European Participation in International Operations

The Role of Strategic Culture

Edited by

Malena Britz



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European Participation in International Operations

The Role of Strategic Culture

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Malena Britz
Stockholm, March 2016

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Strategic Culture and Participation in International Military Operations

Malena Britz

Introduction

There seem to be endless calls for foreign intervention in different crisis spots all over the world. Crises and problems of varying character such as civil wars, failed states, militant Islamism and terrorism call for attention and action. One tool that can be used for handling these crises is military intervention. However, European countries neither can nor wish to participate in efforts to address all crises and conflicts. Disagreement on threat perceptions, economic constraints, and weak domestic political support are examples of the obstacles that prevent military intervention. Against this background we present a comparative study of why militarily capable European states decide to participate, or not to participate, in international military operations. The book examines the behaviour of France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Poland in relation to four military operations, namely International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) (Afghanistan), Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)

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(Iraq), European Union Naval Force Operation (EU NAVFOR) Atalanta (Somalia), and Operation Unified Protector (OUP) (Libya).

The concept of strategic culture is central to the analysis conducted in this book. As an academic concept it has been debated since the 1970s, but more recently it has attracted the attention of a number of scholars who debate its usefulness for studying actor identities and behaviour in security and defence. We rely on the concept of strategic culture to outline an analytical framework. In our conception, strategic culture represents the normative and institutional setting within which political decisions are shaped, made, and justified. More specifically, it consists of the normative and regulatory framework that enables some decisions but at the same time restrains other decisions with regard to participation in international military operations. The analytical focus in this book, therefore, revolves around the normative and regulatory frameworks for each country, including the decision-making process and the relationship between the political and military strategic levels. We study both political decision-making and the involvement of the armed forces in decision-making. As a result, this book shows how strategic culture affects participation and non-participation in different operations for each country studied.

Each country is considered in a separate chapter and for each we ask what the strategic culture (the normative and regulative frameworks) looks like. Similarly, for each operation studied we ask how participation or non-participation has been justified. We also examine the types of capacity the states commit to the territories where they deploy. The concluding chapter, as part of the comparative analysis, softens the otherwise dichotomous relationship between participation and non-participation by discussing attitudes towards participation and the different ways in which states can participate in international operations. The comparative analysis undertaken in the final chapter aims to generate general discussion and draw theoretically inferred conclusions about why European countries participate or do not participate in international military operations.

European states face several challenges with respect to international military operations that could arise in the future. One challenge is mission fatigue after the exhaustive missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, sometimes called 'the Iraq syndrome' (Egnell 2013, pp. 222–3). This is observed not only in reduced political interest to deploy troops, but also in weak domestic opinions in favour of military operations abroad. In 2014, for example, only 43 % of Europeans believed that NATO should be engaged in military operations outside the USA and Europe. There were, however, significant variations within Europe: 55 % of the French thought

NATO *should* be engaged outside the USA and Europe, whereas 69 % of Greeks, 63 % of Germans, and 59 % of Italians thought NATO *should not* be engaged in such operations. In Poland 43 % were in favour and 42 % against, and in the UK 49 % were in favour and 42 % were against (German Marshall Fund 2015).

There are reasons to believe that public hesitancy towards international military operations is not specifically tied to NATO, but rather conforms to a general trend. One example of such hesitancy was the British failure to pass a parliamentary vote in favour of intervention in Syria in the autumn of 2013, even though in the UK parliamentary control of international operations was previously seen to be amongst the weakest in Europe (Matlary 2009, p. 159). Countries also face challenges because of the financial constraints brought about by the 'age of austerity' (Valasek 2011); economic constraints have thus turned into a legitimate part of the discussion of security and defence policies in some countries (examples from this book are Greece, Poland, and the UK). A third challenge is divergent or contested threat perceptions, where common action is hampered due to the variation in threat assessments. Despite these challenges, international military operations do take place, and the results presented in this book help to explain why.

Given our double focus on the political and military levels, a substantive contribution to this study is the incorporation of the concept of civil–military relations as an aspect of strategic culture. Such an approach was suggested by Snyder (1977), but to our knowledge it has not been common in studies about strategic culture that have followed since. According to Huntington's (arguably the most important writer on civil–military relations) analysis, the idea is not far-fetched: "civil-military relations is the principal institutional component of military security policy", which he treats as an aspect of national security policy (1957, p. 1). While Huntington did not specifically discuss participation in international military operations, he did closely study the use of military force. He further emphasised that "the nature of the decisions on these issues [including the use of military force] is determined by the institutional pattern through which the decisions are made" (1957, p. 2), which necessarily includes civil–military relations.

Another aspect of strategic culture which is discussed in this book is the role of the executive and its strength relative to the parliament in decisions to use force, which varies between democracies in Western Europe (Wagner 2006), as well as the elaboration of the decision-making process and the number of actors involved in that process.

This introductory chapter situates the book in relation to the literature on strategic culture and international operations. It outlines the theoretical foundations for the concept of strategic culture and how we have arrived at our definition of the concept. Furthermore, we present our operationalisation of normative and regulative frameworks for participation in international operations, i.e. what we have looked for when studying different countries' strategic cultures. The chapter concludes with a discussion of methodological aspects and a brief overview of the four different military operations studied in this book.

The Concept of Strategic Culture and International Military Operations

To begin, we must explain how we have arrived at our definition of strategic culture as the normative and regulatory frameworks that enable some decisions, but at the same time restrain other decisions with regard to participation in international military operations. This conceptualisation of strategic culture is narrower than the definitions that have previously been used in the literature. As a scholarly concept, strategic culture has evolved since the 1970s (some authors even claim that it has its roots in research from the 1940s), when US and Soviet nuclear strategies were studied by Snyder (Snyder 1977; Schmit and Zyla 2011). Since then, the concept has been used in different ways, resulting in a scholarly debate about how it should be defined and studied—specifically, what kind of variable it is. The debate can be categorised into three generations (or waves) (Johnston 1995); the different generations have been summarised by a number scholars (e.g. Glenn et al. 2004; Lock 2010; Schmit and Zyla 2011; Bloomfield 2012; Biehl et al. 2013). In general, these generations have all dealt with the issues of how to define strategic culture, what kind of variable it is, if there is a causal relationship between strategic culture and behaviour (which is related to what kind of variable it is—is it an independent variable, and if so, does it have a causal relationship to behaviour?), and what should the study of strategic culture entail. All these aspects of the different generations will be discussed below and then related to our own definition of strategic culture.

The idea of the first generation was to challenge other dominant theories of the time such as neorealism, which emphasised actor rationality (Glenn et al. 2004; Biehl et al. 2013). Snyder (1977) defined strategic culture as "the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic community

have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy" (p. 8). As outlined by Snyder, individuals are socialised into a strategic culture. In this way, the first generation students of strategic culture saw it as a "context for understanding, rather than explanatory causality for behaviour" (Gray 1999, p. 49). Gray therefore questioned whether strategic culture could be a causal variable, contending that, as part of the context, it transcends both cause and effect. In his view it is simply not possible to treat strategic culture as an independent variable that can be used to falsify a theory; it would be the same as viewing people as having separable bodies and minds because strategic culture is a part of both humans and their behaviour, and institutions.

When studying Soviet strategic culture, Snyder looked at the strategic situation, the historical legacy, and the role of the Soviet armed forces in the policy process. With regard to nuclear strategy, Snyder concluded that the strategic positions of the USA and the USSR were different due to their different geographic positions in relation to Europe. From the US point of view, the use of nuclear capacities as deterrent risked invoking a general nuclear war that would destroy the countries it was set out to defend. This meant that the USA had to strategise the limited use of nuclear weapons, which the Soviets never needed to do; from the Soviet point of view, nuclear war would not be limited, which meant that they never needed to develop a doctrine for restricted nuclear war (Snyder 1977, p. 23). The historical legacy of the USSR pointed out by Snyder is also related to geography in that it meant that the country had experience of war on its territory, which again made it different from the USA (p. 28). With regard to the role of the military in the Soviet policy process, Snyder stated that "[t]he Soviet strategic culture has been heavily influenced by the willingness of the military to seek a dominant position in the promulgation of strategic doctrine and a significant voice in decisions on force posture" (1977, p. 29). The military's tactics to achieve this (and success in doing so) have differed depending on who the political leader has been; but over time the military became important in the formulation of strategic doctrine and policy.

One author whose work has been labelled as belonging to the second generation of strategic culture studies is Klein (1988), who stated that "[s]trategic culture refers to the way in which a modern hegemonic state relies upon internationally deployed force" (p. 136). Therefore, strategic culture "involves widely available orientations to violence and to the ways in which the state can legitimately use violence against putative enemies" (p. 136). An important aspect here is the way in which violence is legitimised.

According to Klein, the study of strategic culture is the study of "the cultural hegemony of organised state violence" (p. 136) but he also claims that "hegemony concerns the production of legitimacy". This means that an important role of strategic culture is to legitimise policy. At the same time, Klein makes a distinction between what is said—the declaratory policy, and what is done—the operational action policy (p. 138). According to Klein, strategic culture then refers to the declaratory policy—what can be said. In this way strategic culture itself embeds constraints on policies; Klein criticised realists because they saw these constraints as the realities of international relations. Klein thus questions the causal link between strategic culture and behaviour because strategic culture only encompasses the declaratory policy, not the operational action policy. Researchers can then study both the declaratory policy which legitimises military activities, and the operational action policy. Klein, as did Snyder, studied strategic culture in relation to policy on nuclear deterrence, but, as shown above, he also discussed the role of strategic culture on the more general use of international force.

The third generation conceptualised strategic culture as "an independent or intervening variable affecting state behaviour" (Schmidt and Zyla 2011, p. 486). This way of conceptualising strategic culture provided the "'reasons' for state actions" (Schmidt and Zyla 2011, p. 487). Johnston, who himself identified these three generations of strategic culture, defined strategic culture as "a system of symbols" comprising two parts: "basic assumptions about the orderliness of the strategic environment" and "assumptions at a more operational level about what strategic choices are the most efficacious" (Johnston 1995, p. 37). In this way "[s]trategic culture as a system of symbols embodies assumptions about what the security *problematique* is, and therefore about how to best deal with it" (p. 39). Johnston stated that the impact of security culture on behavioural choices derives from the second (operational) level's assumptions about options. These provide actors with strategic preferences that are consistent across objects and time, which means that they do not change due to shifts in non-cultural variables. For Johnston, it was important that the definition of strategic culture meant that it became an independent variable that could be falsified, could produce empirical predictions, and could be tested against other models (Johnston 1995, p. 39). Through this method of viewing strategic culture there might be a causal relationship between strategic culture and behavioural choices, but it is rather an empirical question.

Evidently, the scholarly debate about strategic culture has revolved around its ontological and epistemological properties, which will differ according to definition. Our definition of strategic culture as the normative and regulatory frameworks that enable some decisions, but at the same time restrain other decisions, with regard to participation in international military operations, builds on all three generations of security culture studies. We agree with Snyder (1977) that geography (the strategic situation) might matter for how strategic issues are perceived, and that historic experiences such as war (or not) on one's own territory might affect how strategic issues are perceived. As the concept of strategic culture is used in this book, these are aspects of the normative framework. The normative framework is linked to a country's identity, for which both strategic situation and historical experiences are important. To these more general aspects of strategic culture we have added some elements to our study of normative frameworks which are more closely related to our empirical question of participation in military international operations but are nonetheless related to strategic situation and historical experiences as suggested by Snyder:

- Strategic situation and historic experiences;
- General political aims for international military operations;
- Preferences with regard to types of operations (peace-making, peace-enforcing etc.);
- Ambitions for international military operations;
- The importance of the operation's organisational framework (including preferences for coordination);
- Preferred partners when it comes to cooperation on a strategic and operational level.

As argued below, decisions to use force are not to be considered as just any political decisions. However, the decision-making process might still influence the content of these decisions. Therefore, it becomes important to distinguish (for each country studied) key actors and processes in the decision-making process. Even though this volume covers European democratic countries, these processes differ by country and the extent to which these differences affect participation is an important aspect of the research presented. Moreover, we contribute by focusing on civil–military relations, which is an aspect of strategic culture first examined by Snyder (1977) but that has curiously not played a major role in later studies.

The regulatory framework (the institutional setting) consists of both the decision-making process and the role of the armed forces in that process. Information has been sought with regard to:

- The formal decision-making process;
- Important main and subsidiary actors (both internal and external to the organisation) and their roles in the process;
- Channels of influence for the armed forces;
- The role of representatives of the armed forces as advisors to political decision-makers regarding international operations.

As understood in this book, the character of civil–military relations within a state is an aspect of that state's strategic culture because they are part of the regulatory framework. It can also be argued that the regulatory framework, in this aspect, mirrors the normative framework. This is shown in the case studies in this book where historical experiences have made a distinctive mark on the various countries' civil–military relations and the role that the armed forces play (or do not play) in the decision-making process. There is a substantive body of literature on civil–military relations, beginning with Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* (1957). According to Huntington, there is an inherent tension between the functional and social imperatives of military institutions. The functional imperative demands professional and military institutions with room to manoeuvre when taking important decisions. The social imperative demands that the military institution be subject to political control. Too much of the latter may limit the efficiency of the military function, whereas too much of the former may make it impossible to contain military institutions within society (p. 2).

Consequently, how to control the armed forces without impeding their professional function becomes an important question. Huntington describes two different ways of achieving this, either through subjective or objective civilian control. Subjective civilian control maximises civilian power. Huntington here assumes that there is a struggle between different civilian groups—traditionally the governmental institutions, specific social classes, or constitutional forms—over who should exercise this control. Historical examples given by Huntington are control by the crown in England and America in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the struggle between European aristocracies and the bourgeoisie regarding control of the armed forces in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Through objective civilian control, the armed forces were made a tool of the state rather than a mirror of the state. It was the professionalisation of the military that led to objective civilian control (Huntington 1957).

Huntington's idea of the difference between objective and subjective control of the armed forces has led the literature on civil–military relations to discuss two ideal types of these relations (Feaver 2011): professional and civilian supremacy. Professional supremacy (when the military is under objective civilian control) means more independent armed forces, acting alongside the political authorities in society. Civilian supremacy (when the military is under subjective civilian control) means that the armed forces are seen as part of the political authorities. Put simply, the difference concerns how independent the military should be and to what extent they should voice their advice and concerns. Should they speak up directly (professional supremacy), or only speak when asked (civilian supremacy)? An important issue is the extent to which the general public has the right to know the military's perspective on a given policy. Feaver also points out that for civilian supremacists, civilian strategic judgement might differ from military judgement, and civilians should not necessarily defer to military expertise. As participation in international military operations has become more contested and involves a larger number of the armed forces than any operations in the past (for example, in Iraq and in Afghanistan), the civil–military relationship becomes an important aspect of studying strategic cultures and how they affect decision-making with regard to participation in operations.

One might fairly question why we have chosen to use the concept of strategic culture rather than political culture. The reason is that decisions to participate or not to participate in international operations are essentially decisions on the use of force, which is the conceptual connection to the notion of strategy. Colin Gray defines strategic behaviour as "behaviour relevant to the threat or use of force for political purposes" (1999, p. 50). It is true that we only study a particular aspect of use of force: participation in international military operations. But in many states, traditions of security and defence policy mean that decisions on the use of force are regulated differently to decisions on domestic policy. The extent to which this is the case and the consequences for decision-making with regard to participation in international operations is part of our analysis in this book. Therefore, the concept of political culture would be too broad for our study here; strategic culture is, we contend, a much more appropriate notion.

Studying Participation and Non-Participation in Specific Operations

The next question is how our definition of strategic culture as normative and regulative frameworks that enable some decisions and restrain other decisions with regard to participation in international military operations has affected the analysis undertaken in each chapter. To recapitulate, the normative framework answers questions mainly related to identity—such as who we are, when we act, and with whom we act. The regulative framework for its part answers questions of how decisions are taken, who (within the state) gets a voice in these decision-making processes, and to what extent it is a process only for the executive or whether it is also an issue for the parliament. It also answers the question of what role the armed forces play in the process. Variations in the answers to these questions thus display the differences between strategic cultures.

However, the study of strategic culture only introduces a framework for decisions on participation in operations. In order to find answers to our questions of *why* states decide to participate or not to participate, decisions with regard to specific operations must be studied. As mentioned above, the operations under study here are ISAF (Afghanistan), OIF (Iraq), EU NAVFOR Atalanta (Somalia), and OUP (Libya). In line with Klein's discussion of the role of strategic culture in legitimising the use of force, we study the justifications for decisions to participate or not participate. With regard to the justifications, it is important to note that only official justifications for specific decisions are considered; we do not seek to understand hidden intent or underlying motives (cf. Wagnsson 2008, p. 8) or discrepancies between justifications and actions (as would Klein).

When defining strategic culture as normative and regulative frameworks that enable some decisions and restrain other decisions with regard to participation in international military operations, the definition comes close to the conceptualisation by Peters (2011) when he stated that "strategic culture may not determine the specific political choices of actors, but it refines the range of choices in the sense of enabling or inhibiting condition" (2011, p. 645). The range of choices becomes limited because some forms of action are judged as too costly (in a political or organisational sense). Strategic culture is not seen as an exclusive factor affecting these decisions; there might also be other factors at play, which are identified in the justifications given for those decisions. The justifications for participation or non-participation have been considered against the normative and

regulatory frameworks which constitute the strategic culture. We analyse which aspects of the normative and regulative frameworks are important for decisions about participation. That is, to what extent do the justifications reflect existing strategic culture? Therefore, the justifications to participate or to not participate, may or may not be related to strategic culture, which means that there does not have to be a causal link between strategic culture and behaviour.

This is in fact rather in keeping with Johnston's (1999) statement that it is not only strategic culture that is an ideational factor, other factors are "quite possibly" (p. 521) also ideational. He further concluded that "[r]ival hypotheses were not realist versus ideational [...] but ideational ones" (p. 520). It is thus possible to study strategic culture in relation to behaviour; however, strategic culture might not be the exclusive explanation for behaviour. The explanation of why decisions are made to participate or not in international operations can theoretically be found in different ("quite possibly" ideational) factors. We have been open to the possibility that some decisions have been taken (and justified) relying on factors that cannot be related to the strategic culture of the country in question. Such factors could be related to the capabilities of the armed forces, for example, or to other concerns of domestic policy. However, as will be shown in the chapters in this book, our empirical finding is that justifications to a large extent *are* related to the strategic culture of each country studied. A few decisions have been identified where the justifications were not related to strategic culture. This will be further discussed in the concluding chapter.

As can be seen in the foregoing discussion of the concept of strategic culture, the debate has to a large extent been oriented around reasonably general theoretical and epistemological concerns, rather than pursuing the route of empirical study. In this way, an important contribution of this book is its empirical basis, with the analysis of strategic culture based on a substantive amount of data, including interviews conducted with officials in six countries. In addition to studying the justifications for decisions, we have also studied other aspects of the operations, including the kind of capacities deployed, and whether a particular organisational set-up (independent, NATO, EU, UN) was sought. Such data helps us with a more in-depth analysis of participation and the different ways states can participate in operations. Moreover, as stated above, we contribute by focusing on civil–military relations, which is an aspect of strategic culture that was brought up by Snyder (1977) but that has not played a major role in later studies of strategic culture.

In order to synthesise the material, the analysis of each chapter is undertaken in two steps, the first identifying the strategic culture of the country under study, and the normative and the regulative frameworks for participation in international military operations in each specific state. The second step analyses decisions made, and how these were justified, with regard to specific operations (ISAF, Afghanistan; OIF, Iraq; EU NAVFOR Atalanta, Somalia; and OUP, Libya).

Analytical Focus and Relationship to Previous Studies

The various chapters in this book analyse the strategic cultures of France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, and the UK with regard to participation in international military operations. The chapters do not focus on a more general political or military culture. With this focus, the analyses made in this book have a narrower perspective than what has been presented in much of the existing literature. A contemporary example is the one presented in Biehl et al. (2013), in which the authors seek to understand "opportunities and limitations for collaboration in this [security and defence] policy field" (2013, p. 8). Their analyses focus on the political level and how national policy might create opportunities and limitations for collaboration. Other contemporary examples are research into Scandinavian approaches to military interventions (Edström and Gyllensporre (eds) 2014a) and strategic decision-making in the Baltic states (Ries (ed) 2014).

Some of the questions posed by Edström and Gyllensporre (2014b) are similar to the questions answered in this book. The point of departure is that Scandinavian states are small states with specific challenges with regard to military interventions, shifting the focus on the analytical level (see also Biel et al. 2013), and with regard to theoretical assumptions. They do not explore the dimension of strategic culture, and as such, their analysis stresses instrumental reasons and assumed national interests. Despite this difference, both this book and the work of Edström and Gyllensporre place importance on the relationship between political and military strategic levels (2014b, pp. 21–22).

The analyses undertaken in Ries (ed) (2014) are also concerned with a more general political-strategic level, even though some chapters discuss how micro-level rules of behaviour affect people (Mohlin 2014, p. 28). Other chapters analyse informal decision-making or procedures. Both Ries (ed) and Edström and Gyllensporre present case studies of participation in

specific international operations (such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and EU operations), but study different intervening countries to those analysed in this book.

There is also a body of literature dedicated to the EU, considering its security strategy, its role as an emerging strategic actor, and its nascent strategic culture (Biscop 2005; Hallenberg and Engelbrekt 2008; Meyer 2006; Norheim Martinsen 2013). Some of this research assumes that in order to understand EU strategic culture, as well as NATO strategic culture, domestic strategic cultures need to be analysed (Biehl et al. 2013; Britz and Eriksson 2008). Another important reason to study domestic strategic cultures rather than those of international organisations is that, no matter what form future interventions take (EU, NATO, UN, independent coalitions), they will be dependent on the participating parties' resources and decision-making processes.

Methodology

In order to pave the way for the comparison made in the concluding chapter, some methodological and stylistic parameters were given to the chapter authors. As you would expect, they all had to relate to the questions presented above. Some of the questions have been answered through the study of official documents and secondary sources. Interviews have also been undertaken to complement these. The officials interviewed for this research project are the elite in the sense that only high-ranking officers, policy-makers, and in some cases, academics with specialist knowledge have been interviewed. The subject of analysis is the organisation, not the individual, thus it is the interviewee's *role* within their organisation that has been of primary interest (c.f. Allison and Zelikow 1999, p. 144). The importance placed on interviews as a source has differed between the countries studied, in accordance with the quality of policy documents, other official documents and secondary sources available. All interviews were conducted in accordance with an interview guide, and the same, or very similar, questions have been posed to everyone (some variation necessarily arises due to conducting interviews in different languages). In individual cases, follow-up questions were posed to provide contextual information.

The analysis that is presented in the concluding chapter of this book builds a comparative case study. A case can be defined as "an instance of a class of events" (George and Bennet 2005, p. 17). This book presents two categories of cases, the first category being the countries examined. They

represent a class of events that can be defined as middle-range EU powers. All the countries studied have the potential to be influential with respect to European participation in international military operations (be they EU operations, NATO operations, or coalitions of the able and willing) either because of their military weight,[1] their political weight, or their geostrategic position. Greece could be considered the odd one out on these criteria; however, it occupies a very important geostrategic position as a facilitator for operations close to crisis areas in the Middle East and Africa.

The second category of cases consists of international military operations. The fact that we study participation or non-participation in four specific operations for all states means not only that the comparison across the first category of cases is more solid, but also that it becomes possible to make comparisons between the decisions about operations made by each state. The variation reflected in the European states' participation in the operations ISAF (Afghanistan), OIF (Iraq), EU NAVFOR Atalanta (Somalia), and OUP (Libya) show how specific aspects in the normative frameworks of the relevant strategic culture affect participation. The rarity of this kind of cross-nation, cross-case comparison in strategic culture studies underpins the empirical and theoretical contribution of this book.[2] The comparative aspects of this book facilitate a discussion of how strategic culture affects decisions of participation, which is revisited in the concluding chapter. The final chapter also discusses the results in the light of the first months of the operation that started in 2014 in order to fight the Islamic State/Daesh. This analysis is undertaken in order to assess the extent to which the results from the case studies are consistent with the behaviour in this latter operation. The concept of strategic culture has been criticised for lacking predictive power (see for example Strachan 2013, pp. 136, 256) because it can only explain continuity in strategy, not change. This is further discussed in the concluding chapter in relation to the general results presented in the book and their congruence (or not) with developments in later operations.

Brief Presentation of Military Operations Studied in the Chapters

Operation Enduring Freedom/ISAF in Afghanistan 2001–2014

The operations we have chosen to study in this book are intentionally different in character. First, we have Operation Enduring Freedom, which transitioned into ISAF in Afghanistan (2001–2014). These operations

(in the case studies treated as one operation though they were in fact two operations following each other) were a direct response to the 9/11 attacks in the USA. From the US perspective, the attack on Afghanistan was a necessary response to the 9/11 attacks, based on knowledge about Al-Qaeda bases in Afghanistan, and the fact that Washington's status as a superpower had been challenged (Hallenberg 2005, p. 24). As will be evident in the analytical chapters that follow, it was an operation that, initially, did not provoke significant opposition from the countries under study. Even though offers from other NATO members to participate in the operation (through invoking Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty) were denied on grounds that the coalition needed to be decided according to the mission to be undertaken (Huldt 2005, p. 42), a NATO operation was quite quickly established. This operation was seen as a response to the threats posed by terrorists, and later, one of post-conflict reconstruction (Yost 2014, p. 135). As becomes evident in the chapters of this book, European support for the US operations in Afghanistan was not difficult to mobilise in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The widespread support for the operations in Afghanistan was also reflected in the number of UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions on the operations.

To summarise the operations (NATO 2015a), they took place between 2001 and 2014. Forty-eight countries participated in the operations which began as a "coalition of the able and willing" (Operation Enduring Freedom) and then became a NATO operation (ISAF) in 2003. In total fifteen UNSC resolutions were made with regard to the operations. ISAF's goals were to "enable the Afghan government to provide effective security across the country and develop new Afghan security forces to ensure Afghanistan can never again become a safe haven for terrorists" (NATO 2015). There were both air and ground operations followed by a non-combat operation to support institution-building which started on 1 January 2015.

Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003

The political circumstances for Operation Iraqi Freedom were quite different. From a US perspective, the president had to make a political choice on whether or not to launch the operation. As explained by Hallenberg, this choice was in the end "a truly strategic decision […] on a central political issue" (2005, p. 24). Not only did the US president perceive this operation to be an important political choice, so did many European nations. The decision provoked deep divisions among European states, with the UK

as the primary supporter of the US position, while France and Germany (together with Russia) were against it. These dividing lines meant that even though the USA and the UK initially tried to get a UNSC resolution in support of the use of force, they withdrew the proposed resolution and instead relied on resolutions from 1990 and 1991 as legal grounds for an operation (Huldt 2005, pp. 46–7). Recognising the clear division between the different states' views on the necessity to intervene in Iraq, the case studies in this book offer a nuanced picture of these different decisions.

To summarise, the operation took place between March and May 2003 and the participating states were the USA, the UK, Australia, Poland, Italy, and Greece. However, a number of other states supported the operation.[3] The operation took the form of a coalition of the able and willing and its goal was to topple Saddam Hussein and defeat Iraq's armed forces. It was both an air and ground invasion. Even though the operation was short there was a long pre-war history since the 1990s (Hallenberg and Karlsson 2005) and there has been a long-term military occupation afterwards, which has had significant impact on willingness to participate in future interventions (c.f. Egnell). As will be further discussed in the concluding chapter, there was a return to air strikes in 2014 due to the rise of the Islamic State/Daesh.

EU NAVFOR Atalanta on the Somali Coast

The background to the EU NAVFOR Atalanta operation was a degenerating situation in the Horn of Africa, and primarily in Somalia, which was widely seen as a failed state. The collapse of the Somali state created space for large-scale piracy at sea. In 2008, the UNSC adopted three resolutions to enable the fight against piracy. Thus, this operation is different from the others studied in this book: it is an operation fighting organised crime, albeit with military means. The operation itself first followed, and has then worked in parallel with, the NATO operations Allied Provider, Allied Protector, and Ocean Shield. However, the EU NAVFOR Atalanta operation was better resourced in terms of capabilities. In addition, this EU operation took place in the context of several other EU missions, both other Common Security and Defence Policy operations (e.g. EU CAP Nestor) and programmes by the European Commission. In this sense, the EU NAVFOR Atalanta is only one aspect of a whole EU foreign policy package aiming at increasing security and development in the region (Kaunert and Zwolski 2014; Gebhard and Smith 2015).

To summarise, the operation has been ongoing since 2008, with participation from Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, France,

the UK, and Greece. In addition, Norway, Montenegro, Serbia, Ukraine, and New Zealand have also participated. The operation has a system of rotating participation. It is an EU operation under the authorisation of a UNSC resolution. Its goal is "[t]he protection of World Food Programme (WFP) vessels delivering aid to displaced persons in Somalia and the protection of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) shipping" (EU NAVFOR 2004). Its aims are the deterrence, prevention, and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the Somali coast, the protection of vulnerable shipping and contributing to the monitoring of fishing activities off the coast of Somalia. It is considered to be a successful operation with a decreasing number of piracy incidents. It has engaged in military policing and monitoring of piracy including capturing pirates. Normally it consists of 1,200 personnel, four–seven surface combat vessels and two–four maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft. A related EU operation is EUCAP NESTOR, which is a capacity-building mission. There are also other military operations in the area with the aim of reducing piracy, for example a NATO operation.

Operation Unified Protector in Libya 2011

The NATO mission Operation Unified Protector took place in the wider context of the Arab Spring in 2011. This wave of uprisings for democratisation in several Arab states was first observed in Tunisia at the end of 2010, an uprising which led to the resignation of the Tunisian government and president. The movement reached Egypt in January and led to the resignation in February of Hosni Mubarak. Large-scale demonstrations took place in Libya in February. However, the Libyan president Muammar Gaddafi, who had led the country for more than 40 years, authorised the security forces to brutally suppress the opposition. This lead to increasing violence as the opposition armed itself to fight back and formed the National Transitional Council. Aware that a civil war was brewing, Western politicians started to discuss the possibility of an intervention (Engelbrekt and Wagnsson 2013, pp. 4–5). In March there was a UNSC resolution to intervene, but important states such as Russia, China, and Germany abstained from voting. In the beginning, a number of aspects of this operation were unclear: what kind of operation would it be? What was the end goal? Would it be a NATO operation or a coalition of the able and willing? What role would the USA play at various stages of the campaign? Despite very different opinions on these issues within the alliance, Operation Unified Protector started on 31 March 2011, but

with very varied amounts of involvement among the participating states (Michaels 2014), including the states studied in this book.

To summarise, the operation (Engelbrekt, Mohlin, and Wagnsson (eds) 2013; NATO 2015b) took place between 31 March and 31 October 2011, participating states were (to a very differing degrees) the USA, the UK, France, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Turkey. In addition, Sweden, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Morocco, and Jordan supported the operation in various ways. It was a NATO operation, authorised by a UNSC resolution (on 17 March), taking over from US-led Operation Odyssey Dawn. There was also a 'coalition of the willing', operating partially outside the formal operation. Its stated goal was [t]he enforcement of an arms embargo on the high seas of the Mediterranean to prevent the transfer of arms, related material and mercenaries to Libya; the enforcement of a no-fly-zone in order to prevent any aircraft from bombing civilian targets; and air and naval strikes against those military forces involved in attacks or threats to attack Libyan civilians and civilian-populated areas. The UN mandate was carried out to the letter and the operation was terminated on 31 October 2011 after having fulfilled its objectives (NATO 2015b). In addition to this formal goal, some authors who have studied the operation have also stated regime change as an objective (Michaels, 2014, p. 27). The operation mainly consisted of an air campaign.

Notes

1. All of them except Germany had military spending (as part of GDP) above the EU average in the years 2005–2012, according to official statistics (SIPRI, EDA).
2. An example of cross-nation comparison with similar aspirations to ours, to explain differences in states' choices through answering how strategic culture affects those choices, was recently undertaken by Angstrom and Honig (2012).
3. Supporting states: Afghanistan, Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Hungary, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, and Uzbekistan (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2862343.stm). According to this source Italy and Greece were considered supporting states.

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CHAPTER 2

Assuming Great Power Responsibility: French Strategic Culture and International Military Operations

Maria Hellman

Introduction

This chapter aims to demonstrate the influence of strategic culture on decision-making regarding French participation in the international military operations in Afghanistan 2001, the Gulf of Aden (Atalanta) 2007, Libya 2011, and non-participation in Iraq 2003. The officially stated reasons for these decisions are explored in order to assess critically the salience of strategic culture in French decision-making. Before discussing the arguments behind the different decision-making processes of these cases as presented by political leaders, military commanders, and scholars, I briefly outline the key features of French strategic culture. In the final section of the chapter the justifications for participation in the four military interventions are discussed.

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The Strategic Culture of France

Normative Perspective on the Strategic Culture

Carrying out foreign policy through military means can be traced a long way back in French political history and is a policy which has been relatively uncontroversial in French society at large (Irondelle and Besancenot 2010, p. 22). For centuries France has had troops stationed abroad, in order to protect French citizens around the world (in French overseas territories and regions), to defend French interests, and to maintain global security. It is a classic French doctrine to make sure that France remains a strong military power and safeguards its political great power status. "Through imagination, determination, and a desire to hold its rank in the world, France can affirm itself as it wishes to be—a great power" (Alain Juppé quoted in Treacher 2003, p. 65). Since the end of the colonial era, most military operations have been carried out in accordance with UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions as well as in the name of national security—the two often integrated in French security discourse. Any military intervention with French participation requires the backing of a Security Council resolution. As a consequence, France spends a considerable amount of time and resources in the UN to influence the writing of resolutions, in particular when these involve areas of the world that France considers to be her particular spheres of interest, such as the Sahel region and the Middle East.

While being continuously engaged in foreign military operations, French military deployments and resources are relatively small—in particular when compared to American military capacity. It is, however, a key driving force in French foreign and defence policy to assume a major position in global security, "often punching above its weight in the international system" as Irondelle and Schmitt put it (2013, p. 125; see also Heimann 2014). The strategy to remain influential is to "maximize France's political-military rank within international military coalitions, rather than to maximize operational military power on the ground". The French government and military have been successful in getting command posts in multinational missions for example. However, French ambitions to remain a great world power face increasing difficulties, not the least due to financial constraints (Irondelle and Besancenot 2010, p. 38), while the discrepancy between influence and capacity raises the question of how political ambitions are to be matched by military objectives (see

Barat-Givies 2011). This has become especially pertinent with the increasing number of international interventions. The security of France is to be defended not only at the hexagonal borders but also far away (see, for example, the speech by Prime Minister Fillon 2008). As a permanent member of the UNSC it is also argued that France has a moral and political responsibility to maintain global security alongside the USA.

According to Irondelle and Schmitt (2013), France's strategic culture is characterised by "inconsistent behaviour", said to stem from a tension in the strategic culture between being a country of human rights per se and being a country resting on self-reliance and independence. The latter position rests to a large degree on nuclear deterrence strategy—"the very core of the defence on which the French autonomy rests" (Wedin 2011, p. 394; see also Géré 2010). In recent years this has been complemented by a strong emphasis on a highly qualified national intelligence service. Indeed, French intelligence has become central to the strategic autonomy of France and to decision-making pertaining to strategic issues (Coldefy interview, referring in particular to the Iraq conflict in 2002/3; Wedin interview).

The white paper of 2013 echoes this Gaullist tradition:

> Her history has, as a matter of fact, never ceased to be part of that of the world. Through her economy, her ideas, her language, her military and diplomatic capacities, through her seat on the United Nations Security Council, France is engaged on the international stage, in line with her interests and her values. She takes action in close concert with her European partners as well as with her allies, but maintains the capacity for national initiatives (Livre Blanc 2013, p. 7).

The security objective is closely tied to the status of France as a great power pursuing its military strategy of hard and not soft power (Kempf interview, October 2014). Yet it is a hard power strategy different from that of the USA. Wedin writes that whereas the Americans emphasise technology and material capacity, the French focus more on the human side of warfare (Wedin 2007, p. 381). To this is added the European dimension, where the white paper presents the new strategic landscape by referring to France as a "European power with a global influence". In this regard France remains true to its "mission civilisatrice" of spreading universal values globally.

From a strategic point of view, international engagement is centred around certain zones of the world. These are France's spheres of interest

since the colonial era and include northern parts of Africa and the Sahel region, the Middle East and parts of the Pacific, where France still has Départment d'outre mer (DOM) and Territoire d'outre Mer (TOM). The area stretching from the Sahel region to the Middle East, referred to in the white paper as the "*arc de crise*", is identified as carrying heightened risks of future crisis. France has both permanent and temporary military bases around the world, and has reinforced its presence in the Gulf. In 2009, Sarkozy opened a major military base at Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates, as part of France's efforts to tackle piracy and secure maritime trade, and as a sign of its intention "to shoulder its responsibilities to ensure stability in this strategic region" (Willett 2013, p. 23). France's global military presence is also due to a need to keep capacity for the evacuation of French citizens in case of a crisis and for being able to protect French interests internationally.

Regulative Perspective of the Strategic Culture

The strong presidential influence in military matters, the continuous and daily contacts between the military and the president, and the strict political control of the armed forces all contribute to the possibility of speedy decision-making in regards to military operations—much speedier than in other Western countries. It goes back to the foundation of the Fifth Republic, set up to ensure stability and strong governance with a presidential dominance, a marginalised parliament, a striving for political consensus, a de-politicisation of national security issues, and close civil–military relations (Irondelle 2007).

The president has the right to decide on the deployment of armed forces without having to consult either the parliament or the government beforehand. This is a unique feature of the French constitution with no equivalent in other democracies (see Forster 2006). Defence and security issues are part of the so called '*domaine resérvé*'—the area preserved for the exercise of presidential powers—and most of the processes leading up to decision-making are concealed from the public. Defence policy and in particular questions relating to military operations are dealt with by a small circle of military and civilian top officials, a technocratic elite of the state apparatus (Irondelle 2001, p. 14; Irondelle and Schmitt 2013. See also Cohen 1994; Müller and Risse-Kappen 1994). The president is surrounded by military advisors and the most prominent among them is the personal chief of staff (*chef d'état major particulier*) with whom the

president meets on an almost daily basis, and receives information and advice. The president communicates directly with the armed forces' strategic and planning units, takes decisions himself, and informs rather than consults the defence ministry.

However, the *domaine réservé* has been criticised for being too exclusive and voices have been raised in favour of a strengthened parliament and increased transparency in military matters. Under Sarkozy the influence of the parliament was increased and in 2008 a constitutional reform revised presidential powers so that the president is now required to inform parliament about foreign military intervention within three days. If the deployment of troops exceeds four months, the new article 35.3 of the constitution stipulates that the government should seek authorisation from parliament to prolong the military operation. Since the passing of the reform, article 35 has been applied three times and in each case won acceptance.[1]

In a crisis situation, or when a decision about an international military intervention is to be taken, the president calls up the so-called Restricted Security Council (le Conseil de Défense restreint). Up until the early 2000s the council used to meet no more than four times a year, but in the past decade the council has come to meet more and more often and during the Hollande presidency almost every two or three weeks. The Restricted Security Council is chaired by the president and includes the prime minister, the foreign minister, the defence minister and often also the minister of the interior. Next to the government ministers there are military representatives such as the chief of staff of the armed forces and the personal chief of staff. The latter two report to the president regarding crises and military operations to be decided on. The council is not a forum for discussion, but rather an executive meeting where decisions are taken. There are no official documents from these meetings.

As a whole, the French decision-making system with regard to defence and security issues is closed. On one hand it is a system in which the military and the political spheres are kept distinct and where the military is forbidden to express political views, serving exclusively as advisors, but on the other hand it is also a system where the president consults with his military security advisors on a daily basis and where the defence council meets once every three weeks—signalling a high degree of militarisation of the political system.

