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China and India's Development Cooperation in Africa

The Rise of Southern Powers

Philani Mthembu



International Political Economy Series

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Cooperation in Africa

The Rise of Southern Powers

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BOOK ABSTRACT

The following book offers an explanation of the determinants of China and India's development cooperation in Africa. After collecting over 1000 development cooperation projects by China and India in Africa between 2000 and 2010 with the assistance of AidData, it applies the method of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). While strategic interests were shown to be China's most important driver, it is only when they combined with humanitarian interests that China disbursed high levels of development cooperation. While economic interests emerged as India's most important driver, it is only when these combined with strategic interests and humanitarian interests that India disbursed high levels of development cooperation. Indeed China and India are driven by multiple and conjunctural causal factors in providing more development cooperation to some countries than others on the African continent. The findings demonstrate the social complexity of the determinants of development cooperation. The empirical results thus support key principles of the narrative on South-South cooperation, namely, the combination of material benefits (win-win approach) and humanitarian interests (solidarity).

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AU	African Union
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
CC	Causal condition
CINC	Composite Index of National Capability
COW	Correlates of War Project
CV	Causal variable
DV	Dependent variable
EU	European Union
EXIM	Export and Import Bank
GDP	Gross domestic product
GNI	Gross national income
HDI	Human Development Index
HIPC	Highly indebted poor countries
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International relations
ITEC	Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme
IV	Independent variable
LDCs	Least developed countries
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MEA	Ministry of External Affairs
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MNC	Multinational corporation
MOFCOM	Ministry of Commerce
MOIA	Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

OV	Outcome variable
PRC	People's Republic of China
QCA	Qualitative comparative analysis
SCAAP	Special Commonwealth Assistance for Africa Programme
SSC	South–South cooperation
tralac	Trade Law Centre
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference for Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WTO	World Trade Organisation

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Introduction: The Changing Development Cooperation Landscape

One of the most intriguing dynamics since the fall of the Berlin Wall involves the sustained rise of Southern powers in global politics.¹ They play increasingly important roles within their own regions while simultaneously expanding their influence in various international platforms. Relatively new institutions such as the G20, the India–Brazil–South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum, and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) represent their growing influence in global politics. Indeed, with the BRICS into its ninth year of summits in 2017, it has shown an appetite for expanding its agenda and cooperation beyond strengthening economic and trade relations.

The recent BRICS Academic Forum (2017) held in Fuzhou, China, was innovative in bringing together over 400 delegates from BRICS countries and non-BRICS countries in parallel sessions involving political parties, think tanks, and civil society organisations from the respective countries in order to deepen cooperation among a wider range of actors. Indeed while differences will continue to exist in certain areas, BRICS countries have shown their willingness and ability to individually and collectively push for the reform of existing global governance institutions. They are also increasingly funding their own development ideas through the creation of institutions such as the New Development Bank (NDB), which has started financing projects in all BRICS countries and will expand that financing to non-BRICS countries in their second tranche of loans.

Accompanying these developments, there is also a growing literature on a shift in global power, from a largely unipolar to a multipolar world order (Gu et al. 2008; Renard 2009; Phillips 2008). This shift is not only accompanied by the material changes in the balance of power, but in a growing diffusion of ideas from the global South into the mainstream institutions of global governance. Indeed while the world became accustomed to receiving development ideas from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in recent decades, BRICS countries are increasingly being taken seriously in terms of their own development experiences, which have tended to not strictly follow Western prescripts and development models.

The very notion of Southern powers draws from work done on emerging powers, a concept presupposing a number of characteristics shared by the states in question. These include, among others, regional preponderance, aspiration to a global role, and the contesting of US hegemony. These characteristics arguably make the group as a whole a useful category in analysis and policy formulation (Macfarlane 2006: 41–57).

However, the term “emerging powers” may no longer be the most appropriate concept to refer to this group of countries as they are no longer “seeking” to play a global role; they already play a global role, contest US hegemony, and have formed “poles” of power and influence in the multipolar world that continues to unfold. They are thus no longer “emerging powers,” but “Southern powers.” It is also important to note that in these shared characteristics, it is irrelevant whether the nation states in question are actively seeking to challenge US hegemony as a matter of purposeful strategy or by default. This is because global power is relative, and as some countries increase their influence in global politics, some countries experience a diminished influence over others. The concept of Southern powers also presupposes that these countries share certain minimal values. These values include respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations, the abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country, the settlement of international disputes through peaceful means and dialogue, and the promotion of mutual interests and cooperation in international affairs.

With countries such as China and India having risen individually and collectively, it is notable that recent changes in the transatlantic partnership, seen through the British decision to exit the European Union, and the election of President Trump in the United States may only serve to accelerate the tectonic geopolitical changes. Indeed countries traditionally

known as the champions of globalisation are closing their gaze and retreating towards economic nationalism, while countries previously characterised as inward looking now appear to be the champions of an open global system. This will only create more spaces for BRICS countries to seek to fill the vacuum of a once US-led unipolar moment.

Within the broader geopolitical changes in the distribution of power, an area of increasing interest is that of Southern powers as sources of development cooperation. While some researchers have labelled them as new development partners, they have programmes as old as those of developed countries in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). However, unlike members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, Southern powers are not obliged to transfer their resources to other developing countries through the provision of development cooperation.² As a matter of fact, they continue to be recipients of development cooperation from DAC members and multilateral organisations, even though the amounts they receive continue to decline.

The current international development landscape was created by members of the DAC, and these still account for a majority of the disbursement of development cooperation, with their programmes possibly peaking in the 1990s until the beginning of the twenty-first century to 95 per cent of all foreign aid. Richard Manning (2006: 371) argues that this period was an “exceptional time” in the history of development aid. However, the “exceptional time” alluded to by Manning is now a phenomenon of the past as Southern powers increasingly grow their individual and collective commitments as sources of development cooperation. While the final decade of the twentieth century may have seen DAC members making up 95 per cent of all aid, the first decade of the twenty-first century saw non-DAC nation states accounting for at least 10 per cent of all aid as defined by the OECD (*ibid*).

Southern powers “often point to two declarations as foundations for their activities: the Declaration on the Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation agreed by 29 African and Asian countries at the Bandung Conference in 1955, and the Buenos Aires Plan of Action for Promoting and Implementing Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 1978” (Zimmermann and Smith 2011: 726). Zimmermann and Smith also add that “[t]hese documents help explain how and why emerging powers distinguish their approaches from those taken by DAC donors. The

fundamental difference is that emerging powers still regard themselves as peers in mutually beneficial relationships with their partner countries, rejecting the notion that some countries are experienced donors and others recipients” in need of political and economic advice on overcoming their developmental challenges.³

While the financial resources they are providing have become important for developing countries and least developed countries (LDCs), Southern powers bring a wealth of practical insights into successful and failed attempts at economic growth, poverty reduction, and dealing with transition in their respective countries. This essentially reinforces the process of looking beyond DAC countries for development models and policy ideas, “reflected in Brazil’s experience in social policy and India’s experience on information technology” (Zimmermann and Smith, *Op. cit.*: 731; Task Team on South–South Cooperation 2010: 46, 49, 52). This in itself signifies an important shift in recent history as developed countries lose their monopoly on ideas regarding the role of the state, poverty reduction strategies, and economic growth.

These developments in international development cooperation, brought on partly by the phenomenon of unprecedented growth and development among Southern powers, thus ensures that the global framework of development cooperation is increasingly under pressure to re-examine its practices as countries such as China and India assume greater responsibilities while calling the existing framework into question. It has also provided more options for developing countries in Africa, who were until recently almost completely dependent on DAC donors as a source of development cooperation (Kragelund 2008: 555–584; Saidi and Wolf 2011: 7–18).

Indeed, at the time of writing, a process is underway at the DAC to re-examine their definition and practices of development cooperation. While their definition of development cooperation has remained unchanged since 1971, efforts are underway to experiment with a different definition. The proposed definition being tested is referred to as TOSSD, the Total Official Support for Sustainable Development and efforts are underway to test the implications of such a method of quantifying development cooperation.

Concern among traditional donors over possible impacts of Southern powers on the existing aid architecture is captured by Manning, then Chair of the OECD DAC. While presenting his concerns over the general aid system, he questions the possible risks to recipient countries in the developing world, namely, unsustainable debt, the postponement of

domestic governance reforms due to a lack of conditionalities, and government waste on unproductive investments (Manning, *Op. Cit.*). Implicit under such concerns is the assumption that the manner in which the DAC organises its aid programmes represents the best practice, standards which Southern powers should move closer towards. However, as Emma Mawdsley (2010: 363) argues, this assumption takes a very uncritical view of foreign aid practices from the DAC since the inception of development cooperation as a financing mechanism. This approach also assumes, often falsely, that donors know more about the national priorities of foreign countries than the inhabitants of those countries. It is this very assumption that Southern powers seek to debunk as they position themselves as alternatives by refusing to impose their own conditions on recipient countries under the idea of promoting mutual partnerships and win-win relations.

The expanding flows of development cooperation from Southern powers have given rise to various questions. While the literature grows, many disagreements still remain; these range from empirical, theoretical, and methodological questions such as how best to analyse their development cooperation, what constitutes development cooperation from Southern powers, how they disburse it, why they have disbursed more development cooperation to some countries than others, and what strategies they use.

The following book thus contributes on various levels and answers the question of why Southern powers have provided more development cooperation to some countries than others in Africa. In answering this question, it makes use of an innovative methodology in the form of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to uncover configurations of causal variables that led to some African countries receiving high levels of development cooperation. Unlike conventional research strategies, the causal variables identified are not made to compete in the way they compete in variable-oriented research strategies. The book is thus interested in uncovering how the causal conditions actually interact with each other to produce the outcome of interest instead of testing whether one particular theory has a better explanatory power than the others. The theories from which the four causal conditions are outlined include realism, liberalism, and constructivism, thus drawing from both materialistic and non-materialistic assumptions about the determinants of development cooperation.

The book essentially provides a comparative analysis of the motives and interests of China and India's development cooperation programmes in Africa. It builds on the project-level information for the period 2000–2010 provided by AidData. The causal factors considered for both countries'

development cooperation are strategic interests, economic interests, humanitarian interests, and the size of the diaspora. The empirical research-generated findings that somewhat run counter to the dominant discourse often focused on the one-dimensional pursuit of economic gains by the provider. The empirical results thus support key principles of the narrative on South–South cooperation, namely, the combination of material benefits (win–win approach) and humanitarian interests (solidarity).

The comparative analysis reveals interesting differences and commonalities between Chinese and Indian aid. While China is more driven by a strategic motivation, India seems to pursue more economic objectives. Both countries however converge with regard to humanitarian concerns as a foreign policy determinant. While studies on China and India as individual providers of development cooperation have proliferated in recent times, comparative perspectives are rare, making the publication of particular relevance since it is based on a large sample of project-level information in Africa, provided by AidData.

Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001, 392) argue that constructivism and rationalism provide the major points of contestation shaping international relations as a discipline. In the case of development cooperation, which is explicitly provided and evaluated based on its ability to address the needs of the poor in developing countries across the world, it is necessary to uncover the role of both material and ideational variables, which can all be operationalised empirically. This allows one to have a better understanding of what the key drivers have been among the largest Southern powers in Africa, namely, China and India.

Peter Schraeder, Steven Hook, and Bruce Taylor (1998: 295) argued towards the latter part of the twentieth century that “[...] the ongoing debate over the foreign aid regime remains trapped in something of an intellectual vacuum given the lack of scholarly understanding of the *determinants* of foreign aid programs. While normative critiques of aid are numerous, critical analysis based on comprehensive empirical evidence is rare.” While important strides have since been made in understanding empirically why nation states provide development cooperation, gaps remain, especially when analysing Southern powers.

While development cooperation programmes have historically been viewed as “unique and non-comparable” (ibid, 296), data collection schemes from the DAC have greatly assisted the emergence of comparative analyses focused on DAC donors.⁴ However, while the DAC donors have a common definition of aid and a joint reporting system, problems

related to the difficulty of accessing data regarding the development cooperation programmes of Southern powers have become notorious in the research community and compounded the difficulty of conducting empirically based comparative analyses.⁵ In this sense, while Southern powers are united in the conviction that they are not donors in the traditional sense of the DAC and often adhere to the same principles of South–South cooperation (SSC), they do not have a common definition of what constitutes their development cooperation, leading to questions over its operationalisation, comparability, and how to quantify it.

This has partly led to a proliferation of single-case studies focused on Southern powers as sources of development cooperation, and where comparative analyses have been undertaken, they have mostly compared the principles adopted by DAC donors and those adopted by Southern powers promoting South–South cooperation (Jung et al. 2008). This tends to group DAC donors on one side of the spectrum and Southern powers on the other side of the spectrum, solely based on the principles they adopt.

The following book breaks with this tradition by comparing the development cooperation strategies of China and India, both Southern powers with expanding development cooperation programmes. While it is important to understand their overarching principles, it is of great importance to understand empirically what factors have been the key determinants of their strategies, especially in a comparative manner. This allows one to better understand whether their programmes are unique, responding only to their individual foreign policy agendas, or whether one can find cross-national trends among these Southern powers as their significance as sources of development cooperation continues to grow. It also assists in verifying or falsifying the myriad claims regarding their development cooperation. In order to compare the two largest Southern powers, the book will propose a common definition of development cooperation that allows for comparability, thus reviewing the many inconsistencies that continue to pervade the literature.

In the absence of empirical analyses based on a common definition, the debate on Southern powers is caught in an overly simplified discussion laden in value judgements and normative declarations painting their programmes as either “rogue aid” (Naim 2007: 95–96) or examples of positive alternatives to OECD DAC donors (Asian Approaches to Development Cooperation Dialogue Series, 2010). While the discussion is fruitful and of great interest, judgements on the merits of DAC or non-DAC development cooperation have thus far depended mostly on the subjective values

of those who shape the debate and not always based on objective empirical analyses. To put it differently, statements referring to their development cooperation as either good or bad lack clarity and are hardly subjected to empirical tests. Underscoring the importance of understanding the determinants of development cooperation, Schraeder et al. (1998: 296) note that “[i]n short, how can we speak of altering aid policies when it is unclear what considerations have heretofore driven these policies?”

Using existing research as a guide, the following book compares the determinants of development cooperation from the two largest Southern powers in Africa during the period 2000 until 2010. While it has become common to argue that the commitments made are determined by the foreign policy interests of donors, this broad assertion simply does not tell us enough and leaves questions unanswered. It thus begs the question of which of many potential foreign policy interests determine their strategies, and whether some interests play a larger role than others. Less known in the study of the determinants of development cooperation is whether these possible explanations and proposed variables are sufficient on their own or whether the outcome is only present when causal conditions interact with other causal conditions. Assuming that causation in the social sciences is not linear, but instead multiple and conjunctural, this book will uncover the conjunctural causal patterns which explain the phenomenon of interest.

Given the fact that most research primarily focuses on the material foreign policy interests of donors, there continues to be a dearth of analytical and systematic research combining the role of ideas and norms with materialistic interests in shaping the determinants of development cooperation among Southern powers. This overreliance on linear and rational choice explanations drawing primarily from the realist tradition has meant that constructivist arguments drawing from humanitarian values have not been subjected to systematic observation in the case of Southern powers. Besides not incorporating ideational variables, existing research also does not incorporate in a systematic and comparative manner the possible role played by the presence of the Indian and Chinese diaspora in Africa when looking at the determinants of their development cooperation.

The following book thus contributes to the ongoing debate by theoretically and empirically analysing the motives behind the development cooperation strategies of China and India between the years 2000 and 2010. The book analyses a variety of determinants in order to understand

how they combine to produce high levels of development cooperation in some African countries more than others.

The period of analysis chosen is due to the observable expansion in the role of Southern powers as sources of development cooperation during that period. It is thus during this period that a growing literature and debate emerged on the topic, raising many still unanswered questions. While their development cooperation in Africa greatly expanded during this period, it did not expand evenly, leading to some countries receiving high levels of development cooperation while others received lower levels of development cooperation. Understanding what happened in this period thus improves our overall grasp of the determinants of their development cooperation in Africa. This period also bears witness to a time of rapid economic growth across the African continent, where between six and seven African countries consistently count among the fastest growing economies in the world.

China and India are selected for comparison since they are both recognised as increasingly significant sources of development cooperation, especially in Africa due to the volume and geographical reach of their programmes. They also play an important role in other forms of South–South cooperation, as they attempt to project themselves as championing the interests of the developing world.

The African continent is chosen as the target region of development cooperation for several reasons. As noted by Schraeder et al. (1998: 296–297) in their comparison of leading OECD DAC donors, Africa is significant as a target of development cooperation due to being home to a large number of diverse developing countries. As the continent consisting of the largest number of developing countries and a myriad of development challenges, a focus on Africa importantly assists in improving one's understanding of the broader development cooperation landscape.

Drawing from existing theoretical and empirical studies on the determinants of development cooperation, the study analyses the following causal conditions in order to explain how they combine to produce high levels of development cooperation among some African countries:

- Strategic importance of recipients;
- Economic importance of recipients;
- Humanitarian needs of recipients; and
- Size of the diaspora from Southern powers in Africa.

While the first variable is largely drawn from the realist tradition, the second variable is drawn from liberalism, while the third is drawn from the theoretical literature on social constructivism and the role of morality, norms, and ideas in global politics. The fourth variable is drawn from the literature on migration and development, yet is formulated within the realist framework. It thus allows one to empirically examine whether Southern powers have solely been motivated by their material national interests or whether they are also genuinely influenced by a commitment to alleviate poverty and assist in the economic development of needy countries in the developing world.

While the third variable explores a largely unexplored question of the role of ideas based on humanitarianism and the tackling of poverty, the fourth variable draws from regional area studies that attempt to account for the role of the diaspora. While no direct colonial history exists between Southern powers and their African counterparts, a web of both pre-colonial and colonial era linkages remains in the form of migration and the existence of diaspora communities. When this historical migration is combined with the more recent phenomenon of migration by Chinese and Indians towards Africa, it becomes valuable to empirically examine the importance of this aspect when it comes to development cooperation and whether it plays a role in the international development strategies of Southern powers. This study thus includes the diaspora as a variable worthy of analysis as it has also largely been neglected when it comes to the development cooperation of Southern powers, especially China and India, who both have large diaspora communities. The study thus makes for a good balance of variables which have been widely used and those that have largely remained unexamined in analysing the determinants of development cooperation from Southern powers in Africa.

While making an important contribution to the existing scholarly work, it is equally important to be explicit about the limitations of the study and its approach. The study is exclusively focused on the motives and interests of the providers of development cooperation and does not intend to address in any systematic manner the interests and objectives at the side of beneficiaries. Nor does it take into consideration the extent to which China and India have been successful in the pursuit of their interests. The text will also not explicitly address the impact of Chinese and Indian development cooperation on the economies and societies of

African recipients. Another aspect that is not explicitly addressed is to what extent Chinese and Indian development programmes in Africa might engender rivalry and conflict between the two countries and how their growing engagement on the continent will affect Western geopolitical and economic intentions. While some of these questions may be addressed in passing, the main research question is on the determinants of China and India's development cooperation in Africa during the year 2000 and 2010.

Having introduced the topic while showing ways in which the following study makes a valuable contribution to the existing literature in Chap. 1, Chap. 2 will underscore the importance of well-defined concepts in the social sciences and introduce two important terms that are vital to the research question and book as a whole. It firstly outlines what is usually meant by the concept of emerging powers that is often used in the existing literature, before providing reasons why this concept is problematic in contemporary global politics. Instead of using the concept of "emerging powers" to refer to nation states such as China and India, the chapter will then explain the concept of "Southern powers" in capturing the phenomenon of certain non-OECD countries re-emerging as central players in global politics. Given the role these nation states are already playing in the provision of global public goods, it no longer makes sense to refer to them as "emerging powers."

It then introduces the concept of development cooperation and constructs a definition applicable to both China and India. This chapter will underline the various policy problems which have become apparent as a result of the incorrect definition and use of terms such as development cooperation or by the lack of clarity in their definition and operationalisation. While most likely not as important in the colloquial sense, it is imperative for social scientists to clearly define important terms used in their research endeavours, especially when these are either misunderstood or contested.

Chapter 3 provides a comprehensive overview of China and India's development cooperation in Africa, adding important context to their contemporary relations with the African continent. Indeed this chapter serves as a vivid reminder that despite being often referred to as new donors, their development cooperation is far from new and is in a way a continuation of old relations under a vastly different international system. Besides providing a historical overview, this chapter will also

introduce the basic characteristics of China and India's development cooperation and the manner in which it is currently organised. It is thus not only about historical context, but also highlighting the basic infrastructure of their development cooperation architecture while introducing the key players in both countries when it comes to development cooperation.

Chapter 4 gives a thorough introduction of the four explanatory variables under scrutiny and outlines the theoretical foundations of the determinants of development cooperation. It introduces the main theoretical traditions from which the causal conditions under examination throughout the book were identified. This chapter serves to highlight the important role of theory in identifying potential causal factors for the outcome of interest, while also elaborating the manner in which the four causal conditions are analysed in the study. Indeed it will be shown that the dominant theories of the determinants of development cooperation do not specify how certain variables actually interact to produce an outcome.

Chapter 5 introduces in a detailed manner the research methodology used for the analysis of the data on the disbursement of development cooperation from Southern powers in Africa. This chapter not only introduces qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) as the methodology used, but also outlines the data collection strategy that was followed and where the information on the different variables was actually sourced. The chapter thus opens the book to fellow researchers interested in the topic and eager to understand in a concise manner how the findings were reached. It operationalises the variables and makes the findings reached in the book transparent and replicable while also discussing openly the assumptions made throughout.

Chapter 6 applies the method of QCA to analyse the data. It thus draws up raw data and truth tables for the determinants of development cooperation from China and India in Africa, before interpreting the findings with the application of Boolean algebra. This chapter thus specifies very clearly what the primary causes for China and India's development cooperation in Africa were throughout the period under examination.

Chapter 7 draws conclusions and highlights the implications and opportunities brought on by the research findings. It also points to new research opportunities as the world moves to implement the new development agenda as seen through the sustainable development goals.

NOTES

1. Unless quoting directly, the following book uses the term Southern powers instead of emerging powers. A more detailed explanation follows in Chap. 2 on the rationale for the usage of the term instead of the more common “emerging powers.”
2. While most have not reached the target, members of the DAC have agreed to contribute 0.7 per cent of their GNI towards development cooperation.
3. Also check Woods (2008: 726–728).
4. More information on DAC aid statistics and reporting procedures available here: <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/methodology.htm>
5. An overview of the data available for China’s development cooperation is provided by Grimm et al. (2011).

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CHAPTER 2

Conceptual Framework and the Importance of Consistent Definitions

It then introduces the concept of development cooperation and constructs a definition applicable to both China and India. This chapter underlines the various policy problems that have become apparent because of the incorrect definition and use of terms such as development cooperation, or by the lack of clarity in their definition and operationalisation.

While the notion of emerging powers has become widespread in the global media, diplomacy, and in academia, it is necessary to briefly clarify its meaning while problematising it. It is thus important to analyse its historical evolution and appropriateness for contemporary developments in global politics. While this may not be as important in colloquial language, it is imperative in academic research. One should also be able to suggest more appropriate terms if the ones under current usage are found to not be relevant to contemporary reality.

The notion of emergence is firmly rooted in a worldview that expresses recognition of a particular status among nation states: it thus conjures the image of “waiting in the lobby to enter the major league, the club of the most advanced countries that have completed their development.” The value judgements inherent in the term are transmitted through major international media, the academic world, and major investment banking experts and largely fit into a Eurocentric view of world history, where developed countries are seen as the yardstick to measure economic and social changes in human society (Gabas and Losch 2009: 13–14).

In its current usage, the concept can be traced to that of “emerging market economy”, forged in the early 1980s by analysts at the International Finance Corporation (IFC) to characterise countries in rapid transition, undergoing industrialisation, having high growth rates and presenting investment and equity opportunities due to this growth and the development of financial infrastructure” (ibid, 15–16).

The fact that China and India have entered the centre of analyses is not only due to their rapidly growing economies, but also related to the “size of [their] territory and especially their population, which create gigantic domestic markets provoking an exponential demand in raw materials and capital goods. Whereas the European Union will ‘lose’ 40 million inhabitants, China and India, which together account for nearly 40% of the world’s population, will have nearly 800 million more inhabitants by the year 2050.” Rising standards of living will completely “alter the balance of power still largely marked by the European nineteenth century,” having a systemic impact on global politics (ibid, 18). This ability to individually and collectively have systemic effects on the international system while attempting to gradually reform it puts these countries at the centre of attention.

The focus on macro-aggregates largely structures the contemporary debate and “explains the emphasis on the leading group of emerging powers: the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa).” While the initial acronym BRIC was developed by Goldman Sachs investment bank, it has taken on a life of its own as the above countries create formal institutions for various political and economic reasons (ibid). Instead of using the term “economy” or “market” to capture the idea of emergence or re-emergence, this study explicitly uses the term “power” in order to move beyond the purely economic aspects captured by financial institutions. It thus captures the idea that these nation states are not only growing economically, but are also calling into question certain configurations of power in global politics as they aim to assert their individual and collective political weight. The term must thus capture both political and economic aspects of contemporary developments.

Given the rapid transformations taking place in China and India, the responsibility rests on research to “deconstruct the object in question to examine to what extent the notion of emerging powers corresponds to a reality, and what new international configuration it is likely to spawn” (Jaffrelot 2009: 1). Indeed it is argued that the concept may no longer be relevant to the contemporary global landscape as these “emerging powers”

are already reshaping the evolving world order. Indeed referring to them as indefinitely emerging does not clarify when they are likely to have completed the process of emergence. Given that they share certain principles of the global South and are also constituting different geostrategic “poles” in global politics, it is argued that they should rather be referred to as Southern powers.

Not content within their own regions, multinational corporations from Southern powers are increasingly on the offensive, “buy[ing] up companies that are far from lame ducks thanks to liquidity generated by years of double-digit growth. The acquisitions made by Chinese and Indian multinationals have been among the most spectacular in recent years, as seen in the buyout of Tetley, Corus, Jaguar and Rover by Tata and Lenovo’s takeover of IBM’s personal computer division” (ibid, 6). Table 2.1 gives a few examples of mergers and acquisitions undertaken by Chinese and Indian firms (Williamson et al. 2013: 239–277).

Geopolitically, Southern powers increasingly come into direct competition with Western states and corporations in their “traditional hunting grounds of Africa, Latin America, and Asia.” Firstly, they have expanded the disbursement of their development cooperation to poor countries under the framework of South–South cooperation. This development cooperation is all the more appreciated since it is “rarely associated with

Table 2.1 Chinese and Indian companies on the offensive

<i>Recent acquisitions by Chinese companies</i>	<i>Recent acquisitions by Indian companies</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Shanghai Automotive Industrial Corporation (SAIC) acquires 49% of SsangYong Motors (South Korea) for \$500 million • TCL acquires Thomson Electronics (France) for \$560 million • Yanzhou Coal acquires Felix Resources (Australia) for \$2.8 billion • Sinopec acquires Addax (Switzerland) for \$7.2 billion • Xi’an Aircraft International acquires 91.25% of Fischer Advanced Composite Components (Austria) for \$135 million 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tata Motors acquires Jaguar Cars Ltd and Land Rover Ltd (UK) for \$2.3 billion • Bharti Airtel Ltd acquires Zain Africa BV (Nigeria) for \$10.3 billion • Suzlon Energy Ltd acquires 30% of REpower Systems (Germany) for \$546 million • Reliance Industries Ltd acquires 40% of Atlas Energy Inc. (US) for \$339 million • GMR Infrastructure Ltd acquires 50% of InterGen N.V. (Netherlands) for \$1.107 billion

Contracted by author based on Williamson et al. (2013: 239–277)

the political conditionality's that are generally connected to Western aid." In addition to increasing their volumes of development cooperation, Southern powers are investing more and more into Africa in various sectors, investments that have been sought by African countries for several years (*ibid*, 6–7). These developments have at times stoked fear in Western capitals, provoking many scholars to ask what consequences current developments will have on the existing architecture.

In the area of development cooperation, the fall of the Berlin Wall created a scenario where the 24 member countries of the DAC—the development arm of the OECD—effectively monopolised development aid. For the following decade, DAC aid constituted an estimated 95 per cent of all aid. This was brought about due to previously important donors in the former Eastern bloc and the Middle East focusing on domestic affairs, cutting previously important sources of finance for many developing countries (Manning, *Op. cit.*: 371–385).

Zimmermann and Smith (2011: 722) argue that “[w]hen the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were first agreed, the world appeared evenly divided; there were countries that had to achieve the goals themselves and others that had to help them do so. Ten years later, the line between ‘aid recipients’ and ‘donors’ ha[d] become blurry. The impressive rise of China, India, Brazil and many other emerging economies has been accompanied by an equally impressive growth in the development cooperation they provide to other countries.” Mohan and Power (2008: 27) refer to this phenomenon as a “new multipolarity in international development and growing sources of investment and aid outside of the Western axis.”

While Southern powers have either been labelled as emerging powers, new development partners, new donors, non-traditional donors, South–South development cooperation partners, or non-DAC donors, it has been shown that they are not new to development cooperation and have programmes that are even as old as OECD DAC member states.¹ What is however new is the exponential rise in their disbursements, which for the first time since the fall of the Berlin Wall has created new sources that operate outside of the parameters of the DAC. These developments assist in understanding more clearly the historical notion of emerging powers, and why they are considered to be emerging.

However, one should not stop there. It is not enough to describe the concept of emerging powers. One must ask the question of why nation states such as China and India continue to be categorised as emerging powers or economies when most indicators suggest that they are already

significant powers in the global system of nation states. Taking into account their stated identity as members of the global South, this study proposes to use the concept of Southern powers as a more appropriate category in describing these countries in contemporary global politics.

Indeed this term is more appropriate as it acknowledges the contemporary multipolarity of global politics, which sees and acknowledges various centres of power coexisting simultaneously. One cannot speak of a constant process of emergence without clarifying how countries move from emerging powers to recognised powers. Without these clearly defined parameters, one is forced to use the concept of emergence without clearly delineated boundaries. Indeed China and India are already powerful nation states, and have even surpassed the national capabilities of some acknowledged Western powers in the international system. This applies in areas such as trade, investment, development cooperation, military expenditure and output, industrial output, and demographic resources. The concept of emerging powers thus contradicts itself by being applied to now recognised powers of the global South. Unless quoting directly, the rest of this study will thus refer to this group of countries as Southern powers.

Having now explained the notion of emerging powers while problematising it and suggesting an alternative concept, it is equally important to address the inconsistencies in the literature with regard to the definition of development cooperation as applied to Southern powers.

Dane Rowlands (IDRC 2008: 3) states that “[i]nternational development assistance can be a difficult concept to work with. Value-laden euphemisms such as ‘foreign aid’ and technically specific terms such as ‘official development assistance’ are often used as awkward substitutes, making it difficult to describe development assistance in a manner that is both sufficiently broad in conception and analytically precise in application. Moreover, traditional donors have dominated international development assistance—both as a concept and a field of endeavour—making it necessary to re-examine the practice in the presence of new emerging donors.”

Since research on the topic has not agreed on a standard way of defining and measuring development cooperation from Southern powers, this shortcoming must be addressed before one can answer the research question of this study. Indeed, it is hardly conducive when researchers disagree on essential issues such as what constitutes development cooperation from Southern powers if this area of academic inquiry is to be better understood.

While it is understandable that confusion persists on what constitutes development cooperation from China and India due to the relative difficulty of accessing comparable data (unlike the DAC), it is not excusable that researchers continue to accept any numbers published in the media and research papers. Failure to ask critical questions will only further cloud this topic and create more unnecessary mysteries and misinformation. This weakness in the research not only has consequences for academic inquiry, but crucially for policy advice and action on the part of nation states.

Development cooperation forms a part of a wider range of economic tools available to nation states as they conduct economic and political relations with each other. It is considered as official finance, since it comes directly from the government's budget, in contrast to private sources of finance. However, while it is considered as official finance, it is not the only form of official finance that is at the disposal of nation states.

Nation states and their state institutions also give loans at commercial rates, which at times offer slightly better terms to recipients than those provided by private institutions. They also provide export credits to assist mostly local companies in their operations abroad, and also provide buyers' credits, which are often provided to foreign governments that seek to buy goods from the countries providing the credits. These types of credits often explicitly promote the economic interests of countries issuing them and boost exports. However, even with these financial tools, Southern powers have begun to subsidise some of their credits for the purposes of development cooperation while offering other credits under commercial rates.

While these various official economic tools are used by nation states, not all of them fall into the category of development cooperation. The OECD has had a standard definition of what constitutes official development assistance (ODA) since 1972, even though it is undergoing changes with experiments seen through the Total Official Support for Sustainable Development (TOSSD) concept. While this definition is by no means perfect, it will partly be used as a starting point in developing a definition applicable to Southern powers. Journalists and scholars who want to compare China's development cooperation to that of OECD countries often use non-comparable figures, which often results in heavily inflated numbers and misleading results. A common definition allows for comparability across countries, both within the OECD and among Southern powers. This is an important factor for comparative research. A failure to provide a clear definition has mostly led to inflated numbers from Southern powers as economic tools given at commercial rates are often incorrectly included

as development cooperation. This leads to the obvious error of comparing apples with oranges.

Official development assistance, according to the DAC, has long been defined as official flows to developing countries or multilateral institutions that are disbursed for the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective. These flows should be provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by the executive agencies, while being concessional in character and conveying a grant element of at least 25 per cent and calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent (OECD ODA 2014). This definition is important in that it represents an attempt to systematically define and operationalise development cooperation, thus allowing for cross-country comparisons of DAC donors.

As noted above that while only concessional loans and grants may qualify as ODA, governments also offer other official flows, including funds for local firms to subsidise or guarantee their firms' private investment in recipient countries, military aid, and export credits (OECD Fact Sheet 2008). These funds are usually called "other official flows" (OOF) by the OECD, and include those loans that are not concessional in character or those with a grant element of less than 25 per cent (Brautigam 2009: 204). While developed countries in the OECD do provide such funds, they have not been included in their development cooperation calculations.

However, despite researchers not including such flows when referring to DAC members, the same transactions have too often been included by scholars in the calculations for China and India's development cooperation. Chin and Frolic (2007, 13) suggest that "[t]he Chinese definition of foreign assistance is much broader than conventional Western definitions. In China, foreign assistance encompasses not only grants and loans, but also commercial investments, trade-related concessional financing, and educational and cultural exchange programs." When researching Southern powers, it has been quite common to adopt such a broad definition of development cooperation, thus also counting commercial investments as development cooperation.

This has often resulted in inflating their actual disbursements as seen through a now widely quoted paper on China's activities in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in the United States (Lum et al. 2009). In this report, China's development cooperation has been defined very broadly, encompassing all sorts of activities such as commercial loans and investments, prompting Deborah Brautigam (2010) to argue on her blog that the report has "done a great disservice to efforts to understand this issue."

Brautigam also mentions another widely quoted study and figure which exacerbated the perception that China provides “billions in aid” to Africa. This report was conducted by the World Bank and cited a figure of \$44 billion for China’s total disbursements to Africa between 1960 and 2006 (Foster et al. 2008), despite the Chinese government actually having stated that the figure was actually 44 billion renminbi (approximately \$5.6 billion) over nearly 50 years (Brautigam, *Op. cit.*).

This misunderstanding and inaccurate measurement of the international development programmes of Southern powers is more widespread within the academic community and cannot be restricted to just a few research reports.² It also continues to be pervasive in the reporting conducted by mainstream media outlets, who often mistake commercial investments from China and India for development cooperation, which arguably leads to a lot of misinformation in the public discourse.³ This study takes a more critical and analytical approach to such contested definitions and intentionally excludes those economic tools that cannot be regarded as development cooperation. It thus develops a common definition to facilitate the comparison of China and India in Africa.

