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BORDERS AND MOBILITY IN TURKEY

Governing Souls and States

Shoshana Fine

Mobility & Politics

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Human mobility, whatever its scale, is often controversial. Hence it carries with it the potential for politics. A core feature of mobility politics is the tension between the desire to maximise the social and economic benefits of migration and pressures to restrict movement. Transnational communities, global instability, advances in transportation and communication, and concepts of 'smart borders' and 'migration management' are just a few of the phenomena transforming the landscape of migration today. The tension between openness and restriction raises important questions about how different types of policy and politics come to life and influence mobility.

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Series Editors' Foreword

Turkey has become one of the focal points in the current global refugee crisis. In 2013, Turkey ratified its first law to address migration and international protection, as well as formed the Directorate General for Migration Management (DGMM), the national body tasked with enacting the law. Prior to this point, Turkey had not adopted such 'migration management' strategies, a term representing steps and policies inherent to Eurocentric ideals, defining what is 'safe', 'inside', 'outside' and 'other'.

Timely and poignant, Shoshana Fine's *Borders and Mobility in Turkey: Governing Souls and States* serves to deconstruct European/Western-based, de facto assumptions of 'migration management' through Turkey's politicised relationship with the EU. Through extensive research, she critically explores how Turkey has been labelled as 'transit', 'destination', 'European', 'Muslim' or 'safe', depending on altering political and securitised interests of the EU. *Borders and Mobility*'s remarkable research displays the interrelated rationalities of humanitarianism, securitisation and orientalism. The critiques of (quasi-)humanitarianism, inherently political as it seeks to control and intervene in populations and territory, and of orientalism, as an effect of colonial assumptions that treat the non-West as object and the West as subject, are masterly introduced and interwoven in her arguments. Humanitarian interventions with the intention of securitisation and the subtle idea of orientalism serve to contain and filter 'undesirable' populations in the global South; such is the practice of refugee camps. Moreover, she adroitly reveals the dialectical relation between humanitarianism and other facets of border institutionalisation.

Through this fine-tuned utilisation of Critical Border Studies, the author guides us in transcending traditional definitions of the border as 'merely a line demarcating a geographical barrier'. Rather, she focuses on the realisations of borders through different practices and policy implementations that are deeply embedded in Western notions of 'humanitarianism', territory and security. Through this focused and deliberative practice, Shoshana Fine engages with the long legacy of orientalism and the racialisation of borders, and develops expository vocabulary for use: borderocracies and bordercrats. In doing so, she is able to dissect the practices of migration management in Turkey, illuminating non-traditional actors and sites of significant importance for the future of migration studies as a whole.

Challenging preconceived notions and the instrumentalisation of migration management, *Borders and Mobility* suits to realise and refine the *Mobility & Politics* series with an in-depth, critical analysis of border institutions in greater Europe and their development through political bilateral relationships. This original work of scholarship, driven by intensive fieldwork and the author's own work within intergovernmental organisations in Turkey, informs these invaluable observations and facilitates our understanding of the role of distinct non-state actors in contemporary bordering practices. Displaying a mastery of intersectionality, Fine shows that she does not shy away from engaging head-on with the theoretical concepts of managerialism, securitisation, humanitarianism and orientalism through the Turkey–EU political relationship. Her keen ability to connect otherwise unwieldy processes to life-threatening border control practices and implementation is a bold, unapologetic and necessary step to illuminate power, agency and, ultimately, responsibility in the global refugee regime.

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Acknowledgements

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
ASAM	Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants
DGMM	Directorate General for Migration Management
EC	European Commission
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
Europol	European police office
Frontex	European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union
HRDF	Human Resource Development Foundation
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IBM	Integrated Border Management
ICMC	International Catholic Migration Commission
ICMPD	International Centre for Migration and Policy Development
IHH	İnsani Yardım Vakfı (IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation)
IMC	Istanbul Migrant Charity
Interpol	International Criminal Police Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
LFIP	Law on Foreigners and International Protection
MTM Dialogue	Mediterranean Transit Migration Dialogue
Mülteci-Der	Association for Solidarity with Refugees
RCP	Regional Consultative Process
RSD	Refugee status determination
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Introduction

Abstract   This introduction presents Turkey's migration and refugee landscape, including contextual factors that form a backdrop to the current situation. Orientalist ways of seeing Turkey and its connection with the externalisation strategy of the EU are introduced. Migration management is discussed as a matter of diffuse power that is particularly vested in intergovernmental organisations (IGOs). The terms 'bordercrats' and 'bordercracies' are advanced to support understandings of the workings of this diffused power, of their expert positioning and role in bordering. The intermingling of managerial, humanitarian and orientalist rationalities of mobility government are linked to the generation of a filtering logic based on the selection of desirable and undesirable migrants.

Keywords Migration management • Humanitarianism • Orientalism • Externalisation • Bordering

Just as borders are social constructions, so are border government and bordered populations. Migrants and refugees are not merely out there as natural constituents of the population. Rather, they are 'made up' according to selection processes and fateful classifications assigned to them by states and professional groups. Neither is a 'migration management' perspective a natural way of approaching human mobility, nor is

its underpinning narrative the only possible narrative about how mobility is governed. Both 'migrants' and 'migration management' are embedded in particular ways of seeing, knowing and doing mobility. Drawing on fieldwork conducted between 2012 and 2016,[1] this book takes the case of Turkey to enquire into the nature of this seeing, knowing and doing.

The humanitarian crisis involving thousands of drownings in the seas between Europe and its southern and eastern neighbours cannot be simply read as the result of unfortunate accidents. Neither is it simply the fault of unscrupulous smugglers or apparently misinformed migrants who embark on hazardous routes unaware of the perils that await them. It seems clear that the fate of this anonymous mass of individuals is intimately associated with the bordering practices that target the 'migration threat' emanating from the 'wrong' side of the Mediterranean.

Within this picture, Turkey is positioned as not quite belonging to Europe or completely outside of it. Turkey was never colonised by a European state (indeed, it led a powerful empire), yet its encounters with Europe have often been marked by Othering. Turkey's ambivalent and shifting positionality on the international stage, combined with its critical geographical positioning as a key entry state for migration and refugee flows into Europe, presents an important case for the study of contemporary bordering practices.

In the last two decades Turkey has witnessed a variety of bordering interventions to address its migration 'problem'. Fences and walls have been constructed along Turkey's Bulgarian, Greek and Syrian borders. Policing and patrolling missions have been strengthened along the Aegean Sea through Frontex operations. The US Homeland Security has introduced dense security database checks in its resettlement process for refugees located in Turkey. In 2013, the Turkish government ratified its first law to address migration and international protection. At the same time it formed a national migration management agency in support of this law. By 2015 Turkey became the country hosting the largest number of refugees in the world. This landscape provides a rich setting through which to advance our understandings of contemporary bordering.

The Critical Border Studies (CBS) perspective informing this study provides the conceptual tools to question taken-for-granted understandings of the border as merely a line demarcating a geographical barrier and to engage with the different practices, often deterritorialised, through which borders are constructed. Accordingly, my enquiry treats the diffuse

and multifaceted nature of borders as an assemblage of practices, techniques, technologies as territorialised and deterritorialised. CBS goes beyond an analysis of actors and practices explicitly associated with border control (e.g. passports, patrolling border guards, surveillance technology) to examine the borderwork carried out by less traditional actors and practices. In Turkey, seemingly disparate actors and practices are brought together in the name of controlling, managing, processing, saving and soul-lifting mobile populations. This study draws together an analysis of missionaries as they encourage conversion to Christianity in Istanbul; the International Centre for Migration and Policy Development's (ICMPD's) training sessions in human resources to Ankara-based civil servants; intergovernmental dialogue for those based in Vienna; risk analysis in refugee resettlement from Turkey and the US. I explore how intersecting rationalities of governing mobile populations inform a shared commitment among many of these actors to a migration management perspective.

I argue that the interrelated rationalities of humanitarianism, securitisation and orientalism support a migration management perspective which has the following characteristics: firstly, it purports to generate scientific, neutral expertise and aligned technical interventions which are politically indifferent. Secondly, it approaches the border as a filter that should facilitate economically beneficial migration while hindering the movement of 'undesirable' mobility in all its forms. Thirdly, it favours consensual rather than coercive interventions to steer states and people towards appropriate behaviour regarding the control and management of human mobility. Fourthly, it aspires to achieve a win-win-win ideal that can benefit all stakeholders (sending, transit and receiving countries as well as migrants). We are attuned to seeing humanitarian initiatives as based on an idea of universal solidarity but humanitarianism reserves such acts for some, while abandoning others.

A humanitarian rationality legitimates divisions between desirable and undesirable mobility, deserving and undeserving migrants. One of its effects is to open up space for bordering practices from actors less traditionally associated with border security. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the domain of refugee resettlement where there are surprising linkages between Turkish state officials, Homeland Security, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Christian missionaries.

According to Fassin (in Walters 2006, 143), 'humanitarian government can be defined as the administration of human collectivities in the name of a higher moral principle which sees the preservation of life and the allevia-

tion of suffering as the highest value of action'. Humanitarianism is associated with a desire to relieve suffering as such. It is based on compassion rather than rights and is thus considered 'above politics'. And yet humanitarianism is inherently political as it seeks to control and intervene in populations and territories. Sites of humanitarian intervention such as the refugee camps serve to contain 'undesirable' populations in the global South, where the vast majority of humanitarian projects are carried out (Agier 2011). The camp, as a confined space of monitoring, managing and surveillance, functions to protect life but also to deny the camp population a political existence. This space is inherently about both care and control (Agier 2011; Hyndmen 2000; Malkki 1992). The 'humanitarianism of borders' (Walters 2011) legitimates specific forms of intervention and ways of governing a victim population. It is in a dialectical relation with other kinds of bordering practices (militarisation, technologisation, securitisation) that have increasingly rendered border crossings 'a matter of life and death' for certain members of the global mobile population (Walters 2011, 147). The humanitarian and security border are mutually constitutive. Once a space is classified as humanitarian, it gives certain actors the authority to act.

Appeals to humanitarianism underpin the demands of the EU to intervene in countries of the global South to improve their migration and asylum systems. States create the conditions for humanitarian organisations to act, but they also determine the limits of what counts as humanitarian. Smugglers are a case in point; they are not treated as humanitarian actors supporting desperate individuals fleeing warzones but as criminals infringing on the sovereign claims of states. The illegal migrant smuggler can never become the humanitarian hero saving the lives of Syrian children fleeing Assad's bombs. Part of the answer has to do with the actual practices of migrant smugglers but part may also lie within an orientalist reasoning that treats all migrants and smugglers from south of the Mediterranean as an invading force.

In his seminal study, *Orientalism*, Said (2003) argued that whether the gaze upon the Orient constructs it as exotic or inferior, it is always the Other of the West. Orientalism is not a conscious conspiracy to undermine the non-West, but rather an effect of unreflective colonial assumptions that treat the non-West always as object and the West as subject. Islamophobia is a derivative of orientalism in that it describes the problem of prejudice, while orientalism addresses questions of power and knowledge more broadly. Critical engagement with the relationship between

'the rationalities, technologies and programmes of migration governance and the histories of colonialism' (Walters 2015, 11) raises questions as to how the international government of borders relates to North/South inequalities and whether this has fed into the racialisation of borders. Western and/or EU interests may be secreted beneath the notion of 'global governance' (Geiger and Pécoud 2010), not least because the EU has as one of its objectives a keenness to stem flows from the South heading to its shores. This might involve, for instance, the colonising of non-territorial owned waters in order to push back migrants and keep them away from rights-bearing territory. The border has become a social relation and a space between North and South. IGOs operate in this context as 'experts' without acknowledging the Western provenance of their sources and the problematic nature of knowledge transfer (Mitchell 2002). This issue is related to orientalist notions of the positionality of those from the South as learners needing the capacity-building efforts of IGOs. The IGOs accordingly position themselves as expert teachers of international standards though they often secrete North-serving standards.

Orientalism makes 'migrants' and 'states' alike. Orientalist reasoning constitutes the Turkish state as above all a Muslim state that will never be a true member of the European club. Turkey is seen as backwards, less democratic, less human rights respecting than Europe and therefore in need of international interventions to bring its border governance up to scratch and to participate in the containment of the 'undesirables'. Orientalism constructs the (Muslim) migrant as first and foremost a potential threat to the West. Orientalism then feeds into the deterritorialisation of the European border on the grounds that 'undesirable' populations must be contained away from the borders of Europe and the US.

It is not only states that are subject to an orientalist gaze in the international governance of borders but also bordered populations discussed in Chapter 5. The exercise of freedom in modern forms of government 'requires proof of a legitimate identity' (Rose 1999; Miller and Rose 2008) and is dependent on the exclusion of undesirable elements. If one thinks about mobility rights as a form of freedom, then how does the notion of 'legitimate identity' interact with this orientalist prejudice in bordering practices? Increasingly, orientalist categorisations of states and populations cannot be separated from research into how mobility is governed more broadly.

Overall, the interrelated rationalities of humanitarianism, securitisation and orientalism support a migration management perspective which has the following characteristics: Firstly, it purports to generate scientific, neutral

expertise and aligned technical interventions which are politically indifferent. Secondly, it approaches the border as a filter that should facilitate economically beneficial migration while hindering the movement of 'undesirable' mobility in all its forms. Thirdly, it favours consensual rather than coercive interventions to steer states and people towards appropriate behaviour regarding the control and management of human mobility. Fourthly, it aspires to achieve a win-win-win ideal that can benefit all stakeholders (sending, transit and receiving countries as well as migrants) (Geiger and Pécoud 2010).

Far from being a neutral description for migration policy, migration management is a specific ideology that serves the European externalisation agenda. As a 'paradigm of governance' (Geiger and Pécoud 2010) or 'new type of governmentality' (Geiger 2013; Kalm 2010), it gained momentum in the 2000s as a new way of addressing migration. Made popular by IGOs, migration management discourses distanced themselves from security concerns and became a legalised term in the European context when the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009 (Schotel 2013).[2] According to the migration management view, migration is a normal phenomenon, with the potential to be beneficial for all concerned parties as long as it is regulated in an orderly manner (Ghosh 2000). Migration management shies away from coercive practices in favour of softer means of steering the conduct of its targets. In a 'post-control spirit' of 'regulated freedom' (Geiger and Pécoud 2010) states and migrants are encouraged to self-govern and to orient their conduct towards political objectives held to be in the interests of all parties. While these soft practices are crucial to migration management, they function alongside other harder practices. IGOs assert epistemic authority through their positioning as apolitical actors who provide assistance to states in the form of policy recommendations, best practices, capacity building and evidence-based policy development. Migration management has become an 'entrepreneurial field' or 'testing ground' (Geiger 2013, 15).

The current trend towards interstate cooperation in migration policy-making, as called for within migration management discourses, 'encourages apparently consensual topics in which cooperation between states and non-state actors can be grounded' (Pécoud 2010, 199). Humanitarian and security bordering practices are dynamically linked: migrants only need to be *saved* at sea because security practices have created the conditions that put migrants at risk (Cuttita 2015). The enunciation of humanitarian imperatives over security ones is at the heart of migration management reasoning within contemporary bordering practices.[3]

CBS scholars remind us that borders have been created from power struggles. They point out that far from disappearing, borders are being reconfigured in ways that have increasingly complex functions and relationships with territory (Parker and Vaughan-Williams 2014; Squire 2011; Walters 2006). Parker and Vaughan-Williams (2014) formalise the CBS approach[4] with two key arguments: (1) a shift from the notion of borders to bordering processes and (2) adoption of the lens of performance through which bordering practices are reproduced. Borders are conceptualised as constituted through the meaning-making which border actors bring to their activities. Côté-Boucher et al. (2014, 198) explain that borders are 'a socially negotiated space from the perspective of what actors appointed to secure borders actually *do*'. In this respect, CBS scholars observe that contemporary bordering does not strive to block mobility as a wall, but to filter it and foster 'good mobility'. This filtering function ensures that bordering processes do not target all members of the population in the same manner. Contemporary bordering processes increasingly rely upon profiling and risk analysis that target 'undesirable' groups. Such bordering practices have a strong reliance on technology and surveillance mechanisms (Amoore 2009; Bigo 2006; Salter 2006). Through biometrics, databases and filtering 'big data', border controls strive to trace and profile forms of undesirable, risky mobility (Bigo 2014). Or as Salter (2012, 750) succinctly puts it: 'Borders are not everywhere for everyone'.

In this enquiry the terms 'bordercrats', 'bordercracies' and 'border objects' are coined. A bordercracy is any organisation that intervenes in mobility governance and has a claim to authority based on notions of expertise and technical skill held to be politically neutral and scientific. Bordercracies have come to exercise a significant degree of power in shaping how mobility is governed. Most have a professional commitment to the orderly management of mobility. Although they compete with each other for funding and leadership, they often collaborate. They have common client groups and a shared professional identity. They have a self-serving reproductive dynamic as professional groups that need to sustain themselves through funding. Bordercrats who work for bordercracies may well have corporate loyalties but my focus is on how they are formed across organisations as a transnational professional community. The idea of a 'bordercrat' embraces those who are involved in bordering practices both at and beyond physical borders. Much like any professional group, bordercracies develop a body of knowledge and ways of doing borderwork

that support their sense of worth and legitimacy. Bordercrats have some of the characteristics of a community of practice (CoP) (Wenger 1998).

The relevance of CoP theory rests on its ability to address how a professional class is formed through forms of situated learning. The notion of situated learning captures professional practice as both cultural and technical. Lave and Wenger (1991) and Wenger (1998) argue that technical skills acquisition cannot be separated from the assimilation into a shared rationality and the rituals of belonging to a professional CoP. CoP theory supports an examination of symbolic behaviour among bordercratic actors to see whether initiatives have effects beyond their original intentions; this is the case with Regional Consultative Processes (RCPs) discussed in Chapter 3.

The conception of border objects borrows from Actor Network Theory (Latour 2005) in that it concerns *things* with some agentic qualities. Walls are an obvious border object, a bible less so. Things are held to be agentic when placed in a determining relationship with human agents. That is to say, they acquire agentic force not as things in themselves but as things with humans; they are non-human participants in a human system or network. This notion is well captured, for instance, by the designation *sans papiers*, in which the required papers are the border objects that facilitate border crossing. Border objects in this enquiry include legislation, expert knowledge, data and databases, screening technology, bibles, baptism certificates and inflatable paddling pools. In terms of expert knowledge I discuss how various categorisations of migrants and of Turkey are consequential for the pursuit of migration management solutions.

An important means by which migration management functions is through the categorisation of migrant and refugee populations. IGOs and NGOs, as experts in the field, (re)produce categories to describe migrant populations as if they were objective descriptions (Handmaker and Mora 2014). The standard use of binaries—regular/irregular migrant, legal/illegal, voluntary/forced—functions to protect privileged categories through 'the construction of hierarchies of worthiness' (Handmaker and Mora 2014). Bordercratic expertise generates and supports such hierarchies. Its categories not only underpin practices of selection between desirable and undesirable migrants, but also include innovative concepts such as 'transit migration', 'mixed migration', 'human trafficking' and 'forced migrants'; it engages in a continued effort to recategorise human mobility, often with the effect of relegating traditional migration categories to the margins (Schotel 2013).

Since the mid-1990s EU attention turned increasingly to the significant numbers of migrants who used Turkey as a stepping stone to reach Europe through illegal channels. By the 1990s this was largely conceptualised as 'transit migration' by IGOs and European agencies. Broadly speaking, IGOs and European agencies referred to transit migrants as those who had the intention of moving onwards towards a preconceived final definition as quickly as possible. The category was in its application Eurocentric in assuming that migrants were on their way towards the EU (Düvell 2012). By 2015 Turkey became the largest host country for refugees in the world, mostly from the Middle East and Africa. During the 2000s Turkey had processed huge numbers of asylum seekers from Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan and a mass influx of Syrian refugees following the crisis that broke out in 2011. The unstable situation in Iraq in 2014 led over 80,000 Iraqis to flee to Turkey. Over one million Syrian refugees were residing in Turkey in 2014 and almost three million by 2017.

An important aspect of categorisation discussed in this book concerns the depiction of Turkey as 'safe'. In Chapter 2 I draw attention to the performative function of the law in relation to this determination. Bordering practices function as part of an 'escalating symbolic performance' (Andreas 2000, 9). In his study of the Mexico–US border, Andreas maintains that border controls are more concerned with projecting an impression or an image of the state's control over a situation than with the real consequences of control and deterrence. 'Border control efforts are not only *actions* (a mean to a stated instrumental end) but also *gestures* that communicate meaning. Even if the enforcement performance has failed to deter illegal border crossings significantly, it has nevertheless succeeded in reaffirming the importance of the border.' He explains that 'border policing … is not only the coercive hand of the state but a ceremonial practice, not only a means to an end but an end in itself' (Andreas 2000, 11). I offer the notion of bordercratic performativity to make sense of the effects of Turkey's first asylum law, notably as a gesture of Turkey's safe country status to serve the European externalisation agenda and the bordercratic community than as an action to improve the rights framework of migrants and refugees in Turkey.

Since the 1990s Turkey has been under the eyes of the EU and its member states, criticised for not doing enough to prevent migrants and refugees using Turkey as a bridge to reach Europe. Numerous politicians expressed fears of an 'invasion' of undesirable migrants transiting through Turkey towards Europe, when they discussed Turkey's accession pros-

pects. In 2000 the European Commission and the Turkish government adopted an Accession Partnership strategy for Turkey and a National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis,[5] which defined the reforms Turkey would need to implement to pave the way for harmonisation in an array of policy areas. Reforms addressed migration and border issues that include a readmission agreement with the EU, national asylum legislation, harmonising visa stickers and regulations and establishing a civilian border security agency. Annual progress reports monitor the compliance of Turkey in relation to the priorities set out in the Accession Partnerships. These tools set out roadmaps for what needs to be done and ways to do it. They are about explaining Turkey's perceived lack of know-how and putting forward appropriate ways for Turkey to address it.

The Turkish government made significant steps towards the harmonisation of its migration system with the EU acquis, and in 2013 Turkey ratified its first law on immigration and international protection and set up a civilian agency charged with managing migration. The process of harmonisation was, however, uneven. First, Turkey did not remove the geographical limitation to the 1951 Geneva Convention in its new asylum law for fear of becoming a 'buffer zone' (Kirisci 2005, 2007) for Europe's unwanted migrants. This geographical limitation meant that non-European refugees are only tolerated in Turkey and can only remain on a temporary basis. For the EU this represented a hindrance to being able to send back persons wanting to claim asylum who had transited through Turkish territory on their way towards the EU.[6] Second, Turkey dragged its feet in terms of signing a readmission agreement with the EU to facilitate the expulsion of migrants who had passed through Turkey in order to reach Europe. The agreement was eventually signed in 2013, after almost ten years of negotiations, and ratified by the Turkish parliament in 2014. A third factor concerns how the EU has been pushing Turkey to adopt a civilian body to manage its borders to replace militarised management of the border. Border control has been largely viewed through a security lens in Turkey in the light of its fight against Kurdish separatism particularly in South East Turkey, as well as its border with conflict zones in Iran, Iraq and Syria. Efforts to civilianise the border met with considerable resistance within Turkey. Fourth, a further source of resistance lay in struggles for authority and funding among Turkish bureaucrats who did not want to lose their particular role in border management. Integrated Border Management, as one task force was called, involved persuading various agencies to relinquish their border control activities and hand them to a newly created border management agency.[7]

The overall success of Europeanisation, however, may have been due to the sense that Turkey also gained from it.

From the late 1990s, two hegemonic positions characterised the Turkish political landscape: firstly, the Kemalist elites, who were in the past strongly marked by a Western orientation, became party to a nationalist, anti-European block; and secondly, a pro-European, neoconservative, neoliberal political Islam formed in this period, which would promote EU membership as a fruitful path towards democracy. The latter reflects the positioning of the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi—AKP*) which came to power in 2002 and has been so to date. Europe proved to be a key driving force in Turkey's foreign policy and in spurring domestic reforms in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In 1999, Turkey was granted EU candidacy status at the Helsinki Summit and Ankara published the first National Programme in 2001 (which would later be followed by several others) that set out a pathway towards aligning Turkey's legal, political and administrative practices with the EU. In the early 2000s the Turkish government embarked on reform in a range of policy areas including migration.[8] In October 2005, accession negotiations formally began. Turkey was required to deal with 35 chapters regarding different aspects of its legislation. The Turkish government became disheartened over lack of progress[9] and in 2006 negotiations of eight chapters were stalled by the European Council due to the AKP's refusal to open its sea and airports to Cypriots. The following year France opposed the eventual opening of an additional five chapters. There was strong reluctance to grant Turkey membership from certain member states, notably France under the Sarkozy presidency and Cyprus, for long-standing reasons of conflict. There were also Islamophobic concerns in Turkish accession politics over how a 'mass influx' of Turkish Muslim citizens would impact on Europe's identity. It was increasingly felt among Turkish elites and public that the EU was a Christian club (Brindisi 2011). France along with several other member states (Austria, Germany and the Netherlands) began to push for a 'privileged partnership' to replace Turkey's EU membership. This privileged partnership felt like a second-class status and as a kind of rejection of Turkey's political class.[10] This contributed to a climate of mistrust between Turkey and the EU, which would come to frame Turkey–EU relations, as it had done in the past (Kirisci 2008). Ultimately Turkey was embedded within a process of negotiations characterised by uncertainty, Othering and considerable ambiguity (Kucuk 2011, 3).

Representations of Turkey as a 'privileged partner', 'neighbour', 'safe country', 'European' and (almost) part of the club underpin EU strategies to externalise its migration and asylum regime in Turkey. It is more productive for the EU to convey the image of Turkey as a *partner* and to promote *dialogue* than position Turkey as Other, non-European or a threat (Kirisci 2008). Turkey's potential as bridge was emphasised by European states. For instance, in 2007 in Helsinki, Olli Rehn, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, commented: 'Turkey is an anchor of stability in the most unstable region of the world, in the wider Middle East. It is a benchmark for democracy for the Muslim world from Morocco to Malaysia. With a successful accession process of Turkey to the EU, she can become a sturdier bridge of civilisations' (in Logan 2009, 34). Similarly, in 2007 US President Bush told Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan that Turkey is 'an example of how to be a Muslim country'.[11] Turkey was held to be a model for the Islamic world in moving towards modernity and reform.

It should be noted that in the context of the post-Arab Spring of 2011 Turkey's good relations with Syria, Egypt and Israel ceased. Turkey withdrew its ambassador from Israel in 2010 and from Syria in 2012, and in 2013 Egypt expelled Turkey's ambassador.[12] The Syrian crisis led to the militarisation of security discourses among Turkish authorities. Turkey's own 'Arab Spring', the 2013 Gezi protests and the Turkish government's repressive response, was severely criticised by its civil society and the EU. There were judgements against Turkey by the European Court of Human Rights, especially in relation to the Kurdish issue, leading many to re-evaluate Turkey's potential to become European. Turkey remains its undemocratic other.

Since undertaking this research there have been important further developments. Of relevance are the ongoing conflicts in Syria and the population movements that followed leading to the so-called European migration crisis and the making of the 2016 EU–Turkey 'deal' to contain migrants and refugees in Turkey.[13] This contributed to Turkey's newfound role as the major host country for refugees in the world and Europe's designation of Turkey as a 'safe' country. At the same time that Turkey became 'safe' in the eyes of actors in mobility government, it experienced an attempted military coup, a rapid decline into authoritarianism and destabilisation of its public institutions. Tacit anti-Muslim sentiment in

migration and refugee policies has become explicitly uttered, notably from the US President Trump and his 'Muslim ban' but also from some European states. None of these developments represented new beginnings; they are continuities with the past and they are embedded within practices and discourses this book seeks to expose.