The French public has traditionally been supportive of military interventions (Kempf, interview 2014) and relations between the military and

society have been good (Jankowski 2014, p. 13). A presidential decision to engage French forces in a military operation has tended to boost the president's popularity and positive perceptions of the military has been strengthened since 1990 according to public opinion polls. In 2013, 80 % of respondents claimed to have a positive image of the defence forces and 91 % expressed having confidence in the military institution (Jankowski 2014, p. 13). Thus France can be seen as a country particularly willing to engage its forces in international military operations and the public support for these engagements remains steadfast—also in those instances where France has suffered losses. To some extent this marks France out among the European allies (Jankowski 2014, p. 14) as well as setting it apart from the USA and the strong American sensitivity to lives lost in armed conflicts (Interview, Wedin).

Justifications for Intervention or Non-Intervention

Afghanistan

Justifications for Intervention: on est de bon soldats

The French decision to participate in Afghanistan was an immediate response to the 9/11 attacks and the request from the USA for a French contribution to the elaboration of a plan to attack Afghanistan and for military support to neutralise the Al-Qaeda network and destroy the Taliban regime. The request was sent to France the day after the attack (Barat-Ginies 2011, p. 28). The terrorist attacks were recognised by the French presidency and government—as they were by other allies—as an attack against the USA calling for the implementation of NATO article 5, a collective security obligation (Interviews with Ramel, Kempf and Coldefy). It was a knee-jerk reflex of the French government to come to the support of the USA in this moment of crisis, when one of the major symbols of the free and liberal world had been targeted by anti-democrats and terrorists. President Chirac made strong statements about the bonds between France and the USA and visited President Bush in Washington on 18 September (Barrow 2001).

When Prime Minister Lionel Jospin called the National Assembly into session for a debate on 3 October 2001, he and President Chirac had already taken the decision to send a military force to Afghanistan and

as a first step the US airforce would be given access to French airspace (Le Parisien, 31 August 2001).

The justifications for the French engagement in Afghanistan were thus, initially, directly connected to France's abidance by article 5 of the NATO alliance, and further heightened by France's loyalty to its foremost ally, the USA. Prime Minister Lionel Jospin was explicit in this regard when he spoke to the National Assembly on 21 November. It was an automatic consequence of the alliance, but it was not the same as engaging in President Bush's "war against terror" (Interview, Ramel).

> If France participates in this conflict, it is not to fight against Afghanistan, but because the United States have suffered attacks of exceptional violence, and while being an ally, France must side with the Americans. The international community and France in particular recognize the global threat which is posed by international terrorism. (Prime Minister Jospin 2001)

This quote makes manifest two main arguments that were decisive for the French in justifying intervention in Afghanistan. Firstly, that the USA had come under attack and as an ally it was France's duty to respond and come to the support of the USA. Secondly, that France responded from the position of a state that sees itself not only as a proponent of multilateralism but as sharing with the USA a global responsibility for international security including the prevention of terrorism. There is thus an explicit connection between France's national self-image, as expressed most clearly in the presidential discourse, and political and strategic decision-making. In addition, the intervention served to secure the transatlantic link and foster maintained US security guarantees to Europe (Interview, Kempf).

In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks and with the whole world in shock, any response other than full support to the USA would have been unthinkable from a French perspective. The decision to intervene was thus a decision first and foremost based on collective security premises, a cornerstone of French security policy and strategic culture. However, the political rhetoric also included the involvement of the United Nations and talk of political solutions. President Jacques Chirac said firstly that France would give firm military support to combat the Al-Qaeda terrorists, but also added that the instabilities in Afghanistan called for a political solution with the involvement of the United Nations, and with the aim of regulating the measures in the framework of a UN Security Council resolution (President Chirac, speech to the nation, 16 November 2001).

The initiative and speedy process that resulted in Resolution 1368, giving the USA the right to defend itself individually or collectively with force and to bring those responsible to trial, was, according to Notin (2011), to a large part due to the work of France's UN ambassador Jean-David Levitte. One of President Chirac's advisors and a diplomat at the time, Thierry Dana says that: "[w]e had to, at all costs, make use of the forceful sentiments of the moment. The same resolution, presented one week later, could have met with opposition from this or that member of the Security Council" (Notin 2011, referring to an interview with M. Dana, see note 1278).

An important part of the political rhetoric was the argument that the democracies of the free world must unite against violations of liberal society. France was determined to take a lead position along with other states in this mission. It involved spreading liberal and democratic values to people and societies who had been denied them, from a true human security perspective. In his speech to the nation on 16 November, President Chirac reaffirmed that "France must show the way to understanding, to respect and dialogue between peoples and cultures"[2] and he thus clearly echoed the traditional French self-image of exceptionalism—of a French global responsibility for spreading liberal and multicultural values. President Chirac explained the French participation by stressing the support for the USA at a governmental level, but also framed it as solidarity between the French and American peoples.[3]

By September 2008 the situation for the French troops in Afghanistan had become more insecure with heightened tension in the French region of operations and an increased number of clashes with the Taliban. The mission had broadened geographically and the number of French soldiers had increased, peaking at 4000 in early 2009. In August that year nine French soldiers were killed and 21 wounded by guerrilla forces in the Uzbin Valley. Not since in Beirut in 1983 had France experienced such losses.

Even if the situation on the ground had changed quite dramatically since France first decided to engage in Afghanistan in 2001, the stated reasons and arguments to justify a continued presence there in 2008 were much the same as at the inception. It was still motivated by the protection of the Afghan people against their oppressors, fighting terrorism, and taking responsibility for security in the framework of the international community. In the debate leading up to the parliament vote on prolongation of French troop deployments Prime Minister François Fillon argued that

not acting would be to leave the Afghan people to the executioners, to expose the French people to an upsurge of international terrorism, and to deny the Afghan people the right to universal values (Fillon 2008).

The Role of the Military

The 9/11 terror attacks generated an immediate general confusion among both politicians and the military. Top-ranking French officers differed as to how to define the situation. General Yves Crène, chief of staff of the army, said that many of the officers did not feel that it was a French concern or an event of such drastic magnitude.[4] In contrast, General Richard Wolsztynski, number two of the joint chief of staff, when asked by the defence minister, said that the attack was like closing one history book and starting a new one (Notin 2011).

The events elicited urgent action by the French government. Within 15 minutes of the second attack Prime Minister Lionel Jospin had gathered the director of the cabinet, Olivier Schrameck, his diplomatic advisor, Jean-Maurice Ripert, his defence advisor, Louis Gautier, and Vice-admiral Dumontet at Matignon. However, at the presidential meeting, the Conseil de défense, later that evening, President Chirac, in his capacity as chief of the French armed forces, took charge and reaffirmed his lead-position.[5] The decision was taken to engage in an attack against Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, there were critical views among the high military command arguing that French forces were strained by extensive engagements elsewhere and that Afghanistan was a distant country, unknown to the French army. There were financial restraints to consider too, in particular since the operation was to be financed within the confines of the existing defence budget (Notin 2011). Therefore, a strategy was devised so as to enable a smooth withdrawal should that be called for (Notin 2011).

Despite military reluctance, airforce generals were given orders to prepare their forces and some of the high-ranking officers were sent to Saudi Arabia on 11 September to start collaboration with the Americans (Notin 2011, see note 1284 and 1289). The type and size of the French force came to vary over time partly as a result of presidential concerns involving the relationship with the USA. Where Chirac had wanted to reduce the French terrestrial force considerably, Sarkozy made promises to President Bush to continue supporting ISAF (expert interview, October 2014).

France's military engagement, which had started as an implementation of Nato article 5, in order to preserve the transatlantic alliance, to loyally support the Americans, and to safeguard US security guarantees in and for

Europe (Interview, Kempf), came to an end in 2012—ahead of schedule—as a result of a delegitimising mediatisation of French losses and critical assessments of French achievements. Unusually for a French context, public opinion turned against continued military engagement and Afghanistan became a political burden to President Hollande (Jankowski 2014).

Iraq

The Justification of Non-Intervention: The Primacy of International Law and Multilateralism

France's 'non' to the US-led Iraq intervention in 2003 has been written about extensively, especially as the twists and turns of the decision caused a severe political and diplomatic rift between France and the USA (Meunier 2008). President Chirac stated at the time that he did not believe a war was the right solution to the Iraq problem, defined as Iraq secretly holding and developing weapons of mass destruction. Instead he argued that the UN weapons inspections, which had—although not without difficulties—been ongoing since the end of the Gulf War in 1991 under Resolution 1441, should continue in accordance with the formulations of the resolution and give "a final opportunity [for Iraq] to comply with its disarmament obligations". In a televised interview on 10 March 2003 President Chirac defended the work of the weapons inspectors and, against the view taken by the USA, said that they should continue in order to complete their work before any decision should be taken as to whether to go to war against Iraq or not (Chirac in televised interview TF1 and FR2, 10 March 2003). A decision to intervene militarily could only at that point in time be taken, Chirac stated, by the UNSC. This was also the view presented by Foreign Minister Dominique Villepin in his now famous speech to the UNSC on 19 March 2003:

> Nothing lasting in international relations can therefore be built without dialogue and without respect for the Other, without exigency and abiding by principles, especially for the democracies that must set the example. To ignore this is to run the risk of misunderstanding, radicalization and spiralling violence. This is even more true in the Middle East, an area of divisions, long torn apart by strife, whose stability must be a major objective for us. (Villepin, 19 March 2003)

The USA and the UK were of a different opinion. In this sense, French decision-making on military intervention in Iraq revolved around the

interpretation of Resolution 1441 (Cogan 2004) and it was in all respects a political decision. It was supported by a majority of the French people. According to one opinion poll in March 2003, 69 % of the French supported President Chirac's decision not to intervene militarily in Iraq (see Styan 2004, p. 384 referring to a poll by Ipsos).

The USA and France had interpreted the resolution differently from its very inception and these differences became increasingly problematic as the USA continued to push for a military intervention and argued that the resolution allowed for this. France was not averse to a future military intervention if it could be proven that the Iraqis failed to comply with the inspections satisfactorily. On 21 December 2002 the French chief of staff visited the Pentagon and said that should it come to armed conflict France had 15,000 troops and 100 aircraft to offer (Cogan 2004, p. 126 referring to Jauvert 2003, p. 28).

Despite French opposition, and against their previous position on Resolution 1441, the USA and the UK agreed to create a new resolution which would include an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein. France stepped up its critique and said it would veto such a resolution since it meant launching a war against Iraq should Saddam fail to comply with the weapons inspections and deviate from the agreement (Cogan 2004, p. 128).

Throughout this conflict, President Chirac gave expression to a strong sense of multilateralism and collective responsibility for international principles channelled through the United Nations. He positioned France as a defender of developing countries and not just as a Western ally (Styan 2004, p. 372). The French anti-war discourse promoted international law rather than brute force by both criticising the USA and by favouring the peaceful method of continued weapons inspections to make Iraq conform to international obligations. The decision not to intervene can also be seen as connected to the risks of increased instability and war in the Middle East region and such risks were seen as more threatening than Iraq's weapons arsenal (Styan 2004, p. 372). In his speech on 18 March 2003 Chirac argued that neither a disarmament of Iraq nor enforcing regime change would justify military intervention. The latter reason was a reoccurring feature in the French security strategy: intervention can never take place in order to change a political regime (Interview with Ramel).

In addition to this it has been argued that domestic politics might have had an impact on the French decision not to intervene. President Chirac, known to be American friendly, had at his side during this time Foreign Minister Villepin, a staunch defender of the French national interest and

with considerably less sympathy for the USA (see, for example, Broughton 2003).

The Role of the Military

The decision to veto the proposed resolution that, according to the French, would legitimate the launch of a military intervention against Iraq was a highly political issue where there seems to have been very little involvement of the military. Some would argue that the military had fewer differences with the Americans than the political elite, and the French armed forces were indeed prepared for the operation until late in the autumn of 2002 (Expert interview, October 2014; President Chirac's speech to diplomats 7 January 2003).

A strong argument among the countries which decided to go to war in Iraq, such as the United Kingdom for instance, was that reliable US intelligence sources had evidence that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. The truth of and trust in that information have been heavily debated and questioned in the aftermath of the intervention, with heavy political consequences in several of the countries involved. The French military and political leadership never trusted nor relied on that information. Some would even go so far as to say that they knew the Americans were lying (Expert interview, Oct 2014).[6]

Although the Iraq intervention and the process leading up to it resulted in a breakdown of political and diplomatic relations between the USA and France, there are indications that this had little impact on military relations between the two countries. The US military saw no reason to criticise their French counterparts for political decision-making they could not influence and must not have any opinions about and vice versa (expert interview, October 2014). High-ranking French officers were, for example, invited as guests of honour at US military formals and the friendship between them was maintained. However, since this was politically sensitive, it was made clear from the highest political levels that such expressions of '*amitié*' must not go public (expert interview Oct 2014). Cogan (2004), referring to "anecdotal evidence", argues that "the French military were expecting and desirous of going to war in Iraq with their Anglo-American allies" (122) and, as is normal in such a tense and critical situation, the French forces were ready to go had a political decision been taken in that direction (expert interview, French armed forces, October 2014).

In sum, the French president and government justified France's non-intervention primarily with the lack of a UNSC resolution. President

Chirac did not believe that an intervention would serve its purpose. The intelligence on which the British and US leadership built their argument did not hold up according to the French and France, therefore, saw no reason to put a stop to the ongoing weapons inspections. As the US-led coalition of the willing went ahead, President Chirac stated that the Iraq intervention was illegitimate and illegal because it lacked the backing of a UNSC resolution.

Taking a more cultural strategic approach, Kempf (interview, October 2014) argues that the decision not to intervene in Iraq alongside the USA can be understood from two different perspectives. On the one hand, it might be seen as the last manifestation of traditional Gaullism, stressing French independence and giving expression to a long-held anti-Americanism. On the other, it might be looked upon as connected to French universalistic ambitions: that France has a message to deliver to the world which is different from those of the other big powers—a 'non-Anglo-Saxon' strategy (Kempf, October 2014). The speech by Prime Minister Villepin at the United Nations in 2003 signalled both these tracks: a Gaullism pointing to French independence and perhaps also self-sufficiency, and at the same time the manifestation of France doing global security politics differently from the USA, reaching out to the world, but doing so in line with French culture and a French world view (Kempf, October 2014).

France was severely criticised by the USA and the UK[7] for its decisions at the time and afterwards—for having blocked the development of the resolution (see Styan 2004, p. 372; he refers particularly to the UK) and for refusing to intervene militarily. The French leadership, however, maintained its self-image as a Western ally throughout this crisis.

Atalanta

Justifications for Intervention: Making the UK go European

Unlike the other three military interventions, the Atalanta operation was not a high-stakes political crisis and as a consequence it was also less mediatised—at least to begin with. If asked about NAVFOR today most French people would not know its meaning (Interview, Ramel and Coldefy). However, at the time of the launch of the operation in 2008, there had been a couple of serious incidents reported in the French media which had attracted attention to the problem and its consequences for the passage of

both people and goods in the Gulf of Aden. Not only did the number of attacks by pirates on ships increase, but pirates also began taking hostages and targeted large ships such as oil tankers, posing environmental threats. When a Ukrainian cargo ship (the *Faina*) was seized and found to be transporting heavy weaponry, fears arose among the EU member states that arms might end up in the wrong hands and aggravate the conflict in Somalia and elsewhere, destabilising the region further. There was one hostage-taking in particular in April 2008 of a French yacht—*Le Ponant*—that was extensively reported in the French media and which also made the French president Nicolas Sarkozy have the army respond with force.

Several countries had similar experiences and the UN Security Council, driven on by the USA and France (Chafer and Cumming 2010, p. 1136), passed a series of resolutions to manage the problem, finally allowing in Resolution 1816 "all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery" (Germond and Smith 2009, p. 582; UN Security Resolution 1816, 2008). Parallel to this, but with the support of the resolutions, the council of the EU, headed by France, who held the presidency at the time, set up a so-called coordination cell in Brussels (NAVCO) to assist the different states with their activities in the region (September 2008). Soon afterwards and largely as a result of French efforts, the coordination cell developed into the first European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) naval operation NAVFOR lead by the UK (Chafer and Cummings 2010, p. 1136). France had thus been actively involved for almost a year in the fight against piracy and to protect humanitarian aid transports to Somalia (Operation Alcyon) when the Atalanta operation took over.

Germond and Smith argue that President Sarkozy, also then president of the European Council, took the opportunity following the deteriorating situation in the Gulf of Aden and the passing of the UNSC resolution not only to convince his European partners to set up an ESDP naval operation to combat piracy, but also to make manifest that the EU could indeed coordinate their military capabilities and act together. "President Sarkozy, as holder of the rotating EU presidency between July and December 2008, also employed the traditional French strategy of using the EU to foster France's rank (and eventually France's role) on the world stage" (Germond and Smith 2009, p. 584; See also Chafer and Cumming 2010, p. 1137 and Willett 2011, p. 20). President Sarkozy also had support for the operation from French members of the European Parliament. Philippe Morillon, French MEP and former commander for the UN forces in Bosnia said that the operation "was a chance for the European Union

to use the means to defend its values and interests" (Quoted in Germond and Smith 2009, p. 583, with reference to European Parliament, "Sea Piracy (debate)" 23 September 2008, Brussels).[8]

As mentioned above, France has for decades taken the lead in the European Union for the development of a common security and defence policy that could work as a counterweight to US security dominance and to maintain stability in Europe. This position of pushing the European Union into taking a more active, unified, and independent role in defence matters is clearly visible in the Atalanta operation (as it is in the case of Libya).

The leadership of the operation was however assigned to the British navy. This has been explained by the fact that France had already been involved in three recent ESDP missions in Africa and, with defence budget cuts, faced a somewhat strenuous financial situation. However, it was also in France's interest to involve the UK, and EU NAVFOR being a naval mission made this easier (Expert interview, October 2014)—the British naval chief of staff wanted the command. It was a political driving force to have the Europeans in command of a military operation and a success for the French to see the UK go European (Kempf interview, October 2014).

It has also been claimed that the British did not want to see French leadership of the operation, that maritime organisations expected the UK to shoulder this responsibility, and that by taking the lead the UK could counter criticism that it had been too passive with regard to previous ESDP missions (Chafer and Cumming 2010, p. 1137) (see chapter on United Kingdom in this volume).

Alongside this, the EU NAVFOR operation had strong economic incentives for the French as it had for other nations. Safe transport of goods through the strait was key as alternative routes—around the Cape of Good Hope—would mean considerably increased costs for French enterprises. France was also among the countries whose fishing trade suffered from the piracy (Helly 2009, p. 394).

In sum, the motivations for the decision to participate in the operation from a French perspective were that it was a way to reduce costs for piracy surveillance and security work, to bring in European collaborators and share the costs and the efforts—a strategy perfectly in line with the French endeavour to boost the EU as a security actor. The reasons for French engagement are thus a combination of realpolitik and strategic decision-making, addressing an increasingly tightening economic, security, and humanitarian problem in the region through burden-sharing and

the seizing of the opportunity to push the EU into concerted security policy action.

Libya

Justifications for Intervention: "le Sarkozisme en action"[9]

Of the four cases, the reasons for the French intervention in Libya carry the greatest complexities. Despite the relatively longstanding Franco-Libyan diplomatic and trade relations made manifest in 2007 through a most spectacular and extravagant state visit by Gaddafi to Paris, and the alleged financial support (US$50 million) from the Gaddafi clan to Sarkozy during his election campaign in 2007, French political leaders were among the main proponents for military intervention. The quickly unfolding events of the Arab Spring had turned the narrative around, and the fatal French foreign policy mistakes in Tunisia came to play a key role in the French decision to intervene in Libya. The French government had greatly underestimated the force and significance of the popular protests that broke out in Tunisia in December 2010 and had lent its support to the Tunisian regime and President Ben-Alil. When the error dawned on the French government, Foreign Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie was replaced by Alain Juppé. Later, in May 2011, President Sarkozy confessed in an interview with the journal *l'Express* that he had been too late in grasping the full scope of the Arab Spring (Notin 2012, p. 53). It soon became clear that the French president had no intention of repeating his mistake when the Arab Spring spread to Libya.

The analyses of military and civilian practitioners, experts, journalists, and scholars present partly different explanations, but they agree on several points as to what made France want to intervene militarily and to do so promptly, before any other state. Official documentation shows that these incentives were a result of the unfolding of events in Libya and also domestic politics in France. However, in order for the military operation to be put into action they needed to resonate with underlying French foreign and security principles. The conditions that needed to be met were primarily demands that the operation be multilateral and that it rested on a UNSC resolution (see for example Juppé 2011), aimed to safeguard the civilian population and defend human rights, not to bring about regime change.

In line with Gaullist tradition, rather than the multilateral argument, there was strong resentment about NATO getting involved in the

operation. The alliance was perceived to have an 'aggressive image in the Arab world' and risked jeopardising support for the operation from the Arab League (Michaels 2014, referring also to Jakobsen and Moller 2012).

All of these arguments were key to the actual decision-making and they were referred to explicitly in political discourse (see below), not merely as a way to legitimise military intervention, but also as justifications for such an operation. France manifested its urge to respond to the critical Libyan situation by calling for the implementation of international principles such as that of 'Responsibility to Protect'. At the same time, it should be kept in mind that in the Libyan case, as opposed to that of Iraq, France was heavily involved in creating those conditions by defining the crisis as a situation where the responsibility to protect should be applied. This meant pushing for a UNSC resolution allowing the international community to "take all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack" (United Nation Security Council Resolution 1973, 2011), involving and getting support from the Arab League and quickly recognising the oppositional council—the National Transitional Council—as the legitimate government of Libya (Sarkozy, quoted by Watt 2011). The latter move was heavily criticised by EU diplomats who said that President Sarkozy's recognition was premature and unwise (Watt 2011).

It seems fair to argue that the French justifications for intervening in Libya emanated from a mix of domestic, foreign, and security policy factors, all of which are interlocked with international commitments and global security thinking. Domestically, the involvement in Libya is about the reconstruction of French discourse in the Maghreb from one of imperialism to one of liberation and thus restoring President Sarkozy's reputation and power position following his mistakes in Tunisia. He worked to turn the narrative around and let the world know that France knew how to stand on the side of the oppressed, knew how to support a people who wanted to revolt and to liberate themselves from tyranny (Interviews with Kempf and Ramel, October 2014).

Yet a military engagement in Libya and a manifestation of support for the popular uprising could not materialise without a legitimate Libyan party which could call on France and the international community for support. This came about when President Sarkozy met with Mustafa Abdel-Jalil, Head of the National Transitional Council (NTC) in Paris on 10 March. It was alleged that the meeting had been set up by Bernard-Henri Lévy, a well-known French intellectual and close friend of the president,

who had also brought Abdel-Jalil to France. The meeting was followed by a French recognition of the NTC "as the legitimate government of Libya" (Michaels 2014, p. 20 and Erlanger 2011). After the EU summit Sarkozy called for air strikes and in his public statement said: "The strikes would be solely of a defensive nature if Mr Gaddafi makes use of chemical weapons or air strikes against non-violent protestors" (Sarkozy cited in Watt 2011). The French move to call unilaterally for air strikes met with criticism from other European leaders and was described as a shock also to members of the French government (see for example Ward 2011). In hindsight, it seems as if both the recognition of the NTC and the statement made by Sarkozy in regards to air strikes were measures undertaken to speed up the process meant to lead to a multilateral military intervention in Libya.

Domestic political factors aside, there were also other typically French foreign and security policy triggers for intervention in the Libyan crisis. There is no reason to doubt the rhetoric of genuine concern about the threat Gaddafi's forces posed to the population, and, along with other states, France was anxious not to have another Srebrenica or Rwanda on its conscience (Watt 2011). This was about taking responsibility for the defenceless civilians on France's doorstep. Such concerns added to the pro-intervention arguments and overcame previous standpoints on Libya that France, despite the authoritarian government, had benefited from the stability that Gaddafi and his regime had provided in reference to clandestine immigrants and the fight against terrorism. There was also the issue of safeguarding oil imports. France was a major importer of Libyan oil and in return traded arms and infrastructure (Notin 2012, pp. 55–57).

It has always been part of the political culture in France to support foreign policy objectives with military means if need be—a hangover from French colonial days and a result of French security concerns for citizens living across the globe.[10] The fact that Libya is located close to mainland France (*hexagone*) meant that the security situation in Libya posed threats to French security. However, it also meant that a military operation in Libya could be coordinated and run from France, planes did not need to refuel in the air, for example, and could return to France after completing their missions. Despite the operation being the largest French naval operation since the Suez Crisis in 1956, naval forces were transferred with relative ease to the coastline outside Libya. These logistical factors have been said to have played a part in the decision-making, especially as Libya´s communications and military resources were located close to the coast (Wedin 2012). These factors also meant that as long as there was no

deployment of ground forces—a measure that was ruled out from the very beginning—the risks to French lives were seen to be relatively low.

The Role of the Military

Yet, in contrast to the political leadership, the military experts at the Le Centre de planification et conduite des opérations, (CPCO), were not as ready to intervene in Libya. Even though planning had been ongoing for some time and intelligence services had been active in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, the decision to intervene was taken very quickly by President Sarkozy. Critical commentators argue that the military had to improvise and that had the war been extended for another month the French would have run out of ammunition: "in the case of Libya, it is indeed an example of improvisation in order to obey the wishes of the president of the republic"[11] (Interview with Kempf. This is also mentioned by Géré). However, assessments made afterwards point to both military strengths and weaknesses. Although it remains unclear to what extent the USA assisted in operations, the Libyan intervention showed that the French air- and naval forces had the capacity to make a difference, together with the UK, even if stretched to the limit. Important for the future was that France, starting with the Libyan operation, came to replace the UK as the USA's closest naval ally, to a large extent due to what was seen as the successful contribution of its aircraft carrier *Charles de Gaulle* (Wedin 2012).

In sum, based on scholarly and journalistic analyses, it can be argued that France intervened in Libya in order to act on what it saw as its responsibility regarding the protection of the Libyan people, in line with the responsibility to protect principle and with international rights. The operation was seen as posing low risks to French troops and was relatively easy to manage logistically. It also offered the opportunity for France to make a global statement and reaffirm the image of France internationally as well as domestically. Furthermore, at the time of decision-making, the Libyan crisis offered a golden opportunity for France to show European leadership in collaboration with the British, to keep the USA and NATO in the backseat and reaffirm Europe as a major security and defence actor. Yet, these latter aspects should not overshadow what most experts stress: that prior foreign policy mistakes in responding to the Arab Spring in Tunisia played heavily into the rapid decision to intervene in Libya. According to several French commentators, the French urge to intervene was only partly about defending human rights and protecting a civilian population threatened by its own regime. A major driving force was President Sarkozy's effort

to repair his reputation and to restore the French discourse from one of a colonial power lending support to an oppressive regime, to France as a country founded on revolutionary values and lending its full support to a people trying to free themselves from a despot (Interviews with Ramel, Geré, and Kempf).

Concluding Discussion

Despite the four military operations explored being set in different contexts and revolving around differing types of crises, there are similarities between them with regard to the decision-making that can be related to French strategic culture, especially the normative perspective. The most prominent common denominator is the multilateral argument: France's decision to intervene militarily is justified in the name of its collective security engagements. This is most clearly emphasised in the decision to intervene in Afghanistan, where NATO article 5 is invoked, but it is also coupled with solidarity with the USA. In the case of Atalanta, France pushed for the anti-piracy activities already ongoing in the Gulf of Aden to take the shape of a European operation headed by a British operation commander, seeing this crisis as a window of opportunity for European security collaboration. In the case of Libya, the multilateral justification can also be considered to have played a part in decision-making, even if it appears not to be the primary factor for intervention. Making manifest that Europe can indeed do crisis management without having to lean on the USA was one of the determining factors, even if the USA later joined with the participating European states. In the Iraq case, finally, it was what France saw as the absence of a multilateral agreement that led to it saying 'non' to military participation.

A second feature of the strategic culture that can be traced in the decision-making of military intervention is the heavy reliance on the UN Security Council resolutions. The French government invests heavily in the development of the resolutions and applies political and diplomatic leverage to them. This was especially marked in the Libya and Iraq crises. The decision not to intervene in Iraq can to a large extent be explained by the view taken by the French leadership about the lack of a resolution allowing the use of force. Against this view, critics argued that the French had blocked the possibility to pass such a resolution. In the run up to the Libyan intervention, the situation was almost reversed. French diplomats worked hard to achieve the passing of a resolution that, in line with the principle of responsibility to protect, would allow any possible means to be used should Colonel Gaddafi continue his aggression against the population.

A third feature, connected to both multilateralism and reliance on the UN, is the willingness to assume global security responsibility, similarly to a great power yet distinct from that of the USA. This resonates with the traditional French national self-image and was made manifest in decision-making regarding the Libya and Afghanistan interventions, as well as the decision not to intervene in Iraq. In the case of Libya, acting as a great power and shouldering global responsibility meant both protecting human rights and showing military might.

The tenuous French relationship with the USA is intimately connected to great power aspirations. In the Libya intervention France was keen to keep the USA in the backseat, yet the experiences of collaborating with the Americans (in particular in regards to the use of the aircraft carrier *Charles de Gaulle*) have spurred Franco-American naval cooperation.

All four interventions are also justified on the basis of protecting human rights. This is most pronounced in the cases of Libya and Afghanistan. The domestic political driving force behind the Libyan intervention was Sarkozy's objective to restore his own and the French image abroad, added to the emphasis on human rights, averting genocide, and the classic French notion of spreading universal values, thus re-establishing and reaffirming France as a leading nation.

There seems to be little involvement of the military in these decisions. Whereas the military claimed to be ready and prepared in the Iraq crisis that resulted in no intervention, they were hesitant to intervene in Libya (and at such short notice). In the case of Afghanistan, views seem to have been divided between those who interpreted the 9/11 events as more an American than a global crisis and felt that Afghanistan had too few connections to France's spheres of interest, and those who argued that the event was ground-breaking and that immediate support should be offered to the USA. These assertions must, however, be treated with caution since there is no official documentation confirming them.

Finally, it should be noted that there are a few justifications for military intervention not directly related to the strategic culture, but instead based on rational arguments or national interest. These are most noteworthy in the Iraq case, where one stated reason for the decision not to intervene was that the French knew the US intelligence claiming to have verified the existence of Iraqi nuclear arms was false. The French leadership thought that the weapons inspections should continue according to Hans Blix's time-plan and that a military intervention would not serve the stated purpose of disarming Iraq.

Notes

1. On 22 September 2008 the president asked to prolong the French deployment in Afghanistan; on 28 January 2009 to prolong deployments in Côte d'Ivoire, Chad, Lebanon, Kosovo, and the Central African Republic; on 12 July 2011 to prolong the intervention in Libya.
2. "La France doit montrer la voix de la comprehension, du respect et du dialogue entre les peuples entre les cultures."
3. "La France s'est tenu au côté de la peuple Américain par amitié, par solidarité et aussi parce que nous savions que toutes les démocraties sont en danger lorsque une d'elle est ainsi frappé au coeur." (President Chirac, speech to the nation, 16 November 2001)
4. "Nous n'avions pas l'impression que le monde avait subitement changé. Notin 1251 Kindle."
5. It should be noted that at the time France was in a situation of 'cohabitation', with a socialist prime minister and a rightist (RPR) president.
6. Previous experiences from Iraq in the mid-90s had given France reasons not to trust US intelligence services. The Americans wanted France to mobilise against what they claimed was a deployment of Iraqi forces aiming for Kuwait. France, with the help of their own satellites, found that the American satellite images used to verify the alleged deployment were manipulated (Wedin interview).
7. However, it should be kept in mind that several European countries were critical of the US/UK decision, such as Sweden and Germany for instance.
8. Transcript of the debate available at http://www.europaparl.europa.eu.
9. Olivier Kempf, interview October 2014.
10. Several of the interviewees talk about maintaining military resources globally in order to be able to evacuate French citizens quickly in case of a crisis situation. In the Libyan case, the French evacuation was both swift and said to have been more successful than the British. See Notin, 2012.
11. "Au cas de la Libye, c'est vraiment l'exemple de l'improvisation pour obéir la volonté du président de la république."

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CHAPTER 3

To Deploy or Not to Deploy a Parliamentary Army? German Strategic Culture and International Military Operations

Anna Bergstrand and Kjell Engelbrekt

German Strategic Culture

The post-1945 core professional ethos of the German armed forces is non-expeditionary, due to a perceived need to break from Germany's militarist past of the early twentieth century. A deep-seated societal suspicion of military leaders and military activism (the polemical term for such initiatives being 'adventurism') persists and poses constraints on decisions about international military deployments for multinational operations. The resulting German strategic culture, which has been described as 'reactive, passive, and reluctant' (Junk and Daase 2013, p. 149), is not limited to hesitance in the use force but applies also to the country's foreign policy orientation and ambitions, and to the scope of executive and legislative influence on military decision-making. The latter is reflected in legal and political constraints on international military deployments, with a particularly high level of legislative scrutiny and involvement in military

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decision-making. Notably, in a 1994 ruling of the Constitutional Court, the German armed forces were expressly referred to as a 'parliamentary army' (*Parlamentsheer*).

Nonetheless, in the past two decades, Germany has gradually moved away from an aloof stance towards international military operations to an active policy of accepting a variety of roles in UN, NATO, and EU missions, including dispatching combat forces. In 1994, in response to the severe political and humanitarian crisis that accompanied the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the German government convinced the parliament (the *Bundestag*) to deploy military forces abroad for the first time since the Second World War. The German Constitutional Court ruled that the deployment of an aircraft reconnaissance component to Operation Deny Flight to enforce a no-fly zone over Bosnia would conform with Germany's basic law, so long as it received parliamentary approval. On this basis, Berlin contributed 14 Tornado fighter jets to Operation Deny Flight and subsequently, in 1995, another 3000 logistical support troops and paramedics to back up the French contingent in Bosnia as part of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) mission (Hellman et al. 2005, pp. 196–198).

Germany deepened its commitment toward stabilising the security situation in former Yugoslavia in the second half of the 1990s, with the *Bundestag* taking further decisions authorising the stationing of regular combat forces. In 1996, a relatively modest 1700 combat troops were deployed as part of the UN-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) mission, successor to IFOR, representing the first clear deviation from the country's post-1945 non-expeditionary security and defence policy, which for half a century had precluded any deployment of German troops outside its national territory. Another key juncture was Germany's decision to participate in the so-called Kosovo war of 1998–1999, prompted by Serbia's heavy-handed, widespread coercive crackdown against the Albanian separatist movement and the flight of tens of thousands of civilian Kosovars within a few weeks. Notably, the German air force took part in the military intervention, which was authorised by a NATO decision, but lacked a UN mandate. Germany contributed a further 8000 troops after a UN Security Council resolution was adopted to establish Kosovo Force (KFOR) as a peacekeeping and stabilisation mission (Mirow 2009, p. 33).

The successive development of German positions on deployment out-of-area can be described as one influenced by a strong humanitarian impulse, and more recently by concerns from smaller neighbours that

Berlin's passiveness might create conditions for instability in former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe. At present, German policymakers and advisors are experiencing increasing tensions with regard to reconciling external pressures from EU and NATO partners and allies for a more active foreign and security policy with the preferences that arise from within German society. Furthermore, some commentators say the present political system is not equipped to match supply to the demand for an enhanced German role in European and global security, as a result of its overly cumbersome, deliberative, and transparent decision-making processes (Bruhns et al. 2009; Major and Mölling 2014).

In the parlance of the analytical framework presented in Chap. 1, German decisions to participate or not to participate in international military operations are taken in a political context where strong forces pull in opposite directions. Simply put, in one corner there is the post-1945 strategic culture characterised by hesitance to commit German military personnel and assets outside of the national territory, especially in situations where kinetic action is likely to ensue. This stance resonates with several decades of German experience, and has generated a powerful normative framework to which many institutions adhere. In the opposite corner there is, as noted above, a strong humanitarian impulse to avert genocide, forced expulsion and mass atrocities, by whatever means necessary. This latter purpose challenges the norm of non-intervention. At the end of this chapter, we will try to evaluate the relative strength of either force in the four military operations examined here.

Consulting Parliament Before Taking Decisions

The evolution of German strategic culture and military policy since 1945 has occurred primarily through the *Bundestag*, supported by key institutions such as the Federal Chancellery, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Defence, along with research institutes and think tanks located around the Federal Republic. This institutional framework, with the parliament at the centre, provides a high level of civilian control of the military, ensuring that German foreign and security policy can only evolve and expand to an extent considered appropriate by the society as a whole.

The developments of the 1990s outlined above did not occur without serious reflection by German decision-makers and the public. Even many within the German armed forces resisted the notion that the parliamentary army could switch from an overwhelmingly defensive posture to one

that potentially implied an expeditionary role, including the deployment of combat troops overseas. The broader German foreign, security, and defence policy establishment, in other words, slowly and hesitantly left a comfort zone that Germany had occupied for half a century, a process that was accompanied by soul-searching and sometimes acrimonious debates. The main arena for these debates was the *Bundestag*, where an acceptance of increased deployment of German military personnel abroad evolved within key political parties, ranging from the right-leaning Christian Democratic/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) to the left-leaning Green Party (Kühn 2014; Schröder 2014).

As indicated above, the centrality of the German parliament in this shift was reaffirmed by the Constitutional Court's 1994 decision concerning the essential role of the parliament in authorising international military operations. The principle of a parliamentary army was further entrenched with the Law on the Involvement of the Parliament (*Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz*) passed on 18 March 2005, which required the legislature to formally endorse any foreign deployment of German military personnel and provided it with the power to withdraw troops already deployed (*Rückholrecht*) (Gilch 2005, pp. 147–157). Only two narrowly conceived exceptions to these wide legislative powers were provided for in the law. First, the cabinet was authorised to augment an existing mission in a situation of acute and grave danger. Secondly, an exception was made to dispatch observatory missions (*Erkundungskommando*), with only consent of the heads of the parliamentary party groups and the chairs of the foreign affairs and defence committees (Scherrer 2010).

These sweeping legislative powers mean that members of the Parliamentary Committees on Foreign Affairs and Defence are intimately involved in the preparation of international military deployments, and have significant influence on the original shaping of the mission. Beyond the parliamentary committees, three Berlin-based institutions are principally involved, namely the Ministry of Defence (MOD), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Federal Chancellery with its top-level expertise in both defence and foreign affairs.[1] Deployment of an international mission requires first and foremost an authorisation from the foreign minister, followed by detailed preparations within the relevant ministries. Three key departments of the Ministry of Defence are involved in the process, yet prepare distinct briefs: one focusing on the legal aspects of the mission, another on the coherence of the mission with German security and defence policy, and the third concerned with more technical aspects

of force generation, clarification of tasks, logistics, and other aspects of detailed preparations (Bundesministerium für Verteidigung 2014). In addition to the parliamentary oversight, the fact that all international military operations are financed from within the existing defence budget serves as another limit on the ambition and appetite for overseas deployments (Junk and Daase 2013, p. 140).

The *Bundestag* must renew each mandate for international military operations on an annual basis. This procedure, more demanding than the procedures in most other European countries, represents an additional constraint on German overseas deployment, as it effectively precludes the redirection of a military mission toward new goals mid-stream. The upside is that mandate renewals allow the *Bundestag* to revisit the legal and operational framework of each mission at regular intervals, and compare it to the potentially rapidly evolving situation in the locations where German personnel and equipment are deployed. Thus, obligatory mandate renewal creates an opportunity for staking stock and making improvements beyond the regular mission reviews conducted by NATO, the EU, or the UN. In the context of mandate renewals there are also recurrent possibilities for German policymakers to influence the decision-making process within the institutions leading the multinational missions.