Any broad, monocausal claim about the determinants of development cooperation from Southern powers in Africa which does not adequately define it and provide logical arguments as to why they adopt that particular definition must thus be treated with caution. While such research can certainly not be discarded as it may contribute to describing certain elements of China and India’s development cooperation, the findings reached on how much development cooperation they provide and why they provide it become distorted by the adoption of an inaccurate definition.

The lack of clear and consistent definitions or the use of very broad ones has had immense ramifications for how development cooperation from Southern powers such as China and India is perceived, which in turn affects real policy choices from members of the DAC and multilateral financial organisations such as the World Bank. Understanding what to look for and what to exclude is thus not simply a mental exercise in academia, but a vital part of scientific research on an issue with real-world implications.

Thus, when Hillary Clinton (2011)—as then Secretary of State of the United States—warned African leaders about China’s “aid” in Africa, her warning bells were already based on a very broad interpretation of what constitutes it.⁴ Central to her argument was that China is not interested in the development of least developed countries in Africa—supposedly in

contrast to the United States—but primarily interested in extracting as many natural resources to quench its thirst as it seeks to continue its rapid development in the face of growing demand for new energy sources and mineral deposits. This was indeed the basis of her argument.

Contrary to this commonly held assumption on the broad nature of its development cooperation, China’s actual official definition of development cooperation is not “much broader than conventional Western definitions” as Gregory Chin and Michael Frolic argue (2007, 13). This fact is well illustrated through China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid (2011), which clearly shows that in fact China’s definition is far closer to that of the DAC (yet not identical), and not as “broad” as often suggested.

Conclusions reached by researchers who start from the basis of a broad definition are hardly surprising since they include large commercial loans and investments in their calculations. A particularly problematic issue with such a broad definition is that it ceases to have any real meaning since it classifies just about any type of economic transaction between Southern powers and developing countries as development cooperation.

It is on that basis that scholars such as Brautigam (2009) and Kragelund (2011) have sought to clarify what constitutes development cooperation from Southern powers. While arguing that China’s recent engagement in Africa is largely centred around the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), Kragelund notes that the pledges made by China under the various FOCAC gatherings “by no means consist only of aid. They combine aid, trade and investment measures, and most are best described in terms of the DAC concept ‘other official flows’ (OOF), comprising funds from governments that do not meet the criteria for official development aid” (ibid). Turning his focus onto India, Kragelund also makes a clear distinction between India’s development cooperation and its newer instruments which are better described as other official flows (ibid, 596). These scholars thus attempt to systematise the definition and understanding of development cooperation from Southern powers in order to address the prevalent confusion in the literature.

According to research undertaken by UNESCO (2008: 3), it is imperative to understand that “external financial resources available to developing countries fall into two main categories: (a) development assistance or concessional finance and (b) non-concessional or market-related finance. Many studies analysing South–South cooperation tend to mix these two types of financing” (Table 2.2).

Table 2.2 Official financial resources available for developing countries

<i>Concessional finance</i>	<i>Non-concessional finance</i>
Interest-free loans	Commercial lines of credit (LoC)
Concessional and low-interest loans	Commercial export credits
Grants	Commercial buyer's credits
Humanitarian assistance	
Volunteer work	

While at times exaggerated, there exist a number of constraints that inhibit the development of a comprehensive information base on development cooperation flows from China and India, and some of these include (ibid, 9):

- “*Technical and institutional problems of data definitions and collection:* Many [Southern] powers are themselves unclear about definitional issues such as the concessionality or purpose of assistance, leaving space for interpretation by journalists and scholars of what constitutes their development cooperation. Some contributor countries also appear to collect and publish data largely on commitment rather than disbursement basis, and some with long lags after actual disbursements.”
- “*Lack of data collection at country level:* Some [development] programmes are dispersed across many different ministries and agencies. However, the planned scaling up by [Southern] powers has led to rethinking institutional arrangements for delivering concessional financial flows.”

Despite the long-standing DAC definition of ODA, one should not assume that its definition and operationalisation are without disagreement. Thus, while the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is recorded as having received US\$5.4 billion in ODA in 2003, actual net financial transfers came to only US\$400 million (Chaturvedi et al. 2012: ix). What this highlights is the complexity of defining and operationalising development cooperation.

The more recent approach adopted by Brautigam and Kragelund has thus far been to base their definition of development cooperation from Southern powers on that used by the DAC. While this allows them to

compare development cooperation from Southern powers to that of DAC members, this particular study does not wholly adopt the DAC definition and instead takes the middle path between the more technical definition and the broad definition prevalent in the literature. The primary distinction made to separate what is development cooperation and what is not development cooperation is through an analysis of whether it is explicitly disbursed with commercial terms or whether it is disbursed under explicit concessional terms subsidised by the respective governments.

For the purposes of this study, development cooperation from Southern powers is thus defined as official transfers of money, goods, and services to developing countries specifically for their economic development and welfare. These transfers need to come from official government ministries or agencies and be concessional in nature.

This definition allows for comparability, while it is neither too technical nor too broad. It allows one to identify flows such as commercial export and buyer’s credits as falling outside the realm of development cooperation while including the aid in kind that Southern powers are known to provide. It also removes the technicalities such as the DAC requirement of 25 per cent grant element as Southern powers do not often report on this. The following Table 2.3 shows what the following study considers as development cooperation, and what it considers to fall outside of the definition. It thus simplifies the comparison of China and India’s development cooperation in Africa.

Having contextualised and defined the two central concepts used throughout the study, the following chapter will provide a comprehensive overview of China and India’s development cooperation in a historical and contemporary context. It also provides an overview of the main institutional arrangements for China and India’s development cooperation.

Table 2.3 Classification of development cooperation from Southern powers

	<i>Development cooperation</i>	<i>Non-Development cooperation</i>
Tools	Grants Interest-free loans Humanitarian assistance Volunteer programmes Technical cooperation Other concessional loans	Military aid Commercial lines of credit Commercial export seller’s credits Commercial export buyer’s credits

NOTES

1. For a comprehensive and recent study on emerging powers as “new partners,” check the following publication: Sachin Chaturvedi, Thomas Fues, and Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, eds., *Development Cooperation and Emerging Powers: New Partners or Old Patterns* (London: Zed Books, 2012).
2. Kragelund (2008) also made this assumption in earlier research conducted on non-DAC donors in Africa, although later work pays more attention to the importance of defining their aid in a concise manner.
3. The Economist has published several articles on China, which constantly equate foreign investment with aid. This issue has been picked up by Brautigam in her blog.
4. This interpretation is clearly evident in research conducted by the Congressional Research Service on “China’s Foreign Aid Activities in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia.”

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CHAPTER 3

An Overview of China and India's Development Cooperation in Africa

In historical terms, economic exchange between Africa and Asia predates the colonial era. In this regard, Shelton and le Pere (Op. cit., 17) quote Philip Snow (1988: viii) in stating that “Asia and Africa dealt with each other through complex networks of diplomacy and trade. Arab and Persian merchants plied between the Gulf and fringe of Kenya. Merchants from African cities like Mombasa and Kilwa ventured as far as Malaya in Indian trading fleets. And seventy five years before Vasco da Gama and his ships sailed round the Cape of Good Hope to found a Portuguese empire in the Indian Ocean, great expeditions sent by the court of the Ming dynasty of China crossed the Indian Ocean from the other direction and called repeatedly at the ports of the East African coast.”

Chinese scholars and foreign policy practitioners state frequently the different origins of China's development cooperation and diplomacy. In relation to Africa, the story of China's massive fleet to Africa during the Ming Dynasty has been retold on several occasions. Under the leadership of the admiral Zheng He, China's fleet sailed to the East coast of Africa, crossing the China Sea, then venturing west to Ceylon (contemporary Sri Lanka), Arabia, and finally Africa between 1418 and 1433. Chinese archives state that up to 28,000 men and 62 vessels were part of this expedition and that Zheng made eight great expeditions in this time period, going through 30 countries and territories, including modern Somalia, Kenya, and Madagascar. Having not sought to colonise Africa, the Chinese

are said to have returned with a giraffe, while Chinese doctors and pharmacists took back African herbs and local medicinal compounds (Shelton and le Pere Op. cit., 18), in what could be arguably seen as early examples of “win–win” exchanges.

Regardless of the exact details, this account remains an essential aspect of China–Africa relations, providing a historical impetus for continuing cultural, social, and economic exchanges and diplomatic ties. Due to the fact that Zheng’s expeditions were not motivated by a colonial or aggressive rationale, China has been able to draw on these ancient accounts in contemporary relations (*ibid*, 18).

While missionaries and colonial rule formed the genesis of many developed countries foreign aid, the origins of China’s development cooperation system arguably go back to imperial China’s tribute system, where surrounding nations would pay tribute to China in order to establish and maintain relations. In return, China would often give smaller nations substantial gifts from the Chinese empire. This was an essential part of China’s international relations and worldview (Andornino 2006). It is important to take this historical context into account as it continues to play a role in modern diplomacy.

Indian politicians, much like their Chinese counterparts, are also fond of recalling the ancient bonds between Africa and the Indian subcontinent, often referring to this long history during large summits such as the India–Africa Forum Summit.

This historical narrative is often retold as a reminder of the exploitation that developing countries have had to endure over the centuries and the historical and contemporary virtues of South–South cooperation. Relations between China, India, and their African counterparts can thus be seen as a revival of ancient ties under vastly different global conditions. Given the sharp historical contrast between Africa–Asia and Africa–Europe relations, history is used as an important tool in contemporary relations.

CONTEXTUALISING CHINA’S DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IN AFRICA

The first decade of the twenty-first century witnessed significant increases in China’s development cooperation in Africa, and the Chinese government sealed its growing status as a source of development cooperation by releasing its first White Paper on Foreign Aid (2011). Released by the Department of Foreign Aid within the Ministry of Commerce

(MOFCOM), it outlined China's role as a source of development cooperation since it began its programme in the 1950s.

In terms of official policy documents related to its growing ties to Africa, this had been preceded by the release of China's Africa Policy (2006) in what had been dubbed the "year for Africa." This was a clear signal to the international community during the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) meeting in Beijing that China intended to play a central role in Africa's international relations, which was welcomed by different capitals across the continent. The overwhelming response by African leaders was indicated by the participation of 35 heads of state, business representatives, and the official inclusion of the African Union (AU). The message was clear: in contrast to viewing Africa as the "hopeless continent" as the Economist (2000) and much of the OECD countries had done in the beginning of the new millennium, the Chinese political and business class saw opportunities presented and wanted African leaders to know that China intended to play a central role in Africa's development.

China's Africa Policy can be viewed as a continuation of its "going global" strategy, where the Chinese government encouraged China's leading corporations to expand to other global markets (People's Daily 2001). Within this broader strategy, Africa could be seen as one among other testing grounds for these private and public enterprises as they sought to be more competitive in global trade. However, while addressing issues of development cooperation and the financing that would be made available to Chinese corporations and African nation states, the Africa strategy was not solely focused on development cooperation and instead focused on all aspects of China's relations with Africa. In order to get a better overview of China's international development cooperation system, another five years would pass before the Chinese government released its official White Paper.

While not providing a clear sectoral and geographic breakdown of its aid programmes, the White Paper (2011) does give aggregate figures which reveal that it had undertaken approximately 2000 projects in over 100 countries and regions over the previous 60 years. Breaking it down by region instead of providing a country by country breakdown, it is also revealed that Africa had received 45.7 per cent of the share, Asia 32.8 per cent, and Latin America and the Caribbean receiving 12.7 per cent.

The projects completed include railways, highways, power plants, water conservation schemes, farms, schools, hospitals, and sports venues. It also revealed that between 1963 and 2009 at least 21,000 Chinese medical personnel had given treatment to 260 million people in other developing




Fig. 3.1 Official annual fiscal expenditure for China's external assistance. Source: Ministry of Finance of China

countries, and from 1953 to 2009, China had offered training to over 120,000 people from developing countries (White Paper on Foreign Aid 2011). In terms of development cooperation, Africa had thus been the biggest beneficiary and accounted for almost half of China's disbursements. As the following graph highlights, China's budget has been on a constant upward trajectory since the mid-1990s, with much of that expenditure going towards Africa (Fig. 3.1).

While the first decade of the twenty-first century witnessed consistent increases to China's development cooperation, the same pattern does not hold throughout the previous 60 years. With its genesis in the 1950s, China's development cooperation in Africa and other developing countries increased in the 1960s and 1970s, before decreasing in the 1980s and early 1990s as China began its economic reforms while becoming both a recipient and a source of development cooperation (Chin and Frolic 2007). While their disbursements did not drop drastically throughout this period of slowing down, it was decided by the central government to not take on any new major projects and instead focus on completing its current commitments while reforming its development cooperation system.

Table 3.1 Eight principles for China's development cooperation

1	Emphasis on equality and mutual benefit
2	Respect for sovereignty and never attach conditions
3	Provide interest-free or low-interest loans
4	Help recipient countries develop independence and self-reliance
5	Build projects that require little investment and can be accomplished quickly
6	Provide quality equipment and material at market prices
7	Ensure effective technical assistance
8	Pay experts according to local standards

Source: China's Foreign Aid (White Paper) (2011)

Despite the fluctuations in spending over the decades, China's leaders maintain that the core principles on which its development cooperation infrastructure is built have remained consistent over time. In a speech in Mali, Premier Zhou Enlai (1964) announced that China's development cooperation would be guided by Eight Principles (Table 3.1).

During the Cold War period, it has been widely argued that China's development cooperation was provided in order to assist post-colonial states to become self-sufficient while modernising. These states were mainly the recipients of China's agricultural aid, technical assistance, and infrastructure projects that could be implemented relatively quickly. In the ideological climate of the Cold War, China also used its aid to advance communist internationalism and the aims of the non-aligned movement, often seeking to take a leadership role of the developing world. Besides these determinants, China also used its aid programme to reduce the influence of Taiwan's Kuomintang government, which was greatly assisted by the support gained from African countries at the United Nations (Chin and Frolic 2007, 4). Frolic and Chin (ibid, 5) further state that:

As tensions with the Soviet Union grew in the late 1950s and China shifted to an increased interest in playing a leadership role in the non-aligned movement, the country increased its sponsorships of large-scale aid projects. In many projects, China handled all aspects of development, including sending construction workers. During this time, China took on its largest aid project ever—the 1200 mile Tanzania-Zambia Railroad. Chinese development assistance also went into building large but less developmentally crucial structures such as sports stadiums, which were requested by African leaders.

CHINA'S DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION ARCHITECTURE

While China's development cooperation has been distributed through various ministries throughout the years, three particular institutions stand out as the most important in its architecture. These include the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and the China Export–Import (Exim) Bank (Brautigam 2009, 107). While many studies make mention of loans provided by the China Development Bank (CDB), this study deliberately excludes it in the analysis of China's development cooperation infrastructure since it only provides loans at commercial rates and does not provide development cooperation. The above-mentioned institutions play a central role in the planning and execution of China's development cooperation and thus deserve an additional focus.

The Ministry of Commerce lies at the centre of China's development cooperation landscape and has several departments in charge of development cooperation. While it often coordinates with other government ministries and state-owned enterprises when planning and implementing development projects in Africa, it is widely recognised as the most influential ministry in China's development cooperation infrastructure. Where international development cooperation is concerned, the most important department is the Department of Foreign Aid.

Having been responsible for the drafting of China's White Paper on Foreign Aid, the department is primarily responsible for “program[ming] all the zero-interest loans and grants, draft[ing] the aid budget and aid regulations, manag[ing] the Foreign Aid Joint Venture and Cooperation Fund (set up in 1998 to assist in the consolidation of earlier aid projects), and coordinat[ing] with China's Eximbank on concessional loans” (ibid, 108).

According to Brautigam, “China's Department of Foreign Aid can call for help on Ministry of Commerce branches in all the provinces and the major municipalities. [...] When they need specialists to advise on agriculture, health, or education, they coordinate with the international cooperation offices in those ministries. The Ministry of Commerce takes the lead, however” (ibid, 109). She further adds that “[t]he Department of Foreign Aid is also small because it has no overseas offices. Instead, the Chinese Economic and Commercial Counsellor's office attached to China's embassy will designate one or more staff to oversee the aid program, troubleshooting, monitoring, and checking up at their completion” (ibid).

Given the lead role played by this department, it is also responsible for liaising with various state-owned enterprises concerning the implementation of development projects in Africa. It thus oversees a process of intense domestic lobbying from companies looking to have a footprint in Africa through development projects.

Brautigam (2009, 110–111) states that “the Ministry of Foreign Affairs diplomats are the ‘front line’ in advising the leadership in Beijing on the quantity of foreign aid for a particular African country. [...] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs drafts the annual plan for aid together with the Department of Foreign Aid in the Ministry of Commerce. It also signs off on any changes in the aid plan, and decisions on cash aid, along with the Ministries of Commerce and Finance. Yet the division of labor between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce is an uneasy one when it comes to foreign aid.”

Established as one of China’s three policy banks¹ in 1994, the Eximbank operates primarily as a tool of the government. Modelled around similar institutions in Japan and Korea, it has since played a central role in China’s strategy of going global (ibid, 111–112). It is necessary to quote at length from Brautigam (ibid, 114):

Eximbank’s concessional loans are the only part of their operations that can be called foreign aid [approximately 40 percent of all of their loans]. The subsidy for the interest rate on concessional aid loans comes directly from the Chinese government’s foreign aid budget. Eximbank [then] coordinates with the Department of Foreign Aid on these loans. And in a nod to the language of official development aid, the concessional loans are specifically issued to *promote economic development and improve living standards in developing countries*. China also asks countries who wish to qualify for a concessional loan or grant some kind of preferential treatment to the project: [this could include] tax-free repatriation of the payments on the loan; relief on import tariffs for inputs; lower income tax.

China’s development cooperation toolbox consists of a wide variety of tools and is mainly composed of the following (ibid, 109):

- Medical teams,
- Training and scholarships,
- Humanitarian aid,
- Youth volunteers,

- Debt relief,
- Budget support,
- Turnkey or “complete plant” projects (infrastructure, factories),
- Aid in kind,
- Concessional loans and grants, and
- Technical assistance.

Over the years, much focus has been paid to China’s growing role in aiding infrastructure development across the African continent. One of China’s more recent and highly documented “flagship” projects in Africa is the construction of the headquarters of the African Union in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) at a cost of \$200 million (Conway-Smith 2012). Offered as a grant from the Chinese government, it has arguably become the most significant symbol of China–Africa relations since the TAZARA railway project. The project further highlighted China’s role in Africa’s infrastructure sector and was completed in time for celebrating 50 years of the African Union (previously known as the Organisation for African Unity). By undertaking this project, the Chinese sought to demonstrate their support for Africa’s vision of unity and regional integration while demonstrating the skills they had displayed on so many other infrastructure projects across the continent.

Lucy Corkin, Christopher Burke, and Martyn Davies (2008, 3–4) state that “construction and infrastructure is possibly the sector in which China has made its largest commercial footprint in Africa. [...] The Chinese government regularly commissions SOEs for infrastructural aid projects in countries it wishes to expand its sphere of influence. The government selects construction companies for these projects through a competitive tendering process conducted in China open to local firms. Provincial governments,² primary shareholders in many of the larger state-owned construction companies, partake in lobbying activities in Beijing in attempts to influence project allocation decisions.”

Despite infrastructure development playing a leading role in China’s development cooperation, it is not the only aspect. In early 2008, nearly 1000 Chinese medical workers were providing medical services across the African continent, continuing a tradition that began in 1963 when a team of doctors were sent to a newly independent Algeria at the end of its brutal war with France. Since then, approximately 20,000 medical personnel had served in developing countries (mostly Africa) under the rotating medical team programme. This undertaking from the Chinese

government has seen over 65 countries benefit from Chinese medical aid (Brautigam 2009, 117).

While the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs still have to coordinate, it is ultimately the Ministry of Health which is in charge of the medical teams, including the paying of its experts. The provinces play an important role, as the teams are organised mostly by provincial-level branches of the Ministry. An interesting development to the programme is the concept of twinning, where provinces are paired with specific countries (ibid). Noting the linkages between infrastructure development and the provision of health, Brautigam (ibid, 118) notes the following:

The ratcheting up of aid from China announced in the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Summit in November 2006 also included building twenty-seven hospitals in Africa (some general, some specialist) and providing medical equipment for an additional three hospitals. The Chinese also pledged to build thirty anti-malaria centers which would be equipped with diagnosis and treatment equipment. Each country receiving a center was to be assisted by two Chinese experts, who were dispatched to train African medical workers in the use of the Chinese herbal drug. An initial supply of artemisinin would be provided gratis.

Another increasingly important aspect in China's development cooperation toolbox is the training of African personnel in various areas related to development. This is a growing aspect of China's development cooperation strategy and draws from its own domestic lessons in developing the country. Elaborating on this very aspect of learning from China's own experience, Brautigam (ibid, 119) states the following:

Since 2000, the Chinese government has accelerated the training component of its foreign aid, focusing in part on transferring information about China's own experience with urbanization, economic growth, and poverty alleviation. By 2007, the Ministry of Commerce reported that, over the years, China had held 2500 short and medium courses in twenty different fields (management, economics, agriculture, health, justice, education, etc.) with more than 80,000 people participating.

While this training aspect is largely targeted towards the further education of professionals and government employees, another component of Chinese training is its scholarship programme, which has also been

increasingly expanded in recent years. While growing in importance, scholarships provided by the Chinese government to African students have been a feature of China's development cooperation since African countries began to gain their independence from colonial rule.

While coordinating with the Ministries of Commerce and Foreign Affairs, it is the Ministry of Education that is responsible for scholarships for students pursuing various degrees in China's institutions of higher learning. Beijing often pays the tuition fees, airfare for students from the poorest countries, and accommodation and provides a stipend comparable to that which is received by Chinese students (Brautigam 2009, 121).

The Chinese government is also involved in the provision of humanitarian aid and can be partly viewed from the perspective of China increasingly being a "responsible power" (Shirk 2007, 105). The provision of humanitarian aid is often provided in those cases where it hopes to avert an already dire humanitarian situation from escalating, and China has on various instances even extended humanitarian aid to countries that do not recognise its One-China Policy, providing food and blankets (Brautigam 2009, 122).

Another form of development cooperation provided by the Chinese government has come in the form of Chinese volunteers to various nation states across Africa. While Chinese teachers have worked in African schools for a few decades, the youth volunteer programme presented the first effort to send Chinese youth abroad primarily for assisting in development work. The programme has its roots in a domestic volunteer programme initiated in 1996 by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Youth League called "Go West." Unlike the coastal regions of China, the Western interior is known to be less developed, facing various challenges such as unemployment. The programme was thus initiated as one of the interventions to assist the region and prevent social instability (*ibid*, 123).

The Ministry of Commerce officially took over this programme in 2005, coordinating with the Chinese Youth Volunteers Association. This was followed by the sending of 12 young Chinese volunteers to Ethiopia on a trial basis. It was then further extended at the FOCAC Summit in 2006 as President Hu Jintao announced that Beijing would be sending 300 youth volunteers to Africa between 2006 and 2009 (*ibid*; FOCAC Declaration 2006).

The volunteers have often been selected from China's state-owned enterprises, and the programme has now expanded from Ethiopia to the Seychelles, Zimbabwe, Tunisia, and Mauritius. The volunteers have been

assisting in areas such as Chinese language, agriculture, physical education, and medicine. Brautigam (2009, 124) argues that “this people-to-people program contrasts sharply with the main face of China’s aid to date—state-owned construction companies with compounds of taciturn workers living behind a fence—but is also, so far, extremely small.”

Development cooperation for budget support still plays a minor role in China’s infrastructure and the Chinese government thus seldom gives budget support. Besides this fact, there have been a few exceptions where China offered cash aid, with five such modest cases taking place in Africa. The first such case was in the Central African Republic (CAR), where China provided emergency budget support to pay the salaries of “civil servants” following yet another coup and a worsening humanitarian crisis (ibid, 127).

Other examples include China’s provision of modest budget support to Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, the Seychelles, and Zimbabwe. Most of these cash payments were meant for civil servants following the end of a civil war or some other form of domestic instability (Liberia, CAR, Guinea-Bissau, Zimbabwe), whereas the Seychelles received it for balance of payment support. What they all have in common is that it is extremely rare for the Chinese government to provide budget support, thus making these exceptional cases (Brautigam 2009, 127).

Another form of development cooperation provided by China has been that which involves the cancellation of debts incurred by developing countries and least developed countries (LDCs). However, only those indebted countries with diplomatic ties to China would be beneficiaries. The first major announcement took place at the first FOCAC Summit in 2000, where China pledged to reduce or cancel 10 billion RMB yuan of debt (approximately \$1.2 billion) owed by highly indebted least developed countries in Africa. The Chinese government then made a further announcement at the second FOCAC Summit (2006) that all interest-free government loans that had reached maturity in 2005 would be cancelled. These cancellations have since then periodically continued with Chinese leaders making announcements at high-level meetings (Shelton and le Pere Op. cit., 141–159).

What is also significant about these announcements of debt cancellation is that unlike the HIPC programme (which China is not officially part of), the cancelled debt is not based on a host of conditions such as the poverty reduction strategy papers imposed by traditional donors and Bretton Woods institutions. Countries with more pressing problems have often been

attended to first, with the Ministry of Finance coordinating with the Ministries of Commerce and Foreign Affairs and the People's Bank of China, Eximbank, and the China Development Bank (Brautigam 2009, 128–129).

This section of the chapter has provided an overall context of China's development cooperation in Africa while highlighting its main characteristics and infrastructure. What is clear is that contrary to conventional wisdom that China is only involved in the construction of infrastructure in Africa, the Chinese government has expanded its development cooperation tools and the countries it targets. It is indeed the study's task to systematically evaluate not only the aggregate disbursements, but also to specify which countries have received the most development cooperation, and why it is that some have received high levels while others have not.

CONTEXTUALISING INDIA'S DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IN AFRICA

Following a decade of rapid changes to India's role and profile as a source of development cooperation in Africa and the wider global South, the Ministry of External Affairs formally launched the newly established Development Partnership Administration (DPA) in January 2012. This new institution was tasked with handling India's development cooperation projects through all the various stages of concept, launch, execution, and completion (MEA 2014). This marked a symbolic moment for its evolving role in global politics and signalled its growing commitment to development cooperation.

While India is yet to produce an official policy paper on its development cooperation, it is widely accepted that the 2003–2004 budget speech by then Minister of Finance and Company Affairs—Jaswant Singh—was a watershed moment in India's role as a source of development cooperation (Fuchs and Vadlamannati 2013, 2; Chaturvedi et al. 2012, 170). The speech sent out a clear signal that it no longer wanted to be perceived as a recipient, but as a source of development cooperation. Following the speech, a variety of measures were introduced: these included the announcement that India would only accept government-to-government aid that was untied and only provided by the European Union or five selected countries—Germany, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (ibid; Budget Speech 2003).

The Indian government also resolved to repay its debt to most of its bilateral and multilateral donors. Along with these measures, it would

simultaneously expand its own development cooperation using a variety of tools such as grants, loans, and the cancellation of debts owed to it by some least developed countries. Much of the new project financing would be through the India Development Initiative, while India's Export-Import (Exim) Bank was given a far greater role in India's development cooperation architecture (*ibid*).

India's spending on development cooperation thus witnessed sustained increases throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century, with Africa receiving a growing amount of attention as a recipient. While much of the new projects India committed to in Africa were announced bilaterally, a lot of new projects and financing instruments were also announced through the newly created India-Africa Forum Summit, which brings together high-level public representatives and business leaders from India and various African nation states every few years. The creation of this institutional framework to coordinate India-Africa relations represented India's way of signalling to Africa's political and business elite that in contrast to traditional donor countries of the OECD DAC, India saw great opportunities in closer relations with the African continent and wanted to play a larger role in mutually beneficial South-South relations (Delhi Declaration 2008).

While the first India-Africa Forum Summit had less participation than the FOCAC, thus attracting representatives from 14 African countries, it was nonetheless well received and saw official representation from the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (AU and NEPAD 2011). Although development cooperation plays an important role in these summits, the India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS) is not solely for the purposes of development cooperation. Instead, its focus is broader and thus encompassing all aspects of India-Africa relations; these include military cooperation and international security, trade and investment opportunities, cultivating cultural linkages and the promotion of people-to-people relations, and facing the challenges of global poverty and inequality (IAFS 2008, 2011).

However, the consistently growing volumes of development cooperation from India towards Africa in the first decade of the new millennium cannot be viewed as an uninterrupted continuation from the previous decades that India provided development cooperation to Africa. Instead, India had always paid far more attention to its immediate neighbours than to the African continent. This is constantly reflected in the Ministry of External Affairs's annual reports, which show that as a percentage of its

overall development cooperation, over 80 per cent of its development cooperation had consistently been allocated to its immediate neighbours (MEA Annual Reports 2000–2010).

As soon as India had gained its independence, it saw close linkages with developing countries as one of its main priorities. Sachin Chaturvedi et al. (2012, 171) note that “[i]n 1949 the Indian government established seventy scholarships (increased to 100 in 1952) with the aim of promoting cultural relations with other countries in Asia and Africa, providing facilities for higher education to students from these countries.”

At those initial stages of India’s development cooperation, “the Colombo Plan was the major avenue for external engagement in development cooperation. In the first decade of the Plan, India provided training places to 1622 students from various Plan member countries in fields such as health, medicine, aviation, engineering, forestry, statistics and community development, and various graduate and postgraduate courses. India also arranged training facilities for 662 foreign nationals from non-member countries” (ibid, 171).

As one of the core members of the non-aligned movement of 1955 and a leading member of the non-aligned movement, India saw its development cooperation as an integral part of relations with the developing world in general, and Africa in particular. It thus sought to project itself as a leader in the developing world, lending its support for anti-colonial and anti-apartheid movements across the continent while assisting newly independent African nation states with various aspects of nation-building. These efforts were rooted in the logic of South–South cooperation, where India saw itself as sharing in mutual exchanges with other developing countries their own experiences and skills in an effort to loosen the hold of the developed world on the international system while ensuring that newly independent countries could gradually work towards achieving levels of self-reliance (Mawdsley and McCann 2010, 82).

While the levels of its development cooperation have fluctuated over the decades that India began providing development cooperation in Africa, Indian officials have argued that the principles on which its cooperation has been built have remained constant throughout that period, with the idea of South–South cooperation at the core of its efforts. This has meant that issues such as the provision of development cooperation without any conditionality’s and the promotion of mutual benefits have been central in India’s development cooperation in contemporary times and in decades gone by.

INDIA'S DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION ARCHITECTURE

India's international development architecture has been undergoing a number of changes as it undertook an increasing number of commitments as a source of development cooperation. The most important restructuring has been the setting up of a new agency to take responsibility for its various development cooperation projects called the Development Partnership Administration (DPA). This new development seeks to create an institution that is at a better position to coordinate the various activities India is engaged in through coordinating with the myriad government ministries and institutions involved in the provision and planning of India's development cooperation. As is currently constituted, the DPA falls within the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), traditionally the most influential ministry in the realm of development cooperation (MEA 2014).

It is thus the Ministry of External Affairs, Ministry of Finance, and the Eximbank of India which are currently at the heart of India's architecture, being primarily responsible for the planning and execution of India's expanding development cooperation in Africa and other developing countries. The three institutions thus deserve additional scrutiny.

The Ministry of External Affairs is at the heart of India's development cooperation strategy. It is thus responsible for identifying and approving various requests made to the Government of India, while overseeing a range of departments and agencies responsible for implementing India's development cooperation strategy. The MEA often has to coordinate with other ministries, depending on the type of development cooperation programme being disbursed. As stated, the establishment of the Development Partnership Administration within the MEA has been the most significant development (Mullen 2014, 4). While the original plan was to give it more autonomy (much like aid organs in some OECD DAC countries), it is now more comparable with China's Department of Foreign Aid, which is also situated within its most important aid institution, the Ministry of Commerce.

Since it was established, the DPA undertook the task of creating and improving its own capacity to deliver on India's growing commitments. It has thus been busy creating specialised technical, legal, and financial skills in order to improve its efficiency. The DPA currently has three divisions, named DPA I, DPA II, and DPA III. The first division is tasked with project appraisal, lines of credit (LoCs), and grant projects, while the second division deals with capacity building schemes and disaster relief. It is thus

responsible for over 8500 civilian and 1500 defence training slots allocated under the ITEC and SCAAP to 161 partner countries. Finally, the third division is responsible for project implementation (ITEC 2014).

While India's development cooperation can be traced to the 1950s with its assistance to immediate neighbouring countries such as Nepal, the 15th of September 1964 marks the launch of the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) scheme. Born out of the vision of India's first Prime Minister—Jawaharlal Nehru—it was formally launched under the premiership of Lal Bahadur Shastri and is often referred to as India's premier programme or alternatively as its flagship programme. The Special Commonwealth Assistance for Africa Programme (SCAAP) is also comprised exactly as the ITEC is, except that it is solely targeted towards African countries in the Commonwealth (ITEC 2014; Chaturvedi et al. 2012, 180).

ITEC/SCAAP comprises four elements: projects and project-related work, deputation of experts, and study tours, but its main focus is on providing training programmes in areas as diverse as small and medium enterprises, rural credit programmes, food processing, textiles, and women's entrepreneurship. Information technology and computing skills represent an increasingly large share of the training available and in demand. Its other components include study tours and aid in kind (Mawdsley and McCann Op. cit., 366). The scheme currently runs in 161 countries, and recent reports show that 8280 civilian training slots were allocated to ITEC and SCAAP partner countries from 2013 to 2014 (ITEC 2014).

While not as important as the Ministry of External Affairs, the Ministry of Finance has played an important role in all of India's major restructuring of its development cooperation infrastructure. This was clearly visible in the 2003 budget speech, which announced a host of reforms and new programmes to India's development cooperation. It thus plays an important role in jointly setting and approving the budget in coordination with the MEA and is responsible for much of the new financing in the form of lines of credit (Mullen Op. cit., 5).

Founded in 1982 through the Export–Import Bank of India Act of 1981, the Eximbank of India is a “lead financial institution in financing, facilitating and promoting India's international trade. Among its activities, negotiating credit lines has emerged as a key instrument for supporting small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Since the financial year 2003/2004, when the government launched a new scheme for supporting development cooperation, lines of credit are provided on concessional

terms for financing exports from India. The Indian government provides repayment guarantee and interest subsidy and equalisation support to the EXIM Bank. This scheme was called the India Development and Economic Assistance Scheme (IDEAS)” (Chaturvedi et al. 2012, 182; EXIM Bank 2014).

As highlighted previously, not all disbursements made by the Eximbank are considered as development cooperation under the definition used by this study, and only those explicitly referred to as concessional loans are included. Disbursements known as commercial export credits or commercial buyer's credits, all falling in the category of lines of credit (LoCs) are thus excluded. However, those loans and credits offered by the Eximbank at concessional rates are included in the analysis. An overview of Eximbank's website offers some assistance in identifying those financial tools offered at concessional rates and those offered at commercial rates. Those offered at concessional rates are often reported explicitly as Government of India supported lines of credit or concessional loans (EXIM Bank 2014).

India, much like China, also has a growing number of tools to its development cooperation toolbox. As noted above, these include the following (MEA Annual Reports 2000–2010):

- Training in India of nominees from ITEC/SCAAP partner countries,
- Projects and project-related activities such as feasibility studies and consultancy services,
- Deputation of Indian experts abroad,
- Study tours,
- Gifts/donations of equipment at the request of ITEC partner countries (aid in kind),
- Aid in disaster relief/humanitarian assistance,
- Loans and grants, and
- Debt relief has become a growing feature of their strategy.