My focus has been on Turkey's bordering landscape in the period 1990–2016. The critical role of actors beyond the state is stressed, particularly IGOs, NGOs, transnational religious groups and 'the migrants' themselves, in bordering and rebordering in this context. I ask how have bordering practices transformed the Turkish state's migration and border apparatus and how have they given rise to the formation of a new professional grouping. How are mobile people themselves subject to and participate in bordering practices? How, then, can we understand migrants and bordercrats as both subjects *and* objects of borderwork? Chapter 2 examines the practices of the International Organisation of Migration (IOM), the UNHCR and the ICMPD in the field in forming and transforming Turkey's first national law on migration and asylum and migration management agency. Emphasis is placed on the formation of Turkish bordercrats in transnational contexts and on the performative function of the law. Chapter 3 extends the enquiry into the formation of bordercrats through the examination of two RCPs to which Turkey is a partner state: the Mediterranean Transit Migration Dialogue and the Budapest Process. These are explored for how they shape the conduct of partner states. Chapter 4 examines the troubled relation between the Turkish government and UNHCR and addresses how this impacts on UNHCR operations in Turkey. I show how the UNHCR navigates a path between deference to the authority and agency of the state and the demands of NGOs; I describe the outcomes this produces for refugees. Chapter 5 concerns the intersecting practices of security and humanitarian professionals as they make and unmake refugees fit for resettlement. Chapter 6 examines the Christianising practices of missionaries and migrants' associations as they strive to shed an 'undesirable' Muslim identity for resettlement purposes.

Through the case of Turkey, this book, then, offers an enquiry into the relationship between bordering states, populations and individuals in terms of their inclusion/exclusion, freedom and mobility.

Notes

1. In 2014, I spent six months at the Vienna-based intergovernmental organisation (IGO), the ICMPD, as a participant observer of two Regional Consultative Processes. The second site of fieldwork concerns the Christian evangelical, Istanbul Christian Action (ICA). As well as being able to observe migrants, this experience facilitated my contact with other NGOs and associations working in the migration and asylum field in Turkey. I was invited to the monthly inter-NGO meetings as well as the UNHCR NGO consultation meetings. This experience also facilitated access to the Farsi-speaking Christian community in Turkey. Church groups were run by missionaries, mostly from the US and Canada, and attendees were mostly Iranian or Afghan. Many interviews carried out with migrants at the ICA would often be spontaneous and take place over an instant coffee as migrants were awaiting their turn, or at the end of their day. While some welcomed the opportunity to talk about their situation, others were more reticent and it was sometimes hard to get informants to elaborate. Finally, I carried out 51 interviews with high- and mid-level-ranking Turkish and European civil servants, representatives of various IGOs involved in the field of migration in Turkey as well as representatives from several foreign offices and NGOs, migrants associations and missionaries. I also carried out interviews with almost 30 migrants and refugees in Turkey.

2. Interestingly, the term is rarely used by EU member states to refer to EU member states' national migration policies and institutions.

3. The key bordercracies involved in migration management in Turkey include the IOM, the ICMPD and the UNHCR. They belong to a transnational field of migration and border experts that share a common logic.

4. For a discussion of this perspective, see David Newman (2006), 'Borders and bordering: towards an interdisciplinary dialogue,' *European Journal of Social Theory* 9 pp. 171–186.

5. European Commission, *Turkey: 2000 Accession Partnership* (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32001D0235) (accessed 6 March 2017); National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis   http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/turkey/npaa_full_en.pdf (accessed 6 March 2017).

6. This issue will be explored in detail in Chapter 4.

7. Interview—representative from the Bureau for Integrated Border Management, Ankara, January 2013.

8. For an elaboration of the reforms which took place during this period, please refer to Bill Park (2012), *Modern Turkey: People, State and Foreign Policy in a Globalising World*, Oxon: Routledge, p. 48; or K. Dervis et al (eds) The European Transformation of Modern Turkey (CEPs) Brussels 2004.

9. Barriers to EU accession were due to a number of factors, notably France and Cyprus, who were strongly against Turkey's accession; The Armenian question, notably in 2012 France introduced legislation which would criminalise denial of the 1915 Armenian genocide leading to the suspension of bilateral cooperation between Paris and Ankara; rising Islamophobia across Europe over the course of the last decade and fears of a country of almost 80 million Muslims; the Cyprus issue—Greece–Turkey relations have remained in tension since the Turkish military invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and the Turkish occupation of the north of the island. In 2004, the accession to the EU of Greek Cyprus further tarnished hopes. Turkey's domestic policies have been heavily criticised regarding human rights issues, its treatment of minorities, the Kurdish issue, Alevis, women's rights, freedom of speech and liberty of the press.
10. Today's Zaman, 'Bağışsays Turkey rejects "privileged partnership"' 12 August 2010, http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_bagis-says-turkey-rejects-privileged-partnership_218783.html (accessed 21 September 2016).
11. The Irish Times, Bush Praises Democratic Muslim Turkey, 9 February 2013 http://www.irishtimes.com/news/bush-praises-democratic-muslim-turkey-1.983283 (accessed 1 July 2015).
12. Daily News, Seven World Capitals Now without Turkish ambassadors, 17 September 2015, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/seven-world-capitals-now-without-turkish-ambassadors.aspx?PageID=238&NID=81488&NewsCatID=510 (accessed 16 September 2016).
13. EU–Turkey statement, 18 March 2016, Press Release, 114/16, Foreign Affairs and International Relations http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/

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Bordercracies and Bordercrats

Abstract In this chapter we investigate Turkey's 2013 migration and asylum legislation, the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP), and the concurrent formation of the Directorate General for Migration Management (DGMM), a body created to ensure the law's effective implementation. Our focus here is on the role of intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) in shaping legislation and the formation of a civilian, transnational community of bordercrats. The existence of this legislation supported the labelling of Turkey as a 'safe country' in a joint Turkey–EU declaration reached in March 2016. It is ironic that in 2016 Turkey was designated a 'safe country' for refugees in a context in which Turkey can be said to have become increasingly unsafe for refugees and its citizens alike.

Keywords Migration management • Intergovernmental organisation • Community of practice • Expertise • Turkey

On 4 April 2013, the Turkish Parliament ratified the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) with unanimity from all parties. The law entered into force exactly one year later and the Directorate General for Migration Management (DGMM) was created at the same time in order to ensure the law's effective implementation. The DGMM would

create a civilian body charged with governing migration in place of a security-driven police force. Key actors directly involved in the legislative initiative included the EU, intergovernmental organisations (IGOs; notably the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], the International Centre for Migration and Policy Development [ICMPD] and the International Organisation of Migration [IOM]), as well as NGOs and international and European courts.

The LFIP was to be the first law addressing migration and international protection in Turkey. Up until that point Turkey had no comprehensive law on foreigners. Some provisions were embedded in other laws but the only legislation regarding migration outside the scope of the Settlement Law (No. 5543) was the Passport Law (No. 5682) and the 1950 Law on Sejourn and Movements of Aliens (No. 5683) dating back to the 1950s. Turkey had no legislation regarding international protection.[1] Thus, this law marked a critical juncture in that it was viewed as a sign of Turkey's willingness to embrace a migration management approach, as called for by the EU. The law was intended to bring Turkey's migration and asylum policies largely in alignment with requirements for Turkey's accession to the EU. It is important to underline one important exception: Turkey has maintained the geographical limitation to the 1951 Geneva Convention.

Lifting the geographical limitation was a fundamental requirement of the EU for accession so that Turkey could be treated as a safe country for refugees. This requirement was a major component of the EU agenda for a common migration and asylum policy, as first outlined in the Tampere Programme. Until this limitation was lifted, non-European refugees could not have long-term protection in Turkey and were considered as temporary asylum seekers or 'conditional refugees'. This expectation of Turkey was indicated in the 2000 and 2003 *Accession Partnership Strategies*, as well as the yearly *Progress Reports* (2006–2015). However, Turkey resisted compliance for fear of becoming a 'buffer zone' for Europe's unwanted migrants and refugees (Kirisci 2005, 16). It also wanted to maintain a certain level of political clout towards the EU and this proved useful in the light of the recent influx of Syrian refugees into Turkey.

Despite Turkey's maintenance of the geographical limitation, recent developments have nonetheless led to the recategorisation of Turkey as a 'safe' country for refugees by the EU through a 'deal' forged in March 2016.[2] According to this controversial deal, Syrian refugees who have reached European shores will be sent back to Turkey. It is argued here that the categorisation of Turkey as safe was a performative function of the 2013

LFIP law. While on paper this law provides asylum seekers and refugees with a fairly extensive rights framework in accordance with EU requirements, to date it has not been adequately implemented.[3] Yet even in its early formative stages, it has had indirect effects on mobility governance.

The Turkish government continued to align its migration and asylum policies with the EU in a context in which accession talks eventually stagnated and hopes for European membership became increasingly dismal. In making sense of this, we should bear in mind that as mobility governance transferred to civilian bordercrats, a professional space opened up for them to collaborate with IGOs and the EU. This space became a transnational training ground in migration management for a nascent class of Turkish bordercrats and was accordingly the locus of a 'changing mentality' concerning a willingness by Turkey to collaborate with external agencies, as one senior officer wrote:

> A key element which needs to be mentioned … is the *changing mentality* within the Turkish administration with respect to asylum and migration. During the mission we have noticed generally the will and preparedness among Turkish authorities to cooperate with key stakeholders (EU, UNHCR, NGOs etc.) and to share information. This is a significant development and provides a good basis for further cooperation with the EU.[4]

Similarly, Açiköz and Ariner (2014), both ex-consultants for the Bureau of Migration and Asylum, noted:

> The adoption of the LFIP is not only significant in legislative terms but also as a transformative and *mentality changing process* for all involved actors ranging from the bureaucratic elite to international organisations working in the field of migration management in Turkey. (my emphasis, 2014, 5)[5]

The decision to involve international organisations in law and policy-making processes had not been common practice in Turkey and this suggests a relative acceptance of the legitimacy and truth claims of international organisations concerning how migration and borders should be governed. Involvement of IGOs bore three consequences: (a) convergent discourses and practices on mobility governance in Turkey among Turkish bordercrats and IGOs; (b) the formation of a transnational professional class of bordercrats in which this convergence took place; and (c) prolonged engagement with the EU, often mediated by collaboration with IGOs.

The trajectory of EU–Turkey negotiations and the ways in which Turkey was framed reveal how the formulation of the legislation and EU/IGO involvement were tied into representations of Turkey firstly as transit, then as destination and finally as safe.

It was not until the mid-1990s that IGOs and European agencies began to categorise Turkey as a 'transit country'. The specific meaning they imputed to this term tended to be Eurocentric in the sense that it assumed that migration in Turkey was on its way towards the EU, evoking images of an 'undesirable mass' passing through Turkey onward bound for Europe. In fact, the transit migrant category offers an unreliable description of the experiences and intentions of the many migrants so labelled. However, it can serve to legitimise the EU's efforts to contain undesirable migration in neighbouring countries through the externalisation of its borders (Düvell 2012).

Since the early 2000s, two reports published by the Council of Europe[6] and the annual publication of the European Commission's (EC's) progress reports referred to Turkey's status as a transit country, associating this with illegality and trafficking:

> Alleviating the immigration problem would be the adoption of cooperation measures with the EU in transit matters, in line with the proposals put forward by the EU with Turkey in July 2001. As a matter of priority, Turkey needs to strengthen the efficiency of its fight against illegal migration and trafficking in human beings.[7]

In the mid-1990s, the IOM produced its first publication on transit migration in Turkey (1995), which was followed by two others (2003, 2012) at roughly eight-year intervals. These reports served as tools to assess and measure the threat posed by migrants from Middle Eastern and African countries, assumed to use Turkey as a stepping stone towards the EU. The reports were also a means by which the IOM could assert and sustain its role as an expert, by offering data on the phenomenon.

While the IOM relied on statistical data provided by the Turkish government authorities, it reproduced the data in ways that constructed the transit migration category as a stable observable, calculable, measurable phenomenon. This was also the case with Frontex. Since its inception, Frontex, the EU border management agency, has conducted 'risk analyses' for irregular migration according to designated 'transit routes' heading towards Europe; this is published in its publically available quarterly

reports. For Frontex, Turkey is a transit country along the so-called East Mediterranean route, which is 'the route taken by illegal migrants transiting through Turkey and entering the EU through eastern Greece, southern Bulgaria, or Cyprus. Turkey, due to its geographical position near the EU, is the main nexus point on this route. From Istanbul, illegal migrants may reach the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea, or cross the land borders to Greece or to Bulgaria' (Frontex ARA 2010, 15). Frontex has produced statistics and narratives determining the East Mediterranean routes as the most important ones to the EU on several occasions, for example, in 2010, 2012 and 2015[8]

These depictions of migrants in Turkey were less shared by the Turkish authorities. Many felt the term 'transit' was pejorative, suggesting that no one wants to settle in Turkey. One officer said that it did not help accession negotiations to see Turkey as purely a site of transit. Indeed, from the 2000s one can observe a gradual reframing of the way that IGOs and European agencies represent Turkey's migration landscape: Turkey was less referred to as a mere 'transit country' and more as a 'country of destination in its own right'. This shift can be observed in EU progress reports from 2005 onwards, as well as in concept notes and background papers produced by organisations like the IOM and the ICMPD.[9]

It is rarely acknowledged by IGOs and EU agencies that Turkey's emerging 'destination' status was intrinsically linked to Europe tightening its borders. Instead, the growing immigrant and refugee population in Turkey was explained as a consequence of two factors: firstly, instability in Turkey's neighbourhood (Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria) leading to large-scale migration; and, secondly, 'globalisation processes that changed Turkey's position within international migration systems' (IOM 2012, 20). Significantly, the issue of the strengthened border controls between Turkey and the EU member states is omitted from this explanation.

The transition to 'destination', then, was not a straightforward, natural evolution. Classification is always doing something beyond description. There is certainly a transit phenomenon in which some migrants strive to move towards the EU, risk their lives at sea and sometimes become stuck (or choose to remain) in countries along the route, and thus contribute to the emergence of new 'destination' countries. But this phenomenon is in part made through the very policies, practices and tools designed to govern it. Classifying Turkey as a destination country becomes part of a strategic endeavour to frame migration as a threat not only for the EU but also for these new-found 'destination' countries of the global South; it is

declared that they need to strengthen their borders for themselves and not just for Europe. Indeed, it was due largely to Turkey's new status as a destination country that two Bureaus charged with mobility governance were created. Although their formation was in the context of the stalled negotiations with Europe, Turkish politicians and bureaucrats repeatedly emphasised how these Bureaus and the new law were in Turkey's national interest even though they were originally driven by compliance requirements of the EU. In this relation in March 2005 Turkey adopted a *National Action Plan on Asylum and Migration*, which set out a timetable for steps towards the harmonisation process, including provisions for the new law on migration and asylum. The questions of readmission agreement and visa liberalisation were key aspects of negotiations with the EU.

Debates on visa liberalisation date back to 1963 but they did not return to the political agenda until the opening of accession talks in 2005 when it was presented as conditional upon Turkey signing a readmission agreement with the EU.[10] The visa liberalisation/readmission agreement debates have been critical to the production of a need to govern migration more 'comprehensively' in Turkey. Thus the question of visa liberalisation put migration on the political radar of Turkish politicians and played a central role in its politicisation in Turkey.

After almost a decade of negotiations, the readmission agreement was eventually signed in 2013 in exchange for opening up dialogue on visa liberalisation for Turkish citizens in the Schengen Area (this was granted in October 2014). The effects of visa liberalisation went much further than merely the implementation of the readmission agreement; it encouraged Turkish bordercrats to consider a need to develop policies and practices to deal with the increased flows of 'irregular migration' which would result from this agreement. That is to say, the implementation of one EU-facing policy generated a need for others. It had a domino effect, as one officer from the Turkish Bureau for Integrated Border Management (IBM) commented:

> Visa liberalisation would give a lot of political support to the government in power, and that is tied to the Integrated Border Management unit which is tied to the new law which is tied to the agreement, which is also tied to biometric passports, which we have done, visa liberalisation as a driving force.[11]

Turkish politicians began to consider that if Turkey was to sign the readmission agreement, they needed to be better equipped to manage its consequences (irregular migrants who had transited through Turkey to reach the

EU being deported back to Turkey). At the same time, the EU was able to sustain an active presence in Turkey through collaborative 'technical' projects and the provision of expertise, often mediated by IGOs. Of particular importance was the support IGOs gave to the formation of the two civilian Bureaus.

In 2008, two Bureaus underpinning the legislation were created under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior: the Bureau for Migration and Asylum and the Bureau for Integrated Border Management. The leadership of these Bureaus was given to Atilla Toros, known to be pro-European and liberal minded. This marked a radical shift from the past when Turkish immigration and asylum policy had been managed and led by the Foreigners Department of the police. These Bureaus were responsible for building the capacity of the Turkish government on migration, asylum and borders, drafting complementary legislation and supporting the eventual shift of migration and asylum governance from the Security General Directorate of the country to a civilian authority, later to be known as the Directorate General for Migration Management (DGMM).

As with the DGMM, the name of one of the Bureaus resonates with IGO migration management language, that is, the IBM. Integrated Border Management is a relatively new notion that was first used by EU agencies to frame a European model of good border governance. Not only is IBM championed and deployed by EU agencies but it is also an integral part of the institutional vocabulary of the IOM and the ICMPD. This model is based on the reasoning that the results of individual border agencies generally improve when their level of cooperation is enhanced. The adoption of the notion of IBM as a natural and self-evident way of framing border governance is indicative of the successful steer from EU agencies and IGOs (Martin-Mazé 2015) in normalising and diffusing migration management terminology and best practices in Turkey. Through their strategies and technologies, IGOs as well as European agencies, NGOs and courts have brought Turkey into the field of transnational bordercratic expertise. While the success of their intervention can be interpreted as relatively new (since the ratification of the law and creation of the DGMM in 2013), these organisations have positioned Turkey as a leading 'migration management' player on the international stage. Along these lines, Açiköz and Ariner (2014, 24) wrote:

> One can be hopeful in light of a new beginning inaugurated in the form of the creation of a nation-wide institution with over 3000 personnel, marking Turkey's desire to be an example for migration management in the region and in the world.[12]

In order to understand the nature and effects of this 'new beginning' we need to enquire into how these bordercrats were appointed, upon what basis, where and with whom they were placed and what activities brought them into a professional community with IGOs. This also needs to be brought into a relation with the expansion of IGO activity.

One example of policy and practice diffusion is provided by the ICMPD-led regional dialogues discussed in the next chapter. These regional dialogue groups sensitised participants to ways of approaching governance that could be transferred to their local context. Not all the Turkish delegates participating in the dialogue groups and IGOs moved into local 'migration management' roles but there was significant traffic across these spaces. Inevitably, some joined the ranks of newly created bordercrat positions in the service of domestic migration management. Further, some representatives from the Bureau for Migration and Asylum, who would later work for the DGMM, attended meetings of the Budapest Process on a regular basis, picking up in the process what one participant of the Budapest meetings described as a 'common vocabulary':

> In these meetings we learnt about issues on the international agenda and solutions that had been recognised by the international community. I would not say that these meetings were so important in having a concrete impact on Turkey's migration policies, in fact to be honest there are no concrete impacts from these meetings, no policy … but I suppose they have played a role in building a common vocabulary. And this is extremely important, otherwise there is much confusion and misunderstanding.[13]

Evidently, viewing the provenance of Turkish migration management policy as purely domestic overlooks its connectivity to external agencies and to its transnational character. The involvement of IGOs did not necessarily take place in Turkey in that it worked across national boundaries. From the head offices in Geneva, Vienna and Brussels, or their expert meetings, trainings and workshops in Rabat, Kabul or Baghdad, EU agencies and IGOs have been shaping Turkey's migration governance from a distance as well as on Turkish ground.

Integral to the development of a Turkish migration management infrastructure was the appointment of appropriate teams. The bureau was composed of what was referred to as an 'elite group' led by two inspectors from the Ministry of Interior. Mid- and high-ranking bureaucrats recruited to work for the bureau were hired on a temporary basis on the strength of

their expertise. The composition of the Bureaus was presented as up-to-date and internationally friendly, as the following migration officer at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) based in Turkey commented:

> They are all very modern, young teams, and that's unusual. In Turkey, mostly the boss will be in his fifties, male, and not speak English. With the Bureau, it is quite the opposite.[14]

Many of the bureau staff had studied in Europe. A well-educated group, they include several members of staff involved in doctoral research. During the time of this group's formation, regular meetings between high-ranking Turkish and EU civil servants would continue as the EU encouraged Turkey to develop its migration policies and include other actors in the process, particularly the UNHCR and the IOM as well as NGOs. This led to staff from the Bureau working closely with international policymakers from the IOM, ICMPD, UNHCR and Frontex, as well as academics and relevant NGOs. Collaboration centred on support in drafting the law. This inclusive approach was partly to do with EU pressure but it can also be strongly identified with the Bureau's director, who wanted the law-making process to be the fruits of deliberation and discussion between various stakeholders.

As well as internal staff employed by the Turkish government, the bureau team is also made up of consultants and secondees from the IOM and the UNHCR. Indeed, IOM expertise came to be infused with that of UNHCR's where consultants were hired by both organisations. It became quite difficult to distinguish who worked for whom as internal staff, IGO external consultants and seconded members of staff were all situated in the same offices. Staff from IGOs were all of Turkish nationality. A number of those consultants doing doctorates participated in academic conferences and published academic papers on migration management in Turkey and on their own role in supporting the bureau. As outsourced organisations, IGOs acted much like a private consultancy firm selling their expertise to donors. They were knowledge brokers as well as knowledge producers.

The IOM and the UNHCR also collaborated with the Bureau through their permanent staff. The UNHCR had in the past been excluded from policymaking processes regarding asylum.[15] As indicated by a UNHCR officer Turkey: 'We suddenly got a call from these two Interior Ministry inspectors asking us for a consultation meeting. We wanted to roll out a red carpet for them'.[16] Since 2008, UNHCR has a Transitional Unit, which is charged with supporting the development of the migration

management directorate regarding questions of international protection. Similarly, the IOM has a Project Implementation and Development Unit, which is charged with developing 'strategy documents' and 'action plans'. The permanent staff members were based at their organisational office in another district of Ankara and met with Bureau staff on a fairly frequent basis. They enjoyed close relations with the Bureau but were nonetheless considered as 'external' actors.

The IOM had explicit socialisation strategies for growing its impact among Turkish bordercrats. Notably, high-ranking bordercrats were recruited by the IOM on a temporary basis with the declared aim of supporting the organisation to become better equipped to act as international policy advisors to states. In this case, national bordercrats spend around two or three years at the IOM head office in Geneva. To illustrate, this was the case for one high-ranking civil servant at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was recruited by the IOM in Geneva. He was given an IOM email and an office in IOM's headquarters. While his formal role was to bring Turkey's position, interests and expertise to the IOM, the experience socialised him into IOM cultural norms. This officer had an important position in steering Turkey's migration policies and practices. His time spent at the IOM head office in Geneva was an immersion education into the everyday world of IOM's migration management. IOM bordercrats were not formally 'teaching' specific ways of thinking; rather, this Turkish officer was learning normative migration management discourses and practices through participation within the organisation.

This socialisation process can be likened to something akin to a community of practice (Wenger 1998). Wenger's concept of a community of practice rests on the view that we learn about our work through active participation. At first we are on the edge of professional communities as 'legitimate peripheral participants'. For full integration into a community of practice, we must learn to adopt the culture of the community as well as acquire the professional competences required. This involves learning the classifications deployed (e.g. transit migrant), the 'in' language (e.g. triple win) used, joint enterprises (e.g. dialogue groups) and more generally the formal and informal behavioural norms of the community. The following FCO officer commenting on the growth of IGO Europe-facing involvement describes the influence on Turkish bordercrats:

> So they (Turkish government) are developing a terminology and they are largely fitting it around a European model because that's what they hear mostly.[17]

Significantly, the IOM is far from its days as a mere service provider on combatting human trafficking, or just involved in operational activities such as voluntary return or capacity-building activities on specific themes such as the fight against human trafficking. As examination of the financial reports published by the IOM indicates, the IOM's budget in Turkey (including operational and administrative costs) has increased from 414,418 US dollars in 1998 to 6161,675 in 2008 to 8558,523 in 2012.[18] These reports also reflect a shift in the kinds of projects that the IOM has been carrying out in Turkey. During the 1990s and early 2000s, the majority of IOM's projects were 'operational', mostly concerning voluntary return and combatting human trafficking (technical assistance, training workshops, awareness raising).[19] By 2007, the IOM had broadened its reach to projects on border management, 'technical cooperation' and 'supporting Turkey's overall policy framework' and in 2012, 'Reinforcing Migration Management in Turkey'. The law evidently opened up space for the IOM:

> IOM's role is changing in line with trends and needs but it is not decreasing. I think that its role will not decrease but change form; probably more on the policy side, more on the lobbying, research, capacity building … we are talking about 3000 people. I don't know when IBM will be approved, probably in a long time, but there are still many areas where Turkey needs some technical expertise. Our aim is to build their capacity.[20]

Turkey's relations with the ICMPD also strengthened due to the latter hosting the Secretariat of the Budapest Process. ICMPD support did not have to take place in physical proximity. We can make sense of the way in which 'technical' and seemingly insignificant migration management practices taking place in European cities can have an effect on the development of migration policies and practices in 'beneficiary countries'. The geographic spread of initiatives becomes dynamically linked through the generation and circulation of (in)formal knowledge including that which derives from close working relationships. This transnational circulation can also occur where there is a repetition of certain discourses by IGO bordercrats in geographically separated social spaces.

Clearly, the creation of the Bureaus and the decision to make a new law and to build a 'migration management' institution gave space for both the IOM and the ICMPD to expand their mandates in Turkey. Beyond the participation of these international bordercrats in the preparation of the law

through various capacity-building projects, their involvement in the development of the DGMM was meant to prepare for the takeover from the Security Directorate one year after the law's implementation in 2014, as Ariner and Açiköz (2014) (one a consultant for the IOM and the other an IOM employee assisting the Migration and Asylum Bureau) commented:

> It was now time for the DGMM to put this mental transformation into practice and to flesh out the operationalization of the new system. The GDMM is currently engaged with the completion of institutionalization through the recruitment of personnel, development of training curricula, establishment of an IT system for a Foreigners Information System and drafting of secondary legislation. (Ariner and Açiköz 2014, 7)

To this end, the ICMPD was contracted to assist the Turkish Ministry of Interior. The ICMPD may position itself as a neutral, technical and professional organisation but a glance at its mission statement reveals that its mandate is to serve European states.[21]

According to the outline of the initiative to develop the agency, the ICMPD was charged with 'supporting Turkey's efforts related to the establishment of a modern asylum and migration management mechanism in accordance with the Draft Law on Foreigners and International Protection' funded by the UK's FCO. The UK is a particularly active EU member state in Turkey when it comes to the development of Turkey's migration and asylum policy. Indeed, the FCO (unlike most other embassies in Turkey) has a permanently based migration officer who liaises with the Turkish authorities and IGOs in order to develop projects.[22] Over the past years, the FCO has funded several projects on voluntary return and Integrated Border Management implemented by the IOM. According to interviews with the FCO migration officer in Ankara, the UK government considers Turkey as a priority country regarding funding for migration-related policies and practices. The decision to fund Turkey's 'capacity-building' programme can be interpreted as a form of 'remote control policies' (Zolberg 2003; Guiraudon and Joppke 2001), an initiative to hinder unwanted migrants and asylum seekers from reaching the UK. It could be described as a technique of governing that targets 'transit migration'.

The initiative to support Turkey was based at the ICMPD's Secretariat in Vienna with a staff member of Turkish nationality leading. The same person was also the main point of contact between the ICMPD and Turkish officials in the framework of the Budapest Process. Prior to his recruitment

at the ICMPD, he spent five years working at the EU delegation on issues concerning migration and asylum; thus he was well acquainted with 'EU thinking'.

