

Adrián Albala · Josep Maria Reniu
Editors

Coalition Politics and Federalism

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*To those who assume that it is always
necessary to reach an agreement to form
a government
To Paula and Lina
To Nora, Ferran and Cristina*

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Introduction



Adrián Albala and Josep Maria Reniu

The aim of this book is not to provide an updated theory on federalism, or on political behaviour in federal polities as a whole. We also do not seek to challenge the existing literature of coalition theories as applied to political science. Nonetheless, our goal in this volume is far from unambitious and irrelevant. We focus, rather, on a more prosaic, yet still original, objective.

As a matter of fact, this book deals with the convergence of two of the most studied issues in political science. These issues, however, have only come to be studied together only very recently, and rarely on a comparative perspective: coalition cabinets and federalism. We therefore aim to better understand how coalition cabinets structure themselves in decentralised polities, and whether they follow a common pattern among different levels of representation.

This book focuses, therefore, on comparing the formation of coalition cabinets at the federal (or ‘national’) and subnational¹ levels. This proposal is part of the innovative wave that began in the mid-1990 and consisted of a deepening and broadening of the perspectives of studies on coalition theories. Our main contribution looks at multilevel systems from a comparative perspective, and the consideration of the federal condition as a potential binding one. We suggest that this consideration opens up new possibilities for studies for coalition theories.

Indeed, we argue that there is a ‘missing piece’ that still does not receive sufficient attention from the literature on coalition theories: how coalition partners organise, learn, and seek to rule together under different levels of representation. This missing piece therefore implies a *verticalisation* of the scope of coalition cabinets. Consequently, considering its implications and theoretical potential, we call this approach the *fourth generation* of coalition theories in political science

¹Subnational units have been called ‘states’, ‘provinces’, ‘landers’, ‘departments’, among other terms.

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(in reference to the waves of studies that have emerged since the seminal works of Riker and Gamson, as noted in Chap. 1).

Therefore, the main objective of this book is to update coalition theory by including the introduction of a *vertical* condition. To materialise this fourth generation of coalition studies, we adopt a specific objective, focusing our attention on the concept of ‘vertical congruence’. That is, we determine whether coalition partners, when they ‘verticalise’ (either top-down or bottom-up), replicate their alliance at other levels.

Indeed, while understanding of *coalition governance* (Strøm et al. 2008) constitutes the biggest challenge for coalition theories, we wonder how the vertical condition might affect political systems and, in turn, coalition agreements. Considering that coalition agreements can be structured around a wide variety of commitments and constraints, we therefore assume that vertically integrated coalition agreements are more solid than horizontally integrated agreements alone.

These considerations have led the contributors to this book to observe how verticalisation, when it exists, operates. In other words, we draw out, on the one hand, how the national level influences the subnational level, implying a top-down vertical effect. On the other hand, we also analyse how the subnational level may influence coalition formation at the national level, which would be a bottom-up vertical effect.

Additionally, we hypothesise that the *verticalisation* process of coalition agreements could consist in voluntary strategies for binding and routinizing relations between coalition partners. In contrast, we assume that coalitions that are not replicated at different levels (i.e., coalitions that are not congruent) would be less structured and consequently weaker, lasting less time.

The degree of vertical congruence would therefore indicate a certain state of institutionalisation and ‘routinisation’ of the coalition agreement. Moreover, this attention would lead us to find out general patterns of coalition agreements *verticalisation* through different political systems.

We do not, however, claim to be the first to introduce or make use of this fourth generation of coalition studies. We indeed have noticed that subnational politics is now beginning to receive more attention in the political science literature (see, among others, Olmeda and Suarez Cao 2016; Golosov 2016; Bolleyer et al. 2014; Hepburn and Detterbeck 2013; Detterbeck and Hepburn 2010; Thorlakson 2009; Deschouwer 2009; Van Houten 2009). Most of this literature, though, is focused on the organization of political systems and the behaviour of political parties, looking at issues such as party nationalisation or electoral organization. As a result, this branch of the literature has still not dealt directly with the matter of coalitions.

More recently, however, a few studies have looked at coalition politics and decentralisation, focusing, mostly on the subnational level (see, for instance, Reniu 2014; Back et al. 2013; Detterbeck 2012; Stefuriuc 2009). Nevertheless, most of these works have only focused on Western Europe and parliamentary regimes. We also have not found any relevant contributions on the vertical effects of coalition cabinets up to the present. Stefuriuc (2013), for instance, concentrates primarily on the subnational level, with no regard to multi-level dynamics.

Finally, the literature is empirically limited to two European cases (Spain and Germany). In other words, there is a gap in the literature about this topic, and we intend to fill it with this book. As a result, throughout this book, we do not seek to establish a new agenda on coalition theories, but instead report on the materialisation of this new generation of coalition studies, and in particular, emphasise the importance of the vertical condition.

Conceptual Issues

Given that this volume aims to bring about an updated agenda on coalition theories, we therefore need to set out the conceptual framework we will use throughout the book. Moreover, this conceptual exercise will determine our method of case selection so as to avoid selection bias (Collier et al. 2004).

A recurrent pitfall in many studies on coalition theories lays in a poor definition (or the lack thereof) of what a coalition cabinet is. This lack of definition leads most of these works to dubious conclusions and models with low levels of predictive ability. Indeed, such sloppy case selection can lead to measurement errors in coding and poorly designed studies. Heterogeneity therefore generates instability in the scope of the analysis and thereby reduces the validity of using similar variables for comparison.

As a result, a coalition government presupposes the presence of distinct political forces within the cabinet, each counting on the support of corresponding members in congress. This participation must come from an inter-party agreement. In other words, a coalition government is first and foremost the result of a negotiation between two or more parties, and requires sufficient strength and mutual commitment on a broad list of topics at different levels (mostly at the executive and legislative levels). The collectivisation of these outcomes proceeds from particular goals expressed as shared positive or negative values,² common ambitions for power, policy orientations, and the goal to be re-elected.

Using this narrow definition, we shall not consider as ‘coalition cabinets’:

- (i) Governments formed by one party that receive sporadic support in parliament by parties or independent legislators³;
- (ii) Governments formed by one party that have several internal fractions
- (iii) Governments that include ministers *d’ouverture* (co-opted) or independent ministers.⁴

²Negative values are usually expressed as a shared rejection of a third political actor.

³An example of this is the second May administration in the UK, in which the DUP brings its support without sharing executive responsibility.

⁴Ministers ‘d’ouverture’ (of openness) was a term used under Nicolas Sarkozy’s presidency in France, which was marked by the co-optation of various personalities in the Socialist Party and civil society without the backing of their parties. We do not exclude every cabinet that includes independent ministers: instead, we simply not consider independents to be distinct partisan ‘coalition partners’. Another example of this was Brazil’s Collor de Mello cabinet (1990–1992).

This definition and related conceptual considerations apply equally for national/federal coalitions and subnational ones regardless of the type of political system.

By the same token, the vertical congruence of coalition agreements can also be the source of misunderstanding. Although congruence is often considered to be a synonym for coherence, its use may vary in terms of perspective. Indeed, many recent studies aimed to analyse ‘partisan congruence’ without specifying the level of this congruence.

A first set of studies saw ‘congruence’ as being equivalent with ‘electoral congruence’, which could therefore be considered a substitute for electoral volatility or party institutionalisation. This conception of congruence consequently comes from the perspective of electoral demand (voters). This conception is used in a considerable number of studies (see, among others, Thorlakson 2009; Schakel 2013; Schackel and Dandoy 2014; Golosov 2016; Borges and Lloyd 2016).

Conversely, ‘congruence’ and ‘vertical congruence’ can also be analysed from the political supply perspective, i.e., from the view of political parties.⁵ Looking at the concept this way focuses on how parties behave and organise at different levels, and with whom they form alliances. From this perspective, ‘congruence’ refers to ideological and behavioural coherence, and it is how we conceptualise congruence in this volume.

Analysing congruence, when applied to coalitions, by definition implies comparing two or more coalitions (at the national and subnational levels) in terms of how closely the partners of the coalition resemble one another (Deschouwer 2009; Stefuriuc 2009). As a matter of fact, from a dogmatic point of view, a perfect level of vertical congruence would imply that:

- (i) All parties that are included in the cabinet at the federal/national level are also coalition partners at the subnational level;
- (ii) None of the subnational coalitions contain parties that are absent at the national level.

This dogmatic definition is not wrong, but by requiring exact matches between different levels, it forgets that politics is a complex world in which many different scenarios can happen simultaneously. More specifically, the use of such a narrow definition might be analytically misleading or, worse, lead to erroneous conclusions. Indeed, some political systems allow for the presence of Non-State-Wide Parties (NSWP)—usually regional or ethnic parties—that by definition are not present in every subnational unit. In the case that, one of these NSWP entered a coalition, would this presence generate incongruence? Also, if a national coalition is formed by Parties A and B, can we consider the coalition to be incongruent if in one subnational unit, Party A governs alone?

⁵There is a third literature in political science that uses the notion of congruence, which is inspired by George Tsebelis’s (2002) works on nested games. In this literature, congruence/incongruence between sources of power (mostly among the two houses of congresses) is used as an indicator of the presence of veto players.




Fig. 1 Illustration of the definition of vertical congruence

We need to adopt a more realistic and pragmatic definition. For this purpose, we decided to include political alignment in the concept of vertical congruence. Indeed, the government-opposition dyad is crucial for determining what congruent coalitions are and are not (Back et al. 2013; Deschouwer 2009; Stefuriuc 2009). The key concept here is the ‘political alignment overlap’ of the set of parties competing with one another. That is, we consider coalitions to be congruent if the national government-opposition set is overlapped at (or ‘corresponds’ to) the subnational level. In contrast, when cabinets at the subnational level include partners that are on opposite sides at the federal level (i.e., a coalition that cross-cuts the national government-opposition divide), then one can conclude that the coalition is incongruent.

To illustrate this definition, we present a hypothetical federal polity in Fig. 1 that is composed of 4 subnational units. Party system competition is organised around four parties (A, B, C, and D). At the national (or ‘federal’) level, Parties A and B formed a cabinet coalition, while Parties C and D formed a united opposition. The dotted lines represent the Government/Opposition dyad and the intersections illustrate coalition agreements.

As a result, our definition would categorise, given the coalition system at the national level, the coalition system in Subnational Unit 1 as completely congruent with the federal system because it reproduces the same identical coalition system. By the same token, the coalition system in Subnational Unit 3 is completely incongruent because the coalitions cross-cut the alignment that exists at the federal level.

In addition, the system in Subnational Unit 4 is incongruent because Party B joined Parties C and D in opposition to a cabinet formed by A.

Nevertheless, the cabinet formed in Subnational Unit 2 is not necessarily incongruent. Party A did form a government alone, but Party B has not joined Parties C and D in opposition. As a result, the subnational coalition is not cross-cutting the national divide.

These considerations are therefore quite sophisticated and suppose a particular attention. That said, they still do not consider two types of cases. First, they do not consider the presence of NSWPs within subnational coalition cabinets. These cases need to be treated very carefully (see the case studies of India, Italy, Argentina, and Canada in this volume), and should include ideological considerations measured over time.

The second type consists of grand coalitions at the national level. These cases are rather uncommon, but not rare (see the case study of Germany in this volume). With these cases in point, we can consider logically that the general political alignment became frozen because of the actors' incapacity to form a government at the federal level.⁶ Therefore, congruence should be taken with great caution under this circumstance.

Now that we have outlined the conceptual framework discussed in this volume, we present justifications for our case selection below.

Case Selection

Given that the objective of introducing the fourth generation of coalition theories consists of highlighting the *vertical* condition, we therefore opted to resort to an *extreme cases strategy* (Gerring 2006). In this strategy, one would select cases in which the vertical condition would be most important, and the politics in which subnational issues are the most relevant are, by definition, federal entities. Indeed, as noted by Díaz-Calleros (2006: 10), the direct election of subnational executives constitutes one of the two main conditions that define federalism.⁷ Also, following Cameron and Faletti (2005) and Watts (1998), one should also note that federalism is a system that presents the citizenry with a large number of difficulties in attributing responsibility to different politicians for political outcomes. Furthermore, the dual accountability inherent to federalised political systems requires citizens to acquire more information about the political supply, because these systems are more likely to engender confusions as to which political authorities are responsible for what outcomes, which may, in turn, lead to the misattribution of political responsibility (Rodden and Wibbels 2011; Anderson 2006).

⁶One interesting consideration is that this kind of exceptional coalition is more likely to occur under parliamentary regimes than presidential or semi-presidential ones due to the 'cleaving effect' of presidential elections (Albala 2016). Also, the lack of studies in a comparative perspective about this topic is quite surprising.

⁷Along with fiscal autonomy.

For these reasons, we opted to focus on federal polities because of the crucial importance of the national/subnational relationship, which also explains the title of this volume.

As of 2017, though, there are about 30 federations, federacies, and confederations in the world, depending on the definition used (Watts 1998, 2013). As a matter of fact, Eaton (2008) points out a constant difficulty for the literature: adopting a consensual definition of ‘federation’ and determining the institutional and constitutional attributes of federations. By the same token, there are some cases that have all (or almost all) the attributes of federations except the title of federation, such as Spain (Watts 2013) and the UK (Detterbeck 2012; Bogdanor 2009). Some recent studies have also extended the trend to include *quase*-federations, like Italy (Palermo and Wilson 2014; Baldini and Baldi 2014) and South Africa (Norris 2008).

As a result, the first criterion for case selection was democracy. Given that we aim to compare coalitional behaviour, we needed to eliminate cases where free elections and free governments were not guaranteed, or where the quality of democracy is dubious. This condition necessitated removing cases like Sudan, Ethiopia, or Myanmar, and simili-federations like China.

Second, we opted to select existing countries or federations in order to increase the potential impact of this book. This removes former countries such as the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.

The third and most decisive criterion for selecting cases for this volume was that the cases had to have experienced coalition trends at both national and subnational levels. Indeed, given that the objective of this book is to highlight the vertical dimension of coalitions, this element assumes that coalitions needed to be present at both the national *and* subnational levels. This condition therefore disqualifies many cases such as the U.S., U.K., Venezuela, and South Africa, where coalitions are merely sporadic phenomena.

Among the remaining cases, we opted to select cases with the diverse-cases strategy (Gerring 2006). Most of the literature from this fourth generation has generally focused on either one or a few cases. Furthermore, the few existing comparative studies have generally compared the most similar cases in terms of geographic, economic, or political conditions. Indeed, the huge majority of these studies have centred their comparisons on Western Europe⁸ (Back et al. 2013; Stefuriuc 2009, 2013; Detterbeck 2012; Hepburn and Detterbeck 2013; Reniu 2014; Bolleyer et al. 2014; Thorlakson 2009), which has cases with evident similarities, not only in terms of geography and economics, but also in terms of political culture (and are all parliamentary regimes).

Therefore, we have very little knowledge about how coalition behaviour might differ across political systems and political cultures. The only work dealing

⁸ Recently, the literature has registered an increase in the production of studies dealing with subnational politics under Latin American presidential regimes (Suárez-Cao and Freidenberg 2013; Gibson and Suarez-Cao 2010; Eaton 2008; Faletti 2010; Suarez-Cao et al. 2017). Most of these studies, however, have only dealt indirectly (at best) with the issue of coalition politics, with the exception of Olmeda and Suarez-Cao (2017).

(indirectly) with (electoral) coalition congruence that embraces a truly comparative perspective is a short text by Spoon and West (2015). In fact, the scarcity of comparisons across political systems is a recurrent issue for research on coalition politics. Despite impressive levels of productivity over recent years, scholars working on coalition politics remain, usually, in their comfort zone, rarely comparing coalitions in parliamentary regimes with coalitions in presidential regimes. Surprisingly, the very rare exceptions (see for instance Cheibub et al. 2004; Cheibub 2007), are generally focused on similarities among cases and political systems. Why, then, are there so few studies on coalition theories that compare cases across political systems and continents?

This volume looks to break with this particularism. Instead, it embraces seven different cases over four continents in both parliamentary and presidential systems. We include three cases in the Americas (Argentina, Brazil, and Canada), two cases in Europe (Germany and Italy), one case in Asia (India) and one case in Oceania (Australia). Two of these cases are presidentialist (Argentina and Brazil), three are classic cases of multi-party parliamentarism (Germany, India, and Italy) and two are traditional cases from the British Commonwealth (Canada and Australia). As a matter of fact, we included those two cases as two kinds of ‘least likely cases’—least likely in regard to producing coalitions, especially *vertical* ones.

We thereby aimed to bring real diversity into our sample, trying not to over-represent European cases. This meant overlooking one of the most studied cases of coalition cabinets (Belgium), especially because of how unique the formation of federal cabinets and the composition of the political system both are there, making it a case that is hardly representative or replicable.⁹

Moreover, we can find different levels of decentralisation/federalisation among our cases, ranging from decentralised federal systems (e.g., Australia, Brazil, and India) to hybrid systems (Italy). To our knowledge, this is the very first time in the coalition theory literature that cases from so many different perspectives and realities have been put together.

Through this diversity of cases, we increase the scope and ambition of this book. In other words, our method of case selection allows for a huge variation among the cases, thereby allowing us to benefit from a convincing theoretical outlook.

Organization of the Book

Given this diversity of cases and considering the objectives of this volume, we organised the book as follows.

⁹Indeed, Belgium is composed of three units (Wallonia, Flanders and Brussels). The party system is identical in the Walloon and Flemish regions, and the federal cabinet is required to nominate parties from both sides to form a government. Finally, elections are not national but regional. This reduces parties’ ability to form vertical coalitions (for more details, see Deschouwer 2009).

The first chapter, by Adrián Albala, looks at the theoretical implications of the fourth generation of studies. Albala conducts a historical review of the literature on coalition theories and its latest work. The introduction of this new wave within coalition theories implies certain assumptions and considerations about the phenomenon of coalition verticalisation.

In the first part, we included all our parliamentary cases. First, we look at the German case, one of the classic cases in the coalition theory literature. This analysis, authored by Erik Linhart, brings in interesting findings, particularly in regard to how we should understand and interpret relations between national grand coalitions with subnational agreements. This will be of particular interest to the reader, especially when compared to a similar case: that of Italy. The recent evolution toward a federal system in Italy has resulted in some complications, and Daniela Giannetti and Luca Pinto highlight an increasing incongruence among Italian coalition agreements.

The third case of this section, by Eswaran Sridharan, brings in interesting insights from another multi-party parliamentary regime: India. The idea to place these cases in comparison to one another comes from the fact that, despite many differences, the three cases have interesting similarities, but have never been compared to one another.

In the second part of our volume, we introduce the two presidential cases as two contradictory cases. On the one hand, Brazil, which is analysed by Vitor Sandes and Fernando Bizarro-Neto, should theoretically be the most likely case for producing vertical coalitions. Instead, however, it lays bare some crucial questions about many of our theoretical assumptions in the literature. On the other hand, Argentina, which is analysed by Sebastián Mauro, is much more congruent than expected, given the growing provincialisation of its political system.

Finally, the two outliers of our sample our Australia (analysed by Wayne Errington) and Canada (analysed by Guy Lachapelle and Tristan Masson). Although they end up being much more different than we could have imagined, they present interesting trends in terms of coalition building and coalition verticalisation.

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The Missing Piece: Introducing the 4th Generation of Coalition Theories



Adrián Albala

In political science, coalition theories, mostly applied to the study of governments, have developed during the past decades into a huge body of literature to provide theoretical knowledge and tools for the analysis of formation, maintenance and breakdown of this type of government. In fact, one could say that coalition theories today constitute one of the most prolific fields of academic literature on political science.

Also, it is interesting to note that studies on the field of coalition theories have often accompanied, or even anticipated, the various trends in modern political science. Indeed, whether we consider the streams of behavioural studies, the theory of games or, more recently, those of rational choice and neo-institutionalism, all these currents have been inaugurated or considerably influenced by studies dealing with political coalitions.

However, in order to do so, these studies had to adapt and reinvent themselves over the years. Actually, the title of this chapter indicates that we intend to introduce the 4th generation of coalition studies. By deduction, this means that there have already been three distinct waves of studies.

As a matter of fact, in a 1986 article, Eric Browne and Mark Franklin pointed out two “generations” of research on coalitions, and called for the advent of a third (Browne and Franklin 1986). In this context, the term “generations” does not necessarily imply a chronological dimension, since these approaches develop almost simultaneously, but rather, the term implies a consideration according to the degree of emancipation or diversification from the original theories.

Hence, this chapter consists of an update of the article by Browne and Franklin (1986) as we call for the theoretical onset of a fourth generation of studies on coalition theories, marked by a *verticalization* of the approach. In order to present this future wave in context, we shall begin by introducing the previous three generations of studies.

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The Inception of Coalition Theories

Despite the preliminary works from behaviourist scholars such as Caplow (1956, 1959), Vinacke and Arkoff (1957) and Gamson (1961), coalition theories are generally considered to be Riker's (1962) legacy.

Based on the zero-sum game assumption of games theory, and inspired by the previous works by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), Riker theorised the "size principle" to predict the formation of the coalition and thus guarantees the stability of the government. Riker theorised the Minimal Winning Coalition (MWC), as the central criterion for a coalition's cohesion and durability (Riker 1962: 32–3). This, then, supposes a two-player game: a winning side and a losing side. Ideally, the winning side has to be reduced in order to maximise the benefits materialised by ministerial portfolios. That is, the fewer the winners, the bigger the Executive cake's slices to share, and so the lower the incentives for secession. Applied to the government dimension, a *winning coalition* is therefore characterised by holding the 50%+1 of the seats in parliament. The payoffs to be bargained for are then distributed as proportional rewards in function of every player's contribution, following Gamson's law (1961). Hence, this theory stands on two principles of the perfect rationality of the coalition players, and knowledge of every player's strength. These principles are based on the assumption that parties are interested only in power.

However, these theories quickly came in for criticism, for two main reasons. First of all, as Leiserson (1970) stressed, Riker's assumptions focus only on the rational, with no consideration of empiricism. Indeed, Riker's theory considers the minimal winning rule as a countable assumption and the legislators are taken as independent actors, with no regard for the structures to which the legislators belong. According to Riker, therefore, what counts is the minimum number of seats, the bargaining process being facilitated and maximised with no need for a security margin. Leiserson pointed out that the focus should be put on the minimum number of parties. This supposes an institutionalised party-system and a centred role to party leaders, upon both front and backbenchers MPs.

Secondly, Riker's theory suffered from weak conceptions and empiric refutations. Indeed, by considering the political retributions based on political performance (expressed by the number of seats in parliament), Riker's theory does not take into account the "shadow of the unexpected" MPs' (in)discipline and electoral volatility. Thus the absence of the ideological dimension, coupled with the absence of a security margin, makes Riker's assumption particularly weak and uncertain. Finally, Luebbert (1983) argues that Riker's theory is not interested in cabinet coalition and its logics, but consists rather of the elaboration of a rational theory for coalitions as a more general phenomenon. Therefore, by deriving from mere game theory with no direct studies, this "universalistic" approach includes several methodological problems and in fact, finally and paradoxically, leads to a very low level of prediction.

Notwithstanding these limitations, Riker's *Coalition Theories* had the merit of opening up a new field of studies.

The Second Generation of Coalition Theories: Increasing the Complexity of the Models

In line with Riker's work, there has been a rapid increase in the number of so-called "second generation" studies of a universal nature, based on increasingly complex models, the aim of which is to predict the composition of coalitions while ignoring the contextual dimension. This deductive and quantitative work, in the tradition of game theory, focuses primarily on the formation of government coalitions, and focuses on "rewards" and the allocation/selection of these—mainly ministerial—portfolios among their members. This approach maintains the Rikerian consideration that the main motivation for coalition building is office-seeking. However, this second wave of studies supposed a landing on the "real" world of politics, including notions of willingness and "ideological compatibility".

In this approach, the number of seats and the ideology of the players constitute the central variables, the parties being considered to be unitary actors. Indeed Axelrod (1970) and De Swaan (1973) introduced the ideological proximity criterion to Riker's assumption, so as to increase the level of predictability and profundity of the theory.

This way, coalitions are theorised as more prone to form if they are: (i) minimum winning and (ii) ideologically closed or connected. Keeping the "size principle" they introduced the "affinity principle", measured by the position of each party on the left/right scale of the political spectrum. The Closed Minimal Range Theory (CMRT) supposes that negotiations follow an incrementalist mode of decision making, in which the actors (in this case, the political parties) proceed to form a coalition government, beginning with the partners between whom policy differences are minimal, and going on this way until a majority is obtained (De Swaan 1973). The Minimal Closed Winning Coalition (MCWC) assumption then introduces the policy incentive. While Riker considered the actors as mere office-seekers, this update to the theory introduced the policy-seeking dimension among parties. Finally, Dodd (1976) polished the ideological principle by using the cleavage conflict as the axis to predict the willingness to coalesce. The indicators for that deductive approach focus on the degree of information certainty regarding size and former moves of the actors, and the polarization of the party system.

The emphasis of this generation of theories is on the form of negotiation and distribution. Hence, the actors involved are divided into "core" and "peripheral" actors (Warwick 1998), and the rewards (or "rewards") are graded according to the number and quality of posts distributed. The cluster has been moved to the assumption of the control of the median legislator¹ (Laver and Shepsle 1986, 1998; Budge and Laver 1993).

This approach, which could be called the "bargaining approach", is used to develop negotiation strategies based on: (i) the information available to parties;

¹As the legislator belonging to the party median situated at the middle of the ideological spectrum.

(ii) the weight of each and every player and (iii) the players' ideology and their position on the right/left one-dimensional axis. In this perspective, the party of the median legislator is commonly considered to be the "ideological dictator" of the partisan system and a *de facto* member of any coalition government (Budge and Laver 1993; Laver and Shepsle 1998), when he is not the proper *formateur*.²

Thus, at the outset, this second generation aimed at using complex mathematical regressions, so that the negotiation process for allocating ministerial portfolios was consistent with Gamson's (1961) theory of congruence, with a bonus for the trainer and small parties.

In fact, this second wave is marked by a boom in literature regarding the elaboration of ever more sophisticated and ever more elegant models, so as to achieve an increased level of predictability and systematisation. This almost frenzied research on modelling and complexity contributes to making the study of coalition governments into an abstract sub-field within political science.

While these approaches have contributed to a renewal of theories, and have made certain contributions in terms of strategy and political communication, they suffer from two main shortcomings.

Indeed, despite the strengthening of the theoretical foundations, given the acontextual nature of these models, these approaches attained a particularly modest degree of prediction (Browne and Franklin 1986; Martin and Stevenson 2001). Also, the analysis of inter-party relations, though based on rational assumptions (ideological proximity), demonstrates an ahistorical and static perspective. This way, the interests of the players appear to be time-limited or contractual, and coalitions would be formed *ex nihilo*.

Also, the focus is limited to interparty bargaining with no considerations of intra party dimension supposing informal aspects³, and a merely synchronic time dimension. Those aspects constrain the elegance of these works making them unverified truisms (Luebbert 1983). The conception of parties as unitary actors leads to an underestimation of the evolutions and competitions and even intra-partisan struggles, considering parties as unalterable or static, and whose party leaders are supposed to embody stability and internal discipline (Laver and Shepsle 1998). This double conception, which serves the theory for modelling purposes, nevertheless omits the informal and symbolic part inherent in inter and intra-partisan relations.

In response, many authors have highlighted the simplistic nature of considering internal party cohesion as an asset (see *inter alia* Luebbert 1983; Bäck 2008; Ruiz Rodríguez 2007; Giannetti and Benoît 2009). Indeed, this "exogenisation of parties", considered as units given in a "fixed" temporality, leads to the dematerialisation of parties. This is all the more true since parties themselves are coalitions of individuals who have decided to unite for political reasons, without necessarily adhering to a defined or dogmatized ideology (Offerlé 2006). And these observations are all the more relevant when one sees that competition for the allocation of power parcels is all the more fierce, both within parties and between them (Lupia and Strøm 2008).

²The one who is in charge of "forming" a coalition.

³Would talk about *informal institutions*.

Furthermore, almost all of these works concentrated their study on the mere analysis of the cabinet formation and the repercussions of the distribution of ministerial portfolios on government stability and durability. Regardless of a dubious intent to introduce a qualitative ‘touch’ to numerical counting⁴ (Warwick and Druckman 2001; Gianneti and Laver 2005), the point is precisely that these works fail to establish a comprehensive framework about coalition processes.

Indeed, as Luebbert (1983) pointed out, they assume that the main objective for the actors is to participate in a winning coalition, with little or no consideration being given to minority coalitions. This axiom has been debated by Strøm (1990) who showed that minority government and minority coalitions are quite common phenomena.⁵

As a result, the work of this second “wave” of coalition theories has been limited to treating government coalitions and their actors as fixed and adynamic entities. The under-consideration of a broader *time* approach leads to misleading results, calculations and suppositions (Druckman 2008; Blais et al. 2006; Timmermans 2006), explaining their low levels of prediction.

Focusing attention solely on the “Hollywood Story” (Müller and Strøm 2000), i.e., the formation and dissolution of coalitions, or on methods of selecting members as the main explanatory factor, without considering the immediate environment, maintained this generation of superficial considerations. This is particularly true if the indicators used to identify actors are based solely on questions of weight (parliamentary strength) and position (ideological), indicators that do not take into account the evolution and nature of parties (Luebbert 1983). Indeed, two parties of similar “weight” do not necessarily have the same attraction if one party is in decline and the other is expanding; the same problem arises when it comes to operationalizing the ideological and programmatic evolution of a party.

Also, the importance of former alliances is indeed central to predicting future ones, as well as voters’ behaviour (Austen Smith and Banks 1988; Franklin and Mackie 1983). Thus a synchronic focus on the process, done in the fashion of a snapshot, does not take into account parties’ motivations, abilities and willingness to coalesce (Browne and Franklin 1986).

Therefore, for the next generation, as Druckman (2008) states, the focus should be on the environment and timing of the coalitions, that is the coalition cycle itself. Scholars should rather integrate a diachronic time-dimension so as to achieve a more empirical and realistic modelling, and thus better predictability. The common

⁴Like the attribution of a “numerical” value for each portfolio in function of its “relevance” in order to identify a “qualitative” distribution of portfolios. This apparently ingenious idea reveals itself as quite useless in practice because it is very limited in time and extension. Indeed, depending on the location and the time, some ministries can be very significantly different. For instance, the ministry of ecology in France has greater importance today than a decade ago, but has no relevance at all in Argentina. On the other hand, the Ministry of Mining has great relevance in Chile but does not even exist in Ireland.

⁵These findings also contradicted the theory that proposes the inability to govern in parliamentary regimes without having a majority.

experience of a government coalition thus influences the future motives for renewing or re-establishing alliances.

The Third Generation: The Multivariate and Anti-Static Objective

The third generation of coalition studies was thus characterized by an approach that addressed, among other things, issues arising from constitutional law (“institutions”, in the broadest sense, as a decisive factor) and sociology. Above all, it is the angle of analysis that is different, since by leaving more room for the coalition environment (political system, political culture, history, etc.) and the context related to coalition formation, this approach proposes an inductive treatment, based on solid empirical data (Pridham 1986). The object of analysis is no longer centred on and limited to the predictive nature of coalition formation, but is rather a toolbox for understanding the functioning, limitations and evolution of these types of governments. Also, if the approach is still based on the postulate of the rational character of players, the assumption of perfect, balanced, and complete information has been more and more criticized (Strøm et al. 2008: 32).

Motivational and historical dimensions are as central as predictive considerations. Moreover, this new generation introduced new motivations for coalescence. Indeed, Müller and Strøm (1999) listed two additional motivations to that of office-seeking, which is the one usually considered: parties are also interested in vote and policy incentives for coalescing. These additional motivations expand the bargaining issues to include not only the ministerial portfolios, but also policies and other organizational considerations.

By the same token, while coalition theories until then were limited to (western European) parliamentary regimes, the new generation began to take a broader view. Indeed, by the early 1990s, scholars from Latin America began to study the phenomenon, first setting out the existence and viability of coalitions under presidential regimes (Deheza 1998; Chasquetti 2001; Cheibub et al. 2004). This was an attempt to respond to the “presidentialism versus parliamentarism” debate, in which many scholars stated that coalitions would be unstable or undesirable under a multiparty presidential configuration (Linz 1994; Mainwaring and Shugart 2002). These studies showed that more than half of Latin American governments since 1958 had been coalition governments. Moreover, some countries such as Brazil and Chile have experienced only this type of government (Deheza 1998; Reniu and Albala 2012).

Then, coalition theories applied to other regimes rapidly took flight, without replicating the findings and models from European scholars, and nowadays achieving a comparable level of complexity and sophistication (Albala 2016).

Indeed, by this time, the range of focus of coalition theories has considerably increased, achieving impressive levels of comprehension and knowledge, by the inclusion of multivariate analysis. Albala (2016) and Reniu and Albala (2012) identified five multidimensional research angles related to this third generation of studies, listed according to their main focus (or “objective”).

(i) The institutional condition

The seminal works by Duverger (1951), Strøm, Budge and Laver onwards remind us that political parties and *a fortiori* political coalitions (in the broad sense) do not operate in a world “free from the institutional characteristics that increase the complexity of coalition governance” (Strøm et al. 1994). Thus, if institutions shape the formation of coalitions, they also induce both the training and government practice. Indeed, electoral laws and rules of parliamentary voting lead to a reduction in the “possibilities” of a coalition. For the most part, this applies to formal conditions and more particularly to the electoral system. Similarly, the constitutional provisions regarding the separation of powers (Strøm and Müller 1999), the rules establishing relations between the executive and legislature (Strøm 1990; Strøm et al. 1994), and the prerogatives of the head of government are all elements that influence coalition practice and make it possible to establish both points of comparison and predictions regarding the attitudes of governments.⁶

(ii) The structural and political “motivations” (political, ideological and organisational)

Specific to the distribution and socio-political organization of societies and, in turn, of political systems, this refers to the considerations specific to the “political culture” of societies and the actors involved. It also includes questions on the degree of consensus/polarization of political systems (Lijphart 1999) and the collaborative or hegemonic tradition of “party organization and relations culture” (Sartori 2006). Also, taking into account the cleavage dimension enables a better understanding of the lines of division at both societal and political levels, and to analyse their degree of coincidence, following a “principal-electoral agent” (McDonald and Budge 2005; Schofield and Sened 2007).

These considerations incorporate a dual intra- and inter-partisan approach as well as the “seismic movements” operating both within parties (splits, change of orientation) and outside them (emergence of new parties, disaffection with “traditional” parties). This in turn makes possible a mapping of credible coalition “options” (Daalder 2001). Finally, combined with a diachronic approach, this dimension includes the partisan “realignments” (Mair et al. 2004), as well as the motivations of the nature (positive or negative) of the actors for joining forces.

(iii) The timing dimension

As a qualitative-oriented evolution of coalition theories, Müller and Strøm (1999, 2000) and Strøm et al. (2008) broadened the analysis, introducing a diachronic *time* consideration and multidimensional variables for increasing the comprehension of the coalition “governance”. Studies on coalition governments have been essentially

⁶See *inter alia* the works by Budge and Laver (1993), Laver and Shepsle (1998), Martin and Stevenson (2001), Altman (2000), Amorim Neto (1988), Martínez-Gallardo (2012)...

limited to the “Hollywood Story” (Müller and Strøm 1999), understood as flirting (previous approaches), marriage (formation of the government) and divorce (dissolution of the agreement and therefore the government). The in-between time or the “married life” (known as the “coalition governance”) was often all but neglected, and largely considered to form part of the “black box” (Kellam 2015; Alemán and Tsebelis 2011).

More recently, some works have centred on considerations connected with the inception of the coalitions, particularly on considerations regarding pre-electoral agreements (Golder 2006; Carroll and Cox 2007; Goodin et al. 2007; Debus 2009; Chiru 2015; Spoon and West 2015b; Freudenreich 2016).

(iv) The management of internal conflicts and cabinet turnovers

In this approach, emphasis is placed on the organisational part of the alliance, i.e., formal or informal internal mechanisms for maintaining cohesion. These studies are thus concerned with both the process of decision-making (Laver and Shepsle 1996; Martin and Vanberg 2004; Hiroi and Rennó 2014; Martínez-Gallardo 2012; Raile et al. 2011) and the options available to partisan leaders to prevent any member succumbing to the temptation of the “walk away value” (Laver 1999; Lupia and Strøm 2008; Andeweg and Timmermans 2008; Camerlo and Pérez Liñán 2015).

This approach also makes it possible to observe party strategies according to their priorities, whether electoral or programmatic (Müller and Strøm 1999). These considerations therefore focus on studying the formation and implementation of agreements and programmes (Timmermans 2006), particularly in terms of their degree of publicity, precision and magnitude (Moury 2011). The common assumption is that the more complete and comprehensive the agreement is [i.e. public and precise], the stronger the coalition agreement will be.

(v) The “bargaining environment” and the political accountability of the coalitions

This fifth third-generation approach involves a study of the dynamic relations between coalitions and their “environment”, particularly in terms of stability. For example, some authors point out that coalition governments are best suited to segmented or “divided” societies for maintaining both institutional and governmental stability. Most importantly, the work in this lineage considers two central themes related to the retroactive effects of government coalitions: accountability, and the visibility of coalition governments, which in turn influences the sustainability and duration of these governments.

While voters appear to be able to assess government policies and assign the responsibilities of single-party governments, the allocation of responsibilities of multi-party governments seems to be more problematic. Hence the relevance of considering partisan responsibility (Urquiza Sancho 2011), collective responsibility (Strøm et al. 2008; Powell 2000), and the ability to electoral accountability (Vowles 2010; Fisher and Hobolt 2010).

The question of accountability arises, especially when assessing the outcomes measured in terms of activity and effectiveness, particularly at the level of public policy (Austen Smith and Banks 1988). This is all the more relevant given the

visibility of the “coalition options”⁷ (Strøm 1990; Bargsted and Kedar 2009) mentioned above, which again brings us back to the issue of the “timing” of coalitions, and the existence of a “coalition identification” (Blais et al. 2006; Duch et al. 2010; Vowles 2010).

This holist third-generation approach consists therefore in an undeniable qualitative leap for the analysis and comprehension of coalition government processes. An interesting side-effect of this approach is that it contributed to establishing a clearer and broader framework of coalition governments.

This rational and choice-oriented approach nevertheless has one main weakness, in that it still mainly considers parties as unitary actors.

Actually, a tendency common to the first three generations is that their scope was mostly horizontal (only one degree of study), centred at the national level. Little work concentrated on the subnational level, and no work was focused on the *verticalisation* of coalition cabinets from the national/federal to the subnational level, and vice versa, from a comparative perspective. The fourth generation is the one that introduces the vertical condition.

Presenting The Fourth Generation: Diving into the Administrative Layer Cake

This new generation of coalition studies follows on from the previous one in terms of ambition and complexity. By definition, scholars subscribing to this vertical perspective do not tend to over-value only one dimension (e.g. focusing on a single institutional consideration); rather, they take a multidimensional approach. Also, when considering the multilevel dimension of politics and political representation, one needs necessarily to embrace an anti-static approach (Druckman 2008).

Indeed, the verticalisation of the analysis of coalition agreements supposes a consideration of the different levels of parties’ behaviour (Thorlakson 2007; Detterbeck 2012). Parties compete at a diversity of electoral levels, being responsive and accountable for different means and claims and to different electorates. The study of vertical relations is useful as it points out how parties organize across levels and deal with potential tensions between state-wide and sub-state bodies (Detterbeck 2012). As Borges (2017) states, parties may opt for different electoral strategies, with a decentralised organisation.

⁷European democracies faced many recent cases of incapacity in predicting a clear winner after an election, deriving in the formation of an unpredicted cabinet coalition. See the example of Belgium in 2011–2012, where negotiations lasted almost a year and a half, during which the country had no formal government. This difficulty in forming a government, as happened recently again in Belgium (2015), but also in UK (2010 and 2017), Ireland (2016), Spain (2016), Italy (2013), Greece (2014–2015), or Germany (2017) and the later composition of these governments, raises the question of the responsiveness of these governments. In 2010, for instance, would a LibDem voter have been pleased to see his party forming a Conservative-led government?

By the same token, the vertical organization of the party system—that is, its degree of integration and nationalisation—dramatically influences proclivity to interparty cooperation (Filippov et al. 2004; Schakel 2013; Golosov 2016) and, thus, their ability and readiness to coalesce. As a matter of fact, a common argument states that party systems displaying a high level of nationalization present similar voting trends in every subnational unit. In other words, voters in a context of nationalisation tend to adopt comparable behaviour in every state/province. Conversely, party systems are considered to be “regionalized” (i.e. presenting a low degree of nationalization) when most political parties compete in a few provinces or concentrate their share of the vote only in few regions of the country (Borges 2017; Rodden and Wibbels 2011; Chhibber and Kollman 2004).

Consequently, a rational approach would state that the higher the decentralisation of the political system, the lower the probability of party system nationalization (Chhibber and Kollman 2004; Thorlakson 2007; Schakel 2013).

However, the verticalisation of political alignments—not only electorally but also in terms of the territorial symmetry of the political oppositions (i.e. for both political supply and demand)—resides in a complexity of conditions that cannot be limited to the mere institutional aspects. To paraphrase Lupia and Strøm (2008: 56), institutions, while important, are not all.

In fact, the analysis of territorial cleavage supposes a sociological approach to explain its politicization (Detterbeck 2012). Territorial heterogeneity can be found with respect to a huge variety of conditions, but most authors relate it to ethnicity, language, history, etc. Despite this diversity of causality, it is important to specify that the regionalization of the political competition is not necessarily correlated to the existence of Non State-Wide Parties (NSWP). In other words, the symmetry of the national party-system with the subnational field is not a “guarantee” for the overlapping of political alignments, and the Brazilian case is an excellent example of this absence of correlation.⁸

Therefore, one of the main virtues of the verticalization of the scope (and therefore of the 4th generation of coalition studies) is that it avoids the common pitfall of considering parties to be unitary actors, through a complexification of political parties’ organizational coherence.

These theoretical considerations are in line with the emerging political science literature focused on the subnational fields, which until very recently received very little attention (Schakel 2013). Hence, the studying of coalitions’ vertical congruence shows itself to be particularly relevant, as it permits a better understanding of the complexity of inter-party political agreements. As Bäck et al. (2013) pointed out, congruent coalitions are advantageous since they facilitate cooperation in policy-making across different levels. Conversely, non-congruent coalitions may lead to a stalemate in policy areas which necessitate multilevel decision-making (Stefuriuc 2013).

Hence, the introduction of this fourth generation of coalition theories supposes a formulation of some assumptions that might influence upcoming studies. Thus,

⁸ See the chapter by Sandes de Freitas and Bizarro-Neto in this volume.

besides the assumption that states that parties are not unitary actors (Stefuriuc 2013), I highlight three additional assumptions that would shape the direction of this 4th generation of studies.

Assumption 1: The Greater the Number of Political Layers, the Greater the Number of Bargaining Possibilities

Usually, the most obvious incentive for joining a coalition is the prospect of occupying a ministerial portfolio, at least in the short run. As pointed out above, Strøm (1990) and Müller and Strøm (1999) have counted two additional incentives: *policy* (i.e. the expectation that by occupying a ministerial portfolio or guaranteeing legislative support, a party would get its policy preferences onto the cabinet agenda) and *votes* (i.e. the expectation of reward in the next election). However these two other objectives are rather uncertain⁹ and are to be achieved later (if they are at all).

There is actually a fourth potential incentive. Indeed, subnational retribution—that is, the electoral or political backing at a subnational unit, is relatively common. By the same token, this kind of agreement may also constitute a political strategy (Borges et al. 2017). Hence, parties that lack political strength or strong political figures at the national level may opt to join or form a coalition with a stronger or better-accepted party, renouncing the opportunity to compete at the national executive level, while they expand their electoral base at the subnational level. The nature and form of this subnational support may be diverse. Nevertheless, these kinds of agreements are particularly likely to occur when the process of selection of the executive at the subnational level mirrors the one at the federal level. In other words, if the executive format derives from the same process (through direct or indirect—parliamentary style—election). As a matter of fact, Table 1 lists our seven cases in function of the way their executive are selected at both the national and subnational levels. We opposed the polities where the executive is formed through the

Table 1 National vs. subnational executive selection

		Executive format at the national level	
		Presidential	Parliamentary
Executive format at the national level	Governor style	Brazil; Argentina	–
	Parliamentary style	–	Australia; Canada; Germany; India
	Hybrid		Italy

Source: author’s elaboration, based on the different chapters of this book

⁹For instance, see how the LibDems were electorally rewarded for participating in the first Cameron cabinet.

presidential election (direct election of the executive), with parliamentary polities (this includes semi-presidential regimes such as France) where the executive is formed indirectly, after the election and composition of the parliament (Albala 2016).

The same goes for the subnational level, where “governor-style” selection of the executive mirrors the presidential election (i.e., the executive is directly elected) opposed to subnational parliamentary elections. We can observe that only Italy has a fully symmetrical system. Indeed, while the national executive follows a parliamentary-style pattern (Italy is listed as a parliamentary regime), some provinces opted for “governor-style” patterns and other mirrored the national level.¹⁰

Hence, as a general rule, if the subnational selection of the executive is similar to that of the selection at national level, this may have implications for the organisation and visibilization of the coalition and their verticalization.

Moreover, the controlling of the subnational executive may be much more than a mere consolation prize. Indeed, not every sub-division has the same electoral and economic weight, and controlling some of the wealthiest or most populous regions may have a significant impact on forthcoming elections. Hence the political support for securing some key provinces may prove to be a good strategy. For instance, the party that controls the executive (whether by coalition or not) of the State of Sao Paulo in Brazil, the Province of Buenos Aires in Argentina, the region of Lombardy in Italy, or the State of Uttar Pradesh in India, obtains considerable political exposure and strength, exponentially increasing its electoral and financing resources which, in turn, may be decisive for the outcome of forthcoming national elections.

Moreover, the subnational executive may also exert a considerable influence at the national level. Indeed, the members of the national upper chamber are generally closely linked to the governor or chief of the executive from where they were elected, who very often plays a central role in the selection of a candidate of their own party or coalition. Given the electoral rule for senatorial elections, which often follows a plural system type over different districts, the governor’s candidate(s) may be favoured in the election. For instance, in Argentina, where the election follows a majoritarian rule with compensation to the second list¹¹, there is a clear dependence of the elected senators on their local mentors, the governors (Micozzi 2013). By the same token, even for unelected chambers, the local executive may have huge importance for the composition of the senate. For instance, the German Bundesrat is composed of members of the local executives, thus there is no scope for the opposition in the various federal states to make its voice heard directly in the Bundesrat. Therefore, controlling the head of the executive at a subnational level may be of great relevance on a national level. Thus, the subnational level may easily take on the role of a veto-player at the national level, or be an attractive compensation for coalesced partners.

¹⁰ See the chapter by Giannetti and Pinto.

¹¹ That is, the most voted list elects two senators and second most voted list elects one.

Assumption 2: The Subnational Field Constitutes a Learning and Experimental Field

Most common recent findings from the literature indicate a top-down situation in terms of political agreements. In other words, the coalitional behaviour of political actors at the regional level seems to be constrained by the patterns of party competition at the national level (Bäck et al 2013). These findings mean that because of its importance, the national level would serve as a reference point for the actors engaged in coalition-formation games (Stefuriuc 2013: 2).

Concretely, this supposes that subnational coalitions tend to mirror (i.e. be “congruent with”, see Albala and Reniu in the introduction of this volume) the national agreements. These findings, although limited to a very low number of cases¹², seem to suggest that subnational political parties seem not to have real autonomy from the national organization. It seems also that the local parties seem not to have room for innovation or experimental agreements. In other words, and considering the aim of this book, these findings seem to show that subnational parties tend to form coalitions that are not incongruent coalitions with the national level.

However, considering different levels of representation and political competition must lead to opting for a diachronic approach, instead of mere synchronic “snapshots”.

Hence, recent actuality has come as a counterargument to the former assumption. Indeed, in November 2017, Germany came very close to forming a coalition which had been unprecedented at the federal level, but which had already been tried—with some success—at the subnational one: the “Jamaican coalition”, including the CDU-CSU, the FDP and the Greens. Thus, this supposes that coalition agreements may also follow a bottom-up path.

As a matter of fact, whether in terms of policy or organizational motivations, the subnational level often shows itself to be the ideal area for learning coalition experiments, especially for the preparation of upcoming elections. Indeed, As Spoon and West (2015a) have shown, subnational results and, by the same token, subnational coalition experiments are likely to replicate at the national level in the next election.

Finally, subnational elections also need to be studied so as to consider the behaviour of NSWPs, in order to predict whom they would support at the national level. Thus, the difficulty of including NSWPs in the measuring of (in)congruent coalitions, mostly through a synchronic perspective, may be bypassed by adopting a diachronic approach.

¹²Stefuriuc (2013) limited her work to two countries (Germany and Spain) and the work of Bäck et al. (2013) covers eight countries (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, The Netherlands, the UK, Spain and Sweden), of which half are ruled by low levels of shared-rules or self-rules.