However, despite the myriad tools available to the government, it has utilised some tools more than others. Mthembu (2013) argues that “[t]hrough instruments such as the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) Programme and Special Commonwealth Assistance for Africa Programme (SCAAP), India has predominantly focused its efforts on human capacity development and trained thousands of civil servants from across Africa in areas such as entrepreneurship, business management,

information and communication technology (ICT), finance, trade, and medicine. This has meant that thousands of civil servants and university students have had access to India's educational institutions. This is an essential contribution, building Africa's soft infrastructure."

Emma Mawdsley (2010, 368) reaches the same conclusion in her research on India's development cooperation, arguing that "[w]hereas infrastructure has been the main focus of development assistance to its Asian neighbours, historically India's development partnership with Africa has been heavily oriented towards the provision of technical skills and training, principally delivered through ITEC." This has ensured that the training component of India's development cooperation remains largely the face of India's development cooperation.

One of India's most important development cooperation projects in recent years—the Pan-African e-Network—has often been referred to as India's "flagship" programme in Africa. It essentially aims to connect schools and hospitals on the African continent with institutions based in India with the use of technology. Formally announced in September 2004, it was launched in July 2007 in Addis Ababa after a number of consultations took place in India and Africa. Through the project, facilities for tele-medicine and tele-education are being made available, while network video conferencing for heads of state in all members of the African Union will be provided. When complete, the network will also connect 52 learning centres, ten super speciality hospitals (three in India), 53 other hospitals, and five universities (two in India). The total amount committed to this undertaking is \$125 million (ibid, 366; Pan-African e-Network 2014).

Indian officials (Pan-African e-Network 2014) often highlight that "the project is also equipped to support e-governance, e-commerce, information, resource mapping and meteorological and other services in the African countries, besides providing VVIP connectivity among the Heads of State of the African countries through a highly secure closed satellite network."

The first phase of implementation was inaugurated in February 2009. A total of 47 countries have already signed memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with the Indian government, and it is envisioned that this project will further assist in capacity building by imparting quality long-distance education to 10,000 students in Africa over a five-year period in a range of disciplines. This form of long-distance learning thus gives African students

access to some of India's best institutions of higher learning through the use of technology. The tele-medicine component of the project provides medical services by way of online medical consultation to the medical practitioners at the patient end location in Africa by Indian medical specialists, allowing for skills transfer and access to India's medical expertise by African practitioners (*ibid*).

Given the project is being implemented on a Pan-African scale, India has sought to demonstrate its support towards greater African unity and regional integration, while demonstrating its own domestic strengths in technology tailor made for the developmental needs of developing countries. While the Ministry of External Affairs is responsible for this programme, it is the Telecommunications Consultants India Limited (TCIL), a state-owned Indian company, that is responsible for its implementation on a turnkey basis (*ibid*).

In addition to this Pan-African project, India has also recently initiated a project more regionally focused in Africa. The Technical Economic Approach for Africa Movement (TEAM-9) initiative directly targets African countries in West Africa. Given that previously India had very little relations with this region—focusing more on English-speaking countries in East and Southern Africa—this initiative was seen as central to expanding its linkages with Francophone countries (Price 2011, 2). Like the disbursements provided by the Eximbank, this dissertation selects carefully those projects which can be considered as development cooperation and does not include commercial lines of credit (LoCs) not subsidized by the Indian government.

The MEA has had to partner with a range of domestic actors to implement its development projects effectively, including the various training courses that India offers to its African beneficiaries, where the MEA acts as the central ministry in charge, while various Indian institutions lobby to be the implementation partners of the various forms of development cooperation. It is thus insightful to analyse the companies and organisations closely associated with the MEA, which are primarily involved in a range of consultancy services both within India and abroad. These companies have a close relationship with the MEA and are often entrusted with implementing the training programmes offered by the ITEC and SCAAP. Currently, there are 47 affiliated institutions conducting 280 short-term, medium-term, and long-term courses annually. The courses are fully sponsored by the Government of India and have been broadly

divided into seven categories, namely (ITEC 2014; MEA Annual Reports 2000–2010):

- Accounts, Audit, Banking, and Finance Courses,
- IT, Telecommunications, and English Courses,
- Management Courses,
- SME/Rural Development Courses,
- Specialised Courses,
- Technical Courses, and
- Environmental and Renewable Energy Courses.

The MEA thus partners with a whole range of domestic actors when implementing its development cooperation in the form of human capacity development. These range from universities such as the National University of Educational Planning and Administration in New Delhi, research institutions such as the Research and Information System for Developing Countries and the Centre for Development of Advanced Computing in Noida and Mohali (MEA Annual Reports 2000–2010), while it is also constantly liaising with other government ministries depending on the type of training programmes being undertaken.

In recent years, even business associations such as the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) have partnered with the MEA as the scope of its development cooperation programme has increased. This development coincides with greater efforts from both the Indian government and the private sector to better coordinate their efforts in Africa (Saran Op. cit., 6).

India has relied on the same links and partnerships mentioned above in the deputation of Indian experts abroad. Assisted by their command of the English language and the ability of its institutions of higher learning to produce a skilled middle class, Indian experts in a wide variety of fields have been sought by developing countries to assist them build up their own capacities or assist temporarily in the implementation of development projects (Raghavan 2013). Depending on the type of experts requested, India can then coordinate with its various departments and domestic institutions to send the requested experts abroad for a specified amount of time. This form of assistance goes back to the early days of India's development cooperation and continues to grow.

According to the ITEC (2014), “[t]he experts study the problems and suggest solutions without disturbing the local socio-economic and cultural environment. Some of the fields covered in recent years have been creative arts, pest management, military training, IT, audit, medicine, English teaching, telecommunications, agricultural research, etc. Indian experiences and expertise in the fields of small and medium scale industries, agriculture and financial management have been found to be particularly relevant to the developing countries.”

Another form of development cooperation that India provides its African counterparts comes in the form of feasibility studies. In these instances, the MEA would ordinarily send an Indian institution to carry out the feasibility study and cover all the costs. Once completed, the results of the feasibility studies are then handed over to the governments concerned to use as they see fit (ITEC 2014).

Besides the training of professionals and civil servants, the deputation of experts, and the carrying out of feasibility studies for African countries, the Indian government has also offered scholarships since the inception of its development cooperation programme. These scholarships have allowed thousands of African students—some of which have gone on to take up leading roles in the public and private sectors of their home countries—to benefit from India’s institutions of higher learning. This has certainly been the case with regard to what are known as India’s Institutes of Technology (IIT). At the second India–Africa Forum Summit, Prime Minister Singh announced India’s interest in building an India–Africa Virtual University to meet some of Africa’s growing demand in education, with 10,000 scholarships being offered by the Government of India (Second India–Africa Forum Summit 2011).

While most of India’s development cooperation in Africa is targeted towards building Africa’s “soft infrastructure,” the Indian government has increasingly sought to also play a role in building hard infrastructure. While this aspect of its development cooperation is not as large and well known as its training component, a growing amount of resources have been committed in recent years. Most of the infrastructure funding in the form of concessional loans has come from the Eximbank, with India not only training personnel, but also increasingly committing to building training institutions across Africa in a wide range of areas from information communications technology to institutions specialising in diplomacy and international trade (NEPAD Press Release on Second India–Africa

Summit 2011). This is a significant step, and one accepted with much enthusiasm in Africa. Some of the new institutions that India committed to include the following:

- An India–Africa integrated textile cluster to support the cotton industry;
- An India–Africa centre for medium-range weather forecasting to harness satellite technology for agriculture and fisheries sectors;
- An India–Africa institute of agricultural and rural development;
- An India–Africa University for Life and Earth Sciences (ibid).

These commitments continued a new trend from India to build vocational training and incubation centres across Africa. Chaturvedi et al. (2012, 176) provide a table of established institutions build by India in recent years (Table 3.2):

Another new tool that India has used in its development cooperation in Africa has been the writing off of debt incurred by least developing countries. This initiative borrows from the HIPC process; however, without the attaching of conditionality's to debt cancellation. Announcements have often been made in high-level bilateral and multilateral gatherings

Table 3.2 Newly established Indian institutes in developing countries

<i>Institute</i>	<i>Purpose</i>	<i>Country</i>
India–Africa Institute of Information Technology	Professional courses in ICT	Ghana
India–Africa Institute of Educational Planning and Administration	Training professionals to plan and manage growth of higher education	Burundi
India–Africa Institute of Foreign Trade	MBA and related diploma courses in foreign trade	Uganda
India–Africa Diamond Institute	Training for diamond polishing	Botswana
Institute for Telemedicine	Specialised training for doctors	Ethiopia
Entrepreneurship Development Centre	Training in economically active sectors	Senegal
Plastic Technology Training Centre	Designing, tool room, processing division, and testing centre for the plastics industry	Namibia
Vocational Training Centre for Small and Medium Enterprises	Training in economically active sectors	Zimbabwe

Source: Chaturvedi et al. (2012, 176)

such as the India–Africa summits (India–Africa Forum Summit 2008, 201; MEA Annual Reports 2000–2010).

While these tools are meant explicitly for aiding the development of recipient countries, India also provides humanitarian assistance meant to prevent humanitarian crises brought about through man-made disasters such as wars to natural disasters from escalating further. In such cases, the Indian government is known to provide assistance in the form of food aid, medicines, cash aid, and the provision of blankets where necessary (ITEC 2014). This expanding range of tools highlights that India's development cooperation in Africa has expanded in size and scope in the first decade of the twenty-first century and thereafter.

This section of the chapter has provided an overall context of India's development cooperation in Africa while highlighting its main characteristics and international development infrastructure. What is clear is that contrary to conventional wisdom that India's development cooperation is limited to human capacity development in Africa, the Indian government has expanded its development cooperation tools and the countries it targets. It is the study's task to systematically evaluate not only the aggregate disbursements, but also to specify which countries have received the most development cooperation, and why it is that some have received high levels while others have not, especially in comparison to China's development cooperation in Africa.

The next chapter outlines the causal conditions identified through both theoretical knowledge and substantive knowledge of individual cases. It will also further elaborate on the assumptions on causation and how the causal conditions are intrinsically related to international relations theory.

NOTES

1. The other two include the Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC) and the China Development Bank (CDB).
2. On the role of provincial governments in China foreign aid system, check Zhimin and Junbo (2009).

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Theoretical Foundations of the Determinants of Development Cooperation

The existence of competing theoretical positions to explain particular phenomena is common in the social sciences, in much the same way in which it is common within the natural sciences. Theories are thus often assumed to compete throughout the existence and development of any academic discipline as scholars disagree on important ontological, epistemological, and methodological aspects. These disagreements are mostly rooted in meta-theoretical positions in the philosophy of science and different assumptions on causality. In the discipline of international relations, the dominance of behaviouralism has meant that existing theories are often tested against one another in a competition for explanatory dominance. Two main meta-theoretical positions have been the most relevant to the study of global politics: positivism and scientific realism.

According to Steve Smith et al. (1996, 11), international relations has been dominated by positivism for the past four decades, which has meant a commitment to a unified view of science, and the adoption of methodologies of the natural sciences to explain the social world. The dominance of positivism has meant that the “great debates” in the discipline’s history, between idealism and realism, traditionalism and behaviouralism, or between transnationalism and state-centrism, have thus not involved questions of epistemology. For Smith, this has significantly “narrowed” and “stifled” debate over what the world is like and how it may be explained (ibid).

Hedley Bull (1966, 261), also not entirely satisfied with the dominance of positivism within international relations, makes a plea for what he calls the “classical approach” to research. He defines this approach as follows:

The classical approach is the approach to theorizing that derives from philosophy, history, and law, and that is characterized above all by explicit reliance upon the exercise of judgement and by the assumptions that if we confine ourselves to strict standards of verification and proof there is little of significance that can be said about international relations, that general propositions about this subject must therefore derive from a scientifically imperfect process of perception or intuition, and that these general propositions cannot be accorded anything more than the tentative and inconclusive status appropriate to their doubtful origin.

This position advanced by Bull is quite similar to that propagated by Smith and draws more from scientific realism instead of positivism. Scientific realists claim to put ontology before epistemology. This accounts for their assumption that objective reality exists independently of epistemology or the human mind, language, and interpretation. This is relevant in that scientific realists see theories actually referring to reality, with strong theories explaining and referring truly to the reality that exists. Unlike positivists, scientific realists also believe that unobservables account for reality and credible knowledge, often describing and explaining deeper structures of reality. Methodologically, they do not put emphasis on empiricism and observation and don't think that effective theories are only those that are falsifiable in principle. They however do not emphasise a specific epistemological approach. To the scientific realist, a strong theory is not just a tool or instrument to help us through life, but truly represents objective reality.

Weighing in on the debate, Colin Wight (2002, 30) contends that positivism is a philosophy of, and for, science and its adoption requires the taking of a series of implicit ontological and epistemological assumptions as well as methodological ones. It is on this basis that Wight disagrees with Steve Smith, who argues that positivism is more of a methodology. Moreover, as a philosophy of science with well-formulated accounts of cause, explanation, law, and the nature of the world, he contends that it is incorrect to consider positivism as simply a methodology.

The argument made by Bull in somewhat equating positivism to a methodology has mostly led to the perception that positivism as a

philosophy of science is synonymous with quantitative research designs or the variable-oriented research strategy. This however is not the case, and rather than only associating positivism with one type of methodology, one should look at the broader ontological, epistemological, and methodological aspects. While this study is grounded in the positivist philosophy of science, it is quite evident that instead of using the quantitative method, one has adopted a qualitative comparative method called QCA.

Whether implicitly or explicitly known and acknowledged by the international relations practitioner, philosophy of science debates have a profound impact on the type of research being conducted, posing questions regarding what constitutes science and how scholars should approach their discipline. While these debates are often on a theoretical and abstract level, they significantly influence how scholars view and approach their discipline and research.

To borrow from Alexander Wendt (1998, 103–104), the main question asked in this study is a “causal” and not a “constitutive” question. It thus seeks to explain a phenomenon grounded in a state of “change,” identifying causal conditions constructed from both theory and substantive knowledge, which are then subjected to a process of empirical observation.

The approach adopted is thus primarily influenced by the main question it seeks to answer, on why Southern powers have provided more development cooperation to some countries and not others in Africa. It is posited that in order to satisfactorily answer this question, it is necessary to employ a research design that allows one to empirically examine most of the possible answers and thus provide empirical evidence for the conclusions reached. Given that it is focused on a particular period of time (2000–2010), it is only through the documentation and analysis of the causal conditions and outcome condition throughout that timeframe that one may draw objective conclusions and law-like statements on the determinants of development cooperation from China and India in Africa.

It mostly follows that in providing answers to causal questions, one is actually saying that “X” causes “Y.” In order to state that, three assumptions have to be made, namely, that (1) X and Y exist independent of each other, (2) that X precedes Y in time, and (3) that but for X, Y would not have occurred. This particular research approach thus requires the terminology of “independent” and “dependent” variables that is often used in causal theorising (Wendt 1998, 105).

This study adds another very important assumption about answering causal questions, that of equifinality. This means that instead of assuming that but for X, Y would not have occurred, it is important to allow for the possibility that other causal conditions, alone or combined, may have also led to the outcome of Y. Such an explanation would mean that while X and Y are indeed independent of each other, and while X precedes Y, it is possible that X led to Y, or that X, combined with X₂ or X₄, also led to the outcome of Y. If the empirical evidence does indeed show that only X were responsible for causing Y, then one would state that X is both necessary and sufficient for Y to occur. In doing so, this study assumes maximum complexity to causality in social science and also does not treat the causal variables as independent of one another, but instead as conditions which may in fact interact under different contexts to produce the outcome of interest.

In the case of this study, the causal conditions or variables are drawn from a range of theories that have in different periods of time sought to answer the question of why nation states provide development cooperation. Besides drawing from theory to identify the causal conditions, the study has also relied on substantive knowledge of the cases in order to formulate causal variables.

It is also important to make the observation that while different theories and causal conditions have (competitively) sought to explain development cooperation, none of the dominant theories attempt to explain the possibility of one outlined causal condition combining with another (drawn from a different theory) in order to explain the determinants of development cooperation. The assumptions on causality in the social world adopted here thus make it possible to provide such a combinatorial explanation and not only one which seeks to explain the net effects of one “independent” variable versus the net effects of other competing variables. This has important implications in that instead of the four causal conditions identified in this book directly leading to the formulation of four hypotheses, they actually lead to 16 logical combinations of the four causal combinations. This will be elaborated in the methodology chapter, which follows this chapter.

The theories selected in this type of research design have to be the most relevant in answering the main research question, allowing one to either construct testable hypotheses (quantitative research) or construct truth tables with rows of combinations (qualitative comparative analysis). It is to these various theoretical positions and causal conditions under examination

that this section now turns to, describing and analysing the most relevant theories and identifying the four causal conditions. These four causal conditions mean that 16 logically possible combinations exist to produce the outcome variable and not just four as variable-oriented quantitative studies assume. The main assumption made is that the four hypothetical causes may in fact act in a combinatorial manner to create the outcome. It thus importantly adds the assumption on equifinality and causal complexity to explaining social phenomena. The next section outlines the theoretical and substantive foundations of the four causal conditions identified in this study.

A REALIST THEORY OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION: THE ROLE OF STRATEGIC DETERMINANTS

In an effort to “set the record straight” on realism, William Wohlforth (2008, 131) argues that any study on international politics is incomplete without a grounding in this centuries-old foundational school of thought. While political realists typically claim to be part of a long tradition that stretches back from Thomas Hobbes and Niccolo Machiavelli and Thucydides, he commences to identify four main generations of political realists in the academic study of international relations. These are represented in the table below (ibid, 132) (Table 4.1):

These scholars have built “a bewildering array of arguments, theories, and debates,” which can be categorised into theoretical schools and

Table 4.1 Realist theorists in their historical periods

<i>Historical period</i>	<i>Main theorists</i>
Interwar and wartime generation	Reinhold Niebuhr E.H. Carr
Post-war and early Cold War generation	Hans Morgenthau George Kennan Raymond Aron
Detente generation	Kenneth Waltz Stephen Krasner Robert Gilpin
Post-Cold War generation	John Mearsheimer Steven Walt Randell Schweller Charles Glaser

Based on Wohlforth (2008)

specific realist theories (Wohlforth 2008, 135). International relations scholars have tended to describe the development of theory as a linear process attempting to construct an all-encompassing grand theory of global politics. If this were true, then early attempts by Morgenthau in the 1960s and Waltz in the 1970s must be evaluated as failures due to the later theoretical critiques and empirical setbacks they faced. According to this account, the proliferation of new realist schools in the post-Cold War era such as offensive realism, defensive realism, and neoclassical realism must be seen as indications of the degeneration of neorealism and earlier realist attempts to build an all-encompassing macro-theory of international relations (ibid, 135–136).

Wohlforth (ibid, 136–138) further argues that while Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations* and later Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* made attempts to construct macro-theoretical frameworks of international relations, the diversity that has characterised the discipline did not disappear with these works. He illustrates this point through the publication of Robert Gilpin's *War and Change in World Politics* just two years after the influential publication by Waltz. Thus, even during the height of neorealism's influence, Gilpin was explaining change in global politics—something that neorealism has been criticised for not addressing.

The variety of theories within the realist tradition have been influenced by philosophy of science debates on what constitutes science. Waltz was thus influenced by the “behaviourist turn” as positivism grew within the social sciences in general and international relations in particular. While Waltz's work was now seen as “scientific,” anything that subscribed to a different philosophy of science now fell into the category of “classical realism.” This was largely due to Waltz's argument that classical realists such as Morgenthau's insights into international politics were weakened by their inability to separate the relative importance of human nature, the internal attributes of states, and the international states system as a whole (Wohlforth 2008, 137).

Robert Gilpin (2001: 3) argues that while globalisation has been the defining and noticeable characteristic after the Cold War in both economic and political affairs, its extent and significance have been greatly exaggerated in various discussions and analyses. He thus argues that it is not as “sweeping” or “extensive” as many contemporary observers believe. While acknowledging its impact, his principal argument is that the world we live in is still one where national policies and domestic economies are the key determinants of global economic and political affairs. While affirming the

centrality of the state in global politics, he does not treat it as a black box or a unitary actor and thus acknowledges the role of domestic actors in transmitting their interests into state interests or preferences.

This political economy interpretation used by Gilpin (*ibid*) defines the economy as “a sociopolitical system composed of powerful economic actors or institutions such as giant firms, powerful labour unions, and large agribusinesses that are competing with one another to formulate government policies on taxes, tariffs, and other matters in ways that advance their own interests. And the most important of these powerful actors are national governments. In this interpretation, there are many social, political, or economic actors whose behaviour has a powerful impact on the nature and functioning of markets.” This version of state-centric realism advanced by Gilpin, like other realist positions, also sees state interests—formed through the interaction of domestic individuals and groups—as a central aspect in the explanation of state behaviour. In relation to development cooperation, Gilpin (1987, 312) asserts that “the primary motives for official aid by individual governments have been political, military and commercial.”

Turning his focus to the many scholars who criticise realism, Wohlforth (2008, 143) states the following:

The monolithic myth leads to a tendency to equate diversity with degeneration. Many scholars want to think of international relations scholarship as a neatly defined competition between grand theories or paradigms [...] Diversity within realism undercuts this vision and makes the world of scholarship messier and harder to organise, and so is portrayed as degeneration, a sign of decline. The problem with this vision is that it is normative, not positive. It is how some scholars think their profession ought to work, not how it actually does. Hence, it is profoundly misleading.

Thus, in selecting the most relevant theory within the realist tradition, this study finds merit in the sentiment expressed by Wohlforth (*ibid*, 143) when he argues that in fact “[n]o single sub-school or theory is always right or always the source of the master explanation to which others are subservient. Different strands of realism are more or less relevant to different problems and cases. The question for contemporary researchers is which sub-schools or specific theories apply to a given problem or case?”

In developing his “political theory of foreign aid,” Morgenthau (1962, 301) makes a distinction between six types of foreign aid. The only thing in common they share is the voluntary transfer of money, goods, and services

from one nation state to another. He categorises them as humanitarian aid, subsistence aid, military aid, bribery, prestige, and economic development.

Out of the six types of aid, he argues that much of what is referred to as foreign aid is essentially in the nature of bribes. He thus argues that foreign aid “performs the function of a price paid for political services rendered or to be rendered.” He distinguishes this type of bribe from more historical types of bribes in diplomacy in that it is justified primarily in terms of economic development for the recipients and thus “less effective for the purpose of purchasing political favors than were the traditional ones” (*ibid*, 302).

This illustrates very clearly the nature of an explanation on the determinants of development cooperation from the realist tradition in international relations. Taken to its logical conclusion, it is not even possible that nation states could genuinely provide development cooperation to fellow nation states for the purposes of the economic development of recipients. In the question of donor interests versus recipient interests, realist scholars unequivocally lean towards the former.

Morgenthau goes to great lengths in dismissing the very notion that the transfer of goods, services, and money can bring about economic development to developing countries. As he puts it, some countries are doomed—for a variety of reasons—to be underdeveloped and incapable of the type of economic development witnessed by the West. To put it bluntly in his words, “as there are bums and beggars, so are there bum and beggar nations” (*ibid*, 304–305). This explanation of the determinants of development cooperation as articulated by Gilpin and especially Hans Morgenthau leads to the expectation that development cooperation is only provided for strategic reasons.

While it is certainly plausible that nation states give a great amount of consideration to strategic interests when disbursing their development cooperation, it is quite different to argue that strategic interests are the only explanatory variable for the disbursement of high levels of development cooperation. It is thus important—as this study does—to consider that social phenomena tend to be more complex than that. Monocausal arguments, while sometimes quite possible, often do not explain the complexity of social phenomena. This study will instead specify the importance of this causal condition, how it combined with other variables to produce or not produce the outcome variable of interest, and importantly to discern whether it was a necessary or sufficient condition, or even whether it was both necessary and sufficient in producing the phenomenon of interest.

A LIBERAL THEORY OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION: ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

Having analysed the theoretical underpinnings of the first causal variable on the strategic importance of recipients, it is now necessary to demonstrate what aspects the liberal tradition points to as key determinants of development cooperation. What this variable shares with the first one is its reliance on rational choice and utilitarian assumptions to explain various aspects of international relations. Like the first variable, it captures the material interests of actors in global politics.

Jeffrey Frieden (1999: 39) states that “[i]nterests are central to the study of international politics. To understand relations among countries we must take into account their interests, just as to analyze national foreign policy making requires due attention to the interests of groups, bureaucracies, and other participants in national debates.” According to Andrew Moravcsik (1997: 513), “Liberal IR theory elaborates the insight that state-society relations—the relationship of states to the domestic and transnational social context in which they are embedded—have a fundamental impact on state behaviour in world politics. Societal ideas, interests, and institutions influence state behaviour by shaping state preferences, that is, the fundamental social purposes underlying the strategic calculations of governments.”

According to Moravcsik (*ibid*, 515), his theory of international relations “applies equally to liberal and nonliberal states, economic and national security affairs, conflictual and nonconflictual situations, and the behaviour both of individual states (foreign policy) and of aggregations of states (international relations).” While realist theories may put more emphasis on strategic political determinants, liberal theorists may put more emphasis on economic determinants for development cooperation.

Liberal IR theory is based on three core assumptions, the first being the primacy of societal actors. It is thus assumed that “the fundamental actors in international politics are individuals and private groups, who are on the average rational and risk averse and who organize exchange and collective action to promote differential interests under constraints imposed by material scarcity, conflicting values, and variations in societal influence (*ibid*, 516).” It thus builds its explanation from the “bottom-up,” with the demands of individuals and groups being formed prior to the political process (*ibid*, 517).

The second core assumption relates to representation and state preferences and assumes that “states represent some subset of domestic society, on the basis of whose interests state officials define state preferences and act purposively in world politics (ibid, 518).” The state is thus seen as a representative institution which is open to “capture” and “recapture,” “construction” or “reconstruction” by the dominant social actors. With such a representation of the state, it is clear that the ruling political elite or the government acts under environmental constraints imposed by the varying “identities,” “interests,” and “power of individuals and groups” inside and outside the state apparatus that constantly pressure the decision makers to pursue policies in line with their own preferences. However, since “every government represents some individuals and groups more fully than others,” it is essential to analyse the nature of state institutions and societal interests in determining state behaviour (ibid). This leads to the third core assumption in liberal theory, which is related to interdependence and the international system. Here it is assumed that the configuration of interdependent state preferences determines state behaviour.

While the liberal theory of international relations outlined by Moravcsik can be classified as a macro-theoretical framework as he builds a liberal theory which attempts to explain the whole international system, the following study, and this variable in particular, is not interested in explaining the whole macro-level of global politics. It is thus middle-range theories that this study is interested in. With regard to a liberal theory of the determinants of development cooperation in particular, it is important to keep in mind the core assumptions as outlined above as they are fundamental to the liberal explanation of the determinants of development cooperation. While realism stresses more on security, national capabilities, and strategic interests when it comes to explaining state behaviour, liberalism puts a stronger emphasis on the role of economic transactions between rational actors as a key motivation in an increasingly interdependent world.

Tim Lloyd et al. (1998, 1) demonstrate that “theoretical considerations can be used to justify a link from aid to trade, i.e., donors may use aid as a policy instrument to stimulate subsequent increased trade with the recipient. Alternatively, the link may be from trade to aid; donors will tend to grant more aid to those recipients with which they have strong established trade relations.”

They go on to name a few reasons why one might take the theoretical position linking development cooperation to economic interests. The most obvious example is that which involves tied aid, where the development cooperation projects being disbursed in developing countries are

“contingent on purchasing goods from the donor” (ibid, 2). Such tying of aid is thus seen as exposing the recipient country to the products and services of the donor country, in what Morrissey argues presents a situation where “aid is trade” in the sense that the aid constitutes exports provided as a grant or at a concessional rate to the aid recipients (Morrissey 1993).

While it is certainly plausible that nation states give a great amount of consideration to economic interests when disbursing their development cooperation, it is again quite different to argue that economic interests are the only explanatory variable for the disbursement of high levels of development cooperation. This book thus specifies the importance of this causal condition, how it combined with other variables to produce or not produce the outcome variable of interest, and importantly to discern whether it was a necessary or sufficient condition, or even whether it was both necessary and sufficient in producing the phenomenon of interest.

HUMANITARIAN IDEAS AND NORMS AS DETERMINANTS OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

There can be no satisfactory account of the determinants of development cooperation without an examination of both materialistic and idealistic explanations. When Robert Keohane, in his 1988 presidential address to the International Studies Association (ISA), noted the role of the constructivist approach to global politics, he was unequivocal in stating that its success or failure would be determined by its ability to inspire and support a vigorous programme of empirical research (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 391–392).

At the core of the constructivist approach is its concern with the role of ideas, norms, values, and culture in explaining social phenomena which occur in global politics. Rather than taking interests for granted, it is instead the role of “intersubjective” ideas and meanings which matter more than material factors (Wendt 1992: 396–403). Drawing from Wendt, Price and Reus-Smit, Adler, and Ruggie, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001: 392–393) define constructivism as an approach to social analysis that asserts the following:

- Human interaction is shaped primarily by ideational factors, not simply material ones;
- The most important ideational factors are widely shared or “intersubjective” beliefs, which are not reducible to individuals; and
- These shared beliefs construct the interests and identities of purposive actors.

Constructivist research affirms the great importance of understanding the ways in which social phenomena are constituted as this assists in explaining political outcomes. Seen this way, constitution is clearly not mere description but instead causal explanation since the way in which “things are put together makes possible, or even probable, certain kinds of behaviour and effects” (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001: 393).

“In their efforts to establish independent causal force for norms and ideas, many constructivist studies have emphasized the ways in which ideas and norms run counter to or undermine conventional conceptions of strong state interests” (ibid, 398). This is clearly the case when it comes to the research conducted by David Lumsdaine on the role of morality and humanitarian ideas on the part of donor countries of the DAC, with theoretical and empirical implications for the study and practice of development cooperation.

The conclusions reached by Lumsdaine demonstrate theoretically and empirically how and why it is not enough to test the motivations of development cooperation by only using the materialistic interests of donor countries. He goes beyond making a rhetorical and theoretical critique of rational choice and realist explanations of development cooperation through providing detailed empirical evidence and observations which support his own hypotheses drawn from constructivism. It is important to note that Lumsdaine, Finnemore, Sikkink, and many modernist constructivists see such a constitutive explanation as a partial explanation. Applying the insights reached by his study to the present study thus contributes greatly towards a more comprehensive understanding of Southern powers as sources of development cooperation, especially when causation is understood in a combinatorial manner.

Challenging many established beliefs on development cooperation, Lumsdaine (1993: 3) argues that it was in fact the humanitarian concerns of DAC countries which explain their provision of development cooperation to developing countries. He sees it largely as a genuine response to global poverty and not as the result of cold calculation on the part of donor countries. While decrying the fact that most studies “deny” or “ignore” the possibility of a “moral vision and commitment” shaping global politics, he is equally not interested in producing “purely theoretical discussions about ethics in world affairs” (ibid, 4).

While stating that “[s]elfishness and survival pressures are ubiquitous,” he “argue[s] that they are not absolute. Rigorous-sounding claims that self-interest is all-determining in world politics are often little more than

Table 4.2 How ideas and moral conceptions shape the outcomes of global politics

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1. Through the systematic transfer of domestic political conceptions of justice to international life
 2. Through social and moral dialogue that constitutes international society
 3. Through normative meanings implicit in international regimes or practices such as foreign aid, meanings which shape the ongoing evolution of those practices
-

Based on Lumsdaine (1993)

plausibility arguments. States have significant choice and can modulate and counterbalance self-interest, destructive human impulses, and the pressures of the international system” (ibid). In explaining the role of ideas in development cooperation, Lumsdaine puts forward three ways in which moral conceptions have an effect on global politics (ibid, 5) (Table 4.2):

The theory posited by Lumsdaine thus sees the institutionalisation of development cooperation as the “transfer of domestic principles and practices to international politics,” further making the point that the strongest advocates of development cooperation among the DAC countries have been those with a strong commitment to the welfare state in domestic society. According to this rationale, the international development cooperation system would not have developed without “widespread consensus that the government ought to assist poor people in domestic society” (ibid, 23–24).

As this theory has predominantly been applied to members of the DAC, great insights may be learned about the role of Southern powers and developing countries in general in the constitution of the international development cooperation regime, and what implications this has had for the determinants of their development cooperation. While Lumsdaine understandably applies his theory to those countries which have dominated the aid regime, global changes which have seen Southern powers playing a growing role in development cooperation require that one thinks more broadly about their roles, especially in an environment filled with value judgements about their development cooperation yet little empirical evidence and theoretical insight on their motivations.

While Lumsdaine and many scholars direct their focus towards “well off” or “affluent” countries of the developed world, a key feature of this study is its primary focus on countries that are by no means well off. Southern powers continue to be recipients of development cooperation

and continue to grapple with major domestic developmental challenges. Yet this reality has not prevented them from playing an active role as sources of development cooperation, arguing that in fact it is due to the similarities they share with so many impoverished countries that they are better placed to assist in eradicating global poverty.

This is especially important given the active role played by developing countries in constituting an international development architecture to transfer resources to those countries in need following the independence of previously colonised nation states. Indeed “[t]he years prior to the announcement of Truman’s Point Four plan, the first foreign aid in the modern sense, are full of the Latin American and other less developed countries pressing in the UN’s Economic and Social Council for substantial programs of development assistance. The new awareness of the existence and needs of the underdeveloped countries awakened in many people in the developed world countries a desire to do something; in the context of a world in which the developed countries had already decided that peace and prosperity were linked to the recognition of the needs and rights of all countries, the demands presented were ones to which the developed countries’ leaders, even when they did not like the demands, felt a need to respond” (ibid, 66).

This study thus marks a departure from widely available analyses on the motivations of Southern powers. As Lumsdaine posits (ibid, 61):

When a country undertakes a course of action because it thinks that is the moral thing to do—because others will benefit, or because duty requires it for other reasons—rather than because it thinks the country itself will benefit, this should not be referred to as acting in the national interest. For to do so makes ‘national interest’ an analytically useless concept, since any purposive behaviour that is approved falls under it. Such a usage fails to distinguish pursuit of military strength, diplomatic position, economic gain, and the like from pursuit of the welfare of other states, or principles of justice. In claiming that a nation undertakes *certain* actions from the pursuit of national strength and wealth, or even undertakes *all* actions from those motives, it is necessary to admit a conceptual category of actions that are *not* undertaken for these goals if the claim is to be more than tautology.

While it is certainly plausible that nation states give a great amount of consideration to humanitarian norms and ideas of solidarity with the poor when disbursing their development cooperation, it is again quite different to argue that these constitute the only explanatory variable for the

disbursement of high levels of development cooperation. This study thus specifies the importance of this causal condition, how it combined with other variables to produce or not produce the outcome variable of interest, and importantly to discern whether it was a necessary or sufficient condition, or even whether it was both necessary and sufficient in producing the phenomenon of interest.

THE DIASPORA AS A DETERMINANT OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

While researchers focused on the determinants of development cooperation will be more or less familiar with the hypotheses outlined above, the fourth hypothesis has not been the focus of any systematic analysis on the determinants of development cooperation from scholars focused on OECD countries or those focused more on Southern powers. However, given the growth in interest on the role of the diaspora—especially after the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) in 2007—for the national development of countries of origin shown by a host of international organisations, national governments, NGOs, and area specialists (Agunias and Newland 2012, 3), it makes sense to integrate such a variable when examining China and India, two nation states with very large diaspora communities throughout the world.

