THE TURNING WORLD
Globalisation and Governance at the Start of the 21st Century
Edited by Guido Bertucci and Michael Duggett
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Globalisation and Governance at the Start of
the 21st Century

UNDESA – IIAS
Joint Publication

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Introduction

It is the task of the IIAS and the UNDESA to track and keep in focus changes in the atmosphere of world governance and public administration. The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs is a department of the United Nations, based in New York, with a particular role in improving governance world-wide; and the International Institute of Administrative Sciences, based in Brussels, is a long-established (1930-founded) and neutral scientific institute that studies modern governance and proper public administration. It can clearly be argued that the existence and the work of bodies like UNDESA and IIAS are themselves a consequence of a process that now goes by the contested and contentious term "globalisation". When experts from different cultures and countries meet under our auspices that is in itself "globalisation", as with any kind of intellectual trade or exchange. A process as old as civilisation itself, as old as Marco Polo and his journey to China; or the mediaeval universities, where one culture confronts and learns from another. We find it hard to conceive that such a meeting of minds can be viewed as negative; but there are other aspects of the process that we know many people do view negatively.

That much of the debate in late 2001 was about the positive or negative impacts of what is felt as a new and more powerful form of "globalisation" – and in a context of passionate debate in the streets of many cities, from Genoa to Quebec, and tragic events in the city itself - made it especially timely for us to hold a joint meeting in New York in November 2001 to discuss the issues.

New York 2001

In New York in November 2001 the Institute and the UNDESA under the chairmanship of the Ambassador of Portugal, H.E. Francisco Seixas, President of the Second Committee, jointly held a pair of panels – with invited groups of experts addressing and debating with the Second Committee of the General Assembly - at the HQ of the United Nations hard by the river on the lower east side of Manhattan Island. The IIAS was responsible for the first day’s discussion, on 1st November, with a handpicked team of its most distinguished experts from the different continents that the IIAS represents and the different administrative science fields it claims to speak for. These experts, able in many cases to be in New York only because of funding from the UNDESA, included eminent academics as well as senior practitioners, including an ex-ambassador and a current senior minister, Mr. Atangana Mebara from Cameroon. Mr. Mebara is the President of the IIAS. The UNDESA team, which assembled on 2nd November, also put together with help from the Institute, was equally globally representative. It included a UN Under-Secretary-General, Mr. Nitin Desai, an ex-ambassador,
current ministers (indeed a Prime Minister, Mr. Nsibambi from Uganda) and a
current senior academic, Mr. Anthony Giddens from the United Kingdom,
Director of the London School of Economics and Political Science. Fourteen
different countries were represented in the debate; and all the public
administration experience of all continents came within our frame.

What brought this team of talent and wisdom together was a joint problematic.
It was of course phrased slightly differently in each case.

The IIAS Panel addressed the title

Challenges and Changes in Public Administration Around the World.

While the title of the UNDESA panel was

Globalisation and the State.

But it is reasonable to argue that the issue being addressed in both Panels was
the same.

How should 21st century society so arrange its governance methods that it is
able to reconcile national preference with international pressure? Individual rights
with global well-being? Passionate belief with tolerance? New public management
insights with traditional public service laws and conventions? Freedom of
movement and labour with deleterious consequences for, say the countries which
talented young people leave? The undoubted benefits to humanity brought by the
Internet with the equally evident costs and inequalities if not all of humanity has
access to it? It would be wrong to suggest that we had unanimity or even a
consensus among the experts. A healthy debate, a lively conversation, is an evident
sign of the importance of the issue. As Michel de Montaigne put it in his essay on
this – "In conversation the most painful quality is perfect harmony". It would be
misleading to suggest that there was or is perfect harmony among the contributions
to the debate.

The Unspoken Challenge

The one subject that was not addressed directly was perhaps the one that
hovered most insistently in the air in New York. Every delegate had arrived after a
security screening that was more than normally thorough, and the road outside the
building was closed to traffic. Less than two months after the 11th September 2001
event all of us were particularly aware that no State or its citizens, however
protected by oceans and by conscientious men and women in uniform, can be
outside the world. We are all now even more aware than before of being fellow-
citizens of each other (even if not necessarily, as the Paris newspaper Le Monde
put it "nous sommes tous des Américains").
What does that mean for a scientific debate about Public Administration? An organisation like IIAS makes a practice of enabling public service observers and practitioners, reformers and administrators, from its over 90 member States and national sections, to speak to each other. But perhaps it is appropriate to turn what has been a practice – over 60 years - into a positive value. Sharing experiences is perhaps not only good, it is a good. The different contributors to this debate as shown here demonstrate a wide diversity of experience as well as common themes.

The Issues of Difference, Diversity and Commonality

Making his introduction to the debates Ambassador Ignacio Pichardo Pagaza, past President of IIAS, points out that any reform above all needs also to take into account where a country may stand in terms of its own institutional evolution and, not least, what he calls the “non-administrative values” that surround any system and condition it – as, he might have added, the Hudson River surrounds the UN building. Pichardo observes that a recent IIAS /UNDESA study of 30 countries discovered that there were three generations world-wide of administrative reform. The first was intended to create a professional career civil service, as happened in much of Europe in the last century. The aim of the second was to make it efficient as in the “New Public Management” approaches; and the third to bring it closer, through charters or e-government, to the citizens it served. He points out that all are important, and that sometimes unfortunately countries have jumped straight to the second, for example, without having completed the first. He observes that in the case of some large States they have made progress in introducing measures from NPM but there is a lack of a real system of a professional career civil service. He concludes, from the IIAS study, “…respect for values, for tradition, for culture, for the history of every individual country must be a prerequisite for any administrative modernisation programme, otherwise such programmes are doomed to fail.”

The characteristically elegant paper by Professor Gérard Timsit of the Sorbonne, Paris I, makes the point that, within one of our continents, in this case Europe, despite the diversity of administrative systems and cultures, French and German, Spanish and Swedish, reform has taken similar forms across many States. But he equally notes that to turn this similarity of ambition and objective into a prescription for process or technique would be an error. Every country, and it might be added, every supranational body (such as the European Commission) reforms itself in its own way, responding to its own unique preoccupations. Thus what he calls “une nouvelle gouvernance” emerges in which the “reconfiguration of the State” is a normal element. And, for a text of this kind his interesting comment is that the growth of non-governmental organizations and their influence has created a transnational civil society. Where the main concern may be that whereas there can claim to be at the national level, States, however weakened, at the global level there is a risk of anarchy. As Professor Timsit puts it, in a civil society made up of the whole world, the question should be asked - “Is anyone in charge?”- The redesign of a State or global system to answer this question, and to
find new loci of loyalty for citizens and new sources of legitimacy for international bodies to control and deal with the changed world is, as he says, a great challenge.

In his survey of the "English-speaking world" Professor Andrew Massey looks at the Management-focused agenda of the last twenty years of the century in countries as diverse as Australia and the U.S.A. and how in these States the common tradition of democracy and accountability, which is to some degree external to the pure administrative system, has shaped the limits and challenged the core arguments arising from the internal reforms of the system. How for example, does one manage semi-autonomous agencies (that have been often established in these States) driven by efficiency criteria when, at the same time, there is a desire for overall Ministerial control and responsibility to parliaments? And the question can be even more pointed - in a privatised railway who is to blame if the trains run late? And if you have a Transport Minister and he claims not to be responsible what does it mean to be called a Minister "for" Transport?

There is a salutary reminder for us all in the piece by O.P. Dwivedi, basing himself upon a study of Public Administration and development with special reference to the Asian experience. He looks at how reforms that have become commonplace in some countries, such as those described by Timsit and Massey, can misfire when applied around the world in an unthinking and insensitive manner. Both the western philosophies that he discusses, one based upon treating Public Administration as a neutral and somewhat scientific activity and the other based upon treating it as a branch of management (the "New Public Management") have, he argues, been damaging in the developing world because their effects may have been perverse, "...reproducing the symbolism, but not the substance of, for example, a British, French or American administrative system." Both western reformers, especially in aid or development agencies, and non-western governance authorities, especially officials or politicians, can learn from each other. His closing remarks in New York seem to us extremely powerful:

> if one does not take into account such factors as culture and style of governance, local traditions and beliefs, politics and style of doing things, social and demographic plurality, law and order situation, civil society and responsible and ethical governance, the new Century may not be much different than what we have gone through with the last 50 years...

**Special Continental Issues**

A great deal of the value of assembling teams of experts is the opportunity it offers to call upon a real expertise in particular regions or countries. We offer no apologies for looking at these accounts in some detail. Latin America is historically and culturally both distinct from other continents, with a unity of experience - for example a degree of continental linguistic unity (much more than in Europe); and at the same time contains a great variety of governance systems. Maria del Carmen Pardo's account of Public Administration in that region discusses the role of the State. As with Dwivedi's account of developing countries,
she wonders whether reforms are always sufficiently grounded in political or democratically validated structures.

The modernising effort cannot ignore the fact that, difficult as it may be, the sectors that fall behind must also somehow benefit from the changes.

The reformist bureaucracies, often technocratic in style, she argues, need to protect their project against political influences and so can sometimes have to resort to appeal to legitimation through citizenship participation rather than normal legislative or electoral legitimating. She also discusses the impact of federalism both in the sense of supra-national trade rules and decentralised devolution of power. And in a discussion that parallels much of the globalisation debate the role of IT in changing power structures within bureaucracies is also discussed.

This was also in many ways the theme of Carlos Genatios, Minister from Venezuela. He is particularly concerned by the fact that Latin America currently represents a small proportion of global “digital” activity - 4% was his figure, as against 69% being in the developed world. But he has a story of hope since he demonstrates that if a country is determined it can make a big difference. Venezuela for example, he shows, with deliberate policy initiatives, legislation and expenditure can make a difference. They have introduced policies from the purely normative – a presidential declaration for example, on the importance of the Internet – to the very practical – government portals for areas of policy like health and small business. Many countries might find the provision of Internet contents that cover food prices, on the one hand, and the provision of free access for the rural population, on the other, an excellent example of joined-up policy, which could benefit not only producers but also the consumers of agricultural produce. Genatios focusses (as does Nsibambi, below) upon the area of “cyber” crime as a key field where nations need to work together and to operate as effectively as the criminals do, across borders. However, for Latin America and Venezuela he makes the striking argument that nations should not forget that they are not alone in the face of globalisation – “We believe that regional integration is a good alternative to globalisation …”

There are two chapters on Africa, both written by currently serving ministers, in the case of Uganda in fact its Prime Minister, Professor Apolo Nsibambi, and in the other case Cameroon’s Minister of higher education, Mr. Atangana Mebara, who is currently the President of the IIAS. There is an intriguing contrast and parallelism between these two accounts.

Atangana Mebara has produced a historical summary of public administration developments in the African continent. He describes firstly the four major periods each of which had its own style:

- that of the years following independence, where the new regimes needed to ensure that there remained a public administration at all, and which saw the replacement of colonial administrators by Africans. Many of the latter he
says, were returning to their home countries from study or work abroad out of “a sense of patriotism, of duty or of a search for power and position”, and the great achievement was to rebuild systems as African;

- that of the 1960s and 1970s, the period where African public administration was used to generate “development”. Many of the civil servants, he observes, may have used their positions and access to resources to benefit their own areas or ethnic groups, without a real analysis of costs and benefits for their countries. But during this period many of the administrations also began to train their civil servants, they together set up CAFRAD and sent people abroad to be trained, for example, by the ENAP in Quebec in Canada. This period of growth in the size and cost of public services was brought to a sudden end by the shock of the oil crisis in the early 1970s;

- the third period, the 80s, saw many governments reducing the size of their establishments and looking at efficiency, often guided to do so by international financial institutions. A period of “public service reform” followed. Some reduced the size of their public services, some their salaries. One role of the public administrations during this period was to promote the growth of the private sector. But in many cases observers, such as the World Bank, came to the conclusion that they had gone too far in giving up vital State functions, and as they had rarely been based in a popular sentiment of the need for reform - they often led simply to corruption and to the growth of a “confidence deficit”;

- the nineties and more recently have seen many African programmes of governance, trying to combine efficiency with public and citizen service and confidence. The author analyses his own government’s Governance Programme, and its support by the head of State and its reflection in the Civil Service Charter for Africa signed in Windhock Namibia in 2001.

He concludes with an interesting analysis as to why the promises of reform in Africa have been less successful so far than hoped, and argues that it may be in part that there is a tradition, slow to die out, that public administration in itself has been seen as a colonial (or “white”) activity or as a capital city (and therefore “elite”) activity; and that unless there is a full society-wide sense of ownership of a public service, its reform may be difficult to achieve. Even, he argues, today’s more carefully-considered and endogenous programmes.

The approach of the other chapter by Apolo Nsibambi is different. He provides a classic definition of globalisation

"Globalisation is a process of advancement and increase in interaction among the world’s countries and people facilitated by progressive technological changes in locomotion, communication, political and military power, knowledge and skills..."
And goes on to discuss how African governments in particular should respond. He is not against “globalisation”, and sees it as an opportunity. But what marks his commentary is the realism, recognition that there could be bad effects as well as benefits and that governments should try to garner the latter while avoiding the former. The UNDP *Human Development Report* of 1999 makes this point clearly and he draws our attention to many dualities, for example, that while globalisation opens people’s lives to cultures and creativity and spreads human values quickly and widely it could also destroy cultures and spread negative values equally quickly and widely.

Nsibambi observes that the State today has to exist alongside many competing influences on “its” citizens, and that States nowadays share power in the world not only with other States but with supranational bodies or sets of rules, that they have signed up to, but that constrain their behaviour. He sees that the African State could be overstretched by the demands upon it, undermined by decisions taken elsewhere. Using the interesting example of a classic “globalised” crime, for example, computer fraud, he shows how it is hard for African States to control it, with a demoralising and delegitimating effect. When the publics of African States demand levels of governance sophistication, for example, the use of “New Public Management” techniques, he points out that this may be beyond the ability of the States to deliver even given the will.

However, in his conclusions he argues that African States should be open, proactive in relation to globalisation and seek to strengthen their influence in the world decision-making bodies like the UN. He ends with a plea for African governments to face the challenge of globalisation but also adds, in a telling phrase, “global actors [should not] play globalisation with the poor”.

**General Reflections on Globalisation**

A number of contributors to the debate were concerned to give an overall analysis of the process. Ambassador Kamal from Pakistan expressed deep reservations about it, Mr. Nitin Desai from the UN spoke of both its benefits and drawbacks while Professor Anthony Giddens from the LSE argued that it is a broadly beneficial process. Although his was not chronologically the last contribution, Minister Posada Moreno gave a summing-up of the arguments that seemed to us to be masterly.

*Ambassador Kamal* places globalisation as the latest stage in the shrinking of the world, which had precedents in travel and exploration and, more contestably, with colonialism. He points out however that there has been a significant change in the speed of global communication and in the awareness we all have of being one world, in part through the media. But although he acknowledges that we have been brought closer together, he also argues that globalisation has widened the gap between the richer and the poorer peoples in the world. He argues this for three crucial areas – human rights, trade and the Internet. For trade, he argues that
although there is talk of a “level playing field” it is like a wrestling contest on such a field between a sumo wrestler and a man of his own build and strength – the developing world is confronted by richer States that are simply too strong for fair trade to happen. He also points out that although in theory the internet is a great leveller there are parts of the world, such as Africa, where only very few countries have any significant penetration or presence on the net (pointing out that of African internet connections no less than 90% originate from one State). The fact that the Internet is dominated linguistically by one language also disturbs him – as he says, “homogenisation may be good for milk but it is not necessarily good for the world”.

An argument in many ways echoed by the Under-Secretary-General Nitin Desai. He comments that during the 1980s and 1990s, with liberalisation of trade, the role of the State was re-evaluated and many people argued that it had become almost redundant, that the free-play of market-forces could solve all problems. However, recent events had reasserted the role of the State. In particular September 11th 2001 and its horrific terrorist attack in the city where the UN was based had emphasised one traditional role of the State, namely the maintenance of security and law and order for its citizens. Similarly the economic slowdown of the global economy had led to a move back toward a “Keynesian” approach, with governments taking on themselves the responsibility of managing demand and using fiscal policies. And thirdly, Mr. Desai pointed out that there is some popular unease about globalisation, especially its down-side, as demonstrated in the protests and street marches in many big cities during meetings of world leaders. Ironically it was concerns about globalisation that would have to be placed on the agenda at meetings like those in Monterrey and Johannesburg, which were in themselves an index of and a concomitant of the process itself.

Perhaps somewhat uniquely among the contributors Anthony Giddens of the London School of Economics and Political Science argues both that the current age of globalisation is absolutely unique and that it is broadly a beneficent process. He stresses that it is much more than a process about economics or trade - “It is the marriage between communications technology and computerisation which has changed so much about our lives” – and that globalisation is immensely complex. One element of the complexity is not only, as he says, the globalisation from the top, involving corporations or international organisations, but that from below, involving NGOs – non-governmental organisations - and people in the streets. He cites the placard being carried in Seattle – “Join the world-wide movement against globalisation”. And disagrees strongly with other speakers who are of the view that globalisation is increasing inequalities – “…since 1960 global inequalities have stabilised or become less…”. He concludes with a discussion about how the age of globalisation has also become the age of multi-level governance, with the European Union as the most novel example. (Globalisation and its Discontents, Joseph Stiglitz, Allen lane, London, 2002) and a new and rather complex process whereby countries have rediscovered the need to involve public authority in market matters, which he refers to as “publicisation”, rather than the older notions
of private or public. Giddens concludes that the global conflict may come to be between fundamentalism and cosmopolitanism ("...which the United Nations surely stands for...”).

Minister Posada Moreno from Spain contributes an eloquent call for solidarity and action - "...the globalisation of terror must not be allowed to destroy or diminish the objective of international solidarity and tolerance" - and he points out that the anti-globalisation movements should not be ignored but serve as a spur to action - and that the very complicated set of things that we summarise by the single word "globalisation" covers a “complex and multifarious process”. He is at pains to point out, we think rightly, that it is too soon to conclude that the nation-State has lost the ability to manoeuvre or influence events, especially if States respond in a flexible and sensitive manner to the challenges. Like his colleague from Venezuela Mr. Posada Moreno sees regional integration, in his case within Europe, as a positive response. The terrorist challenge, for example, had been met by very concrete common actions like a new European arrest warrant, and had not remained only at the level of rhetoric. But he does not overlook also the key role of the UN in facilitating a humanistic globalisation. Posada’s conclusion seems to us to contain both eloquence and power:

We should not fall into the trap of oversimplification, stating that because some people gain from globalisation others therefore have to lose. Globalisation is not necessarily synonymous with inequality. In any case, I am certain that the winners are those who establish cooperation and support strategies, those who reinforce their institutions and create confidence in their societies. The winners are also those who improve their economic policies to avoid exposing the structural weaknesses of the economy where this could undermine international competitiveness, by maintaining macroeconomic stability and speeding up structural reforms. Who are the losers? In my view, they are those who refuse to face the fact of globalisation.

Conclusion

The Secretary General to the United Nations Mr. Kofi Annan has said that with September 11th, 2001, mankind entered the Third Millennium “through a gate of fire”. Not unlike it did, of course, at the beginning of the 20th and even the 19th centuries. The world was not at peace in 1914, any more than it was in 1812. From the earlier experience came perhaps some "Pax" – peace – arrangements that provided structures of peace but failed because they were too narrowly based in national perspectives and national or imperial power and domination. From the experience of the most recent century came many of the institutions, regional and global, that are in the front line of the conflict for peace today. Unlike those of the 19th century they have in general been freely entered into, do not proclaim one way or language or approach, and this is perhaps why we are sure that they may, in the end, be more successful. We believe that international bodies must respect diversity and must respect humanity. (Just one instance of this has perhaps been the European Court of Human Rights, whose President, René Cassin, a former President of the IIAS, won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1968, as Mr. Annan and the
UN did in 2001). This was a point made eloquently by H.E. Francisco Seixas, who kindly presided over the panel in his capacity as Chairman of the Second committee of the United Nations, to whom we owe many thanks.

The work of public administration, which both UNDESA and the IIAS support and promulgate, in this context may appear banal or trivial, moving deck-chairs on a sinking ship. We of course do not agree. It has not seemed proper to us to cite our own contributions to the debate unless we can do so briefly and appropriately. One of us (Michael Duggett) summed up his perception of the role of public administration in enabling the normal life of citizens and nations as follows:

*Public administration is no more than the hand-maiden of a good society. It enables the proper business of woman- and man-kind; marriage, business, sports, work, child-rearing and learning – to continue in a structure of security where someone else is designated to ensure order, to collect taxes, to watch the rivers rise against the dams.*

Those of us who travel have we think learned a certain new respect for the people that are watching those dams rise, in practical terms watching with untiring eyes the luggage go through the x-ray machine. We do believe that a new prestige has been earned by public servants like that – whether public or private they are performing a public good - who are in the eye of the storm of globalisation, at the centre of the turning world, in that way. Guido Bertucci speaks about this:

*Unfortunately we have gone through a number of years where the public service has been somehow denigrated as being considered as a lower-end job without the glamour of jobs in the other areas of the economy, whether in the private sector, or entertainment or so on. But public service has to remain an important value in all of our countries and in this respect the group of experts in public administration has called for the creation of a “United Nations Public Service Day”, to celebrate the value of service to the community at the local, national and global level. They have called for the establishing of prizes to be awarded by the Secretary General. For a contribution made to the cause of enhancing the role, prestige and visibility of the public service.*

It is to that public service, the hub of a turning world, that this book is dedicated.