Assumption 3: Deeper Agreements Are More Constraining

The call for the adoption of an “unstatic” (Laver 1986) or “dynamic” (Druckman 2008) approach to coalition agreements has mostly considered elements of timing and governance. More particularly, an important share of third-generation studies have focused on understanding the length of coalition agreements, aiming to determine some conditions that might increase the duration of coalition pacts. These topics have set out very interesting findings highlighting, *inter alia*, the potential effects of: (i) timing, showing that earlier agreements tend to last longer (Chiru 2015; Freudenreich 2016); and (ii) cabinet composition, showing that balanced partisan cabinets tend to be more efficient and durable (Amorim Neto 1988; Laver and Schofield 1990; Martínez-Gallardo 2012).

Among the works, one of the most interesting and innovative approaches was that which considered the extension (completeness) of the agreement and its level of precision (Moury 2004, 2011). This approach supposed that the more complete and precise an agreement, the fewer the possibilities for misinterpretation among the coalition partners, so that any conflicts that arose could be easily resolved which, in turn, would lead to more enduring coalitions. These findings assume, indeed, that complete and precise agreements operate as strong constraints for coalition partners, binding them together more effectively and making the exit of any partner potentially risky. Indirectly, this approach also includes the condition of timing, as it is reasonable to expect that the elaboration of complete and detailed agreements would need some time. Hence the earlier the political rapprochement, the higher the probability for achieving a complete and detailed agreement.

However, this consideration, again, adopted a mere horizontal perspective. We argue that coalition agreement levels are maintained as long as each party is aware that it has a vested interest which it cannot find outside this alliance, or when the cost of walking away is prohibitive. Thus, we assume that verticalised agreements contain binding effects that can prove prohibitive to break. One example of this is the Chilean Concertación that formed after the 1988 Referendum against Pinochet rule, and which was institutionalized through local agreements.

The construction of a coalition identity throughout a national territory would reinforce both the alliance and the links of interdependence. Hence, in Table 2 we set out the conditions that are expected to produce more enduring coalitions.

Table 2 Ideal-type conditions for producing enduring coalitions

Condition	Ideal type
Timing	Pre-electoral
Cabinet composition	Mainly partisan
“Depth” of the agreement	Deep or multilevel coalition

Source: Albala (2016)

Conclusion

Faced with empirical evidence that “multipartyism has become the [European] norm in the twentieth century” (Müller and Strøm 2000: 1), political coalitions and, more specifically, cabinet coalitions in a parliamentary system—initially criticized as vectors or consequences of political instability—have since then proven to have been one of the most prolific fields of political science research.

Since then, the literature on coalition theories has undergone a considerable update and a exponential qualitative leap, as it has expanded to incorporate a diving into the “real” world of coalitions (Laver 1986). However, the “dynamic dimension” of the findings of the three existing generations of studies was for the most part limited to the national and/or the subnational field, with no systemization of possible interactions *between* the levels.

Hence, this volume proposes to demonstrate how coalition agreements may be retroactively fed by both the national and subnational levels. In this chapter, I have set out the recent developments in coalition literature and how the 4th generation might include and contribute to an even better understanding of coalition agreements.

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Coalition Building on the Federal and on the *Länder* Level in Germany



Eric Linhart

Introduction

One of the most crucial issues for representative democracies is the delegation of power from the people to legislatures and governments. Therefore, research on elections and electoral systems can be seen as *the* central sub-discipline in political science (Gallagher and Mitchell 2005: 3; Farrell 2011: 1). However, in many political systems, this delegation chain does not end with the allocation of parliamentary seats to parties after elections. If no party holds an absolute majority of the seats, parties typically start negotiations about coalition governments. This second step is therefore of similar importance for the functionality of democracies.

Yet, while elections and electoral systems have been broadly researched in case studies and from a comparative view as well as on different levels,¹ coalition building is a less prominent topic. Indeed, researchers have developed highly sophisticated models to explain coalition building (for an overview, see e.g. Laver and Shepsle 1996 or Linhart 2013). They have made much effort to describe and analyse coalition governments also from a comparative view (most prominently Müller and Strøm 2000). And they applied modern coalition theories in order to detect which motives influence parties when forming some coalitions and refusing others (for Germany, see e.g. Debus 2008a; Linhart 2009; Shikano and Linhart 2010). Downs (1998) systematically contributed to the question of how coalition formation on different political levels is connected. Again for the German case, a small number of papers has contributed to the question of government congruence between the federal and the *Länder* level (Pappi et al. 2005; Detterbeck and Renzsch 2008; Debus 2008b; Däubler and Debus 2009; Bäck et al. 2013). However, a broad in-depth analysis of coalition building on different levels framed by an international comparison does not exist yet (see Albala in the chapter “The Missing Piece:

¹See, e.g., Gallagher and Mitchell (2005) and Farrell (2011), for the German case see Saalfeld (2005), for a comparison of the federal and the state level in Germany see Raabe and Linhart (2015).

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Introducing the 4th Generation of Coalition Theories” of this book). The aim of this chapter is to contribute to this project by providing descriptive insights for the case of Germany and researching in how far coalition building in Germany on the federal and on the *Länder* level is congruent or divergent.

As the general congruency hypothesis has already been presented in this book’s introduction (Albala and Reniu, in the introduction of this book), I abstain from a repetition and only briefly give an overview on the German-specific literature to this topic (Section “Literature Review”). Based on this literature and some further ideas, I then discuss factors which are expected to influence congruence or divergence on the federal and the *Länder* level in Germany (Section “Congruence Between Coalition Governments on the Federal and the *Länder* Level in Germany: Expectations”). After the presentation of the data on which I base my analysis (Section “Data”), I show and discuss the results (Section “Results”). I conclude with a short summary and outlook (Section “Conclusion: The Case of Germany”).

Literature Review

Downs (1998) was—to the best of my knowledge—the first who focused on the question of how coalition formation on different levels is connected in multi-level systems. He analyzed Germany, France and Belgium with regard to this question with mixed results: Neither a strict dominance of congruent nor of divergent coalitions could be observed. In the German *Länder*, for example, “two of every five governments since 1961 have failed to match the majority-versus-opposition alignments existing in federal governments” (Downs 1998: 138). In 1992 and 1993, Downs interviewed state level politicians about the influence of the federal level. The variation of answers he got mirrors these mixed results. Being asked if congruence with the federal coalition is important when it comes to coalition formation on the state level, the approval rate ranges from roughly 20 to 90 percent (Downs 1998: 194). Whereas a big majority (94 percent) of the German interviewees sees the *Länder* level as more important than the federal for decisions about state level coalition formation, only a negligible minority says that there is no influence from the federal level at all; more than 60 percent evaluate the federal level’s influence even as strong (Downs 1998: 195–198).

Inspired by Downs, Pappi et al. (2005) examine whether or not congruence with the federal coalition can contribute to the explanation of coalition formation on the *Länder* level in Germany. Although divergent coalitions are far from being exceptions, Pappi et al. (2005: 442) show that congruent coalitions are formed significantly more often than divergent ones and that convergence indeed significantly contributes to the explanation of coalition formation. The statistical significance remains stable when standard office or policy variables are included into the analysis (Pappi et al. 2005: 451).

In a similar analysis, Däubler and Debus (2009) largely confirm and refine these results. They add the argument that government parties often are punished in state

elections—in particular in the middle of the legislation period (cf. Dinkel 1977; Jeffery and Hough 2001; Kern and Hainmueller 2006)—what potentially leads to majority structures deviating from the federal level and making congruent coalitions less probable. Indeed, they detect an interaction between congruence and the time since the last federal election. However, in all of their models congruence or an interaction term including congruence significantly contribute to the explanation of coalition formation (Däubler and Debus 2009: 80). In a study focusing more generally on coalition building in the German *Länder*, Debus (2008b) increases the explanatory power of his statistical models when he includes a variable measuring congruence with the federal government. An extended study by Bäck et al. (2013) includes data from seven further countries and shows that congruence is not an exclusively German phenomenon.

Congruence Between Coalition Governments on the Federal and the *Länder* Level in Germany: Expectations

a. Electoral Systems and Party Systems

The political systems of the German *Länder* are very similar to each other as well as to the federal system. Most importantly, this statement holds true for the electoral systems and the resulting party systems. Starting with the electoral systems, all *Länder* as well as the federal republic use some kind of Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) or Proportional Rule (PR) system combined with a legal 5% threshold. Where, generally, MMP systems can produce so-called surplus seats and therefore distort the proportionality between seat and vote shares, all MMP systems applied in Germany include mechanisms to allocate additional seats until the seat distribution resembles that of PR systems (Wahlrecht.de 2016). As a consequence, the electoral systems produce very similar results despite some technical differences.

For the sake of completeness, I have to add that some minor but substantial differences do exist. For example, on the federal level, the legal 5% threshold can be circumvented by parties that win three or more district seats in the plurality tier. In Saxony, two district winners already are sufficient, in three further *Länder* (Berlin, Brandenburg, Schleswig-Holstein), one district winner is enough to bypass the threshold. All other *Länder*, on the other hand, do not adopt such a rule. As a consequence, the chance of representation for small but locally concentrated parties varies from *Land* to *Land*. Again Brandenburg and Schleswig-Holstein have further rules allowing a circumvention of the legal threshold. In these states, parties of ethnic minorities participate at the seat distribution independent of their size. In Brandenburg, these are the Sorbs and Wends; in Schleswig-Holstein, it is the Friesian and Danish minority. In Bremen, finally, the threshold is applied separately for the two parts of the state (the city of Bremen and the city of Bremerhaven) what makes it easier for smaller parties to gain parliamentary representation.

Having outlined the current state, it must be noticed that differences in the past have been more profound what is in particular true for the time shortly after World War II. Between 1946 and 1956, seven elections used the Loser Surplus Method (LSM) where around 80% of the seats have been allocated according to the plurality rule and which is therefore much less proportional than the currently used systems (Raabe et al. 2014). Further, the above mentioned compensation mechanism in order to make MMP results proportional have been launched at different points in time. While this mechanism is common in the *Länder* for several legislation periods already, it has not been applied on the federal level before 2013. Despite this variance, Raabe et al. (2014: 296–7) show that—apart from the LSM elections—this variation does not significantly affect the concentration of the party systems.

It is not surprising that these similar electoral systems lead to similar party systems. The Christian Democrats CDU/CSU and the Social Democrats SPD have been the two² largest parties in the federal parliament since the republic's foundation. Only these two parties have been strong enough to lead coalition governments and staff the chancellor. While in the founding years about ten further parties gained representation in the federal parliament, all of them but the liberal FDP lost relevancy. Between 1961 and 1983, all federal parliaments in Germany consisted of exactly these three parties, CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP. This changed in 1983, when the Greens successfully overleaped the 5% threshold for the first time. As a fifth party, the former GDR socialists (PDS, now Linke), joined the parliament in 1990 after reunification. In 2013, the FDP failed to win seats in the parliament for the first time ever, so that actually (state: August 2017), the legislature is composed of four parties.

The development of the *Länder* party systems is similar. There as well, CDU (in Bavaria CSU), SPD and FDP, build the core, joined by several smaller parties in the 1940s, 50s and 60s. Like on the federal level, party system concentration happened after the decline of these further parties. And also on the *Länder* level, a re-fragmentation took place with the emergence of the Green Party and, after reunification, the PDS/Linke (cf. Raabe et al. 2014: 296).

Despite this generally parallel development, some differences are worth mentioning. A first major point is the decline of the small parties in the middle of the twentieth century. While all of them have been without parliamentary presentation on the federal level since 1961, they survived longer on the *Länder* level. In Bremen, for example, the German Party (DP) was represented in the state parliament until 1967. Second, in some *Länder*, the Green Party has been successful earlier than on the federal level, in others later. The Greens gained parliamentary representation for the first time in Bremen in 1979 and in Baden-Württemberg in 1980, while they have not be represented in Schleswig-Holstein's state parliament before 1996 and in

²The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Union (CSU) are two different parties. The CSU can be elected in Bavaria only, while the CDU covers all other *Länder*. This means that both parties do not compete against each other. As they, further, have always formed a joint parliamentary group in the federal parliament and there behave as an (almost) unitary actor, they are usually counted as one party in the *Bundestag*.

Mecklenburg-Vorpommern's even before 2011. Third, the case of the PDS/Linke is similar. While this party has been represented in six state parliaments since 1990 (all in the Eastern part including Berlin), it failed to overleap the thresholds for a long time in many Western states. In Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria and Rhineland-Palatinate, the PDS/Linke has never got any seats yet.

Fourth, while none of the five parties CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP, Greens and PDS/Linke failed to get re-elected between 1961 and 2013, it regularly happened on the *Länder* level that some or all of the three smaller parties (FDP, Greens, PDS/Linke) have not been represented in the one or the other state parliament. To give just one of many examples, the FDP failed to get more than five percent of the votes in the Bavarian state elections of 1966, 1982, 1986, 1994, 1998, 2003 and 2013. Fifth, on the other hand, these three smaller parties are not that small in all *Länder*. Even though these are still exceptions, after some state elections, they have become the strongest or second strongest party and in three cases even staffed the state prime minister as the largest party in government.³ This points out, sixth, a general difference between East and West German *Länder*. While the PDS/Linke as the successor of the GDR socialists has its origins in the East, it is much weaker in the West. In recent state elections, it got between 2.1 and 16.1 percent of the votes in Western states (including Berlin), but between 16.3 and 28.2 percent in the East. Consequently, the other parties are stronger in the West than in the East. Besides this East/West difference, there are specifics in single states or groups of states. The above mentioned exception for the Danish and Friesian minority in Schleswig-Holstein, for example, becomes manifest in the party SSW which represents these ethnies in the state parliament since the state exists with the exception of the small period between 1954 and 1958. The Bavarian Party (BP), as another example, was successful to gain seats in the Bavarian state parliament between 1950 and 1966. But also numerous further parties punctually gained seats in state elections which they usually lost again one or two periods later. Currently, the Euro-sceptic and right-populist AfD (Alternative for Germany) has been very successful in state elections—in 2016, it got 24.3 percent of the votes in Saxony-Anhalt—but not yet (state: August 2017) at federal elections what makes party systems additionally different.

To conclude this subsection, important institutional settings on the federal and the *Länder* level are very similar. Also the party systems follow the same trends and differ less than in many other countries. On the other hand, a lot of (maybe minor) variation adds up to differences which might lead to different majority structures on various levels. As similar majority structures can be seen as a precondition for congruence (Downs 1998; Pappi et al. 2005; Ștefuriuc 2013), these small differences can already be sufficient to distort congruence.

³ This happened after the 2011 and the 2016 elections in Baden-Württemberg, when the Green politician Winfried Kretschmann was elected as Prime Minister, and in 2014, when Bodo Ramelow (Linke) became Prime Minister of Thuringia. In the 1950s, Heinrich Hellwege (DP) and Reinhold Maier (FDP/DVP) have been Prime Ministers of Lower Saxony and Baden-Württemberg, respectively, but their parties were the smaller coalition partners.

b. The Bundesrat

An important institutional setting regards the question of how federalism is organized in Germany. While for some policy fields, there is a common competency of the federal and the state level, for others, either the *Länder* or the federal level are responsible exclusively. The share of bills with joint responsibility varies between 40 and 60 percent, whereas this share is rising and includes the more important bills (Schmidt 2011: 207).

For all legislation in joint policy fields, the *Bundesrat* (“federal council”) is a crucial institution. Although both the federal parliament and the *Bundesrat* must approve legislative proposals in these policy fields, the *Bundesrat* is not a second chamber like the U.S. Senate or the Italian *Senato*. One major difference between the *Bundesrat* and second chambers is that its members who represent the single states are not elected by the states’ populations but are delegated by the states’ governments. Their mandates are not free but imperative, and the German constitution (*Grundgesetz*) prescribes that all members representing the same *Land* must vote in the same line (Article 51). In particular, this means for a state coalition government that all its *Bundesrat* delegates have to vote in the same way, independent of which coalition party they belong to. Usually, coalition treaties therefore include a rule that, in case of disagreement, the state delegates have to abstain. Since a majority of all votes in the *Bundesrat* is needed to approve a proposal (*Grundgesetz*, Article 52), abstentions count like votes against a bill. That is, the federal government needs *Länder* governments which explicitly support their proposals in legislation processes with joint responsibility.

While the *Bundesrat* formally is an institution to account for the *Länder* interests, the federal opposition has often been criticized for misusing the *Bundesrat* for party instead of *Länder* interests (see, e.g., Scharpf 1988; Bräuninger et al. 2010), for example when *Länder* governed by parties which are in opposition on the federal level blockade bills in the *Bundesrat*. While the question of whether state governments rather consider party interests or interests of their state is of large importance to understand German federalism, there is no clear answer even after extensive research (Bräuninger et al. 2010). On the contrary, there is evidence for both positions. Strohmeier (2004: 728) and Lehnert et al. (2008: 375), among others, show that legislative failure is very low in general what means that the *Bundesrat* is not broadly misused as an instrument to blockade. Manow and Burkhart (2007), on the other hand, argue that these numbers have to be interpreted very carefully as governments can anticipate disagreement in the *Bundesrat* and might abstain from initiating bills with which they probably strand. Lehnert et al. (2008: 375) show that, on a generally low level, proposals fail more often when state governments consisting of federal opposition parties hold a majority in the *Bundesrat*. Lehnert and Linhart (2009: 172) add that also a formal conciliation committee is called less frequently when state governments congruent to the federal government dominate the *Bundesrat*.

While it is still an open question whether party interests or state interests are more important to explain state governments’ voting behavior in the *Bundesrat*, it is

widely undisputed that congruent coalition governments on the state level make legislation easier for the federal government (Lehmbruch 1998; Pappi et al. 2005; Debus 2008b). This means that, if party leaders on the federal level should try to influence state level parties, this persuasion can be expected towards congruent coalitions.

It is further plausible to assume that, vice versa, the *Länder* level could influence the federal level, since party leaders on the federal level could have an eye on possible majorities in the *Bundesrat* when bargaining on coalitions. Imagine an example, in which a party A has the choice between a coalition with party B or with party C, but party B's support in the *Bundesrat* is necessary in both cases for policy fields of joint competencies. Then, party A had to compromise with both parties B and C, if it chose C as coalition partner, but with B only in an A–B coalition. The coalition structure on the state level might therefore also influence coalition formation on the federal level. However, while this argument is plausible, there is, to the best of my knowledge, no evidence that federal parties behave that way. As the federal level is considered as more important and still roughly half of the federal legislation does not need an approval of the *Bundesrat*, party leaders on the federal level mainly focus on other aspects and are influenced by *Bundesrat* majorities in exceptional cases only.

c. The Tradition of Minimal Winning Coalitions and Further Office Aspects

In Germany, there is a tradition of minimal winning coalitions (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944) both on the federal and the *Länder* level. While shortly after World War II, surplus coalition governments have often been built, mostly in order to integrate broad groups of the population after the shock of the Nazi regime, this tradition ended in the 1960s when the country became more and more stable. Following office motivations, parties then decided to form coalitions with parties that were necessary for a majority only. On the other hand, German parties have always been cautious in forming minority governments. Yet, minority governments have never formed after elections on the federal level, and they are quite rare on the *Länder* level.

Two recent exceptions strengthened German parties' reservations against minority governments. After several attempts to negotiate over winning coalitions had failed, Roland Koch staid in office after the Hessian elections in 2008 as head of a CDU minority government. In Northrhine-Westphalia, Hannelore Kraft formed an SPD-lead minority government with the Green Party in 2010. Both governments broke early after 1 or 2 years, respectively. German parties felt confirmed that minority governments are unstable and should be avoided. Noteworthy, two earlier minority governments in Saxony-Anhalt (after the 1994 and the 1998 elections) have been stable. However, these executive minority governments have been legislative winning coalitions supported by the PDS/Linke and based on explicit cooperation treaties.

While the common trend to form minimal winning coalitions on both levels seems to support congruence on the first view, the opposite is true. This rule implies that congruent coalitions should be expected only, if they are minimal winning on both levels. If a potential state coalition consisting of the federal government parties is minority or surplus, divergent coalitions should be more likely.

Even if a coalition is minimal winning on both levels, the (at least partial) office motivation of German parties can attract them to form divergent governments. Consider the example of a so-called red-green coalition consisting of SPD and Greens on the federal level with a strong SPD and clearly weaker Greens. Whereas the SPD could prefer a coalition with the CDU/CSU for policy reasons, it could decide to compensate slightly larger policy compromises in a red-green coalition with higher office gains, as the SPD clearly leads a red-green government and staffs most of the posts what might not be the case in a coalition with the CDU/CSU. If now in one *Land* the CDU/CSU is significantly weaker and the Greens are strong, the SPD might prefer a coalition with the CDU/CSU over one with the Greens there. This means that, beyond the question of the status as a minimal winning coalition, party strengths in detail can affect coalition formation motives and limit congruence.

d. Policy Considerations

Besides office motives, policy aspects can influence congruence or divergence. Recently, several authors have proposed approaches to estimate policy positions of German parties. Applications exist both for the federal and the *Länder* level.⁴ Again, general trends can be found for both levels. The major parties can be arrayed (from left to right) starting with the Linke, followed by the Greens and the Social Democrats. FDP and CDU/CSU are estimated in the centre-right, whereas the Liberals are closer to parties in the left with regard to socio-cultural issues but right to the Christian Democrats in socio-economic terms. Consequences are similar for all *Länder* as well as the federal level: The Greens are more likely to form coalitions with the SPD than with the CDU/CSU, and coalitions in which the Linke had to work together with the FDP or the CDU/CSU can be excluded for policy reasons.

However, all above cited analyses detect within-party variance between the *Länder* with more left and more right *Land* associations. Such variation is able to influence decisions of parties on coalitions (Debus 2008b; Ştefuriuc 2013: 115). To give one example among many: According to the estimation of Pappi and Seher (2014: 185–6), the Linke's positions in socio-economic questions is more moderate in the Eastern *Länder* than in the West. A simple consequence is that coalitions between the Linke and the Social Democrats are more likely in the East than in the

⁴For the federal level, see, for example, Debus (2009), Linhart and Shikano (2009), Pappi and Seher (2009), Proksch and Slapin (2009). For the *Länder* level, see among others Müller (2009), Bräuningner and Debus (2012), Pappi and Seher (2014).

West. Indeed, such coalitions—possibly also including the Greens—have only been formed in East German *Länder* by now (Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Brandenburg, Berlin, Thuringia and, if one counts the legislative coalition described in section c, in Saxony-Anhalt). This variation among the *Länder* is a further factor which potentially limits congruence with the federal level.

Further, I described in section b that policy fields exist for which either the *Länder* or the federal level are responsible. Examples are foreign policy and defense policy (federal level) as well as school policy and education policy (state level). Parties can certainly agree or disagree to different degrees in various policy fields. Therefore, the relevancy of different policy fields on different levels can affect parties' general coincidence and, thus, their likeliness to form coalitions with each other. To give an example, Social Democrats and the Linke strongly disagree on defense policy, since the SPD is pro-NATO and considers military interventions as a possible mean of foreign policy, while the Linke generally opposes foreign deployments of the German armed forces and suggests to leave the NATO. While such a disagreement could prevent an SPD-Linke coalition on the federal level, it cannot on the state level where defense policy does not play a role.

e. Strategic Considerations

Even if all above mentioned variables are structurally identical, divergent coalitions can be formed for strategic reasons. One striking example is the SPD-FDP coalition government in Rhineland-Palatinate between 1991 and 2006. In this period, we find different cabinets on the federal level, but none of them congruent to that in Rhineland-Palatinate. Until 1998, chancellor Helmut Kohl led a CDU/CSU-FDP coalition; between 1998 and 2005, Gerhard Schröder (SPD) formed a government together with the Greens; and in 2005, Angela Merkel became chancellor elected by CDU/CSU and SPD. In particular, the Kohl and the Schröder government underline the bloc competition between CDU/CSU and FDP on the one side and SPD and Greens on the other at this time. It is noteworthy that coalitions mirroring these blocs would have held majorities in Rhineland-Palatinate, too. In 1991 and 2001, the SPD and the Greens could have formed a winning coalition; in 1996, a CDU-FDP government would have had a majority.

While the negotiation leaders' exact motives to form a divergent coalition in Rhineland-Palatinate remain their private knowledge, it is plausible that strategic motives could have played a role. The existence of an SPD-FDP coalition can be seen as a signal to the Greens (as the SPD's potential coalition partner on the federal level) demonstrating that the SPD has further potential coalition partners. If the Greens do not have, this fact is assumed to strengthen the Social Democrats when bargaining with the Greens on coalition treaties in other *Länder* or on the federal level. The same is true for the FDP and its federal coalition partner, the CDU/CSU.

Similarly, the coalition between the CDU and the Greens, built after the 2013 elections in Hesse, can be interpreted as a signal, here vice versa to the SPD and the

FDP, that Christian Democrats and Greens have alternatives, too. This example, however, includes a second aspect. When it comes to coalition bargaining after elections on the federal level, German parties usually are skeptical of ‘experiments’, meaning coalitions that have not proved to work yet. Besides the type of coalition (see section c), this holds also true for combinations of parties. Since 1960, four different combinations of parties only governed on the federal level: CDU/CSU-FDP, CDU/CSU-SPD, SPD-FDP and SPD-Greens. After the 2005 federal elections, when for the first time since the 1949 elections neither CDU/CSU and FDP nor SPD and FDP nor SPD and Greens had a majority, a discussion about new combinations started, for example about a coalition consisting of CDU/CSU, FDP and Greens. There are various reasons why this option has not been realized, but one of them is that there has not been any experience with that kind of coalition, while the CDU/CSU-SPD coalition, that has actually been formed, has not only already governed between 1966 and 1969 on the federal level but also in 2005 in several *Länder* (Brandenburg, Bremen, Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein). Vice versa, when new party combinations form coalitions on the *Länder* level, these coalitions can also act as tests for the federal level (Downs 1998; Debus 2008b; Detterbeck and Renzsch 2008). While the parties’ state associations certainly do not form foredoomed coalitions, they have shown more flexibility in the past in exploring the potential of new coalitions.⁵

If, however, parties use coalition formation in the *Länder* at least partially to demonstrate their potential for alternative options or to test new models that have not governed yet on the federal level, both aspects limit congruence.

f. Further Aspects

Finally, there are two further aspects to discuss. In the previous subsections, I mainly argued why *Länder* parties could have motives to build convergent or divergent coalitions. Divergent coalitions, however, can also evolve when the *Länder* represent “regular” cases and the federal level “diverges”. I indicated above that, since the 1980s, more or less two blocs competed on the federal level, CDU/CSU and FDP on the one side, SPD and Greens on the other.⁶ When one of these blocs got a majority, the respective coalition indeed often has been formed. After two elections in this time period, namely in 2005 and in 2013, none of both blocs has been able to build a winning coalition so that less desired alternatives had to be realized. In

⁵To give a selection of many examples: Besides the party combinations which have also governed on the federal level already, there have been coalitions between Christian Democrats and Greens (Hesse, since 2013), Christian Democrats, Greens and Liberals (Saarland, 2009–12), CDU, SPD and Greens (Saxony-Anhalt, since 2016), SPD, FDP and Greens (Rhineland-Palatinate, since 2016), SPD and Linke (Brandenburg, since 2009) and SPD, Linke and Greens (Berlin, since 2016).

⁶This is supported by work researching the German parties’ coalition signals on the federal level (Pappi et al. 2006).

both cases, it was a grand coalition between CDU/CSU and SPD which formed. The *Bundesrat* discussion (section b) might support the expectation that grand coalitions are also built on the *Länder* level in this time. All other arguments, however, support the expectation that *Länder* parties should continue to try forming small coalitions according to the blocs (cf. Ștefuriuc 2013: 114). Higher divergence can, thus, be expected between 2005 and 2009 and since 2013.

Finally, factors beyond formal coalition theory can be important. One example is the sympathy or antipathy between party leaders. Here, much variation between the levels as well as between single *Länder* is possible. While those factors are hard to measure, they generally can be expected to limit congruence.

Data

For the analysis of whether the rationales for congruent or for divergent coalition formation in the German *Länder* weight stronger, I compile a dataset with 211 cases. These cases include all German state governments between 23. May 1949 when the Federal Republic of Germany has been founded and 31. July 2016. A state government is considered as a new case after state elections and/or if the composition of governing parties changes. Pure exchanges of state Prime Ministers or ministers are not counted as new cases.

Beyond some standard attributes (like the time of government formation and the state in which it took place), the data includes the central variable of this contribution, the congruence between this state government and the federal coalition government. As there are various options how widely congruence shall be defined, I use four different measures here (see Table 1 for examples).

The narrowest definition of a congruent state coalition government requests for an accurate reflection of the federal government, i.e., if the federal government is composed of parties A and B, a state coalition is only counted as congruent, if it is also exactly composed of A and B (definition 1). This rigorous definition, however, ignores that, even in case of perfect bloc competition, the federal opposition parties can win state elections and then are likely to form a coalition. A state coalition

Table 1 Different interpretations of congruence

Federal government: A, B; federal opposition: C, D				
State government congruent according to	Def. 1	Def. 2	Def. 3	Def. 4
A, B	x	x	x	x
C, D		x		x
A			x	x
A, B, E			x	x
C				x
C, D, E				x
B, C				

consisting of the federal opposition parties can therefore be seen as congruent, too (definition 2).

Definition 1 could be regarded as too narrow also from another point of view. One might argue that it is sufficient for congruency, if only some of the government parties form a state government. If, for example, party A holds an absolute majority, a single-party government of A can be seen as in line with a federal A–B coalition government. Vice versa, if the federal government parties need support from a further party E, which is not in the federal opposition, such a state coalition can be interpreted as congruent, too. Definition 3, thus, defines a state government as congruent, if it includes at least one party of the federal government but no party of the federal opposition.

Similarly, one could argue that, then, also state coalitions which include at least one party of the federal opposition, but no party of the federal government are in accordance with the idea of bloc competition as mentioned in definition 2. Definition 4 thus only excludes state coalitions as divergent if they include both parties of the federal government and the federal opposition.

For each case and according to all four definitions, I examined whether or not the state government is congruent to the federal government at the time of its formation. When elections on the federal level and in one or more states took place at the same day, I used the new federal government as reference point, as it usually was clear very early which government will form on the federal level.

While section “Congruence Between Coalition Governments on the Federal and the Länder Level in Germany: Expectations” offers explanations for parties’ motives to form congruent or divergent coalitions in the states, I consciously do not formulate hypotheses, since many of them would not be testable with my data. However, some of the expectations are easy to examine. I therefore structure the analysis by adding for each case whether the parties of the federal government could form a winning coalition, if the parties of the federal opposition could do so, and, if yes, if these coalitions are minimal winning. I additionally differentiate between various time periods and different kinds of federal coalitions (cf. section f).

Results

Table 2 starts with a general overview of the share of congruent coalitions according to the different definitions. Starting the discussion with all cases, it becomes obvious how strongly the broadness of the definition affects the results. While according to the narrowest definition, only 17 percent of the German *Länder* governments are congruent to the federal government, the broadest view sees about two thirds congruent *Länder* governments.

The evaluation of subsets in the rows below helps to explain this variance. I argued above, that in Germany, there is neither a tradition of minority governments nor of surplus governments. It is therefore not surprising that congruent governments in the narrowest sense (definition 1) do form very rarely only, if they do not

Table 2 Share of congruent coalitions (in percent) under various conditions

Condition	Def. 1	Def. 2	Def. 3	Def. 4
1. None (all cases)	17.1	27.5	31.8	67.8
2. Federal government parties hold a majority in the <i>Land</i>	35.5	35.5	65.6	65.6
3. Federal government parties could form a minimal winning coalition in the <i>Land</i>	55.2	55.2	58.6	58.6
4. Federal opposition parties hold a majority in the <i>Land</i>	1.0	22.9	1.0	72.9
5. Federal opposition parties could form a minimal winning coalition in the <i>Land</i>	2.9	57.1	2.9	77.1
6. Either condition 2 or condition 4 is fulfilled	18.0	29.1	32.8	69.3
7. Either condition 3 or condition 5 is fulfilled	35.5	55.9	37.6	65.6

hold a majority in a state (conditions 4 and 5). On the other hand, if they do so (condition 2) and if this potential coalition is even minimal winning (condition 3), the likeliness that this coalition forms raises to 35 and 55 percent, respectively. The importance of the minimal winning criterion becomes also evident when we compare the results of definitions 1 and 3—remember that the latter treats also coalitions as congruent which consist of a subset of the federal government parties only (for example, because the federal coalition would be surplus in the respective state) or in which parties are included which do not play a role on the federal level (for example, because they are needed for a majority). Broadening this view does not affect subset 3 very much, where the federal government parties do need each other but no further party to form a minimal winning coalition. But it almost doubles the share of congruent coalitions in subset 2 what implies that the minimal winning status seems to be more important than absolute congruence.

If the federal opposition parties as the government's competitor hold a majority in a state, there is a certain likeliness that the respective coalition is formed. This becomes evident when we focus on subsets 4 and 5, where the inclusion of pure opposition state governments to the definition of congruence (definitions 2 and 4) significantly raises the share of congruent coalitions. On the other hand, we see that this broader definitions do not have any impact in subsets 2 and 3 where the federal government parties hold majorities.

Finally, looking at subsets 6 and 7 where either the federal government parties or the federal opposition parties have a majority (subset 6) or even are minimal winning (subset 7), we see that there must be relevant factors beyond the coalition structure. Most results resemble those of the full set of cases, albeit on a higher level of congruence. However, when we rivet on the broadest definition, still about one third of the coalitions are divergent even though respective majorities for congruent coalitions existed.

In a nutshell, we get from Table 1 that the minimal winning criterion beats absolute congruence. Indeed, roughly two thirds of all state level coalitions can be interpreted as congruent. But this interpretation includes that congruence is adapted to the majority structure in a state parliament. This means that parties which do not play a role on the federal level can be included in coalitions and that federal coalition

Table 3 Share of congruent coalitions (in percent) by decades

Decade	Def. 1	Def. 2	Def. 3	Def. 4
1949–1959	6.9	13.8	27.6	51.7
1960–1969	34.8	43.5	43.5	56.5
1970–1979	33.3	80.0	53.3	100.0
1980–1989	17.9	32.1	50.0	89.3
1990–1999	9.1	9.1	20.5	70.5
2000–2009	17.1	17.1	22.9	54.3
2010–2016	4.5	4.5	9.1	45.5

Table 4 Share of congruent coalitions (in percent) by time periods

Time period	Def. 1	Def. 2	Def. 3	Def. 4
T1: Adenauer and Erhard governments (1949–1966)	17.4	26.1	34.8	56.5
T2: 1st grand coalition (1966–1969)	33.3	33.3	33.3	33.3
T3: SPD-FDP coalitions (1969–1982)	29.7	73.0	51.4	94.6
T4: CDU/CSU-FDP coalition led by Kohl (1982–1998)	14.0	17.5	35.1	82.5
T5: SPD-Greens coalition (1998–2005)	11.1	11.1	11.1	63.0
T6: 2nd and 3rd grand coalition (2005–2009, since 2013)	13.6	13.6	22.7	22.7
T7: CDU/CSU-FDP coalition led by Merkel (2009–2013)	6.3	6.3	12.5	68.8

partners are not included, if they are not necessary for a majority on the *Länder* level. Still, about one third of the state level coalitions in Germany diverge from the federal level, even if we take into account different majority structures.

Tables 3 and 4 try to bring some light to these cases by breaking down the data into different time periods. Remember that the German party system was relatively fragmented in the 1950s and 60s, before all parties but CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP became irrelevant in the 70s. In the 80s (emergence of the Greens) and the 90s (Linke) the party system got more fragmented again. This fragmentation increased in the 2000s, when the Greens and the Linke became stronger and the larger parties lost electoral support.

Table 3 suggests a relationship between party system fragmentation and congruence, especially with regard to the broadest definition 4. Such a connection is plausible, what can be explained with a view to the Linke. While the Linke is part of the federal opposition since 1990, the CDU/CSU was in government between 1982 and 1998. When the SPD—also in opposition in this time—had to make decisions whether to cooperate with the CDU or with the Linke on the *Länder* level, it was clear that the answer could not simply be a coalition with the Linke just because of a common opposition status, but that the SPD had to explore carefully with which of both parties it could better realize its political program. For this reason, it often decided to form a divergent coalition with the CDU instead of a congruent SPD-Linke coalition.

Broadening this argument, for a long time, the Linke has not been seen as *koalitionsfähig* at all by the other parties, what means that no other party believed the Linke to be a trustworthy coalition partner, ready to compromise and assume

responsibility in a government. Similar holds true for the Greens in the 1970s and early 80s which have been considered as a pure opposition or even anti-system party. In some state parliaments, also right-wing populist or even extreme parties like NPD, DVU, Republicans or AfD gained representation but clearly could not be integrated in any coalition government. Whereas the Greens and the Linke after some years in parliament demonstrated that they are *koalitionsfähig*, the general argument still holds: The more fragmented the party system is, the more likely it includes anti-system parties which do not participate in the coalition game. Then, parties can be confronted with situations in which neither the federal government parties nor the federal opposition parties have majorities. As a consequence, divergent coalitions with parties from both blocs must be formed.

On the other hand, we find an almost perfect congruence for the three-party-systems in the 1970s. In many cases, one of the larger parties, SPD or CDU/CSU, was able to gain an absolute majority in state elections and governed without a coalition partner. At least, according to definition 4, such coalitions can never be divergent. In the rest of the cases, the Social Democrats' coalition partner on the federal level, the Liberals, always formed a respective coalition on the *Länder* level, when no absolute majorities existed. This example also shows that definition 4 might be most appropriate. If the federal opposition party CDU gains an absolute majority in a *Land*, what else should be expected but a single-party CDU-government?

Table 4 divides the periods according to the federal coalitions instead of decades and thus reveals a further facet. While Table 4 generally confirms Table 3's results of higher congruence in the 1970s and 80s and lower in the beginning and current time, it also reveals an effect of grand coalitions. For office reasons, the two larger German parties, CDU/CSU and SPD, are expected to prefer coalitions with smaller partners which they clearly lead over grand coalitions in which they have to divide their power almost equally. Against this expectation and for reasons that would lead too far here, both parties decided to form a grand coalition in the late 1960s. Table 4 shows that *Länder* parties continued following their preferences for senior-junior coalitions and did not adopt what happened on the federal level.

The situation is even more pronounced in the time of the two more recent grand coalitions (T6), in which the bloc competition between CDU/CSU and FDP on the one side and SPD and Greens on the other side still played a role most of the time. The grand coalitions in 2005 and 2013 have been formed mainly because of lacking majorities for both of the blocs. If such majorities existed on the *Länder* level, the blocs oftentimes realized them instead of forming congruent coalitions, as the low congruence values in T6 demonstrate.

This is supported by research on coalition signals. Pappi et al. (2006) have analyzed German federal parties' between 1953 and 2005. In the above mentioned time period of bloc competition since 1983, indeed all signals between Christian Democrats and Liberals have been positive. With two exceptions, Pappi et al. found exclusively positive signals between Social Democrats and Greens, too. On the other hand, only 2 percent of the signals between all other party combinations have been positive. Best (2015) looked at coalition signals on the *Länder* level since

1990. When inspecting state elections between 2005 and 2009, when the grand coalition governed on the federal level, we find a broad continuation of the bloc competition on the state level. Out of 72 signals between Christian Democrats and Liberals or between Social Democrats and Greens, only two have been negative (Best 2015: 523–41).⁷ This share of 3 percent negative signals within these blocs is even lower than under the previous red-green government (1998–2005; 7 percent negative signals within the blocs). This variation on a low level should not be overstated, as the pure number of negative within-bloc signals ranges between 2 and 4 per legislation period. However, we see that the competition structure between CDU/CSU-FDP and SPD-Greens did not change when a grand coalition came into office in 2005. One result is a sharp decline of congruent coalitions in T6 (Table 4).

A final point to be discussed is the question of credibility. If coalition parties worked together confidentially for an election period and keep their majority after the following election, they can have incentives to continue with their alliance. Needless to say that elections change the game—new, more attractive coalition partners can appear, the majority structure can change, and much more. However, it is not necessarily a reason to change a coalition partner, if a respective change on the federal level takes place. As there are too many intermediate variables, this argument cannot be tested systematically here. But the example of Bremen indicates that such arguments can play a role. After the 1959 state elections in Bremen, SPD and FDP built a coalition. At least according to definitions 2 and 4, this coalition was congruent to the federal level where both parties opposed a government by the Christian Democrats and the German Party. After the next state elections, in 1963, SPD and FDP re-formed their coalition, although in the meantime, the Christian Democrats changed their coalition partner on the federal level and now governed together with the FDP. Again four years later, in 1967, the federal government has changed another time. Now, CDU/CSU and SPD built the national government. In Bremen, however, SPD and FDP continued with their cooperation. Although the Bremen government formed a congruent coalition in 1959 and just kept it stable, two divergent coalitions are counted because of changes on the federal level.

Conclusion: The Case of Germany

The theoretical discussion has proved that there are a lot of arguments why we should expect congruent state coalitions in the German *Länder*. However, similarly numerous reasons may let us expect just the opposite. The empirical analysis reflects this ambiguity. According to a narrow definition of congruence, only a minority of *Länder* coalitions reflects the federal coalition. The main reason therefore is the

⁷One negative signal came from the Bavarian CSU in 2008 which sought and got an absolute majority and therefore rejected any potential coalition. The second signal came from the FDP which implicitly refused a coalition with the CDU after the 2006 elections in Berlin. This signal, however, was irrelevant as this potential coalition was far away from getting a majority.

tradition of minimal winning coalitions in Germany on both levels. Although party systems on the federal and the state level are similar, already small differences often lead to divergent majority structures. As a consequence, governing coalitions diverge, as well. However, this does not mean that party competition worked completely differently on both levels. Following a broader definition of congruence which reflects the competition structure on the federal level but at the same time allows for some flexibility regarding various majority structures in the *Länder*, we see that most of the state governments—about two thirds—are congruent with the federal level.

A closer inspection of the divergent cases reveals some—partially huge—variation with regard to time and with respect to the question of which coalition type has formed on the federal level. Typical competition on the federal level has taken place between CDU/CSU and FDP (supported by some smaller parties in the 1940s and 50s) on the one side and the SPD and—since the 1980s—the Greens on the other side. Between 1969 and 1982, alternatively, Social Democrats and Liberals formed coalitions against the Christian Democrats. This competition structure has been largely reflected in the *Länder* when the party systems was concentrated. More fragmented party systems, however, as they occurred more often before the 1970s and since the German reunification in 1990, were more likely to contain anti-system parties not seen as *koalitionsfähig* by the established parties. Majority structures in the *Länder* can then make coalitions necessary which include both federal government and federal opposition parties. This can also happen on the federal level, e.g. in 2005 and in 2013, when CDU/CSU and SPD formed a grand coalition, since neither Christian Democrats and Liberals nor Social Democrats and Green held a majority. Table 4 demonstrates that this solution did not broadly stimulate *Länder* parties to change the so far practiced competition structure on the state level. Analyses of parties' coalition signals (Pappi et al. 2006; Best 2015) support this view by pointing out that the signals for CDU/CSU-FDP versus SPD-Greens coalitions did not change when the grand coalition came into office.

Finally, we find some evidence for further conjectures as described in section “Congruence Between Coalition Governments on the Federal and the *Länder* Level in Germany: Expectations”. Indeed, some coalitions might have been formed to demonstrate that alternatives to the structure on the federal level are possible—the SPD-FDP coalition in Rhineland-Palatinate has been mentioned above in this regard. And some recently formed coalitions like the CDU-FDP-Greens government in Schleswig-Holstein or the SPD-Linke-Green coalition in Berlin might also be seen as tests for whether these parties could be able to work together, before building such a coalition on the more important federal level. However, although those cases can be observed, they rather stay exceptions what again a view to the literature about coalition signals shows.

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Coalition Patterns in Italian Regional Governments 1970–2015



Daniela Giannetti and Luca Pinto

Introduction

Coalition formation is one of “the richest, most fascinating, and most important features of European politics” (Laver and Schofield 1990: v). As most European countries have adopted a proportional (PR) electoral system since 1945, a large number of European governments have been coalition governments (De Winter and Dumont 2006; Müller and Strøm 2000; Woldendorp et al. 2000). Outside Europe, coalition governments have been a common feature of parliamentary systems such as Israel and Japan, as well as of presidential systems such as Latin American countries (Alemán and Tsebelis 2011; Altman 2000; Amorim Neto 2006; Cheibub et al. 2004; Laver and Kato 2001; Schofield and Sened 2005). Consequently, it is not surprising that coalition government is one of the most researched fields in political science.

The formal literature, based on the rational approach to politics, provided a set of models grounded on different motivations of political actors to predict coalition governments’ types and portfolios’ distribution among coalition partners (Bäck et al. 2011; Druckman and Warwick 2005; Laver 1998, 2003; Laver and Schofield 1990; Laver and Shepsle 1996; Müller and Strøm 2000; Strøm et al. 2008; Schofield 1993; Warwick and Druckman 2001, 2006). Building on the same game-theoretical approach a number of models focused on government termination (Diermeier and Stevenson 1999; King et al. 1990; Lupia and Strøm 1995; Warwick 1994). Other important features affecting the making and breaking of coalition governments—such as (1) the duration of the bargaining process leading to government formation and (2) use of enforcing mechanisms in coalition agreements—have been analyzed from an institutional perspective, enriching the previous models by focusing on different rules and procedures constraining the coalition game (Müller and Strøm 2000; Strøm et al. 1994). More recently, the analysis shifted from post-electoral to pre-electoral coalitions (Carroll and Cox 2007; Golder 2006). Parallel to the development of formal models, a large body of empirical literature provided an

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extensive testing of their main implications (Bäck and Dumont 2007; Curini and Pinto 2013, 2016; Debus 2008, 2009; Martin and Stevenson 2001, 2010).

Most of the previous research focused on coalition government at the national level. In recent decades hypotheses about coalition formation at sub-national level of government have been tested in different settings (e.g. Bäck 2003; Bäck et al. 2013; Camoes and Mendes 2009; Olislagers and Steyvers 2015; Skjæveland et al. 2007; Ștefuriuc 2009). However, this subfield remains underdeveloped, mainly due to lack of data (Laver 1989). Our work aims to contribute to this strand of research by exploring the dynamics of coalition formation at the regional level in Italy since 1970 to present.

Regional politics played an important role in Italy since the implementation of regional autonomy in 1970. Regions were granted a measure of political autonomy by the Constitution of the Italian Republic (1948), but the implementation of the constitutional rules was postponed until 1970. In the 1990s, new rules for electing regional parliaments or councils and presidents of regional *Giunte* were approved, with significant variations among regions. Subsequently, Italian regions acquired a further level of political autonomy following a constitutional reform enacted in 2001. These features make Italian regions an important arena for party competition and coalition formation, as they provide an appropriate case study for testing the main hypotheses derived from existing coalition theories. Moreover, as we are interested in exploring the link between sub-national political dynamics and the broader national political game, we focus on a further hypothesis about the vertical congruence among different levels of government developed specifically for the study of regional coalitions.

This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the existing coalition theories to derive relevant implications for understanding coalition government formation at the regional level. Section three describes the main features of regional politics in Italy. Section four presents the methods and data used in this work. We discuss our main results in Section five. Most of our results do not differ very much from those implied by the existing models of coalition formation. Our analysis also shows that regional council coalitions have a higher chance to form when they mirror the national one. However, we find that vertical congruence in Italy started to disappear in the 1990s, as a result of a number of institutional reforms granting regions more political autonomy, combined with the collapse of the national party system in 1994, which had been in place for almost fifty years from the foundation of the Italian Republic. Concluding remarks follow in the final section.

Theories of Coalition Formation

Rational choice theory inspired the first scholars working on coalition formation generating a family of models based on office-seeking assumptions (Gamson 1961; Leiserson 1966, 1968; Riker 1962; von Neumann and Morgenstern 1953). When

applied to coalition formation in multiparty systems, office-seeking models assume that: (1) political parties are rational actors attempting to maximize their utility expressed in office payoffs; (2) parties are modelled as unitary actors that interact under conditions of perfect information about the moves (and the consequences of each move) of each player; (3) they play a constant-sum game, in the sense that the reward of controlling the government is considered a fixed prize, whose value does not increase when members are added to the coalition. Starting from these premises, scholars elaborated a series of propositions about government formation in multiparty systems mainly concerning the size of coalitions.

The “winning” proposal states that only majority cabinets will form, stressing the idea that majority status is a core feature of parliamentary government. The rationale behind this argument is that parties care about holding office, and opposition parties controlling a majority of seats would never accept the formation of a minority cabinet that excludes them from the benefits of controlling the government. Translating this line of reasoning to sub-national governments, we should expect that (H1) *potential governments are more likely to form if they control a majority of seats in the regional council.*

The “minimal winning coalition” proposition refined the winning proposal predicting that when no single party holds an absolute majority of seats only coalitions that do not contain any unnecessary partner for reaching a majority will form. A minimal winning coalition loses its majority status by removing any of its members (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1953). As the payoffs of a coalition are fixed, any unnecessary member will reduce the spoils of office available for the other partners. It follows that we should expect that (H2) *potential governments in regional councils are more likely to form if they are minimal winning coalitions.*

Given the wide set of outcomes predicted by the previous propositions, scholars proposed more restrictive versions of the minimal winning solution. In particular, Gamson (1961) and Riker (1962) introduced the *size principle* which says that among all of the potential minimal winning coalitions, the coalition controlling a minimum number of seats will form. This refinement shares the same logic of its predecessors: potential coalitions’ members will prefer to join a coalition with as little weight as possible because in this situation the spoils of office will be larger for individual members. We should therefore find that (H3) *potential governments in regional councils are more likely to form if they are minimum winning coalitions.*

In the “bargaining proposition” suggested by Leiserson (1966, 1968) parties want to be a member of a winning coalition because of the rewards of office as in the previous models. However, in order to have better chances to form, coalitions should include as few parties as possible. The logic behind this proposition relies on reducing transaction costs to a minimum in order to make agreements between partners easier, and to ensure that office rewards are available as soon as possible. We can therefore derive that (H4) *potential governments are more likely to form the fewer the number of parties they contain.*

The predictions derived from office-seeking models were often contradicted by empirical evidence, as a large number of real world coalitions clearly violate the

propositions discussed above (Laver and Schofield 1990). In light of this, some scholars suggested an alternative set of models, assuming that parties are not primarily driven by office-seeking motivations, but by policy concerns. Policy-seeking theories predict that parties with a similar ideological background should form stable coalitions (De Swaan 1973; Leiserson 1966, 1968). Axelrod (1970) translated this idea into a theory by putting forward the “minimal connected winning” proposition according to which coalitions both winning and comprising adjacent parties on the left-right continuum are the most likely to form. On the basis of Axelrod’s theory, we should therefore expect that (H5) *potential governments in regional councils are more likely to form if they are minimal connected winning coalitions*.