When forming part of an international mission, German officials typically feel they have more insight into, and influence over, the NATO structure than the UN system. The German Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence essentially believe they have a better understanding of NATO's decision-making process and that they are more closely integrated into NATO's planning and command structure, not least because a large number of German officers at one point or another have served at the NATO headquarters in Belgium. As one MOD interlocutor succinctly put it: "with NATO you know what you get" (Bundesministerium für Verteidigung 2014). Germany, along with all other member states, is represented at high levels in NATO structures, whereas there is no comparable sense of control within the UN system. In fact, the highest ranking German officer at the UN is normally a colonel. As a result, in the frank words of an MOD official, in UN-led missions "nobody has a clue of what is going on" (Bundesministerium für Verteidigung 2014).

At an expert level, civil society also has a role to play in civilian control of the military in Germany. Government advisors, academics, and political think tank experts provide different types of input into the often intricate political negotiations that accompany decision-making

and planning processes. Although there is no formal role for civil society actors in decision-making, they are acknowledged as having indirect influence through the ties that exist between on the one hand the Federal Chancellery, the *Bundestag*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the MOD and the Joint Operations Command in Potsdam, and on the other hand key political think tanks (such as the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, and the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and other relevant NGOs (Kühn 2014). The Foundation for Science and Politics (*Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*) is particularly influential due to its non-partisan character and high-level expert advice and policy papers that sometimes bridge the gap between differing positions in the German political landscape.

In the post-Cold War period the deliberative and transparent character of German decision-making has not always managed to offset the public's deep-seated unease about the use of military force, sentiments which at times also allow for the eruption of heated debates in mass media and society at large over individual incidents and military missions. Sometimes these debates have concerned a pending decision to deploy or not to deploy German troops to a particular conflict situation, and sometimes they have been triggered over growing political tensions over a mission that some believe is exposing German military personnel to unnecessary risk or a failure to significantly improve conditions in the area to which they are deployed. Due to the especially longstanding commitment of the German armed forces to Afghanistan over the past 15 years, it is not surprising that a handful of such incidents acted as catalysts for more general concerns about the future direction of Germany's role in the world and in particular the use of its military forces outside of its own territory (Gathmann and Medick 2009; Münch 2014a).[2]

Public Perceptions of the Armed Forces and Military Operations

Despite the country's troubled military history, today's armed forces are held in high esteem in German society. For example, an opinion poll conducted in 2010 surveyed respondents' personal attitude towards the German armed forces (the *Bundeswehr*): 50 % responded that they had a very positive attitude; 35 % positive; 10 % negative attitude; and 5 % very negative (Statista 2010a). Results for this poll have been consistent since 1997: the responses 'very positive' and 'positive' have never fallen

below 76 % (1997), and peaked at 86 % in 2003, 2007 and 2009 (Statista 2010b).

This positive conception of the military is not, however, accompanied by a readiness to accept international military interventions by the German armed forces. In fact, a strong public preference for Germany's approach since 1945 of avoiding military engagements can be seen throughout most survey results. For instance, in a 2011 poll, 66 % of participants responded that international operations should not be expanded; 28 % were in favour of expansion and 6 % were undecided (Statista 2011). Nonetheless, a predisposition to prefer not sending German troops abroad does not negatively affect the evaluation of their work once deployed there. Indeed, when asked to rate Germany's performance in ongoing missions abroad, 68 % rated it positively, only 26 % negatively, and 6 percent were undecided (Statista 2012).

The latter result is presumably connected to the fact that all significant exceptions to Germany's non-expeditionary predisposition during the past 20 years were justified on humanitarian grounds, that is, interventions to halt mass expulsions (especially ethnic cleansing), atrocities perpetrated against civilians, or the threat of genocide. The framing of the intervention, as humanitarian or military in its purpose, thus "plays a decisive role in shaping public opinion towards acceptance or rejection" (Junk and Daase 2013, p. 147). The tendency of the *Bundestag*, which is heavily influenced by German public opinion, to be highly selective with respect to approving of German participation in international military operations, and to do so primarily in the pursuit of humanitarian ends and not with reference to regional stability—let alone a German national interest—is likely to persist (Mirow 2009, pp. 29, 37, 62, 71). Perhaps as a result of the comprehensive review that normally precedes a decision to deploy, support for a military mission, once authorised, tends to continue uncontested. As a matter of fact, so far all mandate renewals in the *Bundestag* have gone ahead unchallenged (Junk and Daase 2013, p. 143).

Nevertheless, 20 years of participation in international military operations did not prepare the German armed forces and the MOD for the major challenges of 2014–2015. Both institutions now found themselves uniquely preoccupied by the escalation of several simultaneous flashpoints in Europe and the Middle East, dealing with growing expectations that Berlin would also use coercive instruments to help stem unrest and instability. Ukraine, where Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula and fomented Russian-speaking separatism, presented a dual security problem

in terms of undermining the close economic engagement with Moscow that Germany has promoted since the mid-1990s and countering the assertive military posture of Russian forces toward neighbours in Central and Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, in the Middle East, allies and partners urged Germany to commit personnel and equipment to help thwart the threat of Islamic radicalism and territorial expansion. In mid-2014 Berlin agreed to help train and arm the Kurdish Peshmerga forces who had taken up the struggle against well-equipped Islamic State militants threatening to overrun all of northern Iraq as well as eastern Syria, seriously contemplating taking the lead in this effort among European countries.

Given Germany's usual hesitance to extend its commitments beyond financial and monetary policy, it looks likely that expectations of Germany assuming a more active stance on security and defence matters abroad will sooner or later clash with hard domestic and economic realities. Faced with a spectrum of challenges, ranging from numerous faulty military aircraft unable to move personnel and military equipment to stepping up with additional resources to meet alliance commitments against the backdrop of a reluctant German public, Berlin needs to carefully weigh its options in the short as well as medium term (*Der Spiegel* 2014). In 2014 the defence budget stood at an unimpressive 1.29 % of GDP and €32.8 billion, but was set to shrink further rather than to grow, despite the apparently expanding aspirations of German foreign policy, made public by some of its most prominent representatives (Gauck 2014).

Most analysts appear to agree that Germany needs to extract more 'bang for the euro' it spends on defence, not least with regard to its deployments abroad. Although precise calculations are notoriously hard to make, the direct costs for the Afghanistan mission—lasting more than a decade—are estimated by German authorities to range between €10 and €11 billion (Mayntz 2013), with total expenses for all foreign deployments amounting to above €17 billion (*Bundestag* 2013). Meanwhile, the widely respected German Institute for Economic Research (*Deutches Institut für Wirtschaftsforchung*) already projected in 2010 that overall costs for Germany's involvement in Afghanistan, counting all indirect expenses and economic consequences, might reach as high as between €26 and €47 billion (Brück et al. 2010). Of course, neither of these estimates have ways of factoring in intangible costs and benefits associated with Germany's standing in the transatlantic alliance, in Europe, and globally, as a result of assuming responsibilities in international military operations after the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989.

Germany's Military Participation in Afghanistan

On 11 October 2001 German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder pledged a contribution to the US-led military operations in Afghanistan despite a sense of reticence felt in German society and among lawmakers, not least within his own Social Democratic Party (SPD), and from his coalition partner, the Green Party. These reservations had already been cast aside when on 12 September 2001, the chancellor described Germany's solidarity with America as "unlimited" (*uneingeschränkt*) in the face of the terrorist threat (Schröder 2001). Ultimately, military support was garnered on the basis of this solidarity, coupled with Germany's firm commitment to multilateralism and a fear for the repercussions if Washington were to go it alone (Holländer 2007, pp. 100–103).

Schröder would, in the next few months, muster a formidable political effort to shore up support for an unprecedented German military engagement in Afghanistan, which would amount to the largest international military deployment since the Second World War. But he was not alone in this difficult political endeavour. An important ally was Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer from the Green Party, whose considerable credibility in left-leaning parties across Europe was instrumental in forging a compromise that saw German leaders robustly supporting the broad-based International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) (Longhurst 2004, pp. 83–84). Following the Petersberg conference in late November/early December of 2001, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution that paved the way for a political and military arrangement in which NATO would form the core and be able to operate side by side with US forces (Holländer 2007, pp. 95–97). The German parliament authorised its part of the operation in two separate votes held on 16 November and 22 December of that year.

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the initial combat mission to Afghanistan, quickly became a controversial subject in German society, despite the high levels of societal empathy with the United States in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Schröder, perhaps anticipating the societal hesitation, raised the stakes for left-wing legislators in his own SPD and the Green Party who threatened to defect on the Afghanistan vote, by coupling it with a vote of confidence that could have brought down the cabinet and triggered early elections. This tactic worked, although resistance to the idea in parliament persisted. Almost three months later, the government bill containing the details of the mission was adopted by

a margin of merely ten votes. By this time, however, Kabul had already been brought under the control of US forces, so the majority of the 3900 troops pledged by Berlin were deployed to the Horn of Africa to ease American responsibilities in that part of the Atlantic Ocean (Mirow 2009, pp. 66–67).

Schröder justified the German participation to legislators prior to the second critical vote on 22 December 2001, saying that

> the international peacekeeping mission is thus consistent with an act of political will. It is consistent with a solidarity that I call—and I remain steadfast on this point—unrestricted, precisely because the act involves the use of military means. It is consistent with what we during the past months have conceived of and implemented in this respect (Bundestag 2001).[3]

The German chancellor asked the legislators to endorse an explicitly "robust" mandate, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, authorising the use of force. At the same time, Schröder assured legislators that German troops would only be stationed in and around the capital, Kabul; that they would follow a separate chain of command, which the US Central Command had no direct authority over; and that Dutch and Danish troops would form part of the German-led contingent—all features of the mandate that were seen to make the decision more palatable to German citizens.

In fact, this was not the only occasion on which different rationales were employed by German political leaders to justify involvement in Afghanistan. Whereas the chancellor emphasised the significance of solidarity and alliance commitments, former defence minister and prominent member of the opposition CDU Volker Rühe highlighted Germany's self-interest in combatting violent political extremism:

> it is nevertheless clear that we are sending soldiers to Afghanistan in order to decisively combat international terrorism, so that it will be unable to carry out attacks in Germany itself (Bundestag 2011, p. 20, 834).[4]

This justification was closer to the one given by the American presidential administration, but was also clearly reflective of genuine concerns that German authorities had following the al-Qaida attacks on the United States. One of the ringleaders of the attacks, Mohammed Atta, had spent several years in Hamburg and authorities were still unable to fully assess

the threat level of political extremists carrying out comparable terrorist activities inside Germany or elsewhere in Europe. Given the possibility that German extremists with both capacity and intent could be part of a transnational network, possibly with ties to al-Qaida training camps in the Middle East, German decision-makers could not separate counterterrorism efforts at home from the American-led effort in Afghanistan.

Notably, the contingent that first arrived in Afghanistan in 2002 consisted of logistic and paramedic units and a small special forces outfit there to perform 'police-like' tasks. Later, the German mission expanded to 3500 troops, mainly engaged in stabilisation and provincial reconstruction efforts in northern Afghanistan and in the Kabul region. The location of German military deployments meant that the Germans faced a substantially less difficult security environment than their American, British, and French counterparts. However, this changed in the wake of the US 'surge' in 2009: as an additional 30,000 American soldiers were deployed to make inroads into Taliban-dominated territory, the number of German casualties mounted. The surge stretched the formal mandate granted by the German parliament, with its strict caveats constraining combat activities to those necessary for individual and collective self-defence, to its limits (Mirow 2009, p. 72). In at least one case, where caveats for Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) missions excluded flying over the territories of neighbouring states, the rigidity actually precluded the use of German aircraft for much-needed reconnaissance missions (Antrag der Bundesregierung 2009).

The German mandate evolved over time. Government and military experts assisted the parliamentary committees in the decisions required as part of the annual mandate renewal process. One major change took place in mid-2003–2004, when Germany accepted responsibility for two out of five Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), namely Kunduz and Fayzabad. In 2006 Germany accepted responsibility for training soldiers for the Afghan National Army, and in mid-2008 it assumed leadership of the Quick Reaction Force in the Northern Command. The 2008 renewal was by far the most significant decision in this period, because it transferred authority from OEF to ISAF so that German forces could better fulfil their responsibilities with the two PRTs, and in doing so restricted the purview of national decision-making authority (Münch 2011).

These mandate extensions inevitably rendered German troops more exposed to attacks from the Taliban and other rebel forces. By May 2013 Germany had sustained a total of 57 losses in Afghanistan. This was by far

the highest number of casualties for the German armed forces since the end of the Second World War. Suicide and roadside bombs were responsible for most deaths in the German contingent; but the rate of combat deaths also rose in connection with the US-led surge as the twentieth century drew to a close.

Withdrawal from Afghanistan also proved to be complicated. The official justifications provided in late 2001 regarding 'alliance commitments' and 'combatting terrorism' were vague and lacked prerequisites to assess when the job was done. When other coalition partners started to announce their planned withdrawal in 2009–2010, the German government and the *Bundestag* started to search for criteria that would justify a drawdown of forces. Ultimately, Berlin determined that its desired end state was one where Taliban forces would be unable to return to power, the constitution of Afghanistan would remain in force, and authorities providing security and basic services in Afghani society would be consolidated (Bundesregierung 2010, p. 1). This meant that the German government would essentially be satisfied as long as Afghanistan did not revert to Taliban rule or become a failed state, a stunningly low bar for declaring operational success.

Germany Rejects Participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom

In stark contrast to the "unlimited solidarity" which the German government expressed for the US intervention in Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks, Washington's evolving plans to invade Iraq garnered very little German sympathy (Hedstück and Hellmann 2003). Initially, senior political figures exercised restraint in commenting on the planned intervention. The sole exception to this was Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer's response to a hypothetical question about Berlin's inclination to join forces with the United States against Iraq, retorting that an alliance partner like Germany is no "satellite" to the world's sole surviving superpower (Die Welt 2002). Beyond this, Fischer avoided openly critical remarks about the evolving American plans to intervene militarily in Iraq. For more than half of 2002, this reticence was also the stance of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. In the early days of the election campaign, the chancellor at times repeated the well-worn "unlimited solidarity" formula, but also hinted that Germany would "not be at disposal for adventures" (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2002).

However, in late 2002, during the final phase of the election campaign, Schröder and other key Social Democratic leaders began to criticise the planned American intervention. In late September 2002, the *New York Times* quoted the chancellor saying that George W. Bush would be making "a big mistake" if he invaded Iraq (New York Times 2002). It was remarks made by Defence Minister Peter Struck and Justice Minister Herta Däubler-Gmelin, however, that attracted the most acrimonious criticism for being perceived as outwardly anti-American. Most controversially, Däubler-Gmelin made an analogy between Bush and Hitler, for which the chancellor subsequently expressed regret in a personal letter to the American president (Frankfurter Rundschau 2002). Angela Merkel, then leader of the centre-right opposition, distanced herself from such anti-American remarks and said she could imagine German military support for the US-led intervention in Iraq.

Overall, German public opposition to military intervention in Iraq was strong and consistent. There was very little support for Germany participating in a 'coalition of the willing' that would act outside of a UN Security Council mandate: according to polls some 80 % of Germans objected to a military deployment to Iraq (Global Policy Forum 2002). It should be noted that the transatlantic rift, with France and Germany pitted against the US and the UK in opposition to the Iraq invasion, deepened in early 2003, with further repercussions on German public opinion. On 5 February, German Foreign Minister Fischer presided over the critical UN Security Council meeting where his US counterpart, Colin Powell, presented patchy, and ultimately faulty, evidence suggesting that Iraq was illegally building weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Berlin, Paris, Moscow, and Beijing joined together in withholding the formal authorisation that Washington and London had requested for the intervention.

Furthermore, Berlin openly sided with the French position which was that the US had no justifiable grounds for invading Iraq. In a short speech at the Security Council, the German foreign minister, temporarily setting his role as chair aside, argued that

> [t]he dangers of a military action and its consequences are plain to see. Precisely because of the effectiveness of the work of the inspectors, we must continue to seek a peaceful solution to the crisis (UN Security Council 2003).

Albeit expressing himself with moderation, Fischer thus distanced himself from the accusations leveraged by the US and the UK against Baghdad

regarding gross and serious violations of international accords on the development and production of WMDs. His position was strongly supported by the German cabinet and domestic public opinion. Though Germany was critical in thwarting a UN-mandated intervention into Iraq, it was unable to halt the military operation altogether. Washington now turned to Plan B: establishing a coalition of the willing, comprised of NATO and regional allies in the Middle East.

Despite its robust stance against a UN mandate, Germany still needed to balance its interests in a continued strong transatlantic alliance. Thus, Germany did not attempt to impede the activities of the coalition of the willing and even provided limited and indirect facilitation for US and UK participation in the intervention. Germany allowed overflights by US aircraft destined for Iraq, assigned some 7000 soldiers to assist in guarding US bases in Germany against heightened security risks, and maintained German military personnel on AWACS reconnaissance aircraft, despite their inevitable involvement in the overall war effort. Three years later, the German Federal Administrative Court ruled that this type of support constitutes participation in the war, which in Iraq had involved violations of international law (Bundesverwaltungsgericht 2005). In a comparable conflict where major NATO partners demand that German military personnel and assets are put to the disposal of a mission with a questionable legal basis, Berlin might therefore be inclined to say no.

Relatively little is known about the views of senior German military leaders regarding the transatlantic friction that resulted from vocal criticism of the US administration's intervention in Iraq during the second half of 2002 (Hedstück and Hellmann 2003). It is certainly no secret that several senior military leaders were concerned by the risk of 'alliance damage' (*Bündnisschaden*) as a result of the Iraq debacle. It seems that both Germany and the US invested great efforts towards mending the relationship in years that followed, not least by reining in critical discourse by public officials. In the context of NATO headquarters and other arenas where US and German military personnel collaborate on a routine basis, however, the fallout seems to have been limited.

Atalanta: Smooth Sailing Through the *Bundestag*

On 19 December 2008 the German *Bundestag* approved a substantive contribution to the EU-led Atalanta mission. The German contribution consisted of 1400 soldiers who were assigned to oversee a vast area

covering 500 sea miles off the coast of Somalia, and the corresponding air space (Bundesregierung 2008). In comparison with the two previous operations discussed above, the Atalanta deployment was relatively non-controversial and considered to be largely in line with the desires and interests of Germany and German public opinion. The left-wing party *Die Linke* was the only one to oppose a German military deployment, instead proposing an international coast guard to 'multilateralize' the effort in support of the Somali government (Bundestag 2008, p. 21,346).

At the time of the *Bundestag* debates, the government consisted of a 'grand coalition' led by Angela Merkel as Chancellor, encompassing the CDU/CSU and the SPD as the two largest political entities, a circumstance which may have helped further suppress public criticism. Nonetheless, despite the deeply ingrained German unwillingness to send troops abroad, the Atalanta operation faced very few objections. Another reason for this may have been that German naval units already formed part of OEF launched in 2001–2002, running smoothly since then and without causing political tensions. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the *Bundestag* stated that the purpose of Atalanta, including its German component, would be to protect civilian vessels carrying humanitarian aid and commercial cargo, and monitor the coastline (Auswärtiges Ausschuss 2008). These goals were not seen as controversial in the eyes of the political parties, and thus, the deployment was not contested. Furthermore, the mission did not entail extensive costs for Germany compared to the massive ISAF undertaking; the total costs of Atalanta involvement including 2014 are estimated at €291 million (Bundeswehr 2014).

It is not surprising that the Atalanta operation was considered to align with Germany's strategic interests. With China and the United States, Germany ranks as one of the world's top trading nations, and the Atalanta operation was essentially a mission to protect cargo traffic along vulnerable sea lanes. Beyond protecting its own national interests, Germany's participation was also perceived as safeguarding freedom of navigation along the Somali coast for the benefit of key trading partners. The overlapping interests of Germany and the international community were emphasised by parliamentarian Reiner Arnold of the SPD (Bundestag 2008, p. 21,350):

> I believe people in Germany understand very well why, in this case, it is in our national interest to undertake this effort together with other countries. It cannot be seriously contended that the world's number one trading nation, as has happened before, leaves others to do its own bidding. No, this time we will be actively contributing.[5]

A leading representative of the other party in the grand coalition, the CDU, expressed a similar standpoint, speaking not only about Germany's trade interests, but also the responsibility of major trading nations in general (Bundestag 2008, p. 21,345):

> In this context we have as the world's greatest trading nation a special interest in safeguarding the routes of international trade, not least at sea. That is particularly the case for the route through the Gulf of Aden, which is increasingly threatened by pirates. Piracy is clearly not a new phenomenon, as we all know.[6]

In the same debate, the SPD parliamentarian Kurt Bodewig highlighted the broader implications of piracy in the Gulf of Aden for global trade, implying a wider commitment to the world at large (Bundestag 2008, p. 21,354):

> This sea is the most important trade route between Europe and Asia. It is a needle's eye, and it is quite easy to shut down. 20,000 vessels travel through it every year. That is, we have a responsibility here, and it is a worldwide responsibility.[7]

The quote subtly suggests that left-wing lawmakers in particular justified Germany's contribution to the Atalanta mission through a combination of two dimensions, one concentrating on maritime issues relevant for all exporting nations and another on support for regional stability and security (Bundestag 2008, p. 21,354). By extension, the latter also pertained to the Somali population, reliant on incoming shipments of food aid and other supplies.

The *Bundestag* followed its usual approach of systematically probing and analysing the reasons for deploying the original Atalanta mission. In the ensuing debates parliamentarians were often divided between whether the humanitarian or trade imperative should be emphasised. Some left-leaning members, while acknowledging the importance of uninterrupted transport at sea, were adamant that Germany's participation in Atalanta was first and foremost a humanitarian operation impacting the livelihoods of the people of Somalia (see, for example, SPD Rolf Mützenich at Bundestag 2008, p. 21,343).

Yet there was also a sobering discussion regarding the security situation in Somalia, in which parliamentarians appeared sceptical that the maritime operation could help alleviate the problems emanating from the

country, including the scourge of piracy. Representatives of the opposition Liberal Party (FDP) strongly emphasised that without security on land it is unlikely there will ever be security at sea. Eckart von Klaeden of the CDU, among others, addressed the necessity of helping to strengthen the capacity of coastal countries to enhance the security of shipping through measures on land (Bundestag 2008, p. 21,346).

> The shipping industry itself can bolster security on board, improve communications among ships sailing in the same waters, and see to that ports are safe and that port authorities cater for the safety of visiting vessels.[8]

Apart from the primary goals described in the government bill, some legislators indicated a potential for broader security benefits through increased cooperation. CDU legislator Ruprecht Polenz, for example, anticipated that the collaborative nature of Atalanta, extending beyond EU member states to include countries like India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Russia, would encourage coordination among the naval vessels present in the Gulf of Aden. Polenz in particular expressed expectations for enhanced collaboration between Germany and Russia on anti-piracy measures, with positive repercussions for the wider security policy relationship (Bundestag 2008, p. 21,346).

Though the hoped-for enhancement of Russian-German cooperation did not materialise, the enhanced UN Security Council mandate for the Atalanta mission (Resolution 1851/2008), along with enhanced commercial security readiness and the dissemination of best practices of the International Maritime Organization in 2009, did create new opportunities for averting hijackings and more concerted action among navies. In 2010 and 2011, the number of piracy incidents was brought down through a variety of measures on the part of the shipping industry and naval forces present in the Gulf of Aden. In 2012, Atalanta also made use of the new prerogatives of UN Security Council Resolution 1851 to destroy equipment and fuel on the Somali shore for preventive purposes (Sörenson and Widén 2014, pp. 414–415).

Despite that, Atalanta never was a contested deployment of German military personnel and assets, and the civil-military exchanges preceding the decision to deploy were rigorous. Parliamentary debates explored the options and the potential problems associated with the mission, and the government weighed the identified risks against the likely benefits before taking a well-informed decision. Given the clear German interest in the

functioning of international shipping and a humanitarian motive, along with an opportunity of gaining experience from operating alongside EU partners in a joint mission outside NATO, Berlin could unreservedly support the Atalanta operation.

Libya: Facilitation Without Participation

In most cases, Germany is not actively involved in UN Security Council deliberations leading up to a resolution allowing for a military intervention on the part of the international community. But in early 2011, when Resolution 1973 authorised the use of force to protect Libyan civilians from atrocities by the Gaddafi regime, Germany held a non-permanent council seat. The most active governments encouraging intervention at the time were France and the UK, with representatives lobbying in the UN Security Council, the G8, the EU, and NATO. Berlin did not move decisively against the desires of Paris and London in any of these international fora, but ultimately abstained from voting at the critical 17 March UN Security Council meeting, placing Germany in the same category as India, Brazil, China, and Russia (Rinke 2011).

As far as can be ascertained, FDP party leader and foreign minister Guido Westerwelle and his staff exerted considerable influence over the German decision to withhold endorsement regarding an intervention in Libya in March 2011. As mentioned above, the domestic procedure for provisional planning for German participation in international military operations requires consent from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which in turn is in contact with the Federal Chancellery (Author's interviews 2014). This time the Foreign Ministry's stance was sufficiently negative that a formal bill (*Antrag*), which would prompt deliberations on the composition and assignment of military units, never reached the *Bundestag*. Due the impression of the 'alliance costs' incurred by Germany's stance in Iraq in 2003, Berlin nevertheless made sure that its reservations would not block a coalition of close allies who wished to go forward, especially as it acted on an explicit UN Security Council mandate. Germany would thus facilitate, but not participate in, the Libya campaign subsequently organised and led by NATO.

Despite German reservations on intervention in Libya, the US, France, and the UK ultimately convinced their allies to conduct the operation under the auspices of NATO (Chivvis 2013). Unsurprisingly, the issue

was hotly contested in Germany: five different debates on Libya were held in the *Bundestag*—and notably not delegated to the foreign affairs and defence committees—between 23 February and 24 March 2011. The key issue facing German lawmakers was not whether Germany would participate in Operation Unified Protector (OUP) but whether regular resources provided to NATO by the German defence forces would remain available for utilisation during the operation, or if Berlin would pull them out for the duration of the conflict. One question was to what extent the country's commitment to the alliance required Germany to place its resources at NATO's disposal. Another question was to what extent the mission would in fact be jeopardised if all German personnel and equipment were barred from use.

For all of the attention brought to the issue of Germany's reluctant facilitation of OUP through the *Bundestag* debates in early 2011, there were a number of details that remained opaque during the course of the military campaign. Only in mid-August that year did news reports begin to reveal the full extent to which German military personnel had been providing important contributions to the overall NATO effort (Gebauer 2011). It has been suggested that an additional reason why the government, as well as many parliamentarians, preferred Germany's facilitation of the allied war effort to be temporarily kept outside the public realm was the then upcoming elections in Baden-Württenberg and Rhineland-Palatinate. Had the extent of Germany's indirect support to the Libya intervention been made public, both major parties would have been vulnerable to criticisms (Rinke 2011).

German reservations about the efficacy of using military means in Libya and more generally in North Africa during the Arab Spring were significant and in many cases well-reasoned. A number of lawmakers voiced serious concerns regarding what they viewed as the likely negative repercussions of international intervention, only slightly mitigated by the fact that this intervention—in contrast to the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the US with the participation of UK forces—had been authorised by the UN Security Council:

– a number of German parliamentarians, including Foreign Minister Westerwelle, cautioned against the effective suspension of the diplomatic route as a result of Resolution 1973 (Bundestag 2011c, Plenarprotokoll 17/97, p. 11,138, Plenarprotokoll 17/95, p. 10,826);

- several lawmakers expressed deep scepticism concerning the prospects of the intervention leading to a stable political situation in Libya, given the absence of robust political and government structures apart from the Gaddafi regime and its entourage (Bundestag 2011b, Plenarprotokoll 17/93, p. 10,479);
- political leaders in Berlin appeared unswayed—certainly much less so than their counterparts in Paris, London, Washington, and New York—by the fragile endorsement provided by the Arab League for the actions being prepared at the UN and NATO headquarters.

Notably, the transcript of the parliamentary proceedings in Berlin demonstrates that German decision-makers were well aware that support from the Arab and Muslim world for a Western-led intervention was paper-thin and could be easily overturned, with potentially severe implications for Middle East politics more generally (Bundestag 2011a, Plenarprotokoll 17/95, p. 10,820). In contrast, pro-intervention allies in Brussels and New York skilfully exploited the Arab League endorsement to undermine the positions of sceptics and opponents (Engelbrekt 2014).

Overall, the German parliamentary debates reflect the inclination of lawmakers to seriously engage with matters of international military operations. But they also demonstrate a strong preference for non-military approaches and hesitancy on the part of many decision-makers to accept the motives of Germany's transatlantic and European allies as the basis for robust action. This is especially visible in the statements of the German foreign minister in early 2011, which consistently opposed a military solution; media reports at the time characterised this as an ingrained "culture of military restraint" (Fichtner 2011). At the very least, the Libya crisis indicated that German politicians and society at large were unable to respond swiftly to a rapidly evolving situation, in contrast to NATO and EU member states with a more 'expeditionary' experience and outlook.[9]

As fears of mid- to long-term implications for Germany's position in the EU and NATO were taken into account, a considerable amount of self-criticism was expressed. Interestingly, among the first to voice concerns about the fact that Germany had not clearly sided with its closest allies on Libya were representatives of the Green Party, who prior to the Balkan wars of the 1990s had taken a dim view of German military engagements (Bundestag 2011d, Plenarprotokoll 17/99, p. 11,411). Perhaps predictably, the hard-hitting *Der Spiegel* magazine went further, quoting officials

in the Ministry of Defence and the Federal Chancellery calling the decision to abstain in the UN Security Council vote a “foreign policy suicide” (Fichtner 2011). This tendency to exert self-criticism over the political headaches caused by the Iraq and Libya crises has on the other hand induced German officials to try and shape a more forward-looking outlook in the security and defence establishment (Bundeskanzleramt 2014).

Conclusion

Germany in the mid-2010s is perhaps best described as an ambivalent country, caught between a strategic culture that evolved in the aftermath of the Second World War and built around a defensive posture, and the realities and expectations of allies and partners concerning a more active stance on security challenges in Europe’s neighbourhood. Were it not for the powerful humanitarian impulse stemming from within German society, this reticence may very well have remained unchallenged. As events have unfolded in the past 15–20 years, however, a sense of responsibility beyond Germany’s political and economic commitment to the EU and NATO has clearly evolved, and is reflected in the seriousness with which decision-makers deliberate on foreign, security, and defence policy in the executive and legislative branches of the government.

This vacillation should therefore probably be seen as a part of a process of reformulating Germany’s mid- to long-term policy and strategy in the area of international military operations. The country’s participation in Afghanistan in the ISAF mission, although initially encountering strong resistance from prominent policymakers and large segments of the German public, did over time in fact render the armed forces more experienced and more capable with respect to international military deployments. Simultaneously, public scepticism about sending troops overseas rose significantly during first decade of German deployment in Afghanistan (Alessi 2013). These conflicting pressures continued to create a contradictory set of incentives for the German government. The decisions not to partake in the Iraq and Libya interventions, meanwhile, underscore the legal and political constraints on Berlin. The shining exception since 2001 is the Atalanta mission, where German self-interest and a clear contribution to an international public good—freedom of navigation—intersected and led to an uncontroversial decision to deploy troops.

Legal and political constraints extend to the armed forces, which will need to be restructured in order to be more effective in out-of-area

operations. While the Afghanistan experience seriously challenged the non-expeditionary strategic culture of the German military and opened it up to new forms of military engagement, it remains to be seen if the strategic culture has been modified to the extent that future German contributions to international military operations will be designed in ways that better suit the actual mission at hand. The ISAF operation suggests that in the absence of lucid political and strategic guidance the armed forces continue to be self-referential and heavily influenced by doctrines and procedures associated with Cold War defensive posture (Münch 2014b, p. 335).

Among promising developments in recent years is the overhaul of Ministry of Defence units charged with provisional and full-scale planning of international military operations, which was completed in 2010–2011. This reorganisation seems to have substantially improved the prerequisites for comprehensive coordination to support political decision-makers between civil servants, ranking officers, and policy analysts. Similarly promising is the forward-looking conceptualisation of novel decision-making and planning procedures aimed at making German security and defence policy more agile, pro-active, and able to integrate with collaborative military operations in and around Europe (Major and Mölling 2014). Ultimately, this may allow for a more active approach to security and defence policy, including the use of military force in serious conflict situations.

Despite these developments, Germany's institutionalised scepticism against rapid and large-scale deployments outside the territory of EU and NATO member states, and continued doubts about employing kinetic military action, are unlikely to change soon. As an economic powerhouse and stabilising core of the European continent, Germany already provides a much-needed backstop that helps counter the aspirations of non-European great powers, such as Russia, and stem the rise of centrifugal forces within the EU and NATO. Its considerable defence industry and intelligence capabilities ensure that it plays a pivotal role in broader security policy commitments. Although Berlin has increasingly sought to respond to the calls of European and NATO allies since 2001, it would be unrealistic to expect a substantive break from entrenched political traditions around military deployments. Germany, while playing a central role in Europe, is therefore unlikely to be a substitute for, or even rival, the expeditionary capacity and competence of the UK, France, and regional coalitions of EU and NATO partners in the years to come.

Notes

1. A new Department for Strategy and Military Operations (*Abteilung Strategie und Einsatz*) was created 2013 to support the inspector general of the German armed forces when it comes to shaping missions. In part, the new department replaces the Command Staff of the Armed Forces II (*Führungsstabes der Streitkräfte (Fü S) II*). Another unit at the Ministry of Defence, the Pol I 2 unit, cooperates closely with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and represents the Ministry of Defence in parliamentary deliberations (the full name of the unit is *Pol I 2 Sicherheitspolitische Grundlagen für die Beteiligung der Bundeswehr an Einsätzen und Missionen und Interessenvertretung in den Vereinten Nationen*).
2. A widely publicised such incident occurred in Afghanistan in September 2009, in which the bombing of a fuel transport following a Taliban hijacking attack may have killed as many as 142 Afghans among whom most were civilians. This only ultimately led to consequences for the political and military leaders involved. At the end of 2009 the commander in chief, General Wolfgang Schneiderhahn, and Defence Minister Franz Josef Jung were both replaced, and Afghan families affected were offered monetary compensation without the German authorities admitting liability (Gebauer 2010).
3. Author's translation. The original German reads: "Die internationale Friedenstruppe ist also die Konsequenz politisch entschiedenen Handelns. Sie ist die Konsequenz einer Solidarität, die ich, dabei bleibe ich, uneingeschränkt genannt habe, weil sie sich eben auch auf den Gebrauch militärischer Mittel bezog. Sie ist die Konsequenz dessen, was in den letzten Monaten an Möglichkeiten entwickelt und durchgesetzt worden ist."
4. Author's translation. The original German reads: "Wir schicken doch Soldaten nach Afghanistan, um ganz entscheidend den internationalen Terrorismus zu bekämpfen, damit er auch in Deutschland keine Chance hat, Anschläge durchzuführen."
5. The original German reads: "Ich denke, die Menschen in Deutschland verstehen sehr genau, warum es im nationalen Interesse liegt, dass wir unseren Beitrag zusammen mit anderen Nationen dort leisten. Es kann doch nicht ernsthaft sein, dass sich das Handelsland Nummer eins darauf verlässt, dass wieder einmal die anderen die Kastanien aus dem Feuer holen. Nein, wir leisten unseren Beitrag."

6. The original German reads: “Dabei haben wir als weltweit größte Exportnation ein besonderes Interesse an der Sicherung der Welthandelswege insbesondere auf See. Das gilt besonders für die Route durch den Golf von Aden, die in zunehmendem Maße von Piraten bedroht wird. Piraterie ist sicherlich kein neues Phänomen, wie wir alle wissen.”
7. The original German reads: “Dieses Seegebiet ist die wichtigste Handelsroute zwischen Europa und Asien. Es ist ein Nadelöhr, und es ist relativ einfach, es zu schließen. 20 000 Schiffe fahren jährlich hindurch. Das heißt, wir haben hier eine Verantwortung, und zwar eine weltweite Verantwortung.”
8. The original German reads: “Dazu gehört erstens, die Sicherheit an Bord zu verbessern, um Piratenangriffe zu vereiteln, zum Beispiel durch eine bessere Kommunikation zwischen den Schiffen und durch mehr Schutz durch die mit der Seeschifffahrt befassten Stellen in den Küstenstaaten.”
9. The German term *Alleingang* (‘walking’ or ‘acting’ alone) was soon bandied about in the press, as commentators and analysts sought to explain and characterise the outcome of the Libya crisis with regard to Berlin’s response. The term seems apt in the limited sense of describing Germany sharply and somewhat surprisingly (to the allies) deviating from the stance of its closest political partners. Yet the term is misleading in its deeper meaning, inferring that Germany would have deliberately chosen to deviate. In fact, Paris and London inevitably left Berlin behind in the increasingly fast-paced diplomatic manoeuvring that took place on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean in the first three months of 2001. In effect, the German government and its *Bundestag* in particular were outpaced as a result of the formal and informal constraints on foreign, security, and defense policy in the federal republic.

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CHAPTER 4

Keeping a Low Profile: Greek Strategic Culture and International Military Operations

Stamatia Boskou and Kjell Engelbrekt

Greek Strategic Culture

The major security challenges Greece faced during the Third Hellenic Republic have arguably had serious implications for Greek strategic culture.[1] In 1974, when Turkey exploited the meddling of the Greek military junta into the affairs of Cyprus by invading the northern part of the island, these two NATO members in Europe's southeast stopped just short of full-scale military confrontation. In the early 1990s, furthermore, the disbandment of communist systems and the Warsaw Pact unleashed nationalistic fervour in Slavic- and Albanian-speaking neighbours to Greece's north, famously prompting a conflict over whether 'Macedonia' ultimately denotes a cultural heritage rightfully claimed by Greece or a geographic location situated in the (Former Yugoslav) Republic of Macedonia.

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The continuing rivalry with Turkey produces recurring challenges to Greek airspace and occasional major incidents, such as the Imia crisis of 1996, while the dispute with Skopje has been contained at the level of contentious diplomacy. The official Greek National Defence Policy outlines what can be referred to as traditional priorities of Greek security and defence policy, namely “the preservation of peace and our country’s territorial integrity and the protection of national independence, sovereignty and safety of our people from any external attacks or threats” (Antonakopoulos 2004, p. 65; Ministry of National Defence 2014a).

Commentators identify three noteworthy characteristics of contemporary Greek strategic culture. One such characteristic is public opinion, which is said to operate as an important factor that to some degree enables, but above all, constrains the government in its decision-making powers (Dokos 2014; Nalmpantis 2014). The general public is rarely supportive of foreign deployment of the Greek armed forces and even less so when casualties are feared. With a strong public perception that Greece’s security is threatened by challenges in its immediate neighbourhood, Greek citizens expect their representatives to primarily concentrate on challenges close to home (Ioakimidis 2003, p. 104). Furthermore, decisions to participate in foreign missions will almost certainly encounter criticism from left-wing parties strongly opposed to virtually all forms of foreign deployment by the Hellenic National Defence Forces (HNDF) (Basaras 2014; Nalmpantis 2014; Lelas 2014).

However, even though public opinion on foreign deployment is always considered in the decision-making process, the political leadership in Greece must carefully balance the potential domestic risks of participation in international military operations against the demands and expectations of the international community and in particular, of Greece’s allies. An acute sense of strategic vulnerability ensures that Athens listens carefully to its key allies on the issues that matter most to them. As a result, Greece has been at least partially engaged in several operations that were not supported by public opinion.

The third and final characteristic forming part of contemporary Greek strategic culture is the role of the office and the personality of the Greek prime minister. Partly stemming from Greek history and partly due to the significant executive authority accorded to the prime minister under the constitution, Greek strategic culture is reasonably permissive regarding the scope of the prime minister’s decision-making power with respect to foreign and security policy (Dokos 2014; Tsakonas 2005, p. 87). The

prime minister is therefore more important than any one of institutions that he leads or presides over, since the entire decision-making process revolves around strategies, policies, and appointments that he (or, hypothetically, she) makes.