The ICMPD organised a number of workshops on information and data management. Participants included a mixture of public and private actors, spanning software specialists, lawyers, police officers and Ministry of Interior personnel. There is a clear, hierarchical balancing of power as international (often European) IGO experts lead, whilst the audience (Turkish bordercrats) listens and takes notes. Case studies on EU practices are shared with the group as examples to be followed. Categories are used as self-evident ways of depicting migration realities, and are thus presented as the internationally recognised, correct way of labelling a phenomenon. So a double-sided pedagogy can be observed, one of which is quite explicit in its aims and positioning within a teacher/student structure and the other is a pedagogical effort which is much more subtle as it functions through a community of practice adherence to shared ways of seeing.

Gathering comparative data for international cooperation is a key objective for the IOM and ICMPD because it leads to the creation of an international system of comparing and contrasting states. The necessity for data generation and information sharing has been repeated so often in international organisations and EU member states' discourses that it has become assimilated as a common-sense call for bordercrats working for these organisations as well as for their Turkish counterparts. These repeat calls for data take place in different contextual settings: from regional consultative processes (RCPs) in Brussels and Vienna, to monitoring reports published by the EC, to country profiles published by the IOM or in Ankara. The discourses produced in training sessions in the Ankara-based meeting room are drawing on the same body of knowledge and evidence that is produced in regional consultative processes (RCPs) in Vienna, Brussels and elsewhere.

Beyond efforts to shape or steer the ways in which the formation of Turkish bordercrats takes place with respect to a migration management rationality, the ICMPD international bordercrats have also been involved in the selection, recruitment and induction of 'appropriate' officers and the development of job profiles. The ICMPD project team contributed to the development of curricula for the in-service training of the first staff recruited (the so-called associated migration experts). The training curriculum is drafted in collaboration with the IOM and the UNHCR. Similar to the way in which the IOM and the UNHCR operated in terms of providing support for the drafting of the law, the ICMPD has hired external

consultants to participate in the 'transformation team' at the DGMM, with the declared role to 'set the vision, mission, corporate values and strategic goals for the Turkish migration management agency'.[23] Although this is presented as a technical role, it is fundamentally political as it contributes to the shaping of the very core of the agency. The efforts of international bordercrats in shaping 'mission, vision and values' of the DGMM are clear examples of how these organisations venture in the political terrain but within the formal framework of a technical project.

The ICMPD also provides English lessons to high-ranking staff at the DGMM. Grasp of the English language is presented as a necessary skill in a context in which 'good migration governance' requires international cooperation. For IGO bordercrats, the making of migration managers as technologically savvy, entrepreneurial and English speaking is paramount. In fulfilment of these attributes, international bordercrats from the ICMPD, IOM and the UNHCR have together developed a curriculum to 'train the trainers', that is to say, train the first group of staff recruited so that this group can subsequently cascade their knowledge. A form of brokering can be observed in which international organisations cultivate a select, small group of Turkish nationals who then disseminate their knowledge to a wider community. This curriculum strives to cover 'all fields of migration', including sections on international migration law and policies, entry and residence of foreigners, labour migration, irregular migration, international protection and refugee law, trafficking in human beings, integration, data and statistical systems to document security. Undoubtedly, some of this content is useful but it also secretes its European-facing direction and this is likely to limit the emergence of alternative ways of thinking about migration issues. In the next chapter, I extend my enquiry into the building of a bordercratic community of practice, taking the case of the RCPs.

To conclude, this chapter has explored three interconnected themes: firstly, the construction of legislation and the establishment of migration management agencies; secondly, the influences of IGOs and accession negotiations with the EU in this construction; thirdly, the formation of Turkish bordercrats within the context of EU and IGO transnational collaboration. In addressing these themes, I have offered a critical discussion of Turkey's emerging migration management apparatus and the significance both of EU externalisation policy and of IGO involvement. I have discussed the ways in which Turkey has been classified from 'transit' to 'safe' and how this has informed policy; I have pointed to the performative function of the

law in allowing the EU to designate Turkey as 'safe'. We have seen how the collaboration of IGOs with Turkish bordercrats in the formulation of legislation built a professional community of practice in the image of mobility governance and narratives offered by and for the EU and IGOs.

NOTES

1. Until the 2013 LFIP law, international protection was managed through secondary legislation, notably the 1994 Regulation on Asylum and administrative circulars, which were revised in March 2010. A circular was also issued in March 2010 on combatting irregular migration, and in September 2010 a circular on admission into centres and informing foreigners who will stay in the country.

2. EU–Turkey statement, 18 March 2016, Press Release, 114/16, Foreign Affairs and International Relations http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/

3. For a critical discussion of the EU's classification of Turkey as a safe third country, you may refer to Ulusoy, O. 29 March 2016, Turkey as a safe third country? https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2016/03/turkey-safe-third (accessed 29 March 2016).

4. European Commission, Peer Review Mission Report Turkey, Chapter 24 Migration and Asylum, 6–10 December 2010.

5. http://avrupa.infor.tr/fileadmin/Content/Downloads/PDF/2010 Peer Review report by Gert Jan Von Holk.pdf (accessed 10 June 2016).

6. Council of Europe. 2000. Transit Migration in Central and Eastern Europe. Report by Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography, Document 8904, 13 December 2000; Council of Europe. 2001. Transit Migration in Central and Eastern Europe. Opinion by Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Document 8937, 22 January 2001.

7. European Commission, 2001 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession, 2001 p. 85.

8. For further details you may refer to *Frontex Annual Risk Analyses* 2010–2016 and BBC News, Migrants turn to Greece–Turkey route to Europe, 5 June 2015 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33020600 (accessed 19 June 2016).

9. See, for example, ICMPD country profile of Turkey.

10. Interview—High Ranking Migration Official, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November §2014 (via Skype).

11. Interview—Programme Manager, Bureau for Integrated Border Management, January 2013, Ankara (Turkey).

12. Açiköz and Ariner (2014, 24).
13. Interview—High Ranking Migration Official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Turkey), Ankara, December 2014.
14. Interview—First migration officer, FCO Turkey, January 2013, Ankara (Turkey).
15. For example, the UNHCR were not consulted regarding the drafting of the 2010 circular on asylum.
16. Jadalyyia, Refugees in Turkey: Implications of Increasing Politicization, 6 June 2015 http://profiles.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/21815/refugees-in-turkey_implications-of-increasing-poli (accessed 12 June 2016).
17. Interview—FCO First migration officer, January 2013, Ankara (Turkey).
18. See Annex 3 for precise figures from 2001 to 2013.
19. Turkey became a member state to the IOM in 2004 and henceforward also contributed voluntary donations to the IOM on a yearly basis.
20. Interview—Project Officer, IOM January 2013, Ankara (Turkey).
21. ICMPD 'About Us' webpage http://www.icmpd.org/ABOUT-US.1513.0.html (accessed 20 May 2016).
22. The FCO has a migration officer in countries considered 'high risk' for irregular migration towards the UK, including countries considered as key 'transit' and 'sending' countries.
23. ICMPD, Vacancy Announcement 13PO18VO1, National Management Consultant, June 2013.

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Regional Consultative Processes as Techniques of Partnership

Abstract This chapter examines two Regional Consultative Processes (RCPs) to which Turkey is a partner state: the Mediterranean Transit Migration (MTM) Dialogue and the Budapest Process. Attention is placed on the symbolic function of RCPs in terms of their ability to encourage a sense of community among partner states. Both the opportunism of Turkey's shifting positionality between East and West and the political conveniences of the EU's externalisation agenda are left unacknowledged in processes that are conceptualised as techniques of partnership.

Keywords Migration management • Regional Consultative Processes • Partnership • Expertise • Community of practice • ICMPD

Turkey is encouraged to adopt a set of practices and ways of seeing migration management through participation as a 'partner state' in two Regional Consultative Processes (RCPs) led by the International Centre for Migration and Policy Development (ICMPD), namely, the Mediterranean Transit Migration (MTM) Dialogue and the Budapest Process. RCPs provide transnational space for the production and diffusion of knowledge on migration issues and, at the same time, encourage a sense of shared community among diverse states.

Studies of RCPs need to be mindful of the distinction between their stated aims and achievements and what actually happens in practice. Some

of the research is commissioned by participating intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) and this might discourage such a distinction. Köhler (2011) draws the reader's attention to the way in which RCPs exercise power through techniques of persuasion and trust building, to encourage methods of self-regulation. This, he argues, creates amenable conditions for policy convergence. Köhler argues that these 'soft' initiatives can support the development of more formal means of cooperation, such as bilateral agreements and the development of legal frameworks at a later stage. However, Köhler sees IGOs as 'only administrative supporters' (2011, 82), on which states with fewer resources may rely on more extensively than better-endowed states (e.g. industrialised Western and Northern states). He presents the objective of RCPs to circulate 'credible' information, without problematising the provenance and the political leaning of such information. Von Koppenfel (2001) argues that RCPs are 'informal but effective'. She outlines four phases integral to RCPs: (1) defining a thematic, (2) developing a common language, (3) developing common objectives and (4) operationalising common objectives. At the formal level, these phases describe the explicit structure and purpose of RCPs but they do not bring this description into a relationship with what actually goes on in the meetings. Echoing Köhler's analysis of RCPs as trust-building mechanisms, Von Koppenfel claims that RCPs encourage participants to feel 'in the same boat' (Von Koppenfel 2001, 74). We agree with this characterisation but offer a critical account of the techniques of partnership that produce this feeling in the interests of Europe. Von Koppenfel sees RCPs as amenable to socialisation practices that can lead to support for the development of bilateral and multilateral agreements further down the line. This may be the case but we need to ask in whose interests such agreements will be made. Rightly, Von Koppenfel (2001) argues that RCPs emerged as a result of shifting migratory realities; she instances the forces of globalisation involving more states in migration systems as they become countries of origin, transit and destination all at the same time, hence the need for strengthened international cooperation. She also draws attention to the importance of the intraregional nature of most migration patterns as key to understanding the development of this governmental practice. However, it is important to bear in mind that what counts as a particular region for RCPs is socially constructed, often having the effect of meeting EU interests. The idea that RCPs are about the sharing of 'common problems' is not untrue but needs to be questioned in relation to the partial political interests they also serve. An illustration of this par-

tiality lays in the fact that certain 'partner states' (often non-EU ones) are actively funded to attend these meetings, in contrast to European states which must provide their own funding. This is a telling indication concerning the target countries of RCPs. It is only if we do not bear in mind various forms of asymmetry in RCPs that the role of IGOs will be held to be that of neutral facilitator, as the following comment suggests:

> The role of IOs as organiser, often chair, mediator, and neutral facilitator, is important … Under the neutral guidance of IOs, certain issues may be brought to the table and be more openly discussed, which under the leadership of one or another participating states, might not be possible. (Von Koppenfel 2001, 69)

Betts (2011, 33) comes closer to the analysis offered in this enquiry in that he defines RCPs as 'non-hierarchical governance structures in which relations among government officials are repeated and enduring but where no one has the power to arbitrate and resolve among the members'. Betts emphasises the crucial role played by IGOs, particularly the International Organisation of Migration (IOM), in shaping the dialogue process, despite claims that these dialogues are state-led. He argues that RCPs provide a role for organisations like the IOM, which function according to a 'projectised' approach, meaning that they are always looking to find more funding and to encourage initiatives. RCPs are characterised as important mechanisms for 'extra-territorial authority' situated within a turn towards increased transregional cooperation. RCPs, argues Betts, and the IGOs that lead them, have enabled Europe (the major donor) to develop 'regional capacity' in Africa and other non-EU countries. Our examination of RCPs' everyday practice finds, like Betts, that they undermine the rhetoric of partnership. Betts (2011) has pointed out that beneath discourses of social harmony and migration management in the interest of all stakeholders, RCPs privilege control-orientated policies and the interests of receiving countries at the expense of migrant origin countries and the migrants themselves. Our practice-based analysis of this governing mechanism complements Betts' argument. Similarly, we concur with Lavenex and Panizzon (2013, 6), who argue that RCPs actually serve to 'disguise, reproduce and even legitimise' unequal balances of power. They suggest that RCPs and the partnership discourses they espouse present forms of European conditionality in disguise, which only position states as partners if they meet EU expectations in migration management. The productive

power of these discourses is that they are deployed in order to make states responsible in line with the EU externalisation agenda, thus pushing the European border outwards to engage non-European countries in Europe-facing migratory controls.

An enquiry into the mundane practices of the MTM Dialogue and the Budapest Process and their respective 'expert' meetings tells us something about how 'migration management' expertise is generated and how scripts are formed, circulated and received. They also tell us something about the dynamics of global/local professional knowledge acquisition and transfer and their connections to the European externalisation agenda.

RCPs are sometimes perceived by delegates as a kind of empty spectacle where unmeaningful conversations take place. Although RCPs may be low on tangible policy outcomes, they function symbolically in relation to the externalisation of the European migration and border regime through the encouragement of a community of practice (Wenger 1998). As early as the Tampere European Council meeting in 1999, when the EU first set out a common agenda for migration and asylum,[1] the objective of developing relations and cooperation agreements with so-called sending and transit countries was at the heart of the EU agenda. Moreover, since the early 2000s migration has been accorded growing importance in the international policy arena, both within UN frameworks and in other intergovernmental fora.

In 2004, the Geneva Migration Group (which was to become the Global Migration Group in 2005), at the initiative of the UN brought together several international organisations to discuss migration. In 2006, the UN High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development was established, followed by the Global Forum on Migration and Development one year later, bringing together states and NGOs. Prior to the birth of these UN dialogues on migration, a growing number of initiatives for regional cooperation dialogues and processes were spurred on by the Cairo Conference in 1994. RCPs on migration had proliferated during the 1990s (Betts 2011; Köhler 2011; Thouez and Channac 2006).

The construction of RCPs extended space for IGOs to intervene in global migration governance (Hess 2010). RCPs, as experimental forms of transnational governance, have proved opportune for IGOs. The declared 'added value' of RCPs is for the facilitation of informal cooperation and practices rather than for the passing of formal laws and regulations.[2] It is represented as a means for states to cooperate in a domain which requires international cooperation without stepping on the toes of

states reluctant to give up their sovereignty. Thus this growth in RCPs since the 1990s has been pushed forward by the IOM and the ICMPD as a means for achieving innovative global migration governance. While the secretariat of RCPs is based in Vienna, its expert meetings take place in various cities across Europe, Africa and the Middle East.

RCPs are non-binding; most are led by the IOM or the ICMPD, and funded by the EU, the US and Australia. 'Partner agencies' (mostly other IGOs working in the migration/border field) are an important feature of most RCPs. These regional cooperation initiatives allow IGOs to enhance their role as experts and policy entrepreneurs. The following extract from an ICMPD factsheet explains:

> One of ICMPD's most important contributions to the migration field is the advancement of multilateral cooperation in the form of 'migration dialogues' to cultivate today's migration opportunities and create forward-looking policies.[3]

The MTM Dialogue was created in 2003 as a way for the ICMPD to expand its activities in countries south of the Mediterranean.[4] It declares itself to be a technical dialogue that bring states together to enable networking, information sharing and to promote common solutions to an array of migration issues.[5] The MTM Dialogue strives to achieve a consensus by positioning 'partner states' as the power-makers through discourses of ownership. The informal environment is intended to create synergies for states to speak openly and frankly about the challenges they face and the possibilities for cooperation and coordination.

When the MTM Dialogue was formed, it was promoted as a dialogue on migration routes. It later expanded its focus to include the issue of migration and development. Betts (2011) makes the point that 'the principal focus of RCPs has generally been in relation to areas that are not widely covered by formal, multilateral governance such as irregular migration, travel, human trafficking, and to a lesser extent labour migration'. The credibility of these dialogues depended on their ability to bring something new to the table that is absent in more formal governing mechanisms (e.g. refugee law); as one member of the RCP commented: 'we always have to come up with new stuff, even when we don't really believe in it. Brussels always needs new toys'.[6] This involves new ways of talking about migration realities. The notion of transit migration in this respect took centre stage. The 'transit migration' category was first constructed by IGOs to propose new

ways of understanding migration. The MTM Dialogue was the first governing tool that explicitly targeted 'transit migration'.

The name of the MTM Dialogue would suggest that it refers to countries in the Mediterranean region. If one considers the partner states that form MTM, it is clearly not a geographical representation but it is one that brings together states considered as important transit and sending countries for what are considered to be undesirable migration flows towards Europe.[7] Member states include Mali, Kenya, Switzerland and the UK, which are hardly on the cusp of the Mediterranean Sea. The inclusion of states like Turkey within this 'Mediterranean space' creates a sentiment of commonality not simply in a geographical sense through shared borders but through shared problems, challenges and interests. Some states in this space are categorised as European and others as Southern.

Certain EU member states and Switzerland have been the main donor states throughout the MTM's lifespan. Turkey has been a member of the MTM Dialogue since it was formed in 2006. The MTM Dialogue does not have a chair but the ICMPD assumed the leadership role as its Secretariat; it decides on the direction of the dialogue meetings and produces reports and other tools for migration management.

While the MTM Dialogue is led by the ICMPD, almost all MTM activities are conducted in cooperation with partner agencies. These agencies would seem to make for surprising partnerships. As of 2011, the following IGOs and European agencies hold the status of MTM partner agencies: Europol, Frontex, International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), Interpol, IOM, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The inclusion of this set of heterogeneous actors undoubtedly has an effect on how migration is spoken about within the dialogue framework. These agencies have different although sometimes overlapping mandates and missions. The UNHCR's mandate is concerned with the protection of refugees; the UNODC is concerned with combatting human smugglers and human trafficking; Frontex, Europol and Interpol are concerned with the prevention of irregular migration; while the IOM's and the ICMPD's activities claim to engage with all dimensions of migration management. Although there are some competing foci of interest, there is convergence around migration management ways of seeing. In any event, these meetings function more as rituals of togetherness than as deliberative spaces for exchanging views. This can also be said of the Budapest Process.

The Budapest Process has existed since 1993 and Turkey has been its co-chair since 2006. As well as organising 'expert meetings', the Budapest RCP funds capacity-building programmes. Like the MTM Dialogue, the Budapest Process claims to pursue a so-called comprehensive approach, promoting information sharing and international cooperation.

The Budapest Process was developed over a series of phases. Phase one (1993–2003) focused on cooperation with the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, at that time outside the EU framework, as well as with South East European countries. In its second phase (2003–2009) Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan became new member to the Process. Phase three (2010 onwards) involved a further expansion eastward with Afghanistan, Bangladesh, China, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan (what is known as the Silk Routes Region) joining as participating and observer states. Turkey became endorsed as co-chair in 2003 alongside Hungary.

While at first the Budapest Process brought together the European Community and European Free Trade Association states and the former Communist bloc, its focus shifted in 2010 due to a complex political process following preparations of the fifth ministerial meeting of the Budapest Process. During preparations for the meeting, which was supposed to take place in Prague, the French blocked the Czech Republic presidency from giving Turkey 'equal partner' status during the meeting. The Prague meeting was supposed to be the fifth Ministerial of Budapest but it actually never happened. Instead, it became the first meeting of the Prague Process.

If Turkey were to continue with the Budapest Process, it needed to redefine the role of this RCP. This led to the incorporation of the 'Silk Routes Region' in the process and proved to be a highly interesting focus for the EU as it was to include several states associated with irregular migration to the EU. In meetings it was stressed that this shift of focus to the Silk Routes was Turkey's own idea; this seemed to be a form of tactical flattery, part of the charm offensive from Europe towards Turkey in relation to migration governance. The proposal concerning the Silk routes was warmly received by the European Commission (EC) and EU member states who agreed to fund the initiative, allotting substantial funding to the ICMPD to act as secretariat to 'support' Turkey. In order to ensure the survival of the Budapest Process, Turkey opened up the Silk Routes angle; otherwise it would have meant that two processes (the Prague

Process and the Budapest Process) were doing the same thing, although perhaps one at the state level and one more EU driven.

According to a source from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey's reasoning behind their new focus was that they were well positioned to mediate between Europe (the donors) and Southern countries (the so-called sending states). 'Turkey knows both. Turkey knows what Europeans think and what Orientals think.'[8] A phase of the Dialogue, 'initiated' by Turkey, included Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Bangladesh, China, Syria and Afghanistan. Turkey is even a donor country for the Budapest Process, along with the EC and several EU countries. Its role as donor is viewed as largely symbolic by the ICMPD secretariat and the EC. It is a relatively small contribution that enables Turkey to be labelled as a donor during meetings and on official documents, thus displaying its leading role within the process. The ICMPD's and the EC's interest in Turkey being positioned as leader within the dialogues concerns a strategy of co-option for adoption. The hope is that Turkey will be steered to become an active agent in diffusing European-facing migration management discourses.

The Turkish Ministry of Interior, as Chair of the Process, is meant to lead the strategic guidance at the meetings, but examination of what actually happens reveals some careful IGO nudging. The ICMPD, as the Secretariat of the Process, was charged with supporting Turkey in developing the agenda. While it is common practice for Turkish ministers to be advised with briefing papers and agendas, what is less usual is for this function to be performed predominantly by an IGO. Much of the support the Turkish authorities receive takes place in the back room (concept notes, background papers, project proposals, etc.), while Turkey assumes the public face of leader. Indeed, it is the Secretariat that drafts the background papers and 'takes the ideas of the Chair forward'.[9] For example, in the framework of the fifth ministerial meeting in 2013, the ICMPD played a decisive role in its direction by developing priority areas and action points for the Ministerial Declaration, which was to be the basis for the process.

The mantra of ownership deployed by the EU and IGOs in a range of policy domains far exceeds that of migration and borders (Balzacq 2009; Hindess 2004; Joseph 2009; Larner and Walters 2004). They are all expressions of techniques of partnership. Ownership discourses (somewhat like partnership and empowerment ones) are entangled in practices of governmentality (Foucault 2007, 2008), in the sense that they encour-

age states to self-govern in an apparently appropriate, rational fashion. The appearance of freedom is manipulated to produce responsibilisation.

The dialogue process positioned the ICMPD and Turkey as intermediaries, a bridge between Western and Eastern regions. The ICMPD frequently stressed the crucial role Turkey has played in 'facilitating the process' and the positive benefits to countries, both Eastern and Western, deriving from the important role played by the Turkish chair of the Budapest Process. It is emphasised that this is particularly the case in relation to the Silk Routes because Turkey is known to have had good relations with countries along these routes. It is precisely for this reason that Turkey is seen to be uniquely placed to access the Silk Routes region and, as chair of the Budapest Process, it is held to be advantageous that Turkey participates as a partner in the lead consortium (to consist of Turkey, Hungary, the EC and the ICMPD).

The perceptions of a privileged positionality between East and West, donor and beneficiary, appear to be inflected with a benevolent orientalist gaze upon Turkey. This is because Turkey was viewed to be closer to its neighbours' perceived autocratic systems and Muslim national cultures than democratic, Christian European countries. The differences that were said to separate Turkey and Europe were packaged as benign and strategically helpful to the externalisation of the European migration agenda. What was notably absent from discussions was a sense of the more troubling aspects of EU–Turkey relations. This is not to suggest that Turkey itself was unmindful of its differences with Europe but it too positioned itself as having a helpful bridging role between East and West. Indeed, this was manifest in its very proposition of the Silk Routes Regional dimension to the Budapest Process.

While the ICMPD had few contacts in countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq, Turkey provided them with significant levels of development aid, under the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) government.[10] The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs facilitated numerous 'assessment visits' for the ICMPD, by providing contacts logistical support and security to networking and organising meetings. Turkey's assistance also carried important symbolic capital in giving legitimacy to the migration management agenda. An ICMPD staff member commented that Turkey 'really opened doors for us', adding:

> Countries along the Silk Route region were perhaps more open to Turkey thanks to its established relations, development aid, and cultural affinity

with the region. Furthermore, unlike the EU Commission and member states, Turkey was not as vocal about readmission agreements, which was very much appreciated by these 'beneficiary states' who view return negatively and as a tool underpinned by interests of the global North.[11]

This soft power position in the region was in line with Turkey's foreign policy at the time; it was keen to retain a balance of interests between the various parties. In this situation, the ICMPD has capitalised on this interest to support the diffusion of its migration management model in the Middle East. The effects of Turkey's participation and leadership in the Process were to strengthen its representation as a progressive state, valuable for its mediating capacity.

> Turkey … is certainly regarded in Budapest as a country that is really chairing, setting priorities and objectives—but trying to find a balance between EU and Middle Eastern countries. It is mediating between two regions with different interests and trying to balance them.[12]

In 2013, member states signed the Istanbul Ministerial Declaration, which declared the provision of the framework for later activities 'to translate the principles of the dialogue into concrete actions'. In his introductory speech at the Istanbul ministerial meeting in April 2013, Turkish Ambassador Şakir Fakılı shared his view on the declaration:

> (The declaration) mirrors a modern approach to migration management because today's migration management is about partnership … and partnership is about mutual trust and sharing common objectives.[13]

The EC has referred to the Budapest Process as a mechanism for implementing the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility.[14] That said, the Process still distances itself from EU interests by stressing Turkey's leadership role; Turkey as European enough to be a model for migration management further East and South, but not too European in order to be considered culturally useful to facilitate dialogue and partnerships with apparently like-minded 'Muslim', 'Southern' 'beneficiary' states. Through Turkey's role in the Budapest Process, arguably it has become an agent of European externalisation although it also has its own political agenda as a (soft) power in the region.

The number of MTM partner countries has grown over the past years and now includes almost all Middle Eastern countries (apart from Israel, the occupied Palestinian territories, Jordan and Syria) as well as a number of sub-Saharan countries. All of the designated Southern countries are 'beneficiary' countries, whilst the donors are among the 'European' countries. In the MTM Dialogue, Turkey was assigned honorary European status (in spite of its not being a donor state).

European states assume a pedagogical role, teaching Southern states to learn from their 'European' peers about how to better manage their borders and human mobility flows. There are echoes of orientalism in this arrangement. Tellingly, while there has been much controversy as to the apparent Europeanness of Turkey in terms of the accession negotiations to join the EU, its European status within the MTM has not been disputed. This suggests that the ICMPD sees Turkey as well on its way to developing convergence with EU member states, or at least more so than its Southern peers.

Turkey is European enough to be part of the 'in-club' (Dean 2010, 38) but not so much that it loses its 'added value' as a state with a predominantly Muslim population, useful for externalisation purposes. One could say that while the EC can be interpreted as often taking the 'bad cop' role, reproaching Turkey for poor behaviour in its progress reports, the ICMPD has taken a 'good cop' role in the framework of the dialogues, praising Turkey for its European-like migration governance.

The binaries that frame partner states within RCPs, as European/ Southern and donor/beneficiary, construct regions which bear political interests. North–South divisions tend to reflect donor–beneficiary divisions, whereby the industrialised Northern states provide the funding in order to export migration control systems along migration routes beyond their territories. However, Turkey's positioning within these binary divisions demands a more complex analysis of the functions of categorisation in (European) bordering practices. By positioning Turkey as 'European', 'Chair' or 'mediator', the ICMPD and the EU are demonstrating Turkey's welcome to the club. They are conveying the message that Turkey has sufficiently converged with European ideals of good migration management. However, this classification is fragile, as it does not always extend to other policy fields. Nowhere is this more striking than in the case of the EU–Turkey membership negotiations. This fragility is politically useful for the EU and the ICMPD. While the categorisation of Turkey as European

would have enormous political consequences if it were coming from the EC, this category assigned by the ICMPD in these dialogue frameworks is a much more symbolic manoeuvre; its main goal is to create a sense of belonging to the 'right' side. Conditional or partial classification of Turkey as European keeps it on its toes and serves to encourage further 'good behaviour' in line with EU expectations from Turkey, in order to achieve a more stable and fixed acceptance in the club.

One of the main activities of the RCP initiative is the establishment of expert meetings for the partner states and agencies. These meetings bring into the same room for a period of two or three days delegates of the ICMPD, of the states involved and of partner agencies. MTM expert meetings have taken place in European hubs in Belgium and Austria as well as 'hot spots' along designated irregular migration routes, such as Turkey, Malta or Morocco. Under the umbrella of MTM, these meetings have been split into two categories to reflect the two dimensions of the MTM Dialogue: Irregular and Mixed Migration and Migration and Development. The former generally brings together representatives from Home Affairs ministries, while the latter mostly draws representatives from development ministries. Mimicking UN-style meetings, partner states sit around a large table next to their country flag alongside partner agencies. There are interpreters of French, Arabic and English, with informal conversation being predominantly in French or English.