A further series of concepts focused on the identity of specific parties that are more likely to enter into government according to either office or policy considerations. For these reasons, these arguments have been classified as actor-oriented theories (Olislagers and Steyvers 2015). The office-seeking approach allows us to identify the “dominant player” in the coalition game. The dominant player is always the party with the largest weight; therefore, it that cannot be easily excluded from winning coalitions (Van Deemen 1989; Van Roozendaal 1990). According to the literature, the largest party enjoys also other benefits such as playing in most cases the role of *formateur*. We should find therefore that (H6) *potential governments in regional councils are more likely to form if they contain the largest party*.

Policy-based theories suggest that when parties compete on a single ideological dimension, the party controlling the median legislator position should have a privileged position in coalition negotiations, since no majority will find another government more preferable to the one including the median party (Black 1958).¹ The median legislator could be a member of either a big or a small party.² It follows that (H7) *potential governments in regional councils are more likely to form if they contain the median party*.

Starting from the 1980s, the neo-institutionalist approach began to emerge as the major one complementing office- and policy-seeking theories. New-institutionalism put the emphasis on the role of different types of norms and institutions structuring the outcome of the coalition formation processes. Norms and institutions can be defined as any constraint on coalition options beyond the control of political actors (De Winter and Dumont 2006; Martin and Stevenson 2001; Strøm et al. 1994). Neo-institutional theories can be distinguished into two broad categories: on the one hand, propositions based on the rules and procedures governing the process of

¹The median party constitutes a powerful explanation of the existence of minority governments which are an “anomaly” within an office seeking perspective (Laver and Schofield 1990; Strøm 1990).

²The median party solution holds only when parties compete on a single ideological dimension. This feature was criticized by many scholars as an unrealistic assumption. The main multi-dimensional alternatives existing in the literature were proposed by Schofield (1993) and Laver and Shepsle (1996). In this work, we do not explore such alternatives given the extreme difficulties related to the definition of the policy spaces, and the estimation of policy preferences across many different local bodies such as those included in our analysis. For an application of the above-mentioned models to the Italian case see Curini and Pinto (2013).

government formation itself; on the other hand, theories focusing on the rules that structure post-formation government decision-making (Martin and Stevenson 2001: 35–38). For the purposes of our research, we will focus on the first category, discussing the role played by informal rules in constraining on coalition formation. Among these, pre-electoral commitments to govern together have proven to be an important predictor of the coalitions that actually form. Due to the importance given by parties and voters to credibility, these statements, which are usually public, constitute a powerful restriction to coalition bargaining (Debus 2009; Golder 2006). We should therefore expect that (H8) *potential governments in regional councils are more likely to form if they are based on pre-electoral coalitions.*

A further element affecting coalition governments' formation is the partisan composition of the incumbent government. Concepts such as familiarity and inertia predict that incumbent parties are more likely to cooperate once more in a government coalition (Franklin and Mackie 1983). The bases for familiarity and inertia are psychological considerations about interpersonal trust, which is expected to emerge in long-lasting relationships. Government formation is not a one-shot game. As a consequence, both past experience and expectations about the future are evaluated by party leaders in coalition bargaining, rewarding partners that have demonstrated to each other a certain degree of loyalty in the past (Martin and Stevenson 2010; Tavits 2008). While the future related dimension is essential to establishing the conditions for cooperation, past experience is important for monitoring actual behaviour. In this way, keeping the same partners, even when it seems irrational according to the size and policy principles, induces political actors to do the same in the future, establishing a relationship of reciprocity which has proven to be robust in explaining the evolution of cooperation (Axelrod 1984). Moreover, repeated interactions facilitate agreements among partners by reducing transaction costs (Warwick 1996). It follows that (H9) *potential governments in regional councils are more likely to form if they replicate the incumbent administration.*

When dealing with regional council coalitions, it should be mentioned that they are formed in a national bargaining context and therefore the broader national political game may strongly influence sub-national coalitional patterns (Skjæveland et al. 2007). Regional council elections may have a national impact, especially when they are held simultaneously, which implies that many voters are involved. The trend in the nationalization of local politics implies that elections are usually contested by local branches of national parties, which in most cases play a central role in local candidate selection. National parties can therefore influence regional council coalition outcomes by controlling ambitious loyal councillors who prefer to keep good relationships with national party leaders in order to advance their future career.³ Moreover, regardless of the level of autonomy that the “party in central office” grants to “the party on the ground” (Katz and Mair 1994), local organizations

³Vertical congruence can also be present when ethno-regionalist parties, together with local branches of national parties, are leading players in local politics (Tronconi 2015a). In Italy, with the exception of the Northern League (*Lega nord*, LN), ethno-regionalist parties are mostly concentrated in the regions with special status (see below), which are excluded from our analysis.

depend heavily on national parties to survive economically, which implies a certain level of congruence between the choices made at the national and local levels. Vertical congruence can also help local administrations to have a privileged access to the centre. In contexts in which local bodies do not enjoy full fiscal autonomy, congruence can play a key role in granting this access, shaping therefore the relationship between the local and the national level (Olislagers and Steyvers 2015).

Our argument does not imply that the regional coalition formation process is centrally controlled by the national level. The great variation in coalition formulas observed in Italian regions (see below) and across other local bodies reveals there are important local dynamics (see Bäck 2003; Bäck et al. 2013; Olislagers and Steyvers 2015; Skjæveland et al. 2007; Ștefuriuc 2009). We simply argue that local actors can benefit for a number of reasons from mirroring national coalition formulas when electoral results allow them to do so. Following this logic, we should therefore expect that (H10) *potential governments in regional councils are more likely to form if they are congruent with the national administration.*

Regional Politics in Italy

According to the Constitution of 1948, the Italian Republic is a unitary state which recognises the principles of local autonomy and decentralisation. Following these principles, regionalism has developed progressively since World War II. The Constitution of 1948 granted a special status to five regions—Friuli Venezia Giulia, Sardegna, Sicilia, Trentino Alto-Adige, Valle D’Aosta—which were established in 1949.⁴ The other fifteen regions—Abruzzo, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Emilia-Romagna, Lazio, Liguria, Lombardia, Marche, Molise, Piemonte, Puglia, Toscana, Umbria, Veneto—were recognised by the Constitution of 1948 as having an ordinary status and were established at a later stage in 1970. Administrative functions were transferred to regions with ordinary status between 1972 and 1977, limiting regional regulating powers to a few important policy areas. However, the process of decentralization was seriously undermined by the limited financial autonomy granted by the state to the regions creating a “weak regionalism” (Cotta and Verzichelli 2007: 182).

In our work, we focus exclusively on regions with ordinary status covering a time span from their establishment (1970) to 2015. In this regard, we may distinguish two phases covering the years 1970–1994 and 1995–2015 respectively. In the first phase (1970–1994), Italian regions worked as parliamentary regimes. The regional government (*Giunta*) had to enjoy the confidence of the council, while the head of the *Giunta* also served as the President of the Region. The weakness of regional governments, whose composition could be frequently modified by regional councils,

⁴Special status was granted to the two main islands (Sardegna and Sicilia) and to three border regions (Friuli Venezia Giulia, Trentino Alto-Adige, Valle D’Aosta) characterized by the presence of consistent language minorities speaking French, German or Slavic.

together with recurrent government crises, put regional councils in a central position in regional politics, effectively creating what resembled a localised assembly system (Vassallo and Baldini 2000).

Between 1970 and 1994, regional councils were elected through a proportional electoral rule with a fixed 5-year term, which facilitated the formation of a multi-party system at the regional level, along the lines of the national one. The national party system has been described by scholars as an example of “imperfect bipolarism” (Galli 1966) or “polarized pluralism” (Sartori 2005) due to the presence of a strong centrist Christian Democrat party (DC, *Democrazia Cristiana*) and one of the biggest communist parties in Europe (PCI, *Partito Comunista Italiano*). However, contrary to what happened at the national level where the Communists were excluded from government due to international constraints, at the local level the PCI succeeded in governing some regions, mainly coalescing with the socialist party (PSI, *Partito Socialista Italiano*), which acted as a pivotal player between the Communists and the Christian Democrats. With the exception of a few regions governed by the PCI, in most of the other regions coalition governments including the DC, the PSI and other minor parties were the norm, mirroring the patterns observed at the national level (see below). This trend towards homogenization between the regional and national levels—also evident in electoral outcomes (Passarelli 2013)—continued until the nineties, when political fragmentation increased as a consequence of the dissolution of the main parties acting in the so-called Italian “First Republic” (Chiaromonte and Di Virgilio 2000).

Starting from 1995 onwards, the role of the regions within the Italian institutional system changed considerably. On the one hand, the launch of the so-called “Administrative federalism” with an unamended constitution (1997–1998) and the revision of the Title V of the Constitution in a federalist manner (1999–2001) limited the authority of the central level, granting the regions exclusive or shared legislative powers on a series of relevant areas of competence. On the other hand, the introduction of a new electoral system (1995) and the revision of the regional government system (1999) modified the working of regional politics. Following the constitutional revision of 2001, Italian regions have now a significant legislative power in a wide range of policy areas. Their competences include the regulation of healthcare systems and social assistance, labour policies, environmental protection, transport, vocational training, and promotion of the right to education. Regions are also engaged in all national decisions affecting regional interests, through the *Conferenza Stato-Regioni*, a permanent institution including representatives from national and regional governments.⁵ Moreover, regions have also enhanced their

⁵The empowerment of Italian regions has been empirically measured by the Regional Authority Index (RAI) developed by Marks et al. (2008a, b). Starting from the seventies, the RAI increased by seven points, moving from a score of 7 in the years 1972–1976 to 14 between 2001 and 2006 (as a term of comparison, a German *länder* has a score of 21). In December 2016 Italian citizens were called to vote in a referendum to approve a constitutional revision which would have modified the division of legislative competences between State and regions turning back to centralization. The referendum confirmed the current institutional arrangement.

role in European politics, by acting as strategic partners in many European Union (EU) programs.

On the institutional side, the reshaping of the Italian regional politics occurred in two stages: first in 1995, as a result of changes in the electoral law, and subsequently in 1999, following a law of constitutional revision. A kind of *neo-parliamentary government*, analogous to the system adopted for municipal elections since 1993, was introduced at the regional level. This led to the direct election of the head of the executive (president of the *Giunta*), who before 1995 was elected by the regional council. The linkage among the regional presidency and council elections facilitates the formation of a majority controlled by the president in the councils. It also envisages the automatic dissolution of the representative council in case of approval of a motion of no-confidence or in case of resignation of the regional president (Fusaro 2007).

A quite complex mixed-member electoral system was introduced, mainly following a proportional design, but allowing corrections in order to ensure the formation of a strong majority (D'Alimonte 2000). Voters cast simultaneously a vote for a candidate to the presidency (the plurality tier) and another vote for a party list running for the regional council (the proportional tier). Each candidate to the regional presidency is endorsed by a party list, or a pre-electoral coalition, running in the proportional tier. Moreover, potential regional presidents lead a list of candidate councillors in the plurality tier (the so called *listino*). In the case of success, seats are assigned to the *listino* on the basis of a majority bonus, which can amount to a maximum of 20%. This bonus guarantees the elected president a majority in the council. The proportional tier assigns the remaining seats on a provincial basis (with a regional 3% threshold for party lists not joining a coalition).⁶

These reforms reshaped Italian regional politics by introducing three major changes. First, at the institutional level, the neo-parliamentary model modified the role of the executive and the legislative: the assemblies lost their centrality as arenas of logrolling, while the direct election of the regional president, together with the attribution of a majority bonus, reinforced the role of the president. Second, in terms of electoral competition, in all regions the new system induced the formation of two main coalitions—a centre-left and centre-right—supporting the major candidates to the regional presidency. Nonetheless, thanks to the low threshold required for the election of the regional council, the regional party systems remained fragmented. Third, as a consequence of the new competences acquired by regions, the national importance of regional elections decreased as the local meaning of the vote increased

⁶It should be noted that the form of government and the electoral system have been applied *transitorily*. The constitutional reform required each region to adopt its own statute, allowing them to define their own form of government and electoral system. However, no region introduced substantial modifications with regard to the direct election of the head of the executive (president) and the relationship between the executive and the council. The possibility to adopt a different electoral law led instead, in the recent years, to a cross-regional fragmentation of voting systems. Although all the regions adopted bonus-adjusted proportional systems, there were differences across the regions in terms of electoral rules with (a) contrasting thresholds for individual parties and coalitions of parties and (b) majority bonuses (Vampa 2015).

Table 1 Background information on Italian regions with ordinary status (1970–2015)

Region	N. of regional governments	Average size of regional councils	Average number of parties in regional councils	Average number of government parties	Average seat share of government coalition
Abruzzo	18 (5)	40	8.00	3.72	0.64
Basilicata	13 (5)	29	7.00	2.77	0.57
Calabria	22 (8)	42	7.68	3.45	0.58
Campania	21 (6)	59	9.10	3.90	0.58
Emilia-Romagna	17 (8)	50	8.71	2.88	0.60
Lazio	26 (6)	59	9.15	3.92	0.55
Liguria	24 (5)	40	8.92	3.88	0.53
Lombardia	19 (5)	80	9.58	4.05	0.59
Marche	16 (6)	40	8.31	3.50	0.51
Molise	21 (8)	29	7.90	2.38	0.57
Piemonte	20 (6)	58	9.70	3.85	0.56
Puglia	20 (6)	55	8.40	4.20	0.62
Toscana	16 (5)	50	7.88	2.81	0.59
Umbria	17 (5)	29	6.35	2.35	0.57
Veneto	20 (5)	58	9.00	2.85	0.62
Total	290 (89)	50	8.46	3.42	0.58

Note: All governments between the years 1970–2015 are taken into consideration (including majority situations and caretaker governments). In round brackets formation opportunities occurring starting from 1995. The analysis covers ten legislatures (11 in Molise)

(Chiaromonte 2007). The latter effect has also been boosted by a de-alignment of the electoral calendar across regions that took place as a consequence of several early elections (see Table 3 below).⁷

The evolution of the institutional characteristics of the regional system described above led to a general process of “presidentialization” of regional politics (Musella 2009). The enhanced role of the executive—and the formation of multiparty pre-electoral coalitions at the regional level—produced a differentiation of regional politics among regions and between regional politics and national politics (Di Virgilio 2007). Moreover, the increasing fluidity of political parties at the national level weakened the capacity of controlling regional parties (Pinto 2015), increasing the autonomy of the regional counsellors even within the same party, producing greater divergences from region to region (Tronconi 2015b).

Table 1 and Figs. 1 and 2 show important background information about Italian regional politics during the years 1970–2015. We identify 290 regional governments, most of them held office between 1970 and 1994. As explained above, this period was characterised by frequent government crises which significantly

⁷The 15 ordinary statute regions voted on the same day from the first elections in 1970 until 2000.




Fig. 1 Government composition by region (coalition formulas). Note: Left: PCI alone or in coalitions with PSDI and other parties. Centre-left: different coalition formulas including DC and PSI (with or without PSDI and/or PRI); starting from 1995 centre-left identifies whether the government is formed by the centre-left electoral alliance participating to the election. Centre: DC alone or in coalition with PSDI and/or PRI. Centre-right: coalition formulas including DC and PLI (with or without PSDI and/or PRI); starting from 1995 centre-right identifies whether the government is formed by the centre-right electoral alliance participating to the election. Five-party coalition: DC allied with PSDI, PLI, PSI and/or PRI. Grand coalition: DC allied with PCI and other small parties. Other: other coalition formulas. The last two formulas are mainly concentrated in the transition period 1992–1994. Party acronyms: *PCI* Italian Communist Party (*Partito Comunista Italiano*), *PSI* Italian Socialist Party (*Partito Socialista Italiano*), *PSDI* Italian Social Democratic Party (*Partito Social Democratico Italiano*), *DC* Christian Democracy (*Democrazia Cristiana*), *PRI* Italian Republican Party (*Partito Repubblicano Italiano*), *PLI* Italian Liberal Party (*Partito Liberale Italiano*)

shortened cabinets' duration, which was on average 21 months (631 days).⁸ As reported in Table 1, these cabinets were composed on average by three or more parties controlling about 60% of the seats available in regional councils. As noted above, regional party systems were generally fragmented with an average of eight

⁸As a counting rule we follow Woldendorp et al. (2000). We define as a regional government any administration that is formed after an election and continues in the absence of (1) a change in the president of the *Giunta*, (2) a change in the party composition of the regional cabinet, and (3) a resignation in an inter-election period followed by re-formation of a regional government with the same president and party composition. Data have been retrieved from the websites of regional governments and integrated with those provided by Vassallo and Baldini (2000) for the period 1970–2000.




Fig. 2 Type of government by region (coalition attributes)

parties per council. Fragmentation peaked during the years 1992–1994, when most of the parties which had been in place for almost 50 years from the foundation of the Italian Republic collapsed following a series of corruption scandals.

Figure 1 reports information on the composition of regional governments. The repeated inclusion of some parties in coalitions during the 1970–1994 period led to recurring patterns in regional cabinets’ composition, or “coalition formulas”, formed around the two main parties: the Christian Democrats (DC) and the Communists (PCI). Regional governments including the DC tended to mirror formulas already experienced at the national level (see Cotta and Verzichelli 2000; Curini and Pinto 2013; Mershon 1996). In particular, five “coalition formulas” at the national level have been identified: national unity (from 1944 to 1947, coalition of DC, PSI and PCI); centrism (from 1947 to 1960, DC governments or coalitions including the DC and other centrist parties); centre-left (from 1960 to 1976, different formulas including DC and PSI); national solidarity (from 1976 to 1979, when the PCI supported the government through abstaining); and finally the five-party coalition from 1979 until the collapse of the First Republic (1993) (coalition including the DC with the PSI plus other centrist parties such as PSDI, PLI, and, at least till 1989, PRI; see Fig. 1 for party acronyms).

According to the patterns of governments’ composition, we can identify at least three groups of regions. The first one—Emilia-Romagna, Toscana and Umbria—has been dominated by the PCI and its allies. In contrast, the second one—Abruzzo,

Basilicata, Campania, Lombardia, Marche, Molise and Veneto—has been dominated by DC-led coalitions. Finally, the third one is composed by those regions—Calabria, Lazio, Liguria, Piemonte and Puglia—that experienced some alternation between the DC and the PCI. Starting from 1995, the coalition game shifted from the post-electoral stage to the pre-electoral one, with the formation of pre-electoral alliances of centre-left and centre-right parties. Again, we can identify regions that experienced an alternation between the two main alliances and others dominated either by the centre-left or the centre-right.

Figure 2 summarizes the main features of the regional governments formed in the years 1970–2015. As the figure shows, most of the cabinets that took office in this period are surplus or over-sized coalitions (i.e. they contain more parties than those necessary for controlling a majority). During the 1970–1994 period, surplus majorities were motivated by the indiscipline of regional councillors and by agreements between national party leaders which influenced coalition negotiations at the regional level (Vassallo and Baldini 2000). Starting from 1995, over-sized coalitions were mainly the product of highly inclusive pre-electoral coalitions which, as noted above, played a role in structuring the outcome of coalition formation process and in the distribution of portfolios across coalition partners. Figure 2 also shows that minority governments were a common feature of Italian regional politics, while single party governments (i.e. those few cases where a single party held a majority of seats) were mainly concentrated in the regions dominated either by the DC or the PCI. Finally, it should be noted that the proportion of minimal winning coalitions varied significantly across regions.

Data and Methods

To explain the variation in coalition formation observed at the regional level in Italy, we need to compare the impact of potential governments' attributes using a multivariate statistical analysis approach. In order to do so, we need information about coalitions that actually formed as well as about all the potential governments that could have formed. Following Martin and Stevenson (2001), we assume that each government negotiation represents a *formation opportunity*, in which actors choose a coalition among a large number of possibilities. The number of potential governments that could form depends on the number of parties represented in regional councils. For example, in a region with three parties (A, B and C), there are seven possible outcomes: each party may govern alone (A, B or C), two party may coalesce together (AB, AC or BC), or all three parties may form a grand coalition (ABC). In general, for p parties, $2^p - 1$ coalitions exist. This means that in Umbria, where we counted 6 parties on average, a government was chosen from among 63 potential coalitions. In a ten party system such as that of Piedmonte, the potential number of governments was 1023.

From the list of 290 regional governments that actually formed in Italian regions, we exclude all the formation opportunities that constitute majority situations (i.e. a single party holds the majority of seats).⁹ We also dropped from the analysis the few cases of caretaker governments. Finally, in each region we excluded the first formation opportunity in 1970 and 1995 in order to take into account the potential impact of the incumbent administration status in both the phases in which we divided regional politics in Italy. This led to a total of 223 formation opportunities, in which the government that actually formed was selected from among the 284,833 potential coalitions possible (120,958 between 1970 and 1994; 163,875 between 1995 and 2015). The huge number of potential governments is due to the fact that numerous parties had representation in most of the regional councils (see Table 1).

The statistical method usually employed to deal with government formation is a regression model based on conditional probabilities (Martin and Stevenson 2001; for recent developments see Glasgow et al. 2012; Glasgow and Golder 2015). Conditional logistic regression is a maximum-likelihood technique specifically designed to deal with the polytomous nature of the problem of government formation. In particular, government formation is modelled as an unordered discrete choice problem where each formation opportunity represents a case, while the set of alternatives is structured by all the potential coalitions of parties that might form the government. Among all these potential coalitions, only one will correspond to the real government. This alternative constitutes the dependent variable in our analysis and it is coded as one in our dataset, while all the other alternatives receive the value of zero.¹⁰

The first group of our hypotheses is related to the size of potential coalitions. Using information on the distribution of seats in regional councils, we create three dummy variables. We coded as one all the alternatives controlling a majority of seats (H1), which are minimal winning coalitions (H2) or minimum winning coalitions (H3). Information about the number of parties included in each potential coalition are added to test the bargaining proposition (H4). To test our hypothesis related to policy-seeking theories, we incorporate in our analysis the party ranking represented in each regional council along the economic left-right scale, which is one of the most salient axes of competition structuring party preferences in Italy and Europe (Benoit and Laver 2006). As a source of data for party ranking, we use five surveys administered to Italian experts following the methodology developed by Laver and Hunt (1992).¹¹ Using information on the ideological ranking of parties,

⁹This is a common practice in the literature. For a similar research design see: Bäck and Dumont (2007), Curini and Pinto (2013), Martin and Stevenson (2001).

¹⁰Conditional logit assumes the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), meaning that the relative odds of selecting between two alternatives is independent of the addition or subtraction of other alternatives from the choice set. In order to check if the assumption is violated, we employ the test developed by Martin and Stevenson (2001). The results show that IIA assumption is not problematic in our analysis.

¹¹Expert surveys target national parties and are aimed to estimate party policy positions on a set of issue scales aggregating expert judgements. As a consequence, they have not been developed to measure the policy preferences of local branches of national parties. Assuming that local branches

we created a dummy variable coded as one for those alternatives that are minimal connected winning coalitions (H5). By employing the same ranking, we identified the median party as the one controlling the median legislator on the economic left-right dimension. Potential coalitions including the median party were coded as one, zero otherwise (H7). We coded in a similar way the alternatives including the largest party in the regional councils (H6). Finally, to test the impact of rules and norms and vertical congruence in structuring government formation, we included three other dummy variables coded as one if potential coalitions were based on the incumbent administration (H9), on a pre-electoral alliance (H8), or were a copy of the national government (H10). Table 2 summarises our main hypotheses, together with the operationalization of our variables and the expectations about their effect on the choice of the regional government in each formation opportunity.

Results and Discussion

Using a series of conditional logit models, in this section we test how the potential coalitions' attributes listed above affect the likelihood of regional government formation. The results are reported in Fig. 3. In the first model, we evaluate how the characteristics of the various alternatives affected coalition formation during the years 1970–1994. The second model reports results for the period 1994–2015. The third model pools together all the formation opportunities for both periods. For all models, we plot unstandardised conditional logit coefficients and their 95% confidence intervals, which inform us if a variable increases or decreases in a significant way ($p < .05$) the likelihood that a potential government will form. When the confidence intervals are both on the right (or left) of the zero line, the coalition attributes positively (or negatively) influence in a statistically significant way the likelihood of government formation. To better understand the substantive effect of the coefficients, in the text we will often refer to the odds ratios: they describe the effect of a unit change in a given coalition attribute on the odds of this potential coalition being chosen as the actual government.

share the same position of national parties is a challenging claim. This is especially true for Italy, which is considered a case study for intra-party politics (Giannetti and Benoit 2009). For this reason, we avoided mechanically applying data on party policy placements at the national level to local branches at the cost of not including in our model several hypotheses related to the ideological polarization of potential coalitions (De Swaan 1973). However, we believe that, even if parties do not share the same position across levels, it is highly likely that they keep at least the same ranking on policy scales. The absence of relevant regional parties, the homogeneity between local and national party systems, and the national significance of regional elections largely support this choice. For this reason, we limit our analysis of policy seeking theories to only one expectation related to the impact of minimal connected winning coalition (Axelrod 1970). For data on expert surveys see: Laver and Hunt (1992), Benoit and Laver (2006), Curini and Iacus (2008), Di Virgilio et al. (2015), Giannetti et al. (2017).

Table 2 The expected impact of potential coalitions' attributes and their operationalization

Variable	Operationalization	Expectations
Dependent variable	The potential coalition forms the actual government: 0: No 1: Yes	
H1: Majority coalition	The potential coalition controls a majority: 0: No 1: Yes	+
H2: Minimal winning coalition	The potential coalition is a minimal winning coalition: 0: No 1: Yes	+
H3: Minimum winning coalition	The potential coalition is a minimum winning coalition: 0: No 1: Yes	+
H4: Number of parties	Absolute number of parties in the potential Coalition	–
H5: Minimal connected winning coalition	The potential coalition is a minimal connected winning coalition: 0: No 1: Yes	+
H6: Largest party	The potential coalition includes the largest party: 0: No 1: Yes	+
H7: Median party	The potential coalition includes the median party: 0: No 1: Yes	+
H8: Pre-electoral coalition	The potential coalition is based on a pre-electoral coalition 0: No 1: Yes	+
H9: Incumbent administration	The potential coalition is based on the incumbent administration: 0: No 1: Yes	+
H10: National congruency	The potential coalition is congruent with the national administration: 0: No 1: Yes	+

The first model shows that during the years 1970–1994, among the variables related to the size of the potential coalitions, only majority status exerts a positive and significant impact on government formation. Looking at the odds ratios, potential governments are 7.2 [3.3–15.6] times more likely to form if they control a majority of seats in regional councils. Being a minimal or a minimum winning coalition does not have any significant impact. Conversely, the higher the number of




Fig. 3 The impact of important coalition attributes on government formation in Italian regions (conditional logit analysis). Note: Only non majority situations (i.e. no party holds a majority of seats in the regional council) are included in the analyses. We exclude also caretaker governments and the first formation opportunities in 1970 and 1995 in order to take into account the role of the “incumbent administration” variable. Between 1970 and 1994 there are no cases of pre-electoral alliances. For this reason the variable is dropped from the first model. Parameter estimates are unstandardized conditional logit coefficients with 95% confidence intervals

parties involved in a potential coalition, the lower is the likelihood of this coalition being formed: the inclusion of one more party reduces the coalition’s chances of being formed by 55 [45–63] per cent. The two coalition attributes related to parties’ ranking on the economic left-right dimension are both positive and significant ($p < .05$) as expected: a minimal connected winning coalition is 3.5 [1.4–9.2] times more likely to form, while the chances of forming a coalition that includes the median party are 4.4 [2.2–8.6] times higher. The greatest impact on government formation is exercised by those variables associated with the role of rules and norms in government negotiations and to vertical congruence. Potential governments are 65.3 [44.6–95.6] times more likely to form if they are incumbent administrations, and 17.5 [9.9–30.8] more likely if they replicate the national administration.

The second model shows a slightly different pattern in government formation for the 1995 to 2015 period when compared to the previous period. Majority status almost halves its substantial impact (the odds ratio is 3.2), while the effect of being a minimal winning coalition formed by ideologically adjacent parties is now indistinguishable from zero. Turning to party characteristics, potential coalitions including

either the median or the largest party have higher chances to be chosen from among the set of all potential governments. As in the previous model, those variables associated with the role of rules and norms in government negotiations have the strongest impact on regional government formation. The most powerful predictor of coalition formation is now the pre-electoral coalition variable: potential coalitions based on pre-electoral pacts are 87.4 [40.4–189.16] times more likely to form. Imitating the national administration does not have any significant impact, while replicating the incumbent administration still increases the chances of government formation by 12.4 [3.8–40.7] times.

The third model is a pooled one for the entire 1970–2015 period. In general, our analysis confirms most of the expectations drawn from coalition theories, with the exception of the hypotheses related to the minimal or minimum winning status of potential governments. However, this is consistent with previous results showing the limitations of a pure office-seeking approach. Our results show that among the set of minimal winning coalitions only those comprising adjacent parties along one ideological dimension have higher chances to be chosen as the actual governments. Together with the role of the median party—which in all the models increases the likelihood of government formation for the potential coalitions including it—these results underline the importance of policy concerns in coalition formation. In other words, other things being equal, parties prefer to form coalitions (a) with partners that are adjacent on the main left-right axis of party competition and (b) that do not include any unnecessary partners to minimise policy conflicts. When this is not possible, they probably find it more convenient to opt for an oversized coalition which includes the median party, which is often a small political group, to anticipate potential policy divergences. These results largely confirm the predictions of existing coalition theories when applied to regional level in the Italian case.¹²

Our analysis highlights once more the importance of institutional or behavioural constraints—such as pre-electoral pacts and the composition of the incumbent administration—in predicting government formation (see Debus 2009; Golder 2006; Martin and Stevenson 2001). Moreover, our findings underline the importance of vertical congruence in the structuring of coalition negotiations. Rules and norms have proven to be strong predictors of coalition membership when examining government formation at the national level (Curini and Pinto 2013). Our findings show that this also holds true when examining government formation at the regional level. However, there are important differences among the two historical phases into which we can divide regional politics in Italy. In the years 1970–1994 what counts more are factors such as inertia and national constraints. In regional government negotiations local branches of national parties tended to replicate coalition formulas already experienced in the immediate past and at the national level, imitating the patterns of national governments. During these years, replicating the national coalition not only increased the chances of government formation, but also the duration of regional council cabinets: congruent governments lasted on average

¹²We also run our models on a subset including exclusively northern regions without finding any important difference.

about 3 months more than the others (695 vs. 613 days), showing therefore a higher stability against potential shocks.¹³ This pattern ended in 1994.

From 1995 coalition negotiations shifted from the post- to the pre-electoral phase. The extremely fragmented party system emerging in the early nineties, combined with the incentives generated by the new electoral system that compelled political parties to create highly inclusive and ideologically heterogeneous pre-electoral alliances in order to win a majority bonus in each region, together with the personalization of regional politics resulted in pattern of politics that (a) varied between national and regional levels and (b) differed within and between regions. This pattern can be better understood by looking at Table 3, which indicates the winning coalition at the regional level in each regional elections starting from 2000 and its level of congruence with the national coalition. Table 3 reveals two main types of incongruence. The first one occurs when winning coalitions at the regional level differ in ideological terms (i.e. centre-left vs. centre-right) from the composition of the national government. The second one occurs when winning coalitions at the regional level had the same ideological complexion as the national government, but were composed of different parties. Here, regional governments can include more parties (+), exclude some parties belonging to the national coalition (–), or exclude some parties and include others (–/+).

This pattern of differentiation was a consequence of two key phenomena at the regional level: (a) the emergence of new local lists not clearly identifiable with party labels (personal or civic lists) and (b) the greater autonomy acquired by local branches of national parties which were then free to develop their own coalitional strategies depending on the regional context (Vampa 2015). This also led to an increased “horizontal incongruence”, which means that even if regional coalitions belong to the same ideological bloc, they were generally formed by different members. Inter-regional differences emerged from the de-alignment of the electoral calendar, which became evident from 2013 when four regions were forced to schedule early elections due to a series of scandals (see Table 3).

All these elements contributed to make vertical congruence an extremely rare phenomenon between 1995 and 2015. However, according to the data presented in Table 3, the nature of this incongruence can be interpreted in different ways. In 2000 and 2005, when all or most of the ordinary regions had simultaneous elections, the incongruence observed can be read as a signal of the emergence of an alternative majority at the national level. In the subsequent general elections (2001 and 2006), in fact, both the centre-left and the centre-right governments were replaced by their main alternative. Starting from 2010, this interpretation seems to be less meaningful: what emerges is an increase in the fragmentation of the regional politics, producing different trajectories of evolution in each region.

A final word should be said about the overall predictive accuracy of our models. A common practice in the empirical literature on coalition formation is to compare predicted probability of formation for each potential coalition in each formation opportunity with the governments that actually formed in order to evaluate the

¹³ However, this difference is not statistically significant according to a means comparison test.

Table 3 Pre-electoral coalitions and congruence

	Regional elections									
	2000	2001	2005	2006	2008	2010	2011	2013	2014	2015
National Gov.	CL	CR	CR	CL	CR	CR	CR	Simul.	CL	CL
Abruzzo	CR		CL		CR(-/+)				CL(-/+)	
Basilicata	CL(+)		CL			CL		CL(-/+)		
Calabria	CR		CL			CR(-/+)			CL(-/+)	
Campania	CL(+)		CL			CR(-/+)				CL(-/+)
Emilia-Romagna	CL(+)		CL			CL			CL(-/+)	
Lazio	CR		CL			CR(-/+)		CL(+)		
Liguria	CR		CL			CL				CR
Lombardia	CR		CR(=)			CR(-)		CR(=)		
Marche	CL(+)		CL			CL				CL(-/+)
Molise	CL(+)	CR(+)		CR			CR(-/+)	CL(+)		
Piemonte	CR		CL			CR(-/+)			CL(-/+)	
Puglia	CR		CL			CL				CL(-/+)
Toscana	CL(=)		CL			CL				CL(-)
Umbria	CL(+)		CL			CL				CL(-/+)
Veneto	CR		CR(=)			CR(-/+)				CR

Note: Dark Grey: CL (centre-left coalition); Light grey: CR (centre-right coalition). (+) in round brackets indicates that the regional council coalition includes more parties than the national one; (-) indicates less parties; (-/+) means that it excludes some parties belonging to the national coalition but includes others; (=) indicates that the regional council coalition includes the same parties as the national one. In bold the years in which national elections occurred. “Simul.” means that regional and national elections were held simultaneously (the same day) for Lazio, Lombardia and Molise, with the exception of Basilicata, in which were scheduled few months later. In this case we evaluate congruence with the pre-electoral alliances constituted at the national level

predictive power of coalition theories (Bäck and Dumont 2007; Martin and Stevenson 2001). According to Fig. 1, the prediction rate of the pooled model is 41 per cent. This means that the combination of our ten coalition attributes predicts the correct government almost half of the time. This rate is quite remarkable if we think that real governments are picked up from the impressive number of 284,833 potential alternatives.

Conclusions

In this work we relied upon the literature about coalition governments' formation to study Italian regional governments. We created a new data set for testing the main hypotheses generated by existing coalition theories, which have been largely concerned hitherto with national governments. From this point of view, our analysis confirms the importance of policy and institutional or behavioural factors in predicting coalition governments' formation.

Moreover, by providing an in-depth analysis of patterns of regional council coalitions in Italy over a long period of time (1970–2015) this work attempted to evaluate the relationship between sub-national political dynamics and the broader national political game. Our results indicate that from their origin in 1970 until 1994 Italian regional governments tended to replicate patterns observed for government negotiations at the national level, producing a process of homogenization between regional and national politics. However, patterns of regional government formation changed following a series of reforms that reshaped regional politics, strengthening the regions' role in the Italian political system starting from 1995 onwards, whereas we observe an increasing differentiation of regional politics among regions and across the national and local levels.

Overall, our work shows through an analysis of many cases within a common institutional framework that the study of regional council coalitions may contribute to greater understanding of the process of government formation in general and in a single country in particular. Research on regional coalitions is seriously limited by a lack of data about the policy positions of political parties operating at the regional level. The lack of these data does not allow scholars to properly test the most advanced theories of coalition formation such as those based on two-dimensional models of party competition. Our work is not exempt from this limitation. Future research should therefore concentrate in developing new methodologies and new sources of data to estimate the policy preferences of the local branches of national parties. This could improve our understanding of local politics, and help to deepen the investigation of the relationships between the national and the local arenas of party competition.

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Coalition Congruence in India's Federal System



Eswaran Sridharan

This paper addresses the issue of coalition congruence in federal democracies and asks the question of whether coalitions at the federal level and at the state/provincial level are congruent, that is: do coalitions at each level consist of the same parties, or at least, of parties that are not allied at one or another level to the opponents of their coalition partners?

The paper and volume put forward two working hypotheses:

- (I). The more institutionalized the party system, the greater the congruence. Institutionalisation can be measured in various ways including duration as a proxy of durability. Congruence can also be measured in various ways but can be conveniently trichotomised into (a) full, 100% congruence; (b) partial congruence, limited to core parties in a coalition; (c) absence of congruence.
- (II). The more federal/decentralized the system, the less the congruence. Here again it is possible to measure the degree of decentralization in various ways.

The above conceptualization—whether the same parties form the national and state-level coalitions—is a more restrictive and detailed conceptualization which tends to suit the complexities of the Indian case. However, I also follow this book's template for conceptualizing coalition congruence (or incongruence) so as to be comparable across countries, which is to compare the cabinets of India's Prime Ministers together with those the composition of the cabinets of the State Chief Ministers' as to the participating parties. Here, by "congruence" I don't mean the exact replication of the same coalition from national level, but at least no incongruence in the composition of the subnational cabinets. For instance, if a Party A and Party B are forming a coalition at the national level; with Parties C and D present in the opposition; a congruent cabinet at the subnational level would be a government: A; AB; B; C; D and CD. Therefore, an incongruent coalition at the subnational level would be a coalition formed by parties that, at the national level are apparently opposed, or vice versa. For instance, following the example above, the following coalitions would be incongruent—AC, AD, BC or BD. In this chapter, we first detail

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the congruence, full or partial, using the more restrictive earlier definition of sameness of coalitions, and then by the latter definition of cabinets being congruent if not actually incongruent.

Before discussing coalition congruence in India it is necessary to provide readers an outline of India's political system and social cleavages, parties, party system evolution and coalitions in the next few sections. In providing this background, I build on my earlier work.

The Political System and Major Social Cleavages

After independence India adopted a parliamentary and federal system of government with a bicameral parliament in which the Westminster-style executive is responsible to a directly-elected lower house known as the Lok Sabha (Assembly of the People), a federal system with legislative powers divided between the national and state legislatures, with a strong centralizing bias, an independent judiciary with the power of judicial review. Since 2014, India is divided into twenty-nine states of very different sizes and seven federally administered Union territories. The states were reorganized on a linguistic basis after 1956 (except for Jammu and Kashmir, and the six northeastern border states). The electoral system is a single-member district, simple-plurality system (a "first-past-the-post" system). There have been sixteen national elections since 1952 (the most recent one in 2014) and at least one election has been held every 5 years at the state level.¹

India's politically salient social cleavages are those of religion, language, caste, tribe, class and the rural-urban divide. Hinduism is the majority religion, with its followers constituting 78% of the population. Hindus are a majority in all states and union territories except seven (Arunachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Lakshadweep, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Punjab).² However, Hindus are internally divided by language, caste, and sect. Within each state, the Hindu population is traditionally (but unofficially) layered into five overarching caste categories—the Brahmins (priests), Kshatriyas (warriors), Vaishyas (merchants), Shudras (farmers, artisans), and the Dalits (formerly the untouchables). Caste is based historically on the traditional division of labor and is not a racial division but an endogamous group and therefore akin to ethnicity. The broad caste clusters are subdivided into over four thousand actual castes (jatis) but the number in each state is different. Each state has a unique caste configuration in terms of both the specific endogamous jatis (which differ from state to state) and their relative population

¹Jammu and Kashmir is only required to hold state assembly elections every 6 years.

²For all figures in this section except where specified otherwise the data are from:
http://censusindia.gov.in/Census_Data_2001/India_at_glance/religion.aspx
http://censusindia.gov.in/Census_Data_2001/India_at_glance/scst.aspx
http://censusindia.gov.in/Census_Data_2001/Census_Data_Online/Language/Statement5.htm
 accessed on July 5, 2011.

share. All states do not necessarily have the same jatis making it difficult to mobilize castes politically across states. The broad caste clusters are the upper castes (the Brahmins, Kshatriyas, and Vaishyas), who along with the so-called “dominant” castes or upper intermediate castes, are a minority of a rough sixth of the population nationally, the intermediate castes (Shudras), and two constitutionally recognized groupings called Scheduled Castes (or ex-untouchables) and Scheduled Tribes (or aboriginal peoples).³ To compensate the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for the discrimination they have historically been subject to, quotas of 15% and 7.5% respectively in parliament, as well as in college admissions and public sector employment are provided for them. There tends to be a strong correlation between caste and class. The upper castes tend to constitute disproportionately the higher classes while the lower castes tend to constitute disproportionately the lowest classes.

The major religious minorities are Muslims (14.3%), Christians (2.3%), and Sikhs (1.9%). There are also relatively small numbers of Buddhists (0.8%), Jains (0.4%), and Parsees (Zoroastrians). Muslims are in a majority only in Jammu and Kashmir. Less than 10% of India's Muslims live in Muslim-majority areas.⁴ Christians are in a majority only in Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Nagaland, while the great majority of the Christian population lives as a minority in other areas.

The Scheduled Castes (16.2%) are distributed as a minority throughout the country. This is so even in constituencies reserved only for their candidates, making the non-Scheduled Caste vote decisive even in such constituencies. The Scheduled Tribes (8.2%) are geographically relatively concentrated, enjoying majorities or near-majorities in many of their reserved constituencies. They are not, however, the majority in any state except Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland. The population in these states is less than 5% of the Scheduled Tribe population.

The Constitution recognizes twenty-two languages in India, of which Hindi enjoys a plurality of over 41%. It is the language of nine of the twenty-nine states, including the largest, Uttar Pradesh. Bengali is the language of two states, West Bengal and Tripura, Telugu of two states, Andhra Pradesh and Telangana. The other major languages are each the official language of one state. India is 30% urban and 70% rural, although the proportion of people primarily dependent on agriculture is about 52%, with a considerable non-agricultural population living in rural areas. However, by most international criteria, India is more urban than these figures would indicate. The proportion of the population below the official poverty line is 26% although a recent new estimate operating with a different poverty line raises the level to 37%.⁵

³For the estimate of upper castes, including dominant castes, see Government of India (1980, Vol. I, Part I, p. 56).

⁴See Ansari (2006, Appendix, pp. 404–413) and Rudolph and Rudolph (1987), 196, Table 16, both for constituency estimates.

⁵Planning Commission, Government of India (2010).

Relevant to our argument in this paper is the fact that in the coalition era of 1989 to the present, India's federal system has become more decentralized. Compared to the 1980s state governments in India play a larger role in their economies compared to the Central government in the post-1991, post-liberalisation period with the end of Central licensing of economic activity and states competing for domestic and foreign private investment in an increasingly private investment-driven economy. There were also other developments that made state governments more secure such as the prevalence of multi-party coalition governments since 1996 in which regional parties played a key role, and the Supreme Court's *Bommai* judgement (1994) which made it much more difficult to dismiss state governments and impose Central rule under Art. 356 on the grounds of constitutional breakdown.

Indian Party System

*The Congress Party*⁶

The Indian National Congress (henceforth Congress party or simply Congress or INC) has ruled India for all but 14 years between 1947 and 2016 (from 2004 to 2014 it headed minority coalition governments). With the exception of the 1977 election, it was the largest party of India for over four decades after independence. However, in the 1996, 1998 and 1999 elections, it lost its leading position to the BJP although remaining the single largest party by vote share in all elections until it lost this status in 2014 to the BJP. From 1989 to 2014 it declined from 39.6% to 19.3% in vote share.

Founded in 1885, the Congress grew from being a group of founding notables to a mass movement that included peasants and workers by the 1920s under the influence of Mahatma Gandhi's mass mobilization. It was an umbrella movement and party for independence and tried to include all religious and linguistic groups, castes, classes and regions and encompassed ideological strands ranging from soft Hindu nationalism to radical socialism. As an independence movement it was gradualist and used non-violent methods under Gandhi's leadership, extracting concessions in the form of increasing degrees of self-rule from the British by successive rounds of pressure, the major constitutional changes to this effect being made in 1909, 1919 and 1935.

From the colonial period onwards, the Congress developed an encompassing and penetrative organizational machinery, organized on a provincial basis and dependent on local notables. In its internal functioning the Congress could be said to approximate a grand coalition of social and political forces, a multi-ethnic and multi-regional coalition, that was on balance ideologically centrist. The party was

⁶The account of the Congress in this section draws on several standard works including Kothari (1970), Weiner (1967), Kochanek (1968), Sisson and Roy (1990), Manor (1988).

committed to democracy, secularism, minority rights, federalism, and a mixed economy.

Over the course of the 1960s, the party machine gradually disintegrated. In 1969, the party underwent a major split—between the faction led by then prime minister Indira Gandhi, and the leaders in control of the party organization. Most of the party's office bearers in most states stayed with the organizational faction leading to a crippling of the organizational capacities of the faction that emerged dominant, that of Mrs. Gandhi. Mrs. Gandhi used her personal charisma and populist appeals to win national elections, and defeat the organizational wing of the party in the 1971 elections, winning a thumping majority, trouncing the organization wing. Her faction came to be considered the real Congress.

The decline of Congress over 1989–2016 has also been due to various newly assertive social groups deserting it for other or new parties. This actually began as early as the late 1960s, with the emerging prosperous peasant constituency in north India, largely belonging to the intermediate castes resenting the dominance of the “upper castes” in the Congress and moving to a range of other parties, primarily what were then called socialist parties.⁷ This was followed in the 1989–2016 period by the upper castes and many intermediate castes moving towards the BJP, a large part of the Scheduled Castes and Muslims in north India towards other parties, and part of the Congress base moving towards regional parties in the south, west and east, leading to an erosion of the Congress base nationally.

The BJP and Other Parties

There are five other major categories of parties (although these groups of parties do not necessarily constitute coalitions). We classify them as:

- (1). Hindu nationalist parties [the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and the Shiv Sena],
- (2). The communist parties, also termed the Left Front [including the Communist Party of India Marxist [CPI(M)] and the Communist Party of India (CPI), and the various CPI (Marxist-Leninist) splinters],
- (3). The agrarian/lower-caste populist parties [the Janata Party, the Janata Dal and its offshoots like the Samajwadi Party, Rashtriya Janata Dal, Rashtriya Lok Dal, Biju Janata Dal, Janata Dal (Secular), Janata Dal (United)], and
- (4). Ethno-regional or ethnic parties based on particular regional linguistic groups or lower-caste blocs or tribes (in the northeastern states, in particular). Examples of such ethno-regional parties are the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) of Tamil Nadu, the Shiromani Akali Dal of the Sikhs in Punjab, the National Conference and People's Democratic Party of Jammu and Kashmir, Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) of Assam, Telugu Desam Party (TDP) of Andhra Pradesh, the tribal

⁷Brass (1997).

Jharkhand Mukti Morcha of Jharkhand, and various small ethnic parties of the northeastern rim states, and the Scheduled Caste–based Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP).

- (5). Congress splinter parties, that is, regional parties formed by Congress leaders who have seceded from the parent party, for example, most prominently, the Nationalist Congress Party of Maharashtra and the Trinamool Congress of Bengal.

Most regional parties, and a large number of even smaller parties, are single-state parties and are officially termed state parties. In the last general election (2014), there were 6 national parties, 34 state parties, recognized by the Election Commission and over a hundred minor parties. Rather than demonstrating political fragmentation alone, these large numbers reflect the underlying diversity of India and the political mobilization of groups that were hitherto not politically empowered.

The Evolution of the Party System: Fragmentation at the National Level Despite Bipolar Consolidation in the States⁸

India's party system evolution can be periodised as follows:

Congress hegemony 1952–1967

The first four general elections to the Lok Sabha, 1952, 1957, 1962 and 1967, coincided with elections to all the state assemblies. In the first three of these, the Congress party won an over two-thirds majority of seats in the Lok Sabha on the basis of only a plurality of votes of 44–48% (Table 1). It also won a majority of seats in nearly all state assembly elections from 1952–1962, again on the basis of mostly a plurality of votes against a fragmented opposition.

