations) had fallen a little to 29%, but the rate of contraction then accelerated, to 25 percent in 1970, and around 18 percent by 2000. By 2050, the figure should be around 10 or 12 percent.[57]

Obviously, the reverse is statistically true for the rate of population growth for the regions of the global South. For instance Jenkins notes that: "Africa and Latin America combined made up only 13 percent of the world's people in 1900, but the figure has now grown to 21 percent. Every indication suggests that the rate of change is accelerating. By 2050, Africa and Latin America will probably be home to 29% of the world's population."[58] In the specific context of sub-Saharan Africa, available data indicate that the eight most populous nations, including Nigeria, Ethiopia, Sudan, South Africa, Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda, had a combined population of about 400 million at the end of the twentieth century. By 2050, the corresponding figure for these countries is expected to rise well over one billion—admittedly, the actual population may be less if the HIV/AIDS epidemic worsens.[59]

While precise data on religious affiliations among Africans are hard to ascertain, all indications point to a resurgence of religion on the continent. For instance, the number of Christians in Africa is also growing; in 1900 there were only about 9 million Christians on the continent, by the year 2001 this has increased to an estimated 303 million, or some 37 percent of the African population then.[60] It so happens that because of the horrible events of 9–11, the Western media, in particular, tend to focus so much on the growth of Islam, as against Christianity, in Africa (and other parts of the Global South). We now have the United States, as part of its "war on terrorism," showing renewed interest in Africa to help quell the rise of militant Islam in dysfunctional states such as Somalia. Sure, Islam is growing in Africa, but so is Christianity. And, as Thomas points out, it is difficult to talk about the growth of Islam without giving due acknowledgment to the rise of Pentecostal and Charismatic Christianity in Africa (as in Asia and Latin America).[61]

The ongoing religious resurgence brings to mind a strange irony among Western sociologists of religion, recently hinted at by Roland Robertson: "many people have identified themselves with this subdiscipline by proclaiming the demise of religion itself."[62] To account for this "unanticipated" resurgence of religion, Norris and Inglehart have revised the long-standing secularization thesis with their new notion of *existential insecurity*. To them, the secularization thesis remains, by and large, accurate, and that religion continues to lose its social and political relevance due to modernization and improved human development, except in the regions of the global South where there is a growing "existential insecurity." Bluntly put, poor people, or people who have difficulty satisfying their material or basic needs are inclined to be religious, according to Norris and Inglehart.[63] In a way, Norris and Inglehart's position is not much different from the orthodox secularization thesis, except that they are more explicit on the role of economics, or material needs, in human religiosity. Their basic argument has some intuitive appeal, especially since they acknowledge the exceptional cases of countries such as the United States and Ireland, where there is not much "existential insecurity," but religion continues to grow.

Still, their hypothesis of *existential insecurity* falls short of addressing some crucial questions. For instance, can we really account for human religiosity only from the standpoint of economics or the lack of basic material needs, without indulging in material or economic reductionism? If the hypothesis of existential insecurity is valid, how then do we account for the rise of Pentecostal and Charismatic Christianity, in particular, among upper- and middle-class people in Africa and Asia, and even among the so-called religious right in the United States? Is not it somewhat ethnocentric to argue that people everywhere—be they essentially materialistic or not—adhere to religion to console themselves from the lack of material well-being? And is it unreasonable to contend, as Thomas does, that poverty is not the main source of human vulnerability or insecurity, as those with "less are actually less worried about losing it?"[64] Put another way, if human vulnerability emanates primarily from the lack of material riches, then how do we account for the far higher rates of suicide, for instance, among Japanese, German, Swiss, Finnish, French, American, and Danish men compared to men in most African countries?[65]

In counterpoint to the economic determinism and the Eurocentricism implicated in the existential insecurity argument, it is reasoned that the religious resurgence in Africa is interconnected with the phenomenon of globalization—a phenomenon that some may reasonably conceive of as a form of modernization and others may, admittedly, see as a source of human vulnerability in Africa. It is argued that religion in Africa performs a lot more functions under contemporary globalization than merely consoling Africans in the face of economic vulnerability or existential insecurity. It has a dynamic bearing on politics, empowerment, class relations, gender roles, citizenship, civil society, cultural diffusion, and transnational migration among Africans, and, therefore, has the potential to facilitate the "eventual" incorporation of Africans into the "global village." Still, the influence of religion in contemporary Africa is not all-positive. Consequently, without conscious efforts to tap into its positive attributes—while simultaneously toning down its negative effects—religion can subvert the socioeconomic development of Africa, and thus, feed into the growing chorus of Afropessimism.

Religion/Christianity under Contemporary Globalization in Africa

The works of several scholars[66] point to an increasing public role of religion, particularly Christianity, in contemporary Africa. This is all the more remarkable given the conspicuous absence of religious groups in Africa's liberation struggle, with the notable exception of South Africa where Christian liberation theology was highly popular in the antiapartheid movement. Prior to the late 1950s and early 1960s, most Christian groups were under the leadership of Europeans, many of whom supported the colonial enterprise and had vested interest in the maintenance of the status quo.[67] Also, the European tradition of separation of religion from the state was extended to African colonies whenever it served the self-interest of the European powers.

Recently, though, the situation has changed with the line between religion and the African state blurring over time. Religion now plays a variety of roles in the African public arena, a trend that is attributable, at least in part, to the erosion of the power of the state under globalization.[68] As Meyer points out in the specific context of Christianity, “important facts explaining Christianity’s public role are the precarious role of the African postcolonial state, with its run-down structures of governance and failures to achieve legitimacy, and its loosening grip on ‘civil society’ as a result of IMF’s pressure for ‘good governance’ and ‘democratization.’”[69] Of course, Meyer is not alone in bringing the IMF and its conditionalities into the equation. Pfeiffer, Gimbel-Sherr, and Augusto even go as far as to assert that Africa’s primary connection to globalization has been through SAPs—and, of course, one can hardly talk of SAPs without implicating the IMF (and the World Bank). Pfeiffer, Gimbel-Sherr, and Augusto write about an increasing affinity of Mozambican women toward Pentecostalism, as a result of the gender-based inequities engendered by SAPs. According to them:

> Neoliberal reforms implemented through a World Bank and IMF-sponsored structural adjustment program that promoted the privatization and contraction of social services in Mozambique actually worsened economic inequality and placed new stresses on poor households in ways that affected men and women differently. In the context of growing socioeconomic differentiation, whereby men increasingly earn and control most household income, the churches appear to provide a uniquely effective way for women to feel protected and to address misfortunes specific to the vulnerabilities created by the deepening inequalities within Mozambican communities and households.[70]

As the SAPs-induced economic hardship worsened and many African governments lost their ability to provide the necessary socioeconomic support for their citizens,[71] religious organizations on the continent strengthened their external networks for development assistance, thereby boosting the public role of religion in African countries. Quite expectedly, foreign governments and religious organizations have responded in ways that enhance their own influence in Africa.

That nearly all African Catholic churches, for instance, now have African bishops should not prompt us to underestimate the extent of their external links. As Gifford notes, “overseas links . . . bring resources, and the Catholic Church has enormous resources available to it, so much so that it always seems to be presumed that money will come from external sources; it is rare in Africa to hear Catholic appeals for money.”[72] Other African Christian groups, notably the

Charismatic and Pentecostal movements, have tapped into yet another formidable, globalization-enhanced network—namely, transnational migration—not only to procure financial and material resources from overseas, but also to promote their religion among diasporic Africans.

In their 2005 monograph, *Religion in the Context of African Migration,* Afe Adogame and Cordula Weissköppel document how African immigrants use religion to facilitate their settlement process in various European cities. Olupona and Gemignani have recently provided a fairly similar account on African immigrants in America.[73] From these and many other writings,[74] we now know that African Christians use their international networks for several purposes, including missionary activities (commonly dubbed "reverse mission"), fund-raising, ecumenical affiliations, leadership exchange programs, conferences, and other special events.

Still, with all the excitement about African evangelism and "reverse missions" in Europe and the Americas, African churches are yet to make perceptible inroads into the white population, due to such factors as cultural and language barriers, the lack of financial wherewithal, xenophobia, and sometimes outright hostility from the dominant white population.[75] At the same time, there is little doubt that religion has become a germane conduit by which Africans are inserting themselves and their cultures into contemporary globalization, at least to the extent that African religious organizations rely on the same processes of globalization (e.g., international migration, remittance flows, and electronic mediation) to maintain their external links. This point is all the more crucial, considering that Africans have generally been bypassed by economic globalization.[76]

Evidently, as African states continue to struggle and the chorus of Afropessimism reaches a crescendo, religious groups are stepping up their efforts to take on more responsibilities. Gifford[77] and De Gruchy[78] have written extensively about how African Christian leaders, for instance, have often mediated between warring factions and promoted national reconciliation and reconstruction following serious interclass and interethnic conflicts. The well-publicized endeavors of Isidore de Sousa in Benin, Philippe Fanoko Kpodzro in Togo, Ernest Kombo in Congo, and, of course, the legendary Desmond Tutu in South Africa are worthy of note here. So are the vociferous public criticisms mounted by Malawian Catholic bishops in the early 1990s, which culminated in the eventual termination of President Banda's rule. The same can be said of the efforts of the Madagascan

Council of Churches in the eventual ousting of President Ratsiraka in 1992.[79]

At the same time, the nexus between religion and African development, in general, and national unity, in particular, has not always been positive—as the recurrent conflicts between Christians and Muslims in places such as Nigeria and Sudan, and the rise of Islamic "fundamentalism" in Egypt, Somalia, Algeria, Morocco, and northern Nigeria remind us all. The common practice of some religious denominations calling for prayers for national leaders, encouraging adherents to abide by the rule of law, to perform their civic duties, and to pay their taxes may be all well and good for national development and democratic governance. However, the usual separation of religion from matters of the state, and the common call to give Caesar his due and Jesus his, feed into a situation where some religious groups steer clear of controversial matters concerning state governance. The *Caesar v. Jesus* doctrine is used, conveniently, by some African Christian leaders to stay out of any popular political opposition, as long as the situation does not affect their ability to practice their own religion. Indeed, this sentiment underpins Haynes' provocative assertion of a "hegemonial coalition" between African religious leaders and secular political leaders that seeks to maintain elite control of society and to reduce popular dissent as much as possible. With insights from Gramsci, Haynes alerts us to the complexity of this hegemony: it entails an ideological emphasis on the "goodness" of national stability over progressive change; the cooption (or the clandestine recruitment) of religious leaders—on the basis of denomination, ethnicity, level of education and so on—into the inner circles of the political and social elite; and the regular provision of material rewards for church leaders for their loyalty and ability to act as gatekeepers between political leaders and the church masses for the maintenance of the political status quo.[80] Still, as Mbembe[81] and Bayart[82] point out, religion, especially popular religion dominated by ordinary people, often provides alternative civic and political space in response to the despotic inclinations of many African political leaders. Similarly, Van Dijk's work among Ghanaian immigrant churches in Holland suggests that these diasporic Africans use their churches to resist some official regulations in their host country by allowing their church members who are without any official staying permits to get married—and thus, posing a serious challenge to the power of the state.[83] Some of these Christian immigrants even console themselves with the idea of being "citizens of heaven," when faced with various forms of discrimination that undermine their worldly citizenship in their adopted nations.[84]

With religion, people are able to go beyond the traditional constrictions of the extended family and tribal links to forge "imagined communities," or identities and allegiances that cut across kinships to promote intertribal cooperation and respect.[85] As a corollary, religious groups are able to provide alternative structures to oversee courtship and marriages in local communities, thereby increasing marriage opportunities for prospective couples. Of course, that human spirituality and religious imaginations tend to be delocalized feeds into these positive attributes of religion in Africa. Furthermore, with religion, traditional roles of African women and the youth are effectively diluted as these "cultural subalterns" become empowered in ways that are otherwise impossible, given the characteristic dominance of the male adult in most African traditional cultural settings.

Notwithstanding these unity and empowerment merits, we must not forget that religion continues to be a source of conflicts and tensions across Africa. Religious identities are frequently used to demonize people and to engage in critical alterity, as in the cynical, and sometimes dangerous, othering of Muslims by Christians, non-believers by "born-agains," Catholics by Protestants, and even Pentecostals by Charismatics, and vice versa, in all the above cases. Moreover, there are indications that, unlike the situation in the immediate post-independent era when the burgeoning AICs were proud advocates of traditional African cultures and spirituality, the growth areas of African religion now seem to be in churches where traditional African cultures are demonized as feeding into practices of witchcraft, sorcery, black magic, and occultism—at least, this is what Paul Gifford uncovered from survey data from Ghana.[86]

It is virtually impossible to discuss the role of religion in contemporary Africa without any mention of the rise of Pentecostal and Charismatic movements, and their attendant prosperity gospel, among Africans on the continent and beyond. As Meyer points out, the growth of these movements started in Anglophone countries, notably Ghana and Nigeria, and later spread to Francophone ones such as Benin, Togo, and Cameroon, where the predominant Catholic church had long distrusted these movements as "tending to draw its adherents into a mainly Protestant, US-oriented, Anglo-sphere."[87]

At the level of theology, these new churches espouse a "prosperity gospel," the core tenets of which can be summed up in two related propositions: first, that God has already met all the needs of his or her followers through the crucifixion, death, and resurrection of Jesus, and that Christians (especially born-again ones) are entitled to prosperity (i.e., material wealth and spiritual healing) won for them by Christ. Second, that Christians only have to *believe* and profess their *faith* in Christ, and to obey and provide material and financial support to God's servants to receive this prosperity—this latter principle amounts to the proverbial planting of a seed in faith for which the planter (the believer) could expect to reap fruits in the future.[88] Generally, the new Charismatic and Pentecostal movements criticize the mainline Catholic and Protestant churches (e.g., Methodist, Presbyterian, and Anglican churches) for legitimizing poverty, as something normal for African believers, not only by persistently referring to Jesus as a poor person, but also by encouraging believers to endure earthly hardships in wait for their future rewards in heaven.[89] This criticism is, indeed, not that new; it has long been mounted from a wider spectrum of African religious leaders. For instance, African theologians, meeting in Dar es Salaam in 1976, chastised mainline churches and their Western missionaries for serving the interest of the Western imperialists "by legitimizing it and accustoming their new adherents to accept compensatory expectations of an eternal reward for territorial misfortunes."[90]

The ideas of financially supporting God's servants and their works have often been put into practice by obliging believers to pay tithes of 10 percent of their income to the operations of the church.[91] Unsurprisingly, one finds many new Charismatic and Pentecostal churches amassing considerable material resources and wealth and their leaders—including the likes of Nicholas Duncan-Williams of Ghana, Nevers Mumba of Zambia, Handel Leslie of Uganda, and Benson Idahosa of Nigeria—exhibiting extreme forms of conspicuous consumption, all in consonance with the prosperity gospel. Unfortunately, the trickle-down impacts, or the grassroots manifestations, of this prosperity are yet to be realized by most ordinary members of these churches.

To the extent that the prosperity gospel takes religion over and above human spirituality into matters of economics, wealth creation, and material reality, one can clearly see its overlap with the Methodist theology of John Wesley in the eighteenth century, especially as documented by Max Weber in his *Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism*.[92] Still, as Meyer observes, the strong emphasis of the prosperity gospel on not only becoming rich, but also on showing off one's riches is a clear departure from the early Protestant ethics. Also, whereas early Protestantism encouraged hard work, asceticism, and investment among its believers, the new churches seem to place much of their emphasis on believing in miracles and the “seed faith” theology.[93] And with more and more church leaders and pastors embroiled in scandals and swindles,[94] and the gap between grassroots believers and their leaders growing,[95] it is not difficult to see why many African Christians are becoming disillusioned with the prevailing prosperity gospel. Clearly, from the preceding, any optimism about the role of religion in the African public sphere needs to be tempered with a reasonable dose of caution.

Exiting the Inquiry

We entered this inquiry with three main suppositions: first, that globalization connotes different things to different people, and as a corollary a wide range of global issues are routinely attributed to it, justifiably or otherwise. Second, that because globalization is often seen in economic and technological terms, few analysts have examined its connections with matters of human religiosity—a lacuna that is particularly evident in the context of Africa where the drumbeat of Afropessimism continues unabated. And, third, that if one extends the discourse on globalization to embrace religion, then Africa is not that marginalized after all.

Midway through this intellectual journey, it was clear that Africa, like other regions of the global South, is in the midst of a religious resurgence. Denominations of both Islam and Christianity continue to grow across the continent, even though the former seems to attract the most attention in the Western press, because of concerns over the rise of militant Islam in failed and failing states of Africa. The timeframe of the ongoing religious resurgence in Africa is roughly coterminous with the era of contemporary globalization and, thus, falls squarely in the period of SAPs in Africa. Among other things, we learned that as the economic situation across the continent worsened, and the power of the nation state weakened with stringent structural adjustment conditionalities, religious organizations assumed more social responsibilities in the public sphere. Religious groups have strengthened their external connections not only for the solicitation and procurement of development resources from outside, but also for “reverse missions” abroad. Furthermore, religious organizations have often promoted national unity, conflict resolution, and civic responsibility among their members. It is against the backdrop of such constructive outcomes that religion is here seen as a phenomenon with a germane potential to inject some optimism into the prevailing negativities surrounding Africa's connection to globalization. Still, before exiting this inquiry, it is worth reiterating that the role of religion in the African public sphere under contemporary globalization is scarcely all-positive. While the ongoing religious resurgence has yielded some notable benefits, the role of religion in Africa's development is best cast in dialectical terms, with the resulting positive and negative outcomes, and their attended causalities, often intermingling with each other, recursively, depending on context.

NOTES

1. The idea of "entering" and "exiting" an inquiry is borrowed from Roland Robertson (2007).
2. Mensah 2006a, 62.
3. Friedman 2000, 406.
4. Beyer and Beaman 2007, 1
5. Lechner and Boli 2008, 1.
6. Beyer and Beaman 2007, 1; emphasis in original; mine in parenthesis.
7. Kurzman 2002.
8. Tibi 1998.
9. Huntington 1996.
10. Roy2 004.
11. Lechner and Boli 2005.
12. Casanova 1997.
13. Jenkins 2002.
14. Harvey1 990.
15. Here, the recent works of Adogame 2007; Pheiffer, Gimbel-Sher, and Auugusto 2007; and Gifford 2003 are worthy of note.
16. Weber 1958.
17. Freston 1995.
18. Hitchens 1994.
19. Michaels 1993.
20. Johnson 1993.
21. Caplan2 008.
22. Collier 2007.
23. Mbembe 2001.
24. Bayart 2000; 1989.
25. Kaplan1 994.
26. George 1993.
27. Mensah 2008a.
28. Arrighi 2002.

29. Mbembe 2001. Emphasis is mine.
30. Ngagwa and Green 1994; Chazan et al. 1992.
31. Arrighi 2002.
32. UNDP2 006,2 65.
33. Ibid.
34. Bauman 2004.
35. Castells 2000, 94.
36. George 1993, 66.
37. Castells 2000.
38. Bayart 1989.
39. Reno 1999.
40. Frimpong-Ansah 1991.
41. Ferguson 2006, 14.
42. Castells 2000; George 1993.
43. Haraway 1991.
44. Ferguson 2006, 29.
45. Mazrui1 986,1 35.
46. Adogame 2007, 530.
47. Adogame 2007.
48. Hastings1 994.
49. Adogame 2007
50. Adogame 2007, 538–9.
51. Adogame 2007.
52. Kaba2 005.
53. Kaba 2005; *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 2003.
54. *Encyclopedia Britannica* 2003; Wright 2004.
55. Wright 2004; Kaba 2005.
56. Thomas 2007.
57. Jenkins 2002, 79.
58. Ibid.,8 0.
59. Ibid., 83.
60. Kaba 2005, 561.
61. Thomas 2007.
62. Robertson2 007,1 6.
63. Norris and Inglehart 2004.
64. Thomas 2007, 35.
65. For data on global suicide rates visit: http://fathersfor life.org/health/who_suicide_rates.htm (Accessed in October 10, 2008).
66. e.g., Lunn 2009; Meyer 2004; Gifford 2003; 1998; Haynes 1996; 1995.
67. Haynes 1995.
68. Meyer 2004; Comaroff and Comaroff 2001.
69. Meyer 2004, 465.
70. Pfeiffer, Gimbel-Sherr and Augusto 2007, 689.
71. Mensah 2006b.

72. Gifford 1998, 311.
73. Olupona and Gemignani 2007.
74. Mensah 2008b; Adogame 2007; Van Dijk 2004; 1997.
75. Adogame 2007.
76. Castells 2000.
77. Gifford 1998.
78. De Gruchy 1995.
79. Gifford, 1998.
80. Haynes 1996.
81. Mbembe 1988.
82. Bayart 1993.
83. Van Dijk 2004.
84. Adogame 2007.
85. Anderson 2006.
86. Gifford 1998.
87. Meyer 2004, 453.
88. Meyer 2004; Gifford 1998.
89. Maxwell 1998; Marshall-Fratani 1998.
90. Torres and Fabella 1978, 226.
91. Meyer 2004.
92. Weber 1958.
93. Gifford 1998.
94. Meyer 2004.
95. Smith 2001.

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CHAPTER 5

Contemporary Islamic Discourses in Senegal: Between the Local and the Global

Mamarame Seck

On May 15, 2010, a Sufi gathering was held by a group of Senegalese immigrant Muslims in Raleigh, North Carolina. The purpose of the meeting was to celebrate the *Gàmmu*, the Wolof name given to the celebration of the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad (*Mawlid al-Nabi* in Arabic), an important event both in Senegal and among its citizens living in the Diaspora. The leader of that congregation was Shaykh Ahmet Sy, president of the Islamic Tijaniyya Foundation of America (ITFA) and grandson of El-Hàjj Malick Sy (1855–1922), an important historical Sufi figure of the Tijaniyya in Senegal. Seated next to Shaykh Ahmet Sy were three other *doomi soxna* (children of saintly women) as they are called in Wolof Sufi discourse: Shaykh Mamoune Mbacké and Mamidou Mbacké, both grandsons of Amadu Bamba Mbacké (1853–1927), another important historical Sufi figure of Senegal and founder of the Muridiyya order, and Shaykh Ibra Laye Thiaw, grandson of Seydina Limoulaye (1883–1909), founder of the Layenne order of Senegal. In short, the three major Sufi orders of Senegal's Islamic landscape were represented at the event.

Invited to deliver a speech, as is common on such occasions, Shaykh Mamidou Mbacké depicted Senegal's Sufi Islam as being at the crossroads of two major threats. First, he mentioned the negative image of Islam that has spread throughout the Western world since September 11, 2001, resulting in a general stigmatization of Muslims and Muslim-dominant countries. Second, he criticized global Salafism's attitude toward Sufi Islam, the dominant religious practice of Senegal, which is frequently accused of committing a *shirk* by associating a person, namely a shaykh, with God. In fact, Mamidou Mbacké blamed both global Salafism and the West for undermining West African Sufi values and practices. Subsequently, he argued that three divergent discourses are in competition in Senegal: global Salafism, Western cultural globalization, and Sufism. But what the shaykh forgot to mention was the discourse on Senegalese indigenous culture, which preexisted all these external forces.

Ali A. Mazrui defines globalization as "processes that lead toward global interdependence and the increasing rapidity of exchange across vast distances."[1] He identifies four forces that have been the "engines of globalization," one of which is religion. The other three are technology, economy, and empire. In his book *The Spread of Islam in West Africa: Colonization, Globalization and the Emergence of Fundamentalism*, Pade Badru discusses the theoretical perspectives of the concept of globalization in the literature and identifies three of them: economic globalization; capitalistic globalization, the Neo-Marxist view of globalization as the necessary consequence of capitalist development; and the view of globalization as the result of the social changes of the twentieth century. But Badru argues that all three perspectives ignore the historical factor of globalization that he sees as "a logical extension of the old process of colonization."[2] For him only the context has changed but not the process. Badru thinks that none of the existing theoretical frameworks seem to give prominence to a cultural perspective of globalization, the one that affects the religious and cultural practices of a country like Senegal.

I have chosen to use the term global Salafism to refer to the doctrine of Salafist reform movements across the globe whose goal is to "purify" Muslim society in accordance with their teachings and philosophy. The term Salafist comes from the Arabic word *salaf* meaning "predecessor" or "ancestor." Salafists claim that the beliefs and customs they follow imitate exactly those of the Prophet Muhammad, his companions, and the first generation of his followers. While Olivier Roy[3] argues that Salafism's popularity lies in the "de-territorialized" and "globalized" condition of contemporary Muslims, Bernard Haykel believes "it is Salafism's claims to religious certainty that explain a good deal of its appeal, and its seemingly limitless ability to cite a scripture to back these up."[4] According to Haykel, "a typical Salafi argument is that Salafists, unlike other Muslims, rely exclusively on sound proof-texts [original message] from revelation as the basis for their views, and they adduce the relevant verses or traditions every time they issue a judgment or opinion."[5] In Senegal, Salafism is championed by various reform movements, two of which are the Jama`at ibadar-Rahman (JAR) and Harakat al-Falah. The goal of these movements is to spread a certain form of Islamic practice, observable in other parts of the globe, namely the Middle East and Asia, regardless of the cultural specificities and local conditions. The declared enemy of Salafis in Senegal is not Sufism but Western cultural globalization. Although they are after certain Sufi practices they consider shirk,[6] Salafis have more grievances against the Western values than the indigenous Sufi practices.

Sufism is another globalizing force, although it operates very differently from global Salafism. Indeed, prior to the coming of both Islam and Christianity to West Africa, the indigenous peoples believed in a single creator-god and various spirits. The latter were associated with sacred sites where rituals were held. In addition, West Africans paid respect to the ancestors' spirits and some communities such as the Lebous of Senegal still believe in the power of such spirits and their capacity to watch over community.[7] But, because of its capacity to adapt to the cultural values of local communities that embrace it, Sufism is generally viewed as an internal rather than an external force. One can claim to be Sufi and, at the same time, continue to observe some of the practices and rituals inherited from the ancestors. That is what makes West African Sufism so dynamic and thus in need of further research. For example, the same respect given to deceased shaykhs, whose tombs are often visited for blessing, is given to family ancestors, whose shrines are sometimes located in the backyard of the house.

In addition to global Salafism and global Sufism, there is a third force referred to in this chapter as Western cultural globalization. The latter is not necessarily synonymous with Westernization, meaning "the imposition of western culture over Third-World peoples."[8] Rather, it can be viewed as the spread of a set of values and beliefs coming from the West, sometimes freely reappropriated by other peoples of the world, sometimes rejected as a whole. In other words, some countries may see Western globalization as a threat to their sovereignty while others may take it more positively. I take Western cultural globalization to be the spread of some concepts of Western cultures pertaining to governance, gender relationships, and human rights issues. These concepts may not be completely new to the countries where they are being brought in. On the contrary, they may have preexisted the coming of the West to those countries but may simply have been called differently or lived in a different manner. For example, it has been demonstrated that the pretended enterprise of bringing civilization into Africa was a fallacious one because, according to some sources, Africa would have been civilized way before both the Atlantic slave trade and colonization began.[9] Moreover, the so-called civilizatory mission of Europe was a challenging one for the missionaries themselves as they were faced with opposition in many African countries, not only militarily but also through religious opposition. Countries like Senegal are reluctant to embrace ideas that threaten the religious and cultural identities of their people. For example, Senegalese religious leaders and some citizens have always rejected the idea of a family code because they found it to be a threat to the establishment of a male-dominated society, inherited from both the indigenous culture or *ceddo* and a certain interpretation of Islam.[10] In his discussion of the concepts of democracy and *demokaraasi*—the former referring to the Western concept and the latter corresponding to the Senegalese view of the same concept—Schaffer points out the necessity to distinguish between the electoral practice of *demokaraasi* in Senegal and the non-electoral one, meaning the “solidarity networks” such as tontines, *mbootaay*, *mbaxal*, *dahira* and others.[11]

Among other things, this chapter is intended to discuss the attitude of both Salafis and Sufis toward each other and toward the West in general and Western cultural globalization in particular. In sum, this chapter analyzes opposing views about Islam in the era of globalization and the dynamic process of its practice in Senegal. More precisely, it aims to look at the extent to which global forces of Sufism, Salafism, and Western cultural globalization have shaped the cultural and religious views and practices in Senegal. Second, the chapter examines the implications these divergent discourses have in society, religion, and politics. This chapter is organized around three points. The first section provides a brief overview of the history of Islam in West Africa followed by a discussion of the genesis and establishment of a Sufi Islamic culture in Senegal. The second section looks at Salafist neo-reform movements and their impact on Islam in Senegal. The third section examines the attitude of both Sufism and Salafism toward each other and toward the discourse of Western cultural globalization in favor of a secular state, meaning a state where spiritual leaders’ influence is limited, if not lost. The last section discusses the impact of the interplay between all the forces mentioned above on society, religion, and politics.

A Brief History of Islam in West Africa and Senegal

Senegal is 95 percent Muslim, 4 percent Catholic, and 1 percent animist. Some sources indicate that Islam came to West Africa as early as 850 CE;[12] however, students of Islam in Africa commonly mention the eleventh century as the beginning of its presence in the region. The history of Islam in West Africa can be explained through five main phases: containment, mixing, reform, accommodation, and neoreform. According to Margari Hill,[13] in the first phase, containment, African kings controlled Muslim influence by segregating Muslim communities. Badru wrote that "the early Muslims were Arab traders from North Africa who had established trade relations with African kings, and these traders were often granted permission to build places of worship without engaging in the spread of their religion."[14] In Senegal, this phase began when Waar Jaabi, the first ruler of the State of Tekrur in the Senegal River Valley became Muslim.[15] By the time the Al- Murabitun of Almoravids, a fundamentalist reform movement, began their attack on Tekrur in 1042 CE, Islam had made a deep impact on the people of that area. Eventually, Waar Jaabi joined the Almoravids in their attempt to purify Islamic practices from syncretistic or heretical beliefs. They imposed greater uniformity of practice and Islamic law among West African Muslims.

In the second phase, mixing,[16] African rulers blended Islam with local traditions as the population selectively appropriated Islamic practices. In Senegal, Islam was mixed with indigenous practices and Muslims started to play major roles in the kings' courts as counselors and advisors, known as *qadi* in Wolof. In the third phase, reform,[17] African Muslims pressed for reforms in an effort to rid their societies of mixed practices and implement *shari'a*. This corresponds to the advent of jihadist movements in the region who attempted to fight against the mixing of Islam with "pagan" practices and called for a strict adoption of *shari'a* law as the sole and unique guidance for West African Muslims. In Senegal the leader of such movements was El-Hàjj Umar Tall (1797–1864) who, in the 1850s, returned from pilgrimage to Mecca claiming to have received spiritual authority over the West African Tijani Sufi order. Subsequently, he launched a vast conquest against "non-Muslims" from the 1850s to 1860s and conquered three Bambara kingdoms.[18]After El-Hàjj Umar Tall was defeated by the French colonial power in 1864, a new phase began with the arrival of a new generation of Sufi Islamic leaders such as Amadu Bamba Mbacké (1853–1927) and El-Hàjj Malick Sy

(1855–1922) who "reinterpreted Islamic reforms and Sufism for their followers"[19] and advocated for a new form of Jihad, referred to as the "Greater Jihad."[20] According to Brenner,[21] the term "Greater Jihad" came from a *hadith* of the Prophet Mohammad, often cited by Sufis, in which the Prophet would have remarked, upon return from a battle against his opponents:

> We have returned from the lesser *jihad* to the greater jihad.
> And they said: "what is the greater *jihad*, O messenger of God?"
> He said, "the struggle with the carnal soul and with the passions."

Robinson[22] portrayed this new era as "paths of accommodation" referring to the new strategy adopted by Sufi clerics, which consisted of collaborating with the colonial power rather than opposing their hegemonic presence. Other members of this new group of Sufis include Limamou Laye, Abdoulaye Niass, Saad Bou Aïdara, and Bou Kunta, respectively leaders of the Layenne Sufi order, the branch of the Tijaniyya called Niassene, and the Aïdara and the Kunta, the two main branches of the Qadiriyya in West Africa. The Qadiriyya is the oldest Sufi order in Senegal. It originated in Baghdad, Iraq, in the eleventh century, and was named after its founder, Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani. The Tijaniyya—the largest order in present-day Senegal—was not founded until the eighteenth century. It originated in Algeria and was named after its founder, Ahmad al-Tijani, an eighteenth-century mystic. The Muridiyya and the Layene orders both originated in Senegal. The contemporary phase, neo-reform, concerns the recent developments of Islam in Senegal, characterized by the presence of Salafist neo-reform movements, which began to operate in the 1930s onward and whose goal was to restore certain orthodoxy, presumably lost, in the way Senegalese Muslims practice their faith.[23] These movements advocate for the alignment with global Salafism in a country that has a deep-rooted Sufi tradition and French colonial legacy. Global Salafism works against a globalized history in Senegal, which is the result of the presence of both global Sufism and French colonization.

Talking about Islam in Senegal today means talking about the Sufi orders given the prominence of such groups in the practice of the Islamic faith in the country. The actual spread of Islam in Senegal and the surrounding region only developed in the nineteenth century with the advent of the Sufi orders. The latter appropriated Islam and adapted it to the local values and beliefs, leading some scholars, especially from the European perspective, to use the term *Islam noir* or Black Islam. Robinson rejects this term, which he believes is pejorative, and rather speaks of the Africanization of Islam, meaning, the way "African groups have created Muslim space or made Islam their own."[24] In Senegal it is mostly through the Sufi brotherhoods and supreme direction of Muslim leaders called shaykhs, or *marabouts* in local parlance, that Islam is practiced. According to Robinson,[25] the term *marabout—sëriñ*, in Wolof— comes from the Arabic name given to the Almoravid, *al-murabitun*, a "soldier-monk."[26] The term *marabout* is today used in the French language to refer to Sufi shaykhs, Qur'anic teachers, and anyone else who provides talismans or protection through mystical knowledge.

Some scholars view Sufism as a search for wisdom, piety, and closeness to God through rituals and litanies.[27] Others see it as the annihilation of the individual's ego, will, and self-centeredness by God, and the subsequent spiritual revival with the "Light of His Essence."[28] Unlike Salafism, which calls for a strict observance of the *shari'a*, or Islamic law, based on the Qur'an and the *Sunnah* or examples of the prophet Muhammad without any intervening guide, Sufism is a belief in mystical forms of knowledge that can only be obtained through studying with a master or guide.

Sufi Islamic discourse in Senegal admits the marriage between Islamic philosophy and local indigenous culture, as it seems to be the case between Islam and some aspects of Arab culture in Saudi Arabia and other Arabic speaking countries. Such a blend results in a unique form of worship and a set of practices that neither change people's rooted ethics nor weaken their faith in Islam. Rather, it makes people believe that they can be "true" Muslims while keeping alive their indigenous culture because Islam is a religion of the "heart" and the "soul." In Senegal, Sufism is practiced individually, through formulaic prayer rituals known as *wird* and *dhikr*, in which one recollects and meditates upon the names of God.[29] It is also practiced collectively, through the chanting of Sufi poems at gatherings and celebrations known as *jàng* in Wolof. The two most popular Sufi events are the *Gàmmu* of Tivaouane (*Mawlid al-Nabi* in Arabic, meaning celebration of the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad in the holy city of Tivaouane by the Tijanis) and the Great *Màggal* of Touba (remembrance of the day of departure of Amadu Bamba into exile by the Murids). Indeed, Amadu Bamba was exiled for seven years from Senegal because of the fear that he would take up weapons against the French colonial regime, in addition to their hope of putting his movement to an end. There are other events such as *ziara,* or visits to the living *marabouts*, in the holy cities of Touba, the headquarters of the Muridiyya; Tivaouane, the headquarters of the Sy branch of the Tijaniyya; Medina Baye and Leona in Kaolack, the headquarters of the Niasse branch of the Tijaniyya; Njaasaan, the headquarters of the Qadiriyya; and Yoff, the headquarters of the Layenes. Other tombs of companions of the founding fathers of the Sufi orders are also visited. The purpose of the visits is to seek *baraka* or spiritual blessings[30] from the shaykhs, dead or alive, and from the holy places. In addition, the *daayiras* or local Sufi associations, mostly in urban areas, hold local events to practice and worship in communion.

The core Sufi relationship is the individual bond between a disciple and a shaykh, who expects complete submission to his or her guidance. There are a few female shaykhs in Senegal. This is in contrast to orthodox Islam, which barely refers to female figures. One such figure was the youngest wife of the Prophet Muhammad, Aicha, who was said to be knowledgeable of the Qur'an and the *hadiths* (or sayings of the Prophet), to the extent that she is often cited by hagiographers of the Prophet Muhammad. Senegal has seen female shaykhs such as Soxna Maimouna Mbacké, who had several disciples during her lifetime. The tomb of Mame Diarra Bousso, mother of Amadu Bamba, is visited by thousands of people every year coming to celebrate her sanctity. In the process of study, the shaykh reveals powerful litanies to students, and enthusiastic disciples seek to acquire all such religious secrets as well as permission to transmit them to others. There is also a widespread belief in the power of particular deceased shaykhs, leading to the practice of making pilgrimages to their tombs, where pilgrims ask the dead to intercede for them before God. Disciples of Sufi orders often work for the shaykh, referred to as *khidma*,[31] expecting *baraka* in return.

Sufi oral productions are composed of songs and stories about the Sufi leaders' miracles and life itineraries (*jaar-jaari sëriñ bi* in Wolof, meaning the spiritual itinerary of the shaykh). Telling stories about past and current shaykhs constitutes an important part of the Sufi practice. Followers of Sufi brotherhoods come and listen to the same stories over and over again and never get tired of it. Rather, it is the telling of such stories that keeps vivid the faith of the Sufi adepts and their attachment to a specific order.[32] The stories are organized around various themes and contents, which include biographies, anecdotes, relationship between shaykh and disciple, and prediction making, to name the most frequent themes. The songs are often sung by griots whose ancestors were also singers for a specific Sufi family. For example, the Mbaye family of Tivaouane—the headquarters of the Sy branch of the Tijaniyya—sings for the Sy family, as did their ancestors in the past. However, not all Sufi singers are griots; some of them are graduates of the *daara* or Sufi Qur'anic schools, where they have learned and mastered the poems of Sufi shaykhs, which they sing. When there is a Sufi gathering such as *Gàmmu*, a celebration of the birth of the Prophet Muhammad, or *Màggal*, a celebration of the day of Amadu Bamba's forced exile for seven years, a designated speaker is hired to talk and recount miracles, and recite other testimonies about the shaykhs, punctuated by the chanting of moralizing poems written by these shaykhs in honor of the Prophet Muhammad. Griot speakers and singers are especially good at recalling past events, which they combine with praises and genealogies. Indeed, in West African societies, the figure of the griot or master of speech, known as *géwël* in Wolof, is fundamental in the weaving together and spreading of oral and written texts. In this respect, griots are those who established the fundamentals of public speaking, as they are known for their verbal skills, inherited from their ancestors. Even though not all public speakers are *géwël*, the fact that a speaker is from that lineage marks differences between his speech and that of others.

Salafist Neo-Reform Movements in Senegal

Although Sufi orders have played a central role in the spread and practice of Islam in Senegal and the West-African region for over two centuries, they have been in competition with Salafist neo-reform movements since the 1930s. Senegal's Salafist movements call for a reform of local Islamic practices, considered too lenient vis-à-vis the commands of the Qur'an and the tradition of the Prophet. Subsequently, they propose a more orthodox way of practicing Islam as an alternative, which aligns with the fundamental precepts of the religion. The two main Salafist movements in Senegal, Jama`at ibadar-Rahman and Harakat al-Falah, which operate in similar ways despite their individual specificities and historical developments. These reform movements constitute a challenge not only to the hegemony of a deep-rooted Sufi Islamic faith and the leadership of the new generation of Sufi clerics, but also to western concepts and philosophy. The commonality between these two movements resides in their constant criticisms of what they believe to be a syncretic Islam, meaning a blend of Islam with pre-Islamic beliefs and practices. They also criticize what they call 'westernization' of Senegalese society, meaning the spread of a set of western values pertaining to education, human rights, governance, secularism, politics and social behavior. For example they condemn the wearing of amulets, presumably containing Qur'anic verses, and the belief in the living or dead shaykhs' intercession before God on behalf of their disciples on the Day of Judgment. These practices or beliefs are considered sins and anti-Islamic. Salafis also lament the wearing of modern western clothing such as close-fitting t-shirts, pants, dresses and skirts, but also baggy pants worn by young men. They believe this new way of dressing to come from the globalization of a western model to the detriment of Muslim values. Similarly, they reject references made by youth to western cultural values learned at French schools or from foreign films and TV, especially American sitcoms. In the meantime, Salafis criticize the ways Senegalese Muslims live Islam, namely their complete allegiance to the brotherhoods rather than the *sunna* or tradition of the prophet. Along the same lines, they disapprove of the fact that many people continue to swear allegiance to Sufi clerics rather than to God directly.

The JIR or the Society of the Servants of God was created in 1979 but the idea started to emerge in the 1930s with an organization called *Brigade de la Fraternité Musulmane* (BFM) or Brigade of the Muslim Brotherhood.[33] However, it was in 1953 that the phenomenon came to its climax with Cheikh Mouhamad Toure, a native of Fass Toure in the Louga region, north-central Senegal, who founded *L'Union Culturelle Musulmane* (UCM) or the Muslim Cultural Union. Cheikh Mouhamed Toure was from a Sufi family and one of his uncles, Hady Toure, studied the Qur'an with El-Hàjj Malick Sy in Tivaouane before becoming the teacher of one of the latter's sons, El-Hàjj Abdul Aziz Sy, the former General Caliph of the Tijaniyya. Although Cheikh's family was Sufi oriented, he rejected from early on the complete allegiance of his classmates to their *marabouts*.[34] The goal of UCM was to oppose the French colonial administration and at the same time to maintain an independent Muslim identity within a system of *maraboutage*, dominated by the Sufi *marabouts*.[35] They promoted Arabic instruction and not just Qur'anic education in Senegal, which already existed, and "the combat against obscurantism." With Senegal's independence in 1960, a new administration came to power and Mamadou Dia, a Senegalese Muslim, was appointed as Prime Minister. Dia, who had shown distinct sympathies for the activities of the UCM in the 1950s continued to support the movement.[36] The fall of Dia and the takeover by President Senghor in 1962 changed the relationship between the state and the Islamic reformists. Senghor was a Christian who believed in secularism and advocated for the establishment of a secular state in Senegal, with a separation between state and religion. Senghor's position aligned with the French Constitution of 1958, which was based on the Law of the Separation of Church and State. Cheikh Mouhamad Toure abandoned the UCM in 1979 to create the JIR with his friend Imam Alioune Diouf. Alioune Diouf became the first president of the movement until 1983. The current president is Imam Ahmet Dia. The JIR continues to hold activities, recruits among young men and women, and builds mosques and Arabic schools throughout the country. The impact of the movement in society is observable through the many women, especially young women, who are now veiling. The JIR usually aligns with Saudi Arabia to start or end the fasting during the month of Ramadan, one of the five pillars of Islam.