Participation in a transnational community of migration experts is a source of prestige for the state delegates. These meetings are also ways in which the ICMPD and partner agencies can take a lead. The ICMPD Programme Officer sits at the head of the table and chairs the meeting. Sat beside him are the partner agencies and spread around the room are the state delegates sitting next to their country flag. As with the Budapest Process, the role of the ICMPD bordercrats is to draft the agenda, the concept paper, the background paper and the guiding points for the plenary discussion. In this way, the ICMPD very much frames the discussion. The meeting themes are in line with those considered important by receiving states; they are decided by the 'steering committee' (the donor states) in the case of the MTM or by the 'friends of the Chair' in the case of the Budapest Process.

States take turns presenting on a topic assigned by the ICMPD secretariat. The meetings are packed with a series of PowerPoint presentations on specific themes, often defined by the ICMPD. During the short time allotted to discussion (about 15 minutes at the end of each session), par-

ticipants are given 'guiding points for discussion', which serve to manage the time and the content.

The atmosphere is convivial and despite attempts to tightly steer there is often digression from the agenda. Most people will know each other from past meetings. There are regular coffee breaks, which provide informal spaces for people to meet and discuss. During the meeting, a group photo is taken and distributed to participants to take home as an affirmation both of their membership of the group and of the group's intimacy, its 'in-group' nature. Cultural outings are often organised during the evening, such as a guided tour of a nearby historical city centre. During the meetings there is an encouragement to treat the group members as equal.

There was significant internal variation within each group's social composition. While the Southern state delegates are predominantly high-ranked, older, male representatives, and this was also the case for Turkey, the European states tend to send young, freshly starting out diplomats and civil servants. As for the partner agencies, most would send mid-level representatives (often quite unacquainted with the dialogue), and in some European cases interns were sent (perhaps indicating that the dialogues were not considered a particular priority for some members). This reflects the 'success' of the RCP initiative in encouraging Southern states, its main targets, to fully participate, while European states may be there for more ritual performances.

The team members working for the MTM Dialogue are young, mostly women in their 20s and 30s, at the beginning of their careers in international organisations. Their professional and education backgrounds tend to be either in the humanitarian or in the security fields. They are well educated and a privileged group; like all permanent staff of international organisations, they do not pay taxes. There is a high turnover since for many the MTM serves as a training ground for more high-profile political careers in the international sector. Before they leave these relatively junior international bordercrats can develop their expertise and commitment to normative migration management scripts.

During a typical meeting, partner countries may present a migration management practice or experience with migration management in their country, and often this will be presented as an instance of 'best practice' or a 'common challenge'. Such instances are presented as relatively context free and thus easily transferable. In this way, national disparities and contextual differences are downplayed. Partner agencies may also present their activities in a particular domain of migration management. The con-

tribution of ICMPD bordercrats range from presenting their country pro-files to presenting capacity-building practices through past successes or potential ways forward. As with the MTM meetings, generally, these meetings are scripted with a familiar and recurrent vocabulary, which serves to reproduce a particular way of seeing the problems that are pre-sented. These scripts are often oriented around a certain migration nexus, from migration and development to migration and security. Notions such as 'Integrated Border Management' are treated as a synonym for gover-nance. Migration categories such as 'transit migration, 'mixed migration', 'human trafficking' and 'people smuggling' are used repeatedly and (rela-tively) unproblematically. There is a sharing of calls associated with com-mon challenges and opportunities, rights and responsibilities, and for a balanced approach having due concern for 'efficient' and humane' poli-cies, and interstate cooperation, to tackle migration.

Becoming a practitioner involves what one might call 'doing being' a transnational bordercrat. This requires socialisation into a group often through the opportunities available beyond formal dialogue structures (Wenger 1998). Indeed, much of the learning and the doing can take place in this way, as this participant remarked: 'These dialogues are more about the process than the outcome. They are about the talk, making friends, sharing ideas rather than concrete, policy decisions.'[15] That more happened in the backstage than the front was expressed by a number of European delegates:

> These meetings are rather surreal experiences … All the good stuff happens in the coffee breaks. The actual meetings are rather long and arduous affairs. I come here to make contacts. You get to know who the right people are, to exchange contacts. It was easier to discuss our projects with the Turkish delegate here than it has been back in Ankara. Everything is on a plate.[16]

The informal activities facilitate a spirit of togetherness which perfectly complements the formal aims of the meetings to bring Southern and European states together. Despite calls for evidence-based practices, these informal spaces appear to be more effective sites of transnational knowl-edge production than are the formal tools and practices. As Wenger (1998) has argued, professional knowledge is constituted out of informal cultural activities of belonging as well as by formal means.

Several participants commented that the benefits of these meetings lay in the framework in which migration-sending and -receiving countries are

brought together. It is through capitalising on this framework that the receiving states hope to develop relations and cooperation with states from the South, with whom they often have difficult lines of communication. It is a form of soft diplomacy in which the deals are made in the coffee breaks or at dinner, away from the formal (informal) dialogue settings.

The role assigned to Turkey is part of Turkey's front stage performance in the global governance arena. Backstage, IGOs and EU agencies have not yet credited Turkey with this. There is an acute awareness on the part of Turkish and international bordercrats alike that this role is one that is confined to the dialogue space. As part of its front stage role, during the biannual expert meetings, the Turkish government has on several occasions been asked to present policy developments to MTM Southern countries, particularly in relation to steps it has taken towards the creation of its Directorate General for Migration Management (DGMM).

The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosted an MTM expert meeting in 2013 in Istanbul on *Population movements in the MTM region resulting from crises situations: experiences, responses and challenges ahead*. The event took place in a five-star hotel; ICMPD staff found this quite extravagant (meetings normally take place in four-star hotels) and viewed this move as a demonstration to the EU and the ICMPD that Turkey is fully on board.

The expert meetings held under the framework of the Budapest Process have a similar setup to those of the MTM Dialogue. As Chair, Turkey is a frequent host for the Budapest meetings. While the members are not divided into 'Southern' and 'European' states during Budapest Process meetings, this division is reflected in the opposition between 'donors' and 'beneficiary states'. During two days, state delegates, high-ranking civil servants from migration departments, mostly from Foreign Affairs ministries, come together to discuss different dimensions of migration governance processes, activities and ambitions.

One ICMPD staff member wondered whether Turkey would perhaps be better positioned to serve as 'expert' to Southern countries because they are much more 'vertical' and 'hierarchical'.[17] It is important to add that this sentiment is shared by certain 'Southern' states, as this Iraqi diplomat commented:

We can benefit from Turkish experience, the Turkish model. Turkey was a country of emigration and now it is a country of immigration, we can learn from this experience … and we share a certain cultural closeness and our

political systems are more similar. I believe that it would be very beneficial to learn from Turkey's example.[18]

Turkey has not only provided a mediating role or bridge for the transfer of migration management norms and practices, but it has also become a migration management concept entrepreneur in its own right through its collaboration with the IOM.

As part of the Silk Routes Partnership for Migration of the Budapest Process, in 2014 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, in cooperation with the IOM, funded an 'assessment' on what was defined as 'humanitarian border management', in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan. Through this report Turkey has been able to position itself as a migration management 'concept entrepreneur'. The aim of the report produced by Turkey is to propose the concept of humanitarian border management and to give it visibility through the Budapest Process. This came about at an interesting moment in 2013 when the EU increasingly began to frame security practices aimed at controlling migration through humanitarian discourses.[19] The Turkish delegate commented: 'It is an innovative way to capture the increasingly humanitarian role that border officials have taken on. This is something we have come to terms with particularly regarding the Syrian crisis.' According to the report, it concerns a balance for the safety and security of people with that of targeted countries of destination:

> Humanitarian border management seeks to help States balance the tension between humanitarian responsibilities towards protection-sensitive migration movements, and concerns for the safety and security of the countries of destination for those movements.[20]

The discussion of this report at a Budapest meeting was limited to affirming comments at the end of a long PowerPoint presentation. This affirming feedback establishes an affable consensus that avoids confrontation with the serious challenges in the report. Such confrontation is intrinsically difficult because it would expose the tension between international migration knowledges and national concerns with sovereignty. The former is an abstraction which is unlikely to be enacted at the national level. It is useful to think of the concept of humanitarian border management as an entrepreneurial one. The entrepreneurial role adopted by Turkey in this manner reflects a certain convergence towards migration management ideals. Indeed, the Turkish government representatives were extremely

proud of their contributing role as one Turkish official commented, 'Turkey is really a laboratory for migration management. We are in the thick of it'.[21]

The notion of concept entrepreneur attempts to capture the making of international migration knowledge as a 'useful illusion' so described because it resists translation into practice. This brings to mind Wenger's (1998) notion of reification. Wenger argued that any community of practice needs to produce objects which serve as bearers of meaning and as a means of participation. But such objects do not necessarily correspond to an intended function. On the contrary, reification suggests that 'forms can take a life of their own … they gain a degree of autonomy from the occasion and purposes of their production' (Wenger 1998, 62). In this way, entrepreneurial concepts can be adrift from what is actually going on and be of little practical service.

Ironically, bordercrats are part of the production of man-made humanitarian crises 'at the border'.[22] They are unaware that they are part of the problem to which they offer a solution or of their investment in these crises. Indeed, ICMPD-led dialogues have been known to feed off the humanitarian disasters at the border because these are tied to funding opportunities as the following ICMPD officer remarked:

> He is only giving so much importance to migrant deaths at sea because this is where the EU funding priorities are at the moment. This is the emphasis that the EU are making and so the Dialogue is trying to mirror that.[23]

Turkey's contribution could be read as revealing much about the 'success' of IGOs and European states in bringing Turkey into the fold but, at the same time, it is important to acknowledge Turkey's agency here. Since the late 2000s, Turkey has been positioning itself not as subject to IGOs governing interventions to produce migration management in Turkey, but as a leader and an 'active subject' (Andrijasevic and Walters 2010) of migration management. While we can observe the humanitarian discourses imbricated with security ones from Frontex, the EC, the IOM and the ICMPD, it was Turkey that, facilitated by the IOM, picked up on this specific language and way of understanding migration issues.

During meetings a recurrent theme was the call for information sharing and evidence-based migration policies. In response to this call the MTM and Budapest Process produced country profiles. The driving rationale behind country profiles according to MTM bordercrats is that these tools

serve to strengthen policymaking by bringing relevant knowledge to the process. Further, they aim to teach partner countries about kinds of information and data that it is important to collect and how to make sense of this material including what categories and terminology to employ. Thus, country profiles can be viewed as indirect expertise-based governing techniques not only through the kind of knowledge selected (e.g. the construction of a migration development nexus) but also through how it is represented as useful. Knowledge production may be as much for show as it is for informing policymaking. Therefore attention should be paid to whether expertise may be more concerned with displaying knowledge than engagement with its substance (Boswell 2009).

In practice, most of the information in country profiles is assembled from reports by other international organisations, which for the most part are partner agencies. Interestingly, the reports frequently cited in the country profiles sometimes cite ICMPD as their source of knowledge. A back and forth process can be observed between a network of migration management actors, whose self-referential system of circulation strengthens the legitimacy of the network and of migration management as the legitimate paradigm for governing mobility. This self-referential system is concerned with generating 'reliable information and data', and 'using consistent, legitimate terminology' as well as reaffirming new migration management concepts which purport to capture new migration realities. The highly derivative nature of this data may compromise its quality and there is a tendency for data to be treated as self-evidently evidence.

Country profiles were diffused through the i-Map portal, which contained intelligence on migration flows based on statistics provided by Frontex. The i-Map is a migration management tool which brings together all of ICMPD's four dialogues, including the MTM Dialogue and the Budapest Process, into one portal. The stated aims of the i-Map are to 'foster information sharing and mutual understanding and cooperation among participating countries'.[24] The i-Map, much like other maps concerning migration routes, makes a contribution to the discursive field in which migration is thought about and understood (Walters 2009).

The i-Map is supposed to provide a platform for sharing information including reports, publications and visualisations. The i-Map's 'Multi-regional visualisation' displays a multiplicity of migration routes on the way towards Europe. The MTM mapping of irregular and mixed migration routes, which can be found on the i-Map portal, is derived from Frontex data on irregular crossings at the European border. The map

offers its reader an apparently factual depiction of migration routes as migrants head towards Europe. It creates an illusion of migratory routes that can be measured, objectified and visualised, and are thus governable through rational responses. The i-Map represents Europe as a space confronted with invading forces coming from the South and East. These flows are directed towards certain hotspots on the shores of the Mediterranean as well as within the Schengen space. The colour scheme is military green. Walters (2009, 126/7) comments that 'the routeway … the migrant's journey, as much as the border, becomes an object of knowledge in its own right'. In this way the i-Map functions as a tool for securitisation.

Further eastwards and southwards of Europe, the migration routes data is collected through a mixture of publications by the UNODC and information from partner countries. Thus, the i-Map tool represents an imagined reality on transit migration derived from knowledge largely produced by international organisations and European agencies. That is not to suggest that the i-Map is treated as robust evidence, as one Turkish bordercrat commented:

> i-Map is a good idea but it is not very realistic. As things happen in an irregular way, I don't think that the data is very accurate. For instance, at one stage every route was going through Ankara. Actually, smugglers and migrants don't use Ankara, so the i-Map is not very precise. It could be developed but it is not very useful in its present state.[25]

How do we make sense of these tools? On the one hand, they are presented as all-encompassing meta-tools, which can be applied to countries indiscriminatingly, and on the other hand, their 'tailor-made' dimension is often stressed. Balzacq (2008, 80) emphasises that in the same way that language does not only have a descriptive function, tools are not neutral, unmediated or unmediating objects or activities. Tools can structure relations as they include and exclude; they produce knowledge on an issue shaping how it is perceived. The technical ring associated with tools gives such knowledge a feel of objective truthfulness and reliability. These insights allow us to critically interpret the following comments from an ICMPD bordercrat:

> Thanks to the i-Map we all know each other, we have created a supportive community with a shared knowledge pool that supports much-needed international cooperation.[26]

It prompts us to reflect upon who belongs to the i-Map community, how its participants are positioned (e.g. European versus Southern), what kinds of knowledge are produced and circulated and how is this knowledge received by targeted states (e.g. are they unproblematically assimilated?). Finally, following Pécoud (2015), it prompts reflection on the replacement of difficult political questions by tools held to be shaped by politically neutral policy directions.

Over the past years there has been emphasis on South–South migration, which in IGO terminology essentially means migration contained away from Europe. Accordingly, irregular migration was not only a European problem but also a North African, sub-Saharan and Middle Eastern one. Promotion of the importance of South–South cooperation emphasised that it is in the interest of Southern states to adopt European migration management practices to protect themselves from unwanted migrant flows. One ICMPD staff member commented:

> Immigration was not such a politicised issue until recently. We tried to stress that migration is not only a threat to Europe … not all flows head towards Europe for whatever reason it is really a problem for all states and demands cooperation. In the case of Turkey, this message has been much easier to get across since the Syrian crises as the media and public opinion sees migration as threatening.[27]

In this case, 'Southern' countries were, on the one hand, labelled as under threat and, on the other, there was emphasis on South–South cooperation as their responsibility—to reduce irregular migration and risks to migrants (or their citizens' lives). South–South information sharing on managing migration routes is consistently called for during the dialogue meetings. ICMPD staff and others stress that this problem is not only a European one, that migration also poses a threat to Southern states. Emphasis is placed on giving examples of best practices of South–South cooperation in order to present a 'balanced' approach. Although the Budapest Process and the MTM are not formal EU Dialogues, they can be interpreted as part of the EU's effort to strengthen cooperation with non-EU countries in the field of migration.

To conclude, RCPs are an important feature for the production, maintenance and enculturation of transnational communities of bordercrats. Through regular meetings, shared discourses and the employment of discourses of social harmony framed as technical and expert driven, they

strive to create a shared community characterised by 'common interests' and 'common problems'. While RCPs claim to be technical and non-political, they function to pave the way for the externalisation of Europe's borders. The language, tools and technologies deployed by and through RCPs function to promote forms of international cooperation, policies and practices guided by a containment agenda—to keep 'undesirable' migration flows east and southwards of the EU.

In the case of both dialogues, Turkey has been positioned so as to encourage it to become an active subject in European bordering practices. Various techniques of partnership underpin this process from specific language and categorisations, technical IT tools and mappings, to socialising activities, all of which function to steer migration government in Turkey. These elements, knowledges, norms, routines and technologies can be conceived of as participating in and making border imaginaries of Turkey, Europe, the Mediterranean, and beyond.

Through its participation in these RCPs, Turkey has been able to position itself (and has been positioned) as norm entrepreneur and mediator/leader in migration management, rather than merely on the receiving end of European externalisation policies. This positionality appears to be inflected with an orientalist gaze whereby Turkey is seen to be a natural mediator between East and West. The categorisation of Turkey as a European country by the ICMPD is a technique of partnership that aims to bring Turkey in line with European political interests, to adopt a 'European outlook', whereby Turkey's Muslim identity is emphasised as a means for Turkey to be better equipped to speak and be heard by fellow Muslim countries. Turkey has become both an object and a subject of EU bordering practices not only in relation to migration government in Turkey but also in respect to that in so-called Southern countries.

Notes

1. Please refer to Chapter 1 for a discussion of the development of EU policy on migration, asylum and borders with respect to its externalisation agenda. You may also refer to Thierry Balzacq, ed, The External Dimension of EU Justice and Home Affairs. Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
2. For example, RCPs emerging since the 1990s: The Budapest Process; The Cross-Border Cooperation Process (Söderköping Process); The Regional Conference on Migration (RCM, Puebla Process); The South American Conference on Migration (SACM); The Regional Ministerial Conference

on Migration in the Western Mediterranean (5 + 5 Dialogue); The Mediterranean Transit Migration Dialogue (MTM); The Migration Dialogue for West Africa (MIDWA); The Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA); The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Regional Consultative Process on Migration (IGAD-RCP); The Intergovernmental Asia-Pacific Consultations on Refugees, Displaced Persons and Migrants (APC); The Ministerial Consultations on Overseas Employment and Contractual Labour for Countries of Origin in Asia (Colombo Process); The Ministerial Consultations on Overseas Employment and Contractual Labour for Countries of Origin and Destination in Asia (Abu Dhabi Dialogue); The Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime (Bali Process).

3. ICMPD, Factsheet, 2011 http://www.icmpd.org/fileadmin/ICMPD-Website/ICMPD-Website_2011/ICMPD_General/ICMPD_Factsheet/ICMPD_Factsheet_24_03_2015.pdf
4. The ICMPD was founded in 1994 by Austria and Switzerland to deal with migration flows from Eastern Europe. The ICMPD only invented a 'Southern' dimension some years later as the Mediterranean became of increasing strategic importance for the EU's migration agenda.
5. ICMPD, The MTM Dialogue 2002–2012: A Multifaceted Approach—an Analysis of the Place, Role and Use of the MTM Dialogue in Support to Regional and National Migration Policy and Strategy Development, Vienna, 2012. p. 6 http://www.imap-migration.org/fileadmin/Editor/Meeting_Doc/MTM_10th_Anniversary/MTM_Anniversary_Malta_final_paper_Jan_2013.pdf (accessed 4 September 2014).
6. Interview—Project Coordinator, ICMPD, November 2014, Skype.
7. As of 2011, the MTM partner states are Algeria, Cape Verde, Egypt, Ethiopia, EU's 27 member states, Ghana, Kenya, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Switzerland, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey.
8. Interview—High-Ranking Official, Migration Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 2014, Istanbul (Turkey).
9. Interview—Senior Regional Advisor—Silk Routes, ICMPD, December 2014, Istanbul (Turkey).
10. See Devex, *Post Arab Spring Turkey flexes its foreign aid muscle*, 17 February 2014 https://www.devex.com/news/post-arab-spring-turkey-flexes-its-foreign-aid-muscle-82871 (accessed 3 July 2015).
11. Interview—Project Officer, ICMPD, December 2014, Istanbul (Turkey).
12. Interview, Senior Regional Advisor—Silk Routes, ICMPD, December 2014, Istanbul (Turkey).
13. Budapest Process webpage https://www.budapestprocess.org/about/news/54-a-silk-routes-partnership-for-migration-is-established (accessed 5 May 2016).

14. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, Brussels, 18.11.2011, COM(2011) 743 final.
15. Interview—Project Manager, ICMPD, June 2014, Vienna (Austria).
16. Interview—First Migration Secretary, FCO, January 2013, Ankara (Turkey).
17. Interview—Senior regional adviser, ICMPD, December 2014, Istanbul (Turkey).
18. Interview—High-ranking official, Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 2015, Istanbul (Turkey).
19. It is not suggested that this humanitarian–security nexus only emerged in this period; indeed, the Hague Programme is perhaps the first EU document that explicitly introduced humanitarian rhetoric. However, this discursive practice gained prevalence since the early 2010s, particularly following the deaths of over 300 migrants and refugees off the shores of Lampedusa in October 2013.
20. IOM (2014) Humanitarian Border Management in the Silk Routes Region—Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan, Geneva: IOM, p. XI.
21. Interview—High-Ranking Official Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 2015, Istanbul (Turkey).
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CHAPTER 4

The UNHCR Steer

Abstract This chapter examines the emergence of 'the refugee problem' in Turkey and how this problematic has been constituted through a focus on the trajectory of the UNHCR's recent relationship with the Turkish government. We point to a concern by UNHCR to cultivate and lead a productive relationship with stakeholders in refugee governance through a charm offensive and techniques of partnership. This case exposes the muddy terrain in which the UNHCR steers Turkey's refugee policies towards European interests.

Keywords Refugee • UNHCR • Humanitarianism • Safe country • Steer

In Chapter 3 we discuss mobility government and the EU externalisation agenda. We do not thereby suggest that Turkey was the passive victim of intergovernmental organisation (IGO) manipulation or orientalist domination. In this chapter we elaborate on how the Turkish government asserts its authority in the field of international refugee government.

Humanitarian discourses can serve as a means to support powerful states of the global North to intervene in sovereign states. Here connectivities with the UNHCR accommodations concerning how the Turkish authorities govern refugees are studied. Merlingen (2003) and Joseph

(2009) shed light on the way in which governmental rationalities and techniques developed in Western states (and reflecting the interests of these states) are being diffused in the non-West, often with the assistance of international and IGOs. Barnett's analysis of the UNHCR resonates with this interpretation as he argues that the UNHCR is a player within this process since it at once diffuses global standards as having unquestionable universal validity and secretes a Western bias. As he puts it:

> UNHCR's role is bound up with a global governance that is designed to maintain and reproduce an international order defined by a state system (sovereignty), whose principal beneficiaries are Western states (contain the refugees), and that contains a cultural hegemony (liberalism and individual rights). (2001, 269)

This cultural hegemony has taken different forms according to different contexts. The 'refugee' became a part of the international system in the post-World War II context through the ratification of the Geneva Convention in 1951. This legal category was at first constructed to deal with the mass human displacement following World War II. The definition of the refugee was extended through the 1967 Protocol, which removed geographical and temporal restrictions from the Convention. During the Cold War, refugees fleeing Eastern Europe and Russia towards the West had a symbolic political function; their decision to flee served as a means to undermine Communist ideology (Betts 2011; Loescher et al. 2008). Thus, at this time the figure of the refugee was represented as a hero or freedom fighter. Much has changed since the fall of the Berlin Wall, not least in terms of numbers of potential refugees seeking sanctuary, countries of origin, reasons for seeking asylum and the ways in which bordering practices regulate their prospects. Refugees largely lost their symbolic value and became associated with the language of burden and threat (Loescher 2001), a 'global pariah' (Andersson 2015).

This construction of the refugee was heightened during the aftermath of 9/11, particularly in relation to the male Muslim who has become increasingly associated with the terrorist threat. This securitisation of the (Muslim) foreigner would have a significant impact on global refugee governance, as deserved refugeness became increasingly subject to the successful negotiation of security practices. Officers in the field with a security brief (Homeland Security or border management officials) or ones of care (NGO and IGO officials), all acknowledged a growing tension between

humanitarian and security imperatives in their work. Agier (2011) points to the ways in which these imperatives are impossible to separate precisely because humanitarian rationales rest on principles of categorisation, selection and the limitation of mobility. For bordercrats in this field, being concerned with these principles increasingly involves a balance between security and protection. As a result, the protection claims of the individual have become more and more subsumed to what are felt to be the security needs of the population as a whole.

Here we turn to a discussion of the emergence of 'the refugee problem' in Turkey and how this problematic has been constituted through a focus on the trajectory of the UNHCR's recent relationship with the Turkish government. We point to a concern by the UNHCR to cultivate and lead a productive relationship with stakeholders in refugee governance.

Turkey's refugee context has dramatically shifted since the post-World War II era. As of 2017, Turkey hosts over three million Syrian refugees.[1] Turkey has also become an important country of asylum for many persons fleeing Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Somalia and Ethiopia, among others. However, all non-European refugees in Turkey are not permitted to stay on a permanent basis. Indeed, Turkey was a drafter and one of the first signatories of the 1951 Geneva Convention, although it chose to impose the geographical limitation pursuant to Article 1b of the Convention, limiting the scope of the Convention to 'persons who have become refugees as a result of events occurring in Europe'.[2] This meant that Turkey only granted refugee status to asylum seekers from Europe. This practice in Turkey's governance of refugee was a result of the Cold War context and Turkey's role as an ally to the West. This created a two-tier system in which all non-European refugees would have no long-term possibilities of integration into Turkish society and must be resettled. This two-tier system gave way to a significant role for the UNHCR in refugee government in Turkey, which would carry out refugee status determination (RSD) procedure for all non-European asylum seekers and coordinate resettlement practices for those accorded refugee status. The UNHCR's role has shifted over the years since its arrival in Turkey.

Içduygu and Kirisci (2009, 16) report that an estimated 13,500 asylum seekers from the ex-Soviet European countries benefited from protection in Turkey from 1970 to the fall of the Berlin Wall. This was followed by 20,000 Bosnian refugees fleeing the former Yugoslavia crisis, who were given temporary protection in Turkey, as well as 18,000 Kosovars who sought protection in Turkey in the late 1999s. From the 1980s onwards,

Turkey witnessed an increase and diversification in people seeking asylum, notably regarding the emergence of significant flows of non-European asylum seekers. In the context of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, thousands of regime opponents and religious and ethnic minority groups fled to Turkey. To deal with these flows, the UNHCR and the Turkish government developed a working arrangement so that the UNHCR could process the asylum claims on the basis that successful applicants would be resettled to a third country. Furthermore, the war between Iran and Iraq in the late 1980s and the Gulf War in the early 1990s caused many to seek refuge in Turkey, including several mass influxes of Iraqi Kurds in 1988 and 1991. This was a particularly sensitive development, as the Turkish government feared that the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) fighters might be amongst the 'bona fide' refugees seeking protection. For Turkey, at this time the fear of the dangerous Other among refugee flows was linked to its domestic struggle against the Kurdish independent movements (Içduygu and Kirisci 2009). Moreover, the rapid growth of asylum seekers and illegal entries into Turkey and the difficulties of deporting large numbers of 'failed' asylum seekers put pressure on Turkey–UNHCR relations.