According to Dina Ionescu (2006, 8), the growing interest can be explained by an “increasing awareness among countries of their own ‘diasporas’ and their potential for poverty reduction, development and economic growth. This has triggered initiatives to collect data, to reach out to diaspora groups, to advocate dual citizenship and to positively influence the images and perceptions of expatriates in home and host countries.” This sentiment is also expressed by Hein de Haas (2006, ii), where he articulates clearly the developmental benefits of the diaspora and need for targeted policies.

Given this context, one is thus interested in finding out empirically whether Southern powers such as China and India have given more development cooperation to those nation states that host larger diaspora communities in the developing world. The inclusion of this causal variable is only possible given the context of a growing consensus of the important role played by the diaspora in national development. This has led to an acknowledgement that the diaspora can and often does have an impact on the foreign policy interests of countries of origin, especially when nation

states have significant diasporas. Presented in this manner, one can actually situate this causal variable in the tradition of realism, as state policies towards the diaspora are seen in terms such as strategic interest, which are underpinned by utilitarian and rational choice assumptions. The policies made by nation states which target their diasporas are thus seen to address their national interest, that of channelling the resources of the diaspora towards their own national development.

Whereas the academic field of transnational studies uses the term “transnational communities” to capture the contemporary movement of people and their continued ties to their home communities,¹ this study uses “diaspora” as a concept. This usage allows one to incorporate the broader and historical movement of people who continue to be associated with their countries of origin despite acquiring the citizenship of their host countries.

Despite the growing interest in recent years from policymakers and international organisations, there remains a dearth of research empirically assessing the developmental impact of the diaspora through the various channels in which they’re engaged with their countries of origin. Within this context, there are even fewer studies which articulate the interests of host countries and countries of origin. Those studies which do address this phenomenon have tended to focus more on contemporary migration flows such as temporary labour migration (Ionescu, *Op. cit.*, 8–9; Mthembu 2008).

Alan Gamlen (2008, 3) states that “the meaning of the term diaspora has been debated extensively since its popularity in academic and policy discourse began to boom in the late 1960s. Scholars have debated whether or not the term should refer to specific historical groups—especially but not only the Jews—or whether it applies more widely.”

Ionescu (*ibid*, 13) adopts an inclusive definition of the diaspora, defining it as “members of ethnic and national communities, who have left, but maintain links with, their homelands.” She further argues that “the overall development potential of the people referred as diasporas can reach significant levels, involving such areas as business creation, trade links, investments, remittances, skills circulations, exchange of experiences and even impacts on social and cultural roles of men and women in the home society” (*ibid*, 8). This is very similar to how Agunias and Newland (*Op. cit.*, 15) define the diaspora:

[Diaspora] refers to emigrants and their descendants who live outside the country of their birth or ancestry, either on a temporary or permanent basis, yet still maintain affective and material ties to their countries of origin. The

common thread among these recent arrivals and members of long-established communities is that they identify with their country of origin or ancestry and are willing to maintain ties to it. These ties are, potentially, beneficial to development.

This inclusive definition, now widely used in diaspora studies, also informs how this study defines and operationalises it. Having the second largest diaspora in the world after China, the Indian government introduced two main categories of the Indian diaspora, namely, non-resident Indians (NRIs) and people of Indian origin (PIOs), where the former is designated for current Indian citizens living abroad and the latter designation aimed at foreign citizens of Indian descent. This categorisation is consistent with that which is adopted by Ionescu and various international organisations such as the IOM, which embrace a more inclusive definition which goes beyond that of transnational communities or “migrants” (ibid, 14–15).

Given the empirical knowledge that “economically more advanced countries have benefited more from the transfers made by their diasporas” (ibid, 22), it is indeed no surprise that China and India both view their diasporas as an important aspect of their national development. However, what is of great interest here is to empirically examine whether this has led to the channelling of more development cooperation to those developing countries that have larger diaspora communities.

To illustrate the contribution of India’s diaspora, Ionescu (ibid, 23) quotes an example mentioned by the Asian Development Bank (2004) regarding the importance of the software industry, which had created 400,000 new jobs and exported more than US\$6 billion in goods and services during 2002. Indeed, at the time of the report, a staggering 19 out of the top 20 Indian software businesses were founded or managed by professionals from the diaspora, making it very clear what an important role its diaspora has played.

Despite the growing interest and awareness of their importance to national development, it is important to keep in mind that only a few governments actually develop policies targeting their diasporas as a distinct issue area, thus shunning away from deliberate efforts to coordinate their state mechanisms to direct their efforts better towards the diaspora (Gamlen, *Op. cit.*, 6). Given that China and India are among the few who are increasingly coordinating their efforts to engage their diaspora, it makes sense to investigate whether the presence of a large diaspora in

African countries has had an impact on their allocation of development cooperation.

While incorporating this causal condition in the analysis, it is again quite different to argue that it constitutes the only important explanatory variable for the disbursement of high levels of development cooperation. This book thus specifies the importance of this causal condition, how it combined with other variables to produce or not produce the outcome variable of interest, and importantly to discern whether it was a necessary or sufficient condition, or even whether it was both necessary and sufficient in producing the phenomenon of interest.

The causal conditions formulated above make for a comprehensive mix of variables drawn from rational choice studies to constructivist research, thus allowing one to analyse theoretically and empirically the determinants of development cooperation from two large Southern powers, China and India. However, it is of little help to formulate causal conditions drawn from theory and substantive knowledge of the cases without actually explaining how one intends to empirically analyse and operationalise the variables that have been developed. It is to this task that the next chapter turns to. It will thus explain the methodology used to analyse the variables.

NOTES

1. Check the first chapter written by Thomas Faist titled “Diaspora and Transnationalism: What Kind of Dance Partners?” in *Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods*, ed. Rainer Bauböck and Thomas Faist (Amsterdam: IMISCOE, Amsterdam University Press, 2010).

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Methodology and the Operationalisation of Variables

All existing examinations of the topic of this study apply single-case study or quantitative methods. This particular research adopts neither of the two approaches that have dominated the social inquiry into the determinants of development cooperation in general or about Southern powers in particular. The use of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) as a method is well suited to middle-range theorising and the introduction of regional ontologies instead of universal claims; this allows one to generalise the results to the whole African continent. It also allows one to employ both a case-oriented and a deductive approach in a formal, systematic, replicable, and transparent manner. Kelly Devers et al. (2013, 1) describe the method in a concise manner as follows:

In general, QCA has been characterized as a new, ‘third’ way to conduct social science research that combines the strengths of traditional quantitative methods. The approach combines the comparative case-based and inductive approaches often used in qualitative research with the formal, mathematical approaches employed in quantitative research. However, this description of QCA can be somewhat deceiving because the approach differs from both traditional qualitative or quantitative approaches in significant ways so that it can be difficult for people trained in either research method to fully grasp its underlying conceptual basis in set-theory. In this respect, the approach might be better characterized as an attempt to redesign or

transcend existing qualitative and quantitative approaches, not substituting for them but complementing them under certain circumstances.

Charles Ragin and John Sonnet (2008: 1) also argue that “case-oriented explanations of outcomes are often combinatorial in nature, stressing specific configurations of causal conditions. Rather than focus on the *net effects* of causal conditions, case-oriented explanations emphasize their *combined effects*.”

Devers et al. (Op. cit., iii) state that “QCA is a research approach and analytic method based on set-theory and Boolean algebra. QCA has been characterized as an innovative methodological approach that is well suited for concept formation, the creation of typologies, and causal analysis, particularly when there is reason to believe that alternative factors can produce the same outcome, single conditions do not display their effect on their own but only in combination with other conditions, or there are different causal explanations for ‘success’ or ‘failure’ on an outcome of interest.”

Whereas quantitative researchers try to have as many cases as possible, and thus often try to make their questions as general as possible in order to incorporate more cases, this study is interested in a very specific question only applicable to a specific region. This means the cases available for observation are limited, what Ragin and Sonnet (ibid, 2) refer to as “limited diversity.”

Locating QCA between complexity and parsimony, Ragin and Sonnet (Op. cit., 2) argue that “case-oriented researchers [...] are not so enamoured of parsimony and prefer causal explanations that resonate with what is known of the cases themselves. Typically, when cases are examined in an in-depth manner, researchers find that causation is complex and very often involves specific combinations of causal conditions.”

All methodological approaches are based on particular assumptions, a fact also applicable to QCA. While most conventional approaches tend to assume that causation is quite simple and straightforward, with particular variables having independent and linear causal effects on the dependent variable, QCA assumes that causality is rather complex. In not seeing causal conditions as independent, QCA actually assumes that causal conditions may actually combine under different configurations to produce an outcome. This is an essential aspect of QCA as it not only sees causal conditions combining to produce an outcome, but also posits that there are often different paths instead of one that lead to a particular outcome of interest (ibid, 8).

As a formal technique to evaluate data, QCA makes use of truth tables to list all of the logically possible causal configurations and their associated

outcome. The number of logically possible causal combinations is dependent on the number of causal conditions under examination, where the number of causal combinations = 2^k , with k representing the number of causal conditions (ibid, 3, 8). With four causal conditions under examination in this study, the configurational question posed by Ragin and Sonnet (ibid, 8) becomes very relevant and applicable:

Can each cause generate the outcome regardless of the values of the other causal conditions or are combinations of causal conditions required? To answer this question for four causal conditions, it would be necessary to examine all sixteen of the logically possible combinations of conditions [...]. If each causal condition is capable of producing the outcome independently, then the only combination without the outcome should be the one with all conditions absent.

Due to the problem of limited diversity in the empirical world as explained above, only a particular number of configurations of the table will be observable in the empirical world. This means that even though in the case of this study—which has four causal conditions—there are 16 different logical possibilities of producing the outcome, only a limited amount of those are actually found empirically. This means that the truth table produces what are called “logical remainders,” being the combinations of causal conditions lacking any empirical cases (ibid, 3, 8–9).

It is then the responsibility of the researcher to deal with, or “treat,” these logical remainders as either “false” or “don’t care.” While treating them as false means that the initial equation produced by a truth table must be analysed and interpreted as it is, treating them as don’t care involves making a “simplifying assumption” which means they are either “treated as an instance of the outcome if doing so results in a logically simpler solution. Likewise, it can be treated as an instance of the absence of the outcome, again, if doing so results in a logically simpler solution for the absence of the outcome” (ibid, 4). Elaborating on these choices, they further state that (ibid, 11):

Researchers using QCA have two main options when confronted with diversity and an abundance of remainders (and thus potential counterfactual cases): (1) They can avoid using any remainders to simplify a truth table, or (2) they can permit the incorporation of the subset of remainders that yields the most parsimonious solution to the truth table. The first option bars counterfactual cases altogether; the second permits the inclusion of both easy and difficult counterfactuals, without any evaluation of their plausibility.

Given these choices, one should not see them as either/or choices since QCA allows the researcher to come up with intermediate explanations which lie somewhere in between parsimony and complexity (ibid, 12). In remaining consistent with the scientific approach to social inquiry, QCA makes the incorporation of all counterfactuals explicit and transparent, which opens up any research making use of this methodology to open evaluation and scrutiny by both those who produce and consume social research (ibid, 14). In this way, it allows one to remain consistent with the tenets of positivism in making knowledge claims that are essentially verifiable and falsifiable through the use of empirical observation.

Making use of Boolean algebra, the equations produced by the method of QCA to interpret and analyse the data make use of “multiplication (*), [which] indicates combined conditions (logical *and*), addition (+), [which] indicates alternate combinations of conditions (logical *or*), and “ \rightarrow ”, [which] indicates ‘is sufficient for’” (ibid, 4).

Ragin and Sonnet (ibid, 5) make it very clear that when using logical remainders to simplify the equations drawn from a truth table, one should follow particular rules:

In QCA it is incumbent upon the researcher to evaluate the plausibility of any *don't care* combination that is incorporated into a solution. [What is important is] the status of assumptions about combinations of conditions that lack empirical instances. In QCA, these assumptions must be evaluated; *don't care* combinations should not be grafted onto solutions in a mechanistic fashion. In conventional quantitative research, by contrast, the issue of limited diversity is obscured because researchers use techniques and models that embody very strong assumptions about the nature of causation (e.g., that causes operate as ‘independent’ variables, that their effects are linear and additive, that parsimonious models are best, and so on).

The procedure assessing the plausibility of the simplifying assumptions reached through the incorporation of remainders is in fact counterfactual analysis since a remainder may in fact be a potential counterfactual case (ibid, 5). Counterfactual analysis, which examines hypothetical cases, is used in historical, comparative, and case study-oriented research for “rhetorical and analytic ends” (ibid, 5). However, while a myriad of disciplines and methods integrate counterfactual arguments into their explanatory frameworks, none of them—except for QCA—actually “formalize [the method of using] counterfactuals within an explicitly configurational understanding of causality” (ibid, 6).

Ragin and Sonnet (ibid, 6) also state that “at a more abstract level, counterfactual analysis is implicated whenever a researcher makes a causal inference based on the analysis of ‘naturally occurring’ (i.e., nonexperimental) social data—data which limited diversity is the norm” (ibid, 6). This ability to integrate in a formal manner counterfactual analysis and arguments adds to the innovativeness of QCA as a method and this study in particular.

Incorporating input from Ragin, Devers et al. (2013) provide a step-by-step guideline of how to use QCA and employ ten steps to clarify the technique, especially to researchers applying the method by hand instead of using the software. It is necessary to go through all of the steps here, especially given the fact that in this study, all of the steps will be followed manually when examining the data.

Step #1. Refine QCA Evaluation Question

Devers et al. (ibid, 9) argue that researchers who use QCA have to ensure that the main research question can actually be analysed using the technique. Indeed, when using crisp sets QCA, one should always ensure that the outcome and condition variables can be expressed as dichotomous sets such as positive/present and negative/absent.

Step #2. Select the Case, Unit of Analysis, and Outcomes to Be Studied

When the unit of analysis has been outlined, one has to indicate which specific cases will be included in the QCA analysis. Devers et al. (ibid, 10) advise that the “[c]ases must share enough background characteristics—considered ‘constants’ in the analysis—to be comparable within the context of the outcome of interest.” However, it is important to note that while the cases should share commonalities, one should ensure that there is diversity within the subset of cases chosen since this assists in reducing the number of logical remainders to the truth table. While including many cases makes it more difficult to have an in-depth knowledge of the individual cases, having too few cases also limits the benefits of QCA as a methodological and analytical tool over other more traditional comparative methods (ibid).

Unlike quantitative methods which expect the random sampling of cases, the cases in QCA are selected based on the research question. This inevitably means that “a case should be included or excluded from a QCA study based on theoretical reasoning and knowledge of the conditions in the context of the outcome of interest” (ibid, 10).

Step #3. Select “Conditions”

Given that in the social sciences, one may choose from a great many possible conditions which have a positive or negative effect on the outcome being investigated, “the primary strategy for reducing the number of conditions to a manageable amount is to take into consideration all existing theories, hypotheses, explanations, and previous findings related to the research question and outcome of interest and rich knowledge of cases, and based on that information, only include in the analysis conditions that are likely to affect the outcome of interest” (ibid, 10–11).

Step #4. Collect and Compile Data into a “Raw Data Table”

After refining the question, selecting cases and causal conditions, one collects the data and compiles it in the form of a raw data table with values which can be translated into a QCA format (ibid, 12).

Step #5. Calibrate the Raw Data

The calibration process involves converting the measurements and values in the raw data into crisp sets or fuzzy sets. This involves giving scores based on set thresholds which show variation on the causal and outcome variables. In the case of crisp sets, dichotomous set membership values are used for the causal and outcome conditions, with 1 signifying the presence of a variable and 0 signifying the absence of a variable. The thresholds used to assign set membership values must be based on theoretical and substantive knowledge of the cases under examination (ibid, 12).

Devers et al. add the important point that “setting a threshold for either the condition or outcome should be done after careful consideration. Since the subjective nature of choosing threshold values introduces the risk of bias, one should check if a small change in the selected threshold will have a significant impact on the results of the analysis” (ibid, 13).

Step #6. Group Sets of Practices Together in a “Truth Table”

The next step is to actually produce the truth table, which summarises relationships between the causal conditions and the outcome of interest. The truth table has the important function of showing which configurations of causal conditions are linked with a positive outcome and which ones are linked with a negative outcome. Devers et al. (ibid, 17) explain that for crisp sets, “researchers should group practices with identical condition values together into a single row, and identify which practices appear in this row. This row should also identify whether all practices with this

combination of values performed highly [1] on the outcome of interest, all performed poorly [0] on this outcome, or had mixed performance on this outcome (indicated by a ‘C,’ for ‘contradiction’).”

Step #7. Resolve Contradictions

If contradictions are present in the truth table, one has to resolve them by going back in order to see whether there needs to be an adjustment to the cases or the thresholds adopted (ibid, 24).

Step #8. Summarise Findings Using Statements and/or Diagrams

The findings can be summarised through solution formulas, written statements, and Venn diagrams and should contain statements which identify which conditions are linked with a positive outcome and which are linked with a negative outcome (ibid, 25).

One of the key characteristics of QCA is that it distinguishes between necessity and sufficiency in identifying the causal conditions associated with an outcome of interest. Conditions are seen to be necessary if they are always present when the outcome is present, whereas conditions are seen to be sufficient if the outcome is always present when the condition is present (ibid, 25).

Step #9. Assess the Strength of Findings

Once the findings have been summarised, one can test the strength of the findings using equations which calculate consistency and coverage; the equations also depend on whether the set membership scores were crisp sets or fuzzy sets. “Parameters of fit” are used to assess how consistently relationships between causal conditions and outcome variables appear in the data, whereas coverage refers to the degree to which the summarised findings actually cover the whole data set. This is a good way of assessing to what extent the findings reached actually deviate from perfect set relationships (ibid, 28).

It is important to note that the consistency can be measured for both conditions which are necessary and those which are sufficient. Devers et al. (ibid) advise that “consistency should be measured for each separate combination of values that produces the outcome of interest (i.e., each row in a truth table). Only combinations with high consistency values that fall above a pre-established consistency threshold (between 0.75 and 0.80) should be interpreted.”

The equations for calculating how consistently a particular dichotomous condition is necessary or sufficient for producing a particular outcome of interest are as follows (ibid, 34–35) (Table 5.1):

Just as it is when measuring consistency, it is also possible to measure the coverage for both necessary and sufficient conditions, and the process allows the researcher to assess “the degree to which a condition (or combination of conditions) in a written statement or Venn diagram covers or explains the outcome observed—thus allowing researchers to identify which conditions (or combinations of conditions) have more empirical importance than others” (ibid, 29). The equations which outline how well-written statements about necessity and sufficiency actually explain the outcome of interest are as follows (ibid, 35–36) (Table 5.2):

Step #10. Interpret Findings

The final step is for researchers to interpret their findings through the use of Venn diagrams where possible, or “in a narrative format, identifying combinations of conditions that are linked with *high* performance on their outcome of interest and combinations that are linked with *low* performance on that outcome—making sure to only interpret combinations with ‘con-

Table 5.1 Calculating consistency

<i>Necessary dichotomous conditions</i>	<i>Sufficient dichotomous conditions</i>
Consistency = # of cases with particular condition(s) present AND high performance on outcome measure # of cases with high performance on outcome measure	Consistency = # of cases with particular condition(s) present AND high performance on outcome measure # of cases with particular conditions present

Construction based on Devers et al. (2013: 34–35)

Table 5.2 Calculating coverage

<i>Necessary dichotomous conditions</i>	<i>Sufficient dichotomous conditions</i>
Coverage = # of cases with particular condition(s) present AND high performance on outcome measure # of cases with particular condition(s) present	Coverage = # of cases with particular condition(s) present AND high performance on outcome measure # of cases with high performance on outcome measure

Construction based on Devers et al. (2013: 35–36)

sistency' values" (ibid, 29). Given that at this stage, one would have calculated the consistency and coverage, it is important to explain what those scores mean for the strength of their findings (ibid).

Given that every step followed must be communicated explicitly and transparently, one should not only present the truth table. In that sense, one should also include all other tables one deems important, such as the raw data table. Being transparent also means being very clear about which thresholds were adopted to convert raw data into dichotomous set membership scores and why they were adopted. One should also refer to previous literature and studies on the topic to explain the linkages between causal conditions and the outcome condition (ibid, 29).

OPERATIONALISING THE OUTCOME AND CAUSAL VARIABLES

The research design of this book is organised into whole cases with values on the causal and outcome variables; these need to be operationalised prior to the QCA analysis. They include the one outcome variable, or the phenomenon that is being explained, and the four causal variables, being the variables doing the explaining and thus also referred to as explanatory variables. Being variables, it is essential to highlight how they vary and what implications the variations have. Given that they vary, one must also be explicit in what thresholds each variable has in order to be considered as part of one set and not the other. It is towards this goal that the study now turns to, operationalising the variables and establishing thresholds, while also showing how they will be empirically analysed.

OUTCOME VARIABLE: HIGH DISBURSEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION FROM CHINA AND INDIA

What this study is essentially interested in explaining is the varied expansion of official transfers of money, goods, and services to African countries specifically for their economic development and welfare. It does this through the specification of causal conditions drawn from theory and substantive knowledge in order to identify how they combined to produce the outcome variable.

The countries under examination as recipients of development cooperation from China and India include countries with the legal recognition of the United Nations (UN) as per the principles of statehood articulated through the Montevideo Convention (1933). Since the period under

investigation goes until 2010, the recently created nation state of South Sudan is excluded from the analysis as the referendum that subsequently led to independence and recognition had not yet taken place. This means that while the African continent currently consists of 54 nation states, only 53 are included in the analysis.

This study collected over 500 development cooperation projects committed by China during the years 2000 and 2010 and have been sourced mainly from AidData's *ODA-Like* and *Official Finance* data, which lists over 2000 projects. In the case of India, the study also made use of AidData, which has data on India's project-level development cooperation between the years 2005 and 2010, listing over 100 development projects in Africa during the period under examination. While this data on India is not as well developed as that which has been collected on China, it is however a useful resource on India's development cooperation projects in Africa, especially given the data collection challenges in research on this topic as outlined earlier.

The study has subsequently developed tables, which organise and simplify the many observations of China and India's development cooperation projects in African countries starting with those that have received the highest amounts of development cooperation to those that received the least amounts of development cooperation. Since AidData had data on both countries, the study was able to comb through it and create a ranking for all countries that had received development cooperation from them (Tables 5.3 and 5.4).

The rankings show concisely which countries have received the highest amounts of development cooperation and which have received the least. It is from these tables that the cases for empirical analysis using QCA were deliberately selected. Before collecting the data in order to construct the tables, it was already decided that the cases used would have to have both positive and negative values on the outcome variable, thus constituting countries which were high recipients of development cooperation and those which did not receive high levels of development cooperation over the period under scrutiny. The 20 cases analysed more closely are thus the top ten recipients and the bottom ten recipients of development cooperation from China and India.

It is also important to understand that this study only analyses development cooperation expressed in monetary terms, meaning that many projects and development initiatives from China and India could not be captured simply due to the fact that it may not be recorded in monetary terms. This is certainly the case for both China and India's human capacity development programmes. When China and India offer to train thousands of students and government employees, or increase the number of schol-

Table 5.3 Distribution of China's development cooperation in Africa (2000–2010)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Commitments (US dollars 2009)</i>
1. Uganda	285,266,279.00
2. Zambia	210,700,399.00
3. Ethiopia	201,857,856.00
4. Ghana	195,244,760.00
5. Angola	177,700,793.00
6. Tanzania	161,536,340.00
7. Kenya	143,448,507.00
8. Ivory Coast	142,460,901.00
9. Mali	141,277,534.00
10. Rwanda	139,412,996.00
11. Congo	129,582,230.00
12. Namibia	126,362,225.00
13. Sudan	126,074,401.00
14. Zimbabwe	123,165,220.00
15. Malawi	118,901,537.00
16. Gabon	115,076,248.00
17. Senegal	114,756,891.00
18. Mauritius	106,936,587.00
19. Mozambique	104,607,308.00
20. Niger	91,593,198.00
21. Liberia	86,181,752.00
22. Guinea-Bissau	80,226,827.00
23. Egypt	79,858,284.00
24. Seychelles	71,317,215.00
25. Congo, Democratic Republic	65,360,770.00
26. Cameroon	62,901,609.00
27. Togo	59,118,452.00
28. Algeria	57,046,687.00
29. Nigeria	56,218,152.00
30. Burundi	54,709,683.00
31. Lesotho	51,573,497.00
32. Madagascar	47,144,510.00
33. Guinea	44,678,184.00
34. Djibouti	41,847,088.00
35. Chad	37,112,400.00
36. Morocco	35,736,181.00
37. Benin	33,670,913.00
38. Eritrea	32,471,079.00
39. Cape Verde	31,957,271.00
40. Botswana	31,839,540.00
41. Comoros	31,488,449.00

(continued)

Table 5.3 (continued)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Commitments (US dollars 2009)</i>
42. Equatorial Guinea	28,997,600.00
43. Sierra Leone	25,725,525.00
44. Central African Republic (CAR)	23,321,191.00
45. Mauritania	22,634,672.00
46. Tunisia	14,663,225.00
47. Somalia	10,763,347.00
48. South Africa	8,117,070.00
49. Burkina Faso	0.00
50. Gambia	0.00
51. Libya	0.00
52. Sao Tome and Principe	0.00
53. Swaziland	0.00
Total	4,182,643,383.00

Constructed by author based on AidData

arships they are providing, these disbursements are not always quantified in monetary terms and thus cannot be included in the QCA analysis. The more the data on Southern powers improves, the more feasible it will be to incorporate such data into future analyses on China and India.

While quantitative figures were used to create the raw data tables, these measures are then converted into dichotomous set membership values. Cases with a positive outcome will thus be given a 1 on the truth table, and those not displaying high levels of development cooperation will receive a 0 on the truth table. The summary of the truth tables will then reveal which combinations of the causal conditions were responsible for producing the outcome variable and which ones were responsible for producing the absence of the outcome variable.

This manner of analysing the data makes logical sense and is a reliable method. It is thus able to empirically examine the validity of the myriad claims on the determinants of development cooperation from Southern powers. It also allows the observations and findings to be replicated using the same method and data. Given that transparency is essential in methodology and scientific explanation, the Appendix includes the raw data documenting every project, its title, year of disbursement or commitment, the amount being disbursed, and which department or agencies were responsible for it. This means that the findings and results reached can be directly scrutinised by going over 2000 projects from China and India in Africa over the years 2000 and 2010.

Table 5.4 Distribution of India's project-level development cooperation in Africa (2005–2010)

<i>Recipient country</i>	<i>Total development cooperation received (US\$)</i>
1. Sudan	673,383,404
2. Ethiopia	428,382,206
3. Mali	180,203,443
4. Ghana	169,411,002
5. Nigeria	117,491,407
6. Angola	110,123,347
7. Ivory Coast	109,124,459
8. Senegal	90,789,474
9. Burkina Faso	78,299,855
10. Congo, Democratic Republic	76,597,107
11. Rwanda	73,318,878
12. Zambia	72,285,139
13. Chad	69,541,316
14. Mozambique	67,112,215
15. Sierra Leone	53,468,219
16. Tanzania	44,814,314
17. Cameroon	44,033,088
18. Central African Republic (CAR)	34,501,357
19. Madagascar	32,477,682
20. Eritrea	29,950,105
21. Mauritania	27,719,576
22. Seychelles	23,573,458
23. Niger	23,390,750
24. Equatorial Guinea	20,862,394
25. Benin	20,140,646
26. Mauritius	20,082,543
27. Djibouti	13,908,263
28. Lesotho	12,677,773
29. Swaziland	12,002,265
30. Namibia	9,444,857
31. Gambia	9,318,536
32. Comoros	2,665,250
33. Botswana	1,621,438
34. Liberia	1,559,578
35. Cape Verde	1,065,942
36. Uganda	726,181
37. Zimbabwe	724,962
38. Sao Tome and Principe	233,247
39. Algeria	0
40. Burundi	0

(continued)

Table 5.4 (continued)

<i>Recipient country</i>	<i>Total development cooperation received (US\$)</i>
41. Congo	0
42. Egypt	0
43. Gabon	0
44. Guinea	0
45. Guinea-Bissau	0
46. Kenya	0
47. Libya	0
48. Malawi	0
49. Morocco	0
50. Somalia	0
51. South Africa	0
52. Togo	0
53. Tunisia	0
Total	2,757,025,676

Constructed by author based on AidData

Lastly, as outlined earlier, this research design must make explicit the thresholds adopted on all the variables. This is important because of the set-theoretic nature of qualitative comparative analysis. It must thus be clear and transparent what thresholds govern the inclusion and exclusion of a particular variable as a member of a set. In the case of the outcome variable, the amount of money disbursed as development cooperation—expressed in US dollars—allows one to establish the thresholds. It is posited here that African countries which received 100 million US dollars or more in development cooperation can be considered as high recipients and those which received less than that cannot be considered as high recipients of development cooperation.

Given the fact that no theory explicitly sets out to construct thresholds which distinguish between high recipients of development cooperation and low recipients, one had to carefully study the cases under observation and the data that was collected. While this introduces a clear element of subjectivity, it is far better to be explicit and unequivocal in introducing the thresholds. It is however posited here that the thresholds make a valid attempt to distinguish between high recipients of China and India's development cooperation and countries that are not high recipients. These comparable thresholds thus operationalise very clearly what is meant by being a high

recipient and what is meant by not being a high recipient of development cooperation. Now that the outcome variable and its thresholds have been operationalised, it is now necessary to turn to the causal variables.

CAUSAL VARIABLE I: STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF RECIPIENTS

Drawn from the realist literature, this variable seeks to capture the resource endowments and material capabilities of recipient countries in Africa. It is posited here that if Southern powers provide development cooperation based on the strategic importance of recipients, then they should theoretically target African countries with more resources and larger material capabilities. However, given the fact that the notion of “strategic importance,” “power,” or “capabilities” is a highly contested concept in international relations, one has to develop well-established indicators to operationalise the strategic importance of recipients.

The operationalisation of the first variable is done through the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) developed through the Correlates of War Project, which was founded by J. David Singer, a renowned political scientist at the University of Michigan in 1963. From its inception, the project has been interested in the “systematic accumulation of scientific knowledge about war.” This has subsequently led to the ongoing measurement and operationalisation of the many concepts utilised in the study of international relations. The project has thus made great strides in operationalising and measuring concepts such as “national capability,” “alliances,” “geography,” and “polarity” in the post-Napoleonic era (COW 2014). This has been a valuable resource for many international relations scholars due to the project’s commitment to making knowledge accumulated publicly available and free of any costs.

According to Version 4.0 of the National Material Capabilities (NMC) Data Documentation codebook (2010: 1), power is defined as “the ability of a nation to exercise and resist influence.” It is also seen as “a function of many factors, among them the nation’s material capabilities. Power and material capabilities are not identical; but given their association it is essential that we try to define the latter in operational terms so as to understand the former.”

While some have criticised the CINC based on its primary focus on material indicators, it nonetheless captures the first variable very well and is grounded in rational choice and realist theory. It is thus not primarily

interested in capturing the non-material notions of power such as “soft power.” The project uses three sub-categories to measure national capabilities, namely, demographic, industrial, and military strength. It is argued that these “reflect the breadth and depth of the resources that a nation could bring to bear in instances of militarized disputes” (ibid, 3). One should add here that these resources are not only available to be brought to bear in cases of militarised disputes, but also in times of peace.

The three sub-categories of national power are then operationalised through the use of six indicators. The demographic resources are operationalised through the size of a state’s overall population, together with its urban population. The industrial resources of a state are operationalised through its iron and steel production and its primary energy consumption. Lastly, its military capabilities are operationalised through a state’s military expenditure and the size of its military personnel (COW 2014).

Once all of the six indicators have been measured and calculated, a concrete statistic is provided which quantifies the particular nation state’s material capability relative to the rest of the community of nation states. The final statistic for any given country is a number between 0 and 1, where 1 represents all of the world’s nation states’ capabilities combined. This is a great asset for this study as it is able to capture in a quantitative and reliable manner the material national capabilities of all 53 African countries covered by this study during the period of interest. The study uses the year 2007 for the measurement of national capability and thus strategic importance since it falls within the period under investigation. Thus, rather than assessing how African countries rank relative to all other nation states, one is able to focus on regional ontologies.

The use of the data has allowed one to rank all African countries based on their national capabilities. It is posited that their national capabilities should be in line with their strategic importance. To put it in a different way, if China and India used development cooperation to strengthen their ties and influence with African countries of strategic value to them, we should see this reflected in the sense that their development cooperation should have gone to those countries with higher material capabilities. This can be examined through converting the quantitative measurements of power into dichotomous set membership values on the condition variable of strategic importance. If a country is of strategic importance, it is given a value of 1 on the truth table, and if it is deemed to not be of strategic importance, it is given a value of 0 on the truth table. The results of the truth table will then be summarised to see whether indeed this causal condition was relevant and, if it was, whether it was a necessary or sufficient causal condition.

Using the Comprehensive Index of National Capability (CINC) developed by the Correlates of War Project, it was possible to rank African countries according to their strategic importance. This is an objective measurement which operationalises the material capabilities of recipient states in Africa. It captures very well the more traditional manner of defining and operationalising power and strategic importance within the discipline of international relations. It is clear that in operationalising strategic importance in this manner, one is essentially making the assumption that Southern powers view the strategic importance of nation states through more or less the same lenses.

As can be seen in the table constructed below, each nation state is given a quantitative CINC score between 0 and 1, capturing military, industrial, and demographic aspects of a nation state's power and capability. The following table thus gives a complete overview and ranking from number 1 to 53 of which nation states are of higher strategic importance and which are of lesser strategic importance within Africa. It relied on the latest CINC scores from 2007, which falls within the period under examination in the study (Table 5.5).

Table 5.5 Ranking of African nation states in the order of strategic importance

<i>Country</i>	<i>Comprehensive Index of National Capability (CINC) score (2007)</i>
1. Egypt	0.0097128
2. Nigeria	0.0077921
3. South Africa	0.0063162
4. Algeria	0.0052899
5. Morocco	0.0044709
6. Congo, Democratic Republic	0.0041745
7. Ethiopia	0.0038581
8. Sudan	0.0030763
9. Angola	0.0024825
10. Eritrea	0.0022562
11. Tanzania	0.0019317
12. Kenya	0.001777
13. Libya	0.0017627

(continued)

Table 5.5 (continued)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Comprehensive Index of National Capability (CINC) score (2007)</i>
14. Uganda	0.0013199
15. Ivory Coast	0.0011732
16. Ghana	0.0011087
17. Mozambique	0.0010318
18. Zimbabwe	0.0009938
19. Cameroon	0.0009505
20. Tunisia	0.0008221
21. Zambia	0.0007486
22. Madagascar	0.0007111
23. Senegal	0.0006968
24. Burkina Faso	0.0006447
25. Rwanda	0.0005813
26. Chad	0.0005676
27. Burundi	0.0005616
28. Somalia	0.0005313
29. Malawi	0.0005272
30. Mali	0.0005161
31. Niger	0.000505
32. Guinea	0.0004583
33. Sierra Leone	0.000393
34. Benin	0.0003699
35. Congo	0.0003614
36. Togo	0.0002974
37. Mauritania	0.0002699
38. Liberia	0.0002231
39. Central African Republic (CAR)	0.0002061
40. Botswana	0.0001868
41. Namibia	0.0001794
42. Gabon	0.0001527
43. Djibouti	0.0001498
44. Guinea-Bissau	0.0001317
45. Equatorial Guinea	0.0001087
46. Lesotho	0.0000976
47. Mauritius	0.0000618
48. Swaziland	0.0000571
49. Gambia	0.0000505
50. Comoros	0.0000239
51. Cape Verde	0.0000221
52. Sao Tome and Principe	0.00000595
53. Seychelles	0.00000377

Constructed by author based on Correlates of War Project

An analysis of the rankings of African nation states from those of greater strategic importance to those of lower strategic importance shows the reliability of the indicators and operationalisation of the variable using the CINC quantitative score. Qualitative-based area specialists focusing on Africa may disagree with the exact order of the countries, but this study posits that they would also be largely in agreement with the countries which sit higher up and those which sit lower down the rankings. It would have been problematic if the quantitative indicator was not really reflective of the qualitative reality in Africa as this would have required one to create a different indicator to rank African countries according to their strategic importance.