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CHALLENGES AND CHANGES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AROUND THE WORLD
Introduction of the Theme

Ignacio Pichardo Pagaza *

Mr. Chairman,

Distinguished delegates,

Dr. Guido Bertucci, Director of UNDESA

I think the best introduction to the topic of this seminar which I can provide is to make a brief reference to the joint work that was done by the International Institute of Administrative Sciences in Brussels and UNDESA. UNDESA in 1999 and the Institute provided a review of the status of public administration at a global level and to that purpose in the Institute a questionnaire was prepared containing ten chapters, ten questions, they were open questions, and that was reviewed by experts in Public Administration from the Institute itself and also by Professors that are not part of the staff. Some of these people are here at the seminar. All regions of the world were represented in the answers that we received to that questionnaire, except from Australia and New Zealand. Industrialised countries, so-called transitional economies and developing countries, all responded. Out of the 31 questionnaires we got 31 answers. A reading of this rich comparative material underscores the following conclusions which are very much of a general nature. Public Administration, the world over, has advanced in the last decades. It is possible to identify two types of programme of modernisation: programmes of a general nature, that intend to modernise the entire governmental apparatus or major sectors of governmental apparatus and the new approach, which we can see from this questionnaire, which is programmes of administrative reform of an institutional type. Virtually all countries, all over the world have attempted comprehensive administrative reforms, in Europe, in America, in Asia, in Africa. These global reforms have not always been extremely successful. However, we do see today in the comparative analysis the fact that countries are interested in carrying out administrative reform of an institutional nature.

The concept of institutionalisation, of institutional development, promotion of administrative efficiency, all that is now at the core of public administration techniques.

* H.E. Ignacio Pichardo Pagaza (Mexico), Past President of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences.
In conducting a survey of these 31 questionnaires, we found that there were different States of progress when it comes to administrative reform. There are some countries, mainly western Europe that are in what we would call the third generation of administrative reform. The immense majority of countries are in what we might call the second generation. In many countries, including transitional economies, we find what we might call the first generation.

Let me try to be a bit clearer. The first generation of administrative reform is that type of reform that was very much in fashion in the 1960's and 1970's. That involved a regrouping of State functions, division into major blocks of authority and reform of personnel in Civil Service.

The second generation is what might be called the New Public Management and there is that other side of the coin, an American term, the Reinvention of Public Management. We all know what we mean by that second generation of administrative reform, so I won't go into detail.

The third is oriented towards citizens, placing the citizens at the centre of government and public administration concerns. The topics for that third generation of reform are participation of the citizenry, ethics in public service, citizens' charter, and something that is more important now than ever before, which is respect for values, for tradition, for the history of countries, in any programme of modernisation.

What are the conclusions that can be drawn up from this comparative study that we conducted with the United Nations, the UNDESA and the IIAS, the International Institute of Administrative Sciences? It's something that is very surprising, and that's the following: in a majority of countries that were studied we see co-existing the need for administrative reform from the first, second and third generations. In other words, there are countries where we have made progress for example in introducing the concepts of New Public Management, privatisation, deregulation, out-sourcing, comparative assessment (which would be translated into English as benchmarking.) At the same time there is a deficit in administrative reform from the first generation. There is a lack there. In the case of some Latin American countries, and not the small countries, the large countries of Latin America, we see that in very impressive terms, they have made progress in introducing measures from New Public Management. However there is a lack of a real system of a Civil Service, professional career civil service. Here we are talking about measures that were implemented in Europe towards the end of the 19th century.

Perhaps the most important conclusion that can be drawn from this comparative study – I cannot go into detail but this information is obviously accessible to everyone interested, and to the delegates of course on the Internet and through UNDESA itself – is that the focus has changed from comprehensive reform to institutional reform, and this is maybe one of the most important conclusions. And
in my opinion, the other important conclusion to be drawn is that respect for values, for tradition, for culture, for the history of every individual country must be a pre-requisite in any administrative modernisation programme, otherwise such programmes are doomed to fail. If we simply import measures that are involved in other countries without adapting them to specific circumstances the risk is that Public Administration will not make progress.

I want to conclude these comments by expressing the hope that participants will stress the positive steps that have been taken in different parts of the world, the progress and also the deficiencies that, unfortunately, remain very much in evidence in governance and in public administration.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Case of Africa

Jean-Marie Atangana Mebara *

Introduction

Since independence in the nineteen sixties, African public administrations have been through many changes, in terms of both their orientations and objectives and their organisation and structure. They have had to face or suffer many challenges created by themselves or imposed from the outside.

In the context of this panel discussion, we shall undertake a dynamic and ongoing reading of these changes. This approach is likely to facilitate understanding of the challenges that today face African Public Administrations. An erroneous understanding of these challenges could result in inappropriate, or even harmful, solutions.

Since the international community is an increasingly active partner in the strategies to meet the challenges facing the public administrations in our countries, I feel honoured to have been invited to speak for Africa.

You will surely understand that I cannot speak for Africa in all its diversity; most often it concerns sub-Saharan Africa. You will also understand that my inspiration is the African country where I know the public administration best, Cameroon, where I have been involved for several years.

This presentation will examine the challenges and changes in African public administrations in four major stages:

- The first major stage covers the first years of independence;
- The second period runs from the mid-sixties to the end of the seventies;
- The third stage covers the first structural adjustment programmes (the eighties to the mid-nineties);
- The last period runs from the mid-nineties to the present day.

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I. Challenges, changes and transformations in African public administrations in the early sixties: survival and mimicry

Following independence in the early sixties, the major challenge for young African countries was to survive the departure of the colonial powers. Whether we liked it or not, this involved ensuring the continuity of public services previously directed by colonial administrators. The survival efforts are even greater in certain countries where links with the colonial powers were suddenly broken (by war); sometimes rivalries and disputes between groups fighting to succeed the colonial administrators were so violent that they led to civil war, preventing young countries from exercising their authority over their entire territory.

Generally, during a good part of the first decade, African leaders tried simply to continue, with new directors, in the footsteps of the previous public administrations.

This first stage in the existence and operation of African public administrations is of interest because of its strong influence on the future development of these administrations.

Although we speak of change during this period, above all it involved the replacement of colonial administrators and managers by young African officials, with little or no real qualifications in the field of administration, not to mention practical or professional experience. Recruitment was carried out at a furious pace, especially graduates from abroad who were expected to do at least as well as the colonial administrators.

This period was also marked by a relatively large-scale return of an intellectual elite sent for training in advanced countries a few years earlier. Patriotism, a sense of duty, seeking positions of power - it is difficult to identify the determining factor behind this return flow to the motherland.

Compared with users and citizens, it would be true to say that during this period the public administration was not well received because it procured well-paid jobs and social status for families in which one or more members were "civil servants". Even though in certain fields, significant measures were taken (security, defence, finance, etc.), it cannot be said that this was a period of reform in African public administrations. It could even be called a period of mimicry.

For these reasons, we shall return in more detail later in this presentation to the challenges that the African public managers tried to face and the changes sought or obtained in the Public Administrations.
II. The second period (Mid sixties – end of the seventies): expansion and development of APAs

This period is marked by a strong desire on the part of the African countries to take real control and master their public institutions and administrations and to make them play a decisive role in the development of their countries; in this case we speak of development public administration.

In order to control their territory and, as it was then described, "to bring the administration closer to the people", the governments created, developed and disseminated all kinds of public services. Benefiting from their positions within the administrative apparatus, the elites, considering themselves more or less openly as the representatives of their villages or their ethnic groups in the administration, created their own administrative units and public services or ran development projects, not necessarily based on real needs or cost-benefit analyses. The public administration came to be seen as a purveyor of jobs and distributor of administrative services (and buildings) to the populations and regions.

The main challenge in this field seems to be the following: with the Public Administration being or becoming the driving force for development, in the absence of a significant private sector, it was necessary to expand the administration wherever possible. This is the challenge of the expansion and development of African Public Administrations.

Overall, this period was notable for an unparalleled increase in staff in the African public services and a corresponding increase in the cost of operating public services, with no link to their efficiency.

The governments then set about training senior civil servants in different fields; schools and institutes for training administrative staff were created or restructured. It was also during this period that the African Training and Research Centre in Administration and Development (CAFRAD), created by the African Governments in 1964, really took off.

Agreements and conventions were signed with similar institutions in Europe (IIAP) and North America (University of Pittsburgh, ENAP in Quebec, etc.), in order to allow senior African officials to master certain management techniques and/or skills.

In terms of the public services rendered, analysts then stated that it was far from satisfying the needs of users as beneficiaries or the State as a provider. It was in this context that in Cameroon, for example, a National Administrative Reform Committee was created on 24 August 1978 by presidential decree as an inter-ministerial consultative body responsible for helping to define the national policy for administrative reform. Unfortunately, this body did not live up to the promises it held out at birth.
It was not until the African economies were hit in their turn by the economic crisis created by the oil shock in the mid-seventies that the expansion and development of African Public Administrations came to halt and the first public service reforms were introduced in Africa.

II. The third period: the first structural adjustment programmes and the first real reforms of African public administrations

Faced with the sudden and serious crisis that rocked their economies and deprived the State of major financial resources, the African Governments first tried to confront the situation alone by cutting back on the lifestyle of the administrations and refraining from creating new administrations.

The ineffectiveness of these measures forced them all to turn to the international financial institutions (IMF/World Bank). Their diagnosis was severe, and the accompanying therapies were a bitter pill.

In brief, the African Governments were persuaded to give the State a new role, that of a facilitator for the private sector; the State therefore had to dispose of all the production and/or commercialisation structures and activities that could be handled by the private sector. As a facilitator, the State generally had to draw up and implement a fiscal policy to encourage private initiative. In this context, the countries were invited, by a system of strict and often overlapping conditions, to reduce their operating costs, largely by massive staff lay-offs. Some African countries immediately opted for the elimination of large numbers of jobs through dismissals and retirement schemes; others preferred a drastic reduction in salaries; other governments were forced to use both approaches: dismissing staff (through the definition of new organisations) and lowering salaries.

In general, these structural adjustment programmes (first generation) were a strand of "Public Service Reform".

Although the stated objectives of these reforms revolved around the quest for greater efficiency in Public Services, it has to be admitted, along with the World Bank (World Development Report 1997) that "(developing) countries had a tendency to go too far" with their reforms, leading to consequences such as "abandoning vital State functions, which are a blow to social security and undermine the foundations for the development of markets".

These attempted reforms of the Public Administrations only rarely improved the efficiency of these administrations. Largely inspired or imposed by the international lenders, these programmes, based on a very financial approach to reform, never obtained the backing or support of public officials or populations. They also created or aggravated the insidious and constant degradation of the foundations of a healthy public administration (corruption, nepotism, etc.), eroding
still further the trust of users, civil society and economic operators in these administrations and public institutions, leading to or confirming what the OECD referred to as a "confidence deficit".

IV. The fourth period (mid-nineties to the present day): the period of National Governance Programmes

Faced with the poor results obtained by the public service reform projects initiated under the structural adjustment programmes, the African governments, on the recommendations of and/or under pressure from the money lenders, drew up or commissioned national governance programmes (NGP). The main aim of these programmes was to set up effective public administrations providing quality services at the lowest possible cost, taking into account the needs of the people and the rights of citizens/users.

When drawing up these NGPs, learning from previous reform experiences, the international institutions recommended and supported a more participative approach. The new approach is global and integrated; the NGPs are no longer appendices of the SAPs; they are no longer drawn up by a few experts and initiates. Not only are civil society and the various beneficiaries of public services involved in drawing up these programmes, it is also formally planned to have the possibility (or even the necessity) to share responsibilities between the State and others involved, as well as social actors, including in fields of intervention or competence traditionally restricted to State organisations.

In the case of Cameroon, the programme was drawn up around the following priority objectives:

[i] greater transparency in the management of public affairs;

[ii] increased empowerment of managers;

[iii] improved services at institutional level, taking the greatest care to provide services that meet the needs of the target groups.

The NGP for Cameroon, drawn up with the support of the UNDP, selected priority actions for the period 2000-2002 that include:

- rehabilitating public finances and improving the effectiveness of expenditure;

- improving social security sector management, with the introduction of institutional co-management frameworks for structures and activities in the fields of education and health for the State, the private sector and civil society;
- strengthening legal security and judicial security;
- intensifying the fight against corruption (creation of a National Observatory and ministerial units to combat corruption with balanced representation of the State and civil society).

The main innovations in these NGPs are: their extension to all sectors of State intervention; the involvement in their elaboration and execution of players other than consultants, civil servants and public officials. It is too soon to assess the impact of this approach on the effectiveness of these reform programmes. In the case of Cameroon, note the personal implication of the highest authorities of the State: the President of the Republic formally approved the National Governance Programme; it should be noted that since his accession to the highest office in 1982, Paul Biya has constantly reiterated the key words of his vision and his priorities, namely instilling rigour and morality into the management of public affairs; the Prime Minister, the Head of the Government, is the leader of the National Governance Committee, as well as the National Observatory for combating corruption.

It is also expected that the wide-ranging decentralisation stipulated in the 1996 Constitution (with the creation of regions with substantial allocations) will significantly influence the organisation of administrative structures and the provision of public services for citizens and users.

At continental level, it should be noted that common targets set by the Ministers representing the African governments were adopted at Windhoek in Namibia in February 2001 in the African Public Service Charter.

This Charter solemnly lays down what could be considered as the major challenges facing African administrations today and tomorrow, namely:

"To respond in a sustainable, quality-conscious and efficient manner to the needs of users by placing them at the centre of their concerns, while ensuring transparency and respect for human rights and democracy;

Modernising administrative structures by mastering the new communication technologies, allowing to transform historically and politically motivated functions into sound business-like operations;

Adapting to the increasing globalisation of the economy and creating an enabling environment for private sector growth;

Ensuring not only the economic growth and the strengthening of basic infrastructure but also promoting social development and striving to reduce the growing disparities in income and opportunities in order to foster social solidarity;

to discharge, in optimum conditions of equity and effectiveness, their vital mission of safeguarding the fundamental values of the public service, protecting the public interest and promoting human and sustainable economic and social development."
As well as reiterating the key principles of public service (equality for citizens and users, neutrality, legality and continuity), the Charter also lays down the rules governing relations between the Administration and users, between the Administration and public officials, and the reference values (professionalism and ethical standards), together with the rules of conduct for public officials.

Finally, based on Resolution 52/225 of the United Nations General Assembly entitled "Public Administration and Development", the African Ministers adopted the Charter, no doubt aware of the probable difficulties, requesting UNDESA, in collaboration with the AEC, to support national efforts for the implementation of the Charter.

Although this Charter represents a considerable step forward for African public administrations, which individually draw inspiration from the internal regulations and conventions, it calls for a commitment from the various partners as well as the mobilisation of major human, material and financial resources.

**Conclusion**

A rapid overview of the challenges and changes in Africa public administrations reveals one constant: the permanent quest for a "formula" for these administrations to contribute to, or even become the driving forces behind, the controlled development of their countries, i.e. the quest for an effective administration.

On this subject, it might be useful to re-read the second chapter of the World Development Report 1997 by the World Bank, the title of which is "Refocusing the State on effective public action".

The authors examine why many African and Latin American countries have not lived up to the promises in the reform programmes undertaken since the mid-eighties. The survey amongst numerous economic agents confirms that whatever indicator is used, the institutional capacity of countries is crucial for the wealth creation and economic growth. Because of the unpredictability of rules and policies, the insecurity for people and goods, legal insecurity and generalised corruption, African countries have been less successful at attracting investors than south-east Asian countries, which have transformed their administrations into facilitators for the private sector.

Many explanations have been attempted or advanced for the mixed results of reforms undertaken to improve Africa public administrations (bureaucratic design and implementation, low pay for public officials, etc.). In conclusion, I would like this presentation to contribute to the debate by offering another explanation.
We first need to recall that the colonial administration left behind bitter memories for many African citizens. After independence, despite the replacement of colonial civil servants by Africans, the public administration was still largely seen as the "White Men's business", or the business of the State or "politicians in the capital". Although there was no longer hostility, African public administrations were regarded by many citizens with distrust or indifference; this raises questions, and gives rise to some concern, when we find that the majority of public officials are totally indifferent; they are there but not committed; the quest for performance, efficiency, respect for ethical rules and the law, are the "Chief's business"; as the 1994 *Juridis et Cible* report states (still sounding topical), "the State officials define the rules of operation in parallel with the laws and procedures governing their personal interests". There is therefore a real gap between the African public administrations and citizens/users, and a misunderstanding between these public administrations and the officials that serve them: it is as if we presume that the public official, at the time of their recruitment would automatically adhere to the general principles underpinning the public administration (see above), whilst he or she presumes that they were recruited to serve their personal interests and those of their families by using the public administration.

As a result, one of the first (structural) challenges for such administrations is that of their internalisation, i.e. their appropriation by the public, users and the people so that they recognise and accept them as an entity concerned for and working for the general interest, the common good and therefore as useful and necessary for each and every person. It has to be recognised that generalised corruption has further aggravated the scepticism of many citizens-users concerning the ability of public administrations to work solely in the general interest.

Governance programmes are without doubt a step in the right direction. But perhaps the first challenge for all of us, individuals and international organisations, who want to improve African public administrations, should be to start by creating entities that are perfectly and definitively integrated into the socio-cultural environment, in the minds of groups and in individual and collective life. This is surely no longer simply the business of the administrative sciences alone.
The Case of Continental Europe

Gérard Timsit *

Two propositions appear to summarise the situation of public administrations in continental European countries as they confront challenges and changes at the beginning of the 21st century. The first is a paradox: despite the extreme diversity of the situations in which these countries find themselves, there is great similarity in the changes that have taken place in their administrations. The second is that this paradox is only apparent: although very similar from one country to the next, these reforms are in each case designed to respond to widely dissimilar concerns, and take place at different stages in the process of construction or reconstruction of the State - which in the end makes them original and specific.

First proposition: a paradoxical situation

The paradox? - similar reforms in countries in different situations.

1. The situations are different from at least three points of view: the administrative cultures of the countries concerned, the administrative systems that they know and the strategies that they employ to implement the adopted reforms.

The administrative culture in which the countries of continental Europe operate is largely a common one, it is true, particularly in view of the historic legacy of the centralising and hierarchical Roman Empire, which many of these countries share. Their organisational model was largely relayed to them by the Catholic Church - itself constructed on a model based on that of the Empire within which it was born.

However, since this imperial Roman culture is not the only one that prevailed in continental Europe and, moreover, it had been demolished, especially in countries that experienced the most active forms of the Protestant reform movement, many other different cultural forms emerged and took root in the different European countries. These include the extremes of legalistic (France, for example) and managerial cultures, and the difference between a consensual culture (the Dutch "polder-model") and a hierarchical model.

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The administrative systems in the different countries of continental Europe are themselves very different. Although before the Second World War the administrations of these countries, in both western and central and eastern Europe, were more or less constructed and organised on the same so-called Weberian model, after this date we see a clear differentiation between east and west. Three major elements characterise them in this respect:

- the politicisation of the administrations in the eastern countries, compared with the neutrality of those in the western countries, unavoidable in central and eastern European countries where single parties controlled administrative life (sometimes referred to as "Politbureaucracy");

- the abolition in the eastern European countries of the distinction between civil servants and company employees, with the working conditions of administration officials governed by the Working Code governing all other agents employed in the economy, resulting in a form of "privatisation" of the administration, thereby eliminating the very idea of a public service;

- finally, the fragmentation of administrations between the different bureaucratic sections, party bureaucracies, State bureaucracies under different ministries, etc. - sections sometimes in competition despite the institution of nomenclatures to control them all.

The administrative strategies themselves are extremely varied:

- market strategies based on competition and contracts;

- managerial strategies stressing the importance of professionalism;

- policy analysis strategies that emphasise the need for assessing public policies when implementing reforms;

- deregulation strategies and that lighten the normative burden, simplify procedures, eliminate controls, etc.

Naturally, none of these strategies is used exclusively, and one could even say that the European countries have "as many strategies as there are countries."