As asylum became increasingly viewed through a security lens, the Turkish government sought to regain control of the asylum system from the UNHCR. In this context, the government issued a Regulation in 1994 on the *Procedures and Principles Related to Mass Influx and the Foreigners arriving in Turkey either as Individuals or in Groups wishing to seek Asylum either from Turkey or Requesting Residence Permits with the Intention of seeking Asylum from a Third Country.*[3] The Regulation formally introduced a parallel process in which Turkish authorities would also conduct status determination. Unlike the 2013 Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP), international experts from the UNHCR, EU agencies, academia and civil society were not consulted during the preparation of the Regulation. The Regulation was driven by a strong security orientation; it introduced a satellite city system in which asylum seekers were designated a city of residence that they were not permitted to leave. It further stipulated that asylum seekers must register with the Turkish authorities upon their arrival in Turkey within a space of five days. This five-day rule led to a tense relationship with the UNHCR when recognised individuals would be stopped from leaving the country for resettlement because they had not abided by the rule. Furthermore, the international community criticised several instances of refoulement, when Turkey deported refugees who had been recognised by the UNHCR (Kirisci 2012; Biehl 2009).

These incidents provoked criticism by European agencies, IGOs and NGOs. In 1997, as part of an effort to reshape Turkish asylum practices, the UNHCR persuaded the Turkish authorities to let it carry out an extensive training programme for police officers, judges and prosecutors in order to disseminate international standards of practice on migration and asylum.[4] These interventions could be said to be the beginnings of a more vigorous 'problematisation' of Turkey's migration and asylum landscape.

UNHCR relations improved with Turkey towards the end of the 1990s; the UNHCR tried to avoid giving the impression of overstepping its role in Turkey's sovereign space. Thus it positioned its role as monitoring and benchmarking progress, supporting the Turkish state, rather than playing an explicit one of intervening in Turkey's asylum governance. Positioning itself as an apparently light-interventionist partner was part of the way in which UNHCR Turkey considerably improved its relations with the Turkish authorities since the 1990s.[5] However, a decade later there was another dip in UNHCR–Turkey relations, as UNHCR shamed and blamed Turkey, rendering fragile its positioning as legitimate actor within this field.

An examination of UNHCR Turkey's press releases, news stories and briefing notes from the period 1996–2014 offers some insight into UNHCR–Turkey's shifting relations and the evolving ways in which the UNHCR gives meaning and order to Turkey's refugee context. These communications can be interpreted as 'external inspections' (Joseph 2009) having the aim of assessing whether Turkey's policies meet 'global refugee standards'. States are assessed on their compliance and encouraged to self-regulate, according to rational, normalised conduct. Benchmarking and measuring 'progress' is constitutive of what Joseph (2009) calls a 'normalising discourse'; he explains:

> Defining good governance in this way allows for a normalising discourse that sets standards by which to judge the achievement of certain domestic goals and which can be used to blame countries when these standards are not seen to have been achieved. These norms are not imposed but are applied using a complex process of assessment of compliance. (Joseph 2009, 422)

By setting such normative standards, benchmarking enacts new forms of global inclusion and exclusion by 'redefining the core and periphery by linking those organisations and people to those who have "value" and discarding the rest' (Larner and Le Haron 2004, 219). This technique subtly closes off alternative ways of reading 'good governance' of refugees

and encourages Turkey to take responsibility and ownership for the problem as defined by others (Hindess 2004, 35). While the UNHCR may strive to promote a 'normalising discourse', this does not mean that such a discourse is accepted and assimilated in straightforward ways.

The UNHCR published very few communications and news briefs in the early 2000s on Turkey's refugee situation. However, this changed by 2007 and 2008 when the UNHCR published a successive number of condemning communications and briefing notes criticising the Turkish government for the disrespect of the refoulement principle as outlined in the 1951 Geneva Convention. To offer some examples, in March 2007, the UNHCR condemned the Turkish government over the refoulement of an Iraqi individual, recognised as a refugee by the UNHCR[6]; in July 2007, the UNHCR criticised Turkey for the forced return of 135 Iraqis, some of whom had made an asylum claim; in August 2007, the UNHCR publically criticised the Turkish government over the expulsion of five Iranian refugees to Northern Iraq[7]; in April 2008, the UNHCR published a communication heavily criticising the Turkish government for the disrespect of non-refoulement and the deaths of four foreign nationals.[8] Four men, including an Iranian recognised as a refugee by the UNHCR, drowned after the Turkish police forced a group of 18 people to cross a fast-flowing river separating Turkey from Iraq.

Following the publication of critical press releases, Turkish officials from the Ministry of Interior called a meeting with the UNHCR representative. At the beginning of the meeting, a high-ranking official from the Turkish Ministry of Interior stood in front of Michel Gaudé, the then UNHCR Head of Office, and ceremoniously snapped a pencil in two. This pencil-breaking drama was meant to symbolise the threat of a broken relationship between the two parties. The UNHCR was told that if the organisation were to commit the same mistake in publically shaming Turkey, UNHCR–Turkey relations would suffer. This incident would mark another essential turning point in UNHCR–Turkey relations; thereafter, the UNHCR refrained from all further criticism of Turkish governmental practices. This example adds to the complexity of Joseph's (2009) 'complex mechanisms of compliance' which are clearly not unidirectional; the UNHCR is only given space to assess and measure Turkey in relation to other countries, so long as it does not offend Turkey. If UNHCR aspired to be the inspector of Turkey's refugee problem, it had to tread careful ground. One organisational strategy to facilitate this ground was to change UNHCR Turkey's leadership.

The UNHCR Turkey's leadership was changed in 2011. Michel Gaudé, the then Head of Office, was replaced by Karim Atassi as Representative of UNHCR Turkey. While Gaudé was known to have pushed for a human rights-centred approach (as indicated in the controversial press releases) and strengthened dialogue with NGOs, his replacement took a much more pro-government, less overtly critical approach. Rather than trying to bring Turkey in line with the 'in-group', Atassi was more concerned with bringing UNHCR back from the periphery to the centre stage in the refugee field. In his first meeting with the Turkish authorities he declared that they should forget all that was said and done by UNHCR under Gaudé's leadership and start afresh.[9] This new leadership regime pursued a charm offensive that recalls tactics we have discussed in past chapters. Indeed, this resonates with Balzacq's (2009) analysis of the European Neighbourhood Policy as a befriending process as well as our discussion of the International Organisation of Migration (IOM) and the International Centre for Migration and Policy Development (ICMPD) who govern 'in the interest' of their subjects in previous chapters. It is about bringing Turkey into the fold not through coercion but by praising Turkey and encouraging 'responsible', 'rational' forms of self-governance through 'like-minded' states with shared interests.

Henceforth the UNHCR ceased all criticism towards the government and developed a revised discourse of partnership and collaboration. The recent comments from a senior UNHCR official capture the spirit of this shift:

> As the 50-year *partner* of the Turkish State, UNHCR has had the opportunity to *observe the progress* achieved by Turkey, a country that continues to expand its asylum space, offering protection to those in need.[10]

This official went on to speak of an amiable, mutually supportive, warm relationship. Clearly, UNHCR is at a distance from the more reproachful stance signalled above concerning its claims to be 'observing Turkey's progress'. The change in UNHCR leadership and strategy came about at the same time as the outbreak of the Syrian crisis in 2011. Turkey has become one of the main 'host countries' for Syrian refugees. By January 2015, Turkey was hosting over 1,800,000 Syrian 'persons of concern'.[11]

In 2011, UNHCR Turkey published almost exclusively press releases on the Syrian refugee situation in Turkey, and reported on the growing numbers and UNHCR responsive activities with this group. This context enabled UNHCR Turkey to broaden its agenda and activities. One indica-

tion of this is the exponential growth in UNHCR Turkey's annual budget: before the Syrian crisis in 2010, UNHCR Turkey's budget was 17,693,965 euros, and by 2014, it stood at 306,553,430 euros.[12]

While UNHCR's role was limited towards the beginning of the crisis, gradually it managed to regain trust and enhance its role in the refugee field of intervention. UNHCR Turkey briefing notes and communications began to praise Turkey, 'welcoming' the New Law,[13] 'welcoming' practices with Syrian refugees, as well as the local population.[14] The UNHCR Representative Karim Atassi strongly praised what he referred to as 'the Turkish model' amid the Syrian refugee crisis and congratulated Turkey for passing the 2013 LFIP, stating that:

> the UNHCR has never seen a country in the middle of a crisis adopting a law managing asylum and migration. There is no other country. Turkey is the first one … Whenever we sit with other countries, we tell them Turkey has done it. If you have more refugees coming to your territory this does not decrease the quality of asylum. This is the Turkey model. It is working.[15]

Atassi reiterated Turkey's 'consistent improvement in the quality of asylum' and he welcomed the Turkish people's hospitality and generosity towards its neighbours. What he neglected to mention was that the 2013 law did not provide enduring protective legislation for Syrian refugees. Instead, the Turkish government created a special 'guest' status for Syrian nationals, which was also later extended to Palestinian nationals fleeing Syria.[16] A regulation on temporary protection was issued on 22 October 2014 by the Council of Ministers of the Turkish Republic, applying to Syrian nationals and stateless persons from Syria. It implied that Syrian nationals will be admitted to Turkey and are protected from refoulement. This temporary protection status excludes this group from entering the traditional refugee status determination procedure for non-European asylum seekers and gives it no prospect for long-term integration into Turkish society, leaving refugees in a state of limbo. Despite much criticism from civil society, the UNHCR declared that this Directive was an 'appropriate' way to deal with mass influxes.[17]

Individual career interests, ethical orientations and the organisation's positioning within the field influence UNHCR's framing of, and interventions in, Turkey's refugee problem. In particular, there is evidence of a

pragmatic approach. For example, one UNHCR staff commented regarding the 2013 Law:

> The UNHCR and the IOM have not been critical because they want to invest first and foremost in getting the law passed; if the law passed today, the credit would go to the current management; they act as a PR for the government for their careers; they do not want the Syrian refugee crisis to harm the law procedure.[18]

Privately some UNHCR officers were much more critical about the situation of Syrian refugees, particularly in relation to the lack of legal underpinning to the temporary guest status. However, as one UNHCR officer said, they did not want to jeopardise the UNHCR Directorate's efforts to create or maintain amenable conditions for the law to be passed smoothly.[19]

UNHCR Turkey, then, refrained from all criticism of Turkey's approach to dealing with the Syrians; it did not criticise conditions in the camps or, for example, the neglect of the security concerns of persons residing in the camps.

> Turkey has always been reluctant in getting help from International Organisations. For instance, with the Syria refugee crisis, the donors complained why are we (UNHCR) are not there, so instead, they extended our technical role, but they still didn't give us an operational one. In order to avoid criticism and increase funds we went from 8 field staff to about 60. So they are happy … we do not reflect the problems that are going on. The government is happy, we are supporting conditions in the camp, we have not been critical. For example, when there is a fire or violence, we don't mention it. We only emphasise the positive aspects.[20]

The camps are run by local governerships and the Turkish Red Crescent. At first the UNHCR was not allowed access to the camps, but as trust was renewed among the two parties, UNHCR managed to secure a 'technical' role. National and international humanitarian NGOs are not allowed in the camps apart from the Turkish NGOs, İHH İnsani Yardım Vakfı and Support for Life, who are allowed to provide assistance in the camps on an informal basis. By 2012, the UNHCR was present in all provinces where Syrian refugees are hosted in camps (Hatay, Kilis, Gazientep, SanliUrfa). The UNHCR's 'technical' role involved 'monitoring' and providing

'assistance' in the camp, although, as noted above, this 'monitoring' role was highly limited.[21]

Prime Minister Erdoğan was formally congratulated by the UNHCR for his open border policy for persons fleeing Syria as early as June 2011. Although UNHCR staff were aware that this 'open border policy' was to some extent filtered and that Turkey only let a few people in at a time (leading to the emergence of spontaneous camps in Syria), this was not said in the public realm. Furthermore, when the Turkish authorities closed the border in April 2015, the UNHCR did not issue any criticism despite the fact that Syrians seeking to flee out of the country now had no way of doing so.

A similar stance to that of the UNHCR can be seen within the IOM. For instance, almost comically a Turkish representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs quoted an IOM official's evaluation of a Syrian refugee camp in Hatay in the south-east of Turkey:

> They were the best that he has seen in his 20 years carrier. I can say that accommodation provided is much better than some of the 'expensive' budget hotels in Geneva.[22]

In contrast to the evaluation of Turkey's policies towards Syrian refugees by the IOM and the UNHCR, NGOs were reporting stories of fires, sexual assaults, theft and hunger across the Syrian refugee camps.[23] Other NGOs heavily criticised Turkey for closing its borders to Syria, alongside other neighbouring countries to Syria, rendering it increasingly difficult for Syrians to leave the country in order to seek international protection.[24]

Clearly, IGOs have to deal with local contexts and the prospect of diminished power in the face of sovereign power. The UNHCR has been able to steer refugee governance by subduing its critique of the Turkish government's human rights record with respect to refugees in order to allow for amenable conditions for its own operations and expansion. This strategy of accommodation necessarily means that the application of rights-based refugee governance is compromised or at least suspended in favour of a law which promises to bestow rights in the future. As subject and object of refugee governance, the UNHCR both steers and is steered. This steer is referential not only to the governmental authorities, but also to the NGOs working in the field of asylum.

The bordercratic field of refugee interventions is one in which NGOs have a significant presence. The Turkish government does not provide

much funding for civil society actors and generally engages in little coop-
eration with them. Be that as it may, civil society actors concerned with
issues of migration and asylum rose in the 1990s and 2000s. While some
of these NGOs and associations are Turkish—İHH İnsani Yardım Vakfı
(IHH Human Relief Foundation 1992), Mülteci-Der (Association for
Solidarity with Refugees 2008), ASAM—the vast majority are interna-
tional—the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly (Caritas 1991), Médécins Sans
Frontières (MSF), the International Catholic Migration Commission
(ICMC), Istanbul Migration Charity (IMC), the Human Resource
Development Foundation (HRDF), Dabatum. The associations and
NGOs provide migrants and refugees with various kinds of social, health,
legal, spiritual persuasion and support; some also do advocacy. Some of
these organisations only work with migrant and refugee population,
whereas some have a much broader spectrum of activities and also provide
assistance to Turkish nationals. It is an important part of the UNHCR's
role to cooperate with these organisations, as the UNHCR formal man-
date states that 'the Office works in partnership with governments,
regional   organizations,   international   and   non-governmental
organizations'.

Again, the UNHCR has to tread careful ground in Turkey because the
Turkish government is suspicious of some NGOs. The challenge for the
UNHCR is to be friendly but not so much that it rattles the Turkish gov-
ernment. For instance, in 2008 the UNHCR planned to organise a meet-
ing in cooperation with the Turkish government and NGOs on the
detention centre in Erzurum. However, the UNHCR had been given a
black list of NGOs that they were directed to exclude from the meeting.
The list included the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly, a human rights organ-
isation which provides extensive support for asylum seekers and refugees
in terms of legal assistance and advocacy. In response to the exclusion of
the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly, other NGOs working on migration and
asylum issues formed a coalition and wrote a public letter to the UNHCR
denouncing this exclusion and demanding that either all NGOs be invited
to participate or none at all.[25] In the end the meeting did not take place.
For the UNHCR, whose mission includes the objective to cooperate with
civil society, this was a shameful moment which destabilised its positioning
as mediator between the Turkish state and the NGO community.

Another attempt of the UNHCR to configure the field is offered by a
case in 2009 when the UNHCR tried to establish a Turkish Refugee
Council, modelled upon the Dutch Refugee Council, and agreed to fund

this endeavour. The UNHCR's proposed Council included governmental actors as well as a select pool of NGOs. Two important NGOs—Helsinki Citizens' Assembly and Amnesty International—refused the idea of creating a council in cooperation with governmental authorities 'led' by the UNHCR. This rejection of cooperation through the UNHCR's leadership led to significant deterioration in UNHCR–NGO relations, and several years later a rival body, the Coordination for Refugee Rights, was established in March 2010 by five human rights organisations.[26]

Thus UNHCR–NGO relations suffered as a consequence of the UNHCR's strategic pro-governmental strategy. This was problematic on two levels; firstly, the UNHCR's international standing and legitimacy is dependent on its consideration as removed (at least partially) from state interests; and secondly, the UNHCR needed to delegate certain activities and their funding to NGOs. One means through which the UNHCR sought to encourage good relations with members of the civil society community was to create an NGO, namely, ASAM, as a direct product of the UNHCR even though its status is not formalised. ASAM was the outcome of a meeting in which the UNHCR expressed a need for an NGO to provide aid and carry out pre-registration for asylum seekers and refugees.

In the light of ASAM's ambiguous status, it had little legitimacy among NGO peers because it was seen as a wooden horse for the UNHCR. Indeed, the UNHCR sought to assert its influence by using ASAM as a conduit for its norms and refugee knowledge. For instance, in 2010, ASAM circulated an email that endorsed and promoted the proposition of the UNHCR to create a Turkish Refugee Council. None of the NGOs replied to the email.

From 2011, the leadership of the UNHCR had extremely poor relations with NGOs since it exhibited low tolerance of any criticism from civil society groups. It would seem that the UNHCR cultivated its good relations with Turkish governmental authorities at the expense of its relations with the NGO community. In 2011, the UNHCR representative went so far as to declare that Amnesty International and other human rights-orientated NGOs were untrustworthy. When Amnesty Turkey launched a campaign on cases of torture in Turkish migrant detention centres in the light of video footage recorded on mobile phones, the UNHCR representative dismissed the video as a fake.[27]

The UNHCR was a key participant in drafting the 2013 LFIP. To a lesser extent, NGOs were also invited to offer feedback on the law (which was a precedent in Turkey).[28] While the UNHCR publically congratulated Turkey on this open practice, this was a cosmetic move; behind closed

doors the UNHCR did not support any of the feedback or criticisms made by the NGOs. For instance, it dismissed criticisms regarding the temporary protection directive for Syrian refugees. Nor did the UNHCR support the pleas of the NGO community for Turkey to afford protection to LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual) cases. The resistance to posing political challenges whether to the Turkish government or to NGOs in relation to the government of refugees exposes the difficulty of sustaining a neutral stance, while at the same time pushing a particular agenda and a confining problematisation. Evidence of this can be found in the UNHCR-led quarterly NGO meetings. These meetings can be considered as tools by which the UNHCR strives to bring actors into the UNHCR's cognitive frame on refugee government, acting in some ways as a 'norm entrepreneur' (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 897):

> Norm entrepreneurs are critical for norm emergence because they call attention to issues or even 'create' issues by using language that names, interprets, and dramatizes them … The construction of cognitive frames is an essential component of norm entrepreneurs' political strategies, since, when they are successful, the new frames resonate with broader public understandings and are adopted as new ways of talking about and understanding issues.

While norm entrepreneurship is often associated with radical paradigm shifting or at least new perspectives, the norms the UNHCR was promoting were a more stable and accepted way of seeing and doing refugee governance. The declared aim of these meetings is to provide an opportunity for the UNHCR and NGOs to discuss with one another current issues regarding refugees in Turkey. The function of these meetings was to encourage participants to assimilate norms set by the UNHCR and to strengthen a sense of community. However, the very name 'UNHCR NGO Consultation meetings' suggests an asymmetry between the leader and the led.

These consultation meetings are led by the UNHCR Ankara Chief of Mission and bring together disparate actors, from human rights organisations, to Christian missionaries, Islamic organisations, to IGOs. They take place in four- or five-star hotels in Istanbul, normally in the Beyoğlu neighbourhood, where most of these organisations are based. In addition to their formal content, these meetings offer an occasion for the different agencies involved to chat in the coffee breaks. Most of these break discussions take place in English. Most participants know each other either from

past meetings or from other activities in which they collaborate. This is not surprising because bordercratic transnational groups crisscross in terms of function, collaboration, purpose and client group. About half of the people sitting around the table are 'internationals'; they come from Western states: Italy, Sweden, the UK, France, Germany, the US, Canada, suggesting international can be a synonym for the West. Indeed, some of the Turkish delegates tend to sit in the corner of the room, somewhat isolated socially, spatially and linguistically from the other delegates.

Much like the regional consultative processes, the meetings are structured to broadcast information rather than to encourage dialogue. They last for about three to four hours with half an hour assigned for discussion time at the end of three or four long UNHCR presentations; thus the setup of the meetings leaves little time for debate or dissent.[29] One hope held out by the UNHCR is that NGOs close to the ground will convey to potential refugees and asylum seekers the resource challenges the UNHCR feels are not fully appreciated. Some NGOs are more yielding to the UNHCR perspectives than others. Yet despite frustrations evident in the meeting, once it is over, relations are less strained as participants smile, laugh and joke with one another over a çay and baklava.

The UNHCR frame is not cynically forced upon NGOs; rather, it is conveyed through a strong emphasis on identification with common interests and problems—this has both a discursive and a non-discursive dimension. Arguably, a non-discursive process to this convergence is ensured by the mere presence of the NGOs in these meetings and their invitation as welcome guests, respected actors in the government or refugees in Turkey, who deserve to be kept up-to-date and can valuably share expertise and knowledge with other members of the group.

At times there was an opportunist move from 'we' to 'you' that resonates with the kind of ownership display discussed in Chapter 2. A noteworthy phrase uttered by a senior official to the NGOs present was 'Congratulations, *your* law has been adopted'. As we have seen in Chapter 2, the UNHCR as well as other IGOs were closely involved in the drafting of the law; yet, the UNHCR did not support any of the criticisms taken up by the NGOs in the drafting process of the law. Thus, one could ask, why announce their inclusion when the UNHCR has specifically excluded their proposals? By referring to the law as 'theirs', as a product (at least in part) of NGOs' expertise and interests, the UNHCR is implicitly strengthening the message that they are part of the 'in-group' (Merlingen 2003), part of a common refugee governance community with a shared discourse. Animating the 'we' of the

group was pursued through further techniques of consensus building, notably statistical representations and the encouragement of adherence to the safe first country principle.

The presentation of issues in the meetings started with a presentation of statistical depictions of trends and the scale of the issue. This functions to support the UNHCR's implicit reasoning about balancing freedom and security, whereby 'the constraint of the few is needed for the freedom of the many' (Rose 1999, 10). Assessments of numbers fleeing, applying for asylum, resettlement, and so forth are an important part of sense making in 'refugee government'. Typically, the UNHCR senior official would start the meeting by defining the current context in these quantitative terms. He conveys a picture of an unstable situation, overwhelming numbers of those fleeing, and the predicaments in which the UNHCR feels they are placed. There will have to be winners and losers. To give one example, during a meeting in May 2013, the UNHCR Chief of Mission made several references to an influx of Afghans in Turkey. He comments:

> Turkey has witnessed an unprecedented increase in Afghans in the last year, an increase by 1500 percent between the last quarter 2011 and the last quarter 2012 … The numbers of Afghans are so high that if we process them we will block the system. Other nationalities will probably benefit from the suspension of Afghans.[30]

These statistically supported problematisations facilitate the diffusion of what may otherwise be perceived to be quite a controversial policy in that the UNHCR had temporarily stopped registering Afghan asylum seekers' claims. Of relevance here is Salter's comment that 'statistics are a form of authoritative knowledge practice' (2008, 254). That is not to suggest that this authority is always taken to be credible or that it is never contested.

While some NGOs may have given their blessing to the UNHCR's decision others were more critical of this particular statistical problematisation of 'the Afghan migration problem' in Turkey. They did not endorse the view that the UNHCR must stop registering Afghans for the sake of other nationalities. Two of the NGOs strenuously objected to what they described as a discriminatory practice. Thus a minority of NGOs present expressed rejection of this zero-sum logic. Yet the UNHCR managed to convey implicitly that it is acting in a certain way for the good of the whole. Interestingly, a UNHCR Turkey senior official also commented during the meeting that:

the exception will be unaccompanied minors, we will not completely abandon them, we will continue to do resettlement referral for this group *even though we shouldn't do it.*

The claim regarding the UNHCR's processing of Afghan minors 'even though they shouldn't' gives out the impression that the responsible response would be not to process Afghans at all but that the UNHCR is willing to make an exception for a highly vulnerable group. Thus, the UNHCR positions itself as above all a humanitarian actor serving the needs of the most vulnerable while at the same time acting in a rational, responsible manner, by using its discretionary licence. Another revealing example of this licence is that of the safe first country categorisation.

As indicated, certain ways of thinking and understanding Turkey's refugee problem are encouraged by the UNHCR through the deployment of specific language and classifications to make sense of the refugee issue. Larner and Le Haron (2004) write that 'power works in part through its ability to name, to define and to describe certain people and places as being different from others and in a way that excludes other definitions' (2004, 219). Similar to mobility government more broadly, in refugee government, categories of people (asylum seeker, refugee, economic migrant) and states (safe country of asylum, safe country of origin, Southern/Northern) frame problematisation and responses. The following description of the safe first country category described by the UNHCR is one such example:

> Simply put, the term 'safe country' has been applied, in the refugee context, to countries which are determined either as being non-refugee-producing countries or as being countries in which refugees can enjoy asylum without any danger.[31]

While the UNHCR formally has some reservations about the concept and the criteria by which 'safe' countries are evaluated,[32] they are also key drivers of its application, particularly in Turkey. This category is a method of refugee population control that purports to be driven by a humanitarian ethic. The 'safe first country' norm, albeit lacking any grounding in international law, has become an important category influencing how refugees in Turkey are governed. UNHCR Turkey has made use of this category for many years as the basis for how it manages resettlement practices. Resettlement is meant to be first accorded to individuals from neighbour-

ing states, for whom Turkey is their 'first country of asylum'. Thus, while the UNHCR still processes the asylum claims of nationals for whom Turkey was not considered a 'safe first country', these individuals have slim chances of being resettled and as a result many remain in Turkey for long periods, return to their home country or try to make their way to Europe through illegal channels. The 'successful' translation of this category into Turkish refugee government is evident from its inclusion in the 2013 Turkish LFIP, inscribing this notion in Turkish national legislation for the first time.

Clearly, the deployment of this category is a feature of bordering processes, legitimising the containment of refugees in the global South (in the declared logic of burden sharing it is held to make sense that a person should seek asylum in the first 'safe country' he or she reaches). This notion does not engage with the reality that the vast majority of refugees come from the global South; thus the 'first safe country' (potential) refugees will meet will undoubtedly be before Europe. UNHCR Turkey officials are not overly critical about applying the label of 'safe country' to a country like Iran for Afghan asylum seekers, despite the numerous reports published by human rights-orientated NGOs such as Human Rights Watch,[33] which have severely criticised Iran's treatment of this refugee population. To the contrary, UNHCR Turkey emphasises the pertinence of the 'safe first country' category applied in this fashion as a responsible, rational approach which puts the human rights of refugees first.

> Afghans who have already been given protection status in Iran are not compelled to come to Turkey, this is not their first safe country of asylum and this explains why there are very few resettlement spots for this population.[34]

By advocating the application of this international refugee norm, the UNHCR is participating in the maintenance of a specific international order, albeit with some reservations. The safe first country principle has a responsibilising function for countries of the global South justified through humanitarian reasoning. This practice depends on the moral language of burden sharing, but actually serves the security interests of Europe in that it seeks to keep refugees confined to the global South.

Despite Turkey's maintenance of the geographical limitation to the 1951 Geneva Convention, recent developments have nonetheless led to the recategorisation of Turkey as a 'safe' country for refugees by the EU. This categorisation is bound to the March 2016 agreement between the EU and

Turkey according to which Syrian refugees who have reached European shores should be deported to Turkey. This categorisation finds its legitimacy through the 2013 LFIP law discussed in Chapter 2. While on paper this law provides asylum seekers and refugees with a fairly extensive rights framework, to date the law has not been properly implemented. However, the performative effects of the very existence of the law and the Directorate General for Migration Management (DGMM) in underpinning Turkey's categorisation as 'safe' have enabled the European Commission and its member states to claim some authority in this designation. This case exposes the muddy terrain in which the UNHCR alongside other IGOs steers Turkey's asylum policies towards European interests. In this way, the safe first country principle, promoted by the UNHCR as a tool for protection, has an explicit bordering function within this field of humanitarian intervention. In the next chapter I continue my examination of refugee government through a focus on the politics of resettlement to the US.