Harakat al-Falah, or the Movement for Salvation was founded in the 1940s, but became more visible in the Senegalese Islamic landscape in the 1970s under Cheikh Ndiaye.[37] The full name of the movement in 1971 was the Movement of Salvation for the Arabo-salafite Culture in Senegal. The particularity of *Harakat al-Falah* is its well-known critical position against Sufi orders and their practices, and its role in spreading Arab education and culture in Senegal. The movement joined the JIR in the war against some Sufi practices such as *dhikr*, faith in amulets or *gris-gris* (a Senegalese French term), as well as social issues such as drug abuse, prostitution, and the Westernization of Senegalese society, for which they hold the secular regime accountable. In response to the dreadful living conditions in traditional *daaras* or Sufi Qur'anic schools, they build new schools in which students are taught Arabic language and culture, and Sunni education. Students of the traditional *daaras* leave their parents at a very early age to stay with the Qur'anic master's family, where they wear tattered clothes and beg for their food at meal times, meaning noon and dusk. Students-beggars are still found in the streets of Dakar today, especially at traffic lights. Drivers and their passengers give them coins and sometimes food, namely sugar, rice, and cola nuts. Many Senegalese are against this form of education, which they consider child labor and exploitation. Sunni women distinguish themselves from others, viewed as "westernized" women, by the wearing of *hijab* (veiling) and the use of simplified face make-up.[38] Because of their differences, Sunni women are often subject to criticisms from their own orthodox Sufi families and some liberals in society.[39]

Overall, the number of adherents to *Harakat al-Falah* and *Jama`at ibadar-Rahman* and other Islamist movements have significantly increased over the past few years. Factors behind this increase include the controversial relationship between the state and Sufi authorities, as well as some people's search for religious practices based on the core precepts of Islam, that is, the five pillars[40] and the *Sunnah* or tradition of the Prophet Muhammad. Because of the apparent competition between religious leaders over benefits coming from the state, many people believe that Sufi leaders have become politicians and businesspeople rather than remaining ascetics like their ancestors. Therefore, there is a growing disenchantment of young generations with Sufi leaders, resulting in a large migration to Sunni movements, which call for faith in God and "purity" of Islamic praxis. However, many Senegalese citizens are still very faithful to their Sufi shaykhs, regardless of what they do or say. For these unconditional followers, the shaykh is a saint who can do whatever he likes. For them, the only way for a disciple to be blessed here and in the hereafter is to avoid criticizing the shaykh or his actions, and, tirelessly, be faithful to him.

Sufism, Salafism and Western Cultural Globalization

Sufis and Salafis have had divergent views on issues pertaining to Islamic and cultural practices in Senegal. Among these is the controversy over the moon sighting, necessary to determine the beginning and end of Ramadan. Ramadan is the month during which Muslims from all over the world fast from dawn to dusk, without eating, drinking, and having sexual intercourse with their partners, meaning their spouses.[41] Islam does not allow sexual intercourse between people outside marriage. Salafis often align with Saudi Arabia and other Middle-Eastern countries about the timing of Ramadan, while Sufis opt for a local assessment of the matter, meaning they believe that the decision of when to start or end fasting should be made by local Muslims. A national committee was put in place by the successive governments to deliberate on when Senegalese Muslims should start or end their fasting. The committee includes representatives from all Sufi communities but the Salafis. The latter would concur to any decision made by Saudi Arabia and other Middle-Eastern Muslim dominant countries.

Sufis and Salafis have also had divergent views about the celebrations of the *Mawlid al-Nabi*, or *Gàmmu* in Wolof, and the dimension given to it by the Sufis, especially the Tijaniyya. According to Salafis, *Gàmmu* is a *bid'ah*, or innovation, as it is not among the most common traditional holidays in Islam such as *Eid-al-Fitr* (end of Ramadan); *Eid-al-Adha* (the Sacrifice of Abraham); *Ashoura* (the tenth day of Muharram, the first month of the Muslim calendar); and the like, even though *Gàmmu* is intended to celebrate the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad, the propagator of the Islamic faith. Sufis often respond to such criticism by stating that although it is an innovation, it is still worth celebrating the birthday of the one who was declared to be the role model for all Muslims.[42] However, there is an area where Salafis and Sufis have convergence: their attitude toward Western cultural globalization, especially the rejection of any adoption of Western views by Senegalese youth and adult Muslims. For instance, Sufis and Salafis both condemn the transfer of certain concepts of the West into Senegalese Society, one of which is secularism or *laïcité* in local parlance, the most widely rejected among all concepts. To many Senegalese Salafis and Sufis, secularism is synonymous with the restriction of the influence of religious groups and their leaders in society, or simply a war against the predominance of Muslims over non-Muslims. To prevent such (mis)conception from being a source of conflict between religious communities and state power, religious leaders and state officials have come to a tacit agreement, which may have contributed to the political and social stability of the country. Senegal's so-called exceptionalism[43] can be seen in the consensus between the spiritual and the secular concerning issues of leadership. Talking about the strong power of Sufi leaders in Senegal, French scholar Christian Coulon, author of *Le marabout et le prince: Islam et pouvoir au Sénégal*, stated: "In Senegal one is often a *taalibe*, disciple of a *Marabout*, before being a citizen of the State."[44] Sufis and Salafis actively participate in the political debate along with the political parties. The collaboration between state and current spiritual leaders is inherited from past leaders and founding fathers of Sufi orders during the accommodation phase of the Islamization of West Africa.[45] Current government officials and spiritual leaders work hand in hand and collaborate in various domains and manners. Catholics are also very active in the political arena, but less influential than Muslims, perhaps because of their relatively small percentage (about 4 percent).

In recent years, however, the long time balance between spiritual power, exerted by the Sufi brotherhoods, and secular power, held by the Executive, that has characterized Senegal since independence, has been threatened by the public allegiance of the former president

Abdoulaye Wade to the Muridiyya order. Wade's declaration was a turning point in the history of the relationship between secular power and religious authority. Indeed, the first president of the country (from 1960 to 1981), Leopold Sedar Senghor was Catholic, and he received support from both the Catholic and Muslim communities. The second president (from 1981 to 2000), Abdou Diouf, was from a Muslim family but never declared allegiance to a Sufi brotherhood publicly, although the caliph of the Muridiyya, Abdoul Ahad Mbacke backed him in 1988 against Abdoulaye Wade. But, in 2000, Abdoulaye Wade came to power and, for the first time in the history of the country, a president officially declared his attachment to a specific Sufi order and claimed allegiance to a General Caliph, namely the General Caliph of the Muridiyya, shaykh Saliw Mbacke. When the latter passed away, Wade swore allegiance to his successors, respectively Seriñ Bara Mbacke (1924–2010) and Seriñ Cheikh Mati Leye Mbacke. Wade said at various occasions that he became president thanks to the benediction and prayers of his former shaykh, Sëriñ Saliw Mbacke. Many Senegalese citizens who voted for him did not like what they believed to be a lack of consideration for not thanking them for their votes, from a candidate whom they strongly supported during the 2000 presidential election. Wade's claim constituted a turning point in the history of the relationship between religion and the secular state. Islam in Senegal had become more politicized than it had ever been and Senegalese citizens began to believe that Touba, the headquarters of the Muridiyya, was the center of important decisions concerning the government's policy.

Subsequently, there was a wave of criticism against Wade's policy. Other Sufi orders, the Tijaniyya, Qadiriyya, and Layenes, expressed their frustration publicly vis-à-vis the state, which kept investing and building infrastructure in Touba while little was built in other holy cities. As a result of the many complaints formulated by the "neglected" Sufi orders, Wade promised to extend his programs to other holy cities after he had finished with Touba. Catholics also began to see themselves as being discriminated against by the Wade regime. In December 2009, young Catholics expressed their anger in the streets of Dakar after Wade said that they worshipped statues in their churches, in reference to Jesus Christ.[46] Wade's statement was in response to those who initiated a religious debate around the building of the African Renaissance Monument, which reportedly cost Senegalese taxpayers US$27 million, and which they considered un-Islamic and unaffordable for a poor country like Senegal.

Wade's successor Macky Sall attempted to restore the secularity of the state and to redefine the relationship between state and religion. He stated at the beginning of his office in 2012 that *marabouts* were "ordinary citizens just like anybody else." Sufi orders and their authorities promptly felt offended by his statement forcing him and his party to publicly retract it. In March 2013, Sall seized the opportunity offered to him by a deadly fire at a Qur'anic school in Medina, an overpopulated suburb of Dakar, to confront an ancient tradition: street beggars.[47] Indeed, lots of young children, mostly boys, populate the streets of Dakar everyday, mainly at the traffic lights and areas around mosques and markets, to beg for money and food to take to their respective Qur'anic masters. The latter receive these children from parents generally living in the countryside and use them as labor for their own monetary gain. Most of these young boys do not master the Qur'an or may know just a few verses that they can recite when begging to attract the sympathy of passersby such as drivers and passengers of public and private transportation or pedestrians. The Qur'anic masters often argue against those who criticize the phenomenon by saying that begging is part of the Qur'anic tradition or by accusing them of anti-Islamism. Recently, when the armed Islamists called Ansar Dine, coming from Northern Africa, threatened the integrity of neighboring Mali territory, Senegalese Salafis and Sufis both condemned the "invasion," especially the destructions of saints' mausoleums in the historic city of Timbuktu. Recall that Mali and Senegal used to be one country, because in January 1959, Senegal and the French Sudan merged to form the Mali Federation, which became fully independent on June 20, 1960, as a result of the independence and the transfer of power agreement signed with France on April 4, 1960. The Mali Federation broke up on August 20, 1960 due to internal political difficulties. Many people were afraid of a possible spread of the Mali conflict within Senegal, given the common history and geographical positions of the two countries, but nothing happened in Senegal, certainly because of the unity of the Muslim community, at least concerning the Mali conflict.

The Implications of Cultural and Religious Globalization in Senegal

The interplay between global Sufism, global Salafism and Western cultural globalization, on the one hand, and the indigenous culture of the Senegalese, on the other hand, has a real impact on society, religion, and politics. There are at least five domains where this impact is visible. First, Senegalese society is characterized by the syncretic nature of the religious and cultural beliefs and practices of its members. In other words, the social and religious behaviors of the Senegalese reflect the various influences that shaped their cultural identity. Among these influences are the native culture, meaning Senegalese indigenous cultural values and religious practices; global Islam, precisely global Sufism and Salafism; and the French colonial legacy, namely Western cultural views. In Senegal, religious celebrations feature Islamic, non-Islamic, or traditional, and modern elements together. Evidence of this blend can be found in the way *Ashoura*, the tenth day of *Muharram*, the first month of the Islamic calendar, is celebrated in the country. The event can be portrayed as a religious event as many Senegalese Sufi Muslims recite religious formulas all day long, using prayer beads, or *kurus* in Wolof. But, a more Western kind of couscous dish has replaced the traditional one, normally cooked with beef and local ingredients and vegetables, and served for dinner. Today, chicken and modern ingredients such as mixed vegetables and canned beans and raisins garnish the couscous. At night, young and adult men and women cross-dress, chant, and drum as they go around, from door to door, asking for money or goods. By the end of the day, they gather a lot of food, generally rice, millet, and sugar, and sometimes money. Dilley depicts Senegal's religious syncretism using the "Accommodationist Theory," which he defines as the combination with subordination of "black knowledge," meaning knowledge coming from the indigenous culture, to "white knowledge" or knowledge coming from the Qur'an.[48] In social events such as naming ceremonies, weddings, and circumcisions these two "sources of lore" are used concomitantly.[49] Another tangible instance where these two sorts of beliefs are being used is wrestling, one of the most popular among indigenous sports of Senegal nowadays. Soccer used to be the main sport practiced in Senegal but wrestling attracts more young men than any other sport today because, not only does it pay more money than soccer for example, but it is rooted in Senegalese culture with lots of dancing and singing. Wrestlers have recourse to both "black" and "white" knowledge to win their matches. Orthodox Muslims reject "black knowledge," which they view as *shirk* or association of God with something or someone else.

Second, the structural adjustment imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (The Bretton Woods Institutions) to developing countries in the 1980s, the subsequent reforms that were involved in that process, and the current World economic crisis together had a global effect, and Senegal particularly suffered from those reforms in the past three decades.[50] Many Senegalese citizens lost their jobs, and those who earned masters and doctoral degrees could not find the jobs they dreamed of. Such economic programs resulted in thousands of young men and women coming to the job market every year or seeking visas and other alternative ways of, not only travelling, but also staying abroad. Many Senegalese young men and women died while attempting to reach Spain in artisanal fishing boats. This phenomenon is known as clandestine immigration. According to many scholars, it is this dramatic situation that led to the youth's adherence to the cause supported by some Muslim associations and reform movements in Senegal. The latter, whether they are Sufis or Salafis, recruited followers from among the desperate young men and women seeking a way out. Such associations include the *Moustarchidine Movement*, the *Mouvement Mondial pour l'Unicité de Dieu*, the *Cantaakóon,* and the *Association des Etudiants Musulmans de l'Université de Dakar* (AEMUD). The *Moustarchidine Movement* was born in the 1970s in Tivaouane, the headquarters of the Sy branch of the Tijaniyya.[51] Moustapha Sy, son of Cheikh Ahmet Tidiane Sy Al Makhtoum and grandson of El-Hàjj Malick Sy, now leads it. Militants of the association are generally composed of teenagers and young adults who gather every Thursday night around *dayiras,* or local Sufi congregations, to study the Qur'an and *hadiths* of the Prophet. They also learn about their *tariqa*, or Sufi path, Sufi Islamic practices, and chant religious poems by El-Hàjj Malick Sy and his descendants. The movement also gathers thousands of followers every year during the celebration of the birthday of the prophet Muhammad, or *Gàmmu,* in Tivaouane, the headquarters of the Sy branch of the Tijaniyya in Senegal. During such events and under the leadership of Moustapha Sy and his father, a musical ensemble sings Tijaniyya songs in the Arabic language, accompanied by modern instruments such as guitars, violins, and others. Moustapha's father gives a lecture in Wolof on that occasion, punctuated with references to Qur'anic verses and *hadiths* of the prophet Muhammad. Seated next to him are his son Moustapha Sy and younger brother Pape Malick Sy. The day after the event, Moustapha Sy takes over the stage and addresses thousands of devoted followers. This way of celebrating the *Gàmmu* deviates from the way it has been held, that is from the time when it was started and propagated by El-Hàjj Malick Sy to date. The innovation brought by the Moustarchidine movement creates a unique celebration on the day of the *Gàmmu.* The movement also holds series of lectures during the month of Ramadan in the so-called *Mosquée Inachevée*, or the Unfinished Mosque, located at Yoff, on the west coast of Dakar. Moustapha Sy organized a protest against former president, Abdou Diouf, and his regime in 1993, resulting in his imprisonment from October 1993 to September 1994.

The *Mouvement Mondial pour l'Unicité Dieu* was created by a grandson of Amadu Bamba, Modou Kara Mbacké.[52] He counts numerous followers among young Murids, especially the Baay Faal, a subgroup of the Murids known for having dreadlocks and wearing colorful patched clothing. The Baay Faal, unlike other declared Muslims, neither performs the five daily prayers nor fasts during the month of Ramadan. The Baay Faal or Yaay Faal, respectively the men and the women, claim to have inherited their attitude from Ibra Faal, a faithful follower of Amadu Bamba. It is said that Ibra Faal did not perform the daily prayers or fast while following his spiritual guide, Amadu Bamba. Adepts of Modou Kara Mbacké can be found in the streets of Dakar, Thies, and Touba, the headquarters of the Muridiyya, where they beg in the name of their shaykh, supposedly to support their movement. Like Moustapha Sy, Modou Kara is a charismatic figure and is paid great respect by his numerous and enthusiastic followers. The many attributes chosen for him by his disciples speak for themselves: *Yallay Jaam ñi*, or the "Lord of the slaves," meaning the creatures, "Seneraal Kara" or "Commander in Chief Kara," and so on. Modou Kara is known for his recurrent backing of candidates at presidential elections.

The *Cantaakóon* are a group of Sufis affiliated with the Muridiyya order and led by Shaykh Bethio Thioune,[53] under the recommendation of his Murid ex-mentor and spiritual guide, Seriñ Saliw Mbacké, son of Amadou Bamba. Unlike Moustapha Sy and Modou Kara, Shaykh Bethio did not come from any of the traditional Sufi leading families, the Sy and the Mbacké families. Rather, he comes from a griot lineage and griots are best known for their entertaining skills. However, just like Ibra Faal was faithful to Amadu Bamba, Bethio, as people call him, is an unconditional follower of Seriñ Saliw Mbacké, who would have elevated him to the rank of shaykh, without telling him what that was all about. Although he declared publicly his lack of deep knowledge and understanding of the Qur'an and illiteracy in the Arabic language, Bethio claims to be granted millions of adepts by his deceased mentor. Bethio is among the most charismatic and popular Murid leaders in Senegal and its Diasporas in France, Italy, and the United States. He is particularly known for his generosity, as he likes to distribute large quantities of food at every celebration, at home and in Touba, during the great *Màggal* of Touba. He also seals numerous marriages between young members of his movement. He recites the name of his spiritual guide, Seriñ Saliw Mbacké, seven times to seal those marriages. Many Senegalese criticize the way these unions are sealed arguing that the shaykh neither consults with the parents of the married couples nor observes the strict Islamic norm for sealing marriages. Nonetheless Bethio continues the practice making hundreds of followers happy not only to be married, without going through the heavy financial cost, but sometimes to be provided with housing and household financial support by the shaykh. In 2012 Bethio backed former president Abdoulaye Wade against Macky Sall, who ended up winning the election. A few weeks later, he was arrested after an investigation was conducted about the mysterious murder of two of his disciples at one of his headquarters, Madinatou Salam in Mbour, along the coastal region of Senegal. Many Senegalese citizens viewed Bethio's fate as a consequence of his political support to the defeated president Abdoulaye Wade. Another influential movement, but from a Salafi perspective, is the *Association des Etudiants Musulmans de l'Université de Dakar* (AEMUD), or the Association of Muslim Students of the University of Dakar.[54] The movement is mainly composed of students, from different regions of Senegal, majoring in sciences and engineering. They have a bulletin, the *Etudiant musulman*, or *The Muslim Student*, which serves as a platform for the movement and its ideological agenda. Their headquarters is located on the Cheikh Anta Diop University campus, where they built a mosque for the adepts' intellectual and religious formation and to observe the five prayers of the day. Their Friday sermons are characterized by their constant attacks against the West and Israel. Unlike the three previous movements above-mentioned, the AEMUD does not have a direct implication in Senegalese politics.

Third, there is the emergence of a young Sufi intellectual elite whose intellectual formation started in Arabic from local *daaras,* or traditional Qur'anic schools of Senegal, and ended overseas. Some of these *marabouts* earned doctoral degrees in humanities from universities in northern Africa, namely Egypt or Sudan, the Middle East, or Europe. They are generally grandsons of founders of Sufi brotherhoods, who have become caliphs or successors of their parents or grandparents, from whom they inherited numerous faithful followers. Note that, in Senegal, it is the oldest son of a *marabout* who becomes his *caliph* or successor when the latter passes away. But, in addition to their spiritual function in society, some of these young leaders have political interests and, as a result, participate actively in the political debate either as supporters or opponents of the current regime. Mansour Sy Jamil, grandson of El-Hàjj Malick Sy, is one of those young *marabouts* who have an overt and clear political agenda. He is a retiree of the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) who returned to Senegal to be the caliph of his deceased father, Moustapha Sy Jamil. Mansour Sy actively participated in the *Assises Nationales,* a national platform that gathered opposition parties and members of civil society after the 2007 presidential election, won by former president Abdoulaye Wade, and the subsequent boycott of the legislative election, that of members of the Parliament. He cofounded a political movement later called *Manifeste Citoyen pour la Refondation Nationale*, or Citizens Manifesto for National Overhaul to denounce the recurrent amendments of Senegal's constitution by Wade and called for free and democratic elections. He was elected deputy after the 2012 legislative election. His radical opposition to former President Wade's regime diverged from the mainstream thinking of his uncle Abdoul Aziz Sy Junior, the official spokesman of the Sy family, who was a rather close collaborator of both Abdou Diouf and Abdoulaye Wade, respectively the second and third presidents of Senegal.

Serigne Modou Bousso Dieng, another young intellectual Sufi and also grandson of Amadu Bamba, is the leader of a movement called *L'Association des Jeunes Chefs Religieux du Senegal*, or Young Religious Leaders Association of Senegal. The movement is composed of young Sufi leaders who disagree with the way the old generation of Sufi leaders deals with politicians. Serigne Modou Bousso Dieng was often in the spotlight during President Wade's office for his severe criticisms against Wade's policy and relationship with the Sufi authorities of Touba, his native town. The latter were accused of corruption. Dieng announced his candidacy for the 2012 presidential election before withdrawing it and, finally, backing his former adversary, Wade, after they met at the presidential palace a few days before the election. Many Senegalese believed that President Wade paid for Dieng's backing. Salafis also have their intellectual and political leaders, one of whom is Imam Mbaye Niang. He is an *imam*, or religious guide, but also the leader of the political movement called *Mouvement de la Réforme pour le Développement Social* (MRDS) or Movement of Reform and Social Development. The movement came into existence under Wade's office and was known for its recurrent attacks against the president at that time. It obtained one seat in the parliament after the 2007 legislative election and two seats after the 2012 election. In addition to being deputy in the parliament, Mbaye Niang was appointed Minister-Councilor in charge of religious affairs by president Macky Sall, the winner of the 2012 presidential election, in recognition of his support. The commonality between all these movements and intellectual elites is their interest in either gaining power in what has been described as a religiously based "civil-society"[55] and political spheres or the battle against the politicization of their faith. For some of them, their attitude toward politicians has always been determined by the extent of the consideration and privilege they received from the government, especially the president. Few of them have resisted the temptation of the numerous privileges distributed by the president.

Fourth, there is the emergence of a new citizenship in Senegal. Indeed, despite their strong attachment to religious and traditional authorities, Senegalese citizens now constantly show their capacity to distinguish between the religious and the secular. The newly invented concept of *Nouveau Type de Sénégalais* (NTP) or New Type of Senegalese by the *Y'en a Marre* (We Are Fed Up) movement corroborates this new state of mind.[56] Indeed, there were times when some religious leaders commanded their followers to vote for a specific candidate, usually the one in power, during presidential elections, and they were obeyed. However, most of those who recently attempted to back a candidate failed to succeed. The reason was that there is a conflict of interest between the shaykh, who constantly receives "brown envelopes" and support of all kinds from the State, and the disciples who continuously face tough living conditions. Consequently, many Sufi leaders, including the general caliphs of the different *tariqas* or Sufi paths, have become skeptical about backing a candidate. They are afraid of being disobeyed by their own followers who prefer voting for the candidate of their choice. Such backing of candidates has become an old-fashioned term that is no longer pertinent in the current political "game." Nonetheless, politicians continue to spend important amounts of their electoral funds on seeking backers but always fail to receive any overt support because of the *marabouts'* fear of being disobeyed and the maturity of Senegalese voters. When there is an official backing of a candidate the challenge will now be whether the backer will be followed or not, and most often he will not.

Fifth, many Senegalese now claim using their own judgment and understanding of the precepts of Islam when observing Muslim pillars and holidays, such as Ramadan, where Muslims are required to fast from dawn to dusk. Indeed, it is the norm that Sufi orders would announce the beginning and end of Ramadan to their followers after consultation with the committee in charge of the moon sighting. As a result, Senegalese Muslims relied on their leaders' recommendations to fast or break their fast, which resulted in multiple celebrations, due to a recurrent lack of consensus. In Islam, the beginning or end of Ramadan depends on the new moon's appearance in the area. However, many Senegalese Muslims now refuse to be passive and unconditional followers of Sufi brotherhoods[57] but would rather prefer using their common sense and free will to make their own decisions. Many of them support that they fast for God, who recommended it, and not for an individual. They do not hesitate to look at what is going on in the surrounding countries and the Muslim *umma* (community) in general, to decide whether they should start or end their fasting or not. These nonconformists do not consider the "artificial" boundaries set by the colonial administration as barriers between Muslims living in the same region. As a result, they believe that Gambians, Mauritanians, and Malians should start and end their fast at the same time, as there is no time difference between the three countries. However, some individuals and groups are still hostile to such innovation and reasoning and would rather continue to rely on their *marabouts* and the *ndigal,* or recommendation they give concerning Ramadan.

Senegalese Muslims have an ambivalent reaction toward the infiltration of globalized views in the understanding and practices of Islam and the relationship between the religious and the political. Nonetheless, there is some observable interest in reformist ideas. Sufi orders continue to attract more people, especially those who do not want to follow *shari'a* literally. This does not mean that Sufi Islam is against *shari'a*, but there are many practices that are condemned by *shari'a* yet tolerated and accommodated by Senegalese Sufi Islam. One of those is veiling. Senegalese Sufi women are asked to cover their heads when they go out or enter holy places such as mosques and mausoleums but are not required to wear the veil the way Salafi women do. Global Sufism remains the main form of Islam in Senegal and Senegalese Muslims continue to celebrate the *Màggal* and *Gàmmu* in Senegal and its Diasporas, which are attended every year by millions of followers seeking *baraka* or blessings from their living and deceased shaykhs. At the same time, global Salafi groups organize themselves and continue to build schools and mosques and hold public conferences regularly, especially during Ramadan.

Global Sufism has managed to adapt to global Salafism, Western culture, and indigenous ethics, and, consequently, gained more space than global Salafism, less open to collaboration. However, with the coming of young globalized Sufi and Salafi leaders in the political arena, one wonders what the political scene will be like in the near future. Will Senegalese exceptionalism and its secular state be challenged or kept alive? The recent Malian crisis and the role the Senegalese government has played in preserving the integrity of that country was the first challenge the new administration has faced. Indeed, Macky Sall's government not only condemned the attacks perpetrated by the Islamist group, Ansar Dine, but Senegal also sent troops to fight side by side with French soldiers against the enemy. Nobody knows what the implications of such an open engagement of Senegal and its military forces will mean for the country in the near future. However, the Malian crisis at least has had a direct impact on the Senegalese Islamic landscape, that is, Salafis and Sufis together condemned the attitude of the Islamists, especially when the latter started to destroy the tombs of Sufi saints in the city of Timbuktu.

Conclusion

Senegal's Islam is at a crossroads of three globalizing forces: global Salafism, Western cultural globalization, and global Sufism. The impact of each of these can be observed through the rise of Salafist neo-reform movements, the debate around the relationship between the secular and the spiritual, and the growing number of followers of Sufi brotherhoods. Yet, despite the significance of the impact of global Salafism and Western philosophy, Sufism remains the most popular religious path in Senegal. The success of Sufism is due to its capacity to mix with local cultural practices. Nonetheless, one can wonder how long Sufi orders will continue to resist reformist ideas as the country moves forward and Senegalese citizens become more demanding and begin to think critically about their faith and their relation to the Sufi brotherhoods. Although the majority of Senegalese Muslims adopted Sufism as their spiritual path there is some observable interest in Salafism as well as a need to set boundaries between state and religion. On the one hand, Sufi orders continue to attract more people, especially those not willing to follow *shari'a* to the letter. Nonetheless, Salafist movements are gaining ground, continuing to build mosques and Arabic schools and to educate their members by focusing on the rigorous Islamic tradition and *shari'a*.

Notes

1. Mazrui 2006, 262.
2. Badru 2006, 124.
3. Roy 2002.
4. Meijer 2009, 36.
5. Ibid.
6. Any belief that is considered to be in opposition to Allah and Islam.
7. Kesteloot 2007.
8. Latouche 1996, 41.
9. Diop 1955.
10. Sow 2003.
11. Schaffer 1998, 129.
12. Doi2 006.
13. Hill 2009.
14. Badru 2006, 87.
15. Villalón 1995; Robinson 2004; Babou 2007.
16. Hill 2009.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Glover 2007, 73.
20. Babou 2007; Robinson 2000.
21. Brenner 1984, 2000.
22. Robinson 2000.
23. Gomez-Perez 1997.
24. Robinson 2004, 42.
25. Robinson 2004.
26. Dilley 2004.
27. Robinson 2004, 19.
28. Gülen2 004.
29. Glover 2007, 46.
30. Ibid., 47.
31. Mbacke2 010.
32. Seck,2 012.
33. Seck 2007; Augis 2009.
34. Loimeier 1996, 183.
35. Ibid., 184.
36. Ibid., 185.
37. Loimeier 2000; 2009.
38. Augis2 009.
39. Ibid.
40. 1. Testimony of Faith; 2. The Prayer; 3. The Obligatory Charity; 4. The Fasting of Ramadan; 5. The Pilgrimage.
41. "It has been made permissible for you the night preceding fasting to go to your wives [for sexual relations]. They are clothing for you and you are clothing for them. Allah knows that you used to deceive yourselves, so He accepted your repentance and forgave you. So now,

have relations with them and seek that which Allah has decreed for you. And eat and drink until the white thread of dawn becomes distinct to you from the black thread [of night]. Then complete the fast until the sunset. And do not have relations with them as long as you are staying for worship in the mosques. These are the limits [set by] Allah, so do not approach them. Thus does Allah make clear His ordinances to the people that they may become righteous" (Qur'an Surat Al-Baqarah, 2:187).

42. Surat Al-Ahzab, Verse 21.
43. Villalón 1995, 3.
44. Coulon 1981, 264.
45. Robinson 2000.
46. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jan/05/senegal-statue-offensive-woman-legs
47. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2013/0318/In-Senegal-a-new-president-confronts-an-ancient-tradition-child-beggars.
48. Dilley2 004,5 .
49. Ibid., 118–22.
50. Diop and Diouf 1990, 25.
51. Samson 2005, 37
52. Ibid., 72.
53. Seck 2013, working paper.
54. Gomez-Perez 1997, 280.
55. Villalón 1995, 12.
56. The movement, composed of Senegalese rappers and journalists, was created in January 2011 to protest ineffective government and register youth to vote.
57. To better understand the relationship between marabout and disciple read Coulon 1981.

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CHAPTER 6

Language Policies in East Africa

EstherM . Lisanza

This chapter examines education language policy debates in three East African countries: Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda in the context of globalization. These countries have a similar history given that they are neighbors and were colonized by the same colonial power—the British, although the Germans colonized Tanzania for a short time. The three countries gained independence in the early 1960s. Tanzania gained its independence in 1961, followed by Uganda in 1962, and finally Kenya in 1963. This colonial infiltration into these three East African countries has continued to influence the language policies in the education system of the three countries since independence.

The three countries under discussion are multilingual societies. Kenya has 42 languages,[1] Uganda has 32 languages,[2] and Tanzania has over 100 languages.[3] Since the introduction of formal education during the colonial period, this linguistic diversity has posed a challenge in regard to the medium of instruction in schools; hence, many debates have arisen on this issue. These language debates have also been complicated by the trends of globalization where English has been accorded higher status globally. Thus, these debates have led to language policy redefinitions in education several times in just five decades since independence. My argument in this chapter is that these language debates have been shaped by local, regional, and global factors.

In the following sections, I will address each country as a case followed by a conclusion. I will examine these countries' language policies in the education system since the dawn of independence to date. The reason why I take this historical perspective is because the colonial language policies in the education system of the three countries seem to shape to a great extent the postcolonial educational language policies in these countries. I will begin with Kenya, followed by Tanzania, and then Uganda.

THE KENYAN CASE

Throughout the 1950s (colonial era), learners in Kenyan primary schools were taught in their various mother tongues (i.e., Kenyan local languages, Asian (Indian origin) languages, or English language) in grades one through four. In these grades, English was taught as a subject for two or three years in African and Asian schools, and thereafter it became a language of instruction from grade five through eight.[4] By the mid-1950s, there was growing discontent about the poor performance of African and Asian children in Kenya's national examinations that were written in English compared to their European counterparts who took the same Kenyan examinations.[5] The poor performance was blamed on the use of mother tongues as languages of instruction for the African and Asian children.[6] Therefore, in 1961 English was introduced as the language of instruction from grade one in Asian schools, and spread very fast to all primary schools in Kenya.[7]

Since independence in 1963, language policy in the Kenyan education system has been reviewed several times. However, in this section, I will only review and discuss recommendations of three important education commission reports on language policy in the Kenyan education system. It is important to note that these commissions went around the country speaking to Kenyan people to gather their views concerning language in education. Hence, the views in these language documents are the views of the majority of the Kenyan population at that historical time. Following the recommendations of the commissions, the government endorsed the recommendations in all Kenyan schools. These commissions are the Ominde Commission (1964), the Gachathi Report (1976), and the Koech Report (1999).

The Ominde Commission (1964)

This was the first education commission in independent Kenya. This commission was appointed by the Kenyan government under the leadership of Prof. S. M. Ominde to look at the existing educational resources of Kenya and advise the government on the formulation and implementation of national policies for education. These recommendations served to launch guidelines for the language policy of the newly independent Kenyan nation. This commission recommended that the medium of instruction right from grade one should be English for the following five reasons:

> First, the English medium makes possible a systematic development of language study and literacy which would be very difficult to achieve in the mother tongues. Secondly, as the result of the systematic development possible in the English medium, a quicker progress is possible in all subjects. Thirdly, the foundation laid in the first three years is more scientifically conceived, and therefore provides a more solid basis for all subsequent studies, than was ever possible in the old vernacular teaching. Fourthly, the difficult transition from a vernacular to an English medium which can take up much time in standard (grade) five, is avoided. Fifthly, the resulting linguistic equipment is expected to be more satisfactory, an advantage that cannot fail to expedite and improve the quality of post-primary education of all kind.[8]

So, the view of this first education commission in independent Kenya was that the language of education should be English and not mother tongues. Muthwii states,

> At independence when the government took over the mandate to provide education, the strong rationalization that all learners needed to learn in English to produce a skilled labor force to run government and industry was already in place. The Ominde Commission of 1964 strengthened this position and instituted English as the language of instruction in all schools from class one.[9]

Therefore, even before the Ominde Commission was in place, there was a strong belief among Kenyans that English was the language that would enable them to produce skilled manpower in government and commerce; the Ominde Commission just reinforced and instituted this common belief. To crown it all, English was the language of power in colonized Kenya, power that Kenyans felt had been denied by their British colonial masters.

In the 1950s, the British colonizers denied Kenyans learning of English, which was the language of government and industry. The colonizers did not want Kenyans to hold positions of power in government and industry;[10] hence, the denial of English. Even though some Kenyans had developed mother tongue literacy, this did not help them in securing jobs in the colonialized Kenya. Hence, parents in independent Kenya wanted their children to have this power that came through English language. As Thiong'o puts it, "English was the official vehicle of the magic formula to colonial elitedom."[11]

Although it is understandable that this commission might have been pushed toward English because there were very few literacy and content materials in mother tongues, Swahili was not given the role of medium of instruction, yet Swahili was already developed[12] and there were all signs that Swahili was ready for this role in the education system not only in Kenya, but also in Uganda and Tanzania. As a matter of fact, Swahili had already been standardized by the Inter-Territorial Language (Swahili) Committee (1930–64), and it was also developing educational materials in Swahili, for example, dictionaries, literacy materials, and content textbooks. Thus, there seem to have been other factors beside availability of literacy and content materials why mother tongues and Swahili were not given the role of languages of instruction. These factors will be discussed later.

Therefore, looking at the above commission's reasons for choosing English as the language of instruction over Swahili and other Kenyan local languages, it appeared that the schools in independent Kenya would have no learning problems. Also, this commission was of the idea that there would be an organized way of learning language and literacy if done in English rather than in the mother tongue. However, these are fallacious ideas as learning can be carried out in any language so long as that language has support. In addition, the commission held the idea that, given that there would be some organized way of learning language and literacy, there would be faster progress in all content subjects. Given that this conclusion is based on a fallacious premise, the conclusion that there would be faster progress in all content subjects is also false. Additionally, the commission considered that the first three years in education were fundamental for future education. Hence, with English as the medium of instruction in these early years of education, future development in education was assured unlike situations in which the initial learning was done in the mother tongue. This reasoning is based on the fourth and fifth claims made by the commission. That is, the transition from one language to another is avoided (i.e., from mother tongue to English) and that the resulting product (the learner) is more satisfying, that is, the learner can execute in post-primary education (i.e., in high school and colleges). From second language research, the five reasons given by the commission for English medium instruction in Kenya are problematic. First, it is possible to learn any language (this includes mother tongues) with proper support, for example, development of literacy and content materials. Regrettably, the monologic voice that is perpetuated by the English only policy is a mockery to the many language voices in Kenya. There is a great need to support the diverse voices in the society[13] hence in the education system.

In addition, the commission stated the following about mother tongues:

> The vernacular languages are essential languages of verbal communication and we recognize no difficulty in including a daily period for story-telling in the vernacular, or similar activities in the curriculum of Standard I, II, and III. We apprehend, therefore, that the vernaculars will continue to serve their historic role of providing a means of domestic verbal communication...We see no case for assigning to them a role which they are ill-adapted, namely, the role of the educational media in the critical early years of schooling.[14]

From the above quote, it seems that the commission did not give mother tongues any literacy consideration like reading and writing. The vernaculars were to remain in their historical oral forms. Also, the commission did not see a reason for the Kenyan local languages to be given the role of medium of instruction at all because they were not prepared for this role. However, this recommendation contradicted UNESCO's[15] recommendation that the best medium for teaching a child is his or her mother tongue because a child learns better through a mother tongue than through an unfamiliar language. As mentioned earlier, there were no written materials for content areas and also not all mother tongues had or have orthographies and hence, it was not surprising for the commission to state that the mother tongues were not prepared to play the role of language of instruction in primary schools. However, to reiterate, any language is capable of being a medium of instruction with proper support. Additionally, Swahili, which was ready for such a role, was not given a chance.

Finally, the commission stated the following about Swahili:

> Those giving evidence were virtually unanimous in recommending a general spread of this language, not only to provide an additional and specifically African vehicle for national coordination and unification, but also with eastern parts of the Congo (Zaire) and parts of Central Africa. Kiswahili is, therefore, recognized both as a unifying national language and a means of Pan-African communication over a considerable part of the continent. In view of these important functions,

> we believe that Kiswahili should be a compulsory subject in primary school.[16]

The commission felt that Swahili deserved to be a compulsory subject in primary schools because of its role as a unifying language in the country and as a regional lingua franca. Moreover, the commission did not give Swahili a role as a medium of instruction even though, as already stated, Swahili had already been standardized, had a significant body of literature, and was spoken by a vast population of Kenyans.[17] Therefore, there seems to have been a greater force behind English compared to Swahili in the country. This will be discussed later.

Thus, the Ominde Commission Report supported English as the medium of instruction from grade one, Swahili to be one of the compulsory subjects, and mother tongues to be given a daily period for storytelling. However, this language policy was not working for a majority of Kenyan children because most of them did not have English exposure in their homes and communities, yet they were to be taught in English from the first day of school. So, the government established a second education commission to look into the matters of language policy in education and other educational matters. This second education commission, the Gachathi Report of 1976 is discussed next.

The Gachathi Report (1976)

This was the second education commission after independence. The Kenyan government set up this commission under the leadership of Mr. P. J. Gachathi. This report was published in 1976. This commission realized that most of the children in the rural areas could only speak their mother tongues (i.e., Swahili or other local languages) at the time of enrolling in primary school. Yet they were expected from the Ominde Commission's perspective to be taught in English from day one of their school entrance. The Gachathi commission had the following recommendations about English, Swahili, and other indigenous languages. The language of instruction for grades one to three was to be the language of the "catchment" (the surrounding community).[18] Therefore, any of the local languages spoken in the country that were given a very marginal role in the Ominde's commission could be the language of instruction in the first three years of primary education. Thus, in rural areas, the language of the surrounding community could have been any Kenyan local language but in most urban centers and settlement areas Swahili was the dominant language. Also, in cosmopolitan urban areas such as Nairobi City, English would be the language of the catchment. So, from 1976 to 1999 in Kenya, English, Swahili or another indigenous language (e.g., Kikamba, Kikuyu, Dholuo) would be used as the medium of instruction in grades one through three.

It is important to note that this document saw the importance of taking the multilingual reality of Kenyan society into consideration in setting the language policy in Kenyan schools. Also, this is in accordance with second language research and UNESCO's recommendation that children should be taught in their first languages. However, its recommendation of initial literacy to be done in mother tongue was a challenge in itself. This was because there was a shortage of literacy and content materials in mother tongues. In this regard, the Gachathi report recommended that the Kenya Institute of Education should prepare materials in the form of graded sets of readers for each mother tongue, for teaching of those languages, as well as other subjects in mother tongues. This progress was very slow. As of 2008, only 22 indigenous languages out of 42 had orthographies.[19] Thus, it was a challenge to develop readers in those indigenous languages that did not have orthographies. Moreover, in Kenya all textbooks for all subjects apart from Swahili and mother tongue were written in English and so were the examinations. I agree with other researchers, like Mbaabu[20] who have argued that Swahili should have been used as the language of instruction because Swahili was Kenya's national language and most children, by the time they enrolled in grade school, had Swahili exposure. Hence, this would have solved the problem of literacy materials in mother tongues.

In addition, the commission had the following recommendation about English, "to introduce English as a subject from Primary 1 and to make it supersede the predominant local language as the medium of instruction in Primary 4."[21] This recommendation stated that English was to be introduced as a subject in grade one and that, in grade four, it was to take over from the language of the catchment area as the medium of instruction. Therefore, all over the country from grade four English was to be the medium of instruction. So, although this document increased the role of mother tongues in education and subsequently the awakening of multilingual and nationalistic realities, it also strengthened the role of English in education. In fact, from the standpoint of second language research this document would be found wanting and an instance of "subtractive bilingualism"[22] where one language is being discouraged in support of another, hence, the killing of diverse voices represented by the Kenyan society. Additionally, this recommendation was contrary to the national goals of education, which had been in effect since independence. For example, the fourth goal of education states that education in Kenya should "promote cultural values."[23] Kenyan indigenous languages are part of these cultural values. So, if these indigenous languages were not used from grade four to eight, then this means Kenyans were not promoting this national treasure.

Next, the commission had the following to say about Swahili:

> To introduce Kiswahili as a compulsory subject in Primary 3 (or when English medium instruction begins) to take over from the vernacular-medium instruction to avoid making pupils of primary school age learn two new languages at the same time.
>
> To teach Kiswahili as a compulsory subject and to include it in the Certificate of Primary Education examination or its successor.[24]

The commission recommended that Swahili should be introduced as a compulsory subject in grade three, or when English started being used as the medium of instruction so that the students do not face two new languages. However, this commission did not realize that in some areas Swahili was not a second language but a first language. Moreover, the majority of Kenyan children were already exposed to Swahili and spoke Swahili in their communities before joining school. Thus, Swahili being taught in first grade would not have been a challenge at all. This commission also recommended that Swahili should not only be taught as a compulsory subject in primary schools, but that it should also be a subject of examination at the end of the primary school cycle. Although this recommendation was made in 1976, it was not implemented until 1985 along with the newly restructured 8–4-4 system of education. Furthermore, this commission seemed to privilege the voice of English over that of Swahili. Swahili was not to be introduced right from first grade like English for the reason that it would be detrimental to the students to learn two new languages at the same time. Why was English not introduced after Swahili? Perhaps, as Hudelson[25] notes, English is such a dominant language (i.e., voice) globally, education systems feel obligated to use and to teach it in schools to be at par with the rest of the world. This is the same reason why Swahili was not made the language of instruction since independence.

It is important to note that this report had a great impact on the other education reports that came after it. I now turn to the Koech Report of 1999 that exemplifies what I have just stated.

The Koech Report (1999)

This is the latest education commission report in Kenya, which was led by Mr. D. Koech. This commission reinforced the Gachathi Report (1976) by acknowledging that:

> To enhance concept formation and articulation in linguistic communication children should continue to be taught in their mother tongue or the dominant language of the school environment until the end of lower primary (primary 3). During this period, English and Kiswahili, the official and national languages respectively, should be taught vigorously as subjects. In upper primary (primary 4–8), when the child has already "mastered" English and Kiswahili, English should then be introduced as the medium of instruction.[26]

Based on second language research, I support the commission's realization of the importance of mother tongues in children's concept formation and articulation in linguistic communication. To give mother tongues a role in primary schools is important to allow home-school continuation. However, this commission, just like its predecessors, privileged the English voice because English took over as the language of instruction from grade four. There was no more voice of mother tongues from grade four. Hence, subtractive bilingualism took place.