2. In this context of extreme diversity of situations - cultures, systems, strategies - there is paradoxically a great homogeneity in the reforms undertaken in the different countries. We find the same range of measures, virtually common to all of continental Europe, from one country to another, where the keywords are: withdrawal of the State, decentralisation, autonomy and responsibility.
All of the countries of Europe have effectively unanimously adopted the idea of the need to reform the structures of the State in line with the idea of the "Lean State". All call for or have undertaken to reduce the size and weight of the State, either directly through privatisation policies of varying degrees of rigour, transferring to the private sector functions previously the responsibility of the State; or indirectly, through deregulation resulting in a lighter regulatory burden holding back enterprise, or resorting to liberalisation measures to encourage competition between certain administrations and with other administrations or even private sector enterprises.

This policy is generally accompanied by the creation or proliferation of new types of administrative structures: agencies - as they are usually called - administrations generally based on the British model of agencies under the "next steps" programme created by dismembering traditional ministries, endowed with real administrative and financial autonomy in carrying out routine tasks previously entrusted to the ministries: the latter only retain the conceptual tasks to which they can now devote their efforts... - "agencification", sometimes bolstered by the "corporatisation" of the agencies in order to emphasise their autonomy by aligning their status with that of private enterprises...

This reform of the central administrative structures is frequently accompanied by the reform of regional administrations - a sort of decentralisation movement - transferring State competencies to autonomous regional authorities - sometimes in tandem with movements towards "deconcentration", i.e. transfers of competencies to local services that are still highly dependent on the State, but which, because they are located at local level, are closer to the general public: this is the case in France where the major decentralisation laws of 1982 were accompanied, some 10 years later, by a series of deconcentration measures that resulted in 500,000 individual decisions being taken at regional level that were covered by almost sixty different procedures that had previously been handled centrally.

Another part of the range of administrative reforms that are so paradoxically common to countries in such diverse situations concern other measures: for example, the reforms to budgetary and accounting procedures (experimentation clause, limits set on public expenditure, introduction of budget envelopes, reforms to budgetary voting procedures, etc.), civil service reform (greater professionalism of officials, effectiveness and suitability for the job, mobility of civil servants, combating corruption, etc.) and also the reform of controls (using either traditional control bodies internal to the administration - administration inspectorates - or a proliferation of new types of institution known in France as independent administrative authorities, a model that is being copied almost everywhere in western Europe.
Second proposition: a seeming paradox

The great similarity of the reforms undertaken in continental European countries conceals a huge difference in outlook and the principles governing these actions. There are three stages or levels in the nature and scope of the policies pursued, which make it possible to place the accent on one or more of the dimensions that the administration favours when dealing with the challenges with which it is confronted.

1. Construction of the State is the challenge facing two types of country in continental Europe:

Firstly, and most urgently, the post-communist countries or countries in transition in central and eastern Europe. Without doubt some of these countries have succeeded in creating the constitutional and institutional foundations for their governmental and administrative actions (in the majority of cases, semi-presidential regimes) in the years since the fall of the Berlin Wall. However, it has to be admitted that most of them have still not made sufficient progress in the construction or renewal of their administration. Their administrative systems still have some of the features that characterised the previous period: lack of coordination, politicisation, poor decision-making ability, lack of qualifications amongst officials and lack of trust amongst citizens, etc.

Moreover, although somewhat less pressing but far from negligible, certain countries, having lived under authoritarian regimes in relatively recent times, may also be faced by the same challenge: the administration has sometimes continued to operate in a pre-Weberian mode, in particular in relations with the political authorities, that still reeks of clientelism and favouritism.

In both types of situation, the challenge is the priority construction of a State - a State that functions, and functions according to the rules of a State of law. The key element of administrative reform is therefore most often the establishment of a civil service worthy of the name and with a status that guarantees political neutrality, and the drafting of legislation capable of providing a proper legal framework for the actions of the public authorities and citizens. There is a risk - which should not be underestimated - that reform based essentially on the definition and elaboration of a legislative framework, will underestimate the consequences of adopting new laws and may, as we have seen in the countries concerned, confuse the "Rule of law" with "Rule by Law". As we have known for a long time, it takes more than one swallow to make a summer, and we cannot expect to "reform society by decree".

2. The modernisation of the State is a challenge common to all continental European countries. In effect, all of them (both those engaged in the tasks of construction or reconstruction of the State, and those elsewhere in Europe that have a solid and well-rooted administrative and legal tradition, are confronted by
this common need) need to adapt their administrative structures and procedures to the operating conditions of the societies of today, which are infinitely more complex than those of the framework and the management for which they were designed. It is this modernisation process - making the State and its administration suitable for the new environment - that requires reform aimed at greater speed, effectiveness, quality and simplicity. Indeed, we find the same determining factors in the different countries driving the modernisation process. The first, and the most important, concerns budgetary constraints. These are imposed on everyone. The desire to reduce public deficits, to optimise the use of human resources and to combat wasting public money have made financial pressure the most powerful lever for administrative reform. Another internal factor has appeared more recently, conferring a new, ethical dimension on administrative reform due to the obligation on public authorities, under pressure from public opinion, to combat corruption and to increase the autonomy and responsibility of civil servants. Added to these internal factors are external factors associated with the needs of European construction, which have had the effect of placing the accent in countries already in the European Union and in applicant countries that are preparing for entry into the European Economic Area, on reform and instigating administrations that are given a priority role in the functioning and development of the Union: economic, monetary and customs administrations, for example.

A new paradigm of public management is therefore emerging, based on a culture of performance and a public sector stripped of hierarchies and decentralising - beyond which a new State is taking shape.

3. A process of reconfiguration of the State is also under way. The trends that we have just described - of construction and modernisation of the State - are nothing more than traditional processes designed to make the State into what we normally expect it to be: a little more or a little less, but still much the same - a State that acts legally, less rigidly; a more flexible, or a "lighter" or more "modest" State... but still the same State. The process of reconfiguration of the State has a completely different meaning and a quite different scope. It involves redefining the State, redesigning it to make a new type of State. Reconfiguration of the State is without doubt within the reach of all countries in continental Europe. All countries have this intention. They all dream of it. However, not all of them can undertake it. And perhaps some of them never will succeed in doing so. We nevertheless need to examine this process, including the factors driving it, the reasoning behind it and the new challenges that it raises.

A. Clearly, all of the above-mentioned factors (modernisation, in particular) play a role in the reconfiguration of the State - at least as factors that trigger the process of reform. But a new phenomenon seems to be playing a crucial role: globalisation. Everything, or almost, has already been said on this subject: globalisation, according to what are now classical analyses, means new markets (markets for capital and markets for trade), new communication and distribution tools, new players (world organisations, NGOs, multinational companies, etc.)
new rules, including multilateral agreements and informal rules that have a privileged role.

Nevertheless, we need to add two observations properly to understand the scope of the phenomenon and its consequences on administration. The first is that whilst globalisation is closely associated with the idea of the market economy, and therefore with economic liberalism (hence its strong ideological resonance), we find that the globalisation movement at the same time leads to greater importance for the role of NGOs that deal with questions of general interest (human rights, sustainable development, managing natural resources, etc.). We are witnessing the emergence of a "transnational civic society", and hence the formation of an embryonic world-wide public opinion that the administration must now take more into account when defining and carrying out its tasks.

The second observation is that because globalisation has the effect of transferring part of the power of States to other players (downwards, through decentralisation; upwards, through the emergence and proliferation of intergovernmental organisations with certain supranational powers; and laterally, in favour of market forces, etc.), the transnational mobility of production factors that characterises it is accompanied by a parallel mobility in factors of destruction (fraud, terrorism, mafias, etc.). For this reason there is a risk that a growing number of human activities will escape all forms of control: "the planet Earth is in the process of becoming completely anarchic". "Is anyone in charge?" was a recently posed question.

This combination of factors forces a reconfiguration of the State, in a framework that no longer bears any relation to the old Welfare State, worn out after having served so well as a factor of redistribution, but having failed in its protective role. Our globalised society therefore needs a new form of governance.

B. New governance? The gradual substitution of the word governance for the traditional government reflects (it has been said) the contemporary floating of the idea of the concept of State power: the idea of the government as an organisation in exclusive charge of public affairs within a State seems to be increasingly inappropriate.

Different reasons are given, especially growing and increasingly complex interdependence, which has stripped the word "direction" of any substance, as well as the increasing role of national and transnational civic society in defending the public interest. We are beginning to see that the new governance means a break with the idea of hierarchy, and a transformation of the regulatory situation. Forms of regulation seen, unlike traditional regulation, as mechanisms of control (which no longer necessarily involve constraint because civil society is now an integral part of the decision-making process) for singular situations assessed on a case-by-case basis by "governing" bodies, the intervention of "networks", the mechanism
of subsidiarity and increasing empowerment are just some of the main anchoring points of this new "art of governance".

In response to these requirements, two alternative scenarios are proposed. Firstly, the "return to the primordial State". Based on the concept of the inevitable decline and decadence of the Welfare State in the wake of the failure, in the mid-seventies, of the growth model on which it was constructed in a Keynesian context, such a scenario is based on the idea that we must return to the three most fundamental and ancient functions of the State: protecting the inhabitants of a country against others (the issue of internal security); defending it against external inhabitants and covetousness (defence); and finally, assisting the poorest and most vulnerable. This analysis is probably not entirely inaccurate. It is however incomplete. On the one hand, it tends to define only the perimeter of the State - not to allow internal restructuring. On the other hand, since it aims to reduce the size of the State, it does not take into account one of its key dimensions, which is to be able to maintain social cohesion in increasingly complex societies. Without going as far as to say that, as in France, it is the State that forges the national identity, we nevertheless have to admit that, in the countries of continental Europe, in times of globalisation, the State can hardly abandon this function with which that has been endowed as a "social teacher". So, is the State making a comeback?

There is a second scenario, it is true: that of a return to the State - but another State - the scenario of the construction of a State based on solidarity. This solidarity goes beyond simply assisting the poorest and most vulnerable of the original State. It involves a three-pronged solidarity: firstly between individuals, whether citizens or not, present on the same territory at the same time, which poses the problem of the status of foreigners and in particular the condition of immigrants; solidarity between territories, raising the problems of decentralisation and autonomy, and as a corollary, maintaining national unity; and finally, solidarity between generations, with each government also acting for those that succeed it, giving rise to problems of safeguarding the environment, preserving natural resources and, naturally, sustainable development.

Earlier I referred to three rationales underlying the reform of the State and its administration: social, strategic and subsidiarity. These are precisely the three rationales that we find at work in the concept and the scenario of the State based on solidarity - a State that, at the same time, must be designed as a strategic decision maker, reduced to the essential, but also as an operator - sufficiently operational to ensure effective management of social processes in the context of globalisation. This gives rise to new challenges.

C. The new rationales that we have just outlined, although they make it possible to face the challenge of globalisation, raise new questions - and require new efforts to meet new challenges. Firstly, the challenge of restoring the internal unity of the community. As the administrator and guarantor, in the name of pluralism, of the social, cultural, ethnic and religious diversity of society, the State is also
responsible for the unity of this diverse community, where, in a democratic society, it has to manage and preserve this diversity. The State and its administration therefore have an intangible function, one which it has always had, of integration, going beyond the avatars of its history and structure, but the task has become more important because modern States are more fragile, threatened with all the "fractures" that riddle them.

There is also the challenge of the construction of a new unity that encompasses and transcends the old identities on which the State was forged. Without doubt this is the most difficult challenge to overcome, and the most exhilarating. Decoupling the State from the former communities, which have up until now been its sole expression, involves their integration into the process of constructing a new unity at a higher level, and giving it a new face - a face of hope and democracy.

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Public Administration in Latin America

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The debate on the autonomy of public administration vis-à-vis the political system in which it operates, is an open discussion where both opposing and complementary points of view have been expounded. Understanding how the concept of modernisation has developed is an important aspect of this debate because it helps us understand that public administration responds to the imperatives of the historical evolution of a given society; in other words, it is not an instrument governed by considerations that can be applied to any context or social scenario. The very concept of public administration is closely tied to the concept of State, particularly to the political system of which it is a part. Thus, according to Rafael Bañón, it is an unpredictable concept, one that varies over time, in a “process that accumulates meanings and changes the predominant validity of [those] meanings and paradigms. As a result, the concepts ‘public’ and ‘administration’ differ depending on the social role [assigned] to the State and on the relationship between State and society.”

Discussing public administration in Latin American countries implies, on the one hand, not forgetting that this is not a homogenous region where everything occurs in much the same manner, and, on the other hand, recognising the fact that the basic referent for public administration in these countries has been the State model in general, and particularly the model of development. In Latin American States, development did not follow the benefactor State model adopted by countries in Western Europe; the conceptual bases of the former were taken from the CEPAL model, those of the latter, from Keynes. Latin American countries developed political systems with a populist bias, based on State intervention in many aspects of social life that in turn led to the creation of popular national States rather than true benefactor States. In these popular national States, participation is through social mobilisation, not through consolidating representational systems, as was the case in Europe. Lastly, they developed mechanisms under a corporate scheme that hindered interactions between democratic and parliamentary interests.


American States was adapted to the chosen model, and its actions subordinated to the model’s imperatives.

In Latin America public administrations became a privileged space for political negotiation precisely because they concentrated both budgetary and legal resources, and supplanted other spheres of political power. However, we must consider specific experiences. Public administration also became an effective vehicle for political intermediation between government and society, especially in countries that lacked a solid party system or those with a dominant party. This is why bureaucracies founded their legitimacy on their abilities. They had to handle many public issues with a certain degree of specialisation, at times pitting their relative independence against the political class. However, the actions of “modernising groups” embedded in high bureaucratic spheres of most administrative structures brought to the fore the key question regarding the administration’s behaviour: How to reconcile the fact that bureaucratic groups whose actions fall within a hierarchical and pyramidal scheme can, at times, act almost independently, promoting effective actions, without violating the principle of constitutional and political subordination? In answering this question we cannot avoid mentioning the tension that exists between the autonomy required by administrators and their subordination to the political project they are committed to if they want to be effective. The problem that arises in view of modernising proposals is that said proposals seem to have a logic of their own, that allows for spaces where a group of officials can create values and norms that are not necessarily shared by the rest of society. Techno-bureaucracy bases its proposals on this logic: The bureaucratic arrangement is transformed, based now on a different “verticality,” with autonomy that is at times excessive, where the modernising group favours its own ends over all others.

The modernisation criterion becomes an element that allows a dynamic, as opposed to a linear, understanding of how administrations behave. From the moment Latin American countries redefined the State as no longer interventionist and populist, this led to a clear differentiation of its areas of competence. Thus, administrative aspects will tend to gain in autonomy and, as a result, also be more clearly defined. Positions will be assigned based on merit, and seniority will no longer be a deciding factor. Rational authority emerges as a condition to improve or increase those State powers that coincide with social development. Public administration reforms necessarily address these processes, and thus become an attribute of technocracy. This leads to divisions in bureaucratic bodies, with traditional bodies lagging behind while resisting change, and this may eventually become an obstacle to achieving objectives. The modernisation of administration becomes an objective as a result of developments in science and technology, which, among other things, emerge as a way to reconcile differences. It is necessary to identify the particular experiences, because there are important differences between Chile, Uruguay and Mexico. And the debate and discussion continue only within legislative bodies and political parties. Another result, one that was not foreseen, is that technocracy not only gains strength, it becomes more
politicised. On the one hand, part of the bureaucracy continues to depend on the results of political and party negotiations, while the “modernising” bureaucracy increasingly steers away from this dynamic, precisely because it is recruited based on its “technical” abilities, and these are very different from those that were characteristic of traditional bureaucrats. Recruitment is now based on more impersonal, and allegedly more professional, criteria. This is why decisions that emanate from the Executive, and particularly from the “professional” bureaucracy, are paradoxically removed from traditional “legitimising” mechanisms but close to the new inputs needed to achieve social cohesion, such as citizen participation.

Evolution of the administrative modernisation concept

The concept of administrative modernisation has evolved, thus allowing Latin American administrations better correspondence with the demands not only of the economic model but of social evolution. However, we must point out that concepts that were appropriate for a given historical moment—for example when the bases of the nation-State are established—do not necessarily lose their effectiveness when times and circumstances change. Rather, new criteria have had to combine with the old in order to face the challenges of social development because we have not yet reached a scenario where the bureaucratic model yields to the so-called post-bureaucratic model, in spite of the pressure exerted on Latin American administrations.

As a Normative Criterion. Contemporary Latin American societies increasingly apply more intensive and extensive norms to regulate social behaviour in general and especially State actions. First, to justify the need to centralise authority and, second, to justify the growth of State intervention in the economy. Today this criterion is still applied: As rules favouring interactions with other countries, notably those that govern trade agreements, like NAFTA, on the one hand, and to perfect general norms, adapting them to the particular reality that has resulted from internal decentralisation processes, on the other, processes that have been very important in Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and Costa Rica concern primarily the “devolution” of federal attributions to municipalities. Both, no doubt, are dynamics that respond to their own logic. Another aspect of the application of the legal-technical criterion has to do with the processes of deregulation that were a consequence of the growing temptation to “shrink” the State. In many cases, these processes have led to in-depth revisions that have not necessarily implied a reduction of the prevailing set of norms but a readjustment of these norms to a different reality. Likewise, norms are related to a different appreciation of the areas that are subject to regulation. In other words, the national boundaries of the State’s activity aren’t as clear and they are extended to include air and nautical

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3 See research by Rogelio Hernández.
space, telecommunications, markets, and financial exchanges, to name the areas that need to be renewed when the concept of sovereignty undergoes a severe redefinition.

In its Relationship with Economic Development. In the 1960’s, Latin American countries began to consider that administration was a resource that could be used to encourage development; this train of thought was labelled "Administration for Development". Administration was considered not only an administrative agent but as an active resource for economic growth. Attention was centered on growth and on the activity of the so-called State-owned sectors. The - in some cases - excessive growth of these sectors caused serious problems when coordinating central agencies and decentralized agencies, since at times the latter carried greater political weight than the former. This led to a significant effort to perfect controls, especially those related to budgetary resources. These changes were a part of programs identified as “administrative reform”; in the 1960’s they had enormous impact. However, these programs, identified as Reform Programs as the ones in Colombia and Venezuela, were limited because they were assigned formal goals, and because they created broad expectations which, when confronted with results, were significantly below those expectations. The reforms that were implemented in the 1960’s and especially the 1970’s were formal operations whose technical content was usually taken from foreign models. As a result, processes which did not acknowledge the nature of political systems ensued, and proposals were designed and discussed exclusively in the circles where they were formulated.

As Programming and Planning Exercises. As a result of the above, there was a moment when it was thought that planning would help solve the problems that troubled Latin American public administrations, —not only problems related to coordination, which were evident in face of the growing number of agencies and that decentralised agencies could easily avoid central controls, but also problems that arose because goals were not met, leading to inefficiency and to the first signs of ungovernability. Planning was a means of expressing aims, objectives, and even goals, clearly. In France, research by Lucien Nizard and Michel Crozier offered a different approach, and in certain cases, questioned the alleged advantages of planning exercises. Once goals were explicit, organisations and agencies that were supposed to work in coordination, following criteria meant to make them homologous, open to concerting decisions, paradoxically became more closed and more competitive. This competitiveness hindered combined efforts, which are a central element of planning exercises. In Latin American countries, like Brazil or Argentina planning was an exercise where goals became aggregate, and it was therefore not easy to identify the responsible parties, resources, or results.

5 In the Mexican case, the state-owned sector registers considerable growth since the Luis Echeverria administration, when a large number of trusts, whose mainspring was, in many cases, economic, but were kept from passing central controls when it came to budgetary resources. Administrative reform programs flourished during the José López Portillo administration. See María del Carmen Pardo, “La reforma administrativa para el desarrollo social,” Foro Internacional, October–December 1984, pp. 101-117.
Evaluation was not a central element of a process that should never have been considered linear, but, if anything, circular, requiring feedback when facing obstacles or problems that affected the fulfilment of established goals.

As a Criterion of Efficiency. Once we understand administrative modernisation as a resource conducive not only to development but to a distribution of its benefits, it acquires even greater autonomy. Social pressure increases, and becomes more active, demanding, and better informed, all of which forces a distinction between the political project, and government and administrative achievements. Demands increase and become more complex, and the viability of the State as an agent able to create conditions for development, and especially for social justice, is questioned. Public administrations are part of the package of elements that needed in-depth adjustments. A proposal is set forth that includes not only regulations and structures but above all aims and the functions required to meet them. And certainly not in any way or at any cost, but efficiently and effectively. The slogan is then to do more and better with fewer resources. The integration of administrative structures is redefined, as is the usefulness of public function, the profile of the officials, and actions in diverse contexts. As was stated above, traditional paradigms (such as the bureaucratic paradigm) are questioned, and administration and its members are the subject of debate among scholars and professionals alike. Many countries begin reform processes based on new, or at least renewed, conceptions: Chile is one good example. The world over, the ineffectiveness of obsolete plans are discussed, as well as the need to construct new plans to make public action respond to current circumstances. These changes require thinking and acting differently. There are theoretical positions that identify the changes which most nations—especially those in Western Europe, but others as well—have embraced. Since the 1980’s, administrative reform has been a topic in the political agenda of most countries.