Notes

1. UNHCR Syria Regional Response—Turkey http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224 (accessed 4 April 2017).
2. The only other signatory countries that maintain a geographical limitation are Congo, Monaco and Madagascar. Turkey defines Europe as all members of the Council of Europe including Russia and ex-Soviet states west of the Urals including the Caucasus.
3. The 1994 Regulation on Procedures and Principles related to Mass Influx and Foreigners Arriving in Turkey either as Individuals or in Groups wishing to Seek Asylum either from Turkey or Requesting Residence Permits with the Intention of Seeking Asylum from a Third Country, No: 94/6169, the Official Gazette, No. 22127, 30 November, 1994.
4. Interview, UNHCR Public Relations Officer, January 2013, Ankara (Turkey).
5. See Kemal Kirisci (2012) for a discussion of the shifting relations between the UNHCR and the Turkish government and how the UNHCR has succeeded in returning to the centre stage.
6. UNHCR, UNHCR protests Turkish refoulement of recognised Iraqi refugee, Briefing Notes, 13 March 2007 retrieved 14 April 2015 http://www.unhcr.org/45f681d911.html
7. UNHCR, Turkey: Expulsion of Iranians concerned: UNHCR raises concerns with government, Briefing Note, 21 September 2007, retrieved 14 April from http://www.unhcr.org/46f3b3452.html

8. UNHCR Press release—UNHCR deplores refugee expulsion by Turkey which resulted in four deaths, 25 April 2008 retrieved 14 April 2016 from http://www.unhcr.org/4811e23c4.html

9. Interview—Ex-UNHCR Turkey Consultant, Paris, July 2015.

10. Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights, Seminar on the human rights dimensions of migration in Europe (Istanbul, 17–18 February 2011) https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1775377#P211_44651

11. UNHCR, Syria Regional Refugee Response—Turkey, 4 April 2017.

12. UNHCR Global Report 2009–2014.

13. UNHCR, UNHCR welcomes Turkey's new law on asylum, Briefing Notes 12 April 2013, retrieved 14 April 2015 from http://www.unhcr.org/5167e7d09.html; UNHCR, UNHCR welcomes Turkey's registration of Syrians in urban areas, 11 March 2013 http://www.unhcr.org/513de5756.html; UNHCR, Turkey proves a saviour for Syrian pensioner recovering from a stroke, 12 February 2015 retrieved 15 April 2015 from http://www.unhcr.org/54dcc3756.html

14. UNHCR, Syrian refugees: the kindness of a stranger in a Southern Turkey border town, News Stories, 7 November 2013 http://www.unhcr.org/527b91669.html

15. AA Breaking, UN praises Turkish model amid refugee crisis, 11 June 2015, http://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/un-praises-turkish-model-amid-refugee-crisis/37591 (accessed 5 October 2015).

16. Alakhbar, Turkey offers residency to Palestinian refugees fleeing Syria, 19 February 2014 http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/18704 (accessed 26 January 2014).

17. Interview—UNHCR Turkey Public Relations Officer, January 2013, Ankara (Turkey).

18. Interview—UNHCR Turkey Public Relations Officer, November 2013, Ankara (Turkey).

19. Interview—UNHCR Turkey Public Relations Officer, January 2013, Ankara (Turkey).

20. Interview—UNHCR Programme Officer, December 2013, Ankara (Turkey).

21. Helsinki Citizens' Assembly—Turkey. 2012. Syrian Refugees in Turkey—Briefing Note, 16 November 2012 http://www.hyd.org.tr/staticfiles/files/20121116_hca_turkey_briefingnotesyrianrefugees.pdf (accessed 23 January 2015).

22. IOM—Speech by Berlan Alan, Head, Migration Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Turkey https://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/microsites/IDM/workshops/moving-to-safety-complex-crises-2012/speeches-presentations/Session-3-Berlan-Alan-Workshop-in-Geneva-Turkey.pdf

23. Little information on the situation in the camps is available; most accounts come from press statements from the Prime Minister's Disaster and Emergency Management Directorate (AFAD).
24. Interview—Resident Programme Officer, National Democratic Institute—Gazientep (by Skype), June 2015.
25. Human Rights Joint Platform, Some Human Rights Organisations not Invited to Refugee Seminar, 22 December 2008 http://www.ihop.org.tr/english/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=98&catid=25&Itemid=19 (accessed 27 January 2015).
26. Members include Helsinki Citizens' Assembly; Human Rights Association; Human Rights Agenda Association; Association of Solidarity with Refugees; Amnesty International, Turkey.
27. Interview—UNHCR Project Officer, June 2014, Istanbul (Turkey).
28. This is largely explained by pressure from the international community as well as the leadership of Atilla Toros, the former head of the Migration and Asylum Bureau and now Director of the Directorate General for Migration Management.
29. We may note that while there is little room for deliberation during the meetings, the NGOs organise their own meetings in which they invite the UNHCR to participate. However, the UNHCR would consistently send junior staff who do not participate but only take notes in order to report back. There is no sense of a dynamic in norm transition but of a linear process in which the UNHCR positions itself as the norm diffuser and NGOs as the norm takers. This unequal balance hinders the 'legitimacy' NGOs accord to the UNHCR.
30. Participant observation during a UNHCR–NGO consultation meeting, May 2013, Istanbul.
31. UNHCR, *Background Note on the Safe Country Concept and Refugee Status*, 26 July 1991, EC/SCP/68, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae68ccec.html (accessed 18 December 2014).
32. UNHCR, Background note on the safe country concept and refugee status, EC/SCP/68, 26 July 1991, http://www.unhcr.org/3ae68ccec.html (accessed 30 December 2016).
33. Human Rights Watch, 'Closed Door Policy: Afghan Refugees in Pakistan and Iran', 27 February 2002, G1402, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3c7ce78a4.html
34. Interview—Programme Officer UNHCR, May 2013, Istanbul (Turkey).

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Refugee (Un)becoming

Abstract The fusion of humanitarianism and security is exposed in relation to the (un)making of the deserving refugee. It does so through an examination of the process of resettlement to the US. Security practices characteristic of the resettlement selection process position the refugee as guilty until proven innocent. This active mistrust is enacted by surveillance technologies which collect, monitor and assess biodata from which to produce a 'threatening population'. In this process 'risky refugees' are constituted through an orientalist gaze based on an imagined amalgam of refugee/foreigner/Muslim with a perceived terrorist threat. We describe how the 'less than human' populations produced through resettlement processes are out of sight, so that we only see some of the consequences of deselection in the production of 'illegal' migration towards Europe.

Keywords Refugee • Resettlement • Humanitarianism • Security • US

As noted, Critical Border Studies scholars have drawn attention to the diffuse and often deterritorialised nature of contemporary bordering practices (Parker and Vaughan-Williams 2014; Salter 2012; Walters 2002). These scholars emphasise the function of the border as a filtering mechanism rather than a wall or barricade endeavouring to stop all forms of

mobility. In this way, bordering increasingly involves the targeting of (risky) population*s* rather than simply the protection of territorial lines demarcating the outer edges of the state (Parker and Vaughan-Williams 2014). Bordering functions by creating divisions between normal and abnormal, desirable and undesirable mobility (Bigo 2008; Mezzadra and Nielson 2013). With this in mind, refugee governance can be understood alongside more traditional views of border management (surveillance, patrols, walls) as it divides mobile populations into legitimate and illegitimate forms. These divisions are characteristic of what has come to be called the humanitarianisation of the border (Walters 2011).

In recent years, we can observe an increase in the use of humanitarian discourses in border policing. This discursive practice has gained momentum following widespread media reports of migrant deaths at sea, particularly since the 2013 October tragedy when over 300 migrants lost their lives near the shores of Lampedusa. This period witnessed the birth of new concepts such as 'humanitarian border management', as well as new tools for 'humanitarian policing' such as the *Mare Nostrum*[1] operation and Frontex's evolving mandate from merely surveillance and detection activities towards 'saving lives at sea'. According to this logic, security practices to keep out 'undesirable' populations are increasingly represented as first and foremost a humanitarian endeavour; this discourse has come to penetrate the EU's external migration agenda. It is widely deployed (implicitly or explicitly) by bordercratic actors like the International Organisation of Migration (IOM), the International Centre for Migration and Policy Development (ICMPD) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) who rely on a migration management rationality that distances itself from state-centred security discourses in favour of notions of social harmony and migrants human rights perspective (Geiger and Pécoud 2010). In the past years a growing number of studies have specifically addressed the humanitarianisation of European bordering practices (Cuttita 2014; Pallister-Wilkins 2015; Walters 2011). However, rather than exploring the apparent 'humanitarianisation' of a more traditionally viewed security domain of controlling the territorial border, I explore a supposedly humanitarian practice, namely, refugee resettlement, to expose the security reasoning and practices that constitute this process.

As we have seen, Turkey's refugee context has dramatically shifted since the post-World War II era. By the end of 2015, Turkey had become the largest host country for refugees in the world with almost three million registered refugees by the end of 2016, according to the UNHCR. This is

in large part due to the Syrian refugee crisis, although Turkey has also become an important country of asylum for many persons fleeing Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Somalia and Ethiopia, among others. However, non-European refugees in Turkey are not permitted to stay on a permanent basis. While Turkey was a drafter and one of the first signatories of the 1951 Geneva Convention, it chose to impose the geographical limitation pursuant to Article 1b of the Convention, limiting the scope of the Convention to 'persons who have become refugees as a result of events occurring in Europe'. This meant that Turkey only grants refugee status to asylum seekers from Europe. This practice in Turkey's government of refugees was a result of the Cold War context and Turkey's role as an ally to the West. This created a two-tier system in which all non-European refugees would be deprived of long-term possibilities of integration prospects into Turkish society and must be resettled. This two-tier system gave way to a significant role for international actors in refugee governance in Turkey. The UNHCR would carry out a parallel procedure of refugee status determination (RSD) for all non-European asylum seekers and process resettlement for those accorded refugee status alongside other actors, notably the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC), governmental authorities and security professionals.

Individuals must go through a number of stages before being given access to RSD in Turkey. Upon arriving in Turkey, all non-European refugees must register themselves with the Turkish police authorities where they are assigned a satellite city in which they must reside. In order to enter the RSD process with the UNHCR, the (potential) refugee must then undergo pre-registration carried out by one of the organisation's implementing partners. In Turkey, the implementing partners are the Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants (ASAM) and the Human Resource Development Foundation (HRDF); these NGOs 'assure the UNHCR's presence' in the 51 satellite cities across Turkey as they carry out pre-registration of asylum seekers. More than simple delegation, implementing partners serve as a means for the UNHCR to extend its authority.

For agencies involved in refugee (un)becoming in Turkey, vulnerability assessments are a crucial means by which decisions are made. Michel Agier (2011) offered the notion of a 'hierarchy of misfortune' in his study of refugee camps, whereby being classified as highly vulnerable is advantageous for acquiring a deserving refugee status. Agier comments (2011, 39):

> Inside the (refugee) camps, the category of 'refugee' is itself divided into several distinct subcategories of 'vulnerability', which end up creating a hierarchy of misfortune … The 'displaced person', the refugee woman, and the refugee child, all receive their survival kits to the extent they are recognized as belonging to these categories, and thus to the extent they are able to attest to this belonging (by stating their age or marital status, by showing their injury, or telling the story of a traumatic event).

In the case of refugee government in Turkey, such humanitarian reasoning is not confined to the refugee camps but is an integral part of the refugee (un)becoming process; humanitarian forms of expertise function alongside legal and human rights expert knowledge. The perception of vulnerability is measured by ASAM and HRDF through people's testimonies, but is also supported by medical documentation or a visible disability. Categorisations of vulnerability range from the relatively straightforward, such as the status of 'pregnant woman', to the more interpretive such as 'traumatised and seriously distressed' and 'demonstrated psycho-social disorder'. There is the risk that the vulnerability criteria deployed by the UNHCR are treated as objective rather than open to interpretation and negotiation.

Asylum seekers who have been identified as highly vulnerable benefit from an accelerated RSD process and are given an interview with the UNHCR much more rapidly than others. The 'less vulnerable' often have to wait months if not years before they are accorded a first interview with the UNHCR.[2] The fast track practice is construed as exceptional and as an act of generosity, characteristic elements of humanitarian discourse (Ticktin 2006). The long wait for most applicants functions as a form of bordering in that it engenders a deceleration of refugee becoming. Such deceleration functions as a policy of dissuasion.

When an asylum seeker has undergone RSD, they may be categorised as refugees, and given a subform of protection[3] or no protection at all. For each of these stages, there are different criteria and conditions which determine successful passage to the next. In the first stage, the application centres on persecution experience, namely, a 'well-founded fear of persecution' as defined in the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol. The Geneva Convention has its own bordering logic; the deserving refugee is constructed out of a liberal, individual rights reasoning that is opposed to the undeserving 'economic migrant' (Nyers 2006). Nyers explains that when UN delegates from Western countries were drafting

the Geneva Convention in the context of the Cold War, they pushed for a refugee definition to embrace those people seeking protection for reasons related to what they perceived as 'pro-Western' values—civil and political rights. Those people who fled from economic deprivation were excluded from refugee eligibility. To this day, the 'economic migrant' is seen as illegitimate in contrast to the genuine, deserving political refugee. Since 9/11 we can observe a growing trend in which the attribution of refugee status may be overridden by recategorisation as 'potentially dangerous'. From the NGOs to the UNHCR, it is now impossible for humanitarian actors in the international refugee regime to proceed in their work without having some measure of engagement with security.

Increasingly, security checks have become a critical stage in the refugee determination process as practised by the UNHCR in Turkey. Loescher et al. (2008, 97) have noted that 'concerns with terrorism, security, and migration control now dominate the concerns of donor states. Some concern for security is reasonable but serving security interests uncritically risks the integrity of UNHCR's mandate, but ignoring these interests risks the UNHCR being bypassed'. UNHCR's security check may take place after the RSD (a person's refugee status can be revoked) or during the process through mechanisms of exclusion.[4] One UNHCR caseworker spoke of her anxiety and that of her colleagues about unknowingly sending Islamicist terrorists to the US or other countries for resettlement. In recent years in the context of the Syrian refugee crisis, several European countries (for instance, Austria, Luxembourg, Hungary) have pledged to accept the resettlement of only Christian refugees. Some senators in the US followed suit, calling for the then President Obama to allow for the resettlement of only Christian refugees from the Middle East. The fact that some Western countries have indicated their readiness to accept more or only Christian refugees rather than Muslim ones reintroduces faith as a source of discrimination in refugee governance. While this has become heightened under the new Republican presidency of Donald Trump, discriminatory resettlement practices towards Muslims have existed for some time. The following UNHCR officers made these comments before the Trump presidency:

> Exclusion affects national groups differently. In Turkey, it particularly concerns Iraqis, Afghans, Syrians but not so much Iranian. This is why there are so few resettlement places for Syrians. They are too scared about bringing in the Islamists.[5]

> Now with Syria it is even worse; everyone is afraid of fighters among these people … so we make sure that we also carry out an exclusion interview to make sure that an Islamist isn't being sent to America. This is crucial as it would really jeopardise UNHCR capabilities to protect genuine refugees.[6]

While the UNHCR's procedural guidelines favour informing the individual about the reasons for exclusion, except in 'exceptional circumstances' full disclosure is often limited. Applicants can formally appeal decisions, although the outcome of the appeal is likely to be unsuccessful if the applicant is unaware of the reasons behind his or her rejection. If a person is excluded from the Geneva Convention, article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights still applies, which means that a person cannot be sent back to their country of origin if they are at risk of torture. This situation puts many refugees who have suffered exclusion in a state of legal limbo. UNHCR officials consider themselves as protectors but the meaning they give to protection (protection of the collective) overrides here the individual's struggle for protection. This is an interesting observation bearing in mind that the Geneva Convention concerns only individual forms of persecution. Yet, these individual rights become washed away in light of the security of the collective.

UNHCR caseworker staff in Turkey assess a person's potential to be a threat, as they assess his or her credibility regarding their persecution narratives. One officer explained:

> In order to assess a threat, we need a perfect idea of the life of the person, if there is a gap that may be suspicious. Or if he was in the army you would ask them: 'what did you do?' There are two options … sometimes people need to talk about what they did, sometimes not giving information is not good for the refugee's case. But we are not the police. The burden of proof for exclusion is much higher than for inclusion, which is based on credibility.[7]

Bearing in mind that refugee protection is inscribed in international law, once accorded refugee status legal restraints make it extremely difficult to revoke this status and practices of exclusion remain few and far between. The case of resettlement presents a very different picture; as resettlement is not anchored in law, it is much easier for professionals to deny a person the right to resettlement on grounds of their security risk. It is during this phase that 'deserving refugees' can be reconfigured from threatened to threatening subjects.

Resettlement is the only pathway for non-European refugees in Turkey to find a stable status with long-term integration prospects; thus attention to this phase is critical for understanding the predicament of refugees. The fact that all non-European refugees in Turkey are considered only as temporary guests or 'conditional refugees' means that Turkey is often experienced as a transit zone, as refugees await to go to another place. Routine security checks within the resettlement selection process have been producing highly significant numbers of 'risky refugees' denied resettlement.[8]

Resettlement, as an 'instrument of migration management' (Garnier 2014), has been insufficiently the object of critical enquiry, yet a study of it has much to reveal about the intersection of security with refugee governance. In theory, all persons from outside of Europe recognised as refugees are eligible for resettlement in Turkey. However, the number of recognised refugees far outweighs the resettlement quotas. While resettlement was considered a foreign policy tool during the context of the Cold War, it has become increasingly marginalised in the last decades, particularly in light of the rise in asylum claims and the increasing involvement of UNHCR in refugee repatriation (Chimni 2004). Loescher and Scanlan (1986) have demonstrated how foreign policy motivations underpinning refugee governance in the context of the Cold War led to resettlement being used as a means to undermine Communist regimes. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the refugee regime was situated within new political developments shaped by North–South inequalities and the so-called war on terror (Betts and Loescher 2011). Changes in resettlement practices in the US are illustrative of the effects of these developments.

The US is by far the most important receiving country for refugees in Turkey followed by Canada and Australia, while European member states have offered few resettlement places for refugees in Turkey, despite the EU's declared efforts to share the refugee burden with Turkey.[9] In 2012, the majority of resettled refugees to the US were Iraqis and Iranians and to a lesser extent Somalis, Afghans and Sudanese. As noted above, Syrian nationals are afforded only a temporary protection status in Turkey, and thus do not benefit from the same protection status as other refugee groups. This means that they are excluded from the traditional resettlement process to the US. However, some EU countries have offered resettlement spaces for Syrian refugees in Turkey in recent years. Indeed, the EU promised to resettle up to 75,000 Syrian refugees residing in Turkey in the framework of the controversial 'deal' made with Turkey in March 2016. Be this as it may, very small numbers of Syrians have been resettled

from Turkey to Europe. As of March 2017, just over 3000 Syrians have been resettled from Turkey to the EU.[10]

In 2013, Turkey received 10,256 refugee resettlement submissions, rendering it the second most important country for resettlement submissions (after Malaysia) for that year. Out of this total 7223 refugees were effectively resettled. In 2012, 7913 refugees were submitted for resettlement, out of which 5929 actually departed.[11] For resettlement, refugees have to go through a secondary selection process in which states and the UNHCR do not operate through legally inscribed definitions of the 'genuine' or 'deserving' refugee, but rather choose how they put resettlement policies into practice. A provisionally positive outcome is then subject to medical and security checks carried out by security agencies of the resettlement countries.

Although officially resettlement is first accorded to the most vulnerable, many commentators, including the UNHCR, have acknowledged a discriminatory dimension to this refugee selection processes. The UNHCR conducts the pre-selection of prospective resettlement candidates based on its knowledge and interpretation of 'appropriate' profiles. Measures of vulnerability of refugees are constructed through an assessment of narratives of persecution, the individual's biodata and international eligibility norms as in the 'the safe first country' principle.

The safe first country principle relies on the assumption that if individuals do not seek protection in the first safe country they enter, their case is questionable. This fails to address the significant variation in each country's resources and the degree of hospitality it gives to refugees. Furthermore, this principle is not applied systematically to all nationalities suggesting that national political agendas underpin this humanitarian practice.

In addition to the criterion of vulnerability, a UNHCR official explained the following formal and informal selection criteria:

> We as an international organisation work according to legal definitions of persecution outlined in the Geneva Convention. Resettlement countries on the other hand have their own criteria, which varies among them. They come up with their own set of criteria, which is often political and also often includes integration criteria such as education, language, age, medical needs … There is also often a cap so as not to burden the health system. For the US, it seems to me that integration criteria are particularly crucial.[12]

It was a widely held view among UNHCR officials that after RSD, the refugee goes through a revised assessment of his or her 'deservedness'

according to more variable criteria depending on how vulnerability is translated by the receiving country:

> Currently there are limited opportunities for resettlement which are available for the most vulnerable refugees from Syria. Not every refugee who is vulnerable would be considered for resettlement. (UNHCR, 8[13])

High levels of vulnerability are not always considered an asset in this process, as the quotation below from a UNHCR document reveals:

> The countries have their own criteria on who they will accept to their country. Some countries only accept refugees from certain countries. They might not want to take members of some political parties and persons who are seen as having participated in violent or illegal activities. Some countries would not like to take unaccompanied minors or seriously or chronically ill persons, or others, whose care would be expensive for the country … In general, the resettlement countries prefer the refugees that come from countries neighbouring Turkey. If you come from a region far away from Turkey (Africa or Asia), finding a country that would accept you from Turkey is very difficult.[14]

Although the final decision remains with resettlement countries, the UNHCR, nonetheless, is charged with making a pre-selection from the pool of refugees deemed to be desirable candidates for resettlement. The latter are then sent to another intergovernmental organisation, namely, the ICMC, for resettlement to the US, or to the IOM if it is to Australia or Canada. Then, for those refugees accepted by the US, the ICMC prepares the relevant documents and organises an interview with an officer of the US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, who makes the final decision about the individual's eligibility for resettlement. A similar process is carried out by the IOM for refugees who are resettled to Australia and Canada. If refugees manage to get through this stage, they face a critical challenge to get through the next stages, which are medical and security checks. At this point security concerns are frequently evoked to legitimise a collapse of any transparency of process or of the right to know any reason for refusal.

The refugee is treated as the most potentially dangerous form of migration for the US authorities. This is illustrated by the comments of Anne C. Richard, the Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (US Department of State 2014), who declared: 'Refugee

applicants are subject to more security checks than any other category of traveller to the United States'.[15] To this effect, a number of security screenings take place for refugees applying to be resettled to the US. Firstly, the Refugee Support Centre (which in the case of Turkey is the ICMC) transfers the refugee's personal data and background information to the US Department of Homeland Security, who runs a name check of the refugee through the CLASS (Consular Lookout and Support System) database. Since 2008, some refugees began to be submitted to 'enhanced inter-agency security checks'; this practice was generalised to all refugees by 2010. In parallel, some refugees undergo a Security Advisory Opinion (SAO), which is carried out by a number of US law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

Refugees from the age of 14 years and upward then have their biometric data taken (photograph and fingerprints). This information is run through another set of databases. If there are no matches, the refugee will then be interviewed by the US Citizenship and Immigration Services to assess whether the individual qualifies as a refugee under US law. If successful, this is followed by a medical screening and cultural orientation training. This is followed by a further security check before the person is allowed to leave. It involves a second interagency review to assess whether there is any new information relating to the refugee as a potential threat. These checks clearly add to the waiting and uncertainty as a US Department of State Factsheet on resettlement explains:

> An individual may experience lengthy delays due to the need to run multiple security checks and some individuals may never clear the required checks … When a refugee case is placed on hold by one or more of the agencies that conduct security clearances due to a name or other biodata match, there is sometimes little that can be done to speed the resettlement process.[16]

These security practices characteristic of the resettlement selection process are a form of 'precautionary governance', which relies on the assumption that security professionals can 'know the future' (Aradau and Munster 2007; Bigo et al. 2011); in other words, the intelligence gathered and scrutinised enables threat predictions. Precautionary governance tends to position the refugee as guilty until proven innocent. The climate is one in which 'the terrorist threat replaces active trust with active mistrust' (Beck 2002, 44). This active mistrust is enacted by systems of 'dataveillance' (Bigo 2010) which collect, monitor and assess biodata and in so doing

produce a 'threatening population'. This population has steadily grown in recent years: in 2012, 5132 refugees were pre-screened by the ICMC in Turkey and 4136 were approved by Homeland Security. That is to say, approximately one in five refugees were considered to be a potential security threat.

In order to be seen as credible, security professionals must demonstrate access to expert knowledge, which enables them to know and make judgements about future risks and risky profiles. While they give the appearance of having such expertise, when one takes into consideration the results of the risk analysis and the disproportionate number of people considered to be at risk, it would seem that their evidential basis is unconvincing. According to an ICMC official if there is the slightest suspicion of a terrorist threat in the applicant, the resettlement application will be rejected:

> I think it is mostly young men, aged 18 to 35. I suspect that they have a number of databases, which they go and check and if there is a hit they don't investigate further, they say no, that is good enough for them. That is my personal opinion. There is so much confusion about Arab names, spelling. So it is very open to confusion and mistakes; they may present security threats but I think that some of them who have been rejected are not threats at all.

The risky profiles produced through bordercratic expertise are based on 'data doubles' (Bigo 2014), that is, a set of identity data based on the 'virtual you', which is an accumulation of any available record that tracks or records activities, affiliations and so on. Indeed, the predictive capacity of security professionals is highly dependent on technologies of 'dataveillance'. Bigo et al. comment (2011, 88):

> In order to ground the claim that they can know the future, security professionals must justify that they have access to knowledge that others do not have, such as secured databases, personal data including details about one's private life or biometric information. They must also claim a specific knowhow (profiling techniques, risk analyses) which is not readily available but which is also reliant on technological devices.

Virtual data is not simply out there as neutral information available for risk profiling. The technology is deployed as a database and search tool for the composition of risky profiles. It is a border object in so far as it supports the constitution of populations and individuals for (im)mobility. But technology cannot imagine, that is to say, it cannot frame where to

look without technical instruction. Decisions about how to define, measure and assess risky profiles are made by security professionals according to their perceptions of risk. Salter (2008) argues that imagination informs the initial conceptualising of risk. Before looking for risky applicants, there is an imagining about who that might be. At one time it was through an anti-Communist gaze, but now arguably through a more orientalist gaze? The unprecedented intensity of rejections of those presumed to be Muslim points to an imagined coupling of Muslim with terrorist threat.

Although refugees are unlikely to know precisely why they have been designated a risk, they are aware at some level that simply being Muslim and/or Arab entraps them in an orientalist gaze. Their individuality is denied in favour of a reductive collective identity, which disqualifies them from having certain fundamental liberties and mobility rights. An official from an international organisation comments:

> Homeland Security have been here for weeks, they come as a big team, they go through all the information; they have their own databases, their ways of checking. We don't know what kind of information they use. They never tell you why they do anything. If they rejected an application they wouldn't give a reason for it. If they are rejected on security grounds, no other country will accept them because they are considered a threat. I think there is a formal appeal but, if you don't know why you have been rejected how can you prove otherwise? This happens increasingly. Last year it was worryingly frequent. People were ready to go, they have their flight tickets and suddenly they didn't pass security clearance and they are pulled out of resettlement. Other members of the family may go … so it could end up breaking up families. Like all government security services, they are not answerable.[17]

Those refugees who have been designated a security threat whilst they await resettlement are not literally incarcerated in the walls of a prison, yet they are thrown into a state akin to banishment. They cannot return to their country of origin, they cannot remain in Turkey with a dignified, stable status and a full rights framework, and they cannot be resettled due to decisions made in the security review. Those who possess the authority to exclude them from the resettlement process are not judges, but they have considerable gatekeeping powers; they exercise the ability to exclude certain categories of people from protection even once they have been accorded refugee status. Once rejected for reasons of security, no other resettlement country will accept the refugee. He or she is caught in an

endless waiting zone, trapped in legal limbo, as the following man explained:

> We can't go back to Iran or Afghanistan and they do not let us go to America. But there is no life for us here. In Turkey we are just existing not living.[18]

A vivid example of the precarious nature of asylum seeking is provided by the case of 'Mohammed'. This Sudanese man was accepted as a refugee by the UNHCR in Turkey. The UNHCR requested his resettlement to the US via the ICMC, which was initially accepted. He then received a rejection letter some months later despite there being no change in his situation. The following is extracted from his letter of rejection:

> After a review of all the information concerning your case, including your testimony, supporting documentation, background checks, country condition and other available information, your application for refugee resettlement in the United States under Section 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act has been denied as a matter of discretion for security related reasons.