Moreover, just like the Gachathi Report, this commission had the following recommendation concerning mother tongue literacy materials: "The Ministry responsible for education works out modalities for ensuring publication of instructional materials in all the local languages in the country."[27] As already mentioned, only 22 local languages have orthographies and all textbooks are in English. Therefore, availability of instructional materials in indigenous languages remains a major challenge in the instruction of indigenous languages. As I have already stated, because Swahili is such a developed language there would be no problem to use it as a language of instruction in grades one to three. Kenya should borrow from its neighbor, Tanzania that uses Swahili as a language of instruction throughout the primary level. Tanzania does not have to deal with the issue of developing literacies in other mother tongues because Swahili fulfills this role nationally.

Looking at the three commissions' recommendations, it is noticeable that English has continued to play a major role in Kenya's education system. It is the language of instruction from grade four nationally. Also, in some urban settings, it is the medium of instruction right from grade one. Swahili and other indigenous languages have continued to play a bridging role between home and school. Swahili continues to be one of the compulsory and examinable subjects in primary schools. The other mother tongues do not appear anywhere in the education system after grade three and in some rural areas, mother tongues are not taught right from grade one.[28] Hence, subtractive bilingualism is a common phenomenon in Kenyan schools. In fact, the current and operating English National Syllabus states:

> English is learned throughout the Primary School. In standard one to three, it is taught as a subject, while mother tongue is used as the medium of instruction. In standard four to eight it is taught as a subject and used as the medium of instruction in other subjects.[29]

Therefore, the English voice thrives right from grade school to higher levels of education and this is clearly viewed as the authoritative voice (discourse).[30] Bakhtin addressing authoritative discourse stated that:

> The authoritative word demands that we acknowledge it, that we make it our own; it binds us, quite independent of any power it might have to persuade us internally; we encounter it with its authority already fused to it. The authoritative word is located in a distance zone, organically connected with a past that is felt to be hierarchically higher.[31]

Bakhtin thus presents a vivid picture of English language in Kenya. The English language demands that Kenyans acknowledge it in schools and make it their own. It has its colonial and global power fused in it. Therefore, English is "the language"[32] in Kenya. Hence, this is the kind of language ideology that Kenyan schools/classrooms operate in—the ideology that English is superior compared to the local Kenyan languages. This ideology is based on the power of English globally and locally in the education system and the job market. As a matter of fact, no one in the country can proceed to higher levels of education or get a good job without a pass in English. As a result of this ideology, English language flourishes as the privileged voice in every Kenyan classroom (from primary schools to the university).

Therefore, although Kenya's education language policy appears to be trilingual (i.e., using mother tongues, Swahili, and English) in primary schools, in reality it is bilingual (use of Swahili and English) or even monolingual (use of English only) because most Kenyans want their children to be exposed as early as possible to English. In higher levels of education, English takes over as the language of instruction. Next, I discuss the Tanzanian case.

The Tanzanian Case

During the colonial era in Tanzania, Swahili was the language of instruction from grade one to six[33] and taught as a subject throughout the primary level while English was the language of instruction beyond the sixth grade.[34] English was taught as a subject from grade three. This colonial bilingual language policy was maintained during the first years of independence (from 1961 to 1967) where Swahili was confined to lower education levels, while English was used at higher levels of education.[35]

However, in 1968 there was a new language policy, which reflected Tanzania's new political ideology, that is, "*Ujamaa*" (self-reliance) that made Swahili the language of instruction throughout the primary school cycle.[36] All subjects in Tanzanian primary schools since 1968 are taught in Swahili and the content textbooks are written in Swahili. English was to be used as the language of instruction in secondary school level and beyond. In addition, from 1968 English was also taught as a subject from grade one, instead of grade three as it was the case prior to 1968. However, many Tanzanians questioned the impact of English as a language of instruction especially at the secondary level. Therefore, language policy debates on whether to change language of instruction to Swahili at all levels emerged during the early days of independence and continue to this day. Interestingly, the other Tanzanian local languages were not given any role in education and the citizens seemed not to question this. Although this arrangement seemed to solve the issue of developing literacy and content materials in many indigenous languages that would be very costly, it also seemed to silence the diverse voices (languages) that Tanzania has. Only two voices seem to be privileged in the Tanzanian classrooms at the primary school level, that of Swahili and English. However, as we climb the ladder of education, the Swahili voice is silenced and we only have one voice, the English voice. Hence, subtractive bilingualism exists in the Tanzanian education system just like in the Kenyan education system. In the next subsection, I will discuss the Arusha Declaration as it relates to language in education and discuss two important presidential commissions on education in Tanzania since independence. These are the 1982 and 1984 presidential commissions.

After the Arusha Declaration (1967)

Although in colonial Tanzania there was a positive attitude toward the use of English and Swahili in the society and in particular in the education system, this attitude changed in 1964 when the mainland (Tanganyika) united with the islands of Zanzibar (Unguja) and Pemba[37] after the Zanzibar revolution in 1964, resulting in the formation of the United Republic of Tanzania. The new state was based on *Ujamaa* (Socialism) ideology and one of the first actions by this state was to introduce a new curriculum, that is, Education for Self-Reliance (*Elimu ya Kujitegemea*), which made Swahili the medium of instruction throughout the primary school level.[38] The reasons that were offered by the government for declaring Swahili as the language of instruction in primary schools were influenced by nationalism. The government wanted "to minimize the universality of English as the medium for transmitting Tanzanian cultural values and to reinforce the promotion of positive attitudes towards respecting rural life."[39] To implement this policy, there were efforts to produce Swahili books by the Tanzania Publishing House and Tanzania Educational Supplies. However, English remained the language of instruction in secondary school curriculum and that of higher education. There was also a plan by the government of Tanzania to introduce Swahili as a language of instruction in postprimary education level from 1971, but this did not materialize.[40] According to many scholars,[41] the reasons for this delay were political and not technical as experts in linguistics, education, and curriculum development had done extensive work in preparation for the switch to Swahili in postprimary education.[42]

It should be noted that the policy of the Swahili medium for primary school education and English as the medium of instruction for postprimary school education was not without opposition. On one hand, the fear was that the Swahili medium of instruction at the primary education level would result in low academic performance at the secondary education level as a result of inadequate mastery of English, which would be the medium of instruction in secondary schools.[43] On the other hand, the concern over English as the medium of instruction at the secondary level was that this switch to English only would force the students to access knowledge through a language they were not proficient in. Hence, instead of acquiring knowledge, a lot of time would be spent learning this new language. No wonder in East African schools education is equated with learning of English.

Since the move to make Swahili the language of instruction at the postprimary level of education failed, problems of the continued use of English as the medium of instruction at the secondary school level have been reported in Tanzania since the 1970s and 1980s.[44] As a result, the Tanzanian government appointed two presidential commissions in 1982 and 1984 to review the state of education and make recommendations for improvements for the next 20 years. These commissions' recommendations concerning the language policy are discussedn ext.

1982 Presidential Commission on Education

In 1982 the Presidential Commission on Education was established under the chairmanship of J. Makweta to look into matters of education in the country. This commission was composed of distinguished academic and professional experts, who had consulted and gathered advice from a wide range of experts from all sectors of national development.[45] Two sets of recommendations were related to language in education. One recommendation was that the teaching of Swahili and English should be strengthened. The other recommendation was as follows:

> In order that the nation is able to develop its culture and ease the understanding of most of the populace at different stages of education after primary education without the encumbrance of a foreign language, it is recommended that: firm plans be made to enable all schools and colleges in the country to teach all subjects using Kiswahili beginning with Form 1 in January 1985 and the University beginning 1992.[46]

Therefore, this commission recommended a gradual shift of language of instruction in secondary schools from English to Swahili. Swahili was to be used as a language of instruction in secondary schools from 1985 and to be completed by the year 1992 at higher levels. However, the ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM; Revolutionary Party) through the Ministry of Education rejected this recommendation.[47] They instead argued that English would remain the language of instruction of education at postprimary levels, and the teaching of Swahili would be strengthened.[48] The government report stated the following:

> The Ministry of Education will draw up and supervise an action plan in the implementation of programmes to improve the teaching and use of Kiswahili and English at all levels of education. Both Kiswahili and English will be used as media of education. The teaching of English

> will be strengthened at all levels. Kiswahili will be the medium of education at nursery and primary levels. The teaching of English will be consolidated in Primary school. English will also be the medium of education at post-primary levels where the teaching of Kiswahili will also be strengthened.[49]

This government's decision not to extend Swahili as a language of instruction to postprimary levels disappointed many concerned language planners and educationists and also "unleashed heated debates between the Swahili developers and promoters on one hand, and the government, on the other."[50] The government's decision was not based on research but politics. Katigula states:

> When the Presidential Commission on Education (1982) came up with the recommendation for medium-switch to Kiswahili for secondary education, this was a result of some research carried out among educationists and students. However, when in 1983 the government decreed against the use of Kiswahili medium in secondary school, this was not a result of any research; certain beliefs, values and prejudices came into play.[51]

In sum, the government's decision could not be justified and therefore, many stakeholders were very disappointed. It was simply a directive that had to be obeyed. However, the government was aware of the growing dissatisfaction among the citizens and the then president Mwalimu Julius Nyerere addressing the National Education Conference in Arusha in October 1984 offered the following justification for retaining English as the language of instruction in the postprimary level.

> English is Swahili of the world and for that reason must be taught and given the weight it deserves in our country... It is wrong to leave English to die. To reject English is foolishness, not patriotism... English will be the medium of instruction in secondary schools and institutions of higher education because if it is left as only normal subject it may die.[52]

The president's statement implies that English is such an important language in the world that it has to be protected from dying. This is one effect of globalization. The issue of globalization and education language policy in East Africa will be discussed later in the conclusion.

Since the government did not implement the recommendation of the 1982 Presidential Commission on Education to switch the language of instruction in secondary schools to Swahili, in 1984 the government called in experts from Britain to come and evaluate the teaching of English and its use as a language of instruction and advise the government on the way forward in terms of language instruction. This commission is known as Criper and Dodd Commission (1984), which is discussed next.

Criper and Dodd Commission (1984)

As did the Presidential Commission (1982), this commission too observed that English was not a practical educational medium and very little learning was taking place in secondary schools in the country.[53] The commission stated,

> The current level of English in secondary schools is so totally inadequate for the teaching and learning of other subjects that emergency steps must be taken now.... Were it not for the fact that much teaching was in practice carried out in Kiswahili...it is hard to see how any genuine education could take place at the lower secondary level.[54]

With such observations, the question is; why did English remain the language of instruction while practically Swahili was used as the language of instruction? As already mentioned under the Kenyan case, English is a dominant global language that dominates at the expense of other languages (e.g., African languages). However, although this Commission made the foregoing observations, unlike the Presidential Commission (1982) that recommended a switch to Swahili as medium of instruction in secondary schools by 1985, Criper and Dodd Commission recommended that the teaching of English language be strengthened and that English should remain as the educational medium. In fact, it called for immediate measures to improve the state of English in schools. It stated:

> The current level of English in secondary schools is so totally inadequate for the teaching and learning of other subjects that we feel that the Ministry of National Education cannot take a long term view—decisions need to be taken now which will lead to an early rise in the level of English. The problem should be treated as an emergency and as not allowing a long term solution.[55]

To conclude, I would like to state that transitional bilingual education policy has not worked in Tanzania for the past fifty years. Rajabu and Ngonyani argue that "the language policies in Tanzania have grossly failed the education system as a whole. The political leaders present very appealing options but the implementation seems not to have taken off and when it does, it appears to be erratic and unrealistic."[56] Thus, language policy in education in Tanzania is heavily imbalanced favoring English use over Swahili at the expense of the learners and teachers. As a matter of fact, the additive bilingual policy may work for Tanzania because this policy enriches a student's abilities by adding to her/his linguistic repertoire while strengthening the first language. I now turn to the Ugandan case.

The Ugandan Case

Even though Uganda gained its independence in 1962, between 1970 and 1985 Uganda was not politically stable compared to its neighbors, Kenya and Tanzania. Therefore, its language policy in education was not given a lot of attention as other sectors of the country (e.g., the economy and security) needed immediate attention. But "since 1986, when the current government came into power, there has been a noted recovery and stability"[57] in many sectors of the country. Just as I have done with the previous two cases, I will look at the language policy toward the end of colonial era followed by postcolonial era.

During the colonial era from 1947, Ugandan mother tongues were used as languages of instruction from grade one to grade four and in 1948 Swahili was allowed in the education system.[58] Until 1952, Swahili was one of the recognized mother tongues in schools. However, the De Bunsen Committee (1952) banned Swahili as one of the mother tongues taught in Ugandan schools as it was not a mother tongue in Uganda. English was the language of instruction from grade five onward. To understand the language policy in education in Uganda, I will discuss two commission reports: the Castle Commission Report (1963) and the Government White Paper (1992).

The Castle Commission Report (1963)

After three years of independence, Uganda acquired a language policy in education. In 1965 it adopted the Castle Commission Report of 1963. This commission was chaired by E. B. Castle. The commission made the following recommendations on language policy in education:

> First, six languages to be used in the primary school, that is, Luganda, Ateso, Lugbara, Luo, Runyoro and Runyankole. Second, children were to be taught in their own mother tongue in the early years of education. Third, English was to be introduced as a subject in grade 1 and continue as a subject for all seven years of primary education. In grade 4 Mathematics and Physical Education were to be taught through the medium of English. Then English as the language of instruction would be gradually extended to Science, Geography, Art, Crafts and Music in grade 5, and in grade 6 and 7 all subjects would be taught in English.[59]

This report was in line with second language research where initial literacy and learning was to be done in the first languages of the children. However, this seems to be the case of subtractive bilingualism just like in Kenya and Tanzania where at higher levels of education English replaces the first languages. Also, the decree that Luganda, Ateso, Lugbara, Luo, Runyoro, and Runyankole would be languages of instruction alongside English was not fully realized since only Luganda had some readers produced by Luganda scholars on an individual basis.[60] The other five languages did not have literacy and content materials. In addition, in this report unlike Kenya and Tanzania, there is no mention of Swahili language even though Uganda played a very active role in the Interterritorial (Swahili) Language Committee during the colonial era until it was banned from the education system in 1952. In fact, there was a brief debate on the inclusion of Swahili in the education system when the government was adopting the Castle Commission in 1965. Consequently, this debate was closed by the then Acting Attorney General[61] who is quoted saying:

> We are concerned here…not with teaching another language altogether, which is altogether strange. (Interruption). Yes, if you teach Kiswahili, you might as well teach Gujarati. Kiswahili is no nearer to the language of the Hon. Member than Gujarati. I want to challenge him on that. Not nearer. He might as well learn what they speak in Paraguay than learn Kiswahili.[62]

Thus, with the declaration of the then Acting Attorney General, the fate of Swahili in the Ugandan education system was sealed.

Since the adoption of the Castle Commission's report in 1965, there have been debates on whether to pursue African languages especially Luganda as the only language(s) of instruction beyond primary level of education. But, there have also been fears of international isolation as the former president of Uganda, Milton Obote noted in 1967:

> The adoption of any of our present languages in Uganda may just go to endorse our isolation: we cannot afford isolation. It is possible today for the people of Uganda to communicate with the people in the neighboring countries in broken Swahili but is not possible for the people of Uganda to communicate with the neighboring countries in broken Luganda. If we cannot communicate with our neighbors in broken Luganda today, how much more difficult would be to try to communicate in first class Luganda?[63]

The fears of isolation from the rest of the world emanate from globalization and regionalization factors that will be discussed later. In sum, the Castle Commission's Report on language policy had been in effect in Uganda up to the launch of the 1992 Government White Paper, which is discussed next.

The Government White Paper (1992)

The current language policy in Uganda is spelt out in the Ugandan Government's White Paper on Education that was based on the report of the Education Policy Review Commission under the chairmanship of Professor W. S. Kajubi, which was set up in July 1987. It states:

> In rural areas the medium of instruction from P1 to P4 will be the relevant local languages; and from P5 onwards English will be the medium of instruction. In urban areas the medium of instruction will be English throughout the primary cycle. Kiswahili and English will be taught as compulsory subjects to all children throughout the primary cycle, in both rural and urban areas. Emphasis in terms of allocation of time and in the provision of instructional materials, facilities and teachers will, however, be gradually placed on Kiswahili as language possessing greater capacity for uniting Ugandans and for assisting rapid social development. The relevant area language will also be taught as a subject in primary schools.
>
> English will be the medium of instruction from Secondary 1 onwards. Kiswahili and English will be compulsory subjects for all secondary school students... One of the major Uganda languages may also be taught.[64]

So, the language policy in the Ugandan education system is envisioned to be bilingual although, in practical terms, it is highly monolingual as far as the language of instruction is concerned. The bilingual nature of the education system in Uganda is only displayed at the lower primary level in some primary schools in rural areas. English, which is a foreign language is the medium of instruction from grade four to tertiary institutions, while the local languages or mother tongues are only used in the early primary. Thus, past primary education, English takes over as a medium of instruction. In addition, since the ban of Swahili in the education system in 1952, the 1992 Government White Paper included Swahili as one of the compulsory languages in primary and secondary schools. The reason for its inclusion was because it was viewed as a language that could unite Ugandans as it had done in Tanzania and Kenya. Also, Ugandans have to embrace Swahili because of its membership in the East African Community since Swahili is the language of communication in this regional community. However, the teaching of Swahili in Ugandan schools has been faced by three challenges:

> The first, is lack of concrete government programmes for successful implementation of the policy; second, is lack of adequate numbers of teachers who are knowledgeable and experienced in the teaching of Kiswahili. Government has no plans to employ teachers from elsewhere. The third, is lack of books and other scholastic materials. Kiswahili books are not available in most bookshops in Uganda.[65]

For the successful implementation of Swahili as a language in education, the stakeholders have to invest in it. Therefore, the government of Uganda, if it deems Swahili as an important language in its education system and society in general, has to invest in it. However, this does not seem to be the case because in 2005, a new curriculum policy for lower primary school level (i.e., grade one through three) was approved by the Ministry of Education and Sports. It states:

> In 2005, Kiswahili will become an optional subject. Schools that have started to teach the subject are encouraged to continue teaching it. However, those schools unable to introduce the subject due to lack of teachers and lack of appropriate materials should see it as an optional subject until more resources are available. Lesson time made available for Kiswahili in the timetable should be allocated to other subjects if schools cannot offer Kiswahili as an option.[66]

Although the Swahili dilemma lingers in Uganda, it has to be resolved for Ugandans to thrive in the East African Community.

Conclusion

As I stated in the introduction, the language debates in these three East African countries appear to be shaped by local, regional, and global factors: colonial mentality, nationalism (i.e., the multilingual reality of these East African countries), regionalization, and globalization.

The construction of colonial mentality was at its peak during the colonial era. However, the same seemed to have flourished during the initial years of independence. During the latter years of colonial era, the language of instruction in Kenya and Uganda from primary schools and beyond was English, while in Tanzania English took over beyond lower primary school. The role of Swahili and other local languages was very minimal in the education system. This situation is well stated by Thiong'o:

> The language of our evening teach-ins, and the language of our immediate and wider community, and the language of our work in the fields were one. And then I went to school, a colonial school, and this harmony was broken. The language of my education was no longer the language of my culture. English became the language of my formal education. In Kenya, English became more than a language: it was *the* language, and all the others had to bow before it in deference. Thus one of the most humiliating experiences was to be caught speaking Gikuyu in the vicinity of the school. The culprit was given corporal punishment.[67]

Unfortunately, this situation did not change with independence. English language continued to be the language of instruction in these three postcolonial countries. The argument put forward was that the local languages were ill-prepared to be languages of instruction (e.g., the Ominde Commission of 1964 in Kenya).

However, looking at Swahili, this was a language that was well prepared to be a language of instruction in the three countries up to secondary level. I attribute this attitude toward local languages to colonial mentality that valued English and devalued local languages. Roy-Campbell observes:

> The low level of development of most African languages during the colonial era suggested that these languages were not seen as capable of serving as vehicles for advanced knowledge. Many Africans carried with them, into their newly politically independent states, this conception of African languages, and it has provided the ideological underpinnings for educational languages in post-colonial states.[68]

In sum, the colonialist had an agenda to devalue African languages and culture as well. But, in the late 1970s to the 2000s the multilingual reality of these countries was being recognized and embraced to some extent. In Kenya, for example, the Gachathi Commission of 1976 and the Koech Report of 1999 recommended the teaching of local languages in lower primary classes and Swahili to be taught beyond primary school in Kenya. In Uganda, the same awakening in terms of multilingual reality was taking place (e.g., the Government's White Paper of 1992). But, in Tanzania all the other local languages apart from Swahili have been silenced in education up to this day.

In addition, with the revival of the East African Community (i.e., regionalization) and globalization, these language debates have become more complex than ever before. Swahili being the regional language and English being a global language, the statuses of these languages are becoming more relevant as compared to other local languages in the region. For instance, we have seen this with the 1982 Tanzanian Presidential Commission on Education, which recommended a gradual shift of language of instruction in secondary schools from English to Swahili because very minimal learning was taking place through English instruction. However, the policy makers rejected this recommendation in favor of English. Therefore, English as a global language won this debate in Tanzania, and as we speak, English is the language of instruction in post secondary levels in Tanzania just as it is in Kenya and Uganda. Thus, the fears that Mwalimu Julius Nyerere harbored on abandoning English as a language of instruction in Tanzanian secondary schools were based on globalization realities while Milton Obote's fears with regard to making Ugandan local language a language of instruction were based not only on globalization realities but also on regionalization realities. Therefore, on one hand, English is seen as a window to the world and hence, its strong emphasis in East African education systems. On the other hand, Swahili is seen as the doorway to the East African community and so, its relevance in education in the three countries.

To conclude, it is very clear that the East African countries highlighted have grappled with the question of language in education for a very long time. It is this struggle that has led to the many debates that each country has had to deal with individually and collectively as a region. In view of these debates, the following can be said: first, I agree with Thiong'o[69] that there is need of decolonization of the African mind, so that Africans can embrace their multilingual realities in education systems. Second, globalization should not be a scapegoat to devalue African languages in the education systems. Finally, it is important to recognize all languages as being equal. No language should be elevated at the expense of another. The approach that will work for the East African countries is to promote the East African regional language—Swahili—so that education, both Western and local, can be accessed and applied to various sectors of the countries' growth.

Notes

1. Abdulaziz 1982.
2. Mukama 2009.
3. Blommaert 1999.
4. Sifuna1 980.
5. Sifuna1 980.
6. Muthwii 2002.
7. Mbaabu1 996.
8. Republic of Kenya 1964, 60.
9. Muthwii 2004, 36.
10. Bunyi 1999; Mbaabu 1996; Muthwii 2004.
11. Thiong'o1 986,1 2.
12. Mbaabu1 996.
13. Bakhtin 1981.
14. Republic of Kenya 1964, 60.
15. UNESCO1 953.
16. Republic of Kenya 1964, 60–1.
17. Bunyi 1999; Mbaabu 1996.
18. Republic of Kenya 1976, 54.
19. Jones 2008.
20. Mbaabu1 996.
21. Republic of Kenya 1976, 54.
22. Baker 2000, 58.
23. Republic of Kenya 1976, 12.
24. Republic of Kenya 1976, 57.
25. Hudelson 2005.
26. Republic of Kenya 1999, 284.
27. Republic of Kenya 1999, 284.
28. Lisanza2 011.
29. Kenya Institute of Education 2006, 2.
30. Bakhtin 1981, 1986.
31. Bakhtin 1981, 342.
32. Thiong'o1 986,1 1.
33. Mbaabu1 996.
34. Abdulaziz 1982.
35. Blommaert 1999.
36. Mbaabu1 996.
37. Blommaert 1999.

38. Mbaabu1 996.
39. Roy-Campbell 1992, 145.
40. Blommaert 1999.
41. Mulokozi 1989; Massamba 1987; Mwansoko 1990; Rajabu and Ngonyani 1993.
42. Mulokozi 1989.
43. Roy-Campbell 1992.
44. Roy-Campbell 1992.
45. Rajabu and Ngonyani 1993.
46. Ministry of National Education 1982, 191–2.
47. Rajabu and Ngonyani 1993.
48. Roy-Campbell 1992.
49. United Republic of Tanzania 1984, 19.
50. Mwansoko1 993,1 5.
51. Katigula 1987, 16–17.
52. Roy-Campbell 1992, 188.
53. Rajabu and Ngonyani 1993.
54. Criper and Dodd 1984, 16.
55. Criper and Dodd 1984, 72.
56. Rajabu and Ngonyani 1993, 13.
57. Tembe 2008, 6.
58. Mbaabu1 996.
59. Ladefoged, Glick, and Criper 1971, 96.
60. Mukama 2009.
61. Mukama 2009.
62. Whiteley 1969, 98.
63. Mukama 2009, 10.
64. White Paper 1992, 19.
65. Mukama 2009, 15.
66. Ministry of Education and Sports 2005, 3–4.
67. Thiong'o1 986,1 1.
68. Roy-Campbell 2000, 118.
69. Thiong'o 1986.

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PART II

Cultural Production

CHAPTER 7

Globalization and African Cinema: Distribution and Reception in the Anglophone Region

Martin R. Mhando

Introduction

Globalization is the all-pervasive constituent of contemporary living, especially where it is underwritten by colonial histories. Keyan Tomaselli argues that European interpretive frameworks have determined readings of African texts.[1] Globalization needs to be understood through the discourse of capital, to understand how entire societies have become affected economically and socially by the dynamics of diversity in this new international division of labor.[2] Globalization is the narrative of socialization that also helps us to locate the local within the global.

Globalization therefore in turn assists us to understand local experiences and consequences as reflective of culture, history, and identity. As we find with cinema distribution in Ghana and Nigeria, globalization has consolidated strategies to confront its effects. This narrative of socialization must be posited and studied to understand the effects of filmic construction and meaning creation.

One of the greatest ironies of the film industry in Africa is in the area of distribution: African film producers often appeal to the international commercial market but receive meager or nonexistent earnings. In the process, they become totally dependent on the festival circuit for the distribution of their product.[3] Other methods for distributing African films continue to be tried in many different parts of the continent: Ghana and Nigeria, for example, have individually developed appropriate means for distributing their films commensurate with their economic and social histories.

This chapter will look at the changing environment of African cinema and the new distribution channels developing in many African countries in terms of how they use technologies appropriate to those who will use it rather than purveyors.

I will focus on the trends in "Anglophone" countries for two main reasons. The first is because of the lack of material from francophone countries translated into English, but second, and more importantly, because there is still a scarcity of critical material on cinema from Anglophone countries with regard to the distribution and reception of visual material in Africa south of the Sahara.[4]

Third, there is an emerging conceptualization of African cinematic expressions based on larger cultural experiences such as colonial subjection, dependency, the anticolonial and the liberationist. These engagements have made critics such as Olivier Barlet advocate for seeing many cinemas coming out of Africa.[5] These "colonial-phonic" derivations have also affected the distribution of African films.

Experiences of commercial distribution of films in Africa have failed miserably. The strength of the commercial distribution system only suited the products for which it was created. The environment of film distribution in the continent is typically that of the West. One might as well have been in London or New York as regards cinema in any African capital before the 1980s. The African product was on alien grounds, even in Africa, especially with technology influencing the take-up and eventual control of the cinema business.

The application of technology for purposes of creating recognizable social forces, as Helen Wilson says, "...is not only developed but also deployed through political choices, within the framework of existing organizations and power relations."[6] African audiences, for example, met the film through the eyes of the colonizer, and therefore the technology of cinema was used not only to project images that showed the superiority of the master but also to further intimidate the viewers through the "magic" of technology. What theory then might we use to successfully process the thinking around the new distribution practices evolving in African cinema, and possibly project its future?

The "theory" that one immediately recognizes when studying the continued state of affairs in film distribution in Africa is that of dependency—the local cinemas' continuing dependence on the dominant cinema for its global construction and maintenance. Due to rapid technological change and cost, local film distribution remains under the control of mainstream distribution patterns.[7] Indeed, the effect of Western-based distribution circuits has been to sideline novel and cheap distribution methods that evolve with the economies of African countries; Western capital will always protect its markets. This is evident in the industrial structure of the commercial 35mm theaters and multiplexes, which exclude participation by local distributors except those that Western businesses canonize.

However, local filmmakers have always expressed divergent needs as regards distribution through their texts and local structures of production and exhibition. A good example is that of the late Ousmane Sembène when he decided in 1974 that he would only film in Wolof, because he wanted to reach what he regarded as "his audience."[8] The challenge of reaching African audiences remains the key to the growth of African cinemas; in the reception of its product, African cinema also presents its diversity and strength. In fact, the explosion of video production and distribution activities in Ghana and Nigeria portends diverse futures, thus reducing what the filmmaker and critic Kwaw Ansah called "the vacuum created in African cinema."[9] These film producers and distributors are indeed the vanguard of African cinematic development.

I want to argue here that the rebirth of African film distribution was dependent on the renaissance of marketing strategies of times gone by, such as those of the African travelling salespersons, described by Hyginus Ekwuazi:

> And so, enter, the folklorists, the Yoruba travelling theatre practitioners who, largely through the pioneering works of Dr Ola Balogun and Bankole Bello, made the transition from the stage, via the TV to film: with the same stories, the same cast and the same faithful audience. With *Aiye, Mosebolatan, Taxi Driver, Omo Orukan*, etc. a new cinema was born: the cinema that took the film to the audience, a travelling cinema![10]

In this case, the social environment provided the structural context for acculturation while the media provided the process of such socialization. Therefore the change that eventuated in the 1990s and beyond was not due to a successful Western-type entrepreneurial effort but to entrepreneurial innovativeness of the African kind. Not much is known of this activity because it requires serious research for primary data collection and study, funded by international research institutions, and such research does not fall within the areas of expertise of those institutions.

Even though it is sometimes seen to be radical, alternative, and indeed oppositional, African cinema has often been propped up by the dominant cinema structures.[11] African filmmakers have even accepted this as normal as they do not have the financial power to build their own structures. But this "normalcy" has been acquired through accepting the ideology and technology of mainstream cinema production and distribution. If African cinema were to challenge this "normalcy" it would require an avant-gardist approach to producing and distributing their texts. If African filmmakers were to take up this challenge it would imply the following:

- The new cinema would not be concerned with communicating using shocking means, skewed moral intents or diverse aesthetic values.
- The new cinema would be unlike the oppositional cinema of the 1970s, which was for personal expression that directors knew would not be suitable for mainstream theatrical release.
- The new cinema could aim at commercial gain and use conventional and nonconventional forms and methods in its effort at communicating with an audience outside the laid-out (and now dying) distribution channels.

These conditions would lead to applying the socialization technologies such as happened in Nigeria and Ghana. These unfolding socialization processes are unfortunately often denigrated, and their locally based approach undermined by contemporary production and distribution structures. The mainstream cinema distribution pattern is a symptom of the sick state of affairs in film distribution as well as production in Africa.

I would therefore like to discuss this unfolding trend, taking into account the nature of globalization and how it continues to affect the way African cinema adapts to the globalizing environment.

Challenging the Globalized Medium

When many African currencies were devalued in the 1980s, few countries could afford to import movies, cinema theaters became decrepit and the movie business effectively died except where Western economies still held sway. The few countries that maintained the traditional cinema business were South Africa (and its satellite countries Lesotho, Botswana, Namibia, and Swaziland) and, further north, the Maghreb countries. Elsewhere in Africa, cinema business did not translate into box office receipts. In francophone countries Burkina Faso, Senegal, and Mali where, "there are problems at every level," says Valérie Mouroux of the well-known film publication *Écrans Nord-Sud*, "the 'cultural' movie theatres in France have less and less room for non-French, non-American films. And in Africa there is no distribution for local films. The directors themselves often go from theatre to theatre hawking their movies."[12]

As Mouroux explains:

> Even with better distribution, it's not clear how many Africans would see the films. Africa boasts a bewildering variety of languages, and a Burkinabe film shot in Mossi won't do well in a Baoule area of Ivory Coast. Subtitling is of limited use in countries with 40 per cent literacy rates. Movie theatres, meanwhile, are shabby and far between. At independence (in 1960), Cameroon had 40 or 50 cinemas. Now there are seven.[13]

Indeed, one might ironically say that a certain renaissance of African cinema was to emerge thanks to the Structural Adjustment Programs meted out by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). After state subsidies and controls from cinema were removed in Zimbabwe, Tanzania, and Mozambique in the 1980s, corrupt businesses characteristically exploited commercial and legal opportunities. Video distribution shops were opened on every available commercial street corner, as well as in homes, and traders broke copyright regulations with impunity. Young lovers who could not afford cinema tickets and the bus/taxi fares to city center cinemas could now enjoy a night out close to their homes watching videos!

This is a feature prevalent in the southern Africa region. Since 1986, in the mining centers of Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and Zambia, video hall showings now clearly outstrip earnings by the commercial cinema circuit.[14] Things changed in the 1990s. Filmmakers and grassroots distributors have taken up the challenge of film and video distribution in Africa with very little prompting. While the commercially run sector still thrives on blockbusters from Hollywood, it is the cheap local film and video that now commands the attention of the urban and rural spectator.

As in Anglophone West Africa, "the filmmakers have resorted to taking their films to exhibit directly to the people in their various communities."[15] In Nigeria and Ghana this system has helped to build a "cartel" of sorts, through which production and distribution is organized. Similar to local theater production and distribution, the system supports direct access to audiences and physical interaction between spectators and the filmmaker. This distribution system is very low cost, and audiences are keen to watch the local product. But what is best about the system is that it is made to order: it suits the cultural, political, and physical environment of the distribution territory. As Chika Anyanwu argues,

> The popularity of the videos is surprisingly high, especially among the youth whose daily struggles are represented in the productions. An important aspect of this mode of production [and distribution] is that there is a conscious effort by these young producers to reach the rural populace.[16]

Jeremy Nathan in fact presents them as role models:

> Nigerian filmmakers have found a way to circumvent the usual industry distribution channels, regularly making both new movies and a living. Relying on neither government funding nor television coin, the Nigerian film industry has forged a viable digital video revolution – a business model that all of Africa and indeed many other parts of the world could emulate.[17]

The Changing Status of Video Production

Until recently, videos coming out of Lagos and Accra were seen as anathema to African film production. They had poor production values (some shot on VHS), they told stories that pandered to the lowest common denominator—sex, violence, and the colonial leftover messages of Christian values. Nigeria and Ghana have done something akin to the impossible. Ekwuazi explains these trends thus:

> [...] when no new film could be made or brought into the country; when there were no films to sustain the theatres, these travelling theatre-turned travelling cinema practitioners were, perhaps not surprisingly, the only ones able to spread their sails to catch the wind of change that was the Structural Adjustment Programme.[18]

Significantly, with the spiraling cost of film production and the devaluation of the Nigerian naira, the cheap medium of video became the filmmaker's savior.

Video is essentially a reception rather than a production format. While television production has readily appropriated the format for production despite its low resolution and color barriers, video remains only a distribution format for the cinema industry. The low cost of video and its rapid and cheap distribution capabilities is ideal for a media-hungry social environment. Not impeded by the "over-sophistication" and "perfect" image, as Western audiences are wont to be, African filmmakers took the opportunity to turn the video format into a production format. These filmmakers considered the aesthetic and social experiences of their expanding, unfulfilled but otherwise reachable audiences, and, by the 1990s, films made on video had begun to appear on the streets of Lagos.

It was only after the appearance of *Living in Bondage* and *Circle of Doom*[19] that the home-video market became a commercial proposition. With the production of *The Battle of Musanga*, a historical thriller directed by Bolaji Dawodu,[20] an audience had been created.[21] These video-films, made by "debutants," many of them without film-school training, were the butt of many African filmmakers' jokes even as late as the second half of the 1990s. They violated every dogma, but since then Western-trained African filmmakers have joined in this enterprise and it is their populist stories that distinguish them from the African cinema product consumed in the West.

> In 1995, the censors reviewed 201 video films, the following year 250, and by now as many as 650 are said to be produced every year—more than the number of films produced in the US. Average sales are about 30,000, but the most successful releases sell as many as 150,000 copies.[22]

Ten years on, and the trend is still toward recognizing these deeply culturally specific stories that resonate with life in urban Africa. The stories describe city violence, rural gullibility, sexual incontinence and attendant diseases like AIDS, changing moral ethics with relation to Christianity and Islam, music-oriented urban living, and other typical and topical African narratives. While Tunde Kelani is not part of the Nollywood production structure, he recognizes the growing power of Nollywood as a distribution machine:

> Videos are cheap to produce: with budgets as small as $4,000, shooting rarely lasts more than ten days or two weeks. The break-even point is 10,000 units sold and a successful title can sell over 100,000 copies . . . The majority of cassettes are reportedly bought by

> ‘housewives’ affluent enough to afford a VCR. The poorer majority of Nigerians see these productions in video theatres, originally little more than a spare room in someone’s house but with the advent of video projection, discrete facilities.[23]

In southern Africa a different distribution regime survives. It is similar to that of West Africa, but there is much more control applied. However, control has its own positives and negatives. The seemingly chaotic processes found in West Africa have the advantages of trial and error: producers and distributors remain close to their audiences and get immediate feedback about their films and processes. The negatives include the potential use of the circuit to distribute pornographic and other antisocial materials.[24]

What these efforts have shown is that community media need to be seen as expressions of formalism, technique, and content structure of their own creation.[25] This kind of reasoning, however, requires a complete rethink of the dominant modes of distribution in practice in the region and in the continent.

When one talks about film distribution in the region, one often has in mind film distribution within established theatrical and video distribution circuits. In the case of southern Africa, the Ster-Kinekor distribution chain controls much of the product and trading in film. With over 300 theaters all over the region and a seating capacity of over 40,000, Ster-Kinekor has a huge and steadfast grip on the kind of films exhibited in the region.[26] Other chains and independent distributors add potentially another 20,000 seats. Under these conditions, the distributor operates like a beef manufacturer who also owns the supermarkets, and even the butcheries, where his products are sold. The distributor’s control is total.[27]

In contrast, film and video distribution in the region also supports another tier for distributing the visual product. This includes the lower end film distributors, like those in Zimbabwe through whom over 1200 local mobile 16mm film and video exhibitors access their product and distribute it to urban and rural audiences. In Tanzania, the defunct Tanzania Film Company, which until 1992 controlled the distribution of films in the country, has seen declining attendance from the high of over a million filmgoers a year in 1987 to hardly a third of that in 1997.[28] Since then, film distributors have moved into video distribution with operators using defunct cinemas, cultural centers, school halls, and eventually residences to show videos at a nominal charge. This situation is replicated in Zambia where, even with over 70 percent of the population living in urban areas, there is little spare cash to afford luxuries like the cinema. Because of this, cinema theaters are closing down. In the other countries of the region (Malawi, Swaziland, Lesotho, Namibia, Mozambique, and Angola), the difference is only in the degree of control rather than which films are distributed. Film distribution in these countries still maintains an orientation that assigns Western distribution monopolies exclusive control over what is shown in the region.

In South Africa the total number of independent operators is unclear but, as in the rest of the region, there is an increasing number of independent video distribution centers. In any case, the video centers in South Africa adhere to government regulations, unlike the situation in Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and Zambia where video distribution is mostly at the level of the individual operator. In South Africa, video clubs under NGOs' supervision slowly graduate to autonomous distribution centers such as the now famous Film Resource Unit (FRU), Video Suitcase Mobile Cinema, Mayibuye Centre, and FAWO (Film and Allied Workers Organization).

A Creative Field

Undeniably, the experience in both the West and southern African English-speaking countries has further evolved to the production of videos in the more stable and aesthetically pleasing digital video format. This low-cost format, and the comparatively easy and accessible editing facilities that abound wherever a fast computer is available, has made video production a growing creative field for new and older filmmakers. Notice the trend toward funded videos in southern Africa such as the successful series *Landscape of Memory*.[29]

Landscape of Memory, a documentary series about truth and reconciliation in southern Africa deals with the need for people in the region to reconcile themselves to the violent past that their countries have recently emerged from.[30] The series involved Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa, and included the following films: *From the Ashes*, Mozambique, directed by Joao Ribeiro; *The Unfolding of Sky*, South Africa, directed by Antjie Krog and Ronelle Loots; *Soul in Torment*, Zimbabwe, directed by Prudence Uriri; *I Have Seen* (*Nda mona*), Namibia, directed by Richard Pakleppa.

The region contains a myriad of imaginary cultural and environmental landscapes. Using descriptive terms such as "settler," "tribal," "development," "front-line," "liberation," "Bantu," "Black farmer," "White farmer," "townships," "reserves" and the like, the topographical imagery of southern Africa is endorsed consciously and unconsciously as a cinematic space. The "educational and development" film ethic is a good example of a new rejoinder to this cinematic landscape. *Landscape of Memory* is therefore an apt term to reflect the cinema emerging from the region.

The series *Landscape of Memory* is a prime example of the closely related regional experiences of recent times, and it shows the ongoing construction of a geopolitical identity that is southern Africa. Although narrated at the national level, these films are first and foremost regionally oriented and, as with the example of recent films coming out of Latin America, the films tend to "defy rather than reinforce national category."[31]

The very themes of the series and the production house (SACOD) are founded on the concept of regional integration and the invoked concept of regionalism. The theme of reconciliation, as portrayed in Uriri's *Soul in Torment* and Pakleppa's *I Have Seen*,[32] could easily be replicated in Angola, South Africa, Zambia, or Tanzania. The issues discussed in the two films appeal and closely relate to events that express the national being of South Africa. The same can be said of the themes covered in Ribeiro's *From the Ashes* and Krog and Loots' *The Unfolding of Sky*,[33] where the victim and perpetrator look one another in the eye and begin a dialogue. The dialogue portends the need for the large, expanding vocabulary of mutual redemption that is encapsulated in the word "journey." The imagery of journey itself conjures up derivatives of panorama as one travels the historical and psychological landscape of memory.

Through these and other upcoming video productions that are aimed at both the television and video circuits, the video-film seems to be moving in the right direction. However, there is always that niggling fear that this adaptation to a specific medium (the video) has not thought through its conditions of socialization. This could lead to corruption and its easy demise. As we have noted earlier, technical devices sometimes attain the level of social technology by affecting or even prompting creation processes. A technologically and socioeconomically inspired approach to cultural analysis could help us recognize the importance of social formations and their effects.

One way that would invariably ensure the video medium's sustenance, and even its viability, is to understand the nature of distribution. To do this, producers may need quite novel ways of communicating visual materials to larger audiences while integrating technology and its socialization capabilities.

Theorizing Distribution in Africa

When Tommy Lott advanced his "no-theory theory" on the concept and definition of black cinema, he argued that a theory remains a theory only up to the time when the meanings it advances "are no longer applicable."[34] By so saying, he showed an awareness of the complexity of theorizing an ongoing activity based on an essentialized notion. African cinema, just like black American cinema in the 1980s, is an unfolding phenomenon and therefore any theorization will necessarily be limited to the reconsideration of its erstwhile undervalued contribution in society. This theorizing can contribute to considerable confusion on how to receive the enabled voices from the narrow value systems now being unlocked. The articulation of alternatives, which have remained invisible, and the charting of their growth comprise the process of theorizing. These articulations are fraught with "experimentation" that will take many years to settle down; hence the importance of the "no-theory theory" perspective.