Whereas all historical and contemporary elements that affect Greek strategic culture have important implications for the formulation of national security policy, the most recent major challenge to Greek society is of a different kind and only indirectly affects foreign affairs and defence matters. The severe financial and economic crisis that erupted with full force in 2009–2010 under the newly elected Social Democratic (PASOK) government led by Georgios Papandreou has given rise to widespread political disturbances, unprecedented austerity policies, and social dislocation, with implications for all domains and levels of government. More importantly, the debt problem at the centre of the economic crisis has seriously weakened the political economy and the functioning of the state in providing basic services to the public. In early 2015, Greek GDP had fallen to a mere three quarters of what it had been six years earlier.

Some reports say that the HNDF have been more insulated from the fallout of the economic crisis than most other sectors of Greek society. It continues to sustain 500 military bases, seventeen training centres, and 136,000 personnel. More than 2 % of the national GDP is spent on defence (Dempsey 2013). Even if the economic crisis has postponed equipment upgrades and reduced the number of exercises undertaken, the US$13 billion defence budget has been trimmed rather cautiously, regardless of whether the sitting government leaned to the left (2009–2011, 2015–), the right (2012–2014), or had a technocratic outlook (2011–2012). Unofficial estimates, taking into account public spending associated with defence expenditures, suggest that the total cost for Greece's defence until recently was substantially higher than what the budget nominally states (Economides 2013, p. 153). Other figures indicate that overall defence expenditures nevertheless fell by as much as by 28.9 % in 2009–2011 (Dokos and Kollias 2013). The most aggressive budget cuts appear to have been in defence procurement, which is estimated to have fallen by 61 % between 2003–2007 and 2008–2012, whereas operations expenses were left virtually intact (SIPRI 2013, p. 10; Reuters 2015).

Understandably, Athens has, since the outbreak of the severe economic crisis in 2009, been more reluctant than usual to seriously consider requests to send troops abroad. Yet even before the crisis Greek security and defence policy clearly prioritised safeguarding national territory

and sovereignty (Economides 2013). Against the backdrop of the 1974 invasion of northern Cyprus—never reversed despite UN Security Council resolutions (353 and 360) demanding a withdrawal of foreign troops, Turkey is consistently viewed as the number one threat to Greek security (Coloumbis 1999; Dokos and Tsakonas 2005). Thus, the security and defence policy of Greece is mainly defensive and designed to deter Turkey from using military means to project its power in the Aegean Sea, let alone expand its territory at Greece's expense.

Taking Decisions to Deploy: The Formal Process

In principle, participation in international military operations is one of Greece's commitments as a member of EU, NATO, and the UN. Participation is seen as an obligation for the Greek government primarily because it needs the solidarity of its allies on other important issues (Dokos 2014; Daskalakis 2014). Greek participation is essentially based on the following informal conditions: the existence of a UN resolution and mandate before the establishment of a force, the configuration of a defined chain of command and, last but not least, the adoption of clear rules of engagement (Hellenic National Defence General Staff 2014a). Since the HDNF started participating more actively in peacekeeping operations in the 1990s, peacekeeping has received more attention from political decision-makers and senior officers, to the point of being recognised as an integral element of Greek foreign and security policy. That being said, Athens remains an introverted military power due to the challenges it faces in its immediate vicinity (Dokos 2014; Bellou 2014). With explicit reference to its interests in the neighbourhood, Greece typically prioritises operations deploying in the Balkan Peninsula, the Middle East, and North Africa (Daskalakis 2014).

In order to participate in these operations, a political decision by the Governmental Council for Foreign Affairs and Defence (KYSEA) is required. The KYSEA is the main decision-making body responsible for security and defence policy (Ministry of National Defence 2014b). This governmental body consists of the prime minister, who chairs the meetings, and nine of his ministers, specifically, the ministers of finance, national defence, foreign affairs, development, interior, public administration and decentralisation, environment, physical planning and public works, and public order, as well as the deputy minister of foreign affairs (Ministerial Council Act 31/26.05.2000).[2] As is stated in article 82, §1 of

the Greek constitution, “the Government is in charge of the design and implementation of the general policy of the state” (Greek Constitution 2008). Foreign and security policy are seen as critical elements of state policy. When defence matters are considered, the KYSEA is complemented by diplomatic and defence advisors serving the prime minister’s office.

The institutional set-up of the KYSEA is reflective of the way in which civil-military relations are managed in a country that has a relatively recent history of a military government (1967–1974), yet at the same time seeks to reduce crisis response time by avoiding convoluted decision-making processes. Rather than delegating important decisions to the military leadership or making parliamentary consultations mandatory, the KYSEA is premised on the subordination of the military command to civilian rule, while at the same time facilitating extensive deliberations on strategic and operational issues within a closely knit collective of decision-makers. The obvious advantage of the system is the strong executive authority in the hands of the prime minister and his or her cabinet colleagues and top-level foreign policy and military advisors, enabling rapid decision-making. The weakness consists in the absence of formal channels for wider consultations among political leaders and/or military experts. This does not mean that the top echelon of decision-makers does not receive information from Greek political and military expertise, only that such interaction is informal. Furthermore, the main political parties continuously use opinion poll data to formulate their positions in order to resonate with public sentiment.

The Greek parliament and/or top military leaders do not always engage closely in the policy debates that precede or accompany a decision from the KYSEA to dispatch troops abroad to partake in an international military operation. Depending on the significance and size of the prospective mission, senior diplomats of influential foreign countries are consulted with regard to the wisdom of participation in a specific military operation. Think tanks in the Greek capital, however, are neither formally consulted, nor active players in this process (Dokos 2015). In case of a pending military operation, the defence minister also briefs the relevant parliamentary committees.

The Greek parliament as a rule tries to supervise the actions of the government by submitting written, often detailed questions or requesting documents regarding security and defence policy issues. The Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence also has the power to ask for insight into specific documents that concern ongoing

military operations. Nevertheless, due to the power of the government to classify the documents, a request for their submission to parliament can be rejected (Dieterich et al. 2008, p. 18).

The formation of a National Council of Foreign Policy, introduced in the 2001 revision of the Greek constitution, includes the participation of officers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, members of the Greek parliament, and experts on foreign policy (Law 3132/2003). Following this reform, the decision-making process shaping Greece's foreign policy strategy offers the legislature a more distinctive role (Gkikas 2003 p. 59). However, the role of both the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence and Foreign Affairs and the National Council of Foreign Policy continues to be very limited compared to that of the KYSEA and the prime minister, focused on providing advice with respect to the exercise of foreign policy strategy.

The reluctance of Greek governments to deploy troops abroad, especially in a combat role, runs deep—regardless of whether the request comes from an international organisation such as the EU, the UN, or NATO, or a friendly country on whose support Athens may want to rely in other contexts.[3] Even under the strong pressure of American presidential administrations in the first decade of the twenty-first century, Athens stayed the course of refraining from deploying significant numbers of combat troops in international military operations. Greece dispatched a little over 100 personnel to the capital of Afghanistan to assist with engineering tasks in 2001–2002, organised sealift capacity with which 81 Hungarian tanks were transported to Iraq in 2003, and allowed coalition air forces to use Greek airspace during the 2011 NATO-led Libya operation. More recently, in the NAVFOR Atalanta operation led by the EU, the Greek government appeared more ambitious, dispatching two large vessels, the frigates *HS Nikiforos Fokas* (2011) and *HS Hydra* (2012) (Hellenic National General Staff 2010).

Judging from the pattern of the past fifteen years, it would at first blush appear that Greek governments prefer assisting or deploying troops in EU-led missions to those organised by the UN or NATO. In the wake of the disastrous economic and debt crisis that many Greeks view as at least partly caused by Brussels and other EU member states, however, EU-led missions are no longer less contentious than other military operations. Nonetheless, the lower profile of most EU missions—which often also entail civilian components—may continue to be advantageous when the HNDF wants to symbolically participate and 'show flag' and at the same time gain useful experience through international military collaboration at the operational level.

From an operational perspective, however, the order of preference is the reverse, as senior HNDF officers consider NATO to be the more efficient organisation, with experience and a command structure adapted to leadership (Gartzanikas 2014). Another reason for appreciating NATO as the leading organisation stems from the many similarities between the doctrines of the Hellenic Armed Forces (HAF) and those of the US and NATO (Stergiou 2014). Therefore, as put by one senior Greek commander, "operating in the frame of a US planned operation and cooperating and coordinating with NATO partners is preferable" (Gkinis 2014).

The Role of the HNDF in Decision-Making

The chief of the Hellenic National Defence General Staff (HNDGS) and the head of the Strategic Planning Office only participate in KYSEA meetings when decisions are taken on issues that pertain to the Ministry of National Defence. Only the former, however, has voting rights,[4] and nor do the diplomatic and defence advisors on the prime minister's staff. The chief of the HNDGS still mainly plays an advisory role, both to the governmental council and the defence minister on military issues (Ministry of National Defence 2014b). Regarding military operations, on the other hand, the chief of the HNDGS holds operational command to conduct operations outside national territory, and further organises the participation of the armed forces in crisis situations during peace time (ibid.).

A preparatory process precedes final deliberations in KYSEA. Greece typically only participates in operations after an informal request by one or more allies. The request is typically conveyed through Greek representatives within an international organisation (e.g. EU, NATO), who inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the head of which in turn then informs the prime minister. In preparation for a decision on whether or not to participate in a particular military operation, the prime minister asks the advice of both the foreign affairs minister and the defence minister.

The role of the foreign affairs minister is focused on the implications of potential participation or non-participation for Greece and its political standing in the world. The defence minister, on the other hand, collects information about the requirements of the HNDF for participating with respect to the economic costs of the mission in question as well as the required size and composition of a Greek contingent (Dokos 2014). Once a formal request has been submitted by the relevant international organisation and Greece has announced its readiness to contribute, the

role of the HAF is to inform political decision-makers of the means at their disposal for the specific operation.

Depending on the type of operation, the chief of the HNDGS asks one or more of the three chiefs of the general staffs to forward concrete proposals on how the Greek armed forces would be able to contribute. The proposals of the chiefs are presented to the joint chiefs of General Staffs Council, which decides on the final recommendations. These recommendations are then submitted to the defence minister (Nalmpantis 2014; Anonymous official 2, 2014). His role is to inform the prime minister and the foreign affairs minister, who also reports with regard to the likely foreign policy implications of Greece's participation. The final decision on the level of participation is taken at the KYSEA meeting, often after careful consideration of public opinion (Dokos 2014). In rare cases the defence minister does not ask the HNDGS for recommendations with regard to participation in an international mission. This occurs when the decision has already been taken by the government, and the role of the HNDF is to contribute through means other than military troops.

The formal decision-making process is somewhat cumbersome and slow, since the HNDF and the HNDGS are only consulted when the highest political level so requests. In reality, therefore, senior officers tend to anticipate a forthcoming request from the cabinet. That is, although the official role of the HNDF is to provide recommendations solely following a request from the prime minister or the defence minister, the operational planning departments often prepare a short brief following the eruption of a crisis in foreign or security policy in Greece's vicinity, using different mechanisms to collect that information (Anonymous official 1, 2014).

The HNDF are also responsible for evaluating Greece's participation in each ongoing and/or completed mission. Participation is normally evaluated every year or when important changes take place in the operation, either on a national basis or in accordance with the schedule managed by the relevant international organisation (be it NATO, the EU, or the UN). The chief of the HNDGS authorises the corresponding branch of the armed forces to conduct an evaluation (depending on the type of the operation) of the progress made, the means used, and the existing capabilities that contribute to the operational level. This evaluation by the HNDF is taken into consideration along with a parallel evaluation conducted at the political level (Anonymous official 2, 2014).

The KYSEA is often the governmental body that takes the final decision with regard to the extension or the conclusion of a mission.

However, there are cases when decisions regarding extending participation were taken at a lower level, at the Defence Council for example, after the authorisation given by the KYSEA as a way of delegating its responsibilities (Anonymous official 2, 2014). The evaluation process is usually a top-down approach requested of the Greek government by the relevant international organisation. Nevertheless, it can also be a bottom-up approach initiated by the HNDGS or the Greek commander of the operation, making his own recommendations to the state concerning the operation (Anonymous official 1, 2014).

Notably, the decision-making process has remained virtually unchanged over the past fifteen years. Despite some minor changes regarding the voting rights of the chief of the HNDGS at the KYSEA and the establishment of the National Council of Foreign Policy in 2001, the government is still the final decision-maker regarding Greece's participation in international military operations, and the role of the prime minister is critical.

In 2014–2015, the HNDF was engaged in as many as ten international military operations, contributing a total of 450 personnel. Among these ten operations, the three largest HNDF contingents were those attached to the joint enterprise in Kosovo (194 soldiers and 25 officers), the UNFIL mission in Lebanon (144 soldiers and 20 officers), and the counterterrorism Active Endeavour mission in the eastern Mediterranean (43 soldiers and ten officers deployed on a torpedo boat/cannon gunboat and at a logistics base on Crete) (Hellenic National Defence General Staff 2014b). These statistics reaffirm a tendency to deploy in areas where a peace enforcement role is less likely but also in accordance with a neighbourhood preference, in that the HNDF might consider assuming a role with a robust mandate if it were in the immediate vicinity of Greek territory. Furthermore, the HNDF focus mostly on training staff operations (Anonymous official 2, 2014).

Operations

ISAF: A Largely Symbolic Role

The key decision-makers involved in pre-deployment deliberations in late 2001 and early 2002 were Prime Minister Konstantinos Simitis, Foreign Minister Georgios Papandreou, and Defence Minister Akis Tsochatzopoulos—all three representing the left-leaning PASOK. The top military officer serving in an advisory role in the KYSEA was General

Manousos Paragioudakis. In the KYSEA he was provided with an opportunity to voice the interests and concerns of the HNDGS, the three branches of the armed forces, and the officer corps more broadly. As already explained, the other ministers serving on the KYSEA are of less consequence in decision-making, with the exception of the finance minister (at the time Yannos Papantoniu) who has a say on the viability of stable funding for an operation if the defence ministry budget does not suffice. As also mentioned above, the generous timeframe allowed by the circumstances rendered consultations within, as well as outside, the KYSEA feasible.

Even though we know that both formal and informal consultations took place prior to the KYSEA decision in mid-January, it remains unclear how Greek military leaders more precisely influenced the decision to participate in Afghanistan within the framework of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation. All KYSEA meeting protocols are classified for an indefinite time period, leaving observers with limited options other than trying to piece together an incomplete picture of the decision-making process from official documents, interviews, and news reports. Suffice to note that KYSEA adopted its formal decision long after prospective partners were first approached by Washington and NATO to consider a formal request. Given this relatively generous timeframe, the decision to participate and the preliminary shaping of the mission are likely to have been interlinked, rather than occurring as a two-step sequence, providing the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Defence with an opportunity to find a balanced solution based on national priorities but also considering operational requirements.

The KYSEA adopted a formal decision to participate in the ISAF operation on 15 January 2002. This participation was not only an obligation resulting from Greece's membership in NATO but also a way for the country to accomplish its national goals: to highlight its stabilising role in the area and strengthen its diplomatic position (Plenary Session XLVI 2007; Plenary Session 2009). In accordance with the KYSEA's decision (no. 3/2002), the HNDF deployed in Kabul and its immediate environs, with legal restrictions imposed on the Greek troops regarding further stationing outside the capital. The mission was officially launched on 17 February 2002, with the HNDF dispatching a rather heterogeneous set of units and competencies. In the original Greek contribution to ISAF there was a Hellenic Army Composite Battalion designated to conduct infrastructure work, a support and security team attached to the latter,

several staff officers in liaison roles at various ISAF headquarters, along with two C-130s Hercules military transport aircraft in an airlift/transport role, plus a National Support Element (NSE), the latter based in Karachi, Pakistan (Hellenic National Defence General Staff 2014c).

The initial decision was to participate for three months, expiring at the end of April 2002. The Defence Council continued to renew the stay of the HNDF until their final withdrawal in 2012. According to decision 1/11 of the KYSEA, the same body was responsible for any changes in the shaping of the mission, including troop numbers, the installation area (based on national caveats), the administrative and operational affiliation of the HNDF under the ISAF operation, and the timeframe of the operation (Hellenic National Defence General Staff 2014c).

The Afghanistan deployment followed several months of preparations and debates within Greece and with foreign partners and allies, especially the United States. It is obvious that Athens, following its support for invoking article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty ('the musketeer clause') in mid-September 2001, had little choice in political terms other than to step up and offer a Greek contingent to ISAF, notwithstanding domestic constraints and Greece's relative inexperience with international military operations. It is equally clear that the Greek government resisted calls to send combat units and instead chiefly dispatched military personnel in support roles of various kinds, from the 120-man engineering battalion to the staff officers and logistical capacity consisting of C-130s. In 2005–2007, Athens added a 45-staff hospital unit stationed near Kabul airport, the mandate for which was renewed on several occasions. Being well acquainted with the area, Greece accepted the role to act as a 'framework nation' in charge of said airport for part of 2010. It should also be noted that the HNDF at one point also donated 13 M60 A3 battle tanks, an old but reliable US model, to Afghanistan's fledgling army. Moreover, in 2006 the HNDF assumed command of the Kabul Multi-National Brigade (KMNB) by contributing 28 officers as a member country of the South-East Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG) (Hellenic National Defence General Staff 2014). The cost of Greek participation in ISAF for 2006 was estimated at €23.8 million (Skouras 2009, p. 11).

In January 2009 the KYSEA, chaired by Kostas Karamanlis, prime minister and party leader of the New Democracy (Nea Dimokratia) party, ordered the removal of the Hellenic Army Composite Battalion from Kabul to the camp INVICTA close to Herat, where the Regional Command West HQ was located. This decision was never implemented

and the order was actually reversed when the PASOK government came to power. Instead, in November 2009, the KYSEA decided to utilize its national caveat and maintain the Greek forces in the area of Kabul. In preparation for this decision, the Greek government took into consideration the level of danger and widespread speculation about a possible deteriorating situation on the ground. Talks were also held with the Italian forces, which were responsible for the security of the HNDF, and the chief of the HNDF in Afghanistan on the approach that should be taken by Greek government. As a small but militarily resourceful European power and a NATO member state, Greece decided to respect the political obligations it had assumed in 2001–2002, and not to withdraw before many of its allies and partners. This new decision provided for continuation of the HNDF (122 people) in the same military base and the additional contribution of €3 million to the reconstruction fund of the Afghan army, along with an observer mission consisting of 19 staff attached to the NATO expert advisory force (Ministry of National Defence 2009a).

In the absence of a strong political commitment by the government, the HNDF, and Greek society at large, it is hardly surprising that the ISAF mission never attained a high profile. Throughout the mission, the heterogeneity and the limited size of the Greek contingent prevented it from taking on wider responsibilities and playing a bigger role. Compared to many other components of ISAF, the Greek units arguably never formed a coherent contribution with distinctive tasks underpinning tactical or strategic objectives. As a result, the main HNDF components were apparently utilised somewhat unevenly, its services not in as great demand as those of countries which contributed larger and more cohesively organised national contingents.

That being said, the resources of the smaller Greek detachments were never as stretched as those of many other NATO countries. The HNDF contingent was charged with narrower tasks and became in some respects less reliant on the performance of other ISAF component units, and functions, primarily deployed in peace enforcement and combat roles. Mission reviews and communication within the contingent and with the HNDGS and the defence ministry in Athens appear to have run relatively smoothly. In fact, the main problems confronted by the Greek contingent in Afghanistan appear not to have been related to deficiencies in national procedures for addressing issues that arose during the more than ten years that the operation was ongoing, but more to do with capability gaps in ISAF at large.

Nor do budgetary constraints and mission expenditures seem to have been a major worry for the Greek contingent during most of the ten-year deployment. As is well known, UN Security Council Resolution 1386 (adopted 20 December 2001) established that the costs of international operations must be borne by the troop-contributing countries. The budget and resources provided to ISAF by Athens may not have been on the scale of the rich and large countries of northern Europe, but the Greek contribution since 2002 ranks among the upper 50 % in terms of economic means provided per capita. Even so, the limited size of the mission and the support roles it performed meant that mission expenditures could be absorbed by budget supplements of a moderate scope.

Greece's 'Constructive Non-Participation' in Operation Iraqi Freedom

Whereas the participation of Greece in ISAF was only questioned by the minority left-wing parties, the prospects of joining the US-led coalition of the willing to invade Iraq during 2003 was a much more contentious proposition. In this case, from the outset the Greek government was reluctant to become involved, and early on, premised its participation on a UN Security Council resolution authorising the military operation. Defence (and former Finance) Minister Yannis Papantoniu nonetheless clarified that logistical support of some kind, especially using Greek port facilities, might be offered in the eventuality of the forming of a coalition of the willing led by the United States and supported by other European states (Athens News Agency, cited in Hummel 2003, p. 20).

In an extraordinary meeting of the Greek parliament on 27 March 2003b, convened at the request of Prime Minister Kostas Simitis, the decision not to send combat troops to Iraq was justified as a decision that respected and upheld "international legitimacy". Furthermore, Simitis asserted that this principle was inseparable from Greek national interests and relied on UN-based legality; thereby, it was the same principle that Greece has tried consistently to apply to the Cypriot issue (Speech of the Prime Minister 2003). Greece officially belonged to the group of countries opposed to the Iraq war and to unilateral military interventions (Standing Committee on National Defence and Foreign Affairs, March 2003, p. 5). Thus, it seems that Greece's national and neighbourhood interests exerted a direct impact on the government's stance. While careful not to alienate political and military allies through the wording used by cabinet members,

Athens clearly felt it was not in a position to offer military assistance and draw on resources potentially needed at home.

Especially given the absence of a UN Security Council mandate and the reluctance of Greek decision-makers towards committing regular combat troops, it is not surprising that Athens eventually decided to strike a compromise with the US and UK governments. This compromise, aiming to display political solidarity with key alliance partners, consisted of logistical facilitation using Greece's strategic location in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. Greece opened its airspace for overflight, landing clearance, and offered support at all airports in connection with the US-led operation, as well as activating the Souda naval base as a forward logistics site for allied naval units operating in the eastern Mediterranean.[5] The Greek government similarly offered the air force base at Souda for handling allied aircraft regarding loading, arming, and storing aircraft weapons. In order to go somewhat beyond the facilitation effort, the government added a medical facility to the functions available at Souda (US Central Command/Greece 2014).

As briefly mentioned in the introduction, Greece also made logistical and maritime capabilities available in order to facilitate the US-led Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). In particular, commercial Greek companies operating out of Greek ports in 2003 helped organise the massive sealift operation that transported 81 Hungarian tanks to Iraq. Two years later, Athens donated 36 refurbished Soviet-built BMP-1 amphibious armoured vehicles, and added another 64 BMP-1s in 2006. Finally, there is some indication that Greece accepted small training commitments with regard to efforts to strengthen security capacities in Iraq. Notably, the Multinational Peace Support Operations Training Centre normally based at Kilkis, on the premises of the Military University in Veliko Tarnovo, Bulgaria, helped train a small contingent of the Iraqi Security Forces (ibid.).

As for the Greek contribution to the ISAF mission, the low-profile logistical assistance offered to the US-led coalition intervening in Iraq in the mid-2000s was decided under the leadership of Prime Minster Simitis and Foreign Minister Georgios Papandreou. There was also continuity with respect to the defence minister, who had been replaced by the former Finance Minister Papantoniu. Although less central to the operational activities, Papantoniu was no doubt engaged in some aspects of the 2001–2002 decision-making process on Afghanistan. Meanwhile, there had been a change of guard at the head of the Greek armed forces. General Georgios Antonakopoulos served as chief of the HNDGS at the time of the launch of OIF.

The highly contested nature of OIF may have limited the room for military expertise when it comes to arguing for or against Greek participation, as well as in terms of informal deliberations that helped shape the mission. On the other hand, representatives of the Greek armed forces presumably highlighted likely negative repercussions from within NATO that might ensue if Athens chose not to offer logistical support, significantly complicating the effort by coalition forces to organise the transfer of military equipment and troops to the Middle East. Based on their contacts with military personnel throughout the alliance they are thus likely to have helped the Greek government to devise ways to extend substantial assistance, without incurring significant political costs with respect to domestic institutions and political parties.

Greek Navy Deploys in EU NAVFOR

One day after a so-called joint action was adopted by the council of the EU regarding the creation of a naval mission in the Gulf of Aden, the KYSEA authorised the participation of the Greek navy in NAVFOR Operation Atalanta for one year and with responsibility for the EU force command during the first four months. Commodore Antonios Papaioannou of the Hellenic Navy was assigned to the post of first force commander between December 2008 and April 2009 (Hellenic Army General Staff 2014). As a country with a strong tradition in the shipping industry, Greece was one of the first European countries to express an interest in launching an EU operation based on UN Security Council Resolution 1814 (2008) (Hellenic National Defence General Staff Public Affairs Office 2010). Since the Greek merchant fleet is one of the largest in the world (it has the highest ranking in tanker capacity, for example), Greece was particularly interested in the maritime part of Operation Atalanta (Ministry of National Defence 2009b). Greece's geographic proximity to the area of operation was another factor considered when assigning Greece the command of EU NAVFOR Atalanta.

As could be expected, the KYSEA renewed the decision for participation for the year 2010 on 12 November 2009 (Ministry of National Defence 2009b). However, this decision came before decision-makers realised the full scale of the financial crisis. In 2011 the defence minister decided to withdraw the Greek frigate with reference to the repercussions of the financial crisis, reportedly saving approximately €7.5 million (Grigoriadis, Kathimerini 20/03/2012). The commitment to Atalanta remained, but Athens was

now more cautious about costly, long-term rotations to the Somali coast. As a result, a Greek frigate was part of the operation for a three-month and two-month period in 2011 and in 2012, respectively, but was not deployed in 2013–2014 (Hellenic National Defence General Staff 2014d).

Since the launch of Operation Atalanta in 2009, Greece has participated with the frigate *Psarra*, which was also used as the force command headquarters. The frigates *Nikiforos Fokas* and *Adrias* replaced their respective predecessors in April and August 2009 (Hellenic National Defence General Staff Public Affairs Office 2010), while the *Psarra* re-joined the operation in February 2014. *Psarra* then spent three months in the Gulf of Aden (EU NAVFOR Somalia 2014).

The contribution in terms of Greek naval vessels was by far the most important part of the assistance offered by the Greek government to EU NAVFOR. Apart from the contribution of regular navy forces, a small number of military officers from the HNDF took part in the operation until April 2010. There were three officers in the so-called forward support area in Djibouti, one officer on the frigate *Adrias*, and two officers based at the operational headquarters in Northwood, UK, as liaison officers facilitating communications (Hellenic Army General Staff 2014).

The participation in Operation Atalanta emerged as a mutually favoured decision between the military forces and the Greek government. In fact, it seems that the recommendations of Greek military leaders to join the operation were approved unanimously at the KYSEA meeting. The importance of safe naval routes for Greek shipping, the prior decision of the UN Security Council, and the humanitarian aspects of the operation were factors which helped influence Greece's decision to play a central role in Operation Atalanta. However, its participation was ultimately significantly reduced, owing to the financial crisis.

Operation Unified Protector: The HNDF as Facilitator

In late March 2011, Greece decided to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1973 by participating in the multinational operation in Libya. Greece did not, however, dispatch combat forces to Libya. Despite some preliminary discussions on whether to send four F-16 aircraft to assist in a reconnaissance role, the Greek cabinet decided not to provide combat support to NATO's military effort. As the Defence Minister Evangelos Venizelos stated at the time, the Greek government took into account

three considerations before making the final decision: the country's membership in NATO and the EU and the obligations of the Greek state in that regard, together with the reasoning of other states, such as Italy, that have close historical relations to northern Africa; Greece's historical links to the Arab world; and the geographical proximity of Greece to Libya (Ministry of National Defence 2011).

Taking these factors into consideration, Greece made available the Souda air force base, the Aktio and Andravida airports, and a frigate that was already on patrol in the maritime area between Crete and Libya, along with air force resources including a helicopter and an Airborne Separation (ASEP) flying radar installed to help enforce the no-fly zone and arms embargo led by NATO's allied joint force command. The radar was connected to the Combined Air Operation Center in Larissa. The Greek government also offered a combat search-and-rescue helicopter to help enforce the arms embargo, although it only operated in areas under Greek jurisdiction (Ministry of National Defence 2011). The cost of Greek participation in Operation Unified Protector was estimated at approximately €6 million per month (Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence and Foreign Affairs, 31/03/2011).

Throughout this process, the HNDF played an advisory role that paved the way for the final decision. Before the Greek government made this decision, the political leadership was informed by the chief of the HNDGS, General Ioannis Giagkos, concerning the capabilities the Greek armed forces could provide for Operation Unified Protector (OUP). A second meeting followed, in which the ministers of defence and foreign affairs took part. The defence minister, Evangelos Venizelos, and foreign affairs minister, Dimtiris Droutsas, then met in order to discuss Greek strategy in response to the Libyan crisis. In the latter meeting General Ioannis Giagkos and the secretary general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ioannis Zeppos, were present as the prime minister, George Papandreou, was informed about the conclusions. A KYSEA meeting followed in which the government took the final decision concerning the government's involvement in the Libyan crisis. As soon as it was taken, both the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence and Foreign Affairs and the Greek parliament were informed by the defence minister and the prime minister, respectively.

In addition to helping enforce the arms embargo and the no-fly zone, the Greek government received separate requests at a bilateral level from allies and partner countries to provide a variety of logistical and support facilities. Belgium, Denmark, Norway, UAE, Qatar, USA, and France all

asked to use Greek facilities in order to operate in the Mediterranean Sea area, invoking the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 as the legal basis (Ministry of National Defence 2011).

It appears that public opinion was once again a factor carefully considered by the Greek government in deciding to play, after some hesitation, a subsidiary role in OUP. According to an opinion survey conducted the day before the final decision of the KYSEA, a three-quarters majority (76 %) of the Greek population did not support Greek participation in the Libyan crisis and some 56.8 % considered the decision to intervene illegitimate. Interestingly, however, 49.8 % of the sample at the same time approved the handling of this specific crisis by the Greek government (KAPA research, March 2011).

In this respect, Defence Minister Venizelos stressed that the decision to play a subsidiary role was taken based on the national interests of Greece, and that a closer engagement would have jeopardised the country's traditional ties with Arab states (Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence and Foreign Affairs, 31/03/2011). That argument was echoed by Prime Minster Papandreou during a briefing of the opposition leaders on the government's decision, which he referred to as a "national interest issue" for Greece. Papandreou specifically pointed out that the "subsidiary support" would protect the Libyan population but simultaneously demonstrate respect and honour for the region's Arab populations (Papandreou speech in the specific agenda of the 22/03/2011 parliament session).

The carefully calibrated level of participation on Greece's part was endorsed, it would appear, both by the cabinet and senior military leadership. From the very beginning of the operation, consequently, the Greek government provided mostly logistical and subsidiary support to its allies. Still, the decision was a delicate one. The almost daily encounters between Turkish and Greek aircraft in the eastern Aegean Sea made participation in OUP a difficult proposition for the armed forces, while relations with Arab countries and the reluctance of the Greek public to become engaged in any capacity reinforced that sentiment.

Conclusion

Greece is today a NATO and EU member state with a military capacity at least nominally exceeding that of most other European states, both in terms of numbers and quality of its military forces. As a result of sustained, heavy investments in military equipment and infrastructure over several decades, the HNDF can be counted among the most militarily

resourceful forces on the continent, even though the rate of technology upgrades has dropped steeply since the outbreak of the economic crisis in 2008–2009. Given its strategic location in the eastern Mediterranean, Greece is exposed to a number of major and minor security challenges, and is the site of one of the EU's five operational military headquarters.

Although Greece has become gradually less resistant to the notion of taking part in international military operations, beginning with the contingents dispatched to Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Albania in the 1990s, there is still a sense that the resources of the HNDF must primarily be at the government's disposal at all times. For the past 40 years, Athens has regarded Turkey as overwhelmingly the most serious threat to its national sovereignty and territorial integrity. The economic crisis has, not surprisingly, made Greece even less inclined to accept the economic costs and operational distractions incurred by international missions. The exceptions to that rule are missions that can be justified politically as an investment for Greece, in terms of its vital economic interests and the goodwill earned vis-à-vis key EU and NATO allies.

It is therefore no coincidence that Athens made an exception for the sake of NATO unity in the case of ISAF, and for the cause of safeguarding international shipping against piracy with respect to the EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta. In these two instances, Greek contributions to international military operations were more than symbolic, although not much more so.

By contrast, with respect to Western military incursions into Iraq and Libya, Greek political and military leaders decided to adopt a low profile, and particularly to avoid accepting any kind of combat role. When taking a closer look at either operation, however, Greek measures did amount to substantive logistical support and generous offers to allies and partners to make use of Greek ports and airbases. This subsidiary role, extended despite widespread resistance among the general public against Greek involvement, was not publicised any more than necessary.

Because the decision-making process remains in the hands of a few individuals in the cabinet, acting on the advice of top-level officers and policy advisors, the inherent contradictions of Greece's approach to international military operations have not yet produced a serious political crisis at home. Greece wants to be able to continue to rely on allies and partners in the often choppy waters of the eastern Mediterranean, while not being bogged down in the disputes and frictions of other powers present in the region. This cool-headed calculation appears so far to have served the country well.

Notes

1. During the 20th century Greek society had been faced with a major security challenge roughly once every decade. Prior to the challenges of the mid-1970s and early 1990s referred to here, there was in the 1920s the Greco-Turkish war which ended with the 1922 'Catastrophe of Smyrna', the great fire that devastated that outpost of eastern Christendom and precipitated the flight of hundreds of thousands of Greeks and Armenians from the Anatolian Peninsula. In the mid-1940s, in the aftermath of German occupation, a civil war ensued between pro-Western and pro-communist movements, subsiding only in 1949 as the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) became internally conflicted over the Soviet-Yugoslav rift.
2. Depending on the structure of the government and the agenda of the meeting, the form of the KYSEA changes accordingly. Since 2009, the deputy prime minister also participates in meetings.
3. This reluctance by the government can be partially be explained by the experience of a significant number of deaths of Greek soldiers during the operation in Korea in the 1950s (Anonymous official 2, 2014).
4. According to the Ministerial Council Act 29/28.8.2012, the chief of the Hellenic National Defence General Staff (HNDGS) has voting rights in KYSEA meetings.
5. The Souda naval base was activated under the defence agreement between Greece and the US (Plenary session 13/02/2003a, p. 2845).

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CHAPTER 5

"Just Deploy and Always Call It Peacekeeping!" Italian Strategic Culture and International Military Operations

Chiara Ruffa

Introduction

Italian strategic culture is constituted by three core building blocks: embracing multilateralism, a solid link to the USA, and a strong emphasis on peacekeeping (Marrone and di Camillo 2013). The first two components emerged at the end of the Second World War, when Italy was trying to rehabilitate its international standing after a legacy of Fascist dictatorship and a lost war (Sundberg and Ruffa 2014; Ruffa and Vennesson 2014; Ignazi et al. 2012). The third emerged strongly as a norm at the beginning of the 1990s.

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The Normative Framework for Italian Strategic Culture: Multilateralism, the USA, and Peacekeeping

Since the end of the Second World War, Italy based its foreign policy on multilateralism. Italy aims to be as present and as active as possible in multinational, international organisations, in particular, the UN, NATO, and more recently, the European Union. In Italy, this explicit foreign policy approach is called 'chair diplomacy' (*la diplomazia della sedia*), that is, ensuring that Italy has a seat at the table in all multilateral initiatives.

Embracing multilateralism has entailed consistent participation in NATO, EU, and UN operations. These multilateral norms have been strongly internalised by Italian politicians and the public (Rosa 2014). Even where interest-based calculations would suggest a particular course of action, for instance, participating in a NATO operation to increase Italy's political capital, these options rarely find support unless they are framed and embedded in normative considerations, namely that the intervention has to be multilateral and legitimate in accordance with international laws, and preferably supported by a UN resolution. Such normative considerations are consistently combined with interest-based calculations. For instance, "if NATO goes to Afghanistan, as it went previously to Kosovo, Italy will go. NATO is an instrument for 'multilateralising' [lit. *multilateralizzare*] crisis management; it does not matter where NATO goes, Italy follows" (Expert 1 2014).

The second important component of Italian strategic culture is Italy's relationship with the USA. For Italy, "having a good relationship with Washington is good in and of itself, and for Europe" (Expert 1 2014). Such connection has historical roots in the pre-eminent role played by the USA in Italy's postwar economic recovery, and in American attempts to contain the rise of the powerful Italian Communist Party, dating back to the first democratic political elections in 1948 and continuing throughout the Cold War. Today, politicians and the military see Italy's strong ties with Washington as a great opportunity, both for the defence industry and for enhancing interoperability of the Italian armed forces with other military organisations. The emphasis on the transatlantic relationship presents itself across the entire political spectrum, while differing substantially between centre-right parties, which are strongly pro-USA, and centre-left parties, which have traditionally cultivated relationships with Italy's Mediterranean partners and the developing world, an approach termed 'third world-ist' (*terzomondista*) (Marrone and di Camillo 2013).

The final important component is the peacekeeping frame. International military operations have become one of the most powerful instruments of foreign and defence policy in the last 25 years. Since the early 1990s, peacekeeping has been the predominant legitimate role for Italian soldiers overseas, following just a handful of foreign missions during the Cold War, namely, the Multinational Force in Lebanon (MNF) in 1982–1984 and in Congo in 1961. Italian soldiers have participated in all major peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions launched by the UN, NATO, and the EU since the early 1990s, making Italy one of the most active contributors to UN peacekeeping, including with respect to troop contributions (United Nations 2016). This 'peacekeeping frame' has profoundly influenced domestic discourse and has wide legitimacy with the public, decision-makers, and at all levels of the armed forces (Sundberg and Ruffa 2014).

In practice, however, Italy has also been involved in more intensive types of operation, in particular, counterinsurgency operations. Nonetheless, neither politicians nor the public are ready to admit that Italian soldiers do occasionally conduct offensive actions. "Just don't call it war" has become the catchphrase to refer to this disconnect, which has important consequences for civil-military relations, the wellbeing of soldiers in operation, and for political credibility (Ignazi et al. 2012).

The Evolution of Italian Strategic Culture

The pillars of multilateralism, the relationship with the USA, and the peacekeeping frame, marking Italian strategic culture in the post-Second World War era, have endured even in the post-9/11 period. The 9/11 attacks, while resonating strongly with the Italian public, did not substantially modify the general posture in foreign and defence policy. To some extent, they worked to reinforce Italy's pro-USA orientation: "a red thread is clearly identifiable from the early phases of the Italian republic, all the way through the big peace operation era, continuing through 9/11 and until today" (Expert 1 2014 and confirmed with experts 2, 3, 6, 7 and 8). Like in other Western countries, the "emotional legacy of the Twin Towers attacks" influenced Italian decision-makers to be more resolute in the expression of their solidarity with the USA and hence, facilitated the decision to deploy troops within the US-led Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) (Antica Babilonia), which was one of the few ad hoc coalition interventions in which Italy ever participated. Furthermore, counterterrorism purposes became a more acceptable justification for international operations that

did not entirely conform to normative standards, that is, were taking place in the absence of UN Security Council authorisation. However, neither enhanced solidarity, nor counterterrorism rhetoric purposes ever gained substantial traction. Even Italy's controversial contribution to OIF still conformed to the pre-established conditions for international deployment, namely, a UN resolution, a multinational contribution, and the presence of the USA. Thus, from 2001 onwards, Italian strategic culture remains consistent with that demonstrated in earlier operations and, in particular, continues the strong Italian attachment to multilateralism. Italy has always deployed with partners, indicating "an inability and unwillingness to act alone" (Expert 1 2014 and confirmed with experts 2, 3, 6, 7 and 8). Looking at the locations of Italian troop deployments in the past ten years, it is clear that Italy has conformed to the three foundational components of its strategic culture: a strong commitment to international multilateral missions, alignment with US preferences (particularly clear in the immediate post-9/11 period from 2001–2005), and a clear preference for peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions. Graph 5.1 shows the general trend of Italian missions from 2006 to 2014, confirming a strong involvement within NATO and UN missions.