Like so many other refugees who have been rejected for security reasons, Mohammed is in a situation in which he does not know why he has been categorised as potentially dangerous, making it extremely difficult to appeal the decision from the US Citizenship and Immigration Services.

The predicament of this Sudanese refugee and other failed applicants of resettlement is that they have already gone through a selection process for refugee status, which has to an extent been emptied of protected meaning by discriminatory forms of resettlement practices. The legal protection that seemed once to be associated with a new-found refugee status disintegrates in the light of an identity perceived to be Muslim. Selection and deselection are a systematic part of refugee government.

Refugees remain the bearers of some limited rights, yet at another level they are thrown back into the kind of state of uncertainty and vulnerability that characterised the period running up to successful refugee application. The grounds for the failure to fulfil another set of criteria established by the resettlement countries in question are not available to them. They are closed in by a border they have never physically encountered. Once again they have become subject to the tyranny of endless uncertainty and wait-

ing. The bordering practice revealing itself here does not take the form of walls, yet it functions to include and exclude, much like the effects of the EU border controls described by Bigo:

> Resettlement creates 'local traps' where people are forced to live in places where they do not want to live and where they can be forgotten. In the process, some populations end up being less human than others. (Bigo 2014, 221)

The 'less than human' populations produced through resettlement processes are erased from view, so that we only see some of the consequences of their deselection. At a distance from the 'border spectacle' (De Genova 2013), where Turkish and EU border guards stop migrants' makeshift boats from crossing the Aegean Sea (which render the person's 'illegality' visible), bordering practice takes place behind closed doors on the basis of unexplained information about the victim as threat. It is not only the refugee subject who lacks information on the bordering processes he or she is being subjected to; these practices are also hidden away from the public eye.

To date, no member of the bordercratic community based in Turkey (NGOs or pro bono legal advisers) assists refugees with appeals following rejection on security grounds during the resettlement process, as the following refugee noted:

> The NGOs don't care about us once we have received refugee status, for them what is important is once somebody has been labelled a refugee—they don't think about resettlement.[19]

While there are several NGO actors such as Helsinki Citizens' Assembly who provide extensive legal assistance to asylum seekers in Turkey during RSD and in the case of appeal, the rejection of refugees at the stage of resettlement has yet to become 'problematised' and acted upon by civil society actors in Turkey. This security practice is increasingly employed by the US administration, not only in relation to the denial of resettlement on unspecified security grounds, but also in relation to deportations or denial of refugee status during the RSD process on security grounds. It seems that security practices that characterise the post-9/11 climate exploit an absence of legal representation for this vulnerable group left on the margins of society.

The rejection of entry for resettlement on security grounds overwhelmingly affects (Muslim) males, while women are affected behind the scenes. Security practices have resulted in splitting up many families in Turkey as men have no means of going forward or back even though their children and wives are able to leave for the US or elsewhere. The psychological consequences of these policies on the lives of the men targeted as well as the women involved can be devastating. The wife of a Somali refugee who refused resettlement on security grounds reported:

> They have torn our lives apart. We were so thrilled to be finally going somewhere where we can build our lives, live like normal people, have a future. and now I don't know what to think, what to do. It is sending me crazy, I have all of these grey hairs now. The worse is that we don't even know why his application has been refused. So what are we supposed to do? I am a married woman, am I supposed to continue, to raise my child by myself? It's like a prison with an indefinite sentence, for Mohammad, he is stuck here with nothing, but also for me. I may go to the US, but in my head I will be with him.

The suffering that women endure from security practices such as these is often left unacknowledged. Women are too often their forgotten victims.

Refugees have little space for manoeuvre within the resettlement process in Turkey. The conditions it creates lead to the production of irregular (transit) migration towards Europe. The decision for many individuals to use smugglers to facilitate their mobility prospects is borne (at least in part) out of the exclusion of certain populations from finding a politically recognised existence in a 'safe country'.

Resettlement practices between Turkey and the US create amenable conditions for the activities of smugglers and as such they are part and parcel of the mobility governance apparatus. The processes of selection integral to the refugee (un)becoming process tolerates and create illegality. Bauder (2014) proposes the notion of 'illegalised immigration' to go beyond the legal versus illegal binary and to acknowledge the *processes* that act on individuals. He quotes McDonald in saying that 'illegality is reconfigured through the regularisation process' (in Bauder 2014, 6). Typically, becoming a refugee in Turkey involves illegally crossing the border into Turkey, often with the assistance of a smuggler. While waiting for refugee status and resettlement, behaving legally is fraught with difficulties; for example, by leaving the satellite city to work in Istanbul to survive or by

deciding to cross the border illegally into Europe to make another asylum claim. Indeed, entering into some form of illegality is an integral part of refugee (un)becoming. For bordercrats processing claims, 'forgiving' this illegality is conditional upon a convincing narrative of 'appropriate' persecution. This is then evaluated against humanitarian and security reasoning, where we enter murky grounds in terms of the legal status of deserving and risky. There is a Kafkaesque side to the filtering out of failed applicants who are unlikely to know why they have been designated a risk.

To conclude, humanitarian/security filtering is played out in the context of refugee resettlement selection processes through vulnerability criteria and technology-based risk assessments driven by an orientalist imaginary. These processes both 'save' and 'kill' (Foucault 2003), leaving large numbers of individuals abandoned from both a rights and a support perspective. Escape may not simply involve crossing over physical boundaries, but involves repositioning the self. In the next chapter I examine how processes of refugee self-(re)formation respond to their 'murder' and banishment. As we shall see, this transformative process sometimes involves a faith (re)positioning that is either an internalisation of orientalism or an engagement with the prejudice about the self it generates.

Notes

1. Operation Mare Nostrum was a year-long naval and air operation led by the Italian government in October 2013 with a mandate to save lives at sea.
2. In 2013 an asylum seeker may have had to wait until 2015 or 2016 for a first interview with the UNHCR. By 2016, some asylum seekers were being scheduled a first interview in 2020.
3. As specified, the 2013 Law on Migration and International Protection has introduced various new subcategories of protection such as humanitarian protection or subsidiary protection.
4. The application of the exclusion clauses in Article 1 F of the 1951 Convention (exclusion of persons who are undeserving of protection) has the effect of excluding from eligibility for refugee status an individual who is otherwise determined to be in need of refugee protection.
5. Interview—UNHCR Case Worker, December 2014, Istanbul (Turkey).
6. Interview—UNHCR Case Worker, December 2014, Istanbul (Turkey).
7. Interview—UNHCR Case Worker, December 2014, Istanbul (Turkey).
8. While it is very difficult to obtain access to precise figures of the numbers of refugees denied resettlement from Turkey on security grounds, inter-

views carried out with the UNHCR, the ICMC and NGO officials indicate that this practice is a growing trend since the beginning of the 2000s, affecting significant numbers of refugees.

9. For details of resettlement practices in the EU, see Adele Garnier, Migration Management and Humanitarian Protection: The UNHCR's 'Resettlement Expansionism' and Its Impact on Policy-making in the EU and Australia, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 40 (6) 2014, pp. 942–959.

10. European Commission, Relocation and Resettlement: Member states need to build on encouraging results, press release, 8 February 2017 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-218_en.htm

11. UNHCR Global Resettlement Statistical Report 2013, 2012.

12. Interview—Resettlement Officer, UNHCR, May 2014 (via Skype).

13. UNHCR, Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Frequently Asked Questions, January 2015 http://www.unhcr.org.tr/uploads/root/frequently_asked_questions.pdf

14. UNHCR, 'Frequently Asked Questions—UNHCR asylum procedure in Turkey' http://info.unhcr.org.tr/faq.php?lang=1 (accessed 15 December 2015).

15. Anne C Richard, Statement submitted for the record to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Human Rights, Washington DC, 7 January 2014 http://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/remarks/2014/219388.htm (accessed 8 October 2015).

16. US Department of State, Factsheet—Expedited Protection and Resettlement of Refugees, 24 October 2011, retrieved 13 April 2015 http://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/factsheets/2011/181021.htm

17. Interview—Programme Officer, ICMC, June 2012.

18. Interview—Mohammed, Afghan, May 2013, Istanbul (Turkey).

19. Interview—Ayan, Somali, June 2012, Istanbul (Turkey).

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Holy Crossings

Abstract The growing phenomenon of conversion from Muslim to Christian among refugees stranded in Turkey and hoping to gain a more desirable faith identity for resettlement is examined. What does conversion involve for the refugee? Can it be conceptualised as an orientalist Othering? How do Christian missionaries encourage and defend conversion? These questions are addressed against an underpinning proposal that conversion can be understood as a form of border work both for the missionaries and for the converting refugee.

Keywords Conversion • Orientalism • Subjectification • Refugee • Resettlement • Othering

An investigation into bordering practices in Turkey reveals that an orientalist gaze is not only directed towards the Turkish state practices, but it is also experienced by the migrants and refugees[1] who are subjects to bordering practices. The containment of 'undesirables' in highly precarious states in Turkey has created conditions that encourage refugees seeking resettlement to manipulate their identities for favourably positioned applications. Missionaries who hang around in migrants' associations at the fringes of Europe can be regarded as a type of peripheral bordercrat in that they exploit, wittingly or not, the conditions of 'undesirables' to

whom they project imaginaries of freedom and mobility associated with the West and Christianity.

This phenomenon should be understood as embedded within a context in which the Muslim refugee in Turkey has been increasingly subject to security practices in the resettlement process, classifying him or her as potentially dangerous and undesirable. This is also related to the condition of waiting created by border control regimes. Conversion is dynamically linked to the deceleration (Hess 2012) of 'undesirable' migration flows which leave migrants in highly precarious states of unknowing and stuckness. The politics of conversion can be interpreted as part of a struggle to be mobile.

All the cases of conversion are not opportunist; rather, they need to be understood as embedded within a context in which the Muslim refugee is objectified through security problematisations and the Christian refugee is often favoured for resettlement.[2] We build on previous studies on the Christian conversion of migrants and refugees in Turkey (Leman 2007; Koser Açkapar 2006, 2007).

Two Foucauldian-related concepts are of use for this enquiry, namely, biopolitical selection and subjectification. Biopolitics relies on techniques of self-government that encourage subjects to construct themselves as worthy (Lemke 2012) though they may also resist or place their own stamp on this construction. Foucault refers to the formative dynamic involved here as subjectification. For Foucault power has to be activated within a social relationship to be power; it is not an inert possession and it is in this activated relationship that the subject is constituted. Thus, we do not enter social relations as a formed subject; rather, we are formed in them. This perspective also sees self-formation as proceeding through perceptions of how people think they are thought about and how they think about themselves. This is particularly true where the subject is vulnerable to Othering.

Fanon has offered a particularly vivid exploration of the formative process within the problematic of Othering (Fanon 1952) that supports our understanding of refugee conversion. In his essay *The Fact of Blackness*, Fanon (1952) talks about how he is judged on the basis of the very sight of his blackness, which in ironic vein he called his uniform. A stereotypical, racialised view of black people meets Fanon before he can introduce himself. This view inhibits a common, equal encounter between human beings. Fanon writes that he is not free to define himself without addressing how he is defined:

For my body, for my race, for my ancestors. I subjected myself to an objective examination, I discovered my blackness, my ethnic characteristics; and I was battered down by tom-toms, cannibalism, intellectual deficiency, fetishism, racial defects, slave-ships. (Fanon 1952, 3)

Fanon is burdened by a white gaze that prevents him from simply and freely being. It is the encounter of the white colonial with the black colonialised that generates the racialisation of the latter. This racialisation is made through an intersubjective encounter with white prejudice. In this encounter Fanon is constructed as inferior, backward, quaint, exotic and amoral. Fanon argues that for the colonised subject to become a moral being in the eyes of the white man, he must put on a white mask.

There are resonances between the notion of the 'white gaze' and the orientalist gaze under discussion here. Both create dualisms that are rooted in colonial ways of seeing. It seems that the effects of subjectification Fanon discussed in the specific context of black/white intersubjectivity may resonate with the Christian/Muslim encounters between refugees and gatekeepers. For Said (2003), 'non-Western', 'Arab' and 'Muslim' are Othered categories which are set against the idea of the Christian 'West'. Even where this Othering comes from well-meaning European orientalists, they do not see, argues Said, the heterogeneity of 'the Orient' or its interconnectivities with the West. Nor do they see Muslims as complex human beings like themselves. It is this simplistic reading with which the Muslim refugee must engage.[3]

Conversion to Christianity among some refugees awaiting resettlement is perceived as enabling the crossing between Turkey and the US. Thus crossing these counter-positioned 'meta borders' (Foucher 2007) is entangled with strategies aimed at crossing state territorial borders. Of interest are the subject formations within this dual space of the spiritual and the territorial and the place of orientalist discourse in them. Both Said and Fanon encourage us to unravel how Othering may be sustained and even reproduced by the Othered inviting us to ask to what extent do orientalist representations of the Muslim refugee as potentially dangerous become internalised by the refugee? Does the shedding of a Muslim identity make for favourable positioning for border crossing within refugee and resettlement governance?

While article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates the right of everybody to leave their country, there is no corresponding right to enter another country without the State's permission

(de Gutcheneire and Pécoud 2007). How then are mobility rights distributed? If we reflect upon the regulation of legal migration, the most important criterion determining access to international mobility is nationality. However, we can also observe an orientalist dimension pervading selection criteria. Nyers (2006, 48) goes so far as to speak of 'racialised restrictions on movement'. Indeed, Palidda has drawn attention to an Orientalisation of border control regimes. He writes:

> Rather than the vision of borders as fences to be defended, it is the 'Orientalisation' of the migrants that has served to transform any traveller into a potential Muslim invader. (Palidda 2011 in Bigo 2015, 63/4)

Mobility rights associated with international protection as inscribed in the Geneva Convention are supposed to be accorded on the basis of human rights. However, resettlement is governed through humanitarian reasoning which rests on an act of 'generosity' by states who have the discretion to choose who they consider to be 'desirable' candidates. This choice is also based on 'integration potential', which has often being associated with social status and faith.

While those involved with the governance of refugees are undoubtedly shaped by a liberal, humanitarian ethic, this does not exclude the intrusion of tacit orientalist thinking in their assumptions and practices. Indeed, Said (2003) argued that orientalist thinking is not necessarily explicit or conscious; it is embedded in a taken-for-granted, normalised discourse. Thus, we should not be surprised that it appears to be present among a community of protestant missionaries through their proselytising activities and their connections with the Istanbul Christian Action (ICA).

While the ICA was part of a protestant church group, its declared aim was to serve all individuals regardless of their religious beliefs. Alongside the migrants, refugees and volunteers, several missionaries also occupied the church gardens. The Iranian and American missionaries would bring their young children along with them. Despite the language difference, their children would often play with young Iranian and Afghan children. On Wednesdays, during the free meal distribution which many migrants and refugees attended, the missionaries would bring copies of the bible in several languages, including English, Turkish, Arabic and Farsi, which they would put on display in the garden. These missionaries, almost all American nationals, had spent time in Iran and Tajikistan and they all spoke fluent Farsi. They were part of one of the Mojdeh Farsi-speaking

churches of Turkey in Istanbul. They would spend hours in the church garden talking to refugees as the latter awaited their turn to be seen by ICA staff. They would be invited to attend their Farsi-speaking church services, to play together in a football game or to just gather for a coffee. The missionaries said that it was much easier to operate in Turkey; they felt safer and less scrutinised in their missionary mission.

Christian services were in Farsi. The preacher and his wife would play instruments and the congregation would sing and clap to the rhythm of the *Daf* (a Persian drum). The Christian music was based on a rhythm found in much traditional Persian music, providing perhaps a transitional object, facilitating an easier crossing to Christianity. The music gave a sense of familiarity, of being close to the homeland. Bodily movements whilst praying and singing also much resembled those common to Shiite Islamic rituals. Thus the music had the potential to create a safe environment in which members of the congregation could consider Christianity as overlapping with their existing culture rather than a clean rupture from it. Once the service was over, the attendees would congregate over coffee and biscuits. Whilst they spoke Farsi with each other, almost all of the Iranians encountered were well educated and spoke good English. As well as Farsi-speaking services, the missionaries would organise regular social activities for the church attendees. The missionaries also provided forms of social assistance to the migrants and refugees, from helping them find housing and furniture to giving them English lessons.

The missionaries had a conception of themselves as doing valuable work in response to a calling. One commented, 'The church was the first organisation helping refugees in Turkey. It is not surprising', he added, 'that Christians created the first hospitals and the first universities in Turkey.'[4] He said that he saw the church 'as a hospital for broken people'. Whilst there is no doubt about the integrity of the missionary's intensions from his point of view, to some extent it seemed that vulnerable migrants were a kind of prey for missionary predators.

It is important to acknowledge that Christian churches have a long history of providing assistance to migrants and refugees. Christian organisations have conducted important advocacy work, critiquing the policies of states towards migrants and refugees and calling for more humane treatment of these marginalised populations. For instance, in November 2014, a network of seven Christian organisations, including the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC), produced a set of recommendations for the EU to promote the development of safe and legal channels

for migrants and refugees to reach Europe. Church organisations attend to the physical and pyscho-social needs of migrants, whatever the migrants' circumstances. They often feed them, provide communal space and health-care support and offer a sympathetic ear to their often anguished stories. They are generous, welcoming and committed to their welfare mission. However, this array of support services may come at a price for some migrants and refugees.

Missionaries are often viewed by NGOs and certain intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) as stakeholders in the migration management apparatus. Indeed, missionaries attend NGO partnership meetings although they rarely speak during the formal part of the day; instead, they tend to sit quietly and listen, taking notes.

Even when ICA and missionary practices overlap with NGOs in terms of satisfying physical and resource needs, for them these are the means by which spiritual work is done, whether it is by setting a Christian example through giving aid or by saying grace before eating free food. It is clear that good deed practices are seen as mediations, as God's work towards a greater good. As one missionary said, 'I want to help people's spiritual self first, I am not interested in their physical needs'.[5] The refugees might want to ease their passage to the West but the missionaries want to ease their passage to their kingdom of God. A place for migrants to explore while they are hanging loose in Turkey?

According to Hess (2012), the EU's policies for the externalisation of migration have the effect of decelerating 'undesirable' migration, creating highly precarious transit zones at Europe's borders. The transformation of these border spaces into zones of transit are concomitantly produced by Turkey's asylum system, which as we have discussed only tolerates non-European refugees on a temporary basis; they must be resettled to a third country. 'Transit migration' towards Europe and the refugee-making process are dynamically linked; faced with difficulties in crossing the border towards the EU, many so-called transit (irregular) migrants end up applying for asylum in Turkey. At the same time, faced with years of waiting in uncertain states, a significant number of asylum seekers in Turkey end up trying to cross the border illegally into Europe.

As we have seen, the 'undesirable' migrant is often framed as single, male, illegal, and from the South (Duvell 2012; Fine 2015) and as such sits on a security continuum connecting migrants, asylum seekers, transnational crime networks and terrorists (Bigo 2002). Enmeshed within this continuum is the construction of the Muslim threat, which trades on a

reductive amalgamation of Islam with Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. Somewhat prophetically Saïd made the following comments in 1988:

> (…) Mainly in the United States, but also generally speaking in the West, terrorism is by now permanently, and subliminally associated in the first instance with Islam, a notion no less overused and vague than terrorism itself. In the minds of the unprepared or the unalert, Islam calls up images of bearded clerics and mad suicidal bombers, of unrelenting Iranian mullahs, fanatical fundamentalists, and kidnappers, remorseless turbaned crowds who chant hatred of the US, 'the great devil', and all its ways. (Saïd 1988, 47)

A number of refugees expressed their concern with Islamophobic prejudice as centring on an interpretation of the Muslim world as monolithic, misogynist, violent and breeder of terrorism (Kumar 2010). Certainly, some of the missionaries held this interpretation such as one who said to me that Islamic culture is broken and that Christianity can put the pieces back together again.

Conversion is represented as a transformative turn for the refugee's empowerment and spiritual prosperity. Like the migration management IGOs, missionaries argue that they do not force conversion upon refugees. To the contrary, missionary narratives construct Christianisation practices as ways of becoming free, as one said, 'I do not push myself onto vulnerable people. I talk to them and … I try to steer them so that they ask certain questions, so that they can think for themselves, what they want to believe in and how they want to act'.[6] For these refugees, freedom is represented as both escape from persecution and escape from Islam. Interestingly, freedom is also learnt through the cultural orientation training programmes conducted by the ICMC to prepare refugees for resettlement in the US. Refugees are taught the appropriate conduct for life of a free subject in a free nation.

As Nyers points out, becoming a refugee is 'a site of struggle, a continual process of identity reconstruction' (2006, xv). 'Authentic' refugeeness is not only about a legal status, it also involves appropriating or at least displaying a certain identity wrought out of power relations. Nyers (2006) claims that 'genuine' refugees must display qualities such as 'passivity' and 'victimhood' (2006, 45) on top of proving their 'well-founded fear of persecution'. The performance of such qualities is situated in a dynamic between the refugee subject and his or her gatekeepers. Subjectification proceeds through this dynamic, and it can be as much

about resisting or subverting 'appropriate' qualities as it can be about accommodation or submission to them. In the case of conversion practices, they can be situated within a nexus between both missionary ambitions and refugee ambitions as well as within a form of 'gift relation'.

It seems clear that refugees sought to manipulate or affirm 'appropriate' qualities, which they knew to be on the deserving side for successful resettlement selection. Critical Migration Studies underlines the significance of the individual in resisting bordering practices (Guild 2009). This manipulation is a form of refugee participation *in* bordering processes, particularly in relation to vulnerability and security criteria. Typically, fulfilling these criteria is seen as something potential refugees bring with them from their country of origin. However, while this may be the case, it is also true that vulnerabilities are *made* through bordering processes. For instance, there were reported cases of refugees who developed gangrene crossing the Turkey–Iran mountainous border. One of them had to have all of his toes amputated in Istanbul. Others lost fingers and some of their toes. There were also harrowing stories of young Afghan boys who were raped at the Turkey–Iranian border and of course some potential refugees perished at the border. Thus, refugee vulnerability is often exacerbated or even produced through the migratory journey, rather than necessarily exclusively deriving from a situation in the country of origin. Furthermore, vulnerability is not an objective or stable and clearly delineated state of being. Much in the same way that IGOs and NGOs need to be context sensitive when they engage in projects for development, refugees wanting to manipulate or highlight vulnerable 'qualities' have to be context sensitive in positioning themselves. They must display qualities that are considered as legitimate and deserving by those with authority in the refugee and resettlement process. This is not always a straightforward process. One example is that of a person with a serious medical condition; this identity can be transformed into a resource or act as an inhibitor in the refugee and resettlement process in Turkey. For instance, according to a US diplomat interviewed, one of the priority categories for the US criteria determining who is selected for resettlement stipulates persons in urgent need of medical treatment not available in the first asylum country.[7] However, even where there is clear evidence of an extreme health-related vulnerability, applicants may lose on the economic grounds, indicated by a United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) official, who comments: 'There are also informal criteria. For instance there is often a cap so as not to burden the health system'.[8]

Interestingly, often the performance of vulnerability is more critical to refugeeness than the actual experience of vulnerability. This is exemplified in the case of the three Afghans all classified as minors. Senem, the female, was confident that she fitted a 'deserving' status because of her age and gender:

> I am all alone here. All my friends are leaving to Europe. I cannot cross the border to Greece because it is too dangerous for girls so I must wait in Turkey. But I am a young girl here and I am all alone so they should invite me to America or to Europe.[9]

The two male Afghans, Mohammed and Javad, did not see themselves as minors before coming to Turkey:

> In Afghanistan at sixteen years old you are not a child anymore, you are the one with the most force, the most stamina. But here in Turkey or in Europe it is different; we have become children all over again. I don't mind, it is better for us like this.[10]

All three were performing 'being minor' as part of their participation in bordering practices regardless of their authentic sense of age. The important point to be made is that refugees learn how to profile themselves vis-à-vis their gatekeepers, although the extent to which they can depends on both the positional advantages they can exploit (e.g. female, minor, sick) and how they are received by their gatekeepers. In the case of Christianisation, this is a particularly complex question because conversion takes place *in* conditions of vulnerability and simultaneously reduces it as it produces it.

The relationship between being a Christian refugee and performing being a Christian refugee is blurred for bordercrats, including missionaries, UNHCR and NGOs, and for migrants/refugees. There are three reasons for this: Firstly, for the missionaries there is an acceptance that some of those who seek to convert offer masked performances. However, from the missionaries' point of view reading the bible remains a way of drawing them into the fold. Regardless of initial intentions, the bible will elicit sympathy for Christianity. As one converted Afghan refugee put it in relation to opportunist conversion:

> Bob and Chris (missionaries) know that they are not real believers and will convert back once they reach their destination; they say that it is enough for them that they read the bible.[11]

Secondly, the UNHCR refugee eligibility criteria rest more on how one is viewed rather than how one presents oneself. As one UNHCR official put it: 'Our job is not to find out if the claim is real, it is just to decide if it is credible. We are not doing police work'.[12] Thirdly, the mental boundary crossing involved in conversion is emotionally complex, often characterised by ambivalence and uncertainty.

There is a limited repertoire of mobility strategies available for refugees in Turkey; they may contemplate the physical challenges of illegal sea crossings, risking their lives, or choose the more psychologically challenging strategy of conversion to Christianity. Previous research (Fine 2014; Leman 2007; Koser Akçapar 2007; Yaghmaian 2005) has demonstrated that the Christian conversion of Iranian Shia migrants and refugees is a significant and growing trend in Turkey. Koser Akçapar (2007) and Leman (2007) have drawn attention to the importance of Iranian migrant and refugee social networks in terms of spreading the idea of Christian conversion as a form of spiritual capital.

Since the outset of the international refugee regime, US foreign policy has shifted attention from Communist regimes to Islamic ones. Rosenblum and Salehyan (2004) argue that the US refugee regime is strategic as well as humanitarian and that by accepting certain populations the US seeks to use its soft power to discredit antagonistic regimes. An expression of this strategic dimension is echoed in US resettlement criteria and can be found in the Lautenberg Amendment, which has shifted from a focus on the resettlement of religious minorities in the former Soviet Union to a similar focus in Iran since 2004. Accordingly, the US accords preferential treatment through reduced evidentiary standards to Iranian religious minorities (Baha'is, Jews, Christians) including converts. One effect of this practice is that the US appears to be sending out messages that it is protecting first and foremost the non-Muslim Iranian population. There is also much popular prejudice about Muslim refugees in the US, which may well have an impact on policy. For instance, Resettlement Watch, an organisation which has branches throughout the States and a significant base of followers, makes the following objection:

> Frankly, we have made a grievous error in taking the Muslim refugees, Somalis in particular, who have no intention of becoming Americans. They are here to change America (…) Although we all have sympathy for persecuted and suffering people there are real questions to be answered about the wisdom of this policy.[13]

NGOs involved in the asylum process all point to a growing number of Iranian and to a lesser extent Afghan asylum applications being based on the grounds of fear of persecution due to their conversion to Christianity. This creates a critical mass of converted or converting Christians that is favourable to the missionaries' work.

For any kind of governing interventions to succeed there needs to be amenable conditions that allow them to take place. The conditions in Turkey are favourable for Christianising practices among refugees. The absence of welfare support in Turkey creates the need for voluntary support, such as that offered by the IMC. In terms of health care, while asylum seekers have a formal right to free health care, in reality their treatment is discretionary and hospitals often deny treatment unless considerable fees are paid. Thus, an important source for social and welfare assistance available for refugees is provided by NGOs, including certain Christian NGOs and church groups like the IMC. For some Iranian and Afghan refugees, these organisations provide a first point of contact with Christianity.