As Communication and Information Technologies. The rapid changes observed in recent years have affected State action and also influence many other aspects of social life. One of the core elements of these changes has been the technological development, which has led to a unique experience in public administration, so much so that it has been influential in defining the content of the concept of administrative modernisation. IT systems have revolutionised public administration. Public function, which had up to now based its performance on its “knowledge” and experience, has become more fluent and flexible. Information technology—data bases and electronic communications—has facilitated the use of computer equipment at operational and professional levels, which intersect the vertical hierarchy. The use of computers in operational levels—while visible results are processed at higher levels—has developed abilities that favour the performance of assigned tasks, beyond decision-making. Yet despite the fact that these changes are so important, the hierarchy is maintained. But there are new routes in bureaucratic functioning that are well worth analysing. Networks are created differently, and are no longer based on hierarchical foundations. The assumption that “information is power” becomes relative, because information is
no longer the source of individual actions at the top of the pyramid. The nature of
the function also changes, because it crosses many spheres of action and increases
the significance of projects implemented by better-integrated groups. Although
agencies continue to be governed by rules, the rules themselves become less
visible and, it seems, less oppressive. The nature of the work changes, and so do
those who carry it out. That is, handling technology, especially technology applied
to information, may lead to a public servant that is able, by correctly handling that
technology, to render his or her daily tasks more complex. This would put him or
her in a privileged situation regarding promotions, something that would never
have happened if they had received traditional training. This, no doubt, can
influence institutions ruled by seniority and rank. These applications have reduced
space and time, they have yielded increases in crossed or shared functional
arrangements, and have encouraged foreign exchanges. Finally, this technology
has helped to, if not eliminate, at least to reduce the tension that arises when
functions and resources are decentralised.

Final Comments

Administrative modernisation is not a static concept, it grows and is enriched as
the State itself is transformed and the government and administration process its
transformation. Thus, for analytical purposes, we can identify the different stages
that it has experienced; these stages are nothing more than society’s notions and
perceptions of its own development, many times interpreted by groups at the top of
the bureaucratic pyramid, that is, the groups that support modernisation.

In their modernising zeal, bureaucratic elites often do not interpret society and
impose notions shared only by the elite. Frequently, this annuls the modernising
effort. The modernising effort cannot ignore the fact that, difficult as it may be, the
sectors that fall behind must also somehow benefit from the changes, because if
this isn’t the case, the transformation loses its meaning and becomes nothing more
than an attribute of the technocracy and an aim in itself. Thus, it becomes
estranged from its commitment to transform in order to benefit the society as a
whole.

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6 See Jane E. Fountain, “The Virtual State. Toward a Theory of Bureaucracy for the Twenty-
First Century,” in Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Democracy Governance in a Networked World,
Aristo tells a pretty story of a fairy, who, by some mysterious law of her nature, was condemned to appear at certain seasons in the form of a foul and poisonous snake. Those who injured her during the period of her disguise were forever excluded from participation in the blessings which she bestowed. But to those who, in spite of her loathsome aspect, pitied and protected her, she afterwards revealed herself in the beautiful and celestial form which was natural to her, accompanied their steps, granted all their wishes, filled their houses with wealth, made them happy in love and victorious in war. Such a spirit is Liberty. At times she takes the form of a hateful reptile. She grovels, she hisses, she stings. But woe to those who in disgust shall venture to crush her. (Macaulay, 1854, p.19).

Synopsis of Presentation

Public Administration in the English speaking world has been informed by the common law tradition of limited government. Since the Eighteenth century there has been a creative tension between the need for democratic accountability and the dynamic for efficiency and effectiveness. The quest to reconcile this tension has been at the centre of a generation of administrative reforms and will prove to be the enduring challenge of the future. The presentation, therefore, will place public administration within the context of this democratic ambiguity. It will then explore the influence of representative democracy and the common impact of the reform agenda over the last twenty years, before discussing the issues raised by this. The presentation will conclude by asking what may succeed the New Public Management agenda currently dominating public administration.

The Context of Public Administration

There are many metaphors to describe a country’s bureaucracy, its public administration. Some commentators speak of it as though it was a machine; indeed, the British Cabinet Office has a unit concerned with the machinery of government. More recently the analogies have been updated and we now hear talk of public administration in terms of it being the software or the wiring that when programmed and booted-up runs the processes of the State. But perhaps the most telling is that used by the American analyst, Don K. Price; he refers to

* Andrew Massey, Professor of Government, Director, Postgraduate Programme, University of Portsmouth, United Kingdom.
administration as 'the seamy side of sovereignty' and of politics (1983), it is what makes constitutions actually work.

The tradition in the English speaking world and in North America in particular is to recognise the potential power of government, and to beware of the opportunity to abuse that power. As such government is limited, indeed fettered. The various countries that comprise the Old Commonwealth and the USA (Canada, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand) are liberal democracies, an organising principle enjoyed by them for many generations. As such it is accepted, indeed is usually part of the constitution, that there are proper limits to the size and scope of government, the notion of limited and accountable government is a defining characteristic of these States. As is the application of Common Law, indeed the precepts of English Common Law inform and give structure to the constitutional conventions of these countries and the day-to-day application of those norms and practices (Hogue, 1986).

The events in North America and Europe that took place during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries enshrined in Britain and the USA the foundation of an established system of checks and balances upon unfettered royal/executive authority. It was a separation of power which ‘originated in fundamental beliefs’, especially that of the Puritans in the ‘depravity of mankind’, which prevented the establishment or maintenance of an institutional structure ‘with absolute political authority’ (Price, 1983, p.150). While the American Revolution ended the formal constitutional ties between the UK and the US, continuities remained in the form of close philosophical links between the two administrative systems (Massey, 1993, p.2). These rejected a traditional establishment or theology that justified authority and ‘politically inoculated’ the two systems against the kind of political tyranny then found on continental Europe and elsewhere (Price, 1983, pp.151-2; Massey, 1993, p.3). In both countries, and then throughout the Old Commonwealth, the public sector came to regard itself, to a greater or lesser extent, as a neutral layer between the government and the governed. The administrators saw themselves not as the unfeeling implementers of executive orders, but one among many essential checks upon arbitrary rule.

Democracy and Reform

From the beginning of the modern era, therefore, there were tensions built into the public administration systems of these countries (see Hood, 2000). The desire of the executive to implement, that is to deliver its policies, often caused elected politicians at times to experience frustration with the recalcitrance or reluctance of public officials to simply do as they were told. Public officials, however, evolved the concept of public duty (O’Toole, 1997) that is the belief that although they must serve the government of the day to the best of their ability, this was not an unswerving loyalty, quite the contrary. Elected politicians were viewed as
ephemeral creatures with attachments to passing fads and fancies, the public sector, therefore, had a wider democratic duty to serve the public as a whole. There began to be developed what the Dutch academic Mark Bovens has referred to as ‘active responsibility’ in complex public sector organisations, with the personal and civic responsibility of bureaucrats sometimes becoming at odds with their professional responsibility (to their peers) and their duties as employees (to ministers) (1998, pp143-175). The notions of legal and illegal orders, due process and equity of treatment have been consciously and conscientiously developed.

Added to these philosophical conundrums were the more practical issues of money, especially the modern version of the old parliamentary doctrine of *the redress of grievance before the granting of supply*. In the USA for example, although the President, as the country’s only nationally elected politician heads the federal executive, only the legislature may raise and spend money. Congress uses the power of the purse to assert its right to hold the public sector’s departments, agencies and bureaux to account and to influence policies of its own constituent (often parochial) factions and lobbies. Much has been written about this complex relationship, and it is a constant factor to be taken into account by those who would reform US public administration. Indeed Aberbach has argued the power and interests of Congress often conflict with those of the Presidency to the extent that both are played off by experienced and knowledgeable senior officials. Thus severely limiting the ability of reformers to implement New Public Management, or indeed any other major reform without considerable difficulty (see Aberbach, 1990; Aberbach and Rockman, 2000).

The growth of welfare services and the military industrial complex between the end of the Second World War and the oil price shock of the 1970s saw the apparently inexorable rise of public expenditure as a major constituent of GDP. There was also an increase in the sheer numbers of people employed in the public sector. There were many critics of this, especially from what became known as the Public Choice school of thought in the US, influenced by the Austrian and Chicago schools of economics (Olson, 1982; Denham, 1996). The leading theorists here included Tullock, Buckonan, Olson and Friedman. From small beginnings and fears about the fiscal crisis of the State, New Public Management was born (although in the US it is often referred to as Reengineering or Reinventing Government).

President Carter in the US first enacted the reform agenda. It passed, with increasing pace to Presidents Reagan, Bush and Clinton, with the latter handing the implementation phase over to Vice-President Gore. In Britain Prime Minister Thatcher began the root and branch reforms carried on by both her successors and apparently with a new wave about to be unleashed by Mr. Blair. But to a greater or lesser extent Canada, Australia, New Zealand and many of the Scandinavian countries have implemented administrative reform (Pollitt, 1995). If one were to construct a continuum of degrees of reform, New Zealand would be at one
The process of reform and its leaders have sought the growth of the importation of private sector practices into the public sector and the development of entrepreneurial officials. Key influences have included a clutch of reform gurus such as Peters and Waterman (1982) and Osborne (1992). Britain established a swathe of semi-autonomous (Next Steps) agencies run by chief executives and self-managing within overall policy guidelines and key performance indicators as set by Secretaries of State. Into these were decanted well over half of all civil servants.

In many countries in this group there were also large-scale privatisations. In the case of the public utilities, this led to concerns about the way in which the public interest may be maintained and protected, especially with regard to natural monopolies such as those found within the utilities. These and related issues were raised by the increased marketisation of the provision of what had hitherto been public sector services. In Britain, for example, a new regulatory framework has grown up to address public concerns, overseen by non-ministerial government departments such as OFWAT, OFTEL and many others.

In this reform movement we have seen an increase in the private provision of State activities and the search for Best Value as part of the latest manifestation. As Hirst argues, “it involves a radically different conception of the relationship between customers and service providers from the conventional view of the relationship between citizens and the welfare State” (2000, p.18).

These reforms have their critics. Parsons has argued that New Public Management with its emphasis on efficiency, economy and quality, is:

*the nearest we have come (in Britain), for a few hundred years at least, to a kind of State religion. To question or deny its essential doctrines is to place oneself beyond the pale. To shout as it parades past that it is stark naked – that the emperor has no clothes – is to risk being bundled away or being injected with a tranquilliser or sent to a gulag (Parsons, 2000, p.7).*

While Parson’s use of amusing hyperbole to illustrate his argument is justified, it should not be allowed to mask the underlying importance of his message. At the heart of NPM is situated the setting of performance targets and their measurement. Many of the changes wrought upon the public sector in many countries as a result of the attempted importation of quasi-business techniques into government bureaucracies are sometimes misplaced and misapplied, being based upon hunch, false assumptions and no systematic research into their efficacy (see Jordan, 1994). Few of us doubt the need for change and modernisation to meet the new demands placed upon public servants; it is the nature of the change imposed through NPM that we must be sure to question.
Hirst has also noted the “practice of co-ordinating activities through networks, partnerships, and deliberative forums that have grown up on the ruins of the more centralised bureaucracies that have been reformed (ibid., p.19). Increasingly this too is linked to NPM. We find this at many different levels, at city, neighbourhood, regional level, and within the constructions of the State. Much of this change is global, but with very distinct national characteristics. What works in Chicago, does not necessarily work in Chichester and what works in New York does not always transfer to New South Wales. But there has been a global reform movement nonetheless.

Issues for the Future

There is a wealth of work exploring the impact of the global economy upon individual States and the resultant loss of sovereignty. It manifests itself in terms of governance with the growth of supra-national institutions such as NATO, NAFTA, the EU and so forth. The challenge, as noted by Hirst, is to reform political institutions to take account of the need to engage in government through consent, while allowing decisions to be taken and implemented. Connected to this are advances in technology; the growth of information technology in particular have allowed the hiving out of governmental functions to multi-national corporations, such as the role the American company EDS have taken in providing computing services across the globe.

In part this along with NPM has led to a kind of MacDonaldisation of public services, with large companies joining forces with certain States to demand a smoothing out of tax and governmental regimes for the conduct of business, similar laws, similar constraints, similar access to funding. This has both benefits and disbenefits. The opponents of globalisation point to the loss of sovereignty experienced by individual States and the problems of trying to make systems developed in one place apply to somewhere quite different. But the whole point of reform is to find a kind of ‘goodness of fit’, this is certainly what the systems of Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea, and Malaysia have attempted with the adaptations they have instituted within their own reform programmes. And clearly the dramatic experiments that have taken place in New Zealand, although labelled New Public Management reflect more that nation’s economic problems and tiny population than a plan to be copied by larger and richer societies.

The globalisation of the reform process clearly does have benefits. At its periphery it is a system that has even threatened the buccaneering tradition of off-shore finance centres such as the Bailiwick’s of Jersey and Guernsey. France, Germany and the Netherlands, not to mention the FBI, have demanded the residual parts of the great Duchy of Normandy open their books for inspection and cease to be so recalcitrantly independent.
Finally, the core of the reforms that have taken place in the English speaking world over the last two decades have attempted to address the contradiction with which I began this presentation, namely the absolute requirement for democratic control and accountability combined with the desire for greater efficiency and effectiveness. The two do not always sit easily side-by side, but sit together they must. The devolved responsibilities and emphasis on delivery we find in the reforms have empowered the citizenry in many areas. This can only be to the good and indeed returns to the precepts set by one of the framers of the USA’s Eighteenth Century Constitution, Thomas Jefferson (who’s mother was from Shadwell in London). He argued we must learn to trust our fellow citizens to govern themselves, this does not mean anarchy and licence, but informed consent. This should be the aim of future reforms and act as a benchmark for good governance.

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Challenges in Public Administration in Developing Nations

O.P. Dwivedi *

I. Development administration: lineage and challenges

When a developmental creed emerged in the West, it posited that in order to attain development, a country’s administrative structure should conform to the standards of the most advanced industrial societies. The key issue, then, was the transformation of the existing traditional and colonial-oriented administrative machinery into the new entity. This was to be accomplished by applying scientific management principles and administrative reforms: the modernisation of the public service machinery through external inducement, transfer of technology, and training by so-called foreign experts. Foreign aid, professionalisation, and development planning were central focus at refurbishing the administrative machinery in these developing countries. For this task, various prescriptive models were advocated by the Western experts. But of course, their prescription was based on the dichotomy between politics and administration; theirs was a system which relied on their home-grown and well-tried Statecraft which was founded on hierarchy, unity of command, political neutrality, recruitment and promotion on the merit principle, public service accountability, and objectivity. In a post-colonial setting, this kind of managerial transformation involved the conversion of a colonial “law and order” system of governance into a “rational bureaucracy” which was supposed to provide the necessary institutional conditions for economic development.

In reality, these principles were to work side by side with the existing indigenous cultures and traditional values. Soon, a parallel value system gained currency along with the Western models. For example, later in the 1990s, when the NPM movement prescribed a ‘leaner but meaner State’, which meant that a small core of public servants everywhere could be better trained, more professional, more globally-minded, more ethical, more productive, more prone to serve customers, and more responsive to business groups’ demands in general. And of course, as the argument goes, a smaller civil service would result in better efficiency and responsiveness by providing appropriate remuneration, thus eliminating the opportunity as well as enticement for enduring corruption.

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Based on this premise, the State (i.e. the public sector) was to retreat, and to privatise, deregulate, down-size, outsource, and localize. Supposedly, the gap thus created by a shrinking government was to be filled by a matching progress in civil society and the private sector. The expected outcome would be sustainable development and prosperity all around. Instead, poverty, civil strife, and other problems ensued; and a truly effective governing system never materialised. While the West was celebrating the “retreat of the State”, deprivation grew at an alarming rate in many developing nations, corruption increased, and civil society as well as social capital deteriorated. The net effect was that the prescribed practices, styles and structures of administration (which remained unrelated to local traditions, needs and realities) succeeded in reproducing the symbolism, but not the substance of, for example a British, French or American administrative system.

Confronted with widespread corruption, an ineffectual developmental bureaucracy, and largely immobile governing institutions, the Western solution was to call for more of the same administrative reforms. A vicious cycle continued that caused these problems in the first place. Thus, the most important challenge before these developing countries was, and still is, what to do, and how much to make their own administrative system imitative and ritualistic in order to get international aid and appreciation from the West.

It is now acknowledged that such an imitative system has not worked well. What happened?

1) For years, the Western scholars have been unable to include the alternatives in the form of non-Western contributions to developmental studies. Ignorance in the West has continued to overshadow the need to appreciate the importance of indigenous culture, traditions and style of governance, their administrative styles, which reflect the distinctiveness and complexity of their various national identities, as well as realities and cultural diversities. These factors must be taken into consideration when public service reforms and aid-related conditions are being imposed. For example, we do know that in developing nations, the nature of public expectations from their governments is basically different from those prevailing in the West; and thus it is sometimes counter-productive to force debureaucratisation and privatisation in the South.

2) The outer layers of each nation’s style of governance are directly affected by current circumstances and global challenges. The paradox is that, while demands on the public sector to provide more services are growing, the State apparatus in developing nations is being forced to shrink and retreat. Instead, developing nations are being compelled to follow the costly fads in the industrialised nations. We also know that any profound administrative reform entails significant attitudinal and value changes, which are based on local culture and traditions. Thus, efforts at administrative restructuring,
“modernisation”, and bringing other types of reforms must address first, either directly or indirectly, the question of the indigenous style, values and culture of governance (Nef, 1998).

From this author’s viewpoint, a country’s culture and style of governance are the key to the understanding of what makes a country function; and thus, it is imperative that any public sector reform forced upon on developing nations must draw on their local customs, culture and traditions. It should be noted that when the local culture and traditions are discarded in the favour of Western-style management practices, and when there is not enough time given to these nations to see if such a transplantation has already taken root in the body politic, a hodgepodge of two value systems starts operating simultaneously with no specific standards against which effectiveness of that administrative system, as well as the conduct of public officials, could be measured. Is it possible that the standards of measurement are skewed because such standards in the past have been always been drawn from the purely mono-cultural perspective of the North? Would it not be better if an inclusive and multi-cultural mixture of alternate medicine is given.

II. From mono-culture to a multi-cultural universe of public administration

By the beginning of the twentieth century, two major events occurred which shaped the future of public administration as a discipline. First was the emphasis that Woodrow Wilson and Frank W. Goodnow placed on the separation of administration from politics as the single most essential public administration reform in achieving efficiency and removing the objectionable and immoral practices of spoils and patronage besetting the democratic system of governing. While Wilson expounded his theory on separation of administration from politics in 1887, other scholars joined a steady stream of advocates for maintaining the dichotomy. By the 1950s, the politics-administration dichotomy was assumed both as a self-evident truth and as a desirable goal. Administration was perceived as a self-contained world of its own, with its own separate values, rules and methods, which were universalistic in nature. Thus, public administration came to be known as the universe of facts, enshrined in a value-free environment, ready to be applied anywhere in the world, akin to scientific experiments as mentioned below.

The second was the rise of scientificism in the discipline. While the roots of scientific analysis in social science disciplines can be traced back to the Age of Enlightenment, slowly the two core elements of scientific method started influencing the philosophical and human sciences. These core elements are rational objectivity and quantification. The main purpose of these scientific elements was, and still is, to remove biases and fallacies of human thought by searching for ‘hard data’ which can be measured, and then presented in an objective and rational manner. In this context, academics and practitioners of
public administration are considered to be applied scientists, who remain dispassionately aloof from that subjective (and therefore irrational) realm of culture, values and ethical issues.

Furthermore, the American scientific management specialists thought that the science of administration was an end itself worthy of systematic study and improvement. For them, government administration was a machine to be driven by scientific management theories such as POSDCORB principles, PPBS, MBO and most recently the New Public Management. It was also thought that the scientific study of administration led to the discovery of principles of administration analogous to the principles or laws of the physical sciences. And finally, it was assumed that the principles of administration determined the way in which specific administrative values, such as efficiency and economy, could be realised.

In such a scientific environment, the use of merit principle became the main ingredient sustaining the functioning of government administration. Thus, public administration turned into (as it was thought by some) a scientific endeavour in which individuality was emphasized because the individual was the unit of measurement in relation to output, efficiency and accountability. Such a philosophy was well suited for the entrenchment of the merit principle in the West because it encouraged individual achievement. It was much later, after the 1970s, that a different philosophy of administration emerged which stated that public administration could not be reduced to a very reductionist scientific experiment alone because the important imperatives of culture, spirituality, ethics and morality would remain fenced out. Thus, a tortuous evolution occurred when the issue of universalistic application of Western-born public administration was challenged.