Apart from the unexpected appearance of Eritrea within the countries of greatest strategic importance, few would question the inclusion of nation states such as Egypt, South Africa, or Nigeria, whereas the inclusion of Ethiopia also makes sense. Besides Ethiopia ranking highly on all the indicators used to operationalise this variable, one should also bear in mind that as the seat of the African Union (AU), it comes as no surprise to close observers of African politics. While the inclusion of Eritrea did come as a surprise, a closer examination shows that it is largely due to the high expenditure on the military that it scores highly in terms of strategic importance. This attests to the traditional nature of measuring power that is embodied in this variable and its measurement.

Even before Nigeria briefly overtook South Africa as the largest economy in Africa during 2014, it is clear that the CINC score had already put it above South Africa in terms of its strategic importance. This further highlights the accuracy and efficacy of this indicator. It should also come as no surprise that Egypt, a large country with a big population and strong modern military systems, ranks number one. Given its historic and contemporary role in Africa and the Middle East, few could voice doubt on its strategic importance. This is further reflected in the huge amount of military aid it has traditionally received from the United States for its role in bringing stability and maintaining the peace in the region.

Looking at the countries at the bottom of the table also makes it clear that indeed the CINC score was well placed to determine the strategic value of African countries within the international state system. Indeed, no one would question why countries such as the Comoros, Sao Tome, Cape Verde, the Seychelles, Swaziland, and Lesotho appear towards the bottom of the table, thus reflecting that within the international state system they do not hold much strategic importance in the traditional sense. To put it

differently, these countries are less capable of resisting the influence of others and are often less capable of influencing other nation states.

As a threshold on strategic importance, it is posited here that the top 15 countries as seen in the table above can be considered to be of high strategic importance and thus display a positive value on the truth table, while the rest of the countries cannot be considered as being of high strategic importance, thus displaying a value of 0 when it comes to strategic importance. This also means that slightly less than a third of African countries can be considered to be of strategic importance in their relations with Southern powers. This threshold makes sense in that in a continent consisting of 54 nation states in total, it is understandable that only some of them can be considered to be of strategic importance in terms of material capability. While the very idea of establishing a threshold introduces subjectivity, it is posited here that the threshold established assists one to conceptualise and understand better what is meant by African countries of strategic value and those which are not of strategic value. Having now operationalised the first variable and outlined how exactly it will be analysed, it is necessary to now move to the second causal variable: the economic importance of the recipients of development cooperation.

CAUSAL VARIABLE 2: ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF RECIPIENTS

According to the second causal variable, the increasing commitments and disbursements of development cooperation from China and India into Africa can be largely explained by the economic importance of the recipient countries. Thus, the expectation is that African countries of high economic importance to Southern powers have been the main beneficiaries of their development cooperation. Slightly similar to the first variable, this second variable is also concerned with what can be termed “self-interest” as Southern powers are expected to align their development cooperation with their own material economic gains, drawing from the liberal tradition and rational theory in general.

In order to operationalise this variable, this study analyses the trade volumes between African countries, China, and India. Those countries with higher trade volumes with China and India should receive the most development cooperation according to the expectations embodied in this causal condition. This is an effective way to measure economic importance

since it captures the trade volumes between China and India in Africa. It thus allows one to rank African countries by their economic importance to China and India with the expectation that countries of economic importance will receive much of the development cooperation.

In order to analyse the trade data, this research has profited immensely from the data analyses conducted by the Trade Law Centre (tralac 2014a, b) in Stellenbosch, South Africa. Having compiled a number of trade analyses between Africa and its most important trade partners, the Africa–India analysis provides data on the “trading relationship between India and Africa from 1999 to 2012.” Besides this detailed analysis, tralac has also been monitoring the trading relationship between Africa and China for several years, empirically documenting the “Africa-China trading relationship between 1995 and 2013.”

Both analyses use reliable data sourced from the Global Trade Atlas, with all values expressed as US dollars and provides an invaluable resource to this research as they cover the period of interest and allow for reliable empirical observations of the second variable. One is thus able to convert the quantitative trade values into set-theoretic membership values for the truth table. Those cases which are found to have a positive value in the causal condition, and thus those countries with high trade volumes with the Southern powers, will be given a value of 1, while those countries displaying low levels of trade will have a value of 0 on the truth table. This will also allow one to observe whether this condition variable was of importance in explaining the outcome condition and whether it was a necessary or a sufficient condition. The following tables operationalise this causal variable and allow one to establish reliable thresholds (Tables 5.6 and 5.7).

The two tables ranking the importance of African nation states for both China and India assist one in establishing clear and transparent thresholds for determining which countries fit the category of being of economic importance and which ones do not fit into that category. These are important for qualitative comparative analysis, allowing one to clearly distinguish how causal variables and outcome variables actually vary in a dichotomous manner.

According to this study, only African countries with bilateral trade volumes of 5 billion US dollars or more can be categorised as countries of high economic importance to China and India, while the rest of their trade partners are not categorised as being of high economic importance. This allows one to establish very clear dichotomous values when constructing the truth tables. This threshold ensures that only countries which had approximately

Table 5.6 Ranking of African nation states in order of economic importance to China

<i>Country</i>	<i>Total trade 2000–2010 in millions US\$</i>
1. Angola	111,119
2. South Africa	107,282
3. Sudan	44,082
4. Nigeria	38,919
5. Egypt	34,538
6. Algeria	25,431
7. Libya	23,224
8. Congo	22,035
9. Morocco	17,532
10. Benin	14,139
11. Equatorial Guinea	13,470
12. Ghana	9887
13. Liberia	9596
14. Gabon	8003
15. Congo, Democratic Republic	7664
16. Togo	7561
17. Kenya	7549
18. Zambia	6872
19. Ethiopia	6659
20. Tanzania	6452
21. Mauritania	5153
22. Tunisia	4842
23. Cameroon	4684
24. Ivory Coast	4081
25. Zimbabwe	2957
26. Madagascar	2921
27. Namibia	2871
28. Mozambique	2603
29. Senegal	2442
30. Mauritius	2289
31. Guinea	2192
32. Chad	2034
33. Djibouti	1713
34. Mali	1542
35. Gambia	1496
36. Uganda	1466
37. Botswana	1404
38. Burkina Faso	1223
39. Niger	936
40. Lesotho	503

(continued)

Table 5.6 (continued)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Total trade 2000–2010 in millions US\$</i>
41. Sierra Leone	476
42. Rwanda	429
43. Malawi	424
44. Somalia	295
45. Swaziland	271
46. Eritrea	210
47. Central African Republic (CAR)	169
48. Burundi	147
49. Cape Verde	128
50. Guinea-Bissau	100
51. Seychelles	77
52. Comoros	68
53. Sao Tome and Principe	13
Total	574,173

Constructed by author based on data from tralac

Table 5.7 Ranking of African nation states in order of economic importance to India

<i>Country</i>	<i>Total trade 2000–2010 in millions US\$</i>
1. South Africa	50,386.20
2. Nigeria	49,912.69
3. Egypt	18,856.98
4. Angola	12,929.28
5. Kenya	9689.41
6. Algeria	8949.75
7. Morocco	6866.75
8. Tanzania	6223.85
9. Sudan	5213.36
10. Mauritius	5150.47
11. Libya	4359.94
12. Ghana	4309.66
13. Tunisia	3218.61
14. Ivory Coast	3148.02
15. Congo	3055.30
16. Senegal	2892.67
17. Mozambique	2662.36
18. Guinea	2471.88
19. Benin	2256.49

(continued)

Table 5.7 (continued)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Total trade 2000–2010 in millions US\$</i>
20. Djibouti	2160.38
21. Togo	1936.23
22. Ethiopia	1589.86
23. Uganda	1388.98
24. Zambia	1353.56
25. Gabon	1224.09
26. Cameroon	926.97
27. Guinea-Bissau	874.61
28. Madagascar	776.50
29. Malawi	729.13
30. Liberia	666.17
31. Somalia	650.60
32. Zimbabwe	553.09
33. Equatorial Guinea	487.40
34. Mali	477.87
35. Swaziland	439.12
36. Namibia	433.96
37. Burkina Faso	389.76
38. Gambia	380.33
39. Congo, Democratic Republic	380.12
40. Niger	378.91
41. Sierra Leone	338.46
42. Mauritania	294.95
43. Seychelles	293.95
44. Eritrea	222.76
45. Botswana	194.99
46. Rwanda	150.94
47. Lesotho	113.97
48. Chad	112.39
49. Comoros	103.88
50. Burundi	92.87
51. Central African Republic (CAR)	31.95
52. Sao Tome and Principe	7.99
53. Cape Verde	5.22
Total	222,715.63

Constructed by author based on data from tralac

500 million US dollars per annum of bilateral trade with China and India are considered of high economic importance. Having operationalised the second variable and established reliable thresholds, it is now necessary to provide indicators for the third variable, on the role of humanitarian ideas and norms on the determinants of development cooperation.

CAUSAL VARIABLE 3: HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OF RECIPIENTS

The third variable is different to the previous two. While they were primarily concerned with the materialistic determinants of development cooperation, the third variable is based on the humanitarian needs of the recipient countries, born out of a genuine humanitarian concern with development and the eradication of global poverty on the part of Southern powers. According to this causal condition, China and India are expected to have expanded their disbursements to those countries with higher humanitarian needs and thus African countries that have lower levels of development. It is thus not material self-interests that are the key drivers here, but ideational concerns about the needs of the poor, not only at home but also abroad.

If Southern powers were genuinely concerned with the humanitarian needs and economic development of needy countries, one would expect their development cooperation in Africa to have gone towards those countries with greater needs. This variable is operationalised with the use of the Human Development Index (HDI), a widely used index to measure global development. Used by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to measure progress on international development, each country is given a score between 0 and 1 based on their life expectancy, education, and the standard of living (UNDP 2013). Besides being a widely used and reliable indicator of development, an added advantage of the HDI is its universal coverage, which means that all African nation states under scrutiny are included within the observed period of interest.

This type of indicator allows one to rank African countries based on their levels of development, with the expectation that countries with lower development scores received higher levels of development cooperation from China and India. It thus makes for an accurate and reliable indicator for the third variable. One is able to convert the quantitative human development values into set membership values for the truth table. Those cases which are found to have a positive value in the condition variable, and thus those countries with high humanitarian needs and thus low human development scores, will be given a value of 1, while those countries displaying comparatively higher human development scores and thus lesser humanitarian needs will be given a value of 0 on the truth table. This will also allow one to analyse whether this condition variable was of importance in explaining the outcome condition and whether it was a necessary or a sufficient condition.

When operationalising this variable through the table which follows, it is important to note that unlike all of the other tables which are organised in terms of countries with the highest quantitative scores on the top and those with the lower scores at the bottom, this table uses the inverse approach, and those countries with the lowest quantitative scores, and thus higher humanitarian needs, are at the top of the table instead of at the bottom. This indicates that those countries at the top of the table have the higher humanitarian needs in Africa, and those that are closer to the bottom of the table have lesser humanitarian needs in comparison with other African countries; these are in a better position to provide for their own needs. The three countries without data will be given a value based on further empirical research on those countries. An example here is that even though Somalia does not have data, one can safely code it with a value of 1 in the truth table, indicating that while no data exists in the HDI, it is widely known that it has high humanitarian needs. This is also the case for Eritrea (Table 5.8).

Table 5.8 Ranking of African nation states based on their Human Development Index (HDI) scores

<i>Country</i>	<i>Human Development Index (HDI) value (2010)</i>	<i>Human development category</i>
1. Zimbabwe	0.14	Low human development
2. Congo, Democratic Republic	0.239	Low human development
3. Niger	0.261	Low human development
4. Burundi	0.282	Low human development
5. Mozambique	0.284	Low human development
6. Guinea-Bissau	0.289	Low human development
7. Chad	0.295	Low human development
8. Liberia	0.3	Low human development
9. Burkina Faso	0.305	Low human development

(continued)

Table 5.8 (continued)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Human Development Index (HDI) value (2010)</i>	<i>Human development category</i>
10. Mali	0.309	Low human development
11. Central African Republic (CAR)	0.315	Low human development
12. Sierra Leone	0.317	Low human development
13. Ethiopia	0.328	Low human development
14. Guinea	0.34	Low human development
15. Sudan	0.379	Low human development
16. Malawi	0.385	Low human development
17. Rwanda	0.385	Low human development
18. Gambia	0.39	Low human development
19. Zambia	0.395	Low human development
20. Ivory Coast	0.397	Low human development
21. Tanzania	0.398	Low human development
22. Djibouti	0.402	Low human development
23. Angola	0.403	Low human development
24. Senegal	0.411	Low human development
25. Uganda	0.422	Low human development
26. Nigeria	0.423	Low human development
27. Lesotho	0.427	Low human development
28. Comoros	0.428	Low human development
29. Togo	0.428	Low human development

(continued)

Table 5.8 (continued)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Human Development Index (HDI) value (2010)</i>	<i>Human development category</i>
30. Mauritania	0.433	Low human development
31. Benin	0.435	Low human development
32. Madagascar	0.435	Low human development
33. Cameroon	0.46	Low human development
34. Ghana	0.467	Low human development
35. Kenya	0.47	Low human development
36. Sao Tome and Principe	0.488	Medium human development
37. Congo	0.489	Medium human development
38. Swaziland	0.498	Medium human development
39. Cape Verde	0.534	Medium human development
40. Equatorial Guinea	0.538	Medium human development
41. Morocco	0.567	Medium human development
42. South Africa	0.597	Medium human development
43. Namibia	0.606	Medium human development
44. Egypt	0.62	Medium human development
45. Botswana	0.633	Medium human development
46. Gabon	0.648	Medium human development
47. Algeria	0.677	High human development
48. Tunisia	0.683	High human development
49. Mauritius	0.701	High human development

(continued)

Table 5.8 (continued)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Human Development Index (HDI) value (2010)</i>	<i>Human development category</i>
50. Libya	0.755	High human development
51. Eritrea	NA	Other countries or territories
52. Seychelles	NA	Other countries or territories
53. Somalia	NA	Other countries or territories

Constructed by author based on Human Development Index (HDI)

Given the fact that the Human Development Index (2010) has already established well-designed thresholds, it was not seen to be necessary to create new thresholds for the purposes of this study. The thresholds established by the HDI divide countries into what is termed a human development category, with some countries considered to fall into the low human development category, some into the medium human development category, and some falling into the high human development category. All countries which fall into the low human development category are thus seen as countries with high humanitarian needs, whereas countries falling into the medium and high human development categories are not seen as countries with high humanitarian needs. With the first three variables now operationalised and the thresholds clarified, it is time to turn to the final variable, which captures the size of the diaspora from China and India in Africa.

CAUSAL VARIABLE 4: THE SIZE OF THE CHINESE AND INDIAN DIASPORA IN AFRICA

The fourth variable is actually drawn from case study work conducted mostly by regional specialists in area studies. However, the manner in which it is framed places it within the broader realist school and shares a similarity with the first and second variable in capturing the materialistic aspects of global politics. This variable posits that Southern powers would have provided development cooperation to those African countries with a high diaspora. While this may puzzle some who may find it difficult to imagine that African countries may host significant populations from

China or India, it certainly does not puzzle close observers of historical and contemporary relations between Asia and Africa.

This variable is operationalised through the existence and size of a diaspora community from China and India in the African countries under observation. The diaspora community may either be a historical community from pre-colonial and colonial times or the more recent post-colonial diaspora communities. Given the fact that China and India have the largest diaspora communities in the world, it makes sense to analyse whether they play any role in the determinants of development cooperation in Africa. In a practical sense, what this variable seeks to capture is whether the development cooperation disbursed by China and India is in any way affected by the existence of a significant diaspora community in particular African countries. It is thus expected that countries with a significant diaspora will also be high recipients of development cooperation from the two Southern powers under examination.

In order to access data on the Indian diaspora, the following study has relied on the Government of India's Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA), which has availed their data to the public and the scholarly community. The Ministry itself was established in 2004 and solely dedicated to the affairs of Indian nationals who have settled abroad, "seek[ing] to connect the Indian Diaspora community with its motherland" (MOIA 2014). What is of great importance here in that the Ministry is focused not only on enhancing networks with non-resident Indians (NRIs) but also with persons of Indian origin (PIOs). It thus contains recent data (2012) covering the exact target group of this variable and has data on most African countries covered by this study. While their data is from 2012 (outside the period of analysis), it is argued here that it is nonetheless reflective of the period examined by this book.

In order to access data about the Chinese diaspora in Africa, this study draws from the China in Africa Project of the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) in Johannesburg. Yoon Jung Park's (2009) research paper on "Chinese Migration in Africa" makes available a table drawn from various existing research projects which lists estimated figures of the Chinese population in 38 countries from the year 2001 to 2008 (*ibid*, 3–4). What is of great benefit is that it draws extensively from a wide range of empirical sources to give a clearer picture of the number of Chinese migrants in various African countries over the period under examination in this study.

While not all 53 countries have available data, the 38 countries included allow for a better picture to emerge. In terms of data collection on the diaspora, Ionescu (2006, 19) states that “the availability of data often reflects the level and degree of policy interest and the quality of data collection mechanisms. Therefore, a documented increase of the growth of diasporas may reflect improved reporting measures and skills, rather than an actual increase as such.” This realisation also leads one to make an important assumption for the construction of the truth table where certain countries have no data on the size of the diaspora. This study thus assumes that those countries which have no data on the diaspora actually fit into the category of countries without a significant diaspora.

While this assumption does not aim to quantify exactly the size of the diaspora in those countries, it does allow one to give those countries a negative value on the truth table. While certainly possible, it is less likely that researchers interested in the Chinese diaspora in Africa primarily investigate countries with a small diaspora or no diaspora at all. Instead it is often the opposite in that scholars often research and make estimates of the Chinese diaspora in those countries with a diaspora or in those countries thought to have a significant Chinese diaspora. For those reasons, it is quite reasonable to make this assumption and give those countries without data a 0 in the truth table.

The data on China and India allows one to rank African countries based on the total Indian and Chinese diaspora community in each country, with those African countries with a significant diaspora at the top and those with a small diaspora at the bottom. One is thus able to convert the quantitative values on the size of the diaspora into set-theoretic membership values for the truth table. Those cases which are found to have a positive value in the condition variable, and thus those countries with a significant diaspora from China and India, will be given a value of 1, while those countries without a significant diaspora will have a value of 0 on the truth table. This will also allow one to analyse whether this condition variable was of importance in explaining the outcome condition and whether it was a necessary or a sufficient condition. The following tables operationalise this causal variable before establishing thresholds (Table 5.9).

It is important to note that where a lower and an upper estimate of the Chinese diaspora were given, this study intentionally included the upper estimate to incorporate into the table. This is largely due to the reality that figures on the Chinese diaspora in Africa tend to be underestimated due to weak reporting systems and the fact that unlike in the case of India, the

Table 5.9 Ranking of African nation states based on the size of the Chinese diaspora

<i>Country</i>	<i>Chinese diaspora (thousands)</i>	<i>Year data was collected</i>
1. South Africa	400,000	2007
2. Nigeria	100,000	2007
3. Sudan	74,000	2007
4. Madagascar	60,000	2003
5. Angola	40,000	2006
6. Mauritius	30,000	2008
7. Algeria	20,000	2007
8. Tanzania	20,000	2006
9. Botswana	10,000	2006–2007
10. Congo, Democratic Republic	10,000	2007
11. Egypt	10,000	2007
12. Uganda	10,000	2007
13. Zimbabwe	10,000	2005–2007
14. Guinea	8000	2007
15. Cameroon	7000	2005
16. Congo	7000	2006
17. Ethiopia	7000	2006
18. Kenya	7000	2007
19. Zambia	6000	2007
20. Gabon	6000	NA
21. Ghana	6000	2005
22. Namibia	5000	2006
23. Lesotho	5000	2005
24. Benin	4000	2007
25. Mali	4000	2008
26. Libya	3000	2008
27. Togo	3000	2007
28. Cape Verde	2000	2006
29. Malawi	2000	2007
30. Senegal	2000	2007
31. Tunisia	2000	2008
32. Mozambique	1500	2006
33. Burkina Faso	1000	2007
34. Niger	1000	NA
35. Liberia	600	2006
36. Chad	500	2008
37. Sierra Leone	500	2008
38. Swaziland	300	2006
39. Burundi	150	2007

(continued)

Table 5.9 (continued)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Chinese diaspora (thousands)</i>	<i>Year data was collected</i>
40. Central African Republic (CAR)	NA	NA
41. Comoros	NA	NA
42. Djibouti	NA	NA
43. Equatorial Guinea	NA	NA
44. Eritrea	NA	NA
45. Gambia	NA	NA
46. Guinea-Bissau	NA	NA
47. Ivory Coast	NA	NA
48. Mauritania	NA	NA
49. Morocco	NA	NA
50. Rwanda	NA	NA
51. Sao Tome and Principe	NA	NA
52. Seychelles	NA	NA
53. Somalia	NA	NA
Total	885,550	

Constructed by author based on Yoon Jung Park (2009)

Chinese government has not taken it upon itself to record estimated numbers of their diaspora in Africa and make it publicly available (Table 5.10).

The tables above are used to create a threshold to determine whether a particular country has a significant diaspora population or a low diaspora population. African countries with an estimated diaspora population of 10,000 or more are thus seen to fall into the category of countries with a significant diaspora population, while the rest fall outside of that category, receiving a value of 0 on the truth table. Much like the other variables, one had to study the data and the cases under examination in order to determine the threshold established.

With all four variables now operationalised and the methodology also outlined, the next chapter explains why Southern powers have expanded their development cooperation in Africa during the period from 2000 to 2010. However, as noted previously, unlike conventional quantitative research techniques, one is not testing four hypotheses drawn from the variables, but instead analysing empirically what combination of variables has been necessary or sufficient in producing the outcome condition of interest. However, it may be beneficial to visualise the variables along with their indicators before embarking on the explanatory chapter (Table 5.11).

Table 5.10 Ranking of African nation states according to the size of the Indian diaspora

<i>Country</i>	<i>Indian diaspora (thousands)</i>	<i>Non-resident Indians (assumed)</i>	<i>People of Indian origin</i>
1. South Africa	1,218,000	18,000	1,200,000
2. Mauritius	882,220	15,000	867,220
3. Kenya	75,000	37,500	37,500
4. Tanzania	54,700	5300	49,400
5. Nigeria	30,000	0	30,000
6. Madagascar	23,000	3000	20,000
7. Mozambique	21,500	1500	20,000
8. Zambia	20,500	12,500	8000
9. Uganda	20,000	15,000	5000
10. Libya	15,000	14,995	5
11. Botswana	11,000	9000	2000
12. Zimbabwe	10,500	500	10,000
13. Ghana	10,000	10,000	0
14. Seychelles	8500	4000	4500
15. Malawi	7000	1500	5500
16. Angola	6000	6000	NA
17. Congo, Democratic Republic	4000	3600	400
18. Egypt	3600	3450	150
19. Sudan	3599	3500	99
20. Liberia	1501	1500	1
21. Lesotho	1200	800	400
22. Rwanda	1040	1000	40
23. Ethiopia	994	992	2
24. Sierra Leone	710	700	10
25. Swaziland	700	200	500
26. Guinea	550	550	0
27. Togo	510	500	10
28. Eritrea	500	0	500
29. Ivory Coast	500	500	0
30. Algeria	450	447	3
31. Senegal	440	412	28
32. Djibouti	350	350	0
33. Gambia	333	329	4
34. Comoros	300	50	250
35. Morocco	300	300	0
36. Burundi	250	200	50
37. Mali	201	200	1
38. Tunisia	199	199	0

(continued)

Table 5.10 (continued)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Indian diaspora (thousands)</i>	<i>Non-resident Indians (assumed)</i>	<i>People of Indian origin</i>
39. Namibia	160	140	20
40. Burkina Faso	100	100	0
41. Equatorial Guinea	100	100	0
42. Niger	60	60	0
43. Guinea-Bissau	31	31	0
44. Mauritania	30	30	0
45. Cape Verde	12	12	0
46. Sao Tome and Principe	4	4	0
47. Benin	NA	NA	NA
48. Cameroon	NA	NA	NA
49. Central African Republic (CAR)	NA	NA	NA
50. Chad	NA	NA	NA
51. Congo	NA	NA	NA
52. Gabon	NA	NA	NA
53. Somalia	NA	NA	NA
Total	2,435,644	174,051	2,261,593

Constructed by author based on data from the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA)

Table 5.11 Summary of the causal conditions

<i>Causal condition</i>	<i>Indicators</i>	<i>Measurement</i>	<i>Source for data</i>
CC1: Strategic importance of recipients	Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC)	CINC score between 0 and 1	Correlates of War Project
CC2: Economic importance of recipients	Trade volumes between recipients and emerging powers in US dollars	Trade volume with Southern powers in US dollars	Trade Law Centre (tralac) data analysis
CC3: Humanitarian needs of recipients	Human Development Index (HDI)	HDI score between 0.000 and 0.999	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
CC4: The Diaspora as a determinant	Size of diaspora community in African countries	Number of diaspora in recipient countries	China in Africa Project (SAIIA) and Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA)

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Explaining the Determinants of China and India's Development Cooperation in Africa

Having now demonstrated the operationalisation of the four causal conditions while outlining the method used to analyse them, this chapter organises the data and applies the method of qualitative comparative analysis. It thus answers the question posed in this study in a multiple and conjunctural manner, helping to make sense of the data that has been collected between the years 2000 and 2010 and presenting the findings. Having stated that the cases under more intense empirical examination consist of the top ten and the bottom ten recipients of China and India's development cooperation in Africa in order to incorporate both positive and negative cases on the outcome variable, it is necessary to firstly present which African countries have been the top and bottom ten recipients of China and India's development cooperation. This will allow one to postulate whether the findings are consistent with prior expectations as expressed through international relations theory and existing studies.

Starting with China and then following with India, the chapter will firstly construct tables which rank African nation states according to the amount of development cooperation they received from the Southern powers during the period under examination. The higher up the table, the more development cooperation a particular nation state received, and vice versa. It thus allows one to understand empirically where most of China and India's development cooperation has flowed in the years under examination using publicly available data which conforms to the definition

outlined in Chap. 2. An analysis of the initial tables consisting of all African nation states which have been recipients of China and India's development cooperation allows one to better understand the broader population from which 20 countries are selected to understand the determinants of both China and India's development cooperation in Africa.

The 20 countries deliberately selected for closer empirical examination will then be outlined in a raw data table consisting of cases with values on the causal conditions and the outcome variable of interest. This raw data is then used—through the explicit use of thresholds—to convert the values on the raw data table into dichotomous set values fit for Boolean algebra.

The results of the empirical observations made on the causal and outcome variables are then outlined through the construction and analysis of the truth table using Boolean algebra to reduce the initial configurations produced. Given the formal and systematic manner in which the method is applied, and the fact that the data used and analysed is made available, it allows other researchers to replicate the findings using the same method in order to test for the reliability of the conclusions reached. This not only allows for reliability, but also allows researchers interested in the topic to use and further analyse the data made available. This ensures that it is not only new knowledge that is produced in this study, but that the data organised and analysed can be further developed and updated by all researchers interested in the topic. After analysing the determinants of China's development cooperation in Africa, this chapter will analyse the determinants of India's development cooperation in Africa following the same procedure, comparing the multiple and conjunctural causes of their development cooperation.

A MULTIPLE AND CONJUNCTURAL EXPLANATION OF THE DETERMINANTS OF CHINA'S DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IN AFRICA

The following table ranks African countries from top recipients to lowest recipients of China's development cooperation between the years 2000 and 2010. The table was drawn up by analysing and calculating over 500 examples of project-level development cooperation from China in Africa over the period under scrutiny. In drawing up the rankings, the study relied on AidData's *ODA-Like* and *Official Finance* data sets, which consist of over 1000 projects which China had committed to in Africa over the period.

The projects that were included in the data analysis for this study are only those which were expressed in monetary values, which excluded some of the aid in kind which was not expressed as a monetary value. However, given the amount of resources and effort that has been made into tracking China's development cooperation in Africa by AidData, a significant amount of China's aid in kind is expressed in US dollars, mostly converted from the Chinese yuan. A great advantage of using this data set is that it not only tracks for announcements of project-level aid from English sources, but also relies a lot on Chinese original sources, ensuring that much of China's publicly announced development cooperation projects are captured (Table 6.1).

Table 6.1 Distribution of China's development cooperation in Africa (2000–2010)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Commitments (US dollars 2009)</i>
1. Uganda	285,266,279.00
2. Zambia	210,700,399.00
3. Ethiopia	201,857,856.00
4. Ghana	195,244,760.00
5. Angola	177,700,793.00
6. Tanzania	161,536,340.00
7. Kenya	143,448,507.00
8. Ivory Coast	142,460,901.00
9. Mali	141,277,534.00
10. Rwanda	139,412,996.00
11. Congo	129,582,230.00
12. Namibia	126,362,225.00
13. Sudan	126,074,401.00
14. Zimbabwe	123,165,220.00
15. Malawi	118,901,537.00
16. Gabon	115,076,248.00
17. Senegal	114,756,891.00
18. Mauritius	106,936,587.00
19. Mozambique	104,607,308.00
20. Niger	91,593,198.00
21. Liberia	86,181,752.00
22. Guinea-Bissau	80,226,827.00
23. Egypt	79,858,284.00
24. Seychelles	71,317,215.00
25. Congo, Democratic Republic	65,360,770.00
26. Cameroon	62,901,609.00
27. Togo	59,118,452.00

(continued)

Table 6.1 (continued)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Commitments (US dollars 2009)</i>
28. Algeria	57,046,687.00
29. Nigeria	56,218,152.00
30. Burundi	54,709,683.00
31. Lesotho	51,573,497.00
32. Madagascar	47,144,510.00
33. Guinea	44,678,184.00
34. Djibouti	41,847,088.00
35. Chad	37,112,400.00
36. Morocco	35,736,181.00
37. Benin	33,670,913.00
38. Eritrea	32,471,079.00
39. Cape Verde	31,957,271.00
40. Botswana	31,839,540.00
41. Comoros	31,488,449.00
42. Equatorial Guinea	28,997,600.00
43. Sierra Leone	25,725,525.00
44. Central African Republic (CAR)	23,321,191.00
45. Mauritania	22,634,672.00
46. Tunisia	14,663,225.00
47. Somalia	10,763,347.00
48. South Africa	8,117,070.00
49. Burkina Faso	0.00
50. Gambia	0.00
51. Libya	0.00
52. Sao Tome and Principe	0.00
53. Swaziland	0.00
Total	4,182,643,383.00

Constructed by author based on AidData

Having now shown a complete overview and ranking of which African countries received the most and least development cooperation from China, the tables below list only the top ten and bottom ten recipients of China's development cooperation. These are the countries which undergo a closer examination in order to make a medium-range generalisation on the determinants of China's development cooperation in Africa (Tables 6.2 and 6.3).

It is important to keep in mind that the top ten and bottom ten countries are only those which did receive development cooperation from China, and thus countries which received no development cooperation as seen in the first table are not included in the table consisting of the bottom ten recipients. This is primarily due to the nature of the research question in that it is interested in why Southern powers have given high levels of devel-

Table 6.2 Top ten recipients of China's development cooperation in Africa (2000–2010)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Commitments (US dollars 2009)</i>
Uganda	285,266,279.00
Zambia	210,700,399.00
Ethiopia	201,857,856.00
Ghana	195,244,760.00
Angola	177,700,793.00
Tanzania	161,536,340.00
Kenya	143,448,507.00
Ivory Coast	142,460,901.00
Mali	141,277,534.00
Rwanda	139,412,996.00
Total	1,798,906,365.00

Constructed by author based on AidData

Table 6.3 Bottom ten recipients of China's development cooperation in Africa (2000–2010)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Commitments (US dollars 2009)</i>
Cape Verde	31,957,271.00
Botswana	31,839,540.00
Comoros	31,488,449.00
Equatorial Guinea	28,997,600.00
Sierra Leone	25,725,525.00
Central African Republic (CAR)	23,321,191.00
Mauritania	22,634,672.00
Tunisia	14,663,225.00
Somalia	10,763,347.00
South Africa	8,117,070.00
Total	229,507,890.00

Constructed by author based on AidData

opment cooperation to some countries and less development cooperation to others. In order to be included in the analysis, it is thus important that they are indeed recipients of development cooperation.

When combing through the data made available by AidData, it was important to take extra care before including all projects listed as development cooperation. Often, very large amounts stick out and often needed further investigation in the case of China's development cooperation. It was quite often found that these very large sums had been included

as development cooperation by mistake in many studies instead of being regarded as commercial export credits and buyer's credits, which tend to be significantly larger than commitments explicitly made as development cooperation. These commercial sums were often provided by the China Development Bank (CDB) or the China Export and Import (Exim) Bank.

Fortunately, as the AidData project has sought ways to improve their website and data set for China's disbursements, they also include descriptive notes on certain individual projects which they themselves are not sure of. It was thus important to always double-check their notes on specific projects, which were made for fellow staff members and researchers using their data. These include examples of where they think that a particular project may be related to another project mentioned at an earlier stage, meaning that if one does not make a follow-up on those notes and conduct further research on those individual projects, it becomes difficult to ascertain whether one is not counting the same project twice. It is easier to do this when two or more projects that may be related were pledged in the same year, while it is significantly more difficult when they were pledged in a different year.

Some of the "staff notes" also state that the project team was not sure how a particular loan agreement's concessionality was calculated. Some projects were also marked by AidData as suspicious, such as in the case of humanitarian aid for \$90 million dollars destined for Sudan (Strange et al. 2013). Projects were also sometimes found to be incorrectly labelled as China granting a certain amount of money to an African country; however, this often needed to be double-checked since the amounts of money being committed were not always grants in the technical sense of the word as is used throughout the study.

While debt cancellation is included in the definition of development cooperation as developed in this study, the data analysis process revealed the importance of excluding it in the final calculations and projects included for analysis. This was largely because almost all of the debt cancelled by China within this period was debt which had been accumulated from earlier interest-free loans and low-interest loans. Including it in the final analysis would have thus amounted to the double counting of foreign aid since one would effectively be including the cancellation of earlier concessional loans. It would make more sense to include the cancellation of debt which had accumulated from commercial loans such as export credits

and buyer's credits, an area of finance which China has not begun to include in its debt cancellation programme.

It was only through the further examination of the data that it became clearer why despite the great contribution to research made by AidData, it is always necessary to go further in order to confirm the accuracy of their data on particular individual projects. While this is not a perfect process, it does improve the way in which empirical research on Southern powers is conducted. In the case of debt relief, including it in the data for this study would have inflated the numbers of development cooperation for countries that in reality do not receive a lot of development cooperation from China, yet have had their previous debt cancelled. This would have been quite misleading. When examining the loans issued by the China Export and Import (Exim) Bank, it was useful to keep in mind that approximately 60 per cent of their loans are commercial export credits, with a growing amount being offered as commercial buyer's credits (Brautigam 2009: 112).