The Bipolarisation of State Party Systems 1967–1989

The 1967 election marks a break with the Congress winning only 283 seats on the basis of its lowest ever vote share until then (40.8%) and losing power in eight out of sixteen states. The 1971 elections saw a restoration of a two-thirds Congress' majority in the Lok Sabha with 43.7% votes and 352 seats. In the "exceptional" post-Emergency elections of 1977, the Congress faced a temporarily united opposition consisting of the Janata Party formed just before the elections, and having a seat adjustment with a Congress splinter group and the CPI-M, thus consisting of virtually the entire opposition. The Congress was trounced, plunging to its lowest-till-then vote and seat figures of 34.5% and 154 seats respectively. The Janata Party won

⁸This section draws heavily on Sridharan (2010).

Table 1 Vote and seat shares of major parties in National Elections, 1952–2014

	1952	1957	1962	1967	1971	1977	1980	1984	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014	
Total Seats	489	494	494	520	518	542	529	542	529	521	543	543	543	543	543	543	
Indian National Congress (INC), (INC) in 1980	364(479) 74.4% 45.0%	371(490) 75% 47.8%	361(488) 73% 44.7%	283(516) 54.4% 40.8%	352(441) 68% 43.7%	154(492) 28.4% 34.5%	353(492) 66.7% 42.7%	415(517) 76.6% 48.1%	197(510) 37.2% 39.5%	232(492) 45% 36.5%	140(529) 25.8% 28.8%	141(474) 26% 25.9%	114(453) 21% 28.3%	145(414) 26.7% 26.4%	206(440) 37.9% 28.6%	206(440) 37.9% 28.6%	444(464) 8.1% 19.5%
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), (BLD) in 1977, (BJS) till 1971	3(94) 0.6% 3.1%	4(130) 0.8% 5.9%	14(196) 2.8% 6.4%	35(251) 6.7% 9.4%	22(160) 4.2% 7.4%	295(405) 54.4% 41.3%	–	2(229) 4% 7.4%	86(226) 16.5% 11.5%	120(468) 23% 20.1%	161(471) 29.6% 20.3%	179(384) 33% 25.5%	182(339) 34% 23.8%	138(264) 25.4% 22.2%	116(433) 21.4% 18.8%	116(433) 21.4% 18.8%	282(428) 51.9% 31.3%
Janata Dal (United) (JD) in 1999, (JD) (1989–1998, (SWA) till 1971	–	–	18(173) 3.6% 7.9%	44(178) 8.5% 8.7%	8(56) 1.5% 3.1%	–	–	–	142(243) 27% 17.7%	59(307) 11.3% 11.8%	46(196) 8.5% 8.1%	6(190) 1.1% 3.2%	21(60) 3.8% 3.1%	8(33) 1.5% 1.9%	20(55) 3.7% 1.5%	20(55) 3.7% 1.5%	2(93) .36% 1.1%
Communist Party of India	16(49) 3.3% 3.3%	27(110) 5.5% 8.9%	29(137) 5.9% 9.9%	23(106) 4.4% 5.0%	23(87) 4.4% 4.7%	7(91) 1.3% 2.8%	11(48) 1.8% 2.6%	6(66) 1.1% 2.7%	12(50) 2.3% 2.6%	14(42) 2.7% 2.5%	12(43) 2.2% 2.0%	9(58) 1.6% 1.8%	4(54) 0.7% 1.5%	9(33) 1.6% 1.8%	4(56) 0.7% 1.4%	4(56) 0.7% 1.4%	1(67) .18% .8%
Communist Party of India Marxist (CPM)	–	–	–	19(62) 3.7% 4.4%	25(85) 4.8% 5.1%	22(53) 4.1% 4.3%	36(63) 7% 6.1%	22(64) 4.1% 5.7%	33(64) 6.2% 6.5%	35(60) 6.7% 6.2%	32(75) 6% 6.1%	32(71) 5.9% 5.2%	33(72) 6.1% 5.4%	43(69) 7.9% 5.7%	16(82) 3.0% 5.3%	16(82) 3.0% 5.3%	9(93) 1.65% 3.3%
Lok Dal (LKD), (JPS) in 1980, (INCO) till 1977	–	–	–	–	16(238) 3.1% 10.4%	3(19) 0.6% 1.7%	41(294) 7.7% 9.4%	3(174) 0.6% 5.6%	0(117) – 0.2%	0(78) – 0.1%	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Samajwadi Party (SP) in 1991, (JP) till 1989	–	–	–	–	–	–	31(432) 5.9% 19.0%	10(219) 1.8% 6.7%	0(156) – 1.0%	5(345) 1% 3.4%	17(111) 3.1% 3.3%	20(164) 3.7% 5.0%	26(151) 4.8% 3.8%	36(237) 6.6% 4.3%	23(193) 4.3% 3.4%	23(193) 4.3% 3.4%	5(197) .92% 3.4%

(continued)

Table 1 (continued)

	1952	1957	1962	1967	1971	1977	1980	1984	1989	1991	1996	1998	1999	2004	2009	2014
Total Seats	489	494	494	520	518	542	529	542	529	521	543	543	543	543	543	543
Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	11(117)	5(249)	14(225)	19(435)	21(500)	0(503)
Praja Socialist Party (PSP), (KMPP) in 1952	9(145)	19(189)	12(168)	13(109)	2(63)	–	–	–	–	–	2%	0.9%	2.6%	3.5%	3.9%	–
	1.8%	3.8%	2.4%	2.5%	0.4%	–	–	–	–	–	3.6%	4.7%	4.2%	5.3%	6.2%	4.2%
	5.8%	10.4%	6.8%	3.1%	1.0%	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Sanyukta Socialist Party (SSP), (SOC) till 1962	12(254)	–	6(107)	23(122)	3(93)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	2.5%	–	1.2%	4.4%	0.6%	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	10.6%	–	2.7%	4.9%	2.4%	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Others	47	31	34	45	53	52	35	79	44	55	115	141	143	140	128	197
	9.6%	6.3%	6.9%	8.6%	10.2%	9.6%	9.1%	14.6%	8.9%	11%	21.2%	26%	26.3%	25.8%	23.6%	36.27%
	16.5%	7.6%	10.5%	10.0%	13.8%	9.9%	8.5%	10.0%	12.2%	12.1%	21.5%	26.3%	27.1%	28.6%	29.2%	34%
Independents	38	42	20	35	14	9	9	5	12	1	9	6	6	5	9	3
	7.6%	8.5%	4%	6.7%	2.7%	1.7%	1.7%	0.9%	2.26%	0.2%	1.7%	1.1%	1.1%	0.9%	1.7%	0.55%
	15.9%	19.4%	11.1%	13.7%	8.4%	5.5%	6.4%	8.1%	5.2%	3.9%	6.3%	2.4%	2.8%	4.3%	5.2%	2.4%

Notes

Elections were not held in 13 constituencies: 12 in Assam and 1 in Meghalaya

Elections were not held in Assam (14 seats)

Elections were not held in Jammu & Kashmir (6 seats) and Punjab (13 seats); 3 countermanded seats results excluded

Figures in parentheses are seats contested, upper percentage is seat share, lower percentage is vote share

Notes: *BLD* Bharatiya Lok Dal, *BJS* Bharatiya Jana Sangh, *SWA* Swatantra Party, *INC* Indian National Congress (Irs), *JPS* Janata Party Secular, *INCO* Indian National Congress (Organisation), *JP* Janata Party, *KMPP* Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party, *SOC* Socialist Party, *SJP* Samajwadi Janata Party

Sources: David Butler, Ashok Lahiri and Pranoy Roy, *India Decides: Elections 1952–1995*, New Delhi: Books and Things, 1995; Election Commission of India, *Statistical Report on General Elections, Vol. 1 (Ver. 1)—National and State Abstracts, for 1996, 1998, 1999*; For 2004 and 2009, Election Commission of India website: www.eci.gov.in

a majority (295 seats) on the basis of 41.3% of the vote. This was a Congress-like victory in reverse, that is, a catchall umbrella party winning a seat majority on the basis of a vote plurality.

In 1980, another Congress restoration took place following the disintegration of the Janata Party, again a near two-thirds majority of 353 seats (out of 542) on the basis of a plurality of 42.7%. The 1984 elections, another “exceptional” election, following the assassination of prime minister Indira Gandhi, saw the highest-ever Congress vote share (48.1%) and 415 seats or a three-quarters majority. The 1989 elections marked another turning point with the Congress crashing to 39.5% and 197 seats against an opposition electoral alliance consisting of seat adjustments, of the National Front coalition (of the Janata Dal and regional and minor parties) supported by the BJP and the Left parties that resulted in a large number of one-on-one contests with the Congress.

The post-1967 period also saw a very important de-linking of parliamentary and state assembly elections since 1971, and a suspension of organisational elections within the Congress from 1972 to 1992, hand in hand with the centralisation of power at the top of the party apparatus. It also saw the emergence of anti-Congress alliances, then of a principal opposition party to the Congress in state after state, in most states, representing a consolidation of the non-Congress space at the state level. The Index of Opposition Unity (IOU) showed an upward trend in state after state over 1967–1989.⁹ This is particularly so if one considers opposition coalitions—and first party plus its pre-electoral allies—as a single party for the purposes of the IOU. This bipolar consolidation was the key feature and driving force of the fragmentation of the national party system. However, these were not the same bipolarity like in the USA, or same two parties or coalitions in each state, but multiple bipolarities.

However, at the end of this 1967–1989 period, just after the 1989 elections and the state assembly elections in early 1990, the Congress remained the leading party in more states (12) in terms of Lok Sabha seats and in terms of vote share (17) than any other, and remained one of the two leading parties in more states in terms of Lok Sabha seats (20) and vote share (24) than any other. In the state assemblies it remained the leading party in more states (9) and in terms of vote share (11) than any other, and one of the two leading parties in terms of vote share in more states (24, or all except Tamil Nadu) than any other. However, many of these were very small states, the Congress having lost U.P., Bihar, Orissa and Haryana to the Janata Dal, Madhya Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh to the BJP, and Rajasthan and Gujarat to a Janata Dal-BJP coalition in both Lok Sabha and state assembly elections (except Haryana, which did not have assembly elections in 1989–1990).

⁹A measure of the fragmentation of the opposition space represented by the percentage share of the largest non-Congress (in today's terms, non-ruling party) vote in the total opposition vote. The higher the IOU the less fragmented the opposition space.

The Evolution of the Pattern of Fragmentation of the Party System 1989–2017

The 1989 election results were not just another repeat of broad-front anti-Congressism of the Janata Party kind, but signified a more far-reaching and seismic shift in the party system rooted in shifts in party organisational strength and support bases at the state level in increasing number of states, and in India's political economy and changing patterns of social mobilisation. The major trends of 1989–2016 are (1) the relative decline of the Congress and (2) the rise of the BJP and (3) regional or single state-based parties.¹⁰

Prior to 1989, the BJP and its predecessor the BJS, the political arm of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), had never exceeded 10% of the vote or 35 seats nationally, except in 1977 when as a component of the Janata Party it won 99 of 295 seats won by the Janata Party (more than the 86 seats it won in 1989). Its rise since then has been steady in terms of both vote and seat shares. It experienced a meteoric rise in seats from a derisory 2 in 1984 (despite 7.4% votes) to 86 (out of 226 contested, mostly in de facto alliance with the Janata Dal) in 1989 owing to the combination of three effects—seat adjustments with the Janata Dal resulting in one-to-one contests against the Congress in most of the seats it contested, an increase in contested seats and a sizeable and regionally concentrated swing in its favour.

In 1989–1991, the BJP contested alone with a religiously polarising platform against the backdrop of the upper caste backlash against the National Front government's decision to implement the Mandal Commission recommendations for reservation of government jobs for backward classes defined in caste terms. Its vote share zoomed to 20.1%, and it won 120 seats (of an unprecedented 468 contested), becoming the second largest party in terms of seats and votes.

The BJP came to form state governments on its own for the first time ever in 1990. It formed the government on its own in M. P. and H. P., and formed coalition governments with the Janata Dal in Rajasthan and Gujarat. The only time that it had dominated state governments earlier was when it was part of the Janata Party in 1977–1979, during which period the Jana Sangh component of the Janata party dominated the government and occupied the chief minister's post in M.P., H.P. and Rajasthan. Thus the BJP arrived as a state-level political force, whereas earlier it had essentially been sub-state, thereby contributing to national party system fragmentation.

In 1991, with the external support of the 11-member AIADMK and some smaller allies the Congress was able to form a minority government dependent on abstention in confidence votes by a section of the opposition. It began adding to its numbers by splitting small parties such as the TDP in fractions of one-third or more

¹⁰Regional party is something of a misnomer as it implies a party strong in two or more states in a region. All the regional parties, however, are single state-based parties except the Janata Dal (United), strong in Bihar and Karnataka, and the CPI(M), strong in West Bengal, Tripura and Kerala, if one considers them regional parties. These sets of states do not constitute recognizable regions. The JD(U) and the CPI(M) are really national parties with a limited geographical spread, the former being a rump of the once much larger Janata Dal.

(legal under the Anti-Defection law), and attained a majority on its own exactly half-way through its term (end-1993).

In 1996, its vote share declined still further to a then-historic low of 28.7%, having been hit badly by the breaking away of the bulk of its Tamil Nadu unit and marginally by the breaking away of factions called the Congress (Tiwari) and the Madhya Pradesh Vikas Congress. For the first time, the Congress was overtaken as the single largest party, by the BJP, winning only 141 seats compared to the BJP's 161, although it remained the single largest party by vote share with 28.8% compared to the BJP's 20.3%.

In 1996, the BJP ran into the limits of contesting alone with a religiously polarising agenda. Despite being catapulted to its higher-ever seat tally of 161 seats, due to its more regionally concentrated vote, making it the largest party in the Lok Sabha and able to form the government for 12 days, its vote share remained stagnant at 20.3% and it failed to win parliamentary support from enough other parties to form a minority or coalition government. Six states—U.P., M.P., Gujarat, Rajasthan, Bihar and Maharashtra—accounted for 143 of its 161 seats, with U.P. and M.P. alone accounting for almost half.

These results can be seen as a delayed reflection of the realignment of political forces that was represented by the results of the elections to the assemblies of fifteen states between November 1993 and March 1995, which, by and large, represented major gains for the BJP, some regional parties like the TDP and Shiv Sena, and state-based parties such as the Samajwadi Party, the Samata Party and the BSP, while at best a holding operation for the Congress in some stronghold states such as H.P. and M.P.¹¹

A United Front government consisting of 11 parties participating in government, including two parties represented only by Rajya Sabha (upper house) members, and three parties formally part of the United Front coalition but not participating in government, and supported from outside by the Congress, was formed in June 1996. The Congress withdrew support to Prime Minister Deve Gowda in April 1997, but continued to support the UF government after his replacement as prime minister by I. K. Gujral, eventually withdrawing support to the UF in November 1997, precipitating fresh elections in February–March 1998.

In 1998, the BJP shelved its overt Hindu nationalist agenda to strike explicit or tacit alliances with a range of state-based parties, both regional parties and others, many of them earlier with the UF, a strategy that it consolidated after its victory.¹² The BJP strategy was certainly helped by the fact that the Congress had toppled the UF government and was the principal opponent of the constituents of the UF in several major states. This catapulted the BJP to power as it emerged once again as the single largest party (the Congress got only 141 seats) and led the single largest pre-election alliance.¹³ A BJP-led 12-member minority coalition government consisting of 11 pre-election (including two independents and one from a one-Rajya Sabha MP party) and one post-election ally, and dependent on the support or absten-

¹¹Yadav (1996).

¹²For the BJP's use of coalitions as a strategy to expand its base across states, see Sridharan (2005).

¹³For details of the alliances, pre- and post-election in 1998, see Arora (2000).

tion in confidence votes of at eight post-election allies and pre-election allies who opted out of the ministry, assumed power in March 1998.

In 1999, essentially the same BJP-led pre-election coalition fought the Congress-led coalition, the latter being a more tentative coalition with state-by-state agreements but no common national platform. The 21-party BJP-led alliance was formally christened the National Democratic Alliance (NDA); The Congress alliance was much smaller, the main difference being that the BJP was now allied to the DMK in Tamil Nadu while the Congress was allied to the AIADMK.

The NDA won a more decisive victory getting 299 seats, with the BJP alone getting 182 as in 1998. With post-election adherents the number went up to 303 seats. The Congress got a lowest-ever 111 seats, and only 134 with allies. However, in terms of vote share, the BJP alone declined to 23.8% while the Congress rose to 28.4%, remaining the single largest party. The NDA formed the government with the 29-member TDP and five other smaller pre-election allies opting to support it from outside.

In 2004, the incumbent BJP-led NDA coalition contested against the newly-formed Congress-led coalition, called the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) after the election, and lost. The major change was that the Congress party became “coalitionable” in a significant way for the first time following a conscious decision to adopt a coalition strategy. The Congress-led alliance consisted of nineteen parties. This meant the addition of eight new allies—including the DMK-led alliance in Tamil Nadu—since the 1999 elections, and the dropping of two old allies. The Congress-led alliance won 222 seats and 36.53% votes (or only a whisker ahead of the NDA in vote share) but 33 seats ahead. With the external support of the Left parties (61 seats) it gained a majority in the Lok Sabha and formed a government. The UPA also enjoyed the unilateral external support of two other significant parties (with whose support it could potentially retain a majority even if the Left withdrew), i.e., the Samajwadi Party (36 seats) and the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) (19 seats). The major difference between 2004 and earlier elections was the success of the Congress’ coalitionability, which was critical to its universally unexpected victory.¹⁴

In 2009, the UPA coalition defeated the depleted NDA by a much greater margin with the Congress winning 206 seats on its own and 263 with its pre-electoral allies, of which, compared to 2004, it had lost the Left as a partial seat adjustment partner in Jharkhand, A.P. and Tamil Nadu, and lost the RJD, LJP, TRS, PMK, MDMK and PDP, but added the Trinamul Congress and the NC (Table 7). The NDA suffered major-ally depletion with the loss of the TDP, BJD and the split in the Shiv Sena but added the AGP, TRS, and RLD. The Congress-led UPA formed a 6-party government of the Congress, Trinamul Congress, DMK, NCP, NC and Muslim League but excluded some pre-electoral [JMM, Bodoland People’s Front, Kerala Congress (Mani)] and all post-electoral supporters who consisted of 9 parties and 3 independents totaling 59 MPs. This coalition resembled the NDA in that the legislative coalition including post-electoral allies constituted a considerable surplus majority

¹⁴For details of the argument and figures, see Sridharan (2004).

and hence provided insurance against defection by any ally, rendering no ally pivotal, and also from the fact that the BJP numbers, down to 116, made it like the Congress during the NDA, in being too small to form a viable alternative coalition given that several parties like the Left, SP, RJD, TDP and BSP would not be prepared to ally with it due to differences on secularism and their need for religious minority votes.

In 2014, the NDA (see Table 2), consisting of the same parties except for the additional of the DMK in Tamil Nadu and a host of minor parties, defeated the UPA and formed a majority government which was an oversized coalition in which the BJP alone had a narrow majority of seats (52% of the seats based on 31% vote share, 38% for the NDA).

Most states remained or became bipolar in the 1989–2016 period, except notably UP. However, in a number of apparently bipolar or two-party states, if we look at vote shares we find the presence of a significant, often growing, third party which has a vote share in double digits but not yet large enough to win a significant number of seats. It is obviously cutting into the potential vote share of one or both of the two main parties or alliances in a way that makes it both a threat to either/both of the former as well as attractive as an ally of one to defeat the other. This is the case in states like Assam, Orissa, Goa, West Bengal, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh.

This rising third party was the BJP in all of these states, and the BSP in Punjab, U.P. and in a small way, M.P. By emerging as a significant third party in vote share at the state level and hence, both threatening to cut into the votes and seat prospects of either or both of the dominant parties, and hence creating incentives for the weaker of the two leading parties to ally with it, typically the regional party, since both the BJP, nationally, and the regional party in the state, face the Congress as their principal opponent.

Thus, a process of bipolar consolidation has been taking place in many states, but of multiple bipolarities (e.g., Congress-BJP, Congress-Left, Congress-Regional Party), contributing to fragmentation at the national level, contributing and directly or indirectly to potential bipolar consolidation of a Congress-led alliance versus BJP-led alliance, although both alliances are as yet unstable, marked by the exit and entry of smaller parties. Furthermore, both alliances are not perfect one-on-one seat adjustments but partial ones, in which the total seats contested by each alliance may exceed the total number of seats. For example, in 2009, the Congress alliances with its partners were explicitly limited to the partner's main state only, so that the latter were free to contest seats against the Congress in other states and did so, contributing to a larger effective number of parties by votes in 2009 despite the effective number of parties by seats shrinking. What this reflects is the drive by several smaller parties like the Samajwadi Party and the Nationalist Congress Party to expand their base horizontally across states, which brings into conflict with the Congress which needs to have as broadly multi-state a base as possible to be able to defend its status as the leading national party.

Table 2 Congruence of coalitions, State-wise, for the BJP alliances (1991–2016) in Lok Sabha and state assembly elections

General election year	Alliance partners	States	Alliance partner in state (Lok Sabha)	Alliance partner in state (state assembly)	State assembly election year
1991	Shiv Sena	Andhra Pradesh	–	–	1994
		Assam	–	–	1991
		Bihar	–	–	1995
		Haryana	–	–	1991
		Jharkhand	–	–	–
		Karnataka	–	–	1994
		Kerala	–	–	1991
		Maharashtra	Shiv Sena	Shiv Sena	1995
		Odisha	–	–	1995
		Punjab	–	–	1992
		Tamil Nadu	–	–	1991
		West Bengal	–	–	1991
1996	Samata Party, Shiv Sena, Haryana Vikas Party, Madhya Pradesh Vikas Congress, Shiromani Akali Dal	Andhra Pradesh	–	–	1999
		Assam	–	–	1996
		Bihar	Samata Party	Samata Party	2000
		Haryana	Haryana Vikas Party	Haryana Vikas Party	1996
		Jharkhand	–	–	–
		Karnataka	–	–	1999
		Kerala	–	–	1996
		Maharashtra	Shiv Sena	Shiv Sena	1999
		Odisha	–	–	2000
		Punjab	Shiromani Akali Dal	Shiromani Akali Dal	1997
		Tamil Nadu	–	–	1996
		West Bengal	–	–	1996

(continued)

Table 2 (continued)

General election year	Alliance partners	States	Alliance partner in state (Lok Sabha)	Alliance partner in state (state assembly)	State assembly election year
1998	AIADMK, Samata Party, Shiromani Akali Dal, All India Trinamool Congress, Shiv Sena, PMK, Lok Shakti, MDMK, Haryana Vikas Party, Janata Party, NTRTDP, Mizo National Front, Biju Janata Dal	Andhra Pradesh	NTRTDP		
		Assam			
		Bihar	Samata Party		
		Haryana	Haryana Vikas Party		
		Jharkhand	–		
		Karnataka	–		
		Kerala	–		
		Maharashtra	Shiv Sena		
		Odisha	Biju Janata Dal		
		Punjab	Shiromani Akali Dal		
		Tamil Nadu	AIADMK, MDMK, PMK		
		West Bengal	All India Trinamool Congress		
1999	Janata Dal (U), DMK, Samata Party, Biju Janata Dal, Shiromani Akali Dal, All India Trinamool Congress, Shiv Sena, PMK, Lok Shakti, MDMK, Indian National Lok Dal, Mizo National Front, Sikkim Democratic Front, MSCP, Telugu Desam Party, TRC, MGR Anna DMK	Andhra Pradesh	TDP	TDP	1999
		Assam	–	AGP	2001
		Bihar	JD(U) ^a	JD(U), Samata Party	2000
		Haryana	Indian National Lok Dal	Indian National Lok Dal	2000
		Jharkhand	–	–	–
		Karnataka	JD(U) ^a	JD(U)	1999
		Kerala	–	–	2001
		Maharashtra	Shiv Sena	Shiv Sena	1999
		Odisha	Biju Janata Dal	Biju Janata Dal	2000
		Punjab	Shiromani Akali Dal	Shiromani Akali Dal	2002
		Tamil Nadu	DMK and minor parties	DMK and minor parties	2001
		West Bengal	All India Trinamool Congress	–	2001

(continued)

Table 2 (continued)

General election year	Alliance partners	States	Alliance partner in state (Lok Sabha)	Alliance partner in state (state assembly)	State assembly election year
2004	Janata Dal (United), AIADMK, Telugu Desam Party, Biju Janata Dal, Shiromani Akali Dal, All India Trinamool Congress, Shiv Sena, Mizo National Front, IFDP, MSCP	Andhra Pradesh	TDP		2004
		Assam	–	–	2006
		Bihar	2005 a and b JD(U)	JD(U)	2005a
					2005b
		Haryana	–	–	2005
		Jharkhand	–	JD(U)	2005
		Karnataka	–	–	2008
		Kerala	IFDP	IFDP merged with the BJP	2006
		Maharashtra	Shiv Sena	Shiv Sena	2004
		Odisha	Biju Janata Dal	Biju Janata Dal	2004
		Punjab	Shiromani Akali Dal	Shiromani Akali Dal	2007
		Tamil Nadu	AIADMK senior	–	2006
		West Bengal	All Indian Trinamool Congress	All India Trinamool Congress	2006

(continued)

Table 2 (continued)

General election year	Alliance partners	States	Alliance partner in state (Lok Sabha)	Alliance partner in state (state assembly)	State assembly election year
2009	Janata Dal (United), Shiv Sena, Indian National Lok Dal, Rashtriya Lok Dal, Asom Gana Parishad, Nagaland People's Front, Gorkha Janmukti Morcha, Uttarakhand Kranti Dal, Kamtapur Progressive Party, Ladakh Union Territory Front, Telangana Rashtra Samiti	Andhra Pradesh	TRS ^b	TRS ^b	2009
		Assam	Asom Gana Parishad, Rashtrawadi Sena	–	2011
		Bihar	JD(U)	JD(U)	2010
		Haryana	–	–	2009
		Jharkhand	JD(U)	JD(U)	2010
		Karnataka	–	–	2013
		Kerala	JD(U)	JD(U)	2011
		Maharashtra	Shiv Sena	Shiv Sena	2009
		Odisha	–	–	2009
		Punjab	Shiromani Akali Dal	Shiromani Akali Dal	2012
		Tamil Nadu	JD(U), Shiv Sena	–	2011
		West Bengal	Gorkhaland Jan Mukti Morcha, Kamtapur Progressive Party	GJM	2011

^aSamata Party and Lok Shakti fought under JD(U) symbol

^bTRS joined the BJP led NDA after the polling

The Evolution of Coalition Governments in India¹⁵

The SMSP or first-past-the-post system strongly incentivizes pre-electoral coalitions due to the imperative to win a plurality of votes at the district level (Golder 2006) and in federal systems, at the state level. Faced with an encompassing umbrella party this incentivized the fragmented and regionalized opposition parties from the late 1960s onwards to form both pre-electoral and post-electoral coalitions against the Congress party, a trend that continued into the 1970s and 1980s, including opposition party mergers, of which we give a brief historical account below.

The evolution of alliances in the Indian party system can be summarised as follows. The first phase of broad-front anti-Congressism in the 1960s and 1970s, was

¹⁵For detailed accounts of coalition dynamics see Sridharan (2002, 2004), Ruparelia (2015), Diwakar (2017). This section draws heavily upon, with modifications, Sridharan (2010).

characterised by intra-state alliances. The component parties of the alliance, e.g., the Jana Sangh, Bharatiya Kranti Dal/Bharatiya Lok Dal, Socialists, Swatantra, Congress (O), had their state units, strongholds and interests in those states while having no ideological glue.

The second phase, again of broad-front anti-Congressism, was that of the Janata Party, which unified ideologically disparate non-Congress parties so as to have one-on-one contests aggregating votes at the constituency level so as to win. It reflected the imperative of aggregation, regardless of ideology, for victory. This also consisted of intra-state alliances of disparate parties within the overall umbrella of unification of those parties at the national level.

The National Front coalition, 1989–1990, was a new departure in three senses. First, that learning from the Janata Party experience, it did not try to unify very different parties but put together a coalition of distinct parties based on a common manifesto. Second, it brought in the explicitly regional parties like the DMK, TDP and AGP, and the Left parties unlike the late 1960s/1970s experiments. Third, it also marked the beginning of inter-state alliances of parties or territorially compatible alliances where parties do not compete on each other's turf.

In 1996, a nine-party United Front (UF) minority coalition government, with another three (Left) parties formally part of the UF coalition but opting to support from outside, and also supported by the Congress, was formed. The UF was a territorial coalition but had a certain secular ideological mooring, ranged as it was against a hardline, perceivedly “anti-system” BJP. The Congress withdrew support in April 1997, forcing a change of prime minister, and then once again withdrew support in November 1997, precipitating early elections in February 1998.

All the coalitions since 1996 have been inter-state territorial, that is, federal coalitions. The period since 1991 has also seen the growth and sustenance of intra-state alliances based on ideology (like the BJP-Shiv Sena) and based on territorial compatibility of two kinds. This consists of intra-state alliances which are a reverse of the historical Congress-AIADMK (a regional party) kind in which the regional party allies with the state unit of the national party with the regional party getting the majority share of both Lok Sabha and assembly seats. The examples are the BJP-AIADMK-smaller parties in 1998 and 2004, the BJP-DMK-smaller parties in 1999, Congress-DMK-smaller parties in 2004, the BJP-TDP in 1999 and 2004, the BJP-Trinamul Congress in 1999 and 2004, BJP-BJD in Orissa in 1998, 1999 and 2004, BJP-Haryana Vikas Party in 1996 and 1998 and the BJP-INLD (Chautala) in 1999, and also RJD-Congress in 2004, and JD(U)-BJP in 2004.

Second, the reverse of this pattern, viz., an alliance between a minor state party and a national party in which the latter gets the lion's share of both Lok Sabha and assembly seats, the key being territorial compatibility in which the national party does not contest in the smaller regional party's intra-state strongholds. Examples are the BJP-Lok Shakti in Karnataka in 1998 and 1999, the BJP-Samata in Bihar over 1996–1999, the BJP-HVC in H.P., and the Congress-JMM-smaller parties in 2004.

The clear emphasis of alliances since the nineties has been on territorial compatibility at the expense of ideological compatibility, particularly the BJP's alliances of 1998, 1999, 2004 and 2014, and the Congress alliances of 2004, 2009 and 2014, but even the UF coalition. However, the most important point to be noted is that in the whole history of alliances since the 1960s, with the exception of the Left Front limited to three states, alliances have been driven by the imperative to aggregate votes to win and not by ideology, programme or social cleavages except for overarching differences between the Congress and the BJP on secularism.¹⁶

Are Coalitions Congruent in India's Federal System?

Tables 2 and 3 below are master tables of coalitions in India since 1991 comparing pre-electoral and government alliances for national elections and for the nearest (in time) state elections (since most such elections are not simultaneous). As mentioned earlier, there are strong incentives in India's SMSP system for pre-electoral coalitions, which lead to post-electoral government coalitions although pre-electoral allies can sometimes remain part of the legislative but not the executive coalition and some post-electoral allies can join the executive coalition.

We can take 1991 to be the beginning of the era of coalition politics in a sense since the Congress plurality did not translate into a majority of seats for the second consecutive time (1989 and 1991) and a non-Congress minority government was formed in 1989 and a Congress minority government in 1991. However, coalitions evolved after a period of flux through the 1990s until they took shape in the NDA coalition in 1998 and in the UPA coalition in 2004. But looking at congruence since 1991 is useful in that coalitions from this date contain the main parties that have been prominent in coalitions later.

The following patterns emerge from this historical record in Tables 2 and 3, and from Tables 4 and 5 which map out, party-wise, the allies of the BJP and Congress respectively; while Tables 2 and 3 give the actual historical record of pre-electoral (whether the coalition wins power or not) or government coalitions (in case the coalition wins power), Tables 4 and 5 list the parties which have been coalition partners, pre-electoral or in government (if the coalition wins power) of the BJP and Congress respectively, for Lok Sabha and state assembly elections and the duration of such alliances.

First, the two core parties, the BJP and the Congress, the nuclei respectively of the NDA and UPA coalitions have not allied in any election at the national or state level throughout this period.

Second, the overall pattern is one of partial congruence with the BJP leading the NDA coalition at the national level and the Congress the UPA coalition.

¹⁶For a detailed overview of state-level coalition politics in India, see Sridharan (1999, 2002, 2003). For a detailed state-wise analysis of the BJP's coalition strategies since 1989, Sridharan (2005). For a detailed analysis of the Congress' coalition strategies and their criticality in the 2004 elections, see Sridharan (2004).

Table 3 Congruence of Coalitions, State-wise, for the INC alliances (1991–2016) in Lok Sabha and state assembly elections

General election year	Alliance partners	States	Alliance partner in state (Lok Sabha)	Alliance partner in state (state assembly)	State assembly election year
1991	AIADMK, Kerala Congress (M)	Andhra			1994
		Assam			
		Bihar			1991
					1995
		Haryana			1991
		Jharkhand			–
		Karnataka			1994
		Kerala	Kerala Congress (M), IUML	Kerala Congress (M), IUML	1991
		Maharashtra			1995
		Odisha			1995
		Punjab			1992
		Tamil Nadu	AIADMK	AIADMK	1991
		West Bengal			1991
		1996	AIADMK, Kerala Congress (M), IUML	Andhra Pradesh	
Assam					1996
Bihar					2000
Haryana					1996
Jharkhand					–
Karnataka					1999
Kerala	Kerala Congress (M), IUML			Kerala Congress (M), IUML	1996
Maharashtra					1999
Odisha					2000
Punjab					1997
Tamil Nadu	AIADMK			AIADMK	1996
West Bengal					1996

(continued)

Table 3 (continued)

General election year	Alliance partners	States	Alliance partner in state (Lok Sabha)	Alliance partner in state (state assembly)	State assembly election year
1998	Rashtriya Janata Dal, RPI, IUML, Kerala Congress (M), Bahujan Samaj Party, Communist Party of India, MGRADMK, Samajwadi Party	Andhra Pradesh	–		
		Assam	–		
		Bihar	Rashtriya Janata Dal		
		Haryana	–		
		Jharkhand	–		
		Karnataka	–		
		Kerala	IUML, Kerala Congress (M)		
		Maharashtra	Samajwadi Party, RPI		
		Odisha	–		
		Punjab	Bahujan Samaj Party		
		Tamil Nadu	MGRADMK		
		West Bengal	–		
1999	RLD, All India Trinamool Congress, AIADMK, IUML, Kerala Congress (M), CPI, CPI(M), RPI, Marxist Coordination, Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha	Andhra Pradesh	–	–	1999
		Assam	–	–	2001
		Bihar	RJD, CPI, MCC		2000
		Haryana	–	–	2000
		Jharkhand	–	–	–
		Karnataka	–	–	1999
		Kerala	Kerala Congress (M), IUML	Kerala Congress (M), IUML	2001
		Maharashtra	Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha, RPI	–	1999
		Odisha	–	–	2000
		Punjab	CPI, CPI(M)	–	2002
		Tamil Nadu	AIADMK, CPI(M), CPI	AIADMK, CPI (M), CPI	2001
		West Bengal			2001

(continued)

Table 3 (continued)

General election year	Alliance partners	States	Alliance partner in state (Lok Sabha)	Alliance partner in state (state assembly)	State assembly election year
2004	RJD, DMK, NCP, PMK, TRS, LJP, JMM, MDMK, CPI(M), CPI, IUML, Kerala Congress (M), J&K PDP, RPI(A), JD(S), Arunachal Congress, RPI, Peoples' Republican Party, Party for Democratic Socialism	Andhra Pradesh	TRS, CPI(M)	CPI(M), TRS	2004
		Assam	–	–	2006
		Bihar	RJD, LJP, JMM	2005 a- no alliance; 2005-b RJD, NCP, CPI(M)	2005 a 2005 b
		Haryana	–	–	2005
		Jharkhand	RJD, LJP, JMM	JMM	2005
		Karnataka	–	–	2008
		Kerala	IUML, Kerala Congress (M)	IUML, Kerala Congress (M)	2006
		Maharashtra	NCP, RPI(A), JD(S), RPI, People's Republican Party	NCP	2004
		Odisha	–	–	2004
		Punjab	CPI, CPI(M)	–	2007
		Tamil Nadu	DMK, PMK, MDMK, CPI(M), CPI	CPI(M), CPI, PMK, DMK	2006
		West Bengal	Party for Democratic Socialism	Party for Democratic Socialism	2006
		2009	All Indian Trinamool Congress, DMK, NCP, J&K NC, NCP, IUML, JMM, VCK, BPF, KC(M), RPI(A), RPI	Andhra Pradesh	–
Assam	BPF			–	2011
Bihar	–			–	2010
Haryana	–			–	2009
Jharkhand	JMM			JVM	2010
Karnataka	–			–	2013
Kerala	IUML, KC(M)			IUML, KC(M)	2011
Maharashtra	NCP, RPI, RPI(A)			NCP	2009
Odisha	–			–	2009
Punjab	–			–	2012
Tamil Nadu	DMK, VCK			DMK, PMK, VCK	2011
West Bengal	AITC			AITC	2011

(continued)

Table 3 (continued)

General election year	Alliance partners	States	Alliance partner in state (Lok Sabha)	Alliance partner in state (state assembly)	State assembly election year
2014	BPP, RJD, NCP, J&KNC, JMM, IUML, Socialist JD, RSP, KC(M), PPP, RLD, Mahan Dal	Andhra	CPI	–	2014
		Assam	BPP	–	2016
		Bihar	RJD, NCP	RJD, JD(U)	2015
		Haryana	–	–	2014
		Jharkhand	RJD, JMM	RJD, JD(U)	2014
		Karnataka	–	–	–
		Kerala	IUML, KC(M), RSP, Socialist Janata Dal	IUML, KC(M)	2016
		Maharashtra	NCP	–	2014
		Odisha	–	–	2014
		Punjab	PPP		2017
		Tamil Nadu	–	DMK, IUML, MakkalDMK, Puthiya Thamizhagam, MMK	2016
		West Bengal	–	CPI(M) led alliance	2016

Third, however, due to the earlier described party system being one of regional parties based in only a single state each or at most two or three states in a very few cases (e.g., RJD in Bihar and Jharkhand), the two core parties typically have only one major coalition partner in each state in which they form a coalition (Kerala in the UPA is an exception with the Congress having two long-standing partners in the IUML and the Kerala Congress (Mani), being parties based on the local Muslim and Christian minorities respectively). Therefore, the state-level coalition in both the UPA and the NDA are only partially congruent with the national UPA and NDA coalitions since most of the parties present in the national coalitions are not present in every state. The common presence is only the core party. However, as we shall see, for most states it is recurrently the same local partner who coalesces with the Congress or the BJP.

Fourth, this core party might even be a junior partner in the coalition in the state as earlier mentioned, for state assembly (BJP and Shiv Sena in Maharashtra) or both national and state assembly elections (e.g., the BJP in Punjab, and the Congress-DMK alliance in Tamil Nadu, or Congress-RJD in Bihar) for example.

Fifth, in the NDA coalition there have been only two longstanding stable allies—the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) in Punjab, from 1996 to 2016 (currently they form a coalition government in Punjab), and the Shiv Sena in Maharashtra from 1991 to 2016 (currently they form a coalition government in Maharashtra although in 2014

Table 4 BJP Allies (Pre-electoral/Government), Party-wise, 1991–2016

Party	Lok Sabha	Assembly	Duration
Shiv Sena	1991–2014	1995–2009 (not 2014)	23 years-stable
Akali Dal	1996–2014	1997–2017	20 years-stable
BSP		1995, 1997, 2002 Post-election	episodic, post-election
AGP	2009	2001, 2014	episodic
Samata Party JD(U)	1996–2009	2000–2013	Broke Bihar government in 2013 -semi-stable
INLD	1999, 1996, 1998	2000, 1996	Episodic
HVK			
HJC	2014		
BJD	1998, 1999, 2004	2000, 2004	Episodic, both anti-congress
TMC	1998, 1999, 2004,	2006	Episodic
GJM	2009, 2014	2011, 2016	
TDP	1999, 2004, 2014	1999, 2014	Episodic
TRS	2009	2009	episodic
DMK AIADMK	1999, 1998, 2004	2001	Episodic DMK government formation (1999–2004)

for the state assembly election they contested separately after 24 years but formed a post-electoral coalition). Between 1991 and 2014, there was coalition congruence for national and state assembly elections for the BJP and Shiv Sena in Maharashtra except for contesting separately in 2014 due to the BJP not willing to play the role of a junior partner in the state assembly any more. Likewise, there was long standing coalition congruence for national and state assembly elections for the BJP and SAD in Punjab from 1996 to 2016. The glue that holds the NDA coalition together in Punjab and Maharashtra is that they have a common enemy, the Congress.

Sixth, for all the other major regional parties that have been allies of the BJP for one or more elections, or have formed post-electoral coalitions with the BJP (viz. BSP, TDP), the alliance can be described as episodic or at best semi-stable if it last two or three elections (e.g., JD(U) in Bihar). Thus alliances with parties such as the BSP in U.P., AGP in Assam, INLD, HVP and HJC in Haryana, BJD in Odisha, Trinamul Congress in West Bengal, TDP and TRS in Andhra Pradesh, DMK and AIADMK in Tamil Nadu can be described as episodic, with the JD(U) in Bihar being the closest to being stable.

Seventh, for the UPA coalition, the only stable longstanding partners of the Congress have been the IUML and the Kerala Congress (Mani) in Kerala. All other coalition partners—DMK and AIADMK in Tamil Nadu, Trinamul Congress in West

Table 5 Congress Allies (Pre-electoral/government), Party-wise, 1991–2016

Party	Lok Sabha	Assembly	Duration
MUL	1991–2014	1991–2016	Stable
KCM	1991–2014	1991–2016	Stable
AIADMK	1991, 1996, 1999	2001	1991–1996, external support, trade off deal
DMK	2004, 2009	2006, 2011, 2016	2004–2013, UPA I&II coalition
NCP	2004, 2009, 2014	2004, 2009	Split away in 2014 assembly elections
TMC	2009	2011	Episodic, INC junior partner
RJD	1998, 199, 2004, 2014	2005b, 2015	Episodic, INC junior partner
JMM	2004, 2009, 2014	2005	Episodic

Bengal, NCP in Maharashtra, RJD in Bihar and Jharkhand, and JMM in Jharkhand—have been episodic and have lasted only for one to three elections, the maximum being the RJD in Bihar and the NCP in Maharashtra (in 2014 however they contested separately for the state assembly). However, even in the case of the RJD congruence between national and state assembly elections has not been present during the entire alliance.

Eighth, the overall picture in a party system characterized by single-state regional parties and two major multi-state national parties since 1996, is one of only partial institutionalisation of coalitions and only partial congruence between state and national elections in the context of growing decentralization of the federal system.

What are the Reasons for Such Outcomes?

First, there are strong incentives to form regional parties because Indian states enjoy substantial enough powers to make capture of power only at the state level an attractive enough prize.

Second, each state is an ethno-linguo-cultural entity with a specific caste and religion make-up and very often other strong regional specificities and regional identity that make it difficult for regional parties to spread across states with the exception of cadre-based ideological parties of the Right (Hindu-nationalist BJP) or Left (communist parties). In the Duvergerian process of the emergence of multiple bipolarities, there typically emerged a single main opponent to the Congress in almost each state with a minor third party seeking to emerge in the post-1989 phase which was either the BJP or a regional party which could be a splinter group of the Janata formations. Thus, at the state level for both national and state elections, coalitions consisted of a national party allied to the opponent of the other national party either as a senior or a junior partner.

Third, only a few of these alliances were of long duration because there is constant competition not only between coalition partners and their opponents but also within the coalition for social base and vote share, thus leading to tensions over allocation of seats to contest in pre-electoral coalitions and of ministerial portfolios in governments when formed.

Fourth, from the earlier three points, it logically follows that the pattern has been one of only partial congruence and partial institutionalization of coalitions.

Comparable Congruence as Defined in This Volume

The foregoing detailed analysis of congruence and incongruence of pre-electoral and executive coalitions in India is necessary to understand the complexities of the Indian situation with regard to coalitions but might not lend itself to comparison across other federal countries. A simpler conceptualization of congruence will make such comparison easier. To repeat what was said at the beginning of this chapter, this book's template for conceptualizing coalition congruence (or incongruence) so as to be comparable across countries is to compare the cabinets of India's Prime Ministers together with those the composition of the cabinets of the State Chief Ministers' as to the participating parties. Here, by "congruence" I don't mean the exact replication of the same coalition from national level, but at least no incongruence in the composition of the subnational cabinets. For instance, if a Party A and Party B are forming a coalition at the national level; with Parties C and D present in the opposition; a congruent cabinet at the subnational would be a government: A; AB; B; C; D and CD. Therefore, an incongruent coalition at the subnational level would be a coalition formed by parties that, at the national level are apparently opposed, or vice versa. For instance, following the example above, the following coalitions would be incongruent—AC, AD, BC or BD.

Using this conceptualisation we get the following table (Table 6) for congruence during the coalition era of 1991–2014.

From the tables above, we can see that Indian coalitions are overwhelmingly congruent, in that they are not incongruent—parties opposed at the national cabinet level are not allied at the state cabinet level, and vice versa, with extremely few and very minor exceptions. There are only five cases of incongruence—in Manipur, Meghalaya, Delhi, Bihar, and Jammu and Kashmir—for specific elections, out of a total of 157 cases in all over the 1991–2014 national elections and the nearest (in time) state assembly elections, or 3.18% incongruence.

Conclusion

The empirical record of the Indian case thus tends to confirm both hypotheses that we began with if we adopt the initial conceptualization or full, partial or no congruence based on the sameness of the national and state pre-electoral coalitions and cabinets. Congruence between national and state coalitions is low and there is only partial congruence limited to the core parties. This is related to the fact that the party system since 1989 is not institutionalized but in flux due to jerky decline of Congress since 1989, with some recoveries like in 2004 and 2009, particularly since 1996, and that the political space consists of not only two major national parties but a host of single-state regional parties.