The need for an inclusive and multicultural world of public administration: During the past century, scholars and practitioners of public administration carried out their work as if all public administration and governance values emanating from the West were universally applicable, akin to scientific principles, and local context or culture did not matter. That vestige of a one-dimensional rationalism is now slowly giving way to a fuller recognition and understanding of the impact and consequences of people’s values.

Development administration has been the handmaiden of Western comparative public administration, an academic field that has not succeeded in breaking loose from its old moorings because it still presses for the Western-oriented, universalistic designs tied to a single, competitive and capitalistic world economy. For example, details of administrative structure, procedure, financial or human-resources management, central-local relationships, organisation of ministries or departments, the role of parastatals, linkages with civil society and grassroots groups for purposes of licensing, permitting, and regulation, and the recruitment/socialisation mechanisms, all these are based on the system perfected in the West. Sometimes lonely voices in the development community call for realisable change from the bottom up, and suggest that it would be desirable if the North could use
many ideas from different sources in the South to enrich its own discipline of public administration as well as its protégé—development administration—by including sensitivity to the local customs, indigenous culture, as well as spirituality, thereby bridging the gap between North and South by drawing a new course which will be holistic and multi-cultural.

It is also clear that through globalisation, a certain dependence and continued reliance on the theory and methodology of the Western-style administration is being emphasised. Would it not be a sad situation when everywhere in the world, not only the governing system but also the style of doing things becomes the mirror image of Western values and practices. Developing countries have a lot to change, and so does the West. One thing is clear: the current crisis of development and administration is precisely a consequence of the inability of the West to incorporate the substance of other non-Western developmental experiences into the prevailing conceptual mould. It is also clear that new approaches to North-South relations are required by acknowledging that alternatives to Western-led reforms might have some values for other nations, just as alternate medicine has finally received acceptance in the West.

The essence of this plea is in the identification of unity in diversity principle so that alternatives (which should be drawn from the South) do not get disregarded simply because either these are not well argued, or are not couched in fine languages of the Western experts. Of course, the author is not advocating a non-involvement and a total detachment of development administration from its moorings, the Western-based public (and comparative) administration. Because, there are some core values, (such as the rule of law and due process, efficiency, economy, accountability, impartiality, integrity, fairness, protecting and serving the common good, etc.) of public administration which are universal in nature and are applicable everywhere irrespective of local traditions, culture and context. Nevertheless, as argued earlier, a holistic approach to administration requires considering all alternatives available.

III. The Challenges

The following general six propositions are offered as concluding observations:

1) The time has come to examine the disruptive impacts of frequent public service reorganisations and reforms, as well as a periodic paradigm shifts. We already know that it is tougher to implement than to design; and we also know that the work is not finished with implementation alone, because there is a danger of backsliding. Without ongoing nurturing, reforms do fade away. Thus, there is a need to get out of the apparent frenzy on doing many reforms so that public service institutions are able to have a breathing space to solidify gains made, and to strengthen their
organisational culture. Could not we pause for some time to see what gains have been made thus far, and whether such gains are effective enough; only then further reforms and changes should be considered. It is equally important that while contemplating new reforms, alternatives available are to be included drawn from the local circumstances, history and culture. In addition, governments should undertake a regular (periodic) assessments of progress made; because it is one thing to introduce measures of reforms but quite another to make them stick. Progress made ought to be regularly and consistently assessed.

2) By their very nature, developmental issues are political because they deal with the authoritative distribution of values (both financial and material) but within the context of limited and oftentimes rapidly diminishing resources. Thus, to expect that public sector management in developing countries will remain politically neutral (as per Weberian concept so ingrained in the West), is unrealistic. What is needed is a new, multi-dimensional, and holistic style of administering development which blends the political, economic, social, administrative, cultural, and spiritual forces to produce a locally-defined yet globally-supported system of governance. Administrative reforms without real political democratic reforms, beyond purely electoral and institutional facades, are fatally flawed and bound to fail.

3) Enough attention is yet to be paid to certain weaknesses in the government's management control framework. For example, the accountability of administrative heads of departments is still not transparent especially when they get transferred from their post too often too soon. While these administrative heads demand results and accountability from their subordinates, should not these heads be also held responsible for creating an innovative and vibrant atmosphere for their people? In the final analysis, it is through the efforts of such people that results can be achieved and good government is possible.

4) The fundamental challenge before these countries is not over management but creating conditions for an effective and good governance. Good government depends on the good performance of its public servants because it is the government and its State machinery that are the best defense of ordinary citizens against organised business, labour, and the powerful vested interests which seek special privileges in laws, or simply to do what they want. Strengthening of governmental institutions ought to be the top priority.

5) As mentioned earlier, in the past, the public service reforms neglected taking into account the historical perspectives and cultural dimensions (Argyriades, 2001). Sensitivity to culture and history of a nation is crucial when designing, imposing, and implementing public service reforms.
Dictating reforms from outside without considering the cultural and historical factors would not achieve expected results as has been demonstrated with respect to the NPM movement.

6) Each time a new paradigm gets created in the West, it starts with the notion that any problem can be solved if there exists a detailed blueprint, sufficient external aid, and political will. However, our experience has been that as these three prerequisites are rarely met by most of the developing world, thus the experiment rarely succeeds. In place of requiring developing nations to implement such blueprints whenever a new paradigm gets manufactured in the West, the time has come to focus and concentrate on results instead of creating grand visions. Because such visions get multiplied as each international development institution tries to broaden its scope and idealism pertaining to areas of human development. We should also consider that perhaps the objectives of such visions and paradigm are not realistic enough. Perhaps in our optimism, we have not paid enough attention to strengthen institutions (which are supposed to implement such spectacular plans) because we have taken for granted that ideals and plans are self-administering. Perhaps the time has also come to pause and reflect on the question: has the medicine prescribed by the West been reasonable and realistic enough? Should not one take into account such factors as culture and style of governance, local traditions and beliefs, politics and style of doing things, social and demographic plurality, law and order situation, civil society, and responsible and ethical governance, before additional prescriptions are suggested? If not, then would the 21st Century be any different than what we have gone through with the last 50 years of the past century?

Above, the author has listed only a selected few public administration challenges faced by developing countries. But should not these challenges be faced first by the bigger players in development arena (such as the World Bank, the IMF and bi-lateral development aid agencies) so that they could transform their rhetoric into reality? Should not they ought to pursue a true bottom-up policy, thinking first about the poor people, and their governing system, their customs and traditions? Most importantly, should not we encourage alternatives to the Western models so that developing nations may be able to choose among the alternatives rather than being consigned to the philosophy of "only one size fits all"? Finally, before another paradigm (manufactured in the West) gets implemented globally, should not we pause and instead focus on results achieved thus far? Because, such grand visions keep on multiplying as each international institution tries to broaden its idealism and scope of activities in the field of human development (Einhorn, 2001). Are the objectives of globalisation realistic enough? Have we paid adequate attention to the quality of institutions responsible to implement such grandiose plans? Or, instead, have we taken it for granted that ideals and plans are always self-effecting only if these come from the West? Finally, has not the time really come to pause and reflect on the matter that perhaps the medicine thus far
prescribed has been faulty, and so there is a need to change the prescription as well as the medicine? In the end, we must face the greatest dilemma before the humanity: how come a small group of nations keep on “progressing” while the rest continues to be poor and deprived?

References


UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY PANEL ON

GLOBALISATION AND THE STATE
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Introduction of the Theme

Nitin Desai *

Thank you Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure for me to be here. And may I particularly welcome his Excellency the Prime Minister of Uganda, the honourable ministers who are part of the Panel and who are here, and Professor Giddens, Director of the London School of Economics. Mr. Chairman, this is part of the work that the Second Committee will be doing on the issue of public administration. The theme that has been chosen for this panel “Globalisation and the State” has been with us for some time. During the 80s and more particularly during the 90s, we became more conscious, more cognizant of the phenomenon of growing interdependence between countries - a phenomenon which is not just economic but has a cultural and political dimension to it also. There have been many questions about what is the role of the national State in this globalised world. There was a sense as to whether, because these processes of growing economic interdependence came along with the package of liberalisation and perhaps even privatisation in many cases, there was a need to have a basic reconsideration of what is the role of the State. And this took many forms; reinventing government was one sort of concept which was very common; but in country after country, the role of the government more precisely, rather than just the State, was something that was being reconsidered, re-examined. To a certain extent the rules of multilateralism also reinforce this tendency. For instance, the prevailing rules now basically make liberalisation irreversible - in the sense that once you have liberalised a particular area of trade or investment, creating rules and systems, you cannot back-track. The sense that had emerged in the 90s was that of a State which was retreating and leaving more and more to the free play of market forces.

I believe that over the past three or four years, there has been a certain reconsideration of this trend. Let me focus on three reasons why we need to visit this issue carefully again and hence the span.

The first, and which is uppermost in our minds sitting here in New York, is of course the events 11th of September 2001. These events have in many ways reminded us and reinforced what is a classical role of the State: the maintenance of law, order and security. This has never been questioned. This has always been an important dimension of the role of the State, but the important part that we have

* Mr. Nitin Desai, Under-Secretary-General, DESA - Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations.
become more conscience of since 11th of September, is the role that global co-operation plays in this entire exercise. This is something which the United Nations has been active in, in specific areas, notably in the area of narcotics, in the area of terrorism, in the area of transnational crime. This General Assembly has become much more engaged in the broader issue of terrorism also. This is one reason why, in some ways, we are looking at the issue of the role of the government of the State, large or small government, in the context of what appear to be a certain increase in the responsibilities of the State in the area of law, order and security.

But that is not the only reason, there is something else which has in a sense reinforced our need to examine the role of the State, and that is the slow-down of the world economy. It is no accident that government after government today is planning stimulus packages to revive the economy - a very classical Keynesian function of the government. You are almost seeing in recent years a revival of classical Keynesianism, something which for a long period was almost forgotten, because it is accepted that the fluctuations in the world economy cannot be managed without an active stance from the government and the State on issues of economic policy.

I would, however, highlight a third reason why in some ways many people in government are examining whether they need to re-visit some of the changes that have taken place earlier. And the third reason is a growing consciousness of the anxieties about globalisation. Many of them have manifested themselves in a very visible way in the demonstrations that we have seen, most often in the context of meetings of the big multilateral organisations. And these demonstrations in some ways are focusing attention on what is described as the downside of globalisation, the marginalisation of countries, of peoples, the possible impact that it may have on environmental conditions, the shift in the balance of influence over the economy between, for example, transnational corporations and others. And this is what has driven many of these protests.

So at least for these three reasons, I believe that we need, not necessarily to go back to the situation which may have prevailed in the past but to ask whether some of the orientations that we had during the 80s and 90s, which essentially argued that more liberalisation is always better than less liberalisation, that liberalisation is irreversible, that sometimes argue that small government is always better than larger government - to ask whether some of these things in some dimensions may not need to be looked at. But let me state here one thing. I do not think that we should confuse the issue of public responsibility with that of necessarily doing everything within the public sector. It is perfectly legitimate and correct to argue that yes, governments do have a responsibility for this area of economic activity and need to have a steering policy. But that does not necessarily translate into having to do all things within what we would call the public sector. And one should keep these two things distinct because both trends were there. There was of course a trend which was re-inventing government - trying to do something through outsourcing, etc. without necessarily denying that there is a responsibility
on the part of the State to deliver that particular service. But there was also to a
certain extent a tendency that the State should not have a view on this or that
particular area of social and economic activity. It is the latter which I am focusing
attention on and it is the latter which perhaps may require a certain amount of re-
thinking in the light of the events that I have described.

We are looking at this, in the context of what are the implications for the design
of public services and public administration and that is why this discussion is
taking place in the context of the Second Committee's discussion on public
administration. So, that is the context in which this Panel has been put together. I
believe that what comes out of this Panel is important, not just for the work of the
Second Committee in this area, but for many of the events that we are working on
and which are imminent. I would particularly draw attention to the importance of
the meeting that we will have next year in Monterrey on finance for development.
In many ways it connects with what I said earlier about a certain greater
acceptance now of the role of the government, of the State, of public authorities, in
managing the level of economic activity - a sort of revival of Keynesianism, if you
like - which clearly connects in many way with an important part of what we will
be discussing in Monterrey at the financial development conference. Equally the
concerns that the protesters against globalisation have voiced about the social and
environmental consequences of globalisation are clearly concerns that we will
have to address very systematically in the world summit on sustainable
development which is to take place in Johannesburg in September 2002. These
two are not the only events where these issues will come up. In fact, the upcoming
World Trade Organisation meeting and the World Food Summit which has been
postponed until next year and the Children's Summit are all major conferences
where we will have an occasion to address certain dimensions of this issue of
globalisation and the State.

So, with these few words, Mr. Chairman, I would stop. I really look forward to
the contributions of the very distinguished panellists. Thank you.
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Globalisation and the State in Africa:
Harnessing the Benefits and
Minimising the Costs

Apolo R. Nsibambi*

I. Introduction

This presentation is not about technical aspects of internationalisation, although I am sure these will continue to be important in Public administration life all over the world. It is not about processes of localisation, although I believe that both theorists and practitioners in politics and public administration must pre-occupy themselves with the questions related to how tendencies and forces of globalisation and localisation have to be compromised for socio-politico-economic harmony within and without African countries. Nor is it about the intricacies of international marketing, trade and finance, even if I am sure that these will continue to play a determinant role in the capacities and ways of Public administration work. Globalisation is having effects on the way the State and its Public administration apparatus behave and this is the main gist of the thinking in my presentation. In the first section, I give my understanding of globalisation. In the second one, I will highlight the effects both positive and negative it has on the State and Public administration especially in Africa. Then I will conclude by proposing how Africa’s Public Administration should respond in order to maximise the benefits of globalisation while minimising negative effects.

II. What is globalisation?

Globalisation is a process of advancement and increase in interaction among the world's countries and peoples facilitated by progressive technological changes in locomotion, communication, political and military power, knowledge and skills, as well as interfacing of cultural and value systems and practices. Globalisation is not a value free innocent self-determining process. It is an international socio-politico-economic and cultural permeation process facilitated by policies of governments, private corporations, International Agencies and Civil Society organisations. It

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essentially seeks to enhance and deploy a country's (society's or organisation's) economic, political, technological, ideological, and military power and influence for competitive domination in the world.

III. Is globalisation positive or negative? The two sided coin.

Globalisation is a phenomenon that seems to have come creeping through man's history only to recently gain speed and cover the entire world in one sweep. Some countries are taking it as a big problem and therefore missing the opportunities it is offering while others have grabbed it as a movement offering development potential and used it to advance their growth and development and their self interest whether they be national or personal. While some are taking it as a dangerous process of exploitation where rich countries and big international corporations are getting bigger and richer at the expense of the poor ones and a sort of fulfilment of "man to man is a wolf", others are seeing it as the final pin in the process of positive socio-politico-economic mutually beneficial global integration.

Which ever way it is taken, the phenomenon of globalisation has attracted enough world attention to warrant intensive discussion at the World's governing body (the United Nations General Assembly) which, in its Resolution 55/102, recognised "Globalisation and its impact on the full enjoyment of all human rights" and expressed the "need to achieve international co-operation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction" (referring to Universal declaration of Human Rights, Civil and political rights, Economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as the right to development).

It is important to note, optimistically, that globalisation offers great opportunities. However, it is probably more important to be clear about the negative aspects of globalisation and of the fact that its benefits are very unevenly shared and its costs are unevenly distributed among, across, and within countries. This is very true especially when seen in the light of African countries. Both in concept and in practice, for every positive aspect of globalisation, there is negative side: "While globalisation has positive, innovative, dynamic aspects - it also has negative, disruptive, marginalising aspects" (UNDP Human Development Report 1999 page 25). Below I give examples to illustrate this point.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive side</th>
<th>Negative side</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Globalisation opens people's lives to other cultures and all their creativity</td>
<td>As cultures interact, some cultures are being diluted and/or destroyed at the expense of others and negative values are being spread all</td>
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<td>and to the flow of ideas and values.</td>
<td>over the world with relative ease.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Information and communication technologies have eased interaction among</td>
<td>The world is now divided between the connected, who know and who have a monopoly on almost everything, and the isolated who do not</td>
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<td>countries and peoples.</td>
<td>know and who practically have nothing.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Globalisation has eased international trade and commerce, facilitated</td>
<td>Globalisation has encouraged illicit trade in drugs, prostitution, pornography, human smuggling, dumping of dangerous waste and depletion</td>
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<td>foreign investment and the flow of capital.</td>
<td>of the environment by unscrupulous entrepreneurs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Globalisation has freed labour across boundaries and facilitated “brain</td>
<td>Globalisation has facilitated the “brain drain” in developing countries thus reducing further their human capacity.</td>
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<td>trade”.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Globalisation has set new rules that are integrating global markets.</td>
<td>Globalisation has set new global rules that have further marginalised Africa’s poor countries and people especially in areas of trade.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Globalisation is creating a global village out of a wide and diverse world.</td>
<td>Globalisation has created a global village of privileged people whose boarders are impenetrable to the poor, unconnected, and unskilled. The citizens of the global village are very few.</td>
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The extreme optimists see globalisation as a glass three-quarters full of opportunities. The extreme pessimists see globalisation as a calabash full of problems especially exploitation and socio-economic injustice and international political domination. Mid-point strategists must see globalisation as a change process full of opportunities and challenges that must be carefully and skilfully harnessed and managed for human development.

The effect of globalisation on the State in Africa is not only of economic nature. The process and the outcome of globalisation involve a lot more than economics. It includes permeation of political ideas and practices across boarders. It includes permeation of cultural and religious beliefs and practices hence resulting in dilution of some cultures. It includes the permeation of administrative/managerial concepts and practices across boarders and organisations. It includes the
domination by some super powers of military coercive means and the impositions it goes with. It involves internationalisation of conflicts, wars etc that would otherwise remain local.

The State decision-making and policy-making process itself and therefore the influence and power of the State has been globalised and shared among the various world decision-making bodies. There are international courts, international human rights organisations, international military conventions, international laws, rules and regulations to which the State is subjected. There are international and regional trade agreements, and powerful international lobby and pressure groups in various fields. There are Universities and Institutions of higher learning with all their power to impart knowledge, skills and attitudes that shift behaviours of societies and State leadership as well as followership. All these combine to reinforce the phenomenon of globalisation and force the State to shift its behaviour and the way it relates with both its "subjects" and its internal and external partners. Below I highlight some of the effects of globalisation on Public Administration in Africa.

i. Overstretched capacity to regulate and protect the environment: The capacity of most African States to handle issues such as production of harmful chemicals, global warming, depletion of natural resources destruction of organic agriculture, dumping of nuclear waste is still limited. However, as global actors invest and expand their activities especially related to industrial, agricultural, mining, forest exploitation, fishing, the regulatory capacity of Public administration in African countries which is already limited in many respects is becoming overstretched. The State is getting caught in the middle of its need to speed development through industrialisation, agricultural modernisation, exploitation of natural resources etc and the pressure of local and global environmentalists groups. Global forces in this respect, rather that putting too much pressure on governments to do what is beyond their capacity, should first and foremost concentrate on strengthening the capacity of these governments in relevant aspects.

ii. Undermining the power of the State: Most African governments are often finding themselves in a situation of "fait accompli" when it comes to making certain policies and decisions. International Agencies such as the World Bank, IMF, the United Nations World Trade Organisation etc, take decisions, which are binding, on countries. This could be looked at as eroding the sovereignty and power of the State. We must add that this is not only the case in Africa. The poorer the country is the more chances of power erosion for the State. This would be minimised if the voice of Africa’s States was increased and strengthened in the World bodies. Stronger African regional bodies would also help in this respect provided these bodies were represented in the World bodies at the same time.
iii. Undermining the democratisation process: There is an on-going
democratisation struggle in Africa. Some African countries began the
process of democratising their Governments, political systems and their
societies sometime back. However, the International partners they are
working with in this globalised world are hardly democratic. While the
democratisation process would require that the people of the country in
question get involved in the taking of decisions and policies that concern
them, some of the big decisions affecting Africa today, are more or less
imposed by the globalisation players such as the World bank, IMF, the
World Trade Organisation etc. This has been the case for example with the
liberalisation and privatisation policies in Africa. This makes the people
not trust the democratisation rhetoric they hear from their leaders when
they are confronted with this “fait accompli”. There is a discrepancy
between the rhetoric from these bodies concerning the need for democracy
and the way the same bodies arrive at decisions of great consequences. It
is not possible to be seen to be democratic by the people you govern when
they do not see or get involved in the process of making the decisions and
policies you follow to govern them. This is a big dilemma for African
Leaders.

iv. Overstretched capacity to handle international and computer based crime:
The African State and its forces of law and order were used to handle
“traditional crimes”. However, with globalisation there has been an
increase in crimes (drugs, pornography, international corruption etc.) that
had been at lower magnitude. In addition progress in Information
technology has facilitated the emergence and growth of computer based
crimes, especially fraud. For this the law and order forces have not been
well prepared. The increase in these crimes across borders makes the
forces of law and order look helpless, unhelpful and incapable. This tends
to erode the confidence of the public in the State thus weakening further
its legitimacy. The strong challenge posed by the powerful criminals on
the State, creates an atmosphere of uncertainty and insecurity in the public
thus reducing the required confidence that would attract both local and
foreign investment. There is need to strengthen the capacity of the forces
of law and order especially in the areas of detecting and handling
sophisticated crime. If this does not happen the sophisticated criminals
will find ready-made comfortable hiding places in Africa. This will be a
big insecurity problem for the rest of the world.

v. Making the task of poverty eradication more difficult: As global actors
pressurise African governments to open up more and more to maximise
foreign investment and capital inflows, and as big multinationals and local
enterprises utilise this environment to cater for their interests, the
government is having less and less room to pay attention to the abject
poverty amongst its poor people. Evidence that shows the widening gap between the poor and the rich both in country and between countries is increasingly becoming abundant. The African State will have to be encouraged to pay more attention to the fate of its poor than to the fate of big global actors. The big global actors can talk for themselves with little problem. The issue is on who will talk for the poor?

vi. Debt accumulation and the debt burden: The phenomenal debt burden of African countries is well known. Most of the accumulation of this date overtime was as much a result of the incapacity of the borrowers to pay it back as it was of the ease with which the lenders gave money to the countries. This was, and still is, facilitated by the context of globalisation. The paradox about this is that the governments borrow in the name of poverty reduction while their social spending that would go towards alleviating poverty remains very low. In the same way the rich countries which lend money rarely allocate their financing towards social goals (see Debt and Sustainable Human Development: Technical Advisory Paper # 4, MDGD, Bureau for Development Policy, UNDP, May 1999)). There is a strong need for both national governments and external partners to shift their spending priorities towards the declared goals such as poverty reduction and sustainable human development.

vii. Drain on the human capacity of the State: Globalisation has opened borders and relatively freed labour movements. But for African countries this has aggravated the problem of brain drain, which has existed for a long time. Although most African countries with appropriate financial policies receive remittances from their nationals working abroad, it is not clear whether the contribution of some of the most qualified to the process of developing their countries would not be more than the remittances they send back home from “exile”. It is noted however that this problem should not be over simplified. Some of the most qualified African ran away from their countries because of the negative behaviour of the regimes themselves. Otherwise, this human capacity in some instances is frightened away by brutal regimes rather than being attracted by globalisation forces as such. This problem can be appropriately tackled if the African leadership put their house to order first and foremost.

viii. Globalisation of public expectations and social demands: The interaction between local socio-politico-economic forces and global actors has generated new and/or different demands from African societies and this has increased pressure on the Public administration system to re-adjust to these demands constantly. Examples of such demands include; the demand for transparency and accountability, democracy, clean environment, gender equality, human rights and freedoms, poverty eradication, competent leadership, effective service delivery and applying New Public Management approaches in public administration. These demands require
that Public administration systems and practices accordingly re-adjust consistently. In most cases these demands are expressed by the private sector and civil society both national and international without considering the cost of what it would take to meet them. This is often beyond the capacities of African States. Moreover some of the demands from international circles are not in line with the contextual realities in Africa.