It was also helpful to notice patterns also referred to by Brautigam (*ibid*: 173–174) that Eximbank concessional loans are often announced in yuan at first, while export and buyers' credits were always announced in US dollars or another foreign currency, even though this is not always the case. She also adds that it is important to pay attention to which actors are involved in the signing ceremonies of framework agreements since unlike in the case of development cooperation, where government officials from China and recipients are the principal signatories, buyers' and export credits are often presided over by representatives of the Eximbank during signing ceremonies. A good example of a buyer's credit incorrectly included by AidData is the \$253 million included for Ghana, which is often included as development cooperation by researchers who do not go further in assessing the data to try to "comb" it further. In another case involving Ghana, one would have incorrectly included a \$464 million project from the China–Africa Development Fund (Strange et al. 2013).

Researchers who are not adequately informed about the institutional framework of China's development cooperation system and those who do not pay enough attention to defining development cooperation from Southern powers may not know that the CADF receives its financial resources from the China Development Bank (CDB), which is on public record as stating that all of its loans are commercial in nature and not concessional as it is sometimes thought (Brautigam 2009). Including them as development cooperation would have thus been incorrect.

It is also important to note that countries such as Malawi, which had relations with Taiwan, until fairly recently have received substantial amounts of development cooperation almost immediately after switching their recognition from Taiwan to mainland China and its One-China Policy. This has at times had the effect of propelling relatively new recipients of China's development cooperation higher up the table of China's recipients through the granting of a few large infrastructure programmes immediately after recognition.

While it is indeed possible that some of the project commitments recorded in this study fell through before implementation, a lot of them are recorded in the past tense and include the dates in which the individual projects were completed. This means that despite great efforts made throughout the study to ensure accuracy and consistency in the projects included, discrepancies may remain. Despite this, I posit that any errors have not been substantial enough to distort the core findings of the study. The transparency of the methodological process and the inclusion in the Appendix of all projects used to reach the findings also ensures that where there are errors detected by other researchers, these may be rectified in further research.

In analysing the data for the purposes of making the tables with rankings, it was better to always lean on the side of caution where there was uncertainty with regard to specific development projects. In the case of Mauritania, while the construction of a new port and airport was included by AidData as development cooperation projects, it was found that these were actually not development cooperation projects. The \$260 million contract for the expansion of the airport in Mauritius was also included as a concessional loan by AidData, but further investigation shows that it was actually more or less a combination of export and buyers' credits from China and not development cooperation as defined in this study. In such cases, it is always better to lean towards caution and exclude it in the calculations.

Having now introduced the cases selected in analysing the determinants of China's development cooperation, one will now construct the raw data table that lists all 20 cases under closer examination, and their values on the causal conditions and outcome variable of interest. This table will then be used to construct the truth table through the explicit use of the thresholds specified earlier in the methodology. The values expressed in the raw data table will then be converted into dichotomous set-theoretic values under the second raw data table (Tables 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6).

Table 6.4 Raw data table for China's development cooperation in Africa (2000–2010)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Strategic importance</i>	<i>Economic importance</i>	<i>Humanitarian needs</i>	<i>Size of diaspora</i>	<i>Disbursements</i>
1. Uganda	14	1466.00	Low human development	10,000	285,266,279.00
2. Zambia	21	6872.00	Low human development	6000	210,700,399.00
3. Ethiopia	7	6659	Low human development	7000	201,857,856.00
4. Ghana	16	9887	Low human development	6000	195,244,760.00
5. Angola	9	111,119	Low human development	40,000	177,700,793.00
6. Tanzania	11	6452	Low human development	20,000	161,536,340.00
7. Kenya	12	7549	Low human development	7000	143,448,507.00
8. Ivory Coast	15	4081	Low human development	NA	142,460,901.00
9. Mali	30	1542	Low human development	4000	141,277,534.00
10. Rwanda	25	429	Low human development	NA	139,412,996.00
11. Cape Verde	51	128	Medium human development	2000	31,957,271.00
12. Botswana	40	1404	Medium human development	10,000	31,839,540.00
13. Comoros	50	68	Low human development	NA	31,488,449.00
14. Equatorial Guinea	45	13,470	Medium human development	NA	28,997,600.00
15. Sierra Leone	33	476	Low human development	500	25,725,525.00
16. Central African Republic (CAR)	39	169	Low human development	NA	23,321,191.00
17. Mauritania	37	5153	Low human development	NA	22,634,672.00

(continued)

Table 6.4 (continued)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Strategic importance</i>	<i>Economic importance</i>	<i>Humanitarian needs</i>	<i>Size of diaspora</i>	<i>Disbursements</i>
18. Tunisia	20	4842	High human development	2000	14,663,225.00
19. Somalia	28	295	NA	NA	10,763,347.00
20. South Africa	3	107,282	Medium human development	400,000	8,117,070.00

Table 6.5 Raw data table for China's development cooperation in Africa with dichotomous set-theoretic values (2000–2010)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Strategic importance</i>	<i>Economic importance</i>	<i>Humanitarian needs</i>	<i>Size of diaspora</i>	<i>Outcome</i>
1. Uganda	1	0	1	1	1
2. Zambia	0	1	1	0	1
3. Ethiopia	1	1	1	0	1
4. Ghana	0	1	1	0	1
5. Angola	1	1	1	1	1
6. Tanzania	1	1	1	1	1
7. Kenya	1	1	1	0	1
8. Ivory Coast	1	0	1	0	1
9. Mali	0	0	1	0	1
10. Rwanda	0	0	1	0	1
11. Cape Verde	0	0	1	0	0
12. Botswana	0	0	0	1	0
13. Comoros	0	0	1	0	0
14. Equatorial Guinea	0	1	0	0	0
15. Sierra Leone	0	0	1	0	0
16. Central African Republic (CAR)	0	0	1	0	0
17. Mauritania	0	1	1	0	0
18. Tunisia	0	0	0	0	0
19. Somalia	0	0	1	0	0
20. South Africa	1	1	0	1	0

Table 6.6 Initial truth table for China's development cooperation in Africa with dichotomous set-theoretic values (2000–2010)

<i>Strategic importance</i>	<i>Economic importance</i>	<i>Humanitarian needs</i>	<i>Size of diaspora</i>	<i>Outcome</i>	<i>Countries</i>
0	0	0	0	0	18
0	0	0	1	0	12
0	0	1	0	C	9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 19
0	0	1	1	?	0
0	1	0	0	0	14
0	1	0	1	?	0
0	1	1	0	C	4, 2, 17
0	1	1	1	?	0
1	0	0	0	?	0
1	0	0	1	?	0
1	0	1	0	1	8
1	0	1	1	1	1
1	1	0	0	?	0
1	1	0	1	0	20
1	1	1	0	1	3, 7
1	1	1	1	1	5, 6

Having now reached an important stage in actually drawing up the initial truth table for China's development cooperation in Africa, it is evident that a further step must still be taken in the finalisation of the initial truth table. This is because in order to begin the Boolean minimisation, the truth table must have values on all causal and outcome variables. This means that one has to now deal with logical remainders (?) and contradictory cases (C). As explained earlier, the logical remainders are common in QCA and the social sciences in general since they represent the possible logical combinations of the causal variables which lack empirical values in the data. Thus, whereas one can imagine that such a combination of causal variables could exist logically, none were found to exist in the empirical data collected and analysed.

This study treats all logical remainders by coding them as 0. While they could logically exist, and would theoretically constitute counterfactual cases if incorporated into the Boolean minimisation, they do not exist in the empirical world and are thus coded with a value of 0 on the outcome variable.

The contradictory cases on the other hand represent cases which do exist in the empirical data collected yet do not display a clear and unambiguous score on the outcome variable of interest. Thus, while some cases were found to have the same combination of causal variables, they were nonetheless also found to display different scores on the outcome variable of interest. Given the fact that this study aims to explain which causal conditions have existed in recipients of high levels of development cooperation, it makes sense to code these cases as 0 since they display ambiguous results on the outcome variable. Some are found to display high levels of development cooperation, whereas some are found to display low levels of development cooperation on the outcome variable. Taking this into account, the following truth table summarises the raw data while dealing with the logical remainders and contradictory cases as outlined above. The same process will be followed for all subsequent truth tables for analysing India's data (Table 6.7).

The truth table above is now ready to be summarised and expressed firstly in the form of a primitive expression, which is then minimised through the use of Boolean algebra. Before representing the configurations

Table 6.7 Final truth table for China's development cooperation in Africa with dichotomous set-theoretic values (2000–2010)

<i>Strategic importance</i>	<i>Economic importance</i>	<i>Humanitarian needs</i>	<i>Size of diaspora</i>	<i>Outcome</i>	<i>Countries</i>
0	0	0	0	0	18
0	0	0	1	0	12
0	0	1	0	0	9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 19
0	0	1	1	0	0
0	1	0	0	0	14
0	1	0	1	0	0
0	1	1	0	0	4, 2, 17
0	1	1	1	0	0
1	0	0	0	0	0
1	0	0	1	0	0
1	0	1	0	1	8
1	0	1	1	1	1
1	1	0	0	0	0
1	1	0	1	0	20
1	1	1	0	1	3, 7
1	1	1	1	1	5, 6

through the primitive expressions, it is necessary to explain what each of the abbreviations used actually stands for as they all represent the variables under examination:

- S = Strategic Importance
- E = Economic Importance
- H = Humanitarian Needs
- D = Significant Diaspora
- O = Outcome of Interest (High Disbursement of Development Cooperation)

Using the above abbreviations, capital letters represent the presence of a particular variable, while a small letter represents the absence of that particular variable. The following symbols are also essential to reading the primitive expression:

- * = Boolean Multiplication (logical AND)
- + = Boolean Addition (logical OR)
- ⇒ = Sufficient for

Having outlined the abbreviations and symbols, one can now outline the primitive expression for the determinants of China's development cooperation as follows:

$$S^*e^*H^*d + S^*e^*H^*D + S^*E^*H^*d + S^*E^*H^*D \Rightarrow O$$

Having established the primitive expression, the next step is the minimisation of the primitive expressions. This is done by distilling all configurations which differ on only one condition, which is done as follows:

$S^*E^*H^*D$	$S^*e^*H^*D$	→	S^*H^*D
$S^*E^*H^*D$	$S^*E^*H^*d$	→	S^*E^*H
$S^*e^*H^*d$	$S^*E^*H^*d$	→	S^*H^*d
$S^*e^*H^*d$	$S^*e^*H^*D$	→	S^*e^*H

With the initial configurations now minimised, the new minimised solution now becomes:

$$S^*H^*D + S^*E^*H + S^*H^*d + S^*e^*H \Rightarrow O$$

The new solution above is known as the prime implicants and may also be further minimised to produce a more parsimonious solution using the same technique of combining configurations which differ on only one condition:

$$\begin{array}{lll} S^*H^*D & S^*H^*d & \longrightarrow S^*H \\ S^*E^*H & S^*e^*H & \longrightarrow S^*H \end{array}$$

This further minimisation allows one to reach a minimal solution which cannot be further minimised and is represented as follows:

$$S^*H \Rightarrow Y$$

It is quite clear that in the case of China's project-level development cooperation in Africa, the minimal solution shows that while there were two necessary conditions, none of them were found to be sufficient on their own. However, the configuration and combination of both conditions was found to be sufficient to produce the outcome variable. In other words even though the strategic importance and humanitarian needs of African countries are necessary conditions for the disbursement of high levels of development cooperation, none are individually sufficient to produce the outcome variable.

Having reached the minimal solution, QCA allows one to evaluate the strength of the findings on necessary and sufficient conditions through the calculation of consistency and coverage using the formulas outlined in the methodology. This ensures that the strength of the findings—represented through the minimal solution—can be evaluated. The study firstly evaluates consistency and then evaluates the coverage of the findings.

In the case of the determinants of China's development cooperation in Africa, the study found that both necessary and sufficient conditions displayed a consistency score of 1, which means 100 per cent of the cases with those combined conditions display a high value on the outcome variable.

In terms of the coverage of the necessary conditions, strategic importance was found to have a score of 0.8, while humanitarian needs as a condition variable were found to have a score of 0.66. While strategic interests account for the positive value of 80 per cent of the cases observed, humanitarian needs account for 66 per cent of the cases. The values for the consistency and coverage of both necessary and sufficient conditions are thus very high and significant. This means that the findings can be taken as being of a high degree of empirical importance and highlights the strengths of the research

strategy followed throughout the study. This also means that the most important condition variable in terms of coverage is strategic interests, followed by humanitarian interests, in the case of China. Despite the calculation of coverage allowing one to determine each condition's empirical importance, it is always important to remember that it is only when they were all combined that high levels of development cooperation were disbursed.

The findings reveal the weakness of monocausal arguments about the determinants of China's development cooperation in Africa. It is indeed quite clear that none of the condition variables were found to be sufficient on their own to produce a high score on the outcome variable. Contrary to the research strategy of competing variables, this study actually shows that the disbursements of high levels of development cooperation from China are caused by the combination of particular variables, not their competition for explanatory power. Thus, whereas strategic importance plays a necessary role in explaining the outcome, it is only when strategically important countries simultaneously display high humanitarian needs that China disbursed high levels of development cooperation. Humanitarian needs are thus also necessary to the explanation.

This combinatorial explanation is central to QCA and shows clearly that only those countries which possessed the above-mentioned conditions were consistently recipients of high levels of development cooperation. Theoretically, this lends a certain amount of support to the realist claim that strategic interests are at the centre of international development cooperation. However, it is important to add that the realist claim is not sufficient on its own. Instead, in order to fully explain the determinants of China's development cooperation in the period under scrutiny, one must take into account the necessary role played by the humanitarian needs of recipients. While strategic calculations thus played a role in its disbursements, the data analysis also reveals a concern with the humanitarian needs of developing countries in Africa.

The explanation of the high disbursement of China's development cooperation reveals the causal complexity of social phenomena. It thus underscores the importance of multiple and conjunctural explanations of the determinants of development cooperation. The data analysis reveals that it makes little sense to continue to debate about the determinants of Southern powers as though each variable was independent. Countries which display high values on strategic importance may also display high levels of humanitarian needs, and the two are not mutually exclusive. Instead, they ensure a high outcome when combined together in the case of China's development cooperation in Africa.

What is equally important in the conjunctural explanation given is the significance of context. Thus, it is only when strategic interests are combined with humanitarian needs that high levels of development cooperation become the outcome. While it probably does not surprise too many that strategic interests play a role for China, it will certainly come as a surprise to some who expected that humanitarian norms play a minimal or insignificant role for China. This seems to affirm the importance of humanitarian ideas and norms as articulated by Lumsdaine (1993) as they are found to be necessary for the outcome. These findings also affirm the claims of win–win partnerships expression through the principles of South–South cooperation.

Despite the growing size of the Chinese diaspora in Africa, it was not found to play a central role in producing the outcome. This was also the case for economic interests. Looking at the truth table and subsequent Boolean minimisation, it becomes clear that the data analysis does not find economic interests or the size of the diaspora to have played an important role in determining the direction of large flows of development cooperation. Now that it has become clear why China has disbursed more development cooperation to some countries than others, it is now time to analyse the determinants of India’s development cooperation.

A MULTIPLE AND CONJUNCTURAL EXPLANATION OF THE DETERMINANTS OF INDIA’S PROJECT LEVEL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IN AFRICA

Having now shown where China’s development cooperation went in Africa and why it went to some countries more than others, the following table ranks African countries from top recipients to lowest recipients of India’s development cooperation between the years 2005 and 2010. The table was drawn up by calculating over 100 examples of project-level development cooperation from India in Africa over the period under scrutiny. The study thus made use of AidData’s *International Aid* data set, which has over 100 projects which India had committed to in Africa over the period under scrutiny.

As in the case of China, the projects that were included are only those which were expressed in monetary values, which excluded some of the aid in kind which was not expressed as a monetary value. Unlike the case of China, AidData does not yet have data from 2000 until 2004, but what is available is nonetheless enough to develop a clearer picture of where most of India’s development cooperation went within the overall period under examination.

In essence, one will create a clearer picture of the determinants of India's development cooperation in Africa through the use of AidData. It is to this task that this section of the study now turns to, with the following table ranking African countries from number 1 to 53 in terms of levels of development cooperation from India (Table 6.8).

When analysing India's development cooperation as listed in the above table, it became clear why it makes sense to define development cooperation in the manner in which it has been defined throughout this study. This definition sought to essentially not be too narrow in order to not exclude some of the development cooperation not traditionally fitting the ODA definition while it also sought to not replicate many of the existing mistakes in research which either do not define it or define it too broadly.

Some of the projects listed would certainly not fit the narrow definition of ODA as defined by the DAC; however, given its concessional nature, it would also not neatly fit into the definition of "other official flows." This is certainly the case for India's concessional lines of credit, a new tool in India's development cooperation architecture which started being disbursed after the watershed speech from the Minister of Finance in 2003, bringing the Eximbank firmly into India's international development cooperation infrastructure through the Indian Development and Economic Assistance Scheme (IDEAS). Many of those government subsidised and concessional lines of credit have been captured by AidData and form a part of the project development projects used to construct the tables issued in this study.

While projects such as the supply of both medicines and medical equipment to Botswana, Seychelles, Liberia, and Zimbabwe in 2010 would have no problem being incorporated as ODA in the DAC sense of the word, development projects such as the setting up of an industrial park in Angola or the financing of 723 vehicles purchased by the government of Tanzania in 2009 would fall into the area of uncertainty between ODA and other official flows (OOF). This would also be the case for the setting up of a power plant in Sudan and the concessional purchase by Ghana of various goods from India in 2005 (AidData Dashboard 2014).

Researchers who do not yet have a firm grasp of India's development cooperation would be advised to go through AidData's project-level aid on India in conjunction with the terms and conditions for the Government of India (GOI) supported Eximbank Lines of Credit (LoCs), which the Ministry of Finance's Department of Economic Affairs released in July 2010. These guidelines confirm the concessional nature of these loans and credits as approved through the Government's IDEAS programme, while

Table 6.8 Distribution of India's project-level development cooperation in Africa (2005–2010)

<i>Recipient country</i>	<i>Total development cooperation received (US\$)</i>
1. Sudan	673,383,404
2. Ethiopia	428,382,206
3. Mali	180,203,443
4. Ghana	169,411,002
5. Nigeria	117,491,407
6. Angola	110,123,347
7. Ivory Coast	109,124,459
8. Senegal	90,789,474
9. Burkina Faso	78,299,855
10. Congo, Democratic Republic	76,597,107
11. Rwanda	73,318,878
12. Zambia	72,285,139
13. Chad	69,541,316
14. Mozambique	67,112,215
15. Sierra Leone	53,468,219
16. Tanzania	44,814,314
17. Cameroon	44,033,088
18. Central African Republic (CAR)	34,501,357
19. Madagascar	32,477,682
20. Eritrea	29,950,105
21. Mauritania	27,719,576
22. Seychelles	23,573,458
23. Niger	23,390,750
24. Equatorial Guinea	20,862,394
25. Benin	20,140,646
26. Mauritius	20,082,543
27. Djibouti	13,908,263
28. Lesotho	12,677,773
29. Swaziland	12,002,265
30. Namibia	9,444,857
31. Gambia	9,318,536
32. Comoros	2,665,250
33. Botswana	1,621,438
34. Liberia	1,559,578
35. Cape Verde	1,065,942
36. Uganda	726,181
37. Zimbabwe	724,962
38. Sao Tome and Principe	233,247
39. Algeria	0

(continued)

Table 6.8 (continued)

<i>Recipient country</i>	<i>Total development cooperation received (US\$)</i>
40. Burundi	0
41. Congo	0
42. Egypt	0
43. Gabon	0
44. Guinea	0
45. Guinea-Bissau	0
46. Kenya	0
47. Libya	0
48. Malawi	0
49. Morocco	0
50. Somalia	0
51. South Africa	0
52. Togo	0
53. Tunisia	0
Total	2,757,025,676

Constructed by author based on AidData

it is also very clear that the Eximbank distinguishes these loans from their commercial loans.¹

The concessionality of the specific loans is often decided by a classification of African countries as highly indebted poor countries (HIPC), low-income countries and least developed countries (LDC), and finally as middle-income countries (Eximbank of India 2014). These classifications guide the Eximbank in setting the levels of concessionality, with poorer countries receiving loans that are more concessional than countries in the other two categories.

Unlike the data on China's development cooperation made available by AidData, the data collection process on India was still in the early stages when this study was conducted. This is reflected in the fact that no staff notes or additional descriptions of individual projects are available, thus making it more difficult for one to evaluate each project and its conformity to the definition adopted in the study. However, despite this fact, it is posited here that any projects which are mistakenly included as development cooperation by this study have not been numerous enough to distort the prevailing patterns of India's development cooperation, and thus the tables constructed are indeed still reflective of where most of India's concessional finance programme has been disbursed.

While relatively new, the Government of India (GOI) subsidised programme of the Eximbank has certainly grown quite rapidly, and in contrast to its older and more traditional training programmes,² most of the financing under the concessional lines of credit (LoCs) have gone towards the African continent. In fact, Chaturvedi et al. (2012, 182) show that 53 per cent of the disbursements have gone towards Africa as from the 1st of September 2010.

Some of the projects undertaken and financed by the Eximbank of India resemble very closely those which the academic world has become accustomed to hearing and reading of with regard to China. Large infrastructure projects, assistance in power generation, and the expansion of ports are all part of the projects that were financed by the Eximbank during the period under observation and show that it is now more important to cast away the old lenses which mainly saw India as being involved in human capacity development and China as being involved mainly in infrastructure. While it is true that India is still widely known for its training programmes, what is important today is that instead of only training personnel in African countries, India is increasingly building training facilities on the African continent in addition to training the personnel who would later manage those institutions.

Just as in the case of China's development cooperation, it was necessary to exclude debt forgiveness for India's development cooperation. Including it would have merely distorted the figures and led to double counting, especially since most of the debt which has been cancelled was based on earlier forms of concessional finance. It would have only made sense to include it in the calculations if the debts cancelled were based on earlier commercial loans provided by the Eximbank or other financing institutions in India.

Having shown a complete overview and ranking of which countries received the most and least development cooperation from India, the following two tables below list only the top ten and bottom ten recipients of India's development cooperation. These are the countries which undergo a closer examination in order to make a medium-range generalisation on the determinants of India's development cooperation in Africa (Tables 6.9 and 6.10).

Having now established which African countries have been the highest recipients and which have been the lowest recipients of development cooperation from India, the following table will now begin the formal process of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) through the construction of a raw data table with values on the causal conditions of the cases and values on the outcome variables of the 20 cases. This table will then be used to construct the truth table through the explicit use of the thresholds specified earlier in the methodology. The values expressed in the raw

Table 6.9 Top ten recipients of India's project-level development cooperation in Africa (2005–2010)

<i>Recipient country</i>	<i>Total development cooperation received (US\$)</i>
Sudan	673,383,404
Ethiopia	428,382,206
Mali	180,203,443
Ghana	169,411,002
Nigeria	117,491,407
Angola	110,123,347
Ivory Coast	109,124,459
Senegal	90,789,474
Burkina Faso	78,299,855
Congo, Democratic Republic	76,597,107
Total	2,033,805,704

Constructed by author based on AidData

Table 6.10 Bottom ten recipients of India's project-level development cooperation in Africa (2005–2010)

<i>Recipient country</i>	<i>Total development cooperation received (US\$)</i>
Swaziland	12,002,265
Namibia	9,444,857
Gambia	9,318,536
Comoros	2,665,250
Botswana	1,621,438
Liberia	1,559,578
Cape Verde	1,065,942
Uganda	726,181
Zimbabwe	724,962
Sao Tome and Principe	233,247
Total	39,362,256

Constructed by author based on AidData

data table are then converted into dichotomous set-theoretic values under the second raw data table (Tables 6.11, 6.12, and 6.13).

Having now configured the initial truth table, it is once again the task of the next step to solve the logical remainders and the contradictory cases

Table 6.11 Raw data table for India's project-level development cooperation in Africa (2005–2010)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Strategic importance</i>	<i>Economic importance</i>	<i>Humanitarian needs</i>	<i>Size of diaspora</i>	<i>Disbursements</i>
1. Sudan	8	5213.36	Low human development	3599	673,383,404
2. Ethiopia	7	1589.86	Low human development	994	428,382,206
3. Mali	30	477.87	Low human development	201	180,203,443
4. Ghana	16	4309.66	Low human development	10,000	169,411,002
5. Nigeria	2	49,912.69	Low human development	30,000	117,491,407
6. Angola	9	12,929.28	Low human development	6000	110,123,347
7. Ivory Coast	15	3148.02	Low human development	500	109,124,459
8. Senegal	23	2892.67	Low human development	440	90,789,474
9. Burkina Faso	24	389.76	Low human development	100	78,299,855
10. Congo, Democratic Republic	6	380.12	Low human development	4000	76,597,107
11. Swaziland	48	439.12	Medium human development	700	12,002,265
12. Namibia	41	433.96	Medium human development	160	9,444,857
13. Gambia	49	380.33	Low human development	333	9,318,536
14. Comoros	50	112.39	Low human development	300	2,665,250
15. Botswana	40	194.99	Medium human development	11,000	1,621,438
16. Liberia	38	666.17	Low human development	1501	1,559,578
17. Cape Verde	51	5.22	Medium human development	12	1,065,942

(continued)

Table 6.11 (continued)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Strategic importance</i>	<i>Economic importance</i>	<i>Humanitarian needs</i>	<i>Size of diaspora</i>	<i>Disbursements</i>
18. Uganda	14	1388.98	Low human development	20,000	726,181
19. Zimbabwe	18	553.09	Low human development	10,500	724,962
20. Sao Tome and Principe	52	7.99	Medium human development	4	233,247

Table 6.12 Raw data table for India's project-level development cooperation in Africa with dichotomous set-theoretic values (2005–2010)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Strategic importance</i>	<i>Economic importance</i>	<i>Humanitarian needs</i>	<i>Size of diaspora</i>	<i>Disbursements</i>
1. Sudan	1	1	1	0	1
2. Ethiopia	1	0	1	0	1
3. Mali	0	0	1	0	1
4. Ghana	0	0	1	1	1
5. Nigeria	1	1	1	1	1
6. Angola	1	1	1	0	1
7. Ivory Coast	1	0	1	0	1
8. Senegal	0	0	1	0	0
9. Burkina Faso	0	0	1	0	0
10. Congo, Democratic Republic	1	0	1	0	0
11. Swaziland	0	0	0	0	0
12. Namibia	0	0	0	0	0
13. Gambia	0	0	1	0	0
14. Comoros	0	0	1	0	0
15. Botswana	0	0	0	1	0
16. Liberia	0	0	1	0	0
17. Cape Verde	0	0	0	0	0
18. Uganda	1	0	1	1	0
19. Zimbabwe	0	0	1	1	0
20. Sao Tome and Principe	0	0	0	0	0

Table 6.13 Initial truth table for India's project-level development cooperation in Africa (2005–2010)

<i>Strategic importance</i>	<i>Economic importance</i>	<i>Humanitarian needs</i>	<i>Size of diaspora</i>	<i>Outcome</i>	<i>Cases</i>
0	0	0	0	0	11, 12, 17, 20
0	0	0	1	0	15
0	0	1	0	C	3, 8, 9, 13, 14, 16
0	0	1	1	C	4, 19
0	1	0	0	?	0
0	1	0	1	?	0
0	1	1	0	?	0
0	1	1	1	?	0
1	0	0	0	?	0
1	0	0	1	?	0
1	0	1	0	C	2, 7, 10
1	0	1	1	0	18
1	1	0	0	?	0
1	1	0	1	?	0
1	1	1	0	1	1, 6
1	1	1	1	1	5

in order to ensure that all combinations have a clear output on the outcome variable. This is done in the same manner in which it was done for the data on China's development cooperation, and thus scores of 0 will be used for all logical remainders and contradictory cases (Table 6.14).

Just as in the case of the determinants of China's development cooperation, the truth table above is now ready to be summarised and expressed firstly in the form of a primitive expression, which is then minimised through the use of Boolean algebra. Before representing the configurations through the primitive expressions, it is necessary to explain what each of the abbreviations used actually stands for as they all represent the variables under examination:

S = Strategic Importance

E = Economic Importance

H = Humanitarian Needs

D = Significance of Diaspora

O = Outcome of Interest (High Disbursement of Development Cooperation)

Table 6.14 Final truth table for India's project-level development cooperation in Africa (2005–2010)

<i>Strategic importance</i>	<i>Economic importance</i>	<i>Humanitarian needs</i>	<i>Size of diaspora</i>	<i>Outcome</i>	<i>Cases</i>
0	0	0	0	0	11, 12, 17, 20
0	0	0	1	0	15
0	0	1	0	0	3, 8, 9, 13, 14, 16
0	0	1	1	0	4, 19
0	1	0	0	0	0
0	1	0	1	0	0
0	1	1	0	0	0
0	1	1	1	0	0
1	0	0	0	0	0
1	0	0	1	0	0
1	0	1	0	0	2, 7, 10
1	0	1	1	0	18
1	1	0	0	0	0
1	1	0	1	0	0
1	1	1	0	1	1, 6
1	1	1	1	1	5

Using the above abbreviations, capital letters represent the presence of a particular variable, while a small letter represents the absence of that particular variable. The following symbols are also essential to reading the primitive expression:

- * = Boolean Multiplication (logical AND)
- + = Boolean Addition (logical OR)
- ⇒ = Sufficient for

Having outlined the abbreviations and symbols, one can now outline the primitive expression for the determinants of India's project-level development cooperation as follows:

$$S^*E^*H^*d + S^*E^*H^*D \Rightarrow O$$

Having established the primitive expression, the next step is the minimisation of the primitive expressions to produce the prime implicants.

This is done by distilling all configurations which differ on only one condition, which is done as follows:

$$S^*E^*H^*d + S^*E^*H^*D \longrightarrow S^*E^*H$$

Given the fact that the truth table only produced two primitive expressions, this further minimisation allows one to reach a minimal solution which cannot be further minimised and is represented as follows:

$$S^*E^*H \Leftrightarrow O$$

It is quite clear that in the case of India's project-level development cooperation in Africa, the minimal solution shows that while there were three necessary conditions, none of them were found to be sufficient on their own. However, the configuration produced by the minimal solution was found to be sufficient to produce the outcome variable. In other words, even though strategic importance, economic importance, and the humanitarian needs of recipients were found to be necessary in producing the outcome, they can only account for the outcome when combined through logical AND.

Having reached the minimal solution, QCA allows one to evaluate the strength of the findings on necessary and sufficient conditions through the calculation of consistency and coverage using the formulas outlined in the methodology. This ensures that the strength of the findings—represented through the minimal solution—can be evaluated and assessed. The study firstly evaluates consistency and then evaluates the coverage of the findings.

In the case of the determinants of India's development cooperation in Africa, the study found that both necessary and sufficient conditions display a consistency score of 1, which means 100 per cent of the cases with those combined conditions display a high value on the outcome variable. In terms of coverage, strategic importance was found to have a score of 0.5, economic importance had a score of 1, while humanitarian needs as a condition variable was found to have a score of 0.33. While strategic interests account for the positive value of 50 per cent of the cases observed, economic importance as a condition variable accounts for 100 per cent of the cases, while humanitarian needs account for 33 per cent of the cases. This means that the most important condition variable in terms of coverage is economic interests, followed by strategic interests, and then humanitarian interests in the case of India. Despite the calculation of coverage

allowing one to determine each condition's empirical importance, it is always important to remember that it is only when they were all combined that high levels of development cooperation were disbursed.

The findings reveal the weakness of monocausal arguments about the determinants of India's development cooperation in Africa. It is indeed quite clear that none of the condition variables were found to be sufficient on their own to produce a high score on the outcome variable. Contrary to the research strategy of competing variables, this study actually shows that the disbursements of high levels of development cooperation from India are caused by the combination of particular variables, not their competition for explanatory power. Thus, whereas economic importance plays a necessary role in explaining the outcome, it is only when economically important countries simultaneously display high strategic importance and humanitarian needs that India disbursed high levels of development cooperation.

This combinatorial explanation is central to QCA and shows clearly that only those countries which possessed the above-mentioned conditions were recipients of high levels of development cooperation. Theoretically, this supports the realist claim that strategic interests are important in the foreign aid regime. However, it is important to add that the realist claim is not sufficient on its own. Instead, in order to fully explain the determinants of India's development cooperation in the period under scrutiny, one must take into account the necessary role played by the humanitarian needs of recipients and their economic importance. Again, in the case of humanitarian norms and ideas, it was shown that Lumsdaine's (1993) argument that strategic and economic interests cannot explain completely the foreign aid regime must be taken more seriously than mere rhetoric.

The explanation of the high disbursement of India's development cooperation reveals the causal complexity of social phenomena. It thus underscores the importance of multiple and conjunctural explanations of the determinants of development cooperation. The data analysis reveals that it makes little sense to continue to debate about the determinants of Southern powers as though each variable was independent. Countries which display high values on strategic importance may also display high values in terms of their economic importance and humanitarian needs.

What is equally important in the conjunctural explanation given is the significance of context. Thus, it is only when strategic interests are combined with economic interests and humanitarian needs that high levels of development cooperation become the outcome.

Table 6.15 Key determinants of China and India's development cooperation

<i>China's development cooperation</i>	<i>India's development cooperation</i>
Strategic importance AND Humanitarian needs	Strategic importance AND Economic importance AND Humanitarian needs

Despite the size of the Indian diaspora in Africa, it was not found to play a central role in producing the outcome. Looking at the truth table and subsequent Boolean minimisation, it becomes clear that the data analysis does not find the size of the diaspora to have played an important role in determining the direction of large flows of development cooperation. Now that it has become clear why China and India have disbursed more development cooperation to some countries than others, the following table highlights the key determinants of both Southern powers in the period under analysis (Table 6.15).

In comparing the two Southern powers, it is quite evident that in their condition variables, they differ on only one aspect: economic interests. Thus, while both China and India see the strategic importance and humanitarian needs of recipients as important to the disbursement of high levels of development cooperation, India requires these two conditions to be further combined with the economic importance of recipients in order to disburse high levels of development cooperation. The calculation of coverage also allowed one to rank the relative importance of each causal variable for China and India, with strategic interests emerging as China's most important variable and economic interests emerging as India's most important variable. The empirical results thus support key principles of the narrative on South–South cooperation, namely, the combination of material benefits (win–win approach) and humanitarian interests (solidarity).

It has almost become standard academic practice to formulate hypotheses as though they always compete against one another in the discipline of international relations. Despite the aforementioned academic environment, this study has been able to demonstrate that variables do not always compete and that systematic and formal methods such as QCA may indeed be used in determining the key drivers of development cooperation among Southern powers. As Schraeder et al. (1998) make clear, it makes little sense to have an endless debate on how to change development cooperation when it is unclear what its key drivers have been.

NOTES

1. Check the official website of the Eximbank of India, which explains further the differences between the commercial loans and the concessional loans supported by the Government of India (GOI).
2. As seen through the annual reports of the MEA, most of these training slots have consistently gone to its neighbouring countries.

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Conclusion and Opportunities for Further Research

As the international development landscape continues to undergo a series of changes partly brought on by the rise Southern powers, this study sought to address some of the research questions which remain unanswered or unsatisfactorily answered when it comes to the determinants of development cooperation. Indeed, whereas everyone agrees that China and India have expanded their development cooperation in Africa, disagreements have remained with regard to where most of it has gone and towards what purposes it sought to play a role. This has led to much misunderstanding on the topic, with many of those who are part of the debate simply reiterating preconceived ideas about how they expect Southern powers to behave.