Graph 5.1 Italian military personnel deployed in out-of-area operations, divided by type of operation. Data coded and elaborated by the author. Source: http://www.difesa.it/Approfondimenti/Nota-aggiuntiva/Pagine/default.aspx (2005–2014). [Accessed: 1 December 2014]. Data for 2009 were declared as 'about 8000' so were coded 8000 in the graph

Notwithstanding the reduction in troops deployed abroad due to domestic budget cuts, it is interesting to note a small increase in EU operations from 2012 (Graph 5.1). This stands in contrast to the general decline in troop contributions to foreign missions at the same time (Graph 5.2). Nonetheless, Italy's international troop deployment for the period from 2005 to 2014 remained high, ranging between 4000 and 10,000 troops deployed at any one time.

Traditionally, 'boots on the ground' operations have predominated. However, the deployment of air and naval operations has caught up since 2012, mirroring not only a broader European trend but also a strong inter-service rivalry, which pushed the Italian airforce and navy to lobby for greater involvement in foreign missions. Consistent with the trend of other Western military organisations, Italy is likely to increasingly call upon other military services in addition to the army in the future. Furthermore, Italian governments have also recently sympathised with the idea of launching more surgical, targeted operations, again consistent with broader European trends (King 2011). Such intentions and operations do, however, beg the question of whether the existing core pillars of Italy's strategic culture are sustainable.



Graph 5.2 Number of Italian troops deployed in out-of-area operations per year (2005–2014). Data coded and elaborated by the author. Source: http://www.difesa.it/Approfondimenti/Nota-aggiuntiva/Pagine/default.aspx (2005–2014). [Accessed: 1 December 2014]

The Regulatory Framework: Always Ask the Parliament

There are no clear legal provisions in Italy concerning the decision to deploy troops abroad. Common practice, however, has been to ask for an explicit authorisation from the parliament, recognising its pre-eminent role in the Italian postwar context. Italy is a parliamentary republic, where the government does not play a particularly strong role, and the parliament sits at the core of the decision-making process. This is a legacy of the Fascist dictatorship, the lost war, and the collusion of the armed forces with the Mussolini regime, which led to the imposition of strong limitations on the executive branch of government (Ruffa 2017; Ruffa and Vennesson 2014). Though changing somewhat in the past twenty years, the prime minister's role within the government is conceived as one of primacy within a team of ministers (*primus inter pares*);[1] his or her work should be conducted in close cooperation with the other ministers, in particular, the ministers for defence and foreign affairs. The 1948 constitution imposes additional provisions severely limiting the margins of manoeuvre for decision-makers with respect to military missions abroad.

The lack of clear provisions has a tendency to create a paradoxical situation in practice. The constitution considers that only the extreme scenario of a declaration of war on Italy justifies the use of force as legitimate self-defence (art. 74). Similar to article 5 of the German Constitution and article 9 of the Japanese, article 11 of the Italian Constitution "rejects war, authorizes limitations of sovereignty necessary to guarantee peace and stability among nations" and "strongly expresses a commitment to favour all international organizations with such objectives, namely peace and justice among nations" (Italian Constitution). Article 11 thus prohibits a war of aggression but clearly not a war in case of legitimate defence, as foreseen in article 74. When it comes to deploying troops in non-offensive operations, decision-makers are left with a legal void and quite ample margins of manoeuvre (Ronzitti and Ruffa 2014). The constitution encourages Italian decision-makers to make Italy an active participant in foreign missions that do not entail any kind of aggression, without setting specific provisions on how to obtain authorisation for the use of force. In theory, parliamentary approval is only necessary to give the government the appropriate power in the case of a declaration of a state of war (Ronzitti and Ruffa 2014). Peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions should not technically require parliamentary authorisation. In practice, the government tends to declare its intent, and such declaration is followed by a

parliamentary debate, which will authorise (or not) a given mission. Even when parliamentary authorisation is not given before the mission launch, it is given ex-post for sure. Because of the existing legal void, formal justification for the resolution to be discussed in parliament is on the basis of its financing aspects. For this reason, it often ends up being a debate on technical profiles or budgetary aspects rather than genuine political elements (Expert 3 2014). Despite the lack of specific provisions, parliamentary approval is the usual practice.

Role of the Armed Forces: An Apparent Civilian Supremacy

Officially, the military has a limited voice in Italy and an extremely narrow influence on civilian decision-making about the use of force. For over 40 years, Italy exemplified the model of civilian supremacy in civil-military relations (Feaver 1999). The military enjoyed little trust from society, as a result of historical legacies demonstrating the importance of controlling the military to ensure it was not involved in subversive plots. During the Fascist dictatorship (1922–1943), the Italian armed forces were seen as collaborators with the Mussolini regime. In the aftermath of the armistice with the Allies in September 1943, the Italian armed forces were left without order and were disbanded. Soldiers' behaviour during the war was considered to be a betrayal, triggering an irreconcilable gap between the armed forces and society (Ruffa and Vennesson 2014).

The Italian armed forces were rarely used during the Cold War due to their lack of legitimacy: they "remained stuck in the barracks for almost half a century" (Expert 11 2010). Italian high-level generals were also involved in some subversive plots, such as the Gladio or the P2 Affairs, which were dismantled in time (Labanca 2009). The only consistent link between the armed forces and society was via conscription, which continued until 2005.

Only after the Cold War did the military start to become a viable instrument of foreign policy. Since the early 1990s, the Italian military has renewed its legitimacy in the eyes of the Italian public through their involvement in international peacekeeping missions. This has been so successful that in the last ten years almost half of the Italian population has ranked the armed forces as the most popular state institution (Coticchia and De Simone 2015). Compared to other countries, however, levels of public support for the military remain particularly low (Ruffa 2014). Furthermore, the level of active support through public demonstrations

for the armed forces in Italy is relatively weak, coming mainly from people connected to the military, former mountaineering troops, and former Carabinieri (a military service tasked with internal order, similar to the French Gendarmerie) (Ruffa 2017). Even so, these active support groups are extremely motivated, can be easily mobilised, and mirror "a patriotism that is not militaristic in any way" (Expert 2 2014). The Italian public, in contrast, remains extremely critical and sensitive about use of the armed forces abroad. To this day in Italy, the display of militaristic symbols is frowned upon domestically. Military operations in a domestic context (such as Operazione Strade Sicure to monitor speed limits) must be framed and clearly explained in terms of civilian objectives. Domestic patrolling units rarely wear military uniforms, unlike in other countries.

The strongly pacifist public, which has insisted upon a limited role and voice for the armed forces, has led to the creation of a peculiar military culture in Italy, based on two profoundly ingrained values: the myth of good humanitarian soldiers and the quest for legitimacy (Ruffa 2017). The myth of good humanitarian soldiers emerged from the First World War, where Italian soldiers were depicted as *brava gente*, 'good people'. Its importance grew profoundly in re-establishing the lost legitimacy of the Italian armed forces at the end of the Second World War. Although some Italian politicians have tried to change this frame of reference for the Italian military, Italian soldiers deployed in operations are still guided by the perception of being exceptionally good at humanitarian work and being in need of recognition and legitimacy (Labanca 2009).

In recent years, the military has found ways to become more influential through informal channels in the decision-making process. The legal vacuum concerning operations abroad and parliament's focus on financial rather than political aspects of military operations has given a substantial margin of manoeuvre to the chief of defence staff, within the constraints of article 11 of the Italian Constitution. The chief of defence staff exercises his or her influence by sitting on the Supreme Defence Council, which is chaired by the president of the republic and includes the prime minister, the defence minister, the foreign affairs minister, the interior minister, the treasury minister and the economic development minister. Though it has no executive power, the council nonetheless plays an important role: "opinions expressed by the Council can heavily influence the government's decision even before coordination with Parliament begins" (Labanca 2009). On the strategic-military level, the chief of defence staff is in charge of implementing security and defence policy decisions. The lack of specific

legal provisions and institutions and civilian experts tasked with managing operations abroad means that the senior levels of the armed forces have increasing leverage in decision-making about international military operations. The Italian military is generally pro-intervention (Expert 2 2014) for two reasons: intervention is both a "powerful engine of standardization" via NATO and the UN to make sure that soldiers' skills and training level is in line with the one of other countries; but it is also a good way to consolidate the army's renewed legitimacy (Expert 2 2014). As we shall see in the four missions under study, the military exerted some influence, albeit limited, on the decision-making process about deployment, well beyond what would theoretically have been expected.

Justifications for Italian Participation in OEF (Operation Enduring Freedom) and ISAF (International Security Assistance Force)

The Berlusconi government authorised the deployment of a limited military contingent to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan in November 2001, paving the way for Italian participation in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to Afghanistan in 2002. Parliament approved participation in ISAF without significant controversy due to the broad multinational coalition making up the mission and its authorisation by the UN Security Council. Italian troops were deployed under strict rules of engagement, with their core tasks defined as "to conduct military operations in Afghanistan according to the mandate, in cooperation and coordination with the Afghan National Forces and the Coalition Forces in order to assist the Afghan government to maintain security, favour the development of governmental structure and extend control over the whole country and assist humanitarian efforts and reconstruction within the Bonn Agreement and other relevant international agreements" (Italian Armed Forces 2004). Defining the mission proved a challenge, with debates revolving around whether to use terms such as 'peacekeeping', 'peace enforcement', or 'stabilisation'. Terms such as 'combat' and 'war' were completely absent from the debate.

Following parliamentary approval, Italian soldiers were deployed under ISAF command within the framework of the Kabul International Brigade, later called the Regional Command Capital. Italy took over responsibility for Regional Command West from 2005. Italian forces remained as part of

OEF until the concluding phase of the mission in 2014. The Italian Special Forces were allegedly involved in coalition operations all over Afghanistan. A small contingent was involved in Operation Nibbio 1 and 2 near Khost, in Eastern Afghanistan. Although experts have noted that Italian soldiers were involved in “risky combat operations”, the domestic framing of the mission remained a “light force consistently with the idea of a peacekeeping mission” (Coticchia and De Simone 2015, p. 227). Publicly identifying the types of tasks involved in executing the mission would have breached the normative standards which political leaders judged as critical for public support to it.

Against a background of progressive and significant deterioration of the security situation in areas of deployment, some political decision-makers and high-ranking military generals tried to draw attention to the poorly equipped state of the Italian forces in Afghanistan (Expert 1 2014; Gaini 2007). This situation became particularly problematic when Romano Prodi took office as prime minister in 2006, leading a broad, centre-left coalition. With the security situation spiralling out of control in Afghanistan, Prodi was “confronted with mounting insurgency also in the region under Italian responsibility” (Coticchia and De Simone 2015). His centre-left government of the time was divided, repeatedly challenged by far-left parties in the coalition, “which staunchly opposed the deployment of Italian troops in Afghanistan” (Coticchia and De Simone 2015). This led to a partial solution from 2006 onwards, under which Italian troops had to operate within stringent caveats, but were nonetheless involved in frequent combat and military intelligence activities which were rarely covered by the Italian press or discussed in public debates. Such exclusion from the public domain was assured by the strict public information policy of the Ministry of Defence (Coticchia and De Simone 2015).

Marking a clear change in policy, Berlusconi’s centre-right cabinet formed in May 2008 immediately decided to lift the caveats imposed by Prodi’s government two years before, and in December 2008, the Italian government authorised the deployment of approximately 600 more troops, adding to the approximately 2200 troops already stationed in Western Afghanistan. This mimicked the US ‘surge’ strategy of the time. Simultaneously, Defence Minister Ignazio La Russa loosened the application of the government’s “no-comment” policy towards the media (Coticchia and De Simone 2015). More frequent references were made to Italian soldiers’ involvement in acts of war. This new development was not, however, well received by the Italian army (Sundberg and Ruffa 2014);

but high-ranking generals did not seize the opportunity to change the public frame of reference for the operation. This exposed a contradiction in the Italian framing of international operations. The not insignificant rate of Italian deaths in international operations makes it difficult to explain all of them within the traditional frame of peacekeeping. However, this frame is so profoundly embedded within Italian military culture that the army itself considers it to be a "non-renounceable component" of its culture (Expert 3 2014).

With the intensification of the mission in Afghanistan in 2007–2009, the army made their needs for better-protected vehicles against Improvised Explosive Devices, Mangusta helicopters, and unmanned vehicles clear to political decision-makers (Expert 3 2014). These demands were predominantly made via informal channels, such as informal discussions, and rarely surfaced in the media. Allegedly, the generals tried to convince politicians by suggesting the new vehicles would reduce the number of Italian casualties and hence, render the mission more palatable in the eyes of the public (Expert 9 2014).

Similarly, in open political arenas such as parliament, discussions about Afghanistan rarely concerned strategic objectives, and rather focused on the budget of the mission. However, the polarisation of the Italian political spectrum, particularly with respect to Afghanistan, meant that some debates on seemingly technical issues—such as where to deploy three additional Mangusta—became political debates for political gains (Expert 2 2014). Notably, the 2007 disagreement about financing the mission in Afghanistan led to the resignation of Prodi's centre-left government. In sum, the involvement in Afghanistan was mainly based on normative considerations and the renewal of Italy's commitment to ISAF was the occasion to discuss contentious domestic political matters.

Justifications for Italian Participation in OIF (Operation Iraqi Freedom)

On 9 October 2001, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the lower and upper house of the Italian Parliament passed two resolutions approving Italian participation in the 'war on terror' alongside the United States, but which did not constitute a formal authorisation. Shortly thereafter, on 7 November 2001, the government informed parliament in broad terms about the potential range of activities that could be carried out. The two resolutions provided the background for the deployment of the Italian

contingent to Iraq, which was authorised by parliament two years later, on 15 April 2003. The Iraq intervention has been the most controversial international intervention in which Italy has participated, and the one attracting the strongest criticism from the public and centre-left political parties. In terms of the decision-making process, however, the intervention mirrored the three core pillars of Italian strategic culture, with a particular emphasis on the US alliance.

The government's core position was based on Italy's traditionally strong connection to the USA, which was at the core of the foreign policy orientation of the centre-right ruling government at the time. Berlusconi, in particular, had an exceptionally close relationship with US President George Bush, and his administration was accordingly closely integrated with that of the Americans in terms of strategic priorities. Foreign Affairs Minister Antonio Martino was perceived as pro-American and the defender of American interests within the Italian government. Particular groups within the government were intellectually influenced by the neoconservative debate in the USA and its conceptualisation of the war on terror, which paved the way for a broad consensus within the governmental majority. To a lesser extent, the flamboyant entrance of the Italian defence sector onto the US market from 2001, with a number of Italian firms willing to sell products there, is also considered to have played a role.

The parliamentary debate to approve the intervention in Iraq is considered by many to be the most contested, polarised, and heated of the post-Second World War era. Nonetheless, the government's ample majority of seats in parliament allowed them to pass the resolution easily (Expert 2 2014). The opposition pointed to Berlusconi's strong ties to Bush and the fact that intervention in Iraq would be the first time since the Fascist dictatorship that Italy had been involved in a mission that followed an occupation which had not been authorised by a UNSC resolution. Furthermore, there were concerns about what soldiers would be asked to do. The strong opposition to the mission led to very restrictive rules of engagement for the soldiers (Stewart 2006).

Public opinion was also particularly critical and divided concerning the intervention. Italian NGOs and humanitarian actors present in Iraq were very much against the intervention, while the military was perceived as in favour. In the days leading up to the decision to deploy troops to Iraq, a strong opposition to the armed forces' participation emerged among the public. But as usual, the armed forces were in favour of an operation and they were reinforced in their position when it became clear that there had been a strong parliamentary approval (Expert 3 2014). Still, this posi-

tion was moderated by the fact that there had been such a strong popular opposition to the intervention. The predominant contingent deployed was the army, followed by important contributions from the airforce, navy, and the gendarmerie-like Carabinieri.

During the intervention, Italian public opinion remained staunchly opposed to a mission broadly perceived as illegitimate. Italian casualties sustained during the mission, a typical trigger of resistance to intervention in Italy, further caused public support for the intervention to plummet further. Casualties have traditionally been seen as closely linked to questions of legitimacy about international interventions, rather than the prospects of success. During the Iraq intervention, nineteen Italian Carabinieri paramilitaries lost their lives in a terrorist attack in Nasiriya; an uproar followed throughout Italy. Several high-ranking army officers remarked that the country had once again found its unity, by rallying around the commemoration of the death of “our boys” (*i nostri ragazzi*), deployed to build peace (Fini 2003). This was the first large-scale attack on Italian soldiers’ in a foreign mission, and it sparked an important debate about possibilities of immediate withdrawal. The fact that the mission involved an ad hoc coalition, occurring outside the framework of NATO, the UN, and the EU, did not enhance its popularity among the public, nor its tolerance of casualties. Overall, however, while there might have been interest-based considerations, normative concerns clearly dominated.

Justifications for Italian Participation in EU NAVFOR Atalanta

Italy’s deployment within EU NAVFOR Atalanta in 2008 was heavily debated in the first phases, before the type of intervention had been clearly defined, but passed remarkably easily once the Italian government specified that it was opting for a purely maritime operation: “There was almost no debate in Parliament because this is a mission that does not endanger in any way the lives of soldiers deployed nor the ones of civilians living in the areas” (Expert 10 2014). However, reaching a definite decision by the government, with the approval of the Supreme Council of Defence, had been a difficult and convoluted process.

When the possibility of an operation was first proposed at the EU level, Berlusconi’s foreign affairs minister, Frattini, signalled a strong preference to deploy boots on the ground; the possibility of a naval operation had not even occurred to him, even though the piracy crisis had been apparent since as early as 2005. Italy had already authorised a unilateral operation called

'Safe Sea' (Mare Sicuro) in 2005 to protect two Italian merchant ships potentially under threat. This deployment was pursuant to an agreement between the Ministry of Defence and *Confidarma*, the confederation protecting the interests of merchant ships. It came as a great surprise to high-ranking naval officers that the Italian foreign affairs minister was not even considering launching a naval operation in 2008. There was also a broader support for a naval deployment at the international level: UN Resolution 1815/2008 authorised UN member states to take all necessary means to fight piracy (Pierini 2013). Piracy thus "became a threat to international peace and security so we did not only have to protect merchant ships from Italy but also react to any attack against anyone else" (Expert 3 2014).

Most experts explain Italy's failure to consider a naval operation by the sheer absence of the navy from the core of decision-making processes. When the issue was debated at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not a single representative of the navy was represented at the so-called Inter-Force Operational Command. The foreign affairs minister "did not favour an enforcement by sea and he thought that one had to intervene with boots on the ground" (Expert 3 2014). According to most commentators, the minister's strong position had been influenced by army and airforce representatives sitting in high-level positions as joint chief of staff at the time. "They got to such high levels of treachery [lit. *perfidia*] that at the meetings at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there was not even one single representative of the Navy and they had sent instead representatives from the Army who had studied piracy in textbooks: only in Italy can you reach these levels!" (Expert 5 2014). Before 1998, in Italy there had not been a unitary asset of the joint chief of staff. "Every service did its own things and did the operations without having to ask to anyone else but the civilian decision makers" (Expert 5 2014). Then in 1998, it was decided to have a joint chief of staff rotating from each service. "The increased rotation from service to service within the joint chief of staff [lit. 'inter-forzificazione', inter-forcification] created a cloudy situation in which everyone can do everything without it really being the case" (Expert 5 2014). But the navy had a long tradition of independence and did not take this provocation well. While the army was "stuck in the barracks the navy was distinguishing itself with a long tradition of autonomy and prestige of which it is clearly still proud" (Expert 5 2014).

The naval operation option ended up prevailing despite these obstacles, for two reasons. First, the international community was reluctant to deploy boots on the ground in Somalia. Hence, Italy, following its

traditional 'chair diplomacy' approach, was not really in a position to propose an alternative option. Second, once EU NAVFOR was launched, the domestic decision-making process moved smoothly because the activities conducted by the navy "are not military activities, strictly speaking" as a high level officer within the navy chief of staff puts it (Expert 5 2014). Accordingly, the need for parliamentary approval was less stringent.

Resistance mounted on normative grounds, such as for humanitarian reasons, was circumvented because the issue of maritime security was considered salient for protecting Italian economic interests. For this reason, EU NAVFOR is probably the mission that best embodies the logic of consequences. "It was becoming very expensive to travel across the Aden Gulf and even South Africa and the mission was approved very rapidly, and was very cost-effective. The number of attacks has diminished and the budget is very small, even in comparison with UNIFIL [the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon]" (Expert 5 2014). Italy is involved with the EU NAVFOR operation to this day, alternating its commitment to EU NAVFOR Atalanta with its involvement in NATO-led Ocean Shield. Since December 2008, Italy deploys *Nave Bettica*, *Nave Maestrale*, *Nave Borsini*, *Nave Etna*, *Nave Libeccio*, *Nave Zeffiro*, *Nave Espero*, *Nave Scirocco*, and *Nave San Giusto* and is currently commanding the operation.

The core tasks of the mission were defined around the necessity to defend Italy's core economic interests: the protection of Italian commercial ships in the Atlantic Ocean, together with the protection of interests threatened by piracy. As usual, the costs were paid out of the national budget, providing a great opportunity for the navy to upgrade its equipment, and undertake specific training drills and maintenance. However, it would not have happened if the normative standards required by Italian strategic culture had not been present. EU NAVFOR is a strong example of inter-service rivalry and how the military can have an influence. For the most part, the mission was in line with Italy's strategic culture with respect to intervention, even though the mission was launched to protect definite national interests.

Justifications for Italian Participation in Operation Unified Protector (OUP)

Italy intervened in Libya in 2012 during the final term of the Berlusconi government. The decision to be part of Operation Unified Protector is perhaps the most interesting case among the four, capturing as it does the recurring tensions between normative and interest-based calculations.

In the spring of 2011, most Italian bureaucrats at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were arguing against intervention in Libya. Libya was hard to govern already, and so intervention seemed overly risky in terms of future scenarios. Moreover, Berlusconi had recently (2010) signed a treaty with Gaddafi to tackle illegal migration, which committed Libya to controlling its shores and preventing illegal migrants from reaching southern Italy. Furthermore, Italy had settled a long-lasting controversy about Second World War reparations, leading to advantageous conditions for Italian firms wishing to invest in Libya. In particular, ENI (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi), a state-controlled energy company, had struck a deal to build several oil wells in the country (Expert 5 2014). Gaddafi also had strong personal ties with Berlusconi, each considering the other to be a close friend. During Berlusconi's time in office, he had helped Gaddafi to increase Libya's international connections and break out from its previous isolation. Therefore, obvious economic interests and the recent deal disposed Italian bureaucrats, companies, and centre-right politicians to be against any intervention in Libya. Also, on a personal level, Berlusconi was utterly reluctant about any kind of intervention against a "friend" (Expert 4 2014). In addition, departing from most of his predecessors, Berlusconi had a unique understanding of his role as prime minister, as pre-eminent over the other members of the government. He led a highly personalised foreign policy, where he had the final word on any decision (Giacomello and Verbreek 2011; King 2011). In the words of an expert leaning to the centre-right, in 2011, "Berlusconi was weak, old and isolated, he did not even want to listen to the possibility of an intervention but at the same time he was too weak to express a legitimate position of refusal" (Expert 9 2014).

In the meantime, national and international positions unfolded. The President of the Italian Republic Giorgio Napolitano expressed support for an intervention that he understood to be within the framework of a legitimate international 'responsibility to protect' the Libyan people. On the other side of the political spectrum, the centre-left party realised that by pushing for an intervention, they could force the resignation of Berlusconi's government. When it became apparent that France, the USA, and the UK were going to intervene, with or without Italy's participation, Berlusconi realised that he had no choice other than intervention (Expert 9 2014). Within 48 hours of the multilateral decision to intervene being taken, Berlusconi turned his back on Gaddafi and authorised the intervention.

Although the decision was mainly taken to protect Italian interests in Libya (largely entailing oil plants) it was framed as a normative intervention to protect the Libyan people, in keeping with Italian strategic culture: "We hopped on the responsibility to protect bus and we could not get off" (Expert 5 2014). Paradoxically, for being such a difficult decision to take, the intervention that was authorised involved not only several on-target offensive missions but was also substantial in terms of sorties: the Italian airforce conducted 9 % of all operations, compared to 12 % conducted by the UK, 20 % by France, and 25 % by the USA (Expert 5 2014).

As usual, the budget used for the mission was drawn from the general national budget, from the specific section for international military operations. This allowed the military to also cover maintenance and training costs of the operation, which would not have been possible under the defence budget.

The military played a rather technical role in the decision-making process, with the main actors involved being the president of the republic (in favour of intervention), and the prime minister (against). High-ranking military officers were overall in favour of intervention and declared themselves ready for it. Only the Italian airforce expressed concerns about the unfortunate possibility of targeting Italian ENI sites (Expert 10 2014). For this reason, the Italian airforce insisted, in the Supreme Council of Defence and through informal channels, on the creation of a NATO chain of command, which would formalise the joint procedure for detecting targets (Expert 10 2014). Indeed, the airforce was right in its concerns about target detection. "In the first 4–5 days, no-one knew, everyone was bombing whoever they wanted. At some point, the French said, 'let's bomb the ENI wells so that we can cut the energy provisions to the regime' [...] but the Italians were against and suggested to cut the other oil pipeline that reaches Tripoli" (Expert 10 2014). Apparently an Italian officer at the joint HQ prevented the French from targeting ENI installations and convinced them to change targets (Expert 10 2014). As is usually the case, many decisions were left to individual initiative.

The formal decision-making process was adhered to; however, the legal void meant that several informal elements were also at play. The use for force was authorised by UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011). The joint Foreign Affairs and Defence Commissions of both chambers (*Senato* and *Camera dei Deputati*) approved a resolution in which the government committed to participate actively with the available international

partners in implementing the UN resolution. Two resolutions were voted, one by the governmental majority and the other one by the opposition (Ronzitti and Ruffa 2014).

As usual, informal networks played a particularly key part in the various phases of the intervention. When it became clear that the intervention would have taken place anyway, actors like ENI tried to play a role and push for intervention. A number of officers and civilian officials were quite involved, taking initiative in various directions. One such example was the officer who prevented the targeting of ENI wells. Apparently, when he realised what was happening, he called the joint chief of staff and reported what he had heard and was immediately authorised to take all measures to prevent ENI sites from being targeted, without even needing to inform the civilian authorities. Similarly, a secretary general at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs took the initiative, with an informal authorisation from Minister Frattini, and talked to the rebels about possibilities for collaboration. This particular diplomat asked the Italian Navy to accompany him in Libyan territorial waters, alone on a rubber dinghy. He talked to the head of the rebels, Gibril, to try to make sure that Italian forces would also be protected under their rule (Expert 10 2014). The blatant lack of strategy regarding the decision to deploy within OUP made it difficult to understand operational and tactical goals and gave substantial leverage to individual initiatives.

Another interesting aspect of OUP was the absolute silence and lack of communication about the actual ongoing bombing. Instead, emphasis was placed on the naval component of the operation and the logistic support given to NATO allies. The defence minister at the time, Ignazio La Russa, did not want any public declaration by high-ranking military officials about the conduct of the air campaign (Expert 10 2014). This was surprising, because La Russa was the one who had promoted a change in the peacekeeping frame during the Afghanistan operations. The few officers who talked about it in an unusually heated way were either retired (such as General Mini) or isolated.

Operation Unified Protector, like other missions, did not trigger any systematic lesson learned. Nonetheless, there was a certain awareness that "being part of international missions gives us a certain visibility, and if we do not go on the next mission, we risk to endanger our political capital, the profile that we built throughout time. It is important to be a bit inertial about deploying because we have to be there" (Expert 10 2014).

In sum, the purported main argument in favour of the intervention in Libya was the responsibility to protect, a justification which covered a wider spectrum of Italian economic interests, relating to energy provisions in Libya needing to be protected. The main arguments against were the traditional friendship between Berlusconi and Gaddafi, as well as the need to protect Italian interests by ensuring that the Gaddafi regime stayed in place. When the inevitability of intervention became apparent, the thinking around protecting Italian interests also shifted to pro-interventionism. OUP is still perceived to be a painful decision, taken at the last minute in order to protect vital national interests.

Comparative Analysis

Italy decided to intervene in all four missions under study, namely the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (March 2002–ongoing), Operation Iraqi Freedom (March 2003–December 2006), EU NAVFOR Atalanta (December 2008–ongoing), and the NATO-led Operation Unified Protector in Libya (March–October 2011). The NATO mission in Afghanistan and the mission in Iraq were peace and stabilisation operations and entailed mainly army boots on the ground, although they both also had a navy, an airforce and a *Carabinieri* component. EU NAVFOR was, in contrast a navy-only operation, and the mission in Libya comprised both an air force and a naval component, performing maritime interdiction operations.

Two decisions to intervene passed without great controversy—EU NAVFOR Atalanta and ISAF—while the other two were difficult to take. Operation Iraqi Freedom was able to be launched thanks to an ample governmental majority, which circumvented serious opposition, including the opposition of thousands of people who took to the streets. With respect to NATO's OUP in Libya, Italian decision-makers reversed a resolute preference for non-intervention within 48 hours to opt for a massive and quite intensive intervention. In three of the interventions, parliamentary debates and resolutions were occasions for the oppositions to denounce governmental weaknesses and try to make the governments fall (2003 about Iraq, 2007 concerning the ISAF renewal, and 2012 for Libya). Overall, most experts involved in this study confirmed that for all four missions, there is always the feeling that while no actual interest was at stake, it was still very important to be there for the usual commitment to multilateralism as well as some important domestic political dynamics (Experts 1–10).

Conclusions

In sum, these four missions indicate the extent to which Italy acts in accordance with a strategic culture based on multilateralism, the US relationship, and the peacekeeping frame. The logic of appropriateness imbues and frames every decision to intervene for deeply ingrained historical and political reasons. However, strong economic interests and broader national considerations also inform decision-making, as was clear from the decision-making process to intervene with EU NAVFOR Atalanta and OUP. In general, the role of the military is quite aligned to the normative frame, as it usually lobbies in favour of international multilateral interventions. However, the leverage remaining in informal processes and the ample margins of manoeuvre left to individual initiative begs further questions. Will Italy's strong normative frame continue to contain interest-based calculation or will it become an empty rhetorical box to disguise vested interests?

Note

1. The Italian term for prime minister literally translates as 'President of the Council of Ministers' (*Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri*).

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CHAPTER 6

From Enthusiasm to Reluctance: Poland and International Military Operations

Fredrik Doeser

Polish Strategic Culture

The strategic culture of Poland is strongly linked with the country's turbulent history (Terlikowski 2013; Szpyra and Trochowska 2014). Historically, Poland's position between Germany and Russia/the Soviet Union had been a major source of threat and a key reason for Poland's collapse in the late eighteenth century and again in 1939, as well as of the imposition of communist rule after the Second World War. This turbulent history, characterised by vulnerability to external aggression, in combination with Poland's geographic proximity to Russia, means that Polish security policy revolves around the notion of 'strategic uncertainty' (Terlikowski 2013). As noted by the former National Security Advisor to the Polish President, Stanisław Koziej (2014): "Our geopolitical location must be reflected in our security policy. Hence, it is of key importance that there are no more wars between East and West, since such a war would be fought out on Polish soil." If there were to be another great war in Europe, control over Polish territory would most likely be paramount for

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the strategic advantage of the conflicting parties (Szpyra and Trochowska 2014, p. 165).

Polish strategic culture is also characterised by the desire "to ensure the most robust international security guarantees attainable, coupled with the belief that armed force can be used only in self-defence or to aid other nations oppose oppressive regimes" (Terlikowski 2013, p. 269). By the early 1990s, a consensus had formed within the Polish political elite that only the USA had the capacity to defend Poland from external attack and that, accordingly, Poland should seek membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) (Zaborowski and Longhurst 2007, p. 12). The strong elite preference for an American-led NATO, able to honour its collective self-defence commitments under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, persists in Poland to this day (Osica 2004, p. 309; White Book 2013, p. 157). As will be demonstrated in the subsequent case studies, the major reason for Poland's participation in international military operations after 9/11 has been to prove its reliability as a NATO member and its strong support of US leadership within the alliance. According to Polish elite thinking, participating in international military operations increases its probability of receiving assistance from the USA and/or

Respondents for the Polish case study

Respondent	*Affiliation*	*Location and time of the interview*
Anonymous 1	Polish diplomat in the Baltic Sea region	Secret, October 2014
Anonymous 2	Polish diplomat in the Baltic Sea region	Secret, October 2014
Anonymous 3	Former Deputy Minister of National Defense	Via phone, 19 December 2014
Anonymous 4	Lecturer and Researcher, Warsaw	Via phone, 9 January 2015
Lubecki, Jacek	Associate Professor and Director of the Centre for International Studies, Georgia Southern University, Statesboro	Via email, 16 December 2014
Nowak, Jerzy M.	Former Polish Ambassador to NATO, Professor at the Private University Vistula, Warsaw	Via phone, 17 December 2014
Swiecicki, Jakub	Research Fellow, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm	Stockholm, 16 October 2014
Terlikowski, Marcin	Head of European Security and Defence Economics, Polish Institute of International Affairs, Warsaw	Via phone, 15 December 2014

NATO if Poland were to be threatened by Russia (Interviews with Nowak, Lubecki, and Terlikowski).

Even though Poland has been a member of NATO since 1999 and of the European Union (EU) since 2004, uncertainty remains a key element in Polish strategic thinking. "It has been fuelled by a belief that formal guarantees of NATO and practical security benefits stemming from EU integration are not sufficient to ensure adequate security" (Terlikowski 2013, p. 271). The Polish security policy establishment believes that NATO would be able to protect Poland in the context of a large-scale conflict involving the territories of several NATO members. If a large number of allies were involved, the probability that Poland would receive help increases, because of the increased practical resonance of the collective self-defence principle. However, according to Polish strategic thinking, the risk lies in the case of a small-scale conflict, where it would be more difficult to receive help from NATO; for example, in the case of a single bomb dropped somewhere in Poland, attacks against critical Polish infrastructure, or the use of "green men", like in Ukraine. In such a case, NATO may not reach a timely consensus in order to come to Poland's aid (Koziej 2014). Poles are even more sceptical about the capacity of the EU to provide protection for Poland, perceiving the EU as a "lousy organisation, which works on an ad hoc basis with no functioning strategy" (ibid.). Nonetheless, the EU is regarded by the Polish political elite as a "second insurance policy" and there has been an evolution towards a more European-centred view of Polish security in recent years (Dobrowolska-Polak 2013, p. 86). "This evolution, however, has not undermined the Atlanticist core of Polish national security policy" (Interview with Lubecki).

With NATO as its main external security pillar, Poland's focus within NATO is to "strengthen … the Alliance's credibility and, in particular … consolidat[e] … its defence function" (White Book 2013, p. 157). Poland's defence priorities are to protect its eastern border, ensure that Russia cooperates with the West, and to shape NATO and the EU so that these organisations are more likely to assist in Poland's territorial defence if needed (Koziej 2014). In Polish strategic thinking, the physical presence of American and/or NATO forces on Polish soil plays an important role in discouraging intrusions by foreign powers. If American troops are stationed in Poland and Poland is attacked, the USA would be drawn directly into the conflict (Matláry 2014, p. 261; Interview with Swiecicki). For the first time in history, a permanent detachment of the US Air Force was dispatched to Poland in 2011 (Terlikowski 2013, p. 275).

Owing to Poland's narrow view of security, which concentrates on the independence, sovereignty and territory of the state, Poland has limited scope to focus on global security issues, and thus desires only to supplement international military operations (ibid., p. 271). This limited focus on global security may seem contradictory to Poland's increased participation in international military operations since 9/11. Poland has participated in all but one of the major EU military operations since 2001 and has made major troop contributions to both the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) (see below). In late 2014, approximately 3500 Polish soldiers and military personnel were taking part in 14 operations carried out under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), NATO or the EU (Ministry of National Defence 2014).[1] The trend since 9/11 has been significantly decreased Polish participation in UN-led missions, and increased participation in NATO and EU-led operations, as well as coalitions of the able and willing. This is explicable because, as noted above, the major reason for participation in international operations is not a desire to contribute to global security, but rather to strengthen alliances considered important for Polish national security. In *The Strategy of Participation of Polish Armed Forces in International Operations*, adopted in 2011, it was stated that decisions to join military operations should be in "conformity with national interest" and that the participation of Poland in EU and NATO operations "brings tangible benefits with regards to Polish capacity to influence decision-making processes of both organisations" (quoted in Terlikowski 2013, p. 272).

However, as will be demonstrated in the case studies to follow, there has been a growing Polish reluctance regarding participation in international military operations in recent years, for a number of reasons. Polish elites became less favourable to out-of-area operations during the Afghanistan campaign, where it was considered that concepts of territorial defence and homeland security were neglected (Koziej 2014). The need to direct government spending towards the immediate needs of a particular out-of-area operation detracts from long-term development plans for acquiring capabilities for territorial defence. Furthermore, participation in military operations abroad "leaves the army remaining in the country not armed sufficiently" (Szpyra and Trochowska 2014, p. 181). Poland's refusal to take part in Operation Unified Protector (OUP) in Libya was underpinned by these reasons (see below). Poland has not completely abandoned international operations, but one can reasonably expect that its future participation in such missions will be more selective and aligned

with prioritising defence capabilities that are necessary for the defence of Polish territory. As noted by Koziej (2014): "If our territorial defence capabilities can be used in international missions, and these units are in need of training, then we can dispatch them abroad. The reason for this is that we are a front-line state."

In sum, a change occurred in Polish strategic thinking with the so-called Komorowski Doctrine (after former President Bronisław Komorowski, 2010–2015)—in which homeland defence was upgraded at the expense of participation in international military missions. More specifically, participating in military operations is no longer seen as a key policy instrument for increasing Polish territorial security. This process of rethinking started after the Russian–Georgian War of August 2008 and accelerated in conjunction with the Russian annexation of Crimea in March 2014 (Interviews with Anonymous respondents 2 and 3). President Komorowski (2013) announced a retreat from Poland's "overzealous" policy of "eagerly sending Polish forces to the world's antipodes". In addition, it is considered that budget funding for the armed forces should not be mainly spent on military operations but rather on modernising the country's military (Komorowski 2013). These ideas are also well entrenched in Poland's National Security Strategy, adopted in October 2014, in which the main priorities are: (1) maintaining national security/defence capabilities and demonstrating readiness to act defensively; (2) supporting processes which strengthen NATO capabilities for collective defence, developing the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EU, strengthening strategic partnerships and regional cooperation; and (3) supporting and selectively participating in military actions of the international community conducted on the basis of international law (National Security Strategy 2014, p. 27). Poland's new president, Andrzej Duda, will most likely only make minor corrections to Poland's overall security strategy (Cienski 2015).

In the future, Polish participation in military operations should aim at "preventing the emergence of hotbeds or the spill-over of already existing crises on the basis of an explicit international mandate" (White Book 2013, p. 156). In addition, Poland should increase its activities in the UN. Decisions on whether or not Poland should participate in a particular operation should be made on the basis of Polish national interests, strategic objectives, and capabilities. From the Polish point of view, it is of particular importance that the operation is based on an explicit international mandate, which was not the case when Poland sided with the US in the invasion of Iraq (see below) (ibid., pp. 164–166).

Decision-Making Process

According to Poland's 1997 constitution, the Council of Ministers (the cabinet) is the central body responsible for foreign, security, and defence policy. However, the president is the supreme commander of the armed forces and acts as the representative of Poland, with responsibility for ratifying international treaties, appointing Polish ambassadors, and accrediting foreign ambassadors. Thus, the president has several special competencies that interact with those of the cabinet (Terlikowski 2013, p. 277). In particular, the constitution states that the president should "safeguard the sovereignty and security of the State as well as the inviolability and integrity of its territory" (Constitution 1997, Chapter V, Article 126, 2). These provisions "ensure that security policy-related consultations between the Council of Ministers and the President cover both technical issues (for example, conferring military ranks) and political actions" (Terlikowski 2013, p. 277).