The conclusion here is that globalisation has posed enormous challenges for the African Public administration systems. It has put demands on their capacities (institutions, structures, skills, knowledge, networks, technology, facilities, equipment etc), which as everyone knows, has always been very weak, the systems themselves being still nascent.

Managing globalisation effectively to benefit the African people, especially the poor, calls for new attitudes and leadership. It requires vision, appropriate knowledge, skills, and wisdom from Africa’s leaders. But it also requires sensitivity, willingness, a change of attitude and the right technical assistance from global actors such as the United Nations, especially in supporting the strengthening of Africa’s Public administration capacity to deal with issues of globalisation.

IV. Response to globalisation:

In a general way and in light of the effects of globalisation on the African State highlighted above, I would like to outline the responses below. African States need to:

i. Be open to uncertainty, ambiguity, and change and develop and strengthen Public Administration systems that are change oriented.

ii. Adhere to openness and accountability, especially to the African people so as to be seen to be democratic and sensitive to the problems of the local people.

iii. Adopt a proactive approach to globalisation so that the challenges it poses and the benefits it offers can be foreseen and planned for. The reality of globalisation is that either a country changes or the globalising forces change it. African States should use globalisation to determine the direction of their people rather than letting globalisation to use their countries to determine the direction of the world.

iv. Address human capacity needs from a comprehensive angle (skills, knowledge, attitude, networks, information technology). In any case,
globalisation or no globalisation, a country cannot be more developed than the capacity of its human resource!

v. Address institutional capacity needs (i.e. create and or strengthen institutions that are change oriented, outward looking, and able to interact meaningfully with global actors). These institutions must be in all spheres of politics and public administration and they must be tailored to have ability to network with the private sector, civil society and the international community. They should include institutions for policy analysis, planning implementation monitoring and evaluation. They should be buttressed in strong legislatures, Executives, Judiciaries and Institutions of control.

vi. Adopt flexible approaches and methods of administration (as opposed to inflexible rule application and inward looking bureaucracies). However, the adoption of the New Public Management approaches as they are advocated for in developed countries should always be done taking into consideration the context of African countries especially their needs and capacities. For example, the rolling back of the frontiers of the State in Africa, which included privatisation, retrenchment, and reduction of public expenditure in social sectors such as education and health was probably not appropriate in the way it was introduced in some African countries. It could be one of the explanations of the current high levels of poverty and inequality on the continent.

vii. Strive to increase and strengthen the voice of African governments in International bodies (United Nations) to off set the weakness created by the pressure of global actors at local level). The decision power of World bodies is eroding the decision power of States. In order to offset this, the African States should have their voice strengthened in these world bodies so that the decision taken have the input and blessing of the African leaders. In many respects, this is not the case to day.

viii. Adopt and practice participative governance involving all actors (central government, local governments, the private sector and civil society in both national and international as well as world bodies).

ix. Embrace the application of information technology to public administration practice (E-government).

x. Develop social capital especially by investing in Education and health sectors.

In other words, a strategic attitude to be taken by African countries in light of the phenomenon of globalisation should not be to seek apportioning blame
between developed and developing countries. They should rather think in terms of strategic analysis to identify, analyse, diagnose their strengths and weaknesses in light of the opportunities and challenges posed by globalisation. Such an attitude would then create a mindset for self-assessment and appraisal to see how the weaknesses can be overcome. The cutting edge for African people to participate in and benefit from the game of globalisation lies within the internal force and the internal force lies within the capacity of its people. African countries themselves and those that hope to assist them must first and foremost recognise this fact and commit resources and energies to harnessing the capacity of the African poor for their development. It is hoped that the global actors will realise that it is not beneficial to them or to anyone else to play globalisation with the poor. For globalisation to be ultimately beneficial to everyone the rich and the poor, they all must have certain levels of capacity that permit them to effectively participate in the game. The current world where resources and benefits are concentrated in the hands of very few is not a comfortable world for anybody. And to sustain it is to breed future insecurity as the mass of the poor strives to get a share of the riches concentrated in the hands of the few. It is clear that globalisation benefits those who have the capacity to harness it but can be very detrimental to those whom it finds not prepared. Most African States are not prepared especially in terms of having the requisite capacity.

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Globalisation and Regional Integration

Jesús Posado Moreno*

Only a short time following the abominable terrorist act of 11th of September, I wish to take advantage of my participation in this panel during the United Nations General Assembly, to convey the condolences and affection of the Spanish people to the people of the United States and to the citizens of New York who have been through such a terrible ordeal. They have shown us all a fine example of fortitude and dedication in the face of tragedy.

I should also like to thank you for allowing me the honour to address you, as a member of the Spanish government and as a European who shares with our other European neighbours a set of convictions about the future of Europe and the rest of the world. I am thankful for the United Nations’ role in promoting solidarity throughout the world, especially at times like these.

Those of us who are here in New York today are familiar with the United Nations’ commitment to mankind’s problems. We also know that the United Nations’ authority and involvement are especially necessary at times like these, when we are facing new, difficult and complex international situations. We have often heard reference to before and after 11th of September. The level of awareness about the shortcomings of international security has increased dramatically.

However, some considerations are still valid, particularly, in my view, the idea - which Spain anticipated - that terrorism is now exploiting the instruments of globalisation and can only be countered by concerted action from governments. Another valid message is that the globalisation of terror must not be allowed to destroy or diminish the objective of international solidarity and tolerance.

The two world wars had a severe impact on the civilised world, which resolved to eliminate political tensions and devise methods of cooperation and international solidarity.

The final decades of the twentieth century not only saw the end of the cold war and the dismantling of the eastern blocks, but also changes that are altering the course of politics as we enter the new century. Two major new concepts of political, economic and also general scope came to join the great political concepts of State, democracy, national sovereignty and decentralisation. They were globalisation and regional integration. And as though to demonstrate that the

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globalisation process is not something that can easily be checked, antiglobalisation movements have emerged, with the interesting paradox that these movements themselves are highly globalised. First and foremost, we must realise that globalisation cannot be reduced merely to its economic components, and that the response to globalisation should not be blind and intransigent, but instead based on dialogue. This is exactly what Anthony Giddens said in a recent discussion with Dahrendorf: a number of current events show us that we must not remain aloof from globalisation, but instead use it to promote universal rules and concerted action.

In my view, globalisation is significant because it is linked with new realities, including the technological and computing revolution and the growth in the information and communication society and the free movement of people and capital. Of course this has its positive effects and others that are perhaps not so positive. In the economic sphere, it has led to increasing flows of international capital and to financial speculation, as well as to the movement of goods and services, the internationalisation of production and other phenomena that are transforming domestic economies into world economies. In the social and political spheres, one consequence of globalisation is that worldwide information has broken down barriers and created new needs among citizens of all countries, who are now demanding greater social involvement from their leaders. So globalisation is not single-faceted, but rather the result of a complex, multifarious process at work in a variety of areas.

At the same time, globalisation is also governments' theoretical and practical response to the new world order. I do not mean globalisation as a global concentration of economic power. Political globalisation must be built on a foundation of democratic thinking and practice and all of this must in turn be based on the key role of civil society. Globalisation must not disregard democracy, the rule of law, human rights, individual freedoms, social justice, respect for all the different groups and communities and respect for cultural identity.

We all know that there has been debate about the nature of the State in the face of the forces and pressures of globalisation. Some have said that the State has also been losing its authority and power for manoeuvre, to the point where its very role as a system of representative power is being debated and called into doubt.

There are two main criticisms about the supposed weakness of nation States:

- The first is of an economic nature and is based on the idea that nation States have gradually been losing control over their own economic and financial policy.
• The second is of a political nature and follows the theory of Habermas who, in his famous work on the problems of legitimisation in late capitalism says that, in a globalised world, the State should act according to the criteria of rationality and legitimacy.

Rationality presupposes that the decisions of a nation State are universal and therefore defend the public interest, while legitimacy is based on how efficient the State's actions are in meeting public expectations.

From both perspectives, reality shows that the State still has a lot of vitality and performs some essential functions. Not only is it able to forge closer links between political decision-makers and citizens, it also guarantees a more balanced society. A major consequence of globalisation is that it has urgently prompted States to instigate sound macroeconomic policies to ensure that their economic sectors and workers remain competitive and to guarantee adequate social expenditure as a basic prerequisite for a more balanced society. In Europe, our response to the world financial situation has also been to speed up the process of monetary integration, which offers advantages such as revitalising trade and boosting trade and promoting reciprocal investment, openness and economic transparency.

Phenomena of regional integration are an apt response to globalisation. In the political sphere the States have decided to develop forms of cooperation and mutual integration, strengthening regional ties. All the various regional integration processes that have emerged as a result of different historic, geographic, political and economic factors need to adapt to the challenges of the future. The European Union has committed itself to a process of enlargement to a further dozen countries, which is likely to bring the peoples of Europe greater economic development, a policy of social justice and equal opportunities, as well as closer cooperation. It is important to pursue this effort. Enlarging the European Union is a powerful means of creating an area of stability, prosperity and security. We Europeans see the recent international terrorist attacks as being directed against the very principles that underpin the process of European construction.

The European Union has declared its solidarity by taking concrete action. Two extraordinary councils were held and from them has emerged a common course of action including three strands:

• A proposed freeze on the assets of organisations and persons suspected of supporting and financing terrorist activities.

• Substitution of extradition procedures by a European arrest warrant and surrender procedures.

• Collaboration by antiterrorist operational and information departments throughout Europe and the rest of the world.
We are also planning to include the fight against terrorism among the priority lines of action in our common foreign and security policy. Europe is determined to combat terrorism in all its forms anywhere in the world, in cooperation with the international community.

As the Spanish president, José María Aznar, has said, we should make no distinctions between types of terrorism.

To tackle the main problems of the current international order, globalisation must therefore be underpinned by an international ethical approach, by an approach based on democracy and education for tolerance and awareness. To achieve this aim, there are calls for global agreements to promote good working and healthcare conditions throughout the world, to fight great evils such as international trafficking in people and discrimination, to reduce inequalities and to combat marginalisation and poverty.

Such ethical globalisation would address the world’s social problems and political globalisation would establish a system to fight international terrorism and crime, whilst ensuring individual liberties and promoting human rights. The challenge of our times will be not to look to the past and turn back the pages of history, but rather to forge a future with ethical rules and requirements for responsibility and reciprocity, which will open up new social arenas. And this is what must be explained to those involved in those world movements of protest that have mistakenly equated uncontrolled capitalism, with its inequalities, as synonymous with globalisation. Nothing could be further from the truth. Globalisation has not only an economic, but also a political and social dimension, and it must be given an ethical dimension to ensure that we evolve within a process whose purpose should be none other than world progress.

Allow me to say that Spain has coped with this process remarkably successfully in economic, as well as administrative and government, terms. It has also risen to major challenges in the field of education, training, infrastructure and regional development, with the latter having been facilitated by the high level of decentralisation Spain has achieved. The current situation represents a challenge for the Spanish presidency of the European Union to begin in January 2002, during which we aim to expand Europe’s presence in the world, to move the enlargement process forward and to create areas of security.

It is with a sense of sorrow and deep concern that the world is now facing an escalation in terrorism, which has hampered the development process and safeguarding of the most basic human rights. The globalisation we support must also be the globalisation of human rights, the globalisation of ideas and values, that of protecting life, safeguarding families and society, that of solidarity and combating poverty. The United Nations has a great say in this task. The
globalisation we support calls for the development of domestic policies with balanced budgets and sound macroeconomic policies with the simultaneous aim of effective public administrations that prove their usefulness in counteracting the negative effects of globalisation.

We should not fall into the trap of oversimplification, stating that because some people gain from globalisation others therefore have to lose. Globalisation is not necessarily synonymous with inequality. In any case, I am certain that the winners are those who establish cooperation and support strategies, those who reinforce their institutions and create confidence in their societies. The winners are also those who improve their economic policies to avoid exposing the structural weakness of the economy where this could undermine international competitiveness, by maintaining macroeconomic stability and speeding up structural reforms. Who are the losers? In my view, they are those who refuse to face the fact of globalisation.
Globalisation and the Technological Gap within the Sectors of Societies in Latin America

Carlos Genatios*

Your excellency, chairman of the second committee, distinguished delegates:

In this short speech, I will give you a perspective on the problems and main initiatives of information technology in Latin America, taking as a point of reference the experience we have had in Venezuela for the last year and a half. It has been a complex and delicate experience that has generated very profound effects, both on the stronger and on the weaker sectors of society. We are very well aware that we need to use the Internet and Information technology not only for economic and educational reasons, but also to strengthen democracy within our countries, and to build more efficient governmental institutions.

Basically the indexes which demonstrate the quality of development in the information technologies in each of our countries focus on the following elements:

- Education.
- Development of contents.
- Access to technology (connectivity).
- Productivity, especially in smaller-medium size enterprises which have specific problems in each of our countries in dealing with local requirements.
- Development in the private sector, solutions to problems of information technology and communication technology.

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Digital Divide

To begin with, we shall remember that the digital divide exists. If you try to sum information technology activities and give that total an index of 100%, then around 70% of the IT activities are concentrated in the developed countries, no less than 40% in the USA alone, while in Latin America it is only 4% and in Venezuela 0.08%. If we look at the use of the different languages in the world in virtual space we will see that English is more than 50% of the total. But we would also see Chinese with 9.2% and Spanish with 6.7%.

There are serious differences emerging among the countries in Latin America. In Venezuela we have developed recently important policies in order to develop Information and Communication Technologies. These public policies are accompanied by a decisive action inviting private and public sector to work together, including in the preparation of laws for the sector. We have achieved immediate results. You can see this in the growth of the number of on-line users. In Venezuela we have the greatest growth in Latin America even though the policies have been applied for only a year and a half: an accelerated growth of 1167% over five years, the largest of the region, followed by Mexico with 877% (figures of Jupiter Communications).

There are of course some negative elements we have to fight in order to diminish the digital divide. Costs: the greatest access cost in Latin America is 53 minimum salaries per hour, opposed to 4 per hour in the United States. Location: in the case of Venezuela 70% of the users are concentrated in three of the largest cities, so geographical access to connectivity is restricted and the largest amount of users have less than four times the minimum salary. The objective of the policy has been to increase the access of the consumers so as to increase connectivity: telecommunications and Internet access. In order to do so, important investments are necessary from both public and private sector, purchasing hardware and software in the country and increasing the development of contents with a regional view. The languages we use are Spanish and Portuguese, a network of almost 500 million people.

E-Commerce

If we talk about electronic commerce (or e-commerce) in the world, the Northern American participation is around 50%, Asia 24%, Europe 22%. In Latin America we have only 1.2% of all electronic transactions in e-commerce. In Venezuela in a year and a half we have had the greatest growth in electronic transactions in Latin America: 8600% projection over five years, followed by Argentina with 7193% and Mexico with 6068%. Basically the limits in Latin America for the development of ICT are the following:
• Educational conditions.

• Spanish and indigenous languages from our countries have small or no presence on the virtual network.

• We require development of local and regional contents to establish networks within the net.

• We have to guarantee access to integrated technology in the public and private sectors. The State has to lead this, creating the best possible conditions which will allow the stimulation of the demand in local and national governments and at the same time shall create areas for national and regional developments for this technologies.

• Furthermore a fundamental element is an analysis of the efficiency of the government; information technology allows us to increase governmental efficiency and democracy in our countries, because it allows the citizens to better know what is being done at government level. It is clearly an opportunity for decentralisation, fight against corruption and local and citizen participation.

So, basically in Venezuela we have decided over the last two years to implement progressive and successful policies in these areas of action:

• Development of “electronic government”.

• Development of contents in the net, particularly dealing with education, health and production in the productive sectors of medium and small enterprises (and also indeed micro-enterprises).

• Development of the digital economy allowing for transactions in all the economic sectors.

• Connectivity: development creating conditions for growth.

• Education, the eternal priority.

**Government policies in ICT**

First of all it is necessary to stimulate the organisation of the State to facilitate communication of the government with citizens and for this we have:

• Made a *presidential declaration* on the importance of the Internet, access, and priorities of uses of IT in the public sector.
We have created a Science, Technology and innovation law which creates the National System of Science, Technology and Innovation, strengthening organisations dealing with information and communication technologies.

Developed government portals, which will allow citizens to participate progressively in information technologies and receive services, giving special conditions for micro enterprises in the cyberspace.

Created an observatory and an IT prospective program.

Began to set the necessary basis to fight against cybercrime. For this is a great world weakness, but also a great opportunity for the development of agreements between different countries to start fight against cyber crime.

So far as the development of the contents is concerned, we have dealt with education, in particular. At the same time, we are working actively with local governments, municipalities, and rural areas with small populations to incorporate agricultural portals. In this last area for example the portals give small producers a means of access to different programmes and different prices for their products. At the end we should be able to progressively decrease the costs for food in the large cities while at the same time generating greater benefits for rural population in remote areas.

We have also developed portals for the industrial sector including small, medium size and micro enterprises, and one in the health sector. An investment of $10 millions has been made in this area of portals development. Overall, in terms of increasing access for users within the Venezuelan population we are pleased to say that we have increased five steps in the Information Society Index in the last year.

Concerning the development of the digital economy sector we have promoted public and private sectors by implementing ICT initiatives and we have stimulated competition within small and medium size enterprises. We already have a digital signals and data messages law, since February 2001. Also a law on data facility was recently enforced, it will be critical in fighting against cyber crime.

We consider that we have to strengthen our capacity to deal with small-scale and local demands, and if we do so, IT products developed in each of our countries will be better adapted and will give us a good chance to reduce brain drain from our countries. In this respect it is not only the investment of $40million this year but the technical and legal support which will allow economic sustainable development.
In order to increase connectivity, we are trying to provide information access to people in remote areas. In fact we have developed a very aggressive program to provide Internet for free in our country. We have created a programme of what we call the Info Centres - with other names in other countries - and this is not unique, but it gives a programme of free access to the Internet which has allowed for a country of 24 million inhabitants to increase internet users. This is accompanied by various funds, for training and development with technological institutes and universities, with the participation of both public and private sectors, including not only large enterprises, but also small institutions. Basically the investments in this area were $20 million. In the education sector we are working very decisively to strengthen our capacity.