A theory of distribution in Africa needs to project a keen alignment with the historical conditions of film distribution in each of the countries of the continent. These conditions of reception contain specific parameters of cinema consumption, suggesting that audience responses need to be accounted for outside of received theories. I submit that, under the current social conditions in the linguistic regions of Africa (anglophone, arabophone, francophone, lusophone and swahiliphone), it is only appropriate to center the theory of distribution within theories of social appropriation. I use the term "appropriation" while aware of the implication of its discourse. From the ongoing discussion on the Nigerian and Ghanaian distribution experiences, appropriation can also be understood as the process through which dominated cultures reinscribe their hegemony over and above the hegemony of the imperial powers.[35] Through appropriation, the dominating culture's form is reconstituted to express and interpolate experience to reach a wider audience. It is also used to express deeper epistemologies of narratives. Just as language can be used to "bear the burden of another experience" (a quotation often ascribed to both Chinua Achebe and James Baldwin), so too can cinema technology be used to bear the burden of another techno-cultural experience. By appropriating modern technologies of culture, communities in Africa are able to intervene directly in the dominant cinema's discourse. In this case, the counter-hegemonic can also be seen as an expression of an earlier or reconstituted hegemony. This challenge to Western hegemony is both pragmatic and constant. This is how the communities interpolate their own cultural realities.

Criticism of this theory is often based on the assumption that the dominant practice has such an overwhelming and powerful hegemony as to deny deconstruction of its dominance. I contend that this is not necessarily the case. The strength of any appropriation lies in the context of the appropriation, which, in this case, is found in the immediacy of experience and self-reflexivity within audiovisual expression. For example, when mainstream Western films and videos are shown in the villages, devoid of their publicity and marketing machinery, they tend to lose their "hegemonic" patronage and attain a position inferior to that of traditional community media. Audiences react to the showings, as would an adult to a child's game—aware of the implications of participation. In that way, the cultural and social impact of the supposedly dominant order is minimized.

Gayatry Spivak speaks of the ability of the subaltern to "catachretise,"[36] meaning that postcolonial communities have the capacity to adopt and adapt specific Western cultural features as appropriate projects for their own "traditional" expression. Reflecting Spivak's catachresis, this practice of film distribution affords empowerment. The catachretized product's appeal is often stronger than that which the mainstream can muster. For example, the local film product still attracted higher box office receipts in South Africa (*Sarafina*),[37] Zimbabwe (*Neria*),[38] and Tanzania (*Fimbo ya Mnyonge/The Poor Man's Stick*).[39] *Sarafina* was based on Mbongeni Ngema's theatrical masterpiece discussing the revolutionary environment of South African school children in Soweto under apartheid. *Neria*, on the other hand, was a story critical of a customary law that oppresses and undermines widows. This is common in all Bantu groups and has easily been consumed by audiences throughout East and southern Africa. *Fimbo ya Mnyonge* from Tanzania was produced during the Tanzanian experiment with African socialism (*Ujamaa*) and was therefore supported by the government of Julius Nyerere and made widely available through the mobile cinema van and other 16mm distribution methods.

This also explains the success of local television programs in many African countries and reveals tendencies of local appeal with subject-form. Even Zimbabwean films such as *Consequences*,[40] *More Time*,[41] and *Neria* commanded respectable attendances in both Kenya and Tanzania where, moreover, the Swahili-language dubbing seemed to help audiences identify more strongly with the story. The growing

Swahili-speaking community in East, central, and southern Africa makes Swahili an important language for cinema distribution in the region.

As audiences react to messages and narratives from a catachretized or adapted media, their readings reveal not the overarching implications that derive from the hegemonic practices of an imperialized medium but their filial connections with community media. Here audiences control the communication process. The principal outcome of this counter-discourse is what I have termed "the liberalized circuit," a concept that should indeed be read from its skeptical semantics.[42] I have used the term to refer to the film and video distribution circuit that grew in a number of African countries in the 1980s after the IMF Structural Adjustment Programs ushered in their economic conditionalities.

This on-the-ground distribution practice is rooted in the spatio-cultural patterns of communication linked to the economic practices of the day. Just as Eric Michaels sees Australian Aboriginals' appropriation and adaptation strategies (in art forms and TV broadcasting) as being "reformulation(s) of classic questions,"[43] in the case of distribution, we (the West) are faced with a transposition of integral priorities that appear strange to "us." I agree with Michaels in his questioning of the authoritative position that the West claims in relation to intellectual questionings. The West is in fact faced with a very sophisticated system of interpretation whose reading exposes the vanity of Western media readings.

There are various devices of reading and interpreting messages, including the not-so-easily deconstructible values of irony, hyperbole, sarcasm, and other humor-based devices. For example, one is often shaken to the roots of one's "sophistication" when one is in a viewing situation and laughter breaks out where least expected. This happened to me once in 1993 in Harare, Zimbabwe, when I watched a grim scene in which white colonial polo players were using a human head for the game. A few other Western trained filmmakers and I were miserably shocked to hear the bawls of laughter coming from the audience. Thinking of it later, I was able to see that the whole episode was a clear upsetting of the logic of space and time that the dominant cinema culture (Western) has come to expect. Western cinematic concepts of time and space suggest continuity and reality, and therefore logic. To the Zimbabwean viewer, the reality of the cinema is in its fantasy. Just as adults recognize the "play" attributes when playing a game with a child, they are also conscious that the child may in fact be so totally involved in the game as to not realize the limits of its realism. The Zimbabwean viewer here was conscious of the limit of cinematic realism and therefore could rise above the meanings that the Westernized viewer was wont to create from the text. As Don Kulick and Margareth Wilson argue:

> The production of meaning involves active spectatorship, and even though analysts commonly employ terms such as the 'negotiation' of meaning between spectator and film, viewers' interpretations are still commonly evaluated against what is taken to be the 'reality' of the filmic text.[44]

The upsetting of Western tropes, narratives, and representations reveals both the difficulty and possibility of repositioning epistemological emphasis on a cultural subject. This is what the current African experiment in Nigeria and Ghana affords.

The film and video distribution practices that continue to grow within the Anglophone countries should be seen as loci of sociological and ontological questionings. We must ask ourselves if community experience of media within postcolonial cultures is dependent on the extent of exposure to Western media concepts. Is exposure itself not merely a limited rather than a limiting experience? This is not simply a questioning of the obvious. To appreciate this question, one only has to see how Western cultural power is maintained through rhetorical versions of hygiene and medicine, or even of the cultural influence in the construction and maintenance of a cinema hall. Indeed, acceptance of Western paradigms sometimes forces other cultures to question and even limit the development of more culturally appropriate practices.

The discourse of distribution here, as it has been projected in many other cultural situations, is that of resistance and resilience. Distribution of visual material in the Anglophone Africa region will grow in all its complexity as it continues to express the discourse of survival. This is clearly reflected in how video distribution in these countries has mushroomed to unheard-of sizes in recent times.

It is through the study of the nature, prospects, and role of the new "catachretized" medium that one would be able to understand the capabilities of distribution that contribute to cultural expression. Indeed,

> The emergence of a vital and prolific popular cinema in Nigeria could be regarded as an important African response to the encroachment of

> Western pop culture in this age of global information flows. Rather than aping foreign models…it is a window into a particular contemporary African society, offering fascinating insights into how people see themselves, their aspirations and fears, including the desire for material well-being and status, and the value attached to pleasure and entertainment in an uncertain post-colonial world.[45]

Conclusion

I have here tried to discuss the basis of cultural bias in understanding cinema and development with regard to Africa in general and Anglophone Africa in particular. I have focused on arguing the case for the regional perspective only as an analytical instrument. Through discussing aspects of cinema as descriptions of knowledge in society, one learns about critical aspects of society. Analytically, one can then condemn or acclaim those aspects, and discriminate among them. I suggest that African cinema has lost and stands to lose even more in its cinematic expressions through accepting systems that are different and vigorously negative to its culture. It is only in its efforts toward reformulating a more Africa-centered system that African cinema correspondingly affords potential for growth and subjectivity.

I argue that there is a sense of inadequacy in the overarching global interpretive practices, due principally to differing political and ideological investments in what are essentially diverse cinema cultures. In fact, even these technological manifestations involve substantial manipulation and control on the part of the dominant Western culture to make the Western paradigm appear predominant. The privileging of European positions can be observed in a number of environments, thus governing, and indeed dictating, how and what is being represented in a given film. As a rule, such tendencies occur all through Africa.

A good example is the report on British American Tobacco's (BAT) EXPERIENCE IT campaign in Nigeria. The makers of Rothmans Cigarettes decided to use cinema to push cigarette use through advertising and other promotional means. They introduced the EXPERIENCE IT marketing concept, through which six US blockbuster movies would be shown in a specially constructed dome. The dome had a capacity of 500, was air-conditioned and created conditions for watching films as if its audience were in America. This attempt to hoodwink Africans into thinking that the mainstream commercial system would rescue their cinemas needs to be put into perspective.

This is but one example of practices and conditions that reveal insidious strategies in the continuing struggle for control of cinema in the continent. I should again stress the importance of understanding the concept of hegemony that seems to be an appropriate mode for approaching textual and institutional analysis of cinema practice in Africa. I propose that a study of the cinema of this continent should help us theorize about cinema language and culture in trying to make sense and come to terms with contemporary global society. It is, however, necessary that this be done in relation to the historical and cultural specificities of each nominated region. To do that, one needs to approach the study of each area with regard to historical references, to social action and interaction between the production and interpretation of texts. That way each new and developing cinema would determine its own subject matter, authorial status and direction.

This new cinema culture subverts conventional expectations and offers a populist critique of African cinema of the past 40 years. It explores the popular even where the conventional "alternative" African cinema would not venture. What these new entrepreneurs are doing is to reinterpret the commercial aesthetic outside the conventional market through establishing relatively inexpensive modes of production and distribution, but at the same moment undercutting the dominance of Western distribution channels, which have been failing African audiences for the last two decades. The capability to produce simply presented to these filmmakers a discursive practice that comments on both the limiting and limited influences of the globalized cinema. The new African filmmaker is reflexively local and unrestricted by either production or marketing conventions.

NOTES

1. Tomaselli1 999,4 5.
2. Sassen 1997, vi.
3. The southern African region seems to present a different dichotomy here in that the films do get good distribution in the countries of production and are often later distributed in other countries in the region. Films like *Neria*, *More Time*, and *Flame* (Sinclair, 2000) have been distributed in Zimbabwe, South Africa, Tanzania, Kenya, and Zambia with remarkable ease and success. Indeed experiences of distributing African films remain undocumented on the belief that they are similar. This needs remedying.

4. I use the terms “anglophone” and “francophone” though I dislike them for semantic and ideological reasons. The colonial inferences embedded in the terms continue to suggest a more recent affinity between African nation states, which have much more in common than European languages and colonial experiences.
5. Barlet 2000.
6. Wilson 1988, 65.
7. In many African countries, film production never had the cultural priority it had in Burkina Faso, Senegal, and other francophone West African states. Indeed, as we know, the French government maintained this priority through its cultural policies. While there have been many different ways through which Anglophone filmmakers received support from their erstwhile colonial master, often, and in many ways, they have had to go it alone.
8. Ashbury 1998, 82.
9. Ansah 1993, 8.
10. Ekwuazi 2004,1 6.
11. Taylor 2000, 138.
12. Steinglass 2001.
13. Steinglass 2001.
14. *Africa Film and TV Directory* (1996: 100–2). During a period of six months when I was making *SADDC: The First Decade* (Mhando, 1990), I was able to witness such video and film shows in the three countries. Research in Tanzania has shown that the three daily showings per weekend that are held in gold mining areas of Shinyanga, Geita, and Mwadui bring revenue of nearly eight million Tanzanian shillings a month (1US $= 1000TSh). Many such independent film and video distributors all over the country survive on this business.
15. Anyanwu 1999.
16. Anyanwu 1999.
17. Nathan 2002.
18. Ekwuazi 2004,1 7.
19. bothR apu1 993.
20. Dawodu 1996.
21. Ekwuazi 2004, 17.
22. Gugler 2003, 177.
23. Kelani 2003.
24. The experience of the distribution of the video of the killing of the ex-president of Liberia is but one example. “The fatal torture of former Liberian President Samuel K. Doe has been well documented. His killers—a gang of thugs led by notorious warlord Prince Yormie Johnson who, together with Charles Taylor, rose up against Doe in 1989—captured the ghastly affair on video, edited the results, gave it a soundtrack and distributed copies among themselves” (Suntimes 2003).

25. Tomaselli 1990, 48.
26. SAPEM 1993/94.
27. *Africa Film and TV Directory* 1996, 157–74.
28. In 1987, Tanzania had 35 cinemas with an attendance of 25 percent of its total seating capacity (four million viewers a year). With declining salaries and increased social strife, urban socialites have reduced their patronage of cinema. By 2002, there was only one cinema theater in Tanzania. The situation has improved somewhat with the construction of the multiple screen cinema opened in 2003.
29. *Landscape of Memory* 2000.
30. *Africa Film and TV Directory* 1996, 157–74.
31. Stock 1997, xxiii.
32. SACOD 2000
33. SACOD2 000.
34. Lott 1995, 40–56.
35. Ashcroft et al. 1998, 34.
36. Spivak 1991, 66.
37. *Sarafina*,R oodt,1 992.
38. *Neria*,M awuru,1 992.
39. *Fimbo ya Mnyonge/The Poor Man's Stick*, Hauxhausen, 1976.
40. Olley 1989.
41. Mabhikwa 1993.
42. Mhando 2001.
43. Michaels 1994, xii.
44. Kulick and Wilson 2002, 271.
45. Spivak 1991, 66.

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——— (1993), *Living in Bondage* (164 min.), NEK Video Links, Nigeria.
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series, comprising Ribeiro Joao, *From the Ashes* (52 min.) Mozambique; Krog, Antjie and Loots, Ronelle, *The Unfolding of Sky*, South Africa; Uriri, Prudence, *Soul in Torment*, Zimbabwe; Pakleppa, Richard, *Nda mona/I Have Seen*, Namibia.

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CHAPTER 8

African Cultural Producers and Border Thinking: Dennis Brutus, Micere Mugo, Ousmane Sembène, and Ngugi wa Thiong'o

Kari Dahlgren

The colonial project in Africa involved not only overt violence, but also more covert forms of control. While the primary goal of colonialism was the exploitation of resources, land, and labor, this project simultaneously required management of the people's psyche, and the creation of the colonized subject: a subject whose past is delegitimized, who is set in opposition to civilization, and whose development depends on the adoption of the philosophies of the colonial master. The colonial project delegitimized the history, epistemology, and ontology of the colonized, persuading the subject that his past is irrelevant and the ideology of the colonizer is the path to enlightenment and civilization. While the physical violence of colonialism has had a profound impact on the continent, perhaps more lasting and insidious is this weapon that Ngugi wa Thiong'o has referred to as the "cultural bomb," which "annihilate[s] a people's belief in their names, in their languages, in their environment, in their heritage of struggle, in their unity, in their capacities and ultimately in themselves."[1]

This aspect of colonial violence made possible the original and continuing forms of colonialism. Although elaborated in the Latin American context, the framework "coloniality of power" as developed by Anibal Quijano[2] can provide a useful reference for looking at the ways in which certain cultural and epistemological projects are tied to colonialism and its continuation in various forms today. While the specificities of the African colonial experience should not be undermined, "coloniality of power" is useful as it illuminates not only the structural legacies of colonialism, but also the ways in which coloniality is reproduced through the continuing hegemony of colonial power relationships, economically, politically, but also epistemologically, by focusing on the role of racial othering in naturalizing the normative binaries of Eurocentrism and the creation of normative difference. Therefore, the cultural domain is an essential location in decoloniality, a role that African artists and cultural producers have takeno n.

Modernity/Coloniality and Border Thinking

The process of decoloniality is twofold; first is the reclamation of those stolen aspects of the African identity: names, languages, struggle, unity, and capacity, and to counter the foundational myths of coloniality thus revealing the entangled nature of the modern/colonial world system. Second is to bring forth not just those subaltern knowledges, but also "worlds and knowledges otherwise," knowledges that present alternative epistemologies and ontologies to those of Eurocentric modernity.[3] A necessary step then is to question the conception of modernity by recognizing the role of coloniality in its production. The emergent descriptor, modernity/coloniality, encapsulates such a perspective by recognizing bidirectionality in the making of the modern world system, without ignoring the colonial power asymmetries in this relationship. The modern and the colonial cannot be disentangled, as modernity has only arisen within the framework of the coloniality of power.[4]

Such a critique of modernity first requires rethinking the moment in which modernity began. While Mignolo, coming from a Latin American perspective, places this moment in the emergence of the Atlantic commercial circuit, he emphasizes less the temporal beginning of this moment, but instead the relationship of this moment to colonialism:

> Although there is discussion as to whether the world-system is five hundred or five thousand years old, I do not consider this issue to be relevant. What is relevant, instead, is that the modern/colonial world-system can be described in conjunction with the emergence of the Atlantic commercial circuit and that such conceptualization is linked to the making of the colonial difference(s).[5]

Recognition of this as the starting point of modernity, as opposed to views that modernity began purely inside Europe, emphasizes the fundamental role of coloniality in the making of the modern world system and thus that the modern world system is marked by the "coexistence and the intersection of both modern colonialisms and colonial modernities."[6] This then denaturalizes the current world system, as well as the current global imaginary of Eurocentric modernity and its attendant properties, including a fundamental perspective of universal history. The universal as a fundamental component of the modern imaginary has led to its embeddedness in global designs, whether this has been in the form of civilizational discourses of the twentieth century, their current manifestations in development discourses, or global neoliberalism.[7]

This universalism has necessarily involved the silencing of local histories in its attempt to reinforce itself and through its embodiment in coloniality. However, as evidenced by the discussion of modernity as modernity/coloniality, it is clear that the universalism espoused by Eurocentric modernity is a false and forced universalism that has perpetuated modern colonialisms and injustice. By recognizing the coloniality inherent in modernity it becomes possible to question the universal of the Eurocentric modernity. Therefore, the colonial experience is the moment in which the faults of Eurocentric modernity are most evident, making the colonial difference a privileged space for the arising of alternatives to the Eurocentric modern/colonial imaginary. This privileged space has been articulated by Mignolo as a locus of enunciation at the colonial difference, at the borders of the modern/colonial world system.

While colonialism did silence subaltern knowledges, it is also a site of possible "knowledges otherwise" that not only counter colonial representations but bring forth entirely new epistemologies. The bringing forth of these knowledges otherwise occurs through a process Mignolo has termed border thinking. To Mignolo, borders are "the moments in which the imaginary of the modern world system cracks."[8] Again, border thinking is the emergence of knowledges otherwise arising from the colonial difference as the locus of enunciation. It is important to note however that "'border thinking' is still within the imaginary of the modern world system. But repressed by the dominance of hermeneutics and epistemology as keywords controlling the conceptualization of knowledge."[9] Therefore border thinking does not require a rejection of all notions or traces of the modern/colonial world system; rather, it comes forth through the recognition of the colonial difference, which can reveal the faults inherent in the Eurocentric Universalist modernity, revealing instead a potential pluriverse.

This chapter will attempt to show how African cultural production may represent a form of border thinking, using the works of Dennis Brutus, Ngugi wa Thiong'o, Ousmane Sembène, and Micere Githae Mugo. These cultural producers all represent responses to coloniality, and reveal the failures of Eurocentric universalisms to articulate the local histories of the modern/colonial world system. The chapter will also argue that through the "cracks" in the modern world system, knowledges otherwise arise through the rearticulation of history as emancipatory local histories emerging from the colonial difference.

Countering Universal History as Border Thinking

A primary epistemological injustice of colonialism was the erasing of a precolonial African history. The delegitimizing of African history is employed to cover up and make invisible a precolonial history, such that African history "before colonialism was one of wanderlust and pointless warfare between peoples."[10] This construction of Africa is rooted in universal theories of history, such as in the German philosopher Hegel's *The Philosophy of History* in which the African is described as irrational and ruled by desire, in a state of religious underdevelopment through a human-centered (non-Christian) religious consciousness, and lacks state formations, a necessary development for Hegel's view of progress. Due to these deficiencies, "the history of Africa was therefore only the history of Europe in Africa, for darkness could never be the subject of history."[11] This representation has a specific political implication, for as Fanon describes, it is utilized "to convince the natives that colonialism came to lighten their darkness."[12] Similarly, when Africa has no precolonial history, "the neocolonial state is the model instrument for Africa's rapid development," but when a local history reveals past struggle and agency outside of universal history another future becomes visible through the denaturalization of the colonial project.[13] While the specific, original colonial project has ended, the relations, epistemologies, and discursive effects that delegitimize an African history and ontology persist in lived experience and power dynamics of the current world paradigm primarily through the continuation of "universalism" as a fundamental component of modernity/coloniality.

History as a discipline in modernity is one that reinforces the concept of universalism, a foundational aspect of the modern/colonial world system. Where universalism attempts to hide the colonial difference, it naturalizes the current world system, hiding alternatives that universalism silences. By countering this universal history with the arising of local histories, (even local histories as different conceptions of history itself), it becomes possible to reveal the deficiencies of such a universal view of the world, bringing forth pluriversality rather than universality as a global project. Therefore African cultural production, through questioning the universal theories of history imposed upon the continent from the coloniality of power, can reveal new forms of history itself, forms of local history that reveal the political dynamics of representation, that denaturalize the discipline of history, and reveal the failures of universal history's manifestation in the modern day through development discourses that fail to address the political foundations of the modern/colonial world system.

Again, the African experience with coloniality's dependence on universal history has enlightened African cultural producers to question not only their own silences but to imagine alternative epistemologies in a critique of "history" itself. Although critiques of history have themselves emerged from within the Eurocentric tradition, the alternatives revealed coming from the subaltern must not be discounted as simple articulations of "Eurocentric critiques of Eurocentrism."[14] According to Mignolo:

> Deconstructing 'history' from inside 'historiography' and 'Western logocentrism' is without a doubt a necessary task. But decolonization of history is also a necessary and distinct one that cannot be reduced or attached to the former. In decolonization the transdisciplinary move is accompanied, unlike deconstruction, by a perspective from the external boundaries of the modern/colonial world where the colonial difference has been defined and maintained… – thus, the need to move beyond disciplines, beyond interdiscipline to knowledge as a transdisciplinary enterprise.[15]

This transdisciplinary aspect of border thinking also opens a space for literature as an enunciation of legitimate knowledges.

NEGOTIATION OF FORM

However, the first element to be addressed in the discussion of African literature as de-colonial border thinking is the authenticity of form. The debate on authenticity in African cultural production is contested and still unresolved; however, the contributions of Quijano and Mignolo may help inform the debate. As described earlier, the description of the world system as one of modernity/coloniality, in contrast to the Eurocentric understanding rooted in universal history, which sees Europe as the sole bearers of modernity, means the relationship of coloniality emphasizes the bidirectional nature of modernity/coloniality, for "modernity is a phenomenon of all cultures."[16] To relegate the "traditional" or the "African" to a form of authenticity belonging to some pre-contact moment is simply to follow the Eurocentric binaries of coloniality.

A point of debate over form in African cultural production is over the relationship between orality and the written word, as well as the use of African or colonial languages. While the reclamation of African epistemologies as part of the decolonial project also involves reclamation of forms of knowing, such as oral traditions, it is important that this project does not itself evoke Hegelian views of history that set the African in opposition to modernity. Claiming oral forms as traditionally African and in opposition to the West plays into the construction of the African as disconnected from modernity and set in a precolonial past of barbarism and without contact, agency, or dynamism.[17] This is problematic for the African cultural producer as "it is the episteme of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that invented the concept of a static and prehistoric tradition."[18] Therefore calls to oral tradition must recognize the appropriation of oral forms, not as bearers of an ethnographic present that place Africanness in the past, but that view orality as "bearers of norms and of logical systems for the interpretation of the past."[19] For Africans "have always sought to master their past, have had their historic discourses which render and interpret the facts of the past, placing them in explicative and aesthetic frame producing the sense of their past."[20] The call to orality should be to re-appropriate orality as an expressive form itself, which includes ways of constructing and expressing local histories. This therefore gives political significance to the appropriation of the oral form by modern cultural producers, as their projects are tied to decoloniality. It also allows for legitimate hybridization, for even where colonial hegemonies have displaced African epistemologies, they have not been able to do so in entirety. The result has been a cultural hybridization, a hybrid that of course has not been made on equal terms, as power asymmetries have clearly marked cultural exchange; yet, the imposition of colonial hegemonies was mediated by the Africans themselves.[21] This is the moment where border thinking emerges, where it is possible to recover elements of authenticity in African identity and give credibility to African forms of cultural production that themselves are participants in the modern/colonial world system. This view allows the strategic use of both traditional forms such as orality along with the written word, the novel, and even modern technologies like film. For, "acculturation is not an African disease but the very character of all histories."[22] All of the authors analyzed in this chapter: Dennis Brutus, Ngugi wa Thiong'o, Ousmane Sembène, and Micere Githae Mugo, negotiate between form and content, based in the specificities of their context and position in the colonial/modern world system.

Dennis Brutus and Poetry as Politics

Dennis Brutus was born in 1924 Rhodesia (present day Zimbabwe); however he grew up in a segregated Port Elizabeth, South Africa, in the colored neighborhood, situated geographically and normatively between the white community and the African/black community. He was considered a "colored" under the racial regime of the day, an identification that would impact an acute awareness of the coloniality of the apartheid state and influence his personal and political life. His activism and poetry inherently respond to the political situation of the imposed identification as "colored" historically and more formally institutionalized under the apartheid regime and the creation of the Department for Colored Affairs. Although his activism perhaps surpassed his contribution through poetry,[23] his poetry itself is political. In a tangible example, even his love poetry "becomes political, through an intermingling of love for South Africa and for a young white woman with whom he was having an affair at the time . . . The affair, in itself, would contravene the Immorality Amendments Act of 1950, so that Brutus (un)consciously was protesting apartheid."[24]

Not originally intending to be a political poet, he found that in his context, his poetry was necessarily political, not only in countering specific apartheid legislation but also in the act of creativity itself, through Brutus's political awareness and activism arising from the colonial difference. To use his own words, "In a country which denies that men/and women are human,/where the/Constitution excludes them as sub-/humans, the creative act is an act/of dissent of defiance."[25] Poetry is essentially political because of the ways in which the coloniality of power operates in the cultural or epistemological sphere.[26] Therefore Brutus's locus of enunciation is that of colonized, in many ways at the border itself, the border in the coloniality of the apartheid regime between black and white communities.

The debate on form of African literature is acute in an analysis of Dennis Brutus, as his poetic style is certainly influenced by Western poetic traditions, for "the origins of Brutus' 'ideas and opinions and art' are on one level peculiar to this South African experience; on another, they belong to the Romantic tradition of poetry in English."[27] Whether he borrows in form or style from romantic traditions, his locus of enunciation is the significant characteristic of his work. Speaking from the colonial difference brings forth the possibility for border thinking. Also the geography of his exile does not disqualify him from border thinking, as the diasporic elements of modernity/coloniality are inclusive of such a geopolitical relationship. However, the Africanness of his poetry, is a topic that Brutus himself questions in the "comments on Poems" at the end of his collection *Poems from Algiers*, "I settle for being the non-totemistic 'new' African artist…who will simply take his place in the whole world of culture while always leaving certain distinctive features as a result of his origins and experiences."[28] These "origins and experiences" are the essential elements for this paper's analysis of African literature as border thinking. Rather than focusing on a literary analysis based in the discipline of literary theory, the form of literature is deferential to the colonial difference as a site of enunciation.

Sembène as Griot

Ousmane Sembène was already an established writer when in 1963 he decided to switch mediums and began making films. Always concerned with the social and political impact of his writings, he realized that illiteracy in Africa was a barrier to reaching the masses he intended as his audience. With his switch to film, he earned his reputation as the father of African cinema, writing and directing nine full-length films in his career.[29] The ideological framing of Sembène's films as well as the colonial experience of his geographic home, place Sembène's films within the tradition of third cinema. Third cinema was originally conceived in the project of liberating the exploited and oppressed of the Third World; it is therefore characterized by certain political goals and orientations that fit the contestation of power inherent in the denaturalization of universal histories.[30] Rather than being a traditionally defined genre of film, third cinema focuses on breaking disempowering representations by capturing the struggles and hopes of the oppressed and allowing for the creation of emancipatory knowledges.[31]

Ousmane Sembène's relationship to representing history and narrating his films is often portrayed by scholars through the tradition of the griot. The griot is a member of the community who serves as a bard, community historian, and oral story teller, found primarily in West Africa. While griots are often present in Sembène's films with varying levels of importance to the narrative, Sembène himself has claimed the title of griot.[32] While Sembène is not a griot in the formal sense, with the accompanying hereditary and class obligations, he has taken up the classification to use the griot as a model through which to organize himself as a producer of local histories by taking up subaltern methods of expression, and awakening alternative ways of knowing.[33] Although cinema is not oral narrative, due to its static state, it shares several elements with orality in terms of music and a visual component that is not present in writing. While the griot has a multiple and a controversial role in society, the way in which Sembène takes the title is through a redefinition of the griot as a member of the community who upholds the political responsibilities of his position, reflecting in his histories and narratives the interests of the community for which such local histories are produced and recalled. It is this reconstituted idea of the griot that fits Ousmane Sembène into border thinking. Ousmane Sembène, in claiming an identity as a griot, asserts his reclamation of a past made invisible under colonialism and within that reclamation, constructs spaces for the creation of local memories around which the oppressed may find inspiration and organize.

Mugoa ndO rature

Micere Githae Mugo's[34] poetry primarily employs orality in its structuring through an inclusion of refrains where her poetry is "designed to be sung rather than read in contemplation."[35] The use of orality is a project of both her academic and artistic work. However, she does not use orality as a call to a tradition separate from modernity. She instead uses orality for its specific strengths in addressing the political projects of creating local histories. For orature and its attendant values and aesthetics such as participation by the community, themes of struggle, ability to both criticize and celebrate, and its drawing from the community's concerns and ambitions, make orature and oral-based poetry especially effective in countering hegemonic representations. The communal and participatory elements of orature-based poetry—such as Mugo's—allow for collective remembrances, capturing "what is memorable to remember in a particular community, and how it will be remembered" as well as tying the past to the present, for "the activity of praising and chanting cannot be restricted to a static notion of tradition but is rather a form of art that is constantly relevant to both the past and the present."[36] Mugo does not romanticize orality in its "traditional" sense. She accepts orality for its uses and effectiveness today, as she recognizes, "this is not to say that the Orature did not have its moments of backwardness, for, some of it could be sexist, pro-patriarchal in values that deified the male principle and subdued the female, praiseworthy of war and conquest, etc."[37] However, by tactfully employing forms of orality that emphasize community participation, themes of struggle, and criticism, Mugo's orature-based poetry works to counter hegemonic representations of Africa, and invoke the creation and recall of local history for communities and is again a clear example of border thinking that questions both the Eurocentric primacy of structured narrative forms as well as historiography.

Thiong'o, the Novel and Language

While Thiong'o's career is not limited to the novel, it is, arguably, his primary contribution to African literature. He has himself analyzed his relationship to this form, primarily to the English language novel. *Petals of Blood* was his last piece of fiction to be written in English, as his commitment to writing in African languages has marked his later career. While the novel in its specific form is foreign to Africa, "the art of the narrative, elaborated within the framework of orality, has always been and remains an essential component of indigenous modes of imaginative expression and of cultural production on the continent."[38] Similarly, the national origins of the novel are less important than "the uses to which it is continually being put."[39] For even in *Petals of Blood*, a novel written in the English language, forms of orality are explicitly and implicitly promoted and utilized to create community-based local histories. This argument is equally true of Brutus's poetry, Sembène's films, and the orality in Mugo's poetry; each recognize the need to use form for specific purposes, such that the political project of the cultural expression outweighs a false dedication to African authenticity, or as Thiong'o has succinctly stated, "content is ultimately the arbiter of form."[40]

However, the question of language remains, for as Thiong'o has best elaborated in his work *Decolonising the Mind*,[41] language is a sight of cultural alienation, for inscribed in language is a specific culture, history, and meaning. His political awareness of the coloniality of language is rooted in the context of his political involvement, primarily his imprisonment related to his work with community theater and the writing and production of *Ngaahika Ndeenda* (*I Will Marry When I Want*), written in the Gikuyu language. Language control is an element of the coloniality of power, as language has been utilized in coloniality as part of the project of delegitimizing forms of knowing, as well as a divisionary mechanism for population control. Sembène uses language strategically in his films to portray the way in which language is used as a colonial differential, most notably, the varied uses of language and the coloniality are addressed in Ousmane Sembène's *Xala*,[42] in which switching between Wolof and French marks specific purposes in the narrative, to expose the power relations inscribed in the use of colonial languages.

However, it is important to emphasize the context of these enunciations, for the inscription of power into language works in varied ways depending on the specific enunciation of the colonial difference. Again, it is necessary to contextualize the relationships of power in coloniality, and not to relegate African languages to the emancipatory and colonial languages to the unique function of coloniality. Tangibly, the language choices of Dennis Brutus operate in the differing context of South African politics. While Ousmane Sembène's use of language and Thiong'o's reclamation of African languages have a sound basis in the broad experience of the politics of language, Brutus and the South African example complicate the picture. Although there is literature being produced in African languages in South Africa, within the context of Bantustan policies in South Africa—which aimed at forcing black Africans back into tribal structures and excluding them from modern political civil institutions—a situation was created such that "the Africans tend to be suspicious even of their own languages and literary vehicles. They are fearful that these might be turned against them and used as one further pretext to force them back into a tribal mode."[43] Therefore, the use of colonial languages may actually be emancipating in this context; such an act may be seen as a reclamation of the African presence and influence in the formation of the modern/colonial world system. This reminds us to look at the specificities of local histories in bringing forth border thinking. For the goal is not just to bring forth new global designs in subaltern languages nor to call for simply another form of global design arising from the subaltern, but to look at how the colonial difference brings forth alternatives that do not fall into the same trap of the universalism or Eurocentric othering by simply switching the perspective. Rather the locus of enunciation must focus on the coloniality of power in its various manifestations and local histories.

RECOGNITION OF HEGEMONIC UNIVERSAL HISTORY

The writing of a decolonial history first requires the recognition of the cooption of history as part of the colonial project. Decoloniality must counter the colonial imposed view of universal history in which the African is relegated to darkness, as well as to denaturalize the West as the marker of civilization and instead reveal the power relations inherent in the formation of the modern/colonial world system. To do this, the coloniality of history and its academic institutionalization as part of the Eurocentric claim of civilizing modernity must be critiqued.

Within Thiong'o's *Petals of Blood*,[44] this universal view of history is brought to the attention of Karega as he questions the representation of Kenyan history that he reads in the works of intellectuals which point to "the primitivity of Kenyan peoples" due to the fact that "nature had been too kind to the African." This leads Karega to ask himself, "so the African, then, deserved the brutality of the colonizer to boot him into our civilization?"[45] Thiong'o, however, does not only blame the Western intellectuals for this representation. Rather, as is a general theme running through the novel, the neocolonial actors perpetuate the same philosophies and oppression as their foreign counterparts. They represent the continuation of coloniality beyond formal institutionalized colonialism through the influence of epistemic coloniality. In *Petals of Blood*, Karega asks the lawyer for books by black professors, hoping to find a more legitimate writing of history; however, he is disappointed to see that these intellectuals are limited by their already colonized minds, "following on similar theories yarned out by defenders of imperialism."[46]

Micere Githae Mugo's poetry in her collection *My Mother's Poem and Other Songs* also calls to the failures of representation, as her work clearly recognizes the epistemicide of colonialism. She specifically implicates intellectuals in her poem, "Intellectuals or Imposters" in which she points out both the failures and successes of academics in knowledge production, as she distinguishes "liberating knowledge" from alienating theories, and calls upon the production of:

Knowledge become
actioned theory
Knowledge become
living testimony
of our people's

affirmative history
liberated herstory."[47]

Both Mugo and Thiong'o draw the inability to articulate authentic histories and the production of alternative knowledges to the failures of the colonial and neocolonial educational system, seeing schools as sites of the assimilation of knowledges, as institutions that embody and reinforce a Eurocentric universal history. In her piece, "The Pan-Afrikanist Poem," which is dedicated to "all those who struggle(d) to establish Afrikana Studies on campuses of cultural domination," Mugo links authentic African academics to excavators working to uncover a "buried Pan-Afrikanist heritage" from the "piece of land/ ambushed by/western civilization."[48] The struggle for control of academia recognizes that education is a sight in which hegemonies of knowledge are reproduced. Within Thiong'o's *Petals of Blood*, Karega recognizes that education, according to the lawyer, "was meant to obscure racism and other forms of oppression. It was meant to make us accept our inferiority so as to accept their superiority and their rule over us."[49] Education under colonialism was employed in the specific project of creating colonized subjects, and the legacy is carried into the neocolonial education system through the inheritance of teachers, structures, and colonial epistemologies that make education and knowledges, even those produced by locals, to be irrelevant and useless in the creation of a legitimate identity. As Karega struggles as a teacher to be relevant and to counter colonial hegemonies, he realizes the failures of his own education to create relevance and to ground himself historically: "How could he enlarge their [his students'] consciousness so that they could see themselves, Ilmorog and Kenya as part of a larger whole, a larger territory containing the history of African people and their struggles? . . . The African experience was not always clear to him and he saw the inadequacy of the Siriana education now that he was face to face with his own kind, little children, who wanted to know."[50] This inability to articulate the African experience is echoed in Mugo's piece "In Praise of Afrika's Children" where the narrator and audience, in refrain, want to sing but struggle to find an appropriate song. The contradictions of the beauty, pride, and passion with the immense history of suffering and exploitation leave the narrator and community unable to articulate an appropriate song, until the narrator articulates a war song:

I will sing
a war song
My words

will be
angry bullets
from the
volcanic barrel
of the well-aimed
AK rifle
of my poem.[51]

The recognition of the struggle and the power of cultural production for liberation, eventually allows the narrator and community to move beyond the war song and articulate a love song that recognizes past suffering and emphasizes rebirth.

While Mugo and Thiong'o reveal the delegitimizing of African history and its role in coloniality, Dennis Brutus, through his experience and work as a global activist, offers another side of the project of decoloniality, which is denaturalizing the European title to modernity that discounts the contribution of coloniality to the making of the current world system. Several of his poems reveal the bidirectional relationship in the making of modernity/coloniality. One example, written in Bristol in 1970, exposes that the development of Europe occurred through the exploitation of Africa and the continuation of such relationships of coloniality:

Fry's still sell chocolate
still glean the cocoabean
and the bean still coalesces a swollen gleam—
sweatdrops globed on salt black flesh
lambent like blooddrops fresh and red

A factory sprawls in acres of verdant park
and the city squats as it anciently did
on its excremental guilt and dominance—
and a ragged refuse dump of spilled, screwed,
dried, twisted, torn and unforgiven
black lives.[52]

Such poetry adds to the decolonial project by bringing forth the possibility of border thinking by revealing the false foundations of Eurocentric universalisms. The delegitimizing of African history is necessary in the project of coloniality, for it makes natural the success of the West, hiding the exploitation that underpins the modern/colonial world system. By revealing the bidirectional nature of coloniality and recognizing the failure of current institutions to deliver liberating knowledges, the experience of coloniality reveals the possibility and need for new articulations and emancipatory knowledges.

Articulating a Local History

Remembering as an oppositional practice to the silencing hegemonies of Eurocentric modernity requires the revelation of alternatives to universal history. The alternative is thus local and heterogeneous. It is necessary not to replace one universalism with another but to allow for the specific local histories to be revealed. As these local histories arise through the faults in the modern/colonial world system, they represent border thinking and may offer knowledges otherwise.[53] There is a need to privilege subaltern forms of knowing and remembering to bring forth those silenced under colonialism, but also to question the Eurocentric claims to the discipline of history, as a formalized and naturalized truth and impervious to representational politics. Therefore, essential in articulating local histories as decoloniality is recognizing the inherently political nature of hegemonic histories, for as Mudimbe has articulated, "history is both a discourse of knowledge and a discourse of power."[54] Thiong'o's *Petals of Blood* and selections of Mugo's poetry expose how the colonial project has misrepresented and appropriated the history of Africa, and Brutus describes the exploitation of Africa involved in the naturalized civilized Europe, but along with the films of Ousmane Sembène, these artists also present alternative visions of African history through this revelation, thus bringing forward local histories, and countering "global designs," such as the Eurocentric universal and formalized view of history.[55] The following section of the chapter will discuss how these cultural producers are engaged in border thinking by creating politically guided, alternative understandings of past, present, and future. Through reclaiming subaltern voices, tracing themes arising from the colonial difference, and presenting local histories that discount the linear temporal and territorial perspectives of universal history, they reveal the possibilities of an emancipatory and decolonial pluriverse.

Struggle as History and Myth

The deep connection of struggle to history is a theme in the work of all artists discussed here, for as Thiong'o writes in *Decolonising the Mind*, "Struggle makes history. Struggle makes us. In struggle is our history, our language, and our being."[56] The importance of remembering and reclaiming a history of struggle empowers the oppressed as it counters the universal historical narrative in which "the African emerges as the acted upon rather than as an actor in the theatre of human history."[57] Within *Petals of Blood*, struggles are reclaimed and connected to a broader past of struggle.[58] In situating a history of struggle, Karega recollects "the past of L'Ouverture, Turner, Chaka, Abdulla, Koitalel, Ole Masai, Kimathi, Mathenge."[59] This list includes both real and fictional characters displaying the interplay of myth and "truth," characteristic of counter-history, which ties myth (in this case the novel) to a subaltern history of struggle. Sembène employs a similar strategy to place the stories of his individual characters in Pan-African or even global struggles for justice; Sembène places images of Pan-African heroes and politicians in strategic locations in his films. Lumumba's image appears in the room of Diouana's boyfriend in *Black Girl*,[60] large portraits of Mandela, Lumumba and Nkrumah hang in the home of Faat Kiné in the film of the same name.[61] The geography is even expanded as a large poster of Che Guevara sits on a table in the post office in *Mandabi*.[62] These visual references are meant to show characters' political inclinations, but more so, they serve to remind the viewer that the narrative and the individual on screen, although they may be fictional, are acting in a nonfictional sociopolitical context. Therefore even the films of Sembène's that do not deal with traditional historical subjects like past mutinies or grand rebellions are constructing local emancipatory histories because their individual struggles are reflective of societal ills and shortcomings. A significant aspect of border thinking in challenging the universal history is to legitimize literature as a genuine site of knowledge, especially knowledge about the past. Border thinking creates "a frame in which literary practice will not be conceived as an object of study (aesthetic, linguistic, or sociological) but as production of theoretical knowledge; not as 'representation' of something, society, or ideas, but as a reflection . . . about issues of human and historical concern."[63] Tying figures legitimated in historiography with those of the narrative reinforces the interdependence of lived history and narrative, serving as knowledges otherwise by involving a new form of recounting and understanding the past.