Table 6 Congruence of Indian Coalitions 1991–2014

Coalition	State	State election year	Party/ Parties in the state government	Type of government	Status
1991					
INC, AIADMK, Kerala Congress (M)	Andhra Pradesh	1994	TDP	SPM	Congruent
	Arunachal Pradesh	1995	INC	SPM	Congruent
	Assam	1991	INC	SPM	Congruent
	Bihar	1995	JD	SPM	Congruent
	Delhi	1993	INC	SPM	Congruent
	Goa	1994	INC	SPMG	Congruent
	Gujarat	1995	BJP	SPM	Congruent
	Haryana	1991	INC	SPM	Congruent
	Himachal Pradesh	1993	INC	SPM	Congruent
	Karnataka	1994	JD	SPM	Congruent
	Kerala	1991	UDF	SMC	Congruent
	Madhya Pradesh	1993	INC	SPM	Congruent
	Maharashtra	1995	SS, BJP	SMC	Congruent
	Manipur	1995	INC, JLP	SMC	Congruent
	Meghalaya	1993	INC, IND	SMC	Congruent
	Mizoram	1993	INC, MJD	SMC	Congruent
	Nagaland	1993	INC	SPM	Congruent
	Odisha	1995	INC	SPM	Congruent
	Punjab	1992	INC	SPM	Congruent
	Puducherry	1991	INC	SPM	Congruent
	Rajasthan	1993	BJP, IND	SMC	Congruent
	Sikkim	1994	SDF	SPM	Congruent
	Tamil Nadu	1991	AIADMK	SPM	Congruent
	Tripura	1993	CPM Led	OC	Congruent
Uttar Pradesh	1991	BJP	SPM	Congruent	
West Bengal	1991	CPM led	OC	Congruent	

Note: *INC* Indian National Congress, *BJP* Bhartiya Janata Party, *CPM* Communist Party of India Marxist, *AIADMK* All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhaghham, *MJD* Mizo Janata Dal, *SS* Shiv Sena, *SDF* Sikkim Democratic Front, *JLP* Joint Legislature Party, *UDF* INC led United Democratic Front, *JD* Janata Dal, *TDP* Telugu Desam Party

(continued)

Table 6 (continued)

Coalition	State	State election year	Party/ Parties in the state government	Type of government	Status
1996					
JD, NC, TDP, AGP, TMC, AIICT, SP, DMK, MGP, CPI, CPM, RSP, AIFB	Andhra Pradesh	–			
	Arunachal Pradesh	–			
	Assam	1996	AGP	MC	Congruent
	Bihar	–			
	Delhi	–			
	Goa	–			
	Gujarat	–			
	Haryana	1996	BJP, HVP	C	Congruent
	Himachal Pradesh	–			
	Jammu & Kashmir	1996	NC	SPM	Congruent
	Karnataka	–			
	Kerala	1996	LDF	SMC	Congruent
	Madhya Pradesh	–			
	Maharashtra	–			
	Manipur	–			
	Meghalaya	–			
	Mizoram	–			
	Nagaland	–			
	Odisha	–			
	Punjab	1997	SAD, BJP	OC	Congruent
Puducherry	1996	DMK	SPM	Congruent	
Rajasthan	–				
Sikkim	–				
Tamil Nadu	1996	DMK	SPM	Congruent	
Tripura	–				
Uttar Pradesh	1996	BJP, BSP	C	Congruent	
West Bengal	1996	CPM led	OC	Congruent	

Note: *INC* Indian National Congress, *BJP* Bhartiya Janata Party, *CPM* Communist Party of India Marxist, *DMK* Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, *UDF* INC led United Democratic Front, *JD* Janata Dal, *TDP* Telugu Desam Party, *Shiromani Akali Dal*, *LDF* CPM lead Left Democratic Front, *AIFB* All India Forward Block, *CPI* Communist Party of India, *NC* National Conference, *HVP* Haryana Vikas Party, *AIICT* All India Indira Congress Tiwari, *TMC* Tamil Manila Congress, *AGP* Asom Gana Parishad

(continued)

Table 6 (continued)

Coalition	State	State election year	Party/ Parties in the state government	Type of government	Status
1998					
BJP, AIADMK, Samata Party, Shiromani Akali Dal, All India Trinamool Congress, Shiv Sena, PMK, Lok Shakti, MDMK, Haryana Vikas Party, Janata Party, NTRTDP, Mizo National Front, Biju Janata Dal	Andhra Pradesh	–			
	Arunachal Pradesh	–			
	Assam	–			
	Bihar	–			
	Delhi	1998	INC	SPM	Congruent
	Goa	1999	INC	SPM	Congruent
	Gujarat	1998	BJP	SPM	Congruent
	Haryana	–			
	Himachal Pradesh	1998	BJP, HVP, IND	C	Congruent
	Jammu & Kashmir	–			
	Karnataka	–			
	Kerala	–			
	Madhya Pradesh	1998	INC	SPM	Congruent
	Maharashtra	–			
	Manipur	–			
	Meghalaya	1998	INC, IND	MC	Congruent
	Mizoram	1998	MNF, MPC	C	Congruent
	Nagaland	1998	INC	SPM	Congruent
	Odisha	–			
	Punjab	–			
Puducherry	–				
Rajasthan	1998	INC	SPM	Congruent	
Sikkim	–				
Tamil Nadu	–				
Tripura	1998	CPM Led	OC	Congruent	
Uttar Pradesh	–				
West Bengal	–				

Note: *INC* Indian National Congress, *BJP* Bhartiya Janata Party, *CPM* Communist Party of India Marxist, *DMK* Dravida Munnetra Kazhaghham, *NTRTDP* NTR Telugu Desam Party, Shiromani Akali Dal, *LDF* CPM lead Left Democratic Front, *HVP* Himachal Vikas Party, *AITC* All Indian Trinamool Congress, *MNF* Mizo National Front, *BJD* Biju Janata Dal, *MDMK* Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhaghham, *SAP* Samata Party, *LS* Lok Shakti, *PMK* Pattali Makkal Kachhi, *IND* Independent, *MPC* Mizoram People's Conference

(continued)

Table 6 (continued)

Coalition	State	State election year	Party/ Parties in the state government	Type of government	Status	
1999						
BJP, Janata Dal (U), DMK, Samata Party, Biju Janata Dal, Shiromani Akali Dal, All India Trinamool Congress, Shiv Sena, PMK, Lok Shakti, MDMK, Indian National Lok Dal, Mizo National Front, Sikkim Democratic Front, MSCP, Telugu Desam Party, TRC, MGR Anna DMK	Andhra Pradesh	1999	TDP	SPM	Congruent	
	Arunachal Pradesh	1999	AC	SPM	Congruent	
	Assam	2001	INC	SPM	Congruent	
	Bihar		2000a	a-Samata Party, BJP, IND	a-MC	Congruent
			2000b	b-RJD, INC, BSP, MCC, CPI, CPM	b-MC	
	Chhattisgarh	2003	BJP	SPM	Congruent	
	Delhi	2003	INC	SPM	Congruent	
	Goa	2002	BJP.MGP, IND	SMC	Congruent	
	Gujarat	2002	BJP	SPM	Congruent	
	Haryana	2000	BJP, INLD	OC	Congruent	
	Himachal Pradesh	2003	INC	SPM	Congruent	
	Jammu & Kashmir	2002	PDP, INC, Panthers Party	C	Congruent	
	Jharkhand	–				
	Karnataka	1999	INC	SPM	Congruent	
	Kerala	2001	UDF	SMC	Congruent	
	Madhya Pradesh	2003	BJP	SPM	Congruent	
	Maharashtra	1999	INC, NCP	SMC	Congruent	
Manipur		2000/2002	2000-MSCP, FPM, NCP, MPP, RJD	C	Incongruent	
			JD(U), IND ^a	SMC		
			2002-INC			
Meghalaya	2003	Meghalaya Democratic Alliance	MC	Congruent		
Mizoram	2003	MNF	SPM	Congruent		
Nagaland	2003	Democratic Alliance	SMC	Congruent		
Odisha	2000	BJD, BJP	C	Congruent		
Punjab	2002	INC	SPM	Congruent		
Puducherry	2001	INC	SPM	Congruent		
Rajasthan	2003	BJP	SPM	Congruent		

(continued)

Table 6 (continued)

Coalition	State	State election year	Party/ Parties in the state government	Type of government	Status
	Sikkim	1999	SDF	SPM	Congruent
	Tamil Nadu	2001	AIADMK	SPMG	Congruent
	Tripura	2003	CPM Led	OC	Congruent
	Uttar Pradesh	2002	BSP, BJP	C	Congruent
	Uttarakhand	2002	INC	SPM	Congruent
	West Bengal	2001	CPM led	SMC	Congruent

Note: *INC* Indian National Congress, *BJP* Bhartiya Janata Party, *CPM* Communist Party of India Marxist, *DMK* Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, *NTRTDP* Telugu Desam Party, *Shiromani Akali Dal*, *AITC* All Indian Trinamool Congress, *MNF* Mizo National Front, *BJD* Biju Janata Dal, *MDMK* Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, *SAP* Samata Party, *LS* Lok Shakti, *PMK* Pattali Makkal Kachhi, *IND* Independent, *MPC* Mizoram People's Conference, *SDF* Sikkim Democratic Front, *JD(U)* Janata Dal United, *MSCP* Manipur State Congress Party, *PDP* Jammu & Kashmir People's Democratic Party, *NCP* Nationalist Congress Party, *FPM* Federal Party of Manipur, *RJD* Rashtriya Janata Dal, *MSCP* Manipur State Congress Party, *MPP* Manipur People's Party, *INLD* Indian National Lok Dal

^aRJD & NCP were not part of the ruling BJP led National Democratic Alliance. The two parties were NDA opponents in Bihar, and Maharashtra respectively

2004

INC, RJD, DMK, NCP, PMK, TRS, LJP, JMM, MDMK, CPI(M), CPI, IUML, Kerala Congress (M), J&K PDP, RPI(A), JD(S), Arunachal Congress, RPI, Peoples' Republican Party, Party for Democratic Socialism	Andhra Pradesh	2004	INC	SPM	Congruent	
	Arunachal Pradesh	2004	INC	SPM	Congruent	
	Assam	2006	INC	SPM	Congruent	
	Bihar	2005	JDU, BJP	C	Congruent	
	Chhattisgarh	2008	BJP	SPM	Congruent	
	Delhi	2008	INC	SPM	Congruent	
	Goa	2007	INC, NCP, MGP, IND	SMC	Congruent	
	Gujarat	2007	BJP	SPM	Congruent	
	Haryana	2005	INC	SPM	Congruent	
	Himachal Pradesh	2007	BJP	SPM	Congruent	
	Jammu & Kashmir	2008	NC, INC	C	Congruent	
	Jharkhand	2005	JMM(S), INC	MC	Congruent	
	Karnataka	2004	INC, JD(S)	C	Congruent	
			2008	BJP, IND	SMC	
	Kerala	2006	LDF	SMC	Congruent	
Madhya Pradesh	2008	BJP	SPM	Congruent		
Maharashtra	2004	INC, NCP	SMC	Congruent		
Manipur	2007	INC led	OC	Congruent		

(continued)

Table 6 (continued)

Coalition	State	State election year	Party/ Parties in the state government	Type of government	Status
	Meghalaya	2008	MPA (Included NCP) ^a	SMC	Incongruent
	Mizoram	2008	INC	SPM	Congruent
	Nagaland	2008	Democratic Alliance	OC	Congruent
	Odisha	2004	BJD, BJP	C	Congruent
	Punjab	2007	SAD, BJP	C	Congruent
	Puducherry	2006	INC	SPM	Congruent
	Rajasthan	2008	INC	SPM	Congruent
	Sikkim	2004	SDF	SPM	Congruent
	Tamil Nadu	2006	DMK	SPMG	Congruent
	Tripura	2008	CPM Led	OC	Congruent
	Uttar Pradesh	2007	BSP	SPM	Congruent
	Uttarakhand	2007	BJP	SPM	Congruent
	West Bengal	2006	CPM led	OC	Congruent

INC Indian National Congress, *BJP* Bhartiya Janata Party, *CPM* Communist Party of India Marxist, *DMK* Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, *Shiromani Akali Dal*, *AITC* All Indian Trinamool Congress, *BJD* Biju Janata Dal, *MDMK* Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, *SAP* Samata Party, *LS* Lok Shakti, *PMK* Pattali Makkal Kachhi, *IND* Independent, *SDF* Sikkim Democratic Front, *JD(U)* Janata Dal United, *PDP* Jammu & Kashmir People's Democratic Party, *NCP* Nationalist Congress Party, *FPMRJD* Rashtriya Janata Dal, *RPI(A)* Republic Party of India (Ambedkar), *JMM (S)* Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (Soren), *MGP* Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party, *IUML* Indian Union Muslim League, *LJP* Lok Janshakti Party, *AC* Arunachal Congress, *TRS* Telangana Rashtra Samiti, *BSP* Bahujan Samaj Party

^aMPA- Meghalaya Progressive Alliance included NCP, though NCP was part of UPA at the centre. NCP decided not to partner with INC

2009

All Indian Trinamool Congress, DMK, NCP, J&K NC, NCP, IUML, JMM, VCK, BPF, KC(M), RPI(A), RPI	Andhra Pradesh	2009	INC	SPM	Congruent
	Arunachal Pradesh	2009	INC	SPM	Congruent
	Assam	2011	INC	SPM	Congruent
	Bihar	2010	JDU, BJP	C	Congruent
	Chhattisgarh	2013	BJP	SPM	Congruent
	Delhi	2013	AAP	C	Incongruent
			INC ^a		
	Goa	2012	BJP	SPM	Congruent
	Gujarat	2012	BJP	SPM	Congruent
	Haryana	2009	INC	SPM	Congruent
	Himachal Pradesh	2012	INC	SPM	Congruent
	Jammu & Kashmir	–			
	Jharkhand	2009	INC, JMM, IND	SMC	Congruent
	Karnataka	2013	INC	SPM	Congruent
Kerala	2011	UDF	SMC	Congruent	

(continued)

Table 6 (continued)

Coalition	State	State election year	Party/ Parties in the state government	Type of government	Status
	Madhya Pradesh	2013	BJP	SPM	Congruent
	Maharashtra	2009	INC, NCP	C	Congruent
	Manipur	2012	INC led	SMC	Congruent
	Meghalaya	2013	INC, IND	SMC	Congruent
	Mizoram	2013	INC	SPM	Congruent
	Nagaland	2013	Democratic Alliance	SMC	Congruent
	Odisha	2009	BJD	SPM	Congruent
	Punjab	2012	SAD, BJP	C	Congruent
	Puducherry	2011	AINRC, AIADMK	C	Congruent
	Rajasthan	2013	BJP	SPM	Congruent
	Sikkim	2009	SDF	SPM	Congruent
	Tamil Nadu	2011	AIADMK	SPM	Congruent
	Tripura	2013	CPM Led	OC	Congruent
	Uttar Pradesh	2012	SP	SPM	Congruent
	Uttarakhand	2012	INC led	SMC	Congruent
	West Bengal	2011	AITC	OC	Congruent

Note: *INC* Indian National Congress, *BJP* Bhartiya Janata Party, *CPM* Communist Party of India Marxist, *DMK* Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, *Shiromani Akali Dal*, *AITC* All Indian Trinamool Congress, *BJD* Biju Janata Dal, *MDMK* Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, *SAP* Samata Party, *PMK* Pattali Makkal Kachhi, *IND* Independent, *SDF* Sikkim Democratic Front, *JD(U)* Janata Dal United, *NCP* Nationalist Congress Party, *RJD* Rashtriya Janata Dal, *RPI(A)* Republic Party of India (Ambedkar), *JMM (S)* Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (Soren), *MGP* Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party, *IUML* Indian Union Muslim League, *LJP* Lok Janshakti Party, *AC* Arunachal Congress, *TRS* Telangana Rashtra Samiti, *BSP* Bahujan Samaj Party, *AIADMK* All India Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, *AINRC* All India National Rajiv Congress, *BPF* Bodo Peoples Front, *VCK* Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi, *RPI* Republican Party of India, *JKNC* Jammu Kashmir National Conference, *UDF* INC led United Democratic Front, *SP* Samajwadi Party

^aINC and AAP fought against each other in a bitterly fought electoral contest. A hung verdict led to the formation of a single party minority government by AAP with the outside support of INC

(continued)

Table 6 (continued)

Coalition	State	State election year	Party/ Parties in the state government	Type of government	Status
2014					
DMDK, PMK, MDMK, KMDK, Indhiya, Jananayaga Katchi, New Justice Party, Telugu Desam Party, Shiv Sena, Swabhiman Paksha, RPI(A), Swabhiman Paksha, Rashtriya Samaj Paksha, LJP, RLSP, Shiromani Akali Dal, Haryana Janhit Congress, Apna Dal, RSP (B), Kerala Congress (N), All Indian NR Congress, NPP, MPP,	Andhra	2014	TDP & BJP	OC	Congruent
	Arunachal Pradesh	2014	INC	SPM	Congruent
	Assam	2016	BJP	SPM	Congruent
	Bihar	2015a	a-RJD, JDU, INC	SMC	a-Congruent
		2017b	b-BJP, LJP, JDU, RLSP ^a	SMC	b-Incongruent
	Chhattisgarh	–			
	Delhi	2015			Congruent
	Goa	2017	BJP, MGP, GFP, IND	SMC	Congruent
	Gujarat	–			
	Haryana	2014	BJP	SPM	Congruent
	Himachal Pradesh	–			Congruent
	Jammu & Kashmir	2014	BJP, PDP ^b	C	Incongruent
	Jharkhand	2014	BJP	SPM	Congruent
	Karnataka	–			
	Kerala	2016	LDF	SMC	Congruent
	Madhya Pradesh	–			
	Maharashtra	2014	BJP, Shiv Sena, IND	SMC	Congruent
	Manipur	2017	BJP, NPF, IND	SMC	Congruent
	Meghalaya	–			
	Mizoram	–			
Nagaland	–				
Odisha	2014	BJD	SPM	Congruent	
Punjab	2017	INC	SPM	Congruent	
Puducherry	2016	INC, DMK	C	Congruent	
Rajasthan	–				

(continued)

Table 6 (continued)

Coalition	State	State election year	Party/ Parties in the state government	Type of government	Status
NPF, UDF, GJM, KPP, MGP, GVP, North East Regional Political Front	Sikkim	2014	SDF	SPM	Congruent
	Tamil Nadu	2016	AIADMK	SPM	Congruent
	Telangana	2014	TRS	SPM	Congruent
	Tripura	–			
	Uttar Pradesh	2017	BJP	SPM	Congruent
	Uttarakhand	2017	BJP	SPM	Congruent
	West Bengal	2016	AITC	SPM	Congruent

Note: *BJP* Bharatiya Janata Party, *INC* Indian National Congress, *RJD* Rashtriya Janata Dal, *AITC* All India Trinamool Congress, *SS* Shiv Sena, *PDP* Jammu & Kashmir People's Democratic Party, *BJD* Biju Janata Dal, *AIADMK* All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, *PMK* Pattali Makkal Katchi, *MDMK* Marumalarchi Munnetra Kazhagam, *DMDK* Desiya Murpokku Dravida Kazhagam, *NPP* Nagaland Peoples Party, *NPF* Nagaland Peoples Front, *MGP* Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party, *RLSP* Rashtriya Lok Samata Party, *LJP* Lok Janshakti Party, *GVP* Goa Vikas Party, *GFP* Goa Federal Party, *MPP* Manipur Peoples Party, *TDP* Telugu Desam Party, *TRS* Telangana Rashtra Samiti

^aJD(U) broke the alliance with RJD and INC in Bihar and decided to form a new government with the support of BJP. The BJP and JD(U) had contested the 2014 parliamentary elections and the 2015 assembly elections against each other

^bPDP and BJP had contested the 2014 parliamentary elections and assembly elections against each other. However, the two parties decided to come together and form the government together in Jammu & Kashmir after a hung verdict

Congruence is also low due to the growing decentralization of India's federal system over the period since 1989 in tandem with the growth of economic liberalization removing many federal level regulatory powers that existed earlier like industrial and import licenses, and the growing presence of regional parties in national governing coalitions, besides the effective removal of emergency powers like the earlier use/misuse of Art. 356, and the growing decentralization of federal fiscal relations. This development strengthens states vis-à-vis the federal government and strengthens regional parties when in power in their states in relations with the national party heading the national coalition government allowing regional parties to often set the terms of coalition agreements.

However, if we adopt the conceptualization in the book's template, then congruence is extremely high in that there are only 3.18% cases of incongruence over 1991–2014 of national and state cabinets for a particular national and nearest (in time) state assembly election, "contradicting" each other in having parties in a coalition at one level, state or national, that are opposed at another level, state or national. This is because, for a given national election and nearest-in-time state assembly election, the same regional parties tend to ally with one or another of the two major national parties, the Congress or the BJP, for both national elections and state elections. Hence, how we conceptualise congruence (or incongruence) is vital in arriving at a conclusion as to whether in India coalition congruence is high or not.

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Coalition Politics in a Federalized Party System: The Case of Argentina



Sebastián Mauro

Introduction

This chapter explores coalition-building dynamics in Argentina from 1983 to 2015. Argentine has not a large tradition in government coalitions on federal level, but since 1995 there is an important increase of electoral coalitions in both national and subnational level (Chasquetti 2001; Cruz 2015; Reniú and Albala 2012).

Which variables explain the growth of electoral coalitions in Argentina? What are the main incentives that lead parties to build coalitions? Which degree of coalition congruence is among the different electoral levels? How coalition congruence is related to the process of increased federalization of the Argentine party system?

To address these questions, this chapter describes and compares the electoral alliances that have run for executive and legislative positions at national and subnational levels in the 24 Argentine provinces between 1983 and 2015. This chapter is based on 1136 observation of coalition-building, candidate selection and electoral results in each of the 24 Argentine provinces since 1983 for all the 9 presidential races, 17 national deputies' elections, 9 rounds of provincial executive and legislative elections. I excluded municipal positions and the election of national senators. I argue that coalitions replace parties in organizing the electoral competition, given the organizational transformations they went through in the last two decades.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I will describe the Argentine party system, specially the process of federalization or denationalization. Second, I will present empirical evidence of the growth of electoral coalitions. In the third section, I will present empirical evidence on the level of congruence of coalition strategies and I will discuss some of its explanatory variables. Concluding remarks follow in the final section.

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The Argentine Political Institutions and Its Federalized Party System

Argentina has a presidential system since 1853. However, until the 1994 constitutional reform the President has not been elected by direct popular vote. Currently, the election of the President also includes a two rounds system¹ and—since the 2009 electoral reform—opened primary elections² (called PASO). Presidents hold a strong agenda-setting power (Negretto 2002; Jones et al. 2009). Argentine Presidents have large autonomy to name cabinet, without consent of allies and even of his or her own party (Scherlis 2013; Corrales 2010; Ollier and Palumbo 2016).

Strong presidentialism also works at the level of the 24 provinces. Although each subnational district is organized under different institutional designs, provincial governors have strong formal and informal powers (Benton 2003; Jones et al. 2002; Ortiz de Rozas 2011). Argentine federalism enabled the development of relatively autonomous civic communities (Escolar 2011; Escolar and Castro 2014), organized by the division between government and opposition. Some studies have focused on the different types of subnational political regimes (Behrend and Whitehead 2016; Gervasoni 2011; Gibson 2005).

National electoral rules enforce the autonomy of subnational systems, allowing the denationalization of parties (Clerici and Scherlis 2014). Subnational party authorities (provincial parties or national party branches) have a high level of autonomy to run for national elections,³ obtain financing, celebrate alliances and nominate candidates, while there are no significant incentives to the vertical integration of the parties.

Argentina has a bicameral legislative system. Since the constitutional reform of 1994, the Senate has three senators by province, elected by direct popular vote. National Deputies are elected by direct popular vote in each subnational district, according to high malapportionment that benefits less populated provinces (Gibson and Calvo 2000; Samuels and Snyder 2001). While there is a high level of partisan discipline, literature indicates that federal legislators play as agents of the Governors and provincial party bosses (Jones et al. 2002; Jones and Hwang 2005; Lodola 2009).

Party competition has evolved from an integrated two-party system in 1983 (Escolar and Castro 2014; De Riz 1992) to a multi-party federalized system since 1999. In 1983, almost all elective positions were distributed between the Justicialista Party (PJ) and the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR), two parties with territorial penetration across the country. Beyond these two parties there are provincial parties and political forces with national incidence mainly in metropolitan districts. The bipar-

¹Until 1994 Argentine president had been elected by Electoral College.

²This system also allows introducing a threshold for parties that seek running for national positions: they have get at least 1.5% of the votes in the PASO elections.

³Because of the hybrid figure of “district party”: parties which are located in one province but can run for national positions like deputies or senators.




Fig. 1 Bipartisan vote and seat share, 1983–2015. Source: National Electoral Direction, Chamber of Deputies and provincial electoral courts. Note 1: In 2003 presidential race I considered the added vote share by the three justicialistas candidates, according to the literature criterion. Note 2: In 2015 presidential race I didn't consider the UCR's vote share. UCR didn't run in these general elections with its own candidates and after losing the primary elections (it got only 3% of the votes), it supported the candidates of its ally, PRO. Note 3: The variable "Bipartisan seat share in the Chamber of Deputies" counts the average seat share in 2-year period. Note 4: The variable "Bipartisan subnational government share" counts the number of governments controlled by the subnational units of the UCR and the PJ. In 2003–2015 period, it counts the PJ subnational governments that didn't respond to the national PJ leadership

tisan vote has a constant dealignment since the mid-1990s. This dealignment has different intensity and impact according to the type of elected position, the district and the party. Figure 1 illustrates this process, showing the diverse evolution of votes and seats obtained by the two major parties. The process ends with the Presidency of an extra-bipartisan candidate, Mauricio Macri, head of Republican Proposal party (PRO).

It is necessary to emphasize that citizen's dealignment has different impact according to the kind of elected position (president, deputies, governors). This variation helps to understand how citizen's dealignment has influenced the denationalization of Argentine party system. Sub-national party elites have deployed strategies to deepen or contain the impact of citizenship dealignment, strategically using the institutional prerogatives that federalism enables them: modification of provincial election rules (Calvo and Escolar 2005), use in favor of the electoral calendar to control the coattail effect (Oliveros and Scherlis 2006), creation of new labels, nomination of extra-partisan candidates (Cheresky 2008), incongruent alliances, etc. The use of these tools by the incumbent and opposition parties has reinforced the process of federalization in the last decade. In addition to the national party system, which is organized for the capture of national offices, Argentine party system con-




Fig. 2 Party System Nationalization in Argentina, 1983–2015. Source: Jones and Mainwaring (2003) and Cámara Nacional Electoral

tains subnational party systems organized for the capture of subnational offices (Gibson and Suárez-Cao 2010).

The decreasing integration of national and subnational party systems has been largely studied (Jones and Mainwaring 2003; Calvo and Escobar 2005; Leiras 2007, 2010; Gibson and Suárez-Cao 2010; Escobar and Castro 2014; Escobar et al. 2014), using concepts of denationalization, federalization, segmentation or territorialization of parties and party systems. This chapter uses the Leiras (2010) definition of federalization, according to: party systems with high vertical integration and low horizontal aggregation.⁴

A valid way to measure party system integration is the Party System Nationalization Score (PSNS) (Jones and Mainwaring 2003). The PSNS measures the differences in vote share obtained by all parties in the same positions across different districts. The values close to 1 show a high level of nationalization, while the values close to 0 mean a high level of denationalization. As illustrated in Fig. 2, the nationalization of the Argentine system began to descend in the 1999 elections, but was only in 2001 when relevant differences between national and sub-national supporters systems are recorded. In the last two elections the level of nationalization of the system was relatively recovered, in part because of the strong polarization of Argentine national politics and, for 2011, to an exceptional electoral performance of the Frente para la Victoria (FPV). However, values remain well below the period before the 2001 crisis (Suárez Cao and Pegoraro 2014; Clerici 2014; Escobar et al. 2014; Del Cogliano and Varetto 2016).

⁴Meaning, those systems where “... parties obtain similar vote shares in elections of different levels in each district, but that not compete in all districts, or run under different coalitions or get different vote share in each district... There is geographic discontinuity with continuity between levels of government” (Leiras 2010: 213).

The Growth of Electoral Multilevel Coalitions in Argentina

Other two phenomena have occurred alongside the federalization of the party system: (a) The number of parties running for national and provincial seats has grown substantially and (b) coalitions have become the principal players in the electoral competition.

Even though the growth of coalitional strategies in Argentine elections has been mentioned by the literature, until today there are few in-depth studies that measure this topic and that evaluate the congruence of partisan coalition strategies through the different levels, categories and districts (with the exception of Clerici 2014, 2015a, b).

Figure 3 shows the growth in the number of parties and electoral alliances that ran for the Presidency between 1983 and 2015: while in 1983 only 3% of parties ran inside electoral alliances, in 2015 the portion that ran inside electoral alliances is of a 99% of all competing parties.

Figure 4 shows the same path in elections for seats in the Chamber of Deputies: in 1983 13% of the running parties did it as part of an alliance, while parties that ran in coalitions reached an 83% in 2015.

The share of coalitions is greater if we consider only parties (national or subnational) that got seats and executive positions: in the 2015 elections, the Presidency, 20 of the 22 subnational governments and the 130 national deputies' seats were occupied by candidates of coalitions. The contrast with the election of 1983 is outstanding: only two seats of national deputies were occupied by alliances, while all other elective positions were distributed among parties that ran individually.




Fig. 3 Parties in presidential elections, 1983–2015. Source: Clerici (2015a) and National Electoral Direction. *Data from primary elections




Fig. 4 N° of parties in national deputies elections, alone or in alliance, 1983–2015. Source: Clerici (2015a) and National Electoral Direction. *Data from primary elections

Compete in electoral alliances increases significantly the likelihood of access elective positions. In fact, it has become almost a mandatory requirement. Regardless of the magnitude of the district, coalitions have become almost the exclusive player of electoral processes: both for majoritarian elections (President or Governor) as proportional (national and provincial deputies).

Some studies argue that the increasing of electoral coalitions is a response to the electoral reform of 2009, which introduced the primary elections (PASO). But, as Figs. 4 and 5 shows, the trend to compete en electoral coalitions is previous. In fact, the electoral reform tried to order electoral competition, introducing incentives to decrease the number of lists and parties running in elections. However, the three elections using the primary system do not reveal significant differences to the previous period. The only difference is the exclusion of a minimum group of parties (most of them competing individually, not in alliance) that didn't pass the threshold in the primaries.

The growth of electoral alliances for national office is expected in a federalized party system, as one (among others) possible strategy of denationalized parties to compete in elections across the national territory. Coalitions would be a resource at hand for parties rooted in subnational territories but incapable to nominate competitive candidates at national level. In the absence of a competitive presidential candidate, these parties could build alliances to follow a strategy of horizontal nationalization (Borges et al. 2017).

This type of explanations keeps the theoretical expectation of party integration, but changes the scale from national to subnational level. Subnational party units are seen as integrated organizations and provincial leaders are described as




Fig. 5 Average of parties for each province in legislative subnational elections, 1983–2015. Source: Provincial electoral courts

unquestionable party bosses (Calvo and Escolar 2005; Calvo and Micozzi 2005; Gibson and Suárez-Cao 2010; Suárez Cao and Pegoraro 2014). However, as Fig. 6 shows, the percentage of coalition strategies used by provincial parties has also increased significantly: from 11% in 1983 to 83% in 2015.

The literature indicates that Governors are undisputed party bosses, that electoral competitiveness has been reduced in most districts (Calvo and Escolar 2005; Calvo and Micozzi 2005; Gibson and Suárez-Cao 2010; Suárez Cao and Pegoraro 2014) and, even, that many districts are ruled by illiberal structures or low democratic regimes (Behrend and Whitehead 2016; Gervasoni 2011; Gibson 2005). However, even in the districts where the ENEP has decreased and incumbents have been re-elected with higher electoral support in each new poll, the percentage of electoral alliances competing has also increased significantly.

Figure 6 analyzes the percentage of alliance strategies used in five subnational legislative elections, by comparing twelve provinces in two sets⁵ grouped according to three criteria: (i) the average of the ENEP for Governor in the whole period,

⁵The six provinces selected as less competitive are Formosa, La Rioja, Neuquén, San Luis, Santiago del Estero and Santa Cruz. In five of these provinces, it never changed the ruling party. In four of them, the incumbent party won by an average difference of 30%, and in five of these provinces the ENEP for Governor is close to a two-party system. Other provinces have similar values in some of these criteria and could be included in this sample, but I have selected these cases to show extreme values in the three criteria combined. In the opposite situation I have selected the Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, Tierra del Fuego, Córdoba, Mendoza, Río Negro and Santa Fe. In five of these cases, the average governorship ENEP is located near to a three-party system. Four of these provinces show high levels of competitiveness: in 9 elections for Governor, the average difference between the winning party and the main contender has been less than 10% points; while the ruling party has changed at least twice in three of these provinces.




Fig. 6 Average of the share of parties in alliance over the political offer in two groups of Argentine subnational units. Subnational legislative elections of 1983, 1995, 1999, 2011 and 2015. Source: Provincial electoral courts and National Electoral Direction. Note: The set of less competitive provinces is formed by Formosa, La Rioja, Neuquén, San Luis, Santiago del Estero and Santa Cruz. The six provinces selected as the most competitive are Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, Tierra del Fuego, Córdoba, Mendoza, Río Negro y Santa Fe.

(ii) alternation of parties in the executive and (iii) average of the competitiveness index for governorship elections throughout the period analyzed. As Fig. 6 shows, the six provinces with higher averages of ENEP, with the highest levels of alternation and less margins of electoral triumph, do not follow a different pattern of alliance strategies from the six provinces with signs of weak electoral competition and little or no alternation in the executive office.

In both groups, coalition-building have changed from a marginal strategy to almost the only way to run for elections. The predominance of the coalition-building strategy within the sub-national arenas—regardless of the level of competitiveness of each system—serves as a hint to infer that there are more than one type of incentive that led parties to build alliances: predominant incumbents, opposition parties in competitive sub-national arenas, provincial party elites who pursue national posts, all have changed from individual competition to coalition-building.

Multilevel Coalition Congruence and Explanatory Variables

To measure the coalition-building congruence in Argentine elections, I will follow the work of Clerici (2014), who has developed indicators for each national party in two dimensions:

- (a) **Horizontal Dimension⁶**: measures the coalition-building strategies congruence for one level of elected positions (national) across electoral districts. This chapter will compare coalition-building strategies assumed by each party for the Presidential race and for national deputies' elections, in the 24 districts. A party has congruent coalition-building strategies when it has the same label and allies in deputies' race than in presidential race. An incongruent strategy will appear when a party runs for deputies' seats with a different label and against its partners in the presidential race.
- (b) **Vertical dimension**: measures the congruence of coalition strategies between different levels of positions (national and provincial) in the same district. Parties with "congruent" strategies do not present variations in the alliance composition for both levels of positions, while parties with "inconsistent" strategies compete at the subnational level against its allies in the national level. In this chapter, I discuss the congruence of coalition strategies in two types of situations. First, I review the congruence of the parties that runs for Presidency with the strategies adopted by their provincial branches to compete for Governor. This comparison is fundamental to understand the level of vertical integration of parties and coalitions. Measure the vertical congruence of strategies for executive positions, however, has two problems: (a) between 1987 and 1995 the elections for national and provincial executives were held in different years, and (b) measure the presidential election tends to overestimate the weight of national parties and to underestimate subnational parties, which do not necessarily participate of all presidential races (like Borges et al. 2017, suggest). For this reason, seen also by Clerici (2014), I included a second observation of vertical congruence, and compared the coalition strategies followed by parties competing for seats in the Chamber of Deputies with the strategies adopted by those same parties to compete for seats in provincial legislatures.

Figure 7 shows the evolution of the aggregate of the congruence of the parties that competed in national and sub-national elections.

Although on average most parties still have congruent coalition-building strategies, the share of incongruent strategies has increased significantly since the collapse of the national party system in 2001. The growth is more important if we consider that at 1983 less than 30% of the parties running for Presidency did it in alliances (and more than 90% of these coalition strategies were congruent horizontal and vertically), while in 2015 over 90% of the parties ran for presidency in alliances (and only 60% of their coalition strategies were congruent vertically and 80% congruent horizontally). This means that incongruent alliances have become a frequent phenomenon in contemporary Argentine politics.

In addition, the impact of the incongruence varies depending on which indicator is considered. In this sense, the congruence of the system is lower if we consider

⁶Clerici (2014) distinguish two possible dimensions of horizontal congruence. This chapter considers only the so called "horizontal categorical" (horizontal by category). The so called "horizontal-districtal" (horizontal by district) compares the coalitions formed for the same category of positions (national deputies, for example) in the 24 districts of Argentine federation.




Fig. 7 Share of congruent strategies of national parties in national and subnational elections, 1983–2015. Source: Clerici (2014), provincial electoral courts and Cámara Nacional Electoral. **Data from primary elections

electoral alliances to Executive (national and subnational) positions. Following Borges et al. (2017), Presidential and gubernatorial coattails could be an incentive for other parties (with less competitive candidates) to build alliances. The influence of governors and political party bosses increases when elections for legislative positions are separate from presidential elections. That explains the evolution of vertical congruence in legislative elections: congruence increases in midterm elections, when there are no executive elections and the Governors (and provincial political bosses) control the policy of alliances and the nomination of candidates.

The expansion of the electoral alliances and their incongruence is an indicator of the territorial fragmentation of the Argentine party system. The scene is completed if we look at its temporary volatility. Considering only the national level, 63 parties ran in any of the three presidential races between 2007 and 2015, but only 11 did it in the three times. And only four did not change coalition strategy: the PJ and three parties of lesser importance, within the Frente para la Victoria coalition (FPV).

The FPV is a coalition structured in lathe of the PJ, led by a party faction in office between 2003 and 2015 (Presidencies of Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernandez). Close to this PJ core it was a set relatively variable of national, district, and provincial parties, some of recent formation, others with long career in Argentine politics (Zelaznik 2011). During the period 2003–2015, no other party (with the exception of its allies in the FPV) have run at all levels with a territorially congruent (in relative terms) and temporarily stable coalition strategy.

The building of the FPV has fractured subnational PJ units, which explains the persistence of inconsistent strategies in some districts (such as the province of San Luis). However, the multiplication of disagreements in the PJ had a strong impact on the Argentine party system. Dissident PJ leaders (relevant party bosses such as former Governors and former Presidents) created new partisan labels with territorial roots, but they couldn't coordinate a national party or coalition, which has contributed to the growth of the number of alliances and its horizontal incongruity (Galván 2011; Mauro 2012).

During this period, the main opposition party, the UCR, has maintained volatile coalition strategies, and has experienced its highest levels of incongruence, both vertical and horizontal (Balazs and Lemos Arias 2015; Clerici 2015b). The failure of Fernando de la Rúa administration⁷ (1999–2001), has affected the capacity of UCR to nominate competitive presidential candidates, so UCR retreated to subnational arenas, where the party still has social roots. The effect of this retirement was the incongruence of coalitional strategies.⁸ The formation of the Cambiemos Alliance for 2015 presidential race, led by Propuesta Republicana party (PRO), broke this path. The nomination of a competitive presidential candidate served as incentive for coordination of provincial factions of radicalism, showing high levels of horizontal congruence (Table 1).

Cambiemos Alliance won the 2015 presidential race, opening a new phase of the Argentine party system: for the first time an extrabipartisan party conquers the Presidency. In addition, PRO controls the governments of the two largest electoral districts, and has an important legislative delegation. Founded 10 years ago, PRO co-opted factions of traditional parties that were available in the context of crisis, and added figures and experts from NGOs and other social spaces, outside parties. PRO wanted to be a national party, but its roots were strong only in the City of Buenos Aires. For nationalization, PRO searched for allies in all districts, and run for seats almost exclusively by building electoral coalitions. PRO coalition strategies were extremely volatile and incongruent in almost all provinces⁹ (Mauro 2015), until Mauricio Macri (founder and party boss) decided to run for Presidency.

⁷Fernando de la Rúa was elected President in 1999, within an alliance between UCR and FREPASO. The combination of economic crisis (crisis of payments for services of external debt and a 4-years recession), social crisis (high rates of poverty and unemployment) and political crisis (the breakdown of the coalition in 2000, parliamentary minority and a rapid loss of popularity among public opinion, which was expressed in the 2001 elections) led to a cycle of intense protests, which forced his resignation on December 20, 2001. Until Nestor Kirchner administration, in 2003, Argentina experienced a period of deep political instability, with the anticipated resignation of five interim Presidents.

⁸This is what Borges et al. (2017) have called “horizontal nationalization”.

⁹As a national party, PRO didn't run in 2007 and 2011 presidential races. In the districts where PRO runs for national and subnational seats, the share of horizontal congruent strategies is close to zero. In addition, in all provinces (except for de City of Buenos Aires) PRO changed its coalition strategy at least once.

Table 1 UCR and PJs congruence coalitions, 2007–2015

PJ		UCR						
	Name of the coalition in presidential race	Horizontal congruence	Vertical congruence I	Vertical congruence II	Name of the coalition in presidential race	Horizontal congruence	Vertical congruence I	Vertical congruence II
2007	FPV	0.58	0.68	0.84	UNA	0.21	0.55	0.74
2011	FPV	0.83	0.73	0.68	UDES	0.25	0.41	0.60
2015	FPV	1.00	0.77	0.83	Cambios	0.91	0.36	0.35

Source: Provincial electoral courts, Cámara Nacional Electoral and Andy Tow Electoral Atlas

Established the main indicators of the coalition congruence, it is possible to identify the variables that explain the phenomenon. Again, there is only one previous study (Clerici 2014) that found two explanatory variables of coalition congruence: electoral calendar and party system nationalization.

With regard to the electoral calendar, literature has established the relationship between the growing separation of election dates for different levels of positions and the federalization of the party system (Calvo and Escolar 2005; Oliveros and Scherlis 2006). These studies found that concurrency of national-subnational (and executive-legislative) elections not only impacts in vote earning (by coattail effect), but also have consequences en coalition-building. Clerici (ibid.) found that concurrent elections impacts in a higher level of coalition congruence. If the presidential and national deputies races are concurrent, horizontal congruence levels tends to be higher. If the national and subnational races are concurrent, vertical congruence is likely to be higher.¹⁰

On the nationalization of the party system, the same study (ibid.) found a significant correlation between the federalization level and the share of incongruent coalition strategies, both vertical and horizontal dimensions. In this sense, while greater is the level of horizontal nationalization; greater is the share of congruent strategies between president-national deputies. And while higher values of horizontal nationalization, is greater the proportion of consistent strategies among the coalitions that are running for national and subnational seats.

Finally, according with findings of literature (Scherlis 2009; Leiras 2007, 2010; Jones and Hwang 2005; Lodola 2009), This study (ibid.) identifies another variable involved in coalition congruence: control of the national or subnational executive. In this regard, parties in national office tend to form congruent alliances in the horizontal dimension, regardless of the influence of the electoral calendar. In opposition, parties in provincial office are more prone to form congruent alliances in its vertical dimension (linkage between coalitions running for national and subnational deputies). These findings confirm the weight that is assigned to President and Governors in Argentine politics, as organizer of a set of nested games between incumbents and oppositions.

Conclusions

This chapter has addressed the growth of electoral coalitions as exclusive players in the democratic competition in Argentina.

After reviewing the main elements of the Argentine institutional design and political dynamics I described the expansion of partisan coalition strategies, in executive and legislative, national and subnational elections. Second, I described the increase of the horizontal and vertical incongruence of electoral alliances, and

¹⁰There is not congruent impact if subnational elections are concurrent with presidential race (as it shows in Fig. 7).

identified variables that explain coalition congruence: party system nationalization and electoral calendar.

Electoral coalitions became more frequent and incongruent, and this phenomenon has a strong correlation with the federalization of the Argentine party system. In a system where subnational party elites have a high autonomy (formal and informal) to decide electoral strategies (and even to shape the election rules), and where citizens set their preferences by assigning a high value to the subnational or local level, the denationalization of the party organizations, electoral competition and coalition strategies tends to rise.

Multilevel coalitions is a recent problem in the research agenda on Argentine politics, accumulation of empirical evidence (with the contribution of qualitative research and case studies) is essential to incorporate more explanatory variables of coalition congruence, accurate causal mechanisms and increase our knowledge about party incentives.

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Presidential and Subnational Elections: The Logic of Party Alignments in Brazil (1994–2010)



Vítor Eduardo Veras de Sandes-Freitas and Fernando Augusto Bizzarro-Neto

The largest concern of this chapter is to understand how elections in Brazilian states have been affected by presidential elections, highlighting the need to focus on the subnational level. Most of political scientists' attention, particularly Brazilians, has been turned to the federal sphere. Thus, we believe that by changing the focus from the national to the subnational level, this research reaffirms the need to contribute to the understanding of the states' political subsystems in the recent democratic context.

We also sought to analyze the relationship of the states' political subsystems with the broader dynamic of the development of democracy in Brazil. Therefore, we ask: in the states' contexts, considering the institutional space given for articulation and inclusion of new political forces, how has the democratization dynamic established itself post-1985? Has it been following a similar pattern to the one established at the national level or does it operate according to a regional logic?

The research's direction is justified by the fact that part of the Brazilian political science literature points to a process of "presidentialization of the electoral competition", starting from the 1994 elections, in which the dynamic of the presidential elections has influenced the coalition strategies in the Brazilian states (Braga 2006; Cortez 2009; Limongi and Cortez 2010; Melo 2007; Melo and Câmara 2012; Meneguello 2010). With this process, political actors, when establishing pre-electoral coalitions, would not be basing themselves only on regional and local motivations. This would go against Lima Junior's (1983, 1997) thesis that there would be "political contextual rationalities"¹ in the states that explain the actions of parties at the state level.

Therefore, this chapter's objective is to deal theoretically and empirically with the "presidentialization of the electoral competition" as the process of replication of

¹Unless otherwise noted, all translations are ours.

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the structure of competition established in the presidential elections, polarized by two large coalitions led by the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) and the Worker's Party (PT), in the elections for the states' governments, with several degrees of alignment between the two levels (presidential and state). Observing the pre-electoral coalitions for state government, we have verified that, since 1994, there is a considerable increase of the electoral force of the PSDB and the PT. Both parties have concentrated the largest share of votes in the presidential elections and have consistently broadened their political bases in the states. In 1990, only the PSDB elected a governor. In 1994, both parties won eight state governments, with the PSDB electing six governors and the PT, two. In 1998 and 2002, there were ten governors elected by these parties, rising to eleven in 2006, and 13 in 2010. Thus, since 1994, the PSDB and the PT elected a significant share of Brazilian governors. In addition, they have increased participation in winning coalitions, also impacting the number of seats won in the Chamber of Deputies and Legislative Assemblies.

The chapter is organized in the following way: the first part is focused on the institutional incentives for electoral coalition formation and for coordination between presidential and subnational elections in Brazil; the second deals with the contextual rationalities of "presidentialization"; lastly, the model of analysis is presented and the tests using fuzzy-set QCA are performed, in order to verify how certain conditions lead to the existence of presidentialized political contexts.

Structure of the Competition and Political Rationality in Pre-electoral Coalition Formation in Brazil

Brazil has a proportional electoral system to choose parliamentarians—deputies (federal and state) and municipal councilperson—and majoritarian for the heads of the executive for the three levels of government (federal, state, and municipal) and for the Senate (state representation at the federal level). Consequently, both types of representation are combined, which generates two effects on the strategies of political actors: if in majoritarian elections there is a reduction in the number of options, in proportional ones there is an increase and the possibility for representation from several parties. This kind of representation, combined with a multiparty system and multimember districts enables the increase of party fragmentation.

Therefore, there are two trends: one that reduces the number of competitive candidacies (majoritarian) and one in which there is the possibility for entry of multiple parties (proportional system with multimember districts). Given this, possible impacts of electoral systems on party systems are majoritarian systems becoming bi-party and proportional ones with high district magnitude becoming multiparty systems (Duverger 1970).

The Brazilian electoral system allows both trends to occur simultaneously. In majoritarian elections, it reduces the options to two or three parties and, in proportional elections, it leads to multiparty competition. Along with that, the Brazilian

electoral system has another particularity: it uses the open-list system, in which voters may choose any candidate from the party's list, creating the list's order from the number of votes obtained by each candidate.

The combination of both models for representative choice leads to less competitive candidacies in executive elections, which makes the competition more manageable for larger parties. On the other hand, these candidates need to be anchored in the multiple parties that make up the proportional seats, gaining more electoral support. Thus, they may make formal pre-electoral coalitions and they may build vertical agreements with other parties, when national and subnational elections occur simultaneously (electoral coordination).

Consequently, in electoral systems such as the Brazilian one, in which the highest electoral prize is an executive office, mainly the presidency, the election tends to be coordinated by the parties with greater competitive advantages. Around them, allied parties in the states give political support in the electoral districts where the state elections are held. The parties that do not intend to occupy the presidency are left with taking part in pre-electoral coalitions, given the bargaining power they have due to the large party fragmentation in Brazil.

In addition to the impacts of the electoral system, other electoral rules may influence in the calculations of political actors, such as the ones that regulate electoral campaigns (Farrel 2001). In the Brazilian case, two electoral rules are important in order to analyze the electoral dynamic in the current democratic context: the electoral coalition between the parties and the concurrence of national and state elections, that is, the occurrence of elections at both levels simultaneously (since 1994).²

Concurrent elections enable the construction of electoral strategies on two government levels (national and subnational), leading more competitive parties in presidential elections to negotiate support in the states, which allows the entry of new political actors in the political strategies of parties seeking the presidency. Elections that occur simultaneously make possible a larger linkage between the national and state dynamics since parties tend to use electoral coordination strategies, which articulate the candidacies at the different levels, increasing the parties' chances of winning the elections for the central government.

According to Cox (1997, 1999), the success of electoral coordination involves the reduction in the number of competitors. One of the factors that works as an institutional incentive for this process are the electoral institutions. They provide the structure for the competition and allow the elites to mobilize under political platforms, in order to direct the voters' preferences. To do so, they tend to join forces and minimize alternative groups that may present similar political platforms.

Nonetheless, the incentive for coordination depends on the degree of vertical centralization of authority at the federal level against the state level and of horizontal centralization of the executive against the legislative (Hicken and Stoll 2008). This will define the size of the presidential prize, leading the main national parties

²Municipal elections for mayor and councilperson do not happen at the same time as national and state election, occurring 2 years later.

to seek out the presidency. In the case of Brazilian presidential elections, since the prize is large (the authority of the national executive is high) and number of seats available is small (just one), the cost of feasibility of a competitive candidacy for political actors is relatively high. Thus, there is a reduction in the number of competitors, which allows for the strategic coordination of actors, that is, parties evaluate further the decision being made: to enter or exit the race and associate themselves or not with other parties.

With relative rule flexibility for creation of political parties in Brazil, a significant number of parties was formed that started to group as coalitions in the electoral arena. Generally, parties take advantage of pre-electoral coalitions to broaden their capacity to elect representatives for the legislative.

The Brazilian model of electoral and political system enabled the gradual increase of party fragmentation in the legislative space, a result of the growth and development of parties. Consequently, the number of parties presented to the electorate grew substantively over the years, which may mean a high cost in making the choice. Pre-electoral coalitions minimize that cost, especially in elections for the executive, which lowers the number of options offered to voters. Thus, institutional changes favored the transition from a two-party system imposed by the military regime (1964–1985) to a multiparty system born out of redemocratization process (post-1985).

Despite the large amount of parties with representation in the National Congress and the Legislative Assemblies, in the presidential elections, since 1994, only two have presented candidacies that are competitive enough to win the majority of the population: the Workers' Party (PT) and the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB). These parties came about at different times, given the flexibility of the legislation for party organization and had, in their programs, political projects at the national level.

The PT was created in 1980 and has its origins based on the union movement and on popular segments supported by a section of the Catholic Church, being a rare case of a party created from the bottom to the top in Brazil (Meneguello 1989). Since its creation, the party had a strong bond with social movements, seeking to broaden the rights of workers, and stood its ground on the left side of the ideological spectrum. Originally, the party “had as its central goals to insert the working class and its demands in the Brazilian political-institutional scenery” (Amaral 2003: 39). From Amaral (2003: 57), it is understood that the establishment of the party in the Brazilian political scenery and its presence as a significant political actor in the presidential elections, since 1989, was, in large part, because of its willingness to represent the interests of the workers and the poor, and its functioning, with internal democracy and responsibility for its actions towards its members. These elements were key in making the party a novelty in the country's political scenery.