According to a separate bill, The Instances of Use and Stay of Polish Forces Abroad Act, adopted in December 1998, there are two forms of engagement of the Polish armed forces outside the country: *use* and *stay*. *Use* implies the participation of Polish military units in armed conflicts to strengthen the forces of Poland and its allies, peacekeeping operations, and actions to prevent acts of terrorism; while *stay* entails the presence of military units overseas for training and military exercises, rescue, search and humanitarian issues, as well as representative undertakings (Pietrzak 2012, pp. 69–70). In line with this bill, the decision to *use* Polish troops abroad, and to shorten or extend their deployment, is made by the Council of Ministers or the prime minister on the basis of preparatory work by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Defence, which propose the mandate, size, and duration of the deployment. However, ultimately, it is the president who decides on the use of Polish armed forces abroad (see below). Decisions on the *stay* of armed forces abroad, however, are made by the Council of Ministers. These decisions must be immediately passed to the president by the prime minister (Szpyra and Trochowska 2014, p. 152).

According to the bill, provision of financial means for the deployment of armed forces internationally is the responsibility of the Council of Ministers. When there is a need for a decision on the participation of Polish military forces in foreign operations not previously planned or outlined in the annual defence budget, the funds for the operation must be

generated from cutbacks in other parts of the defence budget. This creates a slowdown in the technical modernisation of the Polish military (Pietrzak 2012, p. 74).

The formal powers of parliament, including *Sejm* (Lower House) and *Senate* (Higher House), with regard to security policy are very weak. Although the *Sejm* holds the right to declare war, it has practically no influence in decisions to deploy troops (Szpyra and Trochowska 2014, p. 145). Members of parliament have very few supervisory tools at their disposal, such as the vote of confidence or the use of parliamentary commissions. Parliament, thus, can discuss security policy, but not influence it formally (Terlikowski 2013, p. 277). Poland's regulatory decision-making framework means that the country's official security policy is formulated by relatively few actors and decisions to deploy troops can be made in a short time (Interviews with Anonymous respondents 2 and 3 and Swiecicki).

In summary, the key actors in the decision-making process are the prime minister, the defence minister and his/her advisors at the Ministry of National Defence, the foreign minister and his/her advisors at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the president, supported by the National Security Bureau (Terlikowski 2013). In practice, decision-making usually starts with the defence minister, who presents a request for participation in an international operation (under the auspices of the EU, NATO, or the UN) to the prime minister. Before the prime minister presents the proposal to the Council of Ministers for a vote, he/she consults the office of the president. If informally approved by the president and formally approved by the Council of Ministers, the proposal is then signed by the prime minster and formally presented to the office of the president. The advisors of the president then insert the exact specifications for the Polish participation in the operation and hand it back to the prime minister, who confirms the document and sends it to the president for his signature. With the signatures of both the president and the prime minister, the document enters into force (Szpyra and Trochowska 2014, pp. 155–157).

Role of the Armed Forces in Decision-Making

Strategic culture in Poland is based on a "romantic" view of the soldier and of the armed forces as the "carrier of national identity" (Terlikowski 2013, p. 269). The armed forces are generally held in high esteem in Polish society, based on historic experiences of the nineteenth and twentieth

centuries (Latawski 2005, p. 44).[2] However, "the need to keep military and civilian chains of command separate is also firmly entrenched in strategic conceptualization" (Terlikowski 2013, p. 269).

Military officers in Poland are to a large extent neglected as actors in the making of the country's official security policy. According to Article 26 of the constitution (1997): "The Armed Forces shall observe neutrality regarding political matters and shall be subject to civil and democratic control." In addition, according to a 1995 law: "the chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army is directly subordinated to the minister of national defence" and "decisions of the minister of national defence have the force of a military order" (quoted in Latawski 2005, p. 37). Military officers are, thus, discouraged from engaging in debate with their civilian authorities, as this would be seen as a break with "the principle of military subordination to civilians" (Terlikowski 2013, p. 278). In practice, there are usually no differences in opinion between civilian decision-makers and the military, and the military accepts its subordinated role (Interviews with Nowak and Terlikowski).

Thus, the attitude of the armed forces is not decisive for government decisions to enter a military operation (Interviews with Lubecki and Nowak). The formal role of the military is limited to providing advice and information to the government, for instance, on the size and costs of a particular operation and on available military resources, without involving themselves in the actual decision-making process (Interviews with Anonymous respondent 1 and Terlikowski). However, in decisions to withdraw troops from an ongoing operation, that is regarding the issue of when and how the troops should be pulled out, the armed forces may have increased influence (Interview with Nowak). In addition, the military may provide civilian decision-makers with lessons learned from different campaigns. These lessons, however, are mostly technical in nature, and thus, are not provided to the top decision-makers (Interview with Terlikowski).

Informal channels of influence may exist for high-ranking military officers in active duty (Terlikowski 2013, p. 278). Furthermore, some retired officers are affiliated with the cabinet or the president as advisors. Thus, in practice, the dichotomy between civilian and military is not so clear-cut.[3] The extent to which active and retired generals actually wield influence in security policy formulation is difficult to establish empirically. Thus, the role of the military in security decision-making is "more complex and ambiguous than it is the case with constitutional actors" (ibid., p. 278).

In sum, the military is subordinate to civilian decision-makers and both parties cooperate in maintaining this power relation. While the military influence is present at the tactical and operational levels, strategic decisions to deploy force are made by the civilian decision-makers. This means that civil–military relations in Poland is best captured by Peter Feaver's (2011) notion of civilian supremacists, in which the military should speak only when asked.

Poland's Participation in the Afghanistan Operations

At the time of the USA-led invasion of Afghanistan, the military strategic leadership of Poland was composed of President Aleksander Kwaśniewski (Independent), Prime Minister Leszek Miller and Foreign Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz (both from the Democratic Left Alliance—in Polish, *Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej*). Immediately after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the government declared unqualified support to the USA and started to participate in the War on Terror by, for instance, cooperating in various intelligence activities. On 22 November 2001, President Kwaśniewski signed a decision on the deployment, as part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), of a Polish military contingent of 300 troops to Afghanistan and neighbouring areas. The deployment consisted of both Polish Special Forces (the GROM, *Grupa Reagowania Operacyjno-Manewrowego*) and conventional troops (Kwaśniewski 2001).[4] The president justified the decision on the basis of Poland's alliance commitments and of the country's historic experiences:

> The world is facing challenges that have to be surmounted. Combating terrorism calls for undertaking joint action on the basis of international solidarity. Poland has to participate in this undertaking. Today the moment has come for us to join in military operations–as an ally in NATO and as a country painfully experienced in the past by calamities and dramatic turns of history. We know very well that allied support and international solidarity are of supreme importance in moments like this is (ibid.).

According to Szpyra and Trochowska (2014, p. 157), the decision was an obvious one for the Polish government, since the invasion of Afghanistan was dictated by Article 5 of NATO's Washington Treaty. Related to this was "the Polish desire to maintain our 'special relationship' with the USA

and solidarity with America against an open attack on it" (ibid., p. 159). As noted by one Polish researcher: "In Afghanistan, we were not afraid of terrorism. We wanted to help the US, so they can help us in the future" (Interview with Terlikowski). This justification is confirmed by the Polish Ambassador to the USA, Przemysław Grudziński, who asserted in 2003 that Poland tried to exploit every opportunity to get closer to the US (Dunn 2003, p. 67).

Nonetheless, "potential military gains must have been taken into consideration as well. With limited opportunity of combat engagement [...], Afghanistan seemed a good place to develop our military skills and keep the forces fit" (Szpyra and Trochowska 2014, p. 160). Moreover, Polish public opinion generally supported the War on Terror. As demonstrated by a public opinion poll conducted by the Centre for Public Opinion Research (CBOS) in Warsaw in April 2002, nearly 80 % of Poles supported the international coalition operating in Afghanistan, and 57 % supported the Polish troop presence in Afghanistan, with only 32 % opposed (CBOS 2002).

It would take almost six months after the November 2001 deployment decision for Poland to actually deploy its small military unit to Afghanistan, because, apart from the GROM special forces, Poland's forces were prepared for conventional warfare and not for the situation in Afghanistan (Piekarski 2014, p. 88). According to one observer:

> If only special forces were deployed, it is possible that senior military commanders would have 'lost face', because the only valuable assets on the field of this new war would be special forces, 'outsiders' in the eyes of the conventional military, and, because of strong political interest, they would be winners not only on the field of combat, but also in battles for budget, prestige and political support (ibid., pp. 88–89).

Thus, as argued by Piekarski, the special characteristics of the Polish deployment in 2002 may have been influenced by the interests of senior military commanders within the conventional armed forces. However, this is difficult to demonstrate empirically.

Until April 2007, when Poland sent troops to ISAF, Poland maintained only the small force of approximately 300 soldiers in Afghanistan (Piekarski 2014, p. 88). This marginal involvement was criticised in the NATO headquarters and, by the beginning of 2005, the Polish government started to realise that its contribution was not commensurate with

the country's capabilities and importance within the alliance (Winid 2007, p. 32). The decision to expand the Polish deployment was made by then president, Lech Kaczyński, and Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński, from the Law and Justice Party (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*) in September 2006 (Piekarski 2014, p. 89). The Polish contingent increased to become a brigade-sized task force, "gradually enlarged to 2000 soldiers in 2009, and in 2010 reached its peak of 2500 soldiers and civilian armed forces staff" (ibid., p. 92). Thereby, Poland became a significant member of ISAF, executing the full range of combat and non-kinetic operations in Ghazni, one of the most difficult provinces of Afghanistan (Szpyra and Trochowska 2014, p. 159).

The significant Polish troop surge in the spring of 2007 was primarily an expression of support to its allies, and particularly the USA (ibid.). The Law and Justice Party is an ardent supporter of a strong Polish–American alliance, and considers the USA as a much more important partner than European allies. The Polish government was simultaneously working for the establishment of the American National Missile Defence System on Polish soil (Piekarski 2014, pp. 89–90). During an official visit to the USA, Prime Minister Kaczyński said he was concerned about Polish relations with Russia and by Russia's moves to deploy missiles near the Polish border. "We cannot remain helpless in view of that. If the USA is interested [in a missile defence system], we should talk about it" (quoted in White 2006). Moreover, as argued by Bogusław Winid (2007, p. 34), under-secretary of state for international relations at the Ministry of National Defence at the time, if the ISAF-operation "was to become a fiasco it would inevitably weaken the Alliance, thus undermining one of the foundations of our own security. We should not let this happen." Polish participation in ISAF was also an attempt to "build political capital", which could be "used to pursue Polish security interests more effectively" (Terlikowski 2013, p. 272). The government believed that Poland needed to participate in ISAF in order for NATO to acknowledge Polish security interests, in this case "the contingency plans for Central and Eastern Europe and the so-called reassurance provisions in NATOs New Strategic Concept" (ibid.). In addition, both OEF and ISAF had wide domestic political support at their beginning, with very few critics (Szpyra and Trochowska 2014, p. 159; Interview with Anonymous respondent 1).

The Polish ISAF deployment was also a valuable experience from a military point of view (Interviews with Anonymous respondents 1 and 4). "It was not only experience of direct combat, but also of mutual cooperation

with allied forces, exchange of information, and adaptation of new tactics, techniques and procedures" (Piekarski 2014, p. 94). However, these lessons were costly. When Poland withdrew its forces from Afghanistan in December 2014, 44 Polish military personnel had died in the conflict, most of them killed in combat. During the last years of the campaign, the Polish public became increasingly opposed to the military operation.[5] In 2010, for instance, support for the Polish troop presence in Afghanistan was down to 17 %, while as much as 79 % of the population opposed it (Szpyra and Trochowska 2014, p. 180). The political costs of the deployment to Afghanistan made Poland much more hesitant to involve itself in future international military operations (see also below) (Interviews with Anonymous respondents 1 and 3).

Poland's Participation in OIF

The Polish government supported the USA from the beginning of the Iraq crisis. When the US Congress authorised President George W. Bush to use armed force against Iraq in October 2002, Polish President Kwaśniewski told reporters that he had "complete trust" in the American president (Kwaśniewski 2002). In January 2003, Foreign Minister Cimoszewicz stated to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the *Sejm* that Poland would not rule out participation in a US-led operation, even without a UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution. President Kwaśniewski's statement in the same meeting demonstrates the importance of Poland's strategic ties to the USA on Poland's willingness to intervene in Iraq:

> Poland will take decisions when we gather more information, but undeniably the strategic partnership with the United States implies some duties upon us: our soldiers are already in the region, they are not many, but of course we are looking forward to see new developments. (Quoted in Osica 2004, p. 317)

Poland, together with other countries supportive of the USA, signed the Letter of Eight on 30 January 2003, which marked a total division within the EU on Iraq policy (Zaborowski 2004). By early March, the USA acknowledged its inability to obtain a UNSC resolution in support of an invasion of Iraq and abandoned efforts in that direction. On 17 March, President Bush issued a 48-hour ultimatum for Saddam Hussein to leave Iraq, and later the same day Prime Minister Miller requested President

Kwaśniewski to sign a decision on the Polish troop contribution to the coalition of the willing and able being formed at the time (Kwaśniewski 2003a; Miller 2003). Kwaśniewski signed the request the next day:

> I am convinced that the Cabinet's request and my decision are right given the threats we must overcome, given the need to ensure global peace, and given commitments to our allies. I am convinced that, allowing for all the doubts and difficulties, as well as the public reaction in individual countries, those who take this difficult decision are right. We must demonstrate determination and strive for solidarity in action. (Kwaśniewski 2003a)

Poland dispatched 200 troops, including 54 soldiers of the GROM, a 74-strong anti-chemical warfare team supplied with special mobile laboratories, and the Polish supply ship, *ORP Kontradmirał Czernicki*, with a crew of 53. The decision to participate in OIF was jointly initiated by President Kwaśniewski, Prime Minister Miller and Foreign Minister Cimoszewicz and backed by the entire cabinet (Interviews with Anonymous respondent 2 and Swiecicki). The decision was supported by considerable political consensus among the major opposition parties, including the Civic Platform (*Platforma Obywatelska*) and the Law and Justice Party. None of the main opposition parties attempted to politicise the issue (Osica 2004; Zaborowski 2004). In conformity with the government's policy, the main opposition parties emphasised Poland's bonds with the USA as the major reason for joining the Iraq invasion (De Witt 2005, p. 12). Only the fringe parties—the populist Self-Defence of the Polish Republic (*Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*) and the far-right League of Polish Families (*Liga Polskich Rodzin*)—voiced some objections against the decision. These parties claimed, among other things, that the invasion was illegal because the UNSC had not endorsed the mission (Taras 2004, p. 10; De Witt 2005, p. 45).

Despite this broad political consensus, there was overwhelming opposition to the invasion within the Polish public. A January 2003 poll conducted by the CBOS, shows that only 33 % of the Poles supported Polish military involvement in Iraq, while a majority of 55 % opposed it (CBOS 2003a). In the EOS-Gallup Europe poll, also from January 2003, support was even lower, with a majority of 72 % of Polish citizens considering military involvement in Iraq was not justified, against 22 % who considered it was justified (EOS-Gallup Europe 2003). Furthermore, a CBOS poll conducted in February 2003 shows that a majority of 62 % of Poles thought

that the government should not support the USA in any military action against Iraq (CBOS 2003b).[6]

For the Polish government, it was important to go to war in order to develop "a sense of obligation and responsibility for Poland's security in America" (Zaborowski 2004, p. 12). Thus, just as for the case of Afghanistan, Poland wanted to demonstrate its solidarity with the USA by providing military assistance, in order to encourage American assistance in the case that Poland was threatened by Russia (Dunn 2003; Cimoszewicz 2004; Lubecki 2005).

In his address to the *Sejm* on 27 March 2003, Prime Minister Miller said that Poland's participation would "confirm the significance of Poland's alliance with the USA and of transatlantic cooperation for the cohesiveness of NATO and the strategic demands of our country's security" (quoted in De Witt 2005, p. 46). He had explained a few days earlier that Polish "desire to maintain the transatlantic nature of the Western alliance" was a "primary rationale for Polish actions" (Lubecki 2005, p. 74). The same motivation can also be found in speeches by President Kwaśniewski: "We bet on a strategic partnership with the United States, because without it we would surely be in a lot worse situation" (quoted in Wągrowska 2004, p. 10). Piotr Ogrodziński, director of the American department in the Polish Foreign Ministry, summed it up: "This is a country that thinks seriously about security. There's no doubt that for such a country, it's good to be a close ally of the United States" (quoted in Bernstein 2003). The ultimate objective for the Polish government at the time was the signing of a bilateral military agreement with the USA, similar to such agreements concluded between the US and Britain, Germany, and Spain. It would entail the establishment of American military bases on Polish soil (Taras 2004, p. 16; Interview with Swiecicki). Thus, strengthening Poland's territorial security was a clear motivating reason for the Polish government to intervene in Iraq alongside the USA.

Another reason for intervening was the Polish perception of the USA as "Europe's pacifier", in terms of a geographically distant balancer making Poland less dependent on Germany and France. The US's leading role in NATO provides a counter-balance to the Franco-German defence policy dominant within the EU and ensures that Poland will not be coerced into acceptance of that policy (Osica 2004, pp. 309f). France and Germany were strongly mobilised in opposition to the Iraq invasion and Poland feared a Franco-German attempt to fashion the EU foreign policy on their own (*The Economist* 2003; Zaborowski 2004, p. 13). This, furthermore,

hampered Poland's ambition to be represented within the Secretariat of the Convention of the EU concurrently taking place at the time. Thus, by supporting the USA and opposing France and Germany, Poland would strengthen its position within the EU and be among the group of states shaping the "new Europe", according to Polish thinking at the time (Zaborowski 2004, p. 13). The under-secretary of state of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Adam Daniel Rotfeld, claimed that Poland participated in the intervention in Iraq, because "its neighbours [in particular, Germany] will not protect Polish interests, both in the context of the European Union, and in security issues" (quoted in De Witt 2005, p. 48).

> Europe needs Germany and France to take into account to a larger extent the position of the United States. American presence in Europe—from the Polish point of view—is not only essential for security reasons, but is a special guarantee, that a dangerous re-nationalization of defence policies will not happen in Europe. (Quoted in Wągrowska 2004, p. 10)

Thus, Polish decision-makers believed that the external political influence of Poland would increase in joining OIF. As stated by Foreign Minister Cimoszewicz (2003, p. 21) in a retrospective account: "Poland's involvement in Iraq has so far served well our national interests. The country's prestige has been enhanced, and our position within the allied community has been upgraded." In the Polish National Security Strategy (2003, p. 4), it was stated that Poland's role in Iraq "enhances Poland's international standing and the due execution of the mission entrusted to us will add to Poland's prestige and image as a responsible and dependable partner on the international scene".[7]

A final rationale motivating Polish participation in OIF, beyond increasing Poland's security and influence, was the hope for economic benefits which would result from, firstly, closer relations with the USA and, secondly, the future reconstruction of Iraq (Rhodes 2004, p. 431; Wągrowska 2004, p. 14). Among the profits to be made, Poland believed it would be able to recover the nearly US$700 million it had loaned to the Hussein regime (De Witt 2005, p. 46f). Another bonus was the practical experience that would be gained by the Polish military units participating in the operation (Szpyra and Trochowska 2014, p. 163; Interview with Anonymous respondent 1). As noted by the Defence Minister, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, in January 2003: "it would be good if our partners and Allies let us send at least several Polish officers as interns who could assist

US, British, or French officers and gain invaluable experience in carrying out this type of operation" (quoted in De Witt 2005, p. 48). In the end, however, the main reason for joining OIF was based on a desire to strengthen Poland's relations to the USA, which would increase Poland's territorial security.[8] In addition to its participation in OIF, Poland would also contribute 2500 troops to the stabilisation force and take responsibility for one of the four occupation zones in south-central Iraq. This mission was officially terminated on 4 October 2008.[9]

Poland's Non-participation in EU Navfor Atalanta

Despite previous Polish participation in several EU military missions (including the Althea operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, EUFOR Congo, EUFOR Chad, and EUMM Georgia), Poland decided to not participate militarily in EU Navfor Atalanta. Poland's participation in Atalanta was limited to two military liaison officers stationed at the operational headquarters in Northwood, United Kingdom (EU Navfor 2010). Although Polish media speculated in late 2008 and early 2009 that Poland would send the GROM to the coast of Somalia as part of the Atalanta operation, this assistance never materialised (Polskie Radio 2008; Free Republic 2009).

Because Atalanta was perceived as a policing mission and Poland's contribution was so limited, there were no domestic political controversies surrounding the decision (Interviews with Anonymous respondents 1 and 3). So, after such committed participation in Afghanistan and Iraq, why did the Polish government choose to send only two military officers to Atalanta? Poland does want to promote a stronger European security and defence cooperation, although NATO is seen as the main provider of security (Dobrowolska-Polak 2013; Interview with Anonymous respondent 1). "A strong confirmation of new Polish interest in CSDP came when Poland assumed the EU presidency [July–December 2011] and called for reinforcing the Union's capacity to launch operations by revising the concept of Battle Groups and establishing a central EU Operational Headquarters (OHQ)" (Terlikowski 2013, p. 274). This explains, in part, why Poland became involved in the mission.

The extremely *limited* nature of the Polish contribution to Atalanta, however, can be explained by changes in Polish threat perception and strategic thinking, as well as by insufficient naval capacity. As noted by Jerzy Nowak, former Polish Ambassador to NATO: "The [Polish Atalanta] decision is linked with the Komorowski doctrine [see above], which is

based on the idea that we have limited means for our defence and that we should concentrate on such operations that are absolutely necessary and that are not too far away" (Interview with Nowak). The decision is also linked with the Polish perception of ISAF as a failed mission, Polish deaths in Afghanistan, and a more critical public opinion towards expeditionary missions as a result of the ISAF intervention. In addition, "threats coming from terrorists or Islam are [in Poland] considered less troubling and concrete than those next to our door" (ibid.). Furthermore, on a purely technical level, Poland lacked modern maritime equipment and naval resources with real combat value for the nature of the Atalanta mission. Poland was at the time uncertain about its role in maritime operations, and quite likely believed that Polish participation in the operation would not have been very effective (Interview with Terlikowski).[10]

Finally, Polish strategic interests were not particularly engaged by the operation: a negligible number of Polish ships transit the Gulf of Aden and only a few Polish crew members have been hijacked (Polskie Radio 2008, 2011). Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski stated with regard to the kidnappings that it is difficult to react every time a Polish citizen is in trouble and pointed out that "Poles do serve on-board numerous ships under various banners all around the world" (Polskie Radio 2008). Thus, for several reasons, participation in the Atalanta operation was not compatible with Polish strategic interests at the time.

Poland's Non-participation in OUP

In contrast with the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Polish government refused to participate in OUP, breaking with its past behaviour. While Poland supported UNSC Resolution 1973 and offered to provide humanitarian aid to Libyan civilians, it refrained from engaging in military operations in Libya (*The Warsaw Voice* 2011). Prime Minister Donald Tusk (from the Civic Platform) stated at an emergency meeting of world leaders held in Paris on 19 March: "The Polish position is clear—restraint and calm response" (quoted in *Warsaw Business Journal* 2011). As stated by the Defence Minister Bogdan Klich: "Poland will offer logistical support, but will play no military role in Libya. We are ready to help with our transport planes. We can deploy some of our forces and our resources for humanitarian aid" (ibid.). Nonetheless, the Polish government added that it was always prepared "to provide solidarity to any NATO country which will find itself in danger" (quoted in Dicke et al. 2013, p. 48).

The government's position was also supported by a majority in the Polish parliament. The deputy chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the *Sejm*, Karol Karski, said on 22 March: "simply put, our army would not make it. No other decision could be made" (ibid.). As stated by President Komorowski: "Poland's armed forces involvement in a huge operation in Afghanistan induces Poland to focus on humanitarian assistance for Libya" (ibid., p. 51). He added a few days later that "Political responsibility will be borne by all NATO member states, including Poland. However, this does not mean direct involvement in a military operation" (quoted in Trudelle 2011). In addition, Foreign Minister Sikorski said that the government's decision reflected public opinion (Trudelle 2011). A poll taken on 25 March by the Homo Homini institute found that 82 % of Poles thought it correct that Poland should not involve itself in military action in Libya (ibid.). A poll conducted by the CBOS showed that 88 % of respondents were opposed to sending Polish soldiers into combat in Libya (CBOS 2011).

On several occasions, Prime Minister Tusk tried to explain the reasons for Poland's refusal to participate in OUP. In one statement he noted that "there are no military or geographical reasons to send Polish soldiers there" (quoted in Dicke et al. 2013, p. 48). In another he said that the "situation in Libya poses no threat to Poland's interests and Poland's security or to NATO's security in general" (ibid., p. 51). He also referred to "European hypocrisy" as a reason for the Polish decision:

> Although there exists a need to defend civilians from a regime's brutality, isn't the Libyan case yet another example of European hypocrisy in view of the way Europe has behaved towards Gaddafi in recent years or even months? That is one of the reasons for our restraint […] If we want to defend people against dictators, reprisals, torture and prison, that principle must be universal and not invoked only when it is convenient, profitable or safe. (Quoted in Reuters 2011)

Even when US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates called upon Poland and other NATO allies, such as Germany, for additional military assistance in early June, the Polish government refused to change its stance on Libya (Bell and Hendrickson 2012, p. 156).

So why did the Poles refuse to participate in OUP? First of all, Poland has few interests in the Arab world and has no neo-colonial ambitions. Although Poland had some economic interests in Gaddafi's Libya, "this does not appear to have influenced the government to use force to protect" these interests (Dicke et al. 2013, p. 52).[11] Second, parliamentary

elections were scheduled for October 2011 and, as shown above, the public was overwhelmingly opposed to participation in the military operation. Thus, for the government, involvement in OUP would have implied high domestic political risks. Third, the Obama Administration never wanted to play a major role in OUP, however, it was forced to do so belatedly. This could also have made Polish politicians less willing to send troops to Libya (Matláry 2014, p. 263; Interview with Swiecicki). Poland was still a relatively new NATO member when it participated in Afghanistan and Iraq and thus had a stronger incentive to demonstrate its loyalty to NATO and the USA. During the first years of the War on Terror, Poland may also have been motivated by an ideological reason to show its "membership in the western world" (Interviews with Anonymous respondents 1 and 4). Finally, the unexpectedly extensive nature of Poland's engagement in Afghanistan and the financial burdens of this operation made the Polish government sceptical about embarking on new foreign missions (Szpyra and Trochowska 2014, p. 164; Interview with Swiecicki). This can be related to the lessons learned from the campaigns in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Defence Minister Klich stated:

> Today we know that in Iraq there were no weapons of mass destruction, which was the basis of decisions at the time. Our stay in Afghanistan was to be short but instead has lasted many years. The scale of our involvement [in international military operations] should be based on a sober assessment of the situation. (Quoted in Trudelle 2011).

A similar view was also expressed by the Prime Minister: "Looking at Afghanistan and Iraq […] we will take decisions on military involvement elsewhere only when we have a 100 per cent conviction that it is absolutely necessary" (quoted in Reuters 2011). In another statement he noted that Poland's engagement in Afghanistan has "pushed us to the limits of our capabilities" (Tusk 2011):

> We have 3000 men there and it is a large contingent. Not all of the arguments for military intervention in Libya are 100 per cent convincing to us. Do Sudan and Ivory Coast not also face drama that is comparable to what is happening in Libya? My dream would be for the EU to always respond according to the same set of standards (ibid.).

Thus, it is evident that Poland's defence priorities started to change from 2008 onwards, when a process of rethinking was initiated within the

Polish security policy establishment. Afghanistan was considered to be "a strategic trap" and the focus increasingly shifted towards the defence of Poland's eastern border, making Poland more hesitant about future engagements in international military operations such as OUP (Interviews with Anonymous respondents 1 and 3). As stated by Stanisław Koziej in late 2014: "For over ten years all our focus has been on Afghanistan, which unfortunately has decreased the capability for collective defence. For a long time we have been sceptical about this operation and we are happy that it is coming to an end."

Conclusions

The strategic culture of Poland is characterised by the desire to protect the country's territorial security by seeking the strongest and most reliable security guarantees possible. This ideational framework, based on Poland's historic experiences of sharing borders with not only one but two great powers, promotes government decisions which are perceived to increase territorial security and/or increase the likelihood of ally support to Poland in the event of external threat.

Polish perspectives on participation in international military operations have evolved significantly since 2001. During the first years of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Polish government generally believed that participation was vital to demonstrate solidarity with the USA and NATO, and thus increase the likelihood of Poland receiving support if Russia re-emerged as a tangible threat to Polish security. However, a process of rethinking was sparked within Polish security policy circles in 2008, caused by the protracted and, from the Polish perspective, failed operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, in combination with the Russian intervention in Georgia, leading Polish decision-makers to question whether participation in military operations was an effective policy instrument for increasing the country's territorial security. As Poland had already demonstrated its solidarity with the USA and NATO through major troop contributions to both ISAF and OIF, while Poland's regional security environment had simultaneously deteriorated, the new strategic thinking advocated for increased priority to defending the country's eastern border. The subsequent Russian intervention in Ukraine, which took the Polish security establishment by surprise and which in retrospect has been referred to as an "external shock", further strengthened the belief in the threat of further Russia aggression and that Poland, therefore, should focus on self-defence (Koziej 2014).

Turning to the cases studied in this chapter, Polish participation in the Afghanistan and Iraq operations was justified on the basis of Polish strategic culture, in particular the notion of showing solidarity with the USA and/or NATO to bolster ally support for Poland's territorial security against a potential Russian threat. Furthermore, Poland believed that participation in these operations would increase the country's political influence, especially within NATO. Poland's limited participation in the EU Navfor Atalanta mission was justified on the basis of arguments in line with emerging traits of Polish strategic culture, according to which the importance of Polish participation in military operations was downplayed. Somali pirates were not perceived as a threat to Polish security and national interests, and Polish strategists perceived that the country's limited defence means should be used for purposes other than expeditionary missions. Similarly, Polish non-participation in OUP was justified on the basis of arguments consistent with the same changes in Polish strategic culture: the Libyan civil war was simply not a security policy priority for Poland. Moreover, there were particularly high domestic political risks in the Libyan case, which decreased the willingness of politicians to lead the country into yet another war.

In summary, we can expect that Poland will participate more selectively in international military operations in the future, because of lessons from the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and Polish perceptions of a more aggressive Russian foreign policy. This reluctance to participate in international military operations is likely to persist for some time because Polish strategic thinking is pessimistic about the prospects for improvement in international geopolitics. As stated by Koziej (2014): "The new security environment, with a more aggressive and imperialist Russia, is irreversible. There is no room for optimism about the future."

Notes

1. During the Cold War, Poland participated in seven UN-mandated operations: four ceasefire commissions and three peacekeeping missions, with an estimated total of approximately 17,000 soldiers. In contrast, after the Cold War, Poland has participated in 64 operations, with an estimated total of about 67,000 soldiers (Szpyra and Trochowska 2014, p. 174).
2. During most of the Cold War, however, the military was perceived as a part of the suppressive communist system (Interview with Swiecicki).

3. See Nielsen and Snyder (2009) for a general discussion about the difficulties in separating political and military affairs.
4. As a matter of fact, the contingent was composed of two task forces. The first force was sent to Afghanistan in March 2002 and consisted of a 'company-sized force' with 'a logistical support platoon, a sapper platoon and a small GROM protection element' (Piekarski 2014, p. 87). The second force was the logistical support ship *ORP Kontradmirał Czernicki*, which was sent to the Persian Gulf in July 2002 in order to support allied maritime operations. It would also participate in the Iraq invasion (see below).
5. Poland's participation in the secret prisons operated by the US Central Intelligence Agency and the Nangar Khel incident contributed vastly to the decrease in public support for the Afghanistan operation. The Nangar Khel incident occurred in the Afghan village of Nangar Khel in August 2007. Following an ambush on a Polish patrol in the area, Polish soldiers from the elite 18th Airborne-Assault Battalion responded with heavy machine gun fire at the village. The assault resulted in the deaths of six civilians, including a pregnant woman and three children.
6. For more information on Polish public opinion on the Iraq invasion see Doeser (2013) and Doeser and Eidenfalk (2015).
7. See also Kwaśniewski (2003b) for a similar statement.
8. The Polish participation in OIF was to a lesser extent motivated on the basis of combating terrorism or with reference to Iraq's alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction (Interviews with Nowak and Terlikowski).
9. Only a small number of Polish soldiers remained in Iraq (about 20 people) to form the Polish military contingent in the composition of the NATO training mission. In late 2011, NATO agreed to terminate the training mission and the last Polish soldiers could return home (Pietrzak 2012, p. 82).
10. Polish naval capabilities will most likely increase in the coming five to ten years after a recent defence decision on technical modernisation (Interview with Terlikowski).
11. For instance, Polish oil conglomerate PKN Orlen had a large stake in Libyan oil fields and the Polish government had sold military aircraft to Libya for an estimated value of €2,025,846 (Bell and Hendrickson 2012, p. 154f).

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CHAPTER 7

Continuity or Change? British Strategic Culture and International Military Operations

Malena Britz

Introduction

Authors analysing British foreign, security, defence policy, and, more specifically, British strategic culture, tend to emphasise aspects of continuity in policy and culture (Cornish 2013; Wagnsson 2008; Miskimmon 2004). In particular, they point to continuity with respect to how the country sees itself in the world—as a powerful member of the international community, with a "high level of ambition in, and a sense of responsibility for international security"—and to its usual partners of choice in international co-operation—the USA and NATO (Cornish 2013, p. 371). Britain has in fact participated in all international military operations under study in this volume. So, at first glance, the picture is indeed one of continuity.

However, certain changes in British policy have raised questions about whether the UK can still rightly claim membership in the club of 'great powers'. Cornish (2013, p. 373) argues that history has shown a mismatch between Britain's rhetoric and its economic and military realities. One important aspect of the question of continuity or change in British strategic culture is the changes that have taken place since the Conservative–Liberal government took office following the May 2010 elections. The change in government certainly did not reduce the UK's ambitions to

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retain its place as a powerful player in world affairs—the new foreign secretary (William Hague) even argued for an extension in the UK's "global reach and influence" (quoted in Cornish 2013, p.372). However, efforts since 2010 to increase transparency and rationality have led to changes in security and defence policy, and in the organisation of the decision-making process for security and defence matters, including decisions about participation in international military operations. Major changes have included the introduction of a National Security Council, and a host of changes in the wake of the government's strategic defence review.

With respect to the cases of decision-making of international military operations studied in this book, two were undertaken before 2010 (Afghanistan and Iraq) and two after (Libya and EU NAVFOR Atalanta). This chapter therefore has to deal with the questions of whether British strategic culture, as defined in the introductory chapter of this book—the normative and regulatory frameworks that both enable and restrain decisions about participation in international military operations—has changed in the time period studied, and to what extent these changes have affected decisions to participate in international military operations.

British Strategic Culture

Normative Framework

Traditional Norms in British Strategic Culture

British attitudes towards security and defence are heavily shaped by Britain's geostrategic position, and its imperial and colonial past. Furthermore, the UK's importance as an economic power and trading nation has affected views about defence and the best methods to protect the territory and to achieve security for the nation. The UK has obtained significant power resources from trade, its former colonies, and its special relationship to the USA, and as a result, sees itself as holding an important position in the world system, including a certain responsibility for international security. The special relationship with the USA is particularly significant when one considers international military deployments: the UK and the US "deploy together on operations, and train together, often using similar equipment; their respective special or elite forces co-operate closely; and British armed forces do not contemplate undertaking large military operation other than in association with their US allies" (Cornish 2013, p. 377). This is further illustrated by a quote from the 2003 Defence White Paper:

> The most demanding expeditionary operations, involving intervention against state adversaries, can only plausibly be conducted if US forces are engaged, either leading a coalition or in NATO. [...] To exploit this effectively, our Armed Forces will need to be interoperable with US command and control structures, match the US operational tempo and provide those capabilities that deliver the greatest impact when operating alongside the US (Defence White Paper 2003, p.8 Section 3.5).

The special relationship with the USA has in turn coloured attitudes towards both NATO and the EU as partners. NATO has been a primary focus in British security thinking, while the British attitude towards the development of a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in the EU has fluctuated over time (Cornish 2013). Multilateralism through NATO has been a traditional pillar of importance for the UK, especially due to the relevance of NATO for the UK to maintain its influence during the Cold War (Miskimmon 2004). However, the British leadership has tended to adopt a problem-solving attitude towards international crises, and consequently, has employed multilateralism as an efficient method to solve a problem at hand rather than investing in efforts to strengthen multilateralism as a general principle of international cooperation, in contrast to the approach of states like France and Germany (Wagnsson 2008).

Blair's Influence on Norms in British Strategic Culture

Despite its traditional focus on cooperation with the USA and NATO, the UK did have what could be called a 'European moment' under the Blair government, when the importance of EU security and defence cooperation temporarily advanced on the political agenda. For the five years between 1998 and 2003, Blair pushed for a higher commitment from the UK to European military capabilities within the context of the EU's security and defence policy, and supported the EU Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (Dorman 2013). The UK even advocated for the DRC operation to be undertaken under the auspices of the EU, rather than as an independent coalition of the able and willing (Miskimmon 2004, p. 281). However, despite Blair's efforts, there was no major change in British policy towards military cooperation with Europe. This was, for example, evident in the Kosovo crisis where the UK "conveyed that, while the EU ought to evolve as an actor in the security sphere, it should not become independent" (Wagnsson 2008, p. 36). British ability to influence the CSDP went "through short-term difficulties" as a result of the tensions among the European states over

the Iraq War, with the UK siding with the USA for a military intervention, and France and Germany siding against (Miskimmon 2004, p. 275). UK–EU relations have been increasingly tense since the Iraq divide, and British policy with regard to EU operations increasingly politically sensitive. Although the idea of a permanent structured EU cooperation originated with Britain and France, the UK has since questioned the idea, and gone as far as actively blocking discussions about a standing operational EU headquarters, contending it would be an "unnecessary duplication of NATO" (Biscop 2012, p. 1304). Rather, the UK has preferred to focus on enhanced British-French cooperation, entering into the bilateral Lancaster Agreement with France on 2 December 2010, which will be further analysed below.

According to Miskimmon, the 'European moment' was not Blair's only significant policy initiative; the prime minister also pushed three other central developments during his time in office: continued commitment to the relationship with the USA, a more interventionist style of foreign policy, and "an integrated foreign policy reflecting social democratic values" (2004, p. 282). Miskimmon presents the latter two as the basis for a fundamental shift in Britain's policy on the use of force, moderating the importance of national sovereignty in cases where people are abused within their own territory, in line with the concept of 'the responsibility to protect'. The Kosovo crisis introduced humanitarian intervention as a principle that could override sovereignty if human rights, liberty, the rule of law, and an open society were threatened. Blair defined this approach as a 'Third Way' (Wagnsson 2008). Wagnsson (2008, p. 103) argues that the 'ethical dimension to foreign policy' that the Labour Party launched in 1997 strengthened the tendency in Britain to argue for international military operations in terms of norms, building upon the traditional Anglo-British identity of fighting wars for the sake of principles.