While Mugo's poetry does not share the narrative function as do the films of Sembène or Thiong'o's *Petals*, her poetry clearly evokes historical figures to tie the history of struggle to the present act of remembering. The tie to a past of resistance is clearly displayed in her poem “Birth” as she evokes the names of heroic figures of African resistance: Me Katilili, Koitalel arap Samoei, Muthoni wa Kirima, and Kimathi wa Wachiuri, as well as references to “bullets of colonial guns,” “neocolonial treachery,” and “hunger and drought.”[64] Yet arising out of struggle, the refrain repeats “The Beautiful Ones Were Born,” emphasizing the life and resistance in the face of such struggle, tying the past of struggle to the present and thus suggesting “mounting optimism” and “momentous triumph.”[65] The past of struggle is directly tied to the political project of emancipatory remembering. Likewise, Brutus’s poetry includes many similar themes, most notably in references to specific moments of resistance—often tied to a particular landscape. In one such poem entitled “Sharpeville” he urges the reader to remember the Sharpeville massacre not because “seventy died . . . were shot in the back/retreating, unarmed, defenceless” but “Because it epitomized oppression/and the nature of society/more clearly than anything else.”[66] The emphasis is to remember, not for the specificities but for the context; the political power inherent in the event is a reorientation of the perceptions of a neutral history.

Mugo also attempts to bring gender into her reclamation of a past of struggle, arising from the specificities of her locus of enunciation. The explicit perspective of Mugo’s local history is gendered, as she utilizes the terms “herstory” and “Matriots” to emphasize the gendering of portrayals of the past.[67] Therefore, her work calls for the recognition of the silences of colonial and patriarchal interpretations of African history, and all historiography more broadly, which have silenced the active role of women in historical resistance. In “Mother Afrika’s Matriots,” Mugo works to break the “freezing silences/now paralyzing/our womanful lives” by writing a local history that describes the acts of heroic resistance of women throughout the Diaspora and across time.[68] This poem recounts the “herstory” of women ranging from Cleopatra to Muthoni wa Kirima to Sojourner Truth. By bringing forth a counter to patriarchal histories of resistance but also a new gendered form of history, she points to the continued importance of women in the emancipatory projects of the present. She elaborates on this theme in a later poem in the collection, “The Women’s Poem,” in which a united force of women is represented as an undefeatable force for true liberation.[69] While Quijano’s theorizing of the coloniality of power fails to seriously address the role of gender in coloniality, recognizing gender as a site of coloniality adds to countering the universal history of the modern/colonial world system, with its attendant patriarchy, such that gender becomes a locus of enunciation in the colonial difference.

Beyond Rigid Territoriality

Another aspect of decolonizing universal histories is a reallocation of territoriality in history, emphasizing continuity in power over delineations of colonial imposed geographies. This is achieved by African artists through connecting histories of resistance across borders, tying to experiences of the African Diaspora as well as broader global struggles for decoloniality. This is not an attempt to create a new universal, but to recognize alternative connections to the universal that historicity currently privileges, mainly reconfiguring territoriality to emphasize coloniality of power.

To illustrate, Micere Githae Mugo often places her memory projects in the context of Pan-African and diasporic struggles. While Pan-Africanism is mentioned in several of her poems, it is most prominently developed in “In Praise of Afrika’s Children.” In this piece, the Pan-African is evoked through the designation “from Cape to Cairo,” but is also tied to the Diaspora by mentioning “from Harlem to Soweto/ from Lagos to Brighton” and specifically the history of slavery through the evocation of those “scattered…across the Americas/ across the Caribbean.”[70] Similarly, Ngugi wa Thiong’o’s *Petals of Blood* attempts to tie the struggles of the Kenyan quest for true independence to its neighbors’ as well as to a broader geography and temporality. Again, Thiong’o references a list of revolutionaries in the novel: “the past of L’Ouverture, Turner, Chaka, Abdulla, Koitalel, Ole Masai, Kimathi, Mathenge.”[71] While also linking fictional with historical figures, these figures represent a broad continuum of time and geography. Thiong’o also situates the struggle beyond the Diaspora into global class struggles against exploitive capitalism. In *Petals of Blood*, the lawyer recounts his experiences in America where he sees racism, lynching, and struggles of the American workers, leading him to the revelation “that we were serving the same monster-god…the same signs, the same symptoms, and even the sickness.”[72] *Petals of Blood* thus reveals that the struggles of the oppressed Kenyan are rooted to the global exploitive form of capitalism, as a global design within the continued coloniality of power.

Brutus’s global outlook and global activism puts him in the position to comment extensively on the global struggles of the oppressed. Geography has not limited his poetry or political engagement as his writings span struggles worldwide, including the Zapatistas, the WTO Protests in Seattle, Native American Struggles, the Vietnam War, Mumia Abu Jamal, and countless more. Claiming the title of "the world's troubadour" in a 1978 poem[73] he has lived up to this designation by standing "beside freedom struggles everywhere."[74] In fact, several of his poems indiscriminately speak to the suffering of the World's exploited masses, tying his specific experience of coloniality to the suffering of the world under the modern/colonial world system, a world where "everywhere humanity/was being deformed?/ . . . in this new age of man/this lunatic/unsublunary age."[75] For in his activism and poetry, modern geographies yield to the coloniality of power in its global manifestation.

The tie to the Diaspora and the placing of history into a broader context of power and coloniality is aptly utilized in Sembène's *Ceddo*[76] through a representative form that creates conceptual linkages between the presentation of a local historical narrative and that narrative's significance within global coloniality of power. *Ceddo* depicts resistance to forced conversion to Islam and the violence and exploitation that accompanied the spread of Islam into West Africa. Sembène denaturalizes the acceptance of Islam in Senegalese society through presenting a local history that includes acts of resistance, both by the ceddo as well as by the Princess Dior. The presence of a priest and a white slave trader, silent and as nonactors in the plot, presents a conceptual link from the Imam's imposition of Islam to the story of European colonialism, whose crimes the audience is more familiar with.[77] This ties the history of different colonizers together, building a more complete understanding of the nature of religion and foreign influence in the broader coloniality of power. *Ceddo* also ties this oppressive history to the Diaspora—as Thiong'o does by evoking the memory of Toussaint L'Ouverture or Mugo does through referencing the Americas. However, Sembène employs music to draw the connections between the experiences of slavery in North America with earlier slavery in West Africa. By using twentieth-century gospel music played over scenes of slavery—scenes occurring centuries before the music would be created—the film dissolves the arbitrary dividers of geography and time to bring forth conceptual connections that emphasize the interconnectedness of struggle and oppression. While the film focuses on the oppression of the ceddo through Islam, the gospel music foreshadows the Christian fate awaiting the future victims of the transatlantic slave trade, as does the priest's flash-forward in time in which he imagines a modern catholic mass, representing the spread of Christianity within the continent.[78] *Ceddo* serves as an exceptional form of border thinking, creating a "history otherwise" as it works outside the conventional forms of historical narration by linking centuries of time and geography to produce a complete and properly interconnected history of religion and power, thus revealing religion's role in the coloniality of power.

Beyond Linear Temporality

Thiong'o's *Petals of Blood* reveals a similar local history of linkages as *Ceddo*; however, the novel achieves this through both using and espousing a cyclical view of history. This theme is clearly expressed in the novel's organization. The timeline of *Petals of Blood* is cyclical; the novel begins with the arrests of the main protagonists and ends with the solving of the crime. However, it is not only told through a jail cell confessional, nor is it purely directed by the detective's questioning, rather the novel jumps around in time, even within the reminiscences of the jailed protagonists. Similarly, the narrative continually shifts perspectives among its protagonists and an omniscient narrator. The broken chronology and shifting perspectives create a narrative strategy that reveals the interconnectedness of the characters as well as the relation of all people and struggle in both past and present.[79]

A nonlinear view of history allows the current struggles to be seen in the tradition of the past and as a continual project; as Wanja reflects in the novel, "maybe life was a series of false starts, which, once discovered, called for more renewed efforts at yet another beginning."[80] Wanja's personal history of continuous struggle with intermediate periods of success is characteristic of the more general trend of struggle and success typical of the world as she experiences it. She develops her philosophy of "eat or you are eaten" and her assertion that she "will never return to the herd of victims" to justify her brothel; however this philosophy is rejected by Karega and eventually Wanja herself as they dedicate themselves to the creation of a "new world."[81] This concept of the new world is contrasted to how the phrase is employed by the evangelical Christian, Lillian, where the construction of a new world requires nothing but faith in Christ: "Not churches; not learning; not positions; not good works; just acceptance, in faith, and behold: a new earth and a new heaven."[82] This ahistorical vision of the new world is rejected through Munira's fanatical downfall. The lesson is that the world is dynamic and change requires active struggle. Therefore *Petals of Blood*, as border thinking, rejects a linear universal historicity—an epistemic component of coloniality—and instead reveals "knowledges otherwise" by depicting a cyclical history that emphasizes continuous struggle and denaturalizes linear conceptions of civilization and development.

Mugo's poetry uses concepts of rebirth to express a similar conception of local history. Her poem "Birth" uses the refrain "The Beautiful Ones Were Born" to express the continuation of life and thus hope in the face of struggle and oppression.[83] This representation takes the recounting of struggle not as a sign of defeat, but as part of a continuous struggle and accompanying resistance, allowing for the connection of past resistance to present optimism. Similarly, in "In Praise of Afrika's Children" rebirth characterizes the emancipatory song that arises from the recounting and reclamation of knowledge of struggle, such that the people of Africa and the Diaspora are:

> reborn
>   through thunder
> reborn
>   through pain
> reborn
>   through death
> reborn
>   through vision
> reborn
>   through love.[84]

Remembrance is rebirth. The uncovering of a local history of struggle empowers future struggle; as the universal history of coloniality is denaturalized, other futures become possible. Dennis Brutus illustrates this in his poem entitled, "Remembering June 16, 1976: Student Uprising in Soweto." The title of the poem must be seen as significant, as Brutus rarely titles his poetry. The title as "remembering" does not set out to trace or explain the Soweto uprising as in historiography, but memory here is significant such that it brings forth new struggle:

> They are coming back:
> through woodsmoke weaving from fires
> and swirls of dust from erratic breezes
> you will see
> ghosts are returning
> . . .

> they return to join a new generation
> they chant:
> resume the fight, resume the fight,
> resume the fight.[85]

A similar overarching thread in Brutus's poetry is that of resilience and hope in the face of oppression. A trait he questions of himself in his poem, "Stubborn Hope" where he asserts, "Endurance is a passive quality,/transforms nothing, contests nothing/ . . . Yet somewhere lingers the stubborn hope/thus to endure can be a kind of fight."[86] This endurance he often grounds in the land. For Brutus, the resiliency of struggle is rooted in the landscape as he ties human resiliency to the resiliency of nature, for "the spirit will survive/resilient as the soil."[87] Or in the poem "Remembering June 16, 1976: Student Uprising in Soweto," the continuation of struggle and remembrance is embedded in the landscape, for "there is blood in the sands of Soweto."[88] The image of blood mixing with soil is seen again in a poem titled "Abafazi" where "the heroic fighting women of South Africa" have "poured their rich blood with fierce/unrelenting anger into this dark fertile soil."[89] Here the record of history is inscribed in the land. This ignores the modern dualism of nature and man and recognizes the intersection of the land and the history of human struggle. Where knowledges of landscape and nature differ significantly from the modern/colonial world system, alternative understandings of land in the memory of the community compose a form of border thinking.

Thiong'o's *Petals of Blood* also grounds a continuous history of struggle through the land, using the town of Ilmorog as a site of contestation and transformation. Again, placing the people's struggle within the land serves to connect the current state of the land into a longer history of struggle and active creation of a new world. This is reflected in the history of the community whose founding father, Ndemi, courageously struck out to create a new life, "felling trees, clearing virgin grounds, new horizons for the glory of man and his creative genius."[90] The land is a site of creation but also destruction and death, grounding the cyclical history of struggle through the "alteration of fertility and barrenness, drought and rain, night and day, destruction and creation, birth and death."[91] In the novel, the land is a site of struggle: first through the drought that threatens the community's livelihood, then in their attempt to secure help with the drought they end up introducing themselves to a new struggle as the attention brings outsiders in, and the building of a road opens the community up to the vices and threats of the neocolonial order.

While the individual is economically doomed through the privatization of his land, as reflected by Nyakinua losing her land, the privatization of land also represents the collective societal defects under the exploitive capitalism of coloniality, seen in the transformation of Ilmorog from a community to a site of competition and vice. The control of land is a metaphor for political contestation that can only be solved by a return to communal values, reflected in ownership of the means of production, land, and one's labor.[92] However, the neocolonial invasion is itself placed in a longer history of foreign intervention, bringing the local history into an awareness of the past and present coloniality of power, as the highway serves as a historical witness:

> The highway had seen more than its fair share of adventurers from the north and north-west. Solomon's suitors for myrrh and frankincense; Zeu's children in a royal hunt for the seat of the sun-god of the Nile; scouts and emissaries of Genghis Khan; Arab geographers and also hunters for slaves and ivory; soul and gold merchants from Gaul and from Bismark's Germany; land pirates and human game-hunters from Victorian and Edwardian England: they had all passed here.[93]

This recounting serves to counter the Eurocentric universal history that establishes the history of Africa as beginning with colonialism. Rather, the land embodies, has born witness, to a never ending past of struggle. The land ties the present foreign invasion of the community to a history of successful struggle, creating hope for the present struggle, for although "they each had come wearing different masks and guises . . . God's children had, through struggle, survived every onslaught, every land- and soul-grabbing empire, and continued their eternal wrestling with nature and with their separate gods and mutual selves."[94]

Conclusion

The work of the discussed African artists display alternative conceptions of history, local histories that are rooted in local struggles and that shy away from a linear temporality, rigid geography, and the neutrality of a disciplinary history. Therefore, these works counter the universal history of Eurocentric modernity by presenting true alternatives that work toward articulating "worlds and knowledges otherwise" such that the universe may be replaced with a pluriverse that celebrates the heterogeneity of local histories and ontologies. The ability for these cultural producers to bring forth these knowledges otherwise comes from their location at the borders of the modern/colonial world system. The authors' experiences with coloniality, in its naturalization of racialized hierarchies that depend on universal theories of history, reveal the faults in this aspect of the Eurocentric paradigm. Through reclaiming the subaltern aspects of their epistemologies, they have articulated alternative conceptions of history, history rooted in the land, in global power contestations, and in cyclical, continuous struggle. As far as the Eurocentric paradigm's universal historicism perpetuates coloniality, the project of countering universal history offers emancipatory, decolonial potential. The work of Dennis Brutus, Ngugi wa Thiong'o, Ousmane Sembène, and Micere Githae Mugo bring forth local histories that reveal the failures of Eurocentric universalism, revealing that the future emancipatory projects involve recognizing the necessary pluriverse that must arise for true decoloniality.

NOTES

1. Thiong'o1 986,3 .
2. Quijano2 008.
3. Escobar 2008, 12.
4. Quijano 2008; Mignolo 2000.
5. Mignolo 2008, 229.
6. Mignolo 2000, 22.
7. Ibid.,2 1.
8. Ibid.,2 3.
9. Ibid.
10. Thiong'o 1977, 199.
11. Thiong'o and Sahle 2004, 65.
12. Fanon 1963, 211.
13. Thiong'o 1986, 103.
14. Mignolo 2000, 37.
15. Ibid., 324.
16. Quijano2 008,1 91.
17. Mwangi2 009,1 07.
18. Mudimbe 1988, 189.
19. Jewsiewicki and Mudimbe 1993, 4.
20. Ibid., 3–4.
21. Baaz 2001.
22. Mudimbe 1988, 196.
23. By 1946, Brutus had graduated from the South African Native College and was teaching at Patterson high school. He was teaching here when the apartheid regime came to power in 1948, and he

began to challenge apartheid in education, as well as coming into his activism in sports through organizing Patterson High's sports teams. His challenges to the apartheid laws caused the government to ban him from teaching and declare him "unfit to teach young minds" (Karim and Sustar 2006, 27). His activism continued most publicly in his work against segregation in sports, which eventually led to the suspension of apartheid South Africa from the Olympic Games in 1964. However, before this, his activism earned him a banning order under the Suppression of Communism Act in 1961. Brutus's political work against the apartheid regime, earned him a banning order, a bullet in the back, and an 18-month prison sentence. After he was released from prison, still under house arrest and a ban on writing he traveled to London on an exit permit, meaning he would be arrested if he returned to South Africa. This began his many years of exile, but did not end his activism or his writing, as he continued fighting for the end of apartheid, but also speaking up and mobilizing against global injustices. (McLuckie 1995).

24. McLuckie 1995, 13.
25. Karim and Sustar 2006, 370.
26. Ibid., 156.
27. MacGregor 1995, 61.
28. Brutus 1972, 26–7.
29. Busch and Annas 2008.
30. Gabriel 1989.
31. Tomaselli and Eke 1995, 114.
32. Cham1 993.
33. Westmoreland Bouchard 2009.
34. Micere Githae Mugo is a poet, playwright, academic, and activist. She was born in Kenya, educated at Makerere University, University of New Brunswick, and the University of Toronto. She returned to Kenya to teach at the University of Nairobi, becoming the dean of Faculty of Arts until 1982, when she was forced into exile for her work campaigning against human rights abuses by the Kenyan government and for her calls for increased academic freedom. While teaching at the University of Nairobi, she was also involved in the debates over reorienting the Eurocentric literature curriculum to focus instead on African literature and orality. She has since lived and taught in Zimbabwe and America, where she currently teaches in the Department of African American Studies at Syracuse University. (Abala 1998).
35. Agbetuyi 2005, 254.
36. Joubert 2010, 29–30.
37. Mugo 1991, 38.
38. Irele 1993, 160.
39. Thiong'o1 986,8 9.
40. Ibid.,7 8.

41. Thiong'o 1986.
42. Sembène1 974.
43. Karim and Sustar, 217.
44. *Petals of Blood* is a novel by Ngugi wa Thiong'o first published in 1977; it describes the development and situation of neocolonial Kenya, focusing on the exploitive and destructive nature of capitalism. *Petals* points to the lack of substantial change from the colonial past to the neocolonial present, for the exploitive ideology persists as the former colonists are merely replaced by a new African bourgeoisie working in cohort with their former masters. *Petals* tells this story through the lives of its protagonists, Munira, Abdulla, Wanja, and Karega, who have witnessed and lived the injustices and struggles of this period. Each has a history that presents a different element of the oppression, and each represents the possible reactions: however, they are tied together through both narrative and their incorporation in the same neocolonial situation. The protagonists are set in opposition to Chui, Kimera, and Mzigo, whose murders frame the novel. These three represent the new African elite, who in cohort with international capital, perpetuate coloniality and exploit the masses. While the novel is framed by their murders, the narrative weaves present and past, multiple perspectives, and omniscient reflection to paint the historical development of the present situation in Kenya and ending with an optimism grounded in a history of struggle.
45. Thiong'o 1977, 199.
46. Ibid.,6 8.
47. Mugo 1994, 28.
48. Ibid.,4 8.
49. Thiong'o1 977,1 65.
50. Ibid., 109–10.
51. Mugo 1994, 9.
52. Karim and Sustar 2006, 265.
53. Mignolo2 000.
54. Mudimbe 1988, 188.
55. Mignolo2 000.
56. Thiong'o 1986, 108.
57. Thiong'o and Sahle 2004, 65.
58. Sicherman 1989, 351.
59. Thiong'o 1977, 214.
60. Sembène 1965.
61. Sembène2 001.
62. Sembène1 968.
63. Mignolo 2000, 223.
64. Mugo 1994, 1–3.
65. Ibid., 3.
66. Brutus 1975, 38.
67. Mugo 1994, 29–35.

68. Ibid., 29.
69. Ibid.,4 3–7.
70. Mugo 1994, 4–7.
71. Thiong'o 1977, 214.
72. Ibid., 166.
73. Karim and Sustar 2006, 392.
74. Ibid., 393.
75. Ibid., 248.
76. Sembène1 976.
77. Rosenstone 1990, 827.
78. Berrian 2004.
79. Stratton 1980.
80. Thiong'o 1977, 166.
81. Ibid., 294.
82. Ibid., 298.
83. Mugo 1994, 1–3.
84. Ibid.,1 1.
85. Karim and Sustar 2006, 253.
86. Ibid., 274.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid., 253.
89. Ibid., 365.
90. Thiong'o 1977, 212.
91. Ibid., 213.
92. Ogude 1999, 28.
93. Thiong'o1 977,6 8.
94. Ibid.,6 8.

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CHAPTER 9

Missionaries for Capital: Brand Marketers and Music Sponsorship in Uganda

David G. Pier

This chapter is about *branding* as a rising trope in the present-day culture of capitalism in Africa. It draws upon interviews and observations from ethnomusicological fieldwork conducted in Uganda in 2006–2007 and again in 2010. My focus was on the Senator National Cultural Extravaganza, an annual, corporate-sponsored, national-scale event, whose title referred to Senator Extra Lager, a cheap brand of beer that participants in the competition were supposed to praise in their songs and dances. "Senator is good for your health, you drink it, your health improves!" sang one group in Lusoga language, adhering to the company's instructions that they focus on Senator's health benefits over "crude local gins," as well as on the beer's manufacture from ingredients grown on Ugandan farms. East African Breweries Ltd (EABL), a subsidiary of the giant multinational holding company Diageo, decided that the best way to promote its Senator brand in poor rural areas of Uganda was to have local performance troupes sing about it to their neighbors, in local languages and musical styles. (Ugandans speak more than 30 languages, and identify as many distinct cultures within their national boundaries.) The strategy of engaging rural musical groups as advertisers had the appeal of being doable on the cheap: EABL did not have to pay most of the performers anything, just offer big prizes to the top groups and let the performers' competitive impulses take care of the rest.

After the first Extravaganza, held in 2005, the competition was repeated annually until its cancelation by the corporation in 2013. Over this eight-year period, thousands of Ugandan amateur folkloric musicians and dancers were recruited into EABL's marketing project. These performers welcomed the opportunity to join the Extravaganza, even without pay, because they had few other opportunities to perform on a grand public stage. Today, state support for the arts is far from what it was in Uganda's early independence era, though some of the slack has been taken up by NGOs, who are sometimes willing to hire groups to promote their development messages to rural publics. Undeniably, the Extravaganza had a stimulating effect on the production of stage-style "traditional" performance around the country, with many groups who had been long dormant regrouping, and new ones being assembled to take a shot at the Senator prize. But at what cost? Are there insidious effects of such a large-scale "branding" of a nation's cherished musical traditions?

The Senator Extravaganza raises difficult questions about the contemporary production of music and art, in Uganda and the rest of the world. Everywhere we look, commercial interests seem to be colonizing our concerts, our television and radio programming, our public spaces, even our bodies (e.g., Nike "swish" tattoos). Naomi Klein's *No Logo* lays out a full indictment of marketing in its many deceptive and damaging activities, and discusses some of the recent ways American and European activists are endeavoring to resist its influences.[1] Other authors, while sympathetic to Klein's powerful critique, have drawn attention to the ways in which marketing and consumer culture in their diverse contemporary manifestations around the world cannot be narrated with a single story: branding in India means something different than branding in China or branding in Africa.[2] In each locale of globalized consumer culture, they argue, there exist complex agencies that are easily overlooked by analyses that focus exclusively on the top-down workings of a monolithic "culture industry."

In my book *Ugandan Music in the Marketing Era: The Branded Arena,* I offer an in-depth ethnographic exploration of the Extravaganza, its effects on traditional music scenes, and the growing culture of brand marketing in Uganda.[3] This present chapter focuses not on how the Extravaganza was received at the ground level, by local artists and audiences, but rather on how it was conceived at the top, by EABL brand managers working in collaboration with university-trained experts on Ugandan traditional performance arts. I am most concerned with how the marketers' beliefs about the viability of the Extravaganza as a marketing project were shaped by a distinctive, contemporary marketing discourse, which appealed to them in its capitalist utopianism, cosmopolitanism, and promises of privileged insight into the human condition. I suggest that, for the EABL brand managers, this participatory marketing campaign was more than a strategic project for increasing sales of Senator beer: it was a demonstration of a kind of marketing acumen, crucial to the marketers' self-fashioning as visionary, entrepreneurial, moral agents of capitalist progress in Africa. The Extravaganza serves as an illustrative case of Ugandan, and more broadly African, capitalist-elite culture in an era of surging *laissez faire* or "neoliberal" ideology. I explore the ways a notion of "branding" spoke to Ugandan capitalists' moral imagination, as well as to their concerns about the corporate bottom line. To get another view of this corporate marketing culture, I focus additionally on two individuals who were not part of this culture, but were drawn into it by their temporary contract work for the Extravaganza. In order to negotiate successfully with their corporate bosses, two hired Extravaganza administrators, from the artistic/academic field of music education and cultural preservation, were compelled to learn something about the marketing language and worldview. As we will see, they absorbed aspects of marketing, while at the same time defining themselves against it.

Capital, a process that, left unchecked, increasingly foments crises for the sake of accumulation, gives rise to cultures that justify and psychologically cushion capitalist agents against this incessant crisis-state. Today's brand marketing is not just a set of techniques for selling products; I would argue that it is something akin to an international organized religion, geared to capital in its current, overheated, phase. Within this religion, the profession of marketing is rather like priesthood: those who are initiated learn a whole new esoteric language and set of techniques for understanding and acting upon human needs and desires. Marketers may feel they have attained an elevated status and a special calling—particularly when they live in countries that are stereotypically deemed "backward" in terms of capitalist progress. They are not just anointed agents of their corporations, but also missionaries for capitalism in general. Kalman Applbaum, an anthropologist who conducted fieldwork as a marketer in a large corporation, has written of the global marketing discipline's outsized ambitions:

> Marketing undertakes to function as the psychologist, economist, logistical specialist, entertainment medium, catalyst to innovation and technology, modernizer (and in a bygone age 'civilizer'), provider of

> happiness, and the matériel of sustenance to humankind. Only its pretension to be also the supreme theorist of the human condition, the empire's chief anthropologist, as it were, remains obscure from public view.[4]

As Applbaum suggests, professional marketers are trained to believe they can know something about us that we do not know about ourselves. They contend that they can predict and respond to our deepest needs and desires, even before we ourselves are fully aware of them. Applbaum labels the marketing ideal of learning, and instantly fulfilling, consumers' desires "total provisioning." Some of the biggest names in the marketing profession contend that marketing can do much more than sell products; its concepts and techniques can be applied to diverse problems of world development.[5] After all, they ask, cannot any given world problem be defined in terms of a set of individual needs and wants, which might be fulfilled, or productively redirected, by means of a marketing campaign?

"Pyramid" Capitalism and the Fetishization of Participation

While not denying their capabilities outright, one might well accuse some of today's marketers of being overconfident in their powers of knowing and influencing behavior, and too trusting in the developmental benefits of marketing-assisted consumer capitalism. For an example of marketing's overoptimism, one might look to the highly influential global marketing book, *The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid,* by C. K. Prahalad.[6] Prahalad argues that the best way to help the world's poorest people—those earning less than two dollars a day—is to involve them in "bottom of the pyramid" sales schemes, selling small luxuries like shampoos and cosmetics to their neighbors. According to him, mere participation in marketing, from which they earn a small commission, will endow ground-level salespeople with "dignity and choice"—the very cultural encouragements they need to propel their communities out of poverty. (Like many promoters of "market solutions," Prahalad sees poverty as largely a problem of culture, not one caused by the structuring processes of capital itself.) While the world's poor are bettering themselves, through entry-level salesmanship and shopping, the companies at the top of the pyramid can rake in a handsome profit, by skimming off the voluminous penny profits eked out at the bottom. The sheer vastness of any pyramid scheme targeting the global poor guarantees financial viability at the top, Prahalad claims. And the whole system "works"—not in spite of, but implicitly thanks to, its stark inequalities. Corporations, who focus on incorporating the world's poor as marketing participants, will ostensibly be "doing well by doing good."

Ethnographic studies of such "pyramid," or "multilevel" sales schemes as they are actually implemented in poor countries have revealed situations in which ground-level actors experience far less "dignity" and "choice" than Prahalad suggests they will.[7] In the worst cases, salespeople, who fail to sell their allotted products, end up owing their companies money, rather than the other way around. Heady dreams, stoked by marketing supervisors, of climbing the sales pyramid to attain spectacular wealth, prime salespeople for crushing disappointment and a sense of personal failure, for it is implied that a lack of personal ambition or "responsibility," rather than any other cause (e.g., the shabbiness of the products on sale), is the cause of suboptimal earnings. To be fair, at least one study has suggested that some Avon-style schemes in Africa *have* been empowering for the poor women entrepreneurs who become engaged in them.[8] Yet bottom-of-the-pyramid development theory, like recent *laissez faire* capitalist utopianism generally, rests on a shaky foundation—namely, a radical individualist notion of "freedom" based solely on consumer/entrepreneurial "choice" without government interference, which fails to acknowledge the necessity, for true freedom, of a minimal level of life security and wellbeing. The mere possibility of "free" participation in markets is fetishized, while the ravages of deregulated market economics on communities and whole world regions are consistently downplayed.

EABL's Senator Extravaganza music competition was conceived according to this "bottom of the pyramid" paradigm, with local performers being told, in workshops, that they should be grateful for a chance to participate in a grand project of cultural and economic uplift under the aegis of the Senator brand. The festival planners borrowed heavily from the playbook of recent "participatory development," highlighting the benefits of Senator beer production and consumption to local health and economy, and reaching out to the same kinds of groups—typically local "women's development" groups—who were often engaged in NGO-driven development projects. In 2006, the Extravaganza took six months to complete, involved about 300 groups, and held events in 80 different counties. Like a pyramid sales scheme, the Extravaganza offered a spectacular grand prize—6 million shillings, or about $3000—to the top group in the nation, encouraging each group to fantasize that it would be the big winner, though all but a few would in fact go home empty-handed. Groups were encouraged to be "creative" in their advertising of the brand, but their creative labor would ultimately not belong to them, since the property rights to all songs and dances had to be signed over in advance to EABL.[9]

The popular participation dimension of the Senator Extravaganza made sense to EABL's marketing team, in a time when a bottom-up participatory marketing paradigm, exemplified by Prahalad's approach, held sway over the marketing discipline internationally. The brewery, it was presumed, could outsource much of its creative marketing labor to rural amateur performers while benefiting from those performers' diverse linguistic and cultural knowledge. In turn, the performance groups and their rural communities would benefit by becoming energetically involved in the branding project, in ways that would boost their morale as well as their public visibility. As we will see below, the brand managers spoke of the Extravaganza as a kind of gift they were giving to Uganda's "rural cultures," as though the company were engaged in purely altruistic corporate sponsorship of the arts.

To fully grasp the moral, as opposed to merely pecuniary, meaning of the Extravaganza for its marketing team requires that we next consider the moral dimensions of present "branding" discourse more broadly. The Extravaganza was construed by the marketers to be morally valuable not just as a (pseudo) "development" project, supporting local musical traditions and rural agricultural economies. It was deemed especially moral as a development project involving branding, since the activity of branding in itself had been invested with special moral import. Of the various kinds of popular "participation" that are being celebrated in the new neoliberal capitalist climate, participation around brands has come to be especially privileged. In the next section, I investigate the positive morality that today's culture of capitalism attributes to "branding" per se.

Celebratory "Branding" Discourse

In the 2000s, "nation branding" was much discussed by members of the African business/government/media class. Government and NGO-sponsored initiatives to "rebrand" nations sprung up all over: "Brand Kenya," "Brand Uganda," "Brand Nigeria," "Brand Botswana." The British marketing guru Simon Anholt, coiner of the term "nation-brand," had declared that branding was an "ability" that rich nations such as the United States had and poor nations lacked.[10] In his view, no amount of development aid would be enough to revive a country suffering from a "failing brand." Furthermore, Anholt admonished, good nation-branding was not mere PR; a government could not expect to build its international image with a glitzy ad campaign. Improving a nation-brand required deeper and more lasting changes in both policy and overall attitude; indeed, it called for nothing less than the total moral resurrection of the nation. As Anholt wrote in a blog post entitled "Brand Kenya Fails,"

> What Kenyans need to understand is that creating a more positive national image is not a one-off project that government needs to take an interest in. Earning a more positive national image is, quite simply, what good governance is all about.[11]

"Nation-brand" has arguably become the latest term-of-choice in a long-standing, patronizing, Northern discourse that asks *what's wrong with the Global South?* (and Africa in particular). As with earlier "standards" Africans purportedly failed to meet—"civilization," "modernity," "development," "globalization"—the problem is being attributed mainly to a pervasive African cultural shortcoming. According to Anholt, Kenyans simply "need to understand" the authentic, moral, essence of nation-branding. Such prescriptions elide the ways in which Africa has long been thoroughly integrated into global capitalism, though in a position of structural disadvantage. In the cultural discourse of nation-branding, Africa's long-standing structural peripherality goes unacknowledged: any economic problems that continue to plague the continent are to be explained first of all as problems of attitude. One implication is that Africans need above all to be more *sincere* in projecting their enthusiasm for capitalist participation at the global "bottom of the pyramid." Once a welcoming, can-do attitude toward deregulated capitalism is acquired, persistent structural problems will resolve on their own—or so the nation-branding narrative implies. Many African elites have taken such criticisms to heart, as they have *vis-à-vis* other disapproving discourses about necessary civilizing, modernizing, and globalizing. James Ferguson has conducted an illuminating reading of a Zambian online magazine, *Chrysalis*, in which young, well-educated Zambians, many of them living abroad, fretted over how Zambia might possibly compete in a global economy of images. Should young stewards of the nation delve into Zambia's indigenous African traditions (from which they themselves felt culturally distant), or eschew them in an attempt to fully emulate Europeans and Americans? On what basis should the new Zambian nation-brand be built?[12]

The notion of "branding," in nation-building discourse, has performative aspects that older concepts like "development" and "modernity" do not have to the same degree. Development is something that can in theory be done self-sufficiently, whereas branding makes no sense unless someone is paying attention. This shift in emphasis comes as no surprise in an era in which capital, by technological and other means, has thoroughly collapsed the distances between peoples and brought them within performative distance of one another. As one pair of business scholars have influentially put it, we are living in a global "attention economy," in which being seen and "followed" has become, at the same time, more possible and more imperative. Attention has become nothing less than the new "currency," not just in business, but in society as a whole.[13] As a self-proclaimed science of capturing and holding positive attention, the profile of marketing has risen globally, and especially in Africa, where elites have long suffered the world's inattention and misrepresentation. The embrace of a marketing approach, in Africa's relations with the outside world, has been compounded by the international demand that Africans produce compelling, simple-to-understand, representations of themselves, if they are to receive further foreign attention and aid. In the most regrettable cases, the injured and dispossessed are urged to "market their trauma" to Western donors—performing the proven brand of "suffering Africa."[14]

Talk of nation-brands has drawn Africans' attention to the gap that may exist between a country's felt identity, and the image of itself it strategically projects to the world. Some have embraced branding as a kind of unapologetic, profitable, bluffing. In a debate about the "Uganda: Gifted By Nature" nation-brand campaign, one columnist complained that the advertisement's myopic fixation on wildlife, extreme sports such as whitewater rafting, and the like, "leaves us at risk of losing our most treasured cultures." Ugandans value their safari parks, their forests, and their waterfalls, but feel that their cultures are unjustly ignored and endangered by tourists interested in natural wonders only. To this complaint, another marketer responded (lifting a phrase directly from one of Anholt's books) that, while the images of the campaign were "clichés that may be depressing, even insulting, to the average Ugandan," they nevertheless were "a fine platform on which to build a believable global brand."[15] Those initiated into brand marketing take pride in being able to discern and opt for "believability" over genuineness. Their understanding of themselves as savvy strategists manipulating a global attention economy buffers them against the apprehension that they might be compromising their more genuine national identity.

If branding is seen as a kind of necessary strategic bluffing on the global stage, another strain of marketing discourse conversely associates brands with integrity, honesty, and consistency. Successful brands, supposedly, are those that stay stable and authentic through fluctuations over time, not just in the markets, but within the branded companies themselves. Brands are thus held up as metaphors for moral steadiness in diverse social realms, from personal life to national politics. In a piece entitled "Brand It Like Mao" in the Ugandan newspaper *New Vision*, for example, a journalist accused an unnamed politician—presumably President Museveni—of lacking a "brand" based in genuine, lasting responsiveness to his public: "you may have the flashiest and most memorable TV and radio ads and the most striking company signage but it will count for nothing if the driver in your company branded car drives like a bat out of hell in rush hour traffic." By contrast, the challenger, Norbert Mao, had, in this journalist's opinion, a better grip on branding—a better ability to stay cool and attend to "customer loyalty…forged over time." The deeper political problem standing in the way of Mao's candidacy was, the author claimed, that Uganda at present "cannot be accused of being a brand country." But, he concluded, "that day is not long in coming," when Uganda would awaken to the true potential of branding.[16] One can perceive, in this journalistic piece, how, for some Ugandans, branding constitutes not just a set of practical strategies for success, but a moral, prophetic worldview, to be applied well beyond commercial matters.

Branding in Everyday Life

Nation-branding is just one element of an ascendant "branding" popular discourse and public spectacle in Africa. From 1990 to 2010, branded products multiplied on the Kampala streets, and even on country roads, becoming integral to the fabric of Ugandans' everyday life. When I lived in the country in 2006, there were three cell phone services available. By 2010, the number of options had doubled and those who could afford it had taken to traveling everywhere with three different cell phones, each programmed to a different service, to take advantage of the various calling deals on offer. Multinational companies with branches in the capital city had become more aggressive and consistent in their branding strategies, changing "dress-down Fridays" to "corporate-wear Fridays." Buildings in cities, towns, and trading centers, were repeatedly repainted with advertisements from top to bottom, providing a visible record of which brands were on the rise this year and which had been abandoned. In the city, brand "promotion" events, similar to the Senator Extravaganza, had become a major source of nightly entertainment.

Brand advertising is not new in East Africa, but it has reached a feverish intensity, giving rise to a spectacular public "conversation" of brand messages and images, in which Ugandans—especially in the city, but even in the remote countryside—can feel involved. Different brands seem to compete and debate with one another, sometimes reaching "brand synergy," all in a projected spirit of collective, consumerist, progress. In his ethnography of marketing in India, William Mazzarella has coined a phrase, "progress of, and through, pleasure," that captures the utopian spirit that emerges out of branding's commercial simulacrum of the public sphere.[17] With independence-era prospects for genuine democracy having been dampened by a series of authoritarian and "semi-authoritarian"[18] Ugandan regimes, the notion that people might constitute themselves first of all as "consumer citizens," bypassing the need for working democracy, holds understandable appeal. Whereas older Ugandan brands (e.g., of soaps and skin lighteners) played on colonial-inculcated fears of being out-of-the-loop—unhygienic and uncivilized—the newer brands help consumers feel included in a different, more self-motivated, way.[19] Today's brands are engineered to feel participatory—to express an ideal relationship between an individual consumer and some grassroots consumer movement. "Brands are the new traditions," hails a British marketing expert[20]: like traditions, you are supposed to feel personally invested in them—they ostensibly make you what you are and choose to become. It may be telling that the Luganda translation of *brand* is *ekika*, a word with the historical/political resonance of "house" and "clan." In stories in the Luganda language newspaper, *Bukedde*, the brands of cars and other items on the scene are mentioned whenever possible: for example, "the minister drove a motorcar of *ekika kya Hummer*" (the Hummer "clan," in a conceivable misreading).

In Uganda, brands and politics visibly intersect. In 2006, the three major cell phone companies, MTN, Celtel, and UTL, blazed the landscape with the colors yellow, red, and blue, respectively. As it turns out, yellow, red, and blue were also the iconic colors of the three major political parties: NRM, UPC, and DP. (Museveni, the head of the yellow NRM party, happens also to be the dominant shareholder of the yellow MTN Uganda brand.) I was informed that around election time, supporters of each party pledged allegiance to the cell phone service of the respective color. This weaving of commercial and political symbolics is not, I think, a mere surface feature of contemporary Ugandan public life. There are significant imagined communities being formed around brands, which overlap with, and may sometimes challenge, community affiliations by political party, ethnicity, and religion.

These, then, are some of the facets of Uganda's growing culture of "branding." Having provided a broad overview of what branding has come to mean in public, I now return to EABL's corporate offices, to discuss how marketing was being articulated specifically within corporate culture, as this came to be revealed during the planning of the Senator Extravaganza.

The Senator Brand Managers

In 2010, I spoke to Richard Kalema,[21] a brand manager who was in charge of the Extravaganza when it commenced in 2005. Kalema had since taken another job at a major telecom company, and I met him at its offices in Kampala. He had started out in sales and moved into marketing, earning a master's degree at Makerere University in Kampala. At Makerere, he had participated in seminars with visiting professors from Harvard Business School, who introduced him to recent marketing books such as *Blue Ocean Strategy.*[22] This book argues that markets have become overcrowded with suppliers who are forced to fight like sharks to capture their share of limited demand, making a "red ocean." To adopt a "blue ocean strategy" is to focus on seeking out/creating markets that have never existed before—a market for bottled beer among the Ugandan rural poor, for example. As Justin Willis relates, in his history of alcohol in East Africa, *Potent Brews,* the rural hinterland has long been courted by industrial breweries without success, largely because of the positive "traditional" associations rural drinkers attach to homebrew. Beer, made from maize or bananas, ladeled from a communal container, is a substance evocative of the authority of and mutual respect among elder males.[23]

Kalema described marketing as an expert, scientific process:

> With marketing, you have to do a DNA: what we call a Key Brand Benefit—KBB of a brand. Dissect a brand and understand its core values. Then you begin playing on consumer psychology. Around those strong, intrinsic values of a brand—of a person. I can also have intrinsic

> value as Kalema Richard: you could describe me in three words. And that, if you can get that right, as a KBB of a brand, then you will have got the whole insight around marketing.

The notion of imagining a brand as a person is common in contemporary marketing, along with its converse, imagining a person as a brand. "If you don't have a brand, then you cease to exist as a product, or as a person," Kalema assured me. I showed him a recent *BBC: Focus on Africa* cover story, "Mandela: The Brand Scam," which asked, if Nelson Mandela was a brand, how much would he be worth? Kalema applauded the notion of a "Mandela brand," and came up with an impromptu dissection of the South African leader into three core "elements":

> Mandela as a person, has gone through a long period of experience, but there are some values that he . . . people want to associate and relate with him. For example, if you look at the . . . in terms of governance as a person, he has exemplary governance. So emotionally, somebody, whoever wants to be a leader would want to be as good as Mandela. There's that emotion. In terms of being pan-African, he has that element, so that is also another group of people that he connects. In terms of the global, international accolade, he is also there. So he has built his brand over time.

Earlier, I had attended a meeting with Senator's current brand managers, and had been given a handout that described in detail Senator Lager's "brand personality": "Respected, Indigenous, Hardworking, Mature, Strong, Masculine." There was also a dissection of the "target consumer":

> Male 25–34 C2D peri-urban (Including informal settings)/deep rural, usually employed in the informal sector, for instance as a boda-boda rider, market vendor, mason, taxi tout etc. Works hard to support himself and family. Leads a highly demanding life, having to cope with a lot of needs from a meager income. Mature, hardworking and aspiring to be respected in life. Greatest dream is to progress in life, be wealthy, own land, a shop and build a house. Has a lot of pride in his roots and society is important to him. Active participant in communal activities like weddings, funerals, parties and political party activities. He has a good number of friends whom he meets on a regular basis to drink or otherwise catch up. Likes to reward himself after a hard day's work especially at the bar. However he lives within his means as much as may drink local brew daily and only up-scaling to lagers occasionally.

Central to the discourse of "total provisioning" is the idea that marketers can know their target consumers as no one else, including the consumers themselves, can. "Market segmentation" is a kind of anthropological imaging of the target consumer that winnows out cultural complications believed to be extraneous, such as ethnic affiliation and local history. According to Applbaum, marketing assumes a "global convergence of taste."[24] That is, under globalization, "peri-urban" males, of the economic class "C2D" (very low), will inevitably share a certain set of needs and wants, no matter where they come from. Knowing a target consumer in terms of a limited set of universal categories allows one to narrow one's marketing strategies considerably.