Much of this discussion remains shrouded in mystery due to the lack of empirical data used to systematically address the topic of this study. Thus, whereas passionate debates about China being a neocolonial power simply add fuel to the fire, they actually do not contribute much to our individual and collective understanding on the theoretical and importantly the empirical and observable determinants of China and India's development cooperation in Africa. While much of the blame certainly lies with journalists, public commentators, and researchers, Southern powers themselves also share the blame in not reporting on their development cooperation projects in a consistent, systematic, and transparent manner.

Despite these challenges, there are indeed signs that this is changing towards a more open direction. This is demonstrated through China's publishing of their White Paper on Foreign Aid and India's continued institutional reforms to their development cooperation architecture in the form of the Development Partnership Administration. Improvements in the reporting and dissemination of information on development cooperation from Southern powers will certainly go a long way in minimising the confusion; however, scholars should also refrain from allowing the challenges of collecting data to prevent them from applying their own rigorous analyses to the existing data.

Due to the nature of the topic, one had to clarify and define a few concepts before one could even seek to answer the main research question. This is because the very notion of development cooperation from Southern powers remains a disputed or little understood concept in the academic community. Too many researchers have thus simply taken its meaning for granted as though everyone was expected to understand it. However, it was pointed out from the beginning that this tendency to not define it or to simply define it so broadly that it loses any meaning leads to much confusion. It was thus the task of the study to firstly define Southern powers as a concept and then to define the concept of development cooperation as was used throughout the study.

It was shown that the notion of emerging powers is squarely situated in a broader Eurocentric view where some societies became known as developed while others were seen as developing (even underdeveloped). This is also plain to see in terms such as first world and third world. This development was often seen in a linear fashion following the development of the nation state in Europe. This study thus intentionally stayed away from using the concept of 'emergence' since it lacks clarity in terms of the transition from an 'emerging power' to being an actual power. The concept of Southern powers was preferred in acknowledging that while still facing domestic and regional challenges related to development and poverty, countries such as China and India are already shaping the global political and economic landscape and must be recognised as powers in their own right within the multipolar world that is taking shape.

While providing clarity on the notion of Southern powers as used throughout this study did not prove to be as difficult, it became very clear that in order to have a comparable definition of development cooperation, one would have to firstly draw on the long-standing definition of official development assistance as used by the OECD DAC. While this provided

the theoretical and operational foundation, it was clear that one could not simply apply that term to Southern powers without making any adjustments. It was decided that a middle-ground approach would be taken, placing the definition adopted in between the narrow and technical definition of the DAC and that which is simply too broad. This was essential given the comparative nature of the research design.

Many of the strengths and gaps to the existing research landscape were outlined throughout the book, which highlighted epistemological, ontological, and methodological strengths and weaknesses to the existing research. While pointing to the strengths and weaknesses of existing literature, this process allowed one to identify areas that could be improved through the completion of this study.

It became immediately evident that existing research on the rise of Southern powers either employs a qualitative research strategy with very few cases or a quantitative research strategy with the incorporation of many cases. While the former approach often cannot generalise to a larger set of countries, the latter approach finds itself attempting to make universal knowledge claims. This study was squarely situated in the middle of this continuum in the sense that while collecting data on all African countries, the 20 cases empirically examined through the method of QCA are too many for traditional qualitative methods and too few for a formal application of quantitative methods. This dilemma allowed one to explore a different approach which seeks to transcend both approaches and allows for the systematic qualitative analysis of data through the use of Boolean algebra.

The study has provided an overall picture of the development cooperation architecture of China and India, which focused on the main actors in both countries, what their roles were, and what the latest developments to their international development cooperation infrastructure were. The overview made it obvious that the relations between China, India, and Africa were not new but could be seen as a revival of ancient ties under vastly different conditions. Through the overview, one was thus able to gain an overall picture of the main characteristics of China and India's development cooperation in Africa.

In identifying possible answers to the research question, causal conditions were drawn from international relations theory and substantive empirical knowledge. From the realist tradition, the study identified the strategic importance of recipients; from the liberal tradition, it identified the economic importance of recipients; from the constructivist tradition,

it identified humanitarian norms; and from the literature on migration and development, the study identified the size of the diaspora as a causal condition. However, unlike conventional variable-based research strategies in the form of quantitative analysis, this study did not make the assumption that variables are independent and that causality is linear. Instead, it was interested in how these conditions may have combined to produce the outcome of interest.

The process of analysing the data demonstrated the explanatory insight that could be generated through the application of qualitative comparative analysis as a research method in solving the research puzzle on the determinants of development cooperation from Southern powers. The study thus demonstrated in a transparent, replicable, and reliable manner how the method of QCA can be usefully applied to this topic and what implications the assumptions made have on the manner in which social phenomena are studied. One should also keep in mind that the data could be applied to other forms of QCA, and not only through the use of crisp sets. Indeed, it may be of great interest to apply multivalued QCA or fuzzy sets to the data and compare the results. Given the nature of the data collected and organised, it is also quite possible to use it through a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods.

According to Schneider and Wagemann (2007: 25), criticism towards the dichotomisation of variables mainly stems from two reservations, namely, that they “represent a loss of empirical information and [that] they reduce the robustness of results due to the sensitivity of QCA findings to decisions on where to put the threshold for dichotomisation, as the latter is often subject to a relatively large degree of discretion.” The crux of the argument is “the belief that the world and large parts of social science phenomena simply do not come in a binary form.”

When considering this criticism towards dichotomous variables, one should not make the error of simply concluding that interval scale variables are always better and more valid. Schneider and Wagemann (*ibid*) contend that such criticism is especially doubtful “when the underlying concept establishes explicit *qualitative* distinctions between cases.” This was exactly the case in this study, where cases were explicitly distinguished in a qualitative manner. It was thus not only interested in the determinants of development cooperation, but in the disbursement of high levels of development cooperation. The cases under scrutiny could thus be dichotomised into those with high levels of development cooperation and those not displaying high levels of development cooperation.

Benoit Rihoux and Charles Ragin (2009) demonstrate the advantages and disadvantages of using crisp sets, multivalued, and fuzzy sets QCA through the use and analysis of the same data set with the different methods. This is helpful when contemplating whether to use the data as it is or with the use of other forms of QCA.

The findings reached show very clearly that none of the conditions identified through theory and substantive knowledge of the topic were sufficient on their own to produce the outcome variable. This highlights the importance of multiple and conjunctural explanations towards causation. In the case of China, it was thus found that while strategic interests and the humanitarian needs of recipients were necessary conditions, none was sufficient on its own to produce the outcome. Instead, only through these conditions combining was a positive outcome possible. By calculating the coverage of the variables, it was also possible to see that strategic interests cover a higher degree of empirical cases, followed by humanitarian interests for China. Having said that, it is also important to acknowledge that only when the two variables combined was it clear that high amounts of development cooperation were disbursed to recipient countries in Africa. In the case of India, strategic interests, economic interests, and the humanitarian needs of recipients were identified as necessary conditions which were not sufficient to produce the outcome unless they all combined. By calculating the coverage of the variables, it was also possible to see that economic interests cover the highest degree of empirical cases, followed by strategic interests, and then followed by humanitarian interests for India. Having said that, it is also important to acknowledge that only when the three variables combined was it clear that high amounts of development cooperation were disbursed to recipient countries in Africa. The calculation of coverage thus allowed one to rank the relative importance of each causal variable for China and India, with strategic interests being China's most important variable and economic interests being India's most important variable. The empirical results thus support key principles of the narrative on South–South cooperation, namely, the combination of material benefits (win–win approach) and humanitarian interests (solidarity).

The data collected and organised by this study is made available for use by researchers with similar interests. This adds an important resource for scholars with similar research interests. The data on all of the causal variables and outcome variable, and the manner in which they were operationalised, continues the process of seeking to better understand the

phenomenon of Southern powers as sources of development cooperation in Africa and may prove to be an important tool for further research.

The manner in which this study has collected and organised the data on all causal variables allows one to understand how African nation states rank in terms of their strategic importance in international relations. It thus produced tables ranking African countries from most strategic to least strategic. This gives a very visual picture of the balance of material capabilities in Africa and can be applied to a wide variety of research interests on the African continent's political economy.

It also clearly displays which African countries have been the highest trade partners of China and India and which have been the lowest. This was done through the use of existing trade figures to construct tables ranking African nation states from number one to 53 in terms of their economic importance to China and India. This is also a vivid representation of African nation states in the order of their economic importance to China and India and provides a valuable resource for further research.

The study also managed to illustrate which African nation states have the higher needs in terms of human development. This is important in the realm of development cooperation and allows one to categorise African countries into those displaying high levels of human development, medium levels of human development, and low levels of human development. These countries were also ranked from number one to 53, with those closer to the top displaying the highest humanitarian needs and those towards the bottom displaying lower humanitarian needs. This table will also provide a useful resource to those interested in mapping levels of development in Africa and can be used in a wide range of research on the development landscape.

In terms of the size of the Chinese and Indian diaspora in Africa, it was also important to show by way of clearly laid out tables which African countries have the largest diaspora communities and which ones have the smallest diaspora communities from China and India. This was also done through the construction of tables which ranked African countries based on the size of their diaspora communities from China and India. Those countries closer to the top have larger diaspora communities, while those closer to the bottom have a comparatively smaller diaspora community. These tables can thus be used in mapping the geographic distribution of the Chinese and Indian diaspora in Africa. Having a broader picture may even assist researchers to zone in on particular case studies they may have an interest in.

Since the research also made it easier to map the development landscape of Southern powers in Africa, it became possible for one to know and understand more or less about the highest and lowest recipients of development cooperation and which characteristics they possess. The tables used to illustrate where China and India's development cooperation has gone in Africa will thus add an important research tool open to specialists and non-specialists alike. It allows one to visualise which countries have been the highest recipients and which have been the lowest recipients of development cooperation during the period under scrutiny.

An area not addressed in the study which is of growing importance with regard to Southern powers as sources of development cooperation is trilateral cooperation, where Southern powers cooperate with one other donor in order to plan and implement development projects in a third country. Even though bilateral development cooperation will most likely continue to be the dominant form of disbursing development cooperation, the areas of trilateral cooperation and the disbursement of development cooperation through multilateral organisations will have to be scrutinised by researchers interested in the rise of Southern powers as sources of development cooperation. While this study was focused on China and India, there is also no reason to stop there, and other Southern powers within the BRICS could be included in the analysis.

What is essential to keep in mind is the reality that the empirical data can be further updated and improved gradually as projects such as AidData continue to improve their methods, as researchers do more field work, as Southern powers improve their systems of reporting, and as journalists, public commentators, and academics improve their analysis on the topic. What appears to be certain in the discipline and practice of international relations is the continued significance of Southern powers such as China and India in the global development framework. This ensures that the topic and the manner in which the research puzzle was approached have theoretical, methodological, and policy relevance beyond the study undertaken in this book.

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APPENDIX A

DATA ON CHINA'S PROJECT-LEVEL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IN AFRICA (2000–2010)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Recipient country</i>	<i>Commitments (US dollars 2009)</i>	<i>Project title</i>
2002	Algeria	4,959,407.00	Interest-free loan to boost economy
2002	Algeria	9,918,815.00	Economic and technical agreement regulating a loan
2010	Algeria	41,195,244.00	Construction of opera house (grant)
2003	Algeria	973,221.00	Emergency humanitarian aid following earthquake
		57,046,687.00	
2001	Angola	83,140,789.00	Loan to Angolan government
2005	Angola	1,435,869.00	Donation of agricultural equipment
2002	Angola	998,637.00	Buying goods for UNITA soldiers living in confinement camps
2003	Angola	17,721,854.00	Interest-free loan for economic houses
2001	Angola	13,302,526.00	Interest-free loan for hospital
2005	Angola	175,174.00	Donation for medicine to combat Marburg fever
2002	Angola	1,487,822.00	Demining equipment
2001	Angola	997,689.00	Food aid
2001	Angola	40,178,858.00	Furniture for Angolan Chancellery
2005	Angola	9,043,264.00	Interest-free loan

(continued)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Recipient country</i>	<i>Commitments (US dollars 2009)</i>	<i>Project title</i>
2005	Angola	483,323.00	Donation of tuberculosis medicine
2010	Angola	8,239,048.00	Unspecified grant for infrastructure, energy, and investment
2002	Angola	495,940.00	Medicine, equipment, and humanitarian aid
		<i>177,700,793.00</i>	
2007	Benin	4,705,828.00	Interest-free loan
2008	Benin	23,144,526.00	Grant for the construction of an overpass in Cotonou
2008	Benin	5,820,559.00	Cooperation pact and aid for construction of a flyover bridge in Cotonou
		<i>33,670,913.00</i>	
2007	Botswana	1,568,609.00	Construction of two primary schools
2009	Botswana	2,927,650.00	Grant for implementation of the National Development Plan
2005	Botswana	5,255,248.00	Interest-free loan
2010	Botswana	5,492,699.00	Grant within broader Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement
2004	Botswana	642,191.00	Grant for human resource training and purchase of equipment
2008	Botswana	162,921.00	National Referral STD Treatment and Training Centre in Gaborone
2004	Botswana	14,315,217.00	Interest-free loans for multi-purpose youth centre
2009	Botswana	11,180.00	Donation for youth activity centre
2009	Botswana	1,463,825.00	Grant for implementation of the National Development Plan
		<i>31,839,540.00</i>	
2008	Burundi	265,926.00	Funding for electoral support
2006	Burundi	16,892,187.00	Construction of Higher Teacher-Training School
2008	Burundi	8,478,573.00	Construction of Mpanda General Hospital (grant)
2003	Burundi	5,839,327.00	Economic grant
2001	Burundi	4,017,885.00	Technical cooperation
2007	Burundi	1,568,609.00	Grant for Strategic Framework for the Fight Against Poverty
2008	Burundi	2,022,252.00	Interest-free loan
2007	Burundi	1,290,136.00	Malaria Treatment Centre
2007	Burundi	241,126.00	Donation of malaria treatment drugs
2008	Burundi	1,712,426.00	Construction of access road to Mugere Hydropower Station to support repair work

(continued)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Recipient country</i>	<i>Commitments (US dollars 2009)</i>	<i>Project title</i>
2007	Burundi	4,705,828.00	Rehabilitation of Mugere hydroelectric station
2008	Burundi	2,182,709.00	Construction of three rural elementary schools
2010	Burundi	5,492,699 <i>54,709,683</i>	Grant for socio-economic projects
2003	Cameroon	554,396	Unspecified grant
2002	Cameroon	170,771.00	Grant unspecified
2010	Cameroon	13,603,493.00	Grant for economic and technical cooperation
2007	Cameroon	27,388,863.00	Concessional loan for construction of water treatment plant
2007	Cameroon	248,989.00	Gyneco-obstetric and paediatric hospital equipment and studies donation
2001	Cameroon	12,249,295.00	Construction of Yaounde Sports Complex
2007	Cameroon	4,705,828.00	Interest-free loan for economic and technical cooperation
2009	Cameroon	400,000.00	Donation of malaria research centre
2007	Cameroon	3,579,974.00	Yaounde hospital accommodation construction
		<i>62,901,609.00</i>	
2005	Cape Verde	22,657,312.00	Cape Verde National Stadium
2006	Cape Verde	5,921,522.00	Construction of the Poilao Dam
2006	Cape Verde	3,378,437.00	Interest-free loan for construction of medical consulting centre
		<i>31,957,271.00</i>	
2002	Central African Republic	1,997,274.00	Economic Cooperation Agreement
2003	Central African Republic	2,771,983.00	Grant for finances
2003	Central African Republic	180,178.00	Grant for national reconciliation dialogue
2003	Central African Republic	138,599.00	Grant for national reconciliation dialogue
2007	Central African Republic	4,534,634.00	Loan
2006	Central African Republic	7,671,063.00	Loan and aid package
2004	Central African Republic	6,027,460.00	Donation of radio equipment, election equipment, and computer equipment
		<i>23,321,191.00</i>	
2007	Chad	35,799,743.00	Concessional loan for road network in N'Djamena

(continued)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Recipient country</i>	<i>Commitments (US dollars 2009)</i>	<i>Project title</i>
2007	Chad	1,312,657.00	Loan to assist Chadian government electronic records
		<i>37,112,400.00</i>	
2007	Comoros	381,863.00	Anti-malaria drugs
2002	Comoros	66,411.00	Donation of Comoran flags
2001	Comoros	3,931,870.00	National reconciliation and development project
2007	Comoros	3,921,523.00	Grant under economic and technical accord
2010	Comoros	4,119,524.00	Grant for development projects
2010	Comoros	5,005,553.00	Hospital on the Island of Anjouan
2004	Comoros	11,452,174.00	Moroni international airport
2005	Comoros	290,279.00	Renovation of presidential palace
2005	Comoros	2,319,252.00	Renovation of the People's Palace in Moroni
		<i>31,488,449.00</i>	
2010	Congo	6,945,208.00	Interest-free loan
2003	Congo	4,157,975.00	Renovation of sports facilities, broadcasting centre, and foreign affairs building
2006	Congo	8,074,803.00	Construction of China–Congo Friendship Hospital in Brazzaville
2010	Congo	93,854.00	Donation of bus shelters
2008	Congo	677,388.00	Donation of medical equipment to anti-malarial centre
2009	Congo	292,765.00	Donation of office equipment
2006	Congo	5,063,564.00	Economic aid for anti-malarials, agricultural centres, schools, and training
2009	Congo	7,412,328.00	Upgrading health facilities (hospitals)
2003	Congo	8,315,950.00	Infrastructure grant
2001	Congo	6,805,164.00	Interest-free development loan
2010	Congo	68,658,741.00	Interest-free loan agriculture and health
2005	Congo	8,311,191.00	Grant for Sibiti water supply project
2007	Congo	4,773,299.00	Construction of University Library in Brazzaville
		<i>129,582,230.00</i>	
2003	Democratic Republic of Congo	1,167,839.00	Foreign Ministry renovation
2004	Democratic Republic of Congo	10,923,449.00	Hospital with equipment, instruments, and doctors
2009	Democratic Republic of Congo	585,539.00	Humanitarian aid

(continued)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Recipient country</i>	<i>Commitments (US dollars 2009)</i>	<i>Project title</i>
2006	Democratic Republic of Congo	6,056,102.00	Infrastructure grant including Bukavu highway
2006	Democratic Republic of Congo	1,749,540.00	Interest-free loan for telecommunications
2005	Democratic Republic of Congo	2,368,474.00	Grant for Mosaka water supply project
2003	Democratic Republic of Congo	3,892,885.00	Technical and economic cooperation grant
2008	Democratic Republic of Congo	35,650,926.00	Concessional loan for national fibre-optic transmission phase 1
2010	Democratic Republic of Congo	9,296.00	Donation of medical equipment to the Sino-Congolese Hospital in Kinshasa
2006	Democratic Republic of Congo	2,956,720.00	Construction of two schools in Kisangani
		65,360,770.00	
2009	Djibouti	2,927,650.00	Grant for economic and technical cooperation
2001	Djibouti	6,026,828.00	Grant for economic and technical cooperation
2005	Djibouti	10,227,528.00	Cooperation accord
2008	Djibouti	2,503,337.00	Development grant
2004	Djibouti	2,620,960.00	Development aid
2001	Djibouti	4,007,386.00	Construction of Foreign Ministry Headquarters (grant)
2004	Djibouti	180,823.00	Educational materials
2004	Djibouti	937,270.00	Grant to Girl's Orphanage for construction of an art centre
2005	Djibouti	1,751,749.00	Emergency food aid
2009	Djibouti	8,200,000.00	Regional hospital
2003	Djibouti	1,092,310.00	Donation of sanitation trucks and equipment
2004	Djibouti	1,371,247.00	Construction of sports complexes in Dikhil and Tadjourah
		41,847,088.00	
2008	Egypt	1,516,689.00	Agricultural development grant
2002	Egypt	6,612,543.00	Grant for construction of Chinese language school
2002	Egypt	5,991,824.00	Development grant
2009	Egypt	76,000.00	Educational equipment for Freedom Experimental School
2006	Egypt	13,458,005.00	Grant for construction of investment headquarters

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<i>Year</i>	<i>Recipient country</i>	<i>Commitments (US dollars 2009)</i>	<i>Project title</i>
2004	Egypt	15,068,650.00	Feasibility study for investment headquarters in Suez Canal
2002	Egypt	19,972,749.00	Soft loan
2004	Egypt	5,461,766.00	Grant for remote education system
2008	Egypt	3,640,055.00	Grant for construction of school for the handicapped
2008	Egypt	7,275,699.00	Grant for unspecified projects
2007	Egypt	784,304	Construction of Mubarak School in Kfar Museilha
		<i>79,858,284</i>	
2003	Equatorial Guinea	9,537,580	Bata–Niefang section road rehabilitation
2008	Equatorial Guinea	5,763,420.00	Grant for public works projects
2002	Equatorial Guinea	10,332,099.00	Interest-free loan for construction of TV headquarters in Malabo
2006	Equatorial Guinea	3,364,501.00	Grant for relief
		<i>28,997,600.00</i>	
2002	Eritrea	3,967,526.00	Grant
2003	Eritrea	3,222,155.00	Aid in economic and technical sectors
2010	Eritrea	5,578,057.00	Interest-free loan for food security
2004	Eritrea	2,730,883.00	Development agreement
2000	Eritrea	16,972,458.00	Interest-free loan for hospital
		<i>32,471,079.00</i>	
2004	Ethiopia	19,423,490.00	Addis Ababa City ring road phase 2
2002	Ethiopia	1,398,092.00	Training of agricultural technicians
2000	Ethiopia	339,449.00	Aid for drought victims
2003	Ethiopia	19,332,932.00	Construction of Ethio–China Polytechnic College
2008	Ethiopia	5,820,559.00	Construction of agricultural technology demonstration centre
2005	Ethiopia	215,315.00	Demarcation of Ethiopia–Sudan border
2006	Ethiopia	3,558,429.00	Development grant
2002	Ethiopia	3,994,549.00	Grant to bring Chinese experts to help with development projects
2007	Ethiopia	3,137,219.00	Development grant
2009	Ethiopia	9,552,031.00	Development grant
2000	Ethiopia	41,003.00	Donation of office equipment
2001	Ethiopia	166,281.00	Donation of demining equipment
2007	Ethiopia	298,331.00	Emergency food aid
2003	Ethiopia	4,736,568.00	Construction of Ethio–China Friendship Road
2008	Ethiopia	4,044,505.00	Grant for agricultural and government administration projects
2002	Ethiopia	1,997,274.00	Grant for human capacity development

(continued)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Recipient country</i>	<i>Commitments (US dollars 2009)</i>	<i>Project title</i>
2002	Ethiopia	991,881.00	Training centres and programme for textile workers
2002	Ethiopia	1,929,486.00	Human resource development and capacity building
2002	Ethiopia	33,062,719.00	Grant for technical assistance
2010	Ethiopia	6,786,636.00	Grant for development projects
2005	Ethiopia	61,580,327.00	Interest-free loan
2001	Ethiopia	5,653,573.00	Loan (interest-free) for textile factory expansion
2010	Ethiopia	9,677,683.00	Loan and aid agreement for development projects
2010	Ethiopia	4,119,524.00	Interest-free loan for unspecified purposes
		201,857,856.00	
2004	Gabon	7,534,325.00	Aid package for various development projects
2000	Gabon	4,412,839.00	Construction of parliament building
2010	Gabon	15,016,667.00	Cooperation agreement for schools, stadium, and assistance
2004	Gabon	9,041,190.00	Interest-free loan
2002	Gabon	11,983,649.00	Interest-free loan for Senate building construction
2008	Gabon	67,087,578.00	Construction of the "Friendship Stadium"
		115,076,248.00	
2010	Ghana	18,593,525	Interest-free loan to build fish-landing sites
2004	Ghana	5,650,743.00	Interest-free loan
2007	Ghana	4,534,634.00	Economic and technical cooperation
2008	Ghana	7,482,335.00	Technical cooperation
2001	Ghana	6,026,828.00	Grant for various development projects
2007	Ghana	281,624.00	Donation of anti-malaria drugs
2005	Ghana	5,167,579.00	Grant for economic and technical cooperation
2007	Ghana	5,369,961.00	Interest-free loan
2010	Ghana	46,483.00	Flood relief for victims
2008	Ghana	252,781.00	Donation of anti-malaria drugs
2009	Ghana	5,860,000.00	Interest-free loan
2009	Ghana	8,790,000.00	Grant
2004	Ghana	9,794.00	Donation of equipment to University of Ghana (Faculty of Science)
2009	Ghana	447,000.00	Donation of malaria treatment hospital and equipment

(continued)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Recipient country</i>	<i>Commitments (US dollars 2009)</i>	<i>Project title</i>
2002	Ghana	13,225,087.00	Donation to build a hospital
2005	Ghana	87,587.00	Grant for supply of equipment to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
2006	Ghana	2,960.76	Construction of rural primary schools
2004	Ghana	2,109,611.00	Construction of the Kumasi Youth Centre
2006	Ghana	5,383,202.00	Interest-free loan
2004	Ghana	94,179.00	Donation of general goods to Ghana
2009	Ghana	40,000.00	Donation of office equipment to the new Ministry of Foreign Affairs Building
2007	Ghana	71,599,486	Dedicated Information Project Phase 1
2009	Ghana	15,000,000.00	Agriculture and technology transfer
2009	Ghana	4,400,000.00	Grant and interest-free loan
2004	Ghana	3,616,476.00	Grant agreement
2003	Ghana	3,892,885.00	Rehabilitation of National Theatre
2009	Ghana	7,280,000.00	Construction of Teshie Hospital in Accra (grant)
		<i>195,244,760.76</i>	
2008	Guinea	10,111,264.00	Construction of a 150-bed hospital (Kipe International Hospital)
2007	Guinea	6,205,288.00	Aid package
2006	Guinea	78,415.00	Computer and office equipment for the School of Public Administration
2001	Guinea	10,229,783.00	Construction of radio and television headquarters
2006	Guinea	12,112,205.00	E-government project
2006	Guinea	52,276.00	Donation of medical equipment and office supplies for hospital
2004	Guinea	3,013,730.00	Rehabilitation of two power plants
2006	Guinea	2,875,223.00	Rice, chemical fertiliser, seedlings donation
		<i>44,678,184.00</i>	
2005	Guinea-Bissau	1,435,438.00	Grant for budget support
2007	Guinea-Bissau	4,773,299.00	Grant
2006	Guinea-Bissau	1,076,640.00	Grant for Portuguese countries summit
2005	Guinea-Bissau	28,708.00	Grant aid to fight cholera epidemic
2009	Guinea-Bissau	1,470,000.00	Food aid
2005	Guinea-Bissau	142,872.00	Food aid
2007	Guinea-Bissau	26,253,145.00	New government headquarters
2003	Guinea-Bissau	28,999,399.00	Parliament building
2003	Guinea-Bissau	6,000,000.00	Construction of parliament building

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<i>Year</i>	<i>Recipient country</i>	<i>Commitments (US dollars 2009)</i>	<i>Project title</i>
2004	Guinea-Bissau	5,274,027.00	Reconstruct and equip regional hospital in Cachingo
2007	Guinea-Bissau	4,773,299.00	Budget support
		80,226,827.00	
2009	Ivory Coast	14,638,253.00	Interest-free loan for social and economic development
2007	Ivory Coast	5,228,783	Construction of conference hall of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
2007	Ivory Coast	18,674,225.00	Construction of a hospital (grant)
2009	Ivory Coast	10,000,000.00	Election funding
2008	Ivory Coast	61,642,315.00	Post-crisis reconstruction
2006	Ivory Coast	10,295,092.00	Grant and loan agreement
2008	Ivory Coast	293,534.00	Donation of laboratory equipment
2004	Ivory Coast	3,641,177.00	Grant for economic and technical cooperation
2007	Ivory Coast	16,335,725.00	Grant to government
2006	Ivory Coast	1,689,218.00	Interest-free loan
2008	Ivory Coast	22,579.00	Donation of office equipment to Ministry of Foreign Affairs
		142,460,901.00	
2001	Kenya	31,747,992.00	Concessional loan for Kipsigak–Serem–Shamakhokho road project
2002	Kenya	104,962.00	Donation of agricultural machinery
2002	Kenya	1,653,135.00	Anti-malaria biological control
2006	Kenya	843,927.00	Anti-malaria drug donation
2003	Kenya	82,743.00	Anti-malaria drug donation
2005	Kenya	37,997,638.00	Concessional loan
2009	Kenya	878,295.00	Donation of anti-malaria medicine
2009	Kenya	7,032,784.00	Construction of Mama Lucy Kibaki Hospital
2010	Kenya	11,264,088.00	Continuing economic and technical cooperation
2010	Kenya	469,337.00	Donation of reproductive health medical equipment
2008	Kenya	303,337.00	Donation to Kenya Red Cross Society
2006	Kenya	9,519,422.00	Grant under economic and technical cooperation package
2009	Kenya	3,000,000.00	Famine relief fund
2010	Kenya	10,226,439.00	Foreign Affairs Ministry computer program (grant)
2010	Kenya	6,336,049.00	Grant for development projects
2002	Kenya	4,959,407.00	Grant to pay maize farmers

(continued)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Recipient country</i>	<i>Commitments (US dollars 2009)</i>	<i>Project title</i>
2008	Kenya	2,923,373.00	Grant to resettle displaced people following election violence
2008	Kenya	7,308,433.00	Interest-free loan to resettle displaced people from election violence
2003	Kenya	37,407.00	Donation of medical equipment and contraceptives
2008	Kenya	23,255.00	Monetary donation for internally displaced persons
2004	Kenya	95,161.00	Donation of office equipment for Kenyan National Assembly
2004	Kenya	37,671.00	Donation of office equipment for Kenya National Youth Service
2010	Kenya	1,173,342.00	Refurbishing of the Moi International Sports Centre
2006	Kenya	843,927.00	Rice donation
2005	Kenya	786,620.00	Technical training courses to government officials
2005	Kenya	3,799,763.00	Grant for various development projects
		143,448,507.00	
2008	Lesotho	2,447,885.00	Agreement for economic and technical cooperation
2005	Lesotho	4,514,435.00	Economic and technical cooperation
2007	Lesotho	1,568,609.00	Agreement for economic and technical cooperation
2007	Lesotho	3,137,219.00	Agricultural technical assistance
2009	Lesotho	5,900.00	Donation of computers for Lesotho Ministry of Justice
2003	Lesotho	4,535,211.00	Grant for construction of National Library
2007	Lesotho	3,387,545.00	Donation for construction of schools
2010	Lesotho	464,838.00	Food aid
2007	Lesotho	3,770,906.00	Grant to establish television systems in several cities
2005	Lesotho	2,031,495	Grant for equipment and development projects
2003	Lesotho	4,259,434.00	Grant for radio television network
2009	Lesotho	4,248,452.00	Grant for infrastructure development
2002	Lesotho	3,763,989.00	Grant for maize and other projects
2003	Lesotho	7,186.00	Grant for HIV/AIDS Care
2006	Lesotho	3,974,867.00	Construction of two rural schools
2007	Lesotho	9,254,796.00	Construction of new parliament building

(continued)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Recipient country</i>	<i>Commitments (US dollars 2009)</i>	<i>Project title</i>
2005	Lesotho	175,174.00	Donation of office equipment for National Assembly
2003	Lesotho	25,556.00	Office equipment donation
2010	Liberia	51,573,497.00	
2010	Liberia	130	Donation to a Local Agricultural Group-Diversity Farm (DF)
2010	Liberia	1,373,174	Additional medical materials to Tappita Hospital (grant)
2009	Liberia	292,765.00	Donation of anti-malaria drugs
2010	Liberia	8,239,048.00	Agreement on economic and technical cooperation
2008	Liberia	6,066,758.00	China Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centre
2006	Liberia	5,000,000.00	Interest-free loan as part of assistance towards Liberia's reconstruction programme
2006	Liberia	1,345,800.00	Budgetary support for salary arrears
2009	Liberia	9,895,459.00	Grant towards the construction of a new Ministry of Health
2005	Liberia	8,612,633.00	Grant for Samuel Kanyon Doe Sports Complex Renovation
2006	Liberia	336,450.00	Donation of agricultural equipment
2006	Liberia	1,345,800.00	Donation of agricultural tools
2006	Liberia	1,345,800.00	Donation of anti-malaria drugs
2009	Liberia	58,553.00	Chinese technical team to survey Ministry of Health Project
2007	Liberia	164,678.00	Donation of anti-malarial drugs
2010	Liberia	205,976.00	Donation of Equipment to China-Liberia Malaria Prevention and Treatment Centre
2004	Liberia	1,808,238.00	Donation of new vehicles and other logistics
2006	Liberia	40,374.00	Donation of a consignment of drugs to help fight Lassa fever epidemics
2010	Liberia	2,746,349.00	Economic and technical cooperation
2008	Liberia	2,224,478.00	Construction of three village schools
2006	Liberia	6,729,002.00	Grant unspecified
2010	Liberia	411,952.00	Exchange of malaria medicine
2004	Liberia	1,808,238.00	Goodwill donation of office and medical equipment
2010	Liberia	1,301,546.00	Experts for maintenance and training of technicians for Liberian Broadcast System

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<i>Year</i>	<i>Recipient country</i>	<i>Commitments (US dollars 2009)</i>	<i>Project title</i>
2009	Liberia	7,319,126.00	Grant for mutually agreed projects
2005	Liberia	354,553.00	Grant as part of Monrovia Road Rehabilitation Agreement
2006	Liberia	5,383,202.00	Renovated and Expanded Facilities of the Liberian Broadcasting Systems
2006	Liberia	6,751,418.00	Renovation of Ministry of Foreign Affairs
2010	Liberia	5,020,252.00	Renovation of the Ministry of Health Facilities
		86,181,752.00	
2001	Madagascar	6,026,828.00	Economic assistance grant
2005	Madagascar	20,096,144.00	Grant for construction of international conference centre
2003	Madagascar	5,839,327.00	Economic assistance grant
2004	Madagascar	3,641,177.00	Economic assistance grant
2004	Madagascar	32,252.00	Economic assistance grant
2004	Madagascar	4,391,476.00	Relief supplies
2001	Madagascar	504,763.00	Monetary and material support for Indian Ocean Island Games
2002	Madagascar	6,612,543.00	Rehabilitation of Antananarivo's streets
		47,144,510.00	
2008	Malawi	70,778,853.00	Grant for construction of Karonga–Chipita highway
2009	Malawi	45,000,000.00	Construction of National Assembly Building
2009	Malawi	1,000,000.00	Fertiliser Donation
2005	Malawi	358,859.00	Radio Channel Project
2009	Malawi	300,000.00	Furniture and Vehicle Donation to Foreign Ministry
2009	Malawi	1,463,825.00	Construction of two secondary schools (grant)
		118,901,537.00	
2007	Mali	1,568,609.00	Grant
2007	Mali	3,137,219.00	Grant for unspecified projects
2009	Mali	8,709,760.00	Grant for construction of women–children centres
2009	Mali	10,246,777.00	Construction of hospital
2009	Mali	487,095.00	Donation of anti-malarial medicine
2009	Mali	180,013.00	Donation of medical drugs and equipment for Chinese medical missions
2009	Mali	105,890.00	Donation of medicine and medical equipment for Kati Hospital