The PT grew with the expansion of the electoral rhetoric, gaining votes in several sections of society. Already in 1988 and 1989, the party went through a process of nationalization and turning towards the countryside, broadening the PT's electoral bases, which had an impact in the elections of 1990 and 1992, with an increase in the number of federal and state deputies elected (Amaral 2003: 103–105). The

search for a larger space in the national political scenery also led the PT to broaden its alliances with other parties. There were changes in its program throughout the nineties, as Amaral points out (2003: 155). The PT abandoned the class rhetoric, giving little emphasis to ideological positions, such as socialism, in order to promote the party's ability to solve the population's more concrete problems. This process of "de-ideologization" of the PT's program follows a similar path to of European mass parties, particularly the German one.³

The PT's rise to the presidency happened in 2002, after it was defeated three times by right-wing coalitions. According to Amaral (2003: 164), some factors contributed to the party's ascension to power in the 2002 presidential elections, which were "the economic crisis of the last years of the FHC government and the end of the center-right alliances that supported it, the move by PT towards the center, the party's approximation to sectors traditionally against its rhetoric, and its professionalization".⁴ After this process of softening their government program and adhering to more flexible coalitions, the party elected two presidents for three terms: Luís Inácio Lula da Silva, elected in 2002 and reelected in 2006, and Dilma Rousseff, elected in 2010. Even with their turn towards the center, the party has "two souls", in the words of Singer (2010): one of socialist origin and another that made possible the softening of alliances and the program, but still in the left of the ideological spectrum.

The PSDB started in 1988 as a dissident group of parliamentarians from the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), which claimed to be a more progressive wing of the party, differentiating itself from the PMDB's government of José Sarney and its support base composed of the PMDB and the Liberal Front Party (PFL) (Roma 2002). Afterwards, the party showed its program, laying it out more clearly in 1994, when Fernando Henrique Cardoso, from PSDB, won the election and became president with a center-right political agenda, having as his main allied parties the PMDB and the PFL. He was reelected in 1998, after Constitutional Amendment 16 was published in 4 June 1997, which guarantees for the president, governors, and mayors the possibility to run for reelection for one consecutive time only.

Despite claiming the European social-democratic identity for itself, the PSDB "was not born out of ties with labor movements, being a party of high-profile persons, originated from a rift in the PMDB and dissidents from other parties, with

³When looking at the transformations of the PT and the European mass parties, the differences in historical period and political context must be considered. Thus, it is not possible to assert that the PT became a catch-all party, as Kirchheimer identifies, or that it became a professional-electoral party, because both are ideal-types. Without fitting it into a theoretical type, it is possible to affirm that the PT professionalized and sought to broaden and soften its rhetoric in such a way as to increase the possibility of electoral gains.

⁴The winning coalition established by the PT in 2002, which had as a vice-president businessman José de Alencar (Liberal Party), showed the transformation the party went through since its beginning. This was made clearer with the publication of the "Letter to the Brazilian People", in June 2002. As Singer (2010: 105) states, the program published in July 2002 by Lula's coalition points to a "noticeable change in tone regarding capital" (our translation).

very different program from the ones of European social-democratic parties” (Vieira 2012: 171). Besides those differences with European social-democratic parties, the PSDB went through transformations in the way it presented itself to the electorate. In 1988, in the words of Power (2003: 240), “the party began its life defending parliamentarism, the deepening of democracy, and a redistributive policy”. After rising to power in 1994, the party adopted a series of market-oriented policies, which led its governments to be labeled “neoliberal” (Power 2003: 225). It then went through a right-wing shift, already in 1994, while the PT stayed firmly in the left. Along with the PFL, the PSDB formed the coalition that supported Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s government. With the Brazilian Progressive Party (PPB), the government had control over 75% of the Congress.

The monetary stabilization plan, started by Fernando Henrique when he was finance minister during the Itamar Franco government, led to economic stability as well as the electoral and governmental coalition with the PFL, with the respective goals of winning the 1994 presidential elections and maintaining governability from 1995. This changed the initial characteristics of the party, which were center-left. The coalition around the PSDB’s program occupied the center-right in the ideological spectrum, and the PT’s party alliances, the left, and later, the center-left.

Thus, it is noted that, since the beginning, the PT and the PSDB had differences on the basic conceptions of party action.⁵ While the PT had an external origin, extra-parliamentary, the PSDB was created years later by a group of dissident parliamentarians from the PMDB, that is, it is a party that was already born with firm roots inside Congress. Despite different origins, even before 1994, a possible PT-PSDB alliance was thought of, although it was never realized nationally. However, the origins and program and alliance profile of both parties led them to take different paths (Amaral 2003).

From the 1994 elections, the differences between both began to be more evident, especially with increase in the competition between them in the presidential elections. The electoral dispute between them made clear the programmatic differences between both parties. In the 1994 presidential elections, on one side was the PT candidacy of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the main left-wing option, and on the other, the candidacy of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, from the PSDB, supported by conservative sectors, in a coalition with the PFL, one of the main right-wing parties in Brazil at the time. Both parties presented the main governing platforms to the electorate and, since then, have dominated the presidential elections. These parties present themselves to the Brazilian electoral as the main alternatives for the big national issues.

This digression on the origins of the PT and the PSDB, although it highlights aspects deeply discussed by the literature on both parties, is of fundamental importance to think how the differences in the genesis of both parties might explain the trajectory taken by them in the presidential elections since 1994. Strategically

⁵In a meeting in 18 August 1979, during the PT’s creation process, Fernando Henrique Cardoso disagreed with the party’s platform, which opted for autonomy in relation to the parliamentarians (Amaral 2003: 33).

speaking, both parties have articulated nationally, looking to build national candidacies. The polarization of electoral disputes around the PT and the PSDB and, consequently, the effect of candidacy coordination along with state elections begins in 1994. Before that there had been only one direct election for the presidency, in 1989. In that election, both parties lost to the candidate from the National Renovation Party (PRN), Fernando Collor. In the first round, the candidacies from the PT and the PSDB had only 28.7% of the valid votes, out of 21 candidates. The change occurred in 1994, when the first concurrent elections in the new democratic context happened, with the selection of the president, governors, federal and state deputies, and two-thirds of the senators. In these elections, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, from the PSDB, was elected, out of eight candidates total (a number substantially smaller than the one in the “single election” of 1989). In 1994, the candidacies from the PT and the PSDB obtained 81.3% of the valid votes, a proportion almost three times larger than the one received by both parties in the previous election (see Table 1).

In the following elections, both parties continued to control most of the votes. They took 84.8% in 1998, 69.6% in 2002, 90.2% in 2006, and 79.5% in 2010. Therefore, the 1994 election may be considered the central moment of change in the national political scenery of the current democratic period. Since then, the electoral dynamic has centered itself around the PT and the PSDB, which started to concentrate votes in presidential elections despite there being parties with large caucuses in the Chamber of Deputies who are important in regional and local political sceneries, such as the PMDB, the PFL/DEM, the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), the Progressive Party (PP), among others.

In the case of the PMDB, although it has great political strength in the states and in the Congress, its organizational characteristics made its participation unviable to compete competitively in presidential elections. The internal conditions of the organization, inherited from the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB), forced the party to unite several regional political leaders who were not willing to converge politically. The disputes between these leaders and, consequently, the difficulty in positioning itself programmatically, in addition to the political deterioration suffered during the Sarney government, led to weak electoral performances in the presidential elections of 1989 and 1994. Thus, the PMDB went from being a party with national aspirations during the eighties to a party with regional and coalition prospects, participating in presidential elections as a secondary character, but as a key player in governability at the federal level (Bizzarro-Neto 2013; Ferreira 2002; Maciel 2014).

Therefore, the PT and the PSDB have concentrated the largest share of the votes since 1994.⁶ Despite the multiparty system and party fragmentation, the stability of

⁶ Despite the strength of other parties that may, occasionally, get a significant share of voter preferences, making a decision in the first round impossible, the PT and the PSDB have controlled the majority of the votes in presidential elections. In the 2006 elections, Anthony Garotinho (PSB) got 17.9% of the votes and Ciro Gomes (Popular Socialist Party), 12%. In 2010, Marina Silva (Green Party) got 19.3% of the votes. The good performance of these candidates was, in large part, responsible for the run-off elections in 2006 and 2010. However, the run-offs were between the PT and the PSDB.

Table 1 Results from the Brazilian presidential elections by party (1989–2010)—1st round (%)

Party	1989	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010
PRN	30.5	0.6	–	–	–	–
PT	17.2	27.0	31.7	46.4	48.6	46.9
PDT	16.5	3.2	–	–	2.6	–
PSDB	11.5	54.3	53.1	23.2	41.6	32.6
PDS/PPR	8.9	2.7	–	–	–	–
PL	4.8	–	–	–	–	–
PMDB	4.7	4.4	–	–	–	–
PCB	1.1	–	–	–	–	–
PFL	0.9	–	–	–	–	–
PSD	0.7	–	–	–	–	–
PTB	0.6	–	–	–	–	–
PRONA	0.5	7.4	2.1	–	–	–
PSP	0.4	–	–	–	–	–
PP	0.3	–	–	–	–	–
PCN	0.3	–	–	–	–	–
PN	0.3	–	–	–	–	–
PLP	0.2	–	–	–	–	–
PPB	0.1	–	–	–	–	–
PDC do B	0.1	–	–	–	–	–
PSC	–	0.4	0.2	–	–	–
PPS	–	–	11.0	12.0	–	–
PMN	0.2	–	0.4	–	–	–
PV	0.2	–	0.3	–	–	19.3
PSTU	–	–	0.3	0.5	–	0.1
PTdoB	–	–	0.3	–	–	–
PSDC	–	–	0.3	–	0.1	0.1
PTN	–	–	0.2	–	–	–
PSN	–	–	0.2	–	–	–
PCO	–	–	–	0.01	–	0.01
PSB	–	–	–	17.9	–	–
PSOL	–	–	–	–	6.8	0.9
PRP	–	–	–	–	0.1	–
PSL	–	–	–	–	0.1	–
PCB	–	–	–	–	–	0.04
PRTB	–	–	–	–	–	0.06
Number of parties	21	8	12	6	7	9

Source: Superior Electoral Court (TSE)

the electoral competition between the two parties demonstrates that the electorate has, over time, defined political alternatives, that is, electoral preference began to have a certain pattern since 1994. As Lipset and Rokkan (1967) state, in order to understand the voters' alignments that sustain the dispute between parties, it is necessary to understand the variations in the sequences of alternatives defined by them. The parties not only present themselves in each election to the voters, but carry with them their history. That is why it is important to understand how the electoral competition has been structured, in order to understand how and why a dispute was established and is sustained over time.

As Mair (1997: 14) points out, certain party systems tend to center themselves around a specific structure of competition, consolidated over several electoral and political disputes, which tend to organize the national electorate's preference: in Great Britain, the conflict is between Labour and Tories; in France, between left and right; in Sweden, between the Social-Democrats and the bourgeois bloc; in North Ireland, between unionism and nationalism; and in Ireland, between *Fianna Fáil* and the other parties. In Brazil, the PT and the PSDB have shown up, competed, and concentrated the largest share of the vote since the 1994 elections. Has that same political divide happened in the whole of the Brazilian political system? Or is it a dynamic exclusive of presidential elections?

Political Rationalities at the Subnational Level

Brazil has a federative arrangement that allows two autonomous power centers, a national and a subnational one, which makes possible the existence of different electoral-political dynamics in the states (Watts 1998; Soares 2007). This type of institutional arrangement enabled the rise of interests related to regional political circumstances, of "contextual political rationalities", typical of each territorial unit (Lima Junior 1983, 1997). The notion of "contextual political rationality" considers that party behavior is conditioned by time and political space, that is, the election's conditions lead to variability in electoral preferences, considering the level of competition and the party's relative size. These differences exist even if the parties' goal is the maximization of electoral support because circumstances will change the way parties act (Lima Junior 1983: 33).

"Contextual political rationalities" would be responsible in defining party alliances in Brazilian states. The actors' rationalities, therefore, would not be unvarying, that is, not considering political time and scope. Thus, Lima Junior disagrees with the view of ideological closeness of party coalitions and the larger trend of small parties to find coalition partners in relation to bigger ones. For Lima Junior, one cannot start from a conception unvarying rationality. Political time and space condition political actors' rationality. For him, the decision to form alliances would be "rational" because it has as a goal the maximization of electoral support, and "contextual" because it is local, "in light of the previous elections' results, and not

according to a national party strategy” (1983: 77). For this author, the determining factor for party coalition formation is a party’s relative local strength.

Lima Junior focuses on party subsystems in the states during 1946–1964, when most state elections did not occur at the same time as national elections and, specially, when parties were not able to coordinate states’ elections, conditioning alliances between parties.⁷ Unlike what Lima Junior concluded for 1946–1964, this research has found evidence that the rationality of state political actors takes into account parties’ actions at the national level, especially given the PT and PSDB’s ability to organize presidential elections since 1994. The assumptions of exclusively contextual rationality, from the analysis conducted by that author in 1983, are not sufficient to explain electoral coalition formation in the Brazil’s current democratic moment.⁸

Thus, even without the existence of an unvarying political rationality, an alignment between the states’ and national electoral dynamics has been noted when observing the formation of electoral alliances. Therefore, it is asked: when did state political actors begin to take into account the parties’ national strategies? To answer that question, it is necessary to understand how the logic of the competitions between the PT and the PSDB came about for presidential elections in Brazil.

The formation and strengthening of both parties at the national level were due to, first, institutional changes: the flexibilization for political party creation in a free and direct elections environment and the possibility to make pre-electoral coalitions. Moreover, in 1994, there were concurrent elections, an institutional condition that ensured for the PT and the PSDB the construction of competitive candidacies with programmatic platforms that were well-defined and differentiated from each other, being able to use national strategies for their candidacies. The national and state elections occurring simultaneously enabled competitive presidential candidacies connected to state elections. There was a convergence of institutional and organization aspects of parties so that the “presidentialization of the electoral competition” was possible, that is, the replication of the structure of competition established in the presidential races in the elections for state governments as well. This is a result of two processes: on the one hand, the PT and the PSDB need to build their state electoral machines and, on the other, the regional political leaders need to link their candidacies to the most competitive candidates at the national level.

Since 1994, the PT and the PSDB’s votes for president have been reasonably well distributed in all Brazilian regions. This points to how nationalized the parties’ candidacies have been and how much these have sought to build presidential campaigns linked to the state candidacies of their own parties or their allies. Together, the votes for these two parties have been quite high in different Brazilian regions,

⁷ Similar do Lima Junior, Bardi e Mair (2010) believe that political parties, despite being the same at the local and national levels, may have different strategies, with alternative coalitions and alignments in each state (2010: 241).

⁸ The findings of Lima Junior (1983), which allowed the development of the “contextual political rationalities” idea, are restricted to 1946–1964. In the collection organized by him in 1997, it is taken up again, but applied to the current democratic period (post-1985).

Table 2 Election results for the Brazilian presidency by region (1989–2010)—1st round (%)

Regions	1989		1994		1998		2002		2006		2010	
	PT	PSDB	PT	PSDB	PT	PSDB	PT	PSDB	PT	PSDB	PT	PSDB
North	18.7	5.6	25.5	58.9	26.5	57.6	44.4	22.7	56.1	36.4	49.2	31.9
Northeast	22.8	7.6	30.3	57.6	31.6	47.7	45.9	19.8	66.8	26.1	61.6	21.5
Southeast	17.8	16.2	25.6	56.1	31.2	55.3	46.5	22.7	43.3	45.2	56.9	25.2
South	8.1	6.3	28.2	41.3	38.8	49.2	49.4	28.5	34.9	54.9	42.1	43.0
Midwest	16.4	7.8	24.6	60.4	22.1	61.2	43.1	26.2	38.5	51.6	40.0	38.1
Total	17.2	11.5	27.0	54.3	31.7	53.1	46.4	23.2	48.6	41.6	46.9	32.6

Source: Superior Electoral Court (TSE)

which indicates that their strength is diffused throughout the whole national territory (Table 2).⁹

Thus, since 1994, the PT-PSDB dispute has gained stability at the national level, affecting the actions of political actors in the states, who have consistently begun to guide themselves by the way these parties strategically articulate at the national level (Cortez 2009). According to Cortez (2009), this is the mechanism of national construction of candidacies by both parties, guiding the strategies for electoral coalition formation. This reinforces Melo’s argument (2010: 8), who states that candidacies in Brazil have been composed “focusing mainly on presidential strategy over local dynamics”.

The strength of the PT and the PSDB, in large part, comes from the capacity these parties have to coordinate the composition of coalitions established in the pre-electoral moment. National strategies designed by these parties include the states, with the conditioning of the strategies by the states’ political actors (Cortez 2009, 2010). These parties’ leaders are, therefore, aware that the national elections are dependent on the strategies designed in the states, since it is at this level that the parties can mobilize the voters and publicize their program locally (Van Houten 2009). Parties such as the PT and the PSDB, that want to win the presidential elections, depend on the strategies created in the states, which means strategic coordination in the construction of pre-electoral alliances and coalitions.

In the electoral races polarized by the PT and the PSDB (since 1994), the former has won three times, and the latter twice. The electoral coalition strategies of both parties have put them on opposite ends in the states, creating a dynamic in which the political forces tend to guide themselves by the logic of the races for the national executive, since that would be a larger electoral victory for the party.

The data shows that the PT and the PSDB, in general, put themselves on opposite ends in the in the states’ elections. Considering the 1990 election as the first in which the PSDB ran for elected office, we can see, in Table 3, that the differences between the parties were already there, which impeded, in most cases, an alliance

⁹Despite the PT and the PSDB getting their votes from different Brazilian regions, in the last two elections, the Northeast has given the PT its best performance out of all the regions in the country (in 2006, 66.8% of votes and, in 2010, 61.6%), while the PSDB has had its worse performance in that region (in 2006, 26.1% and, in 2010, 21.5% of votes).

Table 3 Elections for Brazilian state governments between the PT and the PSDB (1990–2010)

	1990	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010	Total
Pre-electoral coalitions PT vs. PSDB	22	20	23	21	22	27	134
Victory with PSDB pre-electoral coalitions	6	12	11	12	10	12	63
Victory with PT pre-electoral coalitions	–	4	5	4	7	13	33
PSDB's elected governors	1	6	7	7	5	8	34
PT's elected governors	–	2	3	3	6	5	19

Source: Superior Electoral Court (TSE)

between them in the states.¹⁰ At that time, the pre-electoral coalitions in which the PT and the PSDB were in did not manage to compete with the traditional and hegemonic political forces in the states. The unimpressive performance of both parties in the elections for the states' governments was an indication of the absence of a national strategy that would catapult the candidacies for the executives of the Brazilian states. It was only starting from the 1994 elections that the PT and the PSDB began to lead the electoral races for the presidency, affecting the electoral dynamics in the states, especially regarding the broadening of the PSDB and the PT's electoral force (see Table 3).

It is from 1994 that an increase in the electoral force of the parties in the states is observed. The PT and the PSDB elected only one governor in 1990. In the 1994 elections, together they had eight state governments, with six from the PSDB and two from the PT. In 1998 and 2002, the number of governors elected by the parties was ten, going to 11 in 2006, and 13 in 2010. Thus, since 1994, the PT and the PSDB have been electing a significant share of Brazilian governors.

Moreover, the PT and the PSDB participated in a substantially larger number of winning coalitions. While in 1990, only the PSDB participated in winning coalitions (six, total), in 1994 it took part in 12 and the PT in four, adding a total of 16. That number was steady through the 1998 and 2002 elections, increasing to 17 in 2006, and to 24 in 2010. Both parties have participated in most winning coalitions since 1994 and in 2010, 92.6% of winning coalitions had one of the two parties in it demonstrating, even more, the linkage between the national and state dynamics, a fruit of the nationally designed strategies by the PT and the PSDB.

Consequently, it is possible to state that, in the new democratic context, there are two moments: one prior to the 1994 elections, in which the states' political dynamics had a logic of their own to the point of presenting their own rationality different from the national political dynamic (Lima Junior 1983, 1997); and one post-1994, in which the influence of the presidential races on the states' political dynamics shows that the democratic trajectory in Brazil has led to the linking of the states and the national political dynamics.

¹⁰From 1990 to 2010, there were six elections for governor in the 27 Brazilian states, that is, there were 162 elections in total. From that, there were 134 pre-electoral coalitions that had the PT and the PSDB on opposite sides, that is, on 82.7% of the cases. In only seven cases, the PT and the PSDB were in the same coalition: in 1990, in the states of Amazonas, Amapá, and Pará; in 1994, in Mato Grosso and in Santa Catarina; and in 1998, in Acre and Piauí.

Since 1994, therefore, there is a shift in the logic of coalition formation given that before state political arrangements had their own logic, different from the national political dynamic (Braga 2006; Cortez 2009; Limongi and Cortez 2010; Melo 2007; Meneguello 2010). With the change in the way of strategically coordinating the candidacies, the party system began to become clearer for state political actors, who started to align strategies on both levels (federal and state), which will influence party alliances during elections and, consequently, governments.

Thus, since 1994, there is the development of a path dependent trajectory, in a way that “decisions made in an election may influence the following ones” (Melo 2010: 8). The PSDB and the PT started being the leads in the elections for the presidency, with the national coalitions guiding the behavior of political actors in the states. Furthermore, two institutional alterations implemented post-1994 enabled an institutional environment more favorable to the presidentialization trajectory of the electoral competition: (1) the establishment of reelection for majoritarian offices in 1997, in which the president, governors, and mayors were able to run for reelection for one consecutive term; and (2) in 2002, the imposition by the Superior Electoral Court of the verticalization of party coalitions, which forced more symmetry between party alliances for president and proportional coalitions. This rule only lasted until the 2006 elections.¹¹

Reelection increased the possibility for continuity of any given political group in power, stimulating even more that political actors articulated around governing or opposition candidacies, reinforcing the bipolarity of national and state electoral competitions. The coalitions began to gather many parties and the number of candidacies for majoritarian office tended to diminish with the coalitional strategy, reinforced further by reelection, which diminished the chances of small parties to reach power.

The verticalization of pre-electoral coalitions, despite having occurred only in 2002 and 2006, created stricter limits for alliance construction in presidential and state elections. Thus, parties that launched candidacies for presidential elections were not able to make coalitions in the states existing, therefore, the formalization of the imposition of the presidential logic for competition.

The PT and the PSDB grew stronger as they gained more elected offices. Both parties' strategy of electoral coordination, in a favorable institutional setting, allowed these organizations to consistently become the two reference points for national politics. The predominance of both parties in the elections for the presidency is the result of the articulation of the PT and the PSDB with the candidacies in the states, building electoral machines in different districts, which potentialized their electoral strength. The remaining parties tend to group around of them, through coalitions and alliances in the states.

¹¹The intention was to inhibit the formation of “oddball coalitions”. However, it was observed that in the 2002 and 2006 elections, there was a flourishing of informal coalitions (Fleischer 2007). That may be explained by the differences and particularities of regional politics historically constructed in Brazilian states, which implies in a minimization of the impact of the presidentialization of the electoral competition.

Consequently, pre-electoral coalitions in the states have been led by two inter-related processes: (1) the translation of the competitive presidential arrangement by the winning coalitions in the states (Meneguello 2010: 15); (2) by the preeminence of the executive branch over the dynamic of state coalitions due to the concentration of power on the hands of the governor, which may guarantee to allied parties opportunities to access state resources (Krause 2010: 14–15). The viability of electoral change, thus, is more likely by aggregating opposition forces in broad coalitions, which are generally built nationally.

Therefore, state political actors have been, increasingly, constrained by the decisions made by central party leadership, mainly from the PT and the PSDB. As Melo and Câmara (2010) state, the “reproduction mechanism”, that is, the parties’ decision in the states to align themselves with the national level is found on the actions of the PT’s members and the PSDB’s members.

Thus, because they lay out particular strategies for each state, focusing on the presidential candidacies, the PT and the PSDB have tended to form coalitions with different parties. According to Table 4, which shows the parties in coalition with the PT’s state candidacies, the party has broadened the parties it makes coalitions with. In 1990, the PT made a coalition with only a few parties (five in all) as well as associated itself more with left-wing parties, such as the Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB), the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), and the Democratic Labor Party (PDT).¹² The PT began to increase the number of allies over time: in 1994, there were seven parties; in 1998, fourteen; in 2002, seventeen; in 2006, eighteen; and in 2010, nineteen.

Among the parties that have most supported the PT, the PCdoB and the PSB have been the most constant in the party’s coalitions. In the 2010 elections, despite having been the parties that were most present in the alliances for the PT’s candidacies, the participation of other parties is evident, some small and larger parties from the center and the right (including the PMDB, the PP, the Party of the Republic, and the Brazilian Labor Party). Thus, parties to the left of the PT started to participate no longer in its coalitions, such as the PCB and the United Socialist Workers’ Party (PSTU), as well the Socialism and Liberty Party (PSOL), which never participated in a coalition with the PT. The PSTU only participated in coalitions with the PT in 1994, and the PCB in 1990, 1998, and 2002. Moreover, it is important to highlight that in the last elections, the PT has been more open to alliances with parties more right-leaning, such as the PR and the PP.

The PSDB, on the other hand, has been supported, mostly, by center and right-wing parties. The largest supporters of the PSDB’s candidacies are the DEM (former PFL), the PTB, and the PP (former PPR and PPB) as well as the Socialist

¹²For this analysis, we used the left-right classification done by Zucco Jr (2011). The paper presents an ideological positioning classification of the main Brazilian parties for the period after the Constituent Assembly (1990–2009), from the project “Brazilian Legislative Study” (PLB), the result of a joint effort by several researchers, including Timothy Power (University of Oxford).

Table 4 Parties in coalition with the PT's candidacies for the states' governments (1990–2010)

Parties	PT_1990	PT_1994	PT_1998	PT_2002	PT_2006	PT_2010	Total
PCdoB	11	9	13	24	18	9	84
PSB	13	9	7		8	8	45
PCB	8		9	14			31
PMN		3	4	20	3		30
PL			1	17	8		26
PV		7	5	4	2	3	21
PDT	2		8			7	17
PRB					9	7	16
PPS		9	4		1	1	15
PSTU		10					10
PHS				2	2	5	9
PTB			1		5	3	9
PTdoB		1	1	4	1	2	9
PTN				3	2	3	8
PSC				3	2	3	8
PR						6	6
PSDC				2		4	6
PRP				1	1	4	6
PPR-PPB-PP					2	4	6
PRTB				1	3	2	6
PSL			1	1		3	5
PMDB					3	2	5
PAN			2	1	2		5
PTC						4	4
PST				3			3
PRONA				1	2		3
PSN			2				2
PSDB	1		1				2
PSD				1			1
Total	58	67	75	126	92	90	
Number of parties	5	7	14	17	18	19	

Source: Superior Electoral Court (TSE)

Popular Party (PPS)¹³ (see Table 5). The PSDB's candidacy coalitions, from 1994, began to house a larger number of allies. In 1990, the party made alliances with ten parties, but did not form coalitions on eight candidacies (61.5% of the total). Since

¹³According to the classification established by Zucco Jr (2011), the PPS was one of the parties that most moved towards the right, considering the studies done in 2005 and 2009. However, the PPS's positioning in the studies done before 2009 put it in the left-end of the spectrum.

Table 5 Parties in coalition with the PSDB's candidacies for the states' governments (1990–2010)

Parties	PSDB_1990	PSDB_1994	PSDB_1998	PSDB_2002	PSDB_2006	PSDB_2010	Total
PFL-DEM	1	3	5	7	9	12	37
PPS		3	5		8	11	27
PTB		4	6		10	5	25
PPR-PPB-PP		2	7	5	5	3	22
PSC		1	4	1	5	8	19
PTdoB		1	3	1	8	5	18
PL	1	3	6		6		16
PMDB	1	1	3	4	2	4	15
PV		1	4	4	3	2	14
PMN		1	3		2	8	14
PRTB			1	5	3	4	13
PSD		1	6	5			12
PRP		3	3	2	2	1	11
PSL			2	3		5	10
PHS				2	4	3	9
PSB		1	2		2	3	8
PTN			1	1	3	3	8
PAN				3	5		8
PTC					5	2	7
PSDC			2	2		3	7
PDT	2	2				1	5
PT	2		1				3
PCdoB	1	1					3
PRB						3	3
PR						3	3

PST					3					3
PRONA					1			2		3
PDC	2									2
PCB	1	1								2
PTR	1									1
PSN				1						1
PRN	1									1
PGT					1					1
Total	13	29		67	49		84		89	
Number of parties	10	16		21	16		18		20	

Source: Superior Electoral Court (TSE)

Table 6 Candidacies for state governments—PMDB, PT, PSDB (1990–2010)

Parties	1990	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010	Total
PT	23	19	16	24	18	10	110
PMDB	18	19	19	16	16	13	102
PSDB	13	10	14	12	17	15	81

Source: Superior Electoral Court (TSE)

1994, the party began to form more coalitions¹⁴ and to broaden the profile of the participating parties.

Over the years, the PSDB began to incorporate several small parties as supporters, as the PT did. However, unlike the PT, the PSDB generally makes few alliances with left-wing parties. Its main ally has been the DEM (former PFL), which has always been right-wing, according to Zucco Jr's classification (2011). The participation of the PFL-DEM in the PSDB's alliances has increased, especially with its weakening, whether with seats in Congress or in getting state governments. Unlike the PSDB, the PFL-DEM has never formally allied itself with the PT's candidacies for state government.¹⁵

The PMDB is one of the parties that most allies itself with the PSDB, with few instances of coalitions for the PT's candidacies, even in the last two elections, during which the party was formally a part of the federal government's support base. Even so, it is common to see alliances involving PT-PMDB and PSDB-PMDB. It is also possible to find individual candidacies by the PMDB having as opposition candidacies or coalitions by the PT or the PSDB. The fact is that the PMDB's alliances do not obey the governmental alliance established by the party at the national level. It is evident that the PMDB has opted to launch candidacies to state governments at a higher rate than it has allied itself to the PSDB or the PT. Thus, it is noteworthy that the states are arenas for the party's actions, even though it does not have room to act as a protagonist in the presidential elections. It is observed, on Table 6, that the PMDB has launched candidacies in most Brazilian states, except for the last election, in which it had 13 candidacies out of 27, still a high number.

Thus, in the electoral arena of the Brazilian states, the existence of several other forms of political arrangements as a way of responding also to regional agreements is possible. Although the increase of the presence and strength of the PT and the PSDB in the candidacies for the states' governments is evident, it is not always that the political game in the states is about these two parties. One cannot affirm that the states' competitive logic operates exclusively from the presidential electoral

¹⁴ In 1994, 80% of the PSDB's candidacies to state governments opted to form coalitions with other parties. This trend of the party to launch candidacies with coalitions involving other parties continues in the following elections: in 1998 (100%), in 2002 (90.9%), in 2006 (82.4%) and in 2010 (100%).

¹⁵ As it has been shown, the PFL-DEM has never participated in coalitions in which the candidate for the state's government was from the PT. There are only two instances in which the PT and the PFL-DEM appear in the same coalition: in 2002, in the PSL's candidacy for Roraima's government, and in 2010, in the PMDB's candidacy for Maranhão's government.

dynamic, but that the states' dynamics start to feel its influence. There are particular ways each state context responds to the logic of the presidential elections established by the PT and the PSDB since 1994, to a higher or lesser degree. Therefore, these parties take into account the rationality of state political leaders from other parties to design strategies in the states for presidential candidacies.

In summary, the institutional incentives, and the strategic action by the PT and the PSDB in the presidential elections have been fundamental for conditioning the behavior of state political leaders since 1994. These include linking to presidential candidacies as a way of increasing the electoral potential of their candidacies. By aligning with national candidacies that are more competitive, it was possible to aggregate more parties in broad pre-electoral coalitions. Thus, even with the variety of coalitions existing in the states, and with the presence of candidacies from other parties such as the PMDB, it is evident that the strategy designed in the presidential races has influenced the states' electoral dynamics. Therefore, it is not there a contextual political rationality does not exist anymore, but that it began to be affected by the logic of the elections for the presidency, highlighting the roles of the PT and the PSDB in the states' contexts.

Presidentialization of the Electoral Competition in Brazil: Model and Tests

This section explores a relevant part in understanding state party alliances. The question to be answered is: are there national party alliances developed from the electoral coordination process established by the PT and the PSDB in the Brazilian states? To do so, the relationship between national party alliances and pre-electoral coalitions for governor elections in the states will be analyzed. From that, how much the national bipolar character affects the state election strategies will be verified.

Within the purposes of this research, this chapter tests two theories: the "(purely) contextual political rationalities" and the "presidentialization" of the electoral competition in Brazil. For the former there are, in Brazil, state political subsystems completely detached from the national level. For the latter, since 1994, the PT and the PSDB have organized the electoral competition in Brazil with the process of electoral coordination, that is, by aligning the candidacies for governor around one or the other.

The models presented develop a test for the "presidentialization" theory. Should it be confirmed, it will be understood that state party alliances have followed national cues, not only state and local ones, indicating that the current democratic experience in Brazil has enable that state political subsystems be on a trend of being less detached from national party articulations.

Building the Indicator for Presidentialization

This section presents the proposed model for analysis of “presidentialization”, that is, the capacity that the PT and the PSDB have to coordinate the state elections in such a way that it affects the alliances between parties in the elections for governor. This stems from the discussion conducted previously on the convergence of institutional incentives that favored narrowing the gap between national and state electoral dynamics and the strategic option by the PT and the PSDB, which observed the need to build national presidential candidacies, establishing state machines and participating, consequently, in opposing coalitions in the states.

We start from the assumption that presidentialization occurs when the benefits outweigh the costs. Considering that there are contexts that reproduced nearly perfectly the bipolar dynamic of the presidential elections, we understand that the PT and the PSDB influence local races when they may receive benefits in some way, with few costs to do so. When the costs are higher than the possible benefits, parties have lower capacity to coordinate candidacies through the replication of the logic of presidential elections. Therefore, the variables were defined in the following way.

One of the problems the literature discusses is the absence of indicators that measure how “presidentialized” an electoral race is. Therefore, two ways to solve this issue were thought of: (1) creating a dichotomous dependent variable (presidentialized or non-presidentialized election); or (2) creating a variable that incorporates more levels of “presidentialization”. Given the myriad of possible arrangements between parties during coalition formation, we opted for the latter, thus creating degrees of presidentialization. From there, an indicator was created that quantifies the intensity with which some presidential level elections are reproduced in the elections for governor in Brazilian states (candidacies and coalitions). The index will be the model’s dependent variable, which will vary from 0 to 1.

To compose the indicator, some conditions were defined to verify the existence or not of presidentialized elections, which are: (a) having candidates for governor from the PT and the PSDB (candidate from the PT *versus* candidate from the PSDB); (b) having coalitions in which the PT and the PSDB are a part of, but are not allied (the PT and the PSDB are in rival coalitions); (c) the PT and the PSDB are among the first two positions, with a condition for each party being created here; (d) the PT is in coalition with either the PSB or the PCdoB; (e) that the PSDB is in coalition with the PFL/DEM; (f) the PT is not in coalition with the PFL/DEM; (g) the PSDB is not in coalition with the PSB and the PCdoB.¹⁶

Table 7 presents a summary of the conditions for an election to be “presidentialized” or “non-presidentialized”. A race that meets all the conditions would be a pure-type of a “presidentialized” election. One that does not meet any of the

¹⁶The parties that appeared as the main allies for the PT and the PSDB at the national level were considered, as per the literature presented. The PMDB, in this case, was not considered for the presidentialization calculation given its heterogeneous nature in the states.

Table 7 Conditions for the Brazilian presidentialization index’s composition

Conditions	Description	Values
1	The PT and the PSDB are in different pre-electoral coalitions.	0.15
2	Candidate from the PT <i>versus</i> candidate from the PSDB.	0.15
3	Candidacy from the PT among the top 2 positions.	0.05
4	Candidacy from the PSDB among the top 2 positions.	0.05
5	Presence of a PT-PSB or PT-PC do B coalition.	0.15
6	Presence of a PSDB-DEM coalition	0.15
7	Absence of a PT-DEM coalition.	0.15
8	Absence of a PSDB-PSB and PSDB-PC do B coalition.	0.15
Presidentialization	<i>Pure-type of “presidentialized” election = 1.0</i> <i>Pure-type of “non-presidentialized” election = 0</i>	
Observations	– If the PT and the PSDB are in the race in the same coalition, that is condition enough to qualify as “non-presidentialized” with a score of “0”. – Elections without the PSDB (candidate or in coalition), gets a score of “0”. – Elections without the PT (candidate or in coalition), gets a score of “0”.	

Source: authors’ elaboration

*This table is for the calculations from the 1994 elections. For 1990, the Collor (PRN) and Lula (PT) coalitions were considered

conditions would be a pure-type of a “non-presidentialized” election. Thus, the closer the index is to 1, the more “presidentialized” the race is.

The indicator’s components come from the literature’s basic assumptions that it is necessary to have the PT and the PSDB on opposite sides, having their biggest national allies by their sides in the states. Only two conditions carried less weight (conditions 3 and 4), because they are related to the results of the elections and not exactly to the coordination strategy of the parties in the states. The conditions that were more important represent the most significant share of the indicator, adding 0.9 out of 1.0. The remaining conditions regard the pre-electoral strategy, directly related to the theory’s question: do state elections post-1994 tend to be influenced by the logic of presidential elections polarized between the PT and the PSDB?

The conditions were extracted from the literature about the presidentialization process of elections from the PT-PSDB polarization, that is, from the conditions for vertical alignment between the state and presidential races. Therefore, other parties that were also part of the allied bases of the PSDB and the PT, at the federal level, were excluded from the indicator, in order to follow the literature’s propositions that there are two party blocs led by the PT and the PSDB: on one side, the PSB and the PCdoB and, on the other, the PFL/DEM, respectively. Consequently, the PDT, the PTB, and the PP, as well as the PMDB were excluded as parties that have an impact in the presidentialization index.

The expected presidentialization index, in ideal terms, would equal 1.0, but it is accepted that 0.8 may be considered a high rate of presidentialization, since it would be six conditions out of eight. Although it is a convention, it can be said that elections with an indicator above 0.8 are highly presidentialized because they fit into the conditions laid out by the literature and represented in the indicator.

Table 8 Presidentialization index of state elections (1990–2010)

States	1990	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010	Average 1990–2010	Average 1994–2010	Presidentializ
SP	0.15	0.95	0.8	1	1	0.85	0.79	0.92	High
MG	0.8	0.8	0.95	1	1	0.55	0.85	0.86	
PA	0.3	0.65	0.65	1	1	1	0.77	0.86	
DF	0.5	0.8	0.95	0.85	0.8	0.85	0.79	0.85	
CE	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.79	0.83	
AP	0.5	0.85	0.8	0.95	0.9	0.6	0.77	0.82	
PE	0.45	0.85	0.65	0.85	0.8	0.85	0.74	0.80	
RS	0.15	0.7	0.85	0.7	1	0.65	0.68	0.78	Medium-high
PB	0.45	0.65	0.85	0.95	0.85	0.55	0.72	0.77	
SE	0.5	0.85	0.65	0.65	0.85	0.85	0.73	0.77	
GO	0.6	0.65	0.95	0.95	0.5	0.7	0.73	0.75	
AC	0.65	0.5	0	0.85	0.95	1	0.66	0.66	Medium
RJ	0.35	0.35	0.65	0.8	0.6	0.85	0.60	0.65	
RR	0.45	0.65	0.5	0.35	0.85	0.85	0.61	0.64	
TO	0.15	0.35	0.5	0.8	0.65	0.85	0.55	0.63	
AL	0.6	0.45	0.85	0.45	0.8	0.55	0.62	0.62	
SC	0.45	0	0.8	0.65	0.8	0.8	0.58	0.61	
AM	0.35	0.3	0.85	0.45	0.75	0.65	0.56	0.60	
PI	0.6	0.65	0	0.85	0.65	0.8	0.59	0.59	Medium-low
RN	0.45	0.15	0.8	0.65	0.5	0.85	0.57	0.59	
MT	0.45	0	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.65	0.55	0.57	
BA	0.45	0.15	0.65	0.65	0.5	0.85	0.54	0.56	
MS	0.45	0.35	0.15	0.85	0.85	0.55	0.53	0.55	
ES	0.3	0.65	0.8	0.15	0.35	0.8	0.51	0.55	
RO	0.6	0.35	0.5	0.15	0.65	0.75	0.50	0.48	
PR	0.6	0	0.5	0.9	0.45	0.55	0.50	0.48	Low
MA	0.5	0.15	0.5	0.45	0.45	0.35	0.40	0.38	
Average	0.46	0.50	0.66	0.72	0.74	0.74	0.64	0.67	

Source: Bizzarro-Neto and Sandes-Freitas database

^aThe classification of the last column on the right had as parameters the average from 1994–2010, given that since 1994, the PT and the PSDB began to polarize the presidential races. The results from 1990 were measure from the Collor (PRN) and Lula (PT) coalitions


Applying the model to the elections for state governments from 1990 to 2010, we observed that the index has gradually approached 1.0, showing that, increasingly, state elections have aligned to presidential elections, indicating a degree of alignment between state and national candidacies. For 1990, the index presents an average of 0.46; for 1994, the index has a result of 0.50, and has a significant jump for the 1998 elections, with 0.66. For the 2000's, the indexes were around 0.70, becoming stable at 0.74, from 2006 (see Table 8).

Most of the states have averages from 0.5 to 0.79 throughout the period analyzed, which means that, to some extent, the states replicate some form of nationalized

party arrangement in their elections. In the states with high presidentialization over time, only Acre and Minas Gerais had a significant drop in 2010. On the other hand, São Paulo, Pará, Distrito Federal, Ceará, and Pernambuco maintained a high presidentialization level. São Paulo is the state that had the largest average for the post-1994 period. Ceará is the state that had the smallest minimum for the whole period under analysis (0.6 in 1990), reaching values of 0.8 and above between 1994 and 2010, which demonstrates a high degree of alignment.

Speaking about the least presidentialized, Paraná, Maranhão, and Rondônia have the lowest levels during 1994–2010. Paraná presents high fluctuation during the period, getting the minimum of zero and maximum of 0.9. Maranhão was the only state that did not go over 0.5. In addition, Rondônia is a state that only presented higher values of presidentialization starting from 2006. Previously, there was a lot of fluctuation, not indicating a pattern of continuous party alignment with the presidential races, which also indicates variation in the way party alliances were formed for governor elections.

Graph 1 shows the process of “presidentialization” by region. Noticeably, there was a significant growth among the regions, going from baseline of 0.4 in 1990 to approximately 0.6 and 0.7. In the first elections, it is observed that the alignment around the PT and the PSDB in the states was not strongly present. In the 1994 elections, for instance, in the South region, the presidentialization index was only 0.23, due to the fact that the states of Paraná and Santa Catarina got a zero score in the indicator. That is explained by contextual reasons, demonstrating the importance of regional political agreements in defining pre-electoral coalitions in the states, even



Graph 1 Presidentialization index of state races by Brazilian region (1990–2010). Source: Bizarro-Neto and Sandes-Freitas database

with strong presidential candidacies by the PT and the PSDB.¹⁷ The national element was still not strongly present in the different states in the country, which indicates the existence of coalitions woven from strictly regional variables. The South region, in 1994, was off the curve when we observe the trend of all the regions in the elections between 1990 and 2010 (Graph 1).

In summary, it was observed that the indicator built to understand the party alignments between the state and presidential races has pointed to a constant growing proximity between the two levels of competition, especially from 1994 to 2010, when the average goes from 0.5 to 0.74, a process observed in different regions in the country. This indicator will be used as a dependent variable, which is the basis for the following models.

The Possible Causes for Presidentialization: Defining the Independent Variables

The model must observe the institutional characteristics that would condition the existence of the candidacy coordination process from the top-down and, consequently the understanding by the state political actors that the association with the presidential candidacies will bring electoral gains. At the presidential level, it is observed that the construction of polarized races in only two groups also depends on the configuration of the party groups in dispute. It was observed that, despite the number of parties that run in the presidential elections, the PT and the PSDB have controlled the races since 1994, reducing the space for alternative candidacies.

This reduction in the number of effective competitors in presidential elections is incentivized by the effects of the electoral rules and by the characteristics of the Brazilian institutional arrangement. If on the one hand the multiparty system and the proportional representation system favor party fragmentation in the legislative (in the federal, state, and municipal levels), on the other the majoritarian races favor the bipolarization of the elections (Duverger 1970). Thus, with two parties controlling the biggest electoral prize of the national elections (the presidency), the parties tend to aggregate in coalitions during presidential elections.

Consequently, the PT and the PSDB try to coordinate their candidacies in the states, in the elections for governor. Thus, restrictions are imposed on alliances that are different from the one proposed at the presidential level, in such a way as to align the candidacies and allow for a greater possibility for electoral gains. However, the greater cost for this process of candidacy coordination occurs due to the contextual variables, which lead the “contextual political rationalities”. These

¹⁷In 1994, in Paraná, the PSDB did not have a candidate or participate in any pre-electoral coalitions. The PT had a candidate, but came in third. In Santa Catarina, the PT and the PSDB were in the same coalition, but only came in fourth in the election, one that was polarized between a solo candidacy from the PPR against the PMDB, which was in coalition with several small parties (PTRB-PMN-PSD-PV-PRP) and won.

regional factors are hard to quantify, unless with in-depth study cases, which are beyond the scope of this chapter.

As a result, for there to be “presidentialization” the benefit must be larger than the cost, with the former being votes for president and the latter the difficulty in coordinating these candidacies. The costs, as we pointed out above, also depend on non-quantifiable factors. Given that, the model sticks to the structural conditions of the competitions, which may help in understanding which state contexts tend to be more easily coordinated, that is, are closer to presidentialization or not.

Thus, some institutional conditions were observed for the tests: (1) the adoption of concurrent elections in 1994; (2) the adoption of reelection in 1998. The hypothesis here is that the possibility that incumbents in executive offices run again increases the costs for entry for new actors.¹⁸ Along with that, candidates for reelection have high rates of electoral success, contributing to the decrease in the competitive potential of new candidacies. The trend is that they aggregate around broad coalitions in the states.

These would be institutional incentives for presidentialization, because they would favor the continuity of the dynamic of elections polarized between the PT and the PSDB, which would reinforce, positively, the states’ political actors to move towards the national alignments as a strategic way to link candidacies and receive greater electoral benefit. Consequently, the benefit of presidentialization of candidacies would be for both parties vying for the presidency as well as for state political leaders. Nonetheless, for the model, the benefit being considered will be to coordinate the candidacies, that is, a top-down organization, from the parties’ national electoral strategy.

Therefore, the size of the electorate may be defined as a proxy for benefit (explanatory variable 1). The more voters are at stake in each state, the more interest the parties have in presidentializing the race, due to the possible benefits for presidential elections. As a result, agreements on national matters would have more influence on state and regional ones. Although presidentialization of elections in states with smaller electorates may also be appealing, the interest of the PT and the PSDB, nationally, is to ensure the support of the largest electoral circumscriptions, because they ensure more votes in presidential elections.

On the other hand, the costs of presidentialization are understood as the contextual difficulty in reaching generalized consensus on polarized coalitions and alliances such as the ones at the presidential level. That is why we discuss that the more power is dispersed, the higher the instability and the difficulty in forming majorities. Thus, political costs in the state for following guidelines imposed by the national party leadership tend to be decided by regional conditioning factors.

¹⁸According to Spoon and West (2015: 399), “if party leaders feel that the party has no chance of winning in the current election, they will not risk their reputation by running alone, but will instead wait until they are stronger competitors in the next term. Because there are limits on the number of terms the president can serve, the party knows how long it has to prepare for the next election. In the absence of term limits, a party may be willing to risk its reputation as it has no guarantee how long the incumbent may hold the executive”.

Power dispersion (explanatory variable 2) may be defined as a proxy for cost. That can be measured from the calculations for the Effective Number of Parties (NEP) of the Legislative Assemblies in the elections prior to the one under analysis, to verify the dynamic of the correlation of forces during the 4-year period before electoral coalition formation. The hypothesis suggested is that the more dispersion, that is, the higher the effective number of parties, the larger the cost of negotiation for coalition formation, constraining the actors to follow a contextual logic for elections, rather than the national one.

Thus, the model included, initially, two explanatory variables that may help shed light on the mechanisms that lead to the “presidentialization” of state elections, which are: size of the electorate and power dispersion in the states. Other than those, some variables are proposed which could be called controls: party strength for the PT, the PSDB, and the PMDB. However, as methodological choice, they will be included as conditions, not as control variables, given that it is understood that contextual variables related to the parties’ negotiation capacity in the states must be embodied in the model.

The need to include these contextual variables to understand the variation of presidentialization, nonetheless, creates a series of methodological issues about the use of statistical techniques commonly used in political science for the specific case of presidentialization. The main one is that, by using common statistical methods for the case of presidentialization, the models presented here cannot explain the cases’ particular variations. Presidentialization is explained by contextual variables that may interact in several ways. In some cases, the variables may have the expected effect, and in some, they may not. The problem is that multicausality is not always treated by these common statistical techniques adequately (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). Most social sciences’ phenomena are the result of asymmetric relationships between the variables, derived from the complexity of the social and political reality. Presidentialization, from what was observed, may be the result of this kind of relationship, allowing for multiple conjunctural relationships between the variables analyzed.