EABL's marketers produced a formally appealing diagram of the Senator brand, in its relation to the target consumer. In doing so, they affirmed, for themselves and their employers, the methodical, incisive, quality of their analytical methods. In the center of the paper, in block capital letters, was the Key Brand Benefit: "Senator inspires confidence in a better tomorrow." In rings around it were arranged different analytical boxes: "Consumer Goal," "Think/Feel/do NOW Core," "Think/Feel/do FUTURE Core." In a PowerPoint presentation, the target consumer was given a name, "Matiko," and represented with stock photos of smiling, drinking, working-class Africans. The focus on an imaginary character, "Matiko," rather than any actual Ugandans,[25] signaled the priority these marketers placed on sociological abstraction—on ideal types rather than complicated cases. Such abstraction work is always a symbolic act of power/knowledge, and nowhere more so than in Africa, where memories linger of a colonial rule based on the scientific sorting of people into types.

According to Kalema, different EABL brands were associated with different "motivations." The company's version of *waragi* and their Pilsner beer brand were associated with "release." Guinness, the company's priciest beer brand, was associated with "strength." Senator's motivation was "affiliation": affiliation with one's locality and also with the Ugandan nation. Kalema summarized a problem that has plagued Ugandan governments since the country's creation, "Ugandans are there, but they don't understand Uganda." The strategy, therefore, was to approach people first with their own languages and regional figureheads, and then, by means of "a competition that would now isolate the best culture," draw drinkers into "a national excitement, and a national association with the brand."

One is struck by the political ambitiousness in the rhetoric surrounding the Extravaganza. The festival was presented as an attempt to occupy territories, harness popular sentiments, mend ethnic disputes, and even take on "development" tasks usually associated with the state. At times, the detachment with which the managers spoke of their "target consumers" was alarming: one brand manager stated that the goal was to move the poor consumer to the point where he would gladly "go without paraffin" rather than go without his daily bottle of Senator. In fact, rural people regularly do go without paraffin, charcoal, soap, salt, and children's education, often so that the men of the family can relax with their beer and *waragi*. Marketers, even as they acknowledge the potentially malign influences of their campaigns, avoid seeing themselves as callous by claiming positive "development" effects. When I asked Kalema whether the Extravaganza was taking advantage of a people too poor to buy basic necessities and already plagued by alcohol abuse,[26] he responded with a list of three Extravaganza "benefits": (1) improving the health of drinkers who would no longer be drinking informal *waragi*, (2) getting farmers involved in capitalism, through the production of Senator ingredients, and (3) giving out useful prizes such as hoes and blankets to raffle winners:

> One: from the health aspect I think we are doing them a big justice. We are moving them from the cheaper and more dangerous crude drinks to a more…I mean, if it is passed and certified by National Bureau of Standards, health-wise I am saving you from death!
>
> It was using local materials, so it is creating employment to the people. You grow barley to contribute towards this product. And therefore, when we pay you for barley, it's a cycle, we are picking part of the money we have paid you. You'd be surprised that there is a lot of money seated out there in the rural. But people think there's no money.
>
> If you look at the prizes we are giving: we are giving out candles, we are giving out hoes, we are giving out relevant things that mean a lot through the rural people—we are giving out blankets…That's the benefit that we're giving out.

The "development" veneer of the Extravaganza helped to rationalize a project that was, according to the current brand managers, not producing excellent sales results. At the 2010 meeting of brand managers, it was revealed that Eagle lager, a beer identical to Senator in price and alcoholic strength produced by EABL's arch-rival South Africa Breweries-Miller (SABMiller), was beating Senator in both sales and brand identification. What is more, the Eagle brand strategy was comparatively simple and efficient, consisting merely of discounts and giveaways. Why continue to stage a costly and extremely complicated festival of music and dance when the same or better results might be achieved by simpler means? One of the 2010 Senator brand managers raised the issue himself in a meeting:

> Could I be honest with you? If we just removed the galas, do you know what we could do with that 350,000 [Ugandan shillings]? In [the Senator campaign in] Kenya they just give out *posho* (corn meal) and cash. No galas. But they are doing well! These volumes can be delivered without the galas; that's the bitter truth. But we have fought to have the galas.

I would argue that the Extravaganza's persistence as a brand campaign ultimately did not depend on its profits. It was allowed to continue largely because on paper it looked the way a modern, ambitious, globally-based brand campaign was supposed to look. It was *opening up new markets* among the rural poor. It was *getting people involved at the local level* and capitalizing on their *local tastes and traditions.* It was helping people to "develop," while promoting the company's beneficent image. While all this may have been directed at the brand managers' overseers in the Diageo office in London, it also, perhaps more importantly, fit well into the brand managers' own image of the kind of work they, personally, should be doing. Marketers, as opposed to mere salesmen, are not supposed to focus on short-term results, especially not those brought about by lowly sales tactics such as giveaways. As Kalema explained:

> That's where the difference of brand building comes in. I can have as many [giveaway] t-shirts as possible and I'll just put them on. As soon as the promotion is done, what products shall I continue associating with? So brand building should go beyond just the t-shirts, because t-shirts are short-lived. That's why I'm saying there must be a cultural connotation.

Marketers see themselves as analysts and engineers of culture. While they do have to keep an eye on sales figures, these are ultimately of secondary importance to their proclaimed calling as ministers to human needs and desires. They prefer to focus on the big picture, and their profession rewards big, visionary, ideas. Those who prove they can innovate tend to be promoted up the ranks quickly, often not having to stay attached to a single project long enough to deal with its long-term consequences. (Between 2005 and 2010, Senator had three different brand managers in succession.) As sociologists Boltansky and Chiapello have noted, a privileging of "vision" and rapid mobility is typical of today's corporate culture in general, in contrast to the more staid, secure large-firm-based corporate culture of the mid-twentieth-century.[27] Among the various corporate specialties, marketing places perhaps the highest emphasis on visionary individuals.

In Uganda, marketing is a profession of growing prestige. Marketing students at Makerere and in foreign schools enter a privileged circle where they rub shoulders with Harvard Business School professors and other luminaries of global capitalism. Under Museveni's regime, many older avenues to power and national influence have closed. Political careers, in the present environment, are mostly meted out by Museveni's ruling party. The academic world, centered at Makerere University, has been reshaped, under Museveni, into a diploma mill with an emphasis on vocational training. Professors do not receive the public respect, or benefits, they once did. Entrepreneurial businessmen, on the other hand, are treated with a reverence unprecedented in Ugandan history, by both the government and the mass-media. Corporate business, then, seems to many educated youth to be the most viable path remaining, and marketing is the most creative, intellectual arm of business.

Not all Ugandans, of course, are so enamored with the world of business and its celebratory discourse of development-through-branding. To give a sense of how some Ugandans are defining new subjectivities counter to those of the culture of capitalism, I now turn my attention to two administrators of the Extravaganza, whose livelihoods necessitated that they interact with the corporate world, but who ultimately rejected the marketing worldview, in favor of an alternative worldview they elaborated around the idea of "traditions."

Cultural Workers, Drawn into Marketing

The Extravaganza, in its ambitious saturation of the country with participatory branding events, may be read, on one level, as a symbolic flexing of marketing power—an attempt to demonstrate that Uganda's second largest corporation could provide for the Ugandan people, and capture their democratic loyalty, as well as or better than any government or NGO "development" initiative. EABL's brand managers approved of the project as the kind of visionary, world-engineering work they were destined to do. Someone, however, was needed to carry out the exhausting labor of planning events, getting stages and equipment to the right place at the right time, communicating with performance groups and cultural leaders, and hiring and disciplining staff—all on a tight budget. This work was outsourced to two outside experts in music and Ugandan traditional culture, Godfrey Alibatya and Akram Kintu. In most respects, the Extravaganza was a project they designed, while the brand managers controlled the purse strings and concentrated on abstract branding goals. Kintu and Alibatya were compelled to deal with the corporate world, but clearly did not belong to it —a distance that was to some degree intentional, on their part. In working for the Extravaganza, they both picked up ideas from marketing, but also solidified their sense that what they valued in life was beyond the world of marketing and corporate capitalism.

Alibatya and Kintu were born in separate villages in the poor rural region of Busoga. They grew up first playing xylophone with the other boys in their village, then studying both “Western” and “traditional” music in school. Both had fond memories of the Uganda National Schools Competition, a long running festival which has served as the primary site for the modern, nationalistic production of Ugandan “traditional” music and dance styles.[28] They modeled the Extravaganza, a music/dance competition for adults, substantially on the Schools competition. While their talents had led them eventually to music-oriented careers—Kintu as a professional musician and leader of the touring performance troupe, Godfrey as a music teacher and ethnomusicological field worker for the government and international NGOs—both mused often about other career options they might have taken up or might yet pursue. Kintu flirted with party politics, Alibatya with a string of entrepreneurial schemes. Though they welcomed the Senator contract as the highest paying job either of them had ever secured, they claimed to be reluctant participants in the beer-selling component of the Extravaganza. They preferred to run the festival as much as possible as a project in “preserving and developing” local music cultures. The people they hired to help them train musicians, set up stages, and adjudicate contestants’ performances were likewise performers and academics, interested most of all in musical/cultural qualities and in demonstrating their expertise therein.

Despite taking pains to depict the Extravaganza as an arts project that just happened to be sponsored by a beer company, Kintu and Alibatya at times felt energized by having the wind of Uganda’s third most powerful corporation at their backs. In many matters they were able to be the sole decision makers, since the brand managers preferred to keep their distance from mundane matters of administration. The Extravaganza was far less bureaucratic than the Schools competition, and paid its administrators considerably more. EABL's project was, moreover, a great opportunity for network building around the country, enabling Alibatya to compile a large and closely guarded database of contact information for hundreds of rural adult music groups. Beyond the executive authority and corporate budget, Kintu and Alibatya enjoyed the marketing challenges the EABL team put to them. The task of recasting what they knew about rural tastes, habits, and artistic genres in terms of a brand strategy was an occasionally stimulating, if often irritating, one for the two men. They were mildly interested in the anthropological enquiry of marketing, though they were not privy to the discipline's jargon and its cornucopia of three- five- and twelve-point strategies. Their bosses, the brand managers continued to brandish this technical knowledge over them, as a symbol of their training and career status.

The two corporate meetings I attended in 2010 were between Kintu and Alibatya and the two Senator brand managers, Arthur and Apollo. The musicians and I wore awkward-looking reflective vests as required by the company's strict security protocol, while the brand managers wore expensive-looking business attire. The managers' elevated status over the music experts was underlined by Arthur making Kintu and Alibatya wait for close to two hours while he finished up a meeting and chatted on the phone, and by Apollo spending most of the meeting with his back to the group, typing on his laptop computer and sporadically turning to inject a brusque comment. Kintu and Alibatya had prepared a presentation, complete with video, of their plans for the 2010 Extravaganza. This brand management team was brand new—the most recent of several team turnovers—and apparently had little idea of what the project was and how it had been implemented over the past five years. Almost as soon as Alibatya and Kintu began, however, Arthur cut them off and demanded that they direct their attention to the "activity brief" with its anatomy of Matiko the target consumer. Stories of how the Extravaganza had actually worked or failed to work in the past were, for them, secondary matters, even distractions.

Having broken Kintu and Alibatya's rhythm, Arthur adopted an interrogating tone. Eagle was beating Senator in rural Uganda; something new and innovative needed to be done: "just tell me in a sentence." I saw under his pile of papers the corner of a form to be filled out after the meeting: "Does not reflect Brand or Product truths," next to five empty bubbles: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Kintu began again with an approximation of marketing-speak: "our primary objective is to maximize volumes but also to improve the image of Senator." He explained that this year they planned to stage forty events, each taking two days instead of a single day, so as to give rural spectators time to grow familiar with Senator. He proposed participatory activities, including bicycle races for local bicycle taxi ("*bodaboda*") drivers. The brand managers seemed nonplussed, expressing concerns about company liability for bicycle accidents: "those people are *your* responsibility, because if anything happens, you see, it comes back to the brand."

Still the managers saw, in the bicycle race, a potential for harnessing new workers who would voluntarily promote the brand, motivated by competition, not money: "why don't you get bodaboda guys to be your ambassadors and go out and mobilize people?" Alibatya responded that this was not feasible: the bodaboda men would demand too much money. Apollo pressed on, insisting that Alibatya commit to recruiting new sources of cheap or free labor: "We talked about the bicycle race: that is fun. But how do you go beyond fun? What does the team do? Does it activate the bars? So now your team becomes an integral part of the sales campaign." He advised Kintu and Alibatya to send their assistants to visit towns prior to Extravaganza events to stir up advance interest in the brand. Kintu and Alibatya, for their part, angled to confine their team's role as much as possible to running an arts event. Already on the verge of being defined as sales team leaders (without being paid accordingly), they struggled to define the corporation's relationship to the Extravaganza as much as possible in terms of conventional arts patronage, with the corporation sponsoring events based on their inherent public value. To this end, Alibatya insisted on showing a DVD of dances from earlier events, "to put us in the mood." Arthur, little interested in the Extravaganza as an arts festival, sighed, "I like . . . I like it. But, I think now that we've seen that we can maybe just go on."

It seemed to be a relief to both sides when an idea emerged that everyone liked: distributing coupons with Senator bottles in bars, which could then be redeemed for prizes at upcoming Senator events. Alibatya, getting into the marketing mood, redeemed a word that had been used in a negative context earlier in the conversation: "responsibility." Taking the role of a rural drinker, he exclaimed, "here if I have my coupon, I am one-hundred percent *responsible* for my coupon!" Kintu concurred, "because you have no one else to blame." Everyone in the room concurred that giving a villager a contingent gift to hold on to and be responsible for was properly in the spirit of brand marketing. The consumer was being enticed to participate in a deeper way—to see the Extravaganza and the Senator brand as part of her/his future, entrepreneurial, self-development.

One can see from this interaction some of the ways in which Kintu and Alibatya were pressured to engage in the marketing style of thinking. They did so at times with enthusiasm, since, as freelance artists and promoters of the arts, they were genuinely interested in what marketing might have to teach them about reaching potential audiences, and predicting their needs and desires. On the other hand, they were put off by the professional marketers' consistent and blatant devaluation of aspects of the Extravaganza they believed mattered most. Kintu and Alibatya cared a great deal about inclusiveness and fairness in the dance competition, and wanted to ensure that the Extravaganza would serve as a reverential, as well as joyous, display of traditional cultures. The brand managers, for their part, made it clear that they cared little about such matters: so long as audiences were participating in the brand, it made little difference to them *how* they were enticed to participate. Aggravating this difference in attitudes was the aloof, patronizing, impatient air that the brand managers adopted toward their contract employees. Marketing language and the marketing imperative to be concise and analytical within established marketing categories were used repeatedly to shut down Alibatya and Kintu's attempts to introduce other points of view, based on their real experience in the field. In diverse ways, the marketers emphasized their essential cultural difference from their employees, and the corporate power they wielded over them. Throughout their near decade-long administration of the Extravaganza, Kintu and Alibatya had to deal constantly with the anxiety of not knowing whether EABL would remain committed to the project, and, if so, whether it would remain in the same form, or be radically altered according to the marketing team's whims. Corporate reimbursement for significant expenses incurred in the field often came late, with only vague assurances that it would be coming at all. While running the Extravaganza the administrators' working lives were, in short, always precarious—and this was made worse by the distant and imperious attitudes of their marketing supervisors.

In such taxing circumstances, it is no wonder that Kintu and Alibatya increasingly came to define their own lives in contradistinction to marketing culture. Kintu, a Muslim, opined to me that for some people a brand could be like "their daily prayer"—always reassuringly there for them on TV or the radio, no matter what else might be falling apart in their lives. For him, however, this was a lesser kind of spiritual existence than the one he himself had discovered in music. Whenever possible, Kintu had an *ndongo* lamellophone (so-called thumb piano) in hand, one of the many he kept stacked in his Jinja town office. With this quiet instrument, he engaged in a kind of absorbed meditation, regaining his spiritual center after each bruising encounter with his EABL employers. Alibatya shared Kintu's belief in transcendence through music, but was also zealous in his personal commitment to Jesus. A born-again Christian, he invoked religion often as a consolation against the daily corruption he had to deal with, and as a guide to his eventual worldly success. Acting part-time as marketers only deepened the two men's appreciation of themselves as artists, folklorists, and worshippers. Their work for EABL made them all the more dedicated to the preservation of a sacred lifeworld beyond corporate and consumerist culture.

A Marketing Success?

EABL's cancellation of the Senator Extravaganza in 2013 suggests that the corporation eventually lost faith in the project as a means of building Senator sales and brand loyalty. Or, at least, that they no longer considered its brand-building outcomes to be worth the expense of running such a large and elaborate festival. In addition to tracking sales, the marketing department conducted follow-up field research in towns where Extravaganza events were held, to measure improvements in brand affiliation. While I was not able to access the company's findings, this field research presumably showed less than impressive results. No matter what EABL's own studies may have revealed, the competition administrator, Alibatya, insisted till the end that the Extravaganza had been enormously successful as a marketing project. In villages across Uganda, he assured me, people not only knew the brand name "Senator," but had also pledged their allegiance to it. The beer had become firmly associated, in drinkers' minds, with esteemed music and dance traditions—or so he claimed.

My own ethnographic observations of events suggested that audiences' and performers' feelings about the brand were complex, and to some degree inscrutable. This dimension of the Extravaganza—that which played out at local rehearsals and competition events—is too complicated to broach in this present chapter, though it is discussed at length in my longer study.[29] A question that does fall within my present scope is, "What, in the end, would constitute a 'success,' in the professional marketers' view?" A substantial boost in beer sales would in itself likely have caused the brand executives to proclaim the Extravaganza a triumph. Short of such a decisive sales boost, however, how is "success" in marketing gauged? Since the Extravaganza was extended annually for eight years, it must repeatedly have been deemed successful enough. But on what basis?

In the preceding sections, I have suggested that the Extravaganza's value, in the minds of its marketing overseers, was determined not so much by whatever measurable sales and brand-loyalty results may have been achieved on the ground, but rather by its impressiveness on paper as a visionary marketing exercise. In its penetration of rural regions all around the country, the Extravaganza stood as a powerful demonstration of the "blue ocean strategy," young marketers had been trained to pursue. Rather than trying to win a share of a hotly contested urban market, already saturated with beer brands, EABL would be pushing into notoriously "untapped" territories, where most people were still consuming informally manufactured drinks. Just as important, the Extravaganza lived up to the contemporary marketing ideal that contemporary brand-building should be "participatory" and "local." In this participatory event, the marketing of the Senator brand would be outsourced to low-cost, local, creative volunteers, in the spirit of the marketer C. K. Prahalad's *The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid*.[30] Even if the Extravaganza ended up costing EABL money (and the mere cost of shipping cases of beer to remote rural locations was considerable), the marketers could justify these costs in terms of how much money the corporation would theoretically be saving, by outsourcing advertising labor to a vast pool of mostly unpaid participants. Whether or not this outsourcing strategy actually added up on the corporate balance sheets, the efficacy of such outsourcing strategy was, in the 2000s, conventional wisdom for the global marketing community. In planning such an expansive participatory marketing project, the EABL marketers were demonstrating to future employers—and, not least, to themselves—that they were fluent in the prestigious new participatory-marketing paradigm.

Worth reiterating, in this regard, is the significant overlap between this paradigm of participatory marketing, expressed in the

Extravaganza, and that of "participatory development" simultaneously being implemented in Africa and around the globe by a proliferation of small, independent, development NGOs.[31] The Senator Extravaganza borrowed many of the appearances of a contemporary "African rural development" campaign, involving many of the same women's groups who engaged in local development mobilizations, and adopting a beneficent rhetoric of preserving traditional cultures, building local economies, and improving drinkers' health. It is easy to read EABL's pseudo-"development" stance as a mere cynical ploy—aimed, perhaps, at attracting government support for the corporation. (Notably, in neighboring Kenya, EABL had succeeded in securing a substantial tax break from the government, on the grounds that it was helping to wean rural populations off dangerous distillates.)[32] I would suggest, however, that Extravaganza's "development" stance was not merely cynical PR. It was, rather, expressive of the marketing discipline's wholehearted (if delusional) conviction that its ultimate role is not just to sell products, but to change the world for the better. The world's most famous marketing experts, such as Simon Anholt, introduced above, are increasingly being consulted for global development projects, in the belief that their commercial discipline has special insight into peoples' unarticulated needs and desires. A notion of world-development driven by pluralistic consumer choice—of Mazzarella's "progress of, and through, pleasure"—has captured the marketing profession's imagination.[33] Many of the best and brightest from the elite universities of every country, are choosing marketing, not just as a lucrative career, but as one with prospects for making a difference in African development. The Extravaganza thus held appeal as a new-style marketing project in terms of its grand, developmental, ambitions, even if it proved ultimately unsustainable in terms of the bottom line.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have conceived of marketing not just as a set of corporate strategies for selling products, but also, and especially, as a kind of meaningful work or calling for those engaged in it as a career. I have suggested that the Senator Extravaganza was, in the first place, an opportunity for young professional Ugandan marketers to *do marketing,* in the currently most prestigious, "visionary," mode of this globally constructed profession. Professional marketers need to attend to their company's bottom line, but it is also in their career interests—as well as their subjective interests as self-fashioning vanguard agents of global capitalism—to think beyond the ledger sheets, toward grander ideals of corporate "African development." The Senator Extravaganza was an opportunity for the EABL marketers to show that they were thinking not like mere salesmen, but like sociological researchers and governmental planners. They would be demonstrating especially their ability to delegate/outsource a variety of tasks to others, while they themselves remained serenely above the fray, focusing on abstract, structural concerns. These delegated tasks included the creative work of modulating the Senator brand message for different perceived ethnic tastes, as well as the considerable labor of actually administrating the festival, that is, finding and training groups, budgeting for events, and so on. The tasks that the brand managers took most seriously were those of coming up with a concise, perfectly tuned, "Key Brand Benefit," based on an abstract analysis of target demographics. The KBB, to their minds, would be the spiritual core of the project—the sturdy mantra that would keep the whole affair on course, no matter how complicated and unwieldy it might become on the ground. A compelling KBB, framed in an expertly crafted PowerPoint presentation, would, importantly, be an accomplishment to show future employers, even should the Extravaganza flounder as a working project. The project, however it panned out, would manifest, at least on paper, contemporary ideals of marketing *vision*.

I have entitled this chapter "Missionaries for Capital" to stimulate comparisons between today's Ugandan marketers, and the missionaries, European and African, who played such a shaping role in the colonial era. Rather than serving the Christian God, today's marketing missionaries dedicate themselves to a force that is equally faith-based: the ameliorating force of the globalized "free" market. Like missionaries, marketers convince themselves and others that they have a trained ability, which laypeople lack, to lay bare the internal drives of a society. They have acquired, from a global marketing priesthood, a set of mandalic meditations and divining techniques, with which they claim to be able to deduce the fundamental structures of need and desire that drive market movements. Contradictorily, this same arcane expertise is used to culturally distance marketers from the actual people they target, with their actual, expressed, needs and desires. Kintu and Alibatya, the administrators subcontracted to run the Extravaganza, were charged with dealing with all of the Extravaganza participants' expressed ambitions and grievances. The brand managers purposefully used the two middlemen to insulate themselves from the living reality of Ugandan rural cultures, so that they might better focus on the ostensibly deeper, structural reality they had conjured in diagrams and PowerPoint presentations. Their interest was in "Matiko," a generic peri-urban Ugandan beer drinker compiled from their own armchair sociological deductions. Any more intimate contact with real Extravaganza participants could only cloud their perception of this ideal target consumer.

Professional marketers are not alone in adopting a mode of distancing abstraction in African contexts: this is a tendency that runs throughout the contemporary field of globalized "African development." Morten Jerven has argued, for example, that academic economic forecasting about African development has been characterized by "increasingly sophisticated econometric methods," applied to highly unreliable and incomplete economic data that are collected in the field.[34] *Generating innovative models* for African development is the activity that is privileged throughout the present international system. Engaging with Africans—receptively, broadly, across class boundaries, and over periods long enough to make a difference—is, by comparison, under-incentivized.[35] This was, of course, a pattern established under colonialism, with its cordoned off administrative centers, and its projects of "indirect rule." Colonials, missionaries, and their African collaborators, concerned themselves predominantly with two dimensions of their colonial project: the budgetary bottom line, and the idealistic projection of their own supposedly superior Europe-derived governing/civilizing capabilities. A similar set of priorities, it seems to me, characterizes present-day corporate capitalism in Africa, or at least the instance of it that I was able to observe in EABL's Senator Extravaganza. The corporation, grandiose in its stated ambitions, yet miserly in its applications, seemed, like a colonial power, oddly detached from what it was doing.

A major explanation of this state of affairs, I believe, is to be found in the personal motivations, and present-day circumstances, of corporate actors. EABL's marketers, overseeing the Extravaganza project, were of a middling-to-elite educated class, whose status was newly precarious in an era of *laissez faire* capitalism, under the shadow of an authoritarian state. Old, secure, paths to success, which members of this Ugandan class would once have followed, are increasingly impassable. It no longer means much to acquire a degree from the increasingly vocational Makerere University, and once esteemed careers in bureaucracy or academics are no longer so desirable, as get-rich-quick entrepreneurs and investors win disproportionate wealth and government adulation. Marketing is a prestigious career in the new capitalism, appealing to young Africans of creative, intellectual, sensibility, who are not cut out for the tooth-and-nail mêlée of competitive business. It is, in other words, a career that attracts the same kinds of Ugandans who, in an earlier era, would have joined up with the churches, in their educational and spiritual missions. It is one of the few remaining careers that enables elites of such a temperament to set themselves apart as a class, not on the basis of what they are able to grasp and control as capitalists, but on the basis of the specialized way they have been trained to think.

Surrounding the marketing profession, thus sanctified, is an expansive popular culture of "branding," in which anyone can participate. The implicit promise of what might be called "folk" branding is that anyone, or anything, can achieve greater security in today's precarious capitalist environment by means of the self-help exercise of purifying one's "brand." In a turbulent and decentered political economy in which nothing seems sacred, and personal identities are constantly under threat, brands are upheld as symbols of consistency and commitment within the market flux. Uganda may be insecure about its identity as a nation, but this does not mean it cannot pledge itself to a consistent, if fictional, identity in the form of a "nation-brand." Branding discourse focuses energies on the potentialities of achieving a kind of integrity in self-projection, given the diminishment of substantial possibilities for actual, lived, integrity.

Finally, we have seen how marketing has become something for some Ugandans, like Kintu and Alibatya, to define their identities against, even as they are compelled to work with it. The Extravaganza was, among other things, an opportunity for these two administrators to grapple with what, exactly, it was that they were fighting for as champions of the traditional performance arts. For them, the eight-year project entailed an endless struggle to secure EABL's financial support, while attempting to maintain some boundary between the corporation's marketing aims and their own cherished project of "cultural preservation and development." Each meeting with the Senator brand managers involved some argument about how far the commercial aspect of events could be taken, before it would compromise the valued "cultural" dimension of the Extravaganza. If nothing else, this caused them to renew and reformulate their appreciation of Ugandan traditional culture as something tied to their own life histories, essentially apart from, and morally alternative to, the present, overheated, culture of capitalism.

Notes

1. Klein 1999.
2. See, e.g., Watson 1997; Mazzarella 2003; Wang 2008.
3. Pier forthcoming. Chapter 1 of my longer study is a differently developed version of the materials and arguments advanced in this present chapter, which was the first to be drafted.
4. Applbaum2 004,1 3.
5. See, e.g., Kotler 2009.
6. Prahalad 2004.
7. e.g., Cahn 2008, Krige 2012.
8. Dolan and Scott 2009.
9. Kawooya 2010 has discussed the issue of traditional-music property rights in the context of the Senator Extravaganza.
10. Anholt 2003.
11. http://simonanholt.blogspot.com/2007/11/brand-kenya-fails-why.html
12. Ferguson 2006.
13. Davenport and Beck 2001.
14. Edmondson 2005.
15. “Treat Uganda as a Brand to Penetrate Global Markets,” http://www.newvision.co.ug/PA/9/32/726516. See Anholt 2003, 116 for the plagiarized source.
16. “Brand It Like Mao,” http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/220/711271
17. Mazzarella 2003.
18. Tripp2 010.
19. Burke 1996.
20. Grant1 999.
21. The names of the brand managers and administrators have been changed.
22. Kim and Mauborgne 2005.
23. Willis 2002.
24. Applbaum2 004,8 4.
25. Matiko, notably, is not a common name in Uganda, but derives from Kiswahili, the established language of transnational East African business.
26. World Health Organization 2004.
27. Boltanski and Chiapello 2005.
28. Nannyonga-Tamusuza 2003.
29. Pier forthcoming. See also Pier 2011.
30. Prahalad 2004.
31. See, e.g., Paley 2001; Englund 2006.
32. Sonne, Maylie, and Hinshaw 2013.
33. Mazzarella 2003.
34. Jerven 2013.
35. See, e.g., Smith 2003; Englund 2006.

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CHAPTER 10

Soul to Soul: Hip Hop, Globalization, and Africa

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The dynamic cluster of cultural phenomena known as "hip hop" has risen to global prominence with seeming lightning speed, arising out of efforts by displaced youth to create meaningful life experiences amidst the post-industrial decay of New York City's upper boroughs in the mid-1970s, and sweeping the globe over the last several decades. In multiple iterations across the globe the oppositional, often politically expressive energies out of which local versions of hip hop often emerge develop alongside tendencies toward ever-globalized commodification. This chapter will comment briefly on hip hop's development as it emerged in the United States and fed ultimately into the processes of cultural globalization that spread its practices and precepts to the far corners of the world. In particular, its manifestation on the African continent will be examined with two countries, Senegal and Tanzania, serving as case examples.

We will demonstrate that hip hop has served as a major conduit connecting African youth in various localities to flows of information and sensibility in global arenas and stages. Further, we show how the indigenization of hip hop in specific African localities has stimulated transformation of local, indigenous forms of musical expression. In addition, we will demonstrate how African hip hop has functioned in each country as a medium for political discourse and organization. Finally, we will suggest that in the wake of neoliberal austerity and the diminished role of the state in matters of education and social welfare, hip hop has provided a space, platform, and a voice for African youth for socialization, identity formation, and community building in the modern global age.

Transition Period and the End of "The Sixties"

Appearing with relative suddenness in the mid-1970s, the structural seeds of hip hop's evolution were planted in the previous era of the historic US Black Freedom Movement, from the mid-1950s to roughly the mid-1970s. As this author has previously argued, the two periods overlapped during one interval—roughly the years 1968–73—during which indications of an emerging fault line dividing those in a position to achieve continued progress in this 1968–73 transition period from those not so situated are discernible.[1] The latter experienced what Chang calls "the other side of the sixties," a social and structural subterrain where the social and material advancements that the Freedom Movement brought had not penetrated.[2]

Structural changes in economic production and social organization that sealed a portion of lower strata blacks from any benefits accruing from progressive gains—trends that had actually begun in the mid-to-late 1950s—accelerated dramatically through the transition era after violent disorders erupted in more than one hundred cities in the "hot summers" of 1965, 1966, and 1967. By the end of the sixties the structural conditions that would give rise to what was subsequently noted as the "underclass" were already in place.[3] These decades-long trends, involving urban renewal projects, redlining and disinvestment, relocation of manufacturing, production, and commerce that have created postindustrial wastelands in urban areas where many blacks live, were not unique to New York City; but these forces converged in that city's upper boroughs in a manner that was perhaps uniquely acute and intense, turning the South Bronx into a zone of social abandonment, an island of atrophy and dislocation, by 1968.[4] Amidst these conditions, "the stage was set for a new generation of gangs to take over the Bronx." In Chang's words, then, "[t]he story of the Bronx gangs is a dub history of 1968 through 1973, the other side of the revolution, the exception that became the rule . . . What should have been five years of revolution instead became five years of gang strife."[5]

Early Days and the "Ol Skool"

The iconic events of hip hop's creation occurred at the end of that period of strife, when the gang culture had seemingly exhausted itself, and its leaders, as exemplified by the venerable and exalted Afrika Bambaataa, began to seek peaceful ways of being out of sheer lack of alternatives—literally the only choice after all other modes had been tried in the cycle of violence and revenge from which, finally, they sought to free themselves.[6] The heralded elements of hip hop (djing, mcing, bboying, and graffiti) would then emerge as eruptions of bottled-up creativity that would fill those urban spaces as that gang culture faded, and coalesce as a coherent street culture through the rest of the 1970s.[7]

In using the implements of sound, incantation, and rhythm to transform an otherwise hostile space into an affirming one, early hip hop rearticulated a recurring theme in the black oral tradition. From the ring-shout ceremonies, through which African Americans melded an Afro-Christian spiritual matrix, to the spirituals that informed and illuminated a journey to Emancipation, to the juke joints and rent parties of the early twentieth century, to the blue-light basement parties of the 1960s, the musical sounds of African American worship and celebration have been of utmost importance. Functioning to imbue those appropriated spaces with the communal-participatory dynamics of oral culture, these implements of sonic expression gave expression to a set of shared sensibilities around which African Americans could, in effect, culturally constitute themselves as a people and create a lived collective experience of themselves that could be celebrated and reified.

In the case of hip hop, emerging in an embattled urban context, the first incarnations of the culture were oppositional (and in that way political) in that they embodied the determination of marginalized youth to value and celebrate their lives in defiance of a society that they felt sought to negate and erase them, with their policies, regulations, values, and attitudes. The revolutionary force of Kool Herc's parties came from his sound system, which was *loud* and *crystal clear*, unleashing both the power and the sonic clarity required to redefine those abandoned urban spaces as zones of affirmation and celebration.[8] Ol Skool DJs thus reorganized and redefined the spaces they appropriated, in parks, street parties, and clubs, using sound in ways appealing to configurations of rhythmic and musical sensibilities that resonated among their generational compatriots. For this caste of displaced, alienated youth, the powerful sonic pulses from Herc's towering speakers turned these voided urban spaces into someplace to be somebody.

The evolution of hip hop from a self-contained, strictly local, street culture to a substantial cultural movement began near the end of the 1970s. A signal event in this process was the 1979 recording and release of "Rappers' Delight," the explosive popularity of which gave the first indication of hip hop's potential impact. Hip hop was forever changed as these developments took shape.

The Rise of the Hip-Hop Nation

The New School and the Golden Age

Sugar Hill Records dominated the first few years of hip-hop recording. Tommy Boy Records who worked with Afrika Bambaataa, and Def Jam Recordings who developed, among others, Run-DMC, LL Cool J, and the Beastie Boys rose next as the most influential hip-hop institutions during the 1980s, as hip hop rapidly developed national and international audiences. These "new school" developments fed a stream of creativity and production that led to what some have called a "golden age" of hip hop in the late 1980s and early 1990s.[9]

The diversity, creativity, innovativeness, and strong political positivity for which this "golden age" is remembered took shape alongside changes that were also transpiring regarding the core constituencies of hip hop. The core of production, in terms of where the performers came from as well as where they performed, was no longer situated in the South Bronx and Harlem, and often the principals were college students or graduates, rather than ghetto denizens. Run-DMC, LL Cool J, and Russell Simmons who—along with Rick Rubin—made up the core of Def Jam Recordings, all hailed from the middle-class borough of Queens.[10] Chuck D and the posse that formed Public Enemy—the most strident and explicitly political of hip-hop voices in this golden age—were drawn into the swirling eddies of hip hop's gravity from beyond the five boroughs, where black enclave suburbs had formed further out on Long Island. These developments anticipate the way that hip hop has subsequently spread across geographical and socioeconomic lines.

Gangstas in the West

Almost simultaneously, however, "gangsta rap," spouting chronicles of urban terror and glee was emerging on the West Coast to contest the dominance of East Coast hip hop with alternative, in some part incompatible, messages about the authentic core from which hip hop should emanate. Instead of lessons in political and spiritual knowledge, West Coast gangsta rappers proffered their "ghettocentric" version of "realness" and oppositionality in performances seen as celebrations of street life, criminality, and misogyny.

This division between East and West Coast styles also developed alongside increasing involvement and influence of major corporate-based record companies and white mainstream audiences on the one hand and the proliferation of criminalized images of black youth on the other. Major corporate interest in the expanding rap music market seems to have been stoked when Soundscan—a new "point of sale" (POS) scanning system for tracking sales—produced hard data pinpointing with unambiguous clarity that the gangsta rap then coming out of the West Coast was being consumed at profit-enhancing levels by the white youth demographic which—since the Jazz Age—has defined popular taste, and to which they aspired to market a range of other goods and services.[11]

The fact that the solidification of gangsta dominance occurred in this context—when the nonblack hip-hop fan base was in a phase of immense growth and major companies and distributors were moving to flex their muscles in the hip-hop industry—is quite significant. Even observers who believe that gangsta rap, especially its earliest versions, embodied progressive or oppositional aspects tend to conclude, in the words of one:

> Once hijacked by major corporations, gangsta rap, which began as a critique of the criminalization of black male youth, became increasingly devoid of its subversive edge and, unfortunately, started to contribute to the dehumanizing representations of black men that its originators had intended to deconstruct. In fact, as a result of its meta-minstrelsy, gangsta rap became the most popular genre of rap music and contributed to the decline of rap nationalism as a marketable force in the rap music business.[12]

A similar pattern of development, ownership, and control has emerged as the "third coast" of hip hop; the "Dirty South," has developed as a national phenomenon in the 1990s and 2000s out of local scenes developing in Houston, New Orleans, Memphis, Miami, and Atlanta in the late 1980s and 1990s. The "dirt" in the genre refers first to the deep "bassy" sound of the mixes and secondarily to racy themes and images of the style, which project a modified gangsta trope that emphasizes explicit, often misogynistic, sexuality and conspicuous material wealth ("bling").[13] When local artists and entrepreneurial collaborations establish a regional presence they are sometimes leveraged to national prominence by a major distributor. For example, Cash Money Records and No Limit Records (both of New Orleans) achieved national prominence with the help of Universal and

Priority Records respectively (both of whom are in turn part of the Universal Music Group, one of the three multinational conglomerates who control distribution globally).

Corporate Gangstas

The confluence of the rise of the gangsta trope alongside the rise to dominance of music conglomerates seems to have frozen the former within the logics of production and profit of the latter. At the same time that distribution channels in hip hop were rapidly narrowing as small labels were being swallowed, the major companies that bought them (currently down to three major corporations) wanted to repeat the success of bands like N.W.A. Having found a formula that produced sales, especially in the important youth demographic, there was no incentive to vary, rendering innovation or experimentation unnecessarily risky. In the end, hip-hop scholars, purists, aficionados, and defenders are forced to acknowledge that, with commercial gangstas amassing multi-platinum sales and "conscious" rappers, who explicitly refuse to "gangsterize" or otherwise alter their approaches, enjoying only limited commercial success, the corporate-gangsta model remains dominant, forcing those rappers with associated progressive messages to cluster in the hip-hop "underground." Moreover, although the continued global spread of hip hop complicates these tensions with new dynamics of locality, the basic theme, encompassing the tension driven by corporate logics of profit, remains essentiallyt hes ame.

The Hip-Hop Generation: Reproduction and Globalization

Almost from its beginning, hip hop was also rapidly penetrating channels and networks of international commerce and cultural exchange through which cultures and commodities have become globalized such that today there is virtually no quarter where hip hop—in endless variation—has not penetrated. With regard to Africa in particular, an examination of hip hop's spread there—in addition to being the focus of this chapter—is also compelling for the way these issues weigh on discourses involving (to invoke Paul Gilroy's terms linking the "Black Atlantic") the "roots" from which Afrodiasporic sensibilities are derived and the "routes" by which they are spread around the globe. The lineaments of both are discernible among the processes of cultural globalization of hip-hop culture.

As noted by Denis-Constant Martin, "Most forms of music described today as 'popular' or 'mass' music are derived, in one way or another, from practices that appeared within societies organized around slavery in territories conquered by Europeans."[14] Given these traumatic roots, there is likely an important lesson in noting that, despite the fundamentally brutal structure of relations produced in these moments, "domination never extinguishes creation."[15] African peoples, whose sensibilities and living experiences took shape within these structures of oppression, were exposed to European instruments and music forms with which they forged their sensibilities and living experience to create new forms across the diaspora.

The process through which such forms are created—drawing from disparate sources for their basic components—is referred to as "hybridization" or "creolization" in current discussions of cultural globalization. Moreover, these discourses in turn have particular implications for discerning how global and local forces and conditions interrelate as forms of culture and sensibility transverse the geographical, political, and cultural demarcations that divide the global human collective. By underscoring the resilience of the local practices and reference frames that mediate the incorporation of global sensibilities, these views have contended with, and largely superseded, earlier assertions that the global—in the form of "cultural imperialism"—inevitably overpowers the local in a one-way interaction, erasing local cultures and identities, leading to a "McDonaldization" of the world.[16] Hip hop's globalization seems to be an "animated example" of the newer frame in which the processes of global cultural impact on local sites and sensibilities are described as "glocalization."[17]

Among music scholars the discourse of cultural globalization has involved further parsing of patterns and relationships among constitutive elements of globalizing phenomenon. Mark Slobin, situating himself within anti-essentialist and "postfoundational"[18] discourses, emphasizes the atomizing effects of globalization in coming to the view that the various levels of musical culture interact globally in ways that are essentially "indeterminate" and unsystematic, to produce fragmented "micromusics."[19] Veit Erlmann's analysis, on the other hand, conceptually focuses on the centrality of commodification and market forces to assert that homogenization and differentiation are both part of a developing global economy headed toward "global cultural totality."[20] Meanwhile, Ingrid Monson—seeing a lack of emphasis on human agency in both these approaches—seeks to situate processes of musical globalization "between fragmenting and totalizing theories of the global" and frame and examine "socially produced fields of action and multiplicity that lie somewhere between Slobin's fragmentary 'micromusics' and Erlmann's 'panoramic specter of a global ecumene.'"

Characterizing her effort as an "attempt to reclaim practical action and agency over ontologies of identity—what people do rather than what they are," Monson uses language and concepts of musical analysis as tools of analysis to comment on issues of agency, social process, and social structure.[21] Like Slobin, Monson accepts the continuous reiteration of hybrids, but differs from the former's notion that the combinations of elements that form them are unsystematic. Moreover, in pointing to the "systematicity" of these processes, Monson hypothesizes a special resonance in processes of cross-cultural transfer among African diaspora peoples in particular (at the level of "diasporic interculture")[22] based on patterns of "riffing" and repetition that circulate easily among diaspora and world musics.

Monson rescues the musical mode of repetition from Theodor Adorno's critique of popular music and jazz ("Adorno's aesthetic system simply could not . . . understand how layered repetitions construct a context in which musical creativity can take place over successive periodic units"[23]) and seeks to "illustrate a variety of ways in which repetition is central to shaping African and African diasporic musics," noting that

> The processes of combination that we see at work in riffs, repetitions (of varying periodicities), and grooves, which are shared widely despite the great variety in styles within African diasporic musics (funk, blues, soukous, zouk, reggae, mbalax, rumba, plena, and soca to name only a few), contribute to how freely segments of these styles are borrowed and circulated in contemporary popular world music genres.[24]

Even when the forms of diasporic music vary greatly, underlying patterns of repetition (and riffing) are often similar.[25]

Monson suggests that the shared approach to "riffs, repetition, and grooves," resonates with shared and parallel historical experiences in enslavement and colonization to constitute a "structure of conjuncture" through which the passage or exchange among diaspora communities of the various iterations of these sensibilities is facilitated.[26] She proposes that these processes of musical globalization be conceived as analogies for overlapping social and cultural processes, and be applied to theories of cultural globalization and the problem of hybridity.[27] This approach underscores the notion that whatever "routes" are involved in bringing about cultural exchanges among diaspora components, the common "roots" from which they derive remain salient in such instances. In relation to hip hop, then—although its spread is global—the forms of global—local tension and interaction involved in its penetration into Africa may be especially resonant.