We have said that within globalisation, we have to fight from a local and regional perspective. I think this is how our countries can survive the impacts of globalisation. So we have developed many programmes and we have created opportunities for their development based on strengthening the demand at regional and local levels. We are developing educational contents, particularly in the universities, which could also be used in schools.

We have done a lot therefore to build the presence of Internet at a national level but I would also like to add some more points:

- We have created an international virtual education network, in which we work with Colombia, Argentina and Brazil; we have full programmes in this area trying to integrate programmes at secondary levels.

- We also created a Latin American and Caribbean programme, which was initiated a year ago with a seminar that we had in Venezuela. This initiative develops contents for primary school.

For content developments and ICT training we have made an investment of $50 million in this area and it has an impact of new 16,000 software developments and 4,000 network specialists.

**Conclusion**

I would like to conclude by mentioning the experience of having the infocentres which are not concentrated in the main cities, but in isolated regions, including jungles and even jails. We have always been pleased with the results. Giving opportunity to people who never had the chance to have access is a great thing; and this is our greatest hope of this ICT initiative. Another point is that we prefer on the whole to have a regional integration and this is fundamental. We also give a great importance to international cooperation. We have to try and stimulate regional common political visions concerning cooperation and solidarity. Countries can develop several products at a regional level and give free access to
those software products for countries that have not been able to develop significant initiatives. So in this respect we have proposed a fund with Brazil to provide free access to certain contents for other Latin American countries.

We have created models adapted to our reality and needs, even if this is only the beginning. This will be the chance to develop suitable local and regional contents especially in our countries. We believe that \textit{regional integration} is a good alternative to globalisation.

Thank you.
Globalisation and the State

Ahmad Kamal*

Globalisation is an important and pervasive word in our vocabulary today, so much so that it has become the flavour of the day. Despite its wide use, it remains in many ways a confusing concept. Like Aristotle's analogy of the candle, the more you know about it, the more you are aware of all that you do not know.

Essentially Globalisation is about a shrinking world, a world shrinking both in time and in space.

Shrinking World

The fact that the world is shrinking geographically is nothing new. The world has been shrinking for thousands of years. This began when the first humans, who came from what we now call East Africa, travelled north and then into Asia and Europe in the one direction, and to Siberia and then the Americas in the other direction. Migration was thus the first human experience of placing the whole world on a single stage. Then came the age of travel, when brave individuals like Marco Polo or Columbus, started travelling and exploring, driven partly by curiosity, or simply to see whether the earth was round or flat. Following this era of travel, came trade, when people became aware of how much you could gain by exchanging goods, or even by exchanging ideas and cultures. Then, in a later period, you have the sad story of empires which imagined they spanned the world and boasted of the sun never setting. Each colonial power perceived the world through its own blinkered perspective of a self-centered-stage, as one single space to be exploited. Fortunately, the sun never rises now on some of those arrogant empires.

So these historical shrinkages in space are not new. We must then ask, wherein lies the difference today? There are two obvious points to be considered. The first is that there is a phenomenal increase in the speed of communications. Whereas a letter could take weeks or months to reach another country, an email can now cross the world in seconds. And secondly, there is greater awareness. We are much more aware now of what is happening around the world, due in part to the CNN syndrome, and in part due to mutual dependency.

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Doubts about Globalisation

Trans-national corporations were the first to realise the opportunities inherent in this new game in which the world is a single stage. Their successful and ruthless exploitation of these opportunities is what has created a real sense of doubt and despair. People are not at all sure that they are happy with what is happening. That is why you now have a new wave of protest, with as many as 50,000 people coming out onto the streets of major North American cities, and repeat crowds in many other capitals of the world. Part of this unhappiness arises from a sense that while we talk of globalising opportunities, we are actually globalising poverty and inequality. Globalisation has been a one-way street.

With all the happy talk of globalisation of opportunities, the gap between rich and poor is growing. If you compare the average income-per-head of the top 25% in the developed States with that of the bottom 25% in the developing States, the ratio between those two is currently around 90:1; interestingly, if you go back 30 years you will find that it was only 40:1. So this gap is not just bad in absolute terms, it is also doubling and getting worse.

It is inevitable to conclude then that globalisation has widened the gap between peoples in the world. Let us look at three indicative examples.

Human Rights and Migration

First – human rights and migration. A respect for human rights is of course a vital part of all the spiritual underpinnings of society. It is this increased focus on human rights that has led to the progressive erosion of the principle of “domestic jurisdiction” referred to in Article 2 paragraph 7 of the UN Charter, which was once seen as entitling a nation state to act as it liked within its borders. Nowadays, this “chastity belt” has lost much of its sanctity, and countries or rulers that violate human rights can no longer claim that it is nobody else’s business. In other words, human rights have broken down the walls between peoples and enable people in some countries to look over those walls and draw attention to things in other countries. Clearly, this is on the whole a good thing. But when people from poorer countries try to cross those same walls in person to seek a better life elsewhere they cannot do so. In fact in some ways the barriers to free movement are higher than before, with progressively tighter restrictions on immigration and border controls. So you have an inequality – one part of the world can criticise another, but people from the world that are most often criticised cannot enter that often richer world because of the latter’s asserted right to prevent immigration. This makes it into a one-way street.
Trade

Secondly – trade. Naturally, trade is a major engine of growth and vital to progress in the world. Processes like the GATT and now the WTO, are crucial to reduce the barriers to trade between nations. Yet protectionism is rampant, particularly in relation to the exports of poorer countries which are lower down the sophistication scale. The tariffs on textiles are in general ten times higher than those applied by the developed States to industrial products from other industrial States. So developing countries have to suffer from double jeopardy, once from protectionism against their exports, and again from the subsidies in industrial countries which depress commodity prices.

The Internet

Thirdly – the Internet. Of course the Internet gives us great opportunities for those who can use it, allowing anyone as much information about the world as the richest or most powerful of us. But just as a sizeable proportion of the world has neither access to safe drinking water nor electricity, the vast majority of people does not and will not be able to have access to the Internet. Just to take one example – in the continent of Africa 90% of the connections to the Internet are from just one country. One can also add that 50% of the language used on the Internet is English. And language is not just a neutral tool; it also embodies and carries a culture. It would be very sad if one culture were to spread and dominate. Homogenisation is good for milk but it is not necessarily good for the world.

To sum up, Globalisation is an opportunity but regrettably it has only served the interest of the few. The beneficiaries have been either corporations; most of whom are based in the western States, or governments, also in most cases from the same part of the world. The latter have often been able to utilise Globalisation to impose their model upon other cultures and civilisation, which are often older and culturally richer than their own.

Globalisation clearly puts the State under pressure, and in so doing it can create the tensions that we have seen on the streets of many countries.

Conclusion

The answer lies in an exchange of cultures and a dialogue between them rather than a one-way process of instruction. Cultures should be enabled to keep their own preferences and styles and not forced into a kind of low-quality common denominator. Since Globalisation is inevitable and is proceeding apace we need to ensure that it becomes a process whereby the citizens of the world can demonstrate their sense of being both more integrated and more different but all together sharing a world citizenship. Only if we can achieve that history will judge us kindly.
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Good afternoon everybody. I was pleased that Ambassador Kamal said what he said because previous speakers today have spoken a bit as if the notion of globalisation is uncontested; in fact, it is a very contested concept.

Let me just begin by saying a few words about the great “globalisation” debate. The debate about globalisation is an expression of itself; it is going on all over the world. I haven’t been to a single country where it isn’t happening.

There have been two phases in the great globalisation debate. The first phase lay in an academic debate, involving people like me. It is essentially a debate about whether globalisation exists at all, and whether the current period is really different from previous periods of history. It was mainly a debate about whether the end of the twentieth century was different from the end of the nineteenth. Many people said that at the end of the nineteenth century, you already had a lot of free trade, you had trade in currencies, people did not need passports, you had mass-migration and so on. These people were sceptical about the idea that our age is different and argued that most of what is happening is simply a reversion to the past. That was the first phase of the great globalisation debate.

That phase, in my view, is now over. We have a lot of evidence on what globalisation means today and, to my mind, as someone working in this area, it shows quiet definitively that the current global age is different and distinct in identifiable respects, certainly from ages of the distant past, but also from the late nineteenth century. You could, if you like, call the late nineteenth century the first age of globalisation. If so, we are now in the second age of globalisation. However, this age of globalisation, I can assure you, (and I think in some sense everybody knows it), is much more intensive, comprehensive, dynamic and fast moving, and this time everybody is in it. The current age is different; it is not simply a recapitulation of the past, no matter how much there may be parallels.

We are now in the second phase of the great globalisation debate and this is crucial to our futures, because this phase is about what shape the century shall

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assume. This debate is no longer about whether globalisation exists or is different from the past, but is about the consequences of globalisation for our lives, for divisions within the world, for the nature of sovereignty, the nature of government and many other issues. It is this second phase of the great globalisation debate which has fetched people out in the street from Seattle all the way through to Genoa with many other confrontations figuring in-between.

I would like to propose to you that neither the protesters nor the people like you and me sitting in our air-conditioned rooms (probably expressing themselves in favour of globalisation) have really properly understood what globalisation is. It is a fundamental mistake to identify globalisation with the expansion of the global market place or the role of financial institutions. These, of course, are important - 24-hour money markets operating in the way they now do did not exist before 30 years ago - but globalisation is not simply or even primarily a phenomenon of the market place or of economic institutions. So what is globalisation driven by? Well, it is driven above all by the communication revolution and you could put a pretty precise technological fix on the new global age. The new global age began in the late 1960s and early 1970s. To repeat Ambassador Kamal’s phrase “The first time in human history that you could have instantaneous communication from one side of the world to the other.” It is the marriage between communications technology and computerisation that has changed so much about our lives.

Globalisation affects sovereignty: it is political, cultural, and social as well as economic. It is also absolutely crucial to recognise that globalisation is not a single thing. If you want me to give you a visual image, then globalisation pulls some powers away from the nation (we know that) but it also has an opposite pushdown effect; it creates greater needs for local and regional autonomy. It is that expansion of globalisation that is behind the revival of local culture and local nationalism. Globalisation also squeezes sideways; it creates new regions, partly economic and partly cultural, which sometimes cut across the boundaries of established nation States. You can see the relevance of communications to globalisation clearly if you consider the activities of the protesters themselves. Someone was holding up a very funny placard in Seattle: it said, “Join the world-wide movement against globalisation”. So there are two sides to globalisation: globalisation from below and globalisation from above. One of the crucial things that nobody so far has mentioned about globalisation from below is the massive growth in a number of NGOs in the world. Only a few years ago there were only a few hundred NGOs; now on the latest count, there are 30,000 and half of these have been set up in the last fifteen years. There is a tremendous process of global coordination from below, meeting and clashing with, as it were, the activities of market-driven globalisation, the activities of corporations, and so forth.

One needs to develop a quite complicated idea of what globalisation is. You have all sorts of pushes and pulls, all sorts of contradictions here. There is one thing I feel I must nail on the head, even though I wasn’t going to talk about it, because Ambassador Kamal mentioned it and it is repeated so often: the idea that
the world is becoming more unequal and globalisation is somehow responsible for it. Neither of these things is true. We have now got a lot of statistical studies of inequality that place in serious doubt the idea that there is a simple expansion of economic inequality in the world. One of the main technical reasons for this was that people often compared the GDP of countries without factoring in population growth (comparing a country like China to Mozambique makes no sense at all). If you factor in population growth, you get quite a different picture of global inequalities. What you find is that global inequality did increase for a period of hundred years from about 1860 until 1960; but since 1960 global inequalities have stabilised or lessened. In fact, the richer the notion of inequality you take, (if you take Amartya Sen’s notion of poverty, for example, which includes women’s rights, nutrition, education and democratic rights), you find that actually the world has become more equal, not more unequal. So globalisation is a more complex picture than the protesters say. I feel that it is also a more complex picture than many people at the United Nations say (or have said in the past).

I was asked to talk, as the theme of the discussion, about the role of States and government and this is what I would like to do now. I want to say two main things - with some sub-divisions in them - about the changing nature of government and the State, in relation to what I take to be a more complex idea of globalisation than many people have at present. First, it is just not true, for example, to say that globalisation simply erodes the power of the State. Although many people say that this age marks the end of the notion of the nation State, this is completely false. You can say almost the opposite, that the global age is the first age in which the nation state has become a universal form. In previous eras, nation states always had rivals - empires for example. You can say that the last empire in the world was the Soviet Empire, which ended, as we know, in 1989-1990. Now the only universal form of the State in the world is the nation state. It is perfectly plain that many nations have become stronger rather than weaker over the past thirty years and many countries are nations which were not nations previously. You only have to look at the experience of the post-Soviet Commonwealth to see that this is so. What does happen though, is that the shape of the nation state changes, and this is absolutely crucial to anyone interested in public policy and governance, and how these relate to our living in a more globalised world.

Essentially nation states are re-shaping their identity in relation to the push and pull changes that I mentioned earlier. I don’t think you will find a single nation state in a poor or richer country that isn’t rethinking its past and re-establishing an identity in relation to these shifting forces. What happens is that, as the sociologist Daniel Bell put it, “the nation state becomes too small to solve the big problems, but it is also too big to solve the small problems”.

So now we are all in the realm of multi-level governance. The nation state has a crucial role in multi-level governance; but in the future “multi-level” governance will be the only form that State and government can assume. That is why I think the European Union is a very good example and is relevant to other areas of the
world too. I think you can take it as a principle that there will no longer be any
development that is simply confined to one nation, (with the possible exception of
the United States, which is such a large nation that it can act almost as if it wasn’t
a nation state). All development will be regional rather than carried within
particular countries. Therefore, regional collaboration is absolutely essential for
the recovery of government, but it has to intersect with the power of nations. The
interesting thing about the European Union is that it is different from an
organisation like the United Nations: it is not a traditional association of sovereign
nations. In the European Union, for the first time, nations have actually voluntarily
given up large areas that have been “sovereign” to pool their common resources,
and you can make a strong case for saying that European Union actually defends
the nation state rather than erodes it. It re-establishes the possibility of national
identity within a collaborative framework.

The second thing I want to say is that there are big changes going on in the
relationship between the State and public policy, which is in a way, the main
theme of this discussion. Let me briefly mention three of these big changes. They
are very important because, I would say, they are the backdrop to all discussions
about public policy today.

The first change you could describe as a movement – from the regulatory State
to the investment State - and this applies to poorer as well as to richer countries.
The regulatory State was an interventionist State. The investment State is an
interventionist State, but it recognises the crucial input in investing in human
skills, education and infrastructure. This has been crucial for the establishment of
effective political institutions and democratisation. The old forms of
interventionism have declined, but you must have a key role for the State and
development. If anyone doubts this, look at the writings of Joe Stiglitz since he left
the World Bank – a very good discussion in which he shows that there is no single
case of effective economic development in which government and the State have
not played a part. However, there is no effective case of economic development
where the State simply plays a dominant part. So State and government have to be
in a kind of partnership relationship with civil society and business organisation
for effective economic development to happen.

The second change I would describe as a movement from privatisation to
publicisation. We all have discovered, I think, the limit of privatisation.
Privatisation of industry was necessary and did a lot of good in many countries –
both poorer and richer. However, we discovered that privatised industries did not
necessarily deliver public goods effectively and there is a return to an examination
of what public control can mean. I think we have discovered that this is not simply
a return to the State. “Publicisation” means the discovery of a much richer public
sphere, and range of public institutions than those associated with the State.

This brings me to the third change that you could describe as a movement from
State to public institutions. One discovery that I made - which people should have
realised a long time ago - is that government, State and public sphere are not the same. The State has often been the enemy of the public sphere. The State institution has often been corrosive of public institutions. We need government often to reform the State in order precisely to expand the public sphere. Certainly in industrialised countries this is a reformulation that is very rich in its implication because it is a rediscovery of public power. It brings an end to the idea that markets can simply run our society. Markets bring too much insecurity, too much inequality and too much commercialism. You must have a return to public power and a public sphere. That is what New Labour in my country stands for - the principle of government - that the public sphere is not the same as the State. In many countries, the State is more the enemy of the public sphere than markets are. There is a lot of interesting discussion around this kind of issue, which, I suggest, anyone who wants to pursue these themes should examine.

In conclusion, the whole process of globalisation is now entering a new phase. It is pretty clear that September 11th was not just a random event; it is factored into what globalisation means. If you go back to what I stressed about communication, it is clear that this was not just a horrendous murder of thousands of people. The people that did it and the people it killed had no real claim to be combatants at all in any kind of a war. September 11th was also a global media event and it was designed as such, part of the global communication system. When you have global terrorism, violence no longer serves its traditional role of killing an enemy. The point of violence like that we saw last September is to create division and to build up a following. That is one of the reasons why it is quite difficult to deal with.

The great battle for us will be the battle between cosmopolitanism (which the United Nations surely stands for) and fundamentalism. Fundamentalism is not just religious fundamentalism. You can have fundamentalism of ethnicity and fundamentalism of nationalism. It is a mode of belief that says that there is only one right and proper way of life and everyone else had better accept that or get out of the way. The great difficulty of our age is the convergence of fundamentalism with fanaticism. Not all fundamentalists are fanatics, but when you get a connection between the two, then you get very disturbing, dangerous difficulties for all of us. We all want to make the cosmopolitan spirit triumph. On that point I am very happy to agree with what Ambassador Kamal said.
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56TH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY

SECOND COMMITTEE

PANEL ON
“CHALLENGES AND CHANGES
IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION”

1 NOVEMBER 2001

SUMMARY REPORT

UNDESA
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On 1 November 2001, the United Nations and the International Institute of Administrative Sciences organised a panel discussion on “Challenges and Changes in Public Administration” during a session of the Second Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. The panel was one of two organised to mark the fifth anniversary of the landmark resolution 50/225 on Public Administration and Development, which was taken by the United Nations General Assembly at its resumed 50th session. The following are notes on the presentations and discussions.

- H.E. Mr. Francisco Seixas da Costa, Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations and President of the Second Committee, chaired the panel. Mr. Michael Duggett, Director-General of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences, made an opening speech. The following panellists made presentations:
  - H.E. Mr. Ignacio Pichardo Pagaza, guest research fellow, National Institute of Public Administration, Mexico, former President of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences and former Ambassador of Mexico (Spain and Netherlands);
  - Mr. Jean-Marie Atangana Mebara, President of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences and Minister of Higher Education of Cameroon;
  - Professor Gérard Timsit, Director, Centre of Public Administration Studies and Research, University of Paris I Pantheon-Sorbonne, France;
  - Professor Maria del Carmen Pardo, Professor-Researcher, Center for International Studies, Colegio de Mexico;
  - Professor O.P. Dwivedi, Professor of Comparative Public and Development Policy and Administration, Department of Political Studies, University of Guelph, Ontario, Canada; and
  - Professor Andrew Massey, Professor of Government and Director of Postgraduate Studies in the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Portsmouth, United Kingdom.

H.E. Mr. Ignacio Pichardo Pagaza, the first panellist, reminded the participants that the International Institute of Administrative Science and the United Nations had done some research in 1999 on the status of public administration in the world, which had revealed, among many other things, that:

- Public administration in the world had progressed;
- Institutional reforms were being undertaken globally; and
Countries were interested in carrying out public administration reforms for administrative efficiency.

The study had also illustrated that different countries involved in public administration reforms were at different stages of progress:

- First generation reforms involving reforms in State functions and in personnel;
- Second generation reforms involving reforms in public management; and
- Third generation reforms, which have centred on making citizens part of public administration and have included issues such as ethics, citizens' charters, respect for values etc.

Mr. Pichardo Pagaza said that the study had shown that in a majority of countries, the different generations of reforms were co-existing. The study had concluded that the focus of administrative reforms had changed from comprehensive to institutional reforms and emphasised that respect for values and culture must be at the core of administrative reforms. Mr. Pagaza concluded by saying that public administration reforms will not make progress unless they are tailored to specific circumstances of the societies concerned.

Mr. Jean-Marie Atangana Mebara brought a Sub-Saharan African perspective to the discussion by pointing out that there are four distinct periods concerned with administrative reforms on the African continent:

- The first few years after independence, when there was an African will to maintain the delivery of public services and sustain public administration as the colonialists had left it;
- The period from the mid-sixties to the end of the 1970s, when the African States expanded their public administration, especially through the creation of public enterprises in almost every sector and centrally controlled development projects in all fields;
- The period of structural adjustment, covering the 1980s, which was marked by reforms that were mostly imposed from the outside, including retrenchment, reduction of public expenditure, reduction of wage bills etc. Most of these reform measures were unpopular in Africa because they were not tailored to the specific circumstances and they had negative social impacts;
- The 1990s, which have been a period of governance programmes involving emphasis on the rule of law, participation of the citizen and civil society, transparency and accountability.