Although presidentialization is a national phenomenon, it affects each context in a particular way, due to historical regional conditioning factors. Given that, one of the alternatives to the use of conventional statistical techniques used to evaluate multicausal phenomena is using a method that includes the quantitative aspects without losing sight of the cases’ qualitative elements, that is, the party-political arrangements of each state. That is why we opted for another data analysis technique suited to this case: *Qualitative Comparative Analysis* (QCA).

Tests Using *Qualitative Comparative Analysis*

With the analysis conducted using the QCA¹⁹, it is possible to analyze multiple combinations of conditions, resulting in possible configurations. The method organizes these associations between the conditions and the resulting configurations (Ragin and Rihoux 2004). The analysis is conducted with logical tests, checking causality relationships between the conditions and the outcomes.

The configurational method is different from traditional statistical methods that are based on probabilistic generalization of analysis models. With the QCA, the generalizations are “modest”, with temporal limitations. The model and its variables’ explanatory capacity is not calculated, but a logical analysis is conducted of the existing configurations of the cases under analysis from the conditions defined, checking how much they are necessary and sufficient for the existence of a phenomenon. Therefore, there is no concept of variable in the QCA, but of conditions that are inter-related forming configurations. Thus, we avoid using the term “independent variable” to discuss theoretically given conditions since they are, to some extent, inter-related. The highlighted variables to evaluate the calculations for presidential campaign coordination with state political actors are taken here as conditions.

Accordingly, the cases were chosen intentionally and not randomly, from the selected theoretical assumptions. In the case presidentialization analysis, we worked with the whole population, given that all states are included (all 27 states and all state elections between 1990 and 2010).

The use of this method in the research raised the conditions laid out by the literature, enabling logical tests of them, such as presidentialization. There is, therefore, a closer association of empirical work (the findings of several researchers who have discussed presidentialization so far) with theory (the discussion on the organization of state political subsystems from the calculations established by the PT and the PSDB in the national elections).

Among the QCA’s three variations, fuzzy-set will be used because it handles the complexity derived from the conditions of quantitative continuous variables. The “zero” represents complete exclusion of the condition and “one”, complete presence.²⁰ Another important point of the method’s application is that the definition of the minimum and maximum limits must be given. Another essential definition is the threshold, which defines the central bound.

The first part of the test is calibrating the model’s variables for fuzzy conditions. To do so, it is necessary to define the maximum, minimum, and medium bound for each: the outcome (presidentialization), and the conditions (strength of the PMDB, the PT, and the PSDB, as well as size of the electorate and power dispersion)

¹⁹Like Rihoux and Ragin (2009), the QCA label will be used to describe three types of methods within the same approach: crisp-set QCA (based on binary Boolean logic), multi-value QCA (with the attribution of multiple categorical values for the variables), and fuzzy-set QCA (which attributes 0 to 1 values to the variables).

²⁰For the tests using the fuzzy-set method, the software used was fs/QCA, version 2.5.

Table 9 Calibration of the conditions established for the fuzzy-set model of analysis of the presidentialization of elections for governor (1990–2010)

Power dispersion—NEP						
Bounds	1990	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010
Maximum	6.4	6.7	7.3	8.3	8.7	9.2
<i>Threshold</i>	4.9	5.0	5.4	6.6	7.2	8.2
Minimum	4.0	4.1	4.2	5.2	6.3	7.2
Size of the electorate ^a						
Bounds	1990	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010
Maximum	55	55	58	60	65	69
<i>Threshold</i>	21	23	26	28	31	33
Minimum	7	8	9	9.5	11	12
PMDB's strength						
Bounds	1990	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010
Maximum	40.0	24.0	26.0	25.0	24.5	25.0
<i>Threshold</i>	24.0	15.5	16.0	18.0	14.7	17.8
Minimum	8.5	8.5	10.0	10.0	8.0	7.0
PSDB's strength ^b						
Bounds	1990	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010
Maximum	–	15.0	18.0	22.0	20.0	19.0
<i>Threshold</i>	–	5.2	11.0	13.0	13.0	12.8
Minimum	–	2.5	3.8	7.8	6.5	5.0
PT's strength						
Bounds	1990	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010
Maximum	10.0	15.0	17.0	17.5	20.0	18.5
<i>Threshold</i>	5.4	7.4	8.8	9.5	15.5	15.0
Minimum	2.0	3.7	4.0	5.3	7.4	8.5

Source: Own elaboration based on data by Bizzarro-Neto and Sandes-Freitas

^aThe numbers presented were divided by 100 thousand for this table

^bPSDB was not considered for 1990, because it was the first election in which this party participated. Therefore, it did not have votes in previous elections and it is not possible to calculate the party's political strength

(Table 9). Although there are no pre-defined rules to find good bounds, the ideal is that their definitions are closely related with the theory. Nonetheless, due to the absence of papers that systematically analyze presidentialization, the definition of bounds was done in a way as to avoid distributing the subsets disproportionately, which is indicated by methods experts. Thus, we avoided using the mean or the median as a way to separate the groups, attributing bounds year to year for the conditions according to the cases distribution in the fuzzy scale from zero to one.

In the case of presidentialization, the maximum bound was defined at 0.85 (above is considered presidentialized) and races that are not presidentialized, from 0.20 or less. The mid-bound (threshold) was defined as 0.50. Therefore, in all the elections from 0 to 0.2 the software attributes zero and the ones between 0.85 to 1.0, the software attributes one. The remaining bounds are laid out on Table 9.

The test verifies the necessary and/or sufficient conditions and configurations for the occurrence of the phenomenon under analysis. Sufficiency is observed when a

given condition is present as well as the outcome, that is, when $x = 1$, therefore $y = 1$. A necessary relationship is the one in which a given outcome is only present in the presence of a given condition, thus, if $y = 1$, then $x = 1$. Consequently, this method allows for the evaluation of the conditions that are most helpful in understanding the existence of presidentialization. The concern is not in establishing deterministic relationships, but understanding which and how much the configuration of conditions leads to presidentialization. Thus, the test enables the evaluation of the most common configurations for certain outcomes.

The test starts applying an algorithm that evaluates the multiple combinations between configurations and outcome. On Table 10 are displayed the eight analysis models, of which the first two are the most important because they incorporate a larger number of cases.

For the first model, the year of 1990 was not included, because we noted that the conditions for the state races were different from the others, especially the strength of the parties. The PSDB had not run in any elections up until that moment, which impeded the calculation for the party's strength for that year. From the theory on presidentialization, it is understood that the campaign coordination strategy established by the PT and the PSDB becomes clear from 1994 and so the model used that year as the initial watershed moment.

Nonetheless, before analyzing the results some explanations about the method are needed. The main aspects to be observed from Table 10 are the values for raw and unique coverage and for the model as well as the consistencies of each term (found configuration), and the model consistency. The coverage measures indicate what percentage of the results is covered by the solution. The raw coverage measures the proportion of participation of each term in the solution's result. The unique coverage measures the proportion of participation in the result explained exclusively by an individual term of the solution, that is, not covered by other solutions. Lastly, the solution coverage measures how much of the result is covered by the complete solution. The higher the unique and raw coverage, the higher the possibility that the term is empirically relevant, that is, that the solution has validity in the cases being analyzed.

The consistency of each term measures the degree in which a determined solution is a subset of the result. The model's consistency does the same measure for the whole set of terms of the solution. The closer to one (1.0), the closer the solution's term is to being sufficient for a certain outcome. For the tests conducted, a consistency parameter of 0.8 was considered, as per most studies using QCA. It is expected that states with larger electorates, lower power dispersion, weaker PMDB, and stronger PT and PSDB will be more presidentialized.

The first model includes the elections from 1994 to 2010, having as explanatory conditions the "size of the electorate" (ELEIT), power dispersion (NEP), and strength of the PMDB, the PT, and the PSDB in the states. The second model tests the configurations during 1998–2010, that is, only when reelection was possible. That is why the model included "reelection" (REEL). Other than the conditions expected in model 1, it is expected that this condition is associated with states in which presidentialization occurs, because the possibility for reelection interferes in the coalition strategy, decreasing the number of competitive options.

Table 10 Fuzzy-set test results for presidentialization of governor elections (1994–2010)

	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency		Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency
Model 1 (1994–2010)							
ELEIT	0.513	0.105	0.827	PT	0.532	0.081	0.908
NEP * ~PSDB	0.361	0.082	0.828	ELEIT	0.511	0.032	0.876
~NEP * PSDB	0.285	0.082	0.853	~REEL * ~PMDB	0.225	0.016	0.930
PMDB * PT	0.351	0.022	0.886	PSDB * ~NEP	0.286	0.031	0.908
~PSDB * PT	0.367	0.008	0.880	~PSDB * NEP	0.362	0.062	0.908
~NEP * PT	0.275	0.006	0.887				
<i>Model coverage</i>	0.870			<i>Model coverage</i>	0.907		
<i>Model consistency</i>	0.821			<i>Model consistency</i>	0.867		
Model 3 (1990)							
~PT * PMDB	0.806	0.412	0.781	PSDB * ~PMDB * ~NEP	0.176	0.044	0.786
~NEP * PMDB	0.452	0.014	0.786	PSDB * ELEIT * ~NEP	0.153	0.044	0.820
				~PT*~PSDB* PMDB*	0.216	0.021	0.735
				~NEP			
				PT * PMDB * ~ELEIT *	0.187	0.099	0.864
				NEP			
<i>Model coverage</i>	0.864			<i>Model coverage</i>	0.490		
<i>Model consistency</i>	0.766			<i>Model consistency</i>	0.771		
Model 5 (1998)							
ELEIT	0.523	0.183	0.874	~ PSDB *~ NEP	0.236	0.004	0.984
PSDB * ~PT	0.371	0.181	0.946	~REEL*~PSDB	0.157	0.018	1.000
NEP * ~PSDB * REEL	0.180	0.095	0.894	PT*~ PMDB	0.303	0.033	0.935

					PMDB * ~ NEP	0.418	0.153	0.967
					~ REEL * ~ PMDB * NEP	0.216	0.048	0.972
					~ REEL * PT * ELEIT	0.223	0.002	0.939
					~ PMDB * ELEIT * NEP	0.266	0.064	0.957
<i>Model coverage</i>	0.805				<i>Model coverage</i>	0.832		
<i>Model consistency</i>	0.882				<i>Model consistency</i>	0.950		
Modelo 7 (2006)								
PSDB * PT	0.223	0.055	1.000		~ NEP * ~ REEL	0.310	0.105	0.994
PMDB * ~ PSDB * ~ REEL	0.172	0.096	0.987		~ NEP * ELEIT	0.227	0.067	1.000
NEP * ~ ELEIT * ~ PMDB	0.274	0.033	0.969		PSDB * ~ REEL	0.167	0.077	0.974
* ~ PSDB								
~ NEP * ELEIT * PMDB * REEL	0.162	0.089	0.961		NEP * ~ PSDB * REEL	0.234	0.027	1.000
NEP * ~ PMDB * PT	0.252	0.019	1.000		~ PMDB * ~ PSDB	0.414	0.017	0.998
NEP * ~ PMDB * ~ PSDB * REEL	0.250	0.005	0.971		~ PMDB * ~ ELEIT	0.302	0.029	0.971
<i>Model coverage</i>	0.690				<i>Model coverage</i>	0.787		
<i>Model consistency</i>	0.984				<i>Model consistency</i>	0.980		

Source: Own elaboration based on data by Bizzarro-Neto and Sandes-Freitas

¹ N (model 1) = 135 state elections, N (model 2) = 108 state elections, N (models 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8) = 27 state elections each. ² The tilde “~” means the negation of the condition. ³ Configurations with unique coverage equal to zero were removed from the models. ⁴ The solutions chosen are the parsimonious ones, which are simpler, contemplating less causal conditions

In both models (1 and 2), we observed that the electorate's size is an important condition to understand presidentialization. The raw coverage appears with more than 0.5 and consistency is above 0.8. Therefore, presidentialized elections are associated with larger states, which helps to understand cases such as São Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Bahia, which presented the association for every election analyzed. In São Paulo and Minas Gerais, as well as the large electorate, the PT and the PSDB have expressive political strength, although they have a large dispersion of power. This shows that the candidacy coordination strategy tends to occur more frequently in states with bigger electorates and where the parties (the PT and/or the PSDB) are stronger, regardless of the existence of many actors with the capacity to influence the state's political scenery. In Bahia's case, although the electorate is strong, presidentialization fluctuates more, as does the power dispersion. Moreover, the PSDB, during the period in analysis, appears weak, unlike the PT which, since 2002, occupies an important political space in the state.

There was an important find related to the low fragmentation of state party subsystems and the strength of the PT or the PSDB. The combination shows that the two parties, when strong in the states, have an easier time organizing a state's race. The combination of a strong PSDB and low power dispersion was found in Ceará, given that it is the state in which that association with high presidentialization was found in nearly every election: 1994, 1998, 2002, and 2006. Nevertheless, the same state does not have a strong PT during the period of analysis. A strong PT with low power dispersion is found in 20 cases, highlighting that only three were before the 2002 elections. Seven were during the 2010 elections. Mato Grosso and Distrito Federal are the states where the two conditions (strong PT and low dispersion) are associated from 2002 to 2010.

Other combinations are observed in both models, which reinforces the argument that there are contextual variables not included in the analysis which affect the way state elections are coordinated. Even though there are top-down impositions, it will be increasingly evident that presidentialization is also strategic for state political actors, who also act according to party interests in presidential races, regardless of the logical possibilities expected. These are the cases in which the PSDB is weak with a large power dispersion, which indicates that other parties occupy its space in the state, mobilizing the alignment with presidential candidacies. The same is observed when the PMDB and the PT are strong. Sometimes the PMDB appears as an ally for the PT in the states, sometimes as a rival, allying itself with the PSDB, which happened recently in Santa Catarina and Mato Grosso do Sul.

The inclusion of reelection in model 2 did not substantially alter the results found. The reelection effect, however, is the inverse of what was expected. The absence of a candidate for reelection is associated with presidentialized elections in the states. However, that condition seems to be associated with the PMDB's weakness. The find points to the following conclusion: without a reelection candidate and a strong PMDB, the PSDB and the PT tend to be able to align or provoke the alignment of state candidacies with their presidential candidates more easily. Two cases associated with a still strong PFL in the Northeast are examples of this: Bahia, in 2002, and Maranhão, in 2006.

The models per year serve only to demonstrate that the consistency of the proposed models increases as the elections occur, although the coverage stayed between 0.69 and 0.8 during 1998–2010. In 1994, the model had a consistency below 0.8 and coverage below 0.5, indicating that although presidentialization began during those elections, the process of candidacy coordination did not happen exclusively through the conditions pointed out in the model.

Conclusions

Based on the tests, we can develop some conclusions. First, it is evident that the size of the electorate is important for the calculation of electoral coordination. Second, the strength of the PT and the PSDB are also important for presidentialization. The strength of both parties is related to presidentialization, that is, the weight each of the parties carry in the states influences their capacity to participate in the articulation of agreements that form coalitions and the candidacies for state governments. Thus, they can help coordinate presidential races themselves when they are relevant political actors in the states. When they are weak, the costs of presidentialization become higher and coordination depends on other contextual factors, such as the interest of other actors to be a part of coalitions given national party agreements. Lastly, it is valid to assert that low power dispersion, although it appears as a condition related to presidentialization, is not necessary for coordination to occur, because presidentialized elections with high dispersion were also observed. Therefore, it is understood that presidentialization began to be a defining trait of Brazilian politics in comparison to the reality prior to 1994, in which state political subsystems had their own logic, detached from presidential elections, given the “contextual political rationalities” pointed out by Lima Jr (1983, 1997).

The PT and the PSDB’s organizing effect on political subsystems leads to the construction of opposing candidacies in the states, which include the coalitions of both parties. The parties vying for the presidency, interested in building election machines, guide the action of state political actors, especially when they are still relevant in the states. However, it was also clear that the configurations observed, albeit consistent, did not make up the totality of cases, indicating the existence of other conditions in the states that may lead to the expected outcome. Given that, the configurational method used allows us to understand the multiplicity of possible arrangements among the conditions, opening the field for in-depth studies of the cases.

It is understood that this process of candidacy coordination and, consequently, presidentialization of elections, involves an extremely complex rationality that includes both the structural aspects of electoral competition in Brazil as well as conjunctural factors, mainly those regarding the states’ party-political arrangements, not included in the models suggested. The cost-benefit analysis of the coordination process is conducted by both the PT and the PSDB’s national leaderships as well as state political actors.

It is not possible, therefore, to treat both levels of competition and party organization (federal and state) as disassociated: electoral and political strategies, generally, in Brazilian states have been built taking into account the parties' actions in presidential elections.

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Long-term Patterns of Coalition-Building at State and Federal Level in Australia



Wayne Errington

Introduction

The stability of Australia's party system since the 1940s masks some variation in the parties that comprise the conservative side of the party divide. The often fractious relationship between the Liberal Party and the National Party, in near-permanent coalition at the national level, raises the question of whether a two-party condition in fact exists. More importantly for the thesis of this book, at the sub-national (state) level, while the Australian Labor Party has been a permanent feature of the party system for over a hundred years, a variety of conservative parties have filled the right side of the political divide, and some of that variety persists at state level. This in turn complicates both the operation of the parliamentary parties at national (Commonwealth) level, and, given the federal nature of Australian parties, locates power in a variety of party organisations in the states. While top-down verticalisation has been a powerful force in Australian party politics, national and state parties becoming more congruent over time, and the identity of the major parties at Commonwealth level has been both clear and stable for some seventy years, the constellation of power in the party system is more complicated than it may appear at first.

Australia is a case of what Riker dubbed 'federation by aggregation', that is the national parliament was brought about through constituent parts—former British colonies in this case—joining together, as opposed to devolution bringing about federation from a larger state (cited in Sharman 2015, p. 200). The timing of Australia's Federation in 1901 was crucial to the subsequent development of the party system. Most of the colonial parliaments were self-governing for half a century prior to federation. Organised parties were still coalescing in Australia from an assortment of interests. While the Australian Labor Party was Australia's first mass political party,

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on the conservative side of politics, parties were more of a vehicle for the shifting loyalties of Members of Parliament.

Erk argues that 'the political institutions of federalism adapt to achieve congruence with the underlying social structure.' (2008, p. x) Such movement towards congruence may be centripetal or federal depending on the degree of ethno-linguistic homogeneity. With a high degree of social and cultural homogeneity compared to other federations under consideration in this book, Australia's federal system has on the whole tended toward centralism over 115 years of federation. Most importantly, the act of federation itself signals a degree of consensus over territorial sovereignty, enabling the major political parties to pursue social and economic issues more so than regional autonomy (Sharman 2015, p. 208).

The centralising trend is in part due to the constitutional structure. One observer described Australian federalism as "descending steadily towards its grave from the moment of its birth." (Craven 1999, p. 260) The Australian Constitution nominates a series of Commonwealth powers with few heads of power reserved for the states. Combined with the central government's power to appoint the High Court judges who would for the most part interpret the text of the constitution literally, the omission of more than a handful of powers left to the states, this constitutional birthright guaranteed a century of steady centralisation of power. Consistent with Erk's thesis linking congruence and social structure, expediting the trend in Australia towards accumulation of power in the centre has been the lack of regional cultural diversity compared to other federations (Jaensch 1994, p. 150). There is consequently no successful party that represents regional or state interests, in contrast with Canada. While there are small parties that from time to time compete in elections to represent the interests of indigenous Australians, indigenous representation is facilitated primarily via the two major parties, and then only comparatively recently in Australian history. Australia's state leaders frequently appeal to a sense of local identity against centralisation in their rhetoric but these voices are usually drowned out by national leaders seeking national solutions to the electorate's problems. These debates can feature leaders from the same party, since on the conservative side nationalism and federalism compete for attention in both the Liberal and National parties.

Variation in the Australian party system according to state is more a consequence of historical legacy, different economic bases, and protection of constitutional prerogatives than the cultural differences identified by Erk. Similarities between states have produced parties based on class and urban-rural divides have tended to outweigh differences in patterns of immigration and other demographic factors (Jaensch 1994, p. 155). Additionally, while the Commonwealth Senate was established in part to protect the interests of states through equal representation of each, the party system has been a more powerful force in the behaviour of senators. Indeed senators display greater party discipline today than they did a generation ago.

This chapter will describe the overall trend towards centralisation of the party system as part of the centralisation of Australian politics more generally. It will then analyse the extent of the congruence between state and federal party and coalition arrangements, and the limits of that congruence within the Liberal and National

parties. Similarly, the problems caused by the different character of the National Party in each state and territory and the subsequent effects on coalition arrangements at both levels of government will be examined.

The Limits to Vertical Congruence: Variation in Party Rules Across States

Verticalisation of Australian federation has left two types of regional variation in the party system. This section deals with the development of the two-party system, and in particular the congruence between Commonwealth and state levels, but also the instances where state divisions within parties see important differences persist. The following section describes another kind of persistent difference at state level, where the identity of the Commonwealth parties has not been reproduced at state level. The first variation that limits the extent of congruence in the party system lies in the constitution of each party. In this case, the differences include the federal structure of the Australian Labor Party as well as their conservative counterparts, although not to the same extent. That Australian political parties feature regional differences in membership, influence over the parliamentary party, and in their democratic structures is well accepted. The extent to which those differences are significant is more contested (Jaensch 1994, p. 164). This is in part due to scholarly inattention to state level politics in Australia. It is also due, however, to the fact that those differences do not frequently impinge upon the conduct of state or national elections. Due to the federal structure of the parties, this regional variation has its' analogue at Commonwealth level. Candidates for national elections are chosen by state branches, with the candidate selection rules varying between states and within parties.

State-based parties remain the locus of power in the Australian political system. Members join the state organisation of each of the major parties. Even parties that took the field more recently, such as the Australian Greens, coalesced from regional and state organisations. Exceptions to this trend, such as the Australian Democrats and One Nation, which leveraged representation from MPs breaking away from an existing party, have not endured. Long-standing differences between states occasionally cause problems for the ability of parties to organise federal elections. As recently as 1987, the Queensland National Party forced the cancellation of the Commonwealth coalition arrangements by threatening the candidacy of Queensland-based federal MPs, with the federal National Party and its leader being centred in New South Wales while the Queensland premier was a National intent on disrupting the federal arrangement.

Most Australian jurisdictions feature various kinds of majoritarian electoral system. The exceptions are Tasmania, where the lower house features proportional representation albeit with a threshold that minor parties have historically found hard to meet, and the comparatively new assembly for the Australian Capital Territory,

which shares Tasmania's Hare-Clark voting system. More common are preferential voting systems. However, in spite of numerous important changes, geographic representation has been a continuous feature of Australian electoral politics since colonial self-government. Consequently, the essentials of the party system, if not the identity of the constituent parties, was similar before federation, and ensured some degree of congruence between state and national political parties after federation (Koop and Sharman 2015, p. 178). One of the main arguments in favour of federation was to provide for free trade between the new states instead of the patchwork of colonial relationships, and the relationship of those colonies with the United Kingdom.

One of the main political cleavages in the new parliament, then, was the nature of Australia's trade with its colonial power (federation was not the same as independence) and the rest of the world. As Table 1 shows, that cleavage was represented in the first election after federation in 1901 by a combination of regional and ideological forces—in particular a free trade party based in the largest state of New South Wales and a protectionist party. The Australian Labor Party was at this point coalescing from a number of regionally based labour movements. At state level, a number of right of centre parties, including some temporary organisations that formed around popular leaders, persisted for one or two elections. However, by 1910, the Commonwealth Parliament had decided upon a protectionist economic policy, with the Australian Labor and Protectionist parties providing a parliamentary majority on this issue. The parties representing business interests then combined to fight the assurgent Labor Party, forming the only pure two-party system in Australia's history with the new Liberal Party and Labor dominating the parliament. As Table 1 shows, the state right of centre parties quickly agreed on supporting this formulation. This socio-economic divide was buttressed by religion, with the Anglican middle class supporting the right of centre parties, while Catholic and non-conformist Protestant voters tended to be working class supporters of Labor. While this religious divide has since broken down (the last three Liberal Party leaders have been Catholic), the party system has been mostly resistant to change.

While the contours of the left-right divide were consistent, the first half of the twentieth century saw a variety of parties contest elections on the conservative side of politics. While the majoritarian electoral system encouraged consolidation of fragmented political forces, the identity of the successful parties on the right changed a number of times while the Australian Labor Party became the dominant party of the left. Hueing more to Duverger's rule than India or Canada, parties that represent regional differences other than the urban-rural divide have not persisted. The Country Party emerged in the 1920s, more successful than similar parties that attempted to represent farming interests in earlier decades. While preferential systems such as that adopted in Australia for national elections from 1918, encourage parties of like mind to direct their voters to preference the other party, they also tend to reward the parties with the highest vote with a clear majority in the parliament. Hence in the more urbanised states the Liberal Party could frequently afford to govern without the support of the Country and its successor National Party, but remains

Table 1 The verticalisation of the Australian party system since federation

Commonwealth election (selected)	Parties in state elections ^a	Commonwealth parties ^a
1901 (and closest previous colonial/state elections)	Australian Labor Party (Qld, NSW, SA) Conservative (Vic, SA) Ministerialist ^b (Qld, Vic) Protectionist (NSW) Free Trade (NSW) Liberal (Vic, SA)	Australian Labor Party Protectionist Free Trade
1910 (and closest subsequent state election)	Australian Labor Party Liberal Party Liberal Union (SA)	Australian Labor Party Liberal Party
1943 (and closest subsequent state election)	Australian Labor Party Democratic Party (NSW) Queensland People's Party Liberal and Country League (SA) Liberal Party (Tas, Vic) Nationalists (WA) Country Party	Australian Labor Party United Australia Party Country Party
1949 (and closest subsequent state election)	Australian Labor Party Liberal Party Country Party Liberal and Country League (SA and WA ^c)	Australian Labor Party Liberal Party Country Party
2016 (and closest previous state election)	Australian Labor Party Liberal Party National Party Liberal National Party (Qld)	Australian Labor Party Liberal Party National Party Liberal National Party

Source: The Australian Politics and Elections Database

^aWith 10 or more seats in the relevant parliament

^bA term used by Australian political scientists to describe groupings aimed at supporting an incumbent cabinet

^cThe WA Liberal and Country League became the Liberal Party at the following state election. The South Australian LCL was succeeded by a Division of the Liberal Party in 1974

mindful of the need to form coalitions on occasion, preferring to maintain permanent agreements in most states and at Commonwealth level.

While the parliamentary Labor Party split three times in the twentieth century, its membership base in the trade union movement provided stability while twice the defecting senior Labor MPs prompted a change of party on the conservative side. The heavy defeat of the United Australia Party (UAP) in 1943, itself in existence only since 1931 after the second Labor split, caused a reconsideration of the structure, institutional support and membership of any successor party. Responding to the sense that one of the failures of previous right of centre parties had been regional parochialism, one of the founders of the Liberal Party of Australia, Robert Menzies,

had pressed the importance, amongst other values, of ‘national power and national progress’ (Sydney Morning Herald, October 14, 1944). Like many of its predecessors, the UAP was a creation of incumbent Members of Parliament, with institutional arrangements just an afterthought aimed at supporting those MPs. While such arrangements can be useful in government when the parliamentary party has an incentive for discipline, the lack of any real permanent party organisation makes campaigning from opposition difficult, as the UAP found in 1943. Debates about the constitution of the successor party to the UAP, as they had in earlier such discussions, centred on the relative power of the state and Commonwealth organisations. While the state divisions were founded simultaneously with the national body, they each had different methods of choosing candidates for parliament, a sign that progress towards congruence would be incremental (Hancock 2007, p. 61). With the party officially founded in August 1945, incumbent UAP and some other conservative MPs at both state and Commonwealth level became Liberal MPs. The party fought its’ first election in Victoria later that year, with the incumbent premier having joined the Liberal Party. While the Liberal Party has not quite become the dominant conservative party in every state and territory, its strength in the largest states of New South Wales and Victoria, which provide more than half of the seats in the Commonwealth House of Representatives, has seen the Liberals provide the senior coalition partner in government for the majority of the time since its formation. The junior coalition partner in all of those governments has also been the same—the Country Party and its successor National Party. Failure at the national level on the part of the UAP, then, led to a party organisation capable of campaigning from opposition to win Commonwealth elections. As was the case when the right of centre parties agreed to form the first iteration of the national Liberal Party in 1909, the various state parties that had been formed to represent conservative interests in state election quickly gave way to the new Liberal Party.

While the Liberal Party has more often been characterised as a catch-all more so than a mass party, its organisational base played a role in appealing to the votes, for example, of women. The structure of that organisation, though, was federal, in part a reflection of the shared liberal and conservative commitment to federalism on the Australian right. The course of federalism itself has been at the heart of the issue agenda in Australian politics at state and Commonwealth level. While a common defence and foreign policy were central to federation, increasing national roles in health, education and economic management have been contested constitutionally and through party competition. The Labor Party has been more prepared to propose national policy in health, social policy and infrastructure and more likely to propose constitutional referenda to centralise power. The coalition parties tended to oppose such measures from opposition but occasionally used the Commonwealth’s advantage in taxing powers to promote favoured policy in, for example, school education. The Howard Government (1996–2007), favoured by burgeoning revenue from a commodities boom, narrowed the differences between the parties on federalism by promoting national leadership in a range of policy areas (Errington 2008). The most recent Liberal and National Party coalition government attempted to limit expenditure on health and education but lacked a coherent approach to federalism.

Labor's greater emphasis on using the national government to solve economic and social problems has been matched by its state organisation ceding more power to the national party than have its coalition counterparts. Yet even Labor lacked a permanent national secretariat until 1973. Jaensch characterises the change in Labor's structure from an original confederation, or loose grouping of state based parties to a federal structure with strong national leadership (1994, p. 169). All parties face similar pressures for national structures, such as the need for coherent national election campaigning. However, these pressures are frequently resisted within the Liberal and National parties.

The power of the National Party has declined in line with the comparative decline in the rural population (hence the numerous attempts to appeal to non-rural voters and the change of name from Country Party to National Party in the 1970s). The decline of the Nationals was accelerated by a tendency of the Liberal Party to triumph more often in the three-cornered contests that the coalition agreement allows when a Commonwealth seat is not occupied by a sitting Liberal or National MP. Indeed, at Commonwealth level the Liberal Party now represents more rural-dominated constituencies than the National Party. This agreement also prevents voters in most seats being able to choose between the Liberal and National parties at elections, giving the federal system its two-party character of a choice between Labor and one of the conservative parties in the competition for executive power. In 1951, the then Country Party achieved 9.7% of the vote compared to 40.5% for the Liberals. They held five of 20 cabinet positions and the National Party leader held the treasury portfolio. At the 2013 election, the party vote was complicated by the merged Liberal National entity in Queensland (discussed below) but the National Party vote of around 6% delivered only three out of 19 seats in the cabinet.

Tensions between the parties at Commonwealth level are illustrated by decisions which could adversely affect the National Party's rural constituency, such as foreign ownership of agricultural land, use of prime agricultural land for mining, and competition policy. Coalition arrangements historically allowed the Nationals to influence government decisions beyond the weight of their electoral performance but they risked the Nationals' ability to present an identity distinct from the Liberal party. The long-term partners were also competitors for votes in rural areas.

Having seen in the 1980s the extent to which a disaffected National Party could cruel the chances of defeating Labor, the most recent Liberal prime ministers have placed a priority on good relations with the junior coalition partner. This includes reserving the deputy prime ministership for the leader of the National Party even though the treasury portfolio is the second most senior in the cabinet, and not pressing the Liberals' numerical advantage in the parliament into a larger proportion of ministerial positions, even though this inevitably left some ambitious Liberals disappointed. The tradition of the deputy coalition leadership falling to the Nationals is duplicated in the recent state governments in New South Wales and Victoria.

John Howard, prime minister from 1996 until 2007, had been a cabinet minister in the last coalition government to feature truly powerful National Party figures. He was also leader of the Liberals in the 1980s when coalition arrangements lapsed as the 1987 election approached. However, in both a sign of both shifting power

relations and shifting perceptions of the role of trade in Australia's economic fortunes, Tony Abbott (prime minister from 2013 until 2015) kept the trade portfolio in Liberal Party hands. This reflects the Liberal Party view that Australia's trade profile needs to become more diversified from commodities to more value-added and services oriented exports. In a sign of how much the Nationals valued the portfolio because of its ability to assist in opening up foreign agricultural markets, in the Howard Government the Nationals leader twice held the trade portfolio as deputy prime minister even though the ministry is notionally more junior of the posts in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

Of the main Australian parties, the National Party organisation retains the strongest impulse toward resisting federal power. Variation in membership was historically influenced by the differences between a more conservative pastoralist base in New South Wales compared to radically anti-Labor small wheat or dairy farmers in some of the smaller states (Costar 2015, p. 26). One reason for the confederal arrangements is the historically democratic party organisation, which replaced direct relationships between rural MPs and producer collectives at various points in the early twentieth depending on the state.

Local National Party branches guard their power to select candidates, powers that have been compromised in the Labor and Liberal parties by factional agreements and an approach to politics that incorporates the electoral-professional model to a much greater degree. The change of name from Country Party to National Party in the 1970s was part of a strategy to broaden the party's appeal in the face of demographic challenges but this strategy never really succeeded. The Nationals departed from the mass party model well after the Liberal and Labor parties had adopted the electoral professional mode.

The organisation of Australian political parties has been 'congruent with the allocation of jurisdiction and the general operation of the Australian federal system' (Sharman 2015, p. 201). That is, there has been a tendency towards central control with differences in extent and character between the three main parties. The differences can remain important, though, when it comes to the second limit to vertical congruence in the Australian federation—the business of maintaining coalitions.

The Limits to Vertical Congruence: Party Identity and Cabinet Formation

The second variation from the degree of congruence that might be expected in a relatively culturally homogenous society is in the identity of the conservative parties and the "matter of numbers" that ultimately governs the relationship between them (Jaensch 1994, p. 165). Historically, the Country Party was not always an ally of the other right of centre parties, providing confidence to minority Labor governments on occasion. The Country Party formed a government with the parliamentary support of Labor in the second largest state of Victoria in the 1930s. With the contemporary coalition arrangements having such a long, if tumultuous history, it is easy to

forget that the Labor and Country parties have a common policy interest in interventionist regional development, something the Liberal Party is less willing to devote resources. It is the bedrock industrial relations issues that cement the differences between the Australian Labor Party, which was founded during a shearers strike in rural Queensland, and the party representing the owners of rural capital, the County Party and its successor National Party.

The strength of the contemporary National Party varies greatly between states. Different experiences in the early decades after federation has left a legacy and declining relative population in rural areas has undermined the strength of the party more generally. This variation in strength has resulted in quite differing approaches to politics. One reason for this variation is that the Liberal Party did not always need a coalition with the National Party to govern, although on one occasion the Queensland Nationals decided to govern without the Liberals. For example, there is no National Party in the state of Tasmania. In the Northern Territory, the Country Party had historically been more successful than the Liberals but the small population and strong Commonwealth influence in the Territory saw the two parties see the folly in competing with each other. The result was a merged entity, the Country Liberal Party. This party has been successful in Territory elections and provided a cabinet minister in the Abbott Coalition Government. This is a reminder that regional variation does not necessarily lead to a lack of congruence in the federation where parties can agree on their mutual interests at regional and national level. In turn, this is more likely when the regional variation in Australia is not as strong as some of the cases in this book. There are exceptions, though. The South Australian National Party has no coalition agreement with the Liberal Party. The South Australian National Party even gained a cabinet portfolio in the state Labor Government between 2004 and 2010. This was an interesting assertion of regional interests, with the sole National Party representative in the South Australian Parliament accepting a portfolio of crucial interest to her rural electorate (Parkin 2005). However, the National Party in South Australia has no national representation, and therefore the differences at state level are not reflected in the Commonwealth Parliament. By contrast, in the larger states the Nationals have been more successful. In New South Wales, the National Party has had a stable place in coalition governments as the junior partner since the formation of the Liberal Party in the 1940s, foreshadowing a difficult relationship with the Liberals until a coalition agreement was forged in 1992.

In the state of Queensland the National Party was the dominant conservative party until the electoral system was changed to bring about greater equality between rural and city electorates in 1992. The factors behind this variation help to explain why vertical congruence has often been an irresistible force in Australia. That is, the variation came about through historical differences in patterns of settlement and industry between states rather than socio-cultural characteristics that may have provided stronger resistance to verticalisation. Queensland is the least centralised of the mainland states, with the capital city providing less than half the state's population during the National Party's dominance in the 1970s and 1980s. In the mainland states where the Nationals are weakest, the capital city provides a much larger

proportion of the population. Outside the major cities, primary production provided the bulk of the economic base whereas mining was comparatively more important in other states (Bridson Cribb 1985). The result in Queensland was an electoral contest between Labor and the Nationals for the most part. This unusual set of circumstances also helps to explain why the move to merge the parties succeeded in Queensland but not the other states.

When the National and Liberal Parties merged in 2008, observers believed at the time that the amalgamation was the consequence of factors unique to Queensland and would not be replicated in other jurisdictions (Botterill and Cockfield 2010, p. 163). That has proved to be the case. In addition to Queensland's more decentralised population, the National Party forming government for 6 years without the Liberal Party in the 1980s is crucial to understanding the pressures on the parties there. Another oddity of the situation in Queensland was that the Liberal Party dominated representation from that state in the Commonwealth Parliament, giving them more bargaining power in merger negotiations. When the Queensland National Party state government collapsed in 1989 as a result of corruption allegations, both the National and Liberal parties agreed in principle to merge in order to compete with an ascendant Labor Party. It took almost two decades, though, for the combined party to materialise since it was always in the interests of one of the parties at state or Commonwealth level to block progress. It was after the defeat of the Howard Coalition Government, with the parties in opposition at both levels, that allowed the breakthrough in 2008. The logic of greater cooperation in fundraising and campaigning was too great to resist. 'Electoral desperation' (p. 167), though, can only partly explain the different trajectories of the coalition partners amongst the states. Merging the conservative forces to take on the common foe is one of the oldest notions in Australian politics. Business lobby groups would prefer to deal with a single entity. Contemporary opposition outside Queensland comes from the larger entity—the Liberal Party. With a much larger metropolitan constituency the Liberal Party tends to be less socially conservative but this has not prevented relatively harmonious Coalition Governments in New South Wales, Victoria, and at Commonwealth level.

The merger was hardly smooth, with the Liberal Party state Council postponing the marriage while state Liberal MPs threatened to quit if it didn't go ahead. One federal Liberal senator announced that she would refuse to identify herself as a Liberal-National (Williams 2009, p. 280). The merged Liberal National Party (LNP), whilst an affiliated branch of the Liberal Party, retains some status within the National Party. Since there is no separate Liberal National caucus at Commonwealth level, LNP members can choose to sit as Liberals or Nationals. In fact, long after the merger the lack of a distinct Liberal-National identity continued to cause ructions. When he was left out of the Turnbull Commonwealth ministry after the change of Liberal Party leader in 2015, former cabinet minister Ian Macfarlane announced his intention to join the National Party caucus, which under the coalition agreement would have allowed the Nationals an additional cabinet portfolio. Macfarlane's move was blocked by the Liberal National party organisation but not before speculation about subsequent defections destabilised the government and put the

new prime minister on notice not to take his rural representatives for granted. This episode underlined the extent to which tribalism and personal ambition compete with organisation strength to drive the party system on the conservative side, in turn holding back the extent of vertical congruence.

In other states, the Nationals have adopted a different strategy when faced with a declining electorate. In Western Australia, tensions between the parties in the 1970s and 1980s saw the Nationals lose their Commonwealth representatives in both Houses of Parliament, although the Coalition returned to government at state level in 1993 with the National Party leader as deputy premier. However, the National Party refused to join a coalition in opposition when Labor returned to government in 2001. The party decided to deal with its declining bargaining power outside the realm of coalition politics. At the 2008 Western Australian election, the National Party defied expectations of extinction after the electoral redistribution and instead held the balance of power in both Houses of Parliament. The National Party's main campaign platform was for rural areas to receive a greater share of the state's resources boom, which was fuelled by iron ore exports to China and which had left behind traditional export industries in rural areas such as wool. While the Nationals leader negotiated with the sitting Labor premier, senior National Party figures were reportedly uncomfortable with such an arrangement in spite of the precedent set in South Australia some years earlier. The negotiated agreement with the Liberal Party was called an 'alliance' rather than a coalition (Phillips 2009, p. 287). The Nationals did not have to accept collective cabinet responsibility and the arrangement worked smoothly enough while there was plenty of money in the treasury coffers. Without a coalition agreement at state level, the Nationals attempted to reignite their fortunes in the Commonwealth Parliament. A National Party candidate took on a sitting Liberal MP in the Commonwealth lower house seat of O'Connor at the 2010 federal election. Crook initially sat on the crossbench after the election, not seriously considering supporting the Labor minority government. In April 2012 he decided to sit with the Nationals, taking the state Royalties for Regions policy to the Commonwealth Parliament, and at times voting against the official position of the federal National Party.

The lack of congruence in coalition arrangements in Australia's state and Commonwealth levels of government reflects a long history of turmoil in conservative politics. While the Liberal Party became a permanent fixture in every state and at Commonwealth level after the Second World War, the relative decline of the rural population saw the fortunes of the National Party vary from state to state. In many cases, though, vertical congruence is nonetheless maintained. In the largest states of New South Wales and Victoria, and in the smaller jurisdictions of Tasmania, the Northern Territory, and the Australian Capital Territory, stable coalition arrangements or the absence of a strong National Party presence most closely resemble the desire at Commonwealth level within both parties for stable coalition arrangements. The two federal territories illustrate congruence can emerge from quite conditions. There is no National Party presence in the ACT while the strength of country sentiment in the Northern Territory forced close relations on the two conservative parties. Arrangements in the two territories are thus congruent at Commonwealth and

regional level. By contrast, while the Queensland exception arises from distinct historical circumstances, it has nonetheless impinged upon coalition arrangements at Commonwealth level, to the extent that the parties went their separate ways when fighting the 1987 election. The merger of the parties in Queensland but not other states also limits congruence due to the federal structure of the parties. Meanwhile, the states of South Australia and Western Australia provide examples of innovation in cabinet arrangements similar to those in comparable countries such as New Zealand. These differences reflect choices of tactics in each state in dealing with the long term decline in the rural population and therefore the overall fortunes of the National Party. While the historical contingency of the differences between states and the national uniformity of the decline of the rural population suggest that top-down vertical congruence seems inevitable in the longer term, the limitations to that process remain important to the conduct of Australian politics.

Conclusion

Top-down vertical congruence within Australia's federation has been a steady process since the Australian Constitution was first interpreted in a way conducive to centralisation in the 1920s. While the cause and effect is not necessarily strong the more institutionalised federation of today provides much more stable cabinet government than in the first few decades after federation in 1901. While there has been some instability in the position of prime minister in the past decade, the predictability of coalitions between the main parties has been maintained in spite of the different circumstances facing the Liberal and National Parties in each jurisdiction. When it comes to political parties, the top-down demands for congruence stem primarily from the need to succeed in electoral contests at the national level. Yet, historical differences between the states still place some bottom-up limitations to this congruence. In a comparative sense, though, vertical congruence in Australia is strong. This chapter dwells on the right of politics because the Australian Labor Party has for a century had consistent strength across states and has been the party most prepared to develop national institutions. Support for minority Labor governments from the Greens in Tasmania in 1990 and at Commonwealth level in 2010 may be a sign of things to come. However, such arrangements will reflect the way Australian society as a whole is changing the relative fortunes of these parties rather than any regional or cultural differences that will limit the vertical congruence of Commonwealth and state coalitions. Meanwhile the relative decline of the rural population will continue to put pressure on the National Party to reconsider its relationship to the Liberal Party. It is unlikely, though, that this evolution will decrease the degree of vertical congruence in Australia's political system.

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Political Coalitions in Canada: Understanding the Fabric of Canadian Federalism



Tristan Masson and Guy Lachapelle

Introduction

Much of Canadian political history bears a legacy of political coalitions. A case in point is the unlikely “Great Coalition” in 1864 which culminated in Confederation (Muir 2009, pp. 34–35). As such it is worth investigating the relationship between federalism and coalitions in the Canadian context. A simple way to illustrate the importance of this question to the general functioning of Canadian politics is to consider Canada’s geography. What started out as a dominion of four provinces (Quebec, Ontario, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia) expanded into a country of ten with three territories, making it among the least dense countries in the world spread across the second largest land area (World Bank 2016). Such geography and its political implications prompted Elkins and Simeon (1980) to refer to provinces as “small worlds”, an expression frequently employed to this day. Even Canada’s longest serving prime minister William Lyon Mackenzie King (1921–1926, 1926–1930, 1935–1948) proclaimed, in tongue-in-cheek fashion, that “if some countries have too much history, we have too much geography” (as quoted in Statistics Canada 2009).

Inevitably the dynamics of political coalitions are critical to the government-formation process, on both the national and subnational levels of government. As with the object of this book and for a complete appreciation of Canadian federalism, it is worth considering the congruence and divergence of political coalitions across governments. It appears that Canada is a divergent case with respect to the manifestation of coalitions. This is primarily due to key factors in the government-formation process. As such, this chapter will attempt to piece together an answer to this inquiry

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by expounding the conditions for government-formation and complement this with three examples for how coalitions otherwise take place.

Conditions for Government-Formation

Political Regime

In order to fully understand representation and the ensuing politics among political parties, it is important to dissect certain features of the Canadian and subnational political system. First and foremost, Canada inherited Westminster parliamentary democracy as a former colony. This is true for both the national and subnational levels of government (Canada 1867b).

Throughout history certain principles emerged, shaping and guiding political life across the country. For our purposes, it is noteworthy to remark the significance of the principle of *responsible government*, which is to say that the executive branch of government is ultimately responsible to the will of the people as represented by the elected chamber. Contemporarily, this means that the Crown, as represented by the Governor General of Canada and their provincial lieutenant-governor counterparts, must act upon the advice of those who command the confidence of the elected chamber. In practice, this means the Crown will appoint the leader of the party who is most likely to command the confidence of the elected chamber to the position of prime minister, resulting in a fusion of the executive and legislative powers of government. Some have argued, namely Malcolmson and Myers (2012), that this has led to a subversion of parliamentary government into “cabinet government” (42). All in all, as a parliamentary democracy it is important to recall the ways in which representation is constructed within the context of the political regime. With this in mind, we turn to bicameralism in Canada.

The Parliament of Canada is the only bicameral legislative body, whereas the provincial legislatures are unicameral. *Bicameralism* reflects a dualistic nature of representation in the federal union because it requires two kinds of representation. The House of Commons is the elected body of 338 members founded by the principle of *representation by population*. The Senate, on the other hand, is an unelected body of 105 members founded with the principle of *regional equality* in mind. In fact, the Senate of Canada embodies the very idea of political coalition because without it Confederation would not have been possible (Committees and Private Legislation Directorate 2001). Indeed, the leader of the Reformers George Brown, a party member to the aforementioned “Great Coalition” proclaimed that the Senate was “the very essence of our compact” (as quoted in Committees and Private... 2001). Concerning the allocation of seats, the distribution in the House of Commons favours the provinces of Ontario and Quebec (see Table 1). Furthermore, the same two provinces have more seats in the Senate as well. For this reason, the principle of regional equality is not to be confused with equality of the provinces. The recognized regions are Ontario, Quebec, the Maritimes, and Western Canada.

To better understand the design of the Senate as well as regional equality, we have to understand how “regions” were delineated. Briefly put, “region” and the ensuing

Table 1 Parliamentary Information and... 2016, pp. 3–4

	Distribution of seats in House of Commons	Distribution of seats in Senate
Ontario	121	24
Quebec	78	24
Western provinces:	–	24
British-Colombia	42	6
Alberta	34	6
Manitoba	14	6
Saskatchewan	14	6
Maritimes:	–	24
Nova-Scotia	11	10
New-Brunswick	10	10
Prince Edward Island	4	4
Additional representation:	–	9
Newfoundland and Labrador	7	6
North-West Territories	1	1
Yukon	1	1
Nunavut	1	1
Total seats	338	105

representation reflects the historical and constitutional evolution of Confederation. For example, Newfoundland and Labrador only joined Confederation in 1949 and, thus, presented a challenge for lawmakers seeking to integrate the province in Parliament’s institutions. Ultimately, the province was neither deemed to emanate from the Maritimes region nor its own region and, as a result, was considered an exception to the principle of regional equality (Committees and Private... 2001). Clearly such a design would ignite national debate on the composition of the Senate, and indeed it has as various reforms were proposed over the years and continue to be hotly debated. Namely at the Charlottetown Accord in 1992, following the failure of the Meech-Langevin Accord in 1987, a variant of the “Triple-E” (Equal, Elected and Effective) reform was proposed (Parliamentary Information and... 2011, p. 9).

To summarize the paragraphs above, political coalitions are shaped by the institutional features of a political system, for these shape the distribution of power. We saw that responsible government led to the fusion of executive and legislative powers of government—a phenomenon which occurs across levels of government. We also saw how the bicameral make-up of Parliament is founded on different principles of representation, namely of representation by population and regional equality. At the national level, this institutional arrangement shifts the balance of power towards Central Canada into the hands of Ontario and Quebec.