(continued)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Recipient country</i>	<i>Commitments (US dollars 2009)</i>	<i>Project title</i>
2010	Mali	2,746,349.00	Grant for economic and technical cooperation
2010	Mali	10,985,398.00	Grant for development projects
2006	Mali	6,751,418.00	Grant for economic and technical cooperation
2006	Mali	5,063,564.00	Grant for economic and technical cooperation
2008	Mali	5,820,559.00	Grant for economic and technical cooperation
2007	Mali	4,705,828.00	Grant for unspecified projects
2007	Mali	61,456,225.00	Grant to construct the Third Bridge for Mali in Bamako
2007	Mali	4,705,828.00	Interest-free loan
2006	Mali	3,375,709.00	Interest-free loan for economic and technical cooperation
2010	Mali	6,865,874.00	Loan for economic and technical cooperation
2008	Mali	4,365,419.00	Interest-free loan for economic and technical cooperation
		141,277,534.00	
2009	Mauritania	8,782,952.00	Interest-free loan
2009	Mauritania	439,147.00	Anti-malaria drug donation
2005	Mauritania	10,048,072.00	Grant for development projects
2006	Mauritania	3,364,501.00	Aid package for various development projects
		22,634,672.00	
2004	Mauritius	40,550.00	Donation of computers for Office of the President and Prime Minister's Office
2009	Mauritius	526,977.00	Donation of medical equipment to the Flacq Hospital
2006	Mauritius	843,927.00	Grant for development of aquaculture
2006	Mauritius	32,713.00	Donation of equipment to Ministry of Youth
2006	Mauritius	16,878,547.00	Interest-free loan for constructing Mauritius Broadcasting Corporation HQs
2001	Mauritius	4,017,885.00	Interest-free loan for MBC Headquarters
2002	Mauritius	3,994,549.00	Interest-free loan for X-Ray scanners for Customs department
2006	Mauritius	2,971,043.00	Interest-free loan for MBC Headquarters
2009	Mauritius	5,000,000.00	General grant

(continued)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Recipient country</i>	<i>Commitments (US dollars 2009)</i>	<i>Project title</i>
2009	Mauritius	6,500,000.00	Interest-free loan
2007	Mauritius	1,568,609.00	Grant
2006	Mauritius	843,927.00	Grant towards human resource development
2001	Mauritius	4,017,885.00	Interest-free loan for new market at Quatre Bornes
2007	Mauritius	4,705,828.00	Interest-free loan
2006	Mauritius	5,063,564.00	Interest-free loan
2003	Mauritius	26,387,942.00	Interest-free loan for renovation of Plaza Theatre
2009	Mauritius	12,515.00	Provision of two Masters in Public Policy and Public Administration
2010	Mauritius	8,153,889.00	Operation theatres, wards, and equipment
2010	Mauritius	2,355.00	Public Administration Seminar
2004	Mauritius	3,641,177.00	Interest-free loan for the Mauritius Broadcasting Corporation
2003	Mauritius	3,892,885.00	Interest-free loan for X-Ray scanners at Customs
2004	Mauritius	10,630.00	Sports equipment donation
2005	Mauritius	525,524.00	Funding a seminar on textiles and donation of office equipment
2005	Mauritius	7,299,773.00	Interest-free loan for MBC Headquarters
2005	Mauritius	3,893.00	Tourism seminar
		106,936,587.00	
2002	Morocco	159,781.00	Donation of equipment
2009	Morocco	1,463,825.00	Technical cooperation
2002	Morocco	5,991,824.00	Interest-free loan
2003	Morocco	7,785,770.00	Public works loan
2003	Morocco	910,110.00	Grant for public works projects
2000	Morocco	4,791,936.00	Interest-free loan for economic and technical cooperation
2006	Morocco	6,751,418.00	Grant for technical cooperation
2002	Morocco	998,637.00	Geochemical maps
2004	Morocco	910,294	Emergency humanitarian aid (earthquake)
2009	Morocco	1,365,255.00	Donation of school equipment
2009	Morocco	1,241,141.00	Grant for socio-economic projects
2006	Morocco	3,366,190	Donation of water engineering equipment
		35,736,181	

(continued)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Recipient country</i>	<i>Commitments (US dollars 2009)</i>	<i>Project title</i>
2006	Mozambique	26,916.00	Donation of music equipment to Education Ministry
2001	Mozambique	249,422.00	Donation of demining equipment
2004	Mozambique	5,424,714.00	Cash gift as part of larger agreements
2005	Mozambique	1,435,438.00	Support for drought victims
2008	Mozambique	3,033,379.00	Grant to be used in Basic Development Sectors
2005	Mozambique	4,306,316.00	Donation for Interior Ministry intended to boost capacity of the police force
2000	Mozambique	339,449.00	Donation to flood victims
2003	Mozambique	8,699,819.00	Grant for Joaquim Chissano International Conference Centre
2010	Mozambique	73,072.00	Donation of computers to the Mozambican Assembly of the Republic
2010	Mozambique	4,555,413.00	Grant for development projects
1008	Mozambique	18,200,276.00	Loan to help in agricultural projects
2010	Mozambique	2,045,287.00	Interest-free loan for economic and technical cooperation
2010	Mozambique	37,187,051.00	Concessional loan for construction of office of Auditor-General
2004	Mozambique	18,082,380.00	Construction of new Foreign Ministry Building
2002	Mozambique	198,376.00	Donation/grant
2009	Mozambique	750,000.00	New School of Visual Arts Inaugurated in Maputo
		104,607,308.00	
2001	Namibia	3,862,889.00	Interest-free loan for development projects
2003	Namibia	5,839,327.00	Interest-free loan
2004	Namibia	6,998,158.00	Interest-free loan
2006	Namibia	3,375,709.00	Interest-free loan
2005	Namibia	8,758,746.00	Interest-free loan for small industrial projects and small-scale farming units
2009	Namibia	7,319,126.00	Grant
2009	Namibia	10,246,777	Grant for construction of 60-bed hospital
2008	Namibia	2,910,279.00	Construction of two secondary schools (grant)
2010	Namibia	6,349.00	Donation for Namibian choir
2009	Namibia	5,900.00	Earmark for Mukwamhalanga Tukondjeni Community Trust
2002	Namibia	8,825,809.00	Grant for state house construction

(continued)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Recipient country</i>	<i>Commitments (US dollars 2009)</i>	<i>Project title</i>
2003	Namibia	12,778,303.00	Financing for presidential residence at new state house
2007	Namibia	4,705,828.00	Grant
2009	Namibia	2,360.00	Grant to Ebandulo Women Development Project
2010	Namibia	1,904,756.00	Grant to aquaculture development
2005	Namibia	10,134,907.00	Interest-free loan for national development programme
2007	Namibia	6,266,959.00	Record and management system for the government
2007	Namibia	10,162,636.00	Interest-free loan
2005	Namibia	5,868.00	Donation of computer equipment and office machinery
2007	Namibia	22,019,046.00	Grant for youth-training centres
2005	Namibia	232,493.00	Donation of technical equipment to Namibian Broadcasting Corporation
		126,362,225.00	
2005	Niger	5,255,248.00	Aid grant
2002	Niger	699,046.000	Grant aid to Niamey University (construction)
2008	Niger	218,270.00	Anti-malarial medicine
2006	Niger	168,785.00	Anti-malarial medicine
2009	Niger	292,765.00	Anti-malarial medicines
2005	Niger	408,206.00	Cash assistance for food crisis
2010	Niger	281,562.00	Donation of computers for election watchdog
2006	Niger	50,635,642.00	Construction of the Second Bridge
2007	Niger	392,152.00	Donation of chemical fertiliser
2006	Niger	337,570.00	Donation of medical supplies
2003	Niger	9,732,213.00	Economic aid
2010	Niger	1,373,174.00	Food aid
2009	Niger	7,319,126.00	Non-reimbursable aid
2007	Niger	4,610,002.00	Rehabilitation of General Seyni Kountche Stadium
2003	Niger	50,607.00	Donation of simultaneous interpretation equipment for Foreign Affairs Ministry
2002	Niger	6,612,543.00	Zinder Water Supply Project
2007	Niger	536,996.00	Sino-Nigerien Centre to Combat Malaria
2002	Niger	998,637.00	Donation of supplies and equipment for youth training
2007	Niger	1,670,654.00	Construction of two rural schools
		91,593,198.00	

(continued)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Recipient country</i>	<i>Commitments (US dollars 2009)</i>	<i>Project title</i>
2002	Nigeria	198,376.00	Grant for explosion victims
2004	Nigeria	18,082.00	Cultural equipment donation
2002	Nigeria	5,785,975.00	Grant
2004	Nigeria	3,390,446.00	Grant to Nigeria
2003	Nigeria	5,839,327.00	Grant for unspecified projects
2006	Nigeria	6,751,418.00	Grant for infrastructure projects
2006	Nigeria	843,927.00	Anti-malaria grant
2007	Nigeria	19,729.00	Donation of teaching equipment
2009	Nigeria	12,500,000.00	Grant for hospital upgrade
2007	Nigeria	663,969.00	Donation of avian flu-fighting equipment
2006	Nigeria	838,433.00	Malaria prevention
2006	Nigeria	3,221,929.00	Construction of rural schools
2002	Nigeria	9,092,247.00	Donation of medical equipment and drugs
2005	Nigeria	7,054,294.00	Construction of various water schemes (boreholes)
		56,218,152.00	
2007	Rwanda	596,662.00	Grant for e-learning laboratory
2006	Rwanda	10,308,832.00	Construction of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Headquarters
2007	Rwanda	1,745,408.00	Construction of primary schools
2010	Rwanda	10,985,398.00	Construction of vocational school
2008	Rwanda	50,556.00	Donation for earthquake victims
2000	Rwanda	4,100,368.00	Economic development grant
2006	Rwanda	337,570.00	Donation of medical instruments and medicine
2006	Rwanda	6,056,102.00	Grant for agricultural technology demonstration centre
2010	Rwanda	4,090,575.00	Grant for agreed upon development projects
2001	Rwanda	6,026,828.00	Grant for bilateral projects
2008	Rwanda	1,455,139.00	Grant for construction of Kigali Hospital
2002	Rwanda	9,092,247.00	Grant for unspecified projects
2005	Rwanda	77,198.00	Grant towards construction of state house
2009	Rwanda	70,000.00	Grant to President's efforts in supporting vulnerable children
2003	Rwanda	5,992,979.00	Loan extended for infrastructure and government
2006	Rwanda	3,375,709.00	Grants for economic development
2009	Rwanda	5,855,301.00	Interest-free loan

(continued)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Recipient country</i>	<i>Commitments (US dollars 2009)</i>	<i>Project title</i>
2001	Rwanda	6,005,765.00	Grant to boost rice production
2008	Rwanda	31,132,584.00	Rehabilitation of the urban roads in Kigali
2009	Rwanda	32,057,775.00	Interest-free loan for Kigali road network rehabilitation project
		139,412,996.00	
2006	Senegal	336,450.00	Medicine donation to combat malaria
2006	Senegal	47,103,019.00	Loan to build the Senegal National Grand Theatre
2009	Senegal	11,710,602.00	Loan for cultural, sports, agricultural, and health sectors
2006	Senegal	5,063,564.00	Grant for development and infrastructure projects
2010	Senegal	14,160,632.00	Donation of computer equipment
2006	Senegal	269,160.00	Humanitarian aid for flood
2007	Senegal	313,721.00	Donation of malaria medication
2007	Senegal	35,799,743.00	Construction of a museum in honour of Black Civilisation
		114,756,891.00	
2005	Seychelles	71,771	Relief aid to repair tsunami damage
2007	Seychelles	1,789,987.00	Balance of payment support
2007	Seychelles	3,267,145.00	Construction of National Assembly Building
2007	Seychelles	5,369,961.00	Construction of primary school
2007	Seychelles	47,058,284.00	Extension of concessionary loans
2000	Seychelles	424,311.00	Grant
2007	Seychelles	7,843,047.00	Unconditional grant
2010	Seychelles	5,492,699.00	Donation for economic and technical cooperation projects
		71,317,205.00	
2010	Sierra Leone	8,367,086.00	Loan
2000	Sierra Leone	424,311.00	Donation of agricultural, fishing, lumbering, and machinery maintaining equipment
2002	Sierra Leone	16,531,359.00	Construction of new Foreign Ministry Building
2003	Sierra Leone	402,769.00	Construction of Regent Street/Peterson Street Bridge
		25,725,525.00	
2005	Somalia	8,758,746.00	Grant for economic and technical cooperation
2007	Somalia	157,518.00	Anti-malaria drugs
2004	Somalia	57,097.00	Donation of office equipment

(continued)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Recipient country</i>	<i>Commitments (US dollars 2009)</i>	<i>Project title</i>
2007	Somalia	596,662.00	Humanitarian aid
2007	Somalia	1,193,324.00	Reconstruction aid
		10,763,347.00	
2007	South Africa	4,741,361.00	Gariép fish hatchery
2006	South Africa	3,375,709.00	Training 300 people over three years
		8,117,070.00	
2008	Sudan	8,730,839.00	Voluntary repatriation in Darfur (humanitarian)
2008	Sudan	2,910,279.00	Boosting North–South Unity
2005	Sudan	215,315.00	Demarcation of Ethiopia–Sudan border
2001	Sudan	5,022,357.00	Development grant
2010	Sudan	1,373,174.00	Donation of mobile clinics
2009	Sudan	3,000,000.00	Donation for elections
2002	Sudan	5,991,824.00	Grant for construction of conference hall
2000	Sudan	50,917.00	Grant to assist refugees
2006	Sudan	1,687,854.00	Humanitarian grant to rehabilitate Darfur
2005	Sudan	1,751,749.00	Grant to rehabilitate Darfur
2002	Sudan	4,132,839.00	Grant to rehabilitate radiotherapy hospital
2007	Sudan	3,137,219.00	Humanitarian aid for Darfur
2004	Sudan	910,294.00	Humanitarian aid for Darfur
2009	Sudan	2,927,650.00	Humanitarian aid for Darfur
2007	Sudan	15,686,094.00	Interest-free loan for construction of presidential palace
2002	Sudan	5,991,824.00	Grant towards technical and economic cooperation
2004	Sudan	10,923,532.00	Concessional loan
2009	Sudan	33,667,983.00	Concessional loan
2009	Sudan	11,710,602.00	Interest-free loan
2000	Sudan	4,243,114.00	Unconditional grant
2001	Sudan	2,008,942.00	Unconditional grant
		126,074,401.00	
2006	Tanzania	6,751,418.00	Agricultural Demonstration Centre
2005	Tanzania	179,281.00	Donation of agricultural machinery
2009	Tanzania	21,957,380.00	Development of the IT sector (including Zanzibar)
2010	Tanzania	13,945,144.00	Construction of Julius Nyerere Convention Centre
2006	Tanzania	506,356.00	Donation of anti-malaria drugs
2005	Tanzania	18,660.00	Donation of anti-malaria drugs and mosquito nets

(continued)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Recipient country</i>	<i>Commitments (US dollars 2009)</i>	<i>Project title</i>
2005	Tanzania	13,636.00	Anti-malaria drugs and cement
2005	Tanzania	176,738.00	Anti-malarial drugs
2000	Tanzania	23,113,171.00	Grant for Chalinze Water Supply Project, Phase I
2009	Tanzania	219,573.00	Donation of computer equipment to the Tanzanian Ministry of Home Affairs
2000	Tanzania	7,784,549.00	Dodoma City Water Project (grant)
2010	Tanzania	9,296,726.00	Grant under economic and technical cooperation
2000	Tanzania	3,180,711.00	Interest-free loan for low-cost housing
2010	Tanzania	171,518.00	Donation of various items to the state house
2000	Tanzania	33,944.00	Donation of equipment for cultural activities
2002	Tanzania	3,762,635.00	Grant for Chalinze and Dodoma Water Projects
2006	Tanzania	843,927.00	Grant for construction of a primary school
2006	Tanzania	1,322,257.00	Food aid
2001	Tanzania	379,459.00	Goodwill grant
2010	Tanzania	4,617.00	Goodwill equipment donation
2008	Tanzania	1,516,689.00	Donation of Information and Computer Technology Facilities for Interior Ministry
2002	Tanzania	17,102.00	Grant towards rescue operation
2009	Tanzania	4,400,000.00	Rehabilitation of the state radio and television
2010	Tanzania	42,219.00	Donation of medical equipment
2003	Tanzania	322,215.00	Police vehicles donation
2000	Tanzania	61,493,759.00	Construction of National Stadium
2002	Tanzania	82,656.00	Donation of stationary and musical equipment
		161,536,340.00	
2009	Togo	8,894,794.00	Development grant
2006	Togo	84,934.00	Donation of anti-malaria drugs
2009	Togo	3,600,000.00	Donation of mechanical equipment for road construction
2004	Togo	99,833.00	Donation of drugs and medical equipment
2007	Togo	2,666,635.00	Grant for development projects
2010	Togo	7,995,216.00	Grant for agriculture and infrastructure projects
2010	Togo	11,262,500.00	Grant for socio-economic projects

(continued)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Recipient country</i>	<i>Commitments (US dollars 2009)</i>	<i>Project title</i>
2002	Togo	5,820,559.00	Grant for Agricultural Demonstration Centre
2007	Togo	1,568,609.00	Interest-free loan
2007	Togo	7,469.00	Learning materials for children
2010	Togo	2,974,964.00	Loan for agriculture and infrastructure projects
2008	Togo	5,820,559.00	Prevention of malaria
2008	Togo	6,773,880.00	Loan for projects in health, education, agriculture, and energy
2008	Togo	727,569.00	Supply of materials
2005	Togo	143,543.00	Donation of medical supplies
2008	Togo	677,388.00	Material and financial assistance for flood victims
		59,118,452.00	
2008	Tunisia	4,365,419.00	Construction of two dams in South Tunisia
2010	Tunisia	2,754,035.00	Grant for economic and technical cooperation
2000	Tunisia	5,723,183.00	Soft loan with grant
2004	Tunisia	1,820,588.00	Gift
		14,663,225.00	
2003	Uganda	402,769.00	Aid to Internally Displaced Persons Camps
2001	Uganda	13,939,868.00	Grant aid to fight Ebola virus
2009	Uganda	700,000.00	Construction of China-Uganda Friendship School
2009	Uganda	5,000,000.00	Construction of agricultural aquaculture demonstration centre (grant)
2002	Uganda	7,839,891.00	Construction of building for Ministry of Foreign Affairs Office (grant)
2007	Uganda	32,219,768.00	Construction of government offices
2008	Uganda	6,066,758.00	Construction of hospital
2008	Uganda	411,398.00	Construction of malaria treatment/prevention centre
2009	Uganda	750,000.00	Construction of secondary school (Sembabule District)
2004	Uganda	7,534,325.00	Construction of state house (grant)
2007	Uganda	8,114,608.00	Development grant
2009	Uganda	400,000.00	Donation of anti-malaria drugs
2010	Uganda	371,870.00	Donation of anti-malaria drugs
2009	Uganda	75,140.00	Donation of computers for inspectorate of government
2010	Uganda	426,935.00	Donation of anti-malaria drugs

(continued)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Recipient country</i>	<i>Commitments (US dollars 2009)</i>	<i>Project title</i>
2001	Uganda	62,320.00	Donation of equipment for cultural activities
2008	Uganda	1,528,052.00	Donation of farm supplies and seeds
2002	Uganda	2,396,729.00	Donation of garbage trucks
2002	Uganda	596,782.00	Donation of medical equipment
2009	Uganda	300,000.00	Donation of reproductive health medical equipment
2000	Uganda	5,431,186.00	Donation of road maintenance vehicles
2010	Uganda	98,778.00	Donation of tractors
2004	Uganda	7,346,147.00	Economic and technical cooperation for budget support
2003	Uganda	16,110.00	Donation to the Uganda Olympic Committee
2006	Uganda	17,635,836.00	Expansion of parliament chambers
2004	Uganda	6,707,594.00	Technical experts sent for Mandela Stadium
2001	Uganda	710,727.00	Technical experts sent to Uganda Industry Research Institute for training
2010	Uganda	2,789,028.00	Grant for Mandela Stadium upgrade
2007	Uganda	1,384,775.00	Grant for construction of agriculture schools
2004	Uganda	3,917,849.00	Grant for development aid
2007	Uganda	119,332.00	Grant for flood relief
2001	Uganda	66,512,631.00	Interest-free loan for construction of food research facility
2006	Uganda	13,458,005.00	Grant for refuse collection in Kampala
2001	Uganda	57,153,421.00	Chinese medical team
2006	Uganda	134,580.00	Grant to Mulago Hospital to train health workers to handle HIV/AIDS patients
2003	Uganda	5,839,327.00	Unconditional grant
2009	Uganda	4,414,680.00	Senior agricultural experts from China (technical cooperation)
2006	Uganda	2,459,060.00	Grant to upgrade national broadcaster's technical facilities
		285,266,279.00	
2006	Zambia	1,687,854.00	Donation of material for polls
2001	Zambia	1,004,471.00	Donation of office equipment for OAU Summit
2004	Zambia	1,657,551.00	Grant for road rehabilitations
2001	Zambia	2,269,743.00	Provision of FM radio transmitters under grant
2004	Zambia	753,432.00	Donation of digital equipment

(continued)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Recipient country</i>	<i>Commitments (US dollars 2009)</i>	<i>Project title</i>
2005	Zambia	11,483,511.00	Donation of equipment to Zambian media
2007	Zambia	47,612,465.00	Concessional loan for floods disaster and repair work
2001	Zambia	831,407.00	Grant towards organisation of OAU Summit
2006	Zambia	1,076,640.00	Donation of vehicles, media equipment
2006	Zambia	13,458,005.00	Grant for stadium
2006	Zambia	13,502,837.00	Grant towards water supply
2010	Zambia	49,571,611.00	Concessional loan for mobile hospitals
2010	Zambia	4,119,524.00	Grant in assistance for projects
2006	Zambia	1,345,800.00	Grant to purchase relief food following a severe drought
2007	Zambia	178,998.00	Humanitarian aid
2003	Zambia	12,888,621.00	Donation of equipment to Zambian media
2005	Zambia	660,301.00	Provision of FM radio transmitters under grant
2001	Zambia	4,017,884.00	Grant for social and economic development
2002	Zambia	3,994,549.00	Provide Zambia with fertiliser
2003	Zambia	96,664.00	Donation of computers, printers, and raincoats for the police
2007	Zambia	548,929.00	Compensation to Chambishi Copper Mine Families
2005	Zambia	717,719.00	Grant for assistance
2003	Zambia	9,666,466.00	General grant
2002	Zambia	13,886,342.00	Grant for construction of government complex
2010	Zambia	5,895,560.00	Interest-free loan for fight against poverty
2004	Zambia	3,616,476.00	Grant to finance poverty alleviation programmes
2001	Zambia	4,157,039.00	Grant for technical support
		210,700,399.00	
2002	Zimbabwe	8,265,679.00	Grant for food, irrigation
2001	Zimbabwe	401,788.00	Donation of agricultural equipment
2000	Zimbabwe	1,025,136.00	Donation of office equipment
2010	Zimbabwe	2,696,061.00	Grant for various development projects
2008	Zimbabwe	505,563.00	Grant for cholera vaccines
2003	Zimbabwe	3,222,155.00	Grant for land reform
2009	Zimbabwe	500,000.00	Donation of soybeans to ease food shortages

(continued)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Recipient country</i>	<i>Commitments (US dollars 2009)</i>	<i>Project title</i>
2008	Zimbabwe	7,275,699.00	Grant to fund Grace Mugabe Orphanage School
2010	Zimbabwe	1,394,514.00	Provision of drugs and medical equipment for the Friendship Hospital
2010	Zimbabwe	9,296,762.00	Grant to supply China–Zimbabwe Friendship Hospital with equipment
2003	Zimbabwe	7,249,849.00	Zimbabwe developmental projects
2009	Zimbabwe	10,000.00	Donation to the Mashambanzou Care Trust for people suffering with HIV/AIDS
2009	Zimbabwe	1,500,000.00	Construction of primary school at Bindura
2007	Zimbabwe	7,015,401.00	Donation of desks and chairs to Zimbabwe College
2008	Zimbabwe	2,527,816.00	Loan for critical underfunded area
2000	Zimbabwe	424,311.00	Grant
2003	Zimbabwe	8,055,388.00	Grant for agriculture/land reform
2009	Zimbabwe	11,933,247.00	Chinese–Zimbabwean Friendship Hospital
2004	Zimbabwe	319,295.00	Donation of computer equipment for parliament
2006	Zimbabwe	6,751,418.00	Construction of agricultural demonstration centre
2002	Zimbabwe	3,140,958.00	Donation of goods for Harare Christmas Fund (for orphans)
2010	Zimbabwe	6,865,874.00	Grant for mobile service provider
2005	Zimbabwe	8,758,746.00	Grant for grain and future projects
2001	Zimbabwe	415,703.00	Donation of office equipment for Foreign Affairs Ministry
2003	Zimbabwe	32,221.00	Donation of equipment to parliament
2006	Zimbabwe	13,458,005.00	Renovation of stadium
2002	Zimbabwe	57,725.00	Donation of sports equipment
2009	Zimbabwe	10,000.00	Donation Mashambanzou Care Trust (HIV/AIDS)
2003	Zimbabwe	805,538.00	Yellow maize donation
2000	Zimbabwe	4,100,368.00	Interest-free loans for development project
2009	Zimbabwe	150,000.00	Donation of equipment to parliament
2009	Zimbabwe	5,000,000.00	Cash grant
		123,165,220.00	

Constructed by author using data acquired from AidData

APPENDIX B

DATA ON INDIA'S PROJECT-LEVEL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IN AFRICA (2005–2010)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Recipient country</i>	<i>Commitments</i> <i>(US dollars constant)</i>	<i>Project title</i>
2005	Angola	55,633,052	Railway rehabilitation project by M/s RITES Ltd
2009	Angola	35,925,157	Setting up an Industrial Park
2009	Angola	136,065	Establishment of Artificial Limb Factory in Angola
2009	Angola	17,962,578	Setting up of a Textile Project
2010	Angola	466,495	Establishment of Artificial Limb Factory in Angola
		110,123,347	
2009	Benin	17,962,578	Railway Equipment; Agricultural Equipment & Feasibility Study for Cyber City
2009	Benin	675,378	Supply of equipment, computers, and accessories
2009	Benin	336,452	Supply of tractors
2010	Benin	1,166,238	Supply of medical equipment, computers, and accessories
		20,140,646	

(continued)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Recipient country</i>	<i>Commitments (US dollars constant)</i>	<i>Project title</i>
2009	Botswana	49,478	Supply of computers, printers, UPS, and so on to Botswana
2009	Botswana	405,722	Supply of medical equipment, furniture, and other accessories to hospitals
2010	Botswana	1,166,238 1,621,438	Supply of medical equipment
2005	Burkina Faso	43,073,891	Agricultural materials, modernising post office, and foreign exchange bureau
2008	Burkina Faso	29,238,438	Rural electrification
2009	Burkina Faso	5,987,526 78,299,855	Multi-Media Call Centre Project
2008	Cameroon	44,033,088	Maize and rice farm plantation projects
2010	Cape Verde	1,065,942	Health and education projects
2008	Central African Republic	34,501,357	Setting up a modern dry process cement plant of 400 TPD capacity
2005	Chad	69,541,316	Bicycle Plant, Agricultural Plant, Steel Billet Plant, and Rolling Mill
2008	Comoros	537,654	Construction of convention centre and vocational training centre in Comoros
2009	Comoros	781,757	Setting up a vocational training centre in Comoros
2010	Comoros	879,344	Setting up of vocational training centre
2010	Comoros	466,495 2,665,250	Setting up of a Solar Lighting Project in the Union of Comoros
2005	Cote d'Ivoire	37,274,145	Renewal of urban transport system in Abidjan, agricultural projects
2009	Cote d'Ivoire	35,925,157	Rice production programme
2009	Cote d'Ivoire	35,925,157 109,124,459	Electricity interconnection project between Cote d'Ivoire and Mali
2005	Democratic Republic of Congo	46,592,681	Cement factory, acquisition of 500 buses, rehabilitation of Kisenga Manganese
2009	Democratic Republic of Congo	29,937,631	Installation of hand pumps and submersible pumps
2009	Democratic Republic of Congo	66,795 76,597,107	Supply of medicines
2005	Djibouti	13,908,263	Purchase of various goods from India
2005	Equatorial Guinea	20,862,394	Potable drinking water project
2009	Eritrea	29,950,105	Multipurpose agricultural and educational projects

(continued)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Recipient country</i>	<i>Commitments (US dollars constant)</i>	<i>Project title</i>
2006	Ethiopia	89,102,875	Energy transmission and distribution project in Ethiopia
2007	Ethiopia	143,416,499	Development of sugar industries
2008	Ethiopia	194,412,224	Development of sugar industry
2009	Ethiopia	588,791	Supply of CT scan machine to Black Lion Hospital of Ethiopia
2009	Ethiopia	101,430	Tele-education and tele-medicine pilot project in Ethiopia
2010	Ethiopia	760,387	Supply of CT scan machine to Black Lion Hospital of Ethiopia
		428,382,206	
2005	Gambia	9,318,536	Assembly plant for tractors
2005	Ghana	37,552,310	Rural electrification, agriculture, transportation, and communication equipment
2005	Ghana	20,862,394	Purchase of various goods from India
2005	Ghana	83,449,579	Rural electrification, construction of President's office
2008	Ghana	1,075,308	Support to C-DAC Centre in Ghana
2008	Ghana	25,402,355	Fish processing project and waste management equipment project
2009	Ghana	136,065	Assistance to Kofi Annan Centre of Peacekeeping in Ghana
2010	Ghana	932,991	Assistance to Kofi Annan Centre of Peacekeeping Excellency in IT in Ghana
		169,411,002	
2005	Lesotho	6,954,131	Purchase of various goods from India
2009	Lesotho	5,628,274	Setting up a vocational training centre
2009	Lesotho	24,739	Supply of books to the National Library
2009	Lesotho	846,079	Setting up of Centre of Advanced Education in Information Technology (CAEIT)
2010	Lesotho	1,224,550	Setting up of Centre of Advanced Education in Information Technology (CAEIT)
		14,677,773	
2009	Liberia	66,795	Supply of sprayers, pesticide, and so on to Liberia
2010	Liberia	349,871	Supply of 25 non-AC buses plus service centre
2010	Liberia	163,273	Setting up of ICT Centre
2010	Liberia	163,273	Hole-in-the-Wall Project
2010	Liberia	349,871	Hole-in-the-Wall Project
2010	Liberia	466,495	Health and education project

(continued)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Recipient country</i>	<i>Commitments (US dollars constant)</i>	<i>Project title</i>
		<i>1,559,578</i>	
2008	Madagascar	1,779,635	Set up intranet network in Madagascar
2008	Madagascar	29,238,438	Project for rice productivity and project for fertiliser production
2009	Madagascar	1,459,609	Intranet and Internet for networking of President office with other ministries
		<i>32,477,682</i>	
2005	Mali	37,552,310	Rural electrification, agricultural machinery
2005	Mali	28,678,838	Acquisition of railway coaches and locomotives from India
2007	Mali	52,899,528	Electricity transmission and distribution project from Cote d'Ivoire to Mali
2009	Mali	43,110,189	Completion of Mali-Ivory Coast Interconnection Link
2009	Mali	17,962,578	Agriculture and food processing project
		<i>180,203,443</i>	
2008	Mauritania	1,075,308	Aid for Dairy Development in Mauritania
2008	Mauritania	538,654	Setting up of vocational training centre in Mauritania
2009	Mauritania	26,105,614	Portable drinking water project agriculture development project
		<i>27,719,576</i>	
2005	Mauritius	13,908,263	Construction of Baie du Tombeau sewerage project in Mauritius
2009	Mauritius	1,580,831	Supply of Coastal Radar System to Government of Mauritius
2009	Mauritius	3,114,659	Gifting of Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH)
2010	Mauritius	200,593	Supply of Coastal Surveillance Radar System to Government of Mauritius
2010	Mauritius	1,278,197	Setting up of a planetarium at Rajiv Ghandi Science Centre in Mauritius
		<i>20,082,543</i>	
2005	Mozambique	2,787,652	Financing of exports of various goods from India
2008	Mozambique	35,086,125	Rural electrification project in the provinces of Gaza, Zambia, and Nampula

(continued)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Recipient country</i>	<i>Commitments (US dollars constant)</i>	<i>Project title</i>
2008	Mozambique	29,238,438	Development project
		67,112,215	
2009	Namibia	3,008,280	Establishment of Faculties of Engineering and Information Technology at UNAM
2009	Namibia	22,265	Hole-in-the-Wall project in Namibia
2010	Namibia	4,664,955	Establishment of Faculties of Engineering and Information Technology at UNAM
2010	Namibia	583,119	Assistance to Namibia health sector
2010	Namibia	1,166,238	Supply of educational equipment to Namibia
		9,444,857	
2008	Niger	23,390,750	For power project
2008	Nigeria	116,953,753	Various projects
2008	Nigeria	537,654	Setting up of NRDC Technology Development Centre in Nigeria
		117,491,407	
2009	Rwanda	400,774	Supply and installation of solar photovoltaic equipment in 35 schools
2009	Rwanda	71,850,315	Power project
2009	Rwanda	358,717	Setting up of Appropriate Technology Demonstration Centre in Rwanda
2010	Rwanda	480,490	Supply and installation of solar photovoltaic equipment in 35 schools
2010	Rwanda	228,582	Setting up of Appropriate Technology Demonstration Centre in Rwanda
		73,318,878	
2010	Sao Tome and Principe	233,247	Health and education project
2005	Senegal	24,854,066	Supply of 350 buses by M/s. TATA Motors
2005	Senegal	20,862,394	Development of rural SMEs and purchase of agricultural machinery
2005	Senegal	9,847,050	Acquisition of railway coaches and locomotives from India
2008	Senegal	29,238,438	Electrification project and fishing industry development project
2009	Senegal	5,987,526	Supply of medical equipment, furniture, and other accessories to hospitals
		90,789,474	
2006	Seychelles	10,966,507	Purchase of essential commodities from India

(continued)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Recipient country</i>	<i>Commitments (US dollars constant)</i>	<i>Project title</i>
2009	Seychelles	11,975,052	For budgetary support and economic assistance
2009	Seychelles	363,665	Setting up of IT Centre in Seychelles
2010	Seychelles	268,234	Supply of medical equipment to Seychelles and appointment of consultant
		23,573,458	
2008	Sierra Leone	17,543,062	Procurement of tractors and connected implements, harvesters, rice threshers
2009	Sierra Leone	35,925,157	Restoration of potable water supply to Freetown
		53,468,219	
2005	Sudan	58,275,622	Singa–Gedarif transmission line and sub-station project
2005	Sudan	486,789,213	Setting up power plant by M/s. BHEL
2005	Sudan	69,541,316	Purchase of various goods from India
2007	Sudan	58,777,253	For railway project
		673,383,404	
2009	Swaziland	11,975,052	Information Technology Park
2009	Swaziland	27,213	Hole-in-the-Wall project
		12,002,265	
2009	Tanzania	37,101	Supply of school lab and hospital equipment to Zanzibar
2009	Tanzania	987,092	Setting up of India–Tanzania Centre for Excellence in ICT at Dar es Salaam
2009	Tanzania	43,780,792	Financing the purchase of 723 vehicles
2010	Tanzania	9,329	Supply of school lab and hospital equipment to Zanzibar
		44,814,314	
2009	Uganda	136,065	Hole-in-the-Wall Expansion Project
2010	Uganda	296,224	Deputation of directing staff to Uganda Senior Command and Staff College, Kimaka
2010	Uganda	293,892	Hole-in-the-Wall Expansion Project
		726,181	
2005	Zambia	13,908,263	Purchase of various equipment from India
2008	Zambia	58,476,876	Hydropower project
		72,385,139	
2008	Zimbabwe	701,638	Development of SME sector in Zimbabwe
2010	Zimbabwe	23,324	Supply of medicines
		724,962	

Constructed by author using data acquired from AidData

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