Refugees tend to lack a communal space in which they can safely congregate. The Church gardens and services provide secure, peaceful environments, which offer migrants and refugees' sanctuary from the Istanbul mayhem and a social setting to meet with other refugees. The church provided a refuge, a place of safety, where refugees could relax and be receptive to the support and conversation of the missionaries, as the following asylum seeker said:

> When I come here, I feel safe. They are very good people, Sue has helped our family a lot by paying my son's medication. These days we just come on a Wednesday for a hot meal and to chat amongst friends.[14]

There is a rich and extensive literature on the securitisation of migration and/or foreigners and how this has affected and produced security practices (Bigo 2002; Hyndman 2000; Guild 2009); there is less scholarship on how securitisation practices have shaped the subjectivities of immigrants and their descendants in destination countries[15] or en route. Conditions of migrant/refugee deceleration are enmeshed with migrant/refugee securitisation. Few studies probe the effects of a potent combination of waiting, being feared and being afraid. This combination reduces ontological security through a loss of structure to each day, the absence of peace of mind and of meaning to everyday existence, as the following testimonies attest:

I can't read, my mind is busy. I don't know where I will be in one year, if I can study or not I don't know … I am not living, I am just existing, life is so boring.[16]

I tried many times to cross the border but it is too difficult. They caught me every time. Two years I am waiting for asylum here. All I do is I sleep, I eat. I am finished, all I do in a day is eat macaroni pasta. All together I am crazy, my brain is crazy. For 100 Afghans, 70 have gone crazy.[17]

I get to Turkey and I am crazy; I am in so much pain and they are always sending me somewhere else, telling me to go to another place, another time, I am like a ball, they are just throwing me everywhere.[18]

For those who endure a lack of a sense of direction, missionary attention conveys the promise of restoring it.

It could be argued that just as some smugglers may welcome the desperation of refugees for their business, so too do the missionaries. As one missionary remarked: 'Suffering brings people back to a spiritual reality'.[19] The amenable condition for conversion may be rooted in the depths of the refugees' despair. Missionaries were aware that refugees were living in states of physical and emotional vulnerability, but this was seen to be primarily a problem of spiritual impoverishment that could be overcome. From the missionaries' point of view these states of vulnerability served as a basis for Christianisation; from the refugees' point of view it offered the chance of new beginnings. That is not to say that conversion is simply a private decision. As Rambo (1989, 48) states, conversion 'cannot be extricated from the fabric of relationships, processes, and ideologies which provide the matrix of religious change'. The Othering of Islam is in this fabric of relationships and has a long vintage among Christians.

According to Said (2003, 72), Christians depicted Islam as either an offshoot of heretic Christianity or simply as a deficient orientalist faith. Said instances Dante's depiction of Mohammed's eternal torture. The latter is portrayed as an 'imposter' because he apparently pretended to be like Jesus. According to Said, Christian polemicists were invested in misrepresenting Islam. They had no regard for the claims and expertise of Muslims because their aim was to elevate the status of Christianity by diminishing and distorting that of Islam. This is evident in the contrastive rhetoric of the missionary's following comments:

Islam is driven by fear. Hell forces religious observance. Most Afghan's don't practice religion out of joy, but out of fear. Christianity on the other hand sets you free from fear.[20]

Two NGOs involved with refugees pointed out that convincing the gatekeeping authorities was a matter of 'how the neighbours perceived them' more than it was about knowledge of the bible. Indeed, in assessing an individual's 'authentic refugeeness' in terms of Christian conversion, UNHCR and NGOs are mostly concerned with how the individual is looked upon from the outside, rather than an assessment of the individual's genuine belief in Christianity. The 'credibility' of their cases depends on whether they are genuinely at risk of persecution, not to what extent they genuinely believe in Jesus. Nonetheless, it was important that the conversion narrative included an episode of revelation.

Performing the Christianised self involved an account of an awakening, a miraculous moment. This was often expressed through claims concerning the appearance of Jesus in a dream or of having some connection to Christianity in a former life which may be triggered by feeling close to Jesus when walking past a church or when assisted by a Christian nurse. Converting migrants learn how to identify these confessional moments, sometimes from lawyers, as one NGO reported:

I can show you many, they arrange baptism certificates, some organisations, they are writing old dates like 2005 for example; people pay them and they arrange certificates, fake ones, but they are presenting them to the UNHCR … You can find many people like that and you can find many people at the gates of UNHCR working for lawyers who will write their story and sometimes in the same day many people come here with the same story.[21]

The converting migrant crosses into new ritual territory involving singing, kneeling, immersion in water (baptism) and grasp of a new sacred text. They must reorganise their spiritual self, shedding an old script(ure) for a new one. This crossing may mark the beginning of a journey as potentially perilous as crossing the seas. In Afghanistan and Iran, apostasy[22] is sometimes subject to the death penalty, and more generally, there is a widespread social stigma against converted Christians. Ostracism, suspicion, contempt and family rejection may await them, as the following Iranian explained:

> I lost a lot in Iran, job, family, friends. I only have contact with my mother.
> It is very difficult. Iran is Iran. My friends don't speak to me because I am
> Christian. I have become the enemy. They did not accept my conversion.
> Just try to imagine, someone has to abandon his life, you have to go some-
> where, you don't know where, just to survive … leaving family, good job.
> We love Iran, you know, but unfortunately now we are staying here.[23]

Vulnerability is often exacerbated or even produced through the migra-
tory journey and the same can be said of fear and the conversion journey.
While Nyers (2006) has argued that fear of persecution is a critical part of
the refugee condition, clearly refugeeness is also about being feared. The
refugee has to display fear *for* his security, while displaying safety to allay
fears *of* him. Addressing being feared and being frightened requires a level
of emotional management capable of disowning that part of oneself that is
feared. This recalls Fanon's description of the emotional cost of addressing
the fear the Other experiences of him as a black man.

> I took myself far off from my own presence, far indeed, and made myself an
> object. What else could be for me but an amputation, an excision, a hemor-
> rhage? (Fanon 1952, 3)

The rupture described by Fanon may be compared to an element of
Christianisation for some. Breaking from a faith-based subject position
could be construed as a kind of amputation.

Some refugees stranded in Turkey also experienced stigma there due to
their conversion. Several migrants and refugees complained that they had
problems with their employees when their Christian identity surfaced,
often losing their jobs. In effect, while conversion was perceived as a mode
of 'de-Othering' vis-à-vis the West for some they were also aware that their
conversion entailed an 'Othering' from their homeland, a decision that
once made was irreversible. The violence associated with conversion is not
only an effect of orientalist discourses but is to do with the absence of
freedom to convert to another religion of choice under autocratic regimes.
This predicament itself is likely to produce anxiety states among the
migrants and refugee population. They have not rid themselves of a risky
profile; they have simply exchanged one risky profile for another. Arguably,
when conversion is done in haste the risk is all the more heightened.
Migrants might yield to the temptation of fast-track conversion and later
regret it.

There is a potentially damaging consequence to hasty conversion precisely because it represents such a radical deracination (Leman 2007). While recognised formal processes of conversion can often take years, for some Iranians and Afghans in Turkey it can also take place in a matter of days or weeks. According to a representative of an international organisation in Turkey, interviewed by the Danish Immigration Service (2014, 36), while certain Anglican and Catholic churches in Turkey require an average of two years' church attendance for conversion, new churches have emerged to accommodate the Farsi-speaking migrant and refugee community 'active in the conversion of refugees'. Some of these fast-track new churches issue 'baptism documentation' upon request without any examination into the internalisation of the Christian faith. This has created conflict with some of the more established churches in Ankara, who have expressed concern about the possibilities of opportunist conversion and hard sell approaches.

Missionaries report that where they doubted the authenticity of conversion, they used the term 'rice Christians' to refer to refugees who came to church to eat food offered to them. One might speculate that the more migrants took from the church, the more they felt in some ways indebted to it. Arguably, they felt themselves to be entangled in a gift relationship, in which the only thing they had to return was a willingness to renounce their faith and cross over to Christianity. The following migrant more than hints at this tacit deal:

> I come to the services, I hear when Nambiz preaches the gospel but I don't listen. They are not bad people, they have helped me a lot, more than anyone. They give me food, they helped me find a place to live and get furniture. But I believe this comes at a price. The question is when or will I have to pay?[24]

Taking food, money, shelter, health care or even just a warm welcome can produce anxiety in the resource-poor, needy taker from which relief may be sought in finding something to give back. Guilt may become a form of currency. Leman (2007) talks of the need for converting migrants to embark on crossing 'mental boundaries' and as such he raises the usefulness of the anthropological concept of liminality to capture the border crossing psychic work necessary to move from one faith to another. A liminal state is betwixt and between two ontological positions such as adolescence and adulthood. Escape from this in-between predicament requires

a ritualised crossing. The particular bordercratic practice of IMC and missionaries is to encourage such a break, to encourage refugees to (symbolically or not) cross into Christian territory, as described by the following Iranian refugee:

> In Iran I didn't know anything about Christianity. It wasn't a problem for me at the time. I was a Muslim, I didn't question myself. I prayed like I was supposed to but now I know that it was not right. It was not the real me. It is thanks to Bob, he taught me about Jesus, about God. I feel much better in my skin now, much better about myself. I am much closer to God now.[25]

This is territory imagined to be free, welcoming, modern, wealthy, full of opportunity and counterposed to the Muslim 'world'. Christianity is the gateway to the West. While the missionaries do not intentionally or strategically capitalise on the increase of security practices in the refugee process and the securitisation of Islam at a more generalised level, these discourses are coherent with their own, and serve to facilitate the acceptance of their knowledge claims to be taken as truths. I do not want to suggest that the conversion process is always a system of quiet coercion and that the refugee is always a hapless victim of orientalist zeal. In the bordercratic space shared by refugees and missionaries, conversion can take an instrumental form; it can function as a means to navigate the border in a similar way to, for example, a fake passport or by paying a smuggler to take refugees on perilous routes towards the West. All options are risky ones. It is worth noting that Islam authorises conversion where risk of persecution is at stake. This self-protective strategy (known as *takiya*) is permitted on the assumption that the convertee will revert back to Islam once in a place of safety. An interesting metaphor one Afghan refugee used was that of the bible as a passport:

> My brother (in the US) tells me to be careful and not to believe them; once they get to the US they burn the bible. They say it was just my passport—it is much easier for them to be resettled if they are Christian.[26]

It does seem to be the case that conversion is inserted in a supply and demand relationship between missionaries and refugees. One NGO official commented that Christian conversion as a resettlement strategy has become such an established business in Turkey that baptism ceremonies are in high demand.

In a similar tone, a representative from one NGO referred to some churches as acting like 'paper factories' for the issuing of baptism certificates (Danish Immigration Service 2014, 37). Baptism certificates seem also to function as border objects. These objects document and in so doing strengthen the 'truth claims' of the migrants regarding their Christian self vis-à-vis the UNHCR and other gatekeepers.[27] Whilst they do not suffice to prove authentic Christianity for the UNHCR, they are important elements for performing 'being Christian'. However, this bordering object is a double-edged sword as equally for the Iranian authorities a baptism certificate can serve as a confirmation of apostasy.

In conclusion, it would seem that missionaries and smugglers have a common client population in refugees. Alongside transnational smuggling networks and the sale of counterfeit identification documents, missionaries and baptism ceremonies have inserted themselves into the 'illegality industry' (Andersson 2015) in Turkey. Moreover, they both deal with inflated rubber—paddling pools for baptism ceremonies or boats for sea crossings. In a context in which the EU is strengthening its borders and rendering border crossings ever more hazardous, a situation in which growing numbers of migrants and refugees are being swallowed up by the Mediterranean, perhaps conversion to Christianity seems like a less dangerous option to cross the border into 'the West'.

State borders act on the subjectivities of individuals in movement. We have examined the case of the Christian conversion of refugees in transit as they strive to reach the West. Turkey becomes a site of filtering within this space, between those who can be saved and those who are (figuratively or not) left to die. In this context, conversion to Christianity becomes a strategy to cross the border, much like embarking on a perilous journey across the Mediterranean Sea. The bible functions as a border object much like the passport or the makeshift rubber boat. And the missionary becomes a border-crossing facilitator much like the smuggler in some respects. Christianity holds out the promise of a rescue.

A long way away from the practices of anti-immigrant activists in the US and Homeland Security professionals assessing refugees potential dangerousness before they may enter US are the church gardens in the heart of Istanbul's Beyoğlu neighbourhood. These seemingly disconnected elements are nonetheless in a relationship with each other around the fate of refugees in Turkey. One deters (Resettlement Watch), one filters out the 'undesirables' (Homeland Security), and one produces 'desirables' (ICA/missionaries). Thus in different ways these entities are involved in bordering

practices that have a degree of interconnectivity. One aspect of this is their shared orientalism, beneath which 'the good Muslim' is the Muslim who renounces his faith or stays 'at home'.

Notes

1. Throughout this chapter for convenience the term 'refugee' will be employed as an umbrella term to cover the categories of migrant and asylum seeker as well. We are aware that none of these policy categories satisfactorily describes the populations in my enquiry.

2. A preference for the resettlement of Christian refugees has been observed on numerous occasions in a variety of countries, most recently in relation to the refugee crises emerging from the Syrian conflict. For example, in 2015, Canada declared that it would hold a preference for 'refugees from persecuted groups, specifically religious minorities—which would include Christians—sexual minorities and victims of rape' among its resettlement quotas for Syrians and Iraqis, The Globe and Mail, *Canada vows to accept 13,000 refugees more from Syria or Iraq,* 7 January 2015 http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canada-to-accept-13000-more-refugees-from-syria-and-iraq/article22332408/ (accessed 8 April 2015). Similarly, Austria prioritised the resettlement of Christian refugees in its resettlement quota for refugees from Syria (European Council on Refugees and Exile), Austria to take 1000 more refugees from Syria, 30 April 2014, http://ecre.org/component/content/article/70-weekly-bulletin-articles/685-austria-to-take-in-1000-more-refugees-from-syria-.html (accessed 8 April 2015); or 'Germany giving a preferential treatment for Christians, as a persecuted minority in the Transnational Observatory for Refugee's Resettlement in Europe *Germany offers to take in 5000 Syrian refugees*' http://www.resettlement-observatory.eu/archivio-news/155-germany-offers-to-take-in-5000-syrian-refugees.html (accessed 8 April 2015).

3. Islamophobia is understood as an effect of orientalism. Islamophobia is taken to be more derivative of orientalism in that it describes the problem of prejudice, while orientalism addresses the questions of power and knowledge more broadly.

4. Interview—Missionary, May 2012, Istanbul (Turkey).

5. Interview—Missionary, May 2013, Istanbul (Turkey).

6. Interview—Missionary, May 2013, Istanbul (Turkey).

7. Interview—Migration and asylum officer, US Embassy, June 2014, Athens (Greece).

8. Interview—Resettlement Officer, UNHCR, May 2013, Istanbul (Turkey).

9. Interview—Senem, Afghan, May 2012, Istanbul (Turkey).

10. Interview—Mohammed and Javad, Afghan, May 2012, Istanbul (Turkey).

11. Interview—Daud, Afghan. June 2012, Istanbul (Turkey).

12. Interview—UNHCR Ankara, Case worker, December 2014, Istanbul (Turkey).

13. Resettlement Watch—About webpage https://refugeeresettlementwatch. wordpress.com/about/ (accessed 16 July 2015).

14. Interview—Morteza, Afghan, July 2012, Istanbul (Ankara).

15. For a discussion of the psychological effects of securitisation on immigrants, see Catarina Kinvall and Paul Nesbitt-Larking (2009), 'Security, Subjectivity and Space in Postcolonial Europe: Muslims in the Diaspora', *European Security*, 18, 3, pp. 305–325; Ariane Chebel d'Appollonia (2015), *Migrant Mobilization and Securitization in the US and Europe. How does it feel to be a threat?* Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke.

16. Interview—Ashad, Iranian, May 2013, Istanbul (Turkey).

17. Interview—Javad, Afghan, May 2012, Istanbul (Turkey).

18. Interview—Mohammed, Afghan, May 2013, Istanbul (Turkey).

19. Interview—Missionary, May 2012, Istanbul (Turkey).

20. Interview—Missionary, May 2013, Istanbul (Turkey).

21. Interview—General Coordinator, ASAM, January 2013, Ankara (Turkey).

22. While the Iranian Islamic regime recognises Assyrian, Armenian, Chaldean and Jewish minorities, Baha'is and converts to a non-Muslim religion are not tolerated and suffer discrimination.

23. Interview—Bijan, Iranian, May 2013, Istanbul (Turkey).

24. Interview—Sheriyar, Afghan, July 2012, Istanbul (Turkey).

25. Interview—Kambiz, Iranian, June 2012, Istanbul (Turkey).

26. Interview—Morteza, Afghan, July 2012, Istanbul (Turkey).

27. This could be likened to the example given by Fassin and Rechtmen (2007) regarding the functions of a medical certificate as a form of 'psychological proof' to support the claims of asylum seekers suffering from post-traumatic stress.

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Conclusion

Abstract This conclusion summarises key findings and issues in each of the preceding chapters; it brings these together to support the central argument that bordering operates through a variety of actors, practices and rationalities. The findings are placed in a relationship with present developments in Turkey's political landscape. The reader is invited to rethink the naturalised categories associated with mobility for a democratisation of bordering.

Keywords Orientalism • Humanitarianism • Migration management • Categorisation

The reach of this study extends migration studies scholarship to include some perhaps surprising actors, practices and sites that one might not traditionally associate with state bordering, such as missionaries, church gardens, five-star hotels in Istanbul, and refugee and resettlement selection practices. This diversity of actors and practices are involved with human mobility into and out of Turkey. While they are implicated in different, but intersecting rationalities of mobility government—managerialism, securitisation, humanitarianism, orientalism—they were found to converge as filterers, producing desirables and undesirables.

The number of people swallowed up by the Mediterranean is increasing by the day. Perhaps public tolerance of or at least distancing from these

tragedies is paradoxically fed by the regularity of news reports of drownings. One might have hoped that bordercrats would respond to these tragedies with the aim of eradicating the conditions that give rise to them. Yet, this study of bordering practices reveals the production and maintenance of a dominant problematisation of bordering that follows a containment agenda; this confines the 'undesirables' to immobility, resistance to which entails entering dangerous waters. By representing it as technical and depoliticised, this problematisation distances bordercrats from their unwitting participation in deaths at the border and from their accountability to those who perish. For as long as defining and then filtering out the undesirable is seen as a reasonable aspect of migration management, there will have to be winners and losers, drowned and saved. That some of the losers are at the bottom of the sea is held by many bordercrats to be a lamentable outcome of mismanagement that only good migration management can overcome.

Clearly, the establishment of the 2013 law and the formation of the Directorate General for Migration Management (DGMM) have served as a means for the Turkish government to demonstrate its engagement in the EU's fight against undesirable migration. The construction of this migration management law and agency has functioned inter alia as a symbolic display by the Turkish government to attract approval and perhaps to secure more external funding from the EU. The assimilation of particular ways of seeing mobility by Turkish bordercrats has proven pivotal for the design and enactment of Turkey's first legislation on asylum. Law is a powerful means of establishing new norms in relation to which aligned practices may take time to take root. However, to date the law and DGMM remain predominantly performative, having little effect on the ground for migrants and refugees. This has prompted a key question in my enquiry, namely, are both Turkey and intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) presently performing migration management more than they are *doing* it? One response has been to draw attention to the fact that EU bordercrats have opportunistically mobilised the very existence of the law as evidence that Turkey can be seen as 'safe' for refugees.

Similarly, Regional Consultative Processes (RCPs) can also be seen to have a performative function. A literal reading of RCPs would see little in the generation of useful outputs and genuine collaboration, but an examination of techniques of partnership in RCP meetings reveals their function for reinforcing mutually agreed ways of seeing mobility, notably through a migration management lens. There was something of a snowball effect

generated by such meetings particularly when placed side by side with other IGO capacity-building activities. Through the repeat of utterances of migration management wisdoms in different spatial–temporal settings from the regional dialogues in Brussels, to mappings and country profiles developed in Vienna, to training workshops in Ankara, a migration management rationality is reinforced and diffused. This repetition of migration management discourse in diverse, transnational settings supports its constitution as a natural, taken-for-granted truth. Repetition produces an illusory truth effect; if a 'truth' is often repeated, it comes to be treated as a taken-for-granted premise; this was also the effect of an IGO encouragement to designate Turkey as quasi-European and a natural mediator between North and South.

The RCPs also functioned more as bonding rituals for the development of a community feeling than as deliberative spaces. Community of practice (CoP) theory encourages attention to the cultural side of bordercratic work. It would be difficult to access this side without participant observation, particularly through attendance at the meetings in question. This practice-based focus exposed a variety of techniques of partnership in which a metaphoric arm was placed around Turkish bordercrats as part of the in crowd. At the same time, orientalist judgements went two ways; sometimes through an EU posture of superiority; sometimes as a means by which Turkey was praised for its ability to speak to the Muslim world. This oscillating identity is a distinctive feature of Turkey, and as such, it exposes the opportunism of an EU which is reluctant to fully welcome a predominantly Muslim country into its fold but willing to exploit it as a buffer between its own shores and those further south.

Turkey is at once an object of EU externalisation and also an active agent for EU externalisation among countries with which it was held to have cultural affinities. Since the Muslim world is considered to be both the root and the route of undesirable migration flows, Turkey was held to play an important role in diffusing migration management ideals 'further south'.

I offer the argument that IGO influence in Turkey is exercised through the building of a transnational bordercratic community. I have offered the notion of bordercrat to address the specific positioning and formation of professionals in this community. Bordercrats operate within a specialist domain of knowledge. I have made use of insights from a CoP approach to shed light on how IGOs have created a collaborative, socialising space that encourages common conceptions and problematisations of 'migra-

tion management'. I have also pointed to the opportunist labelling of Turkey as proposed by IGOs as variously 'transit', 'destination', 'European', 'Muslim' and 'safe' and the performative functions associated with these categories for steering Turkey towards containing the EU's unwanted migrants.

A discussion on the emergence of the 'refugee problem' in Turkey has also shed light on how the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has sought to steer the Turkish government and NGOs towards adopting certain behaviours through a charm offensive that conveyed fraternal feelings with Turkey. That said, we need to acknowledge Turkey's agency within this terrain as in the cited case of the legendary pencil-breaking incident involving a high-ranking Turkish civil servant. This seemingly banal act is often recalled by UNHCR officers as a significant expression of Turkey's power. Indeed, since the 2015 'migrant crisis', increasingly Turkey influences European migration politics rather than being simply influenced by Europeanisation.

The world is experiencing the largest refugee crises since World War II and Turkey is right in the thick of it. The fieldwork on which this book is based began in 2011 just several months after the outbreak of the Syria conflict, which in the space of four years would make Turkey the country hosting the largest number of refugees in the world,[1] thus rendering Turkey a priority for the EU externalisation agenda. The 2016 'deal' between the EU and Turkey[2] to contain refugees outside European territory is emblematic of the managerialist, orientalist and humanitarian interplay in borderwork. The six billion euros promised to Turkey to control, care for and contain Europe's unwanted migrants is being channelled through IGOs bolstering the migration management industry. Those contained in Turkey are categorised as refugees that require humanitarian protection, but once they cross the border towards Europe they become illegalised migrants and Europe's undesirable other. How one becomes or unbecomes a refugee has been a core concern of this book.

The issue of conversion in migration studies is quite rare. However, this tends to take an anthropological or sociological perspective, whereas I link it to the politics of the border control regime. I take what is often regarded as a 'private' act, namely, conversion, and situate it in a sociopolitical context characterised by orientalised borders and within abject conditions of living. At times, the pressure to convert is sometimes linked to migrant anxiety to reciprocate the giving of food, space and social assistance from

missionaries. From the testimonies I have gathered, the conversion process also holds out the promise to restore structure and purpose to migrant life.

What is also new in this book is the treatment of missionaries as border-crats explicitly in terms of charitable provision but also in terms of contributing to faithed borders by encouraging conversion. The handing out of baptism certificates has become like handing out passports. Missionaries, I found, were aware of conversion as opportunist but they did not appear to be troubled by their part in supporting this. Any contact with the bible seemed to them to be positive.

There is also a scholarship on 'deceleration' (Hess 2012), namely, imposed immobility. I extend this scholarship through my research into what some migrants actually do in a state of waiting and to relieve conditions of stuckness. I have pressed the case that migrants also do border-work. This builds on the Critical Migration Studies perspective which places migrant agency at the centre of its concerns

Islamophobia and the fear of migrants have become a key determinant in political elections. Several countries have recently expressed a preference for resettling Christian refugees rather than Muslim ones. Ironically, Muslims are said to resist a pluralist nation by those who defend a mono-cultural Christian nation. It is ironic that Turkey is often recognised as a bridge between East and West, Muslim and Christian civilisations, and now it has become the locus for opposing political and spiritual border crossings: on the one hand, since the outbreak of the Syrian crisis, Muslims from a diversity of countries, including European countries, crossing the Turkey–Syria border into the so-called Islamic State of Levant (ISL)[3]; on the other hand, converted Christians from the east and south of Turkey crossing borders to reach 'the West'. The growing polarisation of Muslims and Christians and the misrepresentation of Islam from both sides are affordances for the conversion practices of evangelical missionaries. Ironically, these practices are themselves invested with misrepresentations. Turkey's strategic position as bridge between East and West rested on perceptions of Turkey as the most open liberal of Muslim majority nations; these has been seriously challenged following the 2016 attempted military coup and Turkey's decline into an increasingly illiberal authoritarianism.

In recent years there has been a normalisation of explicit anti-Muslim prejudice. US President Trump's 'Muslim ban' announced in his presidential campaign in 2016 illustrates its mainstreaming. Such displays of Islamophobia are symptoms of embedded orientalism in mobility govern-

ment. Indeed, it is no longer possible to research human mobility without a concern for the workings of orientalist prejudice.

What brings these chapters together are the different processes that produce both migration and refugee management and making of the migrant/refugee subjects. Bordering is not only about states controlling their territorial borders and managing the movement of individuals, it is also about the construction of kinds of states—sending, transit, European and Southern—and certain kinds of people—undeserving migrants, deserving refugees.

I have tried to show the ways in which Turkey has been drawn into identification with Europe's externalisation agenda through its border-cratic formation with IGOs. It would be interesting to probe into how Turkey is increasingly seen less as an object of the Europeanisation of migration policy and more as an actor in its making. That is to say, how do countries outside of the EU countries like Turkey shape EU migration policies (El Qadim 2015).

In pointing out the reproductive needs of IGOs, I do not want to imply that they are always driven by self-interest. Like any professional group, they produce expertise whether this is new forms of classification or specific problematisations in order to contribute to policy and practice. But we need to know more about what inhibits an alternative imaginary to that which is offered within a migration management paradigm. How can a taken-for-granted notion of the necessary filtering function of borders be challenged, and with what practices could it be replaced?

What alternative practices could produce different kinds of populations and states for a democratisation of borders—whereby mobility is considered a right? Is it stretching our political imagination too far to say that the 'migrant crisis' could be an occasion for Turkey, Europeans and IGOs alike to learn about democracy *in practice*? At heart, such a democratisation would require undermining the very existence of the classification of migrant.

Notes

1. Hurriyet Daily News, Turkey world's top refugee hosting country: UN, 18 December 2015 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-worlds-top-refugee-hosting-country-un.aspx?pageID=238&nID=92704&NewsCatID=341 (accessed 11 January 2016).

2. EU–Turkey statement, 18 March 2016, Press Release, 114/16, Foreign Affairs and International Relations http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/
3. Huffington Post, *All it takes to cross from Turkey to ISIS-Held Syria is 25 dollars*, 26 February 2015 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/26/turkey-syria-smuggling_n_6758672.html (accessed 16 October 2015).

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[1] Notes: Page numbers followed by 'n' refers to notes.