The Electoral System and Representation

We have seen Canada's democracy is of the Westminster variety and that both levels of government function in accordance with different principles, with slight differences across the national and subnational governments. Bearing these in mind, it is important to examine the ways in which political parties access and exercise power. To this end, the electoral and party systems will be discussed as these affect the opportunity structures for coalitions. First, however, we will briefly go through the status of the Senate.

For quite some time now the Upper Chamber has been the focus of many reformers' ambitions. As it stands, senators are appointed by the Governor General upon the recommendation of the prime minister. However, former Prime Minister Stephen Harper sought reform which would have introduced term limits and require provincially sponsored candidates, but the Supreme Court of Canada ruled out the possibility of implementing such reforms unilaterally (MacKinnon 2014). This is because there are constitutional provisions safeguarding the key features of the Senate as it is, thereby making it a question of constitutional amendment (Parliamentary Information and... 2011, p. 1). More recently, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has shown interest in reforming the Senate while heeding the previous government's shortcomings. The primary goal would be to eliminate the partisanship appointments by working with an advisory board which would hold public consultations and make non-binding recommendations to the prime minister (Tasker 2016). This direction, while it may sidestep constitutional politics, nevertheless elicits its fair share of detractors. Notwithstanding, the most important aspect of the Senate debate is that of its legitimacy. A May 3, 2016, poll found 94% Canadians wanting reform (55%) or outright abolition (39%) of the Senate and that roughly two-thirds of the population see the Upper Chamber as "too damaged to ever earn [their] good will" ("Two-in-three Canadians..." 2016). Far from being an anomaly in contemporary Canadian public opinion regarding the Senate, this has meant the latter has played a minor role in the legislative process in recent history.

The Senate's obsolescence has had repercussions on the government-formation process at the national level, turning the elected chamber into the de facto battlegrounds for power. Provincially, legislatures are unicameral. Therefore, it is essential that we explain SMP and its effects on representation. As established above, the principle of representation by population confers legitimacy on legislatures, both nationally and provincially. However, devising an electoral system to serve this principle is easier said than done, especially in a vast federation such as Canada. Accordingly, rep-by-pop is district-based, breaking up the province or country into geographical constituencies. For the sake of simplicity, we will take Parliament as an example to illustrate the effects of SMP. As we can see in Fig. 1, geographical division means that each constituency represents varying proportions of the population. The range goes from a population of 128,357 in the constituency of Niagara Falls, Ontario (ON), to a population of 34,562 in the constituency of Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island (PEI). In the case of subnational governments, the range tends




Fig. 1 Average population represented per constituency (Elections Canada 2015a)

to be less extreme. For example, the province of Quebec recently redrew its electoral map with a range of electors going from 33,905 to 56,509 (Commission de la représentation électorale 2012, p. 11). This relates to the regime principles discussed above as the principle of rep-by-pop is in tension with the principle of regional equality. This tension represents a dimension of the federal project and is present solely at the national level. In fact, there are some cases which are constitutionally protected such as the province of PEI and the territories. For the former, Section 51A of *BNA 1867* provides all provinces with representation in the House of Commons equal to that provided in the Senate. For Note: PEI this means it will never have less than four Members of Parliament. For the territories, Section 51(1.1) in the *BNA 1867* guarantees one MP from each territory (Canada 1867a).

Another key feature of SMP concerns the way in which seats are attributed. Some refer to SMP as “first-past-the-post” or “winner-takes-all”, for it is the candidate with the highest vote tally which takes the seat. In other words, no majority is required. As a result, the geographical division coupled with the winner-takes-all allocation of seats rewards parties who are able to cast a wide net of support. For illustrative purposes and for the sake of simplicity, we will only consider the 2015 national election results, but it should be noted that subnational results are similar in outcome. Table 2 shows the proportion of votes and seats won according to political affiliation. Another lens to see the results is through what Lemieux (2016) calls *electoral* and *elective power*, respectively (17). If you consider the *rate of efficiency* at which electoral power translates into elective power, SMP observably inflates representation for the leading party. In the 2015 federal election, the Liberal Party of Canada (LPC) gathered 39.47% of suffrage while receiving 54.44% of the seats,

Table 2 Electoral and elective power (Elections Canada 2015b; Parliament of Canada 2015a)

	Proportion of votes (%)	Proportion of seats (%)	Rate of efficiency (%)
Liberal Party	39.47	54.44	138
Conservative Party	31.91	29.29	92
New Democratic Party	19.72	13.02	66
Bloc Québécois	4.67	2.96	63
Green Party	3.43	0.3	9

Table 3 Votes required per elected MP, as filtered by the electoral system (Elections Canada 2015b; Parliament of Canada 2015a)

	Number of votes	Number of MPs	Electoral exchange rate
Liberal Party	6,942,937	184	95,606/MP
Conservative Party	5,613,633	99	56,703/MP
New Democratic Party	3,469,368	44	78,849/MP
Bloc Québécois	821,144	10	82,114/MP
Green Party	602,933	1	602,933/MP

resulting in a rate of efficiency of 138% (see Table 2). As a general pattern, elective power therefore is not proportionately distributed on account of electoral power. Again, this holds true for subnational electoral politics.

This confirms Lemieux's (2016) conclusion that SMP rewards parties with greater electoral power (36). As a result, dominant "catch-all" parties are overrepresented at the expense of smaller parties like the Green Party (GNP) which saw a rate of efficiency of 9% versus the LPC's 138% or the Conservative Party's, the runner-up, 92%. In the same vein, Table 3 displays the *electoral exchange rate* per party, or, put differently, the average number of votes required by political affiliation to elect a candidate. This too reveals the distorting effects of SMP, as the variation among parties ranges from 56,703 votes per MP for the Conservatives to 602,933 votes per MP for the Green Party of Canada. All in all, the SMP voting system has clear and direct effects on the distribution of power and resources for political parties.

These observations are crucial as they link the electoral system to specific patterns in government-formation. However, recent events in national politics offer an example as well as potential for change since Prime Minister Justin Trudeau campaigned on the promise of reforming the electoral system within 18 months of taking office with (Geddes 2015). This seems congruent with the wishes of the population, as a 2015 post-election poll found that 83% of the population believes some sort of reform is needed (Coletto and Czop 2015, p. 8). Prime Minister Trudeau acknowledges the electoral system's undesirable outcomes and importance to Canadian political life, and has committed to gaining support beyond political stripes. While the Conservative Party of Canada has been adamant on holding a referendum, others suggest a political coalition may achieve the legitimacy that is needed (Wells 2016). Despite this appeal to consensus-building, the initial All-Party Parliamentary Committee on Electoral Reform drew sharp criticism by opposition parties on the ground that said committee simply reflects the problems it is set to

solve (Wherry 2016). By the same token, public opinion indicates a desire for greater involvement in the reform process, with as much as 73% of Canadians either strongly or somewhat agreeing a national referendum is necessary (“Three Quarters (73%) of Canadians...” 2016). In the face of mounting opposition, the LPC approved an amendment put forth by an NDP MP to apportion the committee’s membership according to popular vote. This adds legitimacy to the reform process and offers a rare window of opportunity for coalition on a vital legislative question. Furthermore, changing the voting system is merely one aspect of electoral reform and the Ministry of Democratic Institutions has indicated it will consider a variety of reforms varying from lowering the age for voting to online and compulsory voting (Government of Canada 2016). After the Committee submitted its report and recommendations, following a long public consultation process, the government rejected on the grounds that consensus was not achieved.

Provincially, there have been unsuccessful reform attempts in British-Columbia, Ontario, Quebec, New-Brunswick and Prince Edward Island (Barnes et al. 2016). Recently, however, the government of British-Columbia announced plans to hold a referendum on electoral reform (CBC 2017). In short, the electoral system critical to the way in which power is accessible and shared, making ambitions for reform doubly challenging.

The Electoral System and Party System

The final consideration pertains to the observable effects of the electoral system as it relates to the party system. To begin with, it is worth considering the extant party system. Maurice Duverger, whose theory on the link between electoral and party systems became known as Duverger’s Law, predicts that “the simple-majority single-ballot system favours the two-party system” (as quoted in Gaines 1999, p. 836). Keeping this in mind, we will consider the national and subnational party systems.

The national party system can be broken up into five stages. At the time of Confederation, the national party system was two-party between the Conservative Party and Liberal Party. This was the case until the Progressives emerged and competed in the 14th General Election in 1921 as a reaction from the West to Macdonald’s earlier protectionist policy (Walchuk 2012, p. 420). This represented a shift towards the institutionalization of multipartism. During this second stage of Canada’s party system, important entrants made their appearance. In 1942 the Progressive Conservative Party was wrought as an alliance between the Conservative Party and the Progressives in the West. This alliance constituted the national conservative movement. As for Canada’s socialist movement, the Canadian Commonwealth Federation (CCF) was founded in 1932. While these movements, still alive today with their variants, focused on aggregating and articulating a particular set of interests, the LPC adopted a brokerage style (Carty 2015, pp. 118–120). This meant that instead of representing a coherent set of principles and interests, the party tempered

the interests of the various regions and groups to canvass support. The practice of “balanced cabinets” became conventional and was recently employed by the party following the 2015 elections (“Justin Trudeau Present...” 2015). This approach bore fruit as the LPC is often referred to as the “natural governing party” because of its dominance in federal politics through much of Canada’s history. As a matter of fact, the party formed government in 23 of 42 general elections held since 1867 (Parliament of Canada 2015b).

The third stage of the party system came to be known as a time of pan-Canadian politics. For example, the New Democratic Party (NDP) grew out of the CCF in 1961 in an attempt to broaden its appeal. Paradoxically, the same period saw the rise of regionalism as the Reform Party and Bloc Québécois surfaced in attempt to represent Western provinces’ and Quebec’s interests in Parliament, respectively. The early 1990s marks the start of the fourth party system where multipartism is institutionalized. It is also a time characterized by strong regionalism. As the Reform Party split votes with the Progressive Conservatives in the West and the Bloc Québécois drew off support in Quebec, the Liberals were pressed to focus on Ontario (Walchuk 2012, p. 422).

As such it is doubtful that Canada conforms to Duverger’s Law as stipulated. Two kinds of parties are observed. First is that the dominant parties looking to form government often competed for the image of “national” party, while others managed to survive by focusing of electoral niches (Dobell 1986, p. 593–594). Similarly, there seems to be interplay between provincial and federal politics, as Gaines (1999) highlights regionalism and the existence of multipartism at the subnational level as important reasons for slight deviation from the aforementioned law (588–589). When examining Canada’s electoral history, these conclusions ring true as the formation of government has swung back and forth between the parties branding themselves as “national” parties. In effect, since Confederation government was formed by either the centrist Liberal Party or the conservative movement’s variants (Conservative Party, Progressive Conservatives and the contemporary Conservatives).

At the provincial level the question is much more complicated. For the most part, however, provinces have either a two or two-and-a-half party system. Typically, the parties present at the national level will be present provincially, but this in no way means there is a pan-Canadian party system. In fact, as Wesley (2015) finds, provinces and territories continue the legacy of distinct party systems with variation in dominant and minor parties (206).

Opportunity Structure for Coalitions

While the above patterns pertain to the number and kind of parties which persist in national and subnational party systems, the second trend worth considering concerns the opportunity structure in which political coalitions occur. It must be noted that there are two ways in which government is formed in the parliamentary system. The predominant way occurs when a political party wins a majority of the seats in

Parliament. This is called *majority government*. In this case, the executive-legislative relationship need not seek support beyond party lines. The less common way is when government is formed by a political party with a plurality of seats but not a majority. This is called *minority government*. In this case, the governing party must seek support beyond party lines and, thus, form political coalitions. Nonetheless, unlike other federations, coalitions are not formed at the executive level. Instead they crystallize at the legislative level. As such the balance of power provides third-parties with a chance to exert influence over specific policy decisions, as we will see in the NDP's case.

When examining political coalitions, it becomes critical whether government is formed as a majority or a minority. Both in the provinces and nationally, the historical record shows an inclination for majority governments. At the national level, it was only in the 14th general election when the phenomenon of "minority government" first appeared. This election also marked the shift towards a multiparty system. Hence the relationship between the electoral system and party system, for as a new entrant competed for power this altered the opportunity structure. Therefore, following the two-party system only ten (10) of the 28 general elections resulted in minority governments (Parliament of Canada 2011). The same pattern is observed in the provinces. This may give the impression that consensus is strong in Canadian national politics, yet such a conclusion is misleading. The rarity of minority governments, whether national or provincial, is linked to the factors of government-formation outlined above: the electoral system tends to exaggerate the support for the dominant parties and the party system tends to be dominated by so-called national parties employing a brokerage style to politics. The latter point is symptomatic of geographically distributed electoral power in a geographically diverse and large country. This is illustrated by the fact that the national government has only had five governments to reach the 50% threshold in the popular vote (excluding the two-party system). With the above patterns in mind, one may conclude that the current electoral system allows dominant parties to exercise a majority of elective power with a minority of electoral power and, as a result, the opportunities for third parties to exert influence are scarcer.

Examining Coalitions

Federalism and the Vertical Effect

With the essential pieces of the government-formation process described above, we will take stock of the vertical effect between levels of government. To begin with, it should be noted some political parties exist on multiple levels of government. Some originate from a province and create a national counterpart, while others are created inversely. This cross-level institutionalization of political parties is indicative of the *verticalization* of federal politics, which is a central concern of this book. When a party moves from the provincial realm to the federal realm, we may take this as an

illustration of the *bottom-up vertical effect* whereas a party which moves from the federal realm to that of the provincial is illustrative of *top-down vertical effect*. These concepts will be more profoundly explored with avail of notable coalitions later in the text. For the moment, we will simply look at the congruence between the national and subnational governments.

Table 4 illustrates the congruence between provincial and the national government. As we observe, there is a 91% congruence regarding coalition/non-coalition formation. Only one province, British Columbia, stands as an outlier with a coalition formed between the provincial NDP and Green Party following the 2017 elections (McElroy 2017). With respect to political parties, there is a 55% rate of congruence for Party A. Replicating the same table for every federal election since 1994, Fig. 2 shows the congruence over time. 1994 is the base year because it marks a new period in federal relations, with the heated constitutional negotiations coming to a halt. For our purposes, this period is notable because the frequency of minority governments at the federal level increased. This is observable in most provinces, with some exceptions. Notwithstanding, there were no governments by coalition in this time period, except for the recent case in British-Columbia, representing nearly full congruence. This suggests that the opportunity structure alone cannot predict coalition government.

It is equally important to examine the dynamics of this congruence. For example, in Fig. 3, Party A, which refers to the Liberal Party (LP), is observably prevalent in federal politics. For instance, the LP forms government at the national level and in seven of the ten provinces. Where they do not form government, the Liberals have a minimal legislative presence. The only party coming close to such a widespread foothold in federal politics is Party B, or the NDP. This may come as a surprise seeing that the party has never formed government at the national level and up until the 41st Parliament had never even formed the Official Opposition. In spite of the weaker national performance, the NDP has an elective presence in all provinces but three. This may be a consequence of the bottom-up vertical effect since the NDP draws its origins from the provincial realm of politics. Presently the NDP forms government in the provinces of Alberta (AB), British-Columbia, and in Manitoba until recently when the Progressive Conservatives (PC) ousted the latter following the general election held on April 19th, 2016.

In a similar fashion, it seems there is a verticalization when it comes to the elective power of parties. The Liberals in the 2015 federal election illustrate this effect, for the party performed strongly in all provinces except Alberta and Saskatchewan. In these provinces, the party obtained a meager 12 and 7% of the elective power available (see Fig. 3). Correspondingly, these are the same provinces in which the provincial equivalent of the Liberals performs poorly and do not form government (see Table 4).

Exceptionally, Manitoba is an outlier in this observation since the Liberals performed strongly in the 2015 federal elections, but poorly in the 2016 provincial elections, amassing a scarce 5.3% of elective power. A possible explanation relates to Manitoba's political context. On the one hand, the 2015 federal election was framed as one of "change" where voters sought to replace the Conservative Party

Table 4 Current cross-level congruence

National/ Coalition	Party A										
	BC	AB	SK	MB	ON	QC	NS	NB	PEI	NL	YK
Sub-national/ Coalition	Party B	Party B	Party D	Party C	Party A	Party A	Party A	Party A	Party A	Party A	Party E
Status	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Level of congruence	Incongruent	Incongruent	Incongruent	Incongruent	Congruent	Congruent	Congruent	Congruent	Congruent	Congruent	Incongruent
	Party congruence: 0.55 (6/11)										
	Coalition/Non-coalition congruence: 0.91 (10/11)										




Fig. 2 Congruence, by federal election (Wesley 2015, pp. 222–247)




Fig. 3 Liberal elective power across levels of government and by province (Parliament of Canada 2016)

from forming government. This motivated the Manitoban electorate to consider viable alternatives to the governing Conservative Party. In so doing, the choices were between the NDP and the Liberal Party. On the other hand, support for the governing NDP in the provincial legislature dwindled as the party was closing in another term after 7 years of governing. In fact, Grenier (2016b) found that support

for the governing NDP has declined since 2012 while support for the Progressive Conservatives and Liberals has grown. Indeed, by September 2015, with the federal election well underway, the provincial NDP's support had fallen below that of the Progressive Conservatives and the Liberals (Grenier 2016a, b, c). In parallel, by that same point in time, support for the federal Liberal Party surpassed that of the federal NDP (Grenier 2016a). In all likelihood, it is possible that the provincial NDP's fading popularity reflected negatively on the federal NDP's standing in the province come federal election time. This interplay is compounded by the rise of the Manitoban Liberals and the absence of a Progressive Conservative Party as an option at the national level. All in all, the voting behaviour of the Manitoban electorate seems to lend credence to the vertical effect in federal politics despite its initial appearance as an outlier.

In like manner, while the provincial NDP collected 62.1% of elective power in Alberta, its federal counterpart obtained a mere 2.9%. This incongruence may have to do with provincial politics, as no more than a few months before the 2015 national elections, the NDP gained a majority of seats in the legislature over the two right-wing parties. These parties, while together retaining over half the electoral power together, could not succeed under the conditions of the electoral system because so-called vote-splitting is maladaptive to gaining elective power. With the above examples in mind, although it is true that parties perform well in some regions both provincially and federally, there are exceptions. These exceptions usually involve an appreciation of the political context of the given province. As such the verticalization of a party's elective power is contingent upon more than just party identification in regions. Some of the cases discussed below will illuminate with avail of examples.

Conversely, although parties exist across levels of government, it should be noted that their operations are independent of one another. In fact, there are times when a provincial political party will express outright disagreement with its national equivalent. For example, after the Liberal Party of Canada formed government following the 2015 election, Prime Minister Trudeau announced reform intentions regarding the Senate. In response, then premier of British-Columbia Christy Clark, drawn from the ranks of the British-Columbia Liberal Party, not only criticized but refused to support the proposed reform (Canadian Press 2015). Likewise, when the NDP of Canada held a national convention and adopted the principles of the Leap Manifesto in April 2016 (a document calling for an accelerated shift away from fossil fuels), the Premier and Leader of the NDP of Alberta Rachel Notley referred to the resolution as "naive", "ill-informed" and "tone deaf" (Canadian Press 2016b). A final point to make is that while some political parties have managed to symbolize a particular movement and exist at multiple levels of government, some political parties are province-specific. The province of Saskatchewan exemplifies this as the governing party in Saskatchewan (SK), the Saskatchewan Party, constitutes the right-leaning option in that province. In like manner, the Wildrose Party competes with the Progressive Conservative Party in Alberta over conservative support. All things considered, even if there is a verticalization of political parties across levels of government, it is not unusual for there to also be province-specific parties.

The Quebec Question

As noted above, there have not been any government by coalition federally nor provincially since the party systems formalized in the 1920s. The reasons for are related to the particularities of the government-formation process, as detailed above. That said, by analyzing several notable cases, the coalition dynamics proper to Canada can be better explained. The first case is that of Quebec, which interests us for two principal reasons. First, the political party Parti Québécois (PQ) was created at the provincial level of government. It was the fruition of a secessionist movement and, by dint of this, represented Quebec nationalism. Out of this movement and its formalization into the provincial party system, the Bloc Québécois (BQ) was formed as a counterpart at the federal level. The second reason Quebec presents an interesting case relates to current coalition talks between the PQ and Québec Solitaire (QS). The current coalition talks have been put front and centre by the official opposition on the ground that the independence movement must regroup and resist the current trajectory set forth by the ruling Liberal Party of Quebec.

We will begin with the secessionist movement and its repercussions on federal politics as well as its insight for the vertical effect. To begin with, the movement catalyzed after René Lévesque left the ruling Liberal Party of Quebec in 1966, and formed the Movement souveraineté-association (MSA). The MSA joined forces with the Ralliement Nationale (RN) to create the PQ in 1968 (Québécois 2015a). This marked the formalization of the Quebec nationalist movement into the realm of politics and provincial party system. This thereby gave it access to resources and power to advance its agenda.

Its first electoral experience was disappointing, but not for the lack of public support. While the PQ received only seven seats in the legislature, or about 6.5% of the elective power, it amassed roughly 23% of the popular vote. This gave it the second most electoral power. Nonetheless, the PQ's entrance showed promise for its future. From this point on, as Fig. 4 illustrates, the PQ's electoral base swelled and with it the secessionist movement. Figure 4 also illustrates the effects of SMP as previously discussed. Eventually, the PQ gained sufficient elective power to form government in 1976. As Larocque (2007) observes, the PQ's electoral success as well as its galvanizing effect on the secessionist movement can be, in large measure, attributed to the charismatic leadership of René Lévesque (31–32).

The idea of creating a federal counterpart for the PQ had been discussed before the BQ made its appearance. The turning point followed disappointing results in the 1980 referendum on sovereignty-association with Canada. Prime Minister Pierre E. Trudeau repatriated the constitution shortly after in a process which excluded Quebec; not to mention the inertia of Quebec LPC caucus members in the response to what was perceived by Quebec nationalists as an unapologetic attitude towards Quebec's place in Confederation (Charbonneau and Lachapelle 2010, pp. 24–25). These factors pushed the PQ to register a federal counterpart, until Brian Mulroney, from Baie-Comeau, Quebec, was elected leader of the federal PCC. Several other PCC candidates had their roots in the Quebec nationalist movement.




Fig. 4 PQ trends in elective and electoral power since foundation (“Les elections provinciales au Québec” 2016)

This presented a dilemma for proponents of Quebec independence, for the ultimate goal at the time was to chip away at the LPC’s electoral base. Until then the PQ strategy was to cast blank ballots in protest of the status-quo federalism (Charbonneau and Lachapelle 2010, p. 21). This time this strategy was disadvantageous because it would reduce support from the PCC, the main competitor of the LPC. This coupled with Mulroney’s inclination to heeding Quebec’s constitutional concerns resulted in *le beau risque*. This refers to the PQ’s endorsement of the PCC in the 1984 federal election. The PQ’s support for the PCC proved fruitful, as they received the vast majority of Quebec seats. Nationally, the PCC won in a landslide, capturing a majority of the seats in Parliament with a majority of electoral support—a rare feat in Canadian political history. This was the context entering Prime Minister Mulroney’s first attempt to reconcile Quebec and Canada in the 1987 Meech-Langevin Accord.

When the Meech-Langevin Accord failed ratification by 1990, several Quebec MP’s left the PCC caucus to form the BQ. Once formed, the BQ would act upon *the convergence of both legitimacies*, which meant the BQ would work in concert with Quebec’s National Assembly and defend the constitutional positions of the Bourassa government who had taken over from the PQ after the 1985 elections (Charbonneau and Lachapelle 2010, p. 28). At first glance, the BQ appears to be forming an association as per Lemieux’s typology. However, it is more accurate to say the BQ forms a coalition with the PQ, for both have enshrined Quebec independence as their *raison d’être* in their party constitutions (Québécois 2015b, 2016). All things considered, the PQ-BQ coalition exemplifies the bottom-up vertical effect. The primary engine behind this coalition is regionalism.

Another coalition nearly formalized in Quebec in 2016 between the PQ and QS. On April 23rd, the PQ leader at the time (since resigned) Pierre-Karl Péladeau,

and MNA Véronique Hivon (2016) wrote a letter in *Le Devoir* calling for an alliance among secessionist parties. As the only party apart from the PQ with independence formally in its program, QS was an obvious addressee. At first, however, QS was suspicious. The fervent leftwing QS witnessed the PQ flirting with the rightwing Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ), and, thus, suspected the PQ's call may be opportunistic (Canadian Press 2016a). Indeed, the main short-term objective of the party is to unify enough support to oust the ruling LPQ. To this effect, the QS proposed "social primaries", where the most popular candidate in a riding between the involved parties would present themselves at the next election, to which the PQ leader expressed openness (Bélair-Cirino 2016). However, the QS did not receive the PQ's support when it proposed a bill to raise minimum wage, marking a cleavage between the parties (Durtisac 2016). Finally, coalition talks stalled until the PQ elected Jean-François Lisée a new party leader in October 2016.

As it stands, a coalition still looms among parties to oppose the LPQ. The primary exchange between parties is electoral power. Cotnoir (2016b) calculates that a PQ-QS coalition would yield roughly 3.5% more support for the PQ who are at 30% whereas a PQ-CAQ coalition would yield 7 to 8% more support. Thus, the PQ-CAQ coalition promises more electoral power than that of a PQ-QS. That being said, Cotnoir (2016a) concludes that the strategic obstacles such as sharing constituencies and setting aside political egos are too great to make the coalition likely. Additionally, QS recently formalized a fusion with Option Nationale, another small leftwing independentist party (Radio-Canada 2017).

However, a recent poll showed the PQ-QS to be the more profitable route in ousting the LPQ (see Table 5). According to the poll, the PQ-QS coalition would yield 38% of the votes, enough electoral power to convert into substantial elective power depending on its regional dispersal. The LPQ in this scenario would garner 3% points less, suggesting the coalition could be victorious in forming government. In the PQ-CAQ scenario the coalition yields more support at 40%, but does not do so while reducing LPQ's electoral base as in the PQ-QS scenario. Since the coalition and LPQ have the same electoral support in this scenario, it is uncertain and less likely that the coalition forms government.

The two analyses above are in disagreement as to which PQ-plus coalition would provide the greatest chances in dethroning the ruling LPQ. This suggests voting behaviour in Quebec is not as mechanistic as Cotnoir views it. What is more, the most recent polling data indicates that the PQ is losing ground to the CAQ and QS,

Table 5 "La Politique au Québec" 2016

	PQ-QS coalition scenario (%)	PQ-CAQ coalition scenario (%)
PQ-QS coalition	38	–
PQ-CAQ coalition	–	40
LPQ	35	40
CAQ	21	–
QS	–	15
Other	5	6

as it now has less than 20% of voting intentions whereas a year earlier it had nearly 30% (Bourgault-Côté 2017). This is consistent with the polling trend since the 2014 election which has shown that both CAQ and QS are rising in popularity while the LPQ's declines (Grenier 2016c).

The New Democrats and the Balance of Power

The NDP provides another interesting case for coalition politics in Canada. On the one hand, its history reveals the co-evolution of a social democratic movement and of a party which together advocated for systemic change. This often involved political associations among different actors. On the other hand, it has served as what Lemieux calls the *pivot* in times where the balance of power was at stake, thereby exerting considerable influence on the orientation of legislation. Concerning its electoral success, a notable observation is that the NDP has not formed government at the federal level. It has, however, formed government in the provinces of British-Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Ontario. Additionally, the NDP has formed the Official Opposition only once. Needless to say, the federal NDP has not seen as much success as some of its provincial counterparts.

The NDP draws its origins from the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) which sprouted at the time of the Great Depression. The CCF and, by extension, the NDP are rooted in socialism. More specifically, the CCF responded to the grievances suffered by farmers and workers, with much of its base in western provinces. Equally noteworthy, the CCF was created as an association of social movements opposing capitalism and seeking to alter the political regime (Young 1969, 5). In light of this, the CCF's greatest influence was not so much in its legislative work, although it did have a mix of successes and failures in this respect. Rather its contribution to political thought is most remarkable. In other words, its ideational impact as a movement outshone its impact in Parliament. For example, in 2004 when the CBC called upon Canadians to choose the greatest Canadian of all time, it was the longtime CCF and NDP champion Tommy Douglas who claimed the title. Indeed the party's mere appearance on the federal scene challenged the dominance LPC for progressive policy. This was especially true during Mackenzie King's time in office for the LPC (Young 1969, p. 8). A strong provincial presence materialized with the rise of René Lévesque's PQ, which put the same kind pressure on the governing federal party. In fact, a 2006 opinion poll finds most Quebecers think of Lévesque as their greatest premier (TVA Nouvelles 2006).

By the 1960s, the CCF as a party was in need of rejuvenation. Two objectives drove the CCF towards the creation of the NDP: that of rebranding itself as a post-Depression party set to take on contemporary issues and that of strengthening its ties to organized labour (Erickson and Laycock 2015b, p. 15). This included provisions in the party's constitution in order to promote the affiliation between labour unions and the party. To this effect, the CCF formed an alliance with Canada's largest labour union, the Canadian Labour Congress, which marked the beginnings of

the NDP. The ultimate political objective was to ensure stronger electoral base in Central Canada while maintaining the now defunct CCF's popularity in the west.

At the start of its new beginnings, the NDP was in the midst of a transition. Despite its continued electoral struggle, it was able to grow as a party and market itself as a relevant party (Erickson and Laycock 2015b, p. 16). Slowly but surely its popularity rose. By the 1970s the party was strained by infighting as the “Waffle Movement” sought to redirect the party in a more radical direction. In the 1980s and 1990s, as discussed above, constitutional politics prevailed in national politics. In the NDP's case, this proved a difficult and controversial time. Not only was there internal discord over what constitutional positions the party should support, but by the second round of negotiations the NDP, federally and provincially, found itself to be in a position of strength—having NDP governments in Ontario, Manitoba and Saskatchewan (Erickson and Laycock 2015b, pp. 20–21). In spite of this the party, provincially and federally, was unable to mobilize sufficient support for its positions. Not to mention the deleterious effect the rise of the Reform Party had on its voter base and key ridings.

Finally with the arrival of Jack Layton to the leadership in the 2000s, coupled with a window of opportunity to chip away at a scandal-laden LPC, the NDP made constant gains throughout the federal elections (Erickson and Laycock 2015a, pp. 40–41). As Fig. 5 indicates, the NDP made constant gains in electoral and elective power throughout 2004, 2006, 2008 and its major breakthrough as the Official Opposition in 2011. The 2015 elections, where the NDP achieved its third-best result, was a success for the NDP in the grand scheme of things, but a disappointment given expectations going into the campaign. To summarize the above paragraphs, the NDP offers insight into the ways various interests converge into a single political force. Although not a coalition per se, the NDP as a movement and as a party is the multiplication of associations among social movements and labour unions.




Fig. 5 NDP trends in elective and electoral power since 2000s (Parliament of Canada 2015b)

The second point to raise about the NDP is the role it played as a pivot. As the pivot, this meant the NDP had enough elective power to be decisive on legislative questions. This was most evident in wake of the Great Depression and the subsequent rise of the Canadian welfare state. At this time, the CCF had an ideational impact on the Mackenzie King government's social policy agenda. The most popular example is that of universal healthcare introduced by the Douglas government in Saskatchewan in 1947. As other provinces saw the success of the program, the Mackenzie King government was pressured to develop a national program (Banting 2005, p. 112). That being said, its pivotal role in the balance of power did not come until the postwar period, following a peak in popularity. In fact, it was not until 1957 that a minority government was formed and, thus, a chance for the then-CCF to play a pivotal role. Despite this window of opportunity, a social democratic-conservative coalition lacks the necessary cohesion. As a matter of fact, the favourable conditions for the NDP to play the pivot aligned from 1963 to 1968 under Pearson's LPC minority government and again from 1972 to 1974 under Trudeau's LPC minority government. The NDP-LPC dynamic with the balance of power at stake resulted in coalitions between the two (Banting 2005, p. 102).

In contemporary politics, an NDP-LPC coalition/association looms. Some have argued that in order to counter the CP's 9 year dominance, the centre-left would have to take a page out of the conservative movement's book and unite (Godbout et al. 2015, pp. 257–258). If this were to happen then Canada would be shifting towards a two-party system and, consequently, conform to Duverger's Law. Incidentally, the Liberals, NDP and Bloc came close to coalescing in an effort to oust the minority Conservative government (Canadian Press and Reuters 2008). In the end, Prime Minister Harper successfully called upon the Governor General to prorogue Parliament in order to avoid the vote of non-confidence. All things considered, the CCF/NDP was effective in promoting and shaping policy both ideationally and through democratic institutions, and, in recent times, the centre-left has had to respond to the Conservative Party's unification of Canadian conservatism.

The Conservative Party of Canada: Uniting the Conservative Movement

The conservative movement in Canada offers insight into how federal right-of-centre political parties pooled resources together for electoral ends. This case is of interest to coalition theory since the current Conservative Party (CP) incarnates the crystallization of various conservative parties into one. What followed its foundation was unprecedented electoral success. As such it does not qualify as a coalition as we have defined it, but it is worth examining the association of such parties as they attempt to counter the dominance of the LPC.

For most of the latter-half of the twentieth century, the predominant conservative party in federal politics was the PC, itself the product of a merger between the Progressive Party and Macdonald's Conservative Party towards the mid-century

mark. It was not until constitutional talks in the 1980s and 1990s led by Mulroney that a faction of those belonging to the conservative movement began to seriously question the direction of the PC. In truth, the PC's cuts in social programs and tax policy were ordinary when compared to its equivalents in the USA and Great-Britain (Laycock 2002, p. 7). In effect, Reform Party (RP) was founded in 1986. Its purpose was primarily to serve as a voice for Western Canada and was *ergo* regionalist in character. Besides this it also pursued stricter conservative policy.

In a sense, the RP's story is one of the Western provinces and illustrative of Canada in general. As a vast and diverse society, Canada's federalism attempts to balance regional concerns. Historically there have been successes and failures. One of the underlying themes for Western grievances lies in its perception that federalism lacks the accountability and transparency government should have, and that Western provinces bore the brunt of various governments' political patronage with Central Canada—a question of winning elections (Laycock 2002, pp. 21–22). Stephen Harper, the eventual leader of the RP and broker of the CP, is an important political actor when understanding the rise of the CP. In *The Longer I'm Prime Minister*, Wells (2013) argues that Harper's intellectual inspirations and views have informed his approach to national politics and government. His argument suggests that the former prime minister's time in politics was an effort to wither away and dislodge what he saw as the Liberal hegemony on Canadian federalism (52–54). To this effect, surviving the electoral cycle was the chief objective.

To make this possible, the conservative movement, more specifically the parties which represented the movement on the federal scene, needed to unify. Figure 6 shows the electoral story of the merger starting with the PC's results in Parliament




Fig. 6 Trends in elective and electoral power of conservative variants (Parliament of Canada 2015b)

in 1984. Following the failure of constitutional negotiations and the creation of region-based federal parties, the 1993 elections saw the PC reduced to Jean Charest from Quebec and Elsie Wayne from New-Brunswick; the party managed to yield 16% of suffrage. With respect to the conservative vote, the PC's electoral power fluctuated between 12 and 18% in the 1993, 1997 and 2000 elections while the RP's climbed from under 20% to a quarter of suffrage. Be that as it may, the RP reaped far greater elective power given its regional popularity in western provinces. This is consistent with the observation that SMP rewards local pluralities independent of national outcome.

Following the foundation of the CP, we see that its elective and electoral power is roughly the summation of the two parties' results in the previous elections. However, the CP differed from preceding federal rightwing political parties in that the RP had the upper-hand. This primary had to do with circumstance, but allowed the RP to steer the direction of the conservative movement (Wells 2006, pp. 49–51). Regarding the circumstances, the unification of federal conservatives came at a time where the LPC faced internal conflict over leadership and was further embroiled by a sponsorship scandal. This provided a window of opportunity upon which the CP capitalized, culminating in its 2006 election victory. The CP would string together two more election victories without reaching electoral power beyond 40%. In the 2015 elections the party was reduced to the Official Opposition and faces its first leadership change.

Conclusion

In summary, this chapter examined coalition politics in the context of Canadian federalism. Canada presents a divergent case with respect to political coalitions, given the outright absence of governments by coalition in modern political history. Nonetheless, there is evidence of congruence between subnational and the national governing parties. There is also evidence of a vertical effect. The primary explanations for Canada's divergent character lies in the government-formation process. Important factors include the way in which Canada constructs representation as embodied by key political institutions and regime principles. Additional factors appertain to the operating features of the Westminster parliamentary democracy.

As mentioned, it would be incorrect to presume the absence of political coalition in government to indicate political consensus across the board. Therefore, in order to flesh out the dynamics of political coalitions, three cases were put forth. These cases offered insight into how different interest groups and regions mobilize support for a given movement. This included an analysis of Quebec's independence movement and current provincial politics as well as the CCF/NDP at the federal level and the different ways its shaped politics. The last example pertained to the conservative movement and its culmination in the present-day CP.

In the final analysis, as Canada moves forward in history and its politics change accordingly, federalism never ceases to be the focal point of political life. Electoral

reform, changes in government both federally and provincially, and other challenges promise constant conflicts between the participants of Confederation. With these variables in mind, it is critical to understand the inner logic of the Canadian regime as this unveils its resiliency. Nevertheless, as Hébert (2007) writes, “Reading the tea leaves of Canadian politics to get a glimpse into the future is always risky business” (1).

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Conclusion



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The study of subnational political dynamics has acquired relevance in the last 20 years. Academic consensus considers that it is insufficient to study national political processes in isolation if we want to understand how multilevel political systems work (Swenden and Maddens 2008; Gibson and Suárez-Cao 2010; Suárez-Cao and Freidenberg 2013). Recently, the importance of subnational coalitions in the political dynamics of multilevel states has been recognized, both in parliamentary systems (Downs 1957; Däubler and Debus 2009; Deschouwer 2009; Stefuriuc 2009; Bäck et al. 2013; Olislagers and Steyvers 2015; Pappi et al. 2015) and in presidential ones (Kinzo 2003; Lourenço 2003; Krause and Alves Godoi 2005; Braga 2006; Fleischer 2007; Machado 2009; Reynoso 2011; Méndez de Hoyos 2012; Jones and Micozzi 2013; Cruz 2014; Miño 2014; Clerici 2016).

Studying coalitions at subnational levels of government allows to understand to a large extent how political competition works in multilevel systems, the one in which political parties compete at different levels and districts in the territory, citizens have several votes to choose from among different contenders for different public offices, and mediated by different types of electoral rules (Došek and Freidenberg 2013). Thus, the parties participate in nested games (Tsebelis 1990) since they serve multiple interrelated game boards. The moves they make in one of them (a category/branch or district/province) have consequences in the plays they make in other games.

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Parties and coalitions are one of the most relevant aspects of electoral politics first, and government exercise later. It is not only a detail the question of defining what we speak when referring to *the party*, that is, “who plays the game of the coalition” (Laver and Shofield 1990: 17), which organizational leaders and at what level—federal or local/regional/provincial—coalitions are decided. This issue becomes especially vital in multilevel scenarios like the cases this book compiled. It may happen that it is the territorially extended office—national/federal structure—that delineates coalitional strategy for the different arenas in a kind of verticalization politics. On the contrary, subnational party leaders and offices may be able to autonomously make such decisions attending local dynamics and conjunctures. In this sense, it is the regulatory/legal framework which set the scene to parties tending to nationalization or territorialization.

Although the electoral regulation is a necessary condition for the existence of more nationalized or territorialized party functioning, it does not allow to understand why, under similar legislation, parties coordinate differently. Studying multi-level coalitions implies, then, to analyze the integration of the parties, that is, their formal and informal links between their elites and organizational dynamics both, vertically between the different levels (national, provincial and municipal), and horizontal among the subnational units (Thorlakson 2009). It could be claim that integrated parties, where the national and subnational levels are interdependent and act in a coordinated manner, are crucial for the stability and governability of multi-level political systems (Rodden 2004). However, this book shows country-cases where subnational politics is completely local, unrelated to the federal arena, with no problems of governability.

As presented in the introduction of this book, multilevel perspective to study political coalitions could be considered the fourth generation of coalition studies. This brings new questions and causal phenomenon to study political coalitions: congruence, nationalization of party system, bicameralism, and plurinational/pluri-ethnic societies (typically denominated by classic comparative politics literature as fragmented societies).

In this framework, the concept of political coalition congruence becomes relevant. Level of congruence discusses how similar is the party composition of coalitions (electoral, government or legislative) between different arenas for both, parliamentary or presidential government. A congruent coalition is one in which allied parties in one scenario are similar to those in another district, for example, when comparing federal coalition to subnational one in a particular province. Authors conceptualize and measure congruence differently. Deschouwer (2009) and Stefuriuc (2009) propose three levels of congruence among the government coalitions: absolute congruence is the case when the same parties participate in both, the national and the subnational executive, in contrast, the absolute incongruence takes place when there is no coincidence among the members, and an intermediate of (in) partial congruence occurs when some of the parties that integrate coalition government of one level, are also present in the coalition of the other level. Debus (2009) as well as Bäck et al. (2013) refer to the later cross-cutting coalitions. Clerici (2016) prefers to use a continuum to scale grades of congruence.

Subnational offices of federal/national parties have gained autonomy in recent decades due to the process of progressive denationalization of the party system, a phenomenon in which the electoral/political dynamics of territorial subunits are increasingly less similar to each other, and with respect to the national level. The growing territorialization is evidenced by dissimilar electoral flows of the parties in different arenas (Gibson and Calvo 2000; Caramani 2004; Filippov et al. 2004; Thorlaxson 2009; Vasselari 2009), also by less integrated parties and elites, and for an increase in the effective number of parties in the provincial legislatures in certain districts while prevailing predominant party systems in others (Clerici 2016). Denationalization occurs in those places where more than one system territorially delimited operates (Gibson and Suárez-Cao 2010). This process influences party leaders' perception as information they use when delineating their strategies to face elections (Martin and Stevenson 2001; Bäck et al. 2013; Jones and Micozzi 2013; Clerici 2016).

Each of the strategic decisions taken during the election gives legislators certain space for their behavior in parliament. Rather than pointing out how they are expected to act, these strategies during elections are borders within which they move. It is possible to think of a dialogical relationship of the classical electoral connection (Mayhew 1974; Fenno 1978). First, the electoral connection "backward", between the electoral arena (electoral system, party system, electoral coalitions, electoral results) and party coordination during the decision-making process in parliament. Second, decisions made today anticipating the results of the next contest at the polls. Legislators are supposed to be in tune with their constituencies preferences. The proximity of an election leads legislators to support certain initiatives for which they will have revenue before the electorate, or on the contrary, to oppose others to avoid being penalized at the polls.

Mauro mentions in his chapter that studies on electoral coalitions in Argentina found that coalitions have become more frequent and incongruent, and that this phenomenon has a strong correlation with denationalization of party system (Clerici 2016, 2017). Literature on Argentinean subnational politics also highlights that the fact of controlling national or subnational executives impacts on electoral coalitions congruence. Parties in national office tend to form congruent coalitions in the horizontal dimension (among provinces), regardless of the influence of the electoral calendar. In opposition, parties in provincial office tend to develop congruent coalitions vertically (linkage between coalitions running for national and subnational deputies) (Clerici 2016, 2017). In a system where subnational party elites have a high autonomy (formal and informal) to decide electoral strategies (and even to shape the election rules), and where citizens set their preferences by assigning a high value to the subnational or local level, the denationalization of the party organizations, electoral competition and coalition strategies tends to rise". Presidents and governors in Argentina develop electoral coalitions. They are organizers of nested games between incumbents and oppositions (Jones and Hwang 2007).

In this sense, (de)nationalization of party system and electoral coalition (in)congruence influence decision-making in parliamentary systems, and legislators' positions in presidential ones (and eventually, the cooperative or conflictual relationship with president). It has been argued that the dissidence with respect to the majority position of the ruling party can respond to the electoral connection that placed the

deputies in their seats although there is no clear empirical evidence of this yet. In this respect, the tension is whether it prevails legislators' alignment with the national party line—represented at the position of the president-, or with the provincial leaders of the parties who indicate how legislators should vote in the floor (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Benton 2003; Jones and Hwang 2007; Olmeda 2011; Rosas and Langston 2011). This tension is characterized by Gervasoni and Nazareno (2017) for Argentinean case as a conjunction of two notions, both with some extend of supporting evidence. For the one side, the “old common sense”, which refers to the influence of the president on the legislators, and the “new common sense”, which highlights that these respond politically to the governors within the congress. Mayhew (1974) argues that each legislator faces a dual-constituency pattern because s/he needs a constituency across the country to sustain the constituency in his/her own district.

It seems to be the same open question in Germany whether party interests or state interests are more important to explain state governments' voting behavior in the *Bundesrat*. As Linhart explains in his chapter, the upper house or federal council are integrated by the *läders'* governments. Its members have imperative mandates, those representing the same *länd* must vote in the same line according to German constitution, independently of which coalition party they belong to. Although coalition treaties generally include a rule that, in case of disagreement, the state delegates abstain, since a majority is needed to approve a proposal abstentions count like votes against a bill. This shows that federal government needs *länder* governments which explicitly support their proposals in legislation processes with joint responsibility. For this reason, Linhart mentions that it is widely undisputed that congruent coalition governments on the state level make legislation easier for the federal government (Lehmbruch 1998; Pappi et al. 2015; Debus 2008).

Linhart also argues that when new party combinations form coalitions on the *länder* level, these coalitions may act as tests for the federal level (Debus 2008; Deterbeck and Renzsch 2008). Giannetti and Pinto arrive at similar conclusion for Italian case, their results show that regional council coalitions have a higher chance of forming when they mirror national one. Italian regional government have tended “to replicate patters observed for government negotiations at the national level, producing a process of homogenization between regional and national politics”. However, the authors claim that since a series of reforms beginning in 1995, regional politics have been reshaped.

It could be expectable that coalitions dynamic in federal countries present incongruent vertical scenarios *versus* the ones in decentralized states. Reality is more complex though. Canada is an example of congruence between subnational and the national governing parties notwithstanding its federal organization. Masson and Lachapelle highlight in this book that while Canada is a case of absence of coalition governments, nonetheless there is evidence of how different interest groups and regions mobilize support for a given movement. For example, Quebec's independence movement and current provincial politics as well as the Canadian Commonwealth Federation (CCF)/New Democratic Party (NDP) at the federal level and the different ways its shaped politics.

The opposite case is in this book is Australia where according to Errington's chapter, the identity of the Commonwealth/federal parties has not been reproduced at state level. The first variation that limits the extent of congruence in the party system lies in the constitution of each party. "Top-down vertical congruence within Australia's federation has been a steady process since the Australian Constitution was first interpreted in a way conducive to centralisation in the 1920s, says Errington. The author argues that the lack of congruence in coalition arrangements in Australia's state and Commonwealth levels of government reflects a long history of turmoil in conservative politics. While the Liberal Party became a permanent fixture in every state and at federal level after the Second World War, the relative decline of the rural population saw the fortunes of the National Party vary from state to state. In this case it is possible to see the effect of territorialization as well in Argentinean one and in India. At this respect, Sridharan argues that some coalitions have become institutionalized at the federal level and to a lesser extent at the state level. Additionally, congruence is very limited and this situation has contributed to the further decentralization of power due to the fact that the two major national parties—Indian Congress Party (INC) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the Hindu nationalist party—need regional parties as coalition partners to be able to form governments at the federal level and to pass legislation in both houses of parliament.

Territorialization is relevant in Brazilian politics as well, Sandes-Freitas and Bizzarro-Neto find in their chapter that the strength of both majoritarian parties in Brazil, Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT)—workers' party- and Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB), is related to presidentialization. The weight each of the parties carry in the states influences their capacity to participate in the articulation of agreements that form coalitions and the candidacies for state governments. They can help coordinate presidential races themselves when they are relevant political actors in the states. Contrary, when they are weak, the costs of presidentialization become higher and coordination depends on other contextual factors, such as the interest of other actors to be a part of coalitions given national party agreements.

The Fourth generation of coalition studies becomes evident when relating electoral impact on public policy. This match could be difficult in federal or decentralized scenarios when political coalitions are incongruent in the different executive levels (Cruz and Goyburu 2016). Intergovernmental coordination is an omnipresent and sometimes underestimated dimension of multilevel setting coalitional studies. Intergovernmental coordination is all the activities and interactions that occur among governmental units of all levels (federal, provincial and municipal). The latter is linked to the number of overlapping decision areas that exist between the central government and subnational governments. Generally, this coordination means institutions which articulate territorially to create and implement public policy in subnational units. A robust and effective intergovernmental coordination is vital for citizens welfare. Where there are a significant number of shared responsibilities, the specialists point out that the coordination mechanisms should be highly institutionalized and should therefore attend to better implementation (Bolloyer 2006; Bakvis and Brown 2010; Poirier et al. 2015). This level of coordination

increases when there is congruence of the governmental coalitions producing an impact both, on the distribution of resources, and on the dynamics of the design and the implementation of public policy.

From a vertical perspective, it is assumed that only higher levels of coordination are reached when the central government can transfer resources and leadership. From horizontal perspective, studies focus on coordination problems among subnational units. For this literature, centralization of public policy cycle is rooted in the ability of subnational governments to unify positions contrary to the federal authorities, coordinating policies without central intervention.

Therefore, all these findings constitute as many open doors for the consideration of multilevel politics in coalition theories.

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