That is, some analysts see hip hop's spread to Africa as a "homecoming" of the sensibilities of incantation and rhythm on which hip-hop rapping (or emceeing) is built.[28] On the other hand, however, Eric Charry, in the introduction to his edited volume, *Hip Hop Africa: New African Music in a Globalizing World* critically interrogates that premise, making requisite further parsing and discernment as to ways in which hip hop is and is not connected with the African oral traditions: "The notion that rap has arrived home, in Africa, common in much rhetoric both inside and outside Africa, demands investigation."[29] Acknowledging linkages that "may indeed have laid the groundwork centuries ago," he nonetheless emphasizes separation and difference:

> After centuries of living on American soil, however, African Americans have created their own signature cultures and expressive genres, such as blues, gospel jazz, and rhythm and blues, all of which were unknown in Africa until imported...So it was with rap. And so it is with so many musics in the African diaspora, such as reggae, ragga, and rumba.[30]

His contention that diaspora musics were "unknown in Africa until imported," would sublate the significance of a "structure of conjunction" that facilitates shared sonic memories and patterns built from "repetitions, riffs, and grooves." Moreover, he appears to emphasize the length of the routes hip hop had to travel, and de-emphasize the depth of its roots in Africa, stating, "If rap has come home...it has been primarily young people, part of an African hip-hop generation, who embraced this distant relation."[31]

This imperative to distance these forms of diasporic culture likely attaches to a view that conflates the whole of the American hip-hop community with the commercialized, gangsta-dominated, bling-emblazoned global commodity that the culture industry has created. Thus, writes Charry in the concluding essay of his volume, "The messages of much African rap, especially its social consciousness and global vision, are one of its most significant distinguishing features, certainly compared to its American counterpart."[32] Perhaps this conflation should not be surprising since, ironically, global commercial distribution of hip hop is controlled by the same conglomerate enterprises that factored strongly in the dominance of the gangsta form. A chapter on Nigerian hip hop in Charry's collection reports, for example, that "Nigerians have little access to what is considered underground socially conscious hip hop from the United States. Underground artists based in the United States like Immortal Technique and Dead Prez, are not promoted internationally."[33]

In the end, however, there really may be no controversy. Charry's summary and the volume's chapters go on to explore the ways that African hip hop has evolved from its initial imitation of American rap as second- and third-generation African rappers introduce local languages and musical forms, eventually "completing the loop and making organic connections with deep-rooted traditions."[34] Arguably these developments concur with the expectation that special resonances—"structures of conjuncture"—facilitate passage and incorporation of "riffs and grooves" that resonate easily among Diaspora cultures in ways that distinguish them from the larger process of hip hop's global spread—that the routes eventually connect to the roots.

Charry's concerns and perspectives do signal the necessity to parse and disentangle complex, sometimes contradictory, issues involved in the process of hip hop's incorporation within cultural practices of African societies, which was multilayered in terms of the modes of its transmission, and uneven across the African continent in terms of its timing, role, and impact. Like all human affairs, however, the emergence and spread of hip hop across the African continent was framed by larger macrohistorical and macroeconomic forces and developments that contain and shape its evolution. The most important of these broad factors that frame modern African cultural production generally, and hip hop specifically, are the transitions to independence and the rise and imposition of neoliberal development policies. The generations that have come of age with these major signposts are the generations most involved with hip hop.

Cultural Production, Postcolonial to Neoliberal

In the first postindependence/postcolonial period cultural production took shape in ways that reflected the newly independent African nations' attempts to mark their freedom from colonial influence. On the one hand, in some states, especially Anglophone states, like Ghana in West Africa and Kenya in the East, American—specifically African American—speech, style, and culture became influential with those coming of age in the postindependence era, replacing British speech and culture that were models for the previous generation.[35] In Anglophone Nigeria and Ghana, rhythm & blues, funk, soul, and other African American genres enjoyed wide popularity, and, through fusion with indigenous forms like highlife, influenced the development of "afrobeat."[36]

On the other hand, some independence leaders, like Sékou Touré of Guinea, believed there was potential nation-building power to be harnessed through a national culture that expressed "authentic" values and ideals instead of imposed and internalized values and ideals associated with European colonialism. His efforts, which were duplicated by many African governments, were guided by the belief that African culture was "truly flourish[ing]...in the villages amongst the common people, whose mentalities and social behaviour are the authentic foundation of African humanism."[37] In socialist Tanzania, trends toward adoption of African-American styles and sensibilities were sometimes opposed by efforts to ban or curtail Western fashions considered to be indecent.[38]

Mamdani, through development of a framework and conceptual language for contextualizing the evolution and structure of postcolonial African states, has incisively detailed various ways in which aspects of colonial stratification were reproduced in the various transitions to independence. "In the case of the conservative African states, the hierarchy of the local state apparatus, from chiefs to headmen [through which colonial powers maintained effective 'indirect rule'] were maintained after independence."[39] Those radical states that sought to reform the "decentralized despotism" these colonial structures had created became increasingly coercive themselves, as their attempts were administered top-down by a party or the state, and eventually produced a "centralized despotism."[40]

Independence governments thus, "inherited the repressive apparatus of departed colonizers," with the result that too often "self-rule proved to be a cosmetic replacement of alien rule by indigenous dictatorship"[41] in many of the new countries, as postcolonial governments were able to "deracialize" instruments and institutions of civil society, through which direct colonial rule had been administered, while being unwilling or unable to truly "democratize" them.[42] In all cases, the resulting state structures—having failed to reconcile the contradictions of the "bifurcated state" through which colonials had maintained control through systems of direct and indirect rule—were not stable.[43] In the end, the various postindependence dreams, emerging in the crosscurrents of a raging Cold War, in the midst of shifts and rearrangements among global capitalist structures, were progressively dashed by the reality of neocolonial dependence, Cold War intrigue, ambition, and corruption that misused and depleted national resources, and, finally, crippling debt from asymmetric loan structures proffered by international monetary institutions.[44] The resulting political and economic instability caused widespread disruption in the 1970s and 1980s in all areas of social and institutional development, including cultural production.

While some progress is being made toward greater democratization, in the eyes of most scholars, the impact of structural adjustment on social and economic development has been detrimental to processes of democratization and generally disastrous for the majority of Africans.[45] The lowered trade barriers that were required for countries receiving international aid not only opened those markets to all manner of commodities and products that hurt, in some cases destroyed, local commerce and industry, but the diminished scope of state activity and authority also meant that the whole range of services and resources normally supported by the state became commodified in a near-regulation-free environment of naked free-market capitalism.[46]

One area where these reforms had a devastating effect was education, an area where—as newly independent nations—most states had made significant investments, including development and strengthening of national universities (along with foreign aid/exchange programs like the one that brought President Barack Obama's father to the United States). Moreover, through such avenues as this, institutions of the state functioned significantly as agencies of socialization for their youth[47] (a function markedly diminished by neoliberal policies).[48] In contrast, neoliberal reforms "were guided by the World Bank's then held conviction that higher education is more of a private than a public good."[49] The confluence of these factors—the failure of local commerce, the reduced role of the state as provider of services and resources (and as an employer), and the wide-open commodification of life's components and necessities—led to some starkly transactional practices among Africans negotiating this neoliberal terrain.

At Makerere University in Uganda, for example, leaders responded to a 30 percent cut in funding with an expansion of its student base to include privately financed students alongside the government-supported students. This expansion was not accompanied by an increase in facilities and support services, leading to gaps like the one filled by an enterprising individual who had a line of students waiting to pay for the service of stapling their papers. The matriculation process itself was in some instances commercialized as grades were sometimes traded for various forms of currency.[50] In Kampala, where the university is located, motorcycle taxis called "boda boda" dart around, in between vehicles along and around perpetually dense traffic carrying precariously perched, helmetless passengers to their desired destinations. These unregulated carriers cost a fraction of a regular taxi and save transit time with their agile maneuvering through the always crowded streets. Enough people find those advantages worth the risk and discomfort of this mode of transit to make these motorcycles a ubiquitous presence in the city's perpetually dense traffic.[51]

Africa, Globalization, and Hip Hop

Early years, 1980s

Thus, under structural adjustment programs (SAPs) the postcolonial states were being shaped by conditions of neoliberal austerity which—like the post-industrial atrophy (arguably part of the same global economic trends and forces) in the South Bronx[52]—created the generational socioeconomic displacement that motivated hip hop's birth but also, through economic liberalization and privatization, provided the means for it to develop and grow. As these developments have taken shape, the spread of hip hop among African cultures—"arguably the fastest-growing component of youth culture in Africa today"—has had significant impact in social and political affairs across the continent.[53]

As in the United States and elsewhere, hip hop and its African offshoots have engaged youth in general, and especially lower-strata youth. However, Mamdani's sharp cautionary criticism of "history by analogy"—that fallacy in which developing/emerging nation-states are decontextualized and ahistorically compared in developmental terms with Western nations—certainly also applies to examinations of hip hop's spread in Africa.[54] While hip hop in the United States came bubbling up from the American urban subterrain, its spread and proliferation in Africa involved a very different entry point in terms of the socioeconomic structure. The global tours that brought American hip-hop shows to Europe and other parts of the world did not reach Africa itself until near the end of the (1980s) decade. Up to that point, audio and video recordings and American films and magazines were the mediums through which Africans on the continent learned of, imitated, embraced, and internalized the activities of their kin in North America.

Amidst conditions of neoliberal austerity, audio and video recordings were available only to those who traveled or had connections with those who did. Thus among the cultural flows of globalization, the first significant route of entry for hip hop in most countries was through African elites and their children who were familiar with English and with the tastes, orientations, and awarenesses of assimilated Westerners, and/or who travelled internationally and returned with tapes and CDs with sounds and images of American hip hop.[55] While it is true that, "Once rap gained a foothold, it was eventually picked up by expanding spheres of youth," this path of development "was quite the opposite of its American origins, where it developed in economically depressed communities."[56]

In Ghana, for example—where night life was returning in the mid-1980s after several years of curfew—hip hop began to take root from "CDs, cassettes, and videos . . . sent by relatives in the United States or Europe . . . or acquired by elite youth who travel during holidays."[57] In Tanzania as well, as noted by Perullo, "The genre emerged during the country's liberalization in the mid-1980s among middle- and upper-class youth who had access to foreign records, cassette tapes, and videotapes."[58] Although the situation in South Africa was somewhat more complex, according to Charry, "It was no coincidence that in South Africa rap first took root in Cape Town," where the mixed race population was caught "between overprivileged whites and underprivileged blacks." Though they were also victims of racist apartheid, "they undoubtedly had more stereos and more connections outside South Africa than their black counterparts." (Nigeria, where American and Caribbean styles and musical forms have been especially popular and influential, may be an exception to the pattern.[59])

As this tendency is widespread across Africa, a word might be said here in advance clarification of complexities and contradictions involving the ways that oppositionality informs the basic sense of hip hop authenticity. First, it will be recalled from earlier discussion that although US hip hop came forth from among the environs of a displaced underclass, by the time it evolved into its US "golden age" in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the "core of production, in terms of where the performers came from as well as where they performed, was no longer situated in the South Bronx and Harlem, and often the principals were college students or graduates, rather than ghetto denizens" (see the section titled "The Rise of the Hip-Hop Nation" of this chapter). (Today, although the iconography of "ghetto authenticity" still adheres in theory, hip-hop artists like college-educated Kanye West and Canadian-born Drake have long defied stereotypes requiring a street-ghetto-deprived upbringing to be taken seriously.) Next, having gained cosmopolitan experiences through various routes, these young, erstwhile elite Africans have been informed not only by African American sensibility and style, but also by exposure to American racism and international forms of racialization. The "connective marginality" suggested in these juxtapositions forms an adequate basis for them to identify with the oppositionality offered by hip hop's modalities and practices (dress, attitude, etc.). Finally, the limitations and opportunities of the neoliberal economic order (discussed below) comport well with an embrace of hip hop's rebellious practices that can be well-grounded as well as commercially viable.

At roughly the same time that cassettes, CDs, and videotapes were circulating among young upper-middle-class Africans, other sectors among African youth were also exposed to images of American hip hop while absorbing "the megarhetoric of developmental modernization through the micronarratives of film, television, music, and other expressive forms which allow modernity to be rewritten as vernacular globalization."[60] Thus, for many Africans in urban areas, the first Hollywood hip-hop movies, *Beat Street* and *Breakin'*—both released in 1984—constituted their first experiences with American hip hop.[61] Here, depending on issues of language, hip hop is engaged in various ways. According to Dionne Bennett and Marcyliena Morgan, "In the 1980s, nations with English-speaking populations easily engaged with hip-hop music and rapping…As a result, places such as England and Anglophone former colonies, including South Africa, Australia, and Nigeria, have been creating hip-hop music since it emerged in the United States. [Countries] where English was not the primary language often forged their initial relationship with hip-hop through graffiti and break dancing."[62] Graffiti and breakdancing were also often foregrounded among non-elites in Anglophone African countries whose familiarity with English was often less developed. Regional and national competitions are still held in a number of these countries.

Young elites were at the center of local club scenes emerging from these initial contacts that turned up in Accra, Dakar, Dar es Salaam, among other African capitals by the mid-1980s, and these were often students from elite secondary schools who both listened to and performed hip-hop rhymes in English in local clubs and parties. As part of creating these local settings, these young Africans adopted the dress, speaking style, and other aspects of African American hip-hop iconography, "using African American vernacular, wearing baggy pants, oversized chains, basketball sneakers or Timberland boots."[63] Ironically, considering the street elements and the sense of "grittiness" that comprise the hip-hop imaginary, young elite Africans embraced these items as symbols of status and cosmopolitanism. Soon non-elite urban Africans also aspired to attain what they perceived as the symbols of modern erudition. Moreover, among the numerous rural youth driven by neoliberal forces to the cities "hip hop became a way of differentiating themselves from their rural kinship ties and ideas of traditional culture."[64] A sense of the structure and hierarchy of these settings is embedded in this reflection from the early Ghanaian hip-hop scene:

> We were into break dancing, rapping, and all the hip hop culture . . . Boys from [elite] schools . . . would always be at house parties or clubs; we would get together and talk big things, insulting each other . . . Then there were the more local boys from down the ghetto, we used them as foot-soldiers . . . They would easily throw a punch.[65]

The factors that led to elite African youth comprising audience and consumers in the early years—access to Western technology and media and English language ability—meant that the first African hip-hop artists also tended to be "children of the elite, who were fluent enough in English to write hip hop verses and have access to rap cassettes from abroad."[66] In addition, neoliberal economic austerity and the restrictions (and opportunities) in the neoliberal economy may also factor in this trend, as indicated in the way some rapper crews are supported in launching their careers by funding from parents or relatives. Such support does not necessarily indicate compatibility of musical tastes between the generations. Indeed, because of early Nigerian hip hop's questionable reputation among some adults, Lanre D of the Lagos rap group "Trybesmen," hid his avocation from his upper-middle class parents, even after the group was famous enough for him to be recognized by a security guard as he was accompanying his father in a chauffeur-driven car. Only then did Lanre explain to his bewildered father just what he had been up to.[67] Writing about Mali, Dorothea E. Schulz suggests when parents and others help, "their financial support springs from their hope that, in the absence of other job opportunities, their children will be able to embark on a successful musical career," rather than reflecting "any particular liking for the music their children perform." Thus, "those in Mali who become nationally or even internationally renowned rappers do not represent the socioeconomic background or the marginality that many of their U.S. models claim."[68]

As the scenes developed at school parties and clubs in African cities, African hip hoppers who initially lip-synched to recordings by American rappers, soon began to write their own lyrics, usually in English, that were modeled on the themes and the "flow" of American hip hop. As knowledge of English, even—especially—African American English, was central to this sense of cosmopolitanism (and to the sense of "authenticity" for this strata), the idea of rapping in a local language had no real currency in this phase. "Then, you dare not [rap] in the local language. You would be a laughing stock and seen as outdated or "colo" (colonial) . . ."[69] In some cases "emcees were even rapping entirely in English, though it wasn't the language in which they were most comfortable."[70] Even in Francophone Senegal, out of concerns for authenticity many rap artists in Dakar have attempted to rap in English.[71] Moreover, in Dakar "[t]he break-dance crews appropriated English names that emulated or hinted at an American image, including Dakar's first break-dance crew, the A.B.C.Y. (African/ Bronx City Youngsters)." These acts represented a growing desire on the part of postcolonial youth to shift away from French popular culture and embrace American culture instead.[72] Similarly, in Swahili-dominated Tanzania, "The affluent youth who first picked up rap used English," for their audiences of "affluent East African youth familiar with American and European cultures."[73]

To be sure, the idea that rap could authentically be performed in a language other than African American English had taken hold in France as early as 1983 when two radio hosts—possibly following the suggestion offered by the touring Afrika Bambaataa—began rapping in French on the radio. (France's first international rap star, MC Solaar eventually emerged from this setting, and his tours to Francophone Africa resonated with developing scenes there.) In addition, instances of rapping in African languages did occur on a somewhat isolated basis (unsurprisingly, given the prevalence of oral traditions in so many African cultures). Eventually, as Charry states, the "move to rapping in a local language was fundamental" in the grounding and spread of hip hop "and would be done over and over again" in various African nations.[74] In the main, however, the incorporation of local African languages into hip-hop production and performance was just one element—often the first step—in a wider process of indigenization that also involved incorporation of local music forms and sensibilities, local issues, and in the process effected a wider engagement with local constituencies, usually producing new forms/genres.

To situate this development it is helpful to restate the fact that hip hop's first globalizing flow into African countries was largely through the middle-class elite, through their travels and exposure relative to Western settings and ideas. For those located beyond the elite strata the focus on English (and French) placed limits on how much they could participate, even in Anglophone countries where non-elite strata may be less familiar with English. Thus, the language issue arose (partly as a class issue) in the form of contestation as to how hip hop was "authenticated." In Tanzania an ironic understanding of authenticity took root among the early hip-hop aficionados when some insisted on rapping in English and staying true to the American form.[75] Others developed the rather opposite view that suggests "that those who embrace hip hop . . . have become [too] Americanized." The reaction in many countries was a negative backlash from "the masses of hip hop fans who felt left out of the new music scene because of the mostly English and French lyrics. This was especially the case in Tanzania, where popular demand prompted radio DJs to only play Tanzanian rap from artists who performed in Swahili."[76]

The issue of language was also linked with other issues of local sensibility, namely music forms, both traditional and popular, that occupied some of the cultural space that hip hop sought to penetrate and/or reconstruct. In the words of one writer, "The superficial adoption of hip-hop's American commercial trappings during its inevitable initial imitation phase eventually is not adequate for local needs, and an internalizing of hip-hop practices eventually necessitates a self-reflexive stance in relation to one's own sociocultural circumstances."[77] Thus, as the culture took root and African hip hop developed its own voices, the flexible modalities of rap were refitted to embrace local languages, musics, topics, and perspectives. With this development hip hop's evolution as a voice, a medium of modernity, for the generation emerging in the midst of the neoliberal era was greatly accelerated. In the early 1990s indigenized forms were emerging in several locations. By the middle of the decade "African rap had emerged as a mature genre, featuring creative use of mother tongues, smart multilanguage word plays, messages that were relevant to the experience of African youth, original rhythmic flows, and, within a few years, instrumental tracks that drew on local music.[78]

In many, if not most, countries where hip hop became broadly popular, it did so partly by incorporating elements of popular and traditional culture indigenous to that culture's particular geographies. Thus, a significant effect that hip hop has produced as it spread in Africa was a tendency to generate interest in local popular and traditional forms, and ultimate collaboration and incorporation of those forms and implements to form new, distinctively localized hybrid forms.[79] In some geographies the line and relationship between hip hop and the musical forms with which it exists in tension, and those which it engenders—such as hiplife in Ghana and Nigeria, mbalax and other traditional forms in Senegal, bongo flava in Tanzania, and kwaito in South Africa—is blurred or contested in ways that reflect the tensions—involving class, ethnicity, locality, universality—around which cultures of hip hop are constructed and developed.

African women are constrained in their participation in these areas of cultural activity since African hip hop, like American hip hop (and many societies) tends toward masculinism and male domination. Thus, in several countries reports have indicated that African women were more likely to be participants and consumers in local forms of pop music rather than hip hop. Also, in countries with large percentages of Christians, women are more likely to be involved with gospel music, which outsells hip hop in Kenya and Ghana.[80] Nonetheless African women have also made significant use of the social space created by hip hop and its various local derivations and brought issues and perspectives—gender relations, gender roles, sexual exploitation and abuse, HIV/AIDS—that might not otherwise be part of the discourse.

These are among a broad range of issues for which hip hop serves as a voice for African youth. Especially salient in the context of neoliberal austerity, young Africans' embrace of the hip-hop culture reflects the oppositional utility that displaced, marginalized peoples continually find in hip hop's modes of conduct and expression, and enables them to create a functional space for self-definition in a modern, globalizing (and localizing) world. With the austerity-restricted role of education as an agency of socialization, hip-hop culture has functioned as a tool for identity construction and self-expression not otherwise available to them in a modern world. It has functioned as a medium through which youth have been able to assert themselves in the public sphere, affecting public discourse, becoming a factor in politics at various levels, and not least of all, creating economic opportunities among the neoliberal economic forces that have erstwhile marginalized them. "In all these opportunities, what stands out is the role played by hip hop in articulating, shaping, and projecting youth identities in ways that were hitherto publicly unavailable to many of them."[81]

The remainder of this chapter will examine the process of absorption and indigenization of hip hop in two African countries, Senegal and Tanzania, with the aim of exploring the diversity and the commonalities in hip hop's impact in Africa. In each geography, hip-hop culture is embraced and transformed by processes in which local languages and cultural frames allow hip hop's core modalities to be more widely shared among groups and formations. The analyses will indicate that while hip hop and the derivative forms it created gave platform and voice for the youth constituencies to shape their identities, the ways in which it did so varied in conjunction with the cultural and political forces specific to each location and historical moment. Similarly, while hip hop served to generally enable its constituencies to influence social and political structures, the degree and type of impact were connected to histories and conditions specific to each place. Finally, the tension between the oppositional energies hip hop generally enables and the corporate, commodifying forces that seek to channel and harvest these energies as profit is seen in numerous ways among the selected locations.

FrenchC onnection

Among the first sites of hip-hop penetration in Africa were Francophone countries, largely due to their connections and relationships to the sizable African populations in France, the country which became and remains today the world's second largest hip-hop market. In West Africa, especially in the Francophone states, there were two routes for hip hop's early penetration. In addition to New York—where Senegalese traders traveled for goods to bring back to the home country during periods of economic disruption in the 1980s—Paris was an important source from which globalizing cultural flows brought hip hop to the African continent.[82] DJ Sidney, an immigrant from the Guadeloupe, was using the latest American import records, including hip hop, to attract crowds to his Paris nightclub as early as 1978. When the first American hip-hop tour arrived in 1982, Sidney was piloting a popular radio show—which hosted Afrika Bambaataa and others from the tour—and a small but devoted hip-hop following was already developing in France by way of nightclubs and radio shows like his.[83] Audio and video tapes from radio and television shows from France were among the first vehicles by which hip hop reached Africa. Interchanges involving those connections and relationships thus led to the early emergence of hip-hop scenes and communities in Francophone Africa.

Dionne Bennett and her coauthor, Harvard hip-hop scholar Marcyliena Morgan, assert in *Dædalus* that Senegal in particular, was "the first African country to adopt and develop rap music."[84] While other sources are less specific, it is clear that by 1984 a significant rap movement was afoot in the dance clubs of Dakar where breakdancing had become extremely popular. In the pre-neoliberal absence of local radio and recording, the sound track for the development of this scene was provided by cassette tapes flowing in with Senegalese traders and overseas travelers bringing the sounds of American hip hop—such as Grandmaster Flash and the Sugarhill Gang—which in the mid-1980s dominated the global hip-hop market.[85]

The events shaping a political environment marked by crisis, instability, and violence associated with the presidency of Abdou Diouf (1981–2000) also factored in the development of hip hop in Dakar. Following massive school strikes in 1988, schools were shut down, leaving Senegalese youth with "no place to go and nothing to do."[86] The heady political environment facilitated development of a political edge to the emerging local scene, as hip hop evolved to the role of providing a voice for the mobilization of Senegalese youth. "By the late 1980s, some young Senegalese rap groups had formed, as rap had become a growing medium for youth to express their frustrations with the many social, economic, and political problems."[87]

In 1989, the implementation of neoliberal privatization led to the appearance of private radio, which became an important vehicle for social and political discourse.[88] Subsequently, amid strikes and continued protest, youth became very active in the movement to depose the Diouf regime. Thus, hip hop is "widely recognized as mobilizing Senegalese youth and advocating political change, which culminated in the 2000 election of president Abdoulaye."[89] The privatization of radio broadcasting also factored in the explosion of hip-hop popularity in the early 1990s, which produced a proliferation of local hip hop groups, including Positive Black Soul (PBS), who emerged from the Dakar hip-hop scene as Senegal's and Africa's first internationally renowned hip-hop group. Initially formed from rival local groups in 1989, PBS began to get radio play in 1990. Their first CD, Salaam (1996), was the first African hip-hop recording to be released in the United States on a major record label (Island).[90]

Although English—even in Francophone Senegal—was the dominant language of rap in the initial phase, when cassettes of American rappers were circulated among elite, well-off youth, further development of Africanized versions of hip hop required the incorporation of local languages, such as Wolof, in the case of Senegal, to transform the American/global product into a locally grounded form. As the art form has developed in Senegal's diverse language environment, rap productions have evolved to employ "a pluralist mix of Wolof, French, English, and other native languages that are all part of modern Wolof."[91] Even then, however, the association of hip hop with African American language and slang remains strong as indications of "realness" and "authenticity." "Many youth take ownership in their knowledge and use of African American slang,"[92] and African American style, in terms of fashion, gesture, and even "flow"—that is, using Wolof words in a style and rhythm that mimics African American speech. Contemporary rapper President J—whose style has been compared to the late Tupac Shakur—"uses almost no English but rather raps primarily in Wolof. Rather, his method of pronunciation (his flow) sounds so much like English that even many native Senegalese have difficulty understanding him."[93]

Despite the influence of the global (African American style), it is obvious that the cultural field into which hip hop is penetrating in any given instance is never a vacuum. Thus, the development of Senegalese hip hop, like that in other African countries, was mediated by the presence of local forms, which themselves often previously mediated with other forms in their formation. In Senegal, the most important local indigenous form was *mbalax*, a form that incorporated Cuban dance music with percussion from Senegalese *sabar* drumming and Wolof lyrics. Led by its biggest star, Youssou N'Dour—whose international fame in the "world music" market made him something like a national hero—*mbalax* had been the dominant form of popular music in Senegal since the 1970s.[94]

The dominance of this form initially acted, or at least was perceived, as a hindrance to the spread of hip hop. As PBS DJ Didier Awadi noted, "Because of mbalax, rap couldn't happen in Senegal." Reflecting on hip hop's anti-authoritarian stance he added, "So we had to break mbalax." Eventually, however, PBS found that rather than "breaking" it, they had to incorporate *mbalax*. "We started putting it together in 1989, but it was very tough for us…They would say, No man, no rap today."[95] Thus, eventually they learned to integrate it, incorporating and blending Wolof and other local lyrics, *sabar* rhythms, and local instruments. Currently the two forms (*mbalax* and Senegalese rap) both have a strong presence in a vibrant recording industry. As rap has incorporated adopted features of *mbalax*, so the latter has adopted hip-hop modalities and attitudes. The line between them may be blurred and artists like PBS are likely to include both forms in their repertoires.

Return of the "Djelly"

Another factor possibly involved in the embrace of hip hop in Senegal is the connection some see between current day rappers and the traditional oral poet/historians known as *jewel* (Wolof; also *gewel*), *djelly* (Mande; also *jeli*), or what most Westerners know as the *griot* (French/English). As previously stated, some observers diminish the degree to which hip hop palpably brings African sensibilities back home to the continent. However, ever since Chuck D, leader of the American rap group Public Enemy stated that rap was "a black man's CNN,"[96] rappers on both sides of the Black Atlantic have claimed, and been perceived, to be descendant from or parallel to the legendary *jewel* whose memory and oral utterances respectively preserved and celebrated the community's history and culture.

Dating back more than seven centuries, griots have served prominent roles in West African cultures, "as oral historians, praise-singers, musicians," who "also specialize[d] in a variety of musical instruments." Moreover, although the (American) hip-hop imaginary often constructs the griot as a legacy from the past, contemporary griots and the oral traditions they represent remain visible in these cultures, although their current roles and activities have been shaped to modern times and conditions. "Some griots specializing in the spoken word have become today's politicians and figures in the media (radio and television), whereas griot musicians have found success in the burgeoning music industry." In fact the majority of Senegalese *mbala*x singers come from griot lineages, although *mbalax* is "not per se an exclusive griot genre."[97]

In his interrogation of the validity of hip hop's African roots, Charry notes that most rappers had no significant relationships to traditional practices, like the griot in Senegal.[98] However, the cases of Senegalese-American R&B singer/rapper Akon who is the son of Senegalese griot percussionist Mor Thiam and Senegalese *mbalax* star, Pape Ndiaye Thiopet, who is also from a prominent griot family, at least offer exceptions and counter narratives to this line of thought. Although Charry states that "commercially successful American children of African immigrants, such as Akon . . . have assimilated enough that their music and public identity bear little trace of Africa,"[99] Ali Colleen Neff contends that "For all its hyper-modern, super-American opulence, Akon's is a West African praise singer's pop, packed with shout-outs, dance-floor sexiness, and a surfeit of styles, all brought together in that unmistakable Wolof tenor."[100] Thus, Akon, has been described as a "new school griot," and the original timbre of his voice has been attributed to the style of African griots. According to Neff, "During a spring 2012 visit to [Senegal] his homeland; the national tabloids show him stepping and rocking, Dirty-South-style, to the frenetic Senegalese pop sound based in the deep Wolof *sabar* rhythms of which his father is a master."[101]

Links among contemporary forms—*mbalax* and Senegalese hip hop—and tradition (*jewel/djelly*) also intersect in the person of Pape Ndiaye Thiopet, who, along with Akon "stands as a primary influence on youth style in urban Senegal." Thiopet comes from a griot family "famous for its skill and schooling in praise singing and drumming...and *taasú* (a traditional form of rhythmic poetry, "involving the declamation of heightened rhythmic speech over accompanying percussion").[102] Neff describes his performance in Raleigh, North Carolina as part of a two-week tour of the US's Senegalese diaspora in Harlem's Little Senegal, Atlanta, Houston, and Memphis, sponsored by hometown fans in diaspora. "Thiopet includes praises to the Sufi saints and shout-outs to sponsoring businesses in a stomping dance-floor rhythm drawn from a Wolof dance ritual called *sabar*, in reference to its featured drum." Although he is primarily a *mbalax* star, "he and his crew of drummers and dancers mix the ancient cadence of the Senegalese talking drum with a decidedly American hip-hop swagger." For example, in his made-for TV video, he opened with a mixture of English and English-sounding Wolof words that imitated the cadence of African American speech.[103]

As a hot-selling pop star with credentials as a traditional griot, Thiopet successfully maintains the status of *cossan*, an overarching term used to designate Senegalese culture. Finding a resonant compatibility, infusing ritual Wolof rhythms of rapid-fire *taasú* with a Dirty South two-step swing, "Thiopet has invented a new pop style that will appeal to West African hip-hop fans and elderly alike," according to Neff.[104] Thiopet, Akon, and other young artists on both sides of the ocean thus participate in a process of trans-Atlantic exchange and transfer that continues to reinforce a sense of connection between the modern and the traditional (as well as the migration and movement between continents which have created new diasporas and new audiences). Thus Gin Tess, a Senegalese DJ visits cousins who migrated to Atlanta and Houston and returns "with stacks of underground tracks that sound perfect under the cadences of the Wolof language on Senegalese call-in talk/music shows."[105] Again the notion is sounded that "routes" of various lengths and dimensions can still connect to the "roots" through "repetitions, riffs, and grooves" that pass easily among Diaspora cultures.

The currently acknowledged parameters of difference between current hip hop and traditional oral practices, in terms of both their social location and their social function, are also certainly significant, and indicative of hip hop's role as a channel of expression for youth in this moment. Neff points out that "[w]hile the true, modern-day *djelly* are still constrained by certain traditional rules that dictate their place in society, rappers have the luxury of being *djelly* in a more metaphorical or symbolic sense...and serve to critique, not just to praise." Moreover, although both comment on social issues such as "polygamy, immigration, the importance of respecting elders, and saying no to drugs,"[106] traditional griots make no specific criticisms of people or institutions. In contrast, Senegalese rappers, who emerged in a context of political contestation, are regularly outspoken in the criticisms of politicians, and institutions of government.

In this regard, Senegalese rappers have found ways to appropriate the griot status without being constrained by its ties to tradition. For example, regarding Positive Black Soul's "Return of da *Djelly*," Tang reports, "By invoking griotness, Senegalese hip-hop artists construct a complex, new Africanized identity that draws upon American rap but then gains greater legitimacy through its roots in a historic African tradition. They then reclaim this tradition as their own, having the best of both worlds."[107] Due in part to this ability to operate outside institutionalized tradition, Senegalese hip hop—which developed in the context of political instability and conflict and served as a major organizing force for political opposition—"has literally changed the course of Senegalese politics."[108]

Tanzanian Bongo Flava and Postcolonial Indifference

In Tanzania, an East African variation[109] of the process of indigenization has also produced a scene comprised from globalizing hip-hop practices and sensibilities that have developed in conjunction with local sensibilities and conditions and produced a localized form ("bongo flava") alongside the initially globalizing one. As with Ghana, there is some contestation regarding taxonomy; the relationship, and the boundaries between the forms. In Tanzania, the role of Swahili as a symbol of nationhood—based on both colonial and liberation era practices—and as a *lingua franca* for much of East Africa has factored significantly in hip hop's incorporation and indigenization.

In colonial Tanganyika both German and British policies encouraged use of Swahili, abating fears connected to Africans' possibly rebellious or subversive utilization of colonial languages.[110] The emphasis was reinforced when *Ujamaa,* under the Nyerere-led postindependence government, prescribed Swahili (rather than a colonial language as other postindependence governments did) as the language that would help create a national identity that transcended ethnicity. Thus, even today, "many Tanzanians see their use of Swahili as linked to a sense of national identity."[111]

In terms of local music sensibilities, like other colonial geographies, waves of hybridization involving modification of Western forms with local rhythms and sensibilities have continually produced new forms whose general pattern has been "to imitate foreign styles, localize the sounds, words, and meanings into Tanzanian culture." In the process of localization, distinctive innovations emerged "which helped move these genres toward being regarded as distinctly Tanzanian or East African musical forms." A popular music form emerging from these processes that remained prominent in the twentieth century was dansi, a musical genre that "reflected an urban cosmopolitan view but still sounded distinctly Tanzanian."[112]

During the Nyerere era, struggles over cultural issues cast these localized (though hybridized) sensibilities against the influence from global flows of African American styles and forms. While popular magazines promoted "images of James Brown, Aretha Franklin, and others, which encouraged young people to wear afros, bellbottoms, and miniskirts,"[113] aspects seen as indecent Western influence were resisted and banned by those seeking to implement the principles of Ujamaa. (Bearing on these tensions was the fact that a large number of African Americans—attracted to the Ujamaa project—were expatriated to Tanzania in those "nation-building years.")[114] In that context of the 1960s nation-building project that produced the Arusha Declaration's strident call for self-determination, "foreign music faded as a dominant force in the country, and Tanzanian artists established a dansi sound based more on local and national aesthetics of that period."[115]

After Nyerere became the first postindependence leader to voluntarily relinquish power, accepting the elections results of 1985, subsequent leaders led the postcolonial Tanzanian state through economic and political shifts similar to those that other states experienced.

Through the mid-1980s Tanzania headed quickly down the road to capitalist "reform" and the donor-prescribed SAPs that came with it. As in other postcolonial states in the neoliberal era, conditions were shaped by "massive cuts in government spending, especially in public services such as education and healthcare," as well as widespread rural displacement, flooding the cities with "illiterate and semi-literate youth who increasingly turn to the informal market and illegal activities to survive."[116]

Arising from the unregulated starkness of the neoliberal environment, hip hop in Tanzania shares with other sites the irony that the implements of neoliberal globalization would allow the voices of hip hop to emerge during the country's liberalization in the mid-1980s. Also similar to other sites, the initial entry was through affluent youth who had become familiar with hip hop through imported records and tapes.[117] Professor J, a leading bongo flava artist embodies this flow as a mix of cosmopolitan access and rebellion. "I started to rap in O level, when I was in the seventh grade. In 1989,...listening to rap, such as Public Enemy, 'Fight the Power.' This music really drew me straightaway to become a rapper because I saw the way that a black man was able to search for his own thing [identity]. Public Enemy had the power to stand somewhere and speak with people."[118]

At the same time that hip hop was taking root, neoliberal privatization paved the way for the emergence of independent radio stations. During earlier days of privatization, when independent radio played more foreign than local music, rapping in English was still more beneficial and, because it was usually recorded elsewhere, it was usually better produced, owing to an initial lack of recording facilities.[119] However, the historical dominance of Swahili meant that Tanzania "was one of the first countries to develop a strong 'mother tongue' rap presence"[120] as some Tanzanian emcees responded to local demands and began to rap in Swahili as early as 1991.[121] Although some in this early hip-hop community remained committed to English for reasons of authenticity, early groups who rapped in English like the Kwanza Unit had only a "niche" following of affluent youth who were familiar with Western culture. Although they were popular in the 1990s, they faded slowly into obscurity in the 2000s.[122]

At first Tanzanian rappers were primarily taking popular American hip-hop songs and re-doing them in Swahili. There was more than just imitation, however, as local producers were learning techniques for creating complex and multilayered digital sounds like those they admired on Notorious B.I.G.'s "Things Done Changed" and

Nas's "The World Is Yours," both released in the mid-1990s when an indigenous Tanzanian hip hop was beginning to develop. Using these learned techniques, Tanzanian rappers produced innovations that helped the development of a distinct local hybrid. Master J, for example, is able to add a sound layer carrying an arpeggiated guitar that hints at the dansi tradition; techniques that dansi rhythm guitarists like Master J's father use extensively. Thus, the results of imitation are innovations that incorporate Tanzanian aesthetics and sensibilities in an "organic" fashion as a Swahili-based hip hop emerged in Tanzania.[123] In this social context, bongo flava, a category of music that encompasses several genres, including rap, R&B, zouk, and ragga, became "the most recent form to move from imitation to localization."[124] As such, the increasing aesthetic focus on local practices leads some to conceive of traditional music as a precursor to hip hop, making their connection more grounded in historical terms and less a product of Western hegemony.[125]

As a result of these musical and cultural developments, hip hop moved beyond the small group of aficionados who initially supported the genre and evolved into a popular musical form with broad appeal in Tanzania. In addition, with the growth of independent recording studios since the early 1990s, the local production of music has grown dramatically and bongo flava has emerged as a dominant popular music in Tanzania (and other areas of East Africa).[126] Unsurprisingly, the growing popularity of bongo flava has made it the most lucrative musical genre in the country.[127]

Given that profit enterprises drive the production and distribution processes, it is not surprising that some bands increasingly choose to entertain and "sing without point" (*kuimba bila point*), in one artist's words, effectively "giving in to the commercial concerns one finds in Western mainstream music."[128] Even though the quoted author implies gently that "commercial concerns" are somehow the unique property of "Western mainstream music," the concession that bongo flava artists are "giving in" to those concerns points to the on-the-ground reality that the same commercial and oppositional tensions that shape North American hip hop exist, albeit in different configurations, in the African continent.

From Clark's perspective, the fact that some "have identified Bongo Flava as being synonymous with Tanzanian hip hop" means "there is often confusion over what hip hop actually is," suggesting that a significant divide remains between the two forms.[129] However, Clark's distinction appears to be drawn in terms of assumed "socially conscious" content rather than musical qualities (and also appears to be self-reifying), as she states, "it is difficult for many to articulate all the distinctions between hip hop and Bongo Flava. The main difference is lyrical content. Bongo Flava is almost entirely apolitical, while songs that comment on social and political issues are almost always hip hop songs."[130] Clark's framework, in addition to equating hip hop with socially conscious content, situates socially conscious hip hop as "underground," while bongo flava is considered "commercial."

However, as US hip-hop scholars have contended, it does not follow that commercial success necessarily or always precludes what might be considered "socially conscious" content.[131] Thus, among a range of mundane and profound topics, including romance, sex, humor and horror, a body of discourse in bongo flava expression has consistently maintained a close affinity to political developments in modern Tanzania and resonated with serious and passionate reflections of social sentiment.[132]

To preserve the "conscious hip hop" vs "commercial bongo flava" binary, in the face of this reality, Clark classifies "Profesa Jay"—who is extensively referenced as a prominent bongo flava artist in other accounts—"among the rare hip hop artists to produce socially conscious music and find success and recognition in both pop [i.e., bongo flava] and hip hop."[133] The "invisible"—or at least unstated—factor underlying these complications is the hand of the neoliberal free market. The same dynamics and ultimately (at the global level) the same entities that shaped the marketing and distribution of hip hop globally were/are at work in all the African sites. Whether local or global, business enterprises enable these processes, with economic gain as the primary driving motivation. Factors that make a song or artist popular, sell well, and, thus, be "commercial" are varied (and often unpredictable). Most socially conscious hip hop, according to Clark, is not "commercially viable" in Tanzania (or in Ghana) and therefore relegated to the "underground." The "rare" artists who are both socially conscious and commercially viable are thus claimed as hip hop by those who conflate socially conscious content with hip hop regardless of the popular qualities that connect it to bongo flava.

Although Clark's argument has valid elements, rather than accentuate the division between forms, as she appears to, we argue here that for our purposes it is more useful—in analyzing the variation or configuration of local and global components comprising the indigenization process in Tanzania—to characterize bongo flava as "Tanzanian hip hop"—that is to say, the local iteration of the global impulse centered around hip hop's worldwide spread—but also to position the genre itself in oppositional tension with the institutions of neoliberal society in a way that can be seen as political, particularly from a youth or displaced perspective. As Stroeken explains, the term "Bongo Flava, literally meaning 'flavour of the brains,' originally referred to the cunning needed to live in a city like Dar es Salaam and to cope with the cynicism of wages so low they presuppose additional income from illicit schemes, [or the] informal economy."[134] The meaning of bongo flava also invokes the Swahili credo of the streets: *chemsha bongo*, "boil" or activate "the brains," referring to an attitude of vigilance that parallels hip hop's ghetto discourse of survival, a reflection of life in a terrain ruled by Kinshasa's mythical "Article 15,"[135] signifying "the harsh law of the streets under a failing state."[136]

Far from being "almost entirely apolitical," as Clark contends, Stroeken suggests that bongo flava has in fact, become a primary channel for expression of social discontent. Indeed, as it emerged in the early 1990s, Tanzanian hip hop has "made maximum use of the freedom of expression across a diversity of themes" among Tanzanians seeking their way through the privatized wreckage littering the neoliberal socioeconomic landscape.[137] Coinciding with a climate of "unmasking"—exposure of corruption and wrongdoing—whipped up in newspapers around the first multiparty elections of 1995, and booming in the new millennium, bongo flava has figured importantly in shaping public discourse in the neoliberal, multiparty terrain that twenty-first-century modernity has brought.