It was noted that while it is too early to make a judgement on the success of this period of governance programmes, the previous reforms had mostly met with failure because of the following:

- There was no emphasis on indigenisation;
- Public administration remained a white man's affair;
- Public servants charged with managing public administration systems did not own it because they saw it as an affair of only higher authorities.
Mr. Atangana Mebara concluded that the challenge for Africa now is to integrate public administration into the environment and daily life of Africans or, in other words, to encourage Africans to claim the ownership of public administration in their countries.

Contextualising public administration reforms in continental Europe, Professor Gérard Timsit pointed out that reforms there are paradoxical in two ways. One paradox is that despite the diversity of situations (cultures, social situations and reform strategies), there is homogeneity in public administration change, involving rolling back the frontiers of the State, deregulation, decentralisation, simplification, coordination, professionalisation and accountability. The other paradox is that despite this homogeneity in public administration reforms, the different countries are at different phases of reform. The homogeneity masks the diversity in phases and dimensions of reforms.

The phases and dimensions of the reforms can be seen as:

- Reconstruction of the State, especially in transition countries or past communist countries;
- Modernisation of the State, where the structures and processes of public administration are being adapted to the needs of the citizens; and
- Reconfiguration of the State, where efforts are towards constructing a new type of State to deal with issues of globalisation, especially those aspects of globalisation which are escaping the control of the State as it is structured currently.

In this respect, he said, reconfiguration will not succeed if we resort to the classical State.

It would require going back to the State, but to a new type of State, which is a Solidarity State, emphasising solidarity between individuals, among territories and among generations (dealing with issues of environment for example). This would require working within a three-tier logic of solidarity, subsidiarity and strategy. Professor Timsit concluded that the biggest challenge in this respect is the restoration of internal unity and the construction of a new unity beyond that which has hitherto formed States.

Dr. María del Carmen Pardo focussed on public administration in the Americas and cautioned that the Americas should not be taken as a homogeneous entity, especially in terms of public administration. Discussing the relative autonomy of public administration and the process of its politisation, she noted that public administration is a macroorganism made up of many organisations and agencies with different objectives, and explicit or implicit functions. Institutions are different, even when they appear similar, with dysfunctions resulting from bureaucratic inertia and elite groups that promote administrative reforms. She drew attention to the fact that in Latin America public administration became a privileged space for political negotiation and an effective vehicle for political intermediation between government and society.

The evolution of the administrative modernisation concept was analysed to show four distinct phases of modernising public administration:

- The normative phase, which basically emphasised the State’s role of regulating social behaviour;
- The developmental phase, which conceived the State as the focal engine for socio-politico-economic development;
The programming and planning phase, which saw the State take the role of centralised planning to solve problems confronting Latin America;

- The efficiency phase, which conceived modernisation as the way to achieve efficiency in resource distribution; and

- The current modernisation efforts focused on communication and information technology applications or e-government.

All these necessitate new structures, new competencies and interconnectivity. It was also observed that application of e-government may create imbalances and gaps in societies, and that one of the challenges of public administration today is how to bridge this gap.

Professor Andrew Massey discussed the changes and challenges of public administration in the context of the English-speaking world, especially the Commonwealth and North America. The tradition of common law has influenced the development of public administration in the English-speaking world, where there has been a tension between democratic accountability and efficiency. The quest to reconcile that tension has been at the centre of a generation of administrative reforms and will prove to be the enduring challenge of the future. Professor Massey noted that democracy and reform often do conflict, especially when the public officials desire to implement public policies efficiently and effectively and not to simply do as the politicians tell them. The conflicting tendencies are also observed between personal and civic responsibility and the professional responsibility of public officials.

Reforms have also involved importation of private sector practices into the public sector and the development of entrepreneurial officials. The extreme case of interaction between the private sector methods and the public sector was the privatisation of public enterprises and increased marketisation of public sector services. Public administration became increasingly public management with the tenets of the New Public Management approaches. However, the New Public Management is being criticised for, among many other things, universalism and a “one size fits all” approach.

Professor Massey noted that the future challenges mainly concern globalisation and governance, especially how to reform political and administrative institutions to engage in government through consent while allowing decisions to be taken and implemented within the context of globalisation and participative governance where citizens are allowed to govern themselves.

Professor O.P. Dwivedi offered some reflections on recent developments in public administration in Asia and emphasised that culture and governance style are what makes governments tick. He specifically cautioned that dictating reforms from the outside would not work to improve public administration. In the process of administrative reforms, the following need to be respected:

- Indigenous values must not be sidelined;
- Guard against backsliding;
- Find alternative reform measures for developing countries;
- Make administrative heads accountable;
- Do not divorce public administration from politics; and
- Listen to ideas coming from the south.

Mr. Guido Bertucci, Director of DPEPA/UNDESA, highlighted the perspective of the United Nations regarding public administration reforms. He emphasised the need to avoid prescribing the same measure for different problems and underscored the importance of reform approaches and measures that are customised to cultures, history and socio-political settings. He noted that the United Nations and its development partners could assist public administration reforms by:

- Advocacy highlighting policy options to countries,
- Building a common understanding of certain principles,
- Information-sharing and exchange of ideas;
- Capacity-building;
- Reinforcing core public service values; and
- Improving coordination of development aid.

During the open discussion, the following were emphasised:

- The need for each country to have the institutional capacity to review and coordinate public administration reforms and make them on-going; and
- The need for good leadership at the top, committed reformers in the middle and a degree of courage and patience to make reforms fruitful.

Finally, it was noted that the debate on the role of the State must remain open, especially given the recent events, which demand the State’s effective response.
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56TH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
SECOND COMMITTEE
PANEL ON
“GLOBALISATION AND THE STATE”
2 NOVEMBER 2001
SUMMARY REPORT
UNDESA
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A panel discussion on 'Globalisation and the State' was organised by the Division for Public Economics and Public Administration as part of the work of the Second Committee on Friday, 2 November 2001. The Meeting was chaired by H.E. Francisco Seixes da Costa (Portugal), Chairman of the Second Committee. Mr. Nitin Desai, Under-Secretary General of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs acted as the moderator for the discussion. The speakers were H.E. Professor Apolo Nsibambi, the Right Honourable Prime-Minister of Uganda; H.E. Mr. Jesús Posada Moreno, Minister of Public Administration, Spain; H.E. Mr. Carlos Genatios, Minister for Science and Technology of Venezuela; Mr. Ahmad Kamal, former Ambassador of Pakistan to the United Nations; and Mr. Anthony Giddens, Director, London School of Economics and Political Studies, United Kingdom.

The panellists and the participants discussed various aspects of globalisation and their implications for the changing role of the State. The main themes of the discussion are presented below.

Why the debate on globalisation?

It has been stressed that right now the debate about globalisation has moved to its second phase. In the first phase, it was focused on discussing whether 'globalisation' existed at all and whether it differed from other similar periods in human history. It was basically a debate whether the end of the 20th century had been different from the end of the 19th century. That phase of the debate seems over, with the conclusion that the current phase of globalisation is fundamentally different from any other age in history, especially as a result of qualitative changes brought about by the speed of communication and the ease of access to information.

The current second phase of the globalisation debate is concerned with discovery of the shape this century will assume and what would be the consequences of globalisation.

An opinion was expressed that the search for an answer to the question 'How globalisation is changing the role of the State?' required people re-visit past paradigms of political economy. This had become urgent due to:

1. The recent events of 11 September 2001 that have brought into sharp focus the classic role of the State, i.e. maintenance of order and security. They have also highlighted the importance of the role of global cooperation for global safety and security.

2. The recent slowdown in the world economy, exacerbated by the events in September. The global economic downturn has highlighted the economic interdependence of world economies in today's world and reinforced the need for a concerted global economic effort.

3. The negative impact of globalisation on the marginalized and the poor. The increase in anti-globalisation activism has led to a growing understanding of the world community of the need to re-visit the issues related to the impact of
globalisation, and to take remedial actions, in order to mitigate the adverse impact of globalisation on the poor and on the marginalized groups of population.

Whereas the impact of globalisation is being debated, there is a broad-based recognition that the role of the State has to be redefined to take account of the emerging political, economic, social and cultural challenges. [At the same time it was noted that a revised role for the State, did not necessarily imply a ‘greater’ role, but rather a more ‘effective’ role.]

Globalisation presents unlimited opportunities, but also substantial risks. It has to be linked to global standards. It was noted that unfettered globalisation will not ensure equal distribution of resources. One of the main emerging issues is: Who will get what, when and how much?

**What is globalisation?**

A substantial part of the presentations were devoted to outlining the parameters of what was meant by globalisation. The panellists confirmed that globalisation was not just a phenomenon of the market place or financial transactions. It had also been spreading globally political paradigms, cultural patterns and social ideas. It has led to standardisation of the world’s security systems. This way, globalisation had been affecting the sovereignty of nation States and many of the established political, economic and social structures. Globalisation is driven by both push-up and pushdown trends. There is globalisation from below (e.g. proliferation of NGOs, etc.) and globalisation from above (emergence of international structures, e.g. WTO). It pulls power from the government down to civil society, but it also pushes power out past national borders to the regions and to the global domain.

More importantly, globalisation seems to have been changing the nature of the State and of public policy. States seem to be moving from regulating to investing in crucially needed public goods; from privatisation to “publicisation” (i.e. development of a space in which both public and private providers of services are driven by public interest); from building up the institutions of the State to building up public institutions. In general, the definition, understanding and application of the concept and nature of “public” [interest, opinion] seem to be gaining currency.

The process of globalisation has permeated political ideas, cultural beliefs, managerial practices. It has pronounced itself in internationalisation of conflicts and even in globalisation of anti-globalisation movements.

There was a consensus among the speakers that globalisation is neither a monolithic entity nor a single event. Globalisation is multi-faceted and should be perceived as a dynamic phenomenon.

**Impact of globalisation**

All speakers highlighted that globalisation has both positive and negative effects. In the area of economics, rapid advance of technology, sharp decrease in transportation and communication costs and a series of international agreements have led to greater internationalisation of trade, finance and investment. In this sense, globalisation has
contributed to higher productivity, to a rise in the living standards and to new development opportunities.

However, the political aspect of globalisation has led to a shift of power from sovereign States to technologically advanced global elites and private multinational (oftentimes nonnational) interests. Globalisation has also contributed to the internationalisation of crossborder problems such as drug and human trafficking and terrorism. On the social level, it has produced wide disparities among countries and within countries. For many groups of population it has led to greater vulnerability and social dislocation. It had created openness to other cultures and their creativity, and promoted flow of ideas and values. However, as cultures interact, some have faced the risk of being diluted and/or destroyed at the expense of others.

One can claim that while globalisation has meant the spread of information and communication technology, it has divided the world between the connected and the isolated; while it has increased labour movement across boundaries, it has also encouraged brain drain; and while it has elaborated new rules for integrating the global market, these rules have marginalized groups of population, especially in poor African countries. In short, to some extent, globalisation had created a global village of the privileged.

One can further claim that the effect of globalisation on the State, especially in Africa has been not only of an economic nature. It included cultural, religious, and even military aspects. It involved internationalisation of conflicts and wars, which would otherwise have remained local. Globalisation may be seen as having an impact on the State in Africa in terms of:

- Undermining the power of the State;
- Undermining the democratisation process;
- Over-stretching the State’s capacity to handle international and computer based crime;
- Making the task of poverty eradication more difficult;
- Increasing debt accumulation and the debt burden;
- Undermining its capacity to effectively regulate and protect the environment.

On the other hand, it can be argued that access to the Internet and technology is a prime determinant in harvesting the benefits of globalisation. This in turn is country and region specific and is dependent on the level of education in the society, availability of adequate infrastructure, and financial resources. Access to ICT is unequally distributed between the developed and the developing nations of the world. Additionally, a disproportionate amount of information resources are posted on the Internet in one language only, thereby posing a formidable barrier to equality of access to all. The ‘digital divide’ may be named as one of the factors responsible for the disenchantment with globalisation and a rise in anti-globalisation groups worldwide.
New role of the State

There was a broad agreement that efforts could and should be made to mitigate the negative fallout from the process of globalisation. States have an important role to play here. The role of the State must be changing with the fast emerging new world realities. New systems of global governance would also contribute towards ensuring a more equitable distribution of the benefits of globalisation.

Security and safety

It was noted that the security and safety of citizens remained the paramount responsibility of the State. This role of the State had been underscored in the wake of recent events in the US. It was mentioned that for instance policy makers across Europe were working on the formulation of a set of global responses to terrorism in the area of diplomacy, economy & finance, and security.

It was highlighted by panellists that although the economic dimension of globalisation was more visible, globalisation also had important political and social dimensions. Globalisation policies must be built on democratic practices and inclusion of civil society into local politics. To respond to problems at the international level, globalisation should have a link not only to global standards, but also to globally shared values.

Maintaining macroeconomic stability

The rapid progress of globalisation has highlighted the need for States worldwide to maintain stable macroeconomic policies aimed at enhancing competitiveness of domestic markets, while ensuring sufficient domestic spending for social protection. The State has an important role to play in this process. This also means greater efforts to reform education, to promote advanced technologies and to strengthen the private sector. To support such national efforts, it is important to improve the world trading system and the global economic governance.

An opinion was expressed that the strategic response by African countries to the globalisation processes should consist of identifying, analysing and diagnosing their strengths and weaknesses in light of the opportunities and challenges posed by globalisation. They should rely on their internal force, i.e. the capacity of their own people. African countries themselves and those that hope to assist them must recognise this fact and commit resources and energies to harnessing the capacity of all African people and especially the poor for their development.

In responses to globalisation, States across the world - and in particular the African States - need to:

- Strengthen public administration systems;
- Adhere to openness and adaptability;
- Adopt a proactive approach to globalisation;
- Address human capacity needs;
- Address institutional capacity needs;
- Adopt flexible approaches and methods of administration;
- Strengthen the voice of African governments in international bodies;
- Adopt and practice participative governance;
- Embrace the application of information technology to the practice of public administration;
- Develop social capital.

Regional integration as a response to globalisation

An opinion was voiced that increased regional integration was a good way of mitigating the negative effects of globalisation. As part of greater regional integration, the European Union (EU) was committed to a process of expansion by including thirteen new countries into its membership. This is expected to enhance economic development, provide more social justice, more equal opportunities and closer cooperation between countries of this region. In Europe, one policy response to globalisation was to speed up monetary integration to increase trade and investment flows, promote greater economic transparency and opening up of the economies. There is an expectation that the expansion of the European Union will become a powerful instrument for creating a region of stability, prosperity and security.

Greater dialogue between the government, business and civil society

The speakers stressed that there was a need to promote broad social awareness about globalisation. In this context the State must encourage and support greater dialogue in the society. At the same time, globalisation must mean globalisation of human rights and of the struggle against deprivation and poverty. Globalisation is expected to change the human civilisation. The State should make efforts to reduce structural weaknesses in the society. Those who win as a result of globalisation would be those who foster cooperation, strengthen their institutions, generate trust of their society and improve their economic policies. Again, while economics seem most pronounced in this process, it needs to be tackled in the broader context of the development of the civil society at large.

Global principles of ethics and democracy

The process of globalisation has also an ‘ethical’ dimension. It is this ethical dimension which requires that the process of globalisation be governed by globally adopted and respected values, global principles of ethics and democracy, with greater awareness of the value of and greater tolerance for diversity. Whereas ‘political’ globalisation is aimed at promoting individual freedom and human rights and the right to security of the citizen, the “ethical dimension” should be based on the understanding that it is necessary to follow a course that leads to worldwide progress seen as human development. The challenge for globalisation is to create a future for all humankind that is based on ethical principles and in which responsibility and reciprocity are the necessary pillars in all social spheres. In this context, global agreements should be reached in various areas such as
facilitation of labour mobility, curtailment of international trafficking in people, reducing global poverty and bridging inequality.

**The role of the United Nations**

The speakers emphasised the need for a greater and more effective role of the United Nations in support of all the countries of the world, in creating a new world order based upon the principles of human rights, tolerance, democracy and values, including the value of human solidarity. They stated that globalisation that was supported by them was the globalisation of human rights; of ideas and values; of the defence of life; safeguarding of families and society; of solidarity; and of the fight against poverty.

Within this framework they encouraged the United Nations to initiate formulation of a new global order.
The International Institute of Administrative Sciences

IIAS: What is it?
The IIAS exists to advance the study and practice of public administration and public management. It operates at a global level and is funded by States worldwide; but is independent of any of them and, through its links with the United Nations, seeks to develop a voice and a vision that is neutral, as objective as possible and grounded in the exigency of the fact.

IIAS: What is it for?
Although it has existed for over seventy years (since 1930), the Institute’s focus is on the present and the future. How governance is done and how it could be done better; how the law of administration applies and how it might be applied more correctly; and how the management of public affairs is conducted and how it might be best done – all of these reflect its activities.

IIAS: What are its values?
Accountability is a core value for the Institute. Those who exercise authority must account for its use to those on whose behalf they use it. Public Administration is the key activity that connects between the power-holders and the citizen. We believe it should be effective, efficient and economical in its execution of the duties and rights of the State. We support modern governance and proper public administration and believe these should be carried out in a way that actively acknowledges diversity, that is respectful of identity and serious belief and that reflects balance.

IIAS: How does it work?
A small dedicated bilingual secretariat in Brussels serves an Executive Committee which is in turn accountable to a fully representative Council of Administration. The President and Director General lead and manage the Institute for its members. Each year IIAS:

- holds three conferences in three different countries around the world
The International Institute of Administrative Sciences

- is host for six-hundred plus delegates
- publishes four issues of its prestigious *International Review of Administrative Sciences* (in English, French and Arabic)
- manages a budget of approximately 1 million Euros.

The Institute has two specialised bodies

- The International Association of Schools and Institutes of Administration (IASIA)
- The European Group of Public Administration (EGPA)

each of which conducts study, research and networking. The Institute has a distinguished library of 15,500 public administration books to reflect the accumulated wisdom and experience of its members; and a Website which receives many thousand 'hits' per month about what it is doing now and what it will do in the future.

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**United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs**

Within the United Nations Secretariat, the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), promotes broad-based, sustainable development through a multidimensional and integrated approach to economic, social, environmental, population and gender issues. Tapping on experience dating to the early days of the United Nations, DESA provides policy analysis and facilitates international dialogue on development issues in the General Assembly, Economic and Social Council and the specialised inter-governmental bodies reporting to them. It also provides technical assistance to Member States at the national and sub-regional level.

Within the above framework, DESA provides:

### Research, analysis and support for policy-making bodies

Drawing on the Department’s large statistical capacity, DESA’s staff researches and analyses a broad range of economic and social data and information on development issues and trends. Building on this work, DESA provides substantive support to the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), its functional commissions dealing with issues ranging from statistics and population to sustainable development, social development and the status of women and other intergovernmental and expert bodies (e.g. the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources for Development and the Committee for Development Policy), in their efforts to find coordinated responses to ongoing or emerging global challenges.

### Follow-up to UN world conferences

The Department promotes the implementation, monitoring and review of plans, strategies, programmes or platforms of action agreed to at the global level. This includes follow-up to several of the world conferences, e.g. the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, the World Summit for Social Development and the Fourth World Conference on Women. Its policies are also guided by the Agenda for Development, a comprehensive agreement on development principles and goals adopted by the General Assembly in 1997.
Policy advice and technical cooperation

DESA advises and supports countries, at their request, in implementing their development strategies, within the framework of the action programme adopted at the recent series of global conferences and summits on economic and social development. The aim is to help build national capacities as well as to strengthen economic and technical links among developing countries. Special attention is given to the requirements of the least developed countries, particularly those in Africa, and small island nations.

Support to NGOs

DESA is the designated organisational liaison for the accreditation of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the economic and social areas. The growing support, effectiveness and influence at the grass roots and international levels of NGOs make them increasingly indispensable partners for the global mission and work of the United Nations.

Publications

DESA’s widely respected publications include major recurrent surveys (such as the World Economic and Social Survey), yearbooks, manuals, guidelines and periodicals, some of which are sold by the United Nations Sales and Publications Section and others can be obtained free of charge.

Division for Public Economics and Public Administration (DPEPA) is a Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs. The Division works in partnership with relevant United Nations Departments and Agencies and with other inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations. The Division’s mission is to ensure that the governance systems, administrative and financial institutions, policy development processes and the human resources of the Member States function in an effective, participatory and transparent manner by fostering dialogues, promoting the sharing of information and knowledge and providing technical assistance. DPEPA’s primary competitive advantage is its extensive knowledge base and uncommon professional insights. Such resources enable DPEPA to quickly identify and effectively respond to emerging challenges and issues. Through its broad global reach and distinct mandate, DPEPA plays an indispensable role in the development process.
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