The Strategic Defence and Security Review in 2010

The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) concluded that the UK—despite its possibility to act alone—was increasingly willing and intended to "deepen operational cooperation and potentially rely more" on its allies and partners. An emphasis on burden sharing and effective use of resources led to a tendency to rely on alliances and partnerships, to enhance capability and maximize efficiency (FCO & MOD 2011). However, the review also stated that Britain would prioritise new models of bilateral cooperation "with countries whose defence and security posture is closest to our own or with whom we cooperate in multinational

operations" (SDSR 2010, p. 59). The security and defence relationship with the USA remained "strategically important and mutually supportive". Areas of cooperation include counter-terrorism, cyber, resilience, counter-proliferation, and partner capacity building, as well as currently active operations (p. 60). NATO was stated to be "the bedrock of the British defence" and collective defence was pointed out as the most effective way to deal with unpredictable and diverse threats. There was also an important economic imperative in the 2010 SDSR, seen for example, in the wish to "bring programmes and resources back into balance" (p. 5). Furthermore, the review stated that there had been an over-commitment in the defence programme of approximately £38 billion. Planned savings of at least £4.3 billion in several key areas were presented, including reductions in non-front line service personnel and in the civilian work force. This translated to a reduction of military personnel by 17,000 and Ministry of Defence (MOD) Civil Service personnel by 25,000, both by 2015 (pp. 31–32).

The SDSR also identified France as another important strategic partner for Britain, with whom it intended to intensify its security and defence relationship. It was on this basis that the two countries signed the Defence Cooperation Treaty in 2010 (The Lancaster House Treaty),

> to develop co-operation between our Armed Forces, the sharing and pooling of materials and equipment including through mutual interdependence, the building of joint facilities, mutual access to each other's defence markets, and industrial and technological co-operation and to pursue joint initiatives in the areas of operations and training, equipment and capabilities and unmanned air systems
>
> (Lancaster House Treaty 2010)

The aim of this cooperation was stated not only to be "the improvement of the collective defence capability of the two countries but also the improvement of the collective capability of NATO and European Defence" (MOD 2010).

The intentions expressed at the time of the signing of the Lancaster Treaty have continued to manifest themselves in British policy towards international operations. Officials working at the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) have explained that unless there is a specific threat necessitating direct action by the UK, undertaking international operations in coalition, primarily with the US, but increasingly with France, is the political preference. There has

also been some shifting in these relationships. While the USA still sees the UK as a key partner, some questions have arisen due to the UK's decision not to intervene in Syria in 2013, and regarding issues of capability. One example is the operation in Libya in 2011 analysed below; according to Dover and Phythian (2011), the economic rationale of the SDSR from 2010 did not match the strategic needs as they were shown in the Libya conflict. In the Libya conflict the strategic capabilities, such as aircraft carriers, that had previously been decided to be taken out of service were again needed. In addition, increased US focus on the Asian region has led to decreasing USA–UK military dialogue, while dialogue with France has increased due to a shared focus on Africa. British officials noted in this regard that France has recently had the possibility to be more active because they were not scarred by the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite a general willingness on the part of the UK to be involved, and a political expectation that the UK will play its role, there has been a reduction in domestic public support for British foreign interventions since Iraq and Afghanistan. This has led to increased scrutiny around where British Armed Forces should be deployed, with respect to the kind of missions (UN, NATO, EU, or bilateral) and the reasons for deployment (interviews with officials 1 & 2).

Economic constraints and an imperative to cut public spending on defence were important motivations for the policy change sought in the SDSR, but this economic rationale has proven out of step with strategic needs, as shown for example in the Libya conflict. The new government initiated a National Security Strategy (NSS) to describe the ends to be met by security and defence policy, in addition to the SDSR, which should describe the means and ways to these ends (Cornish 2013, p. 372). In their Programme for Government,[1] they also announced the establishment of a National Security Council (NSC), responsible for implementing the new NSS. The NSC comprises the prime minister, eight cabinet members, the chief of the defence staff, as well as other representatives who may be invited to attend meetings.

Regulative Framework: The Decision-Making Process and the Role of the Armed Forces

The Royal Prerogative in the UK means that the government takes decisions with respect to the armed forces on behalf of the Crown. Declarations of war or other authorisations of the armed forces for military action have been made by the prime minister, without the need to ask parliament for

consent (Cornish 2013, p. 374; Mills 2014, p. 2). Before taking decisions to use the armed forces, the prime minister is advised by the Cabinet and the National Security Council (NSC), as well as the secretary of state for defence and the chief of defence staff. While parliament has no formal role in the decision-making process, its increasing importance in decision-making will be discussed below. There is also a Defence Council that formally needs to authorise military operations. Ultimately, the order to deploy the armed forces comes from the defence secretary. Formally, the defence secretary can refuse to make the order but such refusal would likely cause a political crisis leading to the secretary's replacement by someone closer to the prime minister (MOD 2014; Interview with official 1).

The information and advice of the NSC bears significant weight on the decision-making process: this is the channel through which advice, suggestions, and official government answers to political questions are prepared. The political priority given to NSC meetings—held weekly—is underlined by the fact that Cameron only missed the meetings on rare occasions. Meetings cover standing agenda items, as well as urgent matters that may be added to the agenda. The establishment of the NSC has brought additional structure and discipline to the defence and security decision-making process, with heightened levels of oversight and control. The constitution of the NSC—importantly including officials from policy areas other than defence—has expanded the pool of people involved in decision-making and poses critical questions about the use of the military (Edmunds 2014, p. 184, Interviews with officials 1, 4 & 5).

In addition to the regular weekly NSC meetings, the NSC officials meeting—comprising of the secretary of state for defence and senior civil servants—is held the week before the NSC meeting to prepare papers for the NSC. For example, if a question has been asked at the political level about an upcoming international operation, a military paper may be presented, outlining the capabilities that could be used. The NSC would then task the chief of defence staff to report back on which options are achievable, for example, considering how quickly the necessary capabilities could be ready and what special security issues there would be in the expected theatre of operations. This information could either be reported back to the NSC Officials meeting, or directly to the NSC. The Armed Forces' Permanent Joint Headquarters are formally asked to give their input as part of this process (interviews with officials 1 & 5).

Before an operation can start a Chief of Defence Staff Directive is needed. This "appoints the operational commander; provides strategic direction; identifies the military conditions for success; designates the

'theatre' of operations and the joint operational area; sets force levels and resources; communicates detail on the restrictions on using force; and sets the requirements for strategic intelligence" (MOD 2014a, p. 22). As a preparation for the Chief of Defence Staff Directive the military Permanent Joint Headquarters has to develop a detailed course of action that has been approved by the Cabinet. The course of action has been developed in communication with the MOD and particularly with the Strategic Planning Group. The Strategic Planning Group gives input to the Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) at the MOD, which is responsible for preparing papers for the NSC officials, and has a vital role coordinating inputs from several parts of the administration, both the governmental offices and the armed forces, thus forming the link between the strategic and the operational levels (MOD 2014a, b). It is responsible for briefing ministers and for informing the operational actors of the details of the strategic direction. Before a detailed course of action has been developed an outline of a course of action has to be approved by first the chief of defence staff and then the defence secretary. The outline to a course of action can consist of several different options and once an option has been decided the paper goes back to the MOD for the planning of a more detailed course of action.

A particularly interesting aspect of the British MOD is total integration of civilian and military competences throughout the entire organisation: all positions within the ministry are double-hatted, with a civilian and a military official with equal ranks. In this way, civilian officials and armed forces officers work side by side throughout the whole process of preparing and giving advice for decision-making on international operations. According to one of the officials interviewed, this way of organising the MOD is a result of the constant deployment in operations abroad, which has meant that close civil–military relationships have become very important (interview with official 1). It also means that the planning process is best characterised as a continuous dialogue rather than formalised questions and answers (interview with official 3). However, despite the integrated organisational structure, some authors such as de Waal (2013) have criticised the British system for being unclear with respect to the role of military input in the decision-making process. This criticism rests on the fact that there are very few formal rules about the civil-military relationship, in line with British tradition of having no written constitution.

The most influential civilian policy actors, such as the FCO, see their role as most important before an operation, ideally preventing the need

for military intervention through diplomacy, and after the operation in the reconstruction phase. Furthermore, British politicians have shown themselves more reluctant to question military advice as opposed to advice on other policy areas; there is a great respect for the views of the armed forces, both on the part of politicians and the general public. At the same time, civilian engagement within the armed forces has grown in the last 10 years. There are many civilian personnel at the Permanent Joint Headquarters, where they both take part in the planning process and have their own responsibilities, such as policy and legal aspects or financial control. Civilians are also involved in the actual execution of operations, the harsh lessons of Afghanistan and Iraq having increased the government's desire to exercise civilian and political control of the military. The growth of international and social media means that tactical decisions can quickly become strategically and politically sensitive, and thus politicians seek greater control (interview with official 5).

While the Defence Crisis Management Organisation is attached to the military strategic level, the Permanent Joint Headquarters belongs to the operational level and has formal command over national operations. The Commander of Joint Operations is responsible for "deploying, directing, sustaining, and bringing back deployed forces" (MOD 2014a, p. 25). There is also a Contingency Planning Team feeding into the DCMO, liaising commands with planning and decision-making in ongoing and future operations. The Permanent Joint Headquarters are continuously conducting reconnaissance trips to areas of expected operations, for example, locations where natural disasters are common. In general, senior officials are not included in decision-making processes where the operation has low risks (for example, an evacuation task). The more dangerous a procedure is perceived to be, the more formalised the process will be, involving more senior officials (interview with official 1 & 5). The effort to formalise the strategic process and make it more transparent has also increased the role of the Cabinet Office, which according to Cornish (2013), has become more a contributor to, than a coordinator of, the strategy debate.

In recent years, the prime minister has increasingly brought decisions on participation in international operations to parliament for discussion. This is the result of a campaign to end the Royal Prerogative and give statutory rights to parliament to control government decisions (Cornish 2013, p. 375). By 2011, the government acknowledged that it had become convention to giving the House of Commons an opportunity to debate military deployments (Mills 2014, p. 2). However, as

will also be shown in the below analysis of the different operations, this convention is not strictly applied, and it seems to play a more important role in operations without a UN mandate. For example, in the case of interventions in Mali in 2013 (first support to the French-led operation, then to the EU Training Mission and then to the African-led International Support Mission), there was no debate prior to deployment. The government stated that deployment was due to "an emergency request from the French and Malian authorities and in support of a UN Security council resolution" (Mills 2014, p. 8). In 2013, the UN Security Council was unable to agree a resolution on possible intervention in Syria. The House of Commons was asked to debate a motion from the government on 29 August 2013, a motion that was defeated with 13 votes. This occasion has been pointed out as important because it was the first time since the late eighteenth century that the government was defeated on military action when consulting parliament. The Syria case demonstrated that the existence of military planning for an operation will not necessarily mean that the operation will take place (Mills 2014, p. 9, Interview with official 5).

The role of parliament is slightly different for EU-led operations, as such decisions must pass through a House of Commons Committee on European Scrutiny. This reflects the highly sensitive nature of all EU operations, as will be seen below in the analysis of the decision to deploy troops to the EU Atalanta naval operation. Parliamentary debates about EU operations are less vigorous, as government officials know that all missions will need to receive the approval of the European Scrutiny Committee in any case. Questions that are probed with regard to EU operations are for example: what are the UK's priorities in the geographical area in question? To what extent is the mission aligned with UK priorities? What strategic interest is the mission aiming to achieve, for example, combating terrorism, promoting economic cooperation and trade, or humanitarian objectives? What is the need for an operation, and is it asked for? Are the strategic aims feasible? What kind of operation is it (e.g. security sector reform, stabilization, peacekeeping)? What are other actors (e.g. UN, NATO, AU) doing in the area of operation? How is the EU mission interacting with other international organisations present on the ground? What can the EU offer compared to other organisations? Nonetheless, the Committee sometimes recommends a wider debate, which it did, for example, in the case of the EU operation to Central African Republic (interview with official 2). What we can see from the official documentation from the British MOD is that there have been efforts to formalise the process of decision-making and

bring more actors into the process, the transparency of the regulative framework has been increased. In this way changes to the decision-making process reflect an increased emphasis on efficiency and accountability in the normative framework of the strategic culture.

Participation in International Military Operations

The UK's colonial past and its broad membership in international organisations means that there are, prima facie, no "no go" areas for the British Armed Forces (Miskimmon 2004). During Blair's tenure of office, the British armed forces were deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Studying decision-making behind the operations in Sierra Leone (1997–2000), Kosovo (1999) and the decision to use force after 9/11, Mirow (2009) states that decisions were taken relatively quickly, with consensual parliamentary debates. For example, the first post-9/11 attack was conducted within one month, on 7 October, when the UK fired Tomahawk missiles from a submarine and deployed their airforce (Mirow 2009, p. 63). Mirow concludes that, compared to Germany, both the British public and the elite were more comfortable with the use of force. Wagnsson concurs, stating that British leadership during Kosovo, 9/11, and the Iraq war, consistently adopted a problem-solving attitude towards the crises. Use of force was seen as a legitimate means to defend universal and British values and norms (Wagnsson 2008, p. 25–47).

Generally, the UK has had a broad interpretation when defining the 'national interest' for military interventions, focusing on humanitarian needs and support to the rule of law and justice systems. Compared with the Blair government, however, Cameron's administration can be considered cautious. The government has come under pressure to better define its strategy and to clarify how action taken aligns with the national interest (both in terms of foreign policy and the economy). Increasingly, the consensus is that 'British interests', more narrowly defined and differing between geographic areas, should guide operations. A preference for bilateral cooperation has also emerged, as discussed above. The British approach to international interventions has become instrumentalist, increasingly asking, "what is in it for us?" This is reflected in the National Security Strategy and sub-strategies which have been developed by thematic area (for example, the International Defence Engagement Strategy). The operations and the character of operations that the government envisions the MOD to be capable of deploying are outlined in the Defence

Planning Assumptions. The FCO has also written area-specific foreign policy strategies and produced strategic maps showing British and others' interests and presence in different areas of operation. These strategies are implemented by the Armed Forces' Permanent Joint Head Quarters. New strategies require political consideration (Cornish 2013, p. 373; Evans 2014, p. 145; Edmunds 2014, p. 182; Interviews with officials 1, 2 & 3).

Politically, the question has arisen of where to go after Afghanistan. There has been strong consideration for increasing British support to the UN. At the same time, undertaking joint exercises with NATO has become important (interview with official 1). In order to reinforce military capacities, the UK has developed the concept of a Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF). This is a pool of resources ready to be deployed in any operation, regardless of context (e.g. to protect civilians or to participate in unilateral operations, bilateral operations, NATO or EU operations). The JEF, when fully operational, should be able to generate a maximum of 21,000 multidisciplinary troops. All troops have at least three different designated tasks, with the exception of a spearhead allocated to the NATO Joint Task Force. Furthermore, the UK has started to develop a Combined JEF with France, and established JEF partnerships with the Baltic states, Norway, Denmark, and Holland. Such partnerships were originally envisaged solely to bolster operative capabilities, but have grown into more strategic assets (interview with official 3).

Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF-Afghanistan 2001

The British intervention in Afghanistan following 9/11 occurred rapidly and without major consternation about the decision to use force. The initial justification for invasion was self-defence, in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. Britain notified the UN Security Council that they were intervening in order "to avert the continuing threat of attacks from the same source [...] Usama bin Laden and his Al Qaida terrorist organization […] have been engaged in a concerted campaign against the United States and its allies. One of their stated aims is the murder of US citizens and attacks on the United States' allies" (quoted in Smith and Thorp (2010, p. 4)). The same justification was highlighted in the government dossier "Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States" (Mirow 2009, p. 63).

The House of Commons did not vote on participation in the military operation in Afghanistan, either in 2001 or in subsequent deployments.

The question was debated twice in the House of Commons between the 9/11 attacks in 2001 and the commencement of Operation Enduring Freedom in October 2001. These debates were relatively uncontroversial and did not question the use of force (Mirow 2009). Prime Minister Blair emphasised the importance of activating Article 5 of the NATO Charter and that solidarity amongst NATO members "must be maintained and translated into support for action" (House of Commons debate on "International Terrorism and Attacks in the USA", 14 September 2001). Blair highlighted the obligation to defend values of reason, democracy, and tolerance, stating that "we act out of a sense of justice". Secretary of state for Foreign and Commonwealth affairs Jack Straw emphasised the UK's closeness to the USA in same debate. Secretary of Defence Geoffrey Hoon argued that "the United Kingdom has both an interest and an obligation to provide assistance to the United States to help bring those responsible to account and to remove the threat that terrorists pose to the international community". Holding those responsible to account and removing the threat of terrorism were thus the two goals clearly set for the operation.

Mirow (2009, p. 63–65) contends that the decision to intervene in Afghanistan was primarily taken by Prime Minister Blair and must have been made quickly following 9/11, in view of the fact that the actual military operation had commenced by 7 October. According to newspaper reports, the decision was discussed in two meetings by the Cabinet without much debate. Blair sought international support for the intervention, visiting Russian President Vladimir Putin and Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf in person, and calling Iranian President Mohammed Khatami by telephone.

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was subsequently mandated by Security Council Resolution 1386 in December 2001. The UK also participated in Operation Enduring Freedom "by contributing its Royal Navy submarines and its Royal Air Forces aircraft that provided reconnaissance and air-to-air refuelling capabilities in support of US strike aircraft" (Geneva Academy 2012). In all, the UK contributed three submarines, a military base in Diego Garcia, airpower, intelligence, Special Forces, and 4,000 ground troops in order to support the US-led operations (Mirow 2009, p. 65).

In addition to the two initial pre-deployment debates in the House of Commons, questions and Early Day Motions were initiated by Members of Parliament throughout the duration of the operations. In 2010, a new

Committee—the Commons Backbench Business Committee—held a debate and voted on their own motion in support of continued deployment of the armed forces to Afghanistan. The text was agreed with a substantive majority (Mills 2014, p. 4).

British troops have been deployed to the Helmand province in the south as part of the ISAF mission, with a mandate to protect the civilian population from insurgents, support more effective governance, and provide rapid support to strengthening the Afghan National Security Forces (army and police) (British Army 2014a, b). British operations were conducted under the name Operation HERRICK and consisted of personnel from the Navy, the Army and the Royal Air Force. Ultimately, 8,500 troops were deployed, almost three times the original planned deployment (de Waal 2013, pp 10–12).

Operation Iraqi Freedom

On 31 October 2002, Prime Minister Blair, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Straw, Secretary of State for Defence George Hoon, and Chief of Defence Boyce decided to intervene militarily as part of the coalition of the willing in Iraq. The reasons for this decision have been difficult to discern, due to lack of official documentation (de Waal 2013).

In contrast to the swift decision for Afghanistan, the Iraq intervention was debated 13 times by parliament between 24 September 2002 and 18 March 2003. Ultimately, the mission was authorised by a parliamentary vote on a motion from the government. In these debates, the prime minister (Tony Blair), backed by primarily the Secretary for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Jack Straw) and at times also the Secretary of State for Defence (first George Hoon, then Adam Ingram), put forth three main justifications for why the UK should intervene in Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein from power: to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction (and all possibilities to create such weapons in the future), to improve the human rights situation in Iraq, and to strengthen the authority of the UN (House of Commons 2002a, b). In the 25 November debate, the Secretary of State for Defence (Geoffrey Hoon) stated that the USA had asked the UK (among other states) for support in case of military action against Saddam Hussein and that planning had started, including determining the necessary military capabilities needed, including potential additional requirements that might include both new procurements on short notice and accelerating existing programmes (House of Commons 2002c).

The problem-solving attitude that the British leadership had shown in Kosovo and Afghanistan was again in evidence: the critical issue was how to address the existential threat posed by Hussein's weapons of mass destruction (Wagnsson 2008). Furthermore, the Iraqi people needed to be liberated from their oppressor Saddam Hussein. The UK also emphasised that the democratic world should stand together and that good relations between Europe and the USA were necessary. Iraq was seen as a precedent: "if the international community failed to act determinedly on Iraq, it would soon be challenged by other actors pursuing or possessing weapons of mass destruction" (Wagnsson 2008, p.81).

The decision taken on 31 October did not, however, decide the extent of British engagement. Rather, the decision adopted was to inform the USA that one of three possible options would be chosen. The MOD had presented three different alternatives, referred to as""packages of troops", for the deployment to Iraq. Ultimately, the most ambitious package—"package 3"—was chosen, although according to de Waal (2013), it is not entirely clear when this option was chosen. Package 3 included intelligence support, access to UK bases, special forces, naval and air contribution (a force of around 90 frontline aircraft and 20 warships, with 13,000 personnel), and a ground invasion force of over 300 tanks/armoured vehicles and 28,000 personnel (de Waal 2013, p.5 in turn relying on documents sent from the defence secretary to the prime minister released by the Iraq Inquiry). de Waal found that considerable pressure was exerted by the MOD, emanating from the armed forces themselves, in favour of selecting package 3. Policy arguments in support of package 3 included that it would provide "more influence on the American plan" and that it would "take over a region of the country rather than being integrated with the American force in the aftermath process" (as quoted in de Waal 2013, p.7). These policy arguments were made by the Chief of Defence Staff Michael Boyce, rather than by civilian officials at the MOD or the FCO. According to de Waal, Blair justified the choice of package 3 as a desire to "support the relationship with the US and with the British Army" (2013, p.10).

EU NAVFOR: Atalanta

British participation in EU operation NAVFOR Atalanta was never debated in parliament, but was thoroughly considered in the House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, exemplifying the strong role

of parliament commented on above, in all EU-related military operations. The Scrutiny Committee dealt with the operation in three different sessions, on 8 and 22 October, and on 26 November 2008. The report from the 8 October session stated that joint EU action in support of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1816 would aim to counteract the negative effects of piracy along the Somali coast on humanitarian assistance (notably by the UN World Food Programme), general maritime traffic, and UN arms embargoes. It also stated that a military coordination cell for EU ships escorting the World Food Programme would be established. Referring to an Explanatory Memorandum of 16 September by the Minister for Europe at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the report recalled that the World Food Programme "would be unable to continue the assistance without such EU support" (House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee 2008a, p. 84). In a separate letter from the same date, the Minister for Europe emphasised that unless the joint action was not agreed upon prior to the end of humanitarian escorts by Canada (expected for the end of September), "there would be a gap in the delivery of humanitarian aid, with harmful consequences for the region". The Scrutiny Committee cleared the joint action but specifically asked for indications of potential next steps, as well as what the "strategic military option for a possible European Union naval operation in the future", which had been mentioned by the Council, could be.

In the second session considering the operation, the Scrutiny Committee referred to a 14 October letter from the (new) Minister for Europe at the FCO, Caroline Flint, in which she explained that a number of

> EU member states have agreed that planning should proceed towards a potential operation on the basis of a mission designed to protect shipping in the region, including World Food Programme shipping to Somalia, other humanitarian shipping to Somalia, European flagged ships in the Area of Operations and other flagged ships, as well as creating an additional presence in the Gulf of Aden for deterrence and surveillance of piracy (House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee 2008b, p. 37).

British contribution to the operation became substantive in that it both offered an Operation Commander and Operation Headquarters for the operation at its Permanent Joint Headquarters at Northwood. It also offered a Royal Navy frigate "for at least part of the operation". Flint had stated that this should signal the commitment by the UK that the

operation became a success. In a letter from 19 November the minister also emphasised that the mandate for the operation meant that it would liaise with other organisations and states operating in the region, that it was important to avoid a gap between Operation Atalanta and the NATO operation that had already started but that had a limited mandate (House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee 2008b; House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee 2008c quote from p. 91).

With regard to funding, the minister had earlier stated that the operation "will be dependent upon the need from the smallest possible scale command structure, not least to ensure that the operation is affordable and constructed in a cost effective way" (letter of 14 October quoted in report 40 on p. 88). In the letter of 19 November, the minister stated

> under the standard ATHENA mechanism that covers funding of ESDP operations, current estimates lead us to expect that the UK share of common costs for the entire year-long operation will be approximately 1.2 million [pounds]. Although naval operations to counter piracy directly are important and necessary, we also need to focus on tackling the root causes of piracy in this area—instability in Somalia. This operation is thus part of a wider effort to stabilise the region, with DFID already active with a 25 million [pounds] programme. (House of Commons European Scrutiny Report 2008c, p.92).

The last quote is particularly telling, because it simultaneously demonstrates awareness of the financial aspects of the operation, and that the operation is in line with UK's strategy for that area, including the important objective of stabilising the region.

Operation Unified Protector: Libya

The operation in Libya is the only operation studied in this book which took place after the 2010 SDSR had been published and Cameron's coalition government had come into office. The House of Commons debated a possible intervention in Libya on six occasions before the operation started. The last debate on the issue, including a vote on a motion from the prime minister (David Cameron)—supported with 557 votes to 13—came two days after the operation had started. This is the only case studied in this chapter where there was both a vote in parliament and a clear UN Security Council resolution, notwithstanding that the vote came after the decision to deploy forces had been made. In the final debate before

deployment, the prime minister emphasised that the three conditions that he had previously put forth for military action to be taken in this instance, had been fulfilled. These three conditions were: a demonstrable need, regional support, and a clear legal base (i.e. UN mandate). On these grounds, the prime minister declared that the Cabinet had agreed the same morning that the UK would play its part and join an international operation "to enforce the resolution if Gaddafi fails to comply with the demand that he ends attacks on civilians". To ensure that the audience understood the legality of the actions, Cameron also stated that the Attorney-General had been consulted and had given advice to the Cabinet. Great emphasis was placed on the humanitarian situation and the protection of civilians. To a certain extent, the arguments used by Cameron resembled those previously made by Blair concerning Iraq, in claiming that "Gaddafi's regime must end and he must leave" and "there is a real danger now of a humanitarian crisis inside Libya" (House of Commons 2011a). The same arguments were later repeated by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs William Hague, stating that "the whole world has humanitarian responsibilities—the United Nations has, of course, a responsibility to protect" (House of Commons 2011b).

Three notable differences emerged in the debates on military intervention in Libya. First, the practicalities of how the operation should take place, including the establishment of a no-fly zone, were debated very early on. Second, parliament discussed the need for several contingency plans. Third, politicians made clear that Britain and France were taking the lead in pushing for UN Security Council resolutions and for the international community to act.

The military operation in Libya started with French, British, and American military contributions through Operation Odyssey Dawn, led by US command. Command of the operation gradually transitioned to NATO, as Operation Unified Protector (Taylor 2011). Britain participated with its operation ELLAMY, contributing a Typhoon and Tornado strike aircraft, Royal Navy Trafalgar Class submarine HMS *Triumph* with the capacity to launch Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs), Royal Navy frigates HMS *Cumberland* and HMS *Westminster*, Trafalgar Class nuclear submarine HMS *Triumph*, and transport aircraft for logistical support (Taylor 2011). As stated above, some capabilities were needed that previously had been decided to be taken out of service. For example one ship was even diverted to take part in the Libya operation when it was really on its way to the UK to be scrapped (Dover and Pythian 2011, p. 436).

Justifications and Their Relationship to Strategic Culture

When comparing the justifications for participation in the international military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, EU NAVFOR Atalanta, and Libya, they have some similar traits but also show some developments. For Afghanistan the main justifications were: solidarity with the US and NATO, defending values of reason, democracy and tolerance, self-defence (including participating in the protection of the USA), and to bring those responsible to account and remove the threat of terrorism (to defend society and values). For Iraq, the main justifications were: disarmament, non-proliferation, and safeguarding the authority of the UN. For EU NAVFOR Atalanta the main justifications were: that is was part of a wider UK strategy to create stability in the region, the protection to the UN World Food Programme (which it would otherwise not have been possible to maintain), the effectiveness of UN arms embargo, and to protect trade. For Libya the justifications were to protect civilians, to avoid humanitarian crisis (due to Libya's failure to live up to its responsibility to protect), further it was stated that the operation only would be appropriate if there was regional support, that there had to be a clear legal basis, and a demonstrable need.

Most of the justifications go in line with the idea of the UK as a great power (politically and economically) with a responsibility to maintain a stable world order. However, the operation in Libya seems to indicate some interesting changes. Some of the justifications, or in fact demands put forth as conditions for action, were new. The demand for regional support can be interpreted as a lesson learned from earlier experiences (Afghanistan and Iraq), but nonetheless puts possible constraints on behaviour. The demand for a clear legal basis can be another sign that the strategic culture is changing with respect to one important aspect—the place of the UK in the international system. A great power, it can be argued, does not need the clear legal framework that was demanded in the Libya case. A great power can act from its own power base, and does not have the same need to legitimate its actions through the legal basis in the international system.

This need for a clear legal basis also affects the role of parliament. In this way, the Libya case might indicate that the UK has become relatively "smaller" in its international status. Dover and Phythian (2011), however, contend to the contrary that "Cameron's Libya commitment was a product of a strategic sense of Britain's role in the world" (p. 436). The Libyan intervention, in their view, showed more continuity than change in British policy, despite the efforts in the SDSR from 2010 to change the political

direction. However, the results of this chapter indicate that in order to continue to play a prominent role on the international stage, despite a relative decrease in power, new normative constraints on behaviour arise. Furthermore, increased scrutiny in the decision-making process means that the politicians have to think carefully of which arguments they use in favour of undertaking an operation. In this way, the domestic changes in the UK and its role in the world are interrelated and reinforcing. Of course, the Libya case could prove to be an isolated example and a future government might argue differently. However, now that normative considerations, such as regional support, a clear legal basis, and a demonstrable need have been clearly expressed, it may be more difficult to disregard them in the future.

Conclusions: Changes in British Strategic Culture

Relying on previous literature on British strategic culture, it can be concluded that the traditional normative framework (before 9/11) emphasised the importance of the UK as an international actor, and shaped its behaviour accordingly. The UK's political strengths derived from membership of the UN Security Council, a global political reach due to relations in the Commonwealth and with former colonies, the strong relationship with the USA, and its position as the most important 'transatlantic link' in NATO. The UK's military strength derived from its nuclear arms and NATO contributions. Finally, economic strength derived from its importance as a trade country. The traditional regulative frameworks relating to international military operations thus maintained a strong role for the prime minister (securing the possibility to act and live up to the UK's role as an important actor on the international arena), a weak role for parliament, and a significant consideration of the advice of the armed forces.

The development of strategic culture in the time period studied in this chapter can be divided into two phases: the "Labour phase" which covers the time period after 9/11 until 2010; and the 'strategic efficiency phase' which covers the time period from 2010 to 2014. To a large extent the traditional norms of the strategic culture found in previous literature persisted in 'the Labour phase' after 9/11. However, the normative framework was somewhat extended to place emphasis on the obligation to defend human rights through the idea of the 'responsibility to protect'. This phase also saw an increased role for parliamentary debates in the decision-making process about operations.

The 'strategic efficiency phase' that started with the entry into office of the Conservative government in 2010, maintained the emphasis on the responsibility to protect. At the same time, other aspects became the subject of emphasis, for instance, the idea of economic efficiency and accompanying rationality in policy development. Questions of national interest and instrumentality became central with the development of a national strategy: the question of how each operation contributed to particular British goals and interests in the geographic area became relevant. The normative link to the USA was complemented by a link to France, and both allies became relevant to considerations of how the UK would consider questions of military intervention. The increased emphasis on bilateral co-operation with France came into practice in the operation in Libya. The Libya intervention became the first test for bilateral cooperation between the UK and France. One official interviewed stated that there was a clear political objective in the case of Libya to do something as part of a coalition, to coordinate the operation with USA and with France. Militarily, however, the default reflex was still to look at US capabilities and to NATO for clear command and control structures.

With regard to the regulatory framework, the introduction of the National Security Council has led to both an expansion of the number of people involved in the decision-making process and an effort to make the decision-making process more structured and transparent. The question of whether the UK should be regarded as a case of civilian supremacy or professional supremacy with regard to the civil–military relations is not clear cut. On the one hand, the Royal Prerogative says nothing of the role of the armed forces, giving powers to the prime minister only. On the other hand, it seems as if the armed forces receive great respect and their views and wishes are taken into account: military advice has traditionally not been questioned. According to Thornton (2003) for example, the British Army has traditionally been given authority by their civilian masters. Traditionally class and 'old-school ties' linked the politicians in London and the army and gave the army to be "proactive politicians outside the UK" (p. 54). Furthermore, soldiers became used to working with civilian administrators in the colonies, as the Army was mainly deployed in the Commonwealth. Thornton argues that this tradition of autonomy of the military from the political level still persists and a field commander is only given general orders about a mission. This might be changing due to the increased link between tactics and politics as described above. "Public

opinion, indeed, into the 1990s was 'uniquely supportive of the employment of armed forces, as successive opinion polls over some 30 years have demonstrated'" (Clarke 1998, p. 15, quoted by Thornton 2003, p. 56). This tradition could account for the fact that the wishes of the army seem to have been important input when a decision on what the British contribution to Iraq should be. However, as described above, the political demands on scrutiny has increased the presence of civilians at the Permanent Joint Head Quarter. In this way, the political desire for transparency, oversight and control have affected the organisation of the operational level.

With regard to the organisation of the MOD, the double-hatting of all positions with both civilian and military personnel indicates a situation that may best be analysed with the concept of 'civil–military parity' (Angstrom 2013). Under a situation of civil–military parity, "neither military, nor civilians have exclusive spheres of knowledge and neither can set their own standards" therefore it "draws […] not upon the separation of knowledge and exclusive expertise and exclusive domains of decision-making, but rather the opposite, i.e. the collision between such knowledge domains" (Angstrom 2013 p. 231). Some authors such as de Waal (2013) consider that this has meant that the military views have become dominant, to the extent that their policy judgments sometimes go unquestioned by other policy actors such as the FCO. This seems to have been the case in the decisions taken what capacities should be used in Iraq, but also something that the MOD are aware of, according to one of the officials interviewed for this study. It here seems that the MOD and the armed forces are trying to balance their own roles, if they were perceived as pushing specific options in the Iraq case, they did not want to be seen as pushing specific options in the Libya case. In this way, the increased emphasis on scrutiny and transparency after 2010 has contributed to changes in the civil–military relationship, another indication of changes in British strategic culture. In addition, the need for increased transparency and legitimacy in the policy process has led to an increased role for parliament. Thus, there have been changes in both the normative and the regulatory frameworks of British strategic culture.

Note

1. The coalition government's programme for partnership government. Presenting the policy aims for a large number of policy areas.

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CHAPTER 8

Conclusions: The Willing, the Cautious, and the Ambivalent

Malena Britz

An Answer to Our Questions

This book started out by asking why militarily resourceful European states decide to participate or not to participate in international military operations. In order to answer this question we have relied on the concept of strategic culture. As defined in the introductory chapter, strategic culture consists of the normative and regulative frameworks that enable some decisions but at the same time restrain other decisions with regard to participation in international military operations. For each of the countries studied in this book (France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, and the UK) both normative and regulative frameworks for decisions on participation in international military operations have been studied. In addition we have studied the justifications given for such decisions in four specific operations: ISAF (Afghanistan), Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq), EU NAVFOR Atalanta (Somalia), and Operation Unified Protector (Libya). As can be concluded from the previous chapters, the case studies in this book show that in general, the normative framework of the strategic culture of a country is reflected in the justifications given for decisions to participate (or not to participate) in specific international military operations. In a few instances the justifications were related to other aspects,

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such as consequences for domestic policy, but those were exceptions. The different aspects of participation and non-participation studied show that these states fall into three different groups. The willing: the UK, Italy, and France; the cautious: Poland and Greece; and the ambivalent: Germany.

Willingness to Participate in International Military Operations

The states studied in this book generally show a high degree of participation in the operations studied. It should be remembered though that the picture might have been slightly different had we looked at all operations these countries have been involved in since the end of the Cold War. The most unambiguously willing states were the UK and Italy, who participated in all the operations studied. Greece also formally participated in all the operations studied. However, another aspect that has become evident on studying these states more closely, is the way in which they participate, which should also matter for their classification. Greece has participated in all the operations studied but to a very limited extent, which is the reason why they have been put into the category of cautious here, rather than willing. We could also add France to the willing category, with the addition 'for the right reason'. France, having once decided that the reasons were right, has shown less caution and more determination. This shows that the relationship between participation and non-participation is not binary, but that there are several aspects to participation (and non-participation as was shown in Germany's non-participation in the operation in Libya). Poland has moved to the category of cautious, after operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Germany has its own category as ambivalent. Historical experiences and the institutional set-up of the decision-making process (a consequence of those experiences) mean that they cannot always participate even if they at times (and increasingly) feel obliged to do so.

Similarities and Differences in Strategic Culture Between the Countries Studied

Normative Frameworks

As stated in the introductory chapter, the normative framework of a strategic culture mainly answers questions related to identity such as 'who are we?',

'when do we act?', and 'with whom do we act?'. The idea that normative frameworks should matter for participation in international military operations is not new. A comparative study published by Mirow in 2009, for example, looked at British and German participation in international operations between 1990 and 2002. In these years the UK deployed approximately 136,820 soldiers while Germany deployed approximately 24,140. His conclusion was that it was not the greater military capabilities of the UK, compared with Germany, that made them deploy more frequently and in greater numbers. Rather, he argued that these states were relatively equal when it came to potential, but that they translated this into different capabilities (p. 74). He concluded that differences in "culturally derived norms, ideas, and beliefs about the use of military force" (p. 74) were what determined behaviour. So how have the normative frameworks found in the states studied here affected their participation in international military operations?

Through the analysis in the different chapters of this book, it is possible to be more specific than just claiming that norms, ideas and beliefs about the use of military force matter. A number of factors have affected the different normative frameworks in the states studied. The factors found here were: geostrategic position, historical experiences of war, and traditional role in world politics. All of these have affected the outlooks of the different states, as have traditional bonds with other states, and alliance memberships which have affected expectations of solidarity. Taken together, these factors have made an impact on the willingness to participate in international military operations. Comparing the two groups—the willing (France, Italy, and the UK) and the cautious (Greece and Poland)—it has become clear that the differences in geostrategic position were an important factor affecting strategic culture and willingness to participate. These countries' different geostrategic positions have meant that Greece and Poland have put a greater emphasis on territorial defence than the other countries studied. This has affected their willingness to participate in international military operations. Historical experiences of war and roles in world politics have also meant that both the UK and France see themselves as major actors in world politics, which has included participation in international operations. Historical experiences of war have also played a major role in the ambivalent German attitude towards participation in international operations, despite contemporary political pressure to change this attitude.

In terms of traditional bonds and alliance memberships we can see that the UK and Italy are the states for whom the relationship to the USA seems to have had the greatest effect on the willingness to participate. For France,

this relationship has been important at times, but has not been decisive for participation. For Poland this relationship was very important during the years after 9/11 but as a driver for participation its importance has decreased since 2008. When it comes to the importance of multilateralism, Italy seems to be the state with the most willingness both to act in order to support NATO, and to work to make sure that an upcoming operation would become a NATO operation rather than taking place outside an organisational framework. Greece, on the other hand, has found that multilateral frameworks in the form of NATO or the EU oblige them to participate (in order to show solidarity to the organisations they belong to), rather than actually preferring operations to take place within these frameworks. For France and the UK, it seems that whatever has been perceived as the most efficient constellation has been preferred from a political perspective. It has not been important whether it would be a coalition of the able or willing, or take place in the framework of NATO or the EU. It should be pointed out, however, that France on several occasions has shown reluctance to NATO, in particular when this has implied automatic US leadership. For the UK, France has emerged as a new 'usual suspect' and a preferred partner in bi-, or trilateral co-operations. However, from the point of view of the British armed forces, the NATO framework was preferred due to the less complicated organisational issues that the established control and command structure of the organisation brought, compared to bilateral co-operations. The Greek armed forces seem to have been of the same view, that operations within the NATO framework were the easiest ones to execute.

Regulative Frameworks

Whereas the normative framework answers questions related to identity, the regulative framework answers questions of how decisions on participation in international military operations are taken. Who (within the state) gets a voice in these decision-making processes? Is it a process only for the executive or is it also an issue for the parliament? What role do the armed forces play in the process? Comparing the regulative frameworks with regard to decision-making on participation in international military operations, the states studied in this book differ in two regards. The first is the location of the decision-making and the relative strength of the executive and the parliament. Here the states can be placed on a scale with a strong executive and weak parliament at the top and a strong parliament at the bottom. The second is the role of the armed forces in decision-making. An overview of this aspect looks like this (Table 8.1):

Table 8.1 Role of the armed forces and the executive

Role of the armed forces		Role of the executive		
		Strong	*Medium*	*Weak*
	Strong	France	The UK	
	Weak	Greece, Italy, Poland	Italy	Germany

Medium: (Formally the prime minister decides, but parliament is often consulted.)