Bongo flava has several women artists who have contributed to this discourse. Lady JayDee vaulted to fame in East Africa with a song "Wanaume Kama Mabinti (Men who are like women)," that ridicules men who are content to be supported by their women, constructing this as feminizing behavior. Ntarangwi argues that this premise reifies traditional gender constructions that are reproduced in modern contexts. Among Tanzanian female hip hoppers, only Zay B, according to Ntarangwi, has really challenged constructed views about women and gender, criticizing men for their chauvinist habits as well as admonishing women to believe in themselves and be self-determined. Perhaps reflecting the pessimism of "postcolonial indifference," Zay B and other female artists also perform songs that criticize women for their choices and their destructive behavior, such as her song "Monica" that depicts a woman's drift into exploitive sexual relationships.

Around issues of gender, Ntarangwi fears that while "hip hop has opened up some spaces to contest conservative views of women, it has also allowed for the reinscription of conservative views." Notwithstanding such constraints, however, Tanzanian hip hop (bongo flava)—like hip hop in other African localities—has been a tool for renegotiating relationships among youth, civil society, and the state, in the direction of increased access and influence for youth in spheres of public discourse.[138] No single production better illustrates both these major thrusts than Profesa Jay (aka Profesa J or Professor Jay)'s 2001 song "Ndio Mzee" ("Yes Sir/Elder"); a satiric commentary on the false promises made by older politicians, who, by virtue of age and tradition would be honored mzee (elders). For many Tanzanians, young and old, that one song established the link between bongo flava and protest.[139] A hit not only in Tanzania, but throughout East Africa, the song established him as a serious social critic.[140]

Jay's lyrics point to a devaluation of the term "Mzee" as a designation of honor as it would be applied to the grandparental generation, who are cherished as cohorts of Nyerere. In his perspective an urban elite has misappropriated the code of mzee, which now attaches to the corruption associated with middle-aged elders, situated in the parental generation.[141] Moreover, some have charged, as sociologist Chachage Seithy L Chachage reports, that Tanzania intellectuals have been "complacent and often quiet when it comes to matters of freedom of expression."[142] Such a lack of discourse inhibits public awareness (and thus weakens democracy) regarding critical policies and their impact, leaving a vacuum for hip hop—which has become an alternative channel for discourse in the face of such a decline in social critique—to fill.

For example, as Ntarangwi suggests, lack of such discourse means most Tanzanians have little or no understanding regarding how the "privatization project works," because it is "not well explained to the local people that the policies would adversely affect." Hip-hop group Wagosi wa Kaya, seeks to deconstruct the mystery surrounding privatization in their song "Tumeshtuka (We are shocked)," asking

> What do we gain through privatization?
> We are tricked to embrace this privatization because
> If you scrutinize carefully you will see that we are being ripped off.[143]

The words summarize the reality of the process of privatization as it has come to shape and define the lives of those affected by economic globalization in Tanzania as in other African nations. The resulting economic retrenchment is a "shocker," as Wagosi wa Kaya's lyrics state, all the more so for those who assumed that economic security would be achieved through qualifications and the right kind of education or credentials.[144] Privatization meant that basic social services were to be owned and controlled by private investors, putting their services out of the reach of the poor.[145] In turn, pricing privatized social services out of reach of the poor increases both the number of needy and the income gap between the haves and have-nots. Many are forced to seek alternate channels for resources and support, like traditional healers for unattainable health care, while lack of employment sends many to the fringe (street peddlers, etc.) and underground economies.[146] Evolving in this milieu, Tanzanian hip hop has taken notice of these effects. Thus, subjects such as privatization, unemployment and retrenchment, and health-care provision are often the focus of bongo flava lyrics.[147]

From the point of view of young and displaced Tanzanians, the postindependence generations' experiences, from new nationhood through neoliberal wasteland, resonates strongly in Profesa Jay's critiques, along with those of other bongo flava artists. The lyrics reflect a critical disappointment in the post-socialist generation presently in charge. They suggest that a new generation (*kizazi kipya*) are the rightful heirs to Nyerere and his generation of independence fighters.[148] They do not romanticize a past, lost utopia to which they would return, however. According to Stroeken, their perspective reflects a "postcolonial indifference" that is as skeptical of Nyerere's idealism as it is resentful of those perceived to have betrayed it.[149]

The historical context that frames bongo flava's pessimism, according to Stroeken, has to do with the history of African nationalism and its sometimes bewildering search for the "real structures of oppression."

> Nationalist struggles for independence focused on the colonial administration, before discovering the role of metropolitan capital (Walraven and Abbink 2003: 4). In the 1970s, the newly founded states desperately tried to 'capture' the rural areas through educational and economic programmes, as exemplified in Tanzania by Ujamaa villagization (Hyden 1980)... Under the structural adjustment programmes of the World Bank, the government became an increasingly opaque entity.[150]

Decades of disenchantment with government have followed these seemingly abortive efforts. Through their lyrics, rap songs reflect this disappointment in their depictions of corruption, perceived to have spread widely after the postsocialist generation took over. Moreover, in addition to a lack of hope Stroeken sees that in much of Tanzanian hip hop, "the artists are weary of presenting a signifier that captures the listener (who identifies with the speaker) in positive terms." Who is to be faulted? What is to be blamed, where is the enemy or source of oppression or misery to be found? Should the subject of critique be the government, which betrayed democracy for the majority in favor of enabling accumulation by an elite minority? Should it be international capital that obliterates local enterprise and controls local markets? Or is it the West, historically the beneficiary of this bounty?[151] As Steingo observes in his discussion of South African hip hop, "...neoliberalism poses a far greater challenge than earlier forms of oppression precisely because of its 'unlocatability.'"[152]

Reflecting their state of "postcolonial indifference" in this ambiguous context, Stroeken contends that African artists such as Professor Jay are loathe "to offer yet another utopia on top of the many prospects of liberation that have made up local modernities."[153] As Stroeken sees it, "these African artists expect more benefit from acknowledging the impasse, the political indifference and damaged self-image, than from offering yet another utopia."[154] Nyerere's idealism is deemed not relevant in the terrains they inhabit, where people in various stations, having "learned that Nyerere's idealism did not pay off," were likely to accept bribes and remain silent about the betrayal, evincing a "politics of moral indifference" that allows corruption and dispossession to abound at the institutional as well as the street level; a streetwise "predatory pragmatics" by which social instability and inequality are exploited to achieve personal enrichment.[155]

In the prevailing context of postcolonial indifference the criticisms are not leveled by bongo flava artists from a stance of ethical or moral superiority. Stroeken argues that Tanzanian rappers immunize themselves against the suspicion of moralism (and thus keep their streetwise status) by attributing the criticized practices to survival needs they too share. By including themselves in the critique, they make "their critique resistant by analogy with the biological process of becoming immune after contagion."[156] In this way the indifference of the post-socialist generation projects a message that lines up remarkably well with the point of view that US gangsta acts such as 50 Cent nowadays take in comparison to messages of precursors such as Public Enemy. The neoliberal pragmatic, as magnified in 50 Cent's album Get Rich Or Die Tryin', has displaced the idealism of the first wave of rap bands. Nascent idealism has been engulfed by "postcolonial indifference" in settings where, the "gangsta rapper in New York and the postcolonial politician in Tanzania apply strategies of survival that are very much alike."[157]

Remarkably, given these dynamics, young hip-hop/bongo flava artists who are known for their criticisms of government have reached levels of recognition and status unrivaled in most other places. Professor Jay was one of three Tanzanians recently honored by the government for "contributing to social progress," specifically for "sensitizing people on good governance." The other two honorees were a former prime minister and an ambassador. Thus, as Ntarangwi observes, "That a young person and a musician . . . was honored . . . in the same rank with career politicians/civil servants is a testimony to the role of hip hop in contemporary Tanzanian society and Professor Jay's image as a social critic."[158] Sugu (Mr. II), another hip-hop artist known for his critical posture toward the Tanzanian government, "recently made history in becoming the first hip-hop artist to win political office," with his successful election to Parliament in 2010. His stated objective, after rapping for nearly twenty years, was to have an opportunity to address the issues he rapped about in the ten albums he had produced over that span.[159] Though exceptional, these achievements suggest a measure of the way hip-hop energies have empowered young Africans in Tanzania and elsewhere on the continent toward social engagement.

Conclusion

Much of the commonality comprising hip hop's role and impact in different African geographies revolves around its role as a vehicle for self-formation in the vacuum/vortex created in the conjunction of the retreating state and the neoliberal economy. The sociohistorical context in which these tasks are undertaken is a kind of vacuum or undefined space created as the state with its powers diminished under the onslaught of neoliberal forces plays a progressively lesser role in shaping and directing their lives. The void in the socialization process created by the shrinking state creates a need and an opportunity for self-definition, and sometimes for enterprise. All over the continent African youth have used hip hop to create and define social spaces within which to find and define themselves in the context of contemporary global modernity.

At the same time, the larger world within which they seek to situate themselves bombards them with images, ideas, artifacts, swept by flows of globalization mediated by the same neoliberal forces.

After hip hop's entry in each national setting it became a medium through which much of this global input was incorporated within local settings and sensibilities, becoming integrated with indigenous languages, music forms, and cultural practices. Pre-disposed to oppositionality, political engagement occurs in ways that connect with specific contexts and conditions.

The apparent residual oppositionality among the values and modalities of hip hop can manifest itself along a range of adversarial formations from generational rebellion to profound political revolution if it fits a given context. (In terms of the latter, e.g., although this volume's and this chapter's focus is sub-Saharan Africa, it should not go unnoted that in the "Arab Spring" in 2010, "[w]hen revolution swept through North Africa and the Middle East, it did so to the sound of hip-hop music."[160]) This tendency is seen in the cases we have reviewed here. We have already noted the contentious political context out of which Senegalese hip hop evolved and played a significant role in activities opposing the presidency of Abdou Diouf, who was voted out of office in 2000. "Democracy in Dakar," a film set in 2007 showed that hip hop was still playing a central role in mobilizing youth for an upcoming election. Clark believes that political circumstances shaping the context of their development meant that in Senegal "the early politicization of hip hop seems to have had an impact on the mainstreaming of politically conscious hip hop and hip hopa rtists."[161]

According to Clark, this kind of "mainstreaming" of political hip hop did not happen in Tanzania. Moreover, with some justification, commercialism that crowds out any political edge is often construed as an "American" influence by analysts of African hip hop. However, what we argue here is that the distinction Clark makes between "conscious" hip hop and "commercial bongo flava" forms creates a binary that looks past the way bongo flava has developed as a forum and a language for social and political messages, notwithstanding the fact that commercial forces affect the output of both genres.

In addition to commercial enterprises, the importance, popularity, and credibility of hip hop among youth have been noted and utilized by governments and NGOs who, for their part, have attempted to harness the energy hip hop organizes to communicate with youth and to involve them in communicating national and civic goals and values.[162] Many countries make certain to include hip-hop performers in almost any publically or privately organized cultural festival where youth presence and involvement are desired. Public officials who might otherwise have excluded hip hop from cultural festivals intended to promote a particular national culture—like those featuring competitions involving “traditional” cultural performances—would have quickly discovered that not including hip hop meant little youth interest and participation, and that including it meant interest and participation in hip hop would dwarf that of any other category. State agencies and NGOs also use hip-hop groups and networks extensively to build awareness and support of government social programs and goals, such as (and especially) HIV/AIDS education and prevention.

New technology, especially electronic media, are “resources for experiments with self-making in all sorts of societies, for all sorts of persons,” and have given at least a degree of agency for youth voices seeking to avoid the bottleneck of corporate control of production and distribution.[163] While these efforts have only been marginally successful in terms of diminishing the control of macro-commercial forces, they have facilitated the emergence of global networks of hip hoppers, aficionados, and activists who generate products and knowledge directly among themselves. Rappers in Kenya and South Africa are in close contact with artists and activists in the United States. Local rap collectives in Senegal communicate directly with underground hip hoppers in the United States, exchanging beats, songs, information, and resources. While there may now be limits as to the ability of these developing global linkages to bypass the control of corporate commercial control, the platform this emerging network provides for globalization at the substate, supranational vernacular level may alter that balance in some emerging global future.

Notes

1. Hall2 010,1 4.
2. Chang2 005,4 8.
3. “In the nation’s twelve largest metropolitan areas the central city’s proportion of all manufacturing employment dropped from 66.1 percent in 1947 to less than 40 percent in 1970” (Wilson 1978, 93).
4. Rose 1994, 10–12.
5. Chang2 005,4 8.
6. Ibid., 63–5.
7. “Of hip-hop’s four celebrated elements, three—break dancing, rapping and turntabling—pretty much began at Herc’s parties” (Tate 2006).
8. “Whenever Kool Herc played outside, shit was loud and crystal clean.” Zulu Nation DJ Jazzy J. Quoted in Chang 2005, 83.

9. “Helping to initiate…the ‘golden age of hip-hop,’ Public Enemy on *Don’t Believe the Hype* (1988) exposed the daunting power of the media’s ability to fundamentally choose which artists get exposure and what messages are promoted” (Ogbar 2007, 105). Somewhat different parameters—all of which reference the rise of gansta rap—are presented in other accounts: “Hip-hop’s Golden Age is bookended by the commercial breakthrough of Run-D.M.C. in 1986 and the explosion of gangsta rap with 1992’s *The Chronic* by Dr. Dre (Blackburn 2004, 79–105). Also, “So began the “Golden Age of Rap Nationalism,” a period in rap music history bracketed by the release of two Hip Hop classics: Public Enemy’s *It Takes a Nation of Millions to Hold Us Back* in 1988, which staged the debut of the ‘Prophets of Rage’ and Ice Cube’s *Lethal Injection* in 1993” (Cheney 2005, 278–98).
10. Dimitriadis 2009, 75.
11. Watkins2 005,3 8–9.
12. Cheney 2005, 278–98.
13. Neff 2013, 10.
14. Martin 2012.
15. Ibid.,1 8.
16. Ritzer 1996. Hammett summarizes contending arguments: “Conceptual approaches to ‘globalisation’ continue to evolve from initial conceptions as a hegemonic, universalising Western economic, political and cultural power overwhelming ‘local’ identities and cultures…Transformationalist approaches have superseded this thinking, developing nuanced understandings of globalising processes as hybrid and contested with uneven, incomplete and contradictory local outcomes” (Hammett 2012).
17. Robertson 1995.
18. Ingrid Monson uses this term to refer to “the family of ‘posts’: including poststructuralism, postmodernism, postcolonialism, postnationalism, etc.” (Monson 1999, fn. 3).
19. Slobin 1992, 1–87.
20. Erlmann 1996, 467–87.
21. Monson 1999, 48.
22. Slobin’s framework sees local (subculture), global (superculture), and intermediate (interculture) domains.
23. Monson 1999, 51.
24. Ibid.,4 6.
25. Ibid.,5 4.
26. Sahlins 1985, xiv.; cited in Monson 1999, 47.
27. Monson 1999, 47.
28. Tang2 012.
29. Charry2 012a,1 .
30. Ibid., 3.
31. Ibid., 1.

32. Charry ibid., 294.
33. Shonekan 2012 ibid., 148.
34. Charryi bid.,3 .
35. “While for older Ghanaians, British English had marked elite status, for Ghanaians born after independence, African American styles and speech became signs of authority” (Shipley 2012, 34.)
36. Shonekan 2012, 155.
37. Quoted in Charry ibid., 288.
38. A dispute arose when—as reported in the Jan. 8, 1970 edition of the Washington Post—the regional commissioner for the Dar es Salaam area “angrily banned soul music, saying it was a cause of bad morality in the countries youth . . . .The commissioner, [was] reportedly upset by the effects of soul music on his own children” (Hoagland 1970).
39. Mamdani 1996, 24.
40. Ibid., 290–1.
41. Akiba2 004,7 .
42. Mamdani 1996, 287.
43. “In a state form marked by bifurcated power, deracialization and detribalization were two aspects that would form the starting point of an overall process of democratization . . . By themselves, even if joined together, they could not be tantamount to democratization. Together this amalgam of internal and external imperatives signified the limits and possibilities of the moment of state independence” (ibid., 287–8).
44. “In 1967, for instance, Julius Nyerere, president of Tanzania, issued the famous Arusha Declaration, which urged his counterparts in Africa to withdraw from the world’s economic system dominated by the West) . . . However, very few, if any, governments could build alternative economic systems outside global systems already entrenched through colonialism and Westernization” (Ntarangwi 2009, 87).
45. See Joseph 2003.
46. “Neo-liberal policies of the last ten years have destroyed the small industrial sector—textiles, oil, leather, farm implements, and cashew nut factories” (Shivji, Issa. 2006 quoted in Clark 2012, 27). “The more liberal the economic structures in East Africa became, the fewer the number of local industries that survived the economic rollercoaster and the higher the rate of these nations dependence on imported goods that subsequently led to the devaluation of the local currency” (Ntarangwi 2009, 86).
47. “postindependence East African governments, especially in the 1960s, used their booming export revenues to finance the expansion of free health and education for their newly enfranchised citizens” (Ntarangwi 2009, 88).
48. Ntarangwi indicates that the social space in which hip hop emerged as a primary reference frame for youth “was set in motion by . . . the

weakening of the nation-state following market fundamentalism…and fiscal austerity imposed by the IMF and World Bank through SAPs and…the diminishing of the role of the nation-state as a legitimate agent for socializing youth" (ibid., 5).

49. Mamdani 2007, vii.
50. Ntarangwi 2009, 82.
51. Ibid.,8 1.
52. "These socioeconomic processes that produced hip hop in East Africa also mirrored those that produced U.S. hip hop in the Bronx…and other expressive forms such as "seditious" music in Kenya…In this regard, a direct link can be seen between growing politicoeconomic constraints and the expansion of music as a forum for social critique" (ibid., 5).
53. Ibid., 116.
54. Mamdani excoriates "history by analogy rather than history as process" in which "[a]nalogy seeking turns into a substitute for theory formation…African reality has meaning only insofar as it can be seen to reflect a particular stage in the development of an earlier history" (Mamdani 1996, 12).
55. Charry2 012a,3 1.
56. Charryi bid.
57. Charryi bid.,1 0.
58. Perulloi bid.,1 87.
59. Charry ibid., 303–4.
60. Appadurai 1996, 10.
61. Charry 2012a, 13, 31.
62. Bennett and Morgan 2011, 184.
63. Charry2 012a,3 3.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Clark 2012, 25.
67. Shonekan 2012, 165.
68. Schulz2012,1 35.
69. Charry2 012a,3 4.
70. Clark2 007.
71. Herson 2011, 31.
72. Ibid.,2 8.
73. Charry 2012b, 293.
74. Charryi bid.,7 .
75. Charry ibid., 292.
76. Clark2 007,1 .
77. Osumare2 012,3 3–4.
78. Charry2 012a,1 6.
79. Ibid.,1 8.
80. Charryi bid.,3 07.

81. Ntarangwi 2009, 116.
82. Charry2 012a,9 .
83. Ibid., 5.
84. Bennett and Morgan 2011, 188.
85. Tang2 012,8 3.
86. Herson 2011, 28.
87. Tang 2012, 82.
88. Herson 2011, 28.
89. Tang2 012,8 3.
90. Ibid.
91. Herson 2011, 31.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid.
94. Tang2 012,8 0.
95. Charry 2012b, 302.
96. Chang 2005, 251.
97. Tang2 012,7 9–80.
98. Charry 2012a, 4.
99. Ibid.,1 9.
100. Neff 2013, 13
101. Ibid,1 7.
102. Ibid., 21. Observers seeking to emphasize the African "roots" of hip hop also have drawn a connection between hip hop and taasu. "In the 1990s…rappers and griots began to claim that taasu was the true predecessor to rap"(Tang 2012, 86).
103. Neff 2013, 21.
104. Ibid., 22.
105. Ibid.,1 1.
106. Charry2 012,8 4.
107. Tang2 012,8 9–90.
108. Herson 2011, 26.
109. For discussion of East Africa as a region re: spread of hip hop, see Ntarangwi 2009. "Many scholars have tended to focus on hip hop within specific countries, ignoring growing cross-border exchanges within East African hip hop, collaborations in recording and the emergence of a genre locally referred to as utake music (denoting Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya)….The messages carried in various hip hop songs across these borders gain transnational appeal and relevance because of this shared history as exemplified by "Utake Anthem." Many are the examples of this kind of cross-border collaboration….East African youth have become what Toby Miller (1998) calls "cultural citizens," who, while confined to locality (nation-state) by access to rights and privileges that are availed to citizens, participate in cultural and ideological practices that are beyond the nation-state (cited in Ntarangwi 2009, 17). Or as

Nadine Dolby argues, '...it [is] largely beyond the control of the state'" (2006, 40)" (quoted in Ntarangwi 2009, 17).

110. Charry 2012b, 293.
111. Clark2 012,3 0.
112. Perullo2 012,1 87.
113. Ibid., 197.
114. "Throughout the 1970s, there was a large expatriate community of idealistic, young African Americans who lived and worked throughout Tanzania, and especially in its capital city, Dar Es Salaam. What attracted most of them to the East African country was a remarkable social experiment called 'Ujamaa,' or 'African Socialism'" (Marable 2007).
115. Perullo2 012,1 96–7.
116. Clark2 012,2 6.
117. Perullo2 012,1 87.
118. Ibid., 191.
119. Ibid., 197.
120. Morgan and Bennett 2011, 188
121. Charry2 012a,1 3.
122. Ntarangwi2 009,2 4.
123. Perullo 2012, 193–4.
124. Ibid., 187.
125. Ibid., 191.
126. Ibid., 192.
127. Ibid., 187.
128. Stroeken 2005, 500.
129. Clark 2012, 25.
130. Ibid., 29.
131. See Ogbar 2007.
132. Stroeken 2005, 488.
133. Clark 2012, 29.
134. Stroeken 2005, 488.
135. The term "Article 15" was invoked to refer to the widespread attitude in postindependence Kinshasha that stealing and other illegal activities were necessary for survival and justified by conditions in the failed postindependence state.
136. Ibid.
137. Ibid., 492.
138. Ntarangwi 2009, 5, 15.
139. Stroeken 2005, 493.
140. Ntarangwi 2009, 69. Also discusses a parallel development in Kenya where hip hop duo Gidi Gidi Maji Maji's song "Unbwogable," was "appropriated by the 2002 Kenyan political bloc that ousted President Daniel Moi's twenty-four-year rule...Unbwogable became a catch phrase denoting a state of not being intimidated or threatened" (ibid., 175).

141. Stroeken 2005, 494.
142. Quoted in Ntarangwi 2009, 12.
143. Ibid.,8 8.
144. Ibid.,9 1.
145. Ibid.,8 9.
146. Ibid.,7 9.
147. Ibid., 87.
148. Stroeken 2005, 489.
149. "Whereas scholars choose to speak for the subaltern and expose 'the colonial difference' in the world-view of Eurocentric others (for instance in the Latin American context; Mignolo 2000), Tanzanian rappers observe the multiplication of oppositions and lay bare the resulting postcolonial indifference that has affected all layers of society" (ibid.).
150. Stroeken 2005, 500.
151. Ibid.
152. Steingo 2007, 33.
153. Stroeken 2005, 500.
154. Ibid., 491.
155. Ibid.,49 7,8 9.
156. Ibid., 505.
157. Ibid., 502.
158. Ntarangwi2 009,6 9–70.
159. Clark2 012,3 2.
160. Bennett and Morgan 2011, 178. As indicated in its role in the recent "Arab Spring," the embrace of hip hop in Africa has been no less vital among Arab-dominated cultures in the North. A Tunisian DJ known as El Général—whose hip hop inspiration was American rapper Tupac Shakur, and whose music and performances had been banned by the government for years—was nonetheless able to go viral with an internet video critical of the country's head of state in 2010. In 2011 he released the song named by Time magazine as "the rap anthem of the Mideast revolution" a week before the incident of self-immolation that sparked the Tunisia uprising, which in term sparked revolutionary movements across North Africa and the Mideast, the "Arab Spring." After the Egyptian President Mubarak resigned in the face of an unyielding protest movement, the independent newspaper Al-Masry Al-Youm reported "Although singers affiliated with various musical styles have shown support for the Egyptian people, the style that prevailed—or at least that had the biggest impact—in this fight for freedom and liberty is rap music. East and west, north and south, rappers have emerged as the voice of the revolution." (quoted in ibid.)
161. Clark2 012,3 6.

162. “many government agencies and nongovernmental organizations have realized the power of hip hop in reaching and communicating directly with the youth who in East Africa constitute more than half of the populations” (Ntarangwi 2009, 120).
163. Appadurai 1996, 4.

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INDEX

Accommodationist Theory, 108
Adogame, Afe, 74
  Religion in the Context of African Migration, 81
Adorno, Theodor, 236
African agency, 1–2, 4, 6, 172, 174
African cinema
  and globalization, anglophone region, 149–64
  and piracy, 153
  See also African film; Mhando, Martin R.; Southern Africa cinema
African film
  distribution and reception, 150–62
  Nollywood, 155
  video production and distribution, 151, 153–8
  See also African cinema; Mhando, Martin R.
Afrika Bambaataa
  See hip hop
Afro-optimism, 71, 85–6
Afropessimism, 69–74, 79, 81, 85
AIDS
  See HIV/AIDS
AIDS prevention policies
  See PEPFAR (President's Emergency Plan for AIDS relief), Uganda
Anholt, Simon, 204–6, 221
Ansah, Kwaw, 151
Anyanwu, Chika, 154
Applbaum, Kalman, 201–2, 211
Arab Spring
  See hip hop
Arrighi, Giovanni, 72–3
arts sponsorship, 200, 204, 215, 217–18, 224. *See also* East African Breweries Ltd.; Senator National Cultural Extravaganza; Uganda
Augusto, O. J., 80

Badru, Pade, 97
  The Spread of Islam in West Africa, 94
Bakhtin, Mikhail, 130
Barlet, Olivier, 150
Bauman, Zygmunt, 73
Bayart, Jean-François, 72–3, 82
Beaman, Lori, 69–70
Bennett, Dionne, 243, 249
Bernstein, Elizabeth, 12
Beyer, Peter, 69–70
Boli, John, 69–70
bongo flava
  See Tanzania
border thinking, 6, 170–3, 176–9, 182–4, 188, 190
born-again Christianity, 5
  and AIDS prevention in Uganda, 39–62
  See also charismatic Christianity; Mensah, Joseph; new Christian geographies; Pentecostal Christianity; religion; Uganda
Boyd, Lydia, 2, 4
  on born-again Christianity and AIDS prevention in Uganda, 39–62
branding, 201, 204–9, 214–15, 224
  and Nelson Mandela, 210

Brennan, Denise, 15, 28
Brenner, Louis, 98
bridewealth
  See Boyd, Lydia; Uganda
Brutus, Dennis, 6, 172, 175–6, 178–9, 182–3, 185–7, 189–90, 192–3n23
  Poems from Algiers, 176
Bush, George W., 4, 40, 42–3

Caplan, Gerald, 72
Casanova, J., 70
Castells, Manuel
  End of Millennium, 73
Chachage, Chachage Seithy L., 259
Chang, J., 230
Chapkis, Wendy, 21, 30
charismatic Christianity, 42–3, 45, 69, 78, 81, 83–4
  See also born-again Christianity; Boyd, Lydia; Mensah, Joseph; Pentecostal Christianity; prosperity gospel; religion; Uganda
Charry, Eric, 238, 242, 245, 251
  Hip Hop Africa, 237
child pornography, 12, 24
  Morgens Riber Nielsen, 24, 28
Chow-White, Peter, 12, 24
Clark, M. K., 256–8, 263
Collier, Paul, 72
corporate culture, 201, 209, 219
  See also East African Breweries Ltd.
Coulon, Christian
  Le marabout et le prince, 105
cybersexual activity, 3, 12–13, 17–19, 25–8
  See also Ghana; Internet; sex
cybersexuality, 3, passim
  See also cybersexual activity; Ghana; Internet; sex; sexual commerce; Tettey, Wisdom J.; women

Dahlgren, Kari, 1, 6
  on African cultural producers and border thinking, 169–92
De Gruchy, John, 81
Dilley, Roy, 108
discourse
  abstinence, 60
  Afropessimist, 72
  authoritative, 130
  bongo flava, role in public, 257–8
  brand marketing, 3, 6
  branding, 204–9, 224
  celebratory branding, 204–7, 214
  Christian sexual morality, 61
  contemporary Islamic, Senegal, 93–115
  cultural globalization, 234–5
  development, 171, 173
  distribution (film), 162
  faithfulness, Christianity, 41–2, 49, 56–9, 60–1
  globalization, 74, 85
  hip hop, and women's use of, 247
  hip hop, role in public, 229, 253–62
  Islamic, 2, 3, 5
  love, 52
  marketing, "total provisioning," 211
  social appropriation, 159
  tradition, 52
  victimology, 16
  white men, and sexual tourism, 24–5

East Africa
  bilingualism, 127, 129–31
  language debates, 121, 131, 134, 138, 140–1
  language policies, 121–42
  linguistic diversity, 121
  multiligualism, 121, 127, 141
  See also languages; Lisanza, Esther M.

East African Breweries Ltd. (EABL), 6, 199–201, 203–4, 209–24
  See also Senator National Cultural Extravaganza
economy of desire, 14–18, 26, 28
Ekwuazi, Hyginus, 151, 154
Engels, Friedrich, 52
Erlmann, Veit, 235–6
Europe, 25, 77, 81, 96, 111, 135, 171–2, 174, 182–3, 223, 241–2

Fanon, Frantz, 172
feminization of poverty, 15
Ferguson, James, 73, 205
France, 107, 110, 153, 245, 248
Freeman-Longo, Robert, 28
Freston, Paul, 71
Friedman, Thomas, 69
Frimpong-Ansah, J. H., 73

Gemignani, Regina, 81
George, Susan, 72–3
Ghana, 11–30, 72, 82–3, 82–4, 238–9, 247, 253
  Accra, 22, 24, 26, 28, 154, 243
  cinema distribution in, 149–62
  cybersexual activity, youth, 3, 12–13, 17–19, 25–8
  film distribution, 149–52, 154, 159, 162
  hip hop, 242, 244, 247, 253, 257
  marriage, 14, 26–7
  moral panic, 14, 29
  Swedru, 18–19, 23–4, 26, 28
Ghanaian women
  See Ghana
Giddens, Anthony, 11
Gifford, Paul, 80–1, 83
Gimbel-Sherr, K., 80
global Salafism, 2, 94–5, 98, 107, 115
  See also Salafism
globalization, 1, 94, passim
  as narrative of socialization, 149
  and new Christian geographies, Africa, 69–86
  and sexual commerce, Ghana, 11–30
glocalization, 235
Gregory, Derek, 7

Hall, Perry A., 2
  on hip hop, globalization, and Africa, 239–64
Haykel, Bernard, 94–5
Haynes, Jeff, 82
Hegel, G. W. F.
  Philosophy of History, 172
hegemony, 1–2, 82, 98, 101, 159–61, 164, 170, 177–8, 256
  and universal history, 180–3
Hill, Margari, 97
hip hop
  Afrika Bambaataa, 230, 232, 245, 248
  corporate-gangsta model, 234
  “Dirty South,” 233
  early days and “Ol Skool,” 230–2
  gansta rap, 232–4
  globalization, and Africa, 239–64
  golden age (1980s–90s), 232
  indigenization of, 229, 245, 248, 254, 257
  role in public discourse, 229, 253–62
  role in the Arab Spring, 263, 270n160
  women artists, 258–9
  and women’s use of discourse, 247
Hitchens, Christopher, 71
HIV/AIDS, 4, 14
  PEPFAR (President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS relief), 61–2
  See also Uganda
Hughes, D. M., 11–12

Huntington, Samuel
  Clash of Civilizations, 70

IMF (International Monetary Fund), 19–20, 72–3, 80, 108, 153, 161
  See also Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPS); World Bank
indigenization
  See hip hop
indigenous people
  and elimination of, 3
Inglehart, Ronald, 78
intellectual safaris, 2, 3
Internet
  child pornography, 12, 24
  pornography, 13–14
  and sexual commerce in Ghana, 11–30
  See also sex; women
Islam
  contemporary discourses in Senegal, 93–115
  female shaykhs, Senegal, 100
  marriage, 104, 111
Islamic discourses, 2, 3, 5
  Senegal, 93–115
  See also discourse; Islam; Seck, Mamarame; Senegal
Islamic Tijaniyya Foundation of America (ITFA), 93

Jenkins, Philip, 77
  Next Christendom, 70
Jerven, Morten, 223
Johnson, Paul, 71

Kampala, 207, 209, 241
  born-again Christianity in, 4–5, 40, 42–4, 46–9
  models for intimacy in, 50–9
  See also Uganda
Kaplan, Robert, 72
Katigula, Barnabas, 134
Kenya, 72, 77, 160, 204–5, 213, 221, 238, 247, 264
  language policies, 121–31, 135–7, 139–41
Kim, W. Chan
  Blue Ocean Strategy, 209
Klein, Naomi
  No Logo, 200
Konadu-Agyemang, Kwadwo, 20
Kulick, Don, 162
Kurzman, Charles, 70

language
  See Lisanza, Esther M.
Latin America, 77–8, 169–70
Layene, 98, 100, 106
Lechner, Frank, 69–70
Lisanza, Esther M., 1, 5
  on language policies in East Africa, 121–42
Lott, Tommy, 159

Makerere University, 39, 46, 54, 209, 214, 223, 240
Mamdani, Mahmood, 239, 241
Mandela, Nelson
  See branding
marketing, 199–224
  See also East Africa Breweries Ltd.; Senator National Cultural Extravaganza; Uganda
marriage, 83
  See also Ghana; Islam; Uganda
Martin, Denis-Constant, 235
Mauborgne, Renée
  Blue Ocean Strategy, 209
Mazrui, Ali, 74, 94
Mazzarella, William, 208, 221
Mbaabu, Ireri, 127
mbalax, 2, 236, 247, 250–2
Mbembe, Achille, 72
  On the Postcolony, 72
Mensah, Joseph, 2–3, 5
  on globalization and new Christian geographies in Africa, 69–86
Meyer, Brigit, 80, 83–5

Mhando, Martin R., 6
  on globalization and African cinema, 149–64
Michaels, Eric, 161
Michaels, Marguerite, 71
Michalowski, Raymond, 23
Mignolo, Walter, 6, 170–1, 173
modern/colonial world system, 1
Monson, Ingrid, 235–6, 265
moral panic, 14, 29
  See also Tettey, Wisdom J.
Morgan, Marcyliena, 243, 249
Mouroux, Valérie, 153
Mugo, Micere Githae, 6, 172, 175, 177–8, 180–7, 189, 192, 193n34
  My Mother's Poem and Other Songs, 180
multilevel marketing, 202–4
multilingualism
  See East Africa
Muridiyya, 93, 98, 100, 106, 110
music
  See Hall, Perry A.; hip hop; *mbalax*; Pier, David G.; *sabar* drumming; Senator National Cultural Extravaganza
Muthwii, Margaret, 123

Nagel, Joane, 15
Nathan, Jeremy, 154
nation-brands, 204–7, 224
Neff, Colleen, 251–3
neoliberalism, 1, 4, 15, 28–9, 40, 43–4, 48, 59–60, 80, 171, 201, 204, 229, 238, 240–4, 246–7, 249, 255, 257–8, 260–2
new Christian geographies, 2. *See also* born-again Christianity; charismatic Christianity; globalization; Mensah, Joseph; Pentecostal Christianity; religion; Uganda
Ngonyani, Deo, 136
Nielsen, Morgens Riber, 24, 28
Nigeria, 19, 75–7, 82–4, 163
  cinema distribution in, 149–62
  hip hop, 238–9, 242–4
Nollywood, 155
Norris, Pippa, 78
North America, 77, 242, 256, 263
Ntarangwi, M., 258–9, 262, 266–7n48
Nyamnjoh, Francis, 25
Nyerere, Mwalimu Julius, 134, 141, 160, 254, 259–61, 266n44

O'Grady, Ron, 11–12
Olupona, Jacob, 81
opportunity myth, 16, 25, 28

Page, Ben, 25
participatory development, 203, 221
participatory marketing
  See East African Breweries Ltd.; multilevel marketing; Senator National Cultural Extravaganza
Pentecostal Christianity, 42–5, 69–71, 78, 80–1, 83–4
  See also born-again Christianity; Boyd, Lydia; charismatic Christianity; Mensah, Joseph; prosperity gospel; religion; Uganda
PEPFAR (President's Emergency Plan for AIDS relief), 4, 40–4, 61–2
  See also Uganda
Perullo, A., 242
Pfeiffer, James, 80
Pier, David G., 3, 6
  on brand marketers and music sponsorship in Uganda, 199–224
  Ugandan Music in the Marketing Era, 200
placed-based understanding, 3

Prahalad, C. K., 203–4
  Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid, 202, 220
prosperity gospel, 71, 83–5

Quijano, Anibal, 169, 173, 185

Rajabu, Rehema, 136
religion
  born-again Christianity and AIDS prevention, Uganda, 39–62
  new Christian geographies, Africa, 69–86
  See also born-again Christianity; Boyd, Lydia; charismatic Christianity; Islam; Mensah, Joseph; new Christian geographies; Pentecostal Christianity; Uganda
Reno, William, 73
Robertson, Roland, 78
Robinson, David, 98–9
Roy, Olivier, 70, 94
Roy-Campbell, Makini, 140

sabar drumming, 2, 250, 252
Sahle, Eunice N., 1
Salafism, 104, 108, 115
  global, 94–5, 98, 107, 115
  Harakat al-Falah movement, Senegal, 95, 101, 103–4
  Jama`at ibadar-Rahman (JAR) movement, Senegal, 95, 101, 104
  neo-reform movements, Senegal, 96, 98, 101–4
  See also Senegal
Schaffer, Frederic, 96
Schulz, Dorothea E., 244–5
Seck, Mamarame, 2–3, 5, 70, 75
  on contemporary Islamic discourses in Senegal, 93–115
Sembène, Ousmane, 6, 151, 172, 175–7, 179, 183, 192
  Black Girl, 184
  Ceddo, 187–8
  Mandabi, 184
  Ngaahika Ndeenda, 179
  Xala, 179
Senator National Cultural Extravaganza, 6, 199–201, 203–4, 208–24
  use of Ugandan traditional dance and music, 199–200, 204, 215, 217–19
  See also East African Breweries Ltd. (EABL)
Senegal, 2
  female shaykhs, 100
  hip hop, 2
  Islamic discourses, 93–115
  reform and political movements, 109–13
  See also hip hop; Islam; Islamic discourses; Salafism; Seck, Mamarame; Sufism
sex
  tourism, 12, 15, 22–8
  workers, 21–2, 30
  See also child pornography; cybersexual activity; cybersexuality; Ghana; Internet; sex; sexual commerce; Tettey, Wisdom J.; women
sex tourism, 4, 12, 15, 22–8
  See also cybersexual activity; cybersexuality; Ghana; Internet; sex; sexual commerce; Tettey, Wisdom J.; women
sexual commerce, 14–17, 22–9
  See also cybersexual activity; Ghana
shari'a, 97, 99, 114–15
Slobin, Mark, 235–6
Smith, Neil, 73
South Africa, 75
  film and distribution, 153, 156–8, 160–1, 164n3, 179
  hip hop, 242–3, 247, 261, 264
  See also Brutus, Dennis; Southern Africa cinema

Southern Africa cinema, 153, 156–8, 160–1, 164n3, 179
  Landscape of Memory series, 157–8
space of flows
  See Zook, Matthew
Spivak, Gayatry, 160
Steingo, G., 261
Stroeken, K., 258, 260–1
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPS), 19–20, 72–3, 76, 80, 85, 241, 255
Sufi Islam, 93–4
  See also Seck, Mamarame; Sufi Islamic movements; Sufism
Sufi Islamic movements, 5
  See also Seck, Mamarame; Sufi Islam; Sufism
Sufism, 99
  global, 95, 98, 107–8, 114–15
  in Senegal, 94–6
  See also Layene; Muridiyya; Seck, Mamarame; Senegal; Sufi Islam; Sufi Islamic movements; Tijaniyya
Sunnah, 99, 104

Tanzania, 2, 72, 77, 253–4
  Arusha Declaration, 131–2, 254, 266n44
  bongo flava, 247, 253–63
  hip hop, 2, 257
  language policies, 121–2, 124, 131–7, 139–41
Tettey, Wisdom J., 1, 3–4
  on Ghanaian youth, cybersexuality, and moral panic, 11–30
theoretical incest, 2
Thiong'o, Ngugi wa, 6, 124, 140–1, 172, 175, 178–92
  Decolonising the Mind, 178, 183–4
  Petals of Blood, 178, 180–1, 183–4, 186, 188–91, 194n44
Thomas, Scott, 77–8
Tibi, Bassam, 70
Tijaniyya, 93, 98, 100–2, 105–6, 109
time-space compression, 17, 29, 70
Tomaselli, Keyan, 149
tourism
  sex, 4, 12, 15, 22–8
  See also cybersexual activity; cybersexuality; Ghana; Internet; sex; sexual commerce; Tettey, Wisdom J.; women

Uganda, 72, 77, 240–1
  abstinence (AIDS prevention strategy), 4–5, 39, 42–4, 47, 53, 56, 60–1
  born-again Christianity and AIDS prevention, 39–62
  brand marketers and music sponsorship, 199–224
  bridewealth, 47, 49–51, 57, 64
  concurrent sexual relationships, 41, 61, 62n4
  dating culture, 52–6
  faithfulness (AIDS prevention strategy), 2, 4, 39–46, 48–50, 52–3, 56–61
  gender relations, 41, 49, 59–61
  and global health policies, 40–2, 60–1
  language policies, 121–2, 124, 136–41
  marriage, attitudes about, 39–42, 44–53, 55–61, 62n9, 64n20, 64n24
  PEPFAR (President's Emergency Plan for AIDS relief), 4, 40–4, 61–2
  sexuality, 40–6, 54, 56, 59–61, 62n4
  See also born-again Christianity; Boyd, Lydia; charismatic Christianity; East Africa Breweries Ltd.; Kampala; Pentecostal Christianity; religion; Senator National Cultural Extravaganza

United States, 6, 78, 110, 204
  See also hip hop
US Black Freedom Movement, 230

Van Dijk, Rijk, 82

Wardlow, Holly, 59
Washington Consensus, 73
Weber, Max, 71
  Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism, 84
Weissköppel, Cordula
  Religion in the Context of African Migration, 81
West Africa
  history of Islam, containment phase, 97
  history of Islam, mixing phase, 97
  history of Islam, reform phase, 97
Westernization, 95
  Senegalese society, 101, 103
Willis, Justin
  Potent Brews, 209
Wilson, Helen, 150
Wilson, Margareth, 162
women
  Christianity, 80, 247
  commodification of, 12, 21, 24, 29–30
  female shaykhs, Senegal, 100
  feminization of poverty, 15
  hip hop, 247, 258–9
  multilevel marketing, 203
  Third World, 16
  See also Internet; opportunity myth; sex; Uganda
Wonders, Nancy, 23
World Bank, 19–21, 72–3, 80, 108, 240, 260
  See also IMF (International Monetary Fund); Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPS)
worlds and knowledges otherwise, 1, 6, 170–2, 184, 189, 192

Zimbabwe
  film and distribution, 153, 156–7, 160–2
Zook, Matthew, 17