Germany stands out here with a very strong role for parliament, which actually takes the decision. In this way decisions to participate in international operations also become part of a domestic policy process, where a decision to participate or not to participate can be turned into a vote of confidence for the government. This was not the case for the other states studied. In both Italy and the UK the parliaments were often consulted, even if their opinion was sometimes asked after an operation actually had started. In the UK an operation was either thoroughly debated (in case of non-EU operations) or thoroughly scrutinised by a special commission before a decision was taken (in the case of EU operations). The trend in the UK over recent years has also been to involve parliament more in decision-making, especially if the international legal basis has been unclear (for example, where there is no UN mandate, or no clear request from the authorities in the country in which the operation would take place). There has been a strong push for making a parliamentary vote mandatory and decisive, but so far this has not been formalised. This is the case despite the fact that the government's request to intervene in Syria in the autumn of 2013 was turned down, meaning that it became politically impossible for the prime minister to take a decision to participate. In addition, the introduction of a British National Security Council in 2010 has meant that discussion of a decision on the executive level has taken place among a wider group of participants than used to be the case. The increased role of parliament and the introduction of the National Security Council have meant that the prime minister has less leeway than s/he used to. In Poland the parliament has no role in the decision-making process, it is the executive that decides, but the prime minister and the President (who takes the final decision) have to agree, so there is an aspect of checks and balances. In Italy, even though the parliament generally debated and voted on participation in international operations, the final decision was in the hands of the prime minister. This was clearly shown in the Libya case where the prime minister at a very late stage changed his mind in favour of participation.

In both France and Greece the executive was very strong and it was the President in the French case and the prime minister in the Greek case that took the decisions. In the Greek case however, the prime minister had to consult with a governmental committee consisting of ministers related to foreign, security and defence policy and the chief of defence staff. The French president seemed to be the most independent decision-maker even though he had regular meetings with his personal chief of defence staff (Chef d'État Major Particulière) and decisions were formally taken in the National Defence and Security Council headed by the president. As a more general conclusion, the heavy reliance on the executive to take decisions on participation in international military operations for all the states studied except Germany has meant that it is difficult to see a correlation between the regulative framework and the willingness to participate. What the regulative framework does affect though, is the speed with which decisions can be taken. This will be further discussed below, but first another aspect of the regulative framework—the role of the armed forces in the decision-making process, will be analysed.

Looking at the role of the armed forces in the decision-making processes, there is also quite a wide variation. As a general classification, all the states studied in this book can be labelled as states with civilian supremacy. The armed forces are clearly subordinate to the political process and are not expected to put forward their own views on decisions. Even so, their roles in the decision-making process vary. Historical experiences and their role in the strategic culture weigh heavily in explaining these differences. In the UK, the fact that the armed forces have for a very long time been out on international operations on a regular basis, has meant that they have already become involved in the policy process in the early phases. In this way the armed forces are intermingled with civilian desk officers at the Ministry of Defence. In addition, it has become the tradition of the army to be abroad rather than at home. In France, the major part of the armed forces is permanently deployed abroad on different missions, which has meant that they are used to getting political directions on what to do and where to go, in addition to an obligation to report back to the political level (sometimes directly to the president) on a regular basis.

In Italy, Greece, Poland, and Germany historical experiences have meant that the armed forces have been kept at arm's length in the decision-making process. Even so, it seems that the actual experience of going on international operations has increased the competence of the armed forces in that they have been given slightly more influence in the

decision-making process over time, at least in Italy and in Greece. In the case of Greece it also seems that the role of the armed forces can be stronger if the political stakes are not particularly high for a certain operation. It would not be far-fetched to think that this could also be the case in the other states.

Even if neither the strength of the executive in the decision-making process, nor the role of the armed forces can explain the willingness to participate in international military operations, together these two aspects explain the speed with which such decisions can be taken. As was discussed in the chapter on Germany, German politicians were outpaced in the diplomatic process preceding the operation in Libya, leading to the abstention of their vote in the UN, and domestic fears that they had committed 'foreign policy suicide'. The sense of the domestic policy process not always being up to speed with international policy process has also been true for the UK in regard to EU operations which have to go through the parliamentary scrutiny committee. With regard to non-EU operations the British decision-making process can be much quicker, even if the British themselves perceive their process as being both belts and braces. This means that another aspect of domestic policy process is that the degree of domestic cohesion with regard to foreign and security policy also seems to matter for decision-making; big dividing lines domestically make quick decisions more difficult because they put domestic policy at risk. Of the states studied in this book, the most speedy process was undertaken by France, where a phone call from the president was enough to start an operation, which made all other states appear slow by comparison.

According to Huntington (1957), the balance between the functional imperative of the armed forces and the societal imperative became more relevant when there was a security threat. However, it can also be argued that this tension becomes more important when participation in international operations increases (either in the number of operations or in the number of troops deployed). A complicating factor here is that the dichotomy of 'civilian' and 'military' might not be very clear cut in practice. As pointed out by Feaver (2013), the literature on civil-military relations "has long recognized that the duality of the civil-military distinction is problematic" (Feaver 2013, p. 371). As shown above, even though all the states studied here can be labelled civilian supremacist, the strength of the armed forces in the decision-making process on participation in international operations varied, and the UK was labelled as a case of civil-military parity (cf. Angstrom 2013).

Summary of Participation in the Different Operations

This section summarises the findings in the different chapters regarding the extent to which the different countries have participated in the four operations studied. An overview of the findings in the form of tables is found in Appendix I.

Operation Enduring Freedom/ISAF in Afghanistan

The UK was participating in these operations from the very beginning, supplying naval, air, and ground forces, as well as providing military bases to the operation (Britz this volume). In December 2001, resolution 1386 of the UN Security Council established the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) with the mandate to assist the Afghan Interim Authority with its security, to which the member states were called upon to provide 'personnel, equipment, and other resources' (UNSCR 1386). By May 2002, all the countries studied were participating, to varying degrees, with ground forces and aerial transports in either Operation Enduring Freedom, or ISAF, or in both. All countries except for Poland and Greece also participated in various capacities, such as with naval warships in the form of submarines, aircraft carriers, and frigates. In addition, France provided fighter aircraft, and Germany and the UK provided reconnaissance and logistical air forces (Department of Defence 2002).

In 2003, the UK, Italy, and Germany assumed command over one Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) each, and in 2004 Germany and the UK received command over one more PRT each (Perito 2005; Bergstrand and Engelbrekt this volume). The UK's PRTs located in Northern Afghanistan were later handed over to Swedish and Norwegian forces, and the UK instead assumed command over a PRT in Southern Afghanistan (USAID; ISAF 2007). The ISAF-forces and PRTs in Afghanistan are divided into six regional commands of which Italy assumed command over Regional Command West (RC(W)) in 2005. In 2006, Germany and France assumed command over Regional Commands North (RC(N)) and Capital (RC(C)) respectively, and the UK assumed rotating command over Regional Command South (RC(S)). Later the command over RC(C) would rotate between participating states (Ruffa this volume; ISAF 2007, 2009a, b).

In 2006, the Polish government decided to increase their thus-far meagre force of around 300 soldiers in Afghanistan to a peak deployment in

2010–2011 with over 2500 personnel (Doeser this volume, ISAF 2011a, b). This can be compared to the deployments in the later stage of the OEF–ISAF mission in Afghanistan for the other states studied, which peaked at around 9500 personnel from the UK (ISAF 2009a), 4900 personnel from Germany (ISAF 2013), 4200 personnel from Italy (Ministero della Difesa 2011), 3850 personnel from France (ISAF 2010), and a meagre 170 personnel from Greece (ISAF 2007). In addition, all of the countries studied except Greece have participated in training the Afghan National Army at different stages during the OEF–ISAF mission (RS-NATO; Bindi 2009).

Operation Iraqi Freedom

In contrast to the situation with Operation Enduring Freedom and the ISAF in Afghanistan, the plans for the United States-led Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) were met with harsh opposition from several of the states in this study. France in particular was very vocal in its opposition to the war in Iraq and promised to veto a resolution in the UN Security Council which would have posed an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein (Hellman this volume). Germany, then one of the non-permanent members of the Security Council, openly sided with the French in their opposition to giving the United States a UN authorisation for the invasion (Bergstrand and Engelbrekt this volume). The UK, on the other hand, had already committed to Operation Iraqi Freedom in late October 2002, and was, together with the USA, the main proponent of a UN-authorised invasion in the Security Council (Britz this volume; Bergstrand and Engelbrekt this volume). For the initial phase of OIF the UK committed an ambitious military package consisting of around 41,000 military personnel from all three branches of the British Armed Forces, including 300 armoured vehicles, 90 combat aircraft, and 20 warships (Britz this volume).

Apart from the UK, Poland was the only state of those studied which committed itself to the initial phase of OIF. In January 2003, the Polish government stated that they would not rule out participating in OIF even without UN authorisation. It was, however, not until 17 March, when President George Bush issued the 48-hour ultimatum to Saddam Hussein, that Poland formally committed 200 military personnel, including a supply ship, to OIF. Poland later also contributed 2500 military personnel to the post-invasion stabilisation force in Iraq (Doeser this volume). Italian forces also participated in the post-invasion stabilisation

force in Iraq after the Italian parliament's authorisation on 18 April of the deployment of an Italian contingent, consisting of personnel from all branches of the armed forces, to OIF. By 2004 more than 3000 Italian military personnel were deployed in Iraq (Ruffa this volume; Ministero della Difesa 2005).

Despite formal opposition to OIF, the Greek government decided to lend logistical support to the OIF forces by allowing these forces to use Greek Air and Naval bases located in the eastern Mediterranean. Greek ships and ports were also used to sealift Hungarian tanks to Iraq (Boskou and Engelbrekt this volume 4). Germany too provided some indirect logistical support for OIF by allowing the use of German airspace for coalition aircraft, as well as providing additional guard support to US military bases in Germany, and allowing German military personnel to remain on AWACS reconnaissance aircraft which were used in the overall war effort (Bergstrand adn Engelbrekt this volume).

EU NAVFOR/Atalanta

The European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) came into existence as the result of three UN Security Council resolutions which enabled the use of military resources in the fight against piracy. In December 2008, operation Atalanta was initiated when the EU NAVFOR was deployed to Somalia in order to protect World Food Programme (WFP), African Union Mission on Somalia (AMISOM), and other vulnerable shipping, as well as to deter and disrupt piracy off the coast of Somalia, and support other EU and international missions in the region (EU-EA, n.d.).

The contributions to the EU NAVFOR have been relatively unproblematic for the states studied, and all of these states except for Poland have provided warships to the operation (see individual country chapters). In addition to naval resources in the form of warships, France and Germany have both provided manned aerial reconnaissance aircraft to the EU NAVFOR, and Italy has deployed unmanned aerial reconnaissance drones in the operation (EU-EA 2012; EU—EA 2014; Bundeswehr 2015). Poland did, however, contribute a small number of liaison officers to the Operational Headquarters (Doeser this volume).

The EU NAVFOR headquarters are located at Northwood, UK, and the overarching command is assigned to the UK. In addition to the Operation Commander, there are two rotating command positions, the Deputy Operation Commander and the Force Commander. French,

Italian, and German admirals have held the position of Deputy Operation Commander, and admirals from all the states studied, except for the UK and Poland, have held the position as Force Commander (EU-EA n.d.).

Operation Unified Protector: Libya

The NATO-led Operation Unified Protector (OUP) was launched in late March 2011 against the Libyan government headed by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, with the goal to enforce an arms embargo against Libya, establish a no-fly zone to prevent aircraft from bombing civilian targets, and to enable air and naval strikes against military forces involved in attacks on Libyan civilians (Britz this volume). The operation in Libya was authorised by UN Security Council resolution 1973, proposed by France and the UK. OUP was, however, not uncontroversial among the other states studied. Germany, at the time a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, abstained from voting on the resolution in the Security Council and declined to participate in the Operation with combat aircraft, although it did not actively move to block the operation (UNSCR 1973; Bergstrand and Engelbrekt this volume; Hellman this volume). Despite Germany's resistance to OUP it was later revealed that Germany provided important contributions to the Libyan campaign, for instance by deploying military personnel who participated in target selection for the NATO air strikes (Bergstrand and Engelbrekt this volume; Gebauer 2011).

Italy, too, was reluctant to join the coalition due its agreements with the Libyan government, colonial ties to Libya, and Berlusconi's personal ties to Muammar Gaddafi. However, when it became evident that France, the USA, and the UK would proceed with the operation regardless of Italy's support, the Italian government decided to also join OUP. Of all sorties during the Libyan campaign, the French Air Force conducted approximately 20 %, the Royal Air Force 12 %, and the Italian Air Force 9 % (Ruffa this volume). In addition to fighter aircraft, the UK also deployed naval warships with the capacity to launch Tomahawk missiles (Britz this volume).

Poland and Greece, on the other hand, assumed supportive stances towards OUP, but decided to not provide any combat air capabilities to the operations. The Polish government stated early that they would offer logistical support and transport planes for the operations, but would not play any military role. The Greek government initially discussed sending

fighter aircraft to the operation, but later settled on providing logistical and non-combat support instead by making airforce bases in the eastern Mediterranean available for the coalition, as well as providing reconnaissance and RADAR aircraft, and a frigate for patrol purposes (Boskou and Engelbrekt this volume; Doeser this volume).

Looking Closer at Justifications

As has been stated in previous research (Mirow 2009) it is not necessarily the military capacities a country has that determines their willingness to use these in international military operations, even if capacities do help a willing country to live up to its willingness. This was also shown in the comparison made above where the ambivalent Germany, when deciding to participate in ISAF in Afghanistan, did not contribute fewer resources than the willing Italy, and when studying the participation of Poland (here labelled as cautious) in both ISAF in Afghanistan and in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The next step in this comparative analysis is therefore to look closer at the justifications given for participation and non-participation in the different operations. In order to get a deeper understanding of each country studied, the summary and comparisons are made for each country, rather than for each operation. An overview of the justifications is found in Appendix II.

Justifications for Participation and Non-participation by the Willing: France, Italy, and the UK

Looking at the justifications for participation given by France, they differ between the operations, but they all reflect main French strategic culture traits such as the will to be seen as a great power, support for democratic values and human rights, the provision of humanitarian assistance, and the aim to show French independence from, but at the same time support of, the USA (especially noteworthy in the decision not to participate in OIF, which was also motivated by the lack of a UN Security Council resolution). In addition, in the case of EU NAVFOR Atalanta, the possibility to manifest the EU as a strategic actor that can undertake crisis management was pointed out.

In Italy, justifications of stabilisation, assisting humanitarian efforts, and defending economic interests were common themes in favour of participation, as were solidarity with the US, peacekeeping, and in the case of

Libya, the responsibility to protect. In addition, the Italians pushed for OUP to be a multilateral operation.

For the UK, solidarity with the US and NATO and the defence of values were important justifications in ISAF and OIF. The preservation of the international system (the authority and role and functions of the UN, non-proliferation, to bring those responsible for terrorism to account), and also the protection of trade and civilians were generally pointed out as justifications for participation. However, the later operations were also justified as being part of a wider UK strategy to create stability, and in the case of Libya new kinds of justifications arose: regional support, a clear legal basis and a demonstrable need were pointed out as reasons to participate.

Justifications for Participation and Non-participation by the Cautious: Greece and Poland

For Greece, participation was to a large extent justified by an obligation arising from membership of NATO and/or the EU, or a feeling of solidarity towards other members of these organisations. Compared to the other states, this is a very consistent justification. In addition, as was the case with the operations EU NAVFOR/Atalanta and OUP in Libya, proximity to the area was also given as a justification, as was the protection of the merchant fleet. In the Libya case other justifications were also given such as that there would be no combat troops, and Greece's historical links to the Arab world.

For Poland there were only three arguments justifying their participation in ISAF and OIF: to demonstrate solidarity with the US and/or NATO, to increase political influence, and to strengthen territorial security. For Poland the justifications for not participating in EU NAVFOR Atalanta and Operation Unified Protector in Libya had to do with the lack of connection to the defence of Polish territory and the limited resources of the Polish armed forces which it was stated should be used for other purposes (that is, territorial defence).

Justifications for Participation and Non-participation by the Ambivalent: Germany

For Germany, justifications for participation have been quite sparse, which is understandable given that, according to German strategic culture,

Germany should not participate in international operations. However, in the case of ISAF unrestricted solidarity was given as a justification, and in the case of the EU NAVFOR/Atalanta Germany's role as Europe's pre-eminent trading nation was pointed out. With regard to ISAF, the purpose stated was to combat international terrorism as a means of self-defence, and with regard to Atalanta it was to protect civilian vessels with humanitarian aid and commercial cargo; and to monitor the coastline. An additional argument from Germany for participation in Atalanta was the development of broader security co-operation (since the operation included both Russia and the USA). With regard to non-participation in operations, Germany presented justifications in the case of OIF in Iraq and of OUP in Libya. In both these cases Germany wanted a longer political process where peaceful and diplomatic solutions were considered. In addition, in the case of OUP they were not convinced by the endorsement of the Arab League, which meant that they did not trust the regional actors and their support for the operation in the same way that other countries did.

Justifications that Do Not Refelct Strategic Culture

Certain justifications identified do not reflect the strategic culture but, rather, relate to domestic achievements, domestic apprehensions, or expectations of the outcome of the operation. In Italy, in the case of Atalanta, one justification given for participation in the operation was that it was expected to improve the national naval capacity. In Poland, high domestic political risks were given as a justification not to participate in OUP in Libya. France, on the other hand, saw the possibility to restore the political prestige of President Sarkozy and the French government. Germany stated uncertain outcomes of operations as reasons not to participate, when it claimed that the dangers and consequences of military action in the case of OIF in Iraq were "plain to see", and when it doubted whether OUP in Libya could lead to a stable political situation.

Justifications and Their Relation to Strategic Culture

As has been shown, the normative frameworks of the strategic cultures were reflected to a large extent in the justifications given for participation or non-participation of the states studied. The regulative frameworks affected the content of the decisions to a much lesser extent; they had a greater impact on the speed with which decisions could be taken. However, in some circumstances the speed of the process might affect

the content, which might have been the case with the German decision, had the international process not outpaced the German domestic process in the case of Libya.[1] The fact that the normative frameworks have been shown to be important for the justification of participation (or non-participation) might not be that strange. We have seen that the normative framework presents answers to questions mainly related to identity such as who we are, when we act, and with whom we act. As March and Olsen have stated "[a]s a cognitive matter, appropriate action is action that is essential to a particular conception of self" (1998, p. 95). This is the reason why the justifications to a large extent reflect the normative framework of the strategic culture.

Overall, the willingness to participate in international military operations was primarily affected by three aspects of the normative framework. The possible territorial threat that certain geostrategic positions bring decreases the willingness to participate, as shown in the cases of Poland and Greece. Historical experiences affect willingness in the way that they give the state a precedent for who it should be in international military affairs—someone who actively plays a role (the UK and France) or someone who perhaps should not play a role (Germany). This also reveals a possibility for changing strategic culture. In Italy, for example, the armed forces used to be kept separate from society, but they have assumed a new role due to their participation in international military operations. Traditional bonds and alliance memberships were primarily found to play a role with regard to the US and NATO. Decisions by France, the UK, Italy, and Poland were clearly taken in relation to the role of the USA (even though this affected justifications both in favour of and against participation), and solidarity with NATO was also used as a justification for participation. Strategic culture clearly presents the boundaries for what can be used as a justification, but, as suggested by Lock (2010), it might be that these justifications in turn reproduce and therefore contribute to the constitution of strategic culture. Lock has stated that "practices related to the use of military force serve to reconstitute particular collective identities. Therefore strategic culture constitutes a set of rules regarding what may be communicated" (p. 700).

[1] There is one obvious case, though not studied in this book, in which the regulatory framework meant that an operation did not take place even though the normative framework was in favour of such operation, and that was the British decision not to intervene with military means in Syria in 2013.

We agree with Lock that rules can be changed, but the occurrence of changes is an empirical issue, and the extent to which the justifications we have studied contribute to reproduction of the strategic culture is beyond the scope of this study. This study does not refute Lock's statement that "[s]trategic culture therefore represents an inherently dynamic structure that is repeatedly reconstituted through the very practice that it enables and constrains" (Lock 2010, p. 701). But the possible reproduction found here is an empirical result, we have looked for all kinds of justifications in the different kinds of material studied. Our search for justifications has not been steered by the framework, and it is an empirical finding that a great majority of the justifications found are within the boundaries of that country's strategic culture. A more thorough constructivist approach would have been needed in order to find out the extent to which these justifications also reproduce the strategic cultures identified. An interesting question, though, is how changes in justifications are to be interpreted. If the assumption is that the justifications for participating or not in international military operations to a large extent reflect strategic culture (as they do in our findings in this book), does it mean that changes in justifications show changes in strategic culture? This question was particularly relevant in the chapter about the UK, where some of the justifications for participation in OUP in Libya had a slightly different character to the justifications used for other operations. The cautious have been more consistent in their reasoning, which might indicate that the willing have to live up to their role as responsible, which means adjusting justifications, whereas justifications for non-participation can be quite similar no matter what the operation or the framework the operation is supposed to take place in.

Our Findings and Their Relevance for Future Operations

In August 2014 the USA initiated air strikes in Iraq and later on also in Syria, in order to fight the Islamic State/Daesh. Can the same pattern of participation and non-participation that we have discovered be found for this operation? Were the countries we have labelled 'willing' (the UK, Italy, and France) also willing in this operation, were the 'cautious' (Poland and Greece) also cautious, and what about ambivalent Germany? How did the countries studied in this book act at the beginning of this operation? Below is an analysis of their participation in the first six months of the new operation (an overview of their participation is found in Table 5 in

Appendix I). The situation in Iraq was deteriorating during the summer of 2014 and in the beginning of August the Kurdish minority in the town Kobane was under high pressure from Daesh, who threatened to take over the whole city and a large number of civilians fled into the mountains (Mount Sinjar). The USA authorised air strikes and humanitarian airdrops in Iraq on 7 August after a request from the Iraqi government (and on 23 September, they began air strikes also in Syria). On 15 August the UNSC adopted resolution 2170. The resolution condemned widespread gross abuse of human rights by extremist groups in Iraq and Syria, and called on all UN members to act to suppress the flow of foreign fighters, financing and other support to Islamist extremist groups.

France was the first European country to launch air strikes in Iraq. President Hollande issued a statement on 8 August saying that France "welcomes the important decision taken by President Obama to authorise targeted air strikes to counter the Islamic State and to deploy a humanitarian effort" (Embassy of France in the UK 2014a). On 10 August France began to provide humanitarian aid, and on 19 September it launched air strikes, it also conducted air reconnaissance in Iraq (Embassy of France in the UK 2014b; BBC 2014b). According to the Ministry of Defence website, the French operation in Iraq at this point was made up of nine Rafale aircraft, six Mirage 2000D aircraft, a C-135 FR refuelling aircraft, an Atlantique, two maritime patrol aircraft, and a Jean Bart anti-aircraft frigate (Ministère de la Défence 2014). France also delivered arms (machine guns and munitions) to Kurdish fighters, and sent military advisors to train the Peshmerga (Drennan 2014).

On 8 August 2014 Prime Minister Cameron made a statement on Iraq welcoming President Obama's "decision to accept the Iraqi government's request for help and to conduct targeted US air strikes, if necessary, to help Iraqi forces as they fight back against ISIL terrorists to free the civilians trapped on Mount Sinjar" (Government of the UK 2014a). In addition, the UK released an £8 million emergency aid package to Iraqi civilians, including supplies of filtration containers filled with clean water, solar lights, tents, and tarpaulins (Government of the UK 2014b).

It was clear that the British Prime Minister also wanted to participate in the air strikes, but the political process took some time. On 29 August, the UK raised the threat level of international terrorism from 'substantial' to 'severe', and about a month later, on 24 September, the House of Commons Speaker agreed to the prime minister's request to recall parliament to debate the UK's response to the request from the

Iraqi government for air strikes to support operations against ISIL in Iraq (Government of the UK 2014c, d). On 26 September, a motion was laid in the House of Commons following the agreement in the Cabinet on 25 September, that the UK government should, among other things, support Iraq "in protecting civilians and restoring its territorial integrity, including the use of UK air strikes to support Iraqi, including Kurdish, security forces" efforts against ISIL in Iraq' (Government of the UK 2014e). The motion, that was passed by 524 against 43 votes, emphasised that the UK government would not at this time deploy troops in ground combat operations and that the motion did not endorse UK air strikes in Syria as a part of this campaign (House of Commons 2014). The Royal Air Force conducted its first air strike in Iraq on 30 September (Government of the UK 2014f).

Before the decision on air strikes, the UK had participated in the humanitarian operation and had offered technical assistance in the form of refuelling and surveillance. It had also agreed to provide logistical support for other contributing states in order to transport critical military supplies to the Kurdish forces as well as sending a number of Chinook helicopters to the region. This had already happened at the beginning of August (BBC 2014a; Government of the UK 2014g). On 16 August, Prime Minister Cameron wrote an article about the long-term approach to Iraq and Syria in which he stated: "On Friday [August 15] we agreed with our European partners that we will provide equipment directly to the Kurdish forces; we are now identifying what we might supply, from body armour to specialist counter-explosive equipment" (Government of the UK 2014h). Support for the Peshmerga was strengthened in October with the funding of bomb disposal training, and the deployment of Reaper (Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems [RPAS]) (Government of the UK 2014i), as well as the conclusion of the first UK training programme for Kurdish forces in Iraq. Towards the end of the year humanitarian aid and logistical support continued, as did military training/advising, both of Kurdish forces and Iraqi forces, including the contribution of advisory personnel to the Iraqi headquarters. Surveillance flights and air strikes continued (Government of the UK 2014j). Air strikes were strictly limited to Iraq and only surveillance and reconnaissance flights were undertaken in Syria (Government of the UK 2014k, l.)

Italy contributed with humanitarian aid, weapons, munitions and advisers, and with four Tornado jets and two reconnaissance predators in Kuwait, according to Minister for Foreign Affairs Gentiloni, quoted by

the Ansa news agency (Ansa 2014b). On 16 October the Italian Defence Minister Roberta Pinotti also announced that Italy would deploy military support in the form of "a KC-767 in-flight refuelling plane, two Predator drones and 280 instructors to train Kurdish forces fighting Islamic State (ISIS) militants and advise the Iraqi high command" (Ansa 2014a). On 29 October the Italian Air Force completed its first refuelling operation (Ministry of Defence of Italy 2014). In this way Italy functioned as a facilitator for both air strikes and reconnaissance with its in-flight refuelling aircraft, even if it did not participate in the air strikes in 2014.

The cautious countries Poland and Greece proved true to type at the beginning of this operation as well. On 16 September the Polish Defence Minister Tomasz Siemoniak (according to Foreign Policy) stated that: "Poland does not envisage participation of its soldiers in military operations, though it intends to politically support the coalition and organize humanitarian aid" (Drennan 2014, see also Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014a, b, c). Greece was not very active, but served as a staging point for Belgian F-16s as well as pledging military and humanitarian contributions, including the provision of ammunition (Drennan 2014). In this way Greece continued its role as cautious with regard to its own participation, while facilitating others in carrying out the operation.

The ambivalent Germany for the first time broke its tradition of not sending arms to an ongoing conflict when it decided on 1 September to send weapons to equip Kurdish fighters. Germany sent rifles, machine guns, grenades, anti-tank systems, and armoured vehicles (mostly troop transporters) (BBC 2014c). On 5 September, the first German delivery of (non-lethal) military supplies landed in Iraq to be delivered to Kurdish Peshmerga forces (Hentch 2014). In October, Germany started training Kurdish Peshmerga forces in how to use sophisticated arms, both in Iraq and in Germany (Euronews 2014). At the beginning of November, Germany completed the transports of weapons, ammunition, vehicles, and other military equipment for the Kurdish regional government and the Peshmerga forces. In mid-December, it decided to send more troops to northern Iraq to train Kurdish forces (up to 100) (Deutche Welle 2014; Bundeswher 2014).

In summary, the picture of the first months of the Iraqi operation that started in August 2014 does not show up any major surprises when compared with the results presented in this book. The group of 'the willing' is intact, with a very active France being the first to answer the call for support. For the UK it is clear that the willingness to participate

was intact, but that the trend of giving the domestic policy process more importance continues, meaning that the decision-making process takes longer. The previous no-vote to an operation in Syria also meant that participation in this case became restricted to Iraq, and that only surveillance was authorised with regard to Syria. Italy's military ambition did not match that of France or the UK in terms of air strikes, but it did not hesitate to participate and facilitate the other two in carrying out air strikes. Poland and Greece lived up to their cautious label, as Poland focused on humanitarian aid and political support while Greece facilitated actions taken by others. The only surprise, perhaps, is Germany, who was more active than might have been foreseen. There are two possible reasons for this; increased pressure on Germany to become more active in international operations, and domestic pressures emanating from the fact that Germany has a large Kurdish population and that it was this group that in August had suffered the most from Daesh. For Germany therefore, where the domestic policy process can restrain the country's ability to act in international operations, it can also push Germany into participation.

Revisiting the Concept of Strategic Culture

As stated above, strategic culture, and especially the normative framework, explains if and with whom European states participate in international operations. The regulative framework explains how quickly such decisions can be taken (and thereby to a certain extent with whom operations take place). The roles of the armed forces in decision-making processes have shown to vary considerably in the countries studied. However, the more willing states France and the UK have a stronger role for the armed forces than do the cautious Poland and Greece. However, as suggested above, the involvement of the armed forces in the decision-making process does not seem to cause willingness to participate, but the analyses rather show that willingness itself means that the politicians need the armed forces to be more involved. At the same time, influence in the policy process seems to increase with experience of participation in international operations. Therefore the relationship between political decision-making and the strength of the armed forces might be interpreted as a mutually reinforcing process.

Another interesting aspect that has arisen in this study is that even though the politicians of a country might not have a preference for an

operation to take place within a certain framework, the armed forces might take a different view. For them, the established command and control structures of NATO and the fact that the decision-making procedures already are standardised means that the work becomes easier. Politically, only Italy pushed for operations to be NATO operations rather than independent coalitions of the able and willing. This means that for the states that were labelled willing above, the NATO framework facilitated the military aspects of an operation. However, for the cautious, and perhaps especially for ambivalent Germany, the NATO framework made it more difficult because it led to a difficult decision on whether their ordinary participation in permanent structures should be withdrawn for operations where they did not participate. In the case of OUP in Libya, for example, Germany (despite its abstention from the vote in the UN Security Council) ended up indirectly facilitating the operation due to its presence in NATO structures. So for NATO members the question of how *not to* participate arises. This is a problem that Greece has solved by very limited participation, which has meant that they have not had to say no to any of the operations.

Another factor which does not seem to greatly influence the decision to participate or not is the kind of capacities needed. In order to have a more confident answer on this issue more operations would need to be studied for each country, but in our findings only Poland referred to a lack of capacities as a justification for non-participation. It seems that the willing states in particular are resourceful enough to participate if they want to, and that they have tried to shape the operation from what capacities they had or wanted to send, rather than what had been asked for at the outset of discussions. Both the UK and Italy showed examples of this, with the UK opting to send the Army to OIF, and Italy being the only state that wanted boots on the ground in Somalia, both explained as the result of having a strong army. This aspect of decisions to participate in international operations, however, would need further research.

This question also raises the issue of the relationship between political culture and strategic culture. An interesting point here is that we stated in the introductory chapter that strategic culture might limit the range of choices because some forms of forms of action might be judged as too costly, but this picture is complicated by the couple of instances found where the role of the armed forces has increased the range of choices rather than limited it, by putting forward other options for how a certain operation should proceed.

Another issue that has been briefly touched upon in this book is the role of domestic policy processes and of national parliaments in decisions to participate in international operations. In particular, the British case suggests that a weaker UN means that legitimacy for international military operations has to be sought elsewhere, which might be one explanation for the increased tendency to ask parliament to debate and vote on international operations. France's use of article 42.7 after the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015 to call for support in the fight against IS/Daesh in Syria can also be seen in this light. This call was interpreted both by the UK and by Germany as a legal ground to participate militarily in Syria, which had not been possible previously. This could be seen as a process of learning (by the politicians) how to deal with increasingly complex (in terms of political situation, of tasks and of number of partners) international military operations.

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Appendix I

Summary of Contributions[1]

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Table A.1 Contributions to OEF/ISAF in Afghanistan

Contribution	*France*	*United Kingdom*	*Italy*	*Germany*	*Greece*	*Poland*
Participation in ISAF/OEF	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes (but less extensive than other states studied here)	Yes (but less extensive than other states studied here until 2007, increased after 2007)
Responsibility for PRT	No	Multiple	Single	Multiple	No	No
Military Training	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	–[a]	Yes
Command of Military Region	Rotating	Rotating	Yes	Yes	No	No
Logistical Support	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Deployed Forces						
Army	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Minimum Peak Deployment (ISAF)	3850 (2010)	9500 (2009)	4200 (2011)	4909 (2013)	170 (2007)	2527 (2011)
Airforce	Yes, combat	Yes	Transports	Reconnaissance	Helicopters and Transports	Transports
Navy	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	–

[a]– Indicates “No” based on negative information, no explicit information that they did not participate with such capacities, but no information that they did either.

Table A.2 Contributions to OIF in Iraq 2003

Contribution	*France*	*United Kingdom*	*Italy*	*Germany*	*Greece*	*Poland*
Participation in OIF/ Stabilisation Force	No	Yes	Post-Invasion	No	No	Yes
Logistical Support	–	Yes	–	Yes	Yes	–
UNSC stance	Anti-Invasion	Pro-Invasion	n.a.	Anti-Invasion	n.a.	n.a.
			Deployed Forces			
Army	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Deployment	–	41 000 personnel from all branches	>3000 personnel from all branches (2004)	–	–	200 personnel during OIF, 2500 post invasion
Airforce	No	Yes	Yes	Indirect reconnaissance[a]	No	No
Navy	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes

[a]A question of definition: German crews were stationed on AWACS reconnaissance aircraft participating in the war.

Table A.3 Contributions to EU NAVFOR Somalia

Contribution	*France*	*United Kingdom*	*Italy*	*Germany*	*Greece*	*Poland*
Participation in EU NAVFOR	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Limited
Force Command (rotating)	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Operational Command	Deputy (rotating)	Yes	Deputy (Rotating)	Deputy (Rotating)	No	No
Air reconnaissance	Yes	–	Yes	Yes	–	No
Deployed Forces						
Army	No	No	No	No	No	No
Airforce	Reconnaissance	No	Unmanned Reconnaissance	Reconnaissance	–	No
Navy	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Other		Operation HQ facilities		Liaison Officers	Liaison officers	Liaison officers

Table A.4 Contributions to OUP in Libya

Contribution	*France*	*United Kingdom*	*Italy*	*Germany*	*Greece*	*Poland*
Participation in OUP	Yes	Yes	Yes	Indirect/Facilitating	Facilitating	No
Logistical Support	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Stated
Air strikes	Yes (20 %)	Yes (12 %)	Yes (9 %)	No	No	No
Position on OUP	Eager	Eager	Reluctant	Reluctant/Opposed (Abstained UNSC)	Supportive	Supportive
				Deployed Forces		
Army	No	No	No	No	No	No
Airforce	Yes, combat	Yes. combat	Yes, combat	No	Yes, Reconnaissance/RADAR	Transport Planes
Navy	–	Yes	–	No	Yes	No
Other				11 Soldiers involved in target selection		

Table A.5 Contributions to the operation in Iraq that started in 2014

Contribution	*France*	*United Kingdom*	*Italy*	*Germany*	*Greece*	*Poland*
Air strikes—Iraq	Yes	Yes	Facilitating	–	Facilitating	–
Air reconnaissance—Iraq	Yes	Yes	Yes	–	–	–
Military equipment	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	–
Military training	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	–	–
Humanitarian aid	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Logistical support	–	Yes	–	–	–	–
Deployed Forces						
Army	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	–	–
Airforce	Yes	Yes	Yes	–	–	–
Navy	Yes	Yes	–	–	–	–

Note

1. References to these tables are found in the Conclusions.

Appendix II

Summary of Justifications for Participation and Non-participation

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Justifications for participation

	ISAF	*OIF*	*ATALANTA*	*OUP*
France	Solidarity with the USA in particular wit ref to NATO article 5. Defence of the liberal democratic world and humanitarian assistance to the Afghan population.		An opportunity for European security cooperation in particular Franco-UK collaboration Making manifest EU as a strategic actor. Protect trade Burden sharing	Defending human rights and averting genocide Re-establish and reaffirm France as a nation supporting the rise of an oppressed people against its ruler. Make manifest that Europe can do crisis management without leaning on the USA in particular in Africa. Geographical proximity facilitates a successful military operation. Quick decision-making process resulting in immediate launch of military operation Restoration of political prestige of President Sarkozy and the French government. The president influenced by the French intellectual Bernard-Henry Lévi's diplomatic work.

	ISAF	*OIF*	*ATALANTA*	*OUP*
Greece	Stabilise the area and strengthen diplomatic position – insist on national caveats. Obligation due to NATO membership.	Respect and support "international legitimacy". Display solidarity to key alliance partners.	Vicinity to area of operation. Protection of the Greek merchant fleet.	Geographical proximity. No combat troops. Obligation due to NATO/EU membership. Historical links to the Arab world. Reasoning of other states with close relations to northern Africa.
Germany	Show (unrestricted) solidarity. Consistent with other means. Combat international terrorism as a means for self-defence		National interest as the world's number one trading nation to safeguard routes of trade. Protect civilian vessels with humanitarian aid and commercial cargo. Monitoring he coast line. Hope to develop co-operation of benefit for broader security purposes because the operation also involved regional actors and the USA and Russia.	

	ISAF	*OIF*	*ATALANTA*	*OUP*
Italy	Favour development of governmental structure. Extend control of the whole country. Assist humanitarian efforts and reconstruction in relation to international agreements.	Solidarity with the USA. Participate in war on terror.	Normative standards met (peacekeeping?) cf. p.17 Piracy threat to international peace and security. Defend and protect Italian economic interests. Improvement of national naval capacity: upgrading and maintaining equipment, get specific training.	Protect the Libyan people. R2P. Protect economic interests in Libya. Make sure not to lose impact on the operation once it was clear it would take place. Pushing to make it a multilateral operation
UK	Solidarity with the US and NATO. Defend values of reason, democracy and tolerance. Self-defence, including the participation in protecting the USA. Bring responsible to account and remove threat of terrorists (to defend society and values).	Disarmament. Non-proliferation. Authority of the UN.	Part of a wider UK strategy to create stability in the region. Protect the UN World Food Programme. Effectiveness of UN arms embargo. Protect trade.	Operation only appropriate if there is regional support, a clear legal basis, and a demonstrable need. Protect civilians, avoid humanitarian crisis (R2P).

	ISAF	*OIF*	*ATALANTA*	*OUP*
Poland	Demonstrate solidarity with the USA and NATO. Strengthen territorial security. Increase political influence, especially in NATO.	Demonstrate solidarity with the USA. Strengthen territorial security. Increase political influence.		

Justifications for non-participation

	ISAF	*OIF*	*ATALANTA*	*OUP*
France		Absence of UNSC resolution making the intervention illegitimate and illegal Dislike of US unilateral politics		
Germany		Continue to seek peaceful solution to the crisis. Dangers and consequences of military action "plain to see".		Regretting suspension of diplomatic route. Unimpressed by fragile endorsement by the Arab League. Scepticism of result of intervention: could it lead to a stable political situation?
Poland			Somali pirates no threat to Poland. Limited military resources, which should be used for other purposes.	Libyan civil war no threat to Poland. Limited military resources, which should be used for other purposes. High domestic political